Ethnic Political Settlements in Post-Colonial Africa: A Comparative Study of Nigeria, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda

Citation

Permanent link
https://nrs.harvard.edu/URN-3:HUL.InstRepos:37365015

Terms of Use
This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAA

Share Your Story
The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Submit a story.

Accessibility
Ethnic Political Settlements in Post-Colonial Africa:
A Comparative Study of Nigeria, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda

John E. Stafford

A Thesis in the Field of History
for the Degree of Master of Liberal Arts in Extension Studies

Harvard University
March 2020
Abstract

Interethnic conflict was rampant in many countries of post-colonial Africa, often due to ethnic tensions introduced or exacerbated by colonial rule. After independence, different countries developed different ethnic political settlements—systems, institutions, policies, commissions, etc—to attempt to address these ethnic tensions. These included political power rotation agreements; ethnic quotas for the cabinet, military, and bureaucracy; restrictions on ethnic speech; truth and reconciliation commissions; and many more. Much research describes and compares these ethnic political settlements across countries. Another body of research examines how the specific ethnic settlements came into being in specific countries. However, there is a paucity of research that compares how key factors (“structural drivers”) influence the development of ethnic political settlements across countries. This thesis seeks to identify the linkages between structural drivers and ethnic political settlements for five countries in post-colonial Africa: Nigeria, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda. It finds that there are powerful connections between structural drivers and ethnic settlements. Moreover, it finds that there are patterns and trends in the linkages between drivers and settlements, and that these patterns and trends can be used to begin to identify models of driver/settlement linkages.
About the Author


He teaches U.S. History and Comparative Government at Mercer Island High School. In a prior career, he was a partner with Strategic Planning Associates, a management consulting firm based in Washington, D.C.

He has a B.A. in History from Dartmouth College, and an M.A. in Teaching from St. Martin’s University. He is writing this thesis to complete his M.A. in History from the Harvard Extension School.

He is active in Democratic Party Politics in Seattle, writes articles on public policy for the *South Seattle Emerald*, is on the Steering Committee for the South Seattle Climate Action Network, and is the Treasurer for the Environment and Climate Caucus of the Washington State Democratic Party. His recreational interests include duplicate bridge, jazz drumming, and piano.
# Table of Contents

About the Author ................................................................. iv

List of Tables ........................................................................ vi

List of Figures/Exhibits .......................................................... vii

I. Approach: Research Problem, Hypotheses, Methods and Outline ................. 1

II. Analytical Section One: The Countries, Their Histories, Their Structural Drivers, and Their Ethnic Settlements ......................................................... 4

   Nigeria. ............................................................... 4

   Ethiopia. ............................................................. 13

   Rwanda. ............................................................. 23

   Burundi. ............................................................. 32

   Uganda. ............................................................. 48

   Commentary. ......................................................... 56

III. Analytical Section Two: Structural Drivers and Ethnic Political Settlements ...... 57

IV. Analytical Section Three: Testing the Hypothesis at the Aggregate Level .......... 89

V. Analytical Section Four: Testing the Hypothesis at the Discrete Level .......... 151

VI. Conclusion: Evaluating the Hypothesis ........................................... 165

Appendices ........................................................................... 168

Endnotes .............................................................................. 177

Bibliography ........................................................................ 212
List of Tables

Table 1. Background factors. ................................................................. 57
Table 2. Colonial era events. ................................................................. 63
Table 3. Institutional responses (post-colonial; not ethnic settlements). .......... .66
Table 4. Political/economic system. ....................................................... 70
Table 5. Policy arrangements. ............................................................... 79
Table 6. Institutions, narratives, and justice. .......................................... .82
Table 7. Country summaries. ............................................................... 142
Table 8. Country models. ................................................................. 146
Table 9. Discrete structural drivers and ethnic settlements. ......................... 154
List of Figures

Fig. 1 Aggregate national and discrete perspectives. ............................... 91

Fig. 2 Four-phased methodology. .......................................................... 174
Chapter I

Approach: Research Problem, Hypotheses, Methods and Outline

The colonial period in Africa was characterized by the introduction and/or exacerbation of ethnic tensions. This was often the byproduct of the colonial alteration of the relative power balance of different ethnic groups—via policies such as divide-and-rule, ruling through a chosen ethnic group, economic favoritism, etc. After independence, these ethnic tensions often metastasized into violent conflict. In response, African countries developed ethnic political settlements—ranging from power-sharing agreements to the use of multiparty politics to ethnic-based federalist systems to re-education camps. Naturally, a different set of ethnic political settlements have been reached in each country, reflecting differences in history, political process, nature of conflict, and so on.

This thesis will compare the ethnic political settlements reached in five countries: Nigeria, Ethiopia, Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda. A multi-step screening process was used to select these countries (Appendix A). All 55 African countries were considered, and they were progressively reduced to a set of five that meet each of the selection criteria. The three most important selection criteria are: (1) countries where there has been significant and prolonged post-independence ethnic conflict; (2) the post-independence conflict has primarily been indigenous versus indigenous in nature (as opposed to indigenous versus European); and (3) countries where substantial progress has been made in establishing post-independence ethnic political settlements. (Further information on the
research process is in appendices B through E: significance of the research; definition of terms; research methods; and research limitations).

An assessment of the ethnic political settlements reached in each of the countries will be made, and then the settlements will be compared across countries. In addition, the factors (heretofor referred to as “structural drivers”) that led each country to establish its set of ethnic settlements will be identified, and these will also be compared across countries. Finally, the linkages between these structural drivers and ethnic political settlements will be analyzed to determine how specific drivers led to specific settlements across countries.

The three primary questions that will be addressed are: (1) how did the five countries develop political settlements to address ethnic conflict in the post-colonial period? A wide range of ethnic political settlements variables will be considered to form this assessment; (2) how do these ethnic political settlements compare across countries?; and (3) what are the structural drivers that have influenced the development of these ethnic political settlements?

There are three hypotheses: (1) there are large variations in the nature of the ethnic political settlements reached in the five countries; (2) these differences are largely structurally driven. That is, they reflect the underlying structural historical conditions of each country. Thus, the ethnic political settlements tend to reflect a progression of ostensibly logical responses to underlying structural historical realities; (3) there are patterns and trends that characterize the ethnic political settlements across countries. That is, because certain structural conditions tend to generate certain types of ethnic political
settlements, there will be patterns and trends in the development of ethnic political settlements that can be discerned by comparing the structural drivers and ethnic settlements of the six countries.

To test these hypotheses, research has been conducted to document both the actual ethnic political settlements achieved in each country and the structural factors that drive these settlements. A summary of these drivers and settlements are presented in table format. The thesis then analyzes the manner in which the structural factors influence the ethnic political settlements. Finally, there will be a comparison of drivers and settlements across countries to identify similarities, differences, patterns, and trends.

There are four major analytical sections that follow: (a) a brief review of the modern history of each of the five countries, in order to identify ethnic political settlements and the structural drivers that influence them; (b) six tables that summarize the drivers and settlements for each of the five countries; (c) an analysis of the manner in which the overall compilation of drivers impacts the overall compilation of settlements by country; (d) an analysis of the manner in which discrete drivers influence discrete settlements. Thus, there is the following conceptual flow: the historical review provides the basis for the description of the drivers and settlements, which provides the data to test the hypotheses. This testing of the hypothesis is then done in two phases—the aggregate level (how drivers influence settlements collectively) and the discrete level (how individual drivers influence individual settlements).
Chapter II

Analytical Section One: The Countries, Their Histories, Their Structural Drivers, and Their Ethnic Settlements

This section will provide a brief overview of the modern history (late pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial) of each country in the sample. The intent is to review these histories in order to distill structural drivers and chronicle ethnic settlements. This process of cataloging key drivers and settlements will then be formalized in the next section. Each country will be discussed in turn, with three subsections for each: structural history, ethnic settlements, and discussion.

Nigeria

In Nigeria, three protectorates (North, East, and Lagos) were combined by Britain in 1914 to form the country, and thus the nation is an artificial colonial construct. Padé Badru notes, “In a sense, one could argue that the creation of Nigeria was merely for administrative convenience of the British imperial state.”¹ The three main ethnic groups—Hausa and Fulani (actually two different ethnic groups) (North), Igbo (Southeast) and Yoruba (Southwest)—are distributed regionally. Thus, Nigeria was formed on the basis of powerful and dangerous ethno-regional identification and lack of national allegiance—factors that contributed to the tragic Igbo-secessionist Biafran conflict. Chika Okpalike explains, “Nigeria has remained a political space, with no true national identity, no
national consciousness, no national commitment, and no true national loyalty . . . [It is] a loosely knit nation in the name of Nigeria, made up of strong regions charged with ethnic consciousness . . . Only six years was going to elapse before the dynamite detonated.”

Structural History

Since independence in 1960, political power shifted between civilian regimes (CR) and military regimes (MR), a reality linked to regional ethnic strife (discussed below). The nation has more Islamic prevalence in the North and Christian prevalence in the South, meaning that ethnicity and religion are overlapping dimensions of identity. The British ruled primarily through the Hausa-Fulani in the North, in another variant of its divide-and-rule approach.


Nigeria has a wealth of natural resources, but none more important than oil. Oil changed the political economy of the nation and hence the nature of its ethnic conflicts and ethnic settlements. Thus, while Nigeria shares attributes with other countries in this study, e.g., a nation brought into existence by a European metropole, a divide-and-rule colonial past, colonial rule via a large but nonetheless minority ethnic group, etc—all with
ongoing implications for ethnic strife, it is the only nation in this study where a natural resource (other than land) profoundly altered the ethnic calculus.

There are other important structural historical factors. These include low GDP per capita, an embryonic (non-consolidated) democracy and ongoing British influence in the country’s political and economic systems (neo-colonialism).

Thus, the salient structural historical factors that define Nigeria include: lack of national identity and nationalism; ethnic fragmentation; ethno-religious-regional identification; massive tradeable natural resource (oil); embryonic and non-consolidated democracy; powerful and interventionist military; low GDP per capita; neo-colonialism.

Ethnic Political Settlements

Salient, ethnic political settlements, and the factors that motivate them, include: Federalism. Nigeria’s federalist system has been characterized by a rapidly increasing number of districts, starting at four in 1967 and reaching 36 (plus a federal district) in 1996. The stated purpose has been to devolve decision-making to local territories, thereby creating a more inclusionary political system. However, Michael Mwenda Kithinji (and others) are skeptical about the actual motivation. He notes that there are two types of federal systems—those that allow regional ethnic groups to participate in political power; and those that allow ethnic groups to participate in revenue sharing. He observes that Nigeria’s federal system is the second type. Nigeria’s federation was organized from the top down, not as an agreed-upon amalgamation from the regions themselves (bottom-up).
Gerrymandering. The dramatic increase in the number of districts over time has not been effected on a basis that is ethnically neutral and is thus seen by many experts to be an example of de-facto gerrymandering in support of power perpetration in the North. Okpalike notes that districting has been used to dilute various bases of power:

“Meanwhile, the creation of the Mid-Western region out of the Western region was inspired by the scheme to divide loyalty to Yoruba dominance; the same scheme was to be employed in 1967 by Yakubu Gowen in the creation of twelve states to disintegrate the Eastern region [which he notes contributed to the onset of the Biafran conflict].”

Henry Ani Kifordu argues, “The last time (1996) federated-states were expanded to thirty-six during Abacha’s government; nineteen states, or roughly 53%, went to the North, while the remaining seventeen (47%) were rationed between the two (Western and Eastern) regions of the South. This distribution appears to be more impelled by ‘gerrymandering’ and patronage ambitions of military politicians than by equity principles reflective of national character.”

Political System. Nigeria is a consociational democracy. There are parties and elections, but with the allocation of select political offices based on ethnicity. It transitioned from a Westminster-style parliamentary-democracy at independence to a presidential democracy in 1979.

Political parties. There have been ebbs and flows in policy regarding political parties in Nigeria. In 1989, Ibrahim Babangida reduced the number of parties from 13 to two state parties, which Sani Abacha proceeded to ban in 1993. In 1999, multiparty politics were re-instated. Political parties have a long history of aligning with ethnic groups, as noted by
Christian Ezeibe and Marcellus Ikeanyibe: “The three dominant ethnic groups—Hausa/Fulani, Igbo, and Yoruba—converged in the three different major political parties: the Northern People’s Congress [NPC], the National Congress of Nigerian Citizens [NCNC], and the Action Group [AG], respectively. Other minority groups found reasons to form their own political parties.” Anugwom notes that both the original parties and the next generation parties spawned by them “were all ethnically based, as were their leaders. In effect, no single party was broadly based or cut across ethnic lines. In this way, ethnicity soon became the bane of the first republic.” He asserts that this was a major factor contributing to military intervention in Nigerian politics: “They were ethno-regional in nature first and foremost, rather than central or national political parties . . . This became so bad, that in the end, the politicians themselves were calling upon the military to take control.”

Since the 1999 Constitution, political parties are required to be national in character (having key officials from different parts of the country) and are prohibited from campaigning based on ethnicity. According to Ezeibe and Ikeanyibe, this has had somewhat limited impact: “While most political parties of the Fourth Republic tried to circumvent the constitutional provisions by scouting for party officials and candidates from different parts of the country, they remained, in the main, ethnic in their electoral performance.”

Moreover, there have been attempts to manipulate elections that some analysts have interpreted as an attempt to institute semi-de facto single-party politics. The 2007 elections, won by the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), were marred with irregularities.
Elischer claims that the PDP is a clientelistic party, and that “Open rigging and massive abuse of incumbency have characterized the most recent 2007 elections, which national and international observers have condemned as an attempt by the Nigerian government to implement a one-party state.”

_Elections._ There have been major election reversals in Nigeria. Anugwom notes, “Protests against marginalization have also been taken up by the Yoruba, who see the annulment of the 1993 election, which was won by a Yoruba, as a move by the Hausa-Fulani militocracy to maintain power at all cost.” Olusegun Obasanjo attempted (unsuccessfully) to extend his power for a third term after his 2003-2007 rule. And the PDP failed to follow its zoning formula, allowing Goodluck Jonathan to extend his reign after the death of Yar’Adua in 2010.

_De-ethnicized politics._ There have been numerous laws and regulations passed to de-ethnicize politics. There are bans on the use of political symbols. A 2006 Electoral Act ensures equal airtime for candidates and outlaws campaigning or broadcasting of materials based on ethnic, religious, or sectarian bases. There have also been efforts to provide a range of ethnic groups with the opportunity for expression. Orji notes, “Within the context of power-sharing, there have been efforts to ensure that all political groups are given a fair opportunity to express themselves and project their identities and interests.”

_Power-sharing._ There is a variety of arrangements in Nigeria to ensure meaningful participation in the political process by different ethnic groups. Orji segments power-sharing in Nigeria into three categories: (a) territorial (federalism and the creation of states); (b) fiscal (revenue sharing via allocation); and (c) political (office allocation based
on ethnicity, including the use of zoning). He states that power-sharing “induces a shift in the character of public discourse from the ‘discourse of ethnic competition’ to the ‘discourse of ethnic collaboration.’”\textsuperscript{14} However, Orji also argues that “Power-sharing in Nigeria is not a partnership of equals. It operates based on a hierarchy of power among different ethno-regional elite groups.”\textsuperscript{15} And he refers to this as a form of “internal colonialism.”\textsuperscript{16} Other experts see the power-sharing agreements not primarily as a means of extending an ethnic hierarchy, but rather as a means of consolidating elite political control. Babajide Ololajulo writes:

I argue that zoning or power rotation at different levels of political governance, while demonstrating the absence of a sense of nation or shared expectation among a people, also occurs as an elites’ strategy to negotiate continued participation in the political process and access to the national wealth. In which case, rotational ideas and the practices so engendered are thought to have both stabilizing and destructive effects on the polity…. As they are familiar with the populist desires for access to political power among different identity groups, both at local and national level, political elites preach zoning and rotation as ideal power-sharing mechanisms and opportunities for every segment of the polity to have a ‘fair share’ of the nation’s wealth, when in fact power and wealth simply rotate among the elite. This dynamic interplay of class and community takes us to the very heart of the Nigerian political condition…. Finally, the political corruption it engenders aside, a formal status for zoning and power rotation is as good as giving up on the nation.\textsuperscript{17}

\textit{Change in political economy}. According to William Ehwarie, the emergence of Nigeria as a major petroleum state led to a change in its political economy—from a regional, agricultural economic model to an oil-based economy with a centralized revenue-allocation system. He asserts that this changed the basis of political competition from ethnicity to corruption as the primary means of competition. Ehwarie writes, “In other words, the reduction in the relevance of ethnicity in electoral politics . . . is not the result
of the effectiveness of any reform measures designed to eliminate the monster of ethnicity . . . Rather, the reduction is the product of changes in Nigeria’s political economy, especially the ascendancy of oil, and to some extent, the adoption of the presidential system which has made ethnicity less useful than corruption as a strategy for electoral success.”18

Minority groups. A corollary problem of the power concentration amongst the three largest ethnic groups is that other ethnic groups have not been adequately represented in many ethnic political settlements. According to Anugwom, “In addition, there is urgent need to confront the realities of ethnic minorities, who have thus far been neglected in the dynamics of the Nigerian power and resource game.”19

Discussion

A number of themes emerge:

Ethnic narrative. Some analysts have noted that different philosophical approaches to addressing ethnic conflict implicitly invoke different philosophical assumptions about the nature of ethnic conflict. For example, some argue that power-sharing agreements presuppose the reality of primordial ethnicity, while agreements that promote assimilation tend to deny the existence of primordial ethnic tension. In Nigeria, Ezeibe and Ikeanyibe note the dissonance that emerges from concurrently adopting policies that reflect both worldviews: “Nigeria adopted both approaches. It set up important programs to encourage assimilation, but it made an effort to recognize and manage ethnicity by accommodating existing ethnic divisions and interests.”20 They note that equivocating on the
acknowledgement of primordial ethnicity has led to problems: “The PDP, the ruling party from 1999 to 2015, recognized the necessity of alternating the presidency between the North and the South as a way to recognize and accommodate primordiality of ethnicity and its effect on democratic politics. Nonadherence to this practice in the 2011 and 2015 general elections provided grounds for a relapse into intense ethnic politics, manifested through hate speech and acrimonious politicking that led to aggravated electoral violence.”

Ongoing lack of national identification. Nigeria’s origins—having three regions exogenously combined into a nation-state—has continued to plague the country, as ethnic identification tends to supersede national identity. Tim Curry notes that “Because there is little feeling of national unity among Nigeria’s people, there is little in terms of national symbolism.” And Jude Uwalaka notes: “Nigeria has remained a political space, with no true national identity, no national consciousness, no national commitment, and no true national loyalty.” Some argue that this reality contributes to a focus on ethnic accumulation. Okpalike notes, “. . . every politician has it at the back of his or her mind that the success of a political career is determined by the extent to which the interest of one’s section of the country was served during that period. Evidently, the Nigerian political culture in retrospect and in practical terms is a collection of varied nuances of regional, ethnic, and tribal struggles in which the center is looked upon as a mass carcass to scavenge.” Ezeibe and Ikeanyibe provide an example that illustrates the practical importance of taking care of one’s ethnic group while in office: “Though Buhari, a northerner, had contested and won the 2015 elections, and had indeed made most
appointments, especially of the security agencies, from the north, he is still disliked by northerners who feel unaccommodated in the power shift.”

**Difficulties for democracy.** Many analysts note the difficulty of effecting authentic democratic reforms in an environment of ethnic allegiance and conflict. Anugwon, for example, notes that “Democratic tradition, which is imperative for development, cannot blossom in the context of ethnic conflict.” That being said, Nigeria has clearly instituted a number of political ethnic settlements that do advance the objective of inclusionary democracy.

**Ethiopia**

Ethiopia has notable structural attributes. It has a large population (107 million people); there are over 80 ethnic groups; it has strong Christian (North) and Islamic (South) traditions; it was not colonized; and it has a long, continuous political history. Walle Engedayehu states, “Ethiopia is one of the oldest continuing polities in the world. . . . A semi-feudal state until 1974 when a 2,000-year monarchy was abolished by the military.”

**Structural History**

Ethiopia escaped European colonization but nonetheless embarked on a program of domestic subjugation (the North conquering the South) that induced an ethnic schism similar to that created by European colonialism elsewhere.
Menelik II formed modern Ethiopia, first by thwarting the Italian attempt at colonization; and then by conquering territories in the South. In the late 1800s, Britain, France, and Italy vied for control of the territory. Asafa Jalata and Harwood Schaffer explain that this rivalry created the opportunity for Abyssinia to both maintain its independence and expand: “In the Scramble for Africa, Abyssinian warlords were able to take advantage of their Christian identity and of the rivalry among the three European powers to obtain the resources and the external interstate legitimacy necessary for them to expand their territory, conquering the territory, people, and resources of neighboring ethno-nations, thus establishing the Ethiopian Empire.”

The southern expansion involved the subjugation of the Oromo (and other) ethnic groups, which Tronvoll sees as a form of internal colonization: “Menelik (of Amhara ethnicity) was intent on winning new territories in the south. The well-organized Abyssinian army, equipped with modern firearms, met resistance from local and regional Oromo chiefs . . . These peoples were defeated and succumbed to the military might of the Abyssinian State, a conquest similar to that of the European colonizes elsewhere on the African continent.” John Young adds that this conquest was led by a minority ethnic group, and had class implications: “Lastly, in an increasingly anachronistic empire there was a fundamental class contradiction between a minority from the north who held most of the land in southern Ethiopia and a majority forced to work on what had previously been their land.” In addition, there was a Christian, civilizing mission dimension to the conquest, coupled with the relocation of northern settlers to the South. Tronvoll continues, “In this manner, the Abyssinian conquest of southern and western Ethiopia was similar to
traditional European colonization in that it legitimized colonization with a ‘civilizing’
objective: the central imperial government secured ‘peace, law, and order.”31 This
religious dimension to the conquest fomented a predictable reaction from southern ethnic
groups, who “. . . had accepted Islam ‘as bulwark against being swamped by Abyssinian
nationalism.”32

The result of this was the subjugation of the Oromo (and other southern ethnic
groups), the establishment of an ethno-religious, regional divide with class implications
that would generate ongoing political conflict and create enduring difficulties for future
attempts to create harmonious ethnic political settlements. Merera Gudina concludes,
“The cumulative effect of all of these measures was exacerbation of ethnic domination
that left a permanent grievance in the memory of the subjugated peoples of the South
where the bulk of the Oromo population lives.”33 Ethiopia escaped European colonization
but proceeded to create an internal ethnic schism redolent of those established by the
European metropoles in their colonies.

Haile Selassie came to power in 1930, and after abdicating the throne during the
Italian WWII occupation, returned in 1941. Gudina stresses the continuity to the northern
leadership tradition represented by Selassie: “In a nutshell, Haile Sellasie, who emerged as
a real successor to Menelik, despite his Oromo blood, continued the ‘nation-building’
process on a much more naked and narrow ethnocratic basis. This further deepened
national inequality among the varied ethnic groupings of Ethiopia which, in turn, later led
to the rise of ethnic-based liberation movements.”34
Selassie was deposed in a 1974 coup of the Derg, a military, socialist movement (often referred to as “barracks socialism”) which brought Megistu Haile Mariam to power. The Derg was motivated by student as well as southern landowner unrest. Gudina notes, “Ethnic nationalism in the Ethiopian context was engendered by a century of political, economic and socio-cultural domination of the Amhara elite over others.” The Derg instituted a socialist constitution in 1987, nationalized rural land, reduced the role of civil society, considered efforts to decentralize power, encouraged the use of non-Amharic languages, and instituted other reforms. Ethiopia transferred its international allegiances from the U.S. to the U.S.S.R. during the reign of the Derg. However, according to Young, “. . . the Derg fought to maintain a strong central state, refused to share power with either the politically conscious middle classes or the emerging regional and ethnic elites, and ensured that the state retained its predominately Amhara character. As a result, the new military regime was challenged by many quarters.”

A Tigrayan, militant student movement (the TPLF) was formed to oppose the Derg, which was defeated in 1991 in what is referred to as “the Second revolution.” Following a national conference in Addis Ababa, the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) came to power. Meles Zenawi became the new national leader, as head of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). The country was renamed the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Zenawi is supported by the U.S. Ethiopia adopts a federalist structure comprised of 12 regions and two urban centers, and a new constitution is created in 1994. Zenawi led until his death in 2012, when he was replaced
by Hailemariam Desalegn, who was followed by Abiy Ahmed in 2018, with each of these latter three leaders representing a different ethnic tradition.

A critical issue became the nature of the relationship between entities primarily representing northern interests (the TPLF and EPRDF) and entities representing southern interests (such as those of the Oromo Liberation Front or OLF). These dynamics were complicated, starting with promise but eventually dissolving. Gudina writes, “With the benefits of hindsight, the interest of the TPLF-ERPDRF to invite the Oromo movements seemed to be less for the genuine sharing of power and more for getting the much-needed international legitimacy, as the Oromos constitute the single largest ethnic group in Ethiopia.”

Gudina continues, “The alliance between the TPLF and the OLF could not last for long. What created a serious tension between the TPLF and the OLF, among others, was the contradictory aspirations of the two organizations, the former’s hegemonic aspiration to recreate Ethiopia around the centrality of the Tigrayan elite and the latter’s aspiration to share power comparable to the size of the Oromo people.”

The interpretation of the myriad ethnic political settlements achieved in Ethiopia (discussed below) is controversial and reflects the enduring difficulties of addressing Ethiopia’s troubled history, involving the northern subjugation of the Oromo and other southern ethnic groups.

Thus, a summary of Ethiopia’s structural historical factors includes: internal colonialism; ongoing shifting ethnic alliances, but characterized by Northern subjugation of Southern Oromo; history of military rule; low GDP per capita; lack of highly profitable natural resources.
Ethnic Political Settlements

Ethiopia has instituted a number of ethnic political settlements to deal with its troubled North-South ethnic divide. These have been extolled by some analysts, while seen in more cynical terms by others.

Multiparty politics. Ethiopia has multiparty politics; however, the EPRDF takes measures to limit the effectiveness of other parties, and some have suggested that Ethiopia is, in many respects, a de facto one-party state. Jon Abbink writes, “In the decade since the 2005 elections, Ethiopian politics has been treading water: no opposition parties have entered political space . . . The regime’s still rhetorically affirmed ‘process of democratization’ seems to go on indefinitely. The eternal ‘transition’ that the regime refers to seems a kind of pretext to maintain power ‘in perpetuity’ . . . The distinction between state and party has been dissolving.”39 Indeed, in the 2015 elections, the EPRDF won all 547 seats in Parliament.

Electoral approach. Ethiopia has a district voting system that is “first-past-the-post”. Abbink, who suggests that proportional representation would be superior, criticizes Ethiopia’s approach: “So in a constituency with 12 candidates, as is the maximum in Ethiopia, the winner has to secure only 9% of the vote . . . In Ethiopia, the system has the tendency to privilege the incumbent party because the latter controls, and is, the local government and thus in a position to hand out favors and keep people dependent.”40 Jalata and Schaffer assert, “Elections and other semblances of democracy are implemented, not to gain internal legitimacy or affect the internal decision-making process, but to continue
to maintain external legitimacy in the eyes of major state benefactors. Elections are showcase events rather than exercises in true democracy.**41

Federal system. A proposal for more regional autonomy was first introduced by the Derg in its declaration of the 1976 National Democratic Revolution, but this vision was not effectively implemented. Under the EPRDF, Ethiopia transitioned to a federal system of twelve districts and two territories, ostensibly to devolve political power. Young, writing in 1998, discusses the motivation for the federal system: “Moreover, decentralization and the establishment of local governments in Ethiopia was not, as in much of Africa, primarily a response to administrative weaknesses of central governments and their inability to implement and adequately monitor programs. Instead, they were largely a means to overcome Amhara hegemony, provide a structure through which the EPRDF could govern, and for the Front to achieve legitimacy by the promotion of a convincing alternative to a centralized state with its record of past failures and war.”**42 The 1991 Charter, discussing the federalization process, even calls for right or regions to secede, albeit under stringent conditions (two-thirds vote of the state legislature; majority support of voters; agreement on financial separation; etc.). Engedayehu, writing in 1993, asserts, “Prior to the adoption of the ethnic map, in each of Ethiopia’s pre-1991 administrative regions, members of every nationality had been living harmoniously in cities, towns, and villages irrespective of ethnic backgrounds and places of birth . . . When a Kilel [district] is designated as Amhara or Oromo, other population groups who live in such regions but are known by names different from Amhara or Oromo are likely to be frozen out from geographic identification and ethnic definition . . . it is contended that any federal
structure that exalts differences rather than similarities among people of diverse ethnic backgrounds causes more division than cooperation.”

Institutions. In keeping with the view that there is a clear distinction between the democratic rhetoric of the EPRDF and its operational reality, a number of analysts have criticized the institutional operations of the current regime: elections are not free and fair; the judiciary is not independent; the press is hindered; labor unions are merely an extension of the state; the “gemgema” disciplinary reviews of party officials are conducted by party members themselves and thus not objective or reliable; etc.

Economic distributions. The distribution of federal aid, both via natural resource subsidies and other initiatives, is biased in favor of the ruling Tigrayan regime. Gudina, writing in 2007, notes, “According to data of the period, the Tigray region’s per capita share of the federal subsidy was consistently higher than in Oromia, Amhara and SNNP regions which, together, constitute more than 80% of the country’s population. The same is true for capital expenditures per capita, as well as foreign loan and aid per capita.”

Discussion

A number of experts are skeptical and cynical about genuine prospects for genuine pluralistic and democratic reform in Ethiopia under the EPRDF. Concerns include:

Motives of the federal system.: Tronvoll asks, “what is the real agenda of the TPLF/EPRDF? Are they sincere in their objectives to democratize the Ethiopian State and to devolve power to the ‘nations, nationalities and peoples.’ Or is this system purposefully designed to place ethnic groups against each other in order for the Tigrayan minority to
control the center?" Keller provides a similar view, “In reality, what is billed as a ‘unique form of ethnic federalism’ in Ethiopia operates very much like a centralized, unitary state, with most power residing at the center . . . this is more of a ‘pseudo-democracy’ than anything else.” Finally, Gudina provides her negative view of Ethiopia’s federal system: “Finally, the Ethiopian democratization/decentralization initiative is claimed to be, above all else, a response of the new regime to solve the country’s chronic problem of ethnic inequality and the conflicts thereof. Despite the daily rhetoric about the liberation of the hitherto marginalized ethnic groups and their empowerment, in reality, there is little departure from the country’s past political trajectory.”

Status of democracy. Abbink notes that “A review of studies on the subject . . . shows that few analysts would now consider this country as democratic, despite the regime’s self-designation as such and occasional references by donor countries or African Union observers . . . Skepticism is warranted toward the general claim that ‘the more elections are held in Africa, the more democracy takes hold.’” Gudina adds, “Consequently, there is neither the democratization of the Ethiopian state nor local autonomy that could satisfy the Oromo people’s quest for self-rule, but ‘new authoritarianism’ or tyranny of a minority under the guise of democracy.”

