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**HARVARD Kennedy School**  
JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT

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Faculty Research Working Paper Series

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Pippa Norris  
Harvard Kennedy School

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# Cancel culture:

Heterodox self-censorship or the curious case of the dog-which-didn't-bark

**Pippa Norris**

Harvard University

[Pippa\\_Norris@Harvard.edu](mailto:Pippa_Norris@Harvard.edu)

**Abstract:**

There is widespread concern that academic freedom is threatened by growing demands for intellectual conformity and attempted censorship from intolerant zealots involving 'woke wars' and a 'cancel culture' pitting the socially liberal progressive left against the socially conservative right.

This study seeks to understand the nature and scope of contemporary threats to academic freedom of expression around the world, especially the role of self-censorship in this process. *Part I* unpacks the notion of a 'cancel culture' in academia, understood as a chilly climate silencing speech deemed derogatory, hostile, factually incorrect, or morally offensive. The research explores processes of *self-censorship* where scholars are unwilling to express their authentic views in public. Mechanisms potentially driving these processes include *heterodox status* (cultural minorities out of step with majority views aka fish-out-of-water); *institutions* (constitutional principles, legal frameworks and administrative regulations used by educational authorities to govern academic speech); *culture* (attitudes, values, and social norms towards free speech); and *academic status* (inequalities in academic power, security, gender, and age).

To establish empirical evidence, *Part II* sets out the research design. It draws upon new survey data collected from the second ECPR-IPSA World of Political Science survey (WPS-2023), monitoring the background and attitudes of almost 2000 political scientists living and working in around 100 countries worldwide. *Part III* analyzes the key results, confirming the reluctance of heterodox scholars to challenge majority views in controversial debates. The conclusion in *Part IV* summarizes the findings, considers their broader implications, and discusses the next steps in the research agenda.

Since the Enlightenment, classical and modern philosophers in the liberal canon have advocated freedom of speech, open-mindedness to a broad range of opinions, beliefs and perspectives, and the protection of heterodox views flouting convention. These values are regarded as universal human rights and bedrock pillars of democracy, creative thinking, scientific innovation, societal enlightenment, civic activism, and scholarly inquiry. The value of freedom of opinion and expression, without interference, is recognized in Article 19 of the 1948 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. National constitutions around the world incorporate these principles into law; almost all (192/198) incorporate freedom of speech, like the First Amendment in the US constitution, while around half (95) recognize rights to academic freedom.<sup>1</sup> Article 13 of the 1966 ICESCR recognizes the liberty of individuals and bodies to establish and direct educational institutions, within minimum state standards.<sup>2</sup> The UNHCR highlights the risks of the loss of these rights: “Without academic freedom, societies lose one of the essential elements of democratic self-governance: the capacity for self-reflection, for knowledge generation and for a constant search for improvements of people’s lives and social conditions.”<sup>3</sup>

Today, however, in the United States and many similar liberal democracies, there is widespread concern that academic freedom faces growing threats from a mélange of commercial pressures, government regulations, and social forces.<sup>4</sup> In particular, popular arguments about ‘cancel culture’ and ‘woke wars’ blame either the socially liberal progressive left, or the socially conservative right, or both, for actively seeking to censor the voices of their perceived enemies. Contemporary developments are widely believed to threaten the values of constructive disagreement, independent thinking, viewpoint diversity, and intellectual pluralism at the heart of the pursuit of human knowledge.<sup>5</sup> The core mission of universities is impoverished if there is a climate of intellectual conformity, rote learning, stunted development, and dull thinking, at best, and at worst, ideological indoctrination.

In the light these concerns, this study seeks to understand the nature and scope of contemporary threats to academic freedom of expression around the world and explore some of the underlying reasons for self-censorship. *Part I* of this study unpacks the notion of a ‘cancel culture’ in academia, understood as a chilly climate silencing speech deemed derogatory, hostile, factually incorrect, or morally offensive. The research focuses upon evidence for processes of *self-censorship* where people are unwilling to express their authentic views in public, measured by the hesitancy of scholars to express controversial views in a variety of contexts within and outside academia, such as in their teaching and research, department, and social media. Mechanisms potentially driving self-censorship include *heterodox status* (cultural minorities out of step with majority views); *institutions* (constitutional principles, legal frameworks and administrative regulations used by educational authorities to govern academic speech); *culture* (attitudes, values, and social norms towards free speech); and *academic status* (inequalities in academic power, security, gender, and age). *Part II* sets out the research design drawing upon new global survey data collected in the second ECPR-IPSA World of Political Science survey (WPS-2023) which gathered responses in early-2023 from almost 2000 political scientists living and working in around 100 countries worldwide. *Part III* presents the evidence and analysis of the main factors contributing towards self-censorship.

The conclusion in *Part IV* summarizes the key findings. The evidence demonstrates several main points:

- (i) A liberal-left skew in cultural values is evident within academia worldwide, with a predominant consensus among scholars in Western societies favoring liberal social and moral values like support for abortion rights, same sex marriage and democratic participation.
- (ii) In Western societies, heterodox scholars (identifying as social conservatives, as well as those seeing themselves as out-of-step with the predominant climate of opinion within their department) are most likely to practice self-censorship, hesitating to express controversial views. This pattern was evident in teaching and research, as well as in social media and other public venues.
- (iii) By contrast, in non-Western developing countries, characterized by more traditional moral cultures, self-censorship was not predicted by a scholar's social values or subjective heterodox status.
- (iv) Practices of self-censorship were also related to attitudes towards free speech, the age and gender of scholars, and regulations governing freedom of speech.

The study considers the broader implications of these findings and discusses the next steps in the research agenda. This research helps to deepen our understanding of the spiral-of-silence process of self-censorship in higher education, with important lessons for policies protecting viewpoint diversity within the academy.

### **I: Theoretical and conceptual framework**

What is the best way to conceptualize the 'cancel culture' phenomenon? The term can and has been understood in many ways.<sup>6</sup> Popular usage of the term 'cancel culture' has now become ubiquitous in contemporary media headlines and partisan rhetoric.<sup>7</sup> Intense concern about this phenomenon has focused on the primary agencies of cultural transmission including the predominance of socially liberal voices among commentators and celebrities in the media and among teachers in educational institutions. It can be argued that the phrase (like the related notion of 'woke') has become so over-loaded in partisan rhetoric as a catch-all derogatory term of abuse for stuff people don't like, and so confused, vague, and contradictory in popular usage, that it cannot and should not be redeemed. Rather than being abandoned, however, social scientists should attempt to develop more precise scientific conceptualization of everyday terms which advance the operationalization and measurement of complex social phenomenon.

In this study, the notion of a 'cancel culture' is defined and understood as *a chilly climate silencing speech deemed derogatory, hostile, factually incorrect, or morally offensive*. The strategy of silencing is justified where the value of untrammelled freedom of expression is regarded as less important than other primary moral principles and ethical standards – such as the protection of children, safeguards against alleged sexual harassment, respect for self-ascribed gender or ethnic identities, threats of social violence, regard for religious beliefs and practices, or problems of racial discrimination. Headlines have focused upon campaigns of public shaming and boycotts mobilizing the politics of outrage using online social media platforms, the contemporary equivalent of the village stocks.<sup>8</sup> Within schools, colleges and university institutions, the notion can be applied to diverse forms of interpersonal and mediated communication channels, whether disseminated through teaching and learning, research, publications, and speech, conducted within and outside academia. Teaching faculty and students are often the primary actors on college campuses, but cases also involve administrative staff and senior managers, researchers and visiting speakers, as well as external bodies like national, state and local

governments, governors and lawmakers, the courts, social groups, and NGOs in civil society, like parental rights or free speech advocacy organizations. The chilly climate may be generated by organized actions designed to silence speech – exemplified by lecture boycotts, media campaigns, formal speech codes, or campus protests – or it may be the unintentional product of more subtle and informal cultural processes.

