Hegel’s Metaphysics of Rational Life: Overcoming the Pippin-Houlgate Dispute
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ABSTRACT: In the past decade, the meaning of Hegel’s idea of a “science of logic” has become a matter of intense philosophical debate. This article examines the two most influential yet opposed contemporary readings of the Science of Logic—often referred to as the “metaphysical” and “non-metaphysical” interpretations. I argue that this debate should be reframed as a contest between logic as ontology (LAO) and logic as metaphysics (LAM). According to Stephen Houlgate’s interpretation of logic as ontology, the science of logic is a progressively explicit unfolding of the categories of thought, which is at the same time the process by which being itself determines what it is to be. A second interpretation has been pursued by Sebastian Rödl and Robert Pippin, who read Hegel’s logic as metaphysics. On this reading, the science of logic is a progressively coherent unfolding of the categories of thought, which articulate all that it could intelligibly mean to be. This article intervenes in this debate in three key ways. First, I argue that Houlgate’s ontological approach undermines his attempt to establish the objective validity of the categories. Second, I show that the LAM emphasis on the crucial idea of apperception enables it to succeed where Houlgate fails by doing justice to the rational necessity with which the Logic unfolds. Third, I argue that, despite this success, the LAM program remains unrealized because of its neglect of Hegel’s understanding of cognition as a form of life. While LAM has compellingly unfolded the “thought of being,” it has ignored the inverse question of the “being of thinking.” I attempt to fulfill the LAM program by elaborating Hegel’s account of what it means to be a thinker.
In the past decade, the meaning of Hegel’s idea of a ‘science of logic’ has become a matter of intense philosophical debate. This article examines the two most influential yet opposed contemporary readings of the Science of Logic—often referred to as the ‘metaphysical’ and ‘non-metaphysical’ interpretations. I argue that this debate should be reframed as a contest between logic as ontology (LAO) and logic as metaphysics (LAM). According to Stephen Houlgate’s interpretation of logic as ontology, the science of logic is a progressively explicit unfolding of the categories of thought, which is at the same time the process by which being itself determines what it is to be.1 A second interpretation has been pursued by Sebastian Rödl and Robert Pippin, who read Hegel’s logic as metaphysics.2 On this reading, the science of logic is a progressively coherent unfolding of the categories of thought, which articulate all that it could intelligibly mean to be.3 This article intervenes in this debate in three key ways. First, I argue that Houlgate’s ontological approach undermines his attempt to establish the objective validity of the categories. Second, I show that the LAM emphasis on the crucial idea of apperception enables it to succeed where Houlgate fails by doing justice to the rational necessity with which the Logic unfolds. Third, I argue that, despite this success, the LAM program remains unrealised because of its neglect of Hegel’s understanding of cognition as a form of life. While LAM has compellingly shown how being must be thought, it has ignored the inverse question of the being of thinking. I attempt to fulfill the LAM program by elaborating Hegel’s account of what it means to be a thinker.

This article is divided into four main sections and a conclusion. In section I, ‘Logic as Ontology’, I will show that Houlgate displaces Hegel’s logical interrogation of the ‘thought of being’ with an ontological account of ‘thought as being’. I argue that this ‘objectivising’ reading unintentionally undermines Hegel’s ambition to demonstrate the objective validity of the categories. Houlgate’s account is shown to generate a two-horned dilemma between ‘logical authoritarianism’ and ‘logical anarchy’ that only the apperceptive view can resolve. Section II (‘The Role of Apperception in the Logic’) argues that, by Houlgate’s own lights, the ‘apperception’ reading advanced by Pippin and Rödl becomes unavoidable. Drawing on Rödl’s critique of the force/content distinction in Frege, I show that the derivation of the categories is a matter of their possible justification by actual knowers. In section III, ‘Logic as Metaphysics’, I follow Pippin in arguing that Hegel appropriates and deepens Aristotle’s conception of metaphysics as ‘the science of being qua being’. Contrary to Houlgate’s reading, Hegel shows that the forms of things are inseparable from the forms of their self-conscious comprehension. In the final section, ‘Radicalising LAM’, I claim that Pippin’s version of LAM is partly compromised by his anti-naturalism. According to Pippin, the ultimate task of the Logic is to render intelligible the very activity of ‘rendering intelligible’. But because of Pippin’s restricted reading of life in the Logic, he is unable to fully discharge this task. On my account,
to make good on the promise of LAM is to show that all thinking can intelligibly be is self-conscious life.⁴ As I will show, this radicalisation of LAM enables it to effectively answer one of Houlgate’s most pointed objections: that LAM accounts only for the thought of being and not also for the being of thought.

I. Logic as Ontology

We will begin by examining the key to Houlgate’s reading, the ‘presuppositionless’ opening of the Logic. Houlgate argues that this methodological stricture requires that we understand ourselves as passive ‘spectators’ of the self-development of ‘thought as being’. This view gives rise to three core difficulties. First, I show that Houlgate’s identification of thought as being runs together being (Sein) and existence (Dasein) and objectivises thinking. Second, Houlgate thereby renders thinking an object of passive apprehension that develops ‘before our very eyes’. As a result, LAO voids thinking of its key distinguishing feature, the power of self-determination. Third, because pure thinking in Houlgate’s account is an object of passive apprehension and not our own self-determining power, the categories it derives are powerless to bind either us or the world. Consequently, the LAO view generates a two-horned dilemma: either the categories are externally imposed constraints we are unable to justify (logical authoritarianism) or they are arbitrary results of intellectual acts that lack objective force (logical anarchy).

Broadly speaking, Hegel’s Science of Logic is an account of the forms of being and the forms of thought in their identity. As Houlgate remarks in his landmark work The Opening of Hegel’s Logic, ‘[Being exhibits] a logical form or structure that is intelligible to thought and is the same as the structure of our basic categories’ (2006: 117). Both the ontological and metaphysical readings hold that Hegel tasks himself with overcoming Kantian skepticism regarding the applicability of the categories of thought to things in themselves. For Hegel, ‘although the categories do belong to thinking as such, it does not follow at all from this that they should for that reason be ours alone’ (EL: §42A3).

⁵ As Hegel argues, the categories are not empty forms to be imposed on an exogenous content but are ‘thought-determinations’ that ‘must be exhibited in their necessity’ (that is, derived or deduced in their own right) (EL: §42). It is at this point that Houlgate’s distinctive interpretation of the Logic begins to come into view.

Houlgate’s account places a great deal of weight on the famous ‘presuppositionless’ opening of the Logic, which is said to stem from Kant’s own principle of freedom, understood as the demand that thinking be ‘set free from all authority’ (EL: §60).⁶ For Houlgate, if we are to think without presupposition, we can take nothing on authority and must give ourselves over to pure thinking as it is in itself. Because Hegel cannot assume from the outset the categories or the forms of judgment, he is said to follow and deepen Descartes’ indubitability thesis, by starting not from the existence of the individual thinker (the ‘I think’) but rather from ‘the simple “is” of thinking’. Whereas Descartes understands thinking epistemologically as
what we can know beyond any doubt, Houlgate’s Hegel understands thinking ontologically as what there immediately is for us thinkers (2022: 1:15-16). In other words, Houlgate takes as his starting point ‘the sheer indeterminate being of thought’ (2022: 1:45). Such being is indeterminate because we cannot yet say—on pain of begging the question of thinking—what ‘pure thinking’ amounts to. In contrast to Hegel’s *Phenomenology*, in which thought is confronted by a sensible object in empirical experience, in the *Logic* thought no longer presupposes an existent object but considers only itself. As Houlgate writes, ‘At the start of such logic, thought thinks its own pure simplicity, but such simplicity is precisely sheer indeterminate being; thought thinks being, therefore, in thinking nothing but itself.’ Thought’s awareness of itself is taken by Houlgate to consist in an ‘intellectual intuition’ or direct apprehension of ‘what there is’, being as such (2022: 1:129, 1:107). Houlgate thus infers from the being of thought to ‘thought as being itself’. Thought’s awareness of itself as being has two key features, per Houlgate’s account.

First, as the readers of the *Logic*, we are supposed to suspend ‘our’ own presupposition-laden thinking, the capacity for judgment and inference that—according to Kant—is constitutive of self-consciousness. ‘When thought is conceived as judgment or inference’, Houlgate writes, ‘it can also be conceived as our activity in contrast to what there is’ (2022: 1:107). This is the basis of Houlgate’s dispute with Pippin and LAM more generally. According to Houlgate, one of the deepest problems with the LAM view is that it is not fully presuppositionless because it takes for granted the Kantian understanding of judgment as the minimal unit of thought. For Houlgate, pure thinking at the start of the *Logic* must abstract even from general-logical rules like the law of non-contradiction and the principle of the excluded middle; self-conscious thought—Kant’s ‘transcendental unity of apperception’—is a concrete determination that is said to arise at a derivative level of the system, in Hegel’s *Realphilosophie* (2022: 1:53, 129). The thought that ‘is’ stands over against the judgmental activity of actual thinkers.

Second, if we are to avoid the Kantian error of taking judgment for granted, we must (according to Houlgate) resolve to ‘passively’ bear witness to the self-development of thought, in order to ascertain what being itself ‘proves’ to be. For Houlgate, we must give up any prior assumptions about the nature of thought in order to ‘discover’ what categories might be implicit in it. Such categories are said to develop by virtue of their own internal ‘logical, dialectical rhythm’. The subject thereby ‘surrenders’ herself to the ‘necessity inherent in thought’, a necessity that ‘has no source but thought’s own indeterminate being’ (2022: 1:63, 75). It is not clear how Houlgate understands such ‘necessity’ (a point to which we will return below), but by locating such necessity in being itself, Houlgate hopes to show that the self-determination of thought is precisely not a derivation of epistemic constraints on a possible object (as in Kant), which may or may not be met with in experience. The self-determination of thought is rather held to be a robustly ontological determination of being itself and thus of what there really is. Once again, Houlgate attempts to distinguish the ‘pure thinking’ inherent in being from the merely conscious thought of those observing being/thought.
unfold. Because pure thinking itself is what is, the development of the categories of thought just is the development of the categories of being: the emergence of the thought-form ‘something’, for example, entails that being itself becomes ‘something’, that ‘something’ now is ‘what there is’ (2022: 1:169). This is the fundamental thought of logic conceived as ontology.

