
Citation

Published Version

Permanent link
https://nrs.harvard.edu/URN-3:HUL.INSTREPOS:37363208

Terms of Use
This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#OAP;This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#OAP

Share Your Story
The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Submit a story.
Leah M. Wright

Online publication date: 14 March 2011

To link to this Article DOI: 10.1080/10999949.2011.551479
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10999949.2011.551479

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
This essay is an exploration of the political rise of politician Edward W. Brooke and his impact on the Republican Party and the black community throughout the 1960s. I argue that Brooke’s role in American political and social life reflected the convergence of civil rights and American conservatism, specifically as it related to the struggle for racial equality and the path of the Republican Party; within the article, I explore the ways in which Brooke attempted to prove that liberal ideas about race were not incompatible with the conservatism of the GOP; the black Republican also argued that once coupled, such ideas could be used to create innovative solutions to the needs of the nation’s citizens. Ultimately, I conclude that Brooke represented a centrist vision in the battle for the identity and direction of the modern GOP. Along with other black Republicans of the era, Brooke envisioned and fought for an alternative path for the GOP and for the nation—one that could provide African Americans in the 1960s and 1970s with an attractive and viable alternative to the modern liberalism of the Democratic Party. Brooke’s challenge was dual in nature: repair the soul of the Republican Party while growing the confidence of African American voters. Indeed, Ed Brooke’s involvement in the
In November 1966, Massachusetts Attorney General Edward W. Brooke stunned the nation when he soundly defeated Democratic challenger Endicott Peabody in one of New England’s most intense senatorial races. Earning the support of more than 60 percent of the Massachusetts electorate, Brooke skirted the political bureaucracy of a volatile Republican Party to become the first black politician elected to the Senate since Reconstruction. Significantly, his victory occurred in the midst of a nationwide white backlash, an onslaught of the “worst displays and revival of anti-Negro feelings which [lay] in the souls of whites.” Brooke’s triumph was a tremendous upset; but more than that, it represented a transformative moment in the rapidly changing arena of racial politics in America. Newspapers cheered the “progressive” nature of the Massachusetts electorate, while media outlets described him as the “hope of the nation,” the “hope of his party,” and the “future of American politics.” As California representative W.E. Barnett declared at Brooke’s senatorial swearing-in ceremony, this was the type of landmark event that had the potential to renew the “confidence and faith” of the American public. Life magazine gushed that the senator was the “change that America . . . needs.” Brooke’s rapid rise, one political observer concluded, would soon “shatter the myth that the county wasn’t ready for a black president.”

Edward Brooke’s election was a moment of profound achievement for both black Republicans and the larger GOP apparatus. Viewed as a political phenomenon, he not only represented the abstract goals of independent groups like the National Negro Republican Assembly, but also encapsulated an image that moderate and liberal Republican leaders had struggled to harness since the Goldwater debacle of 1964. Importantly, Brooke’s role in American political and social life reflects the convergence of civil rights and American conservatism, specifically as it relates to the struggle for racial equality and the path of the Republican Party. He advanced a philosophy of conservatism that included social justice and racial equality as core components; as such, he attempted to create a centrist party agenda rooted in civil rights issues that merged liberal ideas about race with traditionally conservative principles to create innovative solutions to the problems of the 1960s. However, Brooke’s centrist position was
not an embrace of Great Society liberalism, but rather, an alternative to it. Thus, the reconciliation of civil rights and conservatism, he argued, was a means of wooing African Americans back to the “Party of Lincoln”—an element he viewed as critical to Republican resurgence and vitality.

As a singular figure, Brooke is fascinating. Yet Brooke is not just a singular figure here, but represents a larger movement of black Republicans in postwar American politics. Theirs is a history that scholars have failed to appreciate, in that black politics and the GOP are viewed as irreconcilable concepts. But when we look at African American politics and the modern American conservative movement as irreconcilable, it creates a historical blind spot that obscures a very real and significant black political tradition.

To those ends, this essay explores the political rise of Ed Brooke and his impact on both the GOP and the black community. The first section highlights the politician’s early impact on party politics, concentrating on his advancement of a theory of “progressive conservatism” as an alternative to Goldwater extremism. The second examines the practical application of Brooke’s theory, specifically focusing on his 1966 senatorial campaign and subsequent victory. Ultimately, as this essay concludes, the senator had an impact on the path of the post-Goldwater Republican Party and on African American voters; moreover, Brooke’s position represented a centrist vision in the battle for the identity and direction of the modern GOP. Brooke, along with other black Republicans of the era, envisioned and fought for an alternative path for the GOP and the nation so that they could provide African Americans in the 1960s and 1970s with an “attractive and viable” alternative to the modern liberalism of the Democratic Party. The underlying challenge was dual in nature: repair the soul of the post-Goldwater Republican Party, while growing the confidence of African American voters.

**Toward a Theory of Progressive Conservatism**

“Ed Brooke,” wrote *Time* magazine, “Runs hard—‘like a Democrat.’” The editors were referring to the Massachusetts politician’s 1962 campaign for the state attorney general position: running on a hearty law and order platform, the young Republican used his easy manner and quick intelligence to capture a decisive political victory. The *Pittsburgh Courier* applauded Brooke’s win as a turning point in American race relations, declaring that the election meant “qualified Negro candidates would be supported on the basis of merit rather than racial ancestry,” and black voters “would support candidates
on the basis of their commitment to issues instead of party politics.” Along these lines, Brooke fought fiercely to convince African Americans to join the GOP, urging the black electorate to forge “shrewd alliances” to make the most of their political power. Eager to reintegrate the party, the ambitious official proclaimed that he was part of a new generation of Republican politicians, ready for change. This dual embrace of civil rights and the Republican Party was, in part, a reflection of Brooke’s upbringing as a member of a segregated black middle class and his experience as a soldier in World War II. Consequently, he returned from the war determined to pursue a career in social justice and politics; however, in many ways, these ambitions were unique, in that they were informed by the principles of traditional conservatism: duty, self-help, free enterprise, small government, fiscal prudence, and a “conservative regard for history and precedent.” Inspired by the legacy of Abraham Lincoln and Theodore Roosevelt, he argued that the “government should do for people only that which they cannot do for themselves.” And yet, given the economic and social realities of modern society, Brooke also reasoned that “there were a number of things people could not do for themselves and that government must do for them”—most notably in the area of American civil rights. It is also important to note that Brooke came of “political age” in Massachusetts during the postwar era; he notes in his autobiography, Bridging the Divide: My Life, that he was “comfortable” with the state GOP and associated Democrats with “corruption” and the “dispensation of patronage.” Herbert L. Jackson’s 1945 victory in local politics also played a significant role in Brooke’s political consciousness; Jackson—a black Republican from Malden, Massachusetts—demonstrated to Brooke that African Americans could win in predominately white areas. Ultimately for Brooke, the Republican Party was the “party of the future,” engaging in progressive activities such as passing antidiscrimination measures; the Democratic Party, on the other hand, resisted such laws and was “devoid of ideas.”

Undoubtedly, this explains both how and why Brooke was able to suggest that the GOP was “truly the party of the people.” As he announced to an audience at the Massachusetts Republican Convention in 1960: “We are a united party and will destroy the myths of class, race, creed, wealth, antilabor, suburbia, which the Democratic Party attempted to shackle us with.” Here then, Brooke viewed civil rights as inherent to the Republican code, as freedom and equality was guaranteed by the Constitution. More specifically, as Brooke declared, support for equal rights was “merely a reaffirmation of our principle ‘with liberty and justice for all.’”

