Human Rights Socialization During and After the Cold War

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Human Rights Socialization During and After the Cold War

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A Thesis in the Field of International Relations
for the Degree of Master of Liberal Arts in Extension Studies

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Abstract

The purpose of this project is to better understand potential systematic human rights roadblocks of the past so that we may be better prepared to avoid them in the future. It seeks to determine if the socialization of international human rights norms was stifled during the Cold War, a bipolar (two-power) period. As two great powers competed in the zero-sum game of global dominance, there could only be one winner, and the hypothesis presented here holds that human rights suffered as a consequence. The study begins with an examination of how international human rights norms were established amongst nations, with the adoption of the UDHR and its accompanying covenants. Once the human rights framework is laid out, I explore Risse and Sikkink’s (1999) five-step model of human rights socialization, an authoritative representation of how states transform from rights abusers to rights observers. The Cold War policies of the United States and the Soviet Union will then be examined to make the case that the foreign policies of these superpowers were inevitably harmful to human rights. Case-study analyses of two human rights incidents, one during and one after the Cold War, are carried out to observe during which period the international community’s response, and thereby the level of socialization, was more robust. I conclude the project with a statistical analysis of human rights factors from the Cold War and post-war period meant to quantifiably support or reject the proposal, and by offering a few alternative explanations of what role the Cold War played in the story of human rights.
Dedication

This project is dedicated to my parents, whose unconditional love, support, and guidance have been paramount in my life. Thank you.

To Amy, who persuaded me to keep going whenever I wavered.

And to Dusty. Writing a thesis is one thing, but watching someone else write a thesis must be another entirely. Let’s go for a walk.
Acknowledgments

While it seemed to be crystal clear in my head for years, this project would not have been what it was meant to be without the assistance of Professor Mathias Risse and Dr. Doug Bond at Harvard University. Their patience and insight has been instrumental in accomplishing what has been the culmination of an academic pursuit that began almost a decade ago.

I would also like to give my utmost thanks to Professor Cyrus Masroori at California State University San Marcos, who first sparked my passion for political theory and considering how to make the world a better place through governance with his wonderfully engaging and thought-provoking lectures.

This opportunity would not have been presented without the support of my chain of command aboard USS Rafael Peralta (DDG 115). Thank you for allowing me to set out on this endeavor, and for pushing me to become a more capable and well-rounded officer.

Beyond the apparent academic development, this project has shown that no matter how lonely a pursuit one sets out for, it is never accomplished alone. To the many others who supported me, gave their time, and shared their knowledge, thank you.
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Chapter I.
Observing Human Rights Through a Polarity Lens

As she addressed the third session of the United Nations (UN) General Assembly at Paris’s Palais de Chaillotin on December 9, 1948, Eleanor Roosevelt appealed to cooperation in the name of progress. The Soviet Union had attempted to submit an amendment in the eleventh-hour to the all-but-adopted Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and the “First Lady of the World” delivered a resounding injunction against further changes:

In the older democracies we have learned that sometimes we bow to the will of the majority… We continue sometimes to persuade, and eventually we may be successful. But we know that we have to work together and we have to progress. So, we believe that when we have made a good fight, and the majority is against us, it is perhaps better tactics to try to cooperate. (Roosevelt, 1948)

Like Mrs. Roosevelt’s appeal to her colleagues, references to the spirit of cooperation permeate the UDHR. Its preamble takes a global perspective, asserting the document “is essential to promote the development of friendly relations between nations” (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, Preamble). The theme of cooperation among individuals similarly underlies the Declaration’s 30 articles by way of forming the implicit duties individuals have in guaranteeing rights to one another (Lazarus, Goold, Desai, & Rasheed, 2009). Indeed, drafters of the Declaration, like Australia’s William Hodgson, argued that “everyone [sic] of these rights has a corresponding duty” (Commission on Human Rights, 1948, p. 5).
So while cooperation and duty are foundational virtues of human rights, they are certainly not solely responsible for the progression of the complex human rights movement (Neier, 2012). Contributions made from religious and philosophical doctrine, such as the Golden Rule, serve as an “example of the way people should treat one another” (Lauren, 2003, p. 9). Philosophers like Hobbes (1651/1985) cite mankind’s natural rights as cause for an authority and system capable of securing those rights, in what would otherwise see individuals living in a state of nature that ensures nothing but a life that is “solitary, poore [sic], nasty, brutish, and short” (p. 186). Revolutions, particularly the American and French uprisings in the 18th century, were inspired in part by these religious and philosophical motivations (Lauren, 2003, p. 17). Each formed the basis for the documents and legal structures from which the international human rights movement took its cue. The UDHR, for example, took “considerable influence” from the US Declaration of Independence and French Declaration of the Rights of Man, each a result of its nation’s revolution (Bantekas & Oette, 2016, p. 8). Still, while the human rights movement has progressed well for the individual, states have been consistently more interested in their own advancement rather than in a sense of cooperation and duty to one another.

In securing individual rights, states seek to protect their citizens from within and without. A substantial means to that end when dealing outside national boundaries is international stability. That is, maintaining global power dynamics, because changes in those dynamics are usually accompanied by conflict – particularly at the top of the international food chain (Allison, 2014). States at the top are resistant to change, while states on the brink of power seek change. States at the bottom of the power scale may ally
themselves with the current or upcoming power, depending on their current or prospective situation. The international community has historically ordered itself into three hegemonic systems: unipolar, a system with one state as the evident world power, bipolar, with two world powers, or multipolar, with many (Waltz, 1979/2010). Waltz (1979/2010) maintains that the bipolar world order led by the United States and Soviet Union throughout the Cold War was particularly stable, much more so than the multipolar systems that existed prior, due to the certainty of “great-power politics” (p. 170). In a bipolar system, “Who is a danger to whom is never in doubt,” and “Any event in the world that involves the fortunes of either [great power] automatically elicits the interests of the other” (p. 170). For example, in the late 1940s, when a Soviet-backed communist insurgency sparked a civil war in Greece, and Moscow intensified pressure on Turkey for access to the Turkish Straits, President Harry Truman was prompted to craft a policy that would prevent communism’s spread into Europe. In what became known as the Truman Doctrine, the United States provided financial support to those governments, militaries, and economies that might otherwise fall to the Kremlin (The Truman Doctrine, 1947). On the other side of the Iron Curtain, Moscow was prompted to create the Warsaw Pact after the US enacted the $12 billion Marshall Plan to rebuild Western Europe, and formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to protect it (Waltz, 1979/2010). In spite of the immense danger that existed during some of the great-power interactions, such as Washington’s discovery of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba in 1962, Waltz argues a state of security and balance is created when each great power is no more or less strong than the other – when each is held in check by continually working to assure their preservation on the one hand, and the complete ruin of their competitor on the other.
This work suggests a conflict of interest between struggles for global superiority and the advancement of human rights. Specifically, I propose the state of bipolar competition between Washington and Moscow hindered human rights socialization, the “process by which international [human rights] norms are internalized and implemented domestically,” during the Cold War (Risse & Sikkink, 1999, p. 5). Three steps will be necessary to make this case. First, I will review the development of international human rights norms. This will include the origin and function of the UN Commission on Human Rights, the UDHR, and the treaty mechanisms through which the rights established in the UDHR are applied to its signatories. We will then walk through the process by which these norms are adopted at the national level using Risse and Sikkink’s “spiral model” of human rights socialization (1999, p. 20). Finally, I will argue that Washington’s Containment policy and Moscow’s Brezhnev Doctrine, the chief geopolitical strategies of the bipolar powers, defied international human rights norms and were incompatible with the socialization process.

Comparing two case studies, Augusto Pinochet’s violent rule of Chile from 1973-1990 and the Kosovo War from 1998-1999, will illustrate the argument by revealing inconsistencies in how aggressively the international community intervened to confront human rights abuses in the bipolar system when compared to the unipolar system that followed. Holzgrefe (2003) defines humanitarian intervention as “the threat or use of force across state borders… aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens” (p. 18). Scheffer (1992) argues further that intervention includes “non-forcible” methods, such as aid from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and support from the United
Nations Security Council (UNSC) in establishing the rights and responsibilities of all parties (p. 266-267). We will combine each perspective to evaluate both cases based on three criteria: the threat or use of force by the international community, the level of involvement of NGOs, and if the UNSC adopted a resolution aimed at resolving the situation.

Having then entirely laid out the argument, we will seek to determine its validity using a statistical analysis to explore if there was a significant difference in human rights socialization between the Cold War’s bipolar system and the unipolar system that followed. This will be accomplished by conducting an observational study of international political rights and civil liberties using data from Freedom House (1973-2018), covering the decades before and after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Political rights and civil liberties will serve as indicators because their data most closely parallels the rights outlined in the UDHR (1948). The proposal, that human rights socialization was hindered during the Cold War, will be considered supported if states score lower on average for the observance of political rights and civil liberties during the Cold War as compared to after, and refuted if states score higher or if there is no significant difference between the two periods.

All this is not to suggest that global power struggles are the only factor in human rights socialization. Such a suggestion would be an affront to the individuals and organizations that have sustained the human rights movement since it began in earnest in the late eighteenth century (Neier, 2012). With this in mind, I will conclude with a discussion of a few supplemental and alternative explanations concerning the role the
Cold War played in the socialization of human rights norms, for which this proposal is meant to be a useful addition.

