Ethnic and Status Identity in Qing China: The Hanjun Eight Banners

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Ethnic and Status Identity in Qing China: The Hanjun Eight Banners

A dissertation presented

by

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Abstract

This dissertation is focused on the Hanjun, the ethnically Han component of the Qing dynasty’s Eight Banner System. The liminal status of the Hanjun – part of the banner system, which was closely associated with a Manchu ruling house, and yet marked as ethnically Han – makes their history a valuable window into Qing ideas about identity. This dissertation traces how the Qing court managed the Hanjun over the course of the dynasty, finding that though Han ethnicity was central to official conceptions of Hanjun identity, it was secondary to their status identity as banner people prior to the 1750s. Though scholarship on the banners often describes them as a fundamentally Manchu organization that served to reinforce a shared Manchu ethnic identity, careful study of the Hanjun reveals that for much of the Qing the banners were an inherently multiethnic institution. Banner people, I argue, constituted a “service elite,” like the samurai of Edo Japan or dvorianstvo of imperial Russia, a common early modern technology of rule that used legal privilege to maintain the loyalty of a large hereditary class of soldiers and administrators. A mid-eighteenth-century policy of expelling much of the Hanjun population from the banners represented an attempt to change the Qing service elite from a status-based category to an ethnic one, but this attempt was abandoned by the early nineteenth century, and the multi-ethnic Qing service elite persisted until the end of the dynasty.
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A Note on Transcription of Names

The bilingual nature of Qing administration means that all names that appear in official sources have two possible forms, one Manchu, and one Chinese, and for a writer in English, it is possible to represent them using either a transcription of the Manchu (for which I use the Möllendorff system) or of the Chinese (for which I use pinyin). I have transcribed names that include both a surname and a given name according to the Chinese characters in the name, with surname and given name written as two separate words (e.g., “Li Shiyao” for Chinese 李侍堯 Li Shiyao, Manchu Lii Śī Yoo). For names without a surname, in order to have a clear and consistent method for choosing which version of the name to employ as the primary form, I have followed a distinction that appears in Manchu-language documents. In Manchu, some such names, particularly those of members of the imperial clan, are written as multiple separate words, each equivalent to a single Chinese character. Because this is analogous to the practice used for Chinese names containing both a surname and a given name, I treat the Chinese form as the primary form for such names, and transcribe them according to the pinyin representation of the Chinese characters associated with them (e.g., “Yongwei” for Ch. 永瑋 Yongwei, Ma. Yung Wei). Other names are written as a single word. I transcribe these names according to their Manchu spellings (e.g., “Sinju” for Ch. 新柱 Xinzhū, Ma. Sinju). This does not mean that I assume that such names are natively Manchu, but since Qing scribes did not distinguish names that were clearly linguistically Manchu in origin (like Ma. Necin, Ch. 訥親 Neqin) from those that may well have been Chinese in origin (like Ma. Dzenghai, Ch. 增海 Zenghai), I will follow their practice. In cases where a Manchu-style name (that is, one lacking a surname) appears only in Chinese-language documents, I transcribe it according to the pinyin version of the Chinese characters used, but separating each character’s transcription with a hyphen (e.g., Chang-shan for
Ch. 長善 Changshan, which would likely be given as Cangšan in Manchu, though this is not confirmed in my documents. The characters used in its Chinese form, if available (some names appear only in Manchu-language documents), will be provided at the first appearance of any name of a Qing-era person, regardless of which form is transcribed.
Introduction

There is perhaps no institution more closely associated with Manchu rule over China than the Eight Banners (Ma. *jakūn gūsa*, Ch. 八旗 *baqi*). The banner armies formed by the founder of the Qing royal lineage, Nurhaci, helped him and his son Hong Taiji to establish a powerful state in Manchuria, to the northeast of Ming China, and gain control over the region’s diverse population of Manchus, Mongols, and Han. Those same armies were the central force that, in 1644, brought Hong Taiji’s brother Dorgon through the Great Wall and into Beijing, where he established the child Shunzhi emperor, Hong Taiji’s son, as the first Qing emperor of China. Banner armies would then help to conquer the rest of China, before, over the remainder of the seventeenth century and first half of the eighteenth century, playing a crucial role in the Qing expansion into Mongolia, Qinghai, and Xinjiang. Banner garrisons were found in most of the empire’s major cities, from the old Manchu capital in Mukden (present-day Shenyang), to the new capital in Beijing, from Guangzhou and Fuzhou along the southeastern coast, to Ili in the northwestern reaches of Xinjiang. Even as the military importance of banner troops declined over the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, bannermen would continue to serve as an armed symbol of Qing rule across the empire, and to defend the dynasty against attacks from both Taiping rebels and British invaders. As rising Han nationalism challenged Qing rule in the early twentieth century, Han revolutionaries would point to the banners and banner people as a symbol of Manchu oppression, on account of both their perceived role as foreign military occupiers and the huge quantity of government funds, mostly extracted from Han taxpayers, that went to their upkeep.¹

In addition to their role as one of the key institutions of Qing rule, the banners are remembered for their association with Manchu identity and the Manchu people as a whole. This is for good reason; all Manchus were enrolled in the banners, bannermen were expected to know how to speak and read the Manchu language and to become proficient in other putatively Manchu skills like mounted archery, and from the late Qing through to the present the distinction between banner membership and Manchu ethnicity has been largely ignored in both the Chinese popular imagination and in official policy toward banner descendants.\(^2\) Indeed, in the People’s Republic of China, all descendants of banner people can choose to be registered as Manzu 满族, or of Manchu nationality.\(^3\) Though scholarly studies of the banners consistently recognize that they were not a homogenous institution and note the existence of both Mongol and Han banners, even so, Manchus have been at the center of most such work.

However, despite the importance of Manchus to the banners and the real connections between banner membership, as well as the identity that accompanied it, and Manchu ethnicity and ethnic identity, from a purely quantitative perspective the banner system was not always all that Manchu. Indeed, from the conquest period until the 1750s, Manchus were not the largest group in the banners, but were outnumbered by a group known as the Hanjun 漢軍 (Ma. Ujen Cooha), which, by and large, was made up of people identified by the Qing state as ethnically Han. Even in the nineteenth century, following the expulsion from the banner system of many

\(^2\) See Edward J.M. Rhoads, *Manchus & Han: Ethnic Relations and Political Power in Late Qing and Early Republican China, 1861-1928* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000), pp. 67-68 for an argument that by the end of the nineteenth century, the banners were generally viewed (by non-banner people, at least) as an ethnic group equivalent to Manchus.

Hanjun, the Hanjun continued to have a population between three-fifths and two-thirds the size of the Manchu banner population.

The Hanjun often seem to be a series of contradictions. Though not Manchu themselves, they were supposed to learn the Manchu language and the martial skills associated with Manchu ethnicity. Though usually discriminated against relative to their Manchu colleagues, they were institutionally privileged relative to the bulk of the Qing empire’s ethnically Han population. Though they included many of the most powerful officials of the empire during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century, by the mid-eighteenth century, much of their population was discarded from the banners entirely.

This dissertation uses the Hanjun as a lens for rethinking our understanding of the banner system, ideas about identity during the Qing, and the workings of the Qing imperial state more broadly. Studying the Hanjun, a group that doesn’t fit cleanly into the standard categories for describing Qing society, reveals that Qing ideas about hereditary identity took two overlapping but distinct forms: status and ethnicity. We learn, moreover, that the banners were not a fundamentally Manchu organization to which other groups were appended, but a multiethnic status category in which the inclusion of Han and other non-Manchus was, for most of the Qing, both normal and normative. Finally, it becomes apparent that the nexus between the Qing imperial court and the banners that helped sustain the dynasty was not based on Manchu ethnic solidarity, but on a relationship between service elite and ruler, in which hereditary service was exchanged for hereditary loyalty, a mechanism that functioned not just in the Qing, but in several states contemporary to it.

The Formation of the Eight Banners and the Origins of the Hanjun
The Eight Banners were one of the earliest institutions of the state formed by the Jurchen leader Nurhaci of the Aisin Gioro clan, whose descendants would go on to conquer China, around the turn of the seventeenth century. Indeed, they predated Nurhaci’s 1616 proclamation of himself as emperor of the Latter Jin dynasty, which his son Hong Taiji would rename the Qing dynasty, by at least fifteen years. In 1601, in the middle of a series of successful wars with other Jurchen and Mongol groups that made his confederation the dominant political power in the region northeast of Ming China, Nurhaci reorganized his army, previously based on hunting units organized by clan or village, into companies (Ma. niru, Ch. 牛錄 niulu, later renamed 佐領 zuoling) of three hundred men. From the beginning, these companies included not just soldiers, but their entire families, who helped perform the auxiliary functions necessary to the support of a fighting man. Banner soldiers were granted land, meant to be the basis of their support, and farmed by members of their household, often agricultural serfs. Company commanders generally held their posts hereditarily, often obtaining the position on the basis of having brought men with them when they joined up with Nurhaci.

In the years after 1601, four banners (Ma. gūsa, Ch. 旗 qi) – yellow, white, red, and blue – were formed, each represented by a different color, commanded by a senior prince or official, and holding authority over a large number of companies. In 1615, the number of banners was doubled by dividing each colored banner into two, one of which was represented with a plain colored flag, and one with colored flag surrounded by a border in another color. That is, there was both a plain yellow banner and a bordered yellow banner, and the same for each of the other three original colors. As the Jin state expanded, it defeated and absorbed neighboring Jurchen tribes and Mongol groups to the northwest and captured Ming territory in Liaodong, in the southwest. Many defeated or captured Jurchens, Mongols, and Han were incorporated into the
Jin military, sometimes voluntarily and sometimes forcibly. Mongols were organized into their own banner companies, which were divided among the eight banners. In 1635, the same year that Hong Taiji invented the ethnonym Manchu and mandated its application to his Jurchen subjects, the Mongol companies were separated out from the original eight banners, now the Manchu banners, and formed into their own set of eight Mongol banners.⁴

The Jin state began using Han soldiers in large numbers in 1621, when it conscripted 5 percent of its adult male Han population. This first Han army was disbanded in 1625 after a Chinese revolt killed many Jurchens.⁵ By 1631, Hong Taiji formed a new Han army, which appears in later historical documents under the name “Old Han Army” (Ch. 前漢軍 jiù Han jun) or “Old Han Troops” (Ch. 舊漢兵 jiù Han bīng, Ma. fe Nikan i cooha).⁶ In 1634, this army was renamed the Hanjun 漢軍 (Ma. Ujen Cooha).⁷ The Chinese term Hanjun literally means “Han troops” and is not a direct translation of the Manchu term Ujen Cooha, which means “heavy troops,” and is likely derived from the most important early function of this group, which was to haul and operate cannons, as they did in numerous battles, including the siege of the Ming fortress of Dalinghe in 1631 and the invasion of Korea in 1636.⁸ In 1637, the Hanjun were

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⁵ On the 1625 revolt, see Wakeman, The Great Enterprise, pp. 72-74.

⁶ The former name appears, e.g., in TZWSL, juan 14, TC 7.6.19 (July 24, 1633), the latter in TZWSL, juan 18, TC 8.5.5 (May 31, 1634).

⁷ Elliott, The Manchu Way, pp. 76-77. The invention of the name Hanjun appears in TZWSL, juan 18, TC 8.5.5 (May 31, 1634).

⁸ Kenneth M. Swope, The Military Collapse of China’s Ming Dynasty, 1618-44 (London: Routledge, 2014), pp. 91-95 describes the role of Han troops and the cannons they produced and operated in the siege of Dalinghe. The role of Han-operated cannons in the invasion of Korea is clear in, e.g. TZWSL, juan 32, CD 1.12.26 (January 21, 1637). On the importance of artillery and new Dutch-style cannons to the creation of the Hanjun, see Huang Yinong 黄一农,
divided into two banners, under the command of Shi Tingzhu 石廷柱 and Ma Guangyuan 馬光遠, and, according to the *Veritable Records*, their soldiers were organized into banner companies.\footnote{TZWSL, juan 37, CD 2.7.29 (September 17, 1637).} Two years later, in part to punish Shi and Ma for their role in a failed attempt to take the Ming city of Songshan in Liaodong by reducing the scope of their authority, the two Hanjun banners were divided into four, each consisting of eighteen companies and having its own commander.\footnote{TZWSL, juan 47, CD 4.6.10 (July 10, 1639). See Huang, “Dutch Cannons and the Eight Banner Hanjun Established by Hong Taiji,” p. 88 for the connection between the attack of Songshan and this division of the Hanjun banners.} In 1642, the Hanjun were divided a second time, ninety-nine companies of Han soldiers in the Manchu banners were included in them, and the Hanjun finally had their own, fully separate, set of eight banners.\footnote{Elliott, *The Manchu Way*, p. 77 described the transfer of companies from the Manchu banners. The order to divide the Hanjun into eight banners appears in TZWSL, juan 61, CD 7.6.6 (July 2, 1642).}

The Hanjun were not the only Han soldiers of the Qing, even during the pre-conquest period. Three surrendered Ming generals, Kong Youde 孔有德, Geng Zhongming 耿忠明, and Shang Kexi 尚可喜, in particular, maintained control over their own armies even after their submission to Hong Taiji. Though they and their troops were nominally re-designated as Hanjun in 1642, they were not incorporated into the banner hierarchy, and they were consistently treated separately from banner commanders in imperial edicts, while their troops were listed separately from banner troops when describing military deployments.\footnote{For their re-designation as Hanjun, see TZWSL, juan 62, CD 7.8.27 (September 20, 1642). For an example of the three former Ming commanders being listed separately from banner commanders, see, e.g., SZZSL, juan 10, SZ 1.10.13 (November 11, 1644) in which an edict is issued to Kong, Geng, Shang, another Ming defector named Shen Zhixiang 沈志祥, and the second son of the Korean king named Yi Ho 李淏, as well as the “Manchu, Mongol, and Hanjun banner commanders and lieutenant commanders” 滿洲蒙古漢軍固山額真梅勒章京, a group that was clearly different from the defectors. For the troops of the defectors being treated separately, see, e.g. SZZSL, juan 4, 74-105.} But, until the formation of the
Green Standard army after the conquest of China, the Hanjun formed the largest and most important ethnically Han component of the Qing army.

Though all Jurchens, now Manchus, defeated by the Qing had been incorporated into the banner system, many Mongol and Han subjects of the empire remained outside it. Thus, though the banners system was decidedly multi-ethnic, only Manchu ethnicity necessarily carried banner membership with it. Mongols and Han could be banner people, but the system only covered a portion of the pre-conquest subjects of the Jin/Qing state. However, though most Han were outside the banner system, the banner system, as of the middle of the seventeenth century, was mostly Han. As of 1654, ignoring Han household slaves of banner families (Ma. booi aha Nikan), who will be discussed briefly in the next section, Han made up approximately 50 percent of the total number of adult men (Ma. haha) in the banners, with Manchu making up just over 33 percent of the population, and Mongols just under 17 percent. The banners that conquered China were not only a multiethnic group, but one in which Han outnumbered Manchus. This would remain true until the middle of the eighteenth century.

In the wake of the 1644 Qing conquest of China, the Eight Banners became the dynasty’s main garrison force. Commoners were expelled from the Inner City of Beijing, which was given over to the banners, and Beijing became the center of banner life, the place where by far the largest number of banner people lived, with a banner population of perhaps five hundred thousand, and the designated native place of all banner people until the first half of the

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SZ 1.4.9 (May 14, 1644), in which the Qing army sets out for Beijing, with its components listed as “two of every three Manchu and Mongol soldiers, as well as the soldiers of the Hanjun, the three princes including the Gongshun Prince [Kong Youde], and the Xushun Duke [Shen Zhixiang].” 滿洲蒙古兵三之二及漢軍恭順等三王續順公兵。

13 Bahana 巴哈納, MWHKTB, FHA 02-02-006-000400-027, SZ 11.10.21 (November 29, 1654).
eighteenth century. Smaller garrisons were created in other cities across the empire over the
course of the first century or so of Qing rule. In each of them, banner people lived separately
from commoners. Some garrisons had soldiers from only some of the banners or banner
ethnicities. For instance, though Manchus, Mongols, and Hanjun from all eight banners were
represented in Xi’an, until the 1750s, Fuzhou had only Hanjun from four banners, with no
Manchus or Mongols present. In addition to Fuzhou, the garrisons at Guangzhou and Jingkou –
the city now known as Zhenjiang in present-day Jiangsu province – consisted entirely of Hanjun,
while Hangzhou also had a large Hanjun population, meaning that Hanjun were particularly
prominent in the southeastern part of the Qing empire. During the Yongzheng period, they would
also come to make up much of the population of newly formed garrisons in the northwestern
frontier, including those in Suiyuan 綏遠, present-day Hohhot in Inner Mongolia, and Liangzhou
涼州, present-day Wuwei in Gansu, supplementing their earlier presence in Xi’an.

Following the conquest, the lives of banner people were defined by two key factors. First,
they were forbidden employment outside state auspices. Most able-bodied adult bannermen were
expected to serve as soldiers or officers in the banners. Though this frequently did not involve
much actual fighting, they were expected to participate in regular training and to demonstrate
competence in military skills. In addition, some bannermen served as officials in the civilian
bureaucracy, which was the only legal extra-banner form of employment. The most common sort
of administrative work done by banner people was translation, especially between Manchu and
Chinese to enable the functioning of the Qing’s bilingual bureaucracy, though many Mongol
banner people did Manchu-Mongolian translation work, and official translation into any

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14 The population estimate of five hundred thousand is justified in Elliott, *The Manchu Way*, p. 118.
language was carried out by banner people alone for most of the Qing period. Bannermen also had nearly exclusive control of the upper ranks of the administration of the Qing’s Inner Asian territories of Manchuria, Mongolia, Xinjiang, and Tibet. In addition, they were disproportionately represented in both provincial-level administrative posts, like those of governor and governor-general, and the most powerful positions in the capital, like presidencies of the Six Boards and seats on the Grand Council. In general, both the rules banning outside employment and the preferential access bannermen had to government jobs meant that military and administrative service were central to banner life.

Secondly, banner people relied on the support of the state. In the first years of the post-conquest period, banner families in Beijing and a handful of garrisons were granted land around the capital to generate income for their support, with the actual farming done by Han commoner tenants. In general, this land soon fell out of banner control, and did not provide much of the basis of banner support from the late seventeenth century on. However, banner soldiers also received salaries in both grain and silver, and those who had not been granted land received additional grain stipends on the basis of household size. In addition, widows, disabled soldiers, and the like were paid pensions and soldiers received allotments to feed their horses that outstripped the actual costs of doing so, particularly since in many garrisons, the number of actual horses present was never as high as the number legally designated. The court frequently offered banner people debt relief, and beginning in the eighteenth century, banner families also received payments to cover weddings and funerals, and unemployed bannermen often received supernumerary stipends. Though the average bannerman was certainly not rich and,

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16 Ibid, pp. 194-197; 316-318
particularly toward the end of the dynasty, many banner people found themselves in difficult financial straits, all banner people could be reasonably assured that the state would help them to meet their basic needs.

**Status and Ethnicity in the Eight Banners**

This dissertation makes extensive use of two analytical concepts in its frequent discussion of identity: status and ethnicity. I argue that the Qing court, and Qing officialdom more broadly, understood these two forms of identity as distinct from one another, and as both contributing to an individual’s position in the socio-political order. By status, I mean the type of identity that separated banner people (Ch. 旗人 qiren, Ma. gūsai niyalma) from commoners (Ch. 民人 minren, Ma. irgen). By ethnicity, I mean the type of identity that divided Manchus and Han, whether inside or outside the banners. My use of the term ethnicity is not meant to suggest that Qing understandings of Manchu-Han difference were precisely identical to any particular contemporary social scientific conception of ethnicity, but simply as shorthand to express the idea that Manchus and Han had certain fundamental differences that defined them as groups. Pamela Crossley argues that Manchu identity should be understood in racial terms beginning in the eighteenth century and in ethnic terms only in the very late Qing. Prior to the eighteenth century, she has described ideas about Manchu and Han identity as “predecessors” of ethnic identity. I do not object to her analysis, but referring to this type of identity as “proto-ethnic,” aside from sounding a bit too teleological, seems cumbersome in a work that will discuss

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17 Mongols also constitute an ethnic category under this scheme, but Manchu-Mongol and Mongol-Han difference is of substantially less importance to this work than Manchu-Han difference.

18 Pamela Kyle Crossley, “Thinking about Ethnicity in Early Modern China,” *Late Imperial China* 11.1 (June 1990), p.11.

Manchu and Han identity quite frequently. The use of “race” meanwhile, seems likely to mislead a contemporary audience that is likely used to thinking of race in terms of skin color and other obvious physical differences. As such, I see no preferable option to describing the type of identity that differentiated Manchus and Han as “ethnic.” Both ethnic and status identity were hereditary and both had both legal and cultural significance. However, the ways these two types of categorizations were defined and understood differed.

As a status group, banner people were subject to different laws, forms of administration, and cultural norms than the Han commoner population, which made up the other main status category, at least in China proper. The clearest bureaucratic indication as to whether an individual was a banner person or a commoner was in what physical register their name (or that of their male head of household) was inscribed in. Banner people were included in records maintained by banner company captains, which every three years were compiled to create a complete census of the entire banner population. Commoners were listed in so-called baojia 保甲 (Ma. gašan falga) records, tied to the mutual surveillance system consisting of groups of ten households (jia) and one hundred households (bao). Status operated at the level of the household (Ch. 户 hu, Ma. boigon), with all members of a household included in the same register. Banner registers kept much more careful track of the people included in them than did records of commoners, paying close attention to births, deaths, marriages, and employment.


21 On the baojia system, see ibid., pp. 60-63.

In addition to being registered differently, members of different status categories were subject to different forms of administration. Commoners were governed through the normal provincial civil bureaucracy, which looked similar to the administrative system in place under the preceding Ming dynasty. Under this system, bureaucrats appointed by the central Qing state were fairly remote from the population. The county (Ch. 縣 xian) served as the lowest level of administration, presided over by a county magistrate (Ch. 知縣 zhixian), perhaps assisted by an assistant magistrate (Ch. 縣丞 xiancheng), whose subordinates consisted of a set of sub-bureaucratic personnel that included both locals employed at the county yamen over the long-term and the magistrate’s personal staff. In the mid-Qing, the empire had 1,502 counties or departments (a variant low-level administrative unit), meaning that the average county or department magistrate was responsible for about two hundred thousand people.23 Local officials were subordinated to a provincial bureaucracy that at the highest level consisted of provincial governors (Ch. 巡撫 xunfu, Ma. giyarime dasara amban) and governors-general (Ch. 總督 zongdu, Ma. uheri kadalara amban).

Banner people faced a much more intrusive bureaucracy. All banner households were assigned to a particular company under the command of a company captain (Ma. nirui janggin, Ch. 佐領 zuoling). Company captains had a variety of subordinate officials with administrative responsibilities, including lieutenants (Ma. funde bošokū, Ch. 驍騎校 xiaoqixiao) and corporals (Ma. bošokū, Ch. 領催 lingcui), who were the lowest ranking banner officers. Company captains were not merely military officials, but responsible for managing all people in the households.

under their command. Marriages, for instance, required the approval of the company captain.\(^{24}\)

Though the most important central government agencies – the Six Boards – had authority over both banner people and commoners, the lower-level administrators with which most people might actually interact were entirely different.

This difference extended to criminal cases, where banner people were subject to their own judicial system, with banner officials responsible for adjudicating cases, and review of serious cases proceeding up through the banner hierarchy, and the garrison general ruling on the most serious cases in provincial garrisons. This was analogous to the judicial process for commoners, where initial determinations were made by county magistrates, subject to escalating review, depending on the severity of the case, up the provincial hierarchy. An official called the judicial subprefect (Ma. \textit{weile beidere uhei saraci}, Ch. \textit{理事同知 lishi tongzhi}) was often involved in investigating crimes within the banners, but was particularly important in adjudicating crimes that involved both banner people and commoners, in part in order to protect the former from judicial torture at the hands of commoner officials.\(^{25}\) Banner people were also exempted from certain punishments to which commoners were subject, most notably banishment, which was commuted to wearing the cangue.

Status identity in the Qing was thus the result of law and administrative practice. It is analogous to the systems of status differentiation that characterized “container societies,” to use the phrase coined by the Japanese historian John Hall, like those of Edo Japan or imperial


\(^{25}\) Pär Kristoffer Cassel, \textit{Grounds of Judgment: Extraterritoriality and Imperial Power in Nineteenth-Century China and Japan} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p.24. Cassel suggests that judicial subprefects existed only for cases involving both sides of the status divide, but archival records reveal that they played a role in investigating crimes that were confined to the banners. See, e.g., Yongwei 永瑋, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0188-2740-032, QL 43.3.30 (April 26, 1776), in which Guangzhou judicial sub-prefect Ciowamboo takes charge of a case involving banner desertion in which no commoners were implicated.
Russia. In a container society, people are administered differently depending on their legally defined social function. In the Qing case, broadly speaking, banner people were soldiers, while commoners were taxpayers. Banner people were administrators and bureaucrats, while commoners were subjects. In practice, this division was less than absolute. Many commoners were soldiers in the Green Standard army. Many bureaucrats, even at the very highest ranks, were initially recruited through the civil service examinations, where success was, by and large, the province of wealthy commoners. However, commoners, unlike banner people, did not inherit these roles, but had to reacquire them each generation. As such, status was an organizing principle of Qing society, one that set the basic rules as to who would do what and how different people would be administered.

In contrast, ethnicity in the Qing was an analytical and descriptive category, not a legally created one. This is not to say that the Qing state played no role in actively creating and defining ethnic identity. But, discursively, ethnicity was treated as natural rather than legally created, something that could be found in the world, rather than something based purely in law. This is apparent even outside the Manchu-Han dichotomy. The interest in the Qing state in creating ethnographies of the people on its frontiers is well-studied. This interest extended to the


27 Some people of banner registry were tax-paying farmers, but the income they produced went directly to the imperial court or the banners and was not included in the revenue available to the regular civilian bureaucracy. In this sense they were analogous to those military households (Ch. 軍戶 junhu) in the Ming who were assigned to military farms rather than required to provide soldiers. In both cases, despite the actual work done by these people looking very much like that done by ordinary commoners, they fit into the political organization of society quite differently, and their land was regulated differently from that of commoners. See Michael Szonyi, The Art of Being Governed: Everyday Politics in Late Imperial China (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017), pp. 131-158.

28 There is some sense in Qing records that sons of long-serving Green Standard soldiers had a right to their father’s job upon his death or retirement, but inheritance was not mandatory, with sons of soldiers free to take up other work, and civilian commoners recruited into the system.

29 See, e.g. Laura Hostetler, Qing Colonial Enterprises: Ethnography and Cartography in Early Modern China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001).
Manchus themselves, with the famous late eighteenth-century “Researches on Manchu Origins” (Ch. 滿洲源流考 Manzhou yuanliu kao) serving as a sort of ethnography of the Manchus, their ancestors, and the other Tungusic peoples of Manchuria. Though much of this sort of work focused on cultural characteristics, with ethnographies of people at the borders of the empire often focused on dress and customs, ethnicity seems to have meant something more fundamental as well.

Though we, like administrators on the Qing frontier, often naturally associate ethnicity with culture, it is important to emphasize that all identity categories, including ones like gender, age, sexuality, and, crucially for my argument, status, have cultural implications. This is true whether we speak of cultural practice, like the role of the social networking app Snapchat among contemporary American teenagers; cultural norms, like the importance of honor culture to samurai identity in medieval and early modern Japan; or politically-imposed cultural mandates, like the Chinese Nationalist government’s promotion of the idea that women should be “good wives and wise mothers” as part of the 1930s-era New Life Movement. In the context of the Qing banners, I argue that the set of cultural mandates sometimes referred to as the “Manchu Way” were mandates that, though having their origins in the Qing court’s ideas about Manchu ethnicity, applied to all banner people on the basis of their status.  

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30 Though Crossley does not use the term “ethnography” to describe this work in Pamela Kyle Crossley, “Manzhou Yuanliu Kao and the Formalization of the Manchu Heritage,” The Journal of Asian Studies 46.4 (November 1987): 761-790, Emma Teng rightly characterizes Crossley’s treatment of the work as placing it in the tradition of “imperially sponsored works of ethnographic documentation.” See Emma Jinhua Teng, Taiwan’s Imagined Geography: Chinese Colonial Travel Writing and Pictures, 1683-1895 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2004), pp. 149-150

31 It is perhaps worthy of note that the idea of “Manchu” ethnicity was invented by the Qing emperor Hong Taiji in 1635, and thus that the ethnic traditions underlying the cultural norms embedded in the Manchu Way (which included frugality, the ability to speak Manchu, and skill in standing and mounted archery) had an association with Manchu ethnicity that was barely longer than their association with banner status.
If it is the case that culture, as prescribed by the Qing state, was largely shared by banner people regardless of ethnic difference, then there must have some other basis for understanding ethnic difference. One important sort of difference appears to have been the perceived natural differences in physical and moral character among different groups. Manchus, the court often seemed to suggest, were stronger, more honest, more martial, and perhaps “purer” than Han. Though Hanjun were supposed to adopt the cultural products of those particularly Manchu ethnic characteristics, the natural differences between the two groups meant that it was usually assumed that they would be worse at archery, less frugal, and more dishonest than their Manchu fellow bannermen.

Perhaps of more practical impact in actually determining who belonged in what ethnic category, though, was ancestry. Until the very late Qing, there was no sense that all members of an ethnic group shared ancestry or were part of a single lineage. In particular, there was no real state-driven effort to trace most banner lineages back beyond the late sixteenth century. However, the identity of one’s paternal ancestors who were alive in the immediate pre-conquest period was central to understanding one’s legitimate ethnic identity in the late seventeenth or eighteenth century. That is, a Manchu was someone descended from Manchus, a Han someone descended from Han, who, if in the banners, would therefore be Hanjun. Though both ethnicity

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32 Note that culture may have formed a more prominent basis of difference in the pre-Qing period, when, Pamela Crossley argues, Nikans (the Manchu word used for people who were perceived as Chinese) were defined on the basis of their “culture and function.” See Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror*, pp. 185-187. That Erdeni 额爾德尼, the inventor of the Manchu script, who Crossley suggests was likely Nikan himself, was later rewritten as Manchu, suggests that cultural-functional difference was no longer treated as the main determinant of ethnicity by the eighteenth century. See ibid., p. 188.


34 See Frank Dikötter, *The Discourse of Race in Modern China* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), esp. ch. 3.
and status were hereditary, only ethnicity was essential and unchangeable. The banners were certainly not an open elite, and the number of people granted banner status after the mid-seventeenth century was quite small. However, the acquisition of banner status was possible in the Qing framework of identity. Change in ethnicity was, generally speaking, not. For instance, when Shi Lang 施琅, the Han admiral who helped the Qing defeat the Zheng 鄭 family and conquer Taiwan, was granted banner status, he was made a Hanjun bannerman, not placed in the Manchu banners. Though his status origins were as a commoner, there was no obstacle to making him and his descendants into banner people, but even after entering the banners, they would remain Han.

The case of the Tong 佟 family provides clear evidence for the importance of lineage to ethnic difference in the Qing as of the late seventeenth century. The Tongs had been early Han supporters of the Qing, and held important posts in the pre-conquest army. One daughter of the family would become a consort of the Shunzhi emperor and give birth to the future Kangxi emperor. They were initially enrolled in the Hanjun banners. In 1688, the Kangxi emperor’s maternal uncle, Tong Guogang 佟國綱, petitioned the emperor to move his family from the Hanjun banners to the Manchu banners, claiming that his family were actually descendants of the Manchu Tunggiya clan. This claim was quite obviously false, but when the Qing court decided to grant the petition, likely on account of his status as an imperial in-law, it did so on the basis of

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35 It was sometimes the case that banner affiliation would not match ethnic identity as perceived by the Qing court, but many of these cases involved people (like Russians, Vietnamese or Muslims) who were few in number and did not have their own set of banners. Cases of Han in the Manchu banners were rare and usually involved special circumstances (particularly marital connections to the royal lineage).
the fabricated genealogy. As Pamela Crossley argues, the putative logic of the decision is clear evidence that Manchu and Han identity had become clearly linked to descent.  

Though the discourse of status and that of ethnicity were clearly distinct during the Qing, there are some complications that prevent their absolute separation. First, though “Han” and “Manchu” were ethnic identities, “Hanjun banner person” and “Manchu banner person” had some characteristics of a status identity. That is, though Hanjun and Manchus were distinguished on ethnic lines, they were also distinguished through law and official registration, just as banner people and commoners were. Manchu and Hanjun banner people were enrolled in different sets of banners, and both sets of banners included a modicum of ethnic difference, with Russians enrolled in the Manchu banners, and ethnic Vietnamese (for a brief period in the late eighteenth century) in the Hanjun banners. Yet, overwhelmingly, ethnicity and membership in one of the ethnic banner categories were aligned, and all banner people operated under the same general legal and administrative framework: that of the banner system. As such, it seems fair to treat the difference between Manchu banner people and Hanjun banner people as, at its basis, an ethnic one, not a status one.

Another sort of complication comes from making a simple distinction between banner people and commoners on the basis of how and where someone was registered. This is because, among the people registered in the banners, were many slaves of regular banner people, as well as the descendants of slaves who had been granted their freedom. People who were personal slaves of regular banner people did not possess the sort of privileges that this dissertation treats as fundamental to banner status, despite their registration in the banners. Additionally,

36 On this case and another similar one from the same time, see Crossley, A Translucent Mirror, pp. 109-116. A brief additional discussion is found in Elliott, The Manchu Way, pp. 86-87.
particularly beginning in the Yongzheng period, even their descendants who had been freed consistently ranked below other banner people and were denied easy access to employment. These “secondary-status” banner people were a sort of in-between category.\(^{37}\) As chapter 2 will make clear, until they were expelled from the banners in large numbers in the middle of the eighteenth century, secondary-status banner people had a much greater ability to move up the banner status hierarchy as a result of military service than did commoners, who were only enrolled in the banners due to absolutely exceptional service, like that of Shi Lang. However, they were hereditarily marked as inferior to regular banner people, likely because their place in the banners was tied to their service to other banner people, not their service to the dynasty itself. So status was not merely a binary that divided banner people from commoners. Yet, in most official discourse about status, the banner-commoner distinction was not further complicated, meaning that the simple binary was the basic framework for Qing thinking about status identity. When discussing secondary-status banner people specifically, this work will consider the status hierarchy internal to the banners in more detail, but for the most part, the basic binary distinction will suffice.

**The Hanjun in Scholarship on the Qing**

Though scholarly work on the Hanjun is limited, questions of identity have often played a substantial role in the scholarship that does exist. One of the earliest articles dealing with the Hanjun, published in 1931 by the Japanese scholar Ura Ren’ichi, considers the history of the Hanjun in relation to two major concepts, nation (Ja. 民族 minzoku) and class (Ja. 階級 kaikyū). For Ura, the Hanjun were defined as Han who served the “Manchu nation” (Ja. 滿州民族

Manshū minzoku) in the formation of an imperial dynasty and thereby entered the “privileged ruling class” (Ja. 特権支配階級 tokken shihai kaikyū) of banner people. From the Manchu perspective, Ura argues, the Hanjun were merely of “temporary” (Ja. 一時的 ichiji teki) use, helping the new Qing dynasty, which he defined almost entirely by its Manchu-ness, to rule and win the loyalty of its conquered Han-majority territory. So, Ura, suggests, as the Hanjun population grew and their usefulness declined, the Qing set about to strip them of much of their privilege, a policy which reached its extreme when the Qianlong emperor expelled a large proportion of Hanjun from the banners beginning in the 1750s. The only reason that expulsion was not total, Ura claims, is that the Qing court feared creating unrest among both the expelled Hanjun and the Han population more generally. As the idea that Hanjun played a central enough role in governing Han commoners even as late as the second half of the eighteenth century that they could not be safely jettisoned suggests, Ura’s work reflects a belief in the overwhelming importance of the nation, with Hanjun defined by their relationship to their Han identity. Indeed, he explicitly identifies the Hanjun as “traitors” (Ja. 漢奸 kankan) to the Han nation who collaborated with a “foreign nation” (Ja. 異民族 iminzoku).38

Ura’s focus on the nation is over-deterministic, based on an assumption that shared national identity was necessarily more important than other types of identity. However, much of what he argues continues to be repeated in newer scholarship on the Hanjun, particularly the idea that the entry of the Hanjun into the banners and the privileges they received as banner people were temporary expedients to meet the needs of the dynasty. Perhaps the most striking aspect of

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his article though, and one that accords well with the argument that I will make, is the notion that
the Hanjun were granted entry into the Qing’s ruling class as a “natural reward” (Ja. 当然の報酬
たそんのほうしゅ) for their contributions to the dynasty. Though Ura uses the Marxist language of
class rather than the concept of “status” (Ja. 身分 mibun) that had been of central importance to
Japan’s own history in the Tokugawa period, his basic idea of the link between service and
privilege is crucial to my own conception of how the banners functioned.

As the study of the Manchu character of Qing rule in the post-conquest period began to
grow in importance in the late 1980s, the Hanjun became an object of interest for a small number
of scholars. Li Yanguang takes an unusual approach to the Hanjun, arguing that ethnic difference
within the banners was only of at most minor importance, with Manchus, Mongols, and Hanjun
legally united with each other and divided from the commoner population of the empire. In
particular, he points to bans on property sales and intermarriage between bannermen and
commoners, as well as the differential criminal punishment of the two groups, while
emphasizing that “without distinguishing between Manchu, Hanjun, and Mongol,” bannermen
could engage in property transactions and marry each other. These interactions, combined with
the shared locations of residence, means of livelihood, and methods for selecting soldiers and
officials of all three banner constituencies led them to develop a shared consciousness, and come
eventually to constitute a single “banner nation” (Ch. 旗族 qizu). Though he notes Qianlong’s
attempts to reduce the size of the Hanjun, he claims that those who actually left the banners were
“extremely few.” Whether contemporary descendants of this banner nation understand
themselves as Manchus or Han has more to do, Li argues, with their place of residence and social
environment than it does with whether their ancestors were in the Hanjun or Manchu Eight Banners.\textsuperscript{39}

Though Li’s suggestion that the difference between banner ethnic groups was of little importance is hard to square with the evidence, and his claim that few Hanjun were actually expelled from the banners by Hanjun is erroneous, his emphasis on the exceptional importance of the banner-commoner division, which he refers to as an “impassable boundary” (Ch. 不可逾越的界限 \textit{bu ke yuyue de jiexian}) remains a valuable contribution. Moreover, his suggestion that banner people would eventually form a quasi-ethnic “banner nation” has been endorsed by other scholars of the late Qing, particularly Edward Rhoads, who notes the use of the term “banner nation” and argues that by the end of the nineteenth century, banner people came to be viewed as an ethnic group, at least by those outside the banners.\textsuperscript{40} Indeed, I will argue that the Qing state did de-emphasize internal ethnic difference in the banners by the nineteenth century, though there is clear evidence that ethnicity remained an important social division for banner people themselves.

The work of Sun Jing, the contemporary Chinese scholar who has taken the greatest interest in the Hanjun, presents an interpretation closer to the dominant perspective on the Hanjun in both Chinese and Western scholarship than does that of Li. Sun argues that the Qing state maintained a consistent policy of discrimination in favor of Manchus at the expense of Hanjun. For her, as for Ura, the use of Hanjun in positions of power was a tool of expediency for the Qing rulers, abandoned as it ceased to be necessary. However, she takes this argument further than Ura, as, unlike him, she does not acknowledge the extent to which Hanjun privilege was

\textsuperscript{39} Li Yanguang 李燕光, “Eight Banner Hanjun in the Qing” 清代的八旗汉军, \textit{Manxue yanjiu} 1992: 91-103.

\textsuperscript{40} Rhoads, \textit{Manchus & Han}, pp. 67-68; 267-269.
institutionalized in the early Qing, suggesting that they were never fully part of the conquest elite. Sun claims that court never really trusted the Hanjun, regardless of the extent of their cultural Manjurification (Ch. 滿洲化 Manzhou hua). Even in the early Qing, when the Hanjun remained clearly different from Han commoners, Manchu aristocrats and high officials “invariably regarded the Hanjun as Han, and discriminated against them.” The Hanjun were clearly ranked below the Manchus and the Mongols in the eyes of the court, even though they remained above the commoner population, simply because of their Han origins. In the mid-Qing, even though the decline of banner skills was common among all three groups, the court viewed Hanjun deficiencies in mounted archery and the Manchu language as tied to their ethnic origins. Sun claims that the real reason the Hanjun were driven out of the banners was not that they were substantially behind Manchu bannermen in military skills, but that the court saw the banners as an institution designed to benefit Manchus. With the removal of many Hanjun during the Qianlong period, Sun argues that the court transformed the banners from a “military organization” into a “special interest group” (Ch. 特殊的利益集团 teshu de liyi jituan). Though I will argue that Sun is wrong to deny that the Hanjun were truly included in the Qing elite and that she ignores the extent to which discrimination against the Hanjun declined during the nineteenth century, her emphasis on the consistency with which the Hanjun were viewed as ethnically Han has a great deal of merit.

In English, only two scholars have given any substantial consideration to the nature of Hanjun identity and the role of the Hanjun in the Qing state: Mark Elliott and Pamela Crossley.

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41 Sun Jing 孙静, “A Discussion of the Change in Status of the Eight Banner Hanjun during the Qianlong Period” 乾隆朝八旗汉军身份变化述论, Heilongjiang minzu congkan 2005.2: 59–64. Sun also has very recently published a book on the Hanjun; unfortunately, I have yet to be able to acquire a copy. See Sun Jing, Research on the Eight Banner Hanjun in the Qing Dynasty 清代八旗汉军研究 (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2017).
Broadly speaking, both are in substantial agreement with the general argument found in the work of both Sun and Ura, particularly the notion that the position of the Hanjun declined over the course of the post-conquest period, eventually culminating in the expulsion of many of them in the middle of the eighteenth century, the approximate point at which both of their narratives end. For Elliott, in contrast to Sun, the ethnic differences among Manchus and Hanjun were muted in the immediate post-conquest period, and expulsion was tied to re-emphasizing the ethnically Han character of the Hanjun. Unlike Crossley, however, he argues that the initial division of the banners among Manchus, Mongols, and Hanjun was fundamentally based on ethnic difference, with ancestry (or, at least, perceived ancestry) playing an important role. He suggests that in the middle of the eighteenth century, the court faced both an “identity crisis” and a financial crisis in relation to the banners, and that the combination of these two factors necessitated expulsion. Hanjun contributed to this identity crisis in part through their failure to successfully emulate Manchus. Though all banner people struggled to meet the expectations of the court in relation to the core skills of the “Manchu way” – including standing and mounted archery and knowledge of the Manchu language – he claims that the extra struggles of the Hanjun made them a particular problem.42

The Hanjun play a more central role in Crossley’s conception of Qing ideology than they do in that of any other scholar. Indeed, those parts of her *A Translucent Mirror* that deal with the banners are almost entirely concerned with the Hanjun or the relationship between Hanjun identity and Manchu identity. Two particular ideas differentiate her work from that discussed

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above. The first is her assessment of the Three Feudatories rebellion as of overwhelming importance to the decline of the position of the Hanjun in the late seventeenth century. She argues that one of the principal effects of the rebellion, one of Han generals whom she identifies as Hanjun, was to make the trustworthiness of the Hanjun suspect. As she describes it, this was not a simple process, as the loyalty of many Hanjun, rather than being questioned, was given a new characterization. Crossley suggests that initially all banner people had been perceived as owing the sort of loyalty to the emperor that a slave owed his master, referred to by the Manchu word jurgan. For many Hanjun banner people, however, in the late seventeenth century, their loyalty took on a more Chinese sense, that form of loyalty owed by a minister to his ruler, referred to by the Chinese word 忠 zhong. Crossley’s other most original contribution to scholarship on the Hanjun also relates to the form of their loyalty, or their lack of it, but this time in the late eighteenth century. She argues that Hanjun expulsion was tied to a rewriting of the history of the conquest period, in which many Hanjun who had previously been lauded for their contributions to the dynasty’s founding were rewritten as disloyal turncoats who had abandoned the ruler to whom they owed allegiance, the Ming emperor.

Argument and Dissertation Outline

Though this dissertation is the study of an institution – the Hanjun banners – it is not intended as an institutional history. Rather, it is a history of ideas about identity. It is not intellectual history in the standard sense; that is, it does not focus on great thinkers or works of literary or philosophical significance. Instead, it focuses on the implicit ideas embedded in

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routine bureaucratic correspondence, as well as those few instances when ideas about identity became an explicit focus of official discussion, and how the nature of those ideas changed over time. It is largely concerned with how banner bureaucrats and the Qing court conceptualized Hanjun identity, and their proper place in Qing society and administration as derived from their identity, though it also offers some suggestions as to how ordinary Hanjun understood their own identities and role within the Qing system.

I argue that, as the banner system reached its mature form in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, Qing officials and banner people understood banner people to constitute a multiethnic “service elite” in which loyalty and service were exchanged for institutionalized privilege, with Manchus, Mongols, and Han (in the form of Hanjun) all having a place within it. This exchange of service for privilege marks the banner system as fundamentally akin to other early modern Eurasian service elites, from the samurai of Edo Japan to the service nobility of imperial Russia and the Ottoman askeri. That is to say, the banners were not an institution uniquely tied to Manchu ethnicity, but rather represent one instance of a common form of state organization. Its inclusion of non-Manchus, among them the Hanjun, was perfectly compatible with this sort of system of rule, which did not necessitate ethnic exclusivism. There was indeed ethnic discrimination in favor of Manchus and Mongols within the banner system, and Hanjun were consistently viewed as ethnically Han. However, the early eighteenth-century Qing state was committed to maintaining Hanjun access to the basic privileges of banner status, particularly the guarantee that they could draw an income from the government treasury to support themselves, and to including them within the idealized cultural framework of the banners – in particular, the “Manchu Way.” For the Qing court, even the Manchu language was not
simply an ethnically defined cultural trait of Manchus, but a necessary attribute of banner status, one in which all banner people were expected to be proficient.

The place of the Hanjun in the banners came under challenge in the middle of the eighteenth century, as the Qianlong emperor ordered the expulsion from the banners of most of the Hanjun who were garrisoned in Chinese cities outside Beijing. The expulsion policy, I argue was in large part the result of an imperially driven ideological shift in official conceptions of the relationship between ethnicity and status. Where Han ethnicity and banner status had previously been viewed as compatible, the new policy was based on the newly invented premise that the banners were, in essence, an ethnically Manchu institution. The radical nature of this shift in approach is underscored by the extent to which certain officials looked for other methods to avoid expulsion, or even misunderstood the intent of the policy entirely. By the late eighteenth century, however, expulsion was discontinued. Instead, the court began to treat all banner people, including the remaining Hanjun, more equally than ever before. This did not necessarily mean a rejection of the notion that the banners were an ethnic category. Instead, by the end of the nineteenth century, official discourse treated “banner” and “Manchu” as more or less synonymous, even as Hanjun remained a substantial portion of the total banner population. Within banner society, however, ethnic boundaries and ethnic hierarchies seem to have been maintained, and as the dynasty ended, Hanjun were still clearly marked as social inferiors in the garrisons in which they lived.

Chapter 1 of the dissertation focuses on the first half of the eighteenth century, describing how the Hanjun were conceived of and managed prior to the announcement of the first precursors of the expulsion policy during the 1740s. It shows that Hanjun were indeed ethnically distinguished from Manchus, as revealed by both policy and social practice, especially marriage
practices. Yet, it shows that recognition of ethnic difference did not mean that the status identity of Hanjun as banner people was compromised. Instead, even as the state faced the fiscal burden created by an exploding banner population, banner officials, with the endorsement of the emperor, developed policy responses that maintained both the banner status and access to government salaries of the Hanjun population. In particular, it discusses at length a policy of employing Hanjun bannermen in the Green Standards, the portion of the Qing military that was normally made up of Han commoners, and the efforts it took to ensure that even the Hanjun employed in this manner remained as closely tied to the banner system as possible.

Chapters 2 and 3 move on to the mid-eighteenth-century expulsion policy. Chapter 2 begins with a narrative that clearly demonstrates the abruptness of the shift in how the banners were conceived, focusing on a group of former banner slaves called the “Household Selected Soldiers.” This group was bought out of slavery by the Qing court in 1731 and sent to the western frontier to fight in the Qing war against the Jungars, after which its members were stationed in a newly established garrison in Inner Mongolia, and elevated to regular banner status. They were, thus, treated according to the classic model for governing the banners as a service elite, rewarded for their service to the dynasty through access to the privileges of banner status. However, a mere fifteen years later, they became the first group to be expelled from the banners, and the mechanisms by which their expulsion was carried out would be mirrored in the broader Hanjun expulsions that began after another decade. The latter part of the chapter discusses another precursor to expulsion, focusing on a decision by the Qianlong emperor to permit the Hanjun of Beijing to voluntarily give up banner status if they chose. The language of the edict that announced this policy shows clear evidence of the ideological shift underway,
emphasizing the ethnically Chinese background of the Hanjun as a reason that they might be better off doing something other than serving as bannermen.

Chapter 3 deals with the implementation of expulsion across the empire’s provincial garrisons, beginning in 1754. It shows how the practical elements of the new policy drew directly on the model created by the expulsion of the Household Selected Soldiers, while also demonstrating that expulsion was initiated by the Qianlong emperor himself, rather than resulting from any proposal made by an imperial official. Though not definitive, this suggests that expulsion was not a natural result of the logic underlying the banner system prior to the 1750s, but a new idea. This conclusion is further bolstered by a look at the difficulty of implementing the expulsion policy in Guangzhou, where garrison general Sitku repeatedly misunderstood the intent of the policy, likely because it was so out of keeping with how he understood the banners to work. The final section of the chapter looks at how ordinary Hanjun reacted to expulsion, suggesting that it was an unwelcome life-altering event that many resisted.

Chapter 4 looks at the aftermath of expulsion, focused on the garrison at Guangzhou, the only garrison in China outside Beijing where Hanjun remained the majority of the banner population. It shows that, over time, garrison officials came to treat the Hanjun under their command more similarly to Manchus, most importantly by creating new jobs and sources of income for them in numbers that better reflected their share of the population, rather than adhering to the equal division of income and labor between the two groups that was meant to define the garrison. The chapter argues that these changes in Guangzhou reflect the broader Qing policy toward Hanjun during the nineteenth century. However, it also demonstrates that increased official equality did not create social equality, as intermarriage between Manchus and
Hanjun continued to flow only one way, with Hanjun women marrying Manchu men but not vice-versa.

Chapter 5 departs from the chronological narrative of the dissertation to focus on the Manchu language, and, in particular, the state-run educational institutions created to teach it to banner people. It shows that the earliest Manchu language schools designed to teach a substantial portion of the banner population, whether in Beijing or provincial garrisons, were established exclusively for Hanjun. This shows, I argue, that though the Qing court understood there to be an ethnic connection between being Manchu and knowing the language, it believed that it was just as important for Hanjun to know Manchu as for Manchus. That is to say, the Manchu language was meant to be a cultural attribute of bannermen generally, and one which was closely tied to fulfilling the roles they held on the basis of their status, in particular to work as translators and thus meet the government’s massive demand for translation. Finally, the chapter argues, the schools established to teach Manchu to Hanjun would, in the nineteenth century, become the model for schools designed to teach European languages to banner people, to help them serve as intermediaries between the Qing and the foreign powers that had defeated it in the Opium Wars. In this sense, the role of the Manchu language in banner life was not just as an identity marker, but as one part, albeit the most important part, of the broader role of translator that banner people played within the Qing bureaucracy.

The conclusion to the dissertation discusses the importance of my reframing of the banners as a status organization for our understanding of state structure and state-making in early modern Eurasia. The banners, it argues, except for a few decades in the mid-1750s, were an institution designed to link a broader service elite to the Qing court, not just to maintain ethnic solidarity between ordinary Manchus and the emperorship. The service elite was not, however,
an institutional form unique to the Qing. Rather, as the conclusion explores in the cases of Japan, Russia, and the Ottoman empire, as well as the Qing, service elites represented one way that a territorially or administratively expanding state could make an older elite continue to serve a useful role. Service elites represented a way to bureaucratize loyalty, turning the personal relationships between ruler and elites that dominated feudal and tribal styles of government into ritual relationships, mediated by status institutions. This allowed the elite status group to grow much larger, and thus continue to provide the manpower necessary for an expanding state, while maintaining the ruling family’s ability to manage them. Service elites were a hybrid between older hereditary elites and modern bureaucracies, but unlike other innovations of the early modern period, they were unable to persist beyond the early twentieth century.

45 By “administratively expanding,” I mean a state that was growing in capacity, and taking on a more interventionist role in society. In the Qing case, this was directly linked to physical expansion, as what began as a small Jurchen confederation quickly grew into one of the largest empires of the early modern period.
Chapter One: A Multiethnic Service Elite: Hanjun and the Banners, 1644-c.1750

In 1644, Qing armies swept through the Great Wall at Shanhaiguan, opened for them by Ming general Wu Sangui 吳三桂, and entered Beijing. They soon conquered the rest of the former territory of the Ming, and after the defeat of the rebellion of the Three Feudatories in 1681, would enjoy secure control of China proper until the middle of the nineteenth century.¹ Over the course of the late seventeenth century and early eighteenth century, banner forces, in conjunction with armies of Mongol princes and Chinese commoners, further extended Qing territory into Mongolia, Qinghai, Tibet, and Xinjiang. Much of the territory under Qing rule was secured by banner garrisons, with the inner city of Beijing forming the largest and most important. In general, the spaces occupied by banner people and their families were clearly divided from those in which commoners were permitted to live, often, but not always, by a wall.² Hanjun made up a substantial portion of many of these banner garrisons, including the entirety of those in Guangzhou, Fuzhou, and Jingkou (present-day Zhenjiang, Jiangsu) in addition to their large presence in both Beijing and the largest provincial garrison, Xi’an.

During this period, the banners were subject to increasing bureaucratization and regulation. In the early years of the banners, whole banners were the personal property of individual members of the ruling house, the banner system as a whole was not subject to uniform management, and indeed, at least in the pre-conquest period, it may not make much sense to even speak of a banner system. Over the course of the second half of the seventeenth century and

¹ I use the term “China proper” to refer to the parts of the Qing empire that had been under Ming rule, had a mostly Han population, and were generally subject to regular civil administration. These three traits were not perfectly coterminous, but given the distribution of banner garrisons in which Hanjun served, a rough definition is sufficient for the purposes of this dissertation.

the first decades of the eighteenth century, however, the central court established firm control of the entire banner system, eliminating many of the hereditary rights of Aisin Gioro princes and princely lineages. This process concluded during the reign of the Yongzheng emperor (1723-1735), who fully standardized banner administration, drastically increased the extent of merit-based appointments to banner captaincies relative to hereditary ones, and spatially centralized the banner bureaucracy.

Thus, it was in the 1720s and 1730s that the banners reached their mature form, and, perhaps due in part to the regularization of banner administration, it is in this period that archival documents dealing with policy toward the banners become especially rich. For reasons both of this relative wealth of archival sources and the banner system having reached its mature form, the period from about 1720 to 1750 will be the focus of this chapter’s efforts to understand the nature of Hanjun identity in the period prior to Hanjun expulsion, though some attention will also be paid to developments during the Shunzhi and Kangxi reign periods (1644-1722).

The dominant historical narrative of the Hanjun in the pre-expulsion period is one of a consistent decline in their position, with the expulsion itself serving as a natural extension of longstanding trends. There are two slightly different scholarly understandings of the position

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3 This process was certainly related to the broader issue of establishing control over imperial relatives, discussed in Macabe Keliher, “The Problem of Imperial Relatives in Early Modern Empires and the Making of Qing China,” *American Historical Review* 122.4 (October 2017): 1001-1037.


5 The maintenance of banner archives was a matter of importance to the central administration, which required reports on the state of the archives of each individual banner. See, e.g., Namtu 納穆圖, MHHBLFZZ, FHA 03-0170-0147, QL 4.5.18 (June 23, 1739). In addition to the regularization of administration, the creation of the palace memorial system in the latter years of the Kangxi period also played a very important role in increasing the volume of documents dealing with the banners (and other topics). On the origins of the palace memorial system, see Mark C. Elliott, “The Manchu-Language Archives of the Qing Dynasty and the Origins of the Palace Memorial System,” *Late Imperial China* 22.1 (June 2001): 1-70.
held by Hanjun in the early Qing. According to Pamela Crossley, during the rise of the Qing state, Han banner people had been included in the banners as near-equals to Manchus and Mongols. This was because the early Qing court viewed the banners as a sort of universal elite mediating between the court and the empire’s broader population.⁶ Mark Elliott, in contrast, argues that the Hanjun had never really been equal, referring to them as “poor relations” from their first appearance on. He does suggest, however, that for a few decades after the conquest, their position was greatly improved because of their natural role as intermediaries in the conquest, both more trusted than Han literati bureaucrats who had served the Ming state, and more capable of using Chinese than the Manchu elite.⁷ Both Elliott and Crossley agree, however, that by the late seventeenth century, the position of the Hanjun was already in steep decline, pointing to repeated lowering of Hanjun quotas for appointment and the reputation they acquired as lazy and inferior in martial skills.⁸

Elliott and Crossley are both right that the Hanjun were subject to discrimination relative to Manchus and Mongols, and that their position likely declined relative to those two groups over the course of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. However, this chapter will show that it is a mistake to view the discrimination against them within the context of the banner system as a step on the path to excluding many of them from the banners entirely. Rather, Hanjun were firmly included in the banner status group, even during the 1720s and 1730s. This chapter argues that Hanjun identity must be understood as the intersection of Han ethnic identity and banner status identity, and that discrimination against Hanjun on the basis of their ethnicity

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⁷ Elliott, *The Manchu Way*, pp. 77-78.

was compatible with continuing to guarantee the privileges associated with banner status. Though disadvantaged relative to other banner people, their participation in the duties, expectations, and rewards of banner status was never challenged prior to the beginning of expulsion. Rather, the court made active efforts to continue to secure that participation, even as rapid population growth made supporting the Hanjun population increasingly difficult over the course of the period.

This chapter begins by looking at cases of people joining the Hanjun banners in the years immediately after the Qing conquest of China, arguing that the willingness of the Qing state to allow Han commoners to join the banners via tenuous connections with Hanjun banner people reflects the role that the banners played as a means of inculcating loyalty. The chapter proceeds to show that the “Manchu Way” – the complex of skills expected of banner people – though closely related to ideas about Manchu ethnicity, was the basis of status performance for all banner people, and imposed mostly uniform expectations on them, regardless of ethnicity. The same section shows that the right to banner status, even in the early eighteenth century, was tied to a family history of hereditary service, and that it was this discourse of service, not one of ethnicity, that played the crucial role in adjudicating claims to banner membership. From there, the chapter moves on to discuss the role of ethnicity in the banners, first confirming the well-attested patterns of internal ethnic discrimination in favor of Manchus and Mongols and against Hanjun, but then demonstrating that this same ethnic hierarchy was apparent outside the political realm, in banner society. I argue that marriage records reveal that while ordinary Manchu and Mongol banner people were close to equal in social position, Hanjun fell far enough below them that it was almost unheard of for a Manchu or Mongol woman to marry a Hanjun man. This was not simply a case of ethnic segregation, however, as Hanjun women married Manchu and
Mongol men quite frequently. In its final section, this chapter considers the use of Hanjun men as soldiers in the Green Standard Army. The Green Standards were separate from the banner system; their soldiers were commoners rather than banner people, and though there were certainly families who served in them for generations, they were not a legally hereditary system, nor connected to any sort of inherited status. This brief study of Hanjun service in the Green Standard army illustrates some of this chapter’s core arguments, both demonstrating the role that ethnicity played within the banner system in determining which banner people received what opportunities, and revealing the efforts that the Qing state made to ensure that the entire Hanjun population could be supported by the state and to keep Hanjun within the banner system.

**Banner Status and Descent Following the Qing Conquest**

In the years immediately following the Qing conquest of China in 1644, some Han commoners believed that they would be better off as banner people. The Qing court was thus faced with a number of claims from Han who lacked banner status that they should be enrolled in the banners. The logic used by these claimants, and accepted by the court, suggests both that the early Qing state still sought to expand the banner population and that Hanjun status was already seen as a hereditary category. The court implicitly assumed the right of family members of banner people to hold the same status as their relatives, treating the banners as a space for the creation of a cohesive and loyal military elite.

A few examples will help illustrate the court’s approach. In 1653, Gadahūn 噶達洪, the president of the Board of Revenue (Ma. *boigon i jurgan i aliha amban*, Ch. 戶部尚書 *hubu*...
reported a petition from a man named Li Guangzu 李光祖.\(^9\) Li was originally from the Liaodong (the eastern part of present-day Liaoning province) town of Tieling 鐵嶺, captured by Nurhaci from the Ming in 1619.\(^10\) He had fled the city at the time of the battle, and accompanied his father-in-law to Lu’an 潞安 prefecture, in the province of Shanxi. Li’s father’s younger brother had just been enrolled in the Plain Yellow banner, joining up with a more distant male relative named Li Sizhong 李思忠. Now Li Guangzu sought to be enrolled in the banners himself, along with all his dependents, with Li Sizhong’s banner status serving as the basis for his claim. Li Sizhong was not an ordinary Hanjun bannerman. He had been captured in Nurhaci’s 1618 assault on Fushun, though his father, uncle, and brothers had escaped to Tieling, where they died in the attack of the following year.\(^11\) Beginning in 1621, Li Sizhong had served as an officer in the Manchu army, where his performance led to repeated promotions, the receipt of a fox fur robe from emperor Hong Taiji, and the eventual bestowal of the hereditary noble rank of baron (Ch. 男爵 nan jue, Ma. ashan i hafan). His son, Li Yinzu 李蔭祖 also had a successful career, and was serving as vice-president of the Censorate (Ch. 副都御史 fu du yushi) at the time of Li Guangzu’s appeal, for which he acted as guarantor (Ma. akdulara niyalma).\(^12\)

The Board of Revenue’s investigation of Li Guangzu’s request consisted of an inquiry to a banner officer named Yang Shangju 楊尚舉, who confirmed Li Guangzu’s hereditary connection

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\(^9\) Note that though “Board of Revenue” is the standard English translation of the office in question, its literal meaning in both Chinese and Manchu is closer to “Board of Households” and it was indeed responsible for managing household registration and status categories, which both had longstanding ties to the taxation system.


\(^11\) One presumes that all of these men were members of the prominent Li clan of Tieling, mentioned in Kenneth M. Swope, *The Military Collapse of China’s Ming Dynasty, 1618-44* (London: Routledge, 2014), p. 24.

\(^12\) The biographies of Li Sizhong and Li Yinzu are found in QSG, *juan* 231.
to Li Sizhong — the former was the son of the latter’s first cousin. Li Guangzu thereupon received approval to be registered in the banners, along with 11 other adult men, 12 adult women, and 4 boys, who presumably comprised his household.  

Later that same year, a memorial from Ceke 車克, the new president of the Board of Revenue, described a similar situation. Li Ruilong 李瑞龍, a native of Jinzhou 錦州 in Liaodong, claimed that in 1627 he had gone south of the Great Wall with his father to engage in trade. According to Li, they heard about the coming of the Manchu army, which unsuccessfully laid siege to Jinzhou in the fifth month of that year, and so decided not to return to Liaodong. Instead, they took up residence in Xiayi 夏邑 County, Henan. Now, he had learned that his cousin, Liu Wenjin 劉文進, was a captain (Ma. nirui janggin, Ch. 佐領 zuoling) in the Plain Yellow Banner, and asked that he be permitted to join Liu’s company (Ma. niru, Ch. 佐領 zuoling). His three guarantors, who included Liu Wenjin, verified their relationship — one of their fathers was the brother of the other’s mother — and Li Ruilong’s family of six was registered in Liu Wenjin’s company.

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13 Gadahūn, HKTB, FHA 02-01-02-2129-010, SZ 10.2.20 (March 19, 1653).

14 On the unsuccessful siege of Jinzhou, see Swope, The Military Collapse of China’s Ming Dynasty, pp. 67-68.

15 The Chinese term for banner companies was the same as that used for their captains, though in the early Qing, the term 牛錄 niulu, a transliteration of the Manchu niru, was generally used, rather than the later standard 佐領 zuoling.

16 The relationship terms used are somewhat imprecise. Li refers to Liu with the Manchu term mini gu i jui ahūn — literally meaning something like “the elder (than me) son of my father’s sister.” But the memorial later refers to Li as the gu i jui ahūn of Liu. In the latter case, the Chinese version of the memorial (which seems likely to be the translation of the Manchu original) gives 姑舅哥哥 gujü gege (elder male cousin, where the parents of each are brother and sister) for the Manchu gu i jui ahūn. So it is not clear which man was older nor whether Li’s father was the brother of Liu’s mother or Li’s mother was the sister of Liu’s father. In either case, though, they were not members of the same patriarchal lineage (as confirmed by their different surnames). The case described here is found in Ceke, HKTB, FHA 02-01-02-2129-016, SZ 10.5.27 (June 22, 1653).
Cases like those of the two Li men suggest that the Qing court saw expanding the banners and incorporating family members of existing banner people as a means of consolidating its authority. Neither man seeking banner enrollment had a claim to it on the basis of his own service to the dynasty – indeed both had fled Qing advances. Nor were their descent-based claims particularly compelling; neither man was the patrilineal descendant of a participant in the conquest; rather, both relied on the service of collateral relatives as justification for their own banner enrollment. In Li Ruilong’s case, his relative in the banners was not even of the same patriline, but a cousin through the female line. So if neither man had earned banner status himself, and neither had inherited it, at least according to conventional rules of inheritance, why let them in? The Qing state must have seen it as advantageous to incorporate the men and their families – in Li Guangzu’s case, quite a large family – into the banner system, suggesting that having a larger banner force was still considered advantageous. Yet, the familial connections that these men had to the banners were treated as important enough that they had to be verified before registering the two applicants as banner people.

One possible explanation for this is that banner status, in addition to being a reward for loyal service, was itself a means of inculcating and guaranteeing loyalty. By bringing the extended families of men who were already enrolled as Hanjun into the banners, the Qing court was helping to define the banners as a group apart from the commoner population. Combined with official disapproval of intermarriage between banner people and commoners, the incorporation into the banners of agnates and cognates of banner people would ensure the full commitment of Hanjun to the banner system, and through the banners, to the court itself.\footnote{Though agnatic relations were certainly of much greater ritual (and likely practical) importance than cognatic ones in late imperial China, families often maintained close ties to relations through the female line, and relied on them for support. See, e.g. Susan Mann, \textit{The Talented Women of the Zhang Family} (Berkeley: University of California}
Though the Hanjun would certainly play an important role as intermediaries between the Manchu court and the overwhelmingly Han population of the empire, they were to be kept distinct from their fellow Han, socially as well as legally.\textsuperscript{18} Though only a few instances of Han being incorporated into the banners in the Shunzhi period appear in the archives, population records suggest that the practice may have been widespread. For instance, over the three years from 1651 to 1654, a time when both the Manchu and Mongol banner populations underwent slight decreases, the number of military-age males in the Hanjun population increased by 2,702, or 3.7 percent.\textsuperscript{19} The contrast between a rising Hanjun population and a static or falling Manchu and Mongol banner population suggests that Hanjun growth was not simply due to natural population increase, but rather reflects the incorporation of Han commoners into the Hanjun population.

\textbf{The \textquotedblleft Banner Way\textquotedblright} \\

It is well known that the Qing court sought to inculcate its version of Manchu identity in Manchus via the banner system. The most important English language work on the banner system, Mark Elliott’s \textit{The Manchu Way}, takes its title from the set of “what were held to be venerable [Manchu] customs and practices” that the court considered necessary for Manchus. Elliott argues that the Qing rulers saw the “Manchu way” (Ma. \textit{Manjusai doro}), which included

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Press, 2007). This may help explain why Li Ruilong was enrolled in the banners with no more difficulty than Li Guangzu.
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\textsuperscript{18} Sun Jing, among others, advances the idea that Hanjun were heavily used in administrative posts in the early Qing due to a need for loyal officials who were fluent in Chinese: See Sun Jing 孙静, “A Discussion of the Change in Status of the Eight Banner Hanjun during the Qianlong Period” 乾隆朝八旗汉军身份变化述论, \textit{Heilongjiang minzu congkan} 2005.2: 59–64.
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\textsuperscript{19} The number of bondservants and banner slaves, who were also overwhelmingly Han, increased similarly rapidly, by about 4 percent. The Manchu population decreased negligibly, by about 0.3 percent, while the Mongol population fell 3.1 percent. See Bahana 巴哈納, MWHKTB, FHA 02-02-006-000400-0027, SZ 11.10.21 (November 29, 1654).
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archery, horsemanship, the ability to speak and write the Manchu language, and frugality, as a means of maintaining Manchu ethnic sovereignty, group cohesion and separateness from the Han population. However, the precepts of the Manchu way did not apply solely to Manchus. Rather, all bannermen, regardless of their ethnic origins, were held to the same standard of performance. Though the elements that made up the Manchu way were certainly derived from the court’s conception of “traditional” Manchu culture, they were not used as a way to divide Manchus from Han, but rather as one that divided banner people from commoners.

The expectation that Hanjun be proficient in the skills associated with the Manchu way appears repeatedly in evaluations of Hanjun. Recommendations for the promotion of Hanjun officers, like one for a Plain White banner colonel in Fuzhou named Shi Ruxi 石如錫, frequently mentioned their skills in “horsemanship and archery” (Ch. 弓馬 gong ma). Similarly, imperial instructions to banner commanders emphasized the need to ensure that their Hanjun soldiers be proficient in all aspects of the Manchu Way. In 1745, for instance, the Qianlong emperor issued parting instructions to new Guangzhou garrison general Sitku 錫特庫 before sending him to take up his post:

The eight banner Hanjun garrisoned in Guangzhou are also banner people. The spoken Manchu of those among them who come to the capital to be received at court is entirely deficient. After you have taken up your post, make special efforts to instruct them. I have also heard that the skills in archery and horsemanship of soldiers in the provinces have degenerated into rustiness. During your term as general, when you don’t have much to do, you should focus entirely on training the officers and men.

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21 Yi Zhaoxiong 宜兆熊, HWZPZZ, FHA 04-01-30-0156-033, YZ 5 (1727). The author of this memorial, Shi’s recommender, was himself a Hanjun.

22 駐廣八旗漢軍亦係旗人。其來京引見人員清話不堪。爾到任後加意教訓。再聞得外省兵丁弓馬技藝墮落生疏。爾將軍任內所辦事少，惟訓練官兵一事。Sitku, HWZPZZ, FHA 04-01-18-0005-029, QL 10.10.1 (October 25, 1745).
After his arrival in Guangzhou, Sitku denied that his men were deficient in martial skills, pointing to their ability to pull bows of appropriate strength, and argued that their Manchu problems were due mainly to the influence of the local accent, and were easily correctible. But the emperor’s concern about this issue, and his reference to the fact that the people in question “[were] also banner people” (Ch. 亦係旗人 yi xi qiren), clearly suggests that the skills under discussion were clearly associated with banner status, even for Hanjun.