Considering such impassioned sentiments, it is unsurprising that Brooke considered Republican Barry Goldwater’s 1964 presidential
nomination offensive; he found the candidate’s repeated and public opposition to civil rights legislation particularly painful given his personal experience as a longtime Republican. In countless ways, Goldwater’s brand of conservatism stood in violation of Brooke’s core principles. Publicly breaking with his party’s nomination, the Massachusetts official implored Republicans not to invest in the “pseudo-conservatism” of zealots; to do so would be a devastating rejection of the better part of Republican ideals and traditions. Conservatism with blatant ties to segregation and racism would be an insult to the origins and history of the party.\textsuperscript{18} His public repudiation of Goldwater actually helped Brooke win a landslide reelection in 1964; in a year when voters were running from the party in droves, Brooke won by a plurality of nearly 800,000 votes—the highest margin of victory of any GOP candidate in the nation.\textsuperscript{19} Such a decisive victory was a sharp contrast to the electoral woes of the Republican Party in the aftermath of the national contest; thus, the country quickly looked to the politician in the days following the election to explain what happened and where the party should go from there.\textsuperscript{20}

Appearing on NBC’s \textit{Meet the Press} the day after the election, Brooke called the presidential contest the “worst he’d ever seen.” In his interview, and in subsequent appearances in other media forums, he argued that the Goldwater candidacy had deprived voters of choice and “backed Negroes into a corner,” forcing them into a relationship where they had no option but to vote for the Democratic nominee.\textsuperscript{21} President Johnson, Brooke railed, “had not been challenged; he did not have to defend the policies and programs he had set before the nation and was proposing for the future. What did he have to defend them against?” In short, Brooke suggested that the GOP had failed the nation by allowing a candidate to “win the Presidency... by default.”\textsuperscript{22} Pointing to notions of linked fate, he also argued that African Americans shared a common bond over issues of racial equality; this community loyalty was “something they are born with, that they have to live with,” Brooke explained. A vote for Goldwater then, would mean being a “traitor” to the cause of civil rights. Interestingly, Brooke insisted that African Americans’ liberal stance on issues of race did not, however, symbolize a blanket acceptance of Johnson’s Great Society initiatives, or even modern Democratic liberalism in general. Instead, he argued, it simply represented an “anti-Goldwater vote.” Consequently, the real damage of the 1964 election was the public’s “measurable” distrust in the Republican Party. Devoid of ideas, programs, solutions, and tangible assets, the GOP appeared to lack purpose and direction. “You can’t say that the Negro left the Republican Party,” Brooke reasoned, “I’m convinced that the Negro feels like he was evicted.”\textsuperscript{23}
Encouraged by an outpouring of positive responses, the spirited attorney general continued to offer blunt criticisms of his party, softening his rhetoric by proposing strategy solutions for Republican revival.\(^{24}\) Chief among these was his suggestion that the party hold an off-year national convention; he even urged Goldwater and his supporters to attend, so that party members of all ideological leanings could “hammer out an agreement for the future of the party” and draft a responsible platform to address “bread-and-butter issues” important to African Americans, women, the elderly, the poor—the “very groups that had rejected the party in droves.”\(^{25}\) Speaking at a Lincoln–Douglass dinner hosted by the Cleveland Eighteenth Ward Republican Club in February 1965, Brooke proposed that true Republicans should seize control of the organization and start presenting positive programs of actions to subvert the party’s image as “do-nothing reactionaries.”\(^{26}\) Accomplishing such a task would never be simple, Brooke acknowledged; nonetheless, the party could begin to make inroads to the “Negro problem” by demonstrating clear support for the enforcement of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and integrating the party by welcoming the “sons, the grandsons, and the great grandsons of slaves.”\(^{27}\)

Brooke’s vigorous emergence as a Republican spokesman for racial equality is notable, for as Time observed, the attorney general “never rallied his race to challenge segregation barriers with the inspirational fervor of a Martin Luther King…. He has triggered none of the frustrated fury of a Stokely Carmichael.”\(^{28}\) Journalist Chuck Stone labeled Brooke the archetype of “non-Negro politics” in his 1968 assessment of black political leadership; as the writer explained, the Massachusetts official cast himself as a politician who “happened to be black.”\(^{29}\) Historian John Henry Cutler expanded this point in 1972, writing, “Brooke recognized the difference between theory and practice and understood the aim of racial balancing.” He was as “anxious as black militants” to enrich the lives of his community, but also understood he could make large gains for civil rights by engaging in “pragmatic” identity politics.\(^{30}\)

Such an approach, the elected official detailed, effectively nullified racist notions that black politicians were unable to govern intelligently; this in turn, facilitated the integration—in both major political parties—of African Americans to influential positions of power. Most important, perhaps, was Brooke’s belief that as an elected official he could boldly influence his party’s ideology, and push legislation and policies rooted in issues of social justice and racial equality.\(^{31}\) Arguably, Brooke’s embrace of both a civil rights agenda and non-Negro politics was heightened dramatically given his party affiliation and his conservative views. Certainly, a number of Brooke’s
ideas came as a “shock” to many; for example, the state attorney general angered both black and white citizens in 1965 by ruling against a proposed boycott protesting “de facto segregation” in Boston’s public school. In that same year, he also argued vigorously in favor of increased accountability among African Americans: “In this respect, I'm purely Republican. I believe very strongly in self-help. Otherwise, you make parasites out of people.”

Given his decidedly unique perspective and nuanced approach to American politics, as well as his emergence as a “ballot box sensation,” it is unsurprising that Brooke generated such intense national interest. His concrete success in the face of the party’s disaster elevated his status to that of a Republican leader who could, as the Washington Post posited, “Potentially do more than any other to win back Negro votes.” Importantly, a number of prominent officials pushed the attorney general as the centerpiece of GOP revival. In March 1965, former vice president Richard Nixon, for instance, led a strategy session in Washington, D.C., that identified Brooke as a logical choice to serve as a liaison between African Americans and the Republican Party, whose responsibility would also include analyzing issues of black concern. Explaining his rationale to the New York Times, the ever-shrewd Nixon theorized that if the GOP contributed to racial uplift and advancement, it would boost the party’s future prospects with a rapidly growing black electorate. In a series of radio programs on civil rights, Brooke discussed race-related issues, interweaving them with suggestions on urban disorder, housing, and health care. Prominent party officials also appeared on the show, offering commentary and different solutions. The Pittsburgh Courier pondered authenticity of the GOP’s “surprising” behavior, speculating that such approval appeared to hint that the party was grooming Brooke to be the vice presidential nominee in 1968. Undoubtedly, such a nomination would strengthen the Republican machine, the editors reasoned, since it would destroy the “honeymoon relationship” between the Democratic Party and the black community.

However, Brooke’s early collaborative relationship with the upper echelons of the party spoke more to his interest in changing the party’s philosophy rather than any vice presidential ambitions. And for the attorney general, the fundamental solution to the GOP’s deep-seated woes began with a furious overhaul of Republican ideology. Survival rested on constructive innovation, a topic he outlined in detail during an April 1965 speech at the National Press Club. To recover its vitality, the GOP needed to invest in domestic issues before they emerged fully in the political arena. Leaders needed to study the problems of everyday Americans and to propose and enact legislation
that would “best solve these emerging problems at their roots.” Pointing to the welfare system as an example of his theory, Brooke argued that the national dole “steps in to help only after the mistakes have been made by the individual.” Republicans could offer alternatives on all levels of government that not only reformed the welfare system but also advanced “honest government, fiscal integrity, and social action.” A shift from the “welfare state” to the “opportunity state,” he concluded, was a policy that employed conservative principles to advance progressive ideas that engaged the economic and social realities of the 1960s.38

In launching such ideas, the party could finally provide the national electorate—in particular, African Americans—with a strong and viable alternative to the welfare state liberalism instituted by the New Deal and expanded by the Great Society; likewise, it presented a solution that placed genuine attention to civil rights squarely within a Republican framework. In no uncertain terms, Brooke was urging his party to advance progressive and forward-thinking ideas and embrace civil rights, or risk being on the “wrong side of history.”