Section 1. The Development of International Human Rights Norms

In order to understand how polarity affects human rights socialization, we ought to identify those rights and the forces that compel sovereign states to adopt them. In this section, I will discuss the creation of the UDHR, signed in 1948 as the internationally-recognized blueprint of human rights. I will also discuss the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the two mechanisms established to proliferate and enforce the rights proclaimed by the UDHR (Morsink, 1999).

Article 68 of the UN Charter directs the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), one of the UN’s six principal organs, to establish a commission for the promotion of human rights (United Nations, 1945). Aptly named, the Commission on Human Rights would “develop[] and codif[y] new international norms and monitor[] the observance of human rights around the world” (United Nations Human Rights Council, 2019). Coming out of the Commission’s first preparatory session in the spring of 1946, the group, led by former First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt, resolved to draft an international bill of human rights that would achieve “the highest aspirations of mankind” (Commission on Human Rights, 1946, p. 3). Such a bill had been discussed going back to the League of Nations, though the vast undertaking consistently lacked the political vigor that would be necessary for it to succeed, a vigor that would ultimately be discovered in the wake of World War II (Lauren, 2003). A preliminary draft prepared by the Commission and the UN Secretariat’s Division of Human Rights laid out rights within 48
articles, though questions remained as to how they would be implemented (Commission on Human Rights, 1947a). The Commission eventually decided on partitioning the bill into a declaration of rights and a separate convention, aimed at compelling domestic governments to follow in practice the international standards they agree to in principle (Drafting of the UDHR, 2019a). Unsurprisingly, implementation requirements drew a considerable level of resistance from states, who submitted comments to the Commission by the dozens, fearing such requirements would draw attention to their shortcomings and threaten their national sovereignty (Drafting of the UDHR, 2019b; Lauren, 2003). In the end, disagreement from all sides on the specifics regarding implementation made completion of the convention alongside the declaration impossible. Not wanting to lose momentum and any possibility of getting the declaration passed, the ECOSOC submitted the draft declaration minus the convention to the General Assembly’s Third Session for review and an eventual vote (Drafting of the UDHR, 2019c).

Adopted on December 10, 1948, the UDHR was a welcome step towards addressing what had been to that point, an international community taciturn on human rights. Many were ready to see some weight behind a set of international standards after the Holocaust – the gravest mass atrocity the world has ever known – and the UDHR would be the vehicle employed to deliver (Morsink, 1999). Harkening back to Hobbes’ natural rights and the 18th century revolutions, drafters of the UDHR sought to create a document that was universal in its application, for every human “without distinction of any kind,” purely based on their status as members of the human family (International Bill of Human Rights, 1948, Art. 2).
Created to be the “moral backbone and source of inspiration of a whole new branch of international law,” the UDHR was truly foundational for international human rights law (Morsink, 1999, p. 20). For all the struggle that could rightly be expected for a collection of delegates across a spectrum of regions and cultures to create a document declaring a universal standard of human rights throughout the world, the UDHR is quite comprehensive in its scope. Its 30 articles, trimmed from the original 48, encompass the right to equal treatment, education, leisure, and even an individual’s duty to their community, among a multitude of others. However, as a declaration it was not designed to have any enforcement capacity; instead, it was designed to be cited as the agreed-upon standard for the human rights treaties and enforcement mechanisms that followed (Forsythe, 2009, “Universal Declaration of Human Rights”). Indeed, the Commission’s vice-chairman, Charles Malik, noted the UDHR “was only the first step in the elaboration of the human rights programme [sic] called for by the [UN] Charter” (United Nations General Assembly, 1948, p. 32). The next step, according to Malik and the rest of the Commission, would be to pass a covenant that would compel signatories to internalize the articles outlined in the UDHR.

Before the next step towards an enforcement mechanism could be taken, the international community would have to address the reluctance states held in giving up the domestic jurisdiction guaranteed to them under Chapter 1, Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter: “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state” (1945). Luckily, the UDHR initiated that process by creating legislative momentum at the domestic and international level. States referenced the UDHR in national laws and
bilateral treaties, and some were even inspired to ratify more narrow international agreements, such as the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (which was actually adopted the day before the UDHR), a passage assuredly made easier given the horrors in Europe that preceded it (Lauren, 2003). Nevertheless, powerful forces in the form of the United States and the Soviet Union derided efforts toward an accompanying covenant to the UDHR. In 1953, for example, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles made clear that the Eisenhower administration would not support any international treaties concerning human rights, citing the administration’s belief that “persuasion, education, and example” are more effective methods of spreading rights and freedoms than political covenants that force uniform standards across a range of cultures (Dulles, 1953, p. 592). With what then seemed to be a lid on any potential top-down path to a covenant, it was instead the numerous colonies achieving independence during the 1950s and 1960s that began to create an upsurge in momentum. The UDHR afforded these newly sovereign states in Africa, Asia, and Latin America a level of equality and legitimacy that allowed them to fight for and win the adoption of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination in 1965. It was this outcome, and decolonization’s resulting increase in size of this particularly invigorated voting bloc, that created the final push needed for the ICCPR and the ICESCR to be adopted by the General Assembly, both in 1966 (Lauren, 2003).

The ICCPR and ICESCR were the much-desired teeth within the International Bill of Human Rights, deriving their force from the Statute of the International Court of Justice (1945), which provides that the authority of international law comes from two primary sources: normative standards and customs, as well as treaties (Art. 38; Bantekas
& Oette, 2016, p. 58). Set on the foundation of the UDHR, the ICCPR and ICESCR have been ratified at the time of this writing by 173 and 170 nations, respectively (Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard). Neier (2012) contends that the ICCPR and ICESCR are “generally regarded as foundational for the legitimacy of the international human rights movement.” That “Attempting to hold governments responsible for compliance with the provisions of the Covenants and the Declaration are central to the activity of the global movement” (p. 108). All of these nations agreed to abide by the articles set forth in the respective covenants, of which Article 2 in each is particularly relevant for demonstrating the nature of human rights socialization. Based on the principle of progressive realization, which is explicitly referenced in the ICESCR, each party “undertakes to take steps… with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant” (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2008, p. 13; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966, Art. 2). Article 2 serves as a directive that signatories without domestic legislation per its articles must pursue to adopt such legislation (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966). In this way, the ICCPR and ICESCR are the original binding international legal covenants that serve to socialize human rights norms worldwide.

Section 2. Socializing International Human Rights at the National Level

Fifty years after the adoption of the UDHR, Risse and Sikkink (1999) set out to determine if the declaration had any impact on the “actual behavior of states towards their citizens” (p. 1). Specifically, they try to ascertain the “conditions under which international human rights norms are internalized in domestic practices” (p. 1). They call
this internalization of norms “socialization,” and suggest in order for norms to be socialized, states must go through three checkpoints: they must offer small concessions on their human rights standards, they must engage in discourse regarding the validity of the norms in question, and they must institutionalize those norms into domestic law. To take them through each checkpoint, Risse and Sikkink (1999) construct a five-step “spiral” model to slide through the process of socialization from start to finish. Risse and Sikkink expect states will move from repressive regimes to norm-observing members of the international community over a considerably lengthy, wide-ranging, and sporadic timeline, with some completing the process sooner than others. They contend that it is a matter of creating the discourse to spur change along with the organizations and institutions capable of carrying out and monitoring the process. This model will act as a lens through which we observe the socialization process in action, allowing us to determine how the competition during the Cold War affected the norms socialization process.

The first step in correcting a deficiency is identifying the problem, which is the defining aspect of the introductory repression phase. Risse and Sikkink suggest that repression begins when domestic opposition is too weak (or non-existent) relative to the government to confront wrongdoing and propose two traits that characterize the pace and strength of international opposition to the malicious government. The first trait is the amount of repression within that state. That is, repression amounting to mass genocide will elicit a stronger response than the repression of isolated rights over a short time. The second trait is the amount of information available for transnational advocacy networks to identify a problem and raise the issue with the international community. If the
government does well in prohibiting information sharing between its citizens and those on the outside that would seek to confront the government, the repressive state of affairs cannot be made known.

If the domestic opposition and network of international advocates prove able to raise awareness of the human rights-violating government to the international level, the model of human rights socialization moves to phase two, denial. The second phase begins with the aforementioned transnational advocacy network, a combination of “international non-governmental organizations… international human rights regimes… and Western states,” putting pressure on the suspect state through activities like lobbying and shaming in the public sphere (Risse & Sikkink, 1999, p. 17). In denial, the suspect state not only refutes the charges, but questions “the validity of international human rights norms themselves” and asserts its sovereign authority in dealing with internal state affairs (p. 23). Risse and Sikkink argue the denial stage begins the process of human rights norms socialization because the suspect state’s rejection of the accusations amounts to an implicit acknowledgment of a difference in principles between the suspect state and the international system. The time spent in the denial phase of the model will vary based on the amount of pressure that can be applied to the suspect state. For example, an independent and isolated state will not be as susceptible to pressure from the international community as one that desires to be a participating member of the international community or is economically dependent on other members.

