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Faculty Research Working Paper Series

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# Policy Consequences of Civil Society: Evidence from German-American Counter-Mobilization to Prohibition

Tobias Resch<sup>\*</sup> Benjamin Schneer<sup>†</sup>

#### Abstract

What impact do mass civil society groups have on public policy? We study this issue by analyzing opposition to national prohibition by German-American groups and associations in the early twentieth century, before and after state-sponsored suppression of them that coincided with U.S. entry to World War I. We measure German-American civil society and organizational strength across time and geography based on historical club directories, newspaper directories and petitioning activity. Comparing votes in the House of Representatives on two near-identical proposals for constitutional amendments—the defeat of the Hobson Prohibition Amendment in 1914 and the successful passage of the eventual Eighteenth Amendment in 1917—we find suppression mattered most in districts located at the middle of the German-American population distribution, where we hypothesize representatives were most persuadable. We estimate that without suppression of German-American organizations the Prohibition Amendment would not have received enough support for passage. Our findings add to an understanding of when and under what circumstances groups and organizations successfully influence public policy and provide a new explanation for the passage of the Prohibition Amendment.

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### Introduction

A long list of observers have noted Americans' tendency to form groups, their proclivity for associational life (Madison 1787; De Tocqueville 1840). Schlesinger (1944) wrote that "in mastering the associative way [Americans] have mastered the democratic way." Modern political scientists have at turns extolled the role of civil society groups in well-functioning democracies and cautioned against the anti-democratic impulses these groups may facilitate (Berman 1997). A developed civil society helps channel the efforts and enhance the political efficacy of ordinary citizens (Henderson and Han 2021), though to varying degrees depending on factors such as group cohesiveness, organization, and resources (Schlozman, Verba and Brady 2012), along with a group's size as a share of the electorate (Anzia 2019). Yet, despite the careful study of mass civil society groups, the question of how specifically they affect public policy remains only partially answered. Several important elements related to this question have not received the attention they deserve.

First, government is rarely an impartial or passive agent during moments of high-stakes conflict over policy, and this often has a direct impact on the effectiveness of groups and associations themselves. While scholars have documented how engagement with the state shapes groups indirectly—whether through "policy feedback" effects that shift group preferences (Campbell 2003; Mettler 2005), or through replication of federal structures within national membership groups (Skocpol, Ganz and Munson 2000)—surprisingly little work examines the effects on groups and associations of direct intervention by the state.

A second key challenge to tracing the effects of civil society groups on political outcomes is that the development of groups along with shifts in public policy are both historical processes, unfolding over long periods of time and bound up with other contemporaneous factors influencing group formation as well as prospects for changing public policy. Some theories of groups even explicitly note the endogenous nature of organizational efforts—e.g., when citizens deploy "slack" resources in response to a policy threat (Dahl 1961). A group's strength (in numbers, in organization, and in expended effort) can serve as both a cause and a symptom of the policy environment, which complicates efforts to identify a group's true impact on public policy. Causal inference approaches in such settings present a variety of challenges, despite growing attention to their value (Wawro and Katznelson 2020).

In this paper, we address these issues by turning to an era that offers opportunities for observing dramatic changes in group activity as well as high-stakes political conflict. Though the Progressive Era has been studied extensively by political scientists (see, e.g., Skowronek 1982), one of the most prominent policy issues at the time—the prohibition of alcohol—offers a unique chance to understand the effects of civil society groups on public policy. The drive toward prohibition involved two massive social movement organizations (the *Woman's Christian Temperance Union* and the *Anti-Saloon League*) and a rare, successful third-party bid for Congressional seats by the Prohibition Party; it resulted in two Constitutional amendments, including an unprecedented outright repeal barely a decade after the adoption of the 18th Amendment. Remnants of this "noble experiment"—e.g., a dramatic expansion of federal policing power and the creation of the federal carceral state (McGirr 2015)—remain relevant today.

In this paper, we study the role of civil society groups in the congressional passage of the prohibition amendment using granular historical evidence on German-American organizations, which proved to be important opponents of prohibition efforts. We document on a congressional district level the rapid decline of German-American civil life resulting from anti-German hysteria and overt political suppression related to the first World War. This detailed geographic resolution allows us both to carefully track changes in civil society groups and to overcome empirical challenges faced by prior work. We ask: Did districts that experienced large declines in civil society suffer the same political consequences as those that did not? This question has important implications for understanding not only (1) the characteristics associated with a group's resilience in the face of government suppression but also (2) the effects that organizing can have on policy outcomes in the first place.

Our answer is an intuitive one, but to our knowledge has not been identified before. We argue that declines in civil society matter in districts where a group's previous efforts had been most essential—tipping an undecided or persuadable representative in one direction or another on a given policy issue. In our historical case, persuadable representatives appear to be located most frequently in districts where a group is neither an overwhelming majority nor an inconsequential minority. In these districts a group's efforts—and their suppression—have the largest impact. This outlook aligns with a classic electoral logic (campaign mobilization efforts, for example, have sought to boost turnout among marginal voters), which we here extend to the study of the policy impact of groups and associations.

#### German-American Civil Society in the Context of Prohibition

By the 1910s, German-Americans had formed an extensive network of civic groups and cultural associations alongside a thriving German-language press—which we will refer to using the umbrella term German-American "civil society." Although much of their political activity occurred outside of partisan channels, German-Americans displayed impressive levels of political organization and could mobilize quickly when they perceived threats to their interests.<sup>1</sup> The U.S. decision to enter World War I in 1917 not only enhanced anti-German-American sentiments that had emerged at the war's start but also resulted in overt suppression of German-American organizations by local, state, and federal governments.

We examine how this suppression impacted the effectiveness of German-American civil society to prevent the prohibition of alcohol, which had long been the raison d'être of German-American political activity.<sup>2</sup> Beer held indispensable cultural significance to German-Americans; its moderate consumption was integral to the club houses and beer halls where much of the community gathered and conducted its civil life. Crucial to our paper's empirical strategy, we observe detailed information on levels of German-American political and social organization as well as political effectiveness against Prohibition *both before and after the onset of suppression*. Unique historical circumstances offer both an abrupt negative shock to German-American civil society and a clean measure of changes in the substantive representation of German-American interests on Prohibition: Congress took roll-call votes on the issue before the U.S. joined the war (the 1914 Hobson Amendment) and three years later, after U.S. entry (the 1917 Prohibition Amendment).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>For example, opposing efforts to close the Chicago World Fair on Sundays or to prohibit alcohol.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Child (1939), noted that "it is in the prohibition question that we find the whole clue to German-American solidarity."

	HJI	R168	SJR17		
Vote	Ν	Pct.	Ν	Pct.	
Nay	194	45%	133	31%	
Yea	207	48%	289	67%	
Abstain	34	8%	11	3%	

Table 1: Prohibition Votes on Hobson Amendment (1914, HJR168) and 18th Amendment (1917, SJR17), House of Representatives

**Note:** Totals include members of Congress who paired or announced votes. The official cast vote total for HJR168 was 197-190 with 40 not voting and 1 answering "present," and for SJR17 it was 282-128 with 23 not voting.

Table 1 reports the roll-call votes for these amendments, which required a two-thirds majority for passage.

By pairing measurement of German-American political and social organizations with districtlevel shifts in support for Prohibition, we identify how suppression affected German-American civil society and, in turn, influenced the substantive representation of German-American interests against Prohibition. Before the onset of World War I, a variety of measures of German-American civil society correlated significantly with a vote against prohibition in the 1914 Hobson Amendment, with the strongest effects observed in congressional districts located in the middle and upper parts of the German-American population distribution. We then document the extent of political and social suppression after the onset of World War I, and we find a concurrent decline in German-American civil society (regardless of the overall level of German-American population in a district).<sup>3</sup> We characterize the policy consequences of this suppression by estimating the effect of declines in civil society on support for Prohibition. To complement this approach, we also employ a simple difference-in-differences design evaluating whether the onset of war altered support for Prohibition in Congress differentially in districts with high levels of German-American civil soci-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>For the purpose of our empirical exercises, we define "suppression" that accompanied U.S. involvement in the War as not any one specific policy or action on the part of the state or private citizens, but rather note that the conduct of the U.S. and its citizens during the War created a hostile climate for German-Americans, raising the cost of continued participation in and maintenance of a previously thriving set of German-American civic organizations.

ety. In each case, we find that the policy consequences depended crucially on the combination of the district's German-American population and the extent of its civil society.

In places at the bottom or top of the German-American population distribution, organization was less important for policy outcomes before the onset of suppression. Crucially, it was in areas with moderate-high levels of German-American population where both the political effects of organization were most important before the war and where the most vote switching occurred after the U.S. declared war. Our estimates suggest that anti-German sentiment and suppression explained somewhere between 11 and 30 vote switches from Nay to Yea on the question of prohibition; even the lower bound of this estimate would have proved pivotal in the passage of this legislation in the House.

#### A New Perspective on the Prohibition Amendment

Our account provides a new perspective on and interpretation of the passage of Prohibition. Given the hurdles to amending the Constitution, passage of the Eighteenth Amendment remains rather puzzling. How did prohibition of alcohol—a policy that would prove to be unpopular and unsuccessful enough for a subsequent repeal amendment to be ratified only thirteen years later (Kyvig 1979)—become constitutionally enshrined in the first place? Our account highlights the crucial role of political and social suppression of German-Americans in this episode.

This interpretation contrasts significantly with most existing historical accounts, which have variably cast prohibition as a battle over status between "old" Anglo-elements and more recent immigrants (Gusfield 1963), emphasized (Goff and Anderson 1994) or deemphasized (Munger and Schaller 1997) brewer/distiller influence, or attributed Prohibition to changes in the temper-ance movement's strategy towards local gradualism (Szymanski 2003). Recent cutting-edge work has refocused explanations on voter preferences, examining the responsiveness of state legislators to their constituents' votes on prohibition referendums and finding a high degree of responsiveness in both the North and one-party South (Olson and Snyder 2021). Our paper proposes to amend these explanations by focusing on the flipside of the temperance movement—countermobilization by "wet" forces.

### German-American Civil Society during the 1910s

How did, as we claim, German-Americans become one of the most formidable opponents to the prohibition of alcohol by the early 20th century? We here point to three key factors: their large share of the population, the development of their civil society/social organizations, and their conduct/lifestyle. Before developing this argument, we will briefly discuss measurement of each key factor and how we define *German-Americans*.

#### **Defining German-Americans**

Many immigrants from Germany arrived in the United States prior to or just after the founding of the German empire in 1871; their regional identities often superseded their German identity (Luebke 1974, 1990; Johnson 1999). Moreover, many immigrants from Switzerland, Austria, or the German-speaking parts of Italy considered themselves as culturally German, although their originating country was not part of the German Empire.<sup>4</sup> We will use the term German-American to refer to *those who primarily conducted their affairs in German language and/or followed mainstream-German cultural and religious practices*.

#### **Share of Population**

We look to census data from IPUMS (Ruggles et al. 2019) for a conservative estimate of the German-American population. According to the 1910 U.S. Census, nearly eight percent of respondents were born in Germany or had parents both born in Germany. Together with respondents born in or with parents both born in Switzerland (less than 1%) or Austria-Hungary (approx. 2%), slightly more than one out of ten whites in America was drawn from this group.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>One illustrative example is that of Karl Muck, the Boston Symphony Orchestra's well-known conductor from 1912 to 1918. Though he was a citizen of neutral Switzerland, having been born in Germany made him *German* enough in the eyes of U.S. authorities, which arrested and interned him for the duration of World War I (Burrage 2019).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>See Appendix A.2.1 for further discussion of our rationale for how to measure German-Americans.

As Figure A.2 illustrates, the German-American population was heavily concentrated in the Midwest (especially in Wisconsin, Michigan, and Nebraska), New York City, and central Texas. In some counties, first- and second-generation ethnic Germans represented half the total white population by 1910; among these were Washington, Fayette, and Austin counties in Texas, Milwaukee, Marathon, and Green Lake counties in Wisconsin, Colfax County in Nebraska, and McLeod County in Minnesota.<sup>6</sup>

Other key census variables include the German-born population in a district<sup>7</sup> and the Urban population in a district.<sup>8</sup>

#### **Civil Society and Social Organizations**

By the 1910s, German-Americans had created a sprawling civil society able to mobilize effectively in response to perceived threats. To illustrate, we focus on three aspects of this civil society: social clubs and organizations, German-language newspapers, and petitions.

#### **German-American Organizations**

Club directories (*Deutsch-Amerikanisches Vereins-Addressbuch*) published by the German-American Directory Publishing Company of Milwaukee provide evidence of a vivid associational life in the German-American community during the first decades of the twentieth century. For example, the 1914 club directory lists more than 4,000 social organizations across 44 different states and DC.<sup>9</sup> Interests ranged from science-based clubs to leagues for the German card game *Skat*,

<sup>6</sup>See Table A.17 in the Appendix for summary statistics of the 50 counties with the highest white population share of ethnic Germans.

<sup>7</sup>German-born population correlates highly with 2nd-generation German-American population (i.e., mother or father born in Germany, Austria. etc.) and can be thought of as a measurement of the extent of the German-American community in a district.