Moreover, by integrating racial equality into the fabric of the GOP institution, civil rights would no longer be a deciding factor in American politics. African Americans could then “choose to embrace” conservatism if they so desired, since it no longer conflicted with their racial reality. A number of historical documents underscore Brooke’s assessment; for example, an April 1965 editorial by black Chicagoan Lillian Calhoun implored the Republican Party to get its ideology right or “keep losing elections.” A growing number of African Americans were open and receptive to conservatism, she argued, but the ideology had to include civil rights and racial equality. If it did not, Calhoun warned, “Even Jesus running on the Republican ticket might not get a respectable vote.”39 Similarly, black Republican Clarence Townes offered an interpretation suggesting that the full appeal of the party lay in its history, principles, and traditions: “If conservatism means the preservation of our traditional doctrine of equality, liberty, freedom and constitutional guarantees of the pursuit of happiness,” he proclaimed, “then the American Negro citizen is a most dedicated conservative.”40

Brooke characterized his approach at length in his book The Challenge of Change: Crisis in Our Two-Party System, released in March 1966. Within it, he expanded his suggestions into an ideological commitment to “progressive conservatism.” A number of reviewers eagerly engaged the book, assessing the blunt arguments within as generally “convincing.” As one commentator wrote, “In telling us his views, Mr. Brooke throws punches instead of pulling them. He has written no dirge for the Republican Party. Rather, he offers a
stimulating blueprint for success that is both practical and workable.” Wendell Woodman of the News-Tribune declared Challenge a classic “modern day essay on political theory”; yet another delivered effusive praise, calling the book a brilliant manifesto for the two party system that pointed the way to party “renaissance and reestablishment,” offered the nation a genuine political choice, and established a “dynamic, pioneer Republican future.”

As Woodman rightly highlighted, much of the significance of Challenge rested in its demand for Republican-initiated progressive and innovative social programs that adequately addressed the needs of the nation. “We are not merely the minority party,” Brooke wrote, “we are the perennial minority party.” Republicans would continue in this state, he argued, so long as they resisted genuine appeals to minorities: “Democrats have not won them so much as we have lost them. In fact, we all but exiled them, including . . . Negroes who were once staunch Republicans.” Likewise, Brooke suggested that the party’s biggest weakness was its failure to produce authentic solutions, whereas the Democratic Party—since the New Deal—had searched for new answers, and proposed and implemented legislation. As such, the GOP had assumed a public identity characterized by its “dogged determination to speak out against the proposals of others.”

Insisting the party look to its history, Brooke claimed that Lincoln and subsequent Republican leaders had once embraced “daring and radical measures” when the times demanded it, some even going so far as to use government as an instrument of social betterment; thus, an “eagerness to meet the challenge of change, to innovate, to channel new social and economic forces within new political institutions . . . was entirely in harmony with . . . the spirit that made the party great.” Moreover, though Brooke indicated that he shared Barry Goldwater’s belief that the GOP should stand firmly for conservatism, he ultimately pegged the Arizona senator’s interpretation as distorted and inauthentic. Republicans had a duty to create permanent solutions, engineering change in order to prevent “serious damage to the foundation.”

Importantly, Brooke’s centrist philosophy was not an embrace of Democratic liberalism, but instead learned from it and proposed ideas as an alternative to it. He declared, “If the Democrats call themselves the party of the people, then we are the party of the individual, concerned with the place and dignity of man; his rights and his welfare, his future in a free society. A party demonstrating this concern will deserve the support of the American people. A party demonstrating this concern will win the support of the American people.” Although he accepted the humanitarian aspect of the Great Society, Brooke rejected the approach as fundamentally inadequate. Here then, as
he maintained, was the Republican Party’s greatest challenge and its greatest opportunity for revival: the “total elimination” of racial inequality in modern society. To those ends, Challenge was Brooke’s attempt to reconcile traditional Republican principles with the realities of civil rights; thus, the solution to the party’s woes lay in its ability to develop social welfare programs within the framework of traditional conservatism.

There are a number of early instances of Brooke testing his theory of progressive conservatism. In particular, soon after publishing Challenge, he launched a detailed twenty-three-page criticism of the Johnson administration, entitled Negroes and the Open Society. He bluntly rejected the Great Society, calling for an “Open Society” or a nation that extended its citizens access to equal justice under the law, a quality education, decent housing and health, and the “economic benefits of the free enterprise system.” Championing a coordinated attack on discrimination, Brooke also proposed that politicians no longer rely solely on the federal government, but also demand constructive joint efforts between the public and private spheres.46 Impressed with the Massachusetts attorney general’s gumption in “rocking the boat” of the Johnson administration, Jet editors also wrote enthusiastically that Brooke’s ideas represented a viable approach to a nation in turmoil. The Republican Party would be wise to follow his “dynamic and outspoken” advice, they declared.47

Many within the party did, in fact, latch on to such concepts, none more so than the officials at the Republican National Committee (RNC). Brooke’s ideas appeared to confirm GOP success in the November 1965 election; specifically, precinct returns showed strong black support for Republican candidates in cities including Philadelphia, Louisville, and New York.48 Eager to better understand the context in which these candidates won, the RNC commissioned a report to determine the driving force behind such success and if it could be duplicated on a larger scale. The findings, stressed the Washington Post, could be “politically explosive” especially if they indicated that black constituents were disenchanted with the Democratic Party. Consequently, the report documented the same conclusion that Ed Brooke had advanced for years: the election findings proved, “without any question,” that the party had a significant opportunity to make inroads with African Americans. “There is ample evidence that Negro voters will support Republican candidates,” the report stated, “when they offer attractive and constructive programs dealing with the important issues of the day.”49

In the same month that Brooke launched The Challenge of Change, the RNC launched its “Negro Advisory Committee,” a working group of prominent black Republicans, dedicated to creating a bold outreach
campaign, along with policies and solutions to address the needs of African Americans. Likewise, Clarence L. Townes of Virginia was appointed special assistant to RNC Chair Ray C. Bliss. In his work with the RNC, Townes offered strategies that paralleled the public outcries of Edward Brooke. In particular, the RNC official urged the national committee to focus on the party’s traditional conservatism by adopting a centrist, pragmatic position; doing so would allow party leaders to understand the desire and aspirations of the “New Negro who has evolved since the 1930s” and provide modern solutions based on conservative principles. But more than that, Townes proposed the RNC cultivate a “Negro Goodwill Ambassador,” or a high-ranking African American politician that could articulate and cultivate a positive appreciation for party policies on civil rights, economics, and foreign affairs. More specifically, the ambassador would draw “logical” connections between historic conservatism and African American issues and ambitions. The situation would be of mutual benefit to the entire party, since goodwill officials had the potential to open doors in the black community otherwise inaccessible by white Republicans. The hypothetical black politician, Townes deliberated, should be a young “fresh name”—a figure of moderate and pragmatic ideology, able to advance nuanced party philosophies and innovative ideas, while appealing to both black and white voters. “We must do it this way because it will send a message to the public that we are serious about a new and real program…and we are in tune with the ‘new day.’…We need a bold new and dramatic program to get black support.”