The third phase of the model, tactical concessions, is also where we find the first and second checkpoints on the road to socialization. It begins when mounting pressure from the international community results in some form of compromise by the suspect
state, the first checkpoint. At this point, the impetus shifts from international to domestic pressure on the state, as national organizations are emboldened by the support of the international community and the concession of their government, they are empowered to seek further allowances. This shift highlights the most fragile aspect of the socialization model, as the domestic opposition is still comparatively small and vulnerable to government obstruction. Still, its fragility is at least well supported. That is, any harmful action by the government at this point would result in further outrage on the international stage and increased support for the anti-government cause domestically. The fragile movement is now merely susceptible to delay, vice destruction. As phase three continues, the government loses more and more control of the domestic situation, and is forced to either begin a process of human rights discourse and socialization, the second checkpoint. Otherwise, it could increase the level of repression and risk staunch backlash from the international community, the retreat of any of their last international allies, and a citizenry focused on removing the government from office (Risse & Sikkink, 1999).

If the government begins outwardly accepting human rights norms by ratifying international human rights conventions, applying those norms to domestic law, providing resources for its people to articulate violations without retribution, and peacefully engaging with its domestic and international opponents, the fourth phase of the spiral model has taken shape. Prescriptive status, as it is called by Risse and Sikkink (1999), is the legislative step in socializing international human rights norms, and it is the third and final checkpoint before the finish line of norms socialization.

Indeed, as words mean little without deed, passing legislation in accordance with international human rights norms would be for naught if the government’s behavior
remains inconsistent with its newly-declared laws. The final phase in the model, rule-consistent behavior, requires the recently-conformed government not be taken off the international stage too quickly, lest it revert to its old ways. This support from the international community is especially vital if the faction of the government that saw the state through the socialization of norms were to be challenged by a faction of the old guard, for example, leaders in the military, in seeking to revert to the previous status quo.

The spiral model is lauded for its contributions to the constructivist field of international relations and human rights research. Rather than explaining the world through the eyes of Realism’s self-interested states or Liberalism’s altruistic international organizations, Constructivism holds that “people and societies construct… each other,” that the world (for better or worse) is what we make of it (Onuf, 1989, p. 36). The spiral model showed that domestic groups were not victims of their authoritarian government, but rather members of a team that could create genuine change within their country (Jetschke and Liese, 2013). The model is not without its criticisms, however, as two decades have shown it to be not as “generalizable across cases irrespective of cultural, political, or economic differences among countries” as its creators initially imagined (Risse and Sikkink, 1999, p. 6). Critiques range from how the model was applied to cases where it did not fit, to its declining relevance in a world of limited and ambiguous statehood, non-state actors, and international corporations that are all having an increasing impact on human rights norms (Börzel and Risse, 2013). Many of these critiques, however accurate they may be, are not particularly relevant to the matter at hand, considering here we are looking at the world as it stood during the Cold War. In the mid-to-late 20th century, non-state actors were not so much of a problem as state actors,
particularly powerful state actors, which are the focus of the spiral model’s criticism most relevant to us.

In critiquing her own work, Kathryn Sikkink (2013) cites the Bush administration’s use of torture in the early 2000s as confirmation of “realist expectations that powerful states are able to disregard international rules at will without significant cost” (Sikkink, 2013). While Sikkink is referring to the US as a unipolar superpower, Snyder (2014) adds that with two superpowers during the Cold War, “attention to human rights abuses internationally was inconsistent and often overshadowed by the perceived stakes… in political, military, ideological, and economic terms” (p. 237). Though the authors do address the variation in case-by-case pressure applied by great power players, the spiral model on its whole does not seem to take this issue of great power politics into consideration as much as it could (Risse and Ropp, 1999). For instance, Risse and Sikkink (1999) include Western governments and public opinion as a force in transnational advocacy networks. They present liberal states as human rights stakeholders at ostensibly the same level as human rights NGOs and advocacy groups, assuming their interests are one and the same: “[Transnational advocacy networks] put norm-violating states on the international agenda… They also reminded liberal states of their own identity as promoters of human rights” (Risse and Sikkink, 1999, p. 5). This perspective bestows upon states the identity of an international promoter of human rights without taking into consideration the state’s political, military, ideological, or economic interests, an omission realists like Waltz (1979/2010) and Mearsheimer (2003) would deride. As will be discussed in the concluding chapter, this is not to say that great power politics cannot play an equal and opposite role in applying pressure to support transnational
human rights networks, as the 1975 Helsinki Accords, apartheid in South Africa, and Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines can attest (Black, 1999; Jetschke, 1999). Still, so long as national sovereignty perseveres, national interests will remain a decisive force in international relations.

Section 3. The Cold War: Bipolarity a Detriment to Socialization

In his address before a joint session of Congress in 1947, President Harry Truman enacted what would come to be known as the Truman Doctrine:

> It must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures… The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms. If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world (Truman, 1947).

Requesting $400 million in assistance for Greece and Turkey, President Truman set the stage for the Cold War in an attempt to stifle communist advancement into Greece and the strategically vital Middle East. Coming out of the Paris Peace Conference as the dominant powers just months before Truman’s speech, the United States and the Soviet Union were set to square off in a tit for tat contest that would demand each state build its military, economic, and ideological strength to levels the world had never before seen. This proliferation, combined with the devastation felt by the rest of the international community after World War II, created a bipolar era that would endure to the last decade of the 20th century.

Utilizing proxy wars, the hegemons of this bipolar era took advantage of every possible opportunity to defend or espouse their ideology during the Cold War. Conflicts in China, Korea, Cuba, and Vietnam are just a few of the well-known examples in which
the United States and the Soviet Union supported their choice regime in hopes of
restraining the other’s. This strategy paid little mind to how regimes, such as Augusto
Pinochet’s in Chile or Carlos Manuel Arana Osorio’s in Guatemala, would conduct
themselves once in power. All but lost, virtually an afterthought in this balancing act
were the civilians who suffered under the leadership of these US or Soviet-supported
regimes. The Cold War foreign policies of both superpowers will be introduced below,
serving as the prism through which international human rights norms must pass towards
the ultimate target of socialization.

Responding to inquiries from the US Department of the Treasury about why the
Soviet Union was unsupportive of the newly-established World Bank and International
Monetary Fund, then deputy chief of mission in Moscow, George F. Kennan, penned
what became known as the “Long Telegram,” his perspective on the budding threat posed
by Joseph Stalin’s communist regime in the post-World War II order. In the telegram,
Kennan (1946) presents the Soviet Union as an instinctively troubled nation, unable to
conceive of peaceful coexistence between socialist and capitalist societies, “Impervious
to logic of reason, and… highly sensitive to logic of force” (p. 15). A sensitivity born out
of an understanding of their own limitations, Kennan suggested the Soviets would
succeed only insofar as the West would allow. That is, a cohesive and unified West
would deter Soviet expansion, particularly in regions of interest to the Soviet Union like
South America and the Middle East, seen as ripe with distaste for the Western policies.
Kennan goes on to propose the containment strategy, the United States’ defining
approach to the Cold War, recommending that “It is not enough to urge people to develop
political processes similar to our own. Many foreign peoples… are seeking guidance…
We should be better able than Russians to give them this. And unless we do, Russians certainly will” (p. 17). Kennan (1947) proceeded to coin the strategy in *Foreign Affairs* under the pseudonym “X,” comparing the Soviet ideology to religion – in that its ideological foundation makes it persistent in the face of one-off defeats – Kennan proposed “any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies” (p. 861).

The containment strategy found traction within the infamous policy paper of the National Security Council (NSC), entitled “United States Objectives and Programs for National Security,” or NSC-68. In it, the Department of State and Department of Defense grant that as a free and democratic state, the American government does not have the same recourse to war as the Soviets, and that the US must “demonstrate the superiority of the idea of freedom by its constructive application, and to attempt to change the world situation by means short of war… to frustrate the Kremlin design” (National Security Council, 1950, p. 11-12). The Kremlin’s design, according to NSC-68, was the buttressing of Soviet power through the domination of non-Socialist governments, foremost among them being the United States. To counter, the NSC recommended to President Truman that the United States pursue “A more rapid build-up of political, economic, and military strength in the free world” (p. 54). Politically, the “objective would be the establishment of friendly regimes not under Kremlin domination” (p. 56). That is, the United States recognized that it could not play ideological defense while the Soviet Union sought to expand its sphere of influence. Instead, the leaders of the West would seek to defeat the Kremlin through an ideological offensive, ensuring regimes friendly to the West and its ideas ascended to power.
Unified under Japanese control before the end of World War II, Korea was split at
the 38th parallel into the Soviet-controlled north and the US-controlled south. Each
supported their choice regimes, Kim Il-sung in the North and Syngman Rhee in the
South, who made clear their intentions to see the peninsula unified under their own
authority. When North Korea invaded the South to do just that, the Eisenhower
administration was presented with its first opportunity to employ the containment
strategy, and drive back North Korean forces as they pushed south of the 38th parallel.
When the defense of Seoul was successful, but the subsequent US-led attempt to push the
communists out to re-unify the peninsula was not, Eisenhower lost his taste for military
intervention, and instead opted to execute containment and the rollback of communist
regimes through cover action (Pach, Jr., 2019).