Legitimacy. Jalata and Schaffer, writing in 2010, claim, “‘Modern’ Ethiopia has been created and maintained through the achievement of external legitimacy . . . The achievement of stability, peace, and development in Ethiopia requires a genuine democratic paradigm that includes decolonization, self-determination, and popular
sovereignty . . . . The modern Ethiopian state has survived to the present day without achieving internal legitimacy . . . . To maintain their power, successive state leaders have maintained order through authoritarian structures where that is sufficient and state terrorism when necessary.”

Donor complicity. Abbink observes the tendency of Western donors to abide non-democratic regimes, if other Western concerns (stability, economic growth, geopolitical support, etc.) are met: “In donor discourse, Ethiopia figures as a fairly strong state and a relatively stable country in the wider region compared to South Sudan (civil war) and Somalia (Islamist terror threats) and, therefore, the argument goes, it deserves support.”

He goes on to assert that elections are a showcase event: “The meaning of the 2015 election in Ethiopia lies perhaps only in it having been held in itself . . . . This has had a ‘demonstration effect’, both toward the donor countries—still providing Ethiopia with most of the funds for its remarkable economic (GDP) growth despite growing inequality and non-inclusiveness—and toward large sections of the domestic voters, who fear voting anything else, or do not see or even know of an alternative.”

Themes. In a lesson reminiscent of those from Rwanda, Gudina writes, “What should be underlined in this regard is that, as can be seen from the lessons in the past and the present political impasse, marginalizing a majority and hoping to democratize/decentralize at the same time is a contradiction.”

Ethiopia, despite avoiding European colonialism, pursued a course of action that led to a structural ethnic predicament similar to African nations that were subject to European colonialism. Despite praise in some circles for its stability, federal system, and
economic growth, many argue that it has not been able to escape the momentum of its problematic history and the ethnic injustices and conflicts that it engendered. That being said, the recent rotation of leadership within the EPRDF amongst individuals with different ethnic backgrounds (Zenawi, Daselegn and Abiy Ahmed), coupled with the more progressive nature of Abiy Ahmed’s ethnic politics lead others to be more hopeful of Ethiopia’s prospects for progress toward more inclusionary political ethnic settlements.

Rwanda

Rwanda has had an inverted political power sequence relative to Burundi (covered next)—majority Hutu leadership at independence, followed by minority Tutsi leadership since the 1990s. This reality created an altogether different set of challenges in Rwanda than those that existed in Burundi. Paul Kagame and his Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) have implemented a plethora of ethnic settlements, but these are seen by many as designed to create stability and perpetuate minority rule; not to advance genuine pluralistic governance.

Structural History

In Rwanda, the minority Tutsi ethnic group was more powerful than the majority Hutu prior to Belgian rule, as reported by Badru: “The economic power of the Watusis, expressed in their wealth in cattle and as warriors, enabled them to maintain themselves in power through the use of force before the arrival of the Belgian colonists.”

Badru adds that this power differential was exacerbated by Belgian rule, which maintained a “...
colonial structure that ensured the political dominance of the Watusis elite.' There is also a regional divide within each major ethnic group that figures prominently in post-independence settlements—the Northern and Southern Hutu; and the Northern (Banayaruguru) and Southern (Hima) Tutsi.

The 1959 Social Revolution ended the Tutsi monarchy and Tutsi political domination. Gareth Austin notes, “The 1959 revolution was limited to reversal and revenge . . . now the minority, not the majority . . . were excluded, but ethnic monopoly continued to be the organizing principle of the state.” In 1961, Gregoire Kayibanda (Southern Hutu) was elected president, just prior to independence in 1962. There were incursions into Rwanda from Tutsi refugees seeking to thwart the dramatic reversal of power in the country.

In 1973, a Juvenal Habyarimana (Northern Hutu) came to power, overthrowing the Southern Hutu Kayabanda. Habyarimana established a new constitution and authoritarian rule. In 1990, the RPF, led by Paul Kageme, invaded Rwanda from Uganda. The ensuing political stalemate was characterized by promises for reform (e.g., multi-party elections and power-sharing agreements) from Habyarimana, followed by delays in implementation. In 1993, the Arusha Accords calling for peace and outlining political reforms were signed. However, Habyarimana was proceeding duplicitously, seeking to undermine the truce. Rachel Hayman writes, “So, even as it was negotiating in Arusha, the president’s party, the MRND, was attempting to derail the process through massacres of Tutsi and political violence against the opposition in order to exacerbate the ethnic, rather than political, dimensions of the conflict. As discussions over demobilization and
disarmament were held, militias were being trained and arms continued to be flown into Rwanda. Hutu hardliners never accepted the peace negotiations.”

Sebastian Silva-Leander notes the implications of this lack of support for the peace process: “In this context democracy quickly became a divisive force rather than an instrument of dialog and mediation.”

In 1994, Habyarimana was killed as his plane was shot down, and genocide ensued in Rwanda, leading to as many as one million deaths (out of a population of eight million) in several months. After the genocide, international aid was focused on the Hutu. Hayman reports, “Western countries mounted the largest, most rapid and most expensive deployment of international humanitarian aid industry in the twentieth century. This caused frustration within the new government, which felt that the needs of Rwanda itself were being overlooked and that the perpetrators of the genocide were being supported, while the victims were not . . . Moreover, the humanitarian aid flows contributed to the continuing conflict and added to insecurity in the regions, as they enabled the establishment of a rump state outside Rwanda’s borders [in Zaire, or modern DRC].”

In 1994, Kagame came to power as president and appointed a Hutu prime minister, Pierre Bizimungu, in a power-sharing agreement. This reversal from majority to minority rule in Rwanda has led to tremendous resentment, and the Hutu “rump state” in Zaire would later become the source of incursions into Rwanda to attempt to destabilize the Tutsi regime. Silva-Leander cites a former Hutu military commander who references the depth of ethnic antagonisms in the country: “Those currently in power in Rwanda have spent over 30 years in the bush, but they managed to fight their way back in. We will do the same.”
Ethnic Political Settlements

The challenge of stabilizing the country, promoting economic development and retaining minority political power have dominated Rwanda for two-and-a-half decades. Hayman observes, “Two major and interconnected themes underpin the political system in Rwanda and much of the ensuing critiques: ethnicity and security. Ethnicity lay at the heart of the political system until the genocide; since 1994, it has also been central to political debates, but in terms of how to remove ethnicity from politics. This has led to the claim that ethnicity is a taboo subject in Rwanda. However, ethnicity is not denied, nor is it avoided in discussion. What is taboo is the political instrumentalization of ethnicity.”

Due in part to the dilemmas associated with having a minority ethnic group come to power in a post-genocide society, there have been a tremendous number of inter-ethnic issues to address, and a tremendous number of inter-ethnic settlements reached in Rwanda, with only the highlights covered in this discussion. Phil Clark, writing in *Foreign Affairs*, states that the Kagame regime utilized a four-pronged approach to dealing with the genocide: commemoration, civic education, socioeconomic development, and reconciliation through justice. Like many others, Clark is positive about progress in Rwanda. Based on extensive surveys of Rwandans from 2002-2017, Clark reports: “What the conversations have revealed above all is that the government’s top-down strategy has largely succeeded, allowing everyday Rwandans to deal with the effects of genocide. But
they have also shown that many Rwandans feel overwhelmed by the government’s barrage of post-genocide programs.” As discussed below, other analysts are less sanguine and more cynical about genuine ethnic progress in Rwanda.

*Tensions associated with democracy.* At the heart of the philosophical conundrum in post-genocide Rwanda is the role of democracy in establishing post-colonial ethnic political settlements. Here, there are three primary issues. The first is that democracy is a tainted concept. Hayman asserts that “the international community caused violence in a sense by calling for democracy.” She continues, “Democracy was introduced within the context of civil war and rising ethnic tension, in a country with no positive history of democracy, and where political commitment was extremely weak. External actors, through diplomacy, aid, and military intervention, played a key role in fostering a peace process which was intertwined with a democratization project. The result is well-known. The civil war descended into genocide and the international community did nothing to stop it.”

The second challenge is the tradeoff between the need for stabilization and security on the one hand and pluralism and democracy on the other. Silva-Learner observes that “At the end of the war in 1994 there existed a broad consensus, including among the international community, that the restoration of security would have to take priority over the instauration of democratic rule.” He also notes that “The centerpiece of Rwanda’s strategy to overcome the ethnic divisions of the past lies in the active suppression of ethnic identities that had been exacerbated both by the colonial and postcolonial rulers.” Thus, stabilization has tended to take precedence over democratization, and ethnicity as a critical political dimension has been subverted. This
has led many to speculate that the real objective of Rwanda’s ruling RPF is to consolidate single-party rule while creating the appearance of democratic reform.

Third and related is the fear of democracy by both Tutsi and Hutu, but for different reasons. Mamdani explains, “After 1994, the Tutsi want justice above all else and the Hutu democracy above all else. The minority fears democracy. The majority fears justice. The minority fears that democracy is a mask for finishing an unfinished genocide. The majority fears the demand for justice is a minority ploy to usurp power forever.”

Thus, the need for stabilization, the goal of democracy, the pervasiveness of ethnic distrust, and the reality of minority rule intertwine to form a profoundly problematic challenge for genuine ethnic settlements in Rwanda.

*Political parties and electoral strategy.* In 1973, Habyarimana abolished political parties, establishing a single-party state. In 1990 multi-party politics returned to Rwanda. And the 1993 Arusha Accords moved Rwanda from a presidential to a parliamentary system. Under Kagame, political parties are allowed but confront restrictions, including being banned from organizing ethnically. Many analysts have commented on the inconsistency of barring parties from organizing ethnically while the RPF itself is effectively an ethnic-based party. In addition, the 2003 Constitution requires all political parties to participate in the Forum of Political Parties. Hayman notes that “While this enables all political organizations to participate in policymaking, it also restricts the possibility for competitive politics. Consequently, there is very little ideological or policy difference among the political parties . . . the system for legislative elections, in which the electorate votes for a
political party rather than for individual candidates, aims to ensure that people cannot vote for a candidate purely on the basis of his or her ethnicity or place of origin.”69

Power-sharing. The 2003 Constitution calls for power-sharing for the cabinet (only half of the posts can be held by the ruling party). There is also an organizational construct referred to as the Government of National Unity, comprised of multiple political parties, designed to seek accommodation and consensus in political decision-making. However, many analysts argue that despite the presence of multi-party politics and elections, power is effectively concentrated with the RPF. Moreover, because of the RPF’s success at national stabilization, the international community has been willing to overlook the lack of genuine progress toward democratization. Beswick claims, “Despite a growing body of evidence that suggests Rwanda could be moving toward a de facto one-party state, successive and critical EU Elections Observer Mission Reports and admissions of ‘grave concerns’ by their own staff in interviews conducted by the author, key donors remain reluctant to challenge the RPF on its handling of political space.”70

Documents establishing settlements. Rwanda has generated an uncommonly large number of documents detailing various aspects of its ethnic settlements: the 1993 Arusha Accords; the 1994 Declarations of Principles; the 1999 Lusaka International Peace Agreement; the 2002 Pretoria International Peace Agreement; the 2000 Rwanda Vision 20/20 document; as well as various constitutional documents.

Refugees and quotas. As elsewhere, the issue of refugees has been salient in Rwanda. After Kayabanda’s 1961 election, the government refused to allow the numerous Tutsis who had fled the country during the 1959 revolution to return to Rwanda, in part due to
fear of land claims from appropriated land. Habyarimana also opposed Tutsi refugees re-entering the country due to concerns about changing the ethnic mix and potential destabilization. In addition, ethnic identity cards were issued and quotas were utilized to limit employment for Tutsis.\textsuperscript{71}

\textit{Gagaca courts.} The government launched a local justice system, Gacaga, to try individuals suspected of participation in the genocide, in part inspired by South Africa’s Truth and Justice Reconciliation Commission. Clark discusses the magnitude of the Gacaca program: “Perhaps the most ambitious—and most controversial—of the Rwandan government’s responses to the genocide was the prosecution of 400,000 genocide suspects in 12,000 community courts called \textit{gagaca}, a process that took place between 2002 and 2012.”\textsuperscript{72} These were not without controversy, however, as the courts were not utilized in an equal manner for the major ethnic groups, as noted by Silva-Leander: “The government argues that crimes committed by the RPF should not be tried through the Gacaca system so as to avoid creating a moral equivalence between these crimes and the crimes of genocide.”\textsuperscript{73}

\textit{Reeducation camps.} The government has utilized youth re-education camps, called Ingando, to allegedly educate returning Tutsi refugees, demobilized soldiers, university students, etc. on foundational principles of Rwandan society. However, according to Silva-Leander, these “have been denounced by human rights groups for mixing ideological teachings with military training and for promoting indoctrination rather than mutual understanding.”\textsuperscript{74}
Narratives. The Kagame regime has managed numerous dimensions of the narratives surrounding the genocide. Sarah Kenyon Lischer reports in 2010, “The government also recently adopted the terminology the genocide of the Tutsi rather than the Rwandan genocide.”\(^7^5\) It has also banned the use of the so-called double-genocide thesis, that maintains that both sides engaged in genocide vis-à-vis the other. In addition, the RPF utilizes what is referred to as “the Genocide credit,” whereby the government references the genocide in order to justify ongoing ethnic dominance and security.

Renaming of cities. The government has renamed cities and sites with links to the genocide and/or suggestive of ethnic identity, in order to reduce the frequency of negative reminders of ethnic strife.

Villagization. There has been a process of villagization (the Imidugugu Project), whereby local districts obtain decision-making power. Some see this as an effort to promote genuine decentralization; others see this as a means of pushing RPF control to the level of local government.

Top-down social engineering. Scott Straus and Lars Waldorf assert that Rwanda is engaged in a top-down social engineering endeavor. They write, “It is not an overstatement to compare the RPF’s top-down reconstruction to those brought about by the French revolutionaries or by Kemal Ataturk.”\(^7^6\)

The seminal issue with respect to Rwanda’s ethnic political settlements is not the pros and cons of each, but rather the meaning or their collective whole. Scott Straus and Lars Waldorf assert that Rwanda is engaged in a top-down social engineering endeavor in order to maintain stability and prolong minority rule. They write, “It is not an
overstatement to compare the RPF’s top-down reconstruction to those brought about by the French revolutionaries or by Kemal Ataturk.”

Discussion

As noted, the RPF is seen via a variety of perspectives. On the one hand, it has made tremendous progress in achieving stability, and this has been an arduous process, involving scores of reforms. On the other hand, this has involved the subversion of democracy. Hayman, taking issue with Freedom House’s assertion that Rwanda had transitioned from a “consensual dictatorship” to a “nominal democracy” between 1994 and 2003, instead argues that the application of Larry Diamond’s regime categorization scheme would lead to the conclusion that Rwanda is “a hybrid regime, which combines authoritarian and democratic elements.”

And Silva-Leander states that it is “hard to have reconciliation as long as an unelected minority rules.” Finally, Andersen discusses what may be the fundamental incompatibility of pursuing both democracy and peace: “. . . the objectives of the democratization and of the peace process may have been fundamentally incompatible.”

Burundi

Burundi’s pre-colonial history is uncommon amongst African nations in that it was a pre-colonial state, and it had limited ethnic strife. Patricia Daley writes: “Unlike many states in Africa, the state of Burundi was not a colonial construct. It existed prior to colonial rule, although its boundaries were extended as a result of colonial conquest of
neighboring territories.” Rockefeller Herisse adds, “Burundi’s pre-colonial history bears no evidence of ethnic conflict between Hutus, Tutsis, and Twas.” The Germans and Belgians ruled the region via the minority Tutsi ethnic group (14% of the population), effectively marginalizing the Hutu (85%). Thus, ethnicity as a divisive dimension of political control was primarily introduced by the metropoles. This reality would portend ominously for Burundi’s future. Herisse continues, “…once [ethnic] differences in Burundi had become established as symbols of superiority versus inferiority, they were used as weapons in later group conflicts.”

Structural History

Five intertwined political fault lines were introduced via colonial rule, all of which would be resolved (generally violently) in the post-colonial era: indigenous peoples versus metropole; minority ethnicity (Tutsi) versus majority ethnicity (Hutu); regional divisions within the ethnic groups (most notably, Central Muramvya Tutsi vs. Southern Bururi Tutsi); monarchy versus democracy; and military vs. civilian.

Another problematic reality (shared by many African nations) was embedded in the post-colonial dispensation: control of the administrative state became a source of economic advantage, and ethnicity became a mobilizing basis for control of the state. Gerard Prunier states that much of the ensuing ethnic conflict in Burundi was “largely a fight for good jobs, administrative control, and economic advantage.” Daley notes the role of ethnicity as a stratagem in vying for control of the state: “... ethnicity acts as a resource around which group consciousness can be articulated, making it a competitive
tool with which the elite and counter-elite can legitimize their claim to economic and political power.”

At independence (1962), the minority Tutsis were in control of the government. This led to Hutu estrangement, exacerbated by knowledge of the establishment of a Hutu republic in neighboring Rwanda. In 1966, the Tutsi military overthrew the King, abolishing the monarchy; in 1972, the Southern Bururi Tutsi completed the transformation of the military to a Tutsi institution. Leonce Ndikuma refers to this period as the “final solution”—the end of the monarchy and the consolidation of Southern Bururi Tutsi leadership reinforced by mono-ethnic military power. In effect, this marked the temporary resolution of the aforementioned five fault lines (albeit in a non-sustainable manner).

For the next three decades, Burundi would be ruled by three different Tutsi regimes (of the Uprona Party). Filip Reyntjens notes that the situation was combustible due to “the near exclusion since 1965 of the majority Hutu from public life, knowledge and wealth.” This was an era marked by assassinations and coup attempts, a 1972 genocide, and both constitutional and military rule. As international pressure mounted for democratic elections, the country was a compressed powder keg, fueled by decades of colonial-linked, militarily enforced, oppressive minority rule.

In the early 1990s, international pressure mounted for democratic elections. Prior to the 1993 elections, President Pierre Buyoya (Southern Bururi, Tutsi) effected a number of inclusionary political reforms, in part via the promulgation of the 1992 Constitution: a government of “national unity”, the appointment of a Hutu Prime Minister, a bi-ethnic
cabinet, multiparty politics, etc. However, the newfound spirit of multi-ethnic accommodation was seen by many in cynical terms – as designed to generate popular favor prior to democratic elections, and it was undermined by an ethnic-based campaign strategy, as described by Reyntjens: “Uprona embarked on a campaign which attempted to discredit Frodebu [the Hutu based opposition party], accusing it of being an ethnic organization of Hutu and even the ‘legal arm’ of the outlawed Palipehutu [a Hutu rebel group].”91 Uprona, despite being the favorite in the elections, was dominated: in presidential elections, Melchior Ndadaye (Hutu) defeated Buyoya with 65% of the vote; in parliamentary elections, the Hutu won over 80% of the vote. Reyentenjs refers to these elections result as “a virtual political earthquake . . . The former single-party . . . comfortably survived three coups and several massive killings, of which the one in 1972 was of a genocidal nature, but was almost blown away by the first democratic exercise since 1965. This simply confirms the fact that Uprona had little or no popular support as a national party, being rather the instrument to legitimize and organize the monopolization of power in the hands of a Tutsi elite. While Uprona was the continuing political façade for this ‘legitimacy’, the army was its physical base.”92

The election results brought turmoil, leading to intervention by the international community, which sought stabilization rather than genuine reform. Devon Curtis writes, “Thus, international peacebuilding efforts focused on stabilizing Burundi . . . the 1993 Burundian democratic elections had triggered violence and instability. Given the failures of this election and the wider violence in the region, the priority for the United Nations in Burundi was to prevent an escalation of violence. Elite division of power-sharing offices
was believed to be the way to do this.” Importantly, the military was not reformed, raising concern about the endurability of Hutu power. Ndikumana observes, “As the 1993 events revealed, winning the elections does not guarantee political power. It should be clear by now that a monolithic military cannot be politically neutral.” Indeed, Ndadaye was assassinated, and Buyoya was returned to power in 1996. The ensuing genocide led to 200,000 deaths, a 25% retraction in the size of the economy, and intra-ethnic fragmentation.

Since 2005, Pierre Nkurunziza (Hutu) has been in power, winning re-election in 2015 after nomination to the presidency for a controversial third term. Just prior to and during Nkurunziza’s reign, there were a number of ethnic political settlements reached in Burundi. Before reviewing these settlements, it will be useful to review the structural historical attributes that provide the necessary lens to interpret them:

- The colonial-era introduced ethnic-based political schism into Burundi.
- A minority ethnic group ruled Burundi for over three decades after independence.
- Ethnicity was “weaponized”—used as a means of mobilization for control of the administrative state.
- An intra-regional struggle (which Ndikumana refers to as an “ethno-regional” struggle) ensued, leading to the dominance of the Southern Bururi Tutsi.
- The military was transformed into a Tutsi organization—a necessary institutional phenomenon to enable minority rule.
• By the time ethnic settlements were pursued, there was considerable guilt on behalf of Western powers emanating from their role in the progression from colonization to enforced minority rule to internationally supported democratic elections to genocide.

All of this leads Herisse to note: “As a destabilization technique, the colonialists introduced the ‘race’ myth and the notion of ethnicity. Later, in order to correct problems created by these, they introduced democracy. The problem with myths is that once created, they have a tendency to live a life of their own.” In addition, Ndikumana observes that Burundi’s “biggest obstacle is its past, especially the devastating record of ethnic exclusion, oppression, repression and all forms of violations of human rights under military regimes.”

Ethnic Political Settlements

The following is a partial list of the post-genocide ethnic settlements reached in Burundi. Most of these are linked to five documents: the 1994 Convention of Government, the 2000 Arusha Accords, the 2002 cease-fire agreement, the 2005 Constitution and the 2011 Vision Burundi 2025. Julius Nyerere and Nelson Mandela served as facilitators of many of these agreements.

**Military.** Under Tutsi rule, the military was also organized along ethnic lines, to allow the perpetuation of minority rule. Ndikumana notes, “The structure of the military in Burundi changed dramatically in 1965. . . The Micombero regime (1966-1976) initiated systematic discrimination against non-Southern Tutsi and the military became a monopoly
under the control of the Southern Tutsi-Hima elite. Because of the monopolization of the military by the Southern Tutsi elite, and its role as a guarantor of political power, public expenditures have systematically been skewed in favor of security to the disadvantage of socially productive investments such as infrastructure, education, and health. The biased allocation of public resources to favor security is closely connected to state legitimacy.\textsuperscript{99}

The challenge of subsequently trying to ethnically integrate the military became clear during the regime of Ndadaye. Cyrus Samii reports, “Ndadaye’s administration called for the rapid promotion of some Hutu officers within the military to better align the officer corps with the interests of the civilian government. After only 3 months in power, Ndadaye was assassinated in a bungled coup attempt on October 21, 1993. The assassination triggered what a United Nations commission described as genocidal reprisals by Hutu mobs against Tutsi men throughout the countryside, followed by massacres of Hutus by the Tutsi-dominated army and police.”\textsuperscript{100} Ndikumana adds the obvious but important point that “Frodebu never took hold of power because it could not control the security forces.”\textsuperscript{101}

Under Nkurunziza, the military was integrated, but only to the level of 50/50 representation between Hutu and Tutsi. This represents a major transformation from historical norms but is far from representative of the overwhelming Hutu demographic dominance. Samii writes, “The peace agreement established a rule of ‘ethnic balance’ such that posts would be allocated to Hutus and Tutsis in a 50/50 manner, and the overall
composition of the security forces was reformed ‘to achieve ethnic balance and prevent acts of genocide and coups d’etat.’”

As in other realms (most notably education), the logic of minority rule compels a problematic ethnic dispensation for the military – in the forms of both overinvestment and Tutsi ethnic monopoly – in order to protect minority rule. Reyntjens notes that for Tutsis, the military represented an insurance policy for the Tutsi elite.\footnote{Reyntjens notes that for Tutsis, the military represented an insurance policy for the Tutsi elite.}

**Political parties.** Prior to the 1993 elections, Buyoya allowed the formation of political parties of different ethnic backgrounds. However, after losing the election, and then returning to power, Buyoya adopted a more cynical approach to ongoing international pressure for multiparty politics. Grauvogel notes, “Nonetheless, the political significance of these reinstated institutions remained extremely limited. Political parties were only allowed under the vague requirement that they ‘positively contribute to Burundi’s development’, which gave Buyoya the freedom to outlaw them as he pleased.”\footnote{Nonetheless, the political significance of these reinstated institutions remained extremely limited. Political parties were only allowed under the vague requirement that they ‘positively contribute to Burundi’s development’, which gave Buyoya the freedom to outlaw them as he pleased.}

Under Nkurunziza, multiparty politics is in effect, and yet the ruling CNDD-FDD placed Nkurunziza on the ballot for a controversial third consecutive term in 2015, in violation of the Arusha Accords. This led to violence and turmoil in Bujumbura and led analysts to speculate that the third term represented a new orientation of the CNDD-FDD to the ethnic settlement process and one linked to a geopolitical realignment. Writing in Foreign Policy Online, Cara Jones and Orion Donovan-Smith suggest:

> Ten years after coming to power in the 2005 elections, . . . CNDD-FDD . . . now seems to be a less committed steward of the accords. After some small steps to erode power-sharing provisions during Nkurunziza’s second term, the decision to name him as its candidate for a third was seen by many as a clear sign of opposition to the Arusha consensus . . . In the face of this prospect, Western governments—notably the United States, France, the Netherlands, and former
colonial powers Germany and Belgium—positioned themselves as stern critics of the regime and played what seems to be their strongest hand: threatening to suspend aid. But Burundi’s government isn’t budging. Instead, the regime is betting that it can withstand isolation by moving closer to Russia and China, making this the unlikely scene of a significant challenge to Western influence in Africa.¹⁰⁵

Elections. The Arusha Accords sought to strike a balance between the implementation of multi-party, democratic elections, and the insurance of minority representation (which would likely be dramatically diminished via pure democracy). This was pursued via elections with power-sharing and institutional representation quotas (discussed below). Curtis observes, “Through institutional engineering, Arusha specifically tried to minimize the negative consequences of winner-take-all majoritarian style elections in an ethnically divided society, while retaining a commitment to liberal democracy.”¹⁰⁶

Executive level power-sharing. Under Buyoya and Ndadaye, prime ministers from the opposing ethnic group were appointed in order to create a power-sharing structure. However, a number of analysts view this as an expedient means of maintaining, rather than distributing power. For example, Curtis writes:

This was a political necessity for both Presidents Buyoya and Ndadaye. Buyoya believed that a gradual extension of patrimonial privileges and access to the state was a way to maintain control, faced with rising internal and external pressures. For Ndadaye, limited power-sharing was a pragmatic response to his vulnerable position vis-à-vis the dominant Tutsi elite and military, on the one hand, and the new Frodebu politicians and supporters with their high expectations on the other. Power-sharing governance was a tool of control, not a break from neo-patrimonial logics.¹⁰⁷
Later, the power-sharing agreement was changed, with the post of Prime Minister abolished and the establishment of two vice-presidents, who must be from different ethnic groups and political parties.\textsuperscript{108}

\textit{Institutional composition.} The composition of both the government and the National Assembly is now based on ethnic apportionment. The government is limited to a maximum of 60\% Hutu and a maximum of 40\% Tutsi, and any political party that achieves 5\% of the popular vote is awarded ministerial posts. The National Assembly is divided according to a 60\% Hutu and 40\% Tutsi allocation. The Senate has two representatives from each province from different ethnic groups.\textsuperscript{109}

\textit{Voting majorities.} A two-thirds majority is necessary to pass legislation in the National Assembly, thereby ensuring Tutsi representation.

\textit{Narratives.} During its time in power, the Tutsi deployed public narratives to justify their ongoing minority leadership position. Prior to the 1993 elections, they used a somewhat tautological argument to construct a national narrative, as described by Daley: “The Tutsi elite’s justification for monopolizing power has been the fear of a Hutu-led genocide against them, with constant references to the Rwandan crises of 1959 and 1994 and acts of violence against Tutsi in Burundi in 1988 and 1993.”\textsuperscript{110} Then, after regaining power in 1996, Buyoya attempted to reframe the interpretation of history, as Gravougel observes: “To justify the takeover of power, Buyoya’s supporters argue that the previous president’s flight to the US Embassy had created a power vacuum, which left the stumbling nation without political leadership in a deepening security crisis . . . In short, the regime disputed that the takeover of power could be characterized as a coup d’état, which would have
potentially justified a strong regional and international response, during this ‘denial phase’. In contrast, Frodebu stressed that the coup had overthrown a democratically elected government.  

*Centrality of ethnicity.* Under Hutu rule, a wide variety of ethnic political settlements have been instituted. These include power-sharing, institutional quotas, multiparty elections, and so on. However, many believe that long term success will be based on a different theoretical construct—the ability to move past ethnic divisions as a central animating force, rather than their enshrinement. Daley writes, “Recent peace negotiations, aimed at correcting ethnic imbalance through power-sharing and reform of the institutions of governance are unlikely to resolve the political crisis as they fail to move beyond a methodological pre-occupation with ethnic identities and address the complex social reality of Burundi society and to include the people of Burundi as part of a broader non-ethnicized political community, a prerequisite for a stable pluralistic democracy.”

Indeed, many argue that the 2015 elections, in which Nkurunziza ran for a third term, imply a lack of commitment to existing ethnic political settlements (an important topic that this thesis will return to).

*Refugees.* During Tutsi rule, there was a significant exodus of Hutu citizens who feared repression under the minority regime, many of whom lost land rights. After winning the 1993 elections, Ndadaye encouraged the return of these Hutu refugees. This further exacerbated the electoral calculus against the Tutsi. Julia Grauvogel writes, “The new government . . . promoted the redistribution of national resources, as well as the return of Hutu refugees, thereby creating anxiety among the Tutsi population.”
Regroupment camps. After Buyoya’s return to power after the assassination of Ndadaye, the government instituted regroupment camps to forcibly house Hutus. At their peak, these camps held as much as 10% of the country’s population. Ndikumana explains, “First, they are an illustration of the institutionalized ethnic discrimination . . . they oppose a government (and its army) against its own people.”\textsuperscript{114} He also notes the obvious dilemma for the international community: “Providing assistance to the regrouped population may be regarded as a sign of support or endorsement of the regroupment policy.”\textsuperscript{115}

Patronage. Grauvogel notes that Buyoya and his Tutsi predecessors utilized the state as a means of dispensing economic advantages on an ethnic basis: “Like the leaders of the two preceding military regimes, Buyoya had made use of extensive patronage networks during his first rule from 1987 to 1993.”\textsuperscript{116}

Public education. The provision of public education in Burundi has been heavily influenced by ethnicity. Ndikumana discusses the nefarious practices utilized by the Uprona regimes, and the underlying structural motivations for these practices: “But since mass literacy increases demands for political participation and economic equity, monolithic regimes see it as a threat, and therefore tend to under-invest in mass education, concentrating instead on providing the best education for a privileged few, and marginalizing the majority (and increasing their resentment). This largely explains why the Southern Tutsi elite in Burundi maintained a discriminatory education system as a tool of power consolidation.”\textsuperscript{117} He also notes, “. . . the concentration of education infrastructure in the Southern province of Bururi in Burundi and the relative neglect of
education elsewhere lowered the country’s overall level of human capital development. Yet this policy was a vital mechanism for consolidating the power of the Southern Tutsi oligarchy. Obviously, because of the conflict that unequal distribution generates, systems based on inequality are difficult to sustain in the long run as they require ever-increasing investments in repression.”