<sup>8</sup>We also use roll call data as well as each MC's age, party affiliation and region (Lewis et al. 2019). <sup>9</sup>This number is actually an undercount, as we had to remove certain groups of organizations that were only listed partially (e.g., lodges for the Sons of Herrmann and mutual aid societies) to ensure consistency between the directories we compare in our paper. Those incomplete categories from occupation-based to ideological affinity groups, and from shooting societies to clubs dedicated to preparing annual carnival celebrations. Singing societies accounted for nearly one out of every four organizations and were the most popular activity. Less popular, but still significant were the *Turnvereine*, which combined physical exercise with enlightenment political ideas, and veteran's clubs, with more than 300 different clubs each. Most organizations met weekly. The single common denominator between many of these clubs was the quasi-public consumption of alcohol—usually beer, less frequently wine. Sometimes, they proclaimed a beer garden or saloon their *Vereinslokal*, but more often they maintained club homes, which almost always included restaurant and bar facilities. In some cities, including San Francisco, Indianapolis, or New York City, groups joined together to build their own *Deutsches Haus*, which would serve as a focal point for German club life.

To track German-American civil society groups, we extracted data from the club directories for 1914, 1916 and 1922. We geolocated their locations using the Google Geolocation API, placing organizations into historical congressional districts and counties.<sup>10</sup>

Figure 1 records the change over time in German-American social organizations by congressional district, and the over-time decline in the density of organizations is clear by visual inspection for many districts.

#### **German-Language Newspapers**


German-American club life was supported by an active German-language press, which we track using data from three editions (1913, 1916, and 1920) of *N.W. Ayer & Son's Annual American Newspaper Directory*. For each city listed in the directory with one or more German language newspaper, we tallied the number of editions published per week and aggregated this count to the Congressional district level.<sup>11</sup>

include more than 2,000 additional organizations.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup>Appendix A.2.2 provides additional details.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup>Appendix A.2.3 provides additional details.

#### Figure 1: Map of German-American Organizations Index



Notes: This map illustrates the change over time in German-American social organizations.

#### **Petitions from German-American Organizations**

We employ petitioning activity among German-American organizations as another measure of historical German-American civil society. Using the petitioning database from Blackhawk et al. (2020), we identify petitions sent to Congress by German-American organizations by constructing regular expressions based on the most common organization names in the German-American directories.<sup>12</sup> We then apply these expressions to search each petition's *petitioner* information. Because the total number of petitions sent by German-American organizations in any single congressional district is relatively low, we use aggregate petitioning activity during the time period spanning from the 54th to the 63rd Congresses to capture this aspect of German-American civil society. Importantly, unlike the previous two measures, this snapshot petitioning measure does not vary over time. As a result, we view this measure as most useful for measuring the pre-war historical organizational activity of German-American civil society groups, which is another indicator

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup>Appendix A.2.5 lists the regular expressions used.

of how embedded civil society groups were in a congressional district.<sup>13</sup>

#### **Civil Society Index**

Finally, we create an index based on the first principal component of the three previous measures, which we term the Civil Society Index. Such an approach could be seen as a historical analog to efforts designed at tracking modern civil society groups (Han, Kim and de Vries 2022; Han and Kim 2022). We scale the index so that larger values indicate a greater level or density of German-American civil society groups and negative values indicate a lesser one. The index has a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.27. The first component explains 54% of the variance in the three variables. The factor loadings are (1) German-Language Newspapers = 0.61; (2) German Clubs = 0.65; (3) Petitions = 0.45.

#### Conduct/Lifestyle

Less quantifiable, but nonetheless important was that the lifestyle of these "Club Germans" provided a visible counter-narrative to the critical accounts of the saloon spun by prohibition advocates, including interest groups like the Anti-Saloon League or the Women's Christian Temperance Union. German-Americans had cultivated an image that demonstrated how the consumption of alcohol could co-exist harmoniously with orderly civil conduct. As early as 1867, Americans could read in *The Atlantic Monthly* how—in beer halls that accommodated "two to three thousand people at a time"—German-Americans in New York managed to keep their composure: "Crowded as these immense halls are at night, it is very seldom that any disturbance occurs in them. [...] loud talking may be heard at the tables, for the Germans are very disputatious, and lager-bier [...] is intoxicating in its effects. But the excitement produced by it seems to be of a mild and innocuous character" (Shanly 1867).

German immigrants and their descendants also rarely lived in dry counties. Table A1 includes information on county prohibition status in 1910 and 1916 for the 50 counties that had the highest

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup>Appendix A.2.4 provides further details.

share of German-American population.<sup>14</sup> In 1910, only one of these 50 counties was dry. That number increased to five by 1916, due to Iowa's legislature re-instituting prohibition in 1916.<sup>15</sup> In 1910, almost 80% of the counties in the top quartile of German-American population share were wet, while nearly 95% of those in the bottom quartile were dry.

However, despite their *wet* proclivities, German-Americans had managed to achieve high socioeconomic status. "Public opinion," Higham (1963) writes, "had come to accept the Germans as one of the most assimilable and reputable of immigrant groups.[...] By and large the Germans had risen out of the working class. They were businessmen, farmers, clerks, and in a few cases highly skilled workmen." If, as Gusfield (1963) notes, "the propagators of Temperance doctrine had confidence that power, prestige, and even income were legitimately tied to the values of the sober, industrious, and steady middle-class citizen" (Gusfield 1963, p. 85), German-American socio-cultural practices and economic success undermined some of the central tenets of the Temperance movement.

## The 1914 Fight Against a National Prohibition Amendment

As the House prepared to vote on the "Hobson Prohibition Amendment" in 1914, German-Americans counter-mobilized and emerged as a crucial opponent to Prohibition. Since the first introduction of a resolution for a national prohibition amendment in 1876, similar resolutions had been introduced regularly; however, they had usually died before reaching the floor for a final passage vote (Cherrington 1920). Nonetheless, this history had resulted in considerable experience on the part of German-American organizations at lobbying against dry legislation. In this section, we first catalogue German-American pre-War efforts at maintaining the wet status quo, then show that their efforts produce several measurable empirical regularities: prior to U.S. entry into the First World War, the extent of German-American civil society in a congressional district strongly pre-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup>Information on prohibition status is based on Sechrist (2012).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup>This ban was short-lived, as Iowa again went *wet* a year. The vote corresponded more closely "with the proportion of residents who were either first- or second-generation German-Americans than with any other variable" (Ryan 1983).

dicted anti-Prohibition votes in Congress; furthermore, the largest effects are located in districts towards the middle of the population distribution of German-Americans.

#### **Organizing for Beer**

German-American efforts against prohibition originated within the universe of German-American clubs, most of which were organized under the umbrella of the German-American Alliance. Efficiently designed as a local-state-national federation (Skocpol, Ganz and Munson 2000), local organizations fought local prohibition measures, and state associations fought efforts at statewide prohibition.<sup>16</sup> At the federal level, the *National German-American Alliance* (NGAA) took charge. Having received a Congressional charter in 1907, the NGAA was formally prohibited from engaging in partisan politics. But that did not keep it out of politics altogether. In addition to encouraging its members to send anti-prohibition letters and petitions to Congress, the President, and federal agencies, *it utilized its resources to ward off the prohibition threat in at least five major ways*.

First, it worked to ensure that there would be no Congressional committee hearing on alcoholrelated matters without testimony by leaders or members of the National German-American Alliance. Johnson (1999) recounts testimony by NGAA leaders and members for all major pieces of legislation with the potential to impede the availability of beer. House Judiciary hearings on the Hepburn-Dolliver Bill (regulating interstate shipment of liquor) in the 58th Congress (1904-1906) marked the first occasion of NGAA advocacy in Congressional hearings, with C.J. Hexamer, the Alliance's long-time president, and several other members of the NGAA leadership speaking before the committee. The 59th Congress saw NGAA leadership giving testimony on three occasions—pertaining to its own charter,<sup>17</sup> regarding commerce of alcohol and alcoholic beverages, and on prohibition in the District of Columbia. Over the next four Congresses (60th-63rd), it provided testimony on thirteen occasions, at least seven of which directly pertained to alco-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup>The state federations frequently provided updates on their ongoing efforts in the national bulletin (*Mitteilungen*), published monthly by the National German-American Alliance.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup>As Johnson (1999) hints, it was perhaps no coincidence that Hepburn emerged as of the most vocal opponents when the time came to debate if Congress should award a charter to the NGAA.

hol restrictions. In addition to its own leadership and member experts, it enlisted members of its women's auxiliary to attest to the benefits of German, "temperate" alcohol consumption (and reimbursed their trips to the capital).

The second approach the NGAA took was to encourage German-Americans to file for naturalization papers, pleading explicitly that their ability to vote was paramount to defeat "illiberal" the preferred synonym for *prohibitionist* in America's German-language press—candidates in many editions of its bulletin. Third, it tried to ensure its members would have the necessary information to vote "correctly", printing and distributing translated sample ballots, so that members could "practice" their wet vote. Fourth, it engaged in informational campaigns, frequently printing and disseminating anti-prohibition literature in both English and German. Lastly, when it feared Congressional passage of anti-alcohol legislation, NGAA leadership would write letters to the President, encouraging him towards a veto. In sum, not only did German-American cultural organizations almost uniformly oppose Prohibition, through mobilization they effectively advocated against passage of a resolution to be ratified by the states.

This organizational heft was reflected in the vehement opposition to prohibition by legislators of German descent and/or representing heavily German-American districts. During the House debate on the proposed amendment, they repeatedly pointed to their own communities to refute the alleged evils of alcohol consumption. Richard Parker (R-NJ) pointed out that "Intoxication is rare in the large German population in my city [Newark], which drinks only light beer, as well as in our Italian community, which drinks light wine."<sup>18</sup> Henry Vollmer (D-IA), a second-generation German-American, challenged prohibition efforts by returning to the familiar example of orderly German beer consumption,<sup>19</sup> while Julius Kahn (R-CA), one of the most prominent German-Americans at the time, called for a more relaxed, *more German* approach to alcoholic bev-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup>Congressional Record, Volume 52, Part I: 512.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup>Congressional Record, Volume 52, Part I: 559. "[...] the saloons where German folks go a great deal are orderly enough. They are gathering places for families and there is nothing that is considered distasteful in having folks sit around in them with women and children in the groups."

erages.<sup>20</sup>

Additional examples of anti-prohibition position taking by Congressmen with similar constituencies are abundant.<sup>21</sup> MCs knew their German-American constituents were monitoring them. The prohibition threat made for front-page news in much of America's German-language press, with papers announcing the vote's tally on the front page and including detailed breakdowns of the vote's partisan composition as well as their local delegation's speeches and votes.<sup>22</sup>

Front-page coverage tended to remain primarily informative, but on the editorial pages of the German language press, sharp opinions flowed freely. Nebraska's *Tägliche Omaha Tribüne* accused the state's Republican Congressmen of a breached promise, calling their pro-prohibitionary votes a "disgusting trick"<sup>23</sup> and announcing that there would be consequences: "They should have known that their party cannot achieve anything in Nebraska without the support of their liberal and, especially, their foreign-born citizens."<sup>24</sup> Cincinnati's *Tägliches Cincinnatier Volksblatt* not only included explicit calls to donate to the anti-prohibition cause, but ascribed the entire prohibition movement to a collective "mental illness of fear-inducing proportions."<sup>25</sup> For Baltimore's *Der Deutsche Correspondent* the true target of the prohibitionists' efforts was obvious: "In their fight for prohibition they focus foremost on beer; the beverage the Germans brought into their country is a thorn in their eyes."<sup>26</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup>See Congressional Record, Volume 52, Part I: 534. Here, he noted: "Is the American less capable of self-restraint than the German, the Frenchman, or the Italian? I have sufficient faith in my countryman to believe he can curb his appetite as well as the former."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup>Barchfeld (R-PA) and Barthold (R-MO), for example, expressed similar sentiments during the debate.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup>Including but not limited to the *Der Deutscher Herold* (SD), *Der Nordstern* (MN), Die *Detroiter Abend-Post* (MI), *Die Tägliche Omaha Tribüne* (NE), or *Der Deutsche Correspondent* (MD).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup>*Tägliche Omaha Tribüne*. December 23, 1914: 4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup>*Tägliche Omaha Tribüne*. December 23, 1914: 4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup>*Tägliches Cincinnatier Volksblatt*. December 23, 1914: 4-5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup>Der Deutsche Correspondent. December 23, 1914: 4.

Overall, the historical record illustrates how German-American organizations recognized the threat of prohibition and took concrete steps to oppose it directly. We now examine the empirical relationship between German-American civil society and congressional vote choice on the Hobson amendment to assess whether these efforts yielded measurable differences in the policies supported by congressional representatives.

#### **Explaining Support for Prohibition Before World War I**

To assess the strength of German-American civil society in a congressional district, we employ: (1) the number of German-American social clubs, (2) the number of German-language newspapers, (3) the level of petitioning by German-American clubs, and (4) the Civil Society Index. In Table 2 we present the results of logistic regressions that model MC vote choice on the Hobson Amendment as a function of a district's German-American civil society along with other covariates including a district's German-American population, urban population, and the MC's age, party and geographic region. Specifications 1-5 estimate the relationship between a pro-Prohibition vote on the Hobson Amendment, the civil society measures, and the German-born population in a district. We find a negative correlation between casting a vote in favor of prohibition and each independent variable.