The first successful execution of an aggressive strategy to install a Washington-
friendly government where it did not otherwise exist came in 1953 with Operation AJAX,
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)-led coup d’état in Iran (Sandler, 2015). Under
intense populist pressure, Iran nationalized the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company’s assets within its borders, and the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, appointed
the liberal democrat Mohammad Mosaddegh as prime minister in 1951. Mosaddegh was
a leader of the National Front, a coalition of political organizations focused on opposing
monarchical rule in favor of populism in Iran. Only a year after his appointment, the
National Front’s various factions began devising plans to seize power from Mosaddegh,
buttressed by their support within the Iranian working class. Among these organizations
was the communist Tudeh Party, which the CIA had been aware of and conducted covert
operations against since the 1940s (Gasiorowski, 1987). Operation AJAX was the CIA’s
effort to restore power to the Shah, who was seen as a puppet of the West by the National Front and who would be all the more willing to support Western policies given its backing. The Shah would also agree to insert a commanding figure into the office of prime minister who could prevent the uprising of the various populist factions within Iran (Central Intelligence Agency, 1953; Gasiorowski, 1987). That figure was found in General Fazlollah Zahedi, who led an authoritarian government focused on suppressing National Front and Tudeh Party members through arrest, exile, press censorship, and martial law (Gasiorowski, 1987). Zahedia also worked with the CIA to establish the SAVAK secret police force, responsible for years of imprisonment and torture of citizens thought to be a threat to the authoritarian government (Gasiorowski, 1987; McTighe, 2012). The success of Operation AJAX convinced the Eisenhower administration that further interventions to prevent the potential spread of Soviet influence and communism would be an essential tool for the West, even though it spelled disaster for human rights and a democratic alternative to the Shah’s rule in Iran (Gasiorowski, 1987; O’Rourke, 2018).

While George F. Kennan was known the father of containment, Soviet leader Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev was the namesake of the Soviet Union’s Brezhnev Doctrine. As the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union through the heart of the Cold War, Brezhnev imposed a standard foreign policy on the Eastern Block that allowed him to pull strings from Moscow (Brown, 1988). He constructed a type of socialist internationalism wherein Moscow based their dominion on ideology rather than national boundaries (Ouimet, 2003, p. 4, 67). Brezhnev reasoned, “when a threat arises to the cause of socialism in that country… this is no longer merely a problem for that
country’s people, but a common problem, the concern of all socialist countries” (Brezhnev, 1970, p. 329). While the Brezhnev Doctrine may seem at first glance more closely related to NATO’s Article 5 principle of collective defense, it was instead designed as a tool to solidify the Soviet position in the east and continue to expand the Soviet sphere westward throughout Europe (Applebaum, 2012).

Moscow was forced to make global expansion an objective of opportunity, as it turned out to be a tall task through Europe, considering the Kremlin was so often preoccupied with maintaining their hold on the Eastern Bloc. As Soviet-inspired leadership frequently incorporated violent takeover of the means of production and imprisonment of political dissidents, uprisings such as East Germany and Hungary in kept Moscow’s hands full (United Nations, 1957). In Hungary, the Communist Party worked to gain power following World War II and by 1948, had suppressed four other significant political movements, including the Social Democratic Party. The Communist leadership of Hungary was staunchly loyal to Moscow and frequently imprisoned and executed potential revolutionaries using the Hungarian secret police, ÁVH. On October 23rd, 1956, a group of Hungarian students demanded democratic reforms and various changes to Hungary’s education system. These demands were proclaimed during demonstrations at the Hungarian Parliament building in Budapest, and they served to inspire between 200,000 and 300,000 Hungarians to take to the streets in support. Demonstrators were angered, however, when their demands went unheeded during a speech that evening by a Hungarian official speaking in response to the protests, provoking students to broadcast their message via Budapest Radio. Their attempt was thwarted when the ÁVH intervened, firing on the crowd of protestors below and killing
one of the students. The incited citizens began fighting both the ÁVH and Soviet forces, gaining control of the government via Hungarian communist politician Imre Nagy, who dissolved the ÁVH and promised to honor many of the citizens’ reformation demands. After a cease-fire and seeming reduction in tensions over the course of the next week, including Hungary’s withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and a declaration by Moscow to withdraw troops from Hungary, Soviet troops returned to Hungary and re-established a repressive government loyal to Soviet rule by force (Byrne, 2002). So while the Kremlin was not reluctant in its employment of regular military forces, opting for a direct rather than covert strategy, Moscow’s intervention in Hungary followed the same dynamic and thus reached the same objective as the CIA’s in Iran – it ensured the survival of a loyal regime, and one that was strong enough to suppress any opposition to its rule. This was the Cold War dynamic that existed to the detriment of human rights.

The tug of war created by the Cold War foreign policies of the two superpowers made various points of contact with Risse and Sikkink’s (1999) spiral model. Installed regimes repressed (phase one) their citizens to prevent the buildup of an opposition that could remove them from power, they denied the validity of human rights norms (phase two). In cases like Chile, pointing to their own sovereignty and domestic authority to prevent opposition “insurgents” from causing disorder (Ropp & Sikkink, 1999, p. 179). With the support of their sponsoring superpower, regimes were not pressured in to making tactical concessions (phase 3), and instead often responded to any pressure with violent backlash. All of this ushered in an era Glendon (2001) calls the “Deep Freeze” of international human rights (Ch. 11). Most importantly, in some instances, Washington and Moscow’s propensity to thrust despots into power created the need for the norms
socialization process. Democratically elected leaders in Iran and Chile were thrown out in favor of regimes that would prevent the spread of communism within their borders by any means necessary (Sikkink, 2004; Gasiorowski, 1987). Military invasions and crimes were perpetrated against the people of Eastern Europe to bolster the Soviet sphere of influence and prevent the spread of liberal democracy (Byrne, 2002). Without the actions of the White House and Kremlin, it is likely that many cases of the spiral model’s application would have been wholly unnecessary. Additionally, support from either power likely provided some relief from the pressure the evil regimes would feel from transnational advocacy networks or the international community of nations as predicted during phases two and three of the model. This was particularly true with US-supported regimes, such as Augusto Pinochet in Chile, whose 25-year reign would likely not have lasted a quarter-century without the support of the Nixon and Ford administrations in particular. Besides the millions of dollars in economic aid that was provided in the face of an economic collapse upon Pinochet’s rise to power, critical figures in those administrations, such as Henry Kissinger, made Washington’s support clear (Sikkink, 2004, p. 102, 110). Lastly, each reference to Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter and the principle of noninterference by Washington and Moscow set the standard and example for others. This tit-for-tat refusal to accept any international jurisdiction is cited as a cause for the delay in passing the ICCPR and ICESCR, as well as stalling any other significant actions by the UN (Lauren, 2003). It is vital to recall, however, that Risse and Sikkink (1999) argue a state’s reference to its own sovereignty in defense of its actions is actually part of the solution in socializing human rights norms. Phase two, denial, is defined by the norm-violating government refusing to accept the validity of international
norms and foreign jurisdiction over its internal affairs. These actions rally domestic
groups and the international community around the cause, putting the norm-violating
state in the spotlight and aiding in the application of international law to the situation.

This chapter introduced human rights and bipolarity, more specifically the
relationship between the two, as the main focus of the project. We examined how human
rights became norms by studying the passage of the UDHR, ICCPR, and ICESCR. Then,
we reviewed how those norms are socialized to the national level using Risse and
Sikkink’s (1999) well-recognized five-step model of human rights socialization. Later,
the Cold War strategies of both superpowers were presented, and the argument was made
that they were as hazardous to human rights socialization. The United States containment
policy, as coined by George F. Kennan and established within NSC-68, led the liberal
democratic hegemon to use interventions like the 1953 US-led coup d’état in Iran, as
tools to prevent the spread of communism. Similarly, the Soviet Union’s Brezhnev
Doctrine created a socialist internationalism that justified, at least to the Kremlin, their
intervention in fellow socialist states given any sense of fragility in the control of their
government, as was seen in Hungary in 1956. Lastly, we considered how Risse and
Sikkink’s spiral model could be applied to the Cold War policies that may have prevented
or delayed it from reaching its final step of socialization.
Chapter II.

Case Studies

In this chapter, an examination of the significant cases of human rights abuses that occurred both during and after the Cold War is conducted. The background of each case is investigated to determine whether the system of polarity might have had influence over the commencement or end of the rights abuse. The response of the international community to the human rights situation will be measured through three elements: the deployment of a peacekeeping or military force, the involvement of transnational advocacy networks as described by Risse and Sikkink (1999), and whether or not the UN adopted a resolution against the violation. The purpose of this chapter is to determine if human rights catastrophes during and after the shift from bipolarity to unipolarity may have been influenced by their respective international power systems, as well as to determine if the response from the international community towards human rights violations during the Cold War was weaker than its response to violations after the Cold War. The response from the international community will be considered weaker if a peacekeeping or military force is not deployed, if the transnational advocacy network is determined to be unresponsive, and if the UN did not adopt a resolution condemning the violation.
Section 1. Chile

Kathryn Sikkink (2004) describes the post-World War II period as one in which most in the United States believed human rights socialization was the primary way in which future conflicts could be prevented. She argues this quickly gave way, however, to the “pressures of anticommunism in foreign policy” (p. 51). When General Augusto Pinochet took power in 1973 through a violent coup d’état, US policy was evidently to “support dictatorships publicly and openly” (p. 48, 51). The promotion of human rights had taken a back seat to the containment of communism.

The Chilean presidential election of 1970 pitted socialist politician Salvador Allende of the Popular Unity party against the Christian Democrats and incumbent Eduardo Frei Montalva for the second time in six years. Frei won the election in 1964 with the help of the CIA, who heavily financed his campaign with a focus on keeping the Soviets from expanding into Latin America through the socialist candidate. A similar strategy was adopted for the rematch in 1970, though this time around, the Kremlin had thrown its own weight behind Allende with hundreds of thousands of dollars in campaign contributions as well as KGB covert operations to ensure his election (Andrews & Mitrokhin, 2005). The Soviet’s efforts paid off, as it was in September of 1970 that Chileans stunned the CIA and other senior US officials by voting Allende into office, the first time a socialist had won office through a vote in the Western Hemisphere, which prompted President Richard Nixon to set Project FUBELT into motion (Kornbluh, 2013).