Maintaining one’s martial skills was also a prerequisite for banner people to advance in their careers, even outside the context of the banners. This too applied to Hanjun, who in this context were treated like Manchus and Mongols if they sought to take the imperial civil service examinations. In 1746, Sitku worried that the martial skills of provincial bannermen who took the exams had become limited on account of their excessive studying, and emphasized the importance of requiring prospective exam candidates form the banners to demonstrate their ability in mounted archery before being allowed to enter the exam hall. As commander of a Hanjun-only garrison, his concerns clearly applied the standards of the Manchu way even to Han bannermen. That martial skills were not required of commoner candidates in the civil examinations makes clear that the purpose of such a regulation was maintaining a standard that all bannermen had to meet. One could not be a good bannerman, Manchu or Han without them.

For this reason, too, the annual garrison-wide drills held at the all-Hanjun Fuzhou garrison required that the garrison general and lieutenant generals personally review the standing and mounted archery skills of the entire garrison. Though some banner soldiers in Fuzhou were in companies that specialized in firearms rather than archery, they were still required to spend substantial portions of their training time on archery, a skill that mattered to their identity as

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23 Sitku, HWZPZZ, FHA 04-01-01-0133-039, QL 11.5.28 (July 16, 1746).
banner people, not just their military function. Fuzhou’s rules were not unique – Hanjun, as well as Manchus and Mongols, at other garrisons were subject to very similar requirements.

Possession of martial skills associated with the Manchu way could even help justify claims to banner status. In 1732, a group of men at the Hangzhou garrison argued that they should be treated like regular Hanjun bannermen on the basis of the service of some of their ancestors. In supporting their case, Hangzhou garrison general Arigūn 阿里衮 noted that many of them were skilled at standing and mounted archery. The case reported by Arigūn pointed to another aspect of banner status shared by all banner people, though not usually discussed as part of the “Manchu way.” This was the idea that banner people were defined through their service, and particularly their military service, to the dynasty. This was in part a matter of the regulations surrounding the livelihoods of those people who possessed banner status. That is, bannermen were generally forbidden to engage in occupations other than official service, either bureaucratic or military. But as the case of these Hangzhou banner people shows, it also served as a justification for one’s place in the banners. The people in question were listed in the official registers under categories used for freed banner slaves, who were considered to have only a partial right to banner status and were forbidden access to many official posts. A group of eight of them, writing on behalf of more than 290 households, claimed that this was not appropriate to their history and situation:

25 Arigūn, MHHBLFZZ, FHA 03-0170-0049-004, YZ 10.9.7 (October 25, 1732).
26 For more on this sort of “secondary status” banner people, see chapter 2.
Our ancestors were originally all commoners from Mukden. In the Tianming period [the reign of Nurhaci], they became aware of the rise in fortune of our dynasty [the Qing], and accompanying the people of twenty-nine surnames, including Tong, Shi, and Li, they came to surrender to our dynasty. They were divided among the companies of the people of the Tong, Shi, and Li clans, and after many years had passed, they made all of us people who had accompanied them in coming over [to the Qing] into their subordinates. If we truly are their slaves, how is it that our ancestors were not left behind in their ancestral villages to serve? How is it that in the fifth year of the Shunzhi period [1648] we were garrisoned in Hangzhou? We are clearly their subordinates, and are absolutely not their slaves. From the Tianming period on, our ancestors risked their lives in military service, expending their strength to the point of sacrificing their bodies.

The petition from the men went on to list no less than 58 battles and campaigns, ranging from the pre-conquest era to the rebellion of the Three Feudatories, in which their ancestors had fought, and noted that 34 of them had received official commendation for their service, while 45 more had died in battle. Arigün, in relaying their petition, accepted their logic, suggesting that this long history of family military service meant that they should not be compared to normal banner household slaves. The court accepted this argument, and allowed those for whom evidence of their ancestors’ service could be found to be treated like regular banner people.

Three years later, just weeks after the death of the Yongzheng emperor, this policy was modified by the Grand Council, requiring that the people included in the original petition be selected for promotion to posts as officers only when no qualified men who had always been listed as regular

27 Probably this is meant to refer to Qing-era Fengtian or Ming-era Liaodong more generally, not just to the city of Mukden (Ch. Shenyang), which was the Manchu capital prior to Beijing and served as a secondary capital in the Qing period.

28 The decision to this effect is quoted in Fusen, MWZPZZ, NPM 412000553, YZ 13.8.27 (October 12, 1735).
bannermen were available.\textsuperscript{30} Yet, their position was still improved relative to before, when they had lacked any right to promotion.

Despite the court’s modification of its policy, the importance of the discourse of service in adjudicating the rights of banner people remained unquestioned, as the court continued to recognize both martial skills and history of service as justifying the partial elevation in status that it still permitted. Service, then, was not just a requirement of banner status, but a qualifier for it. A history of the right sort of military service, particularly meaning service in the Qing conquest – the acceptance of this claim emphasized that the families of the people in question had served since the “foundation” (Ma. \textit{fukjin}) – could help make a Han person into a regular bannerman.\textsuperscript{31}

This was not just an idea accepted by the banner bureaucracy, but one that ordinary banner people believed in, as suggested by the fact that these banner people in Hangzhou made it such a central part of their petition. Indeed, service to the dynasty, perhaps more than those elements defined by the court as part of the Manchu way, would remain fundamental to banner people’s understanding of their identity even beyond the end of the Qing.\textsuperscript{32}

In addition to Manchu-designated martial skills, in which all bannermen were regularly trained and examined, all bannermen, once again including Hanjun, were expected to be able to be proficient in the Manchu language. The existence of this expectation appears in the archives mostly in the context of the failure of most Hanjun to live up to it. The Qianlong emperor’s edict to Sitku, discussed above, was just one instance of a common pattern. To deal with this problem,

\textsuperscript{30} Yunlu 允祿, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0175-1541-015, YZ 13.9.14 (October 29, 1735).

\textsuperscript{31} Service in wars on frontier expansion in the northwest sometimes had similar effect – see the case of the “Household Selected Soldiers” in chapter 2 of this dissertation.

\textsuperscript{32} David C. Porter, “Manchu Racial Identity on the Qing Frontier: Donjina and Early Twentieth-Century Ili,” \textit{Modern China} 44.1 (January 2018): 3-34 describes a Daur bannerman writing after the Republican revolution, who argued for a conception of Manchu racial identity tied to Manchu service to the Qing dynasty.
the Qing state established special schools in both the Hanjun banners in Beijing and provincial garrisons with Hanjun populations, designed to teach Manchu to young men.\textsuperscript{33} Not only were ordinary Hanjun usually deficient in Manchu, but even officers struggled, leading the Yongzheng emperor in 1733 to prohibit promotions for Hanjun officers who lacked the ability to converse in Manchu, and the creation of a scheme to test and grade Hanjun officers according to their Manchu ability on a yearly basis.\textsuperscript{34} But despite the extent to which Hanjun struggled with the language, the preoccupation of the court with ensuring their proficiency is clear evidence that Manchu knowledge was expected of all bannermen, on the basis of status, not Manchus alone on the basis of their ethnicity.

That said, language was not the only realm in which Manchus were perceived to be better at upholding the expectations of banner status than were Hanjun. Indeed, when Hanjun displayed martial prowess beyond that of Manchus, it was likely to be viewed as an anomaly. In 1735, for instance, the Yongzheng emperor simultaneously examined a group of candidates for promotion from Jingzhou, a Manchu garrison, and Fuzhou, a Hanjun garrison. The emperor declared:

\begin{quote}

The people recommended by Jingzhou General Gun-tai used bows of very little force. Gun-tai previously was a man who could pull the strongest bow, but he only taught the soldiers the form of drawing the bow, and did not diligently teach them to draw bows of greater force, or to exercise to become strong. The men recommended by Fuzhou General Zhun-tai seem to all use bows of acceptable force. When their bows were given to the Jingzhou men to draw, they could not pull them apart. This is a contrary case of Manchus being inferior to Hanjun; what sense does this make?!\textsuperscript{35}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{33} These schools are the focus of chapter 5 of this dissertation.

\textsuperscript{34} Zhu Lantai, HWZPZZ, NPM 402020296, YZ 11.5.10 (June 21, 1733).

\textsuperscript{35} 荊州將軍袞泰保送之人弓力甚軟。袞泰原係十五善射之人, 惟教兵丁拉弓樣式, 並未用心教以加增弓力, 習以強壯。福州將軍準泰保送之人看來弓力俱好。將伊等之弓令荊州人拉竟不能開, 是滿洲反不及漢軍, 此何道理。Sinju, \textit{Fuzhou Garrison Gazetteer}, 21.
The success of the men from Fuzhou was not treated as a great accomplishment on their part; rather, the Yongzheng emperor saw their superiority to the Manchus from Jingzhou as a sign of Jingzhou general Gun-tai’s laziness and incompetence and ordered that he receive administrative punishment. The idea here was not that Hanjun were seen as incapable of meeting the standards for banner people set out by the court, or even that they were only capable of meeting them in rare cases or with great difficulty; if they had been, it would have been pointless for the court to set such requirements. Rather, because those standards were based on skills thought to be associated with Manchu identity, Manchus were expected to be better at them. Though the standards of performance were tied to status, there was still a powerful sense that the skills themselves had a close connection to ethnicity.

Given this discrepancy between the origins of the Manchu way, which lay in supposed Manchu ethnic traditions, and the applicability of it, which extended to all banner people, one might well wonder how Qing officials talked about the idea of the Manchu way in relation to Hanjun. There is no single answer, and for the most part, as with Manchus, the “Manchu way” was often no more than an implicit set of assumptions that lay behind rules mandating performance of some part of it, or edicts excoriating bannermen for failing at it, and the term “Manchu way” simply went unmentioned. When the idea was explicitly discussed, though, it appeared in two different ways. The first possibility was to talk about the responsibility of Hanjun to stick to the “Manchu” way. In 1735, for instance, Plain Red banner Hanjun general Baši 八十, worrying about the failure of Hanjun officials to use Manchu in their memorials, claimed that the emperor had repeatedly expressed the belief that “Hanjun banner people should
study and imitate the Manchu way.”

Baši’s memorial can be read to imply that the Manchu way was something somewhat foreign to the Hanjun—a property of the Manchus that they should imitate. But other documents use the term in ways that suggest that the “Manchu” way was integral to Hanjun as well. In a 1738 discussion of the decline of Manchu ability in the Fengtian banners, Mukden lieutenant general Jekune wrote that “because the Manchu language, archery, and mounted archery are extremely important customs of the Manchus [...] in regards to teaching Manchu, for the Manchu and Mongol banners, let there be a one year deadline, and as for the Hanjun, let there be a three year deadline.”

Though the extended deadline for Hanjun implied that Jekune thought that meeting the standard he set would be harder for Hanjun than for Manchus and Mongols, “Manchu customs” (Ma. Manju i tacin) were presented as something that belonged to all three banner groups, not a standard external to the Hanjun. Making absolutely no distinction among the different banner ethnicities, Hanjun Plain Red banner lieutenant general Sao-da-se wrote in a 1723 memorial about eliminating misbehavior in the banners that regular tours of inspection of the Manchu, Mongol, and Hanjun banners by officers would cause all banner people to “abide by the Manchu way.”

Sao-da-se’s memorial is part of another sort of official discourse about the Manchu way as it related to Hanjun: to refer to it as connected to the banners as a whole, not just to Manchus, de-emphasizing its ethnic origins or even ignoring them entirely. One particularly common usage of this sort came in discussion of the Manchu language and translation. Numerous memorials

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36 Ujen Coohai gūsai urse be. Manjusai doro be tacikini. alhūdakini Baši, MWZPZZ, NPM 412000039, YZ 13.11.14 (December 27, 1735).

37 Manju gisun gābtara niyamniyarangge Manju i umesi oyonggo tacin be dāhame [...] Manju Monggo gūsade emu aniya bilagan bilaki. Ujen Cooha be dāhame. ilan aniya bilagan bilaki. Jekune, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0171-0300-004.1, QL 3.6.12 (July 28, 1738).

38 Sao-da-se, MWZPZZ, YZ 1.9.27 (October 25, 1723), YZCMWZPZZ 710, p.388.
from the first half of the eighteenth century declared that “the Manchu language is the root of the
banner people” (Ch. 清話為旗人之根本 Qinghua wei qiren zhi genben), that for Hanjun not to
know Manchu was to “obscure their root” (Ch. 昧根本 mei genben), or that translation work was
“an essential duty of banner people” (Ch. 旗人之要務 qiren zhi yaowu). These phrases were
clearly connected to the idea that “at root the Hanjun are originally of the banners” (Ch. 漢軍根
本原是旗下 Hanjun genben yuan shi qixia).39 Formulae of this sort suggested that the Manchu
language, the Hanjun as a group, and the banners as a hereditary category made up a set of
necessarily and inherently linked concepts, with no explicit reference to Manchu culture
necessary. On at least one instance this idea was made more explicit. In a memorial justifying a
plan to use some of the Hanjun soldiers under his command in local Green Standard garrisons,
Hangzhou general Arigūn wrote that his proposal contained safeguards that would ensure that
the men in question would continue their banner military training and instruction in Manchu.
Thus, he argued, they would “not come to abandon the principles and ways of the banners.”40
Gūsai doro, the first two words of the Manchu phrase that he used, could be directly translated as
“banner way,” a direct parallel to the phrase Manjusai doro – “Manchu way.” Arigūn thus was
using a phrase that seemingly had identical content to the idea of the “Manchu way,” referring to
the same set of skills, but defined that content in terms of banner status, rather than Manchu
ethnicity. This, in conjunction with discussions of the “Manchu way” that ignored its relationship
to Manchu ethnicity, suggests that the “banner way” was fundamental to Hanjun in their capacity

39 See, e.g. Šuhede 舒和德, HWZPZZ, FHA 04-01-38-0058-027, QL 1.3.27 (May 7, 1736); Arsai 阿爾賽,
HWZPZZ, FHA 04-01-38-0180-036, QL 2.8.2 (August 27, 1737); Arsai, HWZPZZ, FHA 04-01-12-0013-015, QL
4.1.15 (February 22, 1739); Sinju, HWZPZZ, FHA 04-01-12-0077-038, QL 15.10.11 (November 9, 1750).

40 gūsai doro ciktan be inu waliyabure de isinarakā omi. Arigūn, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0171-0167-004, YZ 11.5.10
(June 21, 1733). On the use of Hanjun in Green Standard units, including more discussion of the Hangzhou
proposal, see the following section.
as bannermen; they were not simply expected to imitate a “Manchu way” that did not really belong to them.

This interpretation of the Manchu/banner way is one that still holds for the Hanjun when the idea of a “banner way” was not explicitly invoked, or even when they were discussed in terms of their relationship to the “Manchu way.” Though the putative origins of this set of skills and practices lay in the Manchu past, their role in the early eighteenth-century present was to bind all banner people to each other, and divide them from the commoner population. Indeed, in 1738 general Wang Yi 王鈺 could write with no sense of contradiction that the reason the Jingkou garrison, which consisted entirely of Hanjun, needed renewed attention to Manchu language instruction was that “garrison eight banner people, dwelling close together with Han people, could not escape being infected by their local accent and coming to regard the Manchu language as superficial.”

Based on the actual social role it played, it is reasonable to say that prior to the era of Hanjun expulsion, discussed in chapters 2 and 3, the “Manchu way” might better characterized, following Arigūn’s usage, as the “banner way.”

As a point of comparison, it is perhaps worth looking at the notion of a “Mongol way,” which Qing officialdom did use on occasion in reference to the Mongol Eight Banners. Elliott describes it as a “parallel” to the Manchu way, though noting the relative infrequency of its appearance in Qing discourse. Pamela Crossley, though not using the phrase, makes reference both to the role of the early Qing state in creating a version of Mongol identity in the pre-conquest period, and to the court’s ideas about proper Mongol ethnic performance in the

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41 驻防八旗人等，與漢人櫛比而居，未免漸染方音而於清話轉視為泛常。Wang Yi, HWZPZZ, FHA 04-01-01-0025-021, QL 3.2.4 (March 23, 1738).

eighteenth century, in particular its use of the Manchu verb *Monggorombi*, which she glosses as to “act in a Mongol fashion.” Yet, at least in the early eighteenth century, the distinction between expectations for Mongols and Manchus (and Hanjun) in the banners appears to have been more limited than the existence of a genuinely separate “Mongol way” would imply. As we have seen above, generic discussions of the “Manchu way” often were meant to apply to Eight Banner Mongols and Hanjun as well. The only times that a “Mongol way” was discussed separately was in reference to Mongolian language ability alone. This is in keeping with the major contribution that Mongol bannermen specifically made to the Qing state – work as clerks and translators in the Court of Colonial Affairs (Ch. 理藩院 lifan yuan, Ma. *tulergi golo be dasara jurgan*). That is to say, the “Mongol way,” in practice, seems not to have meant a wholly different set of cultural expectations for Mongols in the banners from that for Manchus, but simply referred to the court’s requirement that they maintain proficiency in the Mongolian language, in addition to meeting the general expectations of the “Manchu” or “banner” way.

In the years immediately preceding the start of formal Hanjun expulsion, there is evidence for a type of official discourse that held that the differences between Manchus and Hanjun did mean that the latter were incapable of fully participating in the Manchu way. Most notably, in 1751 new garrison general Sarhadai 薩爾哈岱 wrote of his Jingkou garrison that

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43 Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror*, pp. 208-214; 299. In my own work, I have found that verbs often treated in dictionaries as referring to ethnic performance – *Manjurambi* (“to Manchu”) and *Nikarambi* (“to Chinese”), as well as *Monggorombi*, are almost always used to refer to use of the language in question, not to a Qing understanding of ethnic performativity. There are exceptions, however. Han and Mongol land use, for instance, were differentiated by referring to the former as “cultivating fields in a Han manner” (Ma. *Nikarame usin tari[nge]*), using the Manchu verb *Nikarambi*. See David A. Bello, *Across Forest, Steppe, and Mountain: Environment, Identity, and Empire in Qing China’s Borderlands* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), p. 150.

44 See, for instance, Cirsa 奇爾薩, MWZPZZ, YZ 1.8.10 (September 9, 1723), YZCMWZPZZ 514, p.276; Bootai 保泰, MWZPZZ, YZ 1.9.23 (October 21, 1723), YZCMWZPZZ 690, p. 373; YZBQSY, *juan* 1, p. 22, YZ 1.7.28 (August 28, 1723).
upon his arrival, they were poorly versed in archery, horsemanship, and musketry. He suggested that the problem lay in the fact that “though Hanjun and Manchus really belong to different categories, their training was originally supposed to be uniform.” Sarhadai emphasized that he would indeed stick to the same sort of training used for Manchu troops, suggesting that he did still recognize that the standards of the Manchu way were meant to apply to Hanjun too, but his insistence on the basic difference between Manchus and Hanjun reflected ideas that had perhaps been gaining currency in the years since 1742, when an imperial edict permitting Hanjun to voluntarily give up their banner status had declared that Hanjun were, at root, Han, and thus different from other banner people. This new conception of a Manchu way less accessible, or perhaps even inaccessible, to Hanjun would prove part of a reshaping of the meaning of banner status during the middle part of the Qianlong reign.

**Ethnicity in the Banners**

This chapter has so far argued that, prior to the middle of the eighteenth century, the banners formed a single well-defined status group, one that included the Hanjun. Banner membership was based on hereditary service and offered hereditary privilege, and during this period Hanjun were not treated as less deserving of banner status. This challenge to the idea that the banners were based around specifically Manchu privilege, designed to maintain Manchu ethnic solidarity and political power, raises the question of whether ethnicity was even an important category for banner people in the first century of Qing rule. Indeed, Pamela Crossley has argued that Hanjun identity was not part of an “undifferentiated ‘Chinese’ identity” and has

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45 惟是漢軍與滿洲究屬不同，而操練原應一體。Sarhadai, HWZPZZ, FHA 04-01-16-0035-055, QL 16.5R.19 (July 11, 1751).

46 GZSL, *juan* 164, QL 7.4.13 (May 17, 1742). This edict is discussed in substantially more depth in chapter 2.
suggested that in the earlier part of the Qing, in particular prior to the expulsion of many Hanjun from the banners, Hanjun identity was a distinct cultural form. Crossley is right to recognize that Hanjun identity was substantively distinct from ordinary Han commoner identity, as well as to reject a discourse of the Hanjun that treats them as either a Manchu-Chinese hybrid, or simply an intermediate group. However, there are clear signs that Hanjun were understood to be meaningfully Han by Qing officials even prior to the mid-Qianlong period. Rather than positing “Hanjun” as a totally sui generis category, they are better understood as a group defined intersectionally. That is to say, as a group, the Hanjun did not simply fall along a single Manchu-Chinese axis. Rather, they were the result of the overlap, or intersection, between two axes of identity: to be Hanjun was to be both ethnically Han and of banner status. This intersection produced the unique cultural identity that Crossley recognized, but its uniqueness does not exclude ethnicity from having played a discursive role in defining that identity.

The extent to which Han ethnicity mattered to the construction of Hanjun identity is clear from the ways in which the Qing court treated Hanjun relative to other banner people. One example of this is the expectation, discussed earlier, that Manchu bannermen would naturally be better than Hanjun in performance of the elements of banner status, from speaking Manchu to pulling a bow. But the role of ethnicity in the pre-expulsion banners went far beyond cultural stereotyping of this sort. Hanjun were systematically disadvantaged relative to Manchus in terms

\[47\] Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror*, pp. 44-50. Crossley’s argument is a response to Jonathan Spence, who describes the bondservant official Cao Yin (who was not Hanjun, but part of another category of people that was both of the banners and ethnically Han) as living a life that was a “synthesis” of Han and Manchu. See Jonathan D. Spence, *Ts’ao Yin and the K’ang-hsi Emperor: Bondservant and Master* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 53.

of access to employment, they were treated as an inferior group in their direct interactions with the emperor, and the boundaries between themselves and ordinary Han were not policed as strictly as were those between Manchus and Han commoners.

The existence of an ethnic hierarchy in banner employment has been clearly demonstrated in past scholarly work on the Hanjun. The first important modern scholarly article on the Hanjun, published by Ura Ren’ichi in 1931, argued that Hanjun suffered “discriminatory treatment” in relation to Manchus and Mongols. He pointed in particular to the exclusion of the Hanjun from elite units of imperial guards and the vastly greater number of official posts reserved for Manchus as compared to those reserved for Hanjun. The 1690 Huidian (Ch. 會典, Ma. uheri kooli bithe), the Qing administrative code, provides ample evidence for Ura’s argument. For some posts in the Qing government, Manchus and Mongols were grouped together and assigned a joint quota, as were Hanjun and Han commoners. One example of this is the post of sub-chancellor of the Grand Secretariat (Ch. 內閣學士 neige xueshi, Ma. ashan i da), where Manchus and Mongols were granted six posts collectively, while Hanjun and Han commoners were together granted only four posts. The empire’s population of Hanjun and Han commoners combined to be far greater than that of Manchu and Mongol bannermen, and, even worse for the Hanjun, they themselves were so outnumbered by Han commoners that, all else being equal, they were extremely unlikely to occupy even one of the posts in the combined

49 Ura Ren’ichi 浦廉一, “Regarding the Hanjun (Ujen Cooha)” 漢軍（烏真超哈）に就いて, in Essay Collection on Oriental History in Honor of the Sixtieth Birthday of Dr. Kuwabara 桑原博士還歴記念東洋史論叢 (Kyoto: Kōbundō Shōbō, 1931), pp. 836, 848.

50 Isangga 伊桑阿, et al., eds, Administrative Statutes of the Great Qing 大清會典 (Beijing: Imperial Household Department, 1690), juan 3, p. 2b.
quota. For other posts, separate quotas were maintained for Hanjun, but ones that put them at a substantial proportional disadvantage in relation to the quotas maintained for Manchu and Mongol bannermen. In the case of secretaries of the Grand Secretariat (Ch. 内閣中書 neige zhongshu, Ma. dorgi bithesi), for instance, Manchus held seventy-five posts, Mongols nineteen, Hanjun thirteen, and Han commoners thirty-six. Though all banner people, including Hanjun, were greatly overrepresented in this post when compared to Han commoners, the share of posts granted to Hanjun was disproportionately low when compared to the Manchu and Mongol quotas. The empire’s Hanjun population was approximately equal to that of Manchus and Mongols combined, yet their share of secretarial posts was only about 12 percent of the banner total. Manchus, who probably made up about 40 percent of the banner population, held 70 percent of the posts, and Mongols, at a bit over 10 percent of the banner population, held 17 percent of the posts. The consistent practice of underrepresenting Hanjun in government offices in comparison to Manchus combined with that of frequently lumping together Hanjun and Han commoners in official quotas serves as clear evidence for the hierarchy of ethnic preference in Qing administrative practice.

51 The possibility of affirmative action for Hanjun even within the bounds of quotas like this cannot be ruled out, but it was not something encoded in the Qing law. Moreover, in the case of many posts with combined Hanjun-Han commoner quotas, there had been a brief period when Hanjun had a separate quota from Han commoners – for the post of sub-chancellor in the Grand Secretariat, this had been true until 1673. The decision to instead include Hanjun in the Han commoner quota suggests that official policy after this point was not to reserve any spots for Hanjun. A search of the Ming-Qing Archives Name Authority File 明清檔案人名權威資料庫 (MQNAF) database of Academia Sinica for all people who held the post of sub-chancellor brings up only a handful of identifiable Hanjun out of 948 total holders of the office.

52 Isangga, Administrative Statutes of the Great Qing, juan 3, pp. 3a-3b.

53 Banner population numbers are approximate estimates based on the known figures for 1654 (see Bahana 巴哈納, MWHKTB, FHA 02-02-006-000400-0027, SZ 11.10.21 (November 29, 1654)) and 1720 (see An Shuangcheng 安双成, “A Simple Analysis of the Number of Military-Age Men in the Eight Banners during the Shunzhi, Kangxi, and Yongzheng Periods” 顺康雍三朝八旗丁额浅析, Lishi dang’an 1983.2 (July 1983): 100-103.)
Further, as Ura notes, Hanjun were excluded from some whole categories of posts. In addition to the imperial guards (Ch. 護軍 hujun, Ma. bayara), the vanguard division (Ch. 前鋒 qianfeng, Ma. gabsihiyan) also excluded Hanjun banner people. These positions were more prestigious and better-paying than most ordinary banner posts, and so exclusion from them both suggested the inferiority of the Hanjun and greatly reduced the number of positions available to Hanjun that carried salaries beyond those of an ordinary cavalry soldier.\textsuperscript{54} These exclusions were maintained despite the logistical inconveniences they sometimes caused, in particular that the lack of a mass of soldiers in higher-ranking positions meant that the pool of men who could be chosen for low-ranking officer positions was extremely limited, as one official complained in 1739.\textsuperscript{55} But perhaps the greatest obstacle to the opportunity for promotion of Hanjun soldiers came from the fact that, as Mark Elliott notes, Hanjun were divided into a far smaller number of companies than Manchus, and only slightly more than Mongols, despite making up around half the total banner population. This meant that there were far fewer officer posts available to them – since each company had a set number – and indeed, Elliott finds that in the early Yongzheng period, only 11 percent of banner officials in the Plain Yellow Banner came from among the Hanjun, as compared to the 77 percent who were Manchu.\textsuperscript{56}

In addition to this sort of administrative discrimination, Hanjun were subject to frequent imperial complaint and deprecation. In the mid-1680s, the Kangxi emperor complained that

\textsuperscript{54} Of the imperial guards, Brunnert and Hagelstrom note that “admission to this division is the special ambition of the great mass of the Bannermen of Peking, to whom it secures the advantages of substantial increase in pay and prospects of a promotion of one degree.” H.S. Brunnert, V.V. Hagelstrom, and N.Th. Kolessoff, \textit{Present Day Political Organization of China}, trans. A. Beltchenko and E.E. Moran (Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh, Limited, 1912), entry 734.

\textsuperscript{55} Yunghing 永興, HWLFZZ, FHA 03-0373-023, QL 4.6.7 (July 12, 1739).

\textsuperscript{56} Elliott, \textit{The Manchu Way}, 335.
“lately the Hanjun have come gradually to be more like the Green Standards, ordinary and weak.” This was no idle complaint, but rather coupled with a decision to permit high-ranking posts in the Hanjun banners to be filled by Manchus, even as the analogous Manchu and Mongol posts remained closed to Hanjun.\footnote{SZRSL, juan 116, KX 23.8.21 (September 29, 1684). The quote is adapted from Elliott, The Manchu Way, 78.} The Yongzheng emperor took his father’s criticisms a step further, repeatedly writing rescripts on routine reports by Hanjun officials in which he suggested that their vows to work hard in their posts were not to be trusted. To a Hanjun official in Guangzhou named Mao Keming 毛克明 he wrote:

> Make an effort not to stray from the intention that you have memorialized! You Hanjun have the bad habit of letting your words and deeds be as distantly separated as the highest heavens and the deepest abyss. When it comes to whether your inner [intentions] and outer [representations] are really the same or not, I truly do not dare to predict. I’ll be watching how you act, then of course I’ll know.\footnote{Mao Keming, HWZPZZ, NPM 402004107, YZ 10.9.29 (November 16, 1732).}

To a provincial finance commissioner (Ch. 布政使 buzhen shi, Ma. dasan be selgiyere hafan) in Xi’an named Yang Bi 楊馝, the emperor complained about how the men’s fellow Hanjun included a great number of “toadying officials experienced at deceit” (Ch. 老練巨滑之巧宦 laolian juhua zhi qiaohuan).\footnote{Yang Bi, HWZPZZ, NPM 402008670, YZ 11.12.28 (February 1, 1734).} Even when praising a Hanjun official, the emperor often coupled it with criticism of his colleagues, as when he told Guizhou finance commissioner Zu Binggui 祖秉圭 that though he was very pleased at Zu’s handling of business since taking up his post, his fellow Hanjun were all “good-for-nothing” (Ch. 一無可取 yi wu ke qu) on account of their “inveterate bad habits” (Ch. 積習 jixi) and general character and conduct.\footnote{Zu Binggui, HWZPZZ, NPM 402004343, YZ 5.8.4 (September 18, 1727).} At another point he
wrote that among all his Hanjun officials, those who were like the recently retired Tian Wenjing 田文鏡, one of his favorites, made up scarcely a couple out of every hundred or thousand.\textsuperscript{61} The theme of Hanjun untrustworthiness was a theme in imperial rescripts throughout his reign, particularly in its final few years, with phrases like “their words and deeds do not match” (Ch. 言行不符 yán xíng bufu) appearing in several rescripts. Though not explicitly noting their ethnic character, nor even making the direct comparison to Han commoners in the Green Standards that his father had, Yongzheng’s depiction of Hanjun was an implicit comparison to Han commoners, who Qing emperors also consistently portrayed as “deceitful and crafty.”\textsuperscript{62} That is, Hanjun, in the eyes of the emperor, generally shared the negative ethnic characteristics of their fellow Han.

A belief in the ethnic similarity between Hanjun and Han commoners may have also led the Yongzheng emperor to take a more relaxed view of intermarriage between the two groups. Late in the emperor’s reign, acting Fuzhou garrison general Zhun-tai informed the court about a Plain White bannerman named Hou Hongzuo 候弘祚 selling his daughter to an expectant magistrate from Fujian named Leng Qigun 冷岐昫 to be his concubine. He also noted that similarly, while in Beijing, Zhejiang provincial judge Yang Hongxu 楊弘緒 had illicitly bought a banner girl to be his concubine, for which he had been impeached by Zhe-Min governor-general Hao Yulin 郝玉麟, and dismissed from office.\textsuperscript{63} Moreover, he reported that he had heard that in many provincial garrisons, there were cases of Hanjun betrothing their daughters to

\textsuperscript{61}田文鏡者。百千中未見一二。Sun Guoxi 孫國璽, HWZPZZ, NPM 402006567, YZ 10.4.25 (May 19, 1732).

\textsuperscript{62} This phrase comes from the Kangxi emperor in a rescript to a 1710 memorial, quoted in Elliott, The Manchu Way, 169.

\textsuperscript{63} The dismissal from office is found in SZXSL, juan 158, YZ 13.7.5 (August 22, 1735). Though no specific reason is specified in the Shilu, Juntai’s memorial suggests that this purchase of a banner woman was the cause.
commoners. A failure to establish a specific precedent prohibiting this behavior had led, he argued, to it “becoming well-established practice” (Ch. 相沿成習 xiangyan cheng xi). Zhun-tai clearly believed that these marriages were out of keeping with the institutional framework of the banners, under which the “distinguishing” (Ch. 區別 qubie) of “banner and Han” (Ch. 旗漢 qi Han) was of great importance, and described Leng and Yang as “entirely unscrupulous” (Ch. 尚無顧忌 shang wu guji). He asked that the emperor bring regulations on Hanjun marriages into line with those on Manchu and Mongol marriages by prohibiting the sale of Hanjun girls to Han commoner men, and prohibiting the illicit drawing up of marriage contracts between Hanjun women and Han commoner men.64

The emperor took no interest in Zhun-tai’s memorial, writing a rescript that said “this is not an important matter at present.”65 Ding Yizhuang argues that this document shows that a general prohibition on banner-commoner intermarriage, a prohibition that itself did not actually appear in the Qing Code until the nineteenth century and which likely only applied to banner women marrying commoner men, was never really enforced against Hanjun women marrying Han commoner men.66 Her argument is sound. Zhun-tai’s attitude suggests that at least some high officials understood all marriages between banner women and commoner men to be improper, and quite possibly illegal. Though no explicit prohibitions on intermarriage survive from this period, there is no evidence that there was ever any prohibition on Hanjun men

64 Juntai, HWZPZZ, NPM 402001323, YZ 13.8.4 (September 19, 1735).
65 此非目前要務. Ibid.
marrying Manchu women. These two facts suggests that the dividing line across which intermarriage was understood to be prohibited was indeed that between banner women and commoner men, not that between Manchu women and Han men. However, the shared ethnicity of Hanjun and Han commoners served to soften that prohibition when it came to them intermarrying, perhaps because that shared ethnicity made maintaining clear divisions between them seem less important, or perhaps simply because it made such prohibitions more difficult to enforce.

In all, it is clear that the Qing court both made clear distinctions between Manchu and Hanjun bannermen on ethnic lines, and viewed the latter as sharing an ethnic identity with Han commoners. The banners were a multiethnic status category and ethnic difference shaped how the Qing court, and the Qing state more broadly, managed the banners as of the early eighteenth century.

**Marriage Patterns and the Banner Ethnic Hierarchy**

A clear divide between Manchus and Mongols on the one hand and Hanjun bannermen on the other is clear not just from official regulations and the legal treatment of the different banner categories, but also from social practice. Marriages among banner people, in particular, make clear that this hierarchy extended beyond the actual rules imposed by the Qing court and into daily life. Manchu and Mongol banner men and women intermarried in large numbers, but though many Manchu and Mongol banner men were married to Han – most of whom were presumably Hanjun – women, marriage between Hanjun banner men and Manchu or Mongol women was almost unheard of after the first decades of Qing rule. In a society in which marriage patterns tended strongly toward female hypergamy – that is, where women often married men of

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higher social status, but very rarely men of lower status – marriage rates within the banners are clear evidence of an ethnic hierarchy that placed Manchus and Mongols above Hanjun.⁶⁸

The most comprehensive data on banner marriage patterns comes from the “chaste women” (Ch. 列女 lienü) section of the Imperially-Commissioned Comprehensive History of the Eight Banners (Ch. 欽定八旗通志 Qinding baqi tongzhi).⁶⁹ This section consists of a list of every single banner woman between 1653 and 1795 granted an honorific tablet (Ch. 旌表 jingbiao) for maintaining her chastity by refusing remarriage following the death of her husband, as well, perhaps, as some small number of women honored for other behavior seen as particularly virtuous; since this text contains only a list, and not biographies, it is impossible to determine why any particular woman was honored.⁷⁰ The rules according to which chaste widows were honored with jingbiao varied over the course of the Qing. Until 1723, the Yuan standard, under which women who were widowed before reaching thirty sui and had reached at least the age of fifty sui were so honored, was maintained. After that, standards were relaxed, such that it was necessary only to have maintained one’s chastity for fifteen years and reached at

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⁶⁹ These sections can be found in QDBQTZ, juan 241-269 (pp. 4416-4970). Note that Ch. 列女 is more commonly given as 烈女 (both are read lienü), but in the published QDBQTZ, the former character pair is given.

⁷⁰ Weijing Lu argues that these numbers may include some number of women honored for committing suicide upon the deaths of their husbands (Ch. 殉 xun). See Weijing Lu, True to Her Word: The Faithful Maiden Cult in Late Imperial China (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), 285 (n. 32).
least the age of forty *sui*, with further reductions in requirements instituted in the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{71} The total number of banner women so honored during this period was 15,436.\textsuperscript{72}

Though this data is extremely valuable to the study of the so-called “late imperial chastity cult,”\textsuperscript{73} and has been used for those purposes, particularly in Mark Elliott’s work on the extension of the chastity cult to banner women, it has value of another sort. The standard format of lists of chaste women was to specify the name, banner affiliation, and position of the widow’s dead husband, and then the family (or clan) name of the widow herself. Since the family or clan name can usually be identified as either Manchu, Mongol, or Han, the data thus suggests the frequency with which the three groups of banner people intermarried.\textsuperscript{74} Unfortunately, no indication of the woman’s original banner affiliation is given, so some women with Han surnames may have been from commoner families. However, marriages of bannermen with Han commoner women seem to have been uncommon. In an examination of a variety of sources

\textsuperscript{71} For a comprehensive overview of *jingbiao*-award practices and related imperial rules regarding honoring chaste women, see Mark Elvin, “Female Virtue and the State in China,” *Past and Present* 104 (August 1984): 111-152. Pp. 123-124 provide the requirements for receiving a *jingbiao* tablet.

\textsuperscript{72} Mark C. Elliott, “Manchu Widows and Ethnicity in Qing China,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 41.1 (January 1999), 42 (Table 2.2).

\textsuperscript{73} This is a common usage in scholarship on gender in Qing China, see, e.g., Fangqin Du and Susan Mann, “Competing Claims on Womanly Virtue in Late Imperial China” in Dorothy Ko, JaHyun Kim Haboush, and Joan R. Piggott, eds., *Women and Confucian Cultures in Premodern China, Korea, and Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 219.

\textsuperscript{74} For purposes of creating my dataset, I treated all one-character ordinary Chinese surnames as Han, since Manchu clan names derived from Chinese surnames appear to have been consistently identified by the addition of the character 佳 *jia*, derived from the Manchu giya, itself a Manjurization of the Chinese character 家 *jia*, meaning “family.” That is, where a Han woman would be listed as 李氏 *Li shi*, or “woman of the Li family,” a Manchu woman from a clan whose name was based on the same Chinese surname would be listed as 李佳氏 *Li-jia shi* (Ma. *Ligyia hala*), or “woman of the Ligiya clan.” For native Manchu and Mongol clan names, it was occasionally impossible to determine whether a given clan name was Manchu (or from one of the related New Manchu groups like the Sibe, Solon, Evenki, etc., which I treated as Manchu for this purpose) or Mongol. In these cases, I recorded the ethnicity of the woman as indeterminate. In most cases, though, a name was either common enough to be easily identifiable –舒穆禄 *Shu-mu-lu* for a member of the Manchu Šumuru clan or 博爾濟吉特 *Bo-er-jii-ji-te* for a member of the Mongol Borjigin clan – or could be guessed due to its phonetic characteristics: names ending in –te (usually Ch. 特 or 拆), for instance, are extremely likely to be Mongol.
spanning most of the Qing, Ding Yizhuang was only able to uncover forty-six examples of Manchu men marrying Han commoner women, in comparison to seventy examples of Manchu men in a single branch of the Niohuru clan – the family of the early Qing aristocrat Eidu 额亦都 – who married Hanjun women over the course of six generations. Most banner men, it seems, limited their marriage pool to banner women.

Because of the large volume of data – more than fifteen thousand names – I decided to look only at every fifth year. I began not in 1653, when the first names are listed, but in 1672, because prior to this date many women were listed by something other than their family name, either a given name or some sort of nickname – names like Xinjie 辛姐 (“hardworking elder sister”) or Siji 四姬 (“fourth woman/fourth concubine”), which are harder to identify with a particular ethnic category. That is, my dataset includes women honored in 1672, 1677, 1682, etc., through 1792. In addition, because I was interested in ordinary banner people rather than the imperial family, I ignored wives of members of the imperial clan (Ch. 宗室 zongshi) or their collateral Gioro relatives (Ch. 覺羅 Jue-loo), though I did count women from these groups as Manchus when they appeared as chaste widows. Overall, this left a sample of 3,067 names, sufficient to establish the trends that I will discuss.

The most noticeable trend, as well as the most important, is that Hanjun men almost never married non-Han women. Out of 663 Hanjun men in my dataset, only 6 were married to non-Han (5 Manchus and 1 indeterminate), a rate of endogamy of over 99 percent. At the same time, Manchu and Mongol men frequently married Hanjun women – approximately 44 percent of Manchu banner male marriages and 50 percent of Mongol banner male marriages were to Han

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women (see Figure 1.1, above), most of whom were likely Hanjun. That Hanjun women were sexually available to Manchu and Mongol men, but Manchu and Mongol women were not sexually available to Hanjun men is clear evidence of a social hierarchy in which Hanjun were below their fellow banner people. This was not the result of any legal prohibition, as intermarriage among banner people of different categories was permitted by the central Qing state, a situation confirmed by the fact that a handful of Hanjun men did marry Manchu women, and that their wives were able to receive chastity awards.

At least on the basis of marriage patterns, Manchus and Mongols seem to have been nearly equal. Nearly 22 percent of Mongol men married Manchu women, and though only 3 percent of Manchu men married Mongol women, this is likely due to the much smaller Mongol banner population, combined with a tendency toward endogamy found in all three banner groups.76 The standard explanation of banner hierarchy, with Manchus outranking Mongols who

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76 Manchu men were the group most likely to marry Manchu women, Mongol men the group most likely to marry Mongol women, and Hanjun men the group most likely to marry Han women. The numbers of Mongol women are
in turn outranked Hanjun can thus be a bit misleading, as the gap between Manchus and Mongols was far smaller than that between Mongols and Hanjun.\footnote{See Elliott, \textit{The Manchu Way}, 78, which discusses this hierarchy as a standard formula by which the banners were discussed in the Qing. Elliott himself is clear that the Hanjun were substantially inferior to both Manchus and Mongols, who were more equal to one another.} Socially, Manchus and Mongols jointly formed the upper portion of the banner hierarchy, far ahead of the Hanjun.

In general, the banners appear to have become more socially integrated during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Between 1672 and 1722, the final fifty years of the reign of the Kangxi emperor, among those listed in chaste widow records, 66 percent of Manchu men were married to Manchu women, 50 percent of Mongol men were married to Mongol women and 100 percent of Hanjun men were married to Han women. In contrast, from 1737 to 1792, under the reign of the Qianlong emperor, only 52 percent of Manchu men, 13 percent of Mongol men, and 99 percent of Hanjun men were married to women of their same background. Figures 1.2 and 1.3 (next page) show that during the eighteenth century, as compared to the seventeenth century, Mongol men became more likely to marry Manchus and Hanjun, while Manchu men became more likely to marry Hanjun and less likely to marry Manchus.\footnote{Note that the spikes in 1732 for Manchu men are misleading – the overwhelming majority of records for this year in the Manchu section are for wives of Imperial Household Department bondservants.} Though not shown in the graphs, Manchu men also became substantially more likely to marry Mongol women. However, in the wake of the expulsion of the Hanjun, which began in the 1750s, Manchu marriages to Hanjun women declined sharply, a trend which becomes particularly clear in the

\footnote{Also most likely underestimated in both Manchu and Mongol marriages – the percentage of unidentifiable clan names was highest for women married to Mongol men, suggesting that most such clan names were Mongol. The true percentage of Manchu men married to Mongol women may have been as high as 4.5 percent.}
late 1770s, about twenty years after the beginning of expulsion. Whether this was the result simply of a reduction in the number of Hanjun women available to Manchus or the result of
increasing social segregation between the two groups as Hanjun were judged less deserving of banner status cannot be determined.

A final feature of banner ethnic hierarchy apparent in this data, unrelated to marriage patterns, is that women who married into Manchu banner families were overrepresented among recipients of jingbiao tablets. 62 percent of chastity awards in my dataset went to Manchu banner families, though the combined population of Mongol banner people and Hanjun was at least as high as that of Manchu banner people over the entire period in question, and substantially higher prior to Hanjun expulsion. Yet this did not mean, pace Elliott, that Manchu women were far more likely to receive chastity awards than their Hanjun counterparts. Rather, wives of Manchu men were much more likely to be awarded than wives of Hanjun men. Indeed, though 62 percent of chastity award recipients had been married to Manchu men, only 35 percent of recipients had Manchu clan names, while 57 percent had Han surnames. This suggests that, for official purposes, ethnicity was a characteristic that existed at the level of the household (or, alternately, was only attached to men) – a Hanjun woman who married a Manchu man would receive the preferential treatment that the court offered to Manchus. This further implies that the official policies that preferred Manchus and Mongols over Hanjun within the banners were directly linked to the social hierarchy revealed in marriage patterns. For a bannerwoman, marriage into a

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79 A lag of this sort is to be expected, as a woman would not be awarded for her chastity until at least fifteen years after her husband’s death, so any marriage would in principle have occurred at least fifteen years prior to the date of the award.

80 Elliott, “Manchu Widows and Ethnicity in Qing China,” 41. Elliott, presumably through counting the number of entries in each section of the text in question (which was divided between the Manchu, Mongol, and Hanjun banners) found an overall total of 59 percent of jingbiao going to the Manchu banners, or 63 percent when bondservant bannermen from the Imperial Household Department are included (I treated bondservants as Manchus in forming my dataset, because the text included them in its Manchu section). This is roughly in line with my results from a 20 percent sample.
Manchu family meant gaining official privilege, while marriage out of one, into a Hanjun family, meant losing it.

**Hanjun and Green Standards**

So far, we have seen that Hanjun shared a status identity with Manchus, but were clearly marked as ethnically different, both officially and in social practice. One important example of how the intersection of these two types of identity played out in practice comes from Hanjun service in the Green Standard army. Beginning in the late Kangxi reign, in 1718, Hanjun were permitted to hold posts in the Green Standards, in spite of the clear status division that existed between bannermen and Green Standard soldiers, the latter of whom were normally commoners with no banner affiliation. Indeed, as Luo Ergang explains in his comprehensive history of the Green Standard system, the Green Standards developed from the Ming dynasty garrison system; that is, the origin of both their earliest personnel and their system of administration lay in pre-Qing China, quite unlike the banners, which had been developed independently as the military force of the pre-conquest Manchu state. Their status was markedly lower than that of banner people and they were, in comparison to bannermen, comparatively well-integrated with local Han civilian populations. Mark Elliott has noted the service of Manchu officers as officers in the Green Standards, though he quotes a 1752 rescript of the Qianlong emperor suggesting that such work was inappropriate for them. But that Hanjun served not only as officers in the Green Standards, which was at least a position of command over a commoner army, but as ordinary soldiers in them, is ignored in the current literature on the banners; the only discussion of Hanjun

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entering the Green Standards is in the context of them giving up banner status entirely, through both the voluntary and forced expulsion policies of the 1740s and 50s. An explanation of how and why Hanjun, but not Manchus or Mongols, came to serve in Green Standard units in the early eighteenth century, while retaining banner status, remains an unanswered yet crucial question in understanding how Manchu bannermen, Hanjun bannermen, and commoner Green Standard soldiers were differentiated from one another.

The use of Hanjun in Green Standard companies was directly motivated by a desire to secure employment for the growing Hanjun population. By increasing the number of ways to earn a living available to Hanjun while allowing them to retain banner status, the Qing court clearly demonstrated that the place of Hanjun in the banners was not in question. This was in stark contrast to what would happen in the 1750s, when Hanjun were also moved into Green Standard companies but were simultaneously stripped of banner status. Though the policy blurred the divide between Hanjun and Han commoners in terms of what livelihoods were open to each, it did not challenge the status distinction between them. Indeed, in a certain sense, it even reinforced the hierarchical system under which Hanjun, as banner people, were superior to commoners, by asserting the right of unemployed Hanjun to take salaried jobs that otherwise were the rightful entitlement of commoner families. However, even as it maintained a status system that joined Hanjun with their fellow banner people, the policy emphasized the ethnic division between Manchus and Han, even within the banners. Hanjun, unlike Manchus, were suitable candidates for posts as Green Standard soldiers because of their ethnically Han background. The employment of Hanjun in Green Standard posts thus represents a clear example of how ethnic identity intersected with status identity in the first half of the eighteenth century, with both playing an essential role in defining the Hanjun.
The first garrison to assign Hanjun bannermen to Green Standard companies was that of Fuzhou, a garrison whose entire population was made up of Hanjun. This policy was initiated in response to a 1718 memorial to the Kangxi emperor by Mamboo 滿保, the Min-Zhe governor-general at the time, who wished to use Green Standard posts to provide salaries to otherwise unemployed bannermen. According to Mamboo, beside the two thousand Hanjun already holding banner posts, there were an additional two thousand men who would be eligible for positions, but were kept unemployed by a lack of vacancies. In his memorial, he wrote: “the livelihoods of those people without soldiers’ salaries are somewhat arduous,” but also noted that “observing the appearance of the men, they are far stronger than idle Green Standard men” – that is, the population from which new Green Standard soldiers would otherwise be drawn. He proposed selecting two hundred men from the excess Hanjun population and assigning one hundred to the Green Standard units under the command of the garrison general, and the other one hundred to the battalions under the governor-general’s own command. This would, he suggested, allow “banner people to learn diligence, their livelihoods to also become a bit more comfortable, and during critical junctures, also make it easy for me [Mamboo] to command and supervise from near at hand.” There were already one hundred vacant salaried posts in the two Green Standard battalions under the garrison general’s command, making this especially easy to implement. If a vacancy were to open up within the garrison’s banner units, those who had been transferred to Green Standard posts would remain eligible to fill it. The emperor approved the proposal, telling Mamboo that it was an extremely good idea.⁸⁴ Shortly thereafter, the policy was

⁸⁴ Mamboo, MWZPZZ, KX 57.3.24 (April 24, 1718), KXCMWZPZZ 3167, p. 1281.
further refined, and an additional one hundred Hanjun men were granted posts in the Green Standard units commanded by the Fujian provincial governor.  

The use of Hanjun men in Green Standard posts soon expanded beyond Fuzhou. In 1727, the Yongzheng emperor endorsed this policy as a means of dealing with the excess number of unemployed Hanjun, noting that “each company (Ma. niru, Ch. 佐領 zuoling) has come to have some hundreds of excess [men] and there are even those who up to the end of their lives do not obtain a post.”  

Hanjun banner commanders (Ma. gūsa be kadalara amban, Ch. 都統 dutong) were to either form new companies or assign Hanjun to Green Standard units to alleviate the employment problem. In 1729, the emperor further declared that the Green Standard companies in Jingkou, Fuzhou, and Guangzhou under the command of each city’s garrison general had originally been created because the Hanjun in each place had been insufficient. In a sense, he was thus suggesting that the Green Standard posts in question were really supposed to have been within the banners. Now that the Hanjun had become so numerous, the number of excess men in these garrisons had expanded rapidly. Henceforth, he decreed, whenever a post in these companies became available, it should be filled by an unemployed Hanjun man. To ensure that Green Standard families who had served for many generations were still provided for, their young men would be granted posts in other local Green Standard units, including those commanded by the governor or governor-general. 

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85 Sinju, Fuzhou Garrison Gazetteer, p.28.

86 Ujen Coohai dorgi sula hahasi fulu nirude. niru tome fulu ududu tanggū de isinafi. beye dubentele uksin baharakāngge gemu bi. The edict is quoted in Arigūn, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0171-0167-004, YZ 11.5.10 (June 21, 1733).

87 The passage described here uses Ma. gūsai amban.

88 SZXSL, juan 88, YZ 7.11.7 (December 26, 1729).
In 1733, Hangzhou garrison general Arigūn asked to follow the precedent of what had been done in Fuzhou, as well as that of the 1727 edict discussed above, and assign three hundred of his talented but unemployed men to Green Standard battalions in the city under the authority of the governor and governor-general – the Hangzhou garrison general did not command any Green Standard troops himself. He emphasized that these men would be assigned to patrol Hangzhou’s streets and guard its walls, gates, and granaries, and so would not be stationed far away from the garrison. This would, he argued, allow them to continue to study spoken and written Manchu, ensuring, as discussed in the previous section, that they would not abandon the “banner way.”

As his emphasis on maintaining instruction in Manchu and other elements of the “banner way” suggests, Arigūn’s proposal would, just as in Fuzhou, maintain the banner status of those Hanjun who were employed as Green Standard soldiers. Those who did not maintain discipline would have their salaries stripped from them and be returned to the banners for punishment – that is they would remain subject to the legal authority of the banners. In addition, Arigūn held that the fundamental differences between bannermen and commoners were one reason why his plan made sense. While the family members of Green Standard soldiers could “still rely on farming the fields and engaging in trade in order to live,” banner people “depend[ed] solely on official salaries.” As such, it was far more important to offer military employment to unemployed bannermen, and, moreover, bannermen would happily take it up, while recruiting commoners to join the army imposed hardships on them, and was not likely to be welcomed.

89 ing ni cooha urse i juse deote kemuni usin tarire, hūdašara de nikeme banjire be dahame umai seremšeme tehe gūsai urse adali damu ciyanliyang de akdara. Arigūn, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0171-0167-004, YZ 11.5.10 (June 21, 1733).
In 1735, just two years later, Hangzhou officials reconsidered this policy. A memorial from Zhejiang governor Cheng Yuanzhang 程元章 noted that since Zhejiang province no longer had a governor-general, the relevant Green Standard posts available in Hangzhou were limited to about 646 men under the governor’s command. Moreover, troops under the governor’s command were generally sent out of the city on assignment to root out salt smuggling, banditry, and the like. Because those Hanjun bannermen assigned to Hangzhou’s Green Standard companies were, per Arigün’s original proposal, forbidden from leaving the vicinity of the garrison, granting 300 posts to them left the Zhejiang governor’s forces substantially undermanned when carrying out many of their duties. Moreover, Green Standard families also had men awaiting posts – what would become of them if all new vacancies went to Hanjun? This was a particular problem since he estimated that it would take more than ten years’ worth of vacancies to bring the number of Hanjun up to their 300-man quota. Instead of using Hanjun in his Green Standard forces, Cheng proposed creating 300 stipends of 0.5 taels/month, substantially less than even a Green Standard salary, which would be given to unemployed Hanjun men who would be expected to train alongside regular banner soldiers.

The Yongzheng emperor responded by noting that the excess population in the Hanjun banners had in recent years grown extremely rapidly, and that, given the need to provide them with support, assigning Hanjun bannermen to posts in the Green Standard battalions under the

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90 The administrative scope of the Qing’s various governors-general changed frequently during the first half of the Qing. From 1645 until 1738, Zhejiang and Fujian were variously combined under a single governor-general – sometimes based in Zhejiang, sometimes in Fujian (as was the case when Chen Yuanzhang wrote his memorial) – or each given their own (as was the case when Arigün wrote his memorial). From 1738 on, they would be combined under a single governor-general, based in Fuzhou. See Zhu Taiwen 祝太文, “An Investigation and Discussion of the Establishment of Governor and Governor-General Posts in Qing Zhejiang” 清代浙江督抚设置考述, Wenzhou daxue xuebao (shehui kexue ban) 30.5 (September 2017), pp. 85-86.

91 Cheng Yuanzhang, HWZPZZ, NPM 402015949, YZ 13.3.? (April, 1735).
authority of their own garrison’s general was quite reasonable. However, the emperor agreed
with Cheng’s concern about what would happen to Green Standard families who had provided
soldiers for many decades if more such posts were granted to Hanjun, and so forbade Hanjun in
provincial garrisons from being assigned to any Green Standard battalion other than those
commanded by the garrison general. He further ordered that those already assigned to such posts
be required to give them up, declaring that “if excess Hanjun men are numerous, you must think
of some other means to make provision for them.” Whether this was meant as an endorsement of
Cheng’s specific proposal was left unclear.\footnote{若果漢軍餘丁繁多，當另思所以安頓之法。SZXSL, \textit{juan} 154, YZ 13.4.3 (April 25, 1735).} Though Cheng had emphasized that the issues he
was describing were a result of the specific situation of Hangzhou’s garrison, which he explained
was very different from that in Fuzhou, the emperor decided to apply this prohibition on the use
of Hanjun in Green Standard companies run by governors and governors-general to Fuzhou, and
presumably the rest of the empire, as well.\footnote{Sinju, \textit{Fuzhou Garrison Gazetteer}, 21–22.}

Though Hangzhou’s lack of a garrison general-commanded Green Standard company
meant that its Hanjun would indeed face a shortage of posts, the situation in other garrisons was
not much changed by the new rule. The 1729 edict turning over all newly available posts in
companies under the general’s command to unemployed Hanjun had been implemented in
Guangzhou in 1733.\footnote{Bo Zhifan 柏之蕃, HWZPZZ, NPM 402008802, YZ 11.3.11 (April 24, 1733).} In Fuzhou, garrison general Arsai 阿爾賽 declared in 1736, the first year
of the new Qianlong emperor’s reign, that the number of qualified Hanjun in the garrison was
actually insufficient to fill all of the 2,042 posts in the main garrison, the 500 posts in the naval
garrison, and the 1,860 total posts in the two Green Standard companies he commanded. So, he
proposed that the number of places in the Green Standard companies he commanded available to Hanjun be decreased to 400, a suggestion that the new emperor accepted.95

The surplus of posts available in Fuzhou suggests that this policy was effective at relieving the pressure of population growth in Hanjun-dominated provincial garrisons. Perhaps for this reason, some banner officials soon sought to apply a similar policy elsewhere. In 1741, Hangzhou right wing Hanjun lieutenant general (Ma. jebele galai Ujen Coohai meiren i janggin, Ch. 右翼漢軍副都統 youyi Hanjun fudutong) Bašiu 八十五 proposed Green Standard service as a solution to the question of what to do with Beijing bannermen from so-called “entailed households” (Ma. dangse faksalaha urse, Ch. 開戶人 kaihu ren). These men were descended from slaves and bondservants of “regular Manchus” (Ma. jingkini Manjusa) but had been entered into the Manchu banner registers either on account of their military service or through subterfuge. In 1729, the Yongzheng emperor had prohibited them from holding any post above the rank of cavalryman (Ma. moringga uksin, Ch. 馬甲 majia) and in 1739, in response to a memorial from Zhao Guozheng 趙國政, the lieutenant general of the Plain Red Hanjun banner, the Qianlong emperor had barred them from cavalry posts as well. These restrictions were designed to keep those posts open for the growing population of regular Manchus, but, according to Bašiu, the limited salaries available to infantrymen (Ma. yafahan cooha, Ch. 步甲 bujia) and craftsmen (Ma. faksi, Ch. 匠役 jiangyi), the only posts now open to entailed household men, meant that many could not support their families, or resorted to surreptitiously seeking re-registration as regular Manchus.

95 Proposal is found in Arsai, HWZPZZ, FHA 04-01-16-0002-038, QL 1.5.2 (June 10, 1736). That it was implemented is confirmed by Sinju, Fuzhou Garrison Gazetteer, 32–33.
 Başiu noted that when Green Standard soldiers left their posts and replacements were sought, their units would first attempt to recruit from among the younger male relatives of current soldiers, then from among other local commoners, and finally from among commoners living elsewhere. The first two categories produced good soldiers, he argued, but those soldiers recruited from other places often proved to be unreliable soldiers, which he attributed to the fact that they lacked the checks on their behavior that came from being embedded in the community. Moreover, that very willingness to wander far from home suggested their predisposition to misbehavior. The Green Standard companies along the Great Wall to the north of Beijing, from Shanhaiguan 山海關 (Ma. Šanahai duka) on the coast to Shahukou 殺虎口 (Ma. Šurgei jase) in Shanxi province, were a particular problem, due to the relative scarcity of soldiers’ families there. So, Başiu proposed that those entailed household bannermen who were willing to serve along the northern frontier be allowed to fill vacancies in the Green Standards there, which he argued would prove a boon both to the economic well-being of their families and to military readiness in the region.96

Başiu’s proposal was, however, rejected by the Grand Council, with grand councilor Ortai 鄂爾泰 writing that if men had to be summoned from the capital to fill these frontier posts whenever they opened up, this would result in posts remaining vacant for a long time.97 Three years later, a similar proposal by Fujian provincial censor (Ch. 監察御史 jiancha yushi, Ma. baicame tuwara hafan) Fan Tingkai 范廷楷 was also rejected. Fan had proposed sending Beijing banner people to fill posts in newly created Green Standard garrisons in the provinces as a means

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96 Başiu, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0171-0174-003, QL 6.5.11 (June 23, 1741).
97 Ortai, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0171-0174-005, QL 6.6.12 (July 24, 1741).
to save money, pointing out that the state needed to provide for banner people regardless of whether they had actual military employment, while Green Standard soldiers were commoners who could simply find other work. Moreover, prices were lower outside the capital, meaning that the reassigned bannermen would themselves become cheaper to support. In response, Ortai argued that Green Standard troops were better suited to serve in territories with which they were familiar, that there weren’t enough bannermen in the capital to replace the more than seventy thousand Green Standard men that Fan had wanted to eliminated, and that with all the moving that would be required, the proposal wouldn’t actually save money anyway, while making it very difficult to continue to administer the bannermen in question properly. The emperor sided with Ortai.98

Though the Qianlong-era Qing court rejected the widespread use of banner people to fill Green Standard posts, it did expand the policy in one way. Beginning in 1745, Hanjun from the capital were permitted to fill vacant Green Standard posts in the three police battalions in the capital (Ch. 巡捕三營 xunbu san ying, Ma. siyūn bu ilan ing) and in two garrisons in Zhili, the province surrounding Beijing. These latter two garrisons, at Malan 馬蘭 and Taining 泰寧, were responsible for guarding the Qing imperial tombs, causing the court to view them as more important, and more tied to the maintenance of the dynasty itself, than were most ordinary Green Standard companies.99 The police units too, had a closer connection to the banners than other Green Standard units, due to their responsibility for patrolling the capital, which served as the principal banner garrison in China proper, though the Green Standard police battalions were

98 Ortai, HWZPZZ, FHA 04-01-30-0451-001, QL 9.11.29 (January 1, 1745).

responsible only for the parts of the city outside the banner city walls. Indeed, the memorial proposing this policy had also wanted to assign bannermen to other Green Standard forces in Zhili, including ones based in Tianjin, Xuanhua, and Yizhou, but the emperor had rejected this on the grounds that they were widely dispersed. In the five battalions where the appointment of bannermen was approved, though, new vacancies were to be filled by men who were either in the Hanjun banners, male relatives of current soldiers, or men of secondary banner status. If a Hanjun man assigned to one of these posts retired, he would be replaced by another Hanjun.

This new policy initially met resistance from Bulantai, the commander of the Green Standard forces at Malan and Taining, who argued that his soldiers came from families that had moved to the tomb areas in the early Kangxi period, up to eighty or ninety years earlier, and had provided consistent military service over that time. They were, he said, “no different from banner people” (與旗人無異 yu qiren wu yì), with entire families relying on military salaries and lacking any other source of income. Bulantai’s objections were dismissed by grand councilor Zhang Tingyu, who in addition to noting that various opportunities for service would remain for the commoner (Ma. irgen, Ch. 民 min) Green Standard troops at the two garrison, emphasized the difference between them and genuine bannermen, like the Hanjun of

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100 Qu Chunhai 屈春海, “Public Order and Defense Organizations in the Qing Capital: An Outline of the Office of the Gendarmerie” 清代京师治安防务机构: 步军统领衙门述略, Gong’an daxue xuebao 1989.2, pp. 68-70. The original memorial from Supervisor of Instruction (Ch. 詹事府 zhanshi fu) Li Fu 李绂 proposing the policy directly argued that the special roles of the Green Standard companies in question (both the ones at Malan and Taining and the police battalions) made them particularly appropriate places to use bannermen. See Zhang Tingyu 張廷玉, MHHBZPZZ, FHA 04-01-01-0120-005, QL 10.5.11 (June 10, 1745).

101 Secondary banner status included both members of entailed households, described above, and people “separately recorded in the register” (Ch. 另記檔案 ling ji dang’an, Ma. encu dangsede ejebuhe).

102 GZSL, juan 237, QL 10.3.20 (April 21, 1745).

103 Bulantai, HWZPZZ, FHA 04-01-16-0022-034, QL 10.4.20 (May 21, 1745).
Beijing, writing that: “the people of the Green Standard Army, unlike the people of the Hanjun banners, aside from receiving salaries through government service, still [have] other means of livelihood.” The emperor agreed with Zhang, maintaining a firm sense of the difference between banner people, including the Hanjun, and commoners, even while sending banner people to serve in military units that normally were made up of commoners.

The ways in which they were used in Green Standard units offer compelling evidence for how the Qing state conceived of the Hanjun during the first half of the eighteenth century. At one level, the policy seemed to suggest that Hanjun were more like non-banner Han than Manchus were. Though Manchus sometimes held positions as officers in the Green Standards, Manchu bannermen were not assigned to regular Green Standard posts, nor have I found any indications that any Qing official ever proposed that Manchus of ordinary banner status (rather than men from entailed households registered in the Manchu banners) should serve in them. As such, it seems that Hanjun service in the Green Standards was considered proper, while Manchu service in them, outside of officer posts, was not. This is a clear indication that the early eighteenth-century Qing court saw less of a barrier between Hanjun and Han commoners than it did between Manchus and Han commoners.

However, even as Hanjun served in Green Standard companies, banner officials and the Qing court maintained very clear status divisions between Hanjun and commoners. One indication of this is the preference that Hanjun received in appointment to Green Standard units that would accommodate them; the livelihood of banner people always took precedence over that of commoners, and both officials and emperors emphasized the legal restrictions on non-official

104 niowanggiyan tui coohai urse. Ujen Coohai gysai urse ci encu. ciyanliyang jeme alban kara ci tulgiyen. kemuni encu banjire ba. Zhang Tingyu, MHHBZPZZ, FHA 04-01-01-0120-005, QL 10.5.11 (June 10, 1745)
employment for banner people as a justification for this preference for Hanjun. Moreover, as
seen in the temporary use of Hanjun in the Green Standards of Hangzhou, Hanjun who were sent
to Green Standard units were still expected to uphold the standards of banner service and to
study spoken and written Manchu. Service in the Green Standards meant merely a change in
*livelihood*, not one in *status*, and indeed Hanjun appointed to these units remained subject to the
authority of banner officers and could return to their banner companies to fill newly opened
vacancies in them. Nor was granting Hanjun posts in the Green Standards a means of
marginalizing them relative to Manchus – rather it was clearly designed to increase the amount
of state support available for Hanjun families. This is made quite clear in Cheng Yuanzhang’s
memorial ending this policy in Hangzhou, and in the Yongzheng emperor’s response. Since it
was deemed impossible to employ Hanjun in this way in that garrison, both men agreed that it
was necessary to find another means to supplement the number of salaried posts available to
them. Though the ethnic similarity between Hanjun and commoners must have been the basis for
making regular Green Standard service acceptable for Hanjun but not Manchus, the policy
benefitted the Hanjun who were affected by it. To the extent that Manchus did have access to
Green Standard posts, as officers, Qing officials saw that access as desirable for them, as shown
by a 1738 memorial that sought successfully to give Mongol bannermen that same right, on the
grounds that it was unfair to prefer Manchus over their Mongol colleagues. Though there is no

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105 I draw here on a similar distinction to the one that David Howell makes for Tokugawa Japan between
“occupation” and “livelihood.” Howell argues that “occupation” – the legally defined means of employment for
someone of a particular status (Ja. 身分 mibun) – was frequently different from “livelihood” – the way that someone
actually earned an income. In this instance, Hanjun serving in the Green Standards retained their “occupation” (or
status) as banner people, even as they undertook what was nominally a commoner livelihood. See David Howell,

106 The initial proposal is found in Bulantai, HWLFZZ, FHA 03-0049-021, QL 3.4.17 (June 4, 1738). Imperial
approval for his proposal appears in Ortai, MHHBZPZZ, FHA 04-01-16-0006-033, QL 3.5.7 (June 23, 1738)
clear evidence that Manchus wished to have access to ordinary Green Standard posts, it seems likely that such posts would have been preferable to unemployment, a problem faced by bannermen of all ethnic backgrounds.

As we have seen, an additional consideration related to the employment of Hanjun in the Green Standards was the nature of particular Green Standard units. That is, though Hanjun were permitted to serve as soldiers in the Green Standards, even they were only allowed access to special sorts of Green Standard units. With the exception of a brief period when they were permitted into units commanded by provincial governors and governors-general, a policy that the Yongzheng emperor quickly overturned, the units in which Hanjun could be enlisted were those guarding the two imperial tomb complexes in Zhili province, the police units of Beijing, and companies under the direct command of a garrison general. As argued above, the first two of these types of Green Standard companies had clear connections to the maintenance of imperial rule, a clear reason for making them open to banner troops. The history of the units commanded by the provincial garrison generals in Fuzhou, Guangzhou, and Jingkou shows that their very existence, not just the use of Hanjun in them, offers insight into how the Qing state understood the differences among Manchus, Hanjun, and Green Standard soldiers.

As mentioned above, the only garrisons at which the general also commanded Green Standard companies were Fuzhou, Guangzhou, and Jingkou. These were not randomly selected; they were also the only three provincial garrisons that had banner populations consisting entirely of Hanjun. Ding Yizhuang has argued that the existence of Green Standard units under the

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107 Descendants of the soldiers at Taining, near the Qing’s western tomb complex (Ch. 西陵 xi ling), remember (or at least represent) themselves as Manchus to the present day, though the tomb units were part of the Green Standards until the very end of the dynasty. For Taining as a present-day site of “Manchu” cultural identity, see Jeremiah Jenne, “Making History,” The World of Chinese, Sep-Oct, 2017, http://www.theworldofchinese.com/2017/11/making-history/. The continuation of the Malan and Taining garrisons as Green Standard units through the fall of the Qing is confirmed by XTZJ, juan 70, XT 3.12.22 (February 9, 1912).
control of the garrison generals of each of these three Hanjun-only garrisons reflects Qing mistrust of the Hanjun. She points out that the total strength of the garrisons at Fuzhou, Guangzhou, and Jingkou only matched that of garrisons like Xi’an that mixed Manchu, Mongol, and Hanjun units and were commanded by Manchu officers when the Green Standard troops were included. Since Green Standard soldiers were recruited from the civilian population rather than bound to military service through official registration, Ding claims that this means the garrison generals in the Hanjun-only garrisons, who were usually Hanjun themselves, were weaker than their counterparts in other garrisons. Moreover, their Green Standard units only made up a small fraction of the total size of the Green Standard Army in their respective provinces, meaning that they could not interfere with other Green Standard troops. Thus, she says, making about half of the military forces under their command Green Standards rather than Hanjun “added checks to the power of the Hanjun generals” of whom the Qing court was “deeply suspicious.”

I am not convinced by Ding’s explanation of this phenomenon. If the Qing rulers had wanted to increase the strength of the military forces in southern China without making the Hanjun generals too powerful, even if they did not want to send Manchu or Mongol banners to the area, they could simply have expanded the size of the Green Standard forces under the control of the provincial governor or governor-general or provincial commander-in-chief (Ch. 提督 tidu, Ma. fideme kadalara amban). Moreover, there is no real evidence that the court actually particularly mistrusted Hanjun garrison generals. If the court thought that they were a risk to rebel, would it really have added given them command of soldiers who had previously been in

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the armies of the Three Feudatories and thus already had a history of participating in a rebellion, as it did in Guangzhou? Moreover, the appointment of Hanjun to posts in the Green Standards clearly would have undermined the court’s supposed goal of limiting the number of banner soldiers under the garrison general’s control. It seems more likely, rather, that these companies functioned almost like additional banner units, increasing the power of the garrison general, rather than decreasing it. This was likely why it made sense to the Qing court to allow Hanjun to take over many of the posts in them, even as the Yongzheng emperor forbade Hanjun from serving in otherwise similar units, like the Green Standard companies in Hangzhou commanded by the provincial governor.

