Varieties of American Popular Nationalism

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Varieties of American Popular Nationalism

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Abstract

Despite the relevance of nationalism for politics and intergroup relations, sociologists have devoted surprisingly little attention to the phenomenon in the United States, and historians and political psychologists who do study the United States have limited their focus to specific forms of nationalist sentiment: ethnocultural or civic nationalism, patriotism, or national pride. This article innovates, first, by examining an unusually broad set of measures (from the 2004 GSS) tapping national identification, ethnocultural and civic criteria for national membership, domain-specific national pride, and invidious comparisons to other nations, thus providing a fuller depiction of Americans’ national self-understanding. Second, we use latent class analysis to explore heterogeneity, partitioning the sample into classes characterized by distinctive patterns of attitudes. Conventional distinctions between ethnocultural and civic nationalism describe just about half of the U.S. population and do not account for the unexpectedly low levels of national pride found among respondents who hold restrictive definitions of American nationhood. A subset of primarily younger and well-educated Americans lacks any strong form of patriotic sentiment; a larger class, primarily older and less well educated, embraces every form of nationalist sentiment. Controlling for sociodemographic characteristics and partisan identification, these classes vary significantly in attitudes toward ethnic minorities, immigration, and national sovereignty. Finally, using comparable data from 1996 and 2012, we find structural continuity and distributional change in national sentiments over a period marked by terrorist attacks, war, economic crisis, and political contention.

Keywords

nationalism, national identity, political culture, public opinion, attitudes, latent class analysis

American nationalism—the complex of ideas, sentiments, and representations by which Americans understand the United States and their relationship to it—has largely been the province of U.S. historians and political psychologists. The former have primarily focused on moments when American statehood was problematic: the first years of the Republic and the period after the Civil War (Kohn 1957; Waldstreicher 1997). With a few exceptions (e.g., Citrin et al. 1994), the latter have examined parts of the phenomenon—patriotism, national identity, chauvinism—without considering their interdependence. Although sociologists have made
central contributions to the scholarly literature on nationalism (Brubaker 1996; Calhoun 1997; Gellner 1983; Tilly 1994), they have often avoided the U.S. case.

Yet by almost any definition, the United States is no stranger to nationalism. Scholars have recognized the impact of nationalist thought in both politics and everyday life (Billig 1995; Calhoun 1997; Lieven 2004; Smith 1997), and historians have chronicled its shifting qualities over time (Waldstreicher 1997; Zelinsky 1988). Political nationalism fueled military expansion during the era of Manifest Destiny, and an unusually strong sense of national sovereignty has led U.S. political leaders to reject international governance structures, from the League of Nations to the Kyoto Accord. At the level of everyday life, Americans cherish national symbols—most notably the flag—to a degree unusual in advanced democracies (Collins 2004). And in recent U.S. political campaigns, conflicts over the nation’s meaning, from its treatment of immigrants and religious minorities to its rightful role on the world stage, have mobilized large segments of the electorate.

What explains this scholarly neglect? Much research on nationalism focuses on subnational separatist movements, which have been largely absent from U.S. politics since the conclusion of the Civil War. Research also tends to prioritize explicitly ethnocultural nationalism, whereas civic nationalism—a nationalism of shared values rather than shared ethnicity—has dominated U.S. public discourse (but see Smith 1997). Nationalism is often a weapon of the aggrieved—groups that have lost territorial control of their homelands or nations defeated in war. History’s winners have less reason for bitterness and more power to frame debates. As Billig (1995:55) puts it, “Our” nationalism is not presented as nationalism, which is dangerously irrational, surplus and alien. A new identity, a different label, is found for it. ‘Our’ nationalism appears as ‘patriotism’—a beneficial, necessary, and, often, American force.”

We believe that the neglect of American nationalism is unfortunate for three reasons. First, the U.S. case is significant from a comparative perspective, due to the United States’ distinctive position as “the first new nation” (Lipset 1963), its survival as a multiethnic and multiracial polity over several centuries, its status as a global hegemon, and the prominence of civic nationalism in the American “civil religion” (Bellah 1967). Compared to most European nations, public ethnocultural claims have been relatively muted in mainstream postwar discourse (with notable exceptions, like the presidential campaigns of George Wallace, Patrick Buchanan, and Donald Trump), yet Canadian-style multiculturalism receives little support.

Second, understanding how Americans imagine, feel about, and talk to one another about their homeland is a necessary but ordinarily omitted prerequisite to making sense of political contention in the late-twentieth and early-twenty-first centuries, about which sociologists and political scientists have written so much (Baldassarri and Gelman 2008; DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson 1996; Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2005). As Hunter (1991) argues, participants in cultural contention often base their arguments on beliefs about the appropriate scope of the state’s relationship to the individual; the boundaries (or lack thereof) between government and other social institutions; and criteria for legitimate membership in the national polity.

Third, it is critical to understand American nationalism for its potentially fateful influence on U.S. politics and foreign policy and, through those influences, on the role the United States plays in the world (Lieven 2004). Understanding how Americans conceive of their nation may provide hints as to the limits political leaders face when they prosecute foreign wars or seek international cooperation, as well as offer insight into public responses to terrorist attacks and into cultural motivations that influence voters’ political choices. Our purpose in this article is to examine American nationalism as it is expressed in response to survey items on attitudes related
to the nation and national identity. Based on previous work, we assume that more than one version of nationalist thought organizes Americans’ relationship to their nation. We use latent class analysis (LCA) to identify four subsets of respondents surveyed by the General Social Survey (GSS) in 2004 who vary systematically in their responses. We draw on theory to select attitude items to include in our analysis, but our approach also has a significant inductive component: rather than assume that respondents adhere to coherent ideologies that can be identified a priori, we use LCA to identify distinct types of nationalism without presuming their logical consistency (Bonikowski 2016a). After characterizing the attitudinal composition of the latent classes and analyzing the correlates of class assignment, we explore whether class membership is associated independently with attitudes toward minorities, immigration, national boundaries, and foreign policy, net of the impact of sociodemographic measures and partisan identification. Finally, we confirm that the structure of the classes yielded by the 2004 analyses also fits data from 1996 and 2012, and we then compare the distribution of the classes over the three waves to assess the temporal stability of American attitudes toward the nation-state.

This article makes several distinctive methodological contributions, which in turn yield several novel substantive findings. Whereas most survey-based studies of nationalism focus on a limited range of beliefs, we explore attitudes on four dimensions of nationalism simultaneously: national identification (feelings of closeness to the nation); criteria of national membership (what makes someone “truly American”); pride in the nation’s heritage and in specific institutions; and national hubris (beliefs entailing often invidious comparison between the United States and other countries). We exclude attitudes toward policy issues like immigration and economic protectionism that, although plausibly related to views of nationhood, are not themselves constitutive of those views. Ours is the first study of American attitudes related to nationalism to use latent class analysis to identify groups of respondents with distinctive patterns of survey responses. LCA is designed for cases in which the observed distribution of some set of variables reflects the mixing of two or more heterogeneous groups. Unlike factor analysis, which clusters variables that are associated with one another across an entire sample and assigns continuous factor scores to individual observations, LCA finds discrete sets of respondents with distinctive combinations of attitudes (McCutcheon 1987). Because past work on U.S. nationalism asserts there are distinct modes of national self-understanding (Schildkraut 2011; Smith 1997), LCA is especially well suited to this research problem.

Our interpretation is driven by a theoretical framework that views attitude responses as reflecting underlying schemata—linked representations constituting a cognitive framework through which information is processed—organizing the domain of nationality (Brubaker, Loveman, and Stamatov 2004; DiMaggio 1997). We anticipate that people vary not simply in the particular attitudes they hold, but in their construals of the associations among these attitudes, in the affective loadings of the representations these attitudes evoke, and in connections between the nation-schema and other schemata, including that of the self. This view leads us to use LCA as a means of approximating the identification of cognitive subcultures (Zerubavel 1997; cf. Baldassarri and Goldberg 2014); and, having identified them, to examine how each pattern of attitudes toward the nation is associated with views on immigration and other policy issues.

Finally, we take advantage of the timing of the 2004 GSS, which was fielded in the year following the United States’ invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq and less than three years after the attack on the World Trade Center, and of the fact that the same items were included in national surveys in 1996 and 2012. This makes it possible to explore change over time in both the structure of nationalist attitudes and their distribution during periods in which nationalist
sentiments were more or less likely to be chronically activated. These innovations yield substantive findings that deepen our understanding of Americans’ relationships to their nation. First, combining LCA with an unprecedentedly broad range of indicators reveals that respondents in 2004 divided into four classes: two extreme classes, characterized, respectively, by very high and relatively low levels of endorsement of all types of nationalist claims; and two less extreme, but distinct, intermediate classes. Members of the first group have highly restrictive views of what it takes to qualify as “truly American” but comparatively modest levels of national pride. Members of the second group display high levels of national pride, but a relatively inclusive definition of American identity, endorsing few restrictions to legitimate membership.

Second, our analyses reveal that disagreement about the importance of Christianity as a criterion of national membership is a central axis of division among our respondents. Indeed, religion, along with race and education, is a highly significant predictor of class assignment in our models.4

Third, we demonstrate that latent class membership predicts attitudes toward immigration and other social issues, even after controlling for a wide range of sociodemographic variables and political party identification. In other words, understandings of national membership are related to partisan affiliation, but they also exhibit independent associations with a range of political attitudes.

Finally, our analyses show that the structure of nationalist sentiments as revealed by LCA remained relatively stable between 1996 and 2012, even as the relative size of the classes changed, particularly in 2004. In summary, beneath a general consensus on the virtues of the United States, Americans differ markedly in the extent of their nationalistic feelings and the character of their national self-understandings, in ways that are meaningful and robust to political change.

NATIONALISM DEFINED

Definitions of nationalism are varied, as are the relationships between “nationalism” and such concepts as “patriotism” and “national attachment” (Bonikowski 2016b). Sociologists studying the historical origins of nationstates typically conceptualize nationalism as an ideology mobilized by political elites: “a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent” (Gellner 1983:1). Political psychologists, who tend to study attitudes toward the nation in established democracies, understand nationalism more narrowly, often in terms closely linked to particular survey items. Some describe “nationalism” as “patriotism’s” invidious evil twin, defining the former as “a perception of national superiority and an orientation toward national dominance” and the latter as “a deeply felt affective attachment to the nation” (Kosterman and Feschbach 1989:271). Others make similar distinctions without mentioning “nationalism” at all, instead referring to “blind” and “constructive” forms of patriotism (Schatz, Staub, and Levine 1999).