Driving a Republican Resurgence

Brooke’s theory of progressive conservatism also had a practical component, which largely explained his decision to run for senator in 1966. Shrewdly assessing the politician’s move, a Washington Post reporter observed that a senatorial role offered the Massachusetts leader a greater opportunity to “exploit what the Republican Party has to offer Negroes.” Indeed, Brooke’s candidacy was a means of demonstrating that African Americans could be successful within the framework of the Republican Party inasmuch as it would provide practical counterevidence to the notion that only the Democratic Party cared about civil rights and racial equality. As the Milwaukee Sentinel fervently stated, Brooke’s bid had the potential to “erase the distasteful image the party won in the Goldwater debacle.” Brooke’s decision to run for a position in the U.S. Senate was also part of a general surge of black Republican activity that marked...
the period. A number of African American members decided to seek public office in the aftermath of Goldwater, hoping to make their influence known in the ideological overhaul of the GOP machine. In Virginia, for example, Clarence Townes ran for a seat in the House of Delegates in 1965. Inspired by Brooke’s landslide reelection as attorney general, galvanized by the Goldwater fiasco, and provoked by the local Democratic Party, Townes declared, “In this time and at this stage of our history, our efforts... must provide the Negro’s answer to the call for statesmanship. We must—and we will accept the challenge to greatness as Republicans.” The New York Times agreed, concluding that the black Republican’s candidacy was a symbol of the “growth of the two-party and two-color politics in Virginia.” Cheering the Republican Party for taking a “militant stand” against the “racist policies of Virginia Democrats,” the editors argued that the state’s progressive actions clearly demonstrated that Republicans could still embarrass “Democratic-segregationist regimes” and ultimately win southern black votes.

Brooke’s appeal, however, had a distinctly unique element: as a twice-elected high-ranking party official, he already had a mandate that compelled access to upper-echelon party circles. Moreover, to moderate and liberal Republicans, it appeared as though Brooke had a special aptitude for wooing frustrated voters regardless of race or political affiliation. Media outlets trumpeted Brooke’s “March on Washington,” and declaring that he would help “remodel his party.” “If Brooke wins,” the Newark Sunday News announced, “He will be pioneering the way for other Negroes who are moving up in elective all across the nation.

And yet Brooke simultaneously perplexed both the nation and his party. As a black Protestant Republican in a predominately white Catholic Democratic state, he confused even the most seasoned politicians, including Richard Nixon. In many ways, race became an unspoken issue early in his senatorial campaign, a tension that was heightened by the outbreak of violence and rioting in cities across the nation. Thus, despite running on a platform of law and order, Brooke quickly fell victim to the threat of white backlash politics. A number of media outlets came to the conclusion that the senate hopeful would lose due to the ominous pattern of white resentment. An October 1966 editorial cartoon provided a jarring demonstration of the backlash shroud that covered Brooke throughout his campaign; the drawing depicted a shirtless Ed Brooke, hunched over with the word “Backlash” whipped into his back. Suspended over his head was the phrase “Innocent Victim?”.

Joseph Alsop of the Washington Post predicted that the “mere color of Brooke’s skin” would be the candidate’s downfall. If not for
his race, the journalist lamented, Brooke would be a “sure winner.”

Fears of racial retaliation were stoked by gloomy reports of the growing unease among white voters attributed to the “course of the Negro revolution” and the “menacing rhetoric of the ‘black power’ movement.” In Chicago, civil rights demonstrators were met with angry shouts of “Wait ‘til the election!” “The backlash is definitely growing,” commented Louise Day Hicks of the Boston School Board. “We are feeling the impact from disturbances around the whole country. The backlash will adversely affect Brooke and that’s undeserved. If anything, he is less liberal on civil rights than [Endicott] Peabody.”

“I think there is a backlash,” Democratic Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts remarked, “but it’s not the principal factor in this election. Voters are taking a critical look at Brooke’s record as attorney general.”

However, there were a number of signals that contradicted the threat of a Massachusetts white backlash. For example, a public opinion research firm tracking racial attitudes found that Brooke had a statewide approval rating of 80 percent at the start of the campaign; moreover, by September 1966, only 4 percent of the Massachusetts public felt as though Brooke had done “too much” to help African Americans gain equal rights. Even when the research firm split voters into groups based on racial prejudices, Brooke still tallied uniformly positive ratings. Endicott Peabody, on the other hand, failed to achieve high marks from any group. Interestingly, as the public opinion firm concluded, Brooke’s popularity actually increased after he made a decision to address the issue of race “head-on.” Indeed, his response to the backlash rhetoric including delivering a series of widely publicized speeches and appearances, repudiating Black Power advocates.

During a talk at Harvard University, he told 1,300 rapt college students that the civil rights movement had “taken a turn in the wrong direction”: “After the chant of ‘black power’…fear swept the across the nation…and the percentage of American people believing in equality for all dropped…and the 1966 civil rights act was defeated. I trust there will be a rejection of both ‘black power’ and the echoing cry of ‘white power.’” “Black Power,” he added, “will multiply racial woes instead of solve them.” Moreover, he declared, “I intend to raise my voice at every opportunity against extremists of both the right and the left, to look for them, seek them out and expose them.” He relayed a message to multiple audiences over the course of the campaign that he was a “law and order guy” by trade; thus, equality was a battle best fought through “non-violent, peaceful, lawful procedures.” Rioting and violence, insisted Brooke, would only lead to “bloodshed, deeper fears, and a greater gulf among peoples.” As he closed at one press conference: “A vote for me is a vote against Stokely Carmichael.”
Importantly, Brooke’s rhetoric also probed the idea of black representation, implicitly questioning the “right” vision of uplift for the black community. African Americans, as a collective, were neither excluded nor denounced in his speeches; rather, he spoke of the desperate need to address black citizens’ frustrations and looked to the root economic and social triggers of the anarchic outbursts sweeping the nation. Moreover, though he condemned both black power advocates and white racists, he also urged black and white constituents to be progressive in their concern for civil rights and conservative in their respect for law and order. Appearing on ABC’s *Issues and Answers* in September 1966, he argued, “If Black Power means economic and political power of the Negro in order that they might improve their lot...Americans will accept it. But if it means militancy and violence...it has to be rejected.”

Nevertheless, political observers continued to make bleak predictions; the night before the election, the *Chicago Defender* despaired that Brooke’s defeat was inevitable since the state’s white residents would never tolerate a “Negro political takeover.” Given such depressed outcomes, the nation was shocked when Brooke trounced Endicott Peabody, commanding nearly 1.3 million votes. As reporter Richard Hardwood crowed, “The highly publicized and highly feared ‘white backlash’ failed to materialize.” Adding to this sentiment, Whitney Young of the National Urban League (NUL) observed, “When the chips are down, people prefer to vote their intelligence and good sense rather than their prejudices.” Countless news sources rushed to document the senator’s historic win, including *Time* magazine, which placed Brooke—along with Ronald Reagan, George Romney, Charles Percy, Mark Hatfield, and Nelson Rockefeller—on the cover of the November 18, 1966 issue under the headline “Republican Resurgence”. Just three months later, *Time* would devote an entire cover to Brooke, championing him as the “New style and a new hope” for the Republican Party.

Clearly, the 1966 midterm elections were a moment of profound achievement for the Republican Party. As RNC Chairman Ray Bliss announced, “It looks to me...as if we have a very live elephant.” The editors at *Time* argued that the election had pulled the Republican Party back from the brink, erasing the “Goldwater image of a narrow, negative clique, replacing it with the vision of a cohesive, inclusive party.”

The election had a critical impact on black party members; for groups like the National Negro Republican Assembly (NNRA), Brooke’s election in particular, was seen as a concrete victory in the struggle for racial equality and advancement. Clarence Townes of the RNC specifically pointed to statistics that illustrated Brooke’s
widespread appeal. Not only had the senator claimed a plurality of white voters, but he had also received the support of 86 percent of the black electorate in Massachusetts. Brooke’s historic senatorial win inspired an outpouring of support from African Americans around the country (evidenced in the thousands of letters, telegrams, and speaking requests he received). Likewise, arriving at the Senate in January for his swearing-in ceremony, Brooke was overwhelmed by a crowd of five thousand who cheered for his success. Probing such reactions, Time suggested that Brooke was the embodiment of the “Negro’s deeper vision of equality with white Americans in terms of individual intellect, ability and dignity.” What is perhaps more significant, however, is that African Americans viewed Brooke as their senator; implicit was the understanding that he would represent their desires, regardless of his party affiliation. As Simeon Booker of Ebony mused, Brooke now had “five million white constituents in Massachusetts and . . . 20 million black ones across the country.”

