Ends of Solidarity: China, Tanzania, and Black Internationalism, 1960-1972

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Abstract

At the height of the Cold War, postcolonial state representatives and transnational activists struggled over the premises and boundaries of Afro-Asian unity. This dissertation traces the making and unmaking of 1960s Afro-Asianism along two arcs: on the one hand, the interface of Chinese officials with U.S. civil rights and Black Power activists, and on the other, the cultural and political engagements between Chinese and Tanzanian nationalists, diplomats, and civil society delegates. It presents these narratives side by side while attuned to their interstices, highlighting how Afro-Asian visions, in the years after the 1955 Bandung Conference, persisted in the continued interaction between ideas of Black internationalism and Asian socialism. But these Afro-Asian discourses tended to rely on the demarcation of other Third World formations of solidarity as the foil, and enduring debates over the role of Pan-Africanism and Black nationalism in relation to class struggle impeded this postcolonial expression of Afro-Asian solidarities.

This story is bookended by a series of events in the early 1960s, from Tanganyikan independence to the intensification of the Sino-Soviet Split, and by U.S.-China rapprochement and the assassination of Zanzibar's President Abeid Karume in 1972. In deconstructing the heterogeneities and contingencies of post-Bandung Afro-Asianism, this dissertation contributes to interdisciplinary scholarship on the Cold War, China and Africa, decolonization, Black internationalism, comparative race and ethnic studies, and twentieth-century formations of international society more broadly. It draws from national archives, personal collections, and political ephemera in China, the United States, the United Kingdom, mainland Tanzania, and Zanzibar. In addition to the Sino-Soviet Split, it considers seriously the 1960s conflict between China and India, as well as the fraught histories of Arab engagements in Sub-Saharan Africa, as fault lines with significant fall-out for the contours of coalition politics in the Third World. Its focus on the multi-faceted role of racial and ethnic politics in Afro-Asian constructs also offers insight into the

Third World entanglements of the local and global, lived experiences and interstate diplomacy, colonial legacies and the postcolonial imaginations of new world orders.

The possibilities of racial co-identifications facilitated and inhibited the potential of Afro-Asian unity. Chapters 1 and 3 examine how Chinese officials and propagandists foregrounded racial sensitivities in their appeals to African American activists, a strategy that proved relatively effective in light of Soviet and Cuban failures to demonstrate an equivalent appreciation of race and racism. But the advocates of Black Power who centered space, land, and power in their correlation of self-governance for minority nationalities in China with visions of Black nationalism saw their calls for self-determination become overwritten in Chinese narratives of U.S. civil rights activism. Chapters 2 and 4 focus on the negotiation of relations between Chinese representatives and African nationalists in mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar. Anti-Indian and anti-Arab sentiments in postcolonial Tanzania, widespread as a result of British colonial policies that granted economic and social privileges to these minorities, dovetailed with the Chinese campaign to denounce Indian revisionism and Indians as imperial collaborators in light of geopolitical contest between the two countries. Thus, in spite of a formal rhetoric of Afro-Asian unity, the development of China-Tanzanian relations relied on the vilification of India, on account of its alleged provocation of 1962 Sino-Indian Border War on the one hand, and the role of its East African diaspora in upholding and benefiting from the structures of colonialism on the other.

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me to rethink how different iterations of anticolonial and postcolonial solidarity, from early in the twentieth century up to contemporary times, departed from and overlapped with one another.

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Introduction

It was during the opening address to the Third Annual Meeting of the American Negro Academy in 1900 that W.E.B. Du Bois first ruminated on "the global color line," a concept which later become immortalized in the 1903 essay collection *Souls of Black Folk.* The question of race is not limited to the United States, Du Bois emphasized in the speech, for "the color line belts the world and [the] social problem of the twentieth century is to be the relation of the civilized world to the dark races of mankind." Neither is it limited to black-and-white, as the "continent [of Asia] deserves more than a passing notice from us for it is a congeries of race and color problems." After detailing the litany of racial issues in Asia—internal, like the Indian caste system, as well as external, like Western colonialism—Du Bois proceeded to name Japan's "admission to the ranks of modern civilized nations" as the "greatest concession to the color line which the nineteenth century has seen."[1]

On Du Bois's first visit to China in 1936, he unsuccessfully attempted to convince representatives of the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) that cooperation with Imperial Japan carried its own benefits. Du Bois's reflections from the journey evidenced his deep-seated frustrations that China, unwilling to see its primary enemy in the colonial West, instead marshalled its resources towards battling Japan. At a meeting with KMT officials in Shanghai, he sincerely inquired: "How far do you think Europe can dominate the world, or how far do you envisage a world whose spiritual center is Asia and the colored races?... Why is it that you hate Japan more than Europe when you have suffered more from England, France, and Germany than from Japan?"[2] Du Bois's position here serves as a powerful reminder of the fluidity and contingencies of Afro-Asian and Third World thought. By the time of his second visit to China in the spring of 1959, he valuated China as a model of self-reliance and development for the "dark races," in Du Bois's terms, to emulate. During a speech delivered at Peking University, broadly addressed to Africans

[1] W.E.B. Du Bois, "The Present Outlook for the Dark Races of Mankind," in Nahum Dimitri Chandler ed., *The Problem of the Color Line at the Turn of the Twentieth Century: The Essential Early Essays of W.E.B. Du Bois* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013): pp. 112-114.
[2] W.E.B. Du Bois, "China, June 1959," W. E. B. Du Bois Papers (MS 312), Special Collections and University Archives, University of Massachusetts (Amherst) Libraries.

and African Americans, he declared that "You know America and France and Britain to your sorrow. Now know the Soviet Union and its allied nations, but particularly know China. China is flesh of your flesh and blood of your blood. China is colored and knows to what a colored skin in this modern world subjects its owner."[3] By this moment, the 91-year-old Du Bois had advocated various, successive iterations of Afro-Asian internationalism before upholding the People's Republic of China (PRC) as a beacon for Pan-African liberation.

In this shift, Du Bois was not unique. His wife Shirley Graham Du Bois, an accomplished artist and well-known political activist in her own right, was an admirer of the Soviet Union who became involved with the Communist Party USA (CPUSA) in the 1940s. By the 1960s however, disillusioned with the Soviet line of "peaceful co-existence," which CPUSA embraced but she found insufficient, Graham Du Bois drew closer to China after W.E.B. Du Bois's passing. As her biographer Gerald Horne observes, her misgivings about Moscow were predicated on the legacies of global white supremacy and her distrust of "white allies."[4] Her private communications from this period highlighted profound disappointment with reports of racism in Eastern Europe, though she overlooked similar claims about China.[5] Through the 1960s and 1970s, Graham Du Bois defended China's political positions, especially on account of its support for national liberation movements in the Afro-Asian world, to African American activists more inclined towards the Soviet Union.[6] She died in Beijing in 1977 as a citizen of Tanzania,

[3] W.E.B. Du Bois, "China and Africa," *Peking Review*, March 3, 1959. For sketches of W.E.B. Du Bois's later visits to China, in 1959 and again in 1962, see Kenneth Ray Young and Dan Green, "Harbinger to Nixon: W.E.B. Du Bois in China," *Negro History Bulletin* 35 (1972): pp. 125-128; Yunxiang Gao, "W.E.B. and Shirley Graham Du Bois in Maoist China," *Du Bois Review: Social Science Research on Race* 10 (2013): pp. 59-85; and Keisha Brown, "Blackness in Exile: W.E.B. Du Bois's Role in the Formation of Representations of Blackness as Conceptualized by the Chinese Communist Party," *Phylon* 53 (2016): pp. 20-33.

[4] Gerald Horne, *Race Woman: The Lives of Shirley Graham Du Bois* (New York: New York University Press, 2000), pp. 223-226.

[5] Of these claims about anti-Black racism in Cold War China, the most notable was Ghanaian writer John Emmanuel Hevi's 1963 memoir *An African Student in China*, based upon an eighteen-month stay in Beijing as a student of Chinese language and politics. Hevi condemned Chinese practices of micro-managing, indoctrinating, and spying on foreign students, while also recalling experiences of interpersonal racism.

[6] Gerald Horne and Margaret Stevens, "Shirley Graham Du Bois: Portrait of the Black Woman Artist as a Revolutionary," in Dayo Gore, Jeanne Theoharis, and Komozi Woodard eds., *Want to Start a Revolution? Radical Women in the Black Freedom Struggle* (New York: New York University Press, 2009): p. 108.

where she relocated after the 1966 coup in Ghana that deposed Kwame Nkrumah.[7] In accord with the stature she attained within China, Graham Du Bois is interred at Babaoshan Revolutionary Cemetery (八宝山革命公墓) in Beijing, an honor reserved for Chinese military and national heroes. As lines of friction deepened within the socialist world through the 1960s, other African American activists who once looked to the Soviet Union and Cuba for inspiration or material support, like Graham Du Bois, began to turn to China. This included the ranks of Robert F. Williams, a civil rights leader from North Carolina who openly advocated armed self-defense as well as Harry Haywood, the original architect of the "Black Belt Thesis"—or the proposition that African Americans living in the U.S. South comprised a "nation within a nation," adopted as official policy by the Third Communist International, or Comintern, in Moscow in 1928.

Fig. 1 – Centennial celebration of W.E.B. Du Bois's birth held in Beijing on February 23, 1968 (from left to right: Shirley Graham Du Bois, R.D. Senanayake of the Afro-Asian Writers' Bureau, Foreign Minister of China Chen Yi, and Robert Williams)[8]

[7] After her departure from Ghana, Shirley Graham Du Bois split her time between Dar es Salaam and Cairo, where her son David Graham Du Bois worked as a journalist. See Gerald Horne, *Race Woman: The Lives of Shirley Graham Du Bois*, pp. 173-216.

[8] "Shirley Graham Du Bois, Rathe Deshapriya Senanayake, Chen Yi, and Robert F. Williams at Afro-Asian Writers' Bureau meeting," February 23, 1968, W. E. B. Du Bois Papers (MS 312), Special Collections and University Archives, University of Massachusetts (Amherst) Libraries.

The year 1928 also witnessed the publication of W.E.B. Du Bois's novel *Dark Princess: A Romance*. It recounts the love affair between Matthew Towns, a young African American man, and Kautilya, an Indian princess, both of whom become captivated by the prospect of global alliance among non-white societies.[9] Though relatively overlooked in comparison to Du Bois's better-known works, *Dark Princess* is of immense symbolic value in context of Afro-Asian ideas and movements of the twentieth century. Literary scholar Bill Mullen writes that it is "a central text in African American discursive engagement with the American, Asian, and international left in this century…it [is key] for understanding how resistance, particularly to Eurocentric discourses of race, led to the radical recasting of Afro-Asian relationships as central to twentieth-century world revolutionary struggle."[10] Beyond Mullen's interpretation that *Dark Princess* represented a transformative moment for Afro-Asian relations more broadly, the novel was prescient in bringing to light a persistent and significant point of contention within Afro-Asian constructs.

In Du Bois's telling, the romance between Towns and Kautilya figures as the physical consummation of Afro-Asian solidarity; both labor as part of a fictional, underground anti-imperialist organization, with Towns recruited by the princess after a chance encounter in Berlin. A diverse cast of political actors comprise this coalition: a Japanese man, an Egyptian couple, two Indian men, and "two Chinese, a young man and a young woman, he in a plain but becoming Chinese costume of heavy blue silk, she in a pretty dress, half Chinese, half European, in effect."[11] From the outset, the Chinese pair forms a contrast to the Japanese representative, a cunning and conniving sycophant. In the first meeting that Towns attends, a bitter disagreement breaks out among the delegates over the role of African Americans in a revolt of the "darker world." The Japanese man quickly casts doubt on the capacity of all

[9] In a 1940 autobiography, Du Bois called *Dark Princess* his "favorite book." In reckoning with the possibilities of global anti-imperialist solidarity in all its nuances and implications, the novel consummated, as well as precipitated, the political themes that defined Du Bois's work during and after the interwar period. See W.E.B. Du Bois, *Dusk of Dawn: An Essay Toward an Autobiography of a Race Concept* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1940): p. 270.
[10] Bill Mullen, "Du Bois, *Dark Princess*, and the Afro-Asian International," *positions: east asia cultures critique* 11 (2003): p. 218.
[11] W.E.B. Du Bois, *Dark Princess: A Romance* (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1995): p. 18.

African-descended people to participate equally in this coalition, proclaiming "It would be unfair…not to explain with some clarity and precision that the whole question of the Negro race…is for us not simply a question of suffering and compassion. Need we say that for these peoples we have every human sympathy? But for us here and for the larger company we represent, there is a deeper question—that of the ability, qualifications, and real possibilities of the black race in Africa or elsewhere."[12] A shaken Matthew Towns is left contending with the weight of the realization that the "darker world," in spite of its shared histories and promises of solidarity, contains its own fissure lines and deep-seated biases.

This newfound awareness of the part of Towns mirrored Du Bois's personal grappling with leadership and revolutionary identity within Asia and Africa, and by extension, the contours and debates of Afro-Asianism in the 1920s and 1930s. The gathering of the colonized world in *Dark Princess* is a fictionalized version of the real-life League Against Imperialism (LAI), founded in 1927 in Brussels as the first intercontinental organization to advocate for the end of European colonialism. Presaging the definitional disagreements about the interlocking roles of race, class, and imperialism that would come to hamper Afro-Asian formations of the 1960s, the LAI had encountered similar questions. German communist Willi Münzenberg, initiator of the LAI, imagined a politically inclusive Afro-Asian front against imperialism. Münzenberg however, faced unrelenting criticisms from the Comintern targeting his convictions about working with non-communists, which included the likes of Jawaharlal Nehru and Chiang Kai-Shek. The schism between communist and non-communist factions of the LAI curtailed its efficacy and hastened its disintegration, with Nehru withdrawing from the League in 1930.[13] In an early study of Afro-Asianism, journalist David Kimche wrote that the LAI was "the father of Afro-Asian

[12] W.E.B. Du Bois, *Dark Princess*, p. 21

[13] Michele Louro, *Comrades Against Imperialism: Nehru, India, and Interwar Internationalism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018): pp. 140-177. See also Vijay Prashad, *The Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World* (New York: The New Press, 2007): pp. 16-30; Fredrik Petersson, *Willi Münzenberg, the League against Imperialism, and the Comintern, 1925–1933* (Lewiston: Queenston Press, 2013); and Michele Louro, "'Where National Revolutionary Ends and Communist Begins': The League against Imperialism and the Meerut Conspiracy Case," *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 33 (2013): pp. 331–344. For a global history of the LAI, see Michele Louro, Carolien Stolte, Heather Streets-Salter, and Sana Tannoury-Karam eds., *The League Against Imperialism: Lives and Afterlives* (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2020).

solidarity, the forerunner of the [1955 Asian-African] Conference at Bandung."[14] Indeed, the LAI portended the enduring debates over race and class that would define the course of Afro-Asian ideas and movements in the years after Bandung. The Cold War story told in the following pages—reconstructing the 1960s arc of Afro-Asianism from the vantage points of China, Tanzania, and the transnational networks of U.S.-based civil rights and Black Power activism—more strongly resembles this interwar vision of a racialized "Afro-Asia" than contemporaneous conceptions of non-alignment, which tended to center geopolitical neutrality over racial or anti-imperial solidarities.

The networks of labor, study, and travel traversed by the historical actors in this study bring to light Third World entanglements of the local and global, lived experiences and interstate diplomacy, colonial legacies and the postcolonial imagination of new world orders. Its multilateral perspective illuminates the contingent and deeply contested landscape of Third Worldism in the 1960s. The premises and promises of China-Tanzanian relations not only paralleled, but also intersected with the Cold War relationship between China and the "long civil rights movement" in the United States, a temporal framing that traces the beginning of the Black freedom movement to "the liberal and radical milieu of the late 1930s" and the denouement to the fall of the New Left in the 1970s.[15] In a departure from Afro-Asian visions of the late 1940s and 1950s, which were dominated by Asian and Arab voices to the exclusion of those from sub-Saharan Africa, the symbols and stories of Black liberation circulated freely in later networks of Afro-Asianism. In the Chinese imagination of the 1960s, as in the narratives of many other Asian and African intellectuals and activists of the twentieth century, the campaign for U.S. racial justice and for African decolonization were interwoven struggles.[16] It was no coincidence that when Mao Zedong

[14] David Kimche, *The Afro-Asian Movement: Ideology and Foreign Policy of the Third World* (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1973): p. 5.
[15] This framing, articulated in concise terms by Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, challenges conventional narratives of the civil rights movement that begin with the *Brown v. Board of Education* decision in 1954 and end with the Black Power uprisings of the late 1960s. See Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, "The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses of the Past," *The Journal of American History* 91 (2005): 1233-1263; Nikhil Pal Singh, *Black is a Country: Race and the Unfinished Struggle for Democracy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005); and Glenda E. Gilmore, *Defying Dixie: The Radical Roots of Civil Rights, 1919-1950* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2008).
[16] For example, within the United States, see Penny Von Eschen, *Race against Empire: Black Americans and Anticolonialism, 1937-1957* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997); Mary Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Thomas Borstelmann, *The*

first issued his August 1963 "Statement Calling on the World's People to Unite in Opposition to the Racial Discrimination of U.S. Imperialism" in a private meeting, he recruited African diplomats living in Beijing as his core audience.[17]

Correspondingly, for many U.S.-based Black radical activists of the 1960s, the Chinese model of development in postcolonial Africa figured significantly into the attraction of Maoism. A 1965 issue of *Soulbook*, a journal affiliated with the Black nationalist organization Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM) in Northern California, included the essay "Africa, China, and the U.S." written by Senegalese anthropologist and Pan-Africanist Cheikh Anta Diop. It called for a united Third World to demonstrate solidarity with China, as Chinese military advancements served to safeguard world peace and the rise of China's political power would break the Western monopoly on the means of development. Tellingly, Diop's piece featured a photograph of Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere welcoming Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai to Dar es Salaam in June 1965.[18] The Black Panther Party also appraised Chinese projects in Tanzania as an egalitarian mode of Afro-Asian cooperation. In January 1969, the Black Panthers reported that construction had completed on the Chinese-funded Friendship Textile Mill in Dar es Salaam. The Panthers understood the mill as illustrative of the qualities that set China's economic assistance to Africa apart from Western practices. In their news service, they explained: "The Chinese actually getting their hands dirty demonstrates the basic difference between the Western and Eastern styles of giving foreign aid. When the Chinese come, they bring not only their engineers and technicians but [their] own plumbers, carpenters, cooks, drivers and laborers. When a Western company undertakes a project it only

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Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001); Brenda Gayle Plummer, *In Search of Power: African Americans in the Era of Decolonization, 1956–1974* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Carol Anderson, *Bourgeois Radicals: The NAACP and the Struggle for Colonial Liberation, 1941-1960* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014); and John Munro, *The Anticolonial Front: The African American Freedom Struggle and Global Decolonization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

[17] "毛主席接见非洲朋友发表支持美国黑人斗争的声明 [Chairman Mao Issues Statement Supporting the African American Struggle at Reception Receiving African Friends]," *Renmin ribao* [The People's Daily], August 9, 1963. White American journalist Sidney Rittenberg, who lived in China from 1944 to 1980, also gives a description of this particular event in his memoir. See Sidney Rittenberg and Amanda Bennett, *The Man Who Stayed Behind* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001): p. 269.

[18] Cheikh Anta Diop, "Africa, China, and the U.S.," *Soulbook* 3 (1965): pp. 156-157.

sends supervisory personnel."[19] As a result of Nyerere's stature as an icon of Pan-Africanism, his embrace of Maoist values, aesthetics, and developmental models helped catalyze a new generation of African American nationalists to incorporate Maoism into their philosophies in the late 1960s and early 1970s.[20] Even though aspects of Maoism proved appealing for a number of newly independent African countries and became part of a continental repertoire of development and liberation, Tanzania's unique positioning at the nexus of both Pan-African networks and broader Afro-Asian histories of migration and diaspora renders it an exceptional context for understanding Cold War Afro-Asianism.[21]

The United Republic of Tanzania, established from the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar in April 1964, presents a compelling site of study for several reasons: the staying power of China-Tanzanian relations as a function of long-term partnership between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP); the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU); its political value as a home base for African liberation movements in exile; and its colonial history as a multiracial society. After the 1966 coup that removed Kwame Nkrumah from power in Ghana, Tanzania emerged as the beacon of Pan-Africanism.[22] In Monique Bedasse's words, "Tanzania [as a newly independent state] embarked upon a path that boldly recalled black nationalist ideals of self-determination and self-reliance."[23] Its non-aligned foreign policy and willingness to host exiled anticolonial activists from throughout Southern Africa garnered the support

[19] "Peking Builds Largest Tanzania Textile Mill," *The Black Panther*, January 15, 1969.
[20] Robeson Taj Frazier, "The Congress of Afrikan People: Baraka, Brother Mao, and the Year of '74," *Souls: A Critical Journal of Black Politics, Culture, and Society* 8 (2006): p. 154.
[21] Other African leaders who brought Maoism into their philosophies of governance and development included Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana, Sékou Touré in Guinea, and Modibo Keita in Mali, and other African cities also served as nodal points in Third World imaginaries, the political stability of postcolonial Tanzania allowed Dar es Salaam to assume this role in the long term. For example, under Nkrumah, Ghana was positioned at the crossroads of Pan-Africanist and Afro-Asianism; as the Gold Coast, it sent a delegation to the 1955 Bandung Conference that "stole the show." But this moment drew to a close with Nkrumah's deposition in a 1966 coup, which occurred while he was on a peacemaking mission to Vietnam. See Gerard McCann, "Where was the Afro in Afro-Asian Solidarity? Africa's 'Bandung Moment' in 1950s Asia," *Journal of World History* 30 (2019): pp. 89-123.
[22] For Ghana's promotion of continental unity and Pan-Africanist liberation from the late 1950s and into the mid-1960s, see Kevin Gaines, *Black Expatriates and the Civil Rights Era: African Americans in Ghana* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006).
[23] Monique Bedasse, *Jah Kingdom: Rastafarians, Tanzania, and Pan-Africanism in the Age of Decolonization* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2017): p. 48.

of Pan-Africanists around the Diaspora; Trinidadian historian C.L.R. James considered Tanzania "the highest peak reached so far by revolting blacks."[24]

Tanzania is also home to a significant Indian community dating back to the nineteenth century, and in the case of Zanzibar, Arab and Comorian communities since pre-colonial times. In mainland Tanganyika, African nationalism arose in the 1950s and 1960s not solely in response to British colonialism per se, but also to Indian economic dominance long facilitated by colonial policies; British officers recruited Indian laborers for the work of construction and administration while encouraging Indian emigrants to invest in land and small-scale businesses to the exclusion of Africans.[25] Indians comprised a slim minority of the population in colonial Tanganyika and were concentrated in the urban cores, but by the eve of independence in December 1961, Indian merchants handled more than two-thirds of the overall trade volume in the entire country.[26] Consequently, Chinese officials who sought to push negative portrayals of India as China-Indian relations deteriorated in the 1960s, particularly in the aftermath the Sino-Indian Border War of 1962, found a receptive audience among African nationalists in postcolonial Tanzania.

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[24] C.L.R. James, as quoted in Monique Bedasse, *Jah Kingdom: Rastafarians, Tanzania, and Pan-Africanism in the Age of Decolonization*, p. 49

[25] See John Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979): pp. 264-268; Eric Burton, "'What Tribe Should We Call Him?' The Indian Diaspora, the State, and the Nation in Tanzania since 1850," *Stichproben: Wiener Zeitschrift für kritische Afrikastudien* 13 (2013): pp. 1-28; Laura Fair, "Drive-In Socialism: Debating Modernities and Development in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania," *The American Historical Review* 118 (2013): 1077-1104; Ronald Aminzade, *Race, Nation, and Citizenship in Postcolonial Africa: The Case of Tanzania* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Ned Bertz, *Diaspora and Nation in the Indian Ocean: Transnational Histories of Race and Urban Space in Tanzania* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2015); and Marie-Aude Fouéré, "Indians are Exploiters and Africans Idlers! The Production of Racial categories and Socioeconomic Issues in Tanzania," in Michel Adam ed., Indian Africa: Minorities of Indian-Pakistani Origin in Eastern Africa (Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota Publishers, 2015): pp. 359-396. For a comparative perspective on the Indian diaspora in Kenya, see Sana Aiyar, *Indians in Kenya: The Politics of Diaspora* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015). For older texts that offer a regional assessment, see Dharam Ghai ed., *Portrait of a Minority: Asians in East Africa* (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1965); Agehananda Bharati, *The Asians in East Africa: Jaihind and Uhuru* (Chicago: Nelson-Hall Co., 1972); and Robert Gregory, *Quest for Equality: Asian Politics in East Africa 1900–67* (Hyderabad and London: Orient Longman & Sangham, 1993).

[26] Chambi Chachage, ""A Capitalizing City: Dar Es Salaam and the Emergence of an African Entrepreneurial Elite, c. 1862-2015" (PhD diss., Harvard University, 2018): p. 25.

The islands of Zanzibar, long a cosmopolitan trading post of the Indian Ocean World, once served as the capital for the Arab-dominated East African Slave Trade.[27] Its population is multi-racial and predominantly Muslim. From 1698 until the establishment of the British Protectorate in 1890, it was governed first as part of the Omani Empire and later as an Islamic state under the Sultan of Zanzibar. Though African migrants accounted for the demographic majority, the Arab minority—who enjoyed continued privileges during British rule, including greater access to education and civil service employment—retained political and economic preeminence up until the January 1964 Zanzibar Revolution, in which African youths violently deposed the Sultan who had presided over the new postcolonial government for only six weeks. Parallel to the process by which the Indian minority in the mainland became popularly disparaged as "exploiters," African nationalists in revolutionary Zanzibar nominally collapsed race and class in their designation of the Arab elite as the "oppressor class," laying claim to a Pan-African vision for Zanzibar's future that excluded Arabs from participation.[28] In both contexts, the development of relations with China unfolded against the backdrop of fierce debates over cosmopolitanism, citizenship, and representation. The 1960s call to Afro-Asian solidarities did not constitute so much an all-encompassing ideal as a constellation of visions underpinned by diverse histories of race and colonialism.

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If "Afro-Asianism" is defined as the multiplicity of beliefs or visions that the pasts, presents, and futures of Asia and Africa are entwined, then it did not begin nor end with the 1955 Asian-African Conference held in Bandung, Indonesia.[29] The Bandung Conference commands an outsized significance

[27] For this earlier history of slavery, abolition, and Zanzibar as a central part of the Omani Empire and the broader Indian Ocean World, see John Middleton and Jane Campbell, *Zanzibar: Its Society and Its Politics* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965); A.H.J. Prins, *East Africa Central Part XII: The Swahili-Speaking Peoples of Zanzibar and the East African Coast* (London: International African Institute, 1967); Norman Bennett, *A History of the Arab State of Zanzibar* (Cambridge: Methuen and Co., 1978); Frederick Cooper, *From Slaves to Squatters: Plantation Labor and Agriculture in Zanzibar and Coastal Kenya, 1890-1925* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980); and Abdul Sheriff and Ed Ferguson eds., *Zanzibar Under Colonial Rule* (London: James Currey, 1991).

[28] Jonathon Glassman, "Creole Nationalists and The Search for Nativist Authenticity in Twentieth-Century Zanzibar: The Limits of Cosmopolitanism," *Journal of African History* 55 (2014): pp. 229-247.

[29] If the Bandung Conference marked any sort of a breaking point, it would be, as Michele Louro argues vis-à-vis Nehru's political and intellectual evolution, the foreclosure of other kinds of anti-imperialist internationalism in

in national and popular memories of Afro-Asian collaboration and interchange. But as Rachel Leow writes, a singular focus on Bandung as the launching point of Third World agency is but a misleading "fantasy… formed out of easy metonymy: Bandung the place, Bandung the spirit, Bandung the moment, Bandung the history."[30] Contrary to popular memories, Afro-Asianism comprised, far more than one event, a wide range of convictions born of disparate intellectual genealogies and often formulated in competition with one other. The concept of "Afro-Asia" is also different from that of the "Third World," a term referring to a tricontinental postcolonial solidarity that includes, or even emanates from, the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, the majority of which attained independence in the nineteenth century and perceived their greatest threat to territorial or economic sovereignty as the United States rather than Europe. Another phrase often used today interchangeably with the "Third World" is the "Global South," but the latter denotes the geographic space of Asia, Africa, and Latin America without the political implications of the Third World as a "project," to borrow from the theoretical groundwork laid out by Vijay Prashad in his book *The Darker Nations*.[31] Further, although the idea of "non-alignment" is sometimes confused with Afro-Asianism or mistakenly attributed to the Bandung Conference, it refers to an entirely separate tradition of postwar internationalism that promoted Cold War neutrality over any racialized formation of postcolonial solidarity. Because non-alignment, a term first used by Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in 1949, was neither geographically nor racially conceived, it conferred membership to Yugoslavia, site of the 1961 Belgrade Conference that established the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Yugoslav President Josef Tito had actually been, alongside Nehru and Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, a key architect of the NAM.

By the 1960s, the NAM had emerged as a rival to Afro-Asianism for support and influence in the Global South. The NAM, which did not involve the participation of postcolonial countries like China and

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favor of interstatist collaboration and networking. See Michele Louro, *Comrades Against Imperialism: Nehru, India, and Interwar Internationalism*, p. 270

[30] Rachel Leow, "Asian Lessons in the Cold War Classroom: Trade Union Networks and the Multidirectional Pedagogies of the Cold War in Asia," *Journal of Social History* 53 (2019): pp. 429-453.

[31] For Prashad's conception of the Third World "project," see Vijay Prashad, *The Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World*, p. xv

Pakistan that were technically "aligned," departed from Afro-Asianism with its stances on revolution and armed struggle.[32] Most significantly, Chinese efforts to develop its own nuclear weaponry, in spite of the 1963 Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, proved divisive.[33] Whereas the NAM pushed for disarmament and the prohibition of nuclear development, the Afro-Asian camp, using explicitly racialized language, celebrated China's successful atomic testing as "the first Afro-Asian bomb" and an anti-imperialist victory.[34] As one example, Claudia Jones, a Black feminist activist from Trinidad and a leader within CPUSA until her deportation to the United Kingdom in 1955, endorsed China's detonation of the bomb as a major step forward for the global struggle against white supremacy.[35] Especially as conflict between China and India intensified through the 1960s, China sought dominance of Afro-Asian organizations, especially the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO), headquartered in Cairo, while India devoted its energies to the NAM.

The Bandung Conference itself suffered from the failure of its representatives to reach a common understanding of imperialism in spite of their universal opposition to it. During the proceedings of the conference, Sir John Kotelawala, the Prime Minister of Ceylon, sought for the Soviet domination of Eastern European countries to be categorized as an imperialist project, to the chagrin of delegates whose definitions of anti-imperialism were entangled with aspirations to socialism.[36] Beyond the place of class analyses in Afro-Asian constructs, disagreements about the role of race heightened in the 1960s. Chinese efforts to cohere a second Afro-Asian Conference in June 1965 in Algiers, which would have restricted

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[32] For an analysis of Indian non-alignment as a move away from the "racialized legacy" of the Bandung Conference, see Itty Abraham, "From Bandung to NAM: Non-alignment and Indian Foreign Policy, 1947–65," *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 46 (2008): pp. 195-219. For an earlier take on the cleavages between Afro-Asianism and the NAM, see G.H. Jansen, *Non-Alignment and the Afro-Asian States* (New York: Praeger, 1966).
[33] Lorenz Lüthi, "Non-Alignment, 1946–1965: Its Establishment and Struggle against Afro-Asianism," *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development* 7 (2016): pp. 201-223.
[34] Lorenz Lüthi, "The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War, 1961-1973," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 18 (2016): p. 125.
[35] "Claudia Jones Statement," *Daily Report, Foreign Radio Broadcasts, Issues 205-206*, Central Intelligence Agency, October 19, 1964.
[36] Dipesh Chakrabarty, "The Legacies of Bandung: Decolonization and the Politics of Culture," in Christopher Lee ed., *Making a World After Empire: The Bandung Moment and its Political Afterlives* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2010): pp. 47-53. For Sir John's role in the Bandung Conference, see Luwam Dirar, "Rethinking the Concept of Colonialism in Bandung and its African Union Aftermath," in Luis Eslava, Michael Fakhri, and Vesuki Nesiah eds., *Bandung, Global History, and International Law* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017): pp. 355-366.

attendance—and by extension, membership in the Third World—along racial lines, collapsed in the aftermath of a military coup that deposed Algerian President Ahmed Ben Bella. The struggle over the fortunes of "Bandung II" further attested that the Cold War contest for the postcolonial world was, at its core, also about the utility of race as the overarching logic for international organization.[37] This was a debate reminiscent of that between different schools of anticolonial nationalist and Soviet-inspired socialist thought during the interwar period.

In the 1920s and 1930s, Asian and African communists pushed for an expansive understanding of interlocking global systems of oppression, in and beyond the Comintern. The New York-based African Blood Brotherhood (ABB) advocated for a formulation of exploitation along the vectors of both race and class, in which Asian and African liberation were essential components to the international socialist movement. The theoretical space for this debate within the Comintern had been first opened up by Asian radicals, such as Japanese American communist Sen Katayama and Indian revolutionary M.N. Roy, who challenged the traditional Marxist-Leninist belief that European industrial workers were the vanguard of the world socialist revolution.[38] African American communists in the vein of Cyril Briggs and Hubert Harrison advanced a vision of Black self-determination and African liberation posited against white supremacy and capitalism, articulating a rigorous conception of global anti-imperialism that countered the enthusiasm other Black activists, including many from Marcus Garvey's United Negro Improvement Association, shared for Japan after its victory in the Russo-Japanese War and campaign at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference to append a "Racial Equality Clause" to the Treaty of Versailles.[39] As in the interwar

[37] Eric Gettig, "'Trouble Ahead in Afro-Asia': The United States, the Second Bandung Conference, and the Struggle for the Third World, 1964-1965," *Diplomatic History* 39 (2015): p. 128.
[38] Minkah Makalani, "Internationalizing the Third International: The African Blood Brotherhood, Asian Radicals, and Race, 1919-1922," *Journal of African American History* 96 (2011): pp. 151-178.
[39] Yuichiro Onishi, "The New Negro of the Pacific: How African Americans Forged Cross-Racial Solidarity with Japan, 1917-1922," *Journal of African American History* 92 (2007): pp. 191-203. For other aspects of the relationship between African Americans and Japan in the early twentieth century, see Reginald Kearney, *African American Views of the Japanese: Solidarity or Sedition?* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998); Marc Gallicchio, *The African American Encounter with Japan and China: Black Internationalism in Asia, 1895-1945* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003); Keisha Blain, "'For the Rights of Dark People in Every Part of the World': Pearl Sherrod, Black Internationalist Feminism, and Afro-Asian Politics during the 1930s," *Souls: A Critical Journal of Black Politics, Culture, and Society* 17 (2015): pp. 90-112; and Gerald Horne, *Facing*

years, the political imaginaries of Pan-Africanism, Afro-Asianism, and socialist internationalism at the height of the Cold War were interdependent, and at times, synergetic.

This study charts the heterogeneity of and contingencies within Afro-Asian formations of the 1960s, uncovering how the possibilities of racial co-identifications unlocked and inhibited the potential of Afro-Asian unity. Chinese officials, representatives, and propagandists foregrounded racial sensitivities in their appeals to African American activists. This strategy, in light of Soviet and Cuban failures to demonstrate an equivalent appreciation of race and racism, proved somewhat effective, as Black Power activists from the Revolutionary Action Movement to the Black Panther Party seized on perceived Chinese support for militant revolution and cultural nationalism. This interchange occurred in spite of Chinese efforts to relate their rhetoric of race back to advocacy of class struggle as the tried-and-true path to liberation—in a sense, a "contradiction" as outlined in theoretical Maoism. At the same time, racial debates rooted in the legacies of imperial racism shaped the development of China-Tanzania relations in the 1960s. Chinese and Tanzanian diplomats and cultural representatives often disagreed about the primacy of race or class in dictating the roadmap of anti-imperial transnationalism, but found themselves largely in alignment about Indian collusion with Western colonial and neo-colonial interests. A focus on the comparative racializations of China and India as correlative processes in postcolonial Tanzania highlights the centrality of race and racial nationalism to Tanzanian, and broader East African, narratives of decolonization, development, and the Cold War in the mid-twentieth century.

The story told in the following pages is structured along two arcs: on the one hand, the interface of Chinese officials and propaganda workers with U.S. civil rights and Black Power activists, and on the other, the mutual engagements of Chinese leadership and Tanzanian nationalists, diplomats, and cultural delegates. It is bookended by a series of events in the early 1960s, from the deepening of the Sino-Soviet Split to Tanganyikan independence, and then by U.S.-China rapprochement as well as the assassination of Zanzibar's President Abeid Karume in 1972. Presenting these two narratives alongside each other while

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the Rising Sun: African Americans, Japan, and the Rise of Afro-Asian Solidarity (New York: New York University Press, 2018).

attuned to their interstices highlights how Afro-Asianism, in one of its most significant twentieth-century iterations, derived from the interface of Maoism with ideas of Black nationalism and Pan-Africanism.

The year 1964, employed as a chapter break here, marked a crucial turning point in this genealogy of post-Bandung Afro-Asian formations. Zhou Enlai undertook a ten-country tour of Africa from December 1963 until February 1964. In January 1964, *Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung*, colloquially known as the Little Red Book, was published for the first time; it would be translated into thirty-six languages and sold in many more countries.[40] In October 1964, Chinese officials announced the successful detonation of the atomic bomb. From exile in Havana, Robert Williams heralded the occasion on the basis of Afro-Asian racial confraternity, declaring that "China's dehumanization of the past, like the Negro's today, was based on a system of exploitation master-minded by the same racist savages… [China's bomb is] the Afro-American's bomb, because the Chinese people are blood brothers to the Afro-American and all those who fight against racism and imperialism."[41] As Williams' response makes clear, the Afro-Asian project of the 1960s was steeped in the politics and histories of race: an active, multilateral remaking of the legacies of colonialism, slavery, and racial domination. Chinese, Tanzanian, and African American politicians and activists disputed the role of Black nationalism and Pan-Africanism in relation to class struggle, even as China's outreach to Africa and its Diaspora was predicated on its projections as a non-white and postcolonial power. The appeal of Chinese socialism was heightened by the perceived shortcomings of other Third World formations on the issue of racial nationalism. For many of the African American activists who arrived in Havana in the 1960s, the Cuban state failed to demonstrate adequate support for the politics of Black nationalism on its own terms.[42] Chinese analyses of race were thus rarely

[40] Alexander Cook, "Preface," in Alexander Cook ed., *Mao's Little Red Book: A Global History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014): p. xiii.
[41] Robert Williams, "Hallelujah: The Meek Shall Inherit the Earth," *The Crusader* (October 1964): p. 9.
[42] For overviews of these fraught encounters between African American activists and post-revolutionary Cuba in the 1960s, see Ruth Reitan, *The Rise and Decline of An Alliance: Cuba and African-American Leaders in the 1960s* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1999); Ruth Reitan, "Cuba, the Black Panther Party, and the U.S. Black Movement in the 1960s: Issues of Security," *New Political Science* 21 (1999): pp. 217-230; and Jessie La France Dunbar, "Where Diaspora Meets Disillusionment: Panther Politics in Castro's Cuba," *Interdisciplinary Literary Studies* 19 (2017): pp. 299-319.

received in a vacuum; they stood out in contrast to the shortcomings of other Third World or socialist countries in this regard.

It is widely acknowledged that the Sino-Soviet Split engendered deep frictions within the postcolonial world, but less discussed has been the conflict between China and India, or the fraught histories of Arabs in Sub-Saharan Africa, as fault lines with considerable fall-out for solidarity movements oriented around Afro-Asianism and Third Worldism.[43] With regards to Afro-Arab relations and its bearing on Third World formations more generally, the contentious planning process for the Second Afro-Asian Conference—in which Algerian officials struggled to locate compromises between India and China on the issue of Soviet representation—offers a starting point.[44] Algerian leaders expressed disappointment with Chinese insistence on a racial premise for the Afro-Asian project, pushing instead for a broad-based Third Worldism that included countries like Yugoslavia and Finland. This turn away from racial politics on the part of Gamal Abdel Nasser and Ahmed Ben Bella derived in part from the precarious stakes of Arab diplomacy in Sub-Saharan Africa, where the history of the Arab slave trade instilled deeply ingrained anti-Arab sentiments.[45] That this was the socio-political context in which CCP leaders crystallized their relations with the ruling party of Zanzibar, the African nationalist Afro-Shirazi

[43] Reverberations of the Sino-Indian conflict in the postcolonial world is briefly addressed in John Garver, *Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001): pp. 110-137. See also Dike Nworah, "Nationalism Versus Coexistence: Neo-African Attitudes to Classical Neutralism," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 15 (1977): p. 213-237 and David Kimche, *The Afro-Asian Movement: Ideology and Foreign Policy of the Third World*, p. 246. Both Nworah and Kimche allude to the Chinese position on the Sino-Indian Border War receiving more popular reception than the Indian line in postcolonial Africa. On the Sino-Soviet Split and its global implications, see Gordon H. Chang, *Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991); Odd Arne Westad, *Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998); Lorenz M. Lüthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008); Sergey Radchenko, *Two Suns in the Heavens: The Sino-Soviet Struggle for Supremacy, 1962-1967* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009); Austin Jersild, *The Sino-Soviet Alliance: An International History* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014); Jeremy Friedman, *Shadow Cold War: The Sino-Soviet Competition for the Third World* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015).

[44] Jeffrey James Byrne, *Mecca of Revolution: Algeria, Decolonization, and the Third World Order* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016): pp. 260-261.

[45] Jeffrey James Byrne, *Mecca of Revolution: Algeria, Decolonization, and the Third World Order*, p. 267. Jonathon Glassman also argues that the legacies of the Arab Slave Trade served to reinforce longstanding notions of descent and civilizational difference in the region, all of which ultimately became entangled with Western racial discourses and ideas in the nineteenth century. See Jonathon Glassman, "Ethnicity and Race in African Thought," in Nwando Achebe, Charles Ambler, William Worger eds., *A Companion to African History* (Hoboken and West Sussex: Wiley Blackwell, 2019): pp. 214-216.

Party (ASP)—in the aftermath of anti-Arab violence that dominated on the islands after the January 1964 Zanzibar Revolution—allows for insight into the multi-faceted role of racial and ethnic politics in Cold War Afro-Asianism. At the scale of civil societies, local and regional prejudices often collided with geopolitical and ideological contest.

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This study is situated at the intersection of several distinct but interrelated sets of scholarships: on the Global Cold War, Black internationalism, China and Africa, and twentieth-century formations of Afro-Asianism and international society more broadly. In 2003, the interdisciplinary journal *positions* released the special issue "The Afro-Asian Century," the title of which references W.E.B. Du Bois's observations about the Afro-Asian world from his 1900 speech to the American Negro Academy. In their introduction, editors Andrew Jones and Nikhil Pal Singh intimate that an understanding of the past and present of Afro-Asian connections is critical to "sketching a 'new cartography of possibilities' that can break out of the enclosures of neocolonial color lines and the insularity of ethno-nationalist identity politics."[46] The chapters that follow build on this growing literature from recent years centering the construction of postwar Afro-Asian networks before, during, and after the Bandung Conference.[47] A 2019

[46] Andrew F. Jones and Nikhil Pal Singh, "Guest Editors' Introduction," *positions: east asia cultures critique* 11 (Special Issue, 2003): p. 3.

[47] Bill Mullen, *Afro-Orientalism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004); Matthew Jones, "A 'Segregated' Asia?: Race, the Bandung Conference, and Pan-Asianist Fears in American Thought and Policy, 1954-55," *Diplomatic History* 29 (2005): pp. 841–868; Jason Parker, "Cold War II: The Eisenhower Administration, the Bandung Conference, and the Re-periodization of the Postwar Era," *Diplomatic History* 30 (2006): pp. 867–892; Heike Raphael Hernandez, Shannon Steen, Gary Okihiro, and Vijay Prashad eds., *AfroAsian Encounters: Culture, History, Politics* (New York: New York University Press, 2006); Kristine Dennehy, "Overcoming Colonialism at Bandung, 1955," in Sven Saaler and J. Victor Koschmann eds., *Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Colonialism, Regionalism, and Borders* (New York: Routledge, 2007): pp. 213-225; Amitav Archarya and Seng Tan eds., *Bandung Revisited: The Legacy of the 1955 Asian-African Conference for International Order* (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2008); Derek MacDougall and Antonia Finnance eds., *Bandung 1955: Little Histories* (Melbourne: Monash University Publishing, 2010); Afro-Asian Networks Research Collective, "Manifesto: Networks of Decolonization in Asia and Africa," *Radical History Review* 131 (2018): pp. 176-182; Hong Liu and Taomo Zhou, "Bandung Humanism and a New Understanding of the Global South: An Introduction," *Critical Asian Studies* 51 (2019): pp. 141-143. More recently, a 2018 special issue of *Scholar and Feminist Online* edited by Vanita Reddy and Anantha Sudhankar, on the subject of "Feminist and Queer Afro-Asian Formations," has called for the centering of feminist and queer perspectives in Afro-Asianism. For early analyses of the Bandung Conference, see Richard Wright, *The Color Curtain: A Report on the Bandung Conference* (Jackson: University of Mississippi Press, 1994); Frank London Brown, *Trumbull Park* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 2005); and Eslanda Robeson, "Before and After Bandung," *New World Review* 23 (July 1955): pp. 26-29.

special issue of the *Journal of World History*, edited by Carolien Stolte and Su Lin Lewis, examines "Other Bandungs," with reference to the transnational convenings of the 1950s and 1960s that gathered representatives beyond heads-of-state, frequently of different degrees of affiliation with postcolonial states.[48] This vantage point, as Stolte and Lewis write, "uncovers a 'lived' Afro-Asianism with deep local roots [and reveals] the contours of a broader Afro-Asian movement: connections that supplemented, amplified, traversed, or even countered, the diplomatic maneuvers of Bandung."[49] In keeping with this approach to cataloguing Afro-Asian histories, which emphasizes both precision and multiplicity as to extrapolate about the general arc and features of mid-century Afro-Asian thought, this study emphasizes the "deep local roots" of Afro-Asianism in a moment that is traditionally associated with the denouement of the Afro-Asian project.

That racial and ethnic politics were central to animating Afro-Asian ideas and movements of the 1960s is an aspect sometimes elided in scholarship on China-Africa relations.[50] In the conclusion to the 2010 volume *Making a World After Empire*, Antoinette Burton suggests that "urgently needed is an interpretative framework [of Afro-Asia] that enables us to understand how and why [it] is coded through racial confraternity," as "the question of where legacies of imperial racism end and new racialized politics begun remains [an open one] with critical significance for the histories of transregional [and]

[48] For Pan-Asian organization in the prelude to Bandung, see Cindy Ewing, "The Colombo Powers: Crafting Diplomacy in the Third World and Launching Afro-Asia at Bandung," *Cold War History* 19 (2019): pp. 1-19. See also Elisabeth Armstrong, "Before Bandung: The Anti-imperialist Women's Movement in Asia and the Women's International Democratic Federation," *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 41 (2016): pp. 305-331.
[49] Su Lin Lewis and Carolien Stolte, "Other Bandungs: Afro-Asian Internationalisms in the Early Cold War," *Journal of World History* 30 (Special Issue, June 2019): pp. 5-7.
[50] Recent surveys of China-African relations or China-Tanzanian relations, though diverse in their methods and conclusions, have generally abstained from using race and racialization as a primary or overarching framework in their analyses. See, for example, Bruce D. Larkin, *China and Africa: 1949-1970: The Foreign Policy of the People's Republic of China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971); Alaba Ogunsanwo, *China's Policy in Africa 1958-1971* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974); George Yu, *China's African Policy: A Study of Tanzania* (New York: Praeger, 1975); Philip Snow, *The Star Raft: China's Encounter with Africa* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989); Deborah Brautigham, *The Dragon's Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Alicia Altorfer-Ong, "Old Comrades and New Brothers: A Historical Re-Examination of the Sino-Zanzibari and Sino-Tanzanian Bilateral Relationships in the 1960s" (PhD diss., London School of Economics and Political Science, 2014); and Chris Alden and Daniel Large, *New Directions in Africa-China Studies* (New York: Routledge, 2018).

transnational community formations."[51] In this vein, the second and fourth chapters seek to understand the granular-level constitution of China-Tanzanian relations through the lens of racial exclusions and co-identifications, specifically with an emphasis on comparative Chinese, Arab, and Indian racializations in Tanganyika, Zanzibar, and the post-Union United Republic of Tanzania. The development of China-Tanzanian relations reflects the enduring salience of racial hierarchies and cleavages inherited from colonialism, remade in the postcolonial era.

That the Bandung Conference did not involve the participation of representatives from most of Africa contributes to the eclipse of African perspectives from many studies of Afro-Asianism. Only three Sub-Saharan African nations or territories sent any delegates to Bandung: Liberia, Ethiopia, and the Gold Coast (Ghana). Eschewing the comparative overemphasis on Asian agency in Afro-Asian networks, Gerard McCann argues that "the complex tangle of Afro-Asian and world socialist networks nourished rather than imperiled (pan)African liberation projects… [African activists] swerved the tutelary paternalism of their Asian collaborators to breathe in an atmosphere of experimentation and institutional creativity."[52] In postcolonial Tanzania, the political imaginary of Afro-Asianism overlapped significantly with that of Pan-Africanism and African socialism. After all, when Nyerere first introduced the concept of "ujamaa," the Swahili word for "familyhood" and blueprint for his vision of African socialism, in 1962, he also harbored ambitions for an "East African Federation" comprised of Tanganyika, Uganda, Kenya, and Zanzibar.[53] Moreover, many African nationalists who advocated most vigorously for Afro-Asian

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[51] Antoinette Burton, "The Sodalities of Bandung: Toward a Critical 21st-Century History," in Christopher Lee ed., *Making a World after Empire: The Bandung Moment and its Political Afterlives* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2010): pp. 356-357.

[52] Gerard McCann, "Where was the Afro in Afro-Asian Solidarity? Africa's 'Bandung Moment' in 1950s Asia," p. 93. See also Frank Gerits, "When the Bull Elephants Fight: Kwame Nkrumah, Non-Alignment, and Pan-Africanism as an Interventionist Ideology in the Global Cold War (1957-66)," *The International History Review* 37 (2015): pp. 951-69 and Robert Vitalis, "The Midnight Ride of Kwame Nkrumah and Other Fables of Bandung (Ban-doong)," *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development* 4 (2013): pp. 261-288.

[53] Priya Lal, *African Socialism in Postcolonial Tanzania: Between the Village and the World* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015): pp. 37-39. For overviews of Tanzanian ujamaa, as ideology and practice, see Paul Bjerk, *Building a Peaceful Nation: Julius Nyerere and the Establishment of Sovereignty in Tanzania, 1960-1964* (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2015); Lionel Cliffe and John Saul eds., *Socialism in Tanzania: An Interdisciplinary Reader, Volumes I & II* (Nairobi: East Africa Publishing House, 1972); Jeanette Hartmann ed., *Rethinking the Arusha Declaration* (Copenhagen: Center for Development Research, 1991); G. Andrew Maguire, *Toward Uhuru in Tanzania: The Politics of Participation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969); Leander

solidarities were often socialists who privileged neither race nor class in explicit terms, believing African liberation and socio-economic egalitarianism to be entwined.

Afro-Asianism profoundly shaped the course of the Cold War.[54] Race and racism were very much present in the 1960s geopolitical struggle for influence in Dar es Salaam, a bitter contest in which East Germany and China figured as the principal actors.[55] George Roberts has employed the example of a pamphlet that circulated in Tanzania in 1969 titled "China and the Devil Slaves," likely sourced to East Germany and unyielding in its charges of anti-Black racism in China dating to premodern times, as a window into "the black literature which fueled intrigue and apprehension in Dar es Salaam at the height of the Cold War."[56] Its language, Roberts writes, indicates the powerful appeal of China as a non-white and anti-imperialist power in early postcolonial Tanzania. Regardless of the authorship, the fact "that the Eastern Bloc felt the need to challenge [this connection] head-on [only] demonstrates the strength of such Afro-Asian ties."[57] Similarly, race was omnipresent at the level of grassroots encounters. In *Africa's*

Schneider, "Developmentalism and its Failings: Why Rural Development Went Wrong in 1960s and 1970s Tanzania" (PhD diss., Columbia University, 2003); Issa G. Shivji, *Class Struggles in Tanzania* (London: Heinemann, 1976); and William Tordoff and Ali Mazrui, "The Left and the Super-Left in Tanzania," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 10 (1972): pp. 427-445.

[54] See Matthew Connelly, "Rethinking the Cold War and Decolonization: The Grand Strategy of the Algerian War for Independence," *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 33 (2001): pp. 221-245; Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press: 2001); Jeremy Suri, *Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003); Elizabeth Schmidt, *Cold War and Decolonization in Guinea, 1946-1958* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2007); Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Makings of Our Times* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Jeffrey Ahlman, "Road to Ghana: Nkrumah, Southern Africa, and the Eclipse of a Decolonizing Africa," *Kronos* 37 (2011): pp. 23-40; Samantha Christiansen and Zachary Scarlett eds., *The Third World in the Global 1960s* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012); and Gregg Brazinsky, *Winning the Third World: Sino-American Rivalry During the Cold War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2017).

[55] On relations between East Germany and Tanzania, see Gareth Winrow, *The Foreign Policy of the GDR in Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Quinn Slobodian ed., *Comrades of Color: East Germany in the Cold War World* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2015); Young-Sun Park, *Cold War Germany, The Third World, and the Global Humanitarian Regime* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015): pp. 287-316; Marcia Schenck, "Socialist Solidarities and Their Afterlives: Histories and Memories of Angolan and Mozambican Migrants in the German Democratic Republic, 1975-2015," (PhD diss., Princeton University, 2017); and Eric Burton, "Navigating Global Socialism: Tanzanian Students In and Beyond East Germany," *Cold War History* 19 (2018): pp. 63-83.

[56] In this pamphlet, the term "Devil Slaves" (鬼奴) was a reference to Black slaves who appeared in art and literature from the Tang and Song Dynasties. In this period, East African slaves arrived in China vis-à-vis the Arab slave trade and its maritime routes in Asia. For an overview of this pre-modern history, see Don Wyatt, *The Blacks of Pre-Modern China* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009).

[57] George Roberts, "'China and the Devil Slaves': Challenging Afro-Asian Solidarities in Tanzania," *Afro-Asian Visions*, February 13, 2017 (https://medium.com/afro-asian-visions/china-and-the-devil-slaves-challenging-afro-asian-solidarities-in-tanzania-216ceefa090b).

Freedom Railway, Jamie Monson references a British journalist who observed blackface as entertainment at a railroad work camp; the journalist recalled that "Chinese and Africans sat at different sides of the hall as the artists spun plates, pedaled bicycles and juggled with fruit. But there was loud laughter from both sides when a group of Chinese actors, dressed as African workmen, appeared on stage with their faces blacked and struck militant postures with their shovels."[58] From this episode, it is evident that race registered to Chinese and Tanzanian workers as a significant marker of difference, albeit light-hearted enough to be inscribed into humor. The doctrines of Maoism insisted on the primacy of class, but the popularity of blackface entertainment in the camp indicates that race continued to be imbued with meaning in interpersonal negotiations of Afro-Asian solidarities.

The Chinese workers, diplomats, and officials key to brokering relations with their Tanzanian counterparts were actors in an international racial cartography and hierarchy.[59] Conversely, so were the Tanzanian delegates, students, and cultural representatives who lived and travelled in between the two countries through the 1960s and 1970s. This broad racial landscape was in turn profoundly informed by the legacies of systemic racial exclusion and discrimination that defined the colonial era. This approach resonates with one that a number of social scientists, in the vein of Barry Sautman, Hairong Yan, and Ching Kwan Lee, have adopted to reading contemporary Chinese engagements in Africa not on their own terms but instead, as extensions of the global processes of neoliberal reform, capitalist expansion, and labor casualization.[60] All in all, this work of embedding the development of China-Tanzanian relations responds to the challenge that Jamie Monson and Stephanie Rupp identify as deducing all that "may be omitted when China and Africa are lifted out of the context of global historical dynamics as isolated

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[58] Dexter Tiranti, as quoted in Jamie Monson, *Africa's Freedom Railway: How a Chinese Development Project Changed Lives and Livelihoods in Tanzania* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009): p. 58.
[59] Yoon Jung Park and T. Tu Huynh, "Reflections on the Role of Race in China-Africa Relations," in Chris Alden and Daniel Large eds., *New Directions in Africa-China Studies*, p. 159
[60] See, for example, Barry Sautman and Hairong Yan, "The Forest for the Trees: Trade, Investment, and the China-in-Africa Discourse," *Pacific Affairs* 81 (2008): pp. 9-29; Gordon Mathews, *Ghetto at the Center of the World: Chungking Mansions, Hong Kong* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011); Barry Sautman and Hairong Yan, "'The Beginning of a World Empire'? Contesting the Discourse of Chinese Copper Mining in Zambia," *Modern China* 39 (2013): pp. 131-164; and Ching Kwan Lee, *The Specter of Global China: Politics, Labor, and Foreign Investment in Africa* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017).

'players': what specific realities are diminished or made invisible by this move, realities that may be critically important to understanding historical and contemporary phenomena?"[61]

The arc of China-Tanzanian relations should be considered in light of the racial structures under British colonialism that privileged Indians over Africans in education, business, and the civil service. Such a perspective answers Christopher Lee's call for a "decolonial revision" to existing frameworks of China-Africa Studies vis-à-vis the privileging of social practices. In other words, as Lee writes, scholars of China-Africa relations should adopt a "more expansive definition of 'African-ness' that also includes people and communities of Indian, Lebanese, European, and other geographies of descent… These identities are also embedded in colonial histories, and they have been beneficiaries of anti-Black structures of power."[62] On the other hand, vastly different populations and histories are likewise subsumed under the general category "China." While it can be common practice to consider "China" as a singular entity interchangeable with the party-state, the dynamics that ensue when a Muslim delegation from Zanzibar is taken to a Hui mosque on Friday afternoons are a departure from interstate relations in the traditional sense. These are the complex workings of race, migration, and power that render "China-Africa" less useful as a frame of reference than "Afro-Asianism," which ascribes a diversity of identities and political pasts to "China" and "Tanzania."