By contrast, Brubaker (2004:10) defines “nationalism” not as an elite ideology or a specific set of normative beliefs, but as a domain: “a heterogeneous set of ‘nation’- oriented idioms, practices, and possibilities that are continuously available or ‘endemic’ in modern cultural and political life.” We adopt this broader definition, because we wish to understand how a wide range of attitudes that constitute respondents’ nation-schemata— from love of country and bellicosity toward outsiders to critical engagement with the nation—are distributed, how they respond to external events, and how they link to other attitudes and policy preferences. We
use more specific terms (identification, membership criteria, pride, and hubris) to refer to the
content of these attitudes.

NATIONALISM IN THE UNITED STATES

Scholars have come to accept the view that two or more understandings of nation and citizenship
coexist and compete within U.S. political culture, but neither historians nor survey analysts agree
on the number and nature of these views. Smith (1997) argues that U.S. political culture has been
shaped by three traditions: a liberal tradition that emphasizes universal rights and individualism;
a civic republican tradition that focuses on community self-governance and collective rights and
obligations; and an ethnocultural tradition that reflects the white population’s desire for
continued dominance (with the definition of “white” evolving with successive waves of
immigration) (cf. Walzer 1990). Other authors have discerned two main currents: a public
narrative that articulates civic values of universalism, commitment to nation, rationality,
tolerance, equality of opportunity, and the rule of law; and a xenophobic counter-narrative, often
associated with conservative Protestantism and the tradition of Jacksonian nationalism (Lieven
[2004] articulates this position especially effectively; see also Blum 2005; Kaufmann 2000;
Spencer 1994). Citrin and colleagues (1994) add to the creedal and nativist perspectives a third,
multicultural, definition of American nationhood.

Empirical studies of American nationalism (and closely related topics such as patriotism)
often use factor analysis to identify conflicting themes in Americans’ national self-
understanding. Based on a survey of college students, Schatz and colleagues (1999:153)
distinguish “blind patriotism” (“a rigid and inflexible attachment to country, characterized by
unquestioning positive evaluation, staunch allegiance and intolerance of criticism”) from
“constructive patriotism” (characterized by “questioning and criticism of current group practices
that are driven by a desire for positive change”) (see also Parker 2007). Combining focus group
three forms of national ideology, adding a fourth, “incorporationism,” that depicts the United
States as an immigrant nation continually strengthened by the infusion and assimilation of
successive waves of migrants.

We contribute to this research tradition by integrating analyses of disparate indicators of
nationalism and using an analytic approach that locates ideological patterns in groups of
respondents, rather than in clusters of variables. Specifically, we use data from the 2004 General
Social Survey (supplemented in one section by comparable data from the 1996 GSS and a 2012
GfK Custom Research survey) to address several questions that flow from this literature. How
do the categories of American nationalism that emerge when responses to a broad range of survey
items are subjected to latent class analysis compare to types of nationalism posited by past
studies? What sociodemographic, political, and ideological characteristics predict assignment to
each class? To what extent do respondents assigned to different classes vary in their social
attitudes and public-policy preferences beyond what one would expect based on their
sociodemographic characteristics and partisan commitments? And finally, how robust are these
attitudinal structures over time?

DATA

Data for the main analyses come from the 2004 National Identity Supplement to the GSS, which
was administered jointly with the International Social Survey Programme. The GSS is a full-
probability, personal-interview survey designed to monitor changes in social characteristics and
attitudes. It has been conducted annually, and later bi-annually, by the National Opinion Research Center since 1972. In the mid-1980s, the GSS began including topical modules investigating specific areas in greater depth than the ongoing core survey permits (Davis and Smith 1992). After reviewing 31 publicly available datasets containing items related to the measurement of nationalist attitudes and sentiments (Bonikowski 2008), we chose the GSS data because they are the most complete in the number of dimensions of nationalism covered and in the range and quality of covariates, and because the GSS is the most extensively validated and robust national attitudinal survey in the United States. Moreover, because the same questions were asked in 1996 as well as 2004, we can compare the structure and content of nationalist sentiments before and after the September 11 attacks.

Our analysis focuses on four aspects of American nationalism: national identification, criteria of national membership, national pride, and national hubris. We discuss each set of measures in turn. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics.

**National identification.** National identification—the importance of national identity relative to other aspects of personal identity—is a central part of many conceptions of nationalism. Historical accounts of American nationalism (Kohn 1957) have emphasized the critical importance of the shift from the predominance of state identifications to identification with the national government in the early days of the Republic; and the nation fought a Civil War to decide the primacy of national versus regional identification (Faust 1988). According to Citrin and colleagues (1994:2), “nationalism is successful when it takes precedence over available alternative foci of affiliation such as kinship, religion, economic interest, race or language.” GSS respondents were asked, “How close do you feel to your [town or city; state; America; North America].” Respondents were about twice as likely (51 percent) to report feeling “very close” to “America” than to any other region or political unit.

**Criteria of legitimate membership.** Most accounts of American nationalism regard answers to the question of “Who is an American?” (or in the wording of the GSS, who is “truly American”) as marking the difference between the creedal (or civic) and ethnocultural traditions (Lieven 2004; Smith 1997; Walzer 1990). The former embraces the liberal creed of tolerance and universalism, whereas the latter draws strong boundaries based on characteristics such as birthplace, language, religion, and race. Historically, the United States has oscillated between the openness to newcomers inscribed on the Statue of Liberty, on the one hand, and recurrent episodes of nativist exclusion on the other (Higham [1955] 1983). Focusing on “characteristics that subjectively define membership in a particular political community,” Citrin, Reingold, and Green (1990:1128) find strong support among a sample of Californians for creedal liberalism, yet substantial support, as well, for the salience of linguistic and religious criteria.

A broad consensus emerged among 2004 GSS respondents around the importance to being “truly American” of American citizenship, ability to speak English, feeling American, and “respecting America’s political institutions and laws,” with majorities calling these “very important” and with over 90 percent believing these were “fairly important” or “very important.” Fewer respondents regarded being “born in America” or having “lived in America for most of one’s life” as very important, but these criteria received substantial support nonetheless, with more than three of four respondents selecting “fairly” or “very” important. Respondents were more divided in their views of the centrality of Christianity to national membership: a plurality (48 percent) chose “very important,” but the next most popular response, from 18 percent of respondents, was “not very important.” Overall, 65 percent reported that Christianity was a fairly
Table 1. Nationalism Measures: Ns and Frequencies

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<td>America</td>
<td>1,190</td>
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Some people say the following things are important for being truly American. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is?

| To have been born in America | 1,194 | 7.27 | 16.51 | 21.07 | 55.15 |
| To be a Christian            | 1,180 | 17.17| 17.91 | 16.59 | 48.33 |
| To have American citizenship | 1,206 | .93  | 3.16  | 13.95 | 81.96 |
| To be able to speak English  | 1,213 | .64  | 2.26  | 14.18 | 82.92 |
| To feel American             | 1,191 | 1.68 | 6.02  | 23.73 | 68.59 |
| To respect America’s political institutions and laws | 1,206 | .83 | 2.34 | 22.92 | 73.91 |
| To have lived in America for most of one’s life | 1,205 | 2.76 | 15.9 | 23.57 | 57.77 |

How proud are you of America in each of the following?

| Its achievements in the arts and literature | 1,134 | 1.26 | 6.4 | 50.6 | 41.72 |
| The way democracy works                     | 1,150 | 1.85 | 8.68 | 55.26 | 34.21 |
| America’s economic achievements             | 1,181 | 2.53 | 10.43 | 47.92 | 39.12 |
| Its fair and equal treatment of all groups in society | 1,162 | 5.86 | 18.77 | 48.49 | 26.88 |
| Its history                                 | 1,184 | 2.2 | 5.15 | 30.65 | 61.99 |
| America’s armed forces                      | 1,184 | 1.62 | 4.35 | 19.01 | 75.02 |
| Its political influence in the world        | 1,151 | 2.9 | 18.93 | 54.64 | 23.52 |
| Its scientific and technological achievements | 1,176 | 1.2 | 2.79 | 37.18 | 58.82 |
| Its achievements in sports                  | 1,142 | 1.82 | 7.33 | 46.53 | 44.32 |
| Its social security system                  | 1,167 | 9.92 | 34.55 | 42.05 | 13.47 |

How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

| Generally speaking, America is a better country than most other countries | 1,197 | .94 | 4.58 | 14.48 | 39.73 | 40.28 |
| I would rather be a citizen of America than of any other country in the world | 1,199 | 1.19 | 1.78 | 6.84 | 15.14 | 75.04 |
| The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the Americans | 1,197 | 5.95 | 18.5 | 33.8 | 26.04 | 15.71 |
| People should support their country even if their country is in the wrong | 1,193 | 9.43 | 31.38 | 22.43 | 24.86 | 11.9 |
| There are some things about America today that make me feel ashamed of America | 1,202 | 8.7 | 17.47 | 17.98 | 36.87 | 18.98 |

Note: Data are from the 2004 GSS. The sample excludes respondents with missing values on more than 10 of the nationalism indicators.
or very important criterion, whereas 35 percent selected “not very important” or “not important at all.”

National pride. Citrin, Wong, and Duff (2001) define national pride as central to patriotism (which they regard as closely linked to nationalism). Pride is different from but associated with identification, in that emotional gratification from the achievements of an entity increase with the subjective proximity of that entity to the self. As Smith and Kim (2006:127) put it, “National identity is the cohesive force that both holds nation-states together and shapes their relationships with other states. National pride is the positive affect that the public feels towards their country, resulting from their national identity.” GSS respondents were most proud of the United States’ armed forces, history, and scientific and technological achievements: over half the sample described themselves as “very proud” of each, with over 90 percent “very” or “somewhat” proud. Other sources of pride were achievement in sports and achievements in art and literature (over 90 percent somewhat or very proud), the way democracy works (89 percent), the nation’s economic achievements (87 percent), and its geopolitical influence (78 percent). Respondents rated two items lower: fair and equal treatment of all groups (75 percent) and the social security system (just 56 percent).