So why were these Green Standard units established in the first place? The account of the Fuzhou garrison’s Green Standard companies, included in the Fuzhou garrison’s 1744 gazetteer, offers one explanation. The Green Standard units commanded by the Fuzhou general were created in 1690 following a request by newly appointed garrison general Shi Wenbing. In his memorial to the throne, Shi pointed out that the size of the banner garrison in Fuzhou was quite small; only two thousand soldiers, in comparison to the total of more than sixty-four thousand Green Standard soldiers in the entirety of Fujian province. “The banner battalion by itself,” he wrote, “is truly insufficient to subdue the hearts of the masses and bring about long-lasting peace.” He pointed to the numerous battles, rebellions, and other disturbances in the province since the Qing had established itself as the ruling dynasty, including the resistance of Zheng Chenggong and the revolt of Geng Jingzhong, arguing that the people of Fujian were particularly prone to making trouble. Without more troops, how could his banners “hope to intimidate villains into submission” (Ch. 安冀奸人懾伏 an ji jianren she fu)? However, Shi noted:

109旗營兵單，實未足以懾眾心而致久安也。
Fujian province has extremely few flat plains. If it isn’t high mountains and dense jungles, then it’s deep ravines and paddy fields. It is a difficult place to practice mounted archery, and so providing firearms must be the first priority. If I request a switch to firearms, then I lose my strongest point, but if I entirely rely on bow and arrow, it will not be suitable to my location. I have racked my brains, but my strategic thinking is exhausted and my forces are few; I have no choice but to consider an increase [in the number of troops]. [...] Only Guangdong similarly lies adjacent to the sea and the difficulties on its borders and in its hinterlands are clearly understood. Thus in the [troop] quota of the Guangzhou garrison general, in addition to the three thousand infantry and cavalry, they are combined with four thousand Green Standard soldiers.

After going on to note that Jingkou also had two thousand Green Standard soldiers under its general’s command, Shi suggested that the emperor could strengthen his forces in similar fashion.110

A few points are notable in Shi’s request for the establishment of a Green Standard force under his command. The first is the mismatch between the supposed talents of his banner soldiers and the topography of Fujian. Shi described mounted archery, one of the basic elements of banner training and warfare, and one which the court considered essential for all banner people to possess, as the greatest strength of his existing force.111 But Fujian was, he argued, better suited to the use of firearms, which his argument seems to suggest were associated with the Green Standard troops he wished to add. These new troops would necessary, then, to fill a

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110閩地平原絕少，非高山叢樹，則深溝水田，騎射難施之處，必資火器為先。臣欲請改火器，則失我之所長；欲專恃弓矢，又非地之所宜。輾轉思維，策窮兵寡，是斷不可不為酌增者也。[...] 惟廣東同屬濱海，其邊腹險易瞭如。故廣東將軍額設馬、步甲三千副，外配綠旗兵丁四千名。Simu 新柱, *Fuzhou Garrison Gazetteer*, 138–139. Though both Jingkou and Guangzhou had established the Green Standard companies commanded by their garrison generals prior to Fuzhou, no similarly detailed explanation of their creation survived. The *Veritable Records* report that the Guangzhou general’s Green Standard companies were established simply to make up a deficiency in the number of soldiers under his command, while the late nineteenth-century Guangzhou garrison gazetteer adds only that the additional troops were necessary because Guangzhou is a strategically important coastal city. See SZRSL, *juan* 107, *KX* 22.2.9 (March 6, 1683) and Chang-shan 長善, ed., *Gazetteer for the Eight Banners Garrisoned in Canton* 駐粵八旗志 (Guangzhou, 1884; reprinted Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1997), *juan* 14, p. 1b. The establishment of the Jingkou units is even more obscure, though they certainly existed by 1674, when they are mentioned in the *Veritable Records* – see SZRSL, *juan* 48, *KX* 13.6.25 (July 28, 1674).

111 Mounted archery made up a crucial part of what Elliott has identified as the “Manchu Way” – see Elliott, *The Manchu Way*, 8.
military function that bannermen could not. Thus, in one sense, his request was the result of his belief in the fundamental differences between Hanjun soldiers and Han commoner soldiers – and in the corollary that all bannermen were basically similar. The Hanjun-commoner distinction that Shi made looked little different from a distinction that might be made between Manchu and Han.

Shi’s memorial also suggested that Hanjun troops were the only forces that the Qing could really count on in Fujian province. The more than sixty-four thousand other Green Standard soldiers in the province didn’t really matter; it was the scarcity of bannermen that put the area in danger of further rebellions. The use of terms like she 懾, literally to “intimidate” or to “frighten,” to describe the effect that Hanjun forces were meant to have in the people of Fujian accords well with the Qing court’s notion that one of the major functions of the banner garrisons was to “inspire fear and submission in the Chinese population.”¹¹² That Hanjun had this function as well again implies that they were more like other bannermen than like other Han. Given this, one might well wonder how an addition of Green Standard battalions to his command would help Shi accomplish this goal. Perhaps using Green Standard men and bannermen together was supposed to enable the former to acquire some of the fearsomeness of the latter. This idea would seem to run counter to his suggestion of the essential difference between banner troops and those in the Green Standards, but it does lend credence to the idea that these new companies were meant as a sort of additional banner unit, at a time when the number of available bannermen may still have been insufficient for the dynasty’s military purposes.¹¹³ Or perhaps Shi’s argument should be seen less as a sincere reflection of his understanding of the situation in Fuzhou and


¹¹³ And so, when the Hanjun population had grown large enough to exceed the number of posts available to it, these Green Standard soldiers could simply be replaced.
more as an attempt to increase the size of his own command, and thus his own importance. Regardless, he succeeded in convincing the court, suggesting that his arguments resonated with what the Kangxi emperor and his advisors already believed.

Neither of Shi’s lines of argument explained why only Hanjun garrisons would have Green Standard companies attached to them, and it is hard to escape the conclusion that the ethnic similarity between Hanjun and Han commoners made their shared service more acceptable than Manchus and Han commoners serving together would have been. Yet, it remains clear that both in the establishment of Green Standard units in Hanjun garrisons, and in Hanjun service in Green Standard companies, the status distinction between Hanjun and Han commoners remained important.

Conclusion

In the period between the Qing conquest and 1750, and especially during the first half of the eighteenth century, the Qing banners as a whole are best understood as a multiethnic status category that constituted the empire’s service elite. The Hanjun were defined by the intersection of, or overlap between, their membership in that multiethnic elite and their Han ethnicity. That there was a relationship between Manchu ethnicity and banner status is clear, as the court’s vision of Manchu culture played a clear role in defining the expectations for banner people. But those expectations were, by and large, applied uniformly to the banners; Hanjun had to learn to shoot from horseback and use the Manchu language just as Manchus did. There was ethnic discrimination within the banners themselves, with Hanjun treated less well than their Manchu and Mongol counterparts. Yet this did not mean that the claim of Hanjun to banner status was any less than that of their Manchu counterparts and the Qing state consistently made efforts to
secure the status-based privileges of Hanjun, particularly their right to financial support via official employment, while keeping them within the banner system.

The clear place of Hanjun within the banner system in this period deserves particular emphasis because that place would come under attack later in the eighteenth century. What it means to understand the banners as a “service elite” is that they received certain special privileges tied to their status, and hence were elite, and that those privileges were tied to their service to the ruling dynasty. The basic privileges of banner status were the guarantee that the state would provide all banner people with a means of support, disproportionate access to government posts carrying prestige and high salaries, and the right to have many penalties for criminal offenses commuted. The basic service requirement of banner people was that adult men would serve the state directly, usually as soldiers in banner military units, but sometimes in civil administration, and not hold outside employment. This set of privileges and service requirements was tied to the ritual relationship between the emperor and the banner people; they were his slaves (Ch. 奴才 nucai, Ma. aha), and he was responsible for providing for them.114

All of these privileges and requirements applied to Hanjun. The policy of employing Hanjun in the Green Standards when their growing population made posts within the banners scarce provides clear evidence that the Qing court was committed to supporting the Hanjun and to keeping them employed under state auspices. Moreover, though this employment was outside the banners, it was tied as closely as practicable to the banners by only dispatching Hanjun to Green Standard units with close ties to either the court itself or provincial banner garrisons.

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114 Elliott describes the bureaucratic practice of banner officials referring to themselves as slaves in The Manchu Way, p. 164. He describes this as a means of emphasizing “their [emperor and banner people] common fates as Manchus” and as “one strategy for the preservation of the Manchu ‘nation.’” As is apparent, I see this ritual form as transcending ethnicity, and being tied rather to the role of the banners as a whole.
Manchus and Mongols were likely to get better paying and more prestigious military posts, on average, than their Hanjun counterparts. But the Hanjun were part of the group that was guaranteed state support, a guarantee that did not apply to any other Han, including the (mostly) Han group often considered to make up the Qing elite, graduates of the civil service examinations.\footnote{Passing the highest levels of the civil service exams was a path to state employment, but it never guaranteed it. Nor did being an exam graduate mandate abandoning outside employment.}

Hanjun also had the same sort of improved access to top government posts as did other banner people. Sun Jing argues that the extremely high percentages of governors and governors-general who were Hanjun in the early Qing – during the first three decades of Qing rule, from 1644 to 1674, for example, more than 73 percent of the holders of these posts were Hanjun – was the result of practical need, as they were more reliable than Han commoners and could speak Chinese unlike many Manchus.\footnote{Sun Jing, “A Discussion of the Change in Status of the Eight Banner Hanjun During the Qianlong Period”, p 60.} This is likely true, but it does not explain why, two or three generations after the Qing conquest, Hanjun continued to hold a vastly disproportionate number of these top posts relative to Han commoners, even if they no longer outnumbered Manchus. In the three decades prior to the first move toward forcible Hanjun expulsion, from 1716 until the 1746 expulsion of the Household Selected Soldiers (discussed in chapter 2), nearly 32 percent of governorships and governor-generalships were held by Hanjun, almost exactly the same as the percentage held by Han commoners, and just 3 percent below the percentage held by Manchus.\footnote{Both these numbers and those earlier in the paragraph are taken from Narakino Shimesu 楢木野宣, Research on Important Officials in the Qing Dynasty: With Full Details on the Joint Usage of Manchus and Han 清代重要職官の研究 : 滿漢併用の全貌 (Tokyo: Kazama shobō, 1975), pp. 64-81 deal with governors-general, pp. 97–114 deal with governors. Narakino gives year by year numbers of the percentage of each type of post held by Manchus, Mongols, Hanjun, and Han commoners over the course of the year. That means that the numbers given are the} Since Hanjun were far outnumbered by Han commoners, it is clear that, even well
after the dynasty’s founding, they continued to receive substantial preferences in competition for the highest ranking government posts. Moreover, Hanjun had more or less the same right to commutation of criminal punishments as did Manchus and Mongols.\textsuperscript{118} And, at the ritual level, Hanjun officials, like their Manchu and Mongol counterparts, frequently referred to themselves as the emperor’s slaves.\textsuperscript{119}

The exact relationship between ethnicity and status in the early eighteenth-century Qing was complex and the two were not completely separable. Ideas about Manchu ethnicity influenced conceptions of banner status, and Hanjun were treated more like Han commoners than like their fellow bannermen in some contexts, like when they shared a quota for certain administrative posts. But it is clear that both ethnicity and status were important to official conceptions of identity and that they represented two distinct modes of thinking about identity. This would change in the middle of the eighteenth century as the Qianlong emperor attempted to better align Manchu ethnicity with banner status, and therefore to expel Hanjun from the banners. This shift in thinking about how identity should function, and its consequences for the Hanjun, will be explored in the next two chapters.

\textsuperscript{118} For an example of a Hanjun criminal receiving a commutation on the basis of his status, see Nasutu 那蘇圖, XKTB, FHA 02-01-07-13602-009, QL 5.4.28 (May 23, 1740).

\textsuperscript{119} For an example of a Hanjun official referring to himself as “slave,” see Wang Jintai 王進泰, HWLFZZ, FHA 03-1188-008, QL 3.5.29 (July 15, 1738).
Chapter Two: Two Precursors to Hanjun Expulsion: the Household Selected Soldiers and Voluntary Renunciation of Banner Status

One of the crucial moments in the history of the Hanjun banners, and indeed of the Qing Eight Banners as a whole, was the mid-eighteenth-century decision to expel most provincial garrison Hanjun from the banner rolls. This process, which began in Fuzhou in 1754 and concluded in 1780 with the expulsion of final Hanjun soldiers from Xi’an, marked a major shift in Qing policy regarding banner identity and reshaped the demographics of the banner population. Though Hanjun banner people in both Manchuria and the capital were largely spared from losing banner status, in the empire’s provincial garrisons only half the Hanjun population of Guangzhou and a portion of those in the naval garrison at Fuzhou were allowed to remain. The expelled Hanjun were re-registered as commoners – the set phrase used to order their removal was “remove them from the banners and make them into commoners” (Ma. gūsaci tucibili irgen obufi, Ch. 出旗為民 chuqi weimin) and allowed to choose between becoming ordinary civilians and serving in the Green Standards. The expulsion of the Hanjun will be the focus of chapter 3.

The rethinking of banner status did not, however, begin with the Hanjun. Rather, their expulsion was the culmination of a rapid shift in the court’s ideological approach to the relationship between status and ethnicity during the early years of the Qianlong emperor’s reign. Indeed, the transformation of banner status from a reward for loyalty to an ethnic privilege meant primarily for Manchu and Mongols is clearly apparent over a span of just 16 years. Between 1731 and 1747, a group of former banner slaves called the “Household Selected Soldiers” (Ma. booi sonjoho cooha, Ch. 家選兵 jiaxuan bing) were sent to the Qing’s western frontier, freed

1 The Green Standard Army is introduced in chapter 1 of the dissertation.
from slavery and made into banner people, and expelled from the banners to become Green Standard soldiers. Their story both prefigured and served as a microcosm of the processes that governed the relationship of the Hanjun to the banners as a whole, as the court applied an ethnic logic to deny the legitimacy of banner status that had been granted less than two decades before.

After a discussion of earlier scholarly approaches to the Hanjun expulsion, this chapter will take up the history of the Household Selected Soldiers. I will argue that their initial entry into the banners offers a clear example of how banner status was understood as a reward for service to the dynasty, and service in the expansion of the empire in particular. Their early history, I show, embodies many of the principles that underlay banner status during the first century of Qing rule and were discussed in chapter 1. The decision to expel this group from the banners marked a clear shift away from viewing status and ethnicity as separate categories, and toward viewing banner status in ethnic terms, a shift that would be replicated in the decision to expel many Hanjun and even serve as explicit precedent for it.

In its final section, the chapter turns to another decision from the 1740s that helped make expulsion possible in the following decades: the 1742 edict by the Qianlong emperor to allow Hanjun in Beijing to leave the banners voluntarily. This edict did not itself, as past scholars have generally argued, mark the beginning of expulsion; rather, its direct effects on the Hanjun were neutral at worst. However, the language used to justify it, which suggested the relative unfitness of Hanjun for banner status – to the point that they might well be better off giving it up – had similar ideological implications to the expulsion of the Household Selected Soldiers. Ethnically Han people, the emperor declared, were better suited to being commoners than banner people. Though few Hanjun seemed to agree with the emperor, judging by the number who actually took up his offer to leave the banners, it would not be long before he decided that the link between
ethnicity and status was strong enough that there was no reason to give Hanjun a choice about what status group they would belong to.

**The Hanjun Expulsion in Scholarship on the Eight Banners**

Scholars working on the banner system have generally recognized the expulsion of the Hanjun as key event in the history of the banners, and, indeed, in the history of Manchu-Han relations more generally. Though there is no extended treatment of Hanjun expulsion in either Chinese or English, there are a number of short journal articles in Chinese and smaller discussions embedded in larger works in both Chinese and English that make it possible to draw some general conclusions about the current scholarly understanding of this event. At the broadest level, most work on the Hanjun expulsion makes one or both of the following two claims: first, that the forcible Hanjun expulsions that began in the 1750s were a continuation of a 1742 policy allowing Hanjun to voluntarily leave the banners that was designed to improve the livelihoods of both Hanjun and Manchu banner people; and second, that Hanjun expulsion was a natural result of the Qing court’s longstanding policy of ethnic preference for Manchus within the banner system. Though the second of these claims emphasizes continuity in court policy toward the Hanjun, many scholars use one or both of two major mid-eighteenth-century shifts to explain why Hanjun expulsion happened when it did: first, that the Qing court had less need for the specific skills of the Hanjun, either because ethnic Manchus had acquired those very skills themselves or because the conquest of Xinjiang and the consolidation of control over China proper had made Manchu-specific skills more valuable; and second, that with the Qing clearly established as legitimate rulers of China, loyalty to one’s rightful ruler rather than service to the Qing rulers themselves became the test of one’s moral worth, a test that the Hanjun failed on
account of having abandoned the Ming. This section will discuss each of these claims in more detail, and indicate where the analysis in the next two chapters will depart from them.

The notion that the expulsion of the Hanjun was meant to deal with the “livelihood problem” (Ch. 生計問題 shengji wenti) in the banners is based on a straightforward reading of early imperial proclamations ordering expulsion, which claimed that it would allow Hanjun impoverished by rules prohibiting banner people from seeking outside employment to find more lucrative ways to support themselves while simultaneously opening up more opportunities for Manchus to find work within the banners, thereby improving their situation as well. In making this claim, the Qianlong emperor connected the forcible expulsion of Hanjun bannermen to a 1742 policy that allowed Hanjun who wished to leave the banners to do so voluntarily, arguing that forced expulsion was simply an extension of the same idea. A number of prominent scholars, from Ura Ren’ichi in the 1930s to Ding Yizhuang, Liu Xiaomeng, and Mark Elliott in the past two decades, have accepted this explanation more or less at face value. Ura, for instance, after explaining that on account of the growing Hanjun population, “there had come to be reports of their lives gradually becoming poverty-stricken,” treats the expulsion of Hanjun from Guangzhou as evidence that the 1742 policy was not a temporary expedient. Ding, though recognizing the difference between the voluntary nature of the 1742 policy and the forced expulsions of provincial garrison banner people, emphasizes the poverty of Hanjun in the

2 A straightforward version of all four of these claims appears in Fan Chuannan 范传南 and Li Yuan 李媛, “A Discussion and Analysis of the Reasons for the Expulsion of the Eight Banner Hanjun in the Qianlong Reign” 乾隆朝八旗汉军出旗原因论析, Lilun guancha 2014.11: 65-66.

3 その生計漸く窮乏を告ぐるに及んで. Ura Ren’ichi 浦廉一, “Regarding the Hanjun (Ujen Cooha)” 漢軍（烏真超哈）に就いて, in Essay Collection on Oriental History in Honor of the Sixtieth Birthday of Dr. Kuwabara 桑原博士還歴記念東洋史論叢 (Kyoto: Kōbundō Shōbō, 1931), 842-844. Liu Xiaomeng, similarly, treats the later policy as simply an extension of the former, and both as tied fundamentally to the livelihood problem. Liu Xiaomeng 刘小萌, Eight Banner People of the Qing Dynasty 清代八旗子弟 (Liaoyang, China: Liaoning minzu chubanshe, 2008), 66-70.
provinces and the lack of resistance to their expulsion, treating this as evidence that expulsion was, in fact, in their best interests.\(^4\)

The banner livelihood problem was certainly a real one, as the banner population had grown far faster than the number of available posts, and the growth of grain prices was not matched by increases in stipends, which remained generally flat.\(^5\) However, as I will argue below, it is both wrong to view the forced expulsion of garrison Hanjun as an extension of the earlier policy of voluntary removal, and it is unlikely that Hanjun saw the policy of forced expulsion as beneficial. The difference between a voluntary policy and a mandatory one should be clear enough – indeed, on the basis of that difference alone, Zhang Yuxing pronounces the policies “totally different.”\(^6\) But perhaps even more important is that only the later policy actually reduced the number of positions available for Hanjun. That is, where the early policy aimed to reduce the number of Hanjun who would have to rely on a limited number of salaried positions, the latter policy was based on a presumption that Hanjun did not belong in the banners at all and thus that banner posts should not be made available to them at all, or at least the number of Hanjun positions should be radically decreased. Moreover, though evidence on this point is limited, I will argue that the choices made by Hanjun expelled from the banners suggest

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\(^4\) Ding Yizhuang 定宜庄, “A Brief Discussion of the Garrison Hanjun Leaving the Banners in the Qianlong Period” 乾隆朝驻防汉军出旗浅议, Qingshi yanjiu tongxun 1990.3, p. 15.


that they did not view expulsion as a benefit to their livelihoods, and preferred a reliance on government stipends to the options available to them as commoners.

In addition to mistakenly suggesting that Hanjun benefitted, or at least were meant to benefit, from their expulsion, the conflation of the 1742 policy and that of the 1750s has contributed to erroneous interpretations of larger questions in Qing history. In particular, in criticizing the focus on ethnicity found in much of the predominantly American scholarship grouped together as “New Qing History,” Zhang Jian argues that the Hanjun expulsion did not have an ethnic basis. The evidence for his claim is that the initial 1742 edict excluded Hanjun descended from people who had joined the banner prior to 1644, which suggests, he argues, that Hanjun were expelled “not at all because of their Han lineage, but because, in comparison with Manchus, Mongols, and [other] Hanjun, their record of joining up with and serving the Qing court was shallowest.”\(^7\) However, because of his reliance on Liu Xiaomeng’s brief description of Hanjun expulsion, which treats forcible expulsion as an extension and continuation of the voluntary departure policy, Zhang fails to recognize that the limits to the scope of the 1742 edict were not applied to the forced expulsions, and that Hanjun had to leave the banners regardless of the length of their family’s service.\(^8\) In fact, I will argue, the expulsions represented a rejection of

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\(^7\) 并非因为其汉人血统，而是因为比起满洲、蒙古、汉军投靠和服务清廷的资历最浅. See Zhang Jian 章健, “The Sinicization of the Manchus: Challenging the Ethnic Perspective of New Qing History” 满族汉化: 对新清史族群视角的质疑, Shenzhen daxue xuebao (renwen shehui kexue ban) 30.3 (May 2013), p.158. This article was featured in a selection of articles, curated by Mario Cams and translated into English, featuring notable Mainland Chinese reactions to New Qing History, which appeared in the journal Contemporary Chinese Thought in 2016. Unfortunately, the translation of Zhang’s article (not done by Cams and evidently by a non-expert), is inadequate in various respects, and does not clearly explain the relationship between the Hanjun (translated as “Han army” and at times described as if they were not part of the banner system) and others in the banners. For the translation, see Zhang Jian, “Manchu Sinicization: Doubts on the Ethnic Perspective of New Qing History” (trans. Jeff Keller), Contemporary Chinese Thought 47.1 (September 2016): 30-43.

\(^8\) See Liu Xiaomeng, Eight Banner People of the Qing Dynasty, p.70.
a policy like that described by Zhang, in which banner status was based on service, in favor of a narrower focus on ethnic origins.

Though the scholars discussed above generally downplay the Qing court’s antagonism toward the Hanjun, and treat expulsion as a measure designed at least in part to alleviate their poverty, others treat Hanjun expulsion as the natural result of longstanding discrimination against Han in the banners. Most notably, Sun Jing argues that in the years since the conquest, Hanjun had faced greater and greater discrimination, with expulsion merely the culminating act, which turned the banners from a military organization into a “special interest group.” Though Sun also treats the 1742 and 1750s policies as fundamentally linked, she sees both as designed to benefit Manchu livelihood at the expense of the Hanjun, thus rejecting the Qing court’s own claim that both Hanjun and Manchus would benefit. Sun is also joined by Mark Elliott in seeing the court’s perception of the Hanjun as just one type of Han as central to the decision to expel them, and both scholars also point to Hanjun having “slipped back” to Chinese ways, as Elliott puts it, to explain why the Qing court and Qing officialdom more generally came to believe that they did not belong in the banners.

Though the forcible expulsion of the Hanjun was indeed based on ethnic preference for Manchus, and, as discussed in chapter 1, there was a long history of internal discrimination within the banners, I will argue that it is wrong to treat these two phenomena as inherently linked. The case of the Household Selected Soldiers will show that just 20 years before the start of forcible expulsion, when the forms of discrimination that Sun identifies – like being selected...

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for examination degrees as part of the Han quota, rather than the Manchu one – were already in place, the court continued to elevate Han slaves of Manchu bannermen to regular banner status on the basis of their service. That is, though Hanjun were certainly recognized as Han long before the first expulsions, being Han was never before seen as incompatible with holding banner status. The standard for banner membership until the late 1740s, when the Household Selected Soldiers were expelled from the banners, was service, not ethnicity, and thus the expulsions represented a true shift in approach to the banners.

Related to the claim that Hanjun were expelled due to long-standing prejudices against them is the idea that Hanjun expulsion was the result, at least in part, of Hanjun ceasing to serve a uniquely useful function for the Qing court. Ding Yizhuang argues that the dominance of Hanjun in garrisons in southern China, particularly Guangzhou and Fuzhou, reflected the fact that the early Qing rulers believed these places to be more suited to Han than to Manchus and Mongols, both in terms of climate and in terms of the type of warfare that suited the local geography and topography, which made mounted cavalry less important. But by Qianlong’s reign, she argues, Manchus had already lived among the Han for over 100 years, and had thereby acquired the skills needed to be effective even in the places that would have been most foreign to their ancestors, including knowledge of Chinese language and culture, and experience with artillery, previously the domain of the Hanjun.11 Sun Jing meanwhile argues that the important changes were not just in the skills of the Manchus, but in the military needs of the Qing court. She points out that from the Kangxi period on, the focus of Qing military activities and shifted from South China to the Northwest, leading to the establishment of new garrisons in Ningxia, Suiyuan, and Liangzhou. The resources to support these new forces, she argues, were taken away

from places like Jingkou and Hangzhou, and with that shift, it made sense to replace Hanjun soldiers with Manchus.\textsuperscript{12}

Improved Manchu knowledge of China and the Chinese language is a very reasonable explanation for the changing composition of the upper ranks of Qing officialdom, where, over the course of the eighteenth century, Hanjun gradually lost the dominant position that they had held in the immediate post-conquest years, with many of the gains going to Manchus.\textsuperscript{13} It does not, however, make sense of how the Qing state carried out Hanjun expulsion. Hanjun infantry troops in Fuzhou and Guangzhou were not replaced by Manchu infantry troops, but rather by Manchu cavalry. That is to say, there was no sense in which Manchus were filling particular roles that had once been the province of Hanjun; the court simply changed the types of posts available at the garrisons in question. Similarly, the replacement of Hanjun soldiers proficient in firearms or artillery proved a problem at both Jingkou, where many new Mongol troops would have to be retrained, and Guangzhou, where heavy artillery was simply left in the hands of the remaining Hanjun. Moreover, Sun’s suggestion that the changing geography of Qing garrisons was an important factor in expulsion does not stand up to scrutiny. Much of the military redeployment of the mid-eighteenth century involved moving troops from the near frontiers – places like Inner Mongolia and Gansu – to the far frontier in Ili, not replacing soldiers in interior China with soldiers on the frontier. Moreover, the court made substantial use of ethnically Han troops in northwestern frontier zones, and clearly considered them perfectly capable of serving in such regions. Mid-eighteenth-century redeployments provided an opportunity for expelling the Hanjun, but were not the reason for the policy.

\textsuperscript{12} Sun Jing, “A Discussion of the Change in Status of the Eight Banner Hanjun during the Qianlong Period,” p.61.

\textsuperscript{13} Though, as discussed in chapter 1, Hanjun continued to be disproportionately represented relative to Han commoners.
A different approach to changing views of the Hanjun in the mid-eighteenth century comes from the work of Pamela Crossley. Like Sun Jing, she argues that discrimination against the Hanjun had been building since the late seventeenth century, though her explanation for it is unique, as she argues that the failure to build a universal banner elite, capable of performing any function, and the resultant division of state functions between two types of specialists with different roles – Manchu bannermen and Han literati – led to a diminishing role for the Hanjun, and, eventually, their expulsion. As with Ding’s discussion of increasing Manchu familiarity with China, it seems easier to tie this sort of elite-focused argument to the decreasing Hanjun role in the upper levels of the Qing bureaucracy than to banner expulsions that focused explicitly on ordinary Hanjun.

Crossley’s explanation of the ideological shift that was used to help justify the marginalization of the Hanjun, though, is also worthy of attention. She argues that the creation of the category of *erchen* (‘twice-serving ministers’) in the 1770s served to delegitimize the service of many Hanjun in the early years of the dynasty. Rather than honoring the Hanjun as the first Han who had chosen to serve the Qing court, it cast many of them as traitors to their rightful rulers, the Ming. Yet, as Crossley herself lays out, the official biographies of the *erchen* made clear distinctions among various Han people who joined the Qing in the conquest period, and though some were treated as traitors, many were not. The actual process of expulsion made no such distinctions. That is, the late eighteenth-century discourse of the *erchen* challenged the worthiness of certain of the dynasty’s Han elite, but did not attack the Hanjun as a whole, unlike

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the policy of expulsion, which was targeted at all Hanjun in provincial garrisons. Though Crossley is right to point to the broader ways in which Hanjun service was delegitimized, beyond the expulsion policy itself, the discourse of *erchen* was not really a means of justifying expulsion.

Perhaps the most valuable feature of Crossley’s approach is her appreciation for the role of ideology in the expulsion of the Hanjun. In fact, the best explanation for the expulsion of the Hanjun is an ideological shift in the court’s approach to identity. The Qing court had long made distinctions between Manchus and Han in the banners, without ever seeing Han ethnicity as a reason that someone did not belong in the banners. It seems unlikely that expulsion was actually meant to benefit the Hanjun – at least, it is reasonably clear that most Hanjun did not see it that way – and concerns tied to practical military needs fail to explain the actual changes that took place. Similarly, arguments based on court finances fall short of a real explanation. Though scholars like Mark Elliott are right to note the huge proportion of the Qing budget that went to the banners, and the budgetary challenges thereby created, many instances of Hanjun expulsion were not designed to save any money at all, as salaries paid to Hanjun were simply given over to Manchus or Mongols. But, neither does a desire to maintain the privileges of Manchu bannermen, as suggested by Zhao Bingzhong and Bai Xinliang, constitute a complete explanation for removing the Hanjun, as some Hanjun were not replaced by anyone. Moreover, during the earlier part of the eighteenth century, when the financial burden of supporting banner people was already severe, the court found other means, like employing Hanjun in the Green


Standards, but allowing them to keep their banner status, to deal with its need to provide for a growing baner population. The problems the court faced had not really changed; its approach had. The basic plan put forth by the Qianlong emperor after expulsion got underway in Fuzhou was for all garrison Hanjun to be expelled and this became a fundamental principle independent of any other beneficial effects that expulsion might have had. Later plans for Hanjun expulsions at garrisons like Xi’an would not even make any reference to potential cost savings or increased ability to support Manchus.

The Household Selected Soldiers

The Household Selected Soldiers first appear in the Qing archives in the autumn of the ninth year of the Yongzheng reign (1731) as “slave troops” (Ma. kutule cooha). In the sixth month of that year, a group of two thousand of these soldiers had left Hohhot (Ma. Huhu hoton) under the command of a man named Acengga 阿成阿, heading to Barköl to reinforce the Qing garrison there, following a resumption of Junghar raids.\(^\text{18}\) After a series of misadventures, including having to change their route on account of the lack of fodder on their originally planned path, the loss of their guide, and an inability to resupply at Qing garrisons north of the Gurvan Saikhan mountains due to Junghar attacks, Qing commanders briefly lost track of the army’s whereabouts, and began asking merchants returning to Hohhot from Barköl whether they had run into the army along the way. Within a week of the initial reports that they had been lost, Acengga had been located, having taken his army to Jak Baidarik, a Qing encampment on the east side of Lake Böön Tsagaan, which had agricultural lands (Ma. usin tarire ba) located

\(^{18}\) Peter C. Perdue, *China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), p. 241 describes the resumption of Junghar raids in 1731 as well as Yue Zhongqi’s 岳鍾琪 request for additional troops in Barköl, though he says that request was refused. But Acengga’s intention to head for Barköl is made clear in Acengga, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0173-1112-020, YZ 9.10.25 (November 24, 1731).
nearby, perhaps along the river flowing into the lake. Jak Baidarik was regularly subject to Junghar attacks, and was short of provisions for the army, leading Acengga to request a shipment of food and other supplies.¹⁹ The final report to use the term “slave troops” to refer to this army shortly followed Acengga’s request; in it, the Qing general Marsai 馬爾賽 informed the court that he would arrange for provisions to be sent to Jak Baidarik.²⁰ The army’s next appearance in Qing records was the following year when, the supply problems having been resolved by deliveries coordinated by the Qing state merchant Fan Yubin 范毓欽, the commander at Jak Baidarik, Sirin 西琳, reported that the “two thousand Household Selected Soldiers brought by Acengga” had left Jak Baidarik heading west toward Lake Beger.²¹

In late 1732, while still on campaign, the Household Selected Soldiers were rewarded for their service to the state by being freed from slavery and made into “detached household” (Ma. encu boigon, Ch. 另戶 linghu) banner people. According to their commander Acengga, when the edict announcing this decision reached their camp, the soldiers “leapt for joy,” expressing particular happiness upon being told that their wives and children would also be allowed to join them in the banners.²² Their new status as detached households differentiated them from most

¹⁹ Some of the army’s difficulties appear in Acengga, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0173-1112-020, YZ 9.10.25 (November 24, 1731), while descriptions of attempts to locate the army, and the attacks on Qing outposts in Aji and Biji in central Outer Mongolia are found in Nayantai 纳延泰, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0171-1112-017, YZ 9.10.17 (November 16, 1731).

²⁰ Marsai, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0174-1124-003, YZ 9.10.28 (November 27, 1731).

²¹ acengga i gaifi gajiha juwe minggan booi sonjoho cooha. Sirin, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0171-0385-015, YZ 10.6.21 (August 11, 1732). The continuity between the “kutule cooha” mentioned in earlier reports and the “booi sonjoho cooha” who are discussed for the remainder of the chapter is made clear through this memorial, which shows that the Household Selected Soldiers were in the same place at the same time, with the same number of men, under the same commander, as the group formerly referred to as “banner slave soldiers.” For Fan Yubin’s role in supplying the Qing army in Mongolia and Xinjiang, see Kwangmin Kim, “Saintly Brokers: Uyghur Muslims, Trade, and the Making of Qing Central Asia, 1696-1814” (PhD diss., University of California at Berkeley, 2008), 372-375.

²² Acengga, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0173-1143-008, YZ 10.10.24 (December 11, 1732).
households established by formerly enslaved banner people. According to Mark Elliott, the detached household category was usually applied to descendants of regular banner people who established their own independent households but lacked their own salaried post in the banners. The households of former bondservants or slaves granted the right to establish independent households due to meritorious military service were made instead into “entailed households” (Ma. dangse faksalaha boigon, Ch. 開戶 kaihu). Moreover, in 1729, even those descendants of bondservants or slaves who had managed to obtain detached household status had been stripped of that status, and were “separately recorded in the registers” (Ma. encu dangse de ejebuhe, Ch. 另記檔案 ling ji dang’an), a term signifying that they, like entailed households, were secondary status banner people.23

For the Yongzheng emperor to have made the Household Selected Soldiers into detached households not only differentiated them from other former banner slaves, but also benefited them greatly. Neither members of entailed households nor those in separate-register households were eligible for regular appointments, while men in detached households were allowed to be employed equally with regular banner people (Ma. jingkini boigon, Ch. 正戶 zhenghu). The

23 Mark C. Elliott, “Ethnicity in the Qing Eight Banners,” in Empire at the Margins: Culture, Ethnicity, and Frontier in Early Modern China, ed. Pamela Kyle Crossley, Helen F. Siu, and Donald S. Sutton, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), p. 48-49. In The Manchu Way (pp. 323-324), Elliott writes that “dangse araha boigon” was the Manchu term used for “entailed households” (Ch. 開戶 kaihu) and that “dangse faskalaha boigon” referred to a category called “separate-register households” (Ch. 另記檔案戶 ling ji dang’an hu). However, I have never encountered any uses of the term “dangse araha boignon” and Manchu language documents seem to use “dangse faksalaha boignon” where 開戶 would be used in Chinese. Encu dangse de ejebuhe urse is used where Chinese documents refer to 另記檔案. Since encu dangse de ejebuhe has a literal meaning (“recorded in the separate registers”) like that of the official Chinese term 另記檔案 ling ji dang’an (“separately recorded in the registers”), I surmise that it is in fact the Manchu equivalent of that term. In neither Chinese nor Manchu is this term ever used to describe households (Ma. boigon, Ch. 戶 hu), but only people (as in Ma. encu dangse de ejebuhe urse or Ch. 另記檔案之人 ling ji dang’an zhi ren), and is in fact used most commonly as a verb, usually instructing that a certain person or group of people be “separately recorded in the registers.” Thus, it seems that there was in fact no formal category called “separate-register households” and thus this status was not strictly analogous to that of detached or entailed households.
Household Selected Soldiers, like others in detached households, received posts in the newly established Suiyuan 綏遠 (Ma. goroki be elhe obuha hoton, located in present-day Hohhot) garrison and the salaries and grain stipends that came with those posts. Each of the two thousand men employed was to receive two tael per month in silver, as well as grain sufficient to feed five people, with half the grain stipend also commuted to cash at a fixed rate. For those soldiers for whom this proved insufficient, presumably those with larger families, garrison officials were authorized to pay them an additional 50 percent of their regular salary and grain. These salaries were on par with those paid to regular garrison bannermen.

The emancipation of the Household Selected Soldiers did not come without compensation for their previous owners in the capital. The initial edict granting them their freedom ordered that the state pay their original masters a “body price” (Ma. beyei hūda, Ch. 身價 shenjia) for each of the newly manumitted slaves, “from unweaned babies on” (Ma. huhuri juse ci aname). The body prices of the soldiers themselves had apparently been paid when they were initially sent out on campaign, at a rate of one hundred tael of silver per person, totaling two hundred thousand tael, a very substantial sum. A few years later, in 1736, when the Household Selected Soldiers finally returned from the frontier to take up their posts in Suiyuan, the court of the newly enthroned Qianlong emperor issued payment for the dependents of these soldiers, though at a much lower rate, offering 10 tael of silver each for the soldiers’ “fathers,

24 Yunlu 允祿, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0174-1490-006, QL 1.7.17 (August 23, 1736).


26 Yunlu, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0174-1490-006, QL 1.7.17 (August 23, 1736).

27 Madeleine Zelin, The Magistrate’s Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in Eighteenth-Century Ch’ing China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), pp. 158-159 gives the total proposed budget of Anhui province in 1729, just two years earlier, as 179,244 tael.
mothers, women, and children.”28 The compensation issued by the Qing court clearly demonstrates the original status of the Household Selected Soldiers; they were not simply members of bondservant banners, but privately owned slaves. Moreover, it strongly suggests that the Qing state had great difficulty finding enough banner soldiers to fight in the Jungar campaigns, as it was willing to spend a very considerable sum in order to increase the size of its banner armies in the west. Though the banner system was already creating financial pressures, those pressures do not seem to have dictated how the banners were managed, and the court was willing to spend large sums to maintain the strength of banner forces.

The Household Selected Soldiers remained a coherent group even after they were put into the regular banners and divided according to their ethnic origins. According to a 1736 memorial, the Yongzheng-era edict issued when they were first sent on campaign had said: “once they have achieved merit and returned, make all of them into detached households. If they are Manchu or Mongol, put them in the Manchu or Mongol banners, if they are Chinese, put them in the Hanjun banners.”29 Surviving records do not indicate how the ethnic division of the Household Selected Soldiers broke down numerically, though as former slaves, they were likely overwhelmingly Han. Regardless, the language of the edict is another example of how ethnicity and banner category were connected during the early eighteenth century – the Manchu banners were for ethnic Manchus, the Hanjun banners for ethnic Han. Yet, despite this clear attention to ethnic distinctions, the Household Selected Soldiers continued to be viewed as sharing a single identity that overlapped with, if not largely displaced, their distinct ethnic identities. While most banner people were referred to by the state by some combination of their ethnic affiliation and their

28 eseĩ ama eme hehe juse. Yunlu, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0174-1490-006, QL 1.7.17 (August 23, 1736).

banner color, records regarding the Household Selected Soldiers never mention those details, instead continuing to refer to them collectively as a single institution.

The Household Selected Soldiers remained institutionally distinct from other banner people in another important way. Lieutenants (Ma. *funde bošokū*, Ch. 驍騎校 *xiaoqixiao*), the lowest ranking banner officers, who were selected from among the ranks of the Household Selected Soldiers, as opposed to officers appointed from the regular banners to manage them, were not treated as real officers. One memorial referred to them as receiving “empty epaulettes” (Ma. *untuhun jingse*) and said that “because they are not at all legitimate lieutenants, [they should] receive salaries and grain stipends just like those of the Household Selected Soldiers.”

That is to say, though lieutenants needed to be appointed for practical military purposes, the Household Selected Soldiers lacked the right to hold officer posts, and so even those appointed to posts as lieutenants would not receive higher salaries. Thus, though it provided them with more privileges than were available to most former banner slaves, the Qing state seems not to have forgotten their origins; the Household Selected Soldiers remained unequal to regular banner people.

The idea that people of less secure banner status, like former slaves, could receive detached household banner status as a result of their service was not limited to the Household Selected Soldiers. Indeed, they served as a precedent for granting regular banner status to others who fought in frontier military campaigns. In 1739, Plain Blue Mongol Banner colonel Sanjab 三扎布 requested that the descendants of those entailed householders who died in battle against the Junghars at Lake Khoton and Usun Juil be elevated to detached household status, and allowed to

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30 umai jingkini *funde bošokū* waka be dahame inu booi sonjoho coohai emu adali ciyanliyang bele bahabukini. Ibid.
receive posts in the cavalry, not just the infantry posts to which they had previously been limited. In support of his claim, he referred to the case of the Household Selected Soldiers, who for “having served vigorously” (Ma. faššame yabufi) had been made into detached householders, along with their families. Surely, he argued, if the men who had fought at Lake Khoton and Usun Juil had survived, they would have received the same favor, and their sons and grandsons would have been eligible for better-paying posts in the cavalry. Since their fathers and grandfathers had died for the dynasty, they deserved to receive the same favor as had the Household Selected Soldiers.

Even those men who had made false claims to higher status than they held were to be eligible for rewards of this sort, again following the Household Selected Soldier precedent. The case of Alima is a good example. Alima was an entailed household bannerman who had made up a farfetched life story to claim to be a Mongol bannerman of detached household status. According to Alima, he and his brothers were orphans from the Mongol steppe who had been taken into the household of a Mongol bannerman from Beijing named Baldzang, and accompanied his son Bandi to Jiangning when Bandi was appointed to a post there. His eldest brother Ananda, he claimed, had then become a soldier there. After a long investigation, Alima’s entire story was revealed to be a lie. He was in fact a former household slave of a man named Bašiu, his elder brother’s actual name was Hasigar, and Ananda was really the name of Bandi’s

31 Lake Khoton is referred to as hotong hūrga. Another archival document refers to a battle that occurred at hotong hūrga noor in YZ 9 (1731). See Coldo 鮑勒多, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0171-0220-002, QL 4.9.6 (October 8, 1739). Since noor is the Mongolian word for lake, and the Qing fought a major battle against the Junghars at Lake Khoton in 1731, it seems probable that this is the battle in question. As the description of the case suggests, 80 percent of the ten thousand Qing troops who fought in this battle were wiped out. See Perdue, China Marches West, p. 254. I have been unable to identify “usun juil.”

32 Sanjab, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0173-1212-017, QL 3.12.9 (January 18, 1739).

33 Note that this is not the same Alima discussed in Elliott, The Manchu Way, p.345.
son, which Alima had likely appropriated to bolster his case for regular banner status, which the real Ananda possessed (and which any real brother of his would have thus have possessed as well). Unfortunately for Alima, his fellow soldiers, several of his relatives, and a variety of official documents confirmed that his story was false, a fact which should have made him subject to severe punishment, and required the return of both him and his three sons, two of whom, Sekba and Senggunjab, had managed to obtain posts as translation clerks, or bithesi, to the entailed household registers. However, it turned out that Alima had also fought in the battle at Lake Khoton – he was apparently one of the few survivors – and, as the document describing his case repeatedly mentioned, had not fled from battle (Ma. dain de tucikekù). As a result he had received a hereditary rank, which he had passed to his third son Donjuk, and had earned the right to be raised to detached household status. Moreover, following the precedent of the Household Selected Soldiers, who had been given the right to hold low-level official posts, his sons were eligible to keep their posts as bithesi, which would not have been the case if the family had been demoted. Once again, brave service in a frontier war carried the reward of improved banner status, even for a huckster like Alima.  

Despite the somewhat generous treatment offered to the Household Selected Soldiers at their creation and for the next fifteen years, they would become the earliest focus of Qianlong-era efforts to forcibly remove people deemed to lack a sufficient claim to banner status from the Eight Banners. In 1746, Suiyuan general Buhi 補熙 wrote a memorial stating that, because the Household Selected Soldiers had grown in population, “the salaries and grain stipends that they received were in excess of what was necessary.”

34 Coldo 绌勒多, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0171-0220-002, QL 4.9.6 (October 8, 1739)

35 This date is a little uncertain – the memorial referred to here is quoted in a memorial from late 1746, without a date being mentioned. My assumption is that the memorial quoted was submitted earlier that same year.
receive are insufficient to support the people of their households.” Moreover, their status as detached householders meant that, when a soldier died or retired from his post, his brothers did not have the right to inherit his position. Because of this, an increasing number of families did not even have a member who held a salaried post. According to Buhi, there were 1,700 members of households that either lacked a man with a salaried position or received a salary insufficient to support all of the people in them.

In response to Buhi’s memorial, Grand Councilor (Ma. coohai nashūn i amban, Ch. 軍機大臣 junji dachen) Necin 訥親, likely speaking for the Grand Council (Ma. coohai nashūn i ba, Ch. 軍機處 junji chu) as a whole, suggested that the problem could not be resolved by simple adjustments. There had already been, he wrote, problems with maintaining the livelihoods of the soldiers in Suiyuan, which the court had dealt with by granting them their pay entirely in silver instead of a mix of silver and grain and by providing them with gifts of silver to pay off their debts. Since none of this had worked, a new approach was required. The solution Necin proposed is surprising, because it did not conform to the system of ethnic division that the Qing seemed to employ in managing its population, one in which, as we have already seen, Manchus in the Household Selected Soldiers were to be enrolled in the Manchu banners, Mongols in the Mongol banners, and Han in the Hanjun banners.

Instead, Necin argued, the court should consider transferring the Household Selected Soldiers into the Chahar Eight Banners. Though the Chahars were a Mongol group that had initially submitted to Qing rule in 1635, prior to the conquest of China, the Chahar banners were distinct from the Mongol Eight Banners. At the same time, they were not among the forty-nine

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36 ceni bahara ciyanliyang. bele. boigon anggala be ujire de isirakū. Necin, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0171-0254-010.1, QL 11.8.30 (October 14, 1746).
“banners” of Inner Mongolia, an entirely different form of socio-political organization, which had been created by fixing the membership and territory of the previously fluid and nomadic political units of the region, and were ruled by jasaks chosen from among their own nobility. Rather, they were their own separate division of the Qing’s Eight Banner system, with their own banner companies, divided according to the same system of banner colors applied to the other Eight Banner divisions.

According to Necin, there were many available posts in the Chahar banners, whose soldiers were expected to support themselves through herding, in a nomadized version of the classic Chinese 屯田 tuntian system. Thus, transferring the Household Selected Soldiers to the Chahar banners would fill the open posts in the banners, relieve the state of the need to pay their salaries, and provide the Household Selected Soldiers with a source of livelihood, “benefitting both sides” (Ma. juwe de gemu tusa ombi). Necin argued that there was precedent for this policy. In 1732, a group of two thousand Mongol herders under the authority of Mongol princes and officials (Ma. wang ambasai jafa adun suruk i urse) – and thus presumably outside the banner system – who were “barely eking out an existence” (Ma. angga sulfara), were selected on the basis of their “manliness” (Ma. haha sain), divided into nineteen companies (Ma. niru) and added to the Chahar banners, bringing the total number of Chahar companies to one hundred.


38 Though Elliott states that the Chahar were an “auxiliary” force, not structurally linked to the Eight Banners (The Manchu Way, 74), in fact until 1762, Mongol Eight Banner generals served simultaneously as Chahar banner commanders, and like the other Eight Banner divisions, the Chahar banners were divided into their own companies (Ma. niru, Ch. 佐領 zuoling). See Da-li-zha-bu 达力扎布, “A Brief Examination of the Question of the Early Qing Establishment of the Chahar Banners” 清初察哈尔设旗问题考略, Nei Menggu daxue xuebao 31.1 (January 1999): 38-44, which also argues that the Chahar eight banners were in fact established immediately following their submission to the Qing in 1635, giving them an independent history as long as that of the Mongol Eight Banners, and not after the 1675 rebellion of Borni.

39 Necin, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0171-0254-010.1, QL 11.8.30 (October 14, 1746).
If Necin were operating according to an ethnic logic, this precedent would not seem to be applicable to the Household Selected Soldiers. After all, the people who had been added to the Chahar banners fourteen years earlier were themselves Mongols, already living as herders, and thus, perhaps, logical additions to Chahar banners that were themselves composed of Mongol herders. This was a very different situation from that of the Household Selected Soldiers, few if any of whom were Mongols, and none of whom already lived as herders. An idea that Mongols could be expected to support themselves as herders within the Chahar banners as a consequence of their ethnicity might make sense as an explanation of the 1732 case, but it certainly did not in 1746. Instead, Necin seems to have been adopting a certain sort of administrative logic tied to banner status – the Household Selected Soldiers, like the Mongol herders, were the responsibility of the Qing state and its close allies, and their livelihoods were seen as precarious. Thus, the problem of the Household Selected Soldiers could be resolved the same way as the case of the Mongol herders – their situations were fundamentally analogous, even if their ethnic characteristics were entirely different.

The details of Necin’s proposal for the Household Selected Soldiers make clear that he did not see ethnic categories as a fundamental obstacle to their incorporation into the Chahar banners. Necin suggested that each year, twenty to thirty families per banner of those families without a salaried banner soldier or with one whose salary was too small to support the family would be selected to move to the Chahar banner lands, where they would be divided among the various Chahar banner companies (Ma. *nirude dendeme*).\(^40\) Each household was to receive

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\(^40\) This is an important point because it means that the Household Selected Soldiers would cease to be a coherent entity, since they would not have their own companies (Ma. *niru*). Moreover, it challenges our standard understanding of the ethnic basis of the Qing banner system (as explained in Elliott, “Ethnicity in the Qing Eight Banners,” p. 46), according to which even when a particular ethnic banner category had soldiers of a different ethnic background, individual companies would consist entirely of soldiers of one ethnicity. Necin did not seem to see this principle as an obstacle to his plan. In addition, his memorial proposed that qualified Household Selected Soldiers
thirty taels of silver for moving expenses and then, upon arrival in their new homes, six cows, twenty sheep (total of rams and ewes), two geldings, four female foals, and one Mongol yurt. This property was to serve as the basis for their support, though there would also still be some stipend-carrying posts for soldiers. Necin did not assume that the new arrivals would know how to productively manage these small herds, and they would be entrusted to supervisors (Ma. uherī da) who would “properly supervise, guide, and instruct them” (Ma. cembe saikan tuwaśatame jorišame tacibume) so that they would, “like Mongols [Ma. Monggoso i adali], be made to diligently breed their horses and livestock, and not come to carelessly squander the property granted them by letting their herds die.”

This final statement, with its direct comparison to Mongols, suggests that Necin was certainly aware of ethnic categories, and saw the lifestyle that the Household Selected Soldiers would be adopting under his proposal as one associated with Mongols. Moreover, it was a way of life that they would have to learn, which would require appropriate supervision and training. Yet, at a more fundamental level, it was a perfectly appropriate way of life for them, it was one they were capable of learning, and, for Necin, the fact that the people in question were not themselves Mongols was not an insurmountable obstacle to them entering the Chahar banners and becoming Mongol-like. Ethnic categories mattered, but just as with expectations that Hanjun adopt the Manchu Way, he understood cultural practice as flexible.

One month after he submitted his proposal, Necin received a letter from fellow grand councilor Fuheng 傅恒, transmitting an edict from the Qianlong emperor rejecting Necin’s plan.

could be used as lieutenants (Ma. funde bošoku) in their new Chahar companies, suggesting that they would cease to be distinguished from the original members of these companies.

41 Monggosoi adali morin ulha be fuxembume banjire babe kicebume. šangnaha hethe ulha be balai fayara gasīhiyabure de isiburakā. Necin, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0171-0254-010.1, QL 11.8.30 (October 14, 1746).
The justification for rejecting the plan was a memorial by Suiyuan garrison general Buhi suggesting that he did not consider the plan to be feasible, but the emperor’s decision to endorse Buhi’s judgment over that of the Grand Council is likely an indication that his own position on the issue already was in line with Buhi’s. According to the edict, Buhi memorialized against Necin’s proposal on the following grounds:

They [the Household Selected Soldiers] cannot live by breeding livestock. After they arrive in that place and have completely consumed the property given to them, they will come to be unable to live normally. His Majesty’s profound grace will come to be wasted, and they may not be able to get by.\(^{42}\)

Buhi’s memorial thus reflected a belief that the Household Selected Soldiers were incapable of living as herders. He did not, however, frame this claim in ethnic terms – he may well have simply believed that their lack of experience with herding would lead to problems.

Qianlong’s statement of his own views on the matter made a more direct link to ethnicity. According to his edict, the Household Selected Soldiers would “not be able to live by breeding livestock on the Mongol steppe [Ma. Monggo tala de].”\(^{43}\) The emperor thus explicitly rejected Necin’s understanding of ethnicity, according to which the people in question could learn to live “like Mongols.” For the Qianlong emperor, the steppe was a Mongol space, herding was a Mongol lifestyle, and the Household Selected Soldiers, who were not Mongols, could not be expected to live in such a space or practice such a lifestyle. Necin was not reprimanded for his views, as they had not challenged an orthodoxy that was already in place, but his belief in cultural flexibility was no longer in accord with the emperor’s views. That is to say, the requirements of one’s status, Qianlong suggested, should conform to one’s ethnic background.

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\(^{42}\) *ese ulha be fusembume banjime bahanarakū. tubade isinafi šangnaha hethe be fayame wajiha manggi. an i banjime muterakvū de isinafi. ejen i ujen kesi inu mekele ombi yabume banjinarakū gese. Fuheng, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0171-0254-010.2, QL 11.9.26 (November 9, 1746).*

Qianlong’s solution to the problem of the Household Selected Soldiers, which he appears to have come up with independently of any ministerial suggestion, confirmed this new position; instead of transferring some of the Household Selected Soldiers to the Chahar banners, he decreed that “should be managed by making them into Green Standard soldiers.”

Necin was far from a marginal figure in the Qing court. As a grand councilor, he was one of the highest ranking officials in the empire, whose policy views must have been well within the mainstream, and certainly not in fundamental opposition to the known views of the Qianlong emperor at that time. Thus, even if his flexibility toward ethnicity was not universally shared – and since this proposal was rejected, it certainly wasn’t – nothing about his memorial suggests that he thought his own plan would be received as a radical departure how the banners were usually managed. Moreover, his memorial was framed as a proposal produced after discussion among multiple high-ranking officials, presumably his fellow grand councilors, and thus likely reflects the views of the council as a whole, or at least views seen as reasonable by multiple high officials. Though his proposal might appear bizarre, that it was offered before the possibility of expelling the Household Selected Soldiers was even suggested is strong evidence that existing ideas of banner status treated that status as nearly inviolable; expulsion was not yet even an option. Thus, it was the rejection of Necin’s plan to move the Household Selected Soldiers to the Chahar banners and the emperor’s decision that they should instead be transferred to the Green Standards that marked the beginning a shift in Qing policy on ethnicity and status, one that would come to fruition in the expulsion of the Hanjun, which began just a few years later.

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44 esebe uthai niowanggiyan tui cooha obume icihiyaci acambi. Ibid.

45 The opening to the memorial is signed “Necin, et al” (Ma. Necin se) and the edict responding to it begins, “you all discussed and memorialized” (Ma. suweni gisurefi wesimbuhe).
The transfer of the Household Selected Soldiers to the Green Standard Army was a complicated process, in large part due to the very different relationship of the state to banner people and to soldiers of commoner status. Of the 2,400 men in the Household Selected Soldiers who held salaried posts, 500 were to be sent to a frontier Green Standard garrison at Jingyuan 靖遠, while the remaining 1,900 were to be divided among Green Standard companies in Shanxi and Zhili provinces. Some aspects of the transfer were quite straightforward. For instance, officers to hold the Green Standard posts of lieutenant (Ma. ciyandzung, Ch. 千總 qianzong) and sub-lieutenant (Ma. badzung, Ch. 把總 bazong) were to be selected from among the men holding the banner posts of lieutenant (Ma. funde bošokü, Ch. 驍騎校 xiaoqixiao) and corporal (Ma. bošokü, Ch. 領催 lingcui) respectively. But in other ways, the transfer from the banners to the Green Standard Army was hampered by the incommensurability of the two systems. This sort of problem is perhaps best exemplified in the question of what was to be done with the elderly, disabled, orphaned, and widowed people in the Household Selected Soldiers: that is, those who could not support themselves and had no immediate family members that they could rely on. As Suiyuan garrison general Buhi pointed out, “if these people [were] sent [to the Green Standards], there truly would be nothing for them to rely on.” 46 This was because, unlike the banners, which constituted a status category including entire populations, not just soldiers, and were responsible for the support of all people holding banner status, the Green Standard Army was a mere military apparatus, responsible for the salaries of its soldiers, but nothing else. Buhi seems to have considered the transfer of people who had been promised state support and no longer had the means to support themselves to a system that would not provide for them to have been unethical.

46 aika esebe uggici. yargiyan i nikere akดา ba akú. Buhi, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0171-0179-001, QL 12.1.20 (February 28, 1747).
Instead, he proposed, the people in question should remain at the Suiyuan garrison, and continue to be supported by half-stipends (Ma. *hontoho ciyanliyang*) either for the rest of their lives, or, in the case of orphans, until they reached the age of eighteen and could be sent to the Green Standards to serve as soldiers. This proposal was taken up by the Grand Council, and though Necin seemed to be skeptical that there were really all that many people in the Household Selected Soldiers who lacked any relatives who could support them, the Qing court allowed that “if there [were] aged, disabled, or widowed [people] who truly had no children and were alone,” the Suiyuan garrison would be responsible for taking care of them until their demise.47

Buhi’s proposal for orphans under the age of eighteen was indeed put into practice. Six years later, in 1753, the new general of the Suiyuan garrison, Fucang 富昌, wrote a memorial to the court that discussed the children who continued to be raised there. At that time, thirty young children who were “still awaiting [reaching] the age of eighteen, after which they would be transferred to the Green Standard garrison to become soldiers,” remained at Suiyuan.48 Fucang was writing to the court because, though his instructions from the Board of War were to send these children to Green Standard garrisons when they came of age [Ma. *se de isinafi*], he had not been allocated any funds to pay for the costs of their transfer and their travel provisions [Ma. *kunesun i menggun*]. This problem was quickly remedied by authorizing the use of one of the garrison’s other funds, but the continued discussion of the issue several years after the initial transfer demonstrates that the court did maintain its commitment to support those among the

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47 *yargiyan i juse akū sakdaka fadagalaha, anggasi emteli oci*. Necin, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0171-0258-009, QL 12.1.28 (March 8, 1747).

48 *ne kemuni juwan jakūn se aliyafi niowanggiyan turun i kāwaran de cooha obume guribure.*
Household Selected Soldiers who would have lost any means of support had they been transferred to the Green Standards initially.\textsuperscript{49}

The aged, orphaned, and infirm were not the only people in the Household Selected Soldiers who could not be easily transferred to the Green Standards. In addition, Buhi brought up the issue of people who had taken the translation exams and had been selected to receive posts as \textit{bithesi}.\textsuperscript{50} There were only two such people among the Household Selected Soldiers, but, as Buhi pointed out, “in the Green Standards, there is no business requiring Manchu writing” and, moreover, “because in the Suiyuan garrison there are very few people who know how to translate, will you either retain these [people] in Suiyuan to await [appointment] or will you wastefully order that they be transferred to be used in some post in the Green Standards?”\textsuperscript{51}

Knowledge of Manchu, Buhi recognized, was a skill useful to banner service, but not to service in the Green Standards. As such, to transfer people who had demonstrated their ability to use Manchu out of the banners would have been a waste of their skills, particularly given the need for such skills in the Suiyuan garrison itself.

The court’s response to Buhi’s proposal that the expectant \textit{bithesi} be retained at the garrison was somewhat surprising. Necin began by reprimanding Buhi for having allowed the men in question to take the translation examinations in the first place, before allowing them to be retained in the Suiyuan garrison anyway:

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{49} Fucang, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0172-0545-005, QL 18.4.15 (May 17, 1753).

\textsuperscript{50} \textit{Bithesi} were principally responsible for translation between Manchu and Chinese. The men in question were “expectant clerks” (Ma. \textit{aliyara bithesi}) – meaning that they had not yet been appointed to a specific post, but were in line to receive one. Presumably, any actual \textit{bithesi} from among the Household Selected Soldiers would have been allowed to simply remain in their old posts.

\textsuperscript{51} goroki be elhe obuha hoton i ubaliyambume bahanara niyalma umesi komso be dahame. eici esebe an i goroki be elhe obuha hoton de bibufi babe aliyabure. eici niowanggiyan tui ing ni ai oron de halafi baiatalabure babe. bairengge waliyame afabufi gisurebureo. Buhi, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0171-0179-001, QL 12.1.20 (February 28, 1747).
\end{quote}
Bithesi in provincial garrisons are all selected from among soldiers. Previously, when General Buhi et. al. sent a letter to the Board inquiring as to whether or not it was permissible for people recorded in the separate registers at Youwei 右衛 to take the bithesi examination, the Board responded: “it is not in accord with regulations”. The Household Selected Soldiers in this case are like people recorded in the separate registers, and so for the said general to have originally had them examined for positions as bithesi was thus not in accord with regulations. Now, although they are awaiting posts as bithesi, they still have not received posts and are being retained within the regular quota of soldiers. In this matter of the Household Selected Soldiers, all are to be transferred, but these two people alone will be retained [at Suiyuan].”

Necin’s response actually seems to have strengthened Buhi’s claim that demonstrated Manchu ability gave someone a claim to banner status, even as it undermined the position of the Household Selected Soldiers as a whole. Necin described the Household Selected Soldiers as a whole as being like people in separate-register households (discussed above) and thus excluded from many of the regular privileges of banner people, including the right to take the translation examinations to become bithesi. This was a major shift from how the Household Selected Soldiers had been previously understood, both at the time they were created and in documents from the Qianlong reign, in which they were explicitly described as “detached households” (Ma. encu boigon), whose right to take the translation exams was indisputable. Necin seems to have been aware that the Household Selected Soldiers were not in fact separate-register households, and perhaps that they had not actually been prohibited from taking the exams. The precedent he cited was one in which actual separate-register people had not been allowed to try to become

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52 goloi hoton i bithesi gemu coohai urse ci sonjome gaimbi. erei onggolo jiyanggiyūn buhi se. ici ergi wei i encu dangsede ejebuhe urse be bithesi simnebuci ojoro ojorakū babe jurgan de dacilame bithe unggihie de. jurgan ci kooli de acanarakū seme bederebuhebi. ere hacin i booi sonjoho cooha. uthai encu dangsede ejebuhe ursei adali. harangga jiyanggiyūn se neneme esebe bithesi de simnebuhengge. uthai kooli de acanarakv. te udu bithesi i oron be aiyacibe. kemuni oron bahara unde. an i coohai ton i dorgide bimbime. ere hacin i booi sonjoho jergi cooha be. gemu guribume unggire be dahame. damu ere juwe niyalmai teile bihume. Necin, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0171-0258-009, QL 12.1.28 (March 8, 1747).

53 The term encu boigon is used for the Household Selected Soldiers in Irešen, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0171-0221-003, QL5.5.7 (May 31, 1740), as well as in Yunlu, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0174-1490-006, QL 1.7.17 (August 23, 1736).
"bithesi, and the Household Selected Soldiers are simply described as being “like” (Ma. adali) this group. This claim thus seems to be an attempt to reposition the status identity of the Household Selected Soldiers by making legal and rhetorical comparisons between them and a group already understood not to be less deserving of banner status. Yet, despite declaring the two men having taking the translation exams to have been illegal, Necin still allowed them to remain with the banners at Suiyuan. He, like Buhi, recognized that ability in Manchu was a talent that only served a purpose for banner people, a fact which seemed to trump the supposed irregularity in how the men in question had acquired their positions in the first place. Banner people, especially those who had been recast as illegitimate banner people in the separate-registers, could be removed from the banners and sent to the Green Standards, but sending away translators would have been a waste of scarce resources.

A final problem related to the transfer arose from a principle similar to the one that produced difficulties in regards to those people from among the Household Selected Soldiers without an able-bodied man to support them – in this case, the principle that the banners existed in part to provide support to entire households, while the Green Standards simply paid salaries to individual soldiers. Buhi pointed out that when the Household Selected Soldiers had first been granted banner posts, because the initially proposed stipends were not enough to support large families, the emperor had actually granted them supplemental payments in grain. However, once they were transferred to the Green Standards, the salaries of each soldier would drop below even the base-level stipend of a banner soldier, to a mere one tael of silver and three dou (Ma.
hiyase)\textsuperscript{54} of grain per month.\textsuperscript{55} As Buhi explained, households had anywhere from three to twelve people relying on the salary of a single soldier, and the three dou of grain paid to Green Standard soldiers, “barely suffices for two or three people [Ma. manggai juwe ilan anggala de isimbi],” never mind a household of twelve. To remedy this problem, Buhi proposed that the governors-general and governors responsible for the Green Standard garrisons in question:

Calculate the number of people greater than three [in a household], and, if there are official fields available, taking into account the number of persons in the households in question, give then greater or lesser amounts of land. If there are no official fields available, they should receive money necessary to both acquire the mortgage on a field (Ma. usin diyalara)\textsuperscript{56} and rent a home, in recompense for which, after three years have passed and they have accumulated a bit of property, the term will expire and they will repay the principal.\textsuperscript{57}

Though no official response to this proposal appears to be extant in the archives, and the imperial rescript on Buhi’s memorial simply ordered the Grand Council to discuss the matter, it demonstrates again that the officials involved in the transfer understood that it represented a retreat from promises of support made to the Household Selected Soldiers when they were granted banner status, and that they were attempting to mitigate the effects of that retreat on the people involved.

\textsuperscript{54} One dou/hiyase was equal to about ten liters of grain. See Endymion Wilkinson, \textit{Chinese History: A New Manual}, 4\textsuperscript{th} ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2015), pp. 555-556.

\textsuperscript{55} According to Buhi, their allotment as banner people was one hu (Ma. hule), two dou, five sheng (Ma. moro) per month – which is to say, more than four times as much (about 125 liters of grain as opposed to 30) as it would be when they moved to the Green Standards.

\textsuperscript{56} The Manchu word in question is the Manchu form of the Chinese word dian 典, a type of mortgage that “was often a prelude to an outright sale of the land, [in which] the person who paid the dian would often take control over the land.” See Thomas Buoye, “Litigation, Legitimacy, and Lethal Violence” in Madeleine Zelin, Jonathan K. Ocko, and Robert Gardella, eds. \textit{Contract and Property in Early Modern China: Rational Choice in Political Science} (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), 119. So the plan here was for households to take over the land in question and farm it themselves, not simply to receive the interest on a loan to the person mortgaging the land.

\textsuperscript{57} ilan anggala ci weshiun niyalma be baicafe. siden i usin bici. ese booi anggala labdu komso be tuwame. usin i mu labdu komso be bodore bahabuki. aika usin akā oci usin diyalara boo turire menggun be juwe bahabufi ilan aniya dulefi majihe hethe ilibuha manggi. bilagan bilafi da hacin de toodabuki. Buhi, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0171-0179-001, QL 12.1.20 (February 28, 1747).
Though the supposed reason for transferring the Household Selected Soldiers was that the garrison was no longer able to support them, in a foreshadowing of what would happen to Hanjun garrisons beginning less than a decade later, the positions previously held by the Household Selected Soldiers were not simply eliminated – instead, most of them were to be filled by other bannermen. According to the instructions that Buhi received from the Board of War and the Grand Council, though 700 of the 2,400 posts originally allotted to the Household Selected Soldiers would be eliminated, 1,200 of them would be filled by detached household Manchus from the capital, while 500 would be filled by unemployed (Ma. *sula*) bannermen from the Suiyuan garrison. In the case of this latter group, there was no specification as to whether Manchus, Mongols, or Hanjun were to be used, suggesting perhaps that the Hanjun themselves were not yet seen as undeserving of banner posts.\(^5\) In any case, that most of the Household Selected Soldiers were to be replaced shows that though financial considerations may have played a role, the state was willing to spend the money needed to support a large banner population at Suiyuan, as long as it was benefitting the right people. This shift in personnel may not, however, have been planned from the beginning, unlike what would happen in Hanjun garrisons over the next few decades. The plan to bring in Manchus from the capital does not appear in any memorial until seven months after Buhi’s initial report that funds were insufficient to adequately support the Household Selected Soldiers, and six months after the decision to transfer the latter group to the Green Standards. It thus seems possible that the model for the policy of expelling Hanjun from the banners and replacing them with Manchus was in fact

\(^5\) All three groups were found in the Suiyuan garrison. In fact, the very same document describes a decision to split up the soldiers in a banner unit transferred from Rehe into Manchu, Mongol, and Hanjun companies on the basis of their ethnic status (five hundred “Old Chinese” [Ma. *fe Nikan*] were to be divided among the eight Hanjun companies at Suiyuan), where they had previously been “mixed among the forty companies, without any regard to whether they were Manchu, Mongol or Hanjun [Ma. *umai Manju. Monggo. Ujen Cooha be bodohakâ. dehi niru de barambufi"]'). Buhi, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0171-0179-004, QL 12.03.23 (May 2, 1747).
developed over the course of discussions about how to deal with the Household Selected Soldiers.

