The Paradox of Participatory Institutions: Explaining the Limits and Potential of Large-Scale Experiments in Participatory Democracy

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"The Paradox of Participatory Institutions:

 Explaining the Limits and Potential of Large-Scale

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The Paradox of Participatory Institutions:
Explaining the Limits and Potential of
Large-Scale Experiments in Participatory Democracy

Abstract

In an era when declining support for traditional political parties has given rise to anti-establishment populist movements around the world, participatory institutions (PIs) —formal institutions that give ordinary citizens a direct role in shaping public decision-making— offer an important set of tools for combating deficits in democratic legitimacy. Recognizing this, governments have implemented a bewildering diversity of PIs. But PIs that have a meaningful real-world impact—what I refer to as Binding Participatory Institutions (BPIs)—face a paradox: the conditions required for widespread implementation undermine BPIs' success once established. On the one hand, parties only invest seriously in BPIs when they expect to benefit electorally. On the other hand, parties with an incentive to implement these institutions also have an incentive to politicize them. This stops BPIs from accomplishing their most basic goal: representing the communities they serve.

To understand this paradox, the first part of my dissertation explores the conditions that produce gaps between formal BPI adoption into national laws, and nationwide implementation (specifically when BPIs have been put into practice in all or nearly all of a country's municipalities). While formal adoption is relatively common, nationwide implementation has been rare. I develop a theory to account for this variation, grounded in political parties' electoral incentives. I argue that BPIs will only move beyond formal adoption and achieve nationwide implementation if they are promoted by a powerful institution—often a political party. In turn, parties will only implement

iii

BPIs if they place a higher value on the potential electoral benefits of implementation than on the costs. This will occur under two conditions: first, parties must face societal demand to implement BPIs. Second, parties' political opponents must be incapable of taking advantage of the institution for their own political gain.

The second part of my dissertation explores the fate of BPIs after implementation. Specifically, why do BPIs often represent particular interests, even though they are meant to serve the whole community? I argue that the representativeness of BPIs —a measure of politicization and rates of community participation—is affected by the type of institution that implements them. Governing parties ordinarily have an incentive to exclude supporters of opposition parties, as they do not want to waste scarce resources wooing unswayable voters. So, while overall rates of participation can be high—since parties hope to attract as many of their own supporters as possible —BPIs implemented by political parties often suffer from high rates of politicization, and fail to represent broad community interests. By contrast, when technocrats take the lead in BPI implementation, there will be less politicization, but implementation will be top-down, and will generate little buy-in from citizens, producing low participation.

BPIs will only be implemented nationwide *and* be representative, when championed by political parties with an electoral incentive to promote cross-partisan participation. These are young, outsider parties that cannot rely on state resources to secure broad-based political support, and therefore have no choice but to rely primarily on programmatic voter appeals. When these parties implement BPIs, they do so to cultivate a reputation for good governance and democratic deepening. Politicizing the institutions would undermine this reputation, and low rates of participation would minimize the institutions' electoral value—since few supporters or potential

supporters would engage with or have knowledge of the benefits derived from them. Consequently, these parties have an incentive both to maximize participation and minimize politicization.

The dissertation explores the implications of this theory in nine Latin American countries, and draws upon over a year and-a-half of fieldwork in Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, the Dominican Republic, and Brazil. I conducted hundreds of in-depth interviews with local leaders as well as key national figures responsible for implementing BPIs in these countries, observed dozens of meetings, conducted archival research, and implemented a nationally representative survey of nearly 1,800 Venezuelans in 2018.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF TABLES

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION: THE PARADOX OF PARTICIPATORY INSTITUTIONS

There is an astonishing range of participatory institutions (PIs) around the world. These are formal institutions that give ordinary citizens a direct role in shaping public decision-making. Examples range from institutions with real decision-making authority, such as participatory budgeting or consulting with communities affected by a proposed extractive or infrastructure project, to participatory mechanisms of a largely symbolic character that have little or no effect on any important outcomes.[1] The latter include citizen oversight committees of municipal governments (Ayo, 2004; Gaytán Olmedo, 2005), and local, regional, and national-level policy and planning councils (Jara & Vera, 2012; Mayka, 2019; Pogrebinschi & Samuels, 2014), among many others.[2] While a global census is not available, the sheer magnitude of participatory institutions is clear. For instance, over the past 10 years the World Bank has invested $85 billion to globally support community participation (Baiocchi & Ganuza, 2017). In Latin America alone, over 2,400 participatory institutions have been created over the past three decades, with over 200 million participants. This is more than a third of the size of the entire population of Latin America. Table 1.1 provides a summary of participatory institutions in Latin America, based on a comprehensive dataset from the team at the LATINNO project.[3] Table 1.1 presents several key variables for each country in Latin America. One is the number of distinct

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[1] See LATINNO 2017 and Abbott 2019 for a broad overview.
[2] See LATINNO 2017 and Abbott 2019 for a broad overview.
[3] While other cross-national databases of PIs exist (particularly Participedia.net) none has reached anywhere near the level of comprehensiveness offered by the LATINNO dataset. It should be noted that the LATINNO data are very new, and consequently a range of cases of participatory democracy in Latin America may not yet be included in the dataset. Nonetheless, the LATINNO dataset includes all PIs identified by scholars to date that conform to the definition provided above of any formal institution that includes individual citizens and/or civil society actors in directly government affairs, either in an advisory, oversight and/or decision-making capacity.

participatory institutions (ranging from participatory budgeting, to education and health councils, to thematic advisory boards, and beyond). The second variable reports the sum of individual cases of all PIs in a given country. For instance, participatory budgeting is a single participatory institution, but, if it occurs in 250 municipalities in a given country, LATINNO would report 250 cases of PB for that country. Finally, participants since 1990 is the total number of individuals reported to have participated in all of the PIs in a given country between 1990 and 2016. Since individuals can participate in more than one participatory institution, the total volume of participation may exceed the total population of a given country.[4]

Table 1.1: Summary of Participatory Institutions in Latin America (LATINNO)

Country	Participatory Institutions	Individual Cases of Participatory Institutions	Participants since 1990	Participants Relative to Population Size
Brazil	270	36,424	264,138	0.13
Dominican Republic	81	3,155	89,979	0.84
Argentina	145	7,291	908,006	2.07
Peru	168	110,864	696,705	2.19
Honduras	106	6,091	644,530	7.07
El Salvador	99	6,513	484,067	7.63
Paraguay	92	4,530	516,841	7.69
Mexico	236	740,377	19,034,285	14.92
Guatemala	96	14,946	2,693,489	16.24
Nicaragua	70	13,122	1,142,226	18.57
Chile	120	2,430	9,087,645	50.74
Panama	76	4,602	2,121,463	52.59
Costa Rica	130	1,436	3,446,255	70.95
Colombia	189	75,017	38,167,490	78.45
Ecuador	168	8,424	17,381,368	106.08
Venezuela	91	29,5989	65,196,177	206.52
Bolivia	129	3,863	27,332,160	251.03
Uruguay	134	1,327	12,853,293	272.21
Total	**2400**	**1336402**	**202060117**	**33.45**

[4] Repeated participation by individuals in the same participatory institution is not a concern with this data. As the LATINNO website describes, the total volume of participation for a given country is "the sum of all individual participants in all cases. In cases of collegiate bodies of permanent or sporadic character, where participants or representatives regularly intervene and/or are the same individual, they are counted only one."

To put these impressive figures into perspective, in 2014, according to the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), 15% of Latin Americans contacted a local official to help with a problem they were having, 6% participated in a protest, and just over 6% attended meetings of a political party. While unfortunately LATINNO does not report the years each individual observation of participation occurred, as shown in Figure 1.1, all but a tiny fraction of PIs have appeared since 1990, and nearly 75% were created since 2000. If we take the total percentage of PIs that were implemented after 2000 as a proxy for the share of participants during that time period, relative to the historical total, then there have been over 150 million participants of PIs since 2000. On an annualized basis, this is nearly 4% of the total adult population of Latin America per year between 2000 and 2016.[5] Consequently, the yearly percentage of all Latin Americans who are involved in some form of participatory institution is likely only slightly lower than the share that engages in protests, or attends meetings of political parties. In other words, PIs are not simply a marginal practice, the significance of which is consistently overestimated by theorists of deliberative and participatory democracy. Rather, PIs have become a regular axis of state-society relations in Latin America.

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[5] World Bank population data. Adult population calculated by subtracting the under-15 population from the total population.

Figure 1.1: Total Number of Participatory Innovations over Time

Note: Author's own elaboration, based on data from LATINNO.

Participatory Institutions and the Crisis of Democratic Representation in Latin America

The rise of participatory institutions is, to a significant extent, a product of citizens'

increasing dissatisfaction with the institutions of representative democracy. In many cases this

frustration has been expressed through declining support for traditional political parties, and

increasing receptiveness to anti-establishment populist movements. At the same time, however,

hundreds of millions of dissatisfied citizens have also turned to participatory institutions, hoping

that new mechanisms of popular participation will make government more responsive and

accountable. If participatory institutions can deliver on their promise to redress the deficits in

democratic representation that have drawn so many citizens to them, they can play a critical role

4

in improving the quality of representative democracy around the world. Encouragingly, a significant and growing body of research has found that participatory institutions can have positive effects on the quality of democracy,[6] access to public services, and citizen well-being,[7] as well as government transparency, accountability, and responsiveness.[8]

Despite these promising findings, however, when we zoom out and assess the aggregate impact of participatory institutions on citizens' satisfaction with the quality of democracy,[9] a different picture emerges. We see that in fact the boom in participatory institutions over the last several decades was not accompanied by a systematic increase in citizens' satisfaction with the functioning of democracy in their countries. This is particularly true in the region that pioneered—and has been a global leader in participatory institutions—Latin America. As Figure 1.2 shows, for example, Latin Americans' satisfaction with the quality of democracy has been consistently low over the past 25 years (typically less than half that of the Eurozone, for example), and reached a 25-year low in 2018 (24% satisfaction). The only period of improvement in democratic satisfaction we see in the region since 1995 occurred between the mid-2000s and 2010. However, this improvement was likely due more to the historic commodities boom that occurred during those years than to participatory institutions. As shown in Figure 1.3, for instance, the supply of participatory institutions in Latin America continued to grow precipitously even after the commodities boom ended, but satisfaction with the quality of

[6] Abers, 2000; Avritzer, 2009; Baiocchi, 2005; Díaz-Cayeros et al., 2014; Donaghy, 2011; Goldfrank 2011; Heller, 2001; Heller et al., 2007; Nylen, 2003.

[7] Andersson et al., 2009; Donaghy, 2011; Gonçalves, 2014; Ostrom, 1998; Touchton et al., 2017; Touchton & Wampler, 2014; Wampler et al., 2019.

[8] Baiocchi, 2003; Besley et al., 2005; Blair, 2000; Boulding & Wampler, 2010; Heller, 2000; Jaramillo & Wright, 2015; Schneider & Goldfrank, 2002; Speer, 2012a; Wampler, 2008a; Wampler & Avritzer, 2004.

[9] By quality of democracy, I refer to a multifaceted concept that includes the quality of elections, extent of citizen participation in government decision-making, as well as levels of government accountability and responsiveness. See (Levine & Molina, 2011).

democracy eroded. In other words, the prevalence of participatory institutions appears to have, at best, no discernible relationship to Latin Americans' satisfaction with the quality of democracy. Of course, it could be argued that citizens in the region would have been even less satisfied with the quality of democracy if new participatory institutions had not appeared. At the very least, however, we can safely conclude that the spread of participatory institutions has not been associated with an overall improvement in Latin Americans' satisfaction with the quality of democracy.

Figure 1.2: Satisfaction with the Quality of Democracy in Latin America

Source: Latinobarómetro.

Figure 1.3: Total Number of Participatory Institutions in Latin America

If participatory institutions were improving the quality of democracy in Latin America, we would also expect to observe an increase in citizens' overall rates of direct participation in government decision-making. Direct citizen participation is the primary mechanism through which participatory institutions affect the quality of democracy. As levels of direct citizen control over public decision-making increase; the participatory, accountability, and responsiveness dimensions of the quality of democracy should improve (as should the quality of public service provision). Thus, an important indicator of the impact of participatory institutions on the quality of democracy is the extent to which citizens directly control political decision-making through participatory institutions. As we can see in Figure 1.4, while direct citizen control over government decision-making rose in Latin America until the 1990s, it has largely stagnated since then. Meanwhile, as discussed above, the supply of participatory institutions rose

steadily throughout this period. Consequently, it does not appear that increasing the supply of participatory institutions led to an increase in direct citizen control over public decision-making.

Figure 1.4: Direct Citizen Control over Public Decision-Making in Latin America

Source: VDEM.

These findings are consistent with recent scholarship, which has offered an increasingly tempered assessment of PIs' effects. For instance, in a review of recent works on participatory institutions, Rhodes-Purdy argues that "more than two decades [after the rise of participatory institutions], the optimism of academics and activists seems, if not misplaced, then certainly excessive" (Rhodes-Purdy, 2017, p. 123). Others go further, arguing that PIs exacerbate inequality because they tend to suffer from elite capture and serve the interests of the politically connected rather than the most needy (Saguin, 2018). Some scholars even argue that PIs can be an effective tool for strengthening authoritarian rule (Handlin, 2016). Meta-analyses of the literature on PIs have offered more optimistic assessments, but have concluded nonetheless that the capacity of PIs to affect important political and social outcomes is, at best, highly uneven and

context-specific (Fox, 2015; Gaventa & Barrett, 2010; Mansuri & Rao, 2012; Speer, 2012b). In sum, despite the fact that we know participatory institutions *can* improve the quality of democracy and other important political, social, and economic outcomes, to date they are clearly failing to do so on a large scale. This begs the obvious question: Why have participatory institutions in Latin America underperformed as a solution to the crisis of democratic representation in Latin America?

Explaining the Limited Impact of Participatory Institutions

This dissertation offers two explanations to account for participatory institutions' limited aggregate effects in Latin America. First, I argue that participatory institutions have not improved the quality of democracy in large part because the vast majority of existing participatory institutions are "window dressing" institutions with little more than symbolic value. By contrast, participatory institutions with a realistic capacity to impact the quality of democracy, in particular those where governments are required to comply with the institution's decisions, are rare. As this dissertation will document, not only are PIs with real decision-making authority rare in general, but where they do exist, they tend to be implemented in an ad hoc manner across some fraction of a country's municipalities. Nationwide implementation of PIs with real authority, as I will show, is quite limited. If the most prevalent PIs do not even have a theoretical chance of affecting the quality of democracy, and if PIs with real authority have been largely restricted to isolated municipal experiences, it becomes immediately apparent that the overall impact of participatory institutions will be low. Consequently, our first step in

understanding the unfulfilled promise of participatory institutions is to explain why participatory

institutions with real authority are so rare.[10]

Second, even if participatory institutions with real authority are implemented on a large

scale, they will not improve the quality of democracy unless they represent broad community

interests. Democratic representation in participatory institutions can be undermined in one of two

ways. First, when participation rates are low, only highly participatory individuals will take part,

and the institution's decisions will disproportionately reflect the interests of those citizens.[11]

Democratic representation can also break down when PIs become politicized. Politicization

occurs when groups outside the governing party's core supporters are marginalized in, or

excluded from, BPI activities. Politicization restricts PIs' capacity to represent broad community

interests by concentrating participation and benefits disproportionately among governing party

supporters. To guarantee effective democratic representation, then, participatory institutions must

feature both high levels of community participation, and low levels of politicization. For the sake

of parsimony, henceforth I refer to the combination of participation and politicization as

representativeness. Deficiencies in representativeness play a critical role in explaining the limited

success of PIs, since they often impose severe constraints on the extent to which PIs can

incorporate citizens directly into public decision-making. As Goldfrank (2011a) explains, "If the

number of participants is too small or if only certain types of people participant, such as

incumbent party supporters or specific well-organized interest groups, the democracy-enhancing

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[10] Similar arguments have been made by scholars such as Baiocchi & Ganuza (2017) and Mayka (2019). Baiocchi and Ganuza argue that participatory institutions are often structurally incapable of generating meaningful positive effects on a large scale, because their design restricts the types of decisions that PIs can affect (135). Switching the focus from design to scale, Mayka argues that, by virtue of their massive scale, PIs that are implemented nationwide participatory institutions have much greater capacity to impact important political and social outcomes than PIs implemented at the discretion of subnational governments (21).

[11] Even if participants are selected in a manner that ensures they are broadly representative of community demographics (for instance, if participants are chosen at random), they will not be perceived as legitimate community representatives, and their decisions will not be viewed as representative by the community as a whole.

rewards of participation…will be minimal or, at best, narrowly focused" (29). Consequently, the

second step in accounting for participatory institutions' limited impact is understanding the

conditions that produce representative participatory institutions.

Primary Research Questions

      To understand the limited success of PIs in Latin America, this dissertation focuses on a

set of participatory institutions with arguably the greatest capacity to affect the quality of

democracy. I call these Binding Participatory Institutions (BPIs). BPIs are characterized by (1)

binding decision-making, (2) the participation of any interested adult members of a given

community, and (3) ongoing meetings. BPIs are more effective in improving the quality of

democracy than other participatory institutions because (1) binding decision-making ensures they

have the capacity to meaningfully impact government behavior, (2) openness to full community

participation maximizes their capacity to include citizens in public decision-making, while also

allowing them to overcome legitimacy problems faced by PIs featuring restricted participation,[12]

and (3) ongoing meetings ensure their capacity to affect public decision-making indefinitely into

the future, as opposed to temporally-restricted participatory institutions, like prior consultation,

which is tied to the implementation of specific extractive or infrastructure projects.[13]

I examine three primary research questions: (1) Why are BPIs implemented nationwide in some

countries but not in others? (2) How can we explain variation in the representativeness of BPIs

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[12] While only a tiny percentage of a country's population can engage with participatory institutions featuring restricted participation, BPIs have the capacity to increase rates of direct citizen engagement in public decision-making on a mass scale.

[13] I include a detailed conceptual discussion of BPIs, and examples of how they are different from related forms of participatory institutions in Chapter 3.

after nationwide implementation? And (3) How do political parties incorporate BPIs into their electoral strategies, and how does BPI participation affect voter behavior?

Turning to the first question, I argue in brief that BPIs will not be implemented nationwide (that is, in all or nearly all of a country's municipalities) unless they are promoted by a powerful institution, normally a political party—though under certain conditions a state agency. While they may not oppose the legal adoption of BPIs into national laws—or even partial BPI implementation—for many reasons, political parties will only implement BPIs nationwide if they place a lower value on the political costs than on the potential benefits of implementation. I argue that they will reach this conclusion under two conditions: (1) if significant societal demand exists for BPI implementation, and (2) if the party's political opponents are incapable of taking advantage of BPIs for their own electoral gain.

In turn, I argue that the way BPIs are implemented (i.e., by political parties or technocrats) plays a key role in determining BPI representativeness.[14] One the one hand, political parties will only invest seriously in BPIs when they expect to benefit electorally. Unfortunately, however, parties with an incentive to implement BPIs also tend to politicize them. This stops BPIs from accomplishing their most basic goal: representing the communities they serve. On the other hand, when BPI implementation is carried out by technocrats, BPI politicization will be limited, but so too will community participation. Either way, BPIs' capacity to represent broad community interests is undermined.

These dynamics constitute what I call the *paradox of participatory institutions*. Specifically, the conditions required for nationwide implementation undermine BPIs' success after implementation. This paradox poses major challenges to successful nationwide BPI

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[14] Agencies can be either governmental entities such as planning or finance ministries, or quasi-governmental entities such as municipal associations or national civil society networks.

implementation, and, I argue, helps explain the limited success of PIs in Latin America to date (with broader implications for other regions). That said, I argue that there is a possible solution to the paradox. BPIs can be implemented nationwide *and* represent broad community interests when they are championed by political parties with an incentive to minimize politicization. These are young, outsider parties that cannot use state resources to secure broad-based political support, and therefore have no choice but to rely primarily on programmatic appeals. When these parties implement BPIs, they do so to cultivate a reputation for good governance and democratic deepening. Politicizing BPIs would undermine this reputation, and low rates of participation would minimize the institution's electoral value—since few supporters or potential supporters would engage with or have knowledge of the benefits derived from them. Consequently, these parties (for example, the Brazilian Workers' Party and the Uruguayan *Frente Amplio*) have an incentive to both maximize participation and minimize politicization.

Finally, if, as I argued above, most parties have a strong incentive to politicize BPIs in the hope of concentrating benefits on supporters or potential supporters, are they successful? To learn if they are, we must open up the black box of how, exactly, parties utilize BPIs for electoral ends. I argue that BPIs offer parties the opportunity to simultaneously target core supporters as well as swing voters (while marginalizing opposition supporters). They do so by offering an exclusionary rhetoric focusing on the importance of BPIs in the party's broader political strategy to the former, while reaching out to the latter through an inclusionary rhetoric that stresses the role of BPIs as community organizations that benefit all citizens, not just party militants. In turn, BPI participation shapes a range of electoral outcomes—including vote choice, voter turnout and electoral work on behalf of political parties.

Primary Contributions

This dissertation makes three main contributions. First, to date we know relatively little about both the political and economic conditions under which governments broadly implement BPIs across national territory, and the general conditions required to produce BPIs that reflect the interests of the communities they represent. This dissertation provides both a generalizable framework for understanding nationwide BPI implementation that can be built upon and applied to new contexts in future scholarship, as well as a parsimonious standard—conducive to cross-national comparison—for assessing participatory institutions' success in improving the quality of democracy. Second, this study demonstrates that successful large-scale PI implementation confronts unique challenges not faced by subnational implementation, particularly since the political conditions required for nationwide implementation tend to undermine PIs' ultimate success. For this reason, any positive effects detected in studies of PIs in specific municipalities will likely not be observed on a large scale unless the paradox of participatory institutions is resolved or mitigated.

Finally, existing scholarship has not offered a general theoretical framework to explain the conditions under which political parties have incentives to incorporate PIs into their electoral strategies, how they do so, or the electoral effects of these strategies. By offering such a framework, this dissertation opens up a fruitful conversation between the literature on participatory institutions and the literature on electoral strategies/distributive politics and political parties. On the one hand, it shows that participatory institutions often serve important electoral functions, and suggests that these functions should be integrated into broader studies of Latin American political parties' electoral strategies. On the other hand, it suggests that scholars of participatory institutions can improve the nuance and precision of their understanding how

14

political parties utilize participatory institutions by drawing upon theoretical insights from the literature on how political parties use distributive politics to mobilize electoral support.

Through these contributions, my dissertation represents an advance toward systematic knowledge of how, when, and why large-scale experiments in participatory institutions succeed and fail. Critically, it identifies key challenges that must be addressed by policymakers if participatory institutions are to realize their full potential for improving the quality of democracy, and ultimately for enhancing citizen well-being.

Overview of Methods, Scope Conditions, and Case Selection

The dissertation draws upon a wide range of quantitative and qualitative methods. First, I marshal public statements, public opinion data, government statistics, and parliamentary debates, as well as nearly 200 interviews with key actors involved in BPI adoption and implementation in nine countries. These data permit me to retrace the steps that led to BPI implementation in Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, Bolivia, and Peru, as well as to the failure of parties to do so in other countries that also adopted BPIs into national laws or constitutions, such as Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, and Guatemala. The sources also allow me to process-trace the relationship between different modes of BPI implementation and national-level variation in BPI representativeness. Elite interviews with officials from the governing Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV), as well as dozens of interviews with local BPI activists and observation of BPI meetings in Venezuela inform my account of how parties integrate BPIs into their electoral strategies.

Additionally, I conducted a nationally representative survey of nearly 1,800 Venezuelans, including nearly 1,200 BPI participants. These data give me the opportunity to both

systematically assess how the PSUV uses BPIs for electoral ends, as well as evaluate the quality

of BPI participation in Venezuela. In addition to my original survey, I also leverage data from

LAPOP between 1998 and 2014 to measure both BPI representativeness and the electoral effects

of BPI participation in countries with nationwide implementation.

Finally, a note on scope conditions and case selection. My only scope condition is that

cases must be drawn from Latin America. As I explain in detail in Chapter 3, I make this

decision for both theoretical reasons (Latin America is the only region in the world where

nationwide BPI implementation is a plausible potential outcome for all countries, and it features

wide intra-regional variation in key independent and dependent variables), as well as pragmatic

ones (there is no global database of BPIs). Case selection varies across research questions. To

understand the determinants of nationwide BPI-implementation, I concentrate my analysis on

one positive case (Venezuela), and one negative case (Ecuador), but I also provide a more

targeted analysis of BPI implementation in each of the other six Latin American countries that

have adopted BPIs into national laws or constitutions (Bolivia, Colombia, the Dominican

Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Peru). To examine national-level variation in BPI

representativeness among countries with nationwide BPI implementation, I necessarily restrict

my analysis to the four countries that have implemented BPIs nationwide (Bolivia, the

Dominican Republic, Peru, and Venezuela). To explore the electoral effects of BPIs, as well as

how parties incorporate BPIs into their electoral strategies, I focus on the case of Venezuela. As I

explain in Chapter 3, this is a consequence of the fact that nationwide BPI implementation has

only been carried out by political parties in two cases (Venezuela and Bolivia), and that usable

data are only available for analyzing the electoral effects of BPIs in Venezuela.

Outline of the Study

To lay the dissertation's theoretical groundwork, the next chapter reviews existing explanations of BPI implementation and representativeness, and presents my theoretical framework for understanding the causes and effects of nationwide BPI implementation. I proceed by first unpacking the paradox of participation, explaining why it poses a serious challenge to the successful implementation of large-scale BPIs, and why it occurs. I turn next to a review of existing work examining political parties' use of BPIs for electoral purposes. I conclude by introducing my theoretical expectations for the form and effects of parties' BPI electoral strategies. Next, in Chapter 3, I build the dissertation's empirical scaffolding, offering detailed descriptions of the key concepts I employ throughout the following chapters. I also explain my approach to concept measurement, and provide a brief summary of the diverse qualitative and quantitative empirical strategies I use to explore the paradox of participatory institutions.

Chapters 4 through 7 comprise the empirical core of the dissertation. Chapter 4 addresses the first element of the paradox of participatory institutions by tracing the processes by which BPIs were implemented nationwide in Venezuela and Ecuador. Chapter 4 also probes the generalizability of these two case studies through targeted analyses of the presence or absence of key explanatory variables in six other Latin American countries (Bolivia, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Peru). Chapter 5 turns to the second element of our paradox: the causes of variation in BPI representativeness. After first measuring BPI representativeness in the four countries with nationwide implementation (Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, Peru, and Venezuela), it goes on to process-trace how different modes of implementation shape BPI representativeness in these countries. Chapters 6 and 7 dive into the

electoral dynamics underlying political parties' promotion of BPIs. Chapter 6 documents the electoral strategy pursued by Venezuela's PSUV through BPIs and explains why we see significant variation in the party's capacity to employ BPIs for electoral purposes across the country. Finally, Chapter 7 estimates the effects of BPI participation on a range of vote choice, voter turnout, and electoral work for political parties. After establishing these effects, it also drills down to identify the range of specific mechanisms through which BPI participation changes voter behavior.

Chapter 8 begins with a summary of the dissertation's primary findings. Since there are no cases to date of successful nationwide BPI implementation where participation rates are high and politicization is low, the chapter offers a critical case of subnational BPI implementation—the case of the Brazilian Workers' Party (PT) and participatory budgeting—which provides important insights into how successful BPI implementation might occur in the future. I conclude with a discussion of key theoretical and practical lessons that can be derived from this study, as well as paths for future research.

Chapter 2. THE THEORY: EXPLAINING THE PARADOX OF PARTICIPATORY INSTITUTIONS

Introduction

The primary objective of this dissertation is to contribute to our understanding of the conditions under which PIs generate large-scale positive effects on outcomes such as the quality

of democracy and public service provision on a large scale. To accomplish this goal, we need to examine national-level (rather than municipal or regional) variation in the causes and effects of BPIs. We must also consider how early steps in the causal chain connecting the formal adoption and ultimate success or failure of BPIs condition later steps in the chain. Specifically, I argue that the conditions required for large-scale BPI implementation ultimately undermine the institutions' success once established. This is what I call the paradox of participatory institutions. One the one hand, since political parties only implement BPIs nationwide when they anticipate an electoral benefit, and since BPIs are more likely to influence the electoral behavior of individuals with direct BPI experience, parties will attempt to mobilize large numbers of citizens into BPI participation. At the same time, however, since the resources distributed through BPIs are scarce, parties will seek to concentrate BPI benefits on supporters or potential supporters. This gives parties a strong incentive to politicize BPIs. On the other hand, when technocrats (leaders of a government or quasi-governmental agency) implement BPIs, they do so in order to improve the quality of governance, rather than for electoral gain. This mode of implementation limits BPI politicization, but since technocrats have a limited capacity to mobilize citizens into BPI participation, it also produces low levels of participation. Ideally, this mobilizational capacity would be bolstered by the participation of strong civil society/social movement organizations (Baiocchi et al., 2011; S. McNulty, 2019; Montambeault, 2015; Wampler, 2008b). Unfortunately, however, parties will only permit nationwide BPI implementation when organized civil society and social movements are too weak to utilize BPIs against them. As a result, technocrats working to implement BPIs cannot depend on the support of influential civil society/social movement allies to assist in bringing BPIs to life around the country. Only under certain circumstances, which I discuss below, are the conditions that permit large-scale BPI

implementation also conducive to building successful BPIs. I argue that the paradox of
participatory institutions is critical for understanding the limited impact of participatory
institutions around the world to date. Overcoming that paradox is a necessary condition for
realizing the substantial potential participatory institutions have shown for improving key
political, social, and economic outcomes in subnational contexts.

The chapter will proceed as follows: I first review existing explanations of BPI
implementation and representativeness. I then present my own theoretical framework for
understanding the causes and effects of nationwide BPI implementation. I start by introducing
the paradox of participation, and how it poses a serious challenge to the successful
implementation of large-scale BPIs. I then detail my explanation for each component of the
paradox (i.e., nationwide BPI implementation and BPI representativeness). I conclude by
reviewing existing work examining political parties' use of BPIs for electoral purposes, and
introducing my theoretical framework for understanding how/why parties incorporate BPIs into
their electoral strategies—and what the electoral effects of these strategies might be.

Existing theories of BPI Implementation

The literature on participatory institutions offers three principal sets of factors to explain BPI
implementation.[15] One strand identifies left-of-center governments with a programmatic

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[15] Several additional factors have been discussed by scholars of participatory institutions to explain BPI adoption or
implementation. These include the strength of existing civil society networks, institutional design, and extent of
resources available to BPIs. I do not address these factors here because they are either better suited to explain BPI

commitment to radical democracy as the leading impetus behind BPI implementation (Avritzer, 2009; Chavez & Goldfrank, 2004; Heller, 2001). Though it is undoubtedly the case that left-wing ideology has played a role in some political parties' decisions to implement BPIs—particularly at the subnational level—a quick examination of parties that have implemented BPIs dispels the notion that left-wing governance is either a necessary or a sufficient condition. Indeed, BPIs were not implemented in a majority of the countries associated with Latin America's Pink Tide of the first decade of the 21st century. Further, in three of the four countries in Latin America where BPI implementation has occurred, it was under the centrist governments of Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (1994) in Bolivia, Leonel Fernández (2007) in the Dominican Republic, and Alejandro Toledo (2003) in Peru.

Other scholars identify international development agencies such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the World Bank as the main protagonists of BPIs (Bland, 2011; Hernández-Medina, 2007; Sintomer et al., 2010). These institutions have played an important role in diffusing the idea of BPIs to new contexts, and they have also provided important technical and financial assistance to BPI implementers. However, in every case of BPI implementation in which international development agencies played any role, the impetus of domestic political actors was decisive (as in Peru, Bolivia, and the Dominican Republic) (McNulty, 2011). Further, there have been cases of BPI implementation where international organizations played no role at all (as in Venezuela).

Finally, a large body of scholarship maintains that BPIs will only be implemented when they further the electoral interests of political parties. These works describe a variety of motivations parties might have for promoting BPIs. Some focus on the institution's capacity to maintain the

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implementation in specific municipalities (as opposed to nationwide implementation) or to explaining the quality of BPIs (rather than their implementation).

21

loyalty of party supporters, either by distributing targeted material benefits (Álvarez & García-Guadilla, 2011; Handlin, 2016), or by demonstrating the party's fulfillment of one of its base's key policy goals (Rhodes-Purdy, 2017; Wampler, 2008b). Others highlight BPIs' potential to expand parties' electoral support to new constituencies. Some parties use BPIs to distribute material benefits among potential supporters (Andersson & Van Laerhoven, 2007; Montambeault, 2015, p. 63), while others employ BPIs to enhance their democratic/good governance credentials among the broader electorate (Abers, 2000; Baiocchi, 2005; S. McNulty, 2011). Taken together, these works convincingly show that BPI implementation will only occur when it aligns with parties' electoral incentives. In general, however, scholars have focused more on understanding *why* parties incorporate BPIs into their electoral strategies, and less on identifying *when* they will do so. That is, the literature has only begun to explore the conditions under which parties' electoral incentives will be aligned with BPI implementation.

To the extent that scholars have identified factors that might explain when parties have an electoral incentive to implement BPIs, they have focused on variations in societal demand, electoral competition, and the political influence of opposition parties. First, a number of studies suggest that BPI implementation is more likely when governments face significant societal demand for increased citizen participation (Andersson & Van Laerhoven, 2007; Balderacchi, 2017; Falleti & Riofrancos, 2018b). Andersson and Van Laerhoven (2007), for instance, argue that while civil society pressure is not a sufficient condition for implementation, it increases parties' incentive to support participatory institutions. When faced with widespread calls for increased citizen participation, they argue that parties are more likely to implement participatory institutions in order to demonstrate their responsiveness to community demands (K. Andersson & Van Laerhoven, 2007, p. 1093). I agree that societal demand is an important factor in

determining BPI implementation, and I incorporate this insight into my theoretical framework below. That said, while these works very helpfully draw our attention to the role of citizen preferences in determining when parties have a political incentive to implement BPIs, they do not account for the role of governing parties' strategic interactions with opposition parties.

By contrast, focusing her attention on the role of political competition, Montambeault argues that parties are more likely to incorporate participatory institutions into their electoral strategies when they face high levels of political competition. Intense competition, she argues, increases the costs parties incur by not using participatory institutions to secure electoral gains (Montambeault, 2015). While Montambeault's objective is to understand variation in institutional quality, her theory can be applied directly to implementation. If high political competition increases parties' incentive to employ BPIs for electoral purposes, it should also enhance their motivation to implement BPIs, since implementation is obviously a necessary condition for reaping BPIs' electoral benefits. I agree with Montambeault that political competition likely affects the way parties interact with existing participatory institutions, but it cannot explain which parties will implement BPIs in the first place. If it could, we would expect BPI implementation to occur much more frequently, given the prevalence of tight elections in Latin America. Specifically, 20% of national legislative elections, and 25% of presidential elections in the region since 1989, have been won by a margin of 5% or less. However, BPI implementation occurred after only 3% of legislative elections, and 3.4% of presidential elections.[16] Further, BPI implementation has taken place in countries with divergent levels of national-level political competition. Compare Peru and Bolivia, where the governing party's margin of victory in the presidential elections directly preceding BPI implementation was 10.7%

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[16] Author's calculation, data from Coppedge et al. (2017). Variables: v2ellostsl, v2ellostss, v2elvotlrg and v2elvotsml.

and 14.5%, respectively, to the Dominican Republic and Venezuela, where this margin was 23.4% and 25.9%, respectively. Differentials between the number of legislative seats won by the two most successful parties in national legislative elections just prior to BPI implementation in these countries were less varied. However, in no case was the margin particularly small, ranging from 7.8% in the Dominican Republic, to 13.2% and 14.2%, respectively, in Bolivia and Peru.[17]

Goldfrank (2011) shifts our attention from electoral competition to a broader examination of the relative political power of governing vs. opposition parties. Specifically, he argues that when opposition parties are strong (well-resourced, strong internal organization, deep ties to civil society), they have the capacity to block or co-opt BPI implementation (Goldfrank, 2011a, p. 32). Further, opposition parties' capacity to impede BPI implementation should be proportional to the organizational resources they have at their disposal. Stronger opposition parties will pose a greater threat to BPI implementation than weaker parties (Goldfrank, 2011a, p. 32). Goldfrank's theory offers critical insights that I build upon in my theoretical framework below. In particular, it underscores the importance of assessing the benefits governing parties believe BPI implementation will bring them, relative to opposition parties. When the balance of political power shifts toward governing parties, for example, not only do opposition parties have a more limited capacity to impede BPI implementation (as Goldfrank's theory suggests), but governing parties also have more to gain (and less to fear) from BPI implementation. At the same time, Goldfrank's and other studies that focus on the strategic interactions between governing and opposition parties, do not integrate this factor into a broader theoretical account of when parties' incentive to implement BPIs is greater than the political risk they associate with implementation. As a result, to date, the literature has not been able to assess the relative importance of political

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[17]In Venezuela, this figure was 96.4%, but that was an anomaly caused by the fact that leading opposition parties boycotted the country's 2005 legislative elections.

competition and opposition strength compared to other factors that shape parties' incentive structures around BPI implementation.

Finally, beyond the theoretical issues highlighted above, the external validity of existing scholarship on BPI implementation has been limited by a methodological focus on subnational analysis. The vast majority of existing studies have centered around the determinants of BPI implementation at the local level (often in a single municipality). As I discuss below, we should not assume that the conditions required for BPI implementation in individual municipalities are the same as the conditions that lead national parties to implement BPIs nationwide. If we want to understand the dynamics of large-scale BPI implementation, then, we must examine variation in national-level variables. Three recent works have begun to address the paucity of national-level, multi-country studies.[18] This research is of great value in moving the literature toward generalizable theory that can help us understand the national-level dynamics that shape participatory institutions. That said, these studies follow a tendency in the broader literature, described above, to either ignore, or under-theorize the centrality of strategic political interactions in understanding BPI implementation. Indeed, only one (McNulty) explicitly acknowledges the importance of aligning BPI implementation and party interests, but it does not theorize the circumstances under which this alignment will occur.

Existing Explanations of BPI success

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[18] (Falleti & Riofrancos, 2018; Mayka, 2019; McNulty, 2019) For a further discussion of the relationship between BPI implementation and national-level political dynamics, see Bruera (2015).

By now an extensive literature has explored the effects of participatory institutions on a wide range of critical outcomes, from public policy (Jaramillo & Alcázar, 2013; Jaramillo & Wright, 2015; Pogrebinschi & Samuels, 2014; Speer, 2012a) to various facets of social well-being (Gonçalves, 2014; Touchton et al., 2017; Touchton & Wampler, 2014; Wampler et al., 2019), the empowerment of marginalized communities (Avritzer, 2009; Donaghy, 2011; Goldfrank, 2011a; Hernández-medina, 2010; S. L. McNulty, 2015), improved public service delivery (Díaz-Cayeros et al., 2014; Jaramillo & Wright, 2015; Wampler et al., 2019), increased spending for pro-poor social policies (K. Andersson et al., 2009; Heller, 2001; Mansuri & Rao, 2012), and strengthening civil society (Abers, 1998; Altschuler & Corrales, 2013; Baiocchi et al., 2011; S. McNulty, 2013; Wampler, 2008b). There are also a number of studies examining the effects of participatory institutions on the quality of democracy.[19] The findings of this literature are inconclusive. Some studies have marshaled compelling evidence suggesting that participatory institutions have a range of positive impacts on political and social phenomena.[20] Others have found that participatory institutions have ambiguous effects (K. Andersson et al., 2009; Besley et al., 2005; Boulding & Wampler, 2010; M. McCarthy, 2012; Saguin, 2018a), while still others have shown that participatory institutions have no effect, or even negative impacts on various political and social outcomes.[21] Meta-analyses of PIs also draw ambivalent conclusions, and suggest that we can make few general claims about PIs effects (Fox, 2015; Gaventa & Barrett, 2010; Mansuri & Rao, 2012; Speer, 2012b).

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[19] Baiocchi et al., 2011; Brinkerhoff & Azfar, 2006; Faguet, 2012; Gibson & Woolcock, 2008; Goldfrank, 2011; Wampler, 2008a, 2010.

[20] Díaz-Cayeros et al., 2014; Donaghy, 2011; Jaramillo & Wright, 2015; Touchton et al., 2017; Touchton & Wampler, 2014; Wampler et al., 2019.

[21] Benton, 2016; Handlin, 2016; Hawkins & Hansen, 2006; Jaramillo & Alcázar, 2013; Mansuri & Rao, 2012; Markussen, 2006; Olken, 2007; Shatkin, 2000.

These conflicting results can be explained by a range of factors. First, in general, the participatory institutions literature does not distinguish adequately between PIs with often radically different causes and effects. As I discuss in Chapter 3, there are strong reasons to believe that "participation" is not a uniform treatment across all participatory institutions, since the quality and impact of participation varies widely depending on the type of PI under consideration. Compare, for instance, citizens making a three-minute comment at a public hearing on a municipal construction project, to citizens making binding decisions over the allocation of the entire municipal investment budget. As a result, some findings that appear to point in contrasting directions are likely not contradictory at all when we account for differences across studies' independent variables.[22] Second, the literature has not specified conditions under which the key causes of variation in the effects of participatory institutions are likely to be operative. For instance, does a robust civil society improve the quality of participatory institutions in all contexts, or only, for instance, in lower-income countries where sufficient community needs exist to motivate civil society actors to engage seriously with PIs, or in countries with weak representative institutions, where civil society actors have no other effective means of engaging the state apart from PIs? As a result, we still have only a limited understanding of the specific contexts in which different factors do and do not matter for producing different outcomes.[23] Finally, while many studies have highlighted the importance of complex causation in understanding the effects of participatory institutions (Falleti & Riofrancos, 2018b; Hetland, 2015; McNulty, 2019; Speer, 2012a; Wampler et al., 2019), the literature remains at a relatively early stage in terms of developing theory that integrates isolated

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[22] See Abbott "A typology of participatory institutions" for a discussion of this issue.
[23] This is a point emphasized in the most exhaustive meta study of participatory institutions to date (Mansuri & Rao, 2012).

contributing factors into a unified causal framework. For instance, existing scholarship

separately identifies the causes of BPI implementation and variation in BPI representativeness,

but it does not consider whether or how the necessary conditions of BPI implementation (such as

a relatively weak civil society) may foreclose paths to BPI representativeness after BPIs have

been established. These challenges are understandable given serious data limitations that

continue to plague the participatory institutions literature, but they have limited systematic

attempts to examine the effects of distinct participatory institutions on different outcomes (and in

diverse settings). That said, various strategies can be utilized to mitigate these problems. I

explore these strategies in detail in Chapter 3.

Existing Literature Explaining Variation in BPI Representativeness

Several theories have been proposed to explain variation in the representativeness of

BPIs, which, as a reminder, I operationalize as (1) overall rates of community participation in

BPIs, and (2) levels of BPI politicization (the extent to which groups outside the governing

party's core supporters are marginalized in, or excluded from, BPI activities). Turning first to

participation rates, scholars have argued that previous activity in civil society associations

significantly increases an individual's likelihood of BPI participation (Baiocchi, 2005; Fedozzi,

2004; Melgar, 2014; Nylen, 2002). The reason is straightforward: People with prior experience

in associational life are more likely to believe that participation matters more than those without

such experience. In turn, they are likely to view participation more favorably than those without

prior participation. Consequently, areas that have higher levels of previous civil society activity

are likely to see higher levels of participation in PIs. This is one of the more robust findings in

the literature on PIs in specific municipalities, but it is a question that has rarely, if ever, been

studied with respect to national rates of BPI participation. Figure 2.1 suggests that cross-national levels of civil society engagement may be less predictive of national BPI participation rates. Specifically, Peru and the Dominican Republic both had above average levels of civil society participation before nationwide BPI implementation. Yet, as I detail below, BPI participation rates in these countries have been comparatively low. If pre-existing civil society participation were an important determinant of BPI participation, we would expect BPI participation rates in Peru and the Dominican Republic to be significantly higher. Further, Figure 2.1 shows that in the years directly prior to nationwide BPI implementation, Venezuelans were not only less active in civil society than Latin Americans in general; they were also less active than their counterparts in the Dominican Republic, who implemented BPIs nationwide around the same time.[24] Nonetheless, BPI participation rates in Venezuela have been higher than any other country in the region, and around 10 times higher than in the Dominican Republic. If civil society participation affected rates of BPI participation, we would expect, to the contrary, BPI participation in Venezuela to be both below the regional average, and also substantially lower than in the Dominican Republic. It may be the case that BPI participation rates were artificially high in Venezuela due to President Hugo Chávez's concerted popular mobilization efforts in the years before BPI implementation (Hellinger, 2012; Smilde & Hellinger, 2011). If this were true, however, we would also expect pre-BPI civil society participation rates in Venezuela to be high by regional standards, given the six years of populist mobilization that occurred under Chávez before 2006. This is not consistent with the evidence presented in Figure 2.1, which suggests that in 2005 Venezuelan civil society was substantially less participatory than the regional average.

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[24] Unfortunately, the fourth country in Latin America that has implemented BPIs nationwide, Bolivia, did so in 1994, before sufficient public opinion data on civil society participation was available.

Figure 2.1: Participation in Civil Society Organizations Before BPI Implementation

Note: Author's calculation, based on data from Latinobarómetro. Calculated by averaging estimates of 12 forms of civil society participation in each country. Estimates for Peru are from 2002. Estimates for the Dominican Republic and Venezuela are from 2005. Note that question wordings for 2005 estimates are different from the 2001 estimates and should not be compared directly.

Other scholars have emphasized the impact of variation in financial resources on levels of BPI participation. They argue that unless significant budgets are allocated to ensure effective BPI implementation and/or motivate citizen engagement, participation rates will be low (Goldfrank, 2011a; Handlin, 2016; McNulty, 2019; Mitchell, 2014; Morgan, 2018). I also expect this to be an important factor in determining cross-national trends in BPI participation. Indeed, respondents from numerous countries involved in BPI adoption and implementation processes stressed that fiscal decentralization—which provides municipalities with discretionary funding that can be allocated through BPIs—was a necessary condition for BPI success. Figure 2.2 suggests, consistent with this line of reasoning, that rates of BPI participation are higher in countries that receive a substantial increase in government revenues prior to BPI implementation, compared to more fiscally constrained countries. At the same time, however, as shown in Figure 2.3, when we examine the relationship between changes in financial resources and BPI participation over time

in each country, we observe trends that do not conform to expectations derived from subnational experiences. Not only is the relationship between the availability of financial resources and BPI participation radically different across the countries under study, but it only comes close to approximating a positive relationship between revenue and participation in the case of Venezuela. Even in this case, however, though post-2014 data are limited, there is evidence to suggest that BPI participation rates in Venezuela remained relatively high even after the collapse of oil prices in 2014.[25] Consequently, the evidence of a correlation between financial resources and BPI participation rates is, at best, limited.

Figure 2.2: Resource Availability and Initial BPI Participation Rates

Note: Author's calculation. Dotted line represents the polynomial trend line. Pre-BPI change in government revenue figures calculated by taking the average rate of yearly change in central government spending (as a share of GDP) for the five years prior to BPI implementation, based on data from the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). BPI participation rate based on survey data from LAPOP (1998-2014). I explain how I calculated participation rates in Chapter 3.

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[25] See Abbott & McCarthy, 2019, pp. 99–100.

Figure 2.3: Changes in Resource Availability and BPI Participation Rates

Note: Author's calculation. Dotted lines represent the polynomial trend lines. Change in government revenue figures calculated by taking the average rate of yearly change in central government spending (as a share of GDP) for each reported time interval, based on data from ECLAC. Change in BPI participation figures report the rate of change in participation rates between the beginning and end of each time interval. Change in BPI participation figures are lagged to ensure comparisons are between previous changes in government spending and subsequent BPI participation rates. BPI participation rate based on survey data from LAPOP (1998-2014). I explain how I calculated participation rates in Chapter 3. I do not include figures for the Dominican Republic because BPI participation data are only available for one year.

Finally, other scholars have argued—following the broader consensus in the literature on political participation—that socioeconomic status is a key determinant of individual-level BPI participation. While traditional scholarship on the relationship between income and political

participation suggests that lower-income individuals are less likely to participate than their higher-income counterparts (Verba et al., 1987, 1995a), scholars of participatory institutions have often found that participation is quite high among the poor (Avritzer, 2006; Baiocchi, 2005; Wampler, 2010). This could be a result of the fact that participatory institutions more closely resemble forms of community participation that are more common among the poor than among middle-class individuals (Avritzer, 2006; Hawkins, 2010). Alternatively, it might be explained by the fact that the poor are less likely to have access to other, more traditional forms of engagement with government officials compared to wealthier individuals—and, therefore, value BPIs more highly than higher-income individuals (Antezana & De La Fuente, 2009).

Applying this logic to national-level variation in BPI participation, if socioeconomic status helped to explain cross-national variation in BPI participation rates, we should first observe higher levels of BPI participation among the poor compared to more affluent citizens in all countries. If the poor do not participate at higher rates than the rest of the population, there is no reason to believe that higher poverty rates will be associated with increased BPI participation. Figure 2.3 shows that, in fact, there is no statistically significant variation in the difference between average incomes among BPI participants and average national incomes in any of the four countries under study. The poor, in other words, are not more likely to participate in BPIs compared to their more affluent compatriots. This means we should not expect variation in the proportion of the poor as a share of the total population to impact cross-national levels of BPI participation. Along those lines, Figure 2.5 suggests that cross-national variation in pre-BPI poverty rates does not tell us very much about subsequent rates of BPI participation. For instance, despite the fact that the percentage of Peruvians living on less than $2 per day prior to nationwide BPI implementation was nearly three times that of the Dominican Republic, BPI

33

participation rates in the two countries were roughly the same. Further, although Peru and

Bolivia had similar poverty rates prior to BPI implementation, Bolivia's subsequent rate of BPI

participation was three times that of Peru's. Of course, none of this rules out the possibility that

there is a significant cross-national relationship between poverty and BPI participation. That

said, Figure 2.4 does raise further questions about the validity of extrapolating findings based on

individual-level or sub-national analysis to cross-national variation in rates of BPI participation.

Figure 2.4: Poverty and BPI Participation Rates

Note: Author's calculation. Dotted line represents the exponential trend line. Poverty rates are reported for the year prior to BPI implementation in each country. Poverty estimates based on data from the World Bank. BPI participation rate based on survey data from LAPOP (1998-2014). I explain how I calculated participation rates in Chapter 3.

Turning to the second dimension of BPI representativeness—politicization (the extent to

which groups outside the governing party's core supporters are marginalized in, or excluded

from, BPI activities)—scholars have argued that when BPIs are incorporated into clientelistic or

other related electoral strategies, they are more likely to be politicized. This is because parties

hope to conserve their clientelism budgets for voters who will be responsive to their electoral

appeals (Hawkins, Rosas, and Johnson 2011; McCarthy 2012, Álvarez and García-Guadilla

2011; Handlin 2015). While I agree with this hypothesis, as I show in Chapter 5, there is wide

variation in the degree of BPI politicization across countries with nationwide implementation.

This variation cannot be explained by existing accounts of the relationship between clientelism

and BPI representation. Specifically, these works seek to document the effects of clientelism on

BPI representativeness, but do not examine why politicization is negligible in some countries,

but extremely high in others.

Looking outside the literature on BPIs, there are a number of well-established theories in the

clientelism literature that might help to explain the conditions under which politicized BPIs may

emerge. First, some scholars hold that clientelism is more likely in contexts where the state's

bureaucratic autonomy is low. Low bureaucratic autonomy enables politicians to employ state

resources for clientelistic purposes. In these contexts, using the "spoils of government…[for]

partisan goals is too strong a temptation to be resisted" (Piattoni, 2001, p. 19). By contrast, where

bureaucratic autonomy is high, this option is foreclosed to politicians, and they must rely on

alternative electoral strategies (Bustikova & Corduneanu-Huci, 2017; Shefter, 1977, 1993). This

argument, again, can be applied directly to BPIs. Since governing parties in countries with low

bureaucratic autonomy have wide discretion to distribute resources through BPIs according to

political criteria, we would expect BPIs in these countries to have high levels of politicization.

Consistent with this expectation, Figure 2.6 documents a clear negative relationship between

bureaucratic autonomy and BPI politicization in countries with nationwide BPI implementation.

However, the picture presented in Figure 2.6 also points to the limits of bureaucratic autonomy

as an explanatory factor for cross-national BPI politicization rates. Specifically, the case of the

Dominican Republic suggests that while high politicization may be more likely under conditions of low bureaucratic autonomy, it is not assured. Consequently, it is important to examine, as I do below, what potential factors may condition the relationship between bureaucratic autonomy and BPI politicization.

Figure 2.5: Bureaucratic Autonomy and BPI Politicization

Note: Author's calculation. Dotted line represents the linear trend line. Bureaucratic autonomy figures are based on data from Varieties of Democracy (VDEM), specifically their neopatrimonial rule index (e_v2x_neopat). This is a continuous variable (0-1) constructed by using Bayesian Factor Analysis to predict the indicators of politicized administration (specifically, indicators predicting clientelism, executive oversight, and regime corruption). Reported scores represent each country's bureaucratic autonomy the year prior to BPI implementation (Bolivia = 1993, DR = 2006, Peru = 2002, Venezuela 2005). BPI politicization averages the "unequal participation" and "perception of politicization" indicators I describe in Chapter 3.

Finally, a range of studies on clientelism argue that increased political competition is associated with lower levels of clientelism (Geddes, 1991; Grzymala-Busse, 2008; Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007). Geddes, for instance, argues that high political competition among parties with relatively equal access to patronage increases parties' willingness to support administrative reform laws that would reduce their access to patronage. This is the case, she argues, because under conditions of high competition the relatively small electoral gain parties might secure by

supporting administrative reform could be decisive electorally. Though ordinarily clientelism and patronage are not key motivating issues for voters, when competition is intense, parties may pursue anti-clientelistic administrative reforms in an effort to woo particularly middle-class swing voters, for whom administrative reform is a salient issue (Geddes, 1991, p. 377) Applying this argument to BPIs, we would expect high levels of political competition to be associated with low levels of politicization. When competition is tight, and parties fear they cannot build a winning coalition on the basis of their core supporters alone, they may shift the focus of their electoral work from core supporters to BPI-curious swing voters who have previously been skeptical of the process. Navarro (2004), for instance, explains how the PT in the city of Porto Alegre altered the structure of BPIs in an effort to woo middle-class voters who had previously been opposed to BPIs. Specifically, the party shifted from an exclusive focus on hyper-local BPI meetings concentrated in poor areas of the city, to broader "thematic" meetings that allowed the BPI process to make decisions over projects that would affect the city as a whole: "The [thematic] meetings became a mechanism for accessing and attracting middle-class sectors that had been averse to the [BPI] process, especially because their immediate interests, usually more global than local, found no place within [the process]…" (Navarro, 2004, p. 252). As Navarro's description implies, swing voters tend to be attracted to the programmatic, "good governance" appeal of BPIs, and turned off by parochial or politicized BPI allocations. As a result, in contexts of high competition, when parties feel the need to target swing voters through BPIs, they should have an incentive to minimize politicization.

As I show in Chapter 6, political competition is likely a factor in predicting subnational levels of BPI politicization. That said, when we turn to national-level analysis, things are less straightforward. On the one hand, the competition hypothesis is clearly consistent with the case

of Venezuela. At the time of BPI implementation, Venezuela had by far the highest level of

single-party control across the four cases under study. Subsequently, Venezuela had the highest

level of BPI politicization. Further, among the three countries with relatively low levels of

single-party control (Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, and Peru), there are no cases with BPI

politicization scores above 50%. On the other hand, while Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, and

Peru had roughly similar levels of single-party control, there was a significant variation in BPI

politicization. Bolivia's politicization score, for example, is more than twice that of Peru and the

Dominican Republic. As a result, while it appears that single-party competition may affect

national rates of BPI politicization, further investigation is required to account for variation in

BPI politicization across countries with similar levels of political competition.

Figure 2.6: Single-Party Political Control and BPI Politicization

Note: Author's calculations, based on data from Varieties of Democracy. For each country, I calculate levels of subnational and national single-party political control by taking the average for each country over the three years preceding nationwide BPI implementation. Subnational party control is based on Varieties of Democracy's v2pssunpar variable, a continuous variable with a range of 0-2. I transform subnational control for ease of interpretation by normalizing on a scale of 0-1, and inverting values to make larger values correspond to higher levels of party control by a single party. National party control is based on Varieties of Democracy's v2ellostsl and ellostss, which are continuous variables capturing the seat share won by the largest two parties in each country's lower legislative chamber. Figure five reports the difference in seat share between the two largest parties in the lower legislative chamber. It is also normalized for ease of interpretation.

A Theoretical Framework for Understanding BPI Implementation and Representativeness in

Latin America

1: Explaining Nationwide BPI Implementation

The literature review above demonstrated that existing theory cannot account for the political

incentive structures that produce BPI implementation. Building upon insights from the literature

discussed above, I argue that parties will only push beyond adoption and implement BPIs if they

value the electoral benefits of BPI implementation higher than the costs. It is important to note,

first, that incorporating BPIs into their electoral strategies represents a serious risk for political

parties. This is because BPI implementation entails both high start-up costs,[26] as well as

uncertain political benefits, since it is a novel electoral tactic for most parties. Consequently,

parties will generally abstain from BPI implementation. They will only consider implementing

BPIs if they face significant societal demand, as this demand can substantially increase the

political costs of non-implementation.[27] At the same time, BPIs may offer political benefits not

only to the governing party, but also to its opponents. As a result, even if they face significant

societal demand, parties will only implement BPIs if they expect to benefit more than their

political rivals.

Demand for BPIs has two components: First, there must be a widespread expectation among

the electorate or the party's base that the party will pursue policies to increase citizen

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[26] Ranging in Latin America from between 3% to 13% of the national government spending.
[27] For related arguments, see Andersson & Van Laerhoven, 2007; Balderacchi, 2017; Falleti & Riofrancos, 2018a;
Garay, 2016; Wampler, 2008a.

participation in government decision-making. Such demand ensures that the party will face pressure to implement some kind of participatory reform. While there is debate about the extent to which politicians' policy agendas are influenced by constituent preferences (Barberá et al., 2018; Waggoner, 2019), there is evidence suggesting that politicians will be responsive to their constituents on highly salient issues (Jones & Baumgartner, 2004; Lax & Phillips, 2009; Soroka & Wlezien, 2010), as well as issues raised by constituents who contact them most frequently (Miler, 2010). When a large segment of the electorate, or a vocal minority of constituents, expresses a strong preference for increasing citizen participation, then, politicians are likely to respond by putting the issue on their political agenda. Additionally, there is evidence that politicians are responsive to organized groups in their coalition that have the capacity to sway large segments of the electorate (Anzia, 2011; Schlozman, 2015). Thus, when influential sectors among the party's base or its allied organizations demand measures to increase citizen participation, the party has an incentive to be responsive, since ignoring the demands of important coalition members could have damaging electoral effects.

However, the specific reforms available to parties vary widely. They include referenda or recall mechanisms, "window dressing" participatory institutions that are unlikely to have a meaningful effect on any important outcomes,[28] and, of course, BPIs. Since BPIs are costly and politically risky to implement, if the party's only goal is to satisfy general demands for increased citizen participation, it will usually opt for more symbolic participatory mechanisms. Consequently, for parties to consider BPIs as a policy choice, influential individuals and/or organizations within their political coalition must press specifically for BPIs. This pressure— generally from the party's left-wing, smaller leftist political parties, civil society organizations,

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[28] See Levitsky & Murillo (2009).

and/or social movements—increases the likelihood that BPIs will be the party's preferred participatory reform.

Demand may be sufficient to produce BPI adoption, but it does not ensure implementation. For this, the political risk level parties associate with implementation is also critical. When movements or parties with political agendas at odds with the governing party are able to effectively utilize BPIs against it, the party will fear implementation could generate negative political consequences. Parties will only implement BPIs if they believe the likelihood of these negative consequences is low. This will be true, first, if opposition-aligned civil society and social movements are too weak to disrupt or co-opt BPIs on a large scale.

By contrast, civil society organizations and social movements within the governing party's coalition can only utilize BPIs against the party if they are both strong, as well as relatively autonomous from the party. From the party's standpoint, "organically linked" coalition partners—those that offer unequivocal support to the party, either because the two enjoy a long-standing relationship and/or because the coalition partner is heavily dependent on the party to achieve its goals—are trustworthy, and are likely to remain in the coalition even in the face of intra-coalition political tension. By contrast, the party views contingently linked allies—those who offer their support on a conditional basis, only for the short-term, or have only done so recently—with suspicion, since they are likely to exit the party's coalition in the event of conflict. [29] If the contingently linked ally is strong, it could use BPIs to mobilize its supporters and organize campaigns against the governing party on a large scale.

Finally, parties also consider the degree to which rival parties can utilize BPIs against them. This is determined by whether rival parties control municipalities representing a large

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[29] Garay, 2016, (p. 54) draws a similar distinction between recent and long-standing alliances between parties and social movements.

percentage of the national population—giving them the capacity to turn BPIs into a credible political threat to the governing party—and whether the opposition can incorporate BPIs into its political platform. If the governing party is dominant at the subnational level, or if BPIs are so closely associated with the governing party that opposition parties would face resistance from their base by associating themselves with BPIs, the governing party will not fear BPI co-optation by opposition parties.

Figure 2.7: Determinants of BPI Implementation

2: Explaining Variation in BPI Representativeness

I turn now to my explanation of cross-national variation in BPI representativeness (as a reminder, this is a country's joint score on BPI participation and politicization).[30] I argue that failures of representativeness are a consequence of the conditions required for nationwide implementation. In other words, successful implementation generally undermines BPIs' subsequent representativeness. This is the paradox of participatory institutions. In this chapter I argue that BPIs can be implemented by two actors—political parties and technocrats—and that

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[30] I explain the operationalization of this measure in Chapter 3.

the modes of BPI implementation employed by these actors face unique challenges in overcoming the paradox of participatory institutions. On the one hand, political parties will only implement BPIs if they anticipate an electoral benefit. This has the positive effect of producing high participation rates, as parties have an incentive to mobilize supporters and potential supporters into BPI activities. At the same time, however, most parties also use BPIs to distribute targeted benefits among supporters or potential supporters. This causes BPI politicization, as parties seek to exclude opposition supporters from BPI participation/benefits. Most parties can achieve high participation, but only at the price of politicization. On the other hand, when technocrats implement BPIs, they are not motivated by electoral considerations.[31] To the contrary, they understand BPIs as a tool for decreasing the politicization of public decision-making—by empowering citizens and civil society organizations to participate in the oversight of municipal governance. Technocrat-led implementation thus offers a possible solution to the problem of BPI politicization. Yet technocratic implementation also produces contradictory effects on BPI representativeness, minimizing both politicization and participation. Because technocrats lack the capacity—enjoyed by political parties—to mobilize large numbers of citizens into BPI participation, they can achieve low politicization, but only at the price of participation.