	Pro Prohibition Vote							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
log(German Social Clubs + 1)	$-0.721^{***}$ (0.095)					$-0.472^{***}$ (0.160)		
log(German Org	(0.070)					(0.100)		
Petitions to MC + 1)		$-0.846^{***}$ (0.231)				-0.566* (0.310)		
log(German-Language Newspapers + 1)		· · · ·	$-0.408^{***}$ (0.083)			$-0.364^{**}$ (0.153)		
Civil Society			(0.083)			(0.155)		
Index				$-0.739^{***}$ (0.099)			-0.776*** (0.187)	
log(German Pop.)				(0.077)	$-0.438^{***}$ (0.068)	-0.043 (0.153)	-0.062 (0.151)	$-0.406^{***}$ (0.121)
log(Urban Pop.)					(0.000)	$-0.708^{***}$ (0.194)	$-0.743^{***}$ (0.186)	$-0.754^{***}$ (0.177)
MC Age						0.016 (0.014)	0.017 (0.014)	0.010 (0.013)
Democratic						-1.682***	-1.663***	-1.559***
Northeast						(0.319) $-1.435^{***}$	(0.316) $-1.414^{***}$	(0.295) $-1.157^{***}$
South						(0.381) -0.747	(0.374) $-0.765^{*}$	(0.352) -0.262
West						(0.465) -0.095	(0.433) -0.107	(0.400) 0.664
Constant	0.970***	0.083	0.874***	-0.152	3.463***	(0.594) 10.547***	(0.566) 9.231***	(0.489) 12.190***
	(0.174)	(0.107)	(0.235)	(0.109)	(0.571)	(2.190)	(2.091)	(1.978)
Ν	407	435	408	401	407	401	401	407
Log Likelihood AIC	-246.633 497.266	-293.269 590.539	-268.879 541.759	-242.622 489.244	-257.359 518.718	-194.069 410.137	-194.310 406.620	-209.904 435.808

Table 2: German Population, Social Clubs and MC Vote Choice: Hobson Prohibition Amendment (HJR 168)

 $^{*}p < .1; ^{**}p < .05; ^{***}p < .01$ 

**Notes:** This table reports the results of a logistic regression. The outcome variable indicates a vote for the Hobson Amendment or not. Multi-member districts are excluded from the sample. The Civil Society Index is based upon the first principal component of the measures of German-American civil society.


Figure 2 illustrates these results graphically and allows for more directly interpretable effects. When the number of German social organizations in a congressional district doubles, the average marginal effect is a 10 percentage point decline in the probability of a vote supporting Prohibition. Similarly, we observe a 14 percentage point decline for petitions and a 7 percentage point decline for newspapers. Each measure captures a slightly different aspect of German-American civil society, but across all three we observe significant correlations with the voting behavior of district representatives. The number of organizations accounts for the civic infrastructure in place in a district in the first place. Petitioning reflects a measure of active outreach and participation; in this and earlier eras canvassing for signatures required not insignificant effort, often put forth by multiple canvassers, and coincided with emergent forms of political organization (Carpenter et al. 2018). Finally, newspapers likely played both an informational role—recounting the debates in Congress on Prohibition—as well as a persuasive role, with opinion pages making the case against prohibition to German-language readers and levelling threats and shame towards MCs displaying weakened resolve against Prohibition.

These estimates suggest that MCs responded to the organizational efforts of German-Americans when voting on the 1914 Hobson Amendment. Our findings for the composite Civil Society Index align with this account too: a one standard deviation increase in the index correlates with a 20 percentage point decline in the probability of a vote in support of Prohibition.

Adding a full set of controls, including the German-American population in the district and region dummy variables, yields similar results. In specifications 6 and 7 of Table 2, we observe strong negative effects even when including all controls.<sup>27</sup> When including German-American population along with the measures of civil society, the population variable is no longer significant while the civil society variables retain statistical significance. With all three individual measures included in the same regression, the number of German clubs is the most robust predictor (significant at p < 0.01). The number of petitions registers a larger but slightly noisier point estimate

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup>One might be concerned that MC characteristics are downstream from district composition so controlling for them could induce bias. Appendix Table A.4 shows the estimates are not sensitive to this concern.





**Notes:** This figure reports the predicted probabilities based on a regression of pro-Prohibition Vote (1914 Hobson Amendment) on measures of German-American civil society. Across all measures, there is a strong negative relationship between German-American civil society and support for Prohibition.

(significant at p < 0.10). A one standard deviation increase in the Civil Society Index corresponds with an average marginal effect equivalent to a 16 percentage point decline in the probability of a vote for Prohibition.

These findings replicate when examining patterns of variation within *state* rather than within region. Appendix Table A.5 reports results from the same set of regressions with full controls but replacing region dummy variables with state fixed effects.<sup>28</sup>


Though controlling for the level of German-American population in a district does not meaningfully attenuate the relationship between civil society and a vote for Prohibition, the effects vary meaningfully when we segment districts based on the level of German-American population. In fact, there was considerable variation in the extent of civil society for a given level of German-American population. Figure A.1 depicts the joint distribution between German-American population and the Civil Society Index, revealing a meaningful number of districts where German-American population and the level of German-American civil society did not have a one-to-one relationship (e.g., see the off-diagonal squares).

Table A.9 in the Appendix reports results where we separately re-estimate logistic regressions of a pro-Prohibition vote on the Civil Society Index after grouping congressional districts by German-American population quartile. Figure 3 graphically presents the results. The third quartile exhibits the effect size with the greatest magnitude average marginal effect, with a one standard deviation increase in the Civil Society Index corresponding to a 25 percentage point decline in the probability of a pro-Prohibition vote. The fourth quartile districts exhibit a statistically significant effect as well, though of a reduced magnitude (around 15 percentage points). The 95% confidence intervals for the districts in the first and second quartiles overlap with zero.

Districts with a moderate to moderate-high concentration of German-American population appear to be where civil society mattered most pre-World War I. A plausible interpretation is that the representatives from these districts were disproportionately on the threshold between a Yea

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup>Tables A.6 and A.7 report the results for odds-ratios with and without state fixed effects. Table A.8 reports the results for a linear probability model. In all cases, the same relationships as in the main model obtain.

Figure 3: **Pr(pro-Prohibition Vote) as a function of a One SD Increase in German-American Civil Society Index, by Congressional District German-Population Quartile** 



**Notes:** This figure illustrates the effects of a one standard deviation increase in the German-American Civil Society Index broken out by the quartile of German-American population residing in a congressional district. Table A.9 in the Appendix reports the full regression results on which this figure relies.

vote and a Nay vote (i.e., persuadable or undecided), and the presence of German-American civil society groups helped push them over the edge. Put differently, organizational efforts matter most in places where MCs were most likely to be persuadable. This account also matches with actions taken by German-American civil society groups detailed above during the 1914 fight against the Hobson Amendment—providing congressional testimony, naturalization and voter-registration drives, reporting on MC's votes in the German-language press—all of these organizational efforts help to cajole, pressure and persuade wavering elected officials.

In districts with a very small German-American population, the level of organization of German-Americans would be unlikely to translate into meaningful substantive representation of their interests. Simply too few German-American constituents resided there to reach a critical mass, and elected officials had few incentives to respond to a group comprising such a small share of the district. A similar but more limited argument can be made for congressional districts with the highest numbers of German-American organizations. In these areas, the level of civil society did matter—but because German-Americans represented a large constituency regardless of their organizational capacity, the variation in civil society measures mattered less than in the most marginal districts.<sup>29</sup>

### The Great War and the Destruction of German-American Civil Society

The U.S. entered World War I on April 6, 1917. The House vote on the Prohibition Amendment occurred December 17, 1917—contemporaneous with widespread anti-German sentiment and even outright suppression, which had begun building before the U.S. declaration of War and continued to escalate through the end of the conflict in 1918. In this section, we characterize the extent of anti-German sentiments that coincided with U.S. entry to the War and describe the extent to which the state condoned or encouraged suppression of German-Americans.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup>This finding has linkages to other cases where non-linear relationships exist between the density of immigrant groups and legislative outcomes, such as support for literacy tests (Goldin 1994).

#### **Efforts to Suppress German-Americans: A Historical Sketch**

As tensions between their *Vaterland* and their new home country escalated, German-Americans became the singular target of nativist sentiment and, ultimately, state-condoned suppression (Higham 1963). Local, state, and federal governments directly suppressed German-American groups and their activities in several ways, including but not limited to (1) local and state restrictions for German language instruction in public and private schools, (2) Congress revoking the national charter of the German American Alliance, (3) authorizing the Postmaster General to revoke mailing privileges for German-language publications suspected of disloyalty, (4) requiring all foreign-language publications to file official English translations with local post offices for any war-related coverage, (5) the Department of Justice enlisting citizen auxiliaries to identify disloyal German elements, (6) requiring the registration of the German-born population over the age of 14 (including naturalized citizens), and (7) detaining roughly 2,000 members of this population in internment camps (Wittke 1936; Luebke 1974; Tolzmann 1996; Wüstenbecker 2007).

While some of these acts of suppression remained largely symbolic,<sup>30</sup> others worked hand-inhand with anti-German hysteria to dismantle the German-American community's ability to mobilize. Effective October 1917, the Trading with the Enemy Act required German-language papers to file official translations for all articles related to the war or American politics with their local Post Office. Together with the threat of losing mailing privileges, a loss of advertising revenue and explicit citizen protests, this added overhead cost put most German-language presses out of business. Two years before the Act was passed, N.W. Ayer & Son's listed 528 German-language newspapers and periodicals across 38 (plus D.C.) states. In 1920, the directory contained only 276

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup>Higham (1963) describes two such policy changes: First, the U.S. imprisoned several thousand Germans under authority of the 1798 Alien Enemies Act, the number of internees amounted to less than one percent of the more than 250,000 registered male enemy aliens over fourteen years old. Second, in 1918, the Department of Justice re-interpreted federal statute to justify stripping citizenship from "disloyal" subjects and prepared a denaturalization drive, but the war's end preempted the drive.

German newspapers across 27 states.<sup>31</sup>

German-American civic organizations faced similar difficulties, which culminated when a subcommittee of the Senate's Committee of the Judiciary held highly publicized hearings on a proposal to revoke the charter of the National German-American Alliance. As the federated head of thousands of organizations, the Alliance was integral to coordination within the German-American community. Although its congressional charter had been approved unanimously only eleven years prior (Johnson 1999), the Alliance now faced accusations of being the conspiratorial propaganda arm of the Kaiser. The hearings began with testimony that the NGAA's true intent was to bring about Pan-Germanism in America: the U.S. becoming "a fief of the German Empire [...] would inevitably have been the result of the continuance of the activities of this organization".<sup>32</sup> The Alliance's leadership concluded that their organization's days were numbered. Preempting Congressional action, they unwound their central office and transferred remaining assets to state-level subsidiaries. The Senate and House votes that resulted in the revocation of the NGAA's charter were primarily symbolic, as the organization had already ceased to exist.

Federal officials and Congress also facilitated more overt forms of anti-German suppression. The Department of Justice semi-officially enlisted citizen auxiliaries, including an estimated 200,000 members of the American Protective League, to supplement its own small staff of investigators to help identify disloyal elements (Higham 1963; Tolzmann 1995); these same citizen vigilante committees were often named as aggressors in anti-German mobs (Wüstenbecker 2007). Such mobs of "superpatriots" (Luebke 1974) regularly forced German-Americans to buy war bonds and to perform other symbolic acts professing allegiance to the United States. German-Americans who rejected such demands sometimes suffered violent consequences.

The most famous example is the lynching of Robert Präger in Collinsville, IL on April 5, 1918. An angry mob paraded Präger, feet bare and draped in an American flag, around town. A po-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup>This was not a case of consolidation; subscription numbers for surviving papers did not increase noticeably between 1915 and 1920, while the number of French- and Italian-language papers increased.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup>U.S. Senate Report (1918), p. 11.

liceman came to his rescue, locking Präger into the city jail for his own protection. However, according to the *New York Times*, at "about 11 o'clock at night men gathered to the number of 300," broke him out of jail, and hung him from a large tree in the early morning hours.<sup>33</sup> Präger, a devoted socialist, had made remarks critical of Wilson's labor policies, but he had never indicated pro-German sentiments, maintaining his loyalty to the U.S. until his death.<sup>34</sup>

Despite several close calls, no other lynchings of German-Americans were widely reported on at the time (Wittke 1936).<sup>35</sup> Still, this episode characterized the implicit and explicit acceptance of such actions against German-Americans. A jury needed only 45 minutes to acquit the defendants, who had freely admitted to hanging Präger but nonetheless pleaded "not guilty"—claiming that "unwritten law" justified their actions. According to the *New York Times*, the announcement of the acquittal "was attended by a wild demonstration in the courtroom in which the accused men were overwhelmed with congratulations."<sup>36</sup>

The full extent of anti-German incidents after U.S. entry into World War I is difficult to ascertain,<sup>37</sup> but all evidence points to anti-German acts as prevalent. For example, the same day that authorities filed murder charges for Präger's assailants, the *Washington Post* listed three additional anti-German incidents. In Jeffersonville, Indiana, a 50 year old farmer was put into state jail to protect him from a mob "which heard that he had threatened violence to a liberty loan bond selling committee at his home." In Ashland, Wisconsin, masked men took a bartender from his home