Restrictions on viewpoint diversity is widely believed by many to pose an existential threat to the university's core mission of deepening intellectual inquiry, learning and knowledge generation. It can undermine academic freedom more generally, defined by UNESCO as “the right, without constriction by prescribed doctrine, to freedom of teaching and discussion, freedom in carrying out research and disseminating and publishing the results thereof, freedom to express freely their opinion about the institution or system in which they work, freedom from institutional censorship and freedom to participate in professional or representative academic bodies.”<sup>9</sup>

The debate has become particularly heated within the United States. Conservative critiques of liberal hegemony on university campuses are far from novel; its modern intellectual origins can be traced back to William F. Buckley in the mid-twentieth century.<sup>10</sup> But concern about freedom of academic expression has intensified and entered popular culture and leadership rhetoric during the last decade. This reflects the broader contemporary climate of heightened partisan polarization and social intolerance in a divided America, with cultural battles intensifying over moral and ethical values, underlying deep partisan political divisions over issues such as reproductive rights, gun control, LGBTQ rights, affirmative action, and racial justice.<sup>11</sup> Social conservatives in America adopted the phrase ‘cancel culture’, like the term ‘woke’, as loose shorthand derogatory political slogans employed rhetorically to attack progressive liberal-left activists involved in grassroots movements for social justice, exemplified by ‘Me Too’ and Black Lives Matters.<sup>12</sup>

Both sides are deeply engaged in cultural battles over the limits of academic free speech.

Progressive forces argue that diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI) policies should expand opportunities for historically socially disadvantaged groups, especially the representation by race/ethnicity, gender, and social class. Interventions in freedom of academic expression are justified by activists as attempts to produce a more diverse mix of identities, life experiences, and social backgrounds in campus communities, which, in turn, it is claimed, enriches the overall mission of a university. DEI principles are thought to over-ride the value of untrammelled free speech, for example, where interventions limit the use of perceived derogatory or prejudiced speech in the classroom, or the range of topics and readings in the curriculum, where official speech codes seek to constrain the language used in hiring and promotion decisions, and where administrators decide to rescind invitation to speakers accused of morally offensive extreme views, like Holocaust deniers, anti-trans authors, or far right White Nationalist provocateurs. Historical topics or texts, seen by modern standards as sexist, racist, classist, anti-Semitic or transphobic, are regarded as beyond the pale for classroom discussion.

By contrast, rightwing critics argue that a persistent liberal bias among teaching faculty, growing intolerance of conservative values in schools and universities, including the use of DEI policies, and claimed indoctrination of impressionable young minds, justifies new regulations. Conservatives claim limits on academic autonomy are needed to protect viewpoint diversity, parental rights, Christian values, and long-standing social norms, especially those

concerning birth-ascribed binary gender identities, marriage and the family, nationalism and nativism, and traditional sexual orientations.<sup>13</sup>

The debate about academic freedom of speech is perhaps most intense in the United States, but similar concerns echo in many other postindustrial societies.<sup>14</sup> In the UK, for example, despite successive Conservative governments in power since 2010, it is claimed that a ‘new elite’ of university-educated cosmopolitan progressives, controlling universities and the media, has long disregarded, and actively sought to silence, the views and values of the socially-conservative majority in British working class society, over issues such as the EU and Brexit, marriage and the family, and sexual orientations.<sup>15</sup> The reasons why ‘woke wars’ have provoked such heated debate remain under debate; the ‘cultural backlash’ theory suggests that they are associated with developments since the mid-1960s and 1970 expanding public support for liberal values on many social and moral issues in post-industrial societies, such as tolerance of racial and ethnic diversity, support for LGBTQ rights, cosmopolitan identities, and gender equality, triggering a counter-reaction where socially conservative forces feel that traditional values of ‘flag, faith and family’ are under existential threat.<sup>16</sup>

#### *Heterodox status and self-censorship*

Many mechanisms could potentially strengthen the development of a cancel culture threatening academic freedom of expression. The theoretical framework used in this study focuses primarily on understanding the role of *self-censorship*. The concept emphasizes that individuals voluntarily and intentionally hesitate to express their personal beliefs and opinions, attitudes and values on controversial issues, choosing to conceal their true views from others likely to disagree, even in the absence of formal obstacles like laws on hate speech or blasphemy, official censorship, or social sanctions.<sup>17</sup>

A classic theoretical framework, generating testable propositions about how this process is thought to work within the academy, draws upon the ‘spiral of silence’ argument, originally developed by Noelle-Neuman in the mid-1970s, and expanded by many subsequent studies.<sup>18</sup> This thesis describes situations where, for fear of social isolation or loss of status, people are hesitant to express authentic views contrary to prevalent moral beliefs and social norms, producing self-censorship of ideas and values perceived as contrary to the prevailing climate of opinion. By contrast, the more that individuals feel confident that their views reflect majority opinion and prevalent social norms within any group, however, the more willing they become to voice them in public discourse, without fearing the penalty of social sanctions. The spiral-of-silence thesis suggests that over time this process is likely to further reinforce the hegemonic viewpoint and ratchet the predominant values in the group consensus. In education, the spiral of silence is likely to muffle overt dissent in classroom discussions, departmental and faculty meetings; to weaken rigorous intellectual debate in scholarly talks, professional conventions, books and journal articles; as well as reinforcing the paradigmatic consensus guiding normal scientific inquiry.

[Figure 1 about here]

The definition of the ‘*heterodox*’ used in this study is understood to depend in practice upon the fit of the values of individuals with their broader societal culture.<sup>19</sup> This is depicted visually in Figure 1, presenting a simple typology where the dominant climate of opinion in the culture (on the horizontal axis) is compared with the values of the individual (on the vertical axis). The heuristic model illustrates the key relationships.

Building upon this thesis, this study theorizes that self-censorship within the academy is likely to be most common among heterodox viewpoint minorities (hereafter referred to simply as the ‘*heterodox*’). These are defined as scholars holding unconventional values, beliefs, and attitudes contrary to the predominant consensus within any collective societal, institutional or group culture. The heterodox fringe is exemplified on the liberal-left by the minority of MAGA-supporting students at UC Berkeley, or on the conservative-right by atheist professors teaching at Liberty University, Lynchburg, VA. By contrast, ‘*orthodox*’ viewpoint majorities (hereafter referred to simply as the ‘*orthodox*’) are conceptualized as members of cultural groups holding hegemonic values, beliefs and attitudes shared by the majority prevailing within any academic community, such as progressives holding liberal views towards diversity and inclusion among social science students at the University of California, Berkeley, or ‘Champions of Christ’ faculty teaching religious studies at Brigham Young University in Utah. Through this processes, practices of ‘self-silencing’ depressing overt dissent are predicted to be greatest in mismatched (heterodox) cases, or ‘fish-out-of-water’, especially about deeply polarizing moral or even factual issues.<sup>20</sup> Consequently, extreme heterodox claims held by fringe groups and small minorities -- such as the voices of Holocaust deniers, White Supremacists, anarchists advocating violent attacks on the state, climate change deniers, or Flat Earthers -- gradually come to be ‘silenced’ within academia. These become regarded as crackpot ideas or conspiratorial beliefs beyond the boundaries of reasonable deliberation, factual evidence, and serious argument. Scholars who continue to express heterodox views despite the academic consensus are expected to encounter hostile reactions and social penalties.<sup>21</sup> By contrast, orthodox individuals, who hold views consistent with the mainstream moral majority in any group environment, will feel emboldened to speak freely and express their views, as they do not risk social sanctions or loss of status. The size of the majority and minority groups, the salience and polarization of moral values, and the contestability of factual opinions, are further conditions likely to reinforce this process. Pluralistic debate flourishes most vigorously where there is a broad balance of opinions among academics, for example constructive exchanges and disputes about the pros and cons of innovative AI technologies. It is stifled most where there is a settled consensus in the climate of group opinion challenged by only a fringe minority of heretics.