National hubris. Dictionaries define “chauvinism” as a form of patriotism that is extreme in extent and entails not only pride in one’s own group but assertions of superiority over others. We avoid the term because of its strong value connotations, instead using “hubris” to describe a set of items that reflect national pride in the United States in general and that affirm a preference for the United States compared to other nations (or, in one case, an unconditional view of citizens’ obligations if the United States is at odds with other countries). We use most of the measures that Smith and Kim (2006) refer to as “general” pride (as opposed to “domain-specific”). This construct is also consistent with Citrin and colleagues’ (2001:74–75) distinction between “patriotism” (“feelings of closeness to and pride in one’s country and its symbols”) and “chauvinism” (“an extreme and bounded loyalty, the belief in one’s country’s superiority, whether it’s right or wrong”). A number of authors go so far as to equate these measures with nationalism as a whole. Williams ([1951] 1970:490), in a classic text on U.S. society, defined nationalism as “the belief that U.S. values and institutions are the very best in the world” (see also De Figueiredo and Elkins 2003).

Five GSS agree/disagree items tap this dimension of nationalist belief and sentiment. Two statements reflect judgments that, while invidious, are not necessarily expressive of moral superiority: “Generally speaking, America is a better country than most other countries,” and “I would rather be a citizen of America than of any other country in the world.” The first could be true if “better” refers to certain criteria on which the United States is relatively highly ranked (e.g., rule of law or civil liberties). The second could be motivated by pure self-interest rather than moral evaluation. These views received extensive support, with 90 percent of respondents endorsing the latter and 80 percent agreeing with the former.

Items in the second pair are more directly indicative of feelings of national superiority: “The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like Americans,” and “People should support their country even if their country is in the wrong.” In contrast to the first pair, agreement with these two statements was far more measured. Just 42 percent reported wishing that people from other countries were more like Americans, with a plurality placing themselves at the midpoint of the five-point scale. Only 37 percent endorsed the view of “my country right or wrong,” with 41 percent taking exception to this position.
Finally, a fifth item measures the degree to which “there are things about America that make me feel ashamed.” Although the question does not explicitly elicit a comparison between the United States and other countries, feelings of shame in the country imply some external reference point from which the respondent renders that judgment. Among the GSS respondents, 26 percent did not feel ashamed of the United States, and 56 percent did feel ashamed (the remaining 18 percent chose the intermediate response category, neither agreeing nor disagreeing with the question prompt).

**IMPLEMENTATION OF LATENT CLASS ANALYSIS**

We begin by using latent class analysis (LCA) to identify classes (subsets of respondents) with distinctive response patterns across all the survey items measuring nationalist attitudes. LCA, which we implemented using the Latent Gold 5.0 software package (Vermunt and Magidson 2005), is a data reduction method that estimates an unobserved nominal grouping variable (where each value corresponds to a discrete “latent class”) that accounts for the covariance between the observed indicators. Using maximum likelihood and the Newton-Raphson method, the model simultaneously estimates multiple parameters under the assumption that the indicators are independent of one another conditional on the latent class variable. An LCA model that predicts the observed response pattern \( y \) using a latent class variable \( X \) with \( T \) values has the following probability structure (Bakk, Tekle, and Vermunt 2013:276):

\[
P(Y = y) = \sum_t P(X = t)P(Y = y | X = t)
\]

Given the local independence assumption, which posits that the \( K \) indicators are independent within each latent class \( t \)—that is, the joint probability of a given response pattern is a product of individual item response probabilities—the latter term of the equation can be rewritten as follows (Bakk et al. 2013:276):

\[
P(Y = y) = \sum_t P(X = t) \prod_k P(Y_k = y_k | X = t)
\]

The parameters to be estimated by the LCA model include the relative class proportions, \( P(X = t) \), and the response profiles for each class, \( P(Y_k = y_k | X = t) \). We exploit three extensions of the basic latent class model. First, in addition to the core nationalism indicators, our model includes sociodemographic covariates, which produce more accurate assignment of observations to latent classes (Clogg 1981; Hagenaars 1993). This approach, also known as “multinomial logit latent-class regression,” simultaneously models two types of conditional probabilities: the distribution of nationalism indicators conditional on latent class membership, and the dependence of latent class membership on sociodemographic covariates (Yamaguchi 2000).

Second, because in practice most LCA models do not perfectly satisfy the local independence assumption, it is possible to improve model fit by allowing for local dependencies between some of the indicator variables, as well as between some indicators and covariates (Vermunt 1997). (In LCA parlance, “indicators” refer to the constitutive variables that are used
to define the classes, and “covariates” are secondary variables that help improve class assignment.) The dependencies that most severely affect the model can be easily identified by examining the bivariate residuals once the model has been estimated. The pairs of variables with the largest residuals can then be specified as jointly dependent in a subsequent model.6

Third, we use a newly developed method for the analysis of distal outcomes (i.e., dependent variables) in the LCA modeling framework. In the past, if researchers wanted to predict other variables using respondents’ latent class membership, they would first estimate the latent class model, then generate posterior probabilities of class membership for each respondent and, finally, in a separate third step, regress the outcomes of interest on those posterior probabilities—a practice criticized for generating severely downwardbiased estimates and incorrect standard errors (Bolck, Croon, and Hagenaars 2004). Recent methodological innovations, however, have made it possible to correct for classification errors (whereby some respondents are imperfectly assigned to the classes) in the threestep process to generate unbiased estimates (Bakk et al. 2013). We use this technique when examining the relationship between nationalism and policy preferences.

The main LCA models in our analysis include the indicators described in Table 1, as well as a set of sociodemographic covariates that includes age, education, income, gender, race, region, religious denomination, religiosity, birth in the United States, and party identification.7 We treated the attitudinal indicators as ordinal for the purpose of the analysis. After the deletion of observations with missing data on sociodemographic covariates, the sample size was 1,077. We chose a four-cluster solution based on goodness-of-fit statistics and interpretability. For more details on question wording, descriptive statistics, model selection, and the treatment of missing data, please see the online supplement (http:// asr.sagepub.com/supplemental).8

VARIETIES OF AMERICAN POPULAR NATIONALISM

We characterize the content of each class with reference to class-specific probabilities of responses to the 23 nationalism indicators. Of the four classes, two were extreme—notable for high and low values on most of the nationalist items. Two others were less easily placed on a continuum of more or less nationalistic: one defined “true American” in a very restrictive manner but expressed relatively low levels of pride in American institutions and accomplishments; the other expressed high levels of pride and defined membership in a much more inclusive way. Figure 1 illustrates the class-specific response probabilities.

**Ardent nationalists.** Members of the larger of the extreme classes (24 percent of all respondents), which we call the ardent nationalists, were more likely than members of any other class to feel very close to America; more likely to say it was “very important” for a true American to possess all seven characteristics about which respondents were asked; most likely to report being “very proud” of all 10 potential sources of pride; and more likely than any other to agree or strongly agree with all five measures of national hubris.9

Even though the ardent nationalists scored highest on every dimension of nationalism—identification, criteria, pride, and hubris—they were not completely indiscriminate in their responses. Large majorities viewed each criterion of being “truly American” as “very important,” nearly all endorsed citizenship, ability to speak English,10 feeling American, having lived in America most of one’s life, and respecting institutions and laws, but fewer believed it was very important that a true American be born in America (86 percent) or be a Christian (75 percent).
Nonetheless, a large majority apparently viewed Jews, Muslims, agnostics, and naturalized citizens as something less than “truly American.”

Nearly all the ardent nationalists reported being “very proud” of America’s armed forces, history, and achievements in science and technology. Considerably fewer expressed great pride in the country’s fair and equal treatment of all groups (51 percent), its political influence in the world (48 percent), or its social security system (28 percent). Other pride items fell in between. Every member of this class expressed a preference for being a citizen of the United States and all but six agreed that America is a “better country” than most others. Nearly two thirds (64 percent)
felt the world would be a better place if people in other countries were more like Americans, and just 50 percent, even of this most nationalistic group, believed people should support their country if it was in the wrong.\textsuperscript{12} More ardent nationalists than members of any other class (43 percent) were unashamed of any aspects of America.

As illustrated in Table 2, the typical member of this class was a white male observant Evangelical or Mainline Protestant with relatively little formal education, living in the South.\textsuperscript{13,14} The ardent nationalists were eight years older than the remainder of the sample, with a mean age of 51. They had moderately low incomes and were more likely than others to have discontinued their schooling after high school. Politically, the ardent nationalists were most likely to self-identify as strong Republicans and were among the least likely to self-identify as Democrats. The minority who self-identified as Democrats were older and had even lower incomes than their Republican counterparts; they were also less likely to identify as white or as Protestant, to live in the South, or to report having no religion.\textsuperscript{15} They were, however, very similar in terms of gender and likelihood of having been born in the United States. There is evidence that at least some ardent nationalism is associated with military service. Although data on veteran status were not available, 18 percent of men in the ardent nationalist class (compared to between 5 and 8 percent in the other groups) reported that they belonged to veterans’ organizations.

The disengaged. The other extreme class was the smallest, making up 17 percent of the sample. It consists of what we call the “disengaged”— disengaged from the nation because they withheld the strongest endorsement of even the most widely held nationalist beliefs and sentiments, because they professed particularly low levels of pride in state institutions, and because they appeared to refrain from wholesale engagement with a national identity. The strongest evidence for the latter inference comes from responses to the national identification item: only 21 percent of respondents in this group reported feeling very close to the nation, compared to 56 percent for the remainder of the sample. They were also least likely to endorse any characteristic as “very important” for being “truly American,” often by wide margins. For instance, just half rated as very important the ability to speak English, which 89 percent of other respondents viewed as constitutive of being truly American. Even citizenship was termed “very important” by just 47 percent. Other criteria, such as being Christian, being born in the United States, or having lived in the United States for most of one’s life, were endorsed as very important by fewer than one in six.

Disengaged respondents were also less likely than members of other classes to express high levels of national pride. Some of these results suggest a negative evaluation of the United States’ performance on elements of the national creed: just 10 percent reported being “very proud” of how American democracy works; 7 percent expressed great pride in equal treatment of all groups; 20 percent expressed pride in American history; and only two people expressed strong pride in the nation’s political influence. But they also expressed lower levels of pride in fields like science and technology (42 percent) and arts and literature (31 percent), where American achievements arguably have been demonstrably significant. Such patterns suggest these respondents were not only critical of the United States on some dimensions, but they also identified less strongly with the country in general, taking less pride in American achievements because their nationality was linked less closely to their sense of self. Not surprisingly, the disengaged were also least likely to endorse any of the hubris items.