The first thing to note about Houlgate’s reading is that, in taking the identity of thought and being to mean that thinking is, he initially assumes that being is an existential predicate attaching to thought. Houlgate ascends through a process of abstraction to the supposedly most general possible predicate, being, which is ostensibly the only predicate we can ‘presuppositionlessly’ ascribe to thought. We cannot say that thought has this or that determinate property, but we can say—just by virtue of thinking—that thought is. Yet Houlgate just thereby commits a cardinal philosophical sin, first identified by Aristotle: he treats being as ‘the highest genus’ (2016: 998b22-25).10

One way of elaborating Aristotle’s critique is to point out that the conception of being as a genus under which everything falls would beg the question of what it is for such being itself to be, since no higher-order concept would be available to determine it as being. And this hits on the first difficulty in Houlgate, who violates his own presuppositionless principle by assuming that pure being can be understood from the jump in terms of the ‘is’ of existence (‘thinking is’). At the start of the Logic, we do not yet have a functional notion of being, such that we know what it means to say of anything that it is.11 While Houlgate is insistent that he adheres to Hegel’s distinction between being (Sein) and existence (Dasein) (2022: 1:111), this claim is not borne out by his actual argumentation. The conflation of being and existence follows straight away from Houlgate’s initial ascription of being to thinking. Houlgate might contend in response that being is not reducible to ‘the simple “is” of thinking’; indeed, as he emphasises, ‘being is not the being of thought in particular but sheer being as such’ (2022: 1:129). Yet as we have seen, for Houlgate, it is because the being of thought just is ‘what is’ that it coincides with sheer being. ‘Sheer being’ on Houlgate’s picture is thus indistinguishable from the existence of thinking. Accordingly, pure being functions as a determinate foundation on which to build. Houlgate thereby takes for granted the determinacy of both thought and being, whereas the Logic requires—as he himself repeatedly reminds us—that we start with pure being in its indeterminacy.

The decisive question, then, is what precisely it means to begin with pure being in its indeterminacy. Contra Houlgate, to think pure being truly without presupposition is to think not ‘the indeterminate being of thought’ but rather ‘the thought of indeterminate being’. Being is not a predicate of thinking but the wholly indeterminate, pure object of thought. Hegel (EL: §44) makes this especially clear when he notes that the Kantian thing-in-itself is a ‘complete abstractum’ void of determination and is precisely the ‘empty identity’ of thinking made ‘into an object for itself’. What Houlgate fails to acknowledge is that ‘the result of such an abstraction from everything existent’ is precisely ‘abstract being’, not being ‘in itself’, beyond
thought (SL: 75/21.87, emphasis mine). This is to say that the abstraction from all determination with which the Logic begins is only conceivable as the thought of such an empty object, not an existent object that is thinking. Hegel could not be clearer: being is not thinking itself but ‘the first pure thought’ (EL: /§86A2). As we will see, to think such a thought (‘pure being’) is not to think that ‘thinking is’ but to fail to think that anything is (SL: 74/21.86). While Houlgate insists that we are thinking successfully from the very beginning (namely, by thinking the being of thought), LAM will show that it is by virtue of this initial, necessary failure that we learn to think being consistently—and learn to think what it means to think per se.

We have seen that the ontological strategy rests on an illicit inference from the ‘being of thought’ to ‘thought as being itself’ (Houlgate 2022: 1:132). According to Houlgate, because thinking alone ‘is’ at the start of the Logic, thinking just is ‘what there is’ and so is being. Houlgate’s premise represents a violation of the presuppositionless principle by begging the question of being: LAO conflates being with existence (Dasein) and ascribes existence to thinking. Houlgate thereby conceives thought as something existent, as a determinate being, and precisely fails to think indeterminate being. While Houlgate claims that thinking is the ‘rationality in being itself’, we will now see that Houlgate’s account of ‘thought as being’ contradicts his understanding of thinking as rational (2022: 1:3).

The second, corollary difficulty with LAO lies in the way it ‘objectivises’ thinking, which results in the elimination of the subjectivity of thought. This is initially manifest in Houlgate’s conflation of logical and chronological necessity. Houlgate explicitly acknowledges that his interpretation renders us, the readers of the Logic, mere spectators of the ‘necessity inherent in each category, that causes it to mutate before our very eyes’ (2022: 1:74). Houlgate argues that this is a ‘logical’ necessity, whereby being itself ‘proves’ to be some successor category (e.g. ‘becoming’). And as he notes in his analysis of the opening, the transitions in the Logic do not occur ‘in time’ (2022: 1:147-148), no more than the successive steps of an inference do. Yet Houlgate does not understand the necessity of the transitions as the kind of inferential ‘necessity […] that leads from judgments to further judgments’ (2022: 1:74). For Houlgate the transitions are not ‘logical’ in the standard sense but are precisely supposed to be ontological: they are supposed to follow from the being of thinking. The question is how such ‘ontological necessity’ is to be understood.

Houlgate is undoubtedly right that the transitions in the Logic are atemporal. His insistence on the atemporality of the transitions, however, is impossible to square with his own reading of the ‘passivity’ of thinking in passages like this one:

Speculative thought may not presuppose any specific rules or method of procedure and so must simply follow the necessary development of thought’s indeterminate being. In this respect, speculative thought must be quite passive. Yet it is not to be passive in the face of an external authority, but must surrender itself to the necessity inherent in thought itself. Since that necessity
has no source but thought’s own indeterminate being, it coincides with thought’s self-determination and freedom. Our speculative thinking, therefore, must follow passively the course of thought’s own free, but also necessary, development. (2022: 1:75)

The problem with this picture is that the simple ‘being’ (the existence) of thinking is held to be responsible for the transition from one category to another. At best, this leaves the source of the necessity of the transitions unclear. In what sense does ‘thought’s indeterminate being’ necessitate the transition to ‘nothing’? At worst, Houlgate’s account of the passivity of thought treats being as somehow causally responsible for the transitions. If thinking is treated as existent, and if we are taken to be merely passively apprehending its development, then such ‘ontological’ transitions from one categorial form to another are virtually indistinguishable from ontic transitions in the external world. Likewise, if being is taken to ‘mutate’ ‘before our very eyes’, then logical necessity in Houlgate is no different from an external, chronological necessity whereby being changes state and causally gives rise to the form of what is (2022: 1:132). Insofar as Houlgate holds that such necessity ‘coincides with thought’s self-determination’, the autonomy of pure thinking is given no independent account and is reduced to the mechanical ‘mutation’ of pure being.

Houlgate’s understanding of thought as ‘what is’, an object, leaves us unable to account for thinking in its distinctness from being. As noted, Houlgate understands the ‘principle of freedom’ Hegel inherits from Kant as the requirement that thought be ‘set free from all authority’. Yet this restricts the post-Kantian notion of freedom to negative freedom (‘freedom from’) and fails to consider Kant’s far more important and original conception of freedom as self-legislation. On this conception of freedom, rational agents are not ‘free from all authority’ but are themselves the sole source of normative authority. Pure practical reason itself establishes that, to be reason, it must be subject to no law it does not give to itself and must be alone responsible for determining what counts as an authoritative reason for performing an action or espousing a belief. As an exegetical matter, there is no question that Hegel accepts such a principle in the Logic: ‘When we consider thinking as it is in and for itself, it is not subject to any external laws, but is self-legislative’ (LL: §79). Houlgate’s strategy is to argue that, insofar as being is said to determine itself, thought ‘gives itself’ such laws through its direct apprehension of itself as being. Yet this strategy not only threatens to “onticize” thinking, as we have seen. It also leaves unexplained the relation of the categories to actual conscious thought. According to Houlgate’s approach, the ‘conscious thought’ exhibited in the activity of any empirical knower ‘emerges only in the philosophy of spirit’ (that is, downstream from the Logic, in the Realphilosophie) and so does not give itself the categories of logic as its own self-legislated rules (2022: 1:129). Indeed, Houlgate’s observational model of ‘our’ conscious thought introduces an opposition between pure and judgmental thinking that contradicts his claim that they will ‘prove to be’ identical in the Realphilosophie.
This brings us to the third difficulty with LAO. There are two ways to understand Houlgate’s claim that being is directly apprehended by thinking. First, Houlgate argues that Hegel endorses an idea of ‘intellectual intuition’ according to which ‘thought by itself can know being directly’ (2022: 1:44). As Houlgate points out, this is not the Kantian idea of a thinking that spontaneously produces the objects it thinks but the pre-Kantian idea—shared by Anselm, Descartes, and Spinoza—of an ‘intellectual perceiving’ of being, the soul, and God by ‘the light of reason’ (2022: 1:34). Houlgate argues that thinking in the Logic must be intuitive rather than discursive if it is to apprehend being itself rather than the mere thought of being (2022: 1:44). Yet Hegel explicitly rejects the rationalist notion of intellectual intuition affirmed by Houlgate. In the EL, Hegel targets intellectual intuition as an example of the epistemic paradigm of ‘immediate knowing’, which purports to sidestep concept-use in its knowledge of the absolute. As Hegel argues, the problem with the rationalist idea is that it eliminates any sharable criterion of truth: ‘The basis for what is alleged to be true is subjective knowing and the assurance that I find a certain content in my conscience’ (EL: §71). Being, for example, is whatever one thinks that it is. Consequently, there is no determinate way in which being ought to be understood, by anyone trying to think it. Hegel thus makes clear that the ‘philosophising standpoint’ based on intellectual intuition would only have the arbitrary ‘authority of one’s own subjective revelation’ (EL: §63). What Houlgate fails to see, then, is that if thinking were to ‘directly apprehend’ the process through which being ‘mutates’ into the categories, the categories of thought would have no specifiable content, let alone be binding on the world. The result would thus be tantamount to logical anarchy, since any claim about the nature of being would be as valid (or invalid) as any other. Houlgate’s attempt to hold the private thoughts and opinions of the individual ‘I’ at bay would founder.