FUBELT, or Track II, was Washington’s attempt to prevent Allende’s confirmation and assumption of power in the six weeks between the election in September and presidential transition in November. It set in motion a coup d’état that
would manifest three years later and was described in classified CIA cables as a “formula for chaos,” that would divide the Chilean military and potentially lead to civil war. However, the only aspect of that formula’s solution the United States was concerned with was the denial of the presidency to Allende (Kornbluh, 2013, p. 22). FUBELT became NSC-93 in November of 1970, just days after the United States failed to prevent Allende from taking office, wherein the NSC outlined what would be Washington’s policy towards Chile: “The United States will seek to maximize pressures on the Allende government to… limit its ability to implement policies contrary to U. S. and hemisphere interests. (National Security Council, 1970, p. 1).

When the ensuing coup d’état succeeded in September of 1973 and General Pinochet, whom the White House had identified in the early stages of Project FUBELT as a conservative opponent of the socialist movement, took power with the support of the Chilean military junta, human rights in Chile suffered dramatically. Pinochet instituted systematic security campaigns with the intent of destroying leftist political movements and labor unions, frequently by imprisoning their members and the exile or outright murder of their leaders. Members of the military junta opposed any attempts to thwart their rule by a legal constitution and permanent political institutions, citing the need to “purge” Chile of Marxists before they could possibly cede power to politicians (Hawkins, 1997, p. 410).

The Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation Report (1991), also known as the Rettig Report, documented the human rights abuses that occurred under Pinochet’s authoritarian rule between 1973 and 1990. In it, accounts of forced disappearances, torture, imprisonment, and terror abound, altogether finding over 2,000
victims of the regime’s abuses. Among these accounts are stories of the Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional (DINA), the Chilean secret police, taking suspected political opponents and civil subversives into custody from their home or place of work, questioning, torturing, and executing them. Countless death certificates note the cause of death for DINA’s victims as something akin to a “perforating bullet wound to the head, inflicted by police” (Report of the Chilean National Commission, 1991, p. 476).

Unlike the rest of Latin America, Chile was firmly rooted in the democratic process prior to 1973. All the more dreadful for the human rights movement, then, that Chile was placed in Washington and Moscow’s crosshairs. It had a generally educated populace, which made denying the validity of human rights treaties to which its government had agreed all the more challenging, even for an authoritarian regime like Pinochet’s. Indeed, Pinochet and his military junta did not fall into the second phase of Risse and Sikkink’s socialization model by opposing the validity of international human rights norms for that reason. Instead, the government argued priority should be given to their effort to bring stability and stamp out insurgents in a time of “war and disorder” (Ropp & Sikkink, 1999, p. 179). Inheriting treaties signed by prior regimes, including Salvador Allende’s ratification of the ICCPR in 1972, Augusto Pinochet needed to come up with legal excuses to prevent those treaties’ implementation. To do this, he influenced the Chilean courts to argue such treaties were not enforceable because they were not published in the Diario Oficial, the publication of legal rules governing the state as mandated by its constitution (Ropp & Sikkink, 1999). This legal loophole formally vindicated, at least in its own eyes, the regime for refusing to follow international treaties. This process is what Ropp and Sikkink (1999) call “government schizophrenia,” a way to
“rhetorically recognize, yet systematically ignore human rights norms” (p. 181). So, while Chile generally fit with the spiral model, there were some significant points of separation. Namely, the “tactical concessions” third phase lasted for much longer relative to other states. This was in part due to the infant nature of the transnational human rights network at the time, but also the leverage Pinochet was allotted by Washington, whose “subsidization of a quasi-fascist extreme rightist group” allowed him the room to maneuver (Sigmund, 1993, p. 48).

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger consistently sent clear messages to the authoritarian Chilean government that “human rights policy was not the policy of the [current] administration” (Sikkink, 2004, p. 110). This reassurance was in response to some efforts within Congress to renounce support for the Pinochet regime, which Kissinger reassured the Chilean dictator was nothing more than a “‘propaganda campaign by the Communists,’” for whom he was referring to those like Senators Ted Kennedy and Frank Church, who were vocal in their opposition to US support of Pinochet (as cited in Sikkink, 2004, p. 110). Indeed, US aid to the country rose significantly following the coup. Harmer (2013) determines that after making “the conditions as great as possible” for the coup, the United States proceeded to give immense financial support to a regime that had already proven to be an enemy of human rights (p. 109). Just a month after seizing power, Pinochet had received a $24 million loan for wheat. A year later, Chile was given 48 percent of US “Food for Peace” grants to the region, though Chile only accounted for three percent of Latin America’s total population. Between 1973-1976, the US Agency for International Development and the Inter-American Development Bank granted Chile $237.8 million, and during that same time, Chile surged to become the
fifth-largest consumer of US military equipment (Harmer, 2013). Fortified by US financial support, Pinochet was able to finance his regime’s violation of human rights. It was not until 1986 that Washington and the Reagan administration contemplated voting against a $250 million World Bank loan to Chile in order to pressure the regime into beginning a democratic transition. Contemplating was the furthest the White House went, and the loan passed (Kennedy, 1987).

Chile proved to be an illustration of hegemonic influence on human rights socialization in a bipolar system. While some senior US officials were taken aback by their country’s support for a regime that was responsible for the death and torment of thousands over the course of almost two decades, even President Carter, who reduced military aid to Pinochet, was not able to put significant pressure on the despot (Glad, 2010). The authoritarian regime in Chile continued until 1988 when the new Chilean Constitution, signed in 1980, set forth a transition to democracy that would not allow Pinochet to be elected for consecutive eight-year terms (Constitution of the Republic of Chile, 1980). The international community was not blind to the atrocities taking place in Chile, even if it was incapable of acting in an adequate manner. No peacekeeping force of any kind was deployed to Chile during Pinochet’s reign, though international support was given to the various national human rights movements created in response to the situation (Ensalaco, 2000). This did not include much participation by the transnational advocacy networks, though, as national human rights organizations in Chile were left to fend for themselves as the international human rights organizations were in their infancy (Ropp & Sikkink, 1999). This point says nothing, however, as to why international organizations did not come to the aid of the Chilean people as the networks developed throughout the
1970s and 1980s. There were 16 resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly between the years of 1974 (one year after Pinochet took office) and 1989 (one year after Pinochet left office), of which the United States voted in favor of half, with the abstentions and votes against occurring during the Nixon and Reagan administrations (“United Nations Digital Library,” n.d.). While it is difficult to ascertain the exact effect the resolutions had on Pinochet’s government, they did create an awareness and pressure on the regime; Ensalaco (2000) argues that pressure led to the dissolution of the DINA secret police in 1977. Based on the evidence above, Chile is determined a classic case of the bipolar system not only leading to human rights abuses but preventing the international community from taking sufficient action to curb the abuse.

Section 2. Kosovo

With the end of the Cold War in 1991, many former Soviet satellite states found themselves declaring independence, and the grip the Soviet Union had on the Eastern Bloc, as well as swaths of the Third World, was released. It was a decade of turmoil, with civil war in Somalia, genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia, and war in Kosovo. The newly-minted unipolar system, with the United States as the world’s lone superpower, was off to a disastrous beginning.

As the Yugoslav Wars raged through the 1990s, the various provinces of what once was the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia seceded, attempting to form their own internationally recognized states. Among these was the territory of Kosovo and its majority Albanian populace. Unsatisfied with the attempted secession, and responding to consistent attacks on his forces by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), President Slobodan Milošević attempted to retain Kosovo through ethnic cleansing and the
complete destruction of the KLA and all who supported it. From 1998-1999, a war in Kosovo would rage between Milošević’s Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and the KLA, who ultimately received military assistance from NATO, that would claim thousands of innocent lives (Perrit, 2008).

Unrest in Kosovo gathered momentum with the desire to gain independence, and the KLA conducted violent attacks against Serbian police forces, and President Slobodan Milošević began a counterinsurgency campaign with the intention of wiping out the KLA and shifting the ethnic balance of Kosovo to reflect a Serbian majority. In order to meet this goal, Milošević needed to gain popular support among citizens in the region. Though having underestimated support the KLA had garnered from the civilian population, Milošević instead proceeded with a campaign of ethnic cleansing to rid the region of the insurgents and those who supported them. In order to accomplish his vision, the “Butcher of the Balkans” needed to keep the international community convinced that his efforts were policing issues of his own “sovereign prerogative” (Perritt, 2008, p. 47). Milošević often made sovereignty claims through speeches he gave to his divided nation: “Our country is a sovereign state. It has its laws. Its own Constitution and institutions. Serbia deserves and is duty-bound to defend itself from this invasion, which has begun with these staged disruptions and false promises of quick improvement” (Milošević, 2000). Some, including Buchanon (2003), claim Milošević did indeed have the international legal structure on his side. Citing Articles 2 (4), 2 (7), and Chapter VII of the UN Charter, Buchanan states that Milošević was correct in his stance that intervention was illegal because it was not done in self-defense and it did not have authorization from the UN Security Council. Milošević carried his claims to sovereignty all the way to the
International Criminal Court, where he stood trial in 2001 for war crimes and crimes against humanity: “I consider this tribunal a false tribunal and this indictment a false indictment” (as cited in Kelly, 2005, p. 87). Notwithstanding Milošević’s perspective, the Kosovo War serves as the model case that made the “Responsibility to Protect” doctrine of international intervention, for what was before considered illegal intervention, justifiable in the case of defending a population from gross human rights violations (Annan, 1999; Buchanan, 2003).

