The Yoga of Dying: Xuanzang on the Nature of Death

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The Yoga of Dying: Xuanzang on the Nature of Death

A dissertation

by

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Abstract

This study reclaims the investigation undertaken by Xuanzang (602-667 C.E.) 玄奘, the translator and peripatetic scholar-monk of the Tang Dynasty, and his translation team, into the nature of dying. It conforms to the chronology of the translation and exegesis of the Buddhist texts, including the ancient Āgamas, the recorded discourses of the Buddha, the Mahāvibhāṣa, the Great Abhidharma Commentary, and the foundational works of the subsequent Abhidharma and Yogācāra scholars, undertaken by Xuanzang, and his coterie of scholars and translators, from 645 to 660 C.E. In his comprehensive analyses and translations of the Indic texts on dying, and in his compilation, Demonstration of Consciousness-only, Xuanzang examines the Buddhist teachings on no-self, karma, and reincarnation. In his analysis of the scriptures, he attempts to reconcile the core commitments to the Buddhist doctrines of karma and reincarnation with the tenet of no-self. With the Buddhist theory of the indriyas, attested in the ancient Āgamas, Xuanzang determines that no enduring or permanent self is lost in dying. The corpus of Abhidharma and Yogācāra Buddhist texts translated by Xuanzang and his coterie describes how, by cultivating the skillful indriyas, the spiritual faculties of sentient life, the karma of a sentient being can be improved, as well as the quality of dying and the afterlife. This study uses a source criticism research methodology to investigate the contributions made by Xuanzang on the subject of dying without a self. It finds that within their exegeses and translations of the Abhidharma and Yogācāra texts, Xuanzang and his collaborators, restore the Buddhist tenets of no-self, karma, and reincarnation, and provide the doctrinal basis for deathbed rituals that are practiced across East Asia today.
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Romanization Conventions

This dissertation follows the International Alphabet of Sanskrit Transliteration (IAST), standard Pinyin for Chinese, and Wylie for Tibetan.

Following general scholarly convention, the plural form of a Sanskrit word, for example, indriya, will be romanized as indriyas, except when referring to a group of indriyas that are qualified by a specific number, or when the word appears in a compound form. In this case, the plural form, indriyāṇi, will be used. Examples of this are: pāñca-vedanēndriyāṇi and pāñca-karmēndriyāṇi. In compound words, or samāsas, a caret will be placed over the vowel. An example of this is: karmēndriyāṇi. The caret indicates a vowel strengthening that results from the euphonic combination, or saṃdhi, of two or more Sanskrit words forming a compound word.

An asterisk (*) appearing in front of a Japanese or Chinese book title indicates my English translation of said title. An asterisk appearing in front a Sanskrit word indicates that I have reconstructed the word based upon either the Chinese or Tibetan correlate. In the Tibetan texts used in this study, a slash (/) indicates a shad, a Tibetan punctuation mark. A slash also indicates a daṇḍa, a Sanskrit punctuation mark.
Introduction

In the final moments of his life, Xuanzang 玄奘 (602-667 C.E.) summons the last of his vital energy and recites two stanzas from the Tuṣita Buddha Sūtra.¹ He sits upright, in the meditative lotus position, surrounded by his followers in the Maitreya Buddha Hall of the Great Benevolence Temple大慈恩寺. According to the eye-witness account of his disciple, Daoshi 道世 (?-683), Xuanzang calmly and resolutely faces his death.² Huili 慧立 (615-?), in his biography of Xuanzang, writes that the redolent scent of incense hangs in the air surrounding the body of Xuanzang for forty-nine days after his death, the period during which the transmigratory being of the deceased attains rebirth. The first-hand reports of his “skillful death” (Chi.: shansi善死) provide corroboration that, in addition to the prodigious achievements of his life, Xuanzang, the pilgrim, scholar-monk, and polymath, was an expert on matters of dying and death. Based on the auspicious signs witnessed by those who were present at his death, it can be said that the attained master, Xuanzang, died well.

This study aims to reclaim the investigation undertaken by Xuanzang into the Brāhmaṇical doctrinal treatises, and the Abhidharma and Yogācāra texts of Indic Buddhism, on the nature of dying and death. It argues that, in their exegeses and translations of the Indic Brāhmaṇical and Buddhist texts, Xuanzang, with a coterie of scholars and scribes, brings Chinese Buddhist studies of dying and death, into a closer alignment with its rich Indic scriptural heritage. This dissertation employs a source criticism methodology to examine the similarities and the differences between the translations of the Indic Abhidharma and Yogācāra texts of Xuanzang and his scribes, with the

¹ For Xuanzang’s deathbed mise-en-scène, see Huili’s Biography of the Tripiṭaka Master (Sanzang Fashi zhuan 三藏法師傳), fascicle 10, at T.2053: 50.277.a10-b10.
² Daoshi’s Jade Forest of the Dharma Garden (Fayuan zhulin 法苑珠林), fascicle 16, at T.2122:53.406.a03-a15.
versions of the same texts available in Chinese, Tibetan, and Sanskrit. It endeavors to illustrate the efforts made by Xuanzang and his team of scholars, in their exegeses and translations of the Abhidharmā and Yogācāra scriptures, to exorcise the “spiritual soul” (Chi.: shenwo 神我) from Chinese Buddhism.

Xuanzang was ordained as a monk at the age of thirteen in Luoyang, a village in Henan Province in Central China. In his biography of Xuanzang, Huili writes that as novice monk, Xuanzang intently studied the Indic Buddhist texts that were available to monastic scholars in seventh century China. While portions of the body of the Abhidharma and Yogācāra texts were available to him in piecemeal form, Xuanzang was dissatisfied with the fragmentary nature of the documents and concerned about the fidelity of the existing Chinese translations to the Sanskrit texts. After reading portions of the Basis for Yoga Practitioners (Skt.: Yogācārabhūmi), by Asaṅga, in a translation by Paramātha 真諦 (499-569 C.E.), the sixth-century Chinese translator of the Yogācāra works, Xuanzang determines to travel to India to read the Indic Buddhist texts, in their complete form, in Sanskrit. At the age of twenty-four, he undertakes his famous journey to the Western Regions (Chi.: Xiyu 西域), to study with Indic Buddhist masters, retrieve the sūtras and

3 Michael Radich shows that by the mid-5th century, “shenwo had emerged in Chinese Buddhist contexts as a technical term for the ātman.” See his article, “Ideas about ‘Consciousness’ in Fifth and Sixth Century Chinese Buddhist Debates on the Survival of Death by the Spirit, and the Chinese Background to Amalavijñāna, in A Distant Mirror: Articulating Indic Ideas in Sixth and Seventh Century Chinese Buddhism (Hamburg: Hamburg Univ. Press, 2014), ed. Chen-kuo Lin and Michael Radich, 480. Yao Weiqun notes that after the introduction of Xuanzang’s “new translations” 新譯 in the early 7th century, the term was generally reserved for the technical term “psychic person” (puruṣa) in the Brahmāṇical philosophical systems. Yao writes of puruṣa: “the psychic person (puruṣa) is recognized as a spiritual substance. This singular substance exists independently of the ‘material nature’ (prakrti) of the Saṅkhya and Yoga school, while it manifests worldly functions through the transformation (parināma) of the material nature.” 神我是個被認為是一個精神性的實體，這一實體與數論及瑜伽派中的另一物質性的實體自性並列存在，對自性轉變出世間各種事物起作用. See Yao Weiqun, Indu Poluomen jiao zhexue yu Fojiao zhexue bijiao yanjiu (印度婆羅門教哲學與佛教哲學比較研究) (A Comparative Study on Indian Brāhmaṇical and Buddhist Philosophies), (Beijing: China Encyclopedia Press, 2004), 72.

4 For the modern reception of Xuanzang’s Records of the Journey to the West (Xiyu ji 西域記), see Benjamin Brose’s article, “Resurrecting Xuanzang: the Modern Travels of a Medieval Monk,” in Kiely and Jessup, eds. Buddhists and Buddhism in the History of 20th Century China (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2016), 143-176.
śāstras, and carry them, in his saddlebag, back to China.

After a death-defying passage through the Western Regions of Asia, Xuanzang establishes a residency at the Nālanda University in the Kingdom of Magadha in Northwestern India. During his five years at Nālanda, Xuanzang reads the Buddhist sūtras and śāstras in Sanskrit and studies and debates with the Indic Buddhist masters and scholars. At Nālanda University Xuanzang reads the Abhidharma, “The Higher Dharma,” the tradition of Buddhism that comprises the systematic exegesis on the Āgamas, the recorded discourses of the Buddha. With the Yogācāra master, Śīlabhadra, Xuanzang reads the scriptures of the Yogācāra, a tradition of Buddhism that describes the theoretical basis for the practice of yoga, or insight meditation. While living in India, Xuanzang discovers the full version of the Basis of Yoga Practitioners, the compendium of the practices and tenets of the Yogācāra tradition that is attributed to the fifth-century scholar, Asaṅga. In this text, Xuanzang finds methods by which the sentient being can improve karma, and the quality of dying through the practice of yoga.

Upon his return to China, Xuanzang and his collaborators, ensconced in a palatial translation studio (Chi.: yiguan 譯館) within the Imperial court of the Tang Emperors Taizong 唐太宗 (reign: 629-649 C.E.) and Gaozong 唐高宗 (reign: 649-683 C.E.), between the years of 645 and 660 C.E., engage in an ambitious translation project. At the request of the Emperor, Xuanzang is charged with supervising the translation of the Sanskrit texts he retrieved from India, and the retranslations of several Chinese versions of Indic Buddhist texts. Huili acknowledges that, in their massive translation project, Xuanzang and his collaborators endeavor to correct misunderstandings and distortions of the Buddhist doctrines that were introduced into the Abhidharma and Yogācāra texts by translators from previous centuries. Specifically, Xuanzang and his team, attempt to

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5 See Huili, Biography of the Tripiṭaka Master, fascicle 1, (T2053:50.222.c05).
expiate the entrenched doctrine of the spiritual soul, or *shenwo*, rendered into the existing Chinese translations of the Abhidharma and Yogācāra texts by earlier scholars. The translations of Xuanzang and his coterie are known as the, “the new translations” (Chi.: *xinyi* 新譯), in modern Buddhist studies scholarship, whereas the Chinese Buddhist texts translated prior to him are termed, “the old translations” (Chi.: *jiuyi* 舊譯).

It is compelling to imagine that the encounters with dying and death experienced by Xuanzang during his travels from China to India and back, informed his inquiry into the nature of mortality. His biographer, Huili, reports that Xuanzang, nearly dying of thirst while crossing the Taklamakan Desert of Central Asia, chants the *Heart Sūtra* as he prepares for death.  

While the stories of the existential anxiety of Xuanzang may be apocryphal, it can be reliably stated that, in their exegeses and translation of the Indic Buddhist texts, Xuanzang and his colleagues address weighty philosophical and doctrinal questions that surround the nature of dying and death. These questions include: What is death? What is dying? What is dying well? What is a pious death? This study follows the fundamental questions about dying and death that Xuanzang and his collaborators investigate in their exegeses and translations of the Indic Buddhist texts. In their analyses of the ancient Indic Buddhist scriptures, Xuanzang and his colleagues return to the tenets regarding the impermanence of life and the idea of no-self (Skt.: *anātman*; Chi.: *wuwo* 無我). The doctrine of no-self means that a sentient being cannot be reduced to a singular or unchanging core that becomes reincarnated after death.

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7. In his 1990 study, *Selfless Persons: Imagery and Thought in Theravāda Buddhism* (Cambridge Univ. Press), 76, Collins describes the doctrine of self (Pāli: *attavada*; Skt.: *ātmavāda*) as rebuked by the Buddha. He writes: “it is the static, unalterable dogma which posits a permanent and reincarnating self of person which is the object of Buddhist censure. Thus, ‘the doctrine of self’ is one of the four forms of grasping (the others are sense-pleasures, (mere) rule-and-ritual, and ‘views.’) Speculation about the [or ‘a’] self’ (Pāli: *attanudīthi*; Skt.: *ātmanādṛṣṭi*) is a term used in the Sūtras for any specific views of self, all of which are rejected tout court.” In his his contribution, in “Buddhist Non-Self: The No-Owners Manual,” in the *Oxford Handbook of the Self* (New York: Oxford Univ.
During his investigations on the topic of dying and death in the Indic Buddhist scriptures, Xuanzang determines that death is a form of deprivation, the loss of a certain number of faculties (Skt: indriyas; Chi.: gen 根) that sustain life. Xuanzang comes to embrace a definition of death that is founded in the theory of the indriyas, a detailed explanatory account of the multiple components of sentient life, explicated in the Āgamas, and in other early Indic Buddhist texts. For Xuanzang, the conceptualization of death in terms of the loss and deprivation of the indriyas is congruent with the tenet of no-self. He and his collaborators, however, face grave difficulty in attempting to reconcile the doctrinal commitment to no-self to the idea of death as a form of deprivation. In his examination of the Buddhist scriptures on the nature of mortality, Xuanzang confronts difficult questions: What is lost in death, if not a person? When a sentient being dies, who, or what, dies? What becomes deceased?

This study conforms to the chronology of the systematic exegesis of dying conducted by Xuanzang, and his coterie of translators and scholars, during the early years of the Tang dynasty (618-907 C.E.). In their exegeses and translations of the texts, Xuanzang and his colleagues make a comprehensive analysis of the Buddhist doctrines on dying, death, and the natures of consciousness and reincarnation. Xuanzang and his collaborators begin their analysis of dying by investigating the Āgamas, the recorded discourses of the Buddha, the Mahāvibhāṣa, the great commentary on the Āgamas, and the foundational doctrinal treatises of the Abhidharma Buddhist scholars of Kaśmir. They examine the doctrinal work of the great Yogācāra Buddhist scholars, and

Press, 2011), 297-98, Siderits writes: “In modern discussions of the Buddha's teachings one sometimes finds it claimed that the Buddha only denied the existence of an empirical self, and not the existence of a self that transcends all possible experience. When, for instance, the Buddha points out that all the psychophysical elements (skandhas) lack the sort of permanence that a self would require, this proves that there is no self only given the additional premise that there is no more to the person than the empirically given elements. This would bring the Buddha's teachings more in line with the views of some of the Brāhmaṇical schools, such as Sāṃkhya and Vedānta. But this is not how the Buddhist philosophical tradition understood the Buddha's teachings. They took the doctrine of non-self to mean that there is no self, tout court.”
translate the texts of the two fifth-century scholars, Vasubandhu, and Asaṅga, and the commentaries on the Yogācāra texts written by the sixth-century scholars, Sthiramati, Dignāga and Dharmapāla. While immersed in an investigation of the ancient Indic texts, Xuanzang and his collaborators also examine the work of their contemporaries, Daoshi, Kuiji 窺基 (632-682 C.E.), and Daoxuan 道宣 (596-667 C.E.), the three philosophers who form the vanguard of Buddhist scholarship during the lifetime of Xuanzang.

Throughout this exhaustive study of the Indic texts and their Chinese exegeses, Xuanzang upholds his commitment to the Buddhist doctrine no-self. Ultimately the analysis of the Brāhmaṇical and Buddhist doctrines on the nature of mortality leads Xuanzang to his definition of the death of a sentient being in terms of the deprivation of a plural constituency of vital faculties, or indriyas, rather than the annihilation of a single entity. Notably, Xuanzang comes to determine that nothing in the form of a self is lost in dying or in death. In his exegeses of dying and death, Xuanzang and his colleagues aim to repudiate the existence of a self, ātman, or soul that transcends death and is reincarnated.

Xuanzang, and his translation team, make a concerted effort to banish the “spiritual soul

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8 Dharmapāla may have been a pupil of Dignāga, see Masaaki Hattori, Dignāga, on Perception: Being the Pratyakṣapariccheda of Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya from the Sanskrit Fragments and the Tibetan Versions (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard Univ. Press, 1968), 2. Very little of the work of Dharmapāla survives in the original Sanskrit. For bibliographical information on Dharmapāla’s corpus as it survives mainly in Chinese, see Tom Tillemans, Materials for the study of Āryaveda, Dharmapāla, and Candrakīrti: the Catuḥṣataka of Āryadeva, chapters XII and XIII with the commentaries of Dharmapāla and Candrakīrti (Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 2008), 1-2.

9 For the stipulation on the semantic range of the Sanskrit word ātman as similar to the semantic range of the English word “soul,” see William K. Mahony, “Concepts of the Soul in Indian Religions,” in Death, Afterlife, and the Soul, ed., Lawrence E. Sullivan (New York: MacMillan, 1987), 189: “If by soul one denotes a dimension to human life that is distinguished from corporeal existence and that to a large extent determines the nature of the human being, then one could rightly say that the various religions and philosophies of South Asia posit the existence of a soul (the most notable exception being the materialistic views of the Čārvāka and Lokāyata philosophies, which maintain that a person is nothing more than a conglomeration of physical matter.” Mahony translates the Buddhist terminology of anātman as “no-soul.”
that survives death” (Chi.: shen bumie 神不滅)\(^\text{10}\) from the textual corpus of Chinese Buddhism. The Buddhist debates around the existence, or the non-existence of the spiritual soul, span from third to the eighth century C.E.\(^\text{11}\) The textual dispute, regarding the role of the soul in dying and death, is illustrated in the choices, made by scholars over several centuries, in the translations of the Sanskrit words, ātman and pudgala, into Chinese. For example, in the Eastern Han dynasty (25-220 C.E.) the Buddhist translator of the Abhidharma texts, An Shigao 安世高 (fl. c. 148-180 C.E.), uses the word, shen, to translate the Brāhmanical idea of the ātman, and the Buddhist conceptualization of the pudgala.\(^\text{12}\) In his analysis of the translations of the Abhidharma treatises by An Shigao, Lai (1986) isolates two levels of meanings in the use of the word shen: first, shen describes the permanent ātman, soul, or self, and secondly, shen describes the part of the sentient being that bears karma from one life to the next. Of the two translation choices made by An Shigao, Lai writes: “If it is the former, then it was a mistake; but if it is the latter, without implying the former, then it is not illegitimate.”\(^\text{13}\)

In his study on the emergence of beliefs in the afterlife in early medieval China, Bokenkamp (2007) argues that between the second and the fifth centuries C.E.\(^\text{14}\) beliefs in the

\(^{10}\) For the translation of shen bu mie as “the spirit survives death,” see Michael Radich, “A ‘Prehistory’ to Chinese Debates on the Survival of Death by the Spirit, With a Focus on the Term Shishen 識神/Shenshi 神識,” Journal of Chinese Religions, 44.2 (2016), 106.

\(^{11}\) For the history of the term shen and its role in the arguments for the survivability of death in the centuries prior to Xuanzang, see Kawano Satoshi 河野訓, “Chū'u 'shin' kanyaku kō” 中有神漢訳考, in Higashi Ajia Bukkyō kenkyū 東アジア仏教研究 1 (2003), 6-12; also Walter Liebenthal, “Immortality of the Soul in Chinese Thought,” in Monumenta Nipponica 8, no. 1 (1952), 332-38.

\(^{12}\) Whalen Lai adduces the 3rd-century scholar Chen Hui's view that the shen survives death in Chen's commentary on An Shigao's Yinchi rujing 隱持人經: “When we examine Chen Hui's discussion of the ‘indestructible soul,’ we find that this shen-pu-mie doctrine pertains to the survival of the viññāna at death and its qualified continuance into the womb of its next rebirth.” See Lai's article, “The Early Chinese Buddhist Understanding of the Psyche: Chen Hui's Commentary on the Yin Chih Ju Ching,” in Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 9, no. 1 (1986), 87.

\(^{13}\) Ibid., 89.

afterlife and of rebirth became entrenched among both Buddhists and non-Buddhists in China. According to Paxton (1990), this is roughly the same period of time in the Latin West during which “attention began to focus on the resurrection of the dead and their care within the indefinite interim that would precede it.”

There is evidence that rites to propitiate the spirits of the war dead were first performed by the Emperor Taizong during the early years of the Tang Dynasty. These rituals are predicated on the notion of an intermediate state or bardo (Skt.: antarābhava; Chi.: zhongyou 中有) that precedes the reincarnation of the deceased into a new corporeal body.

Chinese beliefs in the afterlife and of rebirth operate according to multiple logics and have roots in both Buddhist teachings and pre-Buddhist Chinese antecedents. Stone (2016) refers to the complex of related beliefs in the afterlife and of rebirth following death in early medieval Japan as the “mortuary complex.” As Stone (2016) argues, pre-modern Japanese beliefs in the possibility of improving the course of dying operated according to multiple systems of “deathbed logic.” Stone (2016) describes these systems of “deathbed logic” as “a repertoire of resources that prove useful in dealing with the tensions and inconsistencies when studying approaches to dying and death.”

Rituals for the dying and the deceased practiced in early medieval China have deep roots in both Buddhist and pre-Buddhist customs. Nevertheless, core to the deathbed logic that emerges

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16 See “Tang Taizong’s Edict Ordering the Carrying Out of The Way of Rites of Purity for the War Dead” 唐太宗為戰亡人設齋行道詔, Guang Hongming ji 廣弘明集, fascicle 28, T2103:52.329.a08-20; cited in Ōtani Kōshō’s Tōdai no Bukkyō Girei 唐代的佛教儀礼 (*Tang Dynasty Buddhist Rituals*), vol. 2, 46.


18 According to Stone, *Right Thoughts at the Last Moment*, 7, foremost among the principles of this deathbed logic was the idea that “the last thought is so powerful as to override the wrongdoings of a lifetime, enabling a superior rebirth, or even liberation itself.”

19 Ibid., 5.
during the period studied by Bokenkamp (2007) is the belief in a permanent soul that departs the body at the moment of death and continues onto the afterlife. As Yü Ying-shih (1987) shows, by the Eastern Han Dynasty (25-220 C.E.), a variety of terms had emerged to denote the spiritual part of the human that survives death and continues onto the afterlife. These terms include “cloud soul” (Chi.: hun 魂), “white soul” (Chi: po 魄), “pnema” (Chi.: ling 靈), and “spirit” (Chi.: shen 神).

In the fifth century, the translators of the Abhidharma and Yogācāra texts from the Prajñā schools (Chi.: Bore zong 般若宗) of Chinese Buddhism, in the context of discussions of karma and rebirth, use the word spirit, or shen, to denote the pudgala. Here the scholars of the Prajñā schools refer to the pudgala as the part of sentient being that survives death and continues into the afterlife. In his translation of the Āgamas, the fifth-century Buddhist scholar, Gautama Saṃghadeva (Chi: Qutan Sengqietipo 瞿曇僧伽提婆), uses the word shen to describe the element of consciousness (Skt.: vijñāna) that is transmitted from one life to the next.

In their translations of the masterworks of the Indic Abhidharma and Yogācāra traditions, Xuanzang and his coterie of scholars strive to expiate the doctrines of the supernatural spirit, soul,

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20 Yü Ying-shih writes of the pre-Buddhist picture: “The general picture...reflects what all our evidence tells us, but no claim is made that the beliefs described constitute in any strict sense a unified belief system, much less the only one, embraced by all the Chinese of the Han empire throughout the four centuries of its existence.” See Yü Ying-shih, “O Soul, Come Back! A Study in The Changing Conceptions of The Soul and Afterlife in Pre-Buddhist China,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 47, no. 2 (1987), 363.

21 Yü Ying-shih, “Oh Soul, Come back!” 365: writes of the role of the hun and po in the death of the human: “At the moment when death first occurs, the living cannot bear to believe that their beloved one has really left them for good. The living must first assume that the departure of the hun-soul is only temporary. It is possible, then, that if the departed soul can be summoned back the dead may be brought to life. A person can be pronounced dead when the fū 復 (“summons”) ritual has failed to achieve its purpose.” For more on the interaction between the hun and po souls, see Yü, “Oh Soul, Come Back!” 369-378.

22 For instance, in the Ekottarikāgama 增壹阿含經, translated by Gautama Saṃghadeva in 397 C.E., the “seven abodes of consciousness” (Skt.: saptavijñāna-sthitayah) are rendered as “seven abodes of spirit” 七神止處 — see T125:2.7.30-31. Across his translation corpus, Xuanzang renders this Sanskrit terminology using the Chinese character shi 識, meaning, “consciousness,” while eschewing the character shen.
and person, entrenched within the Chinese Buddhist scriptures. In their seventh-century translations of the Abhidharma and Yogācāra texts, Xuanzang and his team of translators refrain from using the word \textit{shen} 神, unless they are specifically referring to the Brāhmaṇical \textit{ātman}. The word \textit{shen} is notably missing in their Chinese translations of the Indic texts containing the Buddhist teachings.

In the first English translation of the ninth chapter of the \textit{Treasury of Metaphysics} by Vasubandhu, the Russian Buddhist scholar, Stcherbatsky (1919), like Xuanzang centuries before him, takes the Buddhist \textit{pudgala} to be tantamount to an \textit{ātman}. In his translation of the Abhidharma masterwork of Vasubandhu, Stcherbatsky uses the word, soul, to describe the \textit{pudgala}. Implicit in this translation choice is the understanding by Stcherbatsky that the soul is equated to the \textit{pudgala}. Here Stcherbatsky follows the precedent established by Xuanzang and his colleagues that repudiates the use of the word, soul, in Buddhist discussions of dying and death.