Who were these least nationalistic Americans? With a mean age of 38 years, they were the youngest of any class. African Americans and respondents in the “other” race category were overrepresented in their ranks, as were respondents born outside the United States.\textsuperscript{16} Highly
Table 2. Proportion of Respondents with Selected Attributes by Class

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class prevalence</th>
<th>Creedal</th>
<th>Disengaged</th>
<th>Restrictive</th>
<th>Ardent</th>
<th>P-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in United States</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born outside United States</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than high school</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school or some college</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor’s degree</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advanced degree</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Democrat</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat(^a)</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican(^a)</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Republican</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lives in Midwest</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lives in Mountain states</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lives in Northeast</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lives in Pacific states</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lives in South</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evangelical Protestant</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainline Protest</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Protestant</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly religious</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not strongly religious</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean age</td>
<td>44.44</td>
<td>38.36</td>
<td>41.21</td>
<td>51.31</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean income (2004 dollars)</td>
<td>$78,582</td>
<td>$39,724</td>
<td>$42,048</td>
<td>$48,185</td>
<td>.003</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Data are from the 2004 GSS. P-values for differences in model parameters across classes are based on Wald tests with robust standard errors.

\(^a\)Includes Independents who reported leaning Democrat or Republican, respectively.

educated and less religious respondents were particularly likely to belong to this group, and almost all were Democrats (with only seven reporting a Republican partisan affiliation). This class was found in high numbers in the Northeast and the Pacific West; few lived in the South or the Mountain West. In terms of religion, Evangelical Protestants and Catholics were
underrepresented in this class; Jews and respondents who chose “no religion” and “other” religion were overrepresented. Although the incomes of the disengaged were the lowest of the four classes, this is a function of their young age; among respondents who were 25 or older, the mean income of the disengaged exceeded that of restrictive and ardent nationalists (but not creedal nationalists).

Just under 10 percent of respondents assigned to this class did not hold U.S. citizenship, and another 6 percent were foreign-born citizens.17 (Nearly half of non-citizens in the sample were classified as disengaged, compared to just about 14 percent of the foreign-born citizens.) It is not surprising that non-citizens would fall into this class. The foreign-born are status-inconsistent—those who were classified as disengaged were highly educated and relatively well paid, but also 62 percent non-white, predominantly non-Christian, and, of course, newcomers to the United States. Five percent of the disengaged were second-generation Americans, but more than three quarters were neither immigrants nor children of immigrants. The native-born members of this class were well educated, young, relatively more likely than respondents assigned to other classes to be non-white, and most likely to describe their religious faith as “none” (36 percent) and their political affiliation as Democrat (80 percent). In other words, the disengaged class mixes a relatively small set of prosperous immigrants whose views may reflect a lack of identification with the United States with a much larger set of relatively young and well-educated native-born respondents who favor Democrats and are often (but not exclusively) members of ethnoracial or religious minorities.

Restrictive nationalists. Unlike the ardent nationalists and the disengaged, the two remaining classes did not fall into a monotonic continuum from more to less nationalistic. They were, however, moderate in very different ways. One class, which we call the restrictive nationalists, consisted of respondents who expressed only moderate levels of national pride but defined being “truly American” in particularly exclusionary ways. The other class, which we call creedal nationalists because their profile of attitudes suggests fidelity to the American creed of liberal universalism, consisted of respondents who expressed high levels of national pride alongside a reluctance to qualify “truly American” with many strong conditions.

We begin with the former: the restrictive nationalists, who were the largest group, constituting 38 percent of the sample. Members of this group were moderate in their national identification and espoused modest levels of national hubris (less than either the ardent or creedal nationalists): 94 percent preferred to be U.S. citizens, 79 percent agreed that there is no better country than the United States, 43 percent agreed that people in other countries should be more like Americans, and 38 percent endorsed the view that one should support one’s country even when it is wrong. Only 18 percent reported never experiencing shame in the United States. Restrictive nationalists were also similar to, although less extreme than, the ardent nationalists in placing conditions on who should be viewed as a “true American.” Well over half strongly endorsed the view that only Christians can be “truly American”; nearly three in four believed it is “very important” that a “true American” be born in the United States or have lived in the United States for most of one’s life; and 69 percent viewed respect for American political institutions and laws as very important for being truly American.

Given their high level of support for restrictive criteria of national membership, surprisingly few members of this class reported being “very proud” of American achievements. Indeed, their responses to the pride questions were closer—in most cases, much closer—to those of the disengaged than to those of the ardent nationalists or creedal nationalists. Majorities expressed
Table 3. Class Assignment Probabilities by Party Identification and Race

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Creedal</th>
<th>Disengaged</th>
<th>Restrictive</th>
<th>Ardent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>.91</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>.91</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>.93</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>.97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

great pride only in America’s armed forces and its history. By contrast, just 13 percent reported being very proud of American democracy and just 9 percent expressed great pride in America’s global political influence.

Who were these respondents who defined true Americans so restrictively yet evinced such low levels of national pride? A rough generalization would depict them as Americans who are disadvantaged with respect to some combination of race, gender, or social class. Women were overrepresented among the restrictive nationalists; average incomes were the second lowest of all the classes; and a relatively small percentage of these respondents continued their education beyond high school. African Americans were strongly overrepresented in this class (68 percent were assigned to this group), as were Hispanics. Black Protestants were also represented in large numbers (much more so than in any other class), as were Evangelical Protestants. Not surprisingly given their criteria for “true American” status, relatively few were born outside the United States. Politically, Independents were strongly overrepresented (almost half the Independents in the sample were in this class), suggesting a gravitation to the restricted class by the politically disaffected. Although moderate Democrat and Republican identifiers were nearly equally likely to be assigned to this class, strongly partisan Republicans were underrepresented (most of them were found among the ardent and, to a lesser extent, creedal classes), whereas strong Democrats were overrepresented, reflecting the different socioeconomic positions and racial compositions of these two groups. The vast majority of African Americans in this class were Democrats, even though 14 of the 18 African American respondents who declared themselves Republicans were assigned to this category. In contrast, Hispanic respondents who identified with the Democratic Party were underrepresented and those who identified with the Republican Party were overrepresented in this class. Overall, it seems likely that this form of nationalism reflects ressentiment more than ideology.

Given the unexpected prominence of African Americans among restrictive nationalists, we checked to see if these results were artifacts of poorer assignment of non-whites to latent classes due to a combination of smaller numbers with possible model heterogeneity. We thus compared mean individual-level class assignment probabilities for blacks and whites in each of the four classes. The results, presented in Table 3, show that the differences in the precision of classification by race across the four classes are minor. In the case of the restrictive class, the mean classification probabilities for black respondents are actually higher than those for white respondents.
Creedal nationalists. Creedal nationalism refers to the form of national self-understanding associated with a set of liberal principles—universalism, democracy, and the rule of law—sometimes referred to as the American creed (Hartz 1964; Lieven 2004; Lipset 1963). The class of respondents we call creedal nationalists, which accounts for 22 percent of the sample, fits this profile more aptly than any other. Their form of nationalism was high on national pride but placed few restrictions on who can claim to be “truly American.” Creedal nationalists exhibited high levels of national identification, with 65 percent reporting that they felt “very close” to America, a percentage comparable to that of the ardent nationalists. They were less likely than the ardent nationalists to report being “very proud” of American achievements, but more likely to do so than either restrictive nationalists or the disengaged. Fifty-seven percent expressed great pride in the “way democracy works,” compared to just 13 percent of the restrictive nationalists, and 67 percent expressed pride in America’s economic achievements. They rivaled the ardent nationalists in pride in science and technology, with 82 percent reporting high levels. Like all but the disengaged, they strongly endorsed the ideas that America is a better country than most and that it is better to be a citizen of the United States. Although they did not score as high on the hubris variables as did the ardent nationalists, a plurality agreed that the world would be better if others were more like Americans and that one should support one’s country even if it is wrong. Like the ardent nationalists, they were also much less likely than restrictive nationalists or the disengaged to feel ashamed of America.

The differences between creedal and restrictive nationalists are especially evident in their responses to the questions about the qualities that are very important in making someone “truly American.” They were more likely than the restrictive nationalists (85 versus 69 percent) to say that respect for American institutions and laws was very important. In contrast, few regarded being a Christian (21 percent), having been born in the United States (16 percent), or having lived here most of one’s life (20 percent) as very important criteria. In other words, although the creedal nationalists differentiated between degrees of Americanness, unlike the restrictive nationalists they did not do so on the basis of ascribed characteristics.

Who were these just over one in five Americans whose views most closely approximated what is purportedly the American creed? For the most part, they were men and women upon whom fate had smiled. They were most likely of any group to hold advanced degrees and to have graduated college; their mean income of $78,582 was almost 40 percent higher than that of the next wealthiest group (the ardent nationalists). Consistent with their economic well-being, they were disproportionately Republican, almost as much so as the ardent nationalists (although with fewer strong partisans). They were more likely than any other group to have been born outside the United States (23 percent), and most of the foreign-born in this group possessed U.S. citizenship. Very few were African American or identified as Black Protestants. This class also included the largest share of respondents who classified themselves as racially other and as Jewish, with Catholics well represented (constituting at 28 percent a religious plurality) but Protestants, especially Evangelicals, less likely to be assigned to this group. Regionally, creedal nationalists were overrepresented in the Pacific and Mountain states and underrepresented in the Northeast and South. In other words, creedal nationalism is, to some extent, the ideology of men and women for whom the American Dream has worked. In many cases, however, their immigrant origins, religious faith, racial identities, or regional locations place them at the periphery of what is often represented as the American mainstream. We suspect this combination of economic success with biographical marginality produces an affinity for a broadly inclusive understanding of the nation.
It is notable how little overlap we observe between nationalism and partisan position among the two middling groups. (The dominance of Republicans among the ardent nationalists and of Democrats among the disengaged better matches received wisdom.) To ensure that the overrepresentation of Republicans among creedal nationalists was not an artifact of the model, we broke down the individual-level class assignment probabilities by party identification for each of the four classes. These results, presented in Table 3, show no statistically significant differences in the quality of classification by party in any of the classes, serving as further reassurance that the LCA model is correctly specified and the party results accurately reflect the data.  