Second, Houlgate claims that the transitions in the Logic are driven by the indeterminate nature of pure being itself, which we passively apprehend in its unfolding. Yet as we saw above, Houlgate’s notion of ‘mutation’ begs the question of the necessity of the transitions and is unable to account for the precise way they rule forms of being in and out. Indeed, the idea that categorical forms are directly manifest to an observing subject comes perilously close to rendering what is supposed to be absolute and unconditioned merely contingent and derivable from experience. The ‘mutations’ of being that we supposedly perceive cannot themselves tell us how we ought to understand being, unless such mutations are in fact the self-determined transitions of any possible thinker. Houlgate is clear that the Logic is an attempt to derive and ground the categories that make possible the experience of any individual knower, but unless the transitions are rationally justifiable to thinkers, they will have no authoritative bearing on what counts for any thinker as the thought of being. In stark contrast to Houlgate’s view that pure thinking and self-conscious thought stand opposed in the Logic, Hegel is emphatic that ‘the “I” and thought are the same […]’. In the “I” pure thinking is wholly present’. For the categories to be binding, I in my reflective role as pure thinker must regard them as authoritative, must take them to have validity just in my acts of thinking. The ‘I’ on Hegel’s
view expresses that pure thinking (Denken) must always be the ‘thinking of someone [Denkendes]’ (EL: §24A1). Otherwise, Hegel’s program would be vulnerable to the charge of logical authoritarianism, since the categories would be an external imposition on our thinking.

As we will now see, this last point suggests that, unless Houlgate gives up his claim that thought is an independent object of passive apprehension, his attempt to establish the objective validity of the categories will run aground. By Houlgate’s own lights, the apperceptive activity of pure thinking must be grasped as the only possible source of the transitions in the Logic. As I have shown, by objectivising thinking, Houlgate violates the idealist thesis of the spontaneity of mind that his own account requires. If being is taken to be an object of immediate apprehension, then either logical authoritarianism or logical anarchy ensues. If being is held to exercise immediate authority over what we think, then the categories are an unjustified, external constraint on thought (logical authoritarianism). If the nature of being is taken to be immediately apprehended in an act of ‘intellectual intuition’, then the categories are an arbitrary result of thinking (logical anarchy). In either case, the effect is to render the deduction groundless, foiling Houlgate’s broader attempt to provide an ‘ontological’ proof of the objectivity of the categories.

II. The Role of Apperception in the Logic

As we have seen, Houlgate sequesters ‘conscious thought’ in the extra-logical domain of Hegel’s Realphilosophie. As Houlgate notes, conscious thought consists in thinking ‘on the basis of reasons’, which is ‘not the way in which speculative philosophy is to proceed’ (2022: 1:87). Accordingly, for Houlgate, the categories in the Logic unfold independently of our capacity for judgment and inference. This sequestration of judgmental thinking has a precedent: Frege’s influential separation of the content of a proposition from its assertoric force. To better understand the failure of LAO, we will first consider a key claim underpinning recent articulations of LAM, the rejection of Frege’s separation of force/content. I will argue that Hegel overcomes this distinction through his appropriation of the Kantian notion of apperception, which grounds the idea of rational necessity to which Houlgate claims to be entitled but which his own reading effectively disavows. We will then sketch the LAM account of Hegel’s derivation of the rules of pure thinking and consider Houlgate’s most pointed objection to Pippin’s elaboration of LAM.

For Frege, to secure the objectivity and truth-bearing function of propositions, their content must be abstracted from the psychological attitudes and dispositions of individual knowers—much in the way Houlgate sequesters ‘judgmental thinking’ (Frege 1997: 329). The content of a proposition is thus regarded as intrinsically unasserted and as intelligible apart from its ‘force’, its empirical assertion as true. Force, then, is affixed to the content of a proposition in a second step, through an act of judgment. Yet as Rödl has recently argued, if force is understood as external to content, then we cannot say in virtue of what a
proposition says \( p \) rather than \( \neg p \). Judgment loses all logical traction because the proposition is indifferent to its own possible denial or negation (2018: 43). While Frege does hold that propositional content is constrained by the principle of non-contradiction, if force is divorced from content then there is no difference between thinking a proposition and thinking its contradictory. If the contradictory content is to be grasped as contradictory, it must be taken to be *false* rather than true (2020a: 512). Otherwise, there are only two distinct—rather than opposed—propositional contents. The thought of \( p \) does not rationally *necessitate* the negation of \( \neg p \). This in turn voids propositional content of its determinacy (its necessarily being *this* and not *that*), since there is no rational requirement to deny what such content excludes or to affirm what it entails. The determinacy of conceptual content is inseparable from the modality of rational necessity—understood in terms of contradiction (\( \neg (p \cdot \neg p) \)), incompatibility (\( \neg (p \cdot q) \)), and consequence (\( p \supset q \))—by which such content is articulated. For such necessity to get a grip, force must be regarded as *internal* to content. In articulating that a square is not non-square; that a square is not a circle; that a square is a shape; one must take such propositions to be true, if their conceptual content is to be the determinate content it is.

In contrast to Frege, the apperceptive model overcomes the opposition of force/content. In a revolutionary departure from the Cartesian tradition, Kant understands judgment as the minimal unit of thought for which the subject is *responsible*.

This is because concepts for Kant are not self-standing senses but predicates of possible judgments that function as *rules* or norms for their own application. For Kant, judgment is apperceptive because to judge is to be conscious of oneself as judging. Such consciousness of oneself does not consist in observational knowledge of just another object, one that the judger happens to be. If self-consciousness were just ‘consciousness squared’, only now of one’s own mental activity, a regress would be unavoidable: one would have to be conscious of that consciousness. According to the Kantian view, self-consciousness is intelligible not as a second-order mental activity but only as an implicit attentiveness to the conceptual proprieties involved in doing or believing anything. As Pippin puts it, apperception consists in ‘implicit subscription to the requirements of any such judging’ (2019a: 263). To judge something to be the case is thus to be attentive to the warrants for believing what one does (and one’s reasons for denying the truth of an opposed belief) and to thereby be conscious of one’s judgment as *true*. In taking our judgments to be valid just *in* making them, we take it that there is some way things themselves are about which we can be right or wrong. Any ‘take’ is thus susceptible to mistakenness, to the rational need to be revised.

Force is thereby understood as internal to content, which only has the determinate shape it does by virtue of the status of judgment as the consciousness of (1) its opposition to its own contradictory and (2) the inferential bases for taking things to be thus and so. The apperceptive concept of judgment is thus the condition of the unity of the contradictory pair, \( p \) and \( \neg p \), since \( p \) only is as the negation of \( \neg p \) and vice
versa. Apperception is the ground of the possible opposition to—or affirmation of—either term. Consequently, only if judgment is the consciousness of its own validity (and thus of its opposition to its contradictory) can I feel the force of the necessity to exclude \( q \) in thinking \( p \) or to infer \( q \) in thinking \( p \). The apperceptive concept of judgment is thus the ground of the principles of inference (Rödl 2018: 137ff).

Hegel radicalises Kant’s notion of apperception by showing that—contrary to Houlgate’s sharp separation of the categories and the I—the self does not just apply concepts but in a fundamental sense is the Concept: the self is the purposive drive to effect its own unity through attentiveness to the conceptual rules for judging things as the determinate things they are (SL: 516/12.18-19). If rain could turn into steel, fall upwards, and then burst into flames, for example, one could not even so much as purport to take anything as what it is. The basis of the unity of the concept—and thus of the self—would be lost, because there would be no entailments and exclusions determining the content of our theoretical claims or of our practical commitments. For the perception that ‘it is raining’ to count as ‘mine’, I must take it that the world ought to be so judged and thereby be responsive to the possible negation of my judgment, its contestation by another. In abiding by the concept ‘rain’, I am committed to denying that conditions are dry and to counting the nimbus clouds up above and the droplets on my skin as reasons for taking my judgment to be true. To judge what is the case is to be conscious of such inferential grounds of one’s judgment. Yet this is not to manifest a separate, second-order commitment to inference as a form of proof (as Carroll shows in his essay on the Achilles and the tortoise paradox) but to manifest one’s self-knowledge as a judge—one’s knowledge of how it is one must judge, if one’s activity is to count as judging (Rödl 2018: 141).