Thus, under minority Tutsi leadership, education was underprovided and skewed toward the Tutsi—damaging the country’s development prospects in order to perpetuate minority rule. Consequently, Elavie Ndura and Sixte Vigny Nimuraba suggest, “Educational inequity may be the main root of the Burundian civil war.”

Under Nkurunziza, numerous education reforms have been instituted. Ndura and Nimuraba state, “The decision made by Pierre Nkurunziza, President of Burundi, and his coalition government, to provide free education in primary school is a major achievement in promoting equal access to education, democracy and social justice in Burundi.” Yet they also note limitations to the education system, including insufficient emphasis on education on social cohesion and social change.

In short, the ethnic settlements instituted during the decades of Tutsi leadership were designed to protect minority rule, often at the expense of national development. This contributed to under-development; oppression; insufficient investment in education; excessive investment in the military; and massive resentment; ultimately leading to genocide. During Hutu rule, a broad range of ethnic settlements has been instituted, in the spirit of promoting consociational governance. There remains a critical question of whether these settlements and the inclusionary sentiment behind them will endure.
Discussion

A review of these discrete ethnic settlements leads to synthesized observations about their meaning and significance, including the following:

*Enshrining ethnicity.* A number of experts have stated that the manner in which ethnic settlements are reached, as well as the settlements themselves, actually serve to further embed ethnicity as a divisive phenomenon. This can undermine efforts to transition away from identity politics and toward a more inclusive democracy. Daley notes, “This exclusion of civil society representatives from actively participating in the peace process reinforced the idea that peacemaking is solely the prerogative of political parties, rebel movements, and men. In this respect, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement promoted an elitist and ethnicized politics of the state and failed to conceptualize a more inclusive politics that give the agency a multiple-voiced political community.”¹²² Curtis adds, “Furthermore, critics say, power-sharing hinders democracy by institutionalizing ethnic difference and making governance and decision making more difficult.”¹²³

*Mobilizing ethnicity.* A related concern is that ethnicity, once established as a primary dimension of political power, becomes difficult to turn back. Indeed, it can become a tool of an elite, who harness it to pursue control of the administrative state. Daley states, “The on-going violence is attributed to an increasingly factionalized political elite, based on the multiple cleavages in Burundi society, who mobilize ethnicity in their struggle for control
The pattern of mobilizing ethnicity to obtain power can then self-perpetuate, and continually defer authentic democracy. Ndikumana notes, “However, as the history of the country has revealed, non-democratic regimes are not an antidote to ethnic conflict, but the opposite.”

**Distributional conflict.** Ndikumana emphasizes that the root of the ethnic tension in Burundi is distributional inequity. He argues that it is fundamentally a distributional conflict, in which ethnicity is mobilized for distributional advantage: “Burundi’s successive conflicts are rooted in an unequal distribution of wealth and power which has strong ethnic and regional dimensions . . . In Burundi’s case, we argue that civil war arises from distributional conflict. Thus creating institutional mechanisms to correct the legacy of inequality in access to economic and political power across ethnic groups and regions is essential to achieving political power.”

A corollary concern is that as political power moves from minority to majority governance, economic power will then be allocated based on a new patrimonial logic. Ndikumana writes, “First, in a polarized society like Burundi, economic liberalization in the conventional sense may simply transfer monopoly rents from the government to the dominant ethno-regional entities.”

**International community motivations.** The dynamics of international engagement in post-genocidal conflicts are complex. In Burundi, the metropoles created a skewed ethnic landscape, installed a minority group to govern at independence, and then advocated for democratic elections without the appropriate safeguards for a transition from minority to majority rule, all of which culminated in tragedy. In the aftermath of genocide, the international community, with some responsibility for the genocide, often places a priority
on national stabilization, rather than enduring reform. This can lead to significant contradictions and even reproductions of the characteristics that gave rise to prior ethnic conflict. Curtis writes:

. . . despite the chorus of donors who talk of liberal peacebuilding, inclusive peacebuilding, local peacebuilding, and social justice, post-election governance in Burundi shows that international and regional actors are willing to tolerate an authoritarian government as long as the government contains certain kinds of insecurity . . . For donors, a degree of low-intensity violence in Burundi and authoritarian practices seem acceptable and even normal, as long as this does not destabilize the region or threaten the international system . . . At key junctures, international peacebuilders largely turned a blind eye to governance abuses, human rights violations, and militarism, when confronted with the messy and contested politics of transition, as long as Burundi remained generally stable. For Burundian power holders, coercive control served personal and regime security interests. This has meant that despite talks of liberal peace, local participation, bottom-up peacebuilding, and inclusive governance, in practice, peace-building has been expressed as stability, containment, and control.128

Burundian politicians have a tendency to play international negotiators off against each other, with Buyoya refusing to accept Nyerere as a chief mediator, for example; and the Burundian government later referring to a proposed international mission as “an invasion force.”129 Curtis notes that these phenomena have led to a series of ethnic political settlements which have “international and regional, but not popular legitimacy.”130

Overall evaluation. There have been those that have argued that Burundi has been a success story. Curtis, writing in 2012, observes that, “At first glance, Burundi represents a successful negotiated transition to peaceful governance through power-sharing, and a justification for regional and international peacebuilders’ involvement. It is undeniable that Burundi is safer than it was a decade or two ago. Most notably, while Burundi was
once known for its ethnic divisions and antagonism, today ethnicity is no longer the most salient feature around which conflict is generated.” However, with the highly flawed 2015 elections and an increasingly clear pattern of governmental reductions in pluralistic ethnic settlements, most analysts are highly concerned about the political trajectory in Burundi. Once ethnicity is politicized, it becomes difficult to stop.132

Uganda

Richard Dowden states that the British made the southern Buganda kingdom the core of a state that was then extended to include a number of other ethnic groups, “some of whom had been at war with the Buganda kingdom before the British arrived.”133

Structural History

Britain ruled indirectly, via local Bagandan kings and chiefs, who carried out administrative orders, and this system was applied to other regions, which, according to Dowden, “stored up problems for the future.”134

The British also eviscerated tribal allegiances in the North, leading to the artificial creation of the Acholi ethnicity. Charles Amone and Okullu Muura report, “. . . the Acholi as a distinct and collective identity are a British creation . . . The British abolished those chiefdoms and in their place created a single ethnic identity called Acholi.” Britain ruled administratively from the South but militarily from the North. This reinforced the divide-and-rule approach, but it “set the stage for a Nilotic supremacy in at least the first
few decades of post-colonial Uganda.”136 Thus, indigenous vs. colonial, Nilotic vs. Bantu, Southern Protestant vs. Southern Catholic, monarchy vs. civilian, and administrative vs. military, were the overlapping and intertwined fault lines introduced by Britain into Uganda. Some analysts argue that the ensuing insecurity necessitated authoritarian rule. Susan Dicklitch observes that “Colonialism also helped foster political instability and an autocratic political system.”137 Unsurprisingly, there were five post-independence coups (1966, 1971, 1979, 1985 and 1986).

At independence in 1962, Milton Obote, a Northerner, became Prime Minister and launched a coup (led by Idi Amin) against King Mutesa in order to thwart southern Bagandan attempts to increase their autonomy. Obote eliminated the administrative role of the Baganda, abolished the monarchy, and pursued socialism, which posed the threat of the nationalization of Britain’s extant economic interests.138

In 1971, Idi Amin (representing the interests of the southern Buganda) led a coup against Obote. Obote returned to power in 1979 after Amin’s overthrow, and then won flawed elections in 1980, leading to Civil War. Dicklitch claims, “The one-time ‘pearl of Africa’ became the basket case of Africa.”139

Finally, in 1986, Yoweri Museveni came to power, again representing the interests of the Buganda South as well as the Southwest. In 1993, his National Resistance Movement (NRM) called for the restoration of the Monarchy. National stability was restored. In the 1990s, inflation fell from 250% to 5% and economic growth rates exceeded 5% per annum. Consequently, many analysts see Uganda as a success story. The reality, seen from the perspective of its ethnic political settlements, is far more complex.
There are a variety of dimensions to Uganda’s structural history, including: intense ethnic fragmentation; ethno-regional-religious divide; pattern of violent regime change; varied role of the monarchy, which has been manipulated for political expediency; minority-rule.

Ethnic Political Settlements

There have been a number of ethnic political settlements in Uganda. These include:

The movement system. The NRM is positioned as a movement to transition the country away from its dictatorial past, enfranchise the citizenry, and devolve power to the local level. Giovanni Carbone notes that it is motivated by “the alleged need to keep ethnic and religious identities out of politics.” However, Carbone argues, “Despite the claimed ideological rejection of communal identities, politics under the Movement has never done away in practice with ethnic arithmetic . . . The current ruling group is commonly perceived to be largely of Banyankole [a large, southern ethnic group] origins.”

Dicklitch, noting that the NRM tends to serve its own ethnic base, observes that it is corrupt and stifles dissent.

Political parties. The NRM was deemed to be a no-party political system. This was seen as an essential pillar for reducing ethnic strife. In 2005, the NRM transitioned from a no-party system to a multiparty system, although there were a number of restrictions placed on political parties (they must be national in orientation; not based on ethnic affiliation; register with the state; etc.). Singh, referencing Carbone, notes that “These factors
contribute to his [Carbone’s] idea that the 2005 referendum did not create a radical break in Uganda, not because of the weak basis for the transition, but because the no-party system was a ruse and the president’s party, the National Resistance Movement (NRM), always acted as a political party itself.”

Singiza and De Visser add that “It is also argued here that an electoral system that encourages one political party to dominate the political space is incapable of fostering reconciliation and accountability.”

In 2010, the multiparty system was further liberalized, with political parties promised state funding via the 2010 Political Parties and Organizations Act. However, Singh again comments critically, “The multiparty system opens up the country to political competition on a national level but there exist no ideological bases or resources to facilitate this.”

Local control. The NRM utilizes Resistance Councils as an alleged means of devolving political power to the local level, thereby broadening citizen participation in governance. Some praise the local initiative, but others are critical. Dicklitch argues, “Often, directives come from above (district level) and get filtered through to LC1 [village] level, rather than from the grassroots upwards . . . State directions and bureaucratization increasingly devour the populism of the movement . . . Broad-based inclusionary representation (regional, religious and ethnic) at the national level has also decreased, especially at the cabinet level.”

Singissa and Deviser level a different criticism—that the councils serve to ban ethnic minorities from the political process: “the law and practice surrounding the election of district councils reveal the political exclusion of ethnic minorities. It is argued that this is contrary to the stated policy objectives of decentralization in Uganda and only serves to further promote the political dominance of the ruling party.”
Gerrymandering. The number of local districts has increased dramatically over time. This was lauded by the government as a means to further empower local communities. Again, many analysts see the motivation differently. Anna Reuss and Kristof Titeca state, “Since 2002, the number of Uganda’s districts has doubled: Justified by the country’s decentralization policy, new district creation has in many cases been primarily a critical tool of patronage for government to secure votes in elections, while leaving substantive development challenges unaddressed.”¹⁴⁸ Singiza and DeVisser state, “There are now 122 districts in Uganda. The aim of the creation of many additional districts was, in part, to weaken strong ethnic groups. An economically stronger and/or more populous district can compete politically with the central government better than an economically weaker of less populous one . . . not a single district council is headed by a chairperson from any of the minority ethnic groups.”¹⁴⁹

Universal Public Education (UPE). After greeting initial proposals for the introduction of universal public education in Uganda with skepticism, Museveni changed his view and launched the effort, leading to quick and massive investments in education, an approach that Stasavage refers to as “big bang.”¹⁵⁰ But some analysts are skeptical of Museveni’s motive. Stasavage continues, “Uganda’s UPE initiative was announced during a presidential election campaign, and primary education has remained a prominent issue in Uganda political discussions ever since. This raises the question whether UPE has been achieved as a result of the revival of electoral competition in Uganda.”¹⁵¹

Traditional rulers are banned from elections. There have been bans on traditional rulers running for political office in Uganda. Singiza and De Visser write, “In the African
context, culture and ethnicity are almost always intertwined and the prohibition of traditional leaders’ participation in politics was thus an early move to legally and politically neutralize ethnicity.”

Electoral system. Uganda utilizes a winner-takes-all electoral system. This system favors the dominant party and leads to the under-representation of minority groups. Opposition leader Paul Ssemogerere (and others) have long argued for change: “The Westminster or winner-takes-it-all model tends to render minority groups inconsequential. It is vulnerable to gerrymandering; such situations tend to breed ground for social injustice and conflict.”

The military. The NRM significantly decreased the percentage of the military that was Northern Acholi, which was previously represented at perhaps 10 times their national population percentage (four to five percent), transferring the concentration of personnel to the South.

English as official language. The NRM made English the official language in Uganda. Carbone sees this as driven by a desire to de-emphasize ethnicity: “Finally, the constitutionalization of 11 official languages in South Africa—a symbolic recognition of communal diversities—is in stark contrast with the adoption of English as a single national language for Uganda.”

Discussion

In Uganda, in a structural configuration similar to that of Rwanda, the minority ethnic group that the colonial power utilized to rule the country has re-emerged in power.
In both situations, the rise of minority leadership in post-conflict society led to initial attempts to de-emphasize ethnicity. Uganda initially sought to de-emphasize ethnicity (a no-party political movement, etc.), then later purported to espouse it (multiparty elections, Resistance Councils, etc.) as a means of striving for inclusiveness. A fundamental question is whether these alleged transitions toward greater ethnic participation are genuine, or a cynical means of creating the illusion of plurality while actually strengthening single-party control. This question applies to many Ugandan ethnic political settlements—the multiparty system, the Resistance Councils, the lack of an electoral system based on proportional representation, the deployment of universal basic education, and so on. Uganda under the NRM has often been portrayed in a positive light; but others, as noted above, are highly cynical. Writing in 1999, Ellen Hauser notes, “Uganda is a more divided country today than it was when the NRM came to power in 1986. Corruption is rampant, and regionalism and ethnicity continue to be the usual means of determining who gets what in the political and economic arenas.”

Some analysts see this duality of expression—some progress toward ethnic pluralism and democratization while simultaneously solidifying de facto single-party rule—as reflective of a broader strategy tied to international objectives. It is important for Uganda to be seen as making progress toward democracy to continue to curry favor (aid) from the international community; and yet it is also important for Uganda to maintain political stability, in order to fulfill its geopolitical role for Western powers. Singh observes, “The problem is that, while multiparty democracy is being instituted, the international community is simultaneously encouraging Museveni’s military control of the
whole of East Africa, from Somalia to the Congo. Uganda’s strategic location, coupled
with the Western military training of its key leaders, has given it the region’s most fierce
and disciplined army.”

This ties to the question of regime legitimacy. Susan Dicklitch, writing in 2002,
states, “An initial period of stabilization and reconstruction (1986-1995) may have been
necessary to rebuild state legitimacy, but after 1996, it seemed that the Movement regime
was more interested in consolidating and maintaining its power than in building a stable
and human-rights-respective regime . . . Museveni and his Movement regime are deriving
legitimacy from the international arena rather than by securing it internally through
genuine political competition and participation.” And Singh, writing in 2017, makes a
related observation by attributing Uganda’s decision to eschew its no-party political
system to the international community’s desire to have Uganda occupy a different
position—optically and geopolitically—in East Africa: “Treated as an illness of
traditionalism [referencing the no-party era of the NRM], the system has been replaced
through a politics of dispensation, by a system that is more suited to the logic of modern
states in the international system.” This highlights the importance of interpreting ethnic
settlements not only in the context of structural history but also in the context of
international community geopolitical realities—a perspective especially important for
impoverished countries that obtain significant parts of their annual budgets from
international donors. In sum, it is perhaps fair to see Uganda’s ethnic political settlements
in mixed terms—as making some progress toward inclusiveness, but concurrently
ensuring prolonged NRM minority rule.
Commentary

The five countries are characterized by very different structural histories. Burundi was a pre-existing state with little pre-colonial ethnic tension, with minority rule at independence that later reverted to majority rule. Nigeria was a colonial fabrication—an artificial amalgamation of three macro-regions with ethnic loyalty, with lasting implications for (lack of) national cohesion. Ethiopia avoided European colonial colonization. And yet its domestic history generated a powerful and enduring North-South ethnic schism that resembles the ethnic divides created in other African countries by the European metropoles. Its ethnic political settlements continue to reflect this schism. In Uganda, there is ongoing minority rule, somewhat similar to Rwanda, whose post-independence majority- to minority-rule progression is the inverse of Burundi’s. And so on. With the modern histories of the five countries in the sample encapsulated, the foundation has been established to chronicle this range of structural drivers and ethnic political settlements that characterize them.
Chapter III

Analytical Section Two: Structural Drivers and Ethnic Political Settlements

This section describes and compares the primary structural drivers and ethnic political settlements for all five countries. This data will serve as the grist for the analysis of the connections between the two in the subsequent two sections.

There are three tables for structural drivers: background factors, colonial-era events, and institutional response. This segmentation distinguishes between underlying attributes of the country, the manner in which the country was shaped during the colonial era and the myriad ways in which the country responded to the challenges presented by the colonial era. It is important to note that this latter category deals with each country’s institutional responses to colonialism and not the creation of ethnic political settlements themselves. Each table is divided into sections (which will be described later). There are a total of 44 structural drivers covered in the three tables.

There are also three tables for the ethnic political settlements: political and economic system, policy arrangements, and institutional, narratives and justice. This segmentation distinguishes between changes to the actual political and economic system, the adoption of policy that operates within these systems, and the mechanisms by which each country dealt with the issues of ethnic justice and ethnic understanding—via institutional adjustments, reconciliation commissions and national narratives. Again, these
tables are divided into sections. There are 47 settlements covered, and 13 metrics that provide insight into how select settlements are performing, for a total of 60 data items.

Several caveats must be noted. First, these drivers and settlements are, of course, a subset of the total. There are countless factors that influence the formation of ethnic settlements, and if the term “ethnic political settlements” is defined broadly, there are countless numbers of these as well. This analysis seeks to focus on the more critical drivers and settlements. Second, the discussion of each driver and settlement is not thorough. It would require extensive research to comprehensively compare any single ethnic settlement across five countries. Thus, this presentation merely seeks to provide an overview of the key drivers and settlements. The ultimate objective is to diagnose connections between drivers and settlements; not to elaborate on the details of each specific one. Third, there are issues with data comparability (which will be noted in the tables), due to lack of data availability (e.g., data on labor force composition is from different years for some countries). Again, this is not a major issue for this analysis, as the goal is to identify conceptual connections between drivers and settlements, not make precise calculations based on perfect data.

With respect to presentation, each driver and settlement is assigned a number within its table. Thus, “population density” is in the first table, and it is the twelfth driver in this table. Subsequent references to “population density,” will be referred to by name and table location number (“1/12” = first table; 12th driver). Thus, references to population density will read, “population density (1/12),” to enable the reader to quickly locate the driver in the tables. The source(s) of the data for each driver is described in the footnotes.
Finally, there will not be a discussion of each driver in each table, as many drivers are self-explanatory. Instead, several drivers will be reviewed for each table, often to introduce a theme.

The first table deals with background factors in the country – factors that provide critical background context for each country. There is an economic section, a demographics section and a section that highlights the major ethnic conflicts in neighboring countries that each of the five countries has been involved in. As we will consider later, these involvements can influence domestic ethnic political settlements.

Table 1. Background factors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. ECONOMIC</th>
<th>Nigeria</th>
<th>Ethiopia</th>
<th>Rwanda</th>
<th>Burundi</th>
<th>Uganda</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Square Miles (000s)</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>426</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>GDP/Capita (2018)(^{159})</td>
<td>$2,028</td>
<td>$772</td>
<td>$773</td>
<td>$275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>GDP/Capita Growth Rate (20 Year: 1998 -2018; Constant USD)(^{160})</td>
<td>74% (2.8% CAGR)</td>
<td>204% (5.7% CAGR)</td>
<td>147% (4.6% CAGR)</td>
<td>-12% (-0.7% CAGR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>GINI Index(^{161})</td>
<td>43.0 (2009)</td>
<td>39.1 (2015)</td>
<td>43.7 (2016)</td>
<td>38.6 (2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Trend in GINI Index(^{162})</td>
<td>Rise (38.7 in 1985 to 51.9 in 1996), then mild decline</td>
<td>Fall (44.6 in 1995 to 29.8 in 2004) then mild rise</td>
<td>Rise (28.9 in 1984 to 52.0 in 2005) then mild decline</td>
<td>Flat (since 1992)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Percent of National</td>
<td>Roughly 40%</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Oil Profit as Percent GDP (2017)</td>
<td>6.1 (But understated)</td>
<td>0.0 (But exploration underway)</td>
<td>0.0 (But exploration underway)</td>
<td>0.0 (But exploration underway)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Top Exports (2018)</td>
<td>Mineral fuels including oil (94%)</td>
<td>Coffee/Tea/Spices (34%); Vegetables and Oil Seeds (34%)</td>
<td>Ores/Slag/Ash (41%); Coffee/Tea/Spices (38%)</td>
<td>Coffee/Tea (48%); Gems/Precious Metals (12%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Distribution of Natural Resources by Region and Ethnicity</td>
<td>Oil concentrated in Niger Delta and Delta State and Rivers state skewed toward Igbo, Ogoni, Ijaw, and Ikwerre</td>
<td>More industry in more urban North (Amhara and Tigray); more subsistence agriculture in South (Oromo). Oil emerging in Southeast. More plow-based agriculture in North; more pastoralism in South</td>
<td>Reasonably even. The limited manufacturin skewed toward Kigali</td>
<td>Reasonably even. The limited manufacturin skewed toward Bujumbura (with proportionately more Tutsi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Land Ownership and Distribution by Ethnic Group</td>
<td>Government owns land which: (a) favors the three primary ethnic groups at the expense of smaller ethnic groups; (b) inhibits industrialization which favors the Hausa-Fulani and damages the Igbo, Ogoni, Ijaw, Under Menelik, Oromo land owned by Northerners. Under Derg, Land Nationalized (which favored South and this has not been rescinded. 1995 Constitution states that land is property of The State owns all land—some argue that this hinders inter-communal conflict resolution. Land policy provides land for returning Tutsi refugees and promotes large scale agricultural plots (which favors Tutsi).</td>
<td>Land policy has provided land for returning Hutu refugees. It also favors elite Hutu</td>
<td>The Kabaka and the British reached land agreement that favored Baganda elite, and land was given to collaborators by Britain. Amin made land leasehold. Museveni favored the Mailo system in 1996,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
and Ikwerre\textsuperscript{170} state and land use is possible via long-term leases. Instituted to protect Southern Agrarian Interests (Oromo) from Northern Industrialists (Amhara and Tigray). Criticized because it hampers industrialization\textsuperscript{171}.

Some argue that land policy will only remain fixed as long as regime is Tutsi\textsuperscript{172}.

which historically favored Buganda. His land policies favor those that help the NRM. Biased land reform has led to calls for federation. Museveni has not socialized land, as some thought he would\textsuperscript{174}.

**B. DEMOGRAPHICS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>12</th>
<th>Population (Millions; 2019)\textsuperscript{175}</th>
<th>201.0</th>
<th>110.1</th>
<th>12.8</th>
<th>11.6</th>
<th>45.7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Population Density (People per Square Kilometer; 2019)\textsuperscript{176}</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>519</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Ethnic Structure</td>
<td>Tripodal</td>
<td>Multipodal, with two dominant</td>
<td>Bipodal</td>
<td>Bipodal</td>
<td>Multipodal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Ethnic Composite\textsuperscript{177}</td>
<td>34/14/14 (Hausa-Fulani; Yoruba; Igbo)</td>
<td>34/27/6/6 (Oromo; Amhara; Somali; Tigray)</td>
<td>85/14 (Hutu; Tutsi)</td>
<td>85/14 (Hutu; Tutsi)</td>
<td>17/10/9/7/6 (Baganda; Banyankole; Basoga; Bakiga; Iteso; Langi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Total Number of Ethnic Groups (Approximate) \textsuperscript{178}</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Fearon Index of Ethnic</td>
<td>0.805</td>
<td>0.760</td>
<td>0.180</td>
<td>0.328</td>
<td>0.930</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Several variables of note in the first table are percent of national income from natural resource (1/7), land ownership and distribution by ethnic group (1/11), ethnic composite (1/15), cross-cutting or reinforcing cleavages (1/21) and conflictual ethnic involvement in neighboring countries (1/22). Each of these will figure prominently in later
discussions. It is important to note the obvious but critical observation that applies to all tables: for certain variables, e.g., the Gini index (1/4), the figures are not too dissimilar across countries, although this has not always been the case—see trend in Gini Index (1/5); for other variables, the differences between countries is tremendous. Nigeria’s GDP per capita (1/2) is over seven times that of Burundi, and it has oil (1/8), which Burundi does not. Rwanda has a bipodal ethnic structure (1/14) where the ratio of the largest to second largest primary ethnic group (1/15) exceeds six, whereas Ethiopia has a multipodal ethnic structure (1/14) and a ratio of largest to second largest ethnic group of 1.3 (1/15). These types of massive structural differences between countries naturally have tremendous implications for ethnic settlements—huge cross-country differences in structural drivers create the undercurrent that drives everything that follows.

Table 2 deals with colonial-era events—critical dimensions of colonial rule that had profound impacts on ethnic dynamics in the colony. These are divided into four categories: state formation; colonial political rule; colonial economic policy; and independence political structure.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. STATE FORMATION</th>
<th>Nigeria</th>
<th>Ethiopia</th>
<th>Rwanda</th>
<th>Burundi</th>
<th>Uganda</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Is Country a Colonial Creation or Did It Preexist?</td>
<td>Colonial creation</td>
<td>“Colonial Creation.” Technically, N.A. since not Ethiopia colonized. However, “Colonial Preexisted. Ruanda and Burundi were independent kingdoms (but managed as a single entity under)</td>
<td>Preexisted. Ruanda and Burundi were independent kingdoms (but managed as a single entity under)</td>
<td>Colonial Creation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Creation in sense that internal colonization created country from disparate regions to create modern Ethiopia</td>
<td>Belgian rule until 1962)</td>
<td>Belgian rule until 1962)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Were ethnic relations harmonious or antagonistic prior to colonial era?</td>
<td>Limited ethnic conflict</td>
<td>Antagonistic</td>
<td>Some ethnic conflict</td>
<td>Very limited ethnic conflict</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### B. COLONIAL POLITICAL RULE

<p>|   |   | Direct versus Indirect Rule |   |   |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | Direct versus Indirect Rule | Indirect | Direct | Indirect |
| 4 | Divide and Rule? | Yes | Yes (ruled from North) | Yes | Yes |
| 5 | Chosen Ethnic Group | Hausa-Fulani | Amhara | Tutsi (until independenc e era and then Hutu after Social Revolution) | Tutsi | Baganda (for political rule but with Northern military) |
| 6 | Rule via Majority/Minority Ethnic Group | Largest (but still minority) | Minority -- Second Largest | Minority in colonial era and then majority in Independenc e era | Minority | Largest (but still minority) |
| 7 | Chosen Region | North | North | South Until Hutu Social Revolution (Tutsi relatively more prominent in South); Then North (Hutu relatively more prominent in North) | North (Tutsi Monarchy in Muramvya) | South Central (Buganda Kingdom) |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>8</th>
<th>Primary Religion in Region of Colonial Rule</th>
<th>Islam</th>
<th>Orthodox</th>
<th>None (but complicated)</th>
<th>None (but complicated)</th>
<th>Protestant and Catholic (complicated)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B: COLONIAL ECONOMIC POLICY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Economic Bias and Natural Resource Allocation Bias</td>
<td>Hausa-Fulani</td>
<td>Amhara</td>
<td>Tutsi until independence era (then Hutu)</td>
<td>Tutsi</td>
<td>Buganda. Buganda appropriates land at time of quasi-federal system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C: INDEPENDENCE POLITICAL STRUCTURE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Ethnic Bias of Independence Constitution</td>
<td>Biased toward Hausa-Fulani: Abubakar Tafawa Balewa from North; 52% of national delgates from North; federal system with three regions but most territory in North</td>
<td>Technically N.A. since Ethiopia didn’t “gain independenc e.” 1931 and 1955 Constitutions biased toward Amhara; 1995 Constitution biased toward Tigray</td>
<td>Favored Hutu. 1962 Constitution abolished the Tutsi Monarchy and established a multiparty state, which effectively consolidated Hutu rule</td>
<td>Favored Tutsi. 1962 Constitution established Constitutiona l Monarchy based on Tutsi leadership</td>
<td>Biased toward Baganda. 1962 Constitution gave Kingdom of Buganda special treatment: It created quasi-federal system but only Buganda had full federal status (with more rights and privileges)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Who inherited the colonial state</td>
<td>Hausa-Fulani (political culture from North; bureaucracy from South)</td>
<td>Technically N.A. as there was no “colonial power.” 1995 Constitution shifts power from Amhara to Tigray</td>
<td>Hutu</td>
<td>Tutsi</td>
<td>Political power in North (Obote first Prime Minister)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Variables of note for Table 2 include whether or not the country is a colonial creation (2/1), with implications for intrinsic level of nationalism in the country (e.g., low in Nigeria) and whether it was the majority or minority ethnic group that the colonial power ruled through (2/6) with implications for the ability to sustain various ethnic settlements.