The legacy of the translation decisions made by Xuanzang and his coterie of scholars and scribes to distance Buddhism from the notion of the soul is evident in the recent work of Stone (2016) and Watson (2014). In her study of deathbed rituals in medieval Japan, Stone (2016) makes the important point, that by using the word, soul, in a discussion of the Buddhist doctrine

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Introduction

of dying and death, scholars risk distorting the meaning of the Buddhist teachings. Stone writes: “The no-self doctrine rejects the notion of anything self-existent: unchanging, independent of conditions, existing under its own power.”26 This study takes a methodological cue from scholars ranging from Xuanzang to Stone, by avoiding the term soul in the discussions of the Buddhist texts on dying and death. The word, soul, is used only in discussions of the Brāhmaṇical doctrine of the ātman.

In his study of the Buddhist-Brāhmaṇical debates about the self, Watson (2014), crystalizes the question about the birth, death and the transmigration and reincarnation of the self as follows: “The Brāhmaṇical self, with its permanently unchanging essence, dissolves in Buddhism into a diachronic and synchronic plurality. The self, since it endures permanently, beyond death, is what explains reincarnation for the Brāhmaṇical schools. In other words, it is that which means we continue to be the same thing when we have a different body, in a different incarnation, or no body, between incarnations. How then can the Buddhists, in whose teachings reincarnation occupies an important place, explain the process?”27 This study follows the question eloquently posed by Watson (2006) in his examination of the Buddhist-Brāhmaṇical debates.

In their recent work on the influences of Xuanzang on the Buddhist doctrine, Sakuma (2006)28 and Yoshimura (2014)29 employ a source criticism30 based methodology that isolates the

26 Stone, Right Thoughts at the Last Moment, 12.
29 Yoshimura, A History of the Chinese Yogācāra Philosophy, 3-5.
30 Following Floss, who derives his definition from Biblical scholarship, this study stipulates that source criticism consists in the investigation of a source, that is “...a written document...in order to shed light on the origin/provenance and contexts of past historical events and/or people.” See his “Form, Source, and Redaction Criticism,” in the Oxford Handbook of Biblical Studies, edited by Judith M. Lieu and J. W. Rogerson (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2008), 30.
doctrinal position of Xuanzang and compares his texts with both previous and contemporary authors within the Indic Buddhist tradition, including Sthiramati and Dharmapāla. Source criticism methodology, often used in biblical studies, examines the full body of sources that are used by a translator or an author, to determine the final form of a scripture. Modern source criticism methodology was first employed in the analytical study of the sources of the Pentateuch, the first five books of the Hebrew Bible, in Hebrew, Greek, and Latin. This research method involves isolating and identifying the similarities and the differences between the early sources and the doctrine that is represented in the final version of the text. In the Buddhist source criticism methodology used in this study, the Tibetan and Sanskrit sources, and the earlier Chinese translations of the Indic texts used by Xuanzang in his exegesis of dying and death, are read and compared to the translations by Xuanzang of the same texts. For example, in determining the doctrinal position taken by Xuanzang on the Buddhist pudgala, references that are made to the pudgala by Vasubandhu in the Sanskrit, Tibetan, or earlier Chinese versions of the Treasury of Abhidharma, are compared to the translations of the same references to the pudgala in the translation of the Treasury of Abhidharma composed by Xuanzang. Where the original Sanskrit texts are not available, recourse is made to the Tibetan translations, or to the earlier Chinese versions of the sūtras and śāstras examined by Xuanzang.

Despite the historical importance of Xuanzang, and his proximity to, and his influence on, the Second Tang Emperor, Taizong, and the Third Tang Emperor, Gaozong, there is no secondary scholarship on the translation corpus of Xuanzang regarding the topics on dying and death. This study is the first exploration of the exegesis and translations of the Indic texts on the topic of dying and death conducted by Xuanzang and his large coterie of Buddhist scholars, commentators, translators, and scribes during the early years of the Tang dynasty. This examination follows the
exploration of Xuanzang into nature of what lives and dies, if not a self.

Using a textual analysis of the corpus of Xuanzang and his colleagues, this study treats the mode of translation employed by Xuanzang as a demonstration of the process by which he, and his Tang Buddhist collaborators, arrive at a conceptualization of dying and death that does not rely upon the presence, or the absence, of a spiritual soul. The first chapter describes the Buddhist enumeration of the *indriyas*, the foundational theory that Xuanzang uses to determine, in meticulous detail, what is lost when a sentient being dies. The second chapter examines the analysis of the Brāhmaṇical scriptures that Xuanzang employs in addressing the entrenched heterodox view of the deprivation of the ātman in dying. The third chapter examines the presentations of good, bad, and karmically neutral ways of dying that are illustrated in the Yogācāra portion of the translation corpus of Xuanzang and his collaborators. The final chapter examines the definition provided by Xuanzang in his translation of the Abhidharma and Yogācāra texts that describes how a sentient being, by improving the quality of the spiritual *indriyas*, can obtain a better death and rebirth.

In their exegesis and translations of the Abhidharma and Yogācāra canon, Xuanzang and his colleagues look to the Āgamas and examine the teachings of the Buddha on the topic of reincarnation. Xuanzang determines that the Buddha relies upon the theory of the *indriyas* to explain the locus of transmigration of a sentient being, from this life to the next. He then turns to an analysis of the ancient scriptures of the Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika traditions and examines how the theories of karma and the *indriyas* posited by the ancient Brāhmaṇical scholars, square with the ideas held by the contemporary Brāhmaṇical scholars at Nālanda. Xuanzang finds that the Brāhmaṇical scholars, past and present, cling to the notion of an enduring self that bears the karma of the sentient being. Xuanzang determines that, because the karma of Buddhism is mutable, unlike
the permanent and unchanging soul of the Brāhmaṇical tradition, a sentient being can improve the quality of dying and the afterlife. By practicing yoga and by performing meritorious actions, even a sentient being freighted with bad karma can alter and improve the quality of death and afterlife. In his exegesis of dying, Xuanzang rediscovers the message of the Buddha, that for all sentient beings, karma is not destiny.
Chapter 1: What is Death?

What is death? In 645 C.E., Xuanzang, after sixteen years of travelling from China to India and back, returns home to Chang'an to devote himself to the work of translating the Indic sūtras he gathers during his residency in India. After nearly dying of thirst during a perilous crossing of the Taklamakan desert, Xuanzang turns to Buddhism to understand his existential fear of death. In his efforts to master his fear of dying and death, Xuanzang returns to the ancient Indic scriptures that describe the impermanence of life and the tenet of no-self. Tranquility comes to Xuanzang in his recognition that death marks a transition in the cycle of death and rebirth rather than the end of an enduring or unchanging self. This chapter analyzes the exegetical process undertaken by Xuanzang in his exploration into the nature of death.

During his study of the Indic Buddhist scriptures of dying and death, Xuanzang determines that death is a particular form of deprivation, the loss of a certain number of faculties (Skt.: indriyas; Chi.: gen 根) that sustain life. The definition of death that Xuanzang comes to endorse, emerges out of his uncompromising commitment to the core Buddhist tenet of no-self. The doctrine of no-self means that a sentient being cannot be reduced to any singular or unchanging core that becomes reincarnated after death. For Xuanzang, the definition of death, as the loss of an immortal soul, is antithetical to the Buddhist ideal of liberation, the relinquishment of clinging to a static, or unchanging self. The doctrine of no-self presents a thorny question, however: What is lost in death if not a self? Simply put, when an individual dies, who, or what dies?

This chapter examines the systematic discussions on the nature of death found in the translations of the early Indic Buddhist literature by Xuanzang. It follows the exegesis of death conducted by Xuanzang and begins with his analysis of the Abhidharma, the elaboration of the ancient sūtras that contain the teachings of the Buddha. After examining and translating the
Abhidharma texts, Xuanzang turns to the Yogācāra discussions on the theory of the *indriyas*, the doctrine that defines and categorizes the faculties that maintain the vital processes of sentient life. Throughout his exhaustive study of the Indic texts, Xuanzang upholds his commitment to the Buddhist doctrine no-self. Ultimately his analysis leads him to define the death of a sentient being as the deprivation of a plural constituency of vital faculties, or *indriyas*, rather than as the annihilation of any single living entity.

This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section presents the translation and explication by Xuanzang of the Abhidharma taxonomy of the twenty-two *indriyas*. It addresses two questions: What are the essential components of life? What is deprived in death? The second section examines the response offered by Xuanzang to the related question: What distinguishes the living organism from the corpse?

**Section One: What are the Essential Components of Life?**

Xuanzang begins his exploration into the nature of death by examining the essential components of life. In coming to his definition of death, Xuanzang conducts an intensive examination of the theory of the *indriyas*, the doctrine that describes the physical and intrapsychic strengths and abilities that provide the foundational basis for all sentient life. The taxonomies of different *indriyas*, the listings of the faculties that compose all species of sentient life, are attested in the Āgamas, and other Buddhist and Brāhmaṇical texts. For Xuanzang, the *indriyas* are roughly equivalent to the modern-day human genome.31 The *indriyas* are the primary elements of life that

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31 This study employs the term “genome” merely to indicate the range of conspecific traits that are inherited by members of a certain genus of sentient being. In Xuanzang’s cosmological understanding, the six genera of sentient beings – namely, celestials, humans, non-human animals, hungry-ghosts, hellish beings, and transitory beings – are each defined by a specific number and type of faculties that is pre-determined by phylogenetics. However, this number and type of faculties will vary within a specific genus based upon the factor of dhātu or transmigratory realm. This idea of variability of genetic trait depending upon the specific karmic standing of the individual is not captured under the conventional modern understanding of the inheratability of genetic traits,
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are responsible for initiating and sustaining the physical and cognitive functions that allow a sentient being to survive and thrive. The number and the type of indriyas that are possessed by a sentient being determines the range of capacities that a sentient being can execute, as well as the conditions that are required for its ongoing survival. Because the indriyas are regarded as the essential elements that sustain life, the deterioration of the indriyas determines the ultimate demise of a sentient being. The definition of death that Xuanzang comes to endorse during his comprehensive exegesis of the Buddhist and Brāhmaṇical texts, is thus founded on the theory of the indriyas.

The word, indriya, is derived from the verbal root √ind, which means, “to be powerful.” The word, indriya, first appears in the Rg Veda and is frequently mentioned in the Hindu and Buddhist literature. In the ancient scriptures, the word indriya refers to the spiritual and physical powers that belong to Indra, the supreme deity of the Vedic pantheon. Because the word indriya is associated with the name of the most powerful of the Hindu deities, it is synonymous with potency. The doctrine of the indriyas is significant within the Buddhist tradition, as in his sermons, the Buddha expounds upon the indriyas as the essential components of life.

In an effort to provide an account of death that conforms to the Buddhist teachings, the

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according to which “a genetic individual is a genetically homogenous unit.” See Wilson's clear stipulation on the conventional modern scientific notion of genetic individuality in *Biological Individuality: The Identity and Persistence of Living Entities* (New York: Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Biology, 1999), 64-65. Wilson's view of what constitutes a biological individual is predicated on the idea of numerical identity of all species defined by a discrete genetic code. This entails that “a population of clones is a single genetic individual whether the clones are physically connected or not.” As this study argues, Xuanzang maintains a less rigid definition of “conspecificity” (Skt.: sabhāgatā; Chi.: tongzhōng fēn 同眾分) that is predicated on qualitative identity of biological traits within a given species, without implying a strict sense of numerical identity of genome across all members of a species.

Mizuno Kōgen 水野弘元 (1901-2006) writes: “the word indriya has existed since the time of the Rg Vedas. Initially, it was regarded as a descriptor for or quality of the god Indra. Since Indra possesses predominant power among the gods, he is thus regarded to indicate the 'sovereign power.' Later, it [the word] is taken to represent humanity's powers of life, physical force, natural ability, perception, movement, etc.” – see Mizuno Kōgen Anthology (ed. Shi Huimin 释惠敏, 2008), 133.
Abhidharma editors closely examine the nature and characteristics of the *indriyas*. The literature of the Northern transmission of the Buddhist Abhidharma offers the earliest attempt to systematize the contents of the sermons of the Buddha on the topic of the *indriyas* into a logically-ordered taxonomy of the *indriyas.* Skilling observes that “no single discourse in Pāli lists all twenty-two faculties.” The list of the twenty-two *indriyas* first appears in the *Jñānaprasthāna śāstra*, the *Treatise on the Basis of Gnosis*, a commentary on sūtra literature dating to the first century B.C.E.

The taxonomy of the twenty-two *indriyas* is first standardized and codified in the *Mahāvibhāṣa*, a voluminous compendium written by five hundred Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma experts around 150 C.E. The Sarvāstivādin authors of the *Mahāvibhāṣa* present a consolidated list of the twenty-two *indriyas* that are clustered into five discrete sets. Essentially, the Sarvāstivādin scholars catalog the twenty-two *indriyas* and then group them into taxonomic categories that

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33 On the frequent appearance of the Buddha's disputes with the Brahmin Jātiśroṇa (studied in chapter 2) in intra-Buddhist doctrinal debates about the nature of the *indriya*, Skilling remarks: “*indriya* does not seem to figure conspicuously, however, in debates between the Buddhist and other Indian traditions, although further research may qualify this statement. Whatever the case, sūtra citation was *hors de propos* in debates with ‘outsiders’ or non-Buddhists; it mattered only in debates among the Buddhists themselves.” See Skilling, “Discourse on the Twenty-Two Faculties. Translated From Śamathadeva’s *Upāyikā-Tīkā*,” In L. Shravak abd C. Willemen, eds., *Dharmapracayah: Aspects of Buddhist Studies, Essays in Honour of Professor Narayan Hemandas Samtani* (Delhi: Buddhist World Press, 2012), 430. Skilling hedges slightly on this provocative stance later on, citing Rhys Davids and Stede's *Pāli Text Society: Pāli-English Dictionary* (London: Routledge and Kegan, 1922, reprint 1972, 122) entry that explains: “this system of 22 *indriyāṇi* reflects a revised and more elaborate form of the 25 (or 23) categories tattvas] of the Sāṁkhya philosophy.” The present investigation does not assume any direct correlation or historical link between Buddhist or Brāhmaṇical taxonomies of faculties. Rather, in taking a methodological cue from Skilling, “Discourse on the Twenty-Two Faculties,” the examination of the *Jātiśroṇa sūtra* in chapter 2 of this dissertation focuses on the immediate context of the usage of this particular *sūtra* within intra-Buddhist doctrinal debates, while recognizing the general commensurability of the key term – the *indriya* – in both parties to the broader rationalistic tradition of Buddhist-Brāhmaṇical debate. Disputes aired within the more ecumenical forum of this logical system are believed to withstand the scrutiny of different religious and philosophical traditions, and their logical conclusions believed to stand independently of any religious dogma.

correspond to different forms of sentient life. This is the first time a systematic taxonomy of this nature appears in the Buddhist literature. The Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma taxonomy of the *indriyas* thus becomes the standard from the second century to the present day.

In the fourth century, the prodigious Abhidharma scholar, Vasubandhu, reaffirms the ancient doctrine of the twenty-two *indriyas* in his *Treasury of Abhidharma*. While defending the doctrinal edifice of the twenty-two *indriyas* as presented in the *Mahāvibhāṣa*, Vasubandhu takes steps to streamline the taxonomy of twenty-two faculties into ten clear and cohesive verses. Xuanzang, in his translations of the *Mahāvibhāṣa*, and the *Treasury of Abhidharma*, reaffirms the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma teachings of the faculties, while integrating the rigorous and critical perspectives given by Vasubandhu on the *indriyas* in his writings. Xuanzang relies upon these venerable source materials to come to his determination that death is the deprivation of the *indriyas*.

**Xuanzang on the Indriyas**

In his development of the definition of death, Xuanzang examines the original Abhidharma literature, and the commentary by Vasubandhu, on the subject of the taxonomy of the twenty-two *indriyas*. The doctrine of the *indriyas* that is explicated in the Abhidharma sources provides Xuanzang with the doctrinal foundations for his investigation into the nature of death. In his compilation and translation of the entire *Mahāvibhāṣa*, the *Great Abhidharma Commentary*, Xuanzang codifies a standard taxonomy of the twenty-two *indriyas* into specific sequences and precise categories. Hewing closely to text of the *Mahāvibhāṣa*, Xuanzang enumerates and defines the *indriyas*, and organizes them into a coherent sequence of twenty-two faculties that are contained within five groups. The taxonomy of the *indriyas* derived by Xuanzang is elaborated in
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both the Abhidharma and Yogācāra portions of his translation corpus. The taxonomy of the twenty-two indriyas that is established by Xuanzang becomes the theoretical paradigm, and the inviolable standard, that is followed by all scholars of Buddhism in East Asia.

Xuanzang translates the existing portions of the Mahāvibhāṣa in China, and the recovered portions of the Mahāvibhāṣa from India, from the original Sanskrit into Chinese, between August 18th, 656 C.E. and July 27th, 659 C.E. He completes this project while ensconced in a capacious studio inside the Imperial Palace of the Tang Emperor Gaozong. Xuanzang is assisted by a staff of twenty scribes who transcribe, proofread, and polish the verse and prose of Xuanzang’s oral renditions of the texts of the Mahāvibhāṣa. His coterie of translators and scribes also endeavor to corroborate Xuanzang’s oral translations with the Chinese and Indic source materials. The materials found in the Mahāvibhāṣa constitute the most complete presentation of the twenty-two indriyas available in any source. Xuanzang’s translation of the Mahāvibhāṣa is significant in that it makes the doctrine and systematic exegesis of the indriyas available for the first time to a Chinese readership.

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36 On the Abhidharma side, the sources transmitted by Xuanzang back to the Capital of Chang’an of China’s Tang Dynasty include Mahāvibhāṣa, the sourcebook upon which the Mahāvibhāṣa is roughly structured, and the JñāP, among a number of other works -- constituting the entirety of parts one, two, and four Taishō volumes, Titles No. 1536-44, 1545, and 1558-1563. Colophon of the latter work of Taishō, the Dhātu-kāya translated by Xuanzang in 3 fascicles says that this treatise is the fourth of six “legs” of the exegetical literature on the Jñānaprasthāna. 界身足論者，說一切有部 省智 六足之一足也 (T1540:26.625, c10). Completed on Fri., July 14th, 663 唐總明 三年六月四日, according to the author of this colophon, disciple Kuiji 窺基 (or Ji, for short): Japanese pronunciation: Ki). This study refers to him by his full name. For the analysis of the biographical sources see Stanley Weinstein's groundbreaking study -- “A Biographical Study of Tz’ü-ēn,” Monumenta Nipponica 15 (1959), 119-49. The list is mentioned in this work translated by Xuanzang, titled Treatise on the Categories and Grades. The list of twenty-two faculties according to Xuanzang’s hereafter standard sequence is also found in his translation of Sthiramati’s 安慧 Commentary on the Authentic Doctrine of the Treasury of Abhidharma 俱舍論實義疏 (Taishō Vol. 29 No. 1561), discovered by Pelliot at Dunhuang in Western Gansu Province of P.R.C. China. The terminus pro quem for the cache in the library cave at Dunhuang is disputed, but by the most conservative estimate falls around roughly, ca. late 10th-century.

37 Dates according to colophon (T1545:27.419).

38 The Xuanzang translation of the Mahāvibhāṣā is one of three extant texts of roughly the same name, but varying in length, all preserved in the Chinese canon. Xuanzang’s text in two-hundred fascicles was translated into Chinese between 656–659 at the translation studio 譯館 inside the Tang Imperial palace. The earlier
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The exegesis of the discussions on the twenty-two indriyas is found in the section of the Chinese translation of the Mahāvibhāṣa by Xuanzang and his coterie, entitled, “Chapter On the Faculties” (Skt.: Indriya-varga; Chi.: Gen naxi 根納息).\(^\text{39}\) In this chapter, Xuanzang provides an explicit rationale for the taxonomy of the faculties and takes great pains to do three things: to precisely define each of the twenty-two indriyas, to group them into five categories, and to provide a theoretical basis for the taxonomic classification.

**Xuanzang on the Earliest Taxonomy of the Twenty-Two Faculties**

The full translation of the Mahāvibhāṣa by Xuanzang and his team unfurls across more than two hundred papyrus rolls (Chi.: juan 卷), or fascicles. The “Chapter on Faculties” occupies one fifth of the entire text, and begins in the one hundred and forty-second roll of the two hundred roll text.

The “Chapter on Faculties” opens with a definition of the word, indriya. The text reads: “The indriya means the master 主義是根義.”\(^\text{40}\) With this definitive statement, Xuanzang

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\(^{39}\) The full title of this section is “Chapter (varga) the Sixth on the Aggregate (Skandha) and Faculty (Indriya): Section I.A” 根蘊第六中根納息第一之一 runs for more than 71 pages in the modern Japanese Taishō edition (T27, no. 1545, p.728c02-p.796, a17), and is organized into five sections with individual subsections, each counting for one folio in Xuanzang's text: I.A-E; II.A-E; II.A-e; IIIA-B; IV.A-E; V.A. The discussion of faculties in the previous Vibh translations by Buddhavarman 浮陀跋摩, Daoai 道泰 et al., in 437–439 CE. Radich (2010) arrives at the conclusion that “These three texts are best treated as plural texts in a genre of vibhāṣā commentary, rather than as parallel translations of the same text.” There is evidence that more such texts existed and were lost, and that others in the genre were based upon other texts. Also see Charles Willemen, Bart Dessein and Collett Cox, *Sarvāstivāda Buddhist Scholasticism* on “The Vibhāṣā Compendia,” 229-39.

\(^{40}\) Vibh 142 says: There are those amongst the ranks of the wayfarers (tīrthikas, i.e., non-Buddhists) who say that there are one-hundred-and-twenty faculties. Namely, there are two faculties each for vision, audition, and olfaction – six in total. The faculties managing gustation, tactition/proproception, vitality, along with the five hedonic faculties, along with with the five [skillful] faculties including faith, etc., together amount to twenty-six. Then within each transmigratory destiny (gati) there are another twenty [faculties] for a total of one-hundred-and-twenty [faculties]. They say that the jealous gods (asurās) count as a sixth destiny. They elaborate that there are one-hundred-and-twenty masters – for example, the masters of heaven, nagas, asurās, humans, etc. – the main
references the primordial power of the *indriya* that is built into the very definition of the word.

Following the Sarvāstivādin editors, Xuanzang invokes the cosmology of ancient Buddhism to illustrate the primeval potency of the *indriyas*. The Sarvāstivādin editors use the metaphor of the rulers over the inhabitants of the four continents of the Buddhist world: the Southern *Jambudvīpa* (the Rose-Apple Continent 南瞻部州), the Western *Godaniya* (the Cow-Granting Continent 西牛貨洲), the *Uttarakuru* (the Northern Continent 北俱盧洲)\(^{41}\) and the *Pūrvavideha* (the Furthest Easterly Continent 東勝身洲),\(^{42}\) to illustrate the elemental power of the *indriyas*.\(^{43}\) This metaphor is employed to make a doctrinal point: while the *indriyas* are powerful, they do not operate independently and ultimately derive their power through cooperative action.

In this simile, each of the twenty-two *indriyas* is likened to a sovereign power that reigns over a domain: the Cakravārtin king rules over human subjects, the Siṃha king rules over the lion kingdom, King Yāma rules over the demon kingdom, and so forth.\(^{44}\) The Sarvāstivādin editors

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\(^{41}\) *Monier-Williams Skt. Dictionary*: “the country of the northern Kurus situated in the north of India, and described as the country of eternal beatitude.”

\(^{42}\) Xuanzang’s translation of this Skt. *toponym* includes the character *shen* 身 meaning “body.” Xuanzang’s disciple and prolific Kośa commentator Puguang 普光 takes his Master Xuanzang’s favored rendition to also indicate how far “superior in physical features” 則身州身形勝 the inhabitants of this continent are. For starters, the average lifespan for humans in this continent is one millenium – see his *Study Notes on the Kośa* (fasc. 8) 遠舍論記 (T182:41.148.b25-6).

\(^{43}\) The literal meaning of these toponyms is given in (parentheses).

\(^{44}\) Saṅghabhadra, *Nyāyanusāra*, fasc. 9: We liken it to the Lion King, the chieftains of the villages and towns, the Wheel-turning-king (Cakravārtin), and so forth, because they are the most dominant over the animals, villages, towns, and the four continents [respectively]. 如師子王、及村邑長、轉輪王等。於獸村邑四大洲等，極增上故 (T1562:19.377.b07-8). This is a summary of the more elaborated gloss found in the *Mahāvibhāṣa*: These twenty-two faculties are likened to all (i.e., each and every) sentient being[s], although each and every has the meaning of “dominant,” and yet there is the predominant one. We liken to how in the ghostly realm, King Yāma is supreme/predominant among the *tiryāṅc* (e.g., mammalian kingdoms, that is “animals born viviparously”, “those born oviparously” [i.e., the various species of avian creatures], and the insect kingdom (AKBh3.6: “insects such as mosquitoes, moths, centipedes, and other wigglers.”)
employ the synecdoche of the king reigning over a domain to illustrate three points. The first is that while the domains of each of the rulers overlap with one another, they are not mutually exhaustive or exclusive. The second is that while each sovereign presides over a specific kingdom, each sovereign can only obtain the full extent of his or her power through interaction with other rulers. The third is that because each kingdom overlaps with others, each king must forge alliances and collaborate with other kings to survive. For example, without an alliance with the Śiṃha king, the subjects of the Cakravārtin monarch would be under the constant threat of attacks from lions.