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup>*New York Times*, June 2, 1918, page 7.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup>Both German-language and English-language newspapers reported that neither the mayor nor the police chief had seen any evidence of Präger's disloyalty.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup>Tolzmann (1995) documents another case—of Rev. Edmund Kayser in Gary, IN in 1915—which received far less press coverage than Präger's.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup>New York Times, June 2, 1918, page 7.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup>In a pathbreaking paper, Fouka (2019*a*) compiles an index of such incidents, but her data appears most valuable for capturing geographic variation in anti-German sentiment rather than as a comprehensive accounting of such incidents. Later in the paper, we make explicit use of this data.

to tar and feather him "because of his alleged pro-Germanism."<sup>38</sup> Lastly, in Pensacola, Florida, an "American-born German was severely flogged" and "forced to yell: 'To hell with the Kaiser; hurrah for Wilson'" before being ordered to leave the state.<sup>39</sup>

Although they frequently condemned such anti-German acts after the fact, political elites and the English-language press had previously encouraged vigilantism. About eight months prior (in August 1917), under the bold title "ACT ON ROOT'S CHARGE," the *Washington Post* had printed excerpts of a speech by Elihu Root, who—the *Post* proclaimed—if he "was not actually speaking for the administration [...] at least spoke the opinion of administration leaders." The article's headline succinctly captured the general sentiment:

That Such [Pro-German Traitors] "Should Be Shot," as Mr. Root Declared, Is Opinion in Washington, and Drastic Action Against Teutons Who Cloak Treason With Americanism Is Said to Be Near.<sup>40</sup>

Later in the same newspaper edition, the editorial page opined that "enemy propaganda must be stopped, even if a few lynchings may occur."<sup>41</sup>

#### Tracking the Decline of German-American Civil Society

The historical sketch above matches squarely with over time changes in empirical measures of civic and political organization. Our Civil Society Index varies over time based on two inputs: German-language newspapers published per week in a congressional district (observed for 1913, 1916 and 1920) and German-American civic organizations (1914, 1916 and 1922). Figure 4 displays the trends for these measures. The dark line tracks the overall average across time, and the gray lines break out trends by German-American population quartile. We observe the lowest values across the board, regardless of German-American population quartile, after the U.S. entered World War I. Overall, for German-language newspapers we observe a 56% decline on average from 1913

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup>This incident was the second in Ashland within two weeks.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup>Washington Post, April 12 1918, page 4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup>*Washington Post*, August 17, 1917, page 2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup>Washington Post, April 12 1918, page 6.

to 1920 (e.g., pre-War to post-War). For social organizations, we observe an overall 51% decline from 1914 to 1922. The totality of the historical record and these empirical measures leave little doubt that the onset of World War I and accompanying suppression led to meaningful declines in German-American civil society. Furthermore, it does not appear that declines in civic organization or newspapers occurred more sharply in areas with a high concentration of German-American residents; rather the declines appear relatively uniform across the board, or possibly even sharper in districts with few German-American residents. For example, among German-language newspaper publications per week the declines from 1913 to 1920 range between 48% and 59%, with the largest percentage decline occurring in the second quartile. Among German-American social organizations, the largest decline actually occurs in the first quartile, with relatively less heterogeneity in declines among the top quartiles.

## German-American Suppression and Passage of the Prohibition Amend-

#### ment


#### The 1917 Amendment House Debate and Passage

When the House considered the national prohibition amendment that would become the Eighteenth Amendment on December 17, 1917, arguments in defense of the "German-American lifestyle" had become remarkably absent. At most, representatives made veiled references to the endangerment of "personal liberty." Meanwhile, though largely eschewing explicit attacks on German-Americans, proponents of prohibition drew parallels between the war effort abroad and prohibition at home. Several Congressmen in support of the amendment characterized alcohol as a great ally to Germany and Austria-Hungary.<sup>42</sup>

The resulting 282-128 vote in favor of prohibition made front-page news in the German-language press, despite the preponderance of war news common to front pages at the time. In their opinion pages, editors painted doomsday scenarios. For the *Der Deutsche Correspondent* of Baltimore,

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup>M. Clyde Kelly (Progressive – PA) articulated the parallel most forcefully. See *Congressional Record*, December 17, 1917: 438

Figure 4: Components of German-American Civil Society Over Time



**Notes:** This figure tracks the decline in the number of German-Language publications per week and German-American Social organizations that occurred between 1914 and 1920. The figures include lines demarcating the sinking of the Lusitania in 1915 and the U.S. entry to World War I. The black line reports these results across all congressional districts, while the gray lines break results by German population in the district.

prohibition amounted to a rift in democracy akin to "slavery and secession." All told, support for prohibition had increased from 47.6% of the chamber (or 51.6% excluding abstentions) to 66.74% of the chamber (68.5% excluding abstentions) in just three years. We now examine how this shift in support occurred.

#### **Explaining Vote Switching: Changes in Civil Society**

Congressional districts with a well-developed German-American civil society had played a role in defeating early efforts at Prohibition. After the onset of World War I, many of these organizations disbanded or went dormant. As demonstrated above, these declines appear to have been relatively uniform across districts. In addition to the more than 50% declines across the board in German-language newspapers and German-American civic organizations, the clubs that remained in existence likely downplayed their German cultural origins (Fouka 2019*a*).

While it would amount to a mistake to characterize the onset of anti-German suppression in the U.S. simply as a "sharp" treatment occurring precisely along with the U.S. declaration of war, widespread anti-German sentiment in the United States certainly had not yet arisen at the time of the Hobson prohibition amendment vote in 1914, and would not do so before the sinking of the Lusitania on May 7, 1915.

We now explicitly examine how shifts in civil society measures from 1914 to 1917 altered the probability of a pro-Prohibition vote.<sup>43</sup> We estimate a model of the form:

$$ProVote_{it} = \delta \cdot CivSoc_{it} + \gamma_t + \theta_s + X_{it}\beta + \varepsilon_{it}$$
<sup>(1)</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup>Because we do not directly observe civil society measures for all of these years, we linearly interpolate their levels based on the years that we do observe—1913, 1917 and 1920 for German-Language newspapers and 1914, 1916 and 1922 for German-American social organizations. This approach likely understates the extent of the decline observed for both of these measures, since it does not explicitly account for the pressures on German-Americans occurring with the onset of the War, which were front-loaded (e.g., mostly in 1917 and 1918 while the War was still being fought).

where the outcome variable remains identical to Equation 2, and  $CivSoc_{it}$  measures a congressional district's level of German-American civil society in 1914 or 1917; also, we now include a year ( $\gamma_t$ ) and state ( $\theta_s$ ) fixed effect, along with a vector of individual level controls ( $X_{it}$ ).

We define the  $CivSoc_{it}$  variable in several ways: (1) most directly, with the Civil Society Index, and (2) using components (number of organizations, newspapers published in a week) that vary over time. The onset of World War I led to changes in  $CivSoc_{it}$  and, when paired with a congress fixed effect, the regression allows us to separate the overall changes over time in support for Prohibition from the specific impact of declines in civil society.

A positive coefficient on *CivSoc<sub>it</sub>* suggests something akin to a backlash effect: declines in preexisting organization would actually have led MCs to be less likely to vote in favor of prohibition. A negative effect, on the other hand, suggests that suppression targeting civic organizations also corresponded to increased support for Prohibition. Such a phenomenon would be consistent with previously effective civic organizations losing their ability to lobby and organize effectively after the onset of the War. A third possibility is a null effect: changes in the level of prior organization in a district would have no real bearing on Prohibition voting. Thus, we seek to estimate whether a decline in German-American civil society corresponding with the U.S. declaration of War and accompanying suppression of German-Americans affected public policy in the form of support for prohibition legislation.

As before, we expect any observed effects to be non-linear in the share of German population in a district—for several reasons. As we showed in Table 2, a bivariate relationship exists between German-American population share and 1914 anti-Prohibition vote—in part because of German-American organizational efforts, but also because of factors including correlation between German-American population share and other immigrant communities, an increased likelihood of citizen-candidates, and an understanding that district opinion was overwhelmingly "wet". Given that 1914 votes varied considerably by German Population quartile and that few MCs switched their votes away from pro-Prohibition, we will likely encounter a bound on any effect in low German-American population districts. Appendix Table A.1 characterizes overall voting patterns by German-American population quartile. Notably, almost 70% of MCs in the bottom quartile of German-American districts had already voted in favor of Prohibition in 1914. Furthermore, we only identify 8 congressional districts in which MCs switched away from support for Prohibition in 1914. Most of the variation, therefore, comes from districts that switch towards support for Prohibition, with the bulk of these occurring in the mid-range quartiles of the German-American population distribution.

Table 3 reports the results for high-German-American population districts. All three timevarying civil society measures have a negative relationship with the probability of casting a pro-Prohibition vote. As before, the strongest relationships are evident in congressional districts with a German-American population in the third quartile, with the effects for the Civil Society Index as well as German social clubs having 95% confidence intervals that do not overlap with zero. Specifically, a one standard deviation decrease in the Civil Society Index corresponded to about an eight percentage point increase in the probability of an MC casting a pro-Prohibition vote. Looking only at shifts in German-American groups and organizations, a doubling of the number of clubs in a district corresponds to around a ten percentage point decline in the probability of a pro-Prohibition vote (e.g.,  $0.144 \times ln(2) = 0.0998$ ). The effect for a change in German-language newspapers is in the same direction, though the estimate is noisier. Finally, for congressional districts with a lower German-American population (e.g., first and second quartiles), the measures indicating a more developed civil society also correlate negatively with a pro-Prohibition vote, however the effects are not statistically distinguishable from zero in most cases (see Table A.10).<sup>44</sup>

The same results obtain when we include district fixed effects. Table A.14 in the Appendix presents these results for the Civil Society Index. We estimate that a one standard deviation decrease in the German-American Civil Society Index corresponded to about a ten percentage point increase in the probability of an MC casting a pro-Prohibition vote for congressional districts in the third quartile of German-American population. The effects for other population quartiles are again not statistically distinguishable from zero.

While our results thus far point towards the importance of declines in German-American civil

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup>Including or excluding MC-level controls does not affect our estimates. See Appendix Tables A.11 and A.12.

	Pro Prohibition Vote							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)		
Civil Society								
Index	$-0.064^{**}$			-0.015				
	(0.028)			(0.023)				
log(German Social								
Clubs + 1)		$-0.144^{***}$			$-0.067^{*}$			
		(0.053)			(0.040)			
log(German-Language								
Newspapers + 1)			-0.074			0.070		
			(0.066)			(0.053)		
log(Urban Pop.)	-0.036	0.043	-0.028	$-0.112^{***}$	$-0.092^{***}$	$-0.104^{***}$		
	(0.059)	(0.055)	(0.062)	(0.039)	(0.031)	(0.039)		
MC Age	0.002	0.001	0.002	0.004	0.004	0.004		
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)		
Democratic	$-0.153^{*}$	$-0.191^{**}$	$-0.175^{*}$	$-0.332^{***}$	$-0.317^{***}$	$-0.346^{***}$		
	(0.089)	(0.088)	(0.090)	(0.072)	(0.074)	(0.071)		
State FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Congress FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
German Pop.	Third	Third	Third	Fourth	Fourth	Fourth		
Composition	Quartile	Quartile	Quartile	Quartile	Quartile	Quartile		
N	158	158	158	176	176	176		
<u>R<sup>2</sup></u>	0.517	0.536	0.509	0.456	0.467	0.463		

Table 3: Prohibition Voting (District Level), WWI Anti-German Outbreak and Shifts in German-American Civil Society

 $^{*}p < .1; ^{**}p < .05; ^{***}p < .01$ 

SEs clustered at CD level.

**Notes:** This table reports a regression where the outcome is a binary variable denoting a pro-Prohibition vote (or not) and the explanatory variables are the two components of the Civil Society Index that are time-varying. The analysis is broken out by German population quartile in the district, with results for the Third and Fourth Quartiles reported here. We include a more limited set of controls than in previous tables because the fixed effects absorb controls that do not vary over time or within state.

society as a driving force behind vote switching on Prohibition, we also want to evaluate a related but distinct explanation. Geographically specific increases in anti-German sentiment could be correlated with both declines in German-American civil society and pro-Prohibition organizing that led to MC vote switching in 1917. In this account, declines in civil society per se would not, on their own, cause the observed vote switching. We examine this possibility in two ways. First, we try to measure directly the extent of anti-German sentiment in congressional districts; second, we re-estimate a differences-in-differences regression where we identify high levels of German-American civil society based only on pre-War levels, ensuring that the estimates are based on "pre-treatment" district characteristics rather than varying responses to suppression.

To examine anti-German sentiment directly, we rely on data gathered in Fouka (2019*b*) that measures anti-German sentiment via violence against German-Americans documented in Englishlanguage newspapers in 1917 and 1918. We cannot include this variable directly in our regression estimates above since the violence documented here occurred mostly after the pro-Prohibition vote. However, we can examine the degree to which these cases of anti-German violence correlate with changes in our Civil Society Index before the War and afterwards (based here on the social organizations and newspapers data we have for 1920 and 1922).


Appendix Table A.13 presents the results. The regressions examine the change in anti-German harassment incidents in relation to the Civil Society Index, including the same controls as above.<sup>45</sup> Regardless of the concentration of German-American population in a district, we find no statistically significant relationship between increases in anti-German crimes and changes in the Civil Society Index before versus after the onset of war. This clarifies several key aspects of our findings: (1) we do not see evidence that geographically specific changes in anti-German sentiment, proxied for by harassment incidents, are likely to lead to time-varying confounding of the relationship between declines in German-American civil society and vote switching; (2) an overall atmosphere of suppression, rather than geographically specific bursts of anti-German sentiment, is likely what drove the bulk of the declines in German-American civil society and concurrent vote switching in


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup>Anti-German harassment incidents are recorded at the county level and mapped from county to congressional districts based on the share of each county in each congressional district.

our specific historical case.