*Mediating conditions: Institutions, cultural attitudes and academic power structures*

The spiral of silence thesis provides a powerful and testable theory in social psychology and communication studies, but it is worthwhile exploring the role of several additional factors which could potentially reinforce practices of self-censorship. This includes institutional accounts (the constitutional principles, legal statutes and administrative rules governing the regulation of free academic speech in any society); culture (moral values and attitudes towards tolerance of free speech); and structural disparities in academic power (like employment status, tenure security, and the related characteristics like age, gender and race/ethnicity).

*Institutions*

Institutional accounts in legal studies emphasize that the overarching formal constitutional principles, the de jure legal framework, and the administrative regulations used by state agencies and institutional authorities to govern higher education influence free speech within academia. Formal regulations are thought to reinforce the propensity to self-censor, through sanctions and penalties for outspoken speech, for example the use of blasphemy laws in strict



Islamic states, or limits on public criticisms of the Ukrainian invasion in Russia.<sup>22</sup> Therefore, in societies worldwide where there are more strict restrictions legal regulations of academic autonomy and freedom of expression, these institutional constraints are likely to reinforce informal processes of self-censorship among scholars, especially in the world's most repressive regimes such as among anti-Putin Russian dissidents, Hong Kong democracy advocates, or Turkish critics of President Erdogan, but also in liberal democracies seeking to constrain the content of classroom curricula or restrict the use of diversity, equity and inclusion interventions in free speech.

*Cultural attitudes and values towards tolerance of free speech*

Cultural theories suggest that the hesitancy to speak up is also likely to be reinforced directly by social attitudes, values and moral beliefs about the principles of free speech.<sup>23</sup> This is likely to be important for social pressures mobilized by activists within and outside of educational institutions who either seek to restrict or to protect discourse regarded as morally offensive, like rowdy school board protests over 'woke' library books, student attempts at shout down far-right campus speakers, and complaints about the contents and language used in social media posts by faculty. Cultural attitudes towards the value of free speech are likely to justify the strategy of social isolation and ostracism from peers. Moreover, scholars holding strong opinions about the importance of robust free speech are more likely to be outspoken in challenging consensual views, rejecting politically correct language. Therefore, scholars who regard freedom of expression as an important principle, overriding other moral values, can be expected to be less likely to self-censor.

*Academic power structures*

Finally, academic power structures are also likely to influence who is willing to challenge majority views, especially disparities in employment status and seniority, silencing those holding insecure positions like early career scholars and non-tenured lecturers. Faculty expressing unpopular beliefs risk the possible loss of reputational goods, including professional status, rewards, and respect from colleagues, promotion from departmental chairs and faculty deans, and opportunities to collaborate with networks of researchers within the discipline. Academic advancement depends heavily upon peer review at all stages, including processes of training and certification, career opportunities for faculty appointment, advancement, and tenure, publications and citations, invitations to give keynote talks and media interviews, and the award of honors, research grants, and resources, all of which flow from the favorable (and often confidential) opinions of senior gatekeepers, like journal peer reviews or job references.<sup>24</sup> Those lacking academic status, power and security in their careers, such as graduate students and untenured faculty, can be expected to be most prone to self-censor. Some accusations target senior professors protected legally by tenure. But the most vulnerable victims, like PhD students, younger researchers, and untenured part-time lecturers, and thus early career scholars rather than established professors, are more likely to lack the legal rights, resources, and capacity to fight back.<sup>25</sup>

Formal academic status and tenure are also related to disparities in age and gender, since fewer younger scholars and women hold positions in the most senior professorial ranks. There may also be direct effects in this process, for example sociolinguistic studies emphasize the existence of enduring gender differences in language and the communication styles, with women more reticent and conciliatory in speech, and less willing than men to engage in confrontational debates.<sup>26</sup>

## II Evidence, data and research design

Therefore, to summarize, these arguments and the previous literature suggest several empirically testable propositions. In particular, for reasons already discussed, theories suggests that:

(H#1) A skew is likely to be observed towards liberal values and moral beliefs in academic cultures, as well as leftwing economic values, especially in Western societies.

(H#2) Self-censorship is likely to be greater among heterodox scholars (social conservatives and those perceiving themselves as out of step with the dominant views in academia) than among orthodox scholars.

(H#3) Self-censorship will be lessened among scholars endorsing the value of robust free speech in higher education.

(H#4.) Self-censorship will be greater among scholars lacking tenure and high academic status, as well as among women and younger cohorts.

(H#5) Self-censorship will be greater in states repressing academic freedom.

Despite the wealth of popular commentary, does systematic empirical evidence support these claims in the United States and similar postindustrial Western societies, as well as more broadly elsewhere? Establishing systematic data about these questions is far from straightforward. The phenomenon of self-censorship has been studied in multiple contexts, such as the role of secrets within families, whistle blowers in organizations, dissidents living in authoritarian regimes, and journalists in the news media.<sup>27</sup> The spiral of silence thesis has long provided an influential and powerful argument about processes of group communications, attracting a considerable body of empirical research in diverse disciplines. Nevertheless, an earlier review concluded that the research literature in communication studies and social psychology provided mixed confirmation of this thesis, with the observed results contingent upon conditions such as the nature and severity of group threats from speaking out, the type of social context, the relative size of majority and minority groups, and the type of issue cleavage.<sup>28</sup> Indeed perceptions about holding a minority view within a group may potentially generate the opposite effect, for example if more aggressive, angry, and contrarian individuals seek to stoke Us-Them polarization, such as members of fringe hate groups like neo-Nazi antisemites, anti-government militias, and White supremacists provoking outrage, and even violent confrontation, on issues of racism and gender.

Previous reports claiming a pervasive cancel culture in college campuses which is biased against conservatives have commonly buttressed their case by citing specific examples of laws and court cases restricting free speech in society and academia, as well as highlighting individual scholars, visitors and speakers allegedly ostracized, demoted, or sacked on college campuses.<sup>29</sup> Media commentators and politicians headline specific claims of intolerance and silencing by students on college campuses: speakers shouted down, events cancelled, Twitter outrage trending, and so on. Yet, it remains difficult to generalize about this complex phenomenon more broadly from specific cases in the tabloid headlines, either in America or elsewhere.

As discussed later, a long series of general surveys of the attitudes and values of academics, conducted in America and similar post-industrial societies over many decades, have been conducted which have demonstrated a long-standing liberal-left hegemony among the

professoriate.<sup>30</sup> But an ideological skew among faculty does not necessarily imply the active suppression or self-censorship of rightwing views on campus.

Recently dedicated surveys monitoring perceptions of the prevalence of cancel culture within academic communities, among students and faculty, have developed in several countries, including the United States, the United Kingdom and Germany.<sup>31</sup> Advocacy organizations, like the Heterodox Academy, have spearheaded these efforts, such as their annual Campus Expression Survey.<sup>32</sup> Online surveys distributed through social media, however, which depend upon opt-in participation, encounter risks of response bias and preference falsification on any sensitive or controversial topics, especially where advocacy organizations are known to have an explicitly political agenda.<sup>33</sup> Unintended cues and measurement biases can arise from the selection of items and from question framing.<sup>34</sup> It remains difficult to establish the reasons why students may hesitate to speak in classrooms discussions, for example this may be due to lack of expertise or interest about a topic, introvert inhibitions, cross-cultural norms about participation, or even practical constraints like class size and pedagogic format, as much as fear of being criticized by their peers or the professor. Moreover, self-censorship of speech, by definition, implies an absence of observable words or overt expressions, akin to Sherlock Holmes's curious case of the 'dog-which-didn't-bark'.<sup>35</sup> As such, like the study of 'non-decisions', this phenomenon poses serious challenges for empirical survey research. Indeed, the existence of self-censorship may be strongly denied by those holding orthodox views, like liberals on campus who sincerely believe that they welcome open debate on controversial issues. If there is an overwhelming consensus about a topic, people may not even be aware that there are alternative views, so that they are conforming with the conventional wisdom. And if it is widely reported that conservatives are the victims of self-censorship (even if these claims are imagined), this may have a reinforcing effect, in a self-perpetuating cycle, where they come to fear social pressures. If scholars and students hesitate to express their genuine views to colleagues and peers, for example concerning issues of racial discrimination, support for former President Trump, or trans-gender rights, they may also be likely to choose to disguise their authentic views when responding to interviewers in social surveys. Survey data may thereby generate a systematic *under*-estimate of the actual degree of self-censorship.