The framework of Afro-Asianism adopted in the following pages is different from that of "Global Maoism," or the study of the international impact of ideological Maoism and its prescriptions for revolution. Neither African American activists nor Tanzanian representatives who looked to China for ideological guidance adopted Maoism per se.[63] Rather, it was a two-way exchange in which China—not

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[61] Jamie Monson and Stephanie Rupp, "Introduction: Africa and China: New Engagements, New Research," *African Studies Review* 56 (2013): p. 24.
[62] Christopher Lee, "Decolonizing 'China–Africa Relations': Toward a New Ethos of Afro-Asianism," *Journal of African Cultural Studies* 33 (2021): p. 232.
[63] For an overview of Global Maoism, see Julia Lovell, *Maoism: A Global History* (New York: Knopf, 2019). On other aspects, see Alexander Cook, "Third World Maoism," in Timothy Cheek ed., *A Critical Introduction to Mao* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010): pp. 288-312; Fabio Lanza, *The End of Concern: Maoist China, Activism, and Asian Studies* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2017); and Quinn Slobodian, "The Meanings of Western Maoism in the 1960s," in Chen Jian, Martin Klimke, Masha Kirasirova, Mary Nolan, Marilyn Young, Joanna Waley-Cohen, eds., *The Routledge Handbook of the Global 1960s: Between Protest and Nation-Building*

only in the theoretical realm, but also Chinese socialism as a postcolonial ideal—became powerful ammunition in the global repertoires of Pan-Africanism and Black internationalism. At the same time, stories of African and African American resistance were prominent in Chinese narratives of Maoist progressivism on race, a core issue in the Chinese challenge to visions of socialist internationalism based in Havana or Moscow. Rather than using Global Maoism as a primary framing device then, I understand Maoism in the vein of Alexander Cook's "spiritual atom bomb," a term Vice Premier Lin Biao coined to refer to the tremendous capacity of Marxism-Leninism and Maoism to remake the world order. Cook concludes that Third World nationalists "made mixed use of [the] spiritual atom bomb—donning its symbolic accoutrements, playing the Mao card to extract aid from China or others, engaging in dogmatic imitation, or attempting creative application of Mao's doctrine to local circumstances."[64] Maoism informed, but did not dictate, the contours of a uniquely Tanzanian socialism that figured significantly into the global networks of Pan-Africanism.[65] Similarly, Vijay Prashad describes the flexible remaking of Maoist ideologies by African American activists in the 1960s as "Black Maoism," a concept that Robeson Taj Frazier also employs in his analysis of the Congress of Afrikan People, a Newark-based Black nationalist organization active in the 1970s.[66]

(Abingdon: Routledge, 2018): pp. 67-82. In comparative literary studies, there is a special issue of *Comparative Literature Studies* from 2015 on "Global Maoism and the Cultural Revolution in Global Context."

[64] Alexander Cook, "Introduction: The Spiritual Atom Bomb and its Global Fallout," in Alexander Cook ed., *Mao's Little Red Book: A Global History*, p. 18. This creative, flexible adaption of Maoism is reminiscent of how anticolonial nationalists deployed the Wilsonian conception of self-determination around and after the end of World War I. See Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).

[65] Priya Lal, "Maoism in Tanzania: Material Connections and Shared Imaginaries," in Alexander Cook ed., *Mao's Little Red Book: A Global* History, pp. 96-116. For African socialism as a socio-historical trend from the 1950s to the 1980s, during which a majority of newly independent African countries implemented some form of socialist policies, see William Friedland and Carl Rosberg eds., *African Socialism* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964); Marina Ottaway and David Ottaway, *Afrocommunism* (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1986); and Anne Pitcher and Kelly Askew, "African Socialisms and Postsocialisms," *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute* 76 (2006): pp. 1-14. On the role of Dar es Salaam in the decolonization of Southern Africa, see Arrigo Pallotti, "Postcolonial Nation-Building and Southern African Liberation: Tanzania and the Break of Diplomatic Relations with the United Kingdom, 1965–1968," *African Historical Review* 41 (2009): pp. 60–84 and George Roberts, "The Assassination of Eduardo Mondlane: FRELIMO, Tanzania, and the Politics of Exile in Dar es Salaam," *Cold War History* 17 (2017): pp. 1-18.

[66] Vijay Prashad, *Everybody Was Kung Fu Fighting: Afro-Asian Connections and the Myth of Cultural Purity* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2002): p. 136. See also Robeson Taj Frazier, "The Congress of Afrikan People: Baraka, Brother Mao, and the Year of '74," pp. 142-159

On the other hand, this study is invested in recovering the significance of Third World stories and movements in the Chinese imagination, such that in these interfaces, actors rarely engaged each other on the same definitional and thematic terms; instead, their exchanges were marked by critical gaps in temporalities and theoretical moorings. This synchronicity and asymmetry are aptly illustrated by the lack of correspondence between African American engagements of Maoism, which tended to occur on the basis of racial or cultural nationalism and co-identification, and Chinese projections of Black resistance that emphasized its militancy and potential to unite with a broad-based, multiracial working-class revolution in the United States. As the first chapter will demonstrate, the former trend, in which African American struggle assumed such significant stature in the Chinese political imaginary, peaked in the years 1963 and 1964, apex of Sino-Soviet struggle for the Afro-Asian world, while the latter would reach its crest in the late 1960s alongside the rise of the Black Power Movement.

While Afro-Asianism is not at all interchangeable with Global Maoism, theoretical Maoism as an intervention in orthodox Marxism-Leninism proved uniquely appealing for revolutionary nationalists throughout the Third World. Mao's emphasis on the peasantry as the vanguard obviated the Marxist prescription that the industrial working class should stand at the helm of revolution. Additionally, if this revolution could be successfully waged in the countryside, then Asian and African societies did not need to wait for the "right" conditions to commence their struggle. After all, as Mao famously declared in 1938, "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." Nor was the attraction of Maoism contained to ideology; the world-historical context of the Chinese Revolution also figured significantly. In Arif Dirlik's terms, modern China experienced globalization primarily by force, akin to most of the Third World. Consequently, Chinese socialism represented "not merely an alternative to capitalism, but an alternative that promised national liberation from capitalist hegemony, and the possibility of entering global history not as its object but as an independent subject."[67] As a result of this confluence of factors,

[67] Arif Dirlik, "Mao Zedong Thought and the Third World/Global South," *Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies* 16 (2014): p. 236. For liberal conceptions of internationalism, to which Afro-Asian visions of the Cold War were often conceived as alternatives, see Glenda Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013).

Maoism facilitated the initiative of Third World actors to creatively adapt the tenets of Marxism to their own objective situations.

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This study is narrated along two arcs and in four chapters. The first, titled "**Black Nationalism in China, 1960-1964: Encounters and Projections**," examines Chinese narrations and consumption of African American history and political movements in the early 1960s. This period marked a high tide in Chinese outreach to the U.S. civil rights movement: Stories of the Atlantic slave trade, Jim Crow segregation, and the Ku Klux Klan became frequently told in art, literature, and music. In Chinese cities, students and workers staged rallies and other public forums that disseminated updates about the struggle for civil rights, rewriting it as a monolithic revolutionary movement that would lead to the overthrow of U.S. capitalism. But this far-reaching, vigorous campaign within China did not in practice correspond, discursively or conceptually, to the efforts of African American activists to garner Chinese support for Black nationalism.

The second chapter, titled "**Triangulating China, Tanganyika, and Zanzibar, 1960-1964: Debating Class and Empire**," deconstructs the early 1960s encounters and negotiations of Chinese, Tanganyikan, and Zanzibari representatives. A key vignette is the visit to China of Ali Mwinyi Tambwe, General Secretary of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), dispatched in the fall of 1962 to convince Chinese leaders to support the African nationalist Afro-Shirazi Party in Zanzibar over the Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP), which maintained a predominantly Arab leadership but articulated stronger anti-imperialist and socialist politics. Tambwe hoped to convey to Chinese officials that Arabs in Zanzibar, while nominally a racial group, constituted a "imperialist, exploitative feudal class." This chapter also draws from records of the Foreign Ministry Archives in Beijing to uncover the stories of various challengers to Nyerere's leadership—the short-lived opposition party the African National Congress (ANC), Tanzanian Minister of Foreign Affairs Oscar Kambona, and Zanzibari revolutionary Abdulrahman Mohamed Babu—and their efforts to obtain Chinese support for their political objectives positioned to Nyerere's "left."

The third chapter, "**Black Power in China, 1965-1972: Minority Nationalism and Class Struggle**," is a discussion of the relationship between China and U.S.-based Black Power activists from 1965 to 1972. The Chinese imagination of the Black Power Movement was defined by the conflicting impulses to celebrate the African American turn to militancy as revolutionary vanguardism and to overwrite the racial nationalist—and sometimes explicitly separatist—calls of Black Power advocates for political and cultural self-determination. This latter trend is exemplified by the official recasting within China, in the early 1970s, of African Americans as an "ethnic minority" (少数民族) in Chinese terms, who would eventually join forces with Chicanos, Puerto Ricans, Native Americans, and white progressives to remake U.S. society. This chapter additionally explores the symbolic values of Maoism and Chinese socialism in the race and rights lexicon of late 1960s and early 1970s United States, specifically through the lens of two Black activists with divergent politics: Huey Newton and Hosea Williams, an ordained minister and National Program Director for the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC).

The fourth and final chapter, "**Minutiae of Solidarity: Race, Culture, and Public Diplomacy Between China and Tanzania, 1965-1972**," unfolds at the granular level of civil societies. The negotiation of the terms and discourses of solidarity was a capricious process of brokering that was very much a "civil society" story. Tanzanian and Chinese cultural delegates who represented an array of interests—youth organizations, women's associations, acrobatics troupes, and athletic teams—became indispensable players. Their experiences shed light on the interplay of statecraft and individual agency in the context of Afro-Asian internationalism. In spite of an official rhetoric of Afro-Asian solidarities, the development of China-Tanzanian relations through the 1960s relied on the vilification of India, on account of its supposed provocation of Sino-Indian Border Conflict and the role of its East African diaspora in upholding and benefiting from the economic structures of colonialism. In essence, the deterioration of relations between China and India, once a touchstone of Pan-Asianism in the earlier decades of the twentieth century, facilitated the development of China-Tanzanian relations.

By the end of the Mao era, the pro-China leadership in several left-leaning African countries had turned more explicitly to the Soviet Union.[68] This was due to an array of decisions made within China in the early 1970s that were destructive to its standing in the Third World: its opposition to the entry of Bangladesh into the United Nations, its immediate recognition of Augusto Pinochet's regime in Chile, and ultimately, in 1975, its involvement in the Angolan Civil War on behalf of the same factions supported by the United States and apartheid South Africa.[69] The concluding chapter explores the legacies to this 1960s expression of Afro-Asianism. Ultimately, these vignettes serve as a window unto the heterogeneity of Cold War Third Worldism, whereby the politics of anti-imperial solidarity figured as a precarious project of constant negotiation and struggle.

[68] Tareq Ismael, "The People's Republic of China and Africa," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 9 (1971): pp. 507-529.
[69] Jeremy Friedman, *Shadow Cold War: The Sino-Soviet Competition for the Third World*, pp. 209-210

Black Nationalism in China, 1960-1964: Encounters and Projections

On August 8, 1963, Mao Zedong released his first declaration in support of the African American freedom struggle at the request of Robert Williams.[70] Intended as an appeal for a global coalescence of progressive forces, it called for "workers, peasants…enlightened persons of all colors in the world" to condemn the farce of the Kennedy administration in its advocacy of "civil rights."[71] As evidence of a mounting revolutionary movement within the United States, increasingly militant in its methods of resistance in the face of violent state-sanctioned backlash, Mao cited the organized efforts to integrate public schools in Little Rock, the assassination of civil rights activist Medgar Evers in Mississippi, and the Freedom Riders who fought for transit desegregation across the South. This proclamation galvanized a vigorous and far-reaching campaign within China to publicize the nature of U.S. white supremacy, emphasize the class nature of racial hierarchy, and anticipate the success of a violent revolution on U.S. soil with African Americans as the vanguard.[72]

The temporal arc of this campaign, which reached its high tide in the year-long span from Mao's August 1963 pronouncement to its first anniversary, did not actually correspond to African American efforts to engage Chinese socialism, which would peak in the late 1960s and early 1970s. It was in early 1960s China that African American political movements resounded as an affirmation of the Maoist theory

[70] Vicki Garvin, an African American educator and political activist who lived alongside Robert Williams in Beijing in the mid-1960s before relocating to Shanghai on the eve of the Cultural Revolution, recalls that Williams inspired and collaborated with Mao on this statement in a 1983 interview with Komozi Woodard. See Komozi Woodard, "Amiri Baraka, the Congress of African People, and Black Power Politics from the 1961 United Nations Protest to the 1972 Gary Convention," in Peniel Joseph ed., *The Black Power Movement: Rethinking the Civil Rights-Black Power Era* (New York: Routledge, 2006): p. 61.

[71] Mao Zedong, "呼吁世界人民联合起来反对美帝国主义的种族歧视, 支持美国黑人反对种族歧视的斗争的声明 [Statement Calling the World's People to Unite in Opposition to the Racial Discrimination of U.S. Imperialism]," *Renmin ribao*, August 9, 1963.

[72] Follow-up articles lauded the inspirational effects of the proclamation, asserting that Mao's words have galvanized Africans and African Americans alike. See "毛主席声明像火炬一样照亮了黑人的心 [Like a Torch, Mao's Declaration Has Alighted Black People's Hearts]," *Renmin ribao*, August 22, 1963. Further news reports of the U.S. civil rights and Black Power movements frequently alluded to Mao's declaration, commending the theoretical accuracy and predictive powers of Maoism. See, for example, "美国黑人争取自由斗争进入新阶段, 中国人民坚决反对美帝的种族压迫政策 [African American Freedom Struggles Enter New Phase, the Chinese People Resolutely Oppose American Imperialism's Policies of Racial Oppression]," *Renmin ribao*, August, 18, 1965.

of world history, global capitalist development, and the course of revolutionary change. The theories and stories of the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade, the brutalities of slavery in the antebellum U.S. south, patterns of racialized economic oppression, and the terrorism of the Ku Klux Klan became ubiquitous in Chinese press, culture, and everyday political life. Public rallies and meetings in Chinese cities disseminated knowledge about African American history, while occasioning declarations of solidarity from social groups at the forefront of Chinese revolution: women, workers, youth, and students. A plethora of Chinese cultural productions depicted and celebrated African American movements, including documentary film, poetry, choral ensembles, and children's stories.

Discursively, Chinese emphasis on the racial particularities of the African American freedom struggle distinguished Maoism from other forms of socialist internationalism anchored in the Soviet Union or Cuba. The declaration of Chinese delegates at the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity (AAPSO) Conference in Moshi, Tanzania in 1963—that the "Russians had no business in Africa because they were white"—galvanized Black nationalists to look to China as a race-conscious ally.[73] Malcolm X delighted in Chinese social and economic achievements as a victory in racial terms for the Afro-Asian world, writing "Some observers inside Red China have reported that the world has never known a hate-white campaign as is now going on in this non-white country… Some Chinese chickens will soon come home to roost, with China's recent successful nuclear tests."[74] In this case, the Chinese willingness to execute a racialized campaign for international status proved most appealing; Malcolm adopted an expansive conception of Black nationalism to refer to revolutionary movements throughout Asia and Africa, and intimated that racial conflict was the primary explanatory factor for the Sino-Soviet Split. In his "Message to the Grassroots" speech in December 1963, Malcolm stated that alongside the American Revolution and the French Revolution, "The Russian Revolution too — yes, it was — white nationalism… Why [do] you think Khrushchev and Mao can't get their heads together? White nationalism. All the revolutions

[73] Robin Kelley and Betsy Esch, "Black Like Mao: Red China and Black Revolution," *Souls: A Critical Journal of Black Politics, Society, and Culture* 1 (1999): p. 9.
[74] Malcolm X and Alex Haley, *The Autobiography of Malcolm X* (New York: Grove Press, 1965): pp. 205-206.

that's going on in Asia and Africa today are based on what? Black nationalism."[75] Huey Newton, who co-founded the Black Panther Party in Oakland in 1966, would also embrace the race-conscious frame that the Chinese state applied to Marxism-Leninism, writing that "As the dogma of Moscow had not been useful to the Chinese, it could find no home in the rest of the world of color. Perhaps there was the added factor of centuries of race superiority… [causing] such insensitivity to the undeveloped, non-industrial world of color on the part of Moscow-directed [communists]."[76] This blind spot, Newton believed, explained the failure of the Soviet Union to attend to the specificities of African American struggle.

Functionally, the racial rhetoric that the Chinese state intended as a means to the end of class struggle served as an end in itself, attracting Black nationalists who sought a non-white model of political defiance. This chapter deconstructs the intimately entwined discourses of race and class at the core of Chinese narratives of African American history and politics in the early 1960s as well as the diplomatic, popular, and cultural channels by which this message was conveyed. Its engagements with U.S. civil rights activists afforded the CCP the opportunity to present to the Afro-Asian world as the race-aware foil to the United States, the Soviet Union, and Cuba. African diplomats in China were frequently asked to attend gatherings that commemorated African American movements, and references to U.S. racial injustices were commonplace in arguments that Chinese officials presented to African guests about the nature of imperialism. In their discussions with the first Tanganyikan and Zanzibari cultural delegations to visit China in the early 1960s, Chinese representatives grouped the African American freedom struggle alongside the Vietnam War and the assassination of Patrice Lumumba as evidence of Western imperial brutalities. These East African delegates, from the Zanzibari women studying cross-stitching to translators working to dub Chinese films in Swahili, also attended the symposium for the first anniversary of Mao's statement in support of African American movements, held in Beijing in August 1964.[77]

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[75] Malcolm X, "Message to the Grassroots," in George Breitman ed., *Malcolm X Speaks: Selected Speeches and Statements* (New York: Grove Press, 1990): p. 10.
[76] Huey Newton, "On Pan-Africanism or Communism," in David Hilliard and Donald Weise eds., *The Huey P. Newton Reader* (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2002): p. 252.
[77] "毛主席接见非洲朋友发表支持美国黑人斗争的声明 [Chairman Mao Issues Statement Supporting the African American Struggle at Reception Receiving African Friends]," *Renmin ribao* [The People's Daily], August 9, 1963.

Chinese narratives invoked semi-colonialism in pre-revolutionary China as a parallel to African American experiences, heightening the desirability of the Chinese trajectory whereby class revolution would be the means to resolve the social contradictions of racial capitalism. On this trend of Afro-Chinese comparison, Keisha Brown identifies a 1950s "shift from Blacks as metaphor for Chinese suffering pre-1949 to Blacks as a metonymic part of a huge complex web of global struggles."[78] This assessment is true in the sense that in the early 1960s, the CCP began to construe African American activism as a critical link in the global anti-imperialism. Chinese narratives on the subject displayed a remarkable arsenal of knowledge, inferring local civil rights campaigns in the United States with factual precision and proficiency. But the continuation of Afro-Chinese historical analogization served an additional purpose: it provided a means of relating far-away developments to popular Chinese audiences.

Beyond the U.S. public sphere, this chapter additionally centers the domestic Chinese campaign to recast images and stories of racial oppression and struggle in the United States. These enunciations served as occasions to cement cross-group solidarities within China whereby women, youth, and ethnic minority groups came together to declare their revolutionary affiliations with African Americans. Published in 2014, Robeson Taj Frazier's *The East is Black* marked the first book-length examination of the Chinese interface with African American radicalism in the Cold War. Frazier however, notes that the more comprehensive mapping of Chinese responses to the African American freedom movements remains to be done, writing "While this book has mainly been concerned with black radical imaginings of China, an interesting question is how did the corresponding side of these relations—Chinese citizens—alternatively imagine and represent the Black Freedom Struggle?"[79] Indeed, few studies of Black internationalism have taken as a subject the non-U.S. constructions of African American politics and histories: their depictions in foreign press, representations in popular culture, and receptions on the

[78] Keisha Brown, "Blackness in Exile: W.E.B. Du Bois's Role in the Formation of Representations of Blackness as Conceptualized by the Chinese Communist Party," p. 25
[79] Robeson Taj Frazier, *The East is Black: Cold War China in the Black Radical Imagination* (Durham: University of North Carolina Press, 2014): p. 212.

ground.[80] In her conclusion to a 2010 collection on "the Bandung Moment," Antoinette Burton also asks, "Where exactly does the Cold War civil-rights movement in the US belong in truly global histories of Bandung?"[81] This chapter is an effort to begin to address this important set of questions.

Marc Gallicchio's study of African American perspectives on China and Japan, from the late nineteenth century to the end of World War II, highlights the promises and shortcomings of Black internationalist politics in East Asia in the first half of the twentieth century. As Gallicchio observes, the specter of Japanese military dominance first elucidated, for many African American observers, the dilemma of "class or color." While a number of Black activists affiliated with CPUSA condemned Japanese aggression in Asia alongside the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, Black nationalists in the 1920s and 1930s celebrated the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" as a victory against global white supremacy. Editorials in Black newspapers condemned the Republic of China as an "Uncle Tom" while characterizing Imperial Japan as engaged in a valiant struggle to ensure that "Asia is for Asians."[82] Only in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor did many who embraced Japan reconsider their defense of Japanese imperialist ambitions in Asia, though U.S. intelligence officials continued to regard Japanese outreach to African Americans a significant liability to national mobilization for war.[83] In the 1960s story of Chinese engagements with African Americans, this debate of "class or color" would again feature.

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This history of formal encounter between African Americans and China begins decades earlier. In the early twentieth century, the stories and symbols of Black oppression and resistance in the United States facilitated the development of modern Chinese nationalism. Harriet Beecher Stowe's *Uncle Tom's Cabin* was the first U.S. novel to be translated into Chinese in 1901. Published under the title *A Black*

[80] One outstanding example in this regard is Yuichiro Onishi's work on African American history and politics in Japan. See Yuichiro Onishi, *Transpacific Antiracism: Afro-Asian Solidarity in 20th-Century Black America, Japan, and Okinawa* (New York: New York University Press, 2013).
[81] Antoinette Burton, "The Sodalities of Bandung: Toward a Critical 21st-Century History," in Christopher Lee ed., *Making a World after Empire: The Bandung Moment and its Political Afterlives* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2010): p. 355.
[82] Marc Gallicchio, *The African American Encounter with Japan and China*, pp. 65-66.
[83] Marc Gallicchio, *The African American Encounter with Japan and China*, pp. 123-125

Slave's Cry to the Heavens (黑奴呼天录), the book became widely popular in Republican China. In Chinese writer Lin Shu (林紓)'s preface to the Chinese edition of the novel, he compared slavery in the U.S. South to the experiences of Chinese immigrants in other parts of the United States, as a call for a Chinese nationalist reckoning with the realities of racial oppression borne by the "yellow" race.[84] In 1907, *A Black Slave's Cry to the Heavens* was adapted for the stage by Chinese students in Tokyo.[85]

For a Chinese readership grappling with the precarity of China's global positioning in the late Qing Dynasty, and for whom Social Darwinism often served as the dominant framework for understanding racial hierarchy and progress, the stories of slavery, abolition, and imperial domination proved instructive and appealing.[86] The advent of German colonialism in Qingdao, as one example, spurred a regional rise in racial awareness and nationalist sentiments; these convictions took the paradoxical form of both identification with and a desire to distance Chinese civilization from Africa and the other parts of the colonized world.[87] As Rebecca Karl writes of late imperial China, the African continent "had been assumed since the mid-nineteenth century to be the last truly unhistorical space of the modern world, an unhistorical space peopled, moreover, entirely by 'slaves.'"[88] These connotations of desolation and civilizational barrenness that were associated with "black slaves," or with Africans and African Americans, did not simply dissipate with the founding of the People's Republic of China and the

[84] For an analysis of Lin Shu's translation in context of the 1905 Chinese boycott of U.S. goods, to protest Chinese exclusion and anti-Chinese violence in the United States, see Edlie Wong, *Racial Reconstruction: Black Inclusion, Chinese Exclusion, and the Fictions of Citizenship* (New York: New York University Press, 2015): pp. 194-202. For an in-depth examination of Lin Shu as a translator of Western texts and a preeminent early twentieth-century authority on Chinese national culture, see Michael Gibbs Hill, *Lin Shu, Inc.: Translation and the Making of Modern Chinese Culture* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).

[85] Tao Jie provides a nuanced contextualization of these different Chinese adaptations of *Uncle Tom's Cabin*. See Tao Jie, "Uncle Tom's Cabin: The First American Novel Translated into Chinese," *Prospects: An Annual of American Cultural Studies* 18 (1993): pp. 517-534.

[86] See Frank Dikötter, *The Discourse of Race in Modern China, Revised Edition* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015. For a broader overview of the roots of East Asian racial thought, see Rotem Kowner and Walter Demel, "Modern East Asia and the Rise of Racial Thought: Possible Links, Unique Features and Unsettled Issues" in Rotem Kowner and Walter Demel eds., *Race and Racism in Modern East Asia* (Leiden: Brill, 2013): pp. 1-37.

[87] Klaus Mühlhahn, "Negotiating the Nation: German Colonialism and Chinese Nationalism in Qingdao, 1897-1914," in Bryna Goodman and David Goodman eds., *Twentieth-Century Colonialism and China: Localities, the Everyday, and the World* (New York and Abingdon: Routledge, 2012): pp. 44-51.

[88] Rebecca Karl, *Staging the World: Chinese Nationalism at the Turn of the Twentieth Century* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002): p. 121.

new political vocabularies—of "racial discrimination (种族歧视)," "new and old colonialism (新老殖民主义)," and "just struggle (正义斗争)"—that framed Chinese narratives of the world through the 1950s and 1960s.

A small but significant number of Chinese travelers to the United States in the early twentieth century took note of Jim Crow and racial inequality as a contradiction to the founding principles of a nation they admired, a thorn in their grappling with democracy and republicanism as the mode of governance for modern China. Liang Qichao, widely considered one of the foremost intellectual figures in twentieth-century China, toured the United States in 1903. Though Liang believed that Black men were inherently predatory towards white women, he condemned lynching—a practice which he was shocked to encounter reports of in local newspapers—as "cruel and inhuman acts [he could not believe were] performed in broad daylight in the twentieth century."[89] Zou Taofen, a Chinese journalist who travelled to Alabama in 1935, wrote about the stark segregation of living quarters and public spaces in Birmingham. He conversed with white business owners who refused service to Black customers and noted the decrepit conditions that Black residents endured in crowded, resource-poor neighborhoods. While riding on a segregated bus to Selma, as Zou watched the Black passengers move further and further to the back whenever more white passengers boarded, he brooded that he was "solitary and all alone, [brain swirling] with thoughts of the wretchedness of an oppressed people and the cruelty of this irrational world."[90] The white bourgeois in Alabama, Zou concluded, "regards the exploitation of blacks as its lifeline."[91]

The writings of Liang and Zou encapsulate the shifts in Chinese racial thought in the decades from the 1890s to the outbreak of the Chinese Civil War. Liang's ideas about race, nation, and social advancement represented the height of Social Darwinist influences on Chinese intellectualism at the turn

[89] Liang Qichao, "Observations on a Trip to America," in R. David Arkush and Leo Lee eds., *Land Without Ghosts: Chinese Impressions of American from the Mid-Nineteenth Century to the Present* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989): p. 91. For the arc of Liang's travels to the United States, see K. Scott Wang, "Liang Qichao and the Chinese of America: A Re-evaluation of His 'Selected Memoir of Travels in the New World'," *Journal of American Ethnic History* 11 (1992): pp. 3-20.
[90] Zou Taofen, "Alabama: Reds and Blacks," in R. David Arkush and Leo Lee eds., *Land Without Ghosts*, p. 158
[91] Zou Taofen, "Alabama: Reds and Blacks," p. 156

of the century. An outspoken advocate of political reform through late Qing era, Liang harnessed the language and hierarchies of race to explain the differences in economic and technological development between nations, exhorting the "yellow race" to pursue self-improvement as a means of ensuring evolutionary survival, a protracted battle which he believed the "black, red, and brown races" to have already lost.[92] Meanwhile, Zou's critical take on segregation in Alabama, adopting aspects of class analysis and reprehending the emotional and personal impact of anti-Black racism, augured the patterns of Maoist racial discourses in the early to mid-1960s.

In this period, modern Chinese identity became formulated against the backdrop of anticolonial movements throughout Asia and Africa, as well as increasing consciousness of race as a driving element of world history and racial solidarity as a path to liberation. Jazz trumpet player Buck Clayton and his band "The Harlem Gentlemen" performed at the Shanghai Canidrome for a six-month period in 1934.[93] In the cosmopolitan and colonial city that Shanghai was at the time, jazz was popular among both foreign residents and the Chinese elite. Langston Hughes recalled that during his visit to the city in 1933, he was most astonished to see "a Negro who looked exactly like a Harlemite" riding in a rickshaw along the Bund.[94] Over the course of his stay, Hughes had been well-received by the circle of left-leaning intellectuals in Shanghai, with his writings widely translated and discussed in the city's burgeoning literary community.[95] As early as 1936, Mao Zedong sent a personal message of support to the National Negro Congress, a broad-based organization affiliated with CPUSA working towards industrial unionism, anti-fascism, and solidarity with the Ethiopian resistance against Italy. Along with greetings with Zhou

[92] Frank Dikötter, *The Discourse of Race in Modern China, Revised Edition*, pp. 40-50
[93] Buck Clayton personally recalls his experiences in Shanghai in his autobiography. See Buck Clayton and Nancy Miller Elliott, *Buck Clayton's Jazz World* (Oxford, MS: Bayou Press, 1986): pp. 66-78. A historical description of Clayton's time in Shanghai, as well as Shanghai's role as a capital of Western jazz from the 1920s to the 1940s, can be found in James Farrer and Andrew David Field, *Shanghai Nightscapes: A Nocturnal Biography of a Global City* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015): pp. 124-127.
[94] Langston Hughes, *I Wander as I Wonder* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1956): p. 245.
[95] Selina Lai-Henderson, "Color Around the Globe: Langston Hughes and Black Internationalism in China," *MELUS* 45 (2020): pp. 88-107.

Enlai and Chief Commander of the Red Army Zhu De, Mao expressed his wishes that the power of the Black freedom struggle in the United States be strengthened in a new united front.[96]

Heiren Toothpaste (黑人牙膏), a brand first launched in Shanghai in the 1930s, remained widely used into the Mao years and beyond. Its ubiquity and popularity belied the contradictions of Black identities as, at once, a foil for national development and revolutionary solidarity throughout China's long twentieth century. Heiren, which translates to "Black Person Toothpaste," sported an advertising campaign that hinged on racial stereotyping from its earliest days. Also known by the English name "Darkie," Heiren featured the logo of a smiling man in blackface modeled after the renowned U.S. entertainer Al Jolson. It was only in the 1950s, as a result of the Korean War and the anti-racist exigencies of the new communist state, that Heiren would become rebranded as Heibai, or simply "black and white," with the blackface logo removed.[97] The name change to Heibai however, did not endure past the 1970s, reverting back to Heiren after the Mao era. The continued popularity of Heiren Toothpaste in China in the twenty-first century, with a logo still based on Jolson's likeness, is suggestive of the transitory, albeit far-reaching, nature of Chinese relations with Black radicalism in the 1960s.

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Until Mao's August 1963 statement, official rhetoric rarely recognized African American freedom struggles on their own terms, opting instead to understand racial injustice as one category of labor exploitation under U.S. monopoly capitalism. A January 1962 rally in Beijing, organized in opposition to the persecution of CPUSA members by the U.S. government, was attended by an audience of more than 1,400. The speakers included important leaders who represented labor, student, women's, and cultural groups in Beijing. Their testimonies condemned the use of the McCarran and Smith Acts to arrest or intimidate communists and their sympathizers. The municipal chairman of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions called out the irony that:

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[96] Gwendolyn Midlo Hall ed., *A Black Communist in the Freedom Struggle: The Life of Harry Haywood* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012): p. 225.
[97] Karl Gerth, *Unending Capitalism: How Consumerism Negated China's Communist Revolution* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2020): pp. 104-113.

> "In this democratic paradise, the working class and the laboring masses occupy no political standing and sway... African Americans who comprise 10% of the national population are also deprived of political, economic, and social equality. They experience constant [harassment]. The spies of the reactionary U.S. government surveil workers everywhere, with the KKK, the John Birch Society, and other fascist organizations engaging in such savage activities."[98]

Close reading of these proceedings reveals that in this moment, African Americans were considered a sub-category of marginalized workers, with race employed as one means of classifying the dimensions of oppression within the United States. In other words, racial struggle still figured as marginal relative to the larger narrative of U.S. labor exploitation and the suppression of communist organizing. Wang Chunping (王春平), the chairwoman of the Beijing Women's Federation, followed up with remarks about how African American female workers, concentrated in the lowest-paying sectors, doubly experience the bind of "equal work, unequal pay." In Wang's narrative, the KKK was singled out for condemnation as another example of a "fascist organization" with the aim of persecuting U.S. workers.

This rhetorical trend shifted quickly. From the summer of 1963 into the end of 1964, in the aftermath of Mao's first public statement in support of the African American struggle, the U.S. movement for racial equality began to feature much more prominently, in its own right, in the repertoire of Chinese challenges to political hypocrisy in the United States. A search for the keywords "美国黑人" (African American) on the engine "全国报刊索引"—or the national newspaper index of China, which also holds runs of magazines and gazettes—illustrates the early 1960s rise in the popularity of stories featuring themes of Black oppression and resistance in the United States. While each of the years from 1960 to 1962 saw less than 25 mentions of "African American," in 1963, there was a dramatic spike to more than 130 mentions.

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[98] Publicity Department of Beijing Municipal Committee of the Communist Party of China, "Plans and Draft Speeches of Beijing All-People's Conference to Condemn the Anti-Communist Atrocities of the U.S. Government and Support the Just Struggle of the U.S. Communists (北京市各界人民谴责美国政府反共暴行支持美共正义斗争大会计划和大会发言稿)," January 17, 1962, File No. 1-12-533, Beijing Municipal Archives (BMA).
In the 1950s, more than one hundred activists affiliated with CPUSA were accused of violating the 1940 Smith Act, which forbid the forceful overthrow of the U.S. government. Many of these convictions were later ruled as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.

This corresponded to a proliferation of public meetings and rallies in which local citizens of various social groups and revolutionary backgrounds—women, students, factory workers, and minority nationalities—declared their empathies with African American activists. These expressions of solidarity served a two-fold purpose: they cemented intra-national cohesion while underscoring to domestic audiences China's central role in fomenting global revolution. In addition to laying out the Maoist theory of change and deconstructing for Chinese citizens the real-time makings of a revolution, these gatherings solidified the revolutionary credentials of civilian groups foundational to Chinese national identity in the Mao era. African American political movements provided a canvas upon which Chinese citizens announced their affinities with an anti-imperial struggle resonant with China's recent history. Aligned with the state-sponsored take on the race question, they praised the alleged African American turn to armed resistance for its grit and makeshift bravery rather than for its strategy, as the latter remained the realm and invention of revolutionary China.

On August 8, 1964, five organizations—the Shanghai all-workers union, the Shanghai branch of the Chinese Communist Youth League, the Shanghai women's federation, and the Shanghai branch of the Council of Chinese Citizens to Protect World Peace—hosted a public meeting in which representatives from each group delivered speeches in praise of the U.S. civil rights movement. In this caucus, the identity of each speaker carried as much significance as his or her words; a balance between high-level party leaders and common workers indicated their united-front solidarity. In his introductory notes, union representative Zhang Qi established the context of the gathering as follows:

> "The African American struggle against racial discrimination has persisted for a century… After World War II, the strength of the Black proletariat has increased. Ethnic liberation and socialist struggles proliferate around the world…Since educational desegregation in Little Rock in 1957, the scale of the struggle has steadily expanded… This attests to U.S. communist leader [William] Foster's observation that 'Within the ranks of American workers, Black workers possess the greatest potential for struggle'… Because this struggle occurs in the heart of the primary fortress of world reactionaries, its meaning is critically important…We Chinese people are even more deeply concerned with the African American struggle, and see supporting their struggle as our high internationalist duty."[99]

[99] "纪念毛主席反对种族歧视斗争的声明发表一周年座谈会，张琪主席和工人代表在会议的发言稿 [Speaking Notes for Symposium Commemorating the One-Year Anniversary of Chairman Mao's Statement in Support of the

In casting William Foster, General Secretary of CPUSA from 1945 to 1957, as a leading theorist of this new revolution, Zhang's narrative represented a moment of transition between the framing of African American struggle as a subset of worker resistance and as the revolutionary vanguard.[100] In his concluding remarks, Zhang directly equated African American suffering to that of pre-1949 China, reminiscent of the rhetorical strategies which once defined U.S. debates over Chinese immigration in the late nineteenth century; the "coolie-slave" continuum that came into popular usage during that period paralleled the experiences of Chinese laborers with Black slaves in the Americas.[101] As Zhang's argument implied, the road to liberation that China took, of anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist revolution, would be the exact prescription for Black activists in the United States:

> "We, the laboring people of Shanghai, experienced long-term oppression and bondage at the hands of imperialism; foreign imperialists considered us 'yellow-skinned slaves,' throwing at us unwarranted indignities and humiliations. At a deep level, we understand the truth that Chairman Mao has pointed to: 'racial struggle is fundamentally a matter of class struggle.' The foreign imperialists call themselves the 'superior race' and call us Chinese the 'inferior race,' which allows them to act like a vampire, riding on the heads of the Chinese laboring masses... As we live like cattle, the Chinese officials and landlords, who belong to the same race as us, form a coalition [with the imperialists], also riding on our heads. This isn't a problem between the races, but between classes… The anti-discrimination struggle, like our struggle against imperialist aggression, is a grave scene of class struggle."[102]

Zhang racially coded the history of Western imperialism in China, reframing it as testament to real-time Chinese experiences of racism and the European invention of racial hierarchy as a tool to further their

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African American Struggle against Racial Discrimination]," Shanghai Municipal All-Workers' Union, August 8, 1964, File No. C1-2-4392, Shanghai Municipal Archives (SMA).

[100] During these years, Chinese officials frequently inferred William Foster as one of the utmost authorities on the subject African American politics. Foster's book *The Negro People in American History* (New York: International Publishers, 1954), though relatively unknown within the United States, was translated into Chinese and provided the theoretical foundation for subsequent Chinese scholars who pursued research in African American history.

[101] Edlie Wong, *Racial Reconstruction: Black Inclusion, Chinese Exclusion, and the Fictions of Citizenship*, p. 6. For other literary perspectives on African American and Asian American cross-representations or co-identifications in the United States in the post-Emancipation era, see Julia H. Lee, *Interracial Encounters: Reciprocal Representations in African and Asian American Literatures, 1896-1937* (New York: New York University Press, 2011); Crystal Anderson, *Beyond the Chinese Connection: Contemporary Afro-Asian Cultural Production* (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2013); and Helen H. Jun, *Race for Citizenship: Black Orientalism and Asian Uplift from Pre- Emancipation to Neoliberal America* (New York: New York University Press, 2014).

[102] [102] "纪念毛主席反对种族歧视斗争的声明发表一周年座谈会，张琪主席和工人代表在会议的发言稿 [Speaking Notes for Symposium Commemorating the One-Year Anniversary of Chairman Mao's Statement in Support of the African American Struggle against Racial Discrimination]."

territorial and profit-seeking objectives. In calling out the "Chinese officials and landlords, who belong to the same race as us," Zhang underscored the inadequacy of racial nationalism to address elemental political and economic contradictions; only a class-based movement akin to China's would prove extensive enough to remake society. An unnamed worker from No. 2 Textile Factory echoed Zhang's emphasis on race as a matter of class struggle, stating that Mao's analysis was a case of "one needle meets blood," before elaborating, "The U.S. monopoly capitalist class depends on racially discriminatory policies to stir up the hatred of white workers, resulting in white workers' prejudice towards black workers, breaking apart the unity of the laboring masses."[103] Only after Zhang established China's credentials as a nation historically sensitive to racial discrimination and oppression did the speakers who follow expand on the class origins of the U.S. race question.

Other representatives from the ranks of laborers, women, and students testified to the tremendous inspirational value they perceived in African American freedom struggles, as well as the enthusiasm with which they watched new developments in the U.S. civil rights movement. The opening lines of Liu Kunlin's speech captured this; Liu announced, "I am a worker at the Shanghai Turbine Factory and a member of the [factory's] militia. All of our militia, the brothers and sisters at the factory, resolutely support [African American activists and protesters] … From newspapers we read reports that their struggle has vigorously progressed. We all say: 'Our black brothers in America did it right… We must learn from [their] fearlessness of force, courageous and resilient fighting spirit, to make greater contributions to building our homeland, protecting our homeland, and supporting the international communist revolution."[104] Explicit identifiers like "worker" and "soldier" drew more nuanced attention to the revolutionary connection holding together these two groups of proximate historical experiences. For the speakers, these opportunities asserted their global citizenship, demarcating their participation in an

[103] "纪念毛主席反对种族歧视斗争的声明发表一周年座谈会, 张琪主席和工人代表在会议的发言稿 [Speaking Notes for Symposium Commemorating the One-Year Anniversary of Chairman Mao's Statement in Support of the African American Struggle against Racial Discrimination]."
[104] "上海汽轮车厂五好民兵刘琨林的发言 [Speaking Notes of Shanghai Turbine Factory Five-Best Employee Liu Kunlin]," August 8, 1964, SMA, File No. C1-2-4392.

international socialist movement under the auspices of Maoism. The curation of representatives from every corner of civil society further helped present Chinese position on the progressive side of history at a level accessible to ordinary citizens.

Informational mass meetings facilitated mass diffusion of knowledge on African American history. On the same day as this workers' symposium, Zhang Huiwen (张汇文), a professor at the Shanghai Academy of Sciences, presided over a different public lecture. In Zhang's scathing critique of Johnson's 1964 Civil Rights Act, he discussed six previous occasions dating back to Reconstruction in which executive action on civil rights failed to produce any effect. "From a historical viewpoint, this charade of civil rights that Kennedy and Johnson put up is not anything new," Zhang stated, "[The first civil rights bill] was passed in 1866. Many Southern states [then] passed their own statutes, the so-called Black Codes, which forcefully implemented racial segregation, stripped away the right to vote, [and] prohibited interracial marriage."[105] Zhang proceeded to explain that in essence, the U.S. state is so bound up with the interests of monopoly capitalism that it cannot be trusted as the vehicle for bringing about transformative change on the question of racial oppression and discrimination. In Zhang's lecture, the persistence of racial violence and hierarchy in the United States, despite the rollout of civil rights legislation, only evinced the hypocrisy of the federal government.[106] The sum of these discursive patterns was key to abetting the early 1960s Chinese narrative of African American history and politics: Chinese

[105] "纪念毛主席支持美国黑人反对种族歧视斗争的声明发表一周年, 上海科学院教授张汇文的对台宣传稿 [Shanghai Academy of Sciences Professor Zhang Huiwen's Draft Speech in Commemoration of the First Anniversary of Chairman's Mao Statement in Support of the African American Struggle against Racial Discrimination]," August 8, 1964, File No. C46-2-14-158, SMA.

[106] The Chinese assessment of civil rights reform actually drew criticism from some American communists aligned with the Soviet Union. While most of the world paid little attention to Chinese propaganda about African American social movements, CPUSA read closely into Chinese arguments and condemned their vilification of the federal government. Taking issue with public statements printed in the *Peking Review*, which emphasized the "fascist atrocities" of the Kennedy Administration, an October 1963 editorial CPUSA journal argued that the true perpetrators of racial violence were "in the first place the Wallaces, the Barnetts, the Eastlands, and the rest of the Dixiecrat racist elements, supported chiefly by the extreme Right in other parts of the country." Proposed civil rights legislation had generated a wave of African American support in spite of its shortcomings, the editorial explained, and to dismiss the government as a "fascist regime is not a help but a disservice to the cause of the Negro people. To do so would only lead to sectarian isolation, to splitting the Negro people's movement from its natural allies among the white masses." See "On the Ideological Position of the Communist Party of China: An Editorial Article," *Political Affairs* (October 1963): p. 20.

representatives established a historically grounded authority to speak on the question of race, infusing their testimonials with an array of facts and anecdotes as a means of legitimating their advocacy of class-based solutions.

These dynamics are captured in a "World Events Report Meetings" lecture series delivered at the Shanghai Youth Palace, on subject of the African American freedom struggle. Between 1963 and 1965, Liu Liangmo (刘良莫), a musician and politician who served in a number of high-level positions, spoke at four different sessions.[107] More than five hundred schoolteachers and students turned out to three of the gatherings, with the other attracting three hundred. In September 1963, Liu designed his lecture around the thesis that U.S. capitalism saw its lifeblood in the hyper-exploitation of Black workers.[108] He deployed impressive factual knowledge of U.S. racial injustices to bolster his prediction of an imminent African American revolt with ripple effect to the whole society. He relayed the many injustices and indignities visited upon African Americans by the government and organized white supremacists, such as oral exams to inhibit voting (allegedly, with impossible questions such as "How many windows are in the White House?" and "How many bubbles are in a bar of soap?"), segregated public facilities, and atrocities committed by the Ku Klux Klan. The rationale for the crimes of the KKK, Liu explained, was the threat posed by an energized black electorate primed to elect black politicians. Harkening back to the Chinese revolution, he reminded the audience of a parallel: just as the Chinese people had taken up arms to defend themselves against European imperialists, African Americans stood on the verge of their own righteous revolution.

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[107] Liu Liangmo had traveled extensively in the United States in the 1940s to rally mass support for Chinese resistance against Japan. Liu also collaborated with African American singer and political activist Paul Robeson. Robeson would go on to perform "March of the Volunteers," which would eventually become the Chinese national anthem, in both English and Chinese at a series of benefit concerts in the United States. See Richard Jean So, *Transpacific Community: America, China, and the Rise and Fall of a Cultural Network* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016): pp. 94-121.

[108] "天下大事报告会请示政协副秘书长刘良莫同志讲支持美国黑人反对种族歧视的正义斗争 [Meeting to Report on World Events Invites Deputy Secretary of the Municipal People's Political Consultative Conference Liu Liangmo to Discuss Support for the African American Just Struggle Against Racial Discrimination]," August 8, 1964, File No. C26-2-84-152, SMA.

Parallel to Thomas Burgess' observation of China-Zanzibar relations in the early 1960s, which will be explored further in Chapter 2, this informational campaign in Shanghai engaged African American activism "on the abstract level of memory and history, [rooted in the belief that African Americans] were reenacting elements of their own recent past."[109] This revolutionary comparison highlighted the exigency of African American uprisings and forecast their success in lockstep with the progression of the Chinese Revolution to Chinese audiences otherwise unfamiliar with U.S. history. To name the U.S. government as the prime enabler of racial injustice, not individual perpetrators or Southern segregationists, conveniently collapsed a complex problem into a popularly digestible one about state violence and mass uprising, relatable for Chinese citizens who recalled their defeat of a corrupt Nationalist regime not long ago. Decontextualized images of African American rebellion and U.S. state violence further supported this narrative. Chinese newspapers from *People's Daily* to regional gazettes featured photographs of African Americans protesting on city streets and their assaults by police.



Fig. 2 – The caption reads: "July 18 in New York: U.S. anti-riot police on July 16 at a mass gathering to protest the violence against Black children. Photograph depicts the police in helmets arresting a Black protester."[110]

How did Liu, or other Chinese representatives, obtain their factual command of the civil rights movement? In North Vietnam, popular reporting about African Americans consisted of information taken

[109] G. Thomas Burgess, "Mao in Zanzibar: Nationalism, Discipline, and the (De)Construction of Afro-Asian Solidarities," in Christopher J. Lee ed., *Making a World after Empire: The Bandung Moment and its Political Afterlives* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2010): p. 197.
[110] "Untitled photograph," *Liaoning ribao*, August 11, 1964.

from U.S. newspapers and magazines. Judy Wu identifies Pham Kac Lam, who once worked for General Vo Nguyen Giap before joining the propaganda committee, as the individual within the country who was responsible for the task of combing through the latest U.S. media outlets for stories he could reframe as "weaknesses" of the United States for his Vietnamese readership; these included pieces about civil rights and the Black Panther Party.[111] It is difficult to ascertain all the names of the individuals who assumed this role in Beijing, but the process by which they carried out their work is likely resonant with that of Lam's. Among them was Clarence Adams, a Black prisoner-of-war from Tennessee who, having grown up under segregation and frustrated with the racism he encountered during military service, elected to remain in China in lieu of repatriation after the Korean War. China, Adams wrote, provided "the right to create a good life" that he did not believe he could attain at home.[112]

Adams was one of the foreign-born translators assigned to Foreign Languages Press (FLP), where he worked from 1961 to 1966.[113] While completing language training in Beijing, Adams married a Chinese woman before going on to receive an undergraduate degree from Wuhan University. In his memoir, he recalls that during his time at FLP, he was able to access various U.S.-based popular publications, including *TIME*, *Life*, and *Newsweek*. The content in these magazines kept him abreast of the progress of the civil rights movement. From afar, he celebrated the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act as an indication that his mixed-race family could live safely in his hometown.[114] Ironically, it was this knowledge of the Civil Rights Act, which amounted to a performative gesture in official Chinese narratives, that spurred Adams to resettle in the United States. The final straw that sealed his decision to leave China was the ire he drew from Chinese authorities at the launch of the Cultural Revolution in

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[111] Judy Wu, *Radicals on the Road: Internationalism, Orientalism, and Feminism During the Vietnam Era* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013): p. 118.
[112] Clarence Adams, *An American Dream: The Life of an African American Soldier and POW Who Spent Twelve Years in China* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2007): p. 65.
[113] The FLP, a publishing house founded in Beijing in 1952, took on a critical role in promoting Mao's works in the global realm. It would be responsible for the translation and distribution of the Little Red Book in more than one hundred countries from 1966 to 1967, in addition to other transnationally circulated propaganda like *China Pictorial*, *China Reconstructs*, and *Peking Review*. For a short history of the FLP, see Lanjun Xu, "Translation and Internationalism," in Alexander Cook ed., *Mao's Little Red Book: A Global History*, pp. 76-94
[114] Clarence Adams, *An American Dream: The Life of an African American Soldier and POW Who Spent Twelve Years in China,* p. 102

1966, for the close relationships that he developed with African students and diplomats in Beijing. These African visitors, curious about the lives of ordinary Chinese citizens but unable to speak with or access knowledge about them, had turned to Adams as a source of insight. Consequently, Adams was harshly interrogated, removed from his post at FLP, and dispatched to work at a textile mill in Shandong Province.[115] Deeply frustrated by the curtailing of his political freedoms, Adams negotiated a return to the U.S. with his wife and children.

A few more steps down the path of unintended consequences, Black radical activists in the early to mid-1960s formulated a global analysis that advocated the primacy of race over class, relying on the success of Chinese socialism as a logic of legitimation. In December 1964, the editorial committee of the Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM), the first Black nationalist organization in the U.S. to model the tenets of Maoism, celebrated Zanzibari nationalist Abdulrahman Mohammed Babu's speech in Harlem for its "forward tendency," which "lies in the fact that the oppressed peoples (colonial peoples), or what we call the 'Bandung' world are beginning to link up internationally, to unite against the white slavemasters."[116] It is no coincidence that Babu had been the first representative of East or Central Africa to visit the People's Republic of China in 1959; as well as among the earliest advocates of Maoism as the mode of economic development for independent East Africa.

The sentiments expressed by RAM encapsulated the calls of many Black Power activists to political self-determination, alternative paths to modernity, and the systematic undoing of racial hierarchy on a communal and international scale. "We are at war with white America," RAM founding member Max Stanford declared, "[and our] philosophy… states that black people of the world (darker races, black,

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[115] Clarence Adams, *An American Dream*, pp. 106-108

[116] Editorial Committee, "Babu & Malcolm X," *Black America: Theoretical Journal of RAM-Revolutionary Action Movement, Black Liberation Front of the U.S.A.* (Summer-Fall 1965): p. 2. Founded in 1963 as a clandestine collective, the RAM aimed to train a vanguard for Black nationalist revolution, one that would employ guerilla warfare to liberate blacks from the bonds of colonialism and imperialist capitalism. The RAM drew its membership primarily from students and urban activists and intellectuals. See Maxwell Stanford, "Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM): A Case Study of an Urban Revolutionary Movement in Western Capitalist Society" (M.A. thesis, Atlanta University, 1986).

yellow, brown, red, oppressed peoples) are all enslaved by the same forces."[117] As such, the RAM posited a definition of "black" that was relational rather than biological, encompassing the entirety of the non-white world that suffered in similar fashions under European domination.[118] This reading of identity and power did not map evenly onto 1960s Chinese analyses of race, global order, and prospects for revolution. But the RAM leadership employed Maoist theories and rhetoric of guerilla warfare and cultural revolution in any case, while also advocating Black nationalist insurgency within the United States as an essential link in a worldwide anti-imperialist insurrection.

Evocations of Birmingham and the assassination of Medgar Evers encapsulated the race-specific nature of Chinese appeals to African American activists; the politics of race stood at the very heart of Chinese outreach to Black Power activists. In the mid-1960s however, African American activists who looked to China embraced internationalism as the flipside to Black nationalism; they attached significant purchase to China's racial positioning and celebrated Chinese social and military achievements as akin to their own. China's successful detonation of the nuclear bomb in October 1964 marked a high tide. Chinese narratives deemed the event a turning point in international politics and an anti-imperialist victory for all of the Afro-Asian world, breaking the Western stranglehold on nuclear weaponry. Robert Williams responded with corresponding enthusiasm, asserting that China's bomb is "the Afro-American's bomb, because the Chinese people are blood brothers to the Afro-American and all those who fight against racism and imperialism."[119] Like Zhang Qi, Williams engaged liberally in a politics of analogy that paralleled the Chinese past with the African American present. But taking a different tack, Williams chose to underscore racial co-identification as the bottom line that facilitated this cross-racial equivalency. In claiming China's success as one in the grand campaign to dismantle "racism and imperialism," he insisted on racial oppression as the primary contradiction in world history and politics. In his expression

[117] Max Stanford, "We are at War with White America / The World Black Revolution," *Black America: Theoretical Journal of RAM-Revolutionary Action Movement, Black Liberation Front of the U.S.A* (Fall 1964): pp. 11-12.
[118] Bill Mullen, "Transnational Correspondence: Robert F. Williams, Detroit, and the Black Power Era," *Works and Days* 20 (2002): p. 192.
[119] Robert Williams, "Hallelujah: The Meek Shall Inherit the Earth," *The Crusader* (October 1964), p. 9.

of joy about news of the bomb, Williams believed that China's success was a part of the grand campaign to dismantle "racism and imperialism." Indeed, Chinese authorities did not trust that African American nationalists subscribed to their theory of race, class, and imperialism in full. They monitored every word that Robert Williams and his wife Mabel spoke during their time in China for evidence of a grave political transgression: prioritizing racial liberation over the broad-based, anti-capitalist revolutionary transformation of the United States. But Williams had become disenchanted with the Soviet line precisely because he perceived it to subsume race under class, accusing Black communists in the United States of using Marxist analysis to justify a white supremacist international order.[120]

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Robert Williams, who would relocate his family to Beijing in 1966, first visited China in fall 1963 and again in fall 1964 from Havana, his home in exile since 1961.[121] In October 1963, a special committee charged with his reception gathered to discuss the political underpinnings of their task; they summarized their goals as follows: "[The guest] doesn't understand us, and while abroad, has also heard a variety of false Western claims about us… Our conclusion is that we must help him on two fronts. We must emphasize that race struggle is class struggle and that racial nationalism cannot counter racial nationalism. In addition, it is through our receiving of him that he can attain a 'correct understanding' of us."[122] Indeed, the draft of Shanghai Mayor Ke Qingshi's speech welcoming Williams to his city, which condemned the many manifestations of U.S. racism, shows that a higher-ranking official had scribbled a rejoinder to conclude with the line "The world's white, black, yellow, and brown races will see its

[120] Timothy Tyson, *Radio Free Dixie: Robert F. Williams and the Roots of Black Power* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001): p. 293.

[121] It is important to note that the PRC handpicked its roster of African American visitors. Before Williams traveled to China, for example, his friend William Worthy, an African American journalist, had recruited his help in securing himself and two cinematographers visas to China. After Worthy's initial travels to China in 1957, all of his subsequent requests for visas had been denied. When Williams brought this issue to the attention of Chinese officials, they ambiguously explained that the PRC's relationship with Worthy was complicated. See "接待美国黑人领袖罗伯特威廉全家的计划 [Plan for Receiving African American Leader Robert Williams and His Family]," C-36-2-215, SMA.

[122] "美国黑人领袖罗伯特威廉接待工作小组谈论提要 [Discussion Notes from Working Group for Receiving African American Leader Robert Williams]," C36-2-175-195, SMA.

workers, peasants, revolutionary intellectuals, progressive capitalists, and all other progressives unite [to support] the struggle against the racial discrimination of U.S. imperialism."[123] The agenda for Williams' 1964 visit, meticulously laid out in a report that circulated between major municipalities, further emphasized the national interests served in receiving Williams: "It will take us a step further in proving that we staunchly oppose U.S. imperialism [and support the goals of] racial liberation movements. [We will also] raise Williams' ideological consciousness, solidify and expand his influence and impact in the African American struggle."[124] As such, Chinese authorities kept close tabs on Williams' political "evolution," particularly with regards to his opinions on ideas of racial nationalism, socialist internationalism, and Soviet revisionism.