The final element of the transfer to be managed was the actual logistics of incorporating the Household Selected Soldiers into their new Green Standard units. The basic procedure was determined by Zhili governor-general Nasutu 那蘇圖 and acting Shanxi governor Depei 德沛, who governed the provinces containing the Green Standard units to which most of the Household Selected Soldiers would be transferred. The transferred soldiers were to be “evenly assigned to the two provinces in accordance with the total number of military posts in the province,” and divided among cavalry (Ch. 馬兵 mabing), infantry (Ch. 步兵 bubing), and garrison troop (Ch. 守兵 shoubing) positions.59 In addition, Nasutu made explicit comparisons to the use of unemployed Hanjun troops at the Zhili garrisons of Malan 馬蘭 and Taining 泰寧, which had begun in 1745, as a precedent for the transfer of the Household Selected Soldiers.60 Though the Hanjun referred to, unlike the Household Selected Soldiers, still retained their banner status, and thus retained precedence over the Household Selected Soldiers – their posts were explicitly excluded from being used for the newly transferred troops – this prior incorporation of banner people into Green Standard units offered certain logistical parallels. In particular, Nasutu and Depei referred to this precedent in describing the help that would be provided to the Household Selected Soldiers to move to their new posts. When Hanjun soldiers had moved to the Green Standard camps at Malan and Taining, taking their families with them (Ch. 掣眷 qiejuan), each

59 按照兩省兵缺多寡，均勻分派。For instance, Zhili had 5,768 posts available for infantry while Shanxi had 6,511. 815 Household Selected Soldiers were to serve as infantry in Zhili, and 919 in Shanxi, numbers that are almost exactly proportional to the total number of posts available (53 percent in Shanxi in both cases).

60 The origins of Malan/Taining policy are discussed in more detail in chapter 1.
soldier had been given one cart and ten taels of silver to serve as moving expenses (Ch. 搬移之費 banyi zhi fei). In the case of the Household Selected Soldiers, because families were traveling quite different distances depending on where they were eventually to be stationed, they were to receive varying amounts of support. In addition, money for provisions would vary depending on the size of the family, a continuation of the economic logic involved in supporting banner people. Those going to Datong were to receive five taels of silver in moving costs, while those going to Taiyuan or anywhere in Zhili would receive ten. In addition, each adult would receive 0.05 taels of silver per day of travel and each child would receive 0.04 taels per day, in order to purchase food.

The Green Standard posts into which the Household Selected Soldiers were moving were, of course, already filled by soldiers. In order to balance the need to quickly find jobs for the incoming men from Suiyuan while also avoiding the wholesale exclusion of men whose families relied partially on the salary of a Green Standard soldier for support, Nasutu and Depei proposed that the transferred Household Selected Soldiers would only move into posts as they naturally became vacant. In addition, out of every ten vacancies that arose, only seven would go to the Household Selected Soldiers while three would be retained for people in current Green Standard households. Though clearly giving precedence to the Household Selected Soldiers, this policy thus avoided a situation in which the court totally abdicated its responsibility to soldiers in the Green Standards.61

Nasutu and Depei also offered a proposal for how to deal with the status registration of the Household Selected Soldiers following their transfer:

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61 Nasutu, HWZPZZ, FHA 04-01-01-0146-008, QL 12.07.06 (August 11, 1747).
Because they are no different in origin from commoners, they thus should be entered into the registers at the places where they receive their posts. It should still be recorded that they are banner households [at first], but after they have been recorded in the same register as commoners for five years, the registers will be recompiled and a report filed. [...] If there are those who do not follow garrison regulations, or those with insufficient skills, or who have gotten old, in accordance with the rules for Green Standard soldiers, they will be dismissed from the army, and turned over to local officials to be placed into the *lijia* system. 62

The memorial went on to note that those who committed crimes would be tried by local civil officials (Ch. 地方官 *difang guan*), again as would be the case for regular commoners, but not for banner people, who were subject to the jurisdiction of banner officials. In short, unlike Hanjun who had received Green Standard posts to provide them with salaries, but had retained banner status, 63 the Household Selected Soldiers were to be made into regular commoners. That is, this was not merely to be a shift in their means of livelihood (Ch. 生計 *shengji*) from banner salaries to Green Standard salaries, but a change in their formal status. 64 Just as with the decision to replace the Household Selected Soldiers in Suiyuan with Manchus from the capital, this move to formally strip them of banner status clearly foreshadows what would happen to the Hanjun beginning in the 1750s. The proposal received the clear endorsement of the Qing court, with

62 原與民人無異。應請即以補缺之地入籍，仍註明旗戶。雖同民籍一例五年編審，另冊造報[...]如有怠惰不守營規，或技藝不堪年老事故者，照綠旗兵丁例，革除名糧，移交地方官編入里甲收管。 Ibid.

63 In addition to the cases of Malan and Taining mentioned earlier, similar policies were in place in many provincial garrisons that had Hanjun soldiers, where otherwise unemployed Hanjun served in Green Standard companies commanded by the garrison general. See chapter 1 of this dissertation as well as Ding Yizhuang 定宜庄, “The Problem of Qing Dynasty Eight Banner Garrison Generals Simultaneously Administering Green Standard Troops” 清代八旗駐防将军兼統綠旗的问题, *Zhongguo shi yanjiu* 2003.4: 135–144.

64 This distinction between livelihood and status is discussed in chapter 1 in relation to Hanjun service in Green Standard companies, and draws on the distinction that David Howell makes between “occupation” and “livelihood” in the context of Edo Japan. See Ch.1, note 105.
Board of War President Peng Weixin 彭維新 memorializing: “let all of these matters be carried out in accordance with what the aforementioned governor-general and governor said.”

The sixteen years of the existence of the Household Selected Soldiers as a separate banner category offer a clear glimpse of the Qing court’s changing stance toward the banners and shifting ideas about identity during the Yongzheng and early Qianlong period. The initial grant of banner status to this group reflects a conception of the banners as a service elite – a status category granted special legal and economic privileges in exchange for military and administrative service to the state. This exchange was made explicit in the case of the Household Selected Soldiers. The Yongzheng emperor both freed them from personal slavery and gave them banner status as a direct reward for their service on the frontier. Moreover, Necin’s initial proposal for dealing with the financial problems associated with maintaining the Household Selected Soldiers at Suiyuan reflected a sense that the banners as a whole were a coherent category that the Qing court had a responsibility to support, even if doing so meant crossing ethnic boundaries, which were less important than status lines. The ultimate resolution of the situation, though, demonstrated that banner status under Qianlong would mean something different than it had previously. Ethnic categories became primary, with the court deciding that supporting Manchus was a more fundamental aspect of the banner system than was maintaining the multiethnic service elite that existed at the time. This shift in logic would soon be applied to the Hanjun.

Even as the court undertook to remake the banners, the prior logic of the system did not completely vanish, at least not immediately. The officials charged with carrying out the removal

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65 gemu harangga dzungdu. siyūn fu sei gisurehe songkoi icihiyakini. Peng Weixin, MHHBZPZZ, FHA 04-01-01-0146-011, QL 12.08.19 (September 23, 1747). The emperor’s Manchu-language rescript endorsed this position: “Make it in accord with what was stated [here] [Ma. gisurehe songkoi obu].”
of the Household Selected Soldiers from the banners, particularly Suiyuan garrison general Buhi, saw certain of the guarantees that the state had made to banner people as continuing to apply to them. Most obviously, those who could not provide for themselves as commoners could not simply be abandoned. But at an even more basic level, the decision to transfer them into the Green Standards, rather than simply change their status registry, demonstrates that high officials and the court itself believed that they still had some obligation to provide the Household Selected Soldiers with employment. Their livelihoods would no longer be guaranteed, but nor would they simply be lost. In addition, Manchu language ability continued to be a status marker, not an ethnic one. Though all of their able-bodied comrades were sent away from Suiyuan, the two men who had demonstrated their ability to use Manchu and work as translators were allowed to remain in the banners. Even as efforts to ethnicize the banners intensified in the succeeding decades, the Manchu language and translation more broadly would remain the domain of all banner people, not just ethnic Manchus.66

Allowing Hanjun to Leave the Banners

As mentioned above, the standard narrative of the expulsion of the Hanjun from the banners begins in 1742, when the Qianlong emperor, possibly in response to a memorial by Huguang governor-general Sun Jiagan 孫嘉淦 from earlier that year, issued an edict permitting most Hanjun to leave the banners and live as civilians if they so desired.67 Sun’s memorial, though not itself suggesting that any banner person be allowed to give up his banner status, advanced a version of the argument that the emperor would use to justify Hanjun being allowed

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66 See chapter 5 of the dissertation.

67 Those Hanjun descended from men who were already serving the Qing prior to 1644, and entered Shanhaiguan with the Qing army (Ma. fukjin dahame jihe, Ch. 從龍入關 conglong ruguan) were excepted from this edict.
to depart the banners. First, he pointed to the rapid growth in banner population over the preceding decades, which, perhaps to emphasize that the problems faced by bannermen were the result of the successes of dynastic policy rather than its failures, he attributed to the *pax Manjurica* brought about by Qing rule: “In our dynasty’s days of peace, the population of the land has flourished, and the [increase of the] eight banner population has been especially vigorous.” He then suggested that though imperial support was very generous, bannermen would be more secure in the continuance of their livelihoods if they provided for themselves. Sun noted that in his earlier tenure as Zhili governor-general, he had made a proposal for bannermen in the capital region to go to the countryside and make a living through farming, and had received official approval for his idea. Moreover, he remarked, in a recent edict, the emperor himself had given permission for banner people over the age of eighteen to accompany relatives serving in posts outside the capital, which would have the additional benefit of opening up posts and their accompanying stipends for unemployed (Ch. 閒散 *xiānsàn*, Ma. *sula*) bannermen in the capital. Sun argued that when bannermen serving outside the capital left their posts, and were required to return to Beijing, they were soon overrun by shiftless friends and relatives asking for loans and the extortions of minor banner officials, and between those demands and their own idleness, any wealth they had managed to accumulate soon ran out. Would it not be better, he suggested, to permit retiring bannermen to buy land outside the capital, which they could use as a basis for both agricultural and commercial activity, and thus build a basis for their family’s future prosperity?

68 国家太平日，四海户口殷繁，而八旗人丁尤盛。

69 This edict can be found in GZSL, *juan* 158, QL 7.1.4 (February 8, 1742).
At this point, Sun finally introduced a distinction between Manchus and Hanjun to argue that only the latter were really capable of benefitting from his plan. “In my opinion,” he wrote, “Manchus who live for a long time outside the capital may face difficulties. When it comes to Hanjun, though, they are different from Manchus. They were originally Han people, and farming, craftsmanship, commerce, and business are all things they can learn without difficulty.”

Sun’s logic here is similar to that which the Qianlong emperor would adopt four years later in rejecting Necin’s proposal to put the Household Selected Soldiers in the Chahar banners; people of a particular ethnic background were naturally better able to live in ways traditional to people like them than they were in the ways of people of a different ethnicity. Though Hanjun could live like Chinese, Manchus would struggle with such a lifestyle. This was a new sort of argument for Sun, as his past attempts to find alternate means of livelihood for banner people had not made ethnic distinctions. In fact, the proposal he had made just two years earlier, while serving as Zhili governor-general, for banner people to be given reclaimed banner land if they farmed it themselves, which he referred to in this memorial, had been directed at all banner people. Yet even in the later memorial, he did not suggest that Hanjun who found

70臣伏思，滿洲在外久住，或有難行之处，至漢軍則與滿洲不同，伊等原係漢人，一切農工商賈之業，習為之而不以為難。This passage is also cited in Elliott, *The Manchu Way*, p. 338. My translation differs somewhat from his, but is basically alike in meaning. Elliott argues that this passage shows that Hanjun were viewed as “simply Chinese with peculiar backgrounds” and “no longer were they ‘men of the banners.’” I think this somewhat overstates the claim of the memorial, which, as explained below, and as Elliott himself notes, did not even suggest that Hanjun who took up this offer should lose their banner registry.

71 In the earlier memorial he had written, “instruct the Eight Banners: if there are those who wish to go to the countryside and live by cultivating the land, there is no need for them to pay, give them 100 *mu* of superior land, 150 *mu* of medium quality land, or 200 *mu* of lesser quality land, and have them take their wives and children, live in the countryside, and farm.” 暝諭八旗，如有情願下鄉種地為生者，不必取償，上地給與百畝，中地給與一百五十畝，下地給與二百畝，令其率領妻子居鄉耕種。This memorial is found in He Changling 賀長齡, ed. *A Collection of Essays on Statecraft from Our Dynasty* 皇朝經世文編 (1826, reprinted Shanghai: Guangbaisong zhai, 1887), juan 35, pp. 10b-11b. It is undated in this collection, but quotes an edict from late 1739 – see GZSL, juan 104, QL 4.11.2 (December 2, 1739). Sun’s tenure as Zhili governor-general ended in 1741, so the memorial must date from 1740 or 1741, and given the date of the quoted edict, is likely from 1740.
alternate means of supporting themselves should leave the banners. Rather, local officials would be required to maintain special registers of the Hanjun living in their jurisdiction, which they would report to both the Board of Revenue – which managed household registration – and the Board of War on the occasion of the regular banner census, enabling them to be called to military service if needed. This system would be, he suggested, “completely consistent with the ancient system of soldiers living as farmers [during times of peace].”

The Qianlong emperor did not directly endorse Sun’s memorial, which lacks a rescript in the Grand Council copy, but less than two months later he issued an edict of his own, adopting some of Sun’s suggestions, but offering a somewhat different vision of Hanjun identity. Just as Sun had, the emperor noted that as the empire “recovered and regained strength” in the wake of the dynasty’s founding, the Hanjun “population has grown ever-more numerous.” Moreover, like Sun, he declared that “when I consider it, the Hanjun people were originally Han.”

However, the emperor’s understanding of the relevance of the Han origins of the Hanjun was somewhat different from Sun’s. First, he distinguished between two types of Hanjun – the “descendants of those officials and people who submitted when the [dynasty’s] foundation was erected” – that is, those who had joined the banners prior to the Qing armies entering Shanhai Pass – and the descendants of Hanjun who had entered the banner in any other way. This

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72 與古者寓兵於農之意，實有相合。Sun Jiagan, HWLFZZ FHA 03-0523-010, QL 7.2.24 (March 30, 1742).

73 八旗漢軍，自從龍定鼎以來，國家休養生息，戶口日繁 Much of this edict, including this passage, is also translated in Elliott, The Manchu Way, pp. 339-340. My translation differs from his in some particulars; I have also made use of the Manchu version of the edict to help ensure the accuracy of the translation (the Manchu language version is damaged and missing the section cited in this note).

74 This line is especially striking in Manchu, where the term used for Hanjun does not already include the ethnonym for Han: bi gûnîcî. Ujen Coohai urse daci Nikan bihe (“when I consider it, the Ujen Cooha people were originally Han”). The Chinese version reads: 朕思漢軍，其初本係漢人。

75 fukjin doro neihe de dahaha hafan ursei juse omosi – the Chinese is somewhat more literary – the descendants of those who “followed the dragon”: 從龍人員子孫. The emperor also laid out the other ways that Hanjun may have entered the banners: “those who submitted and entered the banners after the establishment of the capital at Beijing,
distinction mattered because those who had been with the dynasty since its early days “had exploits and achievements long ago, and passed many years [in the dynasty’s service].” Those in this category were to be exempted from the edict permitting Hanjun to leave the banners; their record of service to the dynasty meant that their right to banner status remained unimpeachable. However, there seems to have been another reason that this distinction mattered; those who had served the dynasty since prior to 1644 did not necessarily have a place to which they belonged in China proper. This was the other difference between Sun’s view of how Hanjun differed from Manchus and the view expressed in the edict; rather than emphasizing the natural ability of the Han to live off of commerce and agriculture, the emperor pointed out that Hanjun who had entered the banners after 1644 had somewhere to return to if they left them. It was “because some have homes, graves, households, and property in their native place and some have clans, in-laws, and extended families in another province” that they could easily leave the banners.

That is, it was their continuing ties to Chinese society, and the fact that locations in China remained their native places, that made it fitting for them to leave the banners behind.

also those who on account of a crime entered the banners and those entered into the banners as people under the Three Feudatories, those raised out of bondservant companies of the Imperial Household Department or the nobility and put into the banners, along with those recruited to serve as artillermen, those adopted as descendants from outside the patriline, and those who followed their mother on account of her marriage [to a banner person], etc.

The importance of this is much clearer in the Manchu version of the edict, which uses the Manchu word “dahame,” meaning “because,” following its claim that Hanjun who had joined up late all had homes to return to, clarifying that this was a reason for the following decision, that they would have the right to leave. Notably, this established a parallel with the earlier description of Hanjun who because they had spent so many years in service were to be exempted (aniya goidahangge be dahame), perhaps suggesting that the very length of their service had led to them no longer having the sorts of connections to a native place in China that those who entered the banners later still had.

76 fe gung faššan bifj aniya goidahangge 舊有功勛，歷世既久

77 embici da bade boo eifu boigon hethe bisire. embici ġuwa golode mukūn falgan niyaman hūnčihin bisire be dahame. 或有廬墓產業在本籍者或有族黨姻屬在他省者
The most important difference with Sun’s original proposal, however, was that according to the emperor’s edict, those Hanjun who chose to take up a new means of livelihood would lose their banner status. This point is made quite clearly; those who move away from their former banner “will be entered into baojia units just like commoners of that place.”78 That Hanjun were to be allowed to give up their banner status entirely suggests that the emperor thought of them as fundamentally different from Manchu or Mongol bannermen, who were never permitted to become commoners. However, though this decision to allow Hanjun to leave the banners voluntarily would eventually be cited as the earliest precedent for the decision to forcibly expel Hanjun bannermen from provincial garrisons, the emperor made it very clear that he was neither attempting to force the Hanjun out nor did he intend the decision to serve as precedent.79 The decision, he declared:

is the result of [an act of] specially bestowed grace; it will not serve as precedent for the future. This is me specially extending benevolence; the original feeling [behind my action] was an intention to show solicitude [for the Hanjun]. It by no means is meant to force them to leave the banners and become commoners (Ch. 並非逐伊等使之出旗為民 bingfei zhu yideng shi zhi chuqi weimin, Ma. umai cembe bošome gūsaci tucibufi irgen oburengge waka) nor is it a result of the dynasty having insufficient provisions [to support the Hanjun].80

78 harangga ba i irgen i emu adali banjibuha gašan falga de dosimbukini. 與該處民人，一例編入保甲。

79 The edict that began the process of expelling the Fuzhou Hanjun cited the “precedent of the capital Hanjun,”(京城漢軍之例) who, as the edict said, had been permitted to leave the banners. See GZSL, juan 459, QL 19.3.27 (April 19, 1754). According to this edict, this right had never before been extended to Hanjun in the provincial garrisons, and indeed the scholarly literature on the Hanjun expulsion also says that it applied only to capital Hanjun (c.f. Elliott, The Manchu Way, 340). However, at least at the time of the 1742 edict, the emperor seems to have intended Hanjun anywhere in the empire to be able to take advantage of its provisions, decreeing: “For those who wish to change to commoner status and wish to move to the provinces to live, without regard to whether they are in the capital or in the provinces, or to whether they are official soldiers or unemployed, […] it will be arranged thusly.”

78 cohotoi isibuha kesi be dahame. amala kooli oburakū ere mini kooli ci tulgiene kesi isibume turgun be giljame jilame gosire guınun. umai cembe bošome gūsaci tucibufi irgen oburengge waka. inu gurun booi jeku ciyanliyang tesurakā jalin waka. 出自特恩，後不為例。此朕格外施仁，原情體恤之意。並非逐伊等使之出旗為民，亦非為國家糧餉有所不給。The Chinese language text of the entire edict can be found in GZSL, juan 164, QL 7.4.13
Moreover, though the edict only permitted Hanjun to leave the banners, it does not seem to have been intended to shift the state’s resources from Hanjun to Manchus. No salaried posts in the banner armies designated for Hanjun were eliminated or reclassified as Manchu posts, quite unlike what would happen with both the Household Selected Soldiers and the Hanjun in many provincial garrisons. Additionally, it seems that the policy was genuinely intended to benefit Hanjun, as the court refused to extend it to a group that was perhaps even less favored – the entailed households, who not only were mostly Han in origin, but were also descended from slaves, rather than ordinary bannermen. The justification for denying entailed householders the right to leave was twofold. First, many of them farmed land in banner villages to make their living, and being reregistered as commoners would thus force them to give up their current property, providing them no advantage. Second, they were already forbidden from holding posts in the cavalry or infantry, so an entailed householder leaving the banners would not open up a salaried post for another bannerman.81 The implication of this second claim is that part of the benefit of the original policy was opening up posts to currently unemployed banner people. Since the overall balance of Manchu and Hanjun posts was not changed, it appears that one of the ways Hanjun were meant to benefit from the policy is that some unemployed Hanjun would find jobs when their employed comrades chose to leave the banners. Thus, though the edict marks the first appearance of the set phrase “remove [them] from the banners and make them commoners” (Ch. 出旗為民 chuqi weimin, Ma. gūsaci tucibući irgen obumbi) that would become the watchword for the policy of Hanjun expulsion beginning in 1754, the policy that the edict advanced was

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81 Guanglu 廣祿, MHHBZPZZ FHA 04-01-16-0016-054, QL 7.9.2 (September 30, 1742).
quite different from that of the later part of the Qianlong period. In fact, the later import of the phrase lends irony to its sole appearance in the edict, in the block quote that ended the previous paragraph, where it was used to explain that Hanjun should not be forced out of the banners.

Permitting Hanjun to leave the banners voluntarily proved problematic for maintaining clear status divisions between banner people and commoners. One troublesome issue was the possibility that families could be divided by status, which created problems for a hereditary status system based on the household unit. To some degree, this could be prevented by legal measures, in particular a ban on a son leaving the banners if his father did not, and vice-versa. Though insufficient oversight by banner officials sometimes permitted violation of this rule, particularly when father and son lived in different jurisdictions on account of the military or administrative service of one of the other, those who were later found out were returned to the banners.82

Conflict between family ties and banner status in cases involving people who left the banners became more complicated in cases of adoption. In 1737, a childless Bordered Yellow Hanjun bannerman named Qi Bin 齊斌 adopted Qi’er 七兒, the son of Yu Zongshun 余宗舜, a Bordered Red Hanjun bannerman who served in the company of Qi’s wife’s younger brother. At the time, Qi did not make an official report of the adoption, which proved a problem when, in 1743, Yu decided to become a commoner. Three years later, in 1746, while Qi was serving as left-wing lieutenant general (Ma. meiren i janggin, Ch. 副都統 fudutong) in Hangzhou, he realized that it would soon be time for the now sixteen-year-old Qi’er, who had taken the name Qi Guangzuo 齊光祚, to be recorded as a man of military age, and thus to become eligible for

82 Yunbi 允祕, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0181-2109-006, QL 29.10.4 (October 28, 1764).
banner rank. However, Qing law prohibited banner people from adopting the children of commoners, and those who had been adopted anyway would only hold secondary banner status, and thus have very little likelihood of receiving a salaried post. Citing his need for an heir, and the fact that the Yu family had been banner people at the time of Qi Guangzuo’s adoption, Qi Bin begged the Qianlong emperor to permit his adopted son to be his heir and receive regular banner status.\textsuperscript{83} The recommendation that the emperor received from the commander of Qi’s banner paid particular attention to the fact that Qi Guangzuo was the natural son of a former Hanjun banner man, nothing that this made the case “slightly different from the adoption of a commoner’s son,” and thus that, given Qi Bin’s age and lack of other children, the adoption should be permitted.\textsuperscript{84} Hanjun who left the banners were still not quite the same as ordinary commoners, at least in this respect, though as an adoption case discussed in the following chapter will show, these differences would cease to have any legal significance after the forced expulsion of the provincial garrison Hanjun.

Conclusion

The Household Selected Soldiers, though registered in the banners even before being sent into military service, initially had a much lower position in the internal status hierarchy of the banners than did ordinary banner people. Rather than being the hereditary servants of the court, who were therefore granted privilege by it, they were hereditary servants of individual banner families. Their acquisition of regular banner status, or at least something much more closely approaching it, thus embodies the logic, discussed in chapter 1, that underlay the banner system in the first half of the eighteenth century. That is, as a reward for their service, and the loyalty to

\textsuperscript{83} Qi Bin, HWZPZZ, FHA 04-01-01-0131-048, QL 11.11.29 (January 9, 1747).

\textsuperscript{84} “似於過繼民人之子有間” Qi Bin, HWZPZZ, FHA 04-01-01-0142-004, QL 12.1.25 (March 5, 1747).
the dynasty suggested by it, they were offered hereditary privilege. That privilege should have been permanent, and indeed, no official seems to have considered the possibility of stripping their banner status even as the financial burden of providing for them came to be treated as a problem. However, though not a true precedent for expulsion, it is worth thinking about the extent to which the prior use of Hanjun in Green Standard companies, also discussed in chapter 1, contributed to the Qianlong emperor’s plan for dealing with the Household Selected Soldiers. It is possible that the earlier policy, though not challenging the permanence of banner status, by breaking the link between status and livelihood, while creating a link between ethnicity and livelihood, had helped lead the court to rethink the relationship between status and ethnicity. If both status and ethnicity (and not status alone) were now tied, at some level, to the sort of work one might do for the state, then perhaps the two categories had, even in the late Kangxi period, already begun to acquire a greater degree of overlap.

The decision to allow Hanjun to leave the banners appears at first to have been mostly innocuous, and in its direct effects it was. No Hanjun who wanted to remain in the banners was forced out, and the Hanjun as a group did not lose any of their access to the privileges of banner status – in particular, no employment slots assigned to Hanjun who chose to leave were reassigned to Manchus; rather, they would be passed to other Hanjun. In this sense, the edict permitting voluntary departure did not actually mark the beginning of expulsion. Rather, its significance was primarily ideological; it challenged the idea that Hanjun were as suited to banner status as were Manchus or Mongols, and suggested that status and ethnicity had, or should have, far more overlap than had been previously believed.

Neither the expulsion of the Household Selected Soldiers nor the decision to give Hanjun the option to leave the banners and give up their banner status necessarily had to lead to the
forcible expulsion of Hanjun in provincial garrisons. However, the precedents established by these two events likely helped to make the large-scale expulsion of the Hanjun possible by altering two important ideas about banner status. The first was that banner status was, under normal circumstances, permanent and that the court had an obligation to ensure the economic maintenance of all banner people within the context of the banners. Individual banner people and their families might lose banner status on account of a criminal offense, but to remove the banner status of a large group of people, like the Household Selected Soldiers, simply due to the difficulty of supporting them, was previously unprecedented. The second was the idea that all ethnic groups in the banners had an equal claim to banner status. Though the court had always offered preferential treatment to Manchus and Mongols in comparison to Hanjun, it had not suggested that the Hanjun were, on ethnic grounds, less suited to membership in the banners. Sun Jiagan’s memorial and the subsequent decision to permit Hanjun to voluntarily renounce their banner status changed that. Only the latter change would be directly cited by either the court or the officials who formulated plans to expel the provincial garrison Hanjun, but both were necessary to make such plans conceivable. The next chapter will take up the new policy of Hanjun expulsion that the Qianlong emperor announced in 1754.
Chapter Three: The Expulsion of the Garrison Hanjun and the Transformation of Banner Status, 1754-1780

The mid-eighteenth-century expulsion from the banners of nearly all Hanjun stationed in provincial garrison cities reflected the rise of a new vision of banner membership, one based primarily on ethnic origins and one that denied the right of Han banner people to banner status. Unlike the policies described in the preceding chapter, which were either applied fairly narrowly, as with the expulsion of the Household Selected Soldiers, or which were purely voluntary, as with the 1742 edict permitting Hanjun to give up banner status, the expulsion process that began in 1754 targeted a large proportion of the Hanjun population and denied those it included any chance to legitimately maintain their place in the banners. The first wave of these expulsions, directed against Hanjun people living in the Fuzhou and Guangzhou garrisons, was ordered directly by the Qianlong emperor, and, in the case of Guangzhou, was resisted by the garrison general charged with implementing the policy. By the late 1770s, though, when expulsion began in the Xi’an garrison, the idea that Han did not belong in the banners had become an operating principle for local garrison commanders, who made plans for expelling additional Hanjun banner people beyond those that the emperor had ordered them to expel.

The Hanjun were not the only group to face large-scale removal from the banners during this period. Simultaneous with the purging of many Hanjun, the court sought to expel secondary status bannermen – those who had originally been, or were descended from, unfree people serving in the households of regular bannermen, as well as those who had illicitly obtained banner status via adoption.¹ Despite the closeness in both the time and manner in which these two sorts of banner purges were carried out, the expulsion of secondary status banner people fit

¹ There was a substantial degree of overlap between these two groups.
much better with prior precedent. At the time of the expulsions, the Qing court had already spent more than two decades identifying secondary status bannermen and denying them certain basic privileges of banner status, even including the right to hold a paid post as a soldier, on the basis that they and their ancestors lacked the history of military service to the dynasty that justified regular banner status. The expulsion of the provincial garrison Hanjun meant that merely on account of having Han ancestry, a bannerman would be treated similarly to those whose families had never really served the dynasty at all, or even illegally entered the banner registers. The Qianlong emperor did declare that secondary status bannermen were even less deserving of their banner status than were the Hanjun, but in the end this meant little more than a delay in the expulsion of many Hanjun – fundamentally, the two groups were treated quite similarly in most provincial garrisons. A history of loyalty and service to the dynasty was no longer considered sufficient to merit the privileges afforded to bannermen; rather, Han ethnicity became a justification for removal from the banners.

This chapter will recount the process of Hanjun expulsion in the provincial garrisons. It will show that the logic underlying the forced removal of the Hanjun was not simply a continuation or extension of the 1742 edict that gave Hanjun from the capital the option to leave the banners if they chose: a policy that, as discussed in chapter 2, may have been genuinely intended to improve the economic situation of the Hanjun and that excepted those who had joined the banners prior to 1644. Rather, forced expulsion benefitted Manchus at the expense of Hanjun, which was in keeping with longstanding ethnic preferences within the banners, but did so by taking the unprecedented step of denying the hereditary right to banner status of Hanjun banner people. It thus challenged the idea that the banners were necessarily a multietnic status group, containing both Manchus and Han. In addition, this chapter will note the very clear
connections and parallels between Hanjun expulsion and the 1746 expulsion of the Household
Selected Soldiers, detailed in the preceding chapter. It will argue that the earlier expulsion,
though almost never referred to by formulaters of the later policy, was, practically speaking, at
least as much a precedent for the later one as was the 1742 policy permitting Hanjun to
voluntarily relinquish banner status, which has usually been treated as the opening act of Hanjun
expulsion. Precedent alone, however, was not sufficient to make the court’s desire to Manjurify
the banners clear. At the second garrison to carry out Hanjun expulsion, Guangzhou, garrison
general Sitku struggled to develop a policy that satisfied the emperor, in large part because his
understanding of how to manage banner status was not in accord with the court’s new approach.
Yet, as the expulsion process continued, the new, ethnicized conception of banner status became
the basis for policymaking for officials at garrisons across China.

In this chapter, I begin by describing the first round of forced expulsions in Fuzhou and
Guangzhou, laying out the basic procedures established for expulsion, which would remain fairly
consistent over the succeeding decades. In addition, the first section explains the conflict
between Sitku and the Qianlong emperor over how to carry out expulsion in Guangzhou. In the
next section, I briefly discuss the expulsion of secondary status banner people, showing how this
policy helped save the Hanjun of both the Fuzhou naval garrison and one wing of the Guangzhou
garrison from expulsion. Then, I deal with the second round of Hanjun expulsion in the early
1760s, discussing how Qing officials tied it to military redeployment following the conquest of
Xinjiang. From there, I move to Xi’an, the final garrison to expel its Hanjun banner people,
arguing that the total expulsion there, in the largest and most important provincial banner
garrison, demonstrates the penetration into the bureaucracy of the ethnicized conception of
banner status that the Qianlong emperor had articulated in earlier episodes of expulsion. In the
final section of the chapter, I consider Hanjun reactions to expulsion, arguing that it was an
unwelcome policy for a group of people that both identified with the banners and relied on the
military service that accompanied banner status as their means of support. To conclude, I make
the case for understanding Hanjun expulsion as the result, in large part, of the Qianlong
emperor’s personal obsession with ethnicity and ethnic distinctiveness, a concern that informed
his actions in other areas of policy and personnel as well. Though identity in the banners was
always based on an intersection of status and ethnicity, it was in this period of Hanjun expulsion
that the connection between Manchu ethnicity and banner status, at least as perceived by the
Qing court, reached its peak.

The First Expulsions: Fuzhou and Guangzhou

The forcible expulsion of the provincial garrison Hanjun began with an April 1754 edict
from the Qianlong emperor:

The Eight Banner slaves have received the dynasty’s grace for more than one hundred
years. In that time their population has grown immensely and it is necessary to find a way
to handle it. Therefore, as the result of an edict that I issued, Eight Banner Hanjun in the
capital who wish to disperse and become commoners have been permitted to become
commoners. At present, action in accordance with this practice has not been extended to
the Hanjun of the various provincial garrisons. They should also be handled in accord
with this [past edict], making them all able to obtain a livelihood. Send Manchus from the
capital to fill the posts they leave behind, and capital Manchus will also be somewhat less
obstructed [in finding employment]. Let this [edict] be handed over to governor-general
Kargišan 喀爾吉善 to work together with Fuzhou general Sinju 新柱 and have them
make the Hanjun people of that place either also follow the precedent of the capital
Hanjun and be managed by letting them disperse where they like, or, when posts become
available in the garrison general’s Green Standard regiments, be transferred to fill those.
As for the vacancies that are thus created, immediately send Manchus from the capital to
fill them. Thus, obstructions for Manchus in the capital will be removed and the local
Hanjun will also obtain freedom in [selecting] their way of life; it will truly benefit them
both. Once Kargišan and Sinju have devised a thorough plan [for this], let them jointly
memorialize.²

² 八旗奴僕，受國家之恩，百有餘年。邇來生齒甚繁，不得不為酌量辦理。是以經朕降旨，將京城八旗漢軍
人等，聽其散處，願為民者，準其為民。現今遵照辦理至各省駐防漢軍人等，並未辦及，亦應照此辦理，
令其各得生計。所遺之缺，將京城滿洲派往，而京城滿洲，亦得稍為疏通矣。著交總督喀爾吉善、會同福
The emperor’s edict, though making multiple mentions of the prior policy that permitted Hanjun to voluntarily leave the banners, and suggesting that he was merely extending its beneficial effects to Hanjun in provincial garrisons, made quite clear that he wanted something different to happen in Fuzhou. First, it presented the earlier policy as one option for the Hanjun in Fuzhou, with the only other option being to accept a transfer into the Green Standards, quite unlike the 1742 edict which had explicitly stated that no one who wanted to remain in the banners was to be forced to leave. Second, where the previous policy had made no changes to the total number of salaries posts available to Hanjun and Manchus, the 1754 edict specified that posts opened by the departure of Hanjun should be filled by Manchus. That is, the Fuzhou garrison, where all posts had previously been designated for Hanjun, was now to become a fully Manchu garrison. Rather than some Hanjun benefitting from the salaries made available by the departure of their comrades, it was now Manchus who would be the sole beneficiaries.

In their response to the emperor’s edict, Min-Zhe governor-general Kargišan and Fuzhou garrison general Sinju explained their understanding of the logic underlying it. They noted that though the garrison at Fuzhou, excluding the naval forces located at Sanjiangkou 三江口, had only about two thousand households officially entitled to a salaried post, these households contained a total population of 13,389 people, meaning that between six and seven people had to survive off of each soldier’s salary. Moreover, the regulations on banner livelihood prevented

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3 Note that this ratio is in fact lower than the one estimated by Elliott for banner garrisons (other than those recently constructed) in the mid-eighteenth century, which he places at about 10:1, thus estimating a total Fuzhou population of twenty-one thousand. Mark C. Elliott, *The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), pp.119-121. It is possible that this ratio was somewhat
these people from developing any other source of income. The new edict, they said, was a bountiful extension of the emperor’s favor that would allow the Hanjun the freedom to choose their own livelihoods and the ability to provide for the long term future of their families. Even those bannermen who “ordinarily only practice the skills of horsemanship and archery, have no other plan to support themselves, and lack the capital to engage in commerce” would be provided for by being put into the Green Standards. This would, moreover, prevent them from being corrupted by the local customs of Fujian, the influence of which might otherwise lead them to become “brawling thugs and untamedoughs” (Ch. 好勇鬥狠、獷悍不馴之輩 haoyong douhen, guanghan buxun zhi bei) or even bandits (Ch. 匪類 feilei). Though the two officials discussed the new policy as entirely beneficial for the Hanjun, the notion that entry into the Green Standards would help control them suggests that Kargišan and Sinju were aware of the risks of demobilizing so many soldiers at once, and the possibility that it would lead to them engaging in unauthorized violence. Moving Hanjun into the Green Standards was thus not merely a way to allow former banner people to continue a life like the one they had while in the banners, but a way to prevent them from getting out of control; perhaps Kargišan and Sinju recognized that Hanjun would not in fact find leaving the banners to be as great an advantage as the emperor had suggested.

lower at Fuzhou on account of the recent establishment of the naval garrison, which had opened up six hundred new salaried posts, and thus relieved some of the pressure. However, even if the naval garrison had approximately the same ratio of dependents to salaried posts as did the main garrison, the total Fuzhou banner population would only have been between seventeen thousand and eighteen thousand.

4平日惟練習弓馬技藝，別無資生之策，經營貿易又乏資本。

5 This was the opposite problem from the one that banner officials usually brought up when discussing the effects of local commoner customs on banner people, who they usually worried would lose their marital spirit. Kargišan, HWZPZZ, NPM 403006689, QL 19.6.6 (July 25, 1754).
Since Fuzhou was the first garrison to implement Hanjun expulsion, and since its procedures would be the model for garrisons elsewhere in the empire, it is worth examining those procedures in some detail. As will become clear, there were many similarities to the methods used to expel the Household Selected Soldiers less than a decade earlier, discussed in the preceding chapter. The initial proposal for dealing with the expulsion was spelled out in a memorial from Kargišan and Sinju. Those Hanjun who chose to make their own living as civilians were straightforward to deal with. Just like Hanjun who had chosen to leave the banners voluntarily in the wake of the 1742 edict also described in chapter 2, they were to be allowed to move wherever they liked, entered into the commoner registers and local baojia units in their new place of residence, and removed from the banner registers. The memorial goes to some lengths to specify all the ways in which they would be identical to other commoners: they would be able to take the imperial examinations in their new place of residency alongside other commoners, would receive the privileges that accompanied degree status if they already held degrees, and would be permitted to marry commoners, which banner people were banned from doing.6

For Hanjun who chose to enter the Green Standards, there were quite a few additional complications, coming from their continued desire to live off an official salary. First, though the emperor’s edict had initially ordered that those who wished to enter the Green Standards would receive posts in the units commanded by the garrison general, in fact there were not enough of those posts available. As Kargišan and Sinju pointed out, after excluding the 400 posts in

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6 Presumably they would also no longer be able to marry banner people themselves, though this fact is not mentioned. Though, as discussed in chapter 1, there is no clear evidence for a total prohibition of intermarriage (particularly between banner men and commoner women), the memorial quite clearly states that “when it comes to the prior regulation that Hanjun men and women must not marry commoners, now those who have already dispersed [from the garrison] and become commoners are permitted to contract marriage with commoner households as a single group.”
general’s two Green Standard companies that were already filled by Hanjun, there were only 1,141 total positions. Even if all of those posts were taken away from their current occupants and given to Hanjun leaving the banners, it still would not be enough to accommodate the number of men needing new jobs. So, he proposed, Hanjun entering the Green Standards should be divided among all nine of the companies based in Fuzhou, with posts being made available to them on a rotation system. For every four vacancies occurring in the nine Fuzhou companies, three would be filled by expelled Hanjun, while one would be given to members of current Green Standard households. Though no reference was made to the earlier incorporation of the Household Selected Soldiers into Green Standard units in Shanxi and Zhili, the strategy was almost identical; the only change was offering the expelled bannermen three-fourths of the available vacancies rather than seven-tenths. The two officials also made clear that this was not merely a variation on the earlier policy of granting Green Standard posts to unemployed Hanjun; their memorial stated explicitly that Hanjun entering the Green Standards as a result of the new policy would “all be changed to commoner registration,” entered into the registers in the place where their new company was located, and treated as commoners when taking the exams and in all other relevant aspects of their lives.

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7 The policy of appointing unemployed Hanjun to Green Standard posts to provide them with an income while allowing them to retain their banner status is described in detail in chapter 1.

8 Normally, younger male relatives of Green Standard soldiers had the right to fill supernumerary posts (Ch. 餘丁 yuding), from which regular soldiers would be selected. If a vacancy appeared in the ranks of regular soldiers, men would first be taken from among the supernumeraries to fill it. Only if the number of available supernumeraries was insufficient would military officials recruit from among the general commoner population. As such, there was a strong hereditary component to Green Standard service, though unlike with bannermen, there was no requirement that sons of Green Standard soldiers take up military service. See Guo Taifeng 郭太凤, “An Initial Survey of the Salary System of the Eight Banners and Green Standards” 八旗绿营俸饷制度初探, Fudan xuebao (shehui kexue ban) 1982.4, pp. 106-7.

9 此等改歸綠營食糧之漢軍，亦應一體改為民籍，就食糧地方入籍，現在子弟內有與試應考等事，即准照民籍一體辦理。
Standard units across the province also differentiated this policy from the earlier use of Hanjun in Green Standard posts, where keeping Hanjun, as banner people, under the control of the garrison general was considered an important priority.

To make room for the arriving Manchus from the capital, all of whom held posts in the cavalry, Hanjun holding cavalry posts were to be expelled prior to those holding infantry posts. However, cavalry posts, which paid more than infantry posts, were much less numerous in the Green Standards than in the Fuzhou garrison, and though 1418, or more than 70 percent, of Fuzhou’s Hanjun were in the cavalry, the total number of cavalry posts in all nine of the local Green Standard companies was only 1,200. Though the soldiers would be transferred in two waves, with only a bit over 1,000 soldiers expelled at first, waiting for enough cavalry posts to open up for even that group alone would take far too long, and would, moreover, remove promotion opportunities from Green Standard soldiers. As such, Kargišan and Sinju proposed designating 600 of the 1,200 cavalry posts for the expelled Hanjun, but to help make up the lost income that some cavalry would suffer from being moved to the infantry, he suggested that those Hanjun cavalrymen with large numbers of dependents who were willing to take up a post in an outer prefecture, rather than in the provincial capital, could in addition to their infantry post receive a post for one of their family members in the guards (Ch. 守兵 shoubing, Ma. tuwakiyara cooha) – the lowest paid division of the Green Standards. This was meant to ease the transition, and shows that, just as with the Household Selected Soldiers, for whom large families were offered land to farm in addition to their Green Standard post, officials in charge of the expulsion

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10 Dividing the Hanjun into two groups for expulsion was itself intended to ensure that enough posts in the Green Standards would be available to accommodate them (there were in fact only eight thousand spots for soldiers of any type in the nine Fuzhou companies), and thus to avoid hard-up Hanjun becoming totally unable to support themselves, a point clarified in Kargišan, HWZPZZ, NPM 403006689, QL 19.6.6 (July 25, 1754).
believed that they continued to have obligations to the expelled Hanjun beyond those that they
would have had to ordinary commoners.

As mentioned above, in addition to the main garrison, Fuzhou had a naval garrison at
Sanjiangkou consisting of 610 Hanjun soldiers and their families. The two officials recognized
that the naval garrison required special skills, like the ability to pilot boats, which Manchus from
the capital would not have. As such, they proposed delaying the expulsion of Hanjun sailors until
a sufficient number of Manchus had become proficient in these naval skills. Upon the arrival of
Manchu troops in Fuzhou, able-bodied men who were the dependents of transferred soldiers and
had accompanied them south were to be selected for training. Whenever a vacancy arose in the
naval garrison, those Manchus who had acquired sufficient skills would have first priority in
filling it, with Hanjun gradually transferred to neighboring naval garrisons. The few remaining
Green Standard sailors from Min’an 闽安 who had been brought to the banner naval garrison at
the time of its establishment in 1728 to help with training, but who had not yet been replaced by
Hanjun, were to be replaced immediately by Manchus, perhaps because it was considered
unacceptable for Manchus to serve alongside Green Standard soldiers.11

Hanjun soldiers leaving the banners, whether to enter civilian life or to become Green
Standard soldiers, were required to give up their homes in the garrison. This rule applied even to
Hanjun who had built their own homes, rather than receiving official quarters. However, these
latter were to be compensated from the official treasury for their lost homes, in accordance with
the house’s size and age, in order to help them build a home in their new place of residence. But
even if they were stationed in a Green Standard unit in Fuzhou, or chose to remain there, as

11 As opposed to commanding them, which was certainly permissible.
commoners they would not be permitted to remain within the garrison quarter. The houses that had belonged to the Hanjun would all be taken over by the newly arrived Manchus.\footnote{The preceding five paragraphs are all based on Kargišan, HWZPZZ, NPM 403006688, QL 19.6.6 (July 25, 1754).}

The two officials also gave consideration to the costs that Hanjun would incur in moving to new homes. Though no provision was made for most Hanjun entering civilian life, those entering the Green Standards were to receive a small sum of money to help them move. If their new garrison had housing for its soldiers, they would receive two taels of silver in moving costs, but if not – and most Green Standard soldiers in Fuzhou did not receive housing, the officials said – they were to receive six taels to help them rent a house. Unemployed Hanjun banner people who were penniless and had no means of support, a category that included old, disabled, widowed, or orphaned banner people who lacked a family member to rely on, would not be able to enter the Green Standards. Thankfully, the number of such people was small, and they would receive eight taels of silver each to serve as the “basis for their support” (Ch. 資生之本 zisheng zhi ben). This money was all to come from salt tax revenue.\footnote{Kargišan, HWZPZZ, NPM 403006689, QL 19.6.6 (July 25, 1754).}

Kargišan and Sinju’s memorial was referred by the emperor to the Grand Council for discussion, where it received a complete endorsement, though the council asked for some clarification as to the exact procedure by which Hanjun in the naval garrison would eventually be replaced. In addition, Grand Councilor Fuheng 傅恒 made some additional suggestions for handling the Hanjun expulsion. In particular, Fuheng was interested in the question of how to deal with officers in the banner. Six Hanjun officers had originally been sent to Fuzhou from the capital, and they were to be allowed to return there if they desired. The remaining officers, all originally from Fuzhou, were either to be allowed to retire if they were no longer able to serve,
or, following examination, to be transferred to a comparable post in the Green Standards. Fuheng suggested that the Board of War discuss whether these men should retain their banner registry or be re-registered as commoners; later memorials suggest that higher-ranking officers like captains (Ch. 防禦 fangyu, Ma. tuwašara hafan i jergi janggin) were to be sent to the capital for review, while lower ranking officers like lieutenants were to be transferred to equivalent post in the Green Standards. The difference in the treatment of officers originally from Fuzhou and those originally from Beijing was likely due to longstanding legal preferences for bannermen from the capital as compared to those from the provinces. These sort of preferences offered some protection to Hanjun men from Beijing who might otherwise have faced expulsion.

Bithesi (Ch. 笔帖式 bitieshi), the clerks responsible for translation between Manchu and Chinese, also received special attention. Though Fuheng wrote that in the future all three bithesi at the garrison should be selected from among its new Manchu soldiers, the two currently-serving Hanjun bithesi were to be allowed to choose between going to Beijing to undergo selection for an official post there, or remaining in Fuzhou, but being transferred to the Green Standards to serve as military officers. In the end, both would choose to remain in Fuzhou, one explicitly noting that he lacked both family and property in the capital. Whether bithesi choosing to remain in Fuzhou or lower-ranking transferred Hanjun officers, the men Fuheng

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14 See Kargišan, HWZPZZ, NPM 403009414, QL 20.5.22 (July 1, 1755), Kargišan, HWZPZZ, NPM 403010176, QL 20.8.10 (September 15, 1755), and Yang Tingzhang 楊廷璋, HWZPZZ, FHA 04-01-16-0040-033, QL 25.6.24 (August 4, 1760). These memorials also confirm that officers from Beijing were allowed to return to the banners there.

15 This man, Quan Shangxian 全尚賢, was, however, commended by Sinju for his extreme talent and dedication in helping manage the Hanjun expulsion, and it was decided that it would be a shame to waste his real talents. As such, it was decided to follow the precedent for Manchu language secretaries (Ch. 清字外郞 Qingzi wailang) who had served capably in the garrison general’s office for eight years, and appoint him the post of assistant magistrate (Ch. 縣丞 xiancheng) (see chapter 5 of this dissertation for more on this rule). His case, and that of his colleague Xu Jingguo 徐經國 are discussed in Gui Xuanguang 歸宣光, LKTB, FHA 02-01-03-05482-010, QL 23.9.16 (October 17, 1758).
discussed would take on the ranks of lieutenant and sub-lieutenant in the Green Standards, just as had been the case for officers in the Household Selected Soldiers. That bithesi were offered the possibility of remaining in the banners suggested that demonstrated competency in written Manchu continued to influence how officials perceived the banner-worthiness of Hanjun men. By the end of the expulsion period in the late 1770s, though, this would no longer be the case.

The emperor was delighted by the proposals of Kargišan and Sinju as augmented and endorsed by Fuheng. Not only did he grant his assent to everything they suggested, but he immediately issued an additional edict:

As for the Hanjun soldiers of the Fuzhou garrison, in accordance with what the governor-general of that place memorialized, let them disperse to become commoners and be transferred to salaried posts in the Green Standards. Fill the posts they leave behind with Manchus from the capital. All of the Hanjun of the garrisons in Jingkou, Hangzhou, and Guangzhou should also be handled in accordance with this. Let each of the respective governors-general and garrison generals formulate a clear and detailed plan according to the particular situation of each place. When the memorials arrive, once again reach a decision, and once an edict is received, there will be no need to reconsider this in the future. This should be carried out beginning in Jingkou.

Hanjun expulsion was not to be limited to Fuzhou; rather, as the emperor’s edict earlier in the year had suggested, it was to become general policy for all garrisons in the empire. Yet, there is no record of either Jingkou or Hangzhou officials making any move to expel their Hanjun for another nine years, when a new edict ordering removal there was issued. Only in Guangzhou did

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16 Fuheng, HWZPZZ, FHA 04-01-16-0036-096, QL 19.7 (1754). Note that this document, which has no date on any of the surviving pages, is listed in the FHA computer system as dating from QL 21 (1756), but this is clearly incorrect, both because it is a direct response to two memorials sent by Kargišan and Sinju in the sixth month of QL 19 and because an imperial response to the memorial appears in the Shilu in the 7th month of that year – see GZSL, juan 469, QL 19.7.17 (September 3, 1754).

17 福州駐防漢軍兵，經該督等奏請，聽其散處為民。及改補綠營糧缺，所遺甲缺，以京城滿洲派往坐補。所有京口、杭州、徽州、各駐防漢軍，似應照此辦理。請令各該總督將軍按各處情形，詳悉妥議，奏到再行定議。得旨、不用將來再看。若要辦從京口起。GZSL, juan 469, QL 19.7.17 (September 3, 1754).
Hanjun expulsion begin quickly, but matters there did not proceed quite as the emperor seemed to expect.

The expulsion of the Guangzhou Hanjun began with a memorial from Guangzhou garrison general Sitku 錫特庫 in 1755. Sitku’s memorial opened with a standard description of how the banner population in the empire had grown massively, and noted the imperial policy that allowed Hanjun to leave the banners voluntarily. He argued that because Hanjun could abandon the capital and go live with relatives serving as officials in the provinces, they were actually better off than Manchus and Mongol bannermen, who were stuck in Beijing, growing in numbers, without new positions opening up. He then offered a misunderstanding of the policy in Fuzhou, which he believed was to replace a mere one thousand of the garrison’s Hanjun with Manchus from the capital, a policy he believed was designed to even out opportunities for Manchus and Hanjun, by turning garrisons at which all soldiers were Hanjun into mixed Manchu/Hanjun garrisons. Sitku wrote that since the garrison in “Guangdong is like Fujian, and all its soldiers are Hanjun. I ask if the emperor will extend his grace and likewise send one thousand Manchus out to be garrisoned [here]” replacing one thousand of his garrison’s Hanjun, who could, as in Fuzhou, either become Green Standard soldiers or ordinary civilians.18 Sitku, it seems, incorrectly believed that the first wave of transfers at Fuzhou represented the emperor’s entire plan for the garrison, and it was a plan that fit with his understanding of proper policy for managing the banner population, in which garrisons should mix Manchus and Hanjun in order to provide fair opportunities for each.

18 Guwangdung, Fugiyan emu adali, gemu Ujen Coohai cooha, aha meni bairengge ejen i desereke kesi isibume, inu emu minggan Manju be tucibufi tebubureo. Sitku, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0171-0341-002, QL 20.3.7 (April 17, 1755).
The emperor made clear that his original plan had not looked like the one advanced by Sitku. Not only were all Hanjun at Fuzhou to be replaced, but the expulsion of Hanjun at other garrisons was supposed to occur in sequence after the Fuzhou process was complete. Yet, the emperor decided that since Sitku had already proposed to begin to expel the Hanjun of Guangzhou, he might as well go ahead with it, and told him to work together with Liangguang governor-general Yang Yingju 楊應琚 to carry it out, beginning by getting in touch with Kargišan and Sinju to get an explanation of the procedures that should be followed. Kargišan quickly sent along the regulations they had drawn up, though noting that the situations in Guangzhou and Fuzhou were not identical and that Sitku and Yang Yingju should carefully consider their local circumstances.

Upon receipt of Kargišan’s correspondence, Yang and Sitku immediately set to work drawing up plans for the Guangzhou expulsion. Though in many respects their plan was similar to that for Fuzhou, and even adopted some of the same language that appeared in Kargišan’s memorials, there were some differences. Most importantly, Guangzhou officials continued to propose the removal of only 1,000 of their garrison’s more than 3,000 Hanjun soldiers, in addition to half of the 600-strong naval garrison. Combined with the larger number of Green Standard units in Guangzhou, this meant that it would only be necessary to give two out of every three newly vacated Green Standard post to expelled Hanjun soldiers, a slightly lower ratio than in Fuzhou. This also meant that it was necessary to choose which soldiers would be expelled. Sitku and Yang proposed that each of the upper three Manchu banners send either 333 or 334 soldiers to Guangzhou, perhaps implying that the expelled Hanjun would also come from the

19 GZSL, juan 486, QL 20.4.8 (May 18, 1755).
20 Kargišan, HWZPZZ, NPM 403009631, QL 20.6.13 (July 21, 1755).
upper three banners. There are two potential reasons for this, though neither was explicitly stated in the memorial. The first is a possible belief that Manchus should hold the slightly more prestigious positions in a garrison divided between Manchus and Hanjun, and thus should hold posts in the upper three banners, while Hanjun were limited to the lower five. More intriguing, though, is a distinction between the upper three and lower five banners that was unique to Guangzhou. The upper three banners in Guangzhou were made up of descendants of former soldiers of Shang Zhixin 邑之信, son of Shang Kexi, and one of the so-called Three Feudatories, who had rebelled against the Qing in the 1670s, while the lower five banners consisted of descendants of Hanjun soldiers transferred from Beijing. The former group had been one of the specific categories of Hanjun who the emperor had permitted to leave the banners in his 1742 edict. Moreover, though any legal distinction between them and other Hanjun had been eliminated decades earlier, their descent from rebels may still have made them appear to have less of a right to banner status than descendants of men who had always remained loyal. It seems possible, then, that Yang and Sitku were attempting to reconcile the new imperial policy of expelling those people from the banners who had the wrong ethnic background with an older set of values in which a family history of loyal military service was the basis of banner membership. Finally, the two officials noted that artillery was the traditional responsibility of Hanjun, and so asked to remove the posts of artilleryman from each of the upper three banners, which would now consist of Manchus, and redistribute them to the lower five banners.

21 The upper three banners were the Bordered and Plain Yellow Banners and the Plain White Banner – they had originally been the personal property of the emperor, while the lower five banners belonged to other nobles, though this was no longer a relevant distinction in the mid-Qianlong period. They did, however, continue to be somewhat better funded, and as a result, somewhat larger, and certainly were a bit more prestigious.

22 Yang Yingju, HWZPZZ, NPM 403009753, QL 20.6.21 (July 29, 1755). Hauling cannons was likely the original function of Han soldiers in the pre-conquest state (see chapter 1), and cannons remained the special responsibility of Hanjun in Beijing, where they were never expelled, even in the nineteenth century (see chapter 4).
The Qianlong emperor, in his surprise that Sitku was not waiting for Guangzhou’s turn to begin Hanjun expulsion, had perhaps not paid all that much attention to the fact that the general’s initial proposal had called for the expulsion of only one thousand Hanjun. But when Yang and Sitku’s second memorial reached his desk, he noticed the limited scale of their plan, and responded with extreme displeasure. The emperor accused Sitku of “presumptuously” (Ch. 冒昧 maomei) seeking to change the emperor’s original plan so that in the end the general could delay having to actually accomplish the task at hand, and declared that if Sitku had any actual evidence that Guangzhou had particular reasons that it couldn’t expel all its Hanjun, he needed to provide it forthwith. 23 Sitku’s response, though apologetic, was to continue to defend his plan, arguing that he should at least be given more time to plan for the expulsion of the other 2,000 Hanjun in his garrison. He pointed out that banner salaries were substantially higher than those for Green Standard soldiers, and argued that “if we now move [all Hanjun] to Green Standard posts, among those households with many adult men as well as those whose clans live nearby, there will be those for whom [the stipends] will be insufficient to support them.” 24 It would be necessary, he suggested, for officials to come up with a way to employ many other of the adult men in the families of the expelled Hanjun, in order to ensure that they would still have enough to survive.

The Qianlong emperor was still not impressed by Sitku’s argument, declaring that the general was still “distinctly unclear as to the intention underlying this” policy of Hanjun expulsion (Ch. 此事本意，殊未明晰 ci shi benyi, shu wei mingxi). The emperor went on to

23 GZSL, juan 493, QL 20.7.27 (September 3, 1755).
24 今改補綠營粮缺，其壯丁較多以及親族附居之戶，有不敷養贍者。Sitku, HWZPZZ, NPM 403010464, QL 20.9.28 (November 2, 1755).
explain once again that “the Hanjun population grows incessantly. If they are made to be concentrated in the Eight Banners, and occupy posts in the provincial garrisons, then they will not be able to freely seek their own livelihood like Han people (Ch. 漢人 Hanren). Therefore, ordering them to leave the banners is truly motivated by [concern for] their livelihoods.”

Even Yang and Sitku’s plan to provide employment to the family members of expelled Hanjun who entered the Green Standards was, the emperor argued, fundamentally misguided. By providing them with official employment, Guangzhou garrison officials would be continuing to restrict their livelihoods, and preventing them from freely deciding what to do; how, he asked “is it any different from not even expelling them from the banners at all?”

The option to enter the Green Standards was, he proclaimed, not meant to be the method of managing all Hanjun – it was only meant for those who were only capable of serving as soldiers. For Sitku and his fellow officials to simply compare the salaries of banner soldiers and Green Standard soldiers was to miss the point entirely – these men were to be commoners; it was no longer the state’s job to be concerned about how each one of them provided for himself. To drive home the point, the emperor pointed out how absurd it would be if officials tried to do this for all commoners: “consider the commoners of the directly administered provinces, who are exceedingly numerous. How could officials possibly manage individually the increase and decrease of their daily expenses?”

Officials in Guangzhou were “playing the zither with glued pegs” (Ch. 膠柱鼓瑟 jiao zhu gu se), stubbornly sticking to an old way of doing things despite the newly decreed

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25 漢軍生齒日繁，若令專隸八旗，坐守駐防之缺，轉不能如漢人之隨便謀生。所以令其出旗，正為伊等生計起見。

26 若如所奏漢軍出旗後，復為料理安插，親族戶口，輾轉籌畫，是使伊等仍就拘束，不能隨便營生，其與不令出旗何異？

27 試思直省民人，如此浩繁，其日用盈縮，安能一一官為料理耶？
imperial policy. Hanjun were now to be treated just like Han commoners; why couldn’t Sitku adapt to the new circumstances? It wouldn’t even require any creativity on his part; all he had to do, the emperor said, was to simply copy the regulations that Fuzhou garrison officials had already developed. The emperor’s frustration with Sitku was obvious, and just nine days after issuing this edict, he ordered him transferred to serve as garrison commander in Barköl, to be replaced as Guangzhou general by Li Shiyao 李侍, the vice-president of the Board of Revenue (Ch. 戶部侍郎 hubu shilang, Ma. boigon i jurgan ashan i amban). The back-and-forth between Sitku and the Qianlong emperor makes the shift in approach to banner status represented by the Hanjun expulsion policy quite clear, and follows a similar logic to the rejection of Grand Councilor Necin’s first proposal for the Household Selected Soldiers prior to the emperor’s decision to expel them from the banners. Necin had, as discussed in chapter 2, wanted to put the Household Selected Soldiers into the Chahar Mongol banners, which had fewer men than called for in their official quotas, in order to ensure that they could continue to receive the support appropriate to banner people. Both Sitku and Necin had made the mistake of thinking that their first priority was to find the best way to provide a livelihood to the banner people in question. Instead, as the emperor explained in both cases, their banner status was no longer relevant; it was now necessary to treat them in accordance with their ethnic backgrounds. Though officials in Fuzhou and Guangzhou, like those in Suiyuan who had

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28 GZSL, juan 500, QL 20.11.4 (December 6, 1755).

29 GZSL, juan 500, QL 20.11.13 (December 15, 1755). No reason is given for the transfer, but Barköl, in far-off Xinjiang, was almost certainly a less favorable assignment than Guangzhou, and it seems unlikely to be coincidental that Sitku was transferred after 10 years of service in Guangzhou only days after receiving a harsh rebuke for his plan for Hanjun expulsion. The Guangzhou garrison gazetteer also claims that Li Shiyao was specially appointed for the purposes of managing the expulsion. See Chang-shan 長善, ed., Gazetteer for the Eight Banners Garrisoned in Canton 駐粵八旗志 (Guangzhou, 1884; reprinted Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1997), juan 14, 8a.

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been responsible for the Household Selected Soldiers, still made some special accommodations for their now former bannermen, from continuing to support the elderly and infirm, to helping provide housing, property, and jobs for family members in their new roles, the emperor’s view was absolute. Former bannermen must now, like ordinary Han, seek their own livelihoods, without the structures of the Eight Banners to either support or restrict them. It is unclear why Sitku was so driven to protect the Hanjun under his command. He himself was a Manchu of the Plain Yellow Banner, not a Hanjun bannerman.\textsuperscript{30} Perhaps his relatively long term of service in Guangzhou meant that he had developed a personal concern for his men there; perhaps, as the emperor said, he simply did not understand the new direction that the banners were taking. Such a misunderstanding would have been exacerbated by the Qing court’s failure to admit that treating Hanjun as unworthy of banner status was indeed an entirely novel approach, as it chose instead to treat expulsion as a natural outgrowth of earlier policies. Regardless, Sitku had to be dismissed.

Perhaps surprisingly, though, the removal of Sitku did not result in the expulsion of all Guangzhou’s Hanjun. At the time Li Shiyao, himself a Hanjun bannerman of the Plain Blue Banner, arrived in Guangzhou, he carried instructions from the emperor allowing that Guangzhou could become a half-Manchu, half-Hanjun garrison. This would still necessitate the expulsion of 1,500 Hanjun soldiers, 500 more than Sitku had wanted, but it did not mean their total elimination. Why the emperor changed his mind was left unexplained. Though Manchus and Han were to evenly split the salaried posts at both the main garrison and the naval garrison, there would not be complete equality between the two groups. First, only Manchus would be

\textsuperscript{30} A brief description of his service as garrison general can be found in Chang-shan, \textit{Gazetteer for the Eight Banners Garrisoned in Canton}, juan 14, pp. 7b-8a.
allowed to hold positions in the vanguard (Ch. 前锋 qianfeng, Ma. gabsihiyan), a prestigious military division from which Hanjun had always been excluded. Second, similar to Sitku and Yang’s original proposal, only Hanjun would handle the heavy cannon, though Manchus would also be trained in the lighter cannon (Ch. 子母砲 zimu pao, Ma. sihan sirabure poo). This continuing reliance on Hanjun for work as artilleryman is a challenge to Ding Yizhuang and Sun Jing’s claims that increased Manchu familiarity with artillery was one of the factors permitting Hanjun expulsion.  

Finally, and somewhat perplexingly, of the 800 Hanjun who received their salaries from posts in the Green Standards, 400 would be expelled from the banners, while 400 could continue to do so. No Manchus would receive analogous posts. This seems to have been the result of a mechanical application of the rule that half of Hanjun should be expelled, even though it did not really fit with the broader logic of the expulsion, since the expelled Hanjun were not to be replaced.

The Expulsion of Secondary-Status Bannermen

As the Fuzhou and Guangzhou expulsions were being carried out, the emperor turned his sights to another group of people who did not belong in the banners: the secondary-status banner people, including both those classified as entailed households (Ma. dangse faksalaha boigon, Ch. 開戶 kaihu), and those “separately recorded in the registers” (Ma. encu dangse de ejebuhe, Ch. 另籍檔案 lingji dang’an). In a 1756 edict, the Qianlong emperor noted that these

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32 Yang Yingju, HWLFZZ, NPM 403011889, QL 21.5.11 (June 8, 1756)

33 These two groups are discussed in chapter 2. As described there, entailed households were the “households of former bondservants or slaves granted the right to establish independent households due to meritorious military service” while those “separately recorded in the registers” were “those descendants of bondservants or slaves who
people were only permitted to receive salaried banner posts if there were no regular or detached household banner people to take them up. With the growth of the banner population, this meant that it was very hard for them to find jobs of any sort. Secondary-status banner people without employment or with employment that was not tied to banner status were to be immediately removed from the banners. Those who had managed to find a banner post were to be given a time limit to leave the banners, in order to prevent them from falling into economic distress if they were simply suddenly forced out.34 A few months later, in response to a request from Kargišan to follow the precedent of the Hanjun and expel the secondary status households of the Fuzhou garrison in order to allow them to become commoners, the Grand Council offered further clarification to the emperor’s edict. These descendants of household slaves, Grand Councilor Fuheng declared, not only were unequal to regular Manchu bannermen, but didn’t even deserve to be compared to Hanjun or Green Standard soldiers. Those who didn’t already hold salaried posts were to be expelled immediately, and because the number of Green Standard posts were limited, and expelled Hanjun and current Green Standard soldiers deserved priority, officials were to make no provision for them to find employment in Green Standard units. Those currently holding posts would be allowed to hold them until their retirement, after which their families would be expelled from the banners, with no possibility of holding a banner position ever again.35

34 GZSL, *juan* 506, QL 21.2.2 (March 2, 1756).
35 SYD, QL 21.5.9 (June 6, 1756).
Despite the Grand Council’s instructions, though, in most provincial garrisons the expulsion of secondary status bannermen eventually took a different path, one which may have helped save the remaining Hanjun in Guangzhou and in the naval garrison at Fuzhou from expulsion. Unemployed secondary status bannermen generally do seem to have been expelled quickly, as was done in Hangzhou, where garrison general Sarhadai 蘇爾哈岱 promptly sent a memorial explaining his intention to carry out expulsion on his garrison’s more than 1,400 secondary status bannermen without jobs.\(^{36}\) But the emperor soon began to vacillate about what to do with men of this sort, and in 1758, decided to send some such men from the capital to Fuzhou and Guangzhou to replace the departing Hanjun.\(^{37}\) Oddly, even some secondary status bannermen officially registered in the Hanjun banners in the capital were included among this number, and allowed to hold Manchu-designated posts in Fuzhou.\(^{38}\) Then, in 1759, Suiyuan general Henglu 恆祿 proposed the expulsion of those secondary status bannermen in his garrison, and in the garrison at Youwei (in present-day Shanxi, on the border with Inner Mongolia, in Youyu County of Shuozhou City), who did hold salaried posts, seemingly in contradiction to the Grand Council’s earlier plan, which had called on officials to wait until such men had retired before removing their households from the banners. Moreover, Henglu proposed allowing the men in question to be transferred into Green Standard units if they wished, exactly what had been done with Hanjun in both Fuzhou and Guangzhou.\(^{39}\)

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\(^{36}\) Sarhadai, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0176-1590-016, QL 21.4.24 (May 22, 1756).

\(^{37}\) GZSL, juan 557, QL 23.2.24 (April 1, 1758). That this edict was carried out is confirmed in Fusengge 福增格, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0180-1976-015, QL 27.10.? (November/December, 1762), which proposes using some of the secondary-status bannermen sent to Fuzhou to fill posts in the naval garrison that are to be vacated by Hanjun.

\(^{38}\) GZSL, juan 575, QL 23.11.16 (December 16, 1758). That Hanjun were among the secondary status bannermen sent to Fuzhou is confirmed in Sinju, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0177-1734-015, QL 23.11.17 (December 17, 1758).

Finally, in 1762, a final decision was reached on the secondary-status households, one that placed them firmly below Hanjun in the hierarchy of who belonged in the banners. This decision sprang from a memorial by Shaanxi governor Obi 鄴. Obi noted the 1756 edict that had called for these people to leave the banners, but reported that in Xi’an there were still over 1,250 such men holding salaried posts, and that a whopping 1,799 of the people who had actually been expelled continued to live in the banner garrison, relying on the income of their relatives and friends, and seemed unable to find an alternate livelihood, which he worried would lead them to become poverty-stricken and perhaps even take up a life of banditry. He proposed that it would be best to follow the example of Suiyuan and Youwei, and place these men into Green Standard units in the vicinity of Xi’an.\(^{40}\)

The secondary status bannermen who had been sent to Guangzhou and Fuzhou were soon dealt with similarly. Later in 1762, Fuzhou general Fusengge 福增格 proposed filling a set of vacant naval posts with secondary status bannermen and, after enough had been trained, to expel the Hanjun who still held those posts.\(^{41}\) The emperor denied his request, proclaiming that: “the Hanjun banner soldiers who have long been at Fuzhou are all detached households, my longtime slaves. They cannot be compared to people of entailed households or those separately recorded in the registers.”\(^{42}\) He ordered that, in both Fuzhou and Guangzhou, those secondary status bannermen who had been dispatched to the garrisons a few years previously should be expelled and put into the Green Standards, to be replaced by a new group of detached household

\(^{40}\) Obi, HWZPZZ, FHA 04-01-01-0252-053, QL 27.7.16 (September 3, 1762).

\(^{41}\) Fusengge, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0180-1976-015, QL 27.10.? (November/December, 1762)

\(^{42}\) Fujeo de fe bistre Ujen Coohai gūsai hafan cooha gemu encu boigon. mini fe aha. dangse faksalaha encu dangse ejebuhe urse de duibuleci ojorakā.
Manchus from the capital. Only when those Manchus had become numerous enough to need the posts currently allocated to Hanjun should the Hanjun be expelled. Thus, in the end, the emperor had decided that Hanjun had more right to banner status than did secondary status bannermen, because even if both groups consisted mostly of people of Han ethnic background, at least the Hanjun had a long history of service to the emperor to lend legitimacy to their status; they were no mere interlopers. The further delay that this decision created in expelling the remaining Hanjun at the Fuzhou naval garrison and Guangzhou would eventually prove permanent, and Hanjun remained at both places until the fall of the dynasty.

The Second Wave of Hanjun Expulsion: Hangzhou, Jingkou, and the Northwest

Even as the remaining Hanjun of Fuzhou and Guangzhou were allowed to remain in the banners, a new round of Hanjun expulsion began in garrisons across the rest of the empire. In 1763, the expulsion process began in Hangzhou, Jingkou 京口 (present-day Zhenjiang, Jiangsu), Liangzhou (present-day Wuwei, Gansu), and Zhuanglang 莊浪 (Gansu), and in 1764 it was extended to Suiyuan and Youwei. As had happened in Fuzhou and Guangzhou, the Hanjun in each garrison were given the choice of either becoming ordinary civilians or entering the Green Standards. But the process in each of these garrisons differed from that of Fuzhou and Guangzhou in one crucial way; in no case were the expelled Hanjun to be replaced by Manchus.