*The ECPR-IPSA World of Political Science survey, 2023*

Bearing in mind these important caveats, this research draws upon a general survey of the political science profession around the globe -- the ECPR-IPSA World of Political Science survey (WPS-2023) -- the second study in this series.<sup>36</sup> The European Consortium of Political Research (ECPR) and the International Political Science Association (IPSA) are the foremost international organizations in the discipline, covering Europe and the world, respectively. Political science is also a suitable discipline to study the prevalence of self-censorship, since the sub-field is at the forefront of 'woke wars' over 'identity politics' involving controversial issues of partisanship and ideology, race, nationalism and religion, class and inequality, and gender and sexuality.

The WPS-2023 survey was also designed to gather comprehensive information about multiple aspects within the discipline of political science, minimizing the risks of cueing respondents by dedicated surveys asking only about the issue of academic freedom of expression. This included monitoring the respondent's 1. Nation of current work or study; 2. Academic work experiences, satisfaction, and perceptions; 3. Ideological values; 4. Equality, diversity and inclusion within the discipline; 5. Experience and perceptions of academic freedom; 6.

Preferences for in-person or online communications; 7. Their background characteristics, including socio-demographic, educational qualifications, institutional contexts, methods and sub-fields; and 8. Academic geographic mobility. The macro-level national context of academic and media freedom within each society was matched to the survey responses, derived from estimates in V-Dem 13.0.

Invitations asking political scientists to participate in this study were widely distributed through social media notifications (Facebook, emails, and Twitter), the ECPR Newsletter list and IPSA lists, and through newsletters among several national associations (CPSA, PSA UK, Australian PSA, and the Russian PSA). For the WPS-2023 survey, 1,989 responses were collected online between 29 November 2022 and 31 January 2023. This included replies from respondents who were currently studying or working in 103 countries located in eight global regions, including Western Europe and North America (1224), Latin America (362), Eastern and Central Europe (157), Asia-Pacific (129), the Middle East and North Africa (59), and Sub-Saharan Africa (48). The dataset also allows analysis of national samples in several diverse countries which generated many responses, such as in Germany (214), the UK (185), the US (128), Brazil (116), Switzerland (84), Italy (74), Mexico (66), Argentina (62), Belgium (56), Spain (54), India (52), the Netherlands (50), Canada (44), and Norway (39).

#### *Measuring self-censorship*

In the WPS-2023, self-censorship was monitored by asking respondents: “*How often have you felt hesitant to express controversial and heterodox views?*” Responses were measured on a 4-point scale from ‘always’ to ‘never’. The question was asked concerning five diverse contexts, including in the individual’s teaching, research and publications, their department or institution, in social media, and in other public venues. This helps to examine the common assumption that self-censorship is more likely to exist in academia, rather than in society more generally. The responses across the five items were tested with reliability analysis and proved to be strongly intercorrelated (Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.856 N. 1989), so they were examined descriptively and then summed to create a standardized 100-point Self-Censorship index.

#### *Subjective heterodox status*

The theory in this study assumes that the heterodox who perceive themselves to hold minority views on controversial issues will be most likely to self-censor. To monitor this directly, the survey also asked respondents whether they believed that their political and moral views were shared by the majority of people in three contexts: their department, local community, and society (each measured on four-point scales from ‘always’ to ‘never’). Subjective heterodox status was defined and measured by whether respondents perceived that their political and moral views were shared by climate of opinion within these contexts.

#### *Measuring ideological values*

Many academic surveys have asked about ideological identities using a simple Left-Right scale or set of categories. This approach assumed that the terms ‘Left’ and ‘Right’ are universal and hold equivalent meanings around the world. Even more serious measurement ambiguities arise when asking about scholars about their position on scales as ‘Liberals’ or ‘Conservatives’, not least because usage of these terms can refer to either free market economics or social and cultural policies, and the meaning differs cross-nationally. Accordingly, the WPS-2023 survey asked scholars to classify themselves based on two ideological 10-point scales, replicating those

used in the cross-national Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES), each of which provided short descriptive cues to frame the meaning of the measures.<sup>37</sup>

The first question was the GALTAN question in CHES which was designed to measure social or moral liberalism and conservatism by asking respondents to identify their own position using the following cue: *“People also differ in their social values. Those with LIBERAL values favor expanded personal freedoms, for example, on abortion rights, same-sex marriage, and democratic participation. Those with CONSERVATIVE values reject these ideas in favor of order, tradition and stability, believing that government should be a firm moral authority on social and cultural issues. Where would you place your views on this scale?”* The responses allowed respondents to be classified on the continuous scale, as well as categorizing responses into ‘Social Conservatives’, ‘Moderates’ and ‘Social Liberals’.

As an alternative measure, in the second measure respondents were also asked to identify their position on a similar economic left-right 10-point scale about the economy from CHES, using the following question: *“People differ in their views towards ECONOMIC ISSUES such as privatization, taxes, regulation, government spending, and the welfare state. Those on the economic LEFT want government to play an active role in the economy. Those on the economic RIGHT favor a reduced role for government. Where would you place your views on this scale?”*

#### *Classifying societal cultures*

What constitutes heterodox or orthodox views? This is obviously contextual. The cultural environment defining viewpoint majorities and minorities can refer to any collective unit of analysis, whether the predominant nation-wide culture in any society – or sub-cultures within specific regional or local communities, institutions and departments, academic disciplines, or informal social groups. Scheufle and Moy reviewed numerous studies of the spiral of silence thesis over a quarter century, many conducted within specific societies, and concluded that cross-national contextual differences are key factors in predicting the willingness to speak out.<sup>38</sup>

The extensive body of literature on modernization theories helps to classify the predominant values in societal cultures by the proxy measure of levels of economic development. The work of Inglehart and other scholars, drawing upon a wealth of cross-national survey research in the World Values Survey, has demonstrated how social cultures are transformed by processes of the human and economic development.<sup>39</sup> Modernization theory suggests that the dominant culture in poorer developing non-Western societies usually remains deeply socially conservative on many moral values, such as those concerning the importance of religion, respect for traditional binary sexual social norms and roles for women and men in marriage and the family, and the importance of largely fixed social identities based on birth-sex and gender, race and ethnicity, class and caste, nativism and nationalism. Numerous studies drawing upon the World Values Survey and related international social surveys have demonstrated that those living in poorer developing societies around the world, with larger rural, religious, and less educated populations, tend to have highly traditional and socially conservative values towards a range of moral and social issues, such as the importance of nationalism, religiosity and spiritual authority, and the traditional division of sex roles for men and women in the home, family, and paid workforce. A wealth of evidence from pooled cross-national surveys has documented these broad cultural patterns, demonstrating the evolution of values over four decades of European and World Values Surveys covering more than 115 societies around the globe.<sup>40</sup>