Table 3 addresses the institutional response to colonial rule—the consequences of colonial rule and the response of the country’s institutions to these consequences. It is important to recall that these are not ethnic settlements, but rather institutional responses. There are three sections: the formation of political parties; the emergence of violent conflict; and the pattern of regime change.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nigeria</th>
<th>Ethiopia</th>
<th>Rwanda</th>
<th>Burundi</th>
<th>Uganda</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A: POLITICAL PARTIES AT INDEPENDENCE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Basis for Political Parties at Independence</td>
<td>Ethno-Regional. NPC = North (Hausa-Fulani); NCNC = East (Igbo) AG = Yoruba (West)</td>
<td>Technically “N.A.” as no “independence.” In 1995, essentially ethnic. Dominant party—EPRDF—is comprised of 4 parties; other parties largely ethnic</td>
<td>Ethnicity. Multiparty state becomes de facto single-party state under Hutu rule (main opposition parties made illegal in 1965)</td>
<td>Ethnicity. Prior to independence, 23 political parties. After independence, two were relevant—UPRONA (Tutsi) and the People’s Party (Hutu)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ruling Party at Independence</td>
<td>NPC: Representing Hausa-Fulani of Northern Region</td>
<td>Technically “N.A.”. In 1991, TPLF; in 1995, EPRDF</td>
<td>Parmehutu: Representing Hutu in new republic (following)</td>
<td>UPRONA: Representing Tutsi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>end of Tutsi monarchy)</td>
<td>North, but complicated</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3</strong></td>
<td><strong>Inter-Ethnic Violence: Frequency</strong>&lt;sup&gt;192&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>High Frequency. Kano Riot (1953); Biafran Civil War (1967-1970); Boko Haram Uprising (2009 – Present); Multiple Coups; Other</td>
<td>High Frequency. Several Famines (1961 to 1985); Ethiopian Civil War (1974-1991); Ogaden and Eritrean Conflicts; Gedeo-Guji Dispute (2018); Coups; Other</td>
<td>High Frequency. Social Revolution (1959-1961); Tutsi Massacre (1963-1964); Purge of Tutsis (1973); Genocide (1994); Coups; Other</td>
<td>High Frequency. Ethnic Violence (1963); Genocide (1972); Massacre (1988); Genocide (1993); Civil War (1993-2005); Term-Limit Crisis (2015); Coups; Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5</strong></td>
<td><strong>Major Threat of Ethnic-Based Secession?</strong></td>
<td>Yes — Igbo Liberation Front (OLF), Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and Sidama</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>6</strong></td>
<td><strong>Religious Conflict</strong>&lt;sup&gt;195&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Ongoing Islam (North) versus Christian (South) conflict</td>
<td>Ongoing North (Christian) versus South (Islam) conflict</td>
<td>Catholic Church involvement in ethnic conflict evolves over time, but Church sides with Hutu against Tutsi in 1994 Genocide</td>
<td>Catholic Church in Burundi sided with the majority Hutus under Tutsi rule</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Key variables from Table 3 include whether or not there has been a major secession attempt and/or if there is the threat of one (2/5), and the pattern of historical regime progression (3/9), including the inverse patterns of moving from majority to minority rule in Rwanda while moving from minority to majority rule in Burundi. The military has tended to play a different type of role (3/11) in different countries as a
function of whether there is minority rule (2/11 and 3/2), amongst many other differences exhibited by countries under majority or minority rule (discussed later).

Considering the drivers in a collective sense (Tables 1, 2 and 3), several themes emerge. First, there are often “camps,” or groupings of countries that cluster around certain sets of variables. Many analysts, for example, have commented on similarities between Rwanda and Uganda, and this is reflected in the tables. Both countries were ruled via an ethnic group during the colonial era (2/5) that did not inherit the colonial state (2/11 and 3/2), but that later returned to power (covered in Table 4), as well as other similarities. These parallels in structural drivers will, of course, lead to similarities in ethnic political settlements.

In a related manner, there are groupings of countries with respect to a single variable. For example, GDP per capita growth rates (1/3) are highest in Ethiopia and Rwanda (and have been historically high in Uganda). Many argue that this can have implications for international donor favor, which can lead to international support in spite of non-progressive ethnic settlements. Similarly, with respect to demographics, the countries split into two camps with respect to ethnic fragmentation, with Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Uganda highly fragmented; and Rwanda and Burundi much less so. Ethiopia and Uganda have multiple ethnic groups, and no single ethnic group in the majority; while Rwanda and Burundi are dominated by two ethnic groups (Hutu and Tutsi) with one (Hutu) being overwhelmingly numerically dominant. This can create a very different set of concerns and motivations for certain types of ethnic settlements. And Nigeria is the
only country that derives significant income from oil (1/8), with tremendous implications for ethnic political settlements.

The discussion now turns to ethnic settlements. Table 4 is the first of the tables on ethnic settlements. It deals with the nature of the political and economic systems constructed in the post-colonial environment. It is divided into seven categories: documentary institutions, political system nature, political system attributes, political system structure—central, political system structure—non-central political system metrics and economic system.

Table 4. Political/economic system.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nigeria</th>
<th>Ethiopia</th>
<th>Rwanda</th>
<th>Burundi</th>
<th>Uganda</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A: DOCUMENTARY INSTITUTIONS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Constitution and Ethnicity in General</td>
<td>Ostensibly egalitarian; enshrines ethnicity as variable in democracy; silent on secession</td>
<td>Enshrines ethnicity as operational variable in democracy; the fundamental subject of the constitution is nationality, not the individual, which some say is antithetical to democracy; State Constitutions</td>
<td>Enshrines ethnicity as central operational variable in democracy; numerous anti-genocide provisions ; bars divisionism; some power-sharing provisions</td>
<td>Enshrines ethnicity as central operational variable in democracy; numerous provisions for power-sharing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>do not have to have components of the Federal Constitution (unlike Nigeria); allows secession via Article 39 but of dubious authenticity; Constitution can only be amended if all states agree in order to protect minority rights</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Constitution and Ethnic Bias(^{201})</td>
<td>Issues with: (a) historic immunity; (b) legitimacy of process favor Hausa-Fulani</td>
<td>Consolidates power of EPRDF ethnic groups relative to others; biased toward Tigray; problems with legitimacy of process (non-inclusive and excluding Amhara input); maintains central power despite ethnic federalism</td>
<td>Biased toward Tutsi: (a) bans ethnic parties but allows RPF, creating powerful incumbency advantage; (b) 2015 Amendments extend presidential term limits</td>
<td>2018 Constitutional Referendum biased toward Hutu by extending term limits, centralizing more power in president</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Consociational or Integrated Constitution(^{202})</td>
<td>Consociational</td>
<td>Consociational</td>
<td>Integrated</td>
<td>Consociational</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

\(^{201}\) Consociational or Integrated Constitution

\(^{202}\) Consociational or Integrated Constitution
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>B. POLITICAL SYSTEM – NATURE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Stated Political System (C.I.A. World Factbook)(^{203})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index (2018 and 2006)(^{204})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Freedom House 2019 Freedom Score(^{205})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>De Facto Single-Party State?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Role of Military -- Fused with Party and/or State(^{206})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Reliant on enduring “Strongman” Leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Duration of Current Leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>4-Pronged Power Configuration: De Facto Single-Party State tied to Ethnic Group or Coalition with Captive Military and Enduring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C. POLITICAL SYSTEM – ATTRIBUTES</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Nature of Rule: Majority or Minority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Ethnic Heritage of Leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Has Colonial Era Power Returned to Power?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>How did Current Regime Originally Come to Power?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>D: POLITICAL SYSTEM – STRUCTURE (PART ONE – CENTRAL)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Branches of Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Presidential or Parliamentary System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Ethnic requirements for Vice President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 20 | Fair Executive Branch Elections (Freedom House 2019) | 3/4 (2015 Election reasonably sound) | 0/4 (2015 Election not sound) | 0/4 (Numerous pro-Kagame irregularities) | 0/4 (Numerous pro-Museveni irregularities) |
| 21 | Vote Count For President/Prime Minister in Recent Election | 56% | N.A. (not elected) | 99% | 69% | 61% |
| 22 | Legislature: Freely Elected (Freedom House 2019) | 3/4 | 0/4 | 1/4 | 0/4 | 1/4 |
| 23 | Party concentration of Legislature | 322/360 members of House of Representatives from two main parties (APC and PDP) | 500/547 members of House of People’s Representatives from EPRDF and remaining 47 from EPRDF allies | 41/80 Chamber of Deputies = RPF Coalition; 12 = opposition; 27 = independently elected | 86/121 of National Assembly from CNDD-FDD | 293/426 of Unicameral Parliament from NRM |
| 24 | Judiciary Independence (Freedom House 2019) | 2/4 (some Independence) | 1/4 (driven by EPRDF policy) | 0/4 (controlled by Kagame and RPF Senate) | 0/4 (controlled by Nkurunziza) | 1/4 (executive and military Influence) |

### E. POLITICAL SYSTEM STRUCTURE (PART II – NON-CENTRAL)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Federal Versus Unitary</th>
<th>Federal</th>
<th>Unitary</th>
<th>Unitary</th>
<th>Unitary (but quasi-federal system from 1962 to 1966)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Nature of Federal</td>
<td>Mixed – territorial/ethnic</td>
<td>Ethnic</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System (if Federal)</td>
<td>Number of States (Current And Over Time)</td>
<td>Attributes of Federal System</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>36 States and the Federal Capital Territory (from 3 regions in 1960)</td>
<td>Federalism inherited from colonial era; Top-down directed federalism rather than bottom-up aggregation; Ethno-federalism; Distributive federalism (of oil revenue) leading to “winners and losers”; Focus on oil revenue distribution leads to focus on oil profit allocation rather than economic growth; Operates with Federalism not from “colonial power” (as in Nigeria); Top-down directed federalism rather than bottom-up aggregation; Ethno-federalism; Two tiers of regions: Amhara/Oromia/Tigray/Southern Region that are part of ruling coalition and 5 economically underdeveloped smaller regions that are called “partners” – falsely</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9 Regional States and 2 multiethnic chartered administrations -- Addis Ababa and DireDawa (it has been stable in size since its inception in 1995. (A 14 region federal system was implemented during the Transitional Government of Ethiopia in 1992.)</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>During quasi-federal era, there were three tiers: Buganda as federal and four others as semi-federal and then administrativ e units</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
too much central power; Expansion of number of states dilutes ethnic competition between three primary ethnic groups and also reduces religious tension; Federal system expansion is form of gerrymandering that helps Hausa-Fulani; Some refer to it as a unitary system in disguise\textsuperscript{215} implying unanimity; Regions have differential levels of power – thus asymmetrical federalism; Possibility of secession via Article 39\textsuperscript{216}

<p>| | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Local Governance Structure\textsuperscript{217}</td>
<td>774 Local Government Areas (LGA's)</td>
<td>15 Administrative Regions; 103 Sub-Regions; 505 Districts</td>
<td>5 Provinces (used to be 12) and 30 Districts (Akarere); 416 Sectors (Imerenge); 2148 Cells (Utugari); 14,837 Villages (Imudungu). Elections every 5 years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

29 Local Governance Structure\textsuperscript{217} 774 Local Government Areas (LGA's) 15 Administrative Regions; 103 Sub-Regions; 505 Districts 5 Provinces (used to be 12) and 30 Districts (Akarere); 416 Sectors (Imerenge); 2148 Cells (Utugari); 14,837 Villages (Imudungu). Elections every 5 years 18 Provinces; 119 Communes and 2639 Colline 5-Tier LC System. But now 4 Administrative Regions and 127 Districts (with further local subdivisions - Counties/Sub Counties/Parish/Village OR District/etc.

| 30 | Local Governance Power\textsuperscript{218} | Very limited power – dwarfed by federal and state governance | Very limited power – dwarfed by federal and regional power. Used | Largely used to consolidate RPF power. The | Largely used to consolidate CNDD-FDD control. Insufficiently funded for local | Largely used to consolidate NRM power. The number of local |

30 Local Governance Power\textsuperscript{218} Very limited power – dwarfed by federal and state governance Very limited power – dwarfed by federal and regional power. Used Largely used to consolidate RPF power. The Largely used to consolidate CNDD-FDD control. Insufficiently funded for local Largely used to consolidate NRM power. The number of local
by EPRDF for local control

Imihigo System, calling for peasants to support local governance, and Imigudugu (villagization) are RPF Programs

service provision and limited opportunity for individual involvement. Local elite appointed from central government helps establish control of the countryside

districts is increasing – they serve to funnel patronage. District councils serve the regime and do not protect minority rights. The increase in the number of districts is a form of gerrymandering. The top-down directives eviscerate populist dimension

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>F. POLITICAL SYSTEM METRICS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>G: ECONOMIC SYSTEM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed (free market/state planning)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Variables of note include whether the country is defined by a four-pronged power structure (4/12). Again, countries divide into camps—with Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda all characterized by this attribute, but not Nigeria or Ethiopia. The connection between structural drivers and this settlement will be discussed later.

The attributes of the federal system (4/28) are also very different between Nigeria (colonially inherited, economically highly redistributive, ever-expanding) versus Ethiopia (indigenous, somewhat redistributive, fixed in terms of districts). There are structural drivers that contribute to this difference as well (also discussed later).

Table 5 considers the policy arrangements made in different realms within each country. There are five sections: executive power-sharing agreements; political parties; elections; economic policy; and foreign policy and international community relations.
Table 5. Policy arrangements.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A: EXECUTIVE POWER-SHARING AGREEMENTS</th>
<th>Nigeria</th>
<th>Ethiopia</th>
<th>Rwanda</th>
<th>Burundi</th>
<th>Uganda</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Term Limits</td>
<td>2 four-year terms for President</td>
<td>No term limits for Prime Minister. However, Abiy Ahmed has announced plans to institute term limits</td>
<td>2 five-year terms for President starting in 2024. This 2015 change also allows Kagame to run in 2024 and 2029</td>
<td>2 seven-year terms for President starting in 2020. This 2018 change also allows Nkurunziza to run in 2020 and 2027</td>
<td>2 five-year terms for President (this 2017 law changed 2005 law repealing term limits). Also, 2017 law eliminated 75-year age limit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Zoning Agreement s (Alternating Political Power)</td>
<td>Yes. Unwritten understanding since 1979 that power should alternate between North and South after every 2 four-year terms</td>
<td>No, although recent intra-EPRDF power rotation between ethnic groups</td>
<td>No, but 3 of 4 Prime Ministers under Kagame have been Hutu</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C: POLITICAL PARTIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3 Party Reality for Executive Branch</th>
<th>De jure multiparty; de facto two dominant parties (APC, PDP)</th>
<th>De jure multiparty; de facto one dominant four-party coalition (EPRDF)</th>
<th>De jure multiparty; de facto one dominant party (RPF)</th>
<th>De jure multiparty; de facto one dominant party (CNDD-FDD)</th>
<th>De jure multiparty; de facto one dominant party (NRM)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 Number of Registered Political Parties</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5 Key Political Party Restriction s | Numerous: party cannot have name, symbol or logo with ethnic or religious connotation; | Numerous and severe: at times severe repression and intimidation of parties; | Numerous and severe: Severe repression and intimidation; parties cannot organize | Numerous and severe: Severe repression and intimidation; restrictions on the right to | Numerous and severe: Severe repression and intimidation; restrictions on gathering; |
no campaigning, broadcasting or materials based on ethnicity, religion or region; must be pan-ethnic when formed; must demonstrate national presence; equal allocation of media time to parties; parties cannot advocate for hate; parties that do not participate in successive elections can be disqualified; locally; parties are asked to leave elections; assemble; regular intra-party harassment; restrictions on holding internal party elections; bans on other party activity; parties must be national in character and not based on dimension of division

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Political Party Equity (Freedom House 2019)²²⁴</th>
<th>6/8 (Reasonable Multiparty Democracy)</th>
<th>2/8 (EPRDF dominance of process; but recent improvements)</th>
<th>1/8 (RPF oppresses opposition parties)</th>
<th>1/8 (CNDD-FDD oppresses opposition parties)</th>
<th>2/8 (NRM oppresses opposition parties)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

D: ELECTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Electoral Strategy for Lower House</th>
<th>SMDs with FPTP</th>
<th>SMDs with FPTP</th>
<th>53/80 seats using nationwide constituency with PR (party list); 24/80 seats for women (regional allocations) and 3/80 seats for youth and minorities</th>
<th>17 constituencies -- using PR (party list with 2% threshold)</th>
<th>SMDs with FPTP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ethnic Vote Minimums and Ethnic Seat Allocations</th>
<th>President: requires 25% of vote in 24/36 states to prevail in round one</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>National Assembly: 60% Hutu; 40% Tutsi. Senate: 1 Hutu and 1 Tutsi from each of 18 provinces as</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Free and Fair Elections (Freedom House 2019)²²⁵</td>
<td>8/12</td>
<td>0/12 (2015: EPRDF and allies won all 547 seats in House)</td>
<td>1/12 (Myriad pro-RPF biases: voter registration; media control; etc.)</td>
<td>0/12 (Opposition boycott of 2015 elections)</td>
<td>3/12 (Myriad pro-NRM biases).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**E: ECONOMIC POLICY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Natural Resource Revenue Sharing Agreement (e.g., Oil)²²⁶</th>
<th>Yes – Revenue Derivation Formula for Oil and Gas</th>
<th>N.A.</th>
<th>N.A.</th>
<th>N.A.</th>
<th>N.A.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Corruption Index (C.P.I. 2018)²²⁷</th>
<th>27/144</th>
<th>34/114</th>
<th>56/48</th>
<th>17/170</th>
<th>26/149</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**F: FOREIGN POLICY and INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Major ethnic-based incursions abroad</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>Involvement in Eritrea and Ogaden</th>
<th>Involvement in Congo, Uganda and Burundi</th>
<th>Involvement in Congo and Rwanda</th>
<th>Involvement in Congo, Rwanda, Sudan and South Sudan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>% of Budget Foreign Aid (Foreign Aid/National Budget in USD $BB)²²⁸</th>
<th>15% (3.4/22.2)</th>
<th>28% (4.1/14.6)</th>
<th>53% (1.2/2.3)</th>
<th>56% (0.4/0.7)</th>
<th>38% (2.0/5.3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

|---|---|---|---|---|---|

²²⁶ Oil and Gas Revenue Sharing Agreement.
²²⁷ Corruption Index (C.P.I. 2018).
²²⁸ % of Budget Foreign Aid (Foreign Aid/National Budget in USD $BB).
²²⁹ Implied Western Donor Perspective (Select Observations).
A variable of note is term limits (5/1), which have recently been relaxed in Rwanda and Burundi, and age limits, which have been relaxed in Uganda. These changes enable prolonged rule for Kagame and Museveni, and possibly Nkurunziza (although he has announced that he will not, in fact, run for another term). This is in contrast with Nigeria (no term limits) and Ethiopia (Abiy Ahmed has announced his intent to introduce term limits). Again, countries fall into groupings, driven by structural drivers (discussed later).

Table 6 is the final table. It addresses institutions, narratives, and justice. It has five sections: government institutions and quotas; K-12 education system and language; truth and reconciliation as well as re-education; speech; and narrative management.

Table 6. Institutions, narratives, and justice.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nigeria</th>
<th>Ethiopia</th>
<th>Rwanda</th>
<th>Burundi</th>
<th>Uganda</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A: QUOTAS AND GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Cabinet – Ethnic Quotas and/or Bias?[^230]</td>
<td>Quotas -- Federal Character Principle applies (use of algorithmic quotas to “equalize” ethnic representation across regions). Requires President to appoint one Minister from each state</td>
<td>No ethnic quotas. However, informal quota system operates in favor of EPRDF coalition parties (e.g., 30/34 Desalegn cabinet posts to EPRDF)</td>
<td>No ethnic quotas. However, biased toward Tutsi for appointments, but does not use quotas as this would emphasize ethnicity</td>
<td>2005 Constitution enshrines ethnicity. Establishes 60%/40% Hutu/Tutsi quotas. Declining adherence to quotas and entire topic now subject to Constitutional Review</td>
<td>No ethnic quotas. However, skewed toward Bagandan and Banyankole (in Southwest) for NRM bias</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bureaucracy – Ethnic Quotas and/or Bias?</th>
<th>Federal Character Principle applies</th>
<th>No ethnic quotas. However, informal quota system operates in favor of EPRDF coalition parties</th>
<th>No ethnic quotas. Meritocracy with Tutsi bias</th>
<th>2005 Constitution calls for quotas, but adherence to quotas declining and now subject to review</th>
<th>No ethnic quotas. Skewed toward Baganda and Banyankole (in Southwest) for NRM bias</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Military – Ethnic Quotas and/or Bias?</td>
<td>Federal Character Principle applies. Historically, officers heavily biased in favor of North/Hausa-Fulani (much less so now)</td>
<td>No ethnic quotas. Multiethnic in principle; skewed toward Tigrayan in practice</td>
<td>No ethnic quotas. Extreme bias toward Tutsi. Independence era military Hutu; In 1993 Arusha Accords, the military was still to be 60% Hutu; Now overwhelmingly Tutsi (but difficult to investigate due to ban on invocation of ethnicity). Thus, the composition of the military has followed ethnic group leadership</td>
<td>50%/50% integration of the military via Arusha 2000 and Pretoria 2003 – although specifics more complicate. Declining adherence to quotas and recent allegations of purge of Tutsi. Thus, the composition of the military has followed ethnic group leadership</td>
<td>No ethnic quotas. Skewed toward Baganda and Banyankole (in Southwest) for heavy NRM bias</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### B: K-12 EDUCATION SYSTEM, LANGUAGE, AND SPEECH

| 4 | Free Universal Basic Education | Yes: 9 years basic, free, compulsory (ages 6-15). 76% primary school completion rate (2010) | Yes: 11 years basic, free, compulsory (ages 5-16). 54% primary school completion rate (2014) | Yes: 9 years basic, free, compulsory (ages 7-16). 67% primary school completion rate (2013) | Yes: 6 years basic, free, compulsory (ages 7-13). 67% primary school completion rate (2014) | Yes: 7 years (6-13) basic, free, compulsory. 56% primary school completion rate (2013). Initial UPE (1997) for up to 4 children per family, but |
| 5 | Language Policy$^{234}$ | Three tiers: English = official language; Hausa/Yoruba/Igbo = primary languages – taught in school; Other languages (over 500 total) = spoken locally | Official multilingualism. (x129) Multi-tiered: Amharic = official language; Several regional working languages including Amharic, Oromo, Tigrinya. In primary school, “first languages” used based on 1995 Constitution; In secondary school and university, English is used. 70-100 total languages. Oromo and Amharic most commonly spoken languages; English less significant than elsewhere due to non-colonial background. EPRDF has encourage | Multi-tiered: National language = Kinyarwanda; Official languages = Kinyarwanda (dominant), English (increasing), French (decreasing), Swahili (new official). Early primary school = Kinyarwanda (and some French which has been reintroduced); Later primary school = English. Total languages = 4 | Multi-tiered: National language = Kirundi; Official languages = Kirundi (dominant), French, English. Kirundi and French in early primary education; French and Kirundi in later primary education. Original version of all texts must be in Kirundi (2005 Constitution). Total languages = 4 | Multi-tiered: Official languages = English and Swahili; Early primary school = relevant local language; Later primary school = English (but English throughout in urban schools); Secondary school includes English and Swahili and in 2019 Chinese being introduced; Roughly 40 spoken languages |

---

234 EPRDF = Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Select comments on Inferred language strategy</th>
<th>Regional allowances for local languages</th>
<th>Encouragement of local languages</th>
<th>English encouraged for economic development; some anti-French language policy due to genocide</th>
<th>Focus on native language as ethnically unifying</th>
<th>Focus on English and Swahili (Luganda not national language); Chinese being introduced; Regional allowances for local languages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Albaugh Language Categories in Education (2004)²³⁵</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C: TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION, RE-EDUCATION AND SPEECH RESTRICTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>of Inquiry regarding violence in Rivers State associated with 2015 elections (Governor Amaechi)</th>
<th>(since 2007); ICTR for Rwanda (1994 – 2015); Highly controversial Ga gaca Courts</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Re-education Programs?²³⁷</td>
<td>Yes – long history (2005, 2016, 2018 programs) but limited</td>
<td>Yes – extensive. Ingando Camps; Youth Re-Education and Solidarity Camps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No – but Unicef Ubuntu Camps and Reconciliation Centers; and regroupment camps for Hutus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Somewhat – Chaka MChaka (“year after year”) military and political ideology training camps; LRA Conflict Rehabilitation Camps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Strong restrictions on ethnic reference. “Divisionism” is a crime. Ethnicity banned from discussion. Also, negationism, trivialization, and revisionism are punishable by law. These policies support broader ethnic unity-theme objectives, accompanied by myriad slogans: “There is no ethnicity in Rwanda,” “We are all Rwandans now,” “One Rwanda for all Rwandans,” etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Not restricted. Can talk about and make humorous comments about ethnicity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes. Regulations to suppress sectionalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. NARRATIVES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>11</strong> Major Effort to Manage Ethnic Narratives and Use of History[^289]</td>
<td>Some. Emphasizes that diversity need not be negative force, but indeed can be powerful if dealt with meaningfully. Important to acknowledge and harness diversity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Some. Dominant narratives deal with dangers of ethnic subjugation. Many analysts claim Abiy Ahmed needs new narrative(s)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Numerous and wide-ranging initiatives. National narratives and educational narratives are pro-Tutsi ideological narratives. Examples: No Dual Genocide Thesis but rather, “The Genocide of the Tutsis”; cannot name cities with names reminiscent of genocide; annual day of genocide commemoration; official narrative on ethnic strife is that it was introduced by Belgium in the colonial era, and therefore the solution is to return to pre-colonial ethos of, integrated national harmony. Observation that memory is heavily managed in Rwanda, but some skeptical of motive – remembrance or support of authoritarian regime</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes but less broad and much less controlled than Rwanda. Peace curriculum has been added to education system. The creation of alternative “Mythico-histories” – creates cognitive dissonance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes. For example, education curriculum promotes ethnic history but emphasizes pan-African versus European themes rather than ethnic-specific identity and values</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
There are a number of important settlements. Quota policy—in the cabinet, the bureaucracy and the military (6/1, 6/2, and 6/3, respectively)—differs significantly across countries. Narrative management (6/11) is most elaborate where there is minority rule. The same is true for truth and reconciliation initiatives and for bans on ethnic references (6/10).

When considered as a whole, many of the themes that apply to structural drivers also apply to ethnic settlements. For example, there are tremendous differences between countries regarding their orientation towards specific ethnic settlements; countries tend to cluster around common groups of ethnic settlements; and there is large variation in the breadth of ethnic settlements across countries. These themes are explored in the next two sections.

Having reviewed the modern history of each country and used this review as the basis for chronicling the structural drivers and ethnic settlements in each country, this thesis now moves to the analysis of the connections between drivers and the settlements.
Chapter IV

Analytical Section Three: Testing the Hypothesis at the Aggregate Level

The focus will now turn to identifying the linkages between structural drivers and ethnic settlements—how do the former shape the latter. This analysis will be done on two levels (see Exhibit One below): linkages between amalgamated drivers and amalgamated settlements at the country level (this section); and linkages between individual drivers and individual settlements at the cross-country level (next section). Both levels are necessary to understand and interpret the linkages between drivers and settlements.

An example of the latter (discrete analysis) would be to assess how the ethnic composite of a country (1/15) tends to be correlated with whether the country’s constitutional philosophy is consociational or integrative (4/4). An example of the former would be to assess how Nigeria’s overall mix of drivers and settlements compares with Burundi’s. This latter (amalgamated) perspective is crucial for two reasons: just as there are patterns and trends that yield insights at the discrete level; there are also patterns and trends that operate at the amalgamated country level. It is important to understand these patterns and trends. Equally important, one cannot meaningfully conduct the discrete level analysis without understanding the amalgamated perspective. To understand the meaning of an ethnic settlement, one must understand the motivation behind it—what is this settlement trying to achieve? For example, both Ethiopia and Rwanda have established elaborate local governance structures (4/29) and governance mechanisms (4/30), but an
essential question becomes what motivates them? Is it the desire to promote genuine, inclusive democracy, or the perceived need to repress the populace in order to maintain minority rule? During the discrete level analysis, if one were merely to observe that a certain structural driver was correlated with local governance, they would completely miss the point, because the significance of ethnic settlements requires an understanding of the motivation and context behind them.

Regarding approach, there are several important points. First, it is important to conduct the amalgamated country-level analysis first, and conduct the discrete driver-settlement analysis last, so that the latter is informed by the former. Second, this section involves the simplification of significant complexity. Third, because of the fact that an objective of this section is to assess the motivations behind ethnic settlements, subjectivity is introduced, because motivations are not always clear nor always singular. Thus, analysts may vary on their views of the purpose of each country’s ethnic settlements. For example, are Nigeria’s informal zoning agreements (5/2) that call for the alternation of political rule between North and South, substantive and authentic in the pursuit of ethnic inclusion, or are they cosmetic and manipulative in the service of perpetuating elite rule (there are analysts in both camps)? This analysis will offer an interpretation of the data, but because there are myriad perspectives amongst experts, those offered here are certainly not definitive; instead, they are merely deemed to be one plausible interpretation. It is important to re-emphasize that it is not possible to avoid the subjective, interpretive nature of this exercise because one cannot meaningfully assess the connections between drivers and settlements without understanding the motivations and purposes behind the
settlements. Fourth, it is essential to be cautious about forming judgments about a country’s choice of strategies for its ethnic settlements. It is all too easy to state that a certain country’s amalgamation of ethnic settlements are problematic if they do not authentically promote inclusive democracy, but it is possible that there may be a sound rationale for why democracy should be avoided in specific countries and at specific times. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to judge ethnic settlements or determine which composites are better than others; instead, the thesis merely seeks to diagnose the relationships between structural drivers and ethnic settlements.

Figure 1. Aggregate national and discrete perspectives.

Finally, regarding presentation, each country is discussed in turn, first by discussing the regime’s objectives with respect to its ethnic settlements—what is the
regime trying to achieve with its unique assortment of settlements and how do these objectives relate to its structural drivers? To evaluate this, regime objectives will be divided into three categories, based on the paradigm of Mohamed Salih, who asserts that there is a triple quest of objectives in Africa: peace and stability, economic development, and inclusionary democracy. Each regime adopts an approach to deal with all three objectives, but the prioritization of these objectives varies considerably across countries—one might emphasize stability and development, and see democracy as something to merely pay lip service to; another might make authentic democracy a high priority; and so on. It is useful to think of the progression of the process of developing ethnic settlements in the following simple manner: a nation’s history gives rise to a set of structural drivers, which then influence a regime’s objectives for its ethnic settlements, which then lead to a mix of ethnic settlements in support of these objectives. Note that when the text cites a data item from one of the data tables, the footnote from the data table will be deemed to suffice for the text citation as well (i.e., the same data will not be footnoted twice).

Nigeria

Regime objectives for ethnic settlements are as follows:

Peace and Stability

Nigeria’s history and structural drivers make stability a primary concern. Nigeria has a tripodal ethnic pattern (1/14), which is inherently unstable. Mustapha explains, “Nigeria has a tripodal ethnic structure because each of the three majority ethnic groups
constituted a pole in the competition for political and economic resources . . . Tripodal ethnic structures are inherently unstable . . . Each leg of the tripod lives in mortal fear of being shut out by an alliance of the other two.”

Nigeria has a multitude of ethnic groups (1/16), leading to intense ethnic fragmentation (1/17). The political power differential between the big three ethnic groups and all of the others has created a new schism—between the big three ethnic groups and all of the rest. Anugwom explains, “The fear of marginalization, whether real or perceived, is anchored in the belief that ethnic orientation determines one’s access to crucial resources and power. . . . Whereas ethnic rivalry and schism had previously been between the three dominant ethnic groups; since the late eighties, the minority ethnic groups have started to redefine the ethnic terrain of Nigeria schism between the big three and all other ethnic groups.”

Nigeria’s schisms (1/21) are reinforcing. The three major schisms (ethnicity, region, and religion) overlap, leading to heightened risk of conflict.

Nigeria lacks a strong ethos of nationalism (in part because it is a fabricated colonial state (2/1)), which further accentuates ethnic tensions, as they are not ameliorated by nationalism. This recalls the earlier quote from Uwalaka, “Nigeria has remained a political space, with no true national identity, no national consciousness, no national commitment, and no true national loyalty.” Okpalike adds, “. . . in Nigeria, tribal fraternity is stronger than national unity; sectional interests attract more dependable and credible loyalty than national programs. The average Nigerian is more at the tribe than the nation.”
Colonial-imposed federalism established conditions at the dawn of independence for ongoing ethnic conflict. Ihonvbere writes, “Indeed, politics became the only game in town, it was a game played with deadly seriousness for the winner won everything and the loser lost everything.” Nigeria’s federal system was established by the colonial power and it was ethno-regional in nature (4/28). Jacob observes, “The years between 1952 and 1966 brought change in the political culture of the country, transforming the three regions into three political entities. Thus, the struggle for independence was reduced to the quest for ethnic dominance.”