Moreover, this was a phenomenon that went beyond Brooke and affected the mainstream GOP. Nationwide in 1966, the black electorate contributed 20 percent of its vote to the Republican Party—a stark contrast to the meager 6 percent tallied by Barry Goldwater two years earlier (Table 1). African Americans were selective in their support; as one party strategist theorized, “The Negro, it would seem . . . was little interested in party labels [and] immensely interested in the candidates themselves.” In Arkansas, gubernatorial candidate Winthrop Rockefeller, brother of Nelson, received 96 percent of the black vote. In Maryland, Spiro Agnew—a politician who would just two years later come to personify the “Silent Majority” of backlash politics—tallied 79 percent of the African American vote.

Table 1
The black vote in the 1966 election compared to the 1964 election (states)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>1966 (%)</th>
<th>1964 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>Winthrop Rockefeller</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>96.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>Edward Brooke</td>
<td>Senator</td>
<td>85.6</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>Spiro T. Agnew</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>79.0</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>John Sherman Cooper</td>
<td>Senator</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>Clifford Case</td>
<td>Senator</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>George Romney</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>Nelson Rockefeller</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>Howard Baker</td>
<td>Senator</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>Ronald Reagan</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The black electorate played a crucial role in Governor Nelson Rockefeller’s reelection success, contributing 35 percent of its power. And in Houston, Texas, black constituents supplied Congressman George H. W. Bush with a much-needed 30 percent (Table 2).85

All of these figures were significant on their own, but they were made all the more important when contrasted with figures from the 1964 election. Black party strategists claimed that the election returns proved that African Americans would vote for a Republican candidate if the nominee demonstrated a genuine interest in issues of black concern. To be sure, the results in Ohio offered the best example of this: Governor James Rhodes received 47 percent of the black vote in Cincinnati, whereas he received only 25.6 percent in Cleveland. In the latter city, Rhodes’s precinct campaign team exhibited a “cool, if not actively hostile” treatment of black voters; in contrast, Cincinnati was marked by its aggressive liberal county organization.86 “The Negro electorate is about as sophisticated as any segment of American society,” enthused Townes. “They know where their best interest is. They recognize who is doing what.”87

The 1966 election signaled to the nation that the Republican Party could choose a path that stood outside the boundaries of Goldwater conservatism. It was no coincidence that five out of the six Republican politicians featured on the 1966 Time cover were moderates or liberals.88 In a five-page spread, Ebony magazine celebrated this “ideological triumph,” declaring that the party had established a bold new style, attractive enough to convince African Americans to “return to the party of Lincoln in surprising numbers.”89 And as one eager party member shared, “We’re going to re-examine, change, revise and amend existing programs wherever we can. We won’t kill the [Great Society] but we’re sure going to revise it from top to bottom.”90

### Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>1966 (%)</th>
<th>1964 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boston</td>
<td>John Volpe</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>63.1</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cincinnati</td>
<td>James A. Rhodes</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlanta</td>
<td>Fletcher Thompson</td>
<td>Congressman</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houston</td>
<td>George H.W. Bush</td>
<td>Congressman</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philadelphia</td>
<td>Raymond Shafer</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleveland</td>
<td>James Rhodes</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detroit</td>
<td>George Romney</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>Charles Percy</td>
<td>Congressman</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Indeed, by mid-1967, Republican groups in Chicago, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Minneapolis, Kansas City, New York City, and Washington, D.C., had initiated a number of social welfare programs, guided by the overarching principles of self-help and personal responsibility. In Michigan for example, the Metropolitan Action Center provided job-training opportunities for underemployed and unemployed black men and women, developed a summer camp for African American youth, and hosted a 1967 seminar and workshop on Black Power in America; in Houston, Texas, Congressman Bush, along with local black Republican businessmen, initiated a minority bank deposit program and established an African American youth summer job program. Local and state party officials also joined the efforts, pumping money into civil rights commissions, appointing African Americans to high-level state government positions, and sponsoring equal rights legislation—as did Pennsylvania Governor Ray Shafer, whose open housing, fair employment, and injunctive relief bills put him at the “forefront of ‘progressive’ administrations.”

Many of these programs were funded or aided by the RNC as part of a campaign to reintegrate the Republican Party. With a full staff of black Republicans, the Minorities Division of the RNC launched a coordinated endeavor, supplemented by initiatives like voter registration and education drives, leadership training workshops, urban housing, employment, and transportation programs, and business development seminars. In implementing these efforts, Republicans hoped to illustrate and publicize their alternative solutions for curing the black community’s ailments, penetrate “hardcore Democratic oriented” areas, and, as Clarence Townes boasted, “become the party of equal opportunity.” In January 1967, the Minorities Division scored one of its biggest accomplishments, announcing the appointment of Junius Griffin, Martin Luther King Jr.’s former press secretary. The civil rights activist declared that the newly elected liberal and moderate GOP coalition symbolized the direction, in which the Republican Party was headed, concluding that the officials “never separated [themselves] from the aspirations and the demands of the Negro.” In many ways, the GOP hoped that African Americans would begin to embrace the party; as *Ebony* pointed out, so long as the GOP continued to demonstrate a clear commitment to racial progress, all signs pointed to a “glowing reconciliation between the Republican Party and the Negro.”

Moreover, as *Ebony* also argued, much of this “reconciliation” depended on Ed Brooke. More specifically, as the black periodical observed, Brooke was a “commodity” for both black and white voters; he had the potential to become one of the “vaunted ‘leaders’ of the coming years,” so long as the GOP supported his sociopolitical
agenda. Indeed, within the House and Senate, moderate and liberal Republicans attempted to harness the new direction of the GOP and create a new balance of power. For Brooke, this was an opportune period where “Rockefeller Republicans” could forge progressive legislation and create bipartisan coalitions on issues including busing and fair housing; significantly, Brooke claimed that he could do so without sacrificing his race, his principles, or his party. Alongside Senator Charles “Mac” Mathias of Maryland, Brooke revived the Wednesday Club of liberal and moderate Republican officials. Together the members dialogued over progressive issues, reached consensuses and compromises, and often voted as a bloc group.

Similarly, though not a formal member, Brooke also built a strong working relationship with the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC), consulting on issues of race and social welfare. As political scientist Ronald Walters suggests, Brooke’s presence in the Senate was “extraordinarily invaluable” for both Republican conservatives and Democratic liberals in that he could easily act as a liaison for both groups. The members of the CBC, for example, perceived Brooke as another avenue through which to reach Republican senators and congressmen—and eventually, Republican presidents. Brooke’s relationship with the CBC extended further than most scholars recognize; for instance, Congresswoman Shirley Chisholm and Congressman Charlie Rangel, both of New York, aggressively lobbied the White House to select Brooke for vice president in 1973 and 1974.