Xuanzang uses this analogy in the Mahāvibhāṣa to illustrate three methodological tenets regarding the nature of the indriyas. The first is that, while each indriya presides over a specific and unique domain, the domains of each indriya overlap and are not exclusive of one another. The second is that no indriya can operate independently from other indriyas. The third point is that the full power of an indriya can only be obtained though interaction with other indriyas. Although each indriya, like each sovereign, is separate and distinct from other indriyas, and other sovereigns, the twenty-two indriyas and the sovereigns overlap and together empower the capacities of all sentient beings across the Buddhist cosmology. Like the four continents that comprise the entirety of the earth, the five categories of the twenty-two indriyas form a taxonomy that encompasses the entire spectrum of life.

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moisture 潤生.”) The lion is the supreme king, in the towns and citadels the King is supreme and across the four continents the Cakravārtin is supreme; in the world of sensory desire (Skt.: kāmadhātu), Mahēśvara is supreme – across the triple chilicoosm the Brahmā King is supreme; across the three realms the Buddha is the preeminent one. The Buddha is termed the Dharma Master for he alone is peerless.” 如二十二根者，如一切有情，雖皆互有增上緣義。而有勝者。如鬼界中，琰摩王勝傍生趣中，師子王勝，村中主勝，國中王勝。四大洲中，轉輪王勝，於欲界中，自在天勝，千世界中，梵王為勝。於三界中，佛為最勝。於三界中，佛為最勝。佛於一切，有情類中，獨稱法王，無倫匹故 (T1545:27.730.c17-23). This is the most fleshed-out form of the standard gloss.
The Three Methodological Tenets on the Nature of the Faculties

Directly following the metaphor of the four continents in his translation of the *Mahāvibhāṣa*, Xuanzang introduces three methodological tenets regarding the nature of the *indriyas*. Firstly, he states that the *indriyas* constitute the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for life. Secondly, he posits that each *indriya* obtains its power through coordination with other *indriyas*. Thirdly, he argues that the coordination of at least three *indriyas* is required to sustain life. Xuanzang uses these three methodological principles to specify the relationship of the *indriyas* to karma, the actions performed by a sentient being. These three points provide the methodological framework for understanding the elements of life and are therefore crucially important to the exploration by Xuanzang regarding what brings about the loss of life.

The first tenet holds that the *indriyas* constitute the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for the survival of a sentient being because they have the quality of “dominance” (Skt.: *adhipati*; Chi.: *zengshang* 增上). The word “dominant” stands for the “ruler” (Skt.: *adhipa*) and refers to the most powerful and dominant factor among a group of factors that work together to accomplish a specific action. Abhidharma sources classify each *indriya* under an umbrella category of the “dominant condition” (Skt.: *adipati-pratyaya*; Chi.: *zeng shangyuan*增上緣) for action. The dominant condition is the power assigned to an *indriya* to execute a specific action. For instance, the visual faculty supplies the dominant, or the necessary condition, for the action of seeing things. The first tenet qualifies the definition of dominance by qualifying that, although an *indriya* may constitute the dominant power needed to execute a certain action, it is not an

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45 Under the word *adhipa*, *Sir Monier-Williams Sanskrit Dictionary* (hereafter, MW) gives: “a ruler, commander, regent, king.”

46 增上是根義 (T28, no. 1547, p. 441, c17).
autonomous source of power. For example, while the visual faculty is dominant in the action of seeing things, vision requires the coordination of more than one indriya.

The second tenet holds that the coordination of multiple indriyas provides the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for the survival of an sentient being. Each indriya obtains the power to sustain life via the cooperation with other indriyas, just as the monarch requires the assistance of others to fully exert his or her power and sustain the existence of the kingdom. Xuanzang makes the point that no single faculty works in isolation. He argues that the coordinated actions of specific groupings of indriyas are necessary to execute the activities that sustain the life of a sentient being.

The third tenet holds that the ongoing coordination of at least three indriyas is essential to life. The consequence of the third tenet is significant because it forms the basis for the definition of death. Here Xuanzang posits that the presence of at least three indriyas, working in coordinated action, distinguishes a living sentient being from a dead sentient being. Xuanzang specifies that it is the presence of multiple indriyas, in conjunction with their operational bases, the material organs within a body, that differentiates a living organism from a dead body. With the theory of the

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The idea that the faculty informs a “supreme autonomous source of power” (Skt.: paramaiśvaryam; Chi.: zizai lì 自在力) is taken by Abhidharma theorists to be a part of the definition of indriya according to the rival Brāhmaṇical traditions of Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika. However, the Buddhist accusation that Sāṅkhya faculties for action cannot form autonomous sources of causal efficacy appears misplaced, since they were not intended as such. In actuality, Sāṅkhya dogma grants that the indriya of grasping – literally, two hands qua indriya is not a sufficient condition to grasp anything – discussion on these Buddhist anti-Brahmanical polemics is deferred until chapter two, section 2.2.1. The same goes for the two feet (padau) qua faculty or pāṇēndriyam. The vṛtti-commentary transmitted with Paramārtha’s text of Sāṅkhyaakārikās is explicit that the hands, feet, etc., are a metonymy for the faculties of “grasping,” (Skt.: pāṇēndriyam, lit., “two hands [pāṇini] qua organ”) and “locomotion” (pādēndriyam, glossed as ”two feet [pāda] qua indriya, as a whole. Furthermore, according to verse 27 (Dutt 1933, pp. 27-8) the faculty of grasping only executes tasks when it finds itself in conjunction with the mind – also styled “the coordinating faculty” (Skt.: samkalpakamindriyam; Chi.: xin-ping gen 心平根). In light of such passages in the various commentaries on SK 25-8, the accusation that the Sāṅkhya faculties for action cannot form autonomous sources of causal efficacy is misplaced, since they were not intended as such. Rather, the indriyam must cooperate with the mind in order to execute any action. Chapter 2 (Sect. 2) tries to show that this view is partly based upon a mischaracterization, although it features heavily in anti-Brahmanical polemics.
Chapter 1: What is Death?

indriyas, Xuanzang comes to determine that the presence of at least three indriyas, working in conjunction with the material organs, defines the difference between life and death.\textsuperscript{48}

The Abhidharma authorities cited in the Mahāvibhāṣa unanimously agree that life consists in specific groupings of multiple indriyas that operate simultaneously in a body. Life is specifically differentiated from the corporeal body, and from the material organs, by the operations of the indriyas. Xuanzang underscores the idea that the indriyas work in conjunction with other indriyas and the physical organs of the body. He explicitly draws a line between the living organism and its material corporeality, by stating that life is the participation of plural indriyas cooperating throughout the physical body. His translation reads: “Life is not simply having a body” 命者非即身.\textsuperscript{49}

The Taxonomy of the Twenty-Two Faculties

In his translation of the Mahāvibhāṣa, Xuanzang categorizes the twenty-two indriyas into five sets or groupings. While various lists containing the twenty-two indriyas are found in earlier sources, the enumeration by Xuanzang is first codified taxonomy of this nature to appear in the Buddhist literature. Most notably, the twenty-two indriyas are enumerated in the Treatise on the Basis of Gnosis or Jñānaprasthāna śāstra (Chi.: Apidamo fa-zhi lun 阿毘達磨發智論), the ancient

\textsuperscript{48} Earlier works of Abhidhama prior to Xuanzang had stated at least two, but it is not clear that Xuanzang endorses this doctrine. In the Jñānaprasthāna śāstra, forming the most ancient stratum of the Abhidhama literature transmitted by Xuanzang, the view is found that (T1544:26.994.b11-2) “in the realm of sensory desire, how many faculties are born within the continuum at the outset of its life? Reply: those born vivipariously, ovipariously, or born by spawning in moisture, obtain two (namely, aversion and life).” 欲有相續,最初得幾業所生根？答：卵生•胎生•濕生得二。This view is also attested in an Abhidhama work translated into Chinese under the Northern Zhou Dynasty 北周 (557-581), the Abhidharmahrdaya (T1551) (Chi.: Apitan xin lunjing 阿毘曇心論經) by one Narêndrayaśas 那連提耶舍. See Digital-Dictionary of Buddhism entry for this 6th-century monk “who originally came from Oḍḍiyāna in Northern India, and became one of the most important translators under the Sui Dynasty 隋代” (Accessed Jan. 22, 2017).

\textsuperscript{49} Mahāvibhāṣa, fasc. 200: T55:27.1003.a01.
work on which the *Mahāvibhāṣa* is a commentary.\textsuperscript{50} They are also listed, although in different orders, in the *Treatise on Dharma and Skandhas According to the Abhidharma Path* (Skt.: *Abhidharma-dharmaskandha pāda śāstra*; Chi.: *Apidamo fa-yun zu lun* 阿毘達磨法蘊足論), a compendium composed two or three centuries after the death of the Buddha and translated by Xuanzang in 659 C.E. However, the works belonging to this earlier stratum of Abhidharma literature do not provide a definitive categorization, or a consistent order, for the twenty-two *indriyas*.\textsuperscript{51} Xuanzang is the first scholar to present the definitions of the twenty-two *indriyas*, and the doctrinal reasons for their categorization, in an organized and systematic way.

The analysis by Xuanzang into the nature of the *indriyas* is anchored in the basic definition of the *indriya* as presented in the earliest systematic discussions in the *Mahāvibhāṣa*. However, Xuanzang also abides by the exegesis of the *Mahāvibhāṣa* composed by Vasubandhu. In his retranslation into classical Chinese of the touchstone work, the *Treasury of Abhidharma*, by Vasubandhu, Xuanzang promotes the clearly enunciated and hierarchically-ranked groupings of the *indriyas* that are defined by the Abhidharma expert. In his translation, Xuanzang expands the taxononomy of the *indriyas* by Vasubandhu to capture the spectrum of life ranging from protozoans to bodhisattvas. Based on an analysis of the twenty-two *indriyas* of Vasubandhu, Xuanzang derives additional groupings of *indriyas* that describe cognitive capacities of sentient beings that are not captured in the taxonomies offered by previous *Mahāvibhāṣa* scholars.

\textsuperscript{50} In addition to Xuanzang's complete translation completed in 659 C.E., we have two earlier Chinese translations of this early Sarvāstivāda treatise -- a recension in forty fascicles (one hundred Taishō pages) Saṅghabhūti and Daotai, which dates from 383 C.E. (its colophon records that this translation was undertaken from June 6th-November 30th, 383 C.E.); and the earliest and shortest recension attributed to Saṅghabhūti [Hōbōgirin] (Saṅghabhūti [Foguang]) 僧伽跋澄, a Kaśmiри cleric active in translating Skt. words in the Northern-Qin-Dynasty cleric. This is the shortest recension of the three and runs fourteen fascicles. The second earliest recension of Daotai comprises forty fascicles, while Xuanzang's is more than three times that length at two hundred fascicles covering an entire Modern Taishō volume (Vol. 27, 1-999).

\textsuperscript{51} Skilling, “Discourse on the Twenty-Two Faculties,” 431, observes that “no single discourse in Pāli lists all twenty-two faculties.”
Xuanzang also clarifies some of the terminology and conceptual distinctions left unclear in the previous Chinese translation of the *Treasury of Abhidharma*, completed in 562 C.E. by Paramārtha.

Xuanzang appeals to the authority of Vasubandhu for the elucidation of several doctrines that underlie his three methodological tenets: firstly, that the *indriyas* are the dominant causal factors in all bodily action; secondly, that the *indriyas* operate cooperatively; and thirdly, that at least three *indriyas* are required for the survival of an organism. Xuanzang enlists the approach of Vasubandhu by spelling out the groupings of *indriyas* that are required to sustain life in different categories of sentient beings. He specifies the groups of baseline *indriyas* that are necessary for the survival of an organism. Additionally, he states that without the sustained coordinated action of three *indriyas*, an organism will die. Hence, Xuanzang follows the methodological approach employed by Vasubandhu in his search for an explanation of what is lost in death.

**The Sequence of the Twenty-Two Faculties in Five Groups**

The taxonomy of the twenty-two *indriyas* codified by Xuanzang covers the life functions of all sentient organisms. His enumeration of the physical and cognitive capacities of sentient life ranges from descriptions of autonomic functions such as respiration, digestion, and excretion, to the sensory functions such as seeing, hearing, and tasting, to the higher-order cognitive capabilities of attention, learning, and memory. In his translation of the *Mahāvibhāṣa*, Xuanzang divides the twenty-two *indriyas* into five categories: (1) the six *indriyas* of perception that are comprised of the five ordinary senses in conjunction with the mind (Skt.: *saḍindriyam*; Chi.: *liu qing* 六情; *liu gen* 六根), (2) the three embodied *indriyas* that are independent from the sense *indriyas*, (3) the five affective or hedonic *indriyas* (Skt.: *pañca-vedanēndriyāṇi*; Chi.: *wushou gen* 五受根; Chi.:
wu tong-gen 五痛根),
(4) the five cultivatable indriyas or the skillful roots (Skt.: pañcāni
kuśalamulāṇi; Chi.: wu shan gen 五善根),
(5) and the three uncontaminated indriyas (Skt.: anāsravastrindriyāṇi; Chi.: san wulou gen 三無漏根).
The twenty-two indriyas are grouped into five categories as follows:

Faculties 1-6: The six sensory indriyas include tactition and kinesthesia (Skt.: kāyêndriyam; Chi.: shen-gen 身根, pi-gen 皮根),
olfaction (Skt.: ghrāṇêndriyam; Chi.: bi-gen 鼻根), gustation (Skt.: jihvändriyam; Chi.: she-gen 舌根),
audition (Skt.: cakṣurindriyam; Chi.: yan gen 眼根), vision (Skt.: śrotrêndriyam; Chi.: er-gen 耳根), and mind (Skt.: manêndriyam; Chi.: yi-gen 意根).
The sense indriya of taste accounts for absorbtion and digestion of “gross” forms of food, for example rice and sweets. Two other sources of nourishment, piecemeal food (Chi.: duanshi 段食) and subtle nutriments, are absorbed via touch.

The Sanskrit word kāyêndriyam, and its Chinese equivalent, shen-gen 身根, are double entendres. They translate most literally as “the bodily faculty,” and simultaneously refer to the

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52 Sometimes referred to as “five experiential faculties” (Skt.: pañcā-anubhāvêndriyāṇi; Chi. wushou gen 五受根), the Chinese characters for both being the same, in order to disambiguate between these five, and the subsequent set of five cultivatable faculties. Xuanzang uses the Chinese word shou 受 to refer to both vedanā and anubhāva.

53 There is a clever but untranslatable pun on the Chinese character gen in its two senses as both “faculty/organ” and “root.” It is used to render the Sanskrit words indriya and mūla, which literally means “root.”

54 Dunlin 道麟 summarizes the formula of Xuanzang: “First the six loci [i.e., sense bases/homes (āyatanas)] are itemized, then the bimodally-gendered procreative faculties. After those, vitality and subsequently the five hedonic faculties (i.e., joy, pleasure, suffering, perseverance, and aversion). Then the five skillful faculties including faith, etc., are listed, followed by the three uncontaminated faculties.” 第先說六處；次說男•女；次說命並五受；次說信等、及三無漏根 (X841:53.408.c22-3).

55 Also written as liu chu 六處, “six loci.”

56 Pi-gen is the older translation, but Xuanzang takes this to refer to the parallel item in the Sāṃkhya taxonomy of “five faculties of/for action” (Skt.: pāṇca-karmêndriyāni; Chi. wyé-gen 五業根; also trans. variously as wu zuo-gen 五作根; wu xing-gen 五行根; wu shi-gen 五事根), while he refers to the Buddhist faculty by shen-gen, literally, the bodily faculty. The latter is meant to cover not only tactition, but also the kinesthetic capabilities of coordinating movement and the propioceptive functions.

57 The word for the mental faculty is sometimes spelt as manâyatana (mana-āyatana) in Sanskrit texts.
body with its vital organs, and to the faculty of touch. The first sense of the word refers to the body as a whole, while the latter, more restricted definition of the word, means tactition. In either case, this term stands for the fifth sense. Kāyēndriyam plays a dominant role in excretion, kinesthesis, proprioception, digestion, and tactition.\(^{58}\) It also plays a major role in the primitive limbic reactions of fight, flight, and freeze. For example, if a snake is threatened by a predator, it responds by lashing its tail. Kāyēndriyam is included among the thirteen minimum faculties for non-human animals, and among the eight minimum faculties for humans, including homo sapiens and other species of hominid in the Buddhist universe or “great trichiliocosm,” writ large.\(^{59}\) The sixth and last sense in this group is the faculty of mind. The indriya of mind is included under the rubric of the senses because it possesses the unique ability to process perceptual content that involves more than one type of sensory input.\(^{60}\)

**Faculties 7-9:** The three embodied indriyas are based in an intact and able body and are

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\(^{58}\) Depending on the context, Xuanzang sometimes construes the term kāyēndriyam (Chi.: shen-gen 身根) as a coordinative compound or dvāndva (Chi.: xiangwei-shi 相違釋) — lit., “the body-with-faculties.” However, Xuanzang construes the term kāyēndriyam in the context of the twenty-two-faculty taxonomy as either a dependent compound (puruṣa) “the faculty of the body” — or, when construed as an adjectival compound — “the body qua faculty.” Fascicle eight of the Heart-Treatise of Abhidharma (Abhidharma-hṛdaya śāstra) clearly takes this term as a synecdoche for the bodily faculties as a whole. However, this text differs from the Vībh account as far as the precise referent. The Mahāvibhāṣa takes the term kāyēndriyam as analytically independent from the procreative faculties, while the fourth-century Abhidharma Heart Treatise (Hṛdaya śāstra) states that “the bodily faculty exists in three forms, the tactile faculty among them. The “three forms” mentioned are the tactile faculty, the male procreative faculty, and the female procreative faculty.” 身根有三種者，身根亦如是。彼說「三種」：身根 男根 女根。(T1552:28.939.e26-7).

\(^{59}\) According to Xuanzang's trans. of the Mahāvibhāṣa, the triple great trichilocosm – the aggregate of three minor chilocosms – includes the following species of what this study is calling hominids. This vast Buddhist universe includes ample room for extraterrestrial forms of humanity or humanoids. Xuanzang classifies both forms of humanity under the mantle of “ordinary human” (yi-sheng 異生), which is meant to indicate the Sanskrit word prthagjana – Monier-Williams Skt. Dictionary: “an ordinary professing Buddhist.” The editors of the Mahāvibhāṣa further describe a number of variant figures for different species of humanoids across the four inhabitable continents. These pertain to the different genetic features between different species of humans beyond just the homo sapiens – that is, the form of human endemic to our “Rose-Colored Continent” of Southern Jambudvīpa 南瞻部洲.

\(^{60}\) The mind plays the provisory role in coordinating the five other senses. Mind forms the “the underlying basis of five sensory consciousnesses” 五識所依 in that it supplies a necessary condition (Skt.: pratyaya; Chi.: yuan 總) to every act of sensory perception.
independent of the sense *indriyas*. They include the procreative faculties of males (Skt.: *purusêndriyam*; Chi.: *nan-gen* 男根), the procreative faculties of females (Skt.: *strîndriyam*; Chi.: *nû-gen* 女根), and the faculty of vitality (Skt.: *jīvitêndriyam*; Chi.: *ming-gen* 命根). The procreative faculties of men and women are responsible for the expression of physical traits that are related to the expression of bimodal gender, such as height, the size and shape of the breasts, the vocal cords, and the formation of the Adam's apple.\(^6\) The procreative faculties that are linked to bimodal gender are constitutionally different from one another and from *kâyêndriyam*, as each forms differently at the molecular level.\(^7\) The molecular particles that make up the male and

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\(^6\) The parallel physical (i.e., physically active) faculty in Sâńkhya taxonomy of five *karmêndriyân* (faculties of action) is termed *upastha*. Xuanzang renders this non-Buddhist terminology in a denigrating way – literally, “the locus of sexual pleasure (*yule chu* 娛樂處);” while Paramârtha sometimes renders as “human faculty” (*ren-gen* 人根), especially in the context of discussing the Sâńkhya doctrine – see his vṛtti on Sâńkhya-kârikâs in seventy stanzas, titled *Commentary on the Seventy Golden Stanzas* (*Jin qishi lun* 金七十論). The word *upastha* means in Sanskrit sexual organs, “the part which is under” or lap. In the Sâńkhya taxonomy of five faculties of action, *upastha* means the power of procreation and sexual enjoyment, or the procreative faculty. Yuanhui's 圓暉 interlinear gloss describes the factors upon which the bimodal male/female faculties are dominant in crude terms: the physical size of the man is larger, while the physical size of the woman is smaller. Man's voice is gruff, while the woman's voice is gentle. The man's breasts are smaller, while the woman's breasts are larger.” 男形大、女形小。男言雄、女言細。男乳房小、女乳房大。See his *Textbook of Sub-commentary on the Verses of the Treasury* (Chi.: *Jushe lun shu lun ben* 俱舍論頌疏論本), fascicle 3 (T1823:41.834.a17). Yuanhui was a specialist scholar of the *Abhidharmakośa* who lived in Zhongdayun-si 中大雲寺 under the reign of Tang Xuanzong 宣宗 (r. 713–756).

\(^7\) See the *Treatise According to the Correct Logic of Abhidharma* (*Abhidharma Nyâyanusāra sâstra*) of Saṅghabhadra, fascicle 8 for this explanation – T1562:29.373-74. Cf. Xuanzang's original compilation, the *Demonstration of Consciousness Only* (CWSL) subsumes the procreative faculties under *kâyêndriyam*. Across the three transmigratory realms (Skt.: *trîdhâtu*; Chi.: *sanjie* 三界), only a “minority of sentient beings” evince bimodal gendered faculties (男女根以少為性). Denizens of the subtle matter and the immaterial realms, such as certain forms of celestial beings (Skt.: *devas*; Chi.: *tian* 天), are androgynitic in that they do not possess the traits characterized by a bimodal gender. These beings are said to be androgynitic, by nature – literally, “of one gender” (Skt.: *ekavyâñjanam*; Chi.: *yi-xing* 一形). *Abhidharmahrdaya* (Chi. *Apitan xin lun jing* 阿毘曇心論經), fascicle 6, explicitly addresses why this is so: “Question: why do [beings in] the realms of subtle matter lack bimodal male/female gendered faculties? Reply: because they find nothing for their sensual enjoyment; the two faculties of olfaction and gustation are also lacking, since those serve to render the body resplendent and grow without impediment. But the two bimodal male/female faculties render the body ugly and unseemly, so they are lacking. There is no faculty of suffering (*duhkêndriyam*), since there are none of its oppressive effects. Since the sentient being [residing in the realm of subtle matter] gives rise to no afflictions, it lacks the faculty of anxiety (*daurmanasyêndriyam*).” 問曰：何故色界無男女根？答曰：無受用事故，鼻・舌二根亦應無，為端嚴身
female faculties of procreation are different in shape and size from one another and different from the molecular particles that make up kāyēndriyam.

\textit{Jīvitēndriyam}, the faculty of vitality, is required for survival of the body. All sentient beings possess the faculty of \textit{jīvitēndriyam}. Per the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma taxonomy, \textit{jīvitēndriyam} is responsible for the maintenance of the vital organs and fundamental life-processes such as cardio-pulmonary functioning. The presence of the faculty of \textit{jīvitēndriyam} distinguishes humans and non-human animals from vegetables and plants. The \textit{Mahāvibhāṣa} cites the absence of \textit{jīvitēndriyam} in plants as an important difference within the doctrines of Jainism and Buddhism.\footnote{As elucidated in Schmithausen’s authoritative study on \textit{The Problem of the Sentience of Plants in Earliest Buddhism} (Tōkyō: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 1991), plants are not considered to be sentient because they do not evince the the vital qualities of \textit{sattvam} or \textit{jīva}.}

The authors of the \textit{Mahāvibhāṣa} record the opinion that \textit{jīvitēndriyam} is the dominant factor in four vital functions: the capacity to transmit conspecific traits by way of the procreative \textit{indriyas}, the ability to induce the timely expression of these traits at specific points in the development of an organism, the maintenance and regeneration of vital organs throughout the life-cycle, and the retention of specific traits that are shared by members of a common phylogenetic or genetic
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heritage.  

Doxography labels Saṅghabhadra as a “neo-Sarvāstivādin” (Chi.: Xin Sapoduobu新薩婆多部) author, and his opinions, more often than not, diverge from those held by Vasubandhu. Both Saṅghabhadra and Vasubandhu however, regard jīvitêndriyam as the essential factor responsible for the capacity of the biological continuum (Skt.: saṃtāna; Chi.: xiang-xu相續) to persevere into the future. Saṅghabhadra and Vasubandhu parse the definition of jīvitêndriyam to indicate that vitality exerts dominance in two ways: by carrying phylogenetic traits tied to “conspecificity” (Skt.: sabhāgatā; Chi.: tong zhong-fen同眾分) onto the next generation (Chi.: neng jihou能繼后) and by maintaining and coordinating the manifestation of those traits in the living organism (AKBh 2.1). Esssentially, Vasubandhu and Saṅghabhadra agree that vitality is the sine qua non of life.

A question arises, however: does the de fide doctrine on jīvitêndriyam violate the methodological tenet held by Xuanzang, that life requires more than one faculty to be sustained? Apart from transitory beings, or upapādukas, this tenet holds for all beings across the triple

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65 Mahāvibhāṣa, fascicle 142: “the faculty of vitality is dominant with respect to two domains: firstly, it makes sure that one can even speak of "possessing faculties"; and secondly, it makes sure that the faculties are not discontinued.” 命根於二處增上：一、令說有根；二、令根不斷 (T1545.27.731.b23-4).