BPIs will only be implemented nationwide *and* represent broad community interests when they are championed by young, outsider parties that cannot rely on state resources to secure broad-based political support. These parties, what Shefter (1993) refers to as "externally-

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[31] It is important to note that I am not claiming technocrats in general lie beyond the influence of politicians. Indeed, it is certainly possible that parties could employ technocrats as an "apolitical" face to advocate for politically-motivated BPI implementation. As I explain below, however, that would be a case of party-led implementation. By contrast, technocratic implementation occurs when technocrats, for reasons I discuss below, enjoy substantial autonomy from politicians, allowing them to advocate for policies consistent with their own ideological commitments to improving government transparency and efficiency.

mobilized" parties, have no choice but to concentrate their electoral strategies on strictly

programmatic, rather than distributive (either programmatic or clientelistic) appeals.[32] When

these parties implement BPIs, they do so to cultivate a reputation for good governance and

democratic deepening. Politicizing BPIs would undermine this reputation, and low rates of

participation would minimize the institution's electoral value—since few supporters or potential

supporters would engage with, or have knowledge of the benefits derived, from them.

Consequently, these parties (for example, the PT in Brazil and the Uruguayan *Frente Amplio*)

have an incentive to both maximize participation and minimize politicization. These theoretical

expectations are summarized in Table 2.1: Summary of Theoretical Expectations.

Table 2.1: Summary of Theoretical Expectations

		Participation	
		Low	High
Politicization	Low	Technocratic implementation	Externally mobilized party implementation
	High	NA	Internally mobilized implementation

Technocratic Implementation

Let us examine more closely the causal mechanisms connecting the mode of BPI

implementation and BPI representativeness. We begin with those cases in which technocrats take

the lead in BPI implementation. Technocrats are public officials whose authority derives from

expert knowledge in a given policy area. They can be high-level officials as well as low-level

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[32] Shefter counterposes externally mobilized parties to "internally mobilized" parties, which are established parties of government that enjoy ample discretion over public resources that can be used in electoral campaigns.

technical advisors.[33] Technocrats with expert knowledge in participatory institutions range from Vice Ministers of Finance or Planning and Executive Directors of national municipal associations, to technical assistants within congressional committees and academic consultants. The technocrats responsible for BPI implementation are what Gailmard & Patty (2007, p. 874) refer to as "zealots," who are primarily motivated by a desire to pursue their preferred public policies, as opposed to "slackers," who are technocrats without any explicit policy preferences. Only technocrats who are deeply motivated by a desire to realize the policy benefits of BPI implementation will have a sufficient incentive to devise BPI proposals, lobby for their legislative adoption, and marshal the resources of important government or quasi-governmental agencies to support BPI implementation. That said, it is critical to remember, following my discussion of the conditions that produce nationwide BPI implementation, that governing political parties will only permit nationwide BPI implementation when they believe the political benefits will outweigh the costs. As a result, motivated technocrats alone are not a sufficient condition for technocratic BPI implementation, which also requires, at a minimum, the acquiescence of governing political parties. This acquiescence, as I explained above, is conditional upon societal demand and the risk level parties associate with BPI implementation.

Of course, it is possible that technocrats might be induced to implement BPIs not based on any particular ideological affinity with BPIs, but rather as the result of politically motivated threats or inducements (Magaloni, 2006; Stallings, 1992; Teichman, 2004). Yet if technocrats are —in the terminology of Dargent (2015) — "agents" working at the behest of politicians, rather than "actors" advancing their own BPI policy agenda, then they are supporting a party-led implementation and not leading a distinctive, technocratic mode of implementation. Further,

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[33] This definition draws upon similar conceptions in Collier et al., 1979, p. 403 and Dargent, 2015, p. 13.

there is little evidence that political parties or individual politicians (such as cabinet ministers) in Latin America have used technocrats as a political tool for decreasing obstacles to politically motivated BPI implementation. There are no cases, for example, of party-led BPI implementation where technocrats were put forward as the public face of BPI implementation in order to clear the political path of implementation. To the contrary, in every case of technocratic BPI implementation (and cases of technocrat-led BPI adoption without implementation, such as in Colombia), technocrats have persuaded otherwise apathetic or indifferent politicians to support, or at least not oppose, BPI implementation. The lack of political manipulation in these cases is hardly surprising. As I discuss below, politicians in countries with technocratic BPI implementation believed the political stakes of implementation were low and did not perceive any value in co-optation or interference. If they *had* believed BPI implementation would yield electoral benefits, they would have had little interest in ceding political credit to technocrats.

Technocrats' motivations for supporting BPI implementation vary, but are based on some combination of increasing government accountability, responsiveness, transparency, and efficiency, as well as decreasing corruption, improving public service provision, and increasing the quality of democracy.[34] As a result, when technocrats implement BPIs, they do so in a way that attempts to minimize politicization. The steps technocrats take to limit politicization include developing clear guidelines for BPI activities, training sessions conducted with municipal officials to emphasize the importance of keeping partisan politics outside of BPIs, implementing strict reporting requirements to ensure decision-making is transparent, and imposing financial sanctions for non-compliance with agency guidelines. At the same time, compared to political parties, technocrats have a limited capacity to mobilize citizens into BPI participation. They may

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[34] For a summary, see Goldfrank, 2012 and Theuer, 2009.

have some resources for publicizing BPIs and hiring staff to train communities around BPI best practices, but they can boast nothing comparable to the neighborhood or block-level organization of political parties. Technocrats also lack the trust and loyalty that political parties engender among their supporters. As a result, technocratic BPI implementation is broadly perceived as top-down and disconnected to local communities. Hence BPIs generate little community buy-in. This leads to low participation rates, and, in turn, undermines BPIs' capacity to represent broad community interests.

It is possible that strong civil society/social movement organizations could serve as a substitute for political parties' mobilizational apparatus. For instance, in Ecuador during the late 2000s, the governing party (*Alianza País*) was not interested in mobilizing voters into BPIs, as they feared BPIs could be co-opted by their political rivals. This might not have been a serious obstacle to BPI implementation, given the strength of Ecuadorian indigenous movements that could have substituted for party-led mobilization into BPIs (at least in certain regions of the country). Yet parties only permit nationwide BPI implementation when social movements are relatively weak, and the Ecuadorian governing party was no exception. The political risk posed by potentially confrontational social movements meant that the party was not only reluctant to invest in BPIs, but was also strongly motivated to stop anyone else from implementing the institutions. Without the minimum government cooperation required to ensure initial implementation, movements found few BPIs into which they could have mobilized communities. In general, then, since nationwide BPI implementation requires weak civil society/social movement organizations, we are unlikely to observe cases where these organizations are strong *and* where the governing party is willing to permit nationwide implementation.

Technocrat-led BPI implementation requires advancing an independent BPI agenda to which politicians are at best indifferent, and at worst actively oppose. To overcome these political headwinds, technocrats must have sufficient political credibility among, and autonomy from, policymakers. Credibility is established primarily through demonstrated administrative competence (especially relative to other government agencies and political institutions) that shows technocrats can be depended upon to deliver "objectively effective and politically neutral solutions" (Dargent, 2015, pp. 36–37). The emblematic example I discuss below is Peru's Ministry of Economics and Finance (MEF), whose successful economic management during the 1990s gave it unparalleled legitimacy among Peruvian politicians (especially given the extreme weakness of political parties and scarcity of professional politicians) (Dargent, 2015, Ch. 5). Such credibility increases technocrats' capacity to ensure BPIs are placed on the national legislative agenda, and overcome opposition from both national policymakers and individual mayors responsible for municipal-level implementation. Even when technocrats enjoy this credibility, however, politicians may remain concerned about the negative effects BPI implementation could have on their political objectives. They may also view BPIs as politically irrelevant. In either case, they will be unwilling to devote resources to implementation.

To ease politicians' fears about the political consequences of BPI implementation, technocrats frame BPIs as apolitical, procedural institutions that have few, if any, distributive or political consequences. Politicians are encouraged to understand BPIs as institutions that neither pose any significant political risks, nor offer any tangible political rewards. Politicians who might otherwise be keenly attuned to the possible distributive consequences of allocating significant resources to BPIs, are convinced by technocrats that they have nothing to fear from BPI implementation, and are happy to let technocrats with reputations for effective, apolitical

administration handle the details of the legislation. To illustrate, when asked what the role of politicians was in the drafting of the Dominican Republic's BPI law, one technocrat involved in the process admitted, "The congresspeople didn't understand the law. If they had known what was actually in it they never would have approved it" (*Interview with Jacobo Reyes*, November 7, 2019). In turn, since politicians do not see BPIs as a potential site of electoral contestation, they have little incentive to politicize BPIs, and will generally ignore them. The arms-length stance parties take with BPIs, combined with procedural steps technocrats carry out to limit BPI politicization (described above) substantially decreases the risk of politicization. At the same time, however, underscoring the political irrelevance of BPIs also decreases parties' willingness to invest in the institutions. No rational party would devote significant resources to a project it believed had no chance of affecting electoral outcomes. Lack of party investment then puts downward pressure on BPI participation rates.

To motivate indifferent politicians, technocrats emphasize the political benefits politicians (especially mayors) could derive from BPIs. These include shifting the burden to make difficult budgetary decisions from mayors to citizens (K. Andersson & Van Laerhoven, 2007; Hunter, 2010; Mitchell, 2014); cultivating a positive reputation among the electorate by showing their commitment to transparency and fighting corruption, using BPIs to distribute material benefits (García-Guadilla, 2008; Handlin, 2016; M. McCarthy, 2012), and avoiding negative political fallout from failing to meet popular expectations around increasing citizen participation (K. Andersson & Van Laerhoven, 2007). While these techniques help facilitate nationwide BPI implementation, they also increase the risk of politicization by encouraging politicians to view BPIs in strategic/political, rather than apolitical/procedural terms. Political framing increases the likelihood that politicians will engage in tactics such as distributing BPI

benefits exclusively to areas where they have the strongest support, only inviting supporters to BPI meetings, and other related strategies.

Internally Mobilized Party Implementation

The task of BPI implementation can also be led by political parties. Since national incumbent parties are the most capable of ensuring passage of BPI legislation and mobilizing state resources to implement BPIs, parties in control of the national executive are those most likely to implement BPIs. These parties, described by Shefter (1977, 1993) as "internally mobilized" parties, enjoy ample access to state resources that can be employed for electoral purposes. When considering how to incorporate BPIs into their electoral strategies,[35] these parties have a strong incentive to utilize BPIs as a vehicle for distributing material benefits to supporters and potential supporters. The logic is as follows: Parties have to decide between two basic strategies for distributing resources through BPIs. These are (1) distribute resources uniformly across the population or on clearly defined needs-based criteria, or (2) target resources disproportionately to supporters and likely supporters.

Parties must decide which strategy will generate the largest positive electoral effects. To make this calculation, they assess the relative benefits and liabilities of each. On the one hand, distributing resources uniformly across the population could improve the party's reputation among swing voters by demonstrating its commitment to good governance and improving the quality of democracy. On the other hand, uniform distribution entails wasting scarce electoral resources on opposition supporters and nonvoters. This increases the cost of each vote, and leaves fewer resources available to woo potential supporters, and strengthen electoral support

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[35] This assumes the decision to implement BPIs nationwide has already been made, according to the predictions described above in my discussion of the determinants of nationwide BPI implementation.

among core supporters. Moreover, due to the fact that BPI benefits are often distributed directly by subnational governments—many of which are controlled by opposition parties—offering benefits to all could enable opposition politicians to take credit for BPI benefits. This strategy also risks alienating core supporters, who may punish the party—by not voting or volunteering, or possibly even defecting electorally—for allowing BPIs to benefit the opposition. Uniform targeting might also cause core supporters to punish the party if they believe it signals a lack of commitment to incorporating BPIs into the party's broader political agenda.[36]

By contrast, targeting resources to supporters and likely supporters maximizes the electoral value of each Bolívar, Boliviano, Sol, or Peso allocated through BPIs, and avoids alienating core supporters. The only downside the party might face is failing to win the votes of swing voters who might not receive benefits as a result of targeting, or who might be alienated by the party's politicization of BPIs. As I explain in Chapter 6, parties' concern with winning swing voters through BPIs increases with electoral competition, as the combined percentage of their core and likely supporters decreases. That said, governing parties will generally prioritize maintaining their electoral base and limiting the amount of BPI resources they distribute to unswayable voters, over winning the votes of a relatively small, and often not electorally decisive group of swing voters.

When parties use BPIs to target benefits among their supporters, they also work to discourage opposition voters from participating in BPIs, and from receiving their benefits. These efforts can take various forms. National party leaders may publicly state that opposition supporters are not welcome in BPI activities, and systematically exclude areas with high opposition support from BPI benefits. Local party leaders might also withhold benefits from

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[36] This could be, for instance, by using BPIs to mobilize supporters for rallies, or by understanding BPIs as the basis of a new, radical-democratic system of political representation.

opposition supporters within individual BPIs, or deliberately fail to publicize BPI meeting times among opposition supporters. Even when parties do not actively try to exclude supporters of opposition parties from BPIs, their activists may discourage opposition participation by openly praising the governing party (or denigrating opposition parties) at BPI meetings. Such activists might also state openly at BPI meetings that they believe supporters of other parties seek to undermine the success of BPIs. Beyond this, parties might also use BPI spaces directly for electoral purposes.[37] For example, they might invite partisan political figures to speak at BPI meetings, encourage BPI leaders to explicitly connect BPI benefits to the party, or use BPI community outreach activities to canvass for the party's candidates. These tactics, to varying degrees, make opposition supporters feel unwelcome, and decrease their interest in participating. Since parties with an interest in attracting as many supporters and potential supporters as possible to BPI activities are likely to invest significant resources into BPI mobilization, BPI implementation, led by internally mobilized parties, facilitates high participation rates. Nevertheless, BPI representativeness is undermined by the likelihood that BPIs will be politicized. The strategic orientation of internally mobilized parties toward BPIs is premised on the goal of maximizing participation among their supporters, and minimizing the engagement of opposition supporters.

Externally Mobilized Party Implementation

As mentioned above, in most cases party-led BPI implementation will be carried out by internally mobilized parties, since they are typically the only parties capable of marshaling the political and financial resources required for nationwide implementation. In some cases,

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[37] Note that I offer an extensive discussion of this phenomenon later in Chapter 6.

however, externally mobilized parties lead the process. Unlike their internally mobilized counterparts, these parties cannot depend on ample state revenues to secure broad electoral support. As a consequence, when considering how to incorporate BPIs into their electoral strategies, externally mobilized parties have a strong incentive to forgo targeted BPI resource distribution, and turn instead to uniform distribution. Given the limited budgets they have to distribute through BPIs, these parties cannot hope to win many votes based on the direct receipt of BPI benefits. Instead, they use BPIs to make programmatic voter appeals. Specifically, they employ BPIs as an outreach strategy to new constituencies seeking a political alternative to unresponsive, unaccountable, or corrupt traditional political parties. In contrast to internally mobilized parties, then, externally mobilized parties generally do not employ BPIs spaces directly for electoral purposes. Instead, they use the institutions' success as a signal to voters (both participants and non-participants) that the party is a genuine alternative to politics as usual, embodying good governance and democratic deepening. This is why uniform distribution of BPI benefits is so important for externally mobilized parties; targeting benefits only to supporters and likely supporters would weaken the party's programmatic credibility, which in turn would undermine its BPI electoral strategy.

Unlike technocratic and internally mobilized party-led implementation, externally mobilized party-led BPI implementation is associated with both low politicization *and* high rates of participation. Since politicizing BPIs (by targeting benefits only to their supporters) would undermine their reputation for good governance and democratic deepening—particularly among the new voters it hopes to attract through BPI-based programmatic appeals—externally mobilized parties have an incentive to minimize BPI politicization. In turn, since low rates of participation would undermine BPIs' legitimacy among the public, and weaken their utility as

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the party's showcase for good governance and democratic deepening, these parties also have an incentive to mobilize the public into BPI participation. Externally mobilized party-led BPI implementation, then, is the only path through which BPIs can be implemented nationwide *and* be representative of the community.

To illustrate why externally mobilized parties have an incentive to pursue BPI electoral strategies based on uniform resource distribution, compare the Brazilian PT before it won control of the national executive in 2003, to the Venezuelan PSUV after BPI-implementation in 2006. Unlike its rivals, the PT was highly constrained financially during this period (Hunter, 2010, p. 103); it had access only to resources generated by the municipal governments it controlled. The number of municipal governments that the PT controlled never reached more than 187 of the country's more than 5,000 municipalities, and 27 of the largest 100 cities (Hunter, 2010, p. 100). As a result, even if large budgets had been allocated to BPIs in municipalities under PT control, any positive electoral effect generated by targeting benefits only to PT supporters or likely supporters in those municipalities would have been dramatically outweighed by the negative effect this targeting would have had on the party's reputation in Brazil's other 4,800 municipalities. Further, thanks to severe budget constraints faced by Brazilian municipalities, if the PT hoped to allocate significant resources to BPIs in the municipalities under its control, it would have had to do so by increasing municipal property taxes. And in many cases where it tried to raise taxes, the party was unsuccessful in the face of strong business sector opposition (Hunter, 2010, p. 90). It should not come as a surprise, then, that the PT opted to use BPIs as a symbolic gesture to demonstrate its good governance credentials to the electorate (Hunter, 2010, p. 97), rather than as a mechanism for distributing resources to its supporters. By contrast, the PSUV controlled all the coffers of the Venezuelan national state (including the highly lucrative

PDVSA) in the midst of a commodities boom.[38] This made allocating significant financial

resources to newly created BPIs a relatively trivial matter, and increased the party's incentive to

target BPI benefits to supporters rather than distribute benefits uniformly across the population.

However, since control of the national executive is both a condition for generating nationwide

BPI implementation and a guaranteed source of significant financial resources that could be

allocated through BPIs, to date there have been no successful examples of nationwide BPI-

implementation by externally mobilized parties. In Chapter 8, I discuss why parties like the PT

that implement BPIs before coming to power at the national level have not used this platform to

implement BPIs nationwide, as well as the conditions under which they might have done so.

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[38]Similarly, Bolivia's 1994 decentralization law (*Ley* 1551) allocated 20% of the national budget to be distributed through hundreds of newly created municipalities (Van Cott 2007, 42). This offered the governing *Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario* (MNR) a large new budget for distributing benefits through BPIs, and increased its incentive to pursue the exclusionary route.

Figure 2.8: Summary of Causal Mechanisms

A Framework for Understanding BPI Incorporation into Parties' Electoral Strategies

1. <u>Which Voters Will Parties Target Through BPIs, and How?</u>

Scholars have offered a range of theories to explain how political parties incorporate BPIs into their electoral strategies. Consistent with my discussion of externally mobilized parties above, some scholars have suggested that parties implement BPIs to signal broadly to the electorate that they represent a break from politics as usual, and a move toward greater transparency and inclusion in political decision-making (Abers, 2000; Samuels, 2004; Wampler, 2008b). This, they argue, can improve the party's brand among the electorate, thereby broadening its electoral appeal. Others suggest, consistent with my discussion of internally mobilized parties above, that parties implement BPIs to increase their electoral support through the distribution of material benefits to supporters and/or potential supporters, either through clientelism or pork-barrel spending (Handlin, 2016; Rhodes-Purdy, 2017). Finally, other scholars have claimed that BPIs can play an important role in party-building efforts (M. M. McCarthy, 2015). While this literature has explored a range of intriguing partisan-related functions of BPIs, it has not offered a systematic account of voter targeting through BPIs. In the previous section I offered a theory to explain why some (internally mobilized) parties will target BPI resources to their supporters, while others, which are externally mobilized, will distribute benefits uniformly. In this section I draw upon a well-developed literature on voter targeting from the distributive politics literature to drill down further into the logic underpinning voter targeting through BPIs. Since I predict only internally mobilized parties will target specific voter groups directly through BPIs, this analysis applies primarily to these parties, not to externally mobilized parties.

Existing scholarship on voter targeting from the distributive politics literature can provide important insights into which voters parties will target through BPIs. This work assumes there

are three basic types of voters: core supporters, swing voters, and opposition supporters. Given the limited budgets parties have to increase their chances of electoral success, upon which of these three groups are parties most likely to concentrate their resources? According to Cox and McCubbins (1986), their decisions will depend on the responsiveness of each group to appeals by the party, as well as on the predictability of each group's reaction to party appeals. Opposition voters are predictable in their responses to party appeals, but completely unresponsive, since they will likely never be moved to vote for the party making an appeal to them. Thus, parties will devote as few resources as possible trying to reach opposition voters.

In turn, core supporters are also highly predictable in their (positive) responses to party appeals, but given their high initial probability of voting for the party that is making an appeal to them, their responsiveness to such appeals will be relatively low. By contrast, the predictability of swing voters is relatively low (since they may vote for the opposition), but given their relatively low level of commitment to any party, they are most likely to respond to party appeals. For Cox and McCubbins (1986), parties trying to decide between offering benefits to swing voters vs. core supporters will tend to choose core supporters, because even though the potential reward is greater if swing voters are targeted, risk-averse parties are guaranteed stable rewards by offering benefits to core supporters to keep them from defecting. Other theorists disagree, arguing that core supporters can be taken for granted, and that the only group likely to see a marginal increase in its propensity to vote for a given party is swing voters who are responsive to party appeals (Dixit & Londregan, 1996; Lindbeck & Weibull, 1987; Stokes, 2005). In general, this literature assumes it is not possible to simultaneously target both core and swing voters, as targeting swing voters could risk alienating core voters (and vice versa), thus undermining the party's overall electoral strategy (Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2016, p. 83).

Díaz-Cayeros et al. (2016) depart from both of these perspectives in at least two important respects: They argue that the support of core voters cannot be taken for granted, since support from parties' core constituencies is conditional upon the ongoing provision of benefits targeted specifically to those voters. Since parties can often build a winning electoral coalition based primarily on their electoral base, Díaz-Cayeros et al. argue that parties will generally target core supporters in areas of declining support. In a second departure from the standard literature, however, they argue parties need not make an either/or choice between targeting core vs. swing voters. They posit that when the size of a party's core constituency is not large enough to ensure electoral victory, it will diversify its strategic portfolio and reach out to swing voters as well as core supporters.

Joining Díaz-Cayeros et al., I assume the ongoing loyalty of core supporters cannot be taken for granted, and that parties may simultaneously target multiple constituencies. I depart from Díaz-Cayeros et al., however, in two ways. First, I argue that under certain conditions parties may appeal to multiple constituencies even when they do not have an immediate electoral incentive to do so. Díaz-Cayeros et al. argue that parties develop various mechanisms for distributing resources to different constituencies based on their analysis of budget constraints and electoral risks, and that they will choose the most efficient option given these factors. This suggests parties will only take the risk of wooing swing voters when they face a serious threat of electoral failure. By contrast, I argue that regardless of whether parties face an immediate electoral threat requiring them to expand their electoral coalition, if they are under pressure from the base to implement reforms demonstrating a commitment to democratic deepening, they may implement institutions that allow them to reach swing voters without sacrificing electoral support from the base. For instance, in the presidential election that took place during the year BPIs were

implemented in Venezuela (2006), the governing MVR captured a large enough share of the vote to win outright by appealing to its base alone. Specifically, core MVR supporters made up somewhere between 51% and 54% of total voters in 2006 (depending on how turnout is calculated). The Movement for the Fifth Republic (MVR) had no immediate electoral incentive to implement BPIs, but did so anyway. Unfortunately, we do not have data to show that the party actually targeted swing voters through BPIs at the moment of implementation. That said, in Chapter 6 I show that that in 2018, when the governing PSUV had *even less* reason to target swing voters (core PSUV supporters represented somewhere between 65% and 72% of total voters, depending on how turnout is calculated), a significant percentage of PSUV activists reported that when they carried out electoral work through BPIs, they targeted not only core PSUV supporters, but also swing voters. In other words, there is clear evidence that the PSUV targeted swing voters through BPIs at a moment when it had very little incentive to do so, meaning that if anything, in 2006 the party would have targeted swing voters to an even greater extent.

Lastly, while I agree with Díaz-Cayeros et al. that parties may simultaneously target distinct voter groups without risking the support of either, I argue there are additional ways to achieve this objective beyond portfolio diversification, whereby parties target one set of benefits to core supporters and a different set of benefits to swing voters. I argue that under certain conditions parties can simultaneously target core and swing voters through the same participatory institution. This occurs, as I show below, when parties use BPIs to employ messaging that appeals simultaneously to distinct voter groups.

There are in fact strong theoretical reasons to believe parties will use BPIs to target both core supporters and swing voters, even when they do not face a pressing electoral need to do so.

Many core supporters will engage with BPIs regardless of whether the party encourages them to do so, either because they feel obligated to support their party's public policy initiatives and/or because they have strong personal commitments to those initiatives. As a result, once BPIs have been created (for whatever reason), employing them to strengthen partisan ties among core supporters requires a relatively small additional investment by parties, and can yield significant electoral rewards—since BPIs offer parties a regular and ongoing space to interact with core supporters between election cycles. Thus, all else being equal, parties will almost certainly target core supporters through BPIs by distributing either material benefits and such non-material benefits as an increased sense of political efficacy and an increased sense of community.[39] In turn, to ensure core supporters view BPIs favorably, parties will focus rhetorically on the importance of BPIs to their broader political strategies. In general, parties will use BPIs to convince core supporters (1) that they are committed to deepening democracy/increasing the participation of ordinary citizens in political life (by emphasizing that BPIs are community organizations meant to benefit all of society, not just party supporters), and (2) that BPIs play a meaningful role in securing the party's future political success (generally by claiming credit for benefits distributed through BPIs and defending BPIs against political opponents whom party activists believe seek to undermine BPIs). As the empirical analysis in Chapter 6 will show, these two objectives can produce seemingly contradictory rhetoric and behavior by party leaders and activists that can only be understood through the lens of parties' desires to maintain and strengthen partisan attachments among their core supporters.

Parties also understand that, if framed properly, BPIs can attract participants beyond their core supporters, particularly swing voters. This is possible if parties highlight that BPIs are

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[39] I explore the precise mechanisms that might strengthen partisan attachments among core supporters in separate work.

community organizations open to the participation of all and are not formally tied to any political party—however closely associated with parties they may be. Such a signal tells swing voters that they, too, can receive benefits from BPIs, and that BPIs are important community spaces they should join despite potential political misgivings. But how can parties simultaneously target core supporters and swing voters without alienating either? Simply put, parties must ensure that BPIs are sufficiently tied to the party's broader political project to generate credibility among their partisans, but sufficiently inclusive to ensure swing voters believe their participation is worthwhile.

While swing voters may be concerned that the governing party will co-opt BPIs, they—unlike opposition supporters—do not have a strong negative predisposition toward the party, and are at least partially open to party appeals. Consequently, the governing party's characterization of BPIs as community organizations open to all—not just party supporters—is sufficient to incentivize swing voter participation. In turn, thanks to the governing party's credit-claiming efforts with respect to benefits distributed through BPIs, swing voters will likely associate positive experiences they have in BPIs with the governing party. Finally, since supporters of the governing party are also attracted by the democratic, community-oriented rhetoric used to appeal to swing voters, the party risks little electorally by targeting swing voters in addition to its own supporters.[40]

2. <u>Explaining Variation in Parties' BPI Voter Targeting</u>

Though I predict that internally mobilized parties will target specific voter groups through BPIs, there is empirical evidence (which I discuss in Chapter 6) of substantial heterogeneity in the extent to which militants actually carry out the party's BPI electoral strategy. Following

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[40] The question of the precise mechanisms through which parties increase partisan support among individuals active in participatory institutions is beyond the scope of this work. I explore it in a separate paper.

Montambeault (2015), I argue that political competition is a key factor in determining whether

party activists will engage in BPI electoral work. Montambeault argues that higher levels of

political competition increase the political stakes associated with PIs and incentivize parties to

employ the institutions for electoral purposes: "…intense competition increases the electoral

costs of not using and capturing participatory institutions as a militants' network" (63). An

important implication of Montambeault's theory is that BPI electioneering should be high in *all*

competitive districts, regardless of variation in the electoral costs of BPI politicization across

districts. While little work has been done to date on the relationship between political

competition and efforts to politicize participatory institutions, a wealth of literature has examined

this question with respect to clientelism (Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2016; Hale, 2007; Shefter, 1977;

Van de Walle, 2007). Of particular relevance for understanding the relationship between

competition and electioneering in BPIs is Weitz-Shapiro (2012), who argues that high political

competition is associated with clientelism in contexts where most voters are unlikely to punish

politicians for engaging in clientelism (i.e., high poverty areas), but less likely in contexts where

more voters are sensitive to politicians' use of clientelism (i.e., middle-class areas). Using a

similar logic, we should expect—contra Montambeault—that high electoral competition will be

associated with BPI electioneering in places where relatively few voters are likely to punish the

party for politicizing BPIs, and not elsewhere. Since higher electoral competition is—by

definition—associated with larger proportions of swing voters, and since swing voters are more

sensitive to BPI politicization than the party's supporters, areas with a higher density of voters

who might punish the party for politicizing BPIs are also areas with the highest levels of political

competition. Consequently, I expect electoral competition will be positively associated with BPI

electioneering. Relatedly, since the party must rely more on swing voter persuasion to win in

competitive districts compared to non-competitive districts, I expect activists in competitive

districts to report targeting non-party supporters at higher rates than militants in non-competitive

districts.

Figure 2.9: Municipal-Level Political Competition and Activist Compliance with BPI Electoral Strategies

While increased electoral competition is likely to drive party electioneering in BPIs, I also

expect low competition within BPIs themselves to be associated with higher levels of

electioneering. Specifically, I hypothesize that party activists will be more likely to carry out

electoral work if their BPI's leadership is controlled by the party. The logic is simple: In BPIs

controlled by the party, the capacity of party leaders to dominate BPI activities is higher than in

other BPIs. In the absence of such control, it is difficult for militants to use BPI meetings for

partisan lobbying, and/or to use council resources (such as monetary and material resources

transferred to councils from the state, council census data, as well as organizational resources the

councils can deploy to mobilize constituents) for electoral purposes.

In turn, party activists will be more likely to target groups other than their supporters in

BPIs controlled by the party than in BPIs not under party control. This is so for two reasons: (1)

Since party activists' capacity to identify the partisan loyalties of BPI participants is higher in

places where BPI leadership is controlled by the party, they can target swing voters in BPIs

controlled by the party, while also limiting BPI electoral efforts to easily identifiable co-partisans in non-party controlled BPIs. (2) In BPIs with party-controlled leadership, the party's political ideology is regularly reinforced, and the party places a low probability on electoral defections from the ranks of its supporters. With its base secure, it can focus its electoral efforts on groups other than party supporters. By contrast, in BPIs not controlled by the party, activists fear the partisan loyalties of party supporters may be unstable. As a result, to mitigate electoral defections, they focus their BPI electoral work on party supporters.

Figure 2.10: Intra-BPI Political Competition Activist Compliance with BPI Electoral Strategies

3. Which Electoral Outcomes does BPI Participation Affect, and Among Which Voters?

I argue that BPI participation can have at least three distinct electoral effects, two direct and one indirect. Directly, engaging with BPIs can increase a voter's propensity to cast their ballot for the governing party, relative to challengers. The most obvious voter group parties might hope to win over through BPIs is swing voters. These voters may lean toward one party or another, but their future electoral preferences are sufficiently uncertain to make an investment by the party strategically useful (Dixit & Londregan, 1996; Stokes, 2005). Assuming a given party's electoral appeals through BPIs are at least partially successful, then, BPI participation should increase swing voters' likelihood of voting for the party. By contrast, core supporters have such a

high propensity of voting for their preferred party that BPIs should be of little use in affecting their vote choice (Dixit & Londregan, 1996; Stokes, 2005; Stokes et al., 2013). In turn, since opposition supporters are less likely to participate in BPIs than other voters, and since they often face forms of exclusion and marginalization when they do participate, we are likely to observe either no effects or negative effects of BPI participation among these voters. Overall, I expect, given the likelihood that BPI participation will have no effect on the vote choice of core supporters or opposition supporters, that BPI participation's positive effect among swing voters will produce a positive overall impact of BPI participation on vote choice.

The second direct effect BPI participation can have on electoral outcomes is its impact on voter turnout. Specifically, BPI participation can increase an individual's likelihood of choosing to vote rather than to abstain. Here, again, if we assume BPI participation has a positive impact on swing voters' partisan preferences, and also that turnout rates vary among swing voters (which should be the case in any country without enforced mandatory voting), we are likely to observe positive effects of BPI participation on voter turnout among swing voters. For the same reason, if we assume variable turnout rates among core supporters, we are also likely to observe positive effects of BPI participation among these voters. By contrast, governing party activists will *not* work to increase turnout among known opposition supporters within the ranks of BPI participants. Governing party activists may even try to discourage opposition supporters from voting. Consequently, I do not expect BPI participation to increase voter turnout among opposition supporters.

Finally, BPI participation can indirectly affect electoral outcomes by increasing activists' propensity to perform electoral work on behalf of political parties. In general, increased electoral work among supporters improves a party's chance of electoral victory by enhancing its capacity

to mobilize voters on election day (Enos & Fowler, 2018; Green et al., 2013). Since core supporters have stronger ideological commitments to the party than other voters, efforts to mobilize citizens into performing electoral work should be most effective among this group. Core supporters' strong connection to the party means they can be more easily persuaded (compared to other voters) that performing electoral work on behalf of the party is a useful investment of their time—even if they do not receive some material benefit in exchange for their work. At the same time, both core supporters, as well as swing voters who lean toward the party, might expect to receive special benefits if they engage in electoral activity for the party. For instance, they might believe material rewards will be distributed among campaign workers, but not to other BPI participants. They might also anticipate that campaign volunteers will be able to personally withhold a portion of their electioneering budget. As a result, we should observe positive effects of BPI participation on an individual's propensity to carry out electoral work among both core supporters and swing voters. By contrast, given the low probability that opposition supporters would either be interested in, or asked to, perform electoral work for the party; we should not expect to observe effects of BPI participation on governing party campaign work among opposition supporters.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have explored a wide range of scholarship that seeks to explain my three broad research questions. I have shown that, in general, the focus of existing works on subnational analysis has obscured a range of theoretical and empirical puzzles that only become clear when we shift the unit of analysis to the national level. Of the studies that do examine national-level variation, they have tended to downplay or under-theorize the role of strategic

political interactions between parties, voters, and civil society/social movement organizations. Further, to date, the literature's insufficient differentiation between BPI implementation and the quality of BPI implementation has limited its recognition of the fact that, in most cases, large-scale BPI implementation is only possible under conditions that ultimately generate poor-quality implementation. In turn, I have presented a theoretical framework to account for national-level variation in BPI implementation and representativeness. I have argued, first, that we can only understand variation in the representativeness of BPIs if we understand how the conditions required for BPI implementation undermine BPI representativeness. On the one hand, political parties will only spearhead nationwide BPI implementation when they believe BPIs can be used to further their electoral goals. While this motivates parties to mobilize their supporters into BPI participation, it also guarantees that BPIs will be politicized, which restricts the institutions' capacity to represent broad community interests.

On the other hand, as long as governing parties do not fear that the political risks will outweigh the benefits, they will permit other actors to implement BPIs—principally technocrats. Technocratic implementation can mitigate the problem of politicization, but at the same time technocrats do not have the resources that parties enjoy to ensure large-scale participation. Ideally, technocrats could team up with a coalition of pro-BPI civil society and social movement organizations to address this mobilizational disadvantage. Since parties will only permit nationwide BPI implementation when they do not fear the capacity of strong, independent civil society/social movement organizations to employ BPIs against them, however, we will only see technocratic implementation in countries where organized civil society/social movements are relatively weak or state-dependent.

Finally, I presented a theoretical framework to explain the mechanics of internally mobilized parties strategies around BPIs, both which voter groups they will target and how/why they will do so, as well as the likely effects of these strategies on electoral behavior. I argued, first, that parties use BPIs to target both core and swing voters through a dual messaging strategy that emphasizes the importance of BPIs to the party's broader political project among core supporters, while simultaneously presenting BPIs as community organizations open to all (rather than partisan organizations) to swing voters. In turn, I argued that this dual messaging strategy is likely to be effective among swing voters across a range of electoral outcomes, while among core supporters it will only produce positive effects on turnout and performing electoral work. In the following chapter I turn to an empirical test of my framework for understanding BPI implementation.

Chapter 3. CONCEPTS, MEASUREMENT AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY

Introduction

Now that I have presented a broad theoretical framework for explaining the causes and effects of BPIs, in this chapter I describe the key concepts explored in the dissertation, how I measure those concepts, and the empirical strategies I employ to test my core hypotheses. I open with an expanded discussion of how I operationalize PIs in general, and BPIs in particular, and I provide an empirical summary of BPIs in Latin America. Next, I explain how I operationalize and measure the dissertation's key dependent and independent variables, followed by a justification of my scope conditions and case selection strategy. I conclude by summarizing the data collection process, and the primary analytical techniques I draw upon to test each aspect of my theory.

Participatory Institutions

There is general agreement in the literature that a PI is a formal institution that includes individual citizens and/or civil society actors directly in government decision making, either in an advisory, oversight, or decision-making capacity.[41] While this is an extremely broad definition, it is helpful in differentiating between PIs and other primary modes of citizen-government interaction. Such other modes of citizen-government interaction include (1) voting in elections, (2) political lobbying (since lobbying is an informal institution), (3) political protest/contentious politics (again, an informal institution, however routinized it may be),[42] (4) clientelism (as clientelism entails a purely transactional relationship between citizens and political officials in which citizens play no role in public decision-making, but rather cede their political voice to a political broker in exchange for a small material gain (Hicken, 2011), and (5) public opinion polling/census-taking (as these are completely passive forms of citizen engagement). In essence, PIs are a form of citizen engagement that lies outside the traditional repertoire of citizen-government modes of interaction. PIs vary dramatically in the extent of citizen deliberation they entail, though most PIs—beyond direct-democratic voting mechanisms such as referenda—feature some kind of deliberative mechanism. A summary of the range of PIs across Latin America was provided in Table 1.1.

Binding Participatory institutions

As the summary above suggests, the concept of PIs is extremely broad, ranging from forms of participation in which citizens can register a complaint with their municipal

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[41] This is a similar definition to Mayka (2016), who speaks only of civil society actors rather than individual citizens *and* civil society actors. Also see Cameron et al., 2012; Fung, 2006; Pogrebinschi, 2014; Zaremberg et al., 2017.

[42] For a discussion of the routinization of social movement activity, see Meyer & Tarrow (1998).

government, to corporatist advisory councils that help shape national legislation. The concept of

PIs is so broad, in fact, that conceptualizing and analyzing all PIs as a single phenomenon makes

little sense. The concept of PIs is akin to the concept of political regimes: we would never treat

all cases of political regimes as examples of the same phenomenon (doing so would yield

nonsensical results), rather we disaggregate the broad, structuring concept of regimes into types

(democracy, authoritarianism, totalitarianism, etc.).[43] The same is true for PIs, which can only be

conceptualized and studied coherently through disaggregation. Scholars should not assume that

PIs as a whole affect or are affected by phenomena in the same way. Consequently, I argue that

studying discrete types of PIs that can be operationalized on the basis of sound theoretical

criteria is preferable to studying the entire universe of cases. The specific goal of this dissertation

is to understand the conditions under which PIs with the capacity to impact the quality of

democracy can be implemented successfully. Therefore, I focus my analysis on BPIs. As

described in Chapter 1, BPIs are characterized by (1) binding decision-making, (2) the

participation of any interested adult members of a given community, and (3) ongoing meetings. I

will now detail how each of these factors is likely to affect the quality of democracy, as well as

how I operationalize each in my subsequent analyses.

1. Binding Decision-Making

The first essential feature of BPIs is that they enjoy real decision-making authority. That

is, governments must comply with BPI decisions, even if they would prefer not to. Most PIs

offer citizens a chance to raise their concerns about the implementation of government projects,

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[43] For an interesting discussion of theoretical function of broad, structuring concepts such as regime type in political science see Munck (1996).

to suggest projects they would like to see the government undertake, and/or to ask government officials why a given project has not been carried out. By contrast, in the case of BPIs, citizens decide how government resources will be allocated, and governments have a legal obligation to implement those decisions. This means BPIs constitute a more powerful tool for citizens to participate in public decision-making relative to other PIs. As a corollary, however, BPIs also face more resistance from entrenched political and economic interests. Binding decision-making authority has been highlighted repeatedly by scholars as a critical feature of strong PI design (Goldfrank, 2011a; Mayka, 2019; S. McNulty, 2019; Wampler et al., 2018, 2019).

I consider decisions taken by PIs to be binding if there is a reasonable expectation that those decisions will be implemented by the government.[44] Such a criterion allows me to strike a balance between choosing an overly rigid and an overly flexible threshold. If the threshold is too rigid, cases could be excluded arbitrarily from the universe of nationally implemented BPIs. However, if the threshold is too flexible, it could undermine my capacity to differentiate between binding and non-binding decision-making processes. The standard of a "reasonable expectation" that a decision will be carried out acknowledges both the compulsory nature of community decisions, and the fact that not all BPI decisions are implemented, either because municipal governments simply ignore BPI decisions, projects are ruled infeasible by technical teams tasked with executing them, or because projects lack adequate financing. Note that whether BPI decisions are binding is a separate question from *how successfully* those decisions are executed.[45]

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[44] In cases where the implementation of participatory institutions has been very limited (or nonexistent), it is not possible to tell whether there would be a reasonable expectation that the institution's decisions would be carried out if the institution *were* implemented. In these cases, I assume the institution's decisions are binding if the government is legally required to carry them out. If the institution's decisions are not legally binding, I consider them non-binding.

[45] For instance, 2 municipal governments may comply with a BPI decision to build a new community center, indicating the BPI decision is binding. Yet one government may build the center quickly, including community involvement throughout the process, and producing a result viewed favorably by the community, while the other may ultimately build the center, but only after significant delays, ignoring community input during the process,

While the latter is also a very important question, my focus in this study is on the determinants of BPI implementation and the quality of BPI representation, rather than why some BPI decisions are implemented successfully while others are not.

2. Participation Open to All

The second characteristic of BPIs is that participation is open to all members of the community. PIs that limit participation to leaders of civil society or social movement organizations, or that consist of randomly-selected mini-publics (such as citizens juries, citizen assemblies, or planning cells),[46] can address problems of selection bias by constructing representative subsamples of the population.[47] At the same time, however, only a tiny percentage of the population can engage with participatory institutions featuring restricted participation. This means, first, that any direct impact of BPI participation on the quality of democracy will be limited to the few individuals who are allowed to participate. As Levine and Molina (2011) argue, the greater the abundance of citizens who participate in public affairs, "the higher the probability that government and its decisions are responsive to the will of the people" (p. 9). Consequently, restricted participation places limits on PIs' objective capacity to improve government responsiveness. Further, even the most representative PIs featuring restricted participation are often not viewed as legitimate by the broader community (Lafont, 2017). As a consequence, even if these institutions provide effective interest representation or government oversight, restricted participation still limits their capacity to improve the quality of democracy

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producing a result viewed negatively by the community. Decision-making is binding in both cases, but the outcome is only successful in one of the two cases.

[46] See Fishkin, 1997; Leib, 2010.

[47] Note that I include closed participatory processes under the category of participatory institutions, despite their exclusionary character, because, like open participatory processes, they clearly meet the definition of including citizens and/or civil society actors directly in government affairs.

by failing to address citizens' concern that they have no say in the policymaking process.[48] Open PIs, by contrast, have the potential to structurally deepen representative democracy by institutionalizing the mass, regular participation of ordinary citizens in public decision-making (Lafont, 2017; Pateman, 2012). Further, open PIs aggregate citizen preferences directly, without the guiding (leading) hand of intermediary organizations. This allows them to overcome legitimacy problems faced by PIs that limit participation to representatives of civil society or social movement organizations.[49] Open participation, then, is a critical mechanism through which PIs can improve the quality of democracy.[50]

I consider participation open to all when it is not limited to representatives of organizations, either of civil society or government. My goal, again, is to strike a compromise between an overly restrictive definition that might exclude critical cases based on an arbitrary threshold, and one that undermines the basic distinction between restricted and open participation. My definition permits the inclusion of cases—such as Peru—where participants are generally representatives of organizations, but where individual citizens not representing organizations are permitted to, and often do, participate. Finally, my goal in operationalizing BPIs is simply to establish a clear standard for differentiating between BPIs and other participatory institutions. In the case of open participation, therefore, my definition is limited to assessing whether there is evidence that the range of participants extends beyond representatives of organizations. This

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[48] Rhodes-Purdy (2017) has shown that citizens' sense of the degree to which they believe they have the capacity to shape policy decisions plays an important and independent role in shaping citizens' opinions of the government. Thus, even when restricted PIs play an objective role in improving the provision of government services, citizens' views of the quality of democracy may not improve, since they continue to believe the government is not sensitive to their opinions or responsive to their needs.

[49] At the same time, however, given that engagement with PIs open to all is voluntary, and given that in many contexts individuals possessing greater material and cognitive resources participate in voluntary associations at higher rates than other individuals (R. B. Collier & Handlin, 2009; Putnam, 2000b; Verba et al., 1995b), these institutions also run the risk of reproducing a range of social, economic and political inequalities. This problem is the subject of Chapter 5, in which I measure and examine the causes of BPI representativeness.

[50] For a similar perspective, see Wampler et al., 2018, p. 17.

definition does not capture how successfully the ideal of open participation is achieved in practice. Consequently, I include cases where participation is often conditioned by partisan affiliation (which de facto limits the participation of some individuals), but where participation is not restricted to representatives of organizations, since the former is a measure of the quality of participation and not of whether or not participation is open to individual citizens. Finally, my operationalization of open participation assumes that participation refers not simply to meeting attendance, but further that all attendees are invited (though not required) to participate in all of the PI's deliberative and decision-making processes (with the exception of administrative/day-to-day decision-making that may be delegated to elected executive or other BPI committees).

3. <u>Ongoing Meetings</u>

The third, and final characteristic of BPIs is that they hold ongoing, regularly scheduled meetings, rather than ad hoc or temporally restricted meetings.[51] This ensures BPIs have the capacity to affect public decision-making indefinitely into the future. By contrast, temporally restricted, or ad hoc PIs—like public hearings or prior consultation (Falleti & Riofrancos, 2018b; Schilling-Vacaflor, 2013)—are tied to the implementation of specific public works or extractive projects. These PIs can play an important role in increasing citizen oversight over public decision-making, but their lack of permanence means that whatever positive effects they have on the quality of democracy will not be sustained over time. Only permanent PIs with ongoing, regularly scheduled meetings have the capacity to sustain the positive effects of PIs on the quality of democracy over time. BPIs have ongoing, regularly scheduled meetings when they hold meetings at consistent intervals, and when there is an expectation that these meetings will

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[51] The importance of this feature of PIs is also stressed by Mayka, 2019, p. 9 and McNulty, 2019, p. 20.

continue to be held indefinitely into the future. Meetings may take place at weekly, monthly, or annual intervals, or at points in between. They cannot be ad hoc meetings convened to facilitate citizen participation in making decisions about specific proposals, after which meetings cease.

4. Comparing BPIs and other PIs

Table 3.1 provides an illustration of the differences between BPIs and other PIs. It shows that BPIs typically take the form of participatory budgeting processes, planning councils, and citizen councils. These institutions are incorporated into public decision-making to varying degrees. For instance, participatory budgeting is typically limited to allocating a fixed sum of public resources to specific projects. By contrast, some planning councils not only allocate resources to specific projects, but also allow community representatives to participate in broader municipal or regional budgetary processes (though this broader participation is always of a consultative, rather than binding nature). Additionally, not all participatory budgeting processes, or planning/citizen councils, meet the standard of BPIs. For instance, some participatory budgeting processes do not feature binding decision-making, and many limit community participation to representatives of civil society or social movement organizations.

For illustrative purposes, Table 3.1 also contrasts BPIs to several well-known PIs. One of the most common PIs around the world is the public hearing (sometimes called prior consultation) that must occur before governments can carry out public-works projects, or before corporations carry out projects that affect the broader community. These are clearly not BPIs, since, although any community member is permitted to attend and speak at public hearings (unrestricted participation), governments are under no obligation to take any action in response

76

to citizen input. Further, public hearings do not provide an ongoing, regularly scheduled venue for citizens to participate in public decision-making. Another common PI is the local-level referendum, where, as in public hearings, citizens are permitted to express their preferences regarding a given public policy. In contrast to public hearings, however, local-level referenda not only consult citizens, but also give them binding decision-making authority (unless, of course, the referendum is specified as non-binding). That said, in addition to the fact that referenda only occur on an ad hoc basis, getting referenda on the ballot requires substantial citizen effort, and is typically only feasible when advocates of a given initiative have access to significant financial resources. Referenda, then, fall far short of providing citizens an ongoing, regularly scheduled venue for participation in public decision-making.

In some cases, however, the line between BPIs and other PIs is arguably less clear. Perhaps the most important example discussed in the literature is Brazil's public policy councils, particularly its famous health councils. These councils offer civil society and social movements a substantive, ongoing role in the development and approval of municipal health policy (analogous councils also exist at the state and federal levels).[52] Further, councils enjoy the legal authority to reject government budget proposals around health spending (Mayka, 2019, p. 101; Wampler, 2015, p. 135), which meets the standard of binding decision-making. That said, participation in the councils is highly restricted. Not only is the number of council members limited to 38 (Santos et al., 2011), but civil society participation is capped at 50% of the total. One quarter of the remaining seats are reserved for representatives of health care professional organizations, while the remaining 25% are filled by government and private health care representatives (Presidência da República, 2006). Thus, half of council seats are occupied by either government

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[52] For an overview of Brazil's health councils, see Mayka, 2019, Chapter 4, and Wampler, 2015, Chapter 5.

representatives or by individuals who are structurally vulnerable to pressure from government representatives.[53] Consequently, the councils unambiguously fall short of open participation. This has very real implications for the councils' capacity to improve the quality of democracy. First, restricted participation limits the councils' public legitimacy, as well as their ability to institutionalize the mass participation of ordinary citizens in public decision-making. Further, since its representatives have voting rights, the government can exert greater influence over decision-making in the councils compared to participatory institutions where voting rights are restricted to ordinary citizens, or to representatives of civil society organizations and social movements. In turn, when the government enjoys increased control over decision-making in participatory institutions, we are less likely to see democracy or equity-enhancing outcomes. (McNulty, 2019; Montambeault, 2015; Saguin, 2018).

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[53] Martinez & Kohler (2016) explain, based on extensive interviews with council members, that power imbalances between government and health professional representatives mean that the latter tend to follow the lead of the former in council decision-making.

Table 3.1: Differentiating between BPIs and Related Participatory Institutions

Yes:	No:
Some Participatory Budgeting Processes	Public Hearings x Binding decision-making ✓ Unrestricted participation x Regularly occurring
Some Planning Councils	
Some Citizen Councils	Local-Level Referenda ✓ Binding decision-making ✓ Unrestricted participation x Regularly occurring
	Brazilian Health Councils ✓ Binding decision-making x Unrestricted participation ✓ Regularly occurring

5. <u>Mapping BPIs Across Latin America</u>

Based on the LATINNO dataset, in conjunction with a range of country case studies and analysis of participation laws in each country, Table 3.2 presents the range of BPIs across Latin America. First, it reports the governmental level at which BPIs are implemented. Notice that this is the municipal level in all but two cases under examination. While there are rare examples of BPIs at the state/provincial level,[54] participation in supra-municipal participatory institutions of this kind is generally not open to all adult citizens. As a result, most supra-municipal PIs cannot be considered BPIs. Second, Table 3.2 records whether a national legal framework exists to codify BPIs. This is true in eight of the 18 listed countries. While it is theoretically possible for countries to lack a national law mandating BPI implementation but nevertheless implement BPIs nationally, this is unlikely (and none currently exist). Specifically, establishing a legal framework for BPIs appears to be a critical tool for facilitating national BPI implementation. When asked why it was important to ensure BPIs were incorporated into a national legal framework, many of my respondents stressed that legal codification significantly increased mayors' incentive to implement BPIs in their municipalities. This analysis was shared by respondents in countries where many municipalities had already implemented BPIs before BPI laws were enacted, making BPI laws in these countries less likely to have an impact on implementation. In the Dominican Republic, for instance, even the commentators I interviewed who were most skeptical about the practical utility of a BPI law (on the grounds that it would have little more than symbolic value) admitted that without it fewer mayors would have implemented BPIs. One explained that "without the law, things would have been worse, because mayors wouldn't have seen the process as obligatory…this was the success of the law, to force

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[54] See for, instance McNulty, 2012; Schneider & Goldfrank, 2002.

mayors to carry out at least a minimal form of the process" *(Interview with Domingo Matías,* December 28, 2019).

Finally, to assess the extent of BPI implementation in each country, Table 3.2 presents a tally of the total number of municipalities in which some form of BPI exists in each country. Whereas BPIs have been implemented to some degree in 15 of the 18 countries, they have only been implemented universally or near-universally in four (the Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Peru). Small, but significant percentages (6–15%) of municipalities have BPIs in Ecuador, Brazil, and Uruguay. A very small percentage of municipalities have BPIs in eight other countries (El Salvador, Chile, Colombia, Argentina, Costa Rica, Panama, Mexico, and Paraguay), and three countries have no BPIs (Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Honduras).

Table 3.2: Summary of BPI Implementation and Non-Implementation in Latin America

Country	BPI Adoption	Relevant Law	Level Implementation	Number of Municipalities with BPIs	Total Number of Municipalities	Density of BPIs	Nationwide BPI Implementation
Argentina	NO		municipal	56	2112	0.03	NO
Bolivia	YES	Ley Part. Popular	municipal	339	339	1	YES
Brazil	NO		municipal	436	5570	0.08	NO
Chile	NO		municipal	38	345	0.11	NO
Colombia	YES	Ley 1757	municipal	30	1123	0.03	NO
Costa Rica	NO		municipal	3	82	0.04	NO
Dominican Republic	YES	Ley 170-07	municipal	158	158	1	YES
Ecuador	YES	Ley. Org. Part. Ciudadana	municipal	34	221	0.15	NO
El Salvador	YES	Cod. Municipal (2005 reform)	municipal	11	262	0.04	NO
Guatemala	YES	Ley de los consejos de Desarrollo Urbano y Rural	sub-municipal/ municipal	263 (15,000 communities)	340 (29,000 Communities)	0.52[55]	NO
Honduras	NO		none	0	298	0	NO
Mexico	NO		municipal	20	2446	0.01	NO
Nicaragua	NO		none	0	153	0	NO
Panama	NO		municipal	12	76	0.16	NO
Paraguay	NO		municipal	1	254	0.00	NO
Peru	YES	Fram. Law 28056	municipal	1851	1851	1	YES
Uruguay	NO		departmental	8 departments	19 departments	0.42	NO
Venezuela	YES	Ley. Org. Consejos Comunales/CLPP	sub-municipal/ municipal	335	335	1	YES

Note: Author's own elaboration, based on data from LATINNO, Dias 2019, national census data for each country, country case studies, and the author's analysis of participation laws for each country.

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[55] Note that since BPIs exist primarily at the sub-municipal level in Guatemala, I calculate the density of BPIs based on the percentage of local communities with BPIs, rather than the percentage of municipalities.

Figure 3.1: Density of Binding Participatory Institutions in Latin America (% of Municipalities by Country Where BPIs Have Been Implemented (as of 2016))

Operationalizing the Dependent Variables: BPI Implementation and Representativeness

1. <u>Operationalizing BPI implementation</u>

I restrict my study to nationally implemented BPIs. Such a decision may be surprising, because with the exception of Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, this study is based primarily upon small-n, national-level analysis. Focusing on subnational analysis would have allowed me to leverage standard quantitative techniques to test my hypotheses about the paradox of participatory institutions. Yet, my decision to examine only cases of nationwide BPI implementation is justified because the causes and effects of nationally implemented BPIs are distinct from those of subnational implementation (which has been the focus of most scholarship to date). This is

because municipal-level implementation can occur under a much broader range of conditions than nationwide implementation. First, national parties face much looser budget constraints than mayors, and hence have distributive political options that are not available to mayors. Mayors, unable to increase spending to win or retain voters, often turn to BPIs as a means of allowing voters to decide how best to allocate scarce resources (see my case study of BPIs in the Dominican Republic in Chapter 5). Second, since BPIs are almost always a municipal-level phenomenon, they are more likely to be central to the political agendas of mayors, compared to national parties that have to balance a wide range of competing political priorities. Third, mayors worry much less about opposition control of BPIs than national parties. This is because mayors can set the rules of BPI implementation in their own municipalities, whereas national parties can, at best, set the rules only in municipalities where they control the executive. Of course, mayors run the risk that future municipal governments will change BPI rules to the political detriment of the current administration. Yet mayors are more worried about the short-term goal of reelection than they are about the longer-term effects of BPIs on their political leverage. Mayors need to deliver policy and win votes right now, and they view BPIs as a means of accomplishing those goals.[56] By contrast, national parties are less likely to see an immediate electoral advantage from BPI implementation, since these benefits depend on controlling a very large number of municipalities around the country. Finally, if a mayor wants to implement BPIs, she can simply do so, assuming she has a competent staff capable of handling the basic logistics of the BPI process. At the national level, by contrast, the party leadership needs to convince its local party officials and mayors, not to mention opposition mayors, to implement BPIs.

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[56] BPIs can help deliver policy wins by providing mayors leverage, in the form of a popular mandate for their preferred policies, over opposition-controlled city councils.

Just as the causes of municipal-level BPI-implementation are distinct from those of nationwide implementation, likewise variation in BPI representativeness across municipalities has distinct causes from national-level variation. An important example is a strong, well-organized civil society, which is widely considered a key determinant of BPI success (K. Andersson et al., 2009; S. McNulty, 2019; Wampler et al., 2019). As I argued in Chapter 2, and show empirically in Chapter 4, this very strength ensures BPIs will not be implemented on a large scale. Further, we cannot assume that the potential outcomes of BPI representativeness in municipalities located in countries without nationwide implementation are the same as those of municipalities in countries with nationwide BPI implementation. Individual BPIs in countries with nationwide implementation will likely enjoy both larger budgets to allocate, as well as more extensive organizational resources to assist with mobilizing participants, compared to BPIs in countries without nationwide implementation. Relatedly, it is problematic to employ subnational analytical strategies when examining the representativeness of nationwide BPI implementation. This is because we cannot assume the independence of observations (municipalities), which are jointly affected by national-level political dynamics. So, for instance, opposition supporters in Venezuela may feel excluded from BPI participation even if their local BPIs are led by government supporters that go out of their way to create an inclusive BPI environment. This disconnect occurs because opposition supporters are aware of statements made against their participation in BPIs by national-level political leaders.

To be considered a case of nationwide implementation, BPIs must exist in all or nearly all of a country's municipalities. That is, at the very least, BPIs must carry out their most basic legal requirements in virtually all municipalities. Basic implementation is distinct, however, from the *quality* of implementation, which is determined by such factors as the rate of community

participation, how representative participants are of the broader community, and the level of

discretion municipal governments have to determine how BPI-mandated projects will be

executed. It is important that implementation and quality of implementation remain analytically

distinct, since, as I explained in Chapter 2, they have distinct causes. Finally, I juxtapose BPI

implementation to BPI adoption, which simply means that BPIs have been incorporated in a

national law or constitution, but not necessarily been put into practice across the whole country.

As mentioned above, BPIs have been adopted in eight Latin American countries, and

implemented nationwide in four. Figure 3.2 presents a summary of BPI adoption and nationwide

implementation in Latin America. Note that there are no cases of nationwide implementation in

countries without BPI adoption.

Figure 3.2: BPI Legal Adoption and Nationwide Implementation in Latin America

2. Operationalizing Representativeness

Before detailing my operationalization of BPI representativeness, I will first provide a brief

justification for my focus on BPI representativeness, as opposed to many other possible measures

of BPI success. Studies that examine a wide range of outcomes as part of a broader package of

BPI success (from levels of participation and the impact of BPIs on socioeconomic inequality, to

the effects of BPIs on government accountability and responsiveness) (Goldfrank, 2011;

McNulty, 2019; Wampler et al., 2019) are commendable for helping us understand the critical

factors that tend to be associated with positive BPI outcomes. That said, in the case of PIs, all

good things do not necessarily go together. There are some factors, for instance, that may

generate high rates of participation, while undermining responsiveness, accountability, and

transparency. We should not assume, therefore, that there are general causes of BPI success, but

instead acknowledge the possibility that the factors ensuring success in one area may

simultaneously limit success in another. This is especially true when we consider BPIs that are

implemented nationwide, since the conditions required for their implementation produce

contradictory effects on the quality of democracy and governance. For instance, BPI

politicization is likely to have a positive effect on overall rates of participation, while

simultaneously decreasing the institutions' likelihood of success in other areas—notably their

capacity to represent broad community interests. Put simply, since different outcomes are likely

affected by distinct factors, it is advisable to examine important outcomes separately, rather than

as a bundle of factors proxying for overall BPI success.

Turning to my operationalization of representativeness, I focus my empirical attention on two

indicators: aggregate participation rates and levels of politicization (the degree to which groups

outside the governing party's core supporters are marginalized in, or excluded from, BPI

activities).[57] My primary motivation for choosing these two relatively narrow outcomes is a

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[57] As I discuss in detail below, examples of politicization range from BPI leaders openly supporting the governing party during BPI activities, to supporters of opposition parties being excluded from the material benefits distributed through BPIs.

practical one: Data limitations make it very difficult to convincingly demonstrate the causes of

many important indicators of BPI representativeness on a national scale. To address this problem

without entirely abandoning the enterprise of studying the effects of nationally implemented

BPIs, I focus on two outcomes that jointly represent a plausible, yet parsimonious standard for

assessing whether BPIs have the potential to produce significant positive effects on the quality of

democracy and governance.

Participation and politicization rates constitute a reasonable proxy for BPI representativeness

because variation in these factors is likely to be correlated systematically with a broad range of

important BPI outcomes. First, by most measures (i.e., gender, class, ethnicity, race) the

percentage of Latin Americans who occupy a subordinate position in society represents a

majority or more of the population. When BPI participation rates are high, then, it is virtually

inevitable that BPIs will have a positive impact on overall rates of political engagement among

marginalized groups—even if BPIs reproduce existing inequalities in relative rates of

participation across socioeconomic categories (Irahola, 2005; McNulty, 2019a; Saguin, 2018).

High participation rates can also increase civil society leverage vis a vis the state and

government responsiveness to citizen preferences. Politicians are more likely to fear the political

consequences of opposition to or noncompliance of BPI decisions if they believe BPIs

incorporate a substantial percentage of the population in their decision-making processes.

Finally, as I discuss below, high participation rates have the capacity to increase citizens'

satisfaction with the quality of democracy on a mass scale (see page 73).