We also examined the background characteristics of the Republican creedal nationalists (see the online supplement, Table D1). Compared to their Democratic counterparts, they differed notably in their religious backgrounds (nearly half of the Democrats were Catholic and 16 percent were Jewish, compared to 22 percent and 6 percent, respectively, of Republicans, whereas 36 percent of Republicans and just 13 percent of Democrats assigned to this class were Protestant), immigrant status (with 50 percent of Democrats but only 17 percent of Republicans born outside the United States), racial identification (87 percent of the Republicans were white, compared to 69 percent of the Democrats), and gender (with 45 percent of the Republicans and 58 percent of the Democrats being female). In other respects the two groups were similar. Compared to other Republicans, those assigned to the creedal nationalist class were less likely to live in the South; much more likely than Republican restrictives or ardents to report their faith as “other” or Jewish (26 percent compared to 9 and 10 percent, respectively); and considerably more likely to have been born outside the United States (17 percent compared to 3 percent for restrictives and 7 percent for ardents). In other words, the creedal Republicans, although more like Republicans than creedal Democrats, were more like Democrats than other Republicans—more diverse, less Southern, and less conventionally religious.

Summary. The latent class analyses yielded four classes of respondent. Two of these were extreme, one characterized by high levels of national identification, restrictive attitudes toward national membership, high levels of national pride, and high levels of hubris; and one characterized by the opposite of these. Members of the former were disproportionately older, less educated, white Evangelical Republicans living in the South, whereas the latter combined highly educated, well-paid immigrants and young, highly educated, secular Democrats from the coasts. Between the two extremes, two classes appeared more closely aligned with the distinction between ethnocultural and creedal nationalism (see, e.g., Lieven 2004; Smith 1997) (although it is important to note that our measures extend beyond criteria of national membership). Restrictive nationalists were disproportionately female, African American or Hispanic, Evangelical or Black Protestant, low in education and income, and born in the United States. Creedal nationalists were highly educated and high-income, most likely to reside outside the South, and included relatively few Protestants and the largest proportion of immigrants.

Despite some differences, there were striking similarities in demographic profiles between the restrictive and ardent nationalists and between the disengaged and creedal nationalists. One might hypothesize—we can do no more—that restrictives were potential ardents for whom the American dream did not materialize. One might also hypothesize that the creedal nationalists, and to a lesser extent the disengaged, were respondents for whom the American dream did materialize, but for whom marginality from ethnocultural definitions of American identity (by race, faith, or residence) led to adoption of a nationalism that embraces
persons like themselves or, in the case of the disengaged, to a rejection of nationalism altogether.\footnote{21}

The existence of the extreme classes is a novel finding not anticipated by previous research, as is the low level of national pride among a subset of Americans who hold ethnocultural conceptions of the nation. These features of American nationalism became visible here due to the broad range of indicators included in this analysis and the capacity of LCA to isolate subsets of respondents with distinctive response patterns.\footnote{22} It appears that 41 percent of Americans in 2004 possessed national self-understandings that reflected broad sentimental orientations to the nation rather than fine-grained ideological discriminations, such that they either embraced or rejected (respectively) almost every element of a restrictively patriotic nationalism. By contrast, more than half of respondents fell into groups consistent with—but also more complex than—previously observed forms of American nationalism. To be sure, some patterns were common to all classes—a relative priority placed on citizenship and speaking English compared to other warrants of “being truly American;” greater pride in America’s achievements in science and technology than in its social security system; and more willingness to endorse the proposition that American citizenship is preferable over all others than to endorse the principle of “my country right or wrong.” But the differences are striking.

**IS NATIONALISM LINKED TO SOCIAL ATTITUDES AND POLICY PREFERENCES?**

Put another way, does nationalism matter? Is it associated with Americans’ attitudes on important social issues or with their policy preferences, so that knowing Americans’ attitudes and sentiments toward the nation enables us to predict these other attitudes more effectively than we could based only on information about their age, gender, educational attainment, race, country of birth, religious faith, religiosity, region of residence, income, or political party identification?\footnote{23} This test poses a high hurdle. If different types of nationalists still vary significantly after we control for all these other factors, we may infer, first, that our LCA analysis identified dimensions of conviction that are associated with a broad spectrum of belief and opinion; and second, that despite the common threads, the groups are meaningfully different in their views.

Table 4 describes the net association of nationalist class assignment with 17 attitudes: views on policies related to racial and ethnic minorities; attitudes toward immigration; attitudes toward the rest of the world and to multiculturalism; and foreign policy views touching on U.S. sovereignty.\footnote{24} Higher values on the dependent variables correspond to more conservative (i.e., anti-redistributive, anti-immigrant, protectionist, and isolationist) attitudes. The controls mentioned earlier are included in all models but are not displayed for the sake of clarity. Creedal nationalism is the omitted class to which the other classes are compared, but in discussing our results, we occasionally draw on other comparisons as well. All the models use a three-step ordinal-logit LCA model for distal outcomes with a correction for misclassification (Bakk et al. 2013).

Previous research gives us much reason to anticipate that people’s understanding of the nation would be associated with attitudes related to in-group/out-group dynamics (Tajfel 1982) and concerns about social boundaries and ritual penetration (Douglas 1966), such as views of race, immigration, trade, international relations, and national sovereignty (Citrin et al. 2001; Kunovich 2009). Several scholars have found evidence of associations between attitudes related to nationalism and views of intergroup relations. Citrin, Reingold, and Green (1990) find that
Table 4. Impact of Class Membership on Social and Policy Attitudes with Controls

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policies toward Minorities</th>
<th>Immigration</th>
<th>Attitudes toward Rest of the World</th>
<th>Foreign Policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government should protect rights of minorities (rev. coded)</td>
<td>Gov't assist minorities in preserving culture (rev. coded)</td>
<td>Better if ethnic/racial groups blend into larger society</td>
<td>Immigration take jobs from Americans (rev. coded)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disengaged</td>
<td>.768***</td>
<td>.882</td>
<td>.36***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.082)</td>
<td>(.092)</td>
<td>(.201)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrictive</td>
<td>1.324***</td>
<td>.872</td>
<td>1.148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.069)</td>
<td>(.096)</td>
<td>(.207)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ardent</td>
<td>.999</td>
<td>.821*</td>
<td>1.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.072)</td>
<td>(.091)</td>
<td>(.197)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1.072</td>
<td>1.058</td>
<td>1.040</td>
</tr>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Immigration</th>
<th>Attitudes toward Rest of the World</th>
<th>Int'l bodies should enforce solutions to certain problems (rev. coded)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stronger measures to keep out illegal immigrants</td>
<td>TV should give preference to U.S. content</td>
<td>U.S. citizens should help those worse off around the world (rev. coded)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disengaged</td>
<td>.678***</td>
<td>.612***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.115)</td>
<td>(.099)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrictive</td>
<td>1.139</td>
<td>1.683***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.107)</td>
<td>(.091)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ardent</td>
<td>1.738***</td>
<td>2.264***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.1)</td>
<td>(.089)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1.059</td>
<td>1.058</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                              | U.S. should pursue interests, even if this leads to conflict | U.S. does not benefit from NAFTA |
| Disengaged                  | .508***                           | 1.268***        | .624*** |
|                           | (.088)                             | (.088)          | (.094) |
| Restrictive                | 1.081                              | .906            | 1.151  |
|                           | (.052)                             | (.111)          | (.085) |
| Ardent                     | .959                               | 1.308*          | .995   |
|                           | (.048)                             | (.116)          | (.073) |
| N                         | 1.059                              | 1.058           | 1.046  |

|                              | Int'l doesn't benefit from NAFTA  |
| Disengaged                  | .624***                            |                     |
|                           | (.094)                             |                     |
| Restrictive                | 1.151                              |                     |
|                           | (.085)                             |                     |
| Ardent                     | .995                               |                     |
|                           | (.073)                             |                     |
| N                         | 1.046                              |                     |

Note: Data are from the 2004 GSS. All results are from proportional-odds models for ordinal outcomes that include controls for age, gender, race/ethnicity, years of schooling, family income, whether born in the United States, religious affiliation, party identification, and region of residence. Odds ratios are followed by standard errors of the log odds ratios in parentheses. Creedal nationalists are excluded category.
*p < .5; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests).
what they call “Americanism” predicts attitudes toward immigrants and immigration more effectively than do demographic measures or even exposure to a perceived threat. At the same time, different forms of nationalist belief and sentiment may have differing implications for attitudes toward out-groups. Parker (2007), in an analysis of California’s Field Poll, reports that “blind patriotism” (“America right or wrong”) was related to negative views of racial and religious minorities, whereas what he calls “symbolic patriotism” (attachment to patriotic symbols and core American values) was associated with open and embracing responses. Li and Brewer (2004) report that experimental subjects primed with appeals to group solidarity, collective interest, and good citizenship expressed high levels of tolerance; whereas subjects primed with messages that emphasize intergroup differences endorsed relatively more authoritarian and bellicose positions. It may follow from this view that hubris and a restrictive view of membership in the national community would influence attitudes differently than do national identification and pride in America’s achievements (see also De Figueiredo and Elkins 2003).

Policies related to ethnic and racial minorities. Like the studies reviewed above, we find significant net associations of particular forms of nationalism with a range of attitudes. Even with extensive controls, the disengaged were more supportive of multiculturalism and related positions than were members of other classes. Consistent with their support for civic definitions of a “true American” and their low values on hubris, the disengaged were much more likely than others to endorse the view that the government should “respect and protect the rights of minorities” and that it is better if minorities “maintain their distinctive customs and traditions.” Despite their inclusive views of the criteria for national membership, creedal nationalists did not differ significantly from ardent nationalists in their responses to either item tapping attitudes toward multiculturalism. And although they were more likely to say that government should support minority rights than were restrictive nationalists, they were less so than the disengaged. Interestingly—and somewhat surprisingly—ardent nationalists were more likely than creedal nationalists to support government assistance for protecting minority cultures.