There was an immediate secession attempt (3/3A). The Igbo secession movement gave rise to the deadly Biarfan War, precipitated military intervention, and enshrined peace and stability as a paramount objective for subsequent regimes.

Failure to adhere to ethnic settlements has contributed to the rise of internal militias/threats. Boko Haram’s origins reside, in part, on Goodluck Jonathan’s 2011 election victory, depriving the North of its implicitly promised regime secession (5/2).

Economic Development

Naturally, economic development is a priority, but Nigeria’s economic situation is strong relative to the sample.

_Nigeria’s GDP per capita (1/2) is close to three times higher than any other country in the sample._ It also has high inequality (1/4) and has had even more so historically (with a Gini-Index exceeding 50 in the mid-1990s)(1/5).
Nigeria has oil (1/8), which accounts for 70% of government revenue. Historically, although the British ruled through the Hausa-Fulani, the South has been economically advantaged, in part due to the regional location of oil (1/10). Oil changes the ethnic calculus in myriad ways, e.g., oil is distributed unevenly geographically (1/10), which leads to challenging questions regarding the distribution of oil proceed. There is a tendency to nationalize oil profits but allow externalities (e.g., waste site cleanup) to be financed regionally, exacerbating ethnic tensions. There is an oil curse, with ethnic implications. The presence of oil strengthens the currency which damages agricultural exporters, which disproportionately hurts the more agricultural North. An excessive focus on oil can retard economic diversification and yet maintaining its centrality is perceived politically as key for stability and for achieving international prominence. The fact that the overwhelming majority (roughly 90%) of oil revenues are controlled and distributed at the national level reduces the relative power of the regions (where ethnic group authority is highest) and creates the “national cake psychosis,” whereby ethnic groups compete for access for state influence, in order to ensure their right to “eat from the cake.”

Oil and the manner in which it is distributed (5/10) are also drivers of inequalities (1/4), ethnic competition and ethnic grievances. Osaghae notes, “Oil has brought tremendous wealth to the country’s economy, but the wealth is concentrated in the hands of the country’s elite who have access to state coffers. The vast majority of the populace remains poor and deprived, and the Niger Delta region—the source of the wealth—remains one of the poorest and most underdeveloped areas of the country.” And Ehwarieime notes that the ascendance of oil by the time of the Second Republic (1979-1983) changed the
political economy from one of agriculture controlled by ethnic elites at the regional level to one of oil controlled by elites at the national level. In short, oil shifted the locus of power to the national level and exacerbated the class dimension of conflict.254

Inclusionary Democracy

Progress toward a more liberal democracy is a genuine objective in Nigeria. *Nigeria has a consociational constitution (4/4).* There are 91 registered political parties (5/4). Freedom House assigns it a 6/8 for combined political party equity and opportunity to increase support (5/6). Nonetheless, the dominant two parties (PDP, APC) control 322 of the 360 seats in the House of Representatives (4/23). Still, its Democracy Index is relatively high for the sample and rising, and is now at 44.4 (the second highest in our sample)—the Economist Intelligence Unit deems it “a hybrid regime” (4/6). The military has not been involved in governance for two decades (3/11, 4/9) and there has been peaceful transfer of power via the ballot.

Summary (the interplay of the aforementioned regime objectives)

As discussed, Nigeria faces myriad issues associated with the management of ethnic conflict and maintaining national stability; the presence of oil supports economic development but introduces numerous factors into the calculus of establishing ethnic settlements; and democracy is a genuine priority (unlike some other countries in the sample). All three objectives (stability, development, and democracy) are legitimate.
Thus, one would expect Nigeria’s ethnic settlements to be designed to simultaneously advance all three objectives.

However, there is an interesting conundrum that complicates the design of ethnic settlements in Nigeria. As noted above, it is important to build nationalism within a country without a pre-colonial history and a fragmented ethnic mix. Consequently, unevenly distributed regional oil profits are nationalized and re-distributed in order (in part) to build national unity; but the centralization of oil revenues, in turn, increases federal and elite power; and this militates against the objective of ethnic political empowerment via federalism. Thus, in a sense, the goals of nationalism, oil revenue management, and ethnic empowerment through federalism operate at cross-purposes. Nigeria’s ethnic settlements thus reflect all three objectives, but in ways that are at times complex, reflecting the inherent tensions between the objectives.

Implications for Actual Ethnic Settlements

Nigeria has instituted a number of ostensibly progressive power-sharing agreements, but interpreting the purpose of these agreements is complex. The president needs to earn 25% of the vote in two-thirds of Nigeria’s 36 states (5/8). Its presidential elections are deemed reasonably sound by Freedom House (4/20). That being said, the legislative branch and the judicial branch have limited authority and independence (4/22). In addition, Nigeria forgoes the opportunity to utilize proportional representation (5/7), which would increase ethnic representation, and diminish the big three versus all other ethnic group schisms.255
There is an unwritten agreement (‘zoning’) calling for the alternation of power between North and South after every two four-year terms (5/2). The federal character principle calls for significant ethnic representation in myriad institutional entities including the cabinet (6/1), the bureaucracy (6/2) and the military (6/3). In addition, the complex derivation formula determines the amount of oil profit to be allocated to each region, based on a number of criteria (5/22).

These (and other) ethnic settlements are often referred to collectively as “power-sharing” agreements. Some see these as genuine attempts to further inclusion, pluralism and the move towards democracy in Nigeria. Others see them in more ambivalent terms. Orji states, “The tendency is for the ruling elite in Nigeria to converge under one or a few national parties, while much of the activities of these parties and the process of national decision-making are based on elite horse-trading without the involvement of the people. . . The situation breeds one-partyism, suppresses opposition/alternative viewpoints, and foments what is popularly referred to as ‘Godfatherism’ [parceling out parts of the state to a group of elites]. . . . The other problem associated with power-sharing in Nigeria is that it sustains the ‘rhetoric of marginalization’ and creates a ‘dependency syndrome’ [supporting the philosophy that groups should view the state as a source of largesse].”

In spite of these criticisms, Orji concludes by stating, “The above challenges notwithstanding, power-sharing has great possibilities for managing conflicts in Nigeria’s ethnicized public sphere.”

Likewise, the federal system can be seen as having mixed and countervailing purposes. As Campbell notes, the original British-bequeathed federation, based on three
regions, implicitly solidified the pre-eminence of the big three ethnic groups.\textsuperscript{258} Since then, the number of regions has been expanded to 36 plus the federal region (4/27). Many analysts believe that while this appears to increase the devolution of power, by splitting up large ethnic groups and regions, it, in fact, diminishes the power or each and heightens federal power. Saha notes that it also led conflict to be seen more as multi-state rather than multi-ethnic terms.\textsuperscript{259} Nigeria’s federalism is top-down—based on a subdivision of the country (rather than a bottom-up amalgamation of independent polities) and it is revenue-distributive.\textsuperscript{260} In light of this top-down, ever-expanding and thus regional power-diluting, centrally driven redistributing form of federalism, some analysts go so far as to state that Nigeria is a “unitary state in federal disguise.”\textsuperscript{261} Suberu is concerned about a polarizing, conflictive and distributive federalism, but nevertheless believes that federalism still Nigeria’s best hope.\textsuperscript{262}

Nigeria’s ethnic settlements authentically promote all three objectives—stability, development and democracy. In addition, they reflect a duality of intent. On the one hand, they serve to consolidate power federally (in part due to the exigencies of oil revenue management) and facilitate elite rule; on the other hand, they also support genuine democratization.

Ethiopia

Regime objective for ethnic settlements are as follows:
Peace and Stability

Maintaining stability is an essential motivation for the ethnic settlements in Ethiopia.

Ethiopia also has an unstable multipodal ethnic structure, with four primary ethnic groups (the first two being by far the largest) – Amhara, Oromo, Tigray, and Somali (1/14, 1/15). Like Nigeria, its primary schisms are largely reinforcing (1/21), with a fundamental Amhara/North versus Oromo/South divide, compounded by a highland/peasant/Christian and lowland/pastoralist/Orthodox divide, as well as a Christian North versus more Islamic South and East. It also has highly conflictual histories with Eritrea (with which a peace treaty was recently signed) and the Ogaden region. In addition, there have been secession threats: These have emerged from multiple channels— for Oromo secession (from the Oromo Liberation Front); for the Somali’s to secede (via the Ogaden National Liberation Front); and more recently from the Sidama people’s (of the Southern Nations and Nationalities and People’s Regional State).

*Ethiopia’s colonialism was domestic.* Gudina, referencing Addis Hiwot, views Ethiopia’s process of state formation as “internal colonialism,” whose primary dimension was the subjugation of the Oromo South by the Amhara North, a process that involved land appropriation and settler rule (*neftegna*), and that represents a form of “feudal serfdom.” Balema adds the Menelik II effectively participated in the “Scramble for Africa.” Jalata and Schaffer refer to the conquest of the Oromo as involving genocide. All of this has contributed to powerful, enduring ethnic tensions and grievances in Ethiopia.
Ethiopia has a reasonable sense of nationalism, in part due to its successful defeat of Italian colonization attempt. Ethiopia, then, is unique in the sample, as it is characterized by domestic colonialism and the defeat of European colonialism, and this reality has implications for both ethnic tension and nationalism.

Economic Development

Economic growth has to be a top priority in Ethiopia. Ethiopia has an extremely low GDP per capita (1/2), making development a huge priority. Unlike Nigeria, it does not have significant high-value natural resources (although some oil exploration is underway) (1/8). However, it has had very high GDP per capita growth rates (1/3), contributing to regime legitimacy and international donor favor. The economy was transitioned from a socialist command economy (under the Derg) to a more market-based economy (under the EPRDF), although many argue that it is still heavily influenced by socialist/communist principles. Thus, at least until recently, economic improvement has taken precedence over political liberalization. Abbink writes (in 2017), “The regime anchors its legitimacy in state or party-led national economic development and service delivery. GDP growth and working toward middle-income country status by 2025 is the ideal, . . . These plans, incidentally, have no political aims regarding rule-of-law and representative democracy. Accountability is seen in terms of economic performance.”

Inclusionary Democracy

A common narrative has been that Ethiopia suppresses democracy, and in many ways is a single-party state.
The Economist, in 2018 (reflecting the tumultuous Daselegn era), evaluates it as “authoritarian” (4/6) and Freedom House (also in 2018) gives it its lowest score for political rights (4/31). Its 2015 presidential elections were deemed to be unsound (4/20), and its legislative elections received the lowest ranking by Freedom House (4/22). In the 2015 elections, the EPRDF won 500 of 547 seats and its allies won the remaining 47 (4/23). Larry Diamond, writing in 2015, states that Ethiopia cannot “be said to be a democracy at all.” And Abbink in 2017 writes, “It is rather to be considered an instance of an emerging neo-autocratic oligarchy, a new, stratified society where a well-entrenched, economically based party-elite has secured power over society in the name of national interest, and prepares and executes policies by itself, ‘not hindered’ by contesting parties or critical observers.” Abbink also asserts that “The eternal ‘transition’ [to democracy] that the regime refers to seems a kind of pretext to maintain power ‘in perpetuity.’” Thus, the Ethiopian rhetoric paying homage to movement toward democratization has generally been seen in cynical terms.

However, from a perspective that includes both the overall sweep of Ethiopian history, and recent transpirings (Abiy Ahmed), one can argue that there is both historical momentum for, and recent genuine movement in, the direction of liberalism.

It is also important to recognize the broad progression in mode of political rule (3/9) that has characterized Ethiopia since the late 19th century: from imperial colonialism (Menelik II, etc.) to monarchy (Selassie) to authoritarian military (“barracks”) socialism, to transitional governance to ethnic coalition governance (EPRDF), representing a steady (if slow) move toward greater political liberalism. Balema summarizes this trend by
noting that Ethiopia is attempting to move toward democracy on a monarchical and military tradition. During this evolution, Ethiopia transitioned from an assimilationist approach to ethnic groups (under Amhara regimes) to consociational approach (under the EPRDF). Also, Aalen makes the important observation that it was an ethnic coalition that overthrew the Derg, establishing ethnicity as a force that can be positive, and portending a governmental system that enshrines ethnic identification.

Abiy Ahmed represents a major aspirational step in this continued path toward liberalism, although it is too early to ascertain the full impacts of his leadership.

One would expect many of Ethiopia’s existing ethnic settlements to reflect a more regressive past relative to the pursuit of inclusionary democracy, but others to reflect a potentially more progressive future. Schaefer asks the key question of whether Ethiopia is truly committed to democracy.

Summary (the interplay of the aforementioned regime objectives)

Ethiopia has myriad issues associated with peace and stability and major economic development needs. Until recently, talk of the importance of inclusionary democracy was widely seen as inauthentic, and with the first two objectives (stability and development) being the primary motivators for Ethiopia’s ethnic settlements. However, there are signs that this is changing. Accordingly, it may be the case that Ethiopia is transitioning into a new profile of motivations for ethnic settlements—where stability, development, and democracy are all central (somewhat akin to Nigeria). It is too early to tell whether this
vision will become an enduring reality, or whether this is merely an aspirational moment, destined to be unable to withstand long-running, more regressive historical forces.

Implications for Actual Ethnic Settlements

Many of Ethiopia’s ethnic political settlements are seen in cynical terms. The elaborate local governance system (4/29) (comprised of 15 administrative regions, 103 sub-regions and 505 districts) is seen by Kronvoll and Hagmann as a vehicle for the EPRDF to institute local control (4/30). Indeed, in many local districts, the party and state apparatus are seen as being one and the same.\(^{276}\) Ethiopia uses FPTP elections instead of PR (5/7), which gives the four primary ethnic groups of the EPRDF a considerable advantage. There are also no term limits for the prime minister (5/1) (although Abiy Ahmed has announced plans to establish them). There has been intimidation used to influence elections.

Others are somewhat more oriented toward promoting inclusionary democracy. On the other hand, political parties are legal (there are 81 registered parties) (5/4), although there are restrictions on party activity and election intimidation (5/5). Parties that do not participate in successive elections can be banned (5/5). Ethiopia’s language policy calls for official multilingualism (6/5), and while Amharic is the working language (Article 5, Section 2), the Constitution allows states to select their own official language and the EPRDF encourages the speaking of local languages. John Young, writing in 1998, observes: “Official encouragement given to indigenous languages in the schools and
public bureaucracies is fostering the formation of local identities and as a result, a cultural renaissance is taking place in many parts of the country.”

Ethiopia’s federalism is ethno-regional, and it is asymmetrical, operating in two tiers: five of the nine districts have federal or semi-federal status; the others do not. Lahra Smith writes that “Ethnic Federalism is a unique effort to harness the democratic potential of dual citizenship identities in Ethiopia.”

The Constitution provides the right to secede to ethnic groups, via Article 39 (although some say that this right is somewhat circumspect because of the difficulties in executing the clause). It also invokes ethnic groups as the Constitutional entity to be governed, rather than individuals. Mengie (who is negative on Ethiopia’s specific model of federalism) notes the connections between Ethiopia’s ethnic federalism, Article 39, and the “unit of governance” (ethnic groups rather than individuals) in Ethiopia: “Even if there are many multicultural federal systems around the world, it is only Ethiopia that is strictly following a purely ethnic federal system. In Ethiopia, there is a divided sovereignty between ethnic groups and, thus, one cannot talk about the sovereignty of the people of Ethiopia as a whole (Preamble and Article 8 of the current constitution of Ethiopia). The constitution has also granted the unconditional right of secession to each ethnic group (nationality).  

The 1995 Constitution also reduces the power of the historically dominant Amhara, established a coalition of previously antagonistic ethnic-based parties, transitioned power to the Tigray, and allowed further power rotation first to Daselegn (Wolayta) and then to Abiy Ahmed (Oromo/mixed) (4/14). There have been no
transfers of power via election, and yet there have been peaceful inter-ethnic transfers of leadership power. Ethiopia is also changing its economic systems in a more liberal direction (4/34).

In summary, the ethnic settlements reflect the dual interpretive nature of the situation in Ethiopia. There is, on the one hand, much repression of broad-based ethnic representation in Ethiopia’s alleged democracy. On the other hand, the federal system offers promise and some ethnic settlements are progressive. Nine factors, all referenced above, may indicate a fundamental change in Ethiopia’s orientation toward ethnic settlements: the long-term trend toward more liberal modes of governance; the fact that ethnicity served a progressive role in the overthrow of the repressive Derg regime, perhaps fomenting a partial re-imagining of the constructive potential of ethnicity in the Ethiopian psyche; the 1995 Constitution reduced the prominence of the historically-dominant Amhara; the country is transitioning to a more liberal economic system; a legitimate ethnic-federal system has been established; progressive policies are being implemented (e.g., encouraging the use of local languages) and others are being discussed (e.g., the implementation of Prime Ministerial term limits); the EPRDF has allowed inter-ethnic leadership rotation within the party; there has been a peace treaty signed with Eritrea. Thus, like Nigeria (and unlike the other three countries in our sample), there are indications that Ethiopia is moving (albeit slowly) to a position where it is fair to say that it is pursuing a mix of all three of the noted regime objectives, including democracy. This positive and constructive aura around ethnic settlements in Ethiopia’s recent “liberation” makes Ethiopia stand out relative to the other countries in the sample. There appears to be
some momentum for the constructive utilization of ethnicity in pushing for a more liberal political system. Nevertheless, there are major stability and development objectives that militate against full democracy and ethnic recognition. And this leads to Ethiopia’s paradox, as described by Aalen: to give each ethnic group the right to govern its own affairs but doing so within the context of a somewhat authoritarian state.\footnote{282} It is important to recognize this paradox, not merely as a system design flaw, but as a reflection of countervailing objectives, given rise to by structural factors. Ethiopia has simultaneous, conflicting realities, and consequently a conflicted political system. Gudina notes the inherent contradiction of pursuing federalism in the context of an authoritarian, de facto single-party state.\footnote{283} It is important to note that Ethiopia’s paradox is compounded by international donor factors. Ethiopia is supported by the international community for a variety of reasons, including its movement away from the socialist Derg regime, its relative stability, its usefulness as a bulwark against East African security threats, and its high GDP per capita growth rates. According to Young, this leads to an “unwillingness of Western governments and agencies seriously to challenge the government on a range of human rights abuses and the growing role of the party in the economy.”\footnote{284}

Rwanda

Regime objectives for ethnic settlements is as follows:
Peace and Stability

Stability is the primary priority in Rwanda. Ethnic instability was introduced via colonialism, and once it was, it was highly combustible. Prior to the colonial era, Rwanda was a pre-existing polity with ethnic stratification and limited ethnic tension/violence (2/1). Isabirye and Mahmoudi write, “Although the Tutsi overlords had exercised political hegemony over the Hutu for generations, which may have created a few tensions between the two, both groups had coexisted with each other through intermarriage.” It has a highly skewed bi-ethnic ethnic composite (1/14, 1/15) with tremendous population density (1/13). Marijnen and van der Lijn state that subsistence agrarian economies with high density are especially prone to violent conflict, in part due to the propensity for land disputes. Belgium ruled via the minority ethnic group (2/5) using indirect rule (2/3)—a phenomenon that, according to Ibeanu, tends to give rise to later ethnic politics. Rwanda was ruled via a divide-and-rule approach (2/3) via its minority ethnic group, using indirect rule that gives rise to ethnic politics. Minority Tutsi rule was replaced by majority Hutu rule in the independence era (via the Hutu Social Revolution, which saw the abolishment of the Tutsi Monarchy). This led to reciprocal resentments—Hutu toward Tutsi during colonial rule; Tutsi toward Hutu during the independence era. Also, the French came to see the Hutu as well-positioned to support their interests, and thus provided significant military aid during the prolonged period of post-independence Hutu rule. In short, the colonial era and the independence era introduced immense ethnic instability in Rwanda.

Subsequently, there has been regular violence (3/3) and massive peak violence during the genocide (3/4). It is important to note that Rwandan ethnic violence has
extended outside its borders to, most notably, Zaire (and later the DRC) to pursue the Hutu threat to refugee camps (1/22), a reality that heightens the need for domestic ethnic settlements that serve to promote stability.

In short, in the runup to independence and the three-plus decades afterward, Rwanda was a cauldron of instability and violence, precipitating the need for momentous ethnic settlements to provide stability and end this violence.

Economic Development

Economic development is the number two priority in Rwanda. Rwanda has a low GDP per capita (1/2). However, it has recently had very high GDP per capita growth rates of close to 5% per year (1/3). There are no major natural resources (1/7), although oil exploration is underway (1/8). The economy is a mix of capitalist and state planning (4/34), and is mostly free (4/35) (where it far exceeds the other sample countries), and is seeking to transform itself into a middle-income country, often referencing the Singaporean development model. The economic freedoms, growth rates, and development vision figure prominently in the ethnic settlement calculus, as they imply an economic development focus that requires peace and stability, allowing inclusionary democracy to be subverted for these other objectives.

Inclusionary Democracy

Genuine democracy is not a priority in Rwanda; indeed, it is seen as inconsistent with the other two objectives and therefore as something that must be avoided. In
Rwanda, ongoing minority Tutsi rule is deemed as mandatory by the current regime. Enforced rule through an ethnic group that is outnumbered by a 6:1 ratio is a perilous proposition. Genuine democratization could raise concerning prospects, not only for loss of political power but for violence. Saha notes that Kagame determined that the only way to ensure Tutsi survival is to stay in power indefinitely. This recalls the aforementioned quote from Mamdani, “The minority fears democracy. The majority fears justice.” It should be noted that the recent events in Burundi, in which ethnic settlements that protect the minority Tutsi are being dismantled, can only serve to reinforce Kagame’s convictions about the importance of retaining power. In short, democracy is perceived to be a multi-layered threat to Rwanda’s minority regime.

In addition, the ruling Tutsi minority is a small, elite subset of Tutsis. Ansoms notes, “Following the genocide, Rwanda has been ruled by a predominantly Anglophone Tutsi elite, who grew up in exile, mostly in cities or in cattle-farming areas. After their military victory in 1994, the new elite installed themselves in Kigali.”

To ensure elite minority rule, a large military role is required. Jones notes that the maintenance of the rule of an elite minority requires co-option of the institutions and an outsized role for the military: “The institutions of Rwanda have been co-opted by the RPF. . . . The military is not an autonomous body, but rather part of the RPF elite. . . . The military serves three functions—the core institution of the implementation of state policy; the space for socialization of the elite; a link to the citizenry. . . . It is the organizational weapon at the heart of the state.” And Straus and Waldorf add, “With such a narrow—and narrowing—base of support . . . the RPF’s paramount concern is to retain tight control
of the political arena and population in the short term. . . . In short, the RPF’s choice of repression and transformation conforms to a political logic of survival given its narrow base of support.”

It is also worth noting that the possibility of maintaining prolonged minority rule (4/13) is perhaps partially reliant on the leadership of “charismatic, strongman” type leader (4/10), like Kagame.

The suppression of democracy (discussed in the “Ethnic Settlements” sub-section that follows) is facilitated by the fact that democracy has been discredited historically. Hayman notes that there was insufficient indigenous support for the democratization efforts of the early 1990s, which precipitated its failure. Much of the pressure to democratize was from outside donors, including the United States. This failed process was followed by the genocide. In addition, as noted above, with the 1961 abolition of the Tutsi monarchy, Rwanda became independent as a republic with the Hutu in power. The Hutu perpetrated violence against the Tutsi during their rule of the republic (3/3). Hayman concludes regarding Rwandans’ experience with democracy: “Consequently, for many people, democracy is associated with ethnic-based violence.”

The International Community has become complicit in the suppression of democracy. The “Genocide Credit,” the phenomenon whereby the Rwandan regime exploits the guilt of the international community in creating the conditions in which the genocide occurred, is regularly invoked by the Rwandan regime. Hayman clarifies, “Guilt constituted a major reason for coming to Rwanda’s aid in the aftermath of the genocide, and the RPF-led government has been apt at using this ‘genocide credit’ when faced with
external criticism. As far as the RPF is concerned, by its failure to prevent or stop the genocide and its provision of aid to camps where the guilty were fed alongside the innocent—in quantities which dwarfed aid to Rwanda itself—the international community lost its right to criticize the new regime.”

Reyntjens goes further and suggest that the international community, driven by the same guilt, did not sufficiently criticize Rwanda for its intervention in Zaire (later DRC), where they assert it committed crimes against humanity. Numerous analysts have commented on the international community’s misguided support for Rwanda’s elections. Rachel Hayman cites Filip Reyntjens as commenting on an EU report on 2008 legislative elections as, “a fake report on fake elections.”

Summary (the interplay of the aforementioned regime objectives)

In Rwanda, stability, continued minority leadership (which is directly linked to stability in the prevailing regime narrative) and economic growth are existential priorities; inclusionary democracy is not only not a priority it is to be avoided. Yet democracy is important cosmetically, to maintain favor with the international community, which is predisposed to support the regime as a function of its progress in achieving stability and economic growth. Given this mix of regime objectives, we expect Rwanda to generate ethnic settlements designed to emphasize peace and stability, economic development, and the suppression of democracy and the conditions that may demand it (e.g., ethnic consciousness) in order to perpetuate minority rule.
Implications for Ethnic Settlements

Consistent with these expectations, Rwanda operates a de facto single-party state. Reyntjens argues that the RPF pays lip service to democracy (4/5) and supposedly allows political parties (5/4) but that it both represses and co-opts them (5/5), with the RPF becoming a de facto single-party state (4/8). There are now no term limits (5/1) and Kagame has been in power for 25 years (4/11). Elections are not fair – Freedom House gave the 2019 elections a 2/12 due to pro-RPF biases (5/9), and Political Party Equity a 1/8 in part due to repression (5/6). Kagame earned an absurd 99% of the vote in the last election (4/21). Thus, Rwanda is an authoritarian, single-party state with cosmetic elections.

Its ethnic settlements are designed to minimize ethnic consciousness, arguably a prerequisite for perpetrating non-democratic minority rule. Rwanda, consistent with the objective of managing ethnic consciousness, has an integrative, not consociational constitution (4/4). The Constitution bans “divisionism” (inciting ethnic antagonisms; 4/2). There are speech restrictions on ethnic references, and it is illegal to engage in historical “revisionism” and “negationism” (6/10). Myriad narratives are used to influence the perception of ethnicity in the nation’s history. The teaching of democracy is handled carefully in Rwanda. Indeed, as Sarah Freedman and her colleagues discovered, the RPF was not willing to allow democratic teaching of history in secondary schools,301 a finding corroborated by other analysts.302

Regarding language policy (6/5, 6/6), Rwanda temporarily moved away from the use of French and toward English (and it has joined the Commonwealth), in part because
of the French role in supporting Hutu rule in the post-independence era. There are also speech regulations (6/10A). As reported by Lischer in 2010, the government carefully crafts its messaging, including, for example, the use of the terminology, “...the genocide of the Tutsi” rather than “the Rawandan genocide.”303 In an ingenious but manipulative narrative, Kagame argues that prior to Belgian rule, there was no significant ethnic conflict; and that it was unbridled democracy that was, in fact, the primary motivator of the genocide.

Thus, Kagame is implicitly arguing that by being cautious regarding democratization, he is not instituting repressive measures to prolong minority rule; but rather returning Rwanda to its natural, harmonious, pre-colonial conditions.304 There is also a regular invocation of pan-ethnic slogans—“One Rwanda for all Rwandans,” and the like.305

Rwanda’s ethnic settlements are voluminous and reinforcing, in keeping with the need to perpetuate minority rule and suppress ethnic awareness and thwart ethnic mobilization. Rwanda does not utilize an ethnic quota system (6/1, 6/2, 6/3), as this would invoke ethnicity, inappropriate for an integrationist (as opposed to consociational) constitution.

The military is extremely skewed toward Tutsi personnel (6/3). It has utilized Igando re-education camps (6/9) and gagaca courts as one of several truth and reconciliation mechanisms, which include a National Unity and Reconciliation Commission and a National Commission for the Fight against Genocide (6/11). Many see
the gagaca courts as structurally flawed for several related reasons, all discussed by Silva-Leander:

In this respect, the fact that the Gagaca system is, unlike South Africa’s or Chile’s Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, not being implemented by a democratic government, or even minimal conditions of political freedom, increases the risk that it could be perceived as yet another element of a repressive system imposed by the government to control the population, thus reinforcing the sentiment of injustice and the opposition between ‘victims’ and ‘perpetrators’, ‘victors’ and ‘defeated’. The government’s blanket refusal to use the Gacaca system to try crimes committed by the RPF against Hutu populations during and after the genocide can only contribute to strengthening the impression of a ‘victors’ justice.’ The government argues that crimes committed by the RPF should not be tried through the Gacaca system so as to avoid creating a moral equivalence between these crimes and the crimes of genocide. However, as there is currently no alternative forum [writing in 2008] where such crimes could be examined in a comprehensive and systematic way, this creates a de facto moral ambivalence springing from perceived impunity of crimes committed by the RPF.

Rwanda has an elaborate system of local governance (4/29) and numerous local-level initiatives (4/30), but these are generally interpreted in cynical terms. These include the Imigudugu Programs to promote agricultural productivity via land consolidation to create scale and crop concentration, and the Imihigo System to supposedly promote decentralization. But Ingelaere see this cynically: “Under the imihigo system, all Rwandan households and communities are now accountable to appointed political leaders and ultimately to the president. This is the inverse of democratic governance where the leadership is accountable to the citizenry. Imihigo is meant to promote courage and voice; instead, it may be generating unspoken fear and resentment.” Similarly, Ingelaere states that many of the RPF changes to the structure of local governance (e.g., replacing communes with districts) are duplicitous: “. . . under the guise of ‘decentralization,’ the RPF has actually expanded the central state’s political reach down to the local level.
Crucial to understanding this process is the fact that locally elected representatives have been displaced by centrally appointed authorities. Not surprisingly, then, accountability in local governance structures flows upward to central authorities, not downward to the population.  

He concludes, “Although state restructuring was partly justified by the need to overcome ethnic divisions, it has perpetuated the very cleavages it was supposed to eradicate. Local officials in key positions, such as the executive secretaries, are often Tutsi. These positions were previously occupied almost exclusively by Hutu. . . . These local, appointed representatives of the central government are responsible for imposing the RPF’s vision of progress on to the rural peasantry.”

The nature of Rwanda’s motivation for ethnic settlements necessitates a massive number of ethnic settlements. Straus and Waldorf, referencing James Scott, argue that Rwanda’s state restructuring is tantamount to social engineering: “. . . ’the most tragic episodes of state-initiated social engineering’: an administrative ordering of nature and society, a high-modernist ideology that believes in the rational re-design of human nature and social relations, an authoritarian state ‘willing and able to use the full weight of its coercive power to bring these high-modernist designs into being…”

Phil Clark summarizes his extensive interviews in the country: “What these conversations have revealed above all is that the government’s top-down strategy has largely succeeded, allowing everyday Rwandans to deal with the effects of genocide. But they have also shown that many Rwandans feel overwhelmed by the government’s barrage of post-genocide programs, leading to widespread fatigue and a desire to be left alone to address
the past in more personal and local ways . . . Rwandans have grown exhausted from the constant summoning up of the traumatic past.”