As we saw above, LAO begins with the attempt to think ‘thought as being’ and to thereby observe what being-cum-thinking will prove to be. LAM, by contrast, begins with the attempt to think the ‘thought of being’ and to thereby determine how being must be thought, if it is to (intelligibly) be being. The LAM conception of judgment enables us to articulate an alternative to Houlgate’s reading of the opening of the Logic. According to the apperceptive model, in judging anything to be the case \( (p) \), I am just thereby committed to denying the possible negation \( (\neg p) \) of my judgment. The thought of pure being—whether understood on Parmenides’ model or Kant’s—is a thought-content void of all determinacy that, ipso facto, prevents the denial of its own negation. In the case of Kant’s thing-in-itself, no determination is available whereby we could distinguish it from that which it is not; in the case of Parmenides’ One, whatever is not cannot be, since non-being is nothing. Either way, in thinking pure being, I am tacitly committed to denying that ‘\( p \) is not \( \neg p \)’ can be thought: we cannot say what the ‘thing-in-itself’ is not, because that would determine it via negativa; we cannot say what pure being is not, because ‘what is not’ cannot be. This, in effect, means that in thinking pure being I am just thereby committed to holding that the thought of pure being is that of nothing, since it is a wholly indeterminate thought. Contrary to Houlgate’s view that being
mutates ‘before our very eyes’, being has ‘always already’ passed over into nothing because the concept of pure being inferentially entails its own negation.\textsuperscript{24}

If, however, as in Houlgate, first there is the derivation of the categories and then there is I who employ them in judgments, then the opposition of force/content is reestablished and the thought of the validity of the categories is assumed to be external to the categories themselves. As I have shown, Houlgate is committed to the idea that being is immediately apprehended by thinking through intellectual intuition. Houlgate believes that this opens up a non-discursive, non-judgmental route to the derivation of the categories, with the application of the categories in judgment following in the \textit{Realphilosophie}. While it might seem far-fetched to interpret Houlgate’s approach along Fregean lines, my reading finds support in Houlgate’s own claim that one of the key similarities between Frege and Hegel lies in their shared understanding of the ‘objectivity of logic’. According to Houlgate’s account of Frege, logical entities such as concepts have a ‘necessary structure of their own’ that ‘reason has to discover’ (Houlgate 2022: 2: 43, 44).\textsuperscript{25} The laws of logic are said to have objective validity apart from their possible assertion as true. Houlgate argues that this Fregean idea captures the sense in which Hegel’s own logic is ‘objective,’ with the caveat that the categories of thought also hold, for Hegel, for being itself.

Yet as LAM shows, the objectivity of the categories precisely evaporates if each category is not understood as the consciousness of its own validity. On Houlgate’s account, that pure being cannot be anything determinate is not the thought of the invalidity of pure being; likewise, that pure being turns out to be nothing is not the thought of the correctness of the claim that pure being must be nothing. In effect, the categories in Houlgate’s reading become entirely inert and without force: there is nothing to stop one from holding that pure being is not nothing because the category of pure being is not the thought of its own invalidity. As Houlgate helps us to see, Fregean objectivism is nothing other than the siren call leading Hegelian science to shipwreck.

By prying force apart from content, Houlgate undermines his own end of vindicating Hegel’s deduction. The categories, therefore, must be first-person thoughts—and pure thinking must be self-conscious—if the aim of securing the objectivity of the categories is to be accomplished. That thought is self-conscious means that thinking just is the thought of \textit{what it is to think}, and what it is to think is to think the \textit{object} of thought per se: being. Being is the ‘object of thought per se’ because to think is to try to think things as they are,\textsuperscript{26} and the thought of ‘being’ is the thought of \textit{how things can be}. This understanding of the identity of thought and being represents Hegel’s overcoming of a crucial distinction in Kant, between general and transcendental logic.\textsuperscript{27} According to Kant’s distinctive formulation of a general logic, it comprises the rules for thinking as such, for combining terms in a judgment, in abstraction from all content. Such rules are not norms one ought to follow but may \textit{not} follow, since to not abide by them is not to think sloppily or badly but to simply fail to think at all.\textsuperscript{28} Transcendental logic, by contrast, articulates the rules that govern the
thinking of a possible object in experience. For Kant, general logic is formal and empty; it is the syntax for an exogenous semantic content, determined by the material rules of transcendental logic (1998a: A76/B102).\(^29\)

Yet what Hegel sets out to show is that, in determining the possible forms of thought, Kant is already well on his way to determining the possible forms of the thought of objects.\(^30\) Just as it is impermissible to formulate a judgment in which ‘wholly red’ and ‘wholly blue’ are predicated of the same subject at the same time, so is it impossible for the same substance to bear the properties of ‘wholly red’ and ‘wholly blue’ simultaneously.\(^31\) This will amount neither to a determination of how objects appear ‘for us thinkers’ nor to a derivation of what there empirically is from general-logical rules, as in Leibniz and Wolff. Rather, it will amount to a metaphysical specification—along Aristotelian lines—of all that it could mean to be an object, the only sense the notion of objectivity could make. Hence Hegel’s claim that logic and metaphysics ‘coincide’ (EL: §24).

To summarise the LAM view, the Logic begins with the resolve to think pure thought itself, which is a resolve to think not mechanisms in the brain or psychological laws but the conceptual norms to which any thinker holds herself just in thinking anything at all. Self-conscious thought is thus the thought of how one must think, if one’s activity is to count as thinking: the self-conscious thought of pure being is the thought of the falsity of one’s thought, which rationally necessitates commitment to the thought that pure being is nothing. We thereby begin to determine how being itself must be conceived, if it is to be intelligible as being. Hegel tells us that the transition to Dasein, or ‘determinate being’, allows us to grasp in retrospect ‘the very indeterminateness of being [as] its quality’ (SL: 58/21.68). What we learn, in other words, is that the thought of pure being merely conceptualises the necessity of its own a priori determinability—if it is not to be nothing, a failed thought.

As Hegel emphasises, being and nothing are ‘mere abstractions’ that do not yet constitute ‘true determination[s] of thought’ (EL: §88). The first such determination is the very concept of ‘determinateness’ itself, qualitative and quantitative specificity. If determinability is the meta-category that governs the Logic of Being, then ‘predicability’ or ‘articulability’ will prove to be the ‘truth’ of such determinability, the higher meta-category that governs the Logic of the Concept.\(^32\) This concept is ‘higher’ because it reflects a greater degree of explanatory adequacy: we have now begun to explain not just the structure of possible objects but the very idea of explanation in terms of which such objects are explicable. Pure thinking begins to recognise that the determination of the content of the pure concept ‘being’ is the self-determination of pure thought in its attentiveness to what it is to think. To be objectively determinate just is to be intelligible, discursively articulable by—in principle—any thinker.

For Houlgate, however, the LAM view reduces being to what it is for thought and fails to make room for what being is ‘in itself’, apart from (judgmental) thinking. Yet the thought of being as thought-
independent, as independent of the determining activity of judgment, is precisely what at the outset of the *Logic* proves to be a ‘self-negating’ thought. In attempting to think pure being, we could not exclude the contrary and think what being is *not*; as a consequence, we could not think of such being what it *is*. Far from vindicating Houlgate’s thesis that being positively is as thinking, the opening of the *Logic* is the self-repudiation of thought in its attempt to think purely ‘positive’ being, uncontaminated by (discursive) determination. Houlgate counters Pippin’s claim that ‘to be is to be intelligible’ by asserting that being must not be reducible to intelligibility, if it is to be being and not just thinking (2022: 1:131). But here Houlgate pays the price for the mistake of separating *judgmental thinking* from *pure thought*.

First, Houlgate has argued that pure thought is ‘what is’ and that, in apprehending itself, it apprehends being as such. On this ‘conflationist’ view, it is impossible to understand how pure thought could be even notionally distinct from being. Second, Houlgate trades on his distinction between judgmental thinking and pure thought in order to (illicitly) argue that there is a distinction between ‘the necessary structure of being for thought’ and ‘irreducible being itself’ (2022: 1:131). On the one hand, Houlgate accepts Pippin’s claim that thought determines what ‘counts’ as being; on the other hand, what being is ‘in itself’ is held to be ‘irreducible’ to thought. Houlgate’s claim that thought ‘conceives’ of and determines what ‘counts as’ being does not cohere with his own prior claims that (1) thought in the *Logic* is non-judgmental and that (2) it has an intuitive relation to being. Houlgate writes as if the distinction between judgmental thinking and pure thought were sufficient to establish a distinction between pure thought and being, but this is not the case, since judgmental thinking plays no role in the *Logic* for Houlgate. Thinking for Houlgate is rather defined by its passive apprehension of being through intellectual intuition. What this does demonstrate, however, is the emptiness of Houlgate’s notion of pure thought: the only way he can specify a difference between pure thought and being is by illicitly invoking judgmental thinking when faced with Pippin’s challenge. As Houlgate’s own rhetoric conveys, if being is to be distinguished from the activity of thinking, it must be ‘conceived simply as being’ (2022: 1: 111). This is exactly right, but it means that pure thought must thus be grasped not as an intuitive intellect but as the *judgmental* activity of conceiving being as distinct from thinking.

As we have established, any such distinction—if it is to be authoritative—must be made by thought. What being proves to be in the apperceptive specification of the determinate thought of being is thought-independent by virtue of its status as *existence* (*Dasein*). The category of existence does not establish that anything in particular does exist or that being must ‘give rise’ to existent things. Contrary to Houlgate’s claim, Hegel is not out to answer the traditional Leibnizian question, ‘Why is there something rather than nothing?’ This question is a non-starter, for Hegel, since the opposition itself is false: nothing is already, minimally, being. Rather, Hegel tells us not that ‘something’ (*Etwas*) must be but that *whatever is* must be ‘something’ to intelligibly be. For things to be determinate, they must be grasped as dependent for their
existence on empirical conditions, relations, and processes that are not themselves the result of pure thinking. A science of logic can tell us what must be true of any law qua law, or life-form qua life-form, but it cannot establish that, if brought to 100°C at sea level, water will boil, or that healthy horses have four legs. This is just to say that thought itself determines that it is not causally responsible for what exists, not that the category of existence is anything other than self-legislated by thought. To then ask, ‘But what is being on its own, conceived apart from its intelligibility?’ is not only to miss the force of what has just been demonstrated (what it means to be, period) but also to uncritically appeal to some other conception of being (‘being “conceived” on its own’).