Attitudes toward immigrants. We would expect nationalist sentiments—especially sentiments about the nation’s boundaries—to be associated with views of immigrants (Bail 2008), and they were. Restrictive nationalists were significantly more likely than creedal nationalists and the disengaged to believe that immigrants increase crime rates and take jobs away from Americans; and they were significantly more likely than creedal nationalists, the disengaged, and ardent nationalists to disagree that immigration is helpful to the economy and that immigrants improve society by bringing in new ideas and cultures, as well as to agree that there is too much government spending on immigration. Ardent nationalists were also significantly more likely than creedal nationalists (and in most cases, the disengaged) to agree that immigrants cause crime and take away American jobs, that immigrants should not hold the same rights as citizens, and that more needs to be done to prevent illegal immigration. Yet a restrictive view of national membership was not a prerequisite to critical views of immigration: creedal nationalists were also significantly more likely than the disengaged to agree that immigration takes away Americans’ jobs, increases crime rates, and consumes too much government spending, as well as to disagree that immigrants improve society by bringing in new ideas and cultures. They were also more likely than disengaged respondents to favor additional measures against illegal immigration.
Attitudes concerning America’s boundaries. Attitudes toward immigrants are a special case of responses to the penetration of national boundaries by people, cultures, and money from abroad. Results here were similar, with the disengaged expressing the least agreement, and restrictive nationalists and ardent nationalists expressing the most agreement, with protectionist and isolationist views: both groups were significantly more likely than creedal nationalists or the disengaged to endorse the views that U.S. television programming should favor American content, that foreigners should not be permitted to own land in the United States, and that the United States should cut back on imports. Ardent nationalists appeared even more concerned than restrictive nationalists with cultural intrusions from abroad, as evidenced by their stronger support for the showcasing of American content on U.S. television.

Foreign policy. Three items focus on issues related to the strength of American sovereignty: a general statement asserting that the United States should pursue its national interest even when that leads to international conflict; an item about the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); and a hypothetical question about whether the United States should grant international bodies the power to enforce environmental agreements. Consistent with their high scores on hubris and their considerable pride in state institutions, the ardent nationalists were significantly more likely than either the disengaged or the restrictive nationalists to endorse the position that the United States should follow its own interests at all costs (once again, the disengaged were significantly less likely to agree with this view than were the creedal nationalists). The results also suggest that creedal nationalists were significantly more opposed than the rest of the sample to giving international bodies enforcement powers. Finally, the disengaged were the outliers on the NAFTA question, displaying significantly greater agreement than others with the statement that the United States does not benefit from the trade agreement.

Summary. Several conclusions emerge from these analyses. First, even with numerous controls, the disengaged and the ardent nationalists differed significantly from creedal nationalists on many attitudes related to minorities, immigration, and America’s relation to the world. Indeed, creedal nationalists differed significantly from the disengaged on 14 of the 17 items that we investigated, and from ardent nationalists on 10 of 17.

Second, the pattern of difference suggests that the restrictive nationalists’ preoccupation with boundaries, combined with their relatively weak pride in the nation’s accomplishments, generalizes to negative views of minorities and of immigrants, as well as fear of many kinds of penetration of the nation’s boundaries. In contrast, the disengaged respondents’ and the creedal nationalists’ universalistic standards for inclusion in the American polity, and creedal nationalists’ strong pride in American achievements, militates toward an openness to domestic difference and international contact. Given these results, as well as the fact that the differences we describe are observed after controlling for partisan identification, it would clearly be a mistake to conflate popular nationalism with political ideology.

Third, pride in the nation’s accomplishments and national identification may inoculate Americans to some degree against the most extreme forms of racial or ethnic exclusion and xenophobia. We see this in the fact that ardent nationalists were less extreme on some variables measuring these dimensions than were the restrictive nationalists.

Finally, the external validity of the classes identified by the LCA analyses is supported by the fact that respondents’ class assignments were significantly associated with a wide range of social and policy positions. These significant effects are observed after controlling for numerous sociodemographic variables, political party identification, and religious faith.
WAS 2004 A TYPICAL YEAR FOR AMERICAN NATIONALISM?

In describing our results, we intentionally used past tense to signal that the structure and distribution of nationalist attitudes in our data may be specific to 2004, the year in which the second National Identity Supplement to the GSS was administered. In this section, we ask if this was the case, taking advantage of the fact that the GSS featured identical nationalism questions in 1996 and that we were able to administer those questions again in 2012 to a nationally representative sample of respondents polled by GfK Custom Research. By comparing the relative item values in the four classes in 1996, 2004, and 2012, we can assess the structural stability of Americans’ nationalist attitudes; by comparing the percentage of persons assigned to each, we can examine stability in the prevalence of each type over time.

Past research on the impact of major national events on public attitudes gives us reason to expect at least some change in how Americans imagine their country in the time period covered by our data. Throughout U.S. history, nativism and xenophobia have increased in periods of political threat and, to a lesser extent, economic privation (Higham [1955] 1983). Rahn, Kroeger, and Kite (1996) suggest that such crises and their representation in the media affect the public mood (with individual variation in response depending on the extent to which national identity is central to personal identity), leading to increases in the volume of nationalist talk and, potentially, to political mobilization (see also Feinstein 2016a). Consistent with this argument, Perrin (2005) found an increase in both authoritarian and anti-authoritarian discourse in letters to the editor of a North Carolina newspaper after the September 11th attacks. Collins (2012) contends that crises such as 9/11 have a direct—although fleeting—impact on nationalist attitudes by intensifying national attachment and increasing unconditional support for state institutions, producing “time-bubbles of nationalism.”

Given that our 2004 data were collected three years after the September 11 attacks and about one year after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, we expected to observe increases in types of nationalism that place stricter limits on legitimate criteria of national belonging (in line with research on xenophobia in times of crisis) and entail greater pride in and support for both the nation and the state (the “rally around the flag” effect [Feinstein 2016b; Perrin and Smolek 2009; Willer 2004]). We thus expect increases in restrictive nationalism and ardent nationalism and consequent declines in the percentage of respondents assigned to one or both of the other classes.

The post-9/11 changes in nationalist beliefs are likely to be temporary, as suggested by past research on collective identification in the aftermath of major national crises (Collins 2012). We thus expect the distribution of the four classes in 2012 to resemble that observed in 1996. It is conceivable, however, that this trend may be offset by the impact of the Great Recession, which began in 2008. We are somewhat skeptical about this possibility for two reasons. First, by 2012, the economy was in the midst of a sluggish but steady recovery (the NBER dates the end of the recession to the second quarter of 2009 [Cynamon, Fazzari, and Setterfield 2013:21]), which likely dampened any previous shifts in public opinion. Second, evidence from survey research suggests that economic downturns rarely produce major changes in general political attitudes. In a study based on GSS data from 1972 to 2010, Kenworthy and Owens (2011) argue that despite Americans’ acute awareness of macroeconomic conditions, the past six recessions did not affect popular confidence in nonfinancial institutions, attitudes toward government, social justice beliefs, or preferences for redistributive policies. In light of these findings, it seems unlikely that the Great Recession would have significantly reshaped popular understandings of the nation.
Figure 2. Class Content, 1996 to 2012; Partially Homogeneous Model

Note: Y-axis measures the proportion of respondents in each class who expressed strong agreement with the identification, membership criteria, and pride questions, or expressed agreement or strong agreement with the hubris questions. Results are from a partially homogenous model, with conditional probabilities fixed across classes for 11 indicators (these constraints resulted in better model fit, indicating lack of significant cross-class variation in response distributions [Kankaraš, Moors, and Vermunt 2011]): importance of citizenship, English language, respect for laws, and subjective feeling for being a true American; pride in democracy, science, sports, art, and history; and preference for U.S. citizenship, and belief that the United States is a better country than others.
To compare the distribution of classes over time, we ran a partially homogeneous LCA model that enables us to examine simultaneously variation by year in the content of classes (i.e., the distribution of indicators within each class) and in the prevalence of each class within the sample. The main result is that the structure of nationalist sentiments was robust over this 17-year period, whereas the prevalence of the classes varied notably.

Figure 2 depicts change in the percentage of respondents in each class expressing agreement with each of the nationalism items in 1996, 2004, and 2012. We see that the structure of the four classes remains similar throughout this period. Although a number of pride and restrictive attitudes score higher in each class in 2004 than in the other years, and hubris is at its lowest level in 2012, the changes are modest and the relative position of items within and across classes remains stable across the three periods. By contrast, examining the distribution of respondents across classes suggests that 2004 was indeed an unusual year for American nationalism. As Figure 3 illustrates, between 1996 and 2004 the percentages of ardent and restrictive nationalists increased (by 49 and 13 percent, respectively) and those of creedal nationalists and the disengaged declined (by 9 and 36 percent, respectively). By 2012, however, the percentage of restrictive nationalists returned to its 1996 level, and creedal nationalism recovered two thirds of its 2004 losses; the prevalence of ardent nationalism was just 2 percentage points higher and that of the disengaged 2 percentage points lower in 2012 than in 1996. These findings are consistent with Collins’s (2012) argument that crises produce “time-bubbles” of nationalism, but consistent with expectations from past research, ardent nationalism and restrictive nationalism rose in 2004 at the expense of the disengaged class and creedal nationalism. Moreover, the percentage of respondents in each category expressing nationalist sentiments on a number of indicators increased in 2004, even as their relative positions remained stable. These results are consistent with Collins’s (2012) argument that crises produce “time-bubbles” of nationalism, but
such increases may be more durable than Collins predicted. Given that we find heightened levels of ardent nationalism three years after the 9/11 attacks, major shocks to the nation, if reinforced by state action, may reconfigure shared understandings of the nation for relatively long periods of time.26

CONCLUSIONS

Major Findings

To our knowledge, this article undertakes the most thorough analysis of the most complete data containing attitudes on national self-understanding and sentiment from a national sample of Americans. It is also among the first to use latent class analysis, a method that enabled us to identify how combinations of attitudes are held by sets of concrete persons. Our results affirm and extend some results of previous research, while also making discoveries unanticipated by much of the existing literature.

In supporting the position that there are multiple forms of national self-understanding, and that nationalist attitudes and sentiments have different sources and implications for views in other domains, this study converges with and extends previous work. Our findings are most strongly consistent with previous research in demonstrating that a willingness to place ethnocultural restrictions on membership in the national community and what we call hubris are associated with negative views of immigrants and immigration and isolationist and protectionist orientations toward the rest of the world. We build on this work by demonstrating the net associations (after extensive controls for sociodemographic characteristics, religious faith, and partisan identification) of adherence to distinct views of the nation with attitudes toward such matters as unilateralism in foreign policy, cultural and economic protectionism, and multiculturalism.

Our findings also diverge from the results of previous research in several respects. Many observers of nationalism have noted the relative integrity of such intellectual traditions and tendencies as ethnoculturalism, liberal nationalism, civic republicanism, and so on—and have also observed that statistical measures of people’s adherence to such views are associated (as we ourselves have reported) with attitudes toward minorities, immigration, and other social issues. In so doing, they sometimes assume that such coherent ideologies map neatly onto the attitudes of natural persons, so that one could understand the popular politics of nationalism as a contest, for example, between people who place their faith in the American creed and those who view America as a white, Protestant republic. Despite criticism of this view (see Brubaker 2004), much research on social attitudes continues to reflect it.