66 The brief biographical account of Saṅghabhadra found in Xuanzang's travelogue (fasc. 4) describes how Saṅghabhadra viewed Vasubandhu as deviating from Sarvāstivāda orthodoxy (T51, no. 2087, pp. 891-2).

67 For the translation of saṃtāna as “continuum” see Jay Garfield, Engaging Buddhism: Why it Matters to Philosophy (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2014); also Paul Griffiths On Being Mindless (LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court, 1986). The Chinese word xiangxu相續 can be construed both verbally in the sense of “continue/persevere,” or nominally, referring to the continuum of life. Saṃtāna refers to both animals (fauna) and plants (flora). However, Abhidharma doctrine indicates that a difference between Buddhist and Jaina systems of doctrine is that Buddhism does not hold that flora, including fauna, are sentient beings.

68 Stanza 2.41 of Vasubandhu's Treasury glosses sābhagatā as “sameness of species” (Skt.: sattvasāmyam).

69 For Skt. text of Vasubandhu’s Treasury see Pradhan, ed., Abhidharmakośa, 38.

70 Under upapāduka, Sir. Monier-Williams Skt. Dictionary gives: “a superhuman being, a god, demon.” Xuanzang's Chinese designation for this class of beings is huasheng化生—transitional beings. This is the same word that Xuanzang uses for the fourth kind of mortal rebirth — via karmic transformation.
chiliocosm, the entirety of the known universe according to Buddhist cosmology. The precursors to the Mahāvibhāṣa, the Abhidharmahṛdaya texts, contain examples of minimal forms of transmigratory beings, between incarnations, that bear only the faculty of vitality. In general, the upapādukas, apparitional beings, that are defined by their spectral appearance, represent the most attenuated forms of life in the Abhidharma corpus. Apart from these particular forms of life described in earlier texts, all sentient beings bear at least three indriyas.

Upapādukas are found in all three transmigratory realms, the kāmadhātu, the rūpadhātu, and the arūpadhātu. This category of life includes the fantastical creatures of Hindu and Buddhist mythology such as the apsāras (Chi.: feitian-nīshen 飛天女神), kavalinkas (Chi.: jialingpiqie 嘉

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71 The Abhidharma Heart Treatise (Skt.: Abhidharmahṛdaya śāstra; Apitan xin lun 阿毘曇心論) of Saṅghadeva characterizes certain transmigratory upapādukas between incarnations as “solely bearing the one – the faculty of vitality.” The Treatise Containing the Essential Juice of the Abhidharma (*Abhidharmamārta-raśa-śāstra; Chi.: Apitan xin lun 阿毘曇甘露味論), a text in two rolls translated into Chinese during the Northern-Wei Dynasty, attributed to the Sarvāstivādin Master Ghoṣaka 瞿沙, one of the members of the Great Sarvastivadin Council of 318 C.E., states that upapādukas “in the immaterial realm initially it [the upapāduka] obtains a single faculty of vitality” 無色界最初得一命根 (T1553:28.972a01). In short, the “singularly endowed” upāpāduka is found in some earlier Abhidharma works transmitted into China, but Xuanzang eschews it, even if it appears to be an implication of a hemistich in Vasubandhu’s Treasury that reads: “the vitality alone is karmically matured (vipāka)” 命唯是異熟 (ṣa/drāpesuṃekamuttare AK 2.14d). Saṅghabhadra takes the “only” (Skt.: eva) to qualify a forlorn class of upapāduka whose only remaining or “residual faculty” 餘殘根 is that which binds them to another bodily rebirth. However, the Treatise On the Juice of Abhidharma 阿毘曇甘露味論 takes the verse presented also in Saṃyuktābhidharma-hṛdaya-śāstra 雖阿毘曇心論 to mean that this most spectral form of upapāduka can survive between bodies with “solely the one.”

72 Abhidharma treatises prior to Xuanzang say that some forms of upapādukas and certain non-human animals, such as insects, are born without a mental faculty or manêndriyam. One could rule out such examples as atypical in that no Abhidharma authority would consider those most attenuated forms of life to manifest full-fledged “sentience (sattvam).” Furthermore, there is no evidence to suggest that Xuanzang endorses this doctrine, unless one judges him only by the word of Saṅghabhadra, whom he translates along with other numerous other authors who disagree with Saṅghabhadra. Xuanzang’s trans. of Vasubandhu and the Yogācāra works all abide by his third methodological tenet that the conditions for life, however rudimentary, are at least threefold.

73 A quatrain enumerating the numbers of faculties born by upapādukas in the Saṃyuktābhidharma-hṛdaya, attributed to the Sarvāstivādin council member Dharmatrāta (T1552:28.940.c15-16). The forth hemistich of this quatrain reads that “[when the upapādukas are initially born]...they have six in the rūpadhātu and one in the arūpadhātu.” 色六無色一 The six faculties pertaining to upapādukas in the rūpadhātu are the “five physical [sensory] faculties, vitality, and one faculty of procreation, if bimodally gendered; if hemaphroditic, eight.”五色根及命根；一形七二形八. This text also says in the previous line of verse that non-human animals and upapādukas in the kāmadhātu can survive while bearing only the two faculties of kāyêndriyam and jīvitêndriyam (T28, no., 1552, p. 940, c15).
陵頻伽), the gandharvas (Chi.: qiantapo 乾闥婆; 捻闥婆),\(^{74}\) the garudas (Chi.: qielouluo 迦楼羅), and the nāgas (Chi.: naqie 娜迦). Upapādus bear from six to three indriyas, the fewest number of faculties borne by any variety of life form.

The apparitional upapādus are discarnate, in that they do not bear the physical and sensory indriyas that come with incarnation in a corporeal body. They are alive in a minimal sense because they bear jīvitēndriyam. Additionally, they possess a rudimentary form of a mental faculty that supports an attenuated limbic and vascular system, along with the single sensory faculty of olfaction with which they sense and absorb nutrients in the surrounding environment. Vasubandhu states that gandharvas do not bear viscera that contain blood, bones, or flesh; they are “merely mind” (Skt.: manomayaḥ; Chi.: wei yi-cheng 唯意成; AK 3.40cd).\(^{75}\) Presumably, apparitional beings are sentient, but in an minimal way, as they possess only the four faculties of olfaction, mind, aversion, and vitality.

Vasubandhu’s assignation of six to three faculties to the upapādus is derived from The Treatise on the Heart of Unified Abhidharma (Skt.: Samyukābhidharma-hṛdayā 雜阿毘曇心論). The prose commentary found in this source depicts the upapādus as the most minimal form of existence that is recognized as living. The text posits that upapādus possess a full complement of five senses. Saṅghabhadra (Chi.: Zhongxian 眾賢),\(^{76}\) in his prose commentary on the

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\(^{74}\) Lamotte writes: “Les Gandharva sont des artistes divins qui jouissent d’un Bonheur égal à celui des dieux; ils possèdent la sagesse (prajñā) et savent distinguer le beau du laid” — see his Da zhidu lun translation, La Traité de la grande vertu de sagesse (Louvain: Institutorientaliste de Louvain, 1944), 614.

\(^{75}\) Pradhan, ed., Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya (K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute 1967), 158.

\(^{76}\) The surviving works of Saṅghabhadra include two voluminous Abhidharma sourcebook the Nyāyanusāra śāstra and the Treatise Clarifying Tenets 領宗論. Both texts are close exegesis and rebuttals of the Treasury of Abhidharma (AK) by Vasubandhu and the attendant bhāṣya auto-commentary (AK Bh). Nyāyanusāra follows the same topical chapter order as Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośa, while each chapter adheres to the sequence of Vasubandhu’s core stanzas comprising the Abhidharmakośa. Clarification of Tenets, on the other hand, diverges from this explicit organizational trajectory by presenting the same chapter topics and stanzas in a different order. Xuanzang’s trans. of the former is comprised of sixty fascicles, while his translation of the latter is comprised of eighty fascicles.
gandharvas, found in the Treatise Illuminating Tenets (*Abhidharma-samayapradīpika; Chi.: Xianzong lun顯宗論), and in his Abhidharma Treatise Conforming to Logic (Skt.: Abhidharma-Nyāyanusāra śāstra; Chi.: Shun zhengli men lun順正理門論), disagrees that upapādukas can possess all five senses. Vasubandhu also rejects the idea that the upapādukas are fully sentient.78

Faculties 10-14: The five hedonic faculties include joy (Skt.: muditêndriyam; Chi.: xi-gen 喜根), suffering (Skt.: duḥkhêndriyam; Chi.: ku-gen 苦根), pleasure (Skt.: suḥkhêndriyam; Chi.: le-gen 樂根), anxiety (Skt.: daurmanasyêndriyam; Chi.: you-gen 憂根), and aversion (Skt.: upekṣêndriyam; Chi.: she-gen 捨根).79 Xuanzang, following the glosses of Vasubandhu on the five hedonic faculties, regards these faculties as rooted in the faculties of ordinary sensation.

The hedonic faculties cooperate to register an affective or emotional response to a sensory stimulus. For example, the sensory faculty of tactition, and the affective faculty of aversion, work together to engender the subjective feeling of pain. While each of the five hedonic indriyas is distinct in the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma taxonomies, Xuanzang, in the interest of parsimony, subsumes anxiety under the faculty of suffering, and joy under the faculty of pleasure.80 The faculty of pleasure is defined as the dominant function in the production of sensory pleasure via the five organs: the eyes, ears, nose, tongue, and body. In his taxonomy, Xuanzang treats emotions such as joy and anxiety as affective responses to stimuli.

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77 This text survives in Derge Tibetan translation under title Chos mngon pa mdzod kyi bstan bcos kyi tshig le'ur byas pa'i rnam par bshad pa, D, Abhidharma (mngon pa) section, Work no. 4091, vol. 141.

78 Pradhan, Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya, 48.

79 Rendered as hu-gen 護根 in earlier translation of the Jñānaprasthāna into classical Chinese by Saṅghadeva and (Zhu) Fonian between June 6th-November 30th, 383 CE.

80 C.f., CWSL, fascicle five [p. 27 c11]: “Moreover, the faculty of suffering is coextensive with consciousness. These other kinds of anxiety are provisionally titled ‘anxiety.’ Other kinds of anxiety fall under the faculty of suffering, because they harm the body and mind. Although they are subsumed under the faculty of suffering, they are still termed ‘anxiety.’” 又彼苦根，意識俱者，是餘憂類，假說為憂。或彼苦根，損身心故。雖苦根攝，而亦名 憂 (T1585:31.27.c11-13).
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The faculty of aversion is described by Skilling as the “faculty of indifference.”\(^{81}\) The indriya of aversion monitors sensations that are “neither painful nor pleasurable” \(^{82}\) In the CWSL, Xuanzang states that the difference between pain and pleasure is only a matter of degree. Xuanzang states: “That which is closer to joy lends benefit to the body and the mind” 如近分喜，益身心故. According to the explanatory glosses of the CWSL, pain comes from “what harms and distresses the mind and body” 損害身心. The faculty of pain is responsible for registering a negative response to a sensory stimulus.\(^{83}\)

**Faculties 15-19:** The five cultivatable or skillful indriyas (Skt.: pāñcāṇi vedanēndriyāṇi;

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\(^{81}\) Skilling, “Discourse on Twenty-Two Faculties,” 426.

\(^{82}\) Xuanzang’s Chinese translation of the Sanskrit terminology—upeksêndriyam—involves a clever but untranslatable pun on the dual senses of the character she as both “aversion” and “to eschew.” Xuanzang uses this double entendre in order to emphasize the two important functions of this faculty. The former sense of “aversion” indicates the instinctual behavioral response to an aversive stimulus. The presence of this form of aversion explains the “gut reaction” in response to painful stimuli. For example, if you burn your finger in scalding water, your automatic response is to flinch, even before the full sensation of “pain” is registered. The sense of “to eschew” indicates the important function of this faculty within the context of moral psychology. Specifically, it manifests the “retiring” sense of indifference or non-attachment achieved by eschewing the sensual pleasures to be had within the kāmadhâtu – “the realm of desire” in which humans and non-human animals reside. This latter, more elevated sense of aversion indicates attainment of an equanimity neither perturbed by bodily aches and pains nor stimulated by sensual pleasures see Notes on the Treasury of Abhidharma俱舍論記 (fasc. 3). Xuanzang's disciple Puguang 普光 (645?–664), which describes the sense of the word she or upekṣā within the context of monastic discipline and meditation: “There are setbacks in the concentration [i.e., meditation (samādhi)] and monastic discipline (śīla), hence backsliding does happen. If within the locus of skillfulness there arise delusions stemming from these setbacks, those [delusions] are thus effaced [by way of the faculty of aversion]. If not for setbacks faced when focalizing skills, we say that “there are no setbacks in the locus [of skillfulness]. Although there are certainly differences between meditation and discipline, their loci both squarely reside in aversion (upekṣā).” 定戒有退失,故有退捨,故有退起惑,故捨。若惡處中,懼先成故。非由退捨故說 處中無退失捨。唯命終捨同。然定戒分捨,處中全捨. (T1821:41.241.c21–23). The manuscript upon which Taishō edition is based dates from 1135 (6th month, Hōen Reign).

\(^{83}\) The relevant passage in CWSL 5 says: “anxiety is categorized (samgraha) with the faculty of suffering but it's still called ‘anxiety’ (daurmanasyam) 雖苦根攝而亦名憂。Kuiji's Study Notes on the Demonstration of Consciousness Only (Cheng weishi lun shu ji 成唯識論述記, hereafter CWSL-SJ) elaborates: “that which has mental consciousness as its basis finds its locus to be mixed together with other sensations. The faculties of anxiety in the human and the deva (‘heavenly being’ or celestial) resemble each other in the fact that they reside in the mental consciousness (manovijñāna) which induces stress. Both are spoken of as ‘the faculty of anxiety,’ but, in fact, neither are simply the sensations of anxiety.” 意識俱,與餘難受處,及人 天中憂根相似,亦在意識逼迫故。說彼苦根為 憂;實非「憂」受. In this explanation, certain classes of celestial beings who have become adapted to the relatively benign environment of the spheres of the subtle material realm have come to possess a faculty of subtle aversion or upekṣêndriyam in lieu of the ordinary bodily faculty of kāyêndriyam. However, Vasubandhu's Treasury of Abhidharma (AK 2.9) is clear that this marvelously evolved form of upekṣêndriyam is in fact just another form of kāyêndriyam, albeit one that is relatively immune to “painful stimuli.”
Chi.: *wu shou-gen* 五受根) include faith (Skt.: *śraddhendriyam*; Chi.: *xin-gen* 信根), perseverance (Skt.: *vīryendriyam*; Chi.: *qin-gen* 勤根), mindfulness (Skt.: *smṛtīndriyam*; Chi.: *nian-gen* 念根), concentration (Chi: *samādhīndriyam*; Skt.: *ding-gen* 定根), and wisdom (Skt.: *prajñendriyam*; Chi.: *hui-gen* 慧根). Also known as the wholesome roots, these faculties are considered cultivatable because they emerge from the hedonic faculties when nurtured properly. Developing the *indriyas* of faith, perseverance, mindfulness, concentration, and wisdom involves the disciplined practice of a sentient being.

Following the standard Abhidharma gloss, Saṃghabhadra, likens the faculty of wisdom to “the sword that slices through delusion to reveal things as they really are” (Skt.: *yathābhūtām*; Chi.: *ru-shi* 如實). This gloss recalls the *Mahāvibhāṣa* definition of wisdom as “that which is supreme by virtue of understanding” 以解為勝. The Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma scholars treat the faculty of wisdom as an instrumental means by which the final goal of nirvāṇa, the emancipation from the cycle of death and rebirth, can be achieved. Nirvāṇa is obtained by enlisting the faculty of wisdom for analytical observation. However, the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma doctrine holds that the Buddha relinquishes the mortal body and its embodied faculties in realizing “ultimate nirvāṇa without remainder” (Skt.: *anupadhi-śeṣa-nirvāṇa*; Chi.: *wuyu niepan* 無餘涅槃). Envisioned thusly, final nirvāṇa is not a result of the skillful exercise of faculties. To demonstrate this idea, the Sarvāstivāda scholars appeal to the principle of non-reflexivity. Just as a knife is not able to

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84 Also referred to as the “five skillful roots.” The Chinese word *gen* contains an untranslatable pun that exploits the two senses of word—“faculty” and “root.” The same pun applies to the Sanskrit word *mūla*, which can mean both “root” and “indriya”. One of the doctrinal hallmarks of the Vibhājyavādin tradition (whose name literally means “the makers of distinctions” 分別論者) is that these five faculties are essentially “uncontaminated” (Skt.: *anāsrava*) or morally “pure” by nature. However, the Vibh editors’ ultimate ruling rejects this stance. The determines the five hedonic faculties to be morally indeterminate or neutral (Skt.: *avyākrta*; Chi.: *wuji* 無記). The importance of this ruling is that the moral valences of these faculties can tilt either way. This hinges upon the specific moral quality of their execution, and whether it is “skillful” (Skt.: *kuśala*; Chi.: *shan* 善), “unskillful” (Skt.: *akuśala*; Chi.: *bu-shan* 不善) or “neutral.”

85 *Mahāvibhāṣa*, fascicle 142, T1545:27.733.a03.
cut itself, nirvāṇa cannot be a faculty because it brings about the cessation of all embodied faculties.\textsuperscript{86}

\textbf{Faculties 20-22:} The three uncontaminated faculties (Skt.: \textit{anāsravastrīndriyāṇi}; Chi.: \textit{san wulou-gen} 三無漏根) include the faculty capable of knowing what is to be known and heretofore unknown (Skt.: \textit{ājñāsyāmīndriyam}; Chi.: \textit{weizhi-dangzhi-gen} 未知當知根),\textsuperscript{87} the faculty capable of knowing what is already known (Skt.: \textit{sājñātāvyēndriyam}; Chi.: \textit{yizhi-gen} 已知根), and the faculty capable of knowing what is not yet known and what is already known (Skt.: \textit{ājñātāvīndriyam}; Chi.: \textit{juzhi-gen} 具知根; \textit{wuzhi-gen} 無知根).\textsuperscript{88} These faculties are described as uncontaminated or undefiled (Skt.: \textit{anāsrava}; Chi.: \textit{wulou} 無漏) because they share a wholesome nature that is incorruptible. The three uncontaminated faculties can do no harm.

The three undefiled faculties describe the achievements of gnosis, the comprehensive knowledge of past, present, and future lives. The development of the faculties of gnosis is gained through following the path of insight, the path of cultivation and the path of no more training (Skt.: \textit{aśaikṣya}; Chi.: \textit{wu-xue} 無學). The realization of all three of these faculties is the state of “savanthood” (Skt.: \textit{sājñātāvin}). When realized in this sequence, the three uncontaminated

\textsuperscript{86} See Vibhāṣa of Saṅghabhūti (Chi.: \textit{Bi posha lun} 驚婆沙論) fascicle 4, T1547:28.447.b27-9.

\textsuperscript{87} This is the faculty required by a meditative practitioner in the path of insight (Skt.: \textit{darśana-mārga}; Chi. \textit{jiandao} 見道), who is occupied in coming to know what she heretofore did not know.

\textsuperscript{88} The latter designation is the earlier Chi. term for this faculty capable of simultaneously knowing events in the past, present, and future. The negative suffix \textit{wu} 無 imbeds a double-negative — hence, the literal meaning is “the faculty not failing to know either [past or future] 無所不知根.” Keng renders these two faculties — the penultimate and final faculties in the list of twenty-two faculties — as the “faculty of having learned (Skt.: \textit{ājñātēndriyam}; Chi.: \textit{yi zhigen} 已知根)” and the “faculty of revolving to come to know something unknown (Skt.: \textit{ājñāsyāmīndriyam}; Chi.: \textit{zhiweizhi gen 知未知根} or \textit{weizhi yuzhi gen 知未知根})” See Ching Keng, \textit{Yogācāra Buddhism Transmitted or Transformed: Paramārtha (499-569) and His Chinese Interpreters}, (Ph.D. diss.) (Harvard Univ., Cambridge, Mass. 2009), 92. Dunlin 遁麟 cites Saṅghabhādra’s opinion that these three are each adjectival compounds or \textit{kārmadhāryas} 持業釋: i.e., “the faculty which knows that which is heretofore unknown” (see Dunlin’s \textit{Subglosses on Yuanhui’s Commentary on the Treasury} 俱舍頌疏記, fascicle 3, (X841:53.409c05). Dunlin was a disciple of Yuanhui 圓暉, a specialist scholar of the \textit{Abhidharmakośa} who lived in Zhongdayyun Temple 中大雲寺 under the reign of Tang Xuanzong 玄宗 (r. 713–756).
faculties bring about omniscience, the state of knowing the past, present, and future pervasively. The third faculty in this triumvirate, the faculty of knowing that which is not yet known and what is already known, is possessed by enlightened beings who have omniscience, and an unimpeded capacity for compassion and empathy for the suffering of other sentient creatures. In the words of Vasubandhu: “[the three uncontaminated indriyas] are dominant in the achievement of the ultimate achievement of nirvāṇa, etc.” (AK 2.4c-d). Commentators on this line of verse, including Vasubandhu, take the “etc.” at the end of the verse to refer to the “analytical cessation of delusions” (Skt.: pratisaṁkhyānirodha; Chi.: ze-mie 擇滅).

According to the Mahāvibhāṣa, the twenty-two indriyas grouped into the five categories of the faculties of sensory perception, the embodied faculties, the hedonic faculties, the wholesome roots and the uncontaminated faculties, provide an exhaustive enumeration of the essential components of sentient life and a complete classification of all life forms. The taxonomy enumerated by Xuanzang thus provides the theoretical foundation for an understanding of all forms of sentient life that is based upon the teachings of the Buddha.

With this detailed theoretical framework on the table, Xuanzang goes on to determine the number and type of indriyas that are necessary for the survival of different categories of sentient beings. He does this by drawing upon the Treasury of Abhidharma while counterbalancing Vasubandhu’s definitions of the indriyas against those of Vasubandhu’s prolific commentator, Saṅghabhadra.

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89 In his Clarification of Tenets, Saṅghabhadra clarifies that this designation of savanthood applies only to those “free from the yoke of sensory desire (kāmāvacāra)” — namely, those sentient beings who are untethered by attachments to achieving sensory desires and have since “graduated to the two higher realms” (T1563:29.797.b20).

90 Skt. text of Pradhan, ed., Abhidharmakośa, 40, reads: Uttarotarasamprāptir nirvāṇādyādhipatyataḥ//4cd/

91 Ibid., 40.
The Six Categories of Sentient Life and the Twenty-Two Faculties

In his translations of the works of Vasubandhu and Saṅghabhadra, Xuanzang first refines the definitions of the twenty-two indriyas, and then classifies all forms of sentient life into six groups or genera. The twenty-two indriyas form the basic units of the classification system by Xuanzang. In his taxonomy of all sentient life, Xuanzang uses two variables: the number of indriyas with which a form of sentient life is endowed at birth, and the number of indriyas that a sentient being, with training and practice, is capable of realizing during life. The types and numbers of innate and potential indriyas provide the two indices upon which Xuanzang classifies every sentient being in the universe.

In his taxonomy of all forms of sentient life, Xuanzang conforms to the standard Buddhist doctrine that holds that all living beings reside in one of six gatis (Chi.: liuqu 六趣) or “transmigratory paths” (Chi.: liudao 六道). The six transmigratory paths correspond to the six regions demarcated on the famous Buddhist wheel of dying and reincarnation. Each of the six regions of the Buddhist wheel are populated exclusively by one genus of sentient being. Xuanzang

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92 Gati refers to both incarnate and discarnate beings. The Chinese character that Xuanzang employs, qu 趣, is close to the most generic and literal meaning of the Sanskrit word, gati: “going, moving, gait, deportment, motion in general.” According to Monier William's Sanskrit Dictionary, the word gati signifies the transmigratory “mode of passage” of a sentient being's life or afterlife. Monier-William's Dictionary also gives the meaning more specific to Brāhmaṇical religious and philosophical systems: “the course of the soul through numerous forms of life, metempsychosis, condition of a person undergoing this migration.”

93 As section 1.7.3 discusses in detail, Mahāvibhāṣa attributes the alternate rubric of six gatis, excluding upapādukas, to the non-Buddhists or tīrthikas, although the rubric of six including asuras (variably translated as “Jealous/Fighting Gods/Demigods,” does appear in later texts of East Asian Provenance—e.g., Sūtra of Ten Kings. For the apperence of six gatis in this “pseudepigraphical” sūtra see Stephen Teiser, The Scripture on the Ten Kings: and the Making of Purgatory in Medieval Chinese Buddhism (Univ. of Hawaii Press, 2003). Teiser has also studied the adaptation of six gatis in the Buddhist Wheel of Samsāra, see Teiser, Reinventing the wheel: Paintings of Rebirth in Medieval Buddhist temples (Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press, 2006), 319. Based on the index to this monograph (p. 314), Teiser gives 18 references to paths of rebirth numbering five, whereas he devotes 24 references to paths of rebirth numbering 6. Backchecking each of the page references given in this index reveals that all of Teiser's references to five gatis find Indo-Tibetan provenance, while all of the references to 6 find Sinic provenance (including Dunhuang Mogao Grottoes). Teiser also reproduces a Tokugawa-period (1669) diagram-scroll of the realms in ten directions 十方界, which is a much later doctrine found in sinic Huayan Buddhism (Japanese: Kegon) – Teiser, Reinventing the Wheel, 248.
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uses the general nomenclature of the “six transmigratory destinies” (Skt.: gatis) to refer to the six genera of sentient beings. His Mahāvibhāṣa glosses the word, gati, as “the place in which one will be reborn.” Vasubandhu sometimes refers to five gatis, as he excludes the upapādukas, ostensibly because he considers the attenuated upapādukas to be barely alive.