By the conclusion of his stay in 1964, Williams' condemnations of Soviet apathy to racial oppression had garnered him a measurable degree of trust. In reference to his travels in the Soviet Union, Williams complained that "The people there knew very little about [our] struggle, and in speaking with the African students [there], we found that they hadn't heard of [the 16th Street Baptist Church bombing] in Birmingham. The Soviets had moved news of this struggle to the backburner." In addition, he consistently aired grievances about the Cuban government, which he believed to be capitulating to the Soviet political line as a result of its financial dependence on Moscow. He confided that during his years in exile, Cuban officials dissuaded him from any discussions about race in his Radio Free Dixie broadcasts and would arrange for "capitalist music" to be played on the program in place of the Black protest music he requested.

Williams' initial admiration for the Cuban Revolution and its achievements in racial equality had been apparent in the late 1950s.[125] Fidel Castro's camaraderie with the African American community in

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[123] "中国人民保卫世界和平委员会上海分会关于接待罗伯特威廉夫妇的计划, 主要问题请示决定记录, 日程, 情况汇报, 新闻报导, 小结讨论摘要等 [Plans, Record of Decisions Regarding Important Questions, Itineraries, Reports, News, and Summaries of the Chinese People's Association for World Peace, Shanghai Commission's Reception of Robert Williams and His Wife]," C36-2-175, SMA.

[124] "接待美国黑人领袖罗伯特威廉全家的计划 [Plan for Receiving American Black Leader Robert Williams and His Family]."

[125] Cynthia Young, *Soul Power: Culture, Radicalism, and the Making of a U.S. Third World Left* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006): p. 26.

Harlem during his visits to New York City cemented Williams' early affinities for Cuba. In his 1962 *Negroes with Guns*, written in Havana, Williams explained his exile in Cuba as a natural extension of his faith in the Cuban solution to racial hierarchy and discrimination: "I could think of no other place in the Western Hemisphere where a Negro would be treated as a human being, where the race problem would be understood."[126] But by the time of his first visit to Beijing in 1963, open conflict had ensued between Williams and the chairman of the Communist Party in Havana, who expressed concern that Williams' promulgation of Black nationalism might instigate a movement for Black separatism in Oriente, the easternmost province of Cuba where many Afro-Cubans lived.[127] During his years in Havana, Williams' letters to old friends underscored the depths of his frustrations with Cuban leaders who, out of financial necessity, never strayed from Moscow's policy of working-class unity as the solution to all social contradictions. To Mae Mallory, a prominent civil rights activist in New York, he wrote that "The Russian line is to love the white yankee and kiss his ass," while to Harry Haywood, he confessed his disappointment that "I find many of [the Cuban communists and CPUSA representatives in Cuba] to be very notorious racists. Any Afro-American who believes in self-defense and labors militantly for human rights is branded [by them to be] a black racist and considered ripe for liquidation."[128]

But Chinese officials also sought to temper Williams' Black nationalism, unwilling to accept his support for the Nation of Islam. Anna Louise Strong, a Nebraskan journalist who lived in Beijing from the 1950s until her death in 1970, warned them that African American Muslims promoted a policy of complete segregation and resisted contact with white progressives, an admonition that easily mapped on to their distrust of all forms racial nationalism. For his part, Williams boasted that he pulled the strings for *Muhammad Speaks*, the newspaper of the Nation of Islam (NOI), to print the full text of Mao's proclamation in support of the African American struggle. Williams asserted that his views have become increasingly aligned with those of the NOI, offering to suggest the names of NOI-affiliated reporters to

[126] Robert Williams, *Negroes with Guns* (New York: Marzani and Munsell, 1962): p. 64.
[127] Mark Sawyer, *Racial Politics in Post-Revolutionary Cuba* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006): p. 90.
[128] Robert Williams, as quoted in Timothy Tyson, *Radio Free Dixie: Robert F. Williams and the Roots of Black Power*, p. 293

visit China.[129] Disapprovingly, Chinese officials noted that "In discussions over the past few days, Williams has expressed great interest in [the NOI], arguing that it can overturn white supremacist rule [and achieve] black liberation. He also claims that in the 1930s, some black Muslims joined CPUSA and only left due to disagreement on the race question."[130] There is little evidence to suggest that there existed significant cross-membership between the NOI, founded in 1930 and distinguished from many other African American radical organizations in its uncompromising anti-communism, and CPUSA.[131] But Williams' insistence that Black nationalism in itself could be the most effective vehicle for African American liberation, consistent if not compatible with class struggle, drew clear suspicion from his hosts.

This issue of race and class continued to trouble the Chinese representatives assigned to surveil Williams. Sensing pushback for his unrelenting advocacy of Black nationalism, Williams countered that he only opposed white Americans when they were proven to have committed injustices or wrongs. In actuality, he claimed, white American communists first attacked him for his belief that the question of African American liberation is also one of race, labeling him a "black racist." At a press conference he later hosted, Williams declared that "Not all white people are racists. Some are our allies, but these people are few. Not all Americans are savages, but we must ask ourselves, when [white supremacy] committed all those atrocities, where were the Americans who stood for justice?" Chinese authorities singled out this statement as questionable because while it gestured towards Williams' moderated take on the racial culpability of white Americans, he had given a cold shoulder to the handful of white American communists who were in China, never once attempting to contact any of them.

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[129] Towards the end of his three-year exile in China, Williams explicitly declared that *Muhammad Speaks* was the U.S.-based newspaper delivering the most balanced assessments of white supremacy and Black liberation. See Robert Williams, "Tell It to the World and Tell it Like It is!" *The Crusader* (Summer 1969): p. 21.

[130] "中国人民保卫世界和平委员会上海分会关于接待罗伯特威廉夫妇的计划, 主要问题请示决定记录, 日程, 情况汇报, 新闻报导, 小结讨论摘要等 [Plans, Record of Decisions Regarding Important Questions, Itineraries, Reports, News, and Summaries of the Chinese People's Association for World Peace, Shanghai Commission's Reception of Robert Williams and His Wife]."

[131] Garrett Felber, "'Those Who Say Don't Know and Those Who Know Don't Say': The Nation of Islam and the Politics of Black Nationalism" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 2017): p. 5.

Williams filtered most evidence of social and economic progress in China through a racial lens. At a tour of Tsinghua University in Beijing, intended to showcase Chinese higher education, Williams announced that the sight of such an institution "shatters the myth of white supremacy," and presented a model for historically Black colleges and universities.[132] Observations that Williams placed an undue "over-emphasis" on race dominated the internal Chinese records of his visit in 1963, presaging the close monitoring he would receive on his political trajectory for the time to come. The following year, a September 1964 edition of "Report on the Situation of Foreign Visitors (外宾情况汇报)" finally alleged "positive" developments as to Williams' ideological stances, as he asserted in a conversation that one, Moscow stood aligned with the U.S. government and that two, he actually preferred to see an electoral victory for Republican presidential candidate Barry Goldwater, who could then show the "real face" of the United States.[133] For Chinese officials who accompanied him, the arc of Williams' beliefs served as a yardstick for their objective of seeing the course of civil rights activism take turns towards militancy and anti-capitalist revolution.

The relationship between Robert Williams and Chinese authorities carried a similar valence to that between the Black Panther Party and both the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam, which were defined by mutual benefit in political exchange. During Black Panther Minister of Information Eldridge Cleaver's exile in Algeria in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the DRV and the NLF engaged Cleaver as a foreign dignitary; they leveraged with the Algerian government to grant him greater access to space and resources.[134] More immeasurably, their respect for Cleaver also bestowed on him revolutionary legitimacy, the kind of international status that the Panthers, as an anti-statist organization that sought to implement its own foreign diplomacy, pursued. In turn,

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[132] "中国人民保卫世界和平委员会上海分会关于接待罗伯特威廉夫妇的计划, 主要问题请示决定记录, 日程, 情况汇报, 新闻报导, 小结讨论摘要等 [Plans, Record of Decisions Regarding Important Questions, Itineraries, Reports, News, and Summaries of the Chinese People's Association for World Peace, Shanghai Commission's Reception of Robert Williams and His Wife]."

[133] "接待美国黑人领袖罗伯特威廉全家的计划 [Plan for Receiving African American Leader Robert Williams and His Family]."

[134] Judy Wu, *Radicals on the Road*, pp. 117-118

Cleaver ensured that the Vietnam War was depicted as a heroic struggle in the Black Panther newspaper and Ho Chi Minh as an important leader for the broader Third World. In a similar vein, Williams had needed material support for his political activities, revolutionary legitimacy, and as a fugitive in exile from the United States, the security of affiliation with a nation-state. Williams was, as Wu described of Cleaver, an "anticitizen."[135] In exchange for the provision of such resources, the Chinese government obtained the symbolic privileges of hosting an outspoken activist with tremendous influence in global networks of Black radicalism.

As a result, Williams featured prominently in Chinese news and media, always present at public events in which Chinese officials declared their empathy for the African American struggle. Williams himself was willing to engage in the sort of sensationalist denouncement of U.S. atrocities on which Chinese propaganda thrived. In November of 1963, Williams held a massive press conference in Beijing, with over eighty journalists in attendance. He praised the determination with which the fight for Black liberation would carry on even in face of tear gas, bullets, and police batons. In a symbolic gesture, he pulled out the warrant for his arrest and with his finger on the image, announced to the audience: "This is the best evidence of 'democracy' and 'freedom' in the United States." As the *People's Daily* then explained, the U.S. government has already printed 250,000 copies of this warrant, plastered all around the country, instructing anyone who sees Williams to shoot him.[136]

Both of Williams' visits proceeded with pomp and circumstance. In 1963, the CCP organized a banquet in their honor, one attended by African diplomats in Beijing and presided over by Guo Moruo. At the ceremony, Guo expressed that the entire Chinese nation condemned the "monstrous attacks" against African Americans, carried out by white supremacists in the U.S. South whose actions were excused and

[135] Judy Wu, *Radicals on the Road*, p. 114
[136] "罗伯特威廉向中外记者透露美国种族歧视罪行，呼唤世界人民支持美国黑人的正义斗争 [Robert Williams Exposes U.S. Racist Crimes to Foreign and Chinese Journalists, Exhorting the World's People to Support the African American Struggle]," *Guangming ribao*, November 2, 1963.

abetted by the Kennedy presidential administration.[137] At Guo's request, every guest then stood up and raised their fists in mourning for "the martyrs" who perished in Birmingham. Shortly thereafter, a crowd of more than ten thousand gathered at the Great Hall of the People in Tiananmen Square to demonstrate their support for the civil rights movement; Williams delivered a searing sermon to the audience that concluded with a vow to carry out the battle for freedom until death.

In 1964, Williams' hosts enthusiastically complied with his request to tour areas inhabited by ethnic minorities. In Hohhot, Williams marveled at the rapid economic and social progress that Inner Mongolia has witnessed since 1949. He drew the parallel that "the oppression, exploitation, discrimination and other such circumstances experienced by the inner Mongolians before liberation are just like the suffering of African Americans today."[138] As his entourage toured the old city, lined with street vendors hawking vegetables and fruit, Williams called out the "lies" the U.S. government spun that under communism, the Chinese people constantly faced famine and starvation. Time and again, ordinary citizens— "nomads, students, and workers"—approached him to declare their solidarity with the plight of African Americans. The capstone moment came during a music and dance production held specifically for the occasion of Williams' visit, when a male soprano performed two songs dedicated to the African American struggle: "We Shall Overcome," the African American protest song and another piece by a Chinese composer, entitled "We Support You, American Black Brothers!" Mesmerized, Williams exclaimed to the Chinese officials accompanying him that he could not believe he was audience to the anthem of the Black freedom struggle in Inner Mongolia. He requested a recording of the song that he could play for Black audiences in the United States.

Through humor and light-hearted conviviality, the Chinese statesmen assigned to accompany Williams strove to cultivate his political loyalties. The transnational camaraderie between the two camps

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[137] "特大宴会欢迎罗伯特威廉夫妇宾主欢聚一堂，恭祝美国黑人的正义斗争不断取得新胜利 [Large Banquet Welcomes Mr. and Mrs. Robert Williams, Guests Together Wish the African American Just Struggle Continues to Achieve New Victories]," *Renmin ribao*, September 27, 1963.
[138] "接待美国黑人领袖罗伯特威廉全家的计划 [Plan for Receiving African American Leader Robert Williams and His Family]."

was reinforced with facetious reminders that they shared a common political foe. Given the pretext of the Bay of Pigs Incident, Williams joked to Chinese officials that he wanted to ask the Cubans, "Where is your Khrushchev now?" A few days later, when Khrushchev's resignation came up in discussion, Williams remarked that perhaps, he had stepped down not due to "health reasons" as the Soviet media claimed, but rather, ill "political health." At the same banquet hosted by Guo Moruo, where guests honored Birmingham protesters, Williams insinuated to Guo that "The weather in Moscow is too cold. This climate right here is exactly what I like." Then, at the prompting of Chinese officials and of his own accord, Williams laid out the nuances of his relationship to Fidel Castro and to Cuba. He revealed that most recently, Castro had actually written him to request information about this visit to China. In response, to the surprise of Cuban officials, Williams denounced the Soviet Union's false sympathies for the experiences of African Americans and praised Chinese communism. Ultimately, he concluded, though Cuba supported him in his personal endeavours, its "internal revisionism" prevented any endorsement of the Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM), the underground Black nationalist organization that elected him president. Castro, it turned out, ignored Williams' ask of $24,000 each year to fund the guerrilla activities of the RAM.

Irony figured prominently in Williams' framing of a deceptive, manipulative U.S. state. Upon seeing the Tibetan Tripitaka at the National Minorities Institute in Beijing, Williams asked to be photographed with the collection, explaining that the U.S. government long relied on the myth of "communist godlessness" to dissuade African Americans from communism. To press his point to ethnic Tibetan students at the institute, he exclaimed, "The Yankees say you all are suffering under the communist party's violent authoritarian rule, awaiting their rescue!"[139] In Shanghai, Williams visited the Cultural Palace, which for this occasion displayed memorabilia of Mao's 1963 proclamation as well as a translated copy of his own book *Negroes with Guns*. Here, he proceeded to chat with a group of retired factory workers; they contrasted the lack of social benefits the elderly received in the United States with

[139] "接待美国黑人领袖罗伯特威廉全家的计划 [Plan for Receiving African American Leader Robert Williams and His Family]."

their welfare in China and iterated their support for the dismantling of racial discrimination in every form. A different group of workers performed "We Shall Overcome" and two other songs entitled "We Want Cuba, Not the Yankees" and "The World Proletariat Unite." Deeply moved, Williams shook hands with all the workers, expressing his conviction that they stood as one.

At Huangpu Park by the Bund, Williams watched kids play by a tattered sign preserved from colonial Shanghai, one proclaiming "No Dogs and Chinese Allowed."[140] Upon sight of him, the children encircled him and sang "The East is Red." A throng of students at the Children's Palace had presented him with the trademark red scarf of Chinese youth. A somber Williams ruminated that Black children in the United States rarely ever enjoyed such a carefree environment; if they attempted to enter any "Children's Palace," they would have been jailed or bitten by police dogs. "But one day," he predicted, "our children can be like Chinese children and achieve liberation."[141] Throughout the cross-country trek, Chinese officials employed such devices of sentimentality—music, children, performance, reminders of China's colonial past—to reinforce Williams' affinities for socialist China. In the span of one visit, representatives from various geographic, ethnic and revolutionary corners of Chinese society verbalized their commitment to supporting the African American freedom struggle. They did so in factories, schools, and the Inner Mongolian steppes. In a particularly demonstrative episode, Williams was greeted by an enthusiastic group of children upon his arrival in the city of Yan'ji in northeastern Jilin Province, all of

[140] Jeffrey Wasserstrom and Robert Bickers cast into doubt the rigidity of rules barring Chinese entrance into Huangpu Park, the homogeneity of Western attitudes in Old Shanghai, and the existence of the sign itself. However, that has not hindered the proliferation of myths and stories surrounding it. Williams' encounter with the sign did not mark the first time that its symbolism had been deployed to suggest China's historically rooted empathy for black liberation worldwide. In a 1959 speech delivered to a Chinese audience at Peking University, W.E.B. Du Bois had drawn resonant analogies between China's semi-colonial past and Africa present: "Speak, China, and tell your truth to Africa and the world. What people have been despised as you have? Who more than you have been rejected of men? Recall when lordly Britishers threw the rickshaw money on the ground to avoid touching a filthy hand. Forget not, the time when in Shanghai no Chinaman dare set foot in a park which he paid for." See W.E.B. Du Bois, "China and Africa," *Peking Review*, vol. 2 (March 1959): p. 12 and Robert Bickers and Jeffrey Wasserstrom, "Shanghai's 'Dogs and Chinese Not Admitted' Sign: Legend, History and Contemporary Symbol," *The China Quarterly* 14 (1995): pp. 244-266.

[141] "接待美国黑人领袖罗伯特威廉全家的计划 [Plan for Receiving African American Leader Robert Williams and His Family]."

them belonging to the Korean ethnic minority.[142] Immediately, Williams called out the stark difference between his colloquial reception as a Black man in China and in his home country; when children see a Black person in the United States, he explained, they yell racial epithets. Whether ordinary Chinese citizens, without the intervention of the state, actually held Black visitors in such high regard is more dubious, but these street-side overtures captured the heart and imagination of Williams and his family. [143] Williams' elder son, then fifteen years old, expressed the fraternity that he felt with Chinese students upon touring the No. 15 Middle School in Beijing, announcing that the Chinese Revolution is perhaps one that could be carried out by all the world's oppressed peoples.[144]

Upon his return to Havana, Williams spread the message about the social progress he bore witness to in China, with his public recollections emphasizing Chinese sensitivities to matters of race and racism. In his newsletter, Williams touted that ordinary Chinese citizens "whole-heartedly support Afro-Americans who struggle against Jim Crow… in the so-called free world of the racist USA. In the factories, in the store windows, on billboards, in recreation centers and conspicuous places throughout the land, huge posters proclaim the Chinese people's support for oppressed Afro-Americans."[145] Reporting on his 1964 visit, Williams singled out China's understandings of race as uniquely praiseworthy relative even to its speed of technological advancement. He cited the increase in road traffic, the rapid move away from natural gas and towards gasoline as fuel for vehicles, and the wide availability of consumer goods. None of these achievements however, left as deep an imprint as the expressions of solidarity from the

[142] The interplay of Chinese racial discourses and its own ethnic policies—pertaining to the categorization and management of minority groups within China—will be explored further in the third chapter.
[143] In October of 1956, the propaganda committee of the Shanghai Commission for Receiving Foreign Guests issued a citywide notice titled "To Pay Attention to Black Visitors." It noted that "Our government and our people extend our deepest respect to black people, because they experience the same oppression under imperialism as we once did, and carry on the same brave, long-term struggle against imperialism. But we also have some individuals who, because they have never interacted with black visitors, lack understanding, or out of curiosity, instigated various incidents in Shanghai in which they did not treat them with respect or politeness. This includes onlookers laughing at them, shrieking loudly, and even housewives not wanting to shake hands with them, or attempting to keep children away from them." The original file is from No. B255-2-90-91, SMA. See also Philip Liu, "Petty Annoyances? Revisiting John Emmanuel Hevi's An African Student in China After 50 Years," *China: An International Journal* 11 (2013): pp. 131-145.
[144] "接待美国黑人领袖罗伯特威廉全家的计划 [Plan for Receiving African American Leader Robert Williams and His Family]."
[145] Robert Williams, "China: New Hope of Oppressed Humanity," *The Crusader* (February 1964): p. 7.

Chinese people. As he recalled, "Even the most isolated peasants in the remotest reaches… keep abreast of current affairs… They display a great insight into the U.S. race issue and express great sympathy for their oppressed Afro-American brothers."[146] Cuba, where Williams experienced such chilly receptions to Black nationalism, served as the unnamed foil.

As Williams became the preeminent African American activist in Chinese politics, the position he assumed captured the contradictions embedded within Chinese narratives of African American revolution. His advocacy of armed rebellion seemed to affirm the Maoist reading of events, but Mao's insistence on the supremacy of class struggle, overriding racial divides, jarred with Williams' conception of Black nationalism and racial liberation. Sidney Rittenberg, a white American journalist living in Beijing who polished Mao's English-language response to one of the first letters from Williams in 1963, believed that Mao personally instrumentalized him to prove the hollowness of racial identities.[147] Rittenberg recalled that in early August of 1963, he was summoned to a meeting with representatives of various African guerilla groups. After distributing copies of the response to Williams that Rittenberg had written to the audience, Mao asked Rittenberg to stand up. "He is a white man, he is an American but he is our friend" Mao said, but "Who is Chiang Kai-Shek? He is a Chinese, his skin is yellow, just like mine."[148] For Mao, Rittenberg's presence in Beijing embodied his conception of a multi-racial coalition against capitalism taking shape in the United States. Williams however, whose letter served as the pretext for the gathering, ignored Rittenberg during his visits to Beijing, and on the issue of a multiracial working-class coalition, his theory of change diverged from Mao's. Williams condemned all white Americans for prioritizing their hold on power above Black liberation, and singled out the "white new left" for regarding "the savage oppression of the black man [as] of minimal importance, [feigning] desire to liberate the 'white working class' while all others are mere subordinates." Only after African Americans stood up to demand justice did these "leftists" rise to conspire to dominate this burgeoning political movement. Though Williams

[146] Robert Williams, "China: America's Shades of Waterloo," *The Crusader* (March 1965): p. 6.
[147] Sidney Rittenberg and Amanda Bennett, *The Man Who Stayed Behind*, p. 269
[148] Sidney Rittenberg and Amanda Bennett, *The Man Who Stayed Behind*, p. 272

later acknowledged that "there are exceptions to the rule," he also insisted that "At this juncture of our long and arduous march to human dignity we had best concern ourselves with the negative aspect of [this] menacing universal danger."[149]

Williams' advocacy of race as the most salient social division was not the sole aspect of his work that garnered erasure in the Chinese narrative. Before emerging as an icon of armed self-defense and Black radicalism, Williams, as president of his local NAACP chapter, led peaceful campaigns throughout the 1950s to desegregate the public libraries and swimming pools of Monroe, North Carolina; it was only when confronted with brutal retaliation that Williams began to espouse more militant beliefs alongside non-violent direct action, publishing his popular book *Negroes with Guns* in 1962.[150] Chinese narratives de-historicized the progression of Williams' views on militancy and revolution. For his part, Williams sometimes abetted in this flattening of the complexity of his beliefs. As he increasingly came into conflict with Cuban authorities, he sensed the possibility of obtaining from Beijing the platform and resources he could not obtain in Havana. As such, Williams accentuated stories about the violence of his persecution at the hands of the U.S. state and the unique sensitivity of the Chinese people to the race question, as compared to the Cubans and the Soviets.

The ebb of Williams' faith in Cuba occurred just as his enthusiasm for Maoism took off, at the same time that he became acquainted with Afro-Cuban experiences of interpersonal racism.[151] It was in contrast to these constraints placed on Williams' political activities in Cuba that the grandiosity of the platform that he received in China would feel markedly different.[152] When Cuban authorities disappointed his hopes in their construct of an egalitarian and multiracial society, he carried them to China, where he believed that new policies regarding minority nationalities attested to the Chinese realization of a multiethnic society of different religions and cultures co-existing in harmony. Ironically however,

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[149] Robert Williams, "The New Left: Old Ideas in a New Front," *The Crusader* (July 1967): p. 9.
[150] Timothy Tyson, *Radio Free Dixie: Robert F. Williams and the Roots of Black Power*, p. 290.
[151] Robeson Taj Frazier, "Thunder in the East: China, Exiled Crusaders, and the Unevenness of Black Internationalism," *American Quarterly* 63 (2011): pp. 937-939.
[152] Robeson Taj Frazier, "Thunder in the East: China, Exiled Crusaders, and the Unevenness of Black Internationalism," p. 943

Chinese authorities actually took no issues with the Cuban position on race and class. Throughout the early 1960s, they celebrated Cuban declarations of solidarity with African American activists, reporting with enthusiasm about an August 1963 rally in Havana's Parque Central in support of the March on Washington. Reflecting the Chinese belief that class struggle was paramount, a Chinese representative at the Havana rally declared his confidence that African Americans would soon achieve their freedom as they unite with white progressives.[153] How then did the Chinese state seek to more compellingly convey their empathy for Black nationalism and movements for racial liberation?

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African American visitors like Robert Williams in early to mid-1960s China bore witness to an array of Chinese artistic and literary works that grappled with African American history and political movements, whether in translation or in original prose. Far more than cultural curiosities or relics of the era, they are significant for their ubiquity and mundanity. They indicate that the social scale of Chinese engagements of African American struggle extended beyond official rhetoric. The prevailing narrative in these cultural productions was not only one of triumph; similar to the public lectures and information sessions in Shanghai, they relied on detail and sentimentality to communicate to Chinese audiences otherwise unfamiliar with the subject the terror and trauma inflicted by slavery, segregation, and racial discrimination in the United States. These pieces also beckoned the later appeal that Chinese cultural trends would hold for African American artists and intellectuals in the late 1960s and the early 1970s.

Cultural nationalism would serve as an important arc along which African American activists perceived China as a model for liberation, but temporally, this engagement did not overlap with the proliferation of Chinese productions that featured the stories and images of Black liberation. The period of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, from 1966 to the mid-1970s, left a deep imprint on the trajectory of African American radicalism; its call to upend the old socio-cultural order dovetailed with the desire of Black radicals to recast art as a building block of revolution and undo the internalization of

[153] "哈瓦那集会支持美国黑人斗争 [Havana Gathering Supports the African American Struggle]," *Renmin Ribao*, August 30, 1963.

mainstream Euro-American aesthetic norms.[154] The Black Panther Party and cultural nationalists like Ron Karenga, founder of the Pan-Africanist holiday Kwanzaa, harbored bitter political disagreements with each other but all embraced behavioral transformation—the curtailing of excessive drinking, drugs, and sexual promiscuity—as a critical aspect of revolution.[155] A parallel impulse existed on the part of the RAM to promote self-transformation vis-à-vis cultural revolution, though in this instance, the parallel with Maoist ethics was explicit and intentional.[156] The paradox however, is that the Cultural Revolution itself blunted the production of popular Chinese intellectual and cultural works that centered African American history and politics.

The Institute of American History and Culture at Nankai University in the city of Tianjin, at which African American history had comprised one of three branches of study since 1964, ceased its research and writing upon commencement of the Cultural Revolution.[157] Vicki Garvin, a Black educator and activist from New York who settled in China in 1964, had been approved to design and teach a class on African American history and politics at Shanghai Foreign Languages Institute. When her initial proposal of readings was rejected for their association with the Soviet Union, she decided to use the Maoist notion of contradictions to present the trajectory of African American movements as characterized by continual tension between strategies of compromise and militancy.[158] Garvin's notes indicate that the class was effective and popular among students, but the Cultural Revolution quickly drew the course, and Garvin's position at the Foreign Languages Institute, to a close, even as the idea of the Revolution itself propelled African American innovation in arts and aesthetics.[159] Instead, the span between the fall of 1963

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[154] Robin Kelley, *Freedom Dreams: The Black Radical Imagination* (Boston: South End Press, 2002): p. 91.
[155] Daniel Matlin, "Lift up Yr Self!" Reinterpreting Amiri Baraka (LeRoi Jones), Black Power, and the Uplift Tradition," *The Journal of American History* 93 (2006): pp. 101-102.
[156] Robin Kelley, "Stormy Weather: Reconstructing Black (Inter)Nationalism in the Cold War Era," in Eddie Glaude ed., *Is It Nation Time? Contemporary Essays on Black Power and Black Nationalism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002): p. 84.
[157] Zhao Xuegong, "南开美国史学五十年 [American History at Nankai, a Fifty-year Retrospect, 1964-2014]," Nankai University, Tianjin, China.
[158] Robeson Frazier, *The East is Black*, pp. 173-174
[159] The Black Arts Movement—which, beginning in the mid-1960s and extending late into the 1970s, joined the political ideas of Black Power with new directions in art and literature—was very much influenced by Maoism and the Cultural Revolution. See James Smethurst, *The Black Arts Movement: Literary Nationalism in the 1960s and 1970s* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005).

and the fall of 1964 marked the height of Chinese productions that celebrated the imminent victory of the African American freedom struggle and sought to introduce its history to Chinese audiences.

During their 1963 stay in Shanghai, Robert Williams and his family were taken to the Cultural Palace to see two musical performances. The first, "老人河 (Ol' Man River)," from the 1927 Broadway musical *Showboat*, chronicled life and labor along the Mississippi River; it had been most memorably performed by Paul Robeson in 1936.[160] Lyrics from the Chinese rendition were a direct translation from the original.[161] The second piece, "美国黑人要自由 (African Americans Want Freedom)," is the work of a Chinese composer and lyricist. Set to climactic music, it conjured the travesties that formed the bedrock of U.S. capitalism: "the [American] skyscrapers are made of bones, the blood of slaves – American civility… it's not possible to peacefully co-exist with guns, do not allow Kennedy to disguise himself."[162] The themes that defined the Chinese narrative of African American experiences and struggles recurred: the historical contradictions in the development of U.S. society, its longtime exploitation of Black labor, and governmental unwillingness to reverse these trends, regardless of the President's claims to the contrary. Both Robert and Mabel Williams reported being especially impressed with "Ol' Man River," which they never expected to hear performed in China.[163]

A documentary titled "Support the African American Struggle (支持美国黑人斗争)" premiered to great fanfare in Beijing in August 1963. According to reviews of Chinese cinema, it captured the "savage and brutal treatment" that African Americans suffered in a "civil, democratic" society, including

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[160] Shana Redmond, *Anthem: Social Movements and the Sound of Solidarity in the African Diaspora* (New York: New York University Press, 2013): pp. 135-136. The ballad "Ol' Man River" had long been associated with Robeson, one of the most well-known and outspoken advocates of Afro-Asian unity in the mid-twentieth century. When Robeson was banned from international travel by the U.S. State Department and could not attend Bandung, he sent a speech to be played during the conference, commending the spirit of self-determination the event championed, as well as his recordings of three songs, including "Ol' Man River."

[161] "老人河 – 美国黑人歌曲 [Old Man River – An African American Song]," (Beijing: Music Publishing House, 1960), Shanghai Library, Shanghai.

[162] Guang Moran (lyrics) and Luo Nianyi (music), "美国黑人要自由 [African Americans Want Freedom]," Choral Ensemble (Beijing: Music Publishing House, 1960), Shanghai Library.

[163] "中国人民保卫世界和平委员会上海分会关于接待罗伯特威廉夫妇的计划, 主要问题请示决定记录, 日程, 情况汇报, 新闻报导, 小结讨论摘要等 [Plans, Record of Decisions Regarding Important Questions, Itineraries, Reports, News, and Summaries of the Chinese People's Association for World Peace, Shanghai Commission's Reception of Robert Williams and His Wife]."

impressionable scenes of the Ku Klux Klan "wearing masks, donning robes like Catholic priests, burning crosses in the dark of the night, wantonly beating and lynching black residents [in any given town]."[164] This dramatization of racial violence in the U.S. South pinpointed some of the characteristic tactics of Klan-perpetrated terror, while also taking acts of terror out of their historical time. Malcolm X reportedly attended a viewing of this documentary at the Chinese Embassy in Accra during his Africa tour in May 1964; it is evident that these productions—from Ol' Man River to footage of the Klan—were essential components of Chinese outreach to both Africans and African Americans.[165] As such, Chinese authorities financially supported Robert Williams' co-production of a documentary about his 1964 visit, which showcased the modernization of Chinese society, with copies of the film circulating in libraries and universities in the United States.[166]

Chinese literature homed in on the motif of physical and systemic violence enacted on African American communities, lending a crucial context for the theory of an inevitable anti-statist revolution led by the African American vanguard. A series of lyrical poetry published in Chinese journals of art and culture in 1963 and 1964 condemned the past and present of U.S. racial injustices while telling the stories of Chinese citizens who are deeply moved by the knowledge of racial oppression and inspired by the prospect of Black revolution. A poem titled "Paying Tribute to Our Black Brothers" begins with the Chinese author recalling the brutal facts of enslavement that he had learned as a child, of "Evil slave-owners who, for all resisters / take down by shotgun by the river / or burn to the ashes with fierce fire in the fields / if you dared to advance towards a white woman." Now that he is older, not only are these traumas of slavery burnished in his memory, he has truly grasped the magnitude of a collective oppression over generations. He wrote, "Full of emotion, I would read *Uncle Tom's Cabin* / about how kind Tom endured such pain / It was your labor that enriched the capitalists / and it was your blood that

[164] Du Yan, "汹涌澎湃的美国黑人斗争 [The Tempestuous African American Struggle]," *Dazhong dianying*, September 1963, Shanghai Library.
[165] Manning Marable, *Malcolm X: A Life of Reinvention* (New York: Viking Press, 2011): p. 317.
[166] Robeson Taj Frazier, "Black Crusaders: The Transnational Circuit of Robert and Mabel Williams," in Manning Marable and Elizabeth Hinton eds., *The New Black History: Revisiting the Second Reconstruction* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011): pp. 94-95.

fed slaveowners!" In a pivot back to China, he referenced the piece from *People's Daily* "Like a Torch, Chairman Mao's Declaration Has Alighted Black People's Hearts," which celebrated the galvanizing effect of Maoism on Africans and African Americans alike. Other poems in the collection memorialized W.E.B. Du Bois or heralded the rising consciousness of African Americans, as evident "at the doors of the elementary school in Little Rock / in the stores and restaurants of over twenty states / at the University of Mississippi / on the streets of Birmingham / and in the blood of Medgar Evers." [167]

The September 1963 issue of 世界文学 (*World Literature*) was dedicated exclusively to the translated essays and poetry of African American writers, including two painting by artist Charles White. The deeply emotional works of literature evoked despondency and outrage. The poem "For Mack Parker," a Chinese translation of "Mack Parker" by Black communist writer Philip A. Luce, first printed in the Winter 1962 issue of Freedomways.[168] Poet Margaret Walker's "Hometown of Despair" is a paean to the U.S. South, emphasizing the personal trauma of exile from a place she could no longer call home: "Oh, the South, hometown of despair! My bones and my blood are filled with the rhythm of [your] music! The evil KKK and the prisoner's life of chains – how long will you separate me from my hometown?"[169] Bill Mullen cites this issue of *World Literature* as an example of a "transnational correspondence" by which African American activists and Asian socialists circulated "a conception of political indebtedness and simultaneity."[170] From the 1955 Bandung Conference into the early 1970s, Mullen argues, Black and Asian radicals imagined their prospects together, especially in their blueprint for revolution and in the realm of artistic and literary productions. In doing so, they defined the Bandung Era as one of "upstart alliances, improvisational strategies, and synthetic vocabularies for defining Afro-Asian liberation."[171] In

[167] "向黑人兄弟们致敬 [Paying Tribute to Our Black Brothers]," *Yuhua* (September 1963): pp. 35-36. The political context of the late 1950s sparked a revival of interest in *Uncle Tom's Cabin* within China. In 1959, Chinese playwright Ouyang Yuqian rewrote the story as the ten-scene 黑奴恨 ("Hatred of Black Slaves"), staged by Shanghai Vernacular Drama Troupe to great fanfare a year later.
[168] Founded in 1961 by a group of African American intellectuals and activists including W.E.B. Du Bois and Esther Cooper Jackson, *Freedomways* was the preeminent journal of Black politics, theory, and culture in the 1960s.
[169] Margaret Walker, "悲伤的故乡 [Hometown of Despair*]," Shijie wenxue* (September 1963): p. 29.
[170] Bill Mullen, *Afro-Orientalism*, p. 76
[171] Bill Mullen, *Afro-Orientalism*, p. 77

truth, while both Chinese and African American cultural workers indeed conceived of entwined political futures, the trajectory by which they did so was not, at least in the temporal sense, organic or mutual. Rather, the period between August 1963 and the end of 1964 witnessed the frenetic review and translation of African American cultural works which all but ceased by the mid-to-late 1960s.

Chinese reading of African American culture designated certain intellectuals, artists, and productions to be worthy of celebration, while others were deemed illegible. The criteria by which only some pieces received praise appear nebulous, but its pattern offers a portal for understanding the terms of encounter. The works most devastating in capturing the physical violence and traumas of racial oppression—as well as those that explicitly pushed for revolution—received positive attention in Chinese press and media. The journal *Freedomways* served, for instance, a variety of purposes: it was a left-wing but intellectually diverse theoretical publication that helped to incubate the Black Arts Movement of the 1960s and 1970s. Contributions ranged from political exposés about voting rights in Tuskegee, Alabama to "Africa's Liberation and Unity" by Kwame Nkrumah and literature by Ossie Davis. The selective culling of *Freedomways* in *Arts of the People's Liberation Army*, such that all the pieces represented capitalized on themes of violence and anguish, is thus telling.

When the Chinese theoretical journal *Red Flag* published a five-page analytical essay on the state of African American literature, author Li Wenjun concluded that slavery and Jim Crow never curtailed Black intellectual and cultural innovation. Preceding the survey of anti-racist creative works throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Li prefaced: "We are always deeply concerned about our black brothers suffering under the iron shoe of U.S. imperialism, we will always support their just struggle with all our might, value and welcome the cultural pieces reflecting their lives and struggle." Cited works ran a diverse gamut from playwright Lorraine Hansberry's drama *A Raisin in the Sun*, a selection of poetry by later U.S. Poet Laureate Robert Hayden, and W.E.B. Du Bois's published books of history, such as *Black Reconstruction* and *John Brown*.[172] At the same time, a lengthy essay in *Guangming Daily* further

[172] Fan Yangqian, "一盆革命的火苗在燃烧 [A Revolutionary Flame Burns]," *Honqi zazhi* 20 (1963): pp. 28-33.

surveyed key works of African American literature. Here, works summarized in detail include Julian Mayfield's novel *The Grand Parade* (1961), Du Bois's novel *Worlds of Color* (1961), John Oliver Killens' novel *And Then We Heard the Thunder* (1963), and Langston Hughes' poetry collection *Ask Your Mama* (1961).

Li struggled mightily however, to make sense of the writings of James Baldwin, whom Li recognized as a "very talented" but whose novel *Another Country* (1962) "failed to touch people's lives and instead centered 'fashionable' sex, especially homosexual sex, as a main theme." Featuring a bisexual jazz musician as its protagonist, *Another Country* explores subjects otherwise taboo in Maoist China. Li believed that Baldwin's decision to tackle these questions of 1950s New York urban culture, sexuality, and internalized racism indicates that "resisting ideologies of excess and fighting the constraints of bourgeois 'market' culture remain [not yet achieved] primary objectives for the African American literary movement."[173] In this vein, Black cultural productions held political value in the Chinese press so long as they reinforced the narrative of a hypocritical John F. Kennedy Administration, economic oppression, and the inevitable African American turn to armed resistance. But that these diverse, landmark titles received deliberate analysis in the pages of national newspapers is also suggestive of the tremendous currency that African American culture acquired in early 1960s China and a hegemonic reading of race that hewed to one possible political trajectory and outcome.

Popular story collections for Chinese children from this period featured corresponding tales of the poverty, exploitation, and anti-Black racism. Plotlines included that of Jack, a 11-year-old Black boy in Chicago whose mother died in an accident at a toothpaste factory. The orphaned Jack sought help from the factory owner, who offered meager wages in exchange for hawking the streets with an advertising placard. Soon, a group of white men, proclaiming themselves the KKK, encircled Jack; they taunted and beat him until he lost the white teeth that had gained him employment in the first place. The factory owner fired him, and Jack was left to wander the unsympathetic streets as a beggar. Most tellingly, this

[173] Li Wenjun, "战斗的美国黑人文学 [Literature of the African American Struggle]," *Guangming ribao*, September 8, 1963.

story was entitled "I am a Black Child, I Live in America." In using Black identity as stand-in for suffering under capitalism, the writer both deployed race as an analytical category and collapsed the multiplicity of African American experiences into a singular story of anguish. The fact that the injured Jack was rescued off the streets by white workers further reduced the agency of African Americans to determine and pursue just recourse for racial discrimination.

In another tale from the anthology, "A Happy Home," a Black street orphan named Jim was recruited to become an actor, with no training and no compensation, in a documentary that that airbrushed the cruelties of slavery. Jim's father, a poor worker, was jailed two years earlier for the crime of "disrespecting a white man." In the film, Jim has a kindly white mistress who shares with him finger sandwiches, but on the set, he was badly mistreated by the white directors and in real life, was taunted by white schoolchildren. Possibly in reference to the foreign policy of early 1960s United States, the aim of the entire production had been to broadcast to Africa a narrative of domestic racial equality. When a Black stuntman was horrifically injured after falling from a frame, he was revealed to be Jim's father, released from jail without a penny to his name. Though father and son reunited in this cruel coincidence, they were fired from the production and found themselves unemployed and homeless.[174] The parallel in these gloomy conclusions met by Jack and Jim typified the themes present in Chinese depictions of African American experiences. In addition to the overarching framework of paradoxical Black oppression in a nation that prides itself on "freedom," the stories depicted an undifferentiated linearity of despair across time. In conjunction with other instruments or forums of solidarity, these cultural and intellectual works helped construct the two-way but ultimately disconnected exchange between Black activists and China in the 1960s. Albeit constrained, the Chinese framework for the interpretation of African American history, politics, and culture reflected the outsized global reach and currency of the civil rights movement. In early 1960s China, filtered through a Maoist lens that compressed a diverse political movement into

[174] Ye Chao, 圣诞节的礼物 [*Gift of Christmas*] (Shanghai: Youth and Children's Publishers, 1963), Peking University Libraries, Beijing, China.

one progressive story of an inexorable march to revolution, the symbols and images of African American struggle had become, momentarily, the basis around which a society mobilized.

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In essence, the year 1964 marked the height of synchronicity between Chinese engagements of African American activism and its reception: it was the time of the Chinese detonation of the atomic bomb, the publication of the Little Red Book, and within the United States, the crystallization of calls for armed self-defense and systemic transformation that would soon underpin the rise of the Black Power Movement. Christopher Lee has advanced the concept of "communitas"—or a "community of feeling" that is, "in movement, an interval moment of creative possibility and innovation"—to understand the Bandung spirit and the various expressions of Afro-Asianism that ensued.[175] That the 1960s interface of Chinese socialism and African American activists took place along these two distinct arcs, in response to the shifting exigencies of Chinese politics and of the African American freedom movements, encapsulates this idea of "communitas." The unevenness of the encounter did not detract from its objectives because it was precisely the idea of a revolutionary ideal, whether of socialism fully realized in the Afro-Asian world, or of urban guerilla struggle in the "belly of the beast," that rendered each to the other so appealing. The symbolic power that the African American struggle commanded for Beijing's rhetoric of race and class was most significant in the early 1960s, when U.S. imperialism still figured as its greatest geopolitical foe. But the appeal that Chinese socialism held for the African American left was at its apex in the late 1960s and early 1970s, corresponding with the rise of the Black Power Movement. For Black Power activists, the embrace of Maoist militancy was in large part a response to frustrations with mainstream civil rights movement, the escalation of the Vietnam War, and police violence in their communities. Huey Newton recalled that it was "the four volumes of Mao" that sealed his conversion to socialism and desire to establish a revolutionary organization.[176] But as the Black Panthers expanded into

[175] Christopher Lee, "Introduction: Between a Moment and an Era: The Origins and Afterlives of Bandung," in Christopher Lee ed., *Making a World after Empire: The Bandung Moment and its Political Afterlives*, p. 16
[176] Huey P. Newton, *Revolutionary Suicide* (New York: Penguin Books, 2009): p. 6.

a nationwide operation with "serve the people" programs and pursued their own foreign policy in the late 1960s, it was clear from Robert Williams' contemporaneous experiences of exile in Beijing that the Chinese political landscape, which once galvanized such a far-reaching campaign of outreach to African American revolutionaries, had changed irretrievably.

The launch of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 ground to a halt the burgeoning Chinese research into African American history, spurred the departure of Clarence Adams from Beijing, and marked the end of educational campaigns, in the style of Liu Liangmo's lectures, that sought to convey the facts and lessons of Black liberation to broad audiences. Mao's second statement in support of the African American struggle, titled "A New Storm Against Imperialism," would be released in April 1968 after Martin Luther King's assassination. In the declaration, Mao commended African American activists for "winning sympathy and support from increasing numbers of white working people and progressives in the United States. The [African American struggle] is bound to merge with the American workers' movement, and this will eventually end the criminal rule of the U.S. monopoly capitalist class."[177] In this interpretation, African Americans were no longer regarded as the vanguard of an impending revolution, a position which allowed for overlap with calls for Black nationalism and Black Power, but rather, as another participatory element of a broad-based working-class formation.

This discursive shift marked the beginning of a new era in Chinese narratives of race, class, and African American activism: one in which the strategy of deploying a frame of race analysis no longer abetted the argument that China was uniquely attuned to the nuances of racism and thus, uniquely qualified to advocate the supremacy of class struggle. Such a strategy defined the Chinese recasting of African American history and politics from 1963 to 1964, as the inability to understand Black nationalism appeared as weakness on the part of Cuba and the Soviet Union. By the late 1960s and early 1970s however, Chinese efforts to emphasize the particularities of the African American struggle waned. A

[177] "中国共产党中央委员会主席毛泽东同志支持美国黑人抗暴斗争的声明 [Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Chairman Comrade Mao Zedong's Statement in Support of the African American Struggle against Violence]," *Renmin ribao*, April 16, 1968.

number of African Americans—Huey Newton, Elaine Brown, Hosea Williams, John Oliver Killens and others—continued to travel to Beijing, but their muted receptions rang far from the enthusiastic welcome that Robert Williams once received. This dynamic of the later years, in which Black Power activists seized on the discourses of Maoism just as Chinese narratives hurried to wind down its analyses of race and racial struggle, will be the focus of Chapter 3.

Triangulating China, Tanganyika, and Zanzibar, 1960-1964: Debating Class and Empire

Oscar Kambona, the first Minister of Foreign Affairs for the newly established United Republic of Tanzania, was on leave from his position in November 1964 when a diplomat in Kinshasa provided him with three mysteriously sourced letters that detailed plans to bomb Tanzanian "strategic points" used by China and depose President Julius Nyerere. In response, Kambona summoned a press conference to publicize this "Western Plot" to overturn the Tanzanian state, with copies of the letters headlining the November 11, 1964 issue of *The Nationalist*. William Leonhart, U.S. Ambassador to Tanzania, immediately declared the letters forgeries, but the news had already inspired widespread public outrage within the country, occasioning a mass rally in Dar es Salaam attended by thousands, where anti-U.S. banners and slogans were displayed prominently.[178]

When knowledge of the "Western Plot" travelled to the Consulate of the People's Republic of China in Dar es Salaam, Chinese diplomats carried out their own optimistic analysis of events. They believed that a series of recent trends in Tanzania—especially its support for Southern African liberation movements, decision to host Chinese military instructors, and "positive measures in the realm of social revolution"—have stoked the ire of British and U.S. imperial interests. They concluded, "The Zanzibari crackdown on counter-revolutionary conspiracy and the mainland Tanzanian exposition of the imperialist plot is a victory for both places on the road to anticolonialism and national liberation… *The People's Daily* will demonstrate support with an editorial, and Foreign Ministry leaders should reach out to Tanzanian representatives to express concern and support."[179] In categorizing the "Western Plot"

[178] The origins of the letters remain unclear, but the most promising theory is that they were either the deliberate attempt of the United States to shift attention away from its operations in Eastern Congo or the work of Portugal. See Paul Bjerk, *Building a Peaceful Nation: Julius Nyerere and the Establishment of Sovereignty in Tanzania*, pp. 235-242.

[179] "坦桑外长揭露西方颠覆活动 [Tanzanian Foreign Minister Exposes Subversive Activity]," November 11, 1964, The Foreign Ministry Archives of the People's Republic of China (thereafter PRC FMA), Beijing, File No. 108-00444-02. The "crackdown on counter-revolutionary conspiracy" likely refers to the Zanzibari government's deportation of John Okello, a Ugandan migrant of indeterminate political commitments who played a prominent role in the January 1964 Zanzibar Revolution, after which he was quickly marginalized by the new administration. Armed bands of Okello's followers however, continued to patrol the streets of Zanzibar, partaking in acts of looting

alongside the centralization of power in mainland Tanzania and political radicalism in Zanzibar, Chinese officials in Dar understood the event not as an anomaly but rather as one link in a long chain of events that suggested increasing alignment with Maoist views on revolution and governance. This included the January 1964 uprising known as the "Army Mutiny," in which soldiers of the Tanganyika Rifles rebelled against their predominantly European superiors after disputes about labor conditions, necessitating Nyerere's decision to request British military assistance to suppress the uprising. The mutiny had hardened Nyerere's resolve to consolidate power and restructure the army, so as to avoid future mutinies that would require foreign intervention.[180]

The Chinese Consulate took meticulous note of these subsequent developments, reading the post-Plot public rallies in Tanzania as an "anti-U.S. mass movement that is enormous in scale." A number of positive implications could be attributed to the incident, Chinese representatives wrote: increasing consciousness among ordinary Tanzanians about the nature of U.S. imperialism; evidence that the Tanzanian leadership is united and receives popular approval; and in a boon to island-mainland relations—which remained very much uncertain after the April 1964 Union—the experience of joint opposition to imperial incursion. Chinese diplomats in Dar es Salaam now saw a new urgency in continuing the flow of material aid and moral support to the Tanzanian state. Though they observed that Nyerere still harbored doubts about the potential of mass struggle, they expressed confidence that another phase beckoned in China-Tanzania relations.[181]

Indeed, November 1964 marked a turning point. Between Tanganyikan independence in December 1961 and the anti-U.S. demonstrations in November 1964, Chinese diplomats often assessed that, in contrast to explicitly socialist-leaning African countries like the Somali Republic or Mali, Tanganyikan nationalist leaders possessed neither an ironclad commitment to anti-imperialism nor the

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and violence. See Ian Speller, "An African Cuba? Britain and the Zanzibar Revolution, 1964," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 35 (2007): pp. 291-292.

[180] John Gerhart, "Tanganyika Embarrassed by Need for British Assistance; Calls for Pan-African Force to Aid in Future Crises," *The Harvard Crimson*, March 10, 1964.

[181] "报坦反美运动进展情况 [Report about Development of Tanzanian Anti-U.S. Movement]," November 19, 1964, PRC FMA 108-00444-02.

appropriate awareness of Chinese history and politics. When a seven-member delegation of the Chinese Commission for Foreign Cultural Relations returned from a visit to Tanganyika in March 1963, they negatively contrasted their experiences with their time in the Somali Republic, where they witnessed a deeper commitment to "cultural propaganda work" and received a more enthusiastic reception. They noted that to the contrary, Tanganyikans displayed "strong feelings of nationalism. [They are] full of anger towards old-style colonialism, hatred towards the 'middle man exploitation' of the Indian merchants, and general friendliness towards us, but most people still lack knowledge about [China]. The official who accompanied us did not know Mao Zedong. Another official in a different province asked if China still had an emperor."[182]

The early 1960s witnessed a triangulated evolution of relations between the CCP, Zanzibari nationalists, and the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), the ruling party in Dar es Salaam. With the designation of Dar es Salaam as the headquarters of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)'s Liberation Committee in 1963, the city emerged as a nexus between Southern African liberation movements and the socialist world—in Eric Burton's terms, a "hub of decolonization" alongside cities like Accra, Algiers, and Cairo.[183] Chinese, Soviet, and Eastern European shipments of weaponry to the liberation movements passed through the port in Dar es Salaam, while Chinese and Cuban military instructors provided guerilla training at camps in Zanzibar and the mainland.[184] As such, the negotiations between Chinese and Tanzanian representatives profoundly affected, and were in turn molded by, the networks of Pan-Africanism. This dynamic is reinforced by the political milieu of postcolonial Tanzania, where Pan-African liberation and socialism had always been "imbricated, mutually reinforcing

[182] "访问非洲五国总结报告 [Concluding Report from the Visit of Five African Countries]," Chinese Commission for Foreign Cultural Relations, March 12, 1963, PRC FMA 108-00955-02.
[183] Eric Burton, "Hubs of Decolonization: African Liberation Movements and 'Eastern' Connections in Cairo, Accra, and Dar es Salaam," in Chris Saunders, Lena Dallywater, and Helder Fonseca eds., *Southern Liberation Movements and the Global Cold War "East": Transnational Activism, 1960-1990* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2019): p. 26.
[184] Eric Burton, "Hubs of Decolonization," p. 54

imaginaries."[185] After all, when Julius Nyerere first introduced "ujamaa" in 1962, the Swahili term for "familyhood" and the blueprint for "African socialism," he harbored ambitions of an East African Federation comprised of Tanganyika, Uganda, Kenya, and Zanzibar. Moreover, African nationalists who advocated most vigorously for both ends often privileged neither race nor class in explicit terms, believing that the projects of African liberation and socio-economic egalitarianism were entwined.[186]

The triangulation of China-Tanzanian relations in the early 1960s suggests that Third World ideas of Pan-Africanism, African nationalism, and Afro-Asianism intersected in dynamic albeit unexpected ways. The Zanzibari nationalism upheld by Abdulrahman Mohamed (A.M.) Babu—a central figure in this following section—facilitated his vision of Afro-Asian solidarities that was wary of "neo-colonialism" in Maoist terms, as well as the indifference of Tanzania's Indian minority to true decolonization in the political and economic realm. Ali Mwinyi Tambwe, whose 1962 visit to China will be discussed later in this chapter, maintained conviction in a blend of Pan-Africanism and Tanganyikan nationalism that repudiated Arab and Indian participation in Zanzibar's postcolonial future, allowing for a narrow conception of Afro-Asianism in which a "Africa for Africans" vision of continental liberation necessarily underlaid the realization of Afro-Asian collaboration.

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In the years between his first visit to China in 1959 and his appointment as a Minister of Economic Planning in Dar es Salaam after the April 1964 Union, A.M. Babu emerged as a compelling champion of Maoist theory and models of development. As early as the immediate aftermath of the Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP)'s electoral successes in 1961, British intelligence and more conservative elements within the ZNP expressed concerns about Babu's open affections for Chinese socialism and his growing political clout. In June 1962, British colonial authorities arrested him on

[185] The policies of the Tanganyikan state did not always align with movement towards the objective of an East African Federation, in spite of its aspirations to the contrary, such as Nyerere's offer in 1960 to delay independence to allow for the formation of a Federation. See Ali Mazrui, "Tanzania Versus East Africa: A Case of Unwitting Federal Sabotage," *Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies* 3 (1965): pp. 209-225.
[186] Priya Lal, *African Socialism in Postcolonial Tanzania: Between the Village and the World*, pp. 37-39

charges of sedition for his incendiary reporting in his Xinhua News Agency-funded *Zanews* publication and imprisoned him, a controversial act that mobilized many of his supporters. Upon his release, Babu founded the Umma Party in 1963. An explicitly Marxist challenger to the ZNP that boasted a young urban base, Umma collaborated with the ASP in the planning and execution of the Zanzibar Revolution. Babu maintained the longstanding conviction that only socialism, informed by the Chinese mode of governance and development, could dissolve the racial divisions and hierarchies that defined Zanzibari politics and society.[187]

In January 1960, Babu took his second trip to China, where he negotiated for the dispatching Swahili-speaking broadcast workers to Beijing in the spring of that year. While in Shanghai, Babu posed to the Chinese officials a number of questions that reflected his long-term grappling with the process of implementing of socialism. Babu appeared most invested during a conversation with a Foreign Minister of the Civil Affairs Bureau on January 31, who presented an introduction of the work of "social transformation" (社会改造工作), or "re-education," that his ministry had undertaken since 1949. Babu and his wife Ashura eagerly followed up: How long does the task of "social transformation" take on a nationwide scale? How is the problem of sexually transmitted diseases dealt with in China? What other drugs are problems for Chinese addicts besides opium? Which sectors of the population, the youth or the elderly, are the most difficult to "transform" in the realm of politics and morality? [188] Their inquiries laid bare the underpinnings of the powerful appeal that the Chinese experience held for Babu and successive Zanzibari nationalists travelling to China. Beyond showcasing industrial prowess and socialist discipline, Chinese officials were willing to share the nuts-and-bolts of popular mobilization for the sake of revolutionary nation-building. This took the quiet form of conversations with the officials directly engaged on the frontlines.

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[187] Thomas Burgess, "An Imagined Generation: Umma Youth in Nationalist Zanzibar," in Gregory Maddox and James Giblin eds., *In Search of a Nation: Histories of Authority and Dissidence in Tanzania* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2005): p. 232.

[188] "中国人民保卫世界和平委员会上海市分会关于接待桑给巴尔民族主义党总书记穆罕默德及夫人的计划，日程安排，情况简报 [Plans, Itineraries, and Reports of the Chinese People's Committee for World Peace Shanghai Branch Regarding the Reception of ZNP General Secretary A.M. Babu and Wife]," File No. C36-2-105, SMA.

Other questions that Babu put forth, concerning the form and pace of Chinese political and economic development, included: What has been done with the savings and property of capitalists? Can their children inherit family wealth? Did China accomplish the doubling of living standards in ten years from 1949 to 1959 through set prices for goods, raised salaries, or lowered prices for goods? Why does China still allow the British to occupy Hong Kong? Are there anti-imperialist movements or parties indigenous to Hong Kong? The value of analogy that Hong Kong provided, as another semi-autonomous island colony of the United Kingdom and a cosmopolitan economic center of its own oceanic world, to Zanzibar is apparent. So was the intellectual process that led Babu to Chinese developmental models; it had less to do with Maoist propaganda and offers of material aid than with sober inquiry into the promises and pitfalls of alternative modes of development and social organization in postcolonial Zanzibar.