43 For Fuzhou, see Fusengge, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0180-2005-001, QL 28.1.9 (February 21, 1763). For Guangzhou, see Mingfu 明福, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0180-2027-040, QL 28.4.22 (June 3, 1763).

44 For details on the expulsion of secondary status people from Guangzhou, confirming that the process was in fact completed this time, see Yangning 楊寧, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0181-2135-038, QL 30.3.1 (April 20, 1765) and Yangning, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0182-2176-044, QL 30.12.20 (January 30, 1766). For Fuzhou, see Fusengge, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0180-2030-003, QL 28.5.26 (July 6, 1763) and Cangboo 常保, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0181-2066-034, QL 28.12.15 (January 17, 1764). For the continued presence of Hanjun in Guangzhou, see chapter 3 of this dissertation, which focuses principally on that group. For Fuzhou, clear evidence that Hanjun remained in the naval garrison until the end of the dynasty can be found in Pu-shou 朴壽, HWZPZZ, FHA 04-01-16-0298-174, GX 34.7.8 (August 4, 1908), which discusses the selection of a minor officer at Sanjiangkou, the Fuzhou naval garrison, but in the process mentions that Sanjiangkou is a Hanjun garrison.
from the capital. For Jingkou, this difference is perhaps a bit misleading, because the Hanjun
there would in fact be replaced by unemployed Mongol bannermen from Jiangning 江寧 (present-day Nanjing), though even there, only 1,100 of the more than 3,000 vacancies created
by the departure of the Hanjun would be filled. Notably, one of the principal concerns involved
in the Jingkou expulsion was that many Mongols would have to be retrained in artillery and
firearms, again suggesting that Hanjun continued to have military specialties that most Manchu
and Mongol troops lacked.45 In the garrisons other than Jingkou, positions for Hanjun were
simply eliminated – the Liangzhou and Zhuanglang garrisons were eliminated entirely. The extra
salaried posts from Hangzhou and Jingkou that became available were to be given to Chahar and
Solon (a New Manchu group from the Northeast) banner people who were to be sent to Ili, which
would be the base of Qing power in newly conquered Xinjiang.46 When viewed in conjunction
with the elimination of the Liangzhou and Zhuanglang garrisons, it becomes clear that this was
not simply a redeployment from China proper to the frontier, but also one from areas that had
once been frontier zones to newly conquered territories.

The timing of this second wave of Hanjun expulsions was explicitly linked to the defeat
of the Junghars and the conquest of Xinjiang, which necessitated that the Qing court establish
garrisons in the newly conquered territory, and reduced the strategic importance of certain
garrisons that were no longer anywhere near the empire’s external borders. The case of
Zhuanglang and Liangzhou makes this particularly clear. The 3,200 Manchu and Mongol
bannermen in the two garrisons were to be directly transferred to Ili to serve in the new banner

45 Žungboo 容保, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0180-2026-002, QL 28.4.27 (June 8, 1763).

46 The edict relating to Zhuanglang, Liangzhou, Hangzhou, and Jingkou can be found in GZSL, juan 677, QL 27.12.26 (February 8, 1763). The number of Mongols sent from Jiangning to Jingkou is in GZSL, juan 780, QL 32.3.14 (April 12, 1767). The edict ordering Hanjun expulsion at Suiyuan, which provides no guidance as to what to do with the posts thereby made available, is in GZSL, juan 715, QL 29.7.22 (August 19, 1764).
garrison being established there. The 1,000 Hanjun were dealt with according to the same standards as had been applied in Fuzhou and Guangzhou, in part because of the involvement of former Liangguang and Min-Zhe governor-general Yang Yingju, who was now serving as Shaan-Gan governor-general. This meant their division among various Green Standard garrisons in both Gansu and Shaanxi. Finally, those secondary status banner men in the Manchu and Mongol banners who held posts in the garrison were to be allowed to go to Ili with the other Manchu and Mongol soldiers, but would be required to transfer to the Green Standards if they did so. As such, it seems clear that the court was using a major redeployment of its western military garrisons as an opportunity to clear out many of the remaining provincial garrison Hanjun. Though framing the expulsion as in part a result of the defeat of the Junghars, which meant that it was “no longer necessary to station excess troops” at garrisons like Zhuanglang, Liangzhou, Suiyuan, and Youwei, and thus the Hanjun there could be eliminated, the court could certainly have transferred Hanjun westward to serve in Ili had it so chosen, rather than sending different groups of soldiers there as it expelled the Hanjun.

The expulsions in Suiyuan and Youwei also are further evidence that Qing officials understood the Hanjun expulsion to follow the same principles as those employed in expelling the Household Selected Soldiers. In fact, for the first time, the Household Selected Soldiers became an explicit precedent for Hanjun expulsion. Where Zhuanglang and Liangzhou relied on the precedents of Fuzhou and Guangzhou, with which Yang Yingju was intimately familiar, Suiyuan garrison general Yunju 蘆著 repeatedly cited the precedent of the Household Selected Soldiers.

47 See Balu 巴禄, HWZPZZ, NPM 403014224, QL 28.2.13 (March 27, 1763) and Balu, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0180-2020-009, QL 28.4.4 (May 16, 1763).

48 fulu cooha tebure baiburakū be dahame [...]Ujen Coohai gūsai urse be inu giyan i geren goloi Ujen Coohai gūsai ursei adali gūsaci tucibufii. Hokijung 和其衷, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0181-2099-031, QL 29.8.1 (August 27, 1764).
Soldiers, the expulsion of whom some of the officers and staff at his garrison had likely helped to manage, in explaining how and where he would transfer his expelled Hanjun.\(^49\)

**The Conclusion of Hanjun Expulsion in Xi’an**

The final group of Hanjun to be expelled from the banners were those in Xi’an, who remained in their garrison until 1778, when the emperor finally turned his attention towards them. Shaan-Gan governor-general Lergiyen 勒爾謹, responding to a request to increase the number of troops garrisoned in Ili, the center of Qing authority in recently-conquered Xinjiang, had proposed eliminating the post of provincial commander-in-chief (Ch. 提督 tidu, Ma. fideme kadalara amban) in Xi’an, and transferring the five battalions of Green Standard troops under his direct command to Ili. The emperor rejected this plan out of hand as wildly impractical, and instead ordered that 1,500 men be selected from among the various Green Standard units in Shaanxi and transferred to Ili. Rather than eliminating the posts formerly held by these men, he ordered that 1,500 of the more than 2,300 Hanjun soldiers in the Xi’an garrison be sent to fill the newly opened Green Standard posts. 1,000 of the Hanjun would then be replaced by Manchus from the capital.\(^50\) The movement of Green Standard troops to Ili makes it clear that the court did not consider the frontier to be a military zone suited only to Manchus, challenging explanations of Hanjun expulsion that rely on the changing geography of Qing military needs.\(^51\)

As with the expulsions of fifteen years earlier, the impetus for this final expulsion of Hanjun was military redeployment tied to the completion of the conquest of Xinjiang. But,

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\(^49\) See Yunju, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0181-2108-031 and FHA 03-0181-2108-032, QL 29.9.21 (October 16, 1764).

\(^50\) GZSL, *juan* 1065, QL 43.8.19 (October 9, 1778).

\(^51\) Like that in Sun Jing, “A Discussion of the Change in Status of the Eight Banner Hanjun during the Qianlong Period,” p.61.
unlike all previous expulsions of Hanjun, there was no longer any pretext that this was being done for the benefit of the Hanjun. Rather than issuing justifications for the decision as something that would reduce restrictions on Hanjun livelihood or deal with their overpopulation and resulting poverty, both the court and officials in Xi’an treated the process of Hanjun expulsion there as nothing more than a military matter. Indeed, for the first and only time, Hanjun were not even given the choice of becoming ordinary commoners, but were simply removed from the banners and moved into Green Standard units. Yet, Hanjun expulsion in Xi’an, as elsewhere, can only be understood as the result of an unspoken assumption on the part of all officials involved that Manchus belonged in the banners and Hanjun didn’t, an assumption that had not existed in the early years of Hanjun expulsion. The proposal for the removal of the final 800 Hanjun soldiers from Xi’an makes this particularly clear. According to Xi’an general Umitai伍米泰, if 800 Hanjun were left in the garrison, “the troop formation in the garrison would not seem very orderly” and so they should be eliminated, a justification that would have been laughably flimsy were the need to expel Hanjun from provincial garrisons not already an operating principle of banner management. To make the ethnic principle at work even clearer, Umitai then went on to complain that even after the transfer of 1,000 Manchus from the capital, the garrison would only have 2,700 Manchu and Mongol troops, which was not enough for a provincial capital and strategic location, adjacent to all sorts of barbarians (Ch. 番夷 fanyi). As such, even as he asked to remove more than 800 Hanjun soldiers, he asked permission to select

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52 A detailed description of the procedures can be found in Yu Minzhong 于敏中, HWLFZZ, NPM 024451, QL 44.7.26 (September 6, 1779).

53 似與營制部伍不甚嚴整。
300 men from among the garrison’s unemployed Manchu and Mongol population to receive official posts, to bring the total size of the garrison force to 3,000.\textsuperscript{54}

However, though the need to expel Hanjun from the banners was now taken for granted, even in this final set of expulsions, Qing officials continued to offer them considerations designed to help them in their new lives. The last 800 Hanjun expelled, for instance, were to be transferred to fill some of the additional 1,500 Green Standard vacancies created by sending a second group of soldiers to Ili. The posts not filled by expelled Hanjun, though, were simply to be eliminated, suggesting that filling these Green Standard posts was not necessarily a matter of military need, but perhaps simply a way to continue to pay salaries to former Hanjun.\textsuperscript{55}

Moreover, because the reduction of the total garrison population meant that some houses in the walled garrison district would remain open, Hanjun were to be allowed to continue to live in homes near the boundary between the Manchu and Han cities. In fact, reversing a recommendation from garrison officials that would have required expelled Hanjun to purchase these houses, the emperor decided that, in view of their newly reduced salaries, those who were remaining in Xi’an would be given available homes in the garrison for free.\textsuperscript{56} On the other hand, some of the considerations that the court had once shown to Hanjun who had been selected as bithesi, and thus demonstrated their Manchu ability, or who had reached relatively high officer ranks, no longer existed. In the Fuzhou expulsion, such people had been given the right to remain in the banners if they chose, though they would have to be transferred to the capital. In Xi’an, and, indeed, even in some of the second-wave expulsions, no Hanjun were to be excepted. Even

\textsuperscript{54} Umitai, HWZPZZ, NPM 403036532, QL 43.10.26 (December 14, 1778).

\textsuperscript{55} Yu Minzhong, HWLFZZ, NPM 023298, QL 44.3.? (April/May, 1779).

\textsuperscript{56} Yu Minzhong, HWLFZZ, NPM 024451, QL 44.7.26 (September 6, 1779).
the regimental colonels (Ma. gūsai da, Ch. 協領 xieling), the highest-ranking Hanjun officers other than the lieutenant general himself, were to be transferred to the equivalent rank in the Green Standards, that of major (Ma. dasihire hafan, Ch. 游擊 youji). By the end of 1780, there were no Hanjun of any sort left in the Xi’an garrison.

Though the procedures used in the earliest Hanjun expulsions were largely similar to those used in the final one in Xi’an, a real shift had taken place in the minds of the officials charged with carrying out the policy. General Sitku in Guangzhou had struggled to understand the purpose of expulsion, proposing policies designed to create a balance between Manchus and Hanjun in his garrison. The earliest versions of the Hanjun expulsion policy had made exceptions for those who seemed to have demonstrated that they deserved banner status through attaining higher military rank or learning Manchu. Moreover, the policy had been justified in terms of the welfare of the Hanjun themselves. By the time the Xi’an banner people were being expelled, none of this remained true. Officials had no trouble understanding that they were meant to eliminate Hanjun from their garrison, and indeed made proposals to do so on flimsy pretexts, with no pretense that it would benefit the Han themselves. The Qing bureaucracy had, finally, internalized the principle that underlay the court’s new policy toward the banners; banner status was not earned, either through one’s own efforts or those of one’s ancestors, it was an ethnic privilege accorded to Manchus, and not to Han.

Experiencing Expulsion: Hanjun Reactions to the Expulsion Policy

The Hanjun who were expelled from the banners were, by and large, soldiers and their dependents, not the sort of highly literate people who might provide their own written accounts

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57 Umitai, HWLFZZ, NPM 021381, QL 43.10.26 (December 14, 1778).
58 Sabingga 蘇炳阿, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0189-2851-030, QL 45.9.28 (October 25, 1780).
of expulsion. Indeed, I have not managed to find any versions of Hanjun expulsion told by expelled Hanjun themselves. And yet, this does not mean that it is impossible to get some sense of how Hanjun felt about being removed from the banners. The evidence available, in particular coming from the choices Hanjun made when given the option of either remaining soldiers or becoming commoners, suggests that, contrary to the claims of the court in the early stages of expulsion, most Hanjun saw leaving the banners as far from advantageous.

The first indication that Hanjun were not all that enthusiastic about leaving the banners comes from their response to the 1742 edict that had allowed them the choice to leave, a choice that only a few made. In 1720, the total adult male (男丁 nanding) population of the Hanjun banners had been just over 200,000, and by 1742 it was surely larger. If men between eighteen and sixty made up one-fifth of the population, this would mean that the Hanjun population in 1742 was likely higher than 1,000,000. Three months after the edict, a report from the generals of the Hanjun banners reported a total of only 1,075 people choosing to leave the banners. Moreover, of those, 929 came from families that did not hold a paid post of any sort, and only 53 came from the families of actual soldiers – that is, people whose livelihoods were actually

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60 According to Tong Lam, demographic historians believe that in late imperial China generally (not in the banners specifically), the total population was between four and six times as large as the number of able-bodied adult men (丁 ding). See Tong Lam, A Passion for Facts: Social Surveys and the Construction of the Chinese Nation State, 1900-1949 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), p. 59.

61 This number increased to only 1,396 after a full year had passed from the date of the original edict. The report containing this larger number, which is frequently cited in scholarship on the Hanjun expulsion (see, e.g., Ding, “A Brief Discussion of the Garrison Hanjun Leaving the Banners in the Qianlong Period,” p.14) does not, however, include a breakdown of the total that distinguishes unemployed bannermen from ordinary soldiers, and so obscures the fact that even this fairly small number included almost no one who had employment options within the banners. See GZSL, juan 189, QL 8.4.25 (May 18, 1743).
dependent on their banner status.\textsuperscript{62} Even the number of unemployed people leaving the banners during these first three months was not all that impressive, though, as given the total banner population, the number of Hanjun who had chosen to leave within the banners was, at most, barely 0.1 percent of Hanjun.

\textit{Table 3.1 Number of Expelled Hanjun Choosing to Enter Green Standards or Become Civilians}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expulsion Group</th>
<th>Entered Green Standards</th>
<th>Became Civilians</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% Entering Green Standards</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fuzhou\textsuperscript{63}</td>
<td>1851</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>2046</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guangzhou (1\textsuperscript{st} group)\textsuperscript{64}</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guangzhou (2\textsuperscript{nd} group)\textsuperscript{65}</td>
<td>474</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guangzhou (3\textsuperscript{rd} group)\textsuperscript{66}</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jingkou\textsuperscript{67}</td>
<td>1378</td>
<td>1320</td>
<td>2698</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hangzhou\textsuperscript{68}</td>
<td>985</td>
<td>918</td>
<td>1903</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suiyuan and Youwei\textsuperscript{69}</td>
<td>3381</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3381</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8865</td>
<td>2661</td>
<td>11526</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Excluding Suiyuan and Youwei</td>
<td>5484</td>
<td>2661</td>
<td>8145</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As discussed above, after forced expulsions began in 1754, many Hanjun had the choice of either entering the Green Standards or becoming commoners. Though Green Standard service

\textsuperscript{62} The others held posts in civil administration. Hongzhi, MHHBZPZZ FHA 04-01-01-0073-049, QL 7.7.25 (August 25, 1742).

\textsuperscript{63} Šetuken 舍圖肯, MWLFZZ FHA 03-0178-1850-026, QL 25.10.21 (November 28, 1760).

\textsuperscript{64} Yang Yingju, HWZPZZ, FHA 04-01-01-0216-008, QL 22.2.9 (March 28, 1757)

\textsuperscript{65} Tondo 托恩多, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0177-1750-002, QL 24.2.25 (March 23, 1759)

\textsuperscript{66} Li Shiyao, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0178-1815-002, QL 25.2.28 (April 13, 1760).

\textsuperscript{67} Žungboo, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0180-2057-007, QL 28.10.24 (November 28, 1763)

\textsuperscript{68} Fulu 福祿, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0180-2030-032, QL 28.5.19 (June 29, 1763)

\textsuperscript{69} Yunju, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0182-2108-032, QL 29.9.21 (October 16, 1764) says that all of the men being expelled wish to continue to serve as soldiers. The total number is given in Jangboo 彰寶, HWZPZZ, NPM 403021809, QL 30.11.9 (December 20, 1765).
was certainly inferior to banner service, both in terms of salary and in terms of the other privileges that banner people received, the large majority of expelled Hanjun chose to remain soldiers. As Suiyuan general Yunju reported to the throne, when told about their choice, his soldiers responded, “for generation after generation, we have relied on the salaries granted by his Majesty to support the people of our households. At this moment when we have learned how to serve in the military ranks, we cannot leave the ranks and seek another way of life.”\(^{70}\) As such, according to Yunju, it would be best to simply put the entire group of Hanjun from his garrison into the Green Standards.\(^{71}\) Indeed, as seen in Table 3.1 (previous page), though there was some variation from garrison to garrison, 77 percent of expelled Hanjun who were granted a choice elected to remain soldiers, and even if we exclude the soldiers from Suiyuan and Youwei on the grounds that it is unlikely that none of the more than three thousand men there would have chosen to become civilians if Yunju had not decided to transfer them *en masse*, 67 percent of expelled Hanjun entered the Green Standards.

Even some of the exceptions to the general tendency among expelled Hanjun to seek to retain military posts reflected concerns tied to the expulsion process itself, rather than a pre-existing desire to abandon military service. Following the expulsion of the Xi’an Hanjun, none of whom had been given the choice to enter civilian life, a man named Liu Kun 刘坤 deserted from his new Green Standard unit. According to his deposition upon being captured, Liu “feared going far away” and so found a man named Jin Jian 金鑑 to impersonate him and take his place.\(^{72}\) That

\(^{70}\) *ahasi jalan halame enduringge ejen i šangnaha fulun caliyan de akdafi booi anggala be ujime. kūwaran meyen de yabume taciha nerginde kūwaran meyen ci aljafi encu banjire babe kiceme muterakū.*

\(^{71}\) Yunju, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0182-2108-032, QL 29.9.21 (October 16, 1764).

\(^{72}\) 懮於遠行 SYD 48.7.28 (August 25, 1783).
is to say, Liu deserted not because he did not wish to continue being a soldier, but because his transfer to the Green Standards meant that he would have to move to a new garrison far from his previous home. Though no records survive of why some Hanjun who were given a choice to either enter the Green Standards or become civilians chose the latter path, it is possible that some, like Liu Kun, were motivated by a desire to remain in the cities in which they had lived their entire lives.

The reluctance of Hanjun to leave military service is evidence that, in spite of numerous memorials from their commanders reporting their gratefulness for the emperor’s grace in allowing them to become commoners, most Hanjun would have much rather remained in the banners. This conclusion is bolstered by looking at how late-Qing bannermen reacted to the possibility that the banners would be eliminated as part of the reforms of that era. Chengdu bannermen, for instance, rioted at the suggestion that banner stipends would be eliminated.73 According to Lao She, one of his elder male relatives, faced with the proposed end of the banners, argued that “any change is a change for the worse.”74 Indeed, even after the fall of the Qing in 1912, many bannermen continued to rely on the ever-more meager stipends granted by the Republican government, which in the mid-1910s still made up 75 percent of the income of the average Manchu family in Beijing, according to one contemporary sociologist.75 It seems unlikely that many bannermen would have been any more interested in leaving the banner life

behind at a time when there were no doubts that the banner system would continue to exist, and stipends were still reasonably large and distributed regularly.

Some expelled soldiers attempted to maintain their connection to the banners or even regain banner status. This seems to have been a larger problem with secondary-status households than with provincial garrison Hanjun, likely because the former retained clear ties to their old companies, while the latter had in most cases been replaced wholesale by newcomers, who would have had no incentive to help them. Of the 268 secondary-status banner people expelled from the Plain Yellow Mongol banner in 1757, for instance, 70 of them managed to return to the banners that same year by being adopted by a household that remained in the banners. Given that illegally claiming banner status – and the adoption of a commoner into a banner household was illegal – carried criminal penalties as severe as exile to Xinjiang, that such a high percentage of expelled bannermen would attempt it suggests that many were desperate to regain their status.  

In some cases, expelled bannermen managed to maintain connections to the banners for decades. For expelled Hanjun, this was easiest in Guangzhou, were many of their fellow Hanjun, often including relatives by blood or marriage, remained in the banners. In 1811, more than fifty years after expulsion, Guangzhou garrison general Fuhui 福會 explained why some Hanjun were getting involved in criminal conspiracies with commoners by pointing out that many commoners in Guangzhou had originally been Hanjun and still had relations in the banners, and thus that “it is unavoidable that after leaving the banners they would continue to come and go as before.”

Attempts to return to the banners also continued for decades after expulsion. In late 1793 in Guangzhou, a Bordered Blue Manchu bannerman named He-quan 和全 was approached by

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76 Fuheng, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0179-1948-002, QL 27.6.9 (July 29, 1762).
77 出旗後仍舊往來，在所不免。Fuhui, HWZPZZ, JQ 16.7.21 (September 8, 1811).
the husband of his wife’s maternal cousin, a man named Zhao Quan 趙權. Zhao, as he would later tell the local authorities, was “a person expelled from the banners, with no means of support” (Ch. 出旗之人，無業資生 chuqi zhi ren, wuye zisheng). When his wife gave birth to a son, he concocted a plan to improve his situation by getting He-quan to adopt the boy and raise him in the Manchu banners. When the boy reached maturity and received a salaried post, Zhao and He-quan would split his salary to help support themselves in their old age. He-quan quickly agreed to the plan, likely recognizing that a shortage of Manchu personnel in the Guangzhou garrison meant that it was almost a sure thing that his newly adopted son would be able to receive a salary. The son, whom Zhao Quan had named Zhao Tianlu 趙添祿 – his given name literally meant “add an official salary” – was entered into the Manchu banner registers under the false name Quan-heng 全恆 to help pass him off as a Manchu.

As a child, Quan-heng was unaware of his real parentage, and Zhao Quan and He-quan’s scheme went smoothly for twenty years, with He-quan sharing 2.5 dou (about 25 liters) of rice per month with Zhao out of the small stipend that Quan-heng received from a supernumerary post (Ch. 副甲 fujia). However, in 1813, Quan-heng obtained a post in the cavalry, and when Zhao went to He-quan to ask for his share of his son’s now much-increased salary, He-quan refused to share. Hoping that Quan-heng would help him if he knew his true parentage, Zhao revealed everything to the young man. But things did not go as he hoped. In fear that he would be implicated in what constituted a serious crime, Quan-heng went straight to the yamen of his banner commander to explain the situation, resulting in the loss of his banner status and his cavalry post. He-quan was sentenced under the statute prohibiting “falsely obtaining military provisions for oneself” (Ch. 冒支軍糧入己 maozhi junliang ruji), which carried a punishment only one degree less than death – one hundred blows of the heavy bamboo and exile to Xinjiang.
– though as a banner person, his sentence was commuted to sixty days in the cangue and one hundred strokes of the whip. Zhao Quan “fell ill” – likely a euphemism for a failure to recover from judicial torture – in custody and died before he could be sentenced.\textsuperscript{78}

Zhao’s attempt to sneak his son into the banner registers reveals the conflict between new ideas about who belonged in the banners and many Hanjun banner people’s understanding of their own status. Though he was no longer in the banners, Zhao clearly still sought to live as a banner person; he saw his livelihood as bound up with banner status, and continued to think of the banners as a potential source of income. Neither he nor He-quan seem to have believed in a strict division between Manchus and Han – indeed, the two men were relatives by marriage. Yet, Zhao understood the new official perspective that held Manchus to be more deserving of banner status than Hanjun, and chose therefore to find a Manchu, rather than one of Guangzhou’s remaining Hanjun, to adopt his son. Even though Zhao saw himself as a bannerman, he knew that pretending his son was a Manchu was necessary to ensure his access to banner status. For Qing banner officials dealing with the matter, in contrast to those who dealt with the case of Qi Bin prior to the start of forcible Hanjun expulsion, former Hanjun were no different from any other Han person.\textsuperscript{79} In adjudicating the case there is no suggestion that either Zhao’s own past status or his familial relationship to He-quan would make He-quan’s adoption of Quan-heng legal, or even mitigate the punishment of the people involved.

\textbf{Conclusion}

\textsuperscript{78} Ben-zhi 本智, HWZPZZ, FHA 04-01-01-0544-025, JQ 18.8.24 (September 18, 1813).

\textsuperscript{79} Qi Bin is discussed in the previous chapter – in short, he was a Hanjun banner official who had adopted a young man whose parents were Hanjun who voluntarily left the banners before the adoption was reported, technically making the adoption the illegal adoption of a commoner by a banner person. The adoption was permitted to stand in part because the adoptee’s birth parents had formerly been Hanjun, making him more like a banner person than most commoners.
The expulsion of Hanjun from the banners was premised on a change in the Qing court’s understanding of who should be included in the banner system. That Hanjun would be deemed less worthy of remaining in the banners on the basis of their ethnic background was not a foregone conclusion, but rather a new idea developed in the middle of the eighteenth century. Though problems in providing for the livelihoods of both Manchu and Hanjun people may have contributed to the decision to pursue expulsion, they did not necessitate it. Indeed, as seen in chapter 1, there was a reasonably well-established practice of using Hanjun in Green Standard posts while allowing them to retain their banner status, a solution that would have had more or less the same economic effect as expulsion, while not compromising the right of Hanjun to remain in the banners. The 1742 edict that the court would eventually cite as precedent for it was at most a partial step toward forced expulsion, merely recognizing a limited right for certain Hanjun – depending on the history of their family’s service to the dynasty – to leave the banners voluntarily. It was only in 1746, while dealing with the Household Selected Soldiers, that the court had first decided to remove a group of people from the banners on the basis, at least in part, of their ethnic origins.

The idea for this policy shift appears to have come from the Qianlong emperor himself. As discussed in the preceding chapter, the initial memorial by Buhi, the Suiyuan general, about the livelihood problems of the Household Selected Soldiers gives no indication that he intended such a drastic solution. Though he opposed Necin’s proposal to send some of his men to the Chahar banners, Buhi most likely expected his superiors to propose one of the standard solutions for banner overpopulation, like allowing Hanjun bannermen to hold posts in the Green Standards while retaining banner status, or creating new funds designed to support unemployed soldiers. The idea that instead the Household Selected Soldiers should be removed from the banners en
masse first appears only in the emperor’s own edict, which was an extremely rare imperial rejection of a proposal made by the Grand Council, his closest and most powerful advisory body. Most Qing officials, even at the highest levels, seem not to have seen expulsion from the banners as a tool available to them, until explicitly told to do so by the emperor, in an unusual intervention into normal bureaucratic procedure. Even as they carried out the emperor’s order, both in the case of the Household Selected Soldiers and in that of provincial garrison Hanjun, a policy that also originated with an imperial edict rather than a proposal from an official, Qing administrators devised plans designed to ameliorate the effects of expulsion and take into account what they saw as the dynasty’s obligation to the bannermen who had served it. In at least one case, that of Guangzhou, the emperor saw these plans as out of keeping with his intentions, and the garrison general, Sitku, was severely reprimanded for his presumptuousness, and for generally impeding the expulsion process.

It is difficult to offer a definitive explanation as to why the Qianlong emperor wished to expel Hanjun from the banners or why he believed that ethnic origins should be the basis of legal privilege, instead of hereditary status and a family history of service in the expansion of the empire. Zhao Bingzhong and Bai Xinliang argue that “the deep-rooted ethnic-class prejudice of the Qianlong emperor” explains why the banner expulsion policy was designed to protect regular Manchu banner people at the expense of Hanjun and secondary-status banner people (who were descended from slaves); it was a based on a “principle of first [expelling] those who are distant

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and afterwards those who are close.”\textsuperscript{81} Indeed, the Qianlong emperor’s record of suspicion of the Han is well documented – the 1768 soulstealers panic, for instance, was, Philip Kuhn argues, driven in no small part by imperial fears of Han subversion.\textsuperscript{82} Yet complaints and worries about Han subjects were not limited to the Qianlong period, and indeed, imperial diatribes denouncing the Hanjun themselves as lazy and untrustworthy were, if anything, more common under Yongzheng.

More promising perhaps is not to look simply at anti-Han prejudice on the part of the emperor, but at his belief in the fundamental distinctness of Manchus and Han, a position which clearly distinguished him from his predecessors. In his response to the treasonous writings of Lü Liuliang 呂留良 and treasonous plots of Zeng Jing 曾靜, the \textit{Record of Great Righteousness Dispelling Confusion} (Ch. 大義覺迷錄 \textit{dayi juemi lu}), the Yongzheng emperor had argued that both barbarians (Ch. 夷 \textit{yi}), a category in which he included the Manchus, and Chinese were fundamentally alike.\textsuperscript{83} Manchu rule was, for the Yongzheng emperor, justified in large part by the Manchus’ own moral transformation, which had made them fit recipients of the Mandate of


Heaven.\textsuperscript{84} Indeed, a belief in the transformability of barbarians formed the basis of policies for managing the southwestern frontier that were developed in the Yongzheng period.\textsuperscript{85}

The Qianlong emperor, however, rejected the idea that Manchus, and his own Aisin Gioro lineage in particular, had required any transformation to be legitimate rulers, insisting on their independent origins in the Northeast, and their unique and pure cultural identity.\textsuperscript{86} Beyond this, the emperor believed in the need to maintain the distinct ethnic character of the various peoples of Manchuria and Mongolia, and to prevent their transformation by the Han. This attitude was apparent everywhere from attempts to preserve the purity of natural spaces associated with Manchus or Mongols, and in particular to prevent Han intrusion into them, to efforts to maintain the cultural practices of New Manchu groups in the northeast by demanding that they hunt with bow and arrow, not muskets.\textsuperscript{87} Manchus and Chinese even had to be distinguished by their names; in 1785, Qianlong excoriated a Manchu official for having a name that sounded too Chinese, and angrily ordered that he be renamed “Stinking Han” (Ma. \textit{Nikan Fusihun}) as punishment for having blurred ethnic lines.\textsuperscript{88} It is likely that these various policies of maintaining ethnic difference were linked and that they influenced the Qianlong emperor’s

\textsuperscript{84} Pamela Kyle Crossley, \textit{A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), p.256.


\textsuperscript{86} Crossley, \textit{A Translucent Mirror}, 260-262.

\textsuperscript{87} For the ethnic basis for efforts to preserve natural spaces, see Jonathan Schlesinger, “The Qing Invention of Nature: Environment and Identity in Northeast China and Mongolia: 1750-1850” (PhD diss., Harvard, 2012), especially pp.24-30. Schlesinger’s dissertation dates the rise of the “purity” discourse to the mid-eighteenth century, during the reign of the Qianlong emperor. An edict ordering the Solon, a New Manchu group, to follow supposedly traditional practices of archery and eschew the use of muskets can be found in GZSL, \textit{juan} 374, QL 15.10.8 (November 6, 1750).

\textsuperscript{88} The Manchu literally means “less than a Han.” Nikan Fusihun 尼堪富什渾, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0191-0357-009, QL 50.10.12 (November 13, 1785).
attitude toward the banners; if names, places, and cultural practices were all ethnically delimited, it might make sense that banner membership should be as well.

Recognizing the connection between a new emphasis on Manchu ethnicity as a defining attribute of banner status and the expulsion of the Hanjun prompts one clear objection: if the Qianlong emperor and his court had decided that Han did not belong in the banners, why were they not all expelled? A compelling explanation exists for the Hanjun in Guangzhou and Fuzhou; as discussed above, the resistance of the Guangzhou commander to expulsion, the lack of trained Manchu sailors to replace Hanjun sailors in Fuzhou, and the decision to expel in turn the secondary status banner people who were initially sent to replace expelled Hanjun combined to grant a reprieve that outlasted the height of the expulsion policies. However, this still leaves the question of Hanjun banner people in Beijing, who were offered the option to leave the banners voluntarily prior to the beginning of forced expulsion in the provinces, but were never compelled to give up their banner status.89

A substantial part of the answer comes from recognizing that the internal banner hierarchy had a third axis in addition to ethnicity and banner household type.90 The Qing state maintained clear, long-standing preferences for capital bannermen, who were garrisoned in Beijing, over provincial bannermen, stationed in provincial garrisons. Capital bannermen were consistently paid better and granted more benefits than their provincial counterparts.91 Though

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89 The same is true of Hanjun in Manchuria, but because the banners in Manchuria functioned quite differently from those in China proper – most banner people in the Northeast lived in villages and supported themselves through farming rather than living in garrison communities and relying on state employment – there was not as much reason for the court to be concerned about their ethnic composition.

90 That is, whether a household was classified as a regular household, detached household, or entailed household, a distinction discussed in chapter 2.

this can perhaps be explained by an argument that costs were higher for bannermen in the capital, the distinction between the two groups did not just depend on where one was actually stationed. When, in a scheme designed to provide new sources of support for the growing banner population, bannermen willing to give up their military stipends and move to the Manchurian countryside were granted large tracts of land in Shuangcheng, those who had originally been based in the capital were given far more land than those from elsewhere. That same hierarchy would have made Hanjun based in the capital lower-priority targets for expulsion than those based in the garrisons.

At the same time, the bureaucratic structure of the capital garrisons was less amenable to the expulsion process. Provincial garrisons had a single powerful commander, with a great deal of policy-making authority, whose position rested outside the banner ethnic hierarchy. That is, his own post was not tied to the Hanjun (or Manchu) banners, but to the garrison itself. In Beijing, in contrast, the highest banner officials were the banner commanders (Ch. 都統 dutong, Ma. gūsa be kadalara amban), a post that, though carrying a high bureaucratic rank, had little practical power after the early period of the dynasty. Moreover, with one commander for each banner in each ethnic category, so twenty-four in total and eight in the Hanjun banners alone, what authority did exist was fragmented and the men responsible for governing the Hanjun banners held posts tied to those banners’ continued existence. Though a concerted imperial effort could have put an end to the Hanjun banners entirely, no Hanjun banner commander was likely to propose such a step himself. This meant that, particularly during the latter stages of Hanjun

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expulsion, as in Xi’an, where one proposal for expulsion came from the garrison general himself, there was less potential impetus for forced expulsion in the capital. The relative slowness of the expulsion process as a whole and the lack of any real effort to expel Hanjun in the capital suggest that total ethnic purification of the banners was never the Qing court’s goal. However, this does not contradict the broadly ethnicity-based logic that underlay Hanjun expulsion. Under that logic, Hanjun might remain in the banners so long as it was convenient for the court; what had changed was that the court no longer believed itself to have any duty to preserve the banner status of any person considered ethnically Han.

If we understand the Hanjun expulsion as a Qianlong-era move toward turning a status category into an ethnic one, it did have one pre-Qianlong precedent, though not one that Qing officials recognized explicitly. The Yongzheng emperor’s elimination of a variety of base status categories beginning in 1723 – groups of people associated with sex work, music, acting, begging and the like (these occupations were all interrelated) – was based on a policy of commoner equality.94 That is to say, it eliminated differences among the various people categorized as commoners (Ch. 民 min), as opposed to banner people. One of the principal purposes of this policy, Matthew Sommer argues, was to create a universal sexual morality for women, one in which prostitution and other forms of sexual activity regarded as immoral were universally prohibited. That is to say, from the court’s perspective, the policy created a set of universal gender norms applicable to all women. Sommer summarizes this shift as one from “a

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94 Or so argues Philip Kuhn – see Kuhn, Soulstealers, p.34-35. On the base peoples, see Anders Hansson, Chinese Outcasts: Discrimination & Emancipation in Late Imperial China (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 1996).
status hierarchy rooted in an aristocratic vision of fixed social structure” to “a gender order defined in terms of strict adherence to family roles.”

Where the Yongzheng reforms were a move towards eliminating status categories in favor of uniform gender roles, the Hanjun expulsion can be seen as a move towards the elimination of status categories in favor of uniform ethnic roles. That is, the banners had, since the beginning of the Qing, been a multiethnic grouping that constituted one of the two largest divisions of a Qing status system that was generally not based on ethnic distinctions. Though the Hanjun were certainly not totally eliminated by the expulsion policies of the Qianlong era, those policies made ethnicity the basis of banner membership. Both sets of reforms thus meant the elimination of, or at least reduction in emphasis on, the sorts of status divisions that were fundamental to the social structures of both the Qing and many of its early modern contemporaries, from Tokugawa Japan to tsarist Russia, and the strengthening of the identity categories that shaped and continue to shape the modern world: gender and ethnicity. Categories like gender and ethnicity were mediated by status in the early Qing as in much of the early modern world; but, during the mid-eighteenth-century reforms, status would play a clearly subordinate role. The next chapter will explore the effects of this triumph of ethnicity over status on the Hanjun who remained in the banner system.

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96 This is not to say that these categories did not matter before – they certainly did. But the notion of a single sort of role for “women” would have made little sense to someone in Tokugawa Japan where a woman of a samurai household who was confined to her home could obtain a great deal of freedom of movement by becoming a nun – see Laura Nenzi, *Excursions in Identity: Travel and the Intersection of Place, Gender, and Status in Edo Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2008), pp.76-77 – and where a commoner woman past her reproductive years like Matsuo Taseko could obtain a degree of access to a male social and political world that would have been unthinkable either for a younger woman or a woman of samurai status – see Anne Walthall, *The Weak Body of a Useless Woman: Matsuo Taseko and the Meiji Restoration* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), pp.190; 352.
Chapter Four: Administrative Equality and Social Inequality: Hanjun Identity from Expulsion to the End of Qing Rule

The expulsion of many Hanjun in the middle of the eighteenth century was a watershed moment in the history of the banners, but, as discussed in the preceding chapter, it did not mean the end of the Hanjun as a banner category. Indeed, Hanjun would remain a substantial portion of the banner population until the abolition of the banner system following the end of Qing rule. How Hanjun status and identity, their role in the banner system, and their relationship to other banner people changed from the late eighteenth century until the early twentieth century will be the focus of this chapter.

Hanjun in the post-expulsion period have received almost no attention from scholars. Some scholars have, however, made observations about the relationship between ethnic origins and banner status in the early twentieth century. Pamela Crossley argues that Han nationalist revolutionaries viewed the Hanjun as “race traitors” – that is, that they saw them as Han whose banner status and service to the Qing meant that they had turned against their own people.¹ In contrast, Edward Rhoads argues that, at the turn of the twentieth century, the banner population as a whole “was increasingly being viewed (at least in the eyes of non-banner people)” as an ethnic group (the Manchus).” That is, according to Rhoads, all banner people, including the Hanjun, were understood to be Manchus at the end of the Qing period.² Crossley’s position derives some support from the work of Ura Ren’ichi, not because Ura describes a phenomenon of Han nationalists viewing Hanjun as traitors, but because Ura himself referred to them that

way, arguing that the Hanjun who initially joined the Qing had, for their own benefit, “submitted to the Manchus, who constituted an alien race” and thus “revealed their completely traitorous nature.”

Ura was writing around 1930, suggesting that his understanding of the Hanjun as traitors to their own people may reflect a common view only a couple decades after the end of the Qing. Rhoads’s contrasting view is supported by work like that of Wu Xiaoli, who argues that Hanjun in Heilongjiang received treatment equal to that of Manchus and in the wake of 1911, actively identified as Manchus. That many Hanjun identified as Manchus following the end of Qing rule is also noted by Li Yanguang, who points to present-day Hanjun descendants identifying as Manchus as evidence of the extent to which Hanjun-Manchu difference was of little importance.

Though Li argues for the lack of importance of Manchu/Hanjun difference over the entire course of the Qing, even Sun Jing, who generally emphasizes discrimination against the Hanjun, agrees that in the wake of expulsion, the Hanjun who remained were much better integrated into the banners than their predecessors had been.

Overall, most scholars agree that though Han nationalists may have viewed Hanjun as Han people who betrayed their race, by the early twentieth century, within the banners themselves, Hanjun had come to be viewed as little different from Manchus.

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5 Li Yanguang 李燕光, “Eight Banner Hanjun in the Qing Dynasty” 清代的八旗汉军, Manxue yanjiu 1992: 91-103.

This chapter argues that there was indeed a major shift in official approaches to banner identity from the period after the end of Hanjun expulsion until the end of the dynasty. Going beyond work that discusses the state of collective banner identity at the end of the Qing, it shows the process through which both local garrison officials and the central Qing court deemphasized ethnic difference among banner people, and moved toward treating them with relative equality. However, in a partial challenge to arguments that internal ethnic divisions were of little importance in the late Qing banners, it shows that Manchus and Hanjun remained economically and socially stratified into the late Qing. The state’s late eighteenth- and nineteenth-century retreat from the extreme focus on ethnic difference within the banners exemplified by the expulsion policies of the mid-eighteenth century did not eliminate the role that those differences played in the lives of bannermen.

Though the chapter integrates material from across the Qing empire, it is principally focused on the garrison at Guangzhou. Guangzhou was the provincial garrison in which Hanjun played the largest role during the post-expulsion period, and is the most richly documented location for studying policies toward the Hanjun. Though many more Hanjun lived in the capital than in Guangzhou, the availability of large numbers of memorials from Guangzhou garrison generals and the existence of a comprehensive late nineteenth-century garrison gazetteer are of great help in tracing in detail the changing approaches to the Hanjun as well as investigating the nature of banner society in an ethnically-mixed garrison environment. The material on central government policies, and Hanjun in Beijing and Fuzhou specifically, that is also included in the chapter will support the arguments derived from its focused study of Guangzhou, and indicates that the Hanjun experience in Guangzhou can reasonably be taken as broadly representative of the changes in Hanjun identity in the empire as a whole during the period in question.
The chapter begins with a short study of demographic changes in the empire’s banner population both resulting from and subsequent to Hanjun expulsion. This section demonstrates that policies of Hanjun expulsion were completely abandoned, or at least ceased to have much effect on the ethnic breakdown of the banner population, by early in the nineteenth century. The second section shows that though, in Guangzhou, initial moves toward reducing ethnic preferences for Manchus were tied to a shortage of Manchus in the garrison, during the nineteenth century, new policies to increase the number of jobs available to banner people were directed almost entirely at Hanjun. Indeed, between the mid-eighteenth and late-nineteenth centuries, the garrison went from evenly dividing its stipend-carrying military posts evenly between Manchus and Hanjun – despite the much higher total Hanjun population – to offering stipends in numbers nearly proportional to the two groups’ actual population. At the same time, broader policy shifts, from the resumption of employing banner people in Green Standard posts, to legal changes that offered more equal treatment to Manchus and Hanjun in criminal cases, raised the status of Hanjun relative to Manchus elsewhere in the empire as well. The third and final section of the chapter explores the complex interplay of ethnicity and banner status in banner society. It shows that Hanjun expulsion created links between the Hanjun population and Han commoners that had not previously existed and that Manchus and Hanjun operated as equals in some social contexts. However, it argues that asymmetric marriage patterns and income inequality between Manchus and Hanjun persisted through the end of the dynasty, and thus that the moves toward legal and administrative equality between the two groups that characterized official policy toward the banners did not necessarily translate to the social and economic realms. Though the idea of a unified banner identity, even a “banner race,” had some intellectual
currency in the early twentieth century, among both banner people and officials, it did not reflect
the facts on the ground.

**Post-expulsion Population Changes**

Hanjun expulsion resulted in a substantial decrease in the number of Hanjun in the
banners, one that continued for a time even after the end of formal expulsion policies. According
to Board of Revenue regulations, banner officials were to compile registers of all bannermen on
a triennial basis. Though most of these do not survive – many early ones, for instance, were
destroyed in a 1751 fire, we have total figures for the population of military-age men (Ch. 男丁
*nanding*) from the 1720, 1782, 1785, 1788, 1812, and 1887 registers, which enable a comparison
of the banner population from before and after the expulsion process as well as a sense of how
the banner population continued to change over the course of the nineteenth century.7 These
numbers appear in Table 4.1, below.

The differences between the 1720 and 1782 figures make the direct effects of Hanjun
expulsion clear. Based almost entirely on natural population growth, the population of the

Table 4.1 *Population of Military-age Bannermen (男丁 nanding), 1720-1887*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>17208</th>
<th>17829</th>
<th>1785</th>
<th>1788</th>
<th>181210</th>
<th>188711</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manchus</td>
<td>154,117</td>
<td>191,351</td>
<td>196,997</td>
<td>201,373</td>
<td>222,968</td>
<td>229,011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongols</td>
<td>43,636</td>
<td>49,971</td>
<td>52,749</td>
<td>53,404</td>
<td>55,639</td>
<td>56,967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chahars</td>
<td>12,349</td>
<td>18,842</td>
<td>19,225</td>
<td>19,357</td>
<td>16,489</td>
<td>15,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanjun+12</td>
<td>204,870</td>
<td>152,981</td>
<td>150,881</td>
<td>148,945</td>
<td>143,554</td>
<td>143,322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Servants and Slaves13</td>
<td>239,494</td>
<td>73,145</td>
<td>71,382</td>
<td>67,608</td>
<td>50,163</td>
<td>27,172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-conquest Han14</td>
<td>34,440</td>
<td>28,266</td>
<td>28,500</td>
<td>31,635</td>
<td>29,893</td>
<td>32,680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous Other Groups15</td>
<td>5,577</td>
<td>7,236</td>
<td>6,856</td>
<td>6,353</td>
<td>4,346</td>
<td>4,796</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>694,483</td>
<td>521,792</td>
<td>526,590</td>
<td>528,675</td>
<td>523,052</td>
<td>509,348</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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7 The fire is referenced in Board of Revenue 戶部, HWZW, FHA 03-0193-3244-007, QL 54.6 (July/August, 1789).
Manchu banners grew by 24 percent over the sixty-two year period. The Mongol population, similarly, grew by nearly 15 percent. Assuming that natural population growth among Hanjun fell somewhere in this same range, the population of military-age men in the group referred to as “Hanjun+” in the above table, which included all Hanjun along with some members of the bondservant banners, should have reached somewhere between 230,000 and 260,000 people by 1782. Instead, it dropped by more than 25 percent to a little over 150,000, meaning that expulsion policies had resulted in around 100,000 adult Han banner men, along with all of their dependents, leaving the banners, a loss of around 40 percent of their total expected population. Even more dramatic than the decline in Han bannermen, though, was the decline in the numbers of those people, likely overwhelmingly Han, who were hereditary servants or slaves in Manchu or Mongol banner households, referred to as “household members of Manchus and Mongols” (Ch. 滿蒙家人 Man Meng jiaren) in official tabulations. The expulsion of secondary status bannermen likely played some role in this, assuming that people in entailed households

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9 Board of Revenue 户部, HWZW, FHA 03-0193-3244-007, QL 54.6 (July/August, 1789). 1785/88 data from same source.

10 DQHD (1818), *juan* 12, pp.22a-b.

11 DQHD (1899), *juan* 19, pp.21b-22a.

12 This group includes both all, or nearly all, Hanjun and some members of bondservant banners.

13 These are people who served in Manchu and Mongol banner households, and so were registered in the banners, but did not hold military posts of their own.

14 This group includes eunuchs and the descendants of landholders who submitted to the Qing during the conquest of Beijing and received banner status in the bondservant banners as recompense.

15 This includes a variety of small banner groupings, from the Barhu banners under the command of the Heilongjiang general to the single Muslim bondservant company under the Imperial Household Department’s Plain White Banner to a variety of small Mongol groups.
continued to be officially counted in this category, but the consistent decreasing trend in the population of this group, even long after active efforts at expulsion ceased, suggest that other factors may have played a role. Decreasing average real incomes for employed bannermen may have resulted in a decreasing inability to support additional dependents, leading servants and slaves to be released from service and leave the banners. Ignoring servants and slaves, as well as some of the other smaller banner groups, as Figure 4.1 does above, makes the trends in the Hanjun population more apparent.

Looking at population changes from 1782 to 1788 shows that even after the final provincial banner expulsion, in Xi’an, was completed, the Hanjun population of the banners continued to decline. The simultaneous increase in the Manchu and Mongol banner population suggests that this was not the result of any factor affecting all banner people, but rather that Han banner people were likely continuing to leave the banners, albeit less quickly than they had
during the height of the expulsion policies. Whether this was a result of voluntary departures from the banners or if the Qing state was in fact continuing to expel Hanjun on a smaller scale is unclear – no reports that survive deal with either possibility. The same trend continued, though even more slowly, between 1788 and 1812, but during the nineteenth century, the Hanjun population stabilized, decreasing by less than 0.2 percent between 1812 and 1887, compared to growth of only 2.7 percent among Manchus and 2.4 percent among Mongols. The lack of continued growth within the banners as a whole is likely a result, at least in part, of the cataclysmic wars of the mid-nineteenth century in which many banner people, both soldiers and civilians, were killed. In any case, the lack of much discrepancy in the change in population during this period between Manchus and Mongols on the one hand and Hanjun on the other suggests that the expulsion policies formulated during the mid-eighteenth century were no longer of any importance during the nineteenth. Hanjun expulsion was, therefore, a project only of the latter part of the Qianlong period. What, then, did the new post-expulsion era look like for Hanjun?

**Administrative Reforms in the Post-Expulsion Period**

Following the expulsion from the banners of most provincial garrison Hanjun, Guangzhou became the site of the largest Hanjun population in China proper outside the capital region. As such, an examination of changes in the administration of the Hanjun of the Guangzhou garrison during the latter half of the Qing period offers substantial insight into shifting official approaches to Hanjun identity. The Guangzhou garrison is richly documented during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, both through memorials from the garrison general

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16 Rhoads, *Manchus & Han*, pp. 58-59 describes banner casualties during the Opium Wars and Taiping Rebellion. In the latter, more than thirty thousand banner men, women, and children were slaughtered in the Nanjing garrison alone.
and other local officials held at the First Historical Archives in Beijing, and through the 1879 *Gazetteer for the Eight Banners Garrisoned at Canton*, compiled under the direction of the long-serving garrison general Chang-shan 長善, and revised and extended in 1884.\(^\text{17}\)

In general, between 1756 and 1911, the Guangzhou garrison substantially reduced administrative distinctions between Manchu and Hanjun banner people. Moreover, in spite of financial difficulties, it consistently expanded the numbers of jobs and stipends available to Hanjun bannermen, and did so at a much faster rate than it did for Manchus. Though Manchus and Hanjun remained separate administrative categories until the abolition of the banner system, and the two groups were never treated entirely equally, officials both at the garrison and in the capital definitively abandoned the sort of ethnic discrimination within the banners that characterized the expulsion era. In the eighteenth century, departures from rigid ethnic quotas designed to benefit Manchus were normally the result of shortages of able-bodied adult Manchu men at the garrison, but for most of the nineteenth century, officials were principally concerned with ensuring the livelihoods of the entire garrison population, regardless of ethnic background.

The initial post-expulsion composition of the Guangzhou garrison maintained rigid equality between Manchus and Hanjun in terms of available salaries posts, despite a much larger total Hanjun population. In 1756, the garrison had 45 Manchu officers and 45 Hanjun officers, joined by 1,500 soldiers of each category. The only difference was that the 1,500 Manchu soldiers included 150 men of the elite vanguard troops (Ch. 前鋒 qianfeng, Ma. gabsihiyan), a unit that was closed to Hanjun. The 600-strong naval garrison was also evenly divided.\(^\text{18}\) The

\(^{17}\) Chang-shan, ed., *Gazetteer for the Eight Banners Garrisoned in Canton* 駐粵八旗志 (Guangzhou, 1884; reprinted Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1997). Chang-shan served as garrison general from 1869 through 1884.

\(^{18}\) Yang Yingju 楊應琚, HWZPZZ, NPM 403012560, QL 21.8.14 (September 8, 1756).
only extra consideration afforded to Hanjun was the continuation of the policy that allowed 400 of them to hold Green Standard posts in the detachment commanded by the garrison general, while still maintaining their banner status.\(^\text{19}\) The total Manchu and Hanjun population figures for this period are unknown, but in the early nineteenth century, there were more than three times as many Hanjun in the garrison as Manchus.\(^\text{20}\) Thus, it is likely that the percentage of Hanjun with salaried positions was perhaps one-third as large as the percentage of Manchus with such posts. The nominally equal division of the garrison had very unequal implications.

There were other signs of the inferiority of the Hanjun in the new garrison arrangement. Having determined that Manchus and Hanjun could not live mixed up together, garrison officials had the remaining Hanjun abandon what had previously been the quarters of the Bordered Yellow, Plain Yellow, Plain White, and Plain Red banners, which would be turned over to the newly arriving Manchus. The first three of these banners constituted the somewhat more prestigious “upper three” banners (Ch. 上三旗 shang san qi, Ma. dergi ilan güsa), meaning that the new Manchu residents would be occupying a symbolically superior position.\(^\text{21}\) This was despite the fact that the Manchus and Hanjun would also be taking on the roles previously occupied by the two wings (left and right) of the banner army; that is the garrison’s two lieutenant generals (Ch. 副都統 fudutong, Ma. meiren i janggin), who had previously each commanded one wing, would now each have charge of one of the ethnic divisions. The upper three banners were divided between the two wings, which meant that the new division of banner

\(^{19}\) This was a reduction from the eight hundred such posts held by Guangzhou Hanjun prior to expulsion. See Yang Yingju, HWZPZZ, NPM 403011889, QL 21.5.11 (June 8, 1756).

\(^{20}\) Fuhui 福會, HWZPZZ, FHA 04-01-01-0526-042, JQ 16.7.21 (September 8, 1811).

space did not map on to the old one. Indeed, dividing the physical space of the garrison first by ethnicity and then by banner color was a departure from the arrangement used in the empire’s most prominent ethnically mixed garrison – Beijing itself – where the city was divided by banner color (with the left wing in the east and the right wing in the west), and each banner’s section then divided by ethnicity. The Guangzhou garrison had thus created greater ethnic segregation than had previously been the norm.

In addition, a small number of expelled Hanjun were permitted to continue living in the garrison. Though this was likely a practical measure – those allowed to stay had been transferred to the Green Standard unit under the command of the garrison general, and so needed to be located close to the garrison – it did mean that the garrison was separating Manchu and Hanjun bannermen more thoroughly than it was separating bannermen and commoners. Preventing former Hanjun from continuing to live among those Hanjun who kept their banner status may well have been impossible anyway – close contacts between expelled bannermen and those who remained continued long after expulsion, as will be discussed later in this chapter – but granting official permission for the two groups to live intermixed was unorthodox, and is further evidence that Qing officials at the time saw ethnic differences among bannermen as more important divisions than the banner/commoner divide that had been central to Qing law and the layout of Qing cities.

The even division of banner posts between Manchus and Hanjun was soon undermined by a serious logistical problem, the shortage of Manchu men at the garrison. In 1761, garrison

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general Fusengge 福增格 noted that the naval garrison still consisted entirely of Hanjun and asked to be able to fill officer posts in it entirely from the ranks of actual sailors, even for posts nominally designated for Manchus. The reason that the garrison naval forces lacked Manchus became clear in 1762, when new garrison general Mingfu 明福 informed the court that there were only a handful of Manchu boys coming of age in the garrison each year – not even really enough to fill the posts in the main garrison opened up by the gradual expulsion of the secondary-status Manchus who had been initially sent to Guangzhou. As such, he wrote, if the garrison were to attempt to stick to the policy of replacing half the Hanjun in the naval garrison with Manchus, many posts would have to be left vacant, and “more than half of the matters of naval defense would not be able to be carried out.” So, Mingfu proposed, for the time being, naval posts should be filled by strong and capable Hanjun men; as more Manchu boys came of age, the originally intended division could eventually be implemented.

Problems finding enough Manchus capable of military service in Guangzhou continued, and the garrison adopted a variety of strategies to deal with the problem. In 1768, garrison general Dzenghai 增海 reported that there were not enough adult Manchu men to fill even the posts in the main garrison. Indeed, 229 of the supposed Manchu soldiers in the garrison were in fact children under the age of sixteen sui. The origin of the problem, Dzenghai explained, was that very few unemployed men had accompanied the Manchu troops transferred to Guangzhou only a short time before, and so most men who lacked posts came from among the children who had been born since Manchu bannermen had first arrived in the city. Because there was no one

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24 Fusengge, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0179-1885-017, QL 26.?.. (1761).

25 seremšene tuwakiyara mukei baita de oyombume muterakū. Mingfu, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0179-1965-010, QL 27.9.? (October/November, 1762).
else to fill posts vacated due to the death or retirement of a banner person, and because there were many widows and orphans who needed a source of support, garrison officials had for years been assigning military posts to boys as young as six or seven sui. Because these boys were incapable of fulfilling their duties, many spent half their salaries paying an adult bannerman to do their jobs. New soldiers were frequently selected solely on the basis of the number of people in their household, with no attention to whether or not they could actually do the job, a situation that Dzenghai believed to have greatly weakened the forces under his command. But, he noted, if all of these boys were simply removed from their posts, it would mean the loss of the only means they had to support themselves and their families. With this in mind, Dzenghai proposed that all of the boys in question were to leave the military posts that they held. Those who had a father or elder brother who held a post that could support them were to enter the garrison school to study spoken Manchu, as well as both standing and mounted archery. The remaining 93 boys who lacked other means of support were to receive stipends of one tael of silver per month as supernumeraries (Ch. 養育兵 yanyu bing, Ma. hūwašabure cooha), a type of post usually granted to boys to enable them to receive an income prior to receiving an appointment to a regular post. In either case, when the boys in question came of age, they could reassume regular banner posts. In this way, the state would cease wasting money on useless soldiers, but could continue to support the garrison’s entire population.\(^{26}\) The emperor endorsed Dzenghai’s proposal, and also demanded that current and former garrison officials pay back the money that had been wasted on salaries for small children, and ordered other garrisons in the empire to conduct investigations to ensure that the same abuses were not occurring in them.\(^{27}\) In the end,

\(^{26}\) Dzenghai, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0183-2282-027, QL 33.8.25 (October 5, 1768).

\(^{27}\) GZSL, juan 819, QL 33.9.29 (November 8, 1768).
nine current and former garrison officials were required to pay back a total of over twenty-eight thousand taels to the treasury. 

Soon, though, shortages of Manchu soldiers had become a severe enough problem that new garrison general Teksin felt the need to look to Guangzhou’s Hanjun population to fill Manchu-designated vacancies. Like many other memorials dealing with the garrison during the second half of the eighteenth century, Teksin’s memorial emphasized that the garrison was a “critical site” for defending the empire’s “maritime frontier” (Ma. mederi jecen i oyonggo ba). Teksin wrote: “if troops are greatly lacking in relation to their fixed quotas, then they will also become insufficient for performing their official duties of defense and training.” Since Dzenghai’s memorial two years previously, an additional 141 vacancies had appeared in the Manchu banners at Guangzhou, for a total of 376, or 25 percent of the total posts fixed by regulation. Teksin considered asking for more Manchus from the capital, but this would simultaneously increase the total population that needed to be supported, so instead he proposed allowing capable but unemployed Hanjun men to temporarily occupy vacant Manchu-designated posts, with the numbers of Hanjun in such posts to be reduced as more young Manchus came of age. Though this plan could be understood as a means to provide additional support to Hanjun at the garrison, when considered in conjunction with Dzenghai’s proposal from two years before, it seems more likely that garrison officials were genuinely principally concerned with military

28 Dzenghai, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0183-2304-045, QL 33.12.25 (February 1, 1769).

29 The Manchu phrase is equivalent to the Chinese 海疆要地 haijiang yaodi, in which 海疆 haijiang is usually understood to mean simply “coastal region.” I translate it here as “maritime frontier” because both this and other documents from the same period emphasize that Guangzhou was on the “extreme edge” (Ma. dubei jecen) of the empire; the idea seems to be that Guangzhou was a frontier region critical to military defense.

30 aika toktobuha ton i cooha hon ekiyehun oci seremšeme urebure alban kara de inu isirakũ ombi.

31 Teksin, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0184-2386-009, QL 35.8.21 (October 9, 1770).
needs. Any advantage Hanjun were to receive was intended to be temporary, and using Hanjun in Manchu posts represented only one of a variety of strategies used to deal with the shortage of Manchu troops. The benefit received by local unemployed Hanjun was, in all probability, only a side effect.

Meanwhile, a new policy sent down from Beijing in 1768, just prior to Dzenghai’s initial memorial, offers further evidence that the well-being of Guangzhou’s remaining Hanjun was not a top priority for the Qing court. On the basis of the fact that only the garrison generals at Jiangning, Fuzhou, and Guangzhou had a Green Standard detachment under their direct command (Ch. 將軍標下綠旗兵丁 jiangjun biaoxia lüqi bingding, Ma. jiyanggliyűn i fejergi niowanggiyan turun i kuwaran i cooha), the emperor determined that these units were not of great importance and ordered that they all be eliminated. For the Hanjun of Guangzhou, this was a bit of a blow, since four hundred of their number received their salaries on account of service in the Green Standard detachment in question. As discussed in chapter 1, these units had been closely associated with the Hanjun, existing only at garrisons that had large Hanjun populations, so their elimination was probably tied to the broader Hanjun expulsion policy. Guangzhou officials did attempt to mitigate the effects of this policy shift on the Hanjun in their garrison. In order to open up two hundred new posts, still fewer than the four hundred Green Standard posts being lost, Dzenghai proposed replacing two hundred cavalry posts with four hundred infantry posts, enabling the garrison to offer salaries to two hundred more men. This was, however, less generous than it might seem. Infantry soldiers received only one tael of silver and one shi (Ma. hule) of grain per month, in comparison to the two taels of silver and two shi of grain given to

32 See also the discussion in Ding Yizhuang 定宜庄, “The Problem of Qing Dynasty Eight Banner Garrison Generals Simultaneously Administering Green Standard Troops” 清代八旗驻防将军兼统绿旗的问题, Zhongguo shi yanjiu 2003.4: 135-144.
Moreover, infantry soldiers did not receive an additional 0.35 taels/month that served as the cash equivalent for a supplemental payment of 5 dou of grain offered to cavalrymen in Guangzhou. Most advantageously for the state of garrison finances, infantrymen did not require horses, saving the garrison a substantial amount of money that would otherwise go to their feed. As such, though increasing the number of Hanjun supported directly out of the garrison treasury, the net effect of Dzenghai’s plan was a savings of 6,787 taels of silver per year. Thus, though the change would provide some help to Hanjun men who would otherwise lose their Green Standard salaries entirely, on net it was disadvantageous to the Hanjun of Guangzhou as a whole. It can, therefore, be taken as further evidence that maintaining the livelihoods of Hanjun was not a central consideration in setting garrison policy in the mid-Qianlong period.

Seven years later, in 1776, garrison general Yongwei 永瑋 proposed a more permanent solution to the continuing shortage of Manchu troops. Since Teksin had temporarily reduced the number of Manchus in banner posts, the shortage had only gotten worse; there were now only 1,074 Manchu soldiers at the garrison. Teksin would begin solving the problem by examining all the Manchu boys between sixteen and twenty sui in age, who totaled 181, and determining whether they were yet suited to taking up a military position; he expected that he could expect to add 126 new soldiers in this way. The remaining 55 would continue to prepare to assume posts, and would be examined along with those turning sixteen each year to fill posts that became available. As for the remaining 300 unfilled posts, Yongwei argued that they could simply be

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33 One 石 shi of grain is equal to about 100 liters.

34 Five 斗 dou is approximately equal to 50 liters.

35 Dzenghai, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0183-2303-010, QL 33.12.12 (January 19, 1769).
eliminated, pointing out that when sailors in the naval garrison and the newly established 400 Hanjun infantry were taken into account, the garrison had more than its requisite 3,000 soldiers anyway, and thus would not face any deficiencies in its overall military capability. As such, these posts could simply be stricken from the garrison rolls, reducing the quota of Manchu troops to 1,200. The savings thereby generated, which included savings from the elimination of 300 horses, were to be used first to create 400 posts for supernumeraries, but this still left more than 9,700 taels of silver and 4,800 shi of grain per year that would return to the garrison treasury for general-purpose use.\textsuperscript{36} Similarly to the policy that replaced 200 Hanjun cavalry with 400 infantry, financial savings were prioritized over offering additional support to the substantially overpopulated Hanjun portion of the garrison, which, five years later, was reported to have 2,300 boys below the age of military employment, for whom no provision was made, unlike for their Manchu counterparts.\textsuperscript{37}

Once Yongwei’s proposal was approved, it created two other surplus resources: military supplies, weapons in particular, and housing. As cavalry soldiers were normally entitled to three rooms each, 900 rooms would now be available for other uses. The weapons that the 300 cavalrymen would have used were to be sold off, and though 600 of the rooms were to be given to widows and orphans in the garrison, at the rate of two rooms per person, the remaining 300 were to be rented out by the garrison treasury, with the proceeds going to the general’s own administrative expenses.\textsuperscript{38} Again, garrison finances took first priority.

\textsuperscript{36} Yongwei, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0187-2681-005, QL 41.3.20 (May 7, 1776).

\textsuperscript{37} Fuioi 傅玉, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0189-2894-028, QL 46.8.4 (September 21, 1781).

\textsuperscript{38} Yongwei, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0187-2699-039, QL 41.10.2 (November 12, 1776).
At the end of the Qianlong period, the massive population discrepancy between Manchus and Hanjun continued to disadvantage the latter relative to the former, as was apparent in the aftermath of the Lin Shuangwen 林爽文 rebellion of 1787-1788. Banner troops from Guangzhou were sent to Taiwan to help deal with Lin’s secret society rebels. Only a small number of soldiers from Guangzhou, among them both Manchus and Hanjun, died in the campaign, but the measures undertaken to provide for the families of the deceased differed between the two groups. In either case, a surviving son who had come of age was to be allowed to fill his father’s newly vacant post. If deceased soldier’s sons were not old enough to take his place, however, Manchu sons would receive a supernumerary stipend. For Hanjun men, in contrast, a more distant male relative like a nephew would be found to take the deceased man’s place, and no other accommodation would be made. As garrison general Tsuntai 存泰 noted, the long history of Hanjun at Guangzhou meant that there were no instances in which an eligible male relative of a deceased Hanjun soldier could not be found.39 In practice, this meant that Hanjun soldiers were expected to provide for a much greater number of people. A Hanjun nephew who inherited his uncle’s post would, it seems, be expected to provide for his aunt and young cousins, who would have no separate provision made for them. A deceased Manchu soldier’s nuclear family, on the other hand, was guaranteed to receive direct support.

Problems with Manchu shortages continued until the very end of the Qianlong period. In 1794 – one year prior to the emperor’s abdication – garrison general Fucang 福昌 informed the court that in the years since Yongwei’s elimination of 300 Manchu positions, the growth of the Manchu population had continued to be exceedingly small, and once again there were not

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39 Tsuntai, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0192-3213-017, QL 53.10.3 (October 31, 1788); Tsuntai, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0192-3213-010, QL 53.10.22 (November 19, 1788).
enough men to fill even the smaller number of available posts, with more than 200 left unfilled. Fucang also noted the difficult situation of the Hanjun, pointing out that the additional posts created for them, both in the infantry and the naval garrison, carried relatively small salaries and grain stipends, enough only to support a family of three or four, even though many Hanjun soldiers had to feed eight or nine mouths. Moreover, there were 1,512 Hanjun men between the ages of 16 and 40 who lacked employment entirely. To help deal with this problem, Fucang proposed taking 200 Manchu posts and dividing the salaries associated with them in half, creating 200 Manchu posts and 200 Hanjun posts for “auxiliaries” (Ma. araha uksin, Ch. 副甲 fujia). In the Manchu banners, these posts would be given to young men who had reached the age of military service, but were deficient in some way, like being too small or too weak. If there were not enough such men, the posts would be left open. For Hanjun, in contrast, the posts would go to strong and capable adult men who lacked a salary. Unlike the various schemes discussed above, Fucang’s plan did take into account the welfare of Hanjun, granting them salaries not merely in order to fill the garrison’s military needs, but in order to support the large Hanjun population. However, the Qianlong emperor’s response, though granting approval to Fucang’s proposal, made clear that Hanjun needs should be a secondary concern at best. He decreed that once that Manchu population had increased sufficiently, garrison officials should come up with a plan for transferring them into the posts that were for the moment granted to Hanjun. 40

Despite the clear preferences for Manchus that persisted through the entire Qianlong era, the various compromises and accommodations discussed above, designed principally to deal with a shortage of Manchu soldiers, left Guangzhou’s Hanjun with somewhat more posts that

40 Fucang, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0195-3460-019, QL 59.2.? (March, 1794).
their Manchu counterparts as the emperor’s reign came to a close. A 1794 report from the garrison revealed that the total number of Manchu-designated posts, including auxiliaries, supernumeraries and others without actual military function, was 1,515, in contrast to 1,941 Hanjun. In addition, all 604 sailors at the naval garrison also came from the Hanjun banners.\footnote{Author unknown, HWLFZZ, FHA 03-0527-078, QL 59?? (1794).}

Thus, without any real attempt to offer special support to the much larger Hanjun population, the garrison had abandoned the nominally equal split of salaried posts in favor of a division that was somewhat more favorable to the Hanjun. During the following century, the ratio would shift even more in favor of the Hanjun, but unlike in the second half of the eighteenth century, this shift would be the deliberate result of attempts to provide additional aid to Guangzhou’s Han banner people.

The first small move toward making policy designed principally for the benefit of Hanjun occurred in the second year of the reign of the new Jiaqing emperor. A 1797 memorial, authored jointly by Liangguang governor-general Ji-qing 吉慶, Guangzhou garrison general Fucang, Guangdong provincial governor Chen Dawen 陳大文, and Hanjun garrison lieutenant general Huang Wenjing 黃文燝 pointed out that, thanks to the establishment of supernumerary posts in 1768, Manchu widows and orphans were directly provided with state support. The same was not true, however, for Hanjun, for whom no stipends existed other than those for actual soldiers, and the 296 widows, orphans, disabled soldiers, and others incapable of providing themselves among Guangzhou’s Hanjun were supported through voluntary contributions from Hanjun soldiers. The officials noted that the local Puji tang 普濟堂, a Qing state-promoted charitable institution
dedicated to poor relief, particularly for the sick and elderly, ran yearly surpluses.\footnote{On the institution of the Puji tang, which began as private institutions, but came under increasing state control beginning in the Qianlong period, and derived a substantial portion of their income from property donated by the Qing state, the foundational work is Fuma Susumu 夫馬進, \textit{Research on the History of Charitable and Benevolent Organizations in China} 中国善会善堂史研究 (Kyoto: Dōhōsha Shuppan, 1997). See also Wang Weiping 王卫平 and Huang Hongshan 黄鸿山, “State and Society in Qing Dynasty Charitable Organizations: a Study of Yuying tang, Puji tang, Guangren tang, and Fengbei yicang of Suzhou”清代慈善组织中的国家与社会:以苏州育婴堂、普济堂、广仁堂和丰备义仓为中心, Shehuixue yanjiu 2007.4: 51-74. Brief explanations in English can be found in Prangtip Kongridhisakorn, “Community Development in Historical Perspectives: Tianjin from the Qing to the People’s Republic of China” (PhD diss., Indiana University, 2008), p. 32 and Lillian M. Li, \textit{Fighting Famine in North China: State, Market, and Environmental Decline, 1690s-1990s} (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), p. 235.} These surpluses could, they argued, be given over to those in the garrison who required similar support, at a rate of one tael per month per person.\footnote{Ji-qing, HWLFZZ, FHA 03-1833-033, JQ 2.9.1 (October 20, 1797). Imperial approval for the request can be found in SYD, JQ 2.10.12 (November 29, 1797).} Though this policy was directed at benefitting Hanjun specifically and helping provide for their surplus population, that the funds to do so were to be taken from general poor-relief funds, not from the banner treasury, perhaps reflect a continued reluctance to put the needs of Hanjun at the same level as those of Manchus as a garrison priority. That reluctance would soon disappear.