III. Logic as Metaphysics

I have shown that pure thought in the Logic is reflectively attentive to the categories required to authoritatively think the thought of anything at all and to specify being in its determinacy. We are now in a position to examine in greater detail the categorical structure of the ‘pure object’ of thought. This structure is at the heart of Hegel’s distinctively Aristotelian metaphysics, which he defines as ‘the science of things captured in thoughts’ (EL: §24). Metaphysics so conceived poses the question of what must be true of the form of any particular, such that it can be intelligible as the determinate particular that it is. It is no coincidence that Houlgate passes over in silence Aristotle’s central role in Hegel’s project. As we will see, Hegel develops a ‘logical hylomorphism’ in which the form of a thing is the principle of its apperceptive determination. The way Hegel explicitly weaves his account of judgment (logic) into his account of thinghood (metaphysics) poses an enormous obstacle for LAO.

The ultimate horizon of the Logic is Hegel’s notion of actuality (Wirklichkeit), which grasps things in light of their own ‘concept’, an internal norm or principle of adequacy that is the fundamental ground of their knowability. The notion of actuality is Hegel’s way of inheriting and radicalising Aristotle’s hylomorphic understanding of the form/matter relation. The matter (hylê) of a tool, its physical make-up, is its potentiality (dunamis) for being utilised in accord with its function (ergon). Form (morphê), then, is essentially active: it consists in the ‘being-at-work’ (energeia) of the purpose or final cause that prescribes the proper shape of a tool and the parts essential to it. The actuality (entelecheia) of a chair, for example, lies in the realisation of its purpose through its active use. In sitting down to write, I am not just resting on an inert object but activating (energeia) its chair-form and letting it be a chair; there is a real sense in which an unused tool is such a tool only ‘potentially’. It follows that an unstable chair with a broken leg is ‘actual’ to a lesser degree because it fails to adhere to its own concept, the kind (eidos) that defines its purpose or ‘reason’ for being (‘sitting’). For Aristotle, a primary substance (this iconic Eames chair) always belongs to a secondary substance kind, a genus (‘furniture’) or a species (‘chair’). This is treated equally as a
metaphysical delimitation of thinghood and a logical relation between a subject term (primary substance) and the predicate that defines it as the substance it is. Accordingly, this latter kind or ‘genus’ concept (Gattungsbe griff) is not only ‘in the head’ of an artificer or a sitter but is also constitutive of a chair as the sort of material thing that it is. In the total absence of its functional form, such matter does not just indifferently persist but assumes a ‘privative’ status, ceasing to be ‘chair-matter’ altogether.

No one has done more to develop this position than Pippin. As Pippin has argued, for things to determinately be what they are, they must be ‘for’ their concept in this manner (2019a: 54-55). According to what I will call Hegel’s logical hylomorphism, being itself is thereby taken to embody and be determined by the concepts applied in apperceptive judgment—specifically, what Hegel calls the ‘judgment of the concept’. If ‘the chair is brown and large’ is the judgment form specific to a Logic of Being, and ‘chairs have legs’ specifies the sort of essential attribute at issue in a Logic of Essence, then ‘this chair—the one with a broken leg—is a bad chair’ is the value-laden, normative form of judgment we derive in a Logic of the Concept. This last form of judgment (the ‘apodictic’, according to Hegel) is the form of judgment ‘proper’, because its subject term embodies the thought not of bare matter or of an indeterminate substrate but of an individual (a ‘this’) determined by the kind-concept (‘chair’) that enables it to be the determinate particular (‘the one with a broken leg’) that it is. Likewise, the predicate term (‘bad’) relays its own non-arbitrariness and even ‘apodicticity’ by expressing an evaluative criterion intrinsic to the type of the token under consideration (EL: §178-180).

I have suggested that LAO is unable to accommodate Hegel’s logical hylomorphism, but is there not room in Houlgate’s ontological reading for a derivation of the judgmental form of things? Houlgate indeed makes room for the derivation of cognition in the Begriffslogik, but he is clear that it must be distinguished from judgmental thinking: ‘Only towards the very end of the logic does being itself prove to be cognition, though even here what emerges is the onto-logical structure of cognition, rather than cognition in the form of conscious [i.e., judgmental and inferential] thought’ (2022: 1:129). One immediate difficulty is that it is not clear what the ‘onto-logical structure of cognition’ is supposed to be; Houlgate offers no further account of this crucial category. Moreover, Hegel explicitly identifies cognition in the Logic with the ‘judgment of the concept’ described above, whereby the ‘knowing subject posits the concrete reality of the [objective world] as identical with the concept, and conversely posits the latter as identical with objectivity’ (SL: 697/12.200, 696/12.199). Houlgate’s ontological understanding of ‘thought as being’ militates against this conception of the form of a thing as the principle of its self-conscious comprehension, by any possible knower. In contrast to Houlgate’s interpretation of the Logic, the LAM view does not observe how matter ‘really’ emerges out of being-cum-thinking and how matter ultimately ‘mutates’ into cognition itself. Rather, it demonstrates that being can only be cogently conceived as matter, which must be thought in turn as the bearer of the form of the ‘thinkable’, Aristotle’s logos or the Hegelian concept.
We have hinted at several points that the *Logic* is not just an account of the form of any possible *what*, the things of which we make sense (an Objective Logic), but also an account of the form of any possible *who*, the kind of being who makes sense (a Subjective Logic). In contrast, Houlgate holds that self-conscious, judgmental activity arises only at a derivative level in the Hegelian system and that the ‘concept’ in the *Logic* ‘neither is, nor is related to, self-conscious thought’ (2019: 766). One of Houlgate’s most repeated criticisms of the LAM view is that Pippin illicitly presupposes apperception at the start of the *Logic*, which is supposed to be presuppositionless. The intent of Hegel’s methodological stricture is to prevent us, the readers, from interjecting our own views and to prevent pure thinking from begging the question of its own starting point—the tragic flaw in every philosophical system prior to Hegel’s.

Yet we need not presuppose that pure thinking has *meta-knowledge* of the apperceptive structure of thinking for it to implicitly *be* apperceptive in its logical activity—no more than any empirical thinker must have meta-knowledge of apperception to be thinking apperceptively. That this is Hegel’s position is clear in a deeply important passage early in the greater *Logic*. Hegel writes that, ‘as science, truth is pure self-consciousness as it develops itself and has the shape of the self’ (SL: 29/21.34). This directly contradicts Houlgate’s claim (1) that pure thought is not self-consciousness and (2) that pure thought does not have the shape of the self. While Houlgate acknowledges that the ‘science as a whole’ is self-conscious, he insists that ‘at the outset, thought does not take itself explicitly to be self-conscious’ (2022: 1:52). Yet this gives away the whole game: if thought *later* comes to grasp itself as self-conscious, as Houlgate concedes, then it becomes cognizant of the logical form of *any* thinking, which has thus been implicitly operative *since the start of the Logic*. Hence Hegel’s pet image of the ‘circularity’ of the *Logic*, of thought ‘returning to itself’, and so on. In the final chapter, ‘The idea of cognition’, Hegel even points out that ‘the idea enters here into the shape of self-consciousness, and in this one respect coincides with its exposition’ (SL: 691/12.194, 731/12.233). This is to say that pure thinking becomes the overt object of its own exposition in the account of cognition, here unambiguously identified with self-consciousness.

This is not to say, however, that we *presuppose* the self-conscious self at the start of the *Logic*. It is only from the standpoint of the Absolute Idea that we *retrospectively* grasp the self-conscious structure of the *Logic* as a whole. As Hegel puts this point, “This knowing does not yet know itself as the activity of the concept, something which it is only *in itself*, but not *for itself*. Its behaviour appears to it as something passive, yet it is in fact active” (EL: §226A). Hegel thereby grounds the *rational* necessity of the logical transitions, in the judgmental *activity* of self-conscious thought. Yet as we have seen, Houlgate insists on separating the ‘reasons’ given by self-conscious knowers from the ‘reason as such’ innate in being, without providing any account of the activity distinctive of such non-reason-giving ‘reason’.

By driving a wedge between self-consciousness and the ‘self-determining concept’ that pure being purportedly becomes, Houlgate strips the *Logic* of its authority to make sense of actual acts of sense-making, including the reason-
responsive, self-correcting acts by which the Logic progresses. If apperception is not understood as the logical specification of cognitive activity, there is no route to conceiving cognition in the Philosophy of Spirit as apperceptive. Houlgate thus renders unintelligible the relation of the science of logic to the Realphilosophie and undermines the very foundation of the Encyclopedia project.

By contrast, LAM renders intelligible not only ‘what is’ but also the very activity of ‘rendering intelligible’. In the ‘Objectivity’ chapter of the Subjective Logic, Hegel establishes that the general-logical forms derived in the preceding ‘Subjectivity’ sequence are intelligible as such truth-bearers if and only if they are the forms of any possible objective content. Being itself must now be reflectively re-determined in the light of the forms of judgment and inference: the mechanical relation between cause and effect, for example, is the material ‘face’ of the ground-consequence relation of a hypothetical judgment. Reason, Hegel tells us, ‘is the soul of the world’ (EL: §24A). In the transition to the final chapter of the Logic, ‘The Idea,’ pure thought begins to think the unity of the prior ‘Subjectivity’ and ‘Objectivity’ chapters as a condition of thinking being in its full determinacy—precisely by thinking the embodied, practical, context-dependent judgmental activity through which being is thought. Hegel thereby deduces the ‘Idea,’ the notion of an object that constitutes itself in accordance with its concept (its constitutive norm). Such a ‘self-constituting’ object does not just embody judgment and inference but—in a sense to be explained—judges and infers: the living organism.