In public speeches and writings, Babu would distance himself from any conception of Zanzibari politics that prioritized race over class analysis. Through the early 1960s, Babu believed, reactionary elements in both the ZNP and ASP employed racial rhetoric that obscured the realities of class-based exploitation, suffering, and despair. He intended his founding of the Umma Party in 1963 as a salve to the bifurcation of Arab and African racial nationalism on the island.[189] But during this visit to China, at a banquet hosted by Vice Mayor of Shanghai Jin Zhonghua, Babu voiced to Jin his suspicions about the outsized influences that Indians still commanded in Tanganyika and Zanzibar. "In many parts of East and Central Africa, the economy is controlled by Indians. In the past, Indians supported African liberation movements," he confided to Jin, "but now they stand with the imperialists." In this moment, sensing the opening to gesture to a common opposition, Liu Liangmo—a member of Shanghai's Political Consultative Conference who travelled the United States in the 1940s and collaborated with African American singer and activist Paul Robeson to produce Robeson's 1942 "Chee Lai: Songs of New China"—inserted himself into the conversation. Liu asked if Babu heard any news about the border dispute between China and India from within Zanzibar. "Yes," Babu had responded, "but only from India,

[189] A.M. Babu, "The 1964 Revolution: Lumpen or Vanguard?" in Abdul Sheriff and Ed Ferguson eds., *Zanzibar Under Colonial Rule*, pp. 239-240

and it is all a one-sided tale."[190] Presaging the course of conversations to come between Tanzanian and Chinese representatives, shared suspicions about Indian intent created the opportunity for Liu and Jin to establish mutual interests with Babu.

Babu's sentiments that Indians once participated in African liberation movements only to turn their backs on political solidarity after independence is a simplification of a tenuous relationship.[191] In the late 1940s and 1950s, as African nationalism took shape in Tanganyika, ethnic Indian organizations helped to finance the activities of the African Association and its successor TANU, established in 1954. But TANU itself operated as a racially exclusive organization until 1962, relying on a rhetoric of development and nationhood that was implicitly and explicitly racial.[192] Nonetheless, that Babu engaged in the construction of an exclusive, anti-Indian vision of Afro-Asian unity two years before the outbreak of the Sino-Indian Border War indicates that from the very outset, the gradual negotiation of Chinese relations with Tanganyika and Zanzibar proceeded with the history of the Indian diaspora in colonial East Africa as its foil.

In the years following this visit, Babu's publication *Zanews* in Zanzibar generously promoted the Chinese version of the Sino-Indian Border War, with headlines such as "China's Ceasefire Statement Becomes Focus of Attention in Asia, Africa" that emphasized the desire for peace on the part of Beijing in contrast to Delhi's recalcitrance.[193] More significantly, *Zanews* sought to project a popular, anti-imperialist solidarity throughout the Third World with the Chinese position on the question of Sino-Indian conflict. In November 1962, *Zanews* ran an editorial proclaiming that the Chinese proposal for

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[190] "中国人民保卫世界和平委员会上海市分会关于接待桑给巴尔民族主义党总书记穆罕默德及夫人的计划，日程安排，情况简报 [Plans, Itineraries, and Reports of the Chinese People's Committee for World Peace Shanghai Branch Regarding the Reception of ZNP General Secretary A.M. Babu and Wife]."

[191] Babu's characterization of the Indian role in Tanganyikan independence is reminiscent of the "comprador" figure in Maoist theory. Mao used the category "compradors" to refer to a distinct class of native managers and contractors in the service of foreign establishments and interests.

[192] James Brennan, *Taifa: Making Nation and Race in Urban Tanzania* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2012): pp. 143-153.

[193] "China's Ceasefire Statement Become Focus of Attention in Asia, Africa," *Zanews* (No. 510), November 28, 1962, Folder 4, Box 9, Michael Lofchie Papers, University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) Libraries. China's declaration of ceasefire came just four weeks after the outbreak of conflict, when troops from the People's Liberation Army reached Chinese claim lines in Aksai Chin.

ceasefire "is widely acclaimed by world public opinion, and in particular by Afro-Asian peoples and various organizations, and has surprisingly confounded all the reactionaries in the world."[194] Conversely, Nehru was depicted as inspiring the support only of the Western powers, including that of Queen Elizabeth II, as the British government pondered a "lend-lease act" for the provision of weapons to India.[195] At the same time, according to *Zanews*, the Indian leadership lamented the country's inability to win over allies in Asia and Africa.[196]

The course of the Sino-Indian Border War did bring to light for the Indian state at the time that many of its relationships in Africa had frayed.[197] The majority of African governing parties, even the explicitly anti-communist Kenya African National Union (KANU), voiced affinity for the Chinese position in the conflict, while left-leaning governments in Tanganyika, Ghana, and Guinea categorically condemned Indian actions.[198] Ghanaian objections keyed in on Britain's decision to supply India with military aid.[199] In Tanganyika, Oscar Kambona expressed that he readily accepted the Chinese version of its confrontation with India, considering Indian efforts to lead the postcolonial world "decadent" though he also regretted Afro-Asian political fragmentation.[200] In this context, Babu's presentation of the conflict as an exposition of Indian collusion with Western powers reflected broader dynamics at play, in which the

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[194] "For Peaceful Settlement of the Sino-Indian Boundary Question," *Zanews* (No. 509), November 27, 1962, Folder 4, Box 9, Michael Lofchie Papers. See also, for example, "Nkrumah Objects to [Prime Minister Harold] MacMillan's Support for India's Aggression," *Zanews* (No. 492), November 7, 1962; "India Occupies Chinese Territory, Says Pakistani Paper," *Zanews* (No. 492), November 7, 1962; "Cairo Papers Welcome Chinese Government Statement," *Zanews* (No. 509), November 27, 1962; and "Asian, African, and Latin American Press Feature Chinese Statement," *Zanews* (No. 509), November 27, 1962.
[195] "British Queen Supports India's Invasion of China," *Zanews* (No. 492), November 7, 1962.
[196] "Indian Papers Continue to Deplore Lack of Afro-Asian Support," *Zanews* (No. 496), November 12, 1962.
[197] Gerard McCann, "From Diaspora to Third Worldism and the United Nations: India and the Politics of Decolonizing Africa," *Past and Present* 218 (2013): pp. 274-276. Indian popularity in Sub-Saharan Africa was at its height in the decades prior, when Mahatma Gandhi's concept of non-violent resistance influenced a generation of African anticolonial nationalists; see Ali Mazrui, "Africa between Gandhi and Nehru: An Afro-Asian Interaction," *African and Asian Studies* 16 (2017): pp. 14-30. Gandhian influences on the non-violent civil rights movement in the United States were also profound. See Nico Slate, *Colored Cosmopolitanism: The Shared Struggle for Freedom in the United States and India* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012).
[198] Anirudha Gupta, "A Note on Indian Attitudes to Africa," *Indian Affairs* 69 (1970): p. 173.
[199] Wei Liang-Tsai, *Peking vs. Taipei in Africa, 1960-1978* (Taipei: Asia and World Institute, 1982): p. 74.
[200] David Kimche, *The Afro-Asian Movement: Ideology and Foreign Policy of the Third World*, p. 246.

Sino-Indian Border War very much manifested in African politics and facilitated the development of China-African relations.

In other forums, Babu sounded harsh warnings about imperialist and neo-colonialist designs in Africa that hewed closely to Chinese worldviews. At the Fourth Conference of the Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa (PAFMECA), held in Addis Ababa in 1962, he spoke of the insidious trap of reinvented forms of colonial domination. Calling Pan-African unity the "strongest weapon" against imperialism, he stated that "a new and dangerous situation is arising—namely, the intrigue of the neo-colonialists… Through cajole and flattery, with offers of 'financial assistance' the imperialists are trying to corrupt our leaders into dancing to their tune."[201] Babu's convictions influenced an entire generation of Zanzibari nationalists who sought alternative paths to modernity for Zanzibar, as he negotiated for a succession of ZNP-affiliated politicians and students to visit and study in the country. In this first phase of the relationship between China and Zanzibar, the ZNP was the exclusive player while the ASP was absent from the picture. In fact, when two representatives of Zanzibar's agricultural union and a carpenters' union travelled to China in May 1962, they unequivocally attributed the ZNP electoral victory from the previous year to Chinese support.[202]

This is not to say that Babu's personal relationship with the CCP leadership developed without roadblock. In spite of his longstanding revolutionary credentials and appointment as the principal East Africa correspondent for the New China News Agency in 1960, his visit to Shanghai in May 1963 as a representative of his newly founded Umma Party, was not well-received. Though Babu offered to translate a set of Mao's political essays into Swahili, he apparently failed to demonstrate sufficient excitement about the task. As the Chinese record noted:

> "From recent discussions, it is clear that the frame of mind with which [Babu] wants to learn from our experience is not an imperative one. Though he took notes, he did not feel it deeply, and very often after a conversation, would not

[201] A.M. Babu, "Speech to the Fourth PAFMECA Conference in Addis Ababa as General Secretary of the Zanzibar Nationalist Party," in Salma Babu and Amrit Wilson eds., *The Future That Works: The Selected Writings of A.M. Babu* (Trenton: Africa World Press, 2002): p. 61.

[202] "上海市总工会接待桑给巴尔工会代表团的计划，日程，情况汇报等 [Plans, Itineraries, and Reports of the Shanghai All-Workers Union for the Reception of Zanzibari Union Delegation], SMA, File No. C1-2-151-3814.

> mention the subject again. He requested from us books about the United Front and peasant movements, but did not read them… As of now he is most interested in translating [the essays] and intends to finish the translations within two days."[203]

From the beginning, it was not enough for Tanzanian visitors to China, even A.M. Babu, to only verbally affirm Maoist politics or beliefs; their commitments needed to be sealed with acts of enthusiasm. As Chapter 4 will further explore, this expectation continued to hamper the development of China-Tanzanian relations into the 1970s.

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One of the earliest Zanzibari delegations to China, a group of fifteen ZNP representatives, fourteen of whom were practicing Muslims and requested to pray at a mosque every Friday, arrived in Shanghai in August 1960. Their familiarities with China spanned a wide range; a few of the delegates expressed excitement about meeting with Mao because they had studied his works or in one instance, once encountered a woven likeness of Vice Chairman of the CCP Liu Shaoqi, while their peers claimed to have never heard of Mao ever before. The team received full medical examinations at Beijing's famed Peking Union Medical College Hospital, where a number of them obtained diagnoses of hypertension. Others raved about a Chinese acrobatic performance, requesting that the troupe tour Zanzibar. Most impressive to them however, were the mosques they were taken to every week; the delegates reported their surprise that counter to "imperialist messaging," China never banned the practice of Islam and Chinese Muslims appeared to freely attend mosques to worship.[204]

Ibuni Mohamed, a propaganda worker for the ZNP, encapsulated, for Chinese officials, the combination of friendliness and political "confusion" displayed by most members of the delegation. Mohamed described his shock at holding an audience with Mao because "he cannot imagine that

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[203] "中国人民保卫世界和平委员会上海分会关于接待桑给巴尔人民党主席巴布等四人的计划, 活动日程, 座谈会记录, 情况 [Plans, Itineraries, Discussion Logs, and Situation of the Chinese People's Association for World Peace Shanghai Commission's Reception of Zanzibar's Umma Party, Including Chairman Babu]," SMA, File C36-2-173.

[204] "中国人民保卫世界和平委员会上海市分会关于接待坦桑尼亚民族主义党代表团的计划，活动日程，情况汇报，批示等 [Plans, Itineraries, and Reports of the Chinese People's Committee for World Peace Shanghai Branch Regarding the Reception of Zanzibar Nationalist Party Delegation]," SMA File No. C36-2-106.

Eisenhower would receive him [given] his skin color and [Zanzibar being] a small country." Like his compatriots, Mohamed purchased a copy of the *People's Daily* featuring the news of their visit with Mao, the photograph of which they cut out to send home. The Chinese record singled out Ibuni as particularly talkative and open to sharing his thoughts, though many of his statements were factually inaccurate. On different occasions, Mohamed claimed that the Great Wall formed the Chinese border between Myanmar and Inner Mongolia, characterized the pre-modern history of China-African relations as one of "Chinese invasion," called Taiwan "Formosa," and insisted that Japan was a former colony of China. But more notably, Mohamed served as a veritable conduit, to Chinese officials, of information regarding political divisions within and between Tanganyika and Zanzibar. He expressed that many Zanzibari leaders distrusted Nyerere because of his pro-U.S. inclinations and his promotion of non-racialism, both of which he felt indicated capitulation to Western imperialist influences.[205] Ibuni's eclectic mixture of beliefs—he belonged to the ZNP and held staunch anti-imperialist views, but only as a function of racial nationalism rather than revolutionary socialism—is suggestive of the simultaneous frustrations and optimism for Chinese officials in early negotiations of China-Zanzibari relations.

At the core of considerations for Chinese and Zanzibari representatives was the relationship of race to class struggle. Ali Sultan Issa, a committed Zanzibari Marxist who served in a number of cabinet positions for the revolutionary government, spent the 1950s in London immersed in Pan-African and communist networks. A lifelong friend and associate of Babu, Issa's ideological trajectory also captures the myriad twists and contradictions of 1960s Zanzibari politics. Issa remembers that in his association with the British Communist Party, which was strongly aligned with the Soviets, he learned "that not all white people were bad; it eradicated in me any element of racism. When I accepted Marxism, it oriented my thinking completely towards the class struggle and away from racial politics."[206] His visit to China in

[205] "中国人民保卫世界和平委员会上海市分会关于接待坦桑尼亚民族主义党代表团的计划，活动日程，情况汇报，批示等 [Plans, Itineraries, and Reports of the Chinese People's Committee for World Peace Shanghai Branch Regarding the Reception of Zanzibar Nationalist Party Delegation]."
[206] Ali Sultan Issa, as quoted in Thomas Burgess, "A Socialist Diaspora: Ali Sultan Issa, the Soviet Union, and the Zanzibari Revolution," in Maxim Matusevich ed., *Africa in Russia, Russia in Africa: Three Centuries of Encounter* (Trenton: Africa World Press, 2007): p. 268.

1960 however, left a more profound impression on Issa than his time in the Soviet Union in 1957, such that upon his return to Zanzibar, he was solidly in Babu's camp as to the most relevant developmental model for the islands. Yet, of the scholarships that Issa distributed to Zanzibari youth for study in China on behalf of the ZNP, the majority did not result in the completion of courses and degrees. "Our boys could not take the Asiatic lifestyle," Issa concluded, "their society was too tough, and the social life was very bad;" he then reassigned many of them to institutions in Eastern Europe.[207] These tensions reached a peak in March 1962, when Chinese hotel attendants in Beijing apparently attacked a Zanzibari student after an altercation about the purchase of cigarettes, resulting in protests from Africans in the city in the form of sit-ins and hunger strikes.[208] In the aftermath of the incident, only 22 of the 118 African students then present in Beijing remained; the rest chose to repatriate home or to take their studies elsewhere.[209]

Issa's observations resonate with the grievances popularized in John Emmanuel Hevi's memoir *An African Student in China*, published in London in 1963. Hevi, who hailed from Ghana, charged that African students in China were subject to racial discrimination, strict policing of their relationships with Chinese women, and relentless political surveillance. Issa however, while acknowledging that many Zanzibari students could not tolerate the constraints of study in China and supported their out-exodus, continued to promote the expansion of Chinese influence in Zanzibar. Issa was actually living in Beijing, teaching Swahili and undergoing medical treatment, when he received word about the January 1964 Zanzibar Revolution.[210] When he returned to Zanzibar, Issa assumed the post of Area Commissioner for

[207] Ali Sultan Issa, as quoted in Thomas Burgess, "A Socialist Diaspora," p. 272
[208] Barry Sautman, "Anti-Black Racism in Post-Mao China," *The China Quarterly* 138 (1994): p. 414. For a more general overview of the experiences of international students—predominantly from Asian and African countries—in 1950s and early 1960s China, see Theodore Chen, "Governmental Encourage and Control of International Education in the People's Republic of China," in Stewart Fraser ed., *Governmental Policy and International Education* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965): pp. 111-134.
[209] Eric Burton, "Decolonization, the Cold War, and Africans' Routes to Higher Education Overseas, 1957-1965," *Journal of Global History* 15 (2020): p. 185.
[210] The details of and responsibility for the Zanzibar Revolution remains heavily contested, with John Okello taking credit for its planning but Western powers harboring suspicions about Chinese and Cuban involvement. See Thomas Burgess, "Memories, Myths, and Meanings of the Zanzibari Revolution," in Toyin Falola and Raphael Njoku eds., *War and Peace in Africa* (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2010): p. 436.

Pemba.[211] In this early period, the politics of Abeid Karume, the leader of the ASP and the first President of Zanzibar, drifted further to the left, alarming Western observers and prompting their calls for a merger with Tanganyika.

However, after the Union, the islands continued to be dominated by socialist competition for influence vis-à-vis aid. Issa admitted that he applied pro-Chinese pressures on Karume, who was caught between the Soviets and the Chinese. To support his case, Issa gathered anecdotal evidence—Russians demanding freight charges for shipments to Zanzibar, or for the coffins of Russian experts who die in Zanzibar to be sent back, or providing inadequate medicines in spite of Stone Town renaming its hospital after Lenin, while the Chinese dispatched a whole team of doctors—to pass on to Karume.[212] It can only be assumed that persuasive labors undertaken piecemeal by figures like Issa ultimately helped sway Karume towards Beijing, such that by the late 1960s, the Chinese presence, in personnel and financial numbers, on Zanzibar far surpassed that of the Soviets and the East Germans.

For their part, Chinese press accounts of Zanzibari politics in the early to mid-1960s glossed over the racial histories and antagonisms on the islands, celebrating, for instance, newly installed ZNP Prime Minister Mohammed Shamte's call after Zanzibar's independence in December 1963 for multiracial unity in nation-building.[213] Xinhua's reporting about the Revolution itself carefully skirted its racial dimensions. When the news first broke of the government overthrow on Zanzibar, the *People's Daily* chose to focus on its "anti-imperialist" implications: the British authorities is preparing for the evacuation of their citizens while the United States—which operates the Project Mercury tracking station on Zanzibar—is monitoring the situation with grave concern and deployed the U.S.S. Manley, a destroyer that had been docked in Mombasa.[214] Days later, Foreign Minister Chen Yi telegrammed Babu to give

[211] The islands of Zanzibar, where Stone Town—home to government and most businesses—is located, and the smaller Pemba, where a primarily rural population live, comprise Zanzibar.
[212] Thomas Burgess, "A Socialist Diaspora," pp. 281-282
[213] "桑给巴尔宣布独立 [Zanzibar Proclaims Independence]," *Jiefangjun bao*, December 11, 1963.
[214] "桑给巴尔发生政变组成新政府卡鲁姆要求外国不得干涉桑给巴尔内政 [Coup Occurs on Zanzibar and New Government Forms, Karume Requests Non-Interference of Foreign Countries in Zanzibar's Internal Affairs]," *Renmin ribao*, January 15, 1964.

official Chinese recognition to the revolutionary government.[215] Amidst political turmoil, Chinese official sources consistently portrayed each event as a step forward for the cause of anti-imperialism in Zanzibar.

Contrary to the suspicions of Western intelligence at the time, Beijing played no role in either the planning or execution of the Revolution.[216] Chinese officials at every level were as shocked at the turn of events as those from the United States. Zhou Enlai claimed to have read about it in the newspaper.[217] In the very beginning, the *People's Daily* deemed the regime change in Zanzibar a "military coup" rather than a revolution.[218] But while this initial response was muted, Karume's announcement on March 8, 1964 that he would nationalize and redistribute all land in Zanzibar garnered him significant revolutionary credentials in the Chinese press. A public reading and celebration of the declaration by Karume, which Babu hosted, drew an audience of 60,000 on the island, the *People's Daily* reported, and these reforms would benefit the poorest peasants, undoing the colonial legacy of so few owning so much of the land.[219] Further overwriting the racial grounds of Karume's proposal which were specific to Zanzibar, the article heralded the nationalization of private clubs as a major step towards national unity: "Because colonialism uses racial division to maintain its rule, [the ASP government is undertaking this] historically significant measure seeking to eliminate all forms of racism, so that all people can [come together] and move forward."[220] Don Petterson, a U.S. diplomat based in Zanzibar from 1963 to 1965, recalled the same gathering somewhat differently. There were "10,000 people [who] stood sweltering in the mid-afternoon sun" as Karume spoke, flanked by Babu and longtime political ally Ali Mahfudh. The presence of Babu and Mahfudh struck fear for Petterson, who believed that they were on a mission to sway Karume,

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[215] "陈毅外长致电巴布外长 我国承认*桑给巴尔*共和国 [Foreign Minister Chen Yi Telegrams Foreign Minister Babu, China Recognizes the Republic of Zanzibar], *Renmin ribao*, January 18, 1964.
[216] Helen Louise Hunter, *Zanzibar: The Hundred Days Revolution*, p. 51
[217] Helen Louise Hunter, *Zanzibar: The Hundred Days Revolution*, p. 52
[218] "桑给巴尔发生政变组成新政府 [Coup Occurs on Zanzibar and New Government is Formed], *Renmin ribao*, January 15, 1964.
[219] "卡鲁姆总统宣布桑给巴尔宣言实行土地国有并重新分配 [President Karume Issues Zanzibar Declaration to Nationalize and Redistribute Land]," *Renmin ribao*, March 10, 1964.
[220] "卡鲁姆总统宣布桑给巴尔宣言实行土地国有并重新分配 [President Karume Issues Zanzibar Declaration to Nationalize and Redistribute Land]."

popular but uneducated, to the political far left.[221] As Petterson remembers, that very night, the Zanzibari police moved to occupy the private clubs on the island. Boasting dedicated space for activities like golf and sailing, these clubs were technically accessible to all people but remained exclusive, with the "Asian clubs" just as restrictive in membership, if not more so, than European ones.[222] These decrees, combined with the Marxist terms like "reactionary" and "exploiters" that Karume employed in his speech, alarmed Petterson and other Western diplomats that Babu's influence has been immediate and significant.

From the Union up until the mid-1970s, Zanzibar maintained a significant degree of financial, military, and diplomatic autonomy from the mainland.[223] Dashing Western hopes that the Union would allow Nyerere's moderation to counteract radical elements in Zanzibar, both the mainland and the islands independently drifted to the left through 1964 and 1965. In accord with the projections of Chinese officials who received Ali Mwinyi Tambwe in 1962, revolutionary Zanzibar witnessed a nominal collapse of race and class categories, with a number of ASP leader of the 1960s and 1970s proclaiming that the Revolution had in fact been class-based.[224] This rewriting took place in spite of the anti-Arab rhetoric and violence long associated with the Revolution in popular memory, in which thousands of Arabs, Indians, and Comorians were killed or forced into exile. In other words, the new regime creatively welded political reforms along racial and class lines. Issa, for one, recalled that during Karume's rule, while corruption among government officials was an offense that warranted severe punishment, "if you took something from the Indian or Arab merchants, the exploiting class, you might be forgiven."[225]

Indeed, Karume consolidated power on the island hand-in-hand with a revolutionary program of land redistribution, nationalization of factories and businesses, and foreign policy that emphasized relations with communist countries. In the official narrative of the ASP, its post-1964 reforms in the realms of agricultural and industrial development overturned patterns of economic rather than racial

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[221] Don Petterson, *Revolution in Zanzibar: An American's Cold War Tale* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2002): p. 178.
[222] Don Petterson, *Revolution in Zanzibar*, p. 179
[223] Thomas Burgess, "Memories, Myths, and Meanings of the Zanzibari Revolution," p. 430
[224] Thomas Burgess, "Memories, Myths, and Meanings of the Zanzibari Revolution," p. 444
[225] Ali Sultan Issa, as quoted in G. Thomas Burgess, *Race, Revolution, and the Struggle for Human Rights: The Memoirs of Ali Sultan Issa and Seif Sharif Hamad* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2009): p. 106.

exploitation inherited from colonialism and hastened the transition to socialism. In the ASP's telling, ever since "the peasants and workers toppled the oppressive forces ruling Zanzibar and Pemba," it has promoted the effective expansion of tractor farming "to all rice valleys and other areas previously cultivated by hoes."[226] In essence, the development of the relationship between China and Zanzibar under Karume proceeded alongside the ASP's revisionist rewriting of its platform as championing proletarian socialist, rather than African nationalist, interests.

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In September 1962, Ali Mwinyi Tambwe, then serving as the General Administrative Secretary of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) in Dar es Salaam, arrived in Beijing. As the course of Tambwe's visit demonstrates, the case for Afro-Asian solidarities in early 1960s Tanganyika and Zanzibar became complicated by longstanding conceptions of race in which economic exploitation was most often associated with the Arab and Indian land-owning or merchant "class," derivative of East African racial politics under colonialism. In British colonial Tanganyika, Indian entrepreneurs were permitted to borrow any amount from commercial lending institutions while Africans were restricted to a mere 100 shillings, resulting in massive racial disparities in commerce that persisted long after independence.[227] In Zanzibar, pre-colonial histories of race and migration—its rule as part of the Sultanate of Oman since 1698, an Arab-dominated slave trade not abolished until 1876, and myths of "Shirazi" identity, an ambiguous ethnic classification that denoted Persian heritage —also reified during the time that the islands were a British Protectorate, between 1895 and December 1963. Consequently, African nationalism in both places partially arose in response to these complex, long-entrenched histories of racial inequality rather than only as a challenge to European colonialism.

As the first Tanganyikan cultural delegation to visit the PRC, Tambwe and two other TANU representatives received a lavish reception in the Chinese capital. Arrangements were made for the

[226] The Afro-Shirazi Party, *The Afro-Shirazi Party Revolution, 1964-1974* (Zanzibar: The Afro-Shirazi Party, 1974): p. 48.
[227] Chambi Chachage, "A Capitalizing City: Dar Es Salaam and the Emergence of an African Entrepreneurial Elite, c. 1862-2015," p. 25.

selection of the first Tanganyikan students to complete technical courses in China. Tambwe praised the medical attention he received for his prostatitis and joint pain. For him however, the objectives for the trip were not constrained to medical treatment, drug prescriptions, or, as delineated in official records of the FCLC, reaching a deeper understanding of nation-building central party operations within China. Tambwe hoped to convince Prime Minister Zhou Enlai and Vice Prime Minister Chen Yi of the misguided nature of Beijing's decision to endorse the ZNP in Zanzibar's electoral politics and consequently, secure Chinese support for the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) instead. It is unsurprising that among TANU leadership, Tambwe was chosen for this task; he was a Zanzibari native of Comorian descent, though he had moved to the mainland and become involved with TANU in the 1950s.[228]

At this time, Zanzibar remained a British Protectorate. The years leading up to independence witnessed a fierce political and ideological struggle.[229] Debates over nation, race, and self-governance had dominated mid-twentieth century Zanzibari politics. Under British rule, Zanzibar had been allowed to retain its Arab-dominated social structure, with Arabs and Indians receiving the opportunities for higher education and bureaucratic employment to the exclusion of Africans. The rise of Arab nationalism in the 1950s was entwined with the campaign for immediate and unconditional independence, both of which found expression in the ZNP.[230] But rather than the "systemic and repressive subordination of the African community," as political scientist Michael Lofchie writes, Arabs in Zanzibar "attempted to gain [to a measured degree of success] voluntary acceptance among Africans by fostering a multi-racial concept of national community and by championing the cause of representative self-government."[231] On the other hand, early iterations of African nationalism were characterized by disunity between Shirazis and African

[228] In 1969, Karume went to Dar es Salaam to request that Nyerere transfer Tambwe back to Zanzibar alongside Hanga and Shariff. See George Roberts, "Politics, Decolonisation, and the Cold War in Dar es Salaam" (PhD diss., University of Warwick, 2016): p. 165.
[229] This period between 1957 and the January 1964 Revolution is colloquially known in Zanzibar as "zama za siasa," or the "time of politics," referring to a period when racial animosities dominated political debates over Zanzibari identity, culminating in the wave of anti-Arab and anti-Indian violence that followed the Revolution.
[230] Michael Lofchie, *Zanzibar: Background to Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965): pp. 127-156.
[231] Michael Lofchie, *Zanzibar: Background to Revolution*, p. 9.

migrant laborers from the mainland. Further muddying the waters, Tanganyikan politicians followed the political crises on Zanzibar with great interest. In late 1956 and again in 1957, Julius Nyerere, then serving as president of a nascent TANU, visited Zanzibar at the invitation of the island's African Association to express his support for the union of Shirazis and Africans into a single political party.[232] Subsequently, preceding the 1957 elections in Zanzibar, the African Association and the Shirazi Association announced their merging into the ASP. As a racial-nationalist party, the early ASP prioritized the assertion of African nationalism above all else, including independence.

Though most Arab landowners belonged to the ZNP, there existed within the party a sizable and passionate anti-imperialist and socialist faction. While the ASP consisted nearly exclusively of landless Africans, Karume was willing to partner with the British to defer an independence that would likely result in a new Zanzibari government that was predominantly Arab.[233] Neither were all Arabs in Zanzibar wealthy plantation owners. Building on Michael Lofchie's data collected in the 1960s, Issa Shivji concludes that only 1% of all Arabs in Zanzibar were a part of the land-owning "ruling class," while 76% were in the lower classes.[234] The primary difference between the ZNP and the ASP was thus never class composition but political outlook; the ZNP appealed to the culture and history of Swahili civilization as the basis for its nationalism, whereas the ASP espoused an explicitly racialized form of African nationalism. Strategically, Tambwe's overtures caught the Chinese, deeply engaged with the ZNP but also committed to anti-racist rhetoric in its outreach to the Afro-Asian world, between a rock and a hard place. In Chinese press and media, the 1961 electoral victory of the ZNP was cast as a major step in the struggle for national liberation, even as British colonial and U.S. "neo-colonial" interests instigated racial conflicts in order to suppress the popular movement for decolonization.[235]

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[232] Michael Lofchie, "Party Conflict in Zanzibar," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 1 (1963): p. 197.
[233] Issa Shivji, *Pan-Africanism or Pragmatism: Lessons of the Tanganyika-Zanzibar Union* (Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota Publishers, 2008): pp. 35-39.
[234] Shivji, *Pan-Africanism or Pragmatism*, pp. 11-13
[235] Xiao Ou, "为争取民族独立而斗争的桑给巴尔 [Zanzibar, In the Struggle for National Independence]," *Shijie zhishi*, September 1961.

Tambwe premised his arguments in favor of the ASP on the conflation of Arabs in Zanzibar, as a racial group, with a class of "feudalists and exploiters." This resulted in a definitional conflict with Chinese leaders, who insisted that the Arab working classes of North Africa and the Middle East belonged to the same anti-imperialist camp as Africans. In addition, in official conversations with Tambwe, both Zhou and Chen insisted upon a distinction between "old" and "new" colonialisms in which the latter, in the form of foreign aid, posed as significant a threat to postcolonial sovereignty. But Tambwe preferred to use "imperialism" as a racialized general category for all non-African encroachments on Tanganyikan and Zanzibari politics. The official conversation between Tambwe and Zhou, which took place on October 19, 1962, highlights this difference.[236] When Zhou decided to take the opportunity to warn Tambwe that "the Peace Corps is even more shrewd and more adept than old-time colonialism at drugging the masses and upkeeping the semblance of peace," Tambwe responded that regardless of the number of Peace Corps volunteers in Tanganyika, it is only of primary importance for their presence to not interfere with national economy and foreign policy. Zhou did not appear at ease with such an answer, and reminded Tambwe that although the Tanganyikan leadership may be aware of the true intentions of the Peace Corps, the Tanganyikan people may not be. Upset by this statement, Tambwe countered:

> "Every move of the Peace Corps is monitored. Tanganyika is an independent country. The independence struggle taught the people what imperialism is. Even if they don't have cultural education, they have political education… It is in these most difficult of circumstances that we ask for help from China [but] you must know, Tanganyika would rather suffer from hunger and malnutrition than to sell her freedom and sovereignty."[237]

For Chinese officials, their mounting concerns about negative influences upon Tanganyika—ranging from the predatory designs of U.S. aid, the relics of British colonialism, and the economic dominance of Indian merchants—were counteracted one for one by encouraging signs that visiting Tanganyikans appeared

[236] "周恩来总理接见坦噶尼喀文化代表团谈话记录 [Record of Conversation During Prime Minister Zhou's Reception of the Tanganyikan Cultural Delegation]," October 19, 1962, File No. 108-00276-06, FMA.
[237] "周恩来总理接见坦噶尼喀文化代表团谈话记录 [Record of Conversation During Prime Minister Zhou's Reception of the Tanganyikan Cultural Delegation]."

open to Chinese views. But they expected one thing that Tambwe would not give: the implicit recognition that China monopolized the power to define "old and new" colonialisms.

In Tambwe's repeated appeals for China to withdraw its support for the ZNP, the underlying assumptions and logic, as well as the hesitancy with which they were met, departed from Chinese scripts with regards to the strategies and lexicons of anti-racism and international solidarity. For Chinese representatives, racism indisputably existed and engendered popular divisions, but only insofar as it detracted from the true path to liberation of class unity and global socialism. For Tambwe, on the other hand, anti-imperialism was essentially a racial project that had very little to do with global geopolitical and economic systems. By this logic, Tanganyikan decolonization hinged on the undoing of colonial racial hierarchies beyond Black and white; it required the reclaiming of privileges once granted to Arabs and Indians as a necessary measure on the road to African ownership of the national destiny.

On the Zanzibar question, Tambwe was persistent. In his discussion with Chen Yi, he expanded on the duplicitous origins of the ZNP. Tambwe explained that it was after ZNP electoral failures that they siphoned members from the ASP to form the Umma Party, for the specific purpose of inhibiting African unity in racial nationalist terms.[238] "Africans in Zanzibar are not educated," he explained, "their leadership cannot come to China to state their position. But the ZNP can come to China to publicize their beliefs, in a way that befits your tastes and win your support. They are feudalists." To this, Chen responded with displeasure, "The Chinese people are not so easily duped."[239] "The Arabs of North Africa are anti-imperialists," Chen added, "and I regret that you, as a leader of the ruling party of Tanganyika, would come [to China and] call them imperialists… The 50,000 Arabs of Zanzibar are not all feudalists and exploiters. Some of them are laborers, a part of the oppressed, and it is critical to draw

[238] "陈毅副总理接见坦噶尼喀文化代表团团长坦布维的谈话纪要 [Summary of Conversation from Vice Prime Minister Chen Yi's Reception of Tanganyikan Cultural Delegation Leader Tambwe]," October 9, 1962, File No. 108-00276-07, FMA.
[239] "陈毅副总理接见坦噶尼喀文化代表团团长坦布维的谈话纪要 [Summary of Conversation from Vice Prime Minister Chen Yi's Reception of Tanganyikan Cultural Delegation Leader Tambwe].

distinctions."[240] This exchange between Tambwe and Chen reveals the paradox at the heart of Chinese efforts to fashion a Maoist narrative of Asian-African solidarity: race was used as a category of analysis, but only insofar as it supported an anti-U.S. and anti-Soviet vision of revolutionary solidarity.

On the other hand, Tambwe leaned heavily on the motif of the African racial majority, not the Arab minority, as the true representatives of Africa and the pillar of Pan-African unity. In conversations with the FCLC, which coordinated the logistics of receiving his delegation, Tambwe stated that many Africans he was acquainted with believed that China's support for the ZNP stemmed from their shared racial heritage with Arabs: they were both "Asians." The fact China had given this impression, Tambwe suggested, derived from misunderstanding rather than malintent; they could rectify their honest mistake by recognizing the ASP, who constituted "the real Africans" instead.[241] Upon Tambwe's return to Tanganyika, the FCLC reported to the Chinese Consulate in Dar es Salaam that while in Beijing, Tambwe had tried repeatedly to win assurance from Chen that China would, at the very least, declare neutrality in the 1963 Zanzibar elections. In response to this direct request, Chen only offered that China did not wish to interfere in the domestic politics of other nations. Tambwe and his hosts in Beijing had brought to the table contrasting visions about the nature of solidarity with due respect to national self-determination, and they operated with conflicting lexicons of racism, imperialist and neo-imperialist dominations. In the eyes of the Chinese leadership, while racism existed and served to reinforce popular divisions, it did so only insofar as it detracted from the true path to liberation: class unity and global socialism. For Tambwe, on the other hand, imperialism and anti-imperialism were primarily racial projects.

Independent from the two other members in his delegation, Tambwe then embarked on an additional and controversial two-day visit to Shanghai, where the municipal branch of the FCLC received, on the eve of his arrival, a detailed record of his transgressions while in Beijing: Tambwe claimed that he

[240] "陈毅副总理接见坦噶尼喀文化代表团团长坦布维的谈话纪要 [Summary of Conversation from Vice Prime Minister Chen Yi's Reception of Tanganyikan Cultural Delegation Leader Tambwe].
[241] "国庆外宾接待工作简报 [Reports from Receptions of Foreign Guests on National Day]," Foreign Cultural Liaison Committee Office for the Reception of Foreign Guests on National Day, October 6, 1962, File No. 108-00284-06, FMA.

did not oppose U.S. imperialism so much as the domination of the Arab "class," that the Tanganyikan road to nationhood was most desirable as no blood was shed, and that the Congolese were wrong to demand independence "in a hurry."[242] Moreover, Tambwe concluded the fundamental issue in the Congo was not of U.S. imperialism but of foreign political competition over the breakaway Republic of Katanga.[243] In Shanghai, Tambwe continued to resist Chinese warnings about U.S. imperialism. "The number one imperialists [in Zanzibar] are the Arabs, followed by the British, Germans, and the Americans," Tambwe informed the Vice Mayor of Shanghai at a banquet, "and the reason that Zanzibar is not independent is not imperialism. It is because there is a small ruling group [of Arabs] at the top preventing its independence." In response to further Chinese efforts to impose on him their reading of political developments in Africa, Tambwe countered, "We are clear-headed about the situation in Africa and we have no need for further education."[244]

Chinese historian Yang Kuisong argues for an inverse correlation between the CCP's long-term adherence to a rigid, class-driven analysis of international relations and the stability of its diplomatic relationships with other countries.[245] Expanding on Yang's argument that Maoist foreign policy was inseparable from class, Anton Harder observes that in the late 1950s and early 1960s, Chinese leadership held that postcolonial "native reactionaries"—most often the nationalist elite who were willing to collaborate with the West—facilitated the advent of "neo-colonialism." Using case studies of Chinese relationships with India and Algeria, Harder concludes that class trumped anti-imperialism in Chinese understandings of Afro-Asian decolonization and nation-building, in the sense that "the CCP often interpreted imperialism in terms of transnational class alignments, with the comprador-type figure at the

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[242] "对外文联上海联络处接待坦噶尼喀文化友好代表团长的计划与简报 [Plans and Reports of the Foreign Cultural Liaison Committee Regarding the Reception of Tanganyikan Cultural Delegation Team Leader]," File No. C37-2-858, SMA.

[243] Under the leadership of Moise Tsombe, Katanga was a breakaway state that announced its independence in 1960 with the support of the Belgian military and Belgian mining interests. Disappointed with the unwillingness of United Nations troops to quell the secession, Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba called for military aid from the Soviet Union, which drew the ire and fears of the United States.

[244] "对外文联上海联络处接待坦噶尼喀文化友好代表团长的计划与简报 [Plans and Reports of the Foreign Cultural Liaison Committee Regarding the Reception of Tanganyikan Cultural Delegation Team Leader]."

[245] Yang Kuisong," *Modern Chinese History* 3 (2009): pp. 127-145.

center of this: the internal ally of the foreign imperialists."[246] In this bifurcated construction, all countries ruled by "reactionary elements," including postcolonial countries that recently attained independence, were enemies of China. There existed little space in between anti-imperialist solidarity on the one hand, and regressive neo-colonialism on the other.

Indeed, the CCP had maintained strong relationships with India and the Algerian Front Libération Nationale (FLN) in the mid-1950s, but in the aftermath of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution and the 1959 Tibetan Uprising, both of which the Chinese leadership believed to have resulted from collusion between the nationalist bourgeois and imperialist influences overseas, began to harbor increasing suspicions about the Indian ruling elite and about independent Algeria.[247] Tambwe's troubles in China represented an extension of this dynamic. The CCP's warnings about the pitfalls of "neo-colonialism" collided with the inclination of anticolonial nationalists to construe their struggle primarily in the terms of sovereignty or anti-imperialism rather than global class analysis. In this way, Tambwe's experiences mirrored the conflict between Robert Williams' Black nationalist convictions and the CCP's valuations of transnational class alliances over racial unity.

In Tambwe's case, the failure of the Chinese emphasis on multiracial working-class solidarity to map on to the political realities of African nationalists from Zanzibar is not a unique case study in the inability of Afro-Asian discourses to address the complexity of race relations within the Afro-Asian world itself. Radio Cairo, a crucial component of Gamal Abdel Nasser's campaign to extend Egyptian influence in decolonizing Africa, had launched Swahili-language programming in 1954. While the anticolonial messaging of the broadcasts facilitated the rise of popular sentiments against British rule, their stance with regards to race and class generated controversy. Radio Cairo pushed "the Bandung spirit" as one premised on an Asian, Arab, and African united front in East Africa. In doing so, its programming proved palatable for supporters of the ZNP but alienated scores of African nationalists, serving as political ammunition that

[246] Anton Harder, "Compradors, Neo-colonialism, and Transnational Class Struggle: PRC relations with Algeria and India, 1953-1965," *Modern Asian Studies* (Published online in August 2020): p. 40.
[247] Anton Harder, "Compradors, Neo-colonialism, and Transnational Class Struggle," pp. 17-36

only sharpened their antipathy for Arab platitudes about multiracialism.[248] As Egyptian propaganda overlooked the deeply felt history of racial hierarchy in Zanzibar and thus, witnessed its Afro-Asian rhetoric ring hollow, so did Chinese officials whose assignment of prominence to class-based solidarity neglected to account for the indispensable importance of racial politics to African movements for national liberation. In their conflation of race and class in Zanzibar, they eschewed the finer nuances of cleavage within Asia and Africa, advocating a black-and-white picture of anti-imperialist struggle as necessarily a project of Afro-Asian solidarity and anti-capitalism.

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In the early 1960s, most observers considered Julius Nyerere a trusted ally of Western interests. In July 1963, he paid a state visit to Washington D.C., where he received a friendly welcome from President John F. Kennedy, and channeling the broad ideals of global humanitarianism, delivered a public appeal for the U.S. to be the leader of the opposition to apartheid and the continued European colonial presence in Southern Africa.[249] Even after the revelation of the November 1964 plot, Nyerere's response to mounting Cold War pressures focused on downplaying the significance of Tanzania's relationship with China. At the rally in the capital, he announced his vexations that, "towards a mere seven Chinese [military advisers], people have reacted as if they were 70,000 Chinese! And those seven Chinese are to stay for only six months! There was such a big row about this that I had to call a press conference and lash out like a mad man. I am tired of being questioned about the Chinese."[250] As such, public demonstrations in Dar es Salaam, while spontaneous and impassioned assertions of nationalism, were not, as Chinese officials projected, the summation of a mass movement with coherent ideological

[248] James Brennan, "Radio Cairo and the Decolonization of East Africa, 1953-1964," in Christopher J. Lee ed., *Making a World after Empire: The Bandung Moment and its Political Afterlives* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2010): pp. 173-190.
[249] Julius Nyerere, "Independence and Solidarity: Address by the President of the Republic of Tanganyika at National Press Club," July 15, 1963, Washington D.C., East Africana Collection, University of Dar es Salaam.
[250] Julius Nyerere, "Speech Given at Kijangwani Playing Fields, Dar es Salaam, November 15, 1964," as quoted in Emma Hunter, "Julius Nyerere, the Arusha Declaration, and the Deep Roots of a Contemporary Political Metaphor," in Marie-Aude Fouere ed., *Remembering Julius Nyerere in Tanzania: History, Memory, Legacy* (Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota Publishers, 2015): p. 82.

underpinnings. In actuality, the years between Tanganyikan independence and the "Western plot" witnessed a protracted struggle on the part of the CCP to build party-to-party relations with TANU amidst crises in Tanganyikan domestic politics, as challengers to Nyerere—from Zuberi Mtemvu, founder of the African National Congress, a short-lived opposition party to TANU to Oscar Kambona himself—all of whom positioned themselves in the space to Nyerere's left. They strategically marshalled the discourses of anti-imperialism, revolutionary nationalism, and Afro-Asian unity to attract Chinese material support.

In April 1962, He Ying (何英) was appointed as the first Ambassador of the People's Republic of China to Tanganyika. He's tenure overlapped with a January 1963 PAFMECSA meeting in Mwanza, a major city on the Southern shores of Lake Victoria, and the Third AAPSO Conference in the city of Moshi, at the foothills of Mt. Kilimanjaro the following month. In the chronology of the Sino-Soviet Split, the early 1960s was defined by competition for influence over the international organizations of Afro-Asian unity. The Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) figured as a key battleground, as did a slew of other associations including the World Peace Council, the Afro-Asian Writers Association, and the Afro-Asian Journalist Association. While the Soviet Union dominated the World Peace Council, China gravitated to AAPSO as the primary vessel for its political ambitions.[251] But beyond the Afro-Asian groups, Pan-African organizations also became sites of contest between China and the Soviet Union.

In January 1963, the Pan-African Freedom Movement for East, Central, and Southern Africa (PAFMECSA), co-established in 1958 by Nyerere to advocate for African liberation, hosted a meeting at its headquarters in Mwanza to discuss planning for the Third Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) Conference, to be held in Moshi the following month. The founding of PAFMECA in 1958 in Mwanka had first formalized collaborative efforts among the various independence movements in East and Central Africa. After Southern African liberation became an objective of the organization, its name was revised to the Pan-African Movement for East, Central, and Southern Africa (PAFMECSA) in 1962.

[251] Tareq Ismael, "The People's Republic of China and Africa," p. 512

Though generally overlooked in scholarship, PAFMECSA was instrumental in fostering regional unity against white-minority and colonial governance until its dissolution, when many of its functions were assumed by the OAU Liberation Committee.[252]

The conference in Mwanza generated frustrations among African attendants who hoped to placate both Chinese and Soviet officials in the prelude to AAPSO. He Ying had been furious to see his request for 20 Chinese representatives to attend AAPSO—already reduced from his proposal of 25—rejected after an initial approval. Tanganyikan authorities claimed they never received notice of approval from the AAPSO Permanent Secretariat about Chinese representatives and that PAFMECSA already informed Beijing and Moscow that no state or organization could send more than five delegates. Upset and insulted, He Ying insisted on "struggling" against this ruling, reporting to the Chinese ambassador in Cairo that "Recently on a number of internal and external measures Tanganyika has expressed its negative side." "TANU announced that Europeans and Indians can join," He Ying wrote, while the organization also "stepped up its oppression of workers and arrested [a union leader]. They invited non-Tanganyikan observers (possibly such peaceful elements like British and Indian reactionaries) to attend [AAPSO]."[253] As a result, He Ying warned, Chinese representatives must be on the highest alert, as these most recent actions of TANU did not bode well for the conference proceedings to unfold in Beijing's favor.

Nsilo Swai, former Tanganyikan representative to the United Nations, objected to Chinese plans to send 20 representatives to Moshi from the outset, for the given reason that there were not enough hotels in the city to house so many guests. Chinese officials however, countered this objection, arguing that as some delegations will consist of fewer than five guests, other countries can have more, so long as the overall number is acceptable. Yang Ji went as far as to suspect that the Soviets harbored covert plans of

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[252] For the most comprehensive assessment of PAFMECA and PAFMESCA, see Richard Cox, *Pan-Africanism in Practice: PAFMECSA, 1958-1964* (London: Oxford University Press, 1964). A more recent analysis of the organization is offered in Azaria Mbughuni, "Tanzania and the Pan African Quest for Unity, Freedom, and Independence in East, Central, and Southern Africa: The Case of the Pan African Freedom Movement for East and the Central Africa/Pan African Freedom Movement for East Central and South Africa," *The Journal of Pan-African Studies* 7 (2014): pp. 211-231.

[253] "坦方对三届大会态度 [Tanganyikan Attitude towards the Third Conference]," January 12, 1963, Telegram from Dar es Salaam to Cairo, PRC FMA 108-00831-01.

landing a chartered plane in Moshi for 40 AAPSO delegates.[254] In repeated meetings with authorities in Dar es Salaam throughout January 1962, Chinese diplomats refused to send less than twenty delegates to Moshi; their Tanganyikan counterparts, exasperated, contended that the final decision would be rendered by the AAPSO Permanent Secretariat, with whom they had already engaged in seventy hours of discussion on the issue of representation.[255] Ultimately, through negotiations with the Secretariat in Cairo Beijing was able to obtain approval for their 20 delegates to Moshi, as to more effectively "carry out struggle" against revisionism vis-à-vis a resolution on Cuba and opposition to Eastern European participation at AAPSO. These moments of contest between the Chinese Consulate in Dar es Salaam and Tanganyikan officials did not provide for an auspicious beginning to China-Tanganyika relations.

According to Tennyson Makiwane, an African National Congress (ANC) representative in Dar es Salaam, the meeting in Mwanza witnessed several African delegates raising issue with the Sino-Soviet Split in relationship to the cause of African liberation. They expressed a consensus that both China and the Soviet Union were attempting to harness the "Afro-Asian unity movement" in service of their own interests. If, in spite of the pronounced neutrality of African states on this matter, the Sino-Soviet Split is deliberately dragged into their conference planning, they would be ready to quit the Afro-Asian movement. Makiwane stated that on the question of Eastern European participation, which Tanganyikan representatives may have been compelled by the Soviets to suggest, African countries are all in a difficult bind; they either risk the anger of the Soviet Union or the opposition of China. Chinese official Zhu Ziqi concluded, "It is clear that 'revisionism' is gathering power, using or confusing Africans into giving us pressure."[256] These tensions in Mwanza precipitated those that would color the AAPSO conference in Moshi, where Nyerere, in his opening address, condemned socialist countries for "committing the same crimes as were committed by the capitalists before. On the international level, they are now beginning to

[254] Yang Ji (Dar es Salaam) to Yang Shuo (Cairo), "关于代表团人数事 [Regarding the Number of Delegates]," January 5, 1963, PRC FMA 108-00834-01.
[255] He Ying, "关于代表团人数事 [Regarding Number of Delegates]," January 11, 1963, PRC FMA 108-00834-01.
[256] Zhu Ziqi, "马基瓦尼谈及非洲民族主义者在泛非自由活动总部开会情况 [Makiwane Discusses Conference Proceedings of African Nationalists at PAFMESCA Headquarters], January 25, 1963, PRC FMA 108-00831-03.

use wealth for capitalistic purposes, that is, for the acquisition of power and prestige."[257] Open arguments between Chinese and Soviet representatives dominated the conference, beginning with the seating of Eastern European participants but also spanning a range of issues, including the Sino-Indian Border Conflict and the prospect of Latin American membership, as Chinese officials continually questioned the position of the Soviet Union on anti-imperialism due to its status as a "white" country.[258] In their communications, Chinese diplomats were resolute that "Afro-Asian affairs must be decided by the Afro-Asian people themselves: if Eastern European countries dispatched observers, then in the future, organizations controlled by the imperialist countries might also use this excuse."[259]

Zhou Enlai's first visit to Tanganyika was planned for early 1964 as part of his ten-country "African safari," but it would be postponed as a result of an army mutiny in Dar es Salaam in January.[260] The draft of Zhou's speech, which would have been delivered at a welcome reception hosted by Nyerere, paid homage to the conference in Moshi. "Old colonialists will think of new ways to hold on to the benefits they reap and new colonialists will use more subtle methods to extract the fruits won through the struggle of oppressed peoples," Zhou stated, "President Nyerere correctly pointed out in Moshi the dangers when [a formerly colonized] country develops and the [colonizer] or another foreign force comes in through the back door."[261] Even though Nyerere's original address at AAPSO chided socialist countries and Western powers alike for the tendency to view African nations as pawns in their geopolitical designs, Zhou recast the criticism such that it targeted "old and new colonialism." In the terms of Chinese foreign policy, "old and new colonialism" referred to both former imperial powers like the British, who attempt to maintain their influence vis-à-vis material aid and intelligence agents, as well as "new colonialists," exemplified by the United States. Viewed in this light, Tambwe's disagreements with Zhou and Chen Yi

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[257] Julius Nyerere, as quoted in Charles Neuhauser, *Third World Politics: China and the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization, 1957-1967* (Cambridge: Harvard University East Asian Monographs, 1968): p. 40.
[258] Julius Nyerere, as quoted in Charles Neuhauser, *Third World Politics*, pp. 41-42
[259] He Ying to Chinese Diplomats in Cairo and Dar es Salaam, "关于大会邀请东欧观察员事 [Regarding the Invitation of Eastern European Observers to the Conference]," January 19, 1963, PRC FMA 108-00833-03.
[260] See W.A.C. Adie, "Chou Enlai on Safari," *The China Quarterly* 18 (1964): pp. 174-194.
[261] "周恩来总理在尼雷尔总统举行的国宴上的讲话 [Prime Minister Zhou Enlai's Speech at Reception Hosted by President Nyerere]," November 30, 1963, PRC FMA 203-00517-04.

are not singular episodes but rather, part of a longer pattern of definitional contentions with Tanganyikan leaders unwilling to so harshly condemn the United States and the Eastern bloc. Zhou's speeches often referenced the necessity of "world peace," but made clear that such "peace" could only be the product of sustained struggle.

From his appointment as Ambassador to Tanganyika in November 1962 onwards, He Ying performed the painstaking labor of extending Chinese influence on TANU leadership, with his first successes coming in the spring of the following year. In May 1963, He attended the same banquet as Nyerere, Minister of Finance Paul Bomani, and Nsilo Swai, now the Minister of Development Planning. According to He's record of the meeting, Nyerere expressed gratitude for China's direct purchase of Tanganyikan cotton while Bomani, after issuing He an invitation for a meal at his home, voiced his hopes for Chinese experts to inspect underground resources in Tanganyika. "At present all the experts in Tanganyika are from [the West]," Bomani informed him, "and they are here for their own benefit. Tanganyika wishes for support from the other side too, so that through comparison [we] can distinguish good from bad." He Ying concluded that in summary, because Western aid has been slow to arrive, China was able to expand its influence in Tanganyika with its recent cotton purchase. He proceeded to hypothesize, "perhaps Vice President Kawawa's visit to Guinea introduced to Tanganyika the wicked ways of the West and the revisionists as well as our sincere attitudes towards Africa, added to U.S. support for Uganda's Democratic Party. [These events] have all contributed to the Tanganyikan leadership's intent for and curiosity in aid and expertise from us."[262]

He's optimism continued to grow in the days after this conversation with Nyerere, Bomani, and Swai. The dinner at Bomani's residence took place on May 14, with Swai also in attendance. Bomani revealed that he was displeased with conditions for institutional loans from the United Nations, which appeared to him to serve the interests of wealthy European countries rather than poorer Asian and African ones. Further, Bomani let on, he believed that the pace of economic development in post-independence

[262] He Ying to Foreign Ministry in Beijing, "与尼雷尔等接触情况 [Situation of Meeting with Nyerere et al.]," May 10, 1963, PRC FMA 108-01269-01.

Tanganyika has been too slow; perhaps it was time to adopt more "revolutionary" means. Swai followed up that because in the past, Europeans and Indians controlled the sisal industry, Tanganyikan leaders were now considering placing the reins of production in the hands of the state, which would promote direct commerce with Chinese buyers and investors. More than 80% of domestic production in Tanganyika, Swai expressed, was controlled by "capitalists of the Indian diaspora" and this situation was in dire need of change.[263] As Swai's sentiments reveal, the disillusionment with capitalist development that turned the Tanganyikan leadership to China was implicitly and explicitly racialized, with the economic power retained by Indian merchants in postcolonial Tanganyika as the most visceral testament to the flaws of the existing system.

Six months later, Vice President Rashidi Kawawa formally requested financial and technical aid from China for the construction of ten state-run sisal farms, in the amount totaling 1.5 million British pounds. He Ying wrote that while he affirmed to Kawawa Chinese support for Tanganyikan national industry, he had also used the opportunity to assert his hopes that Yang Xikun, a diplomat from the Republic of China in Taiwan who expressed the desire to visit Tanganyika, would be barred from entry into the country. He Ying recommended to the Foreign Ministry in Beijing immediate approval of Kawawa's request, in light of the consideration that not only would Chinese support facilitate economic nationalism in Tanganyika as to break Indian dominance of the sisal industry, the consequent development of closer China-Tanganyika relations would reverberate in effect across East Africa. Even if it might be difficult to find Chinese technicians with expertise in sisal cultivation at the moment, He acknowledged, it would be desirable to first satisfy the financial aspect of the request.[264]

On November 8, He Ying reported that Nyerere sought him out of his own accord at a reception hosted by the Soviet Consulate in Dar es Salaam. Minister of Home Affairs Lawi Sijaona and Speaker of

[263] He Ying to Foreign Ministry and Ministry of Foreign Trade in Beijing, "博马尼和斯瓦依所谈情况简报 [Report of Situation of Discussion with Bomani and Swai]," May 15, 1963, PRC FMA 108-01269-01.
[264] He Ying to Foreign Ministry and Central Bureau for Foreign Economic Liaison in Beijing, "坦要求援助兴办剑麻农场事 [Issue of Tanganyikan Request for Aid to Set Up Sisal Factory]," November 4, 1963, PRC FMA 108-01269-01.

the House Adam Sapi Mkwawa have just returned from their visit to China, Nyerere informed He, and both of them are full of praise about the pace of development and spirit of hard work they gleaned. Nyerere was reported to have stated:

> "In the past I only spread the word about our friendship with China but that is not enough. Now that [Sijaona and Mkwawa] have seen with their own eyes and laud Chinese achievements, it is very meaningful for good relations between our two countries. It also proves that the policy I was behind, of promoting friendship with China, was the correct one. Mkwawa is a conservative man. He has visited many countries but none had a lasting impact. After his return from China he has become more progressive. Not only is this good for friendship between our two countries, it is good for me too… Only poor friends can truly help each other. When the rich and poor collaborate, the rich benefit and the poor suffer. "[265]

To amplify He's delight at the turn of events, Minister of Health Saidi Maswanya added that he personally witnessed Sijaona's report about his time in China and that indeed, Sijaona's impression was glowing.[266] Indeed, Sijaona's early experiences in China proved formative for the philosophy that he would later govern by. As Chapter 4 will discuss, as Chairman of the TANU Youth League in 1968, Sijaona would be instrumental in the launching of "Operation Vijana," a controversial campaign to reform "national culture" vis-à-vis the banning of miniskirts, tight trousers, beauty pageants, and skin-lightening creams. At this time however, He Ying was less concerned with the impact of the visit on Sijaona's own political evolution. Rather, he considered it as the turning point in Tanzania's relationship to China, from a tepid friendship, certainly not imbued with as much significance as the one with Guinea or the Somali Republic, to one of the most decisive relationships in China-African relations.