We also take a second approach designed to account for concerns about differing responses to suppression across districts. We estimate a difference-in-differences model where we coarsen the Civil Society Index and other measures based only on whether a district is above or below the median level of each civil society measure *before* the War (see Appendix Section A.1 for a detailed discussion). Because treatment status here is based only on pre-War civil society levels, the approach guards against concerns about differential responses to suppression. Again, these estimates, which are presented graphically in Figure 5 (with the full results reported in Appendix Tables A.15 and A.16), reveal that the effects of suppression on vote switching are most detectable in congressional districts with a moderate level of German-American population but a high level of German-American civil society.

What theoretical account of civil society and policy best matches these results? How much of the observed vote switching can be attributed directly to declines in political organization? We address these issues in tandem by narrowing our focus to the behavior of MCs who switched their votes from against prohibition to supporting it. Disproportionately located in the middle quartiles of the population distribution, vote switching by these MCs appears to have provided the pivotal margin of victory for "dry" forces.





**Notes:** This figure reports difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of having a high level of civil society pre-War on Pro-Prohibition votes. Each measure of civil society used is indicated on the left (y-axis) for each plot. Tables A.15 and A.16 report the full results.

#### **Predicting Vote Switching**

We now focus on single-member districts that had not been substantially redistricted or newly created mid-decade. Appendix Table A.2 provides a snapshot of these districts, with columns breaking down voting behavior depending on whether a district's MC was an incumbent in 1917 or was newly elected. We note that a significant number of both new and incumbent MCs changed their votes. For example, 31 returning MCs switched to support Prohibition, representing 15.5% of the full sample of incumbents. Thus, both electoral replacement and persuasion played important roles in the process of vote switching.

We first extract predicted probabilities of support for Prohibition based on the model fit from our initial examination of the 1914 Hobson Prohibition Amendment. We use the model from column 6 of Table 2, which models MC vote choice as a function of our three measures of civil society. To determine the threshold value for predicted probabilities that best separates predicted Yea votes from Nay votes (e.g., the classification step), we determine the point that maximizes the sum of sensitivities and specificities (e.g., Youden's J statistic)—yielding a threshold of p = 0.51for predicting a Yea versus a Nay vote.<sup>46</sup>

Using estimates from this model fit, we explore the shift in predicted probability of support for prohibition *operating only through the channel of changes in the measures of civil society*. That is, we hold all other variables fixed at their pre-war values and only allow the civil society measures to vary, equivalent to making an out-of-sample prediction.

Figure 6a depicts the results of this prediction as a shift from pre-War predicted probability of support to the predicted probability after the onset of the War for districts that had voted against Prohibition in 1914. The figure reveals a few key insights. First, conceptualizing the Prohibition votes as depending on the distance to a key threshold or cutoff for a Yea or Nay vote appears reasonable as a model for MC vote choice. Second, predicted probabilities change substantially based only on the shift in measures of civil society. Third, districts located closest to the threshold pre-War were most likely to switch votes—consistent with our earlier results, many of the largest


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>46</sup>We weight false negatives as 1.5 times as costly as false positives. This approach results in an in-sample prediction accuracy of 77%, a precision of 75%, and a recall of 76%.

shifts from 1914 to 1917 in predicted probability of a Yea vote occur for these marginal districts. Table 4 reports key summary statistics from this modelling approach.

Based on this model, we predict 30 (or 16% of) congressional districts in the sample would have switched from a Nay to a Yea vote—purely through changes in civil society measures. The estimate is higher—30.16% of MCs switching from Nay to Yea, as in the second column of Table 4—if we condition on actual rather than predicted 1914 Nay votes. Finally, taking the most stringent possible approach, if we isolate the count of switching districts only to those where (1) the model predicted a 1914 anti vote, (2) the district's MC did indeed cast a 1914 anti vote, (3) the model predicted a 1917 pro vote, and (4) the district's MC did indeed cast a 1917 pro vote, then we identify 11 such districts fitting these criteria—a number that still provides the margin for passage of the 1917 Prohibition bill.

#### Figure 6: Vote Switching Probability Model, CDs with Pre-WWI Anti-Prohibition Vote

(a)  $\Delta$  in Civil Society Only (Out-of-Sample Prediction)



**Notes:** These figures display the changes in predicted probability of a pro-Prohibition vote based on changes (1) in civil society measures only or (2) in all explanatory variables. The predicted probabilities are calculated from the model in column 6 of Table 2. The dotted vertical line depicts the cutoff for predicting a Nay or Yea vote. For each district, a square denotes the 1914 vote and a circle denotes the 1917 vote. A shaded point denotes an observed Yea vote; unshaded denotes an observed Nay vote. The direction pointed by the red arrows is based on whether the predicted probability of a Yea vote increased (pointing rightward) or decreased (pointing leftward).

(b)  $\Delta$  in All Variables (In-Sample Prediction)

1.0

Table 4: Summary	<pre>v of Post-WW1 Prohibition `</pre>	Voting (Predictions)

	Pct of CDs Switch to Predicted Pro Conditional on Pre-WWI Predicted Anti	Pct of CDs Switch to Predicted Pro Conditional on Pre-WWI Actual Anti	Pct Correctly Predicted Post-WW1 Pro Votes	Pct Correctly Predicted Post-WW1 Anti Votes
$\Delta$ Civil Society Only (Out-of-Sample Prediction)	15.79% (30)	30.16% (57)	70.18% (160)	79.31% (92)
Δ All Variables (In-Sample Prediction)	44.22% (88)	35.11% (66)	86.40% (197)	78.45% (91)

**Notes:** The sample for this table excludes congressional districts where (1) redistricting altered more than 5% of the geographic area in the district, (2) at-large congressional districts, and (3) districts where there are missing values for any of the variables used for prediction. This leaves 345 of 435 districts. Eighty districts in this sample switched from a pre-WWI anti vote to a post-WWI pro vote and 8 districts in this sample switched from a pre-WWI pro vote to a post-WWI anti vote.

As a point of comparison, we also model the shift from 1914 to 1917 by accounting for 1914 vote choice explicitly and fitting a new model explaining 1917 vote choice, thereby allowing all explanatory variables to change over time. Comparing the shift in predicted probabilities due only to declines in German-American civil society with predictions using this approach helps illustrate the extent of the shift that can be explained purely through the civil society channel. Figure 6b displays the results. We observe much larger increases in predicted probabilities, consistent with the general shift in support for Prohibition over the course of these three years. As reported in Table 4, we predict 88 (or 44%) of congressional districts in the sample would switch from a Nay to a Yea vote using the full model, incorporating 1914 vote, and allowing all predictors to vary over time. Overall, these results suggest that roughly one in three vote switches can be attributed to suppression of German-Americans and concurrent declines in German-American civil society.

Applying this modelling approach to this historical case illustrates the downstream consequences for public policy of declines in civil society. When suppression makes political organization difficult or eliminates opportunities at organizing entirely, the policy consequences depend crucially on what a group's organizational efforts had accomplished previously. The prediction framework helps illustrate the intuition: vote probabilities for those marginal districts fell just to the left of the threshold separating a Yeah vote from a Nay vote in 1914. In 1917, as anti-German sentiments and suppression grew, these organizational efforts diminished, resulting in an increase in predicted probabilities of a Yea vote for Prohibition. These shifts mattered most in marginal districts; that is where the policy consequences of suppression appear most crucial.

#### Conclusion

This paper has examined the public policy impact of civil society groups and organizations. Prior to the outbreak of the Great War in Europe, German-Americans had emerged as a key opponent to Prohibition. We document their extensive organizational efforts, and develop several new approaches for measuring them. Furthermore, we illustrate how before the war these efforts helped keep MCs from casting dry votes, but by 1917 nothing prevented vote switching.

The widespread suppression of German-American civil society helps identify the effects these groups and organizations had on the policy issue of Prohibition. With the American declaration of war, anti-German sentiment and overt suppression tamped down German-American civil society. We trace these effects empirically, and illustrate their policy consequences: suppression, and the decline in civil society that accompanied it among German-American groups, mattered in districts where the representative was on the margin for or against Prohibition. Districts in the middle of the German-American population distribution were where most of the vote switching occurred particularly places with higher levels of pre-War civil society that subsequently declined.

Earlier efforts against Prohibition had required the development of organizing skills among German-Americans. Singing societies, leagues for the card game *Skat*, the *Turnvereine*—these all created opportunities for German-Americans to be linked together as group members in a public-facing manner. The declines in civil society and in policy influence documented here highlight the importance of the relational aspects of civil society groups. This finding links well with recent research noting how civil society can play a sustaining role for democracy in dual ways, by both fostering peoples' abilities to express political choices and by providing venues for negotiating power (Han and Kim 2022). Belonging and participating in groups and organizations "equips people to identify and express their preferences, helps people learn to work in diverse collective settings, and shapes opportunities for action in which power is negotiated" (Han and Kim 2022, p.

178). But a key element distinguishing "choice" from "negotiating power" is that only the latter is relational. Applying this rubric, we think suppression coinciding with World War I likely had the largest impact on German-Americans' abilities to "negotiate power" since destruction of civil society reduced the interactions and weakened the connections previously so crucial to German-American civil life.

Finally, this paper breaks new ground by developing and utilizing direct measures of civil society that vary across geographical space and over time. These measures help reveal that, even when concentrated in a limited set of districts, civil society groups can still be crucial for policies of national importance.

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For Online Publication Appendix

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# A.1 Explaining Vote Switching between 1914 and 1917 using pre-War Measures of German-American Civil Society

Given the relatively even declines in German-American organizations across districts and the difficulties quantifying efforts by German-American groups to appear less German, we begin by using pre-War measures to understand how suppression interacted with civil society.

We estimate a model of the form:

$$ProVote_{it} = \alpha + \delta \cdot CivSoc_i + \gamma \cdot PostWWI_{it} + \beta \cdot CivSoc_i \times PostWWI_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}$$
(2)

where  $ProVote_{it}$  is a binary variable equal to one if an MC cast a pro-Prohibition vote and zero otherwise,  $CivSoc_i$  is a measure of German-American civil society in the Congressional district before the United States' entry into World War I,  $PostWWI_{it}$  is an indicator for whether the observation occurs before or after U.S. entry in to World War I, and  $\varepsilon_{it}$  is an error term with mean zero and an independently and identically distributed variance  $\sigma_i^2$ . The subscript *i* indexes districts and the subscript *t* indexes time period (either the 63rd or 65th Congress).

We define the *CivSoc<sub>i</sub>* variable several ways: first, we identify districts that were above the median in terms of our Civil Society Index. Similarly, for each component measure (number of organizations, newspapers published in a week, and number of past petitions), we coarsen districts into two groups depending on whether they fell above or below the median for each measure. Identification of the effect stems from the onset of World War I. Districts with developed German-American social and political organizations (e.g., high levels of German-American civil society) may have been differentially impacted by the onset of war, as compared to districts without such a network of organizations. The specification used here separates the overall effect of entry into the War from the specific impacts due to having had a high pre-War level of civic organization (e.g., the coefficient on the interaction between high civil society and post World War I). A negative coefficient on this interaction term would suggest something akin to a backlash effect. Preexisting organization obtained through suppression and even intensified, leading to lower rates of support for Prohibition. A positive effect would suggest that suppression effectively targeted civic organization: not only did high civil society districts experience a shift favoring Prohibition in line with the rest of the country, but the level of vote switching would have actually gone above and beyond other places. Such a phenomenon would be consistent with previously effective civic organizations losing their ability to lobby and organize effectively after the onset of the War. A third possibility is a null effect. In this scenario, the level of prior organization in a district had no real bearing on Prohibition voting. Thus, we seek to estimate whether the U.S. declaration of War and accompanying suppression of German-Americans had a differential impact on districts that had housed a more extensive set of German-American civic organizations pre-War; in this framework, these are the "treated" districts.

Appendix Table A.15 presents our initial set of estimates. We first focus on districts with a high level of German-Americans. In line with the results for 1914, we observe the strongest effects for the third quartile of the population distribution. First, as before, we note the negative association between measures of civil society and a pre-World War I support for Prohibition—this holds true across measures, with confidence intervals that do not overlap with zero for the Civil Society Index and the number of German-American Organizations. Second, we note that the coefficient on the variable indicating a Post-World War I vote is positive across the board. This reflects a general trend, regardless of district, towards an increased probability of support for Prohibition after the War's onset. Finally, the key coefficient of interest is for the interaction term between civil society and post-World War I entry. The coefficient identifies the shift in support for Prohibition occurring in places with high levels of pre-War German-American civil society. We observe positive effects, regardless of the specific measure of civil society. For the third quartile, the results are statistically distinguishable from zero for all measures other than the petitioning measure. As these districts were located in districts in the middle of the population distribution but nonetheless had a well-developed German-American civil society, the positive effect we observe is consistent with the hypothesis that suppression of German-American social organizations was crucial for House passage of the Prohibition amendment. In these districts, the onset of World War I in conjunction with the pre-War high level of organization, led to a roughly 20 percentage point increase in the probability of casting a Pro-Prohibition vote. For the fourth quartile, the effects we observe remain

positive but have a smaller magnitude, with confidence intervals that overlap with zero.