Vasubandhu lays out the taxonomy that encompasses the full range of sentient beings in Chapter Three of the Treasury of Abhidharma. In the opening three ślokas (AK 3.1-3cd) of this chapter, Vasubandhu describes the six genera of all living things. The six categories are intended to capture the full spectrum of sentient life and include: humans, non-human animals, celestials (Skt.: devas; Chi.: tian 天), hungry ghosts (Skt: pretas; Chi.: e-gui 饿鬼), hellish beings (Skt.: nārakas; Chi.: naluoqie 棠落迦), and transitional beings (Skt.: upapādukas; Chi.: huasheng 化生).

The simplicity and concision of the versified account of the spectrum of life by Vasubandhu is unprecedented in the earlier strata of Abhidharma literature. The recitation by Vasubandhu, of the ranges of the indriyas that determine the nature of each species, takes the form of octosyllabic quatrains, with four beats, or morae, to the hemistich, and four octosyllabic hemistiches to the quatrain. These stanzas render the otherwise dense doctrine of the indriyas accessible to, and easily memorized by, students of Abhidharma.

Vasubandhu condenses the bewildering detail presented in the earlier sources into a clear, consise, and systematic taxonomy. The four categories of humans, non-human animals, celestials,

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94 Mahāvibhāṣa, fascicle 150: 所往義是趣義. T.1545:27.865.b07
95 Skt.: Pra + ita, literally meaning “gone forth, departed.”
96 Mahāvibhāṣa, fascicle 172, gives a folk etymology of the word naraka, which takes the nāra (nara is usually spelled with short-first syllable), while the taddhita-suffix ([k]) stands for “being bad.” In fact, it’s just an taddhita-suffix (suffix standing for an exocentric bahu-vrīhi compound – lit., “[he who] belongs in hell.”) Monier-Williams Skt. Dictionary also gives “demon.”
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and transitional beings are subdivided into three environmental realms, or *dhātus*: the *kāmadhātu*, the *rūpadhātu*, and the *arūpadhātu*. The other two categories, hungry ghosts and hellish beings, reside in the subterranean regions of the *kāmadhātu* only.

**The Spectrum of Life Forms in Terms of the Three Dhātus**

What comprises the spectrum of life? Xuanzang follows the *Treasury of Abhidharma* by Vasubandhu in his investigation of the six categories of beings that characterize the spectrum of life forms in the Buddhist universe. Vasubandhu bases the six categories on three factors: the minimum number of faculties possessed by a specific form of sentient life, the maximum number of faculties that a form of sentient life can actualize, and the sequence of the faculties possessed by a specific sentient being.

Vasubandhu lists the six categories of sentient beings in descending order, from the most robust forms of life who possess the greatest number of faculties, to the most attenuated forms of beings who possess the fewest number of faculties. The list spans spiritually-advanced humans who possess close to the maximum number of *indriyas*, to the *upapādukas*, who survive with only three *indriyas*. The first four categories of beings in the taxonomy of Vasubandhu exist in the *kāmadhātu*. Hungry ghosts and hell-born beings (Skt.: *nārakas*), the legions of the “damned” (“le damnéé”), exist only in the *kāmadhātu*. *Upapādukas*, humans, and celestials exist in all three realms. All heterotrophs are considered to be biological continua, or *saṃtānas*. Plants are considered to be *saṃtānas*, but in contrast to animals, are not considered to be sentient beings. The difference between a sentient *saṃtāna* and an insensate *saṃtāna* is the presence in an organism of the sixth sensory *indriya* of mind.

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97 Translation from Lamotte, *La traité de la grande vertu de sagesse (Mahāprajñāpāramitā Śāstra)* (Louvain: Institut Orientaliste de Louvain, 1944).
The Three *Dhātus*

Xuanzang follows the taxonomy of Vasubandhu in his enumeration of the six categories of sentient life forms into three environmental realms (Skt.: *dhātus*; Chi.: *yujie*欲界), the realm of sentient beings bearing five ordinary senses, the *rūpadhātu* (Chi.: *se-jie*色界), the realm of “pure” or “subtle matter” (Skt.: *rūpapräsāda*; Chi.: *qing-jing se*清淨色), and the *arūpadhātu*, the immaterial realm. The descriptions by Xuanzang of the three *dhātus* is as follows:

1. The *kāmadhātu* is defined as the world of sensory desire. The *kāmadhātu* is inhabited by all forms of animals, both human and non-human. According to the first stanza of the “Investigation of the World,” chapter three of Vasubandhu’s *Treasury of Abhidharma*, the *kāmadhātu* is subdivided into twenty divisions (Skt.: *dvīpas*; Chi.: *fen*分), six celestial spheres and fourteen terrestrial spheres. The fourteen terrestrial spheres constitute the surface of the earth, and the eight spheres of subterranean hells.

In concrete spatial terms, Vasubandhu measures the extent of the *kāmadhātu* as “sixteen-hundred-thousand leagues from top to bottom, all supported by the wind disc

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98 Xuanzang’s elision of the term *dvīpa*, which he generally renders as *fen 分*, is *metri causa* in 3.1ab. Xuanzang’s translation of Saṅghabhadra’s *Clarification of Tenets*, fasc. 12 (T1563:29.829.b03) provides the most detailed gloss on the *kāmadhātu* part of the celestial regions, based upon Vasubandhu AKBh 3.1: “The one celestial part [of the *kāmadhātu*] refers to the six heavens of the desire realm: first, the four heavens of the Mahārāja Brāhmā King and his celestial retinue; second, the Trayatriṃśiika heavens; third, the Yāma Heavens; fourth, the Tuṣita Heaven; fifth, the heaven of the automatic reception of one's sensual desires; and sixth, the heavens for other's and one's own sensual enjoyment.” 如是欲界地獄趣等，并器世間總有十處。地獄洲異分為二十。若有情界從自在天至無間獄。若器世界乃至風輪皆欲界攝 (T1563:29.829.b12-13).
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below.”99 This space is also commonly referred to as “this Sahā world of ours” (Chi.: Shapo shijie 娑婆世界), or the “dusty world” (Chi.: chenši塵世). The word Sahā is derived from the Sanskrit root √sah and means, “the world to be endured.” The Chinese translation is a transliteration of the Sanksrit word. The dusty karmic world extends from the eight hot, and eight cold, hells below the earth, to the rarified Brahmā heavens (Chi.: Fantian 梵天) above the earth, and covers the four continents inhabited by human and non-human animals. The surface of the earth is said to include Mt. Sumeru, the seven surrounding territories, the eight seas, and the ring of iron mountains.

The earth and its atmosphere make up one smaller or “lesser world” (Chi.: xiao shijie 小世界). The lesser world extends from the earth out towards the six concentric heavens of the kāmadhātu. One thousand of the lesser worlds form a small chiliocosm (Chi.: xiao qian shijie 小千世界), one thousand small chiliocosms form a medium chiliocosm (Chi.: zhong qian shijie 中千世界), and one thousand medium chiliocosms form one great chiliocosm (Chi.: da qian shijie 大千世界).100 This vast space, the great trichilocosm, makes room in the Buddhist cosmos for the possibility of extraterrestrial life.

Within this elaborate cosmology, the nomenclature of prthajana denotes the “ordinary professing Buddhist”101 who lives in any one of the three dhātus. As Vasubandhu sarcastically puts it: “There are still idiots (Skt.: bālas) [i.e., ‘ordinary people’] in the


100 See Xuanzang’s trans. of AKbh, fascicle 10, T1558:29.61.a05-7.

101 Translation based upon entry in Sir Monier William’s Skt. Dictionary.
Presumably, Vasubandhu is alluding to the humans “of inferior intelligence” who reside in the immaterial spheres. Paramārtha translates the words *prthagjana* and *bāla*, with the Chinese word, *fan-fu* 凡夫, or ordinary human. In general, Xuanzang uses the term *yisheng* 异生, which means “he/she born in a distinctive way,” to refer to the forms of humanity who reside in all three *dhātus*. 

(2) The *rūpadhātu* is defined as the cosmic realm of subtle matter (Skt.: *rūpaprasāda*). The vast majority of celestial beings live in the *rūpadhātu*. The *rūpadhātu* is made of seventeen celestial spheres (Chi.: *sejie shiqi tian* 色界十七天). Unlike their compatriots in the *kāmadhātu*, humanoid and celestial sentient beings who reside in the *rūpadhātu* do not have olfactory and gustatory sense faculties or bimodally gendered procreative faculties. Both genera of sentient beings, humans and celestials, obtain nutrition via tactition. The celestial realms of the *rūpadhātu* are host to both humans and celestial beings, but not to any of the karmically “inferior” (Chi.: *lie 劣*) transmigratory stations (Skt.: *samsthanas*; Chi.: *chu 處) of the pretas, nārakas, or the so-called “demigods,” or *asurās*. Celestial beings born into the Heaven of Extensive Rewards (Skt.: *Brhat-Phala*; Chi.: *Guang guo tian* 廣果天) in the *rūpadhātu* abide in a zombie-like trance state that is “devoid of thought and sensation” (Skt.: *asamjñika*; Chi.: *wuxiang tian* 無想天). The human beings in the *rūpadhātu* are reborn into various stations of the Pure Buddha Lands (Skt.: *Buddhakṣetras*; Chi.: *Fo-cha 佛剎*).

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102 Pradhan, *Abhidharmakośa*, 52.
According to the later Mahāyāna Pure Land teachings that are followed by Xuanzang and many of the Tang Dynasty scholars, these androgynic human beings are said to sprout forth from inside a lotus blossom that rests atop a pedestal on the crystalline lake bedecked with seven kinds of jewels. In general, sentient beings, human or otherwise, who live in the rūpadhātu have substantially longer life expectancies than those residing in the kāmadhātu.

Vasubandhu reports that, unlike the minority of celestials who reside within the Trayatrimśika Heavens and the Brahmā heavens of the kāmadhātu, the celestial denizens of the rūpadhātu live for 16,000 aeons. The Trayatrimśika is viewed as one of the vaunted stations of celestial reincarnation for humans in the kāmadhātu, particularly among the aristocratic lay patrons of Buddhism during the Tang Dynasty.

(3) The arūpadhātu, or the immaterial realm, is defined as physically unbounded. The arūpadhātu occupies more than the three dimensions of the kāmadhātu, as indicated by the designation of non-spatiality or adeśa. The translation of the term for “non-spatial” by Xuanzang means, “without hard edges” (Chi.: wu fangfen 無方分). The immaterial world of the arūpadhātu is understood to be “non-spatial” in the sense that the ultimate nature of the arūpadhātu is not constrained by the mundane notions of space found on earth. This means that the spatial nature of the arūpadhātu can not be fully apprehended by earthlings. In his translation of the Sanskrit word, adeśa,
Xuanzang avers that rarified forms of sentient beings, like apparitions, are able to pass through bodies. Vasubandhu reports that life lasts 20,000 great *kalpas* in the first heaven of the immaterial realm, 40,000 in the second heaven, 60,000 in the third heaven, and 80,000 great *kalpas* in the fourth of these heavens. For the highest of these four meditation heavens in the immaterial spheres, the average lifespan is estimated to be thirty-five quintillion human years.

Only the most attenuated and spiritually advanced life forms are adapted to life in the vaunted *arūpadhātu*. Some of the famous Hindu deities reside in the *arūpadhātu*, including Viṣṇu and Kṛṣṇa. The Sarvāstivāda theorists, clearly enthralled with the *arūpadhātu*, authored numerous and detailed accounts of the immaterial realm. They describe the *arūpadhātu* as a space consisting of four the concentric spheres, or the meditation, or *dhyāna* heavens (Chi.: *si chan tian* 四禪天). These four meditation heavens form the heavenly abodes of humans, devas, and intermediate beings. However, Xuanzang, in his cosmological explanations, emphasizes that even in the most rarified immaterial heavens, sentient beings are all united by common conspecific traits that are rooted in *sabhāgatā* factors, and expressed in the faculty of vitality and the faculty of mind.

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103 For Vasubandhu’s estimations of average lifespan in the *rūpadhātu*, see AK 3.80. For Skt. text see Pradhan, ed., *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*, 173; Xuanzang’s translation of 3.80 at T1558:29.61.b22-c4.
The nomenclature of the immaterial realm does not necessarily imply that its denizens lack physical bodies. It is true that beings born in both the rūpadhātu and arūpadhātu do not possess the ordinary ocular or auditory organs. However, they do have subtle, or rarified bodies, that are considered to be physically lighter than the bodies of humans.

In Chapter Three, “On the Discrimination of Worldly Things” (Skt.: Loka-nirdeśa; Chi.: Fenbie shi pin 分別世品) of the Treasury of Abdhidharma, Vasubandhu begins with a description of ordinary humans and goes on to elaborate upon forms of non-human life, such as non-human animals, and hellish beings (Skt.: nārakas) that are “inferior” (Chi.: lie 劣), to “superior” (Chi.: sheng 胜) humans. The Treasury of Abdhidharma also describes examples of enlightened beings that inhabit the rarified realms of subtle material. In his standard listing Vasubandhu contains five gatis, whereas other Chinese Buddhist texts include the asurās, or jealous gods, in a separate gati.

The transmigratory realm within which a sentient being resides is crucial to the classification scheme of Vasubandhu. This is because the number of indriyas possessed by an organism can refer to more than one cluster of indriyas. For example, a group of five indriyas can include different types of indriyas. Additionally, because a specific cluster of indriyas may be adaptive to a specific environmental realm, different forms of the same species may have different collections of indriyas.

The three environments form a hierarchy of realms of rebirth that divide members of the same genus into three species that are based upon their spiritual standings. The three dhātus do not contain all of the five or six paths of reincarnation that are available to organisms. While the kāmadhātu contains all six forms of life, the rūpadhātu and arūpadhātu are home to only the celestials, humanoids, and intermediate beings. The celestial and humans are considered to be the
more advanced forms of reincarnated sentient life within the Buddhist cosmology. *Upapādukas* are the transient form assumed by sentient beings between bodily reincarnations. The lesser of the three forms of rebirth exist only on earth and include reincarnations in the forms of hell-denizens, hungry ghosts, or non-human animals (Chi.: *chusheng* 畜生; *bangsheng* 傍生). The lower class of animalia excludes humans and devas, as humans and devas are the only mammals found in all three transmigratory realms. Humans that are more evolved inhabit the subtle matter and immaterial realms. Animals considered to be reincarnated into the less desirable forms, reside in the aquatic and terrestrial areas of the earth, a total region comprised of either seven, according to Asaṅga, or eight, according to Vasubandhu, concentric rings of iron mountains, four continents and four oceans.

**The Six Genera in Terms of Faculties**

In his corpus of Abhidharma translations, Xuanzang adheres to the order and enumeration of the six genera as presented in the first twenty-two stanzas in the second chapter of the *Treasury of Abhidharma* by Vasubandhu. The taxonomy of life formulated by Xuanzang is as follows:

1. **Humans** (Skt.: *manuṣya* or *nara*; Chi.: *ren* 人) have nine innate faculties and can realize up to nineteen faculties with cultivation. Humans occupy all three realms: the *kāmadhātu*, the *rūpadhātu*, and the *arūpadhātu*. Vasubandhu uses the term, *human*, to

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104 The former is the older Chi. translation for the Skt. word introduced by Kumarajiva in the 5th century. The latter is Xuanzang's Chi. translation.

105 The *Treasury of Abhidharma* of Vasubandhu and the *Yogācārabhūmi* of Asaṅga are in lock step in maintaining that the *kāmadhātu* extends from the eight hot and eight cold hells below the earth to the Brahmā heavens above the earth. The surface of the earth is said to cover Mount Sumeru and its seven surrounding territories, the eight seas, and the rings of iron mountains. The only discrepancy between the two thinkers’ explanations of *kāmadhātu* is that the Kośa states that there exist eight rings of iron mountains, whereas the *Yogācārabhūmi* states that there exist only seven -- see Kajiyama Yūichi, “Buddhist Cosmology as Presented in the Yogācārabhūmi,” G. Nagao. and J. Silk, (eds.) *Wisdom, Compassion, and the Search for Understanding: The Buddhist Studies Legacy of Gadjin M.* (Honolulu: Univ. of Hawai‘i Press, 2000), 193.
describes homo sapiens, and other more highly-evolved species of humans. 

Vasubandhu and Xuanzang use the terms, *nara* or *ren*, to describe homo sapiens, as well as other humans who inhabit the extraterrestrial realms, the subtle material realms, and the immaterial realms.

The minimum number of faculties required for human survival in the *kamadhātu* is three: the embodied faculty of *kāyendriyam*, mind, and vitality. However, Vasubandhu and Saṅghabhadra generally speak of the “nine faculties native to the human” (Chi.: *jiu gen jusheng* 九根俱生). These nine faculties include the five senses (1-5), the mind (6), the male or female procreative faculties (7-8), and the faculty of vitality (9). Humans in the *kāmadhātu* generally do not live past one hundred years.

Humans in the middle realm, the *rūpadhātu*, possess from eight to twenty-one faculties (9-16). The minimum number of eight includes the three embodied faculties necessary for survival in this realm: tactition (5), aversion (14), and vitality (9). The maximum number of twenty-one faculties includes this grouping, along with the five skillful faculties of faith (15), concentration (18), spiritual vigor (16), recollection (17), and wisdom (19). The faculty of tactition is required for survival, as forms of humanity in the *rūpadhātu* absorb nutrition via touch. The five skillful faculties denote the spiritual prerequisite for rebirth in this realm. The maximum number of twenty-one faculties that are realizable by humans in this realm excludes only the faculty of procreation.

Humans in the highest realm, the *arūpadhātu*, possess from three to twenty-one faculties. The minimum number of three faculties include aversion, vitality, and the bodily faculty of
kāyêndriyam. As in the rūpadhātu, the maximum number of twenty-one faculties excludes only procreation.

The three uncontaminated faculties (20-22) are available only to the humans residing in the upper two realms of rūpadhātu and arūpadhātu. Humans in the “middle realm” (Chi.: zhongjie 中界) of pure matter have from eight to twenty-one faculties. The maximum number of twenty-one faculties also applies to humans across the highest realm of arūpadhātu.

(2) Non-human animals or tiryañe/tiryagyoni (Chi.: bangsheng 僧生; chusheng 畜生), have from thirteen to nineteen faculties. The Mahāvibhāṣa explicitly counts all of the twenty-two applicable, “with the exception of the three uncontaminated roots (i.e., the seven physical faculties).” 十九者，謂除三無漏根，即具七色根者。The text goes on: “The thirteen refer to the body, mind, along with five hedonic faculties (pañca-vedanêndriyāṇi). These match up to five faculties, which are identical to those six physical faculties initially deserted during the course of gradually dying. The same goes for non-human animals as for the realm of hungry ghosts (pretas).” 十三者，謂身 命 意 五受信等五根，即漸命終，先捨六色根者，如說傍生，鬼界亦爾。Jñānaprasthāna śāstra (T1543:26.873.c27-28), trans. Zhu Fonian, et al.: “tiryāñc have a maximum of nineteen and minimum of thirteen faculties. The same goes for pretas. Those who have severed the skillful roots have a maximum of thirteen and minimum of eight.” 畜生，若極多十九，若極少十三。餓鬼亦如是，斷善根，若極多十三，若極少八。The Mahāvibhāṣa elaborates about the assignment of a maximum of nineteen and a minimum of thirteen faculties to tiryāñc: “Non-human animals (tiryāñc) have nineteen [faculties] at the maximum and thirteen at the minimum. The number nineteen excludes the three uncontaminated roots (i.e., the faculties of higher-gnosis, which non-human animals are incapable of attaining), and it is equivalent to ‘fully possessing seven physical faculties.’ At the maximum, the number nineteen refers to body, mind, along with five hedonic faculties – it is equivalent to those six physical faculties initially deserted during the course of gradually dying. The very same applies in the case of non-human animals as for the realm of hungry ghosts (pretas).” 僧生
specifies the thirteen faculties that provide the baseline for the survival and propagation of non-human animals, or tiryāṇc. The assignment of thirteen faculties to non-human animals first appears in Treatise on the Basis of Gnosis (*Jñānaprasthāna śāstra*, fasc. 15). The thirteen faculties are: the five ordinary senses of vision, audition, olfaction, gustation and tactition, a coordinative mind to direct the senses (1-6), the two embodied faculties of male or female procreation (7) and vitality (8) and the five hedonic faculties of joy, suffering, pain, pleasure, and aversion (9-13).\(^{111}\) Importantly, the existence of the faculty of mind in non-human animals implies that they have been regarded as sentient creatures since the time of the early Buddhist sūtras.

Humans have the same number of thirteen baseline faculties as those possessed by non-human animals. In addition to the thirteen faculties with the sentient mind, humans have the five hedonic faculties of joy, suffering, pain, pleasure, and subtle aversion to sensory stimuli. In this

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\(^{111}\) These assignments are corroborated by the earlier Chinese trans. of *Jñānaprasthāna* (Chi.: *Bajian du lun* 八犍度論) compiled by Zhu Fonian, et al., which reads: “How many faculties are initially active within the sentient being residing in the realm of sensual desire? Reply: those born oviparously, viviparously, or via intercourse can each generate two faculties: namely, proprioception and vitality. Those born of karmic transformation have either six, seven, or eight – six if non-gendered; seven if androgynitic; eight if bimodally gendered.”受欲界有，幾根最初得行？答曰：卵生 胎生 合會生二：身根・命根也。化生或六 七 八。無形六；一形七；二形八 (T26, no. 1543, p. 870, c03-5). By “viviparously born,” this text means to indicate mammals, excluding humans. By born through intercourse, the text indicates “humans and the celestials in the six heavens of the desire realm” 六欲天. By contrast, an earlier Abhidharma sourcebook titled *Abhidharmahrdaya* 阿毘曇心論經 (trans. by Narêndrayaśas 那連提耶舍 [517–589]) offers the diverging view that animals may run down to only two, since “those born vivipariously, oviparously, or through spawning [the kingdom of insects or insecta], are sometimes sustained by only “two retributive faculties” during gestation -- namely, kāyêndriyam and jīvitêndriyam. These two are the residual factors expressing inherited karma from a past life, since they are the factors of vipāka or “karmic maturation” (a topic to which more space is devoted in Chap. 2 of this dissertation, “Karma and Faculties.”) Without getting into the bewildering detail of different assignments to the different forms of non-human animals, suffice it to note here that the pair of faculties – aversion and vitality – is already manifest during gestation, although there are disagreements about precisely which point during the course of which trimester. This text unequivocally states in the sixth fascicle that the mental faculty is missing from this form of animal, since it is not included among their native faculties with which they are born. Due to their gestational development, these animals are not born with the faculty of mind. It would entail that non-human animals can survive simply by virtue of possessing a limbic system and vitality. [0864c12] 若眾生根次第生，卵生濕生胎生。彼初念二根報生身根、及命根。意根彼是穢汚 (T28, no. 1551, p. 864, c12-14).
section of the Mahāvibhaṣa, Xuanzang translates the Sanskrit word sattvam, or, “sentience,” as “those having feelings” (Chi.: you-qing有情).\footnote{Previous famous translators of Indic words into classical Chinese, such as Kumārajīva and Paramārtha, use the term zhongsheng眾生 which literally means “myriad of living beings.”} This translation includes the category of non-human animals among “those having feelings” (Chi.: youqing有情) or sentient beings. In the taxonomy of Xuanzang, all animals, whether they are human or non-human, are sensitive beings, and in contrast to plants, are capable of having feelings. As elucidated in Schmithausen’s (1991) study on The Problem of the Sentience of Plants in Earliest Buddhism, plants are not considered to be sentient because they do not evince the the vital qualities of sattvam or jīva.\footnote{The reviewer for Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (JRAS), Karel Werner, summarizes Schmithausen’s (1991) major findings: “defining the problem from the angle of ethical precepts which require followers of Buddhism to abstain from killing or injuring living beings, he bases his understanding of what is a living or animate being on whether it is capable of ‘sentience,’ i.e., of perception and sensation. As the prevailing Buddhist position does not admit plants as sentient beings, they are not included in the above restrictive precept. However, since the Vedic Jaina and post-Vedic Hindu sources admit sentience in plants and even seeds and elements, such as water and earth, the author wonders whether perhaps the earliest Buddhist position was not the same or similar, especially because explicit positions in the matter were formulated comparatively late.” – see Werner, “Book Review: The Problem of the Sentience of Plants in Earliest Buddhism by Lambert Schmithausen (Tōkyō, The International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 1991).” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 9, no. 1 (1999), 183.}

(3) Gods or celestials (Skt.: devas) require a minimum of three faculties to survive but can possess a maximum number of nineteen faculties.\footnote{The bodies of the divine kinds within the Brāhma palace of the Brāhma heavens of the rūpyadhātu are known for possessing the greatest number of faculties among the deva kingdoms. Mahāvibhaṣa 172 describes them: “the bodies of four divine kings (of the Brāhma Heaven) contains at a minimum, seventeen, and at a maximum, nineteen. Celestials within the heavens of the thirty-three, the Yāma Heavens (under the kāmadhātu), the Tuṣita Heaven (DDB: ‘pure land in the fourth heaven in the realm of desire欲界’ [accessed Feb. 21 2017]), then heavens where one can partake in one’s own pleasure, and the heavens where one can partake of the pleasures created in other heavens are all the same.”四天王身，若極多十九，若極少十七。三十三天、炎天、兜術天、化自在天、他化自在天亦復如是 (T1543:26.874.a03) }

The bodies of the divine kinds within the Brāhma palace of the Brāhma heavens of the rūpyadhātu are known for possessing the greatest number of faculties among the deva kingdoms. Mahāvibhaṣa 172 describes them: “the bodies of four divine kings (of the Brāhma Heaven) contains at a minimum, seventeen, and at a maximum, nineteen. Celestials within the heavens of the thirty-three, the Yāma Heavens (under the kāmadhātu), the Tuṣita Heaven (DDB: ‘pure land in the fourth heaven in the realm of desire欲界’ [accessed Feb. 21 2017]), then heavens where one can partake in one’s own pleasure, and the heavens where one can partake of the pleasures created in other heavens are all the same.”四天王身，若極多十九，若極少十七。三十三天、炎天、兜術天、化自在天、他化自在天亦復如是 (T1543:26.874.a03)

For [celestials within] the heaven of universal purity (within the rūpyadhātu), there are a minimum of fourteen and a maximum of sixteen. 遍淨天，若極多十六，若極少十五。光音天亦復如是.