When Sijaona was in Beijing, Zhou requested that his help in conveying to Nyerere the nuances to the deepening Chinese conflict with India. Indian claims about the remobilization of Chinese ground forces are false, Zhou reassured Sijaona, and stemmed only from India's desire to receive more foreign aid. Nehru deliberately manufactured these charges; he "extends his right hand to get assistance from the

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[265] He Ying to the Foreign Ministry, Standing Committee of the People's Congress, the Committee for Foreign Cultural Relations, and the Ministry of Agriculture in Beijing, "尼雷尔总统的谈话 [Conversation with President Nyerere]," November 8, 1963, PRC FMA 108-01269-01.

[266] He Ying to the Foreign Ministry, Standing Committee of the People's Congress, the Committee for Foreign Cultural Relations, and the Ministry of Agriculture in Beijing, "尼雷尔总统的谈话 [Conversation with President Nyerere]."

United States and extends his left hand to get assistance from the Soviet Union... [He also wishes to] suppress India's own domestic progressive forces, to collect high taxes, to confiscate gold."[267] In the reports of the FCLC, Sijaona's three-member delegation proved receptive to the Chinese position on India, though they asked other questions which revealed a real lack of knowledge about China: if there still existed a unity government between the Communists and Nationalists, if present-day China operated an imperial examination system, and in which part of China might Bangkok be located.

Nonetheless, Chinese officials were pleased that the Tanganyikan delegates expressed their support for China on the issue of the Sino-Soviet Split after reading the booklets "Origins and Development of our Split with Soviet Leaders" (1963) and "On Stalinism" (1963). One delegate, whose last name is recorded as Mshangi, shared that before his departure for China, the Soviet Ambassador to Tanganyika asked him many questions, including why they would choose to visit China. "Tanganyika is an independent country," the delegate had responded, "we will go wherever we like… The world belongs to people from different nations. But now on many things it is Khrushchev and Kennedy speaking for those people. Where is the voice of China? Where is the voice of Tanganyika?"[268] The lens through which Mshangi interpreted the Tanganyikan stance in the Sino-Soviet Split emphasized the capacity for independent action rather than alignment with any camp of international socialism. Just Zhou failed to recognize in his discussions with Tambwe that an attack on the decision to receive Peace Corps volunteers could not be disentangled from one on Tanganyikan sovereignty, this exchange demonstrated a blind spot on the part of Chinese representatives with regards to the politics of sovereignty in postcolonial Africa.

An evaluation of the FCLC itself with regards to its efforts in cultural diplomacy with Tanzania, written in March 1964, acknowledged Sijaona's visit as critical to the establishment of favorable

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[267] "周总理接见坦噶尼喀文化代表团谈话记录 [Record of Conversation from Premier Zhou's Reception of the Tanganyikan Cultural Delegation]," October 16, 1963, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, (https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/165480.pdf?v=d877c3bf188cd8a314a142c1fe843762), translated by David Cowhig. Original file is from PRC FMA 108-00032-01.

[268] 坦噶尼喀文化代表团活动情况 [Activities of the Tanganyikan Cultural Delegation]," FCLC, October 15, 1963, PRC FMA 108-00332-02.

conditions for continued outreach. Subsequently, the FCLC believed, without any significant political developments in China-Tanzania relations in the foreseeable future, it is vital to "attain victory in quality" in the domain of cultural diplomacy. In other words, Chinese representatives must undertake propaganda work with renewed vigor, with especial emphasis on the "period of national democratic revolution in China," referring to the run-up to 1949, as well as on Chinese policies of self-reliance in the realm of socialist nation-building. It would be the objective of the FCLC to finalize a series of visits to China from Tanzanian cultural delegations, including educators, broadcasters, and doctors. The evaluation concluded with a reiteration of the importance of cultural exchange to the goal of supporting "newly independent Asian and African countries in their struggle to buck the cultural control of imperialism."[269]

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That Tanzania became an exemplar of political stability in postcolonial Africa often obscures its long history of internal dissent, from the opposition parties to TANU that formed in the early 1960s and the ideological challenges to Nyerere within his cabinet to the always-fraught relationship between Zanzibar and the mainland.[270] At the time of Tambwe's visit to Beijing in 1962, the state of TANU itself was precarious. Though politicians affiliated with TANU held all but one seat in the Legislative Council from September 1960 onwards, the organization encountered real challenges to its claim on power in the form of opposition party African Nationalist Congress (ANC).[271] Zuberi Mtemvu, the founder of ANC, espoused strident anti-imperialist and racial nationalist rhetoric to counter Nyerere's emphasis on multiracialism in the civil service. Mtemvu argued against the "non-racialist" official policy of TANU,

[269] "中国坦桑尼亚文化合作协定 1964 年度执行计划 (Plans for Implementation of the 1964 China-Tanzania Cultural Cooperation Agreement)," the Committee for Foreign Cultural Relations, March 24, 1964, PRC FMA 108-00985-03.

[270] The frictions in the relationship between Zanzibar and mainland Tanzania persists to the present day, as captured by the controversies surrounding the October 2015 elections in Zanzibar. The Civic United Front (CUF), the opposition party to CCM, charged that CCM operatives "stole" the election even though the CUF candidate received more votes. Subsequently, the results were nullified. Both the 2000 and 2005 elections in Zanzibar were marked by outbreaks of violence.

[271] William Tordoff, "Tanzania: Democracy and the One-Party State," *Government and Opposition: An International Journal of Comparative Politics* 2 (1967): pp. 600-601.

which incorporated Europeans and Indians, proposing instead an all-African government.[272] At a moment when Nyerere's promotion of multiracialism earned him Western approval, Mtemvu actively sought Chinese support.[273]

During a visit to Beijing in January 1961, Mtemvu deftly played to the hymn of Chinese attacks on neo-colonialism, identifying the enemies of Tanganyika as Western imperialists and their "lackeys." In response, Liu Zhangsheng, Vice Chair of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, affirmed to Mtemvu that "the imperialists are using more sinister and malicious methods to invade Tanganyika under the guise of 'aid' and 'friendship,' in an attempt to replace colonialism with U.S. neo-colonialism."[274] British intelligence records show that Mtemvu, in conversations with the China Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee which sponsored his travels, made use of aggressively anti-imperialist language that uplifted China and denigrated the West.[275] After TANU cemented its relationship with the ASP in Zanzibar, the ANC also sent representatives to the islands in May 1961 to negotiate with the ZNP; in turn, the ZNP allowed the ANC a small amount of funds from a Chinese-backed account.[276]

This rendezvous however, would not last, with Nyerere quickly re-emerging as the unchallenged leader of Tanganyika in Chinese press. In December 1961, the *People's Daily* reported enthusiastically about Tanganyikan independence, with a series of articles commemorating the lowering of the British flag, Nyerere's inauguration as the first President of Tanganyika, and the immediate formalization of diplomatic relations between China and Tanzania. Chinese reports emphasized the new Tanganyikan administration's harsh attitudes towards "neo-colonialist" practices, as exemplified by the deportation of a

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[272] Ronald Aminzade, *Race, Nation, and Citizenship in Postcolonial Africa: The Case of Tanzania*, p. 82

[273] Babu would recall that on at least one of these occasions, Mtemvu's efforts to present as the far-left alternative to Nyerere met with a tepid reception in Beijing. See Philip Snow, "China and Africa: Consensus and Camouflage," in Thomas Robinson and David Shambaugh eds., *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (Oxford: Clarendon Press of Oxford University, 1994): p. 300.

[274] "中国人民永远是坦噶尼喀人民的忠实朋友,首都盛会欢迎坦噶尼喀政治家姆顿武 [The Chinese People Will Always be Loyal Friends of the Tanganyikan People, Reception in Capital Welcomes Tanganyikan Politician Mtemvu]," *Renmin ribao*, January 10, 1961.

[275] Alicia Altorfer-Ong, "Old Comrades and New Brothers: A Historical Re-examination of the Sino-Zanzibari and Sino-Tanzanian Bilateral Relationships in the 1960s," p. 100

[276] James Brennan, "The Short History of Political Opposition and Multi-Party Democracy in Tanganyika, 1958-1964," in Gregory Maddox and James Giblin eds., *In Search of a Nation: Histories of Authority and Dissidence in Tanzania*, pp. 257-258

Swiss engineer who supposed demeaned the occasion by hanging the Tanganyikan medal of independence around the neck of a dog in a public square.[277]

Through the early 1960s, Chinese singled out moments of anti-Western sentiment in Tanganyika as evidence of a movement against neo-colonialism, while brushing over a larger context of continued friendly relations between Tanganyika and Western countries. In June 1962, the *People's Daily* reported positively that John Mwakangale, Regional Commissioner of the Southern Highlands Province, advocated for the immediate removal of U.S. Peace Corps volunteers from Tanganyika. "The 'Peace Corps' are not committed to peace," Mwakangale had declared on the floor of Parliament, "wherever they go they create trouble… [they are sent] to bewitch the people."[278] Indeed, Mwakangale, a staunch African nationalist who criticized Nyerere's policy of multiracialism, was recorded in the *Tanganyikan Standard* as attacking the Peace Corps.[279] But unacknowledged in the Chinese press is the fact that Rashidi Kawawa also quickly defended the Peace Corps against Mwakangale's charges, calling them "irresponsible."[280] In fact, Mwakangale's anti-U.S. outburst extended from racial nationalist convictions that Africa was for Africans, rather than a Marxist or Maoist-inspired opposition to imperialism, and did not point to Parliamentary consensus in Tanganyika so much as open up the space for debate. As late as 1965, more Peace Corps teachers served as instructors in Tanzanian secondary schools than Chinese technicians in the entire country.[281]

The behind-the-scenes negotiations of Oscar Kambona with Chinese officials in the early 1960s recalled those of Zuberi Mtemvu. In April 1962, the Chinese Consulate in London noted that during a visit Kambona paid to its office, he requested financial aid to cultivate a "leftist faction" within Tanganyikan politics under his leadership; more specifically, he hoped to secure resources for personal

[277] "坦噶尼喀政府下令, 驱逐一外国殖民主义者出境 [Tanganyikan Government Orders Deportation of Foreign Colonialist]," *Renmin ribao*, January 21, 1962.
[278] "美国 '和平队' 滚出去！坦噶尼喀议员谴责美国 '和平队' 制造麻烦 [U.S. Peace Corps Get Out! Tanganyikan Assemblyman Condemns Trouble-Causing U.S. Peace Corps]," *Renmin ribao*, June 15, 1962.
[279] "M.P. Attacks American Peace Corps," *The Tanganyikan Standard*, June 12, 1962.
[280] "Peace Corps in Tanganyika," *U.S. Congressional Record—Senate* 108 (June 1962): pp. 10334-10335.
[281] William Tordoff, "Politics in Tanzania," *The World Today* 21 (1965): p. 359.

travel to Beijing and to fund a school and a newspaper. He only decided to avoid the Chinese Consulate in Dar es Salaam, Kambona explained in London, because he had recently been the target of political attacks from both British representatives and the "rightist" faction within Tanganyika. Chinese diplomats in the United Kingdom decided to tread carefully, telling Kambona that as intergovernmental relations had already been established between China and Tanganyika, any requests of the Tanganyikan government should be expressed vis-à-vis official mediums.[282]

Just a few years later however, a series of political clashes with both Nyerere and Kawawa over the policies of ujamaa resulted in the Kambonas' fall from prominence. In July 1967, five months after the Arusha Declaration, which he vociferously opposed, Kambona departed Tanzania for self-imposed exile in London. In January 1968, his younger brother Otini Kambona, whose travels in China will be discussed in Chapter 4, would be arrested on the account that *Ulimwengu*, his Swahili-language weekly newspaper, published incendiary criticisms of Nyerere and TANU authored by Oscar in exile. Consequently, *Ulimwengu* received a ban and Otini would not be pardoned and released until February 1978.[283] From abroad however, Oscar continued to condemn Tanzania as a one-party dictatorship. In reflections written for a conservative British magazine in 1991, he recalled Nyerere's February 1965 visit to Beijing, for which he was also present, as the turning point in Nyerere's political transformation from a skeptic of Chinese socialism to a zealot for single-party rule. In Kambona's words, that trip marked the moment Nyerere "changed into Mao costume."[284]

While his assessments should be taken with grains of salt, given that Kambona remade an international career as a critic of TANU from the right, it is notable he attributed each and every negative feature, in his view, of post-independence Tanzanian politic to "the time [he] met Mao." In the early 1960s, before Nyerere displayed marked friendliness towards China, Kambona positioned himself as an explicit alternative to Nyerere from the left. This reversal is a testament not only to the contingencies of

[282] "坦噶尼喀内政部长坎博纳要求我援助及访华事 [Matter Regarding Tanganyikan Minister of Home Affairs Oscar Kambona Requesting Aid and Visit to China]," April 3, 1962, PRC FMA 108-00275-06.
[283] Martin Sturmer, *The Media History of Tanzania* (Ndanda, Tanzania: Ndanda Mission Press, 1998): pp. 166-167.
[284] Oscar Kambona, "The Time I Met Mao," *The Salisbury Review* (June 1991): p. 19.

Kambona's own beliefs, but also the enduring power of "left" and "right" as political significations in the evolution of China-Tanganyikan and China-Tanzanian relations. That is, just as Kambona once attempted to harness the "left" label in seeking favor with Chinese officials in London, his subsequent path as one of Nyerere's fiercest detractors also employed Chinese socialism as a gambit and stand-in for centralization, censorship, and authoritarianism.

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A thin booklet titled *Tanzanian Sketches* (坦桑尼亚散记), published in Beijing in 1965, captures the official narrative by which the developments of 1964 and the formalization of China-Tanzanian relations was relayed to Chinese domestic audiences. The first several pages of this combined travel diary and national history are devoted to photographs of daily life: dancing in a town common, a man harvesting coconuts, Chinese tractor mechanics instructing a course in Zanzibar, the Uhuru Monument in Dar es Salaam, and the November 1964 protests in Dar es Salaam after revelations of the Western Plot" to topple Nyerere's administration.

1964年11月15日达累斯萨拉姆数万群众举行示威，抗議美帝国主义的顛覆阴謀。（新华社稿）

Fig. 3 – Caption reads "On November 15, 1964, a crowd of more than ten thousand gather to protest, condemning the sinister plot of U.S. imperialism."[285]

The prominent coverage accorded to the latter event skirted the fact that the letters alleging the plot were likely forgeries. Rather, it was described as a transformative moment that galvanized the anti-imperialist consciousness of already "vigilant" Tanzanian citizens, yet another instance, on the back of the June 1964

[285] Gao Liang and Wang Ye, 坦桑尼亚散记 [Tanzanian Sketches] (Beijing: World Knowledge Press, 1965): p. iii.

rallies in Zanzibar against the installation of U.S. Project Mercury, of "the Tanzanian people using their iron first to teach a lesson to U.S. imperialism."[286] The remainder of the booklet is reserved for dramatic descriptions of Tanzanian history, from the East African Slave Trade and British colonialism to lesser known incidents like the German-Hehe War of 1890-1898, fought between the Hehe ethnic group of Southern Tanzania and German colonial forces.[287] The authors, Gao Liang and Wang Ye, included a moving anecdote about their visit to Kalenga, a ward of Iringa and the former residence of Chief Mkwawa, to pay their respects. As they departed Mkwawa's memorial, they saw a field bursting with flowers, which they likened to an evergreen wreath for a national hero.[288]

Gao and Wang relayed the natural beauty they witnessed as they drove the 1,000 miles from Dar es Salaam to the Great North Road on the Zambian border: the zebras and giraffes grazing peacefully in the Ngorongoro Crater, the towering baobab trees unique to southern Africa, and the diversity of the ethnic groups who inhabited Western Tanzania. In a conclusion that encapsulated the stylistic tensions of this hybrid genre, Gao and Wang conveyed their emotions about setting foot in Zanzibar just two months after the Revolution of January 1964. In the final paragraphs to the travelogue, they wrote of the memorable morning of April 7, 1964 when they watched more than 15,000 residents of Zanzibar gather, singing revolutionary songs in preparation to depart for voluntary labor at Kizimbani, a former colonial prison redesigned as one of the first state-owned farms for spice cultivation. The thousands of faces in the crowd, they observed, glistened with sweat, discipline, and enthusiasm for the nation-building project—one for which they stood ready to lend a hand.[289]

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[286] Gao Liang and Wang Ye, *Tanzanian Sketches*, p. 15
[287] The German-Hehe War is sparsely mentioned in Western literature. See David Pizzo, "'To Devour the Land of Mkwawa': Colonial Violence and the German-Hehe War in East Africa c. 1884-1914" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2007).
[288] Gao Liang and Wang Ye, *Tanzanian Sketches*, pp. 38-39
[289] Gao Liang and Wang Ye, *Tanzanian Sketches*, pp. 129-130

Black Power in China, 1965-1972:
Minority Nationalism and Class Struggle

On August 8, 1966, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Beijing approved the "Sixteen Points" that laid out the official guidelines for the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.[290] On the same day, Robert Williams appeared at a rally in Tiananmen Square to commemorate the third anniversary of the statement that Mao Zedong issued in 1963 in support of the African American struggle. In a searing speech, reprinted in the *People's Daily* in Chinese and the *Peking Review* in English, Williams declared: "We revolutionary Afro-Americans vow that we shall take the torch of freedom and justice into the streets of racist America and we shall set the last great stronghold of Yankee imperialism ablaze with our battle cry of Black Power!"[291] In his conceptualization, race figured as the primary vector along which oppression operated in the United States and the world. Thumbing through the racism that defined centuries of U.S. history, Williams cited the occupation of Native American land, the "Open Door" policy which enabled U.S. economic domination of Asia in the name of "peace," the atomic bombs dropped on Japan, and the plunder of the Vietnam War. These were the same episodes that dominated Chinese press reporting about the racial violence enacted by the U.S. state. But for Williams, rather than the imperialist manifestations of U.S. monopoly capitalism, it was white supremacy that stood as the central theme. As he had on other occasions in China, he called out white socialists—especially the members of Communist Party USA—for standing with Lyndon Johnson's "imperialist" regime. In Williams' analysis, they had feigned progressivism while rejecting Black nationalism, thereby placing their racial interests above those of class.

As an olive branch to his hosts, Williams acknowledged that there existed a handful of white progressives in the United States whose investments in justice embodied "the glorious spirit of the great antislavery fighter, John Brown" while "some black traitors… [act as] insensate running dogs for the

[290] Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, *Mao's Last Revolution* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006): pp. 92-93.
[291] Robert Williams, "Speech by U.S. Negro Leader Robert Williams," *Peking Review* 9 (August 12, 1966): p. 24.

Johnson Administration."[292] But the beckoning of "the thunder of Black Power" that concluded his remarks represented a stark departure from the observations about U.S. revolutionary prospects offered by Chinese speakers gathered at the rally. Guo Moruo (郭沫若), who presided over the Chinese Academy of Sciences and had received W.E.B. Du Bois in Beijing in 1959, advanced a different take. "In the final analysis, the U.S. ruling class's incitement to racial discrimination," Guo announced, "is class persecution and determined by the interests of U.S. monopoly capital." He predicted that because class consciousness among African Americans is growing, they will soon no longer be "hoodwinked" by the illusions of civil rights reform and non-violent protest.[293] In Guo's formulation, this development, rather than "the thunder of Black Power," was the reason for revolutionary optimism. For the duration of Robert Williams' exile in China from 1966 to 1969, Chinese officials hoped that he would come to distinguish the white working class from the monopoly capitalists and the U.S. government that abetted their activities. But up until the very end of his time in Beijing, Williams warned that the "racist American white man" is a "master of deception" who alternately masquerades as a humanitarian, a Christian, or a Marxist while continuing to promote the same blueprint for white supremacist domination.[294]

This chapter examines the uneven, however vibrant, interface between the CCP and advocates of Black Power in the late 1960s and early 1970s, during which official discourses in China transitioned from conceiving of African Americans as the U.S. revolutionary vanguard to a "minority nationality" (少数民族) in Chinese terms. Chinese officials embraced the militancy of Black Power activists even as they repudiated many core tenets of their ideas, especially those related to racial and cultural nationalism. But for Black radicals of diverse intellectual traditions—from Robert Williams to Harry Haywood, once a leading figure in both CPUSA and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union—a key allure of Maoism lay in its perceived respect for Black self-determination, which they believed to be demonstrated by Chinese ethnic policies of the 1960s. This paradox assumed in spite of the fact that, as explored in Chapter 1,

[292] Robert Williams, "Speech by U.S. Negro Leader Robert Williams," p. 27
[293] Guo Moruo, "Speech by Kuo Mo-Jo," *Peking Review* 9 (August 12, 1966): p. 22.
[294] Robert Williams, "Reaction without Positive Change," *The Crusader* (March 1968): p. 2.

China's outreach to the Third World, an important extension of its challenge to the Soviet Union for leadership of international socialism, was predicated on its status as a non-white and postcolonial alternative to Marxism-Leninism.

From early 1965 and into the early 1970s, with periods of ebb and flow, Chinese media outlets reported with enthusiasm about racial uprisings in U.S. cities: Los Angeles in 1965, Detroit in 1967, and Washington D.C. in 1968 were among the focal points; these uprisings were described as revolutionary struggles waged by the most oppressed "class" of African American workers. Photographs culled from the pages of U.S. newspapers and magazines portrayed protesters in the act of struggle and police officers responding with violence. When Black students at Columbia University staged an occupation of Hamilton Hall in April 1968, they received a personal congratulatory telegram from Mao Zedong celebrating their contributions to "the revolution."[295] Raymond Brown, a member of the Student Afro-American Society (SAS), recalled that the students found this amusing, as they knew that their protests were not at all revolutionary in Mao's sense of the word.[296] In fact, white students from the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) espoused far more radical discourses than the SAS, who emphasized instead their history of organizing with, and connections, to the local community in Harlem.[297] Mao's overwriting of the intentions of Black students, in this case, is emblematic of the approach that the Chinese state adopted in the interpretation of late 1960s political unrest in the United States. In proclaiming the revolutionary potential of African American protest, the CCP favored a relationship in which China delivered instigating rhetoric to an anti-capitalist vanguard, who were on a preordained path towards unity with all other progressive elements of U.S. society.

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[295] Raymond Brown, "Race and the Specter of Strategic Blindness," in Paul Cronin ed., *A Time to Stir: Columbia '68* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018): p. 15.
[296] The occupation of Hamilton was a part of a series of demonstrations at Columbia to protest institutional support for the Vietnam War and proposals for the construction of private facilities on public land that the black residents of Harlem would not be able to access. The barricade of Hamilton began as a multi-racial effort, but as a statement about the racism that they experienced on campus, the SAS soon requested that white students leave and "seize other buildings on your own." For an overview of the 1968 student protests at Columbia and the different political alignments within the movement, see Blake Slonecker, "The Columbia Coalition: African Americans, New Leftists, and Counterculture at the Columbia University Protest of 1968," *Journal of Social History* 41 (2008): pp. 967-996.
[297] Jennifer Schuessler, "At Columbia, Revisiting the Revolutionary Students of 1968," *The New York Times*, March 21, 2018.

While Chinese narratives promulgated a linear vision of Black militancy that would join forces with the white working class, Black Power activists engaged Maoism as a theoretical framework for a Black Nationalist—and sometimes separatist—politics that did not necessarily aspire to interracial and anti-capitalist coalition-building as its end goal. A number of events in the mid-1960s, from the assassination of Malcolm X in February 1965 to the radicalization of existing organizations like the Student Non-Violent Action Committee (SNCC), had undergirded the escalation of Black Power politics in the United States.[298] The international dimensions of the Black Power Movement were manifold. African American advocates of Black Power forged a range of alliances throughout the postcolonial world, incorporating theories and symbols from the Chinese, Cuban, and Southern African revolutionary movements. Simultaneously, the stories and images of African American resistance galvanized the formation of "Black Power" organizations within disenfranchised communities in the United Kingdom, Israel, New Zealand, and Australia.[299]

The period from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s was, for many Black Power activists, marked by a polemics of exigency and a tenacious search for transnational alliances, rendering the discourses and impulses of Maoism particularly attractive. That a number of Black nationalists considered African American communities "internal colonies" dovetailed with Chinese proclamations of solidarity among Afro-Asian countries under the banner of anti-imperialism. Black intellectuals harnessed theories of dependency and development to a claim about U.S. poverty: that resource-poor, segregated urban

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[298] At a demonstration in Mississippi in June 1966, SNCC Chairman Stokely Carmichael first popularized the call to "Black Power." The Black Power Movement advocated a militant ideology that included different aspects of cultural nationalism, community control, armed self-defense, and revolutionary socialism. See Peniel Joseph, *The Black Power Movement: Rethinking the Civil Rights-Black Power Era*, pp. 1-21.

[299] The scholarship that examines aspects of Black Power internationalism includes Michael O. West, William G. Martin, and Fanon Che Wilkins eds., *From Toussaint to Tupac: The Black International Since the Age of Revolution* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009); Eric McDuffie, *Sojourning for Freedom: Black Women, American Communism, and the Making of Black Left Feminism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011); Dayo Gore, *Radicalism at the Crossroads: African American Women Activists in the Cold War* (New York: New York University Press, 2011); Joshua Bloom and Waldo Martin, *Black Against Empire: The History and Politics of the Black Panther Party* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012); Nico Slate, ed., *Black Power beyond Borders: The Global Dimensions of the Black Power Movement* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012; Sean L. Malloy, *Out of Oakland: Black Panther Party Internationalism during the Cold War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2017); and Keisha Blain and Tiffany Gill eds., *To Turn the Whole World Over: Black Women and Internationalism* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2019).

neighborhoods constituted "colonies" and that only revolution, in the vein of Afro-Asian movements for decolonization, could bring about liberation within the United States.[300] But Black Power activists drew their greatest inspirations from Maoism at the same time that Chinese authorities tapered their outreach to African Americans and downplayed the racial particularities of their struggle. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Chinese socialism fulfilled the search of Black nationalists for a model of social and economic progress that was non-white and unapologetically independent of Western conventions. The urgency inherent in Maoism, enshrined its belief that the oppressed should not have to wait for "objective conditions" to make revolution, as well as its emphasis on the role of violence in social change, commanded additional pull at a time when non-violent civil rights activists encountered state-sanctioned persecution.[301] Traditional Marxism-Leninism, with its assignment of the greatest revolutionary potential to the European working class, had come across as inadequate to this new generation of Black radical activists who consumed the works of Frantz Fanon, Kwame Nkrumah, C.L.R. James and Malcolm X. The Black Panthers incorporated some aspects of Marxist class analysis into their ideological platform, but believed that the "lumpen-proletariat," or the Black population that was either unemployed or underemployed, constituted a major revolutionary force.[302]

The most profound impact of Chinese socialism on Black radicalism was not in ideology or revolutionary strategization but rather, in terms of style, aesthetics, and tactical flexibility in the face of changing objective conditions. Kathleen Cleaver remembers that by 1967, most Black Panthers were more aware of the poster art in Chinese outreach to African and African American liberation movements than the realities of Chinese history or politics. During the years of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), Cleaver recalled, "few activists and revolutionaries in the U.S. had a really clear appreciation of Chinese history—they read things that Mao wrote… [But it was the Cultural Revolution]

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[300] Ramón Gutiérrez, "Internal Colonialism: An American Theory of Race," *Du Bois Review*: *Social Science Research on Race* 1 (2004): pp. 281-295.
[301] Robin Kelley and Betsy Esch, "Black Like Mao: Red China and Black Revolution," pp. 7-9
[302] Joshua Bloom and Waldo Martin, *Black Against Empire: The History and Politics of the Black Panther Party*, pp. 311-312

and the posters, along with other things coming out of China at the time, that were part of the 'vibe'… they symbolized the height of revolution."[303] In this sense, the most appealing dimension of Chinese socialism lay in the domain of culture and symbolism at a time when official narratives within China conclusively shifted. Correlate with negotiations in U.S.-China rapprochement in the early 1970s, the recasting of African Americans as an ethnic minority (少数民族) in Maoist terms reflected a denouement to relations between China and the Black Power Movement. Truly, Maoism served as a "spiritual atom bomb" for Black nationalists of the early 1970s; it informed rather than dictated the terms of their engagement.[304] The continuation of this interaction between China and African Americans, especially in the realms of arts and culture, also suggests that this relationship did not simply come to an end with U.S.-China rapprochement in 1972.[305]

Though the era of the Chinese Cultural Revolution is often associated with isolationism in political outlook, events and trends overseas continued to be imbued with local meaning for purposes of national mobilization.[306] Violent expressions of the struggle for racial justice in the United States continued to figure into this repertoire as testament to the collateral damages inflicted by capitalism and imperialism as well as the inherent truth in Maoist prescriptions of revolution. However, in a pattern reminiscent of Chinese configurations of ethnic identities in the 1950s and 1960s, the calls for nationalism and political self-determination within the Black Power Movement were effectively overwritten. In theoretical Maoism, the ethnic question (民族问题) paralleled the race question (种族问

[303] Kathleen Cleaver, interview by Lincoln Cushing (August 2006), as quoted in Lincoln Cushing and Ann Tompkins, *Chinese Posters: Art from the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution* (San Francisco: Chronicle Books, 2007): p. 19.
[304] The term "spiritual atom bomb" was first used by Lin Biao, First Vice Premier of the People's Republic of China, to describe the potential international impact of Mao Zedong Thought in 1967. Alexander Cook, "Introduction: The Spiritual Atom Bomb and its Global Fallout," in Alexander Cook ed., *Mao's Little Red Book: A Global History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014): p. 18
[305] Keisha Brown, for example, has indicated that "Nixon's historic trip to China [in 1972] led to the opening of U.S.-China relations which effectively ended the PRC's engagement with Black radicals and Black internationalists." See Keisha Brown, "Blackness in Exile: W.E.B. Du Bois's Role in the Formation of Representations of Blackness as Conceptualized by the Chinese Communist Party," p. 21
[306] See Zachary Scarlett, "China After the Sino-Soviet Split: Maoist Politics, Global Narratives, and the Imagination of the World" (Ph.D. dissertation, Northeastern University, 2013).

题), with Mao declaring that "the nationalities problem is in essence a class problem.[307] But in practice, Mao considered the eventual collapse of ethnic differences into class unity a far more elaborate undertaking. In 1950s Amdo, a region of Tibet that later became Qinghai Province, Chinese officials embraced the ethnic elite leadership, assigning them important administrative roles. Rather than "class liberation" of the masses, priority was placed on the elimination of sentiments that Mao termed "Great Han Chauvinism," in following with Lenin's condemnations of "Great Russian Chauvinism" in the 1920s. Mao attacked Han superiority as reactionary, believing that "local nationalisms" would dissipate alongside the eradication of chauvinistic views and practices on the part of Han officials.[308] Reverberations of Mao's views on Han chauvinism, and their fraught relationship to class analysis, can be found in Chinese narratives of African American activism. Once imagined as the revolutionary vanguard, African Americans became regarded in the early 1970s in Chinese discourses as an "minority nationality" or "ethnic minority," akin to Puerto Ricans or Native Americans. Both the race and ethnic questions however, demanded a multi-layered politicking. The Chinese leadership designated Robert Williams, for whom Black nationalism rather than class struggle was the touchstone of his ideology, as the symbol of its commitment to African American liberation, much as it had courted ethnic leaders in far-flung provinces during the 1950s.

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Both the fictional spoken-word drama "War Drums on the Equator" (赤道战鼓), which debuted in Beijing in June 1965, and its ballet rendition "The Raging Congo River" (刚果河在怒吼) feature the character Warren, an African American soldier dispatched to serve in the Congo. In an act of heroism, Warren defies his superiors to free Mwanka, a Congolese man sentenced to death for refusing to kill

[307] Ralph Litzinger, *Other Chinas: The Yao and the Politics of National Belonging* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000): p. 87. During the Cultural Revolution however, Red Guard factions misconstrued Mao's stance on the ethnic question as the assessment that all differences of nationality must be forcibly eliminated, in the same fashion as differences of class. It was this misinterpretation that resulted in violent attacks on cultural and religious practices, institutions, and artifacts in areas inhabited by ethnic minorities. See June Dreyer, "China's Minority Peoples," *Humboldt Journal of Social Relations* 19 (1993): pp. 344-345.

[308] For the Tibetan context, see Benno Weiner, *The Chinese Revolution on the Tibetan Frontier* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2020): pp. 66-78.

nationalist leader and Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba. Warren's predicament encapsulates the slippage between mid-1960s Chinese efforts to assert affirmative understandings of racial oppression and its advocacy of class revolution as the antidote to the twin forces of racism and imperialism. While soliloquys throughout the drama raise the preeminence of class struggle, Warren presupposes fraternity with Mwanka on the basis of shared racial identity.[309] Close reading into the lyrics of "Warren's Song: An African American Soldier's Awakening," a solo piece from *Raging Congo River* performed before his death at the hands of U.S. military commanders, highlights the disjuncture between the premise of Warren's political consciousness and the dramatic exhortations to the unity of "all the world's people who experience bitterness" that draw an end to the song. Warren opens with a paean to his childhood home on the Mississippi River as well as his ancestral home in Africa before lamenting that "They once took black people away in chains / Today they order me to shoot at my brother… Black people spread across two continents / But suffer humiliation everywhere, their bodies covered in scars."[310] Because Warren foregrounds his racial identity as the material and affective foundation for his beliefs and actions, there is a clear disconnect between his stirring testimony and the far more generalized, broad-based solidarity inferred by "all the world's people who experience bitterness." This sequence is an extension of the enduring friction between the Chinese embrace of race-specific analyses alongside class-oriented revolution.

Chinese observers at the time had taken note of and attempted to make sense of these apparent inconsistencies. In an essay from the *People's Daily*, military historian Chen Feiqin (陈斐琴) wrote that Warren's actions indicate how as racial contradictions sharpen, they reveal hints of class conflict: The U.S. government is recruiting African American soldiers to surveil and kill Africans "as part of a United Nations mission; Warren is singled out for praise for his loyalty. But overturning a longstanding pattern of injustice enacted by the U.S. on Africa, Warren kills a white compatriot instead of Mwanka before

[309] Alexander Cook, "Chinese Uhuru: Maoism and the Congo Crisis," *positions: asia critique* 27 (2019): pp. 582-583.
[310] China Opera and Dance Drama Theater, " 沃伦之歌：一个美国黑人士兵的觉醒 [Warren's Song: An African American Soldier's Awakening]" (Beijing: Music Publishing Press, 1966): pp. 10-11.

joining Congolese rebels. Three years later, Mwanka and Warren, along with other guerilla fighters, capture a white mercenary who believes that the color of his skin should merit him better treatment, only to receive the retort that race is a non-issue in the anti-imperialist struggle, as all the world's people must unite to defeat U.S.-led "old and new colonialisms."[311] In this roundabout fashion, the Chinese spotlight on global manifestations of U.S. racism—a white American soldier calls a Congolese conscript a racial epithet before shooting him, while Warren delivers a soliloquy about his father, who was lynched by the KKK—actually aimed to suggest the triviality of race as a marker of identification, nominally as a justification for oppression, but also inferably as a justification for resistance.

Warren's story allows for insight into the process by which Chinese narratives understood the mid-1960s transition from the framework of civil rights to that of Black Power in the United States. In the Chinese imagination, this was a seismic shift that affirmed the truth of Maoist theories of revolution. In Liu Liangmo (刘良模)'s August 1965 lecture in Shanghai "Developments of the African American Struggle over Two Years," delivered to an audience of 500 local students and educators, he explained that recent events in the United States indicated "the only choice is to counter violence with violence."[312] After presenting a summary of the large-scale uprisings that have engulfed the country since the summer of 1963, Liu compared the U.S. campaign for civil rights to that of the Congolese, Vietnamese, and Dominican peoples; all of them, in their resistance to U.S. imperialism, received the support of the Chinese proletariat.[313] He then observed, "The African American struggle against racial discrimination is the most important one in the world… it is the revolutionary spark that has lit up the heart of the United States." With pride, he recounted the claim of a U.S. journalist that the *Peking Review* and *China*

[311] Chen Feiqin, "一个正义的美国黑人士兵——赞《赤道战鼓》中的沃伦形象 [An African American Soldier Driven by Justice—In Praise of Warren's Image in War Drums on the Equator]," *Renmin ribao*, April 16, 1965.
[312] Liu Liangmo had traveled throughout the United States in the 1940s to rally support for Chinese resistance against Japan and collaborated with African American singer and activist Paul Robeson. As devoted to Christianity as communism, Liu later served in a number of high-level administrative positions in Shanghai that capitalized on his extensive knowledge and experiences of the United States. As early as 1941, speaking to an audience at Lincoln University in Pennsylvania, Liu criticized the Jim Crow racism as comparable to fascism. See Marc Gallicchio, *The African American Encounter with Japan and China: Black Internationalism in Asia, 1895-1945*, pp. 164-165.
[313] Liu Liangmo, "天下大事报告会: 两年来美国黑人斗争的发展 [World Events Report Meeting: Developments of the African American Struggle over Two Years]," August 7, 1965, File No. C26-2-149-55, SMA.

Reconstructs rank as two of the most popular reading choices for the younger generation of Black Nationalists.[314] Liu's narrative conveyed a sense of frenetic progress, with the turn to militancy of African American protesters registering as a matter of world-historical significance, spurred on by Chinese ideological guidance.

Indeed, on September 24, 1965, in the follow-up lecture "The New Storm of African American Revolution," Liu would elaborate as such on the Watts Rebellion, "This August, the U.S. city of Los Angeles exploded in… [racial] struggle. The scale of this struggle has been rarely observed in history… [It involved] taking up arms to fight against the U.S. ruling authorities… Men and women old and young crowded onto the streets. They took up makeshift weapons like sticks, stones, and homemade bombs."[315] Liu painted an image of grassroots uprising rife with revolutionary potential. Chinese narratives assigned such immense significance to Watts that the *People's Daily* attacked Martin Luther King as traitor who colluded with the Los Angeles Police Department, alternately referring to him as "Uncle Tom and "running dog of counter-revolutionaries."[316] These descriptions of the turmoil in Los Angeles pointed to a plotline in which ordinary citizens with make-do arsenal posed an existential threat to the U.S. political order. In Liu's interpretation, Black nationalism and movement-building was only a means to an end. That African American movements could in this fashion be reduced to the "vanguard of the working class" explained the appeal of Black revolution to the Cold War Chinese imagination.

This escalation of tactics also piqued the interests of Chinese social scientists of the mid-1960s, who believed that such a trajectory reaffirmed Mao's ideas about revolutionary change. Liu Xuyi (刘绪

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[314] This latter statement was a likely reference to African American journalist William Worthy's writing in *Esquire* that these Chinese periodicals comprised "standard reading fare for black nationalists across the country." In his piece, Worthy slighted the *New York Times* for failing to grasp the significance of Mao's August 1963 statement from the outset, before recounting the details of the following rally in Beijing that celebrated Chinese support for African American movements. Even as federal intelligence moves to suppress these ideas about collaboration between Black nationalists and China, Worthy wrote that he was "convinced [no] amount of police infiltration can stop a revolutionary thrust so closely paralleling colonial wars abroad." See William Worthy, "The Red Chinese American Negro," *Esquire*, October 1, 1964.

[315] "天下大事报告会: 美国黑人革命新风暴 [Reporting of World Events: The New Storm of Black Revolution in America]," September 24, 1965, File No. C26-2-148-86, SMA.

[316] Yunxiang Gao, "W.E.B. and Shirley Graham Du Bois in Maoist China," pp. 77-78

贻), a longtime professor at Wuhan University, produced a series of Chinese-language scholarship on postwar African American history. These articles, written in 1964 and 1965, placed emphasis on the shift to revolutionary violence in African American protest in the period between the 1955 Montgomery Bus Boycott and the 1963 Birmingham Campaign.[317] Liu, who presided over the U.S. History Research Center at Wuhan, had obtained his M.A. degree in sociology from the University of Chicago in 1947. Liu's analysis, though partial in the weight assigned to the collaborative contributions of the Black proletariat and CPUSA, was incisive in its categorization of phases in the African American freedom struggle.[318] Mei Zupei (梅祖培), a translator, followed Liu's piece with "From Birmingham to Selma—New Developments in the African American Struggle," which was published in 1965 in the official journal of the Foreign Ministry. Drawing from reporting in U.S. newspapers, Mei argued that the recent outbreak of civil rights protests in cities ranging from Cleveland to New York galvanized the multiracial anti-war movement of youth and workers.[319] This research ground to a halt with the anti-intellectual bent of the Cultural Revolution, but Mao's second proclamation in support of the African American struggle, titled "A New Storm Against Imperialism" and issued after Martin Luther King's April 1968 assassination, marked the crowning statement of this crystallizing narrative about African American revolution.[320] Mao alleged that in light of the newest wave of racial uprisings, "the Afro-American

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[317] Liu Xuyi, "从蒙哥马利到伯明翰 — 50 年代中期到 60 年代前期的美国黑人运动 [From Montgomery to Birmingham: African American Movements from the Mid-1950s to the Early 1960s]," reprinted in 20 世纪 30 年代以来美国史论丛 [A Discussion of Post-1930s American History] (Beijing: China Social Science Publishers, 2001): pp. 367-384.

[318] Yu Zhan, "近 50 年来我国的美国黑人史研究 [Historical Studies of African Americans in the Past 50 Years in China]," 史学月刊 [Historical Studies Monthly] 9 (2002): p. 110.

[319] Mei Zupei, "从伯明翰到赛尔馬——美国黑人斗爭的新发展 ["From Birmingham to Selma—New Developments in the African American Struggle]," 国际问题研究 [International Studies] 3 (1965): pp. 14-24.

[320] The publication of the book 美国黑人运动解放简史 [A Brief History of African American Liberation Movements] in 1977 can be considered the magnum opus of this era of Chinese writing of African American history that began in the mid-1960s. Yu Zhan has pointed out the various factual inconsistencies and misinterpretations in the book: the authors stated that most black slaves in pre-independence United States understood British imperialism as the root cause of slavery, thoroughly rebuked Booker T. Washington's "capitulationist" thought and all advocates of non-violence in the civil rights movement, and attacked Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal as a reactionary program "in the style of Mussolini."[320] In language and in its analytical framing, the book exhibited strong continuities with the narratives of African American history first offered in Chinese academic research and public forums in the mid-1960s, whereby the rise in militancy validated Maoist theories about both the inevitable radicalization of African American activism and its eventual consolidation with broader, multi-racial labor and anti-war movements. See The

struggle is winning sympathy and support from increasing numbers of white working people and progressives in the United States. The struggle of the black people in the United States is bound to merge with the workers' movement, and this will end the criminal rule of the U.S. monopoly capitalist class."[321]



Fig. 4 – In this 1968 pamphlet, Mao's April statement is printed in red, while the graphic is a map titled "Basic Sketch of African American Struggle Against Violence." Cities where uprisings occurred are denoted by a flame.[322]

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Robert Williams figured as a synecdoche of African American revolution that lent credence to Mao's interpretation of Black Power, even though his own analysis of protest and progress seized on the necessity of Black Nationalist liberation rather than multiracial political formations. In his May 1968 issue of *The Crusader*, Williams included the final paragraph of Mao's statement, one which called for the "workers, peasants, and revolutionary intellectuals of every country… to take action and extend strong

People's Liberation Army Unit 52977 Theory Group and Nankai University Department of History, Institute of American History and Culture, 美国黑人运动解放简史 [A Brief History of African American Liberation Movements] (Beijing: People's Press, 1977) and Yu Zhan, "近 50 年来我国的美国黑人史研究 [Historical Studies of African Americans in the Past 50 Years in China]," p. 111.

[321] Mao Zedong, "A New Storm Against Imperialism," April 16, 1968, *Peking Review* (April 19, 1968): pp. 5-6.

[322] "Statement by Mao Zedong, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, in Support of the Afro-American Struggle against Repression," Broadside printed in black and red, April 16, 1968.

support to the struggle of the black people in the United States." It was no coincidence however, that Williams neglected to mention Mao's judgment that African Americans and "the masses of white working people" shared many political objectives. Instead, this *Crusader* issue carried a ringing endorsement of Black nationalism and separatism in response to King's assassination. "As the honorable Elijah Muhammad has been teaching us… it is time for the Black man to go for self," Williams wrote, "Our war in racist America must become a war of liberation, a war for nationhood rather than a futile struggle to integrate with a ravenous beast."[323] The ultimate attainment of African American "liberation" in Maoist terms implied the toppling of the capitalist state as a part of a multiracial coalition. But at this stage in Williams' ideological development, Black nationhood in the form of the Republic of New Africa (RNA), comprised of five Southern states, represented a more attractive solution. He reported enthusiastically about the Black Government Conference held on March 31, 1968 in Detroit, at which a Constitution and a Declaration of Independence were drafted for the proposed sovereign territory and Williams was elected president.

Accordingly, Chinese officials magnified Williams' militancy while downplaying their differences. Though Williams also believed that civil rights reform was a "farce," he attributed its failure to the obstinacy of racist power structures in the United States rather than the inherent incapacity of the state to enact change given the intimate links between its interests and those of capital. He continued to assign personal culpability for racism in the United States. In August 1965, Williams wrote that "The racist whites of America are the haves, and they can never truly sympathize and identify with the black have-nots until they feel what it is to be poor, destitute, and oppressed."[324] His reading of race and class converged with Mao's on three points: the need for revolution over non-violent resistance; the imbrication of racism with imperialism in the United States; and the importance of cultural self-determination. Yet on the issue of a multiracial working-class coalition, Williams' theory of change diverged from Mao's. Williams condemned white communists for prioritizing their hold on power above Black liberation,

[323] Robert Williams, "White Man's [Uncle Tom] No More," *The Crusader* (May 1968): p. 3.
[324] Robert Williams, "USA: The Potential of a Minority Revolution, Part II," *The Crusader* (August 1965): p. 4.

calling out the mainstream "New Left" for regarding "the savage oppression of the black man [as] of minimal importance. Their feigned desire to liberate the 'white working class' while all others are mere subordinates." Only now that African Americans have stood up to demand justice have these "leftists" risen to conspire domination of this burgeoning political movement. Williams acknowledged that though "there are exceptions to the rule… [At] this juncture of our long and arduous march to human dignity we had best concern ourselves with the negative aspect of a menacing universal danger."[325] Both Williams and Mao articulated an unyielding faith in the revolutionary remaking of the United States. But Williams was adamant that this would have to be a "minority revolution" in which long-suffering African Americans could alone force a national reckoning. His perspective encapsulated the very vision of Black nationalism that Mao hoped to counteract. As the preeminent African American activist in Chinese politics, Williams assumed a position that captured the contradictions at the heart of the Chinese approach to African American revolution.

This paradox reflected the transactional nature of the relationship between Williams and the Chinese state. Williams needed material support for his political activities, revolutionary legitimacy, and as a fugitive in exile from the United States, the security of affiliation with a nation-state. He was, as historian Judy Wu describes of Eldridge Cleaver adrift in Algeria, an "anti-citizen." In exchange for the provision of resources to Williams, the CCP obtained the symbolic privileges of hosting an outspoken activist with tremendous influence in the transnational networks of African American activism. But the China in which the Williams family settled, which had so vigorously heralded the radicalization of the civil rights movement in the early 1960s, could not—or was unwilling to—grasp the full logic of growing calls for Black Power in the United States. Chinese officials thus arrived at a quandary in the late 1960s: the militant streak of the Black Power Movement aligned with Maoist theories of violent uprising, but its anti-imperialist impulses were propelled as much by racial nationalism as by anti-capitalism. As a result, in the years from 1965 to 1969, while the frequency of Chinese reporting on civil rights and Black Power

[325] Robert Williams, "The New Left: Old Ideas in a New Front," *The Crusader* (July 1967): p. 9.

declined precipitously from its high tide in 1963 and 1964, African Americans continued to be regarded as the vanguard in their turn to militancy. A lengthy exposition from August 1968 in the *People's Liberation Army Daily* about progressivism in the United States explicitly framed African American activism as the main force that motivated other students and workers, noting that within the ranks of youth, "the struggle of the Black students is the bravest and most resolute… the battle between progressive students and reactionaries have almost exclusively occurred first at [historically] Black campuses or were led by Black students."[326]

On the other hand, Williams filtered his experience of exile in Beijing through the lens of racial nationalism. At the 1966 National Day celebrations from atop Tiananmen Gate and flanked by Mao, he praised that "Only in a People's Republic would a refugee from racist 'free world' tyranny, a grandson of chattel slaves robbed from Africa… be extended the honor of representing his oppressed people as I am here today."[327] Williams applied this frame to make sense not only of his presence at the 17th anniversary of the People's Republic of China, but of the occasion itself. He was proud of Chinese achievements in science and technology, Williams wrote, because they "explode the U.S. imperialists' Hitlerite racist myth of the inferiority of non-Anglo-Saxon people."[328] Towards the end of his time in China, Williams shifted further away from class unity as a viable strategy for revolution in the United States. In his newsletter, he even quoted from Mao's works to lend credence to his rebuke of "criminal distortionist… sham CIA-directed Marxism," or in other words, the "false" Marxism practiced by those who insist upon Black solidarity with white progressivism.[329] These counterrevolutionary "communists," like the members of CPUSA, Williams argued, are in reality aligned with the CIA; they aim to "induce further division by focusing unwarranted attention on an exaggerated class structure, thereby diverting fire away from the racist power structure."[330] To press his case, Williams cited Mao on the periodic necessity of

[326] "美国黑人的正义斗争必胜 [The Just Struggle of African Americans Must Achieve Victory]," August 8, 1968, 解放军报 [People's Liberation Army Daily].
[327] Robert Williams, "China's 17th Anniversary: Afro-Americans Represented," *The Crusader* (October 1966): p. 2.
[328] Robert Williams, "China's 17th Anniversary: Afro-Americans Represented," p. 3.
[329] Robert Williams, "The Deprived: Rebellion in the Streets," *The Crusader* (Summer 1969): p. 4.
[330] Robert Williams, "The Deprived: Rebellion in the Streets," p. 4

class struggle assuming the character of national struggle, as had been in the case of the Chinese War of Resistance Against Japan.[331]

At the same time, Chinese narratives began to downplay the racial particularities of African American struggle, opting for general appraisals about the formation of a broad-based anti-capitalist front in the United States, though the move towards this trend unfolded unevenly. Mao's April 1968 statement ushered in a renewed media cycle within China about African American militancy as the beating heart of the anti-imperialist movement in the United States. In these reports, only the liberation of all Black people could induce the downfall of the global status quo. Stories about African American oppression were recounted alongside those of the Atlantic slave trade and more recent episodes of Western colonialism and neo-colonialism in Africa.[332] This definition of Black liberation was remarkable in the primacy assigned to Africans and African Americans in world-historical terms; in naming Black exploitation as the crux of Western capitalist development, it leveraged critiques of the system that later U.S.-based scholars of race, labor, and capital would term "racial capitalism." Yet, contemporaneous pieces in China also urged on the fusing of African American activism with labor and anti-war movements.[333] A number of political logics propelled this apparent tension: the equivalency drawn between African American desires for racial justice and "anti-imperialism" or economic rights, the willful misinterpretation of calls for Black nationalism, and the collapse of all progressive movements in the United States into challenges against the nation-state.

For May Day celebrations in 1969, shortly before his departure from Beijing, Williams stood atop Tiananmen Gate with Mao for the final time, and both Mao and Lin Biao signed Williams' copy of

[331] Robert Williams, "The Deprived: Rebellion in the Streets," p. 5
[332] "殖民主义、帝国主义制度是在黑人的鲜血和白骨堆上建立起来的 [The Systems of Colonialism and Imperialism are Built on the Bones and Blood of Black People]," 解放军报 [People's Liberation Army Daily], April 22, 1968.
[333] "美国黑人斗争必将同工人运动相结合,最终结束美国垄断资产阶级罪恶统治 [The African American Struggle Will Unite with the Workers' Movement, Finally Ending the Criminal Rule of the Monopoly Capitalist Class in the United States]," April 24, 1968 , 解放军报 [People's Liberation Army Daily].

the Little Red Book.[334] Long before this, he was exploring options to leave China. One year earlier in May 1968, Robert and Mabel Williams travelled to Tanzania, where they remained for six months. It was in Dar es Salaam that Williams negotiated for a one-way passport at the U.S. Embassy before he embarking on a 1,500-mile motorcycle journey across the country. Williams referred to his Tanzanian sojourn as "Hell Runs" in honor of a dangerous section of the Great North Road that connected Kapiri Mposhi in Zambia to Tanzania, the purpose of which would soon be replaced by the Chinese-funded Tanzam Railway.[335] Williams reported that many of the Tanzanians he spoke with, like villagers in Iringa Province, talked about Chairman Mao with excitement and some even wore Mao badges.[336]

Bill Sutherland, an African American peace activist who lived in Tanzania from the 1960s to the 1990s, hosted Williams and his family in Dar es Salaam. Sutherland later recalled that "The one thing [Williams] appreciated in China was that they gave him special attention yet didn't try to control him. He was putting out his little magazine. He was meeting with visitors all the time, and it was clear that he was not a Marxist-Leninist by any stretch of the imagination."[337] To the contrary, Sutherland remembered, Williams believed that Cuban officials attempted to impose their political line on him, all the while refusing to acknowledge the racism still prevalent in Cuban society. Consequently, though he had left Cuba in 1966 with hard feelings, his departure from China, in spite of extant political disagreements, came "with a sense of mutual respect."[338]

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By the time Williams left Beijing for Detroit in the summer of 1969, a marked transition had occurred in Chinese accounts of U.S. urban rebellions, now with a clear emphasis on African American

[334] Yu Zhan "美国民权运动中的中国因素 [The China Factor in the U.S. Civil Rights Movement]," 全球史评论 [Global History Review] 7 (2014): pp. 149-150.
[335] Seth Markle, *Motorcycle on Hell Run: Tanzania, Black Power, and the Uncertain Future of Pan-Africanism* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2017): pp. 1-2.
[336] Robeson Taj Frazier, "Black Crusaders: The Transnational Circuit of Robert and Mabel Williams," in Elizabeth Hinton and Manning Marable eds., *The New Black History: Revisiting the Second Reconstruction*, p. 96
[337] Bill Sutherland and Matt Meyer, *Guns and Gandhi in Africa: Pan-African Insights on Non-Violence, Armed Struggle and Liberation* (Trenton: Africa World Press, 2000): p. 225.
[338] Bill Sutherland and Matt Meyer, *Guns and Gandhi in Africa*, p. 225

solidarity with white workers and university students. A rhetorical shift had also taken place: rather than the revolutionary leadership, African Americans became regarded as one of several "ethnic minorities" or "minority nationalities." The September 1970 article "The Awakening of Ethnic Minorities in the United States" reflected the rising popularity of this new category to inscribe U.S. revolutionary prospects. The same term "少数民族," transliterating to "ethnic minorities," is used for the fifty-five ethnic minority groups in China, coined and classified after a state-sponsored intensive process of ethnographic research that began in the mid-1950s.[339] In the U.S. context, the category of "ethnic minorities" referred to the broad grouping of African Americans, Chicanos, Puerto Ricans, and Native Americans—all comprising the most oppressed sector of U.S. society—who have grasped the interconnectedness of Nixon's imperialist policies at home and abroad. The author cited the 1965-1970 Delano Grape Strike in California and the 1969-1971 Occupation of Alcatraz alongside widespread protests around the country as evidence that U.S. ethnic minorities have collectively realized "the reactionary system of imperialist capitalism is the source of their suffering and poverty. Only by overthrowing the criminal rule of U.S. monopoly capital, can [they] attain true liberation."[340]

In a similar vein, a January 1971 explanatory article titled "Oppressed Ethnic Minorities in the United States" examined the economic exploitation of African Americans alongside stories of hardship and depravation on Native American reservations, the plight of Chicano agricultural workers, and the urban poverty confronted by many Puerto Rican immigrants.[341] In the months before and after, other pieces celebrated the violent protests that each of these "ethnic minority" groups staged with makeshift weaponry in spite of police suppression.[342] This series of reporting is notable not only for its collapse of

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[339] Thomas Mullaney, *Coming to Terms with the Nation: Ethnic Classification in Modern China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010): p. 122.
[340] Lu Qunhong, "美国少数民族的觉醒 [The Awakening of U.S. Ethnic Minorities]," *Renmin ribao*, September 2, 1970.
[341] "美国被压迫的少数民族 [Oppressed Ethnic Minorities in the United States]," *Renmin ribao*, January 17, 1971.
[342] "美国少数民族掀起抗暴斗争新浪潮 [Ethnic Minorities in the United States Instigate New Wave of Struggle Against Violence]," *Renmin ribao*, August 24, 1971; "坚决反对种族歧视和种族压迫，美国少数民族人民展开抗暴斗争 [In Resolute Opposition to Racial Discrimination and Racial Oppression, Ethnic Minorities in the United States Expand Struggle Against Violence]," *Renmin ribao*, July 27, 1971; "美国少数民族人民奋起抗暴 [Ethnic Minorities in the United States Struggle Against Violence]," *Renmin ribao*, October 10, 1970.

racial and ethnic categories, but also for its positive framing of militant uprisings as a new phase of "the struggle against violence" (抗暴斗争), facilitating the discursive shift to the language of "peace" and "friendship" that characterized Chinese renderings of African American visitors in the mid-to-late 1970s.