IV. Radicalising LAM

While it is not often noted, Hegel’s deepest critique of Kant unfolds in these final pages of the Science of Logic. Hegel establishes—against Kant—that the unity of apperception must not only unite theoretical and practical forms of reason but must itself be understood as a distinctive way of being a living being, if apperceptive judgment is to consist in genuine knowledge of being in its determinacy. I will now provide a brief sketch of Hegel’s account of logical life and argue that Pippin’s powerful account of LAM is partly compromised by its one-sided reading of this central episode. As I have shown thus far, LAM is far better equipped than LAO to make sense of the necessity of the transitions in the Logic as well as Hegel’s hylomorphic account of substance. Yet LAM remains vulnerable to Houlgate’s critique in this one key respect: it has hitherto grasped only the thought of being and not also the being of thinking. Without an account of the latter, LAM cannot properly ground its conception of thinking or of the thinkable. As I will show in conclusion, Hegel deduces life as the minimal objective form of subjective spontaneity. To make good on the promise of LAM, I will argue that the Logic culminates in a metaphysical deduction of rational life.
The account of life in the Logic derives three key ‘moments’ or aspects that render living subjectivity intelligible: organism, metabolism, and genus.\(^47\) (1) \textit{Organism:} While the final cause of an artifact is ultimately relative to the ends of an external designer, the final cause of an organism lies in its own end of maintaining itself. Once again, Hegel follows Aristotle: just as the ‘soul’ of an axe is the activity (\textit{energeia}) of cutting, so the soul of the organic body is the activity of living, which consists in realising the potential (\textit{dunamis}) of the body for life (Aristotle 2017: 412b11-17). Such self-maintenance consists not just in the negative end of avoiding death but in the positive purpose of realising capacities—for movement, for perception, for play—constitutive of one’s kind (\textit{Gattung}). For example, the potentiality of my elderly cat (a ragdoll) lies in her eyes, whiskers, claws, and tail, the cat-matter she ‘activates’ in feeding herself and in chasing toy mice across the floor. Her organs and members are means to the self-maintenance of the organic whole, but they are also the very end that she, the whole, is striving to maintain.

(2) \textit{Metabolism:} Because the organism values itself as its own end, it relates to the objects in its environment as good-for or bad-for, instrumental or inhibitive. Organism and environment are co-constitutive.\(^48\) The organism enacts an environment comprised of objects of significance by desiring them as means to its end of well-functioning. Such desire is indexed in turn to specific material attributes that the organism must metabolise, if it is to successfully reproduce its own kind of matter. Desire is not a causal force \textit{in} the organism but the original, embodied capacity \textit{of} the organism for judgment (SL: 678/12.181). This is the logical point at which the ‘space of reason’ first arises. Pain, for example, is not just a passive sense response triggered by a stimulus but a way of \textit{taking} something as injurious or threatening. Pain is a felt sense of \textit{deficiency} whereby the organism takes itself to be otherwise than it \textit{ought} to be and thus exhibits a sensitivity to a possible \textit{reason} to act (to avoid the broken glass, say). Pain and pleasure are sensible ways of judging—in the light of one’s purpose of self-maintenance—what in one’s environment is \textit{worth} pursuing or avoiding. By the same token, pain and pleasure are a minimal form of responsiveness to \textit{things as they determinately are}—to glass as sharp rather than dull, to sunlight as cause and warmth as effect, to the mouse as alive rather than dead.

(3) \textit{Genus:} As Hegel explains, the form of the organism lies in its activity of self-production. To be ‘actualised’ (\textit{entelecheia}) as the sort of thing it is, just \textit{is} to be actively (\textit{energeia}) making itself into that thing—in accord with what its life-form or \textit{genus-concept} requires. The organic individual is a product not only of the self with which it is numerically identical but also of the self with which it is formally identical (i.e., with which it shares the same form): it is produced via the life-activity of another member of its kind. This generic form of reproduction establishes species-specific criteria of ‘the good’: each ragdoll ought to exhibit the behavior and possess the organs and faculties required for the self-maintenance of its kind, in both individual and species senses.\(^49\) Because the species good is always an \textit{individual’s} good, self-maintenance is not only a matter of self-preservation but also a matter of the fulfillment of ends—from
feeding to playing—in which the organism feels itself satisfied. Inversely, the perceptual discriminations of good-for from bad-for prove to bear not only a judgmental form but also a syllogistic structure grounded in a species’ vital operations. On the one hand, when my cat walks into the bedroom and jumps onto the ottoman in order to rest, she confers unity on the steps of this sequence by intending them as means to her end of resting. On the other, the end in question functions as the norm-like major premise (‘frequent naps are good’) in a syllogism of action characteristic of her species per se.50

According to Pippin’s articulation of LAM, Hegel’s key achievement in ‘Life’ is to overcome the parochial Kantian view that the ‘inner purposiveness’ of the living is a merely ‘regulative’ rule for the subjective apprehension of nature, not an objective constraint ‘constitutive’ of certain natural entities themselves. For Pippin, the concept of life is logically required for ‘thought to be possibly truth-bearing, to be of an object’ (2019a: 282), since the organism-as-species-member alone satisfies the apperceptive demand for a determinate notion of being, explicable in terms of an internal principle of intelligibility (i.e., the genus-concept). Yet Pippin’s version of LAM arguably misses that life is required not only for thought to be of an object but for thought to be of a subject (and indeed to be of thought itself). While Pippin does grasp the purposive form of reason on the model of life in an important chapter in Hegel’s Realm of Shadows (“The Lives of Concepts”), it is unclear to what extent the “vitality” (Lebendigkeit) of thought is functioning as a metaphor as opposed to grounded in and derived from the logical notion of organic life itself (2019a: 268). For Hegel, life is not just a possible object of judgment but the logical determination of judgment in its living ‘actuality’—as the original purposive form of responsiveness to things as they are. It is in the face of life that things first show up as materially incompatible (predator as distinct from prey), as mechanical and chemical (chewing as the efficient cause of digestible food), as teleological (nesting as the final cause of a collection of twigs and leaves), and indeed as living (live prey as distinct from dead).

Thought’s attempt to render itself intelligible as life ultimately fails, however, because the category of the genus is unable to account for its own possible discursive articulation.51 Life cannot know itself as life, but the exfoliation of the category does lay bare the genus—the living individual grasped in its generality—as an overt object of thinking. The apperceptive derivation of the genus-concept thus already reflects a shift in logical perspective: pure thinking has just thereby achieved knowledge of the genus as genus, which will prove to be the basic structure of ‘thought’ itself.52 Following the partial failure of the determination of the Idea as life, Hegel elaborates an account of ‘Cognition’ (Erkennen) in terms of ‘the Idea of the True’ and ‘the Idea of the Good’. Unlike the non-rational organism, cognition consists not just in responsiveness to means and obstacles in a circumscribed environment but in justifiable knowledge of things as they determinately are (the True). Likewise, cognition consists not in an embodied sensitivity to ‘given’ species ends but in a priori knowledge of agent-general rules that prescribe how one ought to act (the Good).
As Hegel shows, however, the understanding of thought as cognition proves to be vacuous and self-undermining, if cognition is not grasped in its *unity* with the prior category of life.53 Otherwise, as Hegel argues in several places against Kant, the good will be empty. First, the agent-general rules that comprise the good will have no purchase on actual embodied agents, since living desire will remain outside of and opposed to—and at best merely legally compliant with—practical rationality. Second, because such rules will lack any basis in organic sensibility, agents will lack the faculties for being affected by and for picking out the means for the fulfillment of reason’s dictates.54

My account thus attempts to develop Pippin’s powerful and original notion of LAM in a new direction. According to Pippin’s long-held thesis, ‘rational agent’ is not ‘a metaphysical or natural kind’ but rather a social achievement, an ‘artificial status’ akin to ‘being a philosophy professor’. Pippin treats ‘spirit itself as a kind of norm’ we collectively institute while ‘remaining the natural organisms we ontologically are’ (2008: 197, 62). Yet this view generates an irresolvable paradox. If we are ‘ontologically’ mere animals, in virtue of what are we equipped to acquire rational capacities?55 If spirit is a norm certain animals give to themselves, would they not already have to be spirit to exhibit the self-legislative capacity for giving themselves such a norm? In the logical context, the problem is reflected in Pippin’s restricted understanding of ‘the entire “Subjective Logic” [as] a reflective account of the subjectivity of the “Objective Logic”’ (1989: 246-247). This reading can create the impression Pippin has worked hard to dispel that there is a problem in the *Logic* ‘of “returning” to the empirical world’ from out of the inner sanctum of ‘pure thinking’ (1989: 259). Moreover, it neglects Hegel’s complementary account of the *objectivity* of the subject, his account of what it means to be a thinking subject (*SL*: 672-673/12.175-176). Hegel establishes not only that any determination of being is a conceptual self-determination of thinking but also that thinking is itself a distinctive way of being, namely as a life-form.

This raises the question of how we should understand the idea of the ‘being of thinking’. We saw above that Houlgate’s inference from the ‘being of thinking’ to ‘thinking as being’ results in a fateful conflation of being and thinking. If being were thinking in the way Houlgate suggests, then the consequence would follow that everything that is, is thinking. While Houlgate might contend that, for him, everything is *thought* rather than a *thinker*, the Logic culminates in an account of thought as the spontaneous activity of cognition, as Houlgate himself acknowledges (2022: 1:129). If all things were ‘thinking’, there would be no way to ground the distinction between the *lawful* and the *normative* on which the spontaneity of thinking depends. All forms of responsiveness would count as instances of ‘thinking’, such as the rusting of metal in a moist environment. Yet this begs the question of the meaning of thinking, which is *unintelligible* as causally elicited as in the case of rust. Rather, as Houlgate himself holds, ‘the being with which we begin proves in the end to be the ‘absolute Idea’ or self-determining reason’ (2022: 1:90). As ‘self-determining’, thinking is a *normative* activity that can go wrong: in perceiving what is the case, I am trying to perceive things
rightly and am thus open to the possibility of my misperceiving. Houlgate’s view that thinking and being coincide has as a consequence the conflation of lawful responsiveness (rusting) and normative spontaneity (thinking). On the one hand, all instances of mechanism would be instances of thinking, which would contradict the lawful form of mechanical phenomena. On the other hand, thinking itself would be identical with mechanism, which would contradict the normative form of action and belief.