By contrast, the public in affluent post-industrial Western ('WEIRD') societies, with more middle-class workforce and highly educated populations, are more likely to share socially liberal values towards these issues, with cosmopolitan attitudes towards national identity, secular values, and support for more fluid forms of gender identity, sex roles and sexual orientations.<sup>41</sup> Since the mid-twentieth century, cultures in affluent post-industrial societies have gradually become far more socially liberal towards many moral issues, such as by endorsing more fluid (non-binary) sexual and gender identities, support for LGBTQ rights and same sex marriage, tolerance of ethnic diversity and support for racial justice and equality, and related progressive values. A wide range of traditional moral beliefs and social norms, which were once widely shared in America and Europe, have been gradually transformed over many decades – from widespread acceptance of slavery and norms of racial inequality to the civil rights era, from the value of marriage and the strict division of roles for women and men in the family and workforce to contemporary norms accepting diverse forms of gender identities, sexual orientations, and gender equality, as well as the declining role of religion and the church in more secular societies.<sup>42</sup> Moreover, socially liberal social and moral values are usually found to predominate among younger and highly educated populations, characteristic of the population living, studying, and working in college communities, as well as those actively posting in online platforms.<sup>43</sup>

Consequently, in Western societies, heterodox scholars are defined and measured as those holding socially conservative moral values and social norms, who are predicted to be most likely to feel that their views are not merely attacked but also 'silenced', meaning excluded from serious consideration in everything from reading lists to invited speakers, seminar discussions, and lecture halls.

By contrast, in deeply conservative non-Western societies, like Nigeria, Pakistan and Turkey, heterodox scholars are defined as socially *liberal* scholars who are therefore expected to be most likely to feel unable to express their personal beliefs and values openly without social penalty from the majority of their compatriots.

The 2023 ECPR-IPSA World of Political Survey (WPS-2023) includes scholars living or working in 102 countries. These were classified simply into either Western societies, with predominately liberal cultures and high levels of socioeconomic development (including 23 nations with 1,224 respondents), or non-Western societies, with diverse socially-conservative cultures, from Afghanistan to Zambia (including 80 nations with 765 respondents).<sup>44</sup>

### **III: Findings and results**

#### *Socially liberal biases in academia*

For many decades a series of surveys analyzing the sociology of the academy has reported a pervasive liberal-left skew in the values, attitudes, and beliefs of college faculty, although most have been conducted in specific Western societies. Paul Lazarsfeld's pioneering 1958 book *The Academic Mind*, based on a large-scale representative survey of American social scientists sponsored by the Carnegie Foundation, was the first to demonstrate that scholars tended to be more sympathetic to liberal or leftwing values than the general population.<sup>45</sup> The radical era of heated college and university politics during the 1960s and early-1970s triggered further research into the political beliefs and values of college and university professors, with the findings confirming the pervasive liberal tilt of the academy. Everett Carl Ladd and Seymour Martin Lipset reported that about 46% of professors identified as left or liberal, 27% were

middle of the road, while 28% were conservative.<sup>46</sup> Social scientists were further left than most other disciplines. Moreover, similar skews were found among British academics by Albert Halsey and Martin Trow.<sup>47</sup>

A decade ago, Gross and Simmons updated the evidence with another large-scale survey of the American professoriate, demonstrating that conservatives and Republican identifiers remain relatively rare among faculty in U.S. universities, especially in the social sciences, although most scholars held moderate middle-of-the-road views.<sup>48</sup> Shields and Dunn (2016) reviewed five major U.S. surveys of academics conducted since 2000 and concluded that the percentage of self-identified conservatives was found to range between 5% and 15% in the social sciences and 4% to 8% in the humanities. In Europe, as well, analysis of the European Social Survey pooled data by Werfhorst suggests that professors in 31 European countries are usually more liberal and left-leaning than other equivalent professions like lawyers, architects and physicians, although the political values and attitudes of academics on issues such as economic redistribution and EU integration are far from homogeneous.<sup>49</sup>

To update these findings worldwide, Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of political scientists by their ideological values broken down by the type of society where respondents lived or worked. In Western societies, the figure illustrates the strong socially liberal skew in the distribution, confirming the pattern long observed in previous U.S. and European surveys. The mean score on the 0-10 point Liberal-Conservative scale in these societies was 1.86, with a strong skew in the normal distribution (SD = 1.84, skew = 1.402, N. 985). At the same time, however, in developing societies with more socially conservative cultures, a more moderate Liberal-Conservative bias was evident among scholars, with the mean score on the 10-point scale of 2.88 (SD = 2.59, skew = 1.02, N.612).

[Figures 2 and 3 about here]

The same process was followed to compare the left-right positions of scholars towards economic values. As illustrated in Figure 3, there was a leftwing bias observed in the distribution of scholars, especially in Western societies. The mean score on the 0-10 point Left-Right scale in Western societies was 3.0 (SD 1.94, skew = 0.632, N.1021). In non-Western societies the mean score was 3.89 (SD 2.20, skew .299, N. 624). Nevertheless, the Left-Right skew on economic values deviated less from the normal curve than was observed on the social values scale.

To disaggregate the data, the position of scholars on these two scales in the countries with at least 25 respondents in the survey can be compared. As illustrated in Figure 4, this shows the variations, with the political scientists in Western societies such as Austria, Australia and Switzerland tending to position themselves as more economically leftwing and more socially liberal than those in several non-Western societies, such as in Poland and India. Nevertheless, there were some variations within both types of society, even among relatively similar states, such as the contrasts among scholars observed between Brazil and Argentina, as well as between Canada and the US.

[Figure 4 about here]

But further confirmation of a strong socially liberal bias on Western campuses doesn't necessarily imply a lack of tolerance for pluralistic debate, 'left-wing indoctrination', or the silencing of conservative voices, as some rightwing commentators claim. To explore the factors contributing towards self-censorship, Table 1 predicts scores on the standardized Self-

ensorship Index, with separate OLS regression models run in both Western and non-Western societies, including the respondent's moral and social ideological self-position (on the Liberal-Conservative and the Left-Right economic scales), perceptions of heterodox status (in their department, local community and society), cultural attitudes towards free speech, their academic status and background characteristics closely associated with this (including gender and age), and the V-Dem Academic Freedom Index. All models used reliability tests and they were confirmed to be free of multicollinearity issues.

[Table 1 about here]

The results demonstrate that in Western societies, with predominately liberal social cultures, the heterodox fish-out-of-water (social conservatives) were significantly more likely to self-censor their views than the orthodox (liberals), as theorized. By contrast, in non-Western developing societies, characterized by more traditional moral values in society, the respondent's ideology did not prove a significant predictor of self-censorship. Figure 5 illustrates the contrasts in the mean 100-point standardized Self-Censorship Index (across all contexts) by type of society and type of social and moral values (categorized into Liberal-Moderate, or Conservative), without any controls. As the figure illustrates, in the affluent post-industrial Western societies, with predominant liberal cultures, a substantial 20-point gap in the reported propensity to self-censor can be observed between the orthodox (social liberal scholars) and heterodox (socially conservative scholars). In ANOVA tests, the mean gap between these groups proved statistically significant ( $\eta^2=0.071$   $P<0.008$ ). By contrast, in non-Western societies, no significant difference was observed in the propensity to self-censor among liberal, moderate, and conservative scholars.

[Figure 5 about here]

Can self-censorship among conservative academics studying and working in post-industrial societies be blamed on an extremely progressive and intolerant campus culture, as conservative commentators commonly claim – or is this a broader phenomenon also found in online media and society in general? Here we can break down the separate components of the Self-Censorship Index to compare the hesitancy to express controversial views across each of the five contexts contained in the survey, ranging from teaching in the classroom through research and publications among peers in the discipline, membership of the department and institution, communicating through social media platforms like Twitter, and the expression of views in other public venues. Figure 6 illustrates the contrasts in mean willingness for social conservatives and liberals to self-censor in post-industrial and developing societies by each of these contexts. It is apparent that social conservatives in Western countries report being more likely to self-censor not just in their teaching and research publications but also in social media posts and in other public venues. Indeed, social conservatives seem far more willing to express controversial views in their department and institution than in public. If heterodox viewpoint minorities hesitate to speak up to challenge majority viewpoints, this appears to be endemic, not a unique problem in higher education. In developing countries there is a more complex pattern illustrated in Figure 4, with social conservatives most reluctant to express controversial views in their teaching but not in society in general, and liberals are more hesitant than conservatives to speak out in their department.