For [celestials within] the heaven of spiritual fructification, there are a minimum of thirteen and a maximum of sixteen. 果實天，若極多十六，若極少十三 (T1543:26.874.a1-9).
described as invariable (Skt.: anvita) or compresent (Skt.: samanvāgata; Chi.: chengjiu 成就) because they comprise the cluster of rudimentary faculties that are required to sustain life. The gods and celestials are notable for perservering throughout their lengthy lives with only three faculties. Because the devas do not possess the hedonic faculties of suffering, anxiety, or the procreative faculties, they can only realize nineteen faculties.

Celestial beings inhabit all three karmic realms: the kāmadhātu, the rūpadhātu, and the arūpadhātu.115 The regions populated by the celestials stretch from the six desire heavens in the kāmadhātu to the outer regions of the immaterial heavens in the arupadhātu. Rather than relying upon the relatively crude faculty of tactition to sense objects in their benign environments, devas use the the faculty of subtle aversion, or kāyêndriyam without the valence of pain and pleasure. Because of this, these highly evolved creatures are immune to intense feelings of pleasure or pain. Additionally, devas in the the rūpadhātu and the arūpadhātu do not have the sensory faculties required to ingest gross or piecemeal forms of food and must take their nutrition through the faculty of subtle aversion. The most evolved of all the celestials in the kāmadhātu live in the trayastriṃśa

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115 The ancient Āgama literature, recording the discourses of the historical Buddha, detail the spatial extentions of these celestial regions. According to the account in Dirghāgama, the Palace of the Yāma Heaven exists between the thousand spheres of heavens where one can partake in enjoyment and the thousand spheres of heavens of Brahmans (Skt.: Brahma-loka; Chi.: Fan Jiayi 梵迦夷; the first level of the first of the four meditation or dhyāna heavens 四禪天 of the realm of subtle matter 色界). This whole region is six thousand yojanas 由旬 in breadth. With A.L. Basham's estimate that a yojana is about nine miles long, that amounts to roughly fifty-four thousand miles. Buddha says in the Dirghāgama (fasc. 18), that is, “Section One of Part Four, the Span and Record of the World: Chapter the First on Rose-Apple-Continent (Jambudvīpa).” (第四分世記經閻浮提州品第一》，[Taishō, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 115, registers a24-9]: “The outlying heavens of the thirty-three celestials are twice as big as the Yāma heavens, while the Tuṣita heavens are twice as big as the Yāma heavens, while the heavens where one can partake in pleasure for oneself are twice as big as the Tuṣita heavens, while the heavens where one can partake in the pleasure of others are twice as big as the those where one can partake in pleasure for one's own sake, while the heavens inhabited by the Brahmakāyika celestials (an epithet meaning, ‘[celestials] with a Brahman-like body’) are twice as big as those where one can fully partake in pleasure for oneself.” 過三十三天 由旬一倍有焰摩天宮, 過焰摩天宮由旬一倍有兜率天宮, 過兜率天宮由旬一倍有化自在天宮, 過化自在天宮由旬一倍有他化自在天宮, 過他化自在天宮由旬一倍有梵加 (emend: 程)夷天宮(T1:1.p.115.a25-8).
the outermost region of the kāmadhātu, and the furthest point from the Sahā world that is still within the triple chiliocosm. The baser forms of devas live in the Brāhma-loka, the lowest sphere within the kāmadhātu. The Brāhma-loka is the abode of the belligerent “jealous gods,” or asurās, that are depicted frequently in Buddhist painting and sculpture. Despite later texts that treat the asurās as an independent class of beings, the canonical Abhidharma regards them as members of the broader genus of the devas. Celestials occupying the lower heavens of the kāmadhātu, such as the asurās of the Brahma-loka, possess between seventeen to nineteen

116 Mahāvibhāṣa, fasc. 170 depicts the triple-thirty heavens as places “of extremely high-altitude and concentric mountain ridges” 高山頂次第 (T1545.27.868.b13).

117 Saṅghabhadrā’s ultimate verdict that there is no so-called “sixth gati” for the asuras could hardly be more blunt. “In sum, the asurās are simply folded up into the gati of pretras. There’s just no sixth gati. It’s because no one ever talked about it.” 故阿素洛，唯鬼趣收，亦非第六，曾不說故 (T1562.29.461.b18-9). This judgment on the doctrinal issue of how many gatis there are comes at the denouement of his discussion of the relevant verses of Vasubandhu (3.1-3cd) clearly enumerating five gatis. By contrast, modern presentations of the Buddhist Wheel of Life often talk about a sixth gati. While commenting upon a depiction of the Wheel of Rebirth (cotton tankha painting from Tibet, early twentieth century) featured on the second page of his 2008 book, Teiser remarks: “the Buddhist theory states that forty-nine days after death, the person assumes bodily form again as a sentient being. Whether pleasantly as a god, demigod, or human being, or less happily as an animal, hungry ghosts, or resident of hell” – Reinventing the Wheel, 2. By “demigods,” Teiser is speaking about the asurās, which he highlights again in Fig. 1.7 as an important detail of a tangka painting from early-twentieth-century Tibet. Said tangka painting does not show a clear “spoke” or line of demarkation between the devas and asurās, as it very clearly shows between the other four gatis demarcated by a clear red line or “spoke” in the wheel. The other five examples of tangka paintings from early-modern Tibet do not exhibit any more than five spokes in the wheel of rebirth, denoting five gatis. In one of them, there appears to be a baseline out from the internal wheel within the wheel, but the line appears blurred when trying to track it outwards to the perimeter (Plate 2). There are asurā figures fighting on both sides of what appears to be a thin red stub of a line that gets obscured in the clouds surrounding the belligerent asurās. Despite the existence of numerous polemics against it within early Abhidharma literature, at the very least it seems fair to say that six gati is a non-standard and later doctrine that proliferates in the Mahāyāna.

118 Vībha 172 cites the “heterodox opinion” (xiejian 邪見) that asuras are categorized under the gatis of the devas within the kāmadhātu — T1545.27.868.c05-8. Vasubandhu In the succeeding verses, Vasubandhu consistently speaks of only five gatis (AK 3.6). However, some Mahāyāna texts sometimes give six gatis — a rubric which includes the asuras as an independent “sixth” class of beings. Saṅghabhadrā pleads ignorance about the exact provenance of the “distorted” sixth gati theory: “It’s just that the Buddha never spoke about six gatis.” Mahāvibhāṣa, Vasubandhu’s Treasury, and Saṅghabhadrā’s Nyāyanusāra and Clarification of Tenets generally say that six gatis which counts as separate, is a distorted doctrine, either attributing it to tīrthikas or other Abhidharma traditions. According to the Pāli Text Society Pāli-English Dictionary, the earlier texts list five gatis, and the six appear in later texts: 242-43.

That East Asian sources get confused, is easily illustrated by the DDB entry under “six gatis” 六道 which lists the six in the wrong order (asurās should be between humans and devas, not between animals and humans). There are even later Chinese interpretations of asurās as ‘nature spirits.’ Suffice it to say that this is not the way that Vasubandhu or other authors in his tradition go about it.
faculties. The minimum number of seventeen faculties possessed by celestials includes all twenty-two faculties, with the exception of the contaminated hedonic faculty of anxiety, the contaminated embodied faculties of sexual procreation, and the three uncontaminated faculties of higher gnosis.

Devas inhabiting the *rūpadhātu* reside in one of twenty-two concentric spheres that comprise the this vast region. Celestials across the *rūpadhātu*, the region stretching from the outskirts of the Brahma heavens up through the heavens of marvelous spiritual fruits, possess from thirteen to sixteen faculties. The thirteen faculties include the three compresent faculties of mind, aversion, and vitality, along with the five hedonic faculties and the five skillful faculties. The sixteen faculties that can be realized by devas include all of the preceding, with the addition of the two faculties of gnosis, the faculty capable of knowing that which is to be known (Skt.: *ājñāsyāmīndriyaṃ*; Chi.: *weizhi dangzhī gen*未知當知根) about future lives, and the faculty capable of knowing that which is already known (Skt.: *ājñātāvīndriyaṃ*; Chi.: *yizhi gen* 已知根;) about previous lives.

Celestials in the highest immaterial realms possess between fourteen and sixteen faculties. The maximum number of sixteen faculties belonging to devas in this realm are the same as as those residing in the subtle material realms. The cluster of fourteen faculties possessed by this category of devas does not include all of the five hedonic faculties. These celestials bear only the faculties of joy and aversion and do not possess the hedonic faculties of suffering, anxiety and sensory

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119 *Mahāvibhāṣa* 150: “Seventeen [faculties] excludes androgynous beings [who do not evince a bimodally-gendered faculty (6-7)], as well as the faculty of anxiety and the three faculties of higher gnosis (20-22). This [exclusion] is because these beings (i.e., those beings bearing seventeen faculties from birth) are born as human beings who have already fully effaced the pollution of sensory desire. For example, there are the four Guardian Kings and the members of their celestial retinue. It’s the same for the *Trayatrimśika* heavens through heaven where one can partake of the pleasures created in other heavens. In the heavens for the worship of Brahma there are a maximum of sixteen and a minimum of fifteen.” 十七者，謂除一形憂根三無漏根。即已離欲染異生。如四大王眾天。三十三天，乃至他化自在天亦爾。梵眾天極多十六極少十五 (T1545:27.767c08-13).
pleasure. This implies that the most rarified forms of celestials enjoy the fruits of spiritual joy while being unattached to the baser forms of sensory desire.

(4) Hungry ghosts or pretas (Chi.: e-gui 饿鬼) have from eight to nineteen faculties. The Mahāvibhāṣa editors assert that the minimum and maximum number of faculties for the pretas are the same as those for other terrestrial non-human animals: nineteen at the maximum, excluding the three uncontaminated roots of gnosis, and eight at the minimum, including the five ordinary senses, aversion to pain, a suffering mind, and long-lasting vitality. This is considered to be a very unpleasant assignment of faculties.

(5) Pretas are the only forms of life that can be reincarnated either in a warm-blooded mammalian womb or via spontaneous karmic transformation. Spontaneous karmic

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120 Mahāvibhāṣa, fasc. 150 (T1545:27.767.c15).
121 Pra + ita, literally meaning “gone forth, departed.”
122 In the most ancient stratum of the Sarvāstivāda literature transmitted by Xuanzang, the Jñānaprasthāna says, by way of a reply to the question of how many faculties describe each class of sentient being: “Reply: nineteen at the max for hellish beings and eight at the minimum. For the tiryāḍaḥ (non-human animal kingdoms), nineteen at the max and thirteen at the minimum – the same goes for the realm of hungry ghosts (pretas).” 答：地獄，極多十九；極少八。傍生，極多十九；極少十三。鬼界亦爾。
123 Nyāyanusāra, fascicle 21: “Hungry ghosts refer to those with habitual stinginess and greediness, such that they delight in stealing things from other living things. Also, the hungry ghosts are the object of ancestral sacrifices. They seek things from others in order to survive. Although, their body is weak and debased, withered and enervated, irascible in body and mind. Thus they are termed “hungry ghosts.”” 言餓鬼者，謂餘生中，喜盗他物，習毆貪等。又復多是所祀祖宗。又多希求以自存濟。又多怯劣。其形瘦悴，身心輕躁，故名餓鬼 (T1562:29.461.a21-23).
124 According to verse 3.9 of Vasubandhu's Treasury, that pretas are special in this sense in that they can take either of two forms of mortal rebirth: from a mammal's womb, or as the seemingly “spontaneous” emanation of a transitory being assuming a new physical form. The Tattvasiddhi-śāstra (fasc. 2) 成實論 of Harivārman, a 4th century Sanskritic author, translated into classical Chinese by Kumarājīva during the 5th century, also attests to this explanation: “some amongst the non-Buddhist paths speak of perdurance of the spirit which takes consciousness as its basis. Hence [in order to differentiate themselves from the non-Buddhist paths] the Buddhist scriptures speak of the four loci for this consciousness: born either viviparously, oviparously, or via [spawning in] moisture, or via karmic transformation. There are upapādukas across each and every one of the various heavens and hells. Pretas are either born via karmic maturation (that is, as the reincarnation of an upapāduka), or viviparously. The remainder of those bearing residual karma are born amongst the [aforementioned] four.” 外道
transformation involves becoming physically reincarnated as an avatar of an *upapāduka* that has been suspended in the intermediate state between bodies.\(^{125}\)

*Pretas* live only in the *kāmadhātu*. They are known to be chronically unsatiated and malnourished. They survive in the bodily form of beasts that are distinctive for their pencil-thin necks.

(6) *Nārakas* (Chi.: *Naluoqie* 楞落迦), or hellish beings, have from eight to nineteen faculties, again without the three faculties of higher gnosis.\(^{126}\) The *naraka* (sometimes spelled as *nāraka*, with the long vowel) is the genus of the “hell-borne” sentient beings that populate the eight hot and eight cold regions in the *Avīci*, the “uninterrupted hell” (Chi.: *wujian diyu* 無間地獄) that is located 40,000 *yojanas*, roughly 360,000 miles, beneath the surface of the earth.\(^{127}\) The average lifespan of this species of extends over ten long courses of suffering. Vasubandhu calculates that the life-expectancy of a *naraka* is a medium-length *kalpa* cycle (Chi.: *yi zhongjie* 一中劫),\(^{128}\) a period ranging from three-hundred years to thirty-six million years.\(^{129}\)

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\(^{125}\) The fourth designation of sentient beings born via karmic transformation refers to those *upapādukas* or transitional apparitions that become reincarnated as hungry ghosts. In Vasubandhu's words (AK 3.1), as rendered into Chinese by Xuanzang: “intermediate beings are only born via karmic transformation; the pretas are uniformly of two modes of rebirth – either ovipariously or via karmic transformation” 中有唯化生 鬼通胎化二. The gist of stanza 3.9 is that all sentient beings, including *pretas*, endure a one to seven week state of suspended animation immediately following their death. Being reborn from a womb, however, is only one of the four ways to achieve physical reincarnation on earth, the others being oviparous rebirth from an egg, being reborn as an insect (lit., “via incubation”), and via karmic transformation.

\(^{126}\) Tzohar glosses the word nārakas as “beings populating the Buddhist hells” – see his article in *Sophia: International Journal of Philosophy and Traditions* (Melbourne: Univ. of Melbourne Department of Philosophy, 2017), titled, “Imagine Being a *Preta*: Early Indian Yogācāra Approaches to Intersubjectivity,” 56.2, 7.

\(^{127}\) Spatial measurements from *Mahāvibhāṣa* 172 (T1545:27.865.c27).

\(^{128}\) T1558:29.61.c18.

\(^{129}\) According to Nakamura Hajime’s 中村元 reckoning – see his Bukkyōgo Daijiten 仏教語大辞典 (Tōkyō: Tōkyō Shoseki, 1975), 958d.
Chapter 1: What is Death?

(7) *Upapāduka* is the genus of sentient beings that inhabit the “intermediate state” (Skt.: *antarābhava*; Chi. zhong-yin中陰; zhong-you中有) between incarnations in a fleshly body.  

In his versified form of the standard gloss, Vasubandhu states: “The *antarābhava* is [defined as] the distance between (Skt.: *antarā*) dying (Skt.: *mṛti*) and becoming reborn (Skt.: *utpatti*).” The state of *antarābhāva* is very fragile and is said to last for a maximum of forty-nine days and a minimum of two human weeks.  

Although the *upapāduka* are the most populous form of life in the universe, they are also the most evanescent, with a maximum lifespan of only seven human weeks.  

The best-known forms of *upapādukas* include the nāgas, gāruḍas, aprsās, kalavinka, and gandhārvas.

Vasubandhu describes the *upapāduka* as the form of being that a sentient organism assumes during the course after death that precedes reincarnation as a human, non-human animal, hell-born being (Skt.: *nāraka*), hungry ghost, or celestial. In stanza 3.9 of the *Treasury of Abhidharma*, Vasubandhu avers that an *upapāduka* “cannot become another *upapāduka*.” (AK 3.9). This means that an *upapāduka* cannot be reincarnated as another *upapāduka*. Vasubandhu states that the *upapāduka* must be reborn by way of one of four modes of mortal incarnation into a fleshly body.

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130 See AK 3.9dc (according to Xuanzang’s text); also Nyāvanusāra, fasc. 22, (T1562:29.467.a12). For corresponding Skt. of this stanza see Pradhan, ed., Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya, 119.


132 *The Basis for Yoga Practitioners (YBh)* attests to the same assignment of lifespan that is specified in the Abhidharma textbooks of Vasubandhu and Saṅghabhadra.

Vasubandhu agrees with the assignments of the minimum and the maximum numbers of faculties of the *upapādukas* found in the earlier *Samyukābhīdharmahṛdaya* (Chi.: *Za apitan xin lun* 雜阿毘曇心論).¹³⁴ Xuanzang adheres to the enumeration by Vasubandhu of these categories as well. They are as follows:

- *Upapādukas* in the *kāmadhātu* possess a minimum of three faculties and a maximum of eight. The minimum number of three faculties include the three compresent bodily faculties of aversion, vitality, and procreation. In general, the body of Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma teachings recognize bimodally gendered, hemaphroditic and androgyne species of *upapādukas*. *Upapādukas* in the *kāmadhātu* can also realize up to five sensory faculties. The maximum number of eight faculties refers to the hermaphroditic forms of *upapādukas* that possess both female and male procreative faculties, the five physical senses and vitality. Other categories of *upapādukas* do not possess gendered faculties and therefore have a maximum of seven faculties. The Abhidharma literature describes this form of...

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¹³⁴ “The androgyne *upapāduka* contains six [faculties], namely the five physical faculties [vision, hearing, taste, touch, and smell] and vitality. The monadically gendered *upapāduka* contains seven; the bimodally gendered, eight. This description applies uniformly across the *kāmadhātu*.” 化生無形六，謂五色根，及命根。一形七：二形八。此一向說欲界 (T1552:28.940.21-22). Dunlin's commentary on AKBh 3 corroborates that the “five physical faculties” mentioned above refer to the five ordinary sense faculties: “Moreover the *upapāduka* necessarily possesses vision, etc., which forms to a total of eight faculties. Hence it should be known that in the final stages of its life, when all of the mental states fade into the past, that is precisely called ‘aversion.’ But it is not the case that we can speak of it as ‘complete,’ or ‘incomplete’ within this final stage.” 又是化生必具眼等，故成八也。應知此中，於命終位，所有諸心，滅入過去，即名為「捨」，非論後位「成」與「不成」。This work of Dunlin is framed as a sub-commentary on the famous *Commentary on the Stanzas of the Treasury* (Jushe lun song shu lun ben 俱舍論頌疏論本) written by his teacher Yuanhui 圓煕. In turn, Saṅghabhadra's rejoinders to Vasubandhu elaborated in his *Abhidharma Treatise Conforming to Logic* (Skt.: *Abhidharma Nyāyānusāra-śāstra*; Chi.: *Apidamo shun zhengli-men lun* 阿毘達磨順正理論) and his *Clarification of Tenets* (Chi.: *Xianzong lun* 显宗論), come to accept these specific figures as well, with only minor adjustments. In summary, the *upapāduka* necessarily possesses visual, etc., [sensory faculties], and for this reason realizes the eight (five senses + three compresent faculties of mind, vitality, and aversion). Their continued existence ranges from a minimum of three to a maximum of eight. From this we know that when these *upapādukas* in the stage of the end-of-life, the mental states they possess are annihilated and decay into the past – this is what’s termed ‘aversion’ (*upekṣā*) no matter if it's fully manifest [in the final stages of life] or not.” (c.f. *Mahāvibhāṣa* 147).
creature as taking the form of a male *gandharva* or an female *apsarā*. This couple takes the form of the spectral celestial musicians that are often depicted in Buddhist iconography.\(^{135}\)

- *Upapādūkas* in the *rūpadhātu* possess a minimum of the three compresent bodily faculties and can achieve a maximum of six faculties including vitality and the five sensory faculties. The maximum number of six faculties for the *upapādūkas* in the *rūpadhātu* is lower than that of the *upapādūkas* in the *kāmadhātu*. This is because *upapādūkas* in the subtle material realm are androgynic and do not possess the gendered procreative faculties.

- *Upapādūkas* in the *arūpadhātu* possess only the three compresent faculties of vitality, mind, and aversion. *Upapādūka* survive for only one generation or life-span because they do not have the faculties of procreation.

### On the Question of Five or Six Genera

The question of whether or not the taxonomy of life includes a sixth genus of *asurās* is raised in the later Mahāyāna literature and contested within the modern secondary literature.\(^{137}\)

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\(^{135}\) *Apsarās* and *gandharva* spirits show up in the *Ṛg Veda*. However, it is only within the Buddhist Abhidharma literature that they are assigned a gendered role.

\(^{136}\) *Samyuktbhidharma-ḥṛdaya* (fasc. 8), T28, no. 1552, p. 940, c16).

\(^{137}\) Stephen Teiser's book on the Wheel of Rebirth in Buddhist temples highlights the sixfold formula, but asserts that is a later formulation found particularly in later, extra-canonical texts – see Teiser, *Reinventing the Wheel: Paintings of Rebirth in Medieval Buddhist Temples* (Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press, 2006), 208. Teiser, 209, refers to the *asurās* as “demigods.” Schmid refers to both fivefold and sixfold formulas as “standard” and refers to *asuras* as “fighting-gods.” – see his article, “Revisioning the Buddhist Cosmos Shifting Paths of Rebirth in Medieval Chinese Buddhism,” *Cahiers d’Extrême-Asie* 17 (2008), 294. The pictorial example of the wheel of rebirth from Tibet given by Schmid, “Revisioning the Buddhist Cosmos,” clearly displays five *gatis* – that is, a wheel divided into six wedges by five “spokes,” as it were. Schmid concludes that “By the seventh century, other sets of explanatory (i.e., didactic) images [in addition to accepted definitions of both the Five and the Six Paths] came to the fore, namely depictions of Kṣitigarbha with the Six Paths of Rebirth, often accompanied by the Ten Kings of the netherworld, as well as illustrated versions of the Scripture of the Ten Kings.” For the *Scripture of the Ten Kings*, see Teiser, *The Scripture of the Ten Kings* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1994). Nowhere in
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The debate centers on whether the category of genera encompassing all forms of life includes embodied forms that are incarnate, and the disembodied forms of life that reside in the afterlife. After detailing the entirety of embodied and disembodied life in terms of the ranges of the faculties, Vasubandhu turns to the topic of five transmigratory realms, or *gatis*, in the “Discrimination of Worldly Things.” The first stanza of the third chapter of the *Treasury of Abhidharma* represents the standard Sarvāstivāda ordering of the *gatis* into five genera. Vasubandhu does this by paring off the intermediate beings and placing them into a sixth category that is separate from the five *gatis*. In his extensive auto-commentary on his opening stanzas, Vasubandhu states that there are five *gatis* in the *kāmadhātu*, but only two each in the *rūpadhātu* and the *arūpadhātu*.

In the beginning of Chapter Three in the *Treasury of Abhidharma*, Vasubandhu lists the five *gatis* in terms of the three environmental realms (Skt.: *dhātus*). The order of five *gatis* runs from the spiritually “lowest” (Chi.: lie 劣) to most “refined” (Chi.: sheng 勝) forms of incarnate sentient beings, or from the forlorn hellish beings, or *nārakas* trapped in tortuous “solitary hells” (Chi.: *gu diyu* 孤地獄), to the humanoid and non-humanoid celestials who roam freely and happily through the six celestial spheres of this *Sahā* world of ours. The continuum that ranges from the *nārakas* to the devas captures the spiritual spectrum of sentient life.

Saṅghabhadra and Vasubandhu mention the rubric of “four lower *gatis*,” which are the

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138 Notably, the terminology of “six *gatis*” 六趣 occurs 17 times in Xuanzang’s 600 fasc. rendering of the *Prajñāpāramitā sutras*. It occurs in many formative scriptures including the *Lotus Sūtra*, *Avatamsaka Sūtra*, *Daśabhūmika sūtra*, the *Ratnakuta*, *Nirvāṇa Sūtra*, etc etc. And many other texts, including 7 times in the *Mahāvibhāṣa*, is mentioned in several vinaya texts, appears in the *Mūlamadhyamakahārikās* (3 times) and the 12 *Gate Treatise*, and the *Basis for Yoga Practitioners* 瑜伽師地論, fascicle seventy-six: T1579:30.718.a12-17.