Appendix Table A.16 reports results for districts with a lower German-American population (the first and second quartiles). First, very few districts in the first quartile of German-American population had above median levels of civil society. As a result, the interaction term is generally positive but quite noisy. Second, we observe a strong trend towards pro-Prohibition votes just based on the year of the vote (in contrast to the third and fourth quartiles, where the results were positive but noisier). These year effects are largest for the second quartile, where on average there was a 30 percentage point increase in the probability of casting a vote in favor of prohibition. However, we do not observe statistically significant effects for the interaction term for these districts with a low level of German-American population.

#### A.2 Data Processing Description

#### A.2.1 Rationale for Using Foreign-Born Population Categories as a Proxy for German-Americans

While percentages derived from the census based on people born in Germany, Austria-Hungary, or Switzerland, as discussed earlier, include "Church Germans" as well as some respondents who did not consider themselves ethnically German (e.g., immigrants from several regions in the Hungarian part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire), they nonetheless likely underestimate the overall size of the German-American community for two reasons. First, mass migration from German-speaking Europe to the U.S. dated back to as far as the 1840s; yet any member of the German-American community born to just one second-generation parent is excluded in the estimates above. As earlier waves of German immigrants tended to stay together in close residential proximity and continued to conduct everyday affairs in German (Kazal 2004), a not insubstantial number of self-identified German-Americans are therefore excluded. Second, the estimates also exclude any person born to parents who were born in separate countries within the German-speaking world (for example, someone with a German-born mother and an Austrian-born father).

#### A.2.2 Extracting Club Directory Information

We extract club and social organization information from directories, each of which sought to provide a "comprehensive directory of all German Associations, Societies, Clubs, and other organizations (incl. Swiss-German and Austria-Hungary-German) in the United States, with names of officers, meeting locations and times."<sup>47</sup> We turned to three directories in particular: *1914*, *1916* and *1922*.

#### A.2.3 Extracting Newspaper Information

In counting editions per week, a daily newspaper with a Sunday edition would count for seven editions, while a semi-monthly paper would count as 0.5 editions.<sup>48</sup> After matching city boundaries to historical congressional district boundaries for the 63rd and 65th Congress, we identified (a) the districts that intersected with or were contained within each city's boundary and (b) the directly neighboring districts—i.e. those districts sharing a boundary with the subset from (a).<sup>49</sup> To each identified congressional district we then assigned the respective city's count of newspaper editions published per week and aggregated this count at the Congressional district level.

#### A.2.4 Extracting Petition Information

We allocate these petitions to congressional districts based on the congressional district of the petition's recipient in Congress.<sup>50</sup>

- <sup>47</sup>"Ein ausfuehrliches Verzeichnis aller deutschen Vereine, Gesellschaften, Klubs und anderer Verbände (einschließlich Deutsch-Schweizer und Deutsch-Oesterreich-Ungarn) in den Vereinigten Staaten. Nebst den Beamtennamen, Versammlungszeiten und Versammlungsorten," (1916-17 edition.)
- <sup>48</sup>Although the directories also provide circulation data, such data was often missing for foreign language newspapers.
- <sup>49</sup>We excluded at-large districts from this calculation.
- <sup>50</sup>While not all petitions from a given district were sent to that district's representative, it was common practice to do so. Thus, this measure proxies for German-American petitioning activity

#### A.2.5 List of Regular Expressions Search Terms to Identify German Organizations

(|b||s||-) deutsch (er?)? (|b||b) [dlt] deutsch |-?vereine?

- \b(amphion|ambrosius|almira|goethe|aeolian|fidelia|debattier|polyhymnia
  |frohsinn|euphonia|gambrinus|thusnelda|constantia|accordia|waldeck|
  lessing|mithra|sons of her?rmann?|frau(en)?|herr|moltke|n\s?g\s?a\s?
  a|prinz(essin)?|skat|turn(erbund|halle))\b
- \b(gross?([\-\s]+)?loge|walhalla|hoffnung\s|schiller|hertha|edelweiss|
  vergissmei|immergr(ue?|ii)n|elsass(\s\-)?loth)

 $b(h\.?\s?j?\.?\s?r\.?\house(joint)? resolution)\s16[68]\b$ 

- \b(schleswig|holstein(er)?|bremer|hannoveraner|baden(er)?|badisch(er)?|
  schwaben|schwae?bische?|hessen|hessisch|(rhein)?pfae?lzer|schlesier|
  wue?rttemberger|oldenburger|sachsen|west(f|ph)al(en|ische?r?)|sae?
  chsich|alpen|arion|bae?cker|brauer|herr?manns?|voran)[\-\s]
- \b(arbeiter | bayern | bezirk | buerger | deutschnatio | frei ( heit | sinn | willig ) |
  freund | gemischt | gesang | gilde | handlungs | herren | kaiser | kegel | kellner |
  lieder | metzger | onkel | german\- | gr (ue? | ii ) tli | sch (ue? | ii ) tzen | seemann |
  soe?hne | toe?chter | unterhaltung | vereinigung | sae?nger)
- \bgerman (?!(town | ([a-z]+ )?church | methodist | lutheran | evangelical | (and austrian )?republics?))
- \bmaenner\S|\bturn(er)(\-|ver|gem|hal)|\bunterst(ue?|ii)tz|\bvergn(ue?|
  ii)g
- allemann?ia|badenia|concordia|eintracht|fidelia|eichenlaub|freundschaft |gesellschaft|harmonie|harugari|hebamme|landweh?r|krieger|br? auarbeiter|brauerei|damen|helvetia|herr?mannss?oe?hn|lieder(kranz| tafel)|mozart|singing\_society|ofherr?mann|schafskopf|schc(ue?|ii) tzen|schlarr?af|sozialist|sterbe[\-\s]+?kasse|teutonia|turn\-?

in a district.

vereine? | uhland | ungar (lae?nd)? isch | oe? sterreich | schweizer |

plattdeutsch | germanamerica | deutschland | sachsen | vorwae? rts | walpurga | wilhelm tell | wohlth?ae?th?igkei | zweig

(b(ue?|ii)ndniss?|bunde?|chor|kasse|klub|krae?nze?|kreise?|tafel|verbae
?nde?)\b

#### A.3 Supplementary Tables, Lists, and Figures

	1	2	3	4
Not Yea then Not Yea	9.68%	20.24%	37.97%	61.70%
Not Yea then Yea	19.35%	32.14%	21.52%	19.15%
Yea then Not Yea	2.15%	3.57%	3.80%	0.00%
Yea then Yea	68.82%	44.05%	36.71%	19.15%

Table A.1: Vote Switching by German Pop. Quartile

**Note:** Excludes at-large districts and districts redistricted or newly created mid-decade. Percentages calculated for each column.

Table A.2: Prohibition Votes by Congressional District on Hobson Amendment (1914) and 18th Amendment (1917), House of Representatives

	All MCs		Ne	ew MCs	Returning MCs	
Vote Sequence	Ν	Pct.	Ν	Pct.	Ν	Pct.
Not Yea then Not Yea	114	32.57%	47	31.33%	67	33.50%
Not Yea then Yea	80	22.86%	49	32.67%	31	15.50%
Yea then Not Yea	8	2.29%	8	5.33%	0	0.00%
Yea then Yea	148	42.29%	46	30.67%	102	51.00%

Note: Excludes at-large districts and districts redistricted or newly created mid-decade.

Table A.3: "Summary Statistics for Key Explanatory Variables"

Statistic	Ν	Mean	St. Dev.	Median	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)
German Social Clubs, 1914	407	9.7	16.8	3.0	0.4	12.0
German Social Clubs, 1916	407	9.6	14.8	4.0	1.0	13.0
German Social Clubs, 1922	407	4.8	9.3	1.0	0.0	5.6
German Petitions sent to MC, 1895-1914	435	0.5	1.5	0	0	0
German-Language Newspapers per Week, 1913	408	22.3	21.8	15.5	3.0	37.0
German-Language Newspapers per Week, 1916	408	19.0	18.8	13.0	2.0	31.0
German-Language Newspapers per Week, 1920	408	9.9	12.3	5.5	1.0	16.0
German Pop., 1914	407	9,374.2	14,491.8	5,367.0	1,177.8	11,689.0
Urban Pop, 1914	407	83,687.3	101,778.0	51,859.3	26,596.3	102,449.5

**Note:** The table reports key descriptive statistics for the key explanatory variables in regressions examining the relationship between MC vote choice on Prohibition legislation and German-American social organizations in congressional districts.

	Pro Prohibition Vote						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)			
log(German Social							
Clubs)	$-0.425^{***}$	$-0.472^{***}$					
	(0.149)	(0.160)					
log(German Org							
Petitions to MC)	$-0.594^{**}$	$-0.566^{*}$					
	(0.291)	(0.310)					
log(German-Language							
Newspapers)	$-0.401^{***}$	$-0.364^{**}$					
	(0.145)	(0.153)					
Civil Society							
Index			$-0.776^{***}$	$-0.776^{***}$			
			(0.176)	(0.187)			
log(German Pop.)	0.059	-0.043	0.045	-0.062			
	(0.142)	(0.153)	(0.139)	(0.151)			
log(Urban Pop.)	$-0.816^{***}$	$-0.708^{***}$	$-0.831^{***}$	$-0.743^{***}$			
	(0.187)	(0.194)	(0.178)	(0.186)			
MC Age		0.016		0.017			
		(0.014)		(0.014)			
Democratic		$-1.682^{***}$		$-1.663^{***}$			
		(0.319)		(0.316)			
Northeast	$-1.071^{***}$	$-1.435^{***}$	$-1.041^{***}$	$-1.414^{***}$			
	(0.348)	(0.381)	(0.339)	(0.374)			
South	$-1.173^{***}$	-0.747	$-1.143^{***}$	$-0.765^{*}$			
	(0.437)	(0.465)	(0.410)	(0.433)			
West	0.365	-0.095	0.403	-0.107			
	(0.582)	(0.594)	(0.555)	(0.566)			
Constant	10.655***	10.547***	9.083***	9.231***			
	(2.009)	(2.190)	(1.870)	(2.091)			
Ν	401	401	401	401			
Log Likelihood	-211.055	-194.069	-211.186	-194.310			
AIC	440.110	410.137	436.372	406.620			
* . 1 ** . 05 ***	. 01						

Table A.4: German Population, Social Clubs and MC Vote Choice: Hobson Prohibition Amendment (HJR 168), District-Level Versus MC-Level Controls

p < .1; p < .05; p < .01

**Notes:** This table reports the results of a logistic regression where the outcome variable is an indicator for whether a member of Congress cast a vote in favor of Prohibition for the Hobson Amendment. This table replicates the key results in Table 2 but separates district characteristics from MC characteristics to address the concern that MC characteristics are downstream from district composition. Multi-member districts are excluded from the sample where necessary. The Civil Society Index is based upon the first principal component of the three distinct measures of German-American life in congressional districts.

	Pro	Prohibition V	Vote		
	(1)	(2)	(3)		
log(German Social					
Clubs)	$-0.803^{***}$				
,	(0.238)				
log(German Org	× ,				
Petitions to MC)	-0.264				
	(0.404)				
log(German-Language	· · · ·				
Newspapers)	$-0.651^{**}$				
	(0.277)				
Civil Society	. ,				
Index		$-1.019^{***}$			
		(0.277)			
log(German Pop.)	-0.070	-0.112	$-0.482^{**}$		
	(0.273)	(0.263)	(0.244)		
log(Urban Pop.)	$-0.601^{*}$	$-0.734^{**}$	-0.750**		
0. 1,	(0.325)	(0.306)	(0.295)		
MC Age	0.024	0.029*	0.028		
0	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.017)		
Democratic	-1.953***	-1.918***	-1.807***		
	(0.484)	(0.475)	(0.444)		
Constant	7.595***	6.352**	10.054***		
	(2.828)	(2.752)	(2.560)		
State FEs	ves	yes	yes		
N	401	401	407		
Log Likelihood	-127.757				
AIC	359.515	359.763	378.729		
*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p	< .01				

Table A.5: German Population, Social Clubs and MC Vote Choice: Hobson Prohibition Amendment (HJR 168) with State FEs

**Notes:** This table reports the results of a logistic regression where the outcome variable is an indicator for whether a member of Congress cast a vote in favor of Prohibition for the Hobson Amendment. This table replicates the key results in Table 2 but adds state fixed effects. Multi-member districts are excluded from the sample where necessary. The Civil Society Index is based upon the first principal component of the three distinct measures of German-American life in congressional districts.