In 1810, garrison officials, led by general Qing-pu 慶溥 submitted a memorial that, like those from Fucang in 1794 and 1797, took explicit note of the difficult situation of Hanjun in Guangzhou. Indeed, the memorial laid out in detail the extreme contrast in the situations of Manchus and Hanjun at the garrison, directly comparing the number of salaried posts, at this time 1,613 for Manchus and, including naval positions, 2,504 for Hanjun; total population, then more than 4,500 Manchus and 14,300 Hanjun; unemployed adult men, who numbered 72 Manchus and more than 1,800 Hanjun; and boys who had not yet reached the age of military service, totaling 650 Manchus and nearly 2,800 Hanjun. This situation, Qing-pu pointed out, meant an underutilization of the military potential of the Hanjun. Whenever a vacancy opened up
in the Hanjun banners, and officials examined unemployed men to find those men of talent capable of proficiency with both horse and bow, they did not lack for qualified candidates, but the relatively low quota for Hanjun troops prevented most from being selected. Perhaps even more importantly, though, it meant that “for unemployed adult men to obtain a position is extremely difficult, and with many mouths to feed in a family, their livelihoods are frequently impoverished.”

Qing-pu then cited an edict from the Jiaqing emperor, issued in response to a previous memorial by Liangguang governor-general Bai-ling 百齡, which ordered local officials to ensure that ordinary people could pursue legitimate livelihoods without resulting to banditry. This edict had nothing to do with the banners; the memorial that prompted it was about measures to deal with pirates and smugglers along the southeast coast. However, Qing-pu interpreted the admonition as applying to him and his bannermen as well, and using the emperor’s concern for the well-being of his people as his justification, informed the court that he had sought a means to alleviate the problem of a large Hanjun population combined with a small number of salaried posts. He noted that the dynastic treasury was already heavily burdened, and thus that it would not be suitable to rely on drawing from it regularly. Yet he also rejected removing more Hanjun from the banner rolls; though he did not offer any reasons, he described such a policy as “rash” (Ch. 率 shuai). Qing-pu then pointed out that the garrison treasury had two large funds of money, one for horse purchase and one for grain purchase, that were largely underutilized, to the point that a combined 46,200 taels of silver had accumulated. Qing-pu proposed loaning this

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44 閒散丁口得缺維艱, 食指繁多, 生計時形竭蹶 Qing-pu, HWZPZZ, FHA 04-01-01-0514-057, JQ 14.12.12 (January 16, 1810)

45 RZSL, juan 218, JQ 14.9.15 (October 23, 1809).
money out to salt merchants and pawn shop owners at 1.2 percent monthly interest, which would bring in a bit over 550 taels per month, enabling the garrison to support 1,100 Hanjun supernumeraries without rice stipends (Ch. 無米養育兵 wumi yangyu bing) at a rate of 0.5 taels per person per month. To prevent the bannermen receiving such stipends from becoming lazy or dissolute, and to maintain military readiness, the men in question would be expected to drill regularly with the garrison’s auxiliaries. When vacancies appeared in the auxiliaries, they would be filled from among those same supernumeraries.46 The plan was approved without modification by the court in Beijing, who noted that it would benefit both banner livelihood and garrison defense.47

Though Qing-pu cited no precedent for his proposal, it was not in fact an entirely new idea. In fact, a very similar policy had been developed by the Yongzheng court in the 1720s and implemented at garrisons across the empire. Between 1723 and 1746, 2.6 million taels of silver, mostly taken from provincial treasuries, were given to banner officials in both the capital and the provinces to be invested in business schemes that would produce returns capable of supporting a large portion of banner expenses. Pawnshops and salt merchants had been among the most common investment targets, though some garrisons opened retail shops or purchased land for rent. In most garrisons, these schemes were fairly successful for a time, but between the late 1740s and 1754, all were shut down by the Qianlong court. This was in part a response to corruption, as large portions of the proceeds were siphoned off to go into the pockets of the officials managing the programs, and in part due to concerns about the ethics of state-supported

46 Qing-pu, HWZPZZ, FHA 04-01-01-0514-057, JQ 14.12.12 (January 16, 1810)

47 SYD, JQ 15.1.21 (February 24, 1810).
enterprises competing with private businesses. The resurrection of a similar program by Qing-pu and the Jiaqing court, designed exclusively for the benefit of Hanjun, suggests a very real shift in thinking about Hanjun following the death of the Qianlong emperor. Their welfare, like that of Manchu and Mongol banner people was now a state priority, worthy of substantial attention, and important enough to justify reversing a major policy decision made by the previous emperor.

Similar schemes were adopted repeatedly over the course of the nineteenth century, using other funds held in Guangzhou treasuries. Beginning in 1829, an additional 80,000 taels from the provincial treasury were loaned to merchants at 10 percent annual interest, with 3,000 of the resulting 8,000 in taels in annual income going to repay the principal. The remaining 5,000 taels went to the garrison treasury to be used to support unemployed bannermen. Because the garrison’s more than 16,000 Hanjun far outnumbered its 5,000 Manchus, though the latter were finally beginning to experience shortages in the number of available posts, 4,000 taels annually were to be allocated to Hanjun and only 1,000 to Manchus. This did not produce per-capita fairness; 166 Manchus were to be supported at a rate of 0.5 taels/month, while 1,110 Hanjun would be supported at a rate of only 0.3 taels/month. In 1844, the number of Hanjun supported by this fund was increased to 1,666 through a reduction in the monthly payment to 0.2 taels/month.

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49 Kingboo 慶保, HWZPZZ, FHA 04-01-01-0706-014, DG 9.9.2 (September 29, 1829). Favorable imperial review of Kingboo’s proposal can be found in SYD, DG 9.10.16 (November 12, 1829), though it was referred for further discussion. Confirmation of its final approval can be found in Bahangga 巴杭阿, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0202-4084-032, DG 9.12.15 (January 9, 1830).

50 Kingboo, HWZPZZ, FHA 04-01-01-0715-034, DG 10.10.26 (December 10, 1830).

Manchus, reflected the garrison’s concern for Hanjun welfare; by deciding to allocate four times as much money in total to Hanjun as to Manchus, the garrison rejected an artificial equality between the two groups in favor of spending more on the more populous, and more disadvantaged, banner category.

The same 4:1 ratio would in fact recur in a later interest-based scheme for supporting bannermen. In 1836, 10,000 taels of silver from the provincial treasury were loaned out at 1 percent monthly interest, for a monthly return of 100 taels, enabling the support of 100 “supplementary soldiers” (Ch. 餘兵 yubing). 80 of these posts were to go to Hanjun, and 20 to Manchus, meaning that there would in this case be no difference in per-person income.\(^52\)

Beginning in 1855, an additional 200 supplementary soldiers were created, at the same 1 tael/month rate, using most of the 3,000 taels per year that had previously been used to repay the provincial treasury for the principal used to finance the arrangement described in the previous paragraph. This time, though, all 200 posts would be given to Hanjun.\(^53\)

When a few other smaller similar investment projects are taken into account, the total scale of the garrison’s projects to raise money to support its bannermen becomes quite impressive. These projects included an investment of 10,000 taels to support travel to the capital by metropolitan examination candidates from the garrison, two additional investments totaling 30,000 taels toward expanding the number of bannermen receiving small welfare payments of 0.5 taels/month or less, and 20,000 taels toward supporting funeral expenses for bannermen.\(^54\)

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\(^{52}\) Sulfangga 蘇勒芳阿, HWZPZZ, FHA 04-01-01-0775-025, DG 16.3.17 (May 2, 1836).

\(^{53}\) Muten 穆特恩, HWZPZZ, FHA 04-01-01-0857-033, XF 5.10.27 (December 6, 1855).

\(^{54}\) These schemes are described in Mengiu 孟佺, HWZPZZ, FHA 04-01-35-0787-044, DG 2.3.21 (April 12, 1822); Chang-shan, Gazetteer for the Eight Banners Garrisoned in Canton, juan 6, 16b (quoting a memorial from Rui-lin 瑞麟 from TZ 8.4 (May-June, 1869)); Shou-yin 壽陰, HWZPZZ, FHA 04-01-18-0054-058, GX 26.4.8 (May 6, 1900); and Chang-shan, HWZPZZ, FHA 04-01-03-0168-023, GX 2.7.3 (August 21, 1876). Following the end of the
The total amount of funds invested over the course of the nineteenth century thus reaches at least 196,200 taels of silver, providing at least some support to over 3,000 bannermen and their families, almost all of whom were Hanjun. This represents a striking contrast from the second half of the Qianlong era, when active efforts were made to redirect funds away from banner stipends and into the garrison treasury, with additional support offered to Hanjun only as a result of military needs. Table 4.2, below, shows how thoroughly the garrison had moved in the direction of supporting the Hanjun in proportion to their numbers by the late nineteenth century, in comparison to the initial plan from the 1750s, which ordered and even division between Manchus and Hanjun of the number of stipend-bearing posts.

In addition to offering massively increased support to Hanjun through the creation of new banner posts, the mid-nineteenth-century Qing court resurrected the policy of allowing Guangzhou banner people to serve in the Green Standards, which had been effectively abolished.

*Table 4.2 Number of Manchus and Hanjun in Each Type of Garrison Post, 1884*55

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Manchus</th>
<th>Hanjun</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Officers</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporals 領催</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanguard 前鋒</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cavalry 馬甲</td>
<td>730</td>
<td>1180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry 步甲 (from infantry unit that replaced the naval garrison, including officers and corporals)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillerymen 砲手</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craftsmen 匠</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auxiliaries 副甲</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supernumeraries 養育兵</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>1111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplementary Soldiers 餘兵</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerks 隨印外郎</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Men (Manchus supported at rate of 0.5 taels/month, Hanjun supported at rate of 0.2 taels/month)56</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>1666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>6099</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
when the garrison general’s Green Standard battalion was eliminated in the wake of Hanjun expulsion. In the meantime, Hanjun in the capital had continued to be able to hold certain Green Standard posts in the gendarmerie - the units responsible for policing the capital (Ch. 巡捕營 xunbu ying, Ma. baicara jafara kūwaran). Indeed, beginning in 1805, even Manchu and Mongol bannermen were permitted to serve in the Beijing gendarmerie, out of concern for their overpopulation in the capital and the lack of available posts.\(^{57}\) This decision itself reflected a changing view of the differences between Manchus and Hanjun. The previous policy of allowing Hanjun, but not other bannermen, to serve in Green Standards had suggested that it was their ethnic background that made them suitable for what was otherwise a post for commoners; that is, that it was fine for Hanjun to do the jobs of Han commoners, but not for Manchus to do the same. This was apparently no longer the case.

In 1826, Green Standard ranks were further opened to bannermen of all types, with the Daoguang accepting a proposal by Zhili governor-general Na-yan-cheng 那彥成 that Manchus and Mongols in provincial garrisons be allowed to take up Green Standard posts, following the precedent of the Beijing gendarmerie. This would, the edict said, constitute equal treatment for Manchu, Mongol, and Hanjun bannermen. The edict emphasized that these would not be sinecures – only young and healthy men could take up the posts, and they would be held to the same standards as their fellow soldiers of commoner status. Yet, perhaps believing that some bannermen would consider Green Standard service distasteful or would simply be unwilling to

\(^{55}\) Unless separately footnoted, data in this table comes from Chang-shan, *Gazetteer for the Eight Banners Garrisoned in Canton*, juan 1, 2a-5a

\(^{56}\) Chang-shan, *Gazetteer for the Eight Banners Garrisoned in Canton*, juan 6, 13a-14a.

\(^{57}\) SYD, JQ 10.11.10 (December 30, 1805).
move away from their families in a banner garrison to serve in a provincial Green Standard unit that might be located a long distance away, the emperor decreed that all Green Standard appointments would be voluntary. In order to protect the livelihoods of current Green Standard soldiers and their families, bannermen would be limited to two out of every ten spots in a particular unit.\footnote{XZSL, \textit{juan} 110, DG 6.11.22 (December 20, 1826).} Taken as a whole, these regulations confirm that the court now believed Green Standard service to be a perfectly legitimate livelihood for Manchus and show a continued reduction in the official distinctions between Manchus and Hanjun, but also likely reflect a desire to expand employment opportunities for Manchus who by this time made up the vast majority of the provincial garrison banner population.

In Guangzhou, though, officials took the opportunity to use the policy to benefit the garrison’s Hanjun population, not just its Manchus. Shortly after the edict permitting provincial Manchus and Mongols to take up Green Standard posts was issued, garrison general Kingboo set up procedures to put the new policy in place in Guangzhou. Ten years later, new general Sulfangga, noting that the Manchu population remained quite low but that many Hanjun remained unemployed, received permission to apply the procedures Kingboo had designed to Hanjun as well. Sulfangga proposed that two of every three Green Standard positions opened to bannermen in Guangzhou should go to Hanjun, but also that if there were no Manchus to fill the third post, it could go to a Hanjun man as well. However, Sulfangga worried that Hanjun entering Green Standard posts would be treated like those who had been expelled from the banners, and forced to give up their banner registry. He strongly urged that they be allowed to retain their banner status, writing:

\begin{quote}
The Hanjun Eight Banners have been garrisoned in the province for a long time. Dwelling in this tiny plot of land [the garrison], they have come to depend on it as if it
were their native land, and they have bonds of friendship and mutual protection with all
of their clansmen, relatives, and friends. Moreover, the men of the Eight Banners make
mounted archery and military drills their daily focus, but are not accustomed to practicing
agriculture, trade, industry, or commerce. If they are immediately stricken from the
banner rolls upon entering the Green Standards, then if in the future they must give up
their posts due to old age or illness, they will not be able to remain in the Green Standard
camp and it will be extremely difficult for them to return to the banners. This will
certainly lead to them becoming homeless and destitute.\textsuperscript{59}

Sulfangga’s memorial is clear evidence that the Qing state had fully abandoned the
Hanjun expulsion policy by this time. Where mid-Qianlong officials in garrisons like Xi’an had
looked for any excuse to expel Hanjun from the banners, at least once the court’s desire to see
them kicked out had become clear, Sulfangga and his colleagues in Guangzhou were now deeply
concerned with keeping them in. Unlike his predecessor Sitku, who at the start of Hanjun
expulsion had been severely rebuked for resisting the policy, Sulfangga faced no imperial
criticism, and his proposal was allowed to enter force.\textsuperscript{60} The banner status of Hanjun was once
again secure.

Moves toward Manchu-Hanjun equality extended beyond the sphere of employment. In
the realm of criminal law, an edict of 1793 clarified that a statute dealing with “A Manchu who
kills a Manchu” (Ch. 滿洲殺死滿洲 Manzhou shasi Manzhou) should in fact be used for any
case of “a banner person who kills a banner person” (Ch. 旗人殺死旗人 qiren shasi qiren) and
should definitely include both Mongols and Hanjun. The previous statute had been manifestly
unjust, the Qianlong emperor decreed, for “the eight banners together include Mongols and
Hanjun. How could Mongols and Hanjun alone not be banner people, and when a Manchu kills a

\textsuperscript{59}漢軍八旗駐省日久，處此一隅之地即同故土之依，而宗族親朋亦均有守望相助之誼。且八旗子弟平日專務
騎射操防，於農賈工商皆非素習。若一入綠營即扣除旗檔，則日後或因老病開缺，營既不留，旗復難歸，
勢必致於流離失所。Sulfangga, HWZPZZ, FHA 04-01-01-0774-004, DG 16.8.17 (September 27, 1836).

\textsuperscript{60} The emperor ordered that the proposal be “sent down to the Board to discuss and implement” 下部議行, XZSL,
juan 289, DG 16.9.22 (October 31, 1836).
Mongol or Hanjun person, in the end could he not need to make compensation? How could this sort of discrimination be fair?"⁶¹ Banner people, this edict suggested, should be treated as one group for legal purposes. Similarly, in the early nineteenth century, certain more symbolic changes suggested the importance of equality between the two groups. In 1804, the Superintendent of the Imperial Equipage Department, Danba Dorji 丹巴多爾濟 wrote that though each Manchu marshal (Ma. *faidan be kalalara* hafan, Ch. 冠軍使 guanjunshi) in the department was given two horses to raise and use in the performance of his official duties, Hanjun marshals received no horses. Danba Dorji argued that this inequity made it difficult for the Hanjun to perform their duties and proposed that it be rectified.⁶² Symbolic inequities of this sort had been important to maintain Manchu (and Mongol) superiority relative to Hanjun during the first half of the Qing, with the latter excluded from elite units like the Imperial Bodyguard (Ma. *gocika bayara*, Ch. 親軍 qinjun) and the vanguard (Ma. *gabsihiyan*, Ch. 前鋒 qianfeng), and thereby denied certain sorts of prestige.⁶³ Though many discrepancies between the two groups remained through the nineteenth century, in particular rules that frequently required that Hanjun be appointed to government posts under the Han or commoner quota rather than the Manchu or banner quota, the general tendency, both in Guangzhou and in the empire as a whole, was toward more equal treatment.⁶⁴

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⁶¹ 八旗俱有蒙古、漢軍。豈蒙古、漢軍獨非旗人，而滿洲殺死蒙古、漢軍竟可毋庸抵償。如是異視，豈公道乎。SYD, QL 58.8.4 (September 8, 1793).

⁶² Danba Dorji, HWLFZZ, FHA 03-1703-042, JQ 8.12.25 (February 6, 1804)


⁶⁴ For an example of a document mentioning the appointment of Hanjun under the Han quota, and the fact that such appointments made them subject to Han mourning requirements rather than banner ones, see SYD, JQ 15.6.13 (July 14, 1810).
In the final years of the Qing, new schemes to provide employment to a garrison population that had reached more than thirty-six thousand show that Qing authorities in this period did not differentiate much between Manchus and Hanjun. In 1907, garrison general Shouyin and his colleagues wrote to the court about progress in establishing a factory for bannermen that would enable them learn a trade and earn some additional money, helping relieve the garrison’s persistent problems with poverty. Top local officials would invest a total of sixty thousand taels over three years to pay the start-up costs, after which it would be expected to run off its own profit. Most notable for our purposes, though, is that no distinction was made between Manchus and Hanjun in discussion about who would be employed at the factory; bannermen were treated as a uniform group. In the end, four factories were created, largely focused on textile production, which by 1909 were already judged to be functioning well enough to begin sales, and apprentices at the factory were to receive salaries that varied according to their productivity. Providing for the livelihoods of banner people remained an essential state function, but had now taken on a new dimension, with jobs opened up for bannermen that would have previously been forbidden them. Universal education, too, was part of this plan, the eventual goal of which was to make the people of the banners self-sufficient. In this context, ethnic origins were irrelevant, and unlike every prior measure to provide for the banners, the new policies applied to all bannermen evenly, with no separate quotas for Manchus and Hanjun.

The reduction in official attention to the ethnic differentiation among bannermen was not entirely new to the dynasty’s final decade. The clearest evidence of a shift comes from regular

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65 For the garrison population in 1900, though without any breakdown of the relative numbers of Manchus and Hanjun, see Shou-yin, HWZPZZ, FHA 04-01-18-0054-058, GX 26.4.8 (May 6, 1900).

66 Shou-yin, MWZPZZ, FHA 04-01-36-0120-003, GX 33.3.27 (May 9, 1907).

67 Dzengki 增祺, HWZPZZ, FHA 04-01-01-1095-028, XT 1.4.18 (June 5, 1909).
reports filed by garrison generals about the state of banner military forces, which frequently included examination of their military skills, physical condition, knowledge of the Manchu language, and the like. During the first years after Guangzhou became a bi-ethnic garrison, most such reports explicitly distinguished the readiness of the garrison’s Manchus from that of its Hanjun.68 Gradually, though, such reports came to deal with the garrison’s bannermen as a whole, discussing their abilities and deficiencies without specifying any relative differences between the two groups.69

The Hanjun naval garrison at Fuzhou seems to have undergone a similar process, though it was less well documented than that at Guangzhou. Though the main Fuzhou garrison had been transformed through expulsion from an entirely Hanjun entity to an entirely Manchu one, its naval garrison continued to consist exclusively of Hanjun until the end of the Qing. In a report on military readiness at the garrison from 1789, the review of Manchu soldiers had a somewhat different form from that of the Hanjun sailors, with the assessment of the former focused on their abilities in standing archery, mounted archery, and musketry, while the latter were tested principally on naval skills and musketry. These differences could, of course, be attributed simply to what military skills were necessary for soldiers as opposed to sailors, rather than to ideas about their identity, and the sailors were in fact also tested in standing archery, though it was not described as one of their basic drills, suggesting that some military skills were still seen as simply part of being a bannerman. The biggest difference between the two groups, however, is

68 This was not always an unfavorable comparison for the Hanjun, see for instance Fusengge, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0178-1808-34, QL 24.12.29 (February 15, 1760), in which the garrison general, though criticizing the Manchu language abilities of his Hanjun soldiers, offers only praise for their martial skills, in contrast to his Manchu troops, who were less than excellent in mounted archery.

69 See, for instance, Ajingga 阿精阿, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0203-4213-019, DG 20.9.8 (October 3, 1840).
that the Manchus had their Manchu language skills evaluated while the Hanjun sailors did not.  

This marked a clear shift from policies from before the expulsion period, when Hanjun were also expected to know Manchu, and in fact, as discussed in the next chapter, Qing education policies in the banners were focused to a large degree on training Hanjun to use Manchu.

Just twenty years later, though, the differences in the means of evaluating Manchu cavalry and infantry and Hanjun sailors in Fuzhou appears to have sharply diminished. Though the Hanjun sailors were certainly still examined in naval skills that would have been irrelevant to their land-based Manchu counterparts, their standing and mounted archery skills were given first billing in garrison general Saicungga’s 賽沖阿 report, just as they were for his Manchu troops. Saicungga also noted that he offered rewards and encouragement to the Hanjun sailors “in accordance with [what he had done for] the Manchu camp” (Ma. Manju kūwaran i songkoī). Moreover, he made no mention of evaluating either group’s Manchu language abilities.  

Though the separate physical locations of the two groups – the naval garrison was based at Sanjiangkou 三江口, present-day Qinjiang Manchu village (Ch. 琴江满族村), down the river from Fuzhou – meant that they could not be evaluated jointly, as Manchu and Hanjun troops were in Guangzhou by the mid-eighteenth century, they had come to be treated as fundamentally similar.

Certain differences in duties did remain between the two groups, though. In particular, Hanjun retained the principal responsibility for artillery well into the nineteenth century. Each year in the ninth lunar month, the Hanjun banners of Beijing conducted a series of artillery drills,

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70 Kuilun 魁倫, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0193-3260-016, QL 54.10.15 (December 1, 1789).

71 Saicungga, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0198-3743-008, JQ 13.5.19 (June 12, 1808).
the results of which were reported to the court. That these drills were limited to Hanjun suggests one of the most prominent features of the early Hanjun banners survived well into the nineteenth century. Yet this special role was not one which particularly emphasized either the inferiority of Hanjun or their ethnic difference from Manchus, but rather the history of the institution of the Hanjun banners themselves.

Late Qing discussion of policies designed to reduce the gap between banner people and commoners under a new constitutional government served to further obscure any ethnic divide within the banners. A proposal to bring the policing of the garrison and the rest of the city of Guangzhou under unified management referred to the two areas as “banner” and “Han” (Ch. 旗 Han) suggesting perhaps that being a banner person was itself a quasi-ethnic category of the same sort as being “Han.” The phrasing of this contrast is particularly striking because the vast majority of the garrison population was itself Han, at least under the logic that had defined the Manchu/Hanjun divide for most of the dynasty. Contrasts between “banner” and “commoner” (Ch. 旗民 qi min) or between Manchu and Han (Ch. 滿漢 Man Han) were routine in Qing official discourse. But the banner/Han contrast appears only in a couple documents from the very final years of the dynasty, offering some support to Edward Rhoads’s claim that banner membership itself came to be treated as an ethnic marker beginning around the turn of the twentieth century.

One 1907 Manchu-authored petition to the court about the need to eliminate

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72 For a couple examples, see Tojin 托津, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0200-3881-038, JQ 21.9.8 (October 28, 1816) and Cao Zhenyong 曹振镛, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0202-4063-008, DG 8.9.7 (October 15, 1828).

73 Dzengki, HWZPZZ, FHA 04-01-20-0021-005, XT 1.11.17 (December 29, 1909).

74 Edward Rhoads, Manchus & Han, p. 291. Rhoads himself presents an example of a memorial that treated “Manchu” and “banner” as synonymous, with each being opposed to “Han” on pp.65-68. Another example of “banner” and “Han” used as a contrasting pair comes from a memorial dealing with opium prohibition in the Guangzhou garrison, which discusses the two groups living mixed together. See Dzengki, HWZPZZ, FHA 04-01-01-1118-022, XT 2.3.20 (April 29, 1910).
distinctions between Manchus and Han on a wide scale even referred to a “banner race” (Ch. 旗族 qizu) and argued that the elimination of the banners was itself part of a path to the elimination of “racial suspicion” (Ch. 種族猜嫌 zhongzu caixian) that threatened to tear the country apart. Though this was not court-authored language, it may reflect a sense that all banner people shared a common ethno-racial identity, a sense that may have resulted, at least in part, from the sharp decline over the previous century in official emphasis on the differences between Manchus and Han in the banners.

The trend in official management of the garrison population in Guangzhou following expulsion is quite clear. The ethnic distinctions between Manchu and Hanjun that had led to expulsion became less and less important to garrison officials, who, with the acquiescence of the Qing court increasingly ignored those distinctions when formulating policy, particularly following the death of the Qianlong emperor in 1799. We will now turn to developments in garrison society over the same period, to consider how those people living in a mixed garrison interacted with each other below the level of official policy.

**Banner Garrison Society after Hanjun Expulsion**

With the arrival of Manchu bannermen in the mid-1750s, the Guangzhou garrison experienced two substantial changes to its composition. The first one is obvious: no longer would the garrison have a homogenous Hanjun population, as it would instead become a mixed Manchu/Hanjun neighborhood, where interactions between the two groups would be of great importance to the nature of banner identity in the city. At least as important though was another change, one in the relationship of the people of the garrison to the commoners of the city around

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75 Wen-bin 文斌, HWCW, FHA 03-5746-005, GX 33.9.16 (October 22, 1907).
them. With the expulsion of many of their comrades, most Hanjun remaining in the garrison found themselves having much closer ties to commoners than they ever had before. Many Hanjun now had friends or relatives outside the banners, meaning that the social world of Guangzhou’s Han commoners could not be separated cleanly from that of bannermen. Combined, these two shifts greatly complicated the social world of the garrison, now mixed both ethnically and in terms of status.

Garrison officials considered the mixing of commoners and banner people a serious problem, one leading to criminal activity and general disorder. In 1781, general Fuioi complained to the court that many commoners lived within the garrison, but neither local civil officials nor garrison officials would take any responsibility for them, the former denying responsibility on the grounds that the people in question lived in places under garrison authority, the latter on the grounds that as commoners, they fell under the authority of the civil administration. Because of this, a number of “scoundrels of unclear origins” (Ma. sekiyen getuken akū jalingga ehe urse) had fled to the garrison to hide and “establish their nests” (Ma. tomombi). This situation needed to be resolved quickly, Fuioi argued, lest these bad elements start causing trouble in the garrison. To deal with the problem, he proposed the establishment of a register of all commoners who managed temples or shops in the garrison and whose households lived at their place of work. These registers would be updated twice a month, and a list of the number and names of all household members would be carved into wooden tablets to be hung on the gates of each house. Garrison officials would then send people to perform spot checks, which could be conducted at any time, day or night, to ensure that only the officially registered individuals were living at each address. When the “scoundrels of unclear origins”
became aware of these rigorous investigations, they would cease entering the garrison neighborhood to live, and it would, henceforth, be “pure” (Ma. bolgo).\textsuperscript{76}

Criminal elements evading legal control weren’t the only source of concern tied to the mixing of banner people and commoners in Guangzhou. The mere presence of commoners in the garrison was perceived as a possible corrupting influence on the city’s bannermen, and, as garrison general Tsuntai saw it in 1783, one of the two major issues that consistently arose in managing the garrison:

As for Guangzhou, it borders the ocean on the furthest frontier. Traders of the foreign tribes who arrive from all over are many, and, moreover, local commoners live mixed together [with banner people] in one city. We frequently take the troops to drill in artillery, musketry, archery, and mounted archery, and display our power to the foreigners. We are careful to ensure that the troops of the banner camp do not abandon the old Manchu way, and making them honor simplicity and honesty, ensure that they are not corrupted by Han customs.\textsuperscript{77}

Structurally, Tsuntai’s memorial introduced two issues – the presence of large numbers of foreigners and bannermen and commoners living mixed together – and mentioned two general approaches taken to deal with them. Foreigners were to be overawed by the dynasty’s military might as demonstrated through military drills, while bannermen were to be strictly made to adhere to the customs appropriate to them. This discussion thus clearly implied that the mixing together of banner people and commoners was itself what led to the risk of corruption by Han customs and the abandonment of Manchu practices. Interestingly, the phrasing of the memorial implicitly treated the garrison’s Hanjun as Manchus themselves, or at least as not Han, by

\textsuperscript{76} Fuioi, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0189-2873-009, QL 46.2.9 (March 3, 1781).

\textsuperscript{77} Guwàngjìo i ba serengge. mederi jakarambe dehu jecen. ba baci iṣinjìha turerì aima i ṣëdaṣara urṣe laubdu bìme. gëli ba na i ighbori emu ṣotóre de sùwaṣiṣaṣa jëme tehebi. ahardon ton aki hafarì jëna be gaafì po po miyoocan gäbtara niyàmiyàre be urebume. tulerì aima i urse de horon tuwabume. gùñin wersëme gùsai kùwàn i hafarì jëna be Manju i fe dorò be waliyaburakû. guhun enggi be wesihulebume. Níkan tacin de ḣebaru. Tsuntai, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0190-2985-009, QL 48.10.18 (November 12, 1783).
suggesting that all banner troops needed to avoid the influence of Han practices. Discussing all banner people as if they were Manchus was common in memorials from late Qianlong-era Guangzhou, and may reflect an early attempt to reconcile the continuing presence of Hanjun there with the court’s policy of Manjurifying provincial garrisons through the expulsion of Hanjun bannermen.

Relationships between commoners and banner people sometimes went beyond residence in the same neighborhoods. In 1793, Plain Yellow Hanjun bannerman Zhao Xinglu murdered two commoners, Ling Maokui and his wife, née Shang, who was Zhao’s cousin from outside the paternal line. Ling and his wife and come to live with Zhao, who was unmarried, in Zhao’s spare room, while they repaired their own home. Zhao had been short on money, and borrowed 800 copper cash from Ling in the fifth month of the year, repaying 650 copper cash after about a month had passed. When Zhao then sought to borrow an additional 600 cash, Ling initially agreed before changing his mind, leading to a fight in which Zhao stabbed Ling to death with a kitchen knife. When Shang attempted to intervene, Zhao killed her as well. For his crime, Zhao was sentenced to immediate beheading.

This case, and others like it, suggests that it was not uncommon for bannermen in Guangzhou to have familial ties to commoners following Hanjun expulsion. Fucang’s memorial about the case offers no explanation for how it happened that a bannerman’s cousin was married to a commoner – she may have been from a Hanjun family that had been expelled, perhaps Zhao’s mother was a commoner who had married a banner man, or maybe Shang herself was a banner woman who had illegally married a commoner man – and this lack of official interest

78 No interest was charged – presumably the interest-free loan was interpreted as a form of recompense for Ling and his wife being allowed to stay in Zhao’s home.

79 Fucang, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0195-3443-003, QL 58.7.29 (September 4, 1793). 
itself suggests that connections of this sort were not perceived to be unusual. In general, though, it is likely that Hanjun expulsion made such relationships much more common. Female relatives were particularly likely to be divided by expulsion, as marriage separated them from their birth families and the state policies designed to keep men from the same patriline in the same status category. The case of Zhao Tianlu, the son of an expelled Hanjun man illegally adopted into a Manchu family, discussed in the previous chapter, is another example of this phenomenon, as it was maternal relations that connected Zhao Tianlu’s father to the Manchu man who adopted his son. Despite the ritual priority assigned to relatives within the male line – indeed, Zhao Xinglu and Shang were not even mourning relations – maternal relatives were frequent sources of aid and support in late imperial China, as they were for both Shang and Zhao Tianlu. As such, it is reasonable to expect that expelled Hanjun and their descendants, as well as the ordinary commoners that they married, would often have maintained close ties to the garrison. Though these ties would only have made it into the official record when disputes among these family members turned violent, they were almost certainly far from unusual.

In addition to inheriting relationships with commoners through the expulsion process, Hanjun bannermen also formed new ties with commoners through marriage. In 1821, a murder case was reported to the court in which a Hanjun Plain White bannerman in the naval garrison named Yang Zhenquan 杨镇全 beat to death his wife of seven years, a woman born into a commoner family and surnamed Liu. Yang had flown into a fit of rage after his wife repeatedly pressed him to eat despite an illness that left him with little appetite, and struck his wife in the head with a stone disk, a crime for which he was sentenced to strangulation after the autumn.

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The case file specifically mentions that Yang had taken a commoner as his wife, but shows no hint of disapprobation of the marriage itself. This is perhaps unsurprising, as marriages between commoner women and banner men had occurred throughout the Qing, and marriage between Hanjun and Han commoners frequently met with an apathetic official reaction, even when it involved marriage between a banner woman and commoner man. Regulations in the garrison gazetteer also specified the statutes under which marriage between banner women and commoner men would be punished, but state merely that the banner company captain and clan head should investigate and report cases of the reverse. As such, it is difficult to determine whether the expulsion policy increased the frequency of banner-commoner marriage in Guangzhou or even if Hanjun were more likely to marry commoners than were Manchus. Yet, even if Guangzhou were no different from the average banner city in this regard, marriages of this sort likely added to its already high degree of commoner-banner interaction.

There were, however, circumstances in which Hanjun bannermen marrying outside the banners received greater official scrutiny. In late-Qianlong era Mukden, a Bordered Yellow Banner Hanjun lieutenant named Jiang Xingzhou 姜興舟 married a Muslim woman (Ch. 回民 huimin). When this became a matter of discussion in his community, Jiang “feared punishment” (Ch. 懼罪 juzui) and so decided to desert his post. Though he soon returned to his post of his own accord, he was arrested by local banner officials and “sentenced to delayed strangulation in

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81 Mengju, XKTB, FHA 02-01-07-2777-008, DG 1.6.6 (July 4, 1821).
82 See Elliott, The Manchu Way, p.254-255 on the frequency of commoner women marrying into the banners. For a discussion of official attitudes toward commoner-Hanjun marriages, including an oft-repeated Qianlong-era edict that called it “pointless to prohibit” (Ch. 毋庸禁止 wuyong jinzhi), see Chen Li 陈力, “An Investigation into Banner-Commoner Marriage Policy in the Qing Dynasty” 清朝旗民婚姻政策考论 Xinan daxue xuebao (shehui kexue ban) 37.5 (September 2011), pp.81-82.
83 Chang-shan, Gazetteer for the Eight Banners Garrisoned in Canton, juan 5, 78a.
accordance with the statute on military or civil officials who, feeling the weight of their guilt, flee their posts.”

Jiang’s death sentence was eventually commuted, as was common for those given delayed death sentences. Though Jiang was not punished directly on account of his marriage, his fear of punishment and the fact that the statute under which he was punished referred explicitly to deserting a post due to feeling criminal guilt suggest that officials did consider his marriage to be legally problematic. This indicates that the reason that marriages between Hanjun and Han commoners seem to have been widely tolerated was not simply because banner officials did not pay any attention to extra-banner marriages. Rather, those marriages, unlike Jiang’s marriage to a Muslim, were seen as tolerable.

Guangzhou officials recognized the role that Hanjun expulsion had played in fostering banner-commoner connections in the city. In 1811, the Jiaqing emperor issued an edict bemoaning various problems affecting the city of Guangzhou reported by imperial censor (Ch. 御史 yushi) Li Kefan 李可蕃, among which he included a claim that many Hanjun were regularly leaving the garrison and joining up with local ruffians (Ch. 土棍 tugun) to form gangs that engaged in robbery, activities to which local garrison authorities turned a blind eye. The emperor ordered that garrison officials immediately put a stop to this sort of behavior, threatening impeachment or worse if they did not.

In response to the edict, garrison general Fuhui first denied that any such misbehavior could be going on among his soldiers, who aside from their regular training and duties, and the patrols that watched the garrison at all hours, were subjected to regular and rigorous attendance.

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84 照文武官員負罪逃竄例絞侯 SYD 52.1.7 (February 24, 1787).
85 GZSL, juan 1272, QL 52.1.8 (February 25, 1787).
86 SYD, JQ 16.6.26 (August 14, 1811).
checks that ensured that they could not possibly be disappearing from the city to engage in illicit behavior. However, he also noted that unlike the 4,500 Manchus in the garrison, among whom almost all of the men had military employment, the Hanjun population exceeded 14,300, leaving many men idle and dispirited, and prone to making trouble. Moreover, he argued that it was only natural for the Hanjun who had been expelled in the 1750s to continue to come and go at the garrison as they had before. Despite these facts, which did lead to the appearance of some of what Li Kefan had reported to the court – that is, of dissolute Hanjun who were constantly hanging around with Han commoners – Fuhui argued that incidents of the sort Li had described were exceedingly rare. In the more than five decades since Hanjun expulsion, Fuhui could only come up with two cases that resembled what Li had described as a constant problem. Once, in 1790, a Hanjun soldier named Shang Judeng 尚舉等 had conspired with commoner Pei Zhiquan 裴志全 to assault and rob Panyu County commoner Lu Xinsheng 劉信盛 of some silver. Local officials had in fact dealt with the crime appropriately, as Shang had been sentenced to exile and penal servitude. Then, earlier in 1811, the year that Fuhui was writing, an unemployed Hanjun man named Meng Changqing 孟常清 had joined up with commoner Li Danian 李大年 to steal clothing and household items from the house of a Hakka man named Xu Longnian 徐龍年. Again, officials had handled the case quickly and appropriately, and it was currently being investigated by the judicial sub-prefect. Nevertheless, Fuhui and his lieutenants promised to redouble their efforts at discipline and control.87

It is hard to be sure whether Li Kefan or Fuhui had more accurately described the state of affairs in the garrison, though it certainly seems plausible that, as Fuhui suggested, Li had taken

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87 Fuhui, HWZPZZ, FHA 04-01-01-0526-042, JQ 16.7.21 (September 9, 1811).
one case from the year of his report and blown it out of proportion. In any case, despite their opposing perspectives, the two men agreed that Hanjun and Han commoners in Guangzhou had more interaction than was considered normal between banner people and commoners. Moreover, Fuhui’s explanation of this interaction is in line with what the other evidence discussed above leads one to expect – that the expulsion of many Hanjun, combined with their continued residence in and around Guangzhou, reduced the barriers that normally divided commoners from banner people, and that, in many cases seem to have led to tension more than cooperation and friendly interaction.88

The friendly relations between banner people and commoners during the decades after expulsion did not continue through the end of the dynasty. In 1870, general Chang-shan, like his predecessors, reported that bannermen and commoners frequently lived mixed together, in part due to the lack of a wall separating the banner city from the rest of Guangzhou. However, rather than warning against the collaborative criminal enterprises and harboring of Han commoner fugitives that earlier garrison officials had worried about, Chang-shan suggested that conflict between the two groups was the primary result of proximity. The two sides were constantly getting into minor squabbles that at times turned into long-running disputes, which officials struggled to manage due to their separate jurisdictions. So, he proposed, both garrison and civil officials should be given full authority over the city’s entire population, though they should treat the two groups with scrupulous impartiality.89

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88 See, for instance, Mark Elliott, “Bannerman and Townsman: Ethnic Tension in Nineteenth-Century Jiangnan,” *Late Imperial China* 11.1 (June 1990): 36-74, which, challenging prior notions of Manchu assimilation, argues for the continued importance of tension between Manchu bannermen and Han commoners well into the nineteenth century. Elliott’s argument against assimilation is compelling, and the example of Guangzhou does not challenge it, but instead suggests that Hanjun expulsion added additional complexity to the banner-commoner divide.

89 Chang-shan, HWZPZZ, FHA 04-01-01-0910-047, TZ 9.6.19 (July 17, 1870).
Though relations with commoners, discussed above, and Manchus, discussed below, were of greater importance in defining the nature of Hanjun identity in Guangzhou, groups other than Manchus and Han also made appearances in the garrison. Most notable among these were criminal exiles from Qing Inner Asia, sent to Guangzhou to serve as slaves in the garrison, much like Han from China proper who had committed serious crimes were sent into military penal servitude in Xinjiang. In Guangzhou, some of these people became slaves of Hanjun officers, including a Muslim named Ma Jinlu 馬進祿, the son of a man involved in the Muslim rebellion led by Zhang Wenqing 張文慶 in Gansu during the early 1780s. Ma Jinlu was exiled to Guangzhou in 1785, at the age of fourteen sui, and was made the slave of a Bordered Blue Hanjun Banner corporal named Jin Dianxun. Four years later, in 1789, angry at his master’s mistreatment, Ma beheaded Jin in his sleep, then went on a rampage around the garrison together with another Muslim slave of a Manchu banner corporal who he forced to join him. The two killed one of their fellow Muslim slaves with whom they had a dispute and wounded two other bannermen before finally being arrested. Ma was sentenced to execution by dismemberment (Ch. 凌遲 lingchi, Ma. faitarame wambi), which was carried out with the garrison’s other Muslim slaves forced to watch, to serve as a lesson to them. In response to these events, the Qianlong emperor angrily demanded that garrison officials supervise the behavior of Muslim slaves much

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90 On the standard laws regarding exile in the Qing, see Joanna Waley-Cohen, *Exile in Mid-Qing China: Banishment to Xinjiang, 1758-1820* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991), esp. pp.52-77. For examples of statutes according to which Inner Asians were sentenced to military slavery in a banner garrison in China proper, see the 1789 Mongol Code (Ch. 蒙古履歷 Menggu lüli, Mo. Mongyol čayajin-u bičig), which includes, for instance, a statute according to which accomplices to livestock thieves who kill someone during a pursuit which follows the theft were, together with their wives and children, to be “sent to a southern province and given to a garrison soldier to be slaves” (Ch. 發南省，給駐防兵丁為奴, Mo. emin-e-tü mujı-dur çölegülü seregyilen sakiyel quay-ud-tur boyul boly-a). For the Chinese version of this statute, see Mongol Code 蒙古律例 (Beijing: Lifan yuan, 1789; reprinted Taipei: Chengwen chubanshe, 1968), p. 124. For the Mongolian language version, see Batsukhin Bayarsaikhan, *Mongol Code (Mongyol čayajin-u bičig), Monumenta Mongolia IV* (Ulaanbaatar: Centre for Mongol Studies, National University of Mongolia, 2004), p. 142.
more closely and beat to death (Ma. *tantame bucebumbi*) those who disobeyed their masters. Imperial suspicion and retributive anger directed at Muslim slaves likely was a reflection mostly of their own origins as rebels, as well as of more general worries about the possible threat posed by Muslim subjects of the dynasty. Yet, in these events, there is also a sense that Manchus and Hanjun together constituted a unified banner population in relation to their Muslim slaves. Both groups could own such slaves, and both were jointly threatened by their perceived potential for violence. Though the only banner person killed by Ma Jinlu was Hanjun, not Manchu, the attack was on the garrison as a whole.

Two even more unusual temporary residents of the Guangzhou garrison were a pair of Russians who served briefly as bannermen in the late eighteenth century. In about 1774, Dmitri, a man in his late fifties, (Ma. *Timeiterei*) and his mid-twenties son Yakov (Ma. *Yakab*) had been fishing along the Irtysh river when they happened upon a Qing border post (Ma. *karun*) and were captured by the soldiers there. In an odd act of imperial grace, the Qianlong emperor, though dispatching the two men to Guangzhou, did not subject them to criminal punishment for trespassing across the frontier, but rather ordered that they be made into banner soldiers. In early 1775, the two men arrived at the garrison, and Dmitri was made a soldier (Ma. *uksin*) in the Plain Yellow Hanjun Banner, while his son received the same post in the Plain Red Manchu Banner. Over the next three years, the two men managed to save a huge proportion of their salaries, accumulating more than three hundred taels of silver. Their service as banner people did not, however, make them happy. Unable to adjust to the local environment and upset, Yakov later told investigators, that they lacked wives, the two decided to abscond from the garrison and

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91 The case of Ma Jinlu is described in two separate memorials: Šande 善德, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0193-3238-046, QL 54.5.6 (May 30, 1789) and Šande, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0193-3248-028, QL 54.6.30 (August 20, 1789).
return to Russia. They planned to sneak out of the garrison, hire a boat, and take it to a European ship, which they hoped would bring them to Europe, from whence they could return to Russia. If that plan failed, they intended to make their way back overland, using the money they had saved, much of which they had converted to gold to make it lighter to carry, to purchase supplies along the road, and using a rifle they had previously purchased to hunt for game. Unfortunately for the two men, before they had even made their way out of the garrison, wearing large conical hats (Ma. sekiyeku, Ch. 笠) and covering their faces in the hopes of escaping notice, they were spotted by a street patrol and captured. Garrison general Yongwei, believing it necessary to make an example of the two men to other the “Russian, Oirat, and Muslim criminals” (Ma. Oros. Ület. Hoise jergi weilengge niyalma) exiled to the Guangzhou garrison, gathered the said Russians, Oirats, and Muslims, and publicly executed Dmitri and Yakov in front of them. The Qianlong emperor clearly approved, writing an interlinear rescript reading “properly done” (Ma. giyan ningge) next to the word “executed” (Ma. fafun i gamaha).92 The story of Yakov and Dmitri falls well outside the normal bounds of banner life and official policy toward the banners, and thus its broader applicability is likely limited. Yet the initial placement of the two men in the banners was a definite break from a strictly ethnic order. Though they were certainly not the first Russians in the banners – an entire company of Russians, affiliated with the Manchu Bordered Yellow Banner, had been created in 1683 – their ethnic origins were not considered in their banner assignment.93 Not only were they not sent to the Russian company in Beijing, but despite being father and son, they were not even entered into the same banner-ethnic category. They might thus constitute one early example of the Guangzhou garrison’s move away from strictly

92 Yongwei, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0188-2740-032, QL 43.3.30 (April 26, 1778).
adhering to Manchu/Han divisions within the banner population. Moreover, this story is evidence for another way in which banner status functioned throughout the Qing. It did not merely reward loyal service, but could also serve as a way to keep a tighter watch on people believed to be potential troublemakers – Russian border crossers, for instance, who were likely suspected of spying.

Guangzhou was not the only place where people from foreign lands were entered into the banners in the late eighteenth century, nor were Russians the only sort of troublesome foreigners put into the banners in order to keep them under supervision. Following the final collapse of the Vietnamese Lê Dynasty and the defeat of Qing forces who invaded Vietnam on its behalf in 1788-1789, the final Lê ruler Lê Duy Kỳ (Ch. 黎維祁 Li Weiqi) was invited to Beijing to be entered into the Hanjun banners, along with around 100 of his followers, with Lê himself receiving a hereditary banner captaincy. The Qianlong emperor’s motive for extending this invitation was not out of any particular respect for Lê Duy Kỳ, whom he called “cowardly and incompetent” (Ch. 怯懦無能 qienuo wuneng), but rather out of the hope that it would prevent Lê, his followers, and his half-brother Lê Duy Chi (Ch. 黎維祇 Li Weizhi), who was still fighting in Cao Bằng province in northern Vietnam, from continuing to stir up trouble for the new ruler Nguyễn Quang Bình (Ch. 阮光平 Ruan Guangping), who had already been officially recognized by the Qing. Moreover, the emperor refused to let all of Lê’s 376 men who had accompanied him to Guilin become bannermen, instead ordering that fewer than 200 be sent to the capital to enter the banners, while the remainder went to Jiangnan, Zhejiang, or Sichuan provinces to join the Green Standards. Those who were dissatisfied with their position and tried to flee back to Vietnam to make trouble there would be captured and executed. The Lê followers remained in the banners for only 15 years, as in 1804 the Jiaqing emperor permitted them to return to
Vietnam, which was now under the control of Nguyễn Phúc Ánh (Ch. Ruan Fuying) and the new Nguyễn dynasty, who had been enemies of the ruler who had forced Lê into exile. Banner commanders were ordered to strike the Vietnamese population from the banner rolls. The case of the Lê king can be read as another example of the potential flexibility of ethnic origins for banner people even in the immediate post-expulsion period. But, more importantly, Lê and his followers were viewed as potential troublemakers, who could be managed and appeased by a grant of banner status.

This use of the banners as an institution that could secure good behavior did not mean that their original goal of creating and maintaining a loyal and useful hereditary elite – one that included Han as well as Manchus – had disappeared. Even in the final years of the Qianlong emperor’s life, as the Hanjun expulsion policy was abandoned, loyal Han subjects might rewarded by elevation into the banners. On his deathbed in 1796, Han commoner and Sichuan governor-general Sun Shiyi 孫士毅 requested that his grandson, Sun Jun 孫均 be allowed to enter the banners. Sun Shiyi had a long record of distinguished military command, particularly in the Gurkha wars and the suppression of a Miao rebellion, though he had a more mixed record in the disastrous Vietnam campaigns of 1788-1789. His request was granted, and Sun Jun entered the Plain White Hanjun Banner the following year. Sun Shiyi clearly saw banner affiliation, even in the Hanjun banners, as desirable and indicative of higher status, and the Qing court agreed, a belief made even clearer when the Jiaqing emperor stripped Sun Jun of his banner status and hereditary noble title just a decade later, likely due at least in part to Sun Shiyi’s close

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94 For the full story of the Lê entry and exit into the banners, see SYD, QL 54.11.8 (December 24, 1789); SYD, QL 54.11.10 (December 26, 1789); SYD, QL 55.1.9 (February 22, 1790); and RZSL, juan 126, JQ 9.2.13 (March 24, 1804).

95 SYD, JQ 2.9.24 (November 12, 1797).
connections to Hešen 和珅, the disgraced confidant of the Qianlong emperor, to whom Sun had addressed his appeal for banner status. The Hanjun banners had clearly already begun to recover from the attack on their integrity represented by expulsion, and, once again, membership in the Hanjun banners had become indicative of membership in a service elite.

Though Hanjun-Han commoner interactions received more official interest, the relationship between Manchus and Hanjun at the Guangzhou garrison is also crucial to understanding garrison society in post-expulsion Guangzhou, as well as in other parts of the empire that had mixed Manchu-Hanjun banner populations in the second half of the Qing period, in particular the capital itself. One important aspect of this relationship was that Manchus and Hanjun now worked together and served alongside each other in Guangzhou. This joint service itself encouraged interaction that went beyond basic professional requirements. In late 1778, for instance, Plain Yellow Manchu banner lieutenant Giode 九德 and Bordered Yellow Hanjun banner captain Liu Chenghui 劉承惠 were sent to Guangxi together to make horse purchases for the garrison. Prior to setting out, Liu had Giode borrow twenty-four lumps (Ma. fali) of silver on Liu’s behalf from Giode’s friend, surnamed Wang, who had just lent Giode himself twenty lumps of silver. While in Guangxi, the two men ran out of funds and were forced to borrow a total of more than fifty taels of silver from local merchants. On their way back, with the 104 horses that they had purchased, two of the horses the Giode was responsible for went missing, forcing him to spend thirty taels of silver out of his own pocket to acquire replacements. Upon

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96 For a description of Sun Shiyi’s life and career, which also mentions his connection to Hešen, see Iona D. Man-Cheong, The Class of 1761: Examinations, State, and Elite in Eighteenth-Century China (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), pp.180-195. The edict stripping Sun Jun of banner status can be found in RZSL, juan 163, JQ 11.6.17 (August 1, 1806).

97 The Chinese characters for their names are found in Chang-shan, Gazetteer for the Eight Banners Garrisoned in Canton, juan 9, 31a and juan 10, 6b respectively.
this, Giode repeatedly begged Liu to quickly repay the silver he owed, but Liu, lacking any extra money himself, refused. Upon their return to Guangzhou in the first month of 1779, Giode continued to press Liu for repayment, but Liu evaded him and put him off. After ten days of this, the two men ran into each other in the street, and despite Liu’s best efforts, Giode refused to be put off any more, and proceeded to Liu’s house to await his return from his day’s business. Liu had no choice but to send his adjutant, Wang Quan, to follow Giode back to Liu’s home to prepare tea, while Liu made his way to the yamen of his commander, Colonel Han, to file a report. When Wang Quan reached Liu’s house, he discovered Giode lying on the floor, clothes undone and covered in blood, with a small knife in his right hand. As the coroner would later determine, Giode had stabbed himself twice in the belly before cutting his own throat. Officials determined that Liu had not been involved directly in the death, but his attempts to avoid repaying Giode had surely prompted the suicide, and “besmirched his office” (Ma. tušan be gūtubuhabī), and he was fired from his post and ordered to repay his debt to Giode to Giode’s father immediately.98

The case of Liu Chenghui and Giode, though certainly more dramatic than most Manchu-Hanjun interactions would have been, is an example of how shared service in the garrison brought the two groups into closer contact. Liu and Giode were tied together not just by their jobs, but through debt – a debt that was also connected to another Han man, the man surnamed Wang who was the original source of the loan, though whether he was a commoner or Hanjun is unclear. The case also suggests that Manchus did not necessarily have the upper hand in dealings with Hanjun. Liu did hold a slightly higher rank than did Giode – captain (Ma. tuwašara hafan be jergi janggin, Ch. 防禦 fangyu) was rank 5a in the nine-rank Qing system, while lieutenant

98 Yongwei, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0188-2786-004, QL 44.2.22 (April 8, 1779).
(Ma. funde bošokū, Ch. 驍騎校 xiaogixiao) was rank 5b. But it is still telling that he was successfully able to pressure Giode to get him a loan, and that Giode was unable to successfully pressure him to repay it. Indeed, Giode’s suicide was a tactic generally adopted by the disempowered in order to force the law to pay attention to a grievance and punish the responsible party; during the Qing period, women who had been raped or suffered unwanted sexual advances, for instance, used suicide as a means of demonstrating their own righteousness and proving that their attacker should be punished.99 Giode must not have believed that he could rely on garrison authorities to intervene on his behalf, or at least not as quickly as he needed the money, and so saw an act of pure desperation as his only option. At the same time, Giode must have also felt unable to resist his own creditors, including the shadowy Mr. Wang, described by Liu simply as “a person surnamed Wang who he [Giode] knew.”100 Being Manchu did not guarantee any sort of official protection, and if Liu and Giode’s interaction is any indication, Hanjun and Manchus entered financial transactions as equals.

Manchus and Hanjun in Beijing were also at times socially entangled during the latter part of the dynasty, though their shared residence in the inner city was, of course, of much longer standing than that of Manchus and Hanjun in Guanghzou. In 1822, Plain Yellow Banner Hanjun cavalryman Liu Erge 劉二格 committed suicide. Liu and his wife, surnamed Ma and aged 39 sui, lived in the Maojiawan 毛家灣 neighborhood of Beijing, west of Beihai, together with Aršun 阿爾遜, a Bordered Red Banner Manchu aged 33 sui who worked as a gate guard at Fuchengmen, the western gate of the inner city. Liu and Aršun were sworn brothers (Ch. 乾兄弟


100 Ma. emu takara wang halangga niyalma.
gan xiongdi) and shared not just their home, but Liu’s wife, with whom, beginning in the summer of 1820, he frequently “had illicit sex” (Ch. 成姦 chengjian) with Liu’s knowledge. According to Ma, she and Liu were quite poor, and Aršun frequently helped them out with extra money. Though the sex between Ma and Aršun was not explicitly described by either of them as a quid-pro-quo for the financial assistance he offered, both the wife sharing and the financial assistance were likely understood as part of the sworn-brotherhood relationship. Liu’s suicide came after a series of arguments with Aršun in which he wanted his Manchu friend to contribute more money to the household, with both Ma and Aršun denying that their sexual relationship was a factor in his death, though Inghe 英和, the General Commandant of the Beijing Gendarmerie (Ma. yafahan coohai uheri da, Ch. 步軍統領 bujun tongling) who reported on the case was skeptical and referred the matter to the Board of Punishment for further investigation. As with the case of Liu Chenghui and Giode in Guangzhou, the relationship between Liu Erge and Aršun was one of approximate social equality, despite being between a Manchu and a Hanjun. Both were likely relatively poor by banner standards – this was stated explicitly by both Ma and Aršun in the case of Liu Erge, but Aršun’s lack of a family of his own suggests that he was not flush with cash either – and this led both of them into socially non-normative relationships. The official report on the case expressed no surprise that a Manchu and

101 On the legal concept of “illicit sex” (Ch. 姦 jian) in the Qing, see Matthew H. Sommer, Sex, Law, and Society in Late Imperial China (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000), pp. 30-65.

102 Matthew H. Sommer, Polyandry and Wife-selling in Qing Dynasty China: Survival Strategies and Judicial Interventions (Oakland: University of California Press, 2015), pp.39-45 discusses the connection between sworn brotherhood, polyandry, and poverty, in particular in relation to the phenomenon of “getting a husband to support a husband” (Ch. 招夫養夫 zhao fu yang fu).

103 Inghe, HWLFZZ, FHA 03-3841-039, DG 2.12.22 (February 2, 1823).
a Hanjun would be connected as closely as the two men, and there is no indication that Aršun’s Manchu background gave him any particular advantages over his Han friend.

Though in some aspects of banner service, particularly Manchu language study, Manchus were called upon to instruct Hanjun, post-expulsion Guangzhou also provides an example of a realm in which Hanjun were considered experts, and used to train Manchu novices: naval skills. In 1785, the Board of War ordered Guangzhou to select three sailors to send to Lūshun (Port Arthur) to train the naval garrison there in skills like punting boats, climbing masts, and firing guns from a moving ship. The request came from Mukden general Yongwei, who had finished a term as Guangzhou general six years earlier. Yongwei’s decision to look as far afield as Guangzhou to find capable banner sailors to train men in Manchuria suggests that he had been favorably impressed by the skills of Hanjun sailors in his old garrison. He seems to have been right to feel that way – when the three trainers returned home after less than half a year in Lūshun, they had managed to train more than ninety men to the standards expected. As with the case of Giode and Liu, this use of Hanjun to train Manchus suggests that a simple hierarchy in which Manchus were superior to Hanjun does not fully explain the Manchu-Hanjun interactions that occurred in practice. As the military functions of Manchu bannermen diversified in the latter part of the eighteenth century, moving into arenas like artillery and seamanship, Hanjun took on the roles of experienced experts.

Despite the appearance of increased social equality reflected in the above three cases, as well as the decrease in official discrimination discussed in the preceding section, there is strong

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104 Becingge 博清額, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0191-3063-001, QL 50.2.? (March/April, 1785).
105 Chang-shan, Gazetteer for the Eight Banners Garrisoned in Canton, juan 8, 8a.
106 Tsuntai, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0192-3148-041, QL 51.12.20 (February 7, 1787).
evidence that, even in the latter part of the nineteenth century, Manchus held a social position substantially superior to that of Hanjun. The continuing social divisions between the two groups are most clearly reflected in marriage practices within the garrison. The 1884 garrison gazetteer includes a list of women awarded honors for their chastity in each year from 1783 on (Ch. 貞節年表 zhenjie nianbiao), an analogous source of data to that taken from the Imperially-Commissioned Comprehensive History of the Eight Banners and used to discuss the banner ethnic hierarchy in chapter 1. As with the earlier, empire-wide data, the list in the gazetteer is most useful as a source of information on marriage practices in the garrison. Each entry lists the banner affiliation and name of the woman’s deceased husband as well as her surname or clan name. Though surnames cannot necessarily be perfectly mapped on to ethnic background – some Manchu clan names may have been reported using a one character abbreviation – it is highly suggestive. A woman with the surname Zhu 朱 or Li 李 was very likely Han, while a woman with the clan name Irgen Gioro (Ch. 伊爾根覺羅 Yi’ergen Jueluo) or Ligiya (Ch. 李佳 Lijia) was definitely a Manchu. Some names are more ambiguous – a number of people with the reasonably common Chinese surname Tong 佟 were in the Manchu banners, while Guan 關 was used as a surname by some members of the Güwalgiya clan, for instance. In general, though, it is possible to get a good sense of whether a given chaste widow was Manchu or Han. Unfortunately the gazetteer makes no distinctions between women from Hanjun families and those from Han commoner families, but with 899 couples listed, it is a very substantial and extremely valuable source of marriage data.

Beginning in 1809, Manchu clan names begin to be fairly consistently reported in full transcription, whereas before they seem to have generally been shortened, with the frequent appearance of surnames like Guan (mentioned above) and Yi 伊, presumably short for Irgen.
Gioro. Beginning with the entries from this date still leaves a sample of 746. Of these, 189 of the men were Manchu, of whom 37 were married to women whose surnames clearly marked them as Han, in addition to 2 women with ambiguous surnames, while 150 were married to Manchus or Mongols.\textsuperscript{107} This suggests that approximately 20 percent of Manchus in Guangzhou were married to Han women. Of the 557 Han men in the sample, however, 552 were married to women with obviously Han surnamed and 5 to women with ambiguous surnames (Guan 關 or Tong 佟), while not one was married to a clearly Manchu woman.\textsuperscript{108} In late imperial China, female hypergamy – women marrying men of higher economic and social position – was substantially more common than the reverse.\textsuperscript{109} Therefore, the fact that Hanjun women sometimes married Manchu men while Manchu women never married Hanjun men is likely indicative of a socio-economic hierarchy in the Guangzhou garrison in which Manchus were clearly superior to Hanjun. So, despite official policies, discussed in the preceding section, that increasingly treated Manchus and Hanjun as equals, the garrison remained internally divided at least as late as the middle of the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{110} Indeed, these results hardly differ from those for the banner system at large in the pre-expulsion period that were discussed in chapter 1.

Even aside from the apparent continuation of a Manchu/Hanjun hierarchy in the garrison, the decrease in official barriers between the two groups did not lead to a decrease in social

\textsuperscript{107} Surnames like Bo-er-ji-te 白爾吉特 (Borjigit in Mongolian) are clearly identifiable as belonging to Mongols, but, as might be expected in a garrison with no Mongol banner troops, only a tiny number of such surnames appear among the listed women.

\textsuperscript{108} Chang-shan, *Gazetteer for the Eight Banners Garrisoned in Canton*, juan 13, 10a-51b.

\textsuperscript{109} See note 68 of chapter 1, which discusses scholarship demonstrating the tendency toward female hypergamy in both Qing and modern China.

\textsuperscript{110} Since women often had to maintain their chastity for two decades or more after their widowhood to receive official honors, the women who received chastity awards in the 1870s and 1880s had likely married around the middle of the century.
barriers. During the first thirty years (1809-1838) of the dataset discussed above, 27 percent of the listed Manchu men were married to Han women. From 1839 through the end of the dataset in 1883, however, only 14 percent of the Manchu men listed were married to Han women. That is to say, not only did a hierarchical arrangement that made it virtually impossible for a Hanjun man to marry a Manchu woman persist, but any intermarriage between the two groups became less common even as their status in the eyes of garrison and dynastic officials became more equal. Why Manchu men in Guangzhou became less likely to marry Han women over the course of the nineteenth century is not certain, though one possibility is that the relatively small total Manchu population in the decades after Manchu first came to Guangzhou limited the ethnically Manchu marriage prospects of Manchu men, who increasingly chose to marry Manchu women as the number available grew. Regardless, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that Manchus and Hanjun were not developing into a unified social group.

The persistence of a clear socio-economic hierarchy dividing Manchus and Hanjun is supported by early twentieth-century census data from Beijing, the city that housed the bulk of the empire’s Hanjun population. Perhaps most immediately striking from this dataset, published by the new Ministry of Civil Affairs (Ch. 民政部 minzheng bu) in 1908, is that, though Hanjun made up only 21 percent of the banner population of Beijing’s Inner City (Ch. 内城 neicheng), they were 42 percent of the banner population of the Outer City (Ch. 外城 waicheng). Since for most of the Qing period, residence in the Inner City had been almost entirely limited to banner people, though by 1908 these restrictions had relaxed to the point that 65 percent of the Inner City population were commoners, the relative prominence of Hanjun in the Outer City relative to the Inner City may have reflected their marginalization from the broader banner community. However, the vast majority of banner people, including 89 percent of Hanjun, lived in the Inner
City, meaning that it is worth being cautious about assigning too much importance to the handful of banner people who lived outside its walls.

A subtler, but perhaps more important distinction, comes from data about average family size. The average Hanjun household, with 5.9 members, was 13 percent larger than the average Manchu household. By itself, this is not evidence of increased poverty – after all, the average household size for imperial clan members and those in the collateral Gioro lineages (Ch. 宗室覺羅 zongshi jueluo) was even higher, at 6.8 people. However, unlike Manchu, Mongol, and Hanjun households, all of which averaged 54 percent male, households from the imperial lineage were only 42 percent male. This means that the average household in the imperial lineage was, in all likelihood, larger due to its members’ increased propensity to bring in extra women as concubines, reflecting greater than average wealth. For Hanjun, though, whose households were no more female-dominated than those of Manchus or Mongols, there is likely a different explanation. The average Hanjun head of household supported more people not because of his greater ability to afford it, but because of the greater difficulty his male dependents faced in finding incomes of their own.

This theory is further supported by employment data from the same source. Only 40 percent of adult Hanjun bannermen had an income that came from the state, compared to 47 percent of Manchus and 51 percent of Mongols.¹¹¹ Hanjun were comparatively likely to have sources of income outside the banners, so the total number listed as idle or unemployed (Ch. 間

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¹¹¹ These numbers come from summing totals of those people who held state employment, whether the income from a hereditary title (世爵 shijue), salary from employment as an official (職官 zhiguan), or a military salary from the cavalry (馬甲 majia) or infantry (步甲 bujia), and those who were unemployed but received a state stipend, whether from a supernumerary post (養育兵 yangyu bing) or on account of being widowed, orphaned, blind, or disabled (四孤 sigu). 29 percent of Hanjun were employed by the state (compared to 38 percent of Mongols and 35 percent of Manchus), while 11 percent drew a stipend despite being unemployed (compared to 13 percent of Mongols and 12 percent of Manchus).
was only 38 percent as compared to 37 percent of Manchus. Even so, though the gap was not extreme, the comparative lack of access to state salaries may have led to Hanjun being poorer than Manchus and thus helps to explain the difference in average family sizes discussed above.\textsuperscript{112} The increased poverty among Hanjun in the capital suggested by this census data was quite likely replicated in Guangzhou where, even as relative access to state stipends improved, Hanjun never managed to receive as much support on a per capita basis as Manchus. In conjunction with the social hierarchy dividing the two groups, reflected in marriage records, this persistent economic gap, though perhaps smaller than it had been in the eighteenth century, suggests that though, as Edward Rhoads suggests, non-banner people in the late Qing may have come to view the banner people as a whole as a single ethnic group, sharp divisions remained within the banners, ones which were important to how banner people understood their own identities.\textsuperscript{113}

\textbf{Conclusion}

Though divisions among banner people may not have been immediately apparent to those outside the banner system, it is clear that they remained a feature of banner life through the end of the Qing. This was not, however, because of increased official discrimination against Hanjun in the wake of the expulsion of many of their number. Rather, for the Qing state, status had once again come to trump ethnicity as the crucial factor in banner administration, particularly in the dynasty’s final years, as the court sought mechanisms to enable the abolition of the banners and the elimination of the burden they created for state finances. This may in part be a result of Manchu identity becoming more of a liability for Qing rulers than an asset. With Han nationalist

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{112} Statistical Bureau, \textit{Statistical Tables of the Ministry of Civil Affairs} 民政部統計表 (Beijing: s.n., 1908).
\item \textsuperscript{113} Rhoads, \textit{Manchus & Han}, 67-68.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
revolutionaries challenging Qing rule on the basis of its foreign origins, there was little to be gained from using Manchu-ness as a factor for building solidarity between the court and the banners. Yet the retreat from Manchu preferences within the banners had begun before the first real challenge to the Manchu-ness of the Qing state, that of the mid-nineteenth-century Taiping rebellion. The total abandonment of the policy of Hanjun expulsion, which followed closely in the wake of the death of the Qianlong emperor around the turn of the nineteenth century, was accompanied by a move toward broader administrative equality between Manchus and Hanjun. Given the role that the Qianlong emperor’s personal focus on Manchu ethnic identity played in initiating the expulsion process, this is perhaps unsurprising – without his efforts to reinforce the importance of Manchu ethnicity to the banners, garrison administrators became more concerned with simply maintaining the livelihoods of the people for whom they were responsible than with pursuing policies of ethnic preference.

Yet, even as they treated the two major banner groups more equally, the legacy of past discrimination remained. The initial equal division of posts at the Guangzhou garrison in the 1750s meant that even after more than a century of policies that gave more salaried posts to Hanjun, they likely still had less than their fair share. This was certainly true in Beijing, where data on household size and employment in the early twentieth century both strongly suggest that Hanjun remained poorer than their Manchu counterparts. This continued economic inequality likely helped reinforce the social inequality that was perhaps a legacy of many decades of anti-Hanjun discrimination. Though Manchus and Hanjun were more equal before the law than they had been before, in daily life Manchus still perhaps saw themselves as superior to their banner comrades, a view reflected in their refusal to marry their daughters to Hanjun.
If this is the case, it is necessary to explain the apparent readiness with which some Hanjun (and Hanjun descendants) came to identify themselves as Manchus in either the Republican period or under PRC rule. One possible answer is that the events of 1911 helped create a sense of shared identity. Though Hanjun were not present at any of the garrisons which suffered serious violence during the Xinhai Revolution, that the revolutionaries who conducted these massacres seem to have lumped all banner people into the same group may have increased intra-banner solidarity. Moreover, the threat to banner people created by the potential elimination of the banners, a threat which began in the final years of the Qing, created a community of common interest. Chang Shuhong identifies fifteen organizations of banner people formed around 1911, all of them dedicated toward improving the livelihoods and political positions of banner people. With the major political constituencies of the early Republican period defined in ethnic terms, it made sense for Hanjun to appeal to the Republican government as Manchus when seeking to defend their joint interests, while Manchus, now lacking a privileged position, had no reason to exclude Hanjun from their community of interest. Thus, it may be that the Hanjun were only able to become fully identified as Manchus when being Manchu ceased to be particularly advantageous. Official PRC nationalities policy, which permits Hanjun descendants to be registered as Manchus (Ch. 满族 Manzu) thus, to a large degree, reflects ethnic conceptions that developed in the early twentieth century more than those of the Qing period.