In spite of all this, there are some (albeit very limited) protections for the majority ethnic group. There is a Forum of Political Parties, which Silva-Leander sees cynically, but notes, “. . . has the explicit objective of serving as a forum for mediation and consensus-building between parties.” There are also seats reserved in Parliament for minority parties and a constitutional provision stating that the largest party cannot occupy more than half of the positions in the cabinet.

Summary (the interplay of the aforementioned regime objectives)

Rwanda’s ethnic settlements serve two objectives (stability and development) but repress the third (democracy). There is a profound historical and structural logic to this disposition, from the perspective of Tutsi leadership.

This approach requires the subjugation of ethnic consciousness, a strategy with myriad risks. Silva-Leander notes, “Similarly, in Rwanda, the official denial of ethnicity could be perceived as a cover-up for ethnic favoritism, if the government failed to provide a political space for dissent where the largely Hutu population could have an outlet for the frustrations arising, for instance, from growing economic disparities.” And Saha questions whether achieving Kagame’s national unity via the vaunted, “One Rwanda,” might be negative.

Rwanda has benefited from the support of the international community, which has been impressed by Rwanda’s peace and stability as well as economic development.
The situation is replete with internal contradictions. The 2003 Rwandan Constitution used the term “the 1994 Tutsi genocide” instead of the term “genocide.” Waldorf notes that in a country that tries to subvert ethnic consciousness, this serves the purpose of “again making ethnicity paramount.”\textsuperscript{316} Similarly, as Harry Verhoeven notes, the RPF positions itself as the vanguard party that liberated Rwanda, again fueling an ethnic ideology in a country that seeks to heavily manage ethnic discourse.\textsuperscript{317} More generally, Waldorf notes that “There has always been an inherent tension between the government’s forward-looking reconciliation narrative, which seeks to erase ethnicity, and its backward-looking genocide narrative, which inevitably emphasizes ethnicity.”\textsuperscript{318} It is important to note that these contradictions are not necessarily the result of ill-considered strategy. Rather, they are contradictions inherent to a structurally problematic situation driven by a structurally problematic history. Tutsi leadership is seeking to achieve contradictory objectives: the pursuit of stability and development, with donor assistance, requiring obeisance to democracy, which it cannot allow.

\textit{A frozen situation.} An important point is that the situation may very well be, to some extent, structurally “frozen”. Hutus cannot start violence; Tutsis cannot allow democracy. Unlike Nigeria and (as this thesis has argued) Ethiopia, it is difficult to see significant progress toward inclusionary democracy in the foreseeable future. One might argue that while in Nigeria and perhaps Ethiopia, progressive ethnic settlements in support of authentic democracy are structurally possible, in Rwanda they may be structurally blocked. Rwanda has what Joseph Sebarenzi refers to as a “negative peace.”\textsuperscript{319}
There are longer-term concerns associated with the lack of democratization. Many have questioned whether liberal democracy is even a long-term goal or just a concept to which lip service is paid. Silva-Leander, writing in 2008, states, “Today, Rwanda and its international donors face a stark trade-off between short-term stability and long-term peace: the longer the country puts off necessary democratic reform for fear of upsetting stability, the greater the risk of a rejection of government policies by the population and of renewed manipulation of ethnicity in the future.” Straus and Waldorf indicate an ambivalent view toward Rwanda’s approach: “We appreciate Rwanda’s undeniable accomplishments: visionary leadership, political stability, economic growth, pro-business environment, relative transparency, high proportion of women in parliament, and improved education and health care. Still, we have real concerns about the medium- and long-term social and political consequences of Rwanda’s post-genocide model. For Rwanda’s historical experience sadly teaches us that stability, order, and growth do not preclude severe breakdowns and violent conflict.”

Burundi

Regime objectives for ethnic settlements are as follows:

Peace and Stability

Again, Burundi’s history and drivers make stability a top priority. There are many similarities between the Rwanda and Burundi backgrounds, so these similarities will just be summarized briefly: Burundi existed prior to colonial rule (2/1) and had reasonably
harmonious inter-ethnic relations (2/2); has a highly skewed bi-ethnic ethnic composite (1/14, 1/15) with a subsistence agrarian economy (94% of the labor force is involved in subsistence agriculture) (1/6) with high density (1/13) and is thus highly prone to violent conflict; was ruled by Belgium via a divide-and-rule approach (2/4) through the minority ethnic group (2/6) using indirect rule (2/3), all contributing to later ethnically divisive politics. Thus, as in Rwanda, tremendous instability was introduced via the colonial era. There has been high frequency of violence (3/3) and high peak violence (3/4), although not nearly as high as in Rwanda.

In an inverse structure to Rwanda, the minority Tutsi ruled the country for three decades after independence. The simple but critical fact of the post-independence era in Burundi, as noted by Reyntjens, is “the near exclusion since 1965 of the majority Hutu from public life, knowledge, and wealth . . . The reins of power remained firmly in the hands of the minority Tutsi elite, and Hutu continued to be the victims of discrimination and victimization.” Daley observes that the Burundi Hutu were aware of the fact that Hutu were actually in rule in Rwanda, which compounded their grievance. Daley also notes that “Hutus were schooled and politicized in such a way as to see the Tutsi, and not the colonial state, as their oppressors.” Indeed, the first genocide in Burundi (1972) was a Tutsi massacre of Hutu after a Southern Hutu uprising.

The Tutsi, while in power, invested heavily in their own education and military. Ndikumana writes, “For example, the concentration of education infrastructure in the Southern province of Bururi in Burundi and the relative neglect of education elsewhere lowered the country’s overall level of human capital development. Yet this policy was a
vital mechanism for consolidating the power of the Southern Tutsi oligarchy. Obviously, because of the conflict that unequal distribution generates, systems based on inequality are difficult to sustain in the long run as they require ever-increasing investments in repression.” He later adds, “But since mass literacy increases demands for political participation and economic equity, monolithic regimes see it as a threat, and therefore tend to under-invest in mass education, concentrating instead on providing the best education for a privileged few, and marginalizing the majority (and increasing their resentment). This largely explains why the Southern Tutsi elite in Burundi maintained a discriminatory education system as a tool for power consolidation. Since the rest of the population has little influence on the allocation of resources, their incentive to rebel against the dominant group rises. Therefore discrimination in education encourages conflict.” And Daley observes, “In the late 1960s, purges within the army led to the elimination of virtually all Hutu officers and a significant proportion of the rank and file.” Ndikumana views the resultant inequalities as a primary driver of future violent conflict, above and beyond ethnic repression: “We illustrate the distributional nature of conflict by examining the role of two key institutions that cemented inequality and exclusion in colonial and postcolonial regimes, namely the education system and the military.” Thus, there is a structural progression of causation: the need to stabilize minority rule necessitates institutional favoritism (via the military and education) which further enflames inter-ethnic tensions, and adds the compounding phenomenon of unequal distribution as a tension-generating mechanism. There are, of course, numerous parallels to modern Rwanda.
Intra-ethnic fault lines are highly significant. Burundi entered independence as a Tutsi Constitutional Monarchy, which was overthrown in the 1966 Micombero military coup. Importantly, the monarchy had its seat in Muramvia (Northwest) while the military regime had its seat in Bururi (Southwest), establishing intra-ethnic tension amongst Tutsi (1/17). In addition, Ndikumana notes that there is intra-Hutu tension, as the Southern Hutu are seen as “less marginalized” due to the “neighborhood effect” of cohabiting the region of the Southern Bururi Tutsi in leadership. In light of these parallel intra-ethnic tensions (1/18), Ndikumana asserts that, “. . . it is more appropriate to think of ethno-regional fractionalization rather than ethnic fractionalization, with the former being a dynamic phenomenon rather than a fixed factor, which helps to explain the pattern and timing of civil wars over time.” And Lemarchand notes that it was intra-Tutsi rivalry that became a key force in accelerating Tutsi-Hutu conflict. The Bururi Tutsi feared that Muramvya was too soft on the Hutu question, and feared that they would conspire with Hutu to restore the monarchy.

Stability and the past. Thus, as elsewhere, stability is a major issue in Burundi, a concern fueled by its turbulent history. Ndikumana notes that, “As Burundi struggles to find its future as a nation, its biggest obstacle is its past, especially the devastating record of ethnic exclusion, oppression, repression and all forms of violation of human rights under military regimes.” It is also important to note that in Burundi, as elsewhere, violence provides access to the state, as stated by Daley: “Violence has become the instrument with which individuals and groups attempt to negotiate or acquire access to institutions of the
state.331 It is worth noting that access to the state is presumably relatively more beneficial in countries, like Burundi, with extremely low GDP per capita.

Economic Development

Economic development must be a top priority. In Burundi, GDP per capita is extremely low (1/2)—by far the lowest in our sample and GDP per capita growth rates have actually been slightly negative (1/3), making Burundi an extremely challenging situation economically. It has the worst rank of economic freedom (4/35) of any country in our sample (Burundi’s score is 162/180 while Rwanda’s is 32/180), a factor to some extent likely correlated with future economic prospects. It is worth noting that the 1993 genocide decimated GDP per capita. The low GDP level, its stagnant nature, and the historical lessons of the impact of violence on economic growth further accentuate the prioritization of stability. There has also been differential economic development between Hutu and Tutsi. There is a history of rural land theft of Hutu land by Tutsi elite.332 And in colonial- and post-colonial society, the Tutsi had a much higher socio-economic position in society. Thus, the Hutu political grievance from being excluded from power was compounded by economic injustice.

Inclusionary Democracy

As in Rwanda, inclusionary democracy is not a priority, although for different reasons.
The prospects for democracy under Tutsi rule were constrained by minority rule (as is the case in modern Rwanda). Lemarchand writes, “The Tutsi were ascendant, but their legitimacy was limited by the logic of minority rule.”

Democracy was denigrated twice under Tutsi rule, leading to negative sentiment toward democracy, and perhaps a retributive dimension to the Hutu psyche. Regarding the prime minister appointment of 1965, Ndukimana reports: “... the refusal of the king to appoint a Hutu as prime minister despite the landslide victory by Hutu deputies in the May 1965 legislative elections, created political upheaval and poisoned relations between the Hutu and Tutsi political elite.” And Hutu Melchior Ndadaye was assassinated in 1993 after becoming the first elected president of Burundi, with Buyoya returned to office. In both cases, Tutsi leadership did not accede to the implications of democracy.

Buyoya instituted and proposed numerous ethnic settlements, but could not prevail in democratic elections—revealing another historic ethnic grievance. After Pierre Buyoya announced democratic elections, he instituted numerous reforms intended to demonstrate ethnic accommodation in government with Hutus (presumably driven by a desire to win the pending election). These reforms included establishing a commission to investigate the 1988 massacre of Hutu, placing 11 Hutus in charge of ministerial posts, allowing political parties, etc. However, despite these overtures, he was soundly defeated (by Melchior) in the 1993 elections. Reyntjens reports, “The June 1993 elections have resulted in a virtual political earthquake. ... This simply confirms the fact that Uprona had little or no popular support as a national party, being rather the instrument to legitimize and organize the monopolization of power in a Tutsi elite.”
There are interesting parallels between Bagaza and Buyoya (prior Tutsi minority rule in Burundi) on the one hand and Kagame (current Tutsi minority rule in Rwanda). In language anticipating that of Kagame in a structurally similar situation, Buyoya used the phrase, “We are all Burundi.” And a Buyoya Commission placed the blame for the ethnic divide in Burundi on the colonial era. Under Bagaza (prior to Buyoya), it was illegal to use the terms “Hutu” and “Tutsi.” And so on. These similarities are, of course, structural, as leaders attempted to grapple with the ethnic settlement implications of intense, prolonged, enforced minority rule. Regarding the Tutsi in Burundi during their time in leadership, but also applicable to Tutsi leadership in modern Rwanda, Lemarchand notes that they preached egalitarianism, but they couldn’t allow it.

Due in part to this painful history, neither side was enamored of the prospects for democracy. In short, democracy, as elsewhere, is a loaded and troubled concept in Burundi. It was neglected by the Tutsi, with ongoing psychological impacts; it was subverted under Tutsi rule, also with enduring impacts; and it is a Western import.

Vandegiste’s path dependence argument suggests that Rwanda’s regime did not need to make substantive ethnic concessions at the time of power transfer; but that Burundi’s did. However, Burundi’s motivation to continue with pluralistic ethnic settlements is decreasing over time. This important thesis is advanced by Stef Vandegiste (and it is the motivation for (4/16)). He begins by contrasting the manner in which the RPF came to power in Rwanda (military victory) and the manner in which the CNDD-FDD came to power in Burundi (negotiated settlement): “The negotiated settlement between the incumbent regime and predominantly Hutu rebel movements was
the dominant mode of transition to end the war in Burundi.” Conversely, in Rwanda, “Overthrow of the incumbent regime through military victory rather than negotiated settlement determined Rwanda's transition to peace.” Vandegiste then posits that these juxtaposed “modes” of ascending to power have had powerful impacts on the respective regimes’ orientation toward pluralistic ethnic settlements. Regarding Rwanda, “Furthermore, unlike Tutsi elites within Burundi's Uprona party, Tutsi elites within the RPF are opposed to consociationalism for the simple reason that, for the time being, they do not need it in order to maintain a grip on political power, nor did they need it to accede to power.” In Burundi, however, “Successive peace agreements with detailed and complex power-sharing arrangements . . . were signed between August 2000 and December 2008, when the last remaining rebel movement (FNL) agreed to lay down arms.” Vandegiste concludes by observing that these different modes of coming to power also have implications for longer-term trends in regime orientation toward these ethnic settlements. In Rwanda, there has been continuity in opposition to a consociational approach to governance. In Burundi, however, there is a tendency for the initial commitment to consociational governance (necessary to effect the power transfer) to diminish over time. Writing in 2013 in reference to Burundi’s 2010 elections, Vandegiste observes, “What this may indicate, however, is that the sustainability of Burundi’s ethnic power-sharing is questionable. Recent developments, including the announcement of a constitutional reform process, may indeed signal the intention on behalf of the dominant party CNDD-FDD to reduce the consociational nature of Burundi’s political institutions.” In light of the 2015 elections and the diminishment of inclusionary ethnic
settlements that followed, Vandegiste presciently speculated [in 2013] on a possible future scenarios for Burundi: “Alternatively, the political elite representing the demographic Hutu majority may decide to transform Burundi’s institutional set-up from consociational power-sharing to ‘bare majority’ rule with possibly dire consequences for (the political elites representing) the demographic Tutsi minority.”

Consequently, Burundi has moved away from democratic reforms. Burundi has moved steadily in the opposite direction of the Arusha Accords, and away from the direction of inclusionary democracy. It has suffered very sharp declines in Freedom House’s Political Rights Index (4/31) and Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index (4/6).

In summary, Burundi has moved away from inclusionary democracy for several reasons: democracy’s troubled legacy and the consequent lack of commitment to it; historical grievances on behalf of Hutu toward Tutsi leadership when the Tutsi were in power; the strong Hutu majority position that enables an oppressive majoritarian approach to political rule; and Vandediste’s path dependence thesis which holds that Burundi Hutu leadership initially needed to negotiate a progressive approach to ethnic settlements in order to obtain power, but once that incentive dissipated over time, so did the commitment to pluralism. The international community has been complicit in Burundi’s movement away from inclusionary principles. Curtis writes, “At key junctures, international peacebuilders largely turned a blind eye to governance abuses, human rights violations, and militarism, when confronted with the messy and contested politics of transition, as long as Burundi remained generally stable. For Burundian power holders, coercive control
served personal and regime security interests. This has meant that despite talk of liberal peace, local participation, bottom-up peacebuilding, and inclusive governance, in practice peace-building has been expressed as stability, containment, and control.”

Summary (the interplay of the aforementioned regime objectives)

In Burundi, stability and economic development are key; democracy is not a priority and is, in fact, being subverted. This is similar a similar pattern to Rwanda, albeit for inverse reasons: in Rwanda, democracy is subverted because of the exigencies of enforcing prolonged minority rule; in Burundi, democracy can be subverted due to the overwhelming power of the majority, and the diminishing influence of the path dependence logic that suggested the majority needed to make major concessions to the minority in order to obtain political power. For all of these reasons, one would expect a focus on peace and stability and economic development in Burundi, and ongoing movement away from settlements in support of inclusionary democracy.

Implications for Actual Ethnic Settlements

Consistent with the Vandeginste thesis, Burundi had a plethora of progressive ethnic settlements. However, in many areas, these have been eroded. It operates under a Consociational Constitutional model (4/4). There are term limits for president (5/1), but these have recently been relaxed which would allow Nkurunziza to run in 2020 and 2017 (although he has recently announced that he won’t run in 2020). There are ethnic vice-presidential requirements (4/19), which originally called for two Vice Presidents—one
Hutu and one Tutsi but which were changed starting in 2018 to require one Vice President of a party different than the presidents. Political parties are allowed and there is a significant number (5/4) and yet they are severely repressed (5/5). Elections are unfair, and Freedom House assigned scores totaling zero out of twelve for categories measuring free and fair elections for 2015 due to the opposition boycott. There are legislative quotas (5/8), the use of PR (5/7), ethnic quotas for primary institutions (6/1, 6/2, 6/3) including the 50%-50% integration of the military (although adherence to this principle steadily declined and there has been a recent purge of the military. There are quotas applied to local government, as well, and so on.

Thus, there is declining adherence to the pro-inclusionary norms established during power transfer from Tutsi to Hutu leadership. However, the key point regarding Burundi is that these negotiations were critical to securing power at the time, but the incentives for maintaining comprehensive and accommodative ethnic settlements have diminished with time.

This can be seen as being structurally predicted. However, there are other factors that have contributed to the demise of the pluralistic ethnic settlements. Lemarchand states simply that the Hutu demand majoritarian democracy and that is exactly what the Tutsi want to avoid. As noted above, there were incentives for both sides to institute this broad array of ethnic settlements.

There were, however, issues with the process. Curtis reports that “The [Arusha] negotiations conferred legitimacy on individuals and parties who otherwise had no popular support, leading to the charge that the Arusha process had international and
regional, but not popular legitimacy. The power-sharing positions that were divided and distributed did not reflect popular grievances and concerns, and were more akin to elite office trading, often between the very people who had fostered conflict in the first place.” Daley adds, “It argues that proposed political and economic reforms, as articulated in the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, 2000, while correcting ethnic imbalance among the elite through power-sharing, will leave intact the contradictions in society.”

The important point is that in Rwanda, genuine pluralistic democracy is a danger to be avoided; in Burundi, it is a luxury that can be diminished. Agreeing to pluralistic democracy was necessary to establish a peaceful transition of power, but this incentive does not endure. The majority, over time, can exert its will over the minority, and that is exactly what is happening. Burundi can pursue majoritarian politics with virtual impunity.

Summary

Burundi’s ethnic political settlements reflect the prioritization of stability and economic development, the consolidation of Hutu political power, and the diminution of pluralistic governance. Like Rwanda and Uganda, Burundi’s regime is characterized by the four-pronged power configuration (4/12). It refers to itself as a Presidential Republic (4/5) but is, in fact, authoritarian (4/6)—and has had its Freedom House Political Rights Index rating (4/31) and its Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index score (4/6) literally plummet. According to Jones and Wittig (in 2016), “In the years and months leading up to the 2015 elections, political space had increasingly shrunk. They continue,
“The 2015 electoral crisis has its roots in the CNDD-FDD’s growing authoritarian shift since its accession to power, and in the crisis following the 2010 elections.” And they add, “In addition, the ruling party pursued a divide-and-rule strategy. Finally, they state, “The government and the opposition have returned to an ethnicized discourse, sparking fear of renewed violence. . . . The opposition warns of risks of impending genocide and has lobbied for international intervention.” Ndikumana concludes: “As Burundi struggles to find its future as a nation, its biggest obstacle is its past, especially the devastating record of ethnic exclusion, oppression, repression and all forms of violations of human rights under military regimes.”

Uganda

Regime objectives for ethnic settlements are as follows:

Peace and Stability

Again, peace and stability are a mandatory focus of Uganda’s ethnic settlements. The colonial era introduced myriad ethnic tensions.

Uganda has a multipodal ethnic structure (1/14), with a number of ethnic groups within a narrow size range (1/15). In the colonial era, Britain brought together ethnic groups who were heretofore antagonistic toward each other (2/2) and formed them into a colony (2/1), a factor which presaged further ethnic conflict.

*The colonial model of rule introduced tremendous ethnic tensions.* Uganda was ruled via a divide-and-rule approach (2/4) via the Baganda (2/5) of the South Central, the largest
ethnic group but still a distinct minority (2/6), but with the use of a Northern military. The British utilized an extreme form of indirect rule (2/3), based on the Bugandan model of a hierarchy of chiefs with a central council, which was then exported to other regions, further contributing to inter-ethnic tensions.\textsuperscript{358} Okuku asserts that the Bagandan chiefs were actually used to colonize other regions, leading the Baganda—and not the British—to be seen as the primary enemy in the country by other ethnic groups.\textsuperscript{359} Mutibwa notes that the British favoritism of the Baganda altered the relationship between the Baganda and all other ethnic groups.\textsuperscript{360} The schisms—inter-ethnic group, region (2/7)—which is currently South Central and South West versus North and East, and religion (2/6)—are overlapping (2/9). The independence movement was led by Obote and his Uganda People’s Congress (largely from the North) (3/2), cementing an ongoing North-South divide. This led the Baganda to demand (unsuccessfully) a separate independence (they boycotted the London Peace Conference) and made overtures toward secession (3/5). David Apter states that the other ethnic groups would not forget the Baganda’s attempt to secede.\textsuperscript{361}

\textit{There has been massive post-colonial violence.} Uganda has had regular violence (3/3), and high peak violence under Amin (3/4). There has also been conflict over the monarchy, which was co-opted and aligned with Obote during the independence movement, later thrust into exile, and then re-established by Museveni in the South. Okuku notes that at independence, the Bagandan did not want democracy, as it would threaten their ascendant position, and instead preferred the monarchy, a potential institutional vehicle in support of ongoing minority rule. Thus, they supported the
“Kabaka Yekka” (“King Only”) Party. The Lord’s Resistance Army in the North has also been a source of instability. Finnstrom, while acknowledging the atrocities of the LRA, also observes that “the conflict has ethnic roots” [based on opposition to ongoing Southern rule under Museveni]. They state that Museveni positions the conflict as a war for democracy, whereas, “the majority of people in central Uganda perceive Museveni’s war as a war against a regime of northerners, rather than a war for democracy.”

In light of the plethora of unfavorable ethnic structural attributes and the violent history engendered by them, both the international community and the citizenry make allowances for the current regime in order to ensure stability. Dicklitch states, “More importantly, it seems that Ugandans are willing to accept a certain degree of authoritarianism to avoid the bloodshed and chaos associated with multiparty politics from the past.” Dicklitch adds, “The Movement regime appeals to most donors because Museveni has been able to bring Uganda from the brink of chaos to a semblance of order and stability while vigorously embracing economic liberalization.”

Economic Development

Development has been geographically uneven, but it has been strong overall, earning Uganda international credibility.

Under Museveni, there has been economic stabilization. Uganda has a low GDP per capita (1/2) but reasonable GDP per capita growth rates in recent history (1/3). Importantly, economic prospects improved significantly immediately after Museveni came to power, precipitating the aforementioned donor favor: “With Uganda’s 1987
adoption of an economic recovery program supported by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, the country became a role model for African economic reform . . . In fact, Uganda had the sixth-fastest-growing economy in sub-Saharan Africa by 1996 and enjoyed on average, an economic growth rate of 7.1 percent per annum in 1990-1998 (UNDP 2000). . . . Inflation dropped from 250 percent in 1987 to just five percent in 1996 leading up to 10.7 percent in 1998.366

Economic development historically favored the South, and this continues under Museveni. Mutibwa notes that the Baganda were economically favored by Britain. They were given land and engaged in mercantile trade with Britain (involving cotton and coffee) while the North operated more as a source of labor (and the military). Predictably, the Baganda enjoyed high standards of living.367 Dicklitch notes that “Unequal regional development, especially between the poor north and the richer south further enhanced the politicization of ethnicity and the entrenchment of ethnic animosity and rivalry.”368

Uganda has a mixed (socialist and capitalist) economy (4/34) and is categorized as “mostly unfree” by the Heritage Index of Economic Freedom (4/35).

Inclusionary Democracy

The pursuit of genuine democracy is a distant third priority, at best. The Movement System is often seen in cynical terms. Hauser discusses the original rationale of Uganda’s Movement System: “First, the movement system of government, according to its proponents, was supposed to be a democratic way of unifying opposing Ugandan forces. Since the beginning of the NRM government, NRM officials have
claimed that all Ugandans belong to the movement and, unlike in a one-party system, cannot be expelled. During his early years in power, Museveni claimed an interest in reconciliation and invited many of his former opponents into the movement to hold positions in his government. Therefore, according to NRM officials, the movement system was a democratic institution which promoted cooperation and reconciliation."

Many analysts, however, see the Movement system on ethno-regionally biased terms. Carbone argues that the Movement System was fundamentally a recapturing of power for the South [primarily the Banyankole and Buganda] from the North. He asserts that it was about obtaining and maintaining state power, and its roots were as a political wing of a military power [the NRA]. Carbone, citing Human Rights Watch, asserts that the NRM became a de facto political party—a political organization masquerading as a political system. It received state funding. Carbone compared it to Mexico’s PRI.

Carbone notes that the Movement served to de-institutionalize the country, with the consequent institutional vacuum with charismatic leadership in the person of Museveni. Carbone concludes that the Movement System, even after the opening up to political parties in 2005, was largely authoritarian and based on a weakening of liberal standards.

In a 2017 article that summarizes theses from Michael Keating, Singh writes that, “. . . democratization has actually undermined democracy in Uganda. . . donors, it is argued, may be more interested in pursuing neo-liberal reforms in recipient states than in defending forms of substantive democracy that might undermine such reforms.”

Uganda conducted two referendums on the move to make political parties legal, in 2000 and 2005, with opposite results—the first favoring the no-party system and the second
calling for political parties. Singh, cites Carbone’s thesis that, “the 2005 referendum [allowing parties] did not create a radical break in Uganda, not because of the weak basis for the transition, but because the no-party was a ruse and the president’s party, the National Resistance Movement (NRM), always acted as a political party itself. Therefore, he argues, Sartori’s concept of a ‘hegemonic party’ is useful, and Uganda could be characterized under the rubric of ‘one party dominance.’”374 Singh argues that “A frequent complaint in the literature and in my interviews was that multiparty democracy mechanized politics in a way that both ostracized and commercialized voters. . . . The multiparty system opens up the country to political competition on a national level but there exists no ideological bases or resources to facilitate this.”375

Thus, the NRM’s democratization efforts are often seen in cynical terms. Nonetheless, there has been some progress in this area. Economic growth has largely taken precedence over political liberalization. Dicklitch concludes, “It [the NRM] has allowed for elite entrenchment and the prioritization of unequal economic growth over democratization. . . .Because economic liberalization occurred without a simultaneous gradual democratization of political institutions, an authoritarian system of governance was the eventual result.”376 Moreover, many believe that the international community’s involvement with the NRM serves to further compromise democracy. Singh makes the interesting observation that the multiparty system is undermined by international community objectives: “. . . Ugandan democratization is increasingly pinched in every way by the international context of militarization, which is making President Museveni more powerful as a result of the centralization of control necessary for such policies. The
problem is that, while multiparty democracy is being instituted, the international community is simultaneously encouraging Museveni’s military control of the whole of East Africa, from Somalia to the Congo."

All of this being said, Carbone refers to Uganda’s system as a hybrid—neither a democracy or a sham democracy. And it scores higher than any country in the sample in the Economist Democracy Index (4/6) and second-highest (behind Nigeria) in the Freedom House Freedom Score (4/7).

Summary (the interplay of the aforementioned objectives)

Uganda has a problematic, violent post-colonial history, with multiple re-inforcing and recurring schisms, and myriad colonial structural drivers that make stabilization and economic development key priorities. It also serves an important role in the eyes of the international community, which gives Museveni a large amount of backing (also driven by his economic stabilization) but is not necessarily conducive to authentic democratization. This contributes to a political system that is seen cynically by many analysts. That being said, it has made some progress on democratic reforms. One would expect ethnic settlements to emphasize peace and stability and economic development, and to be structurally biased toward ongoing NRM rule, albeit with some background initiatives in the direction of democracy.
Implications for Actual Ethnic Settlements

In many ways, ethnic settlements are non-progressive: there are no zoning agreements (5/2); elections are FTPT (SMD Plurality) rather than PR (5/7) which would favor minority groups and thus promote political pluralism; elections are rated as 3/12 by Freedom House (5/9); there are severe restrictions on political parties (5/5), with Freedom House assigning Uganda a 2/8 for Political Party Equity; there are laws limiting ethnic references (6/10); and quotas are not used (6/1, 6/2 and 6/3). Some even see the introduction of Universal Public Education in cynical terms, as it was instituted in 1996, and arguably implemented in order to support Museveni (6/8). There are also Mchaka Mchaka re-education camps (6/9). Carbone notes that the NRM’s evolution demonstrates the disconnect between Museveni’s alleged fealty to multi-ethnic representation, and the reality of needing to maintain personal control over an ethnically-biased system, as the NRM became increasingly led by personnel from the South and Southwest. 379 Okuku, writing in 2002, referred to Uganda as an ethnic military dictatorship, and likens Museveni’s historic allowance of it to supervise elections as tantamount to placing the country under martial law. 380 Recently, there has been the elimination of age limits on the presidency (5/1), to allow Museveni to continue to lead.

And yet there are areas of strength. There are 29 registered political parties (5/4), regular elections, and Museveni, while perpetually victorious, does not win elections with absurd vote counts (4/21), although there are numerous pro-NRM biases in elections (4/20).

Periphery system with local resistance councils. Uganda utilizes a center-periphery system, ostensibly to increase emphasis on local governance (4/30), and with local
governance used to support national power, which includes a provision banning traditional leaders from participating in politics. Uganda’s resistance councils figure prominently in this scheme. In observations redolent of those made regarding Rwanda, Singiza and DeVisser see the District Councils in primarily cynical terms: “The article concludes that the law and practice surrounding the election of district councils reveal the political exclusion of ethnic minorities. It is argued that this is contrary to the stated policy objectives of decentralization in Uganda and only serves to further promote the political dominance of the ruling party.”

The number of districts has been regularly increased, and reminiscent of Nigeria, this is also seen cynically by many observers. Reuss and Titeca write (in 2017), “. . . district creation has been the primary government response to ethno-nationalist sentiments at the local level . . . Since 2002, the number of Uganda’s districts has doubled: Justified by the country’s decentralization policy, new district creation has in many cases been primarily a critical tool of patronage for government to secure votes in elections while leaving substantive development challenges unaddressed . . . In sum, while district creation might bring political gain for the national government and ruling party, it creates a range of tensions on the ground.”