				Pro	Prohibition	Vote		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
log(German Social								
Clubs)	0.486***					0.624***		
	(0.046)					(0.100)		
log(German Org								
Petitions to MC)		0.429***				0.568*		
		(0.099)				(0.176)		
log(German-Language								
Newspapers)			0.665***			0.695**		
Civil Society			(0.056)			(0.106)		
Civil Society Index				0.478***			0.460***	
muex				(0.047)			(0.086)	
log(German Pop.)				(0.047)	0.645***	0.958	0.940	0.666***
log(derman r op.)					(0.044)	(0.147)	(0.141)	(0.081)
log(Urban Pop.)					(0.011)	0.492***	0.476***	0.471***
						(0.095)	(0.088)	(0.083)
MC Age						1.016	1.017	1.010
0						(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Democratic						0.186***	0.190***	0.210***
						(0.059)	(0.060)	(0.062)
Northeast						0.238***	0.243***	0.314***
						(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.111)
South						0.474	$0.465^{*}$	0.770
						(0.221)	(0.202)	(0.308)
West						0.909	0.899	1.943
						(0.540)	(0.508)	(0.949)
Constant	2.639***	1.087	2.397***	0.859	31.923***	38,065.380***	10,207.910***	196,858.500***
<b>N</b> . <sup>7</sup>	(0.459)	(0.116)	(0.562)	(0.094)	(18.228)	(83,349.440)	(21,347.850)	(389,313.000)
N	407	435	408	401	407	401	401	407
Log Likelihood	-246.633	-293.269	-268.879	-242.622	-257.359	-194.069	-194.310	-209.904
AIC	497.266	590.539	541.759	489.244	518.718	410.137	406.620	435.808

## Table A.6: German Population, Social Clubs and MC Vote Choice: Hobson Prohibition Amendment (HJR 168), Odds Ratios

 $^{*}p < .1; ^{**}p < .05; ^{***}p < .01$ 

**Notes:** This table reports the results of a logistic regression where the outcome variable is an indicator for whether a member of Congress cast a vote in favor of Prohibition for the Hobson Amendment. This table replicates the key results in Table 2 but records the coefficient estimates as odds ratios. Multi-member districts are excluded from the sample where necessary. The Civil Society Index is based upon the first principal component of the three distinct measures of German-American life in congressional districts.

	Pre	o Prohibition `	Vote
	(1)	(2)	(3)
log(German Social			
Clubs)	$0.448^{***}$		
,	(0.107)		
log(German Org	(		
Petitions to MC)	0.768		
,	(0.310)		
log(German-Language			
Newspapers)	0.522**		
	(0.144)		
Civil Society			
Index		0.361***	
		(0.100)	
log(German Pop.)	0.933	0.894	0.618**
	(0.255)	(0.235)	(0.151)
log(Urban Pop.)	$0.548^{*}$	0.480**	0.473**
	(0.178)	(0.147)	(0.139)
MC Age	1.024	1.030*	1.028
C	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Democratic	0.142***	0.147***	0.164***
	(0.069)	(0.070)	(0.073)
Constant	1,987.860***	573.520**	23,247.640***
	(5,621.725)	(1,578.442)	(59,504.840)
State FEs	yes	yes	yes
Ν	401	401	407
Log Likelihood	-127.757	-129.881	-137.364
AIC	359.515	359.763	378.729
*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p	< .01		

Table A.7: German Population, Social Clubs and MC Vote Choice: Hobson Prohibition Amendment (HJR 168), Odds Ratios with State FEs

**Notes:** This table reports the results of a logistic regression where the outcome variable is an indicator for whether a member of Congress cast a vote in favor of Prohibition for the Hobson Amendment. This table replicates the key results in Table 2 but records the coefficient estimates as odds ratios and also includes state fixed effects. Multi-member districts are excluded from the sample where necessary. The Civil Society Index is based upon the first principal component of the three distinct measures of German-American life in congressional districts.

	Pro Prohibition Vote							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
log(German Social Clubs)	$-0.158^{***}$ (0.018)					$-0.084^{***}$ (0.024)		
log(German Org Petitions to MC)	(0.018)	$-0.188^{***}$ (0.048)				(0.024) $-0.078^{*}$ (0.044)		
log(German-Language Newspapers)		(0.010)	$-0.098^{***}$ (0.019)			(0.011) $-0.061^{**}$ (0.025)		
Civil Society Index				$-0.157^{***}$ (0.018)			$-0.125^{***}$ (0.026)	
log(German Pop.)				~ /	-0.099*** (0.014)	-0.022 (0.024)	-0.030 (0.024)	$-0.087^{***}$ (0.020)
log(Urban Pop.) MC Age						-0.063*** (0.020) 0.003	-0.066*** (0.019) 0.003	$-0.064^{***}$ (0.020) 0.002
Democratic						(0.002) $-0.275^{***}$ (0.049)	(0.002) $-0.276^{***}$ (0.049)	(0.002) $-0.284^{***}$ (0.050)
Northeast						(0.049) $-0.253^{***}$ (0.057)	(0.049) $-0.252^{***}$ (0.055)	(0.050) $-0.240^{***}$ (0.057)
South						-0.126 (0.080)	-0.128* (0.074)	-0.047 (0.075)
West						-0.044 (0.103)	-0.043 (0.098)	0.086 (0.090)
Constant	0.717*** (0.036)	0.519*** (0.026)	0.709*** (0.054)	0.469*** (0.023)	1.277*** (0.114)	1.796*** (0.255)	1.580*** (0.254)	2.051*** (0.244)
$\frac{N}{R^2}$	407 0.160	435 0.033	408 0.061	401 0.159	407 0.113	401 0.329	401 0.326	407 0.278

### Table A.8: German Population, Social Clubs and MC Vote Choice: Hobson Prohibition Amendment (HJR 168), Linear Probability Model

 $^{*}p < .1; ^{**}p < .05; ^{***}p < .01$ 

**Notes:** This table reports the results of a linear regression where the outcome variable is an indicator for whether a member of Congress cast a vote in favor of Prohibition for the Hobson Amendment. This table replicates the key results in Table 2. Multi-member districts are excluded from the sample where necessary. The Civil Society Index is based upon the first principal component of the three distinct measures of German-American life in congressional districts.

		Pro Prohibition Vote									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)			
Civil Society											
Index	-0.337	-0.421	-0.226	-0.583	$-1.019^{***}$	$-0.682^{*}$	$-0.743^{**}$	-0.754			
	(0.340)	(0.494)	(0.295)	(0.416)	(0.296)	(0.401)	(0.312)	(0.502)			
log(German Pop.)		0.007		0.224		0.855		1.174			
		(0.352)		(0.577)		(0.778)		(0.800)			
log(Urban Pop.)		-0.238		$-1.366^{***}$		$-0.996^{**}$		$-1.767^{**}$			
		(0.264)		(0.406)		(0.487)		(0.703)			
MC Age		0.076***		0.015		-0.034		-0.022			
Ŭ		(0.029)		(0.028)		(0.034)		(0.045)			
Democratic		-17.488		-0.609		$-2.236^{***}$		$-4.534^{***}$			
		(1,302.004)		(0.597)		(0.681)		(1.311)			
Northeast		-15.987		-1.105		$-2.056^{**}$		1.067			
		(1,302.005)		(0.678)		(0.836)		(0.898)			
South		1.114		$-1.367^{**}$		-0.402		-16.056			
		(1.627)		(0.680)		(0.992)		(2,997.711)			
West				0.007		-0.447		-15.991			
				(1.463)		(0.879)		(4,526.411)			
Constant	0.450	15.446	-0.057	13.304**	0.326	6.855	$-0.613^{*}$	9.669			
	(0.530)	(1,302.008)	(0.209)	(5.586)	(0.262)	(6.232)	(0.355)	(8.605)			
German Pop.	First	First	Second	Second	Third	Third	Fourth	Fourth			
Composition	Quartile	Quartile	Quartile	Quartile	Quartile	Quartile	Quartile	Quartile			
N	103	103	97	97	96	96	105	105			
Log Likelihood	-60.738	-52.492	-66.935	-50.334	-58.563	-41.644	-50.584	-25.433			
AIC	125.477	120.985	137.870	118.669	121.126	101.287	105.168	68.867			

Table A.9: German Population, Social Clubs and MC Vote Choice: Hobson Prohibition Amendment (HJR 168), by Quartile

p < .1; p < .05; p < .01

**Notes:** For the first through fourth quartiles of the German-American population distribution, this table reports the results of a logistic regression where the outcome variable is an indicator for whether a member of Congress cast a vote in favor of Prohibition for the Hobson Amendment. The quartile is specified in the row labelled "German Pop. Composition." Multi-member districts are excluded from the sample where necessary.

			Pro Prohil	oition Vote		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Civil Society						
Index	$-0.072^{*}$			0.025		
	(0.041)			(0.047)		
log(German Social						
Clubs)		-0.029			-0.038	
		(0.068)			(0.041)	
log(German-Language						
Newspapers)			-0.002			-0.018
			(0.047)			(0.030)
log(Urban Pop.)	-0.015	-0.013	-0.014	-0.009	-0.006	-0.011
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.012)
MC Age	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Democratic	-0.143	-0.147	-0.144	-0.102	-0.097	-0.099
	(0.108)	(0.112)	(0.127)	(0.079)	(0.083)	(0.084)
State FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Congress FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
German Pop.	First	First	First	Second	Second	Second
Composition	Quartile	Quartile	Quartile	Quartile	Quartile	Quartile
Ν	186	186	186	168	168	168
R <sup>2</sup>	0.341	0.330	0.329	0.567	0.567	0.566

Table A.10: Prohibition Voting (District Level), WWI Anti-German Outbreak and Shifts in German-American Civil Society

 $^{*}p < .1; ^{**}p < .05; ^{***}p < .01$ 

SEs clustered at CD level.

**Notes:** This table reports a two-way fixed effects regression where the outcome is a binary variable denoting a pro-Prohibition vote (or not) and the explanatory variables are the two components of the Civil Society Index that are time-varying. The analysis is broken out by German population quartile in the district. This table reports the results for the First and Second Quartiles. All specifications include state and congress fixed effects. We include a more limited set of controls than in previous tables because the state fixed effects absorb controls that do not vary over time or within state (e.g., region of country).

	Pro Prohibition Vote								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)			
Civil Society									
Index	$-0.076^{***}$			-0.002					
	(0.029)			(0.023)					
log(German Social									
Clubs)		$-0.141^{***}$			$-0.085^{**}$				
		(0.053)			(0.038)				
log(German-Language									
Newspapers)			-0.080			0.029			
			(0.069)			(0.061)			
log(Urban Pop.)	-0.027	0.052	-0.017	$-0.122^{***}$	$-0.096^{***}$	$-0.119^{***}$			
	(0.056)	(0.051)	(0.059)	(0.038)	(0.031)	(0.038)			
State FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes			
Congress FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes			
German Pop.	Third	Third	Third	Fourth	Fourth	Fourth			
Composition	Quartile	Quartile	Quartile	Quartile	Quartile	Quartile			
Ν	158	158	158	176	176	176			
<u>R<sup>2</sup></u>	0.503	0.515	0.489	0.357	0.378	0.359			

Table A.11: Prohibition Voting (District Level), WWI Anti-German Outbreak and Shifts in German-American Civil Society, No MC-Level Controls

p < .1; p < .05; p < .01

SEs clustered at CD level.

**Notes:** This table reports a regression where the outcome is a binary variable denoting a pro-Prohibition vote (or not) and the explanatory variables are the two components of the Civil Society Index that are time-varying. These specifications exclude MC-level characteristics to make sure that conditioning on variables downstream from German-American Civil Society is not inducing bias in our estimates. The analysis is broken out by German population quartile in the district, with results for the Third and Fourth Quartiles reported here. We include a more limited set of controls than in previous tables because the fixed effects absorb controls that do not vary over time or within state.

			Pro Prohil	oition Vote		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Civil Society						
Index	$-0.071^{*}$			0.017		
	(0.042)			(0.049)		
log(German Social						
Clubs)		-0.038			-0.037	
		(0.074)			(0.041)	
log(German-Language						
Newspapers)			-0.027			-0.006
			(0.042)			(0.030)
log(Urban Pop.)	-0.018	-0.015	-0.015	-0.007	-0.004	-0.008
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.012)
State FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Congress FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
German Pop.	First	First	First	Second	Second	Second
Composition	Quartile	Quartile	Quartile	Quartile	Quartile	Quartile
Ν	186	186	186	168	168	168
<u>R<sup>2</sup></u>	0.323	0.312	0.312	0.561	0.562	0.560

Table A.12: Prohibition Voting (District Level), WWI Anti-German Outbreak and Shifts in German-American Civil Society, No MC-Level Controls

 $^{*}p < .1; ^{**}p < .05; ^{***}p < .01$ 

SEs clustered at CD level.

**Notes:** This table reports a regression where the outcome is a binary variable denoting a pro-Prohibition vote (or not) and the explanatory variables are the two components of the Civil Society Index that are time-varying. These specifications exclude MC-level characteristics to make sure that conditioning on variables downstream from German-American Civil Society is not inducing bias in our estimates. The analysis is broken out by German population quartile in the district, with results for the First and Second Quartiles reported here. We include a more limited set of controls than in previous tables because the fixed effects absorb controls that do not vary over time or within state.

		Civil Soci	iety index	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Anti-German				
Hate Crimes	-0.524	0.255	0.274	-0.004
	(0.561)	(0.285)	(0.215)	(0.112)
log(Urban Pop.)	0.001	-0.001	0.014	0.029
	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.065)	(0.045)
MC Age	0.0004	0.003	-0.008	0.013
U U	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Democratic	0.091	0.337**	0.413**	-0.086
	(0.152)	(0.153)	(0.206)	(0.164)
State FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Congress FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
German Pop.				
Quartile	1	2	3	4
Ν	186	168	158	176
R <sup>2</sup>	0.843	0.207	0.231	0.630

Table A.13: German-American Civil Society and WWI Anti-German Harassment Incidents, Pre and Post World War I

p < .1; p < .05; p < .01

SEs clustered at CD level.