The UNSC, which remained hauntingly quiet during the events in Chile years earlier, was an active player when it came to Kosovo. Having passed five resolutions pertaining to the crisis, each with a certain amount of weight behind them, the UNSC was not only involved in addressing human rights, but it was also effective. Resolution 1160 was the UNSC’s first concerning Kosovo, and it passed in the spring of 1998 by a vote of 14 to 0, with Russia notably in favor, and called for economic sanctions, an arms embargo on Yugoslavia, and a diplomatic resolution to the conflict. (United Nations Security Council, 1998a). Resolution 1160 went unheeded and was followed in the summer with UNSC Resolution 1199, which called for a cease-fire and the acceptance of human rights observers to begin to address a worsening refugee crisis (United Nations Security Council, 1998b). This resolution did not find success either, as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Kosovo Verification Mission was forced to withdraw most of its on-the-ground observers when cease-fire criteria were regularly breached (Maisonneuve, 2000). Making matters worse, the Gornje Obrinje massacre was perpetrated just days after passing resolution 1199, wherein an entire family of 21 Kosovo Albanians was murdered by Serbian police forces (Human Rights Watch, 1999).
Continued failures of peace talks, including Belgrade’s refusal to agree to the terms of the Rambouillet Agreement in early 1999, led to NATO beginning airstrikes in March (NATO Poised to Strike, 1999). It did not take long to subdue Milošević once the strikes began, by June the Military Technical Agreement between the NATO peacekeeping mission and the governments of Yugoslavia and Serbia effectively ended the war. The agreement was reinforced by UNSC Resolution 1244, which required the withdrawal of military forces and authorized humanitarian missions in the region (United Nations Security Council, 1999).

Spassov (2014) analyzes NATO’s role in the post-Cold War world by examining its intervention in Kosovo. As many political scientists observe, the author argues that NATO expansion is an American effort to limit Russia’s strategic abilities in its own backyard. From NATO’s perspective, its intervention was predicated on humanitarian interests when the United Nations was failing to pass resolutions of any force with the constant threat of Russian veto. Nevertheless, Russia saw NATO’s move as a violation of Yugoslavia’s state sovereignty. Spassov points out that while the conflict of interest between Washington and Moscow was the most pronounced since the Cold War, Russia’s failing economy and military shortcomings rendered it incapable of more than diplomatic reprimands and provision of some military advisors to Yugoslavia. Spassov’s (2014) widely-shared perspective demonstrates the change in dynamic of pre- and post-Cold War relations between the United States and Russia, specifically pertaining to a human rights conflict where Russia’s intervention would have stifled human rights socialization. The United States was able to intervene in Russia’s Eastern-European
sphere of influence without the former superpower doing more than making some diplomatic assertions to stop it.

With NATO providing the military strength needed to defeat the Yugoslavian defense forces, the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission, later replaced by the Kosovo Verification Mission, would provide the oversight in ensuring the agreed-to rules of the various international resolutions were followed. When they were not followed, as happened often, one of the over 500 non-governmental organizations who had descended upon the region to assist would step in (Mockaitis, 2004). Among these organizations were some of the most well-known humanitarian groups in the world, like Oxfam, the International Red Cross, and Doctors Without Borders. While practically all of the humanitarian missions in Kosovo fled at the initiation of NATO bombings in March 1999 to provide assistance to fleeing civilians along the border, they quickly returned once bombing had ceased in June (Kosovo Emergency Update, 1999; Mockaitis, 2004). The work of the organizations varied somewhat, but most provided temporary food, water, and shelter to refugees and the internally-displaced (Kosovo Emergency Update, 1999).

All told, over 1 million Kosovars fled their homes as a result of the conflict, and thousands more fell victim to crimes of summary execution, rape, torture, and imprisonment (Power, 2013; Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo, 1999). While the turmoil of Eastern Europe in the 1990s may be attributable to the breaking up of the Soviet Union, it is clear the international community’s reaction to the human rights abuses here was stronger than the response in Chile during the bipolar era. A peacekeeping force was deployed in the form of NATO, above the protests of the Kremlin, who had since 1991 been relegated to a second-tier power. Transnational advocacy networks and NGOs such
as the Oxfam and the International Red Cross were able to provide support for refugees as they fled Kosovo (Roach, 2005; Kosovo Emergency Update, 1999). The passage of five UNSC resolutions pertaining to Western military intervention within an Eastern European country during the Cold War is altogether unimaginable. Nevertheless, these resolutions, with Russia sitting as a permanent member of the UNSC wielding automatic veto power, passed with just a few abstentions from the former superpower. In fact, Russia played a crucial role in mediating the Military Technical Agreement between Milošević and Western representatives (The Kosovo Peace Plan, 1999). This, in contrast to the United States voting against half of the UN General Assembly resolutions concerning Chile during the Cold War.

In this chapter, two case studies of human rights abuses have been examined, one having occurred during the Cold War bipolar era, and one during the post-Cold War unipolar era. Three characteristics of the international community’s response to the abuses were observed: the deployment of a military or peacekeeping force, the involvement of transnational advocacy networks, and whether or not the UN adopted a resolution against the violations. In Chile, there was no deployment of a military or peacekeeping force, potentially because of the lack of pressure even the United States, when it had the appropriate administration in place, was able to put on Pinochet. There were also no international human rights organizations, the transnational advocacy networks which Risse and Sikkink (1999) argue were in the early stages of forming but greatly assist in human rights socialization. While the UN did pass 16 resolutions through the General Assembly concerning Chile, none were passed through the UNSC. The war in Kosovo, which occurred at the end of a rather tumultuous decade following the
collapse of the Soviet Union, provided a new model of international intervention in a world that had been ruled by ideas of sovereignty for centuries before. Military intervention took place in the form of NATO, which was followed by the Kosovo Force peacekeeping unit. There was a significant presence of international human rights organizations, even if they were relegated to the sidelines during the military intervention, most were providing relief to refugees and continued their work inside Kosovo after the aerial bombardment had ceased. The UNSC passed five resolutions concerning the human rights situation in Kosovo, and while they did not have many teeth due to Russia and China’s likely veto of anything more than talking points, the UN had NATO to carry its stick. Based on the criteria set forth above, it is readily apparent that the international response to the human rights abuses perpetrated in Kosovo during the unipolar era was more robust than that of the response to Augusto Pinochet and Chile throughout the last two decades of the Cold War.
This chapter contains a statistical analysis of the socialization of human rights norms during and after the Cold War, ranging from the years 1972-2018. Comparing the bipolar era with a non-bipolar era will assist in demonstrating whether or not the socialization of human rights norms was stifled during the Cold War. This will be an observational study to determine if human rights are correlated with the system of international polarity. The conclusions drawn from observational studies, which require no influencing on the part of the examiner, can be expected to remain consistent across similar circumstances outside the study, a benefit known as external validity (Imai, 2017). The particular type of observational study to be performed below is called a difference-in-differences design, a study commonly used to determine the effect of a treatment, in this case the shift from a bipolar to unipolar system, by comparing its impact on a test group versus a control group over time (Difference-in-Difference Estimation, n.d.). The drawback of observational studies, however, is the presence of confounding factors that could influence both the treatment (polarity) and outcome (human rights) variables (Imai, 2017). In this study, confounders range from states’ gross domestic product (GDP) per capita to what region of the world each is in and its alignment with the superpower states. In order to limit the effect of confounders, this study will hold fixed various independent variables in order to determine if there is a correlation between the system of polarity and human rights socialization.
Measuring human rights has been a growing field since the 1970s, and human rights indicators have only started to be utilized by human rights organizations like the UN since 2000 (Landman, 2006). The lack of data availability going back to the early stages of the Cold War limits the observations available in this study, but the 20 years from the 1970s to the end of the Cold War is enough observational information for this analysis. Freedom House is an NGO that specializes in research and advocacy for human rights. The organization has published an annual report called *Freedom in the World* (2018) every year since 1978, which categorizes every country in the world as either “Free,” “Partly Free,” or “Not Free.” In order to make this determination:

A country or territory is assigned two ratings—one for political rights and one for civil liberties... Each rating of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest degree of freedom and 7 the smallest degree of freedom, corresponds to a specific range of total scores (Freedom in the World, 2018).

An average of the two ratings is then taken, called the “Freedom Score,” which determines if a country is Free (1.0-2.5), Partly Free (3.0-5.0), or Not Free (5.5-7.0). The Freedom House data was chosen because it is a well-known and trustworthy source that has been collecting data in a relatively consistent manner since the 1970s, which goes back far enough to provide sufficient observations during the Cold War to make the data relevant. The analysis completed here will reveal if countries tend to move up or down this seven-point scale based on the system of polarity in effect.