As early as 1953, the African American labor leader Louis Wheaton, who visited Beijing for the October 1952 Asia-Pacific Peace Conference, penned an article for *People's Daily*, contrasting racial discrimination in the United States with his experiences in China, in which large groups of locals would surround him and touch his skin and hair, but only out of curiosity and friendship.[343] Moreover, in industrial areas in Northeast China, he witnessed ethnic minorities employed in a diversity of professions, unlike the United States where African Americans and other minorities found themselves restricted to select, undesirable occupations. Wheaton singled out the Oroqen (鄂伦春族) of Inner Mongolia and Heilongjiang Province as an example of a Chinese ethnic minority group that achieved political and economic self-determination in their own autonomously governed area, while the Chinese government provided much-needed vaccinations and primary education for their youth.[344] In February 1959, when James Jackson, an African American communist affiliated with CPUSA, travelled to China, he recounted an interview with Yang Jianren, Deputy Chief of Commission on National Minority Affairs, as among his most memorable experiences. In his conversation with Jackson, Yang laid out in meticulous detail the new Chinese blueprint for the equality and self-determination, albeit without the right to secession, of all its minority nationalities: due to the exigencies of national unity against imperialism and a dynastic history of ethnic harmony, China has decided on a theory of nationalities that revised its roots in Leninism and Stalinism, which granted more nominal independence and assumed a greater degree of voluntarism in the formation of the multi-ethnic Soviet Union.[345]

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[343] For a close reading into the proceedings of this event, see Rachel Leow, "A Missing Peace: The Asia-Pacific Peace Conference in Beijing, 1952 and the Emotional Making of Third World Internationalism," *Journal of World History* 30 (2019): pp. 21-53.

[344] Louis Wheaton, "一个美国黑人看新中国的少数民族情况 [An African American Views the Situation of Ethnic Minorities in China]," *Renmin ribao*, July 30, 1953.

[345] James Jackson, "Interview with Yang Chien Jen, Deputy Chief of Commission on National Minority Affairs of the Chinese People's Republic Government," February 24, 1959, Box 19, The James E. Jackson and Esther Cooper Jackson Papers, The Tamiment Library and Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives, New York University, New York.

The Chinese construct of minority nationalities provided the logic by which racial oppression in the United States could be unpacked and understood as a sub-national concern rooted in monopoly capitalism. The Han is the ethnic majority in mainland China, comprising more than 90% of the population. In the 1950s, the central government dispatched a series of social scientific expeditions to frontier provinces with the goal of mapping and classifying Chinese ethnicities into official lexicon. These new conceptions of ethnicity were subsumed under class categorizations in the Mao era, with non-Han cultural and religious practices discouraged, censored, or erased.[346] As such, there existed little space within Maoism, which regarded ethnic minorities as sub-groups of the Chinese nation whose lagging societies would be transformed by socialism, for engaging Black nationalism on its own terms.

This occurred even as Robert Williams was elected, while still residing in Beijing in 1968, the first president of the Republic of New Afrika by a diverse group of Black nationalists including LeRoi Jones, Audley "Queen Mother" Moore, and Muhammad Ahmad of the Revolutionary Action Movement. The RNA was premised on the indispensability of land ownership to Black liberation in the United States. Its proposition of a new nation born of states in the U.S. South represented a continuation of the "Black Belt Thesis" that African American communists pushed forth, adopted as official policy by the Comintern in Moscow in 1928.[347] The provisional government of the RNA hoped that in his new role, Williams could assist in the establishment of diplomatic relations with China and other newly independent African states, such as Tanzania and Sudan, en route to securing recognition from the United Nations.[348] In turn, Williams considered the RNA a campaign for self-determination in the tradition of Marcus Garvey, Elijah Muhammad, and Malcolm X. Efforts to attain racial equality within the present system were impossible,

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See also Boris Meissner, "The Soviet Concept of Nation and the Right of National Self-Determination," *International Journal* 32 (Winter 1976-1977): pp. 56-81.

[346] In anthropologist Ralph Litzinger's study of ethnic Yao elite in the project of Chinese nation-building, many Yao recalled that during the Cultural Revolution, they distanced themselves from traditional cultural practices as a demonstration of their commitment to Maoism. As class-based markers of identity emerged as the overwhelming logic of social organization, other Yao suffered violent persecution for their association with the "feudal past." See Ralph Litzinger, *Other Chinas,* p. 86.

[347] For an overview of the politics of land, nationhood, and reparations within the Republic of New Afrika, see Edward Onaci, *Free the Land: The Republic of New Afrika and the Pursuit of a Black Nation-State* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2020).

[348] Edward Onaci, *Free the Land: The Republic of New Afrika and the Pursuit of a Black Nation-State*, pp. 30-32

Williams believed, because "bigoted white America is so calloused with hate and spite" as to render any other solution but real nationhood a delusion.[349] While ultimately unsuccessful, these efforts taken together attested to contradiction between the promise of China within the Black nationalist imaginary just as Black nationalists sought a form of self-determination that Maoism, in theory and in practice, denied minority nationalities within China.

Albeit short-lived, it was also early openness to Black nationalism on the part of the Soviet Union and CPUSA that first augured an era of communist contribution to civil rights struggles in the Jim Crow South.[350] A number of African American visitors in the 1920s and 1930s expressed admiration for the multiethnic underpinnings of the Soviet Union. Akin to African students studying in the country in the 1960s, they were taken on tours of Soviet Central Asia to see the social and economic development of "backwards" national groups under communism.[351] In 1934, Langston Hughes published *A Negro Looks at Central Asia* after travelling through Turkmenistan, positively contrasting the cotton-producing, ethnically diverse areas of "the Soviet South" with the U.S. South under Jim Crow segregation.[352] Hughes, in fact, had been recruited to Moscow as a screenwriter for a failed Soviet film project dramatizing racism in the United States. After the initiative fell through, he requested permission to take the Trans-Siberian Railway to Central Asia as the region was, he later recalled in his autobiography, "where the majority of the colored citizens lived."[353] However, Hughes' consistent projection of Soviet ethnic policy to comparable positions on racial equality did not map on to Soviet discourses. Jamaican communist Claude McKay in the 1920s and African American civil rights activist Paul Robeson in the

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[349] Robert Williams, "Combat the Enemy Within Our Ranks," *The Crusader* (November 1968): p. 6.
[350] Harry Haywood based his ideas about a self-determined "Black Belt Republic" on Josef Stalin's 1913 essay "Marxism and the National Question." In Haywood's formulation, African Americans constituted, in Marxist definitional terms of a shared culture and geographic homeland, not merely a national minority but an oppressed nation. Mao's conception of Chinese ethnic minorities was also grounded partially in the Soviet model of "nationalities" and delineating significant territory as "autonomous," though it did not recognize, like Stalin did, that each nationality was voluntarily a part of the confederation and possessed the right to secession.
[351] Kate Baldwin, *Beyond the Color Line and the Iron Curtain: Reading Encounters between Black and Red, 1932-1963* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002): p. 248.
[352] Steven Lee, *The Ethnic Avant-Garde: Minority Cultures and World Revolution* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015): pp. 80-81.
[353] Langston Hughes, *I Wonder as I Wander: An Autobiographical Journey*, p. 102

1950s were cast as stand-ins for "Africa" in Soviet media during their visits to the Soviet Union, underscoring a reductive conception of race and Black identities that collapsed geographical, historical, and cultural differences within the African Diaspora.[354]

Both Lenin and Stalin believed that allowing national minorities to practice nationhood within the Soviet Union counteracted local nationalism, with the latter as a rightful expression of class-based grievances as well as protest against Russian chauvinism.[355] Their approach to the race question assumed that coincident with the disintegration of race would be the formation of "nationalities and nations" based on commonalities of language and culture, a more desirable and sustainable mode of categorization.[356] The short-lived Chinese Soviet Republic of the 1930s, or the Jiangxi Soviet, had actually honored national self-determination in this vein. But Mao stepped back from this expansive vision of local autonomy after the Long March, choosing not to recognize the right to secession of national minorities.[357] In other words, within theoretical Maoism, anti-imperialism rather than self-determination figured as the linchpin of minority policies.[358] As a result, the aspects of African American nationalism that challenged U.S. imperialism were deemed legitimate while claims to self-determination in the form of territorial or cultural separatism were ignored. On the other hand, Black Power activists who admired Chinese ethnic policies centered space, land, and power in their correlation of ethnic self-governance in China with visions of Black nationalism. Many embraced the idea that African Americans comprised an "internal

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[354] Kate Baldwin, *Beyond the Color Line and the Iron Curtain*, p. 243. The Stalin era witnessed several literary and film productions that featured African American storylines, all of which cast black characters as victims of racism in work and life. Though Chinese productions of the 1960s also emphasized the victimization of African Americans under capitalism, they tended to also sport triumphant narratives of radical resistance. For a description of Stalinist representations of African Americans experiences, see Konstantin Bogdanov, "'Negroes' in the USSR: The Ethnography of an Imaginary Diaspora," *Forum for Anthropology and Culture* 11 (2015): pp. 97-127.
[355] Terry Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011): p. 8.
[356] Francine Hirsch, *Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the Soviet Union* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005): p. 265. As such, in the case of Soviet Central Asia, state officials promoted intermarriage as a means of acculturating non-Russian nationalities, thereby advancing the pace of regional modernization. It was a simultaneous repudiation of race as a fixed quality and a paternalist essentialization of national minorities. See Adrienne Edgar and Saule Ualiyeva, "The 'Laboratory of Peoples' Friendship': People of Mixed Descent in Kazakhstan from the Soviet Era to the Present," in Miri Song eds., *Global Mixed Race* (New York: New York University Press, 2014): pp. 68-90.
[357] Jiann Hsieh, "China's Nationalities Policy: Its Development and Problems," *Anthropos* 81 (1986): p. 6.
[358] Jiann Hsieh, "China's Nationalities Policy," p. 8

colony" of the United States. With Black nationalism as an ideological anchor, they viewed police brutality in urban communities through the lens of Euro-American imperialist atrocities overseas and Afro-Asian movements for decolonization; this analogy became a starting point for considering the spectrum of possibilities for violent resistance in the United States.[359]

As China strived to supplant the Soviet Union as the center of world socialist revolution, did the same patterns by which African American activists looked to Moscow replicate themselves? Major contradictions also characterized Soviet understandings of race. The Marxist-Leninist conviction that ideas of race were the domain of bourgeois, capitalist societies coexisted with the application of racial beliefs—immutability, generational transmissibility, and hierarchy—to many Soviet "nationalities"[360] In Maoist China, the ethnic groups most phenotypically and culturally different from the Han majority were subject to similar biological assumptions. But rather than sidestep the discourses of race as the Soviets did, China's status and historical experiences as a non-white country figured centrally in its projections of solidarity to African Americans as well as to the broader Afro-Asian world.[361] After all, it had been this demonstrated attentiveness to race that garnered the trust of a generation of African American radical activists. For Robert Williams and Huey Newton, China presented as an ethnically inclusive nation-state that respected the cultural distinctions and right to self-governance of its minority populations. For the Black Panthers, who advocated community control vis-à-vis large-scale service programs and the popular surveillance of policing, the evident success of the Chinese model legitimated their platforms and

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[359] Sam Klug, "Making the Internal Colony: Black Internationalism, Development, and the Politics of Colonial Comparison in the United States, 1940-1975 (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 2020): pp. 235-236.
[360] Eric Weitz, "Racial Politics without the Concept of Race: Reevaluating Soviet Ethnic and National Purges," *Slavic Review* 61 (2002): pp. 3-18. Weitz's argument is supported by Brigid O'Keefe's study of Roma, whom Soviet state policy sought to remake as Soviet subjects but remained racialized as backwards Gypsies" in need of redemption by the Soviet state. See Brigid O'Keefe, "The Racialization of Soviet Gypsies: Roma, Nationality Politics, and Socialist Transformation in Stalin's Soviet Union," in David Rainbow ed., *Ideologies of Race: Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union in Global Context* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2019): pp. 132-159.
[361] The racial dimensions of Chinese nationalism, during and after Mao, were also evident in the case of the Peking Man, a collection of fossils found in the 1930s near Beijing that inspired debate over the prehistoric origins of "China." The racialized conception of national identity that the Peking Man legitimated, with the implication that all Chinese people—the "yellow race"—shared a biological ancestor, closely tracked the racialized nationalism deployed in many nation-states across geography and political systems, a far cry from Marxist-Leninist beliefs about race as a Western, capitalist construct. See Barry Sautman, "Peking Man and the Politics of Paleoanthropological Nationalism in China," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 60 (2001): pp. 95-124.

objectives. Huey Newton spoke admiringly of regional ethnic system of governance he was introduced to in China. During an interview with conservative commentator William Buckley in 1973, Newton recalled of his 1971 visit: "I found that 50 percent of the Chinese territory is occupied by a 54 percent population of national minorities, large ethnic minorities. They speak different languages, they look very different [and] they eat different foods. Yet, there is no conflict. I observed one day that each region—we call them cities—is actually controlled by those ethnic minorities."[362]

In practice however, minority nationalism figured as a fundamentally different concept for many other advocates of Black Power. In November 1971, Kathleen Cleaver declared on behalf of the Black Panther Party's International Section based in Algiers:

> "We believe that the burning question confronting the Afro-American people is whether or not we want to be integrated into the United States of America, or liberated into a sovereign nation of our own… [We have] no alternative but to deal first, foremost, and above all else with our National Question. It has been said that in the final analysis, National Questions are Class Questions. We agree. Further, we believe that… the intensification of our National Struggle will intensify our Class Struggle."[363]

Cleaver sought a plebiscite supervised by the United Nations in which all African Americans would vote to determine their national destiny, with a real choice as sovereignty on par with the rights and statuses of the other nations of the world. But conversely, when Chinese officials shuttled African American activists across Inner Mongolia, as they did for Robert Williams during his visit in October 1964, it was with the intention that the displays of ethnic equanimity would gesture to Chinese support for racial equality and local autonomy—but not political self-determination—for its minority populations.[364] In this manner, divergent takes on race, ethnicity, and nationalism rendered Black Power largely illegible in the context of 1960s China. As Jason Christopher Jones writes of the Black Panther Party' representation in Japanese press of the late 1960s and early 1970s, Japanese reporters were "attempting [with tremendous difficulty]

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[362] Huey Newton and William Buckley, "A Spokesman for the People: In Conversation with William F. Buckley, February 11, 1973," in David Hilliard and Donald Weise, *The Huey P. Newton Reader* pp. 279-280

[363] Kathleen Cleaver, "Statement by the International Section of the Black Panther Party on the Afro-American National Question," November 25, 1971, New Orleans, Box 13, The James E. Jackson and Esther Cooper Jackson Papers, New York University.

[364] "接待美国黑人领袖罗伯特威廉全家的计划 [Plan for Receiving African American Leader Robert Williams and His Family]," File No. C-36-2-215, SMA.

to recuperate a black American identity beyond U.S. models."[365] The Chinese leadership had conceived of African Americans vis-à-vis Chinese history and politics, construing them first as the anti-capitalist vanguard akin to the peasantry during the Chinese Revolution, and then as an "ethnic minority," alongside groups like Native Americans, Chicanos, and Puerto Ricans, all of whom supposedly strove for equal incorporation into the nation-state.

A few existing points of overlap escaped the CCP's attention. Perhaps of all Maoist-inspired activists and organizations in the United States at the time, it was Huey Newton's stance on race and nationhood as it pertained to African Americans that most resonated with theoretical Maoism.[366] By the early 1970s, Newton would arrive at the realization that in light of the trajectory of global capitalism, sovereignty has lost its salience as the objective of Black nationalist struggle. Newton's theory of "revolutionary intercommunalism," first coined in a speech delivered in Boston in November 1970, posited that because technological advancements and imperial expansions were eroding national borders, nationalism was no longer a sufficient answer. Thus, the Black Panthers represented not "a nation within a nation" but a collection of dispersed communities.[367] In this vein, Newton had written to the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam in August of 1970 to offer the services of Panther members as soldiers, stating that the Black Panther Party is the "vanguard party of revolutionary internationalists who give up all claim to nationalism."[368] Newton's rejection of African American self-determination in the conventional sense resonated with the Chinese disavowal of Black nationalism, even as the latter was rooted in the desire to overcome ethnic divisions within the confines of an established nation.

The intellectual trajectory of Harry Haywood, the African American architect of the "Black Belt Thesis" who lived in Moscow in the 1920s and served as a spokesperson for CPUSA until his split with the organization in the 1950s, offers an additional lens for understanding the interplay of race, class, and

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[365] Jason Christopher Jones, "The Black Panther Party and the Japanese Press," *Journal of African American Studies* 21 (2017): p. 69.
[366] Robin Kelley and Betsy Esch, "Black Like Mao: Red China and Black Revolution," p. 26
[367] Huey Newton, "Speech Delivered at Boston College, November 18, 1970," in Toni Morrison ed. *To Die for the People: The Writings of Huey P. Newton* (New York: Writers and Readers Publishing, 1999): pp. 20-38.
[368] Huey Newton, "Letter to the National Liberation Front," in Toni Morrison ed. *To Die for the People*, pp. 90-93

nation discourses that underpinned the Chinese interface with U.S. civil rights and Black Power activism. Haywood became a fierce critic of the CPUSA for its postwar abandonment of African American nationhood in favor of a "revisionist" position: that racial discrimination would disappear alongside working-class solidarity and the dissolution of capitalism. By the mid-1960s, Haywood began to take part in Maoist organizations in the United States, assuming a position on the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist), a group politically loyal to China. The CP (ML) recognized the African American right to secession to the Black Belt in the Stalinist vein, while it also proposed a limited notion of "regional autonomy" that applied to other national minority groups, including Chicanos, Puerto Ricans, Native Americans, and Asian Americans.[369]

In Haywood's autobiography *Black Bolshevik*, published in 1978, he charged that "white chauvinism" was the root cause for CPUSA's descent into a "mouthpiece for Soviet social-imperialism, the labor aristocracy, and the pro-détente sections of the U.S. ruling class."[370] Haywood prefaced his epilogue with a quotation from Mao's 1968 statement stating that the systems of colonialism and imperialism could only end with the emancipation of all Black people, and concludes with another that predicted the merging of the African American struggle with that of the working class.[371] His reading resonated with the Maoist version of events, pinning the rise of Black Power as a transition from the reformist framework of civil rights to one of "national liberation," a frontal assault on political power moving towards union with "anti-imperialist revolutions in the Third World and with the working-class movement for socialism."[372] In essence, Haywood disagreed with Black leaders within the CPUSA about whether the Black freedom movement in the U.S. South was an issue of racial discrimination, with the resolution being political integration within the existing system, or a matter of national oppression that was anti-imperialist in nature.[373] Maoism, even with its disavowal of racial nationalism and its

[369] Robin Kelley and Betsy Esch, "Black Like Mao: Red China and Black Revolution," p. 28
[370] Harry Haywood, *Black Bolshevik: Autobiography of an Afro-American Communist* (Chicago: Liberator Press, 1978): p. 627.
[371] Harry Haywood, *Black Bolshevik*, pp. 628-644
[372] Harry Haywood, *Black Bolshevik*, p. 636
[373] Harry Haywood, "For a Revolutionary Position on the Negro Question" (Third printing, 1959).

conservative interpretation of self-determination, became the source to which Haywood turned in his disillusionment with the Soviet Union. Akin to the incidents that drove Robert Williams out of Cuba in 1966, an uneven and asymmetric accession on the question of Black nationalism served as the juncture of China and late-1960s Black Power activism.

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Late 1960s Chinese politics witnessed a redefinition of terms and priorities. Mao's concept of "continuous revolution," around which the entire Cultural Revolution had been organized, began to lose valence as the CCP struggled to reassert dominance over a nation in disarray. In turn, official rhetoric turned away from the idea that China figured as the center of worldwide revolution. Early in 1969, even as Chinese press outlets characterized Nixon's inauguration as another remaking of U.S. imperialism, they also published, on Mao's suggestion, Nixon's inauguration speech in full, which declared that the United States was prepared to cultivate relationships with every country in the world.[374] The correlation between these shifts in Chinese foreign policy and how vigorously, if at all, Chinese narratives engaged African Americans, was profound; it reflected Mao's personal vacillations between faith in a world revolution and compulsion to seek reconciliation with the United States.[375] These fluctuations provided a critical context for the inconsistencies in continued positive reporting about African American protest in Chinese news through the late 1960s and early 1970s.

The activities of the Black Panther Party received a degree of recognition in the Chinese press but rarely on its own terms, with reports singling out, for example, moments of collaboration between the Panthers and the American Indian Movement.[376] Others referenced white mobilization against the police persecution of the Black Panthers, pointing to the 1970 New Haven Black Panther Trials as an episode of "fascism by the Nixon Administration" that galvanized broad-based African American and white

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[374] Chen Jian, "The Path Towards Sino-American Rapprochement," *German Historical Institute Bulletin Supplement* 1 (2004): pp. 26-48.
[375] Yang Kuisong and Xia Yafeng, "Between Vacillation and Détente: Mao's Changing Psyche and Policy Toward the United States," *Diplomatic History* 34 (2010): pp. 395-423.
[376] "美国近十个州印第安人相继奋起斗争 [American Indians in Nearly Ten States Rise Up in Struggle]," *Renmin ribao*, August 14, 1970.

organized opposition.[377] This series of reporting was part of a renewed but contained wave of anti-U.S. propaganda in 1970 inspired by a confluence of events hindering discussions between U.S. and Chinese officials: the U.S. invasion of Cambodia, the visit of Taiwanese Vice Premier Jiang Jingguo to Washington, and heightened power struggle between Mao and his presumed successor at the time, Lin Biao.[378] The spike in coverage of African American activism was an extension of this trend, dissipating as U.S.-China talks resumed at the end of 1970 vis-à-vis a number of channels, including the U.S. journalist Edgar Snow. After his arrival in China for the National Day celebrations in 1970, Snow received the opportunity to speak on the record with Mao. In a surprising turn, Mao stated to Snow during his interview that he would consider extending to U.S. citizens of all political stripes the invitation to visit China. This included Nixon himself.[379]

Chinese rhetoric in the early 1970s embraced the radical possibility of African American urban rebellions, but as one component of a large-scale movement that included Chicanos, Native Americans, and white progressives. Alternatively, Black activists who continued to look to the Chinese revolution sought a model of social transformation in addition to political liberation; as a result, it was still often the racial nationalist dimensions of the Cultural Revolution that held the greatest appeal. In the case of Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) National Program Director Hosea Williams, his desire to understand China derived from aspirations for the cultural self-determination of Black communities in the United States. Williams once spearheaded the desegregation campaigns in Savannah and helped organize the 1965 Selma to Montgomery Marches. In fall 1971, Williams left for a "Worldwide Brotherhood Tour" of fifteen countries in Asia and Africa, accompanied by his wife Juanita.[380] Of all

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[377] "强烈抗议尼克松政府的法西斯迫害罪行：美国黑人、白人群众和波多黎各人示威 [African Americans, Puerto Ricans, and the White Masses Protest in Fierce Opposition of the Nixon Administration's Fascist Crimes]," *Renmin ribao*, July 16, 1970.
[378] Chen Jian, "The Path Towards Sino-American Rapprochement," pp. 36-37
[379] Xia Yafeng, "China's Elite Politics and Sino-American Rapprochement, January 1969-February 1972," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 8 (2006): pp. 13-14.
[380] Established in 1957, the SCLC coordinated a number of voter registration campaigns and protests for civil rights throughout the South, including the 1963 March on Washington. Its philosophy of non-violent social change is closely associated with that of its co-founder Martin Luther King. With the launch of the Poor People's Campaign in December 1967, the organization expanded its focus to economic justice. See David Garrow, *Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King Jr. and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference* (New York: Harper Collins, 1986).

destinations, Williams dedicated the longest stay to China, entering through Hong Kong before visiting nine Chinese cities over four weeks.

"We were originally prompted to seek a Chinese visa after [listening to] hearsays and scathing facts of Red China's Cultural Revolution; how China developed leaders void of opportunism and revisionism ('Uncle Toms'); how China had meshed intellectualism with labor and subjugated personal gain to environmental development," Williams explained, while "the main thing that American blacks are grappling with today is themselves, their heritage, their culture, their being."[381] The attainment of material gains for any marginalized group, Williams believed, would not be sufficient. Rather, only cultural liberation spelled the true marker of freedom. It was on this front that he felt the Chinese Cultural Revolution—namely its advancements in art and education—afforded a model. Even as the specter of Nixon's visit loomed over the visit, the Williamses mined a number of lessons from the Chinese experience in the realm of cultural revitalization.

But their time in China was colored by difficulties from the outset. Though they initially made their formal application to travel to the People's Republic at the Chinese Embassy in Zambia, they received no response at any of three subsequent Chinese embassies they visited in Tanzania, Kenya, or Ethiopia. In Hong Kong, while awaiting a visa decision from Beijing that took weeks to arrive, the Williamses had to move to increasingly run-down accommodations as their funds ran out. Williams' last ditch-effort was a bold and expensive telegram, direct to Zhou Enlai, closing with "Yet, we will understand if it is not expedient for you to allow a black U.S. civil rights worker… even though you had granted President Nixon permission to visit China."[382] Within three days, Chinese representatives in Hong Kong called the Williamses to a travel agency office, inquiring if they would like to leave for Guangzhou that very afternoon.[383]

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[381] Hosea L. Williams, "How It All Got Started," Folder 25, Box 2, Sub-series B, Series 2, The Hosea L. Williams Papers (HWP), Auburn Avenue Research Library on African American Culture and History, Atlanta, GA.
[382] Hosea Williams, "How We Got into China," Folder 25, Box 2, Sub-series B, Series 2, HWP.
[383] Hosea and Juanita Williams' visit to China was arranged by Henderson Travel Agency, an Atlanta-based and black-owned agency that specialized in organizing politically engaged tours for African Americans to Africa. In the

This timing overlapped with the ten-day visit to China of a three-member delegation of the Black Panther Party, comprising Minister of Defense Huey Newton, Minister of Information Elaine Brown, and bodyguard Robert Bays. Newton himself never received the scale of reception that he sought in Beijing; his request for a personal meeting with Mao was unsuccessful and the fact of the Panthers' visit merited only brief mentions in Chinese press. Newton had prepared a note for Mao which he hand-delivered to Zhou Enlai, asking for Mao to negotiate with "Prison Warden Nixon" on behalf of "the oppressed people of the world," including the inmates at Attica State Prison in New York.[384] The note went unanswered and received no publicity within China, a clear contrast with Robert Williams' petition eight years earlier for Mao to take a stance on racial justice in the United States, which had occasioned Mao's well-publicized August 1963 statement.[385]

Unlike Newton, Hosea Williams had no track record of advocating armed insurrection.[386] Furthermore, Williams' religiosity was ill-received by Chinese translators and tour guides who neither understood nor sympathized with Black liberation theology. As such, a remarkable aspect of Williams' visit is the extent to which he openly contested the Chinese practices that he believed antithetical to its professed solidarity with Africa and its diaspora, and also aired without reservation his disagreements and grievances. In Shanghai, Williams took issue with his Chinese translator's decision to use interchangeably the adjectives "sinister" and "black." Williams' tone evinced his shock and displeasure as he reprimanded the translator. "The word 'black' is the imperialists' term for 'sinister,'" he rebuked, "But I'm black and I'm not sinister. I notice the Chinese have adopted the imperialist definition of 'black.' I'm not going to

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early 1970s, co-owner Freddye Henderson cultivated a close relationship with officials Beijing, also helping to organize a 1972 tour of China for African American physicians from the National Medical Association.

[384] Huey Newton, "Attica Statement, October 16, 1971," in Toni Morrison ed., *To Die for the People*, pp. 208-209

[385] In the fall of 1971, Robert Williams himself, detained at the time in a Michigan prison while facing extradition to North Carolina, had asked his friend Tony Soares in London to cable Zhou Enlai to request Chinese assistance in arbitrating with Nixon on his behalf when Nixon arrived in China. Unsurprisingly, Williams' request also went unanswered. See Anne-Marie Angelo, "'We All Became Black': Tony Soares, African-American Internationalists, and Anti-imperialism," in Robin Kelley and Stephen Tuck eds., *The Other Special Relationship: Race, Rights, and Riots in Britain and the United States* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015): p. 99.

[386] As a chief theoretician for the Panthers, Newton believed that his organization was the heir to the principles and mission of Malcolm X, that armed self-defense and guerilla warfare comprised the only viable path to the liberation of the "black colony" within the United States. See Huey Newton, "Essays from the Minister of Defense," Oakland (1968 pamphlet).

let you get away with that. Because it's imperialist. The imperialists always find a way to equate 'black' with something no good."[387] This allegation that Chinese language surrounding Blackness amounted to "imperialism" directly negated the concerted efforts on the part of the CCP to present itself as the foil to the West its anti-racist posturing and outreach. In this instance, Williams caught onto the negative associations of the word "black" in the Chinese language, often used to denote illegality or illegitimacy. The colloquial naming of an urban slum outside the city of Nanning in Guangxi Province in the 1970s, where thousands of unemployed squatters lived, as "African village (非洲村)" is one example of the myriad adverse connotations of "African" or "black" in Chinese discourses.[388]

While on a bus ride in Beijing, Williams voiced his intuition that his Chinese hosts had taken a disliking to him. As he intimated on tape:

> I'm an honest man, I don't feel the friendliness in Peking that I've felt throughout China. Here I get the impression I'm doing something wrong. If I'm doing something wrong, I want to be told… if I'm asking too many questions, taking too many questions, I want to know. I don't want to become a burden… China got problems? Everywhere in the world got problems… I developed a fear in me, a fear of asking questions. I believe in God and I'm a Christian, so I know there are ideological differences. Sometimes I ask a question, I just get the feeling that maybe I'm asking too much, maybe taking too many photos.[389]

His hosts reassured a skeptical Williams that it was fine to take photographs and ask questions, but it failed to quell his misgivings. At a press conference in Atlanta, Williams publicly expressed his suspicions that Newton's delegation of the Black Panther Party received a more enthusiastic reception than did he and his wife. He recalled that given the communist animosity towards Christianity, "The Chinese people were very leery of me. I passed out cards, I passed out Dr. King's book all over China,

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[387] "Fudan University, October 9, 1971," Tape 10, Box 7, Subseries E, Series 11, HWP.

[388] Because the word "black" (黑) in Chinese refers to "undocumented," the phrase "black person" (黑人) also means someone who lacks official documentation. In this case, "African village" became a derogatory phrase to describe the 4,000 squatters outside of Nanning city proper. See Preparatory Group for Conference of National Public Complaints and Proposals Administration, "上海等六省市区落实政策的情况和几个带普遍性的政策问题 (General Issues Regarding the Implementation of Urban Policies in Six Provinces and Cities Including Shanghai)," August 24, 1978, *The Maoist Legacy*, accessed July 16, 2020, https://maoistlegacy.de/db/items/show/4839. For a historical overview of the Black-white polarity in Chinese popular and intellectual discourse, see Frank Dikötter, *The Discourse of Race in Modern China, Revised Edition*, pp. 8-26.

[389] "Communication, Peking, China, October 3, 1971," Tape 6, Box 6, Subseries E, Series 11, HWP.

The Measure of a Man, [which] we had that translated into Chinese. This they rejected… so [they] were much more receptive to the Panthers."[390]

Hosea and Juanita Williams made meticulous notes concerning the fostering of cultural pride and nationalism that they witnessed in China; they believed this to be the aspect of Chinese society most relevant to Black communities in the United States. At Fudan University in Shanghai, the Williamses were enraptured by the personal testimony from a faculty member in Chinese literature, who emphasized his conviction that contrary to the notions held by the Chinese elite at the turn of the twentieth century, education itself was not enough to save a nation. "In the past I wrote many books," the professor explained, "but it was all bourgeois things. During the Cultural Revolution, I was criticized by revolutionary teachers and students... The mistake I made was that I didn't think for the proletariat, the working classes, but for myself, I thought for myself and personal interests."[391] His colleague attested to the importance of connecting theory with practice, raising the example of a student who received high marks in politics classes but in the end, supported "the capitalist roaders" over the Cultural Revolution. Juanita Williams, a longtime educator whose personal objective for her time in China was to conduct research on the Chinese education system, took these statements to heart, assenting that education divorced from politics accounted for the high drop-out rates in the United States, especially among black students.[392] Her typewritten reflections underscored admiration for an education system that centered revolutionary teachings, practical knowledge, political conscientiousness, and instilled in students a discipline honed through work assignments in industry and agriculture.[393]

But the Williamses' vision never dovetailed with the Chinese narrative of African American uprising merging with the broader forces of progressivism as an anti-statist and anti-capitalist front. The early 1970s marked a moment of disjuncture whereby Chinese authorities did not grasp that it was the "culture" in the Cultural Revolution which overlapped the goals of the Black Arts Movement. Increasing

[390] "Press Conference at Hunter Street Baptist Church," Tape 14, Box 7, Subseries E, Series 11, HWP.
[391] "Fudan University, October 9, 1971," Tape 10, Box 7, Subseries E, Series 11, HWP.
[392] Untitled Press Release (New York), October 28, 1971, Folder 24, Box 2, Subseries D, Series 7, HWP.
[393] "Notes on Education," Undated, Folder 25, Box 2, Subseries B, Series 2, HWP.

numbers of African Americans travelled to China in the early and mid-1970s, many of them artists and writers: playwright Alice Childress (1973), actress and civil rights activist Unita Blackwell (1973), poet Sonia Sanchez (1973), journalist Earl Ofari Hutchinson (1973), educator James Breeden (1975), and novelist John Oliver Killens (1973).[394] Their identifications with China often extended from affinities in the realms of arts and culture, or a desire to learn from the Chinese model of cultural self-reliance. Unita Blackwell, in fact, remembered her tour of China most vividly for the moments in which the Pearl River Delta in Southern China reminded her culturally of the Mississippi Delta where she grew up; she recalled recognizing all the roots and leaves that a doctor of traditional Chinese medicine was demonstrating with at the Canton Trade Fair as the same ones that her grandmother once used cure colds, treat wounds, and induce labor in her community.[395]

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The visit of Huey Newton, Elaine Brown, and Robert Bays to Beijing took place shortly after a bitter schism within the Black Panther Party that resulted in the expulsion of Eldridge Cleaver, former Minister of Information who contested the legitimacy of community service programs as a viable revolutionary strategy. For the Black Panthers, a Maoist-leaning organization that funded its first purchase of weapons with sales proceeds of the Little Red Book, the news of Henry Kissinger's clandestine negotiations in China in July 1971—followed by the announcement that Nixon himself would soon make the trip—stirred heated debate over the most effectively revolutionary tactics in the evolving landscape of the Cold War.[396] From its beginning, the Party had adapted not only aspects of Maoism as

[394] Childress, Sanchez, and Hutchinson were a part of the same visit in April 1973 sponsored by the U.S.-China People's Friendship Association and the left-leaning newspaper *Guardian*. Breeden was serving on the faculty of the University of Dar es Salaam when he and his wife undertook a long-awaited trip to China, on the recommendation of Tanzania's Minister of Education. Killens, who published the booklet *Black Man in New China* about his experiences in 1976, recounted a remarkable story: when a young Chinese woman in Guangzhou went up him to say that she once read a book about a black veteran who faced police violence in Georgia, it turned out to be the translation of Killens' own novel from 1963 *And Then We Heard the Thunder*. See Keith Gilyard, *John Oliver Killens: A Life of Black Literary Activism* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2010): pp. 276-278.

[395] Unita Blackwell and JoAnne Prichard Morris, *Barefootin': Life and Lessons from the Road to Freedom* (New York: Crown Publishers, 2006): p. 203.

[396] The international networks of the Panthers are well-documented. See Kathleen Cleaver, "Back to Africa: The Evolution of the International Section of the Black Panther Party (1969-1972)," in Charles E. Jones ed., *The Black Panther Party Reconsidered* (Baltimore: Black Classic Press, 1998): pp. 211-256; Jennifer Smith, *An International*

ideology, but selections of its worldviews. As the Sino-Soviet Border Conflict escalated in 1969, the front page of the March 23 issue of *The Black Panther* declared in bold terms "We will never allow Soviet revisionists to invade and occupy China's sacred territory—Chenpao Island." The Soviet Union has become an accomplice to U.S. imperialist forces, the accompanying article explained, prescribing pacifism for the most oppressed populations in the world and orchestrating a provocative attack against unsuspecting Chinese guards on Zhenbao Island.[397]

Newton further elucidated his stance on the Sino-Soviet Split in an October 1969 interview, stating that China was "truly socialist" rather than the Soviet Union, which he characterized as a model of "state capitalism" in which the governing party reaped the profits that corporations would have monopolized in a capitalist society.[398] Through the late 1960s and early 1970s, *The Black Panther* positively reported on China's support for Southern African liberation movements, and conversely, Southern African anticolonial nationalists drawing inspiration from Maoism.[399] Other subjects that received coverage in *The Black Panther* included the development of China-Albanian relations, the growing popularity of Maoist thought in Mexico, and the outbreak 1967 Arab-Israeli War as a result of collusion between U.S. and British imperial interests, abetted by the tacit consent of the revisionist Soviet Union.[400]

History of the Black Panther Party (New York: Garland Publishers, 1999); Michael Clemons and Charles Jones, "Global Solidarity: The Black Panther Party in the International Arena" in Kathleen Cleaver and George Katsiaficas eds., *Liberation, Imagination, and the Black Panther Party: A New Look at the Black Panthers and Their Legacy* (New York: Routledge, 2001): pp. 20-39; Davarian Baldwin, "'Culture Is a Weapon in Our Struggle for Liberation': The Black Panther Party and the Cultural Politics of Decolonization," in Jama Lazerow and Yohuru Williams eds., *In Search of the Black Panther Party: New Perspectives on a Revolutionary Movement* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006): pp. 289-305; Robyn Spencer, "Merely One Link in the Worldwide Revolution: Internationalism, State Repression, and the Black Panther Party, 1966-1972", in Michael West, William G. Martin, and Fanon Che Wilkins ed., *From Toussaint to Tupac: The Black International Since the Age of Revolution* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009): pp. 215-231. Sean Malloy's *Out of Oakland: Black Panther Party Internationalism During the Cold War* is the most comprehensive account of the Black Panthers' international dimensions to date.

[397] Bob Avakian and Lovis Larris, "The Chinese People's Republic Repels Soviet Aggression," *The Black Panther*, March 23, 1969.

[398] Byron Robertson, "Interview with the Minister of Defense," *The Black Panther*, October 4, 1969.

[399] See, for example, "Southwest Africa Follows Chairman Mao," *The Black Panther*, March 16, 1969 and "African Patriotic Armed Struggle Grows in Strength," *The Black Panther*, February 17, 1969.

[400] See "Chinese Government Statement: Firm Support for the Arab People's Fight Against U.S.-Israeli Aggression," *The Black Panther*, July 20, 1967; "Chairman Mao's Work Published in Mexico," *The Black Panther*, January 4, 1969; and "The Albania Report," *The Black Panther*, October 31, 1970.

On the issue of nuclear disarmament, the Panthers postulated that the Soviets actively collaborated with U.S. imperialism; they mocked Nixon's objective of "better relations" with the Soviet Union, vis-à-vis the launch of chartered flights between New York and Moscow for tourism and cultural exchange.[401] The 1968 Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Panthers wrote, targeted China's acquisition of the bomb, mirroring Chinese charges that the Treaty amounted to a U.S.-Soviet conspiracy to maintain a hegemonic hold on nuclear weapons and transform non-nuclear states into their "protectorates."[402] When the People's Republic of China replaced the Republic of China in the United Nations in October 1971, the Panthers celebrated the occasion as one of especial pertinence to Black communities in the United States, given that African Americans have lived for centuries "in a society in which [their] voice is and has not ever been represented by the laws or the government of that society... Our friends of the People's Republic of China also understand this." *The Black Panther* reprinted the full text of Chinese diplomat Qian Guanhua's speech on the UN floor.[403]

But rising tensions between Eldridge Cleaver and Huey Newton, which sharpened in early 1971, became manifest in their divergent takes on Asian socialism. Cleaver, exiled in Algiers as Head of the Panthers' International Section, accused Newton of leading a "right-wing" dedicated to reformism while he presided over the Party's revolutionary left flank. Cleaver expressed that in pursuit of alternative community-based strategies of "revolution-making," Newton's Oakland-based faction betrayed their political cause.[404] Indeed, for Newton, it was on the front of community service that the Chinese model of socialism—with Mao's call to "serve the people," the dispatching of youth to labor in the countryside, and the "barefoot doctors" program—emerged as a point of inspiration.[405] Conversely, Newton cited

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[401] "Washington/Moscow Collaboration Intensified," *The Black Panther*, March 3, 1969.
[402] "Nuclear Fraud Betrays World's People's Interest," *The Black Panther*, March 31, 1969.
[403] "Revolution is the Main Trend in the World Today," *The Black Panther*, November 29, 1971.
[404] Judy Wu, *Radicals on the Road*, pp. 167-168
[405] Alondra Nelson has discussed the experiences of Black Panther physician Dr. Bert Small in China in 1972. After conversations and trainings with Chinese practitioners, Dr. Small began to experiment with acupuncture as a curative procedure upon his return to Oakland. Furthermore, as Nelson observes, the "barefoot doctor" method of using state vans to bring medicine to the isolated countryside directly inspired the Panthers' People's Free Ambulance Service. See Alondra Nelson, *Body and Soul: The Black Panther Party and the Fight Against Medical Discrimination* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011).

Cleaver's "defection" from the Panthers as extending from a misinterpretation of Mao's dictum "political power grows from the barrel of a gun." Whereas Newton placed emphasis on the word "grows," recognizing that the revolutionary process is contingent on the shifting winds of subjective conditions, he felt that Cleaver would have ordered "everyone into the streets tomorrow to make revolution."[406]

On the other hand, Eldridge Cleaver named Kim Il Sung as the preeminent Asian theoretician of Marxism and anti-imperialism. In September 1969, while attending a conference of the International Organization of Journalists in Pyongyang, he mused that "We need someone to write an article and translate it into all the languages spoken here and explain why Russians and Chinese are killing each other and why the Chinese are not [at the conference]."[407] To Cleaver, the enmity between China and the Soviet Union, for which China bore significant responsibility, posed an affront to anti-imperialist unity. The absence of Chinese representatives from this gathering attended by Cuban, Algerian, Congolese delegates, among many others, was glaring. Further, Cleaver regarded the North Korean principle of "juche," a term that roughly correlated to self-reliance, as a source of insight. In turn, the activities, aspirations, and trials of the Black Panthers became recurring stories in North Korean state media.[408] In rhetoric, Cleaver stepped back from Maoism while Newton, whom he accused of capitulation to "revisionism," legitimated the Oakland-based Panthers' turn to electoral campaigns and service programs with U.S.-China rapprochement and Chinese models of mass-based medicine and education.

When Nixon announced to the public his visit to Beijing, Cleaver confessed his fears to the U.S. mainstream media that "I don't think [Nixon and Mao will] be chit-chatting… there's a deal being made,

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[406] Huey Newton, "On the Defection of Eldridge Cleaver from the Black Panther Party and the Defection of the Black Panther Party from the Black Community," *The Black Panther*, April 17, 1971.
[407] "Notes," September 19, 1969, from the Eldridge Cleaver Papers, Wilson Center E-dossier, North Korea International Documentation Project (http://digitalarchive.org/document/114575).
[408] Benjamin Young, "Juche in the United States: The Black Panther Party's Relations with North Korea, 1969-1971," *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus* 13 (2015) (https://apjjf.org/2015/13/12/Benjamin-Young/4303.html). The breakdown in relations between China and North Korea in the late 1960s resulted from a number of factors: Kim did not appreciate the extent of Chinese anti-Soviet rhetoric, North Korean pushback against chauvinism on the part of Chinese advisers, border disputes, and Chinese mistreatment of ethnic Koreans living in China. See Y.D. Fadeev, First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in DPRK, to CC CPSU, "Korean-Chinese relations in 1969," December 9, 1969, History and Public Policy Archive, contributed by Sergey Radchenko and trans. by Gary Goldberg: (https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/134267.pdf?v=d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e).

and I think this is cause for alarm from the point of view of the black man—the possibility of the world being carved up again without us being consulted on us."[409] For Cleaver, the prospect of U.S.-China rapprochement indicated Chinese revolutionary foreign policy shifted course, and this conciliation could not bode well for Black communities in the United States. Kathleen Cleaver recalled the moment as one of reckoning for the International Section of the Black Panther Party, as "The press photographs showing [Mao and Nixon] shaking hands testified to a meeting that no revolutionary would have ever imagined… It became obvious that world-scale preparations for a post-Vietnam War world were being made, and that the future for the fugitive Black Panthers trapped in Algiers was dim."[410] The Cleavers' assessments of events echoed the criticism expressed by Angela Davis that the decision to receive Nixon constituted a "revisionist act."[411]

But the Black Panther Party in Oakland continued to hold up China as an exemplar of revolutionary values. They defended Chinese foreign policy and interpreted the restoring of diplomatic relations with the United States as a lesson in the periodic necessity of acquiescence to the enemy. An April 1972 issue of *The Black Panther* featured the full-page article "Has China Betrayed the Revolution?" in which Panther member Robert Seier proposed an alternative understanding of Mao's reception of Nixon. "It was Nixon who was forced to recognize the reality of the People's Republic of China… after half a century of struggle, a man like Chairman Mao does not arrogate his principles overnight," Seier reminded his readers.[412] Through this positive appraisal of conciliatory foreign policy decisions by China, Newton's faction preserved the figurative power of Maoism to legitimate their own organizational outlook, which increasingly centered community-based activities. In arguing that the Chinese truce with the Nixon could not have been denounced as "revisionist," Seier explained that "In view of the changing world situation, the Communist Party of China must keep pace with the reality of

[409] John Hess, "Cleaver Sees a Threat to Blacks in U.S.-China Thaw," *New York Times*, October 7, 1971.
[410] Kathleen Cleaver, "Back to Africa: The Evolution of the International Section of the Black Panther Party," p. 244
[411] "Part II of a Conversation with Angela Davis," *The Black Panther*, March 11, 1972.
[412] This is presumably a reference to the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, which resulted in the creation of the People's Republic of Bangladesh. Though a preemptive attack from Pakistan launched the war, the Soviet Union provided significant military support to India.

the situation, or face the possibility of becoming obsolete and anachronistic." In response to Davis's pointed condemnations of China, Seier asserted that Davis had only reiterated Soviet-style rhetoric attacking China while skirting over the "truly revisionist" behavior of the Soviet Union in backing the Indian "invasion" of Pakistan and withholding support for the Palestinian struggle.[413] As such, Chinese socialism remained a paragon of revolutionary values, albeit of a revolution in which the premises, tactics, and exigencies have moved away from armed uprising and towards the remaking of objective conditions on the ground. In fact, Newton's decision to reorient the Black Panther mission around community service was affirmed by his liaison while in Beijing with representatives from the Mozambican liberation organization FRELIMO, who shared their experiences of building alternative social and educational institutions within the territories already freed from Portuguese rule.[414]

During this phase of "practical revolutionary activity" for the Panthers in Oakland, "survival programs" ranged from the renowned "Free Breakfast for Children" initiative to lesser-known services like medical care, distribution of groceries, and screenings for sickle cell anemia.[415] A significant but underappreciated initiative under this umbrella, inspired by the Chinese conception of integrative medicine, was also the Panthers' use of acupuncture to address holistic health issues beyond clinical illnesses in traditional terms, such as opioid addiction. The idea that medicine should serve the most underprivileged populations, enshrined in the Chinese "barefoot doctors" program, commanded particular appeal for the Black Panthers. Tobert Small and David Levinson, instrumental to incorporating acupuncture into the medical services of the Panthers, recalled that they had been impressed by the acupuncture demonstrations they witnessed in China in 1972. In Levinson's words, Chinese integrative

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[413] Robert Seier, "Has China Betrayed the Revolution?" *The Black Panther*, April 15, 1972.
[414] Muhammad Ahmad*, We Will Return in the Whirlwind: Black Radical Organizations, 1960-1975* (Chicago: Charles Kerr Publishing Company, 2007): pp. 210-211.
[415] Robert Self, ""The Black Panther Party and the Long Civil Rights Era," in Jama Lazerow and Yohuru Williams eds., *In Search of the Black Panther Party: New Perspectives on a Revolutionary Movement*, p. 43. When the Panthers launched "Free Breakfast for Children" at a church in West Oakland in January 1969, it marked a definitive shift in grassroots-level strategy from armed patrols on the streets to strategic efforts to alleviating the immediate pangs of poverty. It was the beginning of the multi-year campaign that Newton would term "survival pending revolution." Newton coined this phrase in an article in the *Black Panther* on March 20, 1971. For an account of this transition within the Oakland-based Panthers, see Joshua Bloom and Waldo Martin, *Black Against Empire: The History and Politics of the Black Panther Party*, pp. 368-371.

medicine consisted of "tools and techniques that were available and easily disseminated without having to rely on Western technology or ideas of medicine."[416] Without access to formal training or licensure, Small learned acupuncture through trial and error and soon began making house calls in the Oakland area.[417] Auricular acupuncture, which focused on stimulating trigger points on the ear, proved to be effective treatment for addiction in the repertoire of the Black Panthers in New York. Mutulu Shakur, the Panther activist who brought acupuncture to the Lincoln Detox Center in the South Bronx, had actually been introduced to the practice in by Yuri Kochiyama, when he sought medical treatment for his sons who were injured in a car accident.[418] In these unexpected ways, political borrowings between Maoism and Black radicalism did not simply come to a cessation with U.S.-China rapprochement. For many of the Black Panthers who remained active in local chapters around the United States, the facts of China's choice to receive Nixon helped to legitimate the turn to "serving the people, body and soul."[419]

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In Karen Tei Yamashita's 2010 epic novel *I Hotel*, a fictional recounting of the late 1960s Asian American Movement in the San Francisco Bay Area, one of the main characters, Mo Akagi—a young Japanese American man who joins the Black Panther Party—is happy to have established a channel of communications with Robert Williams in Cuba. Yamashita writes of the moment:

> "Everyone was reading [Williams'] *Negroes with Guns*. He's the man. He's in Cuba transmitting *Radio Free Dixie*. Akagi finds a postal system to his box in Havana… One day, Akagi gets a package by way of Peking: 1 Tai Chi Chang, Peking, China. Got a stamp of a Vietnamese shooting down a U.S. warplane. It's *The Crusader*, Williams' newsletter. Do you know how many copies you can smuggle if they're printed on rice paper? Slip a hundred of those papers under your jacket and distribute them on the Third World picket line at UC Berkeley. Check it out. Brother Robert's in China, sitting at the left hand of Mao."[420]

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[416] David Levinson, as quoted in Eana Meng, "Maoism in New Hampshire: The Black Panther Party's Use of Acupuncture (Undergraduate thesis, Harvard College, 2019): p. 71. For Chinese medicine in Tanzania, see Elisabeth Hsu, "Medicine as Business: Chinese Medicine in Tanzania," in Chris Alden, Daniel Large, and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira eds., *China Returns to Africa: A Rising Power and a Continent Embrace* (London: Hurst Publishers, 2008): pp. 221-235.
[417] Eana Meng, "Maoism in New Hampshire: The Black Panther Party's Use of Acupuncture," pp. 73-74
[418] Eana Meng, "Maoism in New Hampshire," p. 83
[419] "Black Community Survival Conference II*, KPIX Eyewitness News*, March 20, 1972, San Francisco State University: San Francisco Bay Area Television Archive (https://diva.sfsu.edu/ collections/sfbatv/bundles/ 190201).
[420] Karen Tei Yamashita, *I Hotel* (Minneapolis: Coffee House Press, 2010): p. 204.

Akagi begins to deal weaponry for the Black Panthers, reminiscent of the real-life position assumed by Richard Aoki, and receives far-flung messages of support for the party. The chapter then concludes with a quotation from Mao's August 1963 statement in support of the African American struggle.[421] Akagi's tale, however imagined, contains kernels of historical truth: Robert Williams' Cold War entanglements served as an indispensable vector in 1960s revolutionary and intelligence networks between Cuba, China, and the United States. His political activities earned him the surveillance not only of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), but also of the Cuban and Chinese authorities who all courted him as the representative of African American liberation, all the while keeping his advocacy of racial nationalism at arm's length. At the same time, Williams exploited these Cold War rivalries within the socialist world, with measured success, to obtain a media platform and financial resources. His radio broadcasts and newsletters reached a new generation of African American internationalists, vis-à-vis whom his stature as a Black activist "sitting at the left hand of Mao" helped to facilitate the subsequent rise of the Asian American Movement.[422]

But by the late 1970s, the high tide of cross-identification and political solidarities between African Americans and China appeared in the rearview mirror. Clashes between African and Chinese students roiled Chinese university campuses beginning in 1979, culminating with mass anti-African protests in 1988-1989 in the cities of Nanjing, Beijing, and Wuhan. The provocations for these altercations included, on the part of Chinese students, outrage that their African counterparts dated Chinese women and jealousy at the economic privileges they received from the Chinese state. Chinese students at Zhejiang Agricultural University in 1988 hurled the insult that their African peers were

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[421] Richard Aoki was a Japanese American political activist who served as Field Marshal for the Black Panthers and facilitated the first shipments of arms to the Panther leadership. He later became active in the Asian American Political Alliance at the University of California, Berkeley. In 2012, three years after his death, journalist Seth Rosenfeld alleged Aoki of having worked as a long-time informant for the FBI on a number of radical organizations in the San Francisco Bay Area, including the Panthers. Aoki's allegiances and the basis of Rosenfeld's charges remain contested. For Aoki's life and activism, see Diane Fujino, *Samurai Among Panthers: Richard Aoki on Race, Resistance, and a Paradoxical Life* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012).

[422] This is a manifestation of the pattern that Daryl Maeda identifies, by which the first Asian American activists, like those in the Red Guard Party, admired and strove to emulate the Black Power vanguard, including its idealization of socialist Asia. See Daryl Maeda, "Black Panthers, Red Guards, and Chinamen: Constructing Asian American Identity through Performing Blackness, 1969-1972," *American Quarterly* 57 (2005): pp. 1079-1103.

carriers of AIDS.[423] At Hehai University, Chinese students marched to chants of "Beat the Black Devils!" after a false rumor spread that a Chinese man was killed by Africans.[424] Two years earlier in 1986, African embassies in Beijing had received a letter from an unidentified Chinese "student association" decrying the allocation of national resources to educating "backwards" races rather than to catching up with the West, complete with a call to learn from U.S. history valuable lessons in how to "curb" its Black citizens.[425] The shift was remarkable from the earlier period of open declarations of support for African and African American liberation. The years from the late 1960s to the early 1970s lend important insight into this transition: at the height of U.S.-China conflict, state-sponsored outlets trumpeted an anti-racist stance to counter potential popular expressions of racial prejudice. But as rapprochement with the United States beckoned, they toned down revolutionary discourse in favor of a "national unity" framework that posited African Americans as an "ethnic minority," before mentions of African American struggle began to disappear altogether from official channels.

Following Mao's 1976 death, Chinese policies in the semi-autonomous regions where many ethnic minorities reside also veered away from the hardline stance of assimilation and class struggle that once defined the 1960s. Official notes from a "Tibet Work Forum" hosted by the Central Committee in 1980 used Mao's 1963 statement in support of the African American struggle as the foil to accurate interpretations of the "ethnic question" (民族问题) in China: When Mao declared race as an issue of class, it referred to the conflict between African Americans and the structures of U.S. monopoly capitalism, in a country where liberation from capitalism had yet to be achieved. Mao's observation about the supremacy of class contradictions however, would not have applied to post-1949 socialist China. In the latter context of a liberated territory already under socialist rule, like Tibet, the "ethnic question" is no longer a matter of class, but the struggle against both "Han chauvinism and local nationalism to ensure the

[423] Barry Sautman, "Anti-Black Racism in Post-Mao China," pp. 415-429
[424] Michael Sullivan, "The 1988-1989 Nanjing Anti-African Protests: Racial Nationalism or National Racism?" *The China Quarterly* 138 (1994): pp. 449-450.
[425] Michael Sullivan, "The 1988-1989 Nanjing Anti-African Protests," pp. 445-446

democratic equality and unity of all ethnic groups in the motherland."[426] This turn with regards to ethnic concerns proceeded alongside the gradual dislodging of the belief that African Americans, as a racial group that had suffered most acutely under the existing political and economic system, might emerge as the revolutionary vanguard of United States. These pivots in Chinese official discourses and objectives point to the enduring contradictions of race, ethnicity, and class in Maoism—an entanglement that African American experiences of oppression and resistance uniquely brought to light through the 1960s and early 1970s.

[426] The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and Special Commentator of the *People's Daily*, "中共中央关于转发《西藏工作座谈会纪要》的通知 (Notice from the CCP Central Committee Regarding the Forwarded Minutes of the Tibet Work Forum)," April 7, 1980, *The Maoist Legacy Project*, accessed July 16, 2020, (https://maoistlegacy.de/db/items/show/4929).