Turning to politicization, high levels of politicization threaten the ability of participatory

institutions to positively affect a range of important outcomes. Indeed, politicization is one of the

most frequently cited reasons by scholars (Mansuri & Rao 2012, pp. 18-19), BPI leaders, and

participants in my interviews to explain the failure of participatory institutions. Specifically, BPI politicization means that BPI resources tend to be allocated on the basis of political criteria rather than broad community needs/interests (Andersson, 1999; Bland, 2000; Handlin, 2016; Irahola, 2005; Markussen, 2006). As a result, politicization can reproduce, or even worsen, socioeconomic inequality, government responsiveness, and accountability. As Rhodes-Purdy (2017) explains, "If …supporters of certain political parties or movements are viewed as illegitimate by the state, participatory governance will only reinforce existing power structures and patterns of exclusion." If the size of the population excluded from BPI participation or benefits is sufficiently small, then of course a community could see significant overall benefits from highly politicized BPIs. The difficulty is that supporters of opposition parties tend to represent a sizable percentage of the population in countries with at least some degree of meaningful electoral competition. Hence high levels of politicization will generate large-scale negative effects that substantially undermine whatever positive effects BPI generated among beneficiaries. The likelihood that politicization will generate more harm than good for communities is especially high, given that even many government supporters are often excluded from the benefits of highly politicized BPIs. In these cases, benefits are often distributed disproportionately to areas that have supported the party at the highest rates in the past, rather than to the neediest government supporters. Finally, even if we assume that highly politicized BPIs *do* produce positive overall effects on inequality, government responsiveness, etc., politicization would still undermine the quality of democracy. High levels of BPI politicization represent a violation of an excluded groups' right to participate in public decision-making, and cannot be justified under the rules of any democratic system that enshrines individual political rights.

Finally, politicization is also associated with decreased civil society/social movement autonomy. Civil society participation may increase in absolute terms, but civil society will be dependent on the state, and will be unable to advocate freely in defense of its own interests (García-Guadilla, 2008; Hawkins & Hansen, 2006; Hellinger, 2012). The absence of a strong and independent organized civil society/social movement sector undermines the success of BPIs in a host of ways explained in Chapter 2, and documented in Chapter 5. These include weakening the quality of BPI implementation by limiting the deployment of civil society/social movement actors to assist with BPI implementation, and undermining mechanisms of vertical accountability that ensure government actors are responsive to community interests.

Next, I detail my strategy for measuring BPI representativeness. First, to measure BPI participation rates, I employ data from LAPOP. LAPOP's biannual America's Barometer has included a question about BPI participation at least once in each of the four countries with nationwide implementation. Table 3.3 provides a summary of the questions asked for each country, and the years each question was included in the America's Barometer.

Table 3.3: Measuring BPI Participation

Country	Question Asked	Years Asked
Bolivia	"Please tell me if you attend meetings frequently, once in a while, almost never, or never…Territorial Base Organizations (TBOs).?" (por favor, dígame si asiste Ud. a sus reuniones frecuentemente, asiste de vez en cuando, asiste casi nunca o nunca asiste…Organización Territorial de Base (OTB's)?	1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006
Dominican Republic	"Have you participated in the development of the municipal budget?" (¿ha participado usted en la elaboración del presupuesto del ayuntamiento?)	2008
Peru	"Have you participated in the development of the municipal budget?" (¿ha participado usted en la elaboración del presupuesto del municipio?)	2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014

| Venezuela | "I will now read a list of organizations. please tell me if you attend meetings of these organizations at least once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never…and meetings of a communal council?" (ahora le voy a leer una lista de grupos y organizaciones. por favor, dígame si usted asiste a reuniones… de ellos por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca…y a reuniones de un consejo comunal?) | 2007, 2010, 2012, 2014 |

Measuring BPI politicization is less straightforward. No direct measures of the extent to which supporters of opposition parties are excluded or discouraged from BPI participation are available for most countries.[58] That said, LAPOP does include a range of questions that can serve as effective proxies for comparing BPI politicization rates across countries. I divide these into two sets of variables, one assessing variation in BPI participation rates across partisan affiliation, the other exploring variation in the perception of BPI politicization across partisan affiliation. Systematic differences in participation rates among members of different parties tell us whether groups outside the supporters of the governing party (either the party in control of the national executive and/or the party that controls the municipal government), and especially supporters of opposition parties, were marginalized in, or excluded from, BPI activities. For each variable I take the difference between participation rates among supporters of the governing party and supporters of opposition parties.[59] A positive and statistically significant indicator suggests that

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[58] Though they are available for Venezuela thanks to an original survey I conducted in 2018. I analyze these data with respect to the electoral strategy pursued by the PSUV through BPIs in Chapter 6.

[59] I measure political affiliation in different ways. To assess affiliation with the party in control of the national government, I use respondents' reported vote choice in the previous presidential election. This is preferable to using a direct measure of partisan affiliation both because it allows me to capture a broader population of party supporters than simply those who identify most strongly with the party (and who therefore report membership in the party). There is also significant variation in the meaning of party membership across these four countries, so presidential vote choice is a more consistent measure. To assess affiliation with the party in control of the municipal government, I construct a variable that combines respondents' expressed party affiliations with their preferences in the previous presidential election. I include expressed partisan affiliation since three of the countries under study have many local or regional parties that do not compete at the national level, meaning that using the party of their preferred presidential candidate as a proxy for party affiliation could misidentify some respondents as being

supporters of the governing party participate at higher rates than supporters of other parties. To

generate country scores for unequal BPI participation, I calculate the proportion of indicators for

each country that are positive and statistically significant.

Though unequal participation is a strong indicator of BPI politicization, it could be

caused by a range of other factors, including cross-party variation in average socioeconomic

status, or simply varying levels of interest. It is also possible that government supporters are

motivated to overstate their participation while opposition supporters may wish to understate

theirs. To supplement these data, I also analyze a set of variables capturing differences in the

perception of BPI politicization between supporters of the governing party and supporters of

opposition parties. This comparison allows me to assess whether supporters of opposition parties

feel excluded or discouraged from BPI participation. That said, variables capturing perception of

bias may themselves be biased, as opposition supporters might be motivated to exaggerate their

perception of politicization, while supporters of the governing party might seek to understate

politicization. Consequently, both proxies for BPI politicization (unequal participation and

perception of politicization) have analytical strengths and weaknesses. Below I discuss my

strategy to account for potential biases in both proxies.

To analyze perceptions of BPI politicization I draw upon a range of LAPOP survey

questions related to respondents' perceptions of BPIs. I analyze all questions that ask

respondents about their personal assessment of BPIs, their perception of municipal government

members of a different party from the mayor when in fact they are members of the same local or regional party. That said, response rates for party affiliation are low (and the question was not even asked in the case of Bolivia), so for respondents who did not report their partisan affiliation *but did* report their vote choice in the previous presidential election, I use the latter as a proxy for their party affiliation. This runs the risk of misidentifying some respondents who voted for one party in the presidential election but are members of a different party at the local level. In most cases, however, where there is a disjunct between a respondent's local/regional and national party affiliation their preferred national party is not competitive at the local level. This means that when a given mayor is affiliated with a national party, respondents who vote for that party's presidential candidate are also likely to support the party at the municipal level.

interest in citizen participation,[60] and their assessment of municipal government performance directly after being primed with a question about BPIs. The surveys include other questions related to respondents' assessments of municipal governance, but these questions do not provide a way to assess the extent to which responses are influenced by assessments of BPIs vs. other aspects of municipal administration. A list of all the variables and years asked for each country is reported in Table 3.4. For each variable I take the difference in means among supporters of the governing party and supporters of opposition parties. A positive and statistically significant indicator suggests that supporters of the governing party believe BPIs are less politicized than supporters of other parties. To generate country scores for perceptions of BPI politicization, I calculate the proportion of indicators for each country that are positive and statistically significant.

Table 3.4: Measuring Perception of BPI Politicization

Country	Question Asked	Years Asked
Bolivia	(1) "How much confidence do you have in territorial base organizations (tbos)" (¿hasta que punto tiene confianza en las organizaciones territoriales de base (otbs)?) (2) "Would you say that the services offered by the municipality to the people are…excellent, good, regular, bad, or very bad?" (¿diría usted que los servicios que la alcaldía está dando a la gente son ...excelentes, buenos, regulares, malos, o pésimos?)[61]	1998, 2000, 2002 (1 is only available for 1998, 2000, and 2002)

[60] We would expect respondents who feel excluded from BPI participation to be less likely than others to believe the municipal government is interested in citizen participation.

[61] While this question does not ask respondents directly about their perception of BPIs, it was asked directly after respondents were primed with a question about their BPI participation. Further, since the purpose of BPIs is to shift authority over the management of public resources from the government to the community, if the municipal government were effectively empowering citizens to participate in municipal resource allocation, we would expect citizens' confidence in municipal government management of public funds to be positively associated with their assessment of BPIs.

Dominican Republic	(1) "How much confidence do you have that the municipality manages public finances well…a lot of confidence, some confidence, a little confidence, or no confidence?" (¿qué grado de confianza tiene usted en el buen manejo de los fondos por parte del ayuntamiento…mucha confianza, algo de confianza, poca confianza, o nada de confianza?)[62]	2008
Peru	(1) "How much confidence do you have that the municipality manages public finances well…a lot of confidence, some confidence, a little confidence, or no confidence?" (¿qué grado de confianza tiene usted en el buen manejo de los fondos por parte del municipio…mucha confianza, algo de confianza, poca confianza, o nada de confianza?)[63] (2) "how much influence do you believe you have on municipal government actions…would you say you have a lot, some, a little, or no influence?" (¿qué tanta influencia cree que tiene usted en lo que hace la municipalidad? ¿diría que tiene mucha, algo, poca, o nada de influencia?)[64] (3) "How interested do you think the mayor is in citizen participation in municipal affairs…very interested, somewhat interested, not very interested, or not interested?" (¿qué tan interesado cree usted que está el alcalde en la participación de la gente en el trabajo del municipio…muy interesado, algo interesado, poco interesado, nada interesado?)[65]	2008, 2010, 2012, 2014 (1 and 2 only)

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[62] See Footnote 61.

[63] See Footnote 61.

[64] While this question does not ask respondents directly about their perception of BPIs, it is a reasonable proxy for perception of BPI politicization, since BPIs are one of the principal mechanisms through which Peruvian communities have the opportunity to affect municipal government decisions. Of course, we cannot know the extent to which this question reflects respondents' satisfaction with BPIs compared, say, to their broader sense of municipal government responsiveness. Nonetheless, if high levels of BPI politicization were occurring, we would expect government supporters to report having higher levels of influence over municipal affairs compared to opposition supporters.

[65] While this question does not ask respondents directly about their perception of BPIs, it is a reasonable proxy for perception of BPI politicization, since BPIs are the most common and most well-known mechanism for incorporating citizens directly into municipal decision-making in Peru. It is therefore very likely that if high levels

| Venezuela | (1) "Do you believe your communal council only represents on political perspective or that it represents all political points of view?" (¿cree ud. que el consejo comunal de su comunidad representa sólo un lado político de la comunidad o que representa todos los puntos de vista políticos?) (2) What do you think of the way your communal council responds to the needs of the community? are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, not very satisfied, or not satisfied?" (¿qué piensa ud. de la manera en que el consejo responde a las necesidades de su comunidad—está muy satisfecho, algo satisfecho, poco satisfecho, o nada satisfecho?) (3) "Now let's talk about the communal councils. any Venezuelan can participate in the communal councils, regardless of their political views. to what extent does this sentence reflect the reality of the communal councils?" (ahora vamos a hablar de los consejos comunales. cualquier venezolano puede participar en los consejos comunales, sin importar su posición política. ¿hasta qué punto esta frase refleja la realidad de los consejos comunales hoy en día?) (4) "How satisfied are you with the work of the communal councils? are you very satisfied, satisfied, unsatisfied, or very unsatisfied?" (hasta qué punto está satisfecho con el trabajo de los consejos comunales, ¿está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), insatisfecho(a), o muy insatisfecho(a)?) (5) "How much confidence do you have in the communal councils?" (¿hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los consejos comunales?) | 2007 (1 and 2 only), 2012 (5 only) 2014 (3-5 only) |

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of BPI politicization were occurring, government supporters would report having higher levels of influence over municipal affairs compared to opposition supporters.

Finally, to generate overall measures of politicization that account for the possibility that one or both of my proxies for BPI politicization may be biased,[66] I apply the following simple coding rules. First, I set a high threshold for full politicization by requiring evidence of *both* unequal participation *and* the perception of politicization. While we cannot fully rule out the possibility that both proxies are significantly biased (with government supporters over-reporting participation and under-reporting perception of bias, and/or opposition supporters under-reporting participation and over-reporting perception of bias), this strong and consistent bias would itself almost certainly be evidence of politicization.

If, by contrast, there is evidence of either unequal participation *or* perception of politicization, it is more difficult to interpret the likely implications of bias. Consequently, to balance the possibility of both false negatives and false positives, I code cases where there is evidence of *either* unequal participation *or* perception of bias as examples of partial politicization. Finally, the absence of evidence indicating the presence of unequal participation or perception of politicization does not rule out the possibility of BPI politicization, but it makes this probability very low. Thus, I code cases of no politicization as those that have no evidence of either unequal participation or perceptions of politicization. To validate my coding scheme for both proxies, in the case studies below I supplement these survey findings with qualitative evidence.

Operationalizing the Independent Variables: Demand for BPIs, Political Risk Level, and Mode of BPI Implementation

1. Demand for BPIs

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[66] As described above, unequal participation and perception of politicization could be biased, for instance, if respondents have politically motivated reasons for under or overemphasizing levels of BPI politicization.

Societal demand for BPIs exists when there is clear evidence of (1) a perceived demand among the electorate or party base for increased citizen participation, and (2) the existence of influential individuals or organizations within the governing coalition pressing for BPI implementation. If either (1) or (2) is present but not the other, I code the case as "partial" societal demand. I specify observable implications of these conditions for each of my two process-tracing exercises in Chapter 4.

2. Low Political Risk

Low political risk associated with nationwide BPI implementation exists when there is clear evidence that (1) civil society organizations and social movements (either contingently linked coalition partners or oppositional) are not capable of effectively utilizing BPIs against the implementing party, and (2) opposition parties and social movements had a low capacity to utilize BPI spaces against the implementing party. If either (1) or (2) is present but not the other, I code the case as "partial." I specify observable implications of these conditions for each of my two process-tracing exercises in Chapter 4.

3. Mode of BPI Implementation

Mode of BPI implementation refers to the actor that is primarily responsible for nationwide BPI implementation. As described in Chapter 2, these actors can be either political parties (internally or externally mobilized) or bureaucrats. To determine which actor is responsible for nationwide implementation, I first look for consensus (or near-consensus) among commentators and key decision-makers involved in the process of BPI implementation regarding which actor was most central in the process by balancing the weight of evidence collected through interviews and expert accounts of BPI implementation. Next, I seek evidence that parties or bureaucrats

made a significant effort to publicly promote BPI implementation in public statements as well as in my interviews with bureaucrats or party leaders about their efforts to publicly promote BPIs. Finally, I look for evidence that bureaucrats or party leaders devoted significant institutional resources to BPI implementation by analyzing documents detailing how BPIs were to be incorporated into parties' electoral strategies; government/quasi-governmental agency budgets devoted to BPI implementation; training materials created by parties or bureaucrats to facilitate BPI implementation; survey data exploring the extent to which party militants were instructed by party leaders to engage with BPIs; and analyzing my interviews with bureaucrats and party leaders who discussed their efforts to mobilize resources around BPI implementation.

Scope Conditions

The universe of cases for this study is all Latin American countries from 1985 to the present. Before 1985 there were no instances of BPI adoption or implementation in Latin America, as BPIs were not yet on the radar of policymakers in the region. I limit my study to Latin America for several reasons. First, Latin America offers wide variation in both outcomes and independent variables within a broadly comparable regional context. This facilitates cross-national comparison without making Herculean assumptions about confounding variables. Next, unlike other regions of the world, in Latin America PIs are ubiquitous, and BPIs in particular are widely known. This allows us to assume political parties are generally aware of BPIs as a potential policy tool, and increases our confidence that the potential outcomes for each of my primary dependent variables are roughly equivalent across cases. We could not approach this level of confidence for any other region in world, or if I included countries from other regions of the world in my universe of cases. Finally, there is the practical limitation of scoring cases that

98

made a global study infeasible. Given the absence of centralized data, and the need to conduct extensive primary research (especially interviews with policymakers and politicians), scoring each country on key variables, ranging from levels of political risk to modes of BPI implementation, requires a large investment of time. As a result, attempting to code a broader set of cases on all of my key variables was not possible for this dissertation. Efforts are currently underway to build in-depth global databases that might facilitate global analysis of the causes and effects of BPIs in the future (Dias et al., 2019).

My only other scope condition is that I limit my study to BPIs that have authority over a significant percentage of municipal resources. Conceptually, BPIs are any institutions that meet the three criteria listed above (binding decision-making, open participation, and ongoing meetings). However, to ensure I am only examining BPIs with the capacity to meaningfully impact important social, political, or economic outcomes, I only consider BPIs where the amount of resources distributed is substantial. I use a threshold of greater than 10% of the municipality's investment budget to differentiate meaningful BPIs from other participatory institutions that allocate so few resources that the institutions can have little to no effect on the provision of services. I choose this threshold because it is low enough to account for the possibility that BPIs can impact citizens' political engagement, even when the amount of resources allocated as a share of the total budget is relatively small, but high enough to ensure purely symbolic financial allocations are excluded. This excludes no cases of nationwide BPI implementation.

Case Selection

To varying degrees, this dissertation focuses on the eight countries in Latin America identified above that have adopted BPIs into national laws or constitutions (Bolivia, Colombia,

the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Peru, and Venezuela). This set

includes the four cases of nationwide BPI implementation (Bolivia, the Dominican Republic,

Peru, and Venezuela), as well as four "negative" cases, where BPIs were adopted but not

implemented nationwide (Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, and Guatemala). Additionally, to

explore the dynamics of BPI implementation by externally mobilized parties, I also incorporate

Brazil into my analyses in Chapter 5 and Chapter 8. Since case selection strategies vary across

sections of this dissertation, I detail below the logic of case selection for each of my three

primary research questions.

1. Case Selection for Explaining Nationwide BPI Implementation

To examine this question, I limit my universe of cases to countries with BPI adoption. As

mentioned in the previous section, these countries are the most likely cases of nationwide BPI

implementation. Limiting my universe of cases to countries with BPI adoption thus allows me to

choose "negative" cases (no nationwide BPI implementation) that minimize differences between

the potential outcomes of countries with and without nationwide BPI implementation. I provide

targeted analyses of the relationship between BPI implementation and a range of key explanatory

variables for each of the eight Latin American countries that have adopted BPIs in national laws

or constitutions. For my core process-tracing analyses, however, I focus on two primary cases:

Venezuela and Ecuador. Case selection for this analysis is based on the logic of extreme values

on independent variables.[67] Since the objective of process-tracing is to demonstrate the causal

pathways connecting my key independent variables to BPI implementation, I choose cases that

allow me to highlight these pathways most clearly, specifically where the causal role of

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[67] For detailed discussions of this approach to case selection, see (Seawright, 2016; Seawright & Gerring, 2008).

confounding variables is as small as possible. Given that large values of independent variables heighten their causal importance relative to other variables—and likewise that small values diminish their causal weight—choosing cases based on extreme values of independent variables maximizes my capacity to demonstrate the presence of my proposed causal pathways. This is especially important with respect to independent variables that cannot be precisely measured, and are likely to generate significant measurement error. While this approach may limit the generalizability of my findings (since extreme values are, by definition, rare), maximizing external validity is not the primary objective of process-tracing. Choosing typical cases instead would risk the possibility of leaving important causal pathways undetected. Further, my targeted analyses of the other six cases of BPI adoption in Latin America suggest that the results of my process-tracing exercises for Venezuela and Ecuador are indeed generalizable to the region as a whole.

In one of the two cases I have chosen for closer examination, Venezuela's Communal Councils (CCs), both of my explanatory variables are present, and BPIs were implemented. I also choose a case—Ecuador under Rafael Correa (2007–2012)—where societal demand was present, but the level of political risk was not low, and BPIs were adopted but not implemented. The Ecuadoran case allows me to process-trace how a high level of political risk decreases parties' incentives to implement BPIs, even when they face significant demand for BPIs.[68] There are also several theoretically interesting potential outcomes for which it was not possible to engage in process tracing (see Figure 3.3 for a summary of potential outcomes). First, it would have been interesting to examine closely a case where demand was absent, but the level of political risk is low. Such a combination of factors would allow me to assess whether parties ever

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[68] See Appendix 4 for further discussion of the logic of case selection.

consider implementing BPIs when no significant demand exists to do so. Unfortunately, however, I could not identify a case matching these criteria. There are strong reasons to believe this difficulty is a result of the fact that parties simply do not consider BPI implementation in the absence of demand. However, there is no way to fully rule out the possibility of selection bias without, at minimum, undertaking an exhaustive process of interviewing leaders from every governing political party in Latin America over the last three decades. The same logic applies to cases where both variables are present but BPIs *were not* implemented. The fact that I have not been able to locate a case matching these criteria suggests that BPIs may always be implemented under these conditions. In the absence of a comprehensive study of every Latin American government since 1990, however, the possibility of selection bias remains. Finally, I do not choose a case where both conditions are absent, because doing so would offer limited insight into the relationship between my key independent variables and BPI implementation.

Figure 3.3: Case Selection and Potential Outcomes of Nationwide BPI Implementation

	Moderate/High	Low
High	*Implemented/ Not Implemented* (Ecuador, El Salvador, Colombia)	*Implemented* (Venezuela, Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Peru)/ *Not Implemented*
Low/moderate	*Implemented/ Not Implemented* (Guatemala)	*Implemented/ Not Implemented*

Note: I provide detailed explanations for each of these codings in Chapter 4.

2. Case Selection for Explaining Variation in BPI Representativeness

Case selection for my analysis of national-level variation in BPI representativeness is more straightforward. Because I am interested in variation across positive cases of BPI implementation, I restrict my analysis to the four countries that have implemented BPIs nationwide (Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, Peru, and Venezuela). In turn, since there are only four possible cases for analysis, I can measure BPI representativeness and process-trace the relationship between mode of BPI implementation and representativeness in each of the four cases. Finally, I choose Brazil to examine the relationship between externally mobilized party implementation and BPI representativeness because it offers the clearest, and best-known example of an externally mobilized party (the PT) spearheading large-scale BPI implementation.

3. Case Selection for Understanding How Parties Use BPI Participation to Win Votes

My analyses of the ways in which parties use BPI participation to win votes, as well as the electoral effects of these strategies, focus on the case of Venezuela. I make this choice for several

reasons. First, as I explained in Chapter 2, because the only parties that use BPI participation directly to win votes are internally mobilized parties (externally mobilized parties use BPIs as a signal to voters of their programmatic commitment to good governance), only cases where BPI implementation was carried out by internally mobilized parties are appropriate to illustrate how parties implement BPI participation in order to win votes. This condition is satisfied in only two cases: Venezuela and Bolivia. Of the two, only Venezuela afforded an opportunity to survey a large number of party militants who participate in BPIs. In Bolivia, a number of factors made surveying BPI participants in Bolivia impossible: BPIs were implemented more than 25 years ago, the party responsible for implementation is no longer competitive and hence has no active party militants, and the system of BPIs implemented in Bolivia (which I describe below) was eliminated by a 2013 law (*La Asamblea Legislativa Plurnacional*, 2013).

Data to analyze the electoral effects of BPIs were also only available for Venezuela. The Venezuelan case is less than ideal since it is likely that Venezuela is not a typical case of internally mobilized, party-led implementation. Specifically, BPI participation in Venezuela likely produces larger electoral effects than it would in most other cases, due to the highly politicized nature of Venezuelan BPIs (see Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 for detailed discussions of BPI politicization in Venezuela). Specifically, high politicization increases the likelihood that BPI benefits will be more concentrated among party supporters in Venezuela compared to other cases of internally mobilized party implementation. In turn, the magnitude of the "treatment" of BPI participation (and, therefore the magnitude of the effect of BPI participation on electoral outcomes) may be abnormally large. While there is no obvious reason to expect that party use of BPI participation for electoral purposes in Venezuela is qualitatively different from other

countries with internally mobilized implementation, we should exercise caution with respect to the external validity of the magnitude of observed effects.

Empirical Strategy

1. Data Collection

This dissertation draws from over 17 months of fieldwork that includes time spent in each of the four countries that have implemented BPIs: Venezuela (5 months), Bolivia (5 months), Peru (2 months), and the Dominican Republic (1 month), as well as in Ecuador (2.5 months), where BPIs were adopted but not implemented, and in Brazil (3 weeks), where BPIs were partially implemented but never adopted legally. I conducted additional interviews remotely with actors involved in BPI adoption and implementation in Colombia, El Salvador, and Guatemala. While in Venezuela, I also conducted a nationally representative survey of nearly 1,800 Venezuelans, including nearly 1,200 BPI participants. Finally, I supplement these original data with a wide range of other survey data, public statements, government statistics, and parliamentary debates.

Interviews

I conducted nearly 180 interviews with both grassroots BPI leaders as well as key actors involved in the adoption and implementation of BPIs in these nine countries. The objective of these interviews varied across research questions, but all interviews were conducted using a semi-structured format consisting of a standard set of questions that I asked of all respondents. One basic questionnaire was employed for interviews with grassroots BPI activists, where my objective was to understand the dynamics of BPI representativeness, and how local-level party activists incorporate BPIs into their electoral work. A separate basic questionnaire was employed

for interviews with party officials, bureaucrats, and academics, where my objective was to understand the national-level dynamics of BPI implementation. I occasionally included subject-specific questions to better understand a respondent's personal involvement in BPI implementation processes. I also frequently added follow-up questions to probe respondents' answer more deeply, or to further explore unexpected or surprising answers. Finally, it is worth noting that since these interviews were conducted over the course of four years, I naturally updated my basic questionnaires to reflect refinements to, and expansions of, my primary research questions. Consequently, while the core elements of my basic questionnaires did not change substantially, I conceptualized the development of my interview questionnaires as an iterative process, in which information gained from earlier interviews was employed to improve the quality, efficiency, and theoretical focus of later interviews.

Given time limitations and the several countries in which I needed to conduct interviews, it was not possible to select a random sample of local-level BPI activists, or to conduct a census of key national-level figures involved in processes of BPI adoption and implementation. That said, I took a range of steps to ensure my interview samples were as representative of the target population as possible. For instance, in the case of interviews with local-level BPI activists (which I conducted primarily in Venezuela), to ensure my sample was politically balanced, I chose leaders from BPIs based on the level of governing party electoral support in that community. Table 3.5 reports the interviews I conducted with BPI leaders in Venezuela. While I did not interview BPI leaders in areas with extremely high levels of PSUV support (above 70%), I was able to interview BPI leaders in communities in which PSUV electoral support ranged from less than 10% to nearly 70%. This strategy ensured that my sample captured the broadest possible range of BPI leader perspectives. That said, based on our knowledge of variation in

individuals' propensity to engage with Venezuelan BPIs across partisan affiliation (discussed in Chapter 5), we know that my sample of interviews over-represents opposition-aligned BPI leaders. Consequently, in my qualitative analyses later in this dissertation, I am careful to incorporate interview evidence from BPI leaders only to illustrate causal mechanisms, rather than to draw inferences about the broader population of BPI leaders (for which I rely, as I discuss below, on a nationally representative survey of BPI leaders in Venezuela).

Table 3.5: Venezuelan BPIs Selected for Semi-Structured Interviews

Municipality	Parish	BPI Political Tendency	% PSUV Vote 2013
Sucre	mariche	mixed	68.87
Torres	camacaro	mixed	68.67
Libertador	macarao	chavista	67.8
Libertador	23 de enero	chavista	62.52
Libertador	23 de enero	chavista	62.52
Iribarren	juan de villegas	chavista	52.14
Iribarren	juan de villegas	chavista	52.14
Iribarren	tamaca	mixed	51.99
Iribarren	union	chavista	51.24
Libertador	san juan	chavista	49.53
Sucre	petare	chavista	43.44
Sucre	petare	chavista	43.44
Sucre	petare	mixed	43.44
Sucre	petare	mixed	43.44
Libertador	altagracia	chavista	43
Independencia	capacho nuevo	opposition	38.84
San Cristobal	san sebastian	mixed	38.4
Libertador	la pastora	mixed	34.54
Libertador	el paraiso	opposition	34.53
Libertador	el recreo	opposition	33.25
Libertador	el recreo	chavista	33.25
Baruta	las minas	opposition	32.19
San Cristobal	la concordancia	mixed	30.76
San Cristobal	pedro maria	opposition	20.14
Caracas	chacao	opposition	17.04
Chacao	chacao	opposition	17.04
Chacao	chacao	mixed	17.04
Baruta	el cafetal	opposition	7.51

Note: Interviews conducted July-August 2015.

To choose national-level officials for interviews in each country, my strategy was to first

read all publicly available primary and secondary accounts of the process of BPI adoption and

implementation. Second, I identified individuals who appeared repeatedly in these accounts as important figures in the process. Where possible, I also conducted interviews with academic experts of participatory institutions, to ensure my sample was consistent with their assessment of the critical actors involved in BPI adoption and implementation. Inevitably, in the process of interviewing officials, I regularly discovered additional key figures, and where possible, I incorporated them into my sample. For each case I was careful to achieve a balance of government supporters, critics, and impartial observers. The result is the most comprehensive and balanced sample of interviews possible for each country, given the time constraints I faced.

Most interviews were recorded, though in some cases officials requested I not record our conversation. In other cases, interview opportunities arose quickly, and I did not have access to a recording device. Recorded interviews were transcribed and analyzed. For non-recorded interviews I took extensive interview and post-interview notes. With a few exceptions, in cases where respondents preferred to speak in English, all interviews were conducted in the respondent's native language (either Spanish or Portuguese). Table 3.6 presents a summary of the interviews I conducted by country and respondent type. I include a detailed list of interviews in the Appendix A.

Table 3.6: Interviews by Country and Type

	High-level Officials	Mid-level Official	Low-level Officials/Activists	Academics/ Journalists
Bolivia	10	8	13	12
Brazil	9	6	2	0
Colombia	3	3	0	1
Dominican Republic	3	5	0	1
Ecuador	9	16	0	7
El Salvador	1	3	0	0
Guatemala	1	0	0	0
Peru	2	3	0	4
Venezuela	15	13	23	3
Total	53	57	38	28

Survey Analysis

This dissertation draws upon a wide range of original and existing survey data. First, in late 2018, I conducted a nationally representative survey of nearly 1,800 Venezuelans, divided into clusters of six individuals. My goal was to draw nationally representative inferences, not only of the Venezuelan population as a whole, but of all BPI participants, as well as BPI leaders (known as *voceros* in Venezuela). To achieve that goal, in each cluster of six individuals, I sampled two *voceros,* two ordinary BPI participants, and two people who have never participated in a BPI. I sampled clusters according to these quotas in each of 300 neighborhoods across Venezuela. Only voting-age adults were sampled, and all interviews were conducted in-person. To generate nationally representative statistics, respondents are weighted according to BPI

participation and economic strata. I include a detailed description of my survey design in the

Appendix.[69]

In addition to my original survey, I also draw on data from LAPOP between 1998 and

2014 for Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, Peru, and Venezuela (specific years employed vary

by country, as described above and in Chapter 7). These surveys are conducted biannually in

each country and are implemented based on a national probability design. With the exception of

Bolivia, all surveys are self-weighting. Participants are drawn from voting-age adults, and

interviews were conducted in person.[70]

Archival data

Throughout this dissertation I also consult public statements, government statistics, and

parliamentary debates. Public statements include published speeches, official statements, and

newspaper articles quoting party leaders and bureaucrats involved with the adoption and

implementation of BPIs. They also include party documents such as membership guidelines as

well as BPI training materials. Government statistics include BPI spending figures and

implementation rates, elections data, and census data. Finally, I draw upon minutes or transcripts

of parliamentary debates around BPI laws in Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador,

Guatemala, Peru, and Venezuela.

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[69] The original survey referred to in this chapter and the following chapter ''Encuesta: consejos comunales 2018',
was approved under IRB protocol IRB18-1237.
[70] For more information on LAPOP's survey designs see https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/survey-designs.php

2. Process-Tracing

The primary analytical technique I use to test aspects of my theoretical framework in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 is process-tracing. Process-tracing allows researchers to look inside a case of a specific phenomenon (democratic transitions, civil wars, institution-building, etc.) to test explanations of that case. The objective of the analysis is, as Bennett (2008) explains, to:

> "document whether the…processes within the case…[fit] those predicted by alternative explanations of the case. This is closely analogous to a detective attempting to solve a crime by looking at clues and suspects and attempting to piece together a convincing explanation based on the detailed evidence that bears on means, motives and opportunity…process-tracing…works through both affirmation of explanations, through evidence consistent with those explanations, and eliminative deductive, or the use of evidence to cast doubt on alternative explanations that do not fit the evidence" (pp. 711–712).

As scholars such as Hall (2003) have argued, process-tracing is not limited to the tasks of theory generation, or enriching causally identified quantitative findings. It also has "an important role to play in the testing of causal theories" (396). Process-tracing, then, is not a poor substitute for statistical analysis, but rather "a distinctive approach that offers a much richer set of observations, especially about causal processes, than statistical analyses normally allow" (397). Based on this understanding, if sufficient confirmatory evidence can be marshaled to support a given hypothesis, as well as sufficient disconfirming evidence to reject alternative hypotheses, the results of process-tracing can be considered valid causal inferences.

In contrast to earlier scholarship that conceptualized process-tracing as a means of identifying intermediate causal steps linking dependent and independent variables (George & Bennett, 2005), I understand process-tracing as the analytical exercise of marshaling "casual-

process observations" (Brady & Collier, 2010, p. 12)—or observable implications—that we would expect to see if a hypothesis were true, and not expect to see if alternative explanations were true.[71] If, after conducting a process-tracing exercise, the "weight of evidence" (Fairfield & Charman, 2019) points in the direction of the preferred hypothesis, and away from alternative explanations, the hypothesis is supported.[72] This approach to process-tracing is particularly useful in cases where the hypotheses to be tested relate to phenomena that cannot be reduced to sequential steps on a temporal chain, such as the strategic incentives of political actors examined in this dissertation.

Process-tracing is more appropriate than other methods for studying the causes of BPI implementation (Chapter 4) and variation in BPI representativeness (Chapter 5) due to (1) its unique capacity to illuminate complex causal processes and the causal mechanisms connecting explanatory and dependent variables, and (2) the nature of the variables examined. Specifically, because my outcomes of interest can only be observed at the national level, I cannot turn to quantitative causal identification strategies based on subnational analysis. Likewise, since the universe of cases is very small—with only eight cases of BPI adoption and four cases of nationwide BPI implementation in Latin America—and given the impossibility of randomly assigning national-level treatments of BPI demand or level of political risk, neither cross-national quantitative analysis nor experimental methods are appropriate.

3. Quantitative Analysis

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[71] See Bennett & Checkel, 2015 (pp. 7–8) for a similar formulation.
[72] See Bennett, 2008 (p. 709) for a similar formulation.

Finally, in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, I turn to quantitative analytical techniques to examine (1) subnational variation in parties' BPI electioneering, (2) the electoral effects of BPI participation, and (3) the mechanisms through which BPI participation impacts individuals' electoral behavior. These range from causal identification strategies for observational data (including fixed-effects analysis, careful specification of regression models including a set of theoretically informed covariates, and sensitivity analyses), analysis of survey experiments, and descriptive inference. I provide detailed descriptions of these strategies, model specifications, and variables employed in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7.

Conclusion

This chapter has provided a detailed description of the key concepts I employ in the dissertation, my measurement strategies for those conceptions, and the range of empirical methods I will use to test each component of my theory. With this conceptual and methodological foundation in place, I turn next to the empirical core of the dissertation, beginning, in Chapter 4, with an exploration of the determinants of nationwide BPI implementation in Latin America.

Chapter 4. THE CAUSES OF NATIONWIDE BPI IMPLEMENTATION

Introduction

As discussed in Chapter 2, literature on participatory institutions has focused primarily on the dynamics of BPIs in specific municipalities, and has not devoted significant attention to causes of nationwide implementation. This is an important gap in the literature because, as described in Chapter 3, the factors required for BPI implementation in individual municipalities are distinct

from the causes of nationwide implementation. Existing literature has also paid limited attention to the distinction between formal adoption and nationwide implementation of BPIs. This is an important question, because without examining the gap between adoption and nationwide implementation, we cannot understand why BPIs are so rarely translated from rhetoric into reality. We also cannot appreciate the central role played by political parties' electoral cost/benefit analyses in determining whether or not BPIs will be implemented on a large scale.

I address these gaps through an examination of the conditions under which policymakers in Latin America are willing to tie their own hands by going beyond BPI adoption, and devolving real decision-making authority to BPIs on a national scale. To summarize the argument laid out in Chapter 2, I contend that BPIs will not be implemented unless they are promoted by a powerful institution, normally a political party—though under certain conditions a state agency. I argue that political parties may support the adoption—and even partial implementation—of BPIs for many reasons, but will only implement BPIs if they place a lower value on the political costs than on the potential benefits of implementation. This will occur under two conditions: (1) if significant societal demand exists for BPI implementation, and (2) if the party's political opponents are incapable of taking advantage of BPIs for their own gain. I first offer two in-depth case studies of the dynamics of BPI implementation (and non-implementation); one in Venezuela, where BPIs where implemented nationwide by the governing PSUV, and the other in Ecuador, where, despite significant societal demand, the governing Alianza País blocked BPI implementation. Each case study begins with a detailed summary of my theoretical expectations, including the specific observable implications I identify to demonstrate the consistency of each step of my causal argument with the cases under study, before going on to document each observable implication and the relationships between observable implications. Next, I proceed to

a discussion of key alternative explanations of why we see BPI implementation in Venezuela but not in Ecuador. I conclude with a summary of the chapter's primary contributions. Finally, to situate these case studies in the broader context of Latin American countries that have either adopted or implemented BPIs, in Appendix D, I also offer targeted analyses of the relationship between BPI implementation and range of key explanatory variables for each of the eight Latin American countries that have adopted BPIs in national laws or constitutions (Bolivia, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Peru, and Venezuela). These analyses demonstrate the generalizability of my theory beyond my two primary case studies, and to Latin America as a whole. This chapter draws upon 159 interviews I conducted with key actors and grassroots participants involved in BPI adoption and implementation process in the eight countries under study.

BPI Implementation in Venezuela and Ecuador

In this section I trace the implementation of BPIs in Venezuela—known as CCs—and their adoption without implementation in Ecuador. In Venezuela, BPIs were adopted in 2006 (Asamblea Nacional de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela, 2006). Within several years they had been implemented across the country, in 1,053 of Venezuela's 1,134 parishes by 2008,[73] and in *all* Venezuelan parishes by 2013 (República Bolivariana de Venezuela, Ministerio del Poder Popular para las Comunas y Movimientos Sociales, 2013). By contrast, BPIs were adopted both in the Ecuadorian Constitution of 2008 and in the Citizen Participation law of 2010 (Asamblea Constituyente del Ecuador, 2008; Asamblea Nacional del Ecuador, 2010). However, the Correa government made virtually no effort to implement them over the following years. This analysis

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[73] Thanks to Samuel Handlin for generously sharing his data with me.

draws upon 159 interviews with a range of party and social movement leaders, government

officials, and grassroots BPI participants.[74] It also employs public statements from party leaders,

parliamentary debates, party documents, and public opinion data. The general analysis follows

the causal chart in Figure 2.8: Determinants of BPI Implementation above. More detailed case-

specific observable implication tables are provided in Table 4.1: Process-Tracing Emergence of

BPIs in Venezuela and Ecuador below.

Table 4.1: Process-Tracing Emergence of BPIs in Venezuela and Ecuador

CONDITION 1: DEMAND FOR BPIs				
	VENEZUELA	**ECUADOR**	**VENEZUELA**	**ECUADOR**
SUB-CONDITION 1: Demand among electorate or party base for increased citizen participation?	YES	YES	**Observable Implication 1:** Increasing citizen participation was a high-salience issue among a large segment of the electorate before BPI implementation. **Observable Implication 2:** Previous demands for, and experiments with, citizen participation increased expectations of a new system of participatory democracy in Venezuela among the *Chavista* base in the years before BPI implementation.	**Observable Implication 1:** Increasing citizen participation was a high-salience issue among a large segment of the electorate before and during the early years of Correa's presidency. **Observable Implication 2:** Previous demands for, and experiments with, citizen participation increased expectations of a new system of participatory democracy in Ecuador among the AP Base before and during the early years of Correa's presidency.
OUTCOME 1: Increasing citizen participation placed on policy agenda?	YES	YES	**Observable Implication 1:** Increasing citizen participation was incorporated into Chávez's political platform in the years between 1998 and 2006.	**Observable Implication 1:** Increasing citizen participation was incorporated into Correa's political platform during Correa's 2006 presidential campaign, and in the early years of his presidency.
SUB-CONDITION 2: Influential individuals/organizations in party coalition pressing for BPI implementation?	YES	YES	**Observable Implication 1:** Influential individuals/organizations in the governing coalition pressed for BPI implementation during the period prior to adoption and implementation.	**Observable Implication 1:** Influential individuals/organizations in the AP coalition pressed for BPI implementation in the early years of Correa's presidency.
OUTCOME 2: Party feels pressure to show support for BPIs?	YES	YES	**Observable Implication 1**: Law of Communal Councils passed in 2006.	**Observable Implication 1:** BPIs included in 2008 Constitution and 2010 Citizen Participation Law.
CONDITION 2: LOW LEVEL OF POLITICAL RISK ASSOCIATED WITH BPI IMPLEMENTATION				
SUB-CONDITION 1: Civil society organizations/social movements incapable of effectively utilizing BPIs against the party?	YES	NO	**Observable Implication 1:** Pre-1999 Venezuelan civil society and social movements were weak, and tied to discredited political parties. This limited the prevalence of influential and autonomous social movements in Venezuela after Chávez rose to power. **Observable Implication 2:** After 1998 and before 2006, *Chavista* civil society	**Observable Implication 1:** Pre-2006 social movements were strong, and weakly connected to Correa, giving them the capacity to challenge him politically. **Observable Implication 2:** Correa's weak ties to and mistrust of powerful social movement organizations led him to marginalize these organizations

[74] A full list of the 159 interviews conducted for this project are included in Appendix A.

			and social movement groups were organically linked to the MVR, and their attention was focused on defending the revolution. This gave them little capacity to challenge government policies.	politically in the years after he came to power. **Observable Implication 3:** All the participatory institutions Correa implemented were geared toward limiting the participation of social movement and civil society actors.
SUB-CONDITION 2: Opposition parties have low capacity to utilize BPIs against the party?	YES	NO	**Observable Implication 1:** Opposition parties were weak at the local level in Venezuela in the years before BPI implementation.	**Observable Implication 1:** Opposition parties in Ecuador were strong at the local level between 2007 and 2012.
FINAL OUTCOME: BPI implementation?	YES	NO	**Observable Implication 1:** BPIs implemented in nearly all Venezuelan municipalities between 2006 and 2008.	**Observable Implication 1:** Correa and PAIS made virtually no attempt to implement BPIs.

1. Venezuela

Before proceeding, it is critical to note that for Chávez's political party, MVR, and, after 2006, PSUV, BPI implementation was conditional on the belief that the CCs could further the party's electoral objectives. This is necessary for my theory, which assumes that parties will only implement BPIs if they believe doing so will yield electoral rewards. Based on interviews with a range of officials involved in Venezuelan BPI implementation, I argue that while there were various motivations for BPI implementation, they were all based on the assumption that the CCs would be critical spaces for carrying out MVR/PSUV electoral work. As the former Minister of Participation and Social Protection, and primary architect of the Law of CCs described, it was essential that CCs "influence and participate in all electoral processes" (*Interview with David Velázquez*).

Turning to my case study of Venezuelan BPIs, I first show that increasing citizen participation was a high-salience issue among the Venezuelan electorate prior to BPI implementation beginning in 2006. In the early years of Chávez's presidency, there was a widespread desire among the population to overcome what many saw as the politically bankrupt

political institutions of pre-1999 Venezuela (G. B. Hetland, 2015; Lupu, 2016). Indeed,

Venezuelans' confidence in their country's representative institutions was among the lowest in

the region in the 1990s (Corporación latinobarómetro). Further, despite the fact that the country

also faced sustained high inflation, decreasing real wages, a soaring homicide rate, and spiraling

poverty;[75] in 1998 over 40% of Venezuelans identified increasing citizen participation as one of

the top two most pressing political issues facing their country.[76] This generated broad demand for

increased citizen participation among civil society and opposition political parties (Maya &

Lander, 2011; Smilde & Hellinger, 2011).

There was also demand among the *Chavista* grassroots for increased citizen

participation. Julio Chávez, former mayor of the western Venezuelan city of Torres, explained

that a dynamic relationship between President Chávez and his base generated new calls for

citizen participation in the years after 1999:

> "…the people started demanding greater levels of participation…Chávez was insistent on
> the education of the people, around things like their municipal budget, what a mayor
> could do [etc.]…this, without a doubt, generated, in many sectors, particularly the most
> organized sectors of society, a strong interest in citizen participation, in co-management
> between the people and the government (*Interview with Julio Chávez*)."[77]

Along those lines, David Velázquez explained that a range of influential grassroots *Chavista*

organizations formed between 2002 and 2005, and pushed for national-level discussions of how

to deepen Venezuelan democracy. These groups talked about the need for a system of popular

participation that went beyond participation restricted to particular thematic areas (such as water,

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[75] For an excellent summary of changes in Venezuelans' living standards during this period, see (Morgan, 2011, p. Chapter 5)
[76] Latinobarómetro 1998.
[77] Gustavo Villapol made a similar argument.

land, etc.), which were prevalent at the time.[78] As Velázquez described, the key question for these groups was "how do we give more power to the people? There was a saying, 'with Chávez the people rule,' but the question became how to make this a reality" (*Interview with David Velázquez*). *Chavista* activists between 2002–2005 analyzed existing participatory experiments under *Chavismo,* and concluded that these experiences ultimately "showed the need…for new, broader forms of concrete organization of popular power" (*Interview with David Velázquez*).

A range of *Chavista* leaders and grassroots organizations also pressed specifically for BPI implementation. During the 1990s, a left-wing party, Radical Cause (LCR), elected mayors in a number of important Venezuelan cities who implemented municipal-level participatory budgeting (Goldfrank, 2011a). Veterans of these processes (including the former LCR mayor of Libertador—and future Minister of Communes/Venezuelan Vice President—Aristóbulo Istúriz) later pushed for the incorporation of BPIs in Chávez-era participatory institutions (*Interview with Aristóbulo Istúriz*; *Interview with Ilenia Medina*; *Interview with Rafael Uzcátegui*). These efforts even succeeded in producing BPI adoption in 2002 through the Law of Local Councils of Public Planning (CLPP) (Asamblea Nacional de La República Bolivariana de Venezuela, 2002). That law, however, was never implemented. Respondents reported that the participatory experiments of LCR in turn played an important role in Chávez's conceptualization of the CCs (*Interview Carlos Luis Rivero, Caracas*; *Interview with José Martínez*).

Another key influence on the development of the CCs was the experience of participatory democracy in the western Venezuelan city of Torres. Upon his election as mayor in 2004, Fatherland for All[79] member Julio Chávez immediately implemented a robust system of participatory budgeting in Torres (Harnecker, 2008; Hetland, 2015; *Interview with Julio Chávez*).

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[78] These groups included the *Coordinadora Simón Bolívar* and *the Coordinara Popular de Caracas.*
[79] A *Chavista* successor party of Radical Cause.

Mayor Chávez subsequently pressed for the implementation of this model across Venezuela, and offered a draft law that was debated in the National Assembly's Citizen Participation Commission—the body that drafted the CC law (*Interview with Gustavo Villapol*; *Interview with Julio Chávez*).[80] Fernando Soto-Rojas (former president of the Venezuelan National Assembly who served as a technical advisor to Julio Chávez during the Torres municipal constituent assembly) claimed that the Torres experience was "essential" in the development of President Chávez's thinking around the CC system (*Interview with Fernando Soto Rojas*).

Finally, a former technical advisor of the Venezuelan National Assembly's Commission for Citizen Participation (the body responsible for drafting the 2006 CC law) explained that grassroots *Chavista* organizations like the *Coordinadora Popular de Caracas* were responsible for the specific idea of creating a national system of CCs: "The *Coordinadora* put together meetings of [important *Chavista* leaders]…with diverse ideas, like [Fernando] Soto Rojas, Erika Farías, *campesino* leaders, etc. [and Martínez himself]…This group understood that it was essential to develop a new participatory model, at the territorial level, with a socialist vision, to replace the CLPP" ((*Interview with José Martínez*). Martínez related that in 2005, Nicolás Maduro, then President of the National Assembly, appointed him to call a mass meeting of community activists from around the country to discuss reforming the CLPP law. At this meeting, the ideas of the *Coordinadora* held sway. Martínez again: "We did a poll of the attendees, and the result was that the people were clamoring for…a new law that developed a particularly important entity in the CLPP, namely the *Consejos Comunales*. Nicolás [Maduro] read the report from the consultation and said, 'ok, we have a mandate to create a law for the CCs'" (*Interview with José Martínez*).[81] Finally, in addition to expressing their interest in a

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[80] Interview with Julio Chávez; Interview with Gustavo Villapol.
[81] Gustavo Villapol made a similar argument.

national system of BPIs to the *Chavista* leadership, grassroots *Chavista* activists around the country were also leading by example, creating hundreds, possibly thousands of informal CCs in 2005 and in early 2006 (*Interview with José Martínez*).[82]

These diverse demands for increased citizen participation were incorporated consistently into Chávez's political platform between 1998 and 2006, and, in 2006 BPIs were adopted in Venezuela through the Law of CCs. There are countless examples of Chávez's rhetorical commitment to increasing citizen participation during these years, including this explanation of his conception of participatory democracy in 1999: "Democracy has to be participatory, we have to give the people a wide range of mechanisms…to ensure participation is binding and to ensure it's not simply participation for the sake of participation, but rather an instrument for building true democracy" (Chávez Frías, 1999). This emphasis on participatory democracy was reflected in the text of the 1999 Venezuelan Constitution, which mandated a host of these new participatory-democratic mechanisms (Gobierno de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela, 1999, Articles 62, 70, and 184). The role of citizen participation in Chávez's rhetoric only increased over the following years, with the president regularly mentioning the importance of participatory democracy in national addresses (Chávez Frías, 2004, 2005).

I now show that the political costs of devolving authority to BPIs in Venezuela were low in the years prior to implementation. First, Venezuelan civil society and social movements were incapable of utilizing BPIs effectively against Chávez and the MVR. Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 offer a summary of the weakness of Venezuelan civil society prior to and after Chávez's election. Figure 4.1 presents yearly scores (scale of 0-1) for VDEM's measure of the extent to

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[81] Ibid. For additional discussion of the grassroots demands for CCs emanating from *Chavista* social movements in the years prior to BPI implementation, see (Azzellini, 2016, p. 96).
[82] Interview with David Velázquez. Also see (Azzellini, 2016, p. 96).

which large, influential civil society organizations (CSOs) predominated, as opposed to smaller, less-influential CSOs. I use this as a proxy to capture civil society's mobilizational capacity. Figure 2a shows that Venezuelan civil society's mobilizational capacity was low before Chávez's election, then weakened between 1999 and 2004, and partially recovered (while remaining well below regional and world averages) in the mid-2000s. In turn, Figure 4.2 presents yearly scores (scale of 0-3) of VDEM's measure of civil society independence from the state. This is important, because even if civil society has strong mobilizational capacity, if it is closely aligned with the governing party—depending on it for key resources or policy outcomes—it will be unlikely to criticize the party openly, and thus to utilize BPIs against the party. The figure shows that Venezuelan civil society independence was comparatively low throughout the 1990s, before dropping dramatically after Chavez's election.[83]

Despite the limited mobilizational capacity of Venezuelan civil society during this period, it is important to note that between 2002 and 2004 there was a period of heightened civil society activity among organizations affiliated with the opposition-aligned coalition known as the Democratic Coordinator. This was a diverse group of political parties, NGOs, the Venezuelan Chamber of Commerce, and the Venezuelan Workers' Confederation (CTV) which was responsible for a series of major anti-government actions during this period. These included a short-lived coup in 2002, an oil strike in late 2002 and early 2003, and an unsuccessful recall referendum against Chávez in 2004 (García-Guadilla, 2005). As a result of its heterogeneity and organizational fragmentation, this movement fell apart after the 2004 recall referendum (Cannon, 2014, p. 54). A number of respondents indicated that Chávez and the MVR would not have considered BPI implementation under these conditions (*Interview Carlos Luis Rivero, Caracas*;

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[83] For a detailed discussion of the organic, but complex relationship between *Chavista* social movements and the state, see (Hellinger, 2012).

Interview with David Velázquez), since they were too busy organizing against the opposition to implement a national system of BPIs. Not surprisingly, it was only after the Democratic Coordinator dissolved in late 2004, and the opposition's strength had receded, that BPI implementation was put on the political agenda.

Figure 4.1: Civil Society Mobilizational Capacity in Venezuela and Ecuador

Figure 4.2: Civil Society Independence in Venezuela and Ecuador

Note: Author's calculations. Data from Coppedge, Michael, et al. "V-Dem Dataset v7.1" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project (2017). Variables: v2csprtcpt and v2csstruc_1.

Venezuela's opposition parties were also unable to take advantage of the CCs, since their political control at the local level was weak during the period before BPI implementation. Specifically, in 2004, *Chavismo* carried 270 out of 332 (81%) mayoral elections (these were the last mayoral elections before the CC system was established in 2006). *Chavista* mayors

controlled municipalities representing 77% of the population, and 82% of the population among the top 25 most populous cities. Opposition mayors controlled only one of the top five cities by population (the fifth largest) (Consejo Nacional Electoral; Instituto Nacional Estadística, 2001). Consequently, even if more opposition leaders had wanted to recast the CCs as spaces open to all—in an effort to motivate more of their supporters to participate—these efforts could not have reached a very large percentage of the national population.

2. Ecuador

As in pre-2006 Venezuela, increasing citizen participation was a high-salience issue in Ecuador before and during the early years of Correa's presidency. There was a widely shared desire among Ecuadorians to overcome what many perceived as the sclerosis and corruption of the country's representative institutions (Conaghan, 2008; Pazmiño, 2005). For instance, confidence in Ecuador's representative institutions in 2006 was among the lowest in the region (Corporación latinobarómetro). Further, in 2008 over 40% of Ecuadorians identified increasing citizen participation in government decision-making as one of the top two most pressing political issues facing their country (Corporación latinobarómetro).

There were also long-standing demands for the expansion of citizen participation from among a range of Ecuadorian social movements (many of which would eventually ally with Correa). After an historic indigenous uprising on May 28, 1990, the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) began, as Ortíz explains, "to critique the structure of elitist democracy, and demand participatory mechanisms that challenged the prevailing delegative structures and the party system" (Ortíz Lemos, 2013, pp. 32–33). These demands were eventually reflected in the 1998 Ecuadorian constitution, which included a range of

125

participatory-democratic mechanisms (Ortíz Lemos, 2013, pp. 45). The 1998 Constitution was followed by a dramatic increase in the prevalence of municipal-level participatory mechanisms across Ecuador (García, 2008; Torres, 2002). By 2007, according to best estimates, 37 (17%) of Ecuador's 221 cantons[84] employed some form of participatory planning (García, 2008, p. 40). A larger proportion of Ecuador's cantons had some form of participatory planning in 2007 than in any other country in Latin America except for those that actually implemented BPIs nationwide during this period (Peru, Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, and Venezuela).[85]

Another important source of participatory demands emanating from Ecuadorian society in the years before Correa's election came from a protest movement responsible for the downfall of President Lucio Gutiérrez in 2005, known as the *Forajidos* ("outlaws")—with which Correa was closely associated. Increased citizen participation in public decision-making was a core demand of the *Forajidos* (Balderacchi, 2017, pp. 144–145; De La Torre, 2011; Ortíz Lemos, 2013, p. 58)*.* As one pro-*Forajido* commentator argued: "What you saw in Ecuador before the rebellion of the *Forajidos* [in April 2005] was that the mechanisms of elections were closed off from the will of the large majority of the population. The complaint and the force that drove the *Forajidos* was the demand for greater participation" (El Telégrafo, 2015). The *Forajidos* envisioned new democratic spaces called "popular assemblies," which would be direct decision-making bodies of ordinary citizens (many of which were established spontaneously in Quito during the protests), as well as the creation of a national constituent assembly to "democratize the nation" (Hurtado, 2005; Ramírez, 2005). Through these and other mechanisms, the *Forajidos* sought to create a "truly representative and participatory democracy" (Pazmiño, 2005, p. 38).

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[84] Equivalent to municipalities.
[85] See Appendix D.

These demands for increasing citizen participation were consistently incorporated into Correa's political platform, both before and during the early years of his presidency. In turn, BPIs were adopted in Ecuador with the 2008 Constitution and the 2010 Citizen Participation Law.[86] From the beginning of his political career, Correa regularly stressed the need to improve Ecuadorian democracy through new forms of citizen participation. In 2006, he charged that the traditional political system "only represents the mafias called political parties. We have to build a genuinely participatory democracy, [one] that really empowers the people" (Suárez, 2006). Additionally, the platform of Correa's political movement, *Alianza PAIS* (AP), during the 2006 Presidential elections included five thematic "revolutions," one of which was the "constitutional and democratic revolution" (Alianza PAIS, 2006). This revolution would, among other things, prioritize the strengthening of participatory democracy (Hernández & Buendía, 2011, p. 136).

Beyond this general demand for increasing citizen participation, there were leaders from within the AP coalition pressing for BPI implementation. First, a range of NGOs and local governments committed to participatory democracy championed the inclusion of BPIs in the 2008 Constitution (*Interview with Fernando Vega*; Muñoz, 2008; Sauliere & Dávila, Monica, 2009). Other important AP leaders were also critical in ensuring BPIs (among other mechanisms of citizen participation) were included in the new constitution. These included leftist intellectual Alberto Acosta (who served as the first president of the 2008 Constituent Assembly), and members of the Constituent Assembly's Citizen Participation Commission committed to increasing citizen participation (*Interview with Alberto Acosta*; *Interview with Gustavo Darquea*; Nicholls, 2014). This advocacy can be seen clearly in transcripts of the Constituent Assembly's discussion of citizen participation, which included regular interventions by assembly members

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[86] See Articles 67-71 of the 2010 *Ley de Participación Ciudadana y Control Social* and Article 100 of the 2008 Constitution.

stressing the importance of BPIs (Asamblea Constituyente del Ecuador, 2007). There were even groups within the AP coalition, like Diabluma, which explicitly called for a radicalization of the Ecuadorean citizen's revolution along Venezuelan lines, and for the creation of a system of CCs (Ortíz Lemos, 2013, pp. 279–280). Another critical figure pressing for BPI implementation was Betty Tola, a member of the 2007-2008 National Constituent Assembly, who would go on to serve as the president of the Ecuadorian National Assembly's Commission on Social Participation in 2008. In this role, she drew upon a range of existing BPI models for Ecuador to follow as the Commission drafted a new citizen participation law (Carter Center, 2009). These varied influences were ultimately reflected in the text of the 2008 Ecuadorian Constitution, as well as the 2010 Citizen Participation Law, both of which included BPIs.[87]

Like Chávez and the MVR in the early 2000s, the Correa government was under sufficient pressure to put BPIs on its political agenda. Unlike Venezuela, however, where social movements and civil society were relatively weak and dependent on the state before, and especially after, 1998, pre and early Correa-era Ecuador had powerful and independent social movements capable of challenging AP. In the 1990s, Ecuadorian indigenous movements, primarily through CONAIE—with which around 80% of all Ecuadorian indigenous movements were affiliated (Lalander & Ospina, 2011)—were widely considered among the strongest in South America. These movements enjoyed a formidable mobilizational infrastructure that played an important role in the downfall of Presidents Bucaram (1997) and Mahuad (2000) (Lalander & Ospina, 2011; Yashar, 2005). Though weakened by the time of Correa's presidency (Lalander & Ospina, 2011; Ortíz Lemos, 2013), CONAIE was still perceived as a powerful and highly influential social movement organization. With the rise of AP in 2006, CONAIE became a

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[87] See Articles 67-71 of the 2010 *Ley de Participación Ciudadana y Control Social* and Article 100 of the 2008 Constitution.

128

contingently linked AP ally. This ensured the maintenance of its organizational autonomy, and in turn, its willingness to openly challenge the government during moments of political tension. Figure 2 above offers a summary of this development, plotting the independence and strength of Ecuadorian civil society prior to 2006 and during the initial years of Correa's presidency. Figure 2a shows that the mobilizational capacity of Ecuadorian civil society was high until sometime between 2009 and 2012, before dipping below the regional and world averages after the period under study here. In turn, Figure 2b shows that civil society independence was very high until 2011, when it began to converge with the Latin American average (while remaining well above the world average).

If Correa had enjoyed a longstanding, organic relationship with CONAIE, he would have worried less that the indigenous federation might use BPIs against him. Instead, their relationship was characterized initially by skepticism and ultimately by deep mistrust. This led Correa to marginalize CONAIE as much as possible. First, CONAIE rejected Correa's offer to run a joint presidential/vice-presidential ticket in 2006 (Lalander & Ospina, 2011, p. 26), though it encouraged its members to vote for Correa in the second round after CONAIE's candidate (Luis Macas) was defeated in the first round (Lalander & Ospina, 2011, p. 27).[88] After Correa won the election, CONAIE promised to support him as long as he complied with key campaign promises, thus converting itself into a contingent government ally. Things started to break down in early 2009, when the government charged a group of CONAIE leaders with plotting against it. In turn, in September 2009 CONAIE launched a large-scale mobilization against the government's proposal for a new water law. It carried out further mobilizations in early 2010; leading the government to charge several CONAIE leaders with acts of terrorism. Finally, in the midst of a

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[88] Ibid., 27. The following summary of the evolving relationship between Correa and CONAIE is based on the excellent account provided by Ortiz (2013).

police rebellion against Correa in September of 2010, CONAIE announced it would not defend the president. At this point CONAIE was no longer a contingent ally, but instead an open opponent.