Carbone goes so far as to say that Resistance Council, comprised of former guerrilla commanders, are a form of military junta and that they were a way to pre-empt federalism.

Summary

Uganda’s ethnic settlements are geared toward stability and economic growth, with some institutional development in the support of multi-party democracy, but within
the context of ensuring ongoing single-party rule. This configuration is aided and abetted by international donor support. Kagoro notes that Museveni became an esteemed leader in the West despite making insufficient progress toward democracy.\textsuperscript{384} And Carbone notes that Museveni launched a campaign to marginalize the North and was rewarded by the international community.\textsuperscript{385}

A competitive authoritarian regime. Kagoro notes that some call the regime “competitive authoritarian” (combining elements of democracy with authoritarianism), some call it a “militarized democracy” and some call it a “Ugandan disciplined military regime.”\textsuperscript{386} He continues by stating that there are three primary components of the state—Museveni, the Party, and the Military.\textsuperscript{387} Kagoro notes that Museveni became an esteemed leader in the West despite making insufficient progress toward democracy.\textsuperscript{388} And Carbone notes that Museveni launched a campaign to favor the South and marginalize the North and was rewarded by the international community.\textsuperscript{389}

Discussion

Each country has developed its own approach to coming to terms with the relative prioritization of ethnic settlements that deal with peace and stability, economic development and inclusionary democracy. It is critical to note the similarities and differences in these different approaches. Rwanda and Uganda, for example, are both countries where the colonial power ruled through a small ethnic group (although it was the largest minority group in Uganda), but had power transition to other ethnic groups at independence, and later saw a return to colonial era, minority ethnic rule. These
similarities in structural drivers contribute to similarities in the objectives of their regimes regarding ethnic settlements. Both countries use ethnic settlements that emphasize peace and stability and economic development, while ensuring minority rule and courting international favor.

Burundi pursues ethnic settlements according to a very different pattern—emanating from a historic pattern of transition from minority rule to majority rule via negotiation. Here, stability and development are priorities, but so is the heightening and consolidation of majoritarian rule and the repression of democracy.

Finally, this analysis suggests that Nigeria and Ethiopia have some structural parallels (although they have many differences as well). Both have made significant strides from an illiberal history to a more progressive present. This is reflected in genuine progress in pluralistic ethnic political settlements—longstanding in Nigeria while somewhat embryonic and more aspirational in Ethiopia.

The following table summarizes the salient structural drivers, regime objectives for ethnic political settlements, and actual political settlements for each country (and it is useful to see this as a progression—from structural drivers to regime objectives to ethnic settlements). This is followed by brief commentary for each country.
Table 7. Country summaries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>STRUCTURAL DRIVERS (SUMMARY)</th>
<th>REGIME OBJECTIVES FOR ETHNIC POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS (SUMMARY)</th>
<th>ACTUAL ETHNIC POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS (SUMMARY)</th>
<th>COMMENTARY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NIGERIA</td>
<td>Tripodal ethnic demographic profile (1/14); forced integration of ethnic groups via colonial period (2/1); reinforcing cleavages (1/21); presence of natural resource (oil) that is not distributed evenly throughout country (1/10); historic major violence associated with secession attempt—Biafran Conflict (3/5).</td>
<td>Mix of peace and stability; economic development; and inclusionary democracy. The latter is authentic. Somewhat toward liberalism.</td>
<td>Term limits (5/1); Zoning (5/2); national ethnic minimum representation levels (5/8); quotas via Federal Character Principle (6/1, 6/2 and 6/3); ever-expanding federalism (4/26 and 4/27); revenue sharing via oil derivation formula (5/10); many political parties (5/4) reasonably fair elections (5/9); depoliticizing military (4/9); improving political rights (4/31).</td>
<td>Structural characteristics force solution by which state meaningfully addresses ethnic challenges rather than state being used to suppress ethnic tension. Authentically promoting progress toward inclusionary democracy while concurrently managing peace and stability and economic development. A fluid, and not frozen, situation. Structurally, some promise for continued move toward liberalism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETHIOPIA</td>
<td>Multipodal (1/14) but concentrated ethnic composite (1/15); internal colonialism (2/1); during internal colonial era, ruled by minority (2/6); reinforcing schisms (1/21); secession threats (3/5); progressive direction of historic modes of rule (3/9).</td>
<td>Generally interpreted as non-progressive until Abiy Ahmed: False ethnic federalism and false democracy used to enshrine minority rule; strong growth used to mollify international community. Now some sense of cautious optimism by some analysts. Thus, negative until Abiy Ahmed; in process of change. Transition period. Unclear if this will be</td>
<td>Illiberal Ethnic Settlements: Increasingly authoritarian under Daselegn (4/6); overwhelmingly EPRDF Legislature (4/28); some cynicism regarding certain dimensions of federal system (4/28).</td>
<td>Initial post-1995 period: consolidated EPRDF rule under Tigrayan leadership with ethnic settlements interpreted more cynically and regime seen as; under Abiy Ahmed, suppressed artificial democracy; de facto authoritarian. Perhaps cautiously and recently promoting change while maintaining stability. Arguably, a fluid, and not</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RWANDA</td>
<td>Skewed bipodal ethnic structure (1/14 and 1/15); very few ethnic groups (1/16); high frequency of historic violence (3/3) and violence extremely severe at peak (3/4) conflictual involvement in neighboring countries (1/22)</td>
<td>Ethnic settlements geared toward four primary objectives: ensure peace and stability; promote strong economic growth; maintain minority Tutsi rule; and curry international favor for the entire endeavor. Inclusionary</td>
<td>From minority to majority ethnic power during independence era (2/6) and then back to minority rule (4/13 and 4/15); elimination of position of vice president (4/19); enduring strongman leader (4/10 and 4/11); 4-pronged power configuration (4/12) military recently more decoupled from state (4/9); no enduring strongman leader (4/10); ethnic background of current leader partially from historically oppressed ethnic group (4/14) ethno-federalism (4/26) with fixed number of states (4/27) and yet two-tiered (4/28); recent Abiy Ahmed announcement to consider term limits (5/1); no formal zoning agreement but recent power rotation amongst EPRDF leaders (5/2); recent agreement with Eritrea (5/12); language policy encourages local languages (6/5); recent Truth and Reconciliation Commission (6/8).</td>
<td>De jure democracy but de facto more authoritarian. Situation stifles progressive change. A frozen situation. One can argue that liberal pro-women are partially designed to divert attention from illiberal ethnic settlements.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
accentuates need for peace and stability as focus of ethnic settlements. High density (1/13) in low GDP/Capita country (1/2) and predominantly agricultural labor force (1/6) leads to high risk of violence.

democracy, not an authentic endeavor. Not toward liberalism.

leadership configuration (4/12); no quotas (6/1, 6/2, 6/3) to minimize ethnic focus and to enable minority concentration; major initiatives to manage ethnic narratives including re-imagination of ethnic history with Tutsi bias (6/11); bans on ethnic speech (6/10); State owns land (1/11)—Note that here a driver is also a settlement; term limits adjusted to enable prolonged Kagame rule (5/1); de facto single-party state (4/8) and military fused to state (4/9); absurd vote counts for president (4/21).

Ironically, success in peace and stability and economic growth can generate some legitimacy from Hutu, despite political oppression. Frozen situation. Situation does not portend well for movement toward liberalism. Kagame’s visions of being the Singapore of Africa. A negative peace.

**BURUNDI**

Skewed bipodal ethnic structure (1/14 and 1/15); very few ethnic groups (1/16); high frequency of historic violence (3/3); high density (1/13) in low GDP/Capita country (1/2) and overwhelmingly predominantly agricultural labor force (1/6) leads to high risk of violence. From minority to majority rule; historic violence (genocide); colonial power rules through minority group (1/5) and minority group

Despite inverted pattern of ethnic rule (minority to majority) than Rwanda (majority to minority rule), some similarity in overall objective of ethnic settlements: (a) ensure peace and stability; promote economic growth; maintain institutional framework that allows perpetuation of majority rule and even further entrenches majoritarian democracy with increasing

De facto single-party state; military fused with party (4/9); reported purge of military (4/9); declining adherence to quotas (6/1, 6/2, 6/3) in ongoing semi-departure from Arusha; unfair presidential elections (4/20); move away from cross ethnic vice-presidential requirements (4/20); extension of term limits (5/1); allowance of wide-ranging ethnic language—in keeping with lack of

Pseudo democracy; (majority oppression of minority) but de facto authoritarianism. Ongoing move away from Arusha—for two reasons: (a) structurally, it can; (b) retributive dimension relative to injustices of Tutsi rule and its diminishment of democracy (a historical factor from section one of thesis); (c) path dependence. In addition, move to China consistent with move away
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>contextual factors</th>
<th>outcomes</th>
<th>implications</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Multipodal ethnic structure (1/14); very high ethnic fragmentation (1/17); strong reinforcing ethnic cleavages (1/21); country is colonial fabrication (2/1); in colonial era, ruled via largest but still minority ethnic group (2/5) who did not inherit the colonial state (2/11); very high peak violence (3/4); high number of regime changes since independence—also structurally driven (3/10)</td>
<td>Again, priorities are peace and stability, economic development, and international favor; much less so than move toward inclusionary democracy. Similar orientation than Rwanda, although better evaluations on Democracy ratings (4/6).</td>
<td>Many similarities to Rwanda. Colonial era ethnic empowered group returns to power (4/15); enduring strongman leader (4/10 and 4/11); unfair presidential elections (5/9); 4-pronged leadership configuration (4/12); no zoning agreements (5/2); no quotas (6/1, 6/2, 6/3) and opportunities skewed toward Museveni’s regional bases—South Central and Southwest; historical narratives utilized to present anti-colonial conflict attribution (6/11); age limits adjusted to enable prolonged Museveni rule (5/1); de facto single-party state (4/8) and military fused to state (4/9); some re-education programs (6/9); elaborate local governance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>contextual factors</th>
<th>outcomes</th>
<th>implications</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>inherits the colonial state (2/11); later reversion to majority rule (4/15).</td>
<td>diminishment of minority rights. This is done because the structural history enables it to (path dependence, historic grievances, etc.). Professions of interest in inclusionary democracy are not authentic. Not toward liberalism.</td>
<td>threat from majority rule (6/5); enduring strongman leader (4/10, 4/11); local governance primary to consolidate party control (4/30).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As noted in the commentary before Table Seven, there are patterns in the amalgamations of structural drivers and ethnic settlements across countries. Given this, it follows that there is the opportunity to identify models—paradigms defined by like-compilations of driver-settlement combinations. The analysis of this thesis suggests that these five countries can be meaningfully coalesced into three models (Figure 2). These are: indefinite repressive minority rule via a regime that emphasizes stability and development (Rwanda and Uganda); indefinite and repressive majoritarian rule via a regime that emphasizes stability and development (Burundi); and regimes characterized by the pursuit of all three ethnic settlement objectives, including an authentic movement toward more inclusionary democracy (Nigeria and Ethiopia). It has been noted previously that the inclusion of Ethiopia in this latter model is certainly controversial, and reflects, to some extent, an aspirational direction rather than achieved results. The three models are summarized in narrative form below.

Table 8. Country models.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MODEL 1. INDEFINITE REPRESSIVE MINORITY RULE—RWANDA, UGANDA.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>▪ PROLONGED MINORITY RULE WITH NO END IN SIGHT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ RULE VIA RETURN TO POWER OF COLONIAL ERA ETHNIC GROUP WHO LOST POLITICAL POWER AT INDEPENDENCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ PATH TO POWER OF CURRENT REGIME IS VIA MILITARY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ DE FACTO SINGLE-PARTY STATES, WITH LARGELY AUTHORITARIAN RULE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL REPRESSION</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
USING INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SUPPORT
REGIME OBJECTIVES PRIORITIZE STABILITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH, AND HENCE:
- ETHNIC SETTLEMENTS DESIGNED FOR STABILITY AND GROWTH; NOT INCLUSIONARY DEMOCRACY. CLAIMS TO THE CONTRARY ARE LARGELY FOR COSMETIC PURPOSES (AND MORE SO IN RWANDA)
- ETHNIC SETTLEMENTS OSTensibly IN SUPPORT OF DEMOCRACY ARE OFTEN INAUTHENTIC AND MANIPULATIVE
- STRUCTURALLY FROZEN SITUATION—DIFFICULT TO SEE PATH TOWARD INCLUSIONARY DEMOCRACY
- CLOSED POLITICAL SPACE, CONstricting
- PRIMARY ROLE OF MILITARY
- CHARISMATIC MILITARY STRONGMEN REQUIRED
- KAGAME AND MUSEVENI
- INTEGRATIVE, NOT CONSOCIATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS
- ENORMOUS BREADTH OF SETTLEMENTS (ESPECIALLY IN RWANDA)
- MYRIAD INCONSISTENCIES
- LIP SERVICE TO DEMOCRACY BUT CANNOT PRACTICE IT
- IS RECONCILIATION POSSIBLE WITHOUT MORE PLURALISTIC ETHNIC PARTICIPATION IN POLITICS

MODEL TWO: INDEFINITE REPRESSIVE MAJORITARIAN RULE—BURUNDI

- ESTABLISHMENT OF MAJORITY ETHNIC RULE FOR THE FIRST TIME
- VIA ASENDANCE OF MAJORITY AFTER LONG COLONIAL AND POST-COLONIAL MINORITY RULE
- ARGUABLY SOME RETRIBUTIVE MENTALITY ON BEHALF OF ASCENDANT MAJORITY
- PATH TO POWER HAS BEEN VIA NEGOTIATION
- DE FACTO SINGLE-PARTY STATE, WITH AUTHORITARIAN RULE
- SIGNIFICANT AND INCREASING REPRESSION OF MINORITY ETHNIC GROUP
- NOT AS RELIANT ON WESTERN INTERNATIONAL DONORS (CHINA RELATIVELY MORE SIGNIFICANT)
- REGIME OBJECTIVES FAVOR STABILITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH. OPPRESSIVE MAJORITARIAN RULE. CLAIMS OF INCLUSIONARY DEMOCRACY ARE COSMETIC, AND INCREASINGLY SO OVER TIME.
- ETHNIC SETTLEMENTS DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE PEACEFUL POWER TRANSFER FROM MINORITY TO MAJORITY RULE; THEY LOSE UNDERLYING MOTIVATION OVER TIME AND ARE HENCE DIMINISHED; INITIAL COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENTS A FORM OF APPEASEMENT—DEMANDED BY TUTSI AND SO TEMPORARILY ACCEDED TO BY HUTU
- INCLUSIONARY ETHNIC SETTLEMENTS ARE THUS LARGELY EXPEDIENT AND TEMPORARY
  - STRUCTURALLY FROZEN SITUATION AND DIMINISHMENT OF ETHNIC SETTLEMENTS SUPPORTS THIS ASSERTION
  - CLOSED POLITICAL SPACE, CONSTRUCTING MAJOR ROLE OF MILITARY

**MODEL THREE: AUTHENTIC MOVEMENT TOWARD DEMOCRACY—NIGERIA, ETHIOPIA**

- SOME GENUINE ALTERNATION IN POLITICAL POWER (VIA BALLOT IN NIGERIA AND WITHIN EPRDF IN ETHIOPIA)
- ESTABLISHED LONG TERM TREND TOWARD MORE LIBERAL POLITICAL/ECONOMIC SYSTEM
- PATH TO POWER IS VIA FORM OF POWER-SHARING (ZONING IN NIGERIA; EPRDF ROTATION IN ETHIOPIA)
- NO CLEARLY ASCENDANT ETHNIC GROUP WITH A MONOPOLY ON POLITICAL POWER
- NOT SINGLE-PARTY STATES (TRUE IN NIGERIA; ARGUABLY SO IN ETHIOPIA IF EPRDF IS CONSTRUED AS MULTI-PARTY ORGANIZATION)
- SUPPORT FROM INTERNATIONAL DONORS
- REGIME OBJECTIVES ARE A BALANCE OF STABILITY, ECONOMIC GROWTH, AND GENUINE DEMOCRATIZATION
- ETHNIC SETTLEMENTS DESIGNED, IN PART, TO MOVE IN THE DIRECTION OF LIBERALISM AND DEMOCRACY, ALBEIT CONSTRAINED BY BROADER STABILITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT CONCERNS (DEMONSTRATED IN NIGERIA; MORE ASPIRATIONAL IN ETHIOPIA)
- POSSIBILITIES FOR PLURALISTIC ETHNIC SETTLEMENTS ARE SUBSTANTIVE AND ONGOING. HENCE, FLUID, AS OPPOSED TO FROZEN, SITUATION FOR ETHNIC SETTLEMENTS
- OPEN POLITICAL SPACE, EXPANDING
- LONG TERM DECLINE IN ROLE OF MILITARY
- INCONSISTENCIES: STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT WITH DISTRIBUTED ETHNIC POWER

Two points are worth noting. First, different analysts will have different views on how models should be constructed and which countries belong in each. It is common for experts to draw a series of parallels between Rwanda and Uganda; less so for Nigeria and Ethiopia. However, it is useful to see the benefits of constructing models based on the aggregate compilations of drivers and settlements—the very endeavor of defining models...
leads to an appreciation for the power of the linkages between drivers and settlements.

Second, as noted before, this aggregate, country-level analysis useful in its own right—
to distill overall patterns between drivers and settlements across countries; but also to 
establish the interpretive framework that will be necessary for the next section on discrete 
driver-settlement linkages.
Chapter V

Analytical Section Four: Testing the Hypothesis at the Discrete Level

The focus now shifts from an assessment of the relationship between overall amalgamations of drivers and settlements within and between countries, to an assessment of the relationship between specific drivers and settlements within and between countries. Several interpretive comments should be made:

Global Context

The meaning of ethnic settlements must be interpreted in light of global trends. Thus, the recent international shift toward authoritarian nationalism will influence domestic ethnic settlements within our countries. Thus, one might argue that the term limit extensions in Burundi are consonant with broader global trends – not just an expression of domestic drivers and settlements.

Multiple Dimensions of Impact

Similarly, as discussed in the primary data tables of drivers and settlements, events outside of a country, as well as external donors, can influence domestic ethnic settlements. Thus, Rwanda’s military incursions into the DRC, for example, can perhaps heighten the perceived need for more stringent ethnic settlements domestically. In the donor realm, the importance of appealing to the international community can be a significant factor in the design of ethnic settlements.
Strategy and Tactics

Ethnic settlements can be developed to concurrently achieve disparate objectives. For example, different analysts have interpreted various Rwanda’s Truth and Reconciliation initiatives (most notably its Gagaca Courts) as achieving some measure of genuine ethnic reconciliation, while simultaneously reinforcing the national narrative of a non-dual genocide (which can buttress perpetual Tutsi rule), while also ingratiating Rwanda with the international community. Many analysts argue that ethnic settlements are designed with this multi-tiered strategic logic in mind.

Aggregate Motivation and Meaning

As emphasized in the prior section, it is essential to establish an interpretive perspective for the motivation behind and meaning of ethnic settlements within each country. Otherwise, an ethnic settlement may appear similar between two countries, but in fact be very different, as a function of what it is intended to achieve. For example, Nigeria and Ethiopia both operate federal systems, but these systems are very different. Nigeria’s federalism is characterized by a dramatic expansion of states and is motivated, in part, by the perceived need to dilute ethnic power and enhance federal power, with this ambition linked to oil revenue collection and distribution and security concerns. Ethiopia’s federalism is driven by a different set of motivations and hence is structured and operates in a different manner.
Fluidity

It is convenient to divide factors into distinct categories (drivers versus settlements) and sub-categories (e.g., drivers that are background factors versus institutional responses, etc.). However, the reality of drivers and settlements is not that straightforward. A driver can concurrently be a settlement. Thus, the colonial use of a divide-and-rule approach can impact the subsequent regime change pattern, which can be seen as both a settlement and a driver of other settlements. Similarly, some settlements, once instituted, can then drive the need for other reinforcing settlements. Moreover, some drivers and settlements are best understood in paired terms—that is, several drivers dictate a specific settlement (rather than just one) or one driver precipitates several settlements.

Iterative Nature of Settlements

Ethnic settlements are not, of course, fixed over time. One group of settlements can be driven by certain factors, which leads to a certain status within a country. Then, conditions may evolve, settlements may be altered, and a new status may be achieved. Burundi’s declining adherence to the spirit and substance of its Arusha agreements is a case in point.

Causality

It must be emphasized that in diagnosing connections between drivers and settlements, this analysis seeks to identify plausible connections, but it does not seek to statistically prove that they are causal (an endeavor beyond the scope of this project).
Infinite Complexity

For all of the reasons cited above, the relationships between structural drivers and ethnic settlements is one of extreme and ever-changing complexity. It is therefore worth noting the obvious: this assessment does not purport to be comprehensive; instead, it seeks to demonstrate the myriad connections between drivers and settlements necessary to evaluate its hypotheses.

It is essential to emphasize that in the analysis that follows, the process utilized to determine links between drivers and settlements has been informal and non-formulaic: each driver has been considered for possible significant connections to each settlement. Naturally, other researchers have likely identified most or all of these connections as a part of their research—often in different areas of research. Thus, for example, this thesis may note that countries, where regimes are evolving toward more classically liberal governance, are more likely to decouple their military from the state. It is a virtual certainty that many other researchers have investigated this relationship as a part of other research endeavors. A literature review of the efforts of other researchers to identify these linkages has not been done (it is deemed to be an unrealistic endeavor to conduct separate literature review on the possible connections between 44 drivers and 60 settlements for five countries—over 1300 combinations). The point of this analysis is not to identify hitherto undiscovered connections between drivers and settlements; rather, the objective is
to evaluate whether there are a plethora of such connections, and in so doing establish the basis for evaluating the project’s hypotheses.

The chart below considers connections between discrete drivers (column two) and settlements (column three). These linkages are numbered (column one). Sometimes, combinations of drivers are used, and in these situations, “combination” is written above the drivers. Column four discusses the hypothesized mechanism by which the driver(s) influence the settlement(s). The countries to which each connection is most applicable are listed in column five. Conceptually, the table is organized by category of driver, not settlement, according to the logic that one evaluates each driver, and then assess which settlement(s) it may engender. Restated, drivers cause the settlements and therefore the table is organized by drivers; not vice versa. Thus, the first section of Table 8 is “Background Factors: Economic,” the second section is “Background Factors: Demographics,” and the third section is “Background Factors: Ethnic-Related Involvement in Neighboring Countries.” These are the three subsections of Table 1 – Background Factors. After these, the subsections from Table 2 and Table 3 are covered. Finally, two other categories of potential linkages are covered: drivers that give way to other drivers; and settlements that tend to give rise to other settlements (an elaboration on the theme of “fluidity” discussed above).

Table 9. Discrete structural drivers and ethnic settlements.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Structural Driver(s)</th>
<th>Ethnic Settlement(s)</th>
<th>Mechanism of Operation (Hypothesized)</th>
<th>Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BACKGROUND FACTORS: ECONOMIC (1A)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Higher GDP/Capita (1/2)</td>
<td>Higher Democracy Index (4/6) and More Political Rights (4/31)</td>
<td>Modernization theory (controversial): As countries develop, they have higher propensity to become democracies.</td>
<td>Nigeria has highest GDP/Capita; 2nd highest Democracy Index and highest Political Rights Index in sample.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Higher GDP/Capita (1/2)</td>
<td>More Political Parties (5/4) and Fewer Political Party Restrictions (5/5) and More Political Party Equity (5/6)</td>
<td>Higher GDP/Capita tends to lead parties to pursue a more nationalist and less ethnic agenda.</td>
<td>Nigeria has highest GDP/Capita; fewest Political Party Restrictions and highest Political Party Equity in sample; and requires parties to have national presence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Higher GDP/Capita Growth Rate (1/3)</td>
<td>More Accommodative International Community in Supporting Ethnic Settlements (5/14)</td>
<td>International donors more likely to accept cosmetic ethnic settlements where GDP Growth is strong. Arguably a form of appeasement.</td>
<td>Ethiopia and Rwanda have highest GDP/Capita growth rates in sample (and Uganda did in prior era) and high degree of international support, even when ethnic settlements have not been substantive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Higher GDP/Capita Growth (1/3)</td>
<td>Minority Rule (Nature of Rule -- Majority or Minority) (4/13)</td>
<td>High GDP/Capita Growth Rates can facilitate acceptance of prolonged minority rule. Arguably a form of appeasement – economic growth and stability for political power.</td>
<td>Rwanda has high GDP/Capita growth rate as did Uganda in prior era, both minority-rule countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combination: The Presence of Oil (1/8) in a Federal State (4/25)</td>
<td>Number of States in Federal System Over Time (4/27)</td>
<td>Oil creates need for stronger central power relative to state power in order to manage oil revenue collection and distribution. This can be achieved by diluting the power of states via expanding their numbers.</td>
<td>Nigeria (oil) has dramatically expanded the number of states in its federal system; Ethiopia (no oil) has not.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Combination: The Presence of Oil (1/8) coupled with the Uneven Distribution of Natural Resources by Region (1/10)</td>
<td>Natural Resource Revenue Sharing Agreements (5/10)</td>
<td>High level of oil distributed in uneven ethno-regional pattern necessitates revenue sharing via allocation formulas.</td>
<td>Nigeria (unevenly distributed oil) has revenue derivation formula.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Combination: The Presence of Oil (1/8) coupled with Ethnic Military Composition (6/3)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Higher natural resource wealth leads to need for greater security and arguably more ethnically diverse military to</td>
<td>Nigeria has federal character principle (quotas) applied to military.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Composite (1/15)</td>
<td>prevent separatist movements tied to natural resources.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Combination: The Presence of Oil (1/8) coupled with Ethnic Composite (1/15)</td>
<td>Countries with natural resource abundance arguably require greater use of quotas to minimize threat of ethnic-based patrimonialism. Nigeria uses quotas for cabinet and bureaucracy.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**BACKGROUND FACTORS; DEMOGRAPHICS (1B)**

| 8 | Higher Total Population (1/12) and Reinforcing Cleavages (1/21) | Federal Vs. Unitary (4/25) | Countries are more likely to institute federal systems when the population is larger and concentrated regionally by ethnic group. Largest populations with ethno-regional concentration are Nigeria and Ethiopia (which have federal systems) and Uganda (where there has been much discussion of federalism). |

| 9 | Higher Population Density (1/13) and Agrarian Focus (1/6) | Ethnic Violence Peak (3/4) | Higher population density in agricultural societies can create high propensity for violence (often due to conflict over land), which can in turn necessitate a broad range of ethnic settlements to control inherently unstable situation. Rwanda and Burundi are agrarian economies with the highest densities in the sample, and both have had extreme violence, followed by broad arrays of ethnic settlements. |

| 10 | Non-Bipodal Ethnic Structure (1/14) and Ethnic Composite (1/15) | Federal versus Unitary (4/25) | Countries with non-bipodal ethnic structures have higher propensity to adopt federal system. Nigeria and Ethiopia (multipodal) have federal structures; Uganda (multipodal) regularly considers federal structure. |

| 11 | Higher Total Population (1/12) and Higher Ethnic Fragmentation (1/17) | More Political Parties (5/6) | Higher population and greater ethnic fragmentation tend to lead to more political parties. Nigeria and Ethiopia largest populations, very high levels of ethnic fragmentation and the most political parties. |

| 12 | Combination: Multipodal Ethnic Composite (1/15) and High Ethnic Fragmentation (1/14) | Consociational or Integrationist Constitution (4/4) | Two types of countries more likely to have consociational Constitution: High ethnic diversity/fragmentation irrespective of ethnic party in power; and bipodal with minority ethnic group in power. Two countries with Integrationist Constitutions are Rwanda (bipodal, minority in power) and Uganda (multipodal, largest ethnic group in power, but still distinct minority). |

<p>| 13 | Multipodal Ethnic Structure (1/14) | Zoning Agreements (5/2) | Zoning agreements (alternating political rule) are more common in countries with multipodal demographic Informal zoning agreement in Nigeria; intra-EPRDF ethnic power rotation occurring organically in |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Ethnic Composite (1/15)</td>
<td>Electoral Strategy for Lower House (5/7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Combination: Lower Concentration of Largest Ethnic Groups (1/15) and Higher Number of Ethnic Groups (1/16) in Countries with Federal Systems (4/25)</td>
<td>Number of States (4/27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Combination: Multipodal Ethnic Composite (1/15) and Reinforcing or Cleavages (1/21) and the Presence of Oil (1/8) and Uneven Distribution of Natural Resources (1/10)</td>
<td>Larger Military Role (3/11) Role and More Diverse Military Composition (6/3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td><strong>Combination:</strong> Higher Ethnic Diversity (1/15) and Reinforcing Cleavages (1/21)</td>
<td>Federal vs. Unitary (4/25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td><strong>Federal System</strong> (4/25)</td>
<td>No PR for Electoral Strategy for Lower House (5/7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td><strong>Bipodal Ethnic Structure (1/14) and Minority Rule (4/13)</strong></td>
<td>More Elaborate Management of National Narratives (6/11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td><strong>Christian-Islam Divide in Religious Composite (1/19)</strong></td>
<td>Zoning Agreements (5/2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**BACKGROUND ETHNIC-RELATED INVOLVEMENT IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES (1C)**