[Figure 6 about here]



*Conditions*

Of course, beyond the social psychological spiral-of-silence thesis, several additional factors may influence the propensity to self-censor controversial views. As theorized earlier, this study focuses upon variations which may potentially arise from: (i) subjective perceptions of heterodox status; (ii) cultural norms and attitudes towards restrictions on speech perceived as morally offensive; (iii) structural disparities in academic status and power linked with social characteristics (measured by individual-level employment rank and tenure, gender, and age); and (iv) the legal environment, notably the regulation of academic freedom, measured at macro-level by the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project Academic Freedom Index.

Table 1 reports the results of the analysis of these factors on the propensity to self-censor. Perceptions of heterodox status were measured in the survey by whether respondents believed that their political and moral views were shared by others, irrespective of their ideological position as liberals or conservatives. In other words, even liberal respondents could potentially see themselves as hold controversial views on many other specific issues which differed from the climate of public opinion within their department and local community. The results demonstrate that in Western post-industrial societies, self-censorship is significantly related to perceptions of heterodox viewpoint status within the respondents' department and institution, although not within their local communities or society. By contrast, however, perceptions of heterodox status did not prove significantly linked with self-censorship in developing countries.

*Cultural attitudes and social norms*

Another related but distinct correlate with self-censorship concerns attitudes and values towards the principles of free speech. Scholars who are the target of silencing campaigns by are often accused by social liberals of expressing morally distasteful sentiments, including racial, ethnic, misogynistic, transphobic or homophobic slurs.<sup>50</sup> Several items in the survey were subject to factor analysis and used to construct scaled measures of attitudes towards tolerance of freedom of expression.

One battery concerned positive attitudes towards robust speech using five items, as indicated by approval of the notion that it is important for faculty to challenge conventional dogma and orthodoxy; faculty and students are too easily offended by what others say; university policies should respect the expression of extremist views; academics should have freedom to communicate unpopular views without threat of sanction; and scholars should debate the pros and cons of unpopular views about issues of race, ethnicity, gender and class.

By contrast, a second battery used four items to measure approval of restrictions on speech, including approval of statements that scholars should be careful in their language to avoid giving offense; teaching inciting violence should be banned; university policies should restrict intentionally offensive language; and faculty and students should seek to shame and restrict morally offensive speech.

Finally, a third battery replicated earlier research by monitoring perceptions of a worsening cancel culture during recent years.<sup>51</sup> This used five items to generate a scale including agreement that academic freedom to teach and research has got worse; pressures to be politically correct has got worse; tolerance of alternative viewpoints has got worse; freedom of speech has got worse; and respect for open debate from diverse perspectives has got worse.

The results of the analysis in Table 1 suggest that cultural attitudes around these issues are, not surprisingly, linked with practices of self-censorship in both Western and developing societies. Scholars strongly favoring principles of robust free speech were also significantly less likely to self-censor when expressing their views towards controversial issues. Similarly, people were more likely to self-censor if they believed that a cancel culture has worsened in recent years, so that social pressures to conform with the climate of opinion had strengthened. On the other hands, attitudes favoring restrictions on academic free speech were unrelated to patterns of self-censorship.

To explore further, attitudes towards free speech were broken down by the respondent's ideological values. The results demonstrated that social conservatives are slightly more willing than liberals to believe that faculty and students are too easily offended by what others say, university policies should respect the expression of extremist views, and scholars should debate unpopular views about issues of race, ethnicity, gender and class. Nevertheless, the difference between social conservatives and liberals proved modest, and the direction of causality in this relationship cannot be established from the cross-sectional survey data.

#### *Academic status and power*

Social structural explanations focus on disparities in academic status and power which provide another potential explanation of the silencing process. Less secure populations, such as early career scholars seeking approval from senior colleagues for promotion and advancement, and lecturers lacking employment tenure, as well as women and younger cohorts who usually predominate in the lower ranked jobs, may be expected to prove more reluctant to challenge majority views in their institution or discipline. Entrenched inequalities in academic power, authority and status are expected to be important because those holding senior positions are more likely to have the job security which comes with tenure, as well as the reputation, experience, and resources which allows them to express their opinions confidently, even in the face of robust criticism or hostile reactions. By contrast, those with lower academic status posts, including students and lecturers lacking tenure, are far more vulnerable to risks of administrative sanctions or sacking arising from workplace complaints, as well as more dependent upon peer and student evaluations for their career advancement. At the same time, other social characteristics commonly associated with academic status are likely to be important for self-censorship, with potential direct and indirect effects, including gender and age.

In post-industrial societies, however, the analysis in Table 1 suggests that formal academic status and tenure were not significant predictors of practices of self-censorship, contrary to structural explanations. In developing societies, however, these factors were significant but, contrary to the structural account, it was scholars lacking tenure and in lower ranked academic status who were more willing to speak out on controversial issues. The puzzling reasons for this pattern need further research but it may potentially signal that, irrespective of their ideological position, the younger generation and women scholars in developing countries may be less hesitant to challenge the conventional view and predominant (more conservative?) values within their department and society.

#### *The impact of institutional regulations of free speech*

Finally, the institutional context of constitutional principles, the legal framework and regulations governing academic freedom of speech is widely regarded as important for

repressing free speech in society as well as in higher education. This is measured in the models by V-Dem's Academic Freedom Index (AFI), based on expert estimates, where this aggregate scale (low to high) is conceptualized as the right of academics to freedom of teaching and discussion, research and publication, without constraint from institutional censorship.<sup>52</sup>

If self-censorship is indeed influenced by the regulatory environment, it would be expected to be strongest worldwide among those living and working in states repressing academic freedom. The results in Table 1 largely confirm these expectations; in both Western and developing societies, greater academic freedom reduces the propensity for scholars to self-censor when expressing controversial views. This confirms reports by international monitors that the most extreme threats to academic freedom of expression have occurred in the world's authoritarian states and closed societies, but they are not confined to these types of regimes. The results suggest that self-censorship appears to be influenced, at least in part, by fear of formal de jure policies used by educational authorities to protect or to limit academic autonomy and freedom of expression.

This reinforces international reports monitoring freedom of expression and academic freedom worldwide, highlighting the way that authoritarian states have commonly used the most repressive tactics designed to erode university autonomy and persecute individual scholars. The worst human rights abuses of academic freedom worldwide are documented in annual reports by advocacy NGOs like Scholars at Risk, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch, and by regional and global intergovernmental UN bodies including the OHCHR and UNESCO.<sup>53</sup>

Official censorship by states is documented by the Varieties of Democracy project's Academic Freedom Index, based on expert surveys assessing multiple dimensions of de jure and de facto academic freedom worldwide.<sup>54</sup> During the early twenty-first century, the Academic Freedom Index (AFI) estimates that academic freedom eroded in twenty-two countries worldwide, home to over half the world's population, while improving in only five.<sup>55</sup> The study documents growing restrictions on higher education during the last decade in cases as diverse as Poland, Turkey, India, Egypt, Mexico, Nicaragua, Hong Kong, Afghanistan, Ukraine, and Thailand.<sup>56</sup> National studies have also documented processes of self-censorship in several authoritarian regimes which repress dissent, such as in Turkey, Russia, and in Southeast Asia.<sup>57</sup> Global reports suggest that formal and informal constraints on the general autonomy of institutions and individual scholars have become more frequent in recent years.<sup>58</sup> For example, systematic clampdowns on academics have occurred in Turkey and Iran, armed attacks on higher education institutions in conflict zones like Ukraine, and draconian bans on women and girl's education in Afghanistan.