Houlgate’s understanding of ‘thinking as being’ becomes especially insupportable in the light of Hegel’s demonstration that thinking is a way of being a living being. This would collapse Hegel’s own distinction between the living and the non-living, the organic and the mechanical, and ultimately undermine the very idea of rational life: if everything were alive, then nothing could die, since death presupposes the possibility of non-living matter. As the ‘immediate form’ of pure thought, life itself would lose its conceptual moorings by becoming indistinguishable from non-life: the rusting of a metal would bear the same form as a plant’s growing toward the sun. Yet a metal will rust under the right conditions on account of natural laws, while a plant ought to grow towards the sun on account of internal species norms. As a result of the conflation of these two forms, there could be no life, which is defined by the distinction the organism is always drawing between itself and the mechanical forces to which it is always at risk of succumbing. By Houlgate’s own lights, this is an unacceptable consequence, since he upholds Hegel’s view that the finitude of life consists in the possibility of its demise (2006: 432).

Houlgate’s concept of the ‘being of thought’ commits him to an untenable view in which thinking and being cannot even be notionally distinguished. Yet this concept can be redeemed as a corrective to the existing LAM’s neglect of the objectivity of thinking. If Hegel’s own understanding of cognition as rational life is to be maintained, the ‘being of thinking’ must thus be rationally reinterpreted: the only intelligible conception of the being of thinking is the being of any possible thinker. As Hegel writes in a parting critique of Kant in his account of cognition:

> Self-consciousness is precisely the existent and therefore empirically perceivable pure concept; it is the absolute self-reference that, as sundering judgment [trennendes Urteil], makes itself into an object [Gegenstande]. The defect [in the Kantian understanding of the I] appears […] in that the ‘I’ occurs only as the subject of consciousness and no intuition is available by which the ‘I’ would be given as an object. (SL: 691/12.194)

Hegel is here arguing that the pure interrogation of the thought of being eventually requires of itself an account of the possible being of thought, or a formal concept of the material potential for thinking. What kind of being must a thinker be, if she is to be intelligible as a thinker? The ‘being of thought’ is a logical specification of the form of substance distinctive of rational agents. At issue is not which empirical kinds of substance (e.g. silicon) can bear neuronal activity but which metaphysical kinds of substance (i.e. the organism) can embody the normative activity of thinking. As Hegel shows, both justifiable belief about ‘what is’ (the True) and knowledge of what practical reason demands (the Good) prove to be the constitutive...
standards in light of which rational individuals actualise themselves as the kinds of living beings they are (SL: 733-734/12.235).

Accordingly, Hegel elaborates an account of cognition not as something ‘other than’ or ‘in addition to’ life but as a distinctive form of organic life. Hegel inherits and radicalises Aristotle’s distinction in De Anima between three ways of being an embodied life-form. Vegetative life is matter that bears the potential for the activity of feeding (threpsis); animal life is matter that bears the potential for the activity of perception (aisthesis); and rational life is matter that bears the potential for the activity of thought (noësis). Each step in this ‘stepladder’ of life is not merely added to the prior capacity but transforms the way the prior capacity is actualised. A plant realises its potential through a generic repertoire of metabolic activities—such as growing towards the sun and converting sunlight into nutrients—to sustain its growth and reproduce itself. Animal life also maintains itself through a process of feeding, but it does so by perceiving which things are worth consuming or avoiding and by moving toward them or away from them through spontaneous action in space. Finally, rational life encompasses both prior capacities, but in perceiving it is responsive to self-determined norms that specify objects and acts worthy of choice, including possible means of consumption and the manner in which to produce them. Just as the matter of non-rational organisms embodies the potential for feeding and perception, so does the matter of rational animals embody the potential for cognition. This is to say that rationality is a way of being and maintaining the body of an organism.

In the Encyclopedia Logic, Hegel refers to this last life-form as the ‘free genus’ (freie Gattung)—an idea later echoed in Marx’s ‘genus-being’ (Gattungswesen) (EL: §222). It is a genus whose form of the good is only a form of the good because its members are conscious of it as one. Our life activities are the activities they are by virtue of our knowing what it is to perform them. We act in light not of the good distinctive of our species but of a shared conception of the good for which we are responsible. While my ragdoll acts on instincts that express species ends that she neither chooses nor can question, our actions embody our consciousness of our reasons for acting, which render us responsive to the demand for justification and to the potential need for self-correction. Whether our notion of the good actually enables the successful realisation of our bodily potential for agency cannot be decided in advance but is always a live question. For example, to be a teacher is to take oneself to be one, not through overt acts of self-assessment but through sensitivity to shared, institutional rules just in acting—sensitivity to the possible assessment of one’s acts by other agents. Because our own ‘take’ on the meaning of our deeds is normative and thus liable to mistakenness, we are dependent on such recognitive authority to be who we take ourselves to be. By the same token, since to be a teacher is to be attentive to what success in teaching requires, our institutional standards themselves, as well as our very conceptions of Bildung and acculturation, are susceptible to rational re-assessment. Rational life thus exhibits the apperceptive structure examined above:
to engage in the metabolic activity of labor, for example, is to know what it is to reproduce ourselves at a
time and to be responsive to possible challenges to the *rationality* of how and what we produce.61

Hegel is thus developing the idea not of a possible ‘addition’ of Life and Cognition but of the form of
embodied life not just *appropriate or susceptible to* but *in need of* a rational process of formation. In the
absence of initiation into a language, acculturation, and entrance into the social space of reasons, the body
of a rational organism would not just be an animal body; it would be a defective, incomplete instance of a
*rational* body, unable to effect its own unity through the consciousness of what it is to be unified.62

According to Pippin, such an understanding of self-conscious thought as itself ‘life’ would, if true, relativise
the *Logic* by reducing pure thinking to the parochial standpoint of a particular empirical species.53 Yet
Pippin here conflates the claim that thinking is a *form of life* with the claim that thinking is the activity of
a *specific* living species. As Matthew Boyle has argued, ‘rationality’ is not the name of ‘a concrete
characteristic that certain species of living things possess; it marks the possibility of a different form of
predication of vital characteristics in general’.64 In other words, rational or self-conscious animality is a
logically distinctive *kind* of natural kind, precisely not an animal species like the others with the peculiar
empirical attribute of reason. While rationality must always be instantiated by some particular species, there
are *logical constraints on the species-matter that can instantiate reason*. Precisely what Hegel has
accomplished in the *Logic* is the purification of ‘rational life’ of any empirical content, whether
anthropological or biological, in order to specify a formal concept of the matter distinctive of the rationally
alive.65 Via the ‘transformative’ hypothesis, the matter of a rational body must be the potentiality (*dunamis*)
for norm-governed self-organisation, reason-responsive interchange with the environment, and self-
conscious determination of one’s kind. Apperceptive thought thus determines itself to be the consciousness
of what it is to be the organism, metabolism, and the genus—namely the *rational organism, work*, and the
*free genus*. This is the culminating account of what must be true of the ‘being of thought’ (LAO) if thought
is to be intelligible as the thought of any possible being (LAM).

V. Conclusion

In conclusion, I have shown that the idea of a rationally self-determining organism is deduced in the
*Science of Logic* as the thought of what it is to think being in its determinacy. It is the form of any possible
‘who’, of any possible thinker. Against the LAO view, the *Logic* deduces that thinking is not ‘what is’ but
rather the attentiveness to what it means to think the thought of ‘what is’, being as such. Because Houlgate
disavows our *responsibility* as pure thinkers for the categories, the categories can exercise no correlative
*authority* over our acts of thinking—on pain of logical authoritarianism. This contradicts not only the claim
of Hegel’s deduction to objective validity but also Houlgate’s understanding of the *Logic* as the ultimate
exercise in ‘free self-critical thought’ (Houlgate 2022: 1:308). Rather than demonstrating that we pure thinkers can alone determine how being must be thought, Houlgate’s Logic subordinates our thinking to the external, putative authority of pure being. Against the quasi-epistemic version of LAM, I have argued that it is insufficient to claim that the attentiveness in thinking to what it is to think has as its result our acknowledgment of the normative authority of thought. This neglects Hegel’s account of the objectivity of thinking and falls foul of his critique of the Kantian abstraction of cognition from life. According to the renovated version of LAM I have elaborated, the Logic teaches us to understand ourselves as apperceptive organisms responsible for how we live. Responsiveness to reasons is constitutive of the life activity of animals like us: we are attentive in governing to what it is to govern, in educating to what it is to educate, and in working to what it is to work. In governing, educating, or working, we are just thereby trying to do something as it ought to be done—ultimately, to actualise the potential we materially embody for living a rational life.

Endnotes:

1 For Houlgate’s original influential articulation of his ‘ontological’ reading of Hegel, see Houlgate 2006. For his most sustained argument for LAO, see Part I of the first volume of his recent book (Houlgate 2022).

2 Rödl has developed the LAM reading of Hegel in a series of articles. See Rödl 2019; 2020a; 2020b; and 2020c. For Pippin’s early, path-breaking account of the Logic as a record of thought’s self-determination of the conceptual constraints on objectivity, see Pippin 1989. In the 2010s, partly in response to criticisms of misleadingly ‘subjectivist’ formulations in HI, Pippin refined his view and advanced the mature version of LAM defended here. For Pippin’s systematic statement of the position, see Pippin 2019a.