In order to determine if these scores went up or down, various independent variables were identified as possible confounders, in order to determine if human rights change was explicitly due to the system of polarity. The variables identified were GDP per capita, whether or not states were allies with either the United States or the Soviet
Union during the Cold War, and the region in which a country exists (10 regions in total). By controlling variables, we are merely identifying and testing their relationship with the dependent variable in the same way the polarity variable is tested. This prevents the observer from succumbing to omitted variable bias, assigning correlation to a dependent variable that may not tell the whole story (Barret and Howland, 2006).

US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, who bore significant responsibility in the United States’ role in the Vietnam War, once asserted that “There can ... be no question but that there is an irrefutable relationship between violence and economic backwardness.” This sentiment is shared among many scholars and researchers who have studied the relationship between economic prosperity and social factors, particularly those related to violence and human rights abuses (Huntington, 1996). GDP per capita was chosen in order to most efficiently and accurately account for variations in economic conditions among states (Roser, 2016). Measured in current US dollars, the results from the regression analysis show that GDP per capita has a positive correlation with human rights scores, as was to be expected considering previous research that has long supported that notion (Mitchell and McCormick, 1988). All this to say, there is indeed a correlation between GDP and human rights socialization, as well as between GDP and the passage of time in years. This requires us to consider that there may be an alternative explanation to the proposal, something to be addressed in the next chapter.

A state’s status as an ally of either superpower during the Cold War was identified as a likely confounder because of the potential that the observed units (countries) did not randomly assign themselves to either group. For example, countries that are a part of NATO are primarily located in North America and Western Europe, and must also have
met the requirements to join, which includes some political, economic, and military requirements (Frequently Asked Questions, 2017). In order to account for this potential confounder, states were defined as either part of NATO, the Warsaw Pact, or the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). The NAM, established in the midst of the Cold War, is made up of 120 member states that consider themselves to be not aligned with a significant power bloc (About NAM, 2019). Like the polarity variable, which is defined as either bipolar or not bipolar, the aligned variable was defined as either “aligned” (a member of NATO or the Warsaw Pact) or “not aligned” (a member of NAM). States that did not fall into one of those three groups were not included in this regression in order to prevent the influence of human rights data from states with undefined relationships with one or both of the Cold War powers. The data in the regression did not present a clear correlation between a state’s alignment and human rights socialization, meaning it is likely not strongly related to the dependent variable or there was not enough data in the aligned group to make up for the disparity in observations with the non-aligned group.

The Soviet Union demonstrated through the Brezhnev Doctrine that it would be more concerned with intervening in issues concerning its socialist neighbors rather than other states, which may affect whether or not a human rights crisis is caused or thwarted. While applicable rights are the same worldwide, different regions have different histories and cultures that may determine how effectively those rights have been socialized since their inception. It is for these reasons that the statistical analysis sought to control for region. Specifically, Eastern Europe and Latin America were chosen because they are the home regions of the case study countries, and were a hot-bed of activity for the US and Soviet Union during the Cold War (Sikkink, 2004). In isolating the regions, we found
that human rights socialization in these areas was suggestive of the effects around the rest of the world: human rights scores trended negative after the shift into unipolarity (see Table 3 and accompanying discussion below).

Five linear regression models were completed for this analysis. Linear regression models analyze the data of two variables to determine if there is a correlational relationship between them. If increasing values for the independent variable cause a rise in value for the dependent variable, the model is said to have a positive correlation. Decreasing values for the dependent variable in response to a rise in the independent variable, however, is known as a negative correlation. Models can also have no correlation, wherein an increase in the value of the dependent variable will bring mixed results in the dependent variable. Based on my proposal, it is expected that as the system shifts from bipolar to unipolar, human-rights scores will increase, a positive correlation. We should also be sure to understand whether the results are “statistically significant,” that is, whether the results are caused by the independent variable or are simply due to chance. This analysis defines results as statistically significant if the probability value, or p-value, is less than 5%. If the probability score is less than 5% for countries in the unipolar group to have higher average human rights scores than the average score in the bipolar group, the results are deemed to be significant because of the low chance those results could have occurred by chance (Imai, 2017). The first model, which used Freedom Score as the dependent variable, returned no statistically significant results. The second and third models (Tables 1 and 2) took Political Rights and Civil Liberties each separately as the dependent variables, to determine if either was impacted by the shift from bipolarity to unipolarity, both of which returned statistically-significant results.
Table 1. Impact of Bipolarity on Political Rights.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bipolarity</th>
<th>Political Rights</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.068**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N (# of observations) 7,246
R^2 0.501

Note: *indicates significant at p < 0.05 level. ** indicates 0.001 < p < 0.05.
Standard errors in parentheses

The models explore whether the shift in bipolar years to unipolar years (the final bipolar year being set in 1991) had a discernible effect on human rights. The Political Rights category deals with rights related to a country’s electoral process, political participation, and functioning of the government. More specifically, it scores countries on questions related to racial and ethnic equality, how a government took power (by election or force), and if the government is attempting to change the composition of a population for the purpose of destroying a culture (Freedom in the World, 2018). The model depicted in Table 1 above shows that as the system shifts from bipolarity to unipolarity, the Political Rights score on a scale of 1-7 would decrease by 0.068, almost 7%. It is statistically significant with a p-value of 0.005, meaning the predictor (moving from bipolarity to unipolarity) should be believed to cause a change in human rights, though this model demonstrates a negative correlation in rights as opposed to a positive correlation as hypothesized. The R^2 value tells another piece of the story – the amount of variation in our dependent variable (Political Rights) explained by our model. That is, it is a tool used to help determine the strength of the relationship between the independent and dependent variables, denoted as a score between 0% and 100%, though it is not typically depended on as a single-source of evidence. Here, R^2 equals 0.501, which
means that this model could potentially explain 50.1% of the variation in Political Rights. This seems rather unlikely considering the discussion above regarding the multitude of confounding factors involved in this study (Imai, 2017).

Table 2. Impact of Bipolarity on Civil Liberties.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bipolarity</th>
<th>Civil Liberties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.01*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N (# of observations)</th>
<th>7,246</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.563</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *indicates significant at p < 0.05 level. ** indicates 0.001 < p < 0.05. Standard errors in parentheses

Civil Liberties addresses issues relating to the freedom of expression and belief, the rights to associate and organize freely, the rule of law, and individual rights. In particular, the score is based on the results of questions as to a country’s due process, religious freedom, and the rights of citizens to own property, to name a few (Freedom in the World, 2018). The model depicted in Table 2 shows that as the system shifts from bipolarity to unipolarity, the Civil Liberties rating of a country would increase by 0.01, or 1%. It is statistically significant with a \( p \)-value of 0.032 and predicts an increase in human rights socialization in accordance with the hypothesis. Again, the \( R^2 \) result of 56% is questionable.

Interestingly, no significant correlation can be drawn from when the Political Rights and Civil Liberties scores are averaged to create the Freedom Score. However, when those scores are separated, a statistically-significant correlation can be drawn. The fact that Political Rights tend to have a negative correlation with movement from bipolar
to unipolar systems and Civil Liberties has a positive correlation may provide some evidence that they are, in essence, canceling one another out, resulting in a lack of significant correlation on average. It is perhaps intuitive to the observer that with the end of the Cold War and breakup of the Soviet Union, many new territories that were once under the Soviet system were suddenly thrust into independence. Freedom does not necessarily mean order. It seems the negative correlation between political rights and a world with an influx of new states may be attributable to the notion that those new states cause a “power vacuum”, lacking leadership in the midst of tumultuous change and are not able to create a system initially as free as the rest of the already-established states on average (Bremmer, 2017).

As noted above, one of the confounding factors held constant in the analysis of political rights and civil liberties was the global region. The last two models ran for this analysis looked at how human rights varied from region to region, specifically, in the two regions of the world the case-study countries (discussed in Chapter II) are located. The regions were created by grouping together and holding all other regions constant. There are ten regions determined by standards of the UN Statistics Division (2019) consisting of North America, Central America, South America, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Oceania, Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean. The two regions isolated for the analysis were Eastern Europe, wherein Kosovo is located, and significant turmoil occurred in the years following the breakup of the Soviet Union, and South America, where Chile is located and what was a target of expansion for the Kremlin during the Cold War and thus a point of containment for Washington.
### Table 3. Bipolarity & Freedom Rating in Eastern Europe and South America.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Eastern Europe</th>
<th>South America</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bipolarity</td>
<td>-0.067*</td>
<td>-0.093***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N (# of observations)</td>
<td>497</td>
<td>898</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.416</td>
<td>0.237</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * indicates significant at p < 0.05 level. *** indicates p < 0.0001. Standard errors in parentheses.

Here, it is determined that as the system shifts from bipolarity to unipolarity, the Freedom Rating in Eastern Europe and South America decreased by 0.067 and 0.093, or almost 7% and 9%, respectively. The finding in each region is statistically significant, with $p$-values under the 0.05 threshold. These were indeed interesting results again, as the two regions that saw among the most involvement by both superpowers during the Cold War saw relative declines in their human rights scores after the Cold War. With the US containment policymaking appearances frequently in South America and the Brezhnev Doctrine requiring the Kremlin’s attention throughout Eastern Europe, it is indeed surprising that after those influences departed the region, human rights scores decreased.