Minutiae of Solidarity:
Race, Culture, and Public Diplomacy Between China and Tanzania, 1965-1972

On the eve of President Julius Nyerere's arrival in Shanghai in February 1965, as part of his first state visit to the People's Republic of China, the municipal chapter of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions finalized blueprints for its mass organization of Chinese citizens in a welcome ceremony. The union leaders assigned seven different districts of Shanghai the responsibility for staffing stretches along two roads: a total of 100,000 workers and youth would line the 6,430 meters leading from the airport to Nyerere's hotel. At the airport, 45% of those in attendance would wave flowers and ribbons, 15% would hold small colorful flags, while 20% would wield the flags of the two countries. Each member of the welcome squad, the official guidelines further stipulated, must possess reliable politics, healthy bodies, and clean dispositions; pregnant women, children, and the elderly should not be represented, and the teenage girls chosen to present and scatter flowers must be "pleasant in appearance and neat in dress."[427] These hallmarks of a Chinese welcome ceremony for foreign guests, though executed to a uniquely spectacular scale for Nyerere, also characterized the receptions, banquets, and ceremonies arranged for a range of other cultural delegations. For the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the performance and symbolism embedded within these lavish events were intended to suggest the importance that it accorded to African diplomats and visitors. Indeed, the fanfare that greeted Nyerere in Beijing and Shanghai received widespread coverage in mainland Tanzanian and Zanzibari press.[428]

The deeply felt impact of Nyerere's February 1965 trip to Beijing, in highlighting the possibilities of socialist development, is clear.[429] In 1964, the amount of Chinese economic and military assistance to Tanzania, albeit significant, paled relative to the flow of Western aid to the country. But with the signing

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[427]"上海市总工会接待坦桑尼亚联合共和国总统尼雷尔群众组织工作计划，组织编制和内容及机场夹道图等文件 [Plans, Contents, Airport Maps and Other Documents from the Shanghai Chapter of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions Regarding Popular Organization for the Reception of President Nyerere of the United Republic of Tanzania]," File No. C1-2-5347, SMA.

[428] For example, see "Rais Aelezea Safari Yake ya China [The President Describes His Trip to China]," *Kweupe* (Zanzibar), February 27, 1965; and "Mwalimu Karamuni Peking [Mwalimu at the Celebration in Beijing]," *Uhuru*, February 18, 1965.

[429] Alicia Altorfer-Ong, "Tanzanian Freedom and Chinese Friendship in 1965: Laying the Tracks for the Tanzam Rail Link," LSE Ideas: Cold War Studies Working Paper Series (2009): p. 8.

of the Sino-Tanzanian Treaty of Friendship during Nyerere's stay in Beijing, trade volume between China and Tanzania rose drastically, reaching a high of $19.7 million USD by the time of Nyerere's second visit to China in 1968, in spite of the official launch of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in 1966.[430] A public opinion survey revealed that among Tanzanians more broadly, the percentage who reported a positive impression of the People's Republic of China increased from 28% in 1964 to 79% in 1966.[431] In the summer of 1965, the first team of Chinese surveyors arrived in Tanzania to begin charting the possibilities for a Chinese-funded railway from Kapiri Mposhi in landlocked Zambia, a major exporter of copper, to the port city of Dar es Salaam. The Tanzam Railway would be the realization of a Pan-African vision, one that Western donors refused to support, allowing Zambia to transport goods and raw materials without dependence on transit through the white-minority regimes of Rhodesia and South Africa.[432] Such projects of large-scale infrastructure, including but not limited to Tanzam, showcased the Chinese vision of development. As a result, they loom large in popular memories of China and Tanzania during the Cold War. Their dominance in popular narratives of China and Tanzania however, has tended to overshadow other dynamics, trends, and actors in the development of China-Tanzanian relations.

From the mid-1960s onwards, a succession of Tanzanian cultural delegations traveled to China on predetermined itineraries, with their actions and conversations meticulously catalogued in the Chinese record. This chapter uncovers the process by which these civil society representatives, who harbored a range of political beliefs and personal interests, contributed to the protracted and tenuous negotiations of relations between China and Tanzania from 1965 to 1972, when national-scale shifts on both sides, and in the geopolitics of the Global Cold War, rewrote the rules of the relationship. Not only was 1972 the year of Richard Nixon's visit to China and the beginnings of U.S.-China rapprochement, it was also the year of Zanzibari President Abeid Karume's assassination. The power struggle that ensued in Tanzania after Karume's death resulted in the imprisonment of A.M. Babu on unsubstantiated charges of treason. Babu's

[430] George Yu, *China and Tanzania: A Study in Cooperative Interaction* (Berkeley: University of California Press, Center for Chinese Studies, 1970): p. 44.
[431] Wei Liang-Tsai, *Peking vs. Taipei in Africa, 1960-1978*, p. 213
[432] Jamie Monson, *Africa's Freedom Railway*, p. 4

removal from Nyerere's cabinet precipitated the end of this phase in China-Tanzanian relations, after which internal and external pressures compelled TANU to abandon its previous emphasis on national self-reliance and instead, seek integration into the global capitalist economy.[433]

In terms of sources, this chapter draws significantly from Chinese archives at the municipal and provincial levels, especially the Shanghai Municipal Archives (SMA). In spite of ever-tightening restrictions for archival access throughout mainland China since 2012, the SMA has remained relatively open for researchers.[434] As Shanghai was a major center for Chinese light and heavy industry in the 1950s and 1960s, it marked a key stop on the itinerary of virtually every foreign guest in these decades.[435] Records from the Shanghai municipal branches of the All-China Women's Federation, the Communist Youth League, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, the Chinese People's Association for World Peace, and the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries lend insight into the mechanics and priorities in the reception of African guests, as well as the interlocking roles of race and gender in facilitating the course of the visits. While most official Chinese publications from this era fall under the rubric of political propaganda, the internal notes of civil and cultural organizations are substantially different. They detail the real-time struggles of local officials to dictate the ideological developments of their visitors, whose statements, which at times reflected "inaccurate" understandings of world politics or direct challenges to the CCP, were recorded verbatim. This chapter additionally lays out

[433] In 1977, TANU merged with the Afro-Shirazi Party in Zanzibar to become Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), or the "party of the revolution." CCM remains the ruling party of Tanzania today.

[434] Certain documents from the SMA have become inaccessible since my first visit in 2016, such as those relating to anti-African sentiments and movements in early 1960s China, but a plurality of files that concern foreign diplomatic and cultural delegation visits are still available. For recent assessments of the state of the archives in mainland China, as well as its limitations and opportunities, see Charles Kraus, "Researching the History of the People's Republic of China," Wilson Center Cold War International History Project Working Paper #79, April 2016 (https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/researching-the-history-the-peoples-republic-china) and Arunabh Ghosh and Sören Urbansky eds., "China from Without: Doing PRC History in Foreign Archives," Special Issue, *The PRC History Review* 2 (2017).

[435] For the general significance of Shanghai to economic development in the People's Republic of China from the 1950s to the 1990s, see Victor Mok, "Industrial Development," in Yun-wing Sung and Yue-man Yeung eds., *Shanghai: Transformation and Modernization under China's Open Policy* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1996): pp. 199-224.

the secondary factors that rendered the minutiae of solidarity so trying: the clashes of personalities, real political differences, and divergences between public and private aspirations.

Notably, these encounters took place at the height of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in the late 1960s. Some of China's staunchest socialist allies, such as North Korea, denounced the Cultural Revolution as misguided and dogmatic.[436] The operations of the Chinese Foreign Ministry became unsettled as diplomats were recalled en masse from their posts overseas.[437] All educational exchanges, including arrangements for African students to study in China, were brought to a halt in the period between 1966 and 1970.[438] But at the same time, just as the emphasis of the Cultural Revolution on cultural self-determination earned the respect of U.S.-based Black nationalists, it inspired "Operation Vijana" and the formation of the "Green Guards" in Tanzania.[439] The Green Guards, an initiative of the TANU Youth League (TYL) that launched in 1968, marshalled the language of cultural nationalism and morality in a campaign to ban miniskirts, beauty pageants, tight-fitting pants, and cosmetics.[440] Lawi Sijaona, Chairman of the TYL who announced Operation Vijana, had been impressed by the social and economic progress he witnessed during successive visits to China in the early 1960s.[441] The Green Guards comprised squadrons of militant youth from the TYL who patrolled urban neighborhoods to enforce these new decrees and who, on occasion, engaged in acts of vandalism in public spaces. Similar to the CCP's struggles to rein in the Red Guards in China, TANU officials quickly became concerned about threats to

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[436] Shen Zhihua and Xia Yafeng, *A Misunderstood Friendship: Mao Zedong, Kim Il Sung, and Sino-North Korea Relations, 1949-1976* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018): pp. 177-179.
[437] Melvin Gurtov, "The Foreign Ministry and Foreign Affairs during the Cultural Revolution," *The China Quarterly* 40 (1969): pp. 65-102.
[438] Sandra Gillespie, "South-South Transfer: A Study of Sino-African Exchanges (PhD diss., University of Toronto, 1999): p. 289.
[439] For the politics of ujamaa in late 1960s and early 1970s Tanzania, see Bonny Ibhawoh and J.I. Dibua, "Deconstructing Ujamaa: The Legacy of Julius Nyerere in the Quest for Social and Economic Development in Africa," *African Journal of Political Science* 8 (2003): pp. 64-70; Leander Schneider, "Developmentalism and its Failings: Why Rural Development Went Wrong in 1960s and 1970s Tanzania" (PhD diss., Columbia University, 2003); Vijay Prashad, *The Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World*, pp. 191-203; and Priya Lal, *African Socialism in Postcolonial Tanzania: Between the Village and the World.*
[440] For an overview of Operation Vijana, see Andrew Ivaska, *Cultured States: Youth, Gender, and Modern Style in 1960s Dar es Salaam* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011): pp. 86-123.
[441] James Brennan, "Youth, the TANU Youth League and Managed Vigilantism in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 1925-1973," *Africa: Journal of the International Africa Institute* 76 (2006): p. 239.

public security that the Green Guards posed while carrying out Operation Vijana, which included beatings and arrests.[442] In one incident, a band of Green Guards entered the former building of the General Bank of the Netherlands to ceremoniously take down its portrait of Queen Juliana of the Netherlands. A frustrated President Nyerere rushed to condemn the event as "hooliganism."[443]

This period, though commonly associated with China's global isolationism, continued to witness protracted effort and struggle in the granular-level negotiation of Afro-Asian solidarities.[444] Despite internal havoc, the CCP still assigned priority to political and economic activities in countries including Tanzania, Guinea, Mali, and Congo (Brazzaville). In June 1969, a CIA report noted with concern:

> Peking has been able to maintain and expand a significant presence in a handful of African states. It has attached considerable importance to this remnant of conventional Chinese diplomacy during a period when Cultural Revolution excesses have disrupted its relations with most of the world… Although its effort in these few African states is centered around a generally well-received aid program, its eagerness to cooperate with host African governments in support of black nationalist "liberation movements" has also redounded to Peking's favor.[445]

From the mid-1960s to the early 1970s, a succession of Tanzanian civil society delegations travelled to and studied in a number of Chinese cities including Beijing, Shanghai, and Wuhan. Their experiences figured critically in the transnational circulation of knowledge, goods, and cultural practices that facilitated the evolution of China-Tanzanian relations.

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Beyond the ubiquitous rhetoric of friendship rooted in parallel histories and shared interests of national liberation, the implementation of "solidarity" demanded a substantial commitment of resources,

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[442] Priya Lal, "Maoism in Tanzania: Material Connections and Shared Imaginaries," in Alex Cook ed., *Mao's Little Red Book: A Global History* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014): p. 110.
[443] "Nyerere Rebuffs Green Guards 'Hooliganism'," *The Nationalist*, March 17, 1967.
[444] Zachary Scarlett, "China After the Sino-Soviet Split: Maoist Politics, Global Narratives, and the Imagination of the World," p. 10. For the impact of the Cultural Revolution on Chinese foreign policy, see Melvin Gurtov, "The Foreign Ministry and Foreign Affairs during the Cultural Revolution," pp. 65-102; Barbara Barnouin and Yu Changgen, *Chinese Foreign Policy during the Cultural Revolution* (New York: Kegan Paul International, 1998); Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War*, pp. 205-276; and Ma Jisen, *The Cultural Revolution in the Foreign Ministry of China* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2004).
[445] "Central Intelligence Agency Special Report: Communist China's Presence in Africa," *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, Volume E5 (Documents on Sub-Saharan Africa, 1969-1972), June 20, 1969.

especially from the municipal branches of the Chinese cultural associations charged with the reception of foreign visitors. Their labors began with detailed, attentively arranged itineraries in which every hour is accounted for and no decorative plant or portrait of Mao is out of place. In addition to Beijing and Shanghai, visiting delegates were often taken to northeastern industrial cities like Changchun as well as the landmarks and memorials of the Chinese Revolution in Yan'an, in the western province of Shaanxi. During the day, they toured communes, schools, hospitals, public facilities for youth, and factories for light and heavy industry. In the evenings, they watched a rotating selection of films, concerts, and live performances. Popular titles in the 1960s ranged from the ballet "The White-Haired Girl," which dramatized the oppression of women in pre-communist China, to the documentary "Reality of the Sino-Indian Border Question" and the stage drama "War Drums on the Equator," first discussed in the third chapter, which related the Congolese struggle for self-determination. At each step of the journey, the questions and comments raised by guests were recorded and studiously analyzed by the Chinese officials who accompanied them for accuracy of political belief. After nightfall, Chinese officials paid visits to hotel rooms for extended conversations about the nature and root of socialist revisionism. Major topics included the China-India Border Conflict, the "paper tiger" conduct of the United States in Vietnam, the global significance of the Cultural Revolution, the tactical desirability of revolutionary struggle over "peaceful co-existence" in Africa, and the "three true, three false" strategy of the Soviet Union.[446] These discussions served a two-pronged purpose: on the one hand, they allowed for flow of firsthand information into China about internal politicking in the socialist world and on the other, they provided continuous opportunities to influence the views of individuals deemed to display "political confusion" (政治模糊)—or failure to condemn Western and Soviet practices to the sufficient degree.

[446] In an essay from 1965 denouncing the Conference of Nineteen Communist and Workers' Parties, Deng Xiaoping coined the term "三假三真" ("three true, three false") to denote the Soviet policy of promoting anti-imperialism while actually being capitulationist, pro-revolutionary while selling out, and pro-unity while facilitating sectarianism within the socialist world."

For some Tanzanian guests however, their primary concern in China became the challenging of inequalities etched into the premises of China-Tanzanian relations, in spite of official narratives to the contrary. In 1969, Nyerere acknowledged that it was understandable for international observers to perceive that Tanzania was "a satellite" of China. He offered, "I admit in the modern world that real friendship between very big nations and very small nations is a comparatively rare thing. For friendship in these circumstances means a recognition on both sides that the differences in size, wealth, and power are irrelevant to the equality which exists between sovereign nations"; the implication was that China-Tanzanian relations this latter ideal.[447] Tanzanian reporting about Zhou Enlai's visits to Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar in June 1965 emphasized the egalitarianism of diplomacy with China, pointing out that Zhou was taken through the back door to enter the State Houses in both places. "Only members of the same family use the backdoor entrance," President Abeid Karume commented in Zanzibar.[448] But despite these affirmations, more subtle forms of inequality were manifest in the experiences of Tanzanian cultural delegates who performed the myriad labors of travel and translation between the two countries. In turn, they called out specific instances in which Chinese practices deviated from professed egalitarianism.

This dynamic is captured by the contentious exchange in the summer of 1965 between a TANU Youth League representative and his Chinese counterparts in Shanghai. As the TYL delegate purchased a bust of Mao Zedong for display in his workplace, he intimated to his hosts, "Please don't be upset [by what I will say]. Even though I've often watched scenes from the movies of the Chinese people enthusiastically welcoming Nyerere, in none of the many places I visited on this trip did I see a portrait of Nyerere or [Second Vice President Rashidi] Kawawa, while our offices in Tanzania all hang portraits of Zhou En-lai."[449] A quick-thinking Chinese official responded that his fellow countrymen did not hold Nyerere and Kawawa in pictures, but in their hearts. At times, Mao personally warned against "Great Power Chauvinism," an attitude he accused the Soviet Union of harboring towards Eastern European,

[447] "A Friendship of 'Most Unequal Equals'," *The Standard*, June 22, 1969.
[448] Gray Mattaka, "Four Days and Nights of Jubilation," *The Nationalist*, June 8, 1965.
[449] "共青团上海市委接待坦桑尼亚代表团的计划，汇报 [Plans and Reports for the Shanghai Communist Youth League's Reception of Tanzanian Delegation]," File No. C21-2-2640, SMA.

Asian, and African socialists.[450] But in the granular-level constitution of China-Tanzanian relations, Chinese officials confronted their own accusations of chauvinism.

In August 1967, a 24-member Tanzanian acrobatics troupe was taken on a visit to Yan'an, a city of especial significance in the history of the Chinese Revolution.[451] In the Chinese record, the leader of the Tanzanian troupe left a troubling impression as a man who "stands stubbornly for the interests of capitalism… While in Yan'an, he played a series of two-faced tactics, speaking abstract praises in public though his actions strayed very far from his progressive speech."[452] Even though he followed along in chanting slogans of "Long Live Chairman Mao," he would forget to bring his copy of the Little Red Book and feign obvious uninterest during political study. At a tour of Yangjiaping Revolution Memorial Site, he insisted that the guide use simpler language, and pointed out that "You [Chinese people] listen to Chairman Mao's every word, Nyerere is also our great leader, but we don't always listen to him." His team came to China to learn acrobatics, he asserted, not politics. He proceeded to challenge Mao's directive that "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun," stating that the Tanzanian congress is founded on the will of the people, and that he believed in non-violence; later, he professed affinity for the opulent lifestyles that individuals could attain in the United States or Hong Kong and refused to denounce U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism, reserving his disapproval only for British colonialism.[453]

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[450] Beyond tension at the level of high politics, the "chauvinistic" attitudes of lower-level Soviet advisors sent to China in the 1950s was one reason why the Sino-Soviet alliance gradually disintegrated. See Austin Jersild, *The Sino-Soviet Alliance: An International History*. Other historians have argued that parochialism, especially the notion that China is the "Middle Kingdom," was a key determinant of foreign policy in the People's Republic. See Odd Arne Westad, *Restless Empire: China and the World Since 1750* (New York: Basic Books, 2012): pp. 5-6; Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001); Yang Kuisong, "Mao Zedong and the Indochina Wars," in Priscilla Roberts ed., *Behind the Bamboo Curtain: China, Vietnam, and the World Beyond Asia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), pp. 55-91.

[451] Located approximately two hundred miles north of Xi'an, Yan'an (延安) was frequently selected as a destination for foreign visitors to Maoist China due to its significance in the history of the Chinese revolution. The key sites that this troupe toured included Yangjiaping (杨家坪), where the Chinese Communist Party was headquartered from 1938 to 1947, Zaoyuan (枣园), which is the site of the former offices of the Secretariat, and Wangjiaping (王家坪), which was the seat of the Central Military Commission and Eighteenth Group Army during this same time frame.

[452] "坦桑尼亚杂技训练团在延安活动情况简报 [Activities and Report of Tanzanian Acrobatics Troupe in Yan'an]," File No. 196-318, Shaanxi Provincial Archives, Xi'an.

[453] "坦桑尼亚杂技训练团在延安活动情况简报 [Activities and Report of Tanzanian Acrobatics Troupe in Yan'an]."

This litany of transgressions is long and egregious relative to the behavior of other Tanzanian visitors while in China, but it reflected a broader trend. Whether on the basis of ideological or definitional disagreements, a number of Tanzanian representatives objected, in vocal and creative ways, to the terms of China-Tanzania relations or to the treatment they received while they were in China. Even as solidarity was successfully staged at the scale of interstate relations and public proclamations, its enactment at the level of civil society was far more difficult. Conflict derived from tremendous differences in the modes and styles of Chinese and Tanzanian socialisms, as well as the degree to which the performance of commitment was expected. As Vivienne Shue notes about Maoism as lived experience in 1950s and 1960s China, "even under the political absolutism of the high Mao era, some operational space [remained] available for individual and small-group agency, if only in electing how precisely to respond to certain Party-state expectations and requirements."[454] Shue's observation also holds true for foreign guests and student subject to similar measures of political surveillance and regulation.

The CCP sought for every guest to reach an exhaustive, faultless understanding of Maoist positions. While serving as the "Tanzania expert" for the Central People's Broadcasting Station in Beijing, Soud Othman of Radio Tanzania visited Shanghai with his wife in late 1969. The revolutionary committee of the Shanghai People's Radio Station welcomed the couple, arranging for them a packed itinerary that included touring the site of the Chinese Communist First National Congress, a light factory that manufactured toys and a heavy industrial plant that produced high-pressure containers, a model play, and a symphony. The notes of the radio station in Shanghai observed that Othman sang Mao's praises throughout his visit and promised to "convey the boundlessly energetic, revolutionary friendship of the Chinese people to Tanzania." But ultimately, the officials who accompanied Othman concluded that he "loves Chairman Mao and Chinese socialism, but because [the stay of Othman and his wife] in the country is brief, their understanding of Maoism and the revolutionary line is not deep enough. They take

[454] Vivienne Shue, "Epilogue: Mao's China—Putting Politics in Perspective," in Jeremy Brown and Matthew Johnson eds., *Maoism at the Grassroots: Everyday Life in China's Era of High Socialism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015): p. 372.

too much caution in analyzing problems and are careful not to reveal their thinking."[455] A demonstrated faith in Mao the individual, as well as a genuine appreciation for the ideology, were two distinct fronts on which many visitors failed to impress.

In June 1966, twenty-two Tanzanian soccer players arrived in China for five friendly matches in Beijing, Shanghai, and Wuhan. The records of the Shanghai officials who received them stated the core objectives of their reception as follows: to cultivate young propagandists for the Chinese position, and specifically, to "expose the conspiracy of U.S. imperialists to expand its war of aggression [in Vietnam] and the fake support of Soviet revisionists."[456] Initially, the visit proceeded without incident; the soccer team expressed wonder at China's economic self-reliance, as embodied by its nationally produced cars and petrol gas, and Chinese humility, as conveyed by the claim that the highest-earning government ministers only took home the equivalent of sixty British pounds each month. But upon arrival at a revolutionary museum, Chinese officials were shocked by the revelation that the Tanzanian team leader had heard of neither of Chiang Kai-Shek nor Taiwan. In the Chinese notes, this incident is recorded as one that "truly revealed [the Tanzanian] lack of knowledge about China."[457] Such was the liability of cultural diplomacy as the imperfect mechanism for alliance-building in the case of China and Tanzania; delegates who represented a range of backgrounds and interests were expected to serve as perfect political conduits. But in truth, state and personal objectives did not always agree; where propaganda organs of the CCP declared "anti-imperialist solidarity" as the purpose of a delegation visit, the internal record might instead prioritize "political education to reveal the wicked schemes of Soviet revisionism" and guests

[455] "接待中央广播事业局坦桑尼亚专家萨依德噢斯曼夫妇情况简报 [Reports from the Reception of Central People's Broadcasting Station Tanzania Expert Soud Othman]," Revolutionary Committee of the Shanghai People's Radio Station, January 10, 1970, File No. B92-2-1248-8.
[456] "关于接待坦桑尼亚足球队的通知 [Notice Concerning the Reception of the Tanzanian Soccer Team]," SMA, File No. B126-1-951. Amanda Shuman describes this particular delegation visit in detail, tracing its route through Chinese sites from a factory employing the disabled to a church. See Amanda Shuman, "'Giving Prominence to Politics': African Sportsmen Visit China in the Early Cultural Revolution," in Kathryn Batchelor and Xiaoling Zhang eds., *China-Africa Relations: Building Images through Cultural Cooperation, Media Representation, and Communication* (New York: Routledge, 2017), p. 51-72.
[457] "关于接待坦桑尼亚足球队的通知 [Notice Concerning the Reception of the Tanzanian Soccer Team]," SMA, File No. B126-1-951.

might have also wished to take opportunity of their time to China to purchase gifts for family or to diagnose an illness.

In this context, the promise of cultural diplomacy, as well as its pitfalls, were entwined with the politicking of interstate relations. The invitation for Otini Kambona's 1965 visit had been arranged by the China-Africa Friendship Association, and Kambona also completed the well-traversed circuit of factories, museums, schools, and performances. However, the Chinese record of the visit from the Shanghai branch of the Chinese People's Association for Cultural Friendship with Foreign Countries identified its own ambitions for Kambona's reception as the promotion of Chinese views on the Vietnam question, which centered the "nature of American paper-tiger imperialism and its collaborationist plot [of peace talks] with imperialist revisionism." Chinese officials made sure to avoid explicit mentions of the Soviet Union as their point of reference for "imperialist revisionism," opting instead for a more general "Yugoslavia and some others." Kambona delighted them by following up with "Only Tito himself does not have much power. Behind Tito is the Soviet Union," before explaining that a few weeks earlier, Zhou Enlai engaged in a two-hour discussion on this subject with him and other Tanzanians in Beijing, a conversation which imparted a deep impression.[458] Kambona's affirmation that he would report back positively about this particular exchange with Zhou to his older brother further pleased his hosts.

This interwoven nature plays out on a more intimate level as well. Delegates of the women's associations who traveled to China were often either married to or relatives of the highest-ranking Tanzanian politicians. The anatomy of a particular six-member Tanzanian women's delegation's visit to Shanghai in August 1965 is a case in which the internal factionalism and clashes of self-interest rendered any group cohesion impossible. Nearly every member of the delegation, under the leadership of Shadya Karume, wife of Zanzibari President Abeid Karume, was married to an eminent official in Zanzibar. Their constant altercations greatly troubled their Chinese hosts, who sought to temper the barrage rumors and

[458] "中国人民对外文化友好协会上海市分会关于接待坦桑尼亚外长之弟奥蒂尼 - 埃博纳的文件 [Documents from the Shanghai Branch of the Chinese People's Association for Cultural Friendship with Foreign Countries Regarding the Reception of Otini Kambona, Younger Brother of the Tanzanian Foreign Minister]," SMA, File No. C37-2-1185.

insults in order to most effectively carry out their objective, formed in consultation with Mrs. Babu: to promote leftist influences on the "non-energetic, politically disengaged, fashion-loving fan of Chinese brocade" Mrs. Karume.[459] The task of managing of this range of political beliefs and personal interests proved especially difficult.

According to Chinese notes, Hadija Hamid Ameir, Mrs. Karume's personal secretary, was despised by Naila Mahfudh, who believed that Ameir held undue sway over her boss; Mahfudh believed Ameir held the false conviction that the solution to any social problem is a government decree. Naila Mahfudh, who was the wife of Zanzibari military commander Ali Mahfudh, complained to a Chinese translator that Ameir never grasped the significance of "learning from the masses," citing her advice to Karume to ignore a solicitation letter from a South Vietnamese women's organization instead of responding with verbal support, even if material aid was out of the question. Salma Moyo, whose husband Hassan Nasser Moyo was then Zanzibar's Minister of Agriculture, also found herself at the receiving end of ridicule and criticism from the other women. When Moyo claimed that she liked to accompany her husband on tours of the countryside and sometimes participated in the labor herself, Khadija Mgeni Hassan, another woman in the delegation, pointed to Moyo's hands and exclaimed to the Chinese officials around them, "Look at those hands! Do they seem like the hands of a laborer?"[460] These moments of discord, as Tanzanian women heightened the political differences between themselves in order to curry favor with the Chinese and in turn, request special gifts, like a pair of white sandals received by Hassan unbeknownst to her colleagues, capture the capricious nature of cultural diplomacy as a site for grassroots negotiations of solidarity.[461]

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[459] "上海市妇女联合会 1965 年接待坦桑尼亚卡鲁姆夫人计划, 简报, 小结等 [Plans, Reports, and Summary from the Shanghai Women's Federation's 1965 Reception of Tanzania's Mrs. Karume]," File No. C31-2-1085, SMA.

[460] "上海市妇女联合会 1965 年接待坦桑尼亚卡鲁姆夫人计划, 简报, 小结等 [Plans, Reports, and Summary from the Shanghai Women's Federation's 1965 Reception of Tanzania's Mrs. Karume]."

[461] The significance of female delegates from Tanzania to the brokering of relations with China is also a part of a larger twentieth-century history about the growing role of women in diplomacy. For the British context, see Helen McCarthy, *Women of the World: The Rise of the Female Diplomat* (London: Bloomsbury, 2014).

Maoist policies, in spite of its rhetoric of class struggle, promoted their own brand of consumer culture.[462] During their 1960s visits to China, guests like Sophia Kawawa, wife of Tanzanian Vice President Rashidi Kawawa, marveled at the luxury goods, from transistor radios and sleek Phoenix-brand cars, on display in Chinese exhibition halls.[463] While showcasing the manufacturing prowess attainable under Maoism, the highlight of these idolized products long associated with the West reinforced a kind of consumerism as an underlying logic of Afro-Asian internationalism. After all, in the 1950s and 1960s, the mass acquisition of these goods allowed their Chinese owners to enact "an updated, no-longer-backward identity as useful participants in an industrializing country."[464] This logic extended to the realm of China's Third World outreach. In one instance, the list of gifts that the Chinese Communist Youth League presented to their counterparts in Dar es Salaam, as reported and photographed in *The Nationalist*, included exactly "seven radios, ten clocks, 20 fans, 30 footballs, ten table tennis sets, ten small office desks and chairs, a large office table and chair for the office of the General Secretary of T.Y.L., nine cases of accessories for amplifiers, 39 chairs and tables, 20 filing cabinets and two vans." Lawi Sijaona, upon receiving these gifts, assured the Chinese charge d'affaires in the city that this eclectic collection of sporting goods and office equipment "would be used to further the implementation of the country's policy of socialism."[465]

In effect, these items figured into the materiality of China-Tanzanian relations two ways: on the one hand, they challenged Western notions about threadbare socialist lives and on the other, they allowed for an organic "cultural diplomacy" vis-à-vis the purchase and transfer of gifts. Itineraries for guests in Shanghai usually involved a detour to No. 1 Department Store (第一百货) or Friendship Department Store (友谊商店), where visitors bought clothes, watches, and music records for their family and friends

[462] In *Unending Capitalism*, Karl Gerth uses myths and desires surrounding the "Three Great Things"—or wristwatches, bicycles, and sewing machines—unpack the consumerism of the Mao era. This set of highly desired consumer goods later expanded to include radio receivers, becoming known as the "Four Big Things" (四大件)..
[463] Phoenix (凤凰) was also a very well-known, much-desired brand in the production of bicycles in Shanghai.
[464] Karl Gerth, *Unending Capitalism: How Consumerism Negated China's Communist Revolution*, p. 13
[465] "Chinese Gifts for T.Y.L.," *The Nationalist*, May 16, 1967.

back home. The guests who were more into culturally unique Chinese souvenirs bought qipaos for their wives, grooming kits, sandals woven with grass, and chopsticks.[466] That Hadija Hassan received the pair of sandals she so coveted, from the moment she saw them worn by a female Chinese translator, as a favor for her confidences indicates the function that luxury goods served in facilitating the personal relationships between particular guests and their hosts. Most tellingly, the sandals were gifted in secret: the federation noted concern that Sophia Karume, the leader of the delegation, would find out about the exchange, while Hassan exclaimed that "[Salma] Moyo is the biggest liar, she can't know."[467] Despite the overarching political objectives outlined at the outset of these visits, Chinese officials thus devoted a significant portion of time and resources to managing the interpersonal dynamics of any given delegation.

The five-member mainland Tanzanian women's delegation led by Sophia Kawawa that visited in the summer of 1965 was similarly characterized by frustrations over the behavior of a particularly "delicate" delegate then studying abroad in England. During their time in Shanghai, she was upset that she had been assigned a hotel room far from those of the other delegates and demanded a spring pillow because her duck-feather one was inadequate; at a banquet, she complained that she needed to sleep, and was unsure if she could even wake up the following morning. At this, the other Tanzanian women rebuked, "So none of the rest of us are tired! Only she is." The visit was otherwise deemed a success in its attainment of the predetermined objectives—to "promulgate the hard-working spirit of Chinese people and Chinese women… to enhance [Tanzanian women's] confidence in self-reliance as a means of national development"—as the delegates expressed amazement at Chinese-produced goods like transistor radios and Phoenix-brand passenger cars, and four of the women cried during the "War Drums on the Equator" scene when Patrice Lumumba was killed. Later, Kawawa stated that the performance "wasn't

[466] "共青团接待坦噶尼喀，乌干达，肯尼亚留学生的计划，简报，消息报导等 [Plans and Reports of the Communist Youth League's Reception of Tanganyikan, Ugandan, and Kenyan Foreign Students]," August 1964, File No. C21-2-2372, SMA.
[467] "上海市妇女联合会 1965 年接待坦桑尼亚卡鲁姆夫人计划, 简报, 小结等 [Plans, Reports, and Summary from the Shanghai Women's Federation's 1965 Reception of Tanzania's Mrs. Karume]."

only a play, but a reflection of historical reality," one deserving of the world to see.[468] Yet, the frustrations that ensued over the irksome behavior of the "delicate" woman, in addition to an incident in which a Chinese bank teller, to Mrs. Kawawa's anger, initially refused to exchange currency for her, claiming that her signatures did not match, proved to be notable blemishes. Some of these lapses seem insignificant or appear to be mere aberrations, but the keen attention with which they are recorded is a testament to how attuned Chinese officials were not only to political and ideological breaches, but also the potential of personal preferences or honest miscues to jeopardize a visit. As such, they sought to manage every case of mistake or strife behind the scenes, away from the press spotlight that commended these exchanges as achievements in Afro-Asian solidarities.

Privately, they monitored the evolving personal views of their guests on a day-to-day basis, expressing displeasure without hesitation. In November 1965, twenty Tanzanian teenagers arrived in Wuhan for a three-year course in acrobatics under the supervision of Joas Mugangala and his wife Bibi. The phenomenon of young African acrobats studying in China was itself a remarkable dimension of a Cold War tradition in which training in performing arts, especially the circus arts for which long-term formulaic study was essential, became a site of diplomacy within the socialist and left-leaning world.[469] After more than two and a half years of training, this group of Tanzanian acrobats performed at a gala celebration held in Beijing on June 21, 1968, on the eve of Nyerere's departure at the conclusion of his second state visit to China. In its reporting about the gala, the *People's Daily* reported that the accomplishments of this troupe are like "a flower cultivated by the friendship of the Chinese and Tanzanians." Now that the Tanzanian students have come to understand that the arts must serve the people, the article proceeded, "they adopt a most dedicated attitude, unafraid of sweat or pain… When Omari, one of the students, struggled with flexibility in the beginning, his Chinese friends told him to rest.

[468] "上海市妇女联合会 1965 年接待坦桑尼亚卡瓦瓦夫人计划, 简报, 小结等 [Plans, Reports, and Summary from Shanghai Women's Federation's 1965 Reception of Tanzania's Mrs. Kawawa]," File No. C21-2-1081, SMA.
[469] Tracy Zhang, "Bending the Body for China: The Uses of Acrobatics in Sino-U.S. Diplomacy during the Cold War," *International Journal of Cultural Policy* 22 (2016): pp. 123-146.

He refused and continued to practice even outside of class hours. After more than two years, this smart and talented Tanzanian student is performing solo on the great stage."[470]

On the other hand, internal notes from the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries reveals that Chinese officials were dissatisfied with the politics of Joas and Bibi Mgangala, who apparently espoused "confused views" because they had listened to too many British, U.S., Australian, and Japanese radio broadcasts. Most egregiously, it appeared during their weeklong visit to Shanghai in December 1966 that they misunderstood "the problem of Soviet revisionism [only] as an extension of the Sino-Soviet Split," rather than as an ideological failure on the part of the Soviet Union. Further, they seemed unable to grasp the world-historical significance of the Cultural Revolution, regarding it as an internal Chinese event in the realm of aesthetics and the arts, best captured by the predominance of wide-legged trousers they saw on the streets.[471] A note was made about Joas' improper question for a group of elementary school students— "Do you have any bad teachers?"—during a tour of the Children's Palace.

As a consequence of these infractions, Chinese officials were assigned to visit the Mugangalas' hotel room for a two-hour evening conversation to introduce the concepts of socialist revisionism and cultural revolution. When the discussion turned to the principles of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, the Mugangalas interjected many times and appeared reluctant to converse further. The Chinese officials who were present theorized two hypotheses for their hesitancy: that either the Mugangalas descended from plantation owners and thus, their economic positioning interfered with their sympathy for class struggle, or that he and his colleagues were at fault for failing to generate greater enthusiasm for the subject. Each one of Joas or Bibi's "mistakes" appeared innocuous on its own, but their sum resulted in a final

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[470] "中国坦桑尼亚人民的友谊花 [The Friendship Flower of the Chinese and Tanzanian People]," *People's Daily*, June 22, 1968.

[471] "中国人民对外文化友好协会上海市分会关于接待坦桑尼亚穆干加拉夫妇的文件 [Documents of the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, Shanghai Branch, Regarding the Reception of the Mugangala Husband and Wife Team from Tanzania]," File No. C37-2-1281, SMA. In Mao-era China, skinny-legged trousers were considered "bourgeois," as they were in Tanzania during Operation Vijana. See Peidong Sun, "The Collar Revolution: Everyday Clothing in Guangdong as Resistance in the Cultural Revolution," *The China Quarterly* 227 (2016): p. 780.

judgment of the couple as friendly but politically "confused," open-minded yet unable to understand the tenets of Maoism.

Fig. 5 – The twenty Tanzanian youths who trained acrobatics in Wuhan, pictured with Zhou Enlai and Julius Nyerere in Beijing[472]

The achievements of this first Tanzanian acrobatics troupe generated news coverage in their home country as well. The Swahili-language newspaper *Nchi Yetu* recognized the joint efforts of Joas and Bibi to continue grade-appropriate classroom instruction for the young trainees; the hope is, after the completion of their educations, that they would come back to Tanzania and spread their skills and knowledge far and wide. [473] Further, it was recognized that many parents of the trainees were terrified of the unknown when it was announced their children had been chosen study in China, a fear that some of the trainees themselves shared. After the troupe's return to Dar es Salaam, the youth stated that though all went well with their training in Wuhan, there was nowhere like home.[474] Albeit accompanied by photographs celebrating their newfound accomplishments, the discursive emphasis placed on the joys of homecoming departed from the focus in Chinese reporting on discipline, hard work, and solidarity.

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Tanzanian diplomats and cultural delegates negotiated a difficult terrain of Cold War socialist solidarities between East German, Soviet, and Chinese struggles for political influence. Chinese

[472] "Watanzania Ulioko Uchina Wamsalimu Mwalimu Peking [Tanzanians in China Greet Mwalimu in Beijing], *Nchi Yetu* (August 1968): p. 13.
[473] C.L. Mwakambaya, "Watanzania Uchina," *Nchi Yetu* (September 1967): p. 14.
[474] H.I. Kundya, "Sarakasi [Circus/Acrobatics]," *Nchi Yetu* (December 1969): p. 14.

discourses of solidarity were often unyielding, employing inflammatory caricatures and tempestuous language in their accusations that Western and Soviet bloc activities in Tanzania displayed pompousness and insincerity. George Roberts has noted that mid to late-1960s Dar es Salaam gained a reputation as "Rumorville," where "black literature" characterized by slander and dubious information flourished; they "represented a confluence of rumor, print culture, and Cold War dynamics."[475] One Chinese-produced pamphlet from 1969 titled "The Chinese are the True Friends of the Tanzanian and Zambia People," which celebrated the Chinese railway survey team's departure from Dar es Salaam upon the completion of their term, captures the profusions that defined the style of Chinese reporting about Tanzania. After attacking "the arch-renegade Brezhnev and his clique" for their suspicions about Chinese activities in Africa, the pamphlet declared that "The Tanzanian government and the broad masses of the Tanzanian people had wisely come to realize that China is their only true and reliable friend."[476] The Soviets were consequently vilified as "The rumor-mongering anti-China clowns [who] have issued a malicious and lying article pouring scorn on the simplicity and poverty of the broad masses of the Chinese people."[477] The article in question, a press release from Novosti, the Soviet state-run news agency, supposedly ridiculed China for attempting to build the Tanzam railway while its own railroad system remained underdeveloped, charging that the Chinese decision to undertake the project posed a threat to the sovereignty of both Tanzania and Zambia. The polemics of Sino-Soviet contestation displayed here juxtapose with the moderated language of friendship that dominated Tanzanian reporting on China. In fact, the task of tempering the excesses of Chinese rhetoric proved to be critical for Tanzanian officials and publicists, who sought to balance distinct, occasionally antagonistic bilateral relationships with China, the Soviet Union, and East Germany.

In December of 1966, the charge d'affaires of the Tanzanian embassy in Beijing, Ali Mwinyigogo, actually sent a note of concern to the Zanzibari Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Mwinyigogo

[475] George Roberts, "Politics, Decolonisation, and the Cold War in Dar es Salaam, c. 1965-72," p. 80.
[476] "The Chinese are the True Friends of the Tanzanian and Zambia People," undated pamphlet (presumed 1969), Accession 589, No. BM/25A, Tanzanian National Archives (TNA), Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.
[477] "The Chinese are the True Friends of the Tanzanian and Zambia People."

expressed his doubts about a press release issued the previous month by Xinhua News Agency entitled "Chinese Experts Find Underground Water Resources for Zanzibar People," which delivered formulaic praises of Chinese technicians and their indefatigable Maoist spirit. This press release also cited an unnamed Zanzibari official, who openly criticized the "experts of some so-called friendly countries came here with their families. Before they started to work, they were demanding bungalows, cars, refrigerators, air conditioners." It is to their opulence and entitlement, this official stated, that "the simple and plain style of living of the Chinese experts forms a sharp contrast."[478] Mwinyigogo took issue with the printing of this particular quote, contesting its veracity and raising fears about its negative implications for Tanzanian relations with the Soviet Union and East Germany, both of which had deployed large numbers of technical experts to Tanzania. Such a description of foreign advisers cordoned off in their luxury from the local population, Mwinyigogo believed, would perhaps have been befitting of the Western presence in Tanzania before independence, but certainly not of anyone in the present moment. "The most important thing is to understand the people we talk to," Mwinyigogo advised Tawakali Khamis in Zanzibar, "so we do not give them opportunities like this to benefit from Tanzanian politics."[479]

The Xinhua press release in question exemplified Chinese characterizations of its aid work in Tanzania. The members of the Chinese prospecting team had "donned their working clothes and plunged themselves into heavy manual labor" as soon as they arrived on the island. To explain their dedication, the Chinese engineers apparently declared, "the more sweat we drip, the more brilliantly will Mao Zedong's thought shine here."[480] Their supposed demonstration of sincerity inspired Zanzibari youth to voluntarily engage in the difficult labor as well, through scorching heat and torrential rains, such that thirteen deep wells were bored over the course just ten months. Neither did the Chinese prospecting team forget, in spite of time pressures and the complications of the technical assignments, to train twenty-five

[478] Xinhua Press, "Chinese Experts Find Underground Water Resources for Zanzibar People," November 10, 1966, DA 5/1A, Misaada Kutoka Jamhuri ya Watu wa China, Zanzibar National Archives (ZNA), Zanzibar, Tanzania.
[479] Correspondence from Ali M. Mwinyigogo to Tawakali Khamis, December 8, 1966, DA 5/1A, Misaada Kutoka Jamhuri ya Watu wa China, Zanzibar National Archives (ZNA), Zanzibar City, Tanzania.
[480] Xinhua Press, "Chinese Experts Find Underground Water Resources for Zanzibar People," November 10, 1966, DA 5/1A, Misaada Kutoka Jamhuri ya Watu wa China, ZNA.

Zanzibari workers in water resource prospecting, who are now the first group of such technicians in all of East Africa, so that the Zanzibari people can be self-reliant in their continued task of building the nation. The press release told a straightforward tale of Chinese benevolence and local gratitude, one in which international solidarity was forged vis-à-vis communal hard labor. A Zanzibari geographical trainee was quoted as summarizing that "The Chinese experts live and work with us outdoors. We live like members of the same family."[481] Yet, as Mwinyigogo's note indicates, the Chinese narrative did not go wholly uncontested. All the while Chinese officials in Beijing pushed an unrelenting rhetoric of a singular socialist friendship that reinvented colonial relations between Africa and the world, their counterparts in Tanzania sought to counter the excesses of this language. Correspondingly, popular Tanzanian culture remained cosmopolitan and reflected a degree of resistance to the imposition of Maoist worldviews. One cinema manager in Dar es Salaam recalled that the 1968 U.S. film *Shoes of the Fisherman*, though officially banned in Tanzania after Chinese objections to its depictions of the Sino-Soviet Split, netted ticket prices as high as 1,000 shillings on the black market from eager viewers, relative to the typical ten or fifteen, when it was screened for a charity show.[482]

Conversely, Tanzanian politicians invoked a conception of China that facilitated their own objectives. In the aftermath of his first state visit to Beijing in February 1965, Nyerere praised the frugality that he witnessed amongst Chinese people from all walks of life. In a speech broadcast on national radio in celebration of the first anniversary of Union Day in April 1965, he encouraged Tanzanians to practice restraint in daily living as their contribution to national development. "There are hardly any private cars in China; people go to work by bus or on bicycles. The government officials too, use cars only when it is really necessary for their job, and then the cars are small and cheap ones," Nyerere emphasized, "and workers who do not need to spend all their money on food, clothing and

[481] Xinhua Press, "Chinese Experts Find Underground Water Resources for Zanzibar People," November 10, 1966, DA 5/1A, Misaada Kutoka Jamhuri ya Watu wa China, ZNA.
[482] Laura Fair, *Reel Pleasures: Cinema Audiences and Entrepreneurs in Twentieth-Century Tanzania* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2018): p. 106.

housing do not buy a lot of unnecessary things just because they would be nice to have."[483] This vision of China as a country that exemplified sacrifice, discipline, and mass participation in nation-building without qualification was diligently propagated by TANU leaders to assure citizens that the benchmarks of development are within reach.

While in China, Tanzanian visitors made explicit references to Nyerere's call for Tanzania to adopt the Chinese spirit of frugality. But ironically, it was during a souvenir shopping trip in Shanghai that J.M. Mwongosi, captain of the soccer team that visited China in June 1966, expressed that "President Nyerere says we should learn from the simple lifestyles of the Chinese and wait until our clothes are worn-out before purchasing new ones. In China, [I see that] private cars are so few, but in Tanzania, there are 500,000 imported cars. He reminds us that we shouldn't be buying cars, and that we need to learn from the Chinese because they are honest and sincere."[484] In December 1966, Selemani Kitundu, a longtime TANU activist from Mara and then the Regional Commissioner of the Coast, delivered an enthusiastic review of his recent travel to China to *Nchi Yetu*. Kitundu—having toured communes, schools, and factories alongside TANU leader Lucy Lameck—shared his admiration for the arrangement whereby skilled technicians in Chinese factories spent their days working and their evenings passing their expertise on to their subordinates. He recalled, "therefore it is easy for workers in the lower rungs of [Chinese society] to understand the operations of their office or factory." As his visit took place at the height of the Cultural Revolution, Kitundu proceeded to explain that the Red Guards only take on the task of upholding Maoist thought; their negative caricature in some media circles is but an extension of the misrepresentation of progressive youth movements around the world. Rather than chaos, Chinese society

[483] "President's Broadcast on the First Anniversary of Union Day," Press Release, Information Services Division of the Ministry of Information and Tourism, April 26, 1965, East Africana Collection, University of Dar es Salaam.
[484] Mwongosi proceeds to compare the "honesty" of the Chinese with the "wickedness" of the Indians, a racial dichotomization which allowed Chinese and Tanzanian representatives to articulate a blueprint for an idealized Afro-Asian friendship, one posited against the grain of the difficult history of Indians in Africa. This dynamic will be addressed in detail later on in this chapter. "上海市体育运动委员会 1966 年接待阿联体操队, 马里, 刚果 (布), 坦桑尼亚足球队来沪访问比赛有关文件 [Documents from the Shanghai Athletics Association's 1966 Reception of the United Arab Emirates Gymnastics Team and the Mali, Republic of Congo, and Tanzania Soccer Teams]," File No. B126-1-956, SMA.

was the picture of order and discipline, defined for Kitundu by the lack of alcoholism, theft, and "nonsense" like miniskirts and lipstick.[485] These allusions to the modesty of the Chinese lifestyle, made by Tanzanian delegates in China, dovetailed with the self-representation of Chinese advisors in Tanzania. That many Tanzanian representatives were captivated by the blueprint for development they witnessed in Chinese cities and communes is one part of a multi-dimensional project in which Chinese representatives performed the principle of frugality in grand announcements and everyday gestures.

In November 1970, the Chinese government actually sent a formal request, in the form of a letter to President Karume in Zanzibar, that Zanzibar abolish the classification of grades amongst Chinese experts assigned to the island and reduce their salaries to 400 shillings each. The reason behind the surprising request was stated only as "the teaching of Chairman Mao on the style of plain living and hard struggle had to be observed."[486] This kind of revelation corresponded to the meticulous everyday behavior of the Chinese technicians, advisors, and medical personnel on the ground in Tanzania. The pages of both Zanzibari and mainland Tanzanian newspapers periodically printed features of different achievements of Chinese social, political, and economic developments, often culled from Xinhua Press. The subject matter ranged from the introduction of irrigation and canals to Xinjiang Province to promote "self-sufficiency" in its desert climate to model villages that exemplify the transformative and productive benefits of the communal spirit. Each piece underscored the fruits of liberation, begotten by unrelenting hard work and mass commitment to the socialist cause.[487] The ubiquitous emphasis on "self-reliance" reflected the prevalence of concept in Tanzanian nation-building rhetoric. The fact that within Tanzania, there would be objection to certain aspects while embracing others is a testament to the nature of solidarity as measured, tenuous, and constantly in flux.

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[485] "Mambo Yalivyo Uchina [Things in China]," *Nchi Yetu* (December 1966): pp. 22-23.
[486] "Chinese Ask for Wage Cuts," *The Nationalist*, November 20, 1970. The British High Commission in Dar es Salaam also found this particular petition for wage reductions to be a bizarre exclamation to the Chinese insistence on modeling humility in every aspect of their involvements in Tanzania. A clipping of the article "Chinese Ask for Wage Cuts" was sent to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London. File No. JET/3/301/1, British National Archives at Kew, London, UK.
[487] "Tachai Village—Model of Self-Sufficiency," *The Nationalist*, August 20, 1965; and "Army Men Bring Life to China Wasteland," *The Nationalist*, September 2, 1965.

The recollections of Chinese advisers and technicians themselves, on occasion, lend insight unto their struggles, drudgery, and creative thinking which piecemeal, allow for some substantiation of the stories from Xinhua Press. In the summer of 1968, a Chinese-funded pharmaceutical workshop, the first of its kind in Zanzibar, formally began operations on the grounds of the V.I. Lenin Hospital in Stone Town. The *People's Daily* reported that the many Zanzibari visitors touring the workshop were moved by the "Produced in Zanzibar" label affixed to the pill bottles, as they recalled the island's prior reliance on medicine manufactured in Britain, which were prohibitively expensive and represented yet another extension of colonial exploitation. A team of Chinese pharmacists from Jiangsu Province had converted an abandoned shed at the hospital into the bustling workshop, which soon produced insulin, anesthetic, and various injections including sodium chloride and mannitol. The insulin, creatively fashioned from the alkaline groundwater unique to Zanzibar, was initially distrusted by the Western doctors at the hospital. The Chinese pharmacists however, allegedly volunteered their own bodies to test the injections; their selflessness—and the demonstrated quality of the insulin—won praise from the skeptics.[488] The achievements of this first generation of Zanzibari pharmacists they trained, the reporting proceeded, "shattered the vile colonial myth of foolish Africans."[489]

Though the reflections of two Chinese pharmacists who were dispatched to V.I. Lenin Hospital struck a similar note of triumph, they also contained a catalog of the difficulties they encountered over the course of building the workshop in such a limited time span and ensuring its smooth operations. These pharmacists recalled suffering from the physical effects of persistently high temperatures on the island, their frustration at the language barrier, and the fact that the ramshackle shed they had to convert into the workshop simply could not hold the weight of tableting machine, which measured out to be one ton.[490]

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[488] "友谊的结晶—记中国制药人员帮助坦桑尼亚桑给巴尔建立制药车间 [The Crystallization of Friendship: Remembering the Pharmaceutical Workshop that Chinese Pharmacists Helped Build in Zanzibar]," *Renmin ribao*, July 5, 1968.
[489] "友谊的结晶—记中国制药人员帮助坦桑尼亚桑给巴尔建立制药车间 [The Crystallization of Friendship: Remembering the Pharmaceutical Workshop that Chinese Pharmacists Helped Build in Zanzibar]."
[490] "毛泽东思想的伟大红旗飘扬在坦桑尼亚上空 [The Great Red Flag of Mao Zedong Though Flies over the Tanzanian Sky]," undated, SMA, File No. B89-2-744-11.

Ultimately, it was only the thought of Chairman Mao, they wrote, that deflected the heat, while Mao's dictum that "Diligence and frugality must be observed in everything" inspired them to set up a cement frame beneath the machine to dissipate its force, in lieu of searching for another setting. Further, as they were armed "with a red heart belonging to Chairman Mao," they woke up each day before the crack of dawn to study Swahili, in order to more effectively convey Maoism to Africans and support the global socialist revolution.[491] As the Chinese pharmacists felt that their Zanzibari trainees, graduates of Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow, lacked a basic understanding of the principles of Maoism, they took it upon themselves to spread Chairman Mao's messages far and wide, teaching the trainees to sing "The East is Red" during breaks from work.

The pharmacists' reflections were saddled with all the expected excesses of Maoist rhetoric, but nonetheless contained an acknowledgement of the practical difficulties they faced, from gaps in communication to the unfeasible expectation that they could easily remodel a decrepit shed into a functional workshop. According to their recollections, when the workshop opened to the public, more than two thousand Zanzibaris visited; the Zanzibaris' emotional response upon seeing the workshop rendered their labor and sacrifices worthwhile. Apparently, one Zanzibari man had held up two vitamin pills in wonder, "Now that I have seen this first pharmaceutical factory in Zanzibar, which China helped us build, and our first generation of pharmacists, which China helped to train, and these medicines that we have produced ourselves, I know that these are no ordinary vitamins. They are the product of China's friendship with Tanzania. I will bring these pills home so my family can share this happiness."[492] These pharmacists' reflections, which so heavily emphasized the magnitude of hard work matched only by that of gratitude, can be read in two ways. On the one hand, they offer evidence of the discourse of triumph and melodrama that Chinese politicians and technical advisers themselves believed necessary to sustain the relationship as it was between China and Tanzania. On the other, in the memories of the Chinese

[491] "毛泽东思想的伟大红旗飘扬在坦桑尼亚上空 [The Great Red Flag of Mao Zedong Thought Flies over the Tanzanian Sky]."
[492] "毛泽东思想的伟大红旗飘扬在坦桑尼亚上空 [The Great Red Flag of Mao Zedong Thought Flies over the Tanzanian Sky]."

service personnel who undertook the minute tasks in the forging of solidarity, it served as justification and reward for their labors.

This is echoed in the reflections of Chinese textile workers stationed in Tanzania from July 1968 to June 1969, who sacrificed their Sundays to pick rice for the cafeteria, and over the course of the year, distributed more than 500 Little Red Books and Mao badges, in addition to countless copies of the *Peking Review* and *China Pictorial*. They recalled that Tanzanian workers would reference British and German colonialism as the antithesis to Chinese practices, and claim that "When we worked under the imperialists, they abused or yelled at us. To work together with Chinese experts and learn skills in the process—this would not be possible with other people."[493] Here again, Chinese representatives inscribed discipline and egalitarianism into a discourse of exceptionalism, one in which their behavior would be lauded not on its own terms but rather, in contrast to the practices of advisers and experts from other countries in Tanzania, past and present. This pattern echoes Gregg Brazinsky's observations in his study of Chinese-sponsored tea plantations of the 1960s in Guinea and Mali, whereby the Chinese model of Afro-Asian cooperation and aid was largely well-received in local communities partially in light of their positive comparisons to the practices of French colonial development in both countries. In the postcolonial context, technicians and officials from Guinea and Mali enthused about the humility and sincerity of Chinese experts who worked alongside them as equals—reports supported by U.S. intelligence reports.[494]

Chinese narratives of aid emphasized the overabundance of local gratitude, the desolation of the landscape, the unique friendship forged only in shared labor, and the innocence and enthusiasm for learning that Chinese technicians witnessed among the young men and women. The most mundane

[493] "中国人民解放军纺织工业部军事代表业务组转发中国援坦桑尼亚纺织工作组 1968 年 7 月到 1969 年 6 月的技术合作工作总结的通知 [Notice about Technical Collaboration Report from the Chinese Textile Work Group in Tanzania from July 1968 to June 1968, Forward from the Chinese People's Liberation Army Ministry of Textile Military Business Group]," File No. B134-3-240-1, SMA.
[494] Gregg Brazinsky, "Showcasing the Chinese Version of Moderni-tea in Africa," Cold War International History Project Working Paper #80, July 2016 (https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/showcasing-the-chinese-version-moderni-tea-africa).

objects and objectives became the subject of feature-length articles in Chinese newspapers. In December 1964, the Beijing-based *Dagong News* reported on a small group of Chinese advisers who brought tractors and other agricultural supplies to Zanzibar in May of that year. In this account, when a bright red Chinese tractor was first driven out of the port, masses of local residents had crowded around the harbor to touch the new machine with their hands, many of them repeating "nzuri," a Swahili word for "good." Dozens of youth soon volunteered to become tractor trainees; though teaching equipment was non-existent, their eagerness was immeasurably high. The island of Zanzibar was repeatedly referred to as a "barren landscape," where Chinese aid has facilitated the rise of self-reliance in a place formerly dependent on imported foods.[495] More memorable for these Chinese technicians were the spontaneous greetings of "Hujambo, mchina (Hello, Chinese person)!" that they encountered on the streets, and the curious, friendly shopkeepers who asked to learn sentences in Chinese whenever they visited their stalls.[496] Other articles from this period celebrated the "new phase of friendship between China and Tanzania" as derivative and symbolic of Afro-Asian unity (亚非团结), the counterweight to the evils of Western imperialism as well as colonialism and neocolonialism (新老殖民主义).[497] As discussed in the second chapter, the Chinese emphasis on "new colonialism" generated controversy; many African representatives resented the worldview by which all Western intervention, from economic investments to the Peace Corps, is classified as colonialist and fundamentally undesirable.