In the worst performing states, such as Russia and China, the Scholars at Risk network documents many cases of academics and students subject to growing harassment, imprisonment, and exile, with the use of official state censorship and political indoctrination programs silencing dissenting voices among groups critical of the regime. The independence in institutions of higher education has been undermined under President Xi.<sup>59</sup> China has an extensive program of political 'reeducation' designed to indoctrinate over one million Muslim Uyghurs detained in internment camps.<sup>60</sup> Similarly Scholars At Risk highlights many cases of prominent dissident writers, public intellectuals, and protesting students in Bahrain, Iran, and Egypt who have suffered wrongful conviction, incarceration, 'reeducation', or even execution.<sup>61</sup> In Central and Eastern Europe, human rights observers report cases of

government interference in the autonomy of academic institutions along with the use of coercion and violence against students and scholars in Turkey, Belarus, and Russia.<sup>62</sup>

Authoritarian states have the worst record in restricting academic freedoms. But growing restrictions have been found elsewhere. A recent review, commissioned by the European Parliament, also documented major threats to academic freedom across Europe.<sup>63</sup> For example, the AFI Index reports that de jure academic freedom remains relatively high among most EU member states, but it has deteriorated slightly in Greece and Poland, with Hungary the most problematic case within the EU.<sup>64</sup> Under Viktor Orban, university autonomy has been systematically undermined, notably when the Central European University (CEU) was pressured into moving from Budapest to Vienna. The Hungarian government has banned gender studies in colleges, stripped the Academy of Sciences of its autonomy, and appointed party loyalists to many university boards of trustees.<sup>65</sup> Human Rights observers document how LGBTQ rights have been under renewed pressure in Hungary where the government has conflated anti-LGBTQ rights with ‘child protection’, including laws banning depiction of gay people in school books, as well as ending legal gender recognition for transgender people, and amending the constitution to define marriage as a heterosexual union.<sup>66</sup>

Elsewhere, Britain has also seen widespread concern over the state of free speech in universities.<sup>67</sup> Against this background, the UK Conservative Government passed a *Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Act 2023*, allowing speakers to seek compensation if they are “no-platformed” and empowering the Office for Students to fine infringing institutions.<sup>68</sup>

And in the United States, once regarded as a global champion of principles of free speech, there are growing pressures violating rights to academic autonomy. These practices are exemplified by Republican-controlled state houses, city and county governments, and local school boards seeking to restrict diversity, equity and inclusion policies in education, as well as limiting what can be taught about race, sexuality, and gender identities in classrooms and library books. Monitoring organizations such as the American Association of University Professors report a raft of 57 bills in 23 states such as Florida, Texas, Ohio, and Tennessee seeking to limit the autonomy of public colleges and universities by prohibiting or banning the content of syllabi, empowering partisan appointments on managing boards, and limiting freedom to learn, teach and conduct research.<sup>69</sup> Florida, Georgia, Wisconsin, and Mississippi have sought to weaken tenure for faculty employed in public universities where reviews find evidence of bias in teaching. Elsewhere Conservative foundations and wealthy right-wing donors have lobbied state legislatures to withdraw funding from scientific research, such as in gender studies and environmental science.<sup>70</sup>

This development has been reinforced by a coalition of rightwing grassroots organizations, funded by rich donors, claiming to advocate parental rights in schools, like Moms for Liberty, as well as coverage by rightwing media outlets and websites. This conservative movement has attacked the use of ‘politically correct’ language, rejected the claims of so-called ‘woke’ activists seeking social justice, and sought to dismantle diversity, equity and inclusion programs in universities and colleges.<sup>71</sup> Race, racism and ethnicity have proved one of the primary trigger-points; since 2020, over 200 U.S. official bodies have introduced 670 legal measures seeking to ban the discussion of ‘critical race theory’ in the classroom, exemplified by Florida’s ‘Stop WOKE’ Act in 2022, with negative consequences for academic morale.<sup>72</sup> Binary or fluid gender identities and sexual orientation have similarly been central to culture wars: Republican lawmakers in dozens of U.S. states like Florida and Texas have proposed or passed bills

designed to repeal non-discrimination protections for LGBTQ children in public schools, make it illegal for teachers to discuss gender and sexuality, ban gender-affirming health care like hormone treatment to minors, and exclude transgender youths from school athletics, bathrooms and locker rooms, and other gender-segregated spaces.<sup>73</sup> Non-profit organizations have also sought to litigate limits on freedom of religious expression in colleges and universities.<sup>74</sup>

Attempts to restrict academic speech in America are not exclusively on the right, by any means: the Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression (FIRE) also highlights many cases where scholars have been penalized by official university regulations governing higher education which reflect liberal or progressive principles and policies, such as those accused of failing to follow diversity statements in college hiring and appointments, or university policies and speech codes limiting hate speech and offensive expressions.<sup>75</sup> Formal regulations appear to reinforce informal self-censorship, as outspoken scholars incur penalties with different degrees of severity for expressing their personal views.

#### **IV: Conclusions and Implications**

Many commentators suggest that principles and values which are foundational to liberal visions of the core mission of higher education, including freedom of speech and the protection of heterodox views in intellectual inquiry, are being threatened by growing intolerance and polarization in society and academia. Popular debates about freedom of speech have become more heated and divided. Calls from progressive liberals for social justice on campus through silencing what are perceived as morally offensive views have quickly provoked a cultural backlash from social conservatives, including rightwing activists and state legislators seeking to regulate what can be taught about race, sexuality and gender in classrooms and placed on school library bookshelves. The risks to the values of civil discourse, rational deliberation, plural viewpoints, and scientific knowledge by both left and right may be gravest in undermining the production and dissemination of knowledge and learning, which are the core mission of academia. <sup>76</sup> College campus ‘woke wars’ have divided liberals and conservatives over formal regulation and informal pressures restrict academic inquiry and intellectual diversity against those accused of offensive words or deeds in their teaching and learning, research, and speech. <sup>77</sup>

Much concern has been focused on the phenomenon of what has been termed a ‘cancel culture’ restricting free speech within the academy and society, arising from both formal regulations and from informal social pressures – as well as the interaction of both. Broadly speaking, the term ‘cancel culture’ is understood here to refer most generally to a chilly climate on both the liberal-left and the conservative-right which serves to stifle open debate, free inquiry, and tolerance of unpopular heterodox views dissenting from the prevailing orthodoxy in mainstream group norms and values. Factors potentially shaping freedom of expression in schools, colleges and universities include the regulatory context of government policies, legal frameworks, and administrative directives governing freedom to research, teach and learn. These rules influence the independence and autonomy of educational institutions, as well as the activities of social groups, and individual scholars and students within these communities. Academic freedoms can also be constrained in important ways by informal social pressures and group norms from the majority suppressing the expression of heretical views within the academy. And both legal penalties and social sanctions are likely to influence self-censorship,

where individuals restrict the expression of heterodox opinions for fear of negative consequences.

The evidence presented in this study demonstrates four main points:

Firstly, the data in this study further confirms the long-observed ideological skew in academia, as previous surveys have reported, with a predominance of scholars adhering to liberal social values, especially in Western societies. There was also a less pronounced bias towards leftwing positions on economic issues.

Secondly, in liberal Western societies, heterodox (scholars identifying as social conservatives as well as those seeing themselves as out-of-step with the predominant climate of opinion within their department) are more likely than the orthodox to practice self-censorship, hesitating to express controversial views. This pattern was observed in teaching and research, but also more broadly in social media and other public venues.