3 This is the claim advanced in Pippin 2019a, but it has not often been well understood or generously represented by those engaging with Pippin’s work. For a rare exception, see Schulting 2021.

4 This article grew out of a reading group in Summer ’22 of Houlgate’s Hegel on Being. I owe a debt of gratitude to the group as a whole, but I especially want to acknowledge Greg Bartels, Gene Flenady, Steven Levine, Ioannis Molyndris, Viren Murthy, Griffin Shoglow-Rubenstein, and Filip Váňa. I owe a special debt to Martin Hägglund for illuminating conversations regarding many of the key issues in this article.

5 Abbreviations used are given below.


and 5 in consciousness of the judgment of experience. They are knowledge. Rödl (2018: 138) structure of all judgment. Likewise, f

without contrary is not judgment proper but awareness of the logical principles constitutive of any judging. judgments without contrary, since it cannot be opposed without exemplifying the principle itself judgments

since the hard distinction between them is overcome with the distinction between force and content. 2018.

Adorno 2013: 74.

The most well-known critique of the Frege-Geach point, as it is often called, is to be found in Kimhi 2018. Citing Kimhi’s work, both Pippin and Rödl pursue an overcoming of the opposition of force/content.

From this point forward, I follow Rödl in using the term ‘judgment’ interchangeably with ‘proposition’, since the hard distinction between them is overcome with the distinction between force and content.

It might be objected that there are ‘judgments without contrary’ (Rödl) or Hegel’s own ‘speculative judgments’, which have no coherent opposite. Rödl gives the principle of non-contradiction as an example of a judgment without contrary, since it cannot be opposed without exemplifying the principle itself (2018: 139). Yet Rödl also says that ‘judgment with contrary—empirical knowledge, knowledge of nature—is, as such, judgment without contrary, absolute knowledge, knowledge knowing itself’ (2018: 136). This is to say that, in any empirical judgment, I am conscious of the bindingness of the principle of non-contradiction on judgment as such. Judgment without contrary is not judgment proper but awareness of the logical principles constitutive of any judging. Likewise, for Hegel, speculative judgments (‘being and nothing are the same and being and nothing are not the same’) articulate the identity of opposites, and so in that sense are ‘meta-judgments’ regarding the oppositional structure of all judgment. See SL: 66-69/21.77-80.

Hegel (SL: 374/11.279ff) derives the unity of opposites prior to the account of judgment, in the Logic of Essence. See also Wolff 1999.

22 See also Pippin 2019a: 115.

While an extended discussion of this topic would exceed the bounds of this article, it is worth noting that Rödl (2018: 138) develops a distinctive position in relation to the debate over inferential versus non-inferential knowledge. Charting a third way, Rödl argues that ‘the principles of inference are contained in the self-consciousness of the judgment of experience. They are contained in the I experience’.

24 See SL: 59-60/21.69. This is the meaning of Hegel’s point that ‘being has passed over into nothing and nothing into being – “has passed over”, not passes over.’ See also Pippin 2019a: 192; and Rödl, 2019: 112.

25 For Houlgate’s own extensive treatment of the relationship between Hegel and Frege, see chapters 3, 4, and 5 in Vol. 2 of Houlgate 2022.
26 Hegel follows Parmenides here in taking ‘what is’ as the pure object of thought; see SL: 60/21.70, 70/21.81.
27 This is one of the major themes of Pippin’s recent work; see Pippin 2022: 41-43, 64-65, 76. For Hegel’s discussion of this distinction in Kant, see SL: 40/21.46-47.
29 Whether Hegel is right here about Kant is a separate issue, but it is worth noting that this is a controversial reading. For a competing account, see Conant 2020.
30 On the ‘clue’ Kant identifies in ‘general logic’ concerning the proper components of a transcendental logic, see Pippin 2019a: 78.
31 This distinction between impermissibility and impossibility derives from Robert Brandom’s distinction between deontic and alethic modalities, which he takes to be ‘isomorphic’ to one another. By contrast, as I will argue below, LAM understands the relation between mind and world, the deontic and the alethic, as mediated by the category of life. See Brandom 2019: 60-61.
32 Pippin’s account of the pure being dialectic has a supererogatory quality: he claims that the failure of pure being demonstrates ‘the essential discursivity of thought and the first determination of being as such, determinacy, articulability’ (2019b: 185). Yet Hegel is clear that ‘discursivity’ and ‘articulability’ are not demonstrated until much later, noting that ‘being is not the universal, determinateness not the particular’ (SL: 84-85/21.98). Determinacy and articulability will ultimately prove to be two sides of the same coin, but that must be shown; Pippin’s account, on this point, moves much too quickly and opens him to Houlgate’s charge of begging the question.
33 I am grateful to Greg Bartels for pushing me on this point and for several illuminating conversations on the topic.
34 See EL: §6: ‘It is […] important that philosophy come to understand […] that its content is actuality’.
35 Hegel goes beyond Aristotle, however, by deducing the necessity of the hylomorphic understanding of the form/matter relation; see SL: 392-396/11.297-301.
36 Hegel places great emphasis on Aristotle’s idea of form-as-activity (energeia); see LHP: 2: 245.
38 See Chapter 5 of the Categories in Aristotle 1963.
40 For an important, complementary account of a ‘radical hylomorphism’, see Hägglund (forthcoming).
Hägglund’s account overcomes the limitations of Aristotle’s hylomorphism through an immanent critique of his conception of divinity as pure form unconstrained by matter. Radical hylomorphism shows that the form/matter relation goes all the way up (to the highest forms of rationality) and all the way down (to the most elementary forms of inanimate matter). Logical hylomorphism, as we will see, consists in Hegel’s deduction of form as the principle of intelligibility of any possible matter and of matter as the principle of reality of any form.
36 For an ‘objectivist’ reading of this claim, see Horstmann 2017. Horstmann’s reading promotes a version of panpsychism, in that he claims that objects are themselves subjects by virtue of their realisation of concepts applied in judgment. Yet this ignores Hegel’s critical distinction between the non-living and the living, which is the properly self-relating concept and the ‘originative judgment’ (SL: 678/12.182).
42 For an important account of Hegel’s transcendence of the limitations of Aristotle’s term logic, see Redding 2019.
43 The relationship between matter and purpose is stressed in the recent ‘metaphysical’ reading advanced in Kreines 2015: 213. Yet Kreines holds that material substrates are ultimately ‘indifferent’ to their purpose—a claim at odds with Hegel’s Aristotelian understanding of matter as organised in such a way as to be the potential for purposive activity.
44 For Houlgate’s explicit rejection of the idea that ‘speculative logic is based on reasons’, see Houlgate 2022: 1:87.
46 See EL: §192A. See also SL: 624/12.125-126.
47 The following three-part account is a high-altitude reconstruction of SL: 676-688/12.179-12.191.
48 For an account of this point in the enactivist idiom, see Thompson 2007: 225.
49 This argument has been developed in recent years by Michael Thompson; see the account of natural-historical judgment in Thompson 2008: 63ff.
50 For an important account of Aristotle’s practical syllogism and animal life, see Nussbaum 1978: 174ff.
51 I note here a disagreement with the important recent work of Karen Ng, who understands life in the Logic “to be independent of any acts of apperceptive judgment” and to thus “lie outside cognition.” See Ng 2020b: 1060
and 2020a: 258. For Ng, it is by virtue of its lying outside cognition that life can serve as the mediating link between cognition and the world. This approach threatens to fall prey to the “myth of the given,” which is appealed to as the ground for judgment precisely because it lies outside of thought. On my account, by contrast, the category of life is a pure thought-determination and an attempt by thinking to specify itself. See Suther 2020. While I agree that life is crucial for securing the objective purport of thinking, it is not because it lies outside of or prior to cognition; it is rather because it articulates the way in which thinking must be an embodied activity just to be referential and object-directed, to be about anything at all, that is, to be thinking. Such thinking does not “stop short” of life but constitutes the form of the life-form of animals like us. See the discussion of Aristotle’s “transformative” model of life below.

52 Hegel, SL, 688/12.191.
53 See EL: §236A: ‘The absolute idea is […] the unity of the idea of life and the idea of knowing.’
54 See, for example, PS: §622.
55 For a masterful account of this difficulty in the context of McDowell’s work, see Kern 2020.
56 I am indebted to Martin Hägglund for the logical point about death expressed in this counterfactual. For his own elaboration of this point, see Hägglund (forthcoming).
57 For a powerful account of how ‘matter matters’ and of the inseparability of substrate and behavior, see Godfrey-Smith 2016.
58 For a remarkable ‘transformative’ as opposed to ‘additive’ account of rationality, see Boyle 2012.
59 Ng has argued that the transformative model of rationality may not apply in Hegel’s case because he understands logical life as a ‘general form of organisation’ that ‘animals and humans share’; see Ng 2020: 278n48.

In Hegel’s lecture on Aristotle, however, he explicitly admonishes those who ‘seek One Soul that would be common to the sentient and nutritive souls—one that would correspond to the simple logical form of one of these two souls’ (LHP: 2: 247). This might seem to conflict with Hegel’s logical concept of life, but logical life is rather an abstraction that is only ever actual as vegetative or animal. There is no ‘least common denominator’ among these forms, which are rather two different ways of being self-organising.

60 See PN: §360R.
61 See EPR: §147: ‘The ethical is the actual living principle [die wirkliche Lebendigkeit] of self-consciousness.’
62 See PN: §346A. See also Korsgaard 2020: 84.
63 See Pippin 2019b: 1072.
64 See Boyle 2012: 410.
65 See Hegel’s important distinction between anthropological, phenomenological, and logical accounts of spirit at SL: 694-696/12.196-12.198.
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