The narrative of backbreaking work and ebullient gratitude within these advisers' recollections parallels the slate of reports and memoirs that accompanied the completion of the Tanzam railway in 1975. That year, the humanities press at Renmin University published a poetry and song collection compiled from the writings of Chinese supervisors and technicians who worked in East Africa. The title,

[495] Even though Zanzibar's landscape is anything but barren, sporting a rich agricultural economy of spices and raffia, Chinese narratives correlated "barren" with a lack of industrial development.
[496] "开垦了荒地，播种了友谊 [Reclaiming a Wasteland, Sowing the Seeds of Friendship]," *Dagong Bao*, December 16, 1964.
[497] "中国同坦噶尼喀桑给巴尔人民友谊的新发展 [New Development in Friendship between China and the Tanganyikan and Zanzibari People]," *Dagong Bao*, June 19, 1964.

indicative of the overarching romanticization of Chinese involvements in Tanzania, is 友谊的彩虹 (*The Rainbow of Friendship*). Chinese workers recalled their relationships to their African counterparts as profound and sincere in spite of their inability to communication with one another. In a particularly lyrical and emotional piece, an internal combustion engine driver Zhang Zhimin memorializes his friendship with an African worker, in which they remove pincers from bee stings and patch clothes for each other underneath the stars. Zhang concludes, "Our languages may be different but our hearts connect / friendship nestles deep in the heart."[498] A significant task in the negotiation of the terms of solidarity is the brokering of discourses surrounding it. This tussle over rhetoric—with Chinese representatives and promoting a singularly positive relationship, implying flaws of chauvinism or inegalitarianism within Tanzanian associations with other countries—was one in which a wide range of actors participated. A deconstruction into the constitution of China-Tanzanian relations further suggests that more than sentimentalities, the colloquial identification of Indian communities in East Africa as the exemplar of a failed Afro-Asian correspondence served as a linchpin in the formulation of China-Tanzanian solidarity, especially at the level of civil society.

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Sociologists Howard Omi and Michael Winant define racial formation as "the process by which social, economic and political forces determine the content and importance of racial categories, and by which they are in turn shaped by racial meanings."[499] Along this line of analysis, which understands race as fluid and contingent, the racialization of China in Tanzania was refracted through articulations of African nationalism that repudiated the histories and legacies of India in the region. For many African nationalists in postcolonial Tanzania, the realization of ujamaa entailed the categorical undoing of "exploitation," racially defined as annulling the influence of Indian landlords and capitalists in the

[498] Zhang Zhimin, "友谊暖在心窝里 [Friendship Nestles Deep in the Heart]," in 友谊的彩虹：坦赞铁路工地诗歌选 [The Rainbow of Friendship: Poetry Selections from the Construction Site of the TAZARA Railway] (Beijing: Humanities Press of Renmin University, 1975): p. 98.
[499] Howard Omi and Michael Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States: Third Edition* (New York: Routledge, 2015): p. 61.

country's urban cores.[500] Their politics dovetailed with the efforts of Chinese officials receiving them, who condemned Indian behavior on the basis of their conduct before and during Sino-Indian Border Conflict, which erupted into full-scale military confrontation in 1962.

Jamie Monson has written about the triangulation of African, Chinese, and white Euro-American racial identities as a facet in the construction of China-African relations. Drawing from Claire Jean Kim's theory of racial triangulation, which centers the racialization of Asian Americans relative to Black and white identities in the United States, Monson argues that the binary framework for approaching race in China-Africa engagements—with the category of "Chinese" on the one hand and "African" on the other—is insufficient, as it occludes the constancy of whiteness. Tanzanian railway workers of the 1970s contrasted the conduct of Chinese experts to that of British colonial supervisors, and in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, colonial proposals for the importation of Chinese laborers to the Gold Coast articulated desires that they would serve as a "civilizing influence" for Africans in the region.[501] In the case of colonial and postcolonial Tanzania however, the Indian community constituted an "Other" just as important as the significantly smaller numbers of white European settlers. Indians actually comprised 25% of the population in colonial Dar es Salaam.[502] As shopkeepers, merchants, and colonial administrators, Indians were omni-present in the life of Tanganyikan cities.

In explicit or implicit terms, engagements between China and Africa are racialized in the popular imagination, with points of reference beyond the West. A parallel line of inquiry concerns inter-Asian "triangulations," in which places like Hong Kong and Malaysia can figure as foils to interconnectivities between African countries and the Chinese mainland.[503] Similarly, the contradictions within Cold War Afro-Asian constructs can be captured in fuller relief vis-à-vis the triangulation of Indian communities in

[500] James Brennan, *Taifa: Making Nation and Race in Urban Tanzania*, pp. 4-5
[501] Jamie Monson, "Historicizing Difference: Construction of Race Identity in China-Africa Relations," Working Paper of the China-Africa Knowledge Project, Social Science Research Council, September 2014 (https://china-africa.ssrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Monson-Final.pdf).
[502] James Brennan, *Taifa: Making Nation and Race in Urban Tanzania*, p. 2
[503] Roberto Castillo, "'Race' and 'Racism' in Contemporary Africa-China Relations Research: Approaches, Controversies, and Reflections," *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies* 21 (2020): pp. 310-336.

East Africa in the development of China-Tanzanian relations, especially as China-Indian relations deteriorated further as a result of the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War, during which China provided military support to Pakistan.[504] The discourses of friendship espoused by Chinese and Tanzanian representatives were partially forged on the basis of this exclusion; it hinged on criticism, direct or unspoken, of the India state on the one hand, and Indians in Tanzania on the other.

Chinese officials arranged for Tanzanian delegations visiting China through the 1960s to watch documentary films about the Sino-Indian Border Conflict, an experience which evoked for some guests their long-held resentment for Indians and overwrote rockier beginnings to their rapport with Chinese hosts.[505] During the June 1963 stay in Shanghai of two representatives from the National Union of Tanganyika Workers (NUTA)—whose illicit photographs with Czech women from an earlier visit to Prague had been discovered by Chinese hotel staff, much to the ire of the latter—they expressed a steady series of antagonistic notions about the role that Indians had carved out for themselves in postcolonial Tanganyika. "Tanganyikan Indians like commerce, even more than the British," the team leader explained, "and while the Americans set up companies, they don't engage in commercial activities. Indians are exceptionally good at business and speculation; they are the most cunning and dangerous."[506] In this particular instance, Indians were not merely regarded with the same suspicion as Westerners; they were deemed more pernicious. Chinese representatives, charged with the mission of promoting the Chinese position on Sino-Indian conflict, welcomed these sentiments of wariness and distrust.

When the two NUTA delegates watched a documentary about the Sino-Indian Border War, they concurred that "the Indians are indeed very bad." In response to a scene depicting the Chinese army victoriously withdrawing from the frontlines and releasing Indian prisoners-of-war, one of the delegates

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[504] For a general overview of the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War, see Farooq Naseem Bajwa, *From Kutch to Tashkent: The Indo-Pakistani War of 1965* (London: Hurst Publishers, 2013).

[505] Alaba Ogunsanwo argues that it was precisely this active effort of Chinese officials, lacking on the part of Indian representatives—presenting maps, copies of treaties, illustrations of contested territories—that convinced African leaders of its point of view with regards to Sino-Indian conflict. See Alaba Ogunsanwo, *China's Policy in Africa, 1958-1971*, pp. 108-110.

[506] "接待坦噶尼喀劳工联合会代表团的计划, 日程, 情况汇报 [Plans, Itineraries, and Reports from the Reception of the National Union of Tanganyika Workers Delegation], File No. C1-2-178-4324, SMA.

expressed his awe with Chinese military prowess and compassion for the Indian soldiers who had provoked the needless conflict, such that the prisoners "had much to eat and much to laugh about, so grateful for their treatment they teared up."[507] After the film, Zhang Qi, a representative of the Shanghai Municipal All-Workers Union—who would go on to deliver the opening speech of the August 1964 symposium commemorating Mao's statement in support of the African American struggle, referenced in the first chapter—reiterated that Nehru's "capitalist nature" had caused conflict in the first place, an explanation that the two guests found very satisfying. In this case, the interplay of didactic efforts, on the part of Chinese officials, about the ill intents of India, with pre-established Tanganyikan notions of Indian malevolence actually allowed for the NUTA delegates to be in a positive light in the Chinese record in spite of their other infractions, however egregious, including attempts to request sexual services of the Polish women staying across the hallway of their hotel rooms.

This juncture occurred because the very concept of ujamaa and the trope of "nation as family" hinged on a tendency to racialization, evident in the connotations of the preferred Swahili word for "country" (*taifa*), which carried implications of race, over *nchi*, which referred to "country" but in terms of geography.[508] This popular formulation of African socialism assumed in spite of Nyerere's constant evocations of the values of non-racialism and inclusivity. Thus, this official rhetoric of "non-racialism" from TANU and the interlude of Indian and African unity in the movement for decolonization notwithstanding, the years after the Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar witnessed the sharpening of racial animosities. When Nyerere moved to end "Africanization" in 1964, a program which sought to replace non-Africans with Africans in the civil service, the decision drew controversy in public opinion, with Swahili-language press in mainland Tanzania capturing the widespread frustrations that Indians were too hesitant to participate in the nation-building project or disrespected the postcolonial government.[509] After

[507] "接待坦噶尼喀劳工联合会代表团的计划，日程，情况汇报 [Plans, Itineraries, and Reports from the Reception of the National Union of Tanganyika Workers Delegation]."
[508] Priya Lal, *Between the Village and the World: African Socialism in Postcolonial Tanzania*, p. 121
[509] Ned Bertz, *Diaspora and Nation in the Indian Ocean: Transnational Histories of Race and Urban Space in Tanzania*, pp. 142-144

Arusha, local metaphors of exploitation merged with the vision and principles of ujamaa to target Indian merchants and landlords as the barrier to the complete attainment of African liberation. In 1971, the Building Acquisitions Act, which nationalized the majority of Indian-owned residential and commercial properties, propelled a mass Indian exodus out of the country. As James Brennan observes, "For many *ujamaa* supporters… removing exploitation meant removing the enemies of African socialism, enemies whose qualities blurred economic and racial characteristics."[510]

It is important to acknowledge both that racial constructs in postcolonial Tanzania were very much contingent on politics and geography, and that there existed significant gaps in conceptions of race and nation between the Indian and Arab communities in the mainland and in Zanzibar. Indian communities in Dar es Salaam imagined their citizenship differently than Indian communities in Zanzibar. Thomas Burgess has described the irony of the Afro-Asian vision that took hold among African nationalists in Zanzibar. In their search for a "usable future," Zanzibar's nationalist leaders forced "a [racial] reckoning that was fundamentally parochial and past-oriented. As they appropriated Chinese knowledge and disciplinary techniques they also turned Arabs and South Asians… into exiles or second-class citizens—a simultaneous embrace and repudiation of Afro-Asian solidarities."[511] In the case of mainland Tanzania, TANU representatives adopted a resonant lens that viewed Indian economic networks in the region as an extension of the colonial past. In this framework, decolonization entailed the undoing of all social structures inherited from British colonialism, including a mode of Afro-Asian engagement which, in popular discourse, had become largely synonymous with the exploitation of Africans. The irony is stark however, considering the non-racial tenor of Tanzanian nationalism that Nyerere sought to promote in official political discourse.

In May 1965, during Otini Kambona's stay in Shanghai, he delighted his hosts with his appropriate comments on topics ranging from the Vietnam War to the necessity for every hotel room to

[510] James Brennan, *Taifa: Making Nation and Race in Urban Tanzania*, pp. 4-5.
[511] G. Thomas Burgess, "Mao in Zanzibar: Nationalism, Discipline, and the (De)Construction of Afro-Asian Solidarities," p. 200

display a portrait of Mao. When the discussion turned to Soviet support for India during the China-India Border Conflict, Kambona gamely responded: "Indians are the reactionaries of the reactionaries. In Africa, there are many Indians. They brutally exploit Africans. We don't like them at all."[512] This characterization of Indians in East Africa intersected with the Maoist condemnation of "the comprador bourgeois," or "internal reactionaries" in colonial and neo-colonial societies, open to collaboration with foreign imperialists to preserve a system from which they also benefit. These "traitors" included, in the context of 1920s and 1930s China when Mao first advanced the concept, the ranks of right-wing Nationalist Party members profitably engaged in commerce with Western companies and investors. In this manner, the racial histories and politics of Indians in East Africa were proactively inferred and positively received; they figured critically into early China-Tanzanian constructions of friendship, whereby Indians became the stand-in for an Afro-Asian relationship that was unequal and undesirable.

Another pronounced instance occurred during the visit of the 22-member Tanzanian soccer team in June 1966, when team leader J.M. Mwongosi offered, "[President Nyerere] says Tanzania should learn from China because the Chinese people are sincere, not false or wicked, but even though Indians pay lip service to the right things, they are bad at heart. The Europeans taught them to be selfish and do bad things."[513] These episodes are illustrative of the dynamic role of racial identity in interactions and exchange between Chinese and Tanzanian representatives, such that without pretext, India and Indians were inferred as the rhetorical foil to Chinese honesty and goodwill. Later that year, a group of seven Tanzanian workers who specialized in construction and highway maintenance embarked on a week-long study tour in Shanghai as the final component of a four-month long technical course in the People's Republic of China (PRC). In the notes of the Chinese municipal officials who received them, a Tanzanian

[512] "中国人民对外文化友好协会上海市分会关于接待坦桑尼亚外长之弟奥蒂尼 – 埃博纳的文件 [Documents from the Shanghai Branch of the Chinese People's Association for Cultural Friendship with Foreign Countries Regarding the Reception of Otini Kambona, Younger Brother of the Tanzanian Foreign Minister]," SMA, File No. C37-2-1185.

[513] "上海市体育运动委员会 1966 年接待阿联男子体操队, 马里, 刚果（布）, 坦桑尼亚足球队来沪访问比赛有关文件 [Documents from the Shanghai Athletics Association's 1966 Reception of the United Arab Emirates Men's Gymnastics Team and the Mali, Republic of Congo, and Tanzania Soccer Teams]," SMA, File No. B126-1-956.

man in his fifties left a particularly positive impression. At a banquet hosted by Shanghai No. 2 Construction Company, this individual had "mustered the strength of his entire body" during a group chant of "Long Live Chairman Mao," with his voice ringing the loudest of the delegation.[514] He then shared this observation shortly before departure: "The Chinese and Tanzanian people have but two differences: hair and skin color. Our views are aligned, we walk the same road, have the same goal, and most importantly, share an ideology, and that is Mao Zedong Thought. But Europeans are different than us, as are Indians."[515] The positioning of India, and not only the West, as the antithesis to Chinese goodwill is not an anomaly, but rather, an expression of how the nuances of race identification and internal exclusions have always underpinned the Afro-Asian project.

The second chapter examined the experiences of TANU General Administrative Secretary Ali Mwinyi Tambwe in China in the fall of 1962, whose primary objective for the visit had been to convince Chinese officials that the majority-African Afro-Shirazi Party in Zanzibar was more deserving of support than the Arab-dominated Zanzibar National Party. Tambwe challenged Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi's understanding of race, arguing that by virtue of history, Arabs in Zanzibar constituted a feudal and exploitative "class." Further, Tambwe had expressed that he was willing to forgive Chinese representatives for their misguided decision to ally, the byproduct of their shared racial identity with Arabs as Asians. These inferences that Tanzania cultural delegates made in China in the mid-1960s and after serve as an additional dimension to this story, in which racial debates and identifications figured not only into the development of party-to-party relations between TANU and the CCP, but also the granular level of personal encounter and exchange.

To a lesser extent, Eastern bloc countries were also disparaged as racist and unequal in its distribution of resources and income in spite of claims to the contrary, and consequently, not "truly socialist." In January 1964, a delegation of three African students based at universities in the

[514] "关于对坦桑尼亚七名实习生路过上海的安排，简易，简报 [Opinions and Briefings About the Seven Tanzanian Interns Passing Through Shanghai]," November 14, 1966, B29-2-1350-114, SMA.
[515] "关于对坦桑尼亚七名实习生路过上海的安排，简易，简报 [Opinions and Briefings About the Seven Tanzanian Interns Passing Through Shanghai]."

Czechoslovakia had arrived in China at the invitation of the Communist Youth League. Upon visiting a residential home of a worker in Shanghai, the Zanzibari student in the delegation remarked, "In Czechoslovakia, the [state officers] live in Western homes, ride in cars, and their children also have access to this high-class service. These people are concerned only about enjoying themselves, and not about building up the country or whether the people lived or died. The livelihoods of the workers are poor and many people blame socialism. It's actually African students… who point out that socialism is good."[516] In a discussion with Chinese faculty and students at Tongji University in Shanghai, all three African students expressed disenchantment with Czechoslovakia on the basis of the racial slights they experienced while there. The Chinese record of the discussion notes that the students recalled with disgust how Czech newspapers described Africa as "wild" and "savage," and to support this viewpoint, printed irrelevant photographs of naked African women. Czech students, they told the Chinese, would ask them if Africans lived on trees or if they wore clothes at home.[517]

For both parties, identity politics opened up avenues to engagement when the possibilities for political alignment appeared foreclosed. Records of Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries contained notes concerning the October 1964 visit to Shanghai of an Administrative Secretary from TANU, whose particular background was in arts and culture. This guest however, had never heard the name Mao Zedong, knew little of Chinese history, and did not appear to understand the importance of armed struggle to African liberation. He was explicitly crestfallen upon the receipt of a telegram from Czechoslovakia; the Chinese hypothesized that his request to visit Prague after China, in order to ask for technical aid, had been rejected. In spite of these many causes for reservation on the part of Chinese officials who accompanied him, the secretary's appeals on two counts—that a team of Tanzanians could study dance and acrobatics in China, and for donations of costumes and trucks—were

[516] "共青团上海市委接待非洲留捷学生代表团三人，上沃尔特，桑给巴尔，索马里个一人的计划，简报等 [Plan and Report of the Communist Youth League Shanghai Committee's Reception of Three African Students in Czechoslovakia, One Each from Upper Volta, Zanzibar, and Somalia]," C21-2-2349, SMA.
[517] "共青团上海市委接待非洲留捷学生代表团三人，上沃尔特，桑给巴尔，索马里个一人的计划，简报等［Plan and Report of the Communist Youth League Shanghai Committee's Reception of Three African Students in Czechoslovakia, One Each from Upper Volta, Zanzibar, and Somalia]."

granted, as he had implored that Tanzanian performers no longer wished to rely on the goodwill of "the wealthy Europeans and Indians."[518] While in Beijing, he expressed that China presented a welcome contrast to his negative experiences of the United Kingdom. When he previously supervised a youth delegation to England, he recounted, the deputy mayor of an unnamed British city had taken them to a themed "African restaurant," where a donkey roamed freely and the walls were adorned with a pair of grotesque paintings: one featured unclothed African men and women eating with their bare hands while the other depicted a pack of dogs devouring a feast, with the intention of provoking the viewer to draw an equation between the two.[519] Throughout the course of the secretary's visit in China, moments of communion over the betrayal of Europeans and Indians, and the sensitivities of the Chinese by comparison, underpinned the establishment of trust in spite his lack of engagement with the political matters to which the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries would otherwise have assigned great importance.

As trade volume and economic relations between the two countries grew, Tanzanian reporting about the increased availability of Chinese goods took place with reference to the negative backdrop of Indian business practices. In July 1964, a Chinese trade fair held at the Mnazi Mmoja Grounds in Dar es Salaam proved to be enormously popular with local residents. The displays included both "heavy industry" like cigarette-packing machines and "light industry" like cotton products, bicycles, watches, wood carvings, cameras, and other electronics. According to *The Nationalist*, lines of expectant customers snaked down Nkrumah Street as many customers expressed their approval with the array of items sold at the fair, as "the prices at the retail counter were far lower than those in the local Asian shops for the same kind and quality." The article proceeded to quote a satisfied man who cried "Just imagine a thermos flask costing five shillings and a drinking glass fifty cents!"[520] The unstated foil of Indian shopkeepers charging

[518] "中国人民对外文化友好协会上海市分会关于接待坦噶尼喀丘秋的计划与汇报 [Plan and Report for the Chinese People's Cultural Friendship Association Shanghai Branch's Reception of Tanganyikan "Qiu Qiu"], File No. C37-2-1070, SMA.
[519] "中国人民对外文化友好协会上海市分会关于接待坦噶尼喀丘秋的计划与汇报 [Plan and Report for the Chinese People's Cultural Friendship Association Shanghai Branch's Reception of Tanganyikan "Qiu Qiu"].
[520] Nsa Kaisi, "A Rush in Dar to Buy Chinese Goods," *The Nationalist*, July 24, 1964.

unfair prices for lower-quality merchandise served as essential testament to the appeal of Chinese goods. In this way, at the level of popular discourse, racial identities were crucial to the development of China-Tanzanian relations. They marked the inclusion of certain groups at the expense of others. Chinese officials and Tanzanian delegates conjured race both as a basis for fraternity and as a vessel of exclusion.

In contrast to patterns of Western intervention and conquest in Africa, Chinese officials, in formal speeches and informal conversations with Tanzanian visitors, inferred a wholly positive history of a shared spirit of agency and resistance between China and Africa. At the welcome reception for a TANU youth delegation held in Shanghai in June 1965, the Communist Youth League of China lead representative, Pan Wenjing, declared, "You have arrived from anti-imperialist, revolutionary Africa that is in struggle, to anti-imperialist, revolutionary Asia that is in struggle. On your side are the brave Congolese people. On our side are the brave Vietnamese people." This mapping of Afro-Asian confederation, in which China and Tanzania figured as two significant pieces in a greater landscape of revolutionary solidarity, has its own alternative history. As Pan elaborated, "The good relationship between our two countries was in place even 900 years ago. The Maji Maji Uprising of 1905 dealt a shock to imperial governance in East Africa, inspiring the Chinese anti-imperialist struggle of the time."[521] These narratives regarded the past and present of China-Tanzanian relations as singular and drastically different from Western colonial practices, Eastern bloc engagements, and patterns of Indian opportunism and economic exploitation in the region. Reminders of the contingencies and fragility to this construction of China-Tanzanian relations however, remained. In Laura Fair's study of twentieth-century Tanzanian cinema, one of her interviewees remembered that when Chinese doctors visited a household in Zanzibar in the 1960s, the language barrier prevented every form of cross-cultural communication excepting a group rendition of the signature song "Awara Hoon" from the 1951 Indian film *Awaara*.[522] At once a crime drama and a tale of forbidden love, *Awaara* had been widely popular with viewers from East

[521] "共青团上海市委迎坦桑尼亚坦噶尼喀非洲民族联盟青年代表团讲话稿 [Draft Speech of the Communist Youth League Shanghai Branch's Reception of TANU Youth League Delegation]," File No. C21-2-2583, SMA.
[522] Laura Fair, *Reel Pleasures: Cinema Audiences and Entrepreneurs in Twentieth-Century Tanzania*, p. 116

Africa to the Soviet Union and East Asia; at a time of close relations between China and India, it was rumored to have been a personal favorite of Mao Zedong.

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In the early 1970s, the ideas and models of Maoism and Chinese socialism continued to figure centrally into the political repertoire of left-leaning students who challenged Nyerere's blueprint for the implementation of socialism. The year 1971 would mark the zenith of Nyerere's vision for a pragmatic, anti-imperialist, and Pan-Africanist politics. An aspirational statement, the Arusha Declaration of 1967 had greatly facilitated the process of state-building in Tanzania.[523] But in 1971, with the escalation of the Portuguese offensive in Guinea-Bissau and Idi Amin's deposition of Milton Obote in Uganda abetted by British and Israeli support, TANU was mired in a moment of uncertainty. In response, TANU issued Mwongozo, or "Guidelines," a major policy directive which condemned imperialism and rearticulated *ujamaa* as an open-ended enterprise with input from ordinary workers. Mwongozo explicitly called for vigilance against the "puppets" of imperialism in the mold of Amin, the establishment of a "people's militia" under TANU instead of under the military, and national leaders who "respect people, scorn ostentation, and [are] not tyrant[s]."[524]

Generally believed to be the work of leftists in Nyerere's cabinet, including A.M. Babu, Mwongozo in effect inspired the rise of popular class antagonism against the "new bourgeois," or the ranks of a bureaucratic ruling class that derived its legitimacy from the struggle against colonialism and the predominantly Indian "commercial bourgeois."[525] The debate over the future of *ujamaa* played out intensely on the campus of University College in Dar es Salaam, where a markedly left-leaning and

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[523] Issa Shivji, "Nationalism and Pan-Africanism: Decisive Moments in Nyerere's Intellectual and Political Thought," *Review of African Political Economy* 39 (2012): pp. 107-108.
[524] "TANU Guidelines on Guarding, Consolidation, and Advancing the Revolution of Tanzania, and of Africa," *African Review* 1 (1972): pp. 1-8. However, a wave of wildcat strikes inspired by Mwongozo in the early 1970s demanding better labor conditions, stronger welfare benefits, and the recall of Western "experts" were suppressed by TANU. See Horace Campbell, "Socialism in Tanzania: A Case Study," *The Black Scholar* 6 (1975): pp. 49-50. For the English-language text of Mwongozo wa Tanu, also known as the Dar Declaration, see "We Must Safeguard Our Revolution – Mwalimu" and "The Dar Declaration," *The Standard*, February 22, 1971. For a response from national organizations, see "Happy People Praise Militia Plan," *The Standard*, February 23, 1971.
[525] Joel Samoff, "The Bureaucracy and the Bourgeois: Decentralization and Class Structure in Tanzania," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 21 (1979): pp. 30-62.

internationalist intellectual culture flourished.[526] In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Hill had hosted an array of distinguished Marxist scholars from Walter Rodney to Giovanni Arrighi. Correspondingly, the school also attracted students from around East Africa, including future President of Uganda Yoweri Museveni, as the city of Dar es Salaam itself gained in reputation as the center for African liberation. The University Students' African Revolutionary Front (USARF) organized teach-ins, debates, and public actions; visiting luminaries included C.L.R. James and Stokely Carmichael.[527] In this atmosphere of revolutionary passion, student publications, especially the USARF's signature journal *Cheche*, became the site of fierce contestations over policy, governance, and the meanings of African socialism.

As a result of *Cheche*'s publication of criticisms indicting the failure of the Tanzanian state to realize the full promise of ujamaa, TANU banned the journal as well as USARF in November 1970 after a run of only four issues.[528] In its place, students remade the TANU Youth League into the anchor for all political speech and activity on campus.[529] For many of these student activists, the perceived contrast between Chinese and Indian developmental models served as a veritable means of critiquing the prerogatives of the *ujamaa* state. Theories and visions of Chinese politics served as the backdrop against which student debates about Tanzanian governance were cast. Karim Hirji recalls attending a lecture of Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew, who spoke at the university as a personal guest of Nyerere in 1969. After Yew praised the capitalist mode of development, Hirji challenged Lee's touting of "selective evidence," asking him to instead compare China and India.[530] For Hirji, the divergent paths of China and India attested to the promises of Third World socialism when truly attained. In combination with the laudatory chronicles of Chinese development in Swahili and English-language press, this

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[526] See Issa Shivji, *Intellectuals at the Hill: Essays and Talks, 1969-1993* (Dar es Salaam: Dar es Salaam University Press, 1993); Horace Campbell, "The Impact of Walter Rodney and Other Progressive Scholars on the Dar es Salaam School," *Social and Economic Studies* 40 (1991): pp. 99-135; and Immanuel Harisch, "Walter Rodney's Dar es Salaam Years, 1966–1974: *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, Tanzania's ujamaa, and Student Radicalism at 'the Hill'" (MA thesis, University of Vienna, 2018).
[527] Andrew Ivaska, *Cultured States: Youth, Gender, and Modern Style in 1960s Dar es Salaam*, pp. 151-154
[528] Henry Mapolu, "On Producing a Student Magazine," in Karim Hirji ed., *Cheche: Reminiscences of a Radical Magazine* (Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota Publishers, 2010): pp. 65-76.
[529] Andrew Ivaska, *Cultured States: Youth, Gender, and Modern Style in 1960s Dar es Salaam*, p. 159
[530] Karim Hirji, "Not So Silent a Spark," in *Cheche: Reminiscences of a Radical Magazine* (Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota Publishers, 2010): pp. 60-61.

reproduction of China as a myth of socialist success demonstrates the popular reach of China-Tanzanian relations. Not only did higher-level Tanzanian and Chinese officials vest power in this myth, or even those who had travelled to China; it took on a life of its own.

In mining the lessons of the Chinese Cultural Revolution for Tanzanian socialism, F.S. Swai wrote in *Cheche* that "if Tanzania is to succeed in building socialism, then the revolutionary youth must have a full backing of the party just as Mao Tse-tung supported the Red Guards in the Cultural Revolution." Reflecting on the passing of Mwongozo, Swai argued that in addition to the active role of the Red Guards, other aspects of the Cultural Revolution that TANU should adopt included the undertaking of a rigorous class analysis of society, emphasis the "seizure of power from below," and mass mobilization on the basis of political education rather than any form of material incentivization.[531] Swai believed that the model laid out in Mwongozo did not go far enough towards the full implementation of socialism vis-à-vis the cultivation of principled and dedicated revolutionary cadres. In *Maji Maji*, the intellectual journal that students published under the stewardship of the TYL after the prohibition of *Cheche*, pointed written challenges to TANU governance took place into the mid-1970s. In their critiques of Tanzanian political organization and priorities, students continued to infer Chinese society as evidence of socialism fully realized in the postcolonial world. In a particularly incisive editorial denouncing the "petty-bourgeois regimes and intellectuals" in Tanzania who advocated their own visions of indigenous socialisms as more palatable and less dogmatic than Marxism, student activist Jackson Kyonge invoked the different economic models in China and India. Indian social progress has stalled or even regressed since independence, Kyonge wrote, while in contrast, "China is a fast-developing socialist nation, capable of exploding nuclear bombs, sending satellites singing 'the East is Red' around the globe, and constructing the epoch-making Great Uhuru Railway."[532]

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[531] F.S. Swai, "The Chinese Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution and its Relevance to Tanzania in the Post-Mwongozo Days," *Cheche* 6 (1972): p. 15.
[532] Jackson Kyonge, "The Solution to Underdevelopment Must be Sought Outside the Bourgeois System—A Short Comment," *Maji Maji* 12 (September 1973): p. 26.

Meanwhile in Zanzibar, Abeid Karume's centralization of power through the mid-to-late 1960s was abetted by the exposition of a fictitious 1969 "plot" against his life that framed a number of his potential challengers within the ASP, including Kassim Hanga and Othman Shariff, the first Tanzanian Ambassador to the United States. Both Hanga and Shariff were sentenced to death and executed.[533] Though Karume's actual assassination—which occurred on April 7, 1972—was shrouded in rumor and mystery, it quickly emerged that the perpetrator was a TPDF officer motivated by a desire for personal revenge, as his father was jailed and killed after the Revolution. In spite of his outspoken criticisms of Karume's style of rule, there is no direct evidence of Babu's involvement in any grand plan for a government overthrow, though there were indications that he had conspired, along with other ex-Umma Party leaders, in multi-year planning to detain Karume and force him to resign the presidency over radio, after which Babu might be installed the new president of Zanzibar.[534] Regardless of the actual extent of his participation, it was clear that anti-communism played a key role in charges against Babu. His statements in support of Marxism and Maoism, dating back to the early 1960s, were inferred during his trial to suggest his tendencies to sedition.[535] Initially sentenced to death, Babu was imprisoned for six years before an international campaign led to his release in 1978.

Through the 1980s, Babu expressed his deep disappointment with the economic reforms that Tanzania adopted in accordance with the neoliberal logics of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. He regretted that earlier in the 1960s, Tanzanian nationalists had not "seized the time" and applied more lessons from the Chinese experience of development. Recalling that the Soviet Union had, alongside the United States, undertaken a "vicious anti-China campaign in Asia and Africa," Babu asserted in 1987 that it was the Chinese "duality of loyalty to [nationalism and socialism which] enabled China to share more intimately the sentiments and aspirations of Africa's liberation struggles and the

[533] George Roberts, "Politics, Decolonisation, and the Cold War in Dar es Salaam," pp. 163-167
[534] George Roberts, "Politics, Decolonisation, and the Cold War in Dar es Salaam," pp. 191-193
[535] Hank Chase, "The Zanzibar Treason Trial," *Review of African Political Economy* 6 (1976): p. 25.

struggle for national reconstruction."[536] Consequently, he held China's own neoliberal turn in negative regard, writing cynically that "post-Mao China is reverting back to the ranks of the Third World and there is nothing that Africa can learn from it except to appeal for the so-called [New International Economic Order] and prepare the ground for the so-called "South-South" relations whose predictable outcome is for the more advanced to advance more at the expense of the least developed."[537]

In his writings from this period of neoliberal transition and global economic reforms, Babu attacked Tanzanian ujamaa as a form of "cultural escapism" and a futile search for a non-existent alternative path to development, based on false projections of a harmonious, pre-feudal African past. Informed by such romantic ideals, the villagization schemes of the late 1960s and early 1970s could never have transformed the material conditions of the peasant, as they never imagined turning him into "a new person belonging to a new class."[538] His scathing critique of Nyerere's conception of ujamaa was longstanding; Babu had always been dissatisfied with the marginal roles he was assigned within the Tanzanian cabinet, penning a number of anonymous articles in *The Nationalist* that called out the urgency of overthrowing neo-colonialist economic structures he perceived to be extant in Tanzania.[539] Nyerere's policies, he believed, failed to accomplish this critical task.

Babu recalled other disagreements with Nyerere before his detainment in 1972, including his proposition to deploy Chinese equipment and newly trained Tanzanian technicians, all from the construction of the Tanzam Railway, to build other projects that would facilitate the development of Tanzanian industry. Nyerere however, according to Babu, opposed this plan because he envisioned Tanzania as an agricultural country and worried about how such an initiative might appear to the Western powers.[540] Truly an adherent of scientific socialism, Babu also protested the tendency to view through a

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[536] A.M. Babu, "China and Africa: Can We Learn from Each Other?" in Salma Babu and Amrit Wilson eds., *The Future That Works: The Selected Writings of A.M. Babu*, p. 167
[537] A.M. Babu, "China and Africa: Can We Learn from Each Other?" p. 174
[538] A.M. Babu, *African Socialism or Socialist Africa* (London: Zed Press, 1981): p. xv.
[539] Amrit Wilson, "Abdulrahman Mohamed Babu: Politician, Scholar, and Revolutionary," *The Journal of Pan-African Studies* 1 (2007): p. 14.
[540] Amrit Wilson, "Abdulrahman Mohamed Babu: Politician, Scholar, and Revolutionary," p. 16

racial lens matters of imperialism and development in Africa. "Racism [in Africa] is nothing but an outward (and irrational) manifestation of deep-rooted class antagonism," he concluded in 1981, and a large number of post-independence African leaders are actually "African petty bourgeois who adopt the demagogy of racism to cover up their exploitation."[541] For this reason, he had disputed Nyerere's decision after the Arusha Declaration to nationalize the small shops, businesses, and properties in Tanzanian owned by Indian merchants as an act that answered to anti-Indian popular sentiments rather than the real issue of a lack of industrial capacity within the country.

As Babu's primary objective had always been the displacement of neo-colonial economic relationships, the reinvention of China-Tanzania relations in the late twentieth-century would have proved to be a profound disillusionment. In the 1990s, the Chinese government began to assume ownership of state-operated enterprises throughout Tanzania, including the Friendship Textile Mill outside of Dar es Salaam, first established in 1968 with Chinese aid. Consequently, Chinese mill managers facilitated the dismantling of permanent employment regimes and ushered in a new "politics of casualization" with little job security or social benefits, inciting fierce resistance from longtime Tanzanian workers.[542] Three decades after the high-water mark of a Cold War relationship between the two countries defined by the rhetoric of socialist and Afro-Asian solidarities, China has become, as Ching Kwan Lee writes, "a compelling and effective conduit of capitalism" in Tanzania, as well as in a number of other Asian, African, and Latin American countries.[543]

A.M. Babu passed away in London in 1996. His wide array of intellectual and political commitments to Pan-Africanism, Afro-Asianism, and scientific socialism remained consistent through the decades. His life and work not only profoundly affected the contours of early Zanzibar-China and Tanzania-China relations, but reflected the many tensions and controversies within Tanzanian politics that rendered the mid-to-late 1960s relationship with China, and the large-scale aid projects that have come to

[541] A.M. Babu, *African Socialism or Socialist Africa*, p. 102
[542] Ching Kwan Lee, "Raw Encounters: Chinese Managers, African Workers, and the Politics of Casualization in Africa's Chinese Enclaves," *The China Quarterly* 199 (2009): p. 648.
[543] Ching Kwan Lee, "Raw Encounters," p. 652.

symbolize Cold War Afro-Asianism, far from predetermined. In this way, the makings of post-Bandung Afro-Asianism can also be found in the details: in the build-up to transnational and intercontinental conferences, minutiae of diplomatic conversations and visits, intricate negotiations around national and regional political struggles, and ultimately destabilizing conflicts of understanding buried within.

Conclusion: Afterlives

Chinese participation in the Angolan Civil War in the mid-1970s marked an end to this phase of Afro-Chinese collaboration. The potential to counteract Soviet influences in Angola served as the primary motivator for China's decision to enter the conflict on behalf of the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), organizations which the United States and apartheid South Africa patronized. Earlier in the 1960s, ideological affinities had figured far more prominently in Chinese support for Southern African liberation groups, with preferences for those that espoused Maoist language and principles or devoted their energies to rural work with the peasantry rather than the urban, intellectual base.[544] But in the aftermath of the Sino-Soviet Border Conflict in 1969 and correspondingly, the beginnings of U.S.-China rapprochement, opposition to the Soviet Union emerged as the key rationale for covert Chinese military shipments to UNITA and FNLA, even as Chinese propaganda declared support for all liberation movements in the region.[545] Ultimately, the defeat of UNITA and FNLA—and the victory of the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), backed by the Soviet Union and Cuba—represented the nadir of Cold War-era Chinese goodwill in the postcolonial world. By 1975, Chinese support for UNITA and FNLA hampered its relationship with Tanzania as well as with Black radical activists in the United States.[546]

In response to the unyieldingly anti-Soviet tenor of Chinese foreign policy in the early 1980s, Harry Haywood also backtracked his previous support for Chinese policies.[547] Haywood argued that

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[544] Steven F. Jackson, "China's Third World Foreign Policy: The Case of Angola and Mozambique, 1961-93," *The China Quarterly* 142 (1995): pp. 395-400.
[545] Steven Jackson, "China's Third World Foreign Policy," pp. 404-405
[546] For the African American response to China's role in the Angolan Civil War, see Robeson Taj Frazier, *The East is Black*, p. 207. Tanzanian forces actually hijacked a Chinese arms shipment for UNITA that was routed through Tanzania. See Philip Snow, "China and Africa: Consensus and Camouflage," in Thomas Robinson and David Shambaugh eds., *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*, p. 298. For other perspectives on these shifts in China's Africa policies, see Gilbert Comte, "Peking Shows its New Africa Look," *Africa Report* 3 (1971): pp. 19-21; Bruce Larkin, "China and Africa: A Prospective on the 1970s," *Africa Today* 18 (1971): pp. 1-11; and Mohamed El-Khawas, "China's Changing Policies in Africa," *Issue: A Journal of Public Opinion* 3 (1973): pp. 24-28.
[547] The New Communist Movement refers to the racially diverse and dispersed collection of U.S.-based communist organizations which, in the aftermath of the Sino-Soviet Split, sided with China in condemning Soviet "revisionism." See Max Elbaum, *Revolution in the Air: Sixties Radicals Turn to Lenin, Mao, and Che* (New York: Verso Books, 2002).

rather than the Soviet Union as the CCP postulated, the primary target for global revolutionary movements was still U.S. imperialism. The "Three Worlds Theory" that Mao had first posed in 1974, Haywood commented for *The Guardian* in 1984, contained a fundamental fallacy in its implication that communists in the United States needed to ally with the forces of the bourgeois. Nor is the assessment of the Soviet Union as an imperialist power correct, Haywood posited, as Soviet foreign policy has always been non-aggressive in spite of its many problems, including, as he acknowledged, chauvinist attitudes towards other socialist countries.[548]

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, which had begun to wind down by the early 1970s, was itself never such a liability. During his third official visit to China in 1974, Julius Nyerere expressed his belief that the Cultural Revolution was an admirable extension of the Chinese people's unrelenting drive for self-improvement. "As I am a Christian," Nyerere had declared, "I regard [the] attitude [of the Chinese people] as that of 'divine discontent'… I think that we in Tanzania… need to study what you would regard as your revolutionary discontent and to apply it, in our language, to our own situation."[549] After a summer 1972 tour of China, African American sociologist Robert Allen similarly ruminated that for him, a most compelling impact of the Cultural Revolution was its elevation of political consciousness in the popular realm. Allen left China thoroughly impressed that in all aspects of Chinese society, from agricultural collectivization to education and the arts, emphasis was placed on the wholescale transformation of personal beliefs and attitudes. For Allen, upon witnessing the blend of intellectual and practical learning in Chinese education and its mission of service to the people, "the demands of the Black student movement for 'open admissions,' more 'relevant' courses, greater involvement in the community… took on a new meaning."[550] In a resonant vein, Allen wrote that within Chinese industry and trade unions, workers have rebelled against the concept of a factory run by "experts" without giving valuation to the power of the masses.

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[548] Harry Haywood, "China and its Supporters Were Wrong About the USSR," *The Guardian*, April 11, 1984.
[549] Julius Nyerere, as quoted in Issa Shivji, Saida Yahya-Othman, and Ng'wanza Kamata, *Development as Rebellion: A Biography of Julius Nyerere, Volume III* (Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota Publishers, 2020): pp. 86-87.
[550] Robert L. Allen, "China Since the Great Cultural Revolution," *The Black Scholar* 5 (1973): p. 53.

"This is perhaps the major significance of the Cultural Revolution," Allen concluded, "the concept that bourgeois ideology continues to operate even during the building of socialism, and that this ideology in all its forms—individualism, private profit mentality, elitism, racism, male chauvinism—must be consciously struggled against."[551] Allen's assessments of the Cultural Revolution paralleled those of Hosea Williams, Alice Childress, and John Oliver Killens—all part of a wave of African American intellectuals and activists whose early to mid-1970s visits to China proved formative. In recounting her respect for the social and economic achievements of revolutionary China, Childress condemned the pervasiveness of racial chauvinism amongst her traveling companions, noting that "Whites, as a whole, consider themselves the master of the world and are begrudging in their admiration concerning the rise of a Third World people."[552] After her trip, Childress would become active in the U.S.-China People's Friendship Association (USCPFA). Founded in 1974, the USCPFA involved in its initial ranks a number of Black women activists with longtime affiliations to China. Vicki Garvin, who lived in Shanghai and Beijing in the 1960s, served on the editorial committee of *New China*, the official publication of the USCPFA, while Shirley Graham Du Bois took on advocacy work as a member of the organization's New York chapter.

Garvin and Graham Du Bois, in this sense, belonged to a larger cohort of African American radicals whose initiations into political activism were through an interwar Black left associated with CPUSA but who, in the postwar years, became increasingly aligned with Maoism.[553] Other contributors to *New China* in the 1970s included the singer Harry Belafonte and Salim Ahmed Salim, then serving as the Tanzanian Ambassador to the United Nations in New York. In an issue from 1976, Salim praised Chinese generosity and discipline displayed over the course of the construction of the Tanzam Railway, in addition to China's principle of non-interference in its assistance to other countries. "They wouldn't dream of asking for more than the experts and workers of Tanzania," Salim explained, "They don't

[551] Robert L. Allen, "China Since the Great Cultural Revolution," p. 56
[552] Souvenir notebook from Shaoshan Chairman Mao Memorial Museum, Folder 8, Box 4, Alice Childress Papers, Schomburg Center for Research for Research in Black Culture (New York).
[553] Dayo Gore, *Radicalism at the Crossroads: African American Women Activists During the Cold War*, p. 159

demand refrigerators. They don't demand air-conditioned flats as some others do."[554] In spite of significant shifts in the geopolitical terrain of the Cold War as well as in the exigencies of China's outreach to the Afro-Asian world, there were qualities of the Chinese model—in this case, the practice of humility in the provision of aid—that continued to appeal to African American and Tanzanian nationalists.

These aspects still included the recognition of race as a driving element of world history, even if subsumed under the category of class. As Ron Karenga, founder of the Pan-African holiday Kwanzaa, noted after a summer 1977 visit to China alongside twenty other organizers for independent Black schools, "When we argued the dual character of our oppression… the Chinese did not deny the racial factor, only stressed that in the final analysis, class was determinative."[555] The very fact of this tour of China, undertaken by this group of Pan-Africanists known primarily for their advocacy of cultural nationalism, surprised observers in Black nationalist and traditional Marxist networks. But the visit represented an unexpected convergence of sorts: in a decade largely synonymous with the demobilization of Black radicalism, the lines between racial or cultural nationalism, Third World internationalism, and anti-capitalism became, in parts, increasingly blurred. While in China, the group especially admired the Chinese valuation of hard work and self-reliance as well as the non-discriminatory treatment accorded to national minority groups, with the Central University for Nationalities in Beijing (中央民族大学) chosen as one of the sites for Karenga to deliver a lecture about independent Black education in the United States as a function of the African American struggle for liberation.[556] Robert and Mabel Williams devoted the majority of their 1979 return visit in China to travelling in Tibet, where Robert was impressed to witness the economic progress in the region and the fact that "religion and remnants are very much in evidence," contrary to claims in the Western media. Upon seeing the developments in Tibet, Williams reflected that even though Mao had been susceptible to errors of judgment during the Cultural Revolution, they did not

[554] Salim Ahmed Salim, interview with Susan Warren, as printed in *New China* (January 1976): p. 29.
[555] Ron Karenga, as quoted in Russell Rickford, *We Are an African People: Independent Education, Black Power, and the Radical Imagination* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016): p. 255.
[556] "Black Alternative Educators Tour the People's Republic of China," *The Black Scholar* 9 (1977): p. 55.

negate that "Chairman Mao was the first world leader to condemn U.S. racial discrimination and [to] support the Black people when our backs were desperately pressed to the wall." Neither were all aspects of the Cultural Revolution negative, he ventured, like its emphasis on "serving the people" and its prioritization of collective justice and equity over individualism.[557]

This confluence is remarkable considering that in the late 1960s, the conflict between revolutionary and cultural nationalists in Black radical networks deepened to the point of violent confrontation. Revolutionary nationalists, who also aspired to the abolition of capitalism and colonialism, repudiated cultural nationalism as a form of escapism that romanticized racial identity without engaging profound questions of class and imperialism; they often used "cultural nationalist" as a term of derision.[558] The Black Panther Party in fact, sparred with Karenga and derided him as a narrow-minded cultural nationalist, with the conflict escalating into a shoot-out in Los Angeles in January 1969, the outbreak of which was fomented by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. On the other hand, Karenga and his Los Angeles-based organization Us dismissed the Panthers as having fallen under the undue influence of the white Marxist left.[559] Nonetheless, akin to the impressions of Huey Newton and Elaine Brown, the most striking aspect about Chinese society was for Karenga its management of the nationalities question. Karenga, who considered his group of Black educators "members of an oppressed nationality and partisans of a national liberation struggle," wrote after the visit that revolutionary China's minority policy could be distinguished into three periods: the years from 1949 to 1955, when emphasis was placed on self-determination, followed by the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, when the objective of class struggle necessitated a form of "assimilation or forced merger" over than the "integration or unforced merger" that defined the previous era. This was succeeded by policies of the mid-1970s and onwards, which were "an attempt at a synthesis between the latitude of the early years and

[557] Robert Williams, "Mao Zedong Remembered," *The Crusader* (Winter 1981): p 5.
[558] Russell Rickford, *We Are an African People*, pp. 128-129
[559] For an in-depth examination of Ron Karenga and the movement he led for Pan-African nationalism, see Scot Brown, *Fighting for US: Maulana Karenga, the US Organization, and Black Cultural Nationalism* (New York: New York University Press, 2003).

the haste and excesses of the Cultural Revolution."[560] Karenga's discerning take, with an eye towards the applicability of Chinese theory and practice for Black communities within the United States, marked a surprising coda to the tussle of race, ethnicity, and class that characterized China's relationship with Black Power in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Maoism had become widely appreciated by Black cultural nationalists and Marxists at the height of their domestic ideological rift, even as post-Mao China, under Deng Xiaoping's leadership, began to retreat from its political and economic engagements throughout the Afro-Asian world.[561]

Similar to the Black Panther Party's enthusiastic reporting about the Chinese-financed Friendship Textile Mill in Tanzania from the late 1960s, the New Orleans-based Black poet Kalamu ya Salaam, who accompanied Karenga to China in 1977, recalls that when he arrived in Dar es Salaam in 1974 for the Sixth Pan-African Congress, one of his first requests was to stand on the Tanzam Railway. "During that time," he writes, "I also had the opportunity to visit Zanzibar where I took a tour of a cigarette factory that was built and transitionally managed by the Chinese. I spoke to none of the Chinese managers or workers, but I watched and wondered." The showcase value of large-scale China's infrastructural projects in Tanzania, in this sense, continued to figure centrally in Chinese outreach to and receptions by African American visitors into the 1970s. Kalamu ya Salaam would later describe the 1977 tour—and in particular, the ideological discussions with Chinese politicians, officials, and Robert Williams, then also visiting the country—as transformative in this respect:

> For the Chinese, the subsequent disintegration of Soviet Russia, far from refuting communism and the Chinese view, actually was just another wrinkle in the fabric of Eurocentric capitalism's eventual demise. The Chinese had long ago split with the Soviets and saw them as state capitalists who were hopelessly emotionally enmeshed and ideologically intertwined with the Western world. For we black nationalists struggling to conceptualize and actualize some form of a black nation in America, these discussions were eye-opening developments. [562]

[560] Ron Karenga, "Chinese Theory and Practice on the Nationalities Question," *In These Times*, September 14, 1977.
[561] Kalamu ya Salaam, "Why Do We Lie by Telling the Truth?" in Fred Ho and Bill Mullen eds., *Afro Asia: Revolutionary Political and Cultural Connections between Asian Americans and African Americans* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008): p. 206.
[562] Kalamu ya Salaam, "Why Do We Lie by Telling the Truth?" pp. 205-209

This turn to China of Kalamu ya Salaam and Ron Karenga, taking place years after the beginnings of U.S.-China rapprochement, derived from their perception of affinity between Maoism and Black nationalism.

After a period of withdrawal from Third World entanglements in the post-Mao era to focus on its own developing market liberalism, the decade of the 1990s saw a renewal of Chinese engagements in Africa. Western attacks on China's human rights record after the June Fourth Movement in 1989, which resulted in a massacre of civilian protesters by the military in Tiananmen Square, actually garnered sympathies for the CCP from a number of African governments. They believed that the Western elevation of "democracy" and "human rights" intended to detract from China's pursuit of independent development and modernity.[563] At the same time, its increased isolation from the West spurred China to launch a renewed "diplomatic offensive" in search of allies, with its total foreign aid commitments rising from $60.4 million USD in 1988 to $374.6 million USD by 1990. Throughout this period, African countries consistently comprised the plurality of the recipients for Chinese aid.[564] Correspondingly, a central theme in Chinese outreach to Africa was its policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other nations, as well as its relativist approach to democracy and human rights.[565]

In this new millennium, China's economic presence in Africa has grown exponentially, as Chinese companies—including both private and state-owned enterprises—are encouraged to invest overseas, especially in the natural resource and construction sectors. The number of Chinese firms operating in Africa multiplied from 800 in 2006 to 4,600 in 2011 and more than 10,000 by 2017.[566] Discourses from the Maoist period live on in the contemporary moment, even as the fundamental premises and patterns of investment have dramatically changed since the 1960s and 1970s. These continuities—the harkening to non-interference, mutual benefit, and shared colonial pasts—between the

[563] Ian Taylor, "China's Foreign Policy Towards Africa in the 1990s," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 36 (1998): pp. 446-448.
[564] Ian Taylor, "China's Foreign Policy Towards Africa in the 1990s," pp. 450-451
[565] Ian Taylor, "China's Foreign Policy Towards Africa in the 1990s," p. 453
[566] David Shinn and Joshua Eisenmann, *China and Africa: A Century of Engagement* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012): p. 129.

Cold War and the present are no accident; earlier conceptions of the Tanzam Railway as a "friendship railway" linger, with photographs and archival footage of its construction featuring prominently Chinese state propaganda about Premier Wen Jiabao's 2006 visit to Tanzania.[567]

This dissertation traced the stakes and premises embedded within one constellation of Afro-Asian thought through the 1960s. In the aftermath of the Sino-Soviet Split, Chinese outreach to Asia and Africa escalated, often predicated on its status as a non-white and postcolonial power. But at the same time, Chinese, Tanzanian, and African American diplomats and activists contested the role of Black nationalism and Pan-Africanism in relation to class struggle. Ultimately, it was this overlay of race, class, and nation discourses that underpinned the crystallization and decline of this articulation of Afro-Asian visions. Further research might center other nodes within this broad landscape of Afro-Asian and Third World configurations. For Black radical activists in the United States, including those affiliated with CPUSA and therefore more hostile to theoretical Maoism, Vietnam served as political aspiration and a primary banner of anti-imperialism, especially in light of Vietnam's increasingly close relations with the Soviet Union through the 1960s. CPUSA leader James Jackson's visits to North Vietnam during this period, in which he interviewed with Ho Chi Minh and wrote glowingly of the achievements of Vietnamese socialism, are one example that attest to the significance of the Vietnamese War in the Black radical imaginary. For Eldridge Cleaver, the North Korean concept of "juche," or self-reliance, provided a critical source of political insight. During a trip to the Tanzanian National Archives, I came upon documents concerning the popular reception of an Indonesian dance troupe in Dar es Salaam in 1965; they served as a visceral reminder of the flexibility inherent in the Afro-Asian ideal. After the dance troupe's performance on Saba Saba Day, a Tanzanian national holiday which commemorates the founding of TANU every year on July 7, the Minister for Community Development and National Culture, Erasto Mang'enya, declared that "Our association with Asian countries needs neither emphasis nor

[567] Julia C. Strauss, "The Past in the Present: Historical and Rhetorical Lineages in China's Relations with Africa," *The China Quarterly* 199 (2009): pp. 777-795.

reiteration here. Our hope of it growing from strength to strength is obvious."[568] That the performance took place on the occasion of Saba-Saba celebrations also reflected the overlapping nature of the African nationalist and Afro-Asian imaginaries in postcolonial Tanzania.

Taken together, these vignettes in the making and unmaking of Afro-Asianism in the 1960s gesture to the heterogeneous landscape of Third Worldism. The deterioration of relations between China and India, once a touchstone of Pan-Asianism in the earlier decades of the twentieth century, facilitated the development of China-Tanzanian relations.[569] In the aftermath of the 1964 Zanzibar Revolution, the displacement of and eventual ban on the Zanzibar Nationalist Party, which promoted a Pan-Islamic vision of cosmopolitanism, made way for the cultivation of partnership between the ruling Afro-Shirazi Party and the CCP, in spite of Chinese opposition to the pronounced racial nationalism of the ASP. For Robert Williams, it was his disillusionment with the Cuban position on race and national liberation, in spite of Cuba's projections in the late 1950s and early 1960s as a champion of racial equality and African decolonization, that compelled him to seek greater understanding and material support from China. In the cases of Shirley Graham Du Bois and Harry Haywood, their disappointments with the shortcomings of the Soviet position on race and nation spurred their late-life turn to Maoism. As such, the multiplicity of intra-Third World formations of solidarity during the Cold War were not only informed by divergent intellectual traditions and political convictions; they were often advanced against the grain of each other.

This dissertation opened with a discussion of W.E.B. Du Bois's 1900 address to the Third Annual Meeting of the American Negro Academy, in which he first introduced the idea of the "global color line." The contours to the world of the "darker races," in Du Bois's conception, would shift significantly over the ensuing decades, with his 1928 novel *Dark Princess* marking a turning point in his understanding of the extant hierarchies and discriminatory impulses within the Afro-Asian world. After his second visit to

[568] "Speech by the Minister for Community Development and National Culture, Chief Erasto Mang'enya at a Reception of Indonesian Dancing Troupe in Dar es Salaam on July 7, 1965," July 8, 1965, File No. IT/I. 314, TNA.
[569] Rabindranath Tagore and Sun Yat-sen, for example, were among the earliest promoters of Pan-Asianism. For China-Indian relations in the broad context of Pan-Asianism, see Tansen Sen and Brian Tsui eds., *Beyond Pan-Asianism: Connecting China and India, 1840s-1960s* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press in India, 2020).

Beijing in 1959, this time as a distinguished guest of the People's Republic of China, his stirring speech to faculty and students at Peking University was reprinted in the *Peking Review*. Its message extended from his longstanding convictions that Pan-Africanism and Afro-Asianism were interdependent, mutually reinforcing political imaginaries. As his concluding note, Du Bois encouraged Africans as well as African Americans to travel to the Soviet Union but especially China, study the Russian and Chinese languages, and in turn, "Stand together in this new world and let the old world perish in its greed or be born again in new hope and promise."[570] For Du Bois, aspirations to Afro-Asian confederation figured at the heart of his imagination of an alternative world order. While its precise form and configuration were contingent, Afro-Asianism itself was always a part of Du Bois's vision of postcolonial solidarities. In its framing of imperialism as an issue of global racial hierarchy, Afro-Asian unity—in its many iterations through the twentieth century—was critical to Third World projections of a different kind of international society. But as in the fictional universe of *Dark Princess*, for Afro-Asian formations through the 1960s, the politics of racial identifications and exclusions inspired their rise while also curbing their horizons.

[570] W.E.B. Du Bois, "China and Africa," *Peking Review*, March 3, 1959. Though W.E.B. Du Bois himself never mastered either of these languages, he arranged for his stepson David Graham Du Bois, a journalist who later served as editor-in-chief of *The Black Panther*, to spend 1959 completing a Chinese language course at Peking University. See W.E.B. Du Bois, "Letter from W. E. B. Du Bois to Tientsin Normal University students of English," December 2, 1959. W. E. B. Du Bois Papers (MS 312). Special Collections and University Archives, University of Massachusetts Amherst Libraries, Amherst, MA.

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