Understanding this support for a political figure like Brooke hinges, in part, on the significance of two-party politics and black political independence—specifically issues of choice, power, representation, and destiny. An explosion in strategies and ideas for coalition building marked the 1960s and 1970s; of particular importance was the emphasis placed on using the black vote as a force in politics, to enact social and economic change. Such sentiments were strong enough to link loosely many black political actors during the era, despite basic differences in political affiliation. The National Black Political Convention of 1972 in Gary, Indiana, is one of many examples of an attempt of African Americans to unite under a banner of coalition politics; as convener Amiri Baraka observed, black citizens could “pull together, build and rise, or else we can draw apart, splinter polarize, and sink back to our abstract isolated ‘correctness.’” Thus, in Brooke, black leaders saw an abstract opportunity for coalition building and black independence. The black Republican highlighted this concept during a 1975 speech to the National Urban League, declaring, “large black constituencies could mean substantial black influence—how do we make that influence real? What [does] the black vote in different elections actually
mean?” The lesson, Brooke argued, was to learn from African American unity harnessed during the civil rights movement, and apply those lessons to the two-party American political system to institute change from within. African Americans could use their vote as a resource to demand change from both political parties—for instance, as a compelling barrier to segregation or to demand alternative solutions to address failures in federal welfare programs. In essence, for Brooke, the Republican Party was another vehicle for solutions—one that _should_ be seriously considered in the battle for equality and black freedom.

It appears that some of Brooke’s arguments about black independent voting and two-party politics took root; after delivering a keynote address at a 1967 conference on Black Elected Officials, Michigan Congressman John Conyers bluntly declared to the press that if the Democratic Party did not change its attitude toward black citizens, he was going to urge his constituents to vote for the GOP. Reporter Paul Hathaway mused that reports like these would not have been possible in 1964, but “today, it’s no secret that the Republican Party has been attracting a large number of disaffected Negroes.” Clearly, such actions were also tightly bound to the relationship of African Americans and the Democratic Party; however, they also indicated the influence of Ed Brooke, in conveying a message to black citizens about what the Republican Party _could be_.

**Conclusion**

When probed about his longtime commitment to the Republican Party, Edward Brooke commented, “People have asked me over and over again ‘why are you in the Republican Party when so many things you fight for and believe in are not positioned within your party?’ I’ve had my problems with the [GOP] but I believe in the vitality of a two-party system of government. I think I can do more inside the party than outside. I can do more to bring it closer to the center. You might call me a centrist. I’ve tried to bring the Republican Party back.” In truth, Ed Brooke _did_ bring the party closer to the center—if but for a moment—advancing his ideas and solutions into the national political arena. Furthermore, the Republican resurgence was a significant moment in the development of the modern Republican Party. It was a moment where Brooke, as a black Republican, could serve as the opening chairman of the 1968 Republican National Convention; it was a period where in the days leading up to the nomination convention, Brooke could confidently tell reporters that he had not been ruled out for the second spot on the ticket. As Simeon
Booker mused, “With an appealing national ticket in 1968, Republicans could well make their greatest showing among Negroes since Reconstruction.... Party strategists now seem convinced that, with growing Negro registration in the South, a great interest in the North, and a ground swell of enlightenment among younger whites, no truly reactionary candidate can win an important office in mid-20th century America.” There were many that believed Brooke was transcending the politics of Goldwater conservatism and ushering in a new era. As Clarence Mitchell of the NAACP wrote, in an emotional letter from 1973, “In all honesty, I must say that ten years ago, the thought of a black man becoming President would be dismissed as day-dreaming. [But] your impressive victories...and the whole manner in which you served in the Senate have helped to change the picture immeasurably. No matter what you may decide to do, I feel greatly comforted by the knowledge that the country is moving toward recognition of ability in candidates for public office rather than consideration based on race or national origin.”

Nonetheless, while such sentiments hold much power and measurable validity, it is also important to note that the triumph of liberal and moderate politics of the 1966 election experienced major setbacks by 1968. As one reporter correctly explained, despite the “Republican Jubilee,” party members were ever aware of the “rumbling of right wing thunder in the background.” Undoubtedly, the struggle over the fate of the Republican Party was deeply contested territory during this period. From Brooke’s point of view, his party broke over its different visions on foreign policy and the Vietnam War. In other areas, Brooke lamented that presidential ambitions hindered the potential for progressive alliances among conservatives. Perhaps even more damaging, the black Republican sadly observed that when the nation was racked by racial tensions in the late 1960s, his party split between those who favored a socioeconomic solution to riots and those who adopted a decidedly harder law and order stance. As Ebony warned, any burgeoning relationship between African Americans and the GOP would “depend largely on [the Republican Party’s] willingness to cope with the problems of Negroes with the same zeal it tackles the problems of industry and business.” Arguably the ideological fracturing of the GOP, the rise of a “New Republican Right,” and a tense, public divorce facilitated Brooke’s 1978 senatorial defeat. And yet, even as Brooke was slowly losing his public position, the NAACP felt compelled to pass an emergency resolution highlighting the senator’s record: “The NAACP takes note of and applauds the outstanding service Edward Brooke has given this nation, while standing as a shining symbol of American democracy in action.... Let there be no mistake about our position. Senator
Brooke’s performance in public office...has kept the faith in his nation, his constituency, and his people.”

Within the scholarship, the stories with which we are familiar are rich and complicated histories that detail the struggle to achieve black freedom in America. However they understand African Americans as a natural component of a liberal coalition. But when we fail to examine the complex history of black conservatism and the Republican Party, we fail to examine the full spectrum of African American political and social history. Edward Brooke’s involvement in the GOP and black politics during the 1960s dispels the assumption of a solid black vote and broadens our understanding of the diversity of 20th-century American politics. The complex nature of this story is significant because for a period throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s, black Republicans played a critical role in the national conversation over race, politics, and ideology.

Ultimately, Edward Brooke’s role in American political and social life reflected the convergence of civil rights and American conservatism, specifically as it related to the struggle for racial equality and the path of the Republican Party. Brooke proved that liberal ideas about race were not incompatible with conservatism or the Republican Party; moreover, he illustrated that once coupled, such ideas could be used to create innovative solutions to the needs of the nation’s citizens. More broadly, Ed Brooke’s story demonstrates that the current fractious relationship that exists between African Americans and the Republican Party was not an inevitability. Indeed, his efforts and influence, as well as those of other black Republicans, highlight the direction the party could have gone in, and the complicated struggles that marked the party, as it attempted to define an identity and vision in the 1960s.

Notes

1. The Mississippi Legislature appointed two black senators: Hiram Rhodes (1870–1871) and Blanche Kelso Bruce (1875–1881). Additionally, Brooke’s political triumph was all the more remarkable given that fewer than 150 black officials had been elected to national public office at the time. See Poppy Cannon White, “Poppy’s Notes: History and Brooke,” New York Amsterdam News, November 26, 1966; Judson L. Jeffries, “U.S. Senator Edward W. Brooke and Governor L. Douglas Wilder Tell Political Scientists How Blacks Can Win High-Profile Statewide Office,” PS: Political Science and Politics 32, no. 3 (September 1999): 583; Edward W. Brooke, Bridging the Divide: My Life (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2007), 140–146.

8. In our quest to understand black politics, scholars have tended to emphasize the antagonistic relationship that exists between African Americans and the Republican Party. On one hand, in tracking the course of black politics, scholars trace a straight line of history that begins with Goldwater’s opposition to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, is strengthened by Nixon’s “Southern Strategy,” and is cemented by the coded racial language of Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush (with their attacks on “welfare queens” and not-so-subtle ads, such as the infamous Willie Horton commercial of 1988). Within this framework, the outcome is treated as an inevitability: the relationship between African Americans and the modern Republican Party had no choice but to deteriorate. The scholarship on 20th-century American conservatism often supports this thesis by offering an analysis that is concerned solely with white racism, and it treats African Americans as objects of conservative anger. Thus historians of modern conservatism have tended to privilege the presence of white racists in the party, treating their eventual surge in power as an inevitable outcome. These two strands of the historiography are, of course, mutually reinforcing. Republican conservatism is equated with white racism, and as a result, African Americans are by default equated with Democratic liberalism. Simply put: white conservatives are racist, therefore black voters must be liberal. The historiographies complement one another by placing African Americans and the civil rights movement outside the arena of the modern American conservative movement; they tell us that African Americans should not be conservatives. In the event that African Americans are conservatives, the scholarship treats them as outliers or pariahs.