Chapter Five: The Translator Caste: Manchu Language Education in the Hanjun Banners

Scholarship on the use of non-Chinese languages in the Qing frequently emphasizes the connection between language and identity, especially ethnic identity. Quadrilingual stelae and pentaglot dictionaries, Pamela Crossley argues, served as a linguistic reflection of the 5 major constituencies of the empire – Manchus, Han, Mongols, Tibetans, and Muslims. The Manchu language, in particular, has been seen as inextricably linked to the Qing court’s attempts to construct a Manchu people and to maintain Manchu identity even as the conquest people found themselves surrounded by an overwhelmingly Han population. Mark Elliott identifies the Manchu language as one of the crucial components of the “Manchu Way,” alongside archery, horsemanship, and frugality. Qing rulers and officials, as he notes, frequently encapsulated the essence of what it meant to be a Manchu in the phrase “the dynastic language (Manchu) and mounted archery” (Ch. 國語騎射 guoyu qishe). According to Elliott, maintaining this Manchu Way was seen as essential to avoiding the processes of acculturation that had destroyed previous dynasties originating in Inner Asia. As such, at least in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Elliott sees the Manchu language, and expectations that bannermen would study it, as a fundamental part of an imperially-defined Manchu ethnic identity. Pamela Crossley, though denying that Manchu identity was ethnic prior to the twentieth century, also links Manchu identity to the Manchu language, referring to the language, as seen by the court, as the “orthographic expression of the origins and nature of the Manchu people.”


Given these well-established links between Manchu identity and the Manchu language, it is probably unsurprising to see a 1727 edict from the Yongzheng emperor to newly appointed garrison lieutenant general Arsai 阿爾賽 telling him that if his soldiers “do not know Manchu, it is to obscure what is fundamental to them (or, more literally, “obscure their root,” Ch. 昧根本 mei genben). When you return [to the garrison], you must instruct them in the study of Manchu speech and writing.”

What makes this edict perhaps a bit more surprising, however, is that the officer receiving these instructions was serving in Fuzhou, a garrison which at the time consisted solely of soldiers in the Hanjun banners. As we have seen, this meant that, though bannermen, the soldiers in question were recognized by the court to be Han, not Manchu. And though in the late Qing, the categories of “banner” and “Manchu” seem to have collapsed in official discourse to the point that even Hanjun bannermen might be seen as Manchus of a sort, the edict to Arsai came in the early eighteenth century, when ethnic distinctions among bannermen were a point of emphasis for the court.

The case of Fuzhou, where, soon after this edict, the first official Manchu language school in a provincial garrison was founded, was far from unique. In fact, during the Yongzheng and early Qianlong periods, Hanjun became the focus of state efforts to improve the Manchu abilities of men in the Eight Banner system. Formal state-run Manchu education on a large scale began not in attempts to reinforce Manchu identity or ensure that Manchus knew their native language, but rather in efforts to make sure that bannermen generally, and particularly Han in the banners, became competent users of Manchu and translators between Manchu and Chinese. The

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5 Despite his linguistically Manchu name, Arsai was himself Hanjun as well. How he acquired his name is discussed in Elliott, The Manchu Way, p. 245.
development of Manchu education in the early eighteenth century demonstrates that, as with the “Manchu way” more broadly, the court treated knowledge of Manchu as tied more to the prescribed status identity of banner people than the ethnic identity of Manchus, and saw ability in the language as an essential administrative skill for all members of a multiethnic service elite.

The practical functions of the Manchu language in Qing administration are varied and well-studied. Crossley and Evelyn Rawski have argued that documents written by military generals on the Inner Asian frontier were usually written in Manchu because Manchu was a “security language,” the use of which restricted information to those who could read it. Whether or not use of the language was really intended to limit commoner officials’ access to information, it is certainly true that, particularly in the eighteenth century, most military matters were dealt with principally in Manchu, and that it played a particularly important role in Qing Inner Asia for the entire course of the dynasty, even outside a military context. It even played a major role in relations with some European states, particularly Russia, where it was the language that both sides were most likely to understand. At a more mundane level, all routine memorials (Ch. 题本 tiben), regardless of subject, were supposed to be bilingual, requiring translation either from Manchu or into it, depending on the document’s original language, and thus necessitating the employment of a substantial number of translators; over one million of these documents survive in the archives in Beijing, despite the loss of nearly all routine memorials from prior to the

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7 Ibid., 88n70. Note that the Treaties of Nerchinsk and Kiakhta did not even have official Chinese language versions. European Jesuits in the Qing court were also quite likely to know Manchu, see Mårten Söderblom Saarela, “Manchu and the Study of Language in China (1607-1911)” (PhD diss., Princeton, 2015), pp. 164-165.
Qianlong period. In addition, most matters involving the Eight Banners or banner garrisons, even when not dealing directly with military campaigns, were handled in Manchu, meaning that the vast majority of the more than ten thousand officials in the banner bureaucracy would have required competency in the language. All of the above contributed to a very substantial administrative demand for both Manchu knowledge generally, and the ability to translate between Manchu and Chinese in particular; this administrative demand meant that Manchu had a functional role that was perhaps even more important than its role as an identity marker, and was a key factor in the Qing state’s interest in improving the Manchu abilities of bannermen.

This chapter will show that, in both the capital and the provinces, Manchu language schooling in the high Qing was principally directed at Hanjun. The proliferation of official Manchu schools in the banners, moreover, was temporally – and likely practically – linked to the institution of the translation examinations, a system parallel to the regular civil service exams, open only to bannermen, that tested candidates in translating between Manchu and Chinese or Manchu and Mongolian. Both the translation exams and Manchu language schools were, I will argue, outgrowths of the idea that one of the functions of banner people, in addition to military service, was to provide the bureaucratic skills needed to govern the Inner Asian portions of the empire and administer the military, with translation chief among them. Though I do not deny the very real links, particularly in the official rhetoric of the Qing court, between Manchu ethnic identity and Manchu language ability, I will show that the Manchu language belonged to the banners as a whole, not to Manchus alone. When it came to the practical question of who to educate in Manchu, the functional needs of the Qing state, and the role that all people of banner

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9 Elliot gives the number of banner officials as approximately 10,500. See Elliott, *The Manchu Way*, p. 135.
status were expected to play in meeting those needs, were more important than any ideas about the proper performance of Manchu ethnicity. This argument will be further bolstered by looking at the schools established for training in other languages, particularly the foreign language school in Guangzhou that opened in the 1860s. That bannermen were not used simply as translators of Manchu, but for all types of translation required by the Qing state, shows that translation as a broad category was treated as a function of people of banner status, regardless of whether the language to be translated had any particular connection to the identity of the translator.

**Manchu Education in the Early Qing**

The schools established for Hanjun in the Yongzheng period were not the first state-run schools that taught Manchu, though they were the first to be open to large numbers of ordinary bannermen and to make Manchu language instruction their overriding purpose. In 1645, each banner company was ordered to select a single student to be educated in either Chinese or Manchu, and seven years later each banner opened a school for members of the imperial clan (Ch. 宗學 zōngxué, Ma. uksun i tacikū), in which Manchu study, alongside the study of Chinese and mounted archery, was the main activity.\(^{10}\) The first of these schools had its scope reduced even further soon after, with only forty total students – all in the capital – selected to study for the civil 生員 shēngyuán degree, thus presumably relegating Manchu to a relatively minor part of the curriculum.\(^{11}\) Though the imperial clan academy continued to focus on Manchu language education, it was, by its nature, closed to the vast majority of bannermen.

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The first large school for bannermen was the Jingshan official school (Ch. 景山官學 Jingshan guanxue, Ma. ambalinggū alin i alban tacikū), established by the Imperial Household Department (Ch. 內務府 neiwufu, Ma. dorgi baita be uheri kadalara yamun) in 1685 for members of the Imperial Household Department’s bondservant banners. The school initially accepted 360 students, eventually increasing to 388 in 1699. As the principle purpose of the school seems to have been to train bondservants to work in official positions within the palace, its curriculum, like those of the schools described above, emphasized Manchu alongside other skills, but was not primarily focused on translation. However, that the first state-run school for a substantial number of ordinary banner people was established for men in the bondservant banners, an ethnically diverse population consisting only partly of Manchus, itself constitutes evidence that the Qing state did not consistently tie language to ethnicity. Moreover, it too linked Manchu education to a principally functional agenda as the bureaucratic needs of the Imperial Household Department prompted the founding of the school.

The formal translation examination system was not established until the Yongzheng period, but the early Qing court had systems of Manchu assessment designed to help in the selection and retention of bithesi (Ch. 筆帖式 bitieshi), cleks who specialized in translation, and, in the first decades of the dynasty, separate examinations for bannermen that included tests of Manchu proficiency. In the 1651 banner examination, Manchu and Mongol bannermen who did not know Chinese were allowed to take the exam entirely in Manchu. In 1657 the banner examinations were eliminated, due to the Shunzhi emperor’s fear that bannermen might become

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13 For the ethnic composition of the bondservant banners, see Elliott, The Manchu Way, pp. 81-84.
too focused on literary accomplishments and neglect their military duties and training. In the subsequent decades, the banner exams were repeatedly restarted and once again eliminated, following shifts in court policy. A more consistently implemented set of examinations were the selection exams for bithesi and other low-level officials responsible for translation. These exams existed entirely for the purpose of demonstrating one’s basic qualifications to perform official functions that required the ability to translate between Manchu and Chinese. One might expect that in the first decades of the dynasty, at least for Manchu officials, these exams functioned at least as much as a test of Chinese ability as of knowledge of Manchu.

Indeed, early in the dynasty, Manchu bannermen were generally unable to use Chinese, and though most ordinary bannermen would have been illiterate in either language and thus able to benefit from Manchu schooling, the needs of state administration led the court to worry more about the Chinese ability of Manchus than about their knowledge of Manchu. This state of affairs remained the case through the seventeenth century, and indeed perhaps even as late as 1750, though, as we shall see, this was manifestly not the case for Hanjun bannermen by the start of the Yongzheng period. However, despite the early Qing court’s relative lack of concern about the Manchu abilities of bannermen, it was concerned about another group: Han officials, particularly those in the upper ranks of the bureaucracy. As such, one of the main sites of Manchu training in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries was not the banners at all, but the Hanlin academy. Hanlin bachelors, generally the highest performers on the top level of the civil service examinations, spent three years at the Institute for Advanced Study (Ch. 庶常館 shuchang guan,

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Ma. *geren giltusi be tacibure kuren* engaged in further training. After three years, they took a concluding examination that helped determine their future employment. Part of the training for at least some Hanlin bachelors (Ch. 庶吉士 *shujishi*, Ma. *geren giltusi*) in the early Qing consisted of Manchu language study.\(^\text{16}\) Indeed, at least as late as 1736, one of the elements of the concluding examination was a translation of Manchu into Chinese.\(^\text{17}\) As with the establishment of bondservant education, the training of Hanlin bachelors, most of whom would have been Han, in Manchu suggests a court concerned largely with the functional aspects of the language, in this case helping enable high Han officials to deal with Manchu-language documents and Manchu-speaking officials.

**The Flourishing of Manchu Training and Testing in the Eighteenth Century**

The accession of the Yongzheng emperor was accompanied by an increased court focus on improving the Manchu ability of bannermen. During the first few years of his reign, the Qing state implemented a system of three levels of translation exams, parallel to the regular civil examination system. The content of the translation exams varied some over time; at different points it included the translation of passages from the classics from Chinese into Manchu, the translation of official documents, especially those dealing with frontier or banner affairs, and the composition of original policy essays in Manchu. Mongol bannermen took exams focused on translation between Manchu and Mongol, though dealing with many of the same sorts of

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\(^{17}\) In fact, that year, the Qianlong emperor, believing that some elements of the examination – particularly the civil service examination-style eight legged essays – simply repeated the sort of tasks that Hanlin bachelors had been performing since a very young age, reduced the exam sections to three, two poems, and one translation. See Ortai 鄂爾泰, HWZPZZ, FHA 04-01-38-0058-029, QL 1.4.11 (May 21, 1736).
The focus on translating official documents is clear evidence of the functional role that the exams were meant to play in selecting competent translators. But the policy essays also had a very practical logic; the court worried that for the translation portions of the exams, candidates had simply memorized many potential passages and were unable to actually do original translations themselves; the compositions were meant to demonstrate that they had real Manchu ability.

In addition, the court took a stronger than ever interest in schooling for bannermen. Most notably, this included an expansion of the imperial clan schools, new schools for the offspring of hereditary banner officials, and the creation of the Xian’an Palace school (Ch. 咸安宮官學 Xian’an gong guanxue, Ma. hiyan an gung ni alban tacikū), which, like the Jingshan school, principally served members of the bondservant banners. As with earlier schools, though, these new schools had a varied curriculum, focusing on Chinese language and martial skills as well as training in Manchu. The first schools to be principally designed for training in Manchu were, however, also established around the same time. These were the Hanjun Manchu schools in the capital, and the first official schools in the provincial garrisons.

**Hanjun Manchu schools in Beijing**

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19 Šuhede 舒和德, HWZPZZ, FHA 04-01-38-0058-027, QL 1.3.27 (May 5, 1736).

20 Previously schools had only existed for members of the imperial house (Ma. uksun, Ch. 宗室 zongxue), which is to say, the descendants of the founding Qing emperor Nurchai’s father, Taksi. Under Yongzheng, new schools (Ch. 覺羅學 Jueluo xue, Ma. Gioroi tacikū) were established for the “Gioro” clan, the descendants of Nurchai’s paternal uncles.

The Yongzheng emperor ordered the establishment of Manchu language schools in each of the eight Hanjun banners in the capital in 1729, the seventh year of his reign. The initial proposal for setting up these schools came from Board of Rites assessor (Ch. 礼部議覆 libu yifu) and Liu Rulin 劉汝霖, lieutenant general of the Plain Blue Hanjun banner, who wrote:

The young men of the Hanjun should study Manchu writing; I request that each banner establish a free school (Ch. 義學 yixue, Ma. jurgangga tacikū). Order the Manchu general of each banner to coordinate with the Hanjun general of the same banner to select men who are proficient in Manchu from among the Manchu banner unemployed officials, bithesi, and those dismissed from office to serve as instructors. From among the Hanjun of the same banner, select one or two men who shoot well to serve as archery instructors.22

The emperor acceded to Liu’s request, and schools were soon established. That these schools were of a fundamentally different type from previous banner schools is made clear by the lack of any provision for instruction in Chinese. It seems likely that the students at these schools were expected to already have some literacy in Chinese; as will soon become clear, students were expected to become proficient in translation, which would have necessitated knowledge of both Manchu and Chinese. Yet the schools themselves were not meant to provide a comprehensive education to bannermen, or one that would help them pass the regular civil examinations, but instead simply to teach them Manchu and prepare them for the translation examinations.

The close connection between the free Manchu schools for Hanjun and the state’s desire for translators was made clear in Liu’s initial proposal. He suggested that “of the young men who study [in the schools], if they are proficient in literary skills, those who wish to be examined in translation, with no restrictions on those without an official post, should be allowed to go to the..."
Board of Personnel to be tested for [posts as] bithesi.” The central role of the Board of Personnel (Ch. 吏部 libu, Ma. hafan i jurgan) in this process, which continued for the remainder of the dynasty, suggests that students in the Hanjun Manchu schools were not necessarily being directed to take the newly-created translation exams, which were administered by the Board of Rites (Ch. 禮部 libu, Ma. dorolon i jurgan), but might also take the long-established bithesi selection examinations, though documentation of specific cases indicates that many did in fact participate in the former. Regardless, the idea that these schools were meant to produce professional translators for state employment suggests that it may not be coincidence that they came into being at around the same time as the translation exams, which also had the production of bithesi as one of their central functions.

The importance of producing translators was further underscored by the official regulations for Manchu instructors (Ch. 敎習 jiaoxi, Ma. tacibukū) in the schools. According to regulations established in 1734, Manchu instructors were to be assessed on a triennial basis and divided into three grades:

Those who have, among the young men they teach, [students] who are able to pass the examination for translators (Ch. 翻譯外郎 fanyi wailang) or bithesi will be designated first-class and recommended to the Board [of Personnel] for promotion. If among the students they teach, there are none able to take the exams [in translation], yet there are those who can write clear Manchu script and have a rough knowledge of translation, the said instructors shall be designated second-class and retained at the school for an additional three years. If the students they teach can only write Manchu script and have rough knowledge of spoken

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23 其肄業子弟。如有文理精通、願考繙譯者。不拘閒散。俱准赴吏部考取筆帖式。Ibid.

Manchu, they will be designated third-class and sent back to their original places.\(^{25}\)

As this regulation makes clear, producing translators was not merely the central goal of the Hanjun Manchu schools, it was the only goal that had any practical role in school administration. An instructor whose students were able to write Manchu script and speak a bit of Manchu was judged a total failure; producing students who had at least limited ability in translation was necessary for a teacher even to keep his job. If he desired promotion to a more prestigious and better paying post – instructors in the schools received only two taels of silver and two *hu* of rice per month – he needed to produce students good enough at translation to pass an examination in it.\(^{26}\)

The promotion regulations for instructors were modified slightly in 1738 in response to a memorial by Wang Jintai 王進泰, a colonel (Ma. *jalan i janggin*, Ch. 參領 *canling*) in the Bordered White Hanjun banner. Wang argued that instructors believed that it was too difficult to attain first-class status and that continuing to serve as an instructor was not seen as desirable; who, he asked, “would be willing to abandon his present post to be made a teacher of ignorant children?”\(^{27}\) As such, instructors were content to put little effort into their work and simply return to their previous posts when their three years teaching were up. Wang proposed, instead, that the

\(^{25}\)其所教子弟內有能考中翻譯外郎筆帖式者,作為頭等,交部議敘。如所教子弟雖未有考試之人,然有能寫清字、楷書,併粗通翻譯者,將該教習作為二等,再留學三年。如所教子弟止能寫清字,併粗通清話者,作為三等,撥回原處。Wang Jintai, HWLFZZ, FHA 03-1188-008, QL 3.5.29 (July 15, 1738).

\(^{26}\)Salary levels are listed in QDBQTZ, *juan* 98. Teachers at other banner schools were also evaluated on the basis of their students’ success, but with two crucial differences from the Manchu school. First, instructors were judged on the combined number of students passing the civil exams and the translation exams, not just the number of translation graduates. This is probably because, as discussed above, these schools were intended to be comprehensive, not to focus exclusively on Manchu language and translation. Second, rewards for successfully meeting quotas were much less; instead of receiving a promotion, instructors simply received two positive notations on their official CV. See, for example, the case of two instructors in the Gioro school in 1737: Zhang Tingyu 張廷玉, LKTB, FHA 02-01-03-03420-003, QL 2.10.19 (December 10, 1737).

\(^{27}\)孰肯舍現在之任,而為蒙幼之師? Wang Jintai, HWLFZZ, FHA 03-1188-008, QL 3.5.29 (July 15, 1738).
second and third-class instructors be switched, with the former returned to their banners to hold office there, while the latter were to remain on as teachers. If after three more years, they were still found to be ineffective, they were to be impeached and subjected to administrative discipline. In this way, Wang argued, teachers would not dare to be lazy. The court seems to have agreed with Wang that the existing system was not working, but it did not accept his remedy, which would have resulted in only the least successful instructors continuing to teach. Instead, the court continued the same rules as before for instructors in the first two grades, meaning that it was second-class instructors who would be retained as teachers. Third-class instructors, however, now defined as teachers whose students “lack even the slightest understanding of translating Manchu speech, and moreover cannot neatly copy standard Manchu script” and were considered to have failed to perform their basic duties, and as such were to be ineligible for any future state employment (Ch. 永不叙用 yongbu xuyong).  

A few specific cases help illustrate the implementation of the above regulations for Manchu instructors at the Hanjun schools. In 1736, a former Ministry of Works Bureau Director and Plain White Manchu bannerman named Si-ge 四格 was selected by his banner to serve as a Manchu instructor in the banner’s Hanjun school. After three years, in 1739, following the standard regulations, he came up for review. The colonel in charge of the Plain White Hanjun banner school, Cai Songling 蔡嵩齡, found that one of Si-ge’s students, Shi Jun 石鈞, had received the licentiate degree (Ch. 秀才 xiucai, Ma. şusai) in the translation exams of 1737, and that in addition four of his students had a rough knowledge of translation, nine more could write Manchu script, and five more could speak Manchu, all of which was confirmed through Cai’s

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28 並無通曉翻譯清話之人，又不能縂寫清字楷書 Zhang Tingyu, LKTB, FHA 02-01-03-03678-003, QL 4.9.25 (October 27, 1739).
personal examination. As such, by rule, he should have been ranked a first-class instructor and referred to the Board of Personnel for promotion to a regular official post. However, upon his referral to the Board, he ran into a bit of a problem. Si-ge had been sacked from his previous official post for allowing armor in an official storehouse to rust. Apparently, there was no precedent for what to do with an instructor who deserved promotion on the basis of his performance in that role, but whose previous dismissal had rendered him ineligible for ordinary official posts. The Board of Personnel decided to ask Si-ge’s banner to report further on the matter before making a final determination on whether he should receive a seventh rank official post or be retained as an instructor for three more years.29 Though the final result of the matter does not appear in the record, later cases suggest that such officials were deemed eligible for official posts; those who had held the rank of Prefect (Ch. 知州 zhizhou, Ma. jeo i saraci) or higher prior to their dismissal would be granted 7th rank posts, and those who had held the rank of Magistrate (Ch. 知縣 zhixian, Ma. hiyan i saraci) or below would be granted eighth rank posts.30

The promotion cases of Si-ge and men like him offer a sense of how the position of Manchu instructor was viewed by the Qing state. On one hand, it was clearly a marginal post; one that could be given to men who had lost the right to hold regular office. Despite falling under the authority of the Board of Personnel, it does not seem to have been considered a regular bureaucratic post, and though as such it lacked an official civil service rank, it was clearly inferior to an eighth rank position, the promotion available to former low ranking officials who had been dismissed from their previous posts. On the other hand, the court seems to have taken

29 Ibid.
30 Wang Anguo 王安國, LKTB, FHA 02-01-03-05248-003, QL 20.8.22 (September 27, 1755).
success as an instructor quite seriously, considering it significant enough to rehabilitate a disgraced minor official and restore him to the regular bureaucracy. Moreover, these case provide clues as to the scale of the Hanjun Manchu schools. Si-ge had at the very least nineteen students, which with two Manchu instructors per banner would have meant a minimum enrollment of more than three hundred students, a substantial addition to the banner school system in Beijing.\(^\text{31}\)

The basic structure of the Hanjun Manchu schools continued through the end of the dynasty, with only minor changes in the rules for instructors to be promoted. In 1797, the case of Sheng-tai 聖泰, a Manchu instructor in the Plain White Banner, came before the Board of Personnel. Sheng-tai was himself a provincial exam degree holder (Ch. 舉人 juren, Ma. tukiyesi) in the translation exams, who in 1790, while waiting for a bithesi post to become available, was granted an instructor position in a Hanjun Manchu school.\(^\text{32}\) In 1793, he had come up for review, and under a new version of the regulations, because only one of his students had passed the exams, he was retained in his post for an additional three years. In 1797, the additional three year period had elapsed, and because over this time three of his students had received translation exam degrees, he was referred to the Board of Personnel for promotion, to serve as a “minor

\(^{31}\) Given that some students seem to have failed to develop any Manchu abilities at all in these schools, Si-ge quite likely had substantially more than 20 students, meaning that the total enrollment of the Hanjun Manchu schools was itself likely quite a bit higher as well. Regardless, it seems likely that the enrollment would have been substantially higher than that of Hanjun in the more comprehensive Eight Banner officer schools, which had around 160 Hanjun students. See Crossley, “Manchu Education,” pp. 356-357.

\(^{32}\) Note that this case, along with dozens of others from this period and later, is conclusive evidence against Adam Lui’s claim that the Eight Banner free schools (Ch. 八旗義學 baqi yixue), another name used to refer to the Hanjun Manchu schools, were abolished in 1750 due to lack of interest in them among bannermen. See Adam Lui, “The Education of the Manchus, China’s Ruling Race (1644-1911),” Journal of Asian and African Studies 6.2 (April 1971), p. 133. In fact, documents regarding promotion of Manchu school instructors appear until at least the late Guangxu period.
The memorial discussing his case reveals that the regulations in force at the time had made three students passing the exams the prerequisite for promotion, while teachers who had only one or two graduates among their students were retained at the school for three additional years. This was an increase from the standards that had been in force in the early Qianlong period, when a single examination graduate had been sufficient for promotion, perhaps suggesting that students in these schools were passing the exams with greater frequency than they had earlier in their history. Though the post granted to Sheng-tai was not particularly prestigious, likely of the seventh rank, it seems that the provincial-level translation exam degree that he had previously obtained entitled him to a better post than an instructor without such a degree, as another instructor recommended for promotion in the previous year, Jin Tehe, was merely to be granted a post as bithesi the next time one became available in his own banner. Jin’s promotion put him essentially in the same place that Sheng-tai had been prior to serving as instructor, when he held the rank of expectant bithesi (Ch. 候補筆帖式 houbu bitieshi, Ma. ba be aliyara bithesi). This same distinction was made in the 1889 case of Song-kuan, with the added stipulation that those instructors who had previously served as bithesi, as Song-kuan had, were to be treated like provincial degree holders.

33 Though 4 years had in fact passed since his previous review, a one hundred-day period during which Sheng-tai had not been teaching was excluded, pushing the date of his new review into the following year. It is likely that this represents a mourning period for the death of one of his parents, as one hundred days was the official banner mourning period. See Elliott, The Manchu Way, 206.

34 Kinggui, LKTB, FHA 02-01-03-08255-009, JQ 2.R6.23 (August 15, 1797).

35 Heşen, LKTB, FHA 02-01-03-08214-004, JQ 1.1.28 (March 7, 1796).

36 Xi-zhen, LKTB, FHA 02-01-03-12382-029, GX 15.4.13 (May 12, 1889).
Not all instructors in the Hanjun Manchu schools had as much success as the men
discussed above. In 1804, Hanjun Plain Red Banner general Guang-xing 廣興 impeached an
instructor in his banner’s school named Quan-xing 全興. According to Guang-xing, the previous
general, Fucang 福昌, had commended Quan-xing’s work and asked that he be retained for an
additional three year term. However, upon assuming his post, Guang-xing personally inspected
the school and found that Quan-xing was wildly incompetent. Not only were the more than 20
students in the school failing to make any progress, but Quan-xing himself was “completely
 ignorant of Manchu, didn’t recognize Chinese characters at all, hadn’t even read the Four Books,
and when asked to write his own name clearly, couldn’t even do that.” As such Guang-xing
asked that the court not only dismiss Quan-xing and appoint a new instructor, but also
sanction the various banner officials, including Fucang, who had failed to uncover Quan-xing’s
disastrous performance. The case of Quan-xing suggests that, by the Jiaqing period, oversight
of the Manchu schools had become fairly lax. Not only had Quan-xing made it through a three
year term without being fired, but he had actually been reappointed as instructor. Guang-xing’s
memorial does not explain why Fucang had deemed Quan-xing suitable for retention – perhaps
one of his students had managed to pass the translation exams in spite of his inadequacy – but it
suggests that the system for evaluating instructors was far from perfect. But despite the system’s
imperfections, Guang-xing’s memorial reveals that standards for instructors still had legal force
and were still applied regularly; the court continued to demand that the Hanjun banners produce
translators.

37 清文茫然不知，漢字全不識認，即四書亦未念過。詢其自己名字如何繕寫，亦屬不能！Guang-xing,
HWLFZZ, FHA 03-1097-3674-037, JQ 9.10.19 (November 20, 1804).
In addition to attempting to maintain some standards for instructors, the Qing court took a definite interest in the situation of students in the Hanjun banner Manchu schools. One important consideration was the ability of students to support themselves while enrolled. Wang Jintai, in the same memorial mentioned above, noted that students at a free school generally lacked the means to hire a teacher themselves. As such, they were also unlikely to be able to easily afford supplies like brushes, paper, and ink, and perhaps more importantly might struggle to afford such necessities as tea and firewood. To leave them in these straits, Wang suggested, would be to “betray our Majesty’s sincere intention to cherish banner people and promote education.” Thus, he proposed that each student receive a monthly stipend of one tael of silver to meet their expenses and enable them to “devote themselves entirely to study” (Ch. 殼心肄業 danxin yiye), a proposal that the court adopted.

There is limited evidence as to the success of the Manchus schools in improving knowledge of Manchu among bannermen, and, in any case, the court certainly continued to fret about declining Manchu knowledge for the remainder of the eighteenth century. Yet, there is some reason to believe that schools of this sort were actually reasonably effective, at least in their early years. In 1739, Plain Blue Hanjun Lieutenant General Lang Yingxing 郎應星 expressed worry about the increasing difficulties that translation exam graduates faced in finding gainful employment. Lang pointed out that while the one hundred bithesi positions per banner in the Manchu banners, and the forty total bithesi posts in the Mongol banners meant that Manchus and Mongols who passed the translation exams were able to receive employment quite quickly, Hanjun translation exam graduates, for whom only twelve or thirteen bithesi positions per banner

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38 負我皇上惠愛旗人、振興文教之至意
39 Wang Jintai, HWLFZZ, FHA 03-1188-008, QL 3.5.29 (July 15, 1738).
were available, were often unable to receive appointments at all. In the past, Lang wrote, there had been comparatively few Hanjun taking the translation exams, and so most graduates could find positions within two or three years. But the Yongzheng emperor’s repeated attempts to encourage Manchu language study had led to a situation where the number of graduates was several times higher than before, and those who found their names at the end of the list to receive a post were likely to abandon their attempts to become *bithesi*, seeing it as unlikely to provide them a real chance at advancement. Lang proposed substantially increasing the number of posts for translators available in the Hanjun banners, a proposal which the court seems to have ignored.\(^{40}\) However, if Lang’s report was accurate, it suggests that the new schools were having a very substantial effect, and had given many Hanjun the opportunity to learn Manchu to a reasonably high level.

Manchu schooling continued to be popular among Hanjun into the nineteenth century. According to Guizhou censor (Ch. 監察御史, Ma. *baicame tuwara hafan*) Fu-nian 福年, writing in 1807, there was no fixed quota of students for the free Manchu schools in the Hanjun banners. Nor were there any requirements for entering the schools; an unemployed bannerman could simply submit his name to the colonel overseeing the school and would then be allowed to enroll. This led, Fu-nian believed, to a large number of insufficiently talented or diligent students entering the schools. Though he did not suggest imposing quotas on enrollment, he did argue for having prospective students examined for their suitability by the supervising officials, implicitly suggesting that he believed that too many students were being allowed to attend.\(^{41}\) Since he provided no actual numbers, it is impossible to draw definitive conclusions from his memorial,

\(^{40}\) Lang Yingxing, HWLFZZ, FHA 03-0060-009, QL 4.3.7 (April 14, 1739).

\(^{41}\) Fu-nian, HWZPZZ, FHA 04-01-16-0099-147, JQ 12.10.28 (November 27, 1807).
but it does strongly suggest that Manchu language schools were, at the very least, not suffering from under-enrollment.

Why might a young bannerman have chosen to pursue education in translation, and thus to enter the bureaucracy as a *bithesi*? After all, translation has traditionally been understood as having been seen as an inferior sort of career in the Qing, whether compared to military service or a traditional bureaucratic career deriving from success in the civil examinations.\(^4\) One explanation, of course, is that it offered a chance at a salaried post at a time when those were becoming increasingly scarce for bannermen, especially Hanjun.\(^5\) Moreover, despite the increasing number of young men who chose to pursue this path in the wake of the expansion of educational opportunities in the Yongzheng period, it was a far easier option than the regular civil service examinations. Learning to translate took much less time than a thorough classical education – based on the standards for evaluating instructors, three years seems to have been considered enough to achieve proficiency – and, moreover, the level of competition in the exams was almost certainly much less. However, it is also important to point out that translation was not actually all that marginalized as a career path. Of 153 men who served as grand councillors (*軍機大臣*) during the Qing, including both bannermen and commoners, 15 were bannermen who had begun their careers as *bithesi*. Focusing on a position held more exclusively by bannermen, of 420 holders of the leading frontier administrative post in the Qing, that of *amban* (*辯事大臣*),


\(^5\) The mid-nineteenth-century Manchu translator and poet Jakdan suggested just such a reason for his initial study of the language, writing: “Because my family was poor, when I was a young man, I studied Manchu for a little while, thinking only of getting some kind of government job.” See Mark Elliott and Elena Chiu, “The Manchu Preface to Jakdan’s *Selected Stories Translated from Liaozaizhiyi*,” *China Heritage Quarterly* 19 (September 2009), http://www.chinaheritagequarterly.org/scholarship.php?searchterm=019_manchu.inc&issue=019

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a full 100 had served as *bithesi* at the start of their careers.\(^{44}\) These numbers demonstrate that work as a translator was not only a possible path into the bureaucracy, but one of the more common backgrounds for high officials of banner status. It is not surprising, then, that many Hanjun found the study of Manchu and Manchu-Chinese translation to be worth pursuing.

**Manchu Education in Provincial Garrisons**

Yongzheng’s edict to Arsai, ordering him to establish a Manchu language school in Fuzhou, dates to the same period in which Manchu schools were being established in the Hanjun banners of the capital. Over the following decades, the court approved the opening of similar schools in several other garrisons, with Hanjun-dominated garrison schools generally preceding schools in garrisons that consisted mostly of Manchus and Mongols. As with the schools in the capital, these developments suggest a particular state focus on educating Hanjun in Manchu, further demonstrating that the court saw the Manchu language as fundamental to all banner people, not just to Manchus.

The Fuzhou garrison official school (Ch. 官學 *guanxue*, Ma. *alban tacikū*) was formally established in 1728, one year after Arsai’s audience with the Yongzheng emperor. It was, like the schools in the capital, supervised by a colonel, in this case assisted by a *bithesi*, with instructors selected from among bannermen in the garrison who were skilled in both spoken and written Manchu.\(^{45}\) Though there were plans to eventually increase the number of students to 200, as of 1744, the school had 120 students, 30 chosen from each of the four banners. While this was far

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\(^{44}\) These numbers are taken from a search of MQNAF. In both cases, a search was used to identify all holders of the office listed (either “軍機大臣” or “辦事大臣”), those who had held the post of *bithesi* at the beginning of their careers were then manually counted. There may be omissions, either of individuals who had held one of the listed offices, or of the position of *bithesi* in the CV of a given official, but neither of these circumstances would affect the overall conclusion – that service as *bithesi* was quite frequently the beginning of a successful official career.

\(^{45}\) Sinju, HWZPZZ, FHA 04-01-38-0181-014, QL 8.9.3 (October 19, 1743).
from constituting universal education, or even universal male education, it likely represented a higher enrollment relative to population than that of banner schools in Beijing. Moreover, beginning in 1730, each of the four banners present in Fuzhou established its own private school (Ch. 学房 xuefang, Ma. tacikūi boo) from which students could be selected to fill vacancies that arose in the garrison school. The garrison school maintained a hierarchy of students, in which those who most excelled at Manchu were given supervision of their fellow students and the title of “assistant chief” (Ch. 梅楞大 meileng da).

Students in the garrison school were subject to monthly examinations to test their translation abilities, spoken Manchu, and Manchu handwriting. The officials in charge of the school would then produce a ranking and send it to the general’s yamen, where students would be divided into three grades. Those in the first two grades would be eligible to participate in semiannual examinations in the spring and autumn, personally carried out by the garrison general, where those who excelled in both Manchu and archery were granted rewards. When salaried posts in one of the garrison’s banners became vacant, the school was to be send two of its top students to that banner, where they would be examined and one would be selected to fill the position. In addition, beginning in 1730, the four Manchu language secretaries (Ch. 清字外郎 Qingzi wailang) in the general’s yamen and the two officials of the same rank in the naval battalion were selected from among the students at the school. This seems to have been one of the basic functional aspects of the school; it would provide the garrison with the men it needed to produce official materials in Manchu. Those who served in those posts for eight years, and could understand both Manchu and Chinese, were to be recommended to the Board of Personnel for

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46 Sinju, “Fuzhou Garrison Gazetteer,” 109. My interpretation of meileng da (梅楞大) is that it is a phonetic transcription of an invented Manchu title, meiren (i) da.
appointment as assistant magistrates (Ch. 縣丞 xiancheng, Ma. hiyan i saramsi), while those who only understood Manchu, but not Chinese and excelled in archery and horsemanship were to be appointed as corporals (Ch. 領催 lingcui, Ma. bošokū) in the banners. Though promotion into the civil bureaucracy was thus quite difficult, requiring both exceptional success in the school and then a long period of service in the garrison yamen, the preferences that successful students received in obtaining military employment would have been a substantial incentive to enroll in the school since, by this time, the number of able bodied men at the garrison had come to substantially exceed the number of available military posts, which were the main way in which a bannerman could earn a salary.

Though students do not seem to have received regular stipends to cover their living expenses, there were financial prizes distributed to students who did well on exams, while those who repeatedly did poorly were subject to expulsion from the school. In 1743, garrison general Sinju wrote that the free tuition offered to students was an insufficient incentive for students to study hard. He thus requested that monthly exams be held to rank students at the school, with the best performing receiving awards. Henceforth, 240 taels of silver were distributed annually as awards to students at the school. Though this hardly meant that school attendance was lucrative, the average student would have received two taels per year (suggesting that those who did well enough to receive awards would have gotten more), which was not a totally negligible sum, equal to two-thirds of the nominal monthly cash wage of a garrison bannerman. In addition, the

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47 Ibid., 109–110.
48 Elliott, *The Manchu Way*, 192. Bannermen also received a large portion of their salary in grain, part of which was usually commuted to silver, but the official wage in silver for ordinary provincial bannermen was three taels/month.
school provided students with the funds necessary to cover their expenses for paper and ink.\textsuperscript{49} Those students who were not able to enter the top ranks in their school exams within one year of enrollment were to be given a grace period of one additional year, after which those who still had failed to perform well would be dismissed.

Despite the substantial promise that the garrison school had as a means to encourage Hanjun in Fuzhou to learn Manchu, by 1750 it was judged to be failing at this goal. From his own examination of students at the school, Sinju had found that in a translation exercise, every exam paper contained numerous mistakes. Moreover, Sinju told the court, the school was not educating enough students well enough to meet the basic needs of the garrison:

\begin{quote}
When a bithesi vacancy arises in a given province, it is to be filled by examination from among the bannermen in that place […] Currently, the bannermen at the Fuzhou garrison are mostly not very good at translation. In the future, when examinations are used to fill the post, if no one [good enough] can be found, the emperor’s bestowal of grace will not be able to truly provide benefit.\textsuperscript{50}
\end{quote}

Sinju’s complaint is evidence once again of the functional role of Manchu in the banners – students needed to learn Manchu to meet the garrison’s need for translators. Their failure to do so did not arise from students failing to enroll in the school, or even because they were not displaying enough effort in their studies; in fact, Sinju said, the students were “making a determined effort to progress.”\textsuperscript{51} Rather, according to Sinju, the problem was that the instructors at the school were themselves insufficiently versed in Manchu to adequately train their pupils:

\begin{quote}
The Fuzhou banner soldiers have been stationed in Fujian for a long time and their spoken and written Manchu is constantly deteriorating. In the fifth year of Yongzheng (1727), we established an official school to instruct them, but the
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{49} Sinju, “Fuzhou Garrison Gazetteer,” 110–111.

\textsuperscript{50}各省駐防筆帖式缺出，俱在本地旗人內考取、補放 […]今福州駐防旗人翻译既多生疏。将来，过应考补之时，一时如不得人，既于皇上施恩之处不能實沾。Sinju, HZPZZ, FHA 04-01-12-0077-038, QL 15.10.11 (November 9, 1750).

\textsuperscript{51}奮勉向上 Ibid.
instructional staff are all originally garrison people, and are [of merely] ordinary [ability] in translation. For this reason [the students] cannot progress.\footnote{福州旗兵。駐閩年久。清書清話。日就生疏。雍正五年、設立官學教習。但教習之員。皆本駐防之人。繙譯平常。是以不能進益。GZSL, \textit{juan} 375, QL 15.10.30 (November 28, 1750).}

In contrast to the Manchu language schools in the capital, where instructors were chosen from among Manchu bannermen, at Fuzhou, teachers were all Hanjun. Even worse, Fuzhou was not a banner-dominated environment, unlike the capital, so there had been little opportunity for the banner population to maintain what Manchu abilities it may have previously had. As such, Sinju requested that two \textit{bithesi} be sent from the capital to take charge of the school. Unfortunately, the 1754 expulsion from the banners of the Fuzhou Hanjun and their replacement by Manchus means that this new scheme never had a real chance to produce results.

The initial establishment of the Fuzhou garrison school inspired new efforts in Manchu language education in other provincial garrisons. Arsai, the same man the Yongzheng emperor had ordered to establish Manchu instruction in Fuzhou, was appointed general of the Guangzhou garrison, also consisting entirely of Hanjun banner people, in 1737. That same year, Arsai wrote to the court requesting permission to appoint one Manchu instructor in each of the garrison’s eight banners to be responsible for teaching spoken Manchu to ordinary bannermen. Arsai cited two major precedents to justify his request: the first was the same edict that he had received from the Yongzheng emperor ten years earlier while he was serving in Fuzhou, the second was a 1736 edict of the Qianlong emperor noting a decline in the Manchu skills of bannermen in provincial garrisons and instructing garrison generals to order their soldiers to practice spoken Manchu.

Arsai himself further described instruction in the Manchu language as a way to “attach importance to the basic duties” (Ch. \textit{重本務 zhong benwu}) of bannermen.\footnote{Arsai, HWZPZZ, FHA 04-01-38-0180-036, QL 2.8.2 (August 27, 1737).} This language
suggested the important practical role of Manchu for all bannermen; rather than treating it as part of an ethnic heritage, it was part of the duties they owed the Qing state due to their status.

Arsai’s proposal, though, was not designed to create a single garrison school for comprehensive Manchu instruction, like that in Fuzhou. Arsai planned to rely on schools (Ch. 學堂 xuetang, Ma. tacikū) that already existed in each banner in the garrison as a source for his Manchu instructors. These schools do not seem to have been established by the Qing court, but rather were a purely local innovation, and likely functioned more like private academies than like the free institutions established in the capital and in Fuzhou. Arsai wanted to select one student from each school who spoke Manchu clearly, and appoint him to a post as secretary (Ch. 外郎 wailang), where his primary responsibility would not be scribal work in the general’s yamen, unlike the secretaries selected in Fuzhou, but teaching Manchu to soldiers. Up to this point, the system was quite unlike Fuzhou’s. However, there was one Fuzhou precedent that reappeared in Guangzhou. Just like the Manchu secretaries at the former garrison, after eight years of service, instructors in Guangzhou were, assuming they knew both Manchu and Chinese well, to be appointed as assistant magistrates, and to be appointed as corporals if they only knew Manchu.54

Both Arsai’s invocation of the edict that established the Fuzhou school and these rules for promotion suggest that the new Manchu educational policies in Guangzhou were linked to the school established in Fuzhou ten years earlier.55

The court quickly approved Arsai’s request.56 In addition to the procedures already described, the general proceeded to instruct the four bithesi assigned to his garrison to oversee

54 Ibid.

55 Arsai’s involvement in both projects is, of course, a further link.

56 Zhang Tingyu, LKTB, FHA 02-01-03-03419—14, QL 2.R9.18 (November 10, 1737).
his Manchu education efforts, with each man responsible for two banners as well as his regular duties translating official documents. Arsai considered the role of the *bithesi* essential to the functioning of Manchu language schools, which two years after his first memorial apparently included an official school in each banner, in addition to the private academy (Ch. 私學堂 *si xuetang*) in each. So, when the court ordered a reduction in the number of *bithesi* assigned to Guangzhou from four to three, Arsai protested on the grounds that the remaining men would no longer be able to manage what he claimed was a large enrollment in the official schools. His petition to maintain the original quota of *bithesi* apparently convinced the Qianlong emperor, again reflecting the court’s commitment to Manchu education and to the importance of the Manchu language for all bannermen.\(^57\)

In 1746, Manchu-language education in Guangzhou took another step forward. At an audience with the emperor the previous year, Left-wing Lieutenant General Ma Ruitu 馬瑞圖 had been instructed to take responsibility for improving the Manchu abilities of the Hanjun at the garrison. Upon his arrival in Guangzhou, he informed the court that based on his personal examination, bannermen were still greatly struggling with Manchu, and even those who had some knowledge of the language made frequent mistakes. Based on his previous experience serving in Xi’an, Ma diagnosed the problem as deriving from the fact that Guangzhou was an entirely Hanjun garrison, and so the bannermen there did not live together with Manchus, unlike in Xi’an, a garrison that included both types of banner people. Thus, where Xi’an Hanjun had more opportunities to engage a Manchu bannerman as a teacher, and frequently saw and heard the language in their daily lives, Guangzhou Hanjun had no such luck. Moreover, the *bithesi* who

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\(^57\) Arsai, HWZPZZ, FHA 04-01-12-0013-015, QL 4.1.15 (February 22, 1739).
Arsai had put in charge of Manchu instruction in Guangzhou had many other duties, and could not devote themselves fully to the job. Ma proposed that full time Manchu-instructors be appointed to serve in two schools, with one to be established in each wing of the garrison. Garrison officials were to select those bannermen under the age of forty sui, whether holding paid posts or not, who “by nature are not too extremely dull-witted” (Ch. 資質不甚魯鈍 zizhi bushen ludun). Students would be expected to attend the school during times when they weren’t on active duty, and would be supervised by banner officers who would ensure that they devoted appropriate efforts to study. Instructors would be paid out of money left over from the funds allocated to paying for the funerals and weddings of banner people. Instructors would be subject to review after a period of five years; if their students made good progress, they would be referred to the Board of Personnel for promotion to a regular official post. Those whose students made inadequate progress would have an additional three years to shape up before being subject to impeachment.\textsuperscript{58} This process of teacher evaluation was reminiscent of that employed by Manchu schools in the capital.

Because the Guangzhou garrison’s Hanjun population partly survived the Hanjun expulsion of the mid-eighteenth century, Manchu language education for Hanjun in Guangzhou continued until the very end of the dynasty. In 1773, Liangguang governor-general Li Shiyao 李侍堯, then serving as acting garrison general, informed the court that the schools existing at the time, presumably those established by Arsai, were not functioning effectively. According to Li, lack of care in selecting instructors, combined with insufficient examination and oversight had led to Manchu education “existing in name but not in reality” (Ch. 有名無實 you ming wu shi).

\textsuperscript{58} Ma Ruitu, HWZPZ, FHA 04-01-01-0133-038, QL 11.3.22 (April 12, 1746).
This had led to substantial problems in finding adequate Manchu clerks to staff local yamens; even those few who had a rough understanding of Manchu had to first draft a Manchu document in Chinese and then translate it “extremely literally” (Ch. 拘文牽義 juwen qian yi), which, of course, did not produce clear Manchu prose.59

In response to this problem, Li created a two-level system of official Manchu schools that would survive, with the addition of a third level of schools, until the end of the dynasty. At the top were two comprehensive official schools for Manchu (Ch. 清書總官學 Qingshu zong guanxue), one for each of the two banner wings. The instructors at the schools were selected from among banner officers who could speak Manchu, who were to be divided among the two schools. Each banner selected five students to attend the school in its wing. The garrison provided eight taels of silver each month to each school for educational expenses and an additional one and a half taels per month for tea.60 Beneath the comprehensive schools, each banner established its own school, to be staffed by its own personnel, to provide instruction in spoken Manchu to its young men. These schools received very little state funding; a mere 0.4 taels per month each for tea.61

In 1843, these schools were augmented by a pair of free Manchu schools (Ch. 清書義學 Qingshu yixue), one for Manchu bannermen and one for Hanjun. The establishment of these schools was tied to the opening of the translation exam to bannermen in provincial garrisons. In 1800, two free schools – again one for Manchus and one for Hanjun – had been established to

59 Li Shiyao, HWZPZZ, FHA 04-01-16-0055-069, QL 37.12.21 (January 13, 1773).
61 Ibid., juan 3, 15b.
help Guangzhou bannermen study for the civil examinations, employing Han commoners of “good scholarship and moral character” to serve as instructors. However, in 1843, civil examinations ceased to be held in provincial garrisons and were replaced by translation examinations, so the garrison authorities decided that the schools would be of more use if they provided instruction in Manchu, employing bannermen “good at translation” as instructors. In the years that followed, the Guangzhou garrison produced a substantial number of translation examination graduates, nearly all of them Hanjun. Between 1850 and 1883, fifteen men from the Guangzhou garrison received the highest level translation exam degree (Ch. 翻譯進士 fanyi jinshi), of whom thirteen were Hanjun. At the provincial level, Guangzhou was allowed to select one out of ten candidates to receive the provincial level degree (Ch. 翻譯舉人 fanyi juren), with the stipulation that the total number of graduates was not to exceed three. With the exception of the first three provincial level translation exams held in Guangzhou, in 1849, 1851, and 1852 (which had two graduates each) every exam had three graduates, suggesting that at least thirty men were taking the translation examinations at each sitting. Of the forty-five total graduates between 1849 and 1882, thirty-eight were Hanjun. These numbers show that even in the late Qing, quite a large number of Guangzhou bannermen continued to study translation, and, moreover, that Manchu knowledge was by no means limited to Manchus; Hanjun were at least as successful at learning the language. Their success is perhaps further evidence for the argument,

62 Ibid., juan 3, 16a.
63 Ibid., juan 12, 11a-16b.
64 Because Hanjun made up a much large portion of the garrison population than did Manchus, their greater raw number of graduates does not prove their superiority in the exams. However, after 1864, every single translation exam graduate from Guangzhou was Hanjun, perhaps reflecting an extra commitment to studying Manchu, which may have resulted from the greater difficulty of receiving ordinary military employment in the garrison for Hanjun.
made in chapter 4, that during the nineteenth century, official boundaries between Manchus and Hanjun declined in importance.

The system of Manchu education that Arsai had established in Guangzhou was quickly emulated in Jingkou (present-day Zhenjiang), another entirely Hanjun garrison. In 1738, Garrison general Wang Yi 王鉞 claimed that as a result of “dwelling close together with Han people” (Ch. 於漢人櫛比而居 yu Hanren zhibi er ju), few bannermen in provincial garrisons still knew Manchu; when Wang had arrived at Jingkou in 1729, the situation was particularly extreme, with only a single lieutenant named Wang Peng 王朋 able to speak the language well. Like Arsai, Wang Yi noted that Manchu knowledge was essential to all banner people and so he had worked to improve the situation, selecting a dozen or so capable men to study Manchu, and then choosing those who had done well to take charge of new schools. Over the next nine years, his diligence had paid off, and at the time he wrote his memorial, there were more than ten schools, and, he claimed, several hundred bannermen who could speak Manchu to a reasonable degree, albeit with imperfect pronunciation. Wang said that he had done all this on his own, without requesting support from the court in memorials, but having seen Arsai’s request to establish Manchu instruction in Guangzhou more officially, he wished to do the same. As in Guangzhou, he now wished to establish an official school for each banner, with a secretary to serve as its instructor, who would have the same opportunity for promotion after eight years that was available in both Fuzhou and Guangzhou.65 This rule was put into effect, and just over eight years later, a case dealing with a promotion of this sort came before the court.66 By

65 Wang Yi, HWZPZZ, FHA 04-01-01-0025-021, QL 3.2.4 (March 23, 1738).
66 There was one minor difference, which was that the banner military post available to successful instructors was that of lieutenant, not corporal. See Wang Yi, HWZPZZ, FHA 04-01-38-0182-004, QL 11.6.20 (August 8, 1746).
institutionalizing Manchu instruction in this way, he believed, it would be less likely to deteriorate in the future.

Though Wang had in fact begun promoting Manchu instruction prior to the founding of the Guangzhou school that served as the precedent for his memorial, his earlier work fit well within the Qing court-supported efforts to promote Manchu education in the Hanjun banners. His arrival in Jingkou was around the same time as the founding of both the Fuzhou garrison school and the Manchu schools in the capital and thus it seems likely that he was, at the very least, influenced by the prevailing political environment of the time, which was very favorable towards efforts like his. In any case, his efforts, like those of Arsai, predate any similar efforts in garrisons that were not dominated by Hanjun.

The first proposal to open a free, state-run Manchu language school in a garrison with only Manchu soldiers was that of Qingzhou (in Shandong province) garrison general Ertu 頭爾圖 in 1746, who suggested opening four free schools of thirty students each in the Qingzhou garrison, with curricula focused entirely on Manchu.\(^{67}\) Ertu specifically cited the precedent of the Hanjun Manchu schools in Beijing, though he did not mention their particular connection to the Hanjun banners: “in order to nourish and instruct his Manchu slaves, in addition to establishing the official school at the Imperial Academy, His Majesty has also established free schools for the Eight Banners, and appointed instructors to teach writing to banner children.”\(^{68}\) The Manchu phrase he used to refer to the schools, *jurgangga tacikū*, in the context of the capital Eight

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\(^{67}\) Though Elliott at one point suggests that Qingzhou had both Manchu and Hanjun bannermen, he later discusses the establishment of the garrison as involving only Manchu soldiers. See Elliott, *The Manchu Way*, pp. 96, 120. That only Manchu bannermen were included is confirmed by Qing sources; see Shilu, YZ 7.7.11 (August 5, 1729) which established a garrison at Qingzhou with two thousand Manchu bannermen.

\(^{68}\) *enduringge ejen. Manju abasi be hvwaśabume tacihure jalin guwe dzi giyan yamun i alban i tacikū ilibuha ci tulgiyen. jakūn gūsade geli jurgangga tacikū boo ilibüfi. glyoosi sindafi. gūsai juse be bithe tacibumbi.* Ertu, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0172-0798-001, QL 11.4.21 (June 9, 1746).
Banners, was only used in relation to the Hanjun Manchu schools, making it almost certain that it was these schools he saw as justifying his request. His proposal to appoint two instructors per school, reviewed triennially, with promotions available for those whose students were successful, further demonstrates the role of the Hanjun schools in the capital as precedents for his plan. Ertu emphasized two reasons that such schools would be beneficial to the garrison. First, they would enable talented young men from poor families that could not afford private tutors to receive an education. Second, they would help the garrison meet its need for people who could write Manchu, particularly in the production of banner household registers. Ertu made no reference to the importance of the language to Manchu identity; rather it was practical needs, and the functional role of Manchu in particular that prompted his request to establish Manchu schools.

Perhaps surprisingly, even as the court continued to support schools in the Hanjun garrisons of Fuzhou, Guangzhou, and Jingkou, it rejected Ertu’s proposal. As with Ertu’s memorial itself, the response of Grand Councillor Necin made no specific mention of the fact that the capital schools were for Hanjun, not Manchus. Yet, though Necin insisted that the reason that such schools were unnecessary in Qingzhou was because of the differences between the capital banners and those in provincial garrisons, the establishment of such schools in Hanjun-dominated garrisons suggests that the distinction between capital and province cannot have been the genuinely important difference. Necin suggested that, in Qingzhou, the “fathers and elder brothers” of bannermen could take responsibility for teaching them Manchu; perhaps the court believed that Manchus had less need for formal schooling to learn Manchu than did Hanjun. If

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69 Jurgangga tacikū is the literal Manchu translation of 義學, which was the term used for these schools in Chinese documents. Manchu language materials dealing with the promotion of instructors in these schools confirms that jurgangga tacikū was used when discussing them in Chinese. See, e.g. Wensiyang 文祥, LKTB, FHA 02-02-005-000373-0032, TZ 05.12.16 (January 21, 1867).

70 Necin, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0172-0798-002, QL 11.5.11 (June 29, 1746).
so, the decision to deny Ertu’s request is evidence that the establishment of Manchu language schools continued to be driven by practical concerns – making sure that a sufficient number of bannermen were learning Manchu to fill the posts that required such knowledge.

It was only after 1754, when efforts to expel most Hanjun from provincial garrisons had already begun, that Manchu language schools were actually established in a garrison without Hanjun. In 1760, Jingzhou left-wing Lieutenant General Dekiboo 德沁實 informed the court of deficiencies in the Manchu language abilities of his garrison’s Manchu and Mongol bannermen. Dekiboo described his ideas about the importance of Manchu in much more ethnic terms than had either the commanders of Hanjun garrisons or Ertu in Qingzhou; the Manchu language was for him the “root of the Manchus” (Ma. Manjusai julehe da) and part of the “old Manchu way” (Manju i fe doro) that should not be abandoned. Like Arsai and Wang Yi, he believed that long residence in the provinces had caused a decline in the Manchu abilities of his garrison’s bannermen, which he was striving to remedy by reminding them of the language’s importance during military drills, and requiring them to recite important sections of an imperially-commissioned Manchu dictionary. Dekiboo’s proposal to the court was reminiscent of Arsai’s strategy at Guangzhou, though he did not mention it as a precedent. He wished to select one man with good Manchu from each banner and give him a ninth-rank (the lowest official rank) post in which he would take charge of instructing both young and unemployed bannermen in Manchu speech and writing as well as archery and mounted archery. Instructors were to be regularly evaluated, and successful ones would be promoted to serve as banner officers. Those who did poorly would be removed from their posts.\footnote{Dekiboo, MWLFZZ, FHA 03-0178-1822-021, QL 25.5.7 (June 19, 1760).}
The approval of Dekiboo’s memorial is likely the result of two different trends. The first was the natural decline in the Manchu abilities of bannermen beginning to affect Manchus as severely as it had affected Hanjun a few decades before. Though the Qing court in the 1720s and 1730s had treated Manchu as an essential skill for all bannermen, regardless of ethnicity, Hanjun bannermen had generally been considered to need more formal training than Manchus, who were believed likely to learn the language without any special help. By 1760, at least in Jingzhou, this was no longer the case. Also important to Dekiboo, though, was the mid-Qianlong attempt to identify banner status more closely with Manchu ethnicity. Where men like Arsai and Wang Yi, and even the Yongzheng emperor, had discussed knowledge of the Manchu language as one of the basic elements of being a bannerman, Dekiboo saw it as essential to being a Manchu. Only six years before Dekiboo’s memorial, the Qing court had begun the process of expelling most Hanjun from provincial garrisons and replacing them with Manchus or Mongols, as the Qianlong emperor identified the Hanjun as less fit for banner membership due to their Han ethnic origins. To speak of a requirement of banner status generally as part of a uniquely Manchu way of life thus made more sense than it ever had before.

Though its phrasing fit well with the Qianlong emperor’s new approach to banner status, Dekiboo’s memorial was far from the first time in which a Qing official drew a direct line between Manchu identity and the Manchu language. Mark Elliott quotes a 1734 memorial from the Kaifeng garrison commander Hesing 赫星 in which he described the Manchu language as the “root of the Manchus.”72 Outside the state context, Mårten Söderblom Saarela gives the example of the Manchu lexicographer Daigu 戴穀, who, in the preface to his Manchu dictionary, wrote in

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72 Elliott, *The Manchu Way*, 296
1722: “After I reached adulthood, I had the intention of knowing the Manchu language; I did not understand it at all. At that moment, I bent my head down and thought, am I even a progeny of the Manchus?” However, even examples like these do not demonstrate that the Manchu language had been understood as principally connected to ethnic identity in this earlier period. In Hesing’s memorial, it is worthy of note that he used the same word to describe the relationship of Manchus to their language, “root” (Ch. 根本 genben), as the Yongzheng emperor had used to explain to Arsai the connection between the language and his Hanjun soldiers in Fuzhou. That is, as with invocations of the “Manchu way” more generally, prior to 1750 or so, there was little distinction made between the ideal relationship of Manchus to the Manchu language, and that of banner people as whole. As the delay in establishing Manchu language schools in Manchu-dominated garrisons suggests, Manchus may have been expected to have better proficiency in the language in practice, but the obligation to study it was rooted in status, not ethnicity. Moreover, in the case of Daigu, as Söderblom Saarela points out, the subsequent line of his preface was, “If I do not know this [the Manchu language], I thought, not only will it be difficult to serve in the offices of the emperor’s [civil administration], but even in the army.” That is to say, Daigu placed the practical role of knowing Manchu at least on an equal level with the symbolic one. An emphasis on Manchu as a practical tool of state administration was a consistent feature of the Qing approach to the language.

Western Language Schooling in Nineteenth-Century Guangzhou: The Legacy of Manchu Education

Most routine translation work required by the Qing government was between Manchu and Chinese, with Manchu-Mongol translation playing the next most important role, particularly

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in the Lifan Yuan 理藩院 (Ma. tulergi golo be dasara jurgan), which managed the Qing’s Inner Asian territories and relations with its continental neighbors.\textsuperscript{74} However, the requirements of warfare, diplomacy, and frontier administration necessitated that Qing officials both produce and understand documents in several other languages, among them Tibetan, Oirat, Chaghatay, Persian, Burmese, and Russian. To this end, at various points during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Qing state established schools for each of these languages in Beijing. The regulations for every one of these schools limited enrollment to bannermen, sometimes only to specific types of bannermen; students at the Tibetan school, for instance, came only from the Mongol Eight Banners.\textsuperscript{75} The consistent use of bannermen as translators in a variety of different contexts suggests that, in the view of the court, the connection between bannermen and the practice of translation went beyond a belief that banner identity was tied to the Manchu language – or, in the case of Mongol bannermen, the Mongol language – to a consistent policy of treating translation as one of the core functions of the banner status group. Though in some cases the use of bannermen as translators of other languages may have reflected beliefs about identity, with, for instance, Mongol bannermen serving as Tibetan translators because many Mongols were

\textsuperscript{74} The Lifan Yuan is often discussed in English as the “Court of Colonial Affairs.”

\textsuperscript{75} On the Tibetan-language school (Ch. 唐古特學 Tanggute xue, Ma. tanggū tacikū), see Gray Tuttle, Tibetan Buddhists in the Making of Modern China (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 29 and Zhang Yongjiang 张永江, “Qing Dynasty Eight Banner Mongol Official Schools” 清代八旗蒙古官学, Minzu yanjü 1990.6, pp. 101-102, which also discusses the Oirat language school (Ch. 托忒學 Tuote xue). All of these schools trained Eight Banner Mongols and were administered by the Lifan Yuan. On the Chaghatay and Persian school (Ch. 回子官學 Huizi guanxue, Ma. Hoise tacikū), see David Brophy, “The Junghar Mongol Legacy and the Language of Loyalty in Qing Xinjiang,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 73.2 (December 2013), pp. 243-244, Onuma Takahiro, “The Qing Dynasty and Its Central Asian Neighbors,” Saksaha 12 (2014), p. 38, and Wang Dongping 王东平, “A Preliminary Exploration of the ‘Muslim School’” ‘回子官学’初探, Xinjiang daxue xuebao (zhewen, renwen shehui kexue ban) 39.6 (November 2011): 55-58. This school, founded in 1756, and based within the Imperial Household Department, was expanded to include Burmese, and renamed the Muslim-Burmese School (Ch. 回緬官學 Hui-Mian guanxue) in 1768 during the Qing campaign in Burma. On the Russian school (Ch. 俄羅斯文館 Eluosi wen guan, Ma. Oros bithei kuren) see Meng Ssu-ning, “The E-lo-su kuan (Russian Hostel) in Peking,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 23 (1960-1961), pp. 39-45.
Tibetan Buddhists, this was certainly not the case for education in languages like English, which some bannermen began to study in the second half of the nineteenth century.

Following the Qing defeat in the Second Opium War, the court realized that the increasing involvement of European powers in the affairs of the empire had created a need for translators of Western European languages, particularly English. In the same 1861 memorial in which he proposed the creation of a new office for managing foreign affairs, the Zongli Yamen 總理衙門, imperial clansman Yixin 奕訢 (better known as Prince Gong) suggested the establishment of a school for teaching English and French in the capital. The school, named the Tongwen Guan 同文館, or “Institute of Translation,” held its first classes in English in 1862.76

The following year, foreign language schools were established in both Shanghai and Guangzhou.77

Past work on these schools has largely focused on their role as “modern” schools and the degree to which they contributed to the modernization of both China’s foreign relations and its educational system.78 Yet, the Tongwen Guan was not simply a unique innovation of the second

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76 Knight Biggerstaff, *The Earliest Modern Government Schools in China* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1961), pp. 95-103. Students were initially divided between classes in English, French, and Russian (instruction in the latter two languages began in 1863), as the Tongwen Guan took over the functions of the long-established Russian school, mentioned above.

77 Zou Zhenhuan 邹振环, “Foreign Language Instruction in the Tongwen Guan and the Compilation of Foreign Language Textbooks during the Late Qing” 晚清同文馆外语教学与外语教科书的编纂, *Xueshu yanjiu* 2004.12, pp. 119-120. Zou and others date the establishment of the Guangzhou Tongwen Guan to 1864, but the archival sources suggest that the decision to create it was made in 1863, even if it did not open its doors until the following year. The Shanghai school was eventually renamed the Shanghai Guang fangyan guan 上海廣方言館.

78 See Biggerstaff, *The Earliest Modern Government Schools in China*, 94-153, who judges the Beijing Tongwen Guan to have been a successful contributor to modernization, and Mary Clabaugh Wright, *The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T'ung-Chih Restoration, 1862-1874* (New York: Atheneum, 1966), pp. 241-248, who judges it a failure. In Chinese, there are numerous works on the Tongwen Guan, also generally treating its importance as tied to its role in modernization or as a starting point for the study of Western learning; as characteristic examples offering a general treatment of the institution see Zhao Min 趙旻, “The History of the Development of the Capital Tongwen Guan and Its Contributions” 京師同文館的发展历史及其贡献, *Zhongguo wenhua yanjiu* 2000.3 (August 2000): 66-70 and Zou, “Foreign Language Instruction in the Tongwen Guan.”
half of the nineteenth century. In fact, in its structure and operation, the Tongwen Guan, particularly the version of that institution established in Guangzhou, shows clear continuities with the Manchu translation schools established in the eighteenth century, which continued to function at the time the Tongwen Guan was created.\(^7\) As such, its history offers further support for this chapter’s claim that Manchu language education was not principally directed at the maintenance of Manchu identity. Rather, over the course of the Qing period, Manchu education was designed to fill state needs, particularly for translation, which was treated as one of the roles of people of banner status within the Qing state. Translation between Manchu and Chinese was certainly more important to the workings of the Qing state than any other sort of translation, but when other types of translation became necessary, structures originally designed for training Hanjun in Manchu were adapted for use in training bannermen in English, French and other foreign languages. Bannermen were to serve as translators for the Qing court, regardless of the language being translated.

Perhaps in part due to the sharp divide between those historians who work on the history of Manchus or banner people and those who work on Chinese foreign affairs in the late Qing, very little work on the Tongwen Guan schools in Beijing and Guangzhou pays much attention to their connection to the banners. The one exception is a short article by Nancy Evans on the Guangzhou Tongwen Guan. Evans’s major achievement is to recognize that the court’s decision to make bannermen the vast majority of students in the school was a deliberate decision, based on the past role of bannermen as “linguists,” not evidence of the “irrational bungling” of the

\(^{7}\) This is contrary to the claims of Lü Jinglin and Zhang Dexin, who explicitly contrast the Tongwen Guan as the “starting point of new education in China” with earlier educational institutions, including the banner schools (八旗官学), which they call “traditional, rotten and feudal.” See Lü Jinglin and Zhang Dexin 张德信, “A Brief Discussion of the Capital Tongwen Guan and Personnel Training” 略论京师同文馆与人才培养, Jindai shi yanjiu 1988.5 (October 1988): 86-101.
Qing court. This observation accurately refutes Knight Biggerstaff’s claim that the only reason the court relied on bannermen as students in the Beijing Tongwen Guan was that “literati” saw the study of foreign languages as beneath them, or even “treasonable.” In addition, Evans notes a couple of institutional parallels with banner schools, which, besides the recruitment of bannermen as students, included the use of prize money and stipends to encourage study, and the return of unsuccessful students to their original banner for employment.

Evans’s analysis, however, does not take account of many of the institutional connections between the Guangzhou Tongwen Guan and the banner language schools on which it was based, perhaps due to the relative unavailability of Qing archival documents at the time that she wrote. She suggests a link between the Tongwen Guan and the banner schools of the early Qing that focused particularly on teaching Chinese to Manchus, but there are in fact much more direct connections to the Manchu language schools of the mid-eighteenth century and later. The education of bannermen in multiple languages was not a practice of the early Qing that was dusted off in the late nineteenth century, but a continuing policy of the Qing state. In tracing the development of the Guangzhou Tongwen Guan, I will demonstrate that the logic of banner status linked it to the Manchu language schools that both preceded it and existed simultaneously to it.


81 Biggerstaff, The Earliest Modern Government Schools in China, pp. 140-141. The idea that there was resistance to learning foreign languages in Beijing is repeated in the work of Xiong Yuezhi, who claims that the influence of “Confucianism” (Ch. 儒學 Ruxue) and the shame that scholars supposedly felt about learning foreign languages hampered the Beijing Tongwen Guan relative to the Shanghai school. See Xiong Yuezhi 熊月之, “A Brief History of the Shanghai Guang Fangyan Guan” 上海广方言馆史略, in Tang Zhencang 唐振常 and Shen Hengchun 沈恒春, eds., Research in Shanghai History 上海市研究, Vol. 2 (Shanghai: Xuelin, 1988), pp. 197-198 and Xiong Yuezhi, “The Image and Identity of the Shanghainese,” in Tao Tao Liu and David Faure, eds., Unity and Diversity: Local Cultures and Identities in China (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1996), p. 102. But, for banner people, studying foreign languages and translation was normal and normative, and there appears to be little evidence that they sought to avoid it.

82 Evans, “The Banner-School Background of the Canton T’ung-wen Kuan,” p. 95.
The Beijing Tongwen Guan was initially established with thirty students, all bannermen of about fifteen years old, who were supposed to already have studied Manchu. They were divided into three tracks: ten students were to study each of English, French, and Russian. 83 At the school, they were to study both Chinese and the foreign language they were assigned, with foreigners teaching the foreign language course and Chinese civil examination graduates who were awaiting appointment as instructors in banner schools used as Chinese instructors. 84 Chinese instructors, in a process likely derived from the banner schools, were eligible for appointment to regular official posts if they served satisfactorily for a number of years.

Beginning in 1867, the Beijing Tongwen Guan lost its exclusively banner character. In that year, instruction in mathematics and the sciences was added to the curriculum of the school, meaning that it ceased to be a school solely for translation. Students in the mathematics and science branch, rather than being selected from the banners exclusively, were to be chosen by special examination from among civil exam graduates of both banner and commoner status. 85 In addition, students from the schools in Shanghai and Guangzhou who had achieved some success were to be transferred for further training in Beijing, which brought an additional infusion of non-banner students, as the Shanghai school had only commoners, likely due to the lack of a banner garrison in the city. 86 The introduction of additional elements to the Beijing curriculum


84 Biggerstaff, The Earliest Modern Government Schools in China, 101. Pace Zhang Meiping and several other scholars writing in Chinese, the existence of Chinese language instruction certainly does not suggest that these students were only literate in Manchu.