In this respect, this study innovates in using latent class analysis to identify inductively patterns of attitudes that characterize the belief systems of concrete persons without making strong assumptions about ideological coherence. Indeed, such patterns are often untidy, compared to the ideological dimensions that make sense to specialists and observers. Our analysis affirms Brubaker’s (2004) skepticism about the practical exhaustiveness and clarity of the distinction between ethnocultural and civic nationalism and provides explicit estimates of the limits of this view. Essentially, we find that just over half of American adults (the 60 percent whom we describe as restrictive or creedal nationalists) hold positions that can be understood from this perspective. Nearly half (the 40 percent whom we describe as ardent nationalists and the disengaged) either promiscuously endorse central tenets of both civic and ethnocultural nationalism (the ardent nationalists) or are only lukewarmly committed to any form of nationalist sentiment (the disengaged).
Although arguably descriptive of about half the U.S. population, the ethnocultural versus creedal distinction fails to capture their views in a faithful way. A substantial majority of the creedal nationalists endorse the view that someone who does not speak English is not “truly American.” And, like those in the ardent class, the restrictive nationalists endorse all of the restrictions on the definition of the “truly American” that the survey offers, and not simply place of birth, religion, and language (cf. Kunovich 2009). (Of course, criteria of national membership are only one attribute that distinguishes the four classes: variation in national pride and hubris is what separates restrictive from ardent nationalists and the disengaged from creedal nationalists.)

Our analysis also sheds new light on the demographic, political, and religious factors that predict the forms of nationalism to which Americans adhere. Because we focus on predicting assignment to classes rather than positions on distinct attitudinal dimensions, we are, in effect, trying to explain how perspectives combine and map onto sets of persons who share similar views. The most important findings are both positive and negative.

Positively, our results point to strong links between religious and national identity in the United States. When it comes to criteria of national membership, belief that being Christian is very important to being truly American is the attitude that most strongly distinguishes creedal nationalists and the disengaged (few of whom hold this belief) from restrictive and ardent nationalists (most of whom do). And religious faith—especially, the tendency of Evangelical Protestants to gravitate toward ardent nationalism—is an important predictor of class assignment. Although American historians have long appreciated the deep connection between faith in God and faith in country (Higham [1955] 1983; Kruse 2015), our analysis explores this connection with unprecedented empirical specificity.

Finally, we show that nationalism is not fixed over time, but instead its multiple varieties shift in prevalence, presumably in response to nationally relevant events, such as incidents of domestic terrorism and foreign wars. Despite these temporal shifts, the patterns of responses characterizing the four types of nationalism remained relatively consistent across the three survey waves. In other words, Americans’ beliefs about their nation-state cohere into distinct understandings with what appears to be a robust underlying structure. The robustness of the four types of American nationalism and their connection to policy preferences suggest that these attitudinal profiles constitute important cleavages in U.S. political culture that partly cut across partisan identity. Our findings may thus help explain the successes of political mobilization based on populist rhetoric (Bonikowski and Gidron 2016) coupled with nativist and racist claims, most recently exemplified by the presidential candidacy of Donald Trump. Trump’s campaign has used a particular vision of the nation that emphasizes the superiority of the American people, the moral corruption of elites, and dire threats posed by immigrants and ethnic, racial, and religious minorities, all while drawing a sharp distinction between the primordial nation and its political institutions. His calls for a return to America’s alleged glory days resonated deeply with a sizeable segment of voters in the 2016 Republican presidential primary, particularly people who were white, male, less educated, and resided outside coastal urban centers (a group that included not only Republicans, but also conservative Democrats who were eligible to vote in open primaries) (Bland 2016; Cohn 2015). The ideological content of the Trump campaign’s discourse and the sociodemographic composition of its support base closely resemble the characteristics of restrictive nationalists and, to a lesser extent, ardent nationalists. Directly appealing to these groups’ understanding of America may have been an important driver of Trump’s popularity, enabling him to mobilize on the basis of nationalist sentiments Republicans for whom his issue positions might have appeared insufficiently conservative.
We can also conjecture—but do no more, given the lack of direct empirical evidence—about the relationship between our findings and support for the Tea Party movement, which rose to prominence in 2009. In contrast to core Trump supporters in the primary, Tea Partiers were typically staunchly conservative and Republican; they also tended to be older, very religious, mostly Evangelical but also Mainline Protestant, solidly middle-class, college-educated, and living in communities segregated by race and education (McVeigh et al. 2014; Skocpol and Williamson 2012). These sociodemographic traits bear close resemblance to those of the ardent nationalists. Moreover, the ideological bases of Tea Party support echo some of the beliefs we observed among the ardent class: the Tea Partiers’ political activism was triggered by the Great Recession (even if they did not bear its brunt) and deep disdain of Barack Obama’s presidency, but their views were strongly shaped by a more general animosity toward minorities and immigrants, skepticism of intellectual elites, a literalist understanding of the Constitution (they were strong patriots, by their own definition), and deep fear of ongoing cultural changes in the United States (Skocpol and Williamson 2012; Willer, Feinberg, and Wetts 2016). Put another way, although the Tea Party originated as a movement based on economic grievances, its recruitment of supporters fitting the mold of ardent (and perhaps restrictive) nationalists may explain the movement’s use of a nationalist vernacular and patriotic symbols to pursue its claims.

These hypotheses are intriguing, but a note of caution is due: our inductive typology is specifically concerned with varieties of nationalism and not all politics (radical or otherwise) is framed in explicitly nationalist terms. To the extent that political actors privilege specific policy recommendations or emphasize economic insecurities, their political claims may be orthogonal to nationalist beliefs in the population. Thus, to evaluate the relationship between popular nationalism and the recent rise of radical politics, one needs not only further data but also a precise theoretical model that connects nationalism with political behavior. Our article lays the groundwork for such future research efforts.

Finally, we focused exclusively on the United States, but the implications of our analytic approach may be relevant for other countries as well. In particular, the rise of radical-right parties in Europe since the late 1990s has been facilitated by a reliance on exclusionary forms of nationalism combined with the vilification of political elites (Berezin 2009; Bonikowski and Gidron 2014; Mudde 2007), which has appealed to the populations most negatively affected by European supranationalism and neoliberal reforms (i.e., native-born, low-income, low-education, working-class voters) (Ivarsflaten 2005; Swank and Betz 2003). These political movements may have capitalized on nationalist cleavages similar to those we observed in the United States. To explore this possibility, the analytic framework developed here could be extended to comparative research on within-country variation in nationalist beliefs (see Bonikowski 2013, 2016a). Such research has the potential to make important contributions to the scholarly understanding of the rise of nationalist politics across Western democracies.

Limitations

Several considerations qualify our confidence in these findings. Although the GSS data are the most complete we found in an extensive review, they are still imperfect. We see three main problems.

First, the measure of national identification barely gets at what, from a cognitive perspective, is the central issue—the proximity and degree of connectedness of the nation-schema and the self-schema. Central to the notion of nationalism is that commitment to the nation take “precedence over available alternative foci of affiliation such as kinship, religion,
economic interest, race or language . . . nationalism implies that membership in the nation is the most critical of all loyalties” (Citrin et al. 1994:2). Therefore, the ideal set of items would assess not only the degree of identification with the nation, but also the relative importance of national and competing forms of identification.

Second, the GSS items use the term “America” throughout, rather than the country’s actual name, the “United States of America” (commonly truncated to “United States”). The term America is associated with patriotic songs (“God Bless America” and “America the Beautiful”) and symbols (the American flag), but it has also been an object of criticism domestically (both white leftists and African nationalists have used the corrupted forms, Amerika, Amerikka, and Amerikkka as terms of opprobrium) and hemispherically (by people who resent the appropriation of the name of two continents for U.S. nationals, against the claims of Canadians, Mexicans, and other Latin Americans). By contrast, the “United States” appears in government documents and correspondence, and is more commonly used in everyday bureaucratic contexts. We suspect that “America” is an affectively charged term that invokes the sacred site of nationhood, whereas “United States” is a more mundane term that invokes the nation’s profane elements. If this suspicion is correct, then using “America” rather than “the United States” in survey items will likely increase levels of nationalist arousal for most respondents, and perhaps exacerbate negative affect and alienation for some others.

Third, the GSS “true American” series contains more items that tap ethnocultural forms of nationalism than civic nationalism. Liberal nationalism can include commitment to political and racial tolerance, as well as respect for institutions and laws (Citrin, Wong, and Duff 1990). Moreover, the republican tradition (Schildkraut 2002; Smith 1997; Theiss-Morse 1993) suggests that participation in the political process is an obligation of membership in the national community. An ideal dataset would include measures of the importance of political tolerance, support for freedom of expression, and political participation to qualification as a “true American.”

Beyond Attitudes

Public opinion surveys provide an invaluable means of understanding the broad contours of national self-understanding in a manner that can be generalized across a large population. As such, they are indispensable in apprehending the nature of American nationalism. At the same time, a comprehensive research program on popular nationalism requires an integration of three domains in which nationalism becomes manifest: (1) individual responses to social surveys; (2) nationalist talk and the deployment of nationalist symbols in social interaction; and (3) the prevalence of nationalist symbols and cues (e.g., flag lapels) in the broader social environment. To understand the translation of nationalist ideas into political action, one must understand how events trigger variation in nationalist talk and the symbolic environment, and how change in patterns of interaction and in the environment selectively arouse or deactivate competing conceptions of nation and citizenship.

To date, social scientists who study U.S. nationalism have focused more on survey data than on either interaction or the symbolic environment. One limitation of survey-based attitude research, however, is that (with the exception of studies using survey experiments) it ordinarily assumes that particular understandings are chronically activated in particular respondents, so survey responses are reasonably stable at the individual level. Yet most people understand and have access to the most broadly available cultural understandings of nation and citizenship, and in some people, at least, activation of alternative narratives may stand in relative balance. So one
must ask what kinds of events and interactions are most likely to prime and elicit particular versions of nationalism. Experimental research is useful in this regard. Li and Brewer (2004) were able to elicit significant variations in political tolerance and hubris by framing questions in terms of communitarian versus essentialist notions of societal membership. Experimental research is also useful in revealing aspects of schematic organization that operate during automatic cognition, but which may be overridden by deliberation that the survey situation elicits. Devos and Banaji (2005), for example, demonstrated that U.S. college students of all races perceived whites (including white Europeans) as “more American” than African Americans or Asian Americans, even when they were unaware of this bias.