139 MW: relating to hell, hellish, infernal.
nārakas, the non-human animals, the pretas, and the humans. The six gatis, including the asurās, are featured in Buddhist depictions of the “wheel of rebirth” which is based upon Chinese pseudepigraphical works, such as those appearing in the cache at Dunhuang Mogao Grottoes, including the infamous Chinese sūtra by the name of the Sūtra on the Ten Kings (Chi.: Shi Wang jing十王經). By contrast, earlier the Abhidharma authors never mention the six gatis, other than within discussions with rival Buddhists and non-Buddhist tīrthikas. It is not always clear to which rivals the Mahāvibhāṣa refers, but it seems fair to say that the view of six gatis is considered to be specious by the earlier Abhidharma scholars. This appears in the Mahāvibhāṣa discussion on the gatis found in fascicles ten through eleven of the translation by Xuanzang. Saṅghabhadra summarizes the commentary by Vasubandhu on AKBh 3.1 as follows: “Nārakas, etc., belong to the lower four gatis, the entirety of which, along with part of the heavens

140 Lamotte translates a passage in fascicle ten of the Da zhidu lun (T1509:25.135.c5-7) dealing with the status of asurās – see La Traité de la grande vertu de sagesse, Vol. 3, 614-15. In this passage, the question is addressed: why are the gandharvas and asurās not explicitly mentioned in the sūtras? See Kumārajīva 鸠摩羅什 trans. T1509:25, 280a. The response given is that the two are subsumed under the pretas: “Question. – S'il en était ainsi, le sūtra ne décrit pas parler non plus des Gandharva ni des Asurā. pourquoi? Parce que ces êtres sont déjà compris (Skt.: samgrhīta; Chi.: she 攝) dans la destinée des Preta.” 問曰：若爾者，提闍婆，阿修羅亦不應攝，何以故？鬼神道中已攝故（T1509:25.135.c03-4). For more on the status of the sixth gati in Da zhidu lun see Lamotte, La Traité de la grande vertu de sagesse (English trans. by Chodron, 2001) 478, fn. 848.

141 For the provenance of the Treatise on the Ten Kings see Teiser, Scripture of the Ten Kings; also see Makita Tairyō’s 牧田諦亮 (1989) study on East Asian Buddhist pseudepigraphica – Gikyō Kenkyū 疑経研究 (Kyōto: Rinsen Book Co.臨川書店, 1989).

142 The doctrine of six gatis proliferates in the later Mahāyāna literature. But nowhere does Vasubandhu discuss this doctrine in Xuanzang’s translation of the Treasury of Abhidharma. Schmid, “Revisioning the Buddhist Cosmos,” cites also “passages in Paramārtha’s and Xuanzang’s AKBh” that mention the six gatis, but gives only a single citation (T1509, 25: 280a.) to Taishō volume 25, No. 1509. This is a passage from Nagarjuna’s Prajñāpāramitā commentary, the Da zhidu lun大智度論, which Schmid cites, verbatim: “Previously one explained [saṃsāra] with the Five Paths. Now one adds the path of asurās.” 先說五道今益阿修羅道. See *Mahāprajñāpāramitāpāramitopadeśa (Da zhidu lun), fascicle thirty — T1509:25.280.a02-3. Schmid, “Revisioning the Buddhist Cosmos,” inaccurately gives Chi. title as Mahe bore poluomi jing shilun 摩訶般若波羅蜜經釋論, “Treatise on the Great Perfection of Wisdom,” attrib. Nāgārjuna 龍樹, however Schmid’s footnote gives citation to a different text — most commonly referred to in Chinese as Da Zhidu lun – see Lamotte’s translation of this text, La Traité de la grande vertu de sagesse (Mahāprajñāpāramitā sāstra). Taken out of context, the clipped form of the passage given by Schmid might lead one to construe its message as a positive endorsement of the six gatis doctrine. However, in the original work, the cited part of the passage appears in the broader context of the five gatis theory, wherein the sixth gati of the asurās is spoken of as a aside attributed to “some other people.” – see Kumārajīva’s translation 有人言：欲界眾生，應有十一種；先說五道，今益阿修羅道(T.1509:25.280.a02-3).
and their celestial retinue, all belong to the kāmadhātu.”¹⁴³ Saṅghabhadra’s detailed commentary on the six heavens of the desire sphere, and the twenty-eight major hells, begins with the qualification, that is based upon Vasubandhu’s explanation of the kāmadhātu as covering members of “the lower four gatis,” namely, the humans, non-human animals, pretas, and nārakas. Saṅghabhadra claims that the kāmadhātu includes “part of the heavens and their celestial retinue,” but only in a restricted sense.¹⁴⁴ Some sentient beings that inhabit the lower four gatis may be capable of observing surrounding gatis. For example, humans across the four continents can observe certain celestial bodies, including the six heavenly spheres of the kāmadhātu. Interestingly, humans can observe forms of upapādukas and vice versa. This comprises the full range of the “sensory world” (Skt.: bhājanaloka; Chi.: qī shìjiàn器世間) that is observable to human beings in the Jambudvīpa.

**Dhātu and Conspecificity as Independent Variables**

The taxonomy of the six genera that are categorized by Xuanzang according to the minimum and the maximum number of faculties in a species is based on the two foundational concepts of dhātu, and conspecificity (Skt.: nikāya-sabhāgatā; Chi.: tóngzhòng-fèn同眾分). Dhātu and conspecificity are the two variables that determine the specific number and sequence of the faculties that characterize each individual sentient being. Dhātu describes the environment

¹⁴³ See T1558:29.829.b2: “the kāmadhātu refers to the four lower gatis of the nārakas, along with a portion of the devas and their heavenly retinue, together with the bhājanaloka.”那落迦等下四趣全，及天一分眷屬中有井器世間，總名欲界.

¹⁴⁴ The “sensory world” or bhājanaloka here denotes that part of the heavens observable to humans residing the surface of the earth. Does the sensory world (bhājanaloka) include more than just kāmadhātu? Xuanzang’s version of AK Bh 3.1-3 contains the interpolation: “Rūpadhātu refers to the totality of the bhājanaloka and the world of sentient life (sattvaloka).”器及有情總名色界(T.1558:29.41.a15). Xuanzang’s Chinese translation of Vasubandhu’s auto-commentary to AKBh 45a-d reads: “The sattvaloka runs from heaven where one can partake of the pleasures created in other heavens [on high], all the way down to the Hell of Uninterrupted Suffering [down below]. The bhājanaloka runs from the wind-disc [the water-disc, and the space disc] and is a complete classification (samgraha) of the kāmadhātu.”若有多情，從自在天，至無間獄。若器世界，乃至風輪，皆欲界攝(T1558:29.41.a12). For the corresponding Sanskrit text see Pradhan, Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya,158.
that a particular species is born into, and conspecificity determines the composition of the body that an organism inhabits during a lifetime. Together, these two variables provide the doctrinal infrastructure for Xuanzang’s taxonomy of life. Essentially, Xuanzang, following Vasubandhu, sets up his classification in terms of five and six transmigratory realms or genera. Each genus contains three classes of beings in different realms: those residing in the kāmadhātu, the rūpadhātu, and arūpadhātu. Genus stands for the one of the six categories of life, while the species indicates the unique conspecific traits possessed by the organism within one of the three environmental realms.

Dhātu is an ancient Sanskrit word that refers to the environmental conditions into which a particular sentient creature is born. It is a basic component of the Buddhist teaching on reincarnation. It holds that sentient creatures can transcend the station into which they are born, as well as their genetic limitations, by improving their karma. By accumulating good actions during a lifetime, sentient creatures can attain a happier and more desirable station in the next life. For Xuanzang, biology is not destiny.

The word conspecificity (Skt.: sabhāgatā), as defined by the Sarvāstivāda scholars, refers to the common traits shared by all members of a given species. From the earlier Sarvāstivāda scholars, Vasubandhu takes the idea that conspecificity determines multiple traits rather than any one singular or essential aspect of an organism. Xuanzang’s Chinese definition of the Sanskrit word, sabhāgatā, is “the part that is shared in common by all members of the species.” The concept of conspecificity appears in the Sarvāstivāda lists of dharma, or the causal factors that impact the development of an organism. Conspecificity refers to the genetic traits of the body into which a sentient being is born and can be considered to be the ancient Buddhist equivalent of the
genome. For example, conspecificity provides the blueprint that determines the bi-podality and the average life expectancy of humans. Conspecificity thus differentiates the human animal from the non-human animal. It further serves to distinguish variables such as gender that function to “differentiate [individuals] within the species” (Skt.: sattvavikalpa; Tib.: sems can gyi khad pa). It does this by “regulating” (Chi.: jinzhi 禁止) the expression of certain conspecific gendered traits.

Each of the six genera are distinguished from one another by their conspecific traits. At the intra-species level they are divided into the three dhātus: the kāmadhātu, the rūpadhātu, and the arūpadhātu. Only three of the six genera are found all three dhātus: the celestials, the humans and the upapādukas. Members of the same genus who share conspecific factors are differentiated again along the basis of their dhātu. The variance in the number and the order of the faculties within a genus is due to the fact that each species of sentient uniquely adapts to its specific environmental realm. For example, while humans in each of the three dhātus share the common factor of bi-podality, they evince variation in their physical traits depending on the dhātu into which they are

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145 Radich's study on the Sarvāstivāda explanations of the Buddha's embodiment, translates jīvitēndriyam as "life-force" and the closely related factor of sabhāgatā as "mutual identify (sic) [of sentient beings]." (Skt.: sattva-sabhāgatā; Chi.: youqing tongzhong fen 有情同衆分). See “Embodiments of the Buddha in Sarvāstivāda Doctrine: With Special Reference to the *Mahāvibhāṣa.” Annual Report of the International Research Institute for Advanced Buddhology, 13 (2010), 162. The merit of Radich's prescient translation of jīvitēndriyam as life force is that it communicates the material nature of the force of jīvitēndriyam (e.g., f=ma). This study reserves the words related to “brute physical power and/or force” to āyur, simpliciter (shou 寿) — the vital power that invests all things with life or animus/animā, and which finds its basis or āśrayam in the embodied faculty of vitality. Xuanzang takes 命 to indicate jīva/jīvā, while he reserves the character shou for āyur. Paramartha's translation of Kosa does not show sensitivity to the analytical distinction between āyur and jīvā in AKBh 3.45a-b. Xuanzang's translation choice to reserve the character shou for āyur shows sensitivity to the distinction between ayuḥskāras and jīvāskāras, which he takes to be important to understanding Vasubandhu's explanation of how to extend life by inducing a surge of “vital impulses” (āyuḥskāras). See Collette Cox's study for discussion on the distinction between ayuḥskāras and jīvāskāras, titled Disputed Dharmas: Early Buddhist Theories on Existence (Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press, 1997), 125-27. Vasubandhu's auto-commentary on his Treasury (AKBh 3.45a-b) ultimately argues that jīvitēndriyam is reducible to āyur, since the former simply stands for the brute power of the āyur it bears. See Pradhan, ed., Abhidharmakośa, 73. The only reservation with the translation of sabhāgatā as “mutual identity” is that in the Yogācāra context, sabhāgatā is stipulated as a more attenuated form of qualitative identity or unity of conspecific traits, rather than the restricted sense of numerical identity of genome.
born. Humans in the kāmadhātu have five senses because they need to negotiate the world of sensory desire; humans in the rūpadhātu have three senses because they do not require a sense of smell or taste to survive; and humans in the arūpadhātu have no ordinary senses because can rely on the faculty of tactition to feed themselves. Additionally, humans express variation in their lifespans according to their dhātu. Humans on earth generally live to be less than one hundred years, while humans in the Yāma Heavens (Chi.: Yanmo tian 閻魔天) of the rūpadhātu enjoy an average life expectancy of two thousand human years.\textsuperscript{146}

Karma dictates the species, the nature of the environment, and the transmigratory standing into which an organism is reincarnated. It determines both the dhātu and the gati. In his detailed commentary on the AKBh, Puguang 普光, Xuanzang’s collaborator in the translation of the text, writes that conspecificity determines the biological factors of the species in addition to its caste (Skt.: varṇa; Chi.: xing 姓),\textsuperscript{147} or station in life.\textsuperscript{148} Xuanzang's usage of the Chinese character xing involves a double entendre. This character indicates the two distinct Sanskrit words of varṇa, or "caste," and gotra or “family.”\textsuperscript{149} Puguang also includes, under the traits defined by conspecificity, the level of education that a being can attain and the particular vehicle of Buddhism or other religion to which the individual belongs.

\textsuperscript{146} Teiser, Reinventing the Wheel, 21 writes: “According to Buddhist scripture, those who are reborn, those who are reborn into Amitāyus’s land of bliss are invariably born as male babies....” It is unclear what evidence Teiser bases this claim on. The three scriptures of Sino-Japanese Pure Land tradition repeatedly and emphatically state that the babies born into the Amitāyus pure land are androgynitic – that is, possessing no impure sexual organs. See Gómez, The Land of Bliss. Sanskrit and Chinese Versions of the Sukhāvatīvyūha Sūtras (New York: SUNY Univ. Press, 1996), 88-90, passim.

\textsuperscript{147} Xuanzang, along with other translators of Indic languages into classical Chinese, use the Chi. character xing 姓 to variously translate the Skt. words gotra, meaning "family," and varṇa, meaning “caste.” He also employs another Chinese character —zhong 種— to render the Skt. word gotra. Sir. Monier-William’s Skt. Dictionary gives various meanings in addition to the literal meaning of the word gotra as “herd, family enclosed by the hurdle.”

\textsuperscript{148} T1821:41.93.a10-12.

\textsuperscript{149} Sir. Monier Williams Skt. Dictionary gives under varṇa: “class of men, tribe, order, caste (probably from contrast of colour between the dark aboriginal tribes and their fair conquerors).”
The Human Sequence of Faculties

In his exegesis of death Xuanzang is particularly interested in the number of faculties required to sustain the survival of different classes of sentient beings, specifically humans. It is significant that Xuanzang's translation of Vasubandhu's “Discrimination of Faculties” begins with the five ordinary senses possessed by humans living in the kāmadhātu. Ever the pragmatist, Xuanzang, like Vasubandhu before him, starts with the earth and the ordinary humans who populate it. Vasubandhu’s comprehensive exploration of what it means to be human takes him from the ordinary human earthlings (Skt.: prthagjanas; Chi.: yi-sheng 异生 or fan-fu 凡夫) to an investigation of other forms of human life, including embryonic life, non-able-bodied humans, earthly sages, and extraterrestrials.

Xuanzang follows the approach of Vasubandhu by isolating the paradigmatic case for the “able-bodied human” or paripūrin. Xuanzang translates paripūrin as, the “perfect and complete one” (Chi.: yuan-man zhe 圆滿者). Vasubandhu’s Treasury of Abhidharma uses the phrase, “well-bestowed paripūrin,” to describe the characteristics of the human being whose full range of faculties are “complete” or “perfectly-able-bodied.”

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150 Xuanzang treats the latter as exclusively a category of earthbound humans, while he takes the former to include all manner of extraterrestrial humanoids. He nowhere uses the term fan-fu for prthagjana in the CWSL, and uses the term which he takes as derogatory, very seldomly. See Mahāvibhāṣa, fascicle 103 at T1545:27.532.c05.

151 Monier-Williams Skt. Dictionary defines paripūrin as “granting or bestowing richly.” It is the krānta-suffix form of from the strong-form of the 6th-class Skt. root pari-√pur: meaning “to abound” (intransitive pass. : “to be well bestowed/endowed”). The form of the word with the krānta-suffix is taken to be a general epithet for both human and non-human animals that are bestowed with the full array of healthy faculties that are all fully intact.

152 Fascicle 96 of Xuanzang’s Mahāvibhāṣa glosses the term paripūrin as “s/he bestowed with the full power of the faculties.” 具有根力 (T1545:27.498.a27-8).

153 The CWSL abides by the clear stipulation on this term stated by Vasubandhu in his AKBh 3.20. Saṅghabhadra also adopts this stipulation. Xuanzang's Chinese version of the AKBh gloss on paripūrin runs: “Mahānīdayaparāśāya-sūtra describes them as ‘fully-fledged beings. Only in the kāmadhātu are they described as pudgalas, but not in the rūpyadhātu or the arūpyadhātu where there are stillborn beings’” 非諸中夭及色無色。但據欲界補特伽羅。大緣起經 說「具有」故 (T1558:29.48.b5-6). Nyāyanusāra, fascicle 25 reads: “The idea here is that the person (pudgala) covers all stages. Paripūrin, however, excludes the stillborn fetuses, along with the being in the kalala, and so on, [pre-natal] stages in the subtle material realms and immaterial realms.
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The initial four quatrains of Vasubandhu’s “Discrimination of the Faculties” enumerate the sequence of faculties with which a human being is born and can ultimately realize through action in life or rebirth. Vasubandhu orders the human faculties according the sequence codified in the Mahāvibhāṣa. The faculties of the human paripūrin include: the five ordinary senses of tactition, olfaction, gustation, audition, and vision (1-5); the sixth sense of the mind (6); the three bodily faculties independent of sensation and the bimodally gendered procreative faculties (7-8); vitality (9); the five hedonic faculties of suffering, pleasure, joy, anxiety, and aversion (10-14); the five skillful faculties of faith, perseverance, mindful recollection, concentration, and wisdom (14-19); and finally, the three faculties of higher gnosis. Vasubandhu’s sequence of the human faculties becomes the standard formulation that is adhered to by legions of his successors. For example, Saṅghabhadra, Vasubandhu’s contemporary, structures his Treatise Conforming to the Correct Logic of Abhidharma, and his Clarification of Tenets around Vasubandhu’s core verses on the human sequence (AK 2.1-14) from the beginning of the second chapter of the Treasury of Abhidharma.

The Sequence, Order and Dominance of the Faculties of Humans

Vasubandhu begins his exposition of the human sequence of faculties with a precise description of the five ordinary sensory faculties, an explanation for their order, and a discussion about the interaction and cooperation between them. These explanations are encapsulated in the first four quatrains of the second chapter of his Treasury of Abhidharma. In his first verse Vasubandhu prioritizes the faculties of vision and audition as crucial for human survival. His auto-commentary explains that these two faculties are of foremost importance because “by way of... (arūpadhātu), which are excluded.” 此中意說：補特伽羅，歷一切位。名圓滿者。非諸中天，及色·無色，羯剌藍等，諸位闕故 (T1562:29.481.a06-7).
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seeing and hearing, one avoids threats and dangers.\(^{154}\) He then states that olfaction, gustation and tactition are indispensable in the consumption and digestion of food, and therefore necessary for survival.

Having dispensed with the five ordinary senses, Vasubandhu homes in on the sixth sense, the mental faculty. He links the mental faculty with the five ordinary senses to form the six senses that comprise the full complement of human sensory capacities. He regards the six senses as the very “root of sentient life” (Skt.: sattvamūlam; Chi.: youqing ben 有情本). The sixth sense of the mind is significant in that mind plays a provisory role over the five bodily senses by sustaining and coordinating their activities. All sentient creatures are invested with a mental faculty at birth. Essentially, the presence of the sixth faculty of mind separates humans from vegetables. The mental faculty is further defined in terms of its two primary capabilities: the “capability to continue sensory experience, and the “capability to promote independent action.” 謂能續後有、及自在隨行.\(^{155}\) The mind is described as dominant over these two capabilities as it plays a primary and indispensable role in sustaining sensory experience and independent action. Without the sixth sense of mind, humans would be inert.

Vasubandhu devotes the third quatrain in this quadrat of ślokas (AK 1.4a-d) to the five hedonic faculties and jīvitēndriyam. The linkage between vitality and the five hedonic faculties in one hemistich is more a matter of metri causa than a specific doctrinal point. His auto-commentary on this stanza states that the hedonic faculties form the basis of “hedonic experience” (Skt.: vedanā). Hedonic experience consists of painful, pleasurable, and neutral sensations. This group of five faculties (5-9) are united in the common function of registering the affective states of pleasure, pain, suffering, joy, and aversion to stimuli. They are described as the natural growths

\(^{154}\) AKBh, trans. Xuanzang, fascicle 3, T1558:29.13.b19.

\(^{155}\) T1558:29.13.c02-3.
that “sprout forth” (Skt.: prabhava) from the senses. The final hemistich of this third śloka introduces the five skillful faculties of faith, perseverance, mindful recollection, concentration, and wisdom. These five faculties are equally “derived from” (Skt.: matāḥ), yet “independent of” (Skt.: anya) the six senses. The fourth śloka in this series of four quatrains enumerates the final three items in the list of twenty-two faculties that make up the human being, namely, the faculties by which the savant (Skt.: ājñātavin) achieves nirvāṇa. Xuanzang's definition of death centers around the faculties of 1-9 in this list. These are the faculties that are destroyed when ordinary human paripūrin in the kāmadhātu perishes.

Within the first four verses of the Treasury of Abhidharma, Vasubandhu decisively dispenses with the human sequence. He then devotes the balance of Chapter Two, The Discrimination of the Faculties, to refining the scope and the function of the twenty-two faculties. The focus of the next fifteen stanzas is on the paripūrin of the kamadhātu. The first stanza begins with a discussion of the five sensory faculties that are specific to the human paripūrin in the kamadhātu. Here Vasubandhu makes the point that the five faculties of vision, audition, olfaction, gustation, and tactition are unique to the paripūrin in the kamadhātu. Importantly, the number five can refer to more than one grouping of individual faculties possessed by a paripūrin in the rūpadhātu and arupadhātu. However, Vasubandhu is clear that the cluster of five faculties that is comprised of the five ordinary senses, belongs specifically to paripūrin in the kamadhātu. The humans who occupy the two other dhātus do not require all five of the ordinary sensory faculties to survive.

Vasubandhu proceeds to describe the number and groupings of faculties that enable the paripūrin to execute the tasks required for survival within the first of the three dhātus, the
Chapter 1: What is Death?

kāmadhātu. He writes: “the five faculties are dominant over four arthas.”\(^{156}\) Artha in this sense indicates a specific task or objective that is designated to a specific faculty. He employs the example of gustation (Skt.: \(ghrāṇēndriyam\); Chi.: she-gen) to illustrate how certain faculties play indispensable roles in accomplishing the tasks that are required for an organism to survive. Vasubandhu then lists the four basic tasks that involve coordinated action by the sensory faculties using the specific activity of gustation. The dominant tasks performed by the five ordinary senses are:

1. To “guide and nourish” (Skt.: \(viṣamaparivarjanāt\)/\(viṣama-\sqrt{vṛt}\) – lit., “to cause the body to constantly adapt to its environment”; Tib.: \(yongs su bsprung ba\), lit., “to generally maintain”; Chi.: \(Daoyang\ shen\ 導養身\)\(^{157}\) the body by ingesting and digesting food.

2. To “adorn the body” (Skt.: \(ātmabhāva-\sqrt{bhā}\); Chi.: \(zhuang-\text{-}yan\ shen\ 莊嚴身\) by furnishing the aperture and apparatus for the taking of nourishment, including, but not limited to, the tongue, teeth, and palate.

3. To “engender consciousness” (Skt.: \(sasamprayogāṇām\ ut\sqrt{pat}\); Chi.: \(sheng-shi\ 生識;\ Tib.: \(rnam\ par\ shes\ pa\ mtshungs\ ldan\) of a specific type of sensation. For example, the faculty of gustation produces the consciousness (Skt.: \(ghrāṇa-vijñāna\); Chi.: \(she-shi\ 舌識\) of different tastes of food.

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\(^{156}\) Xuanzang’s rather compacted rendition of Vasubandhu’s šloka 2.1 reads: “The Abhidharma tradition says that five [faculties] are dominant over the four tasks (arthas), and that the four faculties are dominant in either of two ways [i.e., by producing purity and/or pollution]. Five [sense faculties] or eight [five ordinary senses + mind, \(kāyēndriyam\), and \(jīvitēndriyam\)] are dominant over purity and impurity (Skt. reads “distress/affliction/pain (kleśas) and purification (vyavadāna). But each and every one [of the faculties] works in a dominant way.”

\(^{157}\) The Skt. compound \(viṣama-pari-varja\) that Vasubandhu uses to describe the second domain within which the senses are dominant comes from the verb \(pari-\sqrt{vṛt}\) — lit., “constantly adapting in a variegated way.”
(4) To exercise a unique or “uncommon instrumentality” (Skt.: asādharaṇaṅkaraṇatva; Tib.: thun mong ma yin pa'i rgyu; Chi. bu-gong shi 不共事) through an “uncommon capacity.” (Chi.: bu-gong gong-neng 不共功能). The “uncommon” capacity of the gustatory faculty resides in its unique ability to take in, taste, and register the consciousness of nutrients.