<p>| 21 | <strong>Conflictual Ethnic Involvement with Neighboring Countries (1/22)</strong> | Nature of Military Role (3/11) | When a country is involved in neighboring countries whose ethnic tensions mirror domestic ethnic tensions, it creates need for both (a) different military role and (b) arguably more regressive ethnic settlements in order to control potential multi-country conflagration. | Involvement of Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda in each other’s countries as well as Zaire (later DRC). |
| 22 | <strong>Conflictual Ethnic Involvement in Neighboring Countries (1/22)</strong> | Zoning Agreements (5/2) | Being involved in conflictual situations in neighboring states leads to more need for domestic stability and continuity in regime. Hence, countries involved in ethnic conflicts abroad have less | Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COLONIAL ERA – EVENTS: STATE FORMATION (2A)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>23</strong> Country is a Colonial Creation? (2/1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>24</strong> Country a Colonial Creation? (2/1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COLONIAL ERA EVENTS: COLONIAL POLITICAL RULE (2B)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>25</strong> Combination: Divide and Rule Strategy (2/4) and Multipodal Ethnic Composite (1/14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>26</strong> Combination: Ethnic Group in Power During Colonial Era (2/5) and Who Inherited the Colonial State (2/11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>27</strong> Minority Rule (Nature of Rule – Majority or Minority) (2/6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>28</strong> Nature of Rule (Majority/Minority) (2/6) and Ethnic Structure (1/14)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COLONIAL ERA EVENTS: COLONIAL ECONOMIC POLICY (2B)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLONIAL ERA EVENTS – INDEPENDENCE POLITICAL STRUCTURE (2C)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Who Inherited the Colonial State (2/11) in a Country with a Powerful Monarchical Tradition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Combination: Who Inherited the Colonial State (2/11) and Has Colonial Power Returned to Power (4/15)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES – POLITICAL PARTIES AT INDEPENDENCE (3A)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31 Higher Frequency of Violence (3/3) and Higher Peak Violence (3/4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32 Combination: Higher Frequency of Conflict (3/3) and Higher Peak Violence (3/4) and State That Pre-Existed the Colonial Era (2/1) and Where Inter-Ethnic Relations Were Harmonious (2/2) and Minority Rule (4/13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33 Country was Colonial Fabrication (2/1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34 Nature and Frequency of Conflict (3/3) and Whether</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country was Colonial Fabrication (2/1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 Secesson Threat (3/5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36 Combination: Nature and Frequency of Conflict (3/3) and Secesson Threat (3/5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37 Combination: Progression of Modes of Rule (3/9) and Nature of Rule (Majority or Minority) (4/13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38 Combination: Nature of Rule (Majority or Minority) (4/13) and Reinforcing Cleavages (1/21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39 Combination: Nature of Rule (Majority or Minority) (4/13) and Progression of Modes of Rule (3/9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 Nature of Rule (Minority or Majority) (4/13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 Ethnic Structure (1/14)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES – REGIME AND LEADERSHIP CHANGES (3C)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>37 Combination: Progression of Modes of Rule (3/9) and Nature of Rule (Majority or Minority) (4/13)</th>
<th>Strongman Rule (4/10)</th>
<th>Transitioning to enduring minority rule requires strongman.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda (Kagame), Uganda (Museveni).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38 Combination: Nature of Rule (Majority or Minority) (4/13) and Reinforcing Cleavages (1/21)</td>
<td>Provision of Education (6/4)</td>
<td>Prolonged minority rule can lead to biased education system (in support of minority rule).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-colonial Burundi under Southern Bururi Tutsi leadership; Baganda in colonial Uganda.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39 Combination: Nature of Rule (Majority or Minority) (4/13) and Progression of Modes of Rule (3/9)</td>
<td>Military Linked to State (4/9) and Ethnically Biased Military Composition (6/3)</td>
<td>Critical to have military fused to state and heavy ethnic personnel bias when instituting minority rule – stabilize minority control and minimize threat of coup.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda; Uganda; Post-colonial Burundi under Southern Bururi Tutsi leadership.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 Nature of Rule (Minority or Majority) (4/13)</td>
<td>Language (6/5) and Bans on Ethnic References (6/10)</td>
<td>Prolonged rule by ethnic minority leads to greater need to suppress ethnic references. Allowing ethnic references in dialogue heightens awareness of minority rule.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda especially, and Uganda.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 Ethnic Structure (1/14)</td>
<td>Term Limits (5/1)</td>
<td>Arguably, easier to extend term limits in bipodal countries, whether under minority rule (since regime is already repressive, and extending term limits merely exacerbates this), or under majority rule (since</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda and Burundi have extended term limits; Uganda did as well but then repealed them; Abiy Ahmed is discussing instituting term limits; term limits exist in Nigeria.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section</td>
<td>Text</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 42 | **Progression in Mode of Rule (3/9) and Reinforcing Cleavages (1/21)**  
**Ethnic Background of Current Leader (4/14)**  
For countries with reinforcing ethno-regional-religious cleavages that are moving in direction of more plurality, arguably some tendency for leaders to have mixed ethnic heritage.  
Nigeria (Buhari) and Ethiopia (Abiy Ahmed) both with mixed ethno-regional lineage. |
| 43 | **STRUCTURAL DRIVER TO STRUCTURAL DRIVER (TABLES 1-3)**  
**Combination:**  
Ethnic Composite (1/15) and Land Ownership (1/11) and Progression of Mode of Rule (3/9)  
**Land Use Policy (1/11)**  
**Major Threat of Ethnic-Based Secession (3/5)**  
Countries with ethnic regime change following major violence that leads to significant refugees later tend to adopt controversial land policy bestowing land on returning refugees from party in power.  
Rwanda, Burundi |
| 44 | **Is Country a Colonial Creation or Did It Preexist (2/1)**  
**Major Threat of Ethnic-Based Secession (3/5)**  
Higher threat of secession where the country is a colonial creation (Nigeria, Ethiopia via “internal colonialism,” and Uganda)  
Nigeria, Ethiopia, Uganda |
| 45 | **ETHNIC SETTLEMENT TO ETHNIC SETTLEMENT (TABLES 4 – 6)**  
**Ethnic Impacts of Constitution (4/2)**  
Managing Narratives (6/11)  
By focusing on ethnicity, one enshrines it rather than diminishes it as a political variable.  
Nigeria, Ethiopia and Burundi Constitutions all focus heavily on ethnicity. |
| 46 | **Integrative Constitution (4/4)**  
Party Restrictions (5/5); Ethnic Reference Restrictions (6/10); and Managing Narratives (6/11)  
Integrative Constitutions tend to be accompanied by strong party restrictions, ethnic reference restrictions, and major initiatives to manage national narratives in order to minimize ethnic consciousness.  
Rwanda classic example. |
| 47 | **De facto Single-Party State (4/8)**  
Role of Military – Fused with Party and/or State (4/9)  
More distributed political power implies less reliance on military and less need to fuse military with state.  
Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda have fused party and military; Nigeria and Ethiopia have not. |
| 48 | **Nature of Rule (Majority or Minority) (4/13)**  
4-Pronged Power Configuration (4/12)  
Prolonged minority rule increases likelihood of enduring “strongman” leader leading a single-party state that is linked to an ethnic group with the military fused to the party/state.  
Rwanda, Uganda |
The vast majority of driver-settlement connections discussed above are self-explanatory. Thus, the discussion that follows will focus on those connections that illustrate broader themes that emerge from this analysis.

First, some drivers are of extreme importance—they appear again and again as influencers of settlements; while others are much less significant. Key drivers include: GDP per capita (1/2), the presence of oil (1/8), ethnic structure (1/14), ethnic composite (1/15), reinforcing or cross-cutting cleavages (1/21), whether the country is a colonial fabrication (2/1), the use of direct or indirect rule (2/4), the utilization of a colonial divide-and-rule strategy (2/4), whether colonial rule was via the majority or minority ethnic group (2/6), who inherited the colonial state (2/11), ruling party at independence (3/2), was there a major threat of secession (3/5), and progression of modes of rule since colonial era (3/9).

Second, the ethnic settlement to ethnic settlement section (numbers 45 to 50 in the table) is important to emphasize. Thus, for example (number 46), once a country has established an integrative Constitution (4/2), this will have implications for the development of other settlements—e.g., political party restrictions (5/5), ethnic speech restrictions (6/10) and the management of ethnic narratives (6/11). One might think of it as a sequenced progression: a certain set of structural drivers creates the impetus for an
integrative Constitution, and this, in turn, creates the motivation for other ethnic settlements.

Third, a highly valuable, exportable natural resource (such as oil—1/8), especially when unevenly distributed by region/ethnic group (1/10), has tremendous impact on the calculus of ethnic settlements, as revenue collection, revenue allocation, the oil curse (which may apply differentially across regions) and the importance of central power all come into play.

Fourth, consistent with the findings of the prior section, the connections between drivers and settlements often cluster around certain subsets of countries. For example, Nigeria and Ethiopia have a high number of situations where there are linkages between drivers and settlements, as do Rwanda and Uganda.
Chapter VI

Conclusion: Evaluating the Hypothesis

This section summarizes the implications of the analysis for the three hypotheses of this thesis. The first hypothesis claims that there are large variations in the nature of the ethnic settlements reached across the countries. This is clearly the case. There are countries with zoning agreements to ensure political power rotation (e.g., Nigeria) and those without; countries that utilize ethnic federalism as a means to address ethnic tension (e.g., Nigeria, Ethiopia) and others that don’t; countries that utilize re-education programs to try to influence the manner in which ethnicity is understood in the country (e.g., Rwanda and to a lesser extent Uganda) and those that don’t; countries that use proportional representation in electoral design (e.g., Rwanda, Burundi) and those that do not. Indeed, an examination of the tables that summarize ethnic settlements (Tables 4, 5, and 6) reveal vast differences across countries.

The second hypothesis asserts that there is a clear connection between the structural characteristics that define a country and the nature of the ethnic settlements that emerge there. In effect, this argues that ethnic settlements are, to a reasonable extent, path-dependent.

The analysis supports this contention as well, and at two levels—the aggregate level and the discrete level. At the aggregate level, countries develop amalgamations of ethnic settlements in response to needs created by the amalgamations of their structural
drivers. The conditions in each country provide strong incentives to establish certain types of ethnic settlements. Each country has a different mix of priorities—for peace and stability, for economic development and for pluralistic democracy. These differential profiles of priorities create different motivations for ethnic settlements. A review of Table 7 demonstrates the clear linkages between the amalgamation of drivers that define a country and the amalgamation of ethnic settlements that have emerged in each.

The same theme—powerful connections between drivers and settlements—exists at the discrete level. Individual structural drivers tend to be associated with individual ethnic settlements across countries. These linkages are summarized in Table 8.

Finally, the third hypothesis, which emanates directly from the first two, asserts that if in fact, there are clear connections between drivers and settlements, one would, therefore, expect to find patterns and trends in the linkages between drivers and settlements. That is, countries with certain profiles of structural drivers would tend to develop reasonably similar profiles of ethnic settlements. Again, the analysis supports this hypothesis. Exhibit 2 posits that the five countries of this sample can be meaningfully grouped into three camps. The first is countries that pursue prolonged, enforced ethnic minority rule and accordingly adopt various ethnic settlement strategies to suppress majority ethnic group political mobilization. These countries are Rwanda and Uganda. The second is countries that are ruled by the majority ethnic group, but that also deploy ethnic settlement strategies to promote a political settlement that favors the majority ethnic group. In our sample of countries, Burundi is the one that fits this model. Finally, Nigeria and Ethiopia represent countries where there is a more authentic move toward
genuine democracy, where political power has some propensity to be shared and rotated, and where ethnic settlements tend to support this objective. It must be emphasized that the inclusion of Ethiopia in this grouping is highly controversial, and to some extent reflects directional aspiration rather than achieved results. Abiy Ahmed is a figure who represents the possibility for progress in this regard, but it is far too early to assess the impact of his legacy. The emergence of three different models, defined by similarities in profiles in drivers and settlements across countries, provides strong support for hypothesis three.

Thus, the analysis strongly supports the three hypotheses established at the outset of this thesis. There are clearly myriad powerful and insightful connections between the structural drivers and ethnic settlements within and between countries. It is also the case that the systematic studying of these connections can yield significant insights into the understanding of ethnic political dynamics in post-colonial Africa.
Appendix 1

Country Selection Screening Process

1. All Countries in Africa

Morocco; Western Sahara; Algeria; Tunisia; Libya; Mauritania; Mali; Niger; Chad; Sudan; South Sudan; Ethiopia; Eritrea; Djibouti; Somalia; Senegal; Gambia; Guinea-Bissau; Cape Verde; Guinea; Sierra Leone; Liberia; Ivory Coast; Burkina Faso; Ghana; Togo; Benin; Nigeria; Cameroon; Central African Republic; Gabon; Equatorial Guinea; Congo Brazzaville; Congo Kinshasa; Uganda; Rwanda; Burundi; Kenya; Tanzania; Angola; Zimbabwe; Zambia; Malawi; Mozambique; Namibia; South Africa; Botswana; Madagascar; Lesotho; Swaziland; Sao Tome and Principe; Mauritius; Comoros

2. There is Significant Post-Independence Ethnic Conflict

a. No: Eritrea; Gambia; Guinea-Bissau; Cape Verde; Burkina Faso; Benin; Gabon; Equatorial Guinea; Tanzania; Zambia; Mozambique; Lesotho; Swaziland; Sao Tome and Principe
b. Yes: Morocco; Western Sahara; Algeria; Tunisia; Libya; Tunisia; Mauritania; Mali; Niger; Chad; Sudan; South Sudan; Ethiopia; Djibouti; Somalia; Senegal; Guinea; Sierra Leone; Liberia; Ivory Coast; Ghana; Togo; Nigeria; Cameroon; Central African Republic; Congo Brazzaville; Congo Kinshasa; Uganda; Rwanda; Burundi; Kenya; Angola; Zimbabwe; Malawi; Namibia; South Africa; Botswana; Madagascar; Mauritius; Comoros

3. The Ethnic Conflict is Not Recent

a. No: Libya; Egypt; South Sudan
b. Yes: Morocco; Western Sahara; Algeria; Tunisia; Mauritania; Mali; Niger; Chad; Sudan; Ethiopia; Djibouti; Somalia; Senegal; Guinea; Sierra Leone; Liberia; Ivory Coast; Ghana; Togo; Nigeria; Cameroon; Central African Republic; Congo Brazzaville; Congo Kinshasa; Uganda; Rwanda; Burundi; Kenya; Angola; Zimbabwe; Malawi; Namibia; South Africa; Botswana; Madagascar; Mauritius; Comoros
4. *The Ethnic Conflict is of Large Scale*

   a. No: Ghana; Cameroon; Malawi; Namibia; Botswana; Madagascar; Djibouti

   b. Yes: Morocco; Western Sahara; Algeria; Tunisia; Mauritania; Mali; Niger; Chad; Sudan; Ethiopia; Somalia; Senegal; Guinea; Sierra Leone; Liberia; Ivory Coast; Togo; Nigeria; Central Africa Republic; Congo-Brazzaville; Congo Kinshasa; Uganda; Rwanda; Burundi; Kenya; Angola; Zimbabwe; South Africa; Mauritius; Comoros

5. *The Ethnic Conflict is Intra-State and Does Not Significantly Involve Outside Countries*

   a. No: Morocco; Western Sahara

   b. Yes: Algeria; Tunisia; Mauritania; Mali; Niger; Chad; Sudan; Ethiopia; Somalia; Senegal; Guinea; Sierra Leone; Liberia; Ivory Coast; Togo; Nigeria; Central Africa Republic; Congo-Brazzaville; Congo Kinshasa; Uganda; Rwanda; Burundi; Kenya; Angola; Zimbabwe; South Africa; Mauritius; Comoros

6. *The Ethnic Conflict is Primarily Ethnic; Not Via Class*

   a. No: Morocco; Algeria; Tunisia

   b. Yes: Mauritania; Mali; Niger; Chad; Sudan; Ethiopia; Somalia; Senegal; Guinea; Sierra Leone; Liberia; Ivory Coast; Togo; Nigeria; Central Africa Republic; Congo-Brazzaville; Congo Kinshasa; Uganda; Rwanda; Burundi; Kenya; Angola; Zimbabwe; South Africa; Mauritius; Comoros

7. *The Post-independence Ethnic Conflict is Primarily Indigenous; Not Primarily Indigenous vs. European*

   a. No: Kenya; South Africa; Zimbabwe

   b. Yes: Mauritania; Mali; Niger; Chad; Sudan; Ethiopia; Somalia; Senegal; Guinea; Sierra Leone; Liberia; Ivory Coast; Togo; Nigeria; Central Africa Republic; Congo-Brazzaville; Congo Kinshasa; Uganda; Rwanda; Burundi; Kenya; Angola; Zimbabwe; South Africa; Mauritius; Comoros
8. *The Ethnic Conflict Has Significant Scope*

   a. No: Congo-Brazzaville; Mauritius
   b. Yes: Mauritania; Mali; Niger; Chad; Sudan; Ethiopia; Somalia; Senegal; Guinea; Sierra Leone; Liberia; Ivory Coast; Togo; Nigeria; Central Africa Republic; Congo Kinshasa; Uganda; Rwanda; Burundi; Angola; Comoros

9. *The Ethnic Conflict Has Significant Complexity*

   a. No: Mauritania; Mali; Niger; Chad; Senegal; Guinea; Sierra Leone; Ivory Coast; Togo; Central African Republic; Angola; Comoros
   b. Yes: Sudan; Ethiopia; Somalia; Liberia; Nigeria; Congo Kinshasa; Uganda; Rwanda; Burundi

10. *Significant Progress Has Been Made to Address the Ethnic Conflict*

    a. No: Somalia; Congo-Kinshasa; Sudan; Liberia
    b. Yes: Ethiopia; Nigeria; Uganda; Rwanda; Burundi
    c. Possible, But Some Remaining Issue: Mauritius (Scope); Djibouti (Scale); Liberia (Progress); Namibia (Scale); Somalia (Progress); Mauritania (Complexity); Mali (Complexity); Chad (Complexity); Niger (Complexity)

11. *Selected Countries*

    o Nigeria; Ethiopia; Rwanda; Burundi; Uganda
Appendix 2

Significance of Research

The significance of the research will be:

1. To chronicle the breadth of ethnic political settlements implemented in select countries in post-colonial Africa.
2. To chronicle the breadth of factors that influence which ethnic political settlements have been implemented.
3. To demonstrate the linkages between these two realms—how drivers influence settlements.
4. To demonstrate the power of analyzing ethnic settlements in a manner that is:
   a. Broad: That addresses the full scope of drivers and settlements within a country (although not every driver and settlement, which would be so vast as to be unfeasible), rather than just focusing on several drivers and/or settlements
   b. Comparative: That assesses multiple countries simultaneously rather than just focusing on one country
   c. Incorporates Purpose: That assesses the motivation behind the political settlements, rather than just accepting their governmental rhetorical rationale
5. To demonstrate an analytical process with frameworks to analyze ethnic political settlements that can be used to inform other, more expansive studies of this topic (possibly including additional African countries and/or countries from different continents).

The research will occupy an uncommon position in the literature on ethnic political settlements. Current research on ethnic political settlements tends to focus on: individual settlements rather than comprehensive mosaics; descriptions of settlements not linked structural drivers; and individual countries, rather than multi-country comparative assessments. There are studies that are broader along one or two of the aforementioned dimensions (e.g., studies that examine a full range of settlements within one country; studies that discuss connections between some drivers and some settlements within one country; or studies that examine a few settlements across a few countries). However, to the author’s understanding, there has not yet been an attempt made to incorporate a large number of drivers and settlements and analyze and compare their interconnections across multiple countries. By simultaneously adopting this more expansive approach, the
research hopes to contribute to a broader, more insightful approach to understanding Africa’s post-colonial ethnic political settlements.
Appendix 3

Definition of Terms

**Colonial Era:** The period of European involvement in a given African territory, generally focused on the era of more intensive engagement—the late-nineteenth and twentieth centuries—as opposed to the less intrusive interactions in prior centuries. In this thesis, the end of the colonial era is independence (even though colonial powers often exerted significant influence after this date).

**Constructivist View of Ethnicity:** The view that ethnic identities evolve over time as a function of historical processes. They are not innate (see primordial) or fabricated (see instrumental).

**Ethnicity:** Used in a broad and general sense to refer to a group of people with a shared heritage and/or culture. The term is at times linked with the modifiers constructed, primordial or instrumental.

**Ethnic Political Settlement:** The range of agreements—both legal and informal—that dictate the nature of relations between ethnic groups within a country. These include electoral systems, power-sharing agreements, truth and reconciliation commissions, deployed historical narratives, etc. It is the comprehensive set of inter-ethnic laws and agreements that define the ethnic relationships within a country.

**Instrumentalist View of Ethnicity:** The view that ethnic identities can be fabricated for the purpose of mobilizing a populace for political and/or economic gain.

**Metropole:** The European colonial power that ruled a given African country.

**Neo-Colonialism:** The ongoing role of the colonial power (political, economic, military, institutional, etc.) in the African country after formal independence.

**Neo-Patrimonial:** A method of politics and governance that relies on the bestowing of economic largesse on select groups (ethnic, religious, regional, etc.) that are allies of the regime.

**Path Dependency:** The theory that starting conditions in a country significantly influence later outcomes. Thus, to understand the current conditions (e.g., ethnic political settlements) in a country, one must understand the historical factors that generated these conditions.

**Post-Colonial:** The era in a country after formal independence.

**Pre-Colonial:** The era in a given territory prior to the era of colonial involvement.

**Primordial View of Ethnicity:** The view that ethnic identities are inherent to groups of people, based on lineage, and are thus relatively static.

**Structural:** The underlying historical factors that give rise to the political arrangements (e.g., ethnic political settlements) within a country. This concept is used to acknowledge the seminal importance of select attributes that play an ongoing role in driving events in a country. Thus, a colonial power ruling through a minority ethnic group, a minority ethnic group holding political power after independence, and the distribution of land and natural resource rights in a manner that favors a specific ethnic group, are all examples of structural historical factors.
Appendix 4

Research Methods

The research will proceed in four phases (Figure 2).

![Figure 2. Four-phased methodology.](image)

The first phase will be to complete a review of the various ethnic political settlements that have been reached in each of the five countries. These settlements will be chronicled in summary form in tables that will provide a cryptic summary of the research conducted for this study. To complete this analysis, a meta-analysis of other researchers’ assessments will be completed. The objective of this phase is to develop a mosaic of the ethnic settlements in each country.

The second phase will be to complete a summary review of the modern (modern pre-colonial, colonial, independence, post-independence) history of each county, with an emphasis on identifying the factors that drive the ethnic political settlements. For example, to understand the ethnic settlements, one must understand the ethnic composition of the country; the nature of the pre-colonial ethnic relations; the manner in which colonial rule altered these relations; the distribution of natural resources by ethno-geographic region; the geo-political realities of the country; etc. The objective of this phase is not to retell modern history; but rather to review modern history to distill from it the structural drivers of the ethnic settlements in each country. It is impossible to develop a meaningful understanding of the ethnic political settlements arrived in each country
without understanding the factors that produced them. This phase will invoke the same methodology as the first phase—a meta-analysis of other researchers’ assessments.

The third phase will be to assess the linkages between the first two phases for each country. That is, this phase will seek to explain the myriad mechanisms by which the structural drivers and the ethnic political settlements have interacted within a country. For example, in Burundi, the colonial disruption of reasonably harmonious inter-ethnic relations via a divide-and-rule strategy, by which it governed primarily via the minority Tutsi population, and the continuation of this minority rule system for several decades after independence has had tremendous influence on the nature of the ethnic settlement process. The approach used will be a free-flowing qualitative assessment, based on an assessment of the various interrelationships between settlements and drivers.

The fourth phase will be to compare the ethnic settlements and their drivers across the five countries. This will start with a descriptive comparison of ethnic settlements. These settlements will then be interpreted in light of their historical structural drivers. For example, how has the fact that Rwanda transitioned from majority ethnic rule at independence to minority ethnic rule in the 1990s wave of democracy influenced the design of its electoral system relative to Burundi, which went through the inverse historical progression (from minority to majority ethnic rule)? To what extent is Ethiopia’s structural situation (an extended period of minority rule, in a manner many experts deem to be effectively non-democratic) similar to Rwanda’s? As with phase three, the approach used will be a free-flowing qualitative assessment.

The four phases of the study and their interrelationships are depicted in Exhibit Three. It is important to reiterate that phases one and two will rely on a meta-analysis of the assessments of other experts; while phases three and four will rely on a free-flowing (i.e., not formulaic), creative analysis of the interconnections between the factors generated in the first two phases.
Appendix 5

Research Limitation

There are four primary limitations on the research for this study:

- **Comprehensiveness of Meta-Analyses:** The first and second phases of the research—conducting meta-analyses of the research done by other scholars to chronicle the ethnic political assessments reached in each country (phase I) and to review modern history to distill the underlying structural drivers in each country (phase II)—will involve gathering information on a considerable number of variables for each country. The meta-analysis for each variable will be partial. That is, the objective will be to reach an accurate understanding of each variable; not to conduct an exhaustive review of existing research for each.

- **Subjectivity of Analytic Process:** The third and fourth phases of the research—diagnosing linkages between structural factors and ethnic settlements (phase III) and making comparisons in the ethnic settlements across countries (phase IV)—will involve a free-flowing, creative analytical process. The nature of this process is inherently subjective—it does not rely on algorithms to reveal meaningful comparisons. Thus, it is certain that some insights will be over-emphasized while others will be inadvertently overlooked.

- **Number of Countries Analyzed:** This study will focus on five countries. Naturally, a more comprehensive comparison of ethnic settlements in post-colonial Africa would be possible if all 55 nations were included.

- **English Sources:** The sources used for the thesis will be in English. The author does not have experience in any African language, and only limited experience in some languages of the non-British European colonial powers, and thus the research will be exclusively from works in English.
Endnotes


8. Ibid., 71.


15. Ibid., 172.

16. Ibid., 173.


21. Ibid., 69.


34. Ibid., 88.

35. Ibid., 88.


38. Ibid., 92.


40. Ibid., 15.


42. Young, “Regionalism,” 202-203.


44. See, for example, Abbink, “Paradoxes.”


53. Ibid., 31.


56. Ibid., 164.


60. Hayman, “Right Direction,” 64.


65. Ibid., 121.


67. Ibid., 1608.


74. Ibid., 1609.


77. Ibid., 4.


83. There are also important intra-ethnic divisions (e.g., Southern Tutsis suffered much fewer casualties than Northern Tutsis during the genocide; and Southern Hutus were favored relative to Northern Hutus during the post-colonial Tutsi regimes). See: Leonce Ndikumana, “Distributional Conflict, the State and Peace Building in Burundi,” The Round Table 94, no. 381 (2005): 413-427.

84. Herisse, “Development,” 297. The brackets are the author’s.


88. Ibid., 667.


91. Ibid., 567.

92. Ibid., 573.


99. Ibid., 420.


102. Samii, “Perils or Promise,” 561.


108. Ibid., 86.

109. Ibid., 86.


115. Ibid., 439.


118. Ibid., 414.


120. Ibid., 715.

121. Ibid., 716.


131. Ibid., 72.

132. See, for example, Crawford Young, The Postcolonial State, 316-318, 320-333.


134. Ibid., 40, 74.


136. Ibid., 254.


138. Dowden, Altered States, 41.


141. Ibid., 237.


151. Ibid., 63.

152. Singiza and DeVisser, “Unresolved Ethnic Question,” 123.


ET-UG. Note: Current GDP/Capita in 2018 Current USD; 20 Year Time Series Data in 2010 Constant USD.

160. Ibid.


162. Ibid.


169. Yasin Olum, The Federal Question in Uganda. (Kampala: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Uganda Office, 2013), 54. https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/uganda/10725.pdf. Note: The formation of kingdoms before colonialism was socio-cultural and political in nature, and today their existence has been fused with a demand for federalism in certain areas. Indeed, the old kingdoms, including the Buganda kingdom, were recognized by the quasi-federal 1962 constitution. Hence, the persistent demand by the Mengo establishment for the return of 9,000 square miles of confiscated land in Buganda along with the implementation of federalism.


176. Ibid.


182. Nigeria was created by Britain in a series of steps starting in the 19th century, culminating in the formal unification of the area as the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria in 1914. Ethiopia was not successfully colonized by Italy (although it was occupied by Italy from 1935-1941). However, it was created through internal annexation of territory and is thus deemed as a “colonial creation” for conceptual purposes in this study. Ruanda and Burundi were independent kingdoms before being managed as the single entity of Ruanda-Burundi (first as part of German East Africa and later under Belgian rule) until independence in 1962. In what became Uganda, the British started its rule of the region via the Buganda Kingdom, and then incorporated adjacent territory to create the Uganda Protectorate in 1894.


189


185. In Nigeria, rule was via Hausa-Fulani; in Ethiopia, rule was via Amhara in North; in Rwanda and Burundi, rule was via Tutsi; in Uganda, rule was via the Baganda.


189. Note that the phrase, “inheriting the colonial state,” is a commonly used phrase in the literature on this subject. For a discussion of the differential development
between the North and South in Nigeria under colonial rule, see: Bola Dauda and Toyin Falola, *Representative Bureaucracy, Meritocracy, and Nation Building in Nigeria.* (New York: Cambria Press, 2015).


191. Again, the concept of “independence” does not technically apply to Ethiopia since it was not colonized. For purposes of this entry, independence is deemed to be in two phases – the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) led defeat of the Derg in 1991 and the later rise of the EPRDF in 1995.


Carney, “A Brief History.”

194. Some speculate that the Baganda made secession overtones in 1966.

195. The role of the Catholic Church in Rwanda has been complicated. See, for example: Carney, “A Brief History.”

196. Southern Bururi versus Muramvya Monarchy in North; and Northern versus Southern Hutu.


200. For a discussion on the meaning of the silence on secession in the Nigerian Constitution, see:


208. Abiy Ahmed’s father was a Muslim Oromo; his mother was a Christian Amhara. Nkurunziza’s father was a Catholic Hutu; his mother was a Protestant Tutsi.

209. The Hausa-Fulani are part of the zoning (power sharing) understanding in Nigeria. In Ethiopia, the “colonial era power” is the Amhara (in power via domestic imperialism, as discussed previously), and they are a member of the EPRDF, and hence have achieved “partial” return to power.


213. Ibid. This is category A2 in the Freedom House evaluations (“Were the current national legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections?”).


Sarah Wells, Maria Burnett, Christopher Huggins, Leslie Haskell, and Alison Des Forges, “VIII. Independence of the Judiciary,” in Law and Reality: Progress in Judicial

226. This is a complicated topic. There are revenue sharing agreements on different levels -- production sharing contracts (between the host country and foreign producers); derivation formulae (to allocate oil profits between states); etc. Nigeria has had a number of different derivation formulae over time.


229. This is deemed to be commonly understood information informally derived from myriad sources.


251. Ibid., 66.


257. Ibid., p. 174.

258. Campbell, Nigeria, 4.


270. Ibid., 308.


273. Ibid., 130.


275. Charles Schaefer, “‘We Say They Are Neftenya, They Say We Are OLF’: A Post-Election Assessment of Ethnicity, Politics and Age-Sets in Oromiya,” in Kjetil Tronvoll and Tobias Hagmann (Editors), *Contested Power*, 216-217.

276. Ibid., 169 and 270.


290. Saha, Ethnicity, 33.


297. Ibid., 70.


309. Ibid., 68.

310. Ibid., 73.


312. Clark, “Rwanda’s Recovery,” 36-38. Note that the author is referencing “conversations” – over 1000 conversations with Rwandans conducted over 15 years.


328. Ibid., 418-419.
332. Lemarchand, Burundi, 152.
333. Ibid., 105.
337. Lemarchand, Burundi, 132.
338. Ibid., 135-136.
339. Ibid., 105.
341. Ibid., 273.
342. Ibid., 273.
343. Ibid., 272.
344. Ibid., 266.
345. Ibid., 271.
346. Ibid., 274.


349. See, for example, Curtis, “International Peacebuilding.”

350. Lemarchand, Burundi, 18.


354. Ibid., 207.

355. Ibid., 208.

356. Ibid., 208.


362. Okuku, Ethnicity, 12. The concept of having a minority group favor the continued existence of a monarchical form of government because it can serve to legitimate minority rule is noted in the literature by several authors.


366. Ibid., 212.


372. Ibid., 87, 201.


387. Ibid., 155-156.


Bibliography


Schaefer, Charles. “‘We say they are Neftenya, they say we are OLF’: A Post-Election Assessment of Ethnicity, Politics and Age-Sets in Oromiya.” In Contested Power in Ethiopia. Edited by Kjetil Tronvoll and Tobias Hagmann, 193-220. Leiden: Koninkijke Brill, 2012.


Interviews from cited authors

Louis Nduwimana, Employee at the UNDP during the embargo, Bujumbura, 20.8.2013.