The combination of Correa's tenuous relationship with CONAIE, and the organization's historically-demonstrated capacity for political disruption, ensured Correa would try to diminish the group's influence in the years after he came to power. Correa would have had little reason to do this if he did not view CONAIE as a political threat. To the contrary, there is ample evidence to suggest he did. For instance, Delfin Tenesaca, a former president of ECUARUNARI, a major Ecuadorian indigenous federation, charged that one of Correa's central goals was to "divide the bases [of the indigenous movements] and get rid of the historic indigenous movements capable of generating serious conflict with the regime" (Ortíz Lemos, 2013, p. 241). Another commentator argued that Correa believed his political project depended on undoing the power of indigenous social movements. This project, the commentator explained "would be difficult to carry out while the indigenous movement, together with social movements, retain[ed] its mobilizing power and capacity for social veto. As a result, it was fundamental [for Correa]...to dismantle the mobilizational and resistance capacity of the social movements" (Dávalos, 2014)[89] Correa also worked hard to court the grassroots membership of CONAIE (bypassing its leadership), and to build relationships with parallel indigenous organizations that could supplant it (De La Torre, 2013).

Given Correa's motivation to limit the influence of social movements and civil society organizations that could challenge his authority, it is unlikely he would have sanctioned the implementation of participatory institutions with the potential to empower his opponents at the

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[89] This point was also stressed by several interview respondents.

local level. Consistent with this expectation, despite the fact that proponents of BPIs in the AP coalition had successfully pushed for the inclusion of BPIs in Ecuador's constitution and citizen participation law, the participatory institutions Correa *did* implement sought to limit the participation of social movements and organized civil society as much as possible (Ortíz Lemos, 2013). The most telling example is the "empty chair," which consists of leaving one seat in local government sessions open to a single ordinary citizen, who is given voting powers during the session they attend (Asamblea Constituyente del Ecuador, 2008, art. 101). This circumscribed and tokenistic participatory mechanism was the sole instrument for including citizens directly in the development of state policies implemented during Correa's presidency (Nicholls, 2014, p. 244).

Correa would also have worried that opposition parties could use BPIs against him, since AP was weak at the municipal level during the whole period under study. In the first municipal elections it contested—in 2009—AP won control of 80 out of 221 of Ecuador's city halls (Hernández & Buendía, 2011, p. 134), or around 35% of the country's cantons. AP mayors governed in cantons representing 43% of the population (49% of the population of the 25 largest cities). The party did win four of the top five cities by population size, but the opposition controlled Ecuador's largest city (Guayaquil), and the third to fifth largest Ecuadorian cities are much smaller than Guayaquil and Quito (Consejo Nacional Electoral; Instituto Nacional Estadística y Censos).[90] If Correa had implemented BPIs at any point between his election and 2012, he would have faced a dramatically higher number of local-level opposition governments than Chávez did in 2006.

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[90] *Consejo Nacional Electoral*; *Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos.*

Addressing Alternative Hypotheses

Before concluding my process-tracing exercises, several important alternative hypotheses must be ruled out.[91] One possibility is that, unlike in Venezuela, there was no immediate political crisis to motivate BPI implementation in Ecuador. Some interview respondents suggested that the *Chavistas* implemented BPIs when they did, because they sought to consolidate a stronger electoral base in the wake of powerful campaigns against the government by the opposition between 2002 and 2004. While responding to these opposition campaigns likely did increase the MVR's incentive to implement BPIs, AP faced similar pressures between 2007 and 2012. Highly disruptive and intensifying conflicts between the Correa government and CONAIE in 2009 and 2010 (Ortíz Lemos, 2013, pp. 230–232), and a police rebellion against Correa in September 2010—among other crises facing the government during this period—convinced AP leadership that a more consolidated party structure was necessary. As Correa explained in 2009, "the great challenge in this new phase of the revolution is to create a revolutionary committee in every house, a committee for the defense of the national government, and for the defense of the citizen revolution in every neighborhood …." (Román, 2014, p. 98) Further, as early as the Constituent Assembly elections of 2007, AP tried unsuccessfully to create a registry of sympathizers and militants to integrate them actively in the movement (Hernández & Buendía, 2011, p. 134). Given AP's need for, yet failure to consolidate a stronger base during this period, then, its incentive to implement BPIs would have increased, not decreased.

Another possibility is that AP had been so successful electorally without BPIs that they simply did not think the institution would provide enough of a value-added to justify implementation. With their twin strategies of permanent campaigning (AP held and won five

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[91] For a discussion of other critical alternative explanations of BPI implementation in Venezuela and Ecuador, see Appendix B.

national contests during Correa's first two years in office), and unmediated appeals to the citizenry (for instance, through Correa's weekly television program), Correa and AP had indeed been quite successful electorally, and with little help from participatory institutions (De La Torre, 2010). Further, Correa's approval rating between 2007 and 2012 averaged an impressive 60% (Corporación latinobarómetro). This suggests Correa likely did not feel an urgent need to expand/alter his electoral strategy. Correa's skepticism of BPIs' electoral utility likely did play a role in decreasing the AP's receptiveness to BPIs. That said, consider 1) that AP leadership was aware of the need for a stronger electoral base in the wake of a series of destabilizing political crises (discussed above), and 2) the fact that AP still faced serious electoral challenges during this period. These were reflected by AP's weaker than expected showing in a 2011 referendum that was seen largely as a bellwether of Correa's popular support (Hernández & Buendía, 2011, p. 134), as well as its inability to secure a majority in 2009 legislative elections; let alone the two-third majority needed to make important constitutional amendments (this would not happen until 2013) (Polga Hecimovich, 2013). These weaknesses suggest that the relative success of the populist electoral strategies discussed above would not have shut the door to BPI experimentation. At least, that is, not in the absence of a more tangible disincentive, such as the capacity of opposition movements and parties to co-opt BPIs against AP. It is important to remember that Chávez, too, had a successful electoral track record based primarily on the success of permanent campaigning and direct citizen appeals, but nevertheless, he implemented BPIs. If Chávez *needed* to implement BPIs to win elections, we would certainly expect his approval ratings to have been lower than the over 60% he enjoyed during the period of BPI implementation (Corporación latinobarómetro).

A final possibility is that AP leadership was simply not aware of the potential electoral benefits BPIs could offer them. This, too, is unlikely. AP leadership explicitly modeled their Committees for the Defense of the Citizen's Revolution on Venezuela's Bolivarian Circles, which in 2006 had been supplanted by the CCs (Llive, 2017). The possibility that AP leadership based their organization's mobilizational apparatus on a *Chavista* model, but were somehow unaware that this model had been replaced by a system of BPIs that the *Chavistas* had incorporated into their electoral strategy, is remote.

Conclusion

This chapter has offered a theoretical framework to explain nationwide BPI implementation in Latin America. Through two careful process-tracing exercises, I have demonstrated that the combination of demand for BPIs and the low level of political risk associated with BPI implementation makes nationwide implementation possible. Whereas the Chávez government had everything to gain and little to lose from implementing BPIs—since it was under strong pressure from below to implement BPIs and faced a relatively weak independent civil society and political opposition—Correa had something to gain but a lot to lose. While he was under pressure to implement BPIs, Correa was also up against a strong and fiercely independent indigenous movement, as well as opposition parties capable of exploiting BPIs in the many cities they governed.

These findings have important implications for the question of why BPIs have not produced meaningful effects on the quality of democracy on a large scale. First, they show that the political conditions required for even basic implementation of large-scale BPIs are relatively specific. Further, these conditions are generally slow-moving, structural factors

134

(strength/independence of civil society, societal demand, local-level opposition strength) that lie well beyond the capacity of BPI promoters to alter in the short to medium term. Not surprisingly, then, only a handful of Latin American countries (four) have been able to implement BPIs nationwide.

Finally, isolating the conditions required for nationwide BPI implementation also helps us understand failures of BPI representativeness after implementation. For example, as this chapter has shown, nationwide implementation by internally mobilized parties is conditional upon parties' belief that they will be able to use BPIs for electoral purposes. Otherwise, parties will have little incentive to invest in BPI implementation. As I described in Chapter 2, and demonstrate in Chapter 5, however, when parties incorporate BPIs into their electoral strategies, the institution tends to become politicized, and the interests of governing party supporters are privileged over those of other groups in society. This undermines BPIs' capacity to represent broad community interests. In turn, as I discussed in Chapter 2, much of the literature on PIs has stressed the importance of a strong, independent civil society to ensure BPIs are accountable to the communities they represent, and are not captured by partisan or elite interests. As we have seen, however, nationwide BPI implementation requires a relatively weak or government-dependent civil society. As a result, nationwide BPI implementation requires precisely the opposite relationship between state and civil society that is needed to safeguard BPIs against partisan capture. Consequently, large-scale BPIs are caught in a paradox in which the conditions that make them possible undermine their capacity to carry out their most basic nominal function: representing the communities they serve. In the next chapter I explore this paradox in greater detail, and discuss the political conditions under which it can be mitigated or avoided.

Chapter 5. THE FATE OF NATIONALLY IMPLEMENTED BPIS

In the last chapter we saw that nationwide BPI implementation is possible, but it only occurs when political parties value the political benefits of implementation higher than the costs. In this chapter I turn my attention to the representativeness of BPIs after implementation. As described in previous chapters, to be representative, BPIs must feature both high levels of community participation and low levels of politicization (the degree to which individuals outside the governing party's core supporters are marginalized/excluded from BPI participation or benefits). Henceforth I refer to the combination of BPI participation and politicization as BPI representativeness. If participation is low, there is a high probability that only individuals from certain sectors of the community will participate, and therefore that the rest of the community's perspective(s) will be excluded from BPI decision-making. Yet even if community participation is very high, there is no guarantee that BPI decisions will be representative of the whole community, particularly if a large segment of the population is systematically excluded from participation.

To explain variation in BPI representativeness, I argue—summarizing the theoretical framework provided in Chapter 2—first, that since internally mobilized political parties only implement BPIs nationwide when they perceive an electoral benefit, they are likely to promote high levels of participation, but also to politicize BPIs. Externally mobilized parties, by contrast, can promote participation without politicizing BPIs. To date, however, there have been no cases of nationwide BPI implementation by externally mobilized parties (though I explore subnational cases of BPI implementation by these parties in Chapter 8). Finally, when technocrats implement BPIs, they do so in order to improve the quality of governance, rather than for electoral gain.

This mode of implementation leads to lower rates of BPI politicization, but since technocrats have a limited capacity to mobilize citizens into BPI participation, it also produces low levels of participation. Ideally technocrats' mobilizational capacity would be bolstered through partnerships with strong and independent civil society/social movement organizations. Unfortunately, however, since nationwide BPI implementation requires relatively weak civil society/social movements (discussed in the previous chapter); such partnerships are unavailable to technocrats during BPI implementation. In what follows, I first present an analysis of survey data from each of the countries in Latin America with nationwide BPI implementation. This analysis demonstrates the consistency of my theoretical expectations, with observed variation in BPI representativeness. In turn, to tease out the causal mechanisms connecting modes of BPI implementation to variation in representativeness, I conduct targeted process-tracing exercises for three countries: Venezuela, Peru, and the Dominican Republic.

BPI Participation Rates

I first offer estimates of the overall rate of BPI participation rates in the four countries under study, for each year data were available. These results are summarized in Figure 5.1. Estimates in green represent rates of BPI participation in countries with party-led implementation, and estimates in red represent BPI participation in countries with technocratic implementation. While Venezuelan BPI participation rates vary significantly over time (from a high of nearly 40% in 2010 to a low of less than 30% in 2012), Figure 5.1 shows that countries where political parties took the lead in BPI implementation (Bolivia and Venezuela) had consistently higher participation rates compared to countries with technocrat-led implementation (Peru and the Dominican Republic). To produce an overall BPI participation rate score for each

country, I simply average each country's scores across all available years. These scores are

reported in Figure 5.2. The results clearly show that the countries with party-led BPI

implementation experienced dramatically higher levels of BPI participation (ranging from

around 23% to 34%) compared to countries with agency-led implementation (around 4% for

both countries).

Figure 5.1: BPI Participation Rates

Note: Author's calculations, based on data from LAPOP (1998-2014). 95% confidence intervals are reported. "gov" = agency-led implementation, "party" = implementation by political party.

Figure 5.2: Average BPI Participation Rates

Note: Author's calculations, based on data from LAPOP (1998-2014). Red bars indicate party-led BPI-implementation, blue bars indicate agency-led implementation.

BPI Politicization Rates

I turn next to variation in BPI politicization. As described in Chapter 3, the first indicator I employ to measure BPI politicization is variation in rates of participation across party affiliation. Specifically, I calculate the difference in participation rates between governing-party supporters and supporters of opposition parties. Since BPIs are generally implemented at the municipal level, where mayors might manipulate BPI participation or distribute benefits to serve their electoral interests, I first measure the difference in BPI participation rates between supporters of the mayor's party, and supporters of other parties. At the same time, national parties often play a central role in implementing BPIs, and will attempt to distribute resources, and control participation based on partisan political criteria. Therefore, it is also important to assess differences in the participation rates between supporters of the party in power at the national level compared to supporters of other parties. I present these findings in Figure 5.3.

Figure 5.3 reports the difference in participation rates between governing and opposition parties (at both the municipal and national levels), for each country-year survey data was available. Point estimates represent the difference in BPI participation rates in a given country-year between supporters of the governing party and supporters of opposition parties (either between the mayor's party and other parties ("mayor"), or between the national governing party and other parties ("natl"). Positive and statistically significant differences (in green) suggest politicization exists. Estimates that are not statistically significant (in red) indicate the absence of politicization. For ease of interpretation, I summarize the results of Figure 5.3 in Table 5.1. The first column reports the percentage of estimates for each country in Figure 5.3 that are positive and statistically significant. This number represents the percentage of estimates for each country that suggest politicization is present. In turn, the second column offers a glimpse of the intensity of politicization, measured by the average magnitude (in standard deviations) of each country's positive and statistically significant estimates. Finally, if the percentage of positive and statistically significant estimates for a country (first column) is greater than 50%, I code that country as a case with unequal BPI participation. Table 5.1 shows, consistent with my theoretical expectations, that BPI participation was unequal in the two cases of party-led implementation (Venezuela and Bolivia), but not in the two cases of technocratic implementation (Peru and the Dominican Republic). Further, the magnitude of positive and statistically significant estimates of unequal participation in Venezuela and Bolivia were significantly higher than in Peru.[92]

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[92] There were no positive and statistically significant estimates for the Dominican Republic.

Figure 5.3: BPI Participation Rates by Party Affiliation

Note: Author's calculations, based on LAPOP. 95% confidence intervals included. Point estimates represent the difference in participation rates between supporters of the governing party and supporters of opposition parties. Blue point estimates indicate positive and statistically significant indicators, and indicate that government supporters participate at a higher rate than opposition supporters. I include estimates for every country-year data are available.

Table 5.1: Summary of Differences in BPI Participation Rates Across Political Affiliation

Country	% estimates positive and statistically significant (.1 level)	average magnitude (sd) of positive and statistically significant estimates	UNEQUAL BPI PARTICIPATION?
Bolivia	**60**	.222	YES
Peru	**12.5**	.160	NO
DR	**0**	NA	NO
Venezuela	**100**	.453	YES

Note: A positive and statistically significant estimate suggests that government supporters (either national or municipal-level) participate in BPIs more than supporters of opposition parties. Unequal participation is coded as "yes if % indicators that are positive and statistically significant is at least 50%.

The second indicator I employ to measure BPI politicization is the difference in perceptions of BPI politicization between governing party supporters and opposition party supporters (again, both at the municipal and national levels). As described in Chapter 3, I analyze all questions that ask respondents about their personal assessment of BPIs, their perception of municipal government interest in citizen participation, and their assessment of municipal government performance, directly after being primed with a question about BPIs. The results of these analyses are reported in Figure 5.4. As with my analysis of differences in participation rates across partisan affiliation, positive and statistically significant differences (in green) suggest politicization exists, while estimates that are not statistically significant (in red) suggest the absence of politicization. Apart from the unmistakable pattern of BPI politicization in Venezuela,

these results are more ambiguous than those reported above for partisan differences in BPI participation.

For ease of interpretation, I summarize the results of Figure 5.4 in Table 5.2. The first column reports the percentage of estimates for each country in Figure 5.4 that are positive and statistically significant. This number represents the percentage of estimates for each country that suggest politicization is present. In turn, the second column offers a glimpse of the intensity of politicization, measured by the average magnitude (in standard deviations) of each country's positive and statistically significant estimates. Finally, if the percentage of positive and statistically significant estimates for a country (first column) is greater than 50%, in the third column I code that as a positive case of perceived BPI bias. Table 5.2 shows, surprisingly, that there is not a clear relationship between mode of BPI implementation and perception of bias. Specifically, even though Venezuela is consistent with my theoretical expectations (showing both a very high percentage of positive and statistically significant estimates of perceived bias, as well as much larger magnitudes of bias compared to the other three countries), variation in perceptions of bias across the other three cases is relatively limited, both in terms of the percentage of positive and statistically significant estimates, as well as the magnitude of those estimates. Further, the only country apart from Venezuela to approach the 50% threshold of positive and statistically significant indicators was the Dominican Republic, a case of technocratic, rather than party-led BPI implementation. It is possible that this surprising finding is a result of limited data availability for the Dominican Republic (making the Dominican Republic figures in Table 5.2 highly sensitive to additional data). That said, in the case study below I supplement these quantitative findings with a range of qualitative evidence of

144

politicization in the Dominican Republic, and I suggest that this finding is likely the result of a

combination of variation in the form taken by technocratic implementation across cases.

Figure 5.4: BPI Assessments by Party Affiliation

BOLIVIA

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

PERU

Mayor Cares About Citizen Part

VENEZUELA

CC Politicization

CC Satisfied

Note: Author's calculations, based on LAPOP. 95% confidence intervals included. Point estimates represent the difference of opinion between supporters of the governing party and supporters of opposition parties. Blue point estimates indicate positive and statistically significant indicators. I include estimates for every country-year data are available.

Table 5.2: Summary of Perceived Perception of BPI Politicization Across Political Affiliation

Country	% estimates positive and statistically significant (.1 level)	average magnitude positive and statistically significant estimates	PERCEPTION OF BIAS?
Bolivia	**31.3**	.250	NO
Peru	**31.8**	.267	NO
DR	**50**	.260	YES
Venezuela	**91.6**	.550	YES

Note: A positive and statistically significant estimate suggests that government supporters (either national or municipal-level) view BPIs more favorably than supporters of opposition parties. Perception of bias is coded as "yes if % estimates that are positive and statistically significant is at least 50%.

Finally, to generate overall measures of politicization, following the procedure used in Figure 2.6 and Figure 2.7, I simply average each country's scores for unequal participation and perception of bias. This is a reasonable aggregation technique, since I use these indicators to capture the same underlying concept (politicization), and include both primarily as a robustness check to account for the possibility of measurement error. Figure 5.3 reports the resulting politicization scores. In turn, Table 5.4 summarizes the relationship between BPI representativeness and mode of BPI implementation. The results are consistent with my theoretical expectations: in cases of internally mobilized party implementation (Venezuela and Bolivia), we observe high rates of participation and at least moderate politicization. In turn, we observe low rates of participation, as well as low rates of politicization, in the cases of technocratic implementation (Peru and the Dominican Republic). Having established the consistency of my theoretical expectations with observed variation in BPI representativeness across Latin American countries with nationwide BPI-implementation, I turn now to three short case studies that process-trace how each mode of implementation produces distinct outcomes with respect to BPI representativeness.

Table 5.3: Final BPI Politicization Scores

Country	Average of Unequal Participation and Perception of Bias Scores	Average of positive and statistically significant estimates for Unequal Participation and Perception of Bias	POLITICIZATION LEVEL
Bolivia	45.65	.236	MODERATE
Peru	22.15	.213	LOW
DR	25	NA	LOW

Venezuela	95.8	.502	HIGH

Table 5.4: Summary of Outcomes

		Participation	
		Low	High
Politicization	Low	*Dominican Republic/Peru* Technocratic Implementation	*NA* Externally Mobilized Implementation
	Moderate/High	*NA*	*Venezuela/Bolivia* Internally Mobilized implementation

1. Three Case Studies

In this section I offer three targeted case studies of the relationship between mode of implementation and BPI representativeness in Venezuela, Peru, and the Dominican Republic. My objective is to process-trace how distinct modes of implementation affects BPI representativeness, following the theoretical expectations discussed above. Note that I do not process-trace a case where politicization is low, and participation is high. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, there are no countries in Latin America where an externally mobilized party has implemented BPIs nationwide. That said, there are interesting instances of subnational BPI implementation by externally mobilized parties (particularly in Brazil) that I explore in Chapter 8. In that chapter I also explore why parties that partially implemented BPIs before coming to power at the national level fail to achieve nationwide implementation after taking control of the national executive.

Internally Mobilized Party Implementation: Venezuela

150

As we have seen, the representativeness of Venezuelan BPIs, known as CCs, has been mixed: on the one hand, CCs are arguably the most participatory of all PIs in modern Latin American history, with, on average, over a third of the adult population having attended a CC activity in a given year. On the other hand, CCs are also among the most highly politicized participatory institutions in the region. I have argued that these two facts are interrelated: the only way to generate such high levels of participation is if national political parties use their mobilizational apparatus to encourage participation. However, the only conditions under which parties have an incentive to invest their resources into BPIs is when they are confident BPIs can be used to win votes. When this is the case, parties will make every effort to mobilize core and likely supporters into BPIs. In Venezuela, there is no doubt that the MVR/PSUV viewed promoting CC participation as a high strategic priority. Indeed, President Hugo Chávez made the CCs a foundational component of his political project, known as "21st Century Socialism." As McCarthy (2015) describes, "…Chávez affirmed that the 'explosion of communal power' [i.e. the creation of the CCs] represented the 'supreme motor' for fulfilling the…project of building Bolivarian socialism" (370). Further, the governing PSUV's organizational manual, known as the "Red Book," states that "all militants of the party must commit to…working with the…communal councils…to strengthen popular power as a strategic axis of Bolivarian socialism" (Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela, 2010, p. 73).

In Venezuela, access to a large revenue stream from the state oil company (PDVSA), combined with a vocal and ideologically-committed base that was highly suspicious of opposition participation in BPIs, made the MVR/PSUV's decision to politicize the CCs a simple one. First, the CCs' inception in 2006 corresponded with a massive increase in state oil revenues,

as the price of crude jumped from less than $30/barrel in 2001 to over $150/barrel by 2008.[93] Further, by 2006 the government enjoyed total control over PDVSA (Ellner, 2008). In addition, thanks to opposition abstention during the 2005 legislative elections, the MVR/PSUV also boasted an overwhelming majority in Venezuela's National Assembly (Ellner, 2008). This meant Chávez and the MVR/PSUV faced virtually no constraints if they wished to channel resources to the CCs. Further, the grassroots base of *Chavismo* became increasingly radical and mistrustful of opposition supporters in the years before BPI implementation. This was caused, on the one hand, by a series of escalating tactics by the Venezuelan opposition between 2002 and 2004 aimed at ending the Chávez government—including a short-lived coup, an economically destructive employer lockout, and a failed presidential recall referendum—and, on the other hand, by a hardening of *Chavismo's* own ideological orientation around a radical program, that Chávez referred to as "21st Century Socialism." Within the framework of 21st century socialism,

Chávez's government was understood as a revolutionary project oriented toward the fundamental transformation of Venezuelan society along participatory-democratic, socialist lines (Vidal-Molina et al., 2018). In this conceptualization, opposition supporters were no longer adversaries, but rather counterrevolutionary enemies of the Bolivarian project, commonly referred to by *Chavistas* as "escuálidos," or "the squalid ones" (Strønen, 2017, p. 99). Under these conditions, using the CCs to show the MVR/PSUV's bona fides as a party of good governance and politically inclusive participation would risk alienating MVR/PSUV supporters who viewed the CCs as an instrument for building 21st century socialism, and who viewed opposition supporters as an existential threat to the Bolivarian project. The combination of the MVR/PSUV's desire to

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[93] World Bank Indicators.

exclude non-swayable voters from CC benefits, and the high likelihood of alienating grassroots *Chavistas* if the CCs were framed in apolitical, inclusive terms, would have dramatically outweighed any possible gains the party might have made among swing or opposition voters by forgoing CC politicization.[94]

On the basis of these incentives, we would expect the MVR/PSUV to engage in practices that limited or discouraged the participation of opposition supporters. There is a wealth of evidence consistent with this expectation. Exclusionary activities are conducted by national as well as local-level MVR/PSUV leaders. National PSUV leaders both actively discourage participation among opposition supporters, and also indirectly discourage opposition participation by incorporating the CCs into the MVR/PSUV's broader political and electoral objectives. Further, there is considerable evidence of the government failing to officially register CCs in opposition areas, despite the CCs carrying out all the required steps for CC registration. Turning to local-level PSUV activists, in some cases PSUV-dominated CC leaderships make important decisions in private without including the community assembly (*Interview with CC Leaders in Capacho Nuevo, Táchira*). In other cases they try to exclude opposition supporters from receiving CC benefits (*Interview with CC Leaders in Petare, Caracas*), or fail to inform opposition supporters of CC meeting times. Another tactic employed by PSUV activists is to implicitly discourage opposition supporters from participating, either by excluding them from CC leadership (*Interview with CC Leaders in El Cañaveral, Caracas*), or creating a political climate in which opposition supporters fear making their political affiliation known within the CC (*Interview with CC Leader in 23 de Enero*).

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[94] Note that I explore the PSUV's CC electoral calculus in greater detail in Chapter 6.

Finally, it is clear from the analyses presented in Table 5.1 and Table 5.3 above, that these efforts by the PSUV to politicize CCs were associated with both low levels of CC participation among opposition supporters, as well as high levels of politicization. In sum, this case study has shown that when internally mobilized parties implement BPIs, they will work to mobilize as many participants as they can, while also taking a range of steps to exclude opposition supporters from participation. The consequence is highly participatory, but highly politicized BPIs.

Technocratic Implementation: Peru

Peruvian participatory budgeting (PB) provides a stark contrast to Venezuela's CCs. It is a clear example of how nationwide BPI implementation can avoid the pitfalls of politicization seen in Venezuela. It also demonstrates, however, that the price of low politicization is political parties' lack of commitment to BPIs. When parties do not invest in BPIs, participation is low, and as a result BPIs cannot adequately represent the communities they serve. To understand how technocratic implementation minimizes both politicization and participation, it is important to explain how BPI implementation in Peru changed politicians' incentive structures with respect to BPI politicization. During congressional debates of the law mandating subnational PB across Peru (La Comisión Permanente del Congreso de la República, 2003), BPIs were promoted not by a political party, but rather by the Ministry of Economics and Finance (MEF). The MEF was an unusually well-respected government agency that enjoyed a substantial credibility within the Peruvian congress (Dargent, 2015; McNulty, 2011, p. 71).The MEF was responsible not only for drafting the PB law, but also for framing the debate around PB in Congress. While PB had potentially serious distributional/political consequences in practice, the MEF cleverly presented

it as a largely technical, apolitical institution, "focused on steps, phases, and technical criteria" (McNulty, 2011, p. 71). This innocuous framing, in conjunction with the MEF's high level of credibility, meant that "…the participatory budget was viewed in Congress as a technical process, spearheaded by a powerful institution, that did not threaten the power of elected officials" (McNulty, 2011, p. 71). In turn, the MEF's detailed guidelines for BPI implementation helped ensure that the process would advance on more or less apolitical lines. As McNulty (McNulty, 2011, p. 45) explains: "...the process is meant to be orderly and technical. The design reduces possibilities for manipulating the process, corrupt practices, or the government's co-optation of the organizations. Governments do not receive their budgets unless they can demonstrate that meetings [of PB] have been held."

Given these conditions, PB faced little political opposition, and implementation, driven by the MEF, was relatively simple. At the same time, by downplaying PB's political implications, the MEF also undermined politicians' incentive to devote resources to the process. The combination of PB's reputation as an apolitical, technical institution, and the fact that the MEF's enforceable guidelines for BPI implementation limited politicians' ability to manipulate or co-opt PB processes, has meant that political parties in Peru do not believe PB is a useful electoral tool. Parties simply do not see the process as an effective channel for legitimating or enhancing their political power (López Ricci, 2014). Consequently, politicians largely ignore PB, seeing little point in diverting scarce resources to mobilizing voters into the process. Accordingly, "there is very little political support for participatory institutions among subnational or national officials" (McNulty, 2019, p. 146). As one commentator explained, "the presence of political parties in …[BPI] is very scarce, and limited to specific events. Parties participate more because they were invited and less on their own volition" (López Ricci, 2014, p.

155

16). He goes on to explain that the primary reason subnational officials even bother to carry out BPIs in their municipalities, which they tend to do "ritually," is because they are required by law to do so.

Politicians' indifference had two contradictory effects on BPI representativeness in Peru. On the one hand, politicians and political parties do not invest enough resources in PB to mobilize significant levels of participation. Specifically, they do not publicize BPIs effectively within communities, they do not actively promote BPIs as a key element of their broader political platform (McNulty, 2011, p. 146), and they do not exhort core supporters to participate, or to mobilize other community members into PB. Not surprisingly then, as Figure 5.2 above shows, BPI participation levels in Peru have been much lower than in Venezuela and Bolivia, where parties incorporated BPIs into their electoral strategies. Of course, this does not mean mayors never attempt to politicize BPIs in Peru, but the general lack of interest in BPIs by Peruvian political parties has substantially limited overall mobilization efforts around BPI participation.

On the other hand, although lack of partisan engagement with BPIs reduces participation, it also decreases politicization. Parties with little strategic interest in BPIs also have weak incentives either to take credit for BPI achievements, or to exclude supporters of rival parties from participating. Though there are isolated cases of subnational government leaders associating themselves with PB to increase their political support, or viewing PB as a tool for justifying subnational government decisions (McNulty, 2011, Chapter 5), there is little evidence that Peru's PB system is systematically employed for any political purposes. If anything, PB is simply ignored by subnational officials, who implement the projects they care about most, regardless of PB decisions (López Ricci, 2014, p. 16; McNulty, 2019, p. 146). PB is also

sidestepped in favor of alternative participatory venues like town halls—which offer subnational government leaders a greater opportunity to politicize participation (McNulty, 2011, p. 106). To sum up, in Peru the force behind BPI implementation was a respected government agency, rather than a political party. This helped ensure political parties would regard BPIs as largely apolitical and technocratic. It also guaranteed there would be strong (and enforceable) rules guiding BPI implementation, which limited the extent to which BPIs could be manipulated for political purposes. These factors, in turn, reduced politicians' willingness to invest in BPIs. Finally, politicians' unwillingness to invest in BPIs put downward pressure on participation rates, while also limiting politicians' capacity to politicize BPIs.

Technocratic Implementation: Dominican Republic

Participatory Budgeting in the Dominican Republic was championed by a coalition of quasi-governmental agencies, primarily the Federation of Dominican Municipalities (FEDOMU) and the National Council of State Reform (CONARE). After the country's first experiments with PB in the late 1990s (funded by the Inter-American Foundation) (Mitchell, 2014, pp. 53–54), these agencies, in conjunction with international aid organizations such as the German Technical Cooperation Agency (GTZ), worked diligently to expand PB across the country. Similar to the MEF in Peru, these agencies were highly respected, in terms of their technical competence (*Interview with Juan Castillo*; Mitchell, 2014, p. 10), as well as their assiduous focus on maintaining credibility among all major political parties (Mitchell, 2014, p. 51). These features helped ensure PB was not perceived as a partisan issue, but instead as an administrative tool for improving municipal government efficacy and transparency (Allegretti et al., 2012, p. 59). As a result, political parties did not oppose efforts to expand PB in the years before 2007 (during

which PB was established in more than 100 Dominican municipalities (Mitchell, 2014, p. 55),

nor did they stand in the way of a 2007 national law that made PB obligatory in all municipalities

(El Congreso Nacional, 2007). Indeed, the 2007 law (170-07) was sponsored by legislators from

the country's three largest political parties— Partido de la Liberación Dominicana (PLD),

Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD), and Partido Reformista Social Cristiano (PRSC)—

and commentators have stressed that "the promoters of PB demonstrated a notable capacity to

mobilize allies in a variety of political parties in Congress" during this process (Mitchell, 2014,

p. 54). Though a small handful of congresspeople expressed reservations about the law

(*Interview with Jacobo Reyes*) respondents who participated in the congressional debates

stressed that passage was easy, and faced very little opposition (*Interview with Jacobo Reyes*;

Interview with Juan Castillo). Some of this support might be explained by the fact that

politicians did not want to be viewed as anti-participation (*Interview with Gennry González*;

Interview with Jacobo Reyes; *Interview with Juan Castillo*). That pressure alone, however,

would have been insufficient unless politicians also believed PB posed little political threat.

Indeed, the key factor in explaining support for PB among politicians was their sense that PB

was a largely symbolic measure with few strategic implications. As one respondent explained,

congresspeople did not hesitate to support the law because they assumed its political effects

would be minimal: "since international aid agencies supported the bill, and since it had a certain

degree of social backing, Congress passed it, *because they knew that there would be no effect on*

political parties if they created a system of PB" (*Interview with Domingo Matías,* my emphasis).

Further, when asked whether their parties hoped to gain electorally from PB, or if they feared

rival parties might benefit electorally, all respondents involved in debates around the PB law

unequivocally answered no (*Interview with Christopher Mitchell*; *Interview with Victor D'Aza*).[95]

In general, then, politicians viewed PB as a low-stakes policy that neither offered significant political benefits nor represented a serious political risk.

Promoters' efforts to minimize political risks associated with PB certainly decreased opposition among Dominican politicians. Yet, as in Peru, these efforts also limited political parties' interest in diverting resources to the institution. Parties that associate few, if any, political stakes with BPIs are not likely to perceive a clear political benefit from investing in implementation. This was true of national party leaders, who let PB sail through Congress, but took few concrete steps to promote implementation beyond paying lip service to the value of citizen participation,[96] as well as mayors. Mayors were perfectly willing to speak positively about BPIs, but were much less interested in devoting resources to implementation. Data collected by technical advisors responsible for carrying out PB processes across the country, for instance, show that PB was only spearheaded by politicians (mayors or city councilors) in around 15% of municipalities (Allegretti et al., 2012, p. 60). This lack of political will was a problem for two reasons. First, unlike in Peru, BPI implementation in the Dominican Republic could not count on financial sanctions imposed by the national government to incentivize implementation in cases where mayors resisted BPIs. Second, as in Peru, weak political commitment to BPIs put downward pressure on participation rates, as politicians had no reason to mobilize voters into BPIs (*Interview with Christopher Mitchell*).

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[95] Some national level politicians were also attracted to BPIs because they believed BPIs might serve as a practical means of ensuring "that revenue-sharing funds actually led to some public works." For these leaders, BPI-implementation was less a matter of distributing clientelist or club goods to supporters, as much as a practical solution to corruption that could improve public service provision.

[96] As one respondent explained, "there was a formal acceptance [of PB], but in practice there was much less acceptance" (Juan Castillo interview).

In order to generate interest in PB among mayors, then, PB promoters would have to be creative. Their solution was to show mayors not only that PBs were politically unobjectionable, but also that implementation was in mayors' self-interest. As one FEDOMU *técnico* explained, "One of the things we [FEDOMU] tried to do was show mayors the political 'value added' of participatory budgeting" (*Interview with Gennry González*). FEDOMU worked to raise awareness of PB's political benefits through various publications and videos, along with interactions between their *técnicos* and municipal officials. In particular, they had to show that implementing PB would be more politically useful than simply making rhetorical gestures in support of the process. PB's political value added could take one of several forms. One was to offer mayors facing hard fiscal constraints a means of shifting responsibility for difficult budgetary decisions onto the community (and away from the mayor). As (Mitchell, 2014) explains:

> "PB provided a mechanism to deal with the gap between high citizen expectations and limited municipal resources…A high *municipio* official in Santo Domingo Norte observed that in his city, PB gave local residents an incentive to prioritize among their requests, and relieved authorities from coping with many disordered demands. These aspects of PB contributed to a conviction among a good many mayors that the consultative procedure brought electoral advantages" (84).

Another mechanism through which PB might provide electoral benefits to mayors is using the process to attract new supporters. As one PLD mayor described, "At times [a local politician] may say 'I need resources for the campaign.' But what better campaign resources could there be, than to have the communities on your side? And you only obtain that through community participation…That's the best campaign any mayor could conduct" (quoted in Mitchell 84). Along those lines, Mitchell explains that, for many mayors, PB "…offered a low-cost way to allocate new construction funds to projects with the greatest community support, while identifying the administrations with openness and transparency" (Mitchell, 2014, p. 84)

160

By highlighting PB's political benefits to mayors, promoters in the Dominican Republic helped motivate implementation, and likely also increased mayors' incentive to mobilize communities into participation (as low participation would undermine the political benefits mayors hoped to reap through PB). But, again, all good things to do not necessarily go together in the case of BPIs. PB promoters' strategic framing also had the unintended effect of increasing the likelihood that mayors would view PB through a political, rather than a technocratic lens, thereby increasing the risk of politicization.[97] Although, consistent with my findings above, researchers have found that parties' lack of interest in Dominican BPIs has reduced the likelihood of unequal participation rates across partisan affiliation,[98] there is ample qualitative evidence showing that mayors have politicized PB in various ways. According to one respondent, who has worked for decades on municipal issues in the Dominican Republic, and has deep knowledge of the reality of PB around the country, "clientelism [through PB] is a generalized practice" (*Interview with Domingo Matías*). This respondent identified three primary mechanisms through which PB politicization occurs. First, mayors may refrain from politicizing PB assemblies (i.e., they encourage citizens of all political persuasions to attend and vote on priorities), but when finalizing the municipal budget, they disproportionately allocate resources to approved PB projects in areas where the party has a strong presence. In turn, when projects are inaugurated, officials in those areas "have to perform a ritual of thanks [to the mayor]…all the works carried out as a result of PB end up personifying the mayor, they end up being politicized" (*Interview with Domingo Matías*). In turn, politically determined allocation of PB benefits leads

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[97] Given high historic rates of clientelism in the Dominican Republic (Sánchez & Lozano, 2012), the risk of mayors politicizing BPIs was likely already higher there than in most countries in Latin America, but I argue that technocrats' framing of the process in political terms likely further increased the risk of politicization.

[98] Allegretti et al. (2012) for instance, find that the political affiliation of BPI participants in the Dominican Republic almost exactly matches levels of support enjoyed by each major political party nationally.

to a second form of politicization—also described above in the case of Venezuela—in which mayors claim PB is open to participants from all political parties, but in practice the process is so closely identified with the mayor's party, that supporters of other parties do not participate (*Interview with Domingo Matías*). In other cases, mayors directly exclude supporters of opposition parties from PB activities by only inviting their supporters to meetings (*Interview with Domingo Matías*; *Interview with Juan Castillo*).

Despite this evidence of politicization, the data presented above demonstrate that BPI politicization in the Dominican Republic was much weaker than in Venezuela. What accounts for this difference? I argue that despite Dominican PB promoters' emphasis on the political benefits mayors could receive from implementing the process, they nonetheless worked—as in Peru—to both ensure implementation minimized politicization to the greatest extent possible, and to impose measures that would limit mayors' individual discretion over the process. Specifically, CONARE and FEDOMU devoted significant resources to developing and disseminating a PB methodological guide and training materials to educate municipal officials on best practices (Allegretti et al., 2012, p. 62; *Interview with Juan Castillo*, personal communication, November 8, 2019; Mitchell, 2014, p. 87). They also established the national monitoring and technical assistance unit for participatory budgeting (Unidad Nacional de Seguimiento y Asistencia Técnica del Presupuesto Participativo), which is responsible for providing technical support to PB processes around the country (Allegretti et al., 2012, p. 61). FEDOMU also created a set of technical criteria for assessing the extent to which each municipality has carried out PB, and these criteria have been incorporated into a national municipal ranking system that assesses municipal performance based on a wide range of criteria (see sismap.gob.do/Municipal). The website for the municipal ranking system allows citizens not

only to see whether their municipality effectively carried out the PB process, but it also houses

PDFs of participant lists, approved projects, and even photos of local meetings. These

transparency mechanisms increase mayors' incentives to comply with PB decisions, and

decrease their incentives to politicize PBs. Additionally, some mayors hope to use high scores on

the campaign trail, or fear that low scores will be used against them by challenger candidates

(*Interview with Juan Castillo*). Some also worry that low scores will hurt their competitiveness

for international aid (*Interview with Juan Castillo*). None of these mechanisms were in place in

Venezuela, making BPI politicization more extreme.[99]

In conclusion, BPIs in the Dominican Republic suffer from low rates of participation

because, in an effort to limit political opposition, implementing agencies (FEDOMU and

CONARE) minimized BPIs' political implications to national parties. While this approach

succeeded in generating a broad coalition to support the national PB law, it also undermined

parties' incentive to invest in BPIs, as it encouraged them to think BPIs were politically

irrelevant. In turn, since there was no sanctioning mechanism for non-compliance in the

Dominican Republic's PB law (unlike the case of Peru), BPI promoters incentivized

implementation by appealing to mayors' political self-interest, stressing the various personal

benefits BPIs could offer to mayors. This led mayors to politicize BPIs, which ultimately

explains why we observe higher levels of politicization in the Dominican Republic compared to

Peru. Yet similar to Peru's MEF, implementers in the Dominican Republic also took steps to

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[99] It is important to note that in addition to steps taken by PB implementers to limit BPI politicization, differences in BPI politicization between the Dominican Republic and Venezuela are also likely explained, in part, by variation in levels of political polarization, which was extremely high in Venezuela (Smilde & Hellinger, 2011) and remarkably low in the Dominican Republic (Sánchez & Lozano, 2012). This meant that while PB was used instrumentally by individual mayors in the Dominican Republic, it was not associated with any party's broader political project or brand (Mitchell, 2014, p. 84). As a result, unlike in Venezuela, BPIs did not become a flashpoint of partisan politics in the Dominican Republic, and party activists did not systematically exclude supporters of other parties from BPI participation or benefits.

limit BPI politicization. This both served as a counterbalance against mayors' incentive to take political advantage of BPIs, while also further limiting participation.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have shown both how the paradox of participatory institutions undermines BPI representativeness in Latin America, and how the way it does so is determined, to a significant extent, by variation in the mode of BPI implementation. On the one hand, when internally mobilized parties implement BPIs, they have little trouble ensuring high rates of participation. Specifically, participation rates in Venezuela and Bolivia were dramatically higher than in Peru and the Dominican Republic in all years for which data are available. This, I argue, is a result of the fact that parties have strong, electorally based incentives to employ their considerable organizational resources in the service of BPI implementation. By contrast, while technocrats in Peru and the Dominican Republic desired high rates of participation, their constrained mobilizational capacity, combined with the relative weakness of potential civil society/social movement organizations with which they could have partnered to boost participation, ensured rates of participation would be comparatively low.

On the other hand, the same electoral incentives that produced high rates of participation in countries with internally mobilized party implementation also generated moderate to high levels of politicization that undermined the quality of BPI representativeness in those countries. By contrast, in countries with technocratic BPI implementation, technocrats were able to frame BPIs to national party leaders in a largely apolitical manner that lowered parties' interest in BPIs, and consequently decreased their incentive to politicize BPIs. This yielded low to moderate levels of politicization in Peru and the Dominican Republic, respectively. The relatively high

level of politicization in the Dominican Republic compared to Peru, I argue, is a result, at least in part, of Dominican BPI implementers' strategy of emphasizing the political benefits of BPI implementation to individual mayors in an effort to boost the latter's willingness to implement BPIs in their municipalities.

Finally, while this chapter has begun to explore the mechanisms through which internally mobilized parties incorporate BPIs into their electoral strategies, it has left open a range of important questions. These includes which voter groups parties hope to reach through BPIs (and why), the specific mechanisms through which they appeal to voters, why BPI politicization is employed by some party activists but not others, and whether BPIs actually yield electoral returns to political parties. These are the questions to which I turn in the following two chapters.

Chapter 6. EXPLORING PARTIES' BPI ELECTORAL STRATEGIES: THE CASE OF VENEZUELA'S COMMUNAL COUNCILS

Introduction

As described in Chapter 2, there is broad scholarly agreement that political parties use BPIs for electoral purposes. In some cases, they do so to distribute benefits among their supporters, while in others, BPIs are employed as a signal to voters that parties are committed to good governance and democratic deepening. While this work has been critical in reframing the literature around the political incentives that actors have to create, implement, and sustain participatory institutions, to date there has been limited examination of the specific electoral strategies parties pursue through BPIs. Specifically, which voter groups do they hope to reach through BPIs, and why? Do parties target their own supporters, swing voters, all voters, or some

combination, and how do they use BPIs to reach voters? These are important questions for scholars and practitioners interested in understanding why BPIs sometimes succeed in representing the broad political interests of the communities they serve, while in other cases they primarily reflect the interests of a particular political party. As I argued in Chapter 5, the type of electoral strategy carried out in BPIs plays a critical role in shaping the representativeness of BPIs. If the party's strategy is focused narrowly on maintaining the loyalty of core supporters, the resultant BPIs will exclude supporters of opposition parties, whereas when this strategy is focused on a broader set of voters the level of political exclusivity will be lower.

In this chapter I explore the electoral strategy pursued by the PSUV through the system of Communal Councils (*Consejos Comunales*). Scholars have drawn sharply contrasting conclusions about this question in the case of CCs. On the one hand, some argue that the CCs are highly politicized spaces where opposition supporters are not welcome (Lovera, 2008; Rhodes-Purdy, 2017, p. 163; Triviño Salazar, 2013). On the other hand, there is ample qualitative and survey evidence to suggest both that participation in the CCs extends far beyond core PSUV supporters, and that a large percentage of individuals active in the CCs do not believe theinstitutions only benefit PSUV militants (Abbott, 2018; Machado, 2009; LAPOP). I argue that, in fact, both of these conclusions are true: the PSUV is both politicizing the CCs *and* using the institutions to build a broader electoral constituency. Specifically, as I explained in Chapter 2, BPIs offer parties an opportunity to simultaneously target supporters as well as swing voters (while marginalizing opposition supporters). To target supporters, parties offer an exclusionary rhetoric focusing on the importance of BPIs in the party's broader political strategy, while reaching the swing voters requires offering an inclusionary rhetoric stressing the role of BPIs as community organizations that benefit all citizens, not just party militants.

Leveraging data from my original survey of nearly 1,800 CC leaders, participants, and other community members, as well as dozens of interviews with national and local leaders responsible for implementing the CCs,[100] I use the theoretical framework offered in Chapter 2 to make sense of contradictory empirical findings regarding the quality of participation in Venezuela's CCs. I confirm that the PSUV in fact incorporated CCs into its electoral strategy, I show which voter groups the party targeted, and I demonstrate the strategies they employed to target those groups. Further, I explain how the PSUV targeted both its supporters as well as swing voters, while simultaneously employing the contrasting frames described above that have made the CCs appear both inclusionary and exclusionary. The PSUV's choice of BPI electoral strategy, then, played a direct role in ensuring that the CCs were more inclusionary than they would have been if the party had only targeted core supporters, but more exclusionary than we would expect if the party were primarily targeting non-PSUV supporters. Finally, before concluding the chapter I delve further into the links between BPI electoral strategies and BPI politicization through an exploration of the conditions under which PSUV activists are likely to engage in electoral work through CCs, as well as when they are more likely to target swing voters. I show, following the theoretical expectations offered in Chapter 2, that both carrying out electoral work, as well as targeting swing voters in BPIs, is more likely to occur when levels of electoral competition are high, and when levels of intra-BPI competition are low (that is, when the leadership of individual BPIs is controlled by the PSUV).

Background on Venezuelan Communal Councils

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[100] The PSUV was founded in late 2007. Before this date, Chávez's political party was called the Movement for the Fifth Republic (MVR). Depending on the time frame being analyzed, I alternately refer to the ruling party in Venezuela as the MVR or the PSUV.

The CCs are a system of local-level participatory institutions (each consisting of around 200-400 families) that hold regular community assemblies to make decisions about local public works programs, ranging from housing and roads to sanitation projects. According to the law regulating CCs, in order for funding for projects to be requested by a given CC, they must be approved by a majority vote of at least 20% of CC members (Asamblea Nacional de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela, 2009). It is estimated that at their height (likely 2010-2013) there were more than 40,000 CCs across Venezuela (in every one of the country's 1,134 parishes) (Ministerio del Poder Popular para las Comunas y Movimientos Sociales, 2012; República Bolivariana de Venezuela, Ministerio del Poder Popular para las Comunas y Movimientos Sociales, 2013). Most, though not all, funding for the councils comes from PDVSA through one of several government development funds (Wilde, 2017). While reliable data are scarce, national government expenditures on CCs in 2012, for instance, were at least $2.5 billion, or roughly 5.5% of total government spending (República Bolivariana de Venezuela, 2013). Additional non-monetary resources (such as building supplies) come directly from government ministries and development agencies (McCarthy, 2012).

Generally speaking, the process for making decisions about the allocation of resources through the CCs occurs through a vote of the CC's Citizen's Assembly, formally the highest decision-making body of the CC, in which any member of the community 15 years of age or older may participate (Asamblea Nacional de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela, 2009, art. 6). According to my original survey data, for instance, in 2018, a majority of CC participants (54%) reported that the Citizen's Assembly is responsible for approving CC projects. This is significantly higher than the percentage of survey participants who reported that state entities are responsible (34%) or that the CC leadership is responsible (21%). Thus, in most cases it is

difficult to exclude particular individuals from participating in decisions about the allocation of resources distributed through the CCs. There is evidence that local party officials sometimes distribute some CC benefits on a less-formal basis, typically in a manner similar to traditional clientelism (Personal interviews with CC participants, August 2015; Elfenbein, 2019), but this is not the norm. At the community level, then, access to benefits from CCs should be considered non-excludable. Further, in general, CC benefits are generally not reversible, since, as Figure 6.1 demonstrates, most of the projects carried out through the CCs are infrastructure projects that are difficult to take away once given.

Figure 6.1: Types of Projects Approved by CCs

The approval of a project by a local council, however, does not ensure that it will be funded and implemented. Execution depends upon political support. One study has offered quantitative support for this assertion, finding a positive effect of the presence of CCs on the PSUV's vote share in a given parish (Handlin, 2016). This occurs because entities within the national government have discretion over which of the projects that are approved at the local level actually receive funding from the national government, and there are no clearly defined rules for which projects ultimately do and do not receive funding. Consequently, benefits distributed through CCs are, in general, club goods. The national party can target resources to areas of the country where it enjoys the strongest support or where it enjoys near-majority support, but in general it is not able to exclude beneficiaries at the community level.

Does the PSUV Use CCs for Electoral Purposes?

Before examining which voter groups the PSUV targets through its electoral work in the CCs, it is important to first demonstrate that the PSUV actually uses CCs for electoral work. There has been significant anecdotal evidence to this effect (García-Guadilla, 2008; McCarthy, 2015), as well as quantitative work showing that the allocation of resources through CCs is determined on a partisan basis (Handlin, 2013, 2016), but there has been little examination of (1) whether the *Chavista* officials responsible for creating the CCs intended for them to be used for electoral purposes, or (2) the extent to which local-level *Chavista* activists actually use CCs for electoral purposes. There are many non-electoral reasons why the PSUV might have created the CCs—from using them to identify and resolve problems and mobilizing core supporters to

defend the government during moments of political crisis, to building the infrastructure for a new apparatus of socialist governance to replace the existing form of representative government that existed in Venezuela at the time. Each of these reasons, among a range of other motivations, were raised by interview respondents to explain the CCs' purpose and objectives. Consequently, it is not obvious that the CCs will in fact be used by the PSUV to achieve electoral objectives. Drawing upon interviews and original survey data I was able to find clear evidence that CCs were initially created with the expectation that they would be used to further the electoral ends of the MVR (and later the PSUV), and also that local-level *Chavista* leaders used CCs in the service of electoral work.

First, interviews with key figures involved in the drafting and implementation of the 2006 Law of CCs suggest that while there were a range of motivations for creating the CC system, they were all based on the assumption that CCs would be used as critical spaces to carry out MVR/PSUV electoral work. As one respondent explained: "In classical liberal theory, the role of political parties is to occupy spaces of power. In a revolution it is the same, only in revolutions there are distinct expressions of power. In our case [the MVR/PSUV], popular power [i.e., CCs] was one of these expressions…So the party needed to have an expression within institutions of popular power, within the Communal Councils…" (*Interview with Gustavo Villapol*).

What did the party do within CCs? The same respondent explained that "in revolutionary theory, the role of the vanguard party to develop the revolutionary project is key…for Chávez the party was indispensable for carrying out the broad revolutionary project [such as building an alternative, revolutionary state based on the CCs], but also to win elections…Our revolution was pacific [i.e. non-violent], and consequently we had to win elections" (*Interview with Gustavo Villapol*). The implication of this statement was that while yes, one of the party's roles in the

171

CCs was to push for their expansion across the country as a means of expanding grassroots popular power in Venezuela, it would also use the CCs electorally to ensure that the revolution was able to continue. Another respondent emphasized that while electoral considerations were not decisive in the party's decision to create the CCs, as a result of the importance of elections to the MVR/PSUV's broader political strategy, it was essential that CCs "influence and participate in all electoral processes" (*Interview with David Velázquez*).

Was this high-level understanding that CCs had to be incorporated into the PSUV's electoral work communicated to local-level *Chavista* leaders carrying out the party's electoral work at the grassroots? Figure 6.2 presents results of a survey that asked over 600 local PSUV activists whether electoral politics plays a role in their CCs. Over 70% reported that CCs have partisan political functions, and over 65% reported either having been asked to carry out or having carried out electoral work within their CCs. Given that in my interviews with CC leaders I found there is a general stigma around admitting CCs are used for electoral purposes, any social desirability bias in these results would almost certainly have the effect of under-reporting the incidence of electoral work within CCs. Consequently, it is clear not only that it was assumed by national MVR/PSUV leadership that electoral work would be carried out in CCs, but also that a large majority of local PSUV activists used CCs to carry out electoral work.

Figure 6.2: Does Electoral Work Take Place within Communal Councils?

Note: Author's calculation, based on Abbott (2018). PSUV members only. "Electoral work asked" is a binary question (24) that asks respondents to answer yes or no to the question "Has anyone ever asked you to work on an electoral campaign during a CC meeting?" "Performed electoral work" is a binary question (26) that asks respondents to answer yes or no to the question "Have you ever worked on an electoral campaign inside your CC?" "Asked to OR performed electoral work" is a binary variable where 0 = respondents who answered no to both question (24) and question (26), and where 1= respondents who answered yes to either. "CCs play role in partisan pols" is a binary question (22) that asks respondents to answer yes or no to the question "As far as you know, does your CC play a role in partisan politics?"

Which Voters Does the PSUV Target?

I now address which voter groups the PSUV targets through its work in the CCs.[101]

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[101] Note that for the rest of this analysis I rely almost exclusively on the perspectives of local-level PSUV activists to reconstruct the PSUV's overall voter targeting strategy. This is a consequence largely of the difficulty of obtaining honest answers from national PSUV leaders about the party's targeting strategies. This strategy, however, begs the question of whether extrapolating a national electoral strategy from survey responses of local-level PSUV leaders is valid. It could be the case that the national PSUV's understanding of the role CCs should play in the party's electoral

173

PSUV activists were clearly able to distinguish between different voter groups; 75% of PSUV activist respondents reported using a census of CC participants to identify different types of voters. To provide an initial sense of the party's voter-targeting strategy through CCs, Figure 6.3 presents survey evidence asking nearly 650 local PSUV activists which voter groups they target through their CC electoral work. As expected, an overwhelming majority reported targeting PSUV supporters. At the same time, over 40% of PSUV activists reported targeting at least one group of voters other than PSUV voters (either opposition (6%), swing (24%), and/or all voters (21%)), suggesting that, while not their most prevalent targeting strategy, reaching beyond the PSUV base through CCs is quite common among PSUV activists. However, given that a large percentage of PSUV activists who reported targeted any voter beyond PSUV supporters reported targeting not just swing voters but rather *all* voters suggests that the PSUV may have a broader targeting strategy than my theory predicts. This possibility, however, is unlikely. First, among PSUV activists who reported targeting all voters, only around 6% reported that they also target opposition supporters, while 30% percent reported also targeting swing or PSUV voters (most only reported targeting all voters and not any group in particular). In other words, PSUV activists who reported targeting all voters were over four times as likely to target core or swing voters compared to opposition voters. Finally, if PSUV activists who reported targeting all voters were sincerely targeting opposition supporters, we would expect them to report trying to exclude opposition supporters from CC activities at a much lower rate than other PSUV activists. To the

strategy diverges significantly from the understanding of the local-level PSUV activists surveyed in this study. Based on a range of interviews with party leaders and experts on Venezuelan party politics, however, there is strong evidence to suggest that the PSUV is in fact a highly centralized party in which, generally speaking, local-level compliance with national party directives is high. As one expert explained, "there is a mandated [electoral] strategy [from national PSUV]…because of the practicalities of the electoral system candidates can verge slightly from it, so you can have some independence exhibited there, but I would not presume much of it would occur." Based on this and other expert opinions, I conclude it is reasonable to take electoral strategies identified through a nationally-representative survey of local-level PSUV activists as a proxy for the PSUV's national-level electoral strategy with respect to the CCs (**Personal** Correspondence with Professor Iñaki Sagarzazu, 2018).

contrary, these activists were no less likely to engage in exclusionary political activity in CCs than other PSUV activists. In sum, Figure 6.3 is consistent with my hypothesis that the PSUV focuses its electoral work in CCs on PSUV and swing voters, and largely discounts opposition supporters.

Figure 6.3: Voters Targeted by PSUV Activists Through Communal Councils

Note: Author's calculation, based on Abbott (2018). PSUV members only. Note that this is a multiple-choice question, and consequently the sum of all y-axis values will be greater than 1. This question (27), asks respondents who answered yes to question (26) "Have you ever worked on an electoral campaign inside your CC?" which specific voter groups (if any) they directed their CC electoral work to. Possible responses were "PSUV militants," "PSUV supporters who are not militants," "neither/nor" (voters who say they don't like PSUV or the opposition), "opposition militants," "opposition supporters who are not militants," or "all voters" and "no voters." To construct the "swing" voter category, I combine respondents who answered yes to "PSUV supporters who are not militants," "neither/nor" (voters who say they don't like PSUV or the opposition), or "opposition supporters who are not militants." To construct "any except PSUV" I combine respondents who answered yes to "opposition," "all," or "swing."

Additional Evidence that the PSUV Targets Swing Voters Through CCs

There is a range of additional evidence to suggest that the PSUV targets swing voters

through CC electoral work. First, as Figure 6.4 shows, depending on the operationalization,

swing voters represented as much as 48% of CC participants 2018.[102] Given that turnout in the

2018 presidential election was very low by historical standards (46.1%), and that participation in

the contest was heavily skewed toward PSUV supporters, the estimate in Panel B—based on

vote choice in the 2018 presidential election—is likely a substantial underestimate of the share of

CC participants who are swing voters (or opposition supporters). By contrast, the estimate in

Panel A suggests that swing voters actually represent a slightly larger share of CC participants

than PSUV supporters.[103] Consequently, the PSUV can potentially reach as many swing voters as

PSUV supporters through the CCs.

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[102] According to Mayer (2008), there are four primary operationalizations of swing voters in political science and public opinion research: 1) political independents, or respondents who report not being affiliated with a political party, 2) party switchers, or respondents who reported switching their vote from one party to another from one election to the next, 3) undecided voters, or respondents who reported not knowing who they were going to vote for in the upcoming election, and 4) neutral preference voters, or respondents who reported holding roughly similar opinions of competing candidates/parties (based on survey feeling thermometers). Unfortunately, operationalizations 3 and 4 (Mayer's preferred operationalization) could not be employed in this study due to data limitations. Thus, while operationalizations 1 and 2 are limited in various respects (1, because self-reported political independents are often "hidden partisans" who consistently vote for one party despite their avowed political independence, and 2, because, among other things, it excludes respondents who did not vote in the last election), they are the best measures available. I ran all analyses using both operationalizes, and found substantively similar results in virtually all cases.

[103] While in theory many of these respondents could be hidden PSUV supporters, around 44% of them who voted PSUV in the 2013 Presidential elections did not do so again in 2018 (either abstaining or switching). This, in conjunction with the fact that obtaining PSUV membership is not demanding (Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela, 2010), and that it is often a basic expectation of party supporters, suggests that non-affiliation with the PSUV, even among those who ultimately supported the party in the 2018 presidential elections, is a reasonable proxy for voters who could be persuaded to either withhold or switch their support from the PSUV. Finally, while it is possible that many unaffiliated respondents could be hidden opposition supporters, this is also unlikely given the various ways in which opposition supporters tend to be marginalized, if not directly excluded from CC participation.

Figure 6.4: Communal Council Participants by Voter Group

a) PARTY AFFILIATION   b) VOTE CHOICE 2018

Note: Author's calculation, based on Abbott (2018). Estimates exclude *voceros*, who are heavily skewed toward the PSUV. Panel A operationalizes voter groups based on respondents' stated party affiliation. Panel B operationalizes voter groups based on respondents' reported vote choice in Venezuela's 2018 presidential elections, except in the "swing" category, which represents the proportion of respondents whose reported presidential vote choice (PSUV vs. opposition) in 2013 changed in 2018.

How Does the PSUV Target Swing Voters Through CCs?

The PSUV targets swing voters by emphasizing that CCs are community organizations that are open to all, and that they are not organs of the party. This is because swing voters are receptive to participating in broad community organizations, but are much less likely to engage with party-linked organizations. The CCs represented an important part of the PSUV's efforts to expand its base among swing voters, since, unlike explicitly party-linked *Chavista* organizations

such as the *Círculos Bolivarianos* (or direct party organs), the CCs could be framed as organizations meant to serve the whole community, and not just PSUV partisans. Swing voters would be highly skeptical of the militant *Círculos*, but they might be persuaded to attend CC meetings. As Figure 6.5 shows, for example, there are clear differences in the degree to which, compared to PSUV supporters, swing voters prefer to participate in a community organization not connected to partisan politics. Consequently, PSUV-sponsored organizations like the CCs— which party activists can promote as community organizations that are open to all—would likely be more successful in attracting swing voters than other party or party-linked institutions.

Figure 6.5: Difference in Preferences for Non-Political Community Organization Across Voter Groups

Note: Author's calculation, based on Abbott (2018). The question (43.j) asks respondents how much they agree with the statement "I would prefer to participate in a community organization that has nothing to do with politics." They may respond "totally disagree," "partially disagree," "neither agree nor disagree," "partially agree," or "totally agree." I convert responses into a 5-point scale where 0 = totally disagree and 4 = totally agree. I include estimates for swing voters and PSUV supporters based on the two distinct operationalizations of voter groups discussed above. Swing_unaff represents voters who reported they were not affiliated with any political party, while swing_switch represents voters who reported changing their vote choice (opposition or PSUV) between the presidential elections of 2013 and 2018. PSUV_aff represents respondents who reported they are members of the PSUV, while PSUV_alt represents respondents who reported voting PSUV in the 2018 presidential elections who did not switch their vote between 2013 and 2018. Finally, I only report results for the operationalization of opposition voters based on 2018 vote choice (not including voters who changed their vote choice between 2013 and 2018), since the number of self-identified members of opposition parties was too small to permit statistical analysis. Coefficients report the difference in means between the two voter groups compared.