By contrast, in developing non-Western countries, characterized by more traditional moral values, self-identified social conservatives, and perceived heterodox status, were not significantly associated with self-censorship.

Finally, other factors predicting self-censorship include attitudes supporting robust free speech and negative views of the cancel culture. Both age and gender proved significant, with early career scholars and non-cis men far more likely to self-censor. Academic status and tenure did not prove a significant predictor in Western nations, contrary to accounts focused on disparities in academic power and status, but they did matter in non-Western societies. The regulatory environment governing academic freedom of speech was also important; not surprisingly, scholars working in states sharply restricting academic freedom, where outspoken critics of the regime faced risks of serious punishment, like Russia and Turkey, were more hesitant to express controversial views.

Many questions about the process of self-censorship deserve to be explored in future research, since this may occur for multiple complex reasons. Studies should seek to understand the psychological mechanisms involved in this process in more depth, and how far heterodox scholars anticipate (correctly or erroneously) a potential social or career cost in revealing information which outweighs the potential benefits of expressing their opinions.<sup>78</sup> Fear of legal sanctions can be best studied by state-level comparisons in America, for example, evidence of a chilly climate generated by penalties in Florida for teaching Critical Race Theory or discussing issues of slavery, civil rights and racial prejudice, as well as teaching about gender identities and sexual orientations in Idaho, Iowa, Oklahoma, and Tennessee. Individual personality characteristics also deserve further exploration, including some of the 'Big Five' psychological predispositions towards risk or security, extroversion or introversion, open-mindedness or closedness, and agreeableness or antagonism, as well as fear of isolation, attitude certainty, and moral conviction.<sup>79</sup> In short, whilst this study contributes further evidence that the heterodox are indeed more likely to shut up on controversial matters, further exploration of the underlying reasons for this propensity, and especially the conditions and policies which could potentially mitigate it, deserve further attention.

**Table 1: Factors predicting the Self-Censorship Index**

	Western societies (North America, W. Europe, Australasia)				Non-Western societies			
	B	SE	Beta	Sig (P)	B	SE	Beta	Sig (P)
<b>Ideological values</b>								
Liberal-Conservative social values	1.04	.396	0.11	***	0.54	0.34	0.08	N/s
Left-Right economic values	.081	.365	.009	N/s	-0.01	0.38	-.01	N/s
<b>Subjective perceptions of heterodox status</b>								
In your department	2.68	1.32	0.08	*	0.86	1.52	0.03	N/s
In your local community	-0.22	1.46	-0.01	N/s	-0.73	1.71	-0.03	N/s
In your society	0.97	1.45	0.27	N/s	-0.97	1.58	-0.03	N/s
<b>Attitudes and values towards free speech</b>								
Favor restrictions on morally offensive speech	0.01	0.09	0.01	N/s	0.06	0.11	0.03	N/s
Favor robust free speech	-0.34	0.08	-0.18	***	-0.27	0.08	-0.19	***
Perception that a cancel culture has worsened	0.50	0.06	0.33	***	0.28	0.06	0.22	***
<b>Academic status</b>								
Academic Job Status: High to low	-0.26	0.48	-0.29	N/s	1.34	0.50	0.15	***
Tenured employment (1)/ Else (0)	0.90	1.62	0.03	N/s	-3.45	1.75	-0.10	*
Gender identity: Cis Man (1)/ Else (0)	-5.82	1.30	-0.159	***	-3.68	1.69	-0.10	*
Age (in years)	-0.16	0.06	-0.13	***	-0.30	0.07	-0.21	***
<b>Societal context</b>								
Academic Freedom Index	-19.46	9.56	-0.07	*	-5.99	3.13	-0.09	*
(Constant)	70.04	11.14		***	75.27	9.18		***
N.	660				440			
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.24				0.12			

Dependent Variable: Self-censorship standardized 100-pt index (in teaching, research, department, social media, and other public venues) \*\*\* p.001 \*\*p.01 \* p.05  
N/s not significant.


Source: ECPR-IPSA *World of Political Science, 2023* (WPS-2023)

**Figure 1: Heuristic model of congruence theory**

		DOMINANT SOCIETAL CULTURE	
		Socially conservative	Socially liberal
INDIVIDUAL IDEOLOGICAL VALUES	Socially conservative	Orthodox majority	Heterodox minority Perceptions of silencing
	Socially liberal	Heterodox minority: Perceptions of silencing	Orthodox majority




Figure 2: Distribution of political scientists by social values and type of society



**Notes:** Liberal-Conservative value scale: “People also differ in their social values. Those with LIBERAL values favor expanded personal freedoms, for example, on abortion rights, same-sex marriage, and democratic participation. Those with CONSERVATIVE values reject these ideas in favor of order, tradition and stability, believing that government should be a firm moral authority on social and cultural issues. Where would you place your views on this scale?” Most Liberal =0, Most Conservative=10.

**Source:** ECPR-IPSA World of Political Science (WPS-2023)


Figure 3: Distribution of political scientists by economic values and type of society



**Notes:** Left-Right economic values scale. “People differ in their views towards ECONOMIC ISSUES such as privatization, taxes, regulation, government spending, and the welfare state. Those on the economic LEFT want government to play an active role in the economy. Those on the economic RIGHT favor a reduced role for government. Where would you place your views on this scale?” Most Leftwing =0, Most Rightwing=10.

**Source:** ECPR-IPSA World of Political Science (WPS-2023)

**Figure 4: Economic and social values of political scientists, selected countries**




**Notes:** Liberal-Conservative social value scale: “People also differ in their social values. Those with LIBERAL values favor expanded personal freedoms, for example, on abortion rights, same-sex marriage, and democratic participation. Those with CONSERVATIVE values reject these ideas in favor of order, tradition and stability, believing that government should be a firm moral authority on social and cultural issues. Where would you place your views on this scale?” Most Liberal =0, Most Conservative=10.

Left-Right economic values scale: “People differ in their views towards ECONOMIC ISSUES such as privatization, taxes, regulation, government spending, and the welfare state. Those on the economic LEFT want government to play an active role in the economy. Those on the economic RIGHT favor a reduced role for government. Where would you place your views on this scale?” Most Leftwing =0, Most Rightwing=10. Red =Western societies/ Blue =Non-Western societies

**Source:** ECPR-IPSA World of Political Science (WPS-2023) Larger response countries only (N. 25+ /nation)


Figure 5: Contrasts in the self-censorship index by social values and type of society



**Notes:** *Liberal-Conservative scale:* “People also differ in their social values. Those with LIBERAL values favor expanded personal freedoms, for example, on abortion rights, same-sex marriage, and democratic participation. Those with CONSERVATIVE values reject these ideas in favor of order, tradition and stability, believing that government should be a firm moral authority on social and cultural issues. Where would you place your views on this scale?” Liberal =0-3, Moderate=4-6, Conservative=7-10. *Self-censorship index:* Constructed as a standardized summary index by feelings of hesitancy to express controversial and heterodox views across different contexts including in my teaching, research & publications, department, social media, and other public venues.

**Source:** World of Political Science (WPS-2023)

Figure 6: Contrasts in self-censorship index by social values, type of society, and context



**Notes:** *Liberal-Conservative scale:* “People also differ in their social values. Those with LIBERAL values favor expanded personal freedoms, for example, on abortion rights, same-sex marriage, and democratic participation. Those with CONSERVATIVE values reject these ideas in favor of order, tradition and stability, believing that government should be a firm moral authority on social and cultural issues. Where would you place your views on this scale?” Liberal =0-3, Moderate=4-6, Conservative=7-10. *Self-censorship index:* Hesitancy to express controversial and heterodox views disaggregated across different contexts including in my teaching, research & publications, department, social media, and other public venues.

**Source:** World of Political Science (WPS-2023)

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