10. Outside of GOP politics, Brooke was active in a number of civil rights groups. For example, he served as the president of the Boston chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and as vice president of the local Urban League. “Massachusetts GOP Choice: Nation’s Eyes on Candidacy of Brooke for Secretary of State,” Pittsburgh Courier, September 24, 1960. See also “Maturity,” Pittsburgh Courier, November 1962.

11. Brooke won the election by more than 250,000 votes. In doing so, he became the first African American in the nation to be elected to a state attorney general position. It also made him the highest ranking elected official at the time. “Political Maturity,” Pittsburgh Courier, November 24, 1962.


13. Born into a middle-class black family in Washington, D.C., in 1919, Brooke was raised in a racially segregated environment that was insulated from the harsh realities of the Deep South. This segregation was no less real; however, it was “subtler” in that Brooke rarely interacted with the white community and was also protected from most (if not all) of the blunt realities of racial violence. However, his experience as a soldier in World War II quickly exposed him to a tangible system of inequality, racism, and violence; Brooke began to rethink his “veneration” of Franklin Roosevelt after the president signed Executive Order 9066 authorizing Japanese internment, seemed “reluctant to act” on Nazi persecution of Jewish people, and failed to desegregate the armed forces. The war also played a critical role in Brooke’s understanding of racial issues, especially interracial marriage; he met his first wife while on assignment in Italy. He reasoned that “race had not mattered during our courtship in Italy,” and therefore it should not have mattered in the United States. Brooke, Bridging the Divide, 4–5, 21–38, 43–48, 278.


15. Of note, in 1950 Brooke cross-filed for candidacy with both majority political parties. Democrats rejected his appeal, whereas the GOP accepted him as a candidate. He was also inspired by the action and presence of party moderates like Joseph W. Martin and Leverett Saltonstall. When he declared GOP affiliation in 1952, Brooke stated that his decision was based on “loyalty, leadership, admiration, and potential.” Bridging the Divide, 55–57, 108; The Challenge of Change, 55–61; “Malden Elects First Colored City Officer,” The Afro-American, November 24, 1945.


17. Ibid., 65–67.

18. In his memoirs, Brooke suggests that the “tragic result” of Goldwater conservatism “was to deny opportunity to black Americans at a time when the majority of Americans wanted progress and social justice.” Ibid., 107–108. See also “Noisy, But Not Numerous,” Baltimore Afro-American, November 10, 1964.


20. “It was a great victory but a bittersweet one,” Brooke later recalled, “when I surveyed the ruins of our state and national party that the Goldwater candidacy had brought.” In a 2008 interview, Brooke also described the Goldwater defeat as disastrous on all levels. “Governors, local politicians, right down to city councils, and down to the towns,” he sadly stated. “The entire Republican Party was devastated by
the election of 1964.” Author conducted interview with Ed Brooke, August 2008; Brooke, Bridging the Divide, 109.

21. EWB, Untitled Interview on Goldwater and 1964 Election, 1965, Box 607, Folder Writings, EWB Papers.

22. Brooke added that the party’s failures created a false binary that “projected an image of a choice between good and evil, black and white, war and peace.” Edward Brooke, Address to the National Press Club, April 28, 1965, Box 607, Folder Writings 1965–78, Speeches and Writings File, 1961–1980, EWB Papers.


29. For example, Brooke stonily explained during a 1965 press appearance: “I am not a civil rights leader, and I don’t profess to be. I recognize… King, James Farmer, Roy Wilkins, Whitney Young, and… others as the civil rights leaders. This is their work—their profession.” His biggest grievance was with “militant white civil rights people” who insisted he should “be in the streets, leading marches.” For an interview with Brooke discussing race-neutral politics, see Jeffries, “U.S. Senator Edward W. Brooke and Governor L. Douglas Wilder”; Chuck Stone, “Non-Negro Politics,” in Black Political Power in America (New York: Dell, 1968); “Edward Brooke is Making His History,” St. Petersburg Times, February 22, 1966.


31. Brooke also noted that it was equally important for young people of color to see “black faces in positions of power” during the 1960s. In closing, he suggested that “black pragmatic politics” was the unwritten rule for many black candidates from both political parties (Doug Wilder, interviewed with Brooke, agreed). See Jeffries, “Brooke,” PS.

32. Brooke reasoned that his decision was fair, given that state law prohibited children from being kept out of schools. Addressing complaints of discrimination, the attorney general stated, “I’m here to rule on the law.” Victor Lasky, “Brooke’s Ideas May Come As a Shock to Liberals,” Virgin Island Daily News, December 14, 1966.


34. Even Goldwater conservatives recognized Brooke’s potential for recruiting black voters and rebuilding a positive party image. Speaking with a group of disgruntled Goldwater supporters in February 1965, former RNC Chair Dean Burch begged the conservatives to pay special attention to the Massachusetts attorney general. Brooke, he argued, had the potential to solve the “Negro vote” problem; Burch further reasoned that such a strategy aligned with a new strategy of Republican “tolerance,” since “no party can fly without a left, middle, and right wing.” Leslie Carpenter, “Washington Beat,” Washington Post, March 13, 1965; “Work to Get Negro Vote, Burch Urges,” Chicago Tribune, February 18, 1965.

35. One also gets the sense that Nixon sensed the political opportunity to make inroads with African Americans given that the constituency was poised to swell with the successful passage of the Voting Rights bill of 1965. Joseph A. Loftus, “G.O.P. is divided on Negro Voters,” New York Times, February 25, 1965.

36. Seeking a broad audience, party officials distributed copies to local radio stations across the country, which broadcast the show as a Republican sponsored public service announcement. “Brooke


41. There are dozens of anonymous clippings from newspaper and magazine book reviews on The Challenge of Change. For reference, please see Box 607, Folders: The Challenge of Change (Boston 1966), Book File[s], [Editor] Critique[s] by John S. Bottomly, and Draft Chapters, EWB Papers. See also Wendell H. Woodman, Challenge of Change, book review, The News-Tribune, April 7, 1966; Little, Brown editor notes on The Challenge of Change, November 4, 1965.


43. Ibid., 77. For a discussion of Abraham Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, and historical "Republican-ism," see 77–121, 243–255.

44. This is different from Barry Goldwater's interpretation of "progressive conservatism." For Goldwater's interpretation, see Leah M. Wright, "The Loneliness of the Black Conservative: Black Republicans and the Grand Old Party, 1964–1981" (Ph.D. dissertation, 2009), chap. 1. Additionally, Brooke argued that Goldwater's interpretation of conservatism indicated a disregard for the citizens of the nation, such as African Americans, the elderly, youth, and farmers; it conveyed an alienating message that things like civil rights, urban renewal, and social security were "un-American." Ibid., 243–258.

45. Ibid., 159.


50. Twelve black Republicans sat on the council, including Clarence L. Townes, special assistant to the Virginia Republican state committee chair; William O. Walker, publisher and editor of the Cleveland Call & Post; Joseph Bell, vice chair of the Michigan Republican state central committee; J. Earl Dearing, a Louisville attorney; James L. Flourney, a member of the California Republican state committee and a local NNRA official; George Fowler, of the New York chapter of the NNRA; Elaine Jenkins, vice chair of the District of Columbia Republican Committee; Stephen Maxwell, an attorney from St. Paul, Minnesota; William Robinson, a former Republican state legislator from Illinois; and Q. V. Williamson, an Atlanta city council alderman. See Republican National Committee, “Bliss Names Negro Advisory Committee,” Press Release, February 25, 1966, Box 51, Negro Vote, LBJ Presidential Papers; Carl T. Rowan, "The GOP's Uphill Fight for the Negro Vote," The Sunday Star, March 6, 1966; "Winning Negro Support for the GOP," New York Herald Tribune, February 27, 1966.