85 Zhang, “On the Mechanisms of Student Selection in the Beijing Tongwen Guan,” p. 35. The official study of mathematics in the Qing did, however, also have a history of association with the banners; see Catherine Jami, The Emperor’s New Mathematics: Western Learning and Imperial Authority during the Kangxi Reign (1662-1722) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), ch. 12.

complicates its connection to the language schools that are the focus of the earlier part of the chapter, so I will focus on the Guangzhou school, which remained principally a language school, for the remainder of this section.\textsuperscript{87}

The Guangzhou Tongwen Guan was established in response to an imperial edict of 1863, which ordered the local provincial and garrison authorities to follow the precedents of Beijing and Shanghai and open a “school for the study of foreign languages and scripts.” According to the edict, students were to be selected exclusively from the garrison population, and either be “bright and talented” boys of around fourteen sui in age, or young men of about twenty who “are already proficient in both Manchu and Chinese.”\textsuperscript{88} In addition to a foreign language – only English was taught initially – students were to receive instruction in the classics from a Chinese civil examination graduate, and to continue their study of Manchu.\textsuperscript{89} Evans suggests that the requirement of Manchu knowledge derived from the court believing that previous practice in language study would give students a leg up.\textsuperscript{90} This seems doubtful, however, as the court allowed that students who began at the school at a younger age need not already have Manchu proficiency, instead expecting that Manchu would form part of their training. Rather, perhaps it

\textsuperscript{87} The regulations for the Guangzhou school mention that Chinese instructors should also handle instruction in mathematics, but archival documents ignore any mathematics instruction, which seems to have been a secondary concern at best, in stark contrast to the situation in Beijing. See Chang-shan, ed., Gazetteer for the Eight Banners Stationed in Guangdong, juan 3, 16b.

\textsuperscript{88} 設立學習外國語言、文字學館[…]選閱揚其姿質聰慧，年在十四歲內外，或年在二十左右而清漢文字業能通曉

\textsuperscript{89} Ku-ke-ji-tai 庫克吉泰, HWZPZZ, FHA 04-01-38-0186-002, TZ 2.3.28 (May 15, 1863).

\textsuperscript{90} Evans, “The Banner-School Background of the Canton T’ung-wen Kuan,” p. 92. Evans rejects the possibility that students might have been expected to translate between Manchu and English directly, arguing that Manchu was no longer in use as an official language. Though this latter assertion is false, she is probably right that students were only to learn to translate between Chinese and English, as there is no evidence of any training in or examination of Manchu-English translation.
was the case that Manchu was simply so closely associated with the practice of translation that the court believed it to be the first new language that a translator should learn.

In fact, the initial regulations for the school, which opened in June of 1864, looked somewhat different from those discussed in the edict that ordered its creation. Initially there were to be twenty students, all of them around twenty years of age: sixteen students of Manchu-Chinese translation from the banners and four from Han families whose families had a history of success in the civil examinations. An additional ten students who desired to enter the school could be recommended for admission by local officials and gentry. Every three years, students of banner status who were judged successful were to receive the licentiate degree (Ch. 生員 shengyuan, Ma. šusai) in the translation exams, while those of Han commoner status would receive the rank of student in the imperial academy (Ch. 監生 jiansheng, Ma. tacimsi).  In either case, they would be permitted to take the provincial level exam (Ch. 鄉試 xiangshi, Ma. golotome simnembi) and sent to a yamen that had need of their services to work as a translator (Ch. 翻譯官 fanyi guan, Ma. ubaliyambure hafan). Those who served meritoriously (Ch. 勞績 laoji) as translators would be allowed to enter the bureaucracy as either a prefecutal secretary (Ch. 府經歷 fu jingli) or an assistant magistrate; if they were in the banners and preferred a military post, they could also receive the banner rank of captain. This procedure for promotion was extremely similar to that employed in the provincial garrison Manchu schools established in the eighteenth century. In both cases, successful graduates in the schools worked in a technical capacity, as translators or scribes, for a yamen that needed them for a period of time, after which

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91 Chang-shan, ed., Gazetteer for the Eight Banners Stationed in Guangdong, juan 3, 16b-17a.
92 Chang-shan, HWZPZZ, FHA 04-01-38-0186-011, TZ 11.4.7 (May 13, 1872).
they would be promoted to a local level official post; the position of assistant magistrate, one of the two possibilities, was the same one offered to graduates of the Manchu language schools. In addition, both sets of regulations provided for the possibility of promotion to a military post instead. Since this sort of procedure existed in the Guangzhou Manchu school established by Arsai, there is no need to follow Evans in speculating that the Guangzhou Tongwen Guan was drawing on the precedent of early-Qing banner schools in Beijing; the school had analogues much closer to home.

The treatment of teachers and other personnel in the school suggests another connection to the previously established Manchu language schools. Though the principal instructor in Western languages was a foreigner, there were various other school personnel, assigned to either assist the foreign instructor or to teach Chinese, who were selected from among the local degree-holding population. Just as with Manchu language instructors at the free schools in the capital, teaching was intended to be a temporary occupation for these men, who would, if successful, be eligible for promotion to regular bureaucratic posts. The discussion of promotions for teachers and officials at the school following the triennial examinations of 1883 provides a good example. In that year, four men – three Hanjun and one Manchu – were deemed capable translators between Chinese and English and awarded the degree of translation licentiate.\(^{93}\) The following year, the court offered promotions to three of the men who taught at the school. Two of the men, Gui-ren 貴仁 and Wang Kunyuan 王坤元 were to be appointed assistant magistrates, while one, Li Dingyuan 李定源 was to be used as a county secretary (Ch. 縣主簿 xian zhubu, Ma. dangse jafašakü). These promotions, though less than the men had hoped – Gui-ren, for instance, had

\(^{93}\) Chang-shan, HWZPZZ, FHA 04-01-38-0186-036, GX 9.6.15 (July 18, 1883).
expected to receive the post of county magistrate – still reflect an attitude toward translation school instructors akin to that toward instructors in Manchu language schools. Successfully bringing a group of students to the point where they could pass an examination in translation meant that an instructor deserved to receive an actual bureaucratic post, a promotion meant to encourage instructors to work hard.94

As with the provincial garrison Manchu schools, the Guangzhou Tongwen Guan was administratively treated as part of the garrison and was under the ultimate authority of the Guangzhou general, with a banner colonel, the same post as that held by the men in charge of Manchu schools in both the capital and provinces, appointed to direct it. This administrative distinction is made clear by the inclusion of the school in the 1884 gazetteer of the Guangzhou garrison, where it is listed immediately after the garrison’s Manchu language schools.95 Moreover, as with the Manchu schools, one of the main functions of the school was to meet the local need for translators. According to Guangzhou garrison general Chang-shan, writing in 1874, the official positions for translators in the various local yamens existed only in name, and no one had been appointed to fill them. As such, when he or another official in Guangzhou needed to meet with a foreigner, they would select a student at the school who “thoroughly understood Western languages” to temporarily serve as interpreter. Thus, despite policies demanding that students who achieved success in an examination jointly administered by the

94 Chang-shan, HWZPZZ, FHA 04-01-12-0531-020, GX 10.2.14 (March 11, 1884).

95 The colonel in charge of the school was termed supervisor (Ch. 提調 tidiao). The post seems to have been one that the local authorities took quite seriously; in the early 1870s, the man who held it, Wang Zhenxiong 王鎮雄, presumably a Hanjun bannerman, had been repeatedly commended for his performance both in battle and in the supervision of cannon placements, and was to be appointed lieutenant general the next time a post became available. See Chang-shan, HWFP, FHA 04-01-38-0186-014, TZ 11.4.12 (May 18, 1872). The entry about the school in the Guangzhou garrison gazetteer is found in Chang-shan, ed., Gazetteer for the Eight Banners Stationed in Guangdong, juan 3, 16b-17b. The Manchu language schools are described in juan 3, 15a-16a.
foreign English instructor, the garrison general, and the Liangguang governor-general be sent to
the capital for further study or appointment to a post, the school still was able to offer assistance
to local officials who needed to interact with foreigners.96

Though the initial regulations for the school allowed for four Han commoners to enroll in
the school, this policy was changed in 1871 to exclude people from outside the banners. In the
same memorial that suggested this shift, Chang-shan discussed the reasons for the above-
mentioned policy of using students at the school as interpreters. Garrison officials preferred
Tongwen Guan students to hired translators because they feared that the latter might translate
“fraudulently” (Ch. 作弊 zuobi), presumably seeking some benefit to themselves by working in
cahoots with the foreigners involved.97 Though these two policies – using students as translators
and ending the enrollment of Han commoners – were not necessarily linked, the combined effect
was to make official interpretation of Western languages, or English at the least, the exclusive
province of bannermen. Moreover, the memorial suggests a reason that the state may have
wished to restrict official interpretation to bannermen; ordinary Han commoners were treated as
untrustworthy. That at least some students at the school were able to carry out work as
interpreters is confirmed by the 1882 decision to eliminate a post at the school for an assistant
instructor who provided translation for the foreign instructor of English, on the grounds that
“there are very many students who are proficient in Western languages and scripts” and so one
could be chosen to take over those duties.98

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96 In 1874, six students passed this examination, which required translating in both directions, including five
bannermen (three Manchus and two Hanjun) and one Han commoner. Chang-shan, HWZPZZ, FHA 04-01-38-0186-
020, TZ 13.3.15 (April 30, 1874).
98 Ibid., juan 3, 17b.
The first proposal for adding new languages to those taught at the school was in 1879, when Guangzhou general Chang-shan suggested adding instruction in French and Portuguese. This proposal, which was never implemented, emphasized the role of the school in meeting local translation needs. This understanding of the school’s role is perhaps most apparent in the idea that it should teach Portuguese, which was not all that important a language in the late nineteenth century, except for the fact that Portugal administered the island of Macau, just south of Guangzhou. The specifics of the proposal, though, further amplified the sense that the school was specifically designed for the Guangzhou context. Chang-shan considered and rejected the possibility of implementing Russian instruction, arguing that Russians had never conducted trade in Guangzhou and that opportunities to negotiate in Russian would be few and far between. In addition, Chang-shan’s memorial showed the continuing sense that Manchu study was connected to the study of translation, as students of the new languages were, like students of English, to attend courses in both Manchu and Chinese.99

Though the above proposal was never implemented, a bit less than two decades later, in 1897, the Guangzhou Tongwen Guan was finally expanded to include instruction in Russian and Japanese.100 Along with the inclusion of the new languages was a substantial increase in the size of the school, which now had twenty-four students of English, twelve of Russian, and twenty-

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99 French, meanwhile, was useful because of its large role in international diplomacy. Chang-shan, HWZPZZ, FHA 04-01-38-0186-031, GX 5.7.23 (September 9, 1879). Portugal is referred to in the document as 布國 (Buguo), a name which had also been used for Prussia. However, I believe that it refers to Portugal here for three reasons. First, since German unification occurred in 1871, Prussia no longer existed as an independent country. Second, it refers to “occurrences of negotiations” being “nearby” and “numerous” (布國交涉事件近亦不少). Finally, Wei Yuan’s 1843 Illustrated Treatise on the Maritime Countries 海國圖志 (republished in expanded form in 1852), uses 布路亞國 as its primary name for Portugal, suggesting that 布國 was in fact used to refer to Portugal in the nineteenth century. See Wei Yuan 魏源, Illustrated Treatise on the Maritime Countries 海國圖志 (Shaoyang, China: Guwei tang, 1852). Accessed via the Hathi Digital Trust database, juan 38 (appears as volume 16 online).

100 By 1902, it also included French, instruction in which is referenced in Shou-yin, HWZPZZ, FHA 04-01-38-0190-009, GX 28.10.23 (November 22, 1902).
two of Japanese. At some point in the intervening years, the school had once again begun to admit Han commoners alongside bannermen, though the latter were still numerically dominant. This was evident in the first triennial examination at the newly expanded school, the results of which were reported in early 1902, where ten of the twelve men who passed the English exam, all four who passed the Russian exam, and nine of the eleven who passed the Japanese exam were banner people.¹⁰¹ The memorial announcing the results also provided detailed information on how the school’s newest graduates would be employed, which depended both on whether or not the man in question had banner status, and on what degrees, if any, he already held. For instance, banner people not holding any prior degree status¹⁰² were given the degree of translation licentiate, while commoners in the same position received the rank of student in the imperial academy. Those holding degrees were either granted one of slightly higher rank, or a low-level bureaucratic post, including assistant magistrate or bithesi. The one man, a commoner, already holding a provincial-level degree was made a county magistrate. Though commoners had been allowed to enter the school, they remained excluded from both the translation degree system and from the posts most tied to translation; all of the bithesi appointed were bannermen.¹⁰³ Thus, even as limits on commoners studying translation in official schools were relaxed, it remained a field dominated by bannermen.

The Guangzhou Tongwen Guan did not quite survive until the end of the dynasty, as the New Policies (Ch. 新政 xinzheng) of the dynasty’s final decade finally broke the banner hold on

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¹⁰¹ Of these, seven Hanjun and three Manchus passed the English exam, three Hanjun and one Manchu passed the Russian exam, and eight Hanjun and one Manchu passed the Japanese exam.

¹⁰² These men were listed as tongsheng 童生 (or “apprentice candidates”), meaning that they were students who had not yet received the licentiate degree.

¹⁰³ Shou-yin, HWZPZZ, FHA 04-01-38-0189-008, GX 27.12.16 (January 25, 1902).
official translation. In 1906, a new school, the Liangguang Language Academy (Ch. 兩廣方言堂
*Liangguang fangyan tang*), was established, designed to provide both foreign language
instruction and other basic education necessary to prepare its graduates to study abroad.\(^\text{104}\) This
school was to be much larger than the Tongwen Guan had been, with 500 students, and would be
dominated by Han commoners. Yet, even this new educational approach did not completely put
an end to the special role of bannermen, who were to be 150 of the 500 students, far out of
proportion to their actual population. These men were to be selected from among students in a
new set of garrison schools, established just four years previously and featuring education in
Western politics and science alongside study of the Confucian classics. Notably, though, these
schools had not replaced the garrison’s Manchu language schools, but rather the garrison’s
Chinese school; in the banners, at least, this sort of comprehensive education substituted for an
entirely classical education focused on preparation for the soon-to-be-eliminated civil service
examinations, it was not a replacement for education in the Manchu language.\(^\text{105}\) Banner people
would continue to study translation, both of Manchu and of Western languages, until the end of
the dynasty.

**Conclusion**

In considering the development of Manchu education in the Yongzheng and early
Qianlong periods, the functional role of Manchu in administration proves to have been the
driving force behind actual policy decisions. The leading role of the Hanjun banners in the
development of official Manchu language schools, both in the capital and in provincial garrisons,

\(^{104}\) Shou-yin, HWZPZZ, FHA 04-01-38-0193-048, GX 32.5.18 (July 9, 1906).

\(^{105}\) For the selection of students in the Liangguang Language Academy, see Shou-yin, HWZPZZ, FHA 04-01-38-
0194-026, GX 32.8.27 (October 14, 1906). For the continued existence of Manchu language schools, see Shou-yin,
HWZPZZ, FHA 04-01-38-0190-009, GX 28.10.23 (November 22, 1902).
challenges Elliott’s notion that the language was primarily linked to an ethnically-defined “Manchu way,” particularly prior to the mid-Qianlong era efforts to remove Hanjun from most provincial garrisons. Both capital and garrison banners had need of men who could read and write Manchu to carry out official business, and they were expected to supply these men out of their own number, making it necessary to ensure that at least some of their population could use the language effectively. In addition, the capital banners were expected to supply translators for the central bureaucracy, and the duty to do so extended to the Hanjun banners, not just the Manchu and Mongol ones. Meanwhile, ordinary soldiers were expected to have some grasp of spoken Manchu, the language in which officers were meant to issue orders. Manchu was thus, from the state’s perspective, the language of a particular status category – banner people – not of a single ethnic group. To the extent that the Manchu language was tied to the court’s conception of cultural performance, it was as one component of the status identity of banner people as a whole.

This is not to deny that the court saw some connection between language and ethnicity, but this connection was practical and descriptive, not normative. Manchus were considered likely to be better than Hanjun at Manchu, a fact which led to the court putting much less effort into educating them in the language than it did for Hanjun bannermen, and to generally using Manchus as Manchu language teachers. Certainly, Manchus were believed to fit the ideal banner model better than Hanjun, an idea that perhaps contributed to the Qianlong emperor’s eventual decision that garrison Hanjun had less of a right to banner status than did Manchus. But during both the Yongzheng and early Qianlong periods, at least, the Qing court was focused on ensuring that Hanjun were able to fulfill their duties as bannermen, which included learning Manchu. Even following the beginning of the Hanjun expulsion policies, though, the functional role of
Manchu remained in many ways at the fore. Manchu schools for Hanjun in the capital and in Guangzhou continued to function as they had before, and when Manchu language schools for Manchus were finally created, as in Jingzhou, they were strikingly similar to the earlier schools for Hanjun. In the latter half of the Qing, as official preferences for Manchus over Hanjun declined, the Manchu language remained a requirement of status, not ethnicity. All that had changed was that Manchu ethnicity was no longer seen as a guarantee that one would actually know the language.

However, even a shift from treating Manchu as the language of Manchus as an ethnic group to the language of banner people as a status group does not fully explain the development of language training and translation in the Qing. Bannermen as a group were not responsible merely for the translation of Manchu, but for all types of translation work required by the Qing state, regardless of the languages involved. Though Manchu was certainly not merely one language among the many that required translation, it is likely that the role bannermen played in its translation was not due simply to a close connection between banner identity and the Manchu language, but also the result of an institutional framework that treated translation as one of the functions of people of banner status. Banner status has always been clearly associated with military service; it seems that translation should also be added to the list of bannermen’s duties. Bannermen, whether Manchu, Mongol, or Hanjun, were the people who enabled information to cross linguistic boundaries, a function just as essential to Qing rule as meeting enemies on the battlefield. As one eighteenth-century official put it, translation was a “central task of banner people” (Ch. 旗人之要務 qiren zhi yaowu).106

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106 Suhede, HWZPZZ, FHA 04-01-38-0058-027, QL 1.3.27 (May 5, 1736).
The preceding discussion leaves open two key questions. The first is why the court insisted on the use of Manchu at all. This is potentially a place where a vision of Manchu identity could come back into the picture; perhaps, though not focused on using the Manchu language as means to reinforce Manchu identity among ordinary bannermen, Qing emperors saw the language as tied to the dynasty’s own origins as conquerors from the northeast, and believed that abandoning it would imperil the Qing’s continued ability to rule.\textsuperscript{107} Yet, it also seems plausible to see the use of Manchu as resulting from a sort of institutional inertia. In China proper, it had been necessary for the early Qing state to function bilingually in order to ensure that both non-banner Han and Manchu officials could perform their duties. Even as bannermen came to be native speakers of Chinese, long-established precedents mandating bilingual administration may have difficult to eliminate. On the frontier, the case is even clearer. In the early Qing, there had been no real reason to use Chinese to deal with the dynasty’s Inner Asian subjects as neither the Qing officials overseeing Inner Asian territories nor the people living in them were likely to be native speakers of the language. By the time that officials of banner status came to be likely to be more competent in Chinese than in Manchu, it was already well-established that local native officials would use Manchu to communicate with the Qing state; attempting to maintain the Manchu abilities of Qing administrators and a supply of Manchu translators even as the average Manchu abilities of bannermen gradually declined may have appeared easier than an abrupt switch to the use of Chinese. In all likelihood both the ideological and institutional factors played

\textsuperscript{107} This interpretation would follow on arguments made by Mark Elliott that the Qing court was deeply concerned with its roots in Manchuria (see Mark C. Elliott, “The Limits of Tartary: Manchuria in Imperial and National Geographies,” \textit{The Journal of Asian Studies} 59.3 (August 2000): 603-646) and that early Qing emperors had seen the loss of Jurchen practices as responsible for the downfall of the Jin (Mark C. Elliott, “Whose Empire Shall It Be? Manchu Figurations of Historical Process in the Early Seventeenth Century,” in Lynn A. Struve, ed. \textit{Time, Temporality, and Imperial Transition: East Asia from Ming to Qing} (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2005), 47).
a role, but even the former is compatible with an educational policy focused more on practicality than identity.

The second question is why the court chose to almost exclusively use bannermen as translators and language experts, rather than opening the jobs to any competent person, particularly if language training was largely designed to meet practical needs. This chapter has rejected an explanation based on ethnic identity as failing either to explain why Hanjun needed to learn Manchu or why translation of languages other than Manchu or Mongolian also necessitated the use of banner people. One explanation is, as above, institutional inertia. In the early Qing, only banner people were at all likely to be capable of Manchu-Chinese translation, the state’s dominant need; as such, regulations for recruiting translators were written to draw them from the banners. Then, as translation of other sorts became necessary, perhaps the court simply adapted already-existing regulations to the new context. However, it is also possible that it was the position of bannermen as trusted servants of the court that made them uniquely suited to translation. Official translation is an inherently sensitive matter, particularly in diplomatic matters, as any user of a translated document has to be able assume that it is roughly equivalent to the original. The act of translation was not subject to routine oversight, unlike administrative decisions; rather, translation itself had to be routine and reliable. That non-banner Han might not be trusted in this role is suggested by Chang-shan’s comment, mentioned above, that Guangzhou merchants could not be used as interpreters of Western languages because they might translate fraudulently. Who better to fill this trusted role than a service elite group, itself conveniently both multiethnic and multicultural, institutionally designed to be loyal to the court?
Conclusion: Service Elites in Early Modern Eurasia: the Qing Banners in Comparative Perspective

Hanjun banner people were not second-class Manchus or partially-Manjurified Han. Rather, this dissertation has argued, they existed at the intersection of two distinct axes of identity: Han ethnicity and banner status. The history of the Hanjun is a history of the changing relationship between those two types of identity in official discourse, imperial policy, and social practice. When the Hanjun were initially included in the banners, their ethnic origins were quite possibly a positive reason for granting them banner status, as it helped them to serve as intermediaries between a Manchu-dominated court and the mostly Han population of China. Even as Manchu and Mongol bannermen acquired the skills that had previously been monopolized by Hanjun, particularly the ability to speak and write Chinese fluently, Hanjun remained an integral part of the banner system. In the early eighteenth century, as a growing banner population created increasing strain on the imperial treasury, the Qing court sought new ways to provide for the Hanjun, most notably by granting them salaried posts in Green Standard companies. But their right to retain banner status remained unchallenged.

Only in the middle of the eighteenth century did this arrangement change. At the direction of the Qianlong emperor, officials at provincial banner garrisons across the empire expelled tens of thousands of Hanjun from the banner system, making them into commoners. Though the policy was justified in terms of benefiting the Hanjun themselves, alleviating financial pressure on the imperial treasury, and redeploying banner troops to newly conquered territories in the northwest, none of those policy aims actually necessitated expulsion. Hanjun were more likely to be helped by policies permitting them to leave the banners voluntarily than by mandatory expulsion, financial pressure could have been alleviated by expanding the pre-
existing program of placing Hanjun into Green Standard companies while allowing them to retain banner status, and redeployment could have been accomplished by sending Hanjun to Ili, rather than replacing them with Chahar and Solon troops. Expulsion is thus best understood as a deliberate rethinking of how the banner system should work, with Han ethnicity becoming a marker of unsuitability for banner status. Though many Hanjun were not, in the end, expelled, the Qianlong-era court had transformed them from core members of the banner elite to disposable interlopers in a system meant to benefit a Manchu and Mongol elite.

This attack on the place of the Hanjun in the banners would not survive the Qianlong reign. In the final decades of his rule, expulsion came to a halt, perhaps due to a shortage of Manchus capable of taking up the posts abandoned by expelled Hanjun, an issue clearly apparent in the Guangzhou garrison where it became necessary to permit Hanjun to take up posts designated for Manchus. During the nineteenth century, the policy of expulsion was abandoned completely, as banner officials once again sought means to provide for all of the banner people under their command within the context of the banner system. In particular, in Guangzhou alone, several programs of acquiring interest income by loaning local treasury funds to merchants were designed with the goal of providing a reliable base of support for unemployed bannermen. During the latter part of the Qing period, official discrimination within the banner system on the basis of ethnicity appears to have become less pronounced, though clear social distinctions remained between Manchus and Hanjun. The banners would survive as a multiethnic service elite for as long as they had a dynasty to serve.¹

¹ Formally, the banner system continued to exist until well after the end of Qing rule in 1912, with its final abolition occurring only in the late 1920s after the establishment of Guomindang control over all of China. But after the establishment of the Republic, it is difficult to argue that the banners still constituted a service elite. On the date of the final elimination of the banner system, see Tong Jiajiang 佟佳江, “A New Opinion on When the Qing Eight Banner System Perished” 清代八旗制度消亡时间新议, Minzu yanjiu 1994.5: 101-108.
Rethinking the Banners

Though this dissertation is focused on the Hanjun, its treatment of their place in Qing society leads directly to a reconsideration of the nature of the banner system as a whole, as well as of its role in maintaining Qing rule over a large empire for more than two and a half centuries. By focusing on the Hanjun, it becomes clear that status as an identity category, one clearly distinct from ethnicity, was central to the functioning of the banners. With the exception of a few decades in the second half of the eighteenth century, to be a banner person did not mean to be a Manchu; Han ethnicity and banner status were, for most of the dynasty, fully compatible. There was indeed ethnic discrimination in favor of Manchus within the banner system, and so this conclusion does not necessarily contradict the claim that the Qing was a state ruled by and for Manchus, the idea of Manchu “ethnic sovereignty” advanced by Mark Elliott. It does, however, challenge Elliott’s formulation of it. According to Elliott, clear separation between a martial Manchu ruling class and a much larger civilian Han population was necessary to maintain the solidarity of the conquest group and the power of the Qing court. He argues that the banners, through maintaining a performative Manchu Way and through the physical infrastructure of the garrison system, which segregated banner people from commoners, prevented Manchu assimilation and preserved Manchu ethnic solidarity and, with it, Manchu ethnic sovereignty.²

Yet Manchus were never really separated from Han. Even following Hanjun expulsion, the number of Hanjun in the banners was more than 60 percent of the number of Manchus. Though many provincial garrisons had been fully purged of Hanjun, Beijing, where the largest

percentage of the banner population lived, remained integrated, as did Guangzhou. Moreover, Hanjun were drawn in to the solidarity of the conquest group in all the same ways as Manchus, from residential segregation to participation in the “Manchu” way to what Elliott calls the “iron rice bowl of banner privilege.” Perhaps most importantly, Hanjun, broadly speaking, appear to have been committed to their banner status identity and loyal servants of the Qing court. This is evidenced in everything from the apparent reluctance of those expelled from the banners to leave them, to the success of Guangzhou’s Hanjun, relative to its Manchus, in the translation exams, to the simple observation that no Hanjun company ever rebelled against Qing rule. If maintaining a loyal and effective military and administrative elite that saw itself as separate from the larger Chinese population was central to the success of the Qing state, then the relevant elite group was not ethnic Manchus, but those of banner status.

This makes the ability of the Qing rulers to create such an elite even more impressive. It is already well-understood that the Qing court had to construct an idea of shared Manchu identity that encompassed a variety of distinct and often-warring Jurchen tribes in order to become a dominant political force. But this sort of state-driven construction of *ethnic* identity was not

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3 Though Fuzhou still had a Hanjun naval garrison, its location was well-removed from that of the main garrison, and so was not really ethnically integrated.


5 One might challenge this last point by arguing that the seventeenth-century rebellion of the so-called “Three Feudatories” was a Hanjun rebellion. This is the argument of Pamela Crossley, who claims that it led to the diminishment of Hanjun status and a move toward treating the Hanjun as no longer part of the “inner” group of subjects most tied to the Qing court. Pamela Kyle Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), pp. 106-108. Li Yanguang, however, makes a compelling case that the Three Feudatories and their soldiers were not actually integrated into the banners. See Li Yanguang 李燕光, “Eight Banner Hanjun in the Qing” 清代的八旗汉军, *Manxue yanjiu* 1992, pp. 93-94. Most relevantly, each of the generals in question maintained command of his own set of troops, which were not redistributed throughout the banners. So these soldiers were never subject to central banner control or discipline, nor did they have a relationship to the court independent of that of their commander.

sufficient to form a *multiethnic* banner elite. Rather, the Qing court had to additionally develop an idea of status identity, tied to membership in the banners, that was compelling enough to win the loyalty of the hundreds of thousands of people included in the banner system. The banner system and the privileges, responsibilities, and ritual forms that came with membership in it, bound all banner people, including the Hanjun, to the court. This made the banner system, like the imperial examination system, one of the core institutions of the empire, necessary to maintain the legitimacy of Qing rule in the eyes of one of the dynasty’s core constituencies.  

**The Eight Banners as “Service Elite”**

The elements of banner status that bound banner people to the court were not unique to the Qing system of rule. Rather, the Qing banners shared much in common with other early modern elite groups that provided military and administrative service to a ruling dynasty. Comparative history has been an important tool in the recent study of empire and imperial rule, as historians recognize that certain strategies and repertoires recur across borders and regions. As Peter Perdue argues, the history of Western Europe has served as a normative source for the study of state development during the early modern period. Yet, he points out, the large agrarian empires of Eastern Europe and Asia – he points specifically to the Ottoman and Qing empires, but it seems clear that Russia and the Mughal empire fit within similar paradigms – shared certain patterns of rule different from those seen on the western fringes of the Eurasian continent.

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7 On the necessity of the examination system for maintaining the legitimacy of the Qing, and the late imperial state more generally, see Benjamin A. Elman, *A Cultural History of Civil Examinations in Late Imperial China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), pp. 620-625.

8 One of the most influential works of comparative imperial history is Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000). Pp. 3-17, in particular, discuss the ways in which different imperial states made use of analogous strategies of rule.
Perdue looked specifically at frontier administration.\textsuperscript{9} I argue that elite groups similar to the banners represent another example of the states, imperial or otherwise, of eastern Eurasia, developing analogous strategies to deal with common challenges.

The banners belong to a type of early modern institution that we can call “service elites.” That is, they were a group granted institutionalized legal privilege, hence an \textit{elite} group, and required to provide \textit{service} to the ruling dynasty. This term “service elite” has itself been used previously only in an imperial Russian context, though various elites, including the banners have been discussed by historians along similar lines.\textsuperscript{10} Brenda Meehan-Waters, who applies it in a much more limited sense than I will give it here, used it to describe the very highest-ranking military and civil officials in early eighteenth century Russia, rather than using it for the \textit{dvorianstvo}, or Russian service nobility, as a whole.\textsuperscript{11} My use of the term is more like that of Elise Wirtschafter, who recognizes that a wide spectrum of the Russian ruling class, from the highest nobility, through lower-ranking bureaucrats and military servicemen were marked by a connection between “elite status and personal service to the ruler.”\textsuperscript{12} The people included in service elites, as I understand them, were not all wealthy or powerful; indeed many faced


\textsuperscript{10} Pamela Crossley, for instance, discusses the seventeenth-century Qing banners according to a similar logic, as an elite “prepared to act in any and all capacities in the service of the empire,” and compares them in this sense to the Ottoman elite. See Crossley, \textit{A Translucent Mirror}, pp. 286-287. Where she argues that this vision was abandoned in the eighteenth century, though, I see it continuing for most of the dynasty’s history, interrupted, but not fully put aside, during the period of Hanjun expulsion.

\textsuperscript{11} See Brenda Meehan-Waters, \textit{Autocracy and Aristocracy: The Russian Service Elite of 1730} (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1982). The introduction (pp. 1-4) makes clear that her use of the term “service elite” applies only to the \textit{generalitet}, “the 179 officials in the top four military and civil ranks.” For a description and explanation of \textit{dvorianstvo} as a group, see Robert E. Jones, \textit{The Emancipation of the Russian Nobility, 1762-1785} (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973), pp. 5-18.

constant financial difficulty and held no office more important than that of a common soldier, if they were employed at all. However, they all possessed rights and privileges, especially economic rights, but also privilege in the legal, political, sumptuary, and other realms, that differentiated them from the bulk of the population. All such groups, I argue, existed to serve a common purpose, to create a military and administrative elite whose loyalty to the ruler was guaranteed not by a personal relationship to him, but by a particular bureaucratic structure that supported a ritual relationship. That is to say, service elites existed to bureaucratize loyalty. The remainder of the conclusion will explore the various features that characterized service elites, describe the nature of these features in the context of the banner system and other early modern service elites, and discuss how these features contributed to the goal of creating a loyal and useful elite stratum. I will focus on three comparative examples in particular, the samurai of Tokugawa Japan, the Russian dvorianstvo, and the Ottoman askeri elite, especially those selected through the devşirme system.

As suggested by the above discussion, two features were universal to service elites: the requirement that they provide service, and the privilege granted to them in exchange for that service. The types of service provided by these groups were quite similar across the different states discussed here. In the Qing case, as this dissertation has laid out, the most basic form of service for bannermen was as soldiers. The banners were the backbone of the Qing army well into the eighteenth century, and even when not engaged in combat, banner people resided in military garrisons under the command of military officers, and were expected to engage in regular training in skills like archery, horsemanship, and musketry. In addition, though, banner people were used as civil administrators. Frontier administrators almost always came from the banners, and banner people held posts at all levels of the bureaucracy in numbers far out of
proportion to their share of the empire’s population. Translation, as emphasized in chapter 5, was a particular administrative responsibility of bannermen. Not only did the ability of the state to function bilingually in Chinese and Manchu depend on their service, but they additionally were responsible for official translation into languages like Mongolian, Tibetan, Russian, and Persian, and, in the nineteenth century, into the languages of Western Europe. As such, the banners should not be seen as a solely military caste, but as a group responsible for both civil and military service.

Service elites in imperial Russia, Tokugawa Japan, and the Ottoman Empire held much the same responsibilities. The Tokugawa samurai had originated as a military class, but the shogunate’s attempts to “eliminate the endemic warfare among landed warriors” that characterized earlier periods in Japan’s history led to their administrative function as bureaucrats predominating. Samurai served as officials both in Edo and in domainal (Ja.藩 han) capitals, as well as in more regional posts. Indeed, their responsibility for administration exceeded that of Qing banner people, as they had exclusive access to bureaucratic posts, unlike Qing bannermen who were in competition with graduates of the civil service examination system, who largely came from wealthy and landed Han commoner families.13 Yet even as the Pax Tokugawa took away the opportunity for samurai to fight in actual battles, they remained organized on military lines.14 The regular sankin kōtai 参勤交代 processions of daimyō 大名, or domain lords, to Edo functioned as military exercises, involving the organized movement of troops and weaponry over

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large distances, both as a display of power, and as a fulfillment of the service requirements both of daimyō to the shogun and of samurai retainers to their daimyō lords.\textsuperscript{15}

In Russia, like Japan, the bulk of the service nobility were made up of men, or descendants of men, who had been granted patents in exchange for wartime military service, and all Russian nobles were expected to provide military and civilian administrative service to the throne whenever called upon. This requirement extended even to the wealthiest and most influential members of the nobility; it was a general requirement of noble status.\textsuperscript{16} Though Russians from other soslovie, or social estates, could enter both the civilian and military bureaucracy, those who reached either the lowest rank of officer in the army or the eighth rank (from the top) in the civil service automatically received noble status following Peter the Great’s 1722 creation of the Table of Ranks.\textsuperscript{17} This both created a relatively large degree of social mobility, which accounted for 30 percent of the growth of the noble estate in the first half of the eighteenth century, and helped maintain the link between service and noble status.\textsuperscript{18}

This automatic assumption of noble status on the basis of service meant that even after Peter III abolished compulsory service for the nobility in 1762, the Russian nobility still had some of the character of a service elite. Indeed, under Catherine the Great’s 1785 Charter to the Nobility, nobility continued to be defined, in the words of Robert Jones, as “a hereditary status conferred

\textsuperscript{15} Constantine Nomikos Vaporis, \textit{Tour of Duty: Samurai, Military Service in Edo, and the Culture of Early Modern Japan} (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2008), pp. 70-73.


as a reward for service to the state,” and the idea of closing the nobility to new entrants and making it exclusively hereditary was rejected. In addition, the privileges of nobles who refused to serve were limited – they could not even vote in elections for noble assemblies. In contrast to Japan, military service was clearly preferred to civil service for nobles, but like both the Tokugawa and the Qing, either type of service could fulfill a nobleman’s responsibilities.

Though entrance to the Ottoman askeri elite looked quite different from the substantially hereditary systems of the Qing, Tokugawa, and Russians, the functions of a member of the class were broadly similar. During the height of Ottoman rule, much of the ruling class was selected via the devşirme system, which relied on the forced recruitment of sons of Christian subjects of the empire, particularly Serbs, Greeks, and Albanians, who were taken between the ages of ten and eighteen in levies that occurred every three to four years. They were circumcised, converted to Islam, and trained in a variety of useful abilities, including literacy and military skills, in either a palace or a military barracks. As adults, these boys would serve either in the kapıkulu, the household troops of the sultan, among whom were included the janissaries, or in the household of the sultan, from which they would graduate to positions of political power in both the court and the provinces. In addition to the devşirme, the hereditary Ottoman elite, who were the holders of timar income from provincial agricultural taxes, were a service class. Timar were granted to cavalrmen as a reward for their military service, and thus service, in addition to being

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20 Those chosen to be sent to one of four palaces had been judged superior in talent and beauty, and received specialized training beyond that offered to their fellows. On devşirme recruitment, see Gulay Yilmaz, “Becoming a Devşirme: The Training of Conscripted Children in the Ottoman Empire,” in Gwyn Campbell, Suzanne Miers, and Joseph C. Miller, eds., Children in Slavery Through the Ages (Athens, OH: University of Ohio Press, 2009), pp. 121-125.

demanded of those recruited through the *devşirme* system, presented a voluntary route into the
Ottoman elite, particularly prior to about 1600.\(^{22}\)

Turning from service requirements to the privileges that came with them, more
differences appear among the various elite groups under consideration. Yet, in every case,
service elites had both economic and legal privileges that differentiated them from members of
other status categories. In the Qing, banner people were to be supported out of the public
treasury. This ideally meant that all healthy adult bannermen would be employed as either
banner soldiers or officers or civilian officials. In fact, as we have seen, this was far from the
case, and banner unemployment was a serious challenge for most of the Qing. Yet, the Qing
court made all sorts of efforts to provide for banner people, from employing Hanjun in Green
Standard companies affiliated with banner garrisons, to loaning out sums of money to merchants
and using the interest to finance supernumerary posts, to forgiving *en masse* those debts
accumulated by banner people.\(^{23}\) In addition, banner people possessed a substantial degree of
legal privilege. When accused of crimes, they were judged outside the ordinary legal system
applied to commoners, spared from torture during interrogation, and held in separate prisons
while awaiting trial in order to avoid the foul smells and evil character of commoner criminals.
Even after being convicted, a banner person’s punishment would be commuted, from flogging
with a bamboo stave to whipping, and from penal servitude or exile to wearing the cangue.\(^{24}\)

\(^{22}\) On *timar*, see Norman Itzkowitz, *Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), pp. 40-41. On the decline of the *timar* system in the late sixteenth century (though *timar* still existed as late as the nineteenth century), see I. Metin Kunt, *The Sultan’s Servants: The Transformation of Ottoman Provincial Government, 1550-1650* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), p. 80. Note that Kunt argues that even after it became impossible to receive a new *timar* grant through military service, service in the private household of a major provincial official became a path into the elite – see ibid., p. 97.

\(^{23}\) The first two points are discussed extensively in chapters 1 and 4 of the dissertation. On the forgiving of debts, see Elliott, *The Manchu Way*, pp. 316-318.

The privileges of the samurai of Edo Japan bore many similarities to those of Qing banner people. The stipends paid to samurai by *daimyō* took up the largest portion of government revenue.\(^{25}\) Samurai livelihoods were, however, somewhat more varied than those of bannermen. In general, samurai retainers were remunerated according to one of two schemes. Those with landed fiefs (Ja. *地方知行* jikata chigyō) had direct control over a particular piece of land, receiving tax payments from a particular set of villagers. Those with stipended fiefs (Ja. *倉米知行* kuramai chigyō) or salaries (Ja. *俸禄* hōroku) were paid directly out of the domain treasury in either money or grain. Most domains relied on stipends for their retainers, though landed fiefs were important in some of Japan’s largest domains. In practice, though, even many landed fief-holders actually lived in the castle town and played little, if any, role in administration in their nominal fief.\(^{26}\) In comparison to the Qing court, Japanese domains were not as consistent in maintaining that all samurai income should come from tax revenue. In Hirosaki, in the far north of Honshū, following the Tenmei famine of the early 1780s, many retainers were forced by the domain to take up farming and pay taxes off their proceeds, while their stipends were substantially cut.\(^{27}\) In Yonezawa, in north-central Honshū, beginning in the late 1600s, samurai were required to take up by-employments to supplement their income, as a high ratio of samurai to commoners made total reliance on stipends fiscally unsustainable.\(^{28}\) In both Hirosaki and

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26 Ibid., pp. 62-67. Note that in the early years of the Qing, banner people were given large tracts of land, the revenue of which was to be used to support them. Over time, most of this land fell out of banner hands, but the initial imposition of the system offers a possible analogue to the landed fief system in the Tokugawa, as in both cases, service elites were meant to be supported by particular tracts of land with which they had very little contact. See Elliott, *The Manchu Way*, pp. 193-194.

27 Ravina, *Land and Lordship in Early Modern Japan*, pp. 128-141. The policy did not succeed, as samurai retainers strongly resisted resettlement to the countryside.

28 Ibid., pp.103-110.
Yonezawa there was a clear sense that requiring samurai to labor was at least potentially inappropriate, but it was deemed an acceptable response to fiscal exigencies. Like Qing banner people, the legal treatment of samurai also reflected a degree of privilege, marked by the double swords that only they were allowed to wear. They could kill with impunity commoners who disrespected them, at least under certain limited circumstances. A member of the samurai status group charged with a crime would be seated at a level more equal to that of the official in charge of his case than would a commoner, and they were held in special jail cells, apart from commoner prisoners. However, quite unlike Qing banner people, they were generally subject to more severe punishments than were members of other status groups.29

The economic privileges of the Russian service nobility took quite a different form from those of the service elites of Japan and the Qing. Though actively serving nobles were paid salaries, there was no sense in which the state, at any level, was directly responsible for the maintenance of all of members of the dvorianstvo soslovie. However, as instituted in 1645 and encoded in the Ulozhenie (law code) of 1649, in response to the petitions of members of the service nobility, serfs were firmly bound to the land under the ownership of nobles.30 This right, as initially envisioned, was itself tied to service; in the seventeenth century, the ownership of fifteen peasant households was considered necessary to support a cavalryman.31 Serfs provided their owners with both cash rent (obrok) and labor service (barshchina), meaning that, for the large majority of nobles who owned serfs, serfdom was their most stable source of income.32 In


31 Ibid., p. 50.

32 Crummey, Aristocrats and Servitors, pp. 128-129.
addition to having the right to own serfs, the Russian service nobility was exempt from taxation.\textsuperscript{33} This was generally the case in both Japan and the Qing as well, though given that most members of those elites received their incomes directly from the state, exclusion from taxation was perhaps not of as much importance as for their Russian counterparts.

Ottoman elites also received economic privilege from their status position. Particularly in the early years of the Ottoman state, cavalrymen were granted \textit{timar} estates, discussed above. In the middle years of the empire, as groups like the janissaries became the most important part of the Ottoman military elite, new economic privileges appeared. Regiments controlled pious endowments (\textit{waqf}) that appear to have been used as investment vehicles for the benefit of their members.\textsuperscript{34} Presumably their commercial activities, though theoretically illegal, were aided by their exemption from taxation.\textsuperscript{35} The solidarity that came from the process of enslavement, and years of shared training and living also created a sort of privilege, as even those \textit{devşirme} recruits who never advanced beyond the position of ordinary soldier were much more likely than an ordinary Ottoman subject to have valuable connections to higher officials.\textsuperscript{36} In any case, the advantages of being selected into the \textit{devşirme} system were clear enough that many tried to buy their sons into it, while others falsely passed themselves off as janissaries.\textsuperscript{37}

Service elites were bound to the ruler not just through an exchange of service obligation for privilege, but through a ritual framing that created an imagined personal relationship between lord and servitor. These ritual framings bore great similarities across early modern Asia. Indeed,

\textsuperscript{33} LeDonne, \textit{Absolutism and Ruling Class}, p. 260.

\textsuperscript{34} Yilmaz, “Becoming a \textit{Devşirme},” pp.125-126.

\textsuperscript{35} Andrew Wheatcroft, \textit{The Ottomans} (London: Viking, 1993), p. 90.

\textsuperscript{36} Yilmaz, “Becoming a \textit{Devşirme},” p. 128.

\textsuperscript{37} Itzkowitz, \textit{Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition}, p. 50; Yilmaz, “Becoming a \textit{Devşirme},” p. 129.
in the Qing, Russian, and Ottoman empires, the elite were treated as “slaves” of the ruler. This was most literally true in the Ottoman case, as the devşirme system developed out of Islamic precedents that dated as far back as the Seljuks and Abbasids, under which non-Muslims were conscripted into slavery in the sultan’s household, and made to serve as soldiers or administrators. In both Russia and the Qing, though elites were not actually enslaved in any meaningful sense, nobles and bannermen referred to themselves as slaves when addressing the tsar or emperor. In both cases, the use of the term “slave” (Ch. 奴才 nucai, Ma. aha, Rus. kholop) was not merely intended to ritually elevate the tsar or emperor and debase the official addressing him. Rather, it suggested a type of ritual relationship between ruler and official in which the official was a member of the ruler’s household, and thus responsible for serving him, but also, as a member of that household, entitled to the ruler’s material support. In this sense, to be the ruler’s slave actually elevated one’s status, and in both Russia and the Qing, it was only members of the service elite who were to use that designation. The ritual master-slave relationship thus reinforced the basic exchange of service for privilege that was the foundation of service elites as status groups. As Marshall Poe has suggested, the traditional Western European understanding of master-slave discourse in the Russian court as simply emblematic of the autocratic despotism of the Russian state and the servile nature of its subjects misses much of the point. Whether in Russia or the Qing, or even in the Ottoman state, to be the ruler’s slave,

38 Kunt, The Sultan’s Servants, pp. 32-33 and Itzkowitz, Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition, p. 49.

39 On the exclusive use of the term slave by banner people, see Elliott, The Manchu Way, p.438n151. The exclusivity of the term was less pronounced in Russia, but in petitionary correspondence, only the service nobility were to use the term “your slave” (Rus. kholop tvoi), while taxpaying subjects were “your orphan” (Rus. sirota tvoi) and clergy were “your pilgrim” (Rus. bolgomolets). See Marshall Poe, “What Did Russians Mean When They Called Themselves ‘Slaves of the Tsar’?,” Slavic Review 57.3 (Autumn, 1998), p. 601.
ritually or otherwise, was to gain power and privilege in the social and political realm, and served as a legal and moral basis for demanding imperial support.\textsuperscript{40}

Though Tokugawa Japan lacked an equivalent discourse of slavery, there was another potentially analogous discourse of the relationship between daimyō and samurai retainer. Mizubayashi Takeshi argues that the exchange of service and income between daimyo and retainer was not like an economic exchange in a marketplace, but like the exchange between master and servant (or slave) within a household. That is, samurai retainers were subordinate to their lords as if they were members of his household.\textsuperscript{41} This situation was the result of an early-Tokugawa period move to strip most warrior households of their independent ability to conduct military action and govern territory. Their privilege no longer derived from their exercise of power on their own behalf, but came from their hereditary place within the household of their lord.\textsuperscript{42} So even in Japan, where an explicit discourse of master-slave relations was lacking, the idea that elites were subordinate members of their masters’ households defined the scope of both their privilege and service.

In addition to these three pillars of service elite status – service, privilege, and a ritualized idea of membership in the ruler’s household – a number of other elements appeared as features or functions of multiple service elite systems. First, it was common for them to be hereditary, and, by extension, to include entire families, not just the men who actually served. In both the

\textsuperscript{40} On the historiography of discussions of Russian despotism and servility in relation to the use of the term “slave,” see Poe, “What Did Russians Mean When They Called Themselves ‘Slaves of the Tsar’?,” pp. 594-598. On the power that a Russian servitor gained by adopting the mantle of slavery, see pp. 606-607 of the same. In general, the argument of this paragraph relies a great deal on Poe’s article.


\textsuperscript{42} Mark Ravina, \textit{Land and Lordship in Early Modern Japan}, pp. 37-40. Ravina draws on both Mizubayashi and Kasaya Kazuhiko in formulating this argument.
Qing and Tokugawa, status attached to the household and defined the positions of women as well as men. Tokugawa women of samurai status were kept mostly separated from the outside world, and their freedom of movement was greatly restricted.\textsuperscript{43} Qing bannerwomen were forbidden from binding their feet. In neither system was it generally permissible for women of the elite group to marry those of lower status, and, if it happened anyway, it meant the loss of elite status for the woman in question, as it was impossible for a woman to have a different status from that of the male head of her household.\textsuperscript{44} The Russian system was somewhat more flexible in this regard than that of the Qing or Tokugawa, and status was attached to the individual, not the household, so women of the noble class who married out could retain their own noble status, though could not pass it to their offspring.\textsuperscript{45} Noble status was generally hereditary, though there were various legal ways to acquire it, and for that reason, movement into the noble estate was much more common than in either the Qing empire or Tokugawa Japan. In all three places, though, the hereditability of elite status reinforced its function, helping make membership in the elite group an important form of identity and maintaining a clear separation between the ruling elite and the broader commoner population. Hereditable membership in the service elite created an alignment between the interests of elite families and those of the ruling court.

The Ottoman empire used a quite different, and less successful, strategy to bind the interests of its elite to those of its court. Under \textit{devşirme}, recruits into the palace and the \textit{kapıkulu} were meant to be fully separated from their original families and denied new ones, transferring

\textsuperscript{43} Laura Nenzi, \textit{Excursions in Identity: Travel and the Intersection of Place, Gender, and Status in Edo Japan} (Honolulu: University of Hawaiʻi Press, 2008), pp. 50-51, 80-83.

\textsuperscript{44} Qing rules on marriage are discussed in chapter 1. The general prohibition on intermarriage for members of different status groups in Tokugawa Japan is discussed in Marcia Yonemoto, \textit{The Problem of Women in Early Modern Japan} (Oakland: University of California Press, 2016), p.96.

\textsuperscript{45} Boris Mironov, \textit{A Social History of Imperial Russia}, p. 270.
their loyalties to their unit and their master. Until the later years of the devşirme system, marriage of kapıkulu was restricted to some degree, although, particularly after the abolition of devşirme, sons of janissaries were a major source of new janissaries, and, throughout the Ottoman period, the sons of high officials inherited rank. Though devşirme recruits did develop strong bonds to each other, the system seems to have largely failed at breaking their ties to their families outside it, and it was not uncommon for men inside the elite to continue to offer assistance to their relatives.

Though the formulation of service elite groups was based around the service of adult men, it is not entirely accurate to say that women in service elites did not themselves provide service to the ruler. In the Qing, young bannerwomen were subject to triennial selections of women for service in the palace, referred to as the selection of “elegant women” (Ch. 秀女 xiuniu) in Chinese or the selection of “daughters” (Ma. sargan jui) in Manchu. Until the mid-eighteenth century, all banner women were eligible for selection, after which the scope of the process was reduced to Manchu banner women in Beijing, usually from families of greater importance. Women included within the scope of recruitment were not permitted to marry if they had not gone through selection. Those selected served in the palace for five years, after which


they were released to marry, though a few were selected as wives or concubines of members of the imperial lineage. A much more limited version of this practice was performed in Russia until 1689, as brides for the tsar or his son were found via bride-shows that began by choosing potential candidate women through regional selections conducted across the empire. The vast majority of these women came from middle-ranking families of the service nobility, and despite the potential advantages of marriage into the royal family, participation in such shows was seen as a burden that families frequently resisted. In Japan, the requirement of female service was limited to the very top of the samurai class, as wives of daimyō and, in the early seventeenth century, those of high ranking retainers, were required to act as hostages in Edo. In each of these cases, particular actions that benefitted the ruler were required of women on the basis of their status, meaning that they can reasonably be understood as requirements of female service in the context of service elite systems.

Another common feature of service elites was their geographic concentration, at times tied to the creation of barriers between them and the general commoner population. Qing banner people lived in garrisons, often surrounded by a wall, separate from the commoner population. In China proper, these garrisons were mostly in cities, making the banners a largely urban group. In Manchuria, banner people lived in more scattered communities, many of them rural, but Han commoners were subject to frequent restrictions on their right to move into the region at all.


50 Russell E. Martin, A Bride for the Tsar: Bride Shows and Marriage Politics in Early Modern Russia (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 2012), pp. 61-69. Martin makes explicit comparisons to the Qing process, though he argues that they had distinct origins (see pp. 27-30).


52 A barrier called the Willow Palisade marked the boundary beyond which Han were generally forbidden from settling beginning in the late seventeenth century. See James Reardon-Anderson, Reluctant Pioneers: China’s
The generally urban character of Qing bannermen was akin to that of Tokugawa samurai retainers, who were gathered in castle towns around the time of the establishment of the shogunate. In Kaga domain, for instance, the ruling Maeda house began moving warriors into residences in the vicinity of the Kanazawa castle in the late sixteenth century, completing the process by 1614.\(^{53}\) In the Ottoman empire, those selected through the devşirme system were often initially sent to live in Anatolian or Rumelian Turkish families, as part of the process of Islamicizing and Turkicizing them, but as adults they were recalled to barracks and would live their lives largely in the company of their fellow kapikulu.\(^{54}\) Russian elites were a partial exception to the general trend, subject to the least concentration, as the importance of landholding to their status meant that many lived in the countryside. Even so, they were a more urban and concentrated group than the empire’s population as a whole.

In the multiethnic Qing, Russian, and Ottoman empires, service elites were also a vehicle for the management of difference and for ensuring the successful inclusion of conquered peoples. In the Qing banners, both the Mongols and the Hanjun are clear examples of this function, which may apply even to the banners’ Manchu population. The Mongols included in the Eight Banners were those, particularly Khorchins and Kharachins, who had submitted to Qing rule the earliest, and their inclusion in the banners was thus a reward for their loyalty, and a means of creating a Mongol elite closely tied to the Qing court.\(^{55}\) As for the Hanjun, though they were not formed out of a native Han elite, in the decades after 1644 they played a major role in governing the


\(^{54}\) Yilmaz, “Becoming a Devşirme,” p. 125.

\(^{55}\) Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror*, p. 213.
dynasty’s newly conquered territory in China. And though their position in the banners made them part of the conquest elite, many Hanjun had in fact entered the banners after being captured in Qing attacks on Ming cities – that is, they themselves were part of a conquered population. Moreover, in the wake of the defeat of the Three Feudatories rebellion in 1681, the armies that had formerly been commanded by generals like Wu Sangui were integrated into the banner system, initially under a special designation (Ch. 異下 fanxia, meaning “under the feudatory”) reflecting their origins. After 1710, even that special designation was removed, making these former participants in a rebellion equal to other Hanjun banner people.\(^{56}\) The decision to include Three Feudatory soldiers in the banner system suggests that the Qing court saw the Eight Banners as a place to manage and keep watch over a potentially problematic population. This same sort of decision was repeated in 1789 when Lê Duy Kỳ, the recently overthrown ruler of Vietnam, and his followers, were granted banner status.\(^{57}\) Even the Manchus themselves were not a unified population of inherently trustworthy subjects at the time the banners were formed – the very name “Manchu” was invented by Hong Taiji in 1635, decades after the creation of the banner system, as a way to bring together a diverse group of Jurchen tribes.\(^{58}\) Following the practice of past Inner Asian rulers, when Nurhaci brought groups like the Haixi Jurchens within the scope of his new banner system, they were divided among companies led by Jianzhou Jurchens, the group of which he himself was a part.\(^{59}\) As they would become later for the deposed Vietnamese king or for Russians captured at Nerchinsk, who were put into their own

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\(^{57}\) This example is discussed at greater length in chapter 4.


\(^{59}\) Ibid., p. 61.
company in 1683, for many Jurchen subjects of the Aisin Gioro, the banners were initially meant as a place where they could be managed and supervised. Thus, the banners were, from the beginning, designed not only to reward prior loyal service, but to make loyal subjects out of potentially restive populations.

In imperial Russia, a similar sort of dynamic is apparent. The nobility or other wealthy or landed elite of conquered territories were frequently granted entry into the Russian noble class, and the imperial elite included Tatars, Baltic Germans, Finns, Poles and others. In the Baltic provinces of Estonia and Livonia, after the 1710 Russian conquest, the local German elite not only had their privileges preserved, but extended, and this population not only helped rule this newly acquired territory, but made substantial contributions to the empire’s central administration. During the sixteenth century, numerous Muslim Nogai Tatar aristocrats were brought into imperial service, and some were granted large estates. By the early eighteenth century, many of their descendants had become Russified, and they made up a substantial portion of the most powerful members of the imperial nobility. The annexation manifesto issued by Catherine the Great on the occasion of the annexation of Crimea in the late eighteenth century explicitly promised the Crimean Tatar murza elite the “rights and privileges enjoyed by a Russian of [their] status” in exchange for their loyalty. Though most murzas were stripped of noble status in 1840, their loss of this status was tied to a process of politicizing ethnicity and

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60 On the Russian banner company, see Ibid., p. 85.


62 Ibid., pp. 73-75.

63 Ibid., p. 42.

64 Ibid., p. 152.
confession under Nicholas I that can perhaps be productively compared to the Qianlong emperor’s ethnicization of banner identity in the 1750s. In general, in the Russian empire, the inclusion of conquered elites in the ranks of the nobility was seen as a way to incorporate new territory and gain those elites’ loyalty to the tsar.

In the Ottoman empire, the elite selected through the devşirme system were exclusively non-Muslim and non-Turkish, though their conversion to Islam was an essential part of the training process. The extent to which the inclusion in the elite of Greeks, Slavs, and the like was meant to integrate the broader conquered populations from which they came should not be exaggerated. Enslaving Muslims was forbidden under Islamic law, and one of the central goals of the Ottoman court was to create an elite with few loyalties outside the palace. However, some Ottoman bureaucrats saw the diversity of the devşirme elite as important to their function, with the sixteenth-century bureaucrat and intellectual Mustafa Ali arguing that ethnic heterogeneity brought with it new and valuable skills and traits, even if it created the possibility for ethnic conflict.

Bureaucracy and Loyalty

To this point, the shared features of the Japanese, Ottoman, Qing, and Russian service elites have been presented atemporally. But to fully understand the purpose and structure of service elites, it is essential to consider the ways in which states reshaped them over time. The

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66 Itkowitz, Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition, p. 60. Kunt, Sultan’s Servants, pp. 32-33. Kunt makes the point that because the populations from whom devşirme were taken were inhabitants of a Muslim state, that they should, according to Islamic law, have been safe from enslavement as well. But despite the Ottomans ignoring this prohibition, it still seems clear that the Ottoman court treated being a non-Muslim was a sufficient and necessary condition to be eligible for the devşirme.

early modern states in question all made substantial moves toward rationalizing the administration of their service elites. In particular, there was a general trend away from granting elites the right to inherit particular privileges tied to an individual family line based on the unique character of its relationship to the sovereign and toward granting standardized privileges tied to shared elite status. This trend can be understood as the rationalization of privilege. In addition, there were moves to rationalize service, by standardizing expectations for elite servitors, and creating hierarchical systems of administration in which promotion was the result of merit, not of inheritance. The result of these two trends was a ritual relationship between ruler and member of the service elite that was itself a form of depersonalization and rationalization. Most members of a service elite had no personal relationship to the ruler, but only a ritual relationship mediated by their status. Thus, though service elites were tied to what Weber would term a patrimonial state, in that they were treated ritually as members of the ruler’s household, when serving in civil or military administration they did not exhibit the characteristic features of what Weber calls “patrimonial officialdom.” That is, on account of the rationalization of their service and privilege, service elites did not treat the offices they held “as a personal right,” nor was their selection, except at the highest levels of administration, “based on personal trust,” and, in contrast to the Weberian idea that patrimonial rule had a natural decentralizing and disintegrating effect on administration, service elites contributed to the centralization of power.68

The Ottoman Empire exhibited perhaps the lowest degree of rationalization of its elite. However, the establishment of the devşirme system in the late fourteenth century, though not replacing the granting of timar fiefs, was a step toward the regularization of administration and

the centralization of authority. The *timar* system made Ottoman military service men into landholders who were required to supply a certain number of soldiers, determined on the basis of the size of their landholding, when troops were mustered.\textsuperscript{69} Thus, the *timar* were a semi-feudal arrangement that decentralized the administration of both land and people, entrusting it to hereditary holders of particular tracts of land. In contrast, though *devşirme* levies were irregularly conducted, those selected in them were subject to a fairly standardized training process, with education in specialized skills depending on where they were to be employed.\textsuperscript{70} Elites selected via *devşirme* did not have hereditary responsibility for, or ownership of, specific territories, and were employed in particular posts according to the need of the government and the sultan. As such, the increased prominence of the *devşirme* elite in the highest ranks of Ottoman government in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries represented a clear move toward a more bureaucratic form of administration.

Edo Japan, like the Ottoman Empire, retained certain elements that have often been seen as “feudal” in the political organization of its elite.\textsuperscript{71} Most important for our purposes is that most members of the samurai status group did not have a direct relationship to the shogun, but were instead bound to the *daimyō* who ruled their domain, who were themselves vassals of the shogun. However, there are two crucial ways in which the Tokugawa order, and in particular the organization of its elite, was shaped by conscious attempts at bureaucratization and rationalization. The first, and perhaps less important one, is that *daimyō* themselves had fairly


\textsuperscript{70} Yilmaz, “Becoming a *Devşirme*,” pp. 122-124.

impersonal relationships with the Tokugawa shogun and the shogun had greater authority over the *daimyō*, in particular the *daimyō* who had been hereditary vassals of the Tokugawa prior to their takeover of the entirety of Japan (Jap. 譜代大名 *fudai daimyō*), than had been the case earlier in Japan’s history.\(^72\) Most importantly, though occurring only rarely in practice, *daimyō* could be and were dispossessed or transferred on account of their conduct in office.\(^73\) In the end, though, *daimyō* retained broad authority over their domains, and the more important trend occurred with domains, where samurai retainers, a far more numerically important part of the samurai elite than *daimyō* themselves, saw their “feudal” privileges largely abrogated. As discussed above, retainers were drawn into cities, paid stipends rather than receiving hereditary authority over fiefs, and used as officials who could be promoted or fired on the basis of their performance or the desires of their lord. That is, at the domain level, in the Tokugawa period, Japanese samurai were a bureaucratized elite, whose relationship to their lord was formalized on the basis of status, rather than personal and “sealed in blood,” as it had been before.\(^74\)

In imperial Russia, though the noble class retained ownership of large estates, it too was subjected to an intense process of rationalizing reform, particularly during the rule of Peter the Great. The first important step occurred earlier, with the aforementioned *Ulozhenie* of 1649. The *Ulozhenie* guaranteed many of the rights of what Richard Hellie calls the “middle service class,” in particular the enserfment of the peasantry. At the same time, much of their responsibility of local administration was removed, meaning that Russia was moving away from a system of

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74 Hall, “Feudalism in Japan,” p. 47.
hereditary political rights over particular territory to one in which the nobility provided service to
the court, which then governed the entire country.\textsuperscript{75} Peter went much further. The introduction of
the Table of Ranks (Rus. \textit{Tabel’ o rangakh}) meant that nobles in imperial service were treated as
members of a ranked bureaucracy in which one’s position was, at least theoretically, to be based
on merit, not hereditary right. And, though it made it possible for commoners to hold official
posts, by providing for the ennoblement of those who reached even moderately high rank, it
ensured the link between noble status and service to the crown.\textsuperscript{76}

The Qing, too, is an example of the bureaucratization of the service class. Though the
banners, created during the rise of Nurhaci in the early seventeenth century, were much younger
than the elites of both Russia and Japan, which descended from older landed aristocracies, in
their initial form banners were the personal property of individual princes, and companies were
usually controlled by hereditary captains. As described in chapter 1, this system was extensively
revised over the course of the seventeenth century, and particularly under the rule of the
Yongzheng emperor, with the imperial court taking direct control over all banners, and
appointments within the banners increasingly made on the basis of merit rather than hereditary
right. Banner people were subject to intensive bureaucratic management, with triennial censuses
counting every male of military age. Indeed, the degree of oversight of the banner population so
far exceeded that of ordinary commoners that the number of banner officials was probably

48-72.

\textsuperscript{76} Lindsey Hughes, \textit{Russia in the Age of Peter the Great} (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), pp. 180-
185.
greater than the number of civil officials, despite the overall banner population making up a mere 2 percent of the empire’s total.77

In broad terms, service elites can be understood as an institutional answer to problems associated with the territorial expansion and growth of the elite population in several of the most important states of early modern Eurasia. In their early years, each of the states discussed here relied on the particular and personal relationships of individual servitors to the ruler. Rulers saw these servitors as fundamental to their power, but recognized that to use them to govern and defend the larger territories acquired through conquest and fill the more complex bureaucracies developed through political reforms required the growth of the service class beyond what the ruler and his inner court could personally manage. But, by transforming the service class into a full-fledged service elite status group, with mostly standardized rights and duties, and a mostly fictive, ritualized relationship to the ruler, a dynasty could hope to win its continued loyalty and ensure its continued usefulness. Service elites were subject to intensive state management and oversight, at least compared to the rest of the population, with the goal of creating a form of loyalty based not on a personal relationship to the ruler, but a rationalized and bureaucratic one – what one might call “bureaucratized loyalty.” John Hall’s summary of the change in the nature of samurai status in Bizen domain in the Tokugawa offer an apt description of the general process that unfolded among all service elite groups: “personal vassalage privately rewarded by enfeoffment was giving way to a system of military statuses which fed into a civil and military bureaucracy. Loyalty was becoming a principle rather than a private commitment.”78


Service elites were not simply a step along the road from feudalism to Weberian rationalized bureaucracy, and they did not transform into some component of the modern states governing China, Japan, Turkey, or Russia. Rather, they were a fairly successful attempt to marry older elite institutions with complex bureaucratic forms capable of maintaining centralized administration over a large territory. In the end, each service elite would only come to its final end through the wholesale and often-violent restructuring of the social order: the 1826 forced disbandment and massacre of the Ottoman janissaries, the 1868 Meiji Restoration in Japan, the 1911 revolution in China, and the 1917 revolution in Russia.
**Reign Names, Dates, and Abbreviations**

CD: Chongde 崇德 (1636-1643)

DG: Daoguang 道光 (1821-1850)

GX: Guangxu 光緒 (1875-1908)

JQ: Jiaqing 嘉慶 (1796-1820)

KX: Kangxi 康熙 (1662-1722)

QL: Qianlong 乾隆 (1736-1795)

SZ: Shunzhi 順治 (1644-1661)

TC: Tiancong 天聰 (1627-1635)

TZ: Tongzhi 同治 (1862-1874)

XF: Xianfeng 咸豐 (1851-1861)

XT: Xuantong 宣統 (1909-1911)

YZ: Yongzheng 雍正 (1723-1735)
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DOCUMENT ABBREVIATIONS

DQHD: Da Qing huidian 大清會典 (Administrative Code of the Qing Dynasty). See full bibliographic detail under “Published Sources.”

GZSL: Gaozong Chun huangdi shil 高宗純皇帝實錄 (Veritable Records of the Qianlong Emperor). See full bibliographic detail in the entry “QSL” under “Archives and Full-Text Bases.”

HKTB: Huke tiben 戶科題本 (Routine memorial of the Board of Revenue, bilingual).

HWCF: Hanwen chengwen 漢文呈文 (Chinese-language petition).

HWFP: Hanwen fupian 漢文附片 (Chinese-language attachment).

HWLFZZ: Hanwen lufu zouzhe 漢文錄副奏折 (Chinese-language palace memorial, Grand Council copy).

HWZPZZ: Hanwen zhupi zouzhe 漢文硃批奏摺 (Chinese-language vermillion-rescripted palace memorial).

HWZW: Hanwen ziwen 漢文咨文 (Chinese-language lateral communication).

KXCMWZPZZ: Kangxi chao Manwen zhupi zouzhe quanyi 康熙朝滿文朱批奏折全譯 (Complete Translation of the Kangxi-period Manchu-language Vermillion-rescripted Palace Memorials). See full bibliographic detail under “Published Sources.”

LKTB: Like tiben 吏科題本 (Routine memorial of the Board of Personnel, bilingual).

MHHBLFZZ: Man-Han hebi lufu zouzhe 滿漢合璧錄副奏摺 (Manchu-Chinese bilingual palace memorial, Grand Council copy).

MHHBZPZZ: Man-Han hebi zhupi zouzhe 滿漢合璧硃批奏摺 (Manchu-Chinese bilingual vermillion-rescripted palace memorial).

MWLFZZ: Manwen lufu zouzhe 滿文錄副奏摺 (Manchu-language palace memorial, Grand Council copy).

MWHKTB: Manwen huke tiben 滿文戶科題本 (Manchu-language routine memorial of the Board of Revenue, generally from the very early Qing).

MWZPZZ: Manwen zhupi zouzhe 滿文硃批奏摺 (Manchu-language vermillion-rescripted palace memorial).
QDBQTZ: Qinding baqi tongzhi 欽定八旗通志 (Imperially-commissioned Comprehensive Gazetteer of the Eight Banners). See full bibliographic detail under “Published Sources.”

RZSL: Renzong Rui huangdi shilu 仁宗睿皇帝實錄 (Veritable Records of the Jiaqing Emperor). See full bibliographic detail in the entry “QSL” under “Archives and Full-Text Bases.”

SYD: Shangyu dang 上諭檔 (Archive of Imperial Edict). Accessed at FHA.

SZRSL: Shengzu Ren huangdi shilu 聖祖仁皇帝實錄 (Veritable Records of the Kangxi Emperor). See full bibliographic detail in the entry “QSL” under “Archives and Full-Text Bases.”

SZXSL: Shizong Xian huangdi shilu 世宗憲皇帝實錄 (Veritable Records of the Yongzheng Emperor). See full bibliographic detail in the entry “QSL” under “Archives and Full-Text Bases.”

SZZSL: Shizu Zhang huangdi shilu 世祖章皇帝實錄 (Veritable Records of the Shunzhi Emperor). See full bibliographic detail in the entry “QSL” under “Archives and Full-Text Bases.”

TZWSL: Tiancong Wen huangdi shilu 天聰文皇帝實錄 (Veritable Records of the Reign of Hong Taiji). See full bibliographic detail in the entry “QSL” under “Archives and Full-Text Bases.”

XKTB: Xingke tiben 刑科題本 (Routine memorial of the Board of Punishments, bilingual)

XTZJ: Xuantong zhengji 宣統政紀 (A Record of Political Affairs in the Xuantong Period). This constitutes the Veritable Records of the Xuantong period. See full bibliographic detail in the entry “QSL” under “Archives and Full-Text Bases.”


YZBQSY: Yongzheng baqi shengyu 雍正八旗聖諭 (Imperial Edicts to the Eight Banners Issued by the Yongzheng Emperor). Manchu edition titled Dergi hese jakün güsade wasimuhangge (Imperial Edicts Issued to the Eight Banners). HYL copy used.

YZCMWZPZZ: Yongzheng chao Manwen zhupi zouze quanyi 雍正朝滿文朱批奏折全譯 (Complete Translation of the Yongzheng-period Manchu-language Vermillion-rescripted Palace Memorials). See full bibliographic detail under “Published Sources.”

ARCHIVES AND FULL-TEXT DATABASES

FHA: First Historical Archives 中国第一历史档案馆, Beijing.
HYL: Harvard-Yenching Library, Rare Books Room, Cambridge, MA.

MQNAF: Ming-Qing Archives Name Authority File 人名權威資料查詢. Institute of History and Philology 歷史語言研究所 of Academia Sinica 中央研究院. Taipei.

NPM: National Palace Museum 國立故宮博物院, Taipei.

QSG: Qing shi gao 清史稿 (Draft History of the Qing). Chief Editor Zhao Erxun 趙爾巽. Scripta Sinica database 漢籍全文資料庫. Published by the Institute of History and Philology 歷史語言研究所 of Academia Sinica 中央研究院. Taipei.

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