With surprising results, to say the least, in this chapter, a difference-in-differences statistical analysis of the socialization of human rights norms during and after the Cold War was conducted, ranging from 1972-2018. By comparing the bipolar era with a non-bipolar era, it was demonstrated that the socialization of human rights norms is not necessarily stifled in bipolar systems. It was noted that in this type of study, confounders are many, and here took the form of states’ gross domestic product (GDP) per capita to region and alliance. We discovered that as the world shifted from a system of bipolarity to unipolarity, aggregate human rights scores tended to drop. This negative correlation
may have been due to the power vacuum that was created when a significant source of governmental authority vanished, speaking more towards the journey than to its destination in terms of the relationship between polarity and human rights socialization.
Chapter IV.

Alternative Explanations

Here, I would like to offer an explanation of why the findings in the previous chapter turned out to be in disagreement with the proposal, as well as some counter and supplemental alternatives to explain the Cold War’s effect on the socialization phenomena.

The concept of “path dependence,” alluded to at the end of the previous chapter suggests, “that what happened at an earlier point in time will affect the possible outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a later point in time” (Sewell, 2005). Pierson (2000) argues the timing of events have the utmost importance in determining future outcomes, regardless of their perceived significance: “Because earlier parts of a sequence matter much more than later parts, an event that happens ‘too late’ may have no effect, although it might have been of great consequence” if it had occurred sooner (Pierson, 2000, p. 263). We should consider, then, the reason the statistical analysis did not result in the anticipated findings was not necessarily because a bipolar system is better for human rights than a unipolar system, but that events and choices affecting human rights socialization during the Cold War had deep-seated effects on what was possible even after that system was gone.

Support for decades of a policy aimed at countering the advances of a mortal enemy would understandably encounter diminishing returns among the general public. Attempting to live a normal life at the business end of intercontinental ballistic missiles
with nuclear warheads armed and ready would take its toll on even the staunchest of supporters. Weakening resolve was demonstrated in both the East and West, manifested through protests like in Hungary, or throughout the United States in response to an unjust war in Vietnam. Morgan (2018) argues this reality, created by the early leadership of the Cold War, spurred President Richard Nixon and General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev to come to the negotiating table as the Cold War transitioned in its arc from climax to falling action. Moscow, which had been calling for a European peace conference since the early 1950s in order to solidify the international system following World War II, was finally able to convince an apocalypse-weary West to come to the table in 1972. A multilateral meeting in Finland’s capital, Helsinki, would spur a détente between the United States and Soviet Union as an attempt to reach peace through creating a stable European and international order.

An alternative explanation to the proposal that the Cold War hindered human rights socialization may point to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and its accompanying Helsinki Accords as evidence that human rights, which are a noteworthy feature of the Accords, could be agreed upon and socialized across the international arena even in the bipolar system (Helsinki Final Act, 1975). The Accords represented a profound change in East-West relations, and committed the Soviet Union to a set of human rights standards that would, “expand international travel, promote the reunification of divided families, increase the circulation of foreign books, newspapers, and films, and improve journalists’ working conditions” (Morgan, 2018). Instead of competition fueling chaos, the CSCE is an example of the Cold War driving compromise. The sole force behind the conference could not be considered human rights socialization
for its own sake, however, as Moscow saw it as an opportunity to weaken the Western alliance by rendering it all but unnecessary through a European peace, and NATO participated as a way to call the communist system into question on the world stage (Morgan, 2018). In fact, the West sought to weaponize human rights to that end, ensuring the Accords did not include any references to rights cherished by the communist states, such as the right to leisure, education, or work. Instead, the Accords reference only those rights that demonstrate the superiority of democracy (Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe Final Act, 1975). Even so, scholars like Waltz (1967), Morgenthau (1967), and Seabury (1967) saw the détente as the beginning of the end of the Cold War, with the recently achieved nuclear balance and the two superpowers coming to the table bringing clarity and stability to what had previously been an unsteady two decades.

A second alternative explanation to this proposal centers on the fact that the United States was not an unflawed player in the Cold War competition. Its failure to treat African Americans with equal rights and basic human dignity was often cited by the Soviet Union as reason enough for Third World states to join the Soviet bloc instead of with the Americans (Skrentny, 1998). As many observers are quick to point out, this truth was a persuasive point of embarrassment for the United States, particularly those institutions that conducted its business on the world stage, namely the Department of State and the White House (Piven and Cloward, 1977). Some scholars take a more nuanced approach, citing political process theory, also known as political opportunity theory, as the catalyst of the civil rights movement (Skrentny, 1998; McAdam, 1999). From the perspective of African Americans in the US, how could their government vie
for the support of and defend those overseas who had a different skin color, when it was not willing to do the same at home?

As race relations became a worsening public issue through the 1950s and early 1960s, including international coverage of the race riots of 1963, President John F. Kennedy worked in the shadows to draft and submit legislation that would later become the Civil Rights Act. In a meeting with top government officials and business leaders, Kennedy urged more hiring of black workers, citing “Clear evidence… that the problem is being exploited abroad and has serious implications in our international relations” (as cited in Skrentny, 1998). The eventual passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 outlawed “discrimination or segregation of any kind on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin” (EEOC, 2019). It was the beginning of the end of the propaganda machine, as more legislation was passed through the 1960s, public sentiment and race relations improved in America, removing African Americans as a potential target of Soviet propaganda (McAdam, 1999). The Cold War competition provided a viable point of strategic emphasis for Moscow, and thus the leverage and bargaining position African Americans needed in order to pass one of the most critical pieces of legislation in American history.

The two examples above offer that the Cold War’s focus on bipolar competition acted as a facilitator, rather than an obstructor of human rights. Next, we will touch on an alternative notion that explains the socialization of human rights norms over time. Modernization theory states that as countries develop economically, they will experience political transformation toward democracy and an increased level of observation for human rights norms (Toppen, 1996). This theory has been borne out by analyses from the
1950s through the 1970s that development, specifically economic development, leads to improvements in a society: “Thus, we see again how the factors involved in modernization or economic development are linked closely to those involved in the historical institutionalization of the values of legitimacy and tolerance” (Lipset, 1959). Mitchell and McCormick (1988) provide a statistical analysis of this phenomena and show a relationship between a state’s per capita income and its use of torture and holding of political prisoners. Their analysis is supported by Poe and Tate (1994), who found that democratization leads to more respect for human rights norms, and like Mitchell and McCormick, Poe and Tate found a modest negative relationship between economic indicators and human rights.

Critics of modernization theory, such as Risse and Ropp (1999) point to many examples of economically developed states that “had some of the most brutal dictatorships and worst human rights records during the 1960s and 1970s (p. 269). What is more, they point to the fact that in the case study analyses for their spiral model, states like Chile and the Philippines where rights received prescriptive status often underwent intense economic turmoil, not development, immediately before rights socialization (Risse and Ropp, 1999). Indeed, today we can use China as an example of a country with a booming economy, a stable government (though not democratic), and a “Not Free” rating based on Freedom House (2019) scores of political rights and civil liberties. Even so, modernization theory presents a sensible explanation for human rights development, if not a one-size-fits-all solution.
Chapter V.

Conclusion

I set off on this project after considering the relationship between great-power politics and human rights. With a realist perspective that human rights were an unfortunate casualty of the Cold War, particularly within those countries that were plagued by the constant competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, it seemed logical that there would be a marked increase in human rights indicators once a victor emerged. However, what we found is just the opposite.

The purpose of this project is to help better understand potential systematic human rights roadblocks of the past so that we may be better prepared to avoid them in the future. It sought to determine if the socialization of international human rights norms is stifled in bipolar systems. As two great powers compete in the zero-sum game of global dominance, there can only be one winner. That being true, the hypothesis held that human rights socialization was degraded during the Cold War. The study began with an examination of how international human rights norms were first legally established amongst nations, with the adoption of the UDHR and its accompanying covenants. Once the human rights framework was established, we went over Risse and Sikkink’s (1999) five-step model of human rights socialization: repression, denial, tactical concessions, prescriptive status, and rule-consistent behavior. The Cold War policies of the United States and the Soviet Union were examined in order to illuminate the notion that the most effective foreign policy in a bipolar system vis-à-vis power is harmful to human rights.
In conducting a case-study analysis of two well-known world events pertaining to human rights, one during and one after the Cold War, it was determined that the international community’s response to human rights violations, and thereby the process of correction and socialization, was more robust in the non-bipolar case. During the Cold War, the White House was unwilling or unable to exert pressure on the regime, led by Augusto Pinochet, that it had put in power. This, in addition to the fact that perhaps due to its infancy, the transnational human rights network was largely unable to support the national, mostly religious organizations working within Chile to assist those in need. An effective response was seen in Kosovo, however, coming at the end of a decade of human rights tragedy, the UN, NATO, and the transnational human rights network came together to prevent what could have turned into the last genocide of a 20th century that had already seen more than its share.

Utilizing the human rights scoring system created by Freedom House as the dependent variable and the years the system was not bipolar as the independent variable, the statistical analysis produced some thought-provoking results. First, it demonstrated that there might be a level of offsetting concerning different types of human rights. Where political rights could have been diminished with the sudden removal of the governing authority in the form of the Soviet Union, civil liberties increased.

Based on the mixed results of the data and case study examinations, it is concluded that the proposed hypothesis has been refuted, as the data analysis showed statistically-significant evidence that human rights actually decreased after the Cold War came to an end. With that, it is determined that a new perspective and new approach will be necessary to make a more precise determination on the effect the Cold War had on
human rights socialization. Therefore it is hoped that at the very least, this study will 
stimulate renewed interest in the study of human rights vis-à-vis great-power politics.