The dominant tasks performed by each of the five senses are: nourishing and guiding sensory perception, adorning the body, engendering consciousness, and evincing uncommon instrumentality. The idea that each of the five sensory faculties are dominant in four ways adds an important qualification to the second and third methodological tenets of Xuanzang concerning the cooperation of faculties. The third methodological tenet, which holds that at least three faculties must cooperate to accomplish their target actions, can be applied to the faculty of gustation. For example, the faculty of gustation is never held singularly responsible for the provision of nutrition to the body. Moving the mouth and grinding the teeth in order to break down the food into ingestible morsels requires the assistance of the mental faculty in conjunction with kāyendriyam. In the example of gustation, the mental faculty and kāyendriyam work together to digest the “grosser forms of food” (Skt.: kavaḍī-kārāhāra; Chi.: cu shi 麤食) rendered “piecemeal” (Chi.: duan shi 段食) by the mouth and then the bowels.

Implicit in Vasubandhu’s example of the faculty of gustation is the essential idea of

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158 Under sādharaṇa, Sir. Monier-Williams Skt. Dictionary gives. “having or resting on the same support or basis belonging or applicable to many or all, general, common to all, universal, common to [all].” Technically speaking, the word asadhāraṇa is an exocentric or samanādhikaraṇa (“having the same substratum with”) kind of bahuvrīhi compound that literally means “whose instrumentality (karaṇatva) has a basis which is not the same.” See Gary Tubb and Emery Robert Boose. Scholastic Sanskrit: A handbook for students (Columbia Univ. Press, 2007), under “Appositional Bahuvrīhis, 128-133, passim.

159 Nyāyanusāra, fascicle 9 glosses this as, literally, “those capacities not shared with others” (T1562:29.78.a03).

160 Digital Dictionary of Buddhism gives “[the first of] four kinds of food 四食.” “段食 piecemeal food (or, interpreted as ‘coarse food’ 搏食); physical food that enters the mouth piece by piece – fruits, meats, vegetables, etc.” (DDB, accessed March 22, 2017; April 5, 2017).
dominance as it relates to the faculties. Vasubandhu uses gustation as a paradigmatic case to demonstrate how a sensory faculty fulfills multiple functions in coordinated action with other faculties. The case of *ghrāhnêndriyam*, or gustation, is one example of how the agenda-driven Abhidharma thinkers attempt to avoid confusion between the Buddhist and Sāṅkhya definitions of a faculty. Sāṅkhya has a linear definition that equates one faculty to one activity. Gauḍapada, the earliest Sanskritic commentator on the *Sāṅkhya-kārikās*, defines *ghrāhnêndriyam* as “the faculty that eats things.” Notably, Xuanzang translates the faculty of gustation as, “the tongue qua faculty.” He uses this translation in his analysis of both the Buddhist and Sāṅkhya taxonomies of the five ordinary senses (Skt.: *paṅca-prājñêdriyāṇi*). However, the Abhidharma definition of the faculty of gustation is unlike its Sāṅkhya counterpart, in that the faculty is defined as having the capacity to perform more than one action when working in coordination with other faculties.

Xuanzang follows Vasubandhu’s paradigm that holds that each faculty has multiple capacities that are expressed when one faculty works in conjunction with other faculties. This stands in contrast to Gauḍapada's definition in which each of the five ordinary senses has a singular and independent ability. This represents a crucial distinction between the Brāhmaṇical and the Buddhist theories of the faculties. Xuanzang, following Vasubandhu and Saṅghabhadra, affirms the Abhidharma Buddhist doctrine that defines each faculty in terms of its “uncommon capacities” (Chi.: *bugong gongneng* 不共功能) the actions that would be impossible to accomplish without the existence of a specific faculty. For example, the vital bodily function of digestion would not

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161 These are the same five physical senses recognized by Buddhists, but listed in a different order.

162 Gauḍapada's commentary on SK, stanza 29, characterizes the five faculties of action (*paṅca-kārmêndriyāṇi*) as “[those] whose common mode of action is instrumentality” (*samānyakāraṇa-vṛtti*). Gauḍapada takes this exocentric or bahuvrīhi-compound to refer to the eleven faculties enumerated in stanzas 26-27 – see *Sāṅkhya-kārikās*, ed. Sharma Dutt (Puṇa: The Oriental Book Agency, 1933), 28
be possible without the faculty of gustation.

Vasubandhu provides examples of how different faculties play dominant, or indispensable roles, in accomplishing the basic tasks of living. For example, he states that the visual and mental faculties play dominant roles in the activity of vision, and that kāyendriyam and the mental faculties play dominant roles in the action of walking. Additionally, the three faculties of gnosis coordinate with each other and with the faculties of wisdom and mind to produce the transcendent experience of omniscience of the past, present, and future.

The Range of the Human Faculties

In the first four quatrains of Chapter Two of the Treasury of Abhidharma, Vasubandhu stipulates that the total number of faculties realizable by humans in the kāmadhātu is nineteen. The first four ślokas list each of the twenty-two faculties, beginning with the five sensory faculties and mind and conclude with the three faculties of higher gnosis (19-22) (AK 2.4cd). This list comprises the range of the human faculties.

In Chapter Two of the Treasury of Abhidharma, Vasubandhu addresses the circumstances of humans inveigled within the world of sensory desire. This involves a constant search for pleasure and the avoidance of pain. In the seventeenth stanza of chapter two (AK 2.17-ad) Vasubandhu points out that the “four senses, and the five bodily senses, save for vision, form the basis of bodily pleasure.” This is because the sensory faculties are directed toward objects, or viṣaya, that contain pleasure. Xuanzang uses the Chinese character “dust” (Chi.: chen 塵) to translate the Sanskrit word, viṣaya. In this translation he conveys the idea that viṣaya can be both a particular sensory object, and a synecdoche for the sensory domain as a whole. The term “dust”

163 The only qualification offered by Vasubandhu is that these four sensory faculties are absent from the bodies of sentient beings within the arūpadhātu (T1558:29.17.c14).
emphasizes the idea that objects of sensory desire and the larger “the dusty Sahā world” (Chi.: chenshi 墮世) are by definition, defiled.

In the eighteenth stanza of chapter two Vasubandhu states that the human who “possesses the faculty of pleasure [also] possesses four [other] faculties.” The possession of the faculty of pleasure presupposes having a body that contains vitality, kāyêndriyam, a mind to process pleasurable sensations, and a faculty of aversion to pain. With the faculty of pleasure (Skt.: saumanasyêndriyam) and the faculty of suffering (Skt.: duhkhêndriyam) the total number of human faculties comes to eight: the four sensory faculties that are sensitive to pain, vitality, a mind, and the two initial hedonic faculties of pleasure and pain. The enumeration continues with the three additional hedonic faculties of joy, anxiety, and aversion. Vasubandhu stipulates that each of the five hedonic faculties are “analytically distinct from mind in terms of their activity” (Skt.: manāyo’vr̥ttiḥ) but “invariably associated with it” (Skt.: saṃyuktaḥ). The importance of this statement is that sensory and emotional experiences are dependent upon the presence of a mind that registers feelings.

In sum, the fifth through the twenty-first stanzas in this section of Vasubandhu's Treasury of Abhidharma outline a distinct sequence of mental and corporeal faculties constituted of fourteen faculties. These include the five ordinary senses (1-5) together with a mental faculty (6), the bodily faculties of vitality and procreation (7-8/9), and the five hedonic faculties (10-14) that correspond to pleasure, pain, joy, anxiety, and aversion. This describes the experience of humans in the kāmadhātu who are driven by their faculties toward the satisfaction of sensory desires for food and sex. By the nineteenth stanza of the chapter, Vasubandhu enumerates a total of fourteen faculties.

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164 Skt.: Caturbhīḥ sukhakāyābhīyaṁ pañcabhīḥ sa kṣuṭrādīmaṁ| saumanasyī ca duḥkhī tu saptabhīḥ strīndriyādīmaṁ|| 2.17c-d. See Pradhan, Abhidharmakośā-bhāṣya, 50-51. Xuanzang's Chi. runs: 成就命意捨 各定成就三 若成就樂身 各定成就四 (T1558:29.17.c05-6).
to describe the human experience. The number thirteen stands generally for the human in the mundane kāmadhātu that is characterizable in terms of a bimodal gender. Because hermaphroditic humans possess both male and female forms of procreative faculties (8-9), they are denoted by the number fourteen. However, Xuanzang’s investigation into the nature of death focuses on only the first nine faculties, the senses and the bodily faculties. This is because the possession of a total nine faculties demarcates the line between a living human body and a dead one.

**Nine is the Magic Number**

The number nine has a vaunted status in the Abhidharma Buddhist systems of doctrine because it signifies the number of faculties that compose the living paripūrin. Vasubandhu states, in the twenty-second stanza of the second chapter of his *Treasury of Abhidharma* (AK 2.22c, Pradhan, 1967, p. 53) that, “possessing a body-with-sense-faculties (Skt.: kāyendriyin) emerges from nine-elements” (Skt.: kāyendriya navadravyah; Chi.: you genshen jiushi有身根九事).\(^{165}\) In his auto-commentary on this line of verse, Vasubandhu determines that this “nine-fold constituency” (Skt.: navadravyah; Chi.: jiu shi 九事) contains the nine faculties that characterize the able-bodied human earthling.\(^{166}\)

The number nine has special significance in the Buddhist literature because it symbolizes the emergence of animate and sentient life from the inert and non-living body. In his taxonomy of life, Vasubandhu refers to the nine essential materials that make up the physical body. These are

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\(^{165}\) T1558:29.18.b21.

\(^{166}\) Xuanzang’s rendition of Vasubandhu’s auto-commentary on AK stanza 2.22 diverges considerably from the Skt.: “The conascent constituency is either ninefold or tenfold. The ninefold constituency is inherent in possessing a body-with-organ. The eight is as aforementioned (i.e., the insensate eightfold material constituency); the body is the ninth constituent. Then, the atomic aggregate with sound arises in such a series – ninefold, tenfold, and elevenfold.” “此俱生事或九或十。有身根聚九事俱生。八事如前，身為第九。有餘根聚十事俱生。九事如前，加眼等一。身耳鼻舌必不離身。展轉相望，處各別故。於前諸聚，若有聲生，如次數增九•十•十一” For Skt. text see Pradhan, *Abhidharmakosā-bhāṣya*, 56. Saṅghabhadra’s section on the faculties cites the above explanation verbatim. See *Nyāyanusāra*, fascicle 9, T1562:29.383.c19-24.
the four sensory organs: the eyes, the ears, the nose and the mouth, the four elements that make up the objects of the sensory world: earth, water, fire, and wind, and finally kāyendriyam. 

Kāyendriyam stands for the organs in the body from which the faculties conduct their life sustaining operations. The term kāyendriyin means the possessor of a body with faculties. The lengthy commentarial discussions on stanza twenty-two explain why the additional ingredient of the “ninth constituent,” kāyendriyam, makes the qualitative difference between an inert body and an animate body “with faculties” (Skt.: sēndriya; Chi.: jugen). These faculties are the nine faculties “conascent” (Skt.: saha\bhū; Chi.: jusheng) in a human paripūrin.

The nine faculties that are required to sustain the human are the five physical senses (1-5), the mind (6), the procreative faculties of males and females (7-8), and vitality. Although the procreative faculties are not necessary conditions for the survival of an individual member of the human species, they are necessary for the propagation and survival of the species. Hence, these nine faculties are considered to form the necessary and jointly-sufficient conditions required to sustain human life.

The idea that the number nine marks the line between life and death is an ancient Sarvāstivāda teaching. The stanza cited in Vasubandhu's Treasury of Abhidharma, within which the significance of the number nine is unraveled, is based upon an ancient strata of Sarvāstivāda source material. The identification of the number nine with the sentient body of sensory organs

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167 Part of the definition of the embodied faculty of kāyendriyam is that it “pervades the body.” This gloss indicates that the operational range of kāyendriyam, or the “body qua faculty” (if construed in the compound form, i.e., karmadhārya) is not reducible to a particular location in the body, but is determined by the full strength and extension of the specific parts of the body.

168 This is understood as an exocentric bahuvrīhi compound that refers to the “possessor” of said faculties.

169 Judging by its appearance in two earlier sources: namely, Abhidharmahrdaya 阿毘曇心論, Abhidharmahrdaya-sūtra-śāstra 阿毘曇心論經 and the*Samyuktābhidharma-hṛdaya-śāstra 雜阿毘曇心論 of Dharmatrāta. The doctrine of the ninefold constituency forming the body is also attested in Yogācārabhumi recension undertaken by Paramārtha, under the Southern-Chen Dynasty, titled Canonical Treatise Making Doctrinal Determinations (Jueding zang-lun 決定藏論), fasc. 3 — T1584:30.1032.a29.
and faculties is attested in a number of earlier Abhidharma works, including the *Samyuktābhidharma-ḥṛdaya-śāstra* (Chi.: Za apitan xin lun 雜阿毘曇心論),\(^{170}\) attributed to “The Great Bhadānta Dharmatrāta” (Chi. Dade Fajiu 大德法救), \(^{171}\) and the *Samyuktābhidharma-ḥṛdaya* 阿毘曇心論經, attributed to Dharmaśreṣṭhin (name accessed from DDB, March 22, 2017).

In the twenty-second stanza of his discussions on the faculties, Vasubandhu argues that the nine faculties distinguish the living human from the dead human. According to the crucial hemistich of this twenty-second stanza (2.22c), the eight-fold constituency is simply an inert body, while nine-fold constituency is a human being “bestowed with faculties” (Skt.: sêndriyam).

**What Does It Mean To Be Human? Other Forms of Human Life**

In his exhaustive investigation of what it means to be human, Vasubandhu explores other forms of human life, including embryonic life, people of Uttarakuru, extraterrestrials, non-able bodied humans, and sages. These categories of humans possess fewer than nine faculties or more than nine faculties.

Building upon Vasubandhu's seminal analysis in the *Treasury of Abhidharma*, Xuanzang examines categories of humans who possess fewer than the nine baseline faculties required for survival ranging from embryonic life, humans born without one or more of the sense faculties, and

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170 The *Samyuktābhidharma-ḥṛdaya* 雜阿毘曇心論 redacted by Saṅghabhūti 僧伽跋摩 under the Six-Dynasties Liu-Song regime gives the pertinent line of the stanza: 身根九外八 謂在於 (emended from 有, based upon the Song edition) 香地.

171 Dharmatrāta is among the four great masters who are said to have convened the great Sarvāstivādin council, which took place in the state of Kāśmīra 迦濕彌羅國 during the reign of King Kaniṣka 奇奴色迦王. The other three old masters of this council are Vasumitra 世友, Ghoṣa 姑沙, and Buddhadeva 覺天. Under the four masters of the Vibhāṣa council, the *Digital Dictionary of Buddhism* states: “it is said that five hundred learned Buddhist masters 五百羅漢 articulated the Abhidharma doctrines, compiling the *Mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra* 大毘婆沙論...These four scholars hypothesized the existence of an eternal essence in dharmas as well as clear distinction in the three time periods” (accessed May 8, 2018).
human sages who have effaced one or more of the hedonic faculties. Members of the first two categories lack one or more of the ordinary sensory faculties, while sages lack one or more of the undesirable or “contaminated” (Skt.: sāsrava; Chi.: you-lou 有漏) hedonic faculties.¹⁷²

Xuanzang employs an exploration of atypical forms of human life to consolidate his definition of what it means to be an ordinary human. While appearing to be a digression into embryology and phantasmagoria, this inquiry brings Xuanzang back to his core subject of survival and the faculties that are required to sustain life. In his penetrating examination into the nature of life, Xuanzang uses Vasubandhu's analysis to determine the minimum number of faculties required to sustain life. This brings him to an understanding of the number of faculties that disintegrate in death.

The Human Embryo

Xuanzang’s signature gloss on the paripūrins found in the text of the CWSL, features an example of the human embryo during the five periods of gestation.¹⁷³ This gloss is rooted in the Buddha's teaching of co-dependent origination (Skt.: pratītya-samutpāda). Xuanzang defends Vasubandhu's claims that the pre-natal organism is a fully-fledged human being and therefore

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¹⁷² The Sanskrit term sāsrava — in Chinese, lit., “with-outflows” (written you-lou 有漏 [Xuanzang] or you-liu 有流 [Paramārtha]) —carries both the sense of “impure/contaminated” and “distress, affliction, pain” (Sr. Monier-Williams Skt.-Eng. Dictionary). Both of these senses are important within the context of Abhidharma discussions of ritual purity. Vasubandhu cites the seven physical faculties in the context of his discussion on which faculties are “pure” and which faculties are “impure.” He concludes that the seven physical faculties are unanimously “contaminated.” Aee AK 2.9, Pradhan, ed., Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya, 42.

¹⁷³ The CWSL abides by the clear stipulation on this term stated by Vasubandhu in his AKbh 3.20. Saṅghabhadra also adopts this stipulation. Xuanzang's Chinese version of the AKbh gloss on paripūrin runs: “Mahānidānaparyāya-sūtra describes them as ‘fully-fledged beings.’ But it excludes the stillborn and those paripūrins in the rūpadhātu rūpadhātu and arūpadhātu, while merely refering to the pudgalas in the kāmadhātu.”

此中意說：補特伽羅，歷一切位。名圓滿者。非諸中夭，及色 無色，羯剌藍等，諸位闕故 (T1562:29.481.a06-7).
sentient. While the sensory and sexual organs of the human are not discernable in the earliest kalala stage, or the first eight weeks of pregnancy, when the embryo is a droplet, Xuanzang insists that “the seeds of the seven physical faculties of vitality, the procreative faculties and the five ordinary senses are already there.” Xuanzang posits that the fertilized embryo contains the genetic information that determines the development of the senses and the procreative organs. This stance is consistent with the judgement of the Sarvāstivādin editors of the Mahāvibhāṣa.

The People of Uttarakuru

In another example Xuanzang describes a species of human who differ from other humans in their physical presentation. One such species resides in the continent of Uttarakuru, the northernmost continent of the earth. The people of Uttarakuru are described in the scriptures as square-shaped and androgynous. Xuanzang states that they possess a minimum of thirteen faculties and can realize a maximum of eighteen faculties. This species of human does not possess the higher.

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174 CWSL, fascicle 7: “Those sentient beings born viviparously, oviparously, or via spawning in moisture (i.e., insects), who have not yet achieved full maturity, definitely fall under “name-and-form” (nāmarūpa, the third “link” or nidāna in the Buddha’s teaching of twelvefold codependent origination). And the link of name and matter is pervasive. When physically incarnate beings born via transformation initially undergo the stage of becoming reborn, although they fully possess five faculties, these [faculties] have not yet obtained their full function. At that point, the being is not yet classified under the link (nidāna) of “six loci [of sensation].” 胎卵濕生者六處未滿定有名色故。又「名色」支亦是遍有。有色化生,初受生位,雖具五根,而未有用。爾時未名「六處」支故 (T1585:31.44.a01-4).

175 This explanation is found in Mahāvibhāṣa, fascicle 147: “Question, for what reason do the loci of those [i.e., physical faculties of procreation] only come to be during the stage of infancy?” 講：如何於少時，頃便得爾所根耶？

Reply: at that time (in prenatal stage), although there are none of the salient features of the physical faculties, although the seed is already there. We liken it to mixing distilled saline-water, ghee, sweet honey, and rum, etc., together and then storing them in a single vessel. If you pick up a single drop with a blade of grass, all of the variegated flavors are present within that [single drop]. We should understand the kalala stage in this way, since the seeds of the physical faculties are already all present. 答：爾時雖無諸色根相而已具得彼根種子。如清鹽水酥蜜沙糖酒等，和合貯在一器。若以草端霑取一渧,於中具有鹽等諸味。羯邏藍位應知亦爾，一切色根種子皆具.
faculties of gnosis or the procreative faculties. Hence, four faculties are deducted from the maximum of twenty-two faculties that make up the full spectrum of humans.¹⁷⁶

**Extraterrestrial Humans**

Xuanzang also examines extraterrestrial forms of humans, or *prthagjana*, that reside in the *rūpadhātu*. These forms of life differ from humans in the *kāmadhātu* in that they are androgynous, do not possess a nose or a mouth,¹⁷⁷ and have an average life span of one thousand years. The *rūpadhātu* heavens are host to extraterrestrial forms of humans with fewer than the nine faculties and to humans with more than nine faculties. The people of the *rūpadhātu* have a minimum of eight faculties and a maximum of twenty-one faculties (AK 20-21a-b). According to stanza 2.21 of Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Abhidharma*, there are examples of humans achieving the full range of twenty-one faculties in *rūpadhātu*, but these cases are rare.

¹⁷⁶ “The northernmost of the four continents 四洲 around Mt. Meru 須彌, square in shape, inhabited by square-faced people” (accessed Jan. 13 2017). The most standard enumeration for humanoids inhabiting the four continents is that given by the Vibh, which is also attested in *Jñānaprasthāna*: “one in the final stage of gradual dying, as it is across the Rose-Apple Continent (Jambudvīpa).” 漸命終位如瞻部洲•毘提訶洲•瞿陀尼洲亦爾。俱盧洲極多十八極少十三。十八者,謂＊kāyêndriyam＊及＊jīvitêndriyam＊。十六者,謂＊色界＊。差別者。彼＊無＊鼻舌識。若生＊無色界＊,意識現在前。若極多十八,若極少十三。閻浮提、拘耶尼、弗于迦亦復如是。（T27, no. 1545, p. 137, b17-8). This gloss also implies that sentient beings in the *arūpadhātu* manifest (*xian*) vivid mental consciousness, as if right before the eyes.” 生欲界, 生色界亦爾。差別者,彼無鼻舌識。若生無色界,意識現在前。（T27, no. 1545, p. 137, b17-8). This gloss also implies that sentient beings in the *arūpadhātu* sense their external environment directly by way of the mental faculty. They do not need recourse to any of the five gross physical senses.
Humans Who are Not “Able-Bodied”

Humans born with congenital disabilities may, or may not, possess fewer than nine faculties. It would make sense, in theory, that a human who lacks an auditory faculty would possess eight faculties rather than nine. Within this framework however, there is no “gene for deafness” that expresses itself in terms of the addition or subtraction of faculties from the baseline number of nine. Xuanzang abides by Vasubandhu's view (AKBh 2.1) that deafness is not the result of a congenital disability of a faculty, or an inherited trait. In his translation of Saṅghabhadra's Ny and XZL, for instance, Xuanzang does not consider the deaf humans to be missing the faculty of audition. Some of the scholars in the second generation of Xuanzang's “Teaching Gate” (Chi.: xue-men 學門), for example, the Northern scholar-monk, Lingtai 靈泰, and the Kośa-specialist, Zhizhou 智周 (668 C.E.-723 C.E.), argue in their commentaries on CWSL that deaf people do not lack an auditory faculty. They posit that the faculty is “dormant” (Chi.: wufa 無發) but retains the latent, or “non-manifest” (Chi.: bubian 不變) potentiality. One of Xuanzang's senior disciples, the Abhidharma scholar, Huizhao 慧沼 (648–714), makes the point that in the case of blindness, the ocular faculty is either “gorged out, caved in, or occluded by something extrinsic to it.”

Lingtai's commentary on CWSL, titled, Jottings on Kuiji’s Commentary on the CWSL (Cheng weishi lun shuchao 成唯識論疏抄), fascicle 5 (X819:50.234.c19-24) describes the capability (sāmarthyam) as being inherent in a faculty, although it may remain “non-manifest” or “un-indicated” – such is the case for sentient beings residing in the realms of subtle material and for humans born without one or more sensory faculties. Lingtai writes: “‘Un-presented/un-manifest’ refers to the olfactory and gustatory sense-faculties pertaining to the realm of subtle material (rūpadhātu) – which although don't produce any function in consciousness, it is yet agreed upon that they are manifest in the nose and tongue. Because if among the sense-faculties one lacks the olfactory or gustatory faculties, the actual physical sense organs should also be lacking.” 不變者, 即如色界鼻舌根, 雖無發識用, 仍許變鼻•舌。根若無鼻舌根, 其扶根塵亦無故。For this reason we know: although another's five sense-faculties fail to produce functions for our own consciousness, they still are manifest in our own consciousness as another's sense-faculties. If we say that only other's physical sensory organs are manifest [in our consciousness], then the five sense-faculties obtain no function [for us]. Since that which remains un-manifest is that way, the realm of subtle material should lack noses and tongues, since the olfactory and gustatory sense-faculties fail to produce any function in consciousness, since there merely exist physical sense organs. Those born congenitally blind are that way. Like someone born congenitally blind, although she possesses the visual faculty, and the root-consciousness (mūla-vijñāna) manifests [light] to the visual-faculty, any light catching up to the eyeball is cut off, and does not activate the visual consciousness.
Saṅghabhadra argues that in blindness, the capacity for sight remains inherent in the visual faculty, but cannot exercise its efficacy (Skt.: kāritram; Chi.: zuoyong 作用) because of a disability in the physical organs involved in eyesight. In the words of Xuanzang’s second generation disciple, Zhizhou 智周 (668–723 C.E.), “it is simply that case its full extension is occluded by something external and cannot see things” 但外物翳致不能見.179

Sages

Although there are no forms of ordinary human who evince fewer than nine faculties, there are forms of humans who evince more than nine. Ordinary humans in the kāmadhātu possess the five hedonic faculties of joy, pleasure, suffering, anxiety, and aversion. However, certain earthly sages develop more than the nine faculties by adding one or more of the five cultivatable skillful faculties (10-14). The addition of the skillful faculties and the substruction of undesireable faculties is accomplished through a process disciplined practice.

Kuiji’s commentary on the CWSL describes Aśvajit (Chi.: Masheng 马勝),180 an earthly sage who so skillfully cultivates his two “fleshy balls for eyes” (Chi.: routuan-yan 肉團眼)181 that he “sprouts forth” (Chi.