51. Townes's speech was quite lengthy, and it contained dozens of recommendations for party success. Perhaps what is most striking is that they reflect the RNC's official move away from the increasing militancy of the NNRA and toward his embrace of black pragmatic politics. His philosophy on this, is in fact, quite similar to Brooke's aforementioned rationales about pushing a specific agenda. See Clarence L. Townes, Speech to the Negro Advisory Committee, Folder Republican Party, RNC, Speeches by Townes, 1966–1969, CLT Papers; phone interview with Clarence L. Townes, July 21, 2008.

52. Townes, Speech to NAC, March 1966, CLT Papers.


54. For more information about the local background politics surrounding Brooke's decision to run, see Brooke, "Running for Senate" in Bridging the Divide.


59. For example, a public opinion study done of the Brooke campaign found that in September 1965, the official was enormously well known and had a general approval rating of 80 percent. John F. Becker and Eugene E. Heaton Jr., “The Election of Senator Edward W. Brooke,” Public Opinion Quarterly 31, no. 3 (Autumn 1967).

60. Ed Brooke’s files at the Library of Congress contain thousands of these references to the politician’s 1966 senatorial campaign. Even Barry Goldwater was moved to donate to Brooke’s senatorial campaign. As the Arizona official wrote in a succinct February 1966 missive: “I believe your election to the U.S. Senate would be good for the country and for the party.” In reply, Brooke (clearly surprised) wrote, “In view of my position in 1964 and my objections to your policies, your offer speaks for the bigness of Barry Goldwater, the man. I hope some day to be as big.” Brooke received thousands of endorsements over the course of his campaign, not only from Republican figures like Nelson Rockefeller, John Lindsay, George Romney, Thurston Morton, and Jacob Javits, but also from newspapers, magazines, constituents, and celebrities. Likewise the delegates to the Massachusetts Republican Convention delivered their rousing support for the candidate, providing him with nearly 1,300 more votes than the nearest contender. Please see: Boxes 613, 625, 639, 644 (Folder Ripon Society, 1965–72), 654, 415 (Folder Blacks Misc. 1967–76), EWB Papers; Vera Glaser, “Goldwater Offers Money to Put Brooke in Senate,” Virgin Island Daily News, February 15, 1966; “Goldwater Aids Brooke, Who Didn’t Support Him,” New York Times, June 25, 1966; “Brooke Wins Endorsement,” St. Petersburg Times, June 26, 1966; John Fenton, “Brooke Is Endorsed by Senate by Massachusetts Republicans,” New York Times, June 26, 1966.


62. Interview with EWB, August 26, 2008. See also Brooke, Bridging the Divide.


66. “A Negro for All the People.”

67. For example, a RNC survey from July 1966 indicated that 44 percent of voters considered civil rights a “major concern.” By October, the figure was at 58 percent.


69. Among the Massachusetts public, 20 percent felt that Brooke had done “too little” to aid civil rights, while 50 percent suggested that he had done “just the right amount.” In January 1966, 80 percent of the Massachusetts public was aware that Brooke was black; by November 1966, the figure reached near 100 percent. With regard to the federal government, 50 percent of respondents indicated that it was “too liberal on civil rights.” Finally, on the spectrum of “racial attitudes and prejudice,” 15 percent of voters fell into the “most prejudiced” category, 63 percent were considered “less prejudiced,” and 22 percent were “least prejudiced.” Brooke received near-perfect approval ratings among the “least” group and managed to break 50 percent approval in the other groups. Becker and Heaton, “Brooke,” POQ.


75. White backlash did, in fact, help a number of candidates during the 1966 midterm elections. However, as Hardwood suggested, it was not an “overriding issue.” For example, the Congressional Quarterly reported that approximately 70 percent of candidates threatened by white backlash ended up winning their races. Richard Harwood, “White Backlash Reported as Failing to Materialize,” Spokesman-Review, November 8, 1966.


77. Between the end of 1966 and 1967, Brooke would appear on the cover of dozens of magazines including Newsweek, Sepia, Ebony, and Jet.


79. Ibid.

80. While black voters in Massachusetts comprised only 2–3 percent of the state electorate in 1966, their overwhelming support for Brooke was striking given the 1964 struggles of the party. Grove, “New Team for the GOP.”


82. Brooke generated a particular brand of reverence from the black electorate. Underscoring this point, many black voters went so far as to change their political affiliation to Republican in a show of support, claiming they were inspired by Brooke's genuine loyalty to “certain goals and ideals, not to the party.” Likewise, a January 1967 Gallup Poll found that Brooke was one of the “most admired” figures, black or white, in the nation. He was joined by seven other African Americans: Martin Luther King Jr. and his wife Coretta Scott King, Ralph Bunche, comedian/civil rights activist Dick Gregory, athlete/actor Jim Brown, and singers Marian Anderson and Mahalia Jackson. See Booker, “I'm a Soul Brother”; Kenneth J. Cooper, “First Black U.S. Senator Elected by Popular Vote Tells His Story,” The Crisis 1, no. 114 (January/February 2008).


Office Files of Fred Panzer, Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library (hereafter referred to as Panzer Files).

89. Booker, “Republican Victory.”


93. Minorities Division, RNC, New Directions ’68.


95. Booker, “Republican Victory.”


97. Booker, “Republican Victory.”

98. Ibid.

99. In 1979, the NAACP highlighted Brooke’s record including the “Brooke Amendment” (ceiling on rents charged to public housing tenants; 1968) and Fair Housing Act (coauthored with Walter Mondale; 1968). The group also applauded Brooke for opposing Richard Nixon’s attempts to appoint conservative judges to the United States Supreme Court (1969, 1970), and for being among the first to call for Nixon to step down during the Watergate scandal. Finally, the NAACP noted that between 1974 and 1978, Brooke had led the fight “against efforts to cut back civil right progress in housing, education, affirmative action, human services, community development and voting rights.” See NAACP, “Emergency Resolutions on Senator Edward W. Brooke,” The Crisis, April 1979; NAACP Hits All Bias, Afro-American, March 23, 1968; “President Signs New Civil Rights Measure,” Rome News-Tribune, April 12, 1968.


104. It is important to note that the CBC later distanced itself from the Gary Convention and produced a “Black Bill of Rights” that it claimed was “more attuned to the ‘political circumstances’ of 1972.” This was due, in large part, the CBC’s insistence that parts of the black agenda produced at the Gary Convention were “too militant.” See Alex Poinsett, “Black Politics at the Crossroads,” Ebony, October 1972.


114. Additionally, dozens of scholars have tackled the serious problems that existed between the GOP and black voters through the late 1960s and into the 1970s. For more, see Dean J. Kotlowski, *Nixon’s Civil Rights: Politics, Principle, and Policy* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001).

115. Scholar Christopher Bailey details the split over Brooke’s 1978 campaign, including “cannibalization of the Republican Party by fellow Republicans.” Bailey rightly highlights the growing schism within the GOP; though Brooke ultimately won the primary nomination, the infighting between party factions deeply hurt his campaign. However, Brooke’s campaign was also hurt by a public and contentious divorce; the NAACP labeled the media frenzy an “unseemly spectacle of a local and national media . . . intent on converting . . . family matters into public issues.” In the end, liberal Democrat Paul Tsongas defeated Brooke in the 1978 race. See Christopher J. Bailey, *The Republican Party in the U.S. Senate, 1974–1984* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1988), 57–59. See also NAACP, “Emergency Resolutions on Senator Edward W. Brooke,” *The Crisis*, April 1979.

116. NAACP, “Emergency Resolutions.”