Of course, it may be the case that while swing voters are theoretically open to

participating in community organizations like the CCs that are not explicitly linked to the PSUV,

in practice they would not participate because they believe that the CCs are too closely tied to the

PSUV. To investigate this question, I included a simple survey experiment in my original survey.

In the experiment, enumerators showed respondents a community meeting invitation (modeled

on real CC invitations reviewed by the author) and asked how likely respondents would be to

attend the meeting. Respondents were randomly assigned to receive a CC meeting invitation that

was sponsored either by the PSUV or by the CC itself.[104] To ensure meeting theme choices

would not generate biased results (that is, perhaps swing voters will attend *any* community

meeting related to food access, but would never attend a PSUV-sponsored meeting about a less

pressing issue like trash collection), three different meeting themes (lighting, trash, and food)

were also varied randomly across respondents.[105] Figure 6.6 shows an example of the invitations

shown to respondents, along with the wording of the question asking them how likely they would

be to attend.[106] In the invitation on the left (treatment), the respondent's local CC invites them to

a community meeting to discuss lighting problems in the community. The invitation on the right

(control) is identical, except that in this case the local PSUV organization invites respondents to

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[104] Randomization was carried out at the individual level. Each enumerator was given six cards, one for each of the six possible outcomes (treatment and control for each of the three possible meeting themes). Respondents held the six cards out for each respondent (upside down) and asked the respondent to choose one. Unfortunately, due to an accidental implementation problem, the survey experiment was only conducted in 43% of the sampled parishes. Consequently, estimates obtained from this data reflect the average treatment effect only among respondents in parishes where the survey experiment was conducted. That said, since the primary balance problems we would worry about relate to political partisanship (i.e., *Chavistas* may have been more skeptical of the experiment than other voters and refused to participate, leading to biased aggregate estimates), and since my analysis examines effects *within* partisanship categories, this is not a problem. Further, while there is no reason to believe that parishes that were ultimately selected to participate in the survey experiment were chosen based on any systematic criteria (rather, some enumerators received proper instructions while others did not), as reported in Appendix 3, parishes included in the survey experiment are better educated (SMD = .24), consume less news (SMD = .234), and are districts where Maduro fared worse in 2018 than other districts (SMD = .52). That said, there is no obvious reason to expect swing voters in these parishes to be more or less receptive to PSUV vs. CC meeting invitations than swing voters in other districts.

[105] Meeting themes were chosen after consultation with the survey firm that carried out the fieldwork for the survey. They were identified as three of the most likely themes that would be addressed at local-level CC meetings in 2018. Further, citizen perceptions of the PSUV's capacity to address these issues in their community likely vary considerably across themes, so any variation in responses caused by choice of theme should be minimized by averaging results across the three randomly-assigned themes.

[106] Further details of experimental protocol are included in Appendix 3.

the meeting. I use the PSUV meeting invitation as the control group because I am interested in

assessing whether CCs are more effective in attracting swing voter participation compared to

explicitly party-linked organizations. Since assignment to treatment was randomized, the

difference in meeting attendance propensities between treatment and control groups yields the

causal effect of direct PSUV sponsorship vs. CC sponsorship on respondents' likelihood of

attending community meetings. Table 6.1 reports covariate balance between treatment and

control groups.[107] Overall, the groups are well-balanced, with only two variables (news

consumption and educational attainment) rising above the .2 threshold for small magnitude

effects (Cohen, 2013).

Figure 6.6: Survey Experiment Setup

Table 6.1: Balance Between Treatment and Control Groups

	Control	Treatment	SMD

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[107] Summary statistics for treatment and control groups are included in Appendix 3.

	194	219	
N			
Treatment	0.00 (0.00)	1.00 (0.00)	-
Outcome	1.49 (1.16)	1.70 (1.14)	0.33
Voted	1.00 (0.00)	1.00 (0.00)	0.105
Maduro assessment	2.53 (0.87)	2.59 (0.95)	0.07
News consumption	**1.66 (0.78)**	**1.55 (0.87)**	**0.251**
Trust	2.22 (0.82)	2.39 (0.82)	0.15
Ethnicity	3.97 (2.25)	3.58 (2.25)	0.07
Sex	0.38 (0.49)	0.36 (0.48)	0.096
Ethnicity	5.53 (2.05)	5.84 (2.24)	0.118
Age	43.89 (12.64)	44.76 (11.93)	0.009
Educational attainment	**3.74 (1.35)**	**3.99 (1.35)**	**0.253**
CC controlled by PSUV	3.74 (1.70)	3.66 (1.44)	0.034
Size of municipality	625070 (677545)	606012 (534851)	0.004
Maduro vote share 2018 (parish)	69.48 (5.94)	67.86 (6.61)	0.173
Vote share difference between Maduro 2018 and PSUV 2015	25.16 (11.17)	25.79 (11.22)	0.184

Note: Bolded variables indicate standardized mean differences (SMD) greater than .2 between groups.

Given their greater skepticism of participating in politicized community organizations compared to PSUV supporters, I expect to find a positive effect of CC-sponsorship among swing voters (as well as opposition voters), and a smaller effect—or no effect—among PSUV supporters, who have a more positive impression of the PSUV than swing voters. Results of the survey experiment are presented in Figure 6.7. Consistent with my expectations, they show that receiving the invitation from a CC rather than the PSUV has a positive effect on meeting attendance among swing voters (even among opposition voters, though this result is not significant at conventional levels), but has no effect among PSUV supporters. Substantively, the .6 coefficient for swing voters (swing_unaff) suggests that a swing voter who was not motivated at all to attend a meeting hosted by the PSUV would be a little motivated to attend a meeting hosted by their CC, or that a swing voter with a little interest in attending a PSUV-sponsored

meeting would be somewhat interested in attending a CC-sponsored meeting. Given potential balance issues across treatment and control groups discussed above, I also rerun the analysis including controls for the covariates included in Figure 6.1. The results are reported in Appendix E, and are substantively similar to the original results presented in Figure 6.7. We can conclude from these findings that the CCs' status as community organizations that are not explicitly linked to the PSUV allowed the party to reach swing voters who would be considerably more difficult to engage through other party or party-linked institutions. Finally, it is important to note that the timing of my original survey (late 2018) makes the survey experiment a hard test for observing positive effects of CC sponsorship on swing voters' meeting attendance propensities. This is because, by 2014, the CCs had become considerably more politicized and associated with the PSUV than they had been over the previous eight years. Specifically, the proportion of respondents who believed that any Venezuelan could participate in the CCs regardless of political orientation increased from around 46% in 2007 to 54% in 2014. However, during the same period the proportion of Venezuelans who reported that their CC was comprised only of PSUV supporters jumped from 34% in 2007 to nearly 53% in 2018. Consequently, if anything we would expect the impact of CC meeting sponsorship to have been *greater* during the earlier period of the CCs' development, when the CCs were less closely linked to the PSUV in the minds of Venezuelans.

Figure 6.7: Results of Survey Experiment

Note: OLS regression models, including Cluster-Robust SEs. Clustered by Municipality. The question (88) asks respondents how likely they would be to attend the meeting. They may respond "very likely," "somewhat," "a little," "not likely." I convert responses into a 4-point scale where 0 = not likely and 3 = very likely. I include estimates for swing voters and PSUV supporters based on the two distinct operationalizations of voter groups discussed above. Swing_unaff represents voters who reported they were not affiliated with any political party, while swing_switch represents voters who reported changing their vote choice (opposition or PSUV) between the presidential elections of 2013 and 2018. PSUV_affil represents respondents who reported that they are members of the PSUV, while PSUV_alt represents respondents who reported voting PSUV in the 2018 presidential elections who did not switch their vote between 2013 and 2018. Finally, I only report results for the operationalization of opposition voters based on 2018 vote choice (not including voters who changed their vote choice between 2013 and 2018), since the number of self-identified members of opposition parties was too small to permit statistical analysis.

Finally, in order to target swing voters through its CC electoral activities, the party also had to

use CC meetings directly to build partisan support. Otherwise, there would be no mechanism for

converting swing voters into PSUV supporters through the CCs. For instance, we would expect

PSUV CC activists to report, in addition to carrying out electoral work in their CCs at a high

rate, that they perform activities with the express purposes of convincing CC participants to

support the PSUV. Along these lines, Figure 6.9 shows that over half of the PSUV CC activists

interviewed reported performing some form of work within their CC with the objective of

increasing the positive image of the PSUV/negative image of the opposition among CC

participants. While it is likely that some swing voters would punish the PSUV for party activists'

partisan activities within the CCs,[108] this is a risk the party must take, both in order to capitalize

politically on its outreach to swing voters through BPIs, as well as to ensure that its core

supporters are not alienated from the CCs.

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[108] Hawkins (2010), for instance, explains that many non-Chavistas do not participate in Chavista participatory institutions like the CCs because they are hesitant to participate in projects dominated by Chavista discourse.

Figure 6.8: Use of CCs to Increase PSUV Support or Turnout

Note: Author's calculation, based on Abbott (2018). PSUV members only. Each item represents a discrete response to a multiple-choice question (23) "What type of political party work takes place in your CC?" "Any" is the sum fraction of PSUV CC activist who responded yes to any of the discrete options. Note that this is a multiple-choice question, and consequently the sum of all y-axis values might be greater than 1.

How Does the PSUV Target Core Supporters Through CCs?

I turn next to the question of how the PSUV uses CCs to target its base. First, similar to swing voters, party activists emphasize to core supporters that the CCs are open to all members of the community. This is because PSUV CC activists view the Bolivarian process as a national transformation that includes all of society, both the willing and the unwilling. As one respondent, a former Vice Minister of Popular Economy, explained, "As Chávez stressed…CCs are by and for the *whole* community, regardless of whether a person is a *Chavista* or anti-*Chavista*…CCs are

186

of the Venezuelan people, regardless of political orientation" (*Interview Carlos Luis Rivero*). For many PSUV supporters, CCs represent the embryo of a post-capitalist Venezuelan society, a society which necessarily includes all Venezuelans, not just supporters of the Revolution. Consequently, it is important for *Chavistas* that the CCs be conceptualized as community groups, rather than partisan political organizations.

At the same time, however, party leaders and activists also appeal to their base through CCs by employing rhetoric challenging the legitimacy of members of the opposition participating in CCs. Initially this may sound like a contradiction, since PSUV activists understand CCs as community organizations that are open to all. In fact, however, many PSUV supporters believe the CCs' continued existence is dependent on defeating enemies of the Bolivarian process, and this entails defending the CC system against real or perceived sabotage by opposition supporters. So, while in theory even the most anti-*Chavista* Venezuelans are part of the revolutionary process, in practice they must be stopped from taking steps that might limit Bolivarianism's future success. This tension often leads PSUV leaders and activists to discourage opposition supporters from participating in the CCs, since the latter's fidelity to the revolutionary process is highly questionable. While rhetorically welcoming the participation of all, for instance, former Minister of Participation and Social Development David Velázquez contended in early 2007 that opposition supporters were poisoning the CCs: "There are neighborhood associations [dominated by opposition supporters] that deny and sabotage the creation of the CCs, so they won't lose control of their communities. As President Chávez said on Sunday: 'the CCs have venom inside them.'" (Quoted in Weffer Cienfuentes, 2007).

Similar dynamics occur at the local level. One PSUV CC activist captured very well the inclusionary/exclusionary dynamic of the PSUV's understanding of opposition members

participating in CCs. She explained that "We don't limit the participation of the opposition in the

CC or try to exclude them, because they are part of the community. But at the same time, we

keep them at arm's length. We make sure to keep *Chavistas* in the CC leadership" (Interview

with respondent 12). Thus, while in principle opposition members' CC participation is not

questioned by PSUV leaders and activists—as this would contradict PSUV supporters' belief

that the CCs are community, rather than partisan organizations—if the party did not signal that in

practice the opposition supporters were not welcome, many PSUV supporters would view the

CCs as a political liability for the Bolivarian process. This would substantially undermine the

CCs' legitimacy among PSUV supporters, as well as potentially damage the party's brand among

its electoral base.

How Does the PSUV Target Both PSUV Supporters and Swing Voters Without Alienating

Either?

Up to this point I have shown the distinct strategies employed by the PSUV to appeal to

core and swing voters, but the contradictory messaging they employ in the process begs the

question of how they are able to avoid alienating swing voters while making exclusionary

appeals about the involvement of opposition members to core supporters. That is, wouldn't we

expect the PSUV's attempts to undermine the legitimacy of opposition supporters' participation

in CC activities to be off-putting to swing voters, who, as Figure 6.11 suggests, are significantly

less invested in furthering the PSUV's political agenda than PSUV supporters?

Figure 6.9: Swing Voter vs. PSUV Supporter Investment in PSUV Political Objectives

Note: Author's calculation, based on Abbott (2018).. "Do Electoral Work," "Build communal state," and "CCs defend Bol Rev," are discrete responses to the multiple-choice survey question "In your opinion, what are the functions of a CC?" (question 17). "Any of the three" is the total fraction of CC activists who responded yes to any of the three previous options.

First, as described above, bringing partisan politics into the CCs *is* a risky decision if the party hopes to win swing voters through BPIs. That said, since the party is primarily concerned about maintaining the support of its base (remember that the PSUV does not need to appeal to many swing voters in order to win elections), the party cannot avoid making exclusionary appeals about the involvement of opposition supporters if it hopes to maintain and strengthen its ties with core supporters. In other words, the PSUV likely underperforms with swing voters in its CC electoral work, but is willing to make this sacrifice because it is more worried about keeping its base happy than failing to gain additional support among swing voters. Further, it is important to

remember that exclusionary practices were only reported in a small percentage of CCs (around 8%), and that, according to my original survey data, over 60% of swing voters believe that the CCs are open to Venezuelans of all political persuasions. This suggests that the party strategically deploys exclusionary rhetoric and tactics in an effort to balance its fear of alienating swing voters with the need to maintain and strengthen support among its base.

Determinants of PSUV Activist Engagement in CC Electoral Work

Despite evidence of systematic voter-targeting by the PSUV in the CCs, there is significant heterogeneity in whether PSUV activists carry out electoral work through their CCs (65% reported they do), as well as which voter groups PSUV activists target (58% of PSUV activists who target any voters target only PSUV supporters, 42% target other voter groups). How can we explain this variation? Why do some PSUV activists carry out the party's CC electoral strategy and others do not? I argue that levels of political competition are a key factor in determining PSUV activists' propensities to engage in CC electoral work.

Specifically, I expect higher electoral competition to be associated with higher levels of CC electioneering across competitive districts (hypothesis 1). Relatedly, since the PSUV must rely more on swing voter persuasion to win in competitive districts compared to non-competitive districts, we would expect PSUV activists in competitive districts to report targeting non-PSUV supporters at higher rates than PSUV activists in non-competitive districts (hypothesis 1a).

Figure 6.10: Summary of Hypotheses 1 and 1a

While increased electoral competition is likely to drive PSUV electioneering in CCs, however, I expect low competition within CCs themselves to be associated with higher levels of electioneering. Specifically, I hypothesize that PSUV activists will be more likely to carry out electoral work through their CCs if their CC's leadership is controlled by the PSUV (hypothesis 2).[109] Second, I predict that PSUV activists will be more likely to target groups other than PSUV supporters if their CC leadership is controlled by the PSUV compared to CCs not controlled by the PSUV (hypothesis 3).

Figure 6.11: Summary of Hypotheses 2 and 3

To test these hypotheses, I run logistic regression models, where the first set of independent variables captures the level of political competition in each respondent's parish (the lowest sub-municipal administrative unit for which electoral data could be linked to survey respondents), based on the difference in vote share between PSUV and opposition candidates in

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[109] Each CC has an elected leadership (known as "voceros") who are responsible for the day to day operations of the CC, and who control meeting agenda, speaking privileges, and serve generally as gatekeepers for their CC.

the 2018 presidential elections (the most recent election before the survey was conducted).[110]

The second independent variable is an ordinal variable capturing whether respondents reported

that their CC's leadership was controlled by the PSUV (tests of Hypotheses 2 and 3).[111] In turn,

in my tests of Hypotheses 1 and 1a, I employ a dependent variable that directly asks PSUV

activists whether or not they carried out any electoral work in their CCs.[112] For the tests of

Hypotheses 2 and 3, the dependent variable captures whether respondents reported targeting

militants of the PSUV.[113] Finally, I run each regressions on two distinct DVs. The first captures

whether any PSUV activist reported engaging in a given type of CC electoral work, and the

second is restricted to examining the electoral work of PSUV activists who also reported being

active in their local PSUV organization (these are known as "Units of Battle Hugo Chávez"

(UBCh). I include this second DV to address the possibility that the PSUV may be encouraging

its activists to engage strategically in electoral work in a manner consistent with my theoretical

expectations, but that PSUV activists who are less connected to the formal party structure may

deviate from the PSUV's strategic orientation. I also include an extensive battery of

theoretically relevant variables that could plausibly affect PSUV activists' propensity to engage

in electoral activities through their CCs.

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[110] Specifically, in one set of models I employ a continuous variable that reports the absolute value of the difference between 50 and the PSUV presidential candidate's (Nicolás Maduro) voteshare in the 2018 presidential election. Low values indicate high levels of competition, and high values indicate low levels of competition. To address potential problems of non-linearity, I also employ a binary variable where parishes with competition levels below the mean (16.14) are coded 0 and parishes with competition levels above the mean are coded as 1.

[111] The question (43.g) asks respondents how much they agree with the statement "My CC is controlled by PSUV supporters". They may respond "totally disagree", "partially disagree", "neither agree nor disagree", "partially agree", or "totally agree". I convert responses into a 5-point scale where 0 = totally disagree and 4 = totally agree.

[112] The question (26) asks respondents "Have you ever worked on an electoral campaign inside your CC?" Respondents who answered "no" are coded 0, and respondents who answered "yes" are coded 1.

[113] This question (27), asks respondents who answered yes to question (26) which specific voter groups (if any) they directed their CC electoral work to. Possible responses were "PSUV militants," "PSUV supporters who are not militants," "neither/nor" (voters who say they don't like PSUV or the opposition), "opposition militants," "opposition supporters who are not militants," "all voters," and "no voters." I construct a binary variable where 0 = any respondent who reported only targeting PSUV militants, and where 1 = any respondent who reported targeting any group other than PSUV militants.

The results of these analyses are presented in Table 6.2 and Table 6.3. Models 1-4 in

Table 6.2 test hypotheses 1, with models 1-2 employing the 2018 vote margin DV and models 3-

4 employing the binary variable capturing competitive vs. non-competitive districts in 2018.

While all of the coefficients for vote margin and competitive district are in the anticipated

direction (larger vote margins being associated with decreased electoral work and competitive

districts being associated with increased electoral work), none are significant at conventional

levels. Thus, while there is suggestive evidence to support hypothesis 1, it cannot be confirmed.

In turn, models 5-8 in Table 6.2 test hypothesis 1a, with models 5-6 examining the relationship

between non-PSUV voter targeting and the 2018 Presidential vote margin, and models 7-8

exploring the relationship between competitive vs. non-competitive districts and non-PSUV

voter targeting. All coefficients are in the anticipated direction (larger vote margins being

associated with lower rates of non-PSUV voter targeting and competitive districts being

associated with higher rates of non-PSUV voter targeting), and 3 of the 4 coefficients are

statistically significant at conventional levels. Further, in models 7-8 the effect size for

competitive districts is larger than the effect size of any other variable in the models. In general,

then, while the results cannot confirm whether increased electoral competition affects the

likelihood of PSUV activists to engage in electoral work, they do indicate, consistent with

Hypothesis 1a, that PSUV activists are more likely to target non-PSUV voters in competitive

districts.

Turning to Table 6.3, models 1-2 test Hypothesis 2, and models 3-4 test Hypothesis 3.

The coefficients for all four models are in the expected direction (with PSUV control of CC

leadership being associated with higher rates of electoral work (Hypothesis 2) as well as higher

rates of non-PSUV voter targeting (Hypothesis 3)). Three of the four coefficients are significant

at conventional levels, and for each statistically significant coefficient CC PSUV control is either the largest or second largest coefficient in the model. The only model where CC PSUV control is not statistically significant is model 3, which examines non-PSUV voter targeting among all PSUV members (rather than only among UBCh activists). This suggests that in places where the PSUV exerts less influence over their activists' electoral work in the CCs, activists are less likely to target non-PSUV voters. Finally, it is worth noting that the only other variable that is consistently significant (and positive) across all models is educational attainment, suggesting that better-educated PSUV activists are both more likely to perform electoral work in general and to target non-PSUV voters in particular than their less educated counterparts. If, following the literature on citizen participation, we assume that better-educated activists have access to greater cognitive resources than other activists (Putnam, 2000; Verba et al., 1995), this is not a surprising finding. Activists with greater cognitive resources are more likely to connect the day-to-day hyper-local issues addressed by their CC to broader political phenomena—and therefore to move from community activist to party activist, which means we would expect a higher propensity for carrying out sophisticated, multi-constituency voter targeting efforts among better-educated activists.

Table 6.2: Tests of Hypotheses 1 and 1a

Note: Logistic regression models, including only respondents who reported being members of the PSUV. Cluster-

	Electoral work	Electoral work ubch	Electoral work	Electoral work ubch	Target nonpsuv	Target nonpsuv ubch	Target nonpsuv	Target nonpsuv ubch
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Vote margin 2018	**-0.183**	**-0.232**			**-0.062**	**-0.413***		
	(0.149)	**(0.158)**			**(0.182)**	**(0.235)**		
Competitive district 2018			**0.259**	**0.346**			**0.879****	**1.779*****
			(0.295)	(0.301)			(0.382)	(0.487)
Municipality size	0.069	-0.012	0.053	-0.036	0.312	0.087	0.356*	0.097
	(0.145)	(0.138)	(0.142)	(0.136)	(0.193)	(0.217)	(0.181)	(0.221)
Maduro assessment	-0.246	-0.538**	-0.247	-0.554**	-0.079	0.070	-0.074	0.060
	(0.198)	(0.263)	(0.201)	(0.262)	(0.211)	(0.279)	(0.209)	(0.310)
Educational attainment	0.345**	0.403**	0.348**	0.408**	0.347*	0.518**	0.337*	0.517**
	(0.159)	(0.162)	(0.160)	(0.162)	(0.183)	(0.216)	(0.185)	(0.226)
Social promotor	0.055	0.107	0.054	0.107	-0.002	-0.002	0.063	0.059
	(0.142)	(0.148)	(0.142)	(0.147)	(0.212)	(0.294)	(0.199)	(0.260)
News consumption	-0.148	0.016	-0.136	0.029	0.122	0.302	0.064	0.227
	(0.205)	(0.188)	(0.205)	(0.187)	(0.253)	(0.294)	(0.243)	(0.277)
Trust	-0.043	-0.081	-0.049	-0.089	-0.151	-0.359	-0.179	-0.423*
	(0.150)	(0.159)	(0.150)	(0.160)	(0.177)	(0.238)	(0.173)	(0.246)
Ethnicity	0.257*	0.133	0.255*	0.130	0.040	0.161	0.037	0.163
	(0.141)	(0.147)	(0.141)	(0.147)	(0.181)	(0.236)	(0.182)	(0.236)
Sex	0.0002	0.191	0.003	0.197	0.168	0.235	0.140	0.266
	(0.147)	(0.157)	(0.147)	(0.157)	(0.199)	(0.275)	(0.196)	(0.269)
Age	-0.030	0.090	-0.038	0.083	0.248	0.381	0.293	0.461*
	(0.170)	(0.171)	(0.169)	(0.171)	(0.224)	(0.264)	(0.230)	(0.273)
Income	-0.005	-0.006	-0.006	-0.006	0.360*	0.505*	0.289	0.431*
	(0.143)	(0.166)	(0.145)	(0.166)	(0.212)	(0.263)	(0.212)	(0.252)
CC PSUV Controlled	0.520***	0.583***	0.521***	0.586***	0.201	0.767***	0.171	0.819***
	(0.132)	(0.154)	(0.133)	(0.154)	(0.189)	(0.269)	(0.184)	(0.308)
Potable water	-0.074	-0.127	-0.063	-0.119	-0.238	-0.062	-0.266	-0.091
	(0.177)	(0.170)	(0.174)	(0.169)	(0.187)	(0.319)	(0.181)	(0.305)
Years PSUV member	0.132	0.014	0.124	0.007	-0.030	0.145	0.006	0.187
	(0.141)	(0.153)	(0.140)	(0.153)	(0.205)	(0.272)	(0.211)	(0.273)
Economic situation worse now than 12 months ago	-0.073	-0.045	-0.074	-0.041	0.129	0.129	0.138	0.136
	(0.122)	(0.131)	(0.123)	(0.131)	(0.136)	(0.195)	(0.144)	(0.195)
CC politicization	0.096	0.226	0.101	0.231	0.073	0.322	0.107	0.443
	(0.162)	(0.176)	(0.161)	(0.174)	(0.226)	(0.275)	(0.228)	(0.297)
Years participated in CC	0.183	0.231	0.175	0.220	-0.241	-0.034	-0.174	0.078
	(0.139)	(0.140)	(0.140)	(0.141)	(0.178)	(0.217)	(0.188)	(0.227)
Constant	0.152	-1.496***	0.008	-1.697***	-0.462*	-2.215***	-0.982***	-3.480***
	(0.220)	(0.259)	(0.264)	(0.310)	(0.276)	(0.400)	(0.352)	(0.539)
Observations	493	487	493	487	293	290	293	290
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01				

Robust SEs in parentheses. Clustered by Municipality. All non-binary variables are standardized to ensure comparability of effect sizes.

Table 6.3: Tests of Hypotheses 2 and 3

	Electoral Work	Electoral Work ubch	Target nonpsuv	Target nonpsuv ubch
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
CC PSUV Controlled	**0.352**[***]	**0.364**[***]	**0.069**	**0.276**[*]
	(0.083)	(0.099)	(0.117)	(0.149)
Municipality size	0.014	0.019	0.283	0.139
	(0.130)	(0.127)	(0.179)	(0.194)
Maduro assessment	-0.233	-0.517[**]	-0.013	0.104
	(0.198)	(0.239)	(0.212)	(0.246)
Educational attainment	0.345[**]	0.449[***]	0.403[**]	0.655[***]
	(0.156)	(0.162)	(0.180)	(0.213)
Social promotor active in CC?	0.056	0.130	-0.010	0.029
	(0.143)	(0.145)	(0.218)	(0.298)
News consumption	-0.103	0.058	0.119	0.295
	(0.199)	(0.183)	(0.246)	(0.285)
Trust	0.022	-0.026	-0.105	-0.223
	(0.147)	(0.153)	(0.172)	(0.226)
Ethnicity	0.263[*]	0.099	0.043	0.091
	(0.139)	(0.148)	(0.179)	(0.222)
Sex	-0.037	0.079	0.180	0.086
	(0.149)	(0.153)	(0.196)	(0.260)
Age	-0.066	0.066	0.257	0.350
	(0.169)	(0.171)	(0.215)	(0.259)
Income	0.028	0.014	0.368[*]	0.527[*]
	(0.140)	(0.162)	(0.205)	(0.270)
Potable water	0.036	-0.119	-0.048	-0.023
	(0.159)	(0.160)	(0.214)	(0.270)
Years PSUV member	0.126	-0.011	-0.061	-0.035
	(0.140)	(0.151)	(0.199)	(0.255)
Economic situation worse now than 12 months ago	-0.074	-0.006	0.102	0.139
	(0.123)	(0.127)	(0.137)	(0.192)
CC politicization	0.113	0.265	0.103	0.404
	(0.157)	(0.171)	(0.220)	(0.268)
Years participated in CC	0.167	0.182	-0.232	-0.105
	(0.136)	(0.137)	(0.173)	(0.209)
Constant	-1.167[***]	-2.785[***]	-0.717	-2.958[***]
	(0.369)	(0.465)	(0.530)	(0.712)
Observations	504	498	298	295
Note:				[*]p<0.1; [**]p<0.05; [***]p<0.01

Note: Logistic regression models, including only respondents who reported being members of the PSUV. Cluster-Robust SEs in parentheses. Clustered by Municipality. All non-binary variables are standardized to ensure comparability of effect sizes.

Discussion and Conclusion

These results help to resolve an empirical puzzle that scholars of Venezuela's CCs have struggled with since the first data on CCs became available in 2007: Why have some scholars and public opinion researchers concluded that CCs are open to individuals from across the political spectrum, while others have found that CCs are spaces where dissenting views are not welcome and where resources are distributed preferentially to PSUV supporters? Rhodes-Purdy argues that the gap between inclusionary rhetoric and exclusionary practice is a reflection of the PSUV's need to retain political legitimacy among its base through a demonstrated commitment to participatory democracy, without devolving any real political control (a phenomenon he calls "the Populist's Dilemma") (Rhodes-Purdy, 2015). While the evidence presented in this chapter is largely consistent with Rhodes-Purdy's theory, it offers empirical support for an alternative hypothesis that CC creation is motivated, at least in part, by a desire (1) to incorporate the CCs directly into their electoral work, and (2) to reach voters outside the party's base (particularly swing voters). There is no conclusive means of adjudicating between these two alternative hypotheses. Indeed, it is most likely that the PSUV simultaneously uses CCs for electioneering in general, and targeting swing voters in particular, while also attempting to resolve the Populist's Dilemma (since the observable implications of shoring up regime support among the PSUV base while maintaining political control would be consistent with the strategies described above of promoting the PSUV's political ideology through the CCs and excluding opposition supporters from CC activities). That said, if the party were *only* motivated by the Populist's Dilemma and was not also targeting swing voters, we would expect lower rates of PSUV activists to report carrying out electoral work in their CCs (since for Rhodes-Purdy the CCs build regime support

197

indirectly by virtue of participation itself, rather than through direct electoral appeals), and also that fewer PSUV activists would report targeting voters other than PSUV supporters. In sum, while my findings do not undermine Rhodes-Purdy's findings,[114] they do suggest that Rhodes-Purdy underestimates the importance of voter targeting strategies in general, and the role of swing voters in particular, in the PSUV's relationship with the CCs.

Further, while Rhodes-Purdy's theory helps explain the ambivalent implications of Venezuela's CCs from the perspective of participatory democracy (i.e., that they are simultaneously highly inclusionary and exclusionary), it does not help us understand the effect of political parties' electoral uses of participatory institutions on the quality of participatory institutions outside the context of left-wing populists like Hugo Chávez and the PSUV. By contrast, my theory suggests that parties' voter targeting strategies in participatory institutions are crucial to understanding the gap between the promise and reality of participatory institutions. Specifically, why are some participatory institutions more effective in representing the interests of the communities they serve than others? My theory offers one of the first generalizable hypotheses to explain this variation: as parties' voter targeting through participatory institutions becomes narrower, the level of political exclusion in participatory institutions will increase and the quality of representation and participation will decrease. While this paper has focused on a single country, the theoretical framework it employs can be applied constructively to explain variation in the quality of participation across the wide range of countries where political parties have incorporated participatory institutions into their electoral strategies (and also to explain variation in the representativeness of Venezuela's CCs over time).

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[114] Indeed, the strengthen his findings by documenting the self-reported political strategies of PSUV activists themselves, rather than inferring the party's strategy from the effects of CC participation on citizen support for the PSUV.

The results presented in this chapter also offer an important caveat to two of Díaz-Cayeros et al.'s (2016) important claims. Díaz-Cayeros argue, (1) when targeting distinct voter groups through distributive mechanisms (clientelism, pork-barrel spending, etc.), parties must employ portfolio diversification aimed at targeting different benefits to different voter groups, and (2) given the risks associated with distributive electoral strategies aimed at constituencies outside of their base, parties will only resort to multiple constituency-targeting when their core constituency is not large enough to ensure electoral success. My findings have demonstrated that in the case of BPIs, parties can utilize the same distributive mechanism (i.e., BPIs) to appeal simultaneously to distinct voter groups. Parties can appeal to both supporters and swing voters through BPIs without risking the support of either by signaling to supporters BPIs serve the political ends of the party, and by emphasizing to swing voters that they are community organizations open to all. Supporters are not alienated by the community-oriented appeal because they are ideologically committed to participatory democracy, and swing voters are not alienated by the partisan appeal because they do not have a negative predisposition toward the party.

In turn, it is important to note that the PSUV implemented CCs at a time when its electoral fortunes were ascendant: Chávez had decisively won a presidential recall vote in 2004, as well as an overwhelming majority in the 2005 elections to the National Assembly (which much of the opposition boycotted), and his approval rating in 2006 was well above 60% (Corporación latinobarómetro). Late in 2006, seven months after the Law of Communal Councils was passed, Chávez enjoyed a landslide victory against presidential hopeful Manuel Rosales. In other words, the MVR was able to win a series of national elections based overwhelming on the strength of its core electoral base. There was no electoral emergency requiring an expansion of the *Chavista* electoral coalition. Yet the party implemented the CCs nonetheless and used them

199

to reach out to voters beyond its core constituency. Why? Because the party faced a legitimacy problem within its base in the years prior to 2006, and felt the need to implement CCs in order to demonstrate to its most loyal supporters that it was living up to its long-standing promises of deepening democracy and devolving the power of Venezuela's popular sectors (see Chapter 4 and Rhodes-Purdy, 2017). Under these conditions, parties *will* deploy risky electoral strategies aimed at multiple constituencies, even when they do not face an immediate electoral imperative to do so.

This is not to say, however, that the PSUV's CC electoral strategy will remain constant regardless of changing economic and political conditions. While the impact of the party's declining national vote share starting in 2012, as well as Venezuela's intensifying economic crisis beginning in 2014, on the PSUV's CC electoral strategy are beyond the scope of this chapter, I can make two predictions for investigation in future research. First, following Díaz-Cayeros et al (2016) I expect—consistent with my findings for Hypothesis 1a—that as the PSUV's national vote share decreases, the party will increasingly focus its CC electoral strategy on swing voters, as it can no longer rely on its core supporters alone to deliver a winning electoral coalition. Second, I expect that after the Venezuelan government became increasingly authoritarian and less dependent on competitive elections to maintain itself in power (beginning around 2015), its targeting of swing voters would have increasingly given way to a focus on maintaining the political commitment of its core supporters. This is because the government's strategic orientation shifted from a focus on the need to build a majoritarian coalition to the need to sustain a relatively small but committed base capable of turning out the vote in low-turnout elections widely viewed as illegitimate (such as the 2017 National Constituent Assembly elections and the 2018 Presidential elections), and capable of hitting the streets to support the

government in moments of crisis. It should come as no surprise, then, that in 2008 34% of Venezuelans reported that their CCs were comprised of only PSUV supporters (LAPOP), while in 2018 nearly 60% did (Abbott, 2018). Future work will hopefully take up the task of applying this dynamic framework for understanding voter targeting strategies in participatory institutions to other cases in Latin America and around the world.

Chapter 7. EXPLORING THE ELECTORAL EFFECTS OF BINDING PARTICIPATORY INSTITUTIONS: THE PSUV AND COMMUNAL COUNCILS

In Chapter 6 I presented evidence suggesting that internally mobilized parties incorporate BPIs into their electoral strategies, targeting both core supporters and swing voters. In this chapter, I turn to the electoral effects of those strategies. Do parties that incorporate BPIs into their electoral strategies succeed in winning the support of core and swing voters, and if so, how? Focusing again on the case of Venezuela's CCs, in this chapter I explore the potential effects of CC participation on a variety of distinct electoral outcomes—ranging from vote choice and voter turnout to performing electoral work—and how these effects might diverge across segments of the electorate. I first derive hypotheses about the effects of CC participation on different electoral outcomes, and how these effects should vary across voter groups. Specifically, I argue that, among both the electorate in general and swing voters in particular, CC participation should have a positive effect on each of the primary electoral outcomes I explore (vote choice, voter turnout, and performing electoral work). In turn, among PSUV supporters, we should see positive effects of CC participation on voter turnout and electoral work, but not on vote choice. Lastly, among

opposition supporters, we should not observe positive effects for any electoral outcomes. I test

these hypotheses through an analysis of the four waves of LAPOP survey data for Venezuela

(2007-2014) that include questions related to CC participation. Next, leveraging a unique battery

of questions drawn from my original 2018 survey of CC participants, I explore eight potential

mechanisms through which CC participation might affect electoral outcomes, ranging from the

receipt of material or non-material benefits to different forms of political education and

persuasion. As far as I am aware, this is the first systematic effort to explore the causal chain

linking BPIs and electoral outcomes. I find, contrary to many existing studies, that, non-material

benefits and political education/persuasion are not only important mechanisms for explaining

how CC participation improves voters' opinions of the PSUV, but actually play a more

substantial role than the receipt of individual material benefits. I conclude with a review of my

primary findings and avenues for future research.

Which Electoral Outcomes Does BPI Participation Affect, and Among Which Voters?

I argue that BPI participation can have at least three distinct electoral effects—two direct

and one indirect. Directly, engaging with BPIs can increase a voter's propensity to cast their

ballot for the governing party, relative to challenger parties. The most obvious voter group

parties might hope to win over through BPIs is swing voters. These voters may lean toward one

party or another, but their future electoral preferences are sufficiently uncertain to make an

investment by the party strategically useful (Dixit & Londregan, 1996; Stokes, 2005). Assuming

a given party's electoral appeals through BPIs are at least partially successful, then, BPI

participation should increase swing voters' likelihood of voting for the party. By contrast, core

supporters have such a high propensity of voting for their preferred party that BPIs should be of

little use in affecting their vote choice (Dixit & Londregan, 1996; Stokes, 2005; Stokes et al., 2013). In turn, since opposition supporters are less likely to participate in BPIs than other voters, and since they often face forms of exclusion and marginalization when they do participate, we are likely to observe either no effects or negative effects of BPI participation among these voters. Overall, I expect, given the likelihood that BPI participation will have no effect on the vote choice of core supporters or opposition supporters, that BPI participation's positive effect among swing voters will produce a positive overall impact of BPI participation on vote choice. Hence, I hypothesize that:

> H1: Among all voters, BPI participation will increase the likelihood of voting for the governing party.
> H2: Among swing voters, BPI participation will increase the likelihood of voting for the governing party.
> H3: Among core supporters, BPI participation will have no effect on the likelihood of voting for the governing party.
> H4: Among opposition supporters, BPI participation will have either no effect or a negative effect on the likelihood of voting for the governing party.

The second direct effect BPI participation can have on electoral outcomes is its impact on voter turnout. Specifically, BPI participation can increase an individual's likelihood of choosing to vote rather than abstain. Here, again, we should observe positive effects among swing voters. If we assume BPI participation has a positive impact on swing voters' partisan preferences (H2), and also that turnout rates are variable among swing voters (which should be the case in any country without enforced mandatory voting), we are likely to observe positive effect of BPI participation on voter turnout among swing voters. This is a result of the fact that the governing party will almost certainly use BPIs to help drive turnout among likely supporters during election campaigns. Consequently, any swing voters who participate in BPIs will receive strong encouragement from party activists within BPIs to turn out on election day. For the same reason,

203

if we assume variable turnout rates among core supporters, we are also likely to observe positive

effects of BPI participation among these voters. By contrast, to the extent that governing party

activists can identify opposition supporters among the ranks of BPI participants, they will not

work to increase turnout among this group, and indeed may try to discourage them from voting.

Consequently, I do not expect CC participation to have an effect on voter turnout among

opposition supporters. Given the likelihood that BPI participation will have a positive effect on

core supporters, swing voters, and even a small number of opposition supporters, I also

anticipate that BPI participation will have a positive impact on overall voter turnout. Hence, I

hypothesize that:

> H5: Among all voters, BPI participation will increase the likelihood of voting.
> H6: Among swing voters, BPI participation will increase the likelihood of voting.
> H7: Among core supporters, BPI participation will increase the likelihood of voting.
> H8: Among opposition supporters, BPI participation will not increase the likelihood of
> voting.

Finally, BPI participation can indirectly affect electoral outcomes by increasing activists'

propensity to perform electoral work on behalf of political parties. In general, increased electoral

work among supporters improves a party's chance of electoral victory by enhancing its capacity

to mobilize voters on election day (Enos & Fowler, 2018; Green et al., 2013). Since core

supporters have stronger ideological commitments to the party than other voters, efforts to

mobilize citizens into performing electoral work should be most effective among this group.

Core supporters' strong connection to the party means they can be more easily persuaded

(compared to other voters) that performing electoral work on behalf of the party is a useful

investment of their time—even if they do not receive some material benefit in exchange for their

work. At the same time, both core supporters as well as swing voters who lean toward the party

might expect to receive special benefits if they engage in electoral activity for the party through

their BPIs. This could take the form, for instance, of material rewards being offered to campaign workers but not to other BPI participants, or campaign volunteers could withhold for themselves a portion of whatever resources they have to distribute for electioneering. As a result, we should observe positive effects of BPI participation on an individual's propensity to carry out electoral work, among both core supporters and swing voters. Of course, given the low overall rate at which citizens engage in electoral work, the absolute magnitude of BPI participation's effects on electoral work are likely to be small. Nonetheless, even a comparatively small increase in the number of individuals performing electoral work for a given party can have a meaningful impact on the party's capacity to reach voters during electoral campaigns. By contrast, given the low probability they would either be interested in, or asked to perform electoral work for the party, we should not expect to observe effects of BPI participation on governing party campaign work among opposition supporters. Overall, I expect, given the likelihood that BPI participation will have a positive effect on core supporters and swing voters, and that fact that it is unlikely to affect opposition supporters, that BPI participation will have a positive impact on overall voter turnout. Hence, I hypothesize that:

> H9: Among all voters, BPI participation will increase the likelihood of performing electoral work on behalf of political parties.
> H10: Among swing voters, BPI participation will increase the likelihood of performing electoral work on behalf of political parties.
> H11: Among core supporters, BPI participation will increase the likelihood of performing electoral work on behalf of political parties.
> H12: Among opposition supporters, the effect of BPI participation will have no effect on electoral work on behalf of political parties.

Data

To evaluate these hypotheses, I leverage four rounds of LAPOP's Venezuela survey (2007, 2010, 2012, and 2014).[115] Each survey wave is a nationally representative sample of 1,500 voting-age adults, administered through face-to-face interviews. The sampling method used was a multi-stage probabilistic design, stratified by major regions of each country, size of municipality, and urban vs. rural areas within each municipality. To assess the impact of BPI participation on vote choice, I employ two independent variables, one capturing respondents' expressed vote choice in the last presidential election, and another reporting which presidential candidate respondents intended to support in upcoming presidential elections.[116] Next, to explore the relationship between BPI participation and voter turnout, I use two dependent variables, one capturing whether respondents reported voting in the most recent presidential election, and the other tracking whether respondents planned to vote in the next presidential election.[117] Finally, to measure the effect of BPI participation on electoral work, I employ a variable that captures

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[115] Unfortunately, the 2016 and 2018 waves of the LAPOP Venezuela survey did not include questions asking respondents about BPI participation.

[116] Vote choice in the most recent presidential election is available for all years (vb2 for LAPOP 2007, 2010, and 2012, vb3n for LAPOP 2014). This is a categorical variable that I convert to a binary variable where 1 = voted for the PSUV candidate and 0 = voted for an opposition candidate. Prospective voting is a categorical variable asking who the respondent would vote for if the next presidential elections were this week, with the following options: 1) would not vote, 2) would vote for the current party/president, 3) would vote for a party/candidate other than the current president, or 4) I would leave a null vote. I also convert this into a binary variable where 1 = would vote for the PSUV candidate and 0 = would vote for the opposition candidate.

[117] Voter turnout in the most recent presidential election is available for all years (vb3 for all LAPOP years, my 2018 survey uses identical wording). This is a binary variable that I recode so that 1 = voted in previous presidential election, and 0 = did not vote in previous presidential election. Prospective voter turnout, by contrast, is only available for 2010, 2012, and 2014 (vb20 for all available years). Prospective voting is a categorical variable asking who the respondent would vote for if the next presidential elections were this week, with the following options: 1) would not vote, 2) would vote for the current party/president, 3) would vote for a party/candidate other than the current president, or 4) I would leave a null vote. I also convert this into to a binary variable where 1 = would vote (which collapses respondents who reported they would vote for the current party/president and those who reported they would vote for a party/candidate other than the current president), and 0 = would not vote.

whether respondents reported attending meetings of a political party.[118] The independent variable

for all analyses captures whether a respondent participates in their local CC.[119] [120]

I also include a range of controls that likely confound the relationship between CC

participation and my key independent variables. First, given the high level of CC politicization

documented in Chapter 5, we know that supporters of the PSUV are much more likely than other

voters to participate in CCs. Since PSUV supporters are also more likely than others to cast their

vote for the PSUV candidate in presidential elections, it could be the case that voters' assessment

of the party drives both CC participation and vote choice. To ensure my models do not suffer

from omitted variable bias induced by the association between respondents' partisan preferences

and their likelihood of participating in a CC, I include an ordinal variable capturing respondents'

assessments of the PSUV's presidential candidate (either Chávez or Maduro).[121] Next, since

many scholars have found that levels of interpersonal trust affect not only an individual's

propensity to participate in civil society organizations (Putnam, 2000) but also their political

participation (Crepaz et al., 2017; Nickerson, 2008; Putnam, 2000), it is likely that trust

confounds the relationship between CC participation and vote choice. Consequently, I include an

ordinal variable capturing each respondent's level of interpersonal trust, on a scale from 0 (low

trust) to 3 (high trust).[122]

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[118] This variable is cp13 for all LAPOP years.

[119] The original variable is a four-point ordinal scale, which I convert to a binary yes/no variable, since my primary interest is in whether participation per se, rather than frequency of participation, affects electoral outcomes. The CC participation variable is cp14 for 2007, 2012, and 2014, and cp15 for 2010.

[120] A summary of all variables used in this study, as well as a table of the number of observations in the dataset for each country, is included in the appendix.

[121] This variable is m1 for all LAPOP years. The wording is as follows: "Speaking generally about the current government, would you say the work being done by President Chávez [or Maduro] is 1) very good, 2) good, 3) neither good nor bad, 4) bad, or 5) very bad?

[122] This variable is it1 for all LAPOP years. The wording is as follows: "Now, speaking of the people from around here, would you say the people in your community are 1) very trustworthy, 2) somewhat trustworthy, 3) only a little trustworthy, or 4) not trustworthy?

In turn, individual income is likely negatively associated with both CC participation as well as electoral support for the PSUV. The negative association between income and CC participation is a result of the fact that CCs are generally concentrated in areas with relatively high needs that lack various basic services in health, education, infrastructure, etc. (Álvarez & García-Guadilla, 2011). The negative association between income and CC participation is a consequence of the PSUV's successful efforts to politicize class cleavages in Venezuela through a range of pro-poor social and economic policies (Handlin, 2013; Roberts, 2003). To address this source of confounding, I include an ordinal variable that reports the range of respondents' monthly household income.[123] Relatedly, ethnicity is also likely to predict both CC participation and PSUV electoral support. One the one hand, non-white Venezuelans tend to be poorer than white Venezuelans, and in greater need of the material assistance CCs can provide (Montañez, 1993; Salas, 2005). As a result, we might expect non-white Venezuelans to participate in CCs at a higher rate than white Venezuelans.[124] Further, given that the PSUV placed racial inequality at the forefront of its discourse—with former President Chávez regularly invoking his *pardo* background as an explanation for opposition bias against him (Cannon, 2008; Lalander, 2016)— and since the government's social policies disproportionately impacted non-white Venezuelans (S. Ellner, 2008), it is likely that non-white Venezuelans are also more likely to support the PSUV electorally compared to their white counterparts. Consequently, I include a categorical

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[123] This variable is q10 for LAPOP 2007 and 2010, and q10new for LAPOP 2012 and 2014. For 2007 and 2010 it is an eleven-point scale, and for 2012 and 2014 it is a 17-point scale (all based in Venezuelan Bolívares). To facilitate comparability, in the pooled analysis I construct income quintile variables for each year. My 2018 survey also includes a question asking respondents the range of their monthly household Income, in this case on a 7-point scale.
[124]Indeed, in 2014, for instance, roughly 30% of white respondents reported participating in their local CC, while 40% of indigenous, 38% of mulattos, and 39% of blacks reported having participated.

variable capturing each respondent's reported ethnicity, which offers six possible ethnicities:

white, indigenous, mestizo, brown, mulatto, and black.[125]

Next, while previous statistical analyses of CC participation have not found a clear

relationship between educational attainment and CC participation (Rhodes-Purdy, 2017), the

high concentration of CCs in marginalized areas with low average rates of educational

attainment suggests that there may be a negative association between the two. In turn, since low

education attainment individuals are also more likely to support the PSUV electorally (Seligson

2007; Lupu 2010) there is a concern that failing to control for educational attainment could

produce biased estimates of the relationship between CC participation and electoral outcomes.

Hence, I include an ordinal variable asking respondents the total number of years of schooling

they have received.[126] Finally, to address three other commonly cited sources of confounding in

studies of participation and political partisanship in Latin America (Booth & Seligson, 2008;

Davies & Falleti, 2017; Handlin, 2016), I include dummy variables indicating whether the

respondent reported being female[127] or living in an urban community,[128] and I include a variable

capturing respondent ages.[129]

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[125] This variable is etid for all LAPOP years. The wording is as follows: "Do you consider yourself a white person, mestizo, indigenous, black, mulatto, brown, or something else? [if the respondent says Afro-Venezuelan, code them as Black]." The wording for my 2018 survey is as follows: "Do you identify as 1) white, 2) mestizo, 3) indigenous, 4) black, 5) mulatto, 6) brown, or 7) other (please specify).

[126] This variable is ed for all LAPOP years. It is measured on a 21-point scale. The wording is as follows: "What was the last year of Education you completed? None, primary 1-6, secondary (basic) 1-3, secondary (diversified) 1-2, technical 1-3, or university 1-6+." The Education variable in my 2018 survey is measured on a nine-point scale. The wording is as follows: "What is your Educational level? None, incomplete primary, complete primary, incomplete secondary, complete secondary, incomplete technical, complete technical, incomplete university, or complete university."

[127] This variable is q1 for all LAPOP years.

[128] This variable is ur for all LAPOP years. Since my 2018 survey does not include a dichotomous urban/rural variable, I instead use a continuous variable capturing the size of each respondent's municipality.

[129] This variable is q2 for LAPOP years 2007, 2010, and 2012. For 2014, LAPOP asks the year of each respondent's birth (q2y). To generate an age variable that can be compared to the other years, for 2014 I subtract q2y by 2014.

Models

To test my hypotheses, I first run pooled regression models that combine data from the four survey waves (2007, 2010, 2012, and 2014), including the battery of controls described above, as well as year dummies to account for time-specific effects. Cluster-robust standard errors (clustered by municipality) are included in all models to address the possibility of within-cluster heteroskedasticity. Since the Venezuela LAPOP surveys are unweighted, I do not include individual survey weights.

The basic model estimated is:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 CC\ Participation_{it+} + \beta_2 Controls_{it} + T_{\gamma+}\ u_{it}$$

Where Y_{it} represents the value of the dependent variable for the *i*th person in the *t*th survey, α represents a vector of constants, T_γ is a vector of time dummies for survey years, and u_{it} is a vector of error terms. I also estimate models including municipal (in addition to year) fixed effects. This approach allows me to account for unobserved, time-invariant municipal-level characteristics that could impact CC participation. Specifically, fixed-effects models analyze only within-municipality variation, thus controlling for any possible municipality-induced selection bias.

The basic fixed-effects model estimated is:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 CC\ Participation_{it+} + \beta_2 Controls_{it} + T_\gamma + D_\mu + u_{it}$$

The model is identical to the basic model described above, except that it includes *D,* which is a vector of municipal dummies.[130] Since all of the dependent variables are binary, I estimate logistic regression models for both the pooled and fixed-effects models. Given that logistic

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[130] This empirical strategy is similar to approach taken by (Blanco, 2013) and (Blanco & Ruiz, 2013) for analyzing within country repeated cross sections of LAPOP survey data.

regression estimates often suffer from a form of small sample bias that produces inflated odds ratios in cases where data are sparse (Cook et al., 2018; Nemes et al., 2009), and since some of my analyses leverage a relatively small number of observations (particularly the fixed-effects models subset by voter group), I also estimate penalized maximum likelihood models. These models have been shown to outperform logistic models in cases of sparse data (Cook et al., 2018; Heinze & Schemper, 2002). In some instances of sparse data, however, neither logistic nor penalized maximum likelihood estimates yield reliable estimates. To address this problem, I also run pooled OLS regressions. In general, OLS regressions produce results nearly identical to logistic models (Angrist & Pischke, 2008, p. 197), especially if most modeled probabilities are between .2 and .8 (Long, 1997). The results below suggest that OLS models indeed yield substantively similar results compared to logistic models for each of my three dependent variables. Consequently, since small samples do not bias OLS estimates, OLS models can be useful both for assessing small sample bias in logistic estimates, as well as providing alternative estimates when logistic and penalized maximum likelihood estimates fail.

To address remaining bias generated by unobserved within-municipality confounders, I tested a range of possible instruments, but the percentage of compliers was too small in each for any to be plausibly considered a strong instrument.[131] Despite this limitation, I employ numerous techniques to limit remaining threats to causal inference. First, as discussed above, I offer a theoretically informed set of covariates that can be plausibly thought to exhaust the range of most critical confounders that would introduce significant selection bias into CC participation. While of course there is no way to rule out the possibility of additional unobserved cofounders,

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[131] These include variables the density of CCs in a given neighborhood in 2007, number of children, the distance CC participants reported walking from their home to the CC meeting and density of civil society participation by parish in 2007.

there is also no reason to believe any critical variable that could significantly affect selection into treatment categories is missing. I also conduct sensitivity analyses to quantify the impact an unobserved confounder would have to have in my models to produce null results, and I find that such a variable would have to explain more variation than several of the most critical variables affecting my key outcomes. This, again, is certainly possible, but there is no compelling theoretical reason to believe that it is likely.

Next, given the close association many Venezuelans draw between the PSUV and the CCs, it is possible that my results suffer from reverse causation, where electoral outcomes affect CC participation rather than vice versa. Since we do not know when respondents initiated their CC participation, nor when PSUV voters first began supporting the party, this is impossible to rule out entirely. That said, if respondents' assessments of the PSUV president are post-treatment (that is, impacted by CC participation), the result would be to downwardly bias my estimates of the effect of CC participation on electoral outcomes (as a portion of this effect would be absorbed into the coefficient for PSUV president assessment). This means that all my estimates of the effect of CC participation on electoral outcomes are likely more conservative than unbiased estimates would be. Thus, if my results yield any positive effects, it will be *despite,* rather than due to bias caused by controlling for presidential assessment.

Finally, it is possible that length of CC participation among current participants, or past participation among current non-participants could bias my estimates. The impact of previous participation (or non-participation) in CCs should not pose a serious problem to causal inference, however, for two related reasons. First, if it is the case that, among current CC participants, the effect of participation on electoral outcomes is greater among participants with more years of CC experience, this would serve only to downwardly bias my results, making the detection of a

causal effect of CC participation more difficult (and thus my statistical test more challenging).

Second, it could be the case that, among current non-CC participants, there is a large subset of

individuals whose previous CC engagement increased their support for the PSUV. This would

produce an understatement of the difference in the effect of CC participation on vote choice

between CC participants and non-participants, and, in turn, an understatement of the effect of CC

participation on electoral outcomes. Again, however, this would only increase the difficulty of

confirming my hypotheses. Thus, even if past participation produces bias in my estimates of the

relationship between CC participation and electoral outcomes, it is likely to do so only in ways

that would produce more conservative estimates than those I report below.

Results

   I run models to assess the effect of CC participation on each of the three electoral

outcomes among the electorate as a whole, and also among specific voter groups (PSUV

supporters, swing voters, and opposition supporters). Table 7.1 and Table 7.2 explore the

relationship between CC participation and vote choice. Table 7.1 reports the results of

regressions with vote choice in the last presidential election as the dependent variable, and Table

7.2 reports the results of regressions where the dependent variable is respondents' preferred

candidate in the next presidential election. Since the fixed-effects models are my preferred

specification, for these and all the other models discussed later in this section, I only report these

estimates in the text. Table 7.1 shows that there is no effect of CC participation on past

presidential vote choice, either among the electorate as a whole or among any voter group. This

is not particularly surprising, since I can only model recent CC participation, which may or may

not be an indicator for CC participation before the previous election. Given that small sample

bias produced substantively meaningless logistic and penalized maximum likelihood estimates

(which I do not report in Table 7.1 and Table 7.2), it is impossible to know the extent of bias in

my fixed-effects OLS models for these groups in Table 7.2 (models 4 and 8) generated by not

properly modeling binary outcomes. That said, the results of logistic and penalized maximum

likelihood models without municipal fixed effects (included in appendix) are not biased by small

sample problems, and are consistent with the OLS fixed-effects models in Table 7.1. By contrast,

the results in Table 7.2 clearly suggest a positive effect of CC participation on future vote choice,

both in the electorate as a whole, as well as among swing voters. The results for PSUV and

opposition voters show no statistically significant relationship (model 4), though this may also be

a consequence of small sample bias that makes reliable logistic or penalized maximum

likelihood estimates impossible in these cases. Again, however, fixed-effects OLS results for

these groups (models 4 and 8) are consistent with logistic and penalized maximum likelihood

models without municipal fixed effects (included in appendix), suggesting they are likely not

biased by failure to account for binary outcomes.

Table 7.1: Effect of CC Participation on Past Vote Choice

	DV: Voted for PSUV in Previous Presidential Election							
	Overall OLS	Overall LOGIT	Overall PMLE	PSUV OLS	UNAFF OLS	UNAFF LOGIT	UNAFF PMLE	OPP OLS
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
CC participation	**0.016**	**0.187**	**0.187**	**-0.007**	**-0.001**	**-0.055**	**-0.055**	**0.061**
	(0.014)	(0.148)	(0.148)	(0.008)	(0.024)	(0.199)	(0.199)	(0.041)
PSUV president assessment	0.250***	2.078***	2.078***	0.022**	0.247***	1.859***	1.859***	0.129***
	(0.005)	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.139)	(0.139)	(0.025)
Urban	0.053	0.494	0.494	0.006	0.109*	0.880**	0.880**	0.033
	(0.038)	(0.335)	(0.335)	(0.043)	(0.060)	(0.417)	(0.417)	(0.041)
Education	-0.006***	-0.047***	-0.047***	-0.001	-0.006**	-0.056***	-0.056***	-0.005
	(0.002)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.003)
Income	0.002	0.019	0.019	0.002	0.004	0.033	0.033	-0.003
	(0.005)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.013)
Indigenous	-0.018	-0.245	-0.245	-0.015	-0.048	-0.234	-0.234	-0.092
	(0.046)	(0.443)	(0.443)	(0.037)	(0.072)	(0.552)	(0.552)	(0.098)
Mestizo/a	0.016	0.124	0.124	0.015*	0.001	-0.033	-0.033	0.065*
	(0.017)	(0.180)	(0.180)	(0.008)	(0.028)	(0.247)	(0.247)	(0.038)
Mulatto/a	-0.011	-0.023	-0.023	0.004	0.086	0.623	0.623	-0.073
	(0.047)	(0.448)	(0.448)	(0.009)	(0.067)	(0.544)	(0.544)	(0.112)
Afro-Venezuelan	-0.049	-0.180	-0.180	-0.010	-0.027	0.474	0.474	0.282*
	(0.043)	(0.674)	(0.674)	(0.007)	(0.072)	(0.635)	(0.635)	(0.145)
Other Ethnicity	-0.158***	-1.683***	-1.683***	-0.014	-0.246***	-2.141**	-2.141**	-0.009
	(0.055)	(0.573)	(0.573)	(0.009)	(0.092)	(0.879)	(0.879)	(0.064)
Moreno/a	0.040**	0.302*	0.302*	0.012	0.059*	0.505**	0.505**	-0.031
	(0.018)	(0.181)	(0.181)	(0.013)	(0.031)	(0.254)	(0.254)	(0.036)
Woman	0.030**	0.218*	0.218*	-0.005	0.036*	0.294	0.294	-0.023
	(0.013)	(0.131)	(0.131)	(0.007)	(0.021)	(0.181)	(0.181)	(0.028)
Trust	-0.013*	-0.115	-0.115	0.003	-0.017	-0.156	-0.156	0.023
	(0.007)	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.005)	(0.013)	(0.109)	(0.109)	(0.015)
Year 2010	-0.026	-0.206	-0.206	-0.005	-0.028	-0.289	-0.289	0.009
	(0.020)	(0.210)	(0.210)	(0.007)	(0.033)	(0.269)	(0.269)	(0.061)
Year 2012	0.042	1.975*	1.975*	-0.007	0.254	2.281*	2.281*	0.240***
	(0.159)	(1.085)	(1.085)	(0.033)	(0.251)	(1.235)	(1.235)	(0.074)
Municipal FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
N	2,878	2,878	2,878	960	1,384	1,384	1,384	411
R^2	0.543			0.239	0.497			0.493
Adjusted R^2	0.517			0.107	0.439			0.305
Log Likelihood		-851.747	-851.747			-484.926	-484.926	
F Statistic	21.151***			1.808***	8.555***			2.623***
AIC		2,011.494	2,011.494			1,257.852	1,257.852	

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Note: All models include Cluster-robust SEs (.95 level). Clustered by municipality. Logistic and penalized maximum likelihood models for PSUV and opposition voters are not shown because they produced substantively meaningless results. There is no coefficient for the year 2014 because the dependent variable was not included in the 2014 LAPOP survey.

Table 7.2: Effect of CC Participation on Future Vote Intention

	Overall OLS	Overall LOGIT	Overall PMLE	PSUV OLS	UNAFF OLS	UNAFF LOGIT	UNAFF PMLE	OPP OLS
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
CC participation	**0.056*****	**0.689*****	**0.689*****	**0.005**	**0.070****	**0.717****	**0.717****	**-0.013**
	(0.016)	(0.187)	(0.187)	(0.019)	(0.029)	(0.321)	(0.321)	(0.027)
PSUV president assessment	0.291***	3.112***	3.112***	0.105***	0.270***	2.947***	2.947***	0.087***
	(0.005)	(0.199)	(0.199)	(0.018)	(0.010)	(0.323)	(0.323)	(0.024)
Urban	-0.014	0.087	0.087	0.040	-0.001	0.471	0.471	0.008
	(0.039)	(0.454)	(0.454)	(0.066)	(0.064)	(0.604)	(0.604)	(0.063)
Education	-0.004**	-0.043*	-0.043*	0.002	-0.007**	-0.066	-0.066	-0.003
	(0.002)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.002)
Income	-0.007	-0.150*	-0.150*	-0.008	-0.011	-0.176	-0.176	0.012
	(0.007)	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.142)	(0.142)	(0.010)
Indigenous	-0.002	-0.439	-0.439	-0.039	-0.149*	-2.306***	-2.306***	0.058
	(0.041)	(0.546)	(0.546)	(0.055)	(0.084)	(0.890)	(0.890)	(0.079)
Mestizo/a	-0.019	-0.407	-0.407	-0.002	-0.063*	-0.687	-0.687	0.027
	(0.020)	(0.267)	(0.267)	(0.027)	(0.034)	(0.434)	(0.434)	(0.034)
Mulatto/a	-0.055	-0.077	-0.077	-0.002	-0.088	-0.340	-0.340	-0.020
Afro-Venezuelan	-0.035	-0.503	-0.503	0.026	-0.083	-0.709	-0.709	-0.057
	(0.038)	(0.447)	(0.447)	(0.024)	(0.067)	(0.670)	(0.670)	(0.048)
Other Ethnicity	-0.121	-12.807***	-12.807***		-0.119	-15.021***	-15.021***	
	(0.086)	(1.478)	(1.478)		(0.130)	(1.837)	(1.837)	
Moreno/a	-0.003	-0.108	-0.108	-0.016	-0.025	-0.259	-0.259	-0.005
	(0.017)	(0.217)	(0.217)	(0.021)	(0.029)	(0.353)	(0.353)	(0.021)
Woman	-0.001	-0.024	-0.024	-0.028	0.009	0.047	0.047	-0.027
	(0.014)	(0.174)	(0.174)	(0.017)	(0.024)	(0.291)	(0.291)	(0.017)
Trust	-0.006	-0.064	-0.064	-0.008	-0.029**	-0.328*	-0.328*	-0.007
	(0.008)	(0.109)	(0.109)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.173)	(0.173)	(0.009)
Year 2012	0.066	3.399**	3.399**		0.408	4.326**	4.326**	0.023
	(0.111)	(1.464)	(1.464)		(0.294)	(1.981)	(1.981)	(0.059)
Year 2014	0.088***	1.196***	1.196***		0.135***	1.634***	1.634***	-0.032
	(0.023)	(0.285)	(0.285)		(0.040)	(0.452)	(0.452)	(0.031)
Municipal FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
N	2,181	2,181	2,181	713	980	980	980	390
R^2	0.649			0.312	0.579			0.524
Adjusted R^2	0.623			0.160	0.510			0.346
Log Likelihood		-494.322	-494.322			-233.489	-233.489	
F Statistic	25.709***			2.048***	8.437***			2.939***
AIC		1,282.644	1,282.644			742.977	742.977	

Note: All models include cluster-robust SEs (.95 level). Clustered by municipality. Logistic and penalized maximum likelihood models for PSUV and opposition voters are not shown because they produced substantively meaningless results. There is no coefficient for the year 2010 because the dependent variable was not included in the 2007 LAPOP survey, making 2010 the reference category for year in these models.

I turn next to the relationship between CC participation and voter turnout. These analyses are presented in Table 7.3 and Table 7.4. The results of regressions with voter turnout in the last presidential election as the dependent variable are reported in Table 7.3, while the dependent

variable in Table 7.4 is whether respondents intend to vote in the next presidential election. Both

tables show clear positive effects of CC participation among the electorate as a whole, as well as

swing voters. By contrast, CC participation is positively associated with future turnout among

PSUV voters (Table 7.4, model 4), but not with past turnout (Table 7.4, model 4), which, again,

is not surprising given the likelihood that CC participation did not precede the previous election

for many respondents.[132] Next, while the OLS fixed-effects estimate in Table 7.3 and Table 7.4

(model 8) suggests a positive effect of CC participation on opposition turnout variables, these are

not reliable estimates. With respect to past voter turnout (Table 7.3), not only is it possible that

reliable logistic or penalized maximum likelihood fixed-effects estimates (which are not

available due to small sample bias) would have yielded contrasting findings, but reliable logistic

and penalized maximum likelihood pooled models (included in appendix) suggest that CC

participation has no effect on past voter turnout among opposition voters. Finally, regarding the

effect of CC participation on voter turnout intention among opposition supporters (Table 7.4),

neither the logistic and penalized maximum likelihood fixed effects models (models 9 and 10)

yielded statistically significant effects, nor did the OLS, logistic, or penalized maximum

likelihood pooled models (included in appendix).

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[132] As was the case for PSUV and opposition voters in Tables 7.1 and 7.2, small sample bias generated substantively meaningless estimates for the logistic and penalized maximum likelihood models, but the OLS fixed-effects models among PSUV voters reported in Tables 7.3 and 7.4 are consistent with unbiased logistic and penalized maximum likelihood pooled models.

Table 7.3: Effect of CC Participation on Past Voter Turnout

	DV: Voted in Previous Presidential Election							
	Overall OLS	Overall LOGIT	Overall PMLE	PSUV OLS	UNAFF OLS	UNAFF LOGIT	UNAFF PMLE	OPP OLS
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
CC participation	**0.067*****	**0.480*****	**0.480*****	**0.029**	**0.077*****	**0.467*****	**0.467*****	**0.062***
	(0.013)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.037)
PSUV president assessment	0.024***	0.169***	0.169***	0.019	0.011	0.063	0.063	-0.025
	(0.005)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.022)
Urban	0.035	0.183	0.183	0.040	0.052	0.241	0.241	-0.065
	(0.036)	(0.240)	(0.240)	(0.062)	(0.049)	(0.272)	(0.272)	(0.080)
Education	0.005***	0.036***	0.036***	-0.001	0.007***	0.039***	0.039***	0.008*
	(0.001)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.004)
Income	0.018***	0.126***	0.126***	0.021***	0.013*	0.078*	0.078*	0.009
	(0.005)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.016)
Indigenous	-0.044	-0.282	-0.282	-0.024	-0.059	-0.309	-0.309	0.194**
	(0.042)	(0.277)	(0.277)	(0.048)	(0.070)	(0.365)	(0.365)	(0.097)
Mestizo/a	0.030**	0.222*	0.222*	0.023	0.057**	0.340**	0.340**	-0.094**
	(0.015)	(0.114)	(0.114)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.137)	(0.137)	(0.046)
Mulatto/a	-0.008	-0.034	-0.034	-0.001	-0.009	-0.044	-0.044	-0.081
	(0.042)	(0.285)	(0.285)	(0.080)	(0.059)	(0.336)	(0.336)	(0.086)
Afro-Venezuelan	-0.040	-0.244	-0.244	0.004	-0.058	-0.281	-0.281	-0.026
	(0.050)	(0.292)	(0.292)	(0.054)	(0.078)	(0.364)	(0.364)	(0.059)
Other Ethnicity	-0.078	-0.438	-0.438	-0.156	-0.057	-0.285	-0.285	-0.061
	(0.063)	(0.363)	(0.363)	(0.146)	(0.082)	(0.424)	(0.424)	(0.175)
Moreno/a	-0.007	-0.055	-0.055	-0.020	0.022	0.114	0.114	-0.043
	(0.016)	(0.112)	(0.112)	(0.028)	(0.024)	(0.138)	(0.138)	(0.042)
Woman	-0.002	-0.005	-0.005	0.029	0.001	0.015	0.015	0.015
	(0.012)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.031)
Trust	0.023***	0.158***	0.158***	0.015	0.018*	0.113**	0.113**	0.026
	(0.007)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.019)
Year 2010	-0.064***	-0.324***	-0.324***	-0.076***	-0.083***	-0.389***	-0.389***	-0.012
	(0.020)	(0.118)	(0.118)	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.142)	(0.142)	(0.071)
Year 2012	0.193	1.323	1.323	0.263	0.081	0.385	0.385	0.039
	(0.170)	(1.317)	(1.317)	(0.219)	(0.296)	(1.547)	(1.547)	(0.085)
Year 2014	0.133***	1.149***	1.149***	0.033	0.140***	0.944***	0.944***	0.155**
	(0.019)	(0.172)	(0.172)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.198)	(0.198)	(0.063)
Municipal FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
N	4,476	4,476	4,476	1,092	2,620	2,620	2,620	505
R^2	0.107			0.153	0.127			0.311
Adjusted R^2	0.076			0.026	0.074			0.100
Log Likelihood		-1,984.645	-1,984.645			-1,329.384	-1,329.384	
F Statistic	3.402***			1.200*	2.386***			1.475***
AIC		4,277.289	4,277.289			2,960.767	2,960.767	

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Note: All models include cluster-robust SEs (.95 level). Clustered by municipality. Logistic and penalized maximum likelihood models for PSUV and opposition voters are not shown because they produced substantively meaningless results.

Table 7.4: Effect of CC Participation on Future Voter Turnout Intention

	Overall OLS	Overall LOGIT	Overall PMLE	PSUV OLS	UNAFF OLS	UNAFF LOGIT	UNAFF PMLE	OPP OLS	OPP LOGIT	OPP PMLE
DV: Intends to Vote in Next Presidential Election										
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
CC participation	**0.064*****	**0.565*****	**0.562*****	**0.039****	**0.069****	**0.441****	**0.441****	**0.064****	**1.711**	**1.704**
	(0.015)	(0.140)	(0.140)	(0.016)	(0.028)	(0.182)	(0.182)	(0.031)	(1.351)	(1.368)
PSUV president assessment	0.019***	0.190***	0.193***	0.041***	-0.003	-0.025	-0.025	-0.018	-0.681	-0.681
	(0.005)	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.015)	(0.624)	(0.624)
Urban	-0.012	-0.119	-0.109	-0.045*	-0.001	-0.007	-0.007			-0.103
	(0.043)	(0.345)	(0.347)	(0.025)	(0.068)	(0.399)	(0.399)			(1.090)
Education	0.004**	0.034**	0.035**	-0.002	0.006**	0.040*	0.040*	0.002	0.135	0.134
	(0.002)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.003)	(0.097)	(0.100)
Income	0.030***	0.298***	0.286***	0.018**	0.035***	0.230***	0.230***	0.014	0.445	0.449
	(0.007)	(0.059)	(0.067)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.011)	(0.440)	(0.442)
Indigenous	0.049	0.493	0.486	0.012	0.074	0.472	0.472	0.090	19.815***	19.816***
	(0.049)	(0.449)	(0.451)	(0.054)	(0.094)	(0.611)	(0.611)	(0.064)	(2.404)	(2.411)
Mestizo/a	0.060***	0.522***	0.517***	0.015	0.125***	0.835***	0.835***	-0.048	-0.929	-0.923
	(0.019)	(0.186)	(0.185)	(0.028)	(0.034)	(0.244)	(0.244)	(0.043)	(1.310)	(1.314)
Mulatto/a	0.088**	0.825**	0.823**	0.085**	0.165***	1.102**	1.102**	-0.191**	-3.524**	-3.529**
	(0.038)	(0.373)	(0.373)	(0.043)	(0.058)	(0.525)	(0.525)	(0.091)	(1.740)	(1.749)
Other Ethnicity	-0.143	-0.977	-0.938		-0.097	-0.665	-0.665			
	(0.281)	(1.652)	(1.660)		(0.294)	(1.635)	(1.635)			
Afro-Venezuelan	-0.009	-0.013	-0.020	-0.017	0.024	0.102	0.102	0.095	20.648***	20.569***
	(0.041)	(0.327)	(0.328)	(0.043)	(0.064)	(0.397)	(0.397)	(0.061)	(1.967)	(2.212)
Moreno/a	0.052***	0.422***	0.425***	0.048**	0.081***	0.480***	0.480***	0.041	1.116	1.120
	(0.017)	(0.143)	(0.143)	(0.021)	(0.028)	(0.176)	(0.176)	(0.030)	(1.256)	(1.249)
Woman	-0.022	-0.195	-0.198	-0.006	-0.013	-0.070	-0.070	-0.033	-0.747	-0.743
	(0.014)	(0.122)	(0.122)	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.152)	(0.152)	(0.024)	(0.943)	(0.954)
Trust	0.020**	0.160**	0.161**	-0.001	0.021	0.130	0.130	0.012	0.485	0.487
	(0.009)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.008)	(0.015)	(0.089)	(0.089)	(0.014)	(0.592)	(0.592)
Year 2012	0.096		0.339	-0.048	0.189	0.786	0.786	0.381***	22.291***	22.325***
	(0.198)		(0.987)	(0.046)	(0.295)	(1.280)	(1.280)	(0.145)	(2.795)	(3.182)
Year 2014	0.021		0.076	0.042	-0.011	-0.126	-0.126	0.107**	2.209	2.211
	(0.024)		(0.188)	(0.031)	(0.041)	(0.232)	(0.232)	(0.045)	(1.401)	(1.410)
Municipal FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
N	2,696	2,696	2,696	753	1,406	1,406	1,406	420	420	420
R²	0.193			0.335	0.232			0.434		
Adjusted R²	0.147			0.194	0.144			0.240		
Log Likelihood		-956.896	-956.809			-629.548	-629.548		-35.290	-35.287
F Statistic	4.128***			2.371***	2.642***			2.239***		
AIC		2,209.793	2,211.617			1,549.097	1,549.097		286.580	288.575

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Note: All models include cluster-robust SEs (.95 level). Clustered by municipality. Logistic and penalized maximum likelihood models for PSUV voters are not shown because they produced substantively meaningless results. There is no coefficient for the year 2010 because the dependent variable was not included in the 2007 LAPOP survey, making 2010 the reference category for year in these models.

The final dependent variable I examine is whether respondents reported performing electoral work on behalf of a political party. These results are reported in Table 7.5.

Unfortunately, logistic and penalized maximum likelihood estimates were biased and not substantively meaningful for all voter groups. That said, the OLS fixed-effects models reported in Table 7.5 suggest that CC participation increases electoral work on behalf of political parties across the electorate as a whole, and also among each specific voter group (PSUV supporters, swing voters, and opposition supporters).

Table 7.5: Effect of CC Participation on Party Work

	DV: Performed Party Work			
	Overall OLS	PSUV OLS	UNAFF OLS	OPP OLS
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
CC participation	**0.199*****	**0.257*****	**0.120*****	**0.240*****
	(0.013)	(0.031)	(0.014)	(0.053)
PSUV president assessment	0.046***	0.065***	0.016***	0.001
	(0.005)	(0.019)	(0.005)	(0.025)
Urban	0.028	0.131	-0.024	-0.085
	(0.031)	(0.088)	(0.031)	(0.131)
Education	0.008***	0.012***	0.003**	0.002
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.005)
Income	-0.002	-0.006	0.001	0.009
	(0.004)	(0.012)	(0.004)	(0.016)
Indigenous	0.126***	0.207**	-0.009	0.367*
	(0.042)	(0.081)	(0.034)	(0.207)
Mestizo/a	-0.002	-0.040	-0.014	0.108*
	(0.014)	(0.039)	(0.013)	(0.056)
Mulatto/a	-0.051	-0.075	-0.004	-0.088
	(0.032)	(0.118)	(0.035)	(0.077)
Afro-Venezuelan	0.070	0.073	-0.004	0.545***
	(0.045)	(0.105)	(0.036)	(0.175)
Other Ethnicity	-0.031	-0.050	-0.006	-0.116
	(0.047)	(0.147)	(0.047)	(0.127)
Moreno/a	-0.008	0.011	-0.023*	0.024
	(0.013)	(0.038)	(0.013)	(0.044)
Woman	-0.014	0.007	-0.019*	-0.028
	(0.010)	(0.029)	(0.010)	(0.036)
Trust	-0.0003	-0.002	-0.006	-0.001
	(0.006)	(0.017)	(0.006)	(0.021)
Year 2010	-0.001	-0.050	0.005	-0.021
	(0.016)	(0.048)	(0.016)	(0.076)
Year 2012	0.020	0.038	-0.018	0.153*
	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.050)	(0.093)
Year 2014	0.024	-0.027	0.028	-0.092
	(0.018)	(0.053)	(0.019)	(0.072)
Municipal FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
N	4,577	1,091	2,707	507
R^2	0.166	0.279	0.130	0.330
Adjusted R^2	0.137	0.170	0.079	0.129
F Statistic	5.766***	2.564***	2.540***	1.641***

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Note: All models include cluster-robust SEs (.95 level). Clustered by municipality. Logistic and penalized maximum likelihood models are not shown because they produced substantively meaningless results.

Summary and Discussion

To assess the consistency of my findings with hypotheses 1-12, in Table 7.6 I summarize the key findings of the first five tables in this section. Table 7.6 first reports whether there is evidence of a statistically significant relationship between CC participation and the three dependent variables for each voter group. Plus signs indicate that, for a given DV among a particular voter group, my preferred models (logistic and penalized maximum likelihood models) yielded a statistically significant relationship for at least one operationalization of the DV (for instance, either past vote choice or future vote intention). I include summaries of both pooled and fixed-effects models. I consider a hypothesis supported (indicated by a check mark in Table 7.6) if my preferred fixed-effects models are consistent with the hypothesis. In cases where all pooled, as well as OLS fixed-effects models, indicate a statistically significant effect in the expected direction, but where my preferred fixed-effects models did not yield substantively meaningful results, I code the hypothesis "likely supported." This indicates that while suggestive supporting evidence exists, we cannot confirm the hypothesis given data limitations that preclude me from executing my preferred statistical tests.

Table 7.6 shows that all hypotheses are supported, or likely supported. First, consistent with my expectations, CC participation makes Venezuelans in general, and swing voters in particular, more likely to vote for PSUV presidential candidates compared to non-CC participants. By contrast, CC participation does not affect the presidential vote choice of PSUV or opposition supporters. Next, CC participation increases voter turnout among all voters, as well as swing and (likely) PSUV voters in particular, while having no effect on voter turnout among opposition supporters. Finally, while the reliability of my findings with respect to the effect of CC participation on party work is limited by small sample bias produced in my preferred fixed

effects models, there is suggestive evidence that CC participation increases party work among all

voters, as well as among swing and PSUV voters in particular, though not among opposition

supporters.

Table 7.6: Summary of Results: Effect of CC Participation on Electoral Outcomes

Vote Choice	ALL	SWING	PSUV	OPPOSITION
Statistical Significance (pooled)	+	+	no	no
Statistical Significance (FE)	+	+	no	no
	Hypothesis 1	Hypothesis 2	Hypothesis 3	Hypothesis 4
Hypothesis Supported?	✓	✓	✓	✓
Voter Turnout	ALL	SWING	PSUV	OPPOSITION
Statistical Significance (pooled)	+	+	+	no
Statistical Significance (FE)	+	+	no	no
	Hypothesis 5	Hypothesis 6	Hypothesis 7	Hypothesis 8
Hypothesis Supported?	✓	✓	**likely**	✓
Party Work	ALL	SWING	PSUV	OPPOSITION
Statistical Significance (pooled)	+	+	+	+
Statistical Significance (FE)	no	no	no	no
	Hypothesis 9	Hypothesis 10	Hypothesis 11	Hypothesis 12
Hypothesis Supported?	**likely**	**likely**	**likely**	**likely**[133]

Not only do my results indicate consistent positive effects of CC participation on

electoral outcomes, but the predicted effects are substantial. Figure 7.1 reports the marginal

effect of CC participation on every electoral outcome and voter group that yielded positive and

statistically significant results. It shows that CC participation increases an individual's likelihood

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[133] Note that while there is evidence of increased party work among opposition supporters, the electoral work these voters perform is almost certainly on behalf of opposition parties, rather than the governing PSUV. Consequently, a positive effect of CC participation on party work among opposition supporters indicates not only that CC participation does not positively impact electoral work on behalf of the PSUV, but it actually increases party work on behalf of opposition parties.

of voting for the PSUV in future presidential elections from around 38% among non-participants

to nearly 50% among participants (all voters), and increases the likelihood of swing voters

supporting the party in future presidential contests from 15% to 22%. Likewise, CC participation

increases individuals' propensity to vote by between 8 (future turnout) and 6 (past turnout)

percentage points among all voters, around 8 percentage points among swing voters, and around

2 percentage points among PSUV voters (who are very high-propensity voters regardless of CC

participation). Finally, the marginal effects for electoral work are striking: CC participation

increases an individual's likelihood of performing electoral work on behalf of a political party

from around 8% to over 25% (all voters), from around 16% to 45% among PSUV voters, and 3%

to 15% among swing voters. These results suggest that CC participation not only affects electoral

outcomes, but that these effects are large enough to meaningfully impact electoral outcomes.

Figure 7.1: Marginal Effects of CC Participation on Electoral Outcomes

Future Vote Choice

Past Voter Turnout

Future Voter Turnout

all voters

psuv

unaff

226

Electoral Work

all voters

psuv

swing

Note: Marginal effects of CC participation are reported for every dependent variable/voter group for which my preferred models yielded positive and statistically-significant effects. All plots report the marginal effects of logistic models, with the exception of the electoral work plots, which report the marginal effects of OLS models.

In general, then, these results provide clear and consistent evidence that CCs are a useful electoral tool for the PSUV. They further indicate that the party's strategy of targeting both core supporters and swing voters through CCs has been successful. While other studies have shown that the presence of CCs in a given area increases electoral support for the PSUV (Handlin, 2016), and that CC participation increases broad support for the PSUV regime (Rhodes-Purdy,

227

2017), this is the first study to identify the direct electoral effects of BPIs, and the first to explore these effects across different voter groups. These findings suggest that BPIs can indeed offer political parties significant electoral benefits, at least in contexts where opposition parties and movements do not have the capacity to utilize BPIs effectively against the governing party.

How Does CC Participation Impact Electoral Behavior?

Having established that CC participation affects each of the three electoral outcomes analyzed in the previous section (vote choice, voter turnout, and electoral work), I turn now to the question of *how* these effects are generated. This is an issue that has received relatively little attention in the literature on participatory institutions. In the case of Venezuela's CCs, the primary mechanism offered by scholars to explain how CC participation affects electoral outcomes (specifically vote choice) is that CCs provide the PSUV a means of offering clientelistic benefits to likely PSUV supporters (García-Guadilla, 2008; Handlin, 2016) and/or distributing club goods to CCs in key districts (Álvarez & García-Guadilla, 2011; Corrales & Penfold, 2007). Consequently, one set of mechanisms I explore tests whether the distribution of material benefits (either clientelistic or club goods) improves CC participants' assessments of the PSUV, which in turn should increase their propensity to vote for the party, turnout on election day, and/or perform electoral work for the party.

By contrast, Rhodes-Purdy (2017) suggests that CC participation can impact voters' political perspectives through a broader range of mechanisms than clientelism or related modes of distributing material benefits. He argues that CC participation increases political support for the PSUV by offering CC participants a direct opportunity to participate in decision-making processes around the allocation of public resources. This increases CC participants' sense of

"regime-based efficacy," or the extent to which citizens believe the government is willing or able to respond to their demands (64). Rhodes-Purdy focuses on a number of non-material benefits a CC participant might receive, ranging from feeling an increased sense of community with their neighbors, to feeling a greater sense of social esteem in their community, to feeling an increased sense of self-worth or political efficacy.

Finally, the most commonly referenced mechanism for increasing PSUV support through the CCs mentioned in my interviews with CC activists and PSUV leaders related to political education and ideological persuasion. In particular, respondents emphasized the importance of using the CCs as a venue to persuade swing voters that they should support the PSUV, and to strengthen PSUV supporters' ideological commitment to the party. As one PSUV CC activist explained, "I've been very emphatic…with people in my CC, you have to get involved in political work…in ideological training schools, in the revolutionary consciousness" (*Interview with CC Leaders in El Recreo, Caracas*). The work of political persuasion and strengthening ideological commitment to the PSUV through CCs is conducted through a range of mechanisms. These include formal ideological trainings carried out in CCs and one-on-one persuasion conversations with CC members.

To test these different mechanisms, I draw again on my original survey of Venezuelan CC participants. Specifically, I explore a battery of questions that allows me to examine why CC participation improves citizens' perception of the PSUV, and in turn increases their likelihood of voting for or performing electoral work for the party. My survey includes questions that allow me to test each of the three classes of mechanisms described above, namely material benefits, non-material benefits, and political education/persuasion. For each class of mechanisms, I test a

range of specific outcomes, based on the theoretical discussion above. Table 7.7 includes a

summary of these mechanisms.

Table 7.7: Summary of Potential Mechanisms to Explain Relationship Between CC Participation and Electoral Outcomes

Class	Mechanism	Variable Wording
Receives Material Benefits	Individual Benefit1	"As a CC participant I receive or received (if no longer participates) more material benefits than people who don't participate."
Receives Material Benefits	Individual Benefit2	Respondent's opinion of the PSUV has improved because…"I've received material benefits from my CC."
Receives Material Benefits	Receipt of community benefits through CC improves respondent's opinion of the PSUV	Respondent's political opinions have been influenced by their CC participation due to…"Believing more in the Bolivarian Revolution after seeing the achievements of the CCs."
Pol. Ed./Persuasion	Contact with PSUV militants	"As a CC participant, I have or had (if no longer participates) more interactions with PSUV militants than people who don't participate."
Pol. Ed./Persuasion	Formal Ideological Trainings1	Respondent's political opinions have been influenced by their CC participation due to…"Receiving ideological training from the CC."
Pol. Ed./Persuasion	Formal Ideological Trainings2	Respondent responded yes to question: "Do you receive, or did you receive (if no longer participates) ideological training from your CC?"
Pol. Ed./Persuasion	Conversation w/neighbors	Respondent's political opinions have been influenced by their CC participation due to…"Conversations with other members of the CC."
Receives Non-Material Benefit	Building Community1	"A substantial part of my social life takes place or took place (when I participated) in my CC."
Receives Non-Material Benefit	Building Community2	Respondent's opinion of the PSUV has improved because…"I made friends with people in the CC."
Receives Non-Material Benefit	Gaining social esteem1	"Thanks to my CC participation, I am more respected in the community."
Receives Non-Material Benefit	Gaining social esteem2	Respondent's opinion of the PSUV has improved because…"I am now a more respected person in the community than I was before participating in my CC."
Receives Non-Material Benefit	sense of self-worth/efficacy1	Respondent's opinion of the PSUV has improved because…"I am now more capable of making change in my community [than I was before participating in my CC]."
Receives Non-Material Benefit	sense of self-worth/efficacy2	"Being a member of my CC is or was (if no longer participates) an important part of my personal identity."

I first estimate the propensity of respondents from each voter group (all respondents, swing voters, and PSUV supporters) to respond affirmatively to each of the survey items included in Table 7.7, controlling for the range of confounders described above. These results are reported in Figure 7.2. Since I am interested in understanding the mechanisms that improve respondents' opinions of the PSUV, for these estimates I subset the data to include only those respondents who reported that their opinion of the party improved after they became CC participants.[134] To visualize the relative importance of each class of mechanisms in explaining the effect of CC participation on electoral outcomes, estimates for each class are reported with different colors. Though small group sample sizes unfortunately limit the precision of my estimates, the results show wide variation in the importance of each mechanism, ranging from around 10% affirmative responses for the least important mechanisms to over 60% affirmative responses for the most important. Further, while there is significant variation in the importance of each mechanism across groups, a few trends emerge. First, non-material benefits and political education/persuasion mechanisms are most prevalent among highly important mechanisms, particularly contact with PSUV militants, social esteem, and self-worth/efficacy. For instance, feeling more respected in the community was either the first or second most important mechanism in each voter group, and contact with PSUV militants was among the top three most important mechanisms among each group. By contrast, the only consistently unimportant mechanisms across all groups were the two variables related to individual material benefits. This suggests, in contrast to much existing literature on the CCs, that non-material benefits are

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[134] Specifically, this question asks respondents the extent to which they agree with the statement "my perception of the PSUV has improved during my time as a CC participation (or improved, if no longer a participant)." For each question, respondents are offered five choices: 1) totally disagree, 2) partially disagree, 3) neither agree nor disagree, 4) partially agree, and 5) totally agree. My analyses include only respondents who answered "partially agree" or "totally agree."

actually more important in affecting CC participants' political perspectives than material

benefits. Of course, it could be the case that respondents understated the extent to which material

benefits, particularly individual benefits, played a role in their political calculations. If this were

true, however, we would expect PSUV supporters to report that receipt of material benefits

influenced their opinion of the PSUV at a lower rate than swing voters. This is because PSUV

supporters, who are more ideologically committed to the party than swing voters, are less likely

to admit that their CC participation is motivated by narrow material interests instead of

programmatic issues. This came up repeatedly in my interviews with CC participants:

Ideologically committed PSUV members tended to view the CCs through the lens of furthering

the Bolivarian Revolution, building an alternative, participatory state, etc., and dismissed

accusations against the CCs, whereas less-ideological respondents often viewed the CCs through

a more pragmatic, instrumental lens. To the contrary, however, in my survey, PSUV supporters

were more actually more likely than swing voters to report that individual material benefits

played a role in shaping their opinion of the PSUV. The relative openness of PSUV supporter

respondents to admit the role of material benefits in shaping their opinion of the CCs and the

PSUV suggests that the level of social desirability bias was not substantial for the questions

listed in Table 7.7.

Figure 7.2: Propensity to Respond Yes to Electoral Effect Mechanisms

Note: Estimates are predicted probabilities based on logistic regression models, including the battery of controls described earlier in the chapter. 95% confidence intervals calculated using cluster-robust SEs. Clustered by municipality. For these analyses, I subset the data to include only those respondents who reported that their opinion of the PSUV improved during their time as CC participants. Variables "individual benefit1," "contact with PSUV militants," "building community1," and "gaining social esteem1," are five-point ordinal variables. For each

question, respondents are offered five choices: 1) totally disagree, 2) partially disagree, 3) neither agree nor disagree, 4) partially agree, and 5) totally agree. For ease of comparison, I convert the original ordinal variables into binary variables where 1 = "partially agree" or "totally agree" and 0 = "totally disagree," "partially disagree," or "neither agree nor disagree." All other variables are binary variables where 1 = respondent answered yes and 0 = respondent answered no.

In turn, it may be the case that the impact of each mechanism is moderated by how frequently respondents participate in CC activities. Indeed, this is highly likely, given that most of the mechanisms examined require repeated interactions between PSUV activists and CC participants to have any effect. For instance, a person who only attends two CC meetings per year *may* feel more respected in her community as a result of this participation, if, for instance, she made a particularly compelling intervention at a CC assembly. That said, it is much more likely that a CC participant who attends meetings every week, and is viewed as a key CC activist by members of the community, would feel more respected in the community as a result of her CC participation. To address this possibility, I run a series of regression models to test, first, whether frequency of CC participation increases respondents' likelihood of reporting that they had a more favorable view of the PSUV after participating in a CC, and, second, whether frequency of CC participation increases respondents' likelihood of responding affirmatively to each of the mechanisms described above.

To test whether frequency of CC participation increases the probability that CC participation will improve respondents' opinions of the PSUV, I run models where the dependent variables are two questions capturing respondents' perceptions of the impact of CC participation on their political views, and the independent variable is respondents' frequency of CC participation.[135] I run separate regressions for all voters, as well as among swing and PSUV

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[135] CC frequency of participation is a 3 point categorical variable that asks respondents who reported being past or present CC participants if their CC meeting attendance was 1) at least once a week, 2) once or twice a month, or 3) once or twice a year. I convert this into a 3 point numeric variable where 0 = once or twice a year, 1 = once or twice a month, and 2 = at least once a week.

voters. For each group of voters, I run one set of regressions among respondents who reported having participated in a CC in the last 12 months ("current"), and another among respondents who reported that they participated in a CC at some point in the past, but no longer do so. For each model I include the battery of controls described earlier in the chapter. The results are presented in Figure 7.3, and suggest that frequency of CC participation only impacts the political views and positive perception of the PSUV among swing voters. Specifically, frequency of CC participation has a positive and statistically significant relationship with the political views of swing voters who are former CC participants, and also with improved opinion of the PSUV among swing voters who currently participate in a CC.[136] These results are consistent with my findings related to the basic effect of CC participation on electoral outcomes, since swing voters are, by definition, more persuadable politically than core PSUV supporters. In turn, increased CC participation may reinforce core supporters' connection to the PSUV, potentially rendering them more likely to turnout on election day or perform electoral work. That said, PSUV supporters' opinions of the party are less likely to change, since they have very favorable PSUV priors. This limits core supporters' potential for positive updating through increased CC participation.

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[136] The coefficients for impact on political views among swing voters/current CC participants and for improved PSUV opinion among swing voters/past CC participants are also positive, but not statistically significant at the .95 level.

Figure 7.3: Effect of Frequency of CC Participation on Political Views/PSUV Opinion

Note: OLS regression models, including controls and cluster-robust SEs (.95 level). Clustered by municipality. "political views" and "PSUV opinion" are five-point ordinal variables. The questions ask respondents the extent to which they agree with the statements "my political views have been influenced by my CC participation," or "my perception of the PSUV has improved during my time as a CC participant (or improved, if no longer a participant)." For each question, respondents are offered five choices: 1) totally disagree, 2) partially disagree, 3) neither agree nor disagree, 4) partially agree, and 5) totally agree. For ease of analysis, I convert the original ordinal variable into a five-point numeric variable (scale 1-5). Consequently, mean scores of less than 3 indicate overall disagreement, and scores greater than 3 indicate overall agreement. On the Y axis, "past" indicates that the independent variable is frequency of CC participation among respondents who used to participate in a CC but no longer do so, and "current" indicates that the independent variable is frequency of CC participation among respondents who have been active in a CC sometime over the last 12 months.

I next consider how frequency of CC participation shapes the impact of various

mechanisms that improve citizens' opinions of the PSUV through CC participation. The results

of this analysis are presented in Table 7.8. For each mechanism, I run regressions where the key

independent variable is frequency of CC participation, and the dependent variable is one of the

mechanisms described above (exact specifications vary by mechanism, details can be found in

the note to Table 7.8). Table 7.8 reports whether there is a statistically-significant relationship

between CC participation frequency and the likelihood that respondents answered yes to a given

mechanism. The results suggest—consistent with my findings above exploring the mechanisms

that are cited most frequently by CC participants to explain how CC participation improved their

opinion of the PSUV—that frequency of CC participation has no effect on the likelihood that

respondents (among any group) will report that receiving material benefits (either individual or

community) through a CC improved their opinion of the PSUV. The results also suggest that

political education/persuasion mechanisms are more effective in improving CC participants'

opinion of the PSUV as their frequency of participation increases. Specifically, frequency of CC

participation has a positive and statistically significant relationship with three out of four

political education/persuasion mechanisms among swing voters, while among PSUV supporters

it only has a positive and statistically significant relationship with one (Formal Ideological

Trainings1). This, again, conforms with my findings related to the basic effect of CC

participation on electoral outcomes, which suggest that CC participation only affects the vote

choice of swing voters. Having more conversations about the PSUV with neighbors, for instance,

may reinforce core supporters' connection to the PSUV, and make them more likely to turnout

on election day or perform electoral work. At the same time, however, since PSUV supporters

already have a favorable opinion of the party, the likelihood that these conversations will have a

positive impact on their opinion of the party is low. Finally, while increased CC participation has

no effect (or even a negative effect) on respondents' propensity to identify gaining social esteem

to explain their improved opinion of the PSUV, it appears to have a positive effect on other non-material benefits related to building community and gaining a sense of self-worth/efficacy through CC participation. This, again, suggests that non-material benefits may be more important for understanding how parties benefit electorally through BPI participation than has been thought previously.

Table 7.8: Effect of CC Participation Frequency on Electoral Effect Mechanisms

Class	Mechanism	All	PSUV	Swing
Material Benefits	Individual Benefits1	no	no	no
Material Benefits	Individual Benefits2	no	no	no
Material Benefits	Community benefits	no	no	no
Pol. Ed./Persuasion	Contact with PSUV militants	no	no	no
Pol. Ed./Persuasion	**Ideological Trainings1**	+	+	+
Pol. Ed./Persuasion	**Ideological Trainings2**	+	**no**	+
Pol. Ed./Persuasion	Conversation w/neighbors	no	no	+
Non-Material Benefits	Building Community1	no	no	no
Non-Material Benefits	**Building Community2**	+	+	**no**
Non-Material Benefits	Gaining social esteem1	-	no	no
Non-Material Benefits	Gaining social esteem2	no	no	no
Non-Material Benefits	**sense of self-worth/efficacy1**	+	**no**	**no**
Non-Material Benefits	**sense of self-worth/efficacy2**	+	**no**	+

Note: Indicators with statistically significant results in bold. The independent variable for all mechanisms is a 3-point categorical variable that asks respondents who reported being past or present CC participants if their CC meeting attendance was 1) at least once a week, 2) once or twice a month, or 3) once or twice a year. I convert this into a 3-point numeric variable where 0 = once or twice a year, 1 = once or twice a month, and 2 = at least once a week. The dependent variables "individual benefit1," "contact with PSUV militants," "building community1," and "gaining social esteem1," are 5-point ordinal variables. For each question, respondents are offered five choices: 1) totally disagree, 2) partially disagree, 3) neither agree nor disagree, 4) partially agree, and 5) totally agree. For these analyses, I convert the original ordinal variables into numeric variables (scale 1-5). For each of these mechanisms, I run OLS regression models, including controls and cluster-robust SEs (.95 level) (Clustered by Municipality). All other variables are binary variables where 1 = respondent answered yes, and 0 = respondent answered no. For each of these mechanisms I run logistic and OLS regressions, including controls and cluster-robust SEs (.95 level). I report effects (+ or -) if the logistic model (preferred model for binary outcomes) is statistically significant at the .95 level, or, in the case of models where the number of observations is too small to permit reliable logistic estimates, if the OLS model is statistically significant. For each mechanism and among each group of voters, I run one set of regressions among respondents who reported having participated in a CC in the last 12 months ("current"), and another among respondents who reported that they participated in a CC at some point in the past, but no longer do so

("past"). I report effects (+ or -) if the coefficient for a given mechanism is statistically significant at the .95 level for either the past or current CC participant independent

Conclusion

In this chapter I have offered systematic evidence that BPIs can affect a range of electoral outcomes, specifically vote choice, turnout, and campaign work, and that these effects vary by voter group. Consistent with my theory expectations, participation in Venezuela's CCs has consistent positive effects across each outcome among swing voters, while its positive impacts among PSUV supporters are limited to voter turnout and work on behalf of the party. Among opposition supporters, the only positive effect observed was, surprisingly, for party work. This can likely be explained by one of two possibilities. Individuals might have negative CC experiences (exclusion, discrimination, unfulfilled expectations) that motivate them to participate in electoral work on behalf of opposition parties. Alternatively, my interviews with CC activists in opposition strongholds suggest that, to a more limited extent, opposition parties also use BPIs for electoral purposes. In general, these findings support my claim that BPIs can yield significant electoral benefits, and consequently that parties may view BPIs, under the conditions described in Chapter 2, as a useful electoral tool.

The results in this chapter are also consistent with my theoretical expectations about the effects of BPI participation across voter groups, though their consistently positive effects among swing voters suggest that the PSUV may have benefited even more electorally from the CCs if it had tailored its political messaging through the CCs more to swing voters than core supporters. This chapter also offered the first in-depth quantitative analysis of the specific mechanisms through which BPI participation generates positive electoral effects. While previous studies have viewed Venezuela's CCs primarily as a mechanism for distributing material benefits to likely

239

PSUV supporters, I find, to the contrary, that political education/ideological persuasion, and a range of non-materials benefits, ranging from building community to gaining esteem in the community, are actually more prevalent mechanisms for explaining how CCs strengthen support for the PSUV among participants than the receipt of individual material benefits. This is an important finding, because it not only complicates the relatively narrow picture in much of the literature of CCs as vehicles to facilitate clientelistic exchange, but it also suggests that BPIs may be less vulnerable to variation in financing than previous studies have suggested. Morgan (2018), for example, argues that due to their dependence on government financing to motivate participation, the CCs are "…unlikely to serve as an organizational base for *Chavismo* absent public funds acquired through control of the presidency" (42). To the contrary, while *Chavismo* still controlled the Venezuelan presidency in 2018, the financial resources it had available to distribute through the CCs had declined substantially since the crash in oil prices beginning in 2014. Despite this, however, CC participation in 2018 remained comparatively high, with less than half of respondents in my original survey reporting that participation had declined in their CCs since the end of the commodities boom, and over 60% of respondents who had ever participated in a CC in the past reporting that they still did so in 2018 (Abbott & McCarthy, 2019). Finally, my findings in this chapter also suggest that the CCs' capacity to improve voters' perceptions of the PSUV through ideological and non-material benefits may actually be critical in helping the party maintain electoral support during periods of fiscal contraction.

Chapter 8. CONCLUSIONS AND THE PATH NOT TAKEN: EXTERNALLY MOBILIZED BPI IMPLEMENTATION

Introduction

This dissertation has focused on the headwinds facing nationwide implementation of representative BPIs. It has shown not only that the conditions required for even basic implementation of BPIs on a large scale are quite demanding, but also that when implementation does occur, BPIs' subsequent trajectory is set on a path-dependent course shaped by the conditions that made implementation possible in the first place. Broadly speaking, I have shown that the conditions required for nationwide BPI implementation (political parties' belief that they will benefit electorally, and a weak/state-dependent organized civil society/social movement sector), tend to undermine the institutions' capacity to serve as effective vehicles for the representation of community interests. In particular, I have shown that the trajectory taken by BPIs in each country is a product of the relationship between the conditions required for nationwide BPI implementation and the type of actor responsible for implementation. For the two most prevalent actors—internally mobilized parties and technocrats—the conditions required for BPI implementation generate distinct advantages and limitations with respect to BPI representativeness.

As we saw clearly in the case of Venezuela, internally mobilized parties' belief that BPIs will bring them electoral rewards produces an incentive to channel significant resources (which they have in abundance) into mobilizing community participation. At the same time, however, the electoral calculus of these parties also includes a strong incentive to politicize BPIs, by excluding/marginalizing supporters of opposition parties from BPI participation or benefits, thereby undermining the institutions' capacity to represent broad community interests. In turn,

when internally mobilized parties implement BPIs, there are few countervailing political forces capable of limiting politicization. This is because internally mobilized parties will only permit nationwide BPI implementation if they do not fear that organized civil society or social movements have the capacity to utilize BPIs against them. By contrast, when technocrats implement BPIs, they largely neutralize the risk of BPI politicization caused by parties' incentive to profit electorally from BPIs. Yet at the same time, technocrats' lack of access to the mobilizational resources parties can devote to BPIs in search of electoral gains severely limits rates of community participation in BPIs. And since parties will only allow nationwide BPI implementation to proceed when the risks of co-optation by strong and autonomous civil society and social movement organizations are low, technocrats lack the coalition partners they would need to generate high levels of BPI participation in the absence of party support.

The dynamics described above raise a series of fundamental questions about the viability and value of BPIs as a tool for improving the quality of democracy. Is the paradox of participatory institutions inevitable? Are there any ways to avoid the paradox, or at least mitigate its effects? Are there any conditions under which successful nationwide implementation could occur? To draw some tentative conclusions about these questions, in this chapter I first examine a case of successful medium-scale, subnational BPI implementation by the Brazilian PT in the 1990s, before it came to power at the national level in 2003. Since there are no cases of nationwide BPI implementation by externally mobilized parties, the PT's experience provides the best evidence available to demonstrate the capacity of externally mobilized parties to overcome the paradox of participatory institutions.

In this case study, I will document the impressive results the PT achieved with respect to BPI representativeness, and also show why the party had a strong political incentive to both

minimize politicization and maximize participation. Yet when the PT eventually won the Brazilian presidency in 2003, not only did it fail to implement BPIs nationwide, but it largely abandoned BPIs as a priority project for municipal governments under its control. Consequently, I conclude my case study by examining why the PT abandoned BPIs after 2002, but also why externally mobilized parties in other contexts may push forward with nationwide implementation. I argue that when the PT reached national power, it was simply too constrained in the legislature to overcome major political and legal obstacles to formal BPI adoption. Additionally, the PT's relative weakness at the municipal level, combined with the absence of a strong PT-aligned coalition pressing for nationwide BPI implementation, shifted the party's electoral calculus around BPI implementation, dramatically increasing the political risks relative to the possible rewards. As a result, I argue that while the PT was faced with insurmountable constraints, externally mobilized parties *can* successfully implement BPIs in more favorable political contexts, and I suggest a number of possible parties around the world that might serve as examples.

Next, since parties, civil society/social movement organizations, and technocrats will (and should) continue experimenting with BPIs in a range of contexts where the prospect of externally mobilized party success at the national level is remote, I briefly discuss a range of lessons this study can offer for maximizing BPI success under unfavorable circumstances. Finally, I discuss avenues of future research that might build upon the findings and theoretical frameworks presented in this dissertation, and I offer concluding thoughts on the implications of my research for the future of participatory institutions.

Externally Mobilized Party Implementation: The Brazilian Worker's Party

BPIs appeared in municipalities across Brazil during the 1990s and 2000s in the form of participatory budgeting (PB). Driven largely by mayors from the PT, practically all of whom implemented some version of PB after taking office (Baiocchi, 2005, pp. 12–13), PB would eventually be implemented in over 400 Brazilian municipalities (Dias, 2018, p. 104). Despite well-documented variation in BPI representativeness across the municipalities under its control (Avritzer, 2009; Baiocchi et al., 2011; Montambeault, 2015; Nylen, 2002; Wampler, 2010), the PT's PB experiments show clearly that when externally mobilized parties implement BPIs, they can do so in a way that is both electorally advantageous *and* minimizes politicization.

1. Evidence of Low Politicization

First, while details of relative participation rates across partisan affiliation are limited, the surveys we do have do not show systematic differences in the prevalence of PT supporters vs. other voters among PB participants. For instance, polls taken of PB participants in Porto Alegre found little difference in rates of support for the PT among PB participants compared to the population as a whole. Baiocchi (2005, p. 151), reports results of a 2001 survey of PB participants in Porto Alegre showing that while a majority of participants expressed political sympathy with the PT, this percentage was actually lower than the citywide preference for the party. Further, the rate of party membership among PB participants in Porto Alegre was roughly equal to that among the population as a whole (Goldfrank, 2011a, p. 201).

It is important to note that when we shift from the universe of all PB participants and focus only on elected PB delegates (who are chosen by PB participants from different organizations and communities to serve as representatives to regional PB assemblies), there is

evidence in some cases of both higher rates of participation among supporters of the mayor's party (Nylen, 2002; Romão, 2016, p. 72; Wampler, 2010, p. 78), as well as higher rates of party affiliation. Goldfrank (2011), for instance, reports that in Porto Alegre (in 2000) 50% of PB delegates preferred the PT to other political parties, compared to the 37% of Porto Alegre residents overall who preferred the PT (Goldfrank, 2011a, p. 202). That said, as I show below, there is little indication that differences in participation rates across partisan affiliation had an impact on participants' perceptions of partisan bias in the PB process. To the contrary, there is significant evidence demonstrating that perceptions of political bias among both PB participants and the broader population were quite low in the case of Brazilian PB.

The most comprehensive evidence that perceptions of political bias in PB processes were low in Brazilian municipalities governed by the PT comes from Wampler (2010), who carried out a representative survey of PB delegates in eight large cities. Wampler finds that, while there is variation across cases, "most survey respondents hold a favorable view of the activities and actions of government officials within PB…most respondents also believe that their fellow delegates are largely respectful of the process" (Wampler, 2010, p. 78). Wampler concludes that "The robust level of responses suggests that delegates do not believe that their fellow delegates are trying to manipulate or bend PB's rules for their own gain" (Wampler, 2010, p. 78). Further, in his statistical analyses of whether PB delegates feel empowered through the PB process, partisan political affiliation is a weak predictor of citizen attitudes (Wampler, 2010, pp. 88–89). Based on this evidence, Wampler concludes that "…PB [participation], rather than partisan politics, has a significant effect on shaping the attitudes of PB participants" (Wampler, 2010, p. 92). Goldfrank (2011), analyzing the results of a range of public opinion polls in Porto Alegre between 1994 and 2000, found that large majorities of Porto-Alegrenses believed PB improved

245

the distribution of public resources in the city (Goldfrank, 2011a, p. 197). These findings are corroborated by qualitative evidence from interviews with PB delegates. Montambeault (2012), for instance, recounts a conversation she had with a PB delegate in Belo Horizonte, who explained that while PB leaders were not necessarily apolitical, they always left partisan politics at the door before entering PB deliberations: "the richness of the process, of the discussion, is that it is not a game between the interests of the political parties, the PT, PDT, PSDM, or the PSL. There is nothing like this. Here, what we have is an interest in the community" (Montambeault, 2012, p. 112). Baiocchi, summarizing his observation of PB meetings and interviews with PB participants in Porto Alegre, draws similar conclusions: "Many community activists have a 'practical relationship' to political parties, but even those who have ideological commitments to the PT 'leave political party activity' at the door of both the [neighborhood] association and the OP [PB]" (Baiocchi, 2005, p. 115). As a result, he explains that "There was little attempt to control the content of discussions in participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre, and OP meetings there were far from being party-controlled spaces" (Baiocchi, 2005, p. 150).

2. Process-Tracing Representative BPIs in Brazil

Limiting Politicization

How was the PT able to limit BPI politicization, despite being a political party facing strong electoral incentives to take advantage of BPIs for political gain? As I described in Chapter 2, when externally mobilized parties implement BPIs, they, like internally mobilized parties, do so with the aim, at least in part, of securing electoral gains. Unlike internally mobilized parties, however, given their limited access to state resources to distribute through BPIs, externally

246

mobilized parties have an incentive to use BPIs primarily for making programmatic voter appeals, rather than distributing material benefits to their supporters. Specifically, they use BPIs as a signal to the electorate that they are a new, different kind of party that is committed—unlike traditional parties—to good governance and democratic deepening. For this appeal to be successful, however, externally mobilized parties cannot be perceived as using BPIs instrumentally to serve their own electoral interests. Consequently, these parties have an incentive to limit BPI politicization.

This characterization of the relationship between PB and electoral strategies is consistent with the way PT leaders describe how PB fit into their political calculus. Since the party's primary arena of electoral struggle during the 1980s and 1990s was at the municipal level, and since it was an externally mobilized party lacking the resources required to compete successfully based on traditional electoral strategies, the party had to devise an electoral strategy based on programmatic appeals that could differentiate it from more resource-rich traditional parties.[137] As Abers (2000), describing PB implementation in Porto Alegre in the early 1990s, explains:

> "The vast majority of big city governments in Brazil seek to gain...[the] blessing...[of public opinion] by demonstrating government effectiveness through a few extremely visible 'big projects'—stadiums, tunnels, bridges—and by cultivating the support of powerful businesses and other elite groups that contribute to flashy media campaigns. The Porto Alegre administration took an entirely different tack, which turned out to have great 'marketability' with the local public: it emphasized being a 'different kind of government,' characterized by the lack of corruption; by transparent, participatory decision making; by an emphasis on social justice; and by being able to promote these ethically valuable goals while at the same time providing basic public services effectively" (Abers, 2000, p. 102).

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[137] The PT's success in branding itself as a party of a different type had real impacts on its national-level political fortunes. Indeed, as Hunter (2010) explains, "had the PT moderated and become 'catchall' in approach sooner than it did, Lula would have had less credibility in casting himself as an alternative" (Hunter, 2010, p. 143).

Promoting this "different kind of government" was not limited to the municipal administration in Porto Alegre. Indeed, it became a central feature of the PT's national strategy to broaden the party's electoral base in the years prior to Lula's victory in the presidential election of 2002. (Hunter, 2010, p. 97; W. Romão, 2016, p. 77; Samuels, 2004). The party sought to create a brand identity, referred to as the "PT way of governing" (*o modo petista de governar*), which consisted, as Baiocchi et al. (2013) describe, in "…direct democracy and ample popular participation; crusade-like campaigns against corruption, patrimonialism and clientelism in the municipal and state institutions; and socio-economic redistribution through improved public infrastructure and services benefitting the subaltern classes…" (p. 223). As the PT's municipal-level success increased in the late 1980s and 1990s, PB emerged as an effective tool to demonstrate the PT way of governing. PB was a particularly attractive option to pragmatically oriented PT leaders, since it allowed the party to reach out to new constituencies without alienating its traditional base of unions and social movements (Baiocchi, 2005, p. 12; Hunter, 2010, p. 96). As a result, the party strongly recommended that all its new mayors implement PB (Bezerra, 2019; *Interview with Eduardo Suplicy*). By 2004, PB had been adopted in all PT-governed cities with more than 100,000 residents, as well as in most smaller cities with PT mayors (Wampler, 2010, pp. 25–26). To publicize its PB achievements, the party also aggressively pursued national and international "good governance" awards (Hunter, 2010, p. 97). In sum, PB became an important component of the PT's broad political strategy to expand its electoral base by differentiating itself programmatically from rival parties.

If PT mayors—and the party more broadly—expected PB to effectively demonstrate the party's commitment to good governance, they could not risk creating the perception that PB was simply an old clientelistic wine packaged in a new participatory bottle. Rather, they would have

248

to work diligently to avoid the appearance of PB politicization. The party took a number of steps toward that end. One was to institute strict rules prohibiting PB assemblies from being turned into partisan spaces. Thus, for example, PT members do not participate in BP processes as members of the party, but rather as individual citizens or members of civil society groups (Baiocchi, 2005, p. 211; *Interview with Luiz Dulci*). Another step the party took to minimize politicization was to ensure that participation was as broad as possible. Accordingly, PT municipal governments "…encouraged an open process, in which anyone could participate and, if he or she played by the rules, could benefit" (Abers, 2000, pp. 100–101).

The PT was so worried about damaging its party brand through PB politicization that it abstained from bringing partisan politics into PB spaces *even when doing so risked empowering its political opponents.* Baiocchi (2005), for instance, explains that PT-aligned PB administrators in Porto Alegre felt the need to provide ample space in PB meetings to their political rivals, because failing to do so could create an opening for opposition parties to tarnish the PT's good governance credentials:

> "As one city hall employee put it, '[O]ne of the things we have to do here is allow the opposition [the PDT] plenty of time at the microphone,' even if they 'always go first at the plenary meetings with the mayor, and always attack him.' He said if PDT activists were not allowed the chance to publicly castigate the PT, the administration 'would be accused of being undemocratic'" (Baiocchi, 2005, p. 126).

Even though, "…from a purely instrumental point of view the party's electoral reproduction there could be a danger that these [PB] spaces could be used against the party itself" (Baiocchi, 2005, p. 150), the PT nevertheless permitted such activities, for fear of undermining their reputation for democratic deepening and good governance.[138]

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[138] For a similar account see Abers (2000), p. 101.

None of this, however, is to suggest that the PT was not using PB for electoral ends, quite the contrary. Indeed, it is clear that the party pursued a range of electoral objectives through PBs, but none entailed attempts to exclude or marginalize non-PT supporters from BPI participation or benefits. First, as explained above, the PT hoped that PB would help it win more adherents by showing its commitment to good governance. This appeal was most salient among middle-class voters who were more concerned with issues of democratic deepening and good governance than their lower-income counterparts, who were comparatively more interested in the immediate material benefits offered by PB (Abers, 2000, p. 103; Bruera, 2015, p. 75; Navarro, 2004, p. 252; Schneider & Baquero, 2006, pp. 24–25). That said, the party also hoped to use PB to gain new lower-class supporters. As one interview respondent explained, "[before PB] we were winning [elections] primarily with support from the 'enlightened' middle class, and the organized working class…The idea was never to limit PB to the PT base…to the contrary, it [PB] was a way of creating dialogue with unorganized [primarily poor] sectors of the city" (*Interview with Luiz Dulci*). In turn, he explained, "PT militants would come to the PB assemblies, participate as individuals (not as the party, because…nobody participated as party members)…build spaces of dialogue with the people, and this would generate connections that the party could build on later."[139] Finally, the PT hoped PB would help it win support among well-connected community activists who would work electorally for the PT outside of PB spaces, and spread the party's message throughout the broader community (Abers, 2000, p. 101; Montambeault, 2015, p. 156; Wampler, 2010, p. 117).[140] As these examples show, whatever electoral uses the party hoped to

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[139]For similar arguments, see Bruera (2015, p. 75) and Melgar (2014, p. 129).

[140] Many commentators have also argued that the PT had clear governability incentives to implement BPIs, specifically, by using PB to generate a popular mandate for the PT mayor's priorities that could be used to overcome opposition-controlled city councils (Bruera, 2015; Couto, 2009; Goldfrank & Schneider, 2006; Leubolt et al., 2012). That said, Spada (2014) finds that this argument is not consistent with available quantitative data on PB adoption by PT mayors (Spada, 2014, p. 28).

make of PB were predicated upon the need to avoid politicization. In other words, the PT's

efforts to minimize BPI politicization were not simply a product of its ideological commitment to

good governance, but rather a tactical necessity based on its broader electoral strategy.[141]

Finally, the PT also had an incentive to permit, and even promote, higher levels of civil

society strength and autonomy, which, in turn, served as a check on BPI politicization. Since the

PT's electoral strategy depended on maintaining the perception that PB represented a different,

more open, and democratic way of doing politics, the PT had a strong incentive to ensure civil

society organizations could operate freely through BPIs. Unlike most political parties, which

typically seek hegemonic political control over civil society, in the case of externally mobilized

parties like the PT, we see the opposite incentives at work. Indeed, as Baiocchi (2005) explains,

the party's "…ability to remain in power depend[ed] on supporting forums where civil society

[was] autonomous and empowered to make claims" (Baiocchi, 2005, p. 150). As a result, "CSOs

and citizens do not shy away from open confrontation with government officials. Citizens and

delegates use their allotted time to explain why they believe that government officials have been

negligent or incompetent" (Wampler, 2010, p. 120). As described above, these critiques could

often be withering, and potentially politically damaging for PT mayors.

Additionally, the PT's desire to facilitate broad community participation also led to PB

rules encouraging the formation of new civil society organizations. Specifically, in order to

become a delegate to one of the large regional or thematic assemblies, aspirants had to secure a

small, but significant number of votes from community members. Consequently, as Goldfrank

(2011) describes:

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[141] While evidence on the electoral effects of PB is scarce, at least two quantitative analyses have found significant positive effects of PB implementation on the PT's electoral results (Schneider & Baquero, 2006; Spada, 2015).
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"Before the assemblies, residents from the same street or neighborhood frequently form ad hoc committees, usually for the purpose of pursuing a specific demand…If enough neighbors come together, they can select a delegate to represent them in the district budget forum. *Thus, PB's informal structure tends to encourage the formation of new organizations among the previously unorganized*" (Goldfrank, 2011a, p. 193, emphasis mine).[142]

Not surprisingly, then, in some cities PB played a major role in increasing civil society activity. In Porto Alegre, for example, "Over half the [neighborhood] associations that existed in 2002 had been founded or restarted after the establishment of the OP" (Baiocchi, 2005, p. 116).

This does not mean that PB experiments by the PT always strengthened autonomous civil society. Numerous scholars have found that in some cases the PT informally controlled PB decision-making processes, or used PB to exert greater influence over civil society (Baiocchi et al., 2011; Leubolt et al., 2012; Montambeault, 2012; Romão, 2011). Further, there is evidence that in many cases the PT only implemented PB because it enjoyed an organic relationship with existing civil society and social movement organizations (which were often very closely linked to the PT historically) (Baiocchi et al., 2011, pp. 128–129; Wampler, 2010, p. 137), or because existing civil society was relatively weak (Abers, 2000, p. 99). In these cases, PB may have strengthened civil society, but that does not mean the PT's willingness to empower potentially disruptive civil society or social movement organizations was without limit. Nonetheless, the virtuous cycle among the PT's electoral incentives, civil society strength and autonomy, and PB politicization illustrates how externally mobilized political parties' BPI electoral strategies can reinforce, rather than undermine, civil society strength and autonomy.

Expanding Participation

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[142] For a similar account, see Montambeault (2015, p. 152).

The PT's experiments with PB suggest not only that externally mobilized parties can implement BPIs while limiting politicization, but also that, unlike technocrats, they can do so while mobilizing large numbers of citizens into BPI participation. Though government-collected participation figures are available for a number of Brazilian cities, they cannot be easily compared to the national-level participation rates documented in Chapter 5. On the one hand, municipal authorities only tracked the participation rates of large, regional, or thematic plenary meetings. They did not track the participation rates of much more frequent local-level meetings (Montambeault, 2015, p. 145; Navarro, 2004, pp. 263, 279). This produces significant underestimates of the total number of participants. On the other hand, as I discussed in Chapter 3, we cannot assume that the potential outcomes of BPI participation rates in countries without nationwide implementation are the same as those of countries with nationwide BPI implementation. The latter enjoy both larger BPI budgets, as well as more extensive organizational resources to assist with citizen mobilization into BPIs. No individual mayor, for instance, has the capacity to mobilize community participation to the extent that, say, former Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez could mobilize communities by going on national television and urging his millions of supporters to participate. Consequently, available data show comparatively low levels of BPI participation in Brazil, ranging from around 4.5% of the adult population in Recife, 3% in Porto Alegre, and 2.6% in Belo Horizonte.[143] That said, reported BPI participation rates in Brazilian municipalities exceed or approach national-level participation rates in countries with technocratic BPI implementation (such as Peru and the Dominican Republic). Considering figures for Brazil in light of the major caveats discussed above, it is

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[143] Porto Alegre participation figures from Avritzer, 2009, p. 93 and Navarro, 2004, p. 145; Recife figures from Montambeault, 2015, p. 145; Belo Horizonte figures from Wampler, 2015, p. 110. Population statistics from IBGE.

reasonable to assume that if all participants were included (rather than just those of the major regional and thematic assemblies), and if PB had been implemented nationwide, Brazilian PB participation rates would be well above those of countries with technocratic BPI implementation.

Further, the PT not only enjoyed a well-organized party apparatus it could employ for community mobilization, but it also had political incentives to encourage widespread BPI participation. Given the party's desire to reach both poor voters and well-connected community activists through BPIs (discussed above), maximizing PB participation was clearly in its electoral self-interest; the more participants the PT managed to attract, the more votes it could sway. Further, the PT's efforts to limit politicization in PB spaces also increased community activists' interest in mobilizing their neighbors. Low politicization afforded PB a high level of popular legitimacy, and this converted the process into a site for activists to prove their organizing bona fides. Baiocchi (2005), for instance, explains how, in Porto Alegre, "the OP is known as a place where neighborhood activists can make a name for themselves by bringing impressive numbers of participants…" (Baiocchi, 2003, p. 120). Consequently, both party and community activists had incentives to promote widespread PB participation.

In sum, then, the PT's experiments with BPIs suggest that if an externally mobilized party in control of the national executive sought to implement BPIs nationwide, it would also deploy its considerable organizational resources to maximize participation. Since, as we have seen, the PT also had an electoral incentive to limit politicization, it is likely that nationwide BPI implementation by an externally mobilized party would produce representative BPIs with both low rates of politicization and high rates of participation. Yet, when the PT eventually captured the Brazilian presidency in 2003, it largely abandoned BPIs.

3. <u>Can Externally Mobilized Parties Implement BPIs Nationwide?</u>

A number of theories have been offered to explain why the PT never implemented BPIs nationwide after 2002. Some argue that winning power at the national level substantially diminished PB's electoral utility in the eyes of the party. This might have been because of a variety of reasons, including: the PT simply no longer needed to establish its track record of good governance after it won the presidency (Spada, 2014, p. 17), achieving national power forced the PT to focus on more pressing policy concerns than PB (Bruera, 2015, p. 8; *Interview with Luiz Dulci*), or the party felt the need to focus on electoral strategies with wider appeal than PB (such as *Bolsa Família)* (Bruera, 2015, p. 2; *Interview with Félix Sánchez*). Others argue that key figures around President Lula viewed nationwide PB implementation as a potential political threat, because it might empower the Left to press for stronger economic reforms than the party was prepared to entertain (Baiocchi et al., 2013; Goldfrank, 2011b, p. 167). Still others maintain that the party believed new kinds of participatory institutions were needed to scale-up citizen participation to the national level (such as national policy conferences), because PB was not viable beyond the municipal level (Bruera, 2015, p. 8; *Interview with Luiz Dulci*). Whatever the relative importance of these factors, it is clear that the PT valued the political risks of nationwide BPI implementation higher than the rewards.

Yet the obstacles to nationwide BPI implementation that are present in the case of the PT do not necessarily apply to all externally mobilized parties. Indeed, these impediments might have been overcome even in Brazil if the requirements identified in Chapter 2 for nationwide BPI implementation had been present. First, as described in Chapter 3, when it came to national power, the PT controlled only a small fraction of municipal governments across Brazil (it

governed in 187 municipalities, representing 17.8% of the Brazilian population).[144]

Consequently, even if the PT had been able to build a legislative majority in favor of nationwide

PB implementation (which would have been very unlikely given its weakness in the national

legislature), it would have feared large-scale co-optation of the process by its rivals.[145] If, by

contrast, the party had been in a dominant electoral position at the local level, its leaders might

have viewed PB as a viable mechanism for consolidating and expanding their electoral base. In

turn, while it is certainly possible to argue that societal demand for increased citizen participation

existed in Brazil in the early 2000s, there was a range of competing proposals from within the PT

coalition regarding the form that this increased participation should take. The wing of the party

committed to PB (around figures like former Porto Alegre Mayor and Housing Minister Olívio

Dutra) was at a distinct disadvantage compared to more influential voices around Lula who were

either openly skeptical of participatory institutions in general, or favored alternative participatory

institutions such as the national policy conferences and councils (Bruera, 2015, pp. 7–8;

Goldfrank, 2011b, pp. 169–173). As a result, PB had little chance of making it onto the national

policymaking agenda.

That said, however, there is no strong reason to believe nationwide BPI implementation

could not occur in contexts where externally mobilized parties enjoy greater local-level electoral

strength than the PT, and where BPIs are the most influential participatory policy proposal

within the governing coalition. For example, in Venezuela in the early 1990s, an externally

mobilized party, Radical Cause (LCR) won municipal elections in two large Venezuelan cities

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[144] This number rose to 441 in 2004, but even then, the PT was at a substantial disadvantage compared to rival parties, and in 2004 the party lost mayoral elections in key cities such as São Paulo and its historic stronghold of Porto Alegre.

[145] As early as 1996, mayors not belonging to the PT were responsible for over half (55.2%) of the total cases of PB implementation across Brazil (Spada, 2014, p. 16).

(including the country's most populous municipality, Libertador, a city within greater Caracas), and its mayors, promoting a rhetoric of radical democracy, implemented PB. While never coming close to winning the presidency, LCR did come in fourth place in the tight presidential race of 1993 (LCR's candidate, Andrés Velásquez, won 22% of the vote, only 8% less than the winner, Rafael Caldera). The party was on track to perform even better in the 1998 election, but the poor performance of its high-profile mayor in Caracas, Aristóbulo Istúriz—who failed to win reelection in 1995—undermined its status as the most important outsider party in Venezuela, and cleared an electoral path for future President Hugo Chávez (Goldfrank, 2011a, p. 249). Would LCR have implemented BPIs nationwide if it had won national power? On the one hand, it might had expected acrimonious relationships with CSOs and social movements linked to Venezuela's traditional parties. At the same time, however, as discussed in Chapter 4, Venezuelan civil society was comparatively weak and state dependent in the 1990s, suggesting that LCR would have perceived a low risk of BPI co-optation by opposition-aligned CSOs/social movement organizations. Consequently, assuming it was able to gain sufficient subnational electoral strength, there is a reasonable chance that the LCR would have implemented BPIs. Indeed, given that a range of its former members (including Istúriz) would eventually be instrumental in pushing for a pre-CC BPI model (CLPPs, discussed in Chapter 4) during the early Chávez years, this possibility appears quite likely.[146]

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[146] It is important to note that the CLPPs, which were tied much more closely to municipal governments than the CCs, had a much greater capacity to limit politicization compared to the CCs. Further, the LCR, unlike the MVR, had experience implementing BPIs *prior* to achieving power at the national level, meaning that it would have been accustomed to limiting BPI politicization before implementing BPIs nationwide.

Conclusions

1. <u>Contemporary Opportunities for Externally Mobilized Party Implementation</u>

Turning to contemporary examples, there a number of externally mobilized parties in Latin America, as well as in other regions of the world, that could conceivably implement BPIs nationwide if they came to power at the national level. In Latin America these include the Chilean *Frente Amplio* coalition (whose most recent presidential candidate garnered 20% of the vote), and Colombia's Humana (whose 2018 presidential candidate won 25% of the first-round vote, before garnering 42% in the second round). The platforms of these parties include calls for increasing citizen participation and strengthening participatory democracy, as well as a commitment to implementing or strengthening participatory budgeting processes (Colombia Humana, 2017; Frente Amplio, 2017).

Outside of Latin America, externally mobilized parties such as Podemos in Spain (which won 14.3% of the vote in 2019 elections), and Levica in Slovenia (which won around 10% of the vote in 2018) have similarly incorporated PB into their political platforms (Dias, 2018; Podemos, 2019). In other cases, new externally mobilized parties may arise to reinvigorate stalled, weak, or failed nationwide BPI processes in countries as diverse as Poland, Peru, and South Korea. Each of these countries have legally adopted BPIs and implemented them on a large scale, but have suffered from complaints that the processes are weak and ineffectual (Dias, 2018; Kim & Lee, 2016; McNulty, 2019; Sześciło, 2015). Since a number of studies have shown that disappointed expectations around BPIs can generate momentum for stronger BPIs in the future (Abers, 2000; Baiocchi, 2003; Hetland, 2014; Hetland, 2015), these frustrated expectations might provide

political opportunities for externally mobilized parties in these countries to differentiate themselves programmatically from rival parties.

2. <u>Lessons for Implementing Representative BPIs in Unfavorable Contexts</u>

Despite these potential opportunities, however, the prospects for nationwide implementation of representative BPIs remain limited. This, as I discuss below, is a reality that promoters of participatory institutions must confront, as it raises difficult questions about the ultimate capacity of PIs to improve the quality of democracy on a large scale. Yet, less-ambitious BPI experiments can, and often do, generate real positive effects on the quality of democracy and governance at the local level (See review of this literature in Chapter 2). As a result, political parties, civil society/social movement organizations, and technocrats will (and should) continue experimenting with BPIs in a range of contexts where the prospect of representative nationwide implementation is remote. A number of lessons can be drawn from this dissertation's study of nationwide BPI implementation, which might be of use in maximizing both the breadth of implementation, as well as the representativeness of BPIs under unfavorable circumstances.

Limiting Politicization

First, as the case of the Dominican Republic showed (in Chapter 5), technocrats can work to limit politicization by making dates of BPI meetings, lists of participants, and even photos of meetings publicly available (similar steps were taken in Peru). While to date there is little work examining the effectiveness of these measures, case studies and interviews with BPI advocates suggest they have significant potential. Further, this is an achievable step that BPI implementers

can take in any country, though it does require a reasonably competent government agency to administer it.

Next, while representative nationwide BPI implementation may be most likely when externally mobilized parties take the lead, under certain conditions BPI advocates may be able to increase internally mobilized parties' incentive to implement representative BPIs. This might be possible, for instance, in contexts where internally mobilized parties seek to stake out more progressive policy positions in the face of (or in expectation of) rising externally mobilized challengers. For example, the center-left Socialist Party in Portugal, perceiving increased citizen discontent with Portuguese political institutions during the previous conservative government, and facing rising parties to its left (whose combined vote share increased from 10.2% in 2005 to 18.5% in 2015), included PB in its 2015 platform (Falanga, 2018). After the Socialist Party's 2015 victory, PB in Portugal expanded further, reaching some 49% of municipalities by 2017 (Dias et al., 2018). The country has even begun experimenting with national-level PB for youth and education issues.

While BPI practitioners working under conditions of high politicization have limited tools at their disposal to improve the representativeness of BPIs, even in these cases (as in Venezuela), there are steps BPI promoters can take to decrease politicization. As I showed in Chapter 6, increased political competition is likely to shift governing parties' BPI electoral strategies toward swing voters. In turn, shifting parties' electoral focus to swing voters should decrease the prevalence of BPI politicization, since swing voters can be put off by politicization. Consequently, BPI practitioners in countries with high rates of politicization should work to strengthen BPIs in competitive areas, where the governing party's electoral incentives align with strategies to limit politicization. In less competitive areas, where the governing party is

electorally dominant, advocates of limited politicization should, to the extent possible, increase

the political costs of BPI politicization by documenting and publicizing cases where individuals

or groups were excluded from BPI participation or benefits. My interviews with BPI activists in

Venezuela suggest that it was not uncommon for this strategy to be effective in turning

community opinion against BPI leaders who attempted to politicize the institution. In some

cases, this led to the election of new BPI leaders who were motivated to limit politicization.

Increasing Participation

Turning to lessons for increasing BPI participation, there is no substitute for having well-

funded BPIs to induce community participation (Goldfrank, 2011a; Schneider & Baquero, 2006).

That said, my analysis in Chapter 7, consistent with existing literature demonstrating that

political engagement can offer a range of important non-material benefits to citizens (Boehnke &

Wong, 2011; Koop, 2014; Vestergren et al., 2019), suggests that focusing on non-material

benefits offered by BPIs can be a useful strategy for increasing participation. This approach can

take many forms, but some examples include explaining to community members that

participating in BPIs is a way to build new friendships, to make a difference in their community,

and to become respected community leaders, among other possible benefits. These benefits can

be publicized through meeting invitations, written or video testimonials from existing

participants, as well as discussions between existing participants and other community members.

Another mechanism for increasing participation, building on my discussion of the importance

of civil society organizations for achieving representative BPIs in Chapter 2 and Chapter 5, is for

technocrats to build the broadest possible civil society/social movement networks possible to

assist with BPI implementation. Technocrats have little control over the broader strength of civil

society/social movement organizations in their countries, and consequently face objective limits to building civil society/social movement partnerships. That said, maximizing the number of partnerships technocrats forge with well-respected civil society/social movement organizations that have deep roots in society can be crucial in expanding technocrats' capacity to mobilize citizens to participate in BPIs (see Mayka (2019, p. 62) for similar discussion).

Expanding Implementation

As the case of Peru clearly demonstrates, the most effective tool for ensuring mayors implement BPIs is to include financial sanctions for non-compliance in BPI laws. In many cases, however, this is a step that national policymakers are unwilling to take, since it limits the executive prerogative of their local-level allies. In the absence of formal sanctions, technocrats can employ creative techniques to align politicians' electoral incentives and representative BPI implementation. As we saw in Chapter 5, this was an effective strategy employed by BPI advocates in the Dominican Republic, who used mayors' fear of receiving a low score on the national government's ranking of the quality of municipal governments to incentivize implementation. Kim & Lee (2016) describe a similar mechanism in South Korea. If technocrats have sufficient political skill to effectively publicize municipal governance rankings that include indicators for BPI implementation, such rankings could be an effective tool to incentivize mayors to implement BPIs, even when they face no formal sanction for non-implementation.

Finally, though formal BPI adoption into national laws or constitutions is, as discussed in Chapter 3, far from a guarantee of implementation—let alone representative implementation —it is nonetheless worthwhile to pursue. As we saw in Chapter 3, PI advocates, even in countries with high levels of BPI implementation prior to legal adoption, believe that creating a legal

framework for BPIs increases mayors' incentives to implement BPIs in their municipalities.[147] Consistent with this perspective, as we have seen, the only cases of nationwide BPI implementation in Latin America are those where legal adoption preceded implementation. At the same time, practitioners should be wary of over-adoption, where BPIs are included in a wide range of unconnected, or loosely related pieces of legislation. In Colombia, for instance, there are over 50 laws creating new spaces for citizen participation (Velázquez & González, 2019, p. 21). A number of my interview respondents argued that this proliferation of participation laws amounted to an over-regulation of participation that created more barriers than opportunities for BPI implementation (*Interview with Fabio Velázquez*; *Interview with John Sudarsky*; *Interview with Juan Fernando Londoño*).

Avenues for Future Research

Building on the findings of this dissertation, as well as a range of other studies (discussed in Chapter 2) that have begun to examine national-level variation in the causes and effects of PIs, a number of important avenues of future research might be explored to better understand the conditions under which large-scale representative BPIs might emerge, as well as how PIs facing unfavorable political contexts can be implemented as broadly and successfully as possible. Along these lines, I highlight three critical areas of future work. First, scholars of participatory institutions desperately need a database of national-level variables that affect the implementation and performance of PIs. Important steps have been taken in this direction (Dias et al., 2019, LATINNO), but these datasets do not include a range of critically important political variables (such as societal demand, mode of implementation, relationship between governing parties and

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[147] Also see Kim & Lee (2016).

CSOs/social movements, etc.) that must be considered to assess the causes and effects of PIs. Further, existing datasets are either geographically restricted or limited to a narrow range of participatory institutions. Once better national-level data becomes available, scholars can begin to more systematically explore the scope of the conditions of different causes and effects of PIs, disaggregate the effects of different types of PIs, and employ more sophisticated case selection strategies for qualitative analysis.

Next, additional theoretical, as well as empirical, work is needed to better understand which types of PIs have the capacity to meaningfully impact important outcomes, ranging from the quality of democracy and governance to citizen well-being. Having access to large cross-national datasets that include a wide range of PIs, as well as more fine-grained, longitudinal data on PIs at the subnational level (especially outside of Brazil) will be of tremendous value in understanding which PIs truly "matter," and which are of largely symbolic value. So, too, will further theorization of which PI characteristics, and in which combination, are likely to produce results that policymakers will care about. Of course, many important studies have taken steps toward identifying these characteristics (see my discussion of BPI characteristics in Chapter 3), but important questions remain unanswered. For instance, as discussed in Chapter 3, many scholars have identified binding decision-making as a key ingredient for successful PIs. At the same time, however, other studies have found that the critical mechanism for ensuring PIs improve citizen well-being is effective information-sharing between citizens and government officials (Wampler et al., 2019). Most likely, some combination of binding decision-making and successful information-sharing is key to PIs' success, but the relative weight that should be placed on each has real implications for how we study PIs. If the critical mechanism for PI success is information-sharing, rather than binding decision-making, perhaps the focus of scholarship and

new participatory experiments should shift to promoting new forms of deliberation, thus deemphasizing PIs' formal decision-making authority. After all, it is precisely the ceding of authority that often limits politicians' willingness to engage with PIs. On the other hand, if binding decision-making is the key mechanism—as I have suggested in this dissertation—the focus should be on understanding the conditions (political, economic, social, etc.) under which citizens have sufficient political leverage, and politicians perceive low enough political risk, to make successful PIs a reality.

Finally, future scholarship must pay more attention to the life cycle of PIs. How do PIs change over time? What are the effects of changing political, economic, and social conditions on PIs? How does past failure impact the possibility of future success? These have become particularly important questions in Latin America since the end of the commodities boom and the decline of the Latin American Left. How are PIs changing in an era of tighter fiscal constraints and governments that are generally opposed or indifferent to PIs? What are the effects of regime change on PIs (such as in Venezuela, which transitioned to an authoritarian government after the death of President Hugo Chávez in 2013)? Several studies have already begun to address these questions (Bezerra & de Oliveira, 2018; Donaghy, 2020; Montambeault, 2019b; Spada, 2014), but they have focused heavily on the case of BPIs in Brazil, and have not begun to explore variation in national-level PIs across time.

Final Remarks

This dissertation has made the case that we cannot understand why PIs have, to date, been unable to generate large-scale positive effects on the quality of democracy. This question follows an increasing concern in the literature about the underwhelming tangible results of PIs more

broadly (Baiocchi & Ganuza, 2017; Goldfrank, 2017; McNulty, 2019; Montambeault, 2019a). The fact that most participatory institutions have been adopted but not implemented, and that the vast majority of participatory institutions that *have* been implemented are "window dressing" institutions with largely symbolic value—rather than BPIs or similar participatory institutions— ensures that the real-world impact of participatory institutions will be limited. In turn, as I have argued, the price of large-scale BPI implementation is BPIs' capacity to represent broad community interests. In other words, the conditions required for nationwide implementation (parties must value the political benefits of implementation higher than the costs) generally undermine the representativeness of BPIs after implementation. I call this dynamic the paradox of participatory institutions. The paradox suggests that implementing the kinds of PIs required to produce large-scale effects on the quality of democracy is a very challenging, if not insurmountable, task. Without large-scale implementation of BPIs or related PIs, however, PIs are unlikely to serve as an effective policy solution to problems of democratic representation. This is in no way to deny the very real impacts of PIs on the quality of democracy and peoples' lives more generally, documented in Chapter 2, but such examples remain comparatively rare. As a result, the question of how (and if) these effects can be expanded on a mass-scale is perhaps the most pressing issue facing scholars and practitioners of PIs.

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APPENDIX A: DETAILED LIST OF INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED

Respondent	Date	High official	Mid-level official	Grassroots official/activist	Academic/ Journalist
<td colspan="6" align="center">**Venezuela**</td>
Former minister of communes/minister of education/vice president of venezuela	Oct. 13, 2018	Yes			
Director of the people's house, petare (caracas)	Aug. 4, 2015		Yes		
Viceminister of communes/former viceminister of popular economy/former executive director of the polo patriótico	Nov. 1, 2018		Yes		
Deputy director for mobilization, psuv	Nov. 28, 2018	Yes			
Director of mobilization, psuv, member of national constituent assembly	Dec. 11, 2018	Yes			
Former minister of participation and social protection	Sept. 25, 2018	Yes			
Former speaker of the national assembly/technical adviser to julio chávez during implementation of torres participatory budgeting process in 2004	Oct. 14, 2018	Yes			
Former viceminister of communes	Aug. 7, 2015	Yes			
Former president of the national commission for popular power	Dec. 2, 2018	Yes			
National secretary, fatherland for all	Dec. 4, 2018	Yes			
Reporter, reuters venezuela	Aug. 13, 2015				Yes
Professor, simón bolívar university	May. 21, 2015				Yes
Official, ministry of foreign affairs	Apr. 16, 2015		Yes		
Former minister of popular economy	Nov. 18, 2018	Yes			

Expert on communal councils, centro gumilla	Aug. 12, 2015				Yes
Táchira state deputy, primero justicia	Aug. 24, 2015		Yes		
Former member, national commission for popular power/former technical advisor at the commission for citizen participation of the national assembly	Dec. 8, 2018	Yes			
Former minister of agriculture	Oct. 3, 2018	Yes			
Member constituent national assembly, where he is the president of the commission on citizen participation/former mayor of torres	Oct. 13, 2018	Yes			
City councilor for caracas metropolitan district, primero justicia	Aug. 8, 2015		Yes		
Director of communes for the state of miranda	Sept. 20, 2018		Yes		
Social promoter, 23 de enero (caracas)	Aug. 5, 2015		Yes		
National chairman, fatherland for all	Oct. 8, 2018	Yes			
Technical advisor, commission on citizen participation, venezuelan national assembly	Dec. 2, 2018		Yes		
Technical advisor, commission on citizen participation, venezuelan national assembly	Dec. 2, 2018		Yes		
Technical adviser, barrio nuevo, barrio tricolor, caracas	Aug. 10, 2015		Yes		
Former president, venezuelan economic and social development bank/ former vice minister of foreign affairs	Oct. 5, 2018	Yes			
Executive director, office of the mayor, san cristóbal	Aug. 24, 2015		Yes		
Mayor of torres	Aug. 2, 2015	Yes			
Official, national fund for popular power (safonapp)	Aug. 19, 2015		Yes		

Executive director, office of the mayor, san cristóbal	Aug. 24, 2015		Yes		
Cc leaders, juan de villegas parish, barquisimeto	Aug. 1, 2015			Yes	
Cc leaders, union parish, barquisimeto	Aug. 3, 2015			Yes	
Cc leaders,	Aug. 4, 2015			Yes	
Cc leaders, 23 de enero parish, caracas	Aug. 6, 2015			Yes	
Cc leaders, petare, caracas	Aug. 7, 2015			Yes	
Cc leaders, san juan parish, caracas	Aug. 9, 2015			Yes	
Cc leaders, macarao parish, caracas	Aug. 9, 2015			Yes	
Cc leaders, san juan parish, caracas	Aug. 10, 2015			Yes	
Cc leaders, petare, caracas	Aug. 12, 2015			Yes	
Cc leaders, el recreo parish, caracas	Aug. 13, 2015			Yes	
Cc leaders, chacao, caracas	Aug. 14, 2016			Yes	
Cc leaders, el recreo parish, caracas	Aug. 15, 2015			Yes	
Cc leaders, el paraíso parish, caracas	Aug. 16, 2015			Yes	
Cc leaders, baruta, caracas	Aug. 17, 2016			Yes	
Cc leaders, petare, caracas	Aug. 17, 2016			Yes	
Cc leaders, filas de mariche parish, caracas	Aug. 19, 2015			Yes	
Cc leaders, la pastora parish, caracas	Aug. 19, 2015			yes	
Cc leaders, chacao, caracas	Aug. 21, 2015			Yes	
Cc leaders, capacho nuevo parish, san cristóbal	Aug. 23, 2015			Yes	
Cc leaders, la concordancia parish, san cristóbal	Aug. 23, 2015			Yes	
Cc leaders, pedro maria morantes parish, san cristóbal	Aug. 24, 2015			Yes	
Cc leaders, camacaro parish, torres	Aug. 25, 2015			Yes	

Cc leaders, el charal parish, unión	Aug. 28, 2015			Yes	
Total by type		15	13	23	3
Ecuador					
National secretary of political education, alianza pais, former secretary of the national planning council of ecuador	Aug. 15, 2016		Yes		
Professor, central university of ecuador	Jul. 17, 2016				Yes
Conaie regional leader, quito	Jul. 30, 2016		Yes		
Conaie regional leader, quito	Jul. 30, 2016		Yes		
Conaie regional leader, quito	Jul. 30, 2016		Yes		
Conaie regional leader, quito	Jul. 30, 2016		Yes		
Metropolitan director of citizen participation, quito	Jul. 28, 2016		Yes		
Director of communications, popular unity	Jul. 12, 2016		Yes		
Professor, universidad andina simón bolívar	Aug. 2, 2016				Yes
Professor, flacso	Jul. 19, 2016				Yes
President of conaie	Aug. 13, 2015	Yes			
Professor, flacso, director of the center for development and social movement research in ecuador (cedime)	Aug. 9, 2016				Yes
Professor, central university of ecuador	Aug. 11, 2016				Yes
General secretary of territorial coordination and citizen participation and general secretary of planning for the metropolitan district of quito	Aug. 8, 2016		Yes		
National secretary for political action, alianza pais	Aug. 3, 2016	Yes			
Professor, universidad andina simón bolívar	Jul. 21, 2016				Yes

Activist, director of urban forum, campaign manager for augusto barrera (ex-mayor of quito, alianza país)	Jul. 16, 2016		Yes		
President of the socialist party of ecuador, ecuadorian minister of defense	Aug. 1, 2016	Yes			
Analyst, promotion of participation, national council of citizen participation and social control	Aug. 16, 2016		Yes		
National subdirectorate for the promotion of participation, national council of citizen participation and social control	Jul. 7, 2016		Yes		
Professor, flacso	Aug. 9, 2016				Yes
Department of political action, alianza pais	Aug. 3, 2016		Yes		
Member of the national constituent assembly, member of the national assembly, alianza pais	Aug. 5, 2016	Yes			
Former president of the national constituent assembly	Aug. 7, 2016	Yes			
Former president, commission for citizen participation, national assembly.	Aug 14., 2015	Yes			
Técnico, territorial planning, association of ecuadorian municipalities (ame), quito	Aug. 12, 2016		Yes		
Executive directo, centro de planificación y estudios sociales	Aug. 6, 2016				Yes
Professor, flacso	Aug. 29, 2016				Yes
Executive, banecuador	Aug. 2, 2016		Yes		
former mayor of quito/member of alianza pais's national political directorate	Aug. 3, 2016	Yes			
Member, national constituent assembly, alianza pais, president of	Dec. 10, 2019	Yes			

mesa 8, justice and anticorruption					
Former member national constituent assembly, president of the commission on the institutional structure of the state	Jul. 29, 2016	Yes			
Total by type		9	14	0	9
Bolivia					
Journalist, former viceminister of popular participation	Apr. 17, 2019		Yes		
Consultant/journalist, former assistant to vice president victor hugo cárdenas	Apr. 18, 2019	Yes			
Former vicemister of planning, former expert in decentralization, eclac, la paz	Apr. 19, 2019	Yes			
Research, friedrich ebert stiftung, la paz	Apr. 15, 2019				Yes
Specialist in municipal governance	Apr. 16, 2019		Yes		
Former national secretary of popular participation and former governor of santa cruz	Apr. 12, 2019	Yes			
Associate professor, texas a & m university	Apr. 11, 2019				Yes
Researcher, centro de documentación e información bolivia (cedib), cochabamba	Jun. 14, 2015				Yes
Former bolivian minister of water and former director of the fejuve el alto	Jul. 11, 2015	Yes			
Former director, fejuve la paz	Jul. 13, 2015		Yes		
Mayor of achacachi, mas, la paz	Jul. 18, 2015	Yes			
Municipal secretary, batallas, la paz	Jul. 19, 2015		Yes		
Technical assistant, national network of participation and social control, la paz	Jul. 22, 2015		Yes		

Senator, mas-ipsp for cochabamba, cochabamba	Jun. 16, 2015	Yes			
Former viceminister of lands, cochabamba	Jun. 11, 2015	Yes			
Professor, universidad mayor de san simón (umss)	Jun. 10, 2015				Yes
President, cochabamba fejuve	Jun. 18, 2015	Yes		Yes	
Fejuve district leaders, cochabamba	Jun. 15, 2015			Yes	
Fejuve district leaders, cochabamba	Jun. 17, 2015			Yes	
Fejuve district leaders, cochabamba	Jun. 16, 2015			Yes	
Fejuve district leaders, cochabamba	Jun. 12, 2015			Yes	
Fejuve district leaders, cochabamba	Jun. 16, 2015			Yes	
Fejuve district leaders, cochabamba	Jun. 11, 2015			Yes	
Fejuve district leaders, cochabamba	Jun. 18, 2015			Yes	
Fejuve district leaders, cochabamba	Jun. 13, 2015			Yes	
Fejuve district leaders, cochabamba	Jun. 9, 2015			Yes	
Fejuve district leaders, cochabamba	Jun. 10, 2015			Yes	
Fejuve district leaders, cochabamba	Jun. 17, 2015			Yes	
Fejuve district leaders, cochabamba	Jun. 12, 2015			Yes	
Former senator, mir, served as president of the senate's commission on popular participation , la paz	Jul. 7, 2015	Yes			
Political analyst, united nations development program, la paz	Jun. 24, 2015				Yes
Professor, universidad mayor de san simón (umss)	Jun. 28, 2015				Yes
Professor, universidad mayor de san simón (umss)	Jun. 12, 2015				Yes

Professor, universidad mayor de san simón (umss)	Jun. 18, 2015				Yes
President, cochabamba fejuve	Jun. 13, 2015		yes		
Cooperación suiza para el desarrollo - ayuda obrera suiza	Jul. 6, 2015				Yes
Fundación tierra	Jun. 30, 2015				Yes
Research director, cides-umsa, la paz	Jul. 1, 2015				Yes
Journalist, la razón, la paz	Jun. 30, 2015				Yes
National assembly member, msm, la paz	Jun. 30, 2015	Yes			
President, national network of participation and social control, la paz	Jul. 22, 2015		Yes		
Department of culture, municipal government of el alto	Jul. 15, 2015		Yes		
Political consultant	Jun. 20, 2015		Yes		
Former director of the fejuve el alto	Jul. 13, 2015	Yes			
Columnist, la razón	Jun. 30, 2015				Yes
General coordinator, national network of participation and social control, la paz	Jul. 9, 2015		Yes		
Total by type		11	10	13	13
Peru					
Professor, la pontificia universidad católica del perú	Jul. 12, 2017				Yes
President, centro nacional de planeamiento estratégico (ceplan), former viceminister, ministry of economics and finance	Jul. 5, 2017		Yes		
Former general director of public budgeting, ministry of economics and finance	Jul. 7, 2017		Yes		
Professor, la pontificia universidad católica del perú	Jun. 30, 2017				Yes
Professor, universidad del pacífico	Jul. 2, 2017				Yes

Associate professor, fraklin and marshall university	Jun. 13, 2017				Yes
Former congressman, former mayor of ilo	Jul. 14, 2017	Yes			
Former executive coordinator, grupo propuesta ciudadana	Jul., 9, 2017		Yes		
Former congressman, former mayor of cajamarca	Oct. 11, 2019	Yes			
Total by type		2	3	0	4
Dominican Republic					
Director of social participation/participatory budgeting, federation of dominican municipalities (fedomu)	May. 16, 2019		Yes		
Technical assistant, federation of dominican municipalities (fedomu)	May. 14, 2019		Yes		
Professor emeritus, new york university	Jan. 8, 2019				Yes
Member of the dominican chamber of deputies, prsc, santo domingo	May. 8, 2019	Yes			
Member of the dominican chamber of deputies, prsc, former mayor of villa gonzález and executive director of fedomu	May. 17, 2019	Yes			
Executive director, fundación solidaridad, santiago	May. 10, 2019	Yes			
Consultant, undp, world bank, oxfam	31-oct-19		Yes		
Director of municipal affairs, centro de planificación y acción ecumenica	15-oct-19		Yes		
Total by type		3	4	0	1
Colombia					
Professor, universidad de bogotá jorge tadeo lozano	Sept. 19, 2019				Yes
Director, foro nacional por colombia	Oct. 17, 2019	Yes			
Estrategia de incidencia y presión política	Oct. 18, 2019		Yes		

corporación viva la ciudadanía					
Former viceminister of the interior	Oct. 20, 2019	Yes			
Former green party senator	Nov. 3, 2019	Yes			
Sociologist, conciudadanía	Nov. 6, 2019		Yes		
Director of presupuesto participativo for municipal governments of pasto and nariño	Nov. 2, 2019		Yes		
Total by type		3	3	0	1
El Salvador					
Regional office director, rti international	Sept. 15, 2019		Yes		
Senior researcher and program coordinator, fundación nacional para el desarrollo	Oct. 23, 2019		Yes		
Subsecretario de desarrollo territorial y descentralización	Nov. 1, 2019	Yes			
Researcher, fundación nacional para el desarrollo	Nov. 8, 2019		Yes		
Total by type		1	3	0	0
Guatemala					
Former viceminister of urban and rural planning	Nov., 5, 2019	Yes			
Former congressman, urng	Dec., 15, 2019	Yes			
Total by type		2	0	0	0
Brazil					
Former mayor, porto alegre, pt	Jan. 18, 2018	Yes			
Former mayor, porto alegre, pt	Jan. 20, 2018	Yes			
City councilor for porto alegre, psol	Jan. 17, 2018		Yes		
City councilor and former senator, pt	Jan. 9, 2018	Yes			
Former mayor of diadema and treasurer for pt presidential campaign	Jan. 10, 2018	Yes			
Federal deputy for são paulo (psol) and former mayor of são paulo, pt	Jan. 15, 2018	Yes			

Former director of participatory budgeting, são paulo	Jan. 13, 2018		Yes		
Mayor of nova santa rita, pt	Jan. 19, 2018		Yes		
Executive secretary, brazilian network of participatory budgeting	Jan. 10, 2018		Yes		
Former executive secretary, brazilian network of participatory budgeting	Jan. 19, 2018		Yes		
Secretary of participatory planning and budgeting, são bernardo do campo	Jan. 15, 2018	Yes			
Former chief of staff of the presidency of the republic, pt	Jan. 11, 2018	Yes			
Former federal deputy for rio grande do sul and former mayor of caxias do sul, pt	Jan. 13, 2018	Yes			
Pt secretary for international relations, former chief of staff for the mayor of são paulo	Jan. 11, 2018	Yes			
Assistant to city councilor and former senator, pt	Jan. 9, 2018			Yes	
Pt national youth secretary	Jan. 21, 2018			Yes	
City council for são paulo, psol	Jan. 10, 2018		Yes		
Total by type		9	6	2	0

Appendix B: Survey Design

I sample 1800 individuals, divided into clusters of 6 individuals (2 *voceros,* 2 ordinary CC participants, and 2 people who have never participated in a CC). I sample clusters of 6 people according to these quotas in each of 300 neighborhoods across Venezuela.

Neighborhoods are stratified according to the standard of living of their residents. There are 4 standard of living levels in urban areas (AB, C, D, EF), and 3 in rural areas (C, D, EF).[148] Neighborhoods are selected according to the population size of urban centers classified into 9 types and rural centers classified into 4 types.

The 9 urban types cover 73% of the population, the 4 rural types cover 27%. The 1800 interviews are distributed according to this proportion: 1512 in urban areas, 288 in rural areas. The 1512 urban interviews are divided into 252 neighborhoods across 4 standard of living levels, and the 288 rural interviews are divided into 48 neighborhoods across 3 standard of living levels.

Sampling Distribution of Urban Neighborhoods

Urban neighborhoods are sampled such that each row in the table below contains an equal number of respondents from each of the 4 standard of living levels (AB, C, D, EF). For each row the number of neighborhoods sampled is set as a multiple of 4 (corresponding to the 4 standard of living levels).

Type of Urban Population Center	% National Population	% Urban Population	**Neighborhoods Sampled**
North-Central Urban Population Centers			
1 Principal population center: Caracas	10.6	14.5	**36**
2 Secondary population centers: Valencia, Maracay	9.1	12.5	**36**
3 9 additional population centers outside major population centers	8.6	11.8	**28**
Urban Population Centers in the Interior			
4 5 primary populations centers	17.9	24.5	**64**
5 5 secondary populations centers	4.9	6.7	**20**
6 10 additional population centers outside major population centers	2.5	3.4	**8**
Outside Major Urban Population Centers			
7 5 population centers with more than 300,000 residents	4.2	5.8	**20**
8 15 population centers with between 100,000 and 300,000 residents	10.2	14.0	**36**
Smaller Urban Population Centers			

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[148] See Centro de Investigaciones Sociales (2018) for an explanation of these standard of living levels.

9	21 population centers with between 14,000 and 100,000 residents	5.0	6.8	**20**
		73.0	100.0	**252**

Sampling Distribution of Rural Neighborhoods

Rural neighborhoods are sampled such that each row in the table below contains an equal number of respondents from each of the 3 standard of living levels (C, D, EF). For each row the number of neighborhoods sampled is set as a multiple of 3 (corresponding to the 3 standard of living levels).

Type of Rural Population Center	% National Population	% Rural Population	Neighborhoods Sampled
Rural Population Centers			
10 52 population centers with between 20,000 and 40,000 residents	5.3	19.6	**9**
11 88 population centers with between 10,000 and 20,000 residents	4.1	15.2	**9**
12 147 population centers with between 5,000 and 10,000 residents	15.4	57.0	**27**
13 **Peri-urban Population Centers**	2.2	8.2	**3**
	27.0	100.0	**48**

Sampling of Neighborhoods within each of the 13 Population Types

Each of the 13 population types described above is distributed across the seven macro-regions of Venezuela and the following number of neighborhoods is sampled in each macro-region, proportional to the population of each region:

Macro-Region	% National Population	Neighborhoods Sampled
Northwest	20.3	48
North-Central	33.3	100

Andes	8.5	26
East	8.8	27
Central-West	9.9	30
Guayana and the South	6.2	18
Los Llanos	17	51
Total	**100**	**300**

Municipalities are chosen at random (proportional to population size) within each macro-region, stratified by population type. In each randomly-sampled municipality, neighborhoods from which to sample 6 individuals are chosen at random, based on an available list of neighborhoods compiled by CISOR, with quotas ensuring equal numbers of individuals from each economic stratum are sampled in each municipality. For logistical and cost reasons, if the chosen neighborhood is inaccessible due to security concerns/transportation difficulties and/or unwillingness to cooperate with survey enumerators, it will be substituted for a neighborhood of similar size, chosen at random.

Finally, within each selected neighborhood enumerators will select two *voceros,* two participants who are not *voceros* (either current or past participants) and two people who have never participated in a CC. Individuals will be randomly selected according to these quotas, and a 50/50 gender quota will be imposed upon the non-*vocero* and non-CC participant groups. If the only individuals available in a given house do not correspond to the desired gender, the survey enumerator will pass to the next randomly selected house. If there are multiple persons home from the correct gender, the individual with the most proximate upcoming birthday will be selected.

Weighting of the Dataset

Once the interviews have been carried out, weights will be constructed based on the 2011 Venezuelan census (the most recent data available), and 2014 data on the distribution of CCs from the Venezuelan government to ensure accurate country-level statistics can be generated from the data. Weights are generated for each respondent according to participation in a CC and economic strata, yielding a nationally-representative dataset.

Auditing/Quality Control

Survey supervisors in each region of the country conduct a daily review of all completed surveys, taking note of high rates of missing data and unusual responses. In cases where the supervisor has reason to doubt the accuracy of information collected from a given respondent, they will follow up by phone with the respondent to ensure the collected information is correct. Additionally, supervisors conduct a random phone audit of 10-15% of respondents to ensure enumerators visited the assigned house and assigned individual within each house. Finally, the length of each survey is recorded by enumerators, after which supervisors check to ensure all

surveys are being completed in a reasonable frame (supervisors also ask respondents in random phone audits approximately how long the survey took to complete).

APPENDIX C: SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

<table>
<tr><td colspan="4" align="center">I. Identificación</td></tr>
<tr><td>a. Fecha de la encuesta:</td><td colspan="3">Día   Mes   Año
|__|__| |__|__| | 2 | 0 | 1 | 8 |</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">b. Entidad:</td><td colspan="2">c. Municipio:</td></tr>
<tr><td>d. Parroquia:</td><td>e. Comunidad:</td><td colspan="2">f. Estrato:</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="4">g. Nombre del Consejo Comunal:</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="4">h. Nombre del encuestador:</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">1. Participantes activos en Consejos Comunales</td><td>Voceros ⬭</td><td rowspan="2">2. Participaron en algún momento en su Consejo Comunal</td><td rowspan="2">⬭</td></tr>
<tr><td>No Voceros ⬭</td></tr>
</table>

Buenos días (tardes). Estamos realizando una investigación sobre Consejos Comunales, desarrollada por _____l, ubicado en Caracas. ¿Puede permitirnos unos minutos de su tiempo? La información que nos suministre es muy importante y será utilizada de manera confidencial y con fines académicos. ¡Muchas gracias por su colaboración!

<table>
<tr><td colspan="6" align="center">II. PARTICIPACIÓN CIUDADANA</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="6">1. Voy a leer una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si usted asiste a las reuniones de estas organizaciones:</td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td>Grupos y organizaciones</td><td>Por lo menos una vez a la semana</td><td>Una o dos veces al mes</td><td>Una o dos veces al año</td><td>Nunca</td></tr>
<tr><td>a</td><td>Organizaciones religiosas</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>b</td><td>Asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>c</td><td>Asociación de vecinos</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>d</td><td>Comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>e</td><td>Partido político</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>f</td><td>Comité de tierra urbana</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>g</td><td>Mesa técnica de agua</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>h</td><td>Frente Francisco de Miranda</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>i</td><td>Unidad de Batalla Bolívar/Chávez</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>j</td><td>Comuna</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>k</td><td>Movimiento social</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>l</td><td>Organización/Asociación de profesionales</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>m</td><td>Organización/Asociación de campesinos</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>n</td><td>Asociaciones o clubes recreativos</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>o</td><td>Otro. Especifique</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr>
</table>

		Por lo menos una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Por cuanto tiempo participaba (0-5, 6-10, 10-20, 30+) Años	Nunca
p	[solo a mujeres] Asociaciones o grupos de mujeres o amas de casa					

2. **Voy a leer la lista de grupos y organizaciones de nuevo. Por favor, dígame si usted asistía a las reuniones de estas organizaciones <u>antes</u> de participar en su consejo comunal:**

	Enunciados	Por lo menos una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Por cuanto tiempo participaba (0-5, 6-10, 10-20, 30+) Años	Nunca
a	Organizaciones religiosas					
b	Asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio					
c	Asociación de vecinos					
d	Comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad					
e	Partido político					

	Enunciados *Continuación…*	Por lo menos una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Por cuanto tiempo participaba (0-5, 6-10, 10-20, 30+) Años	Nunca
f	Comité de tierra urbana					
g	Mesa técnica de agua					
h	Frente Francisco de Miranda					
i	Círculo Bolivariano					
j	Unidad de Batalla Bolívar/Chávez					
k	Comuna					
l	Movimiento social					
m	Organización/Asociación de profesionales					
n	Organización/Asociación de campesinos					
o	Asociaciones o clubes recreativos					
p	Otro. Especifique					
q	[solo a mujeres] Asociaciones o grupos de mujeres o amas de casa					

3. En los últimos 12 meses, **¿Ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública?**

Sí 1 ☐
No 2 ☐   No responde 4 ☐
No sabe 3 ☐

4. En los últimos 12 meses, **¿Ha participado en algunas de las siguientes acciones políticas?**

	Acción política	Ha participado	No ha participado	No sabe	No responde
a	Firmar una petición				
b	Participar en saqueos				
c	Participar en una huelga				
d	Ocupar edificios-fábricas				
e	Asistir una sesión del Concejo Municipal				
f	Pedir ayuda o quejarse ante un promotor social				
g	Pedir ayuda de o quejarse ante alguien del gobierno municipal				
h	Pedir ayuda o quejarse ante alguien del gobierno estadal o nacional				

III. PARTICIPACIÓN COMUNITARIA

5. **¿Diría que la gente de su comunidad es…**

Muy confiable	Algo confiable	Poco confiable	Nada confiable	No sabe	No responde
1	2	3	4	5	6

6. **¿En los últimos doce meses ha asistido una reunión de su Consejo Comunal?**	Sí 1 ☐ No 2 ☐ ➜ 9 No responde 3 ☐ ➜ 9

7. ¿Con cuánta frecuencia asistió…?				
Por lo menos una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	No sabe	No responde
1 ➜ 9	2 ➜ 9	3	4	5

8. ¿Por qué no asistió? *Respuesta múltiple*		
	Ya no le interesa	1 ☐
	Corrupción	2 ☐
	Falta de recursos	3 ☐
	Falta de seguridad	4 ☐
	No tiene tiempo	5 ☐
	Polarización política	6 ☐
	Hay mucho conflicto	7 ☐
	Solo va cuando es importante	8 ☐
	Otra razón. Especifique	9 ☐
	No sabe	10 ☐
	No responde	11 ☐

9. ¿Por cuantos meses o años ha participado en su Consejo Comunal?	|_|_| Meses |_|_| Años

10. ¿Había participado anteriormente en su Consejo Comunal?	Sí 1 ☐ No 2 ☐ ➜ 14 No responde 3 ☐ ➜ 14

11. ¿Hace cuántos años participó?	1 a 3 años 1 ☐ 4 a 7 años 2 ☐ 8 a 10 años 3 ☐ Más de 10 años 4 ☐ No recuerda 5 ☐ ➜ 14

12. ¿Por cuántos años participó?	Menos de 1 año 1 ☐ 1 a 2 años 2 ☐ 3 a 4 años 3 ☐ Más de 4 años 4 ☐ No recuerda 5 ☐

13. ¿Con que frecuencia participó?				
Por lo menos una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	No sabe	No responde
1	2	3	4	5

14. ¿Cuántas veces, en promedio, habla o habló (si ya no participa) Usted durante una reunión de su Consejo Comunal?	0 a 2 veces 1 ☐ 3 a 5 veces 2 ☐ 6 a 8 veces 3 ☐ 9 o más veces 4 ☐ No sabe 5 ☐ No responde 6 ☐

15. ¿En cuáles comisiones de ese Consejo Comunal participa (o participó) Ud.? *Respuesta Múltiple*	Salud	1 ☐
	Vivienda	2 ☐
	Cultura	3 ☐
	Educación	4 ☐
	Tierra	5 ☐
	Servicios	6 ☐
	Economía Popular	7 ☐
	Alimentación	8 ☐
	Igualdad Social	9 ☐
	Otro. Especifique	10 ☐
	No sabe	11 ☐
	No responde	12 ☐

16. **¿Cuántos minutos tiene (o tenía) que caminar desde su casa para llegar a las reuniones del Consejo Comunal?**	|__|__| minutos

IV. FUNCIONES DE LOS CONSEJOS COMUNALES

17. De acuerdo con lo que usted conoce, **¿Cuáles son los proyectos que este Consejo Comunal ha iniciado o está por iniciar en su comunidad?** *Respuesta múltiple*

Proyectos de vivienda	1 ☐
Proyectos del mejoramiento de las vías (pavimento, asfaltado calles y avenidas)	2 ☐
Proyectos de canchas deportivas	3 ☐
Proyectos de drenaje/alcantarillas	4 ☐
Proyectos de alumbrado público	5 ☐
Proyectos de agua	6 ☐
Proyectos de alimentación	7 ☐
No conoce ningún proyecto	8 ☐
No sabe	9 ☐
Otro. Especifique	10 ☐

18. **¿Cuáles son sus motivos para participar en su Consejo Comunal?** *Respuesta Múltiple*

Para participar en discusiones con otros sobre cómo mejorar la comunidad	1 ☐
Para influencia las decisiones políticas en la comunidad	2 ☐
Para darle voz a un grupo específico que representa	3 ☐
Para mejorar las cosas para usted y su familia	4 ☐
Para aprender más sobre política y democracia	5 ☐
Para adquirir contactos útiles.	6 ☐
Para mejorar las cosas en el barrio de manera más general	7 ☐
Si no participa será marginado por la comunidad	8 ☐
Es la única forma de recibir beneficios del gobierno	9 ☐
Otro. Especifique	10 ☐

19. De acuerdo con lo que usted conoce, **¿Cuántos proyectos presentados por su Consejo Comunal han recibido financiamiento este año o recibieron financiamiento durante el último año que participó?**	0	1 ☐
	1	2 ☐
	2	3 ☐
	3	4 ☐
	4	5 ☐
	5	6 ☐
	Más de 5	7 ☐
	No sabe	8 ☐
	No responde	9 ☐

20. **En su opinión, ¿Cuáles son las funciones de un Consejo Comunal?** *Respuesta Múltiple*

Solucionar problemas de la comunidad	1 ☐
Organizar a la comunidad	2 ☐
Elaborar proyectos para la comunidad	3 ☐
Ser contralores sociales	4 ☐
Conseguir recursos	5 ☐
Defender la revolución Bolivariana	6 ☐
Hacer trabajo electoral	7 ☐
Construir el estado comunal	8 ☐
No sabe	9 ☐
Otro. Especifique	10 ☐

21. De acuerdo con lo que Usted conoce, **¿quiénes aprueban los proyectos a ser ejecutados por ese Consejo Comunal?**	
Asamblea de Ciudadanas y Ciudadanos	**1** ☐
Voceras y Voceros del Consejo Comunal	**2** ☐
Voceras, Voceros y la comunidad	**3** ☐
Funcionarios de alguna Entidad Oficial	**4** ☐
PSUV	**5** ☐
Asamblea del PSUV	**6** ☐
Comités Locales de Abastecimiento y Producción (CLAP)	**7** ☐
Todos	**8** ☐
No sabe	**9** ☐
Otro. Especifique	**10** ☐

22. De acuerdo con lo que Usted conoce, **¿el Consejo Comunal tiene funciones político partidista?**	Sí 1 ☐ No sabe 3 ☐ ➔24
	No 2 ☐ ➔24

23. **¿Qué tipo de trabajo político partidista realiza el Consejo Comunal?** *Respuesta múltiple*	
Utilizar el censo comunitario para identificar militantes del PSUV	**1** ☐
Utilizar el censo comunitario para identificar militantes de la oposición	**2** ☐
Invitar a políticos del PSUV dar discursos ante el CC	**3** ☐
Invitar a políticos de la oposición dar discursos ante el CC	**4** ☐
Hacer capacitaciones sobre la ideología del PSUV y/o la Revolución Bolivariana	**5** ☐
Distribuir beneficios materiales a los participantes de los CC según criterios políticos	**6** ☐
Hablar con vecinos sobre el peligro de la oposición y la guerra económica	**7** ☐
Hablar con vecinos sobre todo que el PSUV ha hecho para el país	**8** ☐
Trabajar con partidos políticos para asegurar que toda la comunidad vote	**9** ☐
Trabajar con partidos políticos para influenciar el voto de los participantes del CC.	**10** ☐
Otro. Especifique	**11** ☐

24. **¿Alguna vez le han pedido a usted trabajar en una campaña electoral durante una reunión de su Consejo Comunal?**	Sí 1 ☐
	No 2 ☐ ➔ **26**
	No responde 3 ☐ ➔ **26**

25. **¿Puede mencionar quien o quienes?** *Respuesta múltiple*	Partidos de gobierno	1 ☐
	Partidos de oposición	2 ☐
	Organizaciones de gobierno	3 ☐
	Organizaciones de oposición	4 ☐
	No responde	5 ☐

26. **¿Usted ha trabajado en campañas electorales dentro de su Consejo Comunal?**	SI 1 ☐
	No responde 3 ☐
	➔**28** NO 2 ☐ ➔**28**

27. **¿A qué grupo de votantes va dirigido su trabajo en las campañas electorales dentro de su Consejo Comunal?** *Respuesta múltiple*	Militantes del PSUV	1 ☐
	Personas que apoyan al PSUV y no son militantes	2 ☐
	Ni-Ni votantes	3 ☐
	Militantes de la oposición	4 ☐
	Personas que apoyan a la oposición y no son militantes	5 ☐
	A todos los votantes	6 ☐
	A ningún grupo en particular	7 ☐

28. **¿Ud. hace trabajo electoral dentro de una UBCh?**	Si 1 ☐ No sabe 3 ☐
	No 2 ☐ No responde 4 ☐

29. **¿Ud. es un promotor social?**	Si 1 ☐ No sabe 3 ☐
	No 2 ☐ No responde 4 ☐

30. **¿Y Ud. o algún familiar o conocido ha recibido formación de algún foro, curso, talleres de capacitación y/o actividades formativas dentro del Consejo Comunal?**	Sí 1 ☐
	No 2 ☐
	No sabe 3 ☐
	No responde 4 ☐

31. **En su comunidad, ¿se realiza o se ha realizado contraloría social sobre la gestión de los proyectos impulsados por el Consejo Comunal?**	Sí	1 ☐
	No	2 ☐
	No sabe	3 ☐
	No responde	4 ☐

32. **¿Diría que el nivel actual de participación comunitaria en su Consejo Comunal es:**	Muy alto	1 ☐
	Alto	2 ☐
	Ni alto ni bajo	3 ☐
	Bajo	4 ☐
	Muy bajo	5 ☐
	No sabe	6 ☐
	No responde	7 ☐

33. **Dentro de su Consejo Comunal, ¿cómo ha cambiado la participación comunitaria en los últimos años?** Responda y pase a la pregunta que se indica según la respuesta

1. Ha aumentado mucho	2. Ha aumentado bastante	3. Ha aumentado poco	4. No ha cambiado	5. Ha bajado poco	6. Ha bajado bastante	7. Ha bajado mucho	8. No sabe	9. No responde
➔34	➔34	➔34	➔35	➔34	➔34	➔34	➔35	➔35

34. **¿Por qué ha cambiado?** *Respuesta múltiple*

Por la escasez de servicios	1 ☐
Por la falta de seguridad	2 ☐
Por falta de financiamiento	3 ☐
Porque los CLAP han reemplazado a los Consejos Comunales	4 ☐
Porque la Comuna ha reemplazado a los Consejos Comunales	5 ☐
Otra razón. Especifique	6 ☐
No sabe	7 ☐
No responde	8 ☐

35. **¿Usted ha participado en alguna acción para excluir de su Consejo Comunal a simpatizantes de una tendencia política diferente a la suya?**	Sí	1 ☐
	No	2 ☐ ➔ **37**
	No responde	3 ☐

36. **¿Qué grupo ha tratado de excluir de su Consejo Comunal?** *Respuesta múltiple*	Militantes del PSUV	1 ☐
	Personas que apoyan al PSUV y no son militantes	2 ☐
	Ni-Ni votantes	3 ☐
	Militantes de la oposición	4 ☐
	Personas que apoyan a la oposición y no son militantes	5 ☐

37. **¿Cómo está constituido este Consejo Comunal?**

Agrupaciones pro Gobierno	Agrupaciones de oposición	Ambas agrupaciones	No sabe	No responde
1	2	3	4	5

V. ACTITUDES CON RESPECTO A LOS CONSEJOS COMUNALES

38. Cualquier venezolano mayor de 15 años puede participar en los Consejos Comunales, sin importar su posición política. **¿Hasta qué punto esta frase refleja la realidad de los Consejos Comunales hoy en día?**

Nada						Mucho
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

39. Y pensando en las misiones… Cualquier venezolano puede beneficiarse de las misiones, sin importar su posición política. **¿Hasta qué punto esta frase refleja la realidad de las misiones hoy en día?**						
Nada						**Mucho**
1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**

40. **¿Qué tan de acuerdo o en desacuerdo está usted con cada uno de los siguientes enunciados?**

	Enunciados	**Totalmente en desacuerdo**	**Parcialmente en desacuerdo**	**Ni en acuerdo ni desacuerdo**	**Parcialmente de acuerdo**	**Totalmente de acuerdo**	**No/S**	**No/R**
a	Las personas que dirigen los Consejos Comunales les falta experiencia en administración y dirección							
b	En las actividades y funcionamiento de los Consejos Comunales interviene el factor político							
c	Hay mucho descontrol del dinero que va a los Consejos Comunales							
d	La comunidad en general se incorpora a las actividades de los C Comunales							
e	Los programas que ejecutan los CC benefician más a la comunidad que a personas en particular							
f	Los responsables de los CC consultan con la comunidad sobre las obras que van a realizar							
g	En la administración de los Consejos Comunales existe corrupción							
h	Los Consejos Comunales son diferentes al PSUV							
i	Los Consejos Comunales son organizaciones comunitarias							
j	Para acceder a beneficios del Estado, los miembros de la comunidad deben participar en su Consejo Comunal							
k	A lo largo de los años, su Consejo Comunal ha recibido muchos recursos para financiar proyectos							
l	Los programas que ejecutan los Consejos Comunales benefician toda la comunidad y no solo a los simpatizantes del PSUV							
m	Miembros de la comunidad deben unirse al PSUV para acceder a los beneficios del Consejo Comunal							
n	Miembros de la comunidad deben participar en campañas electorales del PSUV para acceder a los beneficios del Consejo Comunal							
o	El rol de los Consejos Comunales en las campañas electorales es más importante que su rol de defender la Revolución Bolivariana							
p	El trabajo electoral que hace dentro del CC es tan importante como el trabajo electoral que hace dentro de la UBCh							

		Totalmente en desacuerdo	Parcialmente en desacuerdo	Ni en acuerdo ni desacuerdo	Parcialmente de acuerdo	Totalmente de acuerdo	No/S	No/R
q	El trabajo electoral que hace dentro del CC es dirigido por la UBCh							
r	El trabajo electoral que hace dentro del CC es distinto a que el trabajo electoral que hace dentro de la UBCh							

41. ¿Qué tan de acuerdo o en desacuerdo está usted con el siguiente enunciado?

	Enunciados	Totalmente en desacuerdo	Parcialmente en desacuerdo	Ni en acuerdo ni desacuerdo	Parcialmente de acuerdo	Totalmente de acuerdo	No/S	No/R
a	Mis opiniones políticas han sido influenciadas por mi participación en el Consejo Comunal	➜ 43	➜ 43	➜ 43			➜ 43	➜ 43

42. ¿Cómo diría que sus opiniones políticas han sido influenciadas por su participación en el Consejo Comunal? *Respuesta múltiple*	La Formación ideológica que recibe del Consejo Comunal	1 ☐
	En Conversaciones con otros miembros del Consejo Comunal	2 ☐
	Cree más en la revolución bolivariana después de ver los logros del Consejo Comunal	3 ☐
	Cree menos en la revolución bolivariana después de ver los fracasos del Consejo Comunal	4 ☐
	Otro, especifique	5 ☐
	No sabe	6 ☐
	No responde	7 ☐

43. ¿Qué tan de acuerdo o en desacuerdo está usted con cada uno de los siguientes enunciados?

	Enunciados	Totalmente en desacuerdo	Parcialmente en desacuerdo	Ni en acuerdo ni desacuerdo	Parcialmente de acuerdo	Totalmente de acuerdo	No /S	No/R
a	Como participante de un Consejo Comunal, recibo o recibía (si ya no participa) más beneficios materiales que personas que no participan							
b	Una parte substancial de mi vida social ocurre u ocurría (cuando participaba) en espacios conectados al Consejo Comunal							
c	Gracias a mi participación en el consejo comunal, soy una persona más respetada en mi comunidad"							
d	Ser miembro de un Consejo Comunal es o era (si ya no participa) una parte importante de mi identidad personal							
e	Gracias a mi participación en el Consejo Comunal, puedo saber lo que pasa en mi comunidad, más que lo que podía en el pasado							
f	Como participante de un Consejo Comunal, tengo o tenía (si ya no participa) más contacto con militantes del PSUV que personas que no participan en el Consejo Comunal.							
g	Mi Consejo Comunal está controlado por simpatizantes del PSUV							

321

		Totalmente en desacuerdo	Parcialmente en desacuerdo	Ni en acuerdo ni desacuerdo	Parcialmente de acuerdo	Totalmente de acuerdo	No/S	No/R
h	Mi Consejo Comunal está controlado por simpatizantes de la oposición							
i	La intervención de los partidos políticos en las actividades de los Consejos Comunales es un problema importante							
j	Yo preferiría participar en una organización comunitaria que no tenga nada que ver con la política							
k	Un promotor/a social trabaja regularmente con su consejo comunal							

44. ¿Qué tan de acuerdo o en desacuerdo está usted con el siguiente enunciado?

	Enunciados	Totalmente en desacuerdo	Parcialmente en desacuerdo	Ni en acuerdo ni desacuerdo	Parcialmente de acuerdo	Totalmente de acuerdo	No/S	No/R
a	Durante mi tiempo como participante en mi Consejo Comunal, mi opinión del PSUV ha mejorado o mejoró (si ya no participa)	➜ 46	➜ 46	➜ 46			➜ 46	➜46

45. ¿Por qué diría que su opinión del PSUV ha mejorado o mejoró durante su tiempo como participante en el Consejo Comunal? *Respuesta múltiple*	Me hice amigo de la gente del Consejo Comunal	1 ☐
	He recibido beneficios materiales a través del consejo comunal	2 ☐
	Ahora soy una persona más respetada en mi comunidad que antes de participar	3 ☐
	Estoy más capacitado de hacer cambios en mi comunidad	4 ☐
	Otro, especifique	5 ☐
	No sabe	6 ☐
	No responde	7 ☐

46. ¿Recibe o recibía (si ya no participa) formación política de su Consejo Comunal?	Sí	1 ☐
	No	2 ☐ ➜48
	No sabe	3 ☐ ➜48
	No responde	4 ☐ ➜48

47. ¿Diría que esta formación política refleja la perspectiva política del PSUV?	Sí	1 ☐
	No	2 ☐
	No sabe	3 ☐
	No responde	4 ☐

VI. PARTICIPACIÓN EN PROGRAMAS O MISIONES SOCIALES

48. ¿Alguna vez ha sido beneficiario de algunos de los siguientes programas o misiones sociales? *Marque los que mencione el informante. Respuesta múltiple*

1. Alimentación/Mercal	8. Saber y Trabajo/Vuelvan Caras	15. Identidad	22. Ninguna
2. Barrio Adentro	9. GMVV/Barrio Tricolor	16. Hogares de la Patria	
3. Milagro	10. Casa Bien Equipada	17. Transporte	
4. Sonrisa	11. Madres del Barrio	18. José Gregorio Hernández	
5. Robinson	12. Hijos de Venezuela	19. Otro. Específique	
6. Ribas	13. Negra Hipólita	20. No sabe	
7. Sucre	14. Amor Mayor	21. No responde	

49. ¿Alguna vez ha recibido servicio del Comité Local de Abastecimiento y Producción CLAP?	Sí	1 ☐	No sabe	3 ☐
	No	2 ☐	No responde	4 ☐

50. De las siguientes frases, ¿Cuál describe mejor lo que representa el programa del CLAP para la alimentación de Ud. y su familia en la actualidad?

Las bolsas/cajas del CLAP son la principal vía por la cual consigo alimentos para mi hogar.	**1** ☐	
Las bolsas/cajas del CLAP son un complemento importante para la alimentación de mi hogar	**2** ☐	
Las bolsas/cajas del CLAP son un complemento insignificante para la alimentación de mi hogar	**3** ☐	
En mi hogar nunca se ha consumido ningún producto de las bolsas/cajas del CLAP.	**4** ☐	
No sabe	**5** ☐	
No responde	**6** ☐	

51. ¿Qué tan de acuerdo o en desacuerdo está usted con cada uno de los siguientes enunciados?

	Enunciados	Totalmente en desacuerdo	Parcialmente en desacuerdo	Ni en acuerdo ni desacuerdo	Parcialmente de acuerdo	Totalmente de acuerdo	No/S	No/R
a	Después de recibir beneficios de una misión social, mi opinión del PSUV mejoró							
b	Los beneficios que recibí de una misión social fueron más importantes en formar mí opinión positiva del PSUV que mi participación en un Consejo Comunal							
c	Las misiones son diferentes al PSUV							
d	Como participante de una misión social, tengo más contacto con militantes del PSUV que personas que no participan.							

VII. OPINIONES ACERCA DE LA SITUACIÓN POLÍTICA

52. En su opinión, ¿Cuáles son los 5 problemas más graves de su comunidad? *Respuesta espontánea. No leer opciones. Registre según el orden que menciona el informante.* **Numere del 1 al 5**

1. Alto costo de la vida/inflación		12. Falta de seguridad	
2. Caminos/ vías en mal estado		13. Falta de tierra para cultivar	
3. Corrupción		14. Falta de vivienda	
4. Delincuencia/crimen		15. Mala calidad de la educación	
5 Desechos sólidos		16. Migración	
6 Escasez de alimentos		17. Problemas con el transporte	
7 Desnutrición		18. Telecomunicaciones	
8 Drogadicción		19. Otro problema. ¿Cuál?	
9. Falta de agua		20. No sabe	
10. Falta de electricidad		21. No responde	
11. Falta de servicios de salud			

53. Hablando del lugar donde usted vive y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿usted se siente:

Muy seguro	1 ☐	
Algo seguro	2 ☐	
Algo inseguro	3 ☐	
Muy inseguro	4 ☐	
No sabe	5 ☐	
No responde	6 ☐	

54. ¿Diría que la situación económica del país es mejor, igual o peor que hace un año?	Mejor	1 ☐	
	Igual	2 ☐	
	Peor	3 ☐	
	No sabe	4 ☐	
	No responde	5 ☐	

55. Diría su situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace doce meses?	Mejor	1 ☐	
	Igual	2 ☐	
	Peor	3 ☐	
	No sabe	4 ☐	
	No responde	5 ☐	

56. **¿Votó usted en las elecciones presidenciales de 2006?**	Sí	1 ☐
	No	2 ☐ ➔ 60
	No responde	3 ☐ ➔ 60
	No recuerda	4 ☐ ➔ 60

57. **¿Por quién votó en las elecciones del 2006?**	Hugo Chávez	1 ☐
	Manuel Rosales	2 ☐ ➔ 59
	Otro candidato	3 ☐ ➔ 59
	Votó nulo	4 ☐ ➔ 59
	No recuerda	5 ☐ ➔ 60
	No responde	6 ☐ ➔60

58. Voté por el Presidente Chávez porque… *Respuesta múltiple*

Creo en La Revolución Bolivariana	**1** ☐
Estoy agradecido por todo que El Presidente Chávez hizo para mí y mi comunidad	**2** ☐
Recibo o he recibido beneficios de una misión social	**3** ☐
Los Consejos Comunales me han ayudado a mí y a mi comunidad	**4** ☐
Mis amigos son simpatizantes del MVR	**5** ☐
Mis familiares son simpatizantes del MVR	**6** ☐
La gente donde trabajo son simpatizantes del MVR	**7** ☐
Tengo que ser un simpatizante del MVR para conseguir beneficios del gobierno	**8** ☐
Otro. Especifique	**9** ☐
No responde	**10** ☐

59. En una escala del 1 al 7, **¿Hasta qué punto tiene certeza en su respuesta anterior?**

Nada						Mucho
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

60. **¿Votó usted en las elecciones presidenciales de 2012?**	Sí	1 ☐
	No	2 ☐ ➔ 64
	No responde	3 ☐ ➔ **64**
	No recuerda	4 ☐ ➔ 64

61. **¿Por quién votó en las elecciones del 2012?**	Hugo Chávez	1 ☐
	Henrique Capriles	2 ☐ ➔ **63**
	Otro candidato(a)	3 ☐ ➔ 63
	Votó nulo	4 ☐ ➔ 63
	No recuerda	5 ☐ ➔ 64
	No responde	6 ☐ ➔ 64

62. Voté por el Presidente Chávez porque… *Respuesta múltiple*

Creo en La Revolución Bolivariana.	**1** ☐
Estoy agradecido por todo que El Presidente Chávez hizo para mí y mi comunidad	**2** ☐
Recibo o he recibido beneficios de una misión social	**3** ☐
Los Consejos Comunales me han ayudado a mí y mi comunidad	**4** ☐
Mis amigos son simpatizantes del PSUV	**5** ☐

Mis familiares son simpatizantes del PSUV	6 ☐	
La gente donde trabajo son simpatizantes del PSUV	7 ☐	
Tengo que ser un simpatizante del PSUV para conseguir beneficios del gobierno	8 ☐	
Otro. especifique	9 ☐	
No responde	10 ☐	

63. En una escala del 1 al 7, ¿Hasta qué punto tiene certeza en su respuesta anterior?

Nada						Mucho
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

64. ¿Votó usted en las elecciones presidenciales de 2013?	Sí 1 ☐ No 2 ☐ ➔ 67 No responde 3 ☐ ➔ **67** No recuerda **4** ☐ ➔ 67

65. ¿Por quién votó en las elecciones del 2013? *Encuestador muestre tarjeta 2013*	Nicolás Maduro 1 ☐ Henrique Capriles 2 ☐ Otro candidato(a) 3 ☐ Votó nulo 4 ☐ No recuerda 5 ☐ No responde 6 ☐

66. En una escala del 1 al 7, ¿Hasta qué punto tiene certeza en su respuesta anterior?

Nada						Mucho
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

67. ¿Votó usted en las elecciones presidenciales de este año 2018?	Sí 1 ☐ No 2 ☐ ➔ 70 No responde 3 ☐ ➔ 70

68. ¿Por quién votó en las elecciones del 2018? *Encuestador muestre tarjeta 2018*	Nicolás Maduro 1 ☐ Henri Falcón 2 ☐ ➔70 Javier Bertucci 3 ☐ ➔70 Otro candidato 4 ☐ ➔70 Votó nulo 5 ☐ ➔70 No recuerda 6 ☐ ➔70 No responde 7 ☐ ➔70

69. Voté por el Presidente Maduro porque… *Respuesta múltiple*

Creo en La Revolución Bolivariana.	1 ☐
Estoy agradecido por todo que El Presidente Chávez hizo para mí y mi comunidad	2 ☐
Recibo o he recibido beneficios de una misión social	3 ☐
Los Consejos Comunales me han ayudado a mí y mi comunidad	4 ☐
Mis amigos son simpatizantes del PSUV	5 ☐
Mis familiares son simpatizantes del PSUV	6 ☐
La gente donde trabajo son simpatizantes del PSUV	7 ☐
Tengo que ser un simpatizante del PSUV para conseguir beneficios del gobierno	8 ☐
Recibo Servicios del CLAP	9 ☐
Otro. Especifique	10 ☐
No responde	11 ☐

70. ¿En este momento, simpatiza con algún partido político?	Sí 1 ☐ No 2 ☐ ➔ **74** No responde 3 ☐ ➔ **74**

71. ¿Con cuál partido político simpatiza? *Para respuestas diferentes a PSUV pasar a P. 73*

72. Simpatizo con el PSUV porque… *Respuesta múltiple*

Creo en La Revolución Bolivariana.	1 ☐

Estoy agradecido por todo que El Presidente Chávez hizo para mí y mi comunidad	2 ☐
Recibo o he recibido beneficios de una misión social	3 ☐
Los Consejos Comunales me han ayudado a mí y mi comunidad	4 ☐
Mis amigos son simpatizantes del PSUV	5 ☐
Mis familiares son simpatizantes del PSUV	6 ☐
La gente donde trabajo son simpatizantes del PSUV	7 ☐
Tengo que ser un simpatizante del PSUV para conseguir beneficios del gobierno	8 ☐
Otro. especifique	9 ☐
No responde	10 ☐

73. ¿Por cuantos años usted ha apoyado este partido?	|__|__| Años
74. ¿En las elecciones presidenciales, un candidato o representante de un partido político le ofreció a usted un favor, regalo o beneficio a cambio de su voto?	Sí 1 ☐ No 2 ☐ ➜78 No responde 3 ☐ ➜78
75. ¿Recibió el favor, regalo o beneficio?	Sí 1 ☐ No 2 ☐ ➜78 No responde 3 ☐ ➜78
76. ¿El favor, regalo o beneficio significó para usted…	Mucho? 1 ☐ Algo? 2 ☐ Nada? 3 ☐ NS/NR 4 ☐
77. ¿Qué tanta obligación sintió Ud. de votar por el partido o candidato que le dio el favor, regalo o beneficio?	Mucho 1 ☐ Algo 2 ☐ Poco 3 ☐ Nada 4 ☐ NS/NR 5 ☐
78. En campañas electorales, ¿alguna vez Ud. ha pedido algún tipo de ayuda a algún representante de un partido político?	Sí 1 ☐ No 2 ☐ ➜82 No responde 3 ☐ ➜82
79. ¿Recibió la ayuda?	Sí 1 ☐ No 2 ☐ ➜82 No responde 3 ☐ ➜82
80. ¿La ayuda que recibió significó para usted…	Mucho? 1 ☐ Algo? 2 ☐ Poco? 3 ☐ Nada? 4 ☐
81. ¿Qué tanta obligación sintió Ud. de votar por el partido o candidato que le dio la ayuda?	Mucho 1 ☐ Algo 2 ☐ Poco 3 ☐ Nada 4 ☐ NS/NR 5 ☐

82. ¿Diría usted que el trabajo que está realizando el presidente Nicolás Maduro es… ?

Muy bueno	Bueno	Malo	Muy malo	No sabe	No responde
1	2	3	4	5	6

83. ¿Alguna vez le han pedido a usted trabajar en una campaña electoral fuera del CC?	Sí 1 ☐ No 2 ☐ ➜ **85** No responde 3 ☐ ➜ **85**

84. **¿Puede mencionar quien o quienes?**	Partidos de gobierno	**1** ☐
	Partidos de oposición	**2** ☐
	Organizaciones de gobierno	**3** ☐
	Organizaciones de oposición	**4** ☐
	No responde	**5** ☐

85. En campañas electorales, **¿alguna vez Ud. le ofreció a alguien un favor, regalo o beneficio a cambio de su voto?**	Sí	1 ☐
	No	2 ☐
	No responde	3 ☐

86. **¿Usted ha trabajado en campañas electorales fuera del Consejo Comunal?**	Sí	1 ☐
	No	2 ☐ ➜ **88**
	No responde	3 ☐ ➜ **88**

87. **¿A qué grupo de votantes va dirigido su trabajo en las campañas electorales?** *Respuesta múltiple*	Militantes del PSUV	**1** ☐
	Personas que apoyan al PSUV y no son militantes	**2** ☐
	Ni-Ni votantes	**3** ☐
	Militantes de la oposición	**4** ☐
	Personas que apoyan a la oposición y no son militantes	**5** ☐
	A todos los votantes	**6** ☐
	A ningún grupo en particular	**7** ☐

88. Ahora le voy a mostrar unas tarjetas para que escoja una y por favor responda la siguiente pregunta:
Que tan motivado estaría de participar en la reunión?   *Encuestador muestre la tarjeta asignada*

	TARJETA 1		**TARJETA 2**		**TARJETA 3**	
	Consejo Comunal (1)	**PSUV (2)**	**Consejo Comunal (3)**	**PSUV (4)**	**Consejo Comunal (5)**	**PSUV (6)**
1. Muy motivado						
2. Algo motivado						
3. Poco motivado						
4. Nada motivado						
5. No sabe						
6. No responde						

VIII. CARACTERÍSTICAS SOCIODEMOGRÁFICAS

| 89. **Sexo** | Hombre   1 ☐ |
| | Mujer   2 ☐ |

| 90. **Edad** | |__|__| Años |

91. **¿Usted se reconoce como…?**	Blanco(a)	**1** ☐
	Mestizo(a)	**2** ☐
	Indígena	**3** ☐
	Negro(a)	**4** ☐
	Mulato(a)	**5** ☐
	Moreno(a)	**6** ☐
	Otra. Especifique	**7** ☐
	No Sabe	**8** ☐

92. **¿Cuál es su nivel educativo?**	Sin nivel	1 ☐
	Primaria incompleta	2 ☐
	Primaria completa	3 ☐
	Secundaria o bachillerato incompleto	4 ☐
	Secundaria o bachillerato completo	5 ☐
	Técnica incompleta	6 ☐
	Técnica completa	7 ☐
	Universitaria incompleta	8 ☐
	Universitaria completa	9 ☐
	No Sabe	10 ☐
	No Responde	11 ☐

93. **¿Cuál es su situación conyugal?**	Soltero	1 ☐
	Casado	2 ☐
	Unión libre	3 ☐
	Divorciado	4 ☐
	Separado	5 ☐
	Viudo	6 ☐
	No sabe	7 ☐

| 94. **¿Tiene hijos(as)?** | Sí 1 ☐
 No 2 ☐ ➜ 96 |

| 95. **¿Cuántos hijos(as) tiene?** | |_|_| Hijos(as) |

96. **¿Con que frecuencia sigue las noticias ya sea en televisión, radio, periódicos o internet?**	Diariamente	1 ☐
	Algunas veces a la semana	2 ☐
	Algunas veces al mes	3 ☐
	Rara vez	4 ☐
	Nunca	5 ☐
	No sabe	6 ☐
	No responde	7 ☐

97. **¿Su vivienda cuenta con los siguientes servicios?**		SI	NO
	Energía eléctrica		
	Gas directo		
	Agua potable		
	Alcantarillado		
	Recolección de basura		

IX. ACTIVIDAD LABORAL

98. **¿Me podría decir cuál es su ocupación o principal fuente de ingresos en la actualidad?** *Respuesta múltiple*	Desempleado, no ocupado	1 ☐
	Ama de casa	2 ☐
	Trabajo en la economía informal/ Vendo productos por mi cuenta	3 ☐
	Estudiante	4 ☐
	Estudiante y empleado	5 ☐

	Empleado público con sueldo fijo mensual	**6** ☐	
	Empleado en empresa privada con sueldo fijo mensual	**7** ☐	
	Profesional independiente	**8** ☐	
	Jubilado / Retirado	**9** ☐	
	Recibo remesas desde el exterior	**10** ☐	
	NS/NC	**11** ☐	
99. ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de este hogar, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los que trabajan?	Sin ingresos	**1** ☐	
	Menos del salario mínimo	**2** ☐	
	Entre BsS 1.800 y Bs S 3.000	**3** ☐	
	Entre Bs S 3.001 y Bs S 4.000	**4** ☐	
	Entre Bs S 4.001 y Bs S 5.000	**5** ☐	
	Entre Bs S 5001 y Bs S 6.000	**6** ☐	
	Más de Bs S 6.000	**7** ☐	
	No sabe	**8** ☐	
	No responde	**9** ☐	

Hora final:	
Número de teléfono	
Observaciones	

¡Muchas gracias por su colaboración!!

329

APPENDIX D: SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS FOR CHAPTER 4

CODING CASES ON KEY INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

VARIABLES							
COUNTRY	*International institutions pushing for BPIs*	*Left government*	*BPI implementation part of larger decentralization project*	*BPIs implemented in order to distribute clientelist benefits or club goods to supporters*	*BPIs implemented in order to circumvent subnational governments*	*Demand for BPIs*	*Low Level of Political Risk*
Bolivia	PARTIALLY	NO	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES
Colombia	NO	NO	NO	N/A	N/A	YES	NO
DR	PARTIALLY	NO	YES	NO	NO	YES	YES
Ecuador	NO	YES	NO	N/A	N/A	YES	NO
El Salvador	YES	NO	NO	N/A	N/A	YES	PARTIALLY
Guatemala	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	PARTIALLY	PARTIALLY
Peru	PARTIALLY	NO	YES	NO	NO	YES	YES
Venezuela	NO	YES	NO	PARTIALLY	PARTIALLY	YES	YES

Variable: International institutions pushing for BPIs
Coding criteria: 1) Clear evidence that international organizations were advocating the adoption or implementation of BPIs? 2) Clear evidence that key actors involved in the development of BPIs believed that international institutions played a critical role in ensuring BPI implementation (or adoption/partial implementation in cases of non-implementation)? If 1) is present but not 2), I code the case "partially."

- *Venezuela*
  - Variable present?
    - **NO**
      - While there is evidence that BPI implementers in Venezuela studied participatory experiences in other countries, and consulted with foreign experts on participatory democracy (such as Marta Harnecker),[149] none of my respondents mentioned the presence of international organizations in the process of developing the CC law, and none of the secondary literature on CC development mentions their presence. Further, given the Venezuelan government's hostility toward U.S.-dominated international organizations such as the IMF, USAID, and the World Bank (key promoters of BPIs in other countries), such a presence is highly unlikely.
- *Bolivia*
  - Variable present?
    - **PARTIALLY**
      - International organizations such as the National Endowment for Democracy played a role in drafting Bolivia's Law of Popular Participation (LPP) in 1994 that created BPIs in each of Bolivia's municipalities,[150] and the World Bank had been active in promoting decentralization since the Government of Jaime Paz Zamora (1989–1993).[151] That said, the importance of international institutions in the drafting of the law was characterized as limited by virtually all of my respondents. Further, then President Sánchez de Lozada has emphasized that the manner of decentralization promoted by the World Bank in particular was oriented around *federalization* rather than *municipalization.* In other words, the form of decentralization promoted by key international actors was

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[149] (*Interview with David Velázquez, Caracas*, personal communication, September 25, 2018; *Interview with José Martínez, Caracas*, personal communication, December 8, 2018)
[150] (Lalander & Altman, 2003, p. 72)
[151] (Sánchez de Lozada, 2016)

at direct odds with the form of decentralization promoted by the governing MNR, and eventually codified in the 1994 participation law.[152]

- *Dominican Republic*
  - Variable present?
    - **PARTIALLY**
      - International organizations such as the Inter-American Foundation and Germany's GTZ were instrumental in funding early BPI pilot projects in the decade before a national BPI law was passed in 2007.[153] In turn, the success of these pilot programs helped convince national lawmakers that a national BPI law would be in their interests, and international experts assisted in drafting the text of the national BPI law.[154] However, respondents emphasized that this assistance came in response to requests from Dominican advocates of BPIs (rather than vice versa), and further that these agencies were not working directly with Dominican municipalities.[155]

- *Peru*
  - Variable present?
    - **PARTIALLY**
      - BPI implementation in Peru was part of a broader decentralization process in the wake of the fall of authoritarian President Alberto Fujimori in 2000. International organizations such as USAID, the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank gave loans to fund projects related to Peruvian decentralization after the reform process began, but as former President Alejandro Toledo explained, "in no case did the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, or USAID tell us we should decentralize."[156] With respect to the specific decision to implement BPIs, key actors were very clear that international actors were not pushing for the inclusion of participatory institutions in the design of Peru's decentralization laws: "We had the idea. International experiences did not affect the decision-making process at the national level."[157]

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[152] (Sánchez de Lozada, 2016)
[153] (Mitchell, 2014, pp. 52–53)
[154] (*Interview with Victor D'Aza, Santo Domingo*, personal communication, May 17, 2019)
[155] (*Interview with Gennry González, Santo Domingo*, personal communication, May 20, 2019; *Interview with Victor D'Aza, Santo Domingo*, personal communication, May 17, 2019)
[156] (S. McNulty, 2011, p. 53)
[157]Nelson Shack, quoted in (S. McNulty, 2011, p. 58)

- *Ecuador*
  - o Variable present?
    - ▪ **NO**
      - International organizations such as The World Bank and UNICEF played an important role in pushing for participatory reforms in the 1990s, and providing funding for individual municipal-level BPI experiments.[158] Further, a number of AP's most important political leaders and technocrats had direct experience (pre-Correa) working with the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank on decentralization projects.[159] That said, there is no evidence that these organizations played a significant role in pushing for the inclusion of BPIs either in the 2008 Constitution or the 2010 Citizen Participation Law.

- *Colombia*
  - o Variable present?
    - ▪ **NO**
      - The primary institutional force behind the inclusion of BPIs in the Ley 1757 decentralization law, passed in 2015, was the Colombian Ministry of the Interior, in collaboration with a range of Colombian NGOs focused on citizen participation.[160]

- *El Salvador*
  - o Variable present?
    - ▪ **YES**
      - USAID, the German GTZ, and the World Bank played central roles in the development and financing of experiments in Salvadoran participatory budgeting, particularly through piloting participatory budgeting programs in the 1990s and early 2000s which brought PB to between 30 and 40 Salvadoran municipalities.[161]

- *Guatemala*
  - o Variable present?
    - ▪ **NO**
      - There is no indication that these organizations played a significant role in pushing for the inclusion of BPIs in the 1987 *Ley de los Consejos de Desarrollo Urbano y Rural* that represented the initial

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[158] (Proaño, 2014; Sauliere & Dávila, Monica, 2009)

[159] (Dávalos, 2014)

[160] (*Interview with Fabio Velázquez, Bogotá*, personal communication, September 19, 2019; *Interview with Lorena Vásquez González, Bogotá*, personal communication, September 12, 2019; *Interview with Ricardo Jaramillo, Bogotá*, personal communication, October 18, 2019)

[161] (Bland, 2011, 2017; *Interview with Andrew Cummings*, personal communication, October 23, 2019; *Interview with Guillermo Galván*, personal communication, November 1, 2019)

adoption of BPIs in Guatemala, or in the 2002 reform of the law that revived BPIs.[162] This is not surprising, since BPIs were adopted in Guatemala years before any international organizations had begun promoting them around Latin America, and their re-adoption in 2002 was based on the framework established in 1987 rather than models offered by international actors.

Variable: Left government
Coding criteria: Does the governing party have a left-wing political orientation? SEE VDEM variable "Chief Executive Party Orientation" (e_dpi_erlc), which codes national chief executives as Right, Center, or Left.

- *Venezuela*
  - o Variable present?
    - ▪ **YES**
      - The Chávez government (1999–2013) is coded as "Left" by VDEM for its duration.
- *Bolivia*
  - o Variable present?
    - ▪ **NO**
      - The Sánchez de Lozada government (1993–1997) is coded as "Center" by VDEM for its duration.
- *Dominican Republic*
  - o Variable present?
    - ▪ **NO**
      - The Fernández government (2004–2012) is coded as "Center" by VDEM for its duration.
- *Peru*
  - o Variable present?
    - ▪ **NO**
      - The Toledo government (2001–2006) is coded as "Center" by VDEM for its duration.
- *Ecuador*
  - o Variable present?
    - ▪ **YES**
      - The Correa government (2007–2017) is coded as "Left" by VDEM for its duration.
- *Colombia*

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[162] The BPIs included in Guatemala's 1987 *ley de los consejos de desarrollo urbano y rural* were ruled unconstitutional by the country's constitutional court in 1988. The 2002 reform of the 1987 law reestablished BPIs in a slightly different form.

- o Variable present?
  - ▪ **NO**
    - • The Santos government (2010–2018) is not coded by VDEM, so I turn to data provided by Kenneth Greene and Andy Baker, who score Santos' government as conservative for its duration.[163]
- • *El Salvador*
  - o Variable present?
    - ▪ **NO**
      - • Although the Saca government (2004–2009) is coded as "Left" by VDEM for its duration, this assessment is not consistent with other sources, particularly Baker and Greene, who code his ARENA party as right-wing. This latter coding is consistent with standard assessments of the party's ideological orientation.
- • *Guatemala*
  - o Variable present?
    - ▪ **NO**
      - • Both the Cerezo (1986–1991) and Portillo governments (2000–2004) are coded as "Right" by VDEM for their duration.

Variable: BPI implementation part of larger decentralization project
Coding criteria: Is the country's BPI law one of a larger set of concurrent (or close to concurrent) laws with the objective of political, administrative, and/or fiscal decentralization?
- • *Venezuela*
  - o Variable present?
    - ▪ **NO**
      - • Far from pursuing decentralizing reforms, Chávez implemented a wide range of policies intended to *recentralize* Venezuela's political system. This was in response to a decade of decentralization reforms that tended to serve the interests of Chávez's political opponents (whose only bastions of political strength lay at the subnational level).[164] Some of these recentralizing reforms include the end of Venezuela's regionally focused Senate (which was eliminated in the 1999 Constitution), decreased fiscal transfers from the national to subnational governments through a variety of tactics, various forms of administrative recentralization (such as the renationalization of the nation's ports and airports), as well as a range of other recentralization measures implemented by Chávez.[165]

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[163] (Baker & Greene, n.d.)
[164] (Eaton, 2013)
[165] (Eaton, 2013)

- *Bolivia*
  - Variable present?
    - **YES**
      - The creation of BPIs in Bolivia (known as OTBs) was the centerpiece of the ambitious LPP decentralization law, which was approved in 1994. This law not only created BPIs, but also created hundreds of new rural municipalities, in addition to creating new citizen oversight mechanisms for municipal planning and diverting 20% of the national government's revenues to the municipalities.[166] A range of additional decentralization laws were subsequently passed during the following years.[167]
- *Dominican Republic*
  - Variable present?
    - **YES**
      - The creation of BPIs in the Dominican Republic (municipal-level participatory budgeting) through the participatory budgeting law of 2007 (Law 170-07) occurred in the broader context of a decade-long decentralization drive that included a range of laws that increased subsidies for municipalities and increased the fiscal and administrative authority of municipal governments.[168]
- *Peru*
  - Variable present?
    - **YES**
      - The creation of BPIs in Peru (municipal-level participatory budgeting) through the participatory budgeting law of 2003 (Framework Law 28056) occurred in the broader context of an intense two-year period of decentralization reforms in the wake of Fujimori's fall in late 2000. This decentralization wave included more than 26 legal initiatives that (including a reform of the constitution) created new levels of subnational governance, granted them a range of new administrative and fiscal authorities, and provided for the direct election of newly created offices. These laws also created a range of new participatory and citizen oversight mechanisms.[169]
- *Ecuador*
  - Variable present?
    - **NO**

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[166] (*Ley de Participación Popular*, 1994)
[167] For a comprehensive summary, see (Van Cott, 2008, pp. 39–47)
[168] For a comprehensive summary, see (Mitchell, 2014, p. chapter 5)
[169] For a comprehensive summary, see (S. McNulty, 2011, p. chapter 2)

- Upon assuming the presidency in 2007, Rafael Correa implemented a recentralization plan to reverse a range of decentralization measures taken over the previous decade.[170] As Kent Eaton explains,[171] in the first few years of his presidency, Correa took away a range of decision-making powers from municipal governments, especially those in the opposition stronghold province of Guayas. This included taking control of the board of directors of Guayas' transport committee, taking away the province's lottery system, and ending national government support for the provincial police force. More generally, Correa significantly cut subnational revenue transfers through a series of technical measures taken in 2008.[172]

- *Colombia*
  - Variable present?
    - **NO**
      - Decentralization laws were passed in Colombia during the late 1980s and early 1990s.[173] *Ley* 1757 was not part of a broader decentralization package.

- *El Salvador*
  - Variable present?
    - **NO**
      - BPIs were adopted in El Salvador through a 2005 reform of the country's Municipal Code. Though there were a range of sectoral decentralizations in the early-mid 2000s, and widespread political debate around the need for further decentralization, no decentralization law was passed during this period.[174]

- *Guatemala*
  - Variable present?
    - **YES**
      - The 2002 reform of the Law of Urban and Development Committees (*Ley de los Consejos de Desarrollo Urbano y Rural,* Decree 11-2002) was part of a broader set of laws also passed in 2002 related to decentralization. These included the Municipal Code (*Código Municipal,* Decree 12-2002) and the

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[170] For a comprehensive summary, see (Van Cott, 2008, pp. 35–39)

[171] Eaton, Kent. "The Centralism of '21st Century Socialism': Recentralising Politics in Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 45 (3) (2013), 421-450.

[172] (Eaton, 2013)

[173] (Alesina et al., 2005)

[174] Red para el Desarrollo Local, "El Salvador, Desarrollo Local y Descentralización Del Estado: Situación Actual y Desafíos," *Informe Enero*, 2006.

Decentralization Law (*Ley General de Descentralización,* Decree 14-2002).

Variable: BPIs implemented in order to distribute clientelist benefits or club goods to supporters

Coding criteria: 1) Clear evidence that using BPIs as a mechanism for distributing clientelist benefits or club goods to party supporters was a contributing factor in the party's decision to implement BPIs? 2) Clear evidence that using BPIs as a mechanism for distributing clientelist benefits or club goods to party supporters was the primary factor in the party's decision to implement BPIs? If 1) is present but not 2), I code the case "partially."

- *Venezuela*
  - o Variable present?
    - ▪ **PARTIALLY**
      - There is little doubt that Chávez and the MVR implemented BPIs at least in part as a means of distributing benefits to their supporters. In addition to a wide range of anecdotal evidence from the author's own interviews with CC participants, as well as qualitative research on the CCs,[175] there is also quantitative evidence suggesting that the party has used CC benefits as a means of consolidating electoral support among *Chavistas.*[176] Further, the author's interviews with key *Chavista* leaders involved in the creation and implementation of the CCs offer clear evidence that the MVR intended to use CCs for electoral purposes.[177] This, however, does not mean that their primary motivation for implementing the CCs was electoral. Indeed, while there is evidence that the CCs would not have been implemented if the MVR believed they would not generate electoral benefits for the party, my interview respondents stressed that narrow electoral concerns were not the party's primary motivation for implementing the CCs.[178]

- *Bolivia*
  - o Variable present?
    - ▪ **NO**
      - Electoral considerations were certainly critical in Sánchez de Lozada's decision to implement BPIs in Bolivia through the 1994

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[175] (García-Guadilla, 2008; Maya & Lander, 2011b; M. M. McCarthy, 2015)

[176] (Handlin, 2016)

[177] (*Interview with David Velázquez, Caracas*, personal communication, September 25, 2018; *Interview with Gustavo Villapol, Caracas*, personal communication, November 15, 2018)

[178] (*Interview with David Velázquez, Caracas*, personal communication, September 25, 2018; *Interview with Gustavo Villapol, Caracas*, personal communication, November 15, 2018; *Interview with José Martínez, Caracas*, personal communication, December 8, 2018)

LPP.[179] Further, it is clear that MNR strategists believed that transferring money to rural communities through BPIs could help the party regain lost vote shares in rural areas.[180] That said, the political logic behind BPI implementation was not specific enough to conclude that the party was targeting specific voter groups such as their supporters vs. swing voters. Diego Ayo explained that the relationship between the electoral dimension and the law itself was not a direct one: "It's not like you had strategists like James Carville saying, 'for every 5,000 OTBs [BPIs] we will go up 3 points in the polls,' it was not anything so rational…But the desire to regain the MNR's status as a rural party was there all the time, including in the development of the OTBs." The MNR was only thinking in general terms about winning more rural votes through the implementation of BPIs, but had no specific plan to divert resources to particular voter groups to maintain or consolidate their electoral support.

- *Dominican Republic*
  - Variable present?
    - **NO**
      - Electoral considerations in a general sense were important in the implementation of BPIs in the Dominican Republic, but these were more relevant in the thinking of individual mayors (from all three major political parties) than in the political strategy of the ruling PLD. The national-level politicians and civil society organizations pressing for BPIs were able to convince mayors that BPIs could help them either manage the large gap between citizen expectation and municipal resources,[181] and/or that BPIs could help build public confidence in mayors.[182] National level politicians were attracted to BPIs largely because they believed the institutions might serve as a practical means of ensuring "that revenue-sharing funds actually led to some public works."[183] For these leaders, BPI-implementation was less a matter of distributing clientelist or club goods to supporters, as much as a practical solution to corruption that could improve public service provision.

- *Peru*
  - Variable present?

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[179] Kathleen O'Neill, *Decentralizing the State: Elections, Parties, and Local Power in the Andes* (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Interview with Diego Ayo, La Paz, April 17, 2019; Interview with Iván Finot, La Paz, April 19, 2019; Interview with Ivan Arias, La Paz, April 18, 2019.

[180] (*Interview with Diego Ayo, La Paz*, personal communication, April 17, 2019)

[181] (*Interview with Victor D'Aza, Santo Domingo*, personal communication, May 17, 2019; Mitchell, 2014, p. 84)

[182] (*Interview with Gennry González, Santo Domingo*, personal communication, May 20, 2019)

[183] (*Interview with Christopher Mitchell, New York City*, personal communication, January 15, 2019)

- **NO**
  - Electoral considerations in a general sense were important in Peru's decentralization process (of which BPIs were a part), but these were linked more to the strategies of individual political elites rather than to political parties.[184] McNulty explains that elite politicians such as Alejandro Toledo and Alan García focused on decentralization in the presidential campaign of 2001 because 1) they believed holding regional elections could help them consolidate electoral support around the country, and 2) in the Post-Fujimori period they were under pressure to promise decentralizing reforms.[185] With respect to the implementation of BPIs in particular, however, there is little evidence that electoral considerations were a significant, let alone a decisive factor. BPI implementation in Peru was championed by an unusually powerful and respected government agency—the Ministry of Economics and Finance—with the capacity to push through a BPI law (and ensure it included an enforcement mechanism) during a politically unstable period when parties were very weak, and had limited capacity to oppose it, and when the backlash against Fujimori generated a strongly pro-participation congress.[186]
- *Ecuador*
  - Variable present?
    - **N/A**
      - Since BPIs have not been implemented nationwide in Ecuador, we cannot know the degree to which this variable would have been a factor in President Correa's decision to implement BPIs.
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- Colombia
  - Variable present?
    - **N/A**
      - Since BPIs have not been implemented nationwide in Colombia we cannot know the degree to which this variable would have been a factor in President Santos' decision to implement BPIs.
- El Salvador
  - Variable present?
    - **N/A**
      - Since BPIs were never implemented nationwide in El Salvador, we cannot know the degree to which this variable would have been a factor in President Saca's decision to implement BPIs.

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[184] (S. McNulty, 2011, p. 55)
[185] (S. McNulty, 2011, p. 56)
[186] (S. McNulty, 2011, pp. 55–61)

- *Guatemala*
  - Variable present?
    - **NO**
      - There is ample evidence that Guatemalan BPIs are manipulated by mayors for political reasons,[187] but little evidence that the Christian Democrats, who were the primary backer of Guatemala's BPIs, intended to use BPIs in order to distribute benefits to their supporters. To the contrary, there is evidence that the BPIs that have been implemented do not function in the apolitical manner they were originally intended. McNulty (2019), for instance, quotes one scholar she interviewed who explained that "The COCODE [BPIs] have become a tool to politicize projects…The idea of the system is marvelous, but reformers left some holes that allow for clientelism."[188]

Variable: BPIs implemented in order to circumvent subnational governments
Coding criteria: 1) Clear evidence that using BPIs to circumvent the authority of subnational governments was a contributing factor in the party's decision to implement BPIs? 2) Clear evidence that using BPIs to circumvent the authority of subnational governments was the primary factor in the party's decision to implement BPIs? If 1) is present but not 2), I code the case "partially."
- *Venezuela*
  - Variable present?
    - **PARTIALLY**
      - Chávez and the MVR implemented BPIs at least in part as a means of circumventing the authority of local governments they viewed as overly conservative. Multiple respondents mentioned the need to supplant a previous form of Chávez-era BPIs (known as CLPPs)—that were more directly linked to municipal governments than the CCs—as a factor in the decision to implement CCs.[189] That said, this variable was not identified as a motivating factor in the development of BPIs in Venezuela by a number of my respondents, and even among respondents who did mention it, it was not given a primary explanatory role. Further, given the local-level political strength of *Chavismo* when BPIs were

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[187] Interview with Nelson Amaro, November 5, 2019; Nelson Amaro, "Los Instrumentos de Gestion En Los COCODES de Retalhuleu, Champerico y Cuyotenango," *Análisis Político* 2, no. 2 (2008): 185–217.
[188] (S. McNulty, 2019, p. 83)
[189] Interview with David Velázquez, Caracas, September 25, 2018; Interview Carlos Luis Rivero, Caracas, November 1, 2018. Also see Matt Wilde, "Contested Spaces: The Communal Councils and Participatory Democracy in Chávez's Venezuela," *Latin American Perspectives* 44, no. 1 (2017): 140–158, https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X16658257;

implemented,[190] it is unlikely that the MVR's desire to marginalize opposition mayors enjoyed the political salience necessary to justify implementing a system as costly as the Communal Councils.

- *Bolivia*
  - Variable present?
    - **YES**
      - Technically, the creation of BPIs in Bolivia did not undermine the authority of regional (i.e., departmental) governments, since, by virtue of the fact that departmental prefects were appointed by the president (until 2005), regional governments were aligned politically with the national government. That said, the creation of BPIs was a direct attack upon regional elites who sought departmental, rather than municipal, decentralization.[191] Under the government of Jaime Paz Zamora (1989-1993), significant steps were taken to decentralize administrative and fiscal powers to regional governments.[192] When President Sánchez de Lozada was elected in 1993, however, he sought to move away from regional decentralization. He believed departmental decentralization would exacerbate already strong regional fragmentation, while also being much less electorally advantageous to the MNR than municipal-level decentralization.[193] President Sánchez de Lozada explained that the idea of devolving power to municipalities (rather than departments) was a means of "restricting the power of [regional] elites…Popular participation [i.e., BPIs] meant the destruction of regional elites."[194] Virtually every respondent identified the desire of the Sánchez de Lozada government and the MNR to undermine the authority of regional elites as a key factor in the decision to implement BPIs.
- *Dominican Republic*
  - Variable present?

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[190] In 2004, *Chavismo* carried 270 out of 332 (81%) mayoral elections (these were the last mayoral elections before the CC system was established in 2006). *Chavista* mayors controlled municipalities constituting 77% of the population, and among the top 25 cities by population they controlled 82%. Opposition mayors controlled only one of the top five cities by population (the 5th largest). Further, the average margin of victory in *Chavista* controlled municipalities was around 23% (nearly 29% in the 25 largest cities), while the opposition's average margin of victory was 12.5% (nearly 21% in the 25 largest cities)

[191] (*Interview with Ivan Arias, La Paz*, personal communication, April 18, 2019; *Interview with Iván Finot, La Paz*, personal communication, April 19, 2019)

[192] (*Interview with Iván Finot, La Paz*, personal communication, April 19, 2019; Molina, 2019)

[193] (*Interview with Diego Ayo, La Paz*, personal communication, April 17, 2019; *Interview with Ivan Arias, La Paz*, personal communication, April 18, 2019; *Interview with Iván Finot, La Paz*, personal communication, April 19, 2019)

[194] (Sánchez de Lozada, 2016)

- ▪ **NO**
  - • There is no evidence that this variable was present during the implementation of BPIs in the Dominican Republic. All major political parties supported the implementation of BPIs,[195] and by the time the 2007 Participatory Budgeting law was passed, over 100 of the country's 158 mayors had already implemented BPIs in their municipalities.[196] Thus, it is clear that neither the three major national political parties nor most subnational governments feared the implementation of BPIs (since so many voluntarily implemented BPIs before they were required to do so by law). To the contrary, the political utility of BPIs to subnational governments appears to have been widely accepted.
- • *Peru*
  - o Variable present?
    - ▪ **NO**
      - • The primary agent of BPI implementation in Peru was the MEF,. which viewed BPIs as an apolitical tool for improving government efficiency, increasing citizen oversight of government activities, and decreasing corruption.[197] There is no evidence that partisan political motivations or tensions between national vs. subnational governments played a role in the decision to implement BPIs. Further, there is little evidence that subnational governments viewed BPIs as a potential political threat.[198]
- • *Ecuador*
  - o Variable present?
    - ▪ **N/A**
      - • Since President Correa never seriously considered the idea of implementing BPIs, we cannot know the degree to which this variable would have been a factor in his decision to implement BPIs.
- • Colombia
  - o Variable present?
    - ▪ **N/A**
      - • Since BPIs have not been implemented nationwide in Colombia, we cannot know the degree to which this variable would have been a factor in President Santos' decision to implement BPIs.
- • El Salvador

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[195] (*Interview with Christopher Mitchell, New York City*, personal communication, January 15, 2019; *Interview with Gennry González, Santo Domingo*, personal communication, May 20, 2019)
[196] (*Interview with Gennry González, Santo Domingo*, personal communication, May 20, 2019)
[197] (S. McNulty, 2011, p. 61)
[198] McNulty, 5-6.

- o Variable present?
  - ▪ **N/A**
    - • Since BPIs were never implemented nationwide in El Salvador, we cannot know the degree to which this variable would have been a factor in President Saca's decision to implement BPIs.
- • *Guatemala*
  - o Variable present?
    - ▪ **NO**
      - • There is no evidence that this was a significant motivating factor in any actors' promotion of BPIs, either in the 1987 *Ley de los Consejos de Desarrollo Urbano y Rural* that represented the initial adoption of BPIs in Guatemala, or in the 2002 reform of the law that revived BPIs.

Variable: Demand for BPIs

Coding criteria: 1) Clear evidence of demand among the electorate or party base for increased citizen participation? 2) Clear evidence that influential individuals or organizations within the governing coalition pressing for BPI implementation? If either 1) or 2) is present but not the other, I code the case "partially."

- • *Venezuela*
  - o Variable present?
    - ▪ **YES**
      - • See case study in body of paper.
- • *Bolivia*
  - o Variable present?
    - ▪ **YES**
      - • While some scholars such as O'Neill[199] argue that this was not a relevant factor in the implementation of Bolivia's Popular Participation Law (of which BPI-implementation was the centerpiece[200]), they both underestimate the level of societal pressure for democratic deepening that the MNR government perceived during the administration of Sánchez de Lozada, as well as the importance of committed participatory democrats in pressing for the implementation of BPIs during the drafting of the law.[201] Specifically, though organized social movements in Bolivia were at a low point in the early 1990s, there was a strong memory of the strength of social movements from the past that endured in the minds of MNR elites. According to Ayo, MNR elites worried that

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[199] (O'Neill, 2005)

[200] (*Interview with Diego Ayo, La Paz*, personal communication, April 17, 2019) Diego Von Vacano made a similar argument ((*Interview with Diego Von Vacano, La Paz*, personal communication, April 9, 2019).)

[201] (O'Neill, 2005, pp. 130–131)

if they did not implement some form of popular participation, discontent with neoliberal restructuring could explode into serious societal unrest. He explained that "The possibilities for generating a new wave of massive popular discontent were enormous," and that the drafters of the Popular Participation Law explicitly worried that "if there isn't popular participation we're going to have a new *Sendero Luminoso* [a violent Maoist guerrilla movement active in Peru at the time]."[202] In turn, various draft proposals of the law came from (mainly Leftist) intellectuals committed to popular participation in general and BPIs in particular, such as Miguel Urioste, Iván Finot, Iván Arias, and others, and these proposals shaped important aspects of the final law.[203] Further, President Sánchez de Lozada and the MNR formed an alliance with the left-wing Revolutionary Liberation Movement Tupak Katari (MRTKL) (specifically through the nomination of MRTKL leader Victor Hugo Cárdenas as President Sánchez de Lozada's Vice Presidential candidate), as well as a congressional pact with other progressive parties such as the Free Bolivia Movement (MBL). While MRTKL and MBL were very junior partners in the MNR's political coalition, both were influential in ensuring BPIs were considered as a policy proposal by the government. Specifically, the MNR's alliance with MRTKL for the 1993 presidential elections yielded a platform (*Plan de Todos*) that promised the establishment of BPIs (OTBs), which were eventually incorporated into the 1994 Popular Participation Law.[204] For its part, the MBL had been advocating participatory democratic reforms since its founding in 1986, and its ideas had a major influence on the team that drafted the 1994 Popular Participation Law.[205]

- *Dominican Republic*
  - Variable present?
    - **YES**
      - There is evidence that all three major Dominican political parties believed the electorate expected them to implement measures to increase citizen participation. After governments led by the progressive PRD in the late 1970s and early 1980s heightened, but ultimately frustrated expectations of democratic deepening in the

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[202] (*Interview with Diego Ayo, La Paz*, personal communication, April 17, 2019) Other respondents made similar a similar point (Interview with Diego Von Vacano, La Paz).

[203] (*Interview with Diego Ayo, La Paz*, personal communication, April 17, 2019; *Interview with Ivan Arias, La Paz*, personal communication, April 18, 2019; *Interview with Iván Finot, La Paz*, personal communication, April 19, 2019)

[204] (Centellas, 2000; *Interview with Ivan Arias, La Paz*, personal communication, April 18, 2019)

[205] (Centellas, 2000)

country,[206] a wave of social protests erupted calling—among other things—for participatory political reforms. As Mitchell describes, increasing citizen participation gained "new clarity and force as a result of the social protests of the late 1980s."[207] In turn, a range of mayors and *técnicos* from the Dominican Municipalist movement (from across the political spectrum) strongly advocated for BPI implementation, playing instrumental roles both in launching pilot BPI programs in various municipalities in the early 2000s, as well as drafting the final BPI law.[208]

- *Peru*
    - Variable present?
        - **YES**
            - Demands for more robust citizen participation emerged in Peruvian civil society during the government of Alberto Fuijimori (1990–2000), which recentralized power and weakened local level venues for citizen participation.[209] These demands increased dramatically after Fujimori's downfall in 2000, when backlash against authoritarianism produced a wide range of *mesas de diálogo* around the country to address a rising tide of citizen demands.[210] Increased citizen participation was such a salient political theme in Peru before the implementation of BPIs that it was a key promise of both presidential candidates in the 2001 elections.[211] Beyond this broad expectation of increased citizen participation among the population, a number of congress people with extensive experience in participatory budgeting—in cities where they previously served as mayors—pressed for BPI implementation. These included the former mayor of Ilo, Ernesto Herrera Becerra, and the former mayor of Cajamarca, Luis Guerrero (among others) who were elected to congress in 2001 and played direct roles in the congressional decentralization committee that drafted Peru's BPI law.[212] There was also a range of influential civil society organizations actively pressing for BPIs during this period, including by intervening in public meetings hosted by the congressional decentralization committee, as well as providing

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[206] (*Interview with Gennry González, Santo Domingo*, personal communication, May 20, 2019)

[207] (Mitchell, 2014, p. 23)

[208] (*Interview with Gennry González, Santo Domingo*, personal communication, May 20, 2019; *Interview with Victor D'Aza, Santo Domingo*, personal communication, May 17, 2019)

[209] (S. McNulty, 2011, p. 32)

[210] (*Interview with Javier Abugattás, Lima*, personal communication, July 5, 2017; S. McNulty, 2011, p. 33)

[211] (S. McNulty, 2011, p. 34)

[212] (*Interview with Luis Guerrero*, personal communication, October 11, 2019)

language for draft bills, and holding open fora around the country to popularize BPIs.[213]

- *Ecuador*
  - Variable present?
    - **YES**
      - See case study in body of paper.
- *Colombia*
  - Variable present?
    - **YES**
      - There was significant demand for increased citizen participation from civil society in the years before BPIs were included in Colombia's 2015 citizen participation law, especially in the wake of the country's 1991 constitution, which included a range of participatory mechanisms and increased societal expectations around citizen participation.[214] A range of local-level experiences with participatory institutions generally, and BPIs in particular, during the 1990s and 2000s also increased pressure for incorporating BPIs into a national law.[215] Finally, influential civil society organizations, particularly *Foro Nacional por Colómbia*, were central in generating widespread discussions among Colombian civil society about the need for a national law that would include BPIs.[216] Civil society organizations were also critical in pushing for the inclusion of BPIs in the 2015 Citizen Participation Law.[217]

- *El Salvador*
  - Variable present?
    - **YES**
      - There was significant demand for increased citizen participation from civil society in the years before BPIs were included in the reform of El Salvador's municipal code (2005).[218] A range of local-level experiences with BPIs in particular also increased

[213] (S. McNulty, 2011, p. 59)
[214] (*Interview with Fabio Velázquez, Bogotá*, personal communication, September 19, 2019; *Interview with Ricardo Jaramillo, Bogotá*, personal communication, October 18, 2019)
[215] (*Interview with Fabio Velázquez, Bogotá*, personal communication, September 19, 2019; Velázquez & González, 2019)
[216] (*Interview with Fabio Velázquez, Bogotá*, personal communication, September 19, 2019; Velázquez & González, 2019)
[217] (*Interview with John Sudarsky Bogotá*, personal communication, November 3, 2019; *Interview with Juan Fernando Londoño, Bogotá*, personal communication, October 25, 2019)
[218] (para el Desarrollo Local, 2003, p. 61)

pressure for incorporating those mechanisms into a national law.[219] Finally, a wide range of civil society organizations participated directly in ensuring the inclusion of BPIs in the 2005 reform.[220]

- *Guatemala*
  - o Variable present?
    - ▪ **PARTIALLY**
      - There is significant evidence to suggest that increasing citizen participation was an important demand among the Guatemalan electorate and activists in the Guatemalan Christian Democratic Party in the 1980s, as well as during the peace process of the mid-1990s.[221] There is also evidence that influential figures within the Christian Democratic coalition were pushing for BPIs in the 1987 law.[222] Finally, while there is little evidence to suggest that influential individuals or groups in Portillo's Institutional Republican Party (PRI) coalition in the early 2000s pushed for BPIs, it appears that by this time there was a general agreement across the political spectrum that increased citizen participation was needed, and indeed required by the 1996 peace accords.[223]

Variable: Low level of political risk associated with BPI implementation
Coding criteria: 1) Clear evidence that civil society organizations and social movements (either contingently linked coalition partners or oppositional) were not capable of effectively utilizing BPIs against the implementing party? 2) Clear evidence that opposition parties and social movements had a low capacity to utilize BPI spaces against the implementing party? If either 1) or 2) is present but not the other, I code the case "partially."

- *Venezuela*
  - o Variable present?
    - ▪ **YES**
      - See case study in body of paper.
- *Bolivia*
  - o Variable present?
    - ▪ **YES**
      - While MNR politicians feared a new round of mass social unrest in response to neoliberal reforms, organized social movements in Bolivia were not strong in the early 1990s, as the country's

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[219] (para el Desarrollo Local, 2003, p. 61)
[220] (para el Desarrollo Local, 2003, p. 77)
[221] (Iberoamérica & Portugal, 2005, pp. 22–25; S. McNulty, 2019, pp. 62–63)
[222] (*Interview with Nelson Amaro*, personal communication, November 5, 2019; S. McNulty, 2019, pp. 61–62)
[223] *Acuerdos de Paz*, 2nd ed. (Universidad Rafael Landívar/Misión de Verificación de las Naciones Unidas en Guatemala (MINUGUA), 1997), for example, see 15, 18, 22, 56.

historically powerful corporatist structures had been effectively broken by the mid-1980s.[224] Specifically, VDEM's measure of CSO mobilization capacity (v2csstruc_1) shows that Bolivia's civil society/social movements were weaker than the Latin American average by the mid-1980s, and that by 1993 Bolivia had one of the weakest civil society/social movement sectors in the region. With respect to the capacity of opposition parties to utilize BPIs against the MNR, since rural municipalities did not exist in Bolivia before the 1994 participation law, there is no direct measure of municipal-level opposition strength. That said, the MNR's expectation—based on its historic popularity in rural areas—that it would perform well electorally at the municipal level (compared to the regional level) was a key factor in its decision to implement BPIs in the first place.[225] Further, the MNR was careful to ensure that its prefects would control the process of granting legal authority to OTBs, thereby negating the possibility that opposition parties could empower rival OTBs opposed to the MNR.[226]

- *Dominican Republic*
  - Variable present?
    - **YES**
      - While the Dominican Republic enjoyed relatively high levels of civil society participation, civil society and social movements lacked strong national coordination, and levels of social protest were unusually low relative to the rest of Latin America.[227] Espinal et al. explain that the weakness of civil society allowed politicians to ignore the demands of civil society.[228] With respect to the strength of opposition parties at the local level, the ruling PLD fared very well in the municipal elections of 2006 (the year before BPIs were adopted into law 170-07), jumping from control of 11 (6.5%) to 67 (40%) of the country's 167 municipalities.[229] Since the PLD did not control a majority of Dominican municipalities, it might have feared that its rivals could benefit more than it would from BPI implementation. Such fears, however, were likely minimal. Not only did the PLD govern in significantly more municipalities than any of its challengers, but it also had a reasonable expectation of reaching majority control in the future. This was due to the fact that 1) the PLD was gaining municipalities

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[224] (*Interview with Diego Ayo, La Paz*, personal communication, April 17, 2019)
[225] (*Interview with Diego Ayo, La Paz*, personal communication, April 17, 2019; O'Neill, 2005, p. chapter 5)
[226] (*Interview with Diego Ayo, La Paz*, personal communication, April 17, 2019)
[227] (Espinal et al., 2010, pp. 44–45)
[228] (Espinal et al., 2010, p. 47)
[229] Junta Central Electoral.

rapidly, while its key rival's local-level electoral performance was in sharp decline,[230] and 2) the percentage of Dominican municipalities under PLD control was already quite large. Finally, FEDOMU showed unusual political foresight in integrating leaders from all three major parties in their pro-BPI advocacy efforts, with the explicit goal of avoiding even the appearance of an identification between BPIs and any particular political party.[231] This lowered the party's perceived risk of BPI implementation, and made PLD politicians even more open to BPIs than they would have been with municipal-level political dominance alone. Not surprisingly, then, there is little evidence that the PLD feared the possibility of BPI cooptation by its political rivals.

- *Peru*
  - Variable present?
    - **YES**
      - Civil society and social movements were relatively weak in Peru in the years prior to BPI implementation. Both the labor movement and the progressive church saw their influence decline significantly during the 1990s,[232] and the country had no national peasant or indigenous organizations.[233] The Shining Path insurgency, together with the state counterinsurgency, also took a major toll on civil society and social movement organizations in the 1990s.[234] It is true that there was a large and rapid increase in new forms of popular organization beginning at the end of the Fujimori period (in the form of Regional Fronts and Defense Fronts). These organizations engaged regularly in mobilizations, roadblocks, sit-ins, and other types of direct action. That said, however, these organizations remained isolated, and did not form into coordinated national associations.[235] With respect to the strength of opposition parties at the local level, President Toledo's party Perú Posible captured only 180 out of Peru's 1,799 municipalities (10%) in 2002 municipal elections.[236] This was less than the 13% controlled by the party's primary rival, APRA. Further, the party did not have

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[230] The PLD's main rival was the formerly dominant PRD, which won 104 (62%) of mayoral elections in 2002, but lost half of its municipalities in 2006 (dropping to control of 52, or 32% of Dominican municipalities).

[231] These efforts yielded results, as each of the three major political parties in the Dominican Republic (PLD, PRD, PRSC) supported the implementation of BPIs,[231] and mayors from across the political spectrum seem to have viewed BPIs favorably.[231]

[232] (Levitsky & Zavaleta, 2016, p. 424)

[233] (Yashar, 2005)

[234] (Yashar, 2005)

[235] (Arce, 2015, p. 285)

[236] Onpe.gob.pe.

a reasonable expectation of winning a majority of mayoral races in the near future. This was for two reasons. First, the fact that the percentage of Peruvian municipalities under Perú Posible's control was small in 2002 made the prospect of reaching a majority in 2006 remote, especially since no party had won a majority of Peru's municipal elections since 1986.[237] Second, the extreme volatility of Peru's party system made predicting the party's future electoral fortunes even more difficult.[238] Despite these conditions, however, the role of Peru's highly respected and influential MEF in presenting BPIs as a largely apolitical, technocratic process during congressional debates around the law ensured that Perú Posible did not view BPI implementation as a potential political threat.[239] Thus, despite Perú Posible's weak strength at the local level, the MEF's role in the development of Peru's BPI law lowered the party's perceived costs of BPI implementation. The party may not have had a motivation to spearhead implementation, given its weak local-level electoral strength, but it also did not have a strong incentive to impede implementation.

- *Ecuador*
  - Variable present?
    - **NO**
      - See case study in body of paper.
- *Colombia*
  - Variable present?
    - **YES**
      - Civil society was weak in Colombia during this period, with VDEM's measure of civil society's mobilizational capacity (v2csstruc_1) showing that Colombian civil society had among the lowest mobilizational capacity in the region. With respect to the strength of opposition parties, President Santos' Partido Social de la Unidad Nacional only captured 258 out of Colombia's 1,102 municipalities (24%) in the 2011 elections.[240] While low, this percentage was larger than that carried by the party's two strongest rivals (who won 18% and 17% of mayoral races, respectively). Further, the rate of increase in the Partido de la Unidad's municipal-level electoral success between 2007 and 2011 was significantly larger than that of its primary opponents. These facts suggest that Partido de la Unidad could have expected to benefit

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[237] (O'Neill, 2005)
[238] See (Levitsky & Zavaleta, 2016)
[239] (S. McNulty, 2011, pp. 70–71)
[240] Registraduria.gov.co.

from BPI implementation at least as much as any of its individual rivals. Despite this, however, the party's overall weakness at the local-level suggests that it would have viewed empowering local governments as a potential political liability. Additionally, the fact that the percentage of Colombian municipalities under the party's control was small in 2011 made the prospect of securing a majority in 2015 remote, especially since no party had prevailed in more than 26% of Colombia's municipal elections in the previous three election cycles.[241]

- *El Salvador*
  - Variable present?
    - **PARTIALLY**
      - Civil society was weak in El Salvador during this period, with VDEM's measure of CSO fragmentation (v2csstruc_1) showing that Salvadoran civil society had among the lowest mobilizational capacity in the region. That said, while winning more municipalities than any of its opponents in the municipal elections of 2003 (it won 42% of the country's 262 municipalities),[242] President Saca's ARENA party still viewed its chief political rival, the FMLN, as a serious threat at the municipal level. First, the FMLN's municipal-level electoral fortunes were experiencing a sustained period of rapid improvement, while the number of municipal governments under ARENA control declined precipitously from 207 to 111 between 1994 and 2003. Finally, in 2003, the FMLN won municipal governments in eight of the country's 10 most populous cities, including the top three. Thus, despite the relatively weak threat posed by Salvadoran civil society, the Saca government would have feared the possible cooptation of BPIs by a strong local-level opposition.

- *Guatemala*
  - Variable present?
    - **PARTIALLY**
      - Guatemalan civil society and social movements were weak in the early 2000s, in the wake of a devastating, decades-long civil war.[243] Specifically, VDEM's measure of CSO mobilizational capacity (v2csstruc_1) shows that Guatemala's civil society/social movements weakened substantially during the 1990s, and by 2002

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[241] Registraduria.gov.co.

[242] www.tse.gob.sv/

[243] For a discussion of the weakness of Guatemalan civil society during this period, see McNulty, *Democracy from Above?*, 82; Anita Isaacs, "Trouble in Central America: Guatemala on the Brink," *Journal of Democracy* 21, no. 2 (2010): 118-120.

enjoyed among the lowest levels of mobilizational capacity in Latin America. With respect to the strength of opposition parties at the local level, the ruling FRG performed well in the municipal elections of 1999 (the most recent municipal elections before BPIs were adopted into the Law of Urban and Rural Development Councils), winning 46% of mayoral elections. While not winning a majority of Guatemalan municipalities, the FRG won significantly more than any of its challengers.[244] That said, the party still had much to fear with respect to the municipal-level strength of its primary challenger, the PAN. While the PAN only won 108 mayoral elections (33% of total municipalities) in 1999, it had shot up from 12.7% in 1993 to 36.3% in 1995, and its slightly disappointing 1999 showing only represented a 3% decline in its municipal-level fortunes.[245]

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[244] Tribunal Supremo Electoral
[245] Tribunal Supremo Electoral.

APPENDIX E: Supplemental Materials for Chapter 6

Details of Experimental Protocol (experiment format included in survey instrument)

88. Ahora le voy a mostrar unas tarjetas para que escoja una y por favor responda la siguiente pregunta: **Que tan motivado estaría de participar en la reunión**? *Encuestador muestre la tarjeta asignada*						
	TARJETA 1		**TARJETA 2**		**TARJETA 3**	
	Consejo Comunal (1)	PSUV (2)	Consejo Comunal (3)	PSUV (4)	Consejo Comunal (5)	PSUV (6)
1. Muy motivado						
2. Algo motivado						
3. Poco motivado						
4. Nada motivado						
5. No sabe						
6. No responde						

Note: Enumerators offer respondents 6 separate cards (upside down), one for each of the 6 categories described in the table. Respondents then choose one of the 6 cards, and are asked how motivated they would be to attend the hypothetical meeting.

Summary Statistics for Treatment and Control Groups

Control	miss	p.miss	mean	sd	median	p25	p75	min	max
treatment	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
outcome	0	0	1.5	1.2	1	0	3	0	3
voted	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1
maduro assessment	0	0	2.5	0.9	2	2	3	1	5
news consumpetion	0	0	1.7	0.8	1.3	1	2	1	5
trust	0	0	2.2	0.8	2	2	3	1	5
ethnicity	0	0	4	2.2	6	1	6	1	6
sex	0	0	0.4	0.5	0	0	1	0	1
ethnicity	0	0	5.5	2.1	5	4	7	1	9
age	0	0	43.9	12.6	45	35	53	19	70
educational attainment	0	0	3.7	1.3	3	3	4	1	7
CC controlled by PSUV	0	0	3.7	1.7	5	2	5	1	5
municipality size	0	0	625070	677545	270792	217590	704585	29677	2082000
maduro voteshare 2018 (parish)	0	0	69.5	5.9	72	66	74	55	78
difference maduro 2018_PSUV 2015	0	0	25.2	11.2	24.7	18	30	7	53

Treatment	miss	p.miss	mean	sd	median	p25	p75	min	max
treatment	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1
outcome	0	0	1.7	1.1	2	1	3	0	3
voted	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1
maduro assessment	0	0	2.59	0.9	2	2	3	1	5
news consumption	0	0	1.55	0.9	1	1	2	1	5
trust	0	0	2.39	0.8	2	2	3	1	4
ethnicity	0	0	3.58	2.2	3	1	6	1	6
sex	0	0	0.36	0.5	0	0	1	0	1
ethnicity	0	0	5.84	2.2	5	4	8	1	9
age	0	0	44.76	11.9	43.7	34	53	24	72
educational attainment	0	0	3.99	1.4	4	3	5	1	7
CC controlled by PSUV	0	0	3.66	1.4	4	3	5	1	5
municipality size	0	0	606012	534851.8	690749	217590	704585	29677	2082000

| maduro voteshare 2018 (parish) | 0 | 0 | 67.86 | 6.6 | 68 | 62 | 75 | 52 | 78 |
| difference maduro 2018_PSUV 2015 | 0 | 0 | 25.79 | 11.2 | 24.3 | 17 | 34 | 10 | 50 |

Balance between Parishes Included in Survey Experiment and Other Respondents

variable	not included in survey experiment	included in survey experiment	SMD
n	701	433	
treatment	0.00 (0.00)	1.00 (0.00)	-
outcome	**1.54 (1.18)**	**1.86 (1.14)**	**0.354**
voted	1.00 (0.00)	1.00 (0.00)	0.087
maduro assessment	2.52 (0.87)	2.73 (1.03)	0.086
news consumption	**1.64 (0.78)**	**1.51 (0.89)**	**0.236**
trust	2.24 (0.81)	2.42 (0.79)	0.064
ethnicity	3.99 (2.24)	3.74 (2.24)	0.155
sex	0.38 (0.49)	0.40 (0.49)	0.067
ethnicity	5.46 (2.06)	5.67 (2.09)	0.027
age	43.79 (12.48)	46.38 (13.01)	0.076
educational attainment	**3.72 (1.33)**	**4.11 (1.53)**	**0.235**
CC controlled by PSUV	3.67 (1.73)	3.79 (1.43)	0.117
Size of municipality	609051.40 (670373)	482763.93 (495912)	0.171
maduro voteshare 2018 (parish)	**69.42 (6.02)**	**65.78 (6.72)**	**0.52**
difference maduro 2018_PSUV 2015	25.18 (11.07)	25.82 (9.61)	0.022

Note: bolded variables indicate standardized mean differences (SMD) greater than .2 between groups.

Results of Survey Experiment Including Controls

Note: Insufficient number of observations to estimate model among opposition supporters.