**Notes:** This table reports the results of a regression where the outcome variable is the German-American Civil Society Index, as measured before and after World War I. The pre-war period measure used for this index is identical to that used elsewhere in this paper. The post-war period includes 1920 Newspapers data and 1922 German Club directories data along with our existing measure of petitioning activity. We use this updated measure since the anti-German harassment data is available for 1917-1918, e.g., after the Prohibition vote. The data on anti-German harassment incidents comes from Fouka (2019*b*).

	Pro Prohibition Vote							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)				
Civil Society								
Index	-0.064	0.011	$-0.078^{***}$	0.007				
	(0.041)	(0.046)	(0.027)	(0.021)				
District FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes				
Congress FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes				
German Pop.								
Quartile	1	2	3	4				
Ν	186	168	158	176				
<u>R<sup>2</sup></u>	0.724	0.708	0.798	0.809				

Table A.14: Prohibition Voting (District Level), WWI Anti-German Outbreak and Shifts in German-American Civil Society: Difference-in-Differences

 $p^{*} < .1; p^{*} < .05; p^{*} < .01$ 

SEs clustered at CD level.

**Notes:** This table reports the results of a difference-in-differences style regression, including district and congress fixed effects, of pro-Prohibition vote on the Civil Society Index. A negative coefficient indicates that a decline in the Civil Society Index is correlated with an increased probability of casting a pro-Prohibition vote. Each column presents coefficient estimates for a different cut of the data based on the quartile of German-American population.

				Pro Prohibi	ition Vote			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Above Median German Civil Society	$-0.256^{**}$ (0.121)				-0.064 (0.161)			
Above Median German Newspapers	(0.121)	-0.147 (0.118)			(0.101)	-0.072 (0.093)		
Above Median German Orgs		(0.110)	$-0.486^{***}$ (0.112)			(0.093)	-0.102 (0.178)	
Above Median German Petitions			(0.112)	-0.103 (0.119)			(0.178)	-0.040 (0.083)
Post WW1	0.042 (0.073)	0.036 (0.081)	0.048 (0.047)	0.139** (0.068)	0.125 (0.119)	0.103* (0.057)	0.143 (0.134)	0.182*** (0.052)
Above Median German Civil Society								
× Post WW1	0.195* (0.100)				0.073 (0.126)			
Above Median German Newspapers × Post WW1		0.219** (0.106)				0.127 (0.078)		
Above Median German Orgs		(0.106)				(0.078)		
$\times$ Post WW1			0.177** (0.085)				0.053 (0.141)	
Above Median German Petitions × Post WW1				0.143 (0.147)				0.015 (0.119)
Constant	0.583*** (0.102)	0.500*** (0.096)	0.762*** (0.094)	0.436*** (0.068)	0.250 (0.155)	0.241*** (0.081)	0.286 (0.173)	0.207*** (0.054)
German Pop.	Third	Third	Third	Third	Fourth	Fourth	Fourth	Fourth
Composition N Treated CDs	Quartile 55	Quartile 51	Quartile 58	Quartile 13	Quartile 86	Quartile 65	Quartile 87	Quartile 22
N R <sup>2</sup>	158 0.061	158 0.044	158 0.161	158 0.036	188 0.046	188 0.049	188 0.047	188 0.046

### Table A.15: Prohibition Voting (District Level), Pre/Post WWI Anti-German Outbreak and Concentration of German-American Civil Society

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

SEs clustered at CD level.

**Notes:** This table reports the results of a difference-in-differences specification, estimated by ordinary least squares regression, where the outcome is a binary variable indicating a pro-Prohibition vote and the key explanatory variables are a binary indicating a district is above or below the median on a civil society measure (pre-WWI), a binary indicating whether the vote occurred pre- or post-WWI, and the interaction of the two. The analysis is broken out by German population quartile in the district. This table reports the results for the Third and Fourth Quartiles. We also report the number of treated congressional districts (e.g., districts where the interaction variable equals one). The number of treated units for columns where petitions are the key explanatory variable appears low because a majority of congressional districts received zero petitions from identifiable German-American groups during the time period under study.

				Pro Prohił	vition Vote			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Above Median German Civil Society	-0.214	(2)	(9)	(=)	-0.043	(0)	(*)	
Above Median German Newspapers	(0.362)	-0.366**			(0.116)	0.086		
Above Median German Orgs		(0.180)	0.042			(0.113)	-0.071	
Above Median			(0.225)	0.005			(0.117)	0.001
German Petitions Post WW1	0.165***	0.141***	0.169***	0.095 (0.188) 0.181***	0.309***	0.394***	0.304***	-0.081 (0.136) $0.290^{***}$
Above Median	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.068)	(0.094) (0.097)	(0.072)	(0.063)
German Civil Society × Post WW1	0.335				-0.068			
Above Median German Newspapers	(0.361)				(0.127)			
$\times$ Post WW1		0.359* (0.185)				-0.178 (0.120)		
Above Median German Orgs			0.021				0.054	
× Post WW1 Above Median			0.081 (0.224)				-0.054 (0.121)	
German Petitions × Post WW1				-0.147 (0.268)				-0.201 (0.216)
Constant	0.714*** (0.048)	0.741*** (0.048)	0.708*** (0.049)	0.705*** (0.049)	0.491*** (0.068)	0.424*** (0.087)	0.500*** (0.068)	0.493*** (0.062)
German Pop.	First	First	First	First	Second	Second	Second	Second
Composition N Treated CDs	Quartile 2	Quartile 8	Quartile 4	Quartile 6	Quartile 29	Quartile 51	Quartile 28	Quartile 6
N Heated CDS N	186	186	186	186	168	168	168	168
<u>R<sup>2</sup></u>	0.049	0.078	0.048	0.047	0.093	0.095	0.096	0.100

### Table A.16: Prohibition Voting (District Level), Pre/Post WWI Anti-German Outbreak and Concentration of German-American Civil Society

 $^{*}p < .1; ^{**}p < .05; ^{***}p < .01$ 

SEs clustered at CD level.

**Notes:** This table reports the results of a difference-in-differences specification, estimated by ordinary least squares regression, where the outcome is a binary variable indicating a pro-Prohibition vote and the key explanatory variables are a binary indicating a district is above or below the median on a civil society measure (pre-WWI), a binary indicating whether the vote occurred pre- or post-WWI, and the interaction of the two. The analysis is broken out by German population quartile in the district. This table reports the results for the First and Second Quartiles. We also report the number of treated congressional districts (e.g., districts where the interaction variable equals one). The number of treated units for columns where petitions are the key explanatory variable appears low because a majority of congressional districts received zero petitions from identifiable German-American groups during the time period under study.


County	State	Total	Total	German	German	Pct. German	No. German	No. German	Prohibition	Prohibition
Name		Pop.	White Pop.	(1st Gen)	(2nd Gen)	(of White Pop)	Orgs, 1916	Orgs, 1922	Status, 1910	Status, 1916
FAYETTE	ΤX	29796	22434	4326	7527	52.835	4	2	wet	wet
WASHINGTON	ΤX	25561	13541	2380	4724	52.463	6	1	wet	wet
COLFAX	NE	11610	11598	2415	3303	49.302	1	1	wet	wet
MILWAUKEE	WI	433187	432120	89788	121904	48.989	148	125	wet	wet
MARATHON	WI	55054	55013	9819	15869	46.694	2	2	wet	wet
GREEN LAKE	WI	15491	15481	2727	4481	46.560	1	0	wet	wet
AUSTIN	ΤX	17699	12681	2160	3690	46.132	2	0	wet	wet
MCLEOD	MN	18691	18679	3216	5369	45.961	1	0	wet	wet
TAYLOR	WI	13641	13617	2871	3316	45.436	0	0	wet	wet
SHAWANO	WI	31884	30110	4922	8580	44.842	0	1	wet	wet
LAVACA	ΤX	26418	22034	3725	5937	43.850	0	0	wet	wet
CUMING	NE	13782	13755	2322	3663	43.511	0	0	wet	wet
BROWN	MN	20134	20132	3441	5304	43.438	0	0	wet	wet
OZAUKEE	WI	17123	17116	2535	4811	42.919	1	3	wet	wet
JEFFERSON	WI	34306	34282	5418	9102	42.355	4	1	wet	wet
MANITOWOC	WI	44978	44956	6530	12441	42.199	2	0	wet	wet
DODGE	WI	47436	47375	7437	12407	41.887	6	0	wet	wet
SHEBOYGAN	WI	54888	54868	8870	13402	40.592	0	8	wet	wet
WASHINGTON	WI	23784	23777	3074	6486	40.207	2	0	wet	wet
KEWAUNEE	WI	16784	16784	2518	4222	40.157	2	0	wet	wet
STANTON	NE	7542	7541	1168	1823	39.663	1	0	wet	wet
PORTAGE	WI	30945	30937	4202	7906	39.138	2	1	wet	wet
CALUMET	WI	16701	16461	2067	4364	39.068	4	2	wet	wet
CARVER	MN	17455	17451	2333	4394	38.548	1	0	wet	wet
WINNEBAGO	WI	62116	61981	9170	14683	38.484	2	2	wet	wet
WINONA	MN	33398	33374	4814	7970	38.305	1	1	wet	wet


Table A.17: Top 50 German-American Population Counties

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County	State	Total	Total	German	German	Pct. German	No. German	No. German	Prohibition	Prohibition
Name		Pop.	White Pop.	(1st Gen)	(2nd Gen)	(of White Pop)	Orgs, 1916	Orgs, 1922	Status, 1910	Status, 1916
WOOD	WI	30583	30465	4306	7110	37.473	4	3	wet	wet
PLATTE	NE	19006	18983	2807	4248	37.165	5	0	wet	wet
BENTON	MN	11615	11613	1439	2846	36.898	0	0	wet	wet
SALINE	NE	17866	17843	2622	3898	36.541	0	1	wet	wet
DOUGLAS	NV	1895	1570	285	281	36.051	0	0	wet	wet
SCOTT	MN	14888	14882	1876	3481	35.997	0	0	wet	wet
STEARNS	MN	47733	47719	6074	11074	35.935	0	0	wet	wet
BUTLER	NE	15403	15390	2185	3287	35.556	0	0	wet	wet
SIBLEY	MN	15540	15534	1911	3606	35.516	1	0	wet	wet
OTTAWA	OH	22360	22328	3131	4768	35.377	0	0	wet	wet
CRAWFORD	IA	20041	20016	2753	4203	34.752	0	0	wet	dry (state)
LINCOLN	WI	19064	18984	2489	4058	34.487	2	2	wet	wet
SCOTT	IA	60000	59420	8194	11915	33.842	12	12	wet	dry (state)
PIERCE	NE	10122	10122	1235	2174	33.679	0	0	wet	wet
LE SUEUR	MN	18609	18580	2352	3815	33.192	0	1	wet	wet
OUTAGAMIE	WI	49102	47933	5772	10129	33.173	7	7	wet	wet
MARQUETTE	WI	10741	10697	1255	2267	32.925	0	0	wet	wet
GRUNDY	IA	13574	13562	1747	2674	32.598	0	0	dry (county)	dry (state)
WASHINGTON	IL	18759	18685	1911	4099	32.165	0	0	wet	wet
CARROLL	IA	20117	20086	2384	4071	32.137	0	0	wet	dry (state)
CLARK	WI	30074	30030	3765	5857	32.041	0	1	wet	wet
JACKSON	MN	14491	14489	1730	2867	31.728	1	0	wet	dry (county)
OSCEOLA	IA	8956	8950	978	1853	31.631	0	0	wet	dry (state)
FOND DU LAC	WI	51610	51515	5596	10673	31.581	5	3	wet	wet

Table A.17: Top 50 German-American Population Counties





**Notes:** This figure illustrates the share of congressional districts that fall into different German-American Population and Civil Society Index Deciles. The bottom left square represents the first decile for both German-American Population and Civil Society Index, whereas the top right square represents the top decile for both of these variables. Darker squares indicate a greater number of congressional districts (CDs) with a particular combination. For a given level of German-American population, off-diagonal squares indicate those instances where a CD has either a higher than typical level for the Civil Society Index (bottom right) or a lower than typical level.

#### A.4 Maps of German-American Population






Figure A.2: **German-American Population Map:** This graphic depicts the share of first- and second-generation German-Americans as a share of the white population in the United States based on 1910 Census statistics. Darker (purple) shaded regions have a higher German-American population share. First-generation German-Americans are defined as persons born in Germany, Austria-Hungary, or Switzerland. Second-generation German-Americans are persons born to parents who are both from one of these three countries.

#### A.5 Supplemental Materials on Amendments

#### A.5.1 Text of Proposed Hobson Amendment (1914)

Section 1. The sale, manufacture for sale, transportation for sale, importation for sale, and exportation for sale of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes in the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof are forever prohibited

Section 2. Congress shall have power to provide for the manufacture, sale, importation, and transportation of intoxicating liquors for sacramental, medicinal, mechanical, pharmaceutical, or scientific purposes, or for use in the arts, and shall have power to enforce this article by all needful legislation.

#### A.5.2 Text of Eighteenth Amendment (1917)

Section 1. After one year from the ratification of this article the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United States and all the territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited.

Section 2. The Congress and the several States shall have concurrent power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

Section 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of the several States, as provided in the Constitution, within seven years from the date of the submission hereof to the States by the Congress.