Direct observation of the social environment is an invaluable source of understanding as well. Billig (1995:6) calls attention to the importance of “banal nationalism,” the “ideological habits which enable established nations of the West to be reproduced” through indexical expressions that constitute the state as a reified entity. Eliasoph (1998) and Eliasoph and Lichterman (2003) illuminate how social contexts elicit and reinforce differing representations of national citizenship. In addition to demonstrating that nationalism can be as much a feature of environments as of persons, such research also highlights the interpenetration of civic and ethnocultural nationalism (and the difficulty, at times, of distinguishing between them) in concrete political talk and action (see also Brubaker 2004).

In other words, nationalism is a feature of context as well as individual attitudes. A full understanding of American nationalism will require attention to the beliefs and sentiments that Americans reveal to survey researchers and the social mechanisms that activate certain beliefs and sentiments in particular settings and engender their conversion into political action. This article has made a substantial advance on the first of these two goals and may inform progress toward the second.

Acknowledgments

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Notes

1. “Nationalism,” a contested term in the literature, can refer to a wide range of behaviors, symbols, and attitudes associated with the pervasive institutionalization of the nation-state as a political and cultural institution in the modern world. Many political psychologists reserve the term for prideful or protective feelings toward the state, but we favor a more inclusive definition that takes into account the full range of variation in attitudes toward the nation-state, rather than privileging a particular subset of those attitudes.

2. For readers unfamiliar with LCA, it is essential to note that the method identifies classes based entirely on statistical criteria, without any implication that members of the class so defined represent a social class or “class-for-itself.”

3. Attitudinal survey data permit one to make inferences about underlying schemata but cannot in themselves reveal such schemata. Even a relatively complete survey like GSS does not contain items that touch on every element of a domain; and the meaning of a categorical response may vary among respondents. Methods like LCA that search for interpretable patterns (and that can detect heterogeneous patterns) cannot eliminate the tradeoff between the richness of interview or ethnographic data and the generalizability that survey data make
possible; but they push the tradeoff frontier outward, permitting the analyst to approach schemata more closely than would otherwise be possible.

4. For historical insight into the elision of Christianity, Americanism, and capitalism, see Kruse (2015).

5. Although statistically preferable to alternative specifications (both as a matter of general practice and of model fit in our analysis), the inclusion of covariates in the primary LCA model can affect the response probabilities of indicators by latent class. To determine the extent to which this was the case in our data, we modeled the relationship between the nationalism indicators and latent classes with and without covariates. The results, available upon request, did not reveal any substantively meaningful differences. Of the 92 pairwise comparisons of indicator means across corresponding classes, none were statistically significant.

6. The estimation of large numbers of parameters in LCA models is computationally intensive and may result in model non-convergence, so analysts use the size of the bivariate residuals to select pairs of variables for which the assumption of local independence can be relaxed. In our analyses, the following pairs of variables were permitted to covary: pride in arts and literature and pride in sports; pride in global political influence and pride in democracy; pride in economic achievements and pride in global political influence; pride in arts and literature and pride in science and technology; pride in America’s history and pride in fair and equal treatment of all groups; agreement that America is better than most countries and that it would be better if more people were like Americans; speaking English and being a citizen as membership criteria; being born in the United States and living in the United States for most of one’s life as membership criteria; being born outside the United States and preferring U.S. citizenship to citizenship anywhere else; and being strongly religious and believing in Christianity as membership criterion. LCA models with and without local dependencies produced substantively similar results.

7. To determine whether our choice of indicators affected the LCA results, we reran the models while successively excluding each indicator in turn. The content of the classes yielded by the reduced models was consistent with the full model featuring all 23 indicators. Results of these robustness checks are available upon request. We thank a reviewer for this suggestion.

8. A complete replication package that includes the data and statistical code is available in the online supplement.

9. We are aware of the problematic connotations of the term “America,” but we use it in our description of the data to reflect the actual wording of the GSS nationalism items.

10. Much of the literature views belief in the importance of English as a form of ethnocultural nationalism (Citrin, Reingold, Walters, and Green 1990). But as Brubaker (2004:139) points out, one can also characterize policies promoting a common language as “positively civic, that is, as indispensable for the promotion of republican citizenship.”

11. Respondents who expressed pride in aspects of American history or institutions were probably interpreting the questions in a similar manner, but those who withheld their pride may differ markedly in their reasons: for example, people may lack pride in the nation’s social security system because it is too generous, too stingy, or too bureaucratic; they may lack pride in fairness and equality because they believe there is too little or too much of each; and they may lack pride in America’s global influence because they feel the United States has wielded it too heavy-handedly or too selectively.

12. Because the item asked respondents if people in general should support their country when it is wrong, and not if Americans should do so, it is possible that some respondents who disagreed actually do believe that Americans should support their country right or wrong, but are not prepared to hold citizens of other countries to that same standard.

13. Our class descriptions rely primarily on proportions of each sociodemographic category that belong to each class (Table 2), but we also make occasional mention of proportions of each class that belong to each sociodemographic category (see the online supplement, Table C1). P-values for differences in model parameters across classes, reported in Table 2, are generated by the main LCA model with sociodemographic covariates using Wald chisquared tests (Vermunt and Magidson 2005).

14. Gender is only a marginally statistically significant predictor of class membership, as illustrated by a p-value of .061 in Table 2. Although religiously observant respondents appear to be somewhat overrepresented among the ardent nationalists, the relationship between religiosity and class membership is not statistically significant; the same is true of geographic region.

15. Dividing the classes into successively smaller subgroups, such as Democratic ardent nationalists who are non-white, raises the risk of drawing inferences based on small sample sizes. Such findings should therefore be viewed as suggestive rather than conclusive. This issue is only relevant, however, in a few of our between-class comparisons and does not affect our overall characterization of the classes.
16. This finding suggests one possible mechanism leading people to have an arms-length distance toward America: their competing identification with another country. Indeed, when non-citizens are removed from the sample, foreign-born respondents are no longer overrepresented among the disengaged. Citizenship status does not, however, substantially affect the distribution of foreign-born respondents across the other classes or the distribution of race by class. Furthermore, because non-citizens and foreign-born citizens account for only 15 percent of the disengaged, identification with other countries cannot be interpreted as the primary cause of disengagement.

17. The analysis of citizenship and immigrant status among disengaged respondents relies on modal class assignment based on posterior probabilities generated by the LCA model (Bolck et al. 2004).

18. The overrepresentation of Hispanic respondents in this class may partly reflect GSS sampling practices. Prior to 2006, the GSS did not conduct interviews in Spanish, thus excluding non-English-speaking Latino immigrants. The latter differ markedly from English-speaking Latinos both in sociodemographic characteristics and attitudes (Smith 2007).

19. We also compared the attitudinal profiles of Democrats and Republicans within each class to verify that the classes were not masking underlying response heterogeneity by party. The results (available upon request) did not reveal meaningful differences based on party in the attitudinal composition of the four classes.

20. Given the high socioeconomic status and regional distribution of creedal Republicans, it would be reasonable to expect many of them to work in science, technology, and the professions and, in many cases, to have immigrated to the United States in pursuit of occupational opportunities. Additional analyses (results available upon request) affirmed this intuition: among creedal Republicans, there is an overrepresentation of respondents employed in engineering, technology, broadcasting, publishing, finance, medicine, and higher education. All the foreign-born Republicans contained in the overall sample belong to the creedal nationalist class, and they hail disproportionately from China, India, and Italy. There is an overrepresentation of Jewish and Hindu respondents, as well as respondents who list “other” as their religion.

21. To explore this hypothesis further, we exploited three life satisfaction measures in the 2004 GSS, each of which research has found to be a predictor of mental health and each of which (in similar form) has been a component of the psychological well-being scale used by many students of mental health (Ryff and Keyes 1995). If our intuition is correct, the ardent should score higher on these measures than do the restrictive, and the creeds should score higher than the disengaged. Indeed (results available upon request), this is what we find: creedal nationalists were more optimistic, self-confident, and trusting than were the disengaged, and ardent nationalists scored consistently higher on these three variables than did restrictive nationalists. Although these results are far from dispositive, they suggest that research on the relationship between views of the nation and mental health may be productive.

22. That restrictive nationalism was more prevalent than creedal nationalism in our sample is also at odds with research in the Tocquevillian tradition that associates creedalism with the very core of American national identity (e.g., Burnham 1982; Huntington 1981).

23. We would have liked to examine the relationship between nationalism and political ideology—and not just party identification—but the GSS variable that taps liberal-conservative self-identification was not included on the same ballot as the national identity items.

24. For item wording and descriptive statistics, both in the full GSS sample and our reduced sample, see the online supplement, Part A.

25. The 2012 survey was administered as part of a research project sponsored by the U.S. Marine Corps, on which the first author worked in an advisory capacity. The respondents were randomly drawn from GfK’s KnowledgePanel, a nationally representative sample initially identified through a combination of random-digit dialing and address-based sampling methods. All GfK survey participants are equipped with Internet-enabled computers upon joining the KnowledgePanel and subsequent survey recruitment occurs online. The 2012 survey consisted of a sample of 3,136 adults (age 18 and older). The nationalism items matched the exact wording of the questions used in the 1996 and 2004 GSS/ISSP national identity modules. The response rate was 58.5 percent.

26. The conclusion that the higher level of ardent nationalism in 2004 is related to the post-9/11 political climate is further supported by our analyses of annual Gallup data on confidence in the military, Congress, and the presidency (results available upon request), which suggest that public support for state institutions increased sharply in late 2001 and remained relatively stable until at least 2004. Note also that the relative stability of ardent nationalism between 2004 and 2012 occurred in the face of generational replacement of some older Americans, who were most likely to be assigned to the ardent category, by younger Millennials (born between
1987 and 1996 and thus not represented in our 2004 data), who are considerably lower in both self-reported patriotism and religiosity than are older cohorts (Pew Research Center 2014).

27. It is important to note that the restrictive class includes a large share of African American respondents, a constituency that has widely rejected Donald Trump’s candidacy (largely because of its overwhelming identification with the Democratic Party, but also due to Trump’s overtly racial politics). The coexistence of African Americans and conservative whites in the same class is a useful reminder that different groups may subscribe to similar ideas for different reasons and with different implications for political behavior.

References


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