



# Saving Lives While Sharing Power: The United States and China in United Nations Peacekeeping Missions in Africa

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Saving Lives While Sharing Power:  
The United States and China in United Nations Peacekeeping Missions in Africa

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A Thesis in the Field of International Relations for the  
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## Abstract

In past years, many American politicians, intelligence officials, academics, and foreign policy analysts have predicted a dire fate for the future of the international system, especially global issues that may become harder to manage and conflicts that continue to appear. Most of them attribute the decline to the political, economic, military, and technological rise of several nations, and the end of the unipolar post-Cold War period. But whether a rise of these nations will be harmful to the international system is not clear.

In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, China and the United States have been two of the most powerful actors to participate in United Nations peacekeeping missions. Research for this thesis found that U.S.-China cooperation and competition from 2000 to 2020 helped keep U.N. peacekeeping missions in Africa at the same level politically, militarily, and financially compared to the U.S.-led era from the end of the Cold War, and during the unipolar period defined here as 1989 to 2000. China and the U.S. have cooperated and competed politically, militarily, and financially to maintain their own interests and influence. Relative to U.N. missions, in large part both countries provided about equal political support, China provided greater military support, and the U.S. made more financial contributions.

The case studies focus on five U.N. peacekeeping missions conducted in Africa during two time periods: 1989 to 2000 and 2000 to 2020 in Namibia, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, and Mali. The case studies were chosen to detect changes in U.N. peacekeeping missions over time as the U.S.-China relationship evolved. The first time period includes U.S. leadership at the end of the Cold War era and during the subsequent unipolar era from 1989 to 2000 in Namibia and Somalia. There China played a smaller role in the missions. In the second time period focuses on China's surging participation in U.N. peacekeeping missions during the emerging bipolar period of the 21<sup>st</sup> century in Mali, South Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

where the U.S. was also leading. The case studies were chosen to represent four regional sectors of Africa. This thesis also presents data on military and financial contributions to U.N. peacekeeping in Africa during the two studied time periods to further illustrate military and financial support during U.S. leadership and during U.S.-China leadership.

African, American, Chinese, and international sources have been used. The primary sources include United Nations resolutions, United Nations peacekeeping documents, United Nations Security Council documents, United Nations Secretary-Generals' publications, Chinese politicians' and diplomats' speeches, Chinese military officials' statements, United States Congress publications, White House documents, U.S. government reports, African Union publications, African political parties' publications, African activists' statements, and African, American, Chinese, and international newspaper articles. The second set of sources included academic books, journal articles, NGO publications, and "think-tank" articles.

Peace does more than just save lives; it also sets the foundation for countries to develop politically, socially, and economically. Maintaining peace is a key objective of African countries, and U.N. peacekeeping efforts can help. Dire predictions about the fate of the world order, especially as they focus on the rise of China, are unfounded as they related to U.N. peacekeeping efforts in Africa. Based on the past two decades, African policymakers and Africans living in conflict areas and countries affected by conflict can feel relatively confident that the U.N. will maintain its presence in conflict areas on the African continent, regardless of a change in the international order, as long as the U.S. and China continue to cooperate and compete.

## Dedication

To my father, Dr. Amde Wolle, and to my mother, Alemtsehay Tadesse, for devoting decades of your life supporting me and teaching me life lessons. I will always cherish the good times we have spent together, the numerous adventures, and the never-ending laughter. We have gone through difficult times as well, but we got through them together. Throughout your lives, you have contributed much to others and led by example. I am very thankful to have you, and I love you very much.

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## Glossary of Acronyms

Africom	U.S. African Command
AQIM	Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
AU	African Union
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
FOCAC	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IGAD	Inter Governmental Authority on Development
M23	March 23 Movement
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (acronym from French)
MLNA	National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission (acronym from French)
PLAN	People's Liberation Army of Namibia
SWAPO	South West African People's Organization
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia (I and II)
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNTAG	United Nations Transition Assistance Group
UTF	United Task Force

## Chapter I

### Introduction

A strong international system consists of solid international structures, positive interactions among nations, and greater prosperity for people worldwide. In past years, many American politicians, intelligence officials, academics, and foreign policy analysts, predicted a dire fate for the future of the international system, including global issues that would become harder to manage and an increasing number of conflicts (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2017). They mostly attribute the decline of the international system to the political, economic, military, and technological rise of several nations, in particular China, and to the end of the unipolar post-Cold War period, where power was concentrated in the United States. J. Mattis' "Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States" names interstate strategic competition as the greatest threat to U.S. national security. But whether that competition will be harmful to the international system, including United Nations peacekeeping, is not clear.

In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, China and the United States are two of the most powerful actors, with U.N. peacekeeping missions governed by U.S. and Chinese cooperation and competition. The primary mission of the U.N. is to maintain international peace and security, and the United Nations Security Council (U.N.S.C.) is primarily responsible for doing so (U.N., 2020a). The U.S. and China are two of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, so each has greater say in peacekeeping decisions than other countries (U.N., 2020b). Since the founding of the United Nations in 1945, the U.S. has

played a dominant role in United Nations peacekeeping efforts. China, on the other hand, was against U.N. peacekeeping missions in the first ten years of its membership which began in 1971 (Morphet, 2000). It saw U.N. peacekeeping as a tool of powerful countries to dominate the affairs of less-powerful countries (Fravel, 1104).

For purposes of this paper, however, I consider that China promoted peace and security because of its role in supporting various liberation movements across Africa. Chinese politicians and diplomats often voiced the need for solidarity between China and the rest of the developing world (Alden, Large, & Oliveira, 2008). However, since China was less powerful in the early years of its U.N. membership, the country did not have a major impact on decolonization, peace and security in most African countries. That said, China abstained from voting on most U.N. Security Council resolutions relating to peacekeeping, it refused to fund U.N. peacekeeping operations (although that was expected of all five permanent members of the U.N.S.C.), and it opposed sending troops to U.N. missions (Fravel, 1996).

In the late 1980s, however, China began to get involved in U.N. peacekeeping as the country started to have a more positive view of the U.N. (Zhongying, 2005); also because China wanted to be another voice in the developing world where most U.N. peacekeeping missions were located (Morphet, 2000). China was cautious in choosing which peacekeeping missions it supported, choosing to uphold the principle of state sovereignty to not interfere in the affairs of less-powerful countries without their consent (Carlson, 2006).

From 2000 to 2020, China's involvement in U.N. peacekeeping changed dramatically. The country has taken a leading role in U.N. peacekeeping efforts,

especially in Africa, in an effort to maintain China's political, economic, and security interests. Yin He (2019), a scholar at the China Peacekeeping Police Training Center, argues that the change of China's national identity to that of a rising power resulted in the country's desire to be a responsible force in the international arena. This might also explain China's interest and leadership in U.N. peacekeeping missions. But how has this desire for joint leadership between the U.S. and China affected U.N. peacekeeping in Africa?

### Research Problem and Question

Scholars have not yet examined how the change in leadership from the unipolar U.S.-led era, to the emerging bipolar U.S.-China-led era, has affected U.N. peacekeeping missions in Africa. This is the core of the research problem which this thesis will address. Such knowledge will be significant because if U.S.-China cooperation and competition in the new U.S.-China-led era could keep U.N. peacekeeping in Africa at the same level politically, militarily, and financially, many lives in conflict areas could be saved. Hundreds of thousands of people in one country alone die tragically, and millions more are displaced in conflict areas. U.N. peacekeeping is important because it "helps countries torn by conflict create conditions that favor lasting peace" (U.N. 2020c). Peace is a necessary condition for countries to develop politically, socially, and economically. U.S. and China, as the most powerful actors in U.N. peacekeeping, can play a significant role in whether peace is achieved, so it is necessary to conduct research on the effect of their leadership or lack of leadership.

This thesis examines the following question: how has the change in leadership from the unipolar U.S.-led era to the emerging bipolar U.S.-China-led era affected U.N. peacekeeping missions in Africa? To my knowledge, there is no academic literature that addresses this question. This time period was chosen to include the end of the Cold War era, the subsequent unipolar era, and much of the emerging bipolar U.S.-China-led era with an eye to detecting change.

This thesis will analyze five case studies of U.N. peacekeeping in Africa from, 1989 to 2000 and from 2000 to 2020. The sites for the case studies are in Namibia, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), South Sudan, and Mali where the U.S. and China both cooperated and competed. This thesis also outlines U.N. peacekeeping operations in Africa in the 1980s to 1990s when the U.S. had a major influence on the missions and China did not. U.N. peacekeeping operations in Africa in the 2000s to 2010s took place at a time when the U.S. and China were both leading actors in U.N. peacekeeping missions.

### Thesis Hypothesis

The hypothesis is as follows:

*U.S.-China cooperation and competition in the emerging bipolar era have kept U.N. peacekeeping in Africa at the same level politically, militarily, and financially compared to the U.S.-led era at the end of the Cold War and into the unipolar period.*

Both countries have cooperated and competed politically, militarily, and financially to maintain their interests and influence, and both countries provided about equal political support to the missions: China made greater military contributions, the U.S. provided more financial contributions.



This hypothesis is contrary to what one might expect. U.N. peacekeeping has been part of the international system since the founding of the U.N., and it is a key component of the international system. If the end of the unipolar period weakens the international system as many experts predict (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2017), it would be expected that the U.N. and its peacekeeping function would also be weakened.

The significance of hypothesizing that U.N. peacekeeping has remained similar throughout the two time periods is that if U.N. peacekeeping had weakened under U.S.-China leadership, it would be harder to reduce conflict, which in turn would affect the political, economic, and social institutions in countries affected by conflict and lead to more abuses, injuries, and deaths. Along with harming African countries that are affected by conflict, a weakening of U.N. peacekeeping would negatively impact the political, economic, human rights, and security interests of the U.S. and China. Overall, however, although its effectiveness varies, studies have noted that U.N. peacekeeping helps reduce conflict and is making progress on establishing peace (Day, 2018; Lijn, 2019; Novosseloff, 2019). So, maintaining or strengthening U.N. peacekeeping is advantageous for all states involved, offering the benefits improving the peace and security in a country.

### Evidence

This thesis utilizes African, American, Chinese, and international primary and secondary sources. The primary sources include United Nations resolutions, United Nations peacekeeping documents, United Nations Security Council documents, United

Nations Secretary-Generals' publications, Chinese politicians' and diplomats' speeches, Chinese military officials' statements, United States Congress publications, White House documents, U.S. government reports, African Union publications, African political parties' publications, African activists' statements, and African, American, Chinese, and international newspaper articles. Secondary sources consist of academic books, journal articles, NGO publications, and think tank articles on United Nations peacekeeping in Africa, the United States and U.N. peacekeeping, and on China and U.N. peacekeeping.

### Case Studies

The thesis primarily utilizes the comparative case study method. The case studies come from five U.N. peacekeeping missions that were conducted in Africa between 1989 to 2000 and from 2000 to 2020 in Namibia, Somalia, Mali, South Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (see Figure 1). The case studies were chosen in an effort to detect change in U.N. peacekeeping missions over time, especially as the U.S.-China relationship evolved. This time frame includes (a) U.S. leadership at the peak of the Cold War era, (b) during the subsequent unipolar era in Namibia and Somalia where China played a smaller role in the missions, and (c) and China's surge in participation in U.N. peacekeeping missions during the emerging bipolar period in Mali, South Sudan, and the DRC where the U.S. also led. There was no specific moment when the unipolar period ended; rather, the dominance of the U.S. in U.N. peacekeeping missions at the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century began to fade as Chinese strength increased and China began to contend with the U.S. economically and militarily.



Map No. 4045 Rev. 8.1 UNITED NATIONS  
July 2018

Department of Field Support  
Geospatial Information Section (formerly Cartographic Section)

Figure 1. Country Sites for Five Case Studies.

Source: UN Geospatial Information Section, 2018.

The five case studies were chosen to represent four regions of Africa. The name of the missions and their dates of operation are listed below:

- United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), Namibia, April 1989-March 1990
- United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II), Somalia, March 1993-March 1995
- United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission (MONUSCO, based on French name), DRC, July 2010-present
- United Nations Mission (UNMISS), South Sudan, July 2011-present
- United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission (MINUSMA, based on French name), Mali, April 2013-present.

The thesis also presents data on military and financial contributions to U.N. peacekeeping in Africa from 1989 to 2000 and from 2000 to 2020 to illustrate the military and financial support provided by the U.S. during the unipolar period and during U.S.-China leadership.

I will discuss U.S. and China *political* support for missions in Africa in greater detail than the military and financial support sections. Political support that is maintained in the 21<sup>st</sup> century is not as clear—it is more contentious. I also believe the explanations for the military and financial support sections are more straightforward and do not need as much elaboration.

## Research Limitations

One limitation is that data on how much military equipment the U.S. provides to U.N. peacekeeping could not be obtained. The information is not available in the U.N., or the U.S. Department of State, or the Pentagon Libraries, despite requests made through the Freedom of Information Act.

Another limitation is that the net financial budget for seven missions in the 21<sup>st</sup> century is not available. Only the most recent annual data is provided in UN public records. Therefore, the tables I can provide will note “for one year only” where total data is unavailable.

A further limitation is that data on U.S. financial contributions to UNTAG and UNOSOM II are unavailable. It is known that the U.S. was the main contributor to these missions, so the data on total contributions of U.N. member states to the two missions are provided instead.

## Definition of Terms

*African Union*: “The African Union (AU) is [an intergovernmental organization and] continental body consisting of the 55 member states that make up the countries of the African Continent” (African Union, 2020b). “Its constitutive act is . . . to promote unity, solidarity, cohesion and cooperation among the peoples of Africa and African States” (African Union, 2020c).

*United Nations*: “The United Nations is an international organization founded in 1945. It is currently made up of 193 Member States. . . . According to the Charter, the United Nations has four purposes: to maintain international peace and security, to

develop friendly relations among nations, to cooperate in solving international problems and in promoting respect for human rights, and to be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations” (U.N., 2020d).

*United Nations Security Council (U.N.S.C.):* “The Security Council has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. It has fifteen members. . . . Five permanent members: China, France, Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and ten non-permanent members elected for two-year terms by the General Assembly. . . . Each Member has one vote. Under the Charter of the United Nations, all Member States are obligated to comply with Council decisions” (U.N., 2020b).

*United Nations Peacekeeping:* “UN Peacekeeping helps countries navigate the difficult path from conflict to peace. UN Peacekeeping is guided by three basic principles: consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate. . . . Today’s multidimensional peacekeeping operations are called upon not only to maintain peace and security, but also to facilitate the political process, protect civilians, assist in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants; support the organization of elections, protect and promote human rights and assist in restoring the rule of law. . . . [UN Peacekeeping has] unique strengths, including legitimacy, burden sharing, and an ability to deploy troops and police from around the world, integrating them with civilian peacekeepers to address a range of mandates set by the UN Security Council and General Assembly” (U.N., 2020c).

*United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG):* A peacekeeping mission established by the U.N. in Namibia in 1989 comprised of 7,500 military and civilian police personnel and additional international and local civilian staff, with an approved budget from 1989 to 1990 of \$368.6 million (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2020d).

*United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II):* A peacekeeping mission established by the U.N. in Somalia in 1993 comprised of 28,000 military and civilian police personnel and 2,800 international and local civilian staff, with an approved budget from 1993 to 1995 of \$1.6 billion (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2020d).

*United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO):* A peacekeeping mission established by the U.N. in D.R.C. in 2010 comprised of 19,815 military personnel, 1,050 members of former police units, 760 military observers, and 391 police personnel (United Nations, 2020g), with an approved budget from 2019 to 2020 of \$1,086,018,600 (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2020c).

*United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS):* A peacekeeping mission established by the U.N. in South Sudan in 2011 comprised of 17,000 troops and 2,101 police personnel (United Nations, 2020f), with an approved budget from 2019 to 2020 of \$1,081,788,400 (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2020b).

*United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA):* A peacekeeping mission established by the U.N. in Mali in 2013 comprised of 13,289 troops and 1,920 police personnel (United Nations, 2020f), with an

approved budget from 2019 to 2020 of \$1,221,420,600 (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2020a).



## Chapter II

### Political Outcomes Under U.S. Leadership

This chapter provides background and explanations of U.S. interests and influence in two cases in the 1989 to 2000 time period: UNTAG in Namibia and UNOSOM II in Somalia. I will compare the U.S.-led era to the U.S-China-led era in the following chapter to show that political support to U.N. peacekeeping in Africa in the unipolar period has remained similar to what it has been in the emerging bipolar period.

#### Introduction

Before 2000, the United States was the key player in U.N. peacekeeping operations, and there was little cooperation or competition between the U.S. and China during this period. As this occurred near the end of the Cold War and during the unipolar period where America was extremely dominant, the country's political will to get involved in a conflict usually determined whether U.N. peacekeeping missions would be established. Other Western nations on the U.N. Security Council generally voted in line with U.S. decisions because their interests tended to match that of the U.S.

At the time, China was largely uninterested in U.N. peacekeeping, and since the country was not very powerful, it had largely no influential input into political decisions leading up to U.N. missions. Similarly, during the unipolar era, Russia's voting record was sometimes consistent with the U.S. and sometimes went against U.S. decisions—it was about even. The Soviet Union did vote in favor of the U.N. peacekeeping mission in

Namibia in the 1980s since it occurred in 1989—near the end of the Cold War (Morphet, 2000).

For countries plagued by conflict, various U.S. interests lay behind U.S. decisions to deploy. Although the official common interest among U.N. member states in U.N. peacekeeping operations is to save human lives and improve relationships among warring factions thus leading to stable governments, in reality countries have their own interests underlying their participation in peacekeeping missions. The U.S. delayed its response to Namibian independence for both political and economic reasons. The U.S. wanted to maintain its sphere of influence in the region, and the U.S. and other Western nations had numerous economic ties with South Africa. The U.S. and other Western nations on the Security Council clashed with the U.N. on its continued engagement with South Africa. Despite the Cold War being a factor that contributed to the United States' initial hesitation for Namibian independence, in the end the war resulted in U.S. support for Namibian independence.

Despite the delayed response in Namibia, the U.S. took conservative measures throughout the 1970s and 1980s on the issue of Namibian independence, and in the end, the U.S. played an essential role in the Namibian conflict; indeed, the conflict would likely not have been resolved without the support of the U.S.

As noted by the United States Military Joint History Office, in Somalia the U.S. interests were humanitarian, with the main objective being to save lives (Poole, 2005). But I argue that there were also political interests, since the U.S. wanted to maintain its influence in the Horn of Africa. In Somalia, the U.S. had a significant role in establishing the mandate of UNOSOM II, which resulted in the first U.N. peace enforcement mission.

However, U.S. politicians, diplomats, and the American people's views changed, and the U.S. withdrew its troops and soon other countries followed. The withdrawal of troops demonstrated the significant political influence of the U.S. in Somalia.

### Namibia: Background of the Conflict

Namibia, previously known as South West Africa, was the last colony in Africa. As a colony, it remained under German control until World War I, at which time South Africa was granted a class C mandate over the territory by the League of Nations. After World War II, the U.N. (successor to the League of Nations) established its own authority over South West Africa, but South Africa opposed the decision. Instead it attempted to annex the territory and impose apartheid laws (UNTAG).

As African colonies started to gain independence and join the United Nations in the 1950s and 1960s, the issue of Namibia became more important in the United Nations. Namibia and countries sympathetic to the Namibian situation, turned to the U.N. for assistance. South Africa's continuing attempts to annex Namibia, in 1966 the U.N. General Assembly overturned South Africa's mandate to administer the territory (Fortna, 1993).

During the period of turmoil, Namibians increasingly began to take charge of their own situation. The South West African People's Organization (SWAPO), a political party formed in Namibia, opposed South African brutality and its policy of white supremacy. SWAPO believed the best way to counter this oppression was to form a political organization that appealed to the people of Namibia and could end the



Figure 2. Location of Namibia on a Map of Africa.

Source: UN Geospatial Information Section, 2020.

struggle for liberation victoriously. SWAPO outlined its mission: secure liberation and independence for Namibians and establish a democratic people's government. SWAPO also stressed the importance of a guerrilla network that included the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) as an effective way to combat oppression and achieve liberation for Namibia (Central Committee, 1976).

In 1966, the General Assembly passed United Nations Resolution 2145 (XXI), which proclaimed that the Namibian territory would henceforth be under the supervision of the United Nations. In 1967, the General Assembly established the United Nations Council for South West Africa in United Nations Resolution 2248 (S-V) to administer Namibia with the participation of Namibians until independence (UNTAG).

However, by 1969, in Resolutions 264 (1969) and 269 (1969), the United Nations Security Council confirmed the decisions of the General Assembly which expressed serious concern about South Africa's actions toward Namibia. In 1970, U.N. Security Council Resolution 276 reaffirmed that South Africa's occupation of Namibia was illegal. Further, the Security Council requested an Advisory Opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as to the legal consequences of South Africa's continued occupation of Namibia. In 1971, the Court declared South Africa must end its occupation of the territory and that U.N. member states should not assist South Africa in any way in Namibia (UNTAG).

In 1974, other actions in the region began to have an impact. Portuguese rule came to an end in Angola and Mozambique, and Marxist governments soon stepped into the void. As these governments became more powerful, the Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviet Union strengthened in southern Africa (Fortna, 1993). But SWAPO realized that this turn of events could help the Namibian struggle for independence. Thousands of Namibians were now able to move across Namibia and Angola, and in the process increase their knowledge and acquire tools for armed struggle. The result was a surge of enlistments in the Namibian army (Central Committee, 1976).

By 1975, South Africa decided to establish Namibian independence on its own terms, which included establishing a non-SWAPO and non-Marxist government that supported South Africa and would impose a system of apartheid with separate administrations for each ethnic group. The international community opposed this plan (Fortna, 1993). United Nations Security Council Resolution 385, adopted in 1976,

declared that free elections under U.N. supervision must be held in Namibia as a separate political entity. At first, South Africa did not accept this resolution (UNTAG).

The Western members of the Security Council—U.S., U.K., France, Germany, and Canada—formed a group called the Contact Group and began to plan how to implement U.N. Resolution 385. The Contact Group worked with South Africa, SWAPO, and the key states of Angola, Mozambique, Botswana, Zambia, and Tanzania, as well as the U.N. Secretary General and the U.N. Commissioner for Namibia. In 1978, the Contact Group presented “Proposal for a Settlement of the Namibian Situation” to the President of the Security Council (UNTAG).

The Contact Group came out with this plan for two primary reasons. First, the members feared that a militarized liberation struggle in Namibia would increase the influence of the Soviet Union in southern Africa. Second, they feared that if South Africa attempted to grant Namibia independence based on its own set of conditions, the U.N. General Assembly would order sanctions against South Africa, and the Contact Group did not want to either veto or impose sanctions on South Africa (Fortna, 1993).

The Namibian independence proposal required the creation of a United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), which would supervise free and fair elections and adopt a constitution for Namibia. The creation of UNTAG was approved by U.N. Security Council Resolution 435 (1978). However, it took a decade of negotiation and mediation for all parties to consent to the plan. In 1988, the Namibia Accords, which consisted of an agreement between South Africa, Angola, and Cuba to implement Resolution 435 and to withdraw Cuban troops from Angola, was signed (Fortna, 1993).

The agreement occurred partly because the wars between Namibia and South Africa and between Angola and South Africa had come to a deadlock. SWAPO could not push South Africa out of Namibia, and Angola kept facing losses from South African raids. At the same time, South Africa could not defeat SWAPO or the Angolan army. The wars and the administration of Namibia was costly for South Africa, and these costs became too much to bear as South Africa's economy declined under a global recession combined with international economic sanctions. Reforms within South Africa and maintaining domestic order became much greater priorities than occupying Namibia. In fact, Namibian independence could lessen the focus of international scrutiny on South Africa and lift economic sanctions placed earlier on the country. Although South Africa had superior weapons and training than either Angola and Namibia, it became increasingly hard to win the wars; at the same time the South African public began to oppose the war. Additionally, South Africa felt a reduced sense of external threat because Soviet Union's position had changed to include the withdrawal of Cuban troops as part of the settlement. In South Africa's views, all these changes made a political settlement desirable. As for Angola, there were many financial costs and social disruptions because of the war, which was increasing the need to end the war peacefully (Fortna, 1993).

Following resolution of the conflict over Namibia, the United Nations established the UNTAG, which was implemented between April 1989 and April 1990. UNTAG's objective was to arrive at a political settlement. The mission included 7,500 military troops, 1,500 police officers, and 2,000 international civilian and local staff (UNTAG).

## U.S.-China Political Interests and Influence in UNTAG

The U.S. did not show pertinent leadership in U.N. peacekeeping until 1989. This was likely because the U.S. was absorbed in a Cold War which meant it would be difficult to get U.N.S.C. approval for U.S.-backed missions since the Soviet Union was also a permanent member of the Security Council. However, the Soviet Union did cooperate with the U.S. in peacekeeping in Namibia at the end of the Cold War (Howard, 2015).

From 1980 to 1989, there were no U.N. peacekeeping missions in Africa although there were conflicts that could have benefited from such missions. However, at the end of the Cold War, a mission was deployed to Namibia, namely UNTAG. The challenge was not the mission itself but the long and complex process to establish the mission, which included various actors.

The United States delayed its response to Namibian independence mainly because of its and other Western nations' economic ties to South Africa. These countries had lucrative trade and investments, in particular investments in Namibia's natural resources, including zinc, tin, vanadium, lead, uranium, and diamonds (Jabri, 1990). According to the Report on Transnational Corporations in South Africa and Namibia by the U.N. Secretary General, the five Western nations in the Contact Group had the following numbers of transnational companies in South Africa in 1984: United States—406; United Kingdom—364, Germany—142, Canada—21, and France—20. In 1983, the total amount of foreign direct investment amounted to US\$15.5 billion to US\$17 billion, most of which came from these five Western nations (U.N. Centre on Transnational Corporations, 1986).



In addition to economic interests, the U.S. delayed its response because of its significant political interests in Namibia. Namibian independence became an issue during the Cold War, when it was critical for the U.S. not to lose its sphere of influence in the region as newly independent countries risked becoming communist states and allying with the Soviet Union. As South Africa was against communism, it was in the U.S.'s political interest to maintain good ties with South Africa. However, the U.S. and other Western nations on the Security Council still clashed with the U.N. on their continued engagement with South Africa. The U.N. General Assembly Resolution 3295 (XXIX) of 1974:

Calls . . . upon . . . States . . . to discontinue all direct or indirect relations, economic or otherwise, with South Africa when it purports to act on behalf of or concerning Namibia. . . . Reaffirms the right of the Namibian people to permanent sovereignty over their natural resources and condemns the policies of those States which continue to support foreign economic and other interests engaged in exploiting the natural and human resources of Namibia, in some cases to the point of foreseeing the exhaustion of such natural resources. (pp. 107-108)

This clash with the U.N. shows U.S. economic and political interests took precedence over human rights.

This situation continued from one U.S. administration to the next. For example, President Ronald Reagan's administration (1981 to 1989) did not favor the United Nations' position. In contrast, President Jimmy Carter's administration (1977 to 1981) considered human rights when crafting U.S. foreign policy and believed in liberal internationalism. Although in theory the U.S. wanted to be perceived as standing against oppression of the Namibian people, in reality this was not the case, since United States' ties to South Africa prevented that position.

The delayed support by the U.S. for the decolonization of Namibia was reflected in its opposition to other resolutions concerning Namibia when China supported the resolutions. In 1975, Guyana, Iraq, Mauritania, Cameroon, and Tanzania put forth U.N. Security Council Resolution S/11713. The resolution concluded that South Africa's occupation of Namibia was a threat to international peace and security under the terms of the U.N. Charter. The resolution further demanded that South Africa withdraw from Namibia, and that Namibians should be able to hold free and fair elections supervised by the U.N. The resolution stressed that the U.N. had a legal responsibility over the territory, and that all U.N. member states should refrain from providing South Africa with weapons and supplies.

The U.N.S.C. resolution failed because Britain, France, and the United States vetoed it. The resolution espoused more aggressive actions against South Africa, citing the threat to international peace and security and outlining the need for elections supervised by the U.N. These were measures that previous resolutions had not outlined. China, however, voted in favor of the resolution. However, with triple opposition from the Western members of the Security Council, China had limited influence on the matter (Episcopal Churchmen for South Africa, 1975).

Although economic interests took precedence over human rights, the U.S. formally stated it had human rights interests in its support of an independent Namibia. As stated in the U.S. Senate (1976):

The United States must be on the side of human rights, racial equality and majority rule in South Africa. To do otherwise would be to abandon this country's moral principles on an issue of great concern not only to the black African states but to most of the nations of the world. (p. 260)

The issue of Namibia and South Africa was particularly concerning because of the extreme political, economic, and social oppression exhibited by South Africa. Some American policymakers argued that the U.S. should not be highly critical of South Africa's policies and penalize the country because it would only push South African whites to be more extreme. Instead, these policymakers suggested communicating more frequently and more effectively with South Africans and the South African government. They also supported increasing foreign investment in the hope that South Africa would improve its labor policies. Furthermore, they encouraged ending the arms embargo on South Africa in order to end South Africa's military isolation and weaken its large domestic arms industry. In particular, American policymakers argued for increased cultural exchange with South Africa to show that racial domination is wrong and to convince South African whites that their present system of oppression is not in their political or economic interest (United States Senate, 1976).

On the other side, other American policymakers concerned about oppression in South Africa favored several contrary policy measures that they wanted to apply to South Africa. They supported isolating South Africa from the world and viewed that action as the only way of bringing about change in the country. This included excluding South Africa from the United Nations, ending diplomatic relations, imposing an arms embargo, and establishing international economic sanctions. These policymakers also argued for ending all U.S. investment in South Africa and not exporting goods to South Africa (United States Senate, 1976). Historian Barbara Keys argues that the U.S. barely focused on promoting human rights around the world until the 1970s, at which point human rights became a tool of American foreign policy to reclaim American virtues around the world.

Historian Mark Bradley said that human rights started to become a believable part of the American imagination in the twentieth century. Although the formal position in the U.S. Senate was support for human rights due to the changes in American human rights thought noted by Keys and Bradley, the U.S. position on human rights generally and in particular concerning South Africa and Namibia, was in flux during this period, and the policy measures proposed by American senators were not applied.

In addition to economic interests playing a key role, the U.S. had political interests in supporting Namibian independence, such as appeasing other African states. Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere stated: “We . . . are not ready for South Africa. If America wants to be helpful, they would start discussing the question of Namibia with the South African government and use their influence to get South Africa to withdraw” (Jabri, 1990). There was unanimous support for Namibian independence from other African leaders and countries.

Despite its delayed response, the U.S. took conservative measures throughout the 1970s and 1980s while progressing on the issue of Namibian independence. In 1970, the U.S. endorsed the U.N. Security Council Resolution 276, which declared South Africa’s occupation of Namibia illegal (UNTAG). This resolution came about after Western nations faced great pressure from the U.N. General Assembly (Macqueen, 2002). However, as noted earlier, there were many resolutions the U.S. vetoed because those resolutions proposed stronger actions against South Africa. U.S. support of this resolution was a step toward increased involvement in Namibian independence that would eventually lead to the establishment of UNTAG and the successful liberation of Namibia.

Another positive response by the U.S. was its request in 1970 for an Advisory Opinion from the ICJ on the legality of South Africa to confirm the resolution's conclusion. As stated in the previous section, the ICJ had declared in 1971 that South Africa must end its occupation of the territory, and that U.N. member states should not assist South Africa in any way in Namibia (UNTAG).

The Cold War was another factor contributing to both the U.S.'s initial hesitation and its eventual support for Namibian independence. The rivalry between the U.S. and the Soviet Union had expanded to Southern Africa, and both superpowers wanted to minimize the other's influence more than they wanted to establish a peaceful end to the conflict. In neighboring Angola, Cuba and the Soviet Union were providing military and political aid to an anti-colonial African Marxist party. At the same time, the U.S. and South Africa were backing two opposition parties against communism. Considering the situation in Angola, the U.S. wanted to prevent a violent liberation struggle in Namibia that could further strengthen Soviet influence in Southern Africa (Fortna, 1993).

At the end of the 1980s, Soviet Union-U.S. and East-West relations were changing as the Cold War was ending. South Africa could no longer use communist expansion as a reason to pressure the West not to act in Namibia. The U.S. and the Soviet Union now wanted the issue of Namibian independence to come to an end (Macqueen, 2002).

In 1988, the U.S. mediated discussions between Angola, Cuba, and South Africa that resulted in an agreement: "Principles for a Peaceful Settlement in South-Western Africa." Soon after, a cease-fire agreement went into effect, and preparations were underway to implement a peacekeeping mission, UNTAG. UNTAG was put into

operation during 1989-90. At the urging of the U.N. Security Council, however, it was much less robust than originally planned (Macqueen, 2002). UNTAG consisted of 7,500 military and civilian police personnel and additional international and local civilian staff, with a budget of US\$368.6 million (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2020d).

UNTAG had several assigned tasks, most of them political. The first was to guarantee that free and fair elections would be held in Namibia. Second, the mission was supposed to monitor the ceasefire. Third, the mission had to monitor the reduction and removal of the South African military in Namibia. Finally, it had to ensure a free and fair campaign was conducted (UNTAG).

This mission was considered effective. The U.N. set up registration centers all over Namibia and oversaw the balloting and counting of votes. The election had a voter turnout of 97 percent. Furthermore, the U.N. made sure South Africa's military withdrew from Namibia. A new constitution was drafted and unanimously approved and thereafter Namibia became independent and joined the United Nations (UNTAG).

Unlike the U.S., China supported Namibian independence from the beginning (Morphet, 2000), putting the country at odds with the U.S. from the outset. In the 1980s, China wanted to distance itself from the U.S. by being the leader of the developing world, which meant China needed greater participation in the U.N. and in peacekeeping operations because these were important to most developing states (Fravel, 1996). China was the only member of the U.N. Security Council whose votes consistently backed the developing world (Morphet, 2000). At a meeting of the UN council for Namibia, China's ambassador to Zambia stated:

China and Africa shared the common historical experience of suffering from aggression and oppression by imperialism and colonialism, and

today they are confronted with the common tasks of fighting against imperialism, colonialism and hegemonism and building their respective countries (Taylor, 1997).

China supported every resolution that was against South Africa's occupation of Namibia (Taylor, 1997).

Although China fully supported a peacekeeping mission in Namibia right from the beginning, China had little influence on the mission's establishment. Its only real impact was through the rhetoric of Chinese leaders, so the country remained largely without influence during the liberation struggle in Namibia (Taylor, 1997). However, the mission also marked a turning point for China as it saw the beginning of Chinese participation in U.N. peacekeeping and was the first mission to which China sent non-military observers (Rogers, 2007).

Ultimately, the U.S. played an essential role in the Namibian conflict, meaning the conflict would likely not have been resolved without U.S. support. The great difference in power at the time between the U.S. and China resulted in the U.S. having much greater influence. However, the delayed response by the U.S. to ending the conflict in Namibia actually prolonged the conflict and resulted in the U.N. peacekeeping mission UNTAG being instituted decades after the issue of Namibia had already become a worldwide concern.

In the beginning, the U.S. and China had conflicting stances on the Namibia matter, but toward the end the two countries had taken cooperative stances. Because this conflict occurred in the U.S.-led unipolar era, China played a much smaller role, and little cooperation or competition existed.

## Somalia: Background of the Conflict

In the pre-colonial period there was never a cohesive political system in Somalia, and during the colonial period there was no one supreme colonial state. This inhibited the formation of a strong national identity.



Figure 3. Location of Somalia on a Map of Africa.

Source: United Nations Geospatial Information Section, 2020.



In the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, Britain colonized the northern part of Somalia, which was named British Somaliland, and Italy colonized the southern part of Somalia. There were many revolts by Somalis against colonial rule, and the two territories remained in turmoil until the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. After World War II, Italy's territories in Africa were taken away except for Somalia, which remained in Italy's control with the status of a UN Trust Territory that was expected to gain independence within a decade. In 1960, the two British and Italian colonies in Somalia gained independence to become a single unified state (Macqueen, 2002).

After gaining its independence, Somalia was governed by a stable parliamentary democracy for nine years. Aden Abdullah Osman Daar was the country's first president, and he left office peacefully when his term was over in 1967. Two years later, however, his successor, Abdi Rashid Ali Shirmarke, was assassinated in a military coup led by General Muhammad Siad Barre, and Somalia has not yet returned to a stable democratic system of governance (Macqueen, 2002).

In the latter part of the Cold War in the 1970s and 1980s, Somalia became a site of super-power rivalry, partly because the country occupies an important strategic location on the Horn of Africa adjacent to the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. Somali President Siad Barre initially wanted to adopt socialism, but in fact he was much more interested in territorial expansion than socialist solidarity. This was clearly exhibited when Barre attempted to annex the territory of the Ogaden in Ethiopia (which was then a socialist state). Ethiopia, with significant help from the Soviet Union and Cuba, countered the Somali attack (Macqueen, 2002). Hundreds of thousands of refugees from the Ogaden fled to Somalia—right at the time when there was widespread famine in

Somalia, and the influx of refugees exacerbated the food crisis. As it happened, the U.S. was seeking an ally in the Horn of Africa, so the U.S. supported Siad Barre's regime—despite its reputation for being corrupt and dictatorial. Barre renounced socialism to appease the Americans, and with U.S. help he remained in power despite the many challenges facing Somalia. Among others, Barre was accused of favoring his own clan, and there was increasing opposition to the Somali government as ethnic and regional rivalry became widespread. The opposition groups attempted to overthrow the government, which resulted in a civil war. Toward the end of the 1980s, Barre's regime controlled just a small fraction of Somalia (Macqueen, 2002).

When the Cold War ended, the U.S. quickly withdrew from Somalia, which brought about the collapse of the state and reignited the battle for control of the territory. In 1991, Barre was overthrown and any semblance of a national political structure disappeared; Somalia went from having a bad government to no government. Somalis were heavily armed due to a mass distribution of weapons during the conflict with Ethiopia, and soon two prominent factions emerged. As civil war raged, Somaliland seceded from the Somali state. Between 1991 and 1992, about 50,000 Somalis were killed in the civil war, and about 300,000 starved to death. Humanitarian agencies tried to help, but aid became a weapon of war, with widespread attacks on convoys and looting of supplies. Famine became a tool used by the factions to wage war (Macqueen, 2002).

In response to this devastating conflict, the international community acted to try and improve the situation. In 1992, the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) was established, and a few months later, the U.S. set up a mission, the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) which later transitioned to the United Nations Operation in Somalia II

(UNOSOM II). UNOSOM II was comprised of 14,968 to 28,000 troops, military observers, and civilian police and 2,800 international and local civilian staff troops and police personnel (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2020d). It had an approved budget of \$1.6 billion.

### U.S. Political Interests and Influence in UNOSOM II

In contrast to the 1980s, during the unipolar period in the 1990s, there were many U.N. missions in Africa that were supported by the U.S., and the U.S. held great weight in the missions, such as in Somalia. China, on the other hand, had a small role in the mission in Somalia, UNOSOM II, but it did vote in favor of its establishment.

In a U.N. report titled *The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996*, former United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali outlined in the Introduction what the international community was trying to do in Somalia: “End human suffering, foster reconciliation among the warring factions and promote national reconstruction” (United Nations, 1996), in other words, the international community was attempting to reconstruct the Somali nation (Macqueen, 2002).

The United States’ main interest in Somalia was humanitarian. As outlined by the United States Joint History Office, graphic media coverage of the severe famine in Somalia drove U.S. policy for that country and led to U.S. intervention (Poole, 2005), with American public opinion on the side of action (Macqueen, 2002). U.S. government officials used strong rhetoric, for instance when the former director of the U.S. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, Andrew Natsios, labeled the situation in Somalia as, “The

worst humanitarian disaster in the world today” (Human Rights Watch, 1992). The objective was to save lives (Poole, 2005).

At the same time, however, maintaining peace in Somalia could also help the U.S. politically by sustaining the U.S. sphere of influence in the Horn of Africa. In future years, as Islamic extremism became a major threat to the U.S. after the September 11, 2001, attacks and the “global war on terror” was in full swing, U.S. influence in the Horn of Africa began to decline as Islamic extremism started to overwhelm the country. It was clear that maintaining influence in the Horn of Africa could uphold U.S. interests.

As a result, UNOSOM I was established. Boutros-Ghali described it as a traditional peacekeeping mission, with the consent of the parties involved, seeking to establish a ceasefire. However, it also was tasked with creating the conditions for emergency assistance to be provided to Somalis and to stop attacks on humanitarian relief operations. There was fragile cooperation between the Somali factions and opposition by some factions. This, along with the growing severity of the famine, resulted in the need for a much larger force to supply emergency relief (United Nations, 1996).

There was no government in Somalia, no official entity that could ask the international community to get involved. Instead, the U.N.S.C. determined under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter that the situation in Somalia posed a threat to international peace and security (United Nations, 1996). This determination allowed the U.N. to take military action under Article 42 of the U.N. Charter which states:

Should the Security Council consider that measures [not involving the use of armed force] would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. (United Nations, 1945)

The U.S. offered to organize and command such an operation. The purpose of the operation was to resolve security problems in Somalia, create an environment for emergency relief, and attempt to achieve a political settlement. The operation was named the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) and code-named “Operation Restore Hope.” UNITAF was comprised of about 37,000 troops (28,000 of them Americans) at its peak. After a few months, UNITAF transitioned into a U.N-led mission, UNOSOM II.

UNOSOM II had widespread political, military, and financial support. Politically, it was adopted unanimously by the U.N.S.C. at the urging of the United States (United Nations Security Council, 1992). UNOSOM II was the first peace enforcement mission that was both organized and commanded by the United Nations. The mission had the goal of facilitating national reconciliation, re-establishing Somalia’s police forces, and rehabilitating Somalia’s economy and institutions (United Nations, 1996).

UNOSOM II also had the largest number of personnel among all U.N. peacekeeping missions in Africa to date. At maximum deployment, there were 28,000 troops, military observers, and civilian police deployed to Somalia under UNOSOM II and 2,800 international and local civilian staff. The U.S. provided 4,000 troops to the mission (William, 2015); China did not contribute any troops. At the time, UNOSOM II had the greatest funding in U.N. history in Africa. From March 1993 to March 1995, UNOSOM II had a peacekeeping budget of \$1.6 billion (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2020d).

The U.S. had a significant role in establishing the UNOSOM II mandate. Boutros-Ghali noted: “United States officials had proposed [a] change in the nature of the follow-up force—from peacekeeping to peace enforcement—in consultations with senior United

Nations officials about the transition from UNITAF” (United Nations, 1996). U.S. backing resulted in the first U.N. peace enforcement mission.

United States politicians viewed UNOSOM II favorably in the beginning. The State Department’s favorable views were expressed by U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine Albright:

UNOSOM II is an unprecedented enterprise aimed at nothing less than the restoration of an entire country as a proud, functioning and viable member of the community of nations. This is an historic undertaking. We are excited to join it and we will vigorously support it. (*Atlantic*, 2017)

The U.S. political will to improve the situation in Somalia was strong.

However, U.S. support changed when 18 American soldiers were killed in Somalia. The Battle of Mogadishu in 1993, colloquially known as “Black Hawk Down,” led to a dramatic international change in the perception of UNOSOM II. The media broadcast images of American soldiers being dragged through the streets by and in front of cheering Somalis. As a result, the United States withdrew all its troops from Somalia in 1994. Following the U.S. lead, many European and other governments also decided to withdraw their troops (United Nations, 1996).

The withdrawal of troops demonstrated the significant political influence of the U.S. in Somalia. Furthermore, it led to the U.S. abstention from Resolution 946 (1994), which would have extended UNOSOM II’s mandate (United Nations Security Council, 1994). The United States said: “The time had come for the mission to be brought to an end” (United Nations, 1996), and indeed, the mission ended one year after the U.S. withdrew its troops (Williams, 2015). The United States’ political role in establishing UNOSOM II, as well as its part in ending the mission, was undeniable.

Despite widespread preliminary international support for UNOSOM II, the mission had many failures. As outlined by Paul D. Williams (2015), there were key problems:

The transition from UNITAF [the United States mission in Somalia], UNOSOM II's unrealistic mandate and the subsequent gap between means and ends, and the mission's command and control challenges and subsequent issues with coordination. (p. 9)

However, although UNOSOM II was widely considered a failure, Macqueen (2002) said: "It was unlikely that the complex internal components of the conflict [in Somalia] could permit a successful multilateral intervention, however configured, mandated or equipped. Williams noted: "When it departed Somalia in March 1995, UNOSOM II left behind political circumstances largely unchanged from when it arrived: a country at war with itself and lacking a central government" (2015, p. 11). In the end, despite its military and financial strength, UNOSOM II was not stronger than subsequent U.S.-China-led U.N. missions in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

### Chapter Summary

From 1950 to 1978, the U.S. and China held conflicting positions on Namibia, with the U.S. not supporting Namibian independence and China in favor. However, toward the end of the conflict in the 1980s, the two countries had a cooperative stance, with both supporting Namibian independence. Because this conflict occurred in the U.S.-led unipolar era, however, China played a much smaller role—unlike conflicts that will be discussed in Chapters Three and Four. In Somalia, China had barely any political influence, and only voted in favor of establishing UNOSOM II.

U.N. peacekeeping has been and is still important. If UNTAG had not been established, if Namibia had not gained its independence, Namibians would have continued to live oppressed under brutal white supremacist colonial rule, and the war would most likely have been prolonged. Economically, minerals would continue to be exploited with little or no benefit to Namibians.

Similarly, in Somalia, conflict would have worsened if UNOSOM II had not been established. The U.N. would not have provided as much humanitarian and food aid, and the situation there would have worsened as famine expanded.

As will be discussed in the next chapter, the political support the U.S. provided to the missions in Namibia and Somalia is similar to the political support provided to missions during the emerging bipolar U.S.-China-led era of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. It is significant that peacekeeping has been kept at the same level because without U.N. peacekeeping missions, conflicts tend to intensify and be prolonged.



## Chapter III

### Political Outcomes under U.S. and Chinese Leadership

China's political, economic, and military might has increased dramatically in the past few decades. As a result, the country's influence in world matters is also increasing, for example, in U.N. peacekeeping efforts in Africa. This chapter discussed three cases from the emerging bipolar time period: MONUSCO in the D.R.C., UNMISS in South Sudan, and MINUSMA in Mali.

#### Introduction

Political support for U.N. peacekeeping operations in Africa has remained generally the same in the current bipolar era as the U.S. and China have cooperated and competed while sharing leadership positions compared to the unipolar era under U.S. leadership. This is significant because if U.N. peacekeeping had weakened under U.S.-China leadership, it would be more difficult to reduce conflict, which in turn would influence the political, economic, and social institutions in countries affected by conflict and lead to more suffering. Likewise, weakened U.N. peacekeeping would also negatively impact the interests of both the U.S. and China in these African countries.

There is a direct correlation between the U.N. Security Council's political support for establishing U.N. missions and the number of peacekeeping missions deployed worldwide, that is, such missions would not be established if there was no political support for them. In terms of the numbers of U.N. peacekeeping missions in Africa, there

has been about equal political support from 1989 to 2000 and from 2000 to 2020. There were 14 U.N. peacekeeping missions in Africa from 1989 to 2000, and 15 operations from 2000 to 2020 (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2020d).

The U.S. and China have had reasons to cooperate in the MONUSCO, UNMISS, and MINUSMA missions because they had a common over-arching interest in maintaining peace. Both countries also competed in the recipient countries because they held differing interests in the countries. But this helped maintain, not hinder, U.N. peacekeeping, as the two countries came together in the U.N. and decided to provide funding or troops despite their different interests and approaches.

D.R.C.: The U.S. and China cooperated and competed in the D.R.C. China had numerous commercial interests while the U.S. had significant security interests in the region. In line with U.N. requests, both the U.S. and China strengthened their peacekeeping and security roles in the D.R.C. The two countries used their political power to ratify 16 U.N. resolutions to help maintain peace and respect of human rights in the D.R.C. As the U.S. and China cooperated, they also pushed for modifications and took different approaches. For example, China used its political influence in the U.N. Security Council to get its proposals for D.R.C. reflected in the resolutions and then applied on the ground locally. However, sanctions were an area of disagreement. The U.S. Congress placed restrictions on the mining of conflict minerals as part of the Dodd-Frank Act, but China continued its trade in minerals with the D.R.C.

South Sudan: China became focused on changing its national identity to that of a rising power and a responsible force in the international arena. China also had economic and security interests in Sudan. Meanwhile, the U.S. was focused on protecting human

rights and American ideals in South Sudan. In South Sudan, the U.S. and China collaborated in establishing peacekeeping missions. The U.S. was the key player in the creation of the new nation of South Sudan. Unlike in the D.R.C., however, the two countries intentionally communicated outside of the U.N. because the U.S. wanted Chinese officials to conduct bilateral talks with the Sudanese. Chinese leaders had excellent relations with the Sudanese and South Sudanese governments, so one option for maintaining peace in South Sudan was for China to work with South Sudan independently, which China did. For its part, the U.S. recognized the benefits of bilateral talks and encouraged China to work with and place pressure on Sudan bilaterally.

Mali: Like South Sudan, China's desire to participate in the peacekeeping mission in Mali stemmed from its desire to be perceived as a strong international identity. China became involved in MINUSMA to protect its security interests in Africa. Of lesser importance, Mali held economic significance for China as well as the U.S. Both countries jointly used their political influence to establish several U.N. resolutions on Mali that allowed intervention in the country. The U.S. independently increased its peace and security efforts in Mali and the region.

It should be noted that the U.S. and China held significant political influence in all three missions, just as they did in Namibia and Somalia. The influence of both countries on the peacekeeping missions in Africa in the 21<sup>st</sup> century has determined the location, establishment, and mandate of these missions.

## Democratic Republic of the Congo: Background of the Conflict



Figure 4. Location of Democratic Republic of the Congo on a map of Africa.

Source: United Nations Geospatial Information Section, 2020

The original cause of the current violence in the D.R.C. and the massive refugee crisis was the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Rwandan Hutus who had engaged in genocide escaped to eastern D.R.C. and formed rebel groups. In response, Rwandan Tutsis formed armed opposition groups. Some of these groups threatened people in neighboring countries (Council on Foreign Relations, 2020c).

The government in D.R.C. was unable to defeat the armed groups, which resulted in the Second Congo War, from 1998 to 2003. Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe backed the Congolese government, while Rwanda and Uganda supported the rebel groups. A

rough estimate of the number of deaths as a result of the conflict is over three million people. A peace deal was signed in 2002 a transitional government was established in 2003. However, the government was weak, institutions were failing, and corruption was common. Therefore, violence by armed groups against civilians in the eastern part of the D.R.C. continued (Council on Foreign Relations, 2020c).

A rebel group, the March 23 Movement (M23), was a particularly strong rebel group comprised of Tutsis backed by the Rwandan government. Dissatisfied with the Congolese government's lack of follow-up on a peace deal signed in 2009, M23 initiated a rebellion against the government (Council on Foreign Relations, 2020c).

Another source of conflict in the D.R.C. is the country's abundant mineral resources, estimated to be worth US\$24 trillion. The mineral trade provides funding for rebel groups to purchase arms (Council on Foreign Relations, 2020c).

As a result of all the conflict in the D.R.C., the U.N. Security Council established the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission (MONUSCO—derived from the French name). The mission is comprised of 19,815 military personnel, 1,050 members of formed police units, 760 military observers, and 391 police personnel (United Nations, 2020g), with an approved budget from 2019 to 2020 of US\$1.086 billion (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2020c).

#### U.S.-China Political Cooperation and Competition in D.R.C.

The U.S. and China maintained a cooperative and competitive relationship in the D.R.C. with a similar goal of establishing peace. They were the most influential countries in establishing MONSUCO and shaping its mandate. MONUSCO is the second-largest

funded U.N. peacekeeping operation and the third-largest military U.N. peacekeeping mission in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The cooperation and competition between the two countries has resulted in sustained peacekeeping in the country.

China and the U.S. have cooperated to maintain their significant interests in the country. China has numerous commercial interests in the D.R.C.: it extracts copper, uranium, cobalt, tin, and coltan for its domestic markets, which are used in the technology, industrial, and aeronautics industries for everything from laptop computers to mobile phone to jet engines and space vehicles. In return, China has helped strengthen the D.R.C.'s infrastructure, develop the economy, and engage in post-war reconstruction.

Both countries cooperate politically, with the D.R.C. strongly supporting the One-China Policy. China also expects to receive security benefits from its partnership with the D.R.C. (Herman, 2005). Since the D.R.C. is located in a strategic location in the heart of central Africa, China expects to gain power in the rift valley region from working with the D.R.C. Former Chinese President Hu Jintao outlined the important relationship between China and the D.R.C., noting the Chinese government will encourage Chinese businesses to invest in and manufacture goods in the D.R.C. (Embassy of China, 2005). These interests have resulted in China taking a leading role in supporting MONUSCO and benefiting the peacekeeping mission.

Although not as significant as China's interests, the United States has considerable interests in the D.R.C. The presence of many armed groups and a weak government led to rape and sexual violence, extreme poverty, and massive human rights violations. The United Nations, African Union, and neighboring countries have been unable to combat threats by rebel groups and promote development. Therefore, continued

violence in the D.R.C. could spread into Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi (Council on Foreign Relations, 2020c). This is troublesome for the U.S. because these neighboring countries have longstanding ties with the U.S. (Council on Foreign Relations, 2020c). These interests led to the U.S. cooperating with China.

The two countries used their political power to sign and ratify 16 United Nations Resolutions to help maintain peace and respect of human rights in the D.R.C. The 2010 Resolution 1925 on MONUSCO stressed the need for international support in the D.R.C. to help stabilize the country through promoting peace-building efforts. The resolution emphasizes the need for the international community to improve the humanitarian and human rights situation in the D.R.C. The resolution strongly condemned the targeting of the civilian population, recruitment of child soldiers, extrajudicial executions, and rampant sexual violence. The document emphasizes the need of the D.R.C. government to work with the United Nations to end the human rights and humanitarian violations, provide medical and other assistance to victims, and bring those responsible to justice. Furthermore, the resolution noted the D.R.C. government should work with the International Criminal Court to hold perpetrators accountable for crimes against humanity. Resolutions on MONUSCO in following years up until 2020 have reiterated support for the above commitments (United Nations Security Council, 2010).

Both countries had significant political influence in the U.S. Security Council regarding the D.R.C., which is why it was necessary for the two countries to cooperate with each other if they wanted to progress on reducing conflict. China's role was exhibited in MONUC (the precursor mission to MONUSCO), and continues on to MONUSCO.

In 2001, Chinese Ambassador to the United Nations Wang Yingfan proposed three actions to be taken by the U.N. in the D.R.C. First, disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, resettlement, and repatriation of the armed groups should be undertaken. Second, demilitarization of Kisangani should occur. Third, human and material resources by the international community should be made available quickly. Wang also stressed that economic development and reconstruction should be given equal weight as the above issues are important to lasting peace and stability (Wang, 2001).

All three of the Chinese proposals outlined above are reflected in U.N. resolutions on MONUC and MONUSCO or applied on the ground. Echoing China's first proposal, United Nations Resolution 2502 (2019), "*Demands* that all armed groups . . . immediately and permanently disband, lay down their arms, [and] reject violence." Part 2 of MONUSCO's mandate has a section on 'disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration' that also mentions resettlement and reintegration. U.N. Resolution 1445 (2002) includes Chinese proposal 2: "Demand for Kisangani to be demilitarized without further delay or precondition." Also, the international community provided hundreds of millions of dollars in funding for MONUC in 2002 (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2020e) and provided billions through the course of a decade to MONUC and MONUSCO (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2020c), thus fulfilling China's third proposal. As for China's fourth suggestion, the U.N.S.C. did not explicitly adopt economic development or reconstruction; there was no mention of economic development and reconstruction in any of the MONUC resolutions (U.N. Peacekeeping, 2020f). Only three MONUSCO resolutions—Resolution 2147 (2014), Resolution 2211 (2015), and Resolution 2277 (2016)—include socioeconomic recovery and further economic development (U.N.



Peacekeeping, 2020g). Overall, however, China used its political influence to affect the planning of the peacekeeping operation in the D.R.C. and ultimately strengthen its mandate.

Following the U.N. request, China strengthened its peacekeeping and security role in the D.R.C. The 2010 U.N. Security Council Resolution 1925 stressed the importance of international and bilateral partners to train the Congolese army and provide equipment. In line with this request, China increased its military cooperation with the D.R.C. Many Congolese army officers, including President Joseph Kabila, were trained in China, and since 2000, China has engaged in training the Congolese government's military forces and providing information on military technologies (Reuters, 2009). Also, China has provided military equipment, such as arms and ammunitions and logistical support vehicles, to the government along with medical equipment. China has signed various agreements to strengthen military relationships between the two countries. These are just a few of the areas China has worked on with the D.R.C. government to increase military strength and preparedness. In the future, China plans to transition from peacekeeping to peace-building, beginning with the development and reconstruction of the D.R.C. (Herman, 2005).

Similar to Chinese efforts, the U.S. has taken measures to promote peace and security in the D.R.C. consistent with United Nations requests. The U.S. Army has been training Congolese military officers since 2006 and renovated a training college in Kinshasa. The U.S. African Command (Africom) built a training camp in eastern D.R.C. that trains several hundred soldiers who receive training from U.S. instructors (Dalrymple, 2010). The U.S. invested \$35 million in the camp, which opened in 2010

(Reuters, 2009). It is apparent that U.S. involvement has matched Chinese involvement in the D.R.C.

The U.S. has taken other measures to protect its security interests and help promote peace in the D.R.C. The U.S. Congress said that trade in conflict minerals from the D.R.C. is helping to finance conflict in the country. Congress went on to state that measures must be taken to reduce the violence in the D.R.C. The U.S. Congress placed restrictions on mining conflict minerals in the D.R.C. through the Dodd-Frank Act.

Thereafter, U.S. companies basically halted mining operations in the country. The Dodd-Frank Act also made it exceptionally difficult for American companies to engage in the mineral trade in neighboring countries of D.R.C. After the Act was instituted, European countries imposed similar laws (Congress, 2010), exhibiting America's influence on the conflict.

The U.S. and China had differing views on whether trade in minerals should continue. One possible counterargument against U.S.-China cooperation and competition being beneficial in the D.R.C. is that as Congolese trade with the West declined, China increased its trade, possibly still purchasing conflict minerals. According to Congolese leader Jason Luneno Maene, China now has a virtual monopoly on the mineral trade in D.R.C. (Magistad, 2011). One might argue that this could add to further violence and obstruct U.S. efforts to minimize conflict. The problem with such an argument is that it is unclear if the sanctions placed by U.S. and European countries have been helpful or harmful to the D.R.C. conflict. Some argue that U.S. legislative actions to curb the trade of conflict minerals have been counterproductive. Stoop, Van der Windt, and Verpoorten (2018) conducted a study that found the Dodd-Frank policy actually backfired, especially

in areas where there are gold mines. For territories with gold mines, the effect of the Dodd-Frank policy was increased violence: battles increased 44%; looting was up 51% and violence against civilians up 28% compared to pre-Dodd-Frank averages (p. 13). The problem with this study is that it is not clear whether these increases in violence are due to the halt of trade in conflict minerals or simply due to an escalation of conflict over time.

On the other hand, many argue that the Dodd-Frank Act is beneficial, and that its removal would be detrimental. The Congolese Mines Minister Martin Kabwelulu wrote, “The suspension . . . of the Dodd-Frank Act in the long run will jeopardize the stability and security of the DRC by encouraging an escalation in the activities of non-state armed groups” (Stoop & Windt, 2019). Non-governmental organizations, such as Global Witness (2017), had similar views: “Any executive action suspending the US conflict minerals rule would be a gift to predatory armed groups seeking to profit from Congo’s minerals as well as a gift to companies wanting to do business with the criminal and the corrupt.” There is no consensus on whether the sanctions have been helpful or harmful in minimizing conflict, so it is difficult to determine how U.S.-China disagreement on the issue has affected peacekeeping.

Although the effect of sanctions on conflict is unclear, it is clear that sanctions have had a negative impact on the economy, further complicating a determination of the effect of U.S. sanctions on peacekeeping. According to many academics, community leaders, Congolese and Western officials, and activists, the Dodd-Frank Act resulted in poverty for millions of miners and their families (List of Signatories, 2014). This does not necessarily mean that sanctions were the wrong action to take, however. If the U.S.

wanted to make serious efforts to curb violence, sanctions would have to be supplemented by other initiatives, such as establishing job transfer programs so miners could work in other fields. This could be overseen by the U.N., the A.U., sub-regional organizations, or the U.S. if it was outlined in MONUSCO's mandate. Surely sanctions combined with other measures could have helped.

If sanctions were helpful in curbing violence in the D.R.C., China would not have hindered peace efforts in the country. However, China refused to institute sanctions on conflict minerals, which does not mean that the China-U.S. led U.N. peacekeeping era is hurting peacekeeping compared to the U.S.-led era. The U.S. has also hindered peacekeeping missions, such as in Namibia where the U.S. delayed its response to establishing UNTAG. Although the U.S. and China have not always made perfect decisions regarding peacekeeping, both countries are intent on maintaining peace in the countries where they are involved in U.N. peacekeeping. Their interests and efforts have reflected this.

Although the U.S. and China have differing interests in the D.R.C. and did not communicate directly with each other outside the U.N., the two countries ultimately agreed on the over-arching goal of maintaining peace in the country. The MONUSCO mission has the second-largest military and financial resources, clearly exhibiting the political will of the U.S. and China to maintain peace in the D.R.C. and neighboring countries. U.S.-China cooperation and competition through the U.N. has also benefited other countries, such as South Sudan. Although the two superpowers cooperated by helping to improve the situation in the D.R.C. the U.S. was not the only country responsible nor is it expected to lead, but China now shares the responsibility.

## Sudan and South Sudan: Background of the Conflict



Figure 5. Location of Sudan on Map of Africa

Source: United Nations Geospatial Information Section, 2020



Figure 6. Location of South Sudan on Map of Africa.

Source: United Nations Geospatial Information Section, 2020

Conflict has devastated Sudan and South Sudan for more than 20 years as black farmers and Arab herdsman compete for water, land, and other scarce resources. In 2003, this tension resulted in large-scale violence, with rebel groups such as the Sudan Liberation Movement fighting against the Arab militias known as the *Janjaweed*. The government of Sudan supported the *Janjaweed*, supplying arms and supporting air raids (Wuthnow, 2013, p. 96). The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (2020) estimates that over 100,000 Sudanese have died since 2000, while other estimates cite some 600,000 deaths and 4 million displaced (Council on Foreign Relations, 2020a).

In 2011, South Sudan, which previously was part of Sudan, became an independent country.<sup>1</sup> In response to the conflict, the U.N. established a peacekeeping mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) in 2011 comprised of 17,000 troops and 2,101 police (United Nations, 2020e). In 2013, civil war began in South Sudan with widespread ethnically targeted killings (International Crisis Group, 2017). Considering the severity of the conflict, UNMISS has continued to the present day.

#### U.S.–China Cooperation and Competition in South Sudan (UNMISS)

China has a vested interest in maintaining peace in South Sudan and cooperating with the U.S. In his book, *United Nations Peace Operations in A Changing Global Order* (2019), Associate Professor Yin He of the China Peacekeeping Police Training Center, argues that China's rising power has resulted in the country wanting to be a responsible force in the international arena. Vice-Director of China's Peacekeeping Affairs Office in the Ministry of Defense, Dai Shao'an, stated:

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<sup>1</sup> Prior to 2011, both Sudan and South Sudan will be referred to as Sudan in this thesis. After 2011, the two countries will be referred to separately.

If we find that sending peacekeeping forces will be conducive to the peace and development of local people, we will be glad to play a role in saving people from suffering. And China will continue to strengthen its peacekeeping efforts. (Tian & Qiang, 2007)

China focused on projecting a positive image (Ian, 2014). Shao'an also stated:

Wherever they [Chinese peacekeepers] go or whatever they do, they always bear in mind that they are messengers of peace, representing China. . . . To win hearts and minds, you need to devote your own hearts and minds, and that is exactly what our peacekeepers are doing. (Tian & Qiang, 2007)

China had economic and security interests in Sudan as well, providing further incentive to work with the U.S. to establish a mission. First, Sudan was China's fifth-largest supplier of oil; oil exports from Sudan to China increased from \$1.8 billion to \$4.1 billion from 2006-2007. Second, China was the largest shareholder in two of Sudan's largest oil companies, which included investments in Darfur. Third, 7% of China's arms sales between 2003 and 2007 occurred with Sudan. Lastly, China was exploring oil reserves in Chad, a neighbor of Sudan located directly west of Darfur, so any conflict could spill over into Chad (Wuthnow, 2013). For China to maximize its economic benefit, peace had to be established.

The U.S. and China collaborated to establish peacekeeping missions in Sudan and South Sudan. This collaboration is noted by two sources:

In 2007, through public statements and private messaging, Beijing persuaded Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir to accept UN peacekeepers. . . . Chinese diplomats helped broker agreement for an African Union/UN hybrid mission with peacekeepers from developing nations to allay Bashir's fear that Western forces would be used in the service of regime change. (International Crisis Group, 2017)

Author D. Large noted:

China supported the Southern referendum [where South Sudan gained its independence] . . . expending political capital and providing a donation of US \$500,000 to the Southern Sudan Referendum Commission in January 2011 as well as sending a team of observers. (2018, Kindle location 3672).

In addition, China sent vital military equipment to aid peacekeepers in South Sudan. Both the U.S. and China, as well as the A.U. and U.N. Secretary General, requested the Sudanese government's consent for a peacekeeping mission run by the U.N. (Wuthnow, 2013).

The U.S. helped create the new nation of South Sudan in 2011 in order to maintain U.S. interests in the country and to protect human rights and American ideals (United Nations Foundation, 2018). The U.S. was particularly concerned with the humanitarian aspect. The White House noted the importance of U.S. leadership in establishing the UNMISS mandate to focus on the protection of civilians (2014a). As the U.S. had initiated the process, it was also invested in supporting UNMISS and maintaining peace in South Sudan.

One option for maintaining peace in South Sudan was for China to work with South Sudan independently, which China was doing. President Xi Jinping stated: "China and South Sudan are good friends and good partners" (Xinhua, 2019). Talks between a high-level Chinese delegation and South Sudan's President Salva Kiir were favorable regarding a bilateral relationship between the two countries: "[Kiir] thanked China for its humanitarian assistance to South Sudan's national construction, adding that South Sudan would like to further deepen cooperation with China and push for the development of bilateral relations" (Xinhua, 2019).



Since Chinese leadership had excellent relations with the Sudanese and South Sudanese governments, the U.S. recognized the benefits of bilateral talks and working with China to place pressure on Sudan bilaterally (Wuthnow, 2013, p. 107). The International Crisis Group realized that China had unique leverage:

[China] engaged in the peace process held in Ethiopia, hosted discreet talks among warring factions in Sudan, shaped UN Security Council action, sent peacekeepers to the UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and joined the August 2015 peace agreement oversight body. (2017).

This illustrates an instance where China complemented the U.S. to promote peace in an African country, conducting bilateral talks that the U.S. might not have been able to conduct as effectively.

However, there was also strong dispute between the U.S. and China over placing an arms embargo on Sudan. In 2007, after Sudan resisted providing consent for a U.N.-led peacekeeping mission, the U.S. threatened to impose sanctions in an effort to stop the Sudanese government from committing human rights abuses (White House, 2007). But the U.S. was unable to take this step because of China insisted that diplomatic options were the best route (Wuthnow, 2013). The International Crisis Group noted:

[China] continues to draw a line at intruding on matters of domestic governance; opposes regime change or unilateral military intervention; and believes that showing respect, rather than exerting pressure or inflicting punishment, is how to elicit cooperation and improvement in governance. Having itself been a victim of sanctions and public opprobrium, it favors more discreet persuasion. But direct involvement can be justified then civil conflicts cross borders, threaten regional security and stability or create large humanitarian crises, and when regional and local authorities and the UN have granted their imprimatur. In such cases, China tends to support political dialogue without imposing outcomes. (2017)

China has taken a different approach when it comes to the affairs of other countries, which was the case in Sudan and South Sudan. However, it is still possible to cooperate when two countries have different approaches. Despite their contention over the arms embargo, China and America did cooperate overall to establish a peacekeeping mission and conduct bilateral talks simply because the two countries shared the same over-arching goal of maintaining peace.

This same case also shows that when the U.S. chose to act unilaterally in peacekeeping matters instead of working together with China in Africa, the results can be ineffective. In 2007, the U.S. placed unilateral sanctions on Sudan because it was unable to impose international sanctions through the U.N. China had greater influence on the matter of sanctions and a no-fly zone than did the U.S., partly because China had the backing of other powerful actors. Russia and other regional powers, namely, the African Union, Egypt, and South Africa, opposed placing sanctions and a no-fly zone on Sudan—although their motives were different. Russia was against using human rights to interfere in sovereign countries; Egypt wanted to maintain its access to the lower parts of the Nile River, and it wanted to maintain good relations with the Sudanese government. Like Russia, South Africa was against coercion by powerful countries, and the African Union favored an agreement with Sudan's consent and bilateral talks between countries with ties to Sudan, such as China. Beyond the opposition of other countries, U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon also supported a political settlement and diplomatic talks between China and Sudan rather than placing sanctions. That strong opposition ensured that an arms embargo was not placed on Sudan (Wuthnow, 2013). When the U.S. sought to take unilateral action, it became a clear illustration of the case where cooperation and

competition through the U.N. is much more likely to achieve its peacekeeping goals in the 21<sup>st</sup> century than taking unilateral action.

In 2018, an arms embargo was imposed on South Sudan based on a resolution drafted by the United States, which only passed because China abstained from voting. The African Union and the East African regional bloc IGAD (Inter Governmental Authority on Development) opposed an arms embargo on the grounds that it would undermine the peace process. China maintained that the U.N.S.C. should take a diplomatic path and support the African Union (United Nations Security Council, 2019b).

It is highly probable that a well-planned arms embargo in South Sudan would have helped maintain peace or at least not worsen the conflict. As discussed in the D.R.C. section, there is no consensus on whether complete economic sanctions benefit or cripple nations torn by conflict. For instance, Dursen Peksen from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights states: “Economic sanctions fail between 65-95% of the time in achieving their intended goals. Evidence suggests sanctions are also counterproductive in advancing human rights, democracy, and press freedom” (2011, p. 2). Although this might be true for full economic sanctions, in South Sudan’s case, it was only an arms embargo and specific targeted sanctions, not full economic sanctions being considered. It makes sense that stopping the flow of weapons in a country torn by conflict could help maintain peace. Most members of the Obama administration thought an arms embargo was vital to stopping the bloodshed in South Sudan. The U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Samantha Power stated:

The arms embargo would have had some significant effects. It would have made it impossible for the Government of South Sudan to continue to use the precious resources they have to buy heavy weapons and armaments. Would there have been smuggling? I heard a lot about smuggling from

Council members. Of course, there would have been smuggling. But you would have significantly reduced arms sales by UN Member States to a fellow UN Member State that, instead of feeding its people, is ramping up and arming up for an increasingly ethnic conflict. (U.S. Embassy in South Sudan, 2016)

After the arms embargo was imposed on South Sudan, many NGOs and activists echoed these sentiments.

Human Rights Watch also argued that the arms embargo was a long-overdue step (2019). However, it also notes that an embargo would not work without effective implementation, especially from neighboring nations (Pur, 2019). The organization noted that in 2014 and 2015 Uganda purchased weapons from Eastern European countries and sent them to South Sudan's military. If this had continued, any imposed arms embargo would have proven ineffective (2019). As Ernst Hogendoorn of Crisis Group argued, if implemented poorly or without careful analysis, arms embargoes may often do more harm than good (2008). If the political will exists, however, there are measures that can be taken to make the arms embargo effective. These rest on U.N. member states exhibiting the political will to act. The U.N. and other groups could monitor the sale of weapons, including small arms, and enforce the arms embargo. Furthermore, if an arms embargo were imposed, the U.N. would need a long-term strategic plan. The U.N. Secretary-General and the U.N. Secretariat could provide more strategic policy assistance to the U.N.S.C. regarding specific arms embargoes (Hogendoorn, 2008).

One possible counterargument to the claim that U.S.-China cooperation and competition hindered peacekeeping in South Sudan is that an arms embargo was not placed until 2018, and the lack of an embargo prior to 2018 was harmful to South Sudan. Such an argument is likely true, as I discussed above. However, it is clear that China, first

and foremost, wanted peace in South Sudan, and most of its efforts, such as supporting UNMISS and conducting bilateral talks, reflected this. Also, like the D.R.C. case, China's refusal to institute an arms embargo did not mean that the U.S.-China-led U.N. peacekeeping era was hurting peacekeeping compared to the U.S.-led era. The U.S. has also hindered peacekeeping missions, such as in Namibia, where the U.S. delayed its response to establishing UNTAG.

Unlike sanctions, a no-fly zone was never adopted by the U.N.S.C. In 2007, President G. W. Bush instructed Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to work with U.S. allies to establish a new U.N.S.C. resolution that would ban the Sudanese government from conducting military flights over Darfur (White House, 2007). China was opposed to the resolution because it preferred diplomatic talks so U.N. officials stopped pushing for it. Partial sanctions in the form of a no-fly zone could have saved lives, so China's decision went against humanitarian concerns. However, South Sudan benefited from China's and the United States' overall strategy of promoting peace in the country.

In the case of Sudan, China and the U.S. had a mostly cooperative relationship, but there was an area of contention as well. China and the U.S. worked together to establish a peacekeeping operation due, owing to China's political, economic, and security interests in Sudan and the United States goal to protect human rights and American ideals in Sudan. The U.S. helped create the new nation of South Sudan, and China led bilateral talks with the country.

Despite these areas of cooperation between China and the U.S., China also used its power to avoid an arms embargo being placed on South Sudan until 2018 as it preferred taking diplomatic means, which was contrary to U.S. wishes. When the arms

embargo was not implemented, it demonstrated that the U.S. acting unilaterally was less effective than if the U.S. and China had cooperated on the matter. That kind of action shows that when the two countries cooperate in African countries, the results can be beneficial to both U.S. and Chinese interests and to maintaining peace in the African countries involved.

### Mali: Background of Destabilization

Mali is another example of an African country where China and the United States cooperated to establish a U.N. peacekeeping mission, MINUSMA, which in turn helped reduce conflict in Mali.



Figure 7. Location of Mali on Map of Africa

Source: U.N. Geospatial Information Section, 2020

Mali has endured decades of instability after gaining its independence from France in 1960. Arab and Tuareg groups in the north of Mali rebelled against the Malian government in 1963, 1990, and 2006, each time an attempt to gain independence for a specific region called Azawad. In 2012, a Tuareg separatist group—the National Movement for the liberation of Azawad (MNLA)—and several Islamist militant groups—Ansar Dine, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa—took over territory in north Mali. Angered by the government’s weak response to the rebellion, the Malian army deposed the president in a military coup. While the government was in disarray, the MNLA and Islamist militant groups seized territory quickly, took control of most of northern Mali, and declared independence. Later in 2012, the alliance between the MNLA and the Islamist militant groups broke down because the Islamists imposed Sharia law in the north, and began to gain more influence in the center of the country as well (Council on Foreign Relations, 2020b).

The Malian government has been unable to take control of the northern territory, which has resulted in the weakening of the government and destabilization of neighboring countries as well. Furthermore, the government has not implemented the 2015 peace agreement signed with some of the rebel groups. The deal included taking steps to increase political representation in the north, include rebel groups in the governments’ armed forces, and increase development (Council on Foreign Relations, 2020b).

As a result of continued conflict in Mali, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was created. This peacekeeping

mission, established in 2013, is comprised of 13,289 troops and 1,920 police personnel (United Nations, 2020f), with an approved budget from 2019 to 2020 of \$1,221,420,600 (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2020a).

### U.S.-China Cooperation and Competition in Mali

In Mali, China and the U.S., as well as other members of the U.N. Security Council, such as France, cooperated in full. MINUSMA was the second peacekeeping mission China supported in Africa. China and the U.S. promoted several U.N. resolutions that allowed intervention in Mali (United Nations Security Council, 2020). The United States' and China's security interests were in line with Malian interests to maintain peace in Mali and with neighboring countries to secure peace in the greater Sahel region.

China's increased political will to participate in U.N. peacekeeping missions in the 21<sup>st</sup> century stems partly from its new identity. As mentioned earlier, China's national identity as a rising power has caused the country to be a responsible global power (Yin, 2019), and China wants to project a positive image (Ian, 2014). This is part of the reason why China became involved in MINUSMA.

Another reason is to protect its security interests in Africa, where China faces an increased threat from terrorism, such as Islamic extremism in neighboring countries. This poses a threat to China's economic and security interests as well, so Chinese leaders are placing increasing importance on countering terrorism by implementing domestic laws on terrorism and establishing multilateral organizations. Therefore, China considered the terrorist threat in Mali as a greater concern than maintaining its economic interests. Chinese leaders recognized that non-governmental actors, such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic



Maghreb and other Islamist groups, could seize power in African nations, overthrow governments and make the continent unstable (Cabestan, 2018). Since Africa is of increasing importance to China, this was not acceptable to Chinese leaders, and their willingness to cooperate in U.N. peacekeeping in Mali reflected this (Kam, 2017). Of somewhat lesser importance, Mali did hold economic significance for China as well. Mali's fourth-largest trading partner, following Senegal, France, and the Ivory Coast, is China, with Mali mainly exporting cotton and shea butter to the country.

China continues to increase its projects in Mali. For one, China has attempted to improve Mali's infrastructure, constructing bridges, railways, and roads. This also has the purpose of increasing Mali's ties with its neighbors, especially Senegal and Guinea (Cabestan, 2018). Thus, its economic interests in Mali simply added to the necessity for China to intervene in Mali.

Furthermore, Mali is a significant partner with China in other areas. Since gaining its independence from France in 1960, the two countries have collaborated on political, military, medical, and cultural areas. Mali has been an ally of the Chinese communist government. With its geostrategic location right in the middle of West Africa, there are now between 5,000 to 10,000 Chinese citizens in Mali. China's long relationship with Mali offers incentives for Chinese leaders to maintain stability in the country (Cabestan, 2018).

Like China, the U.S. has been concerned with the growing militancy in Mali, which then spreads to countries across the Sahel region, creating a new safe haven for Islamic extremists. In 2017, the Group for Support of Islam and Muslims, an al-Qaeda affiliate in Mali, was formed, and the following year, the U.S. State Department labeled

the group a terrorist organization. In addition, Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, a branch of the Islamic State, has gained influence in Mali. These two groups, along with other Islamic militant groups, have gained control of northern Mali and parts of central Mali. This is concerning for the United States because the entire region could become affected by militancy and terrorism, which would further strengthen al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. Since the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center, countering terrorism has become a priority for the U.S., making Mali's importance to U.S. interests clear (Council on Foreign Relations, 2020b). This has given added incentives for the U.S. to work together with China and other countries in the U.N. to help reduce conflict in Mali.

The U.S. has independently increased its peace and security efforts in Mali and the region. The U.S. military has deployed about 1,500 troops to the Sahel region and built a drone base in Niger that facilitates strikes against militant groups across North and West Africa (Council on Foreign Relations, 2020b).

Both countries jointly used their political influence to promote and establish several U.N. resolutions on Mali, which reflected their stance on stabilizing Mali and allowing intervention in the country. The first resolution that the United Nations Security Council put into effect in 2013 was Resolution 2100, which stated:

Condemning strongly the offensive launched . . . by terrorist, extremist and armed groups towards the south of Mali and stressing that terrorism can only be defeated by a sustained and comprehensive approach involving the active participation and collaboration of all States, and regional and international organizations to impede, impair, and isolate the terrorist threat, and reaffirming that terrorism could not and should not be associated with any religion, nationality or civilization. (p. 1)

As outlined in this resolution, the U.S. and China jointly took a strong stance against terrorism in Mali. Furthermore, each of the eight resolutions on MINUSMA that were

adopted in the following years until 2019 reiterated the same opposition to terrorism in Mali and noted the creation of MINUSMA to fight terrorism in Mali (United Nations Security Council, 2013). In each of these resolutions, the U.S. and China collaborated to pass the resolutions. As a result of their significant interests in Mali, the U.S. and China moved to establish MINUSMA in 2013, which is comprised of 13,289 troops and 1,920 police personnel (United Nations, 2020f), with an approved budget from 2019 to 2020 of \$1,221,420,600 (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2020a).

### Chapter Summary

The two superpowers, the U.S. and China, have tried to improve the situations in three countries—D.R.C., South Sudan, and Mali. This means the U.S. is not the only country responsible and expected to lead as it was in the past, simply because it has the means to do so. China is now also sharing the responsibility. Both countries benefit from their involvement in these peacekeeping missions due to their numerous political, economic, humanitarian, and security interests in the countries, which is why they cooperate and compete to establish and shape the missions.

The U.S. and China had both a cooperative and competing relationship in the D.R.C., but ultimately both countries agreed on a mutual desire for peace in the country. MONUSCO is the U.N. mission with the second-largest military and financial resources, clearly exhibiting the political will of the U.S. and China to maintain peace in D.R.C. and neighboring countries. In the case of South Sudan, China and the U.S. had a mostly cooperative relationship, but there were also some areas of contention such as the use of sanctions. Both countries cooperated on establishing a peacekeeping mission, the U.S.

pushed for sanctions, and China worked with the South Sudanese government bilaterally. This illustrates a case where China complemented the United States in helping promote peace in an African country. In Mali, China and the U.S. along with other members of the U.N. Security Council, such as France, cooperated in full.

U.N. peacekeeping in the missions in Africa in the emerging bipolar era have had the same level of political support from the U.N.S.C. compared to missions in the unipolar US.-led era. For example, the U.S. exerted its influence in Somalia to establish a peace enforcement mission (the first of its kind); likewise, China used its influence to engage in individual talks with the Congolese government and get its proposals included in U.N.S.C. resolutions on the D.R.C. Although U.S. involvement in Somalia was greater than Chinese involvement in the D.R.C., there were other missions, such as UNTAG in Namibia, where the U.S. had little impact in the beginning until its impact increased at the very end.

The two countries had different approaches in Somalia, the D.R.C., and South Sudan. The U.S. in Somalia handled peace enforcement measures; the Chinese resorted to diplomacy and traditional peacekeeping. U.S.-China cooperation in Mali also helped establish a mission to the country and help reduce conflict, similar to the mission in Namibia.

This thesis realizes that political chaos in one country could spill over to other countries, making international peace and security precarious. Thus U.N. members are persuaded to seriously consider participating in peacekeeping. Instability can lead to various crises such as an influx of refugees or terrorist attacks spilling over to other countries (Jones, 2015). It is partly because of this serious concern of political chaos that

we see participation and cooperation between the U.S. and China in matters of peacekeeping, despite their differences in many areas. The United Nations has been instrumental in bringing different countries with various interests together to focus on peacekeeping, with the goal of helping warring factions develop a consensus that will save lives and lead to stability.

Academic institutions and think tanks around the world, for example, the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Igarape Institute, Stellenbosch University, Royal Danish Defence College, Social Science Research Council, Center on International Cooperation, Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology, and the Institute for Security Studies, have studied the effectiveness of missions such as MONUSCO, UNMISS, and MINUSMA. They found that U.N. peacekeeping was either somewhat or mostly effective depending on the mission itself in terms of protection of civilians and humanitarian delivery (Day, 2018; Lijn, 2019; Novosseloff, 2019).

Relative to MONUSCO, these institutions found: “Where . . . MONUSCO has made a concerted integrated effort to protect civilians and deter violence, it has made a real difference. However, there is also evidence of failure to act, both proactively and in reaction to reports of attacks on civilians” (Novosseloff, 2019).

Regarding UNMISS, the researchers found: “The impact of the mission is unmistakable” (Day, 2018). On MINUSMA, they found: “Until 2016, the . . . mission . . . was a relatively successful peace operation. . . . However, since 2016, MINUSMA’s effectiveness in terms of stabilization and the protection of civilians has decreased” (Lijn, 2019).

This thesis has shown that U.N. peacekeeping in the emerging bipolar era has remained similar politically, militarily, and financially to what it was in the unipolar era. This is attributed to U.S. and Chinese cooperation and competition in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, which is significant because conflict has been partly or mostly reduced and lives have been saved due to these missions. Finally, like their political role, the U.S. and China have complemented each other in their military and financial roles in these missions.

## Chapter IV

### Military and Financial Outcomes Under U.S. and Chinese Leadership

Chapter III showed that both the U.S. and China have provided similar political support to U.N. peacekeeping missions in Africa in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Political will is key to establishing peacekeeping missions, but they could not be deployed without adequate military and financial means. This chapter explores U.S. and Chinese cooperation and competition, with research outcomes that found China providing more military support and the U.S. providing more financial support.

#### Introduction

The U.S. and China have cooperated and competed through the U.N. on their military support to U.N. peacekeeping missions in the emerging bipolar era. It is interesting that both countries continue to cooperate even though China leads in troop contributions whereas the U.S. provides military equipment. China has also tried to gain more influence by increasing the number of military troops it provides.

Financial support to U.N. peacekeeping efforts has greatly increased in the joint U.S.-China-led era compared to the U.S. led era as a result of U.S.-China cooperation and competition. The U.S. provided financial support in the unipolar period in order to maintain its interests; China is providing financial support in the emerging bipolar period to maintain its interests. In both UNTAG and UNOSOM II, the U.S. had the greatest influence in determining those missions' budgets. In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, although the two

countries had different interests and approaches in each African country it supported, the U.S. and China cooperated through the U.N. to fund the missions. Competition between the two countries was more apparent when China noticed an opportunity to gain influence by providing more financial contributions at a time when the U.S. has been decreasing its contributions.

#### Comparing U.S.-China Military Support of U.N. Peacekeeping Missions in Africa at the End of the Cold War/Unipolar Period and into the Emerging Bipolar Period

The number of military personnel deployed in all missions in Africa over the unipolar and emerging bipolar periods remained at about the same level. From 1989 to 2000, there were 30,800 total military personnel in all missions in Africa, and from 2000 to 2020, there were 25,662 total military personnel, demonstrating that U.N. peacekeeping missions under joint U.S.-China leadership have been approximately the same size. This is largely due to U.S.-China cooperation and competition on military matters (see Appendix: Table 1, Table 2).

#### U.S.-China Military Cooperation and Competition in U.N. Peacekeeping Missions in Namibia, Somalia, Mali, South Sudan, and the D.R.C.

China has the greatest military influence in U.N. peacekeeping among the members of the Security Council, and is the largest contributor (Zhou, 2017). China is not the largest contributor of U.N. peacekeeping troops worldwide, however; Bangladesh and Ethiopia ranked at the top, and China ranks ninth as of 2020. The U.N. has more than



100,000 peacekeeping personnel from over 120 countries (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2020h). As of January 2020, China deployed 2,544 military and police personnel; the United States deploys 27 (United Nations, 2020i). China has been increasing its military contribution, increasing from 1,271 U.N. troops in 2006 to 3,042 in 2016 (Cabestan, 2018). In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the U.S. military contribution is miniscule compared to that of China. If China did not provide military personnel to these peacekeeping missions, the missions would be weaker.

China uses its contribution to protect its political, economic, and security interests in Africa but not just for that. Chinese leaders, such as former President Hu Jintao and current President Xi Jinping, embraced an international outlook. China also uses its military contribution to create an impression around the world that the country is a responsible global leader (Yen, 2019). China provides troops to increase its political, economic, and security interests while also attempting to project a positive image worldwide. This has led China to compete with the U.S. to provide military contributions.

Due to its interests, China is expected to greatly increase its military support to the U.N. in the coming years. In 2015, President Xi stated that China will provide 8,000 military personnel to a U.N. peacekeeping standby force. Ma Zhaoxu, China's permanent representative to the UN, announced that Xi had fulfilled his promise, and the 8,000 peacekeeping standby force had completed registration with the United Nations Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System. Ma also noted that the force is capable of rapid deployment within 60 days. Chinese Major General Shao Yuanming further noted that China coordinated a training event and joint exercise with other countries in 2020 for U.N. Peacekeeping Standby Forces. China is trying to maintain and expand its military

influence in U.N. peacekeeping missions and by doing so is helping the missions (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2015).

In contrast, whereas China has a significant military role in U.N. peacekeeping in Africa, the U.S. barely participates. China complements the U.S. presence in the U.N. although this is not directly coordinated between the two countries. China began to participate in U.N. peacekeeping missions in 1989 with only a few non-military observers sent to UNTAG in Namibia (Philippe, 2007). China did not contribute any troops to UNOSOM II in Somalia (UNTAG). As of 2019, China contributed 413 personnel to MINUSMA, 1,031 personnel to UNMISS, and 218 personnel to MONUSCO (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2020i). Personnel types included staff officer, experts on mission, police, and contingent troops.

In comparison, U.S. contributions to the missions were 9 personnel in MINUSMA, 7 in UNMISS, and 3 in MONUSCO (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2020h). In the 1989 to 2000 time-period, the U.S. did not contribute troops to UNTAG in Namibia, and it contributed 4,000 troops to UNOSOM II in Somalia (UNTAG). The U.S. also supported UNOSOM II by establishing a Joint Task Force off the Somali coast, a Quick Reaction Force comprised of a United States Army battalion, and United States Army Rangers and specially trained units (United Nations, 1996). This shows U.S. military support has decreased from the U.S.-led to U.S.-China led eras.

Total UNTAG military contributions by all U.N. member states was 9,500, and UNOSOM II contributions by all member states was 30,800 (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2020d). MINUSMA contributions by all U.N. member countries is 13,289 troops and 1,920 police personnel (United Nations, 2020f). In UNMISS, the total

contributions by all U.N. member countries is 17,000 troops and 2,101 police personnel (United Nations, 2020j). This means about 1 in 19 U.N. troops in South Sudan are Chinese. In MONUSCO, there are a total of 19,815 military personnel, 760 military observers, 391 police personnel (United Nations, 2020g). When compared to all countries, China is in the top ten largest troop and police contributors (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2020h).

China's military contribution is significant because it breaks all U.S. and U.N.S.C. precedent on U.N. peacekeeping. In general, U.N.S.C. members fund U.N. peacekeeping missions but do not deploy many troops to peacekeeping missions. This occurs because powerful countries do not want to risk troop lives in conflicts that are not seen as vital to their interests; but they are willing to provide financial support to U.N. peacekeeping missions that are less significant but still important.

Throughout the past few decades, it is countries from the developing world that contribute the most troops. There are notable exceptions, like France which contributes many troops in an effort to maintain peace in Mali. But this sort of contribution generally happens in cases where U.N.S.C. members have major interests in a country, as France has in its former colony, Mali. But this is changing with the rise of China on the U.N. peacekeeping scene. In the past two decades, China has consistently shown it is committed to U.N. peacekeeping by putting its troops on the ground and continuing to increase its personnel numbers. This shows that China is filling gaps the U.S. has not, and in so doing is competing with the U.S. for military influence.

There was a significant change in U.S. troop contributions from UNOSOM II in the unipolar period to the missions in the emerging bipolar period. Despite the small

number of troops deployed by the U.S. in past decades, the U.S. sent 4,000 military personnel to Somalia under UNOSOM II in the 1990s. It is likely that the reduction in U.S. troops today is partly due to the tainted view of U.N. peacekeeping among U.S. government officials after 18 U.S. troops were killed in Somalia. As discussed in Chapter II, humanitarian considerations were key in the U.S. decision to become involved in Somalia. Media images of Somali people suffering appalled many Americans and caused the public to press the U.S. government to intervene. However, after images were broadcast of American soldiers being attacked in Mogadishu, a humanitarian disaster was not enough to sustain public support for a peacekeeping mission. U.S. government officials are most likely to keep the case of Somalia in mind when making future decisions regarding humanitarian crises. Many of the crises that came after Somalia were similar to the Somalia case: an initial public outcry among human rights and activists groups, and a couple months later the crises are largely forgotten by the American public. Knowing the transient nature of the concern, it is usually a safer political calculation for U.S. politicians to focus on issues of immediate concern to Americans rather than on far-off issues. This has resulted in U.S. decreasing its military involvement in U.N. peacekeeping missions.

The weakness of focusing solely on issues of immediate concern to Americans, however, is that far-off conflicts can easily become threats to the United States, making U.S. contributions to U.N. peacekeeping essential to maintaining the country's interests. If a whole region of Africa is destabilized by a conflict started in one African country, there could be severe security and political issues for the U.S. For example, Mali has been plagued with Islamic extremists originating in Northern Mali. The attacks on

innocent people have spread to central Mali and now spill over into neighboring countries. These extremists are linked to terrorist groups worldwide. If the groups in Mali become stronger, this just adds to the difficulty of containing Islamic extremism worldwide—a key concern to U.S. interests. Politically, this will weaken the United States' sphere of influence in the region as well.

Furthermore, U.S. government officials probably recognize that foreign policy is not a top concern of the American public in recent years. Other issues like health care and the economy tend to be at the forefront. This might be because of lengthy wars in the Middle East that have exhausted the American public. Therefore, if politicians want to be re-elected, it does not serve them well to support deploying troops to U.N. peacekeeping. If some troops die in missions, it becomes even more detrimental to approach grieving military families to explain why troops were needed and deployed. U.S. hesitation to send troops in the 21<sup>st</sup> century means that the U.S. is not the dominant force in U.N. peacekeeping as it was at the end of the Cold War period and the unipolar period.

The U.S.-led era of 1989 to 2000 was no stronger than the U.S.-China-led era of 2000 to 2020. In the U.S.-China-led era, the two countries cooperate militarily in U.N. peacekeeping operations. One goal of U.S. willingness to fund peacekeeping is to protect U.N. military equipment and personnel (U.S. Department of State, 2017). As China has provided more troops, the U.S. has funded more equipment. From a U.N. peacekeeping budget of about \$7 billion, \$3 billion is used for equipment, services, and troop costs annually (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2020k), which the U.S. funds the largest portion.

China competes with the U.S. to gain influence and protect its interests through increasing its military contributions. Both countries have also cooperated in the military

aspect of U.N. peacekeeping in Africa, with China providing more troops and the U.S. funding more military equipment. Furthermore, China complements the United States' financial role with military contributions. The two countries also complemented each other politically, providing about equal political support to the missions.

#### Comparison of Financial Support to U.N. Peacekeeping Missions in Africa:

1989-2000 (Unipolar) and 2000-2020 (Bipolar)

Financial support of U.N. peacekeeping operations in Africa has not decreased in the emerging bipolar era as the U.S. and China shared leadership positions. In fact, it has increased significantly.<sup>2</sup> See the Appendix for Table 3 and Table 4, which show financial support to U.N. peacekeeping missions in Africa in the unipolar period and the emerging bipolar period. When numbers over the two time periods are adjusted for inflation, financial funding for most missions in the 2000 to 2020 bipolar time period is in the billions, whereas funding in the 1989 to 2000 unipolar time period is in the millions. Clearly, financial support to U.N. peacekeeping operations in Africa has greatly increased in the U.S.-China led era.

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<sup>2</sup> Note that from 1989 to 2000, total financial support to 16 missions was provided. From 2000 to 2020, total financial support to 8 missions was provided, but data for only 7 missions is provided owing to unavailability of data. However, making comparisons between total numbers in 1989 to 2000 with yearly numbers in 2000 to 2020 shows there has been a major increase in funding in the U.S.-China era from 2000 to 2020.

## Financial Support for U.N. Peacekeeping in Africa During U.S. Leadership

The U.S. provided financial support to U.N. peacekeeping at the end of the Cold War period and the unipolar period in order to support U.S. interests. Examples are UNTAG in Namibia and UNOSOM II in Somalia. The U.S. had political reasons for establishing UNTAG. Despite the Cold War being a contributing factor to the United States' initial hesitation over Namibian independence, in the end the U.S. supported the measure. In Somalia, United States interests were humanitarian, with the main objective of saving lives. But there were also political interests, as the U.S. wanted to maintain its influence in the Horn of Africa.

Presidential leadership made a big difference in the amount of U.S. financial support to U.N. peacekeeping missions in Africa during this period. President Ronald Reagan called for an end to payments of U.N. dues during the 1980s. During Reagan's two terms from 1981 to 1989, there were no U.N. peacekeeping missions deployed to any African country. This changed under President George H. W. Bush's term from 1989 to 1993, when UNTAG was deployed to Namibia. The G.H.W. Bush administration used the U.N. as a tool to support its foreign policy goals. President Bill Clinton's administration from 1993 to 2001 placed great emphasis on multilateralism in the first years of his presidency, planning for the U.N. to be central to Clinton's foreign policy. This resulted in the U.S. working with the U.N. to establish UNOSOM II in Somalia. However, President Clinton turned against the U.N. and continued his predecessor's policy of withholding dues, resulting in \$1.6 billion in U.S. arrears in the 1990s. As of 2017, U.S. arrears had decreased to \$342 million as Congress passed an act requiring payments to the U.N. During President Trump's term, U.S. arrears again increased to 900

million (Blanchfield, 2020). Despite the variation of involvement from one president to the next, however, the U.S. was the top funder of U.N. peacekeeping throughout the Cold War and unipolar eras (Bennis, 1996).

The financial budget for UNTAG reflected U.S. wishes, illustrating how influential the country was regarding funding of U.N. peacekeeping missions in Africa. Originally, the proposed cost was \$650 million, but the U.S. wanted to reduce the cost to \$450 million because the U.S. would bear a large portion of the cost. Meanwhile, the General Assembly, in particular African member states, wanted more funding for UNTAG to prevent South African aggression in Namibia. The final proposed cost was \$416 million. Since the U.S. was the main contributor, it would not commit to expanding funding for the mission, so the budget remained at \$416 despite other member states' requests (Fortna, 1993).

Like UNTAG, the U.S. had considerable influence over determining the budget for UNOSOM II: some US\$1.6 billion (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2020d). Unlike UNTAG where the U.S. was not fully committed to a large U.N. budget, the U.S. was fully committed to being involved in Somalia and willing to contribute significant funding to UNOSOM II.

## U.S.-China Financial Cooperation and Competition in

### U.N. Peacekeeping Missions in Africa

U.N. peacekeeping missions in Africa in the end of the Cold War and unipolar era were dominated by the United States, but that began to change in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The two countries were also competing to gain greater influence through their financial



contributions. In both periods, the end of the Cold War and unipolar periods and the emerging bipolar era, the United States provided the most financial contributions and so has had the greatest financial influence in peacekeeping missions in Africa. If the U.S. did not provide financial resources to U.N. peacekeeping missions in Africa, these missions would essentially have been greatly weakened or become completely ineffective.

The total U.N. peacekeeping budget for 2019–2020 was \$6.51 billion, with about 75% (\$4.82 billion) allotted to peacekeeping missions in Africa (Arieff, et al., 2019).

Total financial contributions by all countries for the missions are as follows:

- MINUSMA: Approved budget 2019–2020 was \$1,221,420,600 (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2020a).
- UNMISS: Approved budget 2019–2020 was \$1,081,788,400 (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2020b).
- MONUSCO: Approved budget 2019–2020 was \$1,086,018,600 (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2020c).

As it was during the unipolar period from 1989 to 2000, the United States is still the top financial contributor to U.N. peacekeeping missions. But the country has been scaling down its contributions to U.N. peacekeeping for the past few years. The U.S. provided 27.89% (\$1.13 billion,) of the peacekeeping budget in 2020; In 2018, the U.S. provided \$2.1 billion to U.N. peacekeeping and provided \$1.55 billion in 2019.<sup>3</sup>

U.S. funding for U.N. peacekeeping operations in Africa is as follows:

\$326,877,000 for MINUSMA in 2019 and \$219,561,000 in 2020, \$342,159,000 for

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<sup>3</sup> Note that the U.S. numbers follow the U.S. fiscal year from October 1 to September 30, whereas the U.N. numbers follow the U.N. peacekeeping fiscal year from July 1 to June 30.

UNMISS in 2019 and \$222,969,000 in 2020, and \$339,013,000 for MONUSCO in 2019 and \$180,521,000 in 2020. The three missions seem equally important to U.S. interests as U.S. funding for them has remained similar. In recent years, despite similarities in funding between peacekeeping missions, the U.S. has decreased its funding for U.N. peacekeeping operations in Africa, with a 41% drop from 2019 to 2020 alone (Blanchfield, 2020).

It is unclear whether decreased funding will be the new normal or if U.S. contributions will return to those of previous years. For decades, U.S. pressure to reform the U.N. has concealed efforts by U.S. policymakers to lessen the power of the U.N.; they no longer see the U.N. as maximizing U.S. influence, in particular after the failure in UNOSOM II in Somalia (Bennis, 1996). However, there has not been such a significant reduction in funding from one year to the next as seen in recent years. This is largely due to President Donald Trump's administration which disengaged from the United Nations and multilateral institutions in general, as Trump believes other countries take advantage of the U.S. and the U.S. does not benefit from its involvement in the U.N. With a change in presidential leadership to a president who is more favorable to the U.N. and its peacekeeping role, U.S. leadership might resume some form of what it was in the past two decades under earlier administrations. However, if the U.S. economy declines due to the severe toll the coronavirus pandemic, U.S. funding to the U.N. may not return to its previous numbers.

The U.S. sets various formal productive objectives for how its financial contribution should be used. In MONUSCO, the mission is supposed to support the Congolese government in protecting civilians, in disarming armed groups, and improving

the judicial and security sectors of the government to end violence. In UNMISS, the U.S. wants its financial contribution to go toward protecting civilians, investigating human rights abuses, supporting the peace agreement, and assisting with the delivery of humanitarian assistance. In MINUSMA, the U.S. wants implementation of the peace agreement, protection of civilians, countering terrorist attacks, protecting human rights, providing humanitarian assistance, and promoting reconciliation (U.S. Department of State, 2017).

Meanwhile, China is competing with the U.S. for financial influence by increasing its financial contributions to these peacekeeping missions. In 2016, China became the second-largest contributor, providing 15.22% of the budget in 2020 (U.N. peacekeeping, 2020j). From 2011 to 2012, China provided only 3.39 per cent of the U.N. peacekeeping budget while the U.S. provided 27.14 per cent. As China's economic might has increased, its contribution to U.N. peacekeeping has increased rapidly, to 6.64 per cent from 2015–2016 and to 10.25 per cent in 2016–2017. During that same period, the U.S. provided 28.47 and 28.36 per cent, respectively (Cabestan, 2018). In 2018, China provided \$746 million to U.N. peacekeeping, while the U.S. provided \$2.1 billion (U.N. Chief Executive Board Secretariat, 2016). China might even surpass the U.S. in financial contributions to U.N. peacekeeping.

China has played an increased role in supporting U.N. peacekeeping in African countries. Along with promising China would increase human resources to peacekeeping operations, in his 2015 speech to the U.N. general assembly, Xi Jinping committed to significantly increasing funding, committing \$1 billion to the U.N. in the next ten years toward peace and development. For one peacekeeping African project alone, Xi promised

to provide \$100 million of free military assistance over five years to help create an African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis and an African Standby Force (2015, p. 6). At a China-Africa summit, the Chinese president vowed to support African countries in defense, riot prevention, counterterrorism, and customs and immigration control (Department of International Relations and Cooperation, 2015).

Based on the trends of the past decade, China might continue to increase its financial contributions to U.N. peacekeeping in Africa, but this is not certain because the world is facing challenging times. It is unclear how much the coronavirus pandemic will cause declines in economies across the world, including China. It is unclear whether China will have the capacity or the will to increase the country's involvement in U.N. peacekeeping in Africa.

With the U.S. and China contributing more than other member states financially, it means they have greater influence in U.N. peacekeeping because they can withdraw funding to missions they do not support. "Over the years, Congress has withheld full or partial funding from selected U.N. bodies and activities" (Blanchfield, 2018, p. 16). For example, first, the U.S. withheld funding to many activities and programs related to Palestinians. Second, complete withdrawal of funds to U.N. agencies that recognize Palestine as a state. Third, any program that engages in coercive abortion. Fourth, all funding to the United Nations Population Fund. Fifth, programs funding North Korea, Syria, Iran, and Cuba (Blanchfield, 2018). Although the U.S. and China have thus far not withdrawn funding from U.N. peacekeeping operations in Africa, the two countries always have the option of doing so if a perceived need arises.

Along with withdrawing funding, the financial contributions the U.S. and China make also translate into influence because of the conditions the two countries can set. Blanchfield (2018) notes: “Congress has enacted legislation linking U.S. funding to specific U.N. reform benchmarks” (p. 2). This means that the U.S. can set conditions when providing financial support to the U.N. Furthermore, Blanchfield points out: “Some suggest that the United States should use its position as the largest U.N. financial contributor to push for the implementation of policies that are in the best interests of the United States” (2018, p. 15).

#### Chapter Summary

The U.S. and China increase their influence and maintain their interests by funding U.N. peacekeeping efforts—a key reason why the U.S. led in the funding of U.N. peacekeeping during the Cold War period and unipolar periods, and the main reason why the U.S. and China have cooperated and competed in U.N. peacekeeping in the emerging bipolar period. This has ensured that funding for U.N. peacekeeping has not decreased since China shares the same interests as the U.S. in maintaining U.N. peacekeeping.

In fact, financial contributions to U.N. peacekeeping in the emerging bipolar era have greatly increased because China has drastically increased its contributions while the United States continues to provide significant funding. China is competing with the U.S. to provide more financial contributions in an effort to gain more influence and maintain its interests in the African countries in which it gets involved. Also, maintaining peace in African countries helps China gain more status and prestige in the world by creating the image that it is a responsible power. At the same time the countries compete, they have

cooperated, coming together through the United Nations to fund peacekeeping missions in Africa.

In addition to its financial contributions, China has competed with the U.S. to gain influence and to protect its interests by increasing its military contributions. China and the U.S. have cooperated on military aspects of U.N. peacekeeping in Africa, with China providing more troops and the U.S. funding more military equipment. China further complements the United States' financial role with its military contributions as the U.S. provides more financial contributions. The two countries have also complemented each other politically, providing approximately equal political support through the United Nations missions.

## Chapter V

### Conclusion

The African Union established a “Silence the Guns” campaign to end all wars, civil conflicts, gender-based violence, violent conflicts, and to prevent genocide everywhere on the continent by 2020 (African Union, 2020a). This was a grand and worthy goal as peace not only saves lives but also sets the foundation for countries to develop politically, socially, and economically. The campaign did not succeed, but maintaining peace remains a key objective of African countries. U.N. peacekeeping can help realize this vision, albeit slowly.

The U.N. has been instrumental in bringing together different countries with various interests, such as the United States and China, to focus on peacekeeping and to help warring factions develop a consensus that will save lives and lead to stability. Powerful countries like the U.S. and China have great capacity to influence U.N. peacekeeping missions and therefore influence peace and security in Africa.

This thesis has shown that U.S.-China cooperation and competition in the emerging bipolar period has helped keep U.N. peacekeeping in Africa at the same level politically, militarily, and financially compared to the earlier U.S.-led era at the end of the Cold War period and into the unipolar period. Both countries provided about equal political support to the missions, whereas the U.S. has provided more financial contributions and China has made greater military contributions. The two countries have cooperated through the U.N. while making their own modifications and sometimes taking

different approaches to peacekeeping. They have also competed to maintain their political, economic, human rights, and security interests in African countries affected by conflict, along the way enhancing the benefit they receive from interacting with these countries.

This competition has benefited the U.N. peacekeeping missions, since their overarching interest has been to reduce conflict and instability. This finding is significant because if U.N. peacekeeping had weakened under the leadership of the U.S. and China, it would have been harder to reduce conflict, which in turn would have affected the political, economic, and social institutions in countries enduring conflict, thus leading to more abuses, injuries, and deaths. Along with harming African countries that are affected by conflict, a weakening of U.N. peacekeeping would also have a negative impact on the political, economic, human rights, and security interests of the U.S. and China in African countries affected by conflict. But this has not happened. Dire predictions about the fate of the world order following the end of the unipolar period and the rise of China (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2017) have been unfounded as they pertain to U.N. peacekeeping in Africa.

Considering the significant interest China has shown in Africa, even more so in maintaining U.N. peacekeeping efforts, U.N. peacekeeping could potentially be strengthened in the future under U.S.-China leadership if U.S. leadership remains constant. U.N. peacekeeping might also be strengthened because over the past few decades China has increased its participation in U.N. peacekeeping, exhibiting an upward trend of involvement. Furthermore, historically, China has exhibited solidarity with African countries, such as in decolonization efforts in countries like Namibia. Despite



China's efforts in peace and security in Africa at the time, however, it did not have the influence required to bring about real change. Speeches by top Chinese politicians and diplomats in the 21<sup>st</sup> century stressed the need for Africa-China solidarity (Alden, Large, & Oliveira, 2008). The rhetoric was similar to that of Chinese leaders decades ago during African liberation movements. However, the level of China's influence has greatly changed, with China now being a world leader able to effect large-scale change on the continent if it so chose. In the future, as China's military and financial participation in peacekeeping increases, if the U.S. continues to provide the same level of support to U.N. peacekeeping, joint Chinese and American leadership in U.N. peacekeeping might prove to be more beneficial to African countries affected by conflict than sole U.S.-leadership was.

Based on the past two decades, policymakers in African continental and regional organizations, such as the African Union, can be relatively confident that the U.N. will maintain its presence in conflict areas on the continent under joint U.S.-China leadership. If the trends of the past two decades continue, the African Union does not have to plan for any reductions in strength of U.N. peacekeeping. Africans living in conflict areas and in countries affected by conflict can still rely upon U.N. peacekeeping in the changing international order. However, if trends do not continue and a major change occurs, namely the U.S. and China waging all-out war on each other, the effect on U.N. peacekeeping will be unclear.

In areas other than peace and security, Africa-China relations have also grown strong. China has increased its support to Africa in various areas: infrastructure building, industry, agriculture, trade and investment, finance, green development, public health,

poverty alleviation, and cultural exchanges (Chan, 2017). The World Bank noted trade between China and Africa had reached over \$170 billion in 2013 and that China had provided 53 billion in loan support to African countries from 2003-2011 (Pigato & Tang, 2015).

China's heightened interest in Africa has also increased the United States' interest in the continent. Since 2000, China and the African Union have jointly organized the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation (FOCAC) summit, which occurs every three years. Following China's lead, other countries started to have summits with African countries, including India, France, Japan, and the U.S. In 2014, the U.S. organized the first United States-African Leaders Summit to discuss strengthening ties between the U.S. and Africa (White House, 2014b). This rising interest and competition between the U.S. and China could benefit African countries as both countries compete to gain greater influence.

In addition to peacekeeping, the U.S. and China could cooperate and compete by contributing to Africa's economy. During the Cold War, the U.S. and the Soviet Union competed for influence in Africa, sometimes benefiting African countries' economies. In Ethiopia, for example, the Soviet Union helped with the country's development and helped support various social and economic reforms (Westad, 2007). Africa's minerals and manpower have great potential for development, and China and the U.S. could contribute to trade, technological transfer, and training manpower. It could be mutually beneficial for China, the U.S., and African countries to collaborate on the African economy, just as the U.S. and China have complemented each other on U.N. peacekeeping.

Although African countries still require assistance from powerful countries such as the U.S. and China, it is absolutely essential that African countries work towards eliminating problems on the continent independently. The *Zimbabwe Independent* (2015) noted:

In the never-ending battle between the ‘East’ and the ‘West’ in creating symbiotic, economically and politically beneficial friendships with African countries, it is Africa itself that must, by addressing its political, economic and humanitarian challenges, chart its own future.

Outside of Africa, shared power between the U.S. and China will also seep into aspects of life that affect the world: science, health, economics, trade, and the environment, among others. If the U.S. and China can complement each other in U.N. peacekeeping in Africa, it raises the question of what else this shared power can affect positively and to what extent? For example, regarding the environment, although the United States is the second-largest greenhouse gas emitter, the country withdrew from the Paris Agreement set up under the U.N. to combat climate change by reducing greenhouse gas emissions (U.N. Climate Change, 2020). However, China ratified the treaty, making up for the lack of leadership exhibited by the U.S.

In trade, China is creating new institutions, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, with the mission of improving social and economic outcomes through the development of infrastructure in the Asia-Pacific region (Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, 2020). This means China is reaching regions and sub-regions that the U.S. had not traditionally focused on improving. Further research is necessary to answer this question of the possible positive effects of shared power.

If the U.S. and China wage all-out war with each other, there will be no progress in areas where both are key players. However, if the two countries cooperate and compete, there could be progress on many different world issues.

APPENDIX 1

Table 1. Military Support to U.N. Peacekeeping Missions in Africa, in the Unipolar and Emerging Bipolar Period, 1989-2000.

	Dates of Operation	Military Support (lowest to highest in any given year) Note X = inapplicable or unavailable
United Nations Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I)	Dec 1989-Jun 1991	X troops, 70 military observers, X civilian police, X international civilian staff, X local civilian staff
United Nations Angola Verification Missions II (UNAVEM II)	May 1991-Feb 1995	X troops, 50-350 military observers, 18-126 civilian police, 40-220 international civilian staff, 70-155 local civilian staff
United Nations Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III)	Feb 1995 – Jun 1997	3,649 troops, 238 military observers, 288 civilian police, X international civilian staff, X local civilian staff
United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group (UNASOG)	May 1994- Jun 1994	X troops, 9 military observers, X civilian police, 6 international civilian staff, X local civilian staff
United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR)	Oct 1993- Mar 1996	1,200-5,200 troops, 146-331 military observers, 60 civilian police, 160 international civilian staff, 160 local civilian staff
United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)	Oct 1999- Dec 2005	944-17,500 troops, 69-260 military observers, 30-170 civilian police, 322 international civilian staff, 369-552 local civilian staff
United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA)	Mar 1998- Feb 2000	1,350 troops, X military observers, 24 civilian police, 114 international civilian staff, 111 local civilian staff
United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA)	Jun 1997- Feb 1999	396-3,026 troops, 41-253 military observers, 54-403 civilian police, X international civilian staff, X local civilian staff
United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL)	Sep 1993- Sep 1997	X troops, 92-303 military observers, X civilian police, 90-105 international civilian staff, 136-550 local civilian staff

	Dates of Operation	Military Support (lowest to highest in any given year) Note X = inapplicable or unavailable
United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL)	Jul 1998- Oct 1999	X troops, 41-210 military observers, 3-5 civilian police, 30-107 international civilian staff, 25-69 local civilian staff
United Nations Observer Mission Uganda – Rwanda (UNOMUR)	Jun 1993- Sep 1994	X troops, 81 military observers, X civilian police, X international civilian staff, X local civilian staff
United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)	Dec 1992- Dec 1994	3,941-6,625 troops, 204-354 military observers, 918-1,144 civilian police, 355 international civilian staff, 506 local civilian staff
United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I)	Apr 1992- Mar 1993	893-3,500 troops, 50-54 military observers, X civilian police, X international civilian staff, X local civilian staff
United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II)	Mar 1993- Mar 1995	14,968-28,000 troops, military observers, and civilian police, 2,800 international and local civilian staff (only total numbers available)
United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC)	Jul 1960- Jun 1964	5,871-19,828 troops, military observers, and civilian police, X international civilian staff X local civilian staff (only total numbers available)
United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG)	Apr 1989- Mar 1990	7,500 troops, military observers, civilian police, 2,000 international and local civilian staff (only total numbers available)
United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)	April 1991-Present	20 troops, X military observers, X civilian police, 230 international and local civilian staff
Total Support (range of lowest to highest total personnel in the missions)	1989-2000	9 to 30,800 total personnel

Source: United Nations Peacekeeping, 2020d.

Table 2. Military Support to U.N. Peacekeeping Missions in Africa in the Bipolar Period, 2000-2020.

	Dates of Operation	Military Support. Note X = inapplicable or unavailable
United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (MINUCI)	May 2003- Apr 2004	X troops, 26-75 military observers, civilian police, 54 international civilian staff, 55 local civilian staff
United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)	Jul 2000- Jul 2008	3,940 troops, X military observers, 214 civilian police, 229 international civilian staff, 244 local civilian staff
United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)	Oct 1999 – Dec 2005	X troops, 70-210 military observers, 3-5 civilian police, 30-107 international civilian staff, 25-69 local civilian staff
United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT)	Sep 2007- Dec 2010	3,531-5,200 troops, 24-25 military observers, 259-300 civilian police, 422 international civilian staff, 524 local civilian staff
United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB)	May 2004- Dec 2006	X troops, X military observers, X civilian police, X international civilian staff, X local civilian staff
United Nations Operations in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI)	Apr 2004- Jun 2017	X troops, X military observers, X civilian police, X international civilian staff, X local civilian staff
United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS)	Mar 2005- Jul 2011	9,250-9,304 troops, 465-513 military observers, 637-702 civilian police, 965-966 international civilian staff, 2,803-2,837 local civilian staff
United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)	Nov 1999- Jun 2010	5,537-19,815 troops, 500-760 military observers, 1,220-1,441 civilian police, 973 international civilian staff, 2,783 local civilian staff
United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)	Sep 2003- Mar 2018	5,873-15,250 troops, 133-250 military observers, 1,115-1,795 civilian police, 485 international civilian staff, 954 local civilian staff
United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)	April 1991- Present	20 troops, X military observers, X civilian police, 230 international and local civilian staff

	Dates of Operation	Military Support. Note X = inapplicable or unavailable
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA)	April 2014-Present	10,741 troops, X military observers, 2,043 civilian police, X international civilian staff, X local civilian staff
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)	April 2013-Present	11,757 troops, X military observers, 1,748 civilian police, 1,421 international and local civilian staff
United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)	July 2010-Present	13,590 troops, 660 military observers, 1,185 civilian police, 2,970 international and local civilian staff
African Union – United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)	July 2007-Present	4,185 troops, X military observers, 2,163 civilian police, X international civilian staff, X local civilian staff
United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA)	June 2011-Present	3,586 troops, X military observers, 30-50 civilian police, 217 international and local civilian staff
United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)	July 2011-Present	13,795 troops, X military observers, 1,696 civilian police, X international civilian staff, X local civilian staff
Total Support (range of lowest to highest total personnel in the missions)		184 to 25,662 total personnel

Source: United Nations Peacekeeping, 2020d



## APPENDIX 2

Table 3. Financial Support to U.N. Peacekeeping Missions in Africa from the end of the Cold War Period and into the Unipolar Period, 1989-2000.

	Dates of Operation between 1989 and 2000	Financial Support (net amount in US\$ unless otherwise specified)
United Nations Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I)	Dec 1989-Jun 1991	\$16.4 million
United Nations Angola Verification Missions II (UNAVEM II)	May 1991-Feb 1995	\$175.8 million
United Nations Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III)	Feb 1995 – Jun 1997	greater than \$752.2 million, (exact number not calculated)
United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group (UNASOG)	May 1994- Jun 1994	\$64,471
United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR)	Oct 1993- Mar 1996	\$453.9 million
United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)	Oct 1999- Dec 2005	\$2.8 billion
United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA)	Mar 1998- Feb 2000	\$103 million
United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA)	Jun 1997- Feb 1999	\$ 293.7 million
United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL)	Sep 1993- Sep 1997	\$99.3 million
United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL)	Jul 1998- Oct 1999	\$12.4 million
United Nations Observer Mission Uganda – Rwanda (UNOMUR)	Jun 1993- Sep 1994	\$2.3 million
United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)	Dec 1992- Dec 1994	\$486.7 million
United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I)	Apr 1992- Mar 1993	\$42.9 million
United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II)	Mar 1993- Mar 1995	\$1.6 billion
United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC)	Jul 1960- Jun 1964	\$400.1 million
United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG)	Apr 1989- Mar 1990	\$368.6 million
United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)	April 1991-Present	X
Total Support (range of lowest to highest funding in the missions)	1989-2000	\$64,471 to \$2.8 billion

Source: United Nations Peacekeeping, 2020d

Table 4. Financial Support to U.N. Peacekeeping Missions in Africa in the Emerging Bipolar Period, 2000 to 2020.

	Dates of Operation	Financial Support (net amount in US\$, unless otherwise specified)
United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (MINUCI)	May 2003-Apr 2004	\$29.9 million
United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)	Jul 2000-Jul 2008	\$1.32 billion
United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)	Oct 1999 – Dec 2005	\$2.8 billion
United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT)	Sep 2007- Dec 2010	\$101.3 million
United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB)	May 2004- Dec 2006	\$678.3 million ( <i>gross amount</i> )
United Nations Operations in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI)	Apr 2004- Jun 2017	\$153 million (for one year only)
United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS)	Mar 2005-Jul 2011	\$5.76 billion
United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)	Nov 1999- Jun 2010	\$8.73 billion
United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)	Sep 2003- Mar 2018	\$7.5 billion
United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)	April 1991-Present	\$60.5 million (for one year only)
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA)	April 2014-Present	\$976 million (for one year only)
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)	April 2013-Present	\$1.2 billion (for one year only)
United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)	July 2010-Present	\$1.1 billion (for one year only)
African Union – United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)	July 2007-Present	X
United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA)	June 2011-Present	\$269 million (for one year only)
United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)	July 2011-Present	\$1.27 billion (for one year only)
Total Support (range of lowest to highest funding in the missions)		29.9 million to X billion

Source: United Nations Peacekeeping, 2020d.

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