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Territorial Discontent: Chamorros, Filipinos, and the Making of the United States Empire on Guam

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July 6th, 2021

Territorial Discontent:
Chamorros, Filipinos, and the Making of the United States Empire on Guam

A dissertation presented by

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to

The Department of History

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

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Territorial Discontent:
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Abstract

“Territorial Discontent” is a century-long history of how the United States military shaped the colonial administration of Guam as a U.S. unincorporated territory from 1898 to 1997, and how the indigenous Chamorro people of Guam and Filipino migrants navigated, negotiated, and resisted the contradictions and complexities of race, indigeneity, land, and labor within empire. This dissertation shows how the colonial administration of Guam was predominantly dictated by the evolving needs of the U.S. military. The U.S. military’s desire to maintain Guam’s strategic location in order to project, expand, and ensure its geopolitical and military power in the Asia-Pacific region was dependent on the subjugation of Chamorros and Filipinos on Guam in different, yet overlapping colonial regimes. The U.S. military conducted carceral colonialism through its use of Guam as a penal colony for Filipino revolutionaries; military colonialism through its military Naval government from 1900-1941 and 1945-1950; settler colonialism and settler militarism through the integrated processes of Chamorro land annexation and the establishment of Filipino migrant labor regimes in the post-World War II era; and a multicultural and racial liberal imperial regime that stymied Chamorro claims to land and self-determination in the latter half of the twentieth century.

Moreover, this research specifically examines how the U.S. empire affected the local interracial political, cultural, and social relations of and between the Chamorro and Filipino communities on Guam. Chamorros continuously rearticulated their Chamorro identity to advocate for political rights within empire. Filipino migrants grappled with the material and cultural manifestations of racial ideologies within a colonial structure that perceived them as perpetually

foreign. Because the U.S. colonial experience is distinct for indigenous peoples and migrants/immigrants, Chamorros and Filipinos sought different, sometimes contradicting political and social goals. While Chamorros attempted to protect claims to land, self-determination, and later indigenous rights, Filipinos generally followed the immigrant narrative and sought inclusion into the American nation-state. This disparity led to tensions between Chamorros and Filipinos which are indicative of a central conflict of settler colonial regimes -- the irreconcilable relationship between indigenous rights and immigrant rights within U.S. empire. Through a historicization of the triangulation of relationships between Chamorros, Filipinos, and the U.S. military, this study elucidates how the United States made its Pacific empire from the vantage point of the island of Guam.

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This research project started out as a simple question that launched a seven-year academic and life journey into understanding what it means to be a person from the island of Guam. Along the way, I have met a countless number of people who have each in their own ways shaped the way I think about the topic of Chamorro-Filipino relations on Guam over the twentieth century. I want to thank each and every one of them, even if not mentioned here.

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Introduction:

Guam and United States Imperial History

In 1947, a group of American academics visited the United States territory of Guam, a Micronesian island so far into the western Pacific Ocean that it was a whole day ahead of the North American continent. Lead by Dr. Ernest M. Hopkins, the Hopkins Committee, as it came to be known, was created to research and offer recommendations to U.S. Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal on what to do with the U.S. Pacific territories of Guam and American Sāmoa, which had been U.S. colonial possessions before World War II.¹ The U.S. federal government questioned whether it was necessary to reconfigure the islands' territorial statuses and the people's citizenship statuses in order to align with the post-World War II priorities of the U.S. military, especially those of the U.S. Navy, which had governed the two territories before the war. In the changing global political landscape, these islands, especially Guam, would come to serve an even more important role in how the United States would project political and military power amid the rising tensions that would become the Cold War.

During their visit in Guam, the Hopkins Committee met with the people of Guam, including indigenous Chamorro leaders, politicians, and businessmen. While the movement for U.S. citizenship was frequently discussed during the proceedings, it was not the only issue on the table. Chamorros sought to regain access to land, which the U.S. military had annexed in order to transform the quaint island into the largest U.S. forward military base in the Western Pacific.² The

¹ The Hopkins Committee included Ernest M. Hopkins, former President of Dartmouth College, Maurice J. Tobin, then U.S. Secretary of Labor, and Dr. Knowles A. Ryerson, professor of horticulture in the University of California system. United States, *Hopkins Committee Report for the Secretary on the Civil Government of Guam and American Samoa*, 1947. Found through HathiTrust: <https://hdl.handle.net/2027/umn.31951002668985h>

² I have chosen to use the widely used spelling of “Chamorro” to describe the Indigenous people, language, and culture of Guam and the Mariana Islands. I do acknowledge that there have been recent changes made *Kumisión I Fino' CHamoru* (Chamorro language Commission) on Guam to decolonize the Chamorro language through revisions in orthography, such as utilizing the spelling “CHamoru” to better fit the sounds of the language. I respect the choices of the historical subjects and scholars I cite, I use “CHamoru,” “Chamoru, or “Guamanian” if they do so themselves. The term

U.S. military condemned one-third of the island's land, constructing roads, airstrips, harbors, and Quonset hut cities in order to support the Allied frontlines in the Pacific Theatre of World War II.³ The importance of the island during World War II made Guam's strategic location all the more apparent for U.S. global military dominance. This transformation irreversibly changed the political, social, and environmental landscape of the island. Two years after the World War ended and Guam once again came under the control of the United States, Chamorro people were still unsettled by war in their home island.

One Chamorro man, Jose M. Flores, was angry with the U.S. military's treatment of the Chamorro people. He testified before the Hopkins Committee, "the people must know where to settle permanently as the government, more or less, owns or have the whole say of our lands and our whereabouts. Such a condition creates discontent."⁴ In the perspective of Flores and many other Chamorros of this postwar period, the U.S. military only replaced the occupying forces of the Japanese military. Rather than bringing freedom to an island that was hit by war, "units (Army and Navy and Marines) at times occupying our properties won't let us come to such properties which causes ill-feeling also."⁵ Even after the so-called "liberation" of Guam by U.S. forces, Flores saw how the Chamorro people still could not move freely around their own island. To make matters worse, Flores reiterated to the Hopkins Committee, "the usual thing we were or are being told is that the properties or properties are not ours. Imagine your feeling when told such a thing!"⁶

"Guamanian" was coined in the specific context of World War II and postwar Guam as a rhetorical tool for Chamorros to convey national loyalty and their desire for US citizenship. However, Guamanian as a term has evolved overtime from being one used to describe the postwar Americanized Chamorro person to now referring to anyone and any race who resides in Guam. Thus, how Chamorros identify themselves in the spelling of "CHamoru" or the usage of "Guamanian" is also indicative of how indigeneity is constantly rearticulated over time.

³ Anne Perez Hattori, "Guardians of Our Soil: Indigenous Responses to Post-World War II Military Land Appropriation on Guam," In *Farms, Firms, and Runways: Perspectives on U.S. Military Bases in the Western Pacific*, ed. L. Eve Armetrout Ma (2001), 186–202.

⁴ "Open Forum in the Halls of Guam Congress, Agana, Guam, 3 March 1947," Papers of Willis Bradley. MSS 960 Box 2 Folder 23. Mangilao, Guam: Micronesia Area Research Center University of Guam. (Hereafter cited as "Open Forum," Willis Bradley Papers).

⁵ "Open Forum," Willis Bradley Papers.

⁶ "Open Forum," Willis Bradley Papers.

Defying Chamorros hopes and expectations, the U.S. military dispossessed, displaced, and restricted the movement of the Chamorro people, brewing discontent within an increasingly important territory of the United States empire.

At the committee meeting, Flores's rhetoric was unusual in that he was explicit about his dissatisfaction with U.S. military operations on the island. He noted that because "the Island has been under Military Rule since its discovery," the Chamorro people would "naturally...abide with whatever the government wants, although we suffer silently."⁷ Chamorro leaders such as Frank B. Leon Guerrero and others would rather negotiate and engage in diplomacy with the United States to express their discontent with imperial rule. Guam was not a place of violent anti-colonial resistance; Chamorro leaders often sought gradual changes in the island's relationship to the United States. Yet, Flores's testimony demonstrates the contentious situation in which both the Chamorro people and the U.S. military found themselves. Chamorros were no longer willing to quietly acquiesce to U.S. colonial rule. Chamorros were ready and willing to vocally express their discontent with the U.S. military and empire. This vocal discontent was a dangerous prospect for the U.S. imperial structure in the paradoxical post-World War II period when the rise of global decolonization grew in tandem with the growth of the U.S. military power. At the end of its fact-finding trip, the Hopkins Committee recommended that the people of Guam be given U.S. citizenship, that their land and property claims be processed in a timely manner, that their heroic loyalty in World War II should be recognized, and that at some future point, the U.S. Navy hand over jurisdiction of the island to another department of the federal government.⁸ Chamorro and Guamanian expression of discontent won them some recommendations in the U.S. colonial governance of the island.

⁷ "Open Forum," Willis Bradley Papers.

⁸ United States, *Hopkins Committee Report*.

Jose M. Flores is not just historically interesting for his testimony before the Hopkins Committee in 1947. At the time of that testimony, Flores happened to be one of the few Chamorro people who was already had U.S. citizenship. His life exemplified a colonial subject moving within and throughout empire. Flores's early childhood reflected the imperial routes of migration and movement between the newly annexed colonies of the American Pacific. Although born and raised in Guam, Flores was sent to attend school in American colonial Manila, Philippines from 1911 to 1914, "at the expense of the Filipino tax payers."⁹ His older brother Pedro Muña Flores had attended school in the Philippines as well, apparently sponsored by former Filipino revolutionary exile to Guam, Silvestre Legaspi, who had been the general treasurer of the Philippine Revolutionary government under Emilio Aguinaldo.¹⁰ From 1900 to 1903, approximately fifty Filipino revolutionaries, including Legaspi, were deemed dangerous to U.S. military's pacification of the Philippine Revolution and were exiled to Guam. Alongside Apolinario Mabini, who was also known as "the Brains of the Philippine Revolution" and the "Sublime Paralytic," these Filipino elites engaged with the Chamorro elites, creating lasting friendships that spanned the Philippine Sea.

After living in the Philippines, Flores moved across the Pacific to California in the 1910s. He enlisted in the U.S. Navy at the age of twenty-one when and was a veteran of World War I.¹¹ After his release from the Navy, Flores took and passed the civil exams to become a worker in the postal service. It was during this period on the North American continent that he became a naturalized citizen of the United States. While living in San Francisco, Flores met Marcello Sgambelluri, a man whose Italian name hides the fact that he was well connected to Guam, having married a Chamorro woman, Joaquina Camacho, after his tour of duty as a musician for the U.S.

⁹ "Memorial Dedication," *The Guam Recorder* Vol. XIV, No.2 (May 1937), 27.

¹⁰ Tony Palomo, "52 Filipinos Exiled Here included an Elite Group of Intellectuals," *Territorial Sun* (May 28, 1961), 10.

¹¹ Ancestry.com. *U.S., World War I Draft Registration Cards, 1917-1918* [database on-line]. Provo, UT, USA: Ancestry.com Operations Inc, 2005.

Navy in Guam.¹² Taking Sgambelluri's offer to partner in a business in Guam, Flores returned to the island eventually becoming a well-known, well-traveled merchant whose advertisements adorned *The Guam Recorder*, the island's Navy-run and only newspaper. His business connections spread across the Pacific, including in Manila, Hong Kong, Shanghai, and Osaka. Flores became a leader in the Guam Congress as well as a judge in its Court of Appeals.¹³

Flores understood his position within the U.S. empire. He was so appreciative of the networks made between his Chamorro family and the Filipino revolutionaries that were exiled to Guam, that he used his connections in the Philippine Chamber of Commerce to organize the installment of a monument in memory of Colonel Lucas Camerino and Pio Barican, two Filipino revolutionaries who died during their exile in Guam.¹⁴ He told the *The Guam Recorder* that the President Manuel Quezon had sponsored the monument. Leon Flores and Pancrasio Palting, two Filipino revolutionary exiles who settled in Guam, attended the memorial dedication. During the ceremony for the monument, Naval Governor of Guam Benjamin McCandish told onlookers that "This monument will serve as evidence of the bond that exists between Guam and the Philippine Islands," and that "the two peoples have kindred interests."¹⁵ The Chamorro and Filipino people had connections that spanned generations.

Flores's life story connected the island of Guam, the Philippines, the continental U.S., and the institutions of the U.S. military and U.S. Congress. His story is just one story of the thousands of stories of Chamorros and Filipinos on Guam whose lives reflect the complexities and contradictions of colonial encounters, transpacific migration and movements, imperial negotiations, and the social relations of colonized subjects within and throughout the United States empire in the Pacific.

¹² "Adolfo Camacho Sgambelluri," *Hale'ta I Manfãyi: Who's Who in Chamorro History*, Hale'ta Vol. II (Agaña: The Chamorro Heritage Institute Planning Group, 1997), 147.

¹³ "Who's Who in Guam: Mr. Jose M. Flores," *The Guam Recorder* Vol. XIV, No. 1 (April 1937), 15.

¹⁴ Memorial Dedication," *The Guam Recorder*, 9.

¹⁵ Memorial Dedication," *The Guam Recorder*, 27.

Written through the political, intellectual, cultural, and social productions and oral histories of people like Jose M. Flores, *Territorial Discontent* is a century-long history of how U.S. militarism shaped the colonial administration of Guam as an unincorporated territory of the United States from 1898 to 1997, and how Chamorros and Filipinos navigated through a militarized U.S. colonialism in Guam. This study asks: how did the U.S. military presence in Guam shape the political development of the island as a colony – specifically an unincorporated territory – of the United States? In what ways did indigenous Chamorro people and Filipino migrants living on Guam navigate, negotiate, and resist the complex contradictions of U.S. colonial governance, especially in regard to land and labor? And how did each group’s quest for better circumstances within empire affect the long, shared historical relationship between Chamorros and Filipinos? Through the historicization of the triangulation of relationships between Chamorros, Filipinos, and the U.S. military in Guam over the twentieth century, this dissertation elucidates how the United States made, governed, militarized, and controlled its Pacific empire – and how colonial peoples resisted it.

An Abbreviated History of Guam.¹⁶

In order to answer these questions, we need to situate Guam. The island is the southernmost island of the Marianas archipelago, located in the Micronesian region of the Pacific. In today’s measurements of distance, it is a seven-hour flight west from Hawai‘i, four hours south of Tokyo, Japan, and three hours east of Manila, Philippines. Although it is the largest island in Micronesia, the land area of the island is small, roughly 200 square miles. Currently, Guam is one of the five territories of the United States, which include the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, American Sāmoa, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico. These islands and archipelagoes

¹⁶ There are three textbooks that attempt to cover the entire history of Guam up to the date of their first publication. They include Robert Rogers, *Destiny’s Landfall: A History of Guam* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2011); Pedro C. Sanchez, *Guåhan Guam* (Agaña: Sanchez Publishing House); Paul Carano and Pedro C. Sanchez, *A History of Guam* (Rutland: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1964).

comprise the United States' formal global empire spanning from the Western Pacific and into the Atlantic. Although political status varies from territory to territory, Guam is an organized unincorporated territory. In other words, it is a colony of the United States that is organized through a civilian government established by the Guam Organic Act of 1950. As in the case for Puerto Rico, those born on Guam are U.S. citizens, but they are not allowed the right to vote for President and are not given voting representation in Congress.¹⁷ With the exception of Puerto Rico and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, the unincorporated territories are considered by the United Nations to be non-self-governing territories, which are territories “whose people have not yet attained a full measure of self-government.”¹⁸ The United States retains a formal colonial empire, despite its purported image of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism.

Guam is home to the indigenous Chamorro people who first peopled what is now called the Marianas archipelago roughly 4,000 years ago. They found their way from Southeast Asia using spectacular technologies of navigation and seafaring.¹⁹ According to oral tradition, the Chamorro people trace their ancestry to a pair of siblings, Puntan and Fu'una, whose bodies created the earth, the sun and the moon, rainbows, and the flora and fauna.²⁰ *Lasso' Fouba*, a rock formation in the southern village of Humatak (Umatac), is believed to be Fu'una.²¹ Chamorros speak the Chamorro language—an Austronesian language—and practice customs and traditions that stem from

¹⁷ This is a simplified definition of unincorporated territory as well as the differences in the legal structure of the U.S. territories in general. On territorial political status, Arnold H. Leibowitz, *Defining Status: A Comprehensive Analysis of United States Territorial Relations* (Boston: Nijhoff, 1989); Lanny Thompson, “The Imperial Republic: A Comparison of the Insular Territories under U.S. Dominion after 1898.” *Pacific Historical Review* 71, no. 4 (2002): 535–74.

On the particular case of American Sāmoa, read Line-Nowe Memea Kruse, *The Pacific Insular Case of American Sāmoa: Land Rights and Law in Unincorporated US Territories* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).

¹⁸ United Nations, *Chapter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice*, (San Francisco, 1945), 14. <https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf>,

¹⁹ Vicente Diaz, “Voyaging for Anti-Colonial Recovery: Austronesian Seafaring, Archipelagic Rethinking, and the Re-mapping of Indigeneity,” *Pacific Asia Inquiry* 2:1 (Fall 2011).

²⁰ Anne Perez Hattori, “Folktale: Puntan and Fu'una: Gods of Creation,” *Guampedia Inc.*, (May 20, 2021), Accessed May 20, 2021. <https://www.guampedia.com/puntan-and-fuuna-gods-of-creation/>

²¹ Artemia Perez, Juan San Nicolas, Lazaro Quinata, and Manuel Cruz, “I Tinituhon: Guam's Creation Story,” *Pacific Daily News* (March 1, 2021), <https://www.guampdn.com/story/news/local/linalachamoru/2021/02/28/tinituhon-history-story-guams-creation/6830534002/>.

Chamorro epistemologies. Chamorro society is structured around matrilineal genealogies and a matriarchal society.²² At the height of the Chamorro period, they erected large edifices called *latte*, which were pillars upon which houses built. The latte stone has since become a symbol of Chamorro continuity across the archipelago.²³

In 1521, the Chamorros were the first Pacific peoples to encounter Europeans when Ferdinand Magellan sought to circumnavigate the world through the Pacific. Magellan claimed Guam and the northern islands for Spain, naming them after Queen Mariana of Austria who funded his expedition. The first Spanish mission was established in Guam in 1662 by Jesuit missionary Diego Luis de San Vitores from Castillo, Spain. San Vitores was killed in 1672 by a Chamorro man Mata'pang, who was angry that the priest had baptized his daughter, in arguably the earliest well-known anti-colonial act.²⁴ Chamorro people were exposed to Spanish missionaries and Catholicism, foreign diseases and deadly warfare, as well as new animals, food, and customs. In the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries, Guam also served as the middle stop on the Spanish Manila galleon routes which connected the bustling trade ports of Acapulco, Mexico to Manila, Philippines. During the Spanish era, Guam was a penal colony, a military fortress, a site for scientific study, and a vital link in the trade routes across the Pacific.²⁵ As a result, the island was integrated within the larger imperial circulation and settlement of people from different parts of the Spanish empire,

²² Christine Taitano DeLisle, "Navy Wives/Native Lives: The Cultural and Historical Relations between American Naval Wives and Chamorro Women in Guam, 1898–1945" (Ph.D., University of Michigan, 2008). For more information on the Chamorro people in the pre-colonization period, read Laura Thompson, *Guam and its People* (San Francisco: American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1941); Lawrence J. Cunningham, *Ancient Chamorro Society* (Honolulu: Bess Press, 1992).

²³ "The Latte in the Marianas: Art, Icon, and Archaeology Project," Humanities Guåhan, Northern Marianas Humanities Council, and the National Endowment for Humanities, (Public Humanities Exhibit, 2019).

²⁴ In *Repositioning the Missionary*, Vicente Diaz has examined the historical record, the folklore, and the hagiography of San Vitores to understand the hybridity of Chamorro culture especially in regard to religion. Vicente M. Diaz, *Repositioning the Missionary: Renriting the Histories of Colonialism, Native Catholicism, and Indigeneity in Guam* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2017).

²⁵ On Spanish colonialism in Guam and the Marianas, read David Atienza, "Priests, Mayors and Indigenous Offices: Indigenous Agency and Adaptive Resistance in the Mariana Islands (1681-1758)," *Pacific Asia Inquiry* 5:1 (2014): 31-48; Carlos Madrid, *Beyond Distances: Governance, Politics and Deportation in the Mariana Islands from 1870 to 1877* (Saipan: Northern Mariana Islands Council for Humanities, 2006).

especially people from the Philippines. These settlers, however, integrated into Chamorro society, speaking Chamorro and practicing Chamorro culture. Chamorro people incorporated imperial cultures, but nonetheless remained rooted in the island itself.

In 1898, Guam became a spoil of the Spanish-American War, alongside Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and Cuba. Rather than claiming all of Spain's Pacific possessions, the United States annexed only Guam believing that its natural deep-water harbor was valuable for transpacific trade and potential Naval use. The island was ruled as if it were a stationary Naval ship, except for a brief period of relative anarchy extending from the moment when the island was declared a U.S. possession by Captain Henry Glass in 1898 and the first official Naval Governor to arrive on Guam a year later. The President of the United States appointed a Naval governor every two to three years who had executive power over both military personnel and civilians – the Chamorro people. Federally, Guam was considered to be an unincorporated territory that was “foreign in a domestic sense” according to the Supreme Court's decisions in the Insular Cases. Believing in the promises of a benevolent America empire, the Navy on Guam commenced an Americanization project, establishing schools and hospitals and teaching English to Chamorro people.²⁶ They also established the Insular Force Guard in order to train and to discipline young Chamorro men how to be American, utilizing military exercises to do so. This Americanized education—pioneered among American Indian people in North America—also deemphasized Chamorro culture, at times punishing Chamorros for practicing Chamorro traditions and speaking the Chamorro language. The

²⁶ There are several books, dissertations, and studies on the U.S. Navy's Americanization project in the first four decades of U.S. rule in Guam. They include Anne Perez Hattori, *Colonial Dis-Ease: US Navy Health Policies and the Chamorros of Guam, 1898-1941* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2004); Anne Hattori, “Righting Civil Wrongs: The Guam Congress Walkout of 1949” *ISLA: Journal of Micronesian Studies* 3, no. 1 (Rainy Season 1995): 1–27; James Viernes, “Negotiating Manhood: Chamorro Masculinities and US Military Colonialism in Guam, 1898-1941” (Ph.D., University of Hawai'i at Manoa, 2015); Elyssa Santos, “‘Practicing Economy’: Chamorro Agency and U.S. Colonial Agricultural Projects, 1898-1941.” M.A. Thesis, University of Hawai'i at Manoa, 2018); Christine Taitano DeLisle, “Navy Wives/Native Lives: The Cultural and Historical Relations between American Naval Wives and Chamorro Women in Guam, 1898–1945” (Ph.D., University of Michigan, 2008).

Naval government also instituted the Guam Congress, comprised of Chamorro men who acted as “advisors” to the Naval government. Although the Guam Congress did not have any legal weight, the members repeatedly petitioned the President and Congress for a civilian government and American citizenship.

On December 8, 1941, Guam was bombed by the Japanese military forces on the same day as they bombed Pearl Harbor in Hawai‘i and Manila Bay in the Philippines (both U.S. territories at the time). The capital city of Hagåtña was flattened, and Chamorro people fled from their town homes to their rural ranches in order to take shelter and seek refuge from the war. Subsequently, Guam came under a brutal Japanese military occupation for thirty-two months from December 1941 to August 1944.²⁷ During this harrowing period, the Chamorro people were forced by the Japanese military to farm for military personnel, build military infrastructure, and move from their lands into concentration camps. The occupying Japanese forces also committed atrocities including massacres and sexual violence. Chamorros maintained allegiance and loyalty to the United States.

In August of 1944, U.S. military reoccupied Guam after carpet bombing the island for a few days. After the U.S. forces landed on Guam, the U.S. military subsequently turned it into a base to support the Allied frontlines in the Pacific theatre. As fears of communist aggression grew in the late 1940s, Guam held even greater strategic value for U.S. military operations in the Pacific. The U.S. military commenced a military build-up which changed the demographics and the physical landscape of the island. This transformation included large-scale land annexation, the recruitment of Filipino migrant labor, and the establishment of large military installations on the land. During this heavily militarized period, the U.S. military reinstated a security clearance requirement in which any person arriving and leaving the island had to obtain permission from the U.S. military to do so.²⁸ In

²⁷ Tony Palomo, *An Island in Agony* (Self-Published, 1984).

²⁸ This requirement would not be lifted until 1963.

response to the growing Chamorro discontent about the military government and land annexation, President Harry S. Truman transferred Guam from the jurisdiction of the U.S. Navy to the U.S. Department of the Interior. The Guam Organic Act was also subsequently signed by Truman in 1950. The Organic Act established a civilian government of Guam and provided U.S. citizenship for those born on Guam, a goal that Chamorro people had been advocating for generations.

When super typhoon Karen hit Guam in November 1962, the island underwent another transformation. The military security clearance had just been lifted, and the opening of Guam allowed for the prospect of a civilian economy based in tourism to become a possibility. While the tourism industry grew, the U.S. military continued to maintain a large presence on Guam, using the island as a forward base for its Cold War operations in Southeast Asia. In addition, in the late 1960s, Chamorros on Guam began to witness the decolonization of United Nations Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands, whose political development was facilitated by the United States. Not wanting to be left out of this global movement, Chamorros on Guam—many referred to themselves as “Guamanian” to distinguish themselves from Chamorros of the Northern Mariana Islands—sought to change their political status with the United States. Chamorro leaders commenced two movements for territorial change: the Guam Constitution Movement (1970-1979) and the Guam Commonwealth Movement (1980-1996).²⁹ Working with Congressional representatives and senators, various federal officials in different federal departments, and consulting the people of Guam, both movements sought improved unincorporated territorial status within the United States empire. The Guam Constitution and the Guam Commonwealth were the political vehicles upon which the Chamorro self-determination movement could grow.³⁰ The Chamorro self-determination

²⁹ Robert Rogers, “Guam’s Quest for Political Identity,” *Pacific Studies* 12:1 (November 1, 1988): 49–70.

³⁰ On Chamorro self-determination and the United Nations, read Julian Aguon, “Our Stories Are Maps Larger than Can be Held: Self-Determination and the Normative Force of Law at the Periphery of American Expansionism,” *In Formations of United States Colonialism* ed. Alyosha Goldstein (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014): 265-288.

movement comprised a diverse set of Chamorros and Filipinos advocated for indigenous rights within the United States and Chamorro right to self-determination as stipulated by the Charter of the United Nations.

Historiography

As this brief history shows, although Guam is a small island in the middle of the vast Pacific, its history is at the crossroads of multiple fields and themes of historical research. Guam's history is a multi-layered experience of U.S. empire, in which the colonial apparatus and its colonial subjects create and contest the contradictions that arise from the implementation of colonial policies. Through a placed-based history of Guam, this study contributes to the fields of U.S. militarism in the Pacific, Chamorro history, Filipino history, the history of Chamorro-Filipino relations, and the field of the United States insular empire.

Militarism on Guam

This study investigates how the U.S. military empire was able to project power in the Asia-Pacific region through its continued colonization of Guam. Seen by military officials as the proverbial “Tip of the Spear,” Chamorro scholars Tiara Na’puti and Michael Lujan Bevacqua argue that “Guåhan is a place where the hammer of American power is remarkably visible, and the network of violence through which its force and interests around the world are protected.”³¹ Historically, Guam has taken on a unique role in U.S. militarism in the Pacific, as its acquisition and continued colonization have been almost completely predicated upon the needs of the U.S. military.³² Guam became the territory from which the United States could support commercial and

³¹ Tiara R. Na’puti and Michael Lujan Bevacqua, “Militarization and Resistance from Guåhan: Protecting and Defending Pāgat,” *American Quarterly* 67:3 (2015), 837.

³² Dissertations on the relationship between Guam and the U.S. military, read Kenneth Gofigan Kuper, “Kontra I Peligru, Na’fansāfo’ Ham: The Production of Military (In)Security in Guåhan” (Ph.D., University of Hawai’i at Manoa, 2019), Michael Bevacqua, “Chamorros, Ghosts, Non-Voting Delegates: GUAM! Where the Production of America’s Sovereignty Begins” (Ph.D., University of California, San Diego, 2010); Camacho, Keith L. *Cultures of Commemoration: The Politics of War, Memory, and History in the Mariana Islands* (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2011).

military operations in the Asia-Pacific region. The U.S. military played a central role in the island's acquisition as a strategic location as a small coaling station for Naval ships in the first four decades of the twentieth century, overseeing its transformation from a war-torn island during World War II, to its transformation into an island fortress for all branches of the U.S military in the latter half of the century. This militarized condition has become so ubiquitous to the point of "banality," as argued by Manuel Lujan Cruz and Michael Lujan Bevacqua.³³ They write, "US colonialism, militarism, and imperialism all pass over and through Guam and do not emerge as smelling dubious or inequitable, but rather fresh and welcoming, or, much more commonly, like nothing at all."³⁴ Rejecting the illusion of banality, this study examines how the colonization of Guam and the subjugation of the indigenous Chamorro people was deemed essential for the United States geopolitical and military power throughout the twentieth century. It shows how U.S. power in the Pacific was dependent on the colonization and militarization of island spaces within its own empire.³⁵

Island spaces are precisely how the United States projected military power and attained geopolitical dominance in the twentieth century.³⁶ In examining Guam as a strategic base for U.S. military operations in the Pacific, this study is also in conversation with the burgeoning field of U.S. base studies. These important works include Catherine Lutz's edited collection *Bases of Empire* and Sasha Davis's *The Empire's Edge*.³⁷ Lutz and Davis consider how the U.S. built its imperial power on

³³ Michael Lujan Bevacqua and Manuel Lujan Cruz, "The Banality of American Empire: The Curious case of Guam, USA," *Journal of Transnational American Studies* 11:1 (2020), 127-149.

³⁴ Bevacqua and Cruz, "The Banality of American Empire," 141.

³⁵ On militarism in the Pacific: Setsu Shigematsu and Keith L. Camacho, *Militarized Currents: Toward a Decolonized Future in Asia and the Pacific* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010); Teresia); Teaiwa, "Bikinis and Other s/Pacific n/Oceans," *Voyaging through the Contemporary Pacific*, eds David L. Hanlon and Geoffrey M. White, 87-109. (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000); Hal M. Friedman, *Governing the American Lake: The US Defense and Administration of the Pacific, 1945-1947* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2007).

³⁶ Inspired by a conversation with Paul Hilding Erickson.

³⁷ Catherine Lutz, *The Bases of Empire: The Global Struggle against U.S. Military Posts* (New York: New York University Press, 2009); Sasha Davis, *The Empire's Edge: Militarization, Resistance, and Transcending Hegemony in the Pacific* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2015).

the islands it controls across the world. As Davis argues, “The islands that host military operations have been occupied and colonized not for direct economic gain through exploitation, but for their strategic positions from which the vital system [of international trade] can be secured.” According to Davis, island bases support U.S. interest in global trade, a key component of what the U.S. defines as “national security.” He writes, further, “the reason many of these islands are *still* denied full sovereignty and subjected to intense militarization is because they are deemed to be critical for American ‘national security’.”³⁸ The U.S.’s direct control of islands such as Guam provided the military support for the U.S. global hegemony. This study records how the U.S. empire made Guam a U.S. territory and how Guam made the U.S. empire, with necessary attention to the experiences of the colonized peoples caught in the development of the U.S. as a global imperial power in the twentieth century.

Militarization was fundamental to the colonial governance of Guam and the construction of the United States empire in the Pacific. As Na’puti and Bevacqua write, “militarism and colonialism are not exceptional facets of American existence but structures that are constitutive and essential to the historical and contemporary production of American power.”³⁹ Even though Guam is a small island in the middle of the Pacific, its history illuminates the deeply militarized character of the United States empire. This study of militarism is not one about war, battles, or the political economy of war. It is about how militarism as a phenomenon has created structures of power that has had material consequences for the political, cultural, and social lives for those living within empire.

Specifically, the U.S. facilitated a process of settler colonialism in order to build and ensure its military presence in Guam. To use Lorenzo Veracini’s typology of the phenomenon, settler colonialism is characterized by “the permanent movement and reproduction of communities and the

³⁸ Davis, *The Empires’ Edge*, 9.

³⁹ Na’puti and Bevacqua, “Militarization and Resistance from Guåhan,” 839.

dominance of an exogenous agency over an indigenous one.”⁴⁰ It is a global and transnational phenomenon in which indigenous peoples are racialized through a “logic of elimination,” as theorized by Patrick Wolfe, in order for settler groups to justify genocide and claim sovereignty over land.⁴¹ Settler colonialism has since been theorized, retheorized, and historicized countless of times since Wolfe’s essay appeared in 2006. Through a history of Guam, this study attempts to show how U.S. settler colonialism evolved in the U.S. overseas territories. Although settler colonialism has become an institutionalized term in the twenty-first century academy, indigenous peoples have been hyper cognizant of the processes of settler intrusion and have been articulating its characteristics for years, if not, centuries.⁴² J. Kehaulani Kauanui acknowledges that the field of settler colonial studies “has multiple (often unrecognized) genealogies and origins.”⁴³ This includes the Chamorro people on Guam who, as this study shows, have witnessed, labeled, and resisted the U.S. military’s annexation of land as well as the U.S. imposition of settlers and settler institutions.

By using the framework settler colonialism to understand the history of Guam, this dissertation suggests that United States colonial governance of the formal insular empire was informed by U.S. expansion across the North American continent. Settler colonialism in Guam was characterized by the U.S. military’s annexation of land, the displacement of the Chamorro people, the importation of foreign migrant labor, the immigration and settlement of non-indigenous peoples, and the replacement of indigenous sovereignty, institutions, and social relations with that of the United States. The United States used Filipino migrants’ labor and presence to transform and maintain Guam as the foremost military bastion in the Asia-Pacific region. Guam’s history within

⁴⁰ Lorenzo Veracini, “Introduction: The Settler Colonial Situation,” *Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 3.

⁴¹ Patrick Wolfe, “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native,” *Journal of Genocide Research* 8:4 (2006): 387-409.

⁴² J. Kehaulani Kauanui, “False Dilemmas and Settler Colonial Studies: Response to Lorenzo Veracini: ‘Is Settler Colonial Studies Even Useful,’” *Postcolonial Studies* 24:2 (2021), 291.

⁴³ Kauanui, “False Dilemmas and Settler Colonial Studies,” 291.

U.S. empire is at the nexus of multiple colonial regimes. As Alyosha Goldstein writes, the United States “remains reliant on the ever-expanding dispossession and disavowal of indigenous peoples, global circuits of expropriated labor, economies of racialization, and its expansive network of military bases – that is, on people and place remade as things in the accumulation of wealth and the exercise of geopolitical power.”⁴⁴ Viewed through a framework of settler colonialism, Guam’s history is not an aberration or anomaly in U.S. imperial history, but another locus of it.

Furthermore, settler colonialism is concomitant with the U.S. militarization of Guam. The presence of the U.S. military undergirded almost every colonial policy enacted on Guam, a form of “settler militarism.” As theorized by Juliet Nebolon, in the case of Hawai‘i, settler militarism is a structure in which “settler colonialism and militarization have simultaneously perpetuated, legitimated, and concealed one another.”⁴⁵ U.S. militarism depended on settler colonialism, and the practices and rhetoric of militarism justified and obscured the dispossession of Indigenous and native peoples. Importantly, Nebolon demonstrates that settler militarism is not necessarily characterized by outright war-like violence. Settler militarism can be enforced through *biopolitics*, or the state’s ability to determine who is worthy of life.

This study shows how Guam’s imperial history complicates what settler militarism, as defined by Nebolon, looked like. While the Hawai‘i’s experience of U.S. imperialism consisted of plantation capitalist economies in addition to U.S. militarization, Guam’s experience of U.S. colonialism was almost always dictated by the U.S. military operations. The construction of the United States’ military installations on Guam relied on the dispossession of Chamorro people from

⁴⁴ Alyosha Goldstein, “Introduction: Toward a Genealogy of the U.S. Colonial Present,” in *Formations of United States Colonialism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014), 1-2.

⁴⁵ Juliet Nebolon, “‘Life Given Straight from the Heart’: Settler Militarism, Biopolitics, and Public Health in Hawai‘i during World War II,” *American Quarterly* 69, no. 1 (2017): 25. Settler colonialism and militarism have been constitutive aspects of imperial powers globally. Notably, Japanese imperialism in Korea, Okinawa, and Manchuria. See Jun Uchida, *Brokers of Empire: Japanese Settler Colonialism in Korea, 1876-1945* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011).

their lands, and required the establishment and regulation of foreign migrant labor regimes. In addition, the imposition of military installations, colonial institutions, and importation of migrant and immigrant communities all partake directly or indirectly in the dispossession, displacement, and replacement of indigenous Chamorro people. Despite the fact that Chamorros remain the plurality of the island's population, they still remain a minority of the entire population. Soldiers and military personnel—although individually transient—still represent a nebulous yet visible settler population on Guam. As Samuel Betances wrote in 1977, “the uniforms are always present, but different people wear them, as one group of soldiers leaves and another takes their place.”⁴⁶ Moreover, the category of settlers within settler militarism need not only be soldiers, military personnel, or colonial officials. They can be migrants and workers who have become imbricated in the process of militarization.⁴⁷ Beyond the realm of institutions and population, the U.S. military in its presence in Guam (and the rest of the Marianas), has inflicted a slow violence through the environmental destruction of land, oceans, and aquifers, the calculated forced dependence on imports of vital resources such as food, as well as the desecration of Chamorro cultural practices and sacred sites. Settler colonialism through militarization is how the United States colonized Guam.

Chamorro Island

While settler colonialism provides the framework for understanding U.S. colonial governance in Guam, this study is also about how the indigenous Chamorro people expressed their discontent for empire throughout the twentieth century. Chamorro people negotiated with colonial officials, engaged in diplomacy and international networks, and outright reject colonialism and

⁴⁶ Samuel Betances, “Limits of Cross-Cultural Education in Solving Ethnic Conflict in Guam,” *Islander by Pacific Daily News* (October 23, 1977), 4.

⁴⁷ The debate of whether to label immigrants and migrants as “settlers” within settler colonial regime is a contentious one. For instance, Lorenzo Veracini makes a critical distinction between settlers – “founders of political orders and carry their sovereignty with them” – and migrants – who “can be coopted” but do not “enjoy inherent rights and are characterized by a lack of sovereign entitlement.” My use of the term settler aligns with how scholars of Asian settler colonialism have also utilized the term to note how in particular Asian immigrants can become complicit and even bolster settler claims to Indigenous lands. Veracini, “Introduction,” 3.

militarism in its different iterations in order to protect land, community, and culture. Penelope Bordallo Hofschneider's book *A Campaign for Political Rights on the Island of Guam*, for instance, historicized how Chamorro leaders drafted and sent multiple petitions for the establishment of a civilian government and U.S. citizenship in the first half of the twentieth century.⁴⁸ In *Colonial Dis-Ease*, Anne Hattori examined how Chamorro people negotiated the implementation of Naval health policies in Guam that discouraged traditional Chamorro healing and encouraged Western health practices that relied on racialized and gendered schemas that characterized Chamorros as a people who needed to be educated into civilization.⁴⁹

The resistance against U.S. colonialism continued after World War II. Contrary to the narrative of Chamorro acquiescence towards the U.S. military's presence after World War II, Hattori analyzed the Chamorro fight against U.S. Naval land policy, arguing in her article "Guardians of Our Soil" that Chamorros expressed their discontent over military land taking through Congressional testimonies.⁵⁰ Her article "Righting Civil Wrongs" about the famous Guam Congress Walkout 1950, in which Chamorro leaders protested the continued U.S. Naval rule after the War, also demonstrates how Chamorro people were not afraid to stand up to the U.S. military's mistreatment of their people.⁵¹ Hattori's work is essential to a historical understanding of Chamorro resistance to U.S. imperial policies in Guam. This study builds upon the foundational work of Hofschneider and Hattori to historicize the evolution of Chamorro resistance to U.S. empire and militarism in the Naval period and beyond.

⁴⁸ Hofschneider, *A Campaign for Political Rights on the Island of Guam*.

⁴⁹ Hattori, *Colonial Dis-Ease*.

⁵⁰ The narrative of Chamorro loyalty to the U.S. and further acquiescence to U.S. military land annexation after World War II has colloquially justified the U.S. military presence on Guam. For more reading on this historical phenomena read, Vicente M. Diaz, "Deliberating Liberation Day: Identity, History, Memory, and War in Guam," in *Perilous Memories: The Asia-Pacific War(s)*, ed. T. Fujitani et al. (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001). Hattori, "Guardians of Our Soil."

⁵¹ Anne Hattori, "Righting Civil Wrongs: The Guam Congress Walkout of 1949," *ISLA: Journal of Micronesian Studies* 3, no. 1 (Rainy Season 1995): 1–27.

This study examines the Chamorro self-determination movement, which began in the late 1960s in response to continuing Chamorro dissatisfaction with U.S. imperialism in Guam especially in regard to land, labor, and immigration policies. The movement centered around the question of Guam's political status as an unincorporated territory of the United States, and who would determine the political future of the island—the indigenous Chamorro people, all people residing on Guam, or the United States—in the eventual event of a self-determination plebiscite as determined by the Charter of the United Nations. It is in this movement that Chamorro leaders began to seriously challenge U.S. imperialism, to resist U.S. militarization of the island outright, to theorize indigenous critiques of the ideologies of multiculturalism, and to question whether or not further inclusion into the United States would benefit the Chamorro people. Several scholars of Guam have examined the rise of the Chamorro rights movement including Tiara Na'puti, Michael P. Perez, Michael Lujan Bevacqua, Julian Aguon, Vivian Dames, and Sylvia Frain.⁵² They all examine the Chamorro self-determination movement from the perspective, actions, and work of Chamorro leaders and activist organizations. This study contributes to the literature on this period through a critical examination of the rhetoric and arguments posed by the members of the Organization of People for Indigenous Rights (OPI-R), the non-Chamorro allies that stood in solidarity with them, and the opposition who denied the validity of Chamorro claims to self-determination.

Chamorro discontent often revolved around land and how colonial institutions such as the U.S. military sought to survey, divide, claim, destroy, and annex land for its own gain. Land was and remains a vital part of Chamorro culture and history. In the words of Chamorro politician Ricardo J.

⁵² Na'puti and Bevacqua, "Militarization and Resistance from Guåhan"; Michael Perez, "Contested Sites: Pacific Resistance in Guam to U.S. Empire," *Amerasia Journal* 27, no. 1 (January 1, 2001): 97–115; Michael P. Perez, "Chamorro Resistance and Prospects for Sovereignty in Guam," *Sovereignty Matters: Locations of Contestation and Possibility in Indigenous Struggles for Self-Determination*, ed. Joanne Barker (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006); Vivian Dames, "Rethinking the Circle of Belonging: American Citizenship and the Chamorros of Guam," (Ph.D., The University of Michigan, 2000); Sylvia C. Frain, "Women's Resistance in the Marianas Archipelago: A US Colonial Homefront and Militarized Frontline," *Feminist Formations* 29, no. 1 (2017): 97–135.

Bordallo, “Above all else, Guam is the homeland of the Chamorro people. That is a fundamental, undeniable truth. We are very profoundly ‘taotao tano’ – people of the land. This land, tiny as it is, belongs to us just as surely, just as inseparably, as we belong to it.”⁵³ For Chamorro people, land is inextricable from their identity. Land is the basis of livelihood, providing sustenance that coincided with the subsistence lifestyles that Chamorro people have had for centuries. Land is how Chamorro people understand their relations to other families and clans across generations.⁵⁴ Tiara Na’puti examines how the phrase “taotao tano” (people of the land) is crucial for understanding how Chamorro people see “the mutually constitutive dynamics of *people as land* and *people belonging to place*, thus orienting Indigenous identity to collective concepts of land and ancestry.”⁵⁵ The diminishing access to land as a result of U.S. militarization, tourism development, and settler and immigrant land ownership led to substantial fears that the Chamorro people would have diminishing access to Guam. In examining how Chamorro people resisted empire, this study is about Chamorros fought hard to retain land for their and their future generations.

In navigating the complexities of U.S. colonialism in Guam, Chamorros articulated multiple definitions of Chamorro identity and indigeneity through time. In doing so, they sought to use the ever evolving language and rhetoric of the colonial power while remaining grounded in Chamorro social relations. Anthropologist Laurel Monnig’s study of Guam, “Proving Chamorro’,” argues that Chamorro people have consistently had to prove their indigenesness due to the colonial legacies that have “stripped Chamorros of cultural ‘authenticity’ and, indeed, political legitimacy, as viewed

⁵³ Ricardo J. Bordallo, “Is Guam for Sale? No.,” Paper delivered at 10th Island Conference on Public Administration (1989), quoted in Michael F. Philips, “Land,” *Hale’ta: Kinalamten Pulitikât, Siñenten I Chamorro: Issues in Guam’s Political Development, The Chamorro Perspective, The Quest for Commonwealth* (Agaña: The Political Status Education Coordinating Commission, 1996), 2.

⁵⁴ Laurel Anne Monnig, “Proving Chamorro’: Indigenous Narratives of Race, Identity, and Decolonization on Guam” (Ph.D., University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, 2007), 221-278. This is chapter 5 of Monnig’s dissertation titled “The Land Describes You.”

⁵⁵ Tiara R. Na’puti, “Archipelagic Rhetoric: Remapping the Marianas and Challenging Militarization from ‘A Stirring Place’,” *Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies*, 16:1 (2019), 9.

by the colonial metropole.”⁵⁶ Due to centuries of cultural exchange arising from colonial encounters, Chamorro culture has incorporated practices and customs from around the globe resulting in a culture that did not fit the categories of race and authenticity that U.S. racial logics demanded. Nevertheless, Chamorros saw their relationality to the land, family and clan, and language as distinct signifiers of their Chamorro identity. Chamorro people have had to “prove” their Chamorroness in different ways over the twentieth century in order to advocate for themselves on the political stage. For instance, Tiara Na’puti has observed how Chamorro testimonies at the United Nations often begin with a statement of indigenous belonging, establishing their continued existence and resistance against the “hegemonic U.S. identity that is connected to forces of military build-up, environmental degradation and cultural erosion.”⁵⁷ Chamorros’ rhetorical claims to indigenous identity becomes forms of resistance against U.S. colonialism. Thus, in tracing Chamorro resistance to U.S. colonialism over the twentieth century, this study follows the evolution of how Chamorros articulated their indigenous identity in politics vis-à-vis colonial institutions such as the U.S. military, U.S. Congress, and the United Nations—as well as in opposition to immigrant groups who settled on Guam.

Filipino Migration

This study is also about how Filipinos who made their way to Guam grappled with their own set of colonial legacies, and how their migrations shaped notions of belonging and identity in diaspora. Particularly, it is an exploration of Filipino identity formation within a place that is both indigenous Chamorro land and a United States territory. From Filipino revolutionary Apolinario Mabini who was exiled to Guam in 1900 to the Filipino migrant workers recruited to build American post-World War II military installations, Filipinos who migrated to Guam were a

⁵⁶ Monnig, “Proving Chamorro’: Indigenous Narratives of Race, Identity, and Decolonization on Guam,” ii.

⁵⁷ Tiara R. Na’puti, “Speaking the Language of Peace: Chamoru Resistance and Rhetoric in Guåhan’s Self-Determination Movement,” *Anthropologica*, 56 (2014), 306-307.

substantial part of how the U.S. military secured, colonized, and governed the Western Pacific. For Filipinos, Guam was a penal colony, a refuge, an economic opportunity, and a steppingstone for further migration into the United States.⁵⁸ Guam, then, is a node in the historical globalization of the Filipino which is, as Robyn Magalit Rodriguez argues, “specifically tied to the US military as it operates around the world.”⁵⁹ Furthermore, the U.S. colonial and neocolonial presence in the Philippines shaped the migration routes of Filipinos to Guam from the Philippine Revolution to Ferdinand Marcos’s Martial Law Philippines. By studying Filipino history on Guam, this study engages with the long history of the global movement and migration of Filipinos in and across the American empire.⁶⁰

This history of Filipinos on Guam contributes to the growing literature of Filipino diaspora within the United States. As Dawn Mabalon and Rick Baldoz have shown in their respective works, Filipino migration patterns to the United States followed the routes of the U.S. colonial empire. Filipino communities sprouted in agricultural landscapes of the continental U.S., in large cities and Navy port towns. Yet, like the work of Roderick Labrador and JoAnna Poblete, this study contends that Filipino migration to the islands of the United States empire requires a different set of questions around citizenship and belonging, especially when these island spaces have indigenous peoples claiming self-determination and fighting for sovereignty. By historicizing the migration of Filipinos

⁵⁸ On Filipino Revolutionaries exiled to Guam and their impact on Chamorro society, read Josephine Faith Ong, “The Colonial Boundaries of Exilic Discourse: Contextualizing Mabini’s Incarceration in Guåhan” (M.A., University of California, Los Angeles, 2019).

⁵⁹ Robin Magalit Rodriguez, “Towards a Critical Filipino Studies Approach to Migration,” *Filipino Studies: Palimpsests of Nation and Diaspora* (New York: NYU Press, 2016), 39.

⁶⁰ JoAnna Poblete’s formulation of “intracolonial” fits aptly with this study’s focus on Filipinos migrating within empire. On Filipino migration in U.S. empire, Joanna Poblete, *Islanders in the Empire - Filipino and Puerto Rican Laborers in Hawai’i*. University of Illinois Press, 2014); Dawn Bohulano Mabalon, *Little Manila Is in the Heart: The Making of the Filipina/o American Community in Stockton, California* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013); Rick Baldoz, *The Third Asiatic Invasion: Empire and Migration in Filipino America, 1898-1946* (New York: New York University Press, 2011); Roderick N. Labrador, *Building Filipino Hawai’i* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2015); Adrian De Leon, “Sugarcane Sakadas: The Corporate Production of the Filipino on a Hawai’i Plantation,” *Amerasia Journal* 45, no. 1 (2019): 50–67; Yen Le Espiritu, *Home Bound: Filipino American Lives across Cultures, Communities, and Countries* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003); Martin F. Manalansan and Augusto Espiritu, *Filipino Studies: Palimpsests of Nation and Diaspora* (New York: NYU Press, 2016).

in Guam, this study examines how migrants and immigrants understood and negotiated citizenship and belonging within a U.S. territory, especially when the Chamorro people sought and negotiated for political status that catered not to U.S. racial logics and multiculturalism, but to indigenous rights.

Although Filipinos comprised the second largest population on Guam after Chamorros, the historiography around Filipinos on Guam is relatively small. Two scholars, Bruce Campbell and Alfred Peredo Flores, have each researched and written about the Filipino community in Guam in the post-World War II period, particularly Filipinos' roles as laborers for the construction of the military installations on the island. In his master's thesis, Campbell focused on the population growth of the Filipino community spurred on by U.S. military policy around the recruitment of temporary alien workers from the Philippines and how the Filipinos on island coalesced to found civil organizations such as the Filipino Community of Guam.⁶¹ Extending beyond the policy driven work of Campbell, Alfred Peredo Flores historicizes the social lives of Filipino migrant laborers working for U.S. military contractors on Guam in the immediate post-World War II era.⁶² Flores examines the racialized process through which Filipinos were recruited, paid, and treated as labor for the U.S. military operations on Guam, while also historicizing the interracial Chamorro-Filipino families that grew out of this particular period in Guam's history. This study builds upon their important contributions to Filipino history on Guam by extending the timeline both backward and forward. This dissertation historicizes the small Filipino community during the U.S. Naval Era in Guam (1900-1941) at a time when both Guam and the Philippines were territories of the United States, and move forward in time into the emergence of a multicultural Guam (1960s-1990s).

⁶¹ Bruce Campbell, "The Filipino Community of Guam," (Master's thesis, University of Guam, 1987).

⁶² Alfred Peredo Flores, "'No Walk in the Park': US Empire and the Racialization of Civilian Military Labor in Guam, 1944-1962," *American Quarterly* 67, no. 3 (2015): 813-35; Alfred Flores, "'Little Island into Mighty Base': Indigeneity, Race, and U.S. Empire in Guam, 1944-1962" (Ph.D., University of California, Los Angeles, 2015).

This study also examines what it means to be Filipino living on Guam. Tabitha Espina's work, "The Ube ('Roots') Generation," theorizes metaphors for how to understand the generational experiences of Filipina women who live on Guam.⁶³ Examining the experiences of three generations of Filipina women, including her own, Espina articulates the different experiences of belonging to both the Philippines and Guam through metaphors based in Filipino deserts. Essentially, Espina argues that the first immigrant generation in a Filipino family are culturally rooted – "ube" – in the home archipelago, with the second generation having a layered – "sapin sapin" – identity, and the third generation being "halo halo" or "all mixed up."⁶⁴ Espina's theorization of identity-formation of each generation of Filipinos on Guam influences how this study historicizes the multiple waves of Filipino migration to the island. It pays particular attention to the different experiences of Filipinos in regard to the specificity of when they migrated to Guam, their relations to other Filipinos in Guam and in the Philippines, and to their relations to the Chamorro people on island. It examines how Filipinos navigated through the uncomfortable and complicated circumstances created by the empire, including the shifting definitions of race, citizenship, and nationality.

Towards a Chamorro-Filipino History of Guam

This study contends that histories of Chamorros and Filipinos on Guam are neither separate nor parallel histories, but are integrated and interwoven experiences of empire. As Keith Camacho argues, Filipinos and Pacific Islander historiographies have often been separated because "canonical treatments of the American empire in the Pacific Islands, the Philippines, and their respective diasporas have discouraged, if not altogether suppressed, histories about Filipino and Pacific

⁶³ Tabitha Espina Velasco. "The Ube ('Roots') Generation." *Humanities Diliman* 13, no. 2 (2016): 75–101; Tabitha Caser Espina, "Unsettling the Rhetorics of the Politics of Filipinos on Guåhan." Ph.D., Washington State University, 2020).

⁶⁴ Tabitha Espina Velasco. "The Ube ('Roots') Generation." *Humanities Diliman* 13, no. 2 (2016): 75–101; Tabitha Caser Espina, "Unsettling the Rhetorics of the Politics of Filipinos on Guåhan." Ph.D., Washington State University, 2020).

Islanders in local, comparative, and transnational terms.”⁶⁵ Moreover, Vicente Diaz has written, “what has been seldom spoken about and never analyzed properly in the discussion of relations between Chamorros and non-Chamorros, however, is an ongoing American colonial history that has orchestrated relations and growth in Guam, a troubled legacy that has unfortunately and unwittingly pitted indigenous Chamorro against non-Chamorro residents.”⁶⁶ This study attempts to address the gaps in the historiography described by Camacho and Diaz to demonstrate how racialization, identity formation, and relational experiences evolve adjacently and simultaneously across time. For instance, this study examines how Chamorros often had to define indigenes in relation to outsiders coming into the island, using the legal and rhetorical tools based on Western ideologies, rather than indigenous kinship and networks. Conversely, for Filipinos living on Guam, their perspectives of the United States and American citizens in one way or another was influenced by the Chamorro experience of U.S. empire on Guam. Thus, the chapters of this history analyze various colonial encounters between Chamorros and Filipinos throughout the twentieth century in order to see how U.S. empire racializes indigenous and immigrants differently and in relation to each other.

This study also engages with the theoretical approach of Asian settler colonialism, which is a useful framework for historicizing the uneven relationships between the U.S. empire, Chamorros, and Filipinos living on Guam. Guided by the work of Kanaka Maoli feminist activist Haunani Kay-Trask, Candace Fujikane and Jonathan Okamura argue in *Asian Settler Colonialism* that Asian “locals” in Hawai‘i have perpetuated the process of Native Hawaiian dispossession by buying into the

⁶⁵ Keith L. Camacho, “Filipinos, Pacific Islanders, and the American Empire.” In *The Oxford Handbook of Asian American History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). A few scholars have written about the interactions between Filipinos and Chamorros on Guam. They include Diaz, Vicente. “Bye Bye Ms. American Pie: The Historical Relations between Chamorros and Filipinos and the American Dream.” *ISLA: Journal of Micronesian Studies* 3, no. 1 (1995): 147–60; Joanne L. Rondilla, “The Filipino Question in Asia and the Pacific: Rethinking Regional Origins in Diaspora,” in *Pacific Diaspora: Island Peoples in the United States and Across the Pacific*, ed. Paul Spickard, Joanne L. Rondilla, Debbie Hippolite Wright (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2002), 56-66; Flores, “Little Island Mighty Base”; Ong, “The Colonial Boundaries of Exilic Discourse.”

⁶⁶ Vicente Diaz, “Bye Bye Ms. American Pie: The Historical Relations between Chamorros and Filipinos and the American Dream,” *ISLA: Journal of Micronesian Studies* 3:1 (1995), 155.

multicultural ideals of the United States.⁶⁷ Asians immigrants, therefore, are not merely victims due to their non-whiteness and labor struggles on the islands, but also complicit in the violence against the Kanaka Maoli. Likewise, Dean Saranillio emphasizes that attention to different relations of power in order to understand the dynamics of settler colonialism especially in multicultural spaces. He writes, “pushing beyond the binary conceptions of power – oppressor/victim, white/nonwhite, settler/Indigenous, settler/migrant -- the intricate *relationality* of power shows how multiple binaries organize and layer differences within the settler state.”⁶⁸ Historicizing the multiple valances of how the settler state operates effectively “*un*-settles supposedly natural or inevitable alliances between historically oppressed groups.”⁶⁹ This study attempts to historicize how exactly U.S. empire has affected the colonial experiences of Chamorros and Filipinos in an interwoven narrative of relations.

Historically, Asian settler colonialism in Guam was embodied by the rapid increase in the Filipino population after World War II, which served as a labor force for the establishment of military bases. Since the 1970s, Chamorro leaders and activists such as Robert Underwood and Pedro Sanchez articulated the central tenets of Asian settler colonialism believing that the influx of Filipino migrants and other settlers into Guam posed serious issues for the future of the island. Meanwhile, Filipinos in their desire to obtain economic opportunities by migrating to the United States through Guam, perhaps unwittingly, contributed to the further militarization and the diminishing sovereignty of the Chamorro people. As observed by Vicente Diaz, the historical tensions between Filipinos and Chamorros on Guam were a symptom of the different ways that U.S. empire has affected its colonial subjects.

⁶⁷ Candace Fujikane, “Introduction,” in *Asian Settler Colonialism: From Local Governance to the Habits of Everyday Life in Hawai‘i* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2008), 6. For more on Asian Settler Colonialism also see, Dean Itsuji Saranillio, “Settler Colonialism,” In *Native Studies Keywords*, Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2015), 284–300 (; Dean Itsuji Saranillio, “Why Asian Settler Colonialism Matters: A Thought Piece on Critiques, Debates, and Indigenous Difference.” *Settler Colonial Studies* 3, no. 3–4 (2013): 280–94.

⁶⁸ Dean Saranillio, *Unsustainable Empire: Alternative Histories of Hawai‘i Statehood* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2018), 18.

⁶⁹ Saranillio, *Unsustainable Empire*, 18.

A relational history of empire requires complexity. The relationship between Filipinos and Chamorros on Guam over the twentieth century was both antagonistic and amicable, strained and cooperative, tense and joyous.⁷⁰ As this study shows, Filipinos and Chamorros, though colonized peoples living under similar conditions of U.S. empire in Guam, had historically different and often contradictory political, economic, and social goals. These differences resulted in interracial and interethnic misunderstandings and tensions. This history of Guam examines Filipino and Chamorro relations on Guam, in the words of Dean Saranillo, “in complex unity – not flattening difference and assuming these groups are in solidarity, nor falling into the pitfalls of difference and framing them as always in opposition.”⁷¹ It is this intimate, intricate complexity that makes Guam history important for complicating the category of Asians and Pacific Islander.⁷²

This study places the history of Chamorros and Filipinos on Guam in conversation with each other, intersecting at crucial moments, which serve to elucidate how the U.S. empire racializes, governs, and controls its colonial subjects unevenly and according to its needs. As Vicente Diaz writes, “one can understand the relations between Chamorros and Filipinos as kin of different colonial struggles.”⁷³ The experiences of Chamorros and Filipinos are shared and connected histories of empire. Diaz further writes that “besides the ancient ties in home region, language, and material culture, Chamorros and Filipinos also share a common history-in-struggle, an asymmetrical solidarity in their respective struggles to maintain and develop their own stories of peoplehood in

⁷⁰ Michael Perez, “Interethnic Antagonism in the Wake of Colonialism: U.S. Territorial Racial and Ethnic Relations at The Margins,” *Ethnic Studies Review*; 23, no. 1,2, & 3 (2000): 38-67.

⁷¹ Saranillio, *Unsustainable Empire*, 24.

⁷² On the conflated category of “Asian American and Pacific Islander,” Vicente M. Diaz, “TO “P” OR NOT TO “P”?: Marking the Territory Between Pacific Islander and Asian American Studies.” *Journal of Asian American Studies*; Vol. 1 no. 3 (October 2004): 183-208,289; Lisa Kahaleole Hall, “Which of These Things is Not Like the Other: Hawaiians and Other Pacific Islanders are Not Asian Americans, and All Pacific Islanders are Not Hawaiian,” in *American Quarterly* Vol. 67, No. 3 (2015): 727-747; Stephanie Nohelani Teves and Maile Arvin, “Decolonizing API: Centering Indigenous Pacific Islander Feminism,” in *Asian American Feminisms and Women of Color Politics* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2018).

⁷³ Diaz, “Bye Bye Ms. American Pie,” 157.

the face of Euro-American encroachment.”⁷⁴ By viewing Chamorro and Filipino history as intertwined on Guam, this study takes on the call of both Camacho and Diaz to historicize both the amicable and the antagonistic relations between Chamorros and Filipinos—indigenous and immigrant—that are indicative of the uneasy contradictions, tensions that exist in the settler colonized spaces of empire.

Historiography of the United States Empire

Ultimately, this in-depth history about Guam, just one territory of the United States, contributes to the robust and expansive field of United States imperial studies which seeks to study the phenomenon of American global power. The U.S. empire in its multiple definitions, geographies, and eras, has been debated by diplomatic, legal, and cultural historians as well as scholars engaged in American studies, ethnic studies, gender and sexuality scholars, area studies. This study, rather having a single historiographical genealogy, takes the opportunity of a concentrated study of Guam to generate inter-field discussions about the character of the U.S. empire. The history of Guam provides historians of diplomatic and foreign relations a geographically specific perspective of the rise of U.S. geopolitical and military power in the Pacific. Furthermore, Guam’s history demonstrates the U.S. reluctance to grant its territories the opportunity to engage in the processes of self-determination and decolonization required by the United Nations, all in order to retain control of its military installations.⁷⁵ This study contributes a

⁷⁴ Diaz, “Bye Bye Ms. American Pie,” 157.

⁷⁵ The historiography of U.S. empire is vast with genealogies from several historical fields and disciplines. The following works have been instrumental to my thinking of the framework of U.S. empire and Guam’s history within it. From American Studies and cultural studies of U.S. empire: Amy Kaplan, and Donald E. Pease eds., *Cultures of United States Imperialism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993); Alyosha Goldstein, *Formations of United States Colonialism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014); Michelle Ann Stephens and Brian Russell Roberts, *Archipelagic American Studies* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2017); Lisa Lowe, *The Intimacies of Four Continents* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2015); Julian Go, *American Empire and the Politics of Meaning: Elite Political Cultures in the Philippines and Puerto Rico during U.S. Colonialism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008). From the historiography of U.S. diplomacy and foreign relations: Alfred W. McCoy and Francisco A. Scarano eds., *Colonial Crucible: Empire in the Making of the Modern American State* (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009); Alfred W. McCoy, *Policing America’s Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State* (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009); Daniel Immerwahr, *How to Hide an Empire: A History of the Greater United States* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2019); Paul Kramer, “How Not to

transnational history of Guam by closely historicizing the relationship between the U.S. military, the political actions of Chamorro leaders and activists, and the lives of Filipino immigrants. Secondly, this cultural history of Guam is a microcosm of how the U.S. empire enacted its racialized and gendered forms of colonialism and the resistance led by colonial subjects. It reckons with the evolution of racial ideologies and its material consequences, as well as the contractions of multiculturalism and racial liberalism when applied to the spaces of empire. Contrary to seeing Guam as a peripheral place, Guam is at the center of multiple trajectories of historical inquiry.

Specifically, this study contends that the U.S territories are essential for understanding U.S. empire. As islands and peoples with limited rights under the direct jurisdiction and sovereignty of the United States, these territories endure the formal empire—limited sovereignty and self-governance, colonization projects, economic dependency, and settler colonial violence—in addition to informal empire—cultural indoctrination, American multiculturalism, and racial liberalism. This colonial status is especially important to consider in the historicization of the latter half of the twentieth century, as historians of the United States tend to either omit the U.S. colonies and territories from the grand narrative or consider the territories as just small vestiges of an imperial past. This dissertation, however, argues that the territories are not vestiges, but constitutive of how the United States empire continued to grow and attain geopolitical power into the twenty-first century.

The Vantage Point of Empire

My family's history is an example of what it means to live at the Pacific edge of America's Empire. I am a third generation Filipino from Guam with American citizenship. My paternal grandparents, Vic and Florita Oberiano, moved to Guam from Iloilo, Philippines during the post-

Write a History of U.S. Empire," *Diplomatic History* 42:5 (2018): 911-931; Daniel Immerwahr, "Writing the History of the Greater United States: A Reply to Paul Kramer," *Diplomatic History* 43: 2 (2019): 397-403; Donna Gabbacia, *Foreign Relations: American Immigration in Global Perspective*. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2012).

World War II military reconstruction. They lived for a short time at Camp Roxas, a labor camp for Filipinos created by military contractors. My father, Ramon Oberiano, was born on Guam and grew up in the village of Santa Rita. Hailing from Ilocos Sur province of Northern Luzon, my maternal grandfather, Manuel Buenconsejo Bello, worked for Andersen Air Force base as a busboy at the Officers' Club in the 1950s and 1960s. And after he settled, he petitioned my aunt, Marieta Bello, to move to Guam who in turn petitioned my grandmother, Leonor Quimino Bello, with two young daughters, Eliza and Marlyn, the younger my mother. They bought a house and settled in the village of Barrigada in 1976. Although I grew up steeped Filipino traditions, I did not learn either the Ilocano or Ilonggo languages and could only speak English fluently, a result of American acculturation on Guam. My family's stories have influenced the way I research and write this history of Guam, and they are embedded throughout this study. My family's fulfillment of the American dream was possible because of the U.S. settler colonialism on Guam; my positionality is shaped by U.S. colonialism.

My upbringing as a Guam Filipino shapes how I view Guam history. In some ways, the research and writing for this study helped me to understand my personal and familial experiences within the larger context of United States imperialism. As Vivian Dames and Tabitha Espina so articulately convey in their works, the experience of growing up Filipino in Guam forms a distinct perspective on the United States, the Philippines, and Guam.⁷⁶ As third generation Filipino from Guam, I am attuned to local culture, have knowledge of unwritten rules of etiquette, and maintain personal and family connections that allowed me to conduct oral history interviews. I interviewed members of my immediate family, my extended families, and family friends. I listened to their stories and learned how to empathize with their experiences of diaspora. Additionally, during my research

⁷⁶ Vivian Dames, "Rethinking the Circle of Belonging: American Citizenship and the Chamorros of Guam" (Ph.D., The University of Michigan, 2000). Tabitha Espina Velasco. "The Ube ('Roots') Generation." *Humanities Diliman* 13, no. 2 (2016): 75–101.

fellowship to the Philippines, I visited the province from which my mother's family hails, getting a small sense of the geographic and cultural displacement that my grandparents, aunts, and mother must have felt when they emigrated from the archipelago. On Guam, my connection to the island and my engagement in nonprofit and community organizations also opened up conversations with Chamorro and Filipino leaders and activists, who quite often asked me to place myself in relation to others on island, and who at times interrogated the purposes of my research. This is to say that my positionality as a third generation Filipino from Guam has shaped this study's perspective—a perspective that tells a history of Guam within the U.S. empire from the territory itself.

This study has almost exclusively been written from Guam with source material that could be accessed locally, physically or digitally. The COVID-19 pandemic of 2020 and 2021 placed a considerable limitation on the amount of transpacific and transcontinental research that could be conducted during my doctoral program. For one, I had to cut my Fulbright Fellowship in the Philippines short by six months, and I subsequently returned to Guam for the remainder of the dissertation writing process. While I could not visit the National Archives in Washington D.C., College Park, and San Francisco, the University of Guam's (UOG) Richard F. Taitano Micronesian Area Research Center (MARC) contains copies of colonial archives relevant to Guam such as the National Archives and Records Administration Record Group 80, the General Records of the Department of the Navy. This study, then, is a fortuitous example of a history written from the perspective of Guam looking outwards, emphasizing the sources available on the island, physically located on and digitally accessed from the island. Besides digitized congressional records and other government documents, this history is written with documents that are archived at the MARC at UOG, the Nieves Flores Memorial Library in Hagåtña Guam, personal and community organization collections, as well as the oral histories that I conducted in the various villages throughout the island. I am indebted to the Chamorro scholars of Guam and the Marianas who have laid the foundation

for studies of Guam and Chamorro studies, who made time to talk story with me about vignettes of Guam's history that are not written in history books. Lastly, the landscape of Guam itself, the constant reminder of U.S. militarism, the community organizing, and the protests and demonstrations in support of indigenous Chamorro rights provided a grounded environment to write this inherently place-based history of Guam.

Rather than seeing these things as limitations on this study, I see them as opportunities to consider what it means to write a history from the territories of the American empire. The historiography of the U.S. empire has come to focus on the U.S. territories and its former colonies as serious sites for historical research, often utilizing archives within these islands to *supplement* documents found in the colonial archives in the metropole.⁷⁷ This transformation of U.S. imperial studies to seriously consider the perspectives of the territories is an important one, a transformation to which this dissertation contributes. Guam is not only the subject of this history, but it is of and from Guam. It is a history of empire, researched and written from the empire itself.

Chapters

Organized into three sections of two chapters each, this dissertation historicizes how articulations of race and indigeneity developed under different iterations of U.S. militarism in Guam: U.S. Naval Period (1898-1942), Cold War Militarism (1945-1965), and Multicultural Guam (1960-1990). As such, my chapters focus on several episodes which are inflection points that demonstrate the change-over-time in the relationship between Filipinos and Chamorros in the context of the evolution of U.S. military policy and geopolitical strategy in the Pacific. Part I of this study explores the long imperial transition from Spanish to American empires as experienced by both Filipinos and Chamorros between 1898-1942. This era of U.S. empire was one of military colonialism in which the U.S. military solely maintained control and command of the island. Although the U.S. utilized

⁷⁷ Paul Kramer, "How Not to Write a History of U.S. Empire," *Diplomatic History* 42:5 (2018): 911-931.

preexisting Spanish colonial infrastructures and systems in the Philippines and Guam, including Filipino political exile to Guam, the U.S. implemented a distinct racial hierarchy that contested the Spanish mestizo racial schema and indigenous Chamorro kinship practices based in the principle of reciprocal social relations, or *inafa'maolek* (Chamorro for “to make good”), that bound family members, networks, and communities to each other regardless of race or ethnicity.

This is seen in the first chapter, “Colonial Siblings,” which historicizes the relations between Filipino revolutionary exiles and the Chamorro in Guam in a period of imperial transition. In 1901, General Arthur MacArthur of the U.S. Army in the Philippines captured and exiled to Guam fifty-six Filipinos who he believed were instrumental in the Philippine Revolution, including most famously Apolinario Mabini. The practice of exiling Filipino revolutionaries and lawbreakers was a preexisting colonial policy from the Spanish period, when the Spanish colonial government also exiled anti-colonial Filipinos to Guam. While on Guam the Filipino revolutionaries from 1901 met with the Chamorro elite of Hagåtña. Piecing together existing Spanish colonial documents, U.S. Naval archives, Apolinario Mabini’s diary, and oral histories written in newspapers from the 1960s, this chapter “Colonial Siblings” asks the question: How did the Filipino and Chamorro encounters at the beginning of American imperialism in the Pacific reflect the intracolonial networks, movement, and migration of colonial subjects within empire? And what intellectual conversations around anti-colonial politics existed at this pivotal stage of U.S. empire? In answering these questions, this chapter emphasizes the longer history that informs the deep relations between Filipinos and Chamorros within United States empire.

The second chapter, “Of a Separate Race,” historicizes how Chamorros leaders and Filipino-Chamorro families—including the families of former Filipino political exiles—navigated between colonies, empires, and indigenous and migrant cultures, and resisted simple categorizations of race, indigeneity, and nation. This chapter asks, how did Chamorros and Filipinos navigated the

complicated intersections of Chamorro, Spanish, and American notions of race, belonging and kinship to advocate for themselves within U.S. empire? The primary story in this chapter examines the 1926 resolution drafted by a member of the Philippine Congress that suggested that the Philippine Commonwealth annex Guam for the Philippines. The resolution caused alarm in Guam among Chamorro leaders of the Guam Congress and Chamorro woman, Agueda Iglesias Johnston, who expressed their anger over the Filipino representative's resolution. They argued that Guam and the Chamorro people deserved a separate political status under United States empire because they were a distinct people with traditions such as language and culture that connected them to Guam. They also delineated the differences between Chamorros and Filipinos with conflicting ideologies of race, indicative of the imperial transition between the Spanish mestizo system of race and the United States homogenous and hierarchical racial categories.

The second story in chapter two is about the legal battle over land and property fought by Filipino men married to Chamorro women. In 1933, the U.S. Naval Government on Guam implemented and sought to enforce alien land laws in Guam, which jeopardized the Chamorro land and property held by Filipino men. Two men in particular—Pancrasio Palting and Leon Flores—who were Filipino exiles turned U.S. Naval officials in Guam were affected by this law. Because the law stated that only Guam Citizens—those who were born or descendants of those who were present on Guam at the time of U.S. annexation in 1898—were eligible to hold land, Palting's Chamorro wife, Soledad Dungca, and children, Margarito (Paul) and Florencia were instructed to turn over their properties to the Naval Government. They were considered Filipinos because of their husband's and father's nationality. Palting along with other Filipinos on Guam utilized rhetoric of race, citizenship, and the paradoxical nature of U.S. imperialism to argue against the implementation of the law. This story demonstrates the racialized and gendered American definitions of race and gender roles that conflicted with Chamorro matrilineal notions of belonging.

Part II examines the rapid Cold War militarization of Guam and its political, cultural, and social effects on Chamorros and Filipinos. In this period of settler militarism, the U.S. military annexed two-thirds of land and recruited thousands of Filipino migrant workers to transform the island into a militarized island. Guam transformed from a small coaling station for the U.S. Navy into the “Tip of the Spear” of U.S. military operations in the Asia Pacific region. Chapter three, “Natives and Aliens,” asks, how the U.S. militarization of Guam ushered in the structure of settler colonialism. How did Chamorros and Filipinos become imbricated in this process. And how did this settler colonial structure affect the relations between Chamorros and Filipinos on Guam? The U.S. military embarked on the simultaneous processes of Chamorro land dispossession and the recruitment of Filipino migrant labor in order to construct the military installations, including the Naval Station Guam and Air Force Base that would become the basis upon which the U.S. could project its power, militarily and ideologically, in the Asia-Pacific region during the Cold War. During this period, Chamorros were forcibly denied entry to the lands that had sustained them, compensated little for their land, pushed into a cash and labor economy, and became dependent on the U.S. military for food and shelter. Meanwhile, Filipinos were shipped in from the Philippines through an agreement between the U.S. Navy and the newly independent Philippine government. As a result, the tensions between Chamorros and Filipinos began in this period as the culmination of land annexation and job competition created structural conditions of settler colonialism.

Chapter four, “Newly American,” historicizes how Chamorros and Filipinos received U.S. citizenship through different means that nonetheless aided in the U.S. military’s operations in Guam. This chapter ponders the relationship between U.S. militarization, U.S. citizenship, and racial liberalism within the territories of the U.S. empire. Chamorro people were finally able to receive U.S. citizenship, a political goal that they had been fighting for generations. To the dismay of Naval officials, Chamorro leaders walked out of a session of the Guam Congress, an act that made national

news and caused embarrassment for some American leaders who sought to project an image of democracy during the Cold War. Meanwhile, some Filipinos workers who made their way to Guam during the military build-up were able to receive permanent residency and eventually U.S. citizenship because of a loophole that was utilized by the U.S. military and military contractors. Due to the nature of Guam's importance to U.S. military operation, however, both of these policies were implemented with military strategy in mind. The rhetorical performance of inclusion through citizenship demonstrated to the world that the U.S. was doing right by Guam, while simultaneously ensuring that the U.S. military retained control over most of the island's resources through the colonial status of unincorporated territory. This chapter posits that U.S. citizenship was a settler colonial tool that solidified, codified, and made invisible destructive military policies in Guam.

Part III historicizes the emergence of a multicultural Guam, which was characterized by an economic shift towards tourism, the formation of a Filipino immigrant community, and a burgeoning indigenous Chamorro movement from the 1960s-1990s. After the security clearance requirement ended in 1962 and the massive super typhoon Karen hit Guam in 1963, the island began another transformation this time on the civilian side of the island. The end of the security clearance meant that a civilian economy could grow with international investments, and in the aftermath of Typhoon Karen, the U.S. federal government injected millions of dollars into Guam's rehabilitation, providing the funds to build infrastructure that could cater to civilian economic sector. As a result, a civilian economy based in international tourism emerged.

The fifth chapter, "The Paradox of Paradise," shows how Guam's burgeoning tourism economy in the 1960s and 1970s projected the image of a peaceful and idyllic multicultural island paradise for international tourism and gave rise to Guam's largest civilian economy. Chamorros, Filipinos, and white statesiders alike took advantage of this economic development. Furthermore, the rise of Filipino community, their regional organizations, lavish events, and monetary and


infrastructural contributions to the island community portrayed Guam as the place where the American dream could be realized. The representation of Guam's multiculturalism belied Guam's continued status as the militarized "Tip of the Spear," and the racial and ethnic turmoil in the island's local community. This chapter asks, what happens when the rhetoric of multiculturalism is applied to a militarized U.S. territory with a large group of indigenous peoples and a growing immigrant population? The U.S. military used Guam's bases to support its war in Vietnam and Southeast Asia, while Chamorros and Filipinos fought in letters to the editor, in political scenes, and in schools. This paradox of paradise, as described Pedro C. Sanchez, placed Guam's multicultural economic development as a priority over the wellbeing of the Chamorro people. He and many other Chamorros believed that they were losing control over Guam's development to those with relatively few social and cultural ties to the island. In addition, some in this Filipino immigrant group began to identify as "Guamanian"—a term that was reserved for Chamorro people after World War II—and deny the distinctiveness of the Chamorro people and identity. The growing diversity and multiculturalism of Guam only elicited and amplified tensions started in the militarization of Guam.

The sixth chapter, "Commonwealth Now!," historicizes the rise of the Chamorro self-determination movement embodied by the Guam Commonwealth Act and the indigenous rights activism in the 1970s through the 1990s. How do the mechanisms of a U.S. military empire shape the possibilities for Chamorros to claim indigenous rights and political self-determination for Guam? Chamorro rights activists, including the Organization of People for Indigenous Rights, criticized how the rhetoric of multiculturalism, the political status of unincorporated territory, and U.S. national security obscured and challenged Chamorro claims to Indigenous rights, land, and political self-determination. Inspired by United Nations Declaration of Human Rights and Indigenous movements across the Pacific and the North American continent, the Chamorro self-determination believed that the self-determination for Guam was the inherent right of indigenous Chamorro

peoples. Chamorro activists testified with an unapologetic Indigenous Chamorro identity before U.S. Congress and the United Nations, as well as led activist demonstrations and civil disobedience protests in Guam. Filipino activists also stood in solidarity to demonstrate support for Chamorro self-determination. However, U.S. federal officials, Filipinos, and other settlers pointed to the island's diverse population and rhetoric of Civil Rights and racial liberalism to criticize Chamorro movements and ultimately ensure Guam's continuing status as an unincorporated territory for the United States.

This study is a Pacific perspective on United States colonialism historicized through an interwoven history of Chamorros and Filipinos on Guam. When Jose M. Flores criticized the U.S. military for its role in the colonization of Guam, he articulated the complicated, yet ardent discontent of an indigenous colonial subject living within a territory of the United States. In the way that the life of Flores illustrates how Chamorro people navigated U.S. colonialism, the twentieth-century history of Guam and its people elucidate the contradictions of colonialism such as the complexities of race and indigenosity, the imperial routes of migration, and the political power of the U.S. military. Ultimately, this history of the island of Guam is a history of how the United States established and fortified its Pacific empire, and how Chamorros and Filipinos experienced the settler colonial transformation of the militarized Pacific.

Maps of Guam⁷⁸




Map 1—Guam's villages explored in "Territorial Discontent," according to the latest data. The boundaries and borders of the villages may have changed since the start of U.S. colonialism in Guam in 1898.

⁷⁸ Google Earth data for generated maps 1, 2, and 3 were retrieved from Water and Environmental Research Institute of the Western Pacific and Island Research & Education Initiative, *Digital Atlas of Southern Guam*, Accessed July 19, 2021, http://south.hydroguam.net/ge_download.php.



Map 2— Chapter one, “Colonial Siblings,” and chapter two, “Of a Separate Race,” take place in the villages of Asan and Hagåtña (Agaña) in Guam.



Map 3— U.S. Military Properties on Guam as of 2021.

U.S. Naval Government of Guam, M.I. Land Claims Commission
“Land Reserved for Guamanian Use”⁷⁹
1947




Figure 4—U.S. Naval Government of Guam, M.I. Land Claims Commission Map denotes the proposed areas in which Chamorros (“Guamanians”) would be allowed during the military build-up of Guam after World War II. The cross-hatched and shaded areas are lands “reserved for Guamanian use” and comprises only about a quarter of the island.

⁷⁹ U.S. Naval Government of Guam M.I. Land Claims Commission, “Land Reserved For Guamanian Use,” Map Collection, Micronesian Area Research Center, University of Guam, Call no. 9416.64 1947 L3 C6.

Colonial Siblings: Filipino Revolutionaries and the Chamorro Elite in Imperial Transition

“Let us give thanks to the Lord our God that you are not in the Marianas Islands planting sweet potatoes.” - Jose Rizal, *Noli Me Tangere*¹

At about three o'clock in the afternoon on January 24th, 1901, the *USS Rosecrans* sunk its anchor into Apra Harbor off the coast of Guam.² It had embarked fifteen days earlier from Manila Bay, Philippines, its cargo carrying coal for steamships, canned food for the Navy personnel, medical supplies for the hospital, and building materials to renovate and construct houses, among other things needed to establish a U.S. Naval station on the island of Guam. Also on its manifest were thirty-seven Filipino men and their servants, men who U.S. General Arthur MacArthur believed to be the most influential and most dangerous men of the ongoing Philippine Revolution. With the approval of U.S. Secretary of War Elihu Root, these men, including “The Brains of the Revolution” Apolinario Mabini, were exiled from the Philippines in the attempt to behead the rebellion against U.S. empire.³ Guam became their prison.

A few months later and a few miles down the road that led towards the capital village of Hagåtña, thirty-two men—a priest, a few cosmopolitan businessmen, former colonial officials of the Spanish government, and descendants of Spanish era Filipino *deportados* (deportees)—gathered to sign a letter to be sent to the White House in Washington, D.C. Even after three years of American

¹ The Leon Ma. Guerrero English translation of Jose Rizal's *Noli Me Tangere* originally published in Spanish writes “let us give thanks to the Lord our God that you are not in *Marianis insulis comotes plantado*.” Jose Rizal, *Noli Me Tangere*, trans. Leon Ma. Guerrero (Manila: Anvil Publishing, 2020). *Noli Me Tangere* was originally published in 1886 and is widely hailed as the novel that spurred the Philippine Revolution. In this scene, a Catholic priest was referring to the Marianas as a penal colony for Filipinos who sought to partake in the revolution against the Spanish colonial government.

² Philippine Diary Project, “Diary of Apolinario Mabini 24 January 1901”
<http://philippinediaryproject.com/1901/01/24/thursday-24-january-1901/>.

³ On the Philippine Revolution, Nicole CuUnjieng Aboitiz, *Asian Place, Filipino Nation: A Global Intellectual History of the Philippine Revolution, 1887-1912* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2020); Resil B. Mojares, *Brains of the Nation: Pedro Paterno, T.H. Pardo de Tavera, Isabelo de Los Reyes, and the Production of Modern Knowledge* (Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2006); Cesar Adib Majul, *The Political and Constitutional Ideas of the Philippine Revolution* (New York: Oriole Editions, 1974). On Mabini and the Philippine Revolution, Cesar Adib Majul, *Mabini and the Philippine Revolution* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 1960).

rule, they still did not have an American-style democracy so they petitioned the U.S. Congress demanding a permanent civilian government. They wrote that such a government would “enable us to mold our institutions to the American standard, and prepare ourselves and our children for the obligations and the enjoyment of the rights and privileges to which, as loyal subjects of the United States, we feel ourselves rightly entitled.”⁴ To them, the arrival of the United States in Guam should have meant more political freedom. But, unfortunately, it did not.

Tucked away on a small island in the middle of the Pacific Ocean, Filipinos and Chamorros hoped for greater self-government for their respective peoples and challenged the young colonial governments of the U.S.’s Pacific empire. While incarcerated on Guam, Mabini wrote his memoirs, *La Revolución Filipina*, recounting his perspective of the decades-long struggle for a Philippine nation.⁵ Simultaneously, the Chamorro elite of Hagåtña petitioned the Naval Governor of Guam and the U.S. Congress for more political rights, citing their loyalty to the United States and their knowledge of American political ideology. Mabini’s incarceration and the 1901 Chamorro petition demonstrate how the U.S. embarked on an improvised colonial governance of the Philippines and Guam, utilizing preexisting Spanish colonial infrastructure and policies including Guam’s status as a penal colony for Filipino criminals sentenced to exile.⁶ The U.S. imperial power was continuously

⁴ U.S. House of Representatives, 57th Congress, 1st Session, *Letter from the Secretary of the Navy: A petition From the Inhabitants of Guam Relating to a Permanent Government*. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1902.

⁵ Apolinario Mabini, *La revolución filipina (con otros documentos de la época)*, (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1931). While there have been a few works that historicize Mabini’s incarceration in Guam, few have historicized him and the relations he had with Chamorro people. One work in particular stands out in historicizing the significance of this Chamorro-Filipino encounter: Josephine Ong, “The Colonial Boundaries of Exilic Discourse: Contextualizing Mabini’s Incarceration in Guåhan,” (MA Thesis: University of California Los Angeles, 2019). Scholarly works that have historicized Mabini’s incarceration in Guam include Atoy M. Navarro, “Philippines-Marianas Relations in History: Some Notes on Filipino Exiles in Guam,” *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal*, Vol.8 Nos. 1-2 (1999): 117-130; Augusto De Viana, *In the Far Islands: The Role of Natives from the Philippines in the Conquest, Colonization and Repopulation of the Mariana Islands, 1668-1903* (Manila: University of Santo Thomas Publishing House, 2004).

⁶ As written in *Colonial Crucible*, “American colonizers initially defaulted to Spanish precedents or deferred to native aspirations” during the first forays into insular empire.” Alfred McCoy, Francisco A. Scarano, and Courtney Johnson, “On the Tropic of Cancer: Transitions and Transformations of U.S. Imperial State,” *Colonial Crucible: Empire in the Making of the Modern American State*, ed. Alfred McCoy and Francisco A. Scarano (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009), 11.

contested, ideologically and physically, by colonial subjects who held onto and enacted upon their own political beliefs influenced by centuries of experience under Spanish imperialism.

The Filipino and Chamorro movements for self-governance were not as separate as the historiography suggests.⁷ This chapter describes the network of Filipino and Chamorro elite connected by business, education, and religion across the Philippine Sea. They also shared political and cultural similarities that bound the Philippine and Marianas archipelagoes together. During the Spanish Era, the Marianas, which Guam is the southernmost island, was a province of the Philippines, its jurisdiction set under the purview of Manila. Its officials were dispatched from ports in the Philippine Islands by orders of Spanish officials based in Intramuros, the walled city and capital of the Philippines. Chamorros from Guam and the other islands in the Marianas sent their children to universities and Chamorro businessmen had connections to trade in Philippines. When the first set of Filipino revolutionaries were exiled to Guam in 1874, elite Chamorro families housed Filipino intellectuals, military officers, and lawyers charged by Spain to be detrimental to its empire in the Philippine archipelago. With the circulation of colonial subjects moving throughout the Pacific, the Chamorro people cultivated their distinct cosmopolitan political philosophy that was influenced by events in the Philippines and the rest of the Spanish Pacific. Chamorro elites understood that they were within a period of imperial transitions, where anything was possible and everything uncertain.

⁷ Keith Camacho has called for more integrated histories of Filipinos in the Pacific Islands, Keith L. Camacho, "Filipinos, Pacific Islanders, and the American Empire," in *The Oxford Handbook of Asian American History* (Oxford University Press, 2016). For reading on the historiography of U.S. colonialism in the Philippines at the turn of the 20th century: Paul A. Kramer, *The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States, & the Philippines* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006); Kristin Hoganson, *Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998); Julian Go, *American Empire and the Politics of Meaning: Elite Political Cultures in the Philippines and Puerto Rico during U.S. Colonialism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008). For readings on the historiography of U.S. colonialism in Guam at the turn of the 20th century: Vicente Diaz, "Pious Sites: Chamorro Culture Between Spanish Catholicism and American Liberal Individualism," in *Cultures of United States Imperialism*, edited by Amy Kaplan. New Americanists (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993); Penelope Bordallo Hofschneider, *A Campaign for Political Rights on the Island of Guam, 1899-1950* (Saipan, CNMI: Division of Historical Preservation, 2001).

The Chamorro elite were not passive subjects of Spanish and American colonialism. In both the Spanish and American periods, they hobnobbed with Spanish officials, Filipino Revolutionaries, and later, American military officials to take advantage of the colonial networks that these people embodied. Their acts of hospitality, aligned with practices in Chamorro culture, were also acts of diplomacy, ensuring the loyalty and affinity of elite Spaniards, Americans, and Filipinos. They also utilized colonial political language and logic in their petitions to advocate for themselves. Yet, when claimed by the United States in 1898, Chamorros did not seek independence like their Filipino counterparts. Chamorros sought a government that was attentive to the needs of the Chamorro people in whatever form that could take, even if that government was U.S. colonial rule.

This chapter tracks the Spanish Era *deportado* system in which the Spanish empire used Guam as a penal colony in the latter half of the nineteenth century.⁸ While the Chamorro elite had a general disdain for lower-class Filipino rebels, they nonetheless welcomed elite, upper class Filipinos who were educated, trained at elite institutions in the Philippines and Europe, and familiar to the Chamorro elite who were also embedded in the political and commercial networks within the Pacific Islands. In the perspective of Chamorro elite, lower-class Filipino *deportados* were seen generally as violent and unwanted criminals and thus required removal. Then, this chapter historicizes how the Chamorro elite capitalized on the improvisational nature of U.S. imperial rule on Guam at the beginning of the century by engaging in diplomacy with U.S. Naval leadership on the island. For instance, the Chamorro elite, led by Padre Jose Palomo, convinced American military official William Safford to deport unwanted Filipino *deportados* in 1899. An intellectual himself, Safford recognized the cosmopolitan character of the Chamorro elite and relied on them to relay messages and garner support from ordinary Chamorros throughout the island. Oppositely, Chamorros used

⁸ Not all Filipinos who made their way to Guam were deemed criminals and exiled to the island as *deportados*. Some were soldiers, traders and merchants, and Spanish officials, etc.

their connection with Safford to relay messages to the United States once Safford left the island. Lastly, this chapter historicizes the arrival and experiences of the last cohort of Filipino exiles to Guam, this time exiled by the U.S. colonial regime in the Philippines in 1901. The friendly relationships formed between the Chamorro elite and the Filipino revolutionary exiles on Guam demonstrate the dynamic circuits and encounters of colonial subjects during the transition of the Spanish and American imperial regimes in the Philippines and Guam.

Filipino – Chamorro Relations under Spanish Imperialism

The Philippine Islands and the Marianas Islands had been claimed by Spain for nearly 300 years starting with the voyage of Ferdinand Magellan in the sixteenth century. Between then and the early nineteenth century, Guam was a stopping point between Acapulco, Mexico and Manila, Philippines in Spain's famed Manila Galleons, which transported goods, people, and gold across the Pacific for nearly 250 years. The archipelagoes were both ruled through Mexico until 1817, when the Philippines and the Marianas became their own political entity ruled directly by Spain. The Mariana Islands was considered a province of the Philippines; and by 1871, the Marianas's provincial status was elevated to a "Politico-Military Government of the First Class."⁹ The movement of military officers, soldiers, merchants, and intellectuals between the Philippines and the Marianas was relatively consistent, with Apra Harbor and the adjacent Chamorro village of Sumay in Guam becoming the hub of trade and commerce in Micronesia. Many of the colonial migrants, especially Spanish imperial soldiers stationed in the Marianas, stayed and had families with Chamorro women, and is the reason for the Hispanicized names of many Chamorro families today.¹⁰

⁹ Robert Rogers, *Destiny's Landfall: A History of Guam* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2011), 86; Carlos Madrid, *Beyond Distances: Governance, Politics and Deportation in the Mariana Islands from 1870 to 1877* (Saipan: Northern Mariana Islands Council for Humanities, 2006), 57.

¹⁰ Michael Clement Research. Chamorro families on Guam especially those with Spanish last names can trace their ancestry to an imperial soldier who was stationed in Guam sometime during the Spanish Era. Some of these men were *peninsulares* (Spanish from Spain), but others were *criollos*, *mestizo*, or indigenous Filipino. Michael Clement, "Garrison Folks and Reducciones: Bifurcating the Hagåtña Narrative in 18th Century Marianas History," *4th Marianas History Conference* (2019), Accessed March 11, 2020, <https://www.guampedia.com/4th-marianas-history-conference/>.

Spanish imperial politics proved critical in the Marianas. Without much economic industry—Chamorro society relied on subsistence farming and cultural practices of reciprocity and mutual good—the colonial government of the Marianas was highly susceptible to changes in funding from the Spanish crown, sunken and missing ships that delayed or lost goods, and greedy Spanish governors or errant priests who exploited the local population and took advantage of the isolated geography of the island. Furthermore, political upheaval on the Spanish peninsula meant rapid and constant changes in leadership on the ground in the Marianas. But because of the type of subsistence culture that existed in Chamorro culture, local life remained fairly consistent, with the exception of exiles and *deportados* who caused trouble on Guam.

Local politics, however, was usually held by a small group of the Chamorro elite. The Spanish political governance of Guam emphasized local knowledge with leadership from the local and indigenous populations. According to historian Carlos Madrid, starting in the 1830s, the municipal government of the Marianas was elected by most of the adult male population and “in which the Indigenous elite held all official positions at the local level.”¹¹ These positions included *gobernorcillos* who led towns and *cabezas de barangay* who led village-level politics and tax collection. Those elected to power were usually of the elite and the elected positions usually reinforced class distinctions. Like many places at the edge of the Spanish colonial reach, indigenous leadership was not unheard of in the Marianas.

Paired with the trade and movement of peoples between the Philippines and the Marianas, the Chamorro elite had access to colonial networks that spanned the Spanish empire. Madrid notes that prominent families with strong patriarchs used these networks for economic and social gain. He

Furthermore, it must be noted that in this period of Spanish empire, the term “Filipino” itself did not necessarily mean natives of the Philippines, but a person of Spanish descent born in the Philippines. Chamorro itself is a contested category and is explored in greater detail in chapter two of this dissertation.

¹¹ Madrid, *Beyond Distances*, 9.

argues, “Besides ties of blood, which facilitated social mobility, it can be considered that this Indigenous middle class, affluent enough to pay for the transportation of good quality water from springs outside Agaña, was in close social contact with Spanish officials.”¹² One example of a cosmopolitan elite Chamorro was Luis de Torres, a mestizo merchant, who used colonial networks to establish trade between the Caroline Islands in Micronesia, the Marianas, and the Philippines.¹³ De Torres was also the point of contact for European scientific expeditions that made their way across the Pacific. His wealth, ingenuity, and penchant for an intellectual life elevated his family to elite status.

The descendants of these patriarchs produced large families with prominent members. De Torres’s grandson, Jose Bernardo Palomo y Torres, was the first Chamorro priest and an important religious and political figure in the Chamorro community during the transition between the Spanish and American rule. According to Madrid, a Spanish Governor once complained that in 1884, “no official order was generally obeyed until the people had consulted with Fr. Palomo, such was his prestige and authority among the people.”¹⁴ Educated in the Spanish Catholic school in Guam and receiving his religious orders in Cebu, Philippines, Padre Palomo, as he is fondly remembered, is representative of the leadership, diplomacy, and intellectualism of the Chamorro elite.¹⁵

Padre Palomo’s life also suggests a certain globalism among the Chamorro elite. As historian Madrid points out, “Those Chamorros who traded products with Manila came into contact with various social and political realities and ideas, and they may have developed the kind of intellectual cosmopolitanism that directly emanated from the intense political life of Spain during these years.”¹⁶

¹² Madrid, *Beyond Distances*, 15.

¹³ Bruce Campbell, “Luis de Torres,” *Guampedia, Inc. Accessed March 4, 2020* <https://www.guampedia.com/luis-de-torres/>

¹⁴ Madrid, *Beyond Distances*, 10.

¹⁵ Audreya JP Taitano and Shannon J. Murphy, “Padre Jose Bernardo Palomo,” *Guampedia, Inc.* <https://www.guampedia.com/padre-jose-bernardo-palomo/>.

¹⁶ Madrid, *Beyond Distances*, 15.

Like his grandfather, Padre Palomo, a polyglot, was usually the first to welcome arriving European expeditions and other Pacific islanders. He was highly educated and offered researchers and outsiders critical insight into Chamorro and Marianas society. He was also well travelled for a Chamorro person born and raised on Guam. The Chamorro elite, though on a geographically isolated island, were nevertheless exposed to and partook in the political and social life of colonial elites, particularly those that extended from Manila. Their networks spanned multiple geographies and across various sectors of society: business, religious, and political.¹⁷

Guam as a Penal Colony

The Marianas were not isolated from world events either. Colonial uprisings in other parts of the Spanish empire including the Philippines and Spain were also felt on Guam and the Marianas through the presence of *deportados* who were exiled to the isolated archipelago. Most of the exiles wreaked havoc on the island, much to the chagrin of Spanish leadership and the Chamorro elite, though some *deportados* provided much needed labor or intellectual community, depending on class. More than just a part of the system of crime and punishment, exile became a way to control the edges of empire. Convicts were seen as a source of labor as well as a civilizing tool for both the origin and the destination. According to Greg Bankoff, “Convicts might prove a useful labor pool for public works or even as contractual laborers to private enterprise, but deportation was not only similarly beneficial to society, it also furthered colonial aims.”¹⁸ Many Filipino convicts from the more Christianized areas of the northern Philippines were sent to the predominantly Muslim southern island of Mindanao to not only remove them from society, but to be examples of

¹⁷ Pacific islands were not insular, but rather loci that connected various places around the world. On Pacific peoples and mobility, read David A. Chang, *The World and All the Things upon It: Native Hawaiian Geographies of Exploration* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2016); Vicente Diaz, “Voyaging for Anti-Colonial Recovery: Austronesian Seafaring, Archipelagic Rethinking, and Re-Mapping Indigeneity,” *Pacific Asia Inquiry* 2:1 (Fall 2011): 21-32; Robert Underwood, “Excursions into Inauthenticity: The Chamorros of Guam,” *Pacific Viewpoints* 26:1 (1985): 160-184.

¹⁸ Bankoff, Greg. *Crime, Society, and the State in the Nineteenth-Century Philippines*. (Quezon City, Philippines: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1996), 185.

civilization in the south. “What began as a judicial expedient for removing undesirable or hostile elements among the indigenous population,” Bankoff argues, “gradually gave way to a more deliberate policy of using deportation for colonial governance.”¹⁹ As one of the edges of Spain’s Pacific empire, Guam and the Marianas would be incorporated into the crime and punishment system and became a penal colony. During the Spanish era, Guam received three waves of exiles from the Philippines: the first of convict labor; the second comprised of Filipino *deportados* associated with the 1872 Cavite Mutiny; and the last of the Spanish *deportados* in the 1890s, who were the most fervent of the revolutionaries who carried their own motivations to Guam.

Though at first objecting to Madrid’s royal order to convert Guam into a penal colony, Spanish Governor of Guam Felipe de la Corte realized how Filipino prisoners could contribute to the island’s economic and infrastructural development in the middle of the nineteenth century.²⁰ Guam and the Marianas would become one of four penitentiaries in the Spanish Pacific (the others included the infamous Bilibid Prison in Manila, Zamboanga, and Cavite). Because the prisoners would not have to be jailed, de la Corte strongly suggested to the Spanish crown that the *deportados* sent to Guam be trustworthy and Filipino so that they did not cause trouble and were able to withstand tropical weather.²¹ At first the Spanish colonial government complied with de la Corte’s request, sending 100 Filipino *presidarios* in 1861. According to William Safford, an American Lieutenant Governor stationed on Guam in 1900, Spanish Governor de la Corte “anticipated no trouble in allowing the convicts to be scattered over the island as long as there were no ship in the harbor, as there was no possible means for them to escape from the island but it was his intention to have them divided into gangs, placed under surveillance of guards, and employed as far as possible

¹⁹ Bankoff, *Crime, Society, and the State*, 185.

²⁰ Rogers, *Destiny’s Landfall*, 95. De Viana, *In the Far Away Islands*, 155 and 118.

²¹ De Viana, *In the Far Away Islands*, 118.

from the port.”²² In the perspective of the governor, convict labor was necessary to build infrastructure on Guam. Anticipating no trouble, the governor distributed the convicts “among the most respectable and industrious citizens of the island dedicated to agriculture and other useful pursuits.”²³ Elite members of Guam’s society, perhaps those closely connected to the Spanish government, were able to use Filipino convict labor to increase their economic potential.

Almost immediately, however, it became apparent that the convict labor was disastrous to the Spanish hold on Guam. On November 8, 1851, there was an “Arrest of Filipino convicts, who, it is alleged, were on the point of rising against the authorities and trying to take possession of the land.”²⁴ The convicts planned to take over the village of Agat, which was three hours by foot from the capital city of Hagåtña and far enough from the military reinforcements that would stop an uprising. Governor de la Corte, however, reported that he “took immediate action to frustrate their desires if they should carry out their design, and I also laid plans in case they should act before the original time intended.”²⁵ Upon realizing that they were being watched, the convicts attacked one of the governor’s patrols then escaped to a nearby village of Anigua. In response, the governor sent out armed reinforcements who promptly subdued the rebellion, with convicts running into the jungle to hide. By the end of the week, all the convicts were captured. In the aftermath, the Governor noted to his superior general that the actions taken by the convicts was an “atrocious plan” that “they had formed from their very first arrival was to pillage all the whites and the principal citizens of these islands.”²⁶ The plan to use convicts for the development of the Spanish empire on Guam backfired.

²² William Safford, *A History of the Marianas Islands*, edited and transcribed by Jillette Leon Guerrero. Unpublished. Guam. Logged under date October 17, 1851 under the title Filipino Convicts on Guam. (Hereafter cited as Safford, *A History of the Marianas Islands*, (date).)

²³ Safford, *A History of the Marianas Islands*, October 17, 1851. d

²⁴ Safford, *A History of the Marianas Islands*, November 8, 1851.

²⁵ Safford, *A History of the Marianas Islands*, November 8, 1851.

²⁶ William Safford, *A History of the Marianas Islands*, November 8, 1851.

Instead, they incited violence on Guam and sought to overthrow the government. Nevertheless, the deportation of convicts to Guam continued through the end of the Spanish empire on Guam.

*The Second Wave*²⁷

By the 1870s, political prisoners began to make up the majority of the second wave of *deportados* sent to Guam. With the slow decline of the Spanish empire and the increased support for a Philippine republic, Guam received more and more political prisoners from the Philippines. According to Rogers, between 1872 and 1877 there were 1,200 Filipino *deportados* living on Guam on an island that registered a little over 3,000 people in 1856.²⁸ Free to roam the island, this new infusion of men and a few women caused trouble and incited paranoia among the Spanish officials as well as Chamorros on Guam.²⁹ The most significant importation of Filipino *deportados* during the Spanish era was actually a result of what many consider to be the first instance of the Philippine Revolution.³⁰

On January 2nd, 1872, hundreds of Filipino rebel soldiers and workers attempted to overtake the Cavite arsenal in order to begin a separatist movement from the Spanish crown. The rebels sought to kill all Spaniards there, including women and children, and declare an independent Philippines.³¹ But, the Cavite Mutiny was quickly suppressed by the Spanish authorities, who punished the rebels with harsh sentences. Three priests – Mariano Gomes, Jose Burgos and Jacinto Zamora — were executed in Manila. The other option was deportation to various prisons across the Philippine and Marianas archipelagoes. According to De Viana, “these individuals constituted some

²⁷ This section on the Spanish period of *deportados* exiled to Guam as a result of the Cavite Mutiny is heavily reliant on – a grateful for – the research and guidance of Dr. Carlos Madrid, Professor and Director of the Micronesian Area Research Center at the University of Guam. His book *Beyond Distances: Governance, Politics and Deportation in the Mariana Islands from 1870 to 1877* informs much of this section.

²⁸ Rogers, *Destiny's Landfall*, 96.

²⁹ De Viana, *In the Far Away Islands*, 125.

³⁰ John N. Schumacher, “The Cavite Mutiny Toward a Definitive History,” *Philippine Studies*, Vol. 59, No.1 (March 2011).

³¹ Schumacher, “The Cavite Mutiny,” 58.

of the leading liberal individuals in the Philippines who clamored for greater civil rights as well as political power.”³² The *deportados* of the Philippine Revolution were sent to Guam and the Marianas.

Twenty-two upper-class and educated Filipino revolutionaries also arrived on the island in April of 1872. According to Madrid, these elite exiles—comprised of lawyers, clergy, businessmen—were distributed among houses in Hagåtña. Padre Palomo housed four exiles including Jose Maria Guevara Reyes, Mariano Sevilla, Toribio del Pilar, and Anacleto Desiderio.³³ These exiled elites took a fairly calm approach to their exile in Guam, working with Spanish officials, the governor, and Hagåtña residents to make their stay as pleasant as possible. They brought along personal belongings that included large wardrobes and exotic jewelry, not to mention books and writing equipment that were rare in the Marianas. In some ways, these Filipino exiles brought a particular sense of modernity to the Marianas.

The presence of these elite Filipinos provided the foundations for an intellectual network of Filipinos and Chamorros from the latter half the nineteenth century and into the twentieth. Madrid notes that the friendship between Filipino Dr. Antonio Maria Regidor and Padre Palomo may have “facilitated the enhancement of their mutual positions of criticism regarding colonial authorities.”³⁴ The presence of Filipino revolutionaries in the center of city life in Guam made it very possible that they had political and cultural conversations about colonial governance. They may have exchanged political philosophies as well as strategies and tactics for how to deal with the colonial government. Chamorro elites took advantage of their presence, using the opportunity to create diplomatic networks that could possibly aid them in the future.³⁵ This network of intellectuals, however, does not mean Chamorros merely adopted Filipino anti-colonial beliefs. As pointed out by historian

³² De Viana, *In the Far Away Islands*, 120.

³³ Madrid, *Beyond Distances*, 72.

³⁴ Madrid, *Beyond Distances*, 213.

³⁵ At this point of time, Chamorro elites sent their children to university in the Philippines.

Madrid, Chamorros had their own experiences in the Marianas that shaped their own political ideologies. Filipino perspectives instead “added to an already-existing political dynamic” of the Chamorro elite.³⁶

Class was a major factor in how the Filipino exiles were treated by the Spanish government and the local elite. Besides the twenty-two exiles already mentioned, there were several hundred ordinary Filipino exiles, soldiers, laborers, and servants who put a strain on the finite resources of Guam.³⁷ Not only did Spanish officials understand the qualitative difference between the upper and lower classes of exiles, but so did the Chamorro elite, who were quick to welcome elite Filipinos and dismiss lower-class Filipinos. Padre Palomo told a former Spanish governor that these exiles were “nothing but a band of thieves, the very scum of Spain, ninety percent of whom could not read or write... wretches who only were good to corrupt the morals of natives.”³⁸ Padre Palomo’s description was not so far-fetched considering the amount of disruption the Filipino exiles had caused on the island since their arrival.

Father Aniceto Ibáñez, a Catholic priest stationed in Guam, wrote in his diary the activities of these Filipino exiles on Guam. Besides the occasional escapes into the jungles of the island, convicts and *deportados* committed violent crimes. Throughout his diary, Filipinos were characterized as violent vis-à-vis the virtually peaceful Chamorro people. “It seems that petty quarrels have been seething among the *deportados*,” Ibáñez wrote. “They tend to settle things with knives and, regardless of the amount of blood spilled, the victims will not reveal or divulge anything.”³⁹ As an example, in 1875, *deportado* Jose Castellón slashed José Cancino y Camacho “across the neck with a razor blade,

³⁶ Madrid, *Beyond Distances*, 213.

³⁷ Madrid, *Beyond Distances*, 206.

³⁸ Quoted in Madrid, *Beyond Distances*, 200.

³⁹ Ibáñez del Carmen, Aniceto, Francisco Resano del Corazón de Jesús, and others. *Chronicle of the Mariana Islands: 1846-1899*. Translated and annotated by Marjorie G. Driver, Spanish text edited by Omaira Brunal-Perry (Mangilao, Guam: Micronesian Area Research Center, University of Guam, 1998), 69. (Hereafter cited as “*Chronicle of the Mariana Islands*”

breaking or severing the jugular vein. He died shortly after from the loss of blood.”⁴⁰ The non-elite of the Filipino *deportados*, whether through sheer desperation for food and shelter or just dangerous men themselves, were violent and needed to be controlled.

The nature of the crimes of the Filipino *deportados* also led to paranoia. Considering the political crimes of many of the *deportados*, Ibáñez speculated whether the Filipino *deportados* would instigate another insurrection on Guam. In 1874, “a kind of powder bomb was tossed onto the roof of the house west of the houses of the Tagalogs.” The fire was extinguished, but this left Ibáñez to hope the culprit was a Spanish *deportado*. He wrote “I hope it was not a native islander or a Filipino, which could mean something else.”⁴¹ Since Filipino *deportados* were known to have anti-Spanish tendencies, Ibáñez, a Spanish priest himself, wondered whether this was an attempt to begin another anti-Spanish revolution on Guam.

The violence was not contained within the presidio because the Filipino *deportados* were allowed to roam free on the island. Though Ibáñez’s position as a Spanish priest may have made him particularly aware of the possibility of insurrection in the Spanish colonies, leading to his suspicion of all Filipino *deportados*, his notes of violence between Filipinos and Chamorros demonstrates the uneasy relations between Filipinos, Chamorros, and the Spanish leaders on Guam. On a November night in 1874, Ibáñez wrote in his diary, “a *deportado* entered a house and struck its owner, a woman, with a stick.” The woman screamed for help, and a few Chamorro men “arrived and struck the *deportado* eleven blows with a cudgel.”⁴² The *deportado* would survive the beating, but this was only one of many instances of the increased violence on the island. Other ethnic groups were also targeted. In another bloody incident in January of 1875, “the old Pagan Chinese, was found murdered in his home.” With the machete, the assailant hit the man eight times, one “struck

⁴⁰ *Chronicle of the Mariana Islands*, 71.

⁴¹ *Chronicle of the Mariana Islands*, 64.

⁴² *Chronicles of the Mariana Islands*, 63.

vertically across his head, had killed him.”⁴³ Ibáñez suspected that “because of the savage manner in which he was killed many people suspect the *presidarios*.”⁴⁴ During the feast day of Santa Rosa de Lima in August of 1875, “there were clubbings and a few stabbings among the native islanders, Taglogs [*sic*], and *deportados*,”⁴⁵ Yet many of the accusations were not verified because the victims did not want to divulge information, perhaps due to fear of retaliation. Ibáñez wrote in his diary, “I doubt that any other time since these islands were conquered has so much kindred blood been shed as has been spilled among the *deportados* since they first came ashore on 6 August 1874.”⁴⁶

Ibáñez’s fears of a potential insurrection were confirmed by the assassination of Governor Angel de Pazos y Vela-Hidalgo in 1884. On his way to dinner, the governor was shot in the back by a twenty-two-year-old Chamorro man, José de Salas. The Spanish guard armed themselves in preparation for an uprising, but none came. Upon further investigation, it became apparent that there was “a conspiracy among soldiers of the local guard company, nearly all Chamorros, to overthrow the government.”⁴⁷ The presence of the Filipino exiles and the Filipino Revolution itself may have influenced the actions of the Chamorro guards, prompting this act of rebellion. Forty-four suspects were apprehended and sent to Manila for their trial. Twelve were found innocent, thirty-one were found guilty and sent to prison, and four were sentenced to death.⁴⁸ The four were executed in Guam in April 1885, a warning to any person living on Guam willing to take arms against the Spanish crown.

The Third Wave

⁴³ *Chronicles of the Mariana Islands*, 64.

⁴⁴ *Chronicles of the Mariana Islands*, 64.

⁴⁵ *Chronicles of the Mariana Islands*, 70.

⁴⁶ *Chronicles of the Mariana Islands*, 74.

⁴⁷ Rogers, *Destiny’s Landfall*, 96. For this episode, I have paraphrased the research and work of historian Robert Rogers. He cites Ibáñez del Carmen and Resano (1976, 57); LCM 82 (1885–1899, Criminal investigation following the assassination of the governor of the Islands, Angel de Pazos); and García de la Purísima Concepción (1964, 64[14]–65[15]).

⁴⁸ Rogers, *Destiny’s Landfall*, 97.

With the rise, yet again, of the Filipino Revolution in the 1890s, more *deportados* were sent to Guam. As the resistance grew more organized in the Philippines, captured and exiled Filipino revolutionaries arrived in Guam with full intention to resist the Spanish government. Most notably on September 11, 1896, fifty-seven prisoners arrived on Guam after they were “captured in Manila during the revolt for independence.”⁴⁹ In December, 207 more *disciplinarios*—rebel soldiers—arrived at Apra Harbor, Guam. A total of five of the *deportados* were women. Father Francisco Resano wrote in his diary that two Chamorro artillerymen overheard that the *deportados* “intended to kill the entire Spanish population, plus any Chamorros who interfered.”⁵⁰ Two days after the *deportados* landed on Guam, “they began attempting to escape through the windows in the roof, but were stopped by bullets.” One person was killed. Five others wounded. Not intimidated by the show of force, the prisoners attempted to escape again that night. They clambered onto the rafters to escape through the roof or threw themselves onto the prison doors. Resano recorded in his diary, “The Chamorro artillerymen held to their posts, shooting them at close range, and they fell to the ground... the shooting continued for some time.”⁵¹ Word of the escaping prisoners spread to the people of Hagåtña, and “armed with shotguns, machetes, and clubs, they congregated at the vicinity of the prisión” to fight against the Filipino prisoners. “When the prison doors were opened,” Resano wrote, “there before our eyes, was a horrible sight: eighty persons lay dead and forty-five wounded, sprawled on the floor, bathed in their own blood.”⁵² The presence of these rebellious and violent Filipino *deportados* shaped the perspectives of the Chamorro elites, many of whom detested the *deportados* presence on the island. One of their first course of actions when the Americans came to

⁴⁹ *Chronicles of the Mariana Islands*, 105.

⁵⁰ Father Ibáñez left the island between 1878 and 1887. This is when Father Francisco Resano started to write his diaries about life on Guam. He continued to write about Guam until his death in 1892. *Chronicles of Mariana Islands*, 106.

⁵¹ *Chronicles of the Mariana Islands*, 106.

⁵² *Chronicles of the Mariana Islands*, 106.

govern the island, as we will see in the next section of this chapter, was to once again exile these misbehaving *deportados* to protect the local population.

Filipino *deportados* in the 19th century earned a mixed reputation in the eyes of the Chamorro elite. Those with wealth and elite status were lauded as symbols of civilization, intelligence, and cosmopolitanism. These Filipinos could advance the well-being of the Chamorro elite on Guam. With the right amount of diplomacy and hospitality, the Chamorro elite could establish networks that could benefit their families and community for generations. Padre Palomo certainly understood the gravity of such connections. Meanwhile, lower-class exiles, especially those with revolutionary fervent, were seen as detrimental to the Chamorro society. Their violence and general bad behavior threatened the balance of people and the Chamorro culture that prevailed on the island. Nonetheless, the relationships between Filipinos and Chamorros of the Spanish period demonstrate the deep and complicated relationship between the two archipelagoes, politically, socially, and intellectually. This shared history influenced the colonial networks in the transition of empires.

Imperial Transitions

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, Filipino *ilustrados* sought allies in different countries around the world to support their campaign for independence from the Spanish Empire. The *ilustrados* were highly educated men, who launched an intellectual, anti-colonial campaign against the Spanish Crown and the Catholic Church. Emilio Aguinaldo, Apolinario Mabini, as well as others in the Filipino Revolutionary Committee understood that a successful independence movement required recognition from multiple powerful nations. Thus, they formed a diplomatic team sent to Japan, Hong Kong, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States to negotiate partnerships to support the revolution either through military aid or even diplomacy.⁵³ Jose M. Basa

⁵³ Augusto de Viana, "The Development of the Philippine Foreign Service During the Revolutionary Period and the Filipino-American War (1896-1906): A Story of Struggle from the Formation of Diplomatic." *The Antonious Journal*, The University of Santo Tomas Graduate School, Vol.2 2015.

and Antonio Regidor, two former Filipinos exiled to Guam and the latter a good friend of Padre Palomo, were a part of this junta. Basa remained in Hong Kong, while Regidor was assigned to be the junta's liaison in the United Kingdom. Ultimately, the junta was successful in gaining an ally in the United States due to their common enemy during the Spanish-American War. After several broken agreements and the ambitions of a rising global power, however, the United States turned its guns away from their Spanish enemies and pointed them towards the Filipino *ilustrados* who had mobilized a mass movement for independence. On February 4, 1899, in the eyes of the United States, the Philippine Revolution became the Philippine Insurrection.⁵⁴

The Philippine Revolution was a brutal campaign for freedom and nation. The Filipino *ilustrados* needed to unite the diverse archipelago into a single nation despite the hundreds of different languages and dialects, the equally numerous regional and provincial identities and personalities, and the multiple cultural and ethnic groups. The coalescing of many different peoples into the notion of *bayang*—nation—was no easy feat, even within the group of Filipino elites themselves. The leaders of the Philippine Revolution were not without their faults. According to several historians, the Filipino revolution failed as a result of an un-unified political elite whose disparate personalities, ambitions, and economic prospects often clouded judgements. When it became apparent that the United States was no longer open to the Philippines quest for independence, many *ilustrados* thought it wise to accept annexation especially in light of the fact that so many millions of soldiers and generals had been lost in the battles across the archipelago.⁵⁵

Although there were those who remained true to the cause such as General Artemio Ricarte, most

⁵⁴ This dissertation will not delve deep into the details of the Philippine Revolution. Rather it utilizes the geography of Guam to understand the ramifications of these global events on the Chamorro people of Guam, who were also experiencing this uncertain time of imperial transitions. Furthermore, there is a wealth of literature both in United States and Philippine academic historiography on the Philippine revolution, but there is relatively little on this period in Guam history.

⁵⁵ The fact that the United States did not invite Filipinos to the negotiations during the Treaty of Paris in 1898 was an ultimate slap in the face to Filipinos who had fought for decades against Spanish imperialism.

of the *ilustrados* eventually acquiesced, ending the Philippine Revolution. U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt declared the war over on July 2, 1902.

The Filipino revolutionaries fought against a country which believed that Filipinos were inferior in race, intellect, and civilization. The intellectuals of the Philippine Revolution were villainized and demeaned despite the fact that they were highly educated not only in institutions in the Philippines, but across several countries in Europe. This racial ideology, in which the Philippine archipelago's linguistic, cultural, and religious diversity were seen as unfit for the creation of a nation-state, justified American soldiers' brutal actions on the battlefield. According to historian Paul Kramer, "race would not justify the ends of the war—especially as the necessary response to Filipino savagery and tribal fragmentation—but would be used to justify many of the 'marked severities' employed by U.S. soldiers to bring it to its desired conclusion."⁵⁶ The brutality of the war was justified through race.

While the U.S. occupation of the Philippines was violent, Guam's experience of the Spanish-American War was relatively quiet. Captain Henry Glass approached the island upon the *USS Charleston*, firing shells at the Orote harbor to no retaliation by Spanish officials. The next day Spanish colonial governor Juan Marina surrendered to Captain Glass, citing that the Spanish garrison on the island could not defend it. On June 21, 1898, at exactly 2:45 in the afternoon, the United States flag was raised and the "Star Spangled Banner" was sung. Shortly after, however, the flag was lowered that same afternoon because Captain Glass was unsure if the U.S. would continue to hold Guam as a territory.⁵⁷ Nevertheless, Captain Glass corralled Spanish officials and military onto his ships and left Guam in a state of political uncertainty, which would only be resolved once the first U.S. Naval governor arrived in 1899.

⁵⁶ Kramer, *Blood of Government*, 145.

⁵⁷ Rogers, *Destiny's Landfall*, passim 103-106.

In the year between Captain Henry Glass's annexation of Guam and the arrival of the first U.S. Naval Governor of the island, there existed several exchanges of leadership between Spanish, Chamorro, and even American men.⁵⁸ When Captain Glass left the island, a former Spanish official named Jose Sixto took it upon himself to become the governor of the island, disbursing the remainder of the treasury's funds to his friends and himself. On New Year's Day, dissatisfied by Sixto's leadership and outright opportunism, the Chamorro elite led by Padre Palomo drafted a document to be given to Sixto demanding his resignation. The Chamorro elite also installed Venancio Roberto as governor of Guam. But according to historian Robert Rogers, the Chamorro elite noticed that an American ship entered Apra Harbor, and "everyone immediately postponed all action until the next day to present their cases to the American captain of the ship."⁵⁹

On board the ship *Bennington* was Captain Edward D. Taussig who brought news about the Treaty of Paris which notified island residents that the island now belonged to the United States. It also brought official news that the Mariana Islands to the north of Guam were now German territories. Captain Taussig presented the first two American orders demanded of the island: the first that the treasury be inventoried, and secondly, that Apra Harbor and the Spanish lands that surround the harbor now belonged to the U.S. Navy. Rather than instituting an American leadership on the island, Captain Taussig also put in charge Chamorro elites Joaquin Perez y Cruz as acting governor, Vicente Perez as secretary, and Vicente Herrero in charge of finances. They would remain official leaders of the island, not uncommon for how the U.S. empire haphazardly ruled its colonial possessions at the beginning of the imperial transition.

That is until American naval captain Louis A. Kaiser arrived on island. While he did not have official orders from the President or the Secretary of the Navy, Kaiser took it upon himself to

⁵⁸ This recounting of how Guam was acquired and annexed by the United States is paraphrased from Robert Rogers's *Destiny's Landfall* and is here for background history.

⁵⁹ Rogers, *Destiny's Landfall*, 108

negotiate with visiting ships. Kaiser, believing himself to be the person in charge of Guam, removed Perez as acting governor in July 1899, and appointed a friend, William Pritchard Coe, as governor. In retaliation for Kaiser's actions, the Chamorro leaders created their own bicameral legislature to counteract policies created by Kaiser and Coe, but Kaiser wanted to remain in power and disbanded what historian Rogers describes as "what would have been the first legislature in Guam's history."⁶⁰ With the U.S. Navy consistently leaving gaps in local power, Chamorro leaders were reluctant to let total chaos reign over the island and took the initiative to take charge of their island's affairs. After years of conversations with Filipino revolutionaries, their own experience ruling towns and villages throughout the island, and their law and religious degrees from universities in the Philippines, the Chamorro elite devised policies that would lead the island through this time of political uncertainty. Contrary to the general perception held by American colonial officials such as Captain Kaiser, the Chamorro elite was not completely isolated from the world, but was a cosmopolitan community able and willing to lead the island into the next phase of imperial transitions.

The Spanish-American War was less violent on Guam, but no less traumatizing. With the coming of American rule, Guam became political separated from their Chamorro families in the Northern Marianas Islands.⁶¹ Since the Chamorro people first settled the archipelago and throughout the presence of the Spanish empire, the Chamorro people of the Marianas were a unified group. As a result of the Spanish-American War and the United States desire for only one island in Micronesia, the Northern Marianas became German territories. The Marianas were no longer ruled as a single entity under the Philippines, as they had been for several hundred years. The Spanish order in which local indigenous leaders were able to decide much of *barangay* and village politics was now uncertain. The Spanish priests who were religious as well as civic leaders were exiled, except for

⁶⁰ Rogers, *Destiny's Landfall*, 110.

⁶¹ For more details about the partition of the Marianas read Don Farrell's "The Partition of the Marianas: A Diplomatic History," in *ISLA: Journal of Micronesian Studies*, 2:2 Dry Season, 1994: 273-301.

Padre Palomo, who would remain a significant figure in the transition between empires. American naval governors were given the wherewithal to determine the island's laws and enforce them.

Ironically, the transition from Spanish to American empires for the Philippines and Guam did not mean the expansion of civic rights but the diminishing of self-governance and representation. Rather than ascribing their acquiescence to American rule as passivity or blind loyalty, the Chamorro elite were negotiating geopolitical forces beyond their control including war and diplomacy between large imperial nations, all the while attempting to advocate for the local Chamorro people who resided on Guam.

American Naval Government on Guam

In August of 1899, Captain Richard P. Leary sailed up to Apra Harbor and declared Guam as a U.S. Naval Station. Posting a "Proclamation!" in English, Spanish, and Chamorro at the turn of the new millennium, Leary shared the news that Spain had transferred sovereignty to the United States. Bringing modernity into the island, the Proclamation explained that the United States would bring about "the surest and speediest route to success, prosperity and happiness for the inhabitants for this island" through "benevolent assimilation to the fundamental principles that constituted the basis of Free American Government."⁶² In addition, the United States was to accomplish this task with "honest labor with just compensation" because the Spanish "labor-degrading system of human bondage and unjust, indefinite servitude or Peonage... is in fact a system of Slavery."⁶³ In its presence on the island, United States would extinguish a regime that was "an obstacle to progressive civilization [and] menace to popular liberty."⁶⁴ Yet, Leary and his Naval administration would not allow Chamorro people to create a representative government in any way as the Chamorro elite had

⁶² "Proclamation," MSS 930 Box 3 Folder 14, National Archives Record Group 80, Annual Reports of the Governors of Guam, 1901-1940, University of Guam, The Richard Flores Taitano Micronesian Area Research Center. (Collection Hereafter cited as MSS 930, MARC, UOG)

⁶³ "Proclamation" MSS 930, Box 3, Folder 14, MARC, UOG.

⁶⁴ "Proclamation" MSS 930, Box 3, Folder 14, MARC, UOG.

practiced during the Spanish era. Nevertheless, this proclamation alone swayed the Chamorro elite to see more opportunities and possibilities in the new empire when compared to the old one, and they took advantage of it.

Together with his Lieutenant Governor William Edwin Safford, Naval Governor Richard Leary administered the first year of nearly fifty years of naval rule on Guam. However, it was not a clean break from Spanish empire; it was a transition. In addition to continuing Spanish law, they issued executive general orders that sought to regulate civilian and military life. Instead of building new facilities, Leary attempted to use Chamorro labor to renovate existing Spanish era structures for military purposes, though without success. Instead, American soldiers would perform the manual labor necessary.⁶⁵ Because the U.S. Navy and the U.S. federal government still did not know how to deal with the newly acquired territories, islands like Guam were in political limbo. Despite this, life continued.

From the beginning, it became apparent that Governor Leary wanted nothing to do with the island, seeking instead to hide himself on the *Yosemite*.⁶⁶ Governor Leary appointed William Safford to be the Judge of First Instance, Recorder of Deeds and Titles, and the Auditor of the Treasury, all in addition to his position as the Lieutenant Governor.⁶⁷ On the night of the change of command, Safford sat in his bed and reflected on his new leadership position. He was to “lay down to think over my new situation, not without the feeling of the unusual responsibility thrust upon me. But I also experience a sort of exultation in being in a position to help people who would need help, and I

⁶⁵ Labor shortages would be a constant problem for U.S. military infrastructure projects throughout the 20th century. Chamorro people did not necessarily want to work for the military because of the relative reliable subsistence living and Chamorro *chenchu’le* system. Occasionally, Filipino laborers would fill the need.

⁶⁶ William Safford, *A Year on the Island of Guam: Extracts from the Notebook of Naturalist William Edwin Safford*, edited by Jillette Leon Guerrero, (Agana Heights: Guamology Publishing, 2016), 22.

⁶⁷ Safford, *A Year on the Island of Guam*, 22.

hoped that our coming would be a blessing to the island.”⁶⁸ Safford took his jobs seriously and he made an impact in Guam society.

The residents of Hagåtña loved Safford because he made an effort to learn Chamorro culture and immerse himself in the Chamorro community. He bought a house, took tours of the islands’ villages, studied the flora and fauna of the island and made inquiries as to how the natives used them, attempted to learn the Chamorro language, and treated the natives with the utmost respect. In some ways, Safford’s respect for the island’s people could be interpreted and seen as a practice of Chamorro *inafa’maolek*—that is the Chamorro cultural practice of “to make good,” to share in reciprocal practices for the good of the whole community. *Inafa’maolek* is the foundation upon which family and kinship relations are created and practiced through generations. It “gave the Chamorros an understanding of who they are in relation to others in their family clans and communities.”⁶⁹ To be *taimamalao*—“to have no shame.” To be disrespectful was to break *inafa’maolek*, which brought shame upon a family. Safford’s willingness to listen to the Chamorro elites, integrate himself in Guam society, and work to better the conditions of the island made him a worthy citizen and participant in Chamorro society. Safford, according to Jillette Leon Guerrero, “was the most prolific and influential public advocate for the people of Guam in these years – introducing the American public to the island, its culture and people.”⁷⁰ Safford was seen as the benevolent face of the U.S. Naval period at the turn of the twentieth century.⁷¹

⁶⁸ Safford, *A Year on the Island of Guam*, 29.

⁶⁹ Carmen Artero Kasperbauer, “The Chamorro Culture,” in *Hale’ta: Issues in Guam’s Political Development: the Chamorro Perspective*, (Agaña, Guam: The Political Status Education Coordinating Commission), 29. More about *inafa’maolek* can be found in Lawrence Cunningham, *Ancient Chamorro Society*, (Honolulu: the Bess Press, 1992), 86-89.

⁷⁰ Safford, *A Year on the Island of Guam*, 6.

⁷¹ In writing this history of William Safford, I am by no means arguing that the American Naval government was benevolent and altruistic. Safford is an exception to the often racist, misguided, and uninterested naval governors that would pass through Guam during the first half of the 20th century. Furthermore, not all of Safford’s policies and law would be beneficial to the island. His land policy which transferred all uninhabited, underutilized land to the Naval Government was the first in the long history of Chamorro land dispossession on Guam. It also led the way for the building of military bases on the island that remain in the 21st century. His tax policy furthermore put a strain on land-owning elites, who were ultimately cash poor because of the subsistence and bartering system that existed in Guam

The Chamorro elite were intelligent and skillful politicians, utilizing their relationships with colonial officials to advocate for Guam in larger circles beyond the island. Lt. Governor William Safford was one of their potential advocates and allies for the future of Guam. Safford visited their homes, met their families, visited their ranches and plantations, travelled to other villages with them, and often described them in his journal. Safford in fact celebrated Thanksgiving dinner with Padre Palomo, Justo Dungca, Juan de Torres, Gregorio Perez, Lorenzo Franquez, and Jose Herrero. According to Safford, “it was the first real American fiesta that the natives had been called upon to celebrate, and they were not sure how to go about it.”⁷² Safford made sure there was an abundance of food at his house and he described the mix of native foods on his dining table cooked and served by Susana, “a most important personage.” Susana also happened to be the sister of Pedro Duarte, one of the Spanish officials captured by Taussig’s crew in the annexation of Guam.⁷³ Safford wrote in his journal, “Nothing more beautiful than this island could be imagined; and no one could wish for more pleasant occupation nor kinder friends.”⁷⁴ The way that Safford described his Thanksgiving Dinner with the natives of Guam and an abundance of food matched his idyllic perception of life on Guam. With the emphasis on friendship and cooperation, Safford might have seen the parallels between his and the U.S. Navy’s presence on Guam with the first European settlers on the North American continent. Harkening to the American responsibility of moral uplift in its imperial project, Safford wrote “Above all, I feel it a privilege to be engaged in work which really counts – work in which I can be of some use to people who need me.”⁷⁵

society. Anne Hattori, “Navy Blues: Naval Rule on Guam and the Rough Road to Assimilation, 1898-1940” in *Pacific-Asia Inquiry* Vol. 5, No. 1(Fall2014):18-19.

⁷² Safford, *A Year on the Island of Guam*, 148.

⁷³ Safford, *A Year on the Island of Guam*, 150.

⁷⁴ Safford, *A Year on the Island of Guam*, 151.

⁷⁵ Safford, *A Year on the Island of Guam*, 151.

In his capacity as Lt. Governor, Safford looked to the Chamorro people for advice and took their requests seriously. One request in particular was to deport misbehaving Filipino *deportados* from the Spanish Era.⁷⁶ On August 28, 1899, the Chamorro elite sent a petition to Governor Leary regarding the deportation of these Filipino exiles—they perhaps broke *inafa'maolek*—to which Leary entrusted Safford the dirty work of exiling the Filipinos. In his diary, Safford wrote about the Filipino *deportados* on the fourth and fifth of September 1899. There were reports of Filipino *deportados* starting a riot in December of 1898, and general misbehavior that annoyed the Chamorro elite. Safford was also told that “there had been a disturbance between some Chamorros and Filipinos on Easter Sunday, and it was feared there would be an outbreak on the part of the Filipinos.”⁷⁷ Safford learned that before he arrived on the island the officer in charge of the *Nashan* issued curfews and “took list of those having firearms in their possession.”⁷⁸ Chamorro fears of misbehaving Filipinos were not unfounded considering the Chamorro elites’ experience with the violence of Filipino *deportados* during the Spanish Era. In addition, several lawsuits existed between Chamorros and Filipinos.

Because misbehaving Filipinos had the capacity and ability to upset the new colonial authorities, the Chamorro elite saw how Filipinos could potentially harm the delicate balance of power that existed between them and the American officials in this pivotal time of transition. The American officials needed much help from the Chamorro elite to implement colonial policies; and the Chamorro elite needed American officials to ensure their continued say in island affairs. The Chamorro elite were also engaging in diplomacy, hoping to create lasting friendships that would benefit them in the long run. Exiled Filipinos, still distrustful of colonial powers, could jeopardize

⁷⁶ Letter to the Secretary of the Navy (Aug 28, 1899) No.18-G.S. MSS 2370 Richard P. Leary Papers, The Richard Taitano Micronesian Area Research Center, University of Guam.

⁷⁷ Safford, *A Year on the Island of Guam*, 52.

⁷⁸ Safford, *A Year on the Island of Guam*, 52.

this goal, and even more, their lower-class status could not offer any political help to aid the Chamorro elite.

Yet, some Filipinos had integrated themselves positively into Guam society. Upon hearing the request, Safford investigated the claims and found that “although many of those names were upon the list furnished me were bad or worthless men, yet some were thrifty, hard-working citizens.”⁷⁹ Those who were deemed “the better class” of Filipino residents were allowed to stay, while “orders were issued for the arrest of others, who were [then] confined in the tribunal for safekeeping to await transportation to Manila on the *Nanshan*.”⁸⁰ The “better class” of Filipinos, according to Safford, were those who were able to provide valuable skills on an island that lacked skilled workers. These included skilled cabinet-makers and rice-planters. Productive members of society were necessary to the Navy’s control and civilization of the isolated island.

Furthermore, men who married Chamorro women and adequately cared for them were allowed to stay. Safford wrote in his journal that he was visited by two poor women and their children who were the families of the arrested men. The women claimed that “they were good men and had never been law-breakers.” As it turns out, a “respectable rice planter” was mistaken for a man of “bad character.” He was allowed to stay. Safford used his discretion to discern between good and bad citizens—something that Naval Governor Richard P. Leary allowed him to do—but also listened to the Chamorro people who spent time among the Filipino men. Filipino men who had a paternal duty to Chamorro families and who were productive and responsible to the island society were allowed to stay. To be a good citizen was to be a good colonial within the U.S. Naval government while simultaneously participating in *inafa’maolek* among the Chamorro families. Thus,

⁷⁹ Safford, *A Year on the Island of Guam*, 53.

⁸⁰ Safford, *A Year on the Island of Guam*, 52.

Filipino *deportados*' criminality was absolved if they contributed positively by becoming productive members of the island.

The next day the arrested Filipinos were marched to the *Nanshan*. In a letter to the Secretary of the Navy, Governor Leary wrote “after investigation of the records of those persons, all who have completed their terms of imprisonment, I have decided to send back to their homes (per *U.S.S. Nanshan*) those who are a menace to the peace of this island and undesirable as residents.”⁸¹ The exile of these Filipino ex-convicts broke down familial and kinship connections that bonded them to the island. Safford wrote in his journal that a group of women went to the jail, “some holding little children in their arms and weeping, running after the men as they marched out of town and handing them little baskets and bags of food.”⁸² They also brought clean clothes so that they would not have to “go on board in the working garments in which they had been arrested.” These men, none of whom were named except for Martin Pagal—the man of “bad character”—evidently had started families with local women who cared for them. Despite having families in Guam, these men were deemed irredeemable criminals, whose only future lied in deportation. The *deportados* experienced a second exile, but this time away from Guam to the Philippines. The improvised structure of U.S. colonial rule, especially in the handling of unwanted Filipinos on Guam, demonstrates how colonial subjects could influence colonial policy as well as the empire’s carceral effects on the familial and intimate relations.

Not all of Guam’s elite were satisfied with the deportations of the *deportados*. On October 22, 1899, Safford visited the copra plantation of Don Justo Dungca in Apurgan—today remembered as Dungca’s Beach. Safford described Dungca as “one of the most thrifty citizens of the islands” because he was able to export copra to the Philippines. Safford wrote that Dungca

⁸¹ Letter to the Secretary of the Navy (Aug 28, 1899), MSS 2370, Richard P. Leary Papers, UOG, MARC.

⁸² Safford, *A Year on the Island of Guam*, 53.

lamented the fact that one of his workers who “cleverly constructed” several houses on Dungca’s plantation was “one of the Filipino ex-convicts sent to Manila.”⁸³ Filipino labor for Dungca was necessary for his business to thrive. Dungca himself was a descendant of a Spanish Era Filipino *deportado*, Nicomedes Ascuncion, who was exiled to Guam in 1855. His family and descendants were “productive and turned out to be good citizens.”⁸⁴ In the 1870s and the 1890s, he housed Filipino revolutionaries exiled to Guam including one of the two women exiled as a result of the Spanish era deportations. Dungca himself became a prominent member of the Spanish colonial administration and easily transitioned into the American Naval administration as Justice of the Peace. Furthermore, at this time, Dungca had a servant in his household, a Filipino woman who was exiled to Guam during the Revolution.⁸⁵ Safford also noted Dungca’s large grazing lands on the island. Dungca, despite his Filipino heritage, was part of the elite in Guam society, and represented a possible future of Guam’s economy. Dungca maintained a friendship with Safford, as their correspondence suggests.

With an attentive Lt. Governor, the Chamorro elite were able to control their island’s population, something they could not do under Spanish rule. To them, Safford represented how the Americans and their political philosophy could allow Chamorro people to exercise political rights, and potentially signal that the United States might hold onto the ideas stated in the Proclamation.

1900 Petition to have Safford as Governor

Safford’s time on Guam, however, would be cut due to the U.S. Navy’s change of command. Naval governors on Guam were only governors so long as the island was their assigned duty. But, the Chamorro elites who Safford had befriended during his year-long stay saw Safford as an

⁸³ Safford, *A Year on the Island of Guam*, 102.

⁸⁴ Jillette Leon Guerrero, “Forzado System and the Mariana Islands,” Guampedia, Inc. Accessed August 17, 2019. <https://www.guampedia.com/forzado-system-and-the-mariana-islands/>.

⁸⁵ De Viana, *In the Far Away Islands*, 134. Mabini also mentions this particular woman during his stay on Guam.

appropriate leader for the island. On April 3, 1900, twenty-eight residents of Hagåtña signed a petition to the President of the United States filled with metaphors explaining their interpretation of a representative political philosophy.⁸⁶ Using a metaphor of a working human body, they believed that communication and a recognition of the people's needs was key to good governance. The parts of the body "each have a function, a mission to accomplish and fulfill."⁸⁷ The head of the body—the governor of a society—"is so essential, so absolutely necessary, that if it is paralyzed or hindered for whatever reason, everything is affected or paralyzed sometimes completely." A good governor was necessary for a society to function well.

Furthermore, the petition stated that a good government required transparent communication and that the government should be adequately suited to the local people and the environment. The petition read that "the governor's authority should be vested, [and] at least begets the knowledge of his subjects of what tends to forge their common wellbeing and prosperity, which is the utmost foundation of the theory and science of government, regardless of the system of government established."⁸⁸ In the perspective of the Chamorro elite, any governor of Guam should put at the forefront of their responsibilities the well-being of island residents, not personal or economic gain. After the tumultuous year of Captain Kaiser and William Coe, the Chamorro elite did not want another person who was unwilling to look after the island's residents.

The Chamorro elite were also not necessarily asking for a representative government. They asserted that in order to help bring about progress for the island, "it is necessary that whoever governs it, or at least some of the governor's adjutants, study, observe, and know said needs, which

⁸⁶ This letter has not been historicized in the literature on Guam self-determination in either Penelope Bordallo Hofschneider's *A Campaign for Political Rights* or Robert Rogers' *Destiny's Landfall*. Written in Spanish among U.S. Naval documents, perhaps researchers ignored the letter. Its importance lies in the fact that many of the signers of this petition went on to sign the 1901 petition as well as attempt to lay out some sort of political philosophy.

⁸⁷ "La Gobernador de isla de Guam," Box 3, Folder 12, MSS 930, MARC, UOG.

⁸⁸ "La Gobernador de isla de Guam," Box 3, Folder 12, MSS 930, MARC, UOG.

can only be achieved through the observation, treatment, and opportune intervention in such matters.”⁸⁹ What the Chamorro elite wanted was a person who was intimately knowledgeable about the local circumstances, the culture, and the people. Only a person who was willing to integrate themselves into Guam society would understand the needs of the people, how they would feel in any implementation of law, and the best practices to help move the island into modernity. They understood that at this point United States rule over Guam was undisputed; but what they did want was certainty that they would be consulted in any of the laws and affairs of the island. This petition was a form of flattery and of diplomacy, demonstrating their knowledge of government and of American values. Of course, the Chamorro elite had a specific person in mind when they wrote this petition to the president of the United States.

This type of leadership was needed to advance the island into modernity. The Chamorro elite believed that although they would always hold true to their culture, they understood that the United States was now the imperial power that ruled over Guam. They wrote, “the people of Guam, always loving of its institutions and fond of its traditional customs has seen with complacency and without disdain for the old regime the undeniable change in government.”⁹⁰ While they acknowledged the change in imperial power, they qualified that they did not necessarily have “disdain for the old regime.” This demonstrates how they were not totally dissatisfied with Spanish colonialism, especially in light of the fact that the Spanish administration of Guam allowed Indigenous leaders to have power in village and local politics. Nevertheless, the Chamorro people had faith that the United States would practice some sort of democracy and help catapult the island into modernity. The Chamorro people wrote that they “had demonstrated deep sympathies for the American people, understanding they were free and because they were free they had become great in

⁸⁹ “La Gobernador de isla de Guam,” Box 3, Folder 12, MSS 930, MARC, UOG.

⁹⁰ “La Gobernador de isla de Guam,” Box 3, Folder 12, MSS 930, MARC, UOG.

a relatively short time.” The United States—with constant communication with Chamorro people, transparent leadership, and a good, attentive governor, in the perspective of the Chamorro elite—could bring the whole of Guam into modernity.

After demonstrating their understanding and knowledge of the responsibilities of good governance, the Chamorro signers requested that Lieutenant Governor William Safford become the Governor of Guam because of his adroit attention to the Chamorro elite’s desires. Safford seemed to be the exemplary candidate for their needs. Fluent in Spanish and genuinely interested in the people and the island of Guam, they wrote that he “has been working inexhaustibly for all the things regarding the common benefit and, without exaggerating or paying flattery, but on the contrary simply doing him justice.”⁹¹ They explained further that Safford has put every effort into getting to know the island of Guam, teaching English language in schools, learning Spanish legal codes, attending to the sick, as well as surveying land. In addition, Safford responded positively to the Chamorro request to remove Filipino *deportados* from the island before the arrival of Mabini.⁹² Safford, an intellectual himself, was attuned to the specificities of Guam. He understood the Chamorro people as not the same as Filipinos, but their own people. He also did not see Chamorros—or at least elite Chamorros—as any less than liberal individuals, capable of leading and thinking for themselves. The signers of this petition were the closest of Safford’s acquaintances while on Guam. These men included Padre Jose Palomo, Jose de Torres, Gregorio Perez, Luis de Torres, Vicente de Leon Guerrero, Atanasio T. Perez among so many others. The signers’ request to have Safford as the governor, however, was not heard by the President of the United States.

Even after Safford’s departure in July 1900, members of the Chamorro elite still managed to keep Safford abreast of the latest news on Guam, sending correspondence about everything from

⁹¹ “La Gobernador de isla de Guam,” Box 3, Folder 12, MSS 930, MARC, UOG.

⁹² Rogers, *Destiny’s Landfall*, 111.

everyday life, to legal disputes, to marriages and deaths, to the Filipino prisoners, and about the petition itself.⁹³ With these letters, Safford continued to write about Guam including publishing books about the natural flora and fauna on Guam and a Chamorro-English dictionary with the aid of Padre Palomo, Pedro Duarte, among others.⁹⁴ In the spirit of Safford as part of the Chamorro family, Anatasio Perez sent a letter to Safford on July 5th, 1902 detailing the marriages, births, and deaths of the families that had hosted in Guam.⁹⁵ The feeling of friendship was mutual. Safford wrote in his memoirs, “As the ship weighed anchor and sailed away I felt real grief, as though leaving people of my own blood. I shall always look back upon the year I spent on this lovely island as one of the happiest of my life.”⁹⁶

The first two years of American rule of Guam was hardly an organized, smooth transition. With orders from Washington D.C. rare, Spanish officials, U.S. military officers, and Chamorro elites clamored for rule and order on Guam. The Chamorro elite were not passive bystanders in this transition of empire, and actively participated when the appointed governors did not do well for them. Furthermore, they advocated for themselves, practicing diplomacy through friendship and *inafa'maolek* with American colonial officials. In other words, rather than viewing Chamorro elites' acquiescence to American rule and hospitality to Americans as blind loyalty and faith, we should see them as calculating actors using what they had to influence local politics in the transition between empires.

Filipino Revolutionaries and the Chamorro Elite under American Empire

⁹³ MSS 980, William Safford Papers Collection, Micronesian Area Research Center, University of Guam,

⁹⁴ William E. Safford, “Guam and Its People,” *American Anthropologist*. (October-December 1902): 707-729.

⁹⁵ Folder 1, MSS 980, William Edwin Safford Papers, MARC, UOG.

⁹⁶ Folder 2, MSS 980, William Edwin Safford Papers, MARC, UOG. After leaving Guam, Safford published several academic pieces on his experiences on Guam, scientific findings in botany from the island, as well as Chamorro-English dictionary he compiled with Padre Palomo. He served as a botanist with the Department of Agriculture, earned a PhD from George Washington University. He was a well-respected scientist who had genera of plants named after him. He passed away in 1924. Jilette Leon Guerrero, “Introduction to William Edwin Safford (1859-1926),” in *A Year on the Island of Guam 1899-1900: Extracts from the Notebook of Naturalist William Edwin Safford* (Agana Height: Guamology Publishing, 2016), 6-7.

While Lieutenant Governor Safford dealt with a family quarrel in the village of Agat in Guam, U.S. military officials surrounded the house of Zacarias Flores in Cayupo, Nueva Ecija on December 10, 1899.⁹⁷ The U.S. military had heard that Apolinario Mabini was in Cayupo, and had spent a week or so spying on the town.⁹⁸ In 1941, Gualben Aguila recorded an oral history of Damian Pascual who had witnessed first-hand the apprehension of Mabini. Pascual recounted that in the latter weeks of 1899 “many strangers were seen loitering about the *población* (population)” and that “these people had no business in Cuyapo.” After about a week of spying, an American soldier asked Pascual if he had seen Mabini in town. The child, petrified, said nothing, his father having warned him “never to betray Mabini to the Americans.” The American, taking Pascual’s silence as a clue to the whereabouts of Mabini, walked to the house of Zacarias Flores, found the front door “securely bolted,” but found a way using the kitchen stairs. In one of the rooms, they found “a man with sallow complexion, sunken eyes and broad intelligent brow sat in a large easy chair in one corner.” Pascual knew it was Mabini. The American soldiers, however, were unsure of Mabini’s appearances, but knew that Mabini was paralyzed. They asked the man to stand. As Pascual remembers “‘Up, up!’ ordered the sergeant lifting both hands upward... With one supreme effort he mustered all his strength and tried to stand, but he soon gave up the attempt. The Americans then knew they had their man.”⁹⁹ As they carried Mabini out of the house, the townspeople shouted “‘*Mabini! Mabini! Mabubay si Mabini!*’” (translated as “Mabini! Mabini! Long live Mabini!”). Mabini was transported in a hammock back to Manila as a prisoner of war, and for a year lived in a home in Intramuros, Manila—then the seat of the United States government in the Philippines.

⁹⁷ William Safford’s journal recorded “Trouble in the village of Agaña, The *Gobernacillio* has arrested the Justice of the Peace and locked him up in a Calaboose. Investigation necessary. It is hard enough to preserve harmony between the natives and the enlisted men – its more difficult to regulate family quarrels.” Safford, *A Year on the Island of Guam*, 154.

⁹⁸ Gualhen I. Aguila, “The Capture of Mabini,” in *Philippine Free Press* (Manila: January 4, 1941), 16-17.

⁹⁹ Aguila, “The Capture of Mabini,” in *Philippine Free Press* (1941), 16-17.

In July 1900 on Guam, Commander Seaton Schroeder and Ensign A.W. Pressey relieved Captain Leary and William Safford taking over the Naval government. Schroeder and Pressey would oversee the creation of the hospital and the rebuilding of the island after a super typhoon in November of the same year. Their most important order, however, came six months into their tenure. In the Philippines, General Arthur MacArthur had caught Mabini sending correspondence to the last holdouts of the Philippine Revolution and realized that the only way to stop his influence was to exile him elsewhere. Subsequently, General MacArthur labeled Mabini and his fellow revolutionaries as dangerous to the American state-building efforts in the archipelago. MacArthur wrote to Washington, Mabini's "deportation absolutely essential."¹⁰⁰ Secretary of War Elihu Root wrote to the Secretary of the Navy that General MacArthur "desires to deport certain of the prominent leaders to the Island of Guam," in order to "emphasize the sincerity of the Government's purpose, and as a practical example to the natives [Filipinos]." In the perspective of MacArthur, deportation was necessary to curb the Philippine Revolution.

As a result, Secretary of War Elihu Root kicked the process for exile into action on December 26, 1900 telling the Secretary of the Navy to inform the Governor of Guam to be prepared to receive the prisoners of war from the Philippines.¹⁰¹ On the 14th of January 1901, Governor Schroeder received a note from Rear Admiral George C. Remey stating that Guam would receive Filipino prisoners of war, among them "are some of the most influential leaders of the Insurrectionist Party in these Islands. Remey requested of Schroeder that his "utmost endeavors are therefore imperative to prevent the escape of any of them from Guam."¹⁰² In fact, Guam would be as important and "in the same category as the Naval Prisons at Mare Island and Boston."¹⁰³ Ten days

¹⁰⁰ Alfredo S. Veloso, *Testament and Political Letters of Apolinario Mabini* (Quezon City: Asvel Publishing Co., 1964), 337.

¹⁰¹ Elihu Root, Letter to Secretary of the Navy, December 26, 1900, Box 3, Folder 28, MSS 930, MARC, UOG. Also known as the "Mabini Folder" in Record Group 80: General Records of the Department of the Navy, 1804-1983.

¹⁰² George C. Remey, Letter to Naval Governor of Guam, January 14, 1901, Box 3, Folder 28, MSS 930, MARC, UOG.

¹⁰³ This dispatch was sent from the headquarters of the U.S. Marine Corps to Governor Schroeder on April 9, 1901, four

after the Remy's letter was written, Apolinario Mabini arrived on the shores on Guam aboard the *USS Rosencrans*.

Six days after the *USS Rosecrans* arrived in Agaña Bay, the Filipino exiles were still imprisoned on board. Mabini observed that “nothing has been unloaded from the boat, nor was there anyone disembarking, except the American commandant and officials.”¹⁰⁴ Breaking the monotony of confinement, a Marine ship *Solace* brought eleven more deportees from Ilocos Norte and transferred them aboard the *Rosecrans*.¹⁰⁵ Mabini inscribed their names in full in his diary: “With this last batch of deportees, there are now 57 of us, including the servants.” They were confined in the quarters meant for soldiers for twenty-eight days—cramped, suffocating, and undignified for the leaders of a national revolution. Occasionally, they were allowed on deck to smoke a cigarette or have their meals.

Eventually, on February 12, 1901, they were allowed to step on *terra firma* and forced to walk—Mabini was probably carried in a hammock—to the village of Piti.¹⁰⁶ There, they discovered that the Navy would house the prisoners in tents on the site of a former colonial Spanish leper hospital. Away from the main village of Hagåtña, they were segregated to be forgotten. Poetically, Mabini wrote to his brother Alejandro on February 17, 1901, “They tell us the place could not be better suited, since our minds are suffering of a contagious illness, they are forced to separate us, like the leper, from the society of our fellow beings.”¹⁰⁷ The Filipino desire for revolution and self-determination was likened to a disease that needed to be contained for fear of spread to other colonized peoples, especially the Chamorros. “Nevertheless,” Mabini wrote to his brother in July

months after the arrival of the Filipino exiles. Box 3, Folder 28, MSS 930, MARC, UOG.

¹⁰⁴ Philippine Diary Project, “31 January, 1901,” <http://philippinediaryproject.com/1901/02/01/1st-of-february-1901/>.

¹⁰⁵ Philippine Diary Project, “31 January, 1901,” <http://philippinediaryproject.com/1901/02/01/1st-of-february-1901/>.

¹⁰⁶ Letter to His Brother Alejandro July 25, 1901” in Alfredo S. Veloso ed., *Testament and Political Letters of Apolinario Mabini* (Quezon City: Asvel Publishing Co., 1964).

¹⁰⁷ Veloso, *Testament and Political Letters of Apolinario Mabini*, 340.

1901, “we occupy a beautiful place.” He found familiarity with the island, seeing the similarities between the Philippines and Guam. “If I face the North,” Mabini wrote, “I have the ever raging sea, a steep hill covers my back and my left side, ... the Barrio huts hidden in the coconut grooves and half-destroyed by the last typhoon and farther on another naked hill.”¹⁰⁸ He also mentioned the village of Hagåtña, and the native people who “are of our race.”¹⁰⁹ Although he was imprisoned, Guam’s beauty brought Mabini some comfort.

After recording a list of prison regulations in his diary, Mabini made a note about the separation of prisoners from the rest of the island. He wrote, “We have also been told that our rigorous lack of communication is due to the request of the natives of the Island, who have been robbed by Filipinos confined for common crimes in during the Spanish government, who committed all kinds of abuses.”¹¹⁰ The Naval government acted accordingly. They separated and guarded the Filipino exiles from the Chamorro elite, emphasizing the supposed tensions between Filipinos and Chamorros. On January 28, 1901 Governor Schroeder wrote a letter to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy concerning the new import of Filipino prisoners, that if more land for the prison was necessary, “recourse would probably be had... to condemnation proceedings against private property, as it is not believed that any Chamorro will voluntarily sell or rent land for the purpose of harboring Filipinos who are held in general detestation.”¹¹¹ While it is true that the Chamorro elite were successful in deporting Spanish era Filipino *deportados* a year earlier, the U.S. naval officials did not understand the class aspect of this decision. The Chamorro elite did not want

¹⁰⁸ Veloso, *Testament and Political Letters of Apolinario Mabini*, 340.

¹⁰⁹ Veloso, *Testament and Political Letters of Apolinario Mabini*, 341.

¹¹⁰ Original Spanish is as follows: Se nos ha dicho ademas que nuestra rigurosa incomunicacion es debida a la peticion de los naturales de la Isla, escarmentados de los filipinos confinados por delitos comunes en tiempo del Gobierno espanol, los cuales cometieron todo genero de abusos.” Mabini, *Las Revolucion Filipina II*, 229.

¹¹¹ Seaton Schroeder, Letter to Assistant Secretary of the Navy, January 28, 1901, Box 3, Folder 28, MSS 930, MARC, UOG.

lower class Filipinos on Guam, but they would welcome any Filipino elite, as they did later with Mabini's cohort of exiles.

Romantic in his first impressions of Guam, Mabini would soon turn angry and bored. He wrote in his diary, "Our life is so boring. Since we are incommunicado, even the servants are not allowed to leave to buy something."¹¹² Helpfully, visitors broke the boredom in Mabini's prison life. Mabini would write about them in his diary. The visitors included "Spanish mestizas from the prominent families of the district," the same people who attended to Lieutenant Governor Safford in 1899 and 1900, including Pedro M. Duarte and Father Palomo.¹¹³ On February 24, 1901, Mabini wrote in his diary, "Mr. Pedro Duarte, who was the captain of the civil guards and an old friend of mine from Manila" came to visit. Pedro Duarte, a former Spanish colonial official on Guam who would work for the U.S. Naval Government and eventually asked for American citizenship, signed the 1901 Chamorro petition later that year. Having an affinity for the Filipino elite, the Chamorro elite made it a priority to meet and welcome the revolutionaries on Guam. Mabini did not write of any details in his diary as to what they spoke about, and we can only speculate if they spoke about the Philippine Revolution, the Naval government on Guam, or maybe even the details of what would become the 1901 petition.

Padre Palomo also visited the prisoners, celebrating Mass on at least two occasions in 1901. Mabini wrote that "P. Palomo has twice celebrated mass for the prisoners in the chapel of the village of Asan."¹¹⁴ Furthermore, Padre Palomo also presided over Catholic burials of the Filipino prisoners who passed away. He also helped the prisoners secure a tombstone for their fellow prisoners Lucas Camerino and Pio Barican. Padre Palomo's seemingly ubiquitous appearances in

¹¹² Philippine Diary Project, "24th of February 1901," <http://philippinediaryproject.com/1901/02/24/24th-of-february-1901/>

¹¹³ Philippine Diary Project, "24th of February 1901."

¹¹⁴ Mabini, *La Revolución Filipina*, 236.

both the Spanish, American, and Filipino archives point to continuing network that existed between the Filipino and Chamorro elite.

The Naval government of Guam was always concerned about lack of supplies for the exiles. Governor Schroeder had to petition for supplies quite frequently. In February of 1901, for example, Captain Schroeder sent a letter to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy asking for a larger than expected provision of food. This scarcity was felt within the prison compounds due to the fact that food was frequently a topic in Mabini's diaries. Mabini often complained about how the canned food negatively affected their health, and he talked about the prisoners' cooks and chefs too, who were dissatisfied by the ingredients they had to make meals. Utilizing the prisoners' right to appeal to the Governor, he sent a complaint about the prisoners' hunger to Captain W.N. McKelvey in November: "we beg you to acquaint the competent authorities with this fact and induced them to preserve us from diseases by starvation. Do it for humanity's sake, if not for other motives."¹¹⁵ The next month, Mabini wrote in his diary "the prisoners could no longer eat canned meat, no matter how they forced themselves, because they felt nauseated and wanted to vomit."¹¹⁶ A few of the prisoners had already passed away due to sickness, and Mabini's preexisting poor health did not help either.

If the prisoners experienced hunger, the Chamorro community was willing to step in. Mabini wrote about how fellow Navy officers and Chamorro people would bring different fresh foods and milk to supplement the prisoners' diets. Mabini specifically mentioned that the men who brought them food were Chamorro: "Also during time we could order vegetables, chickens and other things, either by the Chamorro who brought milk every morning, or by our cook who also Chamorro."¹¹⁷

The scarcity of food in the presidio was ameliorated when Mabini's companions in Hagåtña received

¹¹⁵ Veloso, *Testament and Political Letters of Apolinario Mabini*, 344.

¹¹⁶ Philippine Diary Project, "13 February 1901," 1/02/13/13th-of-february-1901/"<http://philippinediaryproject.com/1901/02/13/13th-of-february-1901/>

¹¹⁷ Mabini, *La Revolución Filipina*, 241.

from the community “gifts in kind, such as meat, fish and other things.”¹¹⁸ Chamorro backyard gardens and ranches had enough to supplement the diets of the revolutionaries; Chamorro practices of *inafa’maolek* and *chenchule’* was extended to these elite Filipino revolutionaries. Despite the Navy’s attempt to separate the two colonized peoples, the Filipino revolutionaries and Chamorro elite were able to nurture substantial friendships.

Slowly, Mabini’s diaries and letters become more detailed with people from the local community. According to a history by Tony Palomo published in a 1961 news article in the *Territorial Sun*, “in fact, during their 19-month stay here, the more prominent of the Filipinos hobnobbed with island society and were accepted by some of the most prominent families.”¹¹⁹ Mabini wrote about a night that the families of Mr. Herrero and Mr. Martinez visited the prison in July 1901. Mabini recorded that “they are Spanish mestizos and their children are the prettiest in Agaña.”¹²⁰ A night filled with dance and music by “a trio of two violins and a guitar,” Mabini enjoyed “a show of the most powerful voice of all of Agaña.” Herrero and Martinez, patriarchs of elite Chamorro families, wanted to welcome and indeed network with the most famous personalities of the Filipino Revolution.

In fact, the *lechonadas* that were organized during this time of exile were remembered decades after they occurred. Pablo Ocampo, a wealthy Revolutionary exile whose family owned land and plantations in the Philippines, “footed the bill for some of the most elaborate parties” held at the beginning of the century.¹²¹ Monsignor Oscar Lujan Calvo described the exiles as “suave and debonair,” bringing Philippine symbols and displays of class and wealth to Guam through these.¹²²

¹¹⁸ Mabini, *La Revolución Filipina*, 242-243.

¹¹⁹ Tony Palomo, “52 Filipinos Exiled Here Included an Elite Group of Intellectuals,” *Territorial Sun* 28 May 1961, 10.

¹²⁰ Mabini, *La Revolución Filipina*.

¹²¹ Palomo, “52 Filipinos Exiled Here Included an Elite Group of Intellectuals,” *Territorial Sun* (1961), 10.

¹²² U.S. Congress, “Commemorating 100 Years of Relations between the People of the United States and People of the Philippines” June 09, 1998.

This included the wedding of Thomas Andersen Calvo and Regina Martinez Torres; Calvo was an alumni of the Philippines' University of Santo Tomas—a university that many of the revolutionaries, including Mabini and Artemio Ricarte, had attended as well.¹²³ Mabini was invited to this celebration as noted in his diaries, but he could not attend. He sent his regrets to the family.

Even more, the Filipino exiles and the Chamorro elites had more opportunity to spend time with each other. By December of 1901, some of the prisoners were able to live “on their own account and with more freedom in Agaña [Hagåtña] town.”¹²⁴ They probably lived near or with other elite Chamorro families. During their short stay, they had integrated into Chamorro elite society as other Filipino revolutionaries had done in the past. Surprisingly, Mabini experienced a Fourth of July celebration with American officials. This would be the only time Mabini would see Hagåtña. Mabini even discovered the existence of some of the older generations of Filipino *deportados* from the 1896 cohort. In December 1901, Mabini wrote to his brother to tell his family in the Philippines that he met a “woman of Santa Mesa, Segunda, deported here during the Spanish regime” who “is still alive and is staying at the house of a well-to-do family that have taken her in.”¹²⁵ Unable to leave the island because of the fare, Mabini hoped that she would be able “to embark with us because a woman without relatives or resources in a foreign land moves one to compassion.”¹²⁶ Slowly seeing the island outside the confines of the Presidio, Mabini's interaction with the island became more complex.

In March 1902, the Filipino prisoners would petition for more freedom from the governor, including the ability to walk to Hagåtña during the day. They petitioned the Governor: “The undersigned crave from you this favor with no other purpose, apart from the expansion of soul and

¹²³ Palomo, “52 Filipinos Exiled Here Included an Elite Group of Intellectuals,” *Territorial Sun* (1961), 10. The Calvo's descendants continue to be integral to the Chamorro business and commerce through the 20th century and into the 21st.

¹²⁴ Veloso, *Testament and Political Letters of Apolinario Mabini*, 345.

¹²⁵ Veloso, *Testament and Political Letters of Apolinario Mabini*, 346.

¹²⁶ Veloso, *Testament and Political Letters of Apolinario Mabini*, 346.

for a change in their food.”¹²⁷ The prisoners finally received permission to head to Hagåtña in May of 1902, “five by five every day from nine in the morning to four in the afternoon, except four or five who did not ask permission because they do not want to go out or cannot go out.”¹²⁸ Unable to walk to Hagåtña due to his paralysis, Mabini stayed at the prison. His companions brought him needed supplies. Mr. Pressey, Lieutenant Governor of the island, offered to house Mabini in his Hagåtña home, but Mabini refused “because it is heavier for me to live at the expense of another strange person.”¹²⁹ He wrote to his brother, “I cannot say anything about the island because I have not seen any of it except the expanse that my sight reaches from the prison windows.”¹³⁰

Though the archive does not divulge the details of the conversations that the Filipino revolutionaries had with the Chamorro elite, we know that they did have the opportunity to do so. They were intellectuals with common imperial histories—colonial siblings in the perspective of the imperial powers that had colonized them. Whatever the case, the sharing of food of resources, the presiding of Catholic masses, the parties, weddings, and *lechonadas*, all point to a convergence of leaders and elite who created and maintained meaningful connections with each other. Chamorros were practicing a form of diplomacy, utilizing friendship with these elites to create opportunities for the future.¹³¹ Perhaps, the petition they wrote in 1901 was inspired by the presence of these revolutionaries.

Democracy on Guam: Filipino Elections and the 1901 Petition

After settling into the Presidio of Guam, the prisoners were met with a surprising degree of rights. Rather than being totally ignored by the Navy officials, the prisoners did have the ability to

¹²⁷ Veloso, Testament and Political Letters of Apolinario Mabini, 351.

¹²⁸ Veloso, Testament and Political Letters of Apolinario Mabini, 355.

¹²⁹ Veloso, Testament and Political Letters of Apolinario Mabini, 356.

¹³⁰ Veloso, Testament and Political Letters of Apolinario Mabini, 356.

¹³¹ Upon returning to the Philippines after his exile to Guam, Pablo Ocampo became a Philippine Commissioner to the United States. On his way to Washington D.C., Ocampo stopped over in Guam, delivering supplies as well as horses to the friends he had made during his exile. This is one of the ways that the Chamorro elite were able to benefit from the friendships made with the Filipino exiles.

complain to the governor of Guam. Major H.B. Orwig, the person in charge of the Presidio of Guam, gave the rules and regulations for the prison on February 12, 1901 and even allowed them to hold elections for their own leadership a month later. The regulations covered many issues including the schedules for meals and baths, letter-writing, dress codes, roll calls, and curfews. Significantly, the prisoners also had the right “to appeal in writing to the Governor of the Island all matters internal or external.”¹³² Although unable to roam freely around the island at first, Mabini and his fellow prisoners were able to exercise some forms of democracy within prison gates.

In March of 1901, forty-eight prisoners took part in an election. Mabini presided over the elections and wrote that Major Orwig allowed the prisoners to elect a President and vice president “to be in charge of watching over the orderly and punctual execution of the orders and dispositions of the authorities relative to the welfare of the prisoners and internal regime of the same prisoners.”¹³³ The *deportados* elected Mr. Pio del Pilar beating out the famed Artemio Ricarte by eleven votes. Hesitant to be the president of the *deportados*, Del Pilar explained that did not know how to speak Spanish or English. But as a former trusted military general of Emilio Aguinaldo during the Filipino Revolution, it seemed that the others believed him to be a perfect, yet symbolic choice in the election.¹³⁴ Perhaps a practice to control the revolutionaries on prison grounds, the Filipino prisoners took the opportunity to practice forms of democracy, which they took seriously. Even as prisoners of war, Filipinos were able to practice democracy on Chamorro island, when Chamorros could not do so themselves.

While Filipino *deportados* voted for a President and Vice-President, the Chamorro elite could only wish for representation and a civilian government. In December 1901, thirty-two prominent

¹³² Philippine Diary Project, “13 February 1901,” 1/02/13/13th-of-february-1901, <http://philippinediaryproject.com/1901st-few-days-of-december-1901/>

¹³³ Veloso, *Testament and Political Letters of Apolinario Mabini*, 342.

¹³⁴ “Pio Del Pilar: Revolutionary Soldier” Online Resource Filipinos in History: Martyrs and Patriots National Historical Commission, <http://nhcp.gov.ph/resource/filipinos-in-history/martyrs/>.

members of Guamanian society requested a survey to study “the situation and needs of our peoples, with instructions to formulate and present to Congress for its action such measures it may deem advisable for the establishment of a permanent government.”¹³⁵ This was one of the first of many Guamanian petitions to the U.S. government.¹³⁶ The signers, which included Padre Palomo, Pedro M. Duarte, Atanasio T. Perez, and Justo Dungca, wrote to U.S. Congress hoping that more attention would be paid to Guam, and that certainty would be given to their political status.

First and foremost, the signers were dissatisfied with the military government and slowness in the determining the status of Guam.¹³⁷ “A military government at best” they wrote, “is distasteful and highly repugnant to the fundamental principles of civilized government, and peculiarly so to those on which is based the American government.”¹³⁸ The way in which Guam was governed like a stationary naval ship disregarded the many residents of the island who were civilians. The signers wanted recognition and representation as the American Constitution offered, which they had undoubtedly heard about and studied. Furthermore, they labeled the government of Guam as autocratic: “the governor of the island exercises supreme power in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, with absolutely no limitations to his actions, the people of this island having no voice whatever in the formulating of any law or the name of a single official.”¹³⁹

¹³⁵ U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Insular Affairs, *Petition Relating to Permanent Government for the Island of Guam*, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., (February 27, 1902), 2.

¹³⁶ Scholars and community members interested in Guam history have labeled this petition as the “first Chamorro petition” as a way to show the starting point of the long movement for indigenous Chamorro self-determination in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. I refrain from labeling all the signers as only Chamorro. Upon researching the signers of the petition, some of them had mestizo heritage, including Filipino, Spanish, Irish ancestors. One man, Charles Stimpson, was a white Navy sailor assigned on Guam. My goal here is not to critique the historiography itself, but to suggest that the long movement for more rights, self-determination, self-governance for the island of Guam has always been a multicultural, multiethnic, multiracial movement. Chamorro historian, Anne Hattori, has used the phrase “Guamanian petition” in her article “Navy Blues” and although the term “Guamanian” is anachronistic as well, I think it is a better descriptor of those who signed the petition.

¹³⁷ Hofschneider, *A Campaign for Political Rights on Guam*.

¹³⁸ U.S. Congress, House, Committee, *Petition Relating to Permanent Government for the Island of Guam*, 2.

¹³⁹ U.S. Congress, House, Committee, *Petition Relating to Permanent Government for the Island of Guam*, 2.

The Naval Governor of Guam was the complete opposite of the type of government that the United States was supposed to represent.

They also pointed out the sheer hypocrisy of American rule and the inaccuracy of American perception of the Spanish government on Guam. Harkening to the days in which local governors and indigenous elite were leaders on the village and island level during the Spanish era, the petitioners wrote “it is not an exaggeration to say that fewer permanent guarantees of liberty and property exist now than when under Spanish dominion.”¹⁴⁰ While at the time the United States was claiming to bring a benevolent assimilation and governance to other peoples around the globe, the Chamorro people experienced first-hand the insincerity of such rhetoric. The Chamorro petitioners were holding the United States accountable to their rhetoric, emphasizing their knowledge of American governance, rearticulating American values, and asserting rights “as loyal subjects of the United States.”¹⁴¹

The Chamorro elite believed that the slow-moving action of the United States continued to create uncertainty in the government and within the legal structure that did not benefit the residents of the island. They wrote “taking into account the time that has elapsed with no apparent effort having been taken toward the establishment of a stable government, we feel it our right and duty to appeal to Congress for relief, confident that the justice of our cause and the propriety of our petition will be recognized.” They thought that speaking loudly of their existence and their demonstration of knowledge of legal and political philosophy would persuade the U.S. government to give some attention to the residents of the island of Guam. The island’s elite believed that they should be treated as such, and that they should be able to access the same imperial networks as they perhaps had done in the Spanish era.

¹⁴⁰ U.S. Congress, House, Committee, *Petition Relating to Permanent Government for the Island of Guam*, 2.

¹⁴¹ U.S. Congress, House, Committee, *Petition Relating to Permanent Government for the Island of Guam*, 2.

On the local level, the signers of the petition believed that any leadership for Guam must be made and carried out with local knowledge in mind.

“We believe ourselves fully justified in asking relief from a system of government that subjects a thoroughly loyal people to the absolute rule of a single person, who is to administer the very cumbersome and complex system of laws which has continued from the time of Spanish control, and which was not framed to suit local conditions, being the legislation for the whole Philippine archipelago, a system of laws which in principle is foreign to that to which he has heretofore been accustomed; and framed and administered in a, to him, foreign tongue.”¹⁴²

Not only did the United States take away representation from the local peoples, they continued to use Spanish imperial law rather than implementing new policies that would cater to their supposed mission and rhetoric to uplift the people of Guam. These laws also did not take into consideration local conditions, culture, and ways of life that ultimately could benefit and make sense to island’s people. Despite not explicitly asking for self-governance, the signers of the petition understood quite well that they knew the island the best, and that they should be the ones governing themselves.

This petition for an investigation to study the island of Guam was a form of Chamorro elite diplomacy. It was a way for the Chamorro elite to influence the thoughts of colonial leaders and policymakers, so that they could have some say in how the island would be governed. This petition was not a passive memo of acquiescence to colonial rule, or a mere request for representation. It was a calculated measure to persuade and influence a young global imperial power that seemed to be improvising colonial rule. After all, they were able to persuade William Safford. They were able to hobnob with Filipino Revolutionaries. They were able to convince U.S. Postmaster and Naval personnel Charles A. Stimpson to sign the petition with them. The United States government was next. And they seemed to get the Naval governor of Guam to agree. Governor Schroeder fully

¹⁴² U.S. Congress, House, Committee, *Petition Relating to Permanent Government for the Island of Guam*, 2.

supported the Chamorro petition. He told the President of the United States, “Their opinions are entitled to respect.”¹⁴³

Despite the seemingly peaceful response to American presence on the island, the Chamorro people resisted what they saw as a despotic, imperial way of governing. Perhaps fueled or influenced by the Filipino revolutionaries who were exiled to the island, Chamorros devised forms of diplomacy to influence colonial officials both on island and across the Pacific. Mabini wrote his famed memoir *La Revolución Filipina* while exiled on Guam, recording his version of events of the Philippine Revolution and his own political philosophy.¹⁴⁴ In it, Mabini had a thoughtful reflection of how practicality was the best mode of operation when deciding how to negotiate for more rights within an imperial relationship. Rather than seeing this period as many scholars have as an unwitting deferral to American colonialism, this petition shows that Chamorro people, though “loyal subjects of the United States,” did not merely conform to imperial modes of power. They thought strategically about how to influence colonial politics. Though the petition was conservative in outcome, its authors must have learned much from the experiences of the Filipino revolutionaries and sought their own forms of diplomacy to ensure the best outcome for the island and themselves. A Chamorro political philosophy emerged in tandem with the Philippine Revolution.

Mabini's Oath and Farewell

By July 1902, Theodore Roosevelt proclaimed the end of the Philippine Revolution and pardoned “all persons in the Philippine Archipelago who have participated in the insurrections” provided that they made an oath of allegiance to the United States.¹⁴⁵ This too applied to the Filipino prisoners on Guam. Federal government officials believed that “the presence of these

¹⁴³ U.S. Congress, House, Committee, *Petition Relating to Permanent Government for the Island of Guam*, 4.

¹⁴⁴ It may not be an exaggeration to say that Mabini's *La Revolución Filipina* is the most influential political document to be written on Guam.

¹⁴⁵ General Orders, No. 69. Box 3 Folder 28, MSS 930, MARC, UOG.

Filipinos in Guam is not considered desirable by the Governor, as there is racial antipathy for them among the natives of Guam. Their return to the Philippines after release from confinement would therefore seem to be desirable in the interests of Guam.”¹⁴⁶ So Elihu Root permitted the Filipino prisoners to be released and transported back to the Philippines if they took the Oath of Allegiance to the United States.¹⁴⁷ And most of the prisoners, wanting to return to the Philippines, agreed.

Although Roosevelt declared the end of the Philippine Revolution, many Filipinos continued to fight in the provinces and resist imperial rule. This included Apolinario Mabini and Artemio Ricarte, a former General of the Philippine Army, who both refused to take the oath of allegiance on Guam. Mabini wrote to his brother Alejandro, “They [U.S. Navy officials] are plainly convinced that I am an astute agitator and very dangerous, and it is very difficult to take away from them this conviction, as experience has proven.”¹⁴⁸ Mabini was correct. In a letter to the Secretary of the Navy, Philippine Governor William H. Taft warned that Mabini was “the most prominent irreconcilable” and that his return to the Philippines may reignite the Philippine Revolution. Taft asserted, “if he were allowed to come to Manila he would form a nucleus for all the discontented elements which he would be certain to encourage in every form and conspiracy against the existing government.”¹⁴⁹ He further added that Mabini’s dream to form an independent Philippines would only reverse the gains provided by the United States and only bring “misfortune and hardship to the people he thinks he loves and would aid.”¹⁵⁰ In Taft’s perspective, Mabini’s incarceration on the island of Guam was necessary to the success of the United States occupation and colonization of the Philippines. To bring back this revolutionary hero would be to upend United States power in the Pacific. Guam, to Taft, was the key holding together America’s control of the Philippines. Ricarte refused to take the

¹⁴⁶ “Mabini Folder,” Box 3, Folder 28, MSS 930, MARC, UOG.

¹⁴⁷ “Mabini Folder,” Box 3, Folder 28, MSS 930, MARC, UOG.

¹⁴⁸ Veloso, *Testament and Political Letters of Apolinario Mabini*, 364.

¹⁴⁹ Veloso, *Testament and Political Letters of Apolinario Mabini*, 368.

¹⁵⁰ Veloso, *Testament and Political Letters of Apolinario Mabini*, 369.

oath, opting to head to Hong Kong. Mabini finally acquiesced to the oath when he noticed his health failing considerably. He arrived in Manila a hero, but passed away a few short months after.

Before he departed for the Philippines, Mabini handed fellow exile Maximo Tolentino a letter “in a sealed envelope.”¹⁵¹ Tolentino, a servant to the Filipino exiles, decided to stay on the island perhaps seeing more opportunities in his newfound home. In the letter, Mabini wrote a short poem to the island that was his prison.

Adios, Asan; Adios, Agana!
We bid thee adieu, We, the unfortunate victims of the love for a sacred ideal;
We vow thee our loyalty for thy humanitarian hospitality.
Adios, Asan!
Our favorite village, on whose sands our pains have been sprinkled, and our tears spread;
Your name I shall Never forget.
Adios, Agana! Soon I shall leave thee;
May heaven shower Happiness on thee;
Adios, my brothers, sisters, of my soul
Adios! Farewell! Adios!

Mabini recognized the Chamorro families who treated the Filipino revolutionaries not as lower-class exiles, but prominent, noteworthy, and intelligent men. This was a far cry from Mabini’s first impressions of an island that was beautiful, yet that had undesirable, aggressive natives. The village that was once the leper colony that contained the “*infectious*” diseases of the Filipino revolutionaries’ desire for independence eventually became Mabini’s “favorite village” where he experienced the island’s “humanitarian hospitality.” Furthermore, the villages of Asan and Hagåtña became places where Mabini and his cohort of exiles felt a visceral connection to, “on whose sands our pains have been sprinkled, and our tears spread.”¹⁵² Wishing farewell to the connections he made to the Chamorro families that hosted him and his colleagues, he called them “brothers, sisters, of [his] soul” further emphasizing the close ties he had fostered with the people of Guam. Mabini’s

¹⁵¹ Tony Palomo, “Among the Exiles, A Sublime Paralytic,” *Territorial Sun*, May 7, 1961, p.10.

¹⁵² Tony Palomo, “Among the Exiles, A Sublime Paralytic,” *Territorial Sun*, (May 7, 1961), 10.

recognition of the Chamorro families of Guam and their hospitality demonstrates the significant connections Filipinos and Chamorros had made during this time of exile and incarceration. Despite the ocean that lay between the archipelagoes and the imperial transition, there existed intimate networks of colonials exchanging ideas, establishing friendships, and becoming kin.

The Revolutionaries' Filipino-Chamorro Families

According to a series of articles written by Chamorro historian Antonio Palomo in 1961, Maximo Tolentino kept the letter he had from “Don Mabini” long after Mabini left the shores of Hagåtña. He was one of three revolutionaries who decided to stay; the others were Leon Flores and Pancrasio Palting who were both highly educated lawyers and who went on to become influential and prominent members of Guam’s society. Tolentino, however, was a poor mess sergeant in the Filipino revolutionary army when he was arrested by the American military patrols. While being questioned in the Philippines, the U.S. military officials offered him the opportunity to “be sent to the island of Guam in the Marianas archipelago, and be in charge of [the exiles] meals.”¹⁵³ In describing the revolutionary desire and high intellect of the other revolutionaries who served, Tolentino described himself as “least of them all.”¹⁵⁴

Tolentino, Flores, and Palting decided to stay on Guam because of the strong connections they forged during their exile and their general contentment with U.S. Navy officials and with the island’s elite. The Chamorro people on Guam were generally friendly with the U.S. Naval government in this period, and it seemed to them that the improvements in the transition of empire were acceptable. The three exiles-turned-settlers became part of the U.S. Naval government on Guam as a messenger and Island Attorney’s.¹⁵⁵ Flores’ and Palting’s command of the Spanish

¹⁵³ Palomo, “Among the Exiles, A Sublime Paralytic,” *Territorial Sun*, (1961), 10.

¹⁵⁴ Palomo, “Among the Exiles, A Sublime Paralytic,” *Territorial Sun*, (1961),10.

¹⁵⁵ Palomo, “Among the Exiles, A Sublime Paralytic,” *Territorial Sun*, (1961),10. The U.S. Naval Government often used elite colonials – Filipino and Chamorro – to be officials in the Navy governments. For more history behind this colonial strategy of tutelage see Go, *American Empire and the Politics of Meaning*.

language and knowledge of the Spanish colonial system—crucial skills needed in the transition of empires—placed them at the top of the Naval government’s civil servant hierarchy.¹⁵⁶ This was similar to what happened in the Philippines and Puerto Rico in the transition of empire. According to Julian Go, the elite often “took up new offices and participated in the new elections, enlisting as the tutelage’s primary ‘students’ and collaborators at once” further hybridizing American politics into their own communities and culture.¹⁵⁷ If Flores and Palting were previously against the U.S. empire in the Philippines, they were now integral parts of its governance of Guam.

This was to the dismay of Artemio Ricarte, who refused to take the Oath and moved onto Hong Kong after his stay in Guam. General Artemio Ricarte wrote to Tolentino a few months after Ricarte exiled himself to Japan “trying to induce [Tolentino] to get the Filipinos in Guam to start an uprising against the Americans.”¹⁵⁸ Tolentino responded that he did not appreciate the content of Ricarte’s letters, and noted in a 1961 interview that “General Ricarte did not realize at the time what he was asking of us Filipinos who had adopted Guam as our new home, in which we were contented and happy with our families.”¹⁵⁹ Tolentino married “a local girl,” Tomasa Crisostomo Lizama, in 1906 and had a family. To continue the revolution in Guam was to possibly destroy familial relations. The kinship relations the revolutionaries had built made it unlikely that they would topple the United States Naval Government in Guam. Tolentino and the others now understood himself as a member of Guam’s society and kinship network, no longer directly tied to the nascent Philippine nation-state that Ricarte was attempting to build.

By 1904, Leon Flores married Felicita Dungca, and Pancracio Palting married Soledad Dungca. They were both daughters of Don Justo Dungca, a signer of the 1901 Petition, a friend of

¹⁵⁶ Often perceived as a form of tutelage, the new American colonial officials utilized preexisting colonial elite to manage their newly acquired colonies. For more information on this read, Go, *American Empire and the Politics of Meaning*.

¹⁵⁷ Go, *American empire and the Politics of Meaning*, 3.

¹⁵⁸ Palomo, “Among the Exiles, A Sublime Paralytic,” *Territorial Sun*, (1961),10., p.10.

¹⁵⁹ Palomo, “Among the Exiles, A Sublime Paralytic,” *Territorial Sun*, (1961),10., p.10.

William Safford and the Filipino revolutionaries, and a man who offered his home to the Filipino revolutionaries throughout the nineteenth century.¹⁶⁰ With the American administration, Dungca became the Justice of the Peace, which allowed him to foster friendships with the American naval government including former Lieutenant Governor William E. Safford. Even after Safford's departure in 1900, Dungca continued to write to Safford proudly, stating that "My two sons-in-law, who are from the same town and province in the Philippines, have been deported here in the year 1900 for political reasons and are now employed in the Government of the Island."¹⁶¹ Dungca emphasized the ability and skill of Flores and Palting and their ability to rise through the ranks of the Naval government. This may have been a critique to one of Safford's successful policies early on in the Naval period to remove Spanish era *deportados* from the island. According to historian Mary Ellen Cook, Dungca "bemoaned the loss of the convicts."¹⁶² Rather than seeing Flores and Palting as irreconcilable outlaws, Dungca perceived them as potential productive members of Guam's society, so much so that he was happy to welcome them to his family. By this point in Guam's history, Filipino-born elite's contributions to Guam's society allowed them to integrate into island society.

By narrating the history of Guam and the Philippines starting in the Spanish era, a time before the Philippines was solidified into a nation-state, before Guam was considered a U.S. territory, before the Philippines and Guam were split by American imperial policy, this chapter highlights the perspectives of the Filipino and Chamorro people who were trying to negotiate the increasingly uncertain world they lived in – a world of imperial transitions, of shifting geopolitical power, and of colonial revolutions. In the transition between the Spanish and American empires, the Chamorro elite sought participation and representation in any way possible. Though geopolitics

¹⁶⁰ Mary Ellen Cook, "A Survey of Exiles in Mariana Islands," (MA Thesis: University of Guam, 1980), 72.

¹⁶¹ "Letter to William Safford from Justo Dungca, 21st March 1904," MSS 980, Folder 11, William Edwin Safford Papers, MARC, UOG.

¹⁶² Mary Ellen Cook, "A Survey of Exiles in Mariana Islands," (MA Thesis: University of Guam, 1980), 77.

were out of their control, they attempted to influence colonial policy by not only advocating on the local community's behalf, but by engaging in diplomacy with elite members of the Filipino exiles and the military officials of the Naval government. Sometimes they got what they requested. Padre Palomo and the Hagåtña elite were able to converse with the elite Filipino exiles of the 1870s, deport lower class misbehaving Filipinos of the 1890s, take control during the uncertain period between U.S. annexation and government in Guam, have Thanksgiving Dinner with U.S. Navy officers, and spend ample amounts of time with the heroes of the Filipino Revolution. They were cosmopolitan in their ideas, utilizing what they had learned from other colonies' imperial experiences to craft their own political philosophy and argue for local governance. And they were practical, understanding the challenges and limits of dealing with a young, but powerful imperial metropole across the largest ocean in the world.

The Filipino-Chamorro relations of this transitional period in Guam's history established the foundations for how the Filipino community on Guam would be understood throughout the twentieth century. The U.S. military would always play a pivotal role in the arrival of new Filipinos to the island. Class status would always mark desirable Filipinos versus unwanted ones. Cultural differences and the resulting tensions would become more amplified. The political separation of the Philippines and Guam would demark beginnings of the social and cultural separation of Filipinos and Chamorros, so much so that shared histories as colonial siblings would be forgotten. On the other hand, with Filipino exiles Leon Flores and Pancrasio Palting marrying into the elite local Dungca family, they started a line of local leaders with Filipino heritage, still remembered and memorialized in Guam today.

While in previous centuries Manila had been a locus of civilization for Guam and the rest of the Marianas, the age of the American Empire in Guam pivoted their gazes eastward. The Chamorro elite began to look towards Hawai'i and Washington D.C. for access to elite colonial networks. This,

however, would prove difficult because of the racial hierarchies, the sheer distance, and even the linguistic and cultural gaps that made it difficult to advocate within the United States empire. In fact, the Chamorro elite submitted several more petitions all asking for a civilian government, more representation in local affairs, and U.S. citizenship. While Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Hawai'i received Organic Acts, Guam remained just on the periphery of American Naval officers' consciousness. The Chamorro elites were often ignored, but what remained constant throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries was the continuing diplomatic effort to increase the possibility for more local self-governance over the island of Guam.

Of a Separate Race: Race, Citizenship, and Belonging in Naval Era Guam

In September 1926, a startling message from Manila arrived in Guam through the Associated Press and Cable News Service. The message was so unexpected that the Guam Congress notified its representatives and called a Special Session to discuss its contents. As the message was read aloud in English and Chamorro, Jose C. Torres observed that “a solemn silence pervaded the assembly hall and from some dazed look which appeared from every face it seemed as if some dire catastrophe impended.” A representative in the House of the Philippine Senate, Eduardo Mercaido, had proposed a resolution that declared that “Guam is intimately linked with the history of the Philippines, and is largely inhabited by people belonging to the Filipino race, and therefore, should have its Representative in the Philippine Legislature.” A subsequent message made matters worse; the Filipino representative also sought “to ask, and hereby ask, the President and the Congress of the United States to cede to the Government of the Philippine Islands, the Island of Guam...”¹ A Filipino leader was attempting to annex Guam.

“The once quiet assembly,” Torres wrote, “emerged into a tumultuous gathering by a simultaneously plea from all corners to voice the unanimous sentiment” that Chamorros “love and will always live to love the United States of America.”² Chamorros saw how the Philippines was on a pathway towards independence, and they were adamant that Guam remained a territory of the United States. Reluctant to make any hasty decisions with heated emotions, the Guam Congress created a special committee to review and draft a response to the Philippine Resolution. A week later, the committee presented their findings and vehemently opposed any assertion that Guam

¹ Jose C. Torres, “Guam Congress Special Session, 25 September 1926,” Guam Naval Government Records, 1899-1950. MSS 870 Box 1 Folder 22, Richard F. Taitano Micronesian Area Research Center (MARC), University of Guam, Mangilao Guam. (Hereafter cited as Torres, “Guam Congress Special Session,” Guam Naval Government Records.)

² Torres, “Guam Congress Special Session,” Guam Naval Government Records.

should have a representative in the Philippine Congress and that the island should be annexed to the Philippines. Arguing against Mercaido's claim, the Chamorro leaders declared that they were of a different race than Filipinos, called Filipinos un-American and uncivilized, used tropes in scientific racism, and described Filipinos as criminals or, in one moment, "infernal wretches."³ Because of these differences, Chamorros believed that they should be treated as a separate political entity and territory within the U.S. empire.

Although no further steps were taken on the resolution, the uproar it caused among Chamorros represents a significant break in historical relations between Chamorros and Filipinos in Guam.⁴ The 1926 Philippine Resolution was a crucial moment of Chamorro identity formation, in which Chamorros embarked on a complex process of racial formation through positioning themselves as separate from their colonial sibling, the Filipinos. In order to be recognized as racially distinct from Filipinos, and thus worthy of a separate political status under U.S. empire, Chamorros navigated through the contradicting intersections of three schemas of race and belonging—Chamorro, Spanish, and American—that operated in Guam. The American hierarchical and homogenous categories of race conflicted with the realities of mixed-race and *mestizo* peoples of Guam and the Philippines.⁵ Nonetheless, the Chamorro leaders of the Guam Congress had to redefine their identity using the rhetoric of U.S. racial logics that would resonate with U.S. colonial

³ Meeting Notes for Guam Congress Meeting, October 2nd, 1926. Guam Naval Government Records, 1899-1950. Micronesian Area Research Center, MSS 870 Box 1 Folder 22. (Hereafter cited as "Proceedings of the Guam Congress," Guam Naval Government Records).

⁴ While there were reasons to see differences, the 1926 petition was the first time Chamorros articulated differences through race. Robert Underwood, Interview with the Author, August 14, 2019. For a commentary that explicitly speaks to the relationship between Filipinos and Chamorros, read Vicente Diaz, "Bye Bye Ms. American Pie: The Historical Relations between Chamorros and Filipinos and the American Dream." *ISLA: Journal of Micronesian Studies* Vol. 3, no. 1 (1995): 147–160.

⁵ This chapter will not delve deep into the racial schemas of the Spanish empire as it existed in Guam but will analyze its lingering effects into the U.S. colonial period in Guam in the first few decades of the 20th century. For reading on Spanish empire and race in Guam, read Vicente Diaz, *Repositioning the Missionary: Rewriting the Histories of Colonialism, Native Catholicism, and Indigeneity in Guam* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2017); Augusto De Viana, *In the Far Islands: The Role of Natives from the Philippines in the Conquest, Colonization and Repopulation of the Mariana Islands, 1668-1903* (Manila: University of Santo Tomas, 2004); Carlos Madrid, *Beyond Distances: Governance, Politics and Deportation in the Mariana Islands from 1870 to 1877* (Saipan: Northern Mariana Islands Council for Humanities, 2006).

officials, while simultaneously acknowledging Chamorro beliefs of kinship and belonging.⁶ This resulted in a Chamorro racial identity that reluctantly eschewed their *mestizo* identity and was imbued with notions of whiteness, civilization, and modernity.

This chapter shows how Chamorros and Filipinos on Guam negotiated conflicting systems of race in order to advocate for closer political relations to the United States and to retain Chamorro claims to land, property, and, indeed, the island of Guam.⁷ It begins with a description of Chamorro values of kinship and belonging that were informed by matrilineal quality of Chamorro kinship networks which embraced mixed-race Chamorros and those who abided by the values of *inafa'maolek* (“to make good”). While Chamorros understood and acknowledged their mixed heritage (some of their ancestors came from the Philippines and across the Spanish empire), they also saw how their *mestizo* race could be used against them to deny their Chamorro genealogies in the U.S. empire.⁸ As such, they employed U.S. racial logics as taught by the Naval Government’s education system that sought to Americanize Chamorros. As demonstrated by Agueda Iglesias Johnston’s essays on racial

⁶ I use Paul Kramer’s definition of “politics of recognition” to analyze the performance and actions of Chamorro and Filipino. Paul Kramer, *Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States & the Philippines* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 18.

⁷ The historiography of race within U.S. empire before World War II is vast. In terms of Philippines, I draw upon Kramer, *Blood of Government*; and Julian Go, *American Empire and the Politics of Meaning* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008). Prewar histories of Guam tend to focus on the racialization of Chamorros vis-à-vis white people associated with the U.S. Navy. They include Anne Perez Hattori, *Colonial Dis-Ease: US Navy Health Policies and the Chamorros of Guam, 1898-1941* (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2004); James Viernes, “Negotiating Manhood: Chamorro Masculinities and US Military Colonialism in Guam, 1898-1941,” (PhD Dissertation: University of Hawai’i, 2015); Robert Underwood, “American Education and the Acculturation of Chamorros of Guam” (Ed.D. Dissertation, University of Southern California, 1987). My general thinking of U.S. empire is informed the essays in *Formations of United States Colonialism*, ed. By Alyosha Goldstein (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014); *Cultures of United States Imperialism*, eds. Amy Kaplan and Donald E. Pease, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993); *Colonial Crucible: Empire in the Making of the Modern American State*, ed. Alfred W. McCoy and Francisco A. Scarano (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009).

⁸ Laurel Monnig’s anthropological dissertation, “Proving Chamorro,” has provided insight into how Chamorro indigeneity and identity is articulated in different settings. My work expands on hers by demonstrating specific points in Guam history where this indigeneity is put under pressure. For more reading on role of women in Chamorro society, Laura Souder, “Feminism and Women’s Studies in Guam,” *NWSA Journal* Vol. 3, No.3 (Autumn, 1991): 442-446; and Laura Marie Torres Souder-Jaffery, *Daughters of the Island: Contemporary Chamorro Women Organizers on Gaum*. (Lanham: University Press of America : Micronesia Area Research Center, University of Guam, 1992). Laurel Monnig, “Proving Chamorro: Indigenous Narratives of Race, Identity, and Decolonization on Guam” (Ph.D., University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, 2007)

and civilizational characteristics of the people of the Philippines, these lessons influenced how Chamorros attempted to define their race in opposition to the racialization of Filipinos.

This chapter then discusses two situations in the 1920s and 1930s—the 1926 Philippine Resolution and the enforcement of alien land laws in the early 1930s—in which the U.S. empire employed logics of race to justify colonial policies that the people of Guam resisted. These precarious situations demonstrate how Chamorros and Filipinos resisted such logics to define for themselves the terms of race and belonging that fit the local experiences of the people of Guam and would further their desire for U.S. citizenship and further integration into the United States. This chapter engages in a close reading of the Chamorro responses to the 1926 Philippine Resolution to show how Chamorros use various forms of racialization to differentiate themselves from Filipinos. Then, it examines the enforcement of alien land laws in the early 1930s in which Filipino men married to Chamorro women sought to protect the land and property of their mixed-race families. The U.S. Naval government in Guam categorized mixed-race Filipino-Chamorro families as “Filipino,” thereby declaring them Filipino citizens and therefore “alien” to Guam.⁹ They were told to turn over their lands to the Naval Government, as a result dispossessing Chamorro women and children of their land and property in the island they were indigenous to.¹⁰ Together, the Chamorro response to the 1926 resolution and the experiences of mixed-race Filipino-Chamorro families of

⁹ Specifically, this refers to the implementation of Guam Citizenship in 1930, which is a different status from U.S. citizenship. Information about its creation, the stipulations, and the implementation of Guam citizenship is explained in detail later in this chapter.

¹⁰ Chamorro scholars have grappled with U.S. colonialism in Guam as a form of settler colonialism, including Christine Taitano DeLisle, “A History of Chamorro Nurse-Midwives in Guam and a ‘Placental Politics’ for Indigenous Feminism,” *Intersections: Gender and Sexuality in Asia and the Pacific*. Issue 37, (March 2015). In addition, I am informed by other sites of Indigenous-settler interactions, specifically the case of Hawai‘i: J. Kehaulani Kauanui i. *Hawaiian Blood: Colonialism and the Politics of Sovereignty and Indigeneity* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008); Haunani-Kay Trask, *From a Native Daughter: Colonialism and Sovereignty in Hawai‘i*. (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1999); *Asian Settler Colonialism: From Local Governance to the Habits of Everyday Life in Hawai‘i*, ed. Candace Fujikane and Jonathan Okamura (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2008).

the Naval era reveal the complicated intersections of race, gender, and citizenship within the colonies of the United States empire.¹¹

Chamorro Kinship & Belonging

As explained in chapter one, for several centuries before 1898, the Spanish Empire in the Pacific connected the Philippines and Guam through Spanish galleon trade routes, imperial militaries, as well as migrants and settlers from across the empire. These cross-imperial interactions led to the emergence of a mixed-race, *mestizo* Chamorro people, in which an indigenous continuity was expressed through a retention of the Chamorro language and other traditional customs passed down by Chamorro women through the generations. According to anthropologist Laurel Monnig, “The notion of mixture, or *mestizyu* (the Chamorro word for the mixture of people), is always in the forefront of conceptions of race on Guam—indeed, racial identity for Chamorros is often all about mixture/hybridity/*mestizyu*.”¹² In Guam, definitions of belonging had less to do with racial purity and homogeneity, than with family and kinship. Despite the imperial transformations, Spanish tolerance of racial mixing allowed for the continuation of Chamorro culture’s expansive definitions of kinship and belonging.

Chamorro definitions of kinship and family are understood to be more inclusive and expansive. According Monnig, “Chamorros have narratives that consistently expand relatedness

¹¹ The residents would not receive U.S. citizenship until the 1950 Guam Organic Act. However, Chamorros did send multiple petitions to the President of the United States to convey their desire for U.S. citizenship. This history can be found in Penelope Bordallo Hofschneider, *A Campaign for Political Rights on the Island of Guam, 1899-1950* (Saipan, CNMI: Division of Historical Preservation, 2001). I am influenced by the notion intra-imperial migration and its ramifications for citizenship within empire, as described by JoAnna Poblete, *Islanders in the Empire: Filipino and Puerto Rican Laborers in Hawai‘i* (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2014). For the intersections between race, gender, empire, and citizenship, I am informed by Nayan Shah, *Stranger Intimacy: Contesting Race, Sexuality, and the law in the North American West*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011); Lisa Lowe, *Intinacies of Four Continents* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2015); and Mary Renda, *Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and the Culture of U.S. Imperialism* (The University of North Carolina Press, 2000). In particular, Margot Canaday’s *The Straight State* informs my understanding of the racial, social, and gendered parameters of citizenship: Margot Canaday, *The Straight State: Sexuality and Citizenship in Twentieth-century America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).

¹² Monnig, “Proving Chamorro,” 132.

beyond ‘blood’ and ‘biology’ – such as through *kompaire*, friendship, and *poksai*.”¹³ *Kompaire* links generations of families to each other, and *poksai* refers to the “parental responsibility to any child, including those brought into the family through other means than giving birth.”¹⁴ Thus, children are raised not just in their immediate and extended families, but also the children’s community. *Kompaire* and *poksai* are intimately intertwined with the concept of *inafa’maolek*, or “to make good.” *Inafa’maolek* is central to Chamorro culture and refers to the reciprocal social relations and responsibilities that a person and family have to another family to ensure mutual harmony within the community.¹⁵ Kinship networks included folks beyond the immediate family and were solidified and reified via cultural and social obligations throughout several generations.

The expansive nature of Chamorro kinship and belonging provides some space for non-Chamorros to integrate. In other words, a person who was not Chamorro could still be integrated into kinship networks if accepted by the clan. For example, although Filipino men were brought into Guam by Spanish colonists to intermarry with local women and to “restock” the island disseminated by war, famine, and disease, as Vince Diaz argues, “Filipino men were among those other foreigners, who, in marrying Chamorro women, were the objects acted upon...Chamorro women married non-Chamorro men... and proceeded to bear children who spoke the Chamorro language.”¹⁶ At the behest of Chamorro women who were “makers and shapers” of Chamorro culture, Filipino men were merely assimilated into Chamorro society and customs abiding by the matrilineal character of Chamorro genealogy and culture. Children of mixed-race relations were often seen as, first and foremost, Chamorro. Furthermore, as Monnig describes some Filipinos “had intermarried with

¹³ Monnig, “Proving Chamorro,” 204.

¹⁴ Monnig, “Proving Chamorro,” 206.

¹⁵ Lilli Perez-Iyechad, “Inafa’maolek: Striving for Harmony,” *Guampedia, Inc.*, December 21, 2019, <https://www.guampedia.com/inafamaolek/>; Lawrence J. Cunningham, *Ancient Chamorro Society* (Honolulu: Bess Press, 1992), 86.

¹⁶ Vicente Diaz, “Bye Bye Ms. American Pie: The Historical Relations between Chamorros and Filipinos and the American Dream,” *ISLA: Journal of Micronesian Studies* 3, no. 1 (1995): 151.

Chamorros, and were for the most part accepted as ‘Chamorro.’”¹⁷ Chamorro kinship and belonging did not necessarily focus on racial similarities or differences. Rather, outsiders such as Filipinos were integrated and assimilated into Chamorro society, given that they abide by cultural practices and fulfilled *inafa’maolek* obligations. Although labeled or categorized *mestizo* from the perspective of colonial racial schemas, Chamorro belonging and relationality, nevertheless, is grounded in kinship, family relations, and *inafa’maolek*, rather than notions of race.

When the United States arrived in Guam, U.S. colonial officials were confronted by *mestizo* Chamorros who did not fit into the patriarchal, hierarchical, and homogenous categorizations of race that were understood and employed by the U.S. colonial government. In order to police the boundaries of belonging and citizenship in the United States, as argued by Nayan Shah, “race makers had to believe in racial essence and presume racial purity. They fixed the vector of racial mixture and contained racial identity even when confronted by social ties that mixed and blurred racial boundaries.”¹⁸ In other words, strict racial boundaries formed the basis for U.S. legal systems, especially in the realm of immigration and naturalization. The peoples within the empire including the Chamorro people, however, were embodied contradictions to the bounded and contained U.S. schemas of race, which led to a set of conflicting racial ideologies present in the colonies. In Guam, “blurred racial boundaries” forced the U.S. Naval government to deem Chamorros “as both vanishing and *mestizo* – i.e., hybrid and assimilated.”¹⁹ Meanwhile, Chamorros had to reckon with

¹⁷ In one chapter of her dissertation, Laurel Monnig delves deeply into the notion of *mestizo/mestiza* in regard to Filipino-Chamorro relationships and *mestizo/a*-ness over the 20th centuries. The tension between Filipinos on Guam stems from an ever-complicated historical process of race-making and indigeneity that is informed by political pressures. She writes: “Chamorros must establish their indigenous authenticity amongst a Filipino group with their own rather lengthy and unique historical stake to the island.” “But therein lies the undetermined and sticky nature of Chamorro *mestizo*-ness. On one hand as already established there is no hesitation with accepting these non-Chamorro ancestors as Chamorro *familia*, as part of themselves, as being Chamorro. Yet, how are these identity politics articulated in an atmosphere when more recent Filipino immigrants muddying the historical imaginings about Chamorro family and identity. In other words, how can Chamorros claim an aspect of Filipino-ness as simply part of themselves, but yet spurn other aspects of Filipino presence on the island? And when exactly is the cut-off date – when exactly can Filipinos be accepted as ‘Chamorro?’” Monnig, “Proving Chamorro,” 362-63.

¹⁸ Shah, *Stranger Intimacy*, 15.

¹⁹ Monnig, “Proving Chamorro,” 127.

their traditions of belonging rooted in kinship alongside the U.S. notions of belonging and citizenship which revolved around race.

U.S. Naval officials attempted to describe and categorize Chamorro *mestizo* populations using racial schemas expressed in terms of blood, moral behavior, civilization, and modernity in order to justify U.S. empire in these islands. For example, in an 1899 *Harper's Weekly* article, Navy ensign C.L. Poor wrote about the “natives” he had encountered during a short stay in Guam. He wrote “The natives of Guam are in pleasing contrast to the Filipinos. Though originally, in great part, from the same stock, they have inherited all of the virtues and a few of the vices of these people. There is in the blood of these people considerable proportion of Spanish, South American, and American stock.”²⁰ Not once referring to the “natives of Guam” as Chamorro, Poor described them as “a mixture of races,” primarily derived from the “blood” of Filipinos and several other races. Poor elicited the trope of the vanishing native, while also emphasizing the Western and European qualities of mixed-race Chamorro people to justify American imperialism in Guam. Perhaps pointing to ideas of civilization and modernity associated with whiteness, he elaborated that the natives were “cleanly, intelligent, and peaceable,” and some were literate. These observations influenced Poor to believe that the natives of Guam were assimilable through the further establishment of an American education, colonialism, and “influences of progress,” and that it was imperative that the United States “plant her a model colony... of the ultimate success of which there is no possible doubt.”²¹ Because of their cultural demeanor and proximity to whiteness, as this American Navy ensign argued, Chamorros were *mestizo* natives deemed ready and eligible to be wards of American empire.

²⁰ Poor visited the village of Agaña (Hagatña), which was the capital village and home to the upper classes of Chamorro society. This upper class was more likely to be *mestizo* with European heritage than other classes in Chamorro society. C.L. Poor, “The Natives of Guam,” *Harper's Weekly*, December 16, 1899, 29.

²¹ C.L. Poor, “The Natives of Guam,” *Harper's Weekly*, December 16, 1899, 29.

In the Naval Era, Chamorros navigated through a clash of racial ideologies—Chamorro, Spanish, and American. While the Spanish racial schema facilitated the continuation of Chamorro definitions of kinship and relations, U.S. racial logics uplifted European and Western heritage of the *mestizo* Chamorro people to deem them assimilable colonial subjects and thus worthy of U.S. benevolent empire. This ideology, however, simultaneously erased Chamorro claims as a distinct and autochthonous race and made them ineligible to claim authenticity to be seen as separate, independent political entity.²² This is the context of the 1926 Philippine Resolution, which sought to annex Guam into the Philippines on the basis that Chamorros had Filipino blood and were of the Filipino race, and could be incorporated into the Philippines. For Chamorros attempting to remain a part of the United States, they could not refer to the complex, intertwined Chamorro identity based in kinship, *inafa'maolek*, and *mestizo* character. Doing so would have bolstered the Filipino representatives claim. Instead, Chamorros attempted to articulate an identity that distinguished themselves from Filipinos, which eschewed notions of *mestizo*-ness and used U.S. racial logics in order to be recognized as their own separate political entity under U.S. empire.

The Racial Education of Agueda Johnston

In order to “civilize” the Chamorro people, the U.S. Naval government implemented an American school system on island. This education system prioritized the English language, American civics and government, public health and hygiene, military discipline, as well as gendered classes on homemaking and agriculture, in the attempt to bring the Chamorro people into an American-style modernity.²³ While Chamorros were encouraged to “take pride in themselves and to

²² Monnig writes in her dissertation of how U.S. understandings of Chamorros in Guam were derived from U.S. settler experiences on the North American continent. Monnig, “Proving Chamorro,” 125-127.

²³ For a history of education on Guam, read Robert Underwood, “American Education and the Acculturation of the Chamorros of Guam,” (PhD Dissertation, University of Southern California, 1987). Education was not just through schools, but through health and the agriculture industry: Hattori, *Colonial Dis-Ease*; Elyssa Santos, “‘Practicing Economy’: Chamorro Agency and U.S. Colonial Agricultural Projects, 1898-1941,” (M.A. Thesis, University of Hawai’i at Manoa, 2018).

be more autonomous,” as historicized by Robert Underwood, “they were being asked to do so with American symbols and American experiences as the basis for this expression of pride.”²⁴ Students instead were taught U.S. history, emphasizing American history and ideals which were “made more vivid by the celebration of nearly all American holidays with the accompanying military symbols.”²⁵ With this education modeled after U.S. continental experience, students would have picked up latent lessons on the racial and gender expectations of what it meant to be American.

One early adopter of and advocate for American education was Agueda Iglesias Johnston, a Chamorro woman who is remembered by her motto, “Guamanian-Chamorro by birth, American by choice.”²⁶ She was one of the first Chamorros to receive an education from the U.S. Naval Government in Guam and eventually became a teacher. In 1911, she married her tutor, William Gautier Johnson, who was a white Navy Lieutenant stationed on Guam. They had seven children born before World War II, all of whom except one became public servants for the island.²⁷ According to Chamorro scholar Christine Taitano DeLisle, Johnston “was a key figure in the construction of an early twentieth century Chamorro womanhood whose investments in American modernity reveal a complex set of negotiations around progress, civic duty, and citizenship.”²⁸ Johnston’s early works reflect how Chamorros, especially women, navigated through the layered and intertwined racial and gender ideologies on Guam. Her seemingly patriotic essays were demonstrations of how Chamorros viewed “performances and expressions as the only available language to achieve Native progress,” as described by DeLisle.²⁹ Thus, Johnston’s use of American

²⁴ Underwood, “American Education and the Acculturation of the Chamorros of Guam,” 147.

²⁵ Underwood, “American Education and the Acculturation of the Chamorros of Guam,” 156.

²⁶ Johnston used her maiden name, “Iglesias,” when submitting these pieces, presumably because her husband William Johnston was an editor at the newspaper. I will refer to her as Johnston for the purposes of clarity. Christine Taitano DeLisle, “Navy Wives/Native Lives: The Cultural and Historical Relations between American Naval Wives and Chamorro Women in Guam, 1898–1945” (Ph.D., University of Michigan, 2008), 172.

²⁷ “Agueda Iglesias Johnston,” *Hale’ta: I Manfāyi Generations of Public Servants Vol. IV* (Hagåtña: Department of Chamorro Affairs, 2003).

²⁸ DeLisle, “Navy Wives/ Native Lives,” 172.

²⁹ DeLisle, “Navy Wives/ Native Lives,” 172.

rhetoric, historical works, and indeed the English language within her essays demonstrated to the Naval officials and all those reading that she and other Chamorros had learned American culture and thus were worthy of American citizenship. They were emblematic of the progress of Americanized education, but also use their knowledge of American culture and politics to articulate their identities as Chamorro people. The arguments she made in her writings show the type of racialized American education that Chamorros had received from the U.S. Naval government on Guam.

In December 1926, Johnston submitted an essay to a contest hosted by *The Guam Recorder*—the island’s only newspaper run by the Naval Government—responding to the prompt, “Should the Philippine Islands be granted Independence?” The contest was sponsored by Congressman William B. Oliver of Alabama who had been making his way across the Pacific when he stopped by in Guam. The essay contest and *The Guam Recorder* was a vehicle through which Chamorros could learn more about the United States and practice reading and writing English as with many of the Naval government projects in Guam. The judges of the contest were more than likely Naval officials who taught and emphasized American culture and ideologies in their classes. Rather than analyzing her early work as simply a reflection of her beliefs, Johnston’s early essays reflect the type of racial language and education Chamorros received as part of their American school system. In this way, success in American education was a way to demonstrate Chamorro acculturation. Paul Kramer writes in *Blood of Government* that the politics of recognition “required the subordinates to acknowledge, learn, and demonstrate their ‘assimilation’ of the standards of the more powerful in order to gain certain powers and resources, defined perpetually as revocable privileges rather than inalienable rights.”³⁰ By extension, the Chamorro desire to demonstrate their successful progress towards Americanization relied on the ability to comprehend and reiterate American racial ideologies, even if these concepts did not seem to apply to the islanders’ lived experience.

³⁰ Kramer, *Blood of Government*, 18.

In response to the prompt, “Should the Philippine Islands be Granted Independence?,” Johnston argued that the archipelago was not ready to assume the status of an independent country.³¹ First, Johnston pointed to the racial heterogeneity of the Philippine country which was “divided into many groups or tribes.” She was taught that the Philippines did not comply with the standard definition of a nation which should be comprised of a homogenous people and race. She wrote:

The pagans, such as the Negritos and the Igorotes [*sic*] in the Northern islands comprise approximately one-fourth of the inhabitants, but in Mindanao and in Sulu in the south, the Moros who are Mohammedans, form practically the entire population. On top of the twelve million polygot [*sic*] and largely helpless people, is a small but powerful and influential educated upper class, mostly of Spanish or Chinese mixture.³²

In addition to the heterogeneity of people, she also questioned the modernity and level of civilization of the whole Filipino people. To be pagan was to be non-Christian and traditional, and thus uncivilized and unmodern. Together, the cultural and religious diversity of the Philippines meant that the Philippines could not become a cohesive country. Oppositely, Johnston gave alternative examples of exemplary nations: “When we speak of the people of any country, as the American people, the English people or the French people, the idea conveyed is that the people of that country are a homogenous race with the same habits, tastes, ideals, and, to a lesser extent, religion.”³³ Johnston was taught that countries were to be comprised of a homogenous race and religion. The Philippines did not fit this requirement.

Johnston also argued that the Philippines should not be granted independence based on the assumption that Filipinos did not understand the system of democracy shown by their reluctance

³¹ Agueda Iglesias (Johnston), “Should the Philippine Islands be Granted Independence?,” *The Guam Recorder* Vol.3 No. 9 (December 1926), 211-212, 239. Johnston wrote this essay for an essay contest sponsored by Congressman William B. Oliver of Alabama.

³² Iglesias, “Should the Philippine Islands be Granted Independence?,” *The Guam Recorder* Vol.3 No. 9 (December 1926), 239.

³³ Agueda Iglesias, “Should the Philippine Islands be Granted Independence?,” *The Guam Recorder* Vol.3 No. 9 (December 1926), 239.

and resistance to wholly accept American colonialism. She wrote that “the large majority of the people know nothing whatever of democratic institutions nor of the responsibilities of government. They are, for the most part, illiterate and have no conception of the outside world nor of the position the Philippine Islands would have to assume, if granted independence.”³⁴ In her writing, she argued the Filipino elite, too, were inexperienced, and would eventually lead the rest of the country away from civilized society. For Johnston, a demonstrated command of democratic, liberal education was necessary for graduation from American tutelage. Without the heavy hand of the U.S. in the empire and if sovereignty were transferred “to an immature and untried form of Government,” then the heterogenous Philippines “could result in only insurrection, revolution and civil war, with the result that the United States would have to step in to restore order.”³⁵ With the Philippines’ diverse population of cultures, languages, and religions, Johnston thought they were unprepared for the practice of self-governance.

Alternatively, the United States colonial government was a benevolent force in the Philippines. Johnston argued in her essay that the U.S. colonial government has “never been harsh and oppressive, but to the contrary, it has been paternal and liberal to the last degree.” The U.S. was obligated to protect the “common masses of Filipino and to the non-Christian tribes” from the destruction that a “mestizo aristocracy” would produce in the absence of an imperial power. In fact, Johnston argued “not only was none of the local revenue taken from the Islands, but both money and energy almost without limit, have been expended to improve conditions and to advance the health and well-being of the natives.”³⁶ To Johnston, the United States brought modernity and civilization to the Philippines, and any attempt at independence on the part of an upper class, mixed-

³⁴ Agueda Iglesias, “Should the Philippine Islands be Granted Independence?” *The Guam Recorder* Vol.3 No. 9 (December 1926), 239.

³⁵ Iglesias, “Should the Philippine Islands be Granted Independence?” 239.

³⁶ Iglesias, “Should the Philippine Islands be Granted Independence?” 239.

raced Filipinos was ill-conceived. She ended her essay with a rhetorical question: “What more could a people want than to have a junior partnership with the mightiest, wealthiest and most powerful nation on earth today?”³⁷

Johnston’s essay reflects the type of racial ideology that Chamorros learned from the Americanized education system of the Naval era. The racial schema was characterized by hierarchical and homogenous categories of race which determined whether a people needed further American tutelage or whether a people was eligible for political independence. For Johnston, Filipinos did not fit the requirements for political independence as demonstrated by their heterogeneity, their religious diversity, and their desire to resist American rule. If this was the lessons learned—that homogeneity, docility, and loyalty were necessary to attain recognition from U.S. colonial government—then Chamorros knew how to distinguish themselves from Filipinos. Faced with the possibility of annexation, Chamorros couched their differences through race, as that was the justification used by empire to justify colonization, to create and amend colonial policies, and at least in theory, that would resonate with colonial officials. As the Chamorro response to the 1926 petition demonstrates, the Chamorro people grappled with this new American system of race and attempted to map onto a mixed-race people, all in the hopes that they could get what they desired from the American colonial system, which was not independence like the Filipinos, but further integration into the United States.

The Chamorro Response to the 1926 Philippine Resolution³⁸

³⁷ Iglesias, “Should the Philippine Islands be Granted Independence?” 239.

³⁸ The text of the 1926 Philippine Resolution as received by the Guam Congress is as follows: “Whereas, the Island of Guam is intimately linked with the political history of the Philippine Islands, as it was the place where those rebellious patriots were banished after refusing to recognize any sovereignty other than that of their own government, following the failure of the revolution; and whereas, according to authentic information, the Island of Guam is inhabited by a people belong to the same race as ours; Therefore be it resolved by the House of Representatives with the concurrence of the Philippine Senate, to ask and it is hereby asked, the President and the Congress of the United States to cede the Government of the Philippine Islands the Island of Guam, situated in the Ladrone Archipelago, which shall have its Legislative Representation in the Philippine Legislature after the cession.” Torres, “Guam Congress Special Session,” Guam Naval Government Records.

In the 1926 resolution, Philippine Representative Eduardo Mercaido made several gestures to the historical connections between the Philippines and Guam in order to justify his request to annex Guam into the Philippines. First, the resolution referred to the exile of fifty-four Filipino revolutionaries to Guam in 1901: “the Island of Guam is intimately linked with the political history of the Philippine Islands as it was the place where those rebellious patriots were banished after refusing to recognize any sovereignty other than that of their own government, following the failure of the revolution,” as chapter one of this dissertation historicizes.³⁹ This cohort of revolutionary exiles included “The Brains of the Revolution,” Apolinario Mabini, General Artemio Ricarte, the last holdout of the Philippine Revolution, and Pablo Ocampo, who became one of the first Philippine Commissioners to Washington D.C. in 1910s.⁴⁰ Mercaido heralded these men as national figures, important to the cultivation of Filipino nationalism.

More significantly, Mercaido justified the annexation of Guam by emphasizing the *mestizo* race of Chamorro people, many of whom had ancestors from the Philippines due to Spanish colonization. “According to authentic information,” the resolution stated, “the Island of Guam is inhabited by a people belonging to the same race as ours.”⁴¹ Mercaido and the resolution did not refer to the inhabitants of Guam as Chamorro, but rather he described them as Filipinos. By denying their Chamorro identity and conflating Chamorros and Filipinos, Mercaido believed that the Philippines was justified in incorporating Guam into the Philippines. In remembering Filipino revolutionary legacies and erasing Chamorro *mestizo* identity, Representative Mercaido’s

³⁹ Torres, “Guam Congress Special Session,” Guam Naval Government Records.

⁴⁰ In the first chapter of this dissertation, “Colonial Siblings: Filipino Revolutionaries and the Chamorro Elite in Imperial Transition,” I explore the carceral connections made between the Filipino revolutionary exiles and the Chamorro elite in the first few years of U.S. colonialism in Guam and the Philippines. For published readings and primary documents about this particular early moment of U.S. empire read, De Viana, *In the Far Islands*; Atoy M. Navarro, “Philippines-Marianas Relations in History: Some Notes on Filipino Exiles in Guam,” *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal*, Vol.8, Nos. 1-2, 1999; Apolinario Mabini, *Testament and Political Letters of Apolinario Mabini*, ed. Alfredo S. Veloso (Quezon City: Asvel Publishing Co., 1964).

⁴¹ Torres, “Guam Congress Special Session,” Guam Naval Government Records

simultaneously erased Chamorro indigeneity, laid Filipino claim to Guam, and justified the annexation of Guam.⁴²

Chamorros believed that if they did not respond head-on to Mercaido's claim that Chamorros and Filipinos were of the same race, they may be usurped into a political entity they neither identified with nor wanted to join for the sole purpose of imperial representation. Instead, they wanted further integration into the United States via U.S. citizenship. But first, Chamorros needed to disprove Mercaido's claim about race and prove that they were a distinct people who deserved their own political status. As Laurel Monnig observes in her study of Chamorro identity under U.S. empire, Chamorros were and are obligated "to prove/to legitimate/to justify/to validate they can be *full* members of the US citizenry, or prove they can be independent, living without a US colonial relationship." In addition, they must prove their relationship to land, the vitality of their language, demonstrate their "American-ness," and "prove they are the authentic indigenous Chamorros - a recognizable, rather than extinct, group of people."⁴³ The Chamorro response to this 1926 petition, is one historical example of "proving Chamorro." The responses by Agueda Iglesias Johnston and the Guam Congress shows how Chamorros used racial justifications to distinguish Chamorros from Filipinos by establishing a Chamorro identity based on genealogical connection to Guam, their proximity to civilization characterized by Christianity and whiteness, and their loyalty to the United States.

Agueda Johnston's Response to the 1926 Philippine Resolution

⁴² In her thesis, Josephine Faith Ong examines how post-World War II memorialization and commemorations of Filipino revolutionary exiles in Guam "constructed the historical divide between Chamorros and Filipinos." She further argues that the memorialization is a tool and part of settler colonialism to erase and replace Indigenous peoples and histories of land. Josephine Faith Ong, "The Colonial Boundaries of Exilic Discourse: Contextualizing Mabini's Incarceration in Guåhan" (MA Thesis, University of California, 2019).

⁴³ Monnig, "Proving Chamorro," 9.

In response to the secession crisis, the *Guam Recorder* held another essay contest asking participants to answer the question, “Shall the Island of Guam be Ceded to the Philippine Government?” Agueda Johnston submitted an essay that argued that “it is a safe assertion to state that a very large majority of the natives of Guam had rather retain their present status than to become citizens of the Philippine Government” and that “the advantages that would be in Guam’s favor are few indeed, if any at all.”⁴⁴ Chamorros would rather maintain their inconclusive status as effectively a stateless people rather than be annexed to the Philippines. There were multiple reasons that Johnston put forth to support her claim, including notions of race, modernity, civilization, and nation.

For Johnston, the racial heterogeneity of the Philippine Islands was an indication of the incoherent governance of the Philippines. If a model country and nation was defined by the homogeneity of the people, as she argued in her essay on Philippine Independence discussed earlier, the racial diversity of the Philippine people made the archipelago ineligible for nation-hood. In this essay on Philippine annexation of Guam, Johnston wrote that the Philippines “is a group of many islands... who are divided into twenty-four tribes. Eight of these tribes are civilized and other sixteen are known as pagan or ‘wild’ tribes – Igorots, Negritos, Moros, etc.’ – who are at least suspicious and distrustful, if not actually hostile, to the ruling class.”⁴⁵ Although Johnston did not equate the indigenous peoples within the Philippines, particularly “Igorots, Negritos, Moros” with the Chamorro people (because, after all, Chamorros were Christian and civilized), she understood that their experiences pointed to the ways in which the *mestizo* ruling class could treat Chamorros on Guam. The cultural and racial differences between Chamorros and Filipinos risked that the former became disadvantaged subjects of the latter. Furthermore, to Johnston, if Chamorros were

⁴⁴ Iglesias, “Shall the Island of Guam,” 210.

⁴⁵ Iglesias, “Shall the Island of Guam,” 210.

integrated into the Philippines, they would not be joining a cohesive country, but a country still figuring out their national identity. She believed that annexation would be a step back in the steady progression towards an American modernity that Chamorros had desired and achieved under the U.S. Naval government. Instead, integration into the U.S. was a better prospect for Chamorros.

Furthermore, in Johnston's perspective, the Philippine government was too young and inexperienced to take on the responsibilities of an independent country. She wrote "under the most favorable conditions the Philippine Government has proven itself to be unstable and it is certainly not government for the people of Guam to prefer to that of the United States."⁴⁶ Johnston believed the Philippines was not yet ready to govern itself, much less Guam. Even if Guam were to gain representation in Philippine Congress, annexation did not mean that Chamorros would receive adequate representation. Johnston further hinted at the possibility of a self-serving Filipino cabal—"The Government of the Philippines is for those within the inner ring of the mystic circle." As an island located thousands of miles away, they believed Guam would never be able to integrate into Filipino society, and risked being exploited by a questionable government. Oppositely, the United States had leaders who "have been men of unquestionable honesty and integrity."⁴⁷ She concluded that the Chamorro people "do not want and will never consent to a transfer to any other nation and most particularly to such as the immature and inexperienced 'Philippine Republic'"⁴⁸

If the Philippine government was inexperienced and childlike, the United States was "a paternal and beneficent government." Johnston believed the infrastructural and civilizational progress experienced by Chamorro people due to the U.S. Naval government in Guam was an advantage. If Guam were to be annexed to the Philippines, she wrote, "one of two things must happen: either Guam would retrograde to the conditions that prevailed under Spanish Rule, which

⁴⁶ Iglesias, "Shall the Island of Guam," 211.

⁴⁷ Iglesias, "Shall the Island of Guam," 231.

⁴⁸ Iglesias, "Shall the Island of Guam," 231.

would mean roads of poor quality and general depreciation of all present public improvements, or else there would have to be an increase of taxes to offset loss incident to the transfer of sovereignty.”⁴⁹ The U.S. brought modernity to the island with thousands of dollars spent on “public improvements and utilities such as water systems, sewers, roads, hospitals, and public works.”⁵⁰ The Philippines, with its limited resources, could not provide this for Guam; simply, she wrote, “it could not do so.”⁵¹ For Johnston, to be annexed to the Philippines threatened to thrust Guam into premodern times, jeopardizing the progress that Chamorros have achieved.

The most important difference between Chamorros and Filipinos, however, was that Chamorros had an unfaltering loyalty to the United States. Johnston argued that there was no other country Chamorros would rather associate with than the United States. Although joining the Philippines would have meant representation in some sort of government, Johnston believed that doing so would not outweigh the disadvantages and did not follow the clear intentions of the Chamorro people to be United States citizens. Instead, she wrote, “The Chamorro people have a deep-seated feeling of loyalty and affection for the United States of America and they heartily wish to see no other flag than the Stars and Stripes fly over their Island Home. They firmly believe that no other country could or would give them the protection and the blessings of good government that they are now receiving.”⁵² Citing the values of liberty and justice that the United States espoused, Johnston believed that the United States actions and rhetoric demonstrates that U.S. had been good stewards for the Chamorro people. The Chamorros’ “highest ambition and their greatest desire is to be granted American citizenship.” American citizenship was the ultimate goal for Chamorros living on Guam as it provided access to modernity and civilization.

⁴⁹ Iglesias, “Shall the Island of Guam,” 211.

⁵⁰ Iglesias, “Shall the Island of Guam,” 211.

⁵¹ Iglesias, “Shall the Island of Guam,” 211.

⁵² Iglesias, “Shall the Island of Guam,” 231.

Johnston separated Filipinos and Chamorros through an integrated set of U.S. racial logics rooted in definitions of modernity. While Filipinos were too heterogenous, uncivilized, ungovernable, and undeveloped, Chamorros in Guam were a distinct people, able and willing to be Americanized and integrated into modern American society. For Johnston, in order for Chamorros to continue to progress to modernity, they had to be part of a Western recognized country and nation, to be possibly governed with democratic principles even if it were imperial in form, to have the infrastructure of the industrialized world, and, most importantly, to be American.

The Guam Congress

The 1926 Philippine Resolution shocked Chamorro members of the Guam Congress could not believe their desires for closer relationships to the United States were unheard especially after several years of loyalty to the Naval Government in Guam. The Guam Congress was established by Naval Governor Roy C. Smith in 1917 as an advisory council of thirty-four leaders from around the island. Comprised of Chamorros and a few military officers, Chamorros believed that the Congress was a step towards greater participation within the Naval Government. Although the governor's intention was to create an advisory body that would aid in the economic affairs of the island, Chamorros took the opportunity of the Congress as a platform to express their political desires as colonial subjects of the United States.⁵³ The opening session of the Guam Congress was highly patriotic towards the U.S. Tomas Anderson Calvo believed that the Congress would allow the Chamorro people to “enjoy through their representatives the privilege of advocating their lawful rights as *citizens* of a nation so highly known through the civilized world for its liberty, republicanism and justice, which ignores and rejects any distinction between races and which embraces equality alone, not only in its social relations, but also in its laws.”⁵⁴ For Chamorros, the Guam Congress was

⁵³ Robert Rogers, *Destiny's Landfall: A History of Guam* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1995), 138.

⁵⁴ As his name suggests, Tomas Anderson Calvo was of *mestizo* background, with ancestors from Scotland and Spain by way of the Philippines, and Chamorros. Calvo attended the University of Santo Tomas in Manila, Philippines. Cited in

the place to practice their knowledge of American forms of governance, as demonstrated by the multiple petitions it sent to U.S. Congress and the President of the United States throughout the first forty years of American rule in Guam.

In order to respond to the resolution, the Guam Congress held a special session to discuss the resolution in depth. A committee was established to research and find more evidence to refute the claims that the resolution outlined. Within a week, the men gathered for nearly two hours to discuss their findings. With the “ever evident desire of becoming naturalized citizens of the United States of America,” the members were unanimous that they needed “to intervene in this proposed political upheaval and ask our mother country to favor us, the natives of Guam, with such rights and recognition as we have so far merited under her government.”⁵⁵ While the debate started with Chamorro speeches of American loyalty, the conversation quickly turned to the differences between Filipino and Chamorro people. Throughout the session, Chamorro men began to articulate a Chamorro identity that was separate from Filipinos by using racialized and civilizational rhetoric to prove themselves worthy of U.S. citizenship and their own political status within empire.

In the proceedings of the Guam Congress meeting, “blood” was repeatedly brought into the conversation to describe the racial composition of the Chamorro people. Among other reasons in his opposition to the resolution, Jose M. Torres from the village of Hagåtña countered the assertion that suggested Filipinos and Chamorros are of the same race. He offered racial science to distinguish the different origins and blood of Chamorros and Filipinos.⁵⁶ He said, “If we compare the two

Pedro C. Sanchez, “Guåhan, Guam: the History of Our Island,” (Agaña: Sanchez Publishing House), 109. For information about Calvo’s background, Tony Palomo, “52 Filipinos Exiled Here Included an Elite Group of Intellectuals,” *Territorial Sun* 28 May 1961, 10.

⁵⁵ “Proceedings of the Guam Congress, 2 October 1926, Agaña, Guam,” Guam Naval Government Records, MSS 870 Box1, Folder 22, MARC, UOG, 1. (Hereafter cited as “Proceedings of the Guam Congress,” Guam Naval Government Records.)

⁵⁶ Not to be confused with Jose C. Torres. In this Guam Congress term, there were three individuals with the first and last name pairing Jose Torres. They are purposefully distinguished here by their middle initial or the village they are representing.

people by their origin, or blood, many authors and scientists who study human races write in their books that the two races of people are not near alike.”⁵⁷ Torres cited Roy Smith, a former Naval governor of Guam, who wrote about the phenotypic qualities that distinguished Chamorros from Filipinos—“the Chamorro is generally taller and more athletic than the Tagalog and of a lighter color.”⁵⁸ Torres’s response was a simultaneous rejection of Filipino ancestors and an embrace of European or Spanish ancestors in order to claim whiteness. More than likely, the Chamorro members of the Guam Congress especially those from Hagåtña knew of the history of Filipino and Chamorro relations in Spanish empire, and indeed of their personal genealogies that may have included Filipino ancestors.⁵⁹ To claim Filipino-ness, however, would be detrimental to their claim. Instead, Torres used Western racial discourse brought to the island via the U.S. Navy, which specifically emphasized the European qualities of a concentrated group of *mestizo* Chamorro people who lived in the capital village of Hagåtña. Although the Navy used mixed-race heritage to erase Chamorro claims to purity and indigenesness, Torres used this science to bolster Chamorro claims to differentiate from Filipinos and demonstrate their proximity to civilization through the presence of European phenotypic qualities in Chamorro people.⁶⁰ Because of this whiteness, Torres argued that Chamorros deserved to have their own say in their political affiliations and be given U.S.

⁵⁷ “Proceedings of the Guam Congress,” Guam Naval Government Records.

⁵⁸ Torres and Governor Roy Smith’s argument about how Chamorros and Filipinos are not related in an anthropological sense has been debunked. Anthropologists, linguists, and cultural historians now argue that Filipinos and Chamorros belong to same Austronesian people. This being said, the racialization of the Filipino was also being contested at this time. Filipino nationalists had to contend with unifying a country which had multiple provinces with different languages and religions and an aboriginal, indigenous peoples living in the inner areas of the archipelagoes. “Proceedings of the Guam Congress,” Guam Naval Government Records, 3; Kramer, *Blood of Government*.

⁵⁹ During the Spanish empire, there were multiple campaigns to repopulate Guam with people from other parts of the empire. This included Filipinos. Most notably, as described by historian Robert Rogers, “A Spanish census of 1727, for example, reported more than 4000 families of Spanish and Filipino soldiers and retirees, most of whom had Chamorro wives and children of mixed ethnicity.” Rogers, *Destiny’s Landfall*, 79.

⁶⁰ In *Possessing Polynesians*, Maile Arvin shows how Western and scientific discourses of the Polynesian race as almost white “continues to authorize white claims to ownership over Indigenous Polynesian lands and identities.” Although not exactly analogous to the racial compositions of the *mestizo* Chamorro, a similar settler colonial concept applies. By emphasizing the European qualities of Chamorro *mestizo* people, the U.S. can erase the indigeneity of Chamorro people, deny political rights, and further claim Guam as part of the United States. Maile Arvin, *Possessing Polynesians: The Science of Settler Colonial Whiteness in Hawai’i and Oceania* (Duke University Press, 2019), 3.

citizenship. This rhetorical shift represents an articulation of a Chamorro identity imbued and articulated through U.S. racial logics in order to gain political recognition from the empire.

Claims to whiteness, however, could not adequately explain the position of mixed-race Chamorro-Filipino children. When thinking about race with regard to mixed-race Chamorro-Filipino children, Torres referred to Chamorro understandings of kinship and belonging. He said “neither can a person truly begotten of Filipino from a Chamorro mother - get along smoothly with a proper Filipino because of their traits and habits [are] altogether different. The Chamorro has a heart that he is a better man than the Filipino.”⁶¹ Torres’s distinction here between pure Filipinos and mixed Filipino-Chamorro children is indicative of the Chamorro understanding of race and belonging. While mixed-race children born to Filipino fathers and Chamorro mothers were politically Filipino, their Chamorro identity flowed from their mother, the person who taught them their roles and responsibilities ingrained in *inafa’maolek* and Guam society. Furthermore, Torres believed that mixed-race Chamorro children could not “get along smoothly with a proper Filipino.”⁶² The inability for mixed children to communicate effectively with full Filipinos was more evidence that bolstered Torres’ point that they were Chamorro. Rather than allowing mixed-race Chamorro-Filipino children to be usurped into Filipino society as required of Western patriarchal logics of race, Torres claimed mixed-race children because of their Chamorro mothers, harkening to indigenous logics of kinship and belonging.

Members of the Guam Congress also contested the idea that Chamorros had vanished. Mr. Taitano of Hagåtña believed this situation to be important to the wellbeing of future generations of Chamorro people. For him, the Chamorro race was not some nebulous racial category; it was a definitive identity. Taitano affirmed to the Guam Congress, “We are Chamorros, natives of Guam

⁶¹ “Proceedings of the Guam Congress,” Guam Naval Government Records, 3.

⁶² “Proceedings of the Guam Congress,” Guam Naval Government Records, 2.

and not Filipinos, and we will always be Chamorros as long as we exist.”⁶³ Applause followed his remarks. In his statement, Mr. Taitano defined Chamorros as “natives of Guam”; their origins were rooted in the island. He emphasized Chamorro identity as different to Filipinos and maintained that Chamorro lineage and culture will remain a core tenant of the people of Guam.⁶⁴

Taitano’s clarification, however, that Chamorros will be Chamorro “as long as we exist” also contains within it an uncertainty about the future generations of Chamorro people. This uncertainty may have been influenced by the prevailing notion of Chamorro extinction, proliferated by anthropologists and scientists who sought to discover the origins of Pacific peoples. To ensure the continuation of Chamorro people, Taitano believed that they must be adamant about their separateness from Filipinos, and resist any move to attempt to conflate the two peoples through political integration, which may result in the dissolution of the Chamorro people. In doing so, Mr. Taitano articulated Chamorro indigeneity as rooted historically, in the present, and in future on the island of Guam.

Taitano’s concern about the survival of the Chamorro people was shared by Mr. Lujan of Dededo. He warned that if the 1926 Resolution passed and Filipinos became independent, Chamorros “might not live to see the damage, but think of your offsprings [*siz*].”⁶⁵ Thinking about the future generations of Chamorro people who the Guam Congress had responsibility to empower, Lujan said, “we will also be Filipinos.” He implied that Chamorros would lose their culture and identity because of the conflation of their people with the Filipino people. Lujan wanted his

⁶³ “Proceedings of the Guam Congress,” Guam Naval Government Records, 6.

⁶⁴ As Monnig argues in her dissertation, “If US narratives say self-identified Chamorros lack a clearly graspable ‘culture’ and ‘indigenous’ group identity – i.e., racial identity – they are perceived to flounder about without clearly delineated indigeneity. And if they cannot define their cultural uniqueness – i.e., a ‘pure,’ unique identity or indigeneity – US colonial discourses ask, “who” should be granted sovereignty, and/or are they really worthy or capable of control over a state? Thus, the decolonization efforts of Chamorros become a continuous struggle to prove ‘authenticity’ of their indigenous group identity and, in turn, to legitimate their right to self-determination and self-rule.” Monnig, “Proving Chamorro,” 158.

⁶⁵ The first name of Mr. Lujan from Dededo was not recorded in the Guam Congress’s meeting notes. “Proceedings of the Guam Congress,” Guam Naval Government Records, 2.

descendants to see themselves as the Chamorro people of the island of Guam. With this, Lujan harkened back to kinship responsibility. He proclaimed that “The Filipinos will not look down upon the Chamorros as they do their own blood.” Because Filipinos and Chamorros were not related to each other, he believed Filipinos would be inadequate leaders who placed their desires before the needs of the Chamorro people. Lujan ended his remarks with a grand statement, to be integrated into the Philippines would have Filipinos “stamping of their foot on the Chamorros’ forehead.”⁶⁶

In a twist to Chamorro gender roles, Lujan harkened to the paternal duty to protect future generations within the realm of politics. Lujan testified further, “We will represent our descendants as long as they exist, and the obligations thus imposed on us by them for our fatherly love, not only require us to feed them, to clothe them, and to give them some sort of recreation in which to enjoy their life, but the most important and imperative obligation is for us as fathers, to protect their rights and privileges.”⁶⁷ The descendants of the Chamorro people were a priority for Lujan, for whom protecting their interest was part of their fatherly, familial duty. Lujan saw the need to protect Chamorro people from possible harms including the governing of Guam by a Filipino government and people. The Filipino move towards independence and what he perceived to be anti-American characteristics would potentially halt the political development of the Chamorro people.

Racial rhetoric overlapped with cultural rhetoric. For instance, Mr. Calvo mentioned to the Guam Congress that he did not believe that “the inhabitants of Guam belong to the same race as the Filipinos.” But, he clarified, “while the people of Guam and the Filipinos belong to the brown race, they do not have the same peculiarities, interest in habits.”⁶⁸ Culture mattered as much as race. Calvo continued later in his remarks, “I have now in mind, from my own personal observation, several instances which would prove to you beyond a reasonable doubt that Chamorros are not

⁶⁶ “Proceedings of the Guam Congress,” Guam Naval Government Records, 2.

⁶⁷ “Proceedings of the Guam Congress,” Guam Naval Government Records, 3.

⁶⁸ “Proceedings of the Guam Congress,” Guam Naval Government Records, 1.

anywhere near related to the Filipinos.” For Calvo, personal observations of culture counted just as much as the scientific categorizations of race. The “brown race” encapsulated a diverse set of cultures that science and the hegemonic racial schema lumped too easily into a single group. His remarks demonstrate the slippery definition of race and ethnicity, especially in the context of the heterogeneity of peoples living within the U.S. Pacific empire who were embodied contradictions to the schema of race in American society.⁶⁹

Even if the Chamorros could be of the same brown race as Filipinos, Chamorros could not understand the suggestion that Filipinos and Chamorros could be so similar that they could be conflated. The resolution they published in response to the Philippine resolution wrote, “the Chamorro may have in ages past been of the same race as the Filipino, they have been so long apart that they are now so widely separated in thought, language, and customs, etc., that there is little in common between the two peoples.”⁷⁰ Member of Guam Congress Cepeda said it succinctly: “I will say, and all Chamorros also say that there is practically no similarity between the two. They are not alike in customs, traits, habits, nor in any other thing.” The cultural differences between Chamorros and Filipinos made them different enough to warrant their own category and specific treatment. Chamorro people found a gap in the logic of race. It failed to account for significant cultural qualities that were core to peoples’ identities.

This racial and cultural difference manifested in moral and civilizational rhetoric. To those in the Guam Congress, Chamorros were innately more civilized than Filipinos. Jose M. Torres continued in his long speech before the Congress, and said that “while the Chamorro cannot boast of a better academic training or more riches than the Filipino, because the condition of his country does not permit him, yet he can say that he is more docile, obedient, holds higher respect for his

⁶⁹ “Proceedings of the Guam Congress,” Guam Naval Government Records, 1.

⁷⁰ “Resolution of Guam Congress,” Guam Naval Government Records, 1899-1950. MSS 870 Box 1 Folder 22. Richard F. Taitano Micronesian Area Research Center (MARC), University of Guam, Mangilao Guam.

government than the Filipino, because he is a better Christian.”⁷¹ In Torres’s reasoning, Filipinos may have had more opportunities to train in Western-based and European institutions because of their historical proximity to colonial metropolises, but Chamorros were obedient to imperial desires. Although Filipinos may have had the typical symbols of progress including wealth and commerce, Torres believed Western training could not change the fundamental characteristic of Filipinos as being rebellious colonial subjects and relaxed Christians. They argued that Chamorros were more ready to adopt American governance because of their docility, obedience, and their Christianity, and therefore the U.S. should recognize Chamorro desire to integrate further into American society.

If Chamorros were a moral people, Filipinos had a penchant for crime. And this, above all, determined the fundamental difference between Filipinos and Chamorros. Mr. Taitano of Hagåtña told the Congress that “in almost every instance where there is what we will call cold-blooded murder, the Filipinos are responsible, or at least men who have little Filipino blood. They are just as treacherous as dangerous. Habitual law-breakers on this island are mostly of Filipino descent.”⁷² For the Chamorro members of the Guam Congress, Filipinos caused most of the trouble on Guam, and their inability to be law abiding was opposite to Chamorro obedience and loyalty. Because *inafa’maolek* marked the social basis of Chamorro society, breaking laws signified Filipino inability to assimilate into Chamorro culture and customs. It was their Filipino blood that prevented them from acknowledging this social and cultural norm.

The legacies of the Philippine Revolution too made an impact at the meeting. Taitano continued his remarks by stating, “Now, about the Chamorros: Have you ever heard of any engaged in a mutiny? To the contrary they are afraid of blood. The so-called quick-tempered and fighting Chamorro will avail himself of no deadly weapon with the intention of using it. He is afraid of

⁷¹ “Proceedings of the Guam Congress,” Guam Naval Government Records, 3.

⁷² “Proceedings of the Guam Congress,” Guam Naval Government Records, 5.

blood.” The Philippine Revolution’s bloody battle for independence signaled to Taitano that Filipinos would rather resort to barbarous acts than to engage in civilized dialogue.⁷³ Chamorros, on the other hand, used diplomacy through petitions and dialogue to advocate for more rights since their annexation. If Filipinos’ rebelliousness caused problems for the United States, Chamorros’ inclination towards peace should be welcomed by the United States.

Mr. Calvo reinforced Taitano’s argument by citing an anecdote that he read in a paper. Mr. Calvo relayed the story of a group of natives Chamorros working in a rice field in Umatac, when an argument developed into a full-on fight. One man pulled a gun and “shot one of the men, though not fatally.” What happened next led Calvo to believe that Chamorros were more noble than Filipinos. He continued, “As soon as the blood from the wounded man started to flow freely, the man dropped the mauser, and the rest of the men started to flee in despair.” The Chamorro man’s dropping of the mauser signified his unwillingness to kill, and thus displayed his more noble nature. Calvo ended his anecdote by stating that this was “evident proof of [the natives] high esteem for Christianity and loyalty which we will never find prevalent among Filipinos.” In Calvo’s perspective, Filipinos would have finished the job, disregarding Christian morals and social relations. Filipinos did not have consciences; Chamorros did.⁷⁴

Chamorros were adamant about proving difference because it was an important aspect of demonstrating loyalty to the United States. Congressman Cepeda of Barrigada said at the Guam Congress Special Session, “You cannot find a Chamorro who is not loyal and true to the American Flag. Among the Filipinos, you will.”⁷⁵ Some Guam Congress members took it further. They argued that to be Chamorro was to be American. Jose M. Torres proclaimed that “We shall be Americans,

⁷³ In some ways, this is an extension of the politics of recognition. The ability to participate in civilized political discourse was to also show a people’s worthiness of citizenship, equality, etc.

⁷⁴ “Proceedings of the Guam Congress,” Guam Naval Government Records, 5

⁷⁵ “Proceedings of the Guam Congress,” Guam Naval Government Records, 4.

by the Americans, and for the Americans.”⁷⁶ Francis Taitano of Hagåtña argued that Chamorro loyalty should be exchanged for American citizenship. He suggested that loyalty was “the more reason why we should insist on a legislation affording us the privilege of becoming naturalized citizens of the United States of America.”⁷⁷ To them, to be Chamorro was to be American.

For some Chamorros, citizenship extended beyond national belonging. It was a familial relationship, a kinship of sorts. Antonio B. Calvo of Santa Cruz said at the Guam Congress Special session that “Guam and its people to this date have deeply embedded down in their hearts their love for the United States of America; America is their mother country; their best and most beloved guardian. America is their protection, their mother, and their father. That is true spirit of every native Chamorro and I am proud of it.”⁷⁸ For them, the United States was the parental figure for Chamorros on Guam protecting them from other nations and nurturing them to grow into modernity.

The inclination towards American culture and politics was a marked shift in Chamorro perception of Filipinos. While the generation of Chamorros in the earlier years of American occupation still held on to Spanish symbols of civilization and success, the American empire offered a new, modern lifestyle that younger Chamorros gravitated towards. The inclination towards the United States, however, should not be taken as blind loyalty. The Chamorro elites who were a part of the Guam Congress had much to gain from the continued presence of the Americans. Advances in infrastructure, education, and, indeed, shipping (to help with their import and export businesses) helped expand the wealth of the elite. Additionally, to be Chamorro-American was also to become closer to a global modernity. In the perspective of these Chamorros, their identity was not defined

⁷⁶ “Proceedings of the Guam Congress,” Guam Naval Government Records, 3.

⁷⁷ “Proceedings of the Guam Congress,” Guam Naval Government Records, 5.

⁷⁸ “Proceedings of the Guam Congress,” Guam Naval Government Records, 1.

by a primitive culture, unconnected to global trends. They articulated and defined a modern Chamorro-American identity in this moment of possible annexation to the Philippines.

The writings of Agueda Johnston and the Guam Congress's responses to the 1926 Philippine resolution give insight into the highly racialized U.S. empire in the Pacific, where colonial subjects were required to show markers of civilization, modernity, and American culture in order to be recognized as a political entity by the colonial government. In the perspective of Filipinos, the Philippines was no longer seen as a country of modernity as it had been in the Spanish period, but as an archipelago riddled with problems stemming from its inherent contradictions with U.S. racial logics and order. In order to prove Chamorro, the congressmen of the Guam Congress needed to articulate Chamorro identity using a mix of racial ideologies that could cater to both American and Chamorro understandings of race, belonging, and citizenship. The tensions and slippages found within their responses are a result of the overlapping and sometimes contradictory systems of race. By proving difference and articulating their own Chamorro identity, they expected that they would be recognized by the United States officials as loyal colonial subjects deserving of greater integration into the United States.

Filipino-Chamorro Families, Guam Citizenship, and the Legal Fight for Land

Since the beginning of U.S. colonialism on Guam, Chamorros had petitioned the United States to determine the political status of the island and the people. However, Guam was still an island colony ruled akin to a Naval ship in the first four decades of U.S. colonial rule. The President appointed Naval governors to govern both the military and civilian population. Even with the Guam Congress performing acts of U.S. governance, the Naval governor had unilateral power to determine laws on the island. This did not dissuade Chamorros from attempting to gain more political rights, and by 1930, their efforts towards Americanization were recognized by a progressive naval governor

of Guam, Willis Bradley, when he established the law of “Guam Citizenship.”⁷⁹ In the Proclamation, Governor Bradley declared who was eligible for Guam citizenship: that citizens of Guam included those who were born or naturalized in Guam, (1) “every person residing on Guam on 1 February 1899” who did not have any allegiance to any foreign power; (2) Every woman who, prior to 22 September 1922, married a citizen of Guam; (3) every future child who was born on Guam whose father held Guam citizenship; (4) and every child under the age of twenty-one whose father qualified with the above rules.⁸⁰ Modeled after American laws, Guam Citizenship was the next step in political education for the Chamorro people.

Although deemed more of a symbolic measure than anything legally binding, Guam citizenship endowed Chamorros living on Guam with some semblance of national citizenship. Guam citizenship signaled to Chamorros how the Naval government recognized their continuing loyalty and progress towards American citizenship. From then on, Guam citizenship status emboldened Chamorros to advocate for more rights, point out hypocrisies in American Naval Rule, and perform more elaborate acts of diplomacy, including a grassroots-funded campaign to send Baltazar Bordallo and Frank B. Leon Guerrero to Washington D.C. towards the end of the 1930s. The Chamorro elite’s identity slowly evolved away from Spanish characteristics and moved toward American elements. Chamorro identity became Chamorro-American identity.

⁷⁹ Rogers, *Destiny’s Landfall*, 149.

⁸⁰ Papers of Governor Willis Bradley, MSS 960 Box 1 Folder 37, Micronesian Area Research Center University of Guam. There are many caveats not included in the body of this paragraph. A more complete text of the proclamation is as follows: “Every person born or naturalized in Guam and subject to the jurisdiction thereof. Every person residing in Guam on 1 February, 1899, who at that time owed no allegiance to any foreign prince or power other than to the Crown of Spain, and that solely by virtue of allegiance to the Government of Guam. Every woman who, prior to 22 September, 1922, married a citizen of Guam; provided, that such women might, at the time of her marriage to said citizen of Guam, have been lawfully naturalized in the United States of America. Every child heretofore born or hereafter born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the Island of Guam, whose father was or may be a citizen of Guam at the time of such birth; provided, that the rights of citizenship shall not descend to a child whose father never resided in Guam. Every child under the age of twenty-one years at the time of the issue of a certificate of naturalization by the Government of Guam to the father of said child; provided, that the said child takes up actual residence in Guam within a period of two years from the date of naturalization of the father.”

Guam citizenship was not helpful for all residents of Guam. Laden with American gender ideologies, Guam Citizenship was passed down through the father's citizenship status and women were given Guam citizenship by way of their husbands.⁸¹ The granting of citizenship status, belonging, and identity based upon the father's and husband's citizenship status was opposite to how Chamorro society functioned, in which matrilineal practices still held strong in this period. If Chamorro women passed on Chamorro culture, the men incorporated the proto-American citizenship Chamorro identity.

As a result of the racialized and gendered premises of citizenship, Filipinos who had settled in Guam after 1898 were not granted Guam Citizenship. There were approximately 365 Filipinos, according to the 1940s census.⁸² For those with mixed-race Filipino-Chamorro families, the creation of Guam citizenship put into question their citizenship status under U.S. empire. The racialized and gendered nature of U.S. citizenship conflicted with Chamorro notions of family and kinship. Although U.S. racial and gendered logics supposed that the patriarch of the family determined the citizenship of his family, Chamorro notions of family and kinship were based upon the heritage of the Chamorro mother and the outsider's assimilation into Chamorro society. This gendered citizenship was materially consequential. The implementation of Guam Citizenship and the Naval

⁸¹ Aside: Reading American Census for Race - The 1920 and 1930 United States Census for the island of Guam demonstrates how the American racial system categorized Chamorro and Filipino people for Guam. When I attempted to reconstruct family trees for the families presented in this early part of American Naval governance on Guam, I came across an interesting pattern that existed in the pre-World War II censuses for Guam. For children whose Fathers were Filipino, but whose mothers were Chamorro, they were listed as "Filipino." So, for Leon Flores and Pancrascio Palting, in the eyes of the U.S. Government, their children were Filipinos.⁸¹ However, this may be opposite of how they themselves identified. For other families, sometimes "Cha" was overwritten by "Fil," perhaps because of nebulous nature of racial identities, but also confusion around national identity in a time when the Philippines was slated to become independent.⁸¹ In another example, Thomas Anderson Calvo and Regina Calvo's children were identified as "White" in 1920, but "Chamorro" in 1930. Thomas Anderson Calvo's Father was born in Spain, and a *Guam Recorder* article described him as having Scottish roots.⁸¹

⁸² Government of Guam, Interagency Committee on Population, "Guam's People, 'A Continuing Heritage': A Statistical Profile of the Territory of Guam, 1920-1980," (June 1988), 134. Copy found at the Pacific Collection, Hamilton Library, University of Hawai'i at Mānoa.

government's enforcement of alien land laws threatened to dispossess mixed-race Filipino-Chamorro families of land and property.

By the 1920s, there was a small yet thriving Filipino community in Guam. Two of the community's most prominent members were former Filipino revolutionary exiles turned Guam residents, Leon Flores and Pancrasio Palting. After opting to stay in Guam when they were released from exile in 1903, they had established large Filipino-Chamorro families, earned reputations as educated lawyers and government officials in the Naval Government of Guam, and positioned themselves at the center of the Filipino community in Guam. According to a speech Leon Flores had delivered during a memorial dedication to commemorate Filipino revolutionary exiles who had died on the island, he and Palting "remained in Guam at the request of Governor Seaton Schroeder to serve under his administration."⁸³ Palting remembered that it was immediately after he pledged allegiance to the United States in 1903, that Governor Seaton Schroeder "prevailed upon me [Palting] to continue in Guam, and become an official of the Government under his administration."

⁸⁴ Flores and Palting had secured positions within the Naval government of Guam in various capacities providing support to the new Americans who had little formal knowledge of the Spanish language and Spanish legal system which remained in place well into the twentieth century. This included positions as Island Attorneys, Judges of First Instance, as well as Registrar of Lands, Deeds, and Titles. Even though Flores and Palting arrived in Guam because of their revolutionary past in the Philippines, they became an essential part of the Naval government of Guam which made it relatively easy for them to become integrated into Guam's elite society.⁸⁵

⁸³ "Memorial Dedication," *The Guam Recorder*, Vol. XIV, No.2 (May 1937), 27.

⁸⁴ Correspondence from Pancrasio Palting to the Attorney-General of Guam, 27 October 1933, MSS 930, Box 9, Folder 5, National Archives Record Group 80 Annual Reports of the Governors of Guam 1901-1941, Richard F. Taitano Micronesian Area Research Center, University of Guam. (Hereafter cited as Palting to Attorney General of Guam, Willis Bradley Papers).

⁸⁵ This does not mean Flores and Palting were not critical of U.S. empire. In fact, it is quite the opposite. Both Flores and Palting were known for being abrasive towards hypocritical, autocratic Naval governors and U.S. federal laws that did not make sense in the context of Guam. Palting, in particular, was a vocal advocate for Guam rights often

Shortly after their release from exile, both Flores and Palting married into the Dungca family of Hagåtña.⁸⁶ The patriarch of the Dungca family, Justo Dungca, was a descendent of a Spanish era Filipino *deportado*. During the Spanish period, the Dungca family gained fluency in Chamorro culture and customs because they integrated and assimilated into Chamorro society. They were examples of the type of *mestizo* Chamorro family that characterized the population of Guam. Justo Dungca, himself, was admired for his business acumen selling copra to the Philippines, and he frequently attended to political matters that impacted the island in the early years of the U.S.'s presence. The Dungca household in Hagåtña was the center of Filipino community in Naval era Guam. While Palting married Soledad Dungca, Flores married Felicita Duncga. By 1920, Palting had two children Margarito—later know as Paul—and Florencia and lived next to Justo Dungca on Herman Cortez Street in Agaña.⁸⁷ After the untimely death of his first wife Felicita, Flores married Ana Camacho; their son Felixberto Camacho Flores would become the first Chamorro Archbishop of Guam in 1970.

The Flores and Palting families had a distinctively Chamorro influenced Filipino identities. According to James McDonald, a descendant and great grandson of Flores, the Chamorro language was the primary language of the household for generations. Flores had “assimilated into Chamorro society,” but “never claimed to be anything else than Filipino.”⁸⁸ Their Filipino heritage was something to be celebrated. Juan Flores said that his grandfather, Nieves Flores (a nephew of Leon

lambasting the Naval Government for ill-treatment of Guam residents through petitions as well as under the guise of ‘Prayers.’ One prayer includes the following – “We close our prayer to thee [God] for thy mercy and help, the first toward the people of Guam in general, and to the poor class in particular, and the second for our actual governor, to remedy for the terrible effects of the policy of the just gone administration of ‘not plenty and low cost’ but ‘high prices and scarcity.’” He continued on in his prayer several other examples of the effects of the administration policy. Correspondence from Pancrasio Palting to Honorable President Franklin D. Roosevelt, 7 April, 1936, MSS 960 Box 1, Folder 31 Willis Bradley Papers, MARC, UOG.

⁸⁶ “Letter to William Safford from Justo Dungca, 21st March 1904,” MSS 980, William Edwin Safford Papers, MARC, UOG.

⁸⁷ Bureau of the Census, “Fourteenth Census of the United States: 1920- Population, The Island of Guam.”

⁸⁸ James McDonald, Phone Interview with the Author, October 10, 2019.

Flores), frequently referred to his birthplace in Ilocos Norte as “the homestead” never forgetting his province in the Philippines.⁸⁹ Both James and Juan remember their Filipino great grandparents and grandparents as “old fashioned,” always well-dressed, indicative of upper-class education and training that was also practiced by the women in their families. James and Juan also remember that their Filipino ancestors living on Guam only spoke Chamorro, and when they did speak English, it was with Filipino accents.⁹⁰ Frequently, members of their families would travel back and forth to the Philippines for education or to visit relatives. Furthermore, the Dungca House in Hågatña, which still stands today, was a social and familial center for the Filipino elite in Guam in the pre-World War II period.⁹¹ Although in 1926, Chamorros had attempted to disentangle Filipinos from Chamorros, there were in Hågatña Filipino-Chamorro families who were integrated into Guam society.

Despite Flores, Palting, and other Filipinos’ integration into Chamorro society, the Naval government questioned the citizenship status of those who had married Chamorro women on Guam. Although the process of Filipinization had begun and Filipinos began to gain more control over the archipelago’s affairs, the Philippines was still a possession of the United States and Filipinos were still U.S. nationals. But Filipinos living in Guam held a liminal position in which they did not want to identify with the Philippine Commonwealth, and they were neither foreign citizens, nor fully fledged U.S. citizens. As migrants within U.S. empire, they fell in between the cracks of ambiguous laws that presumed immobility of colonial people. Filipinos living on Guam and their mixed families were ineligible for Guam citizenship as stipulated by Governor Bradley’s 1930 executive order.

⁸⁹ Juan Flores, Interview with the Author, October 1, 2019.

⁹⁰ McDonald, Phone Interview with the Author October 10, 2019.

⁹¹ United States Department of the Interior, “National Register of Historic Places Inventory – Nomination Form: Agana Houses Thematic Group,” January 3, 1995, <https://npgallery.nps.gov/GetAsset/5e69984e-ad36-43a7-8294-2de88a0cb247>

The inability to claim Guam citizenship posed problems for Filipino men because aliens—those without Guam or U.S. citizenship—could not own land in Guam. On September 18, 1933, a few Filipinos received a notice from the Naval Government of Guam asking them to turn over their land to the authorities on the basis that “acquisition of land by purchase, gift or inheritance by aliens in Guam is prohibited by law.”⁹² Pancrasio Palting, along with his daughter Florencia and his son Margarito who was attending law school in Washington, D.C. at the time, received this notice with the stipulation that they must “convey your title to said lands otherwise they shall be forfeited and escheated to the Naval Government of Guam in accordance with law” within ninety days. Although Florencia and Margarito had been born in Guam and thus fell into an eligible category of Guam citizen, they did not have the right to hold onto their land because their father was Filipino. The Paltings were set to lose several properties including a lot in the city of Hagåtña. Land and property loss not only affected the Filipino father and husband within the household, but the entire family.

The alien status of their Filipino husbands and fathers not only jeopardized the land ownership of their Chamorro wives and children, but their cultural significance and connection to Guam. According to Monnig, “for many Chamorros, narratives about land reside in profound historical ideas about who the Chamorro people were and are in relation to the island of Guam.”⁹³ For these Filipino men with Chamorro families, a loss of these properties would not only affect their access to capital, but their Chamorro families’ claims to Guam. “The whole notion of Chamorro family is often connected – materially, experientially and discursively – to land.”⁹⁴ Furthermore, as argued by Chamorro scholar Christine Taitano DeLisle, Chamorro women continued to facilitate deep connections between Chamorro people and the land itself by maintaining indigenous cultural

⁹² Correspondence of Ion Pursell to P.R. Palting, Florencia Palting, and Margarito Palting, MSS 960, Box 1, Folder 28, Governor Willis Bradley Papers, Micronesian Area Research Center, University of Guam.

⁹³ Monnig, “Proving Chamorro,” 231.

⁹⁴ Monnig, “Proving Chamorro,” 233.

practices despite the arrival of new colonial regimes. Chamorro women taught their children how to be stewards of the land and culture; they were the cultural brokers between indigenous and colonial communities; and they maintained the communal relations at the heart of *inafa'maolek*.⁹⁵ Chamoru mixed-race children would be seen more readily as the child of their Chamorro mother, not necessarily of their foreign father, and their community and family obligations stemmed from their Chamorro mother's connections to others. Integrated into the large kinship structures of the Chamorro elite, the properties that were legally in the names of the Filipino were effectively shared with extended families for both cultural and economic reasons. The loss of valuable real estate validated by past governors, clerks, and judges was potentially disastrous for these Filipinos and their families. Guam citizenship did not account for the familial systems that determined belonging and acceptance in Guam society, especially when women bound the Filipino men to the island.

The Filipino men who called Guam home started a campaign to obtain Guam citizenship in the attempt to save their land from Navy annexation. Some Filipinos filed a "petition for Guam Citizenship" with the Naval Government of Guam Judiciary Department on September 30, 1933, which was denied in November of that year. Leon Flores, along with Filipinos Daniel L. Perez, Bernardo T. Punzalan, and Geronimo P. Santos (all but Flores were veterans of the U.S. military), sent a letter to the Secretary of the Navy and the President of the United States in the care of the Filipino Resident Commissioners of the Philippine Islands to ask for Guam citizenship. Underscoring their loyalty to the U.S. government as shown through their service to the U.S. Navy, they "looked for protection of us in the possession and ownership of real estate of which we came into possession of during our long residence in this Island" all of which were previously allowed and

⁹⁵ DeLisle, "A History of Chamorro Nurse-Midwives in Guam and a 'Placental Politics' for Indigenous Feminism."

certified by previous Naval governors and governments.⁹⁶ Ownership of land in Guam remained the principal subject of concern for the Filipinos.

The Filipino men asserted pointed arguments when calling out the hypocrisy in the unfair and unjust treatment by the Naval Government. They argued that they were “subjects of the United States, and never became subjects of any foreign nations.” In addition, Guam and the Philippines were both U.S. territories. They wrote,

We respectfully call the attention of your Honor to the fact that the sovereign power of the Country to which we belong by birth, and of the Country to which we pertain by residence, is the UNITED STATES OF THE NORTH AMERICAN NATION, under whose flag no people whose allegiance has been transferred to her as the conqueror [*sic*], from Spain, defeated and loser [*sic*] of her possession and colonies, should be classified as ALIEN, by reason of race, etcetera, while they remain under the control of the American Flag.⁹⁷

They believed their designation as aliens in Guam belied the fact that both Guam and the Philippines were territories that the United States annexed in 1898 after the Spanish-American War. They also pointed out the hypocrisy that American rhetoric of equality prevented the use of “race” as a fundamental determiner of citizenship, but that country nonetheless use race to categorize those who would belong to the United States and who did not. In pointing out the inconsistencies in American law when applied to the territories, they demonstrated their keen understanding of U.S. law and attempted to reason their way toward equality. Nevertheless, in the purview of the U.S. government and Navy, the Filipinos were unwanted immigrants living in an American island with a nebulous political status. For Flores, Perez, Punzalan, and Santos, as American colonial subjects, they believed alien land laws should not apply to them.

⁹⁶ Letter to the Governor of Guam 24 October, 1933, MSS 960, Box 1, Folder 28, Willis Bradley Papers, Micronesian Area Research Center, University of Guam.

⁹⁷ Correspondence from Daniel L. Perez, Bernardo Punzalan, Leon Flores, and Geronimo P. Santos to Secretary of the United States Navy, 9 October, 1933. MSS 960, Box 1, Folder 28, Willis Bradley Papers, Micronesian Area Research Center, University of Guam.

The Filipino men were well-aware of how their citizenship affected their Chamorro wives' and family's ability to hold land. In another attempt to gain allies in their struggle for Guam citizenship, Filipinos reached out to Governor General of the Philippine Islands, Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Senate of Philippine Congress, former Governor of Guam Willis Bradley, and Filipino Resident Commissioners based in Washington D.C.. The letter they wrote on October 16, 1933 noted, "Those who came into the Island of Guam, at any time after the occupation thereof, by the military forces of the United States of North America, and the native girls whom they had married, and the children born to those marital unions, and their widows, are now considered by Governor Alexander's administration, Aliens to the United States in Guam."⁹⁸ Because citizenship and nationhood followed a family's patriarch, native and Chamorro women were deemed to be Filipino despite their birth, livelihood, and families residing on Guam. The children also became Filipino. However, the national classifications of Filipino and Chamorro as interpreted by the United States Navy did not fit the cultural norms in which the male Filipino head of household was assimilated into the Chamorro clan system. In Guam society, Filipino men were merely assimilated into local families. Although Filipino by birth and nationality—even if at the time the Philippines was part of the U.S.—they married native women, spoke Chamorro and were fluent in Chamorro customs and cultures.

The writers deconstructed the hypocrisy of the law by offering four logical arguments. First, they pointed to the absurdity in the definition of alien in the context of the U.S. empire. They asked how could the peoples of the Philippines, Guam, Hawai'i, American Sāmoa, and Puerto Rico "all of which countries are still at present time held by it, as its possessions, territories, or like, as shown by the American Flag, which is flying in each of those countries, is any one of those people considered,

⁹⁸ Letter entitled "The Filipinos in Guam," October 16, 1933. MSS 960 Box 1 Folder 28, Willis Bradley Papers, Micronesian Area Research Center, University of Guam. (Hereafter cited as "The Filipinos in Guam," Willis Bradley Papers)

reasonably, an Alien to it, the United States of North America?”⁹⁹ How, they asked, could anyone leaving within the United States territories legally be labeled as alien? For the writers, the American empire was an anathema to the United States rhetoric of a democracy that supposedly emphasized the equality of people.

Secondly, the writers of the letter argued the validity of their land claims by describing how the Naval government of Guam operated. They wrote

Former incumbents as Governors of Guam, *whose will were the “LAW”*, whether manifested or expressed VERBATIM or in any style of writing, had sanctioned and approved the acquisition, the possession, the owning, the documentation, -including registration, survey, payment of real estate taxes, and securing of Guaranteed Claim Title of Certificate of Title, and the laws of Guam call them indistinctly, signed by Notaries Public, Court Clerk, Courts Judges, etc. and Governors of Guam, on the part of those Filipinos, who now keep them in their possessions and controls.¹⁰⁰

Their land titles were valid not only due to the approval from the Naval governor, but because it was approved at various levels of the Naval government’s bureaucracy. The writers demonstrated their familiarity of the bureaucracy of the island’s Naval government, some of them having worked as clerks. They also subtly implied the undemocratic nature of the government by denouncing how one man could arbitrarily decide law for the island. Governors had almost autocratic power to unilaterally dismantle long held policies. Then, in their third argument, the writers pointed to the United States Constitution demonstrating their legal acumen. They wrote, “The Constitutional law of the United States prohibits the promulgation of law, to have its retroactive effects, where that law is prejudicial to certain entities.” They argued that their properties were exempted from the alien land laws because they occurred before the implementation of both Guam citizenship and the alien land laws. The writers demonstrated their command for U.S. law, using it as arguments against the

⁹⁹ “The Filipinos in Guam,” Willis Bradley Papers.

¹⁰⁰ “The Filipinos in Guam,” Willis Bradley Papers.

arbitrary nature of governance on Guam. This, too, might have seemed threatening towards the Naval Government as it could dismantle any autocratic authority that Naval Governors possessed.

And as a final statement, they mentioned how their Filipino-Chamorro families through no fault of their own would be negatively affected by the decision to deny Guam citizenship to Filipinos. In the Great Depression, they could not sell the land for profit, causing them to lose all wealth and subjecting them to poverty. They wrote that “transferring the said properties [to the Naval Government], for no consideration, to friends, or to relatives of their wives, is equivalent to throw them into the sea, and lose, forever, the fruits of honest struggles for life, during the long period of time of residences, as faithful subjects of the United States, in Guam.”¹⁰¹ The enforcement of the alien land laws, thus, would deprive Chamorro families of their land and push them into poverty, in the island that they belonged.

On the 24th of October, the Judiciary Department of the Naval Government of Guam sent a sympathetic letter to the Governor about the Filipinos’ petitions to have Guam citizenship apply to them.¹⁰² It explained that because there were no naturalization laws and procedures for Guam at any period before this order, Filipinos had no opportunity to transfer citizenship. Furthermore, the only way non-citizens and children could receive citizenship was if the Court and the Governor of Guam had “approved the decree, which should have the effect of making it legal.” The writer suggested that immigration laws be created for the island patterned after the U.S., “taking into consideration the immigration laws of Guam.” The territorial status of Guam and the stateless status of the Chamorro people in regard to the United States made it difficult to fairly ascertain legal citizenship and migration. Furthermore, the U.S. did not have clear regulations for colonial subjects moving

¹⁰¹ “The Filipinos in Guam,” Willis Bradley Papers.

¹⁰² Due to the limited clarity of the document in the archive, the author of this report is unknown. Letter to the Governor, 24 October 1933, Willis Bradley Papers.

between territorial spaces. In their quest to keep their lands, the Filipino residents of Guam exposed the inadequacies and inconsistencies of U.S. colonial governance.¹⁰³

The letter also provided legal and economic arguments to justify Filipinos claims for Guam citizenship. It stated that the “present practice of limiting citizenship to persons born in Guam is too severe.” Citing the fact that attaining residency within the continent only took five years, the writer further wrote that “it is in the interest of the state [and] the individual to grant citizenship if it is clear that the petitioner desires in good faith to become a citizen and if he is industrious, in good health, and of good moral character.” In their perspective, the Filipino elites on Guam—particularly those who had worked for the Naval government, businessmen, teachers, and landowners—were well respected and deserved Guam citizenship.¹⁰⁴

From an economic standpoint, they also argued that allowing Filipinos to become citizens would be beneficial to the local community. “If an alien is not permitted to become a citizen there is always a tendency for him to move away and take his personal wealth to the land he can call his home.”¹⁰⁵ As predominately upper class, Filipinos claimed that their citizenship would allow them to help promote the island’s progress to modernity as the U.S. desired for Guam. As Guam citizens, Filipinos would earn and spend their wealth within the local community. They too would be inclined to properly develop the land they owned for economic growth. There was an economic incentive to ensuring that law-abiding Filipinos remain on Guam to further develop the island economically.

Besides Leon Flores and Pancrasio Palting, there were other Filipinos and foreigners who were affected by the Guam citizenship law. They are noted as those “who have resided in Guam a considerable length of time, who have married native women, have large families, and who it is believed would make loyal citizens.” Flores was described as an “Attorney. Resident of Guam for 32

¹⁰³ Letter to the Governor, 24 October 1933, Willis Bradley Papers.

¹⁰⁴ Letter to the Governor, 24 October 1933, Willis Bradley Papers.

¹⁰⁵ Letter to the Governor, 24 October 1933, Willis Bradley Papers.

years. Citizen of the Philippines. Married to Native. Four (4) children.” The others include Pascual Artero who was noted as a “businessman. Citizen of Spain. Resident of Guam for 32 years. Married to Native. Seven (7) children”; Geronimo Pongo Santos who was described as a “Barber. Resident of Guam for 19 years. Married to Native. Nine (9) children. Citizen of the Philippines”; and lastly, Adriano Maria Cristobal “Federal Employee. Resident of Guam for 23 years. Married to Native. Five (5) children. Citizen of the Philippines.”¹⁰⁶ Not only did the authors of the letter demand citizenship based upon the perceived productivity of the Filipino men, but their connections to Guam via their Chamorro wives and families. Here, Filipinos challenged the U.S. definition of belonging based in notions of nation, race, and citizenship to prioritize family and kin on Guam.

Two days later on the 26th of October, Pancrasio Palting received a suspension of the land claim issued by the Naval Government. Ion Pursell wrote to Palting that the 90-day notice to turn over land to the government was “hereby held in abeyance for the time being and until further notice.”¹⁰⁷ The notice was also sent to Palting’s daughter Florencia Dungca Palting and to his son Margarito Dungca Palting (later known as Paul). Listed in the letter was the list of six properties that were to be handed over. One lot in particular “Lot No. 37-New, situated between General Terrero Street and Hernan-Cortes Street, City of Agana, Guam” was divided twenty times, with Palting holding 8/20ths, Florencia holding 3/20ths, and Margarito holding another 3/20ths.¹⁰⁸ This one property alone shows not only how the confiscation of property could affect a whole family, but how the family themselves understood ownership of property. The property was shared with everyone. Nevertheless, the letter provided a short reprieve that allowed the government and the

¹⁰⁶ Letter to the Governor, 24 October 1933, Willis Bradley Papers.

¹⁰⁷ Correspondence from Ion Pursell to P. Palting, Florencia Dungca Palting, and Margarito Palting, 26 October 1933. MSS 960, Box 1, Folder 28 Willis Bradley Papers, Micronesia Area Research Center, University of Guam.

¹⁰⁸ This may refer to General Herrero Street which is consistent with the 1920 Census.

court to read the many letters and petitions sent by the Filipinos and their allies to decide whether or not to grant Guam citizenship to Filipinos and other foreigners living on the island.

On November 10, the Filipinos' petition for Guam citizenship was denied. The summary to the proceedings wrote, "the petitioner is not one of those classes enumerated in the proclamation of the Governor of Guam, namely, that petitioner was not born in Guam; he is not a Chamorro, and was not in Guam on 1 February 1899."¹⁰⁹ As a result, the Senior Island Judge V.P. Camacho declared that the "petition of Leon Flores for Guam citizenship be and is hereby denied." Despite his "medal of service" for twenty years of service to the U.S. Naval Government from Governor Bradley, Flores could not obtain Guam citizenship because he was Filipino.

In the judiciary summary of Filipino petitioner Geronimo Santos, a special remark stated that "he, Leon Flores, Adriano M. Cristobal, and other more Filipinos in Guam were warned to have their properties conveyed, within the time fixed-90 days, otherwise. They would be forfeited to Nav. Govt., [*sic*] as they are, as aliens, prohibited to own real estates in Guam."¹¹⁰ In addition, Guam citizenship for Filipinos was a way to protect their properties. Another note written in the file of Adriano Cristobal wrote, "To save their properties from forfeiture to the Naval govt. of Guam...the gentlemen-applicant and other more Filipinos applied for Chamorro citizenship, but were denied." The Navy Government on Guam determined that Filipinos could not be Guam citizens and as a result must sell their land or risk having it taken by the government. A note written later atop of the document wrote, "All Filipinos-applicants for Guam citizenship were denied, thereby losing the stronghold from which to defend the forfeiture and escheat of their real properties, into the Naval

¹⁰⁹ Naval Government of Guam, Island Court Citizenship Proceedings for Leon Flores, MSS 960 Box 1 Folder 29, Willis Bradley Papers, Micronesian Area Research Center, University of Guam.

¹¹⁰ Naval Government of Guam, Island Court Citizenship Proceedings for Geronimo Santos, MSS 960 Box 1 Folder 29, Willis Bradley Papers, Micronesian Area Research Center, University of Guam. Willis Bradley Papers, MSS 960 Box 1 Folder 29, MARC UOG.

Government of Guam, now held in Abeyance until further notice.” Filipinos without Guam citizenship, then, were required to return their lands to the U.S. Naval Government.

Pancrasio Palting, however, did not give up. He appealed his case on November 13, 1933 by sending a brief to the Chief of Naval Operations arguing against the legal basis of the two decisions made by the Naval Government of Guam. The first was whether as a Filipino-born Guam resident, he would be considered an alien to the United States, and the second, if the land under his name was legally obtained prior to the implementation of the alien land law of 1918, and thus not subject to the new order implemented in 1933.¹¹¹ Perhaps aware of the political moves to prepare the Philippines for national independence, Palting found it absolutely necessary to clarify the legal positions of Filipinos living within Guam. His intracolony migration defied legal categorizations of citizenship and belonging for both colonial subjects as well as the territorial possessions.

In this brief, Palting explained why he was on Guam in the first place. “It was in the midst of the Filipino revolution against the authority of the United States implantation therein,” he wrote, “when in the year 1900, I with others had been removed by Army forces of the United States, from my natal province [Laoag, Ilocos Norte], against our will, to Manila, P.I.”¹¹² Naming a few of his contemporaries—Apolinario Mabini, Artemio Ricarte, Pablo Ocampo—, Palting wrote about how they were “ejected from the Philippine Islands, and brought as political prisoners into a place now known as the municipality of Asan, of this Island of Guam” in December 1901. Palting emphasized that his movement and migration to Guam was not necessarily his personal choice, but a decision made by the United States military. They were “kept isolated from the rest of the World as obstructive elements” because “of the pacification for which the American military forces were

¹¹¹ The first query of the two is explored more deeply in the next paragraphs. The second argued that even if the court decides that Palting and his family were aliens to the United States, the U.S. has decided before that laws should not be enacted retroactively. Thus, the land he was acquired by him before 1918 should not be subject to the law in 1933.

¹¹² Palting to Attorney General of Guam, Willis Bradley Papers, MARC, UOG.

working throughout the Philippine Islands.”¹¹³ The American military governance in the Philippines prompted Palting’s relocation to Guam.

In 1902, however, in exchange for his release from exile, Palting took an oath of allegiance to the United States, and recognized “without reservation, the supremacy of its authority to the Philippine islands.” Although he was released, he “did not return to [his] native country” because the naval governor of the island, Seaton Schroeder, asked if Palting would be willing to “become an official of the Government under his administration.” Palting agreed, and for several years after he had multiple positions within the Naval Government of Guam “swearing, in each and all cases of appointments, to my allegiance to the United States... without mental reservation.” In all cases, Palting emphasized he proclaimed allegiance to the United States witnessed by military governors and officials, and thus, he argued that he should not be considered an alien of the United States and Guam. If military colonialism was the cause of Palting’s exile from the Philippines, it was also the reason for his settlement on Guam. He became a part of the United States’ military’s plan to secure their empire in the Pacific, and, in a way, he argued that he became American.

Palting cited U.S. law to bolster his arguments. Quoting from the decision in *Fourteen Diamond Ring v. United States*, Palting showed that the Philippines was not to be considered a foreign country, and thus, by birth he was not an alien to the United States. He wrote “the Country-Philippine Islands, to which I belong by birth, and the country-Guam, to which I belong by residence, are under the control and sovereignty of the United States, to which their inhabitants and people, among whom I, my children, and my wife, are, owe allegiance and obedience as its subjects up to present time.” Palting argued that he and his mixed-race Filipino-Chamorro family should not be considered aliens living within the United States.

¹¹³ Palting to Attorney General of Guam, Willis Bradley Papers, MARC, UOG.

According to a letter by A.T. Perez to Governor Bradley, as of March 1934, the foreigners who owned land on Guam did not have to give lands to the Navy.¹¹⁴ Perez, who had previously denied the Filipinos Guam citizenship, wrote that

“Upon my arrival, I found what you already known from Mr. Palting that the Japanese, Spaniard, and Filipino residents had to sell their real estate properties within 3 months. However, this order was not carried out due to the cablegrams sent by the above named residents to Washington and coded radiogram was received from the Department [Navy] to hold the order in abeyance.”

Palting’s arguments were heard by the Navy Department and he did not need to transfer his land. Despite the favorable outcome for Palting, the legal battle for land demonstrates the difficulty with which Palting and Flores negotiated—legally, socially, and culturally—through the different articulations of race, citizenship, and belonging in the local Chamorro society that was ruled by the U.S. Naval Government. The lives of Palting and Flores demonstrate how colonial subjects moved and migrated within the American empire.

Race, citizenship, and belonging and were being redefined constantly in Guam in the 1920s and 1930s. The 1926 resolution and the Filipino-Chamorro families citizenship conundrum reflect how the overlapping and sometimes conflicting schemas of race had the potential for material consequences that spurred Chamorros and Filipinos to articulate their racial identities in terms that would be recognizable to U.S. colonial state. Filipino-Chamorro families had to contend with the racialized and gendered notions of citizenship in order to protect their land and property. With the added complexity of the Guam’s political status as a colony of the United States, Guam’s Chamorro people demonstrated the inapplicability of American racial logics to define and categorize those of mixed and indigenous heritage. In this period of undefined political status and the growing desire to become U.S. citizens, their essays, speeches, debates, and legal cases were demonstrations of the

¹¹⁴ Correspondence of A.T. Perez to Governor of Guam Willis Bradley, MSS 960, Box 1, Folder 29, Willis Bradley Papers, Micronesian Area Research Center, University of Guam.

Chamorro and Filipino ability to understand, use, and critique the U.S. empire's racialized and gendered forms of colonial governance for their own gain. Although Guam was not annexed to the Philippines, and Filipino-Chamorro families were able to keep their land, the course of these two events reflect the complexities of the twentieth-century transformation of social relations under U.S. empire.

**Natives & Aliens:
Chamoru Land Dispossession, Filipino Alien Labor,
and the Building of an American Military Empire in the Pacific**

In November 1949, Assemblyman A.C. Cruz from the central village of Barrigada found himself before a visiting commission of the Public Lands Committee of the United States House of Representatives to provide his testimony on the passage of the Guam Organic Act. Despite his support for the Organic Act's provision on U.S. citizenship for the residents of Guam, Cruz was angered by the inefficiency of the U.S. Navy Department's bureaucracy on one specific point. He lamented to the committee, "The land question on Guam is of primary importance." During the reoccupation and rebuilding of Guam in the years after World War II, there were "abuses by the Government [that] have been committed which will certainly astound Americans like you," and that due to the U.S. military's "taking of private properties under the color and scheme of National Security, many a Guamanian property owner has been violently and grossly invaded in his rights of privacy and quiet possession of his property."¹ Although they were liberated from Japanese imperial occupation, the Chamorro people—many of them called themselves "Guamanians" to distinguish themselves from Chamorros of the Northern Mariana Islands—faced a massive process of military land dispossession by the very country who purported to deliver freedom and democracy to the rest of the world.²

¹ House of Representatives, U.S. Congress, "Public Hearings Conducted before a sub-committee of the Public Lands Committee" Agana, Guam, (November 21, 22, 23, 1949), 139. (Hereafter cited as "Guam Organic Act Hearings")

² This dissertation does not examine the World War II experience of Guam and the Philippines. It suggests, however, that the immediate postwar years for Chamorros on Guam – when they were re-occupied by U.S. military forces – were just as destructive and uncertain as the years during the Japanese occupation. While World War II has been written about extensively on Guam from all perspectives including in popular and community memory, the immediate postwar years are ripe for research. In addition, the wartime experience led many Chamorros on Guam to adopt the appellation "Guamanian" as a way to distinguish themselves from Chamorros of the Northern Mariana Islands. Throughout this chapter and subsequent chapters, historical actors may use the term Guamanian to refer specifically to Chamorro people and at other times refer to any person regardless of race who resided on the island. As such, my analysis and interpretation of primary sources will be more specific. I will use "Chamorro" when the historical actor was using "Guamanian" to refer specifically to the indigenous people of the island, and I will use "Guamanian" when the historical actor was using "Guamanian" to refer all residents of the island regardless of race. On the wartime experience of Guam,

Meanwhile, Chamorro lands were transformed into a U.S. military fortress through the labor of Filipino migrant workers. “Almost everything on Guam was built by the Filipinos,” Pilar P. Malilay recounted in the documentary *Under the American Sun*.³ She emphasized, “Roads, buildings, everything in the military was built by Filipinos.” In 1952, Malilay was one of the few women who was recruited to work as a registered nurse at Camp Roxas, one of the several labor camps that housed military contract laborers from the Philippines. She and five other nurses took care of anywhere between 5,000 and 10,000 Filipino men who worked for U.S. military contractors. Filipinos built the military infrastructure upon the Chamorro land that the U.S. annexed for defense purposes. Usually only reported as statistics or seen in anonymous photos in the archives, roughly 20,000 Filipino migrant laborers toiled in the tropical Guam heat to build infrastructure including airstrips, roads, and buildings to support the U.S. military’s strategic realignment in the Pacific.⁴ They were welders, electricians, stevedores, truck drivers, and even accountants, bakers, mailmen, commissary shopkeepers, and busboys. They were not allowed to leave the restricted zones without permission from military personnel and were often paid low wages despite the backbreaking work

On the World War II experience of Guam, Tony Palomo, *An Island in Agony* (Self-Published, 1984); Camacho, Keith L. *Cultures of Commemoration: The Politics of War, Memory, and History in the Mariana Islands* (Mānoa: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2011); Wakako Higuchi, “The Japanisation Policy for the Chamorros of Guam, 1941-1944,” *The Journal of Pacific History* 36, no. 1 (2001): 19–35; Wakako Higuchi, *The Japanese Administration of Guam, 1941-1944: A Study of Occupation and Integration Policies, with Japanese Oral Histories* (Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & Company, Inc, Publishers, 2013). On immediate post-World War II Guam history, Anne Perez Hattori, “Guardians of Our Soil: Indigenous Responses to Post-World War II Military Land Appropriation on Guam,” In *Farms, Firms, and Runways: Perspectives on U.S. Military Bases in the Western Pacific*, ed L. Eve Armetrout Ma, (2001), 186–202; James Viernes, “Fanhasso I Taotao Sumay: Displacement, Dispossession, and Survival in Guam” (Master’s, University of Hawai‘i at Manoa, 2008); Keith Camacho, *Sacred Men: Law, Torture, and Retribution in Guam* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2019). On Chamorro versus Guamanian, Gina E. Taitano, “Adoption of ‘Guamanian’,” *Guampedia Inc.* October 08, 2020. Accessed May 31, 2021, <https://www.guampedia.com/adoption-of-guamanian/>; further historicization of the term can be found in chapters five and six of this dissertation.

³ *Under the American Sun*, directed by Burt Sardoma, Jr. and produced by Bernie Provideo Schumann, 2014. The documentary’s website is www.camproxas.com.

⁴ Robert F. Rogers, *Destiny’s Landfall*, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2011), 201; Bruce Campbell, “The Filipino Community of Guam,” (Master’s, University of Guam, 1987); Alfred Flores, “‘No Walk in the Park’: US Empire and the Racialization of Civilian Military Labor in Guam, 1944–1962,” *American Quarterly* 67, no. 3 (2015): 813–835.; Alfred Flores, “‘Little Island into Mighty Base’: Indigeneity, Race, and U.S. Empire in Guam, 1944-1962” (Ph.D., University of California, Los Angeles, 2015).

they performed for their employers. They were the labor upon which the United States could build its military empire on Guam and project its power in the Pacific.

The U.S. post-World War II militarization of Guam was a confluence of multiple regimes of imperial rule: settler colonialism, international labor migration, and military colonialism. The U.S. military took precedence over Chamorro people's lands and livelihoods, demonstrating the very material consequences of when settler colonialism collides with U.S. militarization. As defined by Dean Saranillio, settler colonialism is "a system of power that aims to expropriate Indigenous territories and eliminate modes of production in order to replace Indigenous peoples with settlers who are discursively constituted as superior and thus more deserving over these contested lands and resources."⁵ Chamorro loss of land at the hands of the U.S. military was a process of land expropriation that dismissed Chamorro claims to land, reconfigured land ownership, and displaced Chamorro people. Militarization also came with the forced reliance on military institutions for livelihood in which Chamorros had to move into a cash economy to survive.

This settler colonial transformation was exacerbated by the migrant labor regimes in which the military negotiated international agreements between the United States and the Philippines to recruit and transport Filipino workers to construct the bases on Guam. Doing so, Chamorros argued, created job competition in which military contractors preferred to hire Filipinos over Chamorros. Although Filipino migrants were transient in nature (and not necessarily settlers), the military installations established throughout the island for the growing U.S. geopolitical power in the Asia-Pacific region became permanent settler institutions that transformed the Chamorro island of Guam into an American military fortress. As Juliet Nebolon argues, settler militarism demonstrates how "settler colonialism and militarism have simultaneously perpetuated, legitimated, and concealed

⁵ Dean Itsuji Saranillio, "Settler Colonialism," In *Native Studies Keywords* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2015) 284.

one another.”⁶ As such, Guam’s immediate postwar history was a rapid acceleration of settler militarism imbued with migrant labor regimes established to bolster American military power in the Pacific.⁷

This chapter historicizes the interwoven regimes of land and labor facilitated by the U.S. military during the militarization of Guam between 1947 and 1956. First, this chapter examines how the U.S. military established legal structures and colonial policies to arbitrarily annex land on Guam. When Chamorros sought compensation or return of land, the military justified its land annexation and its slow response to Chamorro land claims by arguing that the land was necessary for “national defense.” Chamorros, however, pointed out the injustices of how the island was still governed by U.S. military policy, especially when they encountered resistance during their attempts to rebuild their lives after the harrowing wartime experience. Secondly, this chapter examines how the U.S. military facilitated the creation of international migrant labor regimes in order to transform the annexed Chamorro land into useable space for U.S. military operations on Guam. The U.S. State Department, in conjunction with the U.S. military, negotiated with the newly independent Philippines to allow U.S. military contractors to recruit Filipino migrant workers to build the bases in Guam. The migrant labor regime ensured that the contractors for Guam’s military build-up had access to a relatively cheap and stable labor force, while also providing the Philippines with a postwar, post-independence economy built upon the exportation and remittances of Filipino workers abroad. Lastly, this chapter shows how the culmination of the loss of land and the influx of Filipino migrant workers posed problems for Chamorro people. They argued that the U.S. military

⁶ Juliet Nebolon, “‘Life Given Straight from the Heart’: Settler Militarism, Biopolitics, and Public Health in Hawai‘i during World War II.” *American Quarterly* 69, no. 1 (2017): 25.

⁷ Settler militarism happens differently in differently locales. Rather than “failing forward” into statehood – as Dean Saranillio argues was the case for Hawai‘i, the granting of U.S. citizenship to Chamorros on Guam ensured that the island remained a nebulous space of empire– always foreign in a domestic sense. Nebolon, “‘Life Given Straight from the Heart,’” 25.; Juliet Nebolon, “Settler Militarism: World War II in Hawai‘i and the Making of Transpacific Empire” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Yale University, 2017). Saranillio, *Unsustainable Empire*, 19.

set up a structure that not only deprived them of land but that upheld a “coolie labor” regime that disadvantaged Chamorros. For Chamorros, this combination of land dispossession and limitations on job opportunities further exacerbated the difficult legacies of World War II. The postwar militarization of the island in which the U.S. military dictated regimes of land and labor, ushered in an era of settler militarism to Guam.

The Reoccupation of Guam

World War II devastated Guam. From December 1941 to August 1944, the Chamorro people on Guam were subjected to another set of colonial rules under the Japanese empire, including changes in language, behavior, and life in general.⁸ Many Chamorros evacuated their villages homes to their secluded *lanchos* (ranches) in the jungles of Guam to hide from the violence of Japanese military officials and to live off the land. The wartime experiences of abuse such as rape, murder, and massacres of the Chamorro people remain in the general consciousness of the people of Guam. Chamorro people were made to work for Japanese military operations, planting crops, building pillboxes for Japanese guns, and digging tunnels into the limestone cliffs by the beaches.⁹ Furthermore, in the last months of Japanese occupation of Guam in the summer of 1944, Chamorros were forced to leave their respective villages and *lanchos* by the Japanese military and move into the inner valleys and dense jungles of the island, presumably to prevent them from reaching and communicating with U.S. ships and planes that sailed past or flew over the island.¹⁰ This forced relocation moved them away from their ancestral lands. Some families would not be able to see their land again.

⁸ Higuchi, “The Japanisation Policy for the Chamorros of Guam, 1941-1944.”

⁹ Palomo, *An Island in Agony*.

¹⁰ Hattori, “Guardians of Our Soil,” 189. This did not mean Chamorros were unsuccessful in bringing information to American ships that crossed the island. There was a Chamorro uprising against Japanese soldiers in Atâte near the village of Malesso’ close to the end of Japanese occupation in Guam. Men from the village of Malesso’ then sailed to the nearest U.S. naval ship, notified the Americans about Japanese reconcentration plans, which was eventually utilized as intelligence for the subsequent American reoccupation of Guam. Jose M. Torres, *The Massacre at Atâte*, Mangilao: University of Guam Press, 2014.

When the U.S. military invaded in July 1944 as part of the island-hopping strategy across the Pacific, they used a policy of indiscriminate bombing that destroyed many of the structures that existed on the island. According to historian Robert Rogers, “the American bombardment of Guam had gathered momentum from 18 July on to become by the morning of 21 July, the most intense crescendo of conventional firepower ever inflicted on any locality in the Pacific War.”¹¹ The action weakened the Japanese forces on the island, but also destroyed much of the land that Chamorro people depended on to live. Villages no longer existed. Ranches were destroyed. Historian Pedro C. Sanchez wrote how “the city of Agaña was in rubble” in order to “prevent Japanese troops from using buildings as cover against advancing Marines.”¹² Russel Stevens wrote in his 1952 book, “When our troops stormed ashore they came into a city which consisted nothing of rubble, broken glass, burned roofing, metal and ashes.”¹³ By the end of the invasion, Guam was a military wasteland, with broken down tanks, unexploded bombs, and bullet casings scattered all over the island.

Immediately after the Battle of Guam, the U.S. military converted the island to one of the largest stations for continued military operations in the Pacific Theater during the remainder of World War II. According to Chamorro scholar Anne Hattori, “over 200,000 military personnel were stationed on Guam for the remaining battles of the war.”¹⁴ In comparison there were roughly 22,000 civilians, local Chamorros who had survived the war.¹⁵ Military personnel used Guam as a stopover point for other battles in the Asia-Pacific region. Two-thirds of the island was condemned for military purposes including spaces for soldiers to recuperate from the frontlines, stations to house troops, and warehouses to store material. According to Robert Coote, a Department of Interior

¹¹ Rogers, *Destiny's Landfall*, 181.

¹² Pedro C. Sanchez, *Guahan, Guam: The History of Our Island* (Agana: Sanchez Publishing House), 235.

¹³ Russell Stevens, *Guam, USA: Birth of a Territory* (Honolulu: Tongg Publishing, 1953), 107.

¹⁴ Hattori, “Guardians of Our Soil,” 189.

¹⁵ Rogers, *Destiny's Landfall*, 204.

researcher in 1950, “as a result of these takings, large segments of the Guam population were displaced, villages which had survived the reoccupation were moved, and farm lands were converted to airfields, camps, warehouses and storage areas, and to other military uses.”¹⁶ In addition to military infrastructure, the U.S. Navy built temporary housing described as “primitive” for “15,000 natives [who] had to be housed, and three camps were set up in Agana, Agat, and near the Ylig River.”¹⁷ Furthermore, the whole of the Marianas archipelago was crucial for the U.S. invasion of Japan; the island of Tinian stored the two atomic bombs that were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. The strategic role that Guam and the Marianas played in the Pacific theatre only emphasized the islands’ importance to the U.S. involvement in the Pacific.

Even after the war ended in the Pacific and military operations seemed to be on the path to demobilization by 1946, Guam remained a strategic part of the U.S. military’s presence in the Pacific.¹⁸ After George Kennan’s Long Telegram of 1945 sparked fear of Soviet plans to inculcate vulnerable countries with communism, the U.S. commenced a military build-up to fight contain potential communist foes across the world.¹⁹ While the Long Telegram was focused on Europe and the Middle East, the Pacific did not escape the consciousness of foreign policy and military policy makers. After a fact-finding trip in the Western Pacific in 1948, Kennan wrote a letter to the Secretary of State and offered some thoughts on “our over-all problem in the western Pacific area.”²⁰ Kennan observed that the United States was operating without a grand strategy in which the U.S.

¹⁶ Robert K. Coote, “A Report on the Land-Use Conditions and Land Problems on Guam,” Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Department of the Interior (August 1950), 14. (Copy found at the Micronesian Area Research Center, University of Guam)

¹⁷ US, *Building the Navy’s Bases in World War II*, 355.

¹⁸ Hal M. Friedman, *Governing the American Lake: The US Defense and Administration of the Pacific, 1945-1947* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2007).

¹⁹ On the origins of the Cold War, John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War. Rev. and Expanded ed.* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); Melvyn Leffler, *The Specter of Communism: The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1917-1953* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1994).

²⁰ Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1948, General; the United Nations, Volume I, Part 2, Document 6. “The Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan) to the Secretary of State.” Hereafter cited as FRUS, “The Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan) to the Secretary of State.”

military was essential. He wrote, “I apologize for being so bold, as a civilian, to offer suggestions on matters which are largely military; but it is essential that *some* overall pattern including military as well as political factors be involved.”²¹ Kennan balanced the geopolitics of the Western Pacific by suggesting that the United States limit its involvement in Japan, Korea, and the Philippines in order to prevent any rise of anti-American sentiment. Instead, he advised the President to build a “U-shaped U.S. security zone embracing the Aleutians, the Ryukyus, the former Japanese mandated islands, and of course Guam.”²² The potential withdrawal of military forces in the larger countries meant a doubling down of military presence in areas that the United States had political jurisdiction, such as the unincorporated territory of Guam and the United Nations Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands. This strategic shift meant the small islands in the Pacific and their peoples bore the brunt of Cold War militarization. Guam developed into a strategic military base, while the Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands became nuclear testing sites. The Pacific, as historian Hal Friedman wrote, became “the American Lake.”²³

Kennan’s sentiment was shared with other military leaders including Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal. In a 1946 *New York Times* Letter to the Editor, Forrestal argued that a strong network of bases was necessary in the Pacific. He wrote, “we must maintain strong Pacific bases. Single island positions cannot be considered strong bases. Selected islands can, however, together with Guam, form a far-reaching, mutually supporting base network.”²⁴ Guam and the Trust Territories of the Pacific would provide enough land mass and oceanic expanse to make the United States’ presence in the Pacific felt by potential enemies. The prevailing fear of communist aggression in the post-WWII period determined the nature of U.S. involvement in the Pacific in the perspective

²¹ FRUS, “The Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan) to the Secretary of State.”

²² FRUS, “The Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan) to the Secretary of State.”

²³ Friedman, *Governing the American Lake*.

²⁴ James Forrestal, “Letters to the Times – Naval Government in Pacific: The Secretary of the Navy Points out Policy in Administering Islands.” *New York Times*, September 24, 1946.

of federal officials, presidential advisors, and the President. The islands' people were the last priority in respect to U.S. military operations and foreign policy.

Guamanian Land in Militarized Hands

As a result of U.S. foreign policy against Communist expansion, the Chamorro people of Guam—some referred to themselves as Guamanian—witnessed a massive and large-scale land taking for military purposes. This seizure was the single most culturally detrimental American colonial policy of the twentieth century. Land is an integral component of Chamorro life.²⁵ Michael Philips, grandson of Chamorro leader Baltazar J. Bordallo, wrote in a 1996 article, “Land is the soul of our culture; it, together with the sea, gives life to the Chamorro.”²⁶ Not only did the land provide sustenance through farming and agriculture, the land mapped kinship networks and genealogy across geography and time. Anthropologist Laurel Monnig observed that “narratives about ‘Chamorro family’ and narratives about ‘Chamorro land’ are often interconnected. This interwoven discursive fabric is part historical thread, developed over many thousands of generations on Guam.”²⁷ In this way, Chamorro families can often be identified by village and last name or clan name. Even within the hundreds of years under Spanish colonialism and land policies, Chamorro society and cultural values remain interwoven with place. World War II displacement and the permanent removal from ancestral lands and villages was a devastating experience for Chamorros in the postwar period. Land alienation made it difficult for the continuation of Chamorro social systems that relied on that land.

The United States military was hasty and unorganized in their operations especially in regard to land acquisition and the environmental damage caused by military heavy machinery. The lack of

²⁵ There are insightful scholarly and popular articles, books, memoirs, and essays on the topic of land in Guam's history. I do not mean for this chapter to be exhaustive of the importance of land to Chamorro culture. Instead, I provide some background history and instances of land issues to demonstrate how land dispossession was an integral part of the larger militarized settler colonial project on Guam in the postwar period.

²⁶ Michael F. Philips, “Land,” *Hale'ta The Quest for Commonwealth, Issues in Guam's Political Development, The Chamorro Perspective*, (Agaña: The Political Status Education Coordinating Commission, 1996), 3.

²⁷ Monnig, “Proving Chamorro,” 231.

historical land records and incomplete prewar cadastral surveys also made it difficult for the military to account for land ownership.²⁸ Nevertheless, according to Monnig, “the US military was firm in its belief that it had *carte blanche* to take whatever lands it deemed necessary to sustain its military needs on Guam.”²⁹ Land records did not necessarily matter; the priority was annexation of the best lands for military purposes. Coote wrote that “farmlands were turned into airfields; villages which escaped destruction during the actual fighting, were moved elsewhere. Except for the Southern portion of the island, which remained virtually unchanged, the whole land utilization pattern was subjected to rapid and drastic alteration.”³⁰ Guam would be unrecognizable to the Chamorros who left their home villages and ranches during the forced evacuations by Japanese military forces. The island’s physical landscape was destroyed. Coote added that “most of the resulting problems of land use and land ownership are attributed directly or indirectly to the war.” Chamorro desire to rebuild their lives after the war were halted by gates and fences sealing off the military’s “restricted zones” where no civilian could enter, let alone farm the land or forage for food as they had before the war as part of their subsistence lifestyles.

In 1945, the 79th Congress of the United States passed Public Law 225, which “authorized the transfer of lands owned by the United States to the Naval Government of Guam for sale to residents of Guam for their rehabilitation and resettlement.”³¹ In order to carry out this law, the Land and Claims Commission was to “acquire by condemnation proceedings privately owned lands, to survey and subdivide these areas, and to sell the lots to displaced persons among the Guamanian people.”³² Doing so would allow Chamorros to resettle in villages to restart and rebuild their lives. Some of this land would be used for agricultural purposes so that local food production and

²⁸ Coote, “Land-Use Conditions and Land Problems on Guam,” 4.

²⁹ Monnig, “Proving Chamorro,” 237.

³⁰ Coote, “A Report on the Land-Use Conditions and Land Problems on Guam,” 3.

³¹ Coote, “A Report on the Land-Use Conditions and Land Problems on Guam,” 11.

³² Coote, “A Report on the Land-Use Conditions and Land Problems on Guam,” 11.

livelihoods could continue. But, there was much left to be desired in the actual implementation of this law, especially due to the U.S. continued expansion of military installations in the Pacific. This continues to be a problem in the twenty-first century.

In the 1949 hearing for the Organic Act held in Guam, an assemblyman of the Guam Congress, Frank Perez from the village of Barrigada, told the visiting Congressional subcommittee about the troubles he had in reestablishing his commercial farm due to the military land takings. He told the committee that “it is a known fact that about half or more of the area of the most arable land on the Island of Guam, suitable for agriculture and raising of livestock, is in the hands of the military which is essential for the establishment of such installations to finally defeat the common enemy.” He argued definitively that the return of land would be instrumental for Chamorros to rebuild their lives and create a local economy. Before the war, Perez had owned 160 acres of land where he “raised better than 3,000 [egg] layers... producing eggs, supplying the local people, cold storage, Pan American, and even shipped eggs to Honolulu.”³³ His local chicken farming business expanded beyond subsistence levels and allowed him to build a successful business on Guam. Perez also raised hogs, which required facilities, including buildings and fencing. With the land annexation in the immediate postwar period, the U.S. military effectively took land that was necessary for Chamorros to rebuild their lives and establish a local Guam economy. Without access to this land—nearly two-thirds of the island—Chamorros had limited options.

Furthermore, Perez understood that the U.S. military needed the land in order to continue to “defeat the common enemy,” the Japanese Empire, but could not fathom why with the war closed, the U.S. military retained land. He spoke about the loyalty of the Guamanian people who were “very cooperative in giving up their lands and giving up their lives” for the war effort. Coote noticed this,

³³ House of Representatives, U.S. Congress, “Public Hearings Conducted before a sub-committee of the Public Lands Committee” Agana, Guam, (November 21, 22, 23, 1949), 51. (Hereafter cited as “Guam Organic Act Hearings”)

noting in his report that “Surprising enough... there was found little tendency on the part of the Guamanians to question those takings which were necessary for the prosecution of the war and for maintenance of an adequate military establishment subsequent to the war.”³⁴ This loyalty and willingness to help the U.S. military, Perez argued, should be reciprocated by the U.S. military by returning the lands to their rightful Chamorro owners. He told the committee, “the time has come for the responsible agency to draw the line, that this area be permanently acquired for defense purposes and, that other areas are not needed, be returned to the Guamanians for their farming use and otherwise.”³⁵

Once again, perhaps referring to Chamorro values of *inafa’maolek* and *chenchule’*, Perez presumed the U.S. military would reciprocate what the Chamorros had given them: their loyalty, their lives, and their land.³⁶ Historian Anne Hattori makes an eloquent argument about how *inafa’maolek* and *chenchule’* is not just about the giving, but also about the receiving. In her 2018 Pacific Historical Association Presidential Address, she said that “the weight of the *chenchule’* system actually rests on the receiving, because that is when the obligation to reciprocate occurs. It’s not giving something that solidifies your relationship, but rather it’s receiving from them.”³⁷ Because the Chamorro people had given land and maintained loyalty for the United States in the war effort, they demonstrated worthiness of U.S. citizenship. They also expected, perhaps, a reciprocating action of the military returning the land. Doing so, would “make good” the community relations that had governed society on Guam for hundreds, if not, thousands of years. Unfortunately, for Perez, and

³⁴ Coote, “A Report on the Land-Use Conditions and Land Problems on Guam,” 15.

³⁵ “Guam Organic Act Hearings,” November 22, 1949, 51

³⁶ In addition to Hattori, Chamorro intellectual Robert Underwood has written about how Chamorro loyalty was a significant trope in Chamorro petitions to the United States. Loyalty was used as a piece of evidence of how Chamorro should be granted U.S. citizenship, more rights, and recognition from the US. Anne Hattori, “A Take on Taking: Unwrapping Complexities of Oceanic Gifting in the Chamorro Context,” President’s Address at the Pacific Historical Association Conference 2018, 8.

³⁷ Anne Hattori, “A Take on Taking: Unwrapping Complexities of Oceanic Gifting in the Chamorro Context,” President’s Address at the Pacific Historical Association Conference 2018, 8.

the dozens of other Chamorros who wanted their land back, the U.S. military would be reluctant to do so.

When Perez attempted to rebuild his chicken farm after the war, he had a hard time with military authorities. Perez started raising chickens and hogs again on land near a military-run hospital which used to be his land. The Commanding Officer of the hospital, however, asked him to move “two or three different times back of the area – pulling back my fences – and established myself along the cliff to give up my land and give them a place to put my stock and raise it there so I can make a living.”³⁸ The work of moving whole chicken flocks and passels of hogs and the fences required not only labor, but a determination to continue farming. With these many obstacles, the growth of the local agricultural economy was stymied. Perez said to the committee, “You can have seen, gentlemen, by this time, flourishing livestock farms on the Island all over, had any action been taken to protect the farmers and deed them land or assign them the land until such time as everything is set.” The U.S. military’s mishandling of land claims and slow movement of land returns stymied the ability for Chamorros to rebuild their independent civilian economy after the war.

Perez understood that not all farmers wanted to commit the amount of effort and money he had invested into farming, especially when low level military officials could arbitrarily dictate Chamorro movement and demand Chamorro land. He told the subcommittee, “I do not blame the Guam farmers for not having a big chicken farm, a big hog farm, and big fields. It is only natural for any individual who has the heart or sole interest in the soil, to divert temporarily or otherwise, from that profession to find another profession.” Without access to land, prewar farmers were seeking secure jobs in the government so that they could feed their families. Perez continued, “There are so many of us farmers who have forced ourselves to accept positions, work for somebody, for that reason only.” The respectable profession of a farmer—something the Committee on Public Lands

³⁸ “Guam Organic Act Hearings,” November 22, 1949, 52.

would agree on—was no longer a possibility on Guam without permanent and secure access to land that the U.S. military had condemned for purposes of war. Another assemblyman from Barrigada, Joaquin Guerrero, voiced similar concerns. He testified to the committee “We have been talking quite a lot about agriculture as the backbone of the country, but we have done very little toward making the people feel secure in their land. Under such circumstances, nobody will ever attempt to make some kind of permanent improvement to such land if such insecurity still persists.”³⁹ If to be American was to be self-sufficient, the U.S. military on Guam, ironically, was preventing Chamorro from fulfilling the American quality of economic enterprise.

In the prewar period, commercial agriculture was not the occupation of the majority of farmers on Guam. Coote described agriculture on Guam as “more a way of life than a commercial enterprise.”⁴⁰ Families grew their own food, planting and harvesting by hand. Coote noted in his report that “approximately 2,450 families derived their living chiefly from farming.”⁴¹ Much of their produce did not go to market; in fact, the Naval Government had a hard time getting Chamorros to sell their produce at government founded farmers’ markets and cooperatives.⁴² Instead, farming and gardening “was mainly in the form of produce raised for their own consumption or for exchange among themselves.”⁴³ Subsistence farming and sharing with extended family was the basis of how Chamorro people sustained themselves in the prewar period. The sharing of food was instrumental and essential to the relationships that families had built with each other.⁴⁴ Without access to land, many Chamorros not only lost their access to food resources, but a central component of how their society functioned.

³⁹ “Guam Organic Act Hearings,” November 22, 1949, 64

⁴⁰ Coote, “A Report on the Land-Use Conditions and Land Problems on Guam,” 22

⁴¹ Coote, “A Report on the Land-Use Conditions and Land Problems on Guam,” 19.

⁴² For an excellent history on prewar agriculture on Guam, see Elyssa Santos, “Practicing Economy’: Chamorro Agency and U.S. Colonial Agricultural Projects, 1898-1941”, (MA Thesis: University of Hawaii, 2018).

⁴³ Coote, “A Report on the Land-Use Conditions and Land Problems on Guam,” 19.

⁴⁴ Hattori, “A Take on Taking.”

Even if land was returned to the original Chamorro landowners, it was sometimes so heavily destroyed it was impossible to farm. ET Calvo testified to the committee that “a considerable portion of land has been made unsuitable for tilling as a result of rock filling on the topsoil for defense use,” which caused agricultural development to slow. As a result Calvo argued, “the people of the island [have] a feeling of economic insecurity as they have always looked upon the soil as their economic mainstay.”⁴⁵ Furthermore, Joaquin Guerrero commented that sometimes when the U.S. military deemed land no longer useful to the military mission, “the owner goes right into the area and finds a lot of obstructions there that will make a hard time for a poor farmer with poor facilities to help—his bare hands and possibly some animal power—move all these obstructions in order to be able to cultivate the land.” The environmental damage of the war and the reoccupation made it difficult for farmers to reestablish agricultural fields and livestock grazing lands. Guerrero asked the government if “certain help can be extended to the owners so that land can be made productive by the rightful owners,” which included a request for the U.S. military return this land in a productive fashion. Requests such as these were rarely enacted upon by the U.S. military.

This military project of land dispossession had material consequences for Chamorro people for generations. The repercussions of land annexation and the environmental damage extended beyond the inability to produce agricultural products for Guam. If land was the basis for living in the prewar period, it was taken away. Without access to land, and “with private sector opportunities minimally available, Chamorros were forced into two main opportunities for employment: The US military or civil government.”⁴⁶ This transformation pushed Chamorros away from their prewar war lives of subsistence living to a cash economy, making them heavily reliant on the military or other off-island businesses and investment. Those who were able to convert land into cash often did not

⁴⁵ “Guam Organic Act Hearings,” November 22, 1949, 135-136.

⁴⁶ Monnig, “Proving Chamorro,” 237.

have enough capital to invest or establish local business enterprises. This new economic structure resulted in a greater separation of the Chamorro class system, where Chamorro elite, with access to lawyers, land, and capital, became even more privileged in the postwar era. Lower income Chamorros were limited in their opportunities and often worked for the government of Guam, which maintained a preferential hire for local “Guamanian” workers.⁴⁷ No longer could Chamorros produce the same amounts of food to feed the island; they became heavily dependent on imports from the continental United States.⁴⁸ Colonialism took greater control of the everyday lives of the Chamorro people. Instead of becoming self-sufficient, the U.S. military land annexation caused Chamorros to become more reliant on government services.

Day Late, Dollar Short

When the military took land, it often did not compensate Chamorros fairly, adequately, or in a timely manner. Chamorros were often paid below value for their land. Coote observed that land payments were based on fair market value for the land at the date of taking.⁴⁹ However, because of the lack of land surveys before the war, the prices for land were often lowballed. For instance, Frank Perez was paid rent by the U.S. military “a little over \$200 for 160 acres of land from the occupation to 30 June 1946,” approximately two years.⁵⁰ Although Perez valued his land based on potential agricultural earnings at twelve to sixteen dollars an acre a year, he was only being paid sixty-three cents for each acre of land that the U.S. military annexed. At the time of his testimony three years later, he still had not received his land back from the government.

⁴⁷ In this immediate postwar period, the U.S. military as well as federal officials also used the term “Guamanian” to refer to the Chamorro people of Guam. As such, laws and regulation used the term “Guamanian.”

⁴⁸ Furthermore, the reliance on imported food replaced the Guamanian ability to produce food products for themselves. The U.S. military shipped in canned items in order to replace the fresh agricultural produce that were destroyed by the war. This led to a decades-long dependence on food produce from off-island. And though there were times of drought or famine before the World War II period, the postwar period significantly altered and limited the agricultural knowledge passed down from generation to generation.

⁴⁹ Coote, “A Report on the Land-Use Conditions and Land Problems on Guam,” 18.

⁵⁰ “Guam Organic Act Hearings,” November 22, 1949, 54-55.

Some Chamorros refused to give up their land until they received just compensation. Baltazar Jerome “B.J.” Bordallo represented an elderly woman who owned a large parcel of land that was annexed by the Navy government. He took on the case because “she is a widow. She has three or four daughters, not even a man to work this family.” Bordallo understood that access to land or just compensation meant the difference between abject poverty or survival in the postwar years. Bordallo noted that the woman “is now very ill, and I believe the only reason that that lady is living these days is because she is looking forward to the full compensation by the federal government for taking away her land.” The woman sought full payment of the land’s appraised value, which many Chamorros believed should have skyrocketed after World War II. The appraisers, however, were Navy officials who were biased towards the military’s budget for land appropriations, and thus often lowballed land valuations. Chamorros were loyal to the U.S. believing that the military were liberators who freed them from Japanese occupation, but they also knew when they were being swindled.

Some Chamorros felt compelled to follow orders given by U.S. Navy officers, sometimes inadvertently signing away the rights to their lands. Alongside B.J. Bordallo, Alfred Thomas “A.T.” Bordallo was the legal representative for the woman. He told the committee, “She told me that two officials of the Government, Guamanian officials and two Naval officers had come to her house and asked her to sign a paper consisting to sell her land to the Government. I asked if she signed it. She said ‘yes.’ I asked why. She told me that if she were asked by a Guamanian she would sign any paper offered to her, especially when accompanied by two Naval officers.”⁵¹ The elderly woman trusted her fellow Chamorro and believed the Naval officers had her best interests in mind. She did not question their actions until after she realized she had been taken advantage of. She noted that she was not present during any appraisal and that the Navy’s official appraiser approved the appraisal

⁵¹ “Guam Organic Act Hearings,” November 23, 1949, 117.

without visiting her property. Her representative, A.T. Bordallo attempted to aid her through the Naval bureaucracy, but was met with an unorganized system which nevertheless skewed towards the benefit of the Naval government.⁵²

Some Chamorros were plainly deceived by Naval officials in charge of land claims. Vicente T. Cruz experienced this firsthand. He told the Public Lands Committee that he had owned fourteen acres of land and was paid only \$14.10 by the Naval government. He described that it was “the most valuable residence today” because it was converted into housing for military officers. Because of the land taking, Cruz was living with his cousins in a different village, unable to build a home for himself. The land in the village of Asan that Cruz and his father had cultivated to farm corn, watermelons, copra, and sweet potatoes was developed into the Admiral’s house and guest house at Marianas Command. When questioned by Representative William Lemke of North Dakota, Cruz clarified that he “didn’t receive it [the money], they made me sign it [the land] to one of the officials of the Lands & Claims Commission two years ago. I haven’t gotten the money yet.”⁵³ When asked if the Navy officials consulted Cruz on the value of the land, Cruz said that the Navy did not. Cruz elaborated that the officials sent him a notice to sign a form.⁵⁴

Representative Lemke: And you signed it?

Vicente T. Cruz: Well, they made me sign it. (Laughter)

Representative Lemke: Did you sign it because you were afraid of them?

Vicente T. Cruz: Well, the Navy had more power in Guam than anyone else—more power than you have (Laughter)

In this pithy exchange, Cruz pointed out how the U.S. Navy had more power on Guam than U.S. Congress. Guam was not governed by the principles laid out in the U.S. Constitution, but according

⁵² Since the problem was an ongoing one during the testimonies for the Guam Organic Act, it is unclear what happened to the woman’s properties.

⁵³ “Guam Organic Act Hearings,” November 23, 1949, 181

⁵⁴ Anne Hattori also emphasizes this exchange in her article in “Guardians of Our Soil” with good reason. It speaks succinctly the types of experiences that many Chamorros had when dealing with the Navy, an entity they had trusted, but that had ultimately unjustly treated them. Hattori, “Guardians of Our Soil,” 197-198.

to the needs of U.S. military policy in the Pacific. Military policy outweighed the rights and needs of the Chamorro people.

Nevertheless, Representative Lemke recognized the arbitrary nature of the military's land policy. He agreed with the Chamorros, saying "to me it seems very unfortunate that everybody connected with fixing the value of this land is more directly interested in the Government," and characterized them as "always over-zealous to find facts favorably for the government and submit them as just."⁵⁵ Furthermore, the government apparatus that would protect Americans in the states on the continent did not exist in Guam's Naval Government. "In our Nation," Lemke clarified, land disputes were "determined by a jury of twelve men. Here, unfortunately, the only appeal is to the Secretary of the Navy. It is a question of whether he is a disinterested party. In my opinion, he is not."⁵⁶ Representative Lemke saw that the U.S. military on Guam was not benevolent, but a colonizing force that was set on constructing a bastion of American military presence in the Pacific region. These plans were at the expense of the Chamorro people who had no access to paths of grievances that Americans had on the continent.

The seeming willingness for some Chamorros to give their properties to the Naval Government during this postwar build-up cannot be misconstrued as blind loyalty to the United States. On the one hand, some Chamorros like Vicente Cruz felt coerced into signing documents held by Navy personnel. On the other hand, loyalty was also a rhetorical tool for Chamorros to demonstrate their worthiness for U.S. citizenship. As Guam scholar Vicente Diaz argued, "If Chamorro experience was expressed in terms of hyper-loyalty to the United States, it was because this was the only political language that could be heard and understood by the Americans."⁵⁷ For

⁵⁵ "Guam Organic Act Hearings," November 23, 1949, 115 and 117.

⁵⁶ "Guam Organic Act Hearings," November 23, 1949, 117.

⁵⁷ In the context of the article from which this quote was taken, Diaz was analyzing an essay written by Robert Underwood, a Chamorro scholar and long-time advocate for Chamorro rights, and Laura Souder, a Chamorro feminist

instance, “Chamorros would use the terms of patriotism and loyalty to gain what was perceived to be political progress: citizenship and civil government.”⁵⁸ In these testimonies for the Guam Organic Act before the Public Lands Committee, Chamorros were utilizing rhetoric of loyalty to attain political goals. Frank D. Perez expressed full support for the Guam Organic Act even though he had grievances about the Navy’s management of land. Between the testimonies that focused on the land issue, there were other testimonies by Chamorros, including Magarito “Paul” Palting—son of Filipino exile Pancrasio Palting—who expressed belief in American political structure to ensure stability for the island. After introducing himself as a member of the Washington D.C. bar and a veteran of World War II, he expressed that an organic act for Guam “will prove to the world that [the Americans] have been and continue to do what they preach all over—the American system of government.”⁵⁹ Despite their deep-seated dismay with how they were mistreated in the process, Chamorros attempted to demonstrate their desire for American citizenship through their knowledge of American legal practices and compliance with Naval land policies.

Idle Soldiers, Enterprising Natives

It quickly became apparent to Chamorros that the U.S. military was not using all the land solely for defense purposes. At times, land remained untouched. Frank Perez told the Public Lands committee, “You can see for yourself, Mr. Congressmen, that nobody is using that land there but nobody is given full authority to make good use of the land. It is just like having that land idle when it should be giving potential value to the Guamanian people in order to better their economic situation.” In an ironic twist, the U.S. military was leaving land unproductive, which was a contradiction from the prewar period when the U.S. Navy admonished Chamorros for leaving large

scholar. Vicente Diaz, “Deliberating Liberation Day: Identity, History, Memory, and War in Guam,” *Perilous Memories: The Asia-Pacific War(s)*, ed. T. Fujitani, Geoffrey White, and Lisa Yoneyama (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001), 165.

⁵⁸ Diaz, “Deliberating Liberation Day,” 165.

⁵⁹ “Guam Organic Act Hearings,” November 21, 1949, 20-21.

tracts of land untouched. Presidentially-appointed Governor of Guam Carlton Skinner remarked on this situation: “Close to the present BPM camp there are hundreds of acres lying idle which were previously cultivated by Guamanians. It is a restricted area and nobody can come in unless they are authorized by the man in charge.”⁶⁰ (The BPM camp was a military labor camp for Filipino migrant workers). Any civilian who wanted to enter these properties had to gain permission from arbitrary Navy personnel who were inconsistent in their policies. While Governor Skinner acknowledged that some restricted areas were to safeguard the population from unexploded ordnance and other war materiel, the restriction nevertheless on movements hindered Chamorros who wanted “to gather fruits, either planted or wild, and to make use of them for either human consumption or animal use.”⁶¹ Idle land at the hands of the U.S. military was preventing Chamorros and Guamanians from feeding their families and building a civilian economy.

Sometimes the military set aside annexed land for recreational purposes available only to military personnel. By the end of 1946, the U.S. Navy completed building an 18-hole golf course in the middle of the village of Barrigada—named Admiral Nimitz Golf Course after Navy Pacific Fleet Commander Chester W. Nimitz. More egregious was the military’s hold on Tumon Bay, which it acquired mainly for a military-exclusive service recreation area.⁶² According to Hattori, the U.S. Army annexed sixty hectares of Tumon beach in 1948. Even though Guamanians protested the issue by sending petitions and letters to Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal, the military annexed the land, consequently displacing dozens of families. The bay also provided fishing areas and breadfruit and coconut trees that provided sustenance for local families. There were also cultural markers that dotted Tumon Bay including latte stones (ancient and sacred Chamorro stone pillars)

⁶⁰ “Guam Organic Act Hearings,” November 22, 1949, 66.

⁶¹ “Guam Organic Act Hearings,” November 22, 1949, 66.

⁶² At the time of writing, I am in Guam hearing updates on how thousands of U.S. Navy sailors from the *USS Theodore Roosevelt* are being quarantined in Tumon’s civilian hotels as result of a COVID-19 outbreak on ship. “The Tumon Bay Controversy,” *Guam Echo* Vol.2 No.6 (July 30, 1948), 4.

and the shrine of Padre San Vitores, a Spanish-era missionary that brought Catholicism to Guam.⁶³

For Chamorros, the annexation of this land for the purposes of recreation for military personnel was excessive and outright disrespectful.

Chamorro resistance to military land taking was met with apathy from military leaders. The Commanding General of the Marianas-Bonin area Francis H. Griswold commented that “Combined Army-Air force requirement in Tumon area involves only a small portion of total land and approximately one-half of beach” and that he believed “all requirements can be met without undue hardship on Guam or local organizations.”⁶⁴ In addition, the then-Navy Governor of Guam Charles Pownall responded with the general sentiment that there was “adequate land in the Tumon area for all needs.” Despite having already gained two-thirds of the island’s land, the U.S. armed forces felt it necessary to condemn for “defense purposes” their own private beach on prime beach front property that was considered culturally important to Chamorros and had already been in the possession of Chamorro families.

Tumon Bay was also useful for Chamorros because of its potential as a tourism hotspot for the civilian economy.⁶⁵ Francis Moylan testified to the Public Lands Committee that returning the village of Tumon would allow for the development of a tourism economy, managed and built by local entrepreneurs. He told the committee, “we look forward when the land is secure, when we know who owns which property, that a hotel will be erected in its proper place.”⁶⁶ The Navy’s reluctance to figure out land titles allowed them time and the justification they needed to take land

⁶³ Hattori, “Guardians of our Soil,” 194. Hattori cites Simon Sanchez, the previous superintendent of public schools in the prewar period.

⁶⁴ “The Tumon Bay Controversy,” *Guam Echo* Vol.2 No.6 (July 30, 1948), 4.

⁶⁵ Tumon Bay would grow to become the hub of the tourism industry beginning in the 1960s as explored in greater detail in chapter five, “The Paradox of Paradise.” There have been many studies on the relationship between militarism and tourism, and Guam was very much a part of this move in the second half of the twentieth century. Vernadette Vicuña Gonzalez, *Securing Paradise: Tourism and Militarism in Hawai’i and the Philippines* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013) and Teresia Teaiwa, “Bikinis and other S/Pacific N/Oceans,” *The Contemporary Pacific*, Vol. 6, No.1 (Spring 1994): 87-109.

⁶⁶ “Guam Organic Act Hearings,” November 23, 1949, 158.

on the account that it was not definitely known to be owned by anyone. Security of land was necessary for any economic investment to be successful. In addition to the already strict U.S. military security clearance needed to visit the island, the U.S. Army's occupation of Tumon restricted other potential forms of economy building on Guam as well.

Tumon was not the only village affected by military rehabilitation policies that focused on parks and recreation. B.J Bordallo told the Public Lands Committee about how the military government's planned annexation of land in the capital village of Hagåtña would displace seventy-three families in order to build a park. Jesus Okiyama, another assemblyman in the Guam Congress, told the Committee that not only was the land bought from the owners in order to build a park, but that the land itself was a dumping ground established by the Marine Corps during the war. He continued to say that "the construction [of the park] did not follow."⁶⁷ Representative Lemke found the use of the land absurd. "I am very fond of parks," he responded, "but I do not know very many places where they dispossessed a community just to establish a park."⁶⁸ He continued, "You say the money was given for rehabilitation. That means rehabilitate people. Taking property away to make parks? That doesn't mean rehabilitation."⁶⁹ Although rehabilitation was to follow reoccupation of Guam by American military forces, it was often rehabilitation of spaces conducive to U.S. military policy in the Pacific.

Laura Thompson, an anthropologist and advocate for Chamorro people since the prewar period, criticized the U.S. Naval Government's plan to use land in Hagåtña to build a park.⁷⁰ In an article in *Far Eastern Survey* in 1947, Thompson argued that the U.S. military's plan to help

⁶⁷ "Guam Organic Act Hearings," November 23, 1949, 131.

⁶⁸ "Guam Organic Act Hearings," November 23, 1949, 131

⁶⁹ "Guam Organic Act Hearings," November 23, 1949, 132.

⁷⁰ Laura Thompson was a contributor and member of the Institute of Ethnic Affairs, a Washington D.C. based non-profit organization dedicated to advocating for colonized peoples throughout the globe, but especially in Guam and the U.S. territories. For more information about the IEA, read Doloris Coulter Cogan, *We Fought the Navy and Won: Guam's Quest for Democracy: A Personal Memoir* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2008).

Chamorros during the rehabilitation of Guam while simultaneously carrying out their military build-up was paradoxical. “Soon after the reoccupation of Guam by American forces,” she notified the journal’s readership, “there began to talk about rebuilding Agaña into a ‘Santa Monica of the Pacific,’ a city of which the Guamanians might be ‘justly proud.’”⁷¹ The military wanted to transform the capital city of Hagåtña (Agaña) into a leisure destination that conformed to the expectations of white military personnel. Thompson chided the Naval government’s policy to privilege aesthetics, leisure, and tourism rather than to give back the land to the Chamorro owners. For Thompson, it demonstrated the Naval government’s lack of understanding of just how important land was to the Chamorro lives. She continued in her article, “probably nowhere else in the bombed-out world has the idea of rebuilding a city so shining and splendid as to be quite out of keeping with the assets of the bomb victims been the guide of government policy.” Thompson saw that the U.S. military was taking advantage of the war-torn island and loyal islanders, turning it into a militarized paradise for U.S. interest without the consent of Chamorros. This, to her, was just one of many indications of how the U.S. Navy was not a benevolent force, but continued to exert more control over the lands and lives of the Chamorro people.

Thompson also admonished how the Navy sought to “legally” rectify the problem of land ownership. Because the land could not be condemned directly to the Naval government due to legal technicalities, the Naval government devised another way for Chamorros to own the land that met the Naval project’s specifications. The plan was to buy land at exorbitantly low prices and sell it back to Chamorro owners “to clear the title.” The Naval Government, however, would also require the prospective landowners “who have lost most of their assets,” to “buy up and immediately pay for the new large lots as they are offered for sale and also build houses, according to Naval Government

⁷¹ Laura Thompson, “Guam’s Bombed out Capital,” *Far Eastern Survey* Vol. 16, No. 6 (March 26, 1947), 67.

specifications, at a cost of several thousand dollars on the lots thus acquired.”⁷² Only already cash-rich islanders or those who were connected with off-island business interests would be able to afford such a transaction. And even then, the money paid for improvements on lands or to houses would be paid to businesses with military contracts because there were little to no non-military affiliated construction companies on the island. Essentially, the Naval government’s land proposal in Hagåtña was another ploy for the military government to fashion the village in its idyllic image of a tropical paradise, use Chamorro money to do so, and control the most important asset of Chamorro life in the postwar period: land.

The land problem was symptomatic of the larger problem of the U.S. military governing the affairs of civilians. Thompson noted how Chamorros (Guamanians) did not experience American liberty or freedom. The case of Hagåtña “may suggest to Americans who never experienced military rule *as civilians*, implications which the increasing power of the military in the United States may hold for the personal liberties and established way of life for every American.”⁷³ In Thompson’s perspective, the way Guamanians were ruled by a Naval Government should influence the way Americans, generally, view their government as hypocritical. For instance, Chamorros and Guamanians did not have the ability to set their grievances with the Naval Government’s policies fairly, a violation of the democratic processes that were supposedly held throughout the United States. Thompson clarified, “If any Guamanian owner objects to the value which the Naval Government appraisers set on his property he can appeal to local courts. But the local courts on Guam... are controlled by the Naval Government, and there is no appeal beyond the island.”⁷⁴ In the immediate postwar years, democracy was set aside so that military operations—including recreational ones—were prioritized in the rehabilitation of Guam.

⁷² Thompson, “Guam’s Bombed out Capital,” 68.

⁷³ Thompson, “Guam’s Bombed out Capital,” 66

⁷⁴ Thompson, “Guam’s Bombed out Capital,” 68.

There is a certain irony in the way the U.S. Naval Government insisted on using condemned land for recreational purposes. Since the beginning of U.S. colonialism on Guam in 1898, the U.S. Naval Governor annual reports suggested that Chamorros on Guam were unproductive when it came to their land. When the first Naval Lieutenant Governor of Guam William Safford saw “unused land” on the island, he created a system of taxation in 1901 that compelled large landowners to turn over land to the Naval Government. In turn, the land would be sold to those who wanted to farm, thus opening “large agricultural lands that had been laying idle.”⁷⁵ But as historians Paul Carano and Perdo Sanchez noted, “the policy was not too successful.”⁷⁶ Instead, these lands came under control of the Naval Government to be left in the same idle state it had been before the tax policy. The tax policy effectively dispossessed landowners of potentially commercially beneficial land.

Furthermore, the Naval Government believed the general Chamorro unwillingness to follow clock times and participate in commercial agriculture, such as Navy-instituted farmers’ markets, was a cultural indicator of laziness.⁷⁷ As the logic follows, Chamorro adherence to these cultural practices became racialized into the “lazy native” trope that American colonizers had the obligation to fix. Despite Chamorro families’ ability to provide for their own needs and to share produce with extended family in accordance with the *chenchule*’ system, the Navy believed they needed to educate Chamorros on the “proper ways” of land management by instituting a series of practices to encourage Chamorros to participate in commercial farming. These programs including publishing agricultural information in *The Guam Recorder*, creating farmers’ markets, special agricultural weeks, teaching farming in schools, and establishing an agricultural research station on Guam.

⁷⁵ Carano and Sanchez, *A History of Guam*, 194.

⁷⁶ Carano and Sanchez, *A History of Guam*, 194.

⁷⁷ Elyssa Santos, “‘Practicing Economy’: Chamorro Agency and U.S. Colonial Agricultural Projects, 1898-1941,” (MA Thesis: University of Hawaii, 2018).

As Chamorro historian Elyssa Santos argues, however, Chamorros had a different relationship to time and to the land. The Navy understood productivity in terms of “sustained labor and time discipline,” while Chamorros had “an indigenous worldview that privileged familial obligations, called for a particular relationship with the island’s ecology, and understood that supernatural forces also influenced one’s time.”⁷⁸ Chamorros farmed enough to feed themselves and fulfill community obligations. For ordinary Chamorros, working beyond these responsibilities for monetary gain—something that did not have much relevance in the prewar period—was not a good use of time.

For prewar Naval officers, Chamorro unwillingness to farm produce for market was unhelpful for the Naval station. According to historian James Viernes, “quite clearly, a shortfall in available labor to the Navy, widely practiced subsistence-level production, and the absence of a viable cash crop stood in the way of larger military objectives or hopes that Chamorros would be more useful to Americans.”⁷⁹ In a sense, Chamorro subsistence culture and the *chenchule’* system—closed to those who were willing to participate equally in the social lives of the community—stymied a self-sufficient Navy operation in Guam. Therefore, the attempts to teach and foster commercial farming on Guam and the redistribution of idle lands was not necessarily for the benefit of Chamorro people, but to ensure that the U.S. Navy could remain functional on Guam. The annexation of land in the prewar period, too, was for the purposes of sustaining a military presence on Guam.

In the postwar period, the U.S. military continued to annex land for a different reason. Annexing Chamorro land that was previously utilized for homes, subsistence farming, commercial

⁷⁸ Santos, “Practicing Economy,” 38.

⁷⁹ James Viernes, “Chamorro Men in the Making: Capitalism and Indigenous Masculinities Under US Naval Colonialism in Guam,” *eJournal of the Australian Association for the Advancement of Pacific Studies*, Issues 1.2 and 2.1 (April 2010): <http://intersections.anu.edu.au/pacificcurrents/viernes.htm>. Accessed April 17, 2020.

farming, or grazing lands in order to transform the land into a militarized tropical oases was paradoxical to the principles of productivity that justified Chamorro land annexation in the prewar period. The Tumon Controversy and the “Santa Monica of the Pacific” park proposal demonstrate how the U.S. military also sought land that would be utilized for military recreation purposes, further showing how Chamorro land annexation was rarely about productivity of land. Laurel Monnig argued, “At its core, [land annexation] was a racial project premised on the absolute belief in the colonizer’s superiority and privilege to dominate another’s land.”⁸⁰ Across the twentieth century, Chamorros were not able to adequately justify their claims to land, but the U.S. military could always cite vague “defense purposes” to annex it. What happened in the immediate postwar period was a settler colonialism based on, perpetuated by, and justified through U.S. militarism.

From the beginning, military annexation of Chamorro and Guamanian land was a racialized project where the needs of the U.S. military—no matter how vague or inconsequential—took precedence over the sustenance, culture, and lives of the Chamorro people. The war and the postwar military build-up drastically transformed the physical landscape that sustained Chamorro culture and subsistence lifestyles. In this process, there was a deemphasis on the continuation of Chamorro culture and a pivot towards American culture and life, transforming Chamorro identity into one that claimed American-ness as a core trait. In addition, the U.S. military’s slow and bureaucratic response to land claims made it difficult for Chamorros to reestablish their lives through a connection to the land and subsistence economy. As a result, Chamorros became dependent on military and other off-island businesses for food, housing, and income. And without access to capital that land would have given them in a cash economy, Chamorros experienced a rough transition in the postwar period. Although Chamorros touted an unwavering loyalty to the United States, the land issue on Guam prompted Chamorros to grow increasingly dissatisfied by

⁸⁰ Monnig, “Proving Chamorro,” 223.

U.S. military policies on Guam. While Chamorros attempted to envision a postwar life, the U.S. military's incessant annexation of land for "defense purposes" quelled Chamorro attempts to do so. Land annexation was the first piece of a two-part process of U.S. settler colonialism in Guam—an integral component of how the U.S. built its postwar empire in the Pacific.

Filipino Labor Migration and the Rebuilding of Guam

As the United States continued its way across the Pacific during World War II, thousands of military personnel, contractors, and workers traversed over the oceans providing support, supplies, and back up for military operations at the frontlines. According to a government publication on the history of the Bureau of Yards and Docks, "Guam... was destined to become the nerve center of the final thrust against Japan."⁸¹ Thus, within a month of Guam's recapture, the military commenced a large-scale infrastructure project utilizing the Naval Construction Battalion—better known as the Seabees—to dredge harbors, build breakwaters, and pave 103 miles of road. They straightened roads "for access to airfields, ammunition dumps, camps, and other facilities."⁸² They fixed the water system to supply the large demand of military personnel. Because Guam was central to the United States attack on Japan, they also built warehouses for "a large store of supplies, spare parts, equipment, fuels, and refrigerated foods be on hand at all times for the Fleet and for military forces on the island."⁸³ For this first period of the Guam military build-up, "some 37,000 construction troops were employed in the construction of Advance Base Guam."⁸⁴ "Native labor" was not used for the large scale projects because they "were needed in the reconstruction of their own homes and on Federal Economic Administration farming projects aimed at producing fresh foods for natives

⁸¹ United States, *Building the Navy's Bases in World War II: History of the Bureau of Yards and Docks and the Civil Engineer Corps, 1940-1946*, Volume II (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1947), 341.

⁸² US, *Building the Navy's Bases in World War II*, 351.

⁸³ US, *Building the Navy's Bases in World War II*, 351.

⁸⁴ US, *Building the Navy's Bases in World War II*, 356.

and garrison forces.”⁸⁵ While Guam was a sleepy naval base in the prewar decades, World War II transformed the island into “a great Army air base as well as the principal naval base in the western Pacific.”⁸⁶ The island was built up not in order to bring civilization to local residents, but to ensure that the island could support the United States Navy and other military branches. It is in this period that the U.S. military became a settler institution in Guam, its presence made permanent by the concrete roads, the chain-link fences, and the reinforced harbor that was built on condemned Chamorro land and sea.

This primary phase of the U.S. military build-up in Guam ended in 1946 when the World War II war effort in the Pacific ended. Guam, however, would play an important role in the Cold War. By 1947, Guam witnessed another military build-up to increase the services that could be deployed from the island’s bases. With this wave, the labor force changed. The Seabees were not used because it was too difficult to deploy them from the U.S. mainland and Congress provided a limited budget to U.S. Armed Forces after the war. Nevertheless, the proposed scale of the military rehabilitation and the subsequent military build-up required more labor than the local Guam population could provide.⁸⁷ So, the United States Navy contracted private construction companies to work on military infrastructure. According to a 1948 U.S. Naval Government report to the United Nations, the U.S. Navy needed “to recruit workmen from sources outside the island in both skilled and unskilled classifications, chiefly from the mainland United States and Hawaii and in small numbers from the Philippines and other sections of the Pacific Ocean Area.”⁸⁸ These American-owned military contract companies, primarily Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Luzon Stevedoring Company,

⁸⁵ US, *Building the Navy's Bases in World War II*, 357.

⁸⁶ US, *Building the Navy's Bases in World War II*, 339.

⁸⁷ United States Navy Department “Guam: Information on Guam Transmitted by the United States to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, pursuant to Article 73 (e) of the Charter,” Washington: Government of Guam, 1948,” 11. (Hereafter cited as US Navy Department, “Guam”)

⁸⁸ US Navy Department, “Guam” 11.

and Vinnell Construction Company, had preexisting connections and contracts associated with building the U.S. bases in the Philippines.⁸⁹ And as a result, they used their presence in the Philippines to recruit skilled and unskilled Filipino labor for their projects in Guam.

The Foreign Policy of Filipino Labor Migration

The reliance on Filipino labor was so great that the U.S. and the newly independent Philippines crafted foreign policy agreements around it.⁹⁰ The U.S. military foresaw “a need for about 8,000 Filipino laborers to be employed directly by the United States outside the Philippines including Marianas-Bonins, Okinawa, and elsewhere in the Pacific.”⁹¹ So, in 1947, the United States Embassy and the Philippine Secretary of State negotiated an agreement “relating to the recruitment and employment of Philippine citizens by the U.S. Military Forces and its contractors in the Pacific, including Guam.”⁹² As stipulated in the Exchange of Notes, the Philippines allowed U.S. military contractors to recruit Filipino laborers for American military bases throughout the Pacific, a continuation of how U.S. businesses recruited Filipino workers for various industries in the pre-World War II era.⁹³ The “Exchange of Notes” agreed that the recruited men were to be hired on a short-term basis, “usually under contracts of one year in duration,” and as non-immigrant workers, they were “required to leave Guam and to return to the respective places or origin at the termination

⁸⁹ Alfred Flores and Colleen Woods have studied how military contractors utilized their colonial period experience in the Philippines to recruit workers for Guam. Woods, “Building Empire’s Archipelago,” 142.

⁹⁰ For a history on the relationship between immigration policy and foreign policy, Donna Gabaccia, *Foreign Relations: American Immigration in a Global Perspective* (N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2012);

⁹¹ United States, Department of State, “Philippines: Recruitment of Filipino Laborers and Employees, Agreement effected by exchange of notes signed at Manila May 13 and 16, 1947” *U.S. Treaties and Other International Agreements*, Volume 7 Part 3 (1956), 2539. (Hereafter cited as “U.S. State Department, “Philippines: Recruitment of Filipino Laborers and Employees”)

⁹² U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, *The Use of Temporary Alien Labor in Guam*, Committee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law, 95th Cong., Sess. 2 (1979), 4. (Hereafter cited as U.S. Congress, House, “The Use of Temporary Alien labor in Guam”).

⁹³ Flores, “Little Island into Mighty Base,” 105-106. U.S. Congress, House, “The Use of Temporary Alien Labor on Guam,” (1973), 4.

of their employment.”⁹⁴ In addition, U.S. military contractors were responsible for organizing the laborers’ transportation via a U.S. naval ship or commercial freighters and abide by a regulated 40-hour work week. The laborers also received “free laundry services, free medical and dental care, and other fringe benefits. Contract workers were additionally provided with free room and board.”⁹⁵ With this diplomatic agreement, U.S. military contractors were given an opportunity to tap into surplus labor in the Philippines to build U.S. military installations throughout the Pacific.⁹⁶

The Exchange of Notes also regulated the wages the Filipino laborers were owed. The wages offered by the U.S. Army were generally higher than the wages a Filipino could earn while working in the Philippines. For Filipino employees hired for work outside the Philippines, the United States Army would pay “an increase in the current Philippine wages of 15 centavos per hour in lieu of free quarters and subsistence...plus a 25% overseas differential, then charge all employees for quarters and subsistence.”⁹⁷ If the laborers paid for their own housing and food, there was enough money to be “generally considered to be attractive,” according to a 1948 U.S. Navy report to the United Nations. Their wages, however, were lower than wages paid to American and Guamanian workers in the same military installations, which would later foment criticism from American labor unions and Chamorro leaders.

⁹⁴ United States Navy Department “Guam: Information on Guam Transmitted by the United States to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, pursuant to Article 73 (e) of the Charter,” Washington: Government of Guam, 1948,” 11.

⁹⁵ U.S. Congress, House, “The Use of Temporary Alien Labor on Guam,” (1973), 4.

⁹⁶ Due to the history of U.S. colonialism in the Philippines, there is a long history of U.S. recruitment of Filipino laborers to work in different industries, including agriculture, fishing, merchant marines, as well as serving in the U.S. Navy. This history on Guam is part of a larger history of Filipino workers being recruited as civilian labor for U.S. military purposes throughout the Pacific and around the world. On pre-World War II recruitment of Filipino workers, Rick Baldoz, *The Third Asiatic Invasion: Empire and Migration in Filipino America, 1898-1946* (New York: New York University Press, 2011); Dawn Bohulano Mabalon, *Little Manila Is in the Heart: The Making of the Filipina/o American Community in Stockton, California* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013); Roderick N. Labrador, *Building Filipino Hawai‘i* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2015). On global Filipino labor, Robyn Magalit Rodriguez, “Toward a Critical Filipino Studies Approach to Philippine Migration,” in *Filipino Studies: Palimpsests of Nation and Diaspora* ed. Martin Manalansan and Augusto Espirtu (New York: NYU Press, 2016), 33-55.

⁹⁷ U.S. State Department, “Philippines: Recruitment of Filipino Laborers and Employees,” 2540.

With benefits such as these and the postwar labor surplus in the archipelago, the Philippines could provide the steady supply of cheap labor that was needed for U.S. military purposes. Exporting labor also benefited the nascent Philippine nation-state. According to historian Colleen Woods, the decimated prewar agriculture economy and “the utter devastation wrought by the Pacific war on human and natural resources in the Philippines not only created a condition of surplus labor but also inclined the leadership of the commonwealth and independent republic to further bend the Philippine economy to US political and economic interests.”⁹⁸ U.S. military interest in hiring Filipino labor was beneficial and necessary for the economic prosperity in a postwar and postcolonial Philippines. In an article for the *Manila Times*, writer Amadis Ma. Guerrero reported that the U.S. military “preferred Filipino employees in American military bases in the Pacific, as they speak English and present no security problem.”⁹⁹ Filipino workers and their relatively high wages were seen as potential sources of income for the Philippines, and they became economic pawns in US-Philippine foreign policy negotiations. As Robyn Rodriguez Magalit shows, “the globalization of Filipino labor is crucially linked to US empire as well as US capital. The Philippine state plays an active role in facilitating the placement of Filipino workers in the various sites where the US military and firms are located around the world.”¹⁰⁰ Guam was a part of this global Filipino labor phenomenon.

The Exchange of Notes also gave the United States unilateral power to mobilize and transport Philippine citizens for U.S. military projects throughout the Pacific. The U.S. Embassy “requested to recruit Filipino employees as are necessary for duty outside the Philippines, and then process and ship such employees to the desired areas without further contact with Philippine

⁹⁸ Colleen Woods, “Building Empire’s Archipelago: The Imperial Politics of Filipino Labor in the Pacific,” *Labor: Studies in Working-Class History of the Americas*, Volume 13, Issue 3-4 (2016): 138.

⁹⁹ Amadis Ma. Guerrero, “RP Workers go Overseas: Demand for Skilled Workers Triggers off Exodus to other lands.” *Manila Times*, September 6.

¹⁰⁰ Rodriguez, “Toward a Critical Filipino Studies Approach,” 41.

authorities.”¹⁰¹ Information regarding where the Filipinos were going was not necessary except for the names and addresses for each of Filipino workers’ next of kin. Skipping the bureaucracy of the Philippine government allowed the U.S. military “to avoid delays subsequent to processing caused by the submission of rosters for approval before shipment.”¹⁰² The expansion of the United States Pacific military empire, therefore, was contingent on the expediting and mass mobilization of a Filipino labor force. Acting Secretary of Foreign Affairs for the Philippines wrote back to the U.S. Embassy agreeing to the requests, including shipping Filipino workers “to the desired areas without documentation and prior consultation with the Philippine Government.”¹⁰³ The seeming ease with which the Philippine embassy allowed the U.S. government to control recruited Filipino laborers is a demonstration of the US’s continued power in a postcolonial Philippines.

In addition, Filipino labor in Guam’s military bases was considered essential to bypass U.S. federal immigration law. The Exchange of Notes governed U.S. immigration policy on Guam until the 1952 Immigration Act. Then, the labor shortage for the military build-up was taken into account when U.S. Congress decided the Immigration Act of 1952’s applicability to Guam.¹⁰⁴ As noted by historian Robert Rogers, “The U.S.-Philippines exchange of notes was not in compliance with U.S. immigration laws but was expedient to allow the military to obtain Filipino laborers.”¹⁰⁵ According to a Congressional Special Study, the Exchange of Notes “was frequently cited as the authority under which the military brought temporary Filipino workers into Guam, and no attempt was made to reconcile it with U.S. immigration law until 1952. At that point, it appears that the immigration law was administered in a manner designed to accommodate the terms of the 1947 exchange of

¹⁰¹ *U.S. Treaties and Other International Agreements*, 2540.

¹⁰² *U.S. Treaties and Other International Agreements*, 2541.

¹⁰³ *U.S. Treaties and Other International Agreements*, 2542.

¹⁰⁴ This immigration act was a post-World War II, early Cold War update to U.S. immigration law that upheld national quotas, while incorporating policies to more stringently surveyed and interviewed for potential communist threats.

¹⁰⁵ Rogers, “Destiny’s Landfall,” (1994), 217.

notes as fully as possible.”¹⁰⁶ Rather than following national immigration law, the U.S. Navy had the ability to craft its own immigration policies, even when the 1952 Immigration Act’s H-2 program was implemented on Guam. The H-2 program allowed companies to bring in temporary foreign workers if it was proven that there were no available local workers for a specific job. According to a Congressional Special Study, however, “under the H-2 program, passports and visas were waived for Filipino nonimmigrants coming to work for the military or under military contracts.”¹⁰⁷ The military’s need to rapidly expand military presence on Guam justified sidestepping U.S. immigration law.

The U.S. military justified its use of temporary H-2 workers by suggesting its mission to build military installations on the island was temporary in nature, and most importantly was “vital to national defense.”¹⁰⁸ As a result, “On July 27, 1953, the Immigration and Naturalization Service officially accepted this argument, indicating that it would approve H-2 petitions filed by military contractors and by private businesses which ‘substantially serve the Armed Forces or citizen or alien employees of the Armed Forces or contractors thereto within the Territory.’”¹⁰⁹ Because the U.S. military was the island’s largest employer, the Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) effectively approved H-2 workers for close to all the jobs on Guam. Beyond skilled laborers such as engineers and electricians, the H-2 visa was also used to fill auxiliary jobs including “bakers, cooks, barbers and auto mechanics” which the Navy deemed “vital to the national defense” of the United States.¹¹⁰ Military labor then was more than construction workers, but also jobs that were needed to support, feed, and maintain the large group of migrant workers on the island.

¹⁰⁶ U.S. Congress, House, “The Use of Temporary Alien Labor on Guam,” (1973), 5.

¹⁰⁷ U.S. Congress, House, “The Use of Temporary Alien Labor on Guam,” (1973), 11.

¹⁰⁸ U.S. Congress, House, “The Use of Temporary Alien Labor on Guam,” (1973), (1973), 10.

¹⁰⁹ U.S. Congress, House, “The Use of Temporary Alien Labor on Guam,” (1973), 10.

¹¹⁰ Campbell, “Filipino Community of Guam,” 39.

In fact, throughout this postwar period, any and all migration to and from Guam was deemed necessary to U.S. military operations. Guam was a military secure location and any person on the island received a “security clearance” from the U.S. Navy.¹¹¹ Before World War II, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt had signed Executive Order No. 8683, which established Guam as a secure location for U.S. military operations in 1941. When the U.S. military reoccupied the island, President Truman reinstated the security clearance for Guam and it remained in place until President John F. Kennedy lifted the order in 1962. The security clearance ensured that any person leaving and going to Guam had an approved military reason. Filipinos who came in the period between 1946 and 1962 received a security clearance because of the essential labor they contributed to the military build-up. Filipino workers’ intrinsic value was in their positions as pawns in Philippine economic and foreign policy and their ability to provide labor for the expansion of U.S. military in the Pacific.

Labor Camps

The U.S. Navy worked with two main contractors to build military infrastructure on Guam. The first was Luzon Stevedoring Company (LUSTEVCO) and its subsidiary company Marianas Stevedoring and Development Company (MASDELCO). The company “was founded by US veterans of the [Spanish-American War of 1898] and became one of the leading cargo transportation companies in Southeast Asia.”¹¹² The other large company was Brown-Pacific-Maxon, based in the continental United States in Texas, which received contracts for the completion of Andersen Air Force Base in Guam.¹¹³ They recruited from the Philippines, but also hired white workers from the American South. These two military contract companies hired the majority of Filipino workers to do work necessary for the military build-up.

¹¹¹ Stevens, *Guam, USA*, 94.

¹¹² Flores, “No Walk in the Park,” 819.

¹¹³ Flores, “No Walk in the Park,” 819.

Filipinos performed both skilled and unskilled labor for the U.S. bases. Skilled laborers included electricians, welders, plumbers, roofers, and painters.¹¹⁴ Unskilled work consisted of stevedoring and transporting construction materials. Moreover, Filipinos were hired for auxiliary jobs that supported construction, including accountants, bakers, cooks, as well as doctors and nurses. The military contractors were able to hire a wide array of trades that were necessary for the military projects, and as such did not hire local or American workers often. For all their work, Filipinos were placed at the bottom tier of a three-tier wage system, in which American statesider workers were at the top and Guamanian (Chamorro) workers were in the middle. The wage scale ensured profitability for the military contractors, but also made Filipino workers more appealing to hire when compared to Chamorro and American workers.¹¹⁵

Filipino laborers were housed in labor camps that were villages unto their own. These camps allowed military contractors to control their Filipino workers at all times.¹¹⁶ According to scholar Bruce Campbell, “BPM employed more than 17,000 laborers in the mid-1950s in makeshift camps, which later became cities, then disappeared upon completion of the contract.”¹¹⁷ Labor camps were located throughout the island including Camp Edusa near Dededo, Camp Quezon in Mangilao, Camp Magsaysay in Yigo.¹¹⁸ The most remembered and well-known was Camp Roxas, a labor camp for LUSTEVCO, located in the village of Agat adjacent to Navy Base Guam in the southern half of the island.¹¹⁹ Camp Roxas had “miles of barracks, a 15-acre beach, an open-air movie theatre, post

¹¹⁴ Guam Humanities Council, *A Journey Home: Camp Roxas and Filipino American History on Guam* (Hagatña: Guam Humanities Council, 2009), Panel 4.

¹¹⁵ More will be discussed in the next section of this chapter.

¹¹⁶ Campbell, “The Filipino Community in Guam,” 40-41.

¹¹⁷ Campbell, “The Filipino Community in Guam,” 41

¹¹⁸ Guam Humanities Council, *A Journey Home: Camp Roxas and Filipino American History on Guam* (Hagatña: Guam Humanities Council, 2009), Panel 2. Alfred Peredo Flores, “‘Little Island into Mighty Base’: Indigeneity, Race, and U.S. Empire in Guam, 1944-1962,” (Ph.D., University of California, Los Angeles, 2015)—a dissertation which explores in great detail the daily lives and working conditions of Filipino laborers in labor camps throughout the postwar period.

¹¹⁹ Interestingly, Camp Roxas was built on military property that was formerly the property of the Bordallo family; the same Bordallo family whose land was in question during the 1949 Organic Act Hearings analyzed in the first part of this chapter. *Under the American Sun*.

office and sports facilities.”¹²⁰ The camps comprised of Quonset huts—a prefabricated structure of galvanized steel shaped like a half cylinder. These Quonset huts housed the sleeping quarters for the workers as well as other necessary offices. According to historian Alfred Flores, “contractors relied on Quonset huts because they were cheap to build and could house eight to twelve people depending on the length of the buildings.”¹²¹ The camp also had its own clinic and hospital with recruited Filipino nurses. In 1950, there were 7,000 Filipino men and one woman in Camp Roxas. Because of the nature of MASDELCO’s recruitment practices in the Philippines, most of the workers were from Iloilo Province. Each of the camps were self-contained and the Filipino workers did not necessarily have to enter the civilian community for any essentials. The local population rarely visited the camps.¹²² Filipino workers were effectively segregated from the Guamanian community that lived beyond their labor camp gates.

Military contractors could not always keep control of their workers. If discontent brewed, workers were simply not hired for their next year’s contract and were forced to leave the island.¹²³ The disposability with which Filipino workers were treated demonstrates how military contractors took advantage of the surplus labor market in the Philippines and the foreign policy agreements made between the U.S. and the Philippines. Military contractors were often accused of abusing their workers, paying them less, or facilitating unhealthy or violent living conditions in the camps.¹²⁴ The number grievances emerging from the labor camps was enough to warrant a Philippine diplomatic office in Guam to provide services for Filipino workers. According to Flores, the Philippines government responded to reports of discrimination and violations of terms of contracts by

¹²⁰ Campbell, “The Filipino Community in Guam,” 41.

¹²¹ Flores, “No Walk in the Park,” 826.

¹²² This does not mean the local population did not visit the camps at all. When talking to Chamorro people on Guam about my dissertation, a handful of them recalled going to Camp Roxas to play basketball against Filipino teams.

¹²³ Flores, “No Walk in the Park,” 829.

¹²⁴ Flores, “No Walk in the Park,” 827.

establishing a Philippine Consulate in Guam in 1952 in order “to support their workers and to protect remittances.”¹²⁵ The arrival of the first Philippine consulate in Guam marked “the first official representation for the thousands of Filipino residents of the island.”¹²⁶ Prior to the establishment of the consulate, Filipinos had an unofficial representative associated with LUSTEVECO. So not only were workers themselves in need of protection from U.S. military contractors, but also the money they sent home to their families that would ultimately bolster the Philippine national economy. The way in which Filipino laborers were recruited made it so that their companies worked hand in hand with the U.S. military and with foreign affairs—their only outlet of support would be their own national government. Thus, any affair that occurred in regard to Filipino workers in Guam was also a matter of international affairs. Filipino labor on Guam in this period was not just an U.S. immigration issue or a U.S. military issue, but one very much steeped in calculated foreign and economic policy for both the United States and the Philippines.

In addition to strict curfews and camp rules, labor camps had opportunities for recreational and cultural activities for Filipino workers to partake, including sports, arts, gardening, and religious services.¹²⁷ Basketball was a particular pastime time with different departments of the company competing against each other for a prize.¹²⁸ For instance, in 1948, on behalf of “the Filipino Community in Guam numbering about sixteen thousand males,” Jesus Puentebella, Physical director for Camp Roxas, asked Philippine President Elpidio Quirino to purchase “a silver trophy for our Basketball league to be held in a short time to all people in Guam regardless of race as a gesture of friendship.”¹²⁹ Within a few days, the Philippine president agreed and sent a trophy to Guam a week

¹²⁵ Flores, “No Walk in the Park,” 829.

¹²⁶ “Umayan Arrives Here; Will Open Consulate Today,” *Guam Daily News* (August 04, 1952), 1.

¹²⁷ Guam Humanities Council, *A Journey Home*, Panel 3. Alfred Flores suggests that this is a form of welfare capitalism in which companies utilize modes of recreation to appease and prevent worker discontent.

¹²⁸ Flores, “No Walk in the Park,” 825.

¹²⁹ Elpidio Quirino Papers, Box 27 Folder 5, Filipinas Heritage Library, Ayala Museum, Manila, Philippines.

later on a Pan-American flight. In a gesture of gratitude, Puenteblila wrote a letter “to our beloved ‘Apo’” stating “not only do we appreciate the simple trophy that he dearly gave us for the betterment of our youths, but also of his everlasting remembrance to his subjects in this far away island in the Pacific.”¹³⁰ Basketball was a break from the hard work they performed for their company in Guam, a way to bond with the camp mates and others in the Filipino community, and a retreat from the fact that they were far from home.

Furthermore, the Catholic church built by Filipino workers in Camp Roxas provided an opportunity for Filipinos to conduct religious services on weekends, religious holidays, organize fiestas for patron saints, as well as receive Catholic sacraments.¹³¹ In an interview with Patrick Luces, a Camp Roxas descendent, Luces noted that his father Johnny Luces participated in religious services at Camp Roxas every day and found community in church services. With the centrality of religion in many Filipino cultures, this church was a way for construction companies to appease Filipino need for culturally relevant activities. These non-work activities provided some simulacrum of ordinary life, despite the carceral like nature of the camps themselves. In fact, the Filipino laborers built the infrastructure that made these non-work activities possible. The Catholic church was built and decorated by Camp Roxas workers with excess materials. Although these activities may have been provided by military contractors to prevent labor uprisings, these were also opportunities for Filipinos to build communities. “Given that workers spent years, in some cases decades, away from the Philippines,” wrote the Guam Humanities Council in a public exhibition about Camp Roxas, “the relationships they established with each other as well as with the local population laid the foundation for many life-long friendships and community support.”¹³²

¹³⁰ Elpidio Quirino Papers, Box 27 Folder 5, Filipinas Heritage Library, Ayala Museum, Manila, Philippines.

¹³¹ Patrick Luces Interview with author, Dededo Guam, December 11, 2019; Guam Humanities Council, *A Journey Home*, Panel 3.

¹³² Guam Humanities Council, *A Journey Home*, Panel 3.

The military contractors' reliance on specific regions in the Philippines for Filipino workers led to regionalism within the labor camps. In a book published in the 1970s, historian Alfred N. Munoz observed that "the Filipinos in [Guam] were divided sharply into two groups: those from the Visayan islands stayed at Camp Roxas named after the first President of the Philippine Republic, Manuel Roxas, a favorite son of the Visayas; those from Northern Luzon stayed in Camp Quezon, so named after the Commonwealth President Manuel L. Quezon."¹³³ In the Philippines, regions and provinces had their own ethnic identity, often rooted in their own languages and dialects with traditions, foods, and customs specific to that region. Labor camps on Guam were often region specific, and thus each had a predominant regional language and its workers had an inclination to form friendships and bonds with those from the same region or province. Filipinos on Guam retained strong regional identities sustained partly as a result of military contractors' labor recruitment practices. This is seen in the proliferation of regional mutual support groups that rose up among Filipino workers-turned-permanent residents in the 1960s to the present. To this day, there is a general assumption—not wholly incorrect—that Filipinos on Guam who are from the southern villages of Agat and Santa Rita are originally from the Iloilo provinces and those who are from the central and northern villages are from the many provinces of Luzon, such as Ilocos region or Manila. Coincidentally, the geographic locations of these Filipino groups parallel the geographic locations of their originating provinces. Northern provinces to northern Guam; southern provinces to southern Guam.

Nevertheless, in September 1954, the Filipino Community of Guam (FCG) was founded "with some 500 representatives from the three major labor camps and various business firms on

¹³³ Alfred N. Munoz, *The Filipinos in America* (Los Angeles: Mountainview Publishers, 1971), 123. This observation was also mentioned by Dr. Robert Underwood in several conversations I've had with him.

island,” in order to organize the massive presence of Filipino workers on Guam.¹³⁴ It had five objectives, the first of which was to ensure the “welfare of Filipinos in Guam.” As a mutual aid society, members of the FCG would be connected to a network of Filipinos who would look out for each other. The second goal was to “promote unity among all the Filipinos on the island,” a way for Filipinos to connect despite regional differences and under a singular national identity. It was also an advocacy group that could “provide a common and ready agency which could undertake projects that affect Filipinos here.” The fourth objective was to “promote wholesome and friendly relations between Filipinos and local citizens and to create an atmosphere of good will and mutual trust,” and lastly, to “seek more means for the improvement of Filipino relations with their employers especially with the U.S. Armed forces agencies like the Navy and Air Force as well as private business firms.” The FCG was a social and cultural organization that had, nonetheless, political goals to ensure that Filipinos on Guam were represented as a cohesive force in the Guam’s community and labor force.

Despite the work of the Filipino Community in Guam to foster relationships with the Guam community, the temporary nature of most of the Filipino workers made it difficult to do so. The recruitment of Filipino workers for the military build-up continued beyond the transfer of the Guam from the U.S. Navy to the U.S. Department of the Interior in 1950. In this period, thousands of Filipinos made their way to Guam for their temporary contracts and were repatriated. Without the means or the time to form meaningful relationships with the local community, Filipinos were often stereotyped as temporary military workers, and contributed to the perceived perpetual foreignness of Filipino. As argued by Alfred Flores, “the post-World War II militarization of the island resulted in the creation of a Filipino labor class that became synonymous with military employment.”¹³⁵ By the

¹³⁴ Filipino Community of Guam, “Know the Philippines Exhibition: Carnival & Exposition,” Filipino Community of Guam Vertical File, University of Guam, Micronesia Area Research Center, 38.

¹³⁵ Flores, “No Walk in the Park,” 814.

time Camp Roxas closed its gates in 1972, “tens of thousands of Filipino workers made their way to Guam “to work and find a better life.”¹³⁶

The rebuilding of Guam as a strategic island in the U.S. military’s Pacific presence relied on the labor of thousands of Filipino workers recruited by American military contractors. The labor camps housed the massive influx of Filipino laborers into Guam which was a result of U.S. foreign relations. The United States negotiated with the Philippine government to help the U.S. military amass a large and cheap labor force to build its Pacific empire. Labor camps were self-contained military contract company towns that regulated the daily lives of the workers who lived there. The restrictive regulations of camps and the temporary nature of employment also prevented opportunities for Filipinos and Chamorros to create meaningful relations. Paired with the notion that Filipinos were only foreign military contract workers, Filipinos were generally perceived by the local population as perpetually foreign. The segregated nature of the camps, nonetheless, allowed Filipinos to build a sort of Filipino community building through religious activities, shared regional languages, and cultural events. The Filipinos who decided to stay on Guam after their contracts ended usually remained friends with their labor camp colleagues and settled in villages adjacent to the camps where they resided.

Labor Competition

By 1950, the prominence of Filipinos in military construction began to elicit criticism by Chamorros and white statesiders who worked on the bases. In the same U.S. Congressional hearing on the Guam Organic Act where Chamorros lamented their grievances on the U.S. Navy’s land

¹³⁶ Guam Humanities Council, *A Journey Home*, Panel 8. Nevertheless, a few Filipino workers who made Guam home marrying Chamorro women or bringing their wives from the Philippines. Thus, even though most Filipinos who worked in Guam eventually left the island, there was a substantial number of Filipinos who utilized Guam as a stepping-stone towards U.S. citizenship. These Filipino families in turn constituted a non-white settler population in Guam that continued grow in the latter half of the 20th century. More about this is in the next chapter.

policies, several speakers complained about how Filipino laborers “are taking jobs away from American men – also the Guamanians.”¹³⁷ F.L. Davis, the spokesperson for the Construction Man’s Association of Guam, told the Public Lands committee that military contractors prioritized the hiring of alien workers over American and Guamanian labor, despite the fact that there was increasing unemployment in both the U.S. continent and in Guam. In Davis’s experience, military contractors were hiring American skilled workers to teach Filipino laborers skilled work and then subsequently replacing the same American workers with cheaper Filipino laborers: “they surplused [*sic*] the men who taught them and kept the Philipino [*sic*] in his place.”¹³⁸ Furthermore, Davis argued that the thousands of Filipino alien workers were not only competition, but they were being paid with U.S. taxpayer dollars. “Why can’t that money be spent on American people who are out of work?” Davis asked the committee. For Davis, he saw how military contractors, specifically Brown-Pacific-Maxon, used foreign labor for company profit, eschewing the needs of the American and Chamorro workforce.

Indeed, military contractors justified instituting a pay scale by using the cost of living of the workers’ place of origin. White Americans, sometimes referred to as “statesiders,” earned more than Guamanians, with wages based on the standard of living in West Coast cities and an additional twenty-five percent overseas differential.¹³⁹ Local Guamanians were paid the “prevailing wage rate in Guam set by the Government of Guam,” which was “one-half the total of non-local hired employees [statesiders].”¹⁴⁰ Guamanians were not paid as much as statesiders because contractors believed that Guamanians did not require as much compensation because they were local to Guam.

¹³⁷ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Public Lands Committee, *Investigation of an Organic Act for Guam*, 81st Congress, 1st Sess., November 21-23, 1949, 166-168. (Hereafter cited as “U.S. Congress, House, Committee, *Investigation of an Organic Act*, (November 1949)”)

¹³⁸ I am using the term “Guamanian” here because the law was not referring specifically to Chamorro people. U.S. Congress, House, Committee, *Investigation of an Organic Act*, (November 1949), 166-168.

¹³⁹ U.S. Congress, House, Committee, *Investigation of an Organic Act*, (November 1949), 172-174. As testified by Vance O. Smith, a representative of the Guam Chamber of Commerce.

¹⁴⁰ Campbell, “The Filipino Community in Guam,” 31.

Guamanians earned more than alien workers from the Philippines who were paid according to the stipulations agreed in the 1947 Exchange of Notes—twenty-five percent more than the wage in the Philippines plus free transport, housing, and other essential services.¹⁴¹ Not coincidentally, this three-tiered pay scale created a hierarchy on Guam that both statesiders and Guamanians believed mapped onto a racial hierarchy, which placed white Statesider workers above native and foreign workers. According to historian Alfred Flores, these three-tiered system was a demonstration of the ways that U.S. military contractors transplanted tiered racial systems on Guam.¹⁴²

Furthermore, a person's national origin determined the value of their labor. The military justified the pay scales by nationality, classifying Filipinos as temporary and perpetually foreign in Guam. According to historian Colleen Woods, "Philippine independence and the altered status of Filipinos in relation to the United States made it easier for military contractors to justify the lower wages paid to Filipino laborers working on Guam, as the nationality of laborers was one of the ways the US military and military contractors categorized labor and determined wages."¹⁴³ The 1947 Exchange of Notes ultimately gave power to U.S. military contractors to pay Filipinos less than their other workers under their purview. And in order to justify paying lower wages to alien workers, military contractors suggested a hierarchical pay scale protecting American and Guamanian workers.

As a result, the pay scale ultimately made it more profitable to hire Filipinos. Historian Bruce Campbell argued that the preference for Filipino workers by military contractors was "economical."¹⁴⁴ Military contractors took advantage of and capitalized on the 1947 Exchange of Notes and the cheaper wages paid to Filipino workers in order to increase profit for their military construction companies. As argued by Colleen Woods, "the hiring of Filipino laborers for work on

¹⁴¹ Campbell, "The Filipino Community in Guam," 31; Flores, "No Walk in the Park."

¹⁴² Flores, "No Walk in the Park," 819.

¹⁴³ Woods, "Building Empire's Archipelago," 136.

¹⁴⁴ Campbell, "The Filipino Community in Guam," 39.

U.S. military installations deepened an existing transpacific migration pattern whereby state and capital interest collaborated to control, and ultimately exploit the labor of Filipinos.”¹⁴⁵ U.S. foreign policy, the U.S. military, and military contractors capitalized on surplus Filipino labor to solidify their presence in the Pacific and increase profits for their companies. An American worker was more than three times more expensive than a Filipino who could do a similar job, a situation that was not ideal for military construction companies. While military contractors could hire and train local Chamorros, Campbell noted, “the savings generated by paying lower wages to Filipino skilled laborers, rather than providing training and employment for local residents was enormous.”¹⁴⁶ In addition, the Department of Defense was reluctant to do train Guamanians “for fear that people would leave Guam for better wage incentives elsewhere.”¹⁴⁷ Thus, not only were Filipinos cheaper to pay, but they were a more controllable workforce that were at the whims of military contractors, which were attributes necessary to ensure efficient and profitable labor for their businesses.

Fair Labor for Cheap

By 1956, increased labor competition and the racialized pay scale took center stage during a series of Congressional hearings regarding the applicability of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 to the U.S. territories, possessions, and overseas areas of the United States.¹⁴⁸ Held in the months of February and March 1956, this set of hearings brought to light the various viewpoints on the ever complicated entanglement of Filipino labor in Guam and its relation to Statesider labor, Guamanian labor, and the United States military. The hearings were created to ascertain whether or not it was appropriate to apply the Fair Labor Standards Act considering the local conditions and populations that lived in these areas. One primary concern was whether or not local businesses in these areas

¹⁴⁵ Woods, “Building Empire’s, Archipelago,” 132.

¹⁴⁶ Campbell, “The Filipino Community in Guam,” 39.

¹⁴⁷ Campbell, “The Filipino Community in Guam,” 30.

¹⁴⁸ U.S. Congress, House, *Minimum Wages in Certain Territories, Possessions, and Oversea Areas of the United States*, Committee on Education and Labor, 84th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1956, Part One.

could afford to pay their workers the federal minimum wage. If not, the Fair Labor Standards Act could jeopardize any sort of economic growth for small businesses in these places. Members of U.S. Congress, officials of the U.S. Navy, representatives of labor unions, residents from the U.S. territories, and officials from the Philippines participated in the hearings to show how their constituents and priorities would be affected by the rules set forth in the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Throughout the hearings, the context of the rise of Communism in the Asia-Pacific region pervaded most of the testimonies. Many of the speakers at the hearings use an anti-communist, pro-democratic rhetoric to appeal to the U.S. Congress and advocate for their constituents.¹⁴⁹ The military justified their arguments by leveraging their role in safeguarding the region from the expansion of communist powers. Labor unions argued that the United States support for unequal wages for different races and nationalities was undemocratic and played into the perception that the United States was a hypocrisy of racial equality. The independent Philippine government officials also argued that the low wages their Filipino citizens were offered in U.S. military installations was discriminatory and ineffective in garnering the respect of countries in their region. And for Chamorro representatives, they appropriated the rhetoric that Guam was a show of democracy in the region to advocate for higher wages and equal pay for local Guamanians who were American citizens. Unsurprising is the lack of representation of the Filipino workers themselves. Many of the decisions being made with regards to their wages were decided upon by U.S. leaders and military officials.

The U.S. military was the largest employer in Guam, and it was clear that its contractors did not abide by the Fair Labor Standards Act, especially when it came to alien labor. At the time, the

¹⁴⁹ This phenomena of using Cold War racial liberalism as a rhetoric tool has been written about in Mary Dudziak's *Cold War Civil Rights*. My interpretation of racial liberalism is informed by Simeon Man, *Soldiering Through Empire: Race and the Making of the Decolonizing Pacific* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2018), 4; and cultural pluralism as defined by Mae Ngai, *Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 234.

U.S. military was exempt from paying Filipino migrant workers according to the Fair Labor Standards Act because the 1947 Exchange of Notes outlined the process and payment by which recruited Filipino workers were brought to Guam. The question was whether or not alien Filipino workers who were employed on U.S. military bases in Guam would have to be paid the U.S. minimum wage, a potentially expensive proposition, considering the very low wages Filipinos earned in the first place. Admiral Joel D. Parks, the Deputy Chief of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts of the U.S. Navy, noted in his testimony that “if the act were held to apply to the imported Filipinos on Guam, the Department of Defense contractors and eventually the United States would be liable for wages and penalties in excess of \$3 million for retroactive wage payments alone.”¹⁵⁰ Essentially, retroactive pay was too expensive for the U.S. military. Furthermore, Admiral Parks testified that if the act were to apply to military contractors on Guam, it would “increase contract costs of more than \$9 million per year at the present operating level.”¹⁵¹ From Admiral Parks’ testimony, it appears that the military as a whole—not just military contractors—was dependent on cheap, migrant Filipino labor to decrease the cost of building its fortress in the Pacific.

Military officials emphasized how Filipino workers’ low wages were crucial to the United States military policy. The military wanted to increase its presence in the Pacific but was constrained by Congressional budget cuts to defense spending. If there was an increase in minimum wage, Admiral Parks argued, then “we would have two alternatives. One is to drastically cut back the [military] operation at the expense of building up Guam as a defense bastion in the Pacific, and deport hundreds of these Filipinos back to the Philippines because we would not have the money to pay them.”¹⁵² Filipino labor was necessary to “give the taxpayer the maximum value for his defense

¹⁵⁰ U.S. Congress, *Minimum Wages in Certain Territories*, Part One, 116.

¹⁵¹ U.S. Congress, *Minimum Wages in Certain Territories*, Part One, 116.

¹⁵² U.S. Congress, *Minimum Wage in Certain Territories*, Part One, 1956, 267.

dollar.”¹⁵³ Chief of Naval Operations Arleigh Burke emphasized that Filipino workers in Guam were essential and that “substantial salary increases, without a corresponding increase in work performed or appropriations received, will cause a curtailment in the support to the fleet at the affected bases.”¹⁵⁴ Adjusting pay scales to give foreign workers employed by the military minimum wages would negatively affect U.S. military operations in the Pacific. Burke further emphasized that the cost of building bases could not be any lower, and that a further “reduction of these levels will inevitably weaken that defense and imperil our national security.”¹⁵⁵ Like the way the U.S. military arbitrarily condemned Chamorro land after World War II, the U.S. military justified the low wages paid to Filipinos and other alien workers by citing national defense.

Admiral Parks not only justified paying Filipinos lower wages as a way to keep construction costs down, but used racist assumptions to infer that Filipino labor was not as valuable as white labor. He testified that that “though some of these wages are below the Fair Labor Standards Act minimum, they are considered fair and in proportion to productivity.”¹⁵⁶ He cited the need for American contractors to teach Filipinos English and “instruction in American building and administrative techniques.”¹⁵⁷ And subtly, he implied that because “they have been paid a wage substantially higher than they could have learned in the Philippines, have lived under better conditions, and have learned new skills,” Filipino laborers were satisfied with their pay and living conditions and did not need a American minimum wage for their work. Admiral Parks’ testimony demonstrates how the U.S. military capitalized on the postcolonial economy of the Philippines, the country’s surplus labor, and a sense of racial and cultural unfamiliarity to justify lower wages to Filipino workers.

¹⁵³ U.S. Congress, *Minimum Wage in Certain Territories*, Part One, 1956, 267.

¹⁵⁴ U.S. Congress, *Minimum Wage in Certain Territories*, Part Two, 1956, 475.

¹⁵⁵ U.S. Congress, *Minimum Wage in Certain Territories*, Part Two, 1956, 475.

¹⁵⁶ U.S. Congress, *Minimum Wage in Certain Territories*, Part One, 1956, 116.

¹⁵⁷ U.S. Congress, *Minimum Wage in Certain Territories*, Part One, 1956, 116.

The pay scales did not go unnoticed in the Philippines. Philippine Ambassador to the United States Carlos P. Romulo believed that Filipino laborers were being racially and nationally discriminated against in their jobs for the U.S. military. In a letter to John Foster Dulles, U.S. Secretary of State, Romulo argued that the exemption of Guam and Wake Island from the Fair Labor Standards Act “would be interpreted in the Philippines as an act of discrimination against Filipino laborers in those American possessions.”¹⁵⁸ In addition, he argued that the disparity in wages could be used “to misrepresent and exploit divisions and prejudices in the most sensitive sectors of the world.” Romulo emphasized the direct conflict between U.S. rhetoric and actions to suggest that the racial discrimination experienced by Filipino laborers employed by the U.S. military was antithetical to the U.S. mission to spread democracy in the region. Romulo doubled down on his argument and added that “we must not give the enemies of democracy and freedom an opportunity to distort America’s motives and magnify the amendment as a desire of the United States to perpetuate what they will undoubtedly brand as coolie labor.”¹⁵⁹ In labeling the exploitation of Filipino workers as “coolie labor,” Romulo made a direct connection to the racialized labor regimes used by colonial and imperial powers, and that the United States, although it purports equality, was actually utilizing unequal systems of labor to make the maximum profit for their capitalist interests. As aptly argued by Romulo, the plight of the Filipino laborers was a matter of foreign policy and international affairs.

Labor unions also weighed in, advocating to apply the Fair Labor Standards Acts in the territories. Walter J. Mason, of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), testified at the Congressional hearing arguing how the racialized pay scale and low wages hurt U.S. foreign policy, a Cold War concern in the Pacific. He said, “Where you

¹⁵⁸ U.S. Congress, *Minimum Wage in Certain Territories*, Part One, 1956, 146.

¹⁵⁹ U.S. Congress, *Minimum Wage in Certain Territories*, Part One, 1956, 146.

have natives on these bases working alongside one another or doing comparable work and receiving wages, say, one third or one-half of what is received by American workers, naturally I do not think it is helping our international relations."¹⁶⁰ (Mason was using “native” to describe a person from the Asia-Pacific region, not necessarily Chamorros). The AFL-CIO received a letter from Jose J. Hernandez on behalf of the Philippines-based labor union, Philippine Trade Unions Council (PTUC), who asked for the AFL-CIO to oppose the Fair Labor Standards Act because of its exclusion of Guam, Wake, and Samoa from the U.S. minimum wage law.¹⁶¹ Hernandez wrote that “the PTUC strongly denounces this class legislation which is evidently aimed mainly against Filipino workers who constituted the great bulk of the working population” of Guam, Wake, and Sāmoa. Calling the act discriminatory against Filipino workers, Hernandez argued that allowing Filipinos to be paid lower wages “would certainly be to the great benefit of our enemies should any kind of discrimination based on color be committed by any democracies.”¹⁶² The racialized pay scale instituted by the U.S. military and military contractors was antithetical to U.S. rhetoric of democracy and racial equality. Those they needed to convince the most—workers employed by the U.S. military installations in the Asia-Pacific region—experienced first-hand the inequality.

Filipino workers on Guam were not just matters of U.S. immigration policy or military policy, their work was also a matter of foreign policy. Filipino laborers’ existence and labor for U.S. military bases throughout the Asia-Pacific region was politicized by Filipino statesmen and labor unions in ways to demonstrate the inconsistencies in the U.S. actions abroad and its purported policy to increase democracy and racial equality in the face of communism. As exclaimed by Chamorro leader,

¹⁶⁰ U.S. Congress, *Minimum Wage in Certain Territories*, Part One, 1956, 146.

¹⁶¹ In the letter, Jose Hernandez wrote that the mission of the PTUC was to “help in the realization our objective of fostering the solidarity of free world labor on the basis of justice and equality.” U.S. Congress, *Minimum Wage in Certain Territories*, Part One, 1956, 154.

¹⁶² In the letter, Jose Hernandez wrote that the mission of the PTUC was to “help in the realization our objective of fostering the solidarity of free world labor on the basis of justice and equality.” U.S. Congress, *Minimum Wage in Certain Territories*, Part One, 1956, 154.

Antonio B. Won Pat, Guam is a “‘show place’ of democracy within the reaches of Communist influence.”¹⁶³ Filipino workers exemplified the uncomfortable convergence of the two sides of the U.S. Cold War foreign policy: the desire to expand the U.S. influence in the region through both military and humanitarian projects.

Native versus Alien Labor

In February 1956, the Guam Legislature passed a resolution arguing for Congress to apply the Fair Labor Standards Act to Guam. Their primary concern was to protect the Chamorro workforce which they felt was being slighted by military contractors’ recruitment of Filipino labor. The resolution stated, “there appears to be over 3,000 American citizens over 18 years of age who are not now gainfully employed,” and that “there had been some laxity in giving such American citizens priority over alien labor.”¹⁶⁴ To be sure, the Guam legislature emphasized the American citizenship of their Guamanian constituents to make a point about how U.S. military contractors were prioritizing the hiring of foreign Filipino migrant labor over local labor. Furthermore, they highlighted the labor competition Guamanians were facing as a result of military contractor policy; “the entries of such alien labor into Guam are in direct competition with the supply of labor in Guam, thus depriving such local labor employment.”¹⁶⁵ In this period in which the United States military condemned a considerable portion of their lands, displaced Guamanian families, and now prioritized alien workers, Guamanians began to see how American citizenship did not necessarily give them the rights or privileges in their relationship with the United States. Guamanian leaders were furious that the United States military would prioritize financial bottom-lines as opposed to Guamanians, who were by then U.S. citizens.

¹⁶³ U.S. Congress, *Minimum Wage in Certain Territories*, Part Two, 1956, 480.

¹⁶⁴ U.S. Congress, House, Committee, *Minimum Wage*, Part One, 345.

¹⁶⁵ U.S. Congress, House, Committee, *Minimum Wage*, Part One, 345.

The Guam Legislature noted that they were sending two representatives, Antonio B. Won Pat and Cynthia Torres, to plead Guam's case.¹⁶⁶ Before they started their testimonies, however, Won Pat wanted to ensure that the Congressional Representatives knew exactly who they were advocating for. Won Pat told the committee, "We want to make it very clear that when we speak of the people of Guam we are referring to the permanent residents of Guam. We are referring to American citizens who live and earn their livelihood in Guam."¹⁶⁷ He clarified that people of Guam were those who are born or naturalized as American citizens. Unequivocally, Won Pat added, "We want to make it equally clear that when we speak of the 'people of Guam' we are not including 'imported labor' whose employment is justified only when the supply of local labor is not equal to the current demand."¹⁶⁸ Won Pat emphasized the distinction between Guamanians (Chamorro) and Filipinos. He saw Filipinos as perpetually foreign, while articulating Chamorro identity through American citizenship.

Without access to their ranches because of the military's land takings, Chamorros were forced to transition into a cash economy for which they were not trained. The prewar educational system was rudimentary and rarely taught vocational skills that were needed for the military build-up. Furthermore, the destruction of World War II put a damper on the infrastructural and economic progress that Chamorros could achieve on the civilian side of the island. Guam Legislature representative Cynthia Torres made clear the connection between Chamorro loss of land as a result of militarization and the need for new sources of labor to aid Guamanian postwar recovery. As

¹⁶⁶ In 1956, Guam and the rest of the territories did not have any member of Congress, nor any type of representation. Antonio Won Pat was a member of the Guam Congress since 1936 and was a senator in the Guam Legislatures' since the signing of the Guam Organic Act in 1950. Cynthia Torres was one of two women senators elected to the 3rd Guam Legislature in 1954. Cynthia Torres was the daughter of Agueda Johnston and earned her degree in education at the University of California in 1958. She was a businesswoman, teacher, and community leader serving at several government departments and educational institutions in Guam. Hale'ta, *Manfayi'* Volume 2, (Agaña: The Political Status Education Coordinating Commission), 171-172.

¹⁶⁷ U.S. Congress, House, Committee, *Minimum Wage*, (1956).

¹⁶⁸ U.S. Congress, House, Committee, *Minimum Wage*, Part Two, (1956), 480.

Torres mentioned in her testimony, “For a substantial period after reoccupation in 1944, the military and the people of Guam were greatly occupied in the restoration of the Guamanian way of life and resettlement of the lands dislocated through the war and thereafter by the occupation of our military forces.”¹⁶⁹ She also mentioned that the lands “owned or controlled by the military is a majority of the finest prewar farms.”¹⁷⁰ Thus, it was impossible for Chamorros to rely on an agricultural economy. Chamorros were primarily focused on resettling their lands, which as the first part of this chapter demonstrates, was difficult as result of military land annexations.

In order to provide for their families in the postwar period, Chamorros attempted to transition into a military dominated cash economy that was already saturated with Filipino alien workers. With the H-2 temporary visa law in place, the military was supposed to ascertain whether there was enough local labor to fill the jobs it needed.¹⁷¹ Usually the military’s surveys would conclude that there was not enough local Guamanian labor to cover the demand for skilled jobs. As a result, many Chamorros remained unemployed. According to Won Pat and Torres’ statistics, however, roughly 3,700 people on Guam were unemployed, but could be nevertheless hired by the military for unskilled work. The military continued to recruit Filipino workers for unskilled labor as well. Despite the infrastructural development and potential for jobs with the expansion of military presence, Chamorros faced an unemployment problem exacerbated by military contractors’ preference for cheaper Filipino workers. For Chamorros, limited access to land and labor were two central effects of the U.S. military presence on Guam.

Furthermore, the layers of jurisdiction associated with Guam’s territorial status—the island was an unincorporated territory with a civilian government—created problems for the Guam Legislature. On Guam, the military often had more political and monetary power over the territorial

¹⁶⁹ U.S. Congress, House, Committee, *Minimum Wage*, Part Two, (1956), 481.

¹⁷⁰ U.S. Congress, House, Committee, *Minimum Wage*, Part Two, (1956), 481.

¹⁷¹ U.S. Congress, House, “The Use of Temporary Alien labor in Guam.”

and federal government. The security clearance made this doubly true. Won Pat also said that on Guam it was “difficult for us to create some kind of economy other than the military because everything there is controlled largely by the military.”¹⁷² Moreover, the overall mission of national defense often justified the bending of rules in favor of military operations. Military contractors on Guam took advantage of this imbalance of power, often ignoring federal and local government officials. Cynthia Torres testified that military contractors, especially Brown-Pacific-Maxon (BPM), discriminated against Guamanian workers and violated the “unavailable workers” requirement for the H-2 visa. To the dismay of Chamorro leaders, BPM was relaxed in their calculation of available local labor in Guam. Furthermore, military contractors refused to negotiate with the Guam Legislature and Government, adding to the difficult political and economic situation in which Guamanians found themselves. Torres lamented, “we have sent them resolutions inviting them to come and discuss the problem of hiring local residents. We have done everything we could about it, but they have always ignored our petitions and requests because they felt they were in the military area and we had no jurisdiction over them.”¹⁷³ Moreover, Torres testified, a particular military contractor “refused all of these years to employ any local Guamanian citizens.”¹⁷⁴ Contractors hid behind military policy to enable their preferential hiring of Filipino migrant labor. If the expansion of the U.S. presence in Guam held the only opportunities for Chamorros to enter the cash economy, military contractors stood in the way of full Chamorro employment.

Won Pat and Torres cited that the reason the U.S. military was reluctant to hire Guamanians was because of the economic profitability created by the racialized wage scales. It was simply more profitable to hire Filipino laborers, to house them, and to discipline them than to hire Guamanians. Won Pat noted “the very fact that the Filipinos are paid a lower wage than the Guamanians...tends

¹⁷² U.S. Congress, House, Committee, *Minimum Wage*, Part Two, (1956), 490.

¹⁷³ U.S. Congress, House, Committee, *Minimum Wage*, Part Two, (1956), 499.

¹⁷⁴ U.S. Congress, House, Committee, *Minimum Wage*, Part Two, (1956), 499.

to deprive the Guamanian the same opportunity of earning, of obtaining a job.”¹⁷⁵ In an exchange between Senator Carl Elliot of Alabama, Won Pat connected Filipino militarized labor to forms of coerced labor:

Mr. Elliot. Why in your mind-if it be a fact that these two contractors prefer Philippine labor-why do you think that is true?

Mr. Won Pat. Well, it is easy to understand. *These aliens are paid what we call in common terminology coolie wages or slave wages.*

Mr. Elliot. You contend that Guamanians could perform the same work that the aliens from the Philippines perform, at least insofar as some of the jobs are concerned?

Mr. Won Pat. Yes, sir. I will say some of these jobs could be performed by local citizens.

Mr. Elliot. But you say the contractors prefer to bring in the Philippine labor because they can get that labor considerably cheaper than they can get the Guamanian labor?

Mr. Won Pat. That is correct, and in addition *I will say that since they are aliens they will be more submissive to the employer's wishes.*¹⁷⁶

Won Pat recognized a serious flaw in the supposedly helpful wage scales that paid Chamorro workers more than foreign labors. Filipino workers were paid “coolie wages or slave wages” and thus cheaper to employ, and more profitable for military contractors. And, because Filipinos could be sent back to the Philippines at the whim of their bosses, they were “submissive,” less prone to striking, and halting the military buildup. Won Pat harkened back to nineteenth-century coolie labor regimes that exploited foreign laborers for capitalist gain, while ignoring the needs of nativist Americans. He likened that historical situation to Guam where Chamorros were cast aside, and continued to struggle in the face of land condemnation and limited opportunities to make a living.¹⁷⁷ Contractors capitalized on Filipinos’ alien status and prevented Chamorros from attaining relatively lucrative jobs in the postwar era.

¹⁷⁵ U.S. Congress, House, Committee, *Minimum Wage*, Part Two, (1956), 499.

¹⁷⁶ U.S. Congress, House, Committee, *Minimum Wage*, Part Two, (1956), 487.

¹⁷⁷ Preferential hire for Guamanians within the government of Guam was written into the 1950 Guam Organic Act, as a way to help Guamanians find employment in the postwar period.

Other Chamorros and Guamanians were not so subtle in their critique of the U.S. military's racial preferences. James T. Sablan, a member of the Guam Legislature who also testified at a Congressional hearing, believed racism was integral to the wage scales implemented by military contract companies. He testified "The BPM Construction Co. is a company somewhat owned or controlled by southerners and they do not want to hire people other than Caucasians, and the reason why they have Filipinos is because they give them a slave or low salary. Now as proof I don't think there is a single Negro in that Unit."¹⁷⁸ In his reasoning, BPM's racist policies in Guam were a result of the company's historical experience with Southern labor regimes, ones that justified paying little to no money for labor provided by non-white peoples. In doing so, Sablan tied the legacies of the African American experience of slavery to the exploitation of Filipino workers on Guam to point out the flagrant racial preferences of military construction companies which hindered the possibility of Guamanian hires. The nonexistence of black people in BPMs labor force provided proof for Sablan to show how Filipino workers were only prized by BPM because their race and foreignness allowed military contractors to pay them cheaply. Nevertheless, Sablan did not argue for equal pay, but for U.S. Congress to reprimand BPM and the military for not hiring local Guamanians who could perform unskilled labor that many Filipinos were hired for.

The preference for Filipino alien labor over Chamorro labor had ramifications for the development of a local Guamanian economy. As stated in a 1973 Congressional study, "without question, the lower wages paid to the Filipinos, who were so prevalent in construction work, was a major factor in the domination of the construction industry during the 1950s, and in the failure of the native population to develop the necessary skills to compete effectively."¹⁷⁹ The relative ease with which military contractors could recruit Filipino labor stymied the growth of a skilled local

¹⁷⁸ U.S. Congress, House, "Guam Mariana Islands," Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 83rd Cong., 2nd sess., (November 27 to December 4, 1954), 53. (Hereafter cited as U.S. Congress, House, "Guam Mariana Islands")

¹⁷⁹ U.S. Congress, House, "The Use of Temporary Alien Labor on Guam," (1973), 13-14.

Guamanian construction labor force. Won Pat noted in his testimony, “the importation of low-cost labor results in [distinct] deprivation to local citizens of Guam, which unfortunately tends to create misunderstandings and inequities in the recruitment and in the payment of wages to American citizens.”¹⁸⁰ As a result, the supposedly temporary nature of Filipino H-2 workers was made, in practice, a permanent necessity. The U.S. military justified the recruitment of temporary alien workers by arguing that there were not enough local skilled workers to perform the job, while doing relatively little to develop the construction skills among the local population.

The U.S. military’s dependence on Filipino migrant laborers to build its bases in Guam stymied the development of a skilled Chamorro workforce. Chamorro leaders saw how the racial wage scales led to a preference for Filipino alien workers by military construction companies because of alien profitability as well as their controllability. Guamanian leaders argued that their local workforce was being replaced by Filipino alien workers, who were individually transient, but were nevertheless permanently needed as a result of the U.S. continued expansion in the Pacific and its mission to contain communism in the Asia-Pacific Region. Paired with the fact that much of the prime agricultural land was under military domain and the security clearance was still in effect, Chamorros did not have many options in terms of economic development. Even though they became American citizens and attained a civilian government by virtue of the Guam Organic Act of 1950, their rights, opportunities for economic and political development, and their land still remain at the hands of the U.S. military.

The events of World War II had decimated the island’s environment, displaced indigenous Chamorro people from their ancestral lands, and provided an opportunity for the United States to place a naval station and an air force base that were necessary to project American power in the Asia-Pacific region amidst a rising fear of Communist aggression. In these postwar years, Guam

¹⁸⁰ U.S. Congress, House, Committee, *Minimum Wage*, Part Two (1956), 480.

dramatically transformed from a small coaling station into “the tip of the spear” of U.S. military operations in the Pacific. Chamorros and Filipinos on Guam felt the brunt of military policy. In order to carry out military operations, the U.S. military annexed two-thirds of the island, which prevented Chamorros from rebuilding their lives, establishing an agricultural economy, and continuing the subsistence lifestyle that nourished them for centuries. In order to build infrastructure, the U.S. military preferred to recruit Filipino migrant labor—often referred to as “alien” labor by federal and military officials—because of their close proximity to Guam, knowledge of the English language, and ultimately their cheaper wages. Sometimes they were mistreated and taken advantage of. These two processes of land dispossession and racialized labor, together, characterized the U.S. military’s involvement in Guam in the immediate postwar years. It introduced a regime of settler militarism, where settler colonialism and migrant labor regimes collided to establish the United States military as a settler institution in Guam.

Newly American: U.S. Citizenship as Settler Militarism

On August 1st, 1950, Carlos P. Taitano, dressed in his best white suit, gazed excitedly over the right shoulder of President Harry S. Truman. By signing into law H.R. 7273—The Guam Organic Act—President Truman declared the Guam as an unincorporated territory of the United States and ended nearly fifty years of the island’s undefined political status.¹ The act also provided U.S. citizenship to the people of Guam, a status that Chamorro leaders had been advocating for since the island became a possession of the United States in 1898. For Taitano, a Chamorro former U.S. Army captain and a law student at Georgetown University, this moment signified the apex of Chamorro activism since 1898, symbolized the close of a chapter of American colonialism in Guam, and the renewed potential for a more American Guam.²

Under the Organic Act, however, U.S. citizenship was conditional. First, citizenship for those living on Guam, whether born or naturalized, was limited because U.S. citizenship is determined by U.S. Congress, not the U.S. Constitution. This distinction meant that those living on Guam could not vote for President, did not have voting representation in Congress, and were not guaranteed the same rights and privileges outlined in the U.S. Constitution. The Organic Act also stipulated the responsibilities of the new civilian government of Guam, which fell under the purview of the Department of the Interior. The U.S. Navy no longer unilaterally governed the island and the Chamorro people. Less apparent, but more insidious, was that the Guam Organic Act was so heavily influenced by U.S. military strategic interests that resulted in the simultaneous dispossession of Chamorro land in order to build a permanent United States’ military presence in the Pacific. Despite

¹ “Signing of the Guam Organic Act,” 1950, Photograph. 7.5x9.5in, Black and White, Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, <https://www.trumanlibrary.org/photographs/view.php?id=42091>

² Anne Perez Hattori, “Righting Civil Wrongs: The Guam Congress Walkout of 1949,” *Isla: Journal of Micronesian Studies*, Vol. 3, Rainy Season (1995); Penelope Bordallo Hofschneider, *A Campaign for Political Rights on the Island of Guam, 1899-1950* (Saipan, CNMI: Division of Historical Preservation, 2001).

believing that U.S. citizenship would protect their rights to land, Chamorros continued to be displaced from the properties and forced to move to new villages because of U.S. military needs.

The Guam Organic Act did not affect the immigration or citizenship status of the thousands of recruited Filipino migrant workers who worked at military installations and civilian establishments throughout the island since the end of the war. The Act specifically wrote that U.S. citizenship was to be given to those or the descendants of those who were present during the transfer of Guam from Spain to the United States in 1898. In the transition between the Navy government and the civilian government, however, there was some government departmental confusion of how to implement federal immigration policies on Guam in light of the island's new status as an organized unincorporated territory. Since the end of World War II, the U.S. military recruited Filipino workers outside of federal immigration law and without the oversight of the Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS). Thus, when the civilian government took over, federal officials were inundated with thousands of migrant workers who did not have official immigration documentation. Nevertheless, after several recommendations made by military officials and INS officials, the immigration statuses of these migrant Filipino workers were made legal, with a particular subset determined eligible for permanent residency—a crucial step towards U.S. citizenship. Instead of mass deportations that would have dramatically slowed the U.S. military build-up in Guam, the U.S. military was able to persuade the INS to give waivers that merely incorporated Filipino alien workers into the federal immigration laws further ensuring a permanent workforce for the U.S. military. Due in part to the labor produced by Filipino workers, the U.S. military established large bases and a substantial non-white settler population that would grow to challenge Chamorro claims to land and self-determination within the U.S. and at the United Nations in later decades. In effect, Filipino immigrants became the settlers of the settler militarism structure in Guam.

The two pillars of settler militarism on Guam, Chamorro land dispossession and Filipino migrant labor, were the basis upon which the U.S. could project its power, militarily and ideologically, in the Asia-Pacific region during the Cold War.³ To make this possible in an era of an anti-communist U.S. foreign policy, the U.S. employed American citizenship and the political status of unincorporated territory. Together, they were settler colonial tools that solidified, codified, and made invisible destructive military policies in Guam. The establishment of the territorial civilian government and the processes of immigration and naturalization—government policies usually reserved for the federal government and understood in the context of civilian affairs—were improvised on Guam in order to accommodate military strategic interests on the island and throughout the Pacific. Rather than analyzing the Guam Organic Act and federal immigration policies as a fulfillment of racial liberal inclusion into the United States, these policies ensured that Guam remained a fortified military base necessary for the U.S. to project its presence in the Pacific.⁴

³ My use of “settler militarism” is heavily influenced by Juliet Nebolon’s article “Life Given Straight from the Heart,” in which she defines settler militarism as the “dynamics through which, in Hawai‘i, settler colonialism and militarization have simultaneously perpetuated, legitimated, and concealed one another.” I take her definition of settler militarism and apply it to the long history of military involvement in Guam and its heavy hand in influencing policy regarding Indigenous Chamorro people and land. I also extend her definition to include the militarized labor regimes in the establishment of a non-indigenous, non-white settler population. In his dissertation “Little Island into Mighty Base,” Alfred Flores makes a similar argument about the relationship between military attempts to control Chamorro land and Filipino labor in the postwar period. I expand on his dissertation by accounting for the institutional and policy mechanisms that solidified this process of settler militarism in Guam. In terms of the relationship between militarism and citizenship within U.S. empire, I am influenced by Simeon Man’s *Soldiering Through Empire* to understand how military service was used by Asians to prove their Americanness. However, this history of Guam extends this argument towards militarized labor. Juliet Nebolon, “Life Given Straight from the Heart: Settler Militarism, Biopolitics, and Public Health in Hawai‘i during World War II,” *American Quarterly* 69, no. 1 (2017): 23–45; Alfred Peredo Flores, “Little Island into Mighty Base: Indigeneity, Race, and U.S. Empire in Guam, 1944-1962,” (Ph.D. Dissertation: University of California, Los Angeles, 2015); Simeon Man, *Soldiering Through Empire: Race and the Making of the Decolonizing Pacific* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2018).

⁴ The historiography of the relationship between U.S. empire and racial liberalism is vast. In terms of the Pacific, historians have focused Hawai‘i’s incorporation as a state as a foreign policy decision in the Asia-Pacific region, including Sarah Miller-Davenport’s *Gateway State: Hawai‘i and the Cultural Transformation of American Empire*, in which she argues that the incorporation of Hawai‘i as a state was a calculated foreign policy strategy by the U.S. to show dedication to principles of racial liberalism to an international audience. While Miller-Davenport explores this relationship through the lens of field of diplomatic history, Critical Ethnic Studies scholars of Hawai‘i have taken it one step further to explore the intertwined layers of race-making, indigeneity, and Hawaiian statehood in the Pacific. In particular, in *Unsustainable Empire: Alternative Histories of Hawai‘i Statehood*, Dean Saranillo focuses on the intersections of Native Hawaiian sovereignty, Asian Settler colonialism, and U.S. militarism in Hawai‘i to argue that the statehood of Hawaii was “failing forward” because of the U.S. capital’s increasing inability to keep hold and control Hawai‘i. For Guam, Kenneth Gofigan Kuper has explored within his dissertation how the priority of U.S. security and militarism has perpetually left

This chapter explores how the U.S. military influenced the application of federal policy to Guam, and its effects on indigenous Chamorros and Filipino migrant and immigrant workers. First, this chapter analyzes the Guam citizenship movement through the history of the networks of Chamorro leaders, federal officials, military leadership, and Washington D.C. advocates. Chamorros believed that U.S. citizenship would provide them with the ability to air their grievances about the postwar transformation of the island. While citizenship was a major component of these debates, there was also the question of whether the Guam should continue to be governed by the U.S. Navy or if Guam should be transferred to the Department of the Interior in order to implement a civilian government. In all of these conversations, the Cold War influenced the rhetoric utilized by the Navy and the Department of the Interior as well as that of Chamorros who leveraged notions of democracy, anticolonialism, and the threat of communism in the Asia-Pacific region to argue for U.S. citizenship.

Thereafter, this chapter analyzes the Guam Organic Act to demonstrate how Chamorro land dispossession was codified into the same document that gave citizenship to Chamorros.⁵ Written by officials in the Department of the Interior without Chamorro input, the Guam Organic Act was a purposeful middle zone with just enough rhetoric and provisions to allay domestic fears of anti-democratic, colonial policies within the United States Pacific. It nevertheless was written without

Guam in a state of political limbo as an unincorporated territory. Taking this literature into consideration, I show how Guam's status of unincorporated territory and the use of U.S. citizenship were utilized to appease potential uprisings, justify militarism, deny indigenous Chamorro rights, and facilitate settler colonial process in Guam. Sarah Miller-Davenport, *Gateway State: Hawai'i and the Cultural Transformation of American Empire* (Princeton University Press, 2019); Dean Itsuji Saranillio, *Unsustainable Empire: Alternative Histories of Hawai'i Statehood* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2018); Kenneth Gofigan Kuper, "Kontra I Peligru, Na'fansâfo Ham: The Production of Military (In)security in Guåhan," (PhD Dissertation, University of Hawai'i, 2019). For more reading on Hawai'i and statehood: Haunani-Kay Trask, *From Native Daughter: Colonialism & Sovereignty in Hawai'i* (Monroe: Common Courage Press, 1993); Haunani-Kay Trask, "Settlers of Color and 'Immigrant' Hegemony: 'Locals' in Hawai'i?" in *Asian Settler Colonialism: From Local Governance to Habits of Everyday Life in Hawai'i*, ed. Candace Fujikane and Jonathan Y. Okamura (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2008).

⁵ Anne Perez Hattori, "Guardians of Our Soil: Indigenous Responses to Post-World War II Military Land Appropriation on Guam," In *Farms, Firms, and Runways: Perspectives on U.S. Military Bases in the Western Pacific*, ed. by L. Eve Armetrout Ma, (Imprint Publications, 2001): 186–202.

legal avenues for Chamorros and other territorial residents—new Americans—to voice their discontent and potentially upend military strategic interests. This limitation was evident in the Guam Legislature’s attempt to prevent the military’s displacement of hundreds of Chamorro families from the Radio Barrigada area in 1952. Citizenship did not protect Chamorro ownership of land; in a way, citizenship legitimized the U.S. military’s land annexation.

This chapter then shifts attention towards how the Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) implemented federal immigration law in Guam in the aftermath of the Organic Act. The confusing overlapping jurisdictions between the U.S. Navy’s labor recruitment policy, federal immigration and naturalization law, and the Guam civilian government made it difficult to assess the immigration status of thousands of Filipinos who resided in Guam for some years.⁶ In whatever decision was made to clear up the legal confusion, government officials took into consideration the labor needs of the U.S. military build-up. U.S. military policies dictated the applicability of federal immigration law in Guam. While the U.S. militarization and war in the Pacific created the routes of migration, Filipinos often took advantage of the economic opportunity to work in Guam and support their families in the Philippines, but also sought U.S. citizenship and the ability to settle in the United States.

The Guam Organic Act of 1950 and the 1952 Immigration Act can be seen as two moments of Cold War racial liberalism, in which two groups of formerly marginalized peoples within the

⁶ The fact that Filipinos were able to attain a pathway towards citizenship despite efforts on the U.S. Federal side to prevent Filipinos migrating to the U.S. after Philippine Independence represents a break in the chronology of Filipino-American migration histories that between World War II and 1965 and tend to focus around the Immigration Act of 1965. By focusing on the Filipino migration routes produced as a result of the U.S. military empire in the Pacific, this chapter contributes another island geography to expand upon a “Critical Filipino Studies approach to Philippine Migration.” Robyn Magalit Rodriguez, “Toward a Critical Filipino Studies Approach to Philippine Migration,” *Filipino Studies: Palimpsests of Nation and Diaspora* ed. Martin Manalansan and Augusto Espiritu (New York: NYU Press, 2016). There is also a vast literature on the bestowing of citizenship to immigrants of Asian descent in the context of Cold War racial liberalism including: Jane Hong, *Opening the Gates to Asia: A Transpacific History of How America Repealed Asian Exclusion* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2019); Mae Ngai, *Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); Donna R. Gabaccia, *Foreign Relations: American Immigration in Global Perspective* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012); Mary Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011).

United States empire were finally included into the nation-state. However, as this chapter shows, the implementation of the Guam Organic Act and federal immigration laws in Guam were military policies just as they were civilian ones. They were both used as justification for the granting of U.S. citizenship as well as the systematic dispossession of Chamorro people and the exploitation of racialized labor of Filipino workers in the Cold War period.

Chamorro Movement for U.S. Citizenship and Civilian Government

In the early movement for U.S. citizenship before World War II, Chamorros used all the tools available to them. They sent petitions and letters, and conferenced with federal officials, locally stationed Naval officials, and Congressional members who visited Guam on their way to other places in the Pacific. They made continental-based alliances with academic scholars, lawyers, and businessmen to establish a network of people who were interested in supporting the Chamorro movement for citizenship. They also used multiple rhetorical arguments including exhibitions of American loyalty, knowledge of American culture and language, domestic racial politics, regional geopolitics, and the threat of communism to bolster their arguments and persuade Congress and federal officials. This Americanized rhetoric and extensive network helped catapult the Chamorro citizenship movement to the national stage after the Guam Congress Walkout in 1949—a calculated act of Chamorro defiance against U.S. Navy rule—which definitively demonstrated to the American public the inconsistencies between U.S. rhetoric and its military governments in the Pacific territories.

The Chamorro movement for U.S. citizenship existed since the transfer of Guam to the United States, as historicized by Penelope Bordallo Hofschneider.⁷ Multiple petitions were sent to

⁷ Two works stand out in particular when it comes to the Chamorro movement for U.S. citizenship. There were no recorded or known independence movements among Chamorros on Guam in this historical period. For more information about prewar petitions, read Penelope Bordallo Hofschneider, *A Campaign for Political Rights on Guam*. On the Guam Congress Walkout of 1949, read Anne Perez Hattori, “Righting Civil Wrongs: The Guam Congress Walkout of

Congress and the President without much response. The apex of prewar activism occurred in 1937, when Baltazar Bordallo and Francisco B. Leon Guerrero travelled across the globe to Washington D.C. on an intrainperial diplomatic mission to meet with federal officials, testify before Congress, and eventually meet President Franklin D. Roosevelt.⁸ Known to the Guam community as “Kiko Zoilo,” Leon Guerrero was self-described “machete scientist” because of his roots in Guam’s farms. As educated members of Guam’s society, they saw the inconsistencies between American forms of ideal government and the Naval government that characterized Guam’s colonial relationship to the United States. As Bordallo mentioned in a 1937 Congressional hearing, “The founders of this great Republic made no provision, because they never intended that this country should maintain two forms of government, one for its citizens, and another a different form, for its subjects.”⁹ Directly pointing to the imperial project, Bordallo noted how the inequality of peoples within the American empire was in contradiction to the ideals of the country. Chamorros wanted to have more political rights within their island and a civilian government. They believed U.S. citizenship would help them get there.¹⁰

Bordallo and Leon Guerrero, however, were fighting a Navy reluctant to give any rights to the Chamorro people on Guam for both geopolitical and racial reasons. In a 1937 written testimony

1949,” (M.A. Thesis: University of Hawai’i Manoa, 1995). While I summarize some of the arguments made by Chamorro leaders, these two historical works written by Chamorro women scholars delve deeper into the details.
⁸ Although the U.S. Naval Governor of Guam Benjamin V. McCandish declined the Guam Congress’s request for funds to for the two-man delegation, the Guam community pitched in, donating what little cash they had to fund B.J. Bordallo’s and Frank B. Leon Guerrero’s (FBLG) diplomatic trip. FBLG, himself, sold some of his family’s land to finance the diplomatic mission. Anne Perez Hattori, “Righting Civil Wrongs: The Guam Congress Walkout of 1949,” (M.A. Thesis: University of Hawai’i Manoa, 1995), 8-9. Rogers, *Destiny’s Landfall*, 145; Nicholas Yamashita Camacho and Tony Palomo, “Francisco B. Leon Guerrero,” *Guampedia, Inc.* October 15, 2019. Accessed July 12, 2020. guampedia.com/francisco-b-leon-guerrero/.

⁹ U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs, *Citizenship for Residents of Guam*, 75th Cong., 1st sess., 1937, 97.

¹⁰ For more reading on prewar Guam Naval government read Anne Perez Hattori, *Colonial Dis-ease: United States Navy Healthy Policies and the Chamorros of Guam*, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2004); Robert A. Underwood, “American Education and the Acculturation of the Chamorros of Guam,” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Southern California, 1987); Elyssa Santos, “‘Practicing Economy’: Chamorro Agency and U.S. Colonial Agricultural Projects, 1898-1941,” (M.A. Thesis, University of Hawai’i, 2018).

to Congress, Navy representative, Claude Swanson, wrote the “Navy department is of the opinion that the enactment of this measure [US citizenship] would be prejudicial to the best interests of both the United States and the native population of Guam.”¹¹ Swanson reasoned that “the complicated international situation in the Far East, the questionable status of treaties, and the fact that the United States is withdrawing from the Philippines all contribute to the undesirability of any change in the status of the people of Guam or in the method of administration of that island.”¹² Because the Philippines was on the path towards independence as a result of the 1934 Tydings-McDuffie Act, the U.S. Navy wanted to maintain complete control over Guam and ensure U.S. military presence and security in the Pacific region. Giving citizenship to Chamorros would make it more difficult for the Navy to implement policies without the peoples’ consent.

Furthermore, Swanson used racialized language to argue that Chamorros were not ready for the responsibilities of citizenship at the 1937 hearing. Swanson believed that “they have not yet reached a state of development commensurate with personal independence, obligations, and responsibilities of United States citizenship.” Conferring U.S. citizenship, Swanson said, “would be most harmful to the native people.”¹³ He believed that Chamorro people had not reached a sufficient degree of modernity and civilization and thus did not deserve citizenship. In the perspective of the Navy, not only would a civilian government or U.S. citizenship for Chamorros create more problems for military strategic interests in the region, they believed it would be harmful to the proper development of a politically immature Chamorro people and society.

¹¹ U.S. Congress, Senate, *Citizenship for Residents of Guam*, 2.

¹² U.S. Congress, Senate, *Citizenship for Residents of Guam*, 2.

¹³ U.S. Congress, Senate, *Citizenship for Residents of Guam*, 2. Although Claude Swanson believed this, Bordallo and Leon Guerrero were able to convince former Naval Governor of Guam Edward Dorn to testify before the committee. Dorn agreed that much progress had been made on Guam in terms of Americanization, that Chamorro people were proficient in English and should receive U.S. citizenship. “Due to the rather excellent school system which has been established down there, and a great many of these people now, I was told 69 percent of them speak English, and in all the 3 years I was there I saw nothing but an honest appreciation of the benefits that our Government was paying them.” U.S. Congress, Senate, *Citizenship for Residents of Guam*, 99.

Bordallo and Leon Guerrero refuted the Navy's claims and argued that the Chamorro people have achieved a sufficient level of Americanization through culture, education, language, and military loyalty. On the last day of congressional hearings, Bordallo declared "we are now subjects of America through no choice of ours, and ever since American occupation we submitted peacefully and cooperated whole-heartedly with the American officials sent to our island to assume American sovereignty." Unlike other U.S. territories, there had not been any uprising against the U.S. colonial authorities, and further, Chamorros "have learned to respect and love the American flag."¹⁴ Bordallo wanted to demonstrate the steadfast desire for Chamorros to attain citizenship. To counter the racialized language of Naval officials, Leon Guerrero testified, "I still maintain that even under our present status as neither aliens nor citizens of the United States our attitude toward the Navy Department has been very friendly and will continue to be so..." He said further, "My people have been loyal, and they will continue to be so, but there should be some return for that loyalty from the Nation."¹⁵ Bordallo and Leon Guerrero believed that they deserved American citizenship, and that their loyalty to the U.S. should be repaid through U.S. citizenship.

Despite the odes to loyalty and the American rhetoric of Chamorro leaders, U.S. Naval policy was still on the minds of the Congressional committee. During the 1937 hearings, Margarito "Paul" Palting, son of former Filipino revolutionary exile on Guam Pancrasio Palting, entered a heated discussion with Senator Robert R. Reynolds of North Carolina regarding the geopolitical context of Guam in the Pacific region. Margarito had attended law school in Washington D.C. and testified at the hearings on behalf of his father who had ongoing trouble attempting to claim Guam

¹⁴ U.S. Congress, Senate, *Citizenship for Residents of Guam*, 96.

¹⁵ Information on Francisco B. Leon Guerrero as Kiko Zoilo and "machete scientist" is from Michael Bevacqua, "F.B. Leon Guerrero was a fascinating force in Guam politics for close to half a century," *Pacific Daily News*, July 2, 2020. <https://www.guampdn.com/story/opinion/2020/07/02/f-b-leon-guerrero-fascinating-force-guam-politics/5362268002/>;

citizenship, as explained in greater depth in chapter two of this study.¹⁶ Senator Reynolds, a stern isolationist and opposed to giving Chamorros U.S. citizenship, quizzed Palting on the foreign affairs of the Pacific citing that the rest of the Micronesian region were governed and controlled by the Japanese League of Nations Mandate since World War I. Reynolds asked Palting, “Will you not agree that if we were to accord citizenship to the 21,000 people of the island of Guam we would be placing ourselves in a sense in a position to become involved in some foreign embroilments with the Empire of the East?”¹⁷ Although the Navy saw Guam as an important military base in the Pacific, especially with the forthcoming Philippine Independence, Senator Reynolds saw Guam and the Chamorro people as dispensable territory, and was willing to sacrifice Guam to the Japanese empire. Even if Navy officials and senators in Congress disagreed on what to do with Guam, the island was defined by its military importance, not necessarily the American colonial subjects who lived on the island.

Palting argued against Reynold’s suggestion, stating that “the foreign policies of the United States directly affect us in our present status as American nationals as well as it would if we were American citizens.”¹⁸ Guam was American territory, and Palting believed that “Uncle Sam will have to protect his investment in the Far East, and the fact that Chamorros maybe granted American citizenship does not reduce nor increase the responsibility of the United States.”¹⁹ Even if the discussion was whether Chamorros should receive citizenship, Guam’s geographic position in the Asia-Pacific made U.S. Naval interest a large part of the conversation. In the perspective of Senator

¹⁶ Greater discussion on the status of Filipinos in Guam in the prewar period is explored in chapter two of this dissertation, “Of Separate Races.” In short, Filipinos were considered to be “aliens” with respect to the Guam Naval Government’s definition of Guam Citizenship. This meant that Filipinos could not own land on Guam, which posed problems for Palting’s family which was a mixed-race Filipino-Chamorro. It was also a problem considering that Filipinos were not considered to be “alien” to the United States when Guam citizenship was implemented in Guam in 1930.

¹⁷ U.S. Congress, Senate, *Citizenship for Residents of Guam*, 71.

¹⁸ U.S. Congress, Senate, *Citizenship for Residents of Guam*, 71.

¹⁹ U.S. Congress, Senate, *Citizenship for Residents of Guam*, 71.

Reynolds, Guam was destined to be a pawn in an eventual war with the “Empire for the East.” Bestowing citizenship would mean the United States was obligated to protect Guam, something that Reynolds was not willing to risk. Unfortunately for Palting, his belief that the U.S. would protect Guam was wishful thinking. The citizenship movement was sidelined as World War II began.

The U.S. Navy’s perception that Guam was a stationary Naval ship in the middle of the Pacific Ocean meant that the Chamorro people were secondary to U.S. military policy. Throughout this Naval period, Chamorros pleaded for U.S. citizenship and a civilian government, attempting to persuade senators, government officials, and naval officials of their progress towards Americanization. Bordallo, Leon Guererro, and Palting’s testimony before the Committee on the Territories and Insular Affairs in 1937 was one demonstration of how Chamorros not only learned about American politics, but that they were able to employ the values and principles to advocate for their desire for U.S. citizenship and a civilian government. Nevertheless, U.S. racial ideologies couched in civilizational terms and U.S. Naval policy heavily influenced the outcomes of the conversations, and for the most part naval policy and foreign policy in the region took precedence over political rights before World War II.

Although Chamorros demonstrated loyalty to the U.S., the U.S. military evacuated non-Chamorro American military dependents from Guam in the months leading up to the December 8th attack by Japanese forces and occupation of World War II.²⁰ The lightly armed Insular Force Guard comprised of young Chamorro men were the only soldiers left to defend the island during the Japanese military invasion.²¹ Throughout the war several Chamorro families, including the Bordallo

²⁰ Most notably, Agueda Iglesias Johnston married to Navy Lieutenant William Gautier Johnston remained on Guam. William Johnston was captured by Japanese forces, exiled to Japan where he died in captivity. Rogers, *Destiny’s Landfall*, 151; Patricia Long Diego and Jillete Leon-Guerro, “Agueda Iglesias Johnston,” *Guampedia Inc.*, <https://www.guampedia.com/agueda-iglesias-johnston/>

²¹ Lazaro Quinata, “Guam Insular Guard,” *Guampedia Inc.* July 31, 2019, <https://www.guampedia.com/guam-insular-guard/>.

family, the family of Agueda Johnston, the Artero family, and other Chamorro families hid U.S. Navy Radioman First Class George Tweed in the jungles of Guam, putting their lives in danger.²² Chamorro Priest Jesus Baza Dueñas was killed by Japanese forces for allegedly keeping secret the locations of six other U.S. military personnel who escaped Japanese capture.²³ In southern Guam towards the end of the war, Japanese forces met stern resistance from young men from the villages of Malesso' who had heard their families were being shot to death in caves. They rose up against and killed the small Japanese military presence in their villages, in an incident known as the massacre at Atâte, and then swam towards U.S. warships surrounding the island to provide vital information to the American forces that were planning their invasion of Guam.²⁴ In resistance, Chamorro people sang songs wishing and hoping that Uncle Sam would save them from the Japanese occupation.²⁵ When the Americans arrived on the island, Chamorros waved their makeshift American flags.²⁶ But Chamorros were greeted by American soldiers and the Navy who in the next few years took two-thirds of the island in order to build an extensive military base on Guam.

A Citizenship Movement in the New World Order

Immediately after World War II, Chamorros recommenced their citizenship drive with zeal. And the stakes were higher than ever. The experiences of World War II proved that being U.S. colonial subjects was a disadvantage; the U.S. was obligated to protect its citizens, not its colonial

²² More instances on Chamorros aiding American military men can be found in Rogers, *Destiny's Landfall*, 161-162.

²³ Robert Rogers, *Destiny's Landfall: A History of Guam*, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2011), 166.

²⁴ Jose. M. Torres, *Massacre at Atâte* (Mangilao: University of Guam Press, 2014).

²⁵ Paul J. Borja, "Song of Hope, Song of Faith," *Guampedia Inc.*, July 12, 2020. Accessed July 15, 2020.

<https://www.guampedia.com/song-of-hope-song-of-faith/>. Pete Seeger produced a cover of this song. Pete Seeger, "Uncle Sam, Won't You Please Come Home to Guam," The Smithsonian Folkways Collection. Accessed July 15, 2020. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IPrnaxtkiAg>

²⁶ This list of examples of Chamorro acts of resistance during World War II is very much an abbreviated one. There are countless examples written, told in oral history, and commemorated throughout the island in monuments, events, and other forms. World War II is so central to the narrative of Guam history that World War II is referred to as "the war" and marks the major temporal divide for Guam's 20th century. Vicente Diaz, "Deliberating Liberation Day: Identity, History, Memory, and War in Guam," *Perilous Memories: The Asia-Pacific War(s)*, ed. T. Fujitani, Geoffrey White, and Lisa Yoneyama (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001); Keith Camacho, *Cultures of Commemoration: The Politics of War, Memory, and History in the Mariana Islands* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2011).

subjects. Furthermore, the rehabilitation of Guam required as much support it could get and the Chamorros believed the U.S. federal government would support Americans. The war displaced nearly all of the Chamorro families on Guam. The capital of Hagåtña was destroyed. Housing, medical care, and agriculture needed to be rebuilt from the ground up. Every person on island was dealing with the trauma and sheer loss of life. While the U.S. Navy made attempts to facilitate the rebuilding of civilian life in Guam, their prioritization of the World War II's Pacific theatre and the pivot to make Guam a large military base resulted in the annexation of two-thirds of Guam's lands for war purposes.²⁷ If Guam was too much of a liability before the war for the United States, Guam suddenly and quickly became essential to U.S. military operations in the Asia-Pacific Region. In all of this, Chamorro leaders felt as if their concerns were unheard by military officials.

Baltazar Bordallo and Frank B. Leon Guerrero survived the war, and quickly led the renewed citizenship movement. But, this was not the same prewar movement. The experience of postwar rehabilitation pushed them to question the effectiveness of Naval policy and reciprocal relations of the U.S. Naval government to the people of Guam.²⁸ They questioned whether the Navy should continue to govern Guam. On the one hand, the U.S. Navy and the U.S. military "liberated" Chamorros from Japanese occupation, and many Chamorros believed that the U.S. Navy was responsible for bringing modernity to the island. For this, Chamorros believed that they should reciprocate with unabashed loyalty to the U.S. Navy.²⁹ The postwar militarization, however, caused

²⁷ A discussion of the impacts of U.S. military land annexation on Chamorro society can be found in my dissertation's third chapter "Natives and Aliens: Chamorro Land Dispossession, Filipino Alien Labor, and the Building of an American Military Empire in the Pacific."

²⁸ There was growing opposition to Naval rule, led by Leon Guerrero and Bordallo through the short-lived organization, the Friends of Guam. Although this group maintained a platform against Naval governance, Leon Guerrero and other members of the Guam community believed that explicit criticism of Naval government might stall the possibility of U.S. citizenship. In a strategic move, they focused more on earning U.S. citizenship. Rogers, *Destiny's Landfall*, (2011), 195.

²⁹ Diaz, "Deliberating Liberation Day"; Anne Hattori argues in *Colonial Dis-ease* that the brutal occupation under Japanese empire skewed Chamorros view of prewar Guam. She critiques the commonly-held view that prewar naval governance was benevolent, good, and beneficial despite the racist and colonial measures that the U.S. Naval government had enforced on the Chamorro people. Robert Underwood also criticizes the postwar rhetoric of Chamorro loyalty when used to demand for more equality in terms of federal-territorial relations. Robert Underwood, "Uncle Sam,

some Chamorros to believe that the Naval government was stifling self-governance and arbitrarily condemning land.

As discussed in greater detail in chapter three, Chamorro testimonies reveal just how dire Chamorro lives were after World War II. The loss of land was devastating and the inability to settle and build homes put a damper on any type of rehabilitation that Chamorros could accomplish. For instance, on the issue of Chamorros repeatedly being displaced from their homes due to military land annexations, Jose M. Flores, already a U.S. citizen by way of U.S. service in the military, exclaimed “The business of shoving around must be stopped! Units (Army and Navy and Marines) at times occupying our properties won’t let us come to such properties which causes ill-feeling also.”³⁰ The Navy’s policies began to irritate Chamorros who could no longer return to their lands to feed their families. If Chamorro men transitioned to work for the military, they encountered a tiered racialized wage scale that paid them less than those from the States. This growing dissatisfaction with Navy rule posed a threat to U.S. Naval operations and security in Guam and the rest of the Pacific. The U.S. military relied on the loyalty of Chamorros to ensure their ability to retain Guam for military purposes. Without this trust, the Navy believed that its hold on the island would be susceptible to other outside forces.³¹

Chamorro leaders believed that U.S. citizenship would provide them rights that the United States were obligated to protect, as well as open some opportunities for recourse for their grievances. In 1946 and 1947, several commissions made their way to Guam to survey the postwar development of the island. Secretary of the Interior Henry Krug visited in 1947. Most notably, the

Sam My Dear Old Uncle Sam, Won’t You Please Be Kind to Guam?” Guam Humanites Council Lecture Series (August, September, October, 2003).

³⁰ “Open Forum in the Halls of Guam Congress, Agana, Guam, 3 March 1947,” Papers of Willis Bradley. MSS 960 Box 2 Folder 23. Mangilao, Guam: Micronesian Area Research Center University of Guam. (Hereafter cited as “Open Forum, Willis Bradley Papers”)

³¹ Timothy Maga, “The Citizenship Movement in Guam, 1946-1950,” *Pacific Historical Review* (1984), 72.

Hopkins Committee visited in 1947 in order provide recommendations to President Truman on how the U.S. should administrate Guam and American Sāmoa.³² Frank B. Leon Guerrero opened the Hopkins Committee session in Guam by stating “We feel that we are not asking too much for the privileges of Citizenship and civil rights, and an organic Law being passed, as it will give us more say.”³³ Furthermore, Leon Guerrero stated, “any organic act will be certain to help the Guamanian people. By its passage, everyone will have to pay income taxes, but we will also have a voice in our welfare. That is all.”³⁴ Citizenship, they believed, would empower Chamorros to have more political power and more say in the postwar development of their island.

Utilizing the rhetoric of loyalty to the United States during World War II, Chamorro leaders signaled to the United States that they were steadfast in their desire to become U.S. citizens. Father Oscar Calvo joined the conversation exclaiming that he believed “the people would... come to one hundred percent for the granting of American citizenship to the Guamanian people.” He clarified further that “They do not believe they are incapable of receiving citizenship.”³⁵ The show of preference for U.S. citizenship by these Chamorro men who advocated for their peoples perhaps demonstrated to the Hopkins committee the island’s residents were to the United States. Further, they had knowledge of the responsibilities of citizenship.

As a result of its visit to Guam, the Hopkins Committee recommended that both Guam and American Sāmoa receive U.S. citizenship, a boon for the Chamorro citizenship movement.³⁶ Furthermore, the Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan issued an interim Organic Act in August 1947, in which the Guam Congress had the power to make changes in existing laws. If both the

³² The Hopkins Committee was comprised of Dr. Ernest M. Hopkins, Mr. Maurice J. Tobin, and Dr. Knowles Ryerson, who were intellectuals and academics who were appointed by the Secretary of the Navy to research and recommend policies for the Naval Governments in Guam and American Sāmoa.

³³ Open Forum, Willis Bradley Papers 3.

³⁴ Open Forum, Willis Bradley Papers 3.

³⁵ Open Forum, Willis Bradley Papers 5.

³⁶ United States, *Hopkins Committee Report for the Secretary on the Civil Government of Guam and American Samoa*, 1947. Found through HathiTrust: <https://hdl.handle.net/2027/umn.31951002668985h>

Naval governor and the Guam Congress disagreed with enacted policies, the decision was to be made by the Secretary of the Navy.³⁷ According to historian Pedro Sanchez, “For the first time since the first Spanish governor assumed office in Guam, the governor’s absolute authority had been curtailed.”³⁸ This might have been less to do with bestowing more rights to the Chamorro people, but a way for Governor Pownall to delegate the civilian aspects of his job; his military job was to serve as Commander of the Naval Forces Marianas. If in the prewar period race, fitness for self-democracy, and military strategic interests were used to deny Chamorros U.S. citizenship and a civilian government, World War II transformed the playing field. No longer was it acceptable to justify the lack of U.S. citizenship; it hurt U.S. foreign and military policy. With greater powers for the Guam Congress, the move towards a civilian government seemed to be on the horizon.

Civilian Government and Citizenship as Military Policy

Since the end of World War II, the White House, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Interior fought with each other to attain control over the U.S. Pacific territories and its new Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands.³⁹ The problem at hand was how to balance U.S. military strategic interests with the need to display acts of democracy in the Pacific region at the beginning of the Cold War. The United Nations designated Guam as a non-self-governing territory, which meant that the United States was required to report on the island’s development towards decolonization.⁴⁰ The U.S. military interest in the Asia-Pacific region, however, precluded any sort of notion that Guam would become independent.

³⁷ Carano and Sanchez, *History of Guam*, 347. Pedro C. Sanchez, *Guahan, Guam: The History of Our Island* (Agana: Sanchez Publishing House), 297.

³⁸ Sanchez, *Guahan Guam*, 297.

³⁹ Friedman, *Governing the American Lake*, 102-103.; Harold Ickes, “Letter to the Editor, Naval Stand Questioned: Secretary Forrestal’s Statements on Guam and American Samoa are Questioned,” *New York Times* Oct. 21, 1946, 23.

⁴⁰ United States, “Guam: Information on the territory of Guam transmitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, pursuant to Article 73 (e) of the Charter.” Washington, Naval Government of Guam, 1948

The U.S. Navy, under Secretary James Forrestal, believed that Guam needed to remain under the jurisdiction of the U.S. military to ensure security in the Western Pacific. Similar to the prewar period, the Navy believed that granting rights to the civilians on Guam, especially in regard to land use, might impede military policy on the island.⁴¹ While this argument held in the short run, it became increasingly clear that military governments themselves were antithetical to American anti-colonial and anti-imperial rhetoric. In order to project the appearance of democratic governance at the dawn of the Cold War, the United States needed to alter its colonial governance within its territories.

The Department of the Interior opposed the U.S. Navy's desire to retain control over the Pacific Islands since the end of World War II and fought to gain control of Guam. In 1946, two Secretaries of Interior, Harold Ickes and Julius Albert Krug, argued for the Interior to handle the US's Pacific possessions and the newly acquired Trust Territories of the Pacific. They were wholly opposed to a military led government. Secretary Ickes wrote in an August 1946 article for *Collier's Magazine*, "the way these islands are governed will constitute a tablet of imperishable brass from which the other nations of the world can read just what the United States of America and its protestations for democracy really mean."⁴² From the perspective of the Interior, the naval government in Guam was not just a contradiction but an embarrassment to U.S. foreign policy.

A civilian government for Chamorros, at least from the perspective of the Interior, was more aligned with American values. As Secretary Krug testified in a congressional hearing in 1949, "America takes pride in its traditional role as the champion, among nations, of dependent peoples, of representative government, of justice under law, and of fundamental rights and human freedoms

⁴¹ James Forrestal, "Letters to the Times – Naval Government in Pacific," *The New York Times*, September 24, 1946, 27.

⁴² Harold Ickes, "The Navy at its Worst," *Collier's Magazine*, August 31, 1946, 22.

for everyone everywhere.”⁴³ Krug argued that the Department of Interior was better equipped at administering Guam in the postwar period. After all Krug stated, the Department of the Interior had experience governing U.S. territories before World War II as demonstrated in Alaska, Hawai‘i, and Puerto Rico, and it had worked with Native Americans and indigenous peoples across U.S. empire.⁴⁴ Furthermore, by placing jurisdiction of the islands away from the military and into a department with an innocuous sounding name, the U.S. could better demonstrate to the world the country’s intention to ensure equality for all of its people.

Secretary Krug refuted the notion that civil governments would be detrimental to U.S. military policy in the Pacific. “In Guam, a bastion of defense in the Pacific,” Krug testified, “measures taken to satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the Guamanians would actually enhance our national security by binding these people more closely to the rest of the United States.”⁴⁵ Chamorros would not feel compelled to rebel against the military if their grievances were heard, and if some semblance of a civilian and democratic local government was created. As historian Hal Friedman writes, “Interior, in other words, argued for a civil administration that heavily integrated Pacific Islanders into the American polity not as a way to lessen US control over the area but as the best way to ensure long-term US control over the postwar Pacific.”⁴⁶ Paradoxically, bringing Guam into the U.S. through the Interior would make it easier to retain control over the island and maintain military bases within the islands.

Interestingly, former Commissioner of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and historic figure in twentieth-century Native American federal policy, John Collier, joined the debate between the

⁴³ House of Representatives, “Providing a Civil Government for Guam, and for Other Purposes,” Committee on Public Lands, 81st Congress, 2nd sess. February 22, 1950, 3.

⁴⁴ Hal M. Friedman, *Governing the American Lake: The US Defense and Administration of the Pacific, 1945-1947* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2007), 183.

⁴⁵ Representatives, “Providing a Civil Government for Guam, and for Other Purposes,” 3.

⁴⁶ Friedman, *Governing the American Lake*, 208.

Department of the Navy and the Department of the Interior on behalf of the people of Guam. Collier became the chairperson of the Institute of Ethnic Affairs (IEA), an internationally-focused organization dedicated to aiding colonial peoples globally. In this position, he expressed dismay of U.S. Naval governance on Guam in a Letter to the Editor of the *New York Times* in April of 1947. Arguing for a civilian government, Collier wrote, “there is no mistaking the Guamanians’ desire for self-rule.” He explained further the deficiencies in Naval governance including the Navy’s reluctance to pay war claims for injuries and deaths, the condemnation of surplus land without compensation to Chamorro land-owners, the high cost-of-living due to the importation of food, the refusal to help Chamorros rebuild infrastructure, and the Navy’s overreliance on imported labor. Advocating for more Chamorro participation in the governance of their island, Collier cited that Chamorro leaders had the ability to adequately “deal with local problems when so authorized.” Collier utilized his position and the Press, which had been closely following the developments of the U.S. Pacific territories, to push for civilian government on Guam.⁴⁷ Chamorros, too, used Collier’s reputation to put forth their grievances with U.S. Naval rule.

Like Secretary Ickes and Secretary Krug, however, Collier was influenced by anticommunist arguments and did not challenge the premise of the U.S. military presence on Guam. He wrote, “the records give no reason to believe their action would interfere with the Navy in the matter of United States defense.”⁴⁸ Chamorros had proved their loyalty to the United States, and their call for a civilian government did not necessarily mean demilitarization. Collier finished his letter by pointing out a blatant contradiction of Navy rule. “It is difficult to see,” he wrote, “the consistency of American policy when, on the one hand, the Administration asks \$400,000,000 for the spread of democracy to Greece, and other, allows autonomous Navy rule to continue in Guam and American

⁴⁷ John Collier, “Naval Rule in Guam: Hope Expressed that Congress will Remedy situation Soon” *New York Times*, April 12, 1947, E8.

⁴⁸ Collier, “Naval Rule in Guam” *NYT*, E8.

Samoa.”⁴⁹ If the Americanness of Chamorros was not enough to convince the Congress and the President, then maybe, Collier thought, the un-Americanness of Naval rule in the territories would persuade them.

The conversations between the Department of the Interior, Department of the Navy, and even the Institute of Ethnic Affairs through John Collier shows how the issues regarding the political status of Guam and citizenship for Chamorros were always predicated on the assumption that the island’s policy remained important to and highly influenced by U.S. militarism and Cold War foreign policy. By transferring Guam from the Department of the Navy to the Department of the Interior, the United States justified its complete control over the island in a way that was acceptable in the new postwar world order. As historian Megan Black has argued, the Department of the Interior “was a key mechanism for ensuring *and* obscuring the projection of American power in the world, from U.S. settler colonialism to its global hegemony during and after the Cold War.”⁵⁰ In terms of Guam, the Department of the Interior with the heavy influence of the Department of the Navy hope to do exactly that; to obscure U.S. settler militarism on Guam.

Chamorro Postwar Diplomacy and Activism

Chamorros had their hearts set on U.S. citizenship, and they used all the resources they had to shore up support. This included supporting John Collier and Laura Thompson’s Institute of Ethnic Affairs (IEA). Shortly after his resignation from the BIA in 1945, John Collier founded the IEA with his wife Laura Thompson.⁵¹ Thompson was an anthropologist who studied the Chamorro people on Guam in the prewar years and subsequently published a seminal book about Chamorro culture, *Guam and Its People*, in 1947. The IEA was an internationally-minded non-profit organization “whose

⁴⁹ Collier, “Naval Rule in Guam” *NYT*, E8.

⁵⁰ Megan Black, *The Global Interior: Mineral Frontiers and American Power* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018), 4.

⁵¹ Before the war, Thompson conducted anthropological research on Guam, publishing her book *Guam and its People* in 1941. While in Guam, Thompson befriended both elite and ordinary Chamorro families and critiqued U.S. Naval government on Guam.

purpose was ‘to search for solutions to problems within and between white and colored races, cultural minority groups, and dependent peoples at home and abroad.’”⁵² The U.S. territories were central to their project, in particular, Guam.

People on Guam provided the institute with substantial monetary support and readership. Because the U.S. Navy controlled almost all the communication and news that reached Guam, the Colliers and the IEA became a liaison for important news between Washington D.C. and the people of Guam. IEA’s monthly newsletter, which disseminated news from all over the Third World, was overwhelmingly supported by donations sent from Guam. The first issue of the monthly newsletter printed in February 1946 noted that the IEA’s “prospectus struck immediate response among the people of far-off Guam is evidenced by the action of twenty-three of their leaders who sent in their membership applications and a combined money order for \$115!” The Newsletter also noted that the Chamorro members hoped that the newsletter would allow their voices and demands reach a larger stateside audience. When the IEA distributed to Guam thousands of copies of Harold Ickes speech calling for civilian administration of the Pacific territories in May 1946, forty-one Chamorros donated funds to the institute because they believed in the IEA’s mission to advocate for Chamorro rights as well as those of the decolonizing world. A letter that accompanied the donations stated, “we are now living in a new era with many rapid changes but with great hope that the present regime will be forever benevolent, fair, just and without any discrimination to race, color, nationality, or social standing.”⁵³ The IEA’s monthly News Letter, and eventually *The Guam Echo*, were the conduits through which the people of Guam were able to acquire news regarding the quarrels between the

⁵² John Collier, “Prospectus for the Institute of Ethnic Affairs” quoted in Doloris Coulter Coogan, *We Fought the US Navy and Won: Guam’s Quest for Democracy* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2008), 31.

⁵³ “The Guamanians Speak,” Newsletter of the Institute of Ethnic Affairs, Vol.1 No. 4 (September 1946), 10.

U.S. Navy and the Department of the Interior as well as a way to see how their fight for citizenship was part of a global anticolonial movement.⁵⁴

The IEA office was not only a conduit for news, but the home base for the Chamorro citizenship movement in Washington D.C.. If prominent Chamorros made a trip to the East Coast, the IEA was often the place to contact and get up-to-date news on the citizenship movement. For instance, during a trip throughout the United States starting in May 1948, Frank Leon Guerrero made the Institute of Ethnic Affairs his home base on the East Coast. He had traveled throughout the U.S. visiting Chamorros attending school in California, Minnesota, Michigan, and Illinois. He remained on the East Coast for three months, reconnecting with as many of his prewar acquaintances, taking interviews with as many newspapers as would have him, and building support for the Guam citizenship movement.⁵⁵ In August 1948, Leon Guerrero made an unscheduled visit to a member of the Hopkins Committee, Maurice Tobin, to notify him of the continued Chamorro desire for U.S. citizenship. After the meeting, Leon Guerrero returned to the IEA Affairs office “walking on air” because Tobin had told him that the Navy Department was supportive of citizenship for Chamorros.⁵⁶

Chamorros ensured a relatively consistent presence in Washington. In May 1949 Concepcion “Connie” Barrett, who was in the continent to purchase fabrics and other materials for her dressmaking shop in Guam, made a side trip to D.C. to testify before Congress alongside Secretary of Interior Henry Krug to declare the island’s desire for U.S. citizenship.⁵⁷ In July 1949, Baltazar Bordallo visited D.C. again, “meeting informally with several members of Congress and government

⁵⁴ “Newsletter of the Institute of Ethnic Affairs” Vol. 1 No.1 (February 1946), 3.

⁵⁵ “Leon Guerrero Reaches Washington,” *Guam Echo*, Vol. 2. No.5 May 29, 1948, 2.

⁵⁶ Cogan, *We Fought the Navy and Won*, 123.

⁵⁷ Cogan, *We Fought the Navy and Won*, Chapter 12; U.S. Congress, House, “H.R 2987, H.R. 3799, H.R. 4499, H.R. 4500” Committee on Public Lands, 81st Cong. 1st Sess., May 5, 1949.

officials.”⁵⁸ In 1950, the Guam Congress sent Leon Guerrero and younger representative Antonio B. Won Pat to lobby for more support for the Guam Organic Act. They were also able to visit Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands.⁵⁹ Chamorros made a concerted effort to put the movement for citizenship consistently before Congress, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Interior as well as making an effort to assert more rights back home in Guam.

Chamorros increasingly became fed up with military rule on Guam. On March 5th 1949, the Guam Congress unanimously decided to leave its session in protest of the Naval Governor’s arbitrary rule on Guam.⁶⁰ The Guam Congress was an elected body of the Naval government that was given some power to legislate for the civilian population of the island. The Congress had subpoenaed a statesider businessman to testify for an investigation on “possible violations of naval Government’s economic policy, which was designed to prevent exploitation of local business by outsiders with large capital.”⁶¹ It was suspected that statesiders were using Chamorro families to circumvent the requirement that fifty-one percent of any Guam business be owned by local families.⁶² The statesider refused to appear for investigation citing that the Guam Congress had no real powers. When a warrant of arrest was issued, Governor Pownall intervened effectively making the statesider “immune to the laws of Guam.”⁶³ This was the final straw. The Guam Congress felt that it could no longer legislate without knowing for sure what their role was. They decided to

⁵⁸ “B.J. Bordallo in Washington,” *Guam Echo*, Vol.3 No.5 July 30, 1949: 2.

⁵⁹ “Guam Congress Organic Act Committee Arrives in Washington,” *Guam Echo*, Vol. 4. No.2 March 31, 1950, 2.

⁶⁰ In June 1946, the Guam Congress reconvened after Chamorros asked Naval Governor Charles Pownall to hold an election. Forty-six members were elected to the bicameral Congress including the first woman representative, Rosa T. Aguigui from the village of Merizo. Carano and Sanchez, *History of Guam*, 347.

⁶¹ “News Notes: Guam,” *Institute of Ethnic Affairs Newsletter*, Vol. IV, No. 2 (March-April 1949), 6. Statesider refers to the influx of predominantly white men who saw business opportunities in Guam in the postwar period. The term “Statesider” was used in everyday language, and to a certain extent became associated closely with white people who settled in Guam, though it could be applied to the small population of Black people who settled in Guam as well. “Statesider” was used similarly to “Guamanians” and “Filipinos” to denote race and ethnicity.

⁶² There are notable companies still in existence today that were created in this postwar era that utilized Chamorro-Statesider business partnerships to get around the Naval policy protecting local business. “News Notes: Guam,” *Institute of Ethnic Affairs Newsletter*, Vol. IV, No. 2 (March-April 1949), 6.

⁶³ “News Notes: Guam,” *Institute of Ethnic Affairs Newsletter*, Vol. IV, No. 2 (March-April 1949), 6.

adjourn the Guam Congress, but before they did so, they drafted, presented, and approved an Organic Act to be sent to Congress as a demonstration of their adamant desire to become U.S. citizens and to establish a civilian government.⁶⁴

The Congress walked out with full acknowledgement of the compounding issues that demonstrated to them not only their limited powers, but the unwillingness of the Naval Government to take seriously the concerns of the Chamorro people. Four days later the Congress sent a letter to Governor Pownall, where A.B. Won Pat wrote “it must be emphasized that the Assembly’s action was not based upon any single incident, but upon a series of actions which have occurred with increasing frequency.” The Congress could not “determine when it is performing its mission and when it is not, when it is being repudiated and when it is not, and when it is being circumvented when it is not.”⁶⁵ The trust given by Chamorros in a Naval Government was lost; the Chamorro leaders saw that they were secondary to military affairs, and they demanded U.S. citizenship and a civilian government.

Carlos Taitano knew that the Guam Congress Walkout was an important, unprecedented act of Chamorro defiance against Naval rule. To avoid Navy resistance and censorship, he secretly and hurriedly sent a telegram to two news correspondents who he had befriended not too long before. According to Anne Hattori, “Taitano and the newsmen agreed that if the Chamorro people’s desire for self-government was to be heard, an incident of substantial magnitude must occur, great enough to warrant major coverage in newspapers.”⁶⁶ As a result of Taitano’s actions, *The Washington Post*, *The New York Times*, and the *Honolulu Star Bulletin* published news about the walkout. The Guam Congress Walkout was seen as a civil rights movement, which demonstrated to the rest of the

⁶⁴ Hattori, “Righting Civil Wrongs,” 34.

⁶⁵ “Letter from A.B. Won Pat, Speaker of Guam Congress to the Governor of Guam, 9 March 1949,” Papers of Governor Carlton Skinner, MSS 2850 Box 2 Folder 60, Micronesian Area Research Center, University of Guam.

⁶⁶ Hattori, “Righting Civil Wrongs,” 2.

country the un-American character of Naval policy and the arbitrary nature of military rule in the U.S. territories. According to Doloris Coulter Coogan, the editor of IEA Newsletter, “without Taitano and his telegrams to the United Press and the Associated Press in Hawaii, news of the walkout might never have been known—at least not until much later.”⁶⁷ The publicity of the Guam Congress Walkout was vital to the passage of the 1950 Organic Act a year and a half later. Shortly after the news syndication, several commentaries including one by John Collier argued that the political situation in Guam could be used as fodder for communist propaganda in the region. The Naval government in Guam became a liability in the U.S. military’s strategic interest in the Pacific region. To have a colony with a people who demonstrated keen knowledge of American ideals, who survived and aided the American forces during World War II, but who nevertheless did not have U.S. citizenship and a civilian government was antithetical to the image of democracy and racial equality that the U.S. was attempting to project in the region.

Naval Governor Pownall made several blunders in the aftermath of the walkout including doubling down on his authority and declaring vacant the seats of the representatives who walked out. On March 12, Pownall spoke before a relatively empty room “to address the Congress on several matters of wide public interest.”⁶⁸ After a lengthy speech, Frank B. Leon Guerrero commented to the governor, “We must know what limitations shall be prescribed to us and we can only know those limitations by the enactment of an organic act.” “The fact remains,” he continued, “there is no security to ourselves and our posterity.”⁶⁹ Pownall’s actions were too little, too late. Chamorros believed the only way any of the local problems could be solved was through national

⁶⁷ Coogan, *We Fought the US Navy and Won*, 136.

⁶⁸ “Governor Pownall Address Guam Congress, 12 March 1949,” MSS 2850, Box 2, Folder 61, Carlton Skinner Papers, Micronesian Area Research Center University of Guam. (Hereafter cited as “Pownall Address, Carlton Skinner Papers”)

⁶⁹ Pownall Address, Carlton Skinner Papers

legislation that would define the status of Guam, create a civilian government, and give U.S. citizenship to Chamorros.

The Guam Congress Walkout of 1949 pushed those in Washington D.C. over the edge, forcing the Secretary of Interiors, President Truman, and all others to put American rhetoric into action and deliver a civilian government and grant U.S. citizenship.⁷⁰ It catapulted the Guam Citizenship drive to national news, which resulted in a rapid and concerted effort to change Guam's political status and give Chamorro people U.S. citizenship. Chamorros made sure to lobby Washington officials as much as possible. On May 5, 1949, Concepcion "Connie" Barret visited Washington and testified before Congress.⁷¹ On May 21, Truman called Secretary of Interior Henry Krug to begin planning the transfer of Guam from the Navy to the Department of the Interior, which eventually happens in August of the same year. This transfer ended the U.S. Naval government on Guam and paved the way for the establishment of a civilian government through an organic act. In September, Carlton Skinner arrived on island to become the first civilian governor appointed by the president. In November, Agueda Johnston attended the IEA conference advocating for U.S. citizenship for Chamorros. The congressional hearings for the Guam Organic Act were held in Guam in November 1949 with over 100 testimonies.⁷² In May 1950, Frank B. Leon Guerrero once again traveled to Washington, this time with Antonio B. Won Pat to continue the island's presence in D.C., bringing with them a petition with 1,700 Chamorro signatures in favor of an Organic Act.⁷³ On August 1, 1950, Carlos Taitano stood behind President Truman as he signed the Guam Organic Act.

⁷⁰ The Guam Congress was a civilian advisory body composed of Chamorro and Chamorro elites. While it did hold elections for its members, the members themselves had no official say in the affairs of the island. Hattori, "Righting Civil Wrongs"; Cogan, *We Fought the US Navy and Won*, passim 135-142.

⁷¹ Cogan, *We Fought the US Navy and Won*, Chapter 12.

⁷² House of Representatives, U.S. Congress, "Public Hearings Conducted before a sub-committee of the Public Lands Committee" Agana, Guam, November 21, 22, 23. (Hereafter cited as "Guam Organic Act Hearings")

⁷³ Rogers, *Destiny's Landfall* (1994), 221.

For both the prewar and postwar Guam citizenship movements, Washington prioritized U.S. strategic military interests in the Pacific before considering the desires and needs of Chamorro people. Before the war, Chamorros were deemed to be too inconsequential, uncivilized, and unfit for self-governance and U.S. citizenship. World War II changed the conversation towards U.S. citizenship for Chamorros, but it was at the benefit of the U.S. military. Guam became an important military base in the Asia-Pacific region. The United States military took advantage of the unwavering support and loyalty of the Chamorro people who had just experienced a brutal war to transform the island into a military base. But the Chamorro people increasingly became skeptical of the Navy's actions, and thus posed a potential hindrance to the Navy's drastic military policies on the island. Furthermore, the plight of the Chamorro people could be used by opponents to highlight the continuation of United States colonialism.

Thus, the Guam Organic Act was beneficial for U.S. Cold War foreign policy in order to demonstrate to the world the ability for the U.S. to rule its empire more equitably, though of course it was superficial in reality.⁷⁴ The act also symbolized to Chamorros that the United States was capable of keeping promises. Tuned into the world events and geopolitics, Chamorros employed networks, ideas, and optics to further advocate for their desire for U.S. citizenship as exemplified in the Guam Congress Walkout of 1949.

The Guam Organic Act

Before the organic act was signed, it needed to be drafted. In November 1949, congressional hearings were held in Guam to ascertain exactly what the Chamorro people envisioned for the organic act. Between the testimonies demonstrating loyalty to the United States and support for U.S. citizenship for Chamorros were two pressing issues that existed since the end of the war: land and

⁷⁴ Guam Organic Act Hearings, November 22, 1949.

labor.⁷⁵ Five years after the end of World War II, some Chamorros were still constantly being shifted from village to village, living in temporary houses, and had limited access to farmlands to provide for their families. They instead went to find work with the government or the military out of necessity. For instance, commercial farmer, Frank D. Perez said in his testimony, “There are many of us farmers who have forced ourselves to accept positions, work for somebody, for that reason only.”⁷⁶ When they did attempt to find jobs to support their families, they met a military-controlled economy that preferred to hire cheaper Filipino alien workers over local Chamorros. U.S. citizenship and a civilian government, he believed along with many others, would provide them with a voice and the right to participate in government to fix or at the very least help allay the problems Chamorros faced.

The Guam Organic Act, however, was written without any input from Chamorros. The Department of the Interior and the Department of the Navy worked side by side to craft the legislation in order to build the structure of a civilian government that would allow the President and the U.S. military to have critical say in how the island would be governed. The two most important issues for Chamorros—U.S. citizenship and a civilian government for Guam—were at the center of the bill. Section 3 of the Organic Act states that Guam was an unincorporated territory of the United States.⁷⁷ Though simple in its phrasing, this section represented the end of over fifty years of American rule over Guam as merely a Naval station. It became a civilian island with three branches of government. Section 4 outlined how the National Act of 1940 was amended to include all inhabitants of Guam as U.S. citizens. The rest of the Organic Act outlined the Bill of Rights and the

⁷⁵ Chapter three of this dissertation, “Natives and Aliens” explores in depth the issues of land and labor through the lens of settler militarism in Guam in the postwar period.

⁷⁶ Guam Organic Act Hearings, November 22, 1949.

⁷⁷ “The Organic Act of Guam,” Public Law 630, 81st Congress, Chapter 512 (August 1, 1950). For this section, I used a digitized copy created by the Richard F. Taitano, Micronesia Area Research Center, University of Guam. (Hereafter cited, “The Organic Act of Guam (1950)”).

duties of each branch of government. The long Chamorro movement for U.S. citizenship and civilian government was over.

Two other sections of the Guam Organic Act hid behind the historic wins of civilian government and U.S. citizenship. Section 28 and 33 together were used to justify the military's annexation of a third of Guam's land. Section 28 transferred some U.S. property and Naval government departments to the civilian government of Guam, which was under the purview of the Department of the Interior, "to be administered for the benefit of the people of Guam." In addition to land, facilities and infrastructure necessary for civilian affairs such as buslines, buildings, reservoirs, and sewage facilities were to be transferred to the Government of Guam. This transfer seemed to be a boon for all of the Chamorros people who wanted more control over their island's affairs.

As an island under executive jurisdiction through the Department of the Interior, the Organic Act contained provisions that gave the President of the United States overall and complete control of the island. Section 33 is the Organic Act's was the most sinister line. It states, "nothing contained herein shall be construed as limiting the authority of the President to designate parts of Guam as naval or military reservations, not to restrict his authority as a closed port with respect to the vessels and aircraft of foreign nations."⁷⁸ The Commander-In-Chief—not Congress—has the ultimate say in the affairs of the island. The President has the wherewithal to determine the future of Guam. Paired with Section 28 of the Organic Act which outlines "title transfers to all property, real or personal, owned by the United States," the Organic Act reserved the U.S. President the right to revert Guam back into a military government.⁷⁹ Written into the Organic Act was the possibility that

⁷⁸ The Organic Act of Guam (1950), 11.

⁷⁹ In later iterations of the Guam Organic Act, the act has identified specific pieces of land and property that is owned by the United States military and their land sizes. In a document that gives U.S. citizenship to Chamorros, the military justifies its hold on contested Chamorro land.

the President could retake control over the island for military affairs. Under the guise of U.S. citizenship and inclusion for Chamorros into the nation-state, the U.S. guaranteed that Guam's existence in law through the Guam Organic Act remained tied to U.S. foreign policy and military strategy in the Pacific. Civilian government was subservient to military policy.

This is exactly what happened. The Organic Act threatened to jeopardize the military's massive land holdings. Nevertheless, Truman, the Navy, and the Interior circumvented the Organic Act to retain control of annexed land for military strategic purposes. According to historian Robert Rogers, "To make retention of Guam's land by the military legal, Skinner [appointed civilian governor of Guam] was instructed to sign a quitclaim deed on 31 July 1950—the day before the Organic Act went into effect—whereby GovGuam transferred all condemned properties to the United States of America 'for its own use.'" Subsequently, "Truman issued Executive Order 10178 on the 31st of October 1950, returning all the property in the quitclaim deed to the navy be divided among military services by need. These steps were taken without consulting Chamorro officials or owners of leased properties."⁸⁰ In other words, the Presidentially-appointed governor of Guam, Carlton Skinner, transferred land meant for the civilian government to the U.S. Navy even before the Organic Act was signed. With the Organic Act becoming effective not on August 1st, but July 21st, a homage to the "Liberation of Guam," the President, the Interior, and the Navy ensured that the dispossession of Chamorro lands was legal. Rogers notes that thirty-three percent of the island became permanently military property. The Act was a military document as much as it was a civilian one. The Chamorro people were left out of the loop and duped into believing that U.S. citizenship would provide them more rights. The Guam Organic Act embodied and justified settler militarism.

The Case of Radio Barrigada

⁸⁰ Rogers, *Destiny's Landfall* (1994), 230; Harry S Truman, Executive Order 10178: Reserving Certain Real and Personal Property in Guam for the Use of the United States, (October 30, 1950), <https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/executive-orders/10178/executive-order-10178>.

Section 28 and Section 33 in the Organic Act had very real consequences for the Chamorro people. Discontent continued to brew over the Navy's handling of land. Despite having U.S. citizenship and a civilian government, it seemed to Chamorros that the Navy, and now the Air Force, had major control over their livelihoods and their government. This experience was true in the case of Radio Barrigada in 1951 when the U.S. military condemned 2,930 acres for a radio communications center. The Guam Legislature sprung into action sending a resolution to the United States Congress to question the priorities of the military as well as to advocate for the 129 families who farmed the area.⁸¹ This area was a thriving agricultural center for the island during a time in which many people were attempting to return to a subsistence lifestyle in the aftermath of the war. The resolution asked the U.S. federal government and military-affiliated cabinet members to recognize that there were vast spaces of unused land already in the possession of the U.S. Navy that could serve as a radio station, and it admonished the Navy's inadequate price to compensate and move the people from their land.

The Guam Legislature saw how the case of Radio Barrigada was connected to the ongoing battle with the U.S. military over land in Guam. The resolution stated, "Whereas the people of Guam have never objected to the taking of their land when required for military purposes but have the widespread belief that under the guise of military necessity, there has been unwarranted land takings not actually needed by military forces." While Chamorros understood that their island was being transformed into a military base, they still had their limits. The Navy restricting access to arable land was one of them. The resolution wrote, "Whereas the land taking in Barrigada is a continuation of the drastic program of conversion of land to military use which has adversely

⁸¹ "Resolution relative to memorializing the Congress of the United States, the President of the United States, the Secretary of National Defense, the Secretary of National Defense, the Secretary of the Interior, and the Governor of Guam to reconsider the taking of property in Radio Barrigada and review other land takings in Guam." Congressional Records – Senate, September 7, 1951, 11015.

affected and will continue to adversely affect the lives of Guamanian people, causing serious shortage of land, widespread population displacement and economic distress.”⁸² The Guam Legislature saw how military land annexation was alienating the Chamorro population from their land, further dispossessing them of the ability to be self-sufficient. If at first Chamorros believed that U.S. citizenship and the Organic Act would protect them from the unilateral, nonconsensual actions of the U.S. Navy, the case of Radio Barrigada demonstrated that the U.S. Navy continued prioritized military strategic interests over the needs of the people of Guam.

Three years later when U.S. Congress visited Guam to conduct hearings of how the island was transitioning into a civilian government, the case of Radio Barrigada once again became an example of the U.S. military’s inconsiderate land annexation.⁸³ J.C. Okiyama, a representative in the Guam Legislature, called the military’s action as “the celebrated case of the Barrigada taking.” Like the resolution sent three years before, Okiyama acknowledged that Chamorros “will constantly be happy to cooperate with the military if this need is for the protection of the people of Guam.” Yet, he clarified, “The Barrigada taking was not made for this purpose.”⁸⁴ He found out that the land in addition to radio antennae was used to build a golf course for military personnel “to raise the morale of the military.” This angered the Chamorro people as it demonstrated that the recreation of military personnel was more important than the food the land provided to Chamorro families.

The land itself was cultivated to sustain the families who lived there and beyond. Vicente Leon Guerrero and Tomasa Santos Rios owned three hectares of land that was “well cultivated and contained large numbers of fruit bearing trees, yielding an income more than sufficient for the needs

⁸² “Resolution relative to memorializing the Congress of the United States, the President of the United States, the Secretary of National Defense, the Secretary of National Defense, the Secretary of the Interior, and the Governor of Guam to reconsider the taking of property in Radio Barrigada and review other land takings in Guam.” Congressional Records – Senate, September 7, 1951, 11015.

⁸³ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, *Guam Mariana Islands*, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 83rd Cong., 2nd sess., November 27 to December 4, 1954.

⁸⁴ U.S. Congress, House, Committee, *Guam Mariana Islands*, 42.

of our large family.”⁸⁵ Dolores T. Rosario was able “to support [her] children from her farm and where [she] raised livestock.”⁸⁶ Jose I. Franquez owned eight acres that “was so fertile that [he] was able to grown anything that could grow on Guam,” including “1,000 coconut trees, 33 citrus-fruit trees, 96 banana trees, 34 breadfruits, 10 dogdog [indigenous breadfruit], 2 carabao mangos, and 4 kapok trees besides the vegetables I planted for our daily use.” He also had “a considerable number of livestock.”⁸⁷ Jose Borja Flores had eight and a half acres of fertile land which in addition to farming had three buildings. These were just some of the families who were forced to leave the Radio Barrigada area, severed from the trees and land that fed them.

Chamorro anger about the improper use of the annexed land was exacerbated by the lowballed payments given to owners of the land. The four families mentioned above were moved from their Barrigada properties to the new suburban villages like New Dededo in small compact lots that were, to them, overpriced. Vicente Leon Guerrero and Tomas Santos Rios were given a total of \$1,100 for their Barrigada property that was a little larger than three hectares. Not only were they told to move away from land that fed them, they were forced to purchase an “unimproved lot” of 95 by 100 feet which the government of Guam sold to them for \$518.⁸⁸ Dolores Rosario was not paid for her property and as a result of the land condemnation could no longer support her family. She had “found it necessary to ask the Helping Hands of Guam Organization for help.”⁸⁹ Jose Franquez was offered \$1,465 for his eight productive acres. When he refused to accept the offer, he was “evicted by Federal marshal and was told to leave immediately.”⁹⁰ Franquez commented that “once in a while I have passed around that area only to see people having fun playing golf on my old

⁸⁵ U.S. Congress, House, Committee, *Guam Mariana Islands*, 43.

⁸⁶ U.S. Congress, House, Committee, *Guam Mariana Islands*, 43

⁸⁷ U.S. Congress, House, Committee, *Guam Mariana Islands*, 44.

⁸⁸ U.S. Congress, House, Committee, *Guam Mariana Islands*, 43

⁸⁹ U.S. Congress, House, Committee, *Guam Mariana Islands*, 43.

⁹⁰ U.S. Congress, House, Committee, *Guam Mariana Islands*, 44.

neighbors' properties and to see a concessionaire making thousands of dollars at the expense of our misery."⁹¹ His land sat idle. Jose Borja Flores was offered \$1,800 for his eight and a half acres, and moved to New Dededo on a 95 by 103 foot lot. Because he could no longer farm, he took up a job at the naval air station, but his "earnings are not sufficient to meet the needs of my family and myself."⁹² The Barrigada residents believed that they were not paid the appropriate amount for their properties, especially in comparison to the amount of produce that the land had provided for them, and which they could not cultivate in their new properties in New Dededo. Jose Franquez revealed the cruel reality of U.S. military land takings on Guam. He testified "I question, 'Why was I evicted?' The answer, 'the land is needed for a military purpose such as a golf course.'"⁹³

Despite the fact that they had U.S. citizenship and voice in their own affairs, Chamorros were not able to protect their land against the U.S. military. The "celebrated case" of Radio Barrigada demonstrates how land dispossession for military purposes hit at the heart of Chamorro livelihoods. A.C. Cruz testified "To us, the people of Guam, there is no possession as dear as the land on which we live in, the land which we cultivate our daily food, the land which holds for us the abundant quantity of wild foods, the land without which most of our people cannot feel secure in their daily existence."⁹⁴ Military-facilitated Chamorro land annexation dispossessed Chamorros of their land and capital and further trapped them into a cycle of dependency on the U.S. military for jobs and security.

Citizenship did not give Chamorros more pathways to air grievances of American colonial rule as they had hoped; it only solidified U.S. jurisdiction over the island. Civilian government and citizenship ensured that Guam remain central to the needs of U.S. militarization in the Cold War.

⁹¹ U.S. Congress, House, Committee, *Guam Mariana Islands*, 44.

⁹² U.S. Congress, House, Committee, *Guam Mariana Islands*, 44.

⁹³ U.S. Congress, House, Committee, *Guam Mariana Islands*, 44.

⁹⁴ U.S. Congress, House, Committee, *Guam Mariana Islands*, 44.

While Chamorros on Guam saw civilian government and U.S. citizenship as greater self-governance and inclusion into the United States, federal and military agencies saw U.S. citizenship civilian government as the best solutions to execute Cold War racial liberalism as well as stymie Chamorro dissatisfaction and justify land annexations on Guam. The Guam Organic Act of 1950 is a military document disguised as a civilian document. U.S. military policy was a priority before the inhabitants of the territory. Through U.S. citizenship, the U.S. military settled Guam.

Filipinos, Permanent Residency, and U.S. Citizenship

While Chamorros earned their U.S. citizenship and civilian government, though limited that may be, Filipino workers continued to work for U.S. military contractors to build the bases and infrastructure throughout the island.⁹⁵ The provision for citizenship in the Organic Act did not apply to these postwar Filipino migrant workers. It applied specifically to those who were present or were descendants of those present on Guam during the transfer of the island from Spain to the United States in April 11, 1899. This accounted for all the Chamorros on Guam, and for non-Chamorro peoples, like the former Filipino revolutionary exiles, who were residents of Guam.⁹⁶ What did matter to the Filipino recruited workers, however, was how the Organic Act, which transferred Guam from the Department of the Navy to the Department of Interior, affected federal

⁹⁵ A larger discussion about the Filipino recruitment process, international agreements, and labor camp life is in my third chapter of this dissertation, "Natives and Aliens." This chapter focuses on how some of these workers acquired U.S. permanent residency and U.S. citizenship through a series of INS interpretations of federal law and Board of Immigration appeals decisions which attempted to figure out how Immigration policy applied to the island in Guam's transition between a military and civilian government. For academic publications on Filipino labor in Guam in the immediate postwar period, read Bruce Campbell, "The Filipino Community of Guam," (Master's, University of Guam, 1987; Vicente Diaz, "Bye Bye Ms. American Pie: The Historical Relations between Chamorros and Filipinos and the American Dream." *ISLA: Journal of Micronesian Studies* 3, no. 1 (1995): 147–160; Alfred Flores, "'No Walk in the Park': US Empire and the Racialization of Civilian Military Labor in Guam, 1944–1962," *American Quarterly* 67, no. 3 (2015): 813–835; Alfred Flores, "'Little Island into Mighty Base': Indigeneity, Race, and U.S. Empire in Guam, 1944–1962" (Ph.D., University of California, Los Angeles, 2015); Ann M. Pobutsky and Enrico Neri, "Patterns of Filipino Migration to Guam: United States Military Colonialism and Its Aftermath," *Philippine Studies: Historical and Ethnographic Viewpoints*, Vol. 66 No. 1 (2018): 77–94; Colleen Woods, "Building Empire's Archipelago: The Imperial Politics of Filipino Labor in the Pacific," *Labor: Studies in Working-Class History of the Americas*, Volume 13, Issue 3-4 (2016); Guam Humanities Council, *A Journey Home: Camp Roxas and Filipino American History on Guam* (Hagatña: Guam Humanities Council, 2009).

⁹⁶ The Organic Act of Guam (1950), Section 4.

immigration policy. In this transition, federal immigration law needed to be reconciled with how the U.S. military conducted their Filipino migrant labor recruitment.

Immediately following World War II, the U.S. Navy commenced a large-scale military buildup in which the military condemned two-thirds of the island, paved hundreds of miles of road, built thousands of buildings both temporary and permanent, laid runways and airstrips, and dredged and fortified harbors.⁹⁷ While at first the U.S. utilized Seabees for construction, the expenses of the war and a decline in domestic support for large military budgets pushed the U.S. military to transition from employing enlisted construction workers to contracting American construction companies to build bases around the globe.⁹⁸ This included Guam. Military contract companies recruited workers from the Philippines for both skilled and unskilled jobs.⁹⁹

As described in greater detail in chapter three, the military contract companies needed so much Filipino labor that the United States Embassy in Manila and the State Department of the Philippines crafted international agreements around recruitment of labor for U.S. military bases. In 1947, an Exchange of Notes was signed that allowed the U.S. military to recruit Filipino workers and bypass the Philippine government approval.¹⁰⁰ In the agreement, the U.S. military was responsible for the recruitment, transportation, and repatriation of Filipino workers. The Exchange of Notes also stipulated how much the recruited laborer would be paid—25 percent higher than the Philippine wage rate—and required military contract companies to provide housing, food, and medical care during their work abroad. While this wage was considerably higher than what they would have earned in the Philippines, it was still significantly less than the wages paid to Chamorro

⁹⁷ United States, *Building the Navy's Bases in World War II: History of the Bureau of Yards and Docs and the Civil Engineer Corps, 1940-1946, Volume II* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1947), passim 341-357.

⁹⁸ "Testimony of Admiral Joel D. Parks," U.S. Congress, House, *Minimum Wages in Certain Territories, Possessions, and Oversea Areas of the United States*, Committee on Education and Labor, 84th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1956, Part One, 116.

⁹⁹ Flores, "Little Island into Mighty Base," 218; Woods, "Building Empire's Archipelago," 138.

¹⁰⁰ *U.S. Treaties and Other International Agreements*, 2539.

and American workers in Guam. As a result, thousands of workers entered Guam from 1947 through 1952 through the U.S. military using the Exchange of Notes without federal oversight. Military contractors exploited this pay differential and opted to employ more Filipinos.

In addition to land, the U.S. military's dependence on cheap imported Filipino labor was undeniable. Lyle H. Turner, an attorney who dedicated himself to the entanglements caused by the implementation of the Organic Act, estimated that in 1953, "there were 17,000 alien contract laborers in Guam all of which came from the Philippines. Of those 17,000 about 3,000 are in local businesses and private labor markets, so that even the Federal Government itself found it necessary to import 14,000 alien laborers from the Philippines."¹⁰¹ In 1956, when Congress asked if the U.S. Navy could pay recruited Filipino workers according to the Fair Labor Standards Act, Admiral Joel D. Parks believed that doing so could jeopardize the military's presence on Guam. If the higher wages were forced onto the military, Parks said, "we would have two alternatives. One is to drastically cut back the operation in the Pacific and deport hundreds of these Filipinos back to the Philippines because we would not have the money to pay them."¹⁰² Filipinos were necessary because they provided cheap labor for the United States military build-up in Guam.

The expansion of the U.S. military bases on Guam also meant that adjacent businesses had a market to sell their goods or provide services.¹⁰³ The number of civilian businesses which supported military operations and personnel increased rapidly, such as bakeries, barbershops, clothing shops, restaurants, and commissaries. Many of them depended on Filipino labor. Although these businesses did not have military contracts themselves, they still catered to the thousands of people on island

¹⁰¹ U.S. Congress, House, Committee, *Guam Mariana Islands*, 23.

¹⁰² U.S. Congress, House, *Minimum Wages in Certain Territories, Possessions, and Overseas Areas of the United States*, Committee on Education and Labor, 84th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1956, Part One. 267.

¹⁰³ Guam remained a secure military base, which meant that any person coming into Guam would first need approval from the Secretary of the Navy stating that their presence on island was due to military necessity. Thus, it could be assumed that all persons, including Filipino alien workers, were deemed necessary to military operations.

who needed supplementary work located on the island. According to Russell Stevens, “Once the Navy opened up the Filipino labor market, local merchants and others sought to take advantage thereof. Consequently, a procedure was established whereby Filipinos could be brought into the island upon presentation of proper papers, including a bond of employer to guarantee return passage.”¹⁰⁴ To a certain extent, civilian businesses lobbied the U.S. military to allow some imported labor to help the local businesses on Guam. Not only was the U.S. military interested in recruiting labor, but local businesses owned by a cross-section of the island’s people (statesiders, Chamorros, and Filipinos) in need of skilled workers sought Filipino workers to staff their businesses until available local workers could be trained to do so.

In addition to the military recruitment of workers for skilled and unskilled work to build U.S. bases in the Pacific, the civilian Government of Guam found it necessary to recruit Filipino professionals to fill the gap in several sectors of Guam’s economy including the medical field and public health. In March of 1951, Government of Guam Employment Services Manager, Sabino Flores, travelled to the Philippines on behalf of the Government of Guam “to investigate recruiting possibilities in the Philippines for certain types of labor not available on Guam.”¹⁰⁵ Flores met with Philippine Secretary of Labor Jose Figueroa over dinner in Manila in which Figueroa gave his “whole hearted assurance that the Philippines can meet all demands for practically all types of labor.”¹⁰⁶ The rise of the Philippine postwar economy also depended on the export of laborers and their remittances to the Philippines. As Flores observed in his report, “the unemployment trend in the Philippines is so great that an average of 200 persons are applying daily in the Placement Bureau

¹⁰⁴ Stevens, *Guam, USA*, 130.

¹⁰⁵ Sabino Flores is the son of Nieves Flores who we meet in chapter two of this dissertation. Memo of Sabino Flores, “Travel to Manila, P.I. in order to investigate recruiting possibilities – report of,” MSS 2850, Box 2, Folder 25, Carlton Skinner Papers, Micronesia Area Research Center, University of Guam. (Hereafter cited as “Memo from Sabino Flores, Carlton Skinner Papers”)

¹⁰⁶ Memo of Flores, “Travel to Manila, P.I. in order to investigate recruiting possibilities – report of,” Carlton Skinner Papers MSS 2850, Micronesia Area Research Center University of Guam, Box 2, Folder 25.

for both local and overseas employment.” The civilian government of Guam also took advantage of the saturated job market in the Philippines to recruit professionals for the government operations of Guam.

Government of Guam recruitment included Filipino doctors and nurses, who graduated from U.S. accredited universities in the Philippines such as the University of the Philippines and completed their medical residency in the U.S. continent. Seeing more economic opportunities working within the United States, some doctors decided to settle in Guam which was in dire need of medical professionals. After passing the examinations for American medical credentials, they worked at the Guam Memorial Hospital which was controlled by the governor of Guam as stipulated in the Organic Act. These doctors were of the first Filipino professionals who arrived in the 1950s and 60s who consequently made Guam home. They include Ben and Ofelia Sison, Sinforoso Tolentino, Marciano Santos, Rodolfo Silan, Tom Veloria, and Ernesto Espaldon.¹⁰⁷ Because of their position as medical professionals in Guam, many of them and their families became well-known figures in the general Guam society. Filipino professionals such as healthcare workers, teachers, and accountants contributed to the development of the Guam government infrastructure as well as civilian businesses and industries throughout the postwar period.

The rapid postwar changes of Guam required an import of labor that was sufficiently large enough to build both military and civilian infrastructure and bureaucracy. Filipinos who were recruited in this period took advantage of Guam as a U.S. territory not only to obtain better economic opportunities but also to obtain pathways to citizenship that were otherwise unavailable.

¹⁰⁷ Guam Legislature, Resolution No. 130-31 “Relative to honoring and congratulating Dr. and Mrs. Benjamin and Ofelia Sison on the celebration of their Fiftieth (50th) Wedding Anniversary.” 31st Legislature, 1st sess., June 3, 2011; Guam Legislature, Resolution No. 560-31(COR) “Relative to posthumously recognizing and commending Dr. Sinforoso C. Tolentino; and to further extend a warm Un Dângkolo Na Si Yu’us Ma’ase’ to him for his commitment and dedicated work in serving the people of Guam throughout his professional years in the healthcare community.” 31st Legislature, 2nd sess., October 18, 2012.

Nevertheless, Guam's reliance on imported labor for all sectors of the island's labor force compelled those in charge of the island's immigration laws to consistently advocate for policies that were conducive to keeping Guam open to Filipino labor.

Federal Immigration Policy in the Transition between Military and Civilian Governments

Because Guam's government operated essentially as a stationary Naval ship in 1947, the U.S. military's utilization of the 1947 Exchange of Notes operated outside the jurisdiction of U.S. federal immigration laws. Mr. Turner told a visiting Congressional committee, "There was no immigration and naturalization service on Guam and we had no problem. All that was required was to get security clearance."¹⁰⁸ However, as soon as Guam became an unincorporated territory in 1950 through the Guam Organic Act, the presence of these Filipino migrant workers—many without passports and immigration papers and sometimes expired military contracts—confounded the Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS). Turner testified that when the INS established an office in Guam, they found themselves "faced with the problem that we had all of the alien contract laborers in Guam illegally."¹⁰⁹ Rather than deporting the undocumented Filipino workers, the INS, the U.S. military, and the Government of Guam worked together to "regularize" their immigration status, looking through immigration law, deciding court cases, and creating exceptions and waivers for Guam to ensure that the island could hold onto thousands of foreign Filipino workers. The unregulated recruitment of laborers to Guam by the U.S. military was merely added into the U.S. code. In other words, the INS constructed mechanisms for establishing a settler labor class by incorporating U.S. military policies into federal immigration policy around Guam's labor economy.

Between 1950 and December 1952 (before the passage of the Immigration Act of 1952), federal immigration officials utilized Section 3 of the 1917 Immigration Act to determine the status

¹⁰⁸ U.S. Congress, House, Committee, *Guam Mariana Islands*, 23.

¹⁰⁹ U.S. Congress, House, Committee, *Guam Mariana Islands*, 23.

of “illegal” alien workers in Guam.¹¹⁰ The complexity and diversity of the immigration cases required different solutions to regularize their statuses. Ultimately, the outcome of their immigration status depended on two issues: whether the person had a current contract with a company and whether the person was employed in skilled or managerial work often without a contract. Thus, Filipino workers on Guam were separated into two categories, temporary contract workers and workers admitted with the “presumption of lawful admission,” respectively.

The third section of the 1917 Immigration Act prohibited the admission of temporary contract laborers to the United States. Thus, the U.S. military’s implementation of the Exchange of Notes, which allowed military contractors to hire Filipinos on temporary contracts, was technically in violation of the 1917 Immigration Act. Through some skillful maneuvering of the 1917 Immigration Act’s Section 3’s 9th provision, however, the U.S. military received a waiver to retroactively legally admit the nearly 14,000 temporary Filipino contract workers.¹¹¹ This also affected approximately 3,000 Filipino workers who were working in civilian companies that supported the U.S. military’s presence in Guam.¹¹² The affected workers were still temporary contract workers, and they were required to leave the island before the third anniversary of their arrival. But, the INS was able to align Filipino workers’ status to federal immigration law, making their presence change from illegal to legal in one stroke of a pen.

In addition, the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) was updated to include a special circumstance of undocumented workers on Guam who did not hold contracts from the companies. Recruited workers who were admitted to Guam before December 24, 1952 without a contract were presumed to be admitted into the United States legally—“presumption of lawful admission”—, and

¹¹⁰ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, *The Use of Temporary Alien Labor in Guam*, Committee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law, 95th Cong., Sess. 2 (1979), 7. Court of Guam Case *Ex Parte Rogers* reinforced this decision.

¹¹¹ U.S. Congress, House, Committee, *Guam Mariana Islands*, 23.

¹¹² Stevens, *Guam, USA*, 130; U.S. Congress, House, Committee, *Guam Mariana Islands*, 23.

further, eligible for U.S. permanent residency. These included workers recruited as managerial and specialized positions including bookkeepers and trained bakers, skills that were not easily found in the Chamorro population. They were not covered by the waiver meant for temporary workers created out of the 1917 Immigration Act. The loss of these workers, however, would be detrimental to the military build-up and various businesses on the island. So, the INS in conjunction with the U.S. military, amended federal immigration law to allow these workers to become permanent residents. A section of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) created a “presumption of lawful admission” to Guam:

Aliens admitted to Guam. (1) An alien who establishes that he was admitted to Guam prior to December 24, 1952, by records, such as Service records subsequent to June 15, 1952, records of the Guamanian Immigration Service, records of the Navy or Air Force or records of contractors of those agencies, other than as a contract laborer, was not otherwise excludable under the Act of February 5, 1917, as amended, and who continued to reside in Guam until December 24, 1952, regardless of the period of time for which admitted.¹¹³

As a result of this amendment and subsequent Board of Immigration Appeals Cases in the late 1950s, the INS found that there were approximately 1,500 Filipino white-collar workers who were not contract workers. The INS allowed them to receive a more stable immigration status: permanent residency. According to Turner, “they were determined to have been admitted for permanent residence under the 1917 Act, and following medical and immigration inspections, were issued Forms I-151.”¹¹⁴ For these “white collar” workers, the U.S. immigration made them permanent residents, a necessary step towards U.S. citizenship. Furthermore, it allowed the U.S. military to create a more permanent, mostly skilled workforce that aided the smooth running of the military project in Guam.

¹¹³ “Presumption of Lawful Admission, Aliens Admitted to Guam,” *Code of Federal Regulations*, 8 CFR 1101.1(i), <https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/8/1101.1>

¹¹⁴ U.S. Congress, Representatives, *The Use of Temporary Alien Labor in Guam*, 8.

The decision by INS was evidently influenced by the U.S. military's need for labor on Guam. In the testimony, Turner asked "I'm sure the Congressmen will be able to appreciate the problem private businesses faced in 1952. If you had a similar situation in the United States where you suddenly found out about 90 percent of your employees would necessarily be terminated and you couldn't replace them."¹¹⁵ The loss of ninety percent of the workforce would wreck not only on the civilian economy, but the military build-up in Guam. Federal immigration law jeopardized the military and civilian economy development in Guam. Furthermore, these decisions were solidified in two Board of Immigration Appeals Cases later in 1959, including "the Matter of C-Y-L," which determined that a skilled worker employed by a concessionaire company since the late 1940s was still eligible for permanent residency even if they had left Guam on multiple occasions. Significantly, C-Y-L was not a builder or laborer, but a manager of military contract company, Far East Trading Company, which operated "restaurants, cafes, snack bars two (or three) bakeries, ice cream plants, a milk-bottling operation and maintenance facilities on Air and Air Force installations throughout Guam."¹¹⁶ Instead of deporting Filipino laborers, the INS simply accommodated their presence.

The way in which the 1917 Immigration Act was interpreted to alleviate the perceived shortage in Guam's labor force ironically belies the intention of the Act itself. The 1917 Immigration Act was relatively exclusionary, making it difficult for races classified within the Asiatic-Barred Zone from entering the United States.¹¹⁷ While the Philippines was not part of this zone in 1917 because of its colonial status as a U.S. territory, post-independence immigration legislations—most notably the 1946 Luce-Cellar Act—demonstrated the fairly conservative outlook of U.S. immigration policy

¹¹⁵ U.S. Congress, House, Committee, *Guam Mariana Islands*, 23.

¹¹⁶ Although C-Y-L was not Filipino, but "a 38-year-old married male alien, a native and citizens of China," his case created precedent for other Filipinos to claim permanent residency in Guam. Board of Immigration Appeals, "Matter of C-Y-L," June 10, 1959, 372.

¹¹⁷ It also prevented the admission of peoples the U.S. deemed to be public charge, including poor, queer, disabled, and illiterate peoples. Ngai, *Impossible Subjects*, 19.

towards Filipinos. Nevertheless, World War II changed geopolitics to the point where racialized immigration policies did a disservice to U.S. foreign policy both in terms of a projection of democracy at the beginning of the Cold War and the construction of the military empire in the Pacific. Thus, it was necessary to make small revisions to the law to benefit its military operations. Through Guam, the 1,200 foreign white-collar workers attained permanent residency and eventually U.S. citizenship. The U.S. military need for Filipino labor to build the military bases in Guam provided enough justification to admit Filipino permanent workers at the beginning of the Cold War.

The Permanent Nature of Temporary Work:

The 1952 Immigration Act and H-2 Visa after the Exchange of Notes

By the time the 1952 Immigration Act—also known as the Walter-McCarran Act—kicked into action in December 1952, any incoming foreign workers were subject to a new federal law that allowed for the entrance of temporary alien contract workers under the H-2 visa. Section H-2 of the Immigration Act stipulated that the open positions were temporary in nature and that local labor was unavailable. The availability of local labor was determined by the State’s employment service, in this case the Government of Guam, and the U.S. Labor Department.¹¹⁸ The former of these requirements posed a problem for employers who had hired temporary Filipino workers because many of these workers “were found in a wide variety of occupations, many of which did not appear to satisfy the legal requirement that they be of a temporary nature.”¹¹⁹ Filipino workers who were “bakers, barbers, auto repairmen, service station attendants, radio repairmen, and soft drink bottlers,” were not tied to specific temporary construction projects but were recruited to provide services in support of the people and companies that were part of Guam’s military buildup. In the

¹¹⁸ U.S. Congress, Representatives, *The Use of Temporary Alien Labor in Guam*, 9.

¹¹⁹ U.S. Congress, Representatives, *The Use of Temporary Alien Labor in Guam*, 10.

perspective of these companies, the lack of available local workers was evident by how the U.S. military had trouble recruiting workers from Hawai'i and the continental United States. These potential American workers often cited the vast geographical distance and poor working and living conditions as deterrents from wanting to work in Guam. As Admiral Joel D. Parks testified in Congress in 1956, "There is no housing in Guam, no family housing for these vast quantities, or, rather these 8,000 people which would have to come there."¹²⁰ In addition, many businesses believed that the Chamorro population on island was not trained to take on work. In the early 1950s, there were no established training programs on the island, and the U.S. military contractors did not take up the opportunity to do so. (The College of Guam was established in 1952 as a teachers' college and did not offer vocational training.) So instead, the U.S. military and civilian businesses sought to recruit foreign workers, mainly from the Philippines, who were more readily available to do the work necessary to support U.S. military operations in Guam.

In order to become eligible for H-2 workers, the U.S. military petitioned the U.S. federal government to make an exception to the 1952 Immigration Act for its operations in Guam. According to a congressional report, "The Navy argued in 1953 that the aliens employed in connection with its mission on Guam were temporary in the sense that the mission itself was a temporary one, and that they were vital to the national defense."¹²¹ Like the justification for annexing Chamorro land, U.S. military strategic interests heavily influenced the federal enforcement of federal immigration law and subsequently fueled the desire for a cheap, easily accessible labor force from the Philippines. "On July 27, 1953," a congressional report mentions, "the Immigration and Naturalization Services accepted this argument, indicating that it would approve H-2 petitions filed by military contractors and by private businesses which 'substantially serve the Armed Forces

¹²⁰ U.S. Congress, House, Committee, *Minimum Wage*, 268.

¹²¹ U.S. Congress, Representatives, *The Use of Temporary Alien Labor in Guam*, 10.

or contractors thereto within the Territory.”¹²² Although under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Department of the Interior, the U.S. military ultimately dictated the application of U.S. immigration policy in Guam. “In effect then,” the congressional report stated, “INS allowed temporary alien workers to enter during the greater part of the 1950’s more or less as they had prior to the 1952 Act.”¹²³

Here lies the paradoxical nature of U.S. militarism in regard to temporary labor in Guam. While the U.S. military argued that its postwar military build-up was a temporary project, its presence, nonetheless, was the opposite. The permanence of military bases and the U.S. desire to maintain its presence in the Asia-Pacific region meant that there would be a perpetual need for a large enough labor force to continue building, repairing, and managing military infrastructure and adjacent civilian businesses. So even though the recruited workers were temporary on an individual basis—they were allowed to stay in Guam for stints of a maximum of three years—the H-2 program and the U.S. military’s waiver meant that Guam would see a revolving door of Filipino foreign workers throughout the remainder of the twentieth century. When the blanket H-2 program ceased in 1959, the U.S. military was able to lobby for a Defense Parole System, which allowed the military to continue recruiting foreign workers for its projects and missions. This time, the U.S. military argued that Guam’s bases provided crucial reinforcements for the Vietnam War, and thus there was a sufficient need for a large, imported labor force which could not be filled by local labor.¹²⁴ U.S. wars in the Asia-Pacific region only reified and justified the presence of U.S. military bases in Guam, making them permanent installations.

¹²² U.S. Congress, Representatives, *The Use of Temporary Alien Labor in Guam*, 10.

¹²³ U.S. Congress, Representatives, *The Use of Temporary Alien Labor in Guam*, 10.

¹²⁴ U.S. Congress, Representatives, *The Use of Temporary Alien Labor in Guam*, 20.

After the implementation of the 1952 Immigration Act on Guam, the INS started to treat U.S. military and civilian businesses differently in regard to importation of foreign labor. Local business owners argued that this furthered the inability for civilian population Guam to build a local economy exclusive of the U.S. military. While military operations were considered “temporary” and thus eligible for H-2 workers, civilian businesses that were not directly tied to the military contracts had a more difficult time arguing that their need for labor was also temporary. As a result, they were not eligible to receive H-2 workers. As Turner mentioned during a 1954 Congressional visit, local businesses were able to receive support from the U.S. military stating that they contributed to the military, but Turner witnessed a change in their policy: “as I now understand it the military very properly feels that unless they have a direct connection with the business and are able to evaluate that it does render a substantial service to the Armed Forces it is not their duty or their position to make a certification.”¹²⁵ Without other large markets to sell their products or provide services, local civilian businesses were dependent on the military personnel that stayed on the island. By not supporting these local businesses through advocating for much-needed labor, the U.S. military effectively stymied the development of a local economy.

This trend continued into the next decade. While the U.S. military was able to persuade U.S. federal agencies to use foreign workers for military operations through the Defense Parole Act in the early 1960s, civilian companies on Guam had a more difficult time attaining the same waiver for their companies.¹²⁶ In part due to local Chamorro critiques of the H-2 visa’s effects on racialized wage scales and the preference for foreign workers, federal agencies believed that creating a parole system for the civilian side Guam was detrimental to the local labor force.¹²⁷ Military-affiliated

¹²⁵ U.S. Congress, House, Committee, *Guam Mariana Islands*, 24.

¹²⁶ U.S. Congress, Representatives, *The Use of Temporary Alien Labor in Guam*, 16.

¹²⁷ A more thorough explanation of this critique is found in chapter 3 of this dissertation. By 1956, Chamorro leaders lambasted the racialized wage scales utilized by the U.S. military and military contractors. Because Filipino workers were paid less than Chamorros, Chamorro leaders believed that military contractors preferred to hire temporary workers who

companies were not held to the same standard, and could continue recruiting foreign workers. The decision backfired. By March 1960, any civilian company without ties to the military were required by the INS to repatriate one-third of their foreign workforce, approximately 800 workers.

Significantly, as one 1964 report pointed out, “since February 1, 1960, the only Filipino nationals who have been admitted to Guam for the performance of temporary services have been assigned exclusively to defense activities in Guam, with the exception of additional Filipinos who have been admitted to Guam since the devastation of Typhoon Karen in Fall of 1962 for purposes of general rehabilitation of the island.”¹²⁸ So, while the U.S. military continued the militarization of the island with foreign workers, the civilian economy was left without enough skilled workers to create infrastructure or train new local workers for other areas of the economy such as tourism.

It was only when Guam was hit by two massive typhoons Karen (1962) and Olive (1963) and when President John F. Kennedy lifted the island’s security clearance that the INS allowed the creation of the Parole Act for Guam so that local civilian companies can recruit foreign workers to help rebuild the island. Ninety-five percent of all homes were destroyed, thus necessitating a large workforce to get the island back to normal.¹²⁹ By 1964, nearly 700 Filipino foreign workers were admitted to rebuild Guam, and some of them stayed to help build the nascent tourism industry.¹³⁰ The issue of temporary migrant labor, the H-2 visa, and the inconsistency between federal immigration law’s applicability to the U.S. military versus the civilian population of Guam continued to be a contentious issue throughout latter half of the twentieth century. This issue affected not just

were more profitable and easier to manage. Antonio B. Won Pat and Celia Bamba travelled to Washington D.C. to plead their case. At the congressional hearing, Won Pat described the wages paid to Filipino migrant workers in Guam as “coolie wages” and “slavery.” U.S. Congress, House, Committee, *Minimum Wage*, 487.

¹²⁸ Kenneth C. Robertson, “Survey of Alien Labor Policy for Guam, October 14-25, 1964,” MSS 2480 Box 12 Folder 22, Manuel Guerrero Papers, Micronesian Area Research Center, University of Guam, 6.

¹²⁹ U.S. Naval Oceanography Command Center Joint Typhoon Warning Center ComNavMarianas, “Tropical Cyclones Affecting Guam (1671-1990),” (October 1991), 35. Found [https://www.weather.gov/media/gum/Tropical%20Cyclones%20Affecting%20Guam%20\(1671-1990\).pdf](https://www.weather.gov/media/gum/Tropical%20Cyclones%20Affecting%20Guam%20(1671-1990).pdf)

¹³⁰ Robertson, “Survey of Alien Labor Policy for Guam,” 15.

the potential for civilian economic development, but also the Chamorro self-determination movements that critiqued federal immigration laws.

The creation of permanent U.S. military bases and the establishment of a civilian economy relied not only on the annexation of Chamorro land, but the establishment of a non-white laboring settler population in Guam.¹³¹ Since the end of World War II, the U.S. military could manipulate federal immigration law in order to use the growing community of Filipino permanent residents, H-2 temporary labor, and eventually family members of newly naturalized Filipino Americans as a labor force to ensure its grasp on the island. While the U.S. military created the labor regimes for cheap migrant labor, the civilian business community also wanted to do the same. As a result, Chamorros were left out of the burgeoning economy, which further exacerbated the loss of land in the postwar era. This economic transformation was critiqued by Chamorro leaders who felt that they had no control or voice on immigration policy, which directly affected Chamorro people in Guam.¹³²

Guam as a Militarized Stepping-Stone

The growth in the number of Filipino permanent residents in Guam signaled the beginning of a large non-white settler population in Guam, one that was diverse in experience, yet held the common view that Guam was U.S. territory, a place where the American dream was a tangible

¹³¹ It is possible that the U.S. military used immigration law in this way to encourage the settlement of Guam to ensure military security of Micronesia. Historian Hal Friedman uncovered several propositions by Naval officers to settle Micronesia utilizing peoples of different races for different purposes. Though he admits that the views of a couple of Naval personnel does not prove the intention for settler colonialism in the Pacific, his findings are, nevertheless, insightful. Through archival research in Naval archives, Friedman found that “when it came to permanent settlers, as opposed to temporary labourers, the order of race preference changed, with Caucasians again being the most ‘preferred’ group, then Micronesians or Filipinos, and finally East Asians.” White people were considered the optimal peoples to populate and settle the U.S. controlled islands in the Pacific, and Filipinos were the best non-white race to be utilized as laborers. According to Friedman’s, Filipinos were preferred over Japanese and other East Asians because they posed less of a security risk and were familiar with American colonial experience in the Philippines. Some Naval officers believed that perceptions race paired settler colonialism could be used as a tool of military security within the Pacific, thus solidifying the United States hold on the region. Hal Friedman, “Races undesirable from a military point of view: United States Cultural Security in the Pacific Islands, 1945-1947” *The Journal of Pacific History* Vol 32 No. 1, 49-70.

¹³² Chamorros were able to elect its first civilian governor in 1970. Beforehand, the President of the United States appointed governors in Guam who were often privy towards U.S. military operations. In 1972, Guam was able to elect its first non-voting delegate to the United States Congress, Antonio B. Won Pat, who also served as Guam’s territorial lobbyist before the creation of the congressional seat.

possibility. A Filipino seeking a better life in the U.S. could feasibly begin the journey eastward towards the North American continent by first landing a job in Guam with the help of relatives or friends who were already on the island. If their relatives were U.S. citizens, these Filipinos could use familial relations to attempt to secure U.S. permanent residency and eventually U.S. citizenship. This is quite similar to many narratives of chain migration to the United States. But what makes Guam unique is just how much the U.S. military played a role in the establishment of a Filipino community in Guam compared to the Filipino diaspora in the continental United States or Hawai'i where agriculture and plantation economies often paved the way for migration in the early part of the twentieth century. By looking at this period between the end of World War II and 1965, Filipinos on Guam are part of the longer and larger phenomenon described by Robyn Magalit Rodriguez as “the globalization of Filipino labor [that] is crucially linked to the globalization of US empire as well as US capital.”¹³³ The U.S. military influenced so many aspects of Guam’s governance that nearly every Filipino who arrived in Guam in this postwar period had ties to the U.S. military and empire.

Despite the establishment of a civilian government, Guam was a secure zone for military operations. A few months after the Guam Organic Act was signed, the Department of the Navy reissued the security clearance first implemented by Executive Order No. 8683 by Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1941.¹³⁴ Doing so would allow the U.S. military vast control over the movement of peoples and goods in and out of the island despite the establishment of a civilian government and greater civilian governance under the Department of the Interior. Thus, any person who visited Guam needed permission from the Secretary of the Navy who determined that the person was arriving primarily for and posed no threat to military operations. According to lawyers W. Scott

¹³³ Rodriguez, “Toward a Critical Filipino Studies Approach to Filipino Migration,” 46.

¹³⁴ W. Scott Barrett and Walter S. Ferenz, “Peacetime Martial Law in Guam,” *California Law Review* Vol. 48, No.1 (March 1960). Frank Quimby, “Security Clearance on Guam,” Guampedia Inc, (October 13, 2019), Accessed August 24, 2020, <https://www.guampedia.com/security-clearance-on-guam/>.

Barrett and Walter S. Ferenz, multiple justifications were utilized by the U.S. military to regulate those in and out of the island. The reasons included the ongoing Korean War, the desire to prevent businessmen from capitalizing on defense spending, the regulation of the presence of foreign workers, the main purpose of Guam as a military base, as a way to aid the local government from unnecessary politics, and to ensure that “entry into Guam is limited to persons who contribute to its ‘strategic development.’”¹³⁵ The security clearance was another way the U.S. military could retain control over Guam. The security clearance also applied to Filipino alien workers who arrived to work for the U.S. military and its adjacent businesses. Thus, Filipinos arriving in Guam were vetted by the authorities and their entrance was deemed necessary to military operations. Militarism dictated movement of peoples into and out of Guam, ensuring its settled presence on the island.

Military labor recruitment practices in the Philippines also shaped the waves of Filipinos migrating into Guam. U.S. military contractors recruited workers in the Philippines through regionally based recruitment processes that frequently exploited the familial connections to encourage many to sign up to be foreign workers in Guam. Filipinos who arrived in Guam or their descendants often cite the presence of another family member on the island who guided them through the process of adjusting to life on the island. In an oral history, Florita, a woman from Panay Island in the Iloilo region, remarked that her husband Vic had an uncle—specifically his father’s first cousin—working for the U.S. Navy before he arrived in 1950. It was through Uncle Tuting that Vic had first heard about Florita, who was a student at the time. They began to send letters to each other, eventually meeting each other in the early 1960s when Vic took a vacation from his job as an electrician on Guam. They were married not too long after in a shotgun wedding in Iloilo.¹³⁶ Florita then moved with Vic to Guam and settled in a village not too far from Camp Roxas,

¹³⁵ Barrett and Ferenz, “Peacetime Martial Law in Guam,” 7.

¹³⁶ Florita Oberiano, oral history with author, December 25, 2019.

where Vic had worked for a military contract company that built the Navy base. Although Florita does not know how or when Vic received his U.S. citizenship, she nonetheless received her citizenship as a result of their marriage. They decided to settle on Guam, bought land, built a house, and raised their family of five children in the village of Santa Rita. Family members provided support for Filipino migrant workers, giving them guidance on how to deal with their employers and how to live in Guam. While the military provided the routes of empire for many Filipinos, their family members often gave them the first piece support to settle in Guam.

Because some Filipinos in Guam had received U.S. citizenship, they could petition their relatives to come to the U.S.. H-2 workers would sometimes use their family members who already earned U.S. citizenship to petition for their permanent residency as well. A provision of the 1924 Immigration Act “allowed citizen to welcome their immediate relatives” without impacting national quotas.¹³⁷ By working in Guam, a temporary H-2 worker could use their connections to their family to simultaneously seek permanent employment in another business, while waiting for their relative to process immigration papers under the family reunification clause of the immigration act.

Take for instance the story of two brothers, Jose Bello and Manuel Bello, from the Philippine province of Ilocos Sur. Jose left the Philippines when he was seventeen in 1928, embarking on a ship to work in the plantations in Hawai‘i. After years of hard labor with little pay, he decided to upskill, taking welding classes so that he could find a better job elsewhere. With his new skills, he found a job in the docks of Pearl Harbor shortly before the Japanese forces attacked Hawai‘i, launching the United States into war in the Pacific. Meanwhile, his brother Manuel joined the Philippine Scouts fighting guerilla warfare in the mountains of Luzon. Towards the tail end of the war in October 1944, Jose was recruited by the U.S. military to build infrastructure in the newly

¹³⁷ Dawn Mabalon, *Little Manila is in the Heart: The Making of the Filipino/American Community in Stockton, California* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013), 246.

captured Northern Mariana Islands, searching for water sources, and digging water wells to support the U.S.'s advance across the Pacific during World War II. Although his stint in Tinian was cut short, Jose found himself in Guam searching for water sources a year later in November 1945. While living in a labor camp, Camp Edusa, located near the northern village of Dededo, he met Dolores Benavente, his future Chamorro wife. By February 26, 1946, they were married.

Jose told his younger brother Manuel about the possibilities of jobs in Guam, where he could work to support his young family back in the province. The Air Force base, where Jose worked as a welder, did not often use recruitment companies to find workers.¹³⁸ Filipinos, especially Ilocanos, took advantage of this, and often recommended their relatives to their employers. So, in 1953, Manuel departed the Philippines and worked as a H-2 worker employed by the U.S. military. Manuel wanted to earn and save just enough money so that he could live a comfortable life in the Philippines. He was able to do so by the late 1950s, building a house in the *barangay* of Dammay, purchasing land to raise crops. Unfortunately, his son, Maximo, became extremely ill, and needed expensive medical treatment, but ultimately passed away. The medical treatment ate into the money that Manuel had saved from working in Guam, and with his daughter Marieta heading to college soon, Manuel decided to head back to Guam to earn more money for his family.

On Guam, his brother Jose used his connections to get Manuel a job as a busboy at the Andersen Air Force Base Officer's Club, and he lived in the barracks at Camp MARBO, another labor camp near the village of Mangilao. During this time, Jose started the paperwork to have his brother become a permanent resident so that he could gain U.S. citizenship, which he eventually did sometime in the 1960s.¹³⁹ Manuel then petitioned his daughter Marieta to work in Guam, who

¹³⁸ Robertson, "Survey of Alien Labor Policy," 14.

¹³⁹ Jose Bello's family is unsure under what circumstances he was able to receive U.S. citizenship. It is believed that Jose's first wife, who he married while in Hawai'i before WWII, was American, and his family thought he could have received citizenship then. Alternatively, he could have been made a citizen through the post-WWII Luce-Cellar Act which allowed Filipinos who had settled in the US, permanent residents and U.S. citizens. Lastly, Jose could have also received

became a U.S. citizen in 1975. She quickly petitioned her mother and two younger sisters. Marieta eventually moved to Los Angeles in the late 1970s. While Manuel used Guam as an opportunity for economic gain to support his family in the Philippines, his daughter saw the possibilities of his U.S. citizenship to strike it on her own on the U.S. continent. For the Bello brothers, their migration stories were shaped by the contours and routes of the U.S. empire and was influenced by wartime and military experience of the twentieth-century Pacific.

Some Filipinos without Filipino-American met and married Chamorro women who could extend their American citizenship to their Filipino husbands. For example, Constante Ferrandiz Payumo, from the Ilocos region, had an older brother, Geraldo, living and working in Guam for Andersen Air Force Base before he arrived in 1952. In the 1950s, he worked at the Officer's Club, which often hired Ilocanos. He eventually moved to work with the Navy Shipyard and the Navy Supply Depot until his retirement in 1992. Although his brother was deported early on in his stay, Payumo married Nicolasa Delgado, a Chamorro woman from the southern village of Inarajan, in 1959. Constante's family often remark about the romance involved in the lengths Constante traveled to meet his future wife. While Camp MARBO was on the northern side of the island, Inarajan was a southern village. So in order to see Nicolasa, Constante had to travel through an island with a road system still under construction, without access to reliable transportation, and with the military's restrictions that attempted to separate the Filipino migrant workers from the local population. Constante and Nicolasa have a large mixed Chamorro-Filipino family of twelve children. With his new family, Constante subsequently applied for permanent residency, and became a naturalized U.S.

citizenship after marrying Dolores, who would have become a U.S. citizen as a result of the 1950 Guam Organic Act. Whatever the circumstances were, what does matter is that Jose was the first link in a chain of family members who settled in the United States.

citizen in 1962.¹⁴⁰ Constante and Nicolasa and a few of their children and grandchildren now live in Las Vegas, Nevada.

Some Filipinos utilized their participation in the U.S. military during or after World War II to find economic opportunities in other parts of the empire. Lorenzo Bantangan was born to a farming family in the province of Nueva Ecija. At a young age he moved to Manila to live with his uncle's family and to take care of his cousin, until the Japanese military bombed Manila in 1941. Like the Chamorros on Guam who received the same bombardment from Japanese attack, Bantangan's life changed dramatically. To move them from the chaos in Manila, he and his family fled back to the province. He then became a Philippine Scout who worked alongside American soldiers in guerilla warfare against the Japanese occupation. According to an interview Bantangan had with his granddaughter, he recounted, "when the Japanese surrendered to General MacArthur, the very day after, the Philippine Scouts forced me to re-enlist in the U.S. Army, [where] we were retrained."¹⁴¹ His military records show that he enlisted in the U.S. military on June 7th, 1946 shortly before the U.S. declared the Philippines an independent country, and for the years he worked as military police in Manila.

In June 1949, Bantangan was recruited by the U.S. Air Force to work in Guam. With a sense of adventure, Bantangan embraced the opportunity and worked as an auto mechanic with the U.S. Airforce maintenance and transportation division at Harmon Airfield. After the automechanic job dissolved, Bantangan found various jobs in military and military concessionaires from 1950 through the early 1960s. His resumé showed that he worked as a laundry worker, labor packer, house boy, a

¹⁴⁰ Ruben Payumo (son of Constante Ferrandiz Payumo), text message correspondence with the author, August 25, 2020.

¹⁴¹ Chloe Babauta, "Filipino World War II veteran reflects on Service," *Pacific Daily News*, November 10, 2017, <https://www.guampdn.com/story/news/local/bayanihan/2017/11/10/filipino-world-war-ii-veteran-reflects-service/843096001/?hootPostID=78b1477eb9c1b7b2552ea174ad8f167b>

painter, a general maintenance man, and finally a mess attendant until his retirement in the 1990s.¹⁴² His work was located on the northern side of the island, around or near Camp MARBO. For Batangan, the U.S. military provided opportunities to better his socio-economic circumstances, a much better life than the farm he was raised in the province of Nueva Ecija. Reflecting upon his time in working in and for the U.S. military, he commented “The U.S. government takes care of your family, you have all the benefits, and they protect your family.”¹⁴³ For Batangan, the U.S. military provided a pathway to increase his socio-economic status, but also a sense of purpose to an international cause. With pride, Batangan told his granddaughter that he joined the military even though he was not a US citizen because he wanted “to serve under the United States to defend our people.”¹⁴⁴ Seeing Filipinos and Americans not as separate national entities, he saw them as international partners in achieving security and freedom in the Pacific. Batangan was able to receive citizenship in Guam in 1961.

Other business-minded Filipinos used the economic opportunity of Guam’s postwar boom created by the U.S. military build-up to establish businesses on their own. According to Stevens, “A number of them drifted into the community and set up small businesses, such as barber shops.”¹⁴⁵ Some of these small businesses transformed into large conglomerates, including those who would become prominent Filipinos by using Guam’s postwar boom to establish their businesses and rapidly ascend the social and class structure in Guam. These Filipinos included Mark V. Pangilinan and Manual Jose, who according to historian Pedro Sanchez became some of Guam’s first millionaires.¹⁴⁶ Immediately after World War II, Pangilinan had a business transporting American troops back to the mainland from the Philippines, and thus had the opportunity to create

¹⁴² Chloe Babauta, Oral history interview with the author, December 29, 2019.

¹⁴³ Babauta, “Filipino World War II veteran reflects on service.”

¹⁴⁴ Babauta, “Filipino World War II veteran reflects on service.”

¹⁴⁵ Stevens, *Guam, USA*, 130.

¹⁴⁶ Sanchez, *Guáhan, Guam*, 280.

connections when he stopped over in Guam. In 1948, he opened a tailor shop, and then a restaurant, a furniture store, and soon expanded his conglomerate to include “construction, insurance, retailing, sporting goods, publishing, hardware, and car dealerships.”¹⁴⁷ Jose was a concessionaire brought to Guam by the U.S. military, and soon expanded his business beyond the military’s fences. According to historian Pedro Sanchez, “he and his wife, Edwina, opened a tailor shop in Agana which soon became a popular outlet.” Soon after, they expanded their business to include real estate, movie theatres, a bookstore, and a newspaper, in which he voiced his political opinions through a political cartoon character named “Taotato Guam.”¹⁴⁸ Both Pangilinan and Jose became well-known Filipino figures in civilian Guam, paving the way for more businesses and economies to grow on island. They and their wives played prominent roles in the Filipino Community of Guam and the Filipino Ladies Association of Guam, respectively. The success of Pangilinan and Jose show how Guam’s military build-up could provide economic opportunities not just for low-wage workers, but also for Filipino businessmen who took advantage of the military’s security clearance and regulations that prevented outsiders from establishing businesses on Guam.

World War II and the U.S. military shaped the routes of migration for Filipinos throughout the Pacific, and especially to Guam. Filipinos used these pathways to secure economic and social opportunities, during the first postcolonial decades of the Philippines. Family obligations often spurred the desire to find work outside the Philippines. Families were central to the conditions and parameters of their work and labor, their migration patterns, and even their citizenship. Potential overseas Filipino workers utilized the connections of their relatives to find jobs abroad. Once they found jobs, they would remit their earnings to support families in the provinces. Others saw the economic opportunities as businessmen, building their conglomerates on the backbone of Guam’s

¹⁴⁷ U.S. Congressional Record, “50th Anniversary of M.V. Pangilinan Enterprises,” June 3, 1998, E991.

¹⁴⁸ Sanchez, *Guahan: Guam*, 280.

military build-up. While some Filipino men saw the work abroad as temporary, seeking to eventually return to the Philippines, others settled in Guam. Some of them who were bachelors when they first arrived in Guam travelled back to the Philippines to marry, eventually bringing their wives to settle in what they saw as a happy-medium between the United States and the Philippines. For those that settled in Guam, their wives—Chamorro or Filipino—and their children provided a sense of permanence. And U.S. citizenship made migration and settling easier.

While some Filipinos settled in Guam, other Filipino families used the island as the first step in the process of establishing themselves within the United States. Quite often Filipinos continued to seek more economic and educational opportunities by traveling and settling in the North American continent. By the 1970s, a critique of the Filipino community emerged that purported that Filipinos merely used the island as a stepping-stone towards U.S. citizenship and the U.S. mainland and in the process did not make real and tangible connections and contributions to the island's community. Furthermore, the argument went, Filipinos took opportunities away from Chamorros. In other words, Filipino migrants often saw Guam not as the land of the Chamorro people, but solely as U.S. territory. This early critique of Filipinos by Chamorros would become fully-fledged ethnic tensions as the honeymoon period of U.S. citizenship faded, and Chamorros saw the U.S. military prioritizing Filipino immigration. For instance, Chamorro activist and educator, Robert A. Underwood, wrote that the growth of Filipino and other non-Chamorro immigrants on Guam did not “bode well for those concerned not only with the ultimate survival of the Chamorro people, but for those who may be concerned about the debilitating effects of rapid demographic change.”¹⁴⁹

Referring to the histories of Native Americans on the North American continent, Maoris in

¹⁴⁹ Robert Underwood was a member of the Organization of People for Indigenous Rights (OPI-R), a vocal and influential Chamorro Rights group. Robert A. Underwood, “Immigration and Guam’s Future,” in *Chamorro Self-Determination*, ed. Laura Torres Souder and Robert A. Underwood (Guam: Micronesian Area Research Center, University of Guam, 1987), 59.

Aotearoa (New Zealand), and Native Hawaiians in Hawai'i, Underwood observed that the process of settler colonialism, specifically, Asian settler colonialism, was occurring in the postwar period. By 1980s, the Filipinos represented approximately 21.2 percent of the population, a staggering increase since 1940, when they represented only 2.6 percent of the population.¹⁵⁰ Chamorro fears were not unfounded; in later decades as explained in chapter six of this study, U.S. Congress used the large Filipino-American population to refuse Chamorro desires for self-determination and thus continued settler militarism in Guam.

The confusion that arose during the implementation of federal immigration laws in Guam made it possible for the U.S. military to assert control over migration and labor. Federal immigration waivers were given to the U.S. military, which nonetheless, allowed the U.S. military to continue to exploit cheap foreign labor, while ensuring a relatively stable and inexpensive workforce for the U.S. military operations on Guam. With advice from the U.S. military, the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Services allowed nearly 1,500 Filipinos working on Guam between 1948 and 1952 to obtain U.S. permanent residency status.¹⁵¹ Furthermore, the 1952 Immigration Act also established the H-2 visa for entry of temporary non-immigrant unskilled labor, a provision that the military utilized quite heavily to staff their operations and adjacent civilian businesses with Filipino alien workers. As a result, many Filipinos migrant workers began to see the island as a “stepping-stone” for economic and social opportunities and ultimately for further migration to the United States continent.

¹⁵⁰ Today, Filipinos represent nearly 30% of the island's population, while Chamorros represent 35%. Interagency Committee on Population, Government of Guam, “Guam's People, ‘A Continuing Heritage’, Penetsigan Hinirensian Taotao Guam: A Statistical Profile of the Territory of Guam, 1920-1980 (Guam, 1988), 134.

¹⁵¹ U.S. Congress, Representatives, *The Use of Temporary Alien Labor in Guam*, 8.

After World War II, the U.S. military saw the geographic and military strategic value in Guam, fortifying what was a small inconsequential coaling station into the “tip of the spear” of U.S. presence in the Asia-Pacific region at the beginning of the Cold War. The seemingly separate histories of Chamorro aspirations for U.S. citizenship and the waves of Filipino migration into Guam in the latter half of the twentieth century are linked by the U.S.’s preoccupation with Cold War security and further militarization of the island. This early Cold War period shows just how much U.S. military strategic interests influenced federal decisions in regard to Guam’s political status, federal policies, as well as the Chamorros and Filipinos who lived on the island. As such, the United States military dictated the terms upon which Chamorros and Filipinos could be incorporated as American citizens, ensuring the enacted policies ensured the U.S. military’s control over the land and labor it needed to ensure its permanent presence in the Pacific. With the Guam Organic Act and U.S. citizenship, Chamorros incorporated Americanness into their identity. Filipinos, now independent from the United States, saw Guam not just an insignificant island territory, but an island of opportunity, a stepping-stone towards U.S. citizenship and the continental US. With these transformations, the U.S. military’s presence in Guam became permanent; U.S. citizenship became a tool of settler militarism in Guam.

The Paradox of Paradise: The Rise of Multiculturalism and Chamorro-Filipino Tensions

In August of 1970, the *Pacific Daily News* published a magazine about Guam's economic progress since the Guam Organic Act of 1950. In a section titled "Guam USA: Land of Sunshine, Swaying Palms, and Friendly Smiles," the newspaper highlighted the economic and cultural transformation brought on by the island's nascent tourism industry. The cover of the section featured a welcoming local man with a big smile, a silhouette of a single coconut branch, and six men racing carabaos. The stories and articles were adorned with photos of brown-skinned men blowing conch shells, "island-shirt and muumuu clad" Japanese tourists at the Guam International Airport, an "old Chamorro woman" in *mestiza* dress carrying a "Guamanian of the future," a collage of photos that featured "A Real Tourist Attraction—Guam's Beautiful Girls" of a "variety" of ethnicities, and local fishermen holding up their 300-pound groupers caught fresh from the reef. There were also advertisements for new hotels and shipping companies that promised "the paradise island of your dreams."¹

The newspaper signaled to the possibilities of Guam's economic development centered around an ideal, pleasant, and multicultural paradise. Indeed, the market for tourists from Asia—a mere three to four hours away by plane—was seen as the answer to the civilian economic growth the island needed. Rather than fly to Hawai'i which could cost a lot more, some Japanese tourists wanted a more affordable tropical destination and still get the feel of visiting the United States. Embedded in this appeal of tropical paradise were the gendered and racialized locals that brought a certain exoticism to the Japanese tourist experience.² The *Pacific Daily News*, alongside tourism

¹ The tourism section of the Guam Progress insert by the *Pacific Daily News* is a collection of multiple articles. Descriptions of the contents can be found in "Guam USA: Land of Sunshine, Swaying Palms, and Friendly Smiles," *Pacific Daily News* (August 30, 1970), 1-45.

² On the relationship between militarism and tourism especially in the Pacific, read Teresia Teaiwa, "Bikinis and Other s/Pacific n/Oceans," In *Voyaging through the Contemporary Pacific*, eds. David L. Hanlon and Geoffrey M. White (Lanham,

boosters, foreign investors, and local civilian companies all emphasized the gendered multiculturalism that Guam could offer. The feminized Pacific island was complemented by the presumed character of Guam's particular multiculturalism in which there was "very little, if any, outward signs of racial tensions."³ Thus, Guam capitalized on this desire and became the island where Japanese tourists could "return with happy memories of their tropical honeymoon and vacationers take back pleasant thoughts of their first visit to part of the United States."⁴ Guam was to become America's newest peaceful multicultural tropical paradise in the Western Pacific.⁵

Yet, the perception of an idyllic paradise masked the rumbling tensions of an island that was feeling the pressure of this rapid transformation. Fifteen years after the *Pacific Daily News* lauded the peacefulness of the multicultural society, a Chamorro student from John F. Kennedy High School—coincidentally, the school that sits on a cliff overlooking the tourism district for the island—was sent to the hospital for a weekend after suffering a concussion and receiving "four large head lacerations after he was hit with a lug wrench and a belt buckle."⁶ The fight had occurred after he "made ethnic slurs against a Filipino student and another Filipino boy" and the Filipinos fought back.⁷ While students like the class president, who happened to be Korean, did not notice the racial tensions, one

Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 87-109; Vernadette Vicuña Gonzalez, *Securing Paradise: Tourism and Militarism in Hawai'i and the Philippines* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013).

³ "A Hobglob of Ethnic Groups: A mixture of the old and the new," *Pacific Daily News* Progress Edition (August 30, 1970), Tourism Section, 6.

⁴ Janet Go, "Guam – The Honeymoon Island: Return of the Japanese," *Pacific Daily News* Progress Edition (August 30, 1970), Tourism Section, 4.

⁵ On the rise of American multiculturalism in the Cold War from the continental perspective, read Mark Brilliant, *The Color of America Has Changed: How Racial Diversity Shaped Civil Rights Reform in California, 1941-1978* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Yen Lê Espiritu, *Asian American Panethnicity: Bridging Institutions and Identities* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993); Mary Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011). On critiques of liberal multiculturalism from the Pacific perspective, read Haunani Kay Trask, *From a Native Daughter: Colonialism and Sovereignty in Hawai'i* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1999); Candace Fujikane and Jonathan Y. Okamura, *Asian Settler Colonialism: From Local Governance to the Habits of Everyday Life in Hawai'i* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2008); Dean Saranillio, "Colliding Histories: Hawai'i Statehood at the Intersection of Asians 'Ineligible to Citizenship' and Hawaiians 'Unfit for Self-Government,'" *Journal of Asian American Studies* 13, no. 3 (2010): 283–309; Dean Itsuji Saranillio, *Unsustainable Empire: Alternative Histories of Hawai'i Statehood* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2018).

⁶ Victoria King, "School settles after race incident," *Pacific Daily News* (January 15, 1985), 1.

⁷ King, "Schools Settles after race incident," *Pacific Daily News*, 1.

high school student commented after the fight, “Kids are influenced by adults...they (some Chamorro students) know that this is their island and if Filipino boys become outspoken, they feel the Filipino students are trying to take over.”⁸ Throughout the 1970s and into the 1980s, the social tensions between Filipinos and Chamorros had manifested in fights that broke out among teenagers in the Guam public schools.⁹

If settler militarism was the violent structure for U.S. control over Guam in the immediate post-World War II years, the cultural pluralism and multiculturalism of the 1960s and 1970s was the illusive façade that blunted the edge of the presence and legacy of U.S. colonialism in Guam. The burgeoning tourism industry presented Guam as the multicultural island paradise while simultaneously masking a local society that was in ethnic and racial turmoil.¹⁰ The changes caused by the end of the military security clearance and opening of Guam to foreign investors brought along with it social and cultural transformations that were both welcomed and feared. For Chamorro people, the tourism development provided possibilities for a civilian economy beyond catering to the U.S. military. But some Chamorro leaders warned that this transformation, if not properly planned, could reduce Chamorro control over their island’s affairs and society. If loss of land was the major problem in the 1940s and 1950s, the inability to control the economic growth of the island and reap the rewards from foreign investments posed serious problems for Chamorros in the 1960s and 1970s. Furthermore, this economic development was bolstered by multiculturalism which presumed that racial equality also meant equal access to capitalize on Guam’s natural and human resources for profit. In other words, Guam’s economic development did not protect Chamorro perspectives or opportunities. Rather, it was a free-for-all, where white statesiders, immigrants, and

⁸ King, “Schools Settles after race incident,” *Pacific Daily News*, 1.

⁹ Filipino-Chamorro relations literature.

¹⁰ For how tourism has affected Guam’s society, read Christine Taitano Delisle, “Destination Chamorro Culture: Notes on Realignment, Rebranding, and Post-9/11 Miltourism in Guam,” *American Quarterly* 68:3 (2016): 563-572.

foreign investors could take advantage of Guam's unincorporated territorial status, exploit Chamorro land and resources, and reinforce Guam's colonial status within the United States empire.

In this chapter I examine how Guam's economic transformation ushered in a new era of multiculturalism that merged with U.S. settler militarism on the island which ultimately furthered U.S. empire in the Pacific. Starting in the 1960s, the politics, economics, and the culture around Guam's burgeoning tourism industry were heralded by government officials and business leaders as the optimal option for Guam's development. This tourism-based economic development was a gendered and racialized process that relied on tropes of the pristine feminized tropical paradise and a welcoming, hospitable, somewhat gullible, and multi-racial people. Because of this, Chamorro leaders such as Pedro C. Sanchez, a well-respected Guam educator and politician gave provocative warnings about the problems with unregulated, unplanned economic development that threatened to decimate what and who was left of the Chamorro people and culture. Indeed, the rapid transformation of the island created cultural tensions in which Chamorros felt uneasy about their position as racialized minorities within their own home island, as white statesiders and Filipinos began to call for cultural pluralism and multiculturalism, especially in the Guam public school system. In this same moment, the development of Filipino community in Guam was in full swing, which provided community support for diverse waves of immigrants from the Philippines, but nonetheless, created a large settled non-indigenous population on Guam. These transformations exacerbated the racial and ethnic tensions between Filipinos and Chamorros that manifested in Guam politics, in schools, and everyday lives.

Although scholars have studied the Chamorro, Filipino, and white statesider communities on Guam separately, this chapter seeks to triangulate the relations between them to understand the paradox of a multicultural Guam. Even in the economic boom of the 1960s and 1970s, the island "Where America's Day Begins" was a hotbed of racial tensions in its rise to becoming a bastion of

American multiculturalism in the Pacific. The social and cultural developments of the 1960s and the 1970s would set the stage for the racialized discussions that would pierce through the debates around Chamorro self-determination and the possibilities of a renewed political status within the United States empire during the 1980s.

The Economic Prospects of Paradise

On November 11, 1962, Typhoon Karen slammed Guam with 175 miles-per-hour sustained winds and gusts up to 200 miles-per-hour.¹¹ It sat atop the island for nearly two days straight. Although fatalities were low, the island's infrastructure, which was built with temporary materials, was blown away, ripped apart, or otherwise unusable. The damage was so bad that President John F. Kennedy immediately sent recovery teams and aid packages to rebuild the island. Just a couple months before, JFK lifted the seventeen-year-old security clearance requirement that effectively held the island under the U.S. military's control. For the first time since 1938, a person leaving or arriving on Guam did not need to request permission from the US military to do so.¹² The island became ripe with potential as the confluence of the end of security clearance requirement, the possibility of a civilian economy, the need to rebuild after Typhoon Karen and then Typhoon Olive five months later in 1963, and the influx of millions of dollars in recovery aid made the creation of a modern Guam all the more possible.

Guam's leaders sought to use the re-opening of the island and the post-typhoon Karen rebuilding funds to envision and create an economy in which civilians could participate. The island needed an economy that would allow Guamanians to rely less on military spending, and was not as land intensive as agriculture due to the lack of arable land caused by military annexation, destruction, and other things. Guam, however, did have beautiful beaches, a tropical climate, and close proximity

¹¹ Rogers, *Destiny's Landfall*, 219.

¹² Rogers, *Destiny's Landfall*, 218.

to the increasingly booming markets in Asia.¹³ With that, tourism naturally became the emerging industry that would bring the civilian population of Guam into a prosperous future.

In 1962, the presidentially-appointed Chamorro governor of Guam, Manuel Flores, created the Guam Tourist Commission to begin planning economic development around tourism from Japan and countries in Asia.¹⁴ A 1966 Congressional Economic Development report wrote that “a direct potential for Guam exists in the Japanese and Australian tourist markets” and can include travelers from “Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and Thailand” who would stopover in Guam on their way to the United States continent.¹⁵ Particularly for Japanese tourists, Guam would be the alternative tropical paradise to Hawai‘i which became too expensive for low budget travelers. Guam also provided a more isolated, developing island landscape rather than the already bustling city of Honolulu. As one representative of a Japanese-based tourism company said in 1968, “‘Guam is another Hawaii,’ only, ‘unspoiled.’”¹⁶ With this market within reach, Chamorros, Filipino immigrants, statesiders, as well as other foreign investors capitalized on this potential. In 1967, the Guam International Airport opened, sharing the airstrip with U.S. Naval Air Station in the stomach of the island in the village of Tiyan.¹⁷ The same day the first commercial tour group from Japan arrived and stayed at the statesider-owned Cliff Hotel, the U.S.-based company Continental Airlines

¹³ There were attempts by Governor Carlton Skinner in the 1950s to promote tourism on Guam. Due to the security clearance, however, the Government of Guam found it extremely difficult to lure investors into the island. Government of Guam, Department of Commerce, “Guam 1970: An Economy in Transition,” (Hagåtña: Government of Guam, 1971), 20.

¹⁴ “Guerrero Moves to Build Up tourism – Creates Commission,” *Guam Daily News* (June 27, 1973), 1.

¹⁵ U.S. Congress, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs *Economic Development of the Territory of Guam*, 89th Cong., 2d sess., (1966), Committee Print No. 16, 14.

¹⁶ “Japanese Group May Take over Hotel: \$1,000,000 Business,” *Guam Daily News* (September 3, 1968).

¹⁷ Tiyan is the Chamorro word for stomach. The village is near the center of Guam and is only 2 miles away from the tourism district in the village of Tumon. One could see the tourism district with high rise hotels, once that one steps out of front entrance of the Guam International Airport today. Rogers, *Destiny’s Landfall*, 222.

announced plans to build a hotel in Tumon.¹⁸ By 1969, it was reported that 58,000 people had visited Guam.¹⁹ The prospects for a tourist economy seemed bright.

The irony was not lost on a few observers who saw how Japan which held Guam captive for thirty-two months during World War II was now the prime audience for Guam's civilian economic development both as tourists partaking in honeymoon getaways and as investors erecting hotel skyscrapers. Since Governor Guerrero established the Guam Tourism Commission which became the Guam Visitors' Bureau in later years), they anticipated increased arrivals of Japanese tourists. At the invitation of Alfred "Al" Ysrael, a Filipino immigrant and entrepreneur, The Fujita Tourist Enterprise made plans to build their first international hotel in Guam.²⁰ This was the first foreign owned and operated hotel to be built on Guam, and "paved the way for increased commercial confidence in Guam's potential as a world premiere, international visitor destination in the Western Pacific."²¹ By 1973, seventy percent of the quarter of a million tourists were arriving from Japan, many of them honeymooners looking to stretch their dollars.²² On Guam they could spend time at the beaches, shop tax free in luxury shops such as Duty Free Shoppers (DFS), as well as take in "the casual atmosphere on the island."²³ If they wanted a more historical tour, they could visit all of the parks that commemorated World War II in Guam. Japanese tourists embodied the transformation not only of Guam as one of war to peace, but of the geopolitical changes of the whole Pacific. In the *Pacific Daily News* article about tourism, one writer noted that "the sorrow and animosities of war are all but forgotten today by visitors and islanders alike."²⁴

¹⁸ "First Tourist Group Arrives, 17 from Japan," *Guam Daily News* (August 1, 1967), 1; and "Continental to Build Guam Hotel, 92 Rooms, Near Ipao Beach," *Guam Daily News* (August 1, 1967), 1.

¹⁹ Rogers, *Destiny's Landfall*, 222.

²⁰ "Japanese Group May Take over Hotel: \$1,000,000 Business," *Guam Daily News* (September 3, 1968), 1.

²¹ "Alfred Curie Ysrael: Real Estate Developer Improving Guam's Quality of Life," *Hale'ta I Manfäy: Who's Who in Chamorro History* Vol. III (Hagåtña, Guam: Department of Chamorro Affairs, 2002), 284.

²² Rogers, *Destiny's Landfall*, 228.

²³ "Japanese Group May Take over Hotel: \$1,000,000 Business," *Guam Daily News* (September 3, 1968), 1.

²⁴ Go, "Guam – The Honeymoon Island: Return of the Japanese," 4.

White statesiders also saw opportunity in Guam. Earl Edward Kloppenberg, for instance, “built his family enterprise on a host of restaurants, bars, retail gift shops, hotel-motel operations, international food catering and travel hospitality services.”²⁵ Kloppenberg was a World War II veteran of the European theater. Arriving on Guam in 1947 before the security clearance was lifted, he catered mostly to military personnel.²⁶ After 1962, however, he capitalized on the new market of foreign tourist by establishing in-flight kitchen caterers, Turtle tours, Turtle Cove (a beachside campsite), Paradise Pier, River Boat Cruises, Dolphin Watching Adventures in addition to other tourist-oriented activities that highlighted Guam’s tropicality.²⁷ Kloppenberg Enterprises, as his business conglomerate came to be known, was a major contributor to Guam’s tourism development.

Gordon Mailloux, another white statesider who called Guam home, also took it upon himself to boost Guam’s tourism economy around the world. A World War II veteran of the Pacific Theatre, Mailloux arrived in Guam as an investigator for the War Department. With a love for performance and theater, Mailloux contributed to the entertainment industry, eventually and problematically, legally changing his identity to “Johnny Guam.”²⁸ In 1980, Mailloux would use his self-given appellation to travel the world on a self-funded mission to promote Guam as a tourist destination.²⁹ His efforts landed him a position on the Guam Legislature later in the decade. Mailloux’s performance came to represent how white settlers boosted Guam’s economy through the promotion of Guam as a multicultural paradise. Both Kloppenberg and Mailloux demonstrate how

²⁵ “Earl Edward Kloppenberg,” *Hale'-ta I Manfāyi: Who's Who in Chamorro History* Vol. III (Hagåtña, Guam: Department of Chamorro Affairs, 2002), 160.

²⁶ “Earl Edward Kloppenberg,” *Hale'-ta I Manfāyi*, 162.

²⁷ “Earl Edward Kloppenberg,” *Hale'-ta I Manfāyi*, 162.

²⁸ Not to be confused with “Johnny Guam Jr.” who was a pet monkey that Gordon Mailloux brought into Guam illegally via an Air Force MAC flight and who was forced to repatriate back to the Philippines. Ron Ige, “Baby Monkey saved from destruction,” *Pacific Daily News* (September 24, 1986), 4.

²⁹ “Gordon Mailloux ‘Johnny Guam,’” *Hale'-ta I Manfāyi: Who's Who in Chamorro History* Vol. III (Hagåtña, Guam: Department of Chamorro Affairs, 2002), 178, 180.

closely related former or retired U.S. military personnel were to the nascent and developing tourism industry.

Meanwhile, Filipino immigrant investments and labor provided the means by which some of the tourism and entertainment industry could begin. Filipino immigrants turned millionaire entrepreneurs, Al Ysrael and Manuel Jose for instance, invested in real estate in and beyond the Tumon area. For Ysrael, the simultaneous boom in the tourism industry paired with the rise in the statesider population was the perfect opportunity to build housing. “In no time,” one “who’s who” book wrote, Ysrael “became Guam’s ranking landlord with the highest number of housing rental units, available to local and off-island residents.”³⁰ Manuel Jose began as a military concessionaire after World War II and expanded his business enterprises beyond the bases to include real estate and commercial buildings and owned and operated business such as department stores, movie theatres, and even a newspaper *Guam Times Weekly*, which he used to voice his opinions on Guam politics.³¹ Likewise, Mark Pangilinan, another postwar Filipino immigrant, invested in the consumer and entertainment industry in Guam, providing American fashion, goods, and products that Japanese tourist would buy for *omiyage*, or souvenirs. Pangilinan at one point also tried to build a theme park in the village of Yigo, though that did not come to fruition. Nevertheless, Pangilinan was remembered as a “remarkable man” because “he not only immigrated to Guam and established an expansive business enterprise benefiting thousands of local citizens, but also chose to marry a Chamorro woman, and established his home on the island.”³² These Filipino men, all of whose businesses had beginnings with the U.S. military build-up on Guam, took advantage of the new tourism economy to expand their business conglomerates.

³⁰ “Alfred Curie Ysrael,” *Hale'-ta I Manfäyi*, 287

³¹ Sanchez, *Guāhan Guam*, 280.

³² “Marciano ‘Mark’ Vega Pangilinan, Sr.: Invincible Pioneer Entrepreneur,” *Hale'-ta I Manfäyi: Who's Who in Chamorro History* Vol. III (Hagåtña, Guam: Department of Chamorro Affairs, 2002), 201

In order to build hotels and other tourism infrastructure, Filipino migrant and immigrant blue collar workers transitioned from working with the U.S. military to the tourism industry. According to *Filipiniana*, a newspaper published by the Filipino Community of Guam, “most of these new ‘contractors’ were really former individual wage earners employed by the bigger contractor firms before ‘Karen’.”³³ These individual workers found opportunities with the “multiplication of construction enterprises” and “found a new kind of freedom under the post-Karen era.”³⁴ Furthermore, Filipino-Americans on Guam took advantage of the family reunification clause of the 1965 Immigration Act to petition their relatives for permanent residency, such that Filipinos could work in the burgeoning tourism industry as construction workers or even in hospitality.³⁵ After his contract dissolved with military contractors, Vic Oberiano, who we met in the previous chapter, transitioned to working with contractors who built hotel skyscrapers in the Tumon area. In addition, Marieta Bello worked her second job as a restaurant hostess in a Tumon hotel. With the hospitality industry in boom, Guam became another place for Filipinos to earn money for remittances or to save up for further migration to the continent. A slew of new jobs, industries, and companies came to Guam in this economic boom, and Filipinos took advantage of it just as much as Japanese foreign investors, statesiders, and Chamorros did. With people from all backgrounds contributing, many believed that the new tourism economic development signaled to new era in Guam’s history where the island could become a global example of American multiculturalism.

A Militarized Haven

³³ “How many Filipinos are there in Guam – The Better Query Seemed to Be: How many are Domiciled here?,” *Filipiniana* Vol. VII, No. 4 (December 1963): 3, 5, 7, 11. Societies & Associations Vertical File, Nieves Flores Memorial Library Hagåtña, Guam Public Library System. (Hereafter cited as “How many Filipinos are there in Guam,” GPLS.)

³⁴ “How many Filipinos are there in Guam,” GPLS.

³⁵ The 1965 Immigration Act allowed U.S. citizens to petition their relatives through family reunification clause. Many Filipinos took advantage of this, and often started a chain of migrants from the Philippines. For more reading on the 1965 Immigration Act, read Mae Ngai, *Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004); Gabriel J. Chin and Rose Cuison Villazor, *The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 c: Legislating a New America* (Cambridge University Press, 2015); Catherine Ceniza Choy, *Empire of Care: Nursing and Migration in Filipino American History* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003).

Despite the opening of Guam and the turn towards tourism, the U.S. military still maintained a strong presence in Guam throughout this period of economic development. As the Cold War heated up in Southeast Asia, especially in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, the United States used Guam as the “tip of the spear” to support their operations. One-hundred-sixty-five B-52 long range bombers were stationed at Andersen Air Force Base at the height of the Vietnam War in 1972, when President Richard Nixon commenced the Christmas bombings in and around the Hanoi-Haiphong area. The B-52s dropped bombs in what one military official called “the greatest air defense system in history.”³⁶ “Flights of three [B-52s] took off from here every 30 or 40 minutes, in staggering patterns,” *The New York Times* reported, “on round-the-clock missions so that about 72 planes were in the air every 24 hours.”³⁷ While tourism boosters began to project the appearance of the multicultural paradise in the peaceful Pacific, the United States military sent B-52s loaded with bombs and soldiers to Vietnam in a projection of Cold War power.

As “the tip of the spear,” Guam paradoxically became the haven for thousands of Vietnamese refugees who fled the country after the fall of Saigon. The U.S. military commenced Operation New Life in order to organize the Vietnamese refugees and plan their migration to the North American continent. Over 110,000 refugees made their way through Guam, seeking safety in the United States.³⁸ Despite not having any say on the logistics of the military operation, the people of Guam were generally welcoming of Vietnamese refugees, some even volunteering to house refugees if necessary.³⁹ Many Chamorros and people of Guam heralded the generosity of this military mission as evidence of Guam’s character as a hospitable and welcoming place for all peoples

³⁶ Richard Halloran, “The War is Suddenly Grim for the B-52 Fliers on Guam,” *The New York Times* (December 30, 1972), 1.

³⁷ Halloran, “The War is Suddenly Grim for the B-52 Fliers on Guam,” 4.

³⁸ Rogers, *Destiny’s Landfall*, 233. For a more detailed history of this moment in Guam’s history, listen to Evyn Lê Espiritu Gandhi, “Operation New Life,” *Memoirs Pasifika*, Podcast Audio, (April 27, 2021).

https://www.memoirspasifika.com/episodes/episode-03-operation-new-life-nfh9l-neafg?fbclid=IwAR3ir8tJCGPoiRAfrlEh-3i_G7jy-Lad_ESPaMi_f0vyDtnoZr3L4P-vmbs

³⁹ James A. Herbert, “Job Center Finding Evacuees Homes,” *Pacific Daily News* (April 24, 1975), 2A.

of the world, furthering, perhaps, the perception that Guam was a safe haven and a tropical escape that the tourism industry also promoted. The U.S. military base that was the launching point for so many weapons dropped in Southeast Asia was also the stage for U.S. benevolence in Operation New Life.⁴⁰

The U.S. military was not just conducting operations on Guam, it was seen as a vital participant in the development of Guam's economy. In 1966, a Congressional report generated for the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs wrote that the military's contributions in terms of jobs, concessionaires, and other secondary services "provide grounds for confidence that the military will continue to assist Guam's development whenever it can do so without interference to its own missions."⁴¹ Thus, the presence of the US military would be beneficial to the expansion of Guam's civilian economy. Furthermore, the report wrote "Guam's economic development will yield benefits to the military also, by making certain goods and services increasingly available, thereby relieving the military of the need to provide them for itself (often at considerable cost)."⁴² In other words, the establishment of a civilian economy could ensure the security of the U.S. military of Guam. Thus, the U.S. military presence had become inextricable from Guam's civilian economy. Tourism and other service industries were seen as additions to the military spending on Guam.

With tourism on the rise and the U.S. military presence on the island ever more concrete, Guam's economy evolved to become dependent on a phenomenon called "militourism." As Vernadette Gonzalez writes, "militarism and tourism, and the ways they serve each other, illustrate the sometimes brutal and sometimes supple work of U.S. domination in the region: they demonstrate the manifold and overlapping circuits and modes of administrative control, ideological

⁴⁰ Evyn Lê Espiritu Gandhi explores the history of Operation New Life on Guam in her book project, *Archipelagoes of Resettlement Vietnamese Refugee Settlers in Guam and Israel-Palestine*.

⁴¹ U.S. Congress, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs *Economic Development of the Territory of Guam*, 89th Cong., 2d sess., (1966), Committee Print No. 16, 12.

⁴² U.S. Congress, Committee, *Economic Development of the Territory of Guam*, 89th Cong., 2d sess., (1966), 12.

frameworks, and territorial occupations that are part of an American project of domination.”⁴³ In Guam, militarism and tourism together created the economic foundation that made the island continuously dependent on a combination of U.S. investment or foreign investment. The same 1966 Congressional report for the Committee on Insular and Territorial affairs recommended that Guam focus its economic development on 1) the export of goods manufactured on Guam, 2) the “substitution of local production for imported goods, mainly in the field of agriculture,” 3) “tourism based on the United States, Japanese, Australian, and local military markets” 4) “other service exports, mainly based on further supplying the local military market,” and 5) provide vocational training for in public education.⁴⁴ While there was some potential for an export economy, Guam’s globalization, nevertheless, relied on militarism and tourism as integral, large, and relatively stable economies for the future of the island. Together, militarism and tourism fortified the perception and ever-present reality that Guam needed the U.S. for economic stability and thus should remain a territory and colony of the United States ready to be capitalized by all.

Where America’s Multicultural Day Begins

As Chamorros, Japanese, Filipinos, and Statesiders all took advantage of Guam’s new economy in the 1960s and 1970s, it began to seem that Guam was not just advertising the promise of a diverse and exotic population, but actually becoming a multicultural island. In 1940 before World War II and the postwar transformations, 90.5 percent of the island’s population was Chamorro, with Filipinos representing just 2.6 percent. After the war in 1950, Chamorros made up only 45.6 percent of the population. While Chamorros garnered a few more percentage points back in the 1960 census, the Filipino population grew in the postwar military build-up to become 13 percent of the population in 1960. In 1980, the Filipino population grew to 21 percent of the

⁴³ Gonzalez, *Securing Paradise*, 5.

⁴⁴ U.S. Congress, Committee, *Economic Development of the Territory of Guam*, 89th Cong., 2d sess., (1966), 20.

population, perhaps through chain migration and the passage of the 1965 Immigration Act which opened the doors for more Filipino migration to the United States. The white population saw the most dramatic increase in these years, with 3.5 percent in 1940 to a high of 38.5 percent in 1950, and remaining around 25 percent in 1980.⁴⁵ Ultimately, Guam, an island that was close to 100 percent Indigenous Chamorro before World War II, became a plurality of ethnicities and races in the 1960s through the 1970s—another example of America’s multiculturalism in the Pacific.

The new embrace of multiculturalism infiltrated much of the vision for Guam’s future. Both tourism and militarism relied on the perception that Guam was a multicultural paradise for investors to commodify the land and culture in order to participate in a global capitalist economy and for the U.S. military to cover-up the land annexation, legitimize its continued military presence, and keep Guam’s colonial status as an unincorporated territory. As the rhetoric of multiculturalism rose in the 1960s with the opening of Guam to the world, the mixed-raceness of many Chamorros and local Guamainians caught the attention of many outsiders who saw the island in a new light. In the pre-World War II era, the racialization of Chamorro people with mestizo heritage made them unrecognizable in U.S. racial logics. Their mixed-race heritage was something to be dismissed as undesirable.⁴⁶ In the era of Cold War multiculturalism, however, this mixed-raceness became a cultural asset and represented Guam as the ideal place to demonstrate the “beautiful” possibilities of a diverse population. Even if it continued to be a colony of the United States, Guam was to be the place where American multiculturalism and racial liberalism would be realized and showcased in the far reaches of the Western Pacific.

Mixed raced women, in particular, came to embody this racial transformation. In 1963, the *Pacific Profile*, a magazine highlighting events and issues relating to the American Pacific, published an

⁴⁵ Government of Guam, Interagency Committee on Population, “Guam’s People, ‘A Continuing Heritage’: A Statistical Profile of the Territory of Guam, 1920-1980,” (Guam, June 1988), 134 and 138.

⁴⁶ This is the subject of chapter 2 of this dissertation.

article by Genevieve Ploke titled “Guam: Pacific’s New Melting Pot.” In it, Ploke began with a description of the trope of the disappearing native, writing that “‘There is no Chamorro of pure blood living,’” the last one having supposedly died in the seventeenth century. As a result of the death of the last pure Chamorro, Ploke suggested that, if true, Guam was “perhaps the original melting pot, antedating [*sic*] the first Irish lad to land in America and the first Oriental to reach Waikiki.”⁴⁷ By claiming that Guam had been the first “melting pot,” she associated mixed-race characteristics with tropicality and leisure. Ploke simultaneously reiterated tropes of the disappearing native, called for the whitening of Chamorro people, especially in her description of them resembling Polynesians, and made Guam’s diverse and mixed-race population palatable to an American audience.⁴⁸

Ploke’s article described the mixed-race relations from which the mixed-race women were born whose photos were interspersed between the page columns of the magazine. She wrote “When you look around today, you become aware that intermarriages between island residents and off-islander have produced a cosmopolitan atmosphere.”⁴⁹ The gendered and intimate description of Guam’s racial mixture was further emphasized in the stories of couples of different races and backgrounds finding love in travels “aboard a schooner enroute to the Orient,” exiles in Guam after national revolutions, and metaphorical “international marital sweepstakes.”⁵⁰ For instance, Ploke wrote, “Dr. Pedro C. Sanchez, former president of the College of Guam and now with the Peace Corps in the Philippines, lost his bachelorhood in California when he met and married Florida Gailu [*sic*] of American Samoa.”⁵¹ Sanchez’s parents were Chamorro and Filipino as well.⁵² These stories

⁴⁷ Genevieve Ploke, “Guam: Pacific’s New Melting Pot,” *Pacific Profile* (November 1963), 8.

⁴⁸ Ploke, “Guam,” 8.

⁴⁹ Ploke, “Guam,” 8.

⁵⁰ Ploke, “Guam,” 9-10.

⁵¹ The correct spelling of Sanchez’s wife’s name is Florida Galea’i. Ploke, “Guam,” 36.

⁵² Simon Sanchez interview with the author (November 11, 2019).

contributed to the cosmopolitan and global character of Guam society, bolstered by the headshots of their daughters whose names were underlined by their ethnicities, such as Irene Ploke Sgambelluri who was “German-Polish-Guamanian” or Ellen Won Pat Chargualaf who was “Chinese-Guamanian-Puerto Rican.”⁵³ The mixed-race women were indications of Guam’s forward thinking attitudes to race in the multicultural Cold War world.

Beyond what mixed-race women represented in the multicultural territory, they also were considered to be tourist attractions. In their tourism edition, the *Pacific Daily News* published a collage of women dressed in pageant attire, Miss Guam Universe sashes, women dressed in Filipiniana, miniskirts, and tiaras. The women were “A real tourist attraction,” “Guam’s beautiful girls” who “whether clad in minis or mumus, whether serving as waitresses, clerks, or attending school, the gals of the island are a sight to behold, beauty personified.”⁵⁴ They added “the proper touch to the charming, friendly, beautiful island in the midst of the Pacific.”⁵⁵ The women in Guam came to represent a feminized, multiracial Pacific vis-à-vis the masculine militarized soldiers that continued to remain dominant on Guam. The island’s women became metaphors for the subservience of Guam’s people to the wills of American militarism and empire.

Tourism, militarism, and multiculturalism became the three characteristics that came to define modern Guam. With the opening of Guam to the world after 1962, the island experienced a rapid economic and social transformation in which tourism and militarism became two sides of the same imperial coin. Sure enough, in 1970, the Government of Guam’s Department of Commerce announced that “the decade of the sixties saw Guam emerge from a ‘military-base-plus-quonset-

⁵³ At this point in time, a person who was “Guamanian” was understood to be Chamorro. Ploke, “Guam,” 9 and 36.

⁵⁴ “A Real Tourist Attraction: Guam’s Beautiful Girls,” *Pacific Daily News*, Progress Edition, (August 18, 2021), 10.

⁵⁵ “Guam USA: Land of Sunshine, Swaying Palms, and Friendly Smiles,” *Pacific Daily News* (August 30, 1970), 10.

huts' economy to a bustling crossroads of the Pacific."⁵⁶ Yet, even as the civilian sector of Guam came to embrace the image of the multicultural paradise, the U.S. military's operations still made the island a dangerous bastion of U.S. imperialism in the Pacific. Guam became the American island territory of war and peace.

The Paradox of a Paradise

As world travel and events continued to influence the politics, economics, and society in Guam, one man was brave enough to articulate the fears among the Chamorro people over this rapid transformation. That was Pedro "Doc" C. Sanchez. Sanchez was the son of Simon A. Sanchez and Antonia Cruz from the village of Hagåtña in Guam. After growing up in Guam and surviving World War II, Pedro was one of the first few Chamorro boys who went off to college in the continental U.S. to obtain a university education. After graduating from St. Thomas University in Minnesota, he earned his master's degree in education from Columbia University and subsequently went on to earn his doctorate, also in education, at Stanford University.⁵⁷ Subsequently, Sanchez served as the director of education in the U.S. Virgin Islands, the director of the Peace Corps in the Philippines, and various other federal jobs across the North American continent. Sanchez returned to Guam to serve his island community primarily as an educator as his father Simon A. Sanchez had done since the early 1920s. From 1970 to 1994, he served as President of the University of Guam.⁵⁸ A man with international and imperial experience, the transformation he saw on Guam in the twenty-five years he was abroad would have been certainly astounding.

⁵⁶ Government of Guam, Department of Commerce, "Guam 1970: An Economy in Transition," (Hagåtña, Guam: Government of Guam, 1971), 9. Copy found in MSS 2150, Box 10, Folder 25, Papers of Governor Carlos Camacho, Micronesian Area Research Center, University of Guam. (Hereafter cited as "Government of Guam, "Guam 1970,")

⁵⁷ Samantha Marley Barnett, "Dr. Pedro Cruz Sanchez," *Guampedia Inc.* (March 02, 2019), accessed April 28, 2021, <https://www.guampedia.com/dr-pedro-sanchez/>

⁵⁸ Barnett, "Dr. Pedro Cruz Sanchez," <https://www.guampedia.com/dr-pedro-sanchez/>.

This unwieldy transformation was the subject of a speech Sanchez delivered at the Third Economic Conference held in Guam in 1972.⁵⁹ Standing before an audience of Guam politicians, business leaders, and investors, Sanchez boldly argued for a more cohesive and concerted effort to effectively control the rapid economic growth of the island so that the people of Guam could adequately reap the benefits. He warned that neglecting to do so made Guam a “kind of paradoxical paradise,” in which the island was “rich and getting richer in some respects but also poor and getting poorer in other respects.”⁶⁰ He suggested that the “preoccupation” and uncritical applause for economic development at all costs constructed a society in which there was an “unconscious relegation of the social and other human aspects of development to a lower priority of attention and action.”⁶¹ In other words, he argued that the Guam community was too focused on economic development to the point where the island’s civilian infrastructure, institutions, and services were falling behind and the people of Guam were being negatively affected. He continued in his speech, “This imbalance of our growth and development in turn is causing both economic socio-cultural dislocations among many of Guam’s bewildered native-residents who are caught in the throes of a territory in rapid transition.”⁶² Sanchez saw that while business leaders and investors and workers from all over the world capitalized on the opportunity to turn Guam into the tropical paradise of their dreams, Chamorro people were left wondering what this all meant for them.

Among his observations of Guam’s rapid transformation was the problem of land. The land grab on Guam was not only conducted by the U.S. military as had happened in the immediate post-World War II era. Rather, Sanchez noted that “the private ownership of land is shifting dangerously into the foreign hands.”⁶³ The onslaught of foreign, statesider, and even immigrant investors who

⁵⁹ Pedro C. Sanchez, “Guam: Paradox of a Paradise,” *Guam Recorder*, Vol. 2, No. 4 (October-December 1972).

⁶⁰ Sanchez, “Guam: Paradox of a Paradise,” 59.

⁶¹ Sanchez, “Guam: Paradox of a Paradise,” 59.

⁶² Sanchez, “Guam: Paradox of a Paradise,” 59.

⁶³ Sanchez, “Guam: Paradox of a Paradise,” 60.

sought land near potential tourist hotspots did not bode well for the Chamorro people who only had limited access to land and no capital to develop and reap the benefits of the economic boom. The lack of outrage was incredibly ironic to Sanchez because “those who cry to high heaven and do everything within their power to keep Uncle Sam’s Forces from acquiring land” were to him “awfully quiet, or even encourage private landowners to sell their land to foreigners!”⁶⁴ For Sanchez, the U.S. military and outside investors seeking gains in the tourism industry were working hand in hand in the continued dispossession of Chamorro people.

Sanchez’s observations also include the demographic change, in which Guam became a multicultural island where Chamorro people were a minority. To him, this observation was “making many of us jittery” because “the new and dominant majority will no doubt change the character and lifestyle of the island.”⁶⁵ While Sanchez’s statements could point to a certain type of xenophobia, his fears stemmed from the experiences he saw in other colonial spaces with U.S. empire. He told the conference attendees that he foresaw “clearly a second Hawaii developing here where the unsophisticated, untrained and generally unprepared native islanders would be swamped by the new, aggressive majority and relegated to the lower, economic and social strata of the new Guamanian society as native Hawaiians found themselves in the new Hawaiian society.”⁶⁶ In an era of multiculturalism and the embrace of diversity, Sanchez’s fears may have been misconstrued as conservative xenophobia. But taken from the perspective of the Chamorro people who were becoming in a minority in their own island, the rapid influx of immigrants, settlers, and foreign investors threatened Chamorro livelihoods, culture, their ability to determine their future, and even their existence.

⁶⁴ Sanchez, “Guam: Paradox of a Paradise,” 60.

⁶⁵ Sanchez, “Guam: Paradox of a Paradise,” 60.

⁶⁶ Sanchez, “Guam: Paradox of a Paradise,” 60.

Furthermore, Chamorro people found themselves not in an island of abundance, rich with family relations, traditional culture, and sovereignty, but rather one of scarcity of opportunities exacerbated by lack of structural and infrastructural development in the civilian, non-tourism sector on the island. Sanchez feared the growing numbers of Chamorro people needing welfare programs in order to survive despite the dynamic growth of the island. He called the situation “downright disgraceful, indeed deplorable.”⁶⁷ Living in poverty despite growing affluence in Guam’s economy, Sanchez noted, “will push ripples of changes, not necessarily for the better, in our people’s social and cultural behavior in order to absorb the shock and the frustration.”⁶⁸ He added that the island “may be shortchanging ourselves and the future generations for the sake of a handy and expedient way to make money.”⁶⁹ Pushing the need for development in the government services using the profits from growth of Guam’s economic development, Sanchez emphasized to the crowd of conference, “For God’s sake and for our people’s sake, I implore you: *don’t let this happen to Guam!*”⁷⁰

Sanchez’s suggestion to prevent potential problems was unsettling to the ears of the government officials and businesspeople in the room. Sanchez suggested the island “slow down, even reduce the rate of growth,” in order to ensure that Guam would not become “one big moral, spiritual, social, cultural and environmental disaster area!”⁷¹ Some leaders agreed with his bleak prospects for the social lives in a world of unfettered economic growth, including Frank F. Blas who was the director of Commerce for the Government of Guam at the time. In a response to Sanchez’s speech, Blas wrote that “Dr. Sanchez has not simply ‘cried wolf.’ In my opinion, he has correctly assessed the situation.”⁷² Conrad Stinson, a former President of the Guam Federation of Teachers

⁶⁷ Sanchez, “Guam: Paradox of a Paradise,” 61.

⁶⁸ Sanchez, “Guam: Paradox of a Paradise,” 61.

⁶⁹ Sanchez, “Guam: Paradox of a Paradise,” 61.

⁷⁰ Emphasis original. Sanchez, “Guam: Paradox of a Paradise,” 60.

⁷¹ Sanchez, “Guam: Paradox of a Paradise,” 61.

⁷² Community reactions to Sanchez’s speech was published in the *Guam Recorder*. It was listed in the same article. Citation remains as follows, Sanchez, “Guam: Paradox of a Paradise,” 64.

and a statesider himself, wrote that Sanchez's speech was "perhaps the clearest commentary to date on the subject of Guam and the effects of the current economic boom on our society."⁷³ The warnings that Sanchez articulated were fears shared collectively that came bubbling to the surface.

Although he would not use the term, Sanchez was articulating the process of settler colonialism that took over Guam in the postwar period, one that was morphing to include not only the U.S. military as the facilitator of land annexation and immigration, but tourism as well. Tourism, militarism, and capitalism were fundamentally changing the way the people of Guam related to each other, seeing money and wealth as something individually attained and kept, and not necessarily for the benefit of the entire community. As a result, these institutions and industries threatened the ability to for Chamorro people to retain control over their economic and their social lives, and moreover could make Chamorro people dependent on outside forces for their wellbeing.

But for Sanchez there was hope in envisioning other alternatives to this growth. Sanchez ended his speech by harkening to the traditions of Chamorro society—"a society was at peace with itself and with the island."⁷⁴ Rather than understanding society through money and economic development, Sanchez reiterated that the Chamorro people "were not rich, but no one was poor nor neglected either. They cared for one another and they shared in the work and the wealth of islands." In his perspective, the Chamorro people had "created a society where status and prestige came by sharing each other's wealth—not by accumulating it."⁷⁵ Sanchez believed a sound economic development could happen if the people of Guam reclaimed the core of Chamorro culture, *inafa'maolek*, in their visions for the future.⁷⁶

⁷³ Sanchez, "Guam: Paradox of a Paradise," 67.

⁷⁴ Sanchez, "Guam: Paradox of a Paradise," 62.

⁷⁵ Sanchez, "Guam: Paradox of a Paradise," 62.

⁷⁶ *Inafa'maolek* was explored at various points in this dissertation, referring to the core tenet of Chamorro culture that emphasized the reciprocal relations between individuals, families, and communities, that cemented responsibility, obligation, and community harmony through time and generations.

Beyond the tourism district in Tumon Bay, crucial social and cultural transformations took place in the villages. Urbanization led to villages looking less like Spanish villages with dirt roads and family compounds, and more like American suburban subdivisions built with prefabricated houses and paved streets. Liguán Terrace and Kaiser subdivisions in Dededo, Barrigada Heights in Barrigada, and Jonestown in Tamuning among others came to represent how modern Guam would develop in terms of housing. While Chamorros definitely began to move into these new villages, the rise in permanent concrete housing also meant there was spaces for a larger immigrant and settler population. In these villages, cultural identities were in flux.

Reclaiming *I Man Chamorro*

Since the end of World War II, Chamorro people on Guam had for the most part attempted to prove themselves as Americans in order to demonstrate loyalty and thus garner recognition from the United States. Although there was resistance, many Chamorros felt that they could be simultaneously Chamorro and American, embodied by the “Guamanian” identity. Yet the cultural transformations of the 1960s and 1970s started to challenge this Guamanian identity for the Chamorro people as more immigrants started identifying as Guamanian even though they were not indigenous to the island. As Chamorro feminist scholar Laura Souder wrote in 1977, “The experience of the people of Guam in the last three centuries, the recent influx of ethnic groups and technological modernization are some origins of the Guamanian identity conflict.”⁷⁷ These transformations crucially impacted Chamorro youth caught in the windstorm of change.

In an article titled “Sifting through Clues in Search of Identity,” Souder argued that the identity crisis of the Chamorro people—she referred to them as “Guamanian” in this article—lay in “the existence of conflicting values created by a new education system and rapid economic

⁷⁷ Laura Souder, “Sifting through Clues in Search of Identity,” *Islander Magazine* published by *Pacific Daily News* (January 16, 1977), 7.

development.”⁷⁸ She believed these institutions deemphasized traditional Chamorro culture and customs based on family obligations, and instead promoted a certain type of American experience based on individualism and secularism. Furthermore, with rapid economic growth caused by tourism, Chamorro people were left to rely on imports and migrant labor which “leaves a bitter taste,” as “the local person on the one hand, enjoys the comforts of change, but on the other hand, must depend on someone else to make it possible.”⁷⁹ This, she observed, created “a growing resentment between Guamanians and Filipinos and Statesiders, and more recently Orientals.”⁸⁰ Souder argued that rather than being a boon for Chamorro youth, this cultural transformation created a sense of confusion of how to merge and navigate Chamorro culture with this new Americanized, modern, and globalized world. This sentiment was shared by Katherine B. Aguon, the first Chamorro woman to receive a PhD, having completed her degree in education from the University of California at Berkeley in 1971.⁸¹ She also noted how the cultural transformation caused Chamorro youth to feel insecure in their own island. She wrote that “they neither accept their heritage as being valuable nor as being truly their own.... The native islander is sinking slowly into a new world which has no meaning or room for him.”⁸²

The economic and social transformations of the sixties and seventies gave rise to the revitalization and reclaiming of Chamorro identity not only in labels, but also in culture and language. Souder noted that “adults are becoming aware of the identity crisis in youth,” and began to create programming in schools and community projects to “give them a sense of belonging and

⁷⁸ Souder, “Sifting through Clues in Search of Identity,” 7.

⁷⁹ Souder, “Sifting through Clues in Search of Identity,” 8.

⁸⁰ Souder, “Sifting through Clues in Search of Identity,” 8.

⁸¹ “Katherine B. Bordallo Aguon,” *Hale’ta I Manfãyi: Generations of Public Servants* Vol. IV (Hagåtña: Department of Chamorro Affairs, 2003), 48.

⁸² Katherine B. Aguon, “The Guam Dilemma: The Need for a Pacific Island Education Perspective,” in *Hale’ta Hinasso: Tinige’ Put Chamorro Insights: The Chamorro Identity*, (Agana Guam: Political Status Education Coordinating Commission, 1993), 90.

identity.”⁸³ Most notably, there were several proponents of bilingual education in schools such as Bernadita Dungca Camacho and Clotilde Gould who advocated for Chamorro language to be spoken among youth in Guam. Gould wrote that bilingual education was more than syntax and grammar, and that it had “to do with redesigning the child’s entire outlook on life without destroying family ties, cultural identity, self-confidence or pride.”⁸⁴ She saw that language was crucial for how Chamorro students were to navigate the evolving island around them, and indeed, to become prepared for life on the island by receiving an education that matched the conditions on Guam. In addition, a Guam-based education would incorporate Chamorro history and culture, and teach students about Guam’s environment in science classes. In other words, students would learn about how to be successful on Guam, rather than learn about snow and autumn, trains, “fireplace or a furnace,” as Gould mentioned in her article, which were impositions of an educational system based on the United States.

One way that Chamorro educational leaders sought to teach Chamorro culture to their students in their schools was through a cultural pluralism curriculum due in part to the federal government funding that emphasized multiculturalism. Cultural pluralism programs sought to rectify the racial and ethnic tensions in diverse school systems by uplifting and embracing minority cultures within the curriculum. Rather than forcing minority students to merely assimilate into American society, students were encouraged to simultaneously embrace their own originating cultures and heritage and to respect the cultures of others. Chamorro teachers took the opportunity from this move towards multiculturalism and cultural pluralism in the U.S. education system to teach, promote, and preserve Chamorro language and culture in the Guam public schools.

⁸³ Souder, “Sifting through Clues in Search of Identity,” 8.

⁸⁴ Clotilde Gould, “Uno Dos Tres Kuatro,” *Islander Magazine* published by *Pacific Daily News* (January 16, 1977), 9.

While multicultural education was helpful in providing funding for Chamorro bilingual programs, Chamorro teachers and leaders started to see how the whole premise of cultural pluralism did not actually make sense in the case of Guam. As Katherine Aguon wrote, “it is this cultural pluralist rhetoric that the Pacific Islander in his homeland may be trapped.”⁸⁵ Even though Guam was Chamorro land and the plurality of the population was Chamorro, Aguon argued that in a cultural pluralism curriculum, “the island’s history, language and traditions are ‘add-ons’ to an existing curriculum.”⁸⁶ American culture and white statesider experience became the default in the cultural pluralist curriculum in Guam, an experience that did not resonate with many Chamorro students who lived in Chamorro households and practiced traditions in their daily lives. It emphasized American white statesider culture as the standard experience even if it acknowledged the existence of other cultures. Rather, Aguon believed that Chamorro culture “should be the fundamental core to which other areas of study are subsequently added. The people of Guam (those who live here as well as Chamorros) must be obliged to know Guam first before branching out to the world.”⁸⁷ In other words, Aguon reiterated that students living and learning on Guam did not necessarily need to learn about the four seasons and how to deal with snow, but learn about their environment in Guam that would help them live on their own island.

Out of this criticism of overt Americanization in education, especially the move towards cultural pluralism, arose a new generation of scholar activists who were ready to challenge American cultural colonialism in Guam. In addition to Chamorro women Dr. Katherine Aguon, Laura Souder, Bernadita Dungca, and Clotilde Gould, Robert Underwood was another vocal activist who taught Chamorro and organized around the proliferation of the Chamorro language in schools. In later years, he would bring his fervent belief in the perpetuation of the Chamorro language beyond school

⁸⁵ Aguon, “The Guam Dilemma: The Need for a Pacific Island Education Perspective,” 98.

⁸⁶ Aguon, “The Guam Dilemma: The Need for a Pacific Island Education Perspective,” 101.

⁸⁷ Aguon, “The Guam Dilemma: The Need for a Pacific Island Education Perspective,” 101.

campuses and into the island society, organizing campaigns against the *Pacific Daily News* and the Guam International Airport Authority to ensure that Chamorro language was allowed and promoted.⁸⁸ In 1977, Underwood published a scathing critique against white statesiders who lived in Guam in the *Islander* magazine published by the *Pacific Daily News*. Underwood challenged the assumption that multiculturalism and cultural pluralism education was a beneficial curriculum for the island. He argued that multiculturalism not only relegated Chamorro people to a minority group—for which they were not in Guam—but promoted Americanization and English as the baseline characteristics and educational goal for a successful young generation in Guam. Thus, he argued that multiculturalism within Guam’s institutions served to erase Chamorro people within their own land.

Of the many potent critiques found in Underwood’s article, one stood out in particular. It was his observation that white statesiders saw themselves and American culture as the default culture on Guam, instead of seeing themselves as immigrants or settlers who came into a Pacific island with an indigenous Chamorro culture. Underwood wrote, “by the statesider’s refusal to admit that he is an immigrant, he senses no special need to exert himself to become part of Chamorro society or even to understand it.”⁸⁹ For white statesiders, the island’s political status as an unincorporated territory of the United States took precedence over the indigenous culture of the Chamorro people which further influenced how they understood themselves within Guam’s society. Because statesiders refused to acknowledge Guam as Chamorro land, Underwood argued, they sought to transform Guam to look more like the United States. This white statesider desire led to the many cultural tensions that arose in the Guam public schools and other civic institutions. Underwood wrote, the statesider “demands that island institutions be basically Americanized so he has equal access to them. In short, his demand for equality is a demand for institutions on his

⁸⁸ Further explanation of Underwood’s activism with *Para y Pada* can be found in chapter six of this dissertation.

⁸⁹ Underwood, “Chamorro Challenge to Statesiders,” 11.

terms.”⁹⁰ For Underwood, the rhetoric and practices of equality, cultural pluralism, and multiculturalism that white statesiders promoted was just another colonial tool to take over the island’s people and erase Chamorro society.

On Guam, white statesiders molded institutions such as schools, the media, and even political institutions to fit their desires and needs. For instance, Guam’s major newspaper, *Pacific Daily News*, was owned, operated, and edited by white statesiders. Their perspectives of Guam’s politics and society heavily influenced the general population. Underwood underscored how white statesiders “can be in virtual control of institutions, not because they are in positions of command, but because they set up the guidelines under which the system operates. They have instant access to its operations, can understand it fully to their benefit at any given moment. They benefit from the fact that the system exists in terms they understand, whether they choose to exploit it or not.”⁹¹ Even though white statesiders comprised a minority population on Guam, the Americanized system on Guam allowed them to take full advantage of the political, social, economic, and even educational institutions on the island. Though not using the phrase itself, Underwood was articulating the process of settler colonialism in which the term “settler” not only described the people who moved into a territory, but the ability to shape and mold institutions to a certain culture which effectively dispossessed Chamorro people of political and social power. He asked his readers, “please never forget that Chamorros exist. They are everywhere.... Let us reaffirm Chamorro existence to counter the genocidal rumor that Chamorros no longer exist.”⁹² Forty-five years later, in an interview with Edward “Pulan” Leon Guerrero, Underwood admitted that this article “Chamorro Challenge to Statesiders” was his first articulation of “settler colonialism.”⁹³

⁹⁰ Underwood, “Chamorro Challenge to Statesiders,” 11.

⁹¹ Underwood, “Chamorro Challenge to Statesiders,” 10.

⁹² Underwood, “Chamorro Challenge to Statesiders,” 12.

⁹³ PulanSpeaks, "Robert Underwood - Reflections on CHamoru Activism," January 22, 2021, video, 1:05:49, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=54A5SQTaZmo&t=23s&ab_channel=PulanSpeaks

The civilian education system on Guam was one such institution that white statesiders sought to transform, especially through the implementation of cultural pluralism in education. Samuel Betances, a Doctor of Education wrote a piece surveying the causes of ethnic tensions in Guam's public schools. He specifically noted that statesiders—he labeled them as “Americans” in this article—molded the civilian educational system. “Since the military does not run separate schools in Guam,” Betances observed, “the military personnel expect that Guam schools to function as an American school system.”⁹⁴ This desire for an Americanized education ran counter to what Chamorro teachers wanted for the island, which was an education rooted in the indigenous culture and the social realities of the island. Betances asked rhetorically, “Should the Americans who have invaded Guam also control the institutions of Guam and insist that the Chamorro, in their homeland, be schooled to live as though they were going to live their lives in U.S. suburbs they will never see, let alone inhabit? How practical is a white middle-class education for the brown Chamorro people of Guam?”⁹⁵ Like Underwood, Betances saw how the American educational system in Guam was a settler colonial imposition that served white statesiders rather than the Chamorro people. It did not actually aid Chamorro students, but a transient population on island. Instead of promoting a cultural pluralism in Guam schools, Betances recommended that a separate school system for military dependents be created. Military personnel demanding that the educational system fit their needs and not the needs of Chamorros was another instance of how settler militarism operated in Guam's multicultural era.

When Chamorro teachers sought to use the education system to teach Chamorro culture and instill pride in their students, proponents of cultural pluralism criticized them. One influential example of this reclaiming of Chamorro and indigenous identity was the establishment of the first

⁹⁴ Betances, “Limits of Cross Cultural Education,” 4.

⁹⁵ Betances, “Limits of Cross Cultural Education,” 4.

Chamorro week at George Washington High School in 1974. According to the news coverage on the first Chamorro week, “the primary purpose of the celebration is to acknowledge the achievements of the Chamorro people and to foster a healthy interest in the language, customs, culture and history of Guam.”⁹⁶ Organized by the social studies teachers with their students, the week’s festivities included the construction of a “Chamorro Village in the school’s east courtyard,” a theatrical production of “Juan Mala,” a reenactment of a Spanish-Chamorro battle by the ROTC military science students, as well as various displays, entertainment, traditional activities such as weaving, as well as academic panels. The lessons learned were based on the experiences and histories of Guam, rather than presidents of the United States, American cultural activities around holidays, and other non-Chamorro traditions. The first Chamorro week at George Washington was successful and became a hallmark for schools across the island for generations.

Because of the rise of multiculturalism in the island, however, Chamorro week elicited so many critiques from the non-Chamorro population in Guam. Even though “Chamorro week was really insignificant, without any real impact on the cultural continuity of the Chamorro people,” according to Robert Underwood, who was one of the teachers who organized the festivities, “the opponents of the week-long activity argued that since there was not going to be a Filipino week or a Micronesian week, that in the name of cultural equality, we shouldn’t have Chamorro week.”⁹⁷ The reliance on cultural pluralism and multiculturalism in education rendered Chamorro people—the indigenous people of the island—into just another minoritized group. The majority or default culture was inherently an American white-statesider culture, a culture that represented the least number of people on the island. Underwood and other Chamorro educators fought back arguing that schools were one such way Chamorro elders can instill pride in Chamorro identity for the

⁹⁶ Phill Mendel, “Chamorro Week: Catching Up on Culture,” *Pacific Daily News* (February 24, 1974), C-2.

⁹⁷ Underwood, “Chamorro Challenge to Statesiders,” 12.

largest sector of the island's population. For Underwood, such relegation of Chamorro culture as one of many other non-white cultures "was an injustice in the name of equality."⁹⁸

The issue presented by Chamorro educators of the 1970s demonstrates how Chamorro youth and people were grappling with the economic and social transformations of Guam. Many of them feared that the institutions that could provide for the passing of cultural knowledge for Chamorro youth were being sidelined by white statesiders and immigrants who touted ideals of cultural pluralism and multiculturalism. For Chamorros, these were not only colonial impositions, but impositions that rendered Chamorro people as another "minority" group within their own island. Although the realm of education was one of many transformations in this period, the criticisms of multiculturalism as it applied to schools provide multiple insights into the triangulation of relations between Chamorros, Filipinos, and white statesiders. Multiculturalism operated as a tool of further colonization in an island imbued with settler militarism.

Formations of *Ang Mga Kababayan*

While Chamorros were attempting to perpetuate the Chamorro culture in institutions such as schools, Filipino immigrants were building community and an ethnic identity in their own enclaves throughout the island. The December 1963 issue of *Filipiniana*, a publication written by Filipinos for Filipinos on Guam, had an article titled "How many Filipinos are there in Guam?"⁹⁹ Its more pointed question was to survey the extent of Filipino immigrants who chose to be "domiciled" in Guam after arriving in the island. The writer observed that "it looks like every plane flight from Manila nowadays disgorges its own batch of immigrants to Guam, USA."¹⁰⁰ After accounting for the history of the rise of Filipinos living on the island due primarily to the wealth of opportunities in

⁹⁸ Underwood, "Chamorro Challenge to Statesiders," 12.

⁹⁹ "How many Filipinos are there in Guam – The Better Query Seemed to Be: How many are Domiciled here?," *Filipiniana* Vol. VII, No. 4 (December 1963): 3, 5, 7, 11. Societies & Associations Vertical File, Nieves Flores Memorial Library Hagåtña, Guam Public Library System.

¹⁰⁰ "How many Filipinos are there in Guam," *Filipiniana* Vol. VII, No. 4 (December 1963): 3.

the post-Typhoon Karen boom, the anonymous author questioned who exactly could be considered “Filipino” on Guam. The author questioned,

From the ‘Filipinos’ naturalized since 1940 when the U.S. nationality act was passed? Since 1920 or 1930, when Filipino labor was allowed free entry into Hawaii? How about the children of Filipino exiles at the turn of the century and of those who, seeking mental refuge from the anguish of colonial domination, chose to live in the island? Or, should we also include the children of those who had come even before the end of Spanish rule over the island? How about the forebears of those who were here during the Manila Acapulco days? During the early Spanish days? Pre Spanish Era? Or, should we move forward to a later date in 1945 when some in the employ of the U.S. armed services remained here? How about the PINOYS who had filtered from the mainland U.S.A.? Where does one find these records now? All of them? How about 1954? 1956? It’s a mess!¹⁰¹

Because of Guam’s long historical connection to the Philippines and the shifting definition of Filipino after Philippine Independence, it became difficult to ascertain who should be considered Filipino in Guam. While “Filipino” could be understood as an ethnic category, it could also be understood as a nationality in which a person carried Philippine citizenship. With Chamorro people also holding Filipino ancestry, the definitive lines of who should be called Filipino was just as much influx in Guam. As it turns out, however, the period in which a person could trace their earliest Filipino ancestor in Guam would become a marker of assimilation into Guam society.

By the 1970s, it became apparent that there were significant enough differences between waves of Filipino immigrants to Guam.¹⁰² The “old timers” were different from those who came during the martial law Philippines in the 1970s. And postwar immigrants were definitely different from the Filipinos who could trace their lineage to the pre-World War II days. The further back in time a Filipino could trace their family in Guam, the more “local” they were perceived in Guam society. And vice versa, the more recent of a migration history, the more foreign they were. Thus, as

¹⁰¹ “How many Filipinos are there in Guam,” *Filipiniana* Vol. VII, No. 4 (December 1963): 7, 11.

¹⁰² Edna Rebanal, Interview with the Author, Tamuning Guam, January 2, 2020.

the Philippines continued to reconfigure the definition of the Filipino, so too were immigrants from the Philippines on Guam trying to understand their race and ethnicity within empire.

There was a wave of Filipino immigrants in the 1960s and 1970s who were the daughters and sons of Filipino workers who had worked in Guam in the 1950s. These children of the first postwar wave of Filipino immigrants grew up in-between two worlds: the Philippines and Guam. They lived part of their lives in Guam and other parts in the Philippines, which shaped how they saw themselves as Filipinos within Guam. For instance, Ariel Dimalanta, a Filipino artist from Guam, described himself as “manufactured on Guam and assembled in the Philippines.”¹⁰³ Ariel’s father, Antonio Dimalanta, had been an architect for the Perez Brothers Company on Guam, and had brought his older children from the Philippines to Guam. Ariel had been born on Guam, but he moved back to the Philippines with his family in 1957 and attended school. In 1970, they left the Philippines because of their increasing skepticism of political circumstances in Ferdinand Marcos’s presidency. In Guam, Dimalanta’s father worked on major building projects such as the Hagåtña Cathedral and housing complexes such as Perezville in Guam. He also founded the Filipino Community of Guam, alongside other Filipinos who made their way to the island.

After working odd jobs on the island during the economic boom of the 1970s, Ariel found a passion for advertising, eventually winning an account to work on the new Guam Reef Hotel’s marketing. The Japanese ownership hired Ariel, who then hired his family members including his brothers who were an architect and a photographer, and his sister who was an illustrator. This occurred in the early seventies during the boom of the tourism industry and the housing developments such as Barrigada Heights and Baza Gardens. Seeing the success of his small company, Ariel decided to attend the Academy of Arts College in San Francisco in 1978 to learn the new and innovative techniques. “It was easy to position yourself and be recognized at that time

¹⁰³ Ariel Dimalanta, Interview with the Author, Hagåtña Guam, December 31, 2019.

because the island was small,” Ariel said.¹⁰⁴ Ariel continued to work for hotels and the tourism industry, even being hired by Japanese businesses who published Japanese tour and guidebooks for the island. Ariel’s artwork helped to promote Guam in these decades of transformation.

Another Filipino living between two worlds, Edna Rebanal was the youngest child born to Juan Rebanal from the Bicol region of Philippines who worked as an accountant for Koster and Wythe, an American construction company on Guam. Juan brought his children to Guam in 1960, and Edna attended school at Cathedral School in Hagåtña. She remembers being the “exotic” classmate who could only speak Tagalog among a classroom filled with Chamorro students. She did learn a little bit of Chamorro from her friends, and fondly recalls learning Filipino folk dances such as the *tinikling* and coconut dances at the Guam Academy of Music and Arts.

When it came time for her to attend high school, Edna moved back to the Philippines, going to the all-girls school associated with Far Eastern University and eventually went on to graduate from the University of the Philippines in the early 1970s. She visited Guam every summer to stay with family and friends. The early 1970s in the Philippines, Edna remarked, was when “the whole country was on shaky grounds with Marcos as President,” and “that was the time when student activism was at its peak.”¹⁰⁵ As a major in political science, she was all too aware of the government’s disdain for student activists at the University of the Philippines. She remembers seeing Jose Maria Sison, a Filipino activist, rallying up students at the university to criticize the Marcos government. “Martial law was imminent,” Rebanal said, “I was still there when he [Marcos] suspended the *writ* of *habeas corpus*. I was on campus and of course I was listening to all the student leaders.”¹⁰⁶ Observing from across the Philippine Sea, Edna’s father “was not happy with the situation.” Even if she did not feel personally policed by the government, she realized that “the peace I was looking forward to,

¹⁰⁴ Dimalanta, Interview with the Author.

¹⁰⁵ Rebanal, Interview with the Author.

¹⁰⁶ Rebanal, Interview with the Author.

or had known in the past, was no longer there.” From then, she decided to move back to Guam because she “knew what life was like,” and knew that there would be more opportunities to start a career in Guam. “So I had to come back,” she said. “It was not a difficult decision after graduating from college.”

For the small group of people I interviewed, martial law featured prominently in their stories about emigrating from the Philippines and settling in Guam. Indeed, the martial law-period in the Philippines was an uncertain time. Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law in 1972 arguing that “the Philippines was in an emergency state as a result of a burgeoning Communist insurgency, and that he should remain in power,” according to historian Mark John Sanchez.¹⁰⁷ Marcos suspended the *writ of habeas corpus*, imposed curfew, and emphasized the Philippine military and the Philippine constabulary. The martial law period also saw the quelling of dissidents and opposition through violence, murder, and mass arrests. The uncertainties of martial law pushed Sabina Tamondong and her husband to find a way out of the Philippines. She spoke with me about how her husband, Lawrence, who had been part of the University of the Philippines student committee had to “denounce” student activism in order to be eligible for the U.S. immigration process.¹⁰⁸ Sabina had also taken a second job to supplement her low salary as an educator in the Philippine public school system. Afraid that she and her husband might be found out, they sought a way to get out of the Philippines. The United States seemed like the best bet.

Sabina started the process for obtaining immigrant status as a professional, for which she was eligible through because of her master’s degree from the University of the Philippines. She and her husband left the Philippines leaving her two children behind, hoping that they can get their jobs and housing set up before bringing them to the United States. When they found out that Guam was

¹⁰⁷ Mark John Sanchez, “Let the People Speak: Solidarity Culture and the making of a Transnational Opposition to the Marcos Dictatorship, 1972-1986,” (PhD Dissertation: University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2018), 7.

¹⁰⁸ Sabina Tamondong, Interview with the Author, Tamuning Guam, January 4, 2020.

considered a port-of-entry for U.S. immigration— meaning their years on the island would count towards their permanent residency—they opted to settle on Guam as it allowed them to be geographically close to the Philippines and their children.¹⁰⁹ For them, Guam was an American island that could bring them U.S. citizenship. When martial law erupted in the Philippines, many Filipinos who had the means and the connections on Guam took the opportunity to settle on the island. While the 1965 Immigration Act played a part in some of their stories, what was more crucial in their retelling was about the uncertainty of martial law Philippines and what it meant for their wellbeing and prospects for their future.

With the Filipino population steadily growing in Guam, Filipino groups started to pop up in different villages, subdivisions, community halls, churches, among other community spaces around the island.¹¹⁰ These groups were both official organizations such as the dozens of community organizations under the umbrella of the Filipino Community of Guam (FCG) or informal ones in which families from the same barangay, province, or even universities. The members became lifelong friends, extending to their children and grandchildren's generations.¹¹¹ Filipinos throughout the island gathered together in events throughout the island on the weeknights and weekends, for prayer groups, big religious holidays, pageants, civic organization events, and especially for the Philippine Independence Ball hosted by the FCG. The Filipino community comprised of people from a diverse array of Philippines provinces, and represented a variety of occupations and jobs that brought them to Guam in the first place. In any case, these pockets of Filipino families, groups, and

¹⁰⁹ Tamondong, Interview with the Author.

¹¹⁰ For more readings of the Filipino community in Guam in the post-World War II period, read Bruce Campbell, "The Filipino Community of Guam" (Master's, University of Guam, 1987); Alfred Flores, "Little Island into Mighty Base: Indigeneity, Race, and U.S. Empire in Guam, 1944-1962" (Ph.D., University of California, Los Angeles, 2015); Ann M. Pobutsky, and Enrico I. Neri, "Patterns of Filipino Migration to Guam: United States Military Colonialism and Its Aftermath," *Philippine Studies: Historical and Ethnographic Viewpoints* 66, no. 1 (2018): 77–94.

¹¹¹ Norman Analista, Interview with the Author, Mangilao Guam, November 26, 2019.

organizations provided the support needed for new immigrants making their way to a new island, a new country, and a new diasporic community within U.S. empire.

The most notable of the organizations, which still remains in existence at the time of writing, is the Filipino Community of Guam (FCG). The FCG was founded in 1954 by Filipino men who worked as contract and non-contract workers for the U.S. military build-up in the immediate post-World War II era.¹¹² When the FCG was founded, the members felt that they had “a deep sense of duty” and felt that the organization “must contribute its share in bringing of the two peoples even closer if it is to succeed and justify its being.”¹¹³ This mission towards responsible civic engagement and contributions to Guam society continued into the 1960s and 1970s. While the early leadership comprised middle-class Filipino workers, its leadership evolved to comprised some of the wealthiest and high-status Filipino men living on Guam, including Mark V. Pangelinan and Manuel Jose. Through its regional organizations, the FCG would sponsor the construction of pavilions at the Paseo Park in Hagåtña and the Ypao Beach Park in Tumon, and it would erect monuments to historical figures including Filipino revolutionary exiles, President John F. Kennedy, George Washington, and the first Chamorro Archbishop, Felixberto Camacho Flores—a son of Leon Flores, a Filipino revolutionary exile described in Part I of this study. It would restore historic buildings including Spanish era structures, as well as sponsor construction of public spaces such as tennis courts and parks.¹¹⁴ It also donated hemo-dialysis machines to the Guam Memorial Hospital and provided scholarships for students at the University of Guam. Through these acts, the Filipinos of the FCG wanted “pursue that noble task of helping make Guam progressive, and to offer

¹¹² Filipino Community of Guam, “Know the Philippines Exhibition: Carnival & Exposition,” Filipino Community of Guam Vertical File, University of Guam, Micronesia Area Research Center, 38. (Hereafter cited as FCG, “Know the Philippines Exhibition.”)

¹¹³ FCG, “Know the Philippines Exhibition,” 8.

¹¹⁴ A longer explanation of the origin of the Filipino Community of Guam can be found in chapter 3 of this dissertation. Filipino Community of Guam, “25th Anniversary: Installation of Officers, January 26, 1980,” Filipino Community of Guam Vertical File, Collection of the Nieves Flores Library in Hagåtña, Guam Public Library System. (Hereafter cited as FCG, “25th Anniversary.”)

gratitude to an island that has been a generous home to many of them.”¹¹⁵ Whether it be through infrastructure, praised cultural icons, or donating medical technology, the FCG believed that by contributing to Guam the organization was helping to modernize the island.

The Filipino Ladies Association of Guam (FLAG) was the sister association of the Filipino Community of Guam. Founded in 1962 by the wives of the Filipino men who would make names for themselves in the booming years of Guam’s economic growth, the FLAG was a civic and cultural organization dedicated to fostering mutual relations between Filipinos and the people of Guam through philanthropy, volunteer work, and cultural events.¹¹⁶ Like the FGC, the FLAG donated funds to aid many organizations, events, monuments, and materials throughout its existence including medical equipment to the Guam Memorial Hospital, typhoon-relief programs in the Philippines. But FLAG was primarily known as an organization for Filipina socialites; their largest annual event was Santa Cruzan, a religious holiday that is widely celebrated in the Tagalog regions of the Philippines. The festivities coincided with a pageant with women from Filipino and local groups from all over the island.

For some Filipino women especially in the transformation of the 1960s and 1970s, FLAG represented a show of wealth, of connection, and proximity to Americanness. In an oral history interview with retired teacher, Sabina Tamondong, she relayed that FLAG was an organization that not only provided civic and community service for the rest of the island, but also a place that reflected and performed class differences.¹¹⁷ Organizations such as the FCG and FLAG were considered to be places for the Filipino elite to mobilize the other classes of Filipinos to carry out projects that were meaningful to them. Tamondong recalls that the elite ladies of the 1960s and 70s,

¹¹⁵ FCG, “25th Anniversary,” 26.

¹¹⁶ Filipino Ladies Association of Guam, “59th Induction and Christmas Ball,” January 3, 2020, Event Booklet, Private collection of the author. A copy of the booklet as well as past booklets may be found with the Filipino Ladies Association of Guam.

¹¹⁷ Tamondong, Interview with the Author.

such as Edwina Jose—wife of real estate mogul Manuel Jose—would call for sponsorships from banks, big businesses, and commerce, while the “working members” of the time would carry out the day-to-day activities of the organization, dropping off solicitation letters, picking up prizes and supplies among other things.¹¹⁸

In a different way, FLAG had a strict regulation for formal gatherings in which its members were required to wear a *Filipiniana* mestiza dress, a traditional dress of women in the Philippines consisting of sometimes rare materials such as piña thread, fine fabrics, and jeweled adornments. For Tamondong, the *Filipiniana* mestiza dress was a symbol between the rich, poor, and the working classes, as they were expensive to own especially in Guam where all the materials were imported from abroad.¹¹⁹ “They laugh at me during the time I joined,” Tamondong recalled, “I had only two mestiza, the green and the brown.” When the others would point out that they recognized her dress from a previous event, Tamondong would with a smile, reply “Oh no, it’s a different shade.”¹²⁰

The tensions around wealth and social mobility within the Filipino community was reflective of the diverse class and occupational backgrounds of the Filipino community in Guam. While the national trend of the post 1965 Filipino migration tended to skew towards the educated classes—nurses, doctors, and teachers—that would come to dominate the perception of a middle-class Filipino America, the longer history of Filipino migration to Guam starting in the 1940s meant that the streams of new Filipino workers were more diverse in occupation and socio-economic standing than their continental counterparts. There were the upper-class millionaires and billionaires who had business conglomerates, there were the professionals such as doctors and lawyers, there were the blue-collar workers who were electricians, carpenters, construction workers, and there were unskilled

¹¹⁸ Tamondong, Interview with the Author.

¹¹⁹ Mina Roces has written about the symbolism of *Filipiniana* or mestiza dress in politics and society. See Mina Roces, “Gender, Nation and the Politics of Dress in Twentieth Century,” in *The Politics of Dress in Asia and the Americas*, ed. Mina Roces and Louise Edwards (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2007): 19-41.

¹²⁰ Tamondong, Interview with the Author.

workers. As estimated by Nita Baldovino, who arrived in Guam in 1972 as a young bride to a H-2 worker, “one percent of the thirty-three [of Guam’s population] percent came rich. Most came as workers.”¹²¹ The relatives of migrant workers who eventually moved to Guam were also blue collar or working class standing. Nita remarked that five hours after she was sworn in for her U.S. citizenship, she went straight to immigration and petitioned her parents, who received their U.S. citizenship five years later. Even though the 1965 Immigration Act made it more possible for new unattached Filipino immigrants to move to the U.S., in Guam, the increase of Filipino population had been fueled by people who utilized family reunification provisions to bring their family members in the 1960s and 1970s, a little earlier than had happened in the continent.

With the FCG and the FLAG, new immigrants who arrived in Guam in the 1960s and 1970s would find themselves in an island with a relatively well-established Filipino community. The FCG was the large umbrella organization for Filipino organizations on the island (FLAG did not participate in FCG), in which dozens of province-based, region-based, and even university-based organizations became the basis of Filipino social life on Guam. They included groups such as the Samareños Association, the Batangas Association, the Bicol Club of Guam, the Cavite Association of Guam, the Visayan Association of Guam, the Ilocano Association of Guam, the Aklan Association of Guam, the Circulo Pampagueño, the Alumni of University of the Philippines among so many others.¹²² These organizations celebrated the specificity of each region or institution, highlighting the diversity of the Philippines even in diaspora.¹²³

¹²¹ Baldovino was a former president of the Filipino Community in Guam. Nita Baldovino, Interview with the author, Tumon, Guam, January 7, 2020.

¹²² FCG, “25th Anniversary,” Front Cover.

¹²³ On Filipino communities in Guam, see Bruce Campbell, “The Filipino Community on Guam,” (M.A. Thesis: University of Hawai‘i, 1986); Tabitha Espina Velasco, “The Ube (‘Roots’) Generation,” *Humanities Diliman* 13, no. 2 (2016): 75–101. On Filipino communities in Asian America, see Linda Trinh Vo and Rick Bonus eds., *Contemporary Asian American Communities* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2002); Rick Bonus, *Locating Filipino Americans: Ethnicity & the Cultural Politics of Space* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2000); Yen Lê Espiritu, *Home Bound: Filipino American Lives Across Cultures, Communities, and Countries* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003).

Each organization would hold monthly meetings and would have one to two large annual events that would celebrate a holiday that held significance to their specific province, town, or barangay in the Philippines. For instance, the Aklan Association of Guam, which was founded in 1965 by members from Panay Island, many of whom were previously employed as contract workers for the U.S. Naval Station and a Camp Roxas, held their annual Ati-Atihan Festival starting in the mid-seventies. The festival celebrated the feast of Santo Niño and was widely celebrated in Iloilo Province. According to Patrick Luces—a descendent of Johnny and Aida Luces of the Iloilo Province in the Philippines and Agat village on Guam, the members of Aklan Association practiced their drum patterns every Sunday for weeks before the festival and spent time creating costumes that depicted “native” Ilonggo tribes customary among the celebrations in the Philippines.¹²⁴ Annual traditions such as the Ati-Atihan Festival, festivals for patron saints, and even Philippine Independence provided opportunities for the Filipino community to socialize, forming bonds across and through generations on Guam. These groups fostered a sense of cultural continuity of their barangays and provinces in the Philippines through the forging of community in diaspora on Guam.

Regional and provincial identities were not only preserved and passed down through formal organizations, but also in family groups who formed intergenerational friendships. They created close knit groups out of people who they were distantly related to in the Philippines. Arriving in Guam in the 1950s, Nerissa Bretania Underwood recalls how her family was close friends with the Luces, Delfin, Salas, and Malilay families.¹²⁵ Their friendships were fostered around their activities with the Camp Roxas Church. They were also forged on the mahjong tables that would start early in the afternoon on Saturday, played through the night and early morning hours before church services on Sunday morning, only to start yet again after church ended. Some Filipino families would drive

¹²⁴ Patrick Luces, Interview with the author, Dededo Guam, December 11, 2019.

¹²⁵ Nerissa Underwood, Interview with the Author, Tamuning Guam, September 9, 2019.

down to Agat from the central village of Tamuning to join them on the weekends. Underwood also noted that there were other clusters of Filipino family groups who lived in close proximity to each other. There were the families who lived in the R.R. Cruz subdivision, who were different from the family group who lived in the Bordallo subdivision, from those who lived in Agat. The Oberiano family, which I am from, lived in the Bordallo subdivision, and were lifelong friends with the Sutacio, the Sotomil, and Doranilla families.¹²⁶ From Yigo, to Dededo, to Tamuning, to Santa Rita and Agat, Filipinos throughout the island were building an alternative landscape of the island, in which their relations with other Filipino groups and families mapped their knowledge of Guam. They were building a diasporic relationality that in some ways overlaid and competed with the indigenous Chamorro relations to land and people that preexisted on the island. In other words, Filipinos saw Guam in relation to other Filipino groups, not necessarily in relation to Chamorros.

The organizations and informal family groups preserved regional identities in the Filipino community, rather than forcing a homogenous Filipino identity among immigrants in Guam. This was especially true of the first few generations of postwar Filipino immigrants who may have not understood themselves in relation to Manila and the independent Philippine nation state, but to their originating province. This identity was most evident in language politics. Originally from Iloilo Province, Nerissa Bretania Underwood recalled how her mother wanted her children to “maintain our Ilonggo language because she said when we did go back to visit, she did not want our cousins to be alienated from us, or us alienated from them.”¹²⁷ For the Bretania family, language was central to their Ilonggo identity, and had to be preserved even in their migration to the United States.

In a different way, language defined proximity to a generalized Filipino identity. Growing up in an Ilocano household in Barrigada, Marlyn Oberiano remembers how her mother Leonor Bello

¹²⁶ Florita Oberiano, Interview with the Author, Santa Rita Guam, December 24, 2019.

¹²⁷ Underwood, Interview with the Author.

felt much more comfortable speaking to other Filipinos in English rather than Tagalog, which was the language of the provinces around Metro Manila and the basis for the country's national language. While some Filipinos thought she was "putting on airs," Leonor had actually learned more English in her rudimentary education in the pre-World War II, American colonial Philippines in Ilocos Sur and felt more comfortable speaking and writing in English than in Tagalog, which might as well had been a foreign language. At the same time, however, Leonor's other daughter and Marlyn's sister, Eliza, was spending time with her Filipino classmates at George Washington High School and learned Tagalog through conversations with them. For Filipino immigrants to Guam in the 1960s through the 1980s, the formation of a Filipino identity beyond the Philippine archipelago was just as pertinent as finding a home and settling in Guam.

Filipino organizations and family groups signaled not only a site for which Filipino identity could flourish, but they operated as a potential organizing system that could influence over the island's politics. Folks from the greater Guam community began to see immigrants from the Philippines as a homogenous "Filipino" community. The Filipino community in Guam became substantial enough that Chamorro politicians began to canvas for the Filipino vote in local elections and to even play-up their Filipino heritage from generations past.¹²⁸ For instance, the election year of 1978, Governor Ricardo Bordallo made a circuit of the Filipino regional organizations on Guam at their induction ceremonies for their new members. In February, he made an appearance at the induction ceremony for the Filipino Community of Guam, and rather than offering a few short remarks on the accomplishments of the organization, he used the opportunity to talk about the successes of his own administration and his platform for the upcoming election. "My administration has endeavored to ensure that 1978 will be the beginning of a new era of balanced growth and

¹²⁸ Robert Underwood, Interview with the Author, Mangilao Guam, January 14, 2018.

prosperity for all,” he announced.¹²⁹ To emphasize that his administration was meant for all people, not just Chamorros, he closed his speech by referring to his Filipino audience as his “fellow Guamanians,” and “*Manetlubu [sic] ---mgo [sic] kaibigan at kababayan,*” ensuring that they understood that he believed that Filipinos were an integral part of the Guam community.¹³⁰ He shared his optimism that with Filipino “cooperation and support, our economy will continue to improve so that our children can live and work in a community with all the amenities and opportunities that we came to find on this promised land of Guam.”¹³¹ Including Filipinos in the future of the island through notions of the inclusive “we” and family, Bordallo sought to win the vote of the Filipino community.

Attempting to compete against the *Pacific Daily News*, Filipino entrepreneur Manuel Jose also had his own newspaper in the 1960s, the *Guam Times Weekly*. The newspaper was his soapbox from which he could lay out his own opinions concerning the direction of Guam politics.¹³² Interestingly, Jose characterized himself in political cartoons as “Taotao Guam,” a cartoon figure who was dressed in a grass skirt and was shirtless among other Westernized figures in suits, ties, and all the symbols recognizable in American political cartoons. Jose would comment on all aspects of the island’s politics, from gubernatorial races, immigration and labor laws, and debates over Guam’s territorial status. Jose’s opinions came to exemplify how elite Filipinos could insert themselves in political conversations and influence whole groups of people on the island. It did not help that Jose’s perspectives were often criticizing Chamorro leaders for what he believed were incorrect ways of

¹²⁹ “Remarks at the Induction Ceremony, Filipino Community of Guam at the Marianas Ballroom, February 4, 1978,” The Papers of Governor Ricardo Jerome Bordallo, First Term, Box 56, Folder Speeches January-August 1976, MARC, UOG.

¹³⁰ “*Manetlubu*” is Chamorro for “my siblings” in an outdated orthography for the Chamorro language. It would be spelled *mañetlu-bu* today. “*Kaibigan at Kababayan*” is Filipino (Tagalog) for “friends” and “countrymen.”

¹³¹ “Remarks at the Induction Ceremony, Filipino Community of Guam at the Marianas Ballroom, February 4, 1978,” The Papers of Governor Ricardo Jerome Bordallo, First Term, Box 56, Folder Speeches January-August 1976, MARC, UOG.

¹³² A relatively complete set of *The Guam Times Weekly* can be found at the Micronesian Area Research Center at the University of Guam.

doing business and politics. Nevertheless, Jose's political cartoon character of "Taotao Guam" demonstrates how he understood Guamanian identity as one that was not necessarily tied to Chamorro identity, but one that was multicultural.

Filipinos also participated in the legislative process electing at least one leader since the 1950s to represent the Filipino community within the mix of Chamorro leaders in the Guam Legislature. In 1966, Oscar Delfin was the first Filipino immigrant to successfully run for the Guam Legislature. Nevertheless, it was still relatively difficult for Filipinos to be elected. Joe Dizon, a professor at the University of Guam, published a small survey of the 1970 Guam election, in particular how Filipinos came to participate in the electoral process.¹³³ According to his study, the rise of Filipino candidates in the 1970 election was spurred on by the increasing tensions around the anti-alien platforms of some electoral candidates. While six Filipino candidates made it past the primary elections for the Guam Legislature, none of them garnered a seat. Ultimately, he argued that "the Filipino ethnic vote, which numbers 4,000 proves most inadequate by itself as a source of political strength."¹³⁴ In order to assure themselves a seat, they also "must seek wider support from the Guamanian and stateside voters," moving perhaps to "minimize ethnic origins" and speak the Chamorro language.¹³⁵ So although Filipinos came to represent a higher percentage of the island's population, their participation in the legislative process remained at the level of constituent rather than leadership.

With their successes in Guam, Filipinos came to represent a sort of model minority for white statesiders who lived in Guam. With the exception of politics, they demonstrated the possibilities embedded in mythic American dream which they achieved through hard work, determination, and willingness to partake in civic activities. The long-time editor of the *Pacific Daily News*, Joseph C.

¹³³ Joe Dizon, "Filipinos in Guam's 1970 Elections," *Guam Recorder* 2:1 (January-March 1972): 56-59.

¹³⁴ Dizon, "Filipinos in Guam's 1970 Elections," 58.

¹³⁵ Dizon, "Filipinos in Guam's 1970 Elections," 58.

Murphy, wrote in a daily editorial in January 1976 about the “violent confrontations between Guamanians and Filipinos” and his belief that there was “some resentment by Guamanians for the rapid upward movement of the Filipino community.”¹³⁶ He wanted to address the tensions, specifically those that wanted to slow immigration from the Philippines. He believed that Filipinos were assets to Guam’s economy, writing that “The Filipinos, through construction, through business, through the professions and through their rich cultural heritage have contributed a great deal to Guam.”¹³⁷ Despite acknowledging that Chamorros and Filipinos have long known about their shared histories, Murphy believed that education about the Filipino experience in Guam would quell the tensions. Citing the work of Lawrence Lawcock, another white statesider professor from the University of Guam, Murphy argued that Filipinos had contributed to the economic development of Guam, and the “economic successes” that they have had in Guam made them an asset. Murphy included a quote from Lawcock insisted “The number of businessmen and professionals among the post-World War II immigrants who have achieved economic success provides an object lesson for newcomers in what good luck, perseverance or education can accomplish.” Murphy concluded that “The Filipinos, on the whole, have made their contribution, and will continue to do so for the long range future.”¹³⁸ On the whole, white statesiders living on Guam believed that Filipino immigrants represented the benefits of living within a multicultural island of the United States. Chamorro people, Murphy implied, were causing the ethnic tensions on the island and should be more like Filipinos.

In the 1960s and the 1970s, the Filipino community in Guam grew not only in population, but also in diversity in terms of provincial origins, occupations, socio-economic backgrounds, and political leanings. Although they might have seen themselves as a heterogenous community, those

¹³⁶ Joseph C. Murphy, “The Filipino on Guam --- Plus or Minus?...” *Pacific Daily News* (January 15, 1976), 19.

¹³⁷ Murphy, “The Filipino on Guam --- Plus or Minus?...” 19.

¹³⁸ Murphy, “The Filipino on Guam --- Plus or Minus?...” 19.

on the outside of the community began to see them as a monolithic group of people, who had the capacity to overtake economic sectors and potentially the political sphere in the near future. This rise of the Filipino community would exacerbate the fears of many Chamorro leaders who felt that the Chamorro people were losing control over their island's affairs. If white statesiders represented the shift of institutional power away from Chamorro people into civilian white statesider hands, then Filipinos were the demographic shift that threatened Chamorro influence by virtue of sheer numbers.

The Tensions of a Multicultural Island

The rise of the tourism industry, the growing discontent with U.S. institutions controlled by the U.S. military and white statesiders, and the influx of Filipino immigration culminated into contentious relations between Chamorros, Filipinos, and white statesiders in the 1970s. These tensions turned ugly as they began to play out prominently in politics, especially regarding immigration and labor, and in schools around ethnic gangs and cultural pride. Even though the focus in the news and the community was on the contentious Chamorro-Filipino relations, some pointed to the imperial structure that facilitated and exacerbated these racial animosities.

With the rise in numbers of Filipino and other non-Chamorro settlers to the island, Chamorro politicians continued to emphasize the United States' unilateral control over immigration policy in Guam as a hindrance to Chamorro livelihoods.¹³⁹ During his campaign for governor of Guam in 1969, Joaquin C. Arriola, the speaker for the Guam Legislature, ran on a platform of local control over immigration. Thinly veiled against the Filipino immigrant community on Guam, he "alluded that for every alien entering Guam there would be one less job, one less desk for American students, one less hospital bed, one less lot and house, and that much less in funds for a needy

¹³⁹ The criticism of the lack of local control of immigration is not new to the 1970s. As shown in chapter three of this dissertation, the preponderance for military and off-island businesses to hire temporary labor from the Philippines was criticized by Chamorro politicians in U.S. Congress, most notably by Antonio B. Won Pat and Cecelia Bamba.

American family.”¹⁴⁰ Arriola believed with greater local control over immigration policy, and notably, the potential removal of Guam as a port-of-entry for immigration processes, would help to curtail the immigrant population which he saw was mooching off the island’s economic growth and limited resources. For many Filipinos, however, they believed Arriola de-racialized his assertion by using “American” to refer to Chamorros and classified all Filipinos as “aliens.” According to the *Pacific Daily News* article, Filipinos were truly dismayed by Arriola’s rhetoric and fought back. A Filipino was quoted as saying “He’s cutting his own throat. This guy is in trouble for belittling the force of the Filipinos on Guam.”¹⁴¹ Other unidentified Filipinos quoted in the article doubled down on their U.S. citizenship, citing their contributions to the economic development of Guam including paying taxes. With outright anti-immigrant sentiment as headline news in a gubernatorial election, Filipino-Chamorro relations were at an all-time low.

Beyond the realm of the elections, Chamorro-Filipino relations broke down over identity formation. Manuel Jose, who has been mentioned throughout this chapter, was a vocal Filipino perspective in all things politics. While he was supportive of Guam’s political and economic development since the 1960s as shown by his pieces in the *Guam Times Weekly*, the era of strengthened Chamorro identity and politics in the 1970s made his opinions about Guam as a “melting pot” feel like erasure to Chamorro people. Jose was not afraid to voice his skepticism of Chamorro people’s moves towards identifying as “indigenous.”¹⁴² This received the ire of a few Chamorros students who pointed out Jose’s foreignness to Guam. They wrote in a letter to the editor of the *Pacific Daily News*, “since when do outsiders and non-Chamorros like yourself have the

¹⁴⁰ Montie Protasio, “Arriola Brings Out ‘Alien’ Issue,” *Pacific Daily News* (August 19, 1970), 1. This quote has been interpreted by Vicente Diaz in his article, “Bye Bye Ms. American Pie: The Historical Relations between Chamorros and Filipinos and the American Dream,” *ISLA: Journal of Micronesian Studies* 3:1 (1995): 147–60.

¹⁴¹ Protasio, “Arriola Brings Out ‘Alien’ Issue,” 4.

¹⁴² Robert Underwood, Interview with the Author, Mangilao Guam, January 14, 2018.

right to define and to decide our identity as Chamorros and our rights to our island?”¹⁴³

Furthermore, they pointed out the shifting definition of the term “Guamanian,” which they were willing to forgo, but only because they identified more as Chamorro than Guamanian. They wrote, “If you wish to denounce your Filipino heritage and call yourself Guamanian, feel free. However, in our definition you will always be a Tagalo, just like all the indigenous people of Guam, and the Northern Marianas will always be Chamorro.”¹⁴⁴ The Chamorro students chose to place Jose as a “Tagalo,” a derogatory term launched at Filipinos, and thus perpetually foreign to Guam despite his contributions to the island.

The fights were not only in newspaper articles and political advertisements. The tensions played out in the streets and the schools. Ariel Dimalanta remembers that when he returned to Guam in 1970 after living in the Philippines, he “saw violence. I saw kids fighting. I saw Filipinos cussing. Then I saw Chamorros cussing. Then that’s when I learn that wow there is some racial clashes here.”¹⁴⁵ Dimalanta did not quite feel this animosity in his younger years living on the island in the 1960s. Furthermore, there were a slew of “race riots” being reported in the *Pacific Daily News*, including one at Dededo Junior High School where, “a man brandishing a weapon outside its fence caused education officials to close the school at noon... and send the students home.”¹⁴⁶ (The village of Dededo has a high population of Filipinos.) With rumors of an impending race riot between Filipinos and Chamorros due to an incident in which a student “had pushed one of them down during a break between classes,” the Assistant Commissioner of Dededo Popoy Zamora told reports that “a lot of the Filipino students didn’t go to school (Friday) because of the bad rumors.”¹⁴⁷

¹⁴³ Marie A. Crisostomo, Laura I. Manglona, Josepha S. Igisomar, Antoinette Laguana, Barbara C. Millon, Wencesiao C. Leon Guerrero, Frank Aguaio, Frances M. Raguindin, Martha Palma, Goring Duenas, Ana C. Taitano, Teresita A. Salas, Manuel P. Duenas, Raymond A. Perez, Letter to the Editor, *Pacific Daily News* (July 30, 1977), 27.

¹⁴⁴ Crisostomo et al., Letter to the Editor, 27.

¹⁴⁵ Dimalanta, Interview with the Author.

¹⁴⁶ James A. Hebert, “Riot Talk Abbreviates School Day,” *Pacific Daily News* (March 1, 1975), 1.

¹⁴⁷ Hebert, “Riot Talk Abbreviates School Day,” 5.

Zamora elaborated that the ethnic tensions were on the rise: “11 Filipino girls were chased from the school grounds by a group of Guamanians.”¹⁴⁸ After being chased, the Filipino girls had apparently taken refuge in a house, and the Chamorro students continued to tear down the screen door and throw rocks at the girls.

The incident at Dededo Junior High School was not the only occasion that made the news, and it is unlikely that all racial tensions and incidents made the news at all. The tensions between Chamorros and Filipinos did not just stay on the level of students. As a teacher in the public school system, Sabina Tamondong, experienced her fair share of ethnic aggressions from statesider teachers and Chamorro students. As a teacher with a master’s degree from the University of the Philippines, a U.S. accredited university, Sabina started as one of the highest paid teachers at John F. Kennedy High School in Tumon. As a result of her credentials, she was able to choose the upper-level classes that other teachers wanted to teach, and she often felt that people underestimated her abilities because she was Filipino. Additionally, her students often criticized her accent. She relayed that the antagonism manifested outwardly in which students would say “‘go back to the Philippines,’ right in my face.”¹⁴⁹ Making fun of her accent, Sabina’s said her students would say, “‘Mrs. Tamondong, that’s not how you say it. Go teach in the Philippines.’” The incidents in school often shook her to her core, but realizing that she needed her job to support her two kids in the Philippines, she said to herself, “I’m going to swallow all those things. I’m going to prove you.” She smiled, gritted her teeth, and continued teaching at JFK out of sheer will to provide for her children back in the Philippines.

Even as the island became touted as a multicultural paradise in the tourism district in Tumon, Filipino-Chamorro relations on Guam seemed to be getting worse and worse in the 1970s

¹⁴⁸ Tamondong, Interview with the author.

¹⁴⁹ Tamondong, Interview with the author.

in local villages. The tensions in schools warranted attention from public officials as well as concerned parents who wanted to ensure their children's safety. Several parents' meetings took place in the aftermath of the highly publicized incidents with Government of Guam officials attempting to find the root cause of the problems. While some believed the incidents had nothing to do with race, many others did. They saw that work had to be done to reconcile the racial problems.

Eventually, the racial and ethnic tensions in schools generated academic studies from the University of Guam and other researchers. These included Samuel Betances—an education specialist who earned his doctoral degree in education from Harvard University and was the spouse of Chamorro feminist matriarch Laura Souder—who was hired by the College of Education at the University of Guam to create a series of “packets” focusing on cross-cultural education for the Guam's public schools in order to remedy the ethnic tensions between Filipino and Chamorro students. His experiences prompted him to write about the ethnic conflicts in Guam public schools in the 1970s in an *Islander* magazine article titled, “Limits of Cross-Cultural Education in Solving Ethnic Conflict in Guam.”¹⁵⁰ He systematically laid out the different perspectives of how the education system should work on from the point of view of Chamorros, statesiders who he labeled as “Americans,” and Filipinos on Guam. Despite some teachers' desire to use cross-cultural education as a way to curb ethnic tensions, Betances realized that the method would “favor some ethnic groups at the expense of others in Guam.”¹⁵¹ He argued that not only did cross-cultural education favor “American” white statesiders over Filipinos and especially over Chamorros, but cross-cultural education also exacerbated the tensions between Filipinos and Chamorros. To him, cross-cultural education lauded cultural diversity, but did so at the expense of Chamorro people

¹⁵⁰ Samuel Betances, “Limits of Cross-Cultural Education in Solving Ethnic Conflict in Guam,” *Islander by Pacific Daily News* (October 23, 1977), 3-7 and 14.

¹⁵¹ Betances, “Limits of Cross-Cultural Education,” 3.

whose connection to the land warranted them “the most legitimate claim to Guam.”¹⁵² Chamorros were rendered equal with statesiders and Filipinos who were immigrants to the island. For Chamorros, who comprised the majority of students in the schools, the education system on Guam was meant to maintain indigenous Chamorro culture in Guam. Paired with the fact that the education system rewarded proximity to Americanness and whiteness, Chamorros were left behind relative to their statesider and Filipino classmates.

Betances believed the tensions in schools had to do with the economic and political control of the United States over labor and land on Guam. Because of this, he argued that multiculturalism and cross-cultural education was ill-fitting for the island. He wrote, “to reduce the tension between these two groups requires much more than a ‘packet’ which tells Chamorro school children about Filipino history or the heroic exploits of their distant cousins in the Pacific. Cross-cultural education cannot control U.S. military policies or provide the Legislature with control of immigration policy.”¹⁵³ For Betances, the ethnic tensions in the schools were not the root problem. They were the symptoms of U.S. imperialism and militarism in Guam.

For several years after Betances’s article and despite efforts to promote cultural understanding between Filipinos and Chamorros on Guam, the ethnic tensions between Filipino and Chamorro students continued to brew. This includes the moment at the beginning of this chapter when the Chamorro high school student from JFK was sent to the hospital after being beaten with a lug wrench by Filipino boys. The fights in schools, among the next generation of people living on Guam, signaled the racial and ethnic tensions that would exist in the following decades. This was the paradox of paradise.

¹⁵² Betances, “Limits of Cross-Cultural Education,” 3.

¹⁵³ Betances, “Limits of Cross-Cultural Education,” 6.

In the 1970s, Dr. Katherine Aguon wrote that “to the superficial observer, Guam’s multi-cultural society is visually alive and exciting. Guam, however, is not a melting-pot in the sense that various cultural groups contribute to the basic structure of Guam’s society. Quite to the contrary, these groups must conform to the same basic American imposed cultural patterns upon which Guam’s society is based.”¹⁵⁴ She referred to how American cultural experiences came to impact how Chamorros, Filipinos, and statesiders came to view Guam in the 1970s as part of the United States, rather than a Chamorro island. While Chamorros as indigenous peoples began to criticize white statesiders for their roles in shifting institutional power towards an American ideal, statesiders heralded multiculturalism as a vital part to the island’s economic development, often using Filipinos as prime examples. Filipinos, for the most part, were respectful of Chamorro claims to Guam, understanding that their immigrant condition made them foreigners in Guam. This sentiment, however, did not mean that they were accepting of Chamorro desire to control immigration, as Filipinos saw Guam as a United States territory, a convenient place for them to obtain U.S. citizenship and earn economic opportunities, even though these benefits came at the expense of Chamorro people, land, and culture. On the other hand, Chamorros viewed Filipino immigrants as a monolithic group, stereotyping them as “cheap labor” and perpetually foreign without recognizing the shared struggle under the same imperial structure of the United States in the Pacific. Although heralded as the next multicultural paradise in the Pacific, the transformation of Guam in the 1960s and 1970s only facilitated and exacerbated the racial tensions of empire.

The ethnic tensions in the schools in Guam and the rest of Guam society pointed to the uneasy triangulation of relations between Chamorros, Filipinos, and statesiders that was influenced by the imposition of the settler colonial structure. The island’s transformation was not just political, social, or economic, but foundational. With the rise of multiculturalism, the opening of Guam to the

¹⁵⁴ Aguon, “The Guam Dilemma: The Need for a Pacific Island Education Perspective,” 100.

rest of the world, the influx of immigrants from Asia, and the U.S. continued military presence, Guam's culture shifted further away from an island society based on Chamorro values, traditions, and social relations into a culture that was a struggling unincorporated (colonized) territory—the island paradise “Where America’s Day Begins.”

“Commonwealth Now!”:

Envisioning Indigenous Chamorro Self-Determination in a Multicultural Guam

Sometime in the early 1980s, Chamorro activist Hope Alvarez Cristobal wrote an essay in which she explicitly demanded that the Chamorro people of Guam receive the opportunity to exercise self-determination as stipulated by the Charter of the United Nations. She argued that the United States failed to commence the decolonization process for Guam, one of its last unincorporated territories in the Pacific and a United Nations-designated non-self-governing territory. Outlining the decades of United States colonial rule, Cristobal wrote, “an inalienable right to self-determination has yet to be exercised fully on Guam because the people of Guam (the Chamorro people) have been denied their rights in the past.”¹ Rather than waiting for the United States government to present them with the opportunity, the Chamorro people of Guam took it upon themselves to embark on a movement to renegotiate the island’s federal-territorial relationship and change their political status within the United States empire. This was the Guam Commonwealth Movement, the legal and political arm of the more capacious movement for Chamorro self-determination for Guam.

From the 1980s through the 1990s, Chamorro political leaders, including several Guam governors, Congressional representatives, and senators from the Guam Legislature, were consumed by the potential of exercising self-determination and revising the territory’s relationship with the United States through the movement for a Guam Commonwealth. The Guam Commonwealth Act, as it became known, was an island-wide endeavor that operated on multiple levels of governance—the village community, the local Guam government, within the halls of U.S. Congress, and at the

¹ Hope Cristobal, “The Organization of People for Indigenous Rights: A Commitment Towards Self-Determination,” *Chamorro Self-Determination*, ed. Robert Underwood and Laura Souder (Mangilao: Micronesian Area Research Center, 1987), 82. A version of this was delivered at the United Nations in 1982 by Robert Underwood, Ron Teehan, and Chris Perez Howard.

United Nations. The ultimate goal was to draft a Commonwealth Act with input from various leaders and community members that would create a political status that combined the Chamorro desire to remain part of the United States, while also having the ability to negotiate for more local governance than the preexisting Guam Organic Act would allow. It sought to rectify the most pressing issues of Guam's local governance including the limitations of the political status of unincorporated territory, the continued presence of the U.S. military, and the rapid demographic changes caused by the rise of immigration that threatened to displace and outnumber Chamorros in their home island. Chamorro activists used the opportunity of the Guam Commonwealth Movement to advocate for indigenous Chamorro rights at a critical moment of Guam's political and social trajectory. The act became the legislative and legal document through which the Chamorro self-determination movement could potentially be ensured. Thus, the debate over territorial political status within the United States empire and notions of self-determination as defined by the United Nations had become closely associated—almost inextricable—from indigenous Chamorro rights and self-determination.

In the midst of the debates over what the new political status of the Guam Commonwealth should look like, Chamorro activists such as Cristobal were adamant that only Chamorro people—not all people who settled in Guam—should be able to revise and vote to approve this political status within empire. She said that “immigrant citizens, United States citizens from Wisconsin or Georgia have no right to self-determination of Guam” and argued that it was “illogical and unfair to allow them to move to Guam and participate in Guam's self-determination because the Chamorro people have yet to exercise their own self-determination.”² Immigrants, in Cristobal's perspective,

² Hope Cristobal, “The Organization of People for Indigenous Rights: A Commitment Towards Self-Determination,” *Chamorro Self-Determination*, ed. Robert Underwood and Laura Souder (Mangilao: Micronesian Area Research Center, 1987), 82. A version of this was delivered at the United Nations in 1982 by Robert Underwood, Ron Teehan, and Chris Perez Howard.

did not necessarily mean those from foreign countries, but also statesiders who settled in Guam. If Cristobal and other Chamorro activists could have it their way, the immigrant and settler population on Guam could not vote for the island's self-determination. In addition, they saw the vote for a new territorial political status embodied by the Guam Commonwealth Act as a pathway towards a potential exercise of self-determination in the future. Thus, she argued, only the Chamorro people should be eligible to vote. Such vote would be an act of Chamorro self-determination.

Cristobal's essay reflects the tensions of race, indigeneity, citizenship, and belonging within an unincorporated territory of the United States, one that was experiencing a demographic, political, and multicultural transformation in the 1970s and 1980s. As a chairperson of the Organization of People for Indigenous Rights (OPI-R), Cristobal believed that the Chamorro people's genealogical and intimate connection to the island of Guam made their rights inherently different from the migrants, immigrants, and settlers that arrived in Guam after World War II. In other words, Chamorro people were indigenous to Guam, and as an indigenous people, Chamorros had the "inalienable right" to self-determination as stipulated by the Charter of the United Nations.³ Chamorro activists heavily influenced the Guam Commonwealth Movement and helped to facilitate a monumental shift in Chamorro politics on a local, imperial, and international level. Chamorro leaders and activist organizations pushed Chamorros on Guam to claim their indigenous identity and advocate for indigenous rights.

Almost immediately, however, non-Chamorro opponents challenged the Chamorro vote for self-determination, citing that it was in violation of the notion of American multiculturalism and promoted racial inequality within the legal system. The advocacy for the inclusion of indigenous

³ There are a handful of scholars who have studied the Guam Commonwealth Movement in depth. They include Ronald Stade, Robert Rogers, and Michael P. Perez. Other sources that highlight this period of Guam history include Hale'ta series, most significantly, *Hale'ta Kinalamten Pulitikât: Siñenten I Chamorro, Issues in Guam's Political Development: The Chamorro Perspective* (Agaña: Political Status and Education Coordinating Commission, 1996).

Chamorro rights in the Guam Commonwealth Act incited intercommunity and interethnic tensions that surfaced in political meetings, schools, and in the general island community. The Chamorro self-determination movement seemed to exclude non-Chamorro residents of Guam such as Filipinos who adhered to American immigrant narratives, notions of equality, and, indeed, the inalienable right to vote. Filipinos, as well as other non-Chamorro settlers, believed that they should also be able to determine the political future of the island. The debates led to accusations of racial discrimination, descriptions of native inauthenticity, and epithets of colonial collaborators and perpetually alien immigrants. The movement for a Guam Commonwealth came to highlight the central tension of the settler military rule in Guam. At the edge of the Pacific empire, the exercise of indigenous Chamorro Rights and self-determination was at odds with American Civil Rights, the immigrant narrative of the United States, and the promotion of racial liberalism and multiculturalism.⁴

Within the U.S. empire in Guam, the integrated rhetoric of equality, multiculturalism, and racial liberalism downplayed the racial and cultural differences between indigenous Chamorro people, Filipino and other immigrants, and white settlers from the continental United States. The racial liberal narrative of the United States rendered indigenous Chamorro ties and claims to land and self-determination as not so different from the migration struggles of Filipino migrants or the lack of voting rights of white statesiders who had settled in Guam.⁵ This ideological framing posed substantial problems for Chamorros on Guam who sought to improve their territorial relationship with United States, and advocated for an exercise in self-determination. Because of imperial

⁴ Literature on Asian Settler Colonialism

⁵ Because Guam is an unincorporated territory of the United States, U.S. citizens living on Guam regardless of racial or ethnic background are not able to vote for President of the United States and do not have voting representation in U.S. Congress. The field of Asian Settler Colonialism as theorized in the context of Hawai'i has critiqued how multiculturalism in Hawai'i has been used to delegitimize Native Hawaiian claims to sovereignty. These scholars include, Dean Itsuji Saranillio, *Unsustainable Empire: Alternative Histories of Hawai'i Statehood* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2018); Candace Fujikane and Jonathan Y. Okamura, *Asian Settler Colonialism: From Local Governance to the Habits of Everyday Life in Hawai'i*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2008).

multiculturalism, all peoples on Guam were considered equal regardless of the material consequences of their colonial experiences, and settlers and immigrants were eligible to determine the future of the island even if they may have had a hand in the island's colonization. For Chamorro people who sought to regain control over their island, this equality only furthered the injustices of imperialism and colonialism. Thus, multiculturalism operated as a tool of settler colonialism in Guam, in which hierarchies of power and the diversity of experiences of colonialism are conflated, flattened, or ignored all together, and where solutions such as Civil Rights grew in opposition to Indigenous Rights.

This chapter explores the rise and fall of the Guam Commonwealth Movement to examine how the Chamorro self-determination movement exposed the tensions of U.S. settler militarism, multiculturalism, and racial liberalism within the U.S. empire. The Guam Commonwealth Act and its precursor—the Guam Constitution—sought to address the most pertinent grievances that Chamorro and Guamanian leaders held in regard to the island's territorial relationship with the United States. These issues include the overwhelming presence of the U.S. military, the lack of local immigration control, and the desire for the island's self-determination. In addition to government of Guam legislators and officials, the Chamorro activist group—the Organization of People for Indigenous Rights (OPI-R)—participated in the drafting of the act. Their activist and intellectual work influenced the rhetoric of indigenous rights in Guam, critiqued histories of U.S. imperialism in Guam, and articulated the foundational tenets of settler militarism and Asian settler colonialism well before their time. At all levels, they described how the integrated processes of U.S. militarism and immigration contributed to the alienation of Chamorros from their land and resources, and the ability to exercise self-determination. OPI-R's work received a large amount of opposition from white statesiders and Filipinos who believed that indigenous rights conflicted with the island's diverse population. Nevertheless, this chapter also historicizes the complexity with which Filipinos

engaged with the Commonwealth Act. Filipinos both opposed the act and practiced solidarity with the Chamorro self-determination movement, navigating through the complex positionalities that Filipinos had as both immigrant and settler in Guam. In the end, the Guam Commonwealth Act, through the local Guam elections and its death at its U.S. Congressional hearings, demonstrates how multiculturalism and racial liberalism legitimated and further justified United States control of Guam. Ultimately, this chapter historicizes the Guam Commonwealth Movement and the larger movement for Chamorro self-determination to highlight the structural possibilities and impossibilities for indigenous peoples to assert sovereignty and the contentious positionalities of non-white immigrants within the U.S. settler colonial empire.

Rising Discontent

The Chamorro self-determination movement of the 1970s through the 1990s was sparked by a rising discontent with U.S. territorial rule in Guam. The postwar military annexation, the rapid growth of an immigrant population, the limitations to local economic development caused by provisions in the Guam Organic Act, and the Pacific zeitgeist of decolonization propelled Chamorro leaders to question whether Guam should also have the ability to negotiate and determine for themselves the political future for Guam. The U.S. military land annexations since World War II displaced and dispossessed Chamorro people from their lands which they cultivated to participate in a subsistence economy. As a result, they shifted into a cash economy that was predominantly controlled by the U.S. military until the island's military security clearance was lifted in 1962 and a tourism industry emerged in the 1960s and 70s.⁶ In addition to the limitation of use on land, business and elected leaders frequently cited sections of the Guam Organic Act, particularly around labor and immigration, that stymied the development of a robust civilian economy and limited

⁶ Details of land annexation and its effects on Chamorro people can be found in chapter three "Native and/or Aliens" of this dissertation. A history of the development of a civilian tourism industry on Guam can be found in chapter five of this dissertation, "The Paradox of Paradise."

Guam's local self-governance. For instance, residents of Guam were not able to elect a governor until 1970; beforehand, the Governors of Guam were appointed by the President of the United States.⁷ Chamorros criticized U.S. policymakers who they believed did not have the knowledge of the circumstances on Guam to make informed decisions about the island's affairs.

Furthermore, the island's demographics had changed significantly since World War II. What was a small population of roughly 22,000 before World War II ballooned into 200,000 in 1947, and settled around 106,000 by 1980.⁸ Most of the population boom was due to a rise in a Filipino immigrant population who settled on the island by way of military contractors in the era of Guam's military build-up.⁹ As explained in chapter five, Chamorro leaders in the Guam Legislature began to articulate fears of loss of Chamorro culture and "ways of life" as well as Chamorro political influence as a direct result of the growing non-Chamorro population on island in the 1970s.¹⁰ This was further exacerbated by the observation that immigrants, particularly Filipinos, did not necessarily conform or engage with Chamorro life and culture. Furthermore, some Chamorro leaders in both government and business believed that the federal government's control over immigration policy in Guam was hindering economic growth on island. Chamorro leaders, thus, called for local control over Guam's immigration policy rather than having decisions being made unilaterally by the U.S. federal government.

Chamorro leaders were not only influenced by the transformations within Guam, but were also acutely aware of decolonization movements in the greater Pacific. For example, they saw how their Chamorro cousins in the Northern Mariana Islands, which was part of the Trust Territories of

⁷ The Elected Governor's Act of 1968 allowed Guamanians to elect their governor for the first time. In 1970, Guam elected Carlos Camacho, who had previously served as an appointed Guam governor in the 1960s.

⁸ Government of Guam, "Guam's People, 'A Continuing Heritage': A Statistical Profile of the Territory of Guam, 1920-1980," (Interagency Committee on Population June 1988), Hamilton Library Pacific Collection, University of Hawai'i at Mānoa.

⁹ More information about the immigration in the postwar period can be found in Chapter 3 and 4 of this dissertation. The historical survey of the Filipino community in Guam can be found in Chapter 5.

¹⁰ Joe S. Dizon, "Filipinos in Guam's 1970 Election," *Guam Recorder*, 2:1 (January-March 1972), 57.

the Pacific Islands, were able to negotiate a political status with the United States. And they questioned why Guam was not afforded the same opportunity. In addition, Pacific island colonies became independent island nation-states starting with Western Samoa's independence from New Zealand in 1962.¹¹ As former governor of Guam Joseph F. Ada wrote in 2002, "the worldwide movement toward independence and decolonization is still on-going, but Guam has continually been shielded from the excitement."¹² Unlike the Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands which the United States helped to decolonize, the United States did not afford the same opportunity to the people of Guam to determine a new political status because its colonial status as a possession of the U.S. before the war placed it in a different imperial genealogy. As Ada wrote, "if we are unaware of these movements, it is because the U.S. government has stepped up its policies to mold Guam in an American image and has averted our understanding of our rights as a people."¹³ To Ada, the U.S. transformed Guam into an American island in the Pacific, settled it with military bases, and promoted American multiculturalism in the attempt to dissuade Chamorros from Guam from asking for self-determination.

The political, economic, and social changes of the 1960s and 70s prompted Chamorro leaders to stake a claim in Guam's politics by identifying themselves specifically as "indigenous" or "native inhabitants" in order to demonstrate ties to the land that predate European and American colonization and to delineate a set of colonial experiences such as dispossession of ancestral lands in Guam that differ significantly from the colonial experiences of immigrant groups who settled the island. In doing so, Chamorros articulated their identity through an intersection of their distinct

¹¹ Tracey Banivanua-Mar has written extensively about the movements for decolonization in her book *Decolonisation and the Pacific: Indigenous Globalisation and the Ends of Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).

¹² Joseph F. Ada, "The Quest for Commonwealth The Quest for Change," in *Kinalamten Pulitikâat: Siñenten I Chamorro: Issues in Guam's Political Development: The Chamorro Perspective, The Hale'ta Series*, (Hagåtña: Political Status Education Coordinating Commission: 2002), 130.

¹³ Ada, "The Quest for Commonwealth The Quest for Change," 130.

Chamorro culture and genealogical ties to the island in order to claim political rights within Guam, the United States, and in the international arena.

In an attempt to ameliorate the problems associated with U.S. imperialism in Guam, Chamorro leaders commenced a multi-pronged movement for *Chamorro* self-determination. The movement was propelled forward by two separate Guam government-facilitated political status reforms: The Guam Constitution Movement (1970s) and the Guam Commonwealth Movement (1980-1997). The movements were island-wide affairs in which coalitions of elected leaders as well as community organizations worked together to create a list of demands that they thought were necessary to solve the problems associated with the territorial status of unincorporated territory. These movements, however, neither asked for further incorporation into the United States as a state, nor declared to be independent as its own nation-state. Rather Chamorros and other Guam residents sought alternative renewed political statuses that allowed more local governance within the United States empire.

A Constitution and A Commonwealth

Richard F. Taitano, a Chamorro senator who had served as the Deputy High Commission of the Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands in his previous career, started the conversation about a possible change in Guam's territorial status. As a result of his actions, the Guam Legislature passed a bill in 1968 to survey the limitations of the Guam Organic Act and establish a Constitutional Convention at the encouragement of Taitano. Taitano's experience working for the United Nations and the United States TTPI helped to provide intellectual and political insight into how Guam could revise the island's political status. Following his lead, Chamorro leaders went to work, electing forty-three delegates from around the island to the first Guam Constitutional Convention in 1969, establishing a Commission on Political Status in 1973, and hosting a second Constitutional

Convention starting in 1975.¹⁴ Throughout the several years of debates, it became apparent that merely surveying and revising the Guam Organic Act would not ameliorate the problems that Guam faced. And, thus, the purpose of the Constitution shifted from one that sought to revise the Guam Organic Act to one that explicitly sought to fundamentally transform the island's political status.

The Commission on Political Status held two Constitutional Conventions between 1973 and 1975 in which they discussed the major issues of the Guam Organic Act. In a 1975 report, the Commission on Political Status outlined the major issues that would be central to future movements for political status change. It criticized the way the U.S. military “played an unduly large role in the life in Guam in areas not affecting the national security but of critical importance to Guam”; it asserted that “immigration to Guam is threatening to change the way of life on the island”; and it suggested that “a careful review of land ownership and land use in Guam is required.”¹⁵ They believed that the grievances they had about military land use and immigration could only be rectified through a thorough changing of the federal-territorial relationship that dictated these terms. They argued that “Guam should be empowered to determine its future” and that “the relationship between the United States and Guam should be based on the principle of self-determination” and respect for the people of Guam.¹⁶ The Chamorro desire to transform the political status of the island was a critique of U.S. imperialism, a practice in self-governance, and, if executed correctly, could ensure a future exercise of self-determination.

¹⁴ Taitano would not be present throughout the Constitution and Commonwealth processes because he believed quite early on that any change in political status should be determined by the Chamorro people. He told Guam's leaders that he would not participate until it was assured that Chamorro people would be the only eligible group to determine the future of Guam. The details of the political maneuvers for the Guam Constitution was complex, involving multiple commissions, meetings, as well as shifting federal and Guam government administrations. For more detailed information about the process of the Constitutional Conventions, read Ada, “The Quest for Commonwealth The Quest for Change”; Pedro C. Sanchez, *Guåhan: Guam*, (Agana: Sanchez Publishing House), 418-439; Josh Tenorio and James Perez Viernes, “Guam Constitutional Conventions (ConCon),” *Guampedia, Inc.*, <https://www.guampedia.com/guam-constitutional-conventions-concon/>. On Taitano's political stance, read Dominica Tolentino, “Richard Flores Taitano,” *Guampedia Inc.* (September 23, 2020), Accessed June 6, 2021, <https://www.guampedia.com/richard-flores-taitano/>.

¹⁵ Ada, “The Quest for Commonwealth,” 139.

¹⁶ Ada, “The Quest for Commonwealth,” 138.

In 1978, the Commission on Political Status had a final draft of the Guam Constitution after the two Constitutional Conventions. Most of the articles of the Constitution were small revisions of the Guam Organic Act, pertaining to eminent domain, control of natural resources and the environment, public education, as well as the organization of the three branches of government. Article XI stood out in particular. Titled “Chamorro Culture,” Article XI was an outright acknowledgement of Chamorro culture in Guam’s government. It stipulated that “the evolutionary development of the Chamorro culture may not be abridged and no law may discontinue the Chamorro language, traditions, customs or other cultural components of Guam.”¹⁷ Seeking to ensure that Chamorro culture was ingrained into the political foundations of Guam’s territorial relationship with the United States, the Commission on Political Status wrote into Article XI that the Government preserve culturally and historically significant sites and establish a “Chamorro culture commission” in order to “study and promote the perpetuation of Chamorro culture and traditions and to have additional duties and powers provided by law.” Starting with the Guam Constitution, Chamorro culture would become a central tenet of political status debates in the decades thereafter.

The federal government wanted to keep abreast of the developments of the Guam Constitution because it was a potential means to remove Guam from the United Nation’s list of non-self-governing territories.¹⁸ The Carter Administration passed a bill in Congress in 1976 that allowed Guam and the U.S. Virgin Islands to construct territorial constitutions. It also approved the

¹⁷ Government of Guam, “Draft Constitution of Guam Adopted by the Constitutional Convention, September 14, 1977,” Micronesian Area Research Center, University of Guam.

https://issuu.com/guampedia/docs/draft_constitution_of_guampft

¹⁸ Ada, “The Quest for Commonwealth,” 150; Rogers, *Destiny’s Landfall*, 242. Robert Underwood conducted an interview with Edward Leon Guerrero on YouTube channel PulanSpeaks in which he discusses the Chamorro activist group “Para y Pada.” PulanSpeaks, “Robert Underwood - Reflections on Chamorro Activism,” January 22, 2021, video, 1:05:49, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=54A5SQTaZmo&t=23s&ab_channel=PulanSpeaks; Robert Underwood, “Dies Mit: The Origin and End of Chamorro Self-Determination,” *Micronesian Educator*, Vol. 22 (Nov 2015), 105.

Guam Constitution without changes in 1979.¹⁹ If the Constitution was approved by voters in Guam, the U.S. would argue that the people of Guam had indeed practiced self-determination, and the United States would no longer have the obligation to carry out the decolonization process for the island as determined by the Charter of the United Nations. The U.S. government was so optimistic about the passage of the Constitution that it allowed the United Nation's Special Committee on Decolonization to oversee the elections in which Guamanians would approve or reject the Constitution in 1979. This was the only time the United States would allow the UN to send a mission to Guam.

The Guam Constitution, however, did not receive support from Chamorro activist groups. Led by Robert Underwood, Anthony Leon Guerrero, and Marilyn Manibusan, PARA y PADA, as they would come to be known, was an alliance of Chamorros who fought for the preservation and use of Chamorro language and culture in all spheres of Guam's life.²⁰ Their goal was to "Para y pada I Constitution," or to "Stop and Slap the Constitution."²¹ They believed the Guam Constitution did not directly challenge the current political status of unincorporated territory and, in fact, avoided key issues such as immigration because "they were beyond the scope of the U.S. law that authorized the [Constitutional Convention]."²² In addition, they believed the Constitution as it was written would prevent any further claims to Chamorro sovereignty and self-determination, and thus made the

¹⁹ In 1973 and 1974, the Nixon Administration conducted a study on Guam, unknown to the government of Guam, to ascertain how the territory would be managed. Known as "The Secret Guam Study," it suggested that Guam receive a renewed political status of Commonwealth similar to the Northern Mariana Islands. The study's recommendation would not be taken up by the Carter Administration. Robert Rogers, *Destiny's Landfall: A History of Guam* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2011), 240 and 242. On the "secret Guam study," read Howard P. Willens, *The Secret Guam Study: How President Ford's 1975 Approval of Commonwealth was Blocked by Federal Officials* (Mangilao: Micronesian Area Research Center, 2004).

²⁰ Pulan Speaks, "Robert Underwood."

²¹ In the 1970s, PARA led a campaign against the Guam Daily News, a white statesider-owned company, which prohibited the Chamorro language from being printed. They also "invaded" the Guam International Airport Authority Board Meeting to advocate for the inclusion of Chamorro language in signage at the airport. More information about Para y Pada can be found in chapter five of this dissertation regarding the rise of the Chamorro organizations and the Filipino community in Guam. Robert Underwood in PulanSpeaks, "Robert Underwood"; Ada, "The Quest for Commonwealth," 145.

²² Ada, "The Quest for Commonwealth," 148.

Chamorro people and Guam “totally subservient to the federal government now in and the future.”²³

Para y Pada was a conglomeration of two organizations. The People’s Alliance for Responsible Alternatives (PARA) and the People’s Alliance for Dignified Alternatives (PADA). PARA emerged in 1977 in response to a language policy instituted by the *Pacific Daily News* (PDN), the island’s major news source since World War II. Lorraine Underwood attempted to place an “Happy Birthday” advertisement for her husband, Robert Underwood, that was written in Spanish and Chamorro.²⁴ The editors of the *Pacific Daily News* told her that she must also include an English translation in the advertisement. Lorraine and Robert became enraged because the act was so reminiscent of the English-only policies instituted by the U.S. Navy in the prewar period that endangered the Chamorro language. Describing himself as “part time faculty member; full time activist,” Robert Underwood challenged the *Pacific Daily News*.²⁵ At the time, he was a committed educator of the Chamorro language. He was the founder of the first “Chamorro Week” at the George Washington High School in Guam in 1973, became involved in bilingual education programs in Guam and across the Pacific, and was a professor of Chamorro Studies at the University of Guam. Along with some colleagues and friends, they carried out their first political demonstration protesting the *Pacific Daily News* where “people would go in there and cancel their subscription... Someone burned a PDN out there in the middle of the street.”²⁶ The PDN was not the end of their work. They also “invaded” a board meeting of the Guam International Airport Authority (GIAA) demanding that the airport include Chamorro language in signage. The GIAA

²³ Quoted in Ada, “The Quest for Commonwealth,” 151.

²⁴ Ada, “The Quest for Commonwealth,” 152.

²⁵ PulanSpeaks, “Robert Underwood.”

²⁶ PulanSpeaks, “Robert Underwood.”

was sympathetic to PARA's cause and was for a while the only government agency that had Chamorro alongside English in signage.

The People's Alliance for a Dignified Alternative (PADA) had a different origin story. Organized by Guam Legislature Senator Marilyn Manibusan and President of the locally-owned Bank of Guam Anthony "Tony" Leon Guerrero, PADA started out as an activist group called "The Committee for a More Informed Vote on the Constitution."²⁷ They attempted to delay any vote on the Guam Constitution citing that the island's voters were not properly informed by the drafted provisions of the Constitution, and that deciding a constitution was to place the "carabao before the cart" when it came to Guam's political status.²⁸

Due to the fervent activism of PARA y PADA, the Guam Constitution received an unenthusiastic reception by both Guam political leaders and the people of Guam. According to historian Robert Rogers, "Guam's leaders shied away from actively endorsing the draft constitution, thereby leaving the document unprotected from its opponents."²⁹ The Constitution met its demise on August 4, 1979 when it was voted down by the Guam population in a referendum. Although the Constitution tried to address the major grievances held by Chamorro people, it ultimately failed because it was conservative in its aims, especially in regard to the protection of Chamorro people's right to self-determination. The Constitution Movement, however, was deemed only a trial run for another attempt to gain an improved political status.

During the election, the members of PARA y PADA met with the United Nations delegation sent by the United States to oversee the vote for Constitution. It was in this meeting that Robert Underwood, Tony Leon Guerrero, Marilyn Manibusan among other Chamorro activists

²⁷ Ada, "The Quest for Commonwealth," 151.

²⁸ Robert Underwood, "Dies Mit: The Origin and End of Chamorro Self-Determination," *Micronesian Educator*, Vol. 22 (Nov 2015), 103-104.

²⁹ Rogers, *Destiny's Landfall*, 264.

understood that the fight for a renewed political status on Guam was connected to events around the world. Ambassador Gelega-King of Sierra Leone met with PARA y PADA to discuss the decolonization process. At the end of the meeting, as Underwood said in an interview, “we started to say ‘Wow there’s a whole other world out there.’”³⁰ The Guam Constitution was not just about political status within the United States, but also how Guam and the Chamorro people would relate to the world. It became apparent that the passage of the Guam Constitution could limit the possibilities of further negotiation about Guam’s colonial status with the United States. What started as a local response to the legacies of U.S. imperialism in Guam, PARA y PADA transformed to become an internationally-focused organization, hoping to expand the strategies and methods of acquiring political self-determination and Chamorro rights. This international focus would change the way Chamorro activists and government officials would advocate and negotiate for rights within United States empire. The PARA y PADA of the 1970s evolved to become the Organization of People for Indigenous Rights (OPI-R) in the 1980s and 1990s.

What emerged from the failed Constitution movement was a critical consciousness of how the ramifications of U.S. imperial rule in Guam directly and specifically affected Chamorro people. Chamorro leaders and activists believed that a political status change determined by Chamorro people would be the most effective way to ameliorate the problems associated with U.S. colonialism. Chamorro activists led the charge in ensuring that Chamorro self-determination was included in any political status change for Guam. Unlike the preceding generations of the 1930s or the late 1940s whose political actions and diplomacy tiptoed around the idea of U.S. colonialism, this generation of Chamorro activists were not ashamed of explicitly criticizing U.S. imperialism and militarism on Guam. They made a considerable impact on how the island of Guam would demand political rights

³⁰ PulanSpeaks, “Robert Underwood.” Robert Underwood, “Dies Mit: The Origin and End of Chamorro Self-Determination,” *Micronesian Educator*, Vol. 22 (Nov 2015), 105.

and self-determination for decades. As a result of the discussions of the Guam Constitution and the activist groups that emerged, any future conversation on Guam's political status became intrinsically connected to self-determination, and specifically to indigenous Chamorro self-determination.

Undeterred by the failure of the Guam Constitution, the Guam Legislature established the Commission on Self-Determination in 1980.³¹ According to the public law, "the general purpose of the Commission is to ascertain the desire of the people of Guam as to their future political relationship with the United States of America" and to be the "primary advocate in the government of Guam for the relationship that the people of Guam desire with the United States."³² Each of the seven potential alternative political statuses—statehood, independence, free association, status quo, territorial status with the United States, commonwealth with the United States, and "other"—were given a "task force" that would educate the island's population about the pros and cons of each of the status.³³ After an education campaign, the government of Guam would hold a plebiscite to determine the island's desired political status, and subsequently draft an act that would change Guam's colonial status. For this plebiscite, all residents of Guam who were U.S. citizens and regardless of ethnic origin were eligible to vote.

In a September of 1982 plebiscite, Commonwealth received the highest share of the votes of 73 percent of the electorate.³⁴ According to Arnold Leibowitz, a lawyer advising the Commission on Self-Determination, the Guam voting population knew of the vague nature of Commonwealth, "but it saw the status as embracing local self-government similar to that of a State, mutuality of action

³¹ Once again, the details of how the Commonwealth came to be is complicated. The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the controversies that arose from the creation of the act itself. More information about the details can be found in Ada, "The Quest for Commonwealth."

³² Guam Legislature, "P.L. 15-128 An Act to Create the commission on Self-Determination for the People of Guam and Appropriate the Sum of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars (\$150,000.00) to Carry out the Activities of the Commission," 2nd sess., 1980.

³³ Ada, "The Quest for Commonwealth," 158.

³⁴ The Commission on Self-determination held two plebiscites in 1982. The first which took place in January was determined to be inconclusive because none of the status options obtained a simple majority of the votes.

between the Federal government and Guam in key areas, similar to the CNMI, and, perhaps, some restriction on unilateral Federal military actions.”³⁵ Compared to other political statuses, Commonwealth offered the most room for negotiation, and was “promoted as a flexible status which could later lead to Statehood, or even Independence.”³⁶

The Commonwealth Act would represent the desires of those living in Guam, as opposed to the Guam Organic Act of 1950—which was written by federal officials—and the failed Guam Constitution which was weak in its aims. The Commission on Self-Determination began to draft a political status that, Governor Ricardo Bordallo described in his second inaugural address in 1983, “will guarantee close ties with the United States under a new political relationship uniquely tailored to meet the needs and aspirations of the Guamanian spirit.”³⁷ As Bordallo would state in a later 1989 hearing for the Commonwealth Act, this political strategy sought to be “members of the American political family in our own separate house.” Chamorro leaders were reckoning with the imperfect solutions and options for decolonization.³⁸ The Commonwealth Act would be a document that embodied how the people of Guam envisioned the future of the island.

The Activism of The Organization of People for Indigenous Rights

The Commission on Self-Determination was influenced heavily by Chamorro activist organizations seeking to ensure that Chamorro rights remained a non-negotiable item in the drafting of the Guam Commonwealth Act. The Organization of People for Indigenous Rights (OPI-R) emerged out of the activism of PARA y PADA and continued to carry on the work of advocating for Chamorro self-determination during the 1980s.³⁹ They described themselves as a diverse group

³⁵ Leibowitz, *Defining Status*, 338.

³⁶ Ada, “The Quest for Commonwealth,” 161.

³⁷ Quoted in Ada, “The Quest for Commonwealth,” 162.

³⁸ U.S. Congress, Representatives, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, *Guam Commonwealth: Hearings before the subcommittee on Insular and International Affairs Part II*, 101st Cong., 1st sess., 1989, 5.

³⁹ Robert Underwood, “Dies Mit: The Origin and End of Chamorro Self-Determination,” *Micronesian Educator*, Vol. 22 (Nov 2015), 106.

of people whose “common bond is our belief that only indigenous inhabitants of Guam, the Chamorro people, have the right to determine their political destiny by changing Guam’s political status from a non-self-governing territory to a status considered as having a full measure of self-government.”⁴⁰ Indeed, OPI-R was comprised of young Chamorro activists who worked in various movements in the 1970s including PARA y PADA, such as Robert Underwood. Underwood worked alongside Ron Teehan who led the Guam Landowner’s Association in the 1970s and 1980s, an organization that fought for the return of Chamorro lands from the U.S. military. OPI-R also included Bernadita Camacho-Dungca and Clotilde Gould, two Chamorro women dedicated to the preservation Chamorro language and storytelling; Benjamin Cruz, a lawyer; Chris Perez Howard, a writer; Laura Souder, a feminist scholar; and Hope Cristobal, a community activist. A few Filipinos were also involved in OPI-R, including Nerissa Lee, Maria Teehan, and William Hernandez.

The members of OPI-R were quite different from Chamorro advocates of generations before. Unlike previous generations whose Chamorro advocates held positions of power within the Guam Congress, Guam Legislature, and the business community, the members of OPI-R were not government officials. They were for the most part educators, and instead chose to organize outside of the political institutions. Additionally, many of the members of OPI-R spent part of their childhood or adulthood in the States. Some attended higher education institutions for undergraduate, law, or doctorate degrees, while others were veterans or spouses of veterans of the U.S. military. This imperial and international experience ultimately shaped how they saw the plight of the Chamorro people in relation to the rest of the world. Among other world events, they saw how the Civil Rights Movement on the continent, the U.S. Cold War militarization of the Asia-Pacific, and Pacific decolonization were all interconnected with the Chamorro movement for change

⁴⁰ Organization of People for Indigenous Rights, “Self-Determination: A People’s Right,” MSS 010 Box 5 Folder 7, The Papers of Congressman Ben Blaz, 1984-1992, Micronesian Area Research Center, University of Guam.

in Guam. Described as a “intelligentsia of the Chamorro Movement” by Chamorro sociologist Michael P. Perez, OPI-R would go on to theorize the foundational principles of the Chamorro self-determination movement that would continue to influence Chamorro self-determination movements into the twenty-first century.⁴¹

For OPI-R, Chamorro self-determination was more than a local or federal project. OPI-R advocated for Chamorro self-determination at multiple levels of governance: the local Guam government and community, the imperial government through testimonies in the halls of Congress, and the international society at both the United Nations and through participation in other Pacific-focused movements for decolonization.⁴² On Guam, they attended as many Government of Guam Commission on Self-Determination meetings and public hearings as they possibly could, offering suggestions for how to include Chamorro rights for almost every article and draft.⁴³ They also held public demonstrations, published editorials, newsletters, and educational pamphlets, and visited village after village to get the word out. As educators themselves in the public school and university system, they also had the ability to reach the younger generations of Guam. On the imperial level, when the Guam Commonwealth would receive its first Congressional hearing in Hawai‘i in 1989, members of OPI-R showed their support for the bill. They also attended smaller events when federal and United Nations officials would visit and provide recommendations for the draft. And, significantly, in 1982, OPI-R made an appearance at the United Nations demanding that the U.S.

⁴¹ Michael P. Perez, “Chamorro Resistance and Prospects for Sovereignty in Guam,” in *Sovereignty Matters: Locations of Contestations and Possibility in Indigenous Struggles for Self-Determination*, ed. Joanne Barker (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006), 177.

⁴² Organization of People for Indigenous Rights, “Self-Determination: A People’s Right,” MSS 010, Box 5, Folder 7, The Papers of Congressman Ben Blaz, 1984-1992, Micronesian Area Research Center, University of Guam. (Hereafter cited as OPI-R, “Self-Determination.”)

⁴³ The Papers of Ricardo J. Bordallo at the Micronesian Area Research Center at the University of Guam contains the meeting minutes for all of the Commission on Self-Determination meetings, including letters from constituents including OPI-R. This is a rich resource for understanding how political concepts such as sovereignty were being understood and discussed in Guam. Testimonies of OPI-R and members of OPI-R can be found in this collection. The Papers of Ricardo J. Bordallo, Micronesian Area Research Center, University of Guam.

recognize Chamorro self-determination. They made evident the empire that the United States was trying to hide.

OPI-R's core argument remained consistent throughout its existence. They believed that self-determination as stipulated by the United Nations belonged specifically to the Chamorro people in the case of Guam, and that the vote for Commonwealth, as an act of self-determination, should solely be decided by Chamorro people. In various documents and speeches, members of OPI-R advocated for Chamorro self-determination to be embedded in political status documents. As Chris Perez Howard wrote a letter in May 1982 to Congressman Antonio B. Won Pat in Washington D.C.,

By definition, on the island of Guam, only the Chamorro people, the 'indigenous inhabitants' of Guam have the right of self-determination. It is unjust for anyone other than the Chamorro people to vote in any plebiscite to determine their political destiny.⁴⁴

Howard cited the UN Charter and the U.S. Constitution—particularly the idea that treaties should be upheld by the United States—to make an argument about how the Chamorro people as indigenous peoples should be given the opportunity to confront colonial powers and exercise the right to self-determination. Howard wanted to differentiate the Chamorro people from immigrants. Despite their status as U.S. citizens and Guam residents, immigrants made their way to Guam after World War II. There were not of Chamorro descent. OPI-R argued that because self-determination was a solution to the injustices of U.S. imperialism, the right to self-determination should belong to those who were directly affected by the legacies of colonialism as indigenous peoples. For Guam, that was the Chamorro people.

For Howard, the debates over political status were connected to self-determination, and thus, only the Chamorro people should be given the right to determine Guam's political status with

⁴⁴ Letter to Ricardo Bordallo and the Commission on Self-Determination from Chris Perez Howard, MSS __, Box 60 Folder "Political Status" #9, Papers of Congressman Antonio B. Won Pat, Micronesian Area Research Center, University of Guam.

the United States. Howard continued in his letter to Won Pat, “any change in status from a non-self-governing territory to one considered as having a full measure of self-government would be considered as an act of self-determination.”⁴⁵ By arguing that self-determination for Guam was an indigenous right, OPI-R openly criticized the interrelated processes of U.S. imperialism, settler colonialism, militarism, and immigration because each of these processes threatened the existence of Chamorro people and culture on Guam.

Criticizing U.S. Settler Militarism

OPI-R’s politics was in response to U.S. settler militarism in Guam.⁴⁶ Although they did not use the term settler militarism or settler colonialism, they articulated and outlined the historical experience of U.S. imperialism in such a way that criticized colonial policies of Chamorro land annexation, militarism, and immigration that continued to displace and dispossess Chamorro people. They saw how these integrated processes further denied Chamorro people from negotiating their territorial status with the United States and exercising self-determination. They also criticized the rhetoric of militarism and multiculturalism, that alongside their American citizenship, hid the problems caused by U.S. imperialism. They were still fighting against a general population and a U.S. military that believed in the benevolence of American empire and the military in Guam. For instance, the slogan “Where America’s Days Begin,” which was inspired by the multicultural image of Guam, only continued “to reinforce the dependent connections of the territory to the United States, the island’s military importance, and the spatial dimensions of the island as both at the edge and periphery to the United States” as demonstrated by Chamorro scholars Tiara Na’puti and

⁴⁵ Letter to Ricardo Bordallo and the Commission on Self-Determination from Chris Perez Howard, Box 60 Folder “Political Status” #9, Papers of Congressman Antonio B. Won Pat, Micronesian Area Research Center, University of Guam.

⁴⁶ Chapter 3 and 4 of this dissertation historicize how U.S. settler militarism transforms Guam in the years after World War II. My formulation of settler militarism is inspired by Juliet Nebolon, “‘Life Given Straight from the Heart’: Settler Militarism, Biopolitics, and Public Health in Hawai‘i during World War II,” *American Quarterly* 69, no. 1 (2017): 23–45.

Michael Bevacqua.⁴⁷ In the 1980s, OPI-R resisted this prevailing narrative of Guam as the multicultural military paradise of the United States Pacific through explicit direct action and advocacy at multiple levels—the local, the imperial, and the international.

When OPI-R testified at the United Nations in New York in 1982, they were the first Chamorro generation to publicly and internationally criticize the United States for its continued colonialism in Guam, and specifically for how the U.S. used Guam as a military fortress in the Pacific. In their testimony, OPI-R gave a history of imperialism on Guam and the efforts in recent years to exercise self-determination. They argued that self-determination was an “inalienable right,” that it belonged to a people not to a territory, and that it should belong specifically to indigenous people of Guam. Furthermore, OPI-R was adamant that the U.S. federal government did not take Guam’s self-determination seriously because Guam was vital for U.S. military strategy in the Pacific. As the OPI-R testimony read, “Of even greater significance is the presence of military bases on Guam. Guam’s image to the world is not that of an island society struggling to survive as a political and social entity. Rather it is tied up with the overwhelming reality of the presence of the U.S. military in large numbers.”⁴⁸ OPI-R further pointed out that despite the UN’s claim that “the presence of military bases should not be an impediment to self-determination on Guam,” the way military and federal officials treated Chamorro claims to self-determination told them otherwise. U.S. militarism was hindering Chamorro self-determination.⁴⁹ For OPI-R, U.S. security of the Asia-

⁴⁷ Tiara Na’puti and Michael Lujan Bevacqua, “Militarization and Resistance from Guåhan: Protecting and Defending Pâgat,” *American Quarterly* 67:3 (2015), 844. There are many scholars of Guam that point to how the rhetoric of militarism and multiculturalism hide the continued existence of U.S. colonialism in Guam. They include Kuper, “Kontra I Peligru, Na’fansâfo Ham,”; Tiara Naputi, “Archipelagic Rhetoric: Remapping the Marianas and Challenging Militarization from ‘A Stirring Place,’” *Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies*, 16:1 (2019), 4-25; Michael Lujan Bevacqua and Manual Lujan Cruz, “The Banality of American Empire: The Curious Case of Guam, USA,” *Journal of Transnational American Studies*, 11:1 (2020), 127-149.

⁴⁸ Organization of People for Indigenous Rights, “Self-Determination: A People’s Right,” MSS 010, Box 5, Folder 7, The Papers of Congressman Ben Blaz, 1984-1992, Micronesian Area Research Center, University of Guam. (Hereafter cited as OPI-R, “Self-Determination,”)

⁴⁹ OPI-R, “Self-Determination.”

Pacific region in the Cold War rested on the continuing lack of self-determination for the Chamorro people.

Chamorros expressed fears of displacement not just as a result of military land annexation, but also due to the increasing number of non-indigenous immigrants. OPI-R criticized how U.S. militarism on Guam introduced thousands of immigrants and settlers to the island. Another OPI-R member, Hope Cristobal, mentioned her discontent in an essay. She wrote

historically, many United States citizens came to Guam as a result of military activities and decided to stay. The military also employed large numbers of Filipinos and other aliens in constructing the numerous military bases built after World War II. Huge camps of foreign workers and the application of U.S. immigration laws to Guam has meant a continual stream of immigrants which threatens to make Chamorros strangers in their own land.⁵⁰

Immigration and militarization were not seen as two separate issues. Rather, they were two integrated processes that together made Chamorros a minority in their island and threatened to silence Chamorro voices in regard to self-determination. OPI-R wanted to ensure that the United Nations recognized that self-determination belonged with the Chamorro people, and only the Chamorro people.

OPI-R saw how the historical experience of dispossession and displacement was similar to that of other indigenous groups within the United States empire and across the globe. As Cristobal summarized to the Committee of Interior and Insular Affairs in 1986, “the situation of the Chamorro people is not new in the annals of American policy. It is similar to that of the American Indian, the Eskimo, and the native Hawaiian. The end result has unfortunately always been the same.”⁵¹ Likewise, Robert Underwood, in a piece titled “Immigration and Guam’s Future,” likened

⁵⁰ Hope Cristobal, “The Organization of People for Indigenous Rights: A Commitment towards Self-Determination,” *Chamorro Self-Determination* ed. Laura Souder and Robert A. Underwood (Mangilao: Micronesian Area Research Center, 1987), 82.

⁵¹ U.S. Congress, Representatives, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, *United States-Guam Relationship: Oversight Hearing before the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs*, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess., 56.

the experiences of Chamorros on Guam to “painful lessons of the natives of Hawaii and the Maoris of New Zealand.”⁵² Both Cristobal and Underwood saw Chamorro dispossession as a continuation of United States imperialism into the Pacific, criticizing the United States involvement and pushing the Commission on Self-Determination to include Chamorro sovereignty in the Commonwealth Act.

Both Cristobal and Underwood saw how the displacement of Chamorro people from their lands and the influx of immigrants from abroad created material consequences for Chamorro people living on island. “Chamorro people” Cristobal lamented, “are disintegrating under the pressures of social and economic change thrust upon them without their knowledge or control.”⁵³ Land annexation and immigration led to indigenous peoples who “eventually become displaced in their homeland and become the underclass, the disillusioned, the landless, the uneducated, the poor, and the jailed.”⁵⁴ Because of this, Underwood wrote, indigenous peoples “did not merely cease to maintain political control over their society, they began to disintegrate as a people, as a collective body.”⁵⁵ Settler colonialism created systemic problems within indigenous communities that were not just about cultural preservation and self-determination, but material and economic issues such as homelessness, incarceration, and economic status that affected the everyday lives of indigenous peoples within settler colonial societies. Both Cristobal and Underwood warned that the troubles experienced by indigenous peoples abroad was happening to the Chamorro people: “The future of the Chamorro people as a permanent underclass in the next century seems plausible.”⁵⁶ Without

⁵² Robert Underwood, “Immigration and Guam’s Future,” *Chamorro Self-Determination* ed. Laura Souder and Robert A. Underwood (Mangilao: Micronesian Area Research Center, 1987), 60

⁵³ U.S. Congress, Representatives, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, *United States-Guam Relationship*, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess., 56.

⁵⁴ U.S. Congress, Representatives, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, *United States-Guam Relationship*, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess., 56.

⁵⁵ Underwood, “Immigration and Guam’s Future,” 60.

⁵⁶ Underwood, “Immigration and Guam’s Future,” 60.

explicit assertion of Chamorro rights within the Commonwealth, OPI-R and Cristobal believed that Chamorro people could succumb to the pressures of U.S. settler colonialism.

OPI-R's sentiment was shared with Leland Bettis, the executive director for the Government of Guam's Commission on Self-Determination from 1989 to 1997. Bettis, a white statesider married to a Chamorro woman, was influential in creating connections within Washington D.C. to lobby for the Commonwealth Act.⁵⁷ As a statesider himself, Bettis perhaps took it upon himself to be forthright and explicit about what he saw were the majority of concerns of the Chamorro people in regard to fears over immigration. His positionality allowed him to reach both the Guam audience and an audience in the federal government. He wrote in an article, "Colonial Immigration in Guam," that immigration was a "colonial tool" that "served to dilute the strength of the native people of a colonized area."⁵⁸ He argued that immigrants who were or were in the process of becoming citizens of the colonizing country made them loyal and supportive of further colonialism. Thus, they "often assume and expect rights which are not theirs," such as rights to self-determination. Bettis argued beyond the notion of Chamorro identity and claimed that greater immigration into Guam posed "serious social and economic ramifications." He saw that Guam was a stepping-stone for immigrants who took advantage of the island's public services such as education and healthcare. This immigration placed an undue burden on the permanent residents of Guam, and provided support "for those who will probably never return as productive or contributing members of the community."⁵⁹ Local control over immigration was about economic issues just as it was about Chamorro rights.

⁵⁷ Leland Bettis Interview with the Author, September 16, 2019.

⁵⁸ Leland Bettis, "Colonial Immigration in Guam," *Kinalamten Pulitikât: Siñenten I Chamorro: Issues in Guam's Political Development: The Chamorro Perspective*, The Hale'ta Series, (Hagåtña: Political Status Education Coordinating Commission, 2002), 111.

⁵⁹ Bettis, "Colonial Immigration in Guam," 113.

OPI-R offered a criticism of the immigrant and multicultural narrative of the United States from the perspective of indigenous peoples who witnessed how these narratives served to delegitimize claims to land, self-determination, and culture. “The central cultural and social experience of America is tied to a history that celebrates diversity and immigration.... To argue for a restrictive immigration policy in this context is to be un-American,” Underwood wrote in an article. Yet, to apply this immigrant narrative to “a small island in the middle of the Pacific is not only incongruous, but potentially a tool of social destruction and dislocation.”⁶⁰ Immigrant narratives served to facilitate settler colonialism.⁶¹ Underwood argued that instead of perpetuating this multicultural narrative of the United States to understand Guam history, Chamorro people ought to see Guam history through their experiences as an indigenous people. He wrote,

There is simply no conceivable reason why indigenous people should adopt the social vision of an immigrant society. To do so would be not merely self-effacing, but damaging and illogical.... For Chamorros to accept the immigrant dream is to deny their own history as a source of inspiration and as a basis upon which to construct a social vision.⁶²

The immigrant and multicultural narrative of the U.S. was in opposition to indigenous Chamorro experiences of U.S. imperialism. Due to Guam’s position as a territory of the United States, OPI-R and Underwood argued that indigenous rights and indigenous-centered narratives of history were more essential to understanding Guam history and righting the wrongs of the past.

OPI-R was articulating a particular kind of settler colonialism in which the settler was defined by the insertion of American institutions, people (through statesiders and immigrants), and culture and rhetoric of United States colonialism. Settlers did not necessarily refer to a “settled” population, but also referred to the transient population of military personnel who left after short

⁶⁰ Underwood, “Immigration and Guam’s Future,” 62.

⁶¹ Underwood and OPI-R were articulating a criticism of liberal multiculturalism that was also shared by Haunani-Kay Trask, a Kanaka Maoli activist, a staunch advocate for the Hawaiian sovereignty movement. Although they did not call it Asian Settler Colonialism, we can see how Asian immigrants and migrants in their presence on Guam were used as tools to delegitimize Chamorro claims to land.

⁶² Underwood, “Immigration and Guam’s Future,” 62.

tours of duty and immigrants from the Philippines who used Guam as a steppingstone for further migration to the North American continent. Underwood and OPI-R were articulating a criticism of liberal multiculturalism that was also shared by Haunani-Kay Trask, a Kanaka Maoli activist, a staunch advocate for the Hawaiian sovereignty movement.⁶³ OPI-R's reference to immigrants regardless of racial background as imbricated in the process of Chamorro displacement and dispossession demonstrates how Asian Settler Colonialism unfolded in Guam.⁶⁴ Asian immigrants, in particular Filipinos, brought in by the U.S. military and the United States narratives of multiculturalism and immigration were used as tools to delegitimize Chamorro claims to land and self-determination. In other words, settler colonialism was a transformation of the social relations on Guam built and perpetuated by outsiders which eventually replaced the predominance of Chamorro relations on Guam.

The impacts of increased immigration were felt intimately in villages near the military bases where Filipino immigrants settled. On July 25, 1985, Bernadita Camacho Dungca testified in a public hearing for the Guam Commonwealth Act at the Dededo Community Center, a village that saw multiple transformations in land annexation, urbanization, and population changes including the development of the Filipino immigrant community since the end of World War II. A Chamorro woman who was “raised, educated, and married in this very land” and whose maternal family lived in Dededo for generations, Camacho-Dungca supported the passage of the Commonwealth Act. In particular, she reiterated her support for the clauses that ensured the perpetuation of the Chamorro people. For Camacho-Dungca, the Commonwealth Act's provisions on Chamorro self-

⁶³ Haunani-Kay Trask, “Settlers of Color and ‘Immigrant’ Hegemony: ‘Locals’ in Hawai‘i,” In *Asian Settler Colonialism: From Local Governance to Habits of Everyday Life in Hawai‘i*, eds. Candace Fujikane and Jonathan Y. Okamura (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2008): 45-65.

⁶⁴ For theorizations on Asian Settler Colonialism, read Candace Fujikane, and Jonathan Y. Okamura, *Asian Settler Colonialism: From Local Governance to the Habits of Everyday Life in Hawai‘i* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2008); Dean Itsuji Saranillio, “Why Asian Settler Colonialism Matters: A Thought Piece on Critiques, Debates, and Indigenous Difference,” *Settler Colonial Studies* 3, no. 3–4 (2013): 280–94.

determination and local control over immigration would allow Chamorros to curtail the rapid demographic change that challenged Chamorro ties to land, property, culture, and ultimately the island.

Camacho-Dungca asked the audience, comprised of Chamorros and Filipinos alike, to respect the desires of the Chamorro people to be recognized through the Guam Commonwealth Act in the same way Chamorros accommodated foreigners and migrants. To her, the village of Dededo was “the best example of how accommodating a Chamorro is.”⁶⁵ “Name the people of the community of the world,” she said, “and you will find them in Dededo.” Yet, the transformation of Dededo into a multicultural village was a legacy of U.S. militarism in the Pacific which affected Chamorro people in Guam. The village’s location at the nexus of Andersen Air Force base and the Naval Air Station meant that many Filipinos settled in the area. They lived adjacent to the Chamorro families who resided there for generations and other families who were forced from their lands in the land annexation after World War II. “If you look at the land area that has been now used by outsiders you can see that land area used by outsiders is much greater than the people that are supposed to be so called Dededonians.”⁶⁶ In Dededo, Camacho-Dungca witnessed settler colonialism in action. She requested the non-indigenous people in the Dededo Community Center to “please as a form of respect let us try to give the people of Guam what is rightly theirs.”⁶⁷ In return for accommodating Filipino immigrants, Dungca argued that the newcomers should reciprocate by allowing Chamorros to exercise self-determination.

Furthermore, Camacho-Dungca pointed to the interconnected histories of U.S. imperialism and militarism in the Pacific in order to redirect criticism away from OPI-R towards the United States. “To my Filipino ‘*Kababayan*’—and I will not hesitate to say that I am a descendant of a

⁶⁵ “Public Hearing on the Draft Commonwealth Act Dededo Community Center,” MARC, UOG.

⁶⁶ “Public Hearing on the Draft Commonwealth Act Dededo Community Center,” MARC, UOG.

⁶⁷ “Public Hearing on the Draft Commonwealth Act Dededo Community Center,” MARC, UOG.

Filipino. Many of us that are Filipinos that are here are here because of an economic problem that's developed in the Philippines relative to outsiders coming in and taking the land over, taking their economic issues."⁶⁸ Pointing to the shared histories of U.S. militarism, she pleaded for Filipinos "to understand that we are struggling the same efforts."⁶⁹ By finding historical and genealogical connections with Filipinos, Camacho-Dungca hoped that Filipinos and other non-indigenous immigrants would understand that Chamorro self-determination was not intended to deny immigrant rights, but to assert indigenous rights in an imperial system that had denied Chamorros the opportunity. She continued, "we want to control immigration and I want to control immigration as a Chamorro person not because I'm afraid of all the Filipinos that are coming in. I still want them to come in. I'm really rightly more afraid of the same kind of people that came to the Philippines to push the Filipinos out so that they could look for a place on Guam and any other place."⁷⁰ She was not afraid of Filipinos. She was more afraid of how the United States government and military would use the immigrant population to threaten Chamorro power and existence on Guam.

The rapid growth of immigration of people coincided with the increasing numbers of Chamorro people who moved off-island to the continental United States. Leland Bettis wrote, "The out-migration of Chamorros was prompted in large part by the impact of military land-takings, the in-migration of thousands of outsiders, the development of an entirely new economy, the extension of U.S. citizenship and new career opportunities in the military."⁷¹ The Chamorro diaspora was quite large. In fact, Robert Underwood noted in a 1985 article, "Excursions into Inauthenticity," that the Federation of Guamanian Associations of America estimated that there were 55,000 Chamorros living in California in 1978. Underwood wrote that "this figure was startling, for it indicated that

⁶⁸ *Kababayan* is the Filipino (Tagalog) word for "compatriots." "Public Hearing on the Draft Commonwealth Act Dededo Community Center," MARC, UOG.

⁶⁹ "Public Hearing on the Draft Commonwealth Act Dededo Community Center," MARC, UOG.

⁷⁰ "Public Hearing on the Draft Commonwealth Act Dededo Community Center," MARC, UOG.

⁷¹ Bettis, "Colonial Immigration in Guam," 115.

more Chamorros resided in in California than on Guam itself.”⁷² Almost all of these Chamorros in California had some connection to the United States military, enlisting into the armed services as the opportunities for entering the cash economy were limited on Guam. Settler militarism then is not just about the displacement of Chamorro people from their villages to other villages within Guam. The processes of settler militarism pushed Chamorros to seek work and opportunities beyond the island often ending up on the continental United States. With the immigration of non-indigenous people into Guam and the emigration of indigenous Chamorro people away from the island, Chamorro leaders and activists recognized the devastating effects of militarism on island life.

The arguments articulated by OPI-R represented the complexity with which Chamorros on Guam understood the demographic transformation of the island in the 1970s through the 1990s, one that increasingly became multicultural with immigrants from all over the Asia-Pacific region. Chamorros understood that this was part of the legacy of U.S. imperialism and militarism in the Pacific. They also saw how immigration was part of a process of what we would now call settler colonialism, in which a migrant population displaced Chamorro people from the lands, was used as pawns to deny Chamorro political rights, and caused interethnic tensions on the island. Furthermore, American ideologies that aligned with multiculturalism and the immigrant narratives of the U.S. struck a different chord in the islands of the empire, especially for colonized indigenous peoples. They were not solutions to injustices of empire, but rather facilitators of settler colonialism in Guam.

Advocating for Chamorro Rights

Chamorro leaders and activists sought to devise practical legal policies to embed Chamorro rights into the Guam Commonwealth Act. Some policies had no problems gaining the approval (or at the least there was not much opposition) of the general community. These included provisions for

⁷² Robert A. Underwood, “Excursions into Inauthenticity: The Chamorros of Guam,” *Pacific Viewpoint*, 26:1 (1985): 163.

a Chamorro Land Trust as well as a provision for mutual consent between the Government of Guam and the U.S. federal government in regard to federal-territorial relations. On the other hand, the provisions on the exercise of Chamorro self-determination and local control over immigration faced tremendous opposition. OPI-R suggested that the only way to protect Chamorro rights in the Commonwealth Act was not only through inclusion of Chamorro-centered policies within the document itself, but to limit any self-determination and political status plebiscite to those who could prove their indigenous Chamorro identity. Contesting assertions of the extinction of the Chamorro people, OPI-R stated that “the Chamorro people are a readily identifiable ethnic, social and historical group.”⁷³ OPI-R suggested that people could verify the Chamorro people through “historically reliable sources” such as the 1940 U.S. Census, the 1946 U.S. Navy Census, the 1950 Census, and “those who obtained citizenship through the organic act.” Chamorros who did not live on Guam, including those in the Chamorro diaspora, were not eligible to vote, though they can reclaim “this right by establishing residence of Guam.” OPI-R harkened back to the original definition of who “Guamanian” referred to, and thus left out majority of the immigrant population who settled in Guam after 1950.

This emphasis on Chamorro rights was in response to the shifting definition of the term “Guamanian.” The term “Guamanian,” which was used in federal government documents, became an issue for Chamorro activists like OPI-R who attempted to assert indigenous rights. By the 1980s, “Guamanian” was a capacious term, used by politicians and the general public alike to refer to long-term residents of Guam regardless of racial or ethnic origin. The term “Guamanian,” however, did not always have this definition. In the Guam Organic Act of 1950, the United States referred to the inhabitants of Guam as “Guamanians,” surmised Robert Underwood, “in order to distinguish

⁷³ OPI-R, “Self-Determination.”

Chamorros from one island to another, such as Guamanian, Saipanese and Rotanese.”⁷⁴ The Guam Organic Act referred to Guamanians in two sections, one on citizenship and the other for preferential hiring of Guamanians in the government of Guam. Specifically, U.S. citizenship would be bestowed upon “Guamanian persons and persons of Guamanian descent” and preferential treatment for government jobs would be “given to qualified persons of Guamanian ancestry” in order to insure “the fullest participation by Guamanians in government of Guam, opportunities for higher education and in-service training facilities.”⁷⁵ It was apparent that federal and military officials were using “Guamanian” synonymously with “Chamorros” who were from Guam.

Starting in the late 1960s, however, the term “Guamanian” took a more capacious and multicultural definition referring to all people who lived on Guam regardless of their ethnic origin.⁷⁶ Filipinos, long-time white residents, as well as other Asians proudly identified as Guamanians despite having no Chamorro heritage. They adopted the term “Guamanian” in the same way that a resident of the state of California would call themselves “Californian.” Chamorro leaders also began to use “Guamanian” referring to all residents of Guam. So, when the United States and some Chamorro leaders on Guam stated that the right to self-determination was inherent to “Guamanians,” non-indigenous peoples began to assert their right to determine the future for Guam as well.

OPI-R argued that when the Organic Act was read in the context of the 1950s, the term “Guamanian” referred to the Chamorro people. Robert Underwood testified at a public hearing for

⁷⁴ This was a testimony written in Chamorro submitted to the Commission on Self-Determination. Translation by Lawrence Lizama. “Public Hearing on the Draft Commonwealth Act Dededo Community Center,” July 25, 1985, Box 58, Folder July 16-31, 1985, Papers of Ricardo Jerome Bordallo 2nd Term, Micronesian Area Research Center, University of Guam, Attachment D. (Hereafter cited as “Public Hearing on the Draft Commonwealth Act Dededo Community Center,” MARC, UOG”)

⁷⁵ The Organic Act of Guam as Amended (1950), 2 and 4.

⁷⁶ C.T. Perez, “A Chamorro Re-telling of ‘Liberation,’” in *Kinalamten Pulitikát: Siñenten I Chamorro: Issues in Guam’s Political Development: The Chamorro Perspective, The Hale’ta Series*, (Hagatña: Political Status Education Coordinating Commission: 2002), 70.

the Commonwealth Act, “without hesitation, it is clear that when they recognized the rights of Guamanians at the end of the war until the Organic Act, they were referring to the Chamorros.”⁷⁷ Chamorros of the early postwar period happily took on this appellation, some believing that it sounded like “American” and would thus demonstrate their loyalty to the United States.⁷⁸ Because “Guamanian” took on a multicultural life of its own, however, Chamorro activists and intellectuals began to use the term “indigenous” to distinguish themselves from the immigrants who identified themselves as “Guamanian.” The consequences were substantial. Reflecting on this moment, Underwood wrote in an essay, “the use of the term ‘indigenous’ proved to be a watershed contribution because the comparisons to other ‘indigenous’ peoples became part of the political and social dialogue. This had not been the case in the past because of the complexity of identity and self-identification issues historically in Guam.”⁷⁹ OPI-R argued that self-determination for Guam was an “indigenous” right that belonged to the Chamorro people. Yet, as soon as the members of OPI-R claimed their indigenesness, they were labeled as racist and discriminatory towards Filipinos and other non-Chamorro immigrants and settlers on Guam. The history of the term “Guamanian,” in and of itself, is a term that shows the evolution and connection between Guam’s multiculturalism and racial liberalism.

“The Chamorro-only vote,” as it was called by its opponents, was a vision of self-determination promoted by Chamorro intellectuals, bolstered by the rhetoric of United Nations, and villainized by the United States government. Opposing any criticism that a limited plebiscite was racist, Hope Cristobal said the Guam Organic Act “most clearly acknowledges the separate political existence of the Chamorro people” because “it included a provision which gave Chamorros

⁷⁷ “Public Hearing on the Draft Commonwealth Act Dededo Community Center,” Attachment D, MARC, UOG.

⁷⁸ “Public Hearing on the Draft Commonwealth Act Dededo Community Center,” Attachment D, MARC, UOG.

⁷⁹ Robert Underwood, “Dies Mit: The Origin and End of Chamorro Self-Determination,” *Micronesian Educator*, Vol. 22 (Nov 2015), 107.

preference in government promotions and appointments.”⁸⁰ Chamorro activists thought the Organic Act provided a suitable distinction between native inhabitant and non-native peoples. Because the United States had recognized Chamorro people in this document with the term “Guamanian,” they believed that it could give Chamorros leverage to argue for special rights. Reappropriating United States history, Cristobal saw the vote as a reinstatement of a reinvigorated Chamorro identity within the political and social realms. The Chamorro-only vote allowed Chamorros to reassert the right to self-determination, placing the right with the people and not the territory. To the dismay of many settlers and immigrants, Chamorro-only voting also leveraged the power of indigenous Chamorro heritage over American citizenship in all local matters pertaining to Guam.

Ronald Teehan, another OPI-R member, laid out justifications for the Chamorro-only vote at a Commission on Self-Determination meeting. He argued that the United States made promises to the Chamorro people in 1947 and 1950 in which the U.S. indicated that Chamorros were the native inhabitants of Guam.⁸¹ He pointed out that “U.S. documents went on to describe the people of Guam as American nationals and pointed out that they had certain rights not granted to non-indigenous persons on the island of Guam.”⁸² In addition, he noted the United States “clearly defined who Guamanians were”—specifically “the inhabitants, natives, people of Guam, Guamanians”—in multiple laws concerning the governing of Guam.⁸³ All of a sudden, the United States’ unilateral decision that all people present on Guam were eligible to vote in the plebiscite was too convenient for U.S. officials who hesitated to promote Chamorro self-determination. Teehan argued “the U.S. Constitution was unilaterally thrust upon us by the U.S. Government so now we

⁸⁰ Cristobal, “The Organization of People for Indigenous Rights,” 81.

⁸¹ CSD Meeting Minutes, February 13, 1985, 23. Within the Naval Government period and in the Guam Organic Act, special considerations and opportunities were given to Chamorro people within the government bureaucracy. It was only later after the institution of the Elected Governor’s Act in 1969 did the United States remove the special clause for Chamorro people.

⁸² CSD Meeting Minutes, February 13, 1985, 23.

⁸³ CSD Meeting Minutes, February 13, 1985, 23.

are conveniently trapped into including all Americans, and all people who come to Guam under unilaterally established American immigration law and the rights of the Chamorro people under this rationale are conveniently buried.”⁸⁴ Teehan criticized the multicultural interpretation of the term of “Guamanian” that was strategically employed by the U.S. to deny indigenous Chamorro rights. In Teehan’s interpretation of the history of US-territorial relations, the United States federal government had not only promised, but actively gave special support to Chamorro people. To say that the Chamorro-only vote was discriminatory elided the fact that the United States conferred special privileges in the past and recognized the needs of Chamorro people. Teehan used the inconsistencies between past federal laws and those against Chamorro self-determination in order to hold the United States accountable to its UN obligations. This turn towards multiculturalism in Guam’s policies reduced Chamorro political power, threatening the possibility of indigenous self-determination.

The Pushback

By no means did everyone on Guam support the Chamorro self-determination or immigration clauses of the Guam Commonwealth Act. To many people, the question of Guam’s political status had nothing to do with Chamorro rights or self-determination. To them, it was about the political status of Guam itself, and by extension all people who lived within the territory. As such, Chamorro self-determination and local control of immigration seemed un-American and in violation of the Cold War zeitgeist of multiculturalism. Furthermore, the proposed limited plebiscite seemed to contradict the rhetoric of equal voting rights that the Civil Rights movement had fought for. Ironically, white statesiders living on Guam use the argument of racial liberalism to critique OPI-R, the Commonwealth Act, and the limited self-determination plebiscite. Racial liberalism describes the belief that racial equality and democracy were the values necessary to rectify

⁸⁴ CSD Meeting Minutes, February 13, 1985, 23.

inequalities in American society both in the continent and in the empire. It was characterized greater by non-white participation in government and executed through color-blind laws including those dealing with immigration and citizenship.⁸⁵ White statesiders harkened to multiculturalism and color-blind policies to eliminate difference and delegitimize Chamorro claims to self-determination.

For instance, the *Pacific Daily News*, the same newspaper that denied Lorraine Underwood's request to purchase an advertisement in only Chamorro and Spanish, published an editorial early on in 1981 ridiculing the issue of an indigenous self-determination plebiscite. The editors were white statesiders who settled in Guam. "What is an indigenous person?" the editorial read. They subsequently questioned several situations in which a person's presumed indigeness could be disputed: "Is a person who was born on Guam, but whose parents immigrated from the mainland, indigenous? Is a person whose parents came from, say, the Philippines, but who was born and reared on Guam, indigenous?" The *Pacific Daily News* relegated the question over indigenous identity on Guam as a trivial topic amidst larger questions of political status and equal elections. The editorial continued, "Guam's political status is a vital question that affects all its residents, whether they have been five years or fifty, be the white, brown, black or yellow."⁸⁶ For the *Pacific Daily News* and like many opponents of OPI-R in the 1980s, indigenous rights and self-determination was a radical ideology that illegitimately countered ethics of the multicultural and racially liberal American society in Guam.

Likewise, Shelby Shapiro, a representative of the Workman's Circle, an organization that catered to working class and laborers on island, adamantly opposed Chamorro self-determination and the provisions within the Commonwealth Act that gave Chamorros more control over the

⁸⁵ My interpretation of racial liberalism is informed by Simeon Man, *Soldiering Through Empire: Race and the Making of the Decolonizing Pacific* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2018), 4; and cultural pluralism as defined by Mae Ngai, *Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 234.

⁸⁶ "Defining Eligibility for Status Vote," *Pacific Daily News* (May 14, 1981), 8.

island. At the same hearing at which Bernadita Camacho-Dungca testified in Dededo, Shapiro argued that Chamorro self-determination may serve to harm Guam's diverse population. In his submitted testimony, he wrote

Guam is home to people of many cultures: Chamorros, 'Mainlanders,' Filipinos, Japanese, Chinese, Indians, Sikhs, Koreans, Vietnamese, Palauans, and the list goes on. What is unique about the island is that, given a population a bit less than that of a small city (around 100,00) in a relatively small land area (about 210 sq. miles), there is a generally cosmopolitan outlook. Why? Because of the island's multicultural aspects. Guam – if not a 'melting pot' is at the very least, a 'mixed salad.'⁸⁷

Using familiar tropes of multiculturalism such as “melting pot” or “mixed salad,” Shapiro argued that Guam's diverse population added to a certain internationalism that was indicative of a progressive and modern society. Thus, it was something to be celebrated.

Alongside this multicultural worldview, Shapiro utilized the trope of the “inauthentic” and “disappearing” native to delegitimize Chamorro identity and claims to self-determination. “There are no ‘pure Chamorros,’” and “there is no such thing as a ‘pure culture’ anywhere,” he wrote. In Shapiro's perspective, indigenous identity required a purity of culture and blood, something that could not be applicable to Chamorro people due to the legacies of imperialism. Robert Underwood also noted that opponents of the act questioned his Chamorro identity. “They made fun of my name,” Underwood testified at a public hearing, “they say that I'm racist, and many times they've asked me if my parents and I are full-blooded Chamorro. Maybe they are establishing that if they mock me or my peers then they will diminish the dignity of us who support the rights of Chamorros.”⁸⁸ The perceived inauthenticity of the Chamorro people was leveraged against Chamorro rights activists.

⁸⁷ “Public Hearing on the Draft Commonwealth Act Dededo Community Center,” MARC, UOG.

⁸⁸ Robert Underwood submitted his testimony to the Commission on Self-Determination's public hearing in Dededo. Robert's grandfather James H. Underwood was a white U.S. Marine from North Carolina. He arrived in Guam during the early years of U.S. imperialism at the beginning of the twentieth century, and married Ana Pangelinan Martinez. Chamorro document is as follows: “Annai in laknos este siha na puntu, meggai dumespresia i direchon I manChamorro yank on todū hami ni' sumopopotte este na direcho. Ma fa'chalek I na'an-hu, ma sangan na hu chatli'e' otro rason taotao yan meggai biahe di ma faisen yu' kao kabales na Chamorro I haga'-hu yan I mañaina-hu. Buente ma po'po'lu na

Furthermore, Shapiro weaponized mixed-race Filipino-Chamorros against the Chamorro self-determination movement. Shapiro wrote “The Archbishop of Guam, Felixberto Flores, has noted that there are no Guamanians without Filipino blood in their veins.” The rhetoric of mixed-race heritage were used by white statesiders in Guam against Chamorros advocating for self-determination. Contrary to Shapiro’s use of Felixberto Flores to deny Chamorro self-determination, according to Robert Underwood, OPI-R and other Chamorro activists “received legitimacy in our pursuits through the support of noted leaders like Bishop Felixberto Flores.”⁸⁹

White statesiders’ emphasis on multiculturalism and mixed-raceness of Chamorro people served to delegitimize indigenous Chamorro existence and further argued that an indigenous Chamorro self-determination was a moot exercise. What Shapiro and Troutman failed to acknowledge was that Chamorro identity did not revolve around the purity of blood, but on genealogy, language, and culture. It also relied on the continuity of connections to the islands that the Chamorro people emphasized in their daily lives. Multiculturalism erased how Chamorro people identified themselves, and how they came to understand themselves within Guam society and within the U.S. empire.

In addition, opponents of Chamorro self-determination and the limited plebiscite also weaponized Chamorros’ U.S. citizenship to declare that Chamorros had relinquished any right to self-determination. In a testimony at a public hearing for the Commonwealth Act, Charles Troutman, a lawyer who resided on Guam, also opposed Chamorro self-determination stating that “these people, the Chamorros however defined, have made one critical choice of self-determination already. By making that choice, seeking U.S. citizenship, they became a part of a larger group—U.S.

yanggen ma despresia yu’ pat sino otro siha gi mangga’chong-hu na ma ribaha I deknedad I direchon in ManChamorro.” “Public Hearing on the Draft Commonwealth Act Dededo Community Center,” Attachment D, MARC, UOG.

⁸⁹ Robert Underwood, “Dies Mit: The Origin and End of Chamorro Self-Determination,” *Micronesian Educator*, Vol. 22 (Nov 2015), 103.

citizen residents of Guam.”⁹⁰ Troutman refuted OPI-R and many other Chamorro leaders’ beliefs that the Guam Organic Act was not a consensual agreement between the Chamorro people and the United States.⁹¹ Troutman said, “It cannot be said that citizenship was imposed against the will of the people when it was granted following years of requests.”⁹² Troutman did not acknowledge that the Guam Organic Act, although it contained provisions on the much anticipated U.S. citizenship for Chamorros, also held other provisions that exacerbated Chamorro complaints about U.S. imperialism in Guam. Troutman concluded that “as a non-self-governing territory, all inhabitants of Guam have the right to self-determination.”⁹³ Troutman pushed the idea that self-determination belonged to a territory and that any resident and citizen living with that territory should be eligible to determine the future political status of the territory. For Troutman, as an unincorporated organized territory of the United States, the fact that Guam Organic Act had clauses on U.S. citizenship and inclusion into the American body politic necessarily meant that self-determination was a useless exercise.

The opposition went beyond the right to vote in the self-determination plebiscite and into the articles of the Commonwealth Act that involved immigration. Shelby Shapiro proclaimed Guamanians should not have anything to do with American immigration. Appealing to the American myth of multiculturalism, he extolled, “this island is home to the peoples of many cultures, and it is this variety, this diversity, this profusion of different ideas, attitudes, customs and modes of thought that makes our island an exciting place to live. This is also what has made America—the land of immigrants—great.”⁹⁴ Shapiro believed that immigration made Guam a better

⁹⁰ Charles Troutman Letter to the Commission on Self-Determination, July 30, 1985, Box 58 Folder August 1-14, 1985, The Papers of Ricardo Bordallo, Second Term, MARC, UOG.

⁹¹ Chapter 4 of this dissertation explores how U.S. citizenship was bestowed on the Chamorro people in 1950 as part of a Cold War effort.

⁹² Troutman Letter to CSD, Ricardo Bordallo Papers, Box 58 Folder August 1-14, 1985, MARC, UOG.

⁹³ Troutman Letter to CSD, Ricardo Bordallo Papers, Box 58 Folder August 1-14, 1985, MARC, UOG.

⁹⁴ Shelby Shapiro, “Workman’s Circle ‘No!’ to the Draft Commonwealth Act,” Box 58, Folder July 15-31, 1985, Ricardo Bordallo Papers, 8.

place for everyone. “There is no proof whatever,” explained Shapiro, “that the people of this island have had ‘hardships’ ‘imposed’ upon them because of immigration. If anything, the immigrants have done the opposite.”⁹⁵ Shapiro affirmed that Guam was undoubtedly American and Chamorro people were incorrect to think they could control immigration. “It is ironic to note,” Shapiro continued “that this Article is a complete slap in the face to the frequently-cited cultural tradition of Chamorro hospitality.”⁹⁶ For Troutman, multiculturalism and the presumption of unconditional Chamorro hospitality were assets to Guam. The propagation of these notions by settlers elided the Chamorro desire for self-determination.⁹⁷

OPI-R and the limited plebiscite was met by vitriolic criticism by those who were invested in the American empire in Guam. As the letters and testimonies of Shelby Shapiro and Charles Troutman show, U.S. multiculturalism and racial liberalism were used to delegitimize Chamorro existence and further deny the possibilities of an exercise of self-determination. In order to do this, they used tropes of Chamorros’ inauthenticity, mixed-race heritage, and U.S. citizenship to criticize Chamorro people’s claim to indigeneity. Furthermore, white statesiders promoted U.S. multiculturalism to flatten racial differences and legacies of U.S. imperialism and the inequities this had had for the people on Guam.

In response to these criticisms, the Commission on Self-Determination and OPI-R attempted to dissuade the general population that indigenous rights was discriminatory, and instead educate the island’s community on the legacies of U.S. imperialism. Frequently, OPI-R prefaced

⁹⁵ Shapiro, Workman’s Circle ‘No!’ to the Draft Commonwealth Act,” Box 58, Folder July 15-31, 1985, Ricardo Bordallo Papers, 8.

⁹⁶ Shapiro, Workman’s Circle ‘No!’ to the Draft Commonwealth Act,” Box 58, Folder July 15-31, 1985, Ricardo Bordallo Papers, 8. “Slap in the face” was a reference used by PARA-PADA a prior iteration of the Organization of Peoples for Indigenous Rights. Para-Pada’s name come from the Chamorro language to “stop slapping Chamorros.” Rogers, *Destiny’s Landfall*, 241.

⁹⁷ Chamorro scholars have critiqued how notions of Chamorro hospitality have been used to justify military claims to land. For example, Kenneth Gofigan Kuper, “Kontra I Peligru, Na’fansãfo Ham: The Production of Military (In)Security in Guåhan,” (Ph.D Dissertation: University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa, 2019), 175-176 and 289-290.

their speeches and articles with a history of U.S. colonialism in Guam, describing the ways in which Chamorro people were treated by U.S. colonial government. Furthermore, they explained how the United Nations Charter worked and its applicability to Guam. They read this history and legal circumstances through an indigenous framework, seeking to offer an anti-colonial interpretation that emphasized Chamorro culture and perspectives. OPI-R published pamphlets with political cartoons depicting Chamorros being wrongly persuaded by American news media, adopting a colonized mind framework, and as a result denying their own history. It was evident that the Chamorro self-determination movement had a lot of work to do.

Unsettling the Filipino Community

For Filipinos and Filipino-Americans living on Guam, the Commonwealth Act and the Chamorro self-determination movement presented them with an ambivalent position within the political and social context of Guam. Despite living in an island that was remarkably similar to the home archipelago, Filipinos had to contend with a social and political environment that saw them as perpetually foreign. As neither Chamorro nor statesiders, they understood that they had a precarious position within Guam. Filipinos had to navigate Guam society as immigrants in search for economic opportunities beyond their homeland, while simultaneously being racialized as disposable laborers and workers. They often sat in the working or lower classes of the political and social hierarchy on Guam. As a result, Filipino immigrants' feelings and perspectives towards the Commonwealth and the Chamorro self-determination were mixed. Many of them took pride in their American citizenship, while others fully supported Chamorro self-determination.

These tensions of belonging were evident in how the term "Guamanian" was employed and who could be considered "indigenous" to the island. Rogelio A. Sardea testified at a Commission on Self-Determination public hearing in July of 1985. He identified as a "Filipino by blood, American

by citizenship, and a Guamanian by choice to reside in the island of Guam.”⁹⁸ He asked the Commission on Self-Determination including Governor Ricardo Bordallo, “Are we developing a Commonwealth Act for Guam or are we developing a Commonwealth Act for the Chamorros?”⁹⁹ In response, Paul Bordallo, a member of the Commission on Self-Determination, told Sardea that the Commonwealth’s provisions on indigenous Chamorro rights did not create different categories of Guam residents and that Chamorro rights would eventually help all residents of Guam. This answer did not make sense to Sardea who questioned the very categories and names that the Commission and the general population employed. “If you mean that Chamorro means all the Guamanians who are citizens then I adhere to all what you said. But this has been a confusion. Am I a Chamorro or am I just a Guamanian? Am I a U.S. citizen and A Guamanian but never a Chamorro?,” he asked. The shifting appellations of the people of the island, and the relatively novel use of “indigenous” to apply to the Chamorro people of Guam sparked heated discussions. Among Chamorros, the conversation revolved around whether to rename Guam to Guåhan, and whether to call themselves “indigenous,” or “Guamanian,” or “Chamorro,” or “I ManChamorro” or all of the above. For Filipinos and other non-Chamorro residents, the conversation was about understanding how to identify themselves in an island that was experiencing multiple changes in the intersections of local, imperial, and international categories of racial, ethnic, and even national belonging.

Some Filipinos went so far as to say that the term “indigenous” was a divisive term that was inherently discriminatory. In a public hearing in Hagåtña, Manfred Mortera, a Filipino “born a United States citizen to two non-Chamorros in 1967” and a member of the Guam Youth Congress, thought the Commonwealth Act was discriminating against Filipinos because they were not

⁹⁸ “Public Hearing on Draft Commonwealth Act,” Box 58 Folder “July 01-15,1985, Ricardo Bordallo Papers, 2nd Term, MARC, UOG, 38.

⁹⁹ “Public Hearing on Draft Commonwealth Act,” Box 58 Folder “July 01-15,1985, Ricardo Bordallo Papers, 2nd Term, MARC, UOG, 38.

indigenous. He testified, “I see the term indigenous person as a discriminatory term,” because he believed that the writers of the Commonwealth used “indigenous” to deny immigrants certain rights because of the presumption that they had already self-determined. Mortera argued against this notion of choice.¹⁰⁰ “My father immigrated to Guam,” he announced, “My mother was born in Hawaii [...] I wasn’t given a choice to where I was to be born.”¹⁰¹ Despite being born and raised on Guam, Mortera complained the act denied him “rights,” yet “the indigenous person will be given rights that I won’t have simply because I was born after 1950.”¹⁰² He was thus not eligible to vote in the plebiscite.

In general, Filipinos understood their relationship to Guam via the means of U.S. immigration and thought that their presence on the island may be dependent on United States governance of Guam, not Chamorro governance on the island. As immigrants who settled in Guam to achieve some semblance of the American dream, however, the provisions in the Commonwealth Act and the emphasis on indigenous rights frightened many Filipinos who established their in Guam. Rogelio Sardea gave an example, “The land, for example, it’s been a big concern. Many people here have acquired properties through legal means. They pay for it. They pay the market price, and many Filipinos are worried that after the Commonwealth the Chamorro will take our lands...”¹⁰³ Because of this, Sardea told the Commission that “I can assure that my family and with other peoples in Guam they felt alienated... Many Filipinos, and I will be frank, the Filipinos are saying, hey ‘time to ship up,’ otherwise we will be taken away or kicked out of this island.”¹⁰⁴ The

¹⁰⁰ “Public Hearing on Draft Commonwealth Act, Legislative Session Hall, July 22, 1985,” Box 58, Folder August, 01-14, 1985, Ricardo Bordallo Papers, 2nd Term, MARC, UOG, 8.

¹⁰¹ “Public Hearing on Draft Commonwealth Act, Legislative Session Hall, July 22, 1985,” Box 58, Folder August, 01-14, 1985, Ricardo Bordallo Papers, 2nd Term, MARC, UOG, 8.

¹⁰² “Public Hearing on Draft Commonwealth Act, Legislative Session Hall, July 22, 1985,” Box 58, Folder August, 01-14, 1985, Ricardo Bordallo Papers, 2nd Term, MARC, UOG, 8.

¹⁰³ “Public Hearing on Draft Commonwealth Act,” Box 58, Folder July 01-15,1985, MARC, UOG, 40.

¹⁰⁴ “Public Hearing on Draft Commonwealth Act,” Term Box 58 Folder “July 01-15,1985, Ricardo Bordallo Papers, 2nd Term, MARC, UOG, 39-40.

Commonwealth Act and an assertion of Chamorro rights incited fears in Filipino people who immigrated to Guam and called it home.

In order to persuade the Filipino population who could potentially jeopardize the provisions on Chamorro self-determination, Robert Underwood attempted to reframe the animosity of Filipino-Chamorro relations on Guam by laying out the shared colonial histories of Guam and the Philippines from Spanish imperialism into U.S. imperialism. He wrote, “all Chamorros must recognize that there is at least one Filipino progenitor in each and every Chamorro family. The migration to the Mariana Islands from the Philippines in the 1800s is part of the island’s history.”¹⁰⁵ Guam and the Philippines have a deep past that could not be denied, and in fact could be leveraged to demonstrate how the United States had in the past decolonized its colonial possessions, with the largest most pertinent example the Philippines.

Underwood, however, criticized how Filipinos and other opponents of Chamorro self-determination used deep and long-lasting Filipino-Chamorro relations as a justification for Filipino and other non-Chamorro eligibility to vote for or deny altogether the exercise of self-determination. He made a distinction between the generations of Filipinos migrants; between Filipinos who made meaningful connections to Guam and the Chamorro people, and Filipinos who reified and took advantage of Guam’s colonial status to attain economic gains or obtain American citizenship. Underwood wrote, “The migrations of the 1800s took place over longer periods of time and the Filipinos were eventually assimilated into Chamorro life and culture. There is little evidence that this is occurring now except in rare, individual circumstances.”¹⁰⁶ Although Underwood emphasized the historically close relations between Guam and the Philippines, he noted that while many Chamorros had Filipino heritage, their Chamorro genealogies connected them to Guam in a fundamentally

¹⁰⁵ Underwood, “Immigration and Guam’s Future,” 63.

¹⁰⁶ Underwood, “Immigration and Guam’s Future,” 63.

different way to the island. Thus, Underwood emphasized that Chamorro people should embrace their indigenous identity, and Filipinos and other non-Chamorro residents of Guam should recognize it.

More explicitly, Underwood refocused the criticism, saying that it was not about the Filipino community and about the colonial mechanisms that would prevent people on Guam from self-governing. Underwood wrote,

both promoters of the Filipino contributions to Guam and their detractors fail to recognize that Filipinos are not being judge here. It is not the value of Filipinos, their economic potential, their eating habits, their customs, or their backgrounds that make a difference. It is merely the fact of numbers, the capacity of a society to absorb those numbers and the desirability of a society being able to plan its future.¹⁰⁷

Senator Marilyn Manibusan shared this perspective as well. In a Commission on Self-Determination hearing, she argued “control of immigration to me is when you look at your limited resources and your we can’t have any more outside [*sic*] without having to try to figure out what we do with our own.” Immigration control was positioned as a way to allocate resources in such a way that would benefit all people on the island, not just Chamorro people.

The movement for indigenous Chamorro self-determination in Guam forces us to reconsider the implications of defining settler colonialism as a binary between indigenous peoples and the white settlers. Guam scholar Vicente Diaz wrote about the tense relationship between Filipinos and Chamorros as symptomatic of the “asymmetrical relations” that undergirded both the Chamorro and Filipino experience within the United States empire. Filipinos were “not innocent bystanders, poor helpless immigrants, who want only to live a life of dignity often denied back home. Many Filipinos look down on Chamorros as not culturally rich as people in their mother country, even as they look to Guam as a wonderful place to have the best of both worlds.”¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁷ Underwood, “Immigration and Guam’s Future,” 63.

¹⁰⁸ Diaz, “Bye Bye Ms. American Pie,” 155.

Filipinos tended to laud Guam's relationship to the United States, and subsequently ignoring the centrality and importance of Chamorro culture in Guam. While there were a substantial number of white statesiders who lived on Guam who owned businesses, contract companies, and newspapers, Filipinos comprised most of the immigrant population on Guam. Filipinos' stories of migration and their desire to obtain the American Dream represented the prevailing narrative of the multicultural United States. Chamorro self-determination and the emphasis on Chamorro rights in the Commonwealth Act seemed to contradict this narrative, and brewed controversy.

The Dynamics Filipino Solidarity

Despite the interethnic tensions that were exacerbated by white settlers use Filipinos as pawns in the multicultural narrative of Guam, OPI-R's work attracted Filipina allies including Nerissa Bretania and Maria Teehan. While Maria Teehan was married to Ron Teehan, another vocal Chamorro OPI-R leader, Nerissa Bretania was, in her own words, "the token Filipino" and "the only legitimately independent Filipino that was involved."¹⁰⁹ Nerissa became involved with OPI-R in early 1980s, when her friend, Hope Cristobal, invited her a meeting. Nerissa was blown away by the intellectual language of Robert Underwood, Ron Teehan, and Benjamin Cruz. The way in which they spoke about imperialism and colonialism in Guam history reminded her of Paulo Freire's call for liberatory education, something that she became intrigued with after taking an education course taught by Robert Underwood. Quickly, Nerissa became OPI-R's treasurer.

In an oral history interview, OPI-R member Benjamin Cruz said that Filipina women were strategic offsets to the hot-headed Chamorro men who often alienated would be allies with their sharp tongues and incomprehensible theoretical language.¹¹⁰ For example, in their most successful

¹⁰⁹ Nerissa Bretania and Nerissa Lee is the same person as Nerissa Bretania Underwood described in chapter five of this dissertation. Nerissa married Robert Underwood in 2009, and subsequently changed her name to Nerissa Bretania Underwood. Nerissa Underwood, Interview with the author, Guam, September 9, 2019.

¹¹⁰ Benjamin Cruz, Interview with the author, Guam, January 13, 2017.

political action, Nerissa and Maria were able to convince all but one of the island's village mayors to sign a petition to the United Nations to show that there was support for a political status change in Guam.¹¹¹ Rather than sending the Chamorro men to solicit signatures, OPI-R capitalized on the perception of the non-political Filipino woman as a way to open doors for tough conversations on self-determination and decolonization among leaders who were for the most part Chamorro men. While the Chamorro men of OPI-R pushed the political conversation toward acknowledgment of indigenous rights, Filipino women strategically used their positionalities as immigrant women to quell charges of racism and soften the perception of OPI-R.

Filipina women also had the cultural capital to spread the message about Chamorro self-determination within the Filipino community, one that OPI-R had difficulty reaching. Born in Iloilo province in the Philippines, Nerissa arrived on Guam when she was five years old with her mother and sister to join her father who was recruited as a laborer for a military contractor in the 1950s and 60s. Although they lived in the southern village of Agat and integrated with both the Chamorro and Filipino communities, her mother was adamant that she retain her Ilonggo identity. Nerissa remembers bringing a petition to one of the many gatherings the Ilonggo community had on weekends. Nerissa relayed to me "I would have people sign petitions. My dad said, 'They are going to be mad at you.' But they signed it, the Ilonggos... Maybe they trusted me."¹¹² If Filipino women were ardent supporters of ideas that seemed contrary to their interests, then maybe there was an argument for Chamorro self-determination worth paying attention to.

Filipina women's activism was not without its tensions. Nerissa and Maria often felt that were being pulled in multiple directions. The intersections of their positionalities as being Filipinos, women, and immigrants made them important players for the movement for Chamorro self-

¹¹¹ A copy of this petition can be found in OPI-R's pamphlet "Self-Determination: A People's Right." Nerissa Underwood, Interview with the author, Guam, September 9, 2019.

¹¹² Nerissa Underwood, Interview with the author, Guam, September 9, 2019.

determination, but it also placed them at the crossroads of different and contradictory perspectives that they needed to reconcile.¹¹³ This reconciliation often came with tough personal reflections and outputs of emotional labor. They wanted to stand in solidarity with Chamorro people who had experienced injustices of colonialism on Guam, without seeming as if they disregarded their Filipino heritage and disrespected their Filipino families' immigrant struggles.

Nerissa and Maria also understood that their participation in the Chamorro self-determination movement had the potential of alienating people within their own Filipino communities. Filipinas were part of a relatively new Filipino community that for the most part spent time amongst themselves and not with Chamorro people—due in part to how U.S. militarized labor regimes limited relations between Filipinos and the Chamorro communities on the island.¹¹⁴ This separation made it difficult for Filipinos to build relations with Chamorro people which further reified the perception that Guam was solely a U.S. territory and not the land of the Chamorro people. Some of the many critiques launched at Filipino allies were that they misunderstood the idea behind self-determination, that they were not grateful for their American citizenship, that they were disrespectful of their family's immigrant experience, and that they denied their Filipino heritage. Filipino allies grappled with these contradictions that were microcosms of the inherent tension within settler colonial regimes in which immigrant and Civil Rights are often placed in opposition to indigenous peoples and their rights.

When she began working with OPI-R, Nerissa was not sure how she could articulate support for Chamorro self-determination. But after one transformative conversation with her

¹¹³ Vivian Dames writes about how the positionality of being a Filipina woman “of” Guam creates a “conflicted position” in regards to activism and scholarship about Guam. Vivian Dames, “Rethinking the Circle of Belonging: American Citizenship and the Chamorros of Guam,” (PhD Dissertation: University of Michigan, 2000), xxi-xxii.

¹¹⁴ Chapter three and four of this dissertation examines the circumstances through which Filipino migrants came to Guam in the postwar period as a result of the opportunities associated with the military build-up in Guam. Chapter five examines how the Filipino community in Guam grew and came to call Guam home.

mother, Rosalina Bretania, Nerissa's perspective changed. Rosalina told Nerissa that "every group of people have a right to [self] determine, especially if they have been colonized. They have a right to determine which political direction they want to take."¹¹⁵ Furthermore, Rosalina told Nerissa "for the Chamorros they also have to exercise that right. And for us, we already exercised it as a group and as individuals because we have closer ties to the U.S." To Rosalina, Chamorro self-determination would be a fulfillment of the universal right for a people to determine and govern themselves. Rosalina emphasized that Filipinos had already exercised national self-determination when the Philippines obtained independence, and that as Filipino immigrants on Guam, they had also exercised individual self-determination in their decision to migrate to the United States. Rosalina was a history teacher, who lived through World War II in the Philippines, who moved overseas with her young children to an unfamiliar island. She had a unique perspective that utilized her personal experiences and her knowledge of history to find connections between what her daughter wanted to do without sacrificing her Filipino identity. By evoking the related imperial histories of the Philippines and Guam, Rosalina gave Nerissa historical and moral reasons to articulate how and why Filipinos can and should stand in solidarity with Chamorro self-determination.

The generational lessons of the Filipino fight for independence sat in the minds of Filipinos on Guam who supported Chamorro self-determination. Another young Filipino from the village of Dededo, Philip Sumang testified in a Commission on Self-Determination public hearing in 1985, "although I am an immigrant from the Philippines, the local Chamorro people have shown me respect and have treated me with dignity... it is now my turn to show them my respect and permit the existence of their dignity as they permitted mine."¹¹⁶ Sumang was able to differentiate the immigrant struggles of Filipinos living on Guam from Chamorros who sought self-determination.

¹¹⁵ Nerissa Underwood, Interview with the author, Guam, September 9, 2019.

¹¹⁶ "Public Hearing on Draft Commonwealth Act, Legislative Session Hall," July 22, 1985, 20.

He wanted to give back to the community who had given him much. Furthermore, Sumang linked the history of the Philippines to what Chamorros sought to do on Guam. “In 1940 my grandfather was a pro-advocate of independence in the Philippines,” he said. His grandfather taught him “to recognize this because everyone has the right to determine themselves. My grandfather was there fighting for their rights to have their independence, and finally they gained it.”¹¹⁷ In this reading of the history of U.S. imperialism in the Pacific, Sumang saw interconnected and related struggles of Filipino independence and Chamorro self-determination.

Nerissa, Rosalina, and Philip simultaneously acknowledged that Guam is indigenous Chamorro land and recognized their Filipino connection to the homeland. This perspective was crucial for usurping the U.S. settler colonial project of indigenous erasure and immigrant assimilation. Filipinos who were in solidarity with Chamorro self-determination were primed to complicate the immigrant narrative of the United States by rooting their identity not solely in U.S. citizenship, but in their homelands.

“Commonwealth Now!”¹¹⁸

After monthly meetings over a period of two years and with input from Guam government leaders, community advocates, and federal officials, the Commission on Self-Determination had a draft of the Guam Commonwealth Act in 1986. According to the official announcement of the Commission on Self-Determination, “this draft Act expresses the consensual aspirations of the people of Guam to change the island’s political status from that of an unincorporated territory to that of a self-governing Commonwealth, recognizing the sovereignty of the United States of America.”¹¹⁹ Rather than being a document that sought total decolonization through the formation

¹¹⁷ “Public Hearing on Draft Commonwealth Act, Legislative Session Hall,” July 22, 1985, 20.

¹¹⁸ “Commonwealth Now!” was the slogan for the Commission on Self-Determination’s educational campaign.

¹¹⁹ Commission on Self-Determination, “Guam’s Quest for Commonwealth: A Draft Guam Commonwealth Act,” (Mangilao: Micronesian Area Research Center University of Guam), https://issuu.com/guampedia/docs/the_draft_guam_commonwealth_act_pft

of a nation-state, the Commonwealth Act sought more local control over affairs that were at that point controlled solely by the U.S. federal government. Chamorro leaders believed that they, knowing the needs of their island, should have more say in the island's local political and economic development.

At first glance, the Commonwealth Act seemed to be an oxymoronic, contradictory document that contained ideas and concepts that did not necessarily fit together.¹²⁰ It was presented as an anticolonial document, but it did not request decolonization. It asked for more local control over systems and institutions that are usually reserved for federal powers, such as the U.S. military and immigration policy. It was also seen as an “intermediary step” for a more permanent political status such as statehood or independence. It employed both American rhetoric of freedom and equality while also emphasizing special rights to indigenous Chamorro people. Scholars of indigenous politics have noted how state-based solutions did not necessarily fit the political goals of indigenous peoples. The Chamorro people and the Commonwealth Act were no exception.¹²¹ Indigenous Chamorro visions for Guam's political future did not match the independent nation-state model, nor did it conform to idealized American conceptions of racial liberalism and multiculturalism.

The draft Commonwealth Act began with a preamble that reflected the burgeoning interest in Chamorro rights for any political status change for the island.

In recognition of the long-cherished aspiration of the people of Guam to direct the course of their own destiny, and with the belief that mutual respect, understanding, and compromise among people form a more perfect Union, the people of the United States of America, nurtured in the ideals of liberty and democracy, conscious

¹²⁰ The Guam Commonwealth Act went through several revisions during its seventeen-year life as a result of federal suggestions and changes, as well as Chamorro and Guamanian leaders attempting to reinstate certain provisions. For the purposes of this dissertation, I have chosen to focus on the first iteration of the Guam Commonwealth Act that published and disseminated to the Guam community in 1986. This version would be the document that spurred several debates over concepts of indigenous rights and sovereignty in the 1980s.

¹²¹ Tracey Banivanua-Mar, *Decolonisation and the Pacific: Indigenous Globalisation and the Ends of Empire*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016); S. James Anaya, *Indigenous Peoples in International Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

of the obligations under the Treaty of Paris of 1898 and the Charter of the United Nations, do hereby embrace the establishment of the Commonwealth of Guam, ever mindful that the right to self-determination is the heritage of the Chamorro people of Guam, shall be protected.¹²²

Combining rhetoric of the United States' "liberty and democracy" and the United Nations of "right to self-determination," the preamble proudly and affirmatively recognized that the Commonwealth would be an assertion of Chamorro people's relationship to the Guam. It put the onus on the United States to be responsible for carrying out its obligations based upon international treaties, including the Treaty of Paris of 1898 that made Guam a colonial possession of the United States, and the Charter of the United Nations, which called for the decolonization of the rest of the world's colonies.

Significantly, the preamble made an explicit and specific assertion that the Chamorro people of Guam were the benefactors of the right to self-determination. Yet, the slippage between "the people of Guam" at the beginning of the preamble and "the Chamorro people of Guam" towards the end signaled to the uncomfortable transformation of island society. On the one hand, the Commission on Self-Determination wanted to assert Chamorro self-governance to protect the indigenous claims to land, but on the other hand they knew that the United States would not approve a document that was solely dedicated to Chamorro claims. They also represented the tensions during the public hearings of the Commonwealth Act in which the Commission on Self-Determination sought to incorporate input from both Chamorro activist groups such as OPI-R and Filipinos because of the approval by the voting population that was needed to pass the act for submission to Congress. It represented the tensions of practicing indigenous rights within the framework of multiculturalism and racial liberalism within the United States empire.

¹²² Commission on Self-Determination, "Guam's Quest for Commonwealth: A Draft Guam Commonwealth Act," 3.

In addition to a preamble stating Chamorro rights, the draft act had eleven articles relating to the jurisdiction of U.S. federal law in Guam, the judicial system, trade, taxation, law enforcement, labor, transportation and telecommunications, airlines, land and natural resources, and U.S. financial assistance. Each of these articles were researched and discussed by the Commission on Self-Determination with consultation with constitutional lawyers and people living on Guam.¹²³ Significantly, the Commonwealth Act sought to rectify the problems associated with the intersection of settler colonialism and militarism—land annexation, immigration, and most importantly Chamorro self-determination.

In terms of military affairs, Article III of the Commonwealth Act on “Foreign Affairs and Defense” stipulated that the United States had to agree to consult with the people of Guam in regard to treaties and international agreements that would affect Guam, and significantly that “no military security zones shall be established and no foreign military personnel shall be stationed on the Island of Guam without approval of the government of the Commonwealth except in time of declared war, and no military bases will be established without consultation with the Governor of the Commonwealth of Guam.”¹²⁴ Recognizing the history of military land annexation since World War II, the Commission on Self-Determination wanted to ensure that the people of Guam had a seat at the proverbial table when it came to military activities on Guam. They wanted to ensure that further militarization would not occur without their knowledge. As the legislative history of the draft act document stated, Article III “reflects both the civil liberties and economic opportunities lost to Guam from 1945 to 1962 when, in peace time, a military zone was established which restricted Guam citizens and U.S. citizens from entering Guam without U.S. military approval.”¹²⁵ If the

¹²³ The Papers of Ricardo Bordallo (Second Term) at the Micronesian Area Research Center contains the minutes of these meetings and are rich with the discussions over the application of certain laws on Guam, and how Guamanians could argue for what they want in the Commonwealth Act.

¹²⁴ Commission on Self-Determination, “Guam’s Quest for Commonwealth: A Draft Guam Commonwealth Act,” 5.

¹²⁵ Commission on Self-Determination, “Guam’s Quest for Commonwealth: A Draft Guam Commonwealth Act,” 5.

Commonwealth were to be approved by the U.S. Congress and the President, Guam residents would regain some control over the militarization process on the island, and instead figure out for themselves how the island would develop economically.

Extending from the consultation with the Guam Government over military affairs, the Commission on Self-Determination included provisions that would allow the Government of Guam to access and regain control over excess federal lands that lay vacant. Many Guamanians and especially Chamorros who were forced off their land after World War II wanted the lands to be returned to the original landowners. To solve this problem, Article X of the draft act stated that “All real property, including undeveloped land and developed recreational facilities, controlled or owned by any United States military service or federal agency on Guam and not necessarily for direct and continuous operational, logistical, or security use as a military facility or other federal function shall be transferred as excess federal real property to the Government of Guam.”¹²⁶ To prevent the military from unilaterally taking land and not using it, the Commission on Self-Determination structured land policy around the return of land to Chamorro people.

In addition to unchecked militarism, the Commission on Self-determination sought to control immigration to Guam by delisting the island as a port of entry for U.S. immigration policies. The goal of this article was to stipulate the Government of Guam’s ability to locally control immigration policy for the island. In a departure from federal immigration policy that controlled migration in and out of the empire, the Commonwealth Act stipulated that Guam “shall have the authority to control entry of all aliens into the Commonwealth of Guam to include the admission, exclusion, and expulsion of such aliens.”¹²⁷ The Government of Guam sought to do so because “continuous and mounting immigration from Asian countries under the U.S. Immigration and

¹²⁶ Commission on Self-Determination, “Guam’s Quest for Commonwealth: A Draft Guam Commonwealth Act,” 9.

¹²⁷ Commission on Self-Determination, “Guam’s Quest for Commonwealth: A Draft Guam Commonwealth Act,” 7.

Naturalization law has imposed hardships on the people of the island, and could submerge their Chamorro identity within a few decades.”¹²⁸ Local control over immigration policy was supported by both Chamorro activists who sought to preserve Chamorro culture on Guam, and business leaders who saw how U.S. federal immigration policies affected the island’s ability to recruit and retain foreign migrant workers which stymied civilian economic development on island. Perhaps not wanting to appear anti-immigrant, as was the case with many Chamorros who offered this point of view, the Commission on Self-Determination argued that there existed legal precedent for a territory to control immigration as seen in how the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands and American Samoa were able to do so. Of all the articles of the Guam Commonwealth Act, Article VII on immigration policy created the oddest coalition of supporters.

The Commonwealth Act was a conservative document when compared to other anticolonial movements around the Pacific which sought independence from their colonial metropolises. The Commonwealth Act of Guam was a result of Chamorro leaders having to navigate through contradicting imperial and international policies and desires from all sides—the United Nations and United States conventions, visions of indigenous Chamorro self-determination, and the desires of all the residents of the island. As historian Robert Rogers wrote, “although radical by Guamanian standards, Chamorro activists are decidedly mild in their demands in comparison with indigenous-rights advocates in New Caledonia, Fiji, and Southeast Asia.”¹²⁹ At the core of the Commonwealth Act was the explicit assertion that Chamorro people should determine the future of the island of Guam—a concept that was revolutionary for an island that was controlled unilaterally by colonial powers for nearly 400 years.

Voting for Commonwealth

¹²⁸ Commission on Self-Determination, “Guam’s Quest for Commonwealth: A Draft Guam Commonwealth Act,” 7.

¹²⁹ Robert Rogers, “Guam’s Quest for Political Identity,” *Pacific Studies*, 12:1 (1988), 58.

When the Commission on Self-Determination presented a completed draft of the Guam Commonwealth Act in 1986, it commenced an educational campaign to shore up support from the Guam community. They had originally hoped to have a plebiscite in 1986, but it was postponed to take place in August of 1987 after the inauguration of new governor Joseph F. Ada and a nine-week educational campaign.¹³⁰ In August, only thirty-nine percent of the island's eligible electorate, all residents of Guam regardless of racial and ethnic origin, participated in the plebiscite. Officials believed the low voter-turn out was due to unsuccessful education campaigns. All except two articles were approved by the electorate; the ballot was organized so that a voter had to approve or disapprove each of the articles. The two articles, perhaps unsurprisingly, were on the two most controversial topics: Chamorro self-determination and immigration. It was assumed that these two articles failed to garner support because "voter trends strongly indicated that relatively more Filipino voters turned out than Chamorro voters to ensure defeat of Articles 1 and 7."¹³¹ Because of their failure, the Commission on Self-Determination rewrote the articles and conducted another educational campaign for another election that was held in November of the same year.

Article I, which was originally written to solely "recognize" the right to Chamorro self-determination, was made more explicit to create concrete processes for the exercise of self-determination. This change was in response to many Chamorro activists including OPI-R who had called for explicit assertion of indigenous self-determination. The original Article VII on immigration sought to provide local control over the mechanisms for which immigrants could become permanent residents on Guam. It essentially stipulated that Guam could not be considered a "port of entry" for immigration purposes, which effectively disallowed immigrants from using their time in Guam to count towards permanent residency and subsequently U.S. citizenship. After the

¹³⁰ Ada, "The Quest for Commonwealth," 167.

¹³¹ Pedro Sanchez, *Guåban, Guam*, (Agana: Sanchez Publishing House), 450.

plebiscite in August 1987, it was rewritten to allow residents of Guam to petition relatives for two years after the passage of the Commonwealth Act. This change would also give the island time to create an immigration policy that could benefit the island's cultural, demographic, and economic needs. The Commission on Self-Determination noted that the revision was "a compromise between the legitimate desire to influence the direction of Guam's social and economic development by better controlling immigration, without the sacrifice of the individual rights for those permanent resident aliens already living on Guam, and with compassion for all residents of Guam who many still have non-citizen relatives that they would like to bring to Guam."¹³² Once again, the Commonwealth Act was revised to somehow hold the contradictory elements of Chamorro desires of local control alongside Filipino migrants who called Guam home.

The Commission on Self-Determination then commenced another educational campaign through newspaper inserts and voting guides. These guides were written in English as well as Chamorro. Yet, it does not seem that these were also written in Filipino (Tagalog) or other foreign languages. With the knowledge that the Filipino community on island had a strong pull towards rejecting the articles on Chamorro self-determination and immigration, OPI-R conducted their own educational campaign to get Chamorro people out to the polls with the apt slogan "*Hunggan!*"—the Chamorro word for "yes." They created pamphlets, wrote editorials and op-eds, held rallies in support of the Commonwealth Act, and created hype around the plebiscite to encourage people to vote.

Still, it seemed that white and Filipino residents of the island opposed the act, while Chamorro people supported it. Even with the revisions, the Commonwealth Act did not sit well with Filipinos. For example, the day before the vote, Filipino medical doctor, Eddie Del Rosario,

¹³² Pacific Daily News Voter's Guide insert, a copy of this was found at the Pacific Collection, University of Hawai'i at Mānoa.

told the *Pacific Daily News*, “as far as indigenous rights like self-determination, we recognize that right. But what guarantees do we have that we are not going to be second-class citizens, for instance, in political representation and economic opportunities.”¹³³ The fear of becoming the discriminated immigrant or indeed ousted from the island prevailed in the minds of Filipino voters. The Commonwealth Act was still perceived to be a document for Chamorros and not every group on island.

On November 7, 1987, a second plebiscite was held. Fifty-seven percent of the island’s electorate voted, and both clauses on Chamorro self-determination and immigration passed. A couple of days after the plebiscite, the *Pacific Daily News* published unofficial results including the breakdown of votes for the Commonwealth articles according to village.¹³⁴ In the villages with high concentrations of immigrants such as Dededo, Yigo, and Tamuning, majority (between fifty and fifty-nine percent) voted “no” to the articles. The villages with higher proportions Chamorro residents, particularly in southern Guam such as Umatac, Merizo, and Inarajan, voted “yes.” With this approval from the Guam electorate, the Commission on Self-Determination took the win and presented the act to Congress in February 1988.¹³⁵

The Unconstitutionality of the Commonwealth Act

The Commission on Self-Determination and the Guam Congressional Representative Vicente “Ben” Blaz secured a congressional hearing for the Commonwealth Act in December 1989 in Honolulu, Hawai‘i. The Commission on Self-Determination took the opportunity to solicit as many testimonies from the people of Guam as they could, and it was estimated that “over 200

¹³³ “Where they stand on the draft act vote,” *Pacific Daily News*, November 6, 1987, 4.

¹³⁴ “Tabulated breakdown of village vote,” *Pacific Daily News*, November 9, 1987, 4.

¹³⁵ By this point in time, various Congressional members, legal teams and counsels, federal officials, as well as United Nations officials had contributed their perspectives on how the Commonwealth Act should be written. The Commission on Self-Determination took these into consideration, but ultimately decided to work with the issues that mattered to them most. For more detail about these conversations and the politics behind the drafting of the Commonwealth Act and the subsequent plebiscite read Ada, “The Quest for Commonwealth”; Robert Rogers, “Guam’s Quest for Political Identity,” *Pacific Studies* 12, no. 1 (November 1, 1988): 49–70.

people from Guam were in attendance, many former political and community leaders, youth representatives and ordinary citizens joined Guam officials in presenting testimonies.¹³⁶ They had fundraised throughout the island in order to support the travel of those who needed financial assistance to provide their testimonies. The commitment of these 200 people from Guam to travel to Hawai'i to present their case was a powerful demonstration of the overwhelming support for the Commonwealth.¹³⁷

Former Governor Ricardo Bordallo thought the number of supporters for the hearings would demonstrate how much the people of Guam wanted this political status change. He too offered his testimony. Bordallo wrote “We are few; we are distant; we are politically powerless, but we are Americans.” He asserted that Chamorros “seek to become members of the American political family in our own separate house, far removed from yours. We seek autonomy and self-government in the form and manner best suited to our needs and situation.”¹³⁸ In a paradoxical line of reasoning, Bordallo’s testimony use the rhetoric of U.S. citizenship to claim rights to self-governance and self-determination on Guam. Living in country that promised liberty and self-governance and witnessing decolonization movements around the world, Bordallo—along with hundreds of Chamorros on Guam—envisioned a world in which the Chamorro people of Guam self-determined and self-governed.

Among the sixty people who testified at the hearings, Ron Rivera took to the podium to deliver the testimony of the Organization of People for Indigenous Rights. Rivera pushed the Congressional delegation to think about how the U.S. reluctance to acknowledge Chamorro self-

¹³⁶ Ada, “The Quest for Commonwealth,” 175.

¹³⁷ Although there may have been Filipinos who attended the festivities around the Congressional hearings, there were no Filipinos who officially testified in support. Filipinos, however, were not totally absent from the testimonies of the Chamorros. Filipinos were referenced when Chamorros spoke about the demographic changes that threatened the possibility of self-determination, but also were used as a justification for how American and cosmopolitan Guam was.

¹³⁸ U.S. Congress, Representatives, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, *Guam Commonwealth: Hearings before the subcommittee on Insular and International Affairs Part II*, 101st Cong., 1st sess., 1989, 9.

determination was cause for international embarrassment. He told them that “to undermine Chamorro self-determination is to give life to imperialism at a time when we are celebrating its demise in other parts of the world.”¹³⁹ Although the Commonwealth Act was not a form of Chamorro self-determination because it was approved by all residents of Guam, Rivera said that OPI-R supported the Commonwealth Act because it had made an explicit notation that Chamorro self-determination would be a priority for this new territorial relationship. In Chamorro, Rivera declared “*I magahet na linibri siempre u fatto gi ya hita kumu gaige I destinu-ta gi kannai-ta*”—“True freedom will come to us when our destiny is fully in our hands.”¹⁴⁰

Of all the testimonies were delivered during the congressional hearings, not one person from Guam opposed the Commonwealth Act. Even Gordon Mailloux (“Johnny Guam” from chapter five), a white senator who served the Guam Legislature and waxed lyrical about the benefits of U.S. imperialism and militarism on Guam, supported the Guam Commonwealth Act because of its provisions to stimulate a local, self-sustaining economy.¹⁴¹ Yet one testimony in particular had more power than the others combined—Stella Guerra, an Assistant Secretary of the Office of Territorial and International Affairs. Sitting behind her were representatives from the Department of the Interior, a representative from the Department of Justice, and Rear Admiral Bill Pendly who was the director of Plans and Policies of Commander in Chief Pacific (CINPAC) of the U.S. Navy.¹⁴² The imperial government was not going down without a fight.

Stella Guerra represented the Federal Interagency Task Force on the Guam Commonwealth Act. Guerra testified that the task force had understood “the desires for a new political relationship” and that they appreciated that “the new relationship may require significant changes from the status

¹³⁹ U.S. Congress, Representatives, Committee, *Guam Commonwealth, Part II*, 257

¹⁴⁰ U.S. Congress, Representatives, Committee, *Guam Commonwealth, Part II*, 260-61.

¹⁴¹ U.S. Congress, Representatives, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, *Guam Commonwealth: Hearings before the subcommittee on Insular and International Affairs Part II*, 101st Cong., 1st sess., 1989, Part I, 412-417.

¹⁴² U.S. Congress, Representatives, Committee, *Guam Commonwealth, Part II*, 271.

quo.”¹⁴³ She testified “at the outset, let me emphasize, as vigorously and as honestly as I can, that the Administration wholeheartedly endorses and supports commonwealth and increased self-government for Guam.”¹⁴⁴ She qualified this statement, however, and said “we strongly urge the enactment of legislation, *permissible under the Constitution of the United States, acceptable to the Congress, the Administration, and the people of Guam* to achieve a commonwealth relationship which brings greater measure of self-government to the people of Guam.”¹⁴⁵ The Commonwealth Act had to be approved by federal and imperial agencies including the U.S. Navy. It also had to abide by the U.S. Constitution. She emphasized that the “Federal-Guam relationship cannot be unilaterally determined by Guam.”¹⁴⁶ The Guam Commonwealth Act, which represented a culmination of years of public hearings in Guam, legal counsel who advised on Constitutional law, input from members of U.S. Congress, and a United Nations ambassador, was torn apart by federal agencies who upended the most significant goals of the Commonwealth Act on the basis of constitutionality.¹⁴⁷

In her testimony, Guerra pointed out several provisions that were of special concern to the interagency task force. The first was the Commonwealth Act’s clause on “mutual consent,” which required any federal law that would be implemented on Guam to be first approved by the Government of Guam. Guerra noted that this provision would not hold constitutional muster at it placed Guam at the same legal level as the U.S. federal government. It would also result in “legislative and regulatory chaos,” and “make it impossible for Federal agencies to carry out their

¹⁴³ U.S. Congress, Representatives, Committee, *Guam Commonwealth* Part II, 272.

¹⁴⁴ U.S. Congress, Representatives, Committee, *Guam Commonwealth* Part II, 272.

¹⁴⁵ Italicized for emphasis. U.S. Congress, Representatives, Committee, *Guam Commonwealth*, Part II, 271.

¹⁴⁶ U.S. Congress, Representatives, Committee, *Guam Commonwealth*, Part II, 271

¹⁴⁷ The Interagency Task Force did support some provisions of the Commonwealth Act, including those that dealt with federal laws that hampered economic development, guidelines around eminent domain, and access to excess federal lands. Furthermore, they did support provisions that helped Chamorro people. These included the establishment of the Chamorro Land Trust, greater education programming “aimed at preserving and promoting their culture, and enhancing their social and economic well-being and advancement.” U.S. Congress, Representatives, Committee, *Guam Commonwealth* Part II, 273.

program and policy responsibilities in the Commonwealth.”¹⁴⁸ Mutual consent would especially constrain the possibility for the United States military to conduct their operations on the island, which proved to be of great concern to national security. Furthermore, the Commonwealth Act’s provisions on local control over immigration policy were too stringent in the perspective of the task force. While they were willing to concede special provisions and exceptions to federal immigration law to account for Guam’s geographic location, they were not willing to provide the territory government of Guam complete control over immigration policy including naturalization. Stella Guerra testified that the task force ultimately could not support a bill that “infringe on, constrain, or impede the overall conduct of U.S. immigration policy, foreign relations, international defense commitments, and national defense.”¹⁴⁹ The task force essentially limited what the Commonwealth Act could do to solve the problem of U.S. settler militarism on Guam.

The Commonwealth’s keen attention to Chamorro self-determination came under special scrutiny by the federal task force. The implementation of Chamorro rights in the way the Commonwealth contradicted the American ideal of multicultural equality. “We believe,” Guerra said, “that sections 102(a) and 102(b) of the Guam Commonwealth Bill, which could be used to deny some U.S. citizens the right to vote based solely on their ethnic background, are unconstitutional.”¹⁵⁰ These sections stipulated that those of Chamorro descent would have the right to vote in any future self-determination plebiscite. They were also the sections that OPI-R had advocated to be included within the Commonwealth Act. Guerra cited the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to show that a Chamorro self-determination plebiscite was unconstitutional. She said the limited plebiscite “would violate the express language of the Fifteenth Amendment. It would also violate the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, by impinging in a racially

¹⁴⁸ U.S. Congress, Representatives, Committee, *Guam Commonwealth* Part II, 275.

¹⁴⁹ U.S. Congress, Representatives, Committee, *Guam Commonwealth* Part II, 276.

¹⁵⁰ U.S. Congress, Representatives, Committee, *Guam Commonwealth* Part II, 275

motivated manner, on the fundamental right to vote.”¹⁵¹ As a result, she argued, “such provisions were hopelessly flawed.”¹⁵² The foundations of Civil Rights within the United States held within the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were used to prevent the exercise of indigenous Chamorro rights on Guam. The legal structures that called for the equality of people living within the United States furthered the inequality for Chamorro people living within empire. Racial liberalism and multiculturalism ran counter to this expression of indigenous self-determination. In any iteration of the Guam Commonwealth Act or any iteration of Chamorro self-determination, Chamorro leaders would not be able to challenge the very colonial policies that were the basis of their discontents.

Despite the successful show of support for the act from the Guam delegation, the Commonwealth Act was sent back to the drawing board for revisions. The Commission on Self-Determination continued to work with the Congressional leaders and the Bush Administration Task Force on Guam to reconfigure the act and find compromises in 1990 through 1992.¹⁵³ Finding compromises, however, was difficult to do as the Commission on Self-Determination was adamant about keeping the provisions that mattered most to the people of Guam, including Chamorro self-determination and local control of immigration, and the Bush administration was operating through the lens of constitutionality. Even when Robert Underwood became the congressional representative for Guam in 1992, the Commission on Self-Determination could not get the Guam Commonwealth Act through Congress until 1997, when it received its final hearing.¹⁵⁴ By this point, support for Commonwealth waned. The Guam Commonwealth would never be realized, and the hopes for Chamorro self-determination were placed on hold.

¹⁵¹ U.S. Congress, Representatives, Committee, *Guam Commonwealth* Part II, 275.

¹⁵² U.S. Congress, Representatives, Committee, *Guam Commonwealth* Part II, 275.

¹⁵³ Ada, “The Quest for Commonwealth,” 175-180.

¹⁵⁴ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Resources, *Hearing on H.R. 100, H.R. 2370, And 210: Guam Commonwealth Act, to establish the Commonwealth of Guam, and for other Purposes, Guam Judicial Empowerment Act of 1997, and To amend the Organic Act of Guam*, 105th Cong., 1st Sess., (1997).

The Chamorro self-determination movement embodied by the strong support for the Guam Commonwealth Act of the 1980s and 1990s represents the contradictions and paradoxes of United States multiculturalism and racial liberalism when applied to the territories of the U.S. empire. Chamorro leaders attempted to revise a political relationship with the United States that would solve the problems that militarization introduced to the island, and reassert power and sovereignty by claiming indigenous identity, demanding more rights within United States empire, and fighting for self-determination on the international stage. Even with support from Filipino allies who understood the Chamorro struggles as related to their homeland's struggle for independence, the fight for indigenous Chamorro rights and self-determination came up against the multicultural narrative of the United States. The Filipino immigrants who made Guam home and the white statesiders who saw military and economic opportunity for an island with geographical significance in the middle of the Asia-Pacific region only reaffirmed Guam's place within the United States empire. Despite one hundred years of advocacy for more self-governance and self-determination, the Chamorro people remained discontent with United States empire in the Pacific.

Conclusion **Pacific Militarism**

“Guam may have to bear the burden of being a colony in a world suffering from decolonization fatigue, but—to be clear—her people mean to live.”

- Julian Aguon, *The Properties of Perpetual Light*, 2021¹

Although Guam sits at the far edge of the western Pacific, the stories of Chamorros and Filipinos in the twentieth century elucidate the complexities and contradictions of race, citizenship, and social relations that arise out of US military colonialism, settler colonialism, and imperialism. Three arguments are at the basis of this study, one of continuity in colonial governance via the U.S. military, and the other two about transformation of relations among Chamorros, Filipinos, and the U.S. military. The first argument is that U.S. militarism has driven U.S. colonialism on Guam throughout its existence as a territory of the United States. Since the island’s annexation in 1898, the U.S. military became the administrator and facilitator for the different iterations of imperial rule in Guam, from military colonialism in the Naval Era (1900-1941), to the settler militarism of the post-World War II years (1945-1960s), to the culmination of imperial regimes, most notably multiculturalism and racial liberalism, in the later decades of the twentieth century. The U.S.’s colonial governance of Guam was predicated on the needs of the United States military, including governing policies and regulations usually reserved for non-military affairs such as the applicability of federal immigration law, the creation of Guam’s territorial civilian government, and the possibility of self-determination in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. In Guam, U.S. colonialism was U.S. militarism.

While Guam’s colonial history is a militarized history of empire, it is also a history of indigenous and migrant discontent and resistance against the very institutions that sought to control

¹ Julian Aguon, *Properties of Perpetual Light*, (Mangilao: University of Guam Press, 2021), 32.

them. The second argument of this dissertation asserts that the Chamorro and Filipino community, in each of their own ways, navigated, negotiated, and resisted the contradictions of U.S. military empire in their petitions, legal cases, their protests and demonstrations, and even in their appearances at the United Nations. The Chamorro experience of colonialism in Guam influenced how Chamorro identity was articulated and rearticulated over time. The complexity of indigenous identity formation within U.S. empire was heavily influenced by the imperial and international politics that incentivized Chamorros to use language that resonated with colonial officials. While in the first decades of U.S. colonial rule Chamorro identity was articulated in opposition to their colonial siblings—the Filipinos—it also became about proximity to Americanness and whiteness, about connection to land, and about indigenous connections and relations to the island of Guam. For Filipino exiles and migrants to Guam, the legacies of United States military empire and neocolonialism in the Philippines shaped their routes of migration. Filipinos navigated through racialized labor regimes of the U.S. military, the convoluted nature of immigration and naturalization law, as well as dealing with the complexities of what it meant to be Filipino on Guam. Hailing from multiple regions across the Philippine archipelago, they had to reckon with identity formation in diaspora vis-à-vis an indigenous Chamorro population who were also seeking recognition within empire. Thus, they found themselves in uneasy positions as American immigrants within a settler colonized territory of the United States.

Lastly, this study argues that U.S. settler colonialism and militarism facilitated a shift in the social landscape of the island. Indigenous Chamorro relations rooted in kinship, belonging, and *inafa'maolek* became overshadowed by the U.S. emphasis on the concepts of race, nationality, and citizenship. While Filipinos who made their way to Guam before World War II integrated into Chamorro society, Filipinos of the postwar period viewed Guam as U.S. soil, a place where the American dream was a tangible possibility. The shift in the perception of the territory of Guam was

further solidified by how the U.S. governed the island through a combination of colonialism, militarism, racial liberalism, and multiculturalism. This colonial governance led to tensions in which Chamorros feared losing political and physical control of their home island and some Filipinos believed Chamorros were racist and discriminatory against Filipinos. The tensions embedded in the Chamorro-Filipino relationship in Guam reflect a central tension at the heart of U.S. settler colonialism; the fundamental conflict between indigenous rights and immigrant rights within the United States empire.

Each of the chapters in this dissertation has shown how U.S. colonialism via militarism in Guam shaped Chamorro-Filipino relations in different ways throughout the twentieth century. Under the auspices of the U.S. Naval Government, Guam operated as a stationary naval ship in which the President-appointed Naval Governor administered the island unilaterally and often at his own whims. Chapter one, “Colonial Siblings,” was about the unlikely and little told history of how the U.S. military in the Philippines exiled Filipino revolutionaries to Guam in the U.S.’s quest to pacify the Philippine Revolution. In Guam, these Filipino revolutionaries met and hobnobbed with a cosmopolitan Chamorro elite who leveraged the transition of imperial rule to advocate for themselves in the new colonial system. Although the archive does not divulge the conversations between the Filipinos revolutionaries and the Chamorro elites, this episode in Guam history highlights the intracolonial networks of elite colonial subjects within U.S. empire in which Filipinos and Chamorros saw each other as colonial siblings, and demonstrates the improvisational nature of imperial rule at the beginning of the United States presence in Guam.

Chapter two of this study historicized how Chamorros and Filipinos living on Guam found it necessary to navigate through U.S. Naval government policies that categorized them as racially ambiguous, colonized subjects often with rules and legislations that did not fit the racial make-up and social norms of the Chamorro people. Chamorros and Filipinos expressed their discontent and

advocated for themselves utilizing a combination of racial ideologies that reflect the long imperial transition from the Spanish mestizo system to the U.S. hierarchical and homogenous racial schema. As demonstrated by the 1926 Philippine petition to annex Guam and the legal battles over land fought by former Filipino revolutionaries and their Chamorro wives and children, Chamorro and Filipinos in Guam had to contend with the conflicting definitions of race and gender as well as the contradictions that arise when Chamorro notions of belonging, kinship, and family were overlaid with U.S. categories of belonging rooted in race and citizenship.

As the U.S. military strategy in the Pacific changed throughout the twentieth century, Guam's military importance increased. While Guam operated as a small coaling station for the US Naval Fleet for the first forty years under the American flag, Guam became the forward most military bastion for the US military in the Asia-Pacific region in the post-World War II era. As chapter three, "Natives and Aliens," shows, the U.S. projected power in the region by building military installations upon annexed indigenous Chamorro land and through the labor of Filipino migrant and immigrant workers. Both Chamorros and Filipinos became imbricated within the structure of settler militarism. Furthermore, in its quest to fortify the island, the U.S. military created the permanent demand for land and labor. But the case of Guam also demonstrates that settler militarism was not solely about armed forces taking territory from indigenous peoples through acts of violence, but through the replacement of indigenous institutions, social relations, and people with that of the colonial power. Military installations and bases, social relations based in citizenship and race, and settlers—whether they be white statesiders or immigrants from other parts of the globe—affected Chamorro access to land and culture. Settler militarism in Guam happened relatively quietly, masked by the ironic rhetoric of the military's mission to liberate colonized peoples, and promote and protect global democracy.

Moreover, despite the general move towards racial liberalism and multiculturalism in the federal administration of Guam in the Cold War Era, colonial policies such as the Guam Organic Act or U.S. immigration law still served to ensure U.S. military presence on Guam. As seen in chapter four, “Newly American,” the Guam Organic Act was a double-edged sword in which Chamorros finally attained the desired status of U.S. citizenship, but it came with the codifying of military land annexation. Chamorros voiced their discontent clearly, as demonstrated in the Case of Radio Barrigada, where they realized that U.S. citizenship did not protect their claims to land. Likewise, the U.S. immigration laws that were implemented on Guam in the 1950s and 60s allowed some Filipino migrant workers a pathway to citizenship, all in a concerted effort by the U.S. military and military contractors to ensure there was a stable labor force to continue to build and maintain the U.S. military installations on the island. Filipino inclusion into the United States through the territory of Guam was predicated on their ability to provide labor for the expansion of U.S. military dominance in the Pacific. The history of United States citizenship on Guam serves as a potent example of the tenuous contradictions for colonized peoples to be incorporated and belong to a nation-state, especially when they are situated in a unincorporated territory at the edges of empire.

Even as the U.S. military security clearance came to an end in 1962 and Guam opened to the rest of the world, Guam’s civilian economy was inextricably tied to both U.S. military spending and the image of the island as an American multicultural paradise destination for Asian tourism. In this period of the modern multicultural Guam explored in chapter five of this dissertation, “The Paradox of Paradise,” the island experienced an influx of immigrants, many from the Philippines and the continental U.S., which consequently sparked fears in Chamorro leaders who saw the rapid transformation as deleterious to Chamorro tradition, culture, and life. Yet, Filipino migrants and immigrants were also adapting to the legacies of U.S. militarism and colonialism in the Philippines, seeking ways to ensure economic stability and create a diasporic community beyond the Philippine

archipelago. Nevertheless, this rapid increase of outsiders on Guam led to cultural and ethnic tensions which played out in politics, fights in schools, and general animosity among civilians on island. Moreover, the U.S. military-maintained bases on the island so it could wage war in Southeast Asia through the 1970s and monitor China in the 1980s in the Cold War. Despite the façade of a multicultural, idyllic paradise, Guam was an island fortress for the U.S. to launch military operations as its civilian population was in the midst of a cultural and social crisis. The history of Guam in the 1960s and 1970s demonstrates how multiculturalism was not always beneficial for those living in empire.

U.S. colonialism, militarism, multiculturalism, and racial liberalism became the integrated and overlapping systems that stymied the Chamorro self-determination movement of the 1970s through the 1990s. As historicized in chapter six, “Commonwealth Now!,” Chamorro leaders and indigenous rights advocates led a movement to change the island’s colonial status of unincorporated territory. Drafted with input from villages throughout the island, the Commonwealth Act was seen by Chamorros as the closest possibility for a political status that fit how they believed the island should be governed. The Guam Commonwealth Movement and the activist group, the Organization of People for Indigenous Rights, laid the foundation for the rhetoric of Chamorro self-determination and shifted the conversation about U.S. colonialism in Guam from one of mere acquiescence to U.S. military presence on and federal oversight over the island to one of outright and vocal criticism of U.S. colonial rule. In their fight for Chamorro rights, Chamorro activists met opposition from white statesiders and some Filipinos who labeled them as racist and discriminatory because Chamorro rights seemed to contradict the multicultural narrative of the United States. Yet there were a few Filipinos who stood in solidarity with the Chamorro movement, believing in the mission for Chamorro people to determine the political destiny of the island. Despite the support from Guam, the Guam Commonwealth Movement ultimately failed at the hands of federal officials who claimed

that an exercise of Chamorro self-determination would not be possible because it would be in violation of the civil rights protected by the U.S. Constitution and that it could possibly hinder the U.S. military's presence in Guam. Guam's history is a history of U.S. empire.

As the Guam Commonwealth Act faltered at the hands of the Bush Administration Task Force on Guam in the early 1990s, Chamorro activists from *Nasion Chamoru* defiantly scaled the fence at Andersen Air Force Base in an act of anti-colonial resistance.² The armed military police arrested them, including Angel “Anghet” Leon Guerrero Santos, who would become the radical face of the Chamorro independence movement.³ When the military police charged them with trespassing on federal property, *Nasion Chamoru* argued that the U.S. military was trespassing on their ancestral lands. Anghet would serve a six-month sentence in a federal prison in California for physically attempting to reoccupy his land. Although the majority of the people of Guam perceived them as radicals who “jumped the fence,” *Nasion Chamoru* would redefine once again the conversation of the stakes of why Chamorro self-determination was fundamentally important to the island of Guam. Anghet wrote in a poem in 2000, “As I pen this poem, while I sit in prison, For you silence my voice, in the American tradition....Our lives are unbearable, it's hard to surmise, You take our human rights, and then compromise.”⁴ At the beginning of the twenty-first century, U.S. imperialism remained undefeated in the face of Chamorro resistance. Chamorro self-determination would not be realized. And Guam remains a colony of the United States.

² Video footage of this event can be found in Chris Barnett, “Old videos of late Angel Santos resurface, shed light on current events,” *kuamnews*. YouTube Video.

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³ Dominica Tolentino, “Angel Leon Guerrero Santos,” *Guampedia, Inc.* September 17, 2020. Accessed June 6, 2021.

⁴ “Two Poems Written By Angel Santos in Federal Prison,” *No Rest for the Awake – Minagahet Chamorro*, ed. Michael Lujan Bevacqua, published February 28, 2019, Accessed June 6, 2021, <http://minagahet.blogspot.com/2019/02/two-poems-written-by-angel-santos-in.html>

Epilogue:

Contemporary Filipino Solidarity with Chamorro Self-Determination

In my interview with Nerissa Bretania Underwood in 2019, I asked her what was the greatest accomplishment of OPI-R. She said that it was the remarkable outpouring of support that she witnessed at “The Fanohge March” on September 2, 2019. Over two thousand people gathered at Adelup Park in Guam to demonstrate in what is considered the largest march for indigenous Chamorro self-determination in recent memory. The Fanohge March—*fanohge* is Chamorro for “Stand-up”—was partly a response to a Ninth District Court case, *Davis v. Guam*. The plaintiff, Arnold “Dave” Davis was a white military veteran who believed that any native inhabitant requirement for Guam’s political status plebiscite was unconstitutional because it violated the Fifteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The quest for Chamorro self-determination continues to be stymied by the same issue of civil rights versus indigenous rights forty years after OPI-R brought these questions to the fore.

The Fanohge March of 2019, however, represented something unprecedented. First, the sheer number of people—estimated at 2,000 participants—who vocally supported Chamorro self-determination was astonishing. Secondly, the participants came from a diversity of communities, generations, and occupations, something that was imaginable in the 1980s, but seemingly improbable. On that bright and sunny day, Nerissa Underwood and Maria Teehan led “The Fanohge March” alongside Benjamin Cruz, Hope Cristobal, and Robert Underwood, who were all members of OPI-R. Nerissa smiled during our interview, “OPI-R had actually planted the seeds of knowledge, about how we have to follow through with fighting for justice so that Chamorros will exercise the right to self-determination.”⁵

⁵ Nerissa Underwood, Interview with the author, Guam, September 9, 2019.

Between the signs of support from Chamorus, community members, community organizations and advocacy groups, was a sign that read “Filipin@s for Chamoru Self-Determination.” It was hand-painted by Jamela Santos, a Filipina woman born and raised on Guam who has participated in several activist organizations who organize for Chamorro self-determination and against the increased militarization of the island. For Jamela and other Filipino women who participated—including myself—who are second and third generation Filipinos, we wanted to flip the narrative that Filipinos were a monolithic group that would naturally align ourselves to the immigration and multicultural ideology of the United States. Like the Filipina allies Nerissa Bretania Underwood and Maria Teehan, we understood that because we call this island home, we have an obligation to respect, support, and protect the Chamorro right to self-determination. Filipin@s for Chamoru Self-Determination—now we call ourselves Filipinos for Guåhan—seek to be the next generation in the genealogy of Filipino solidarity with indigenous Chamorro rights and Guam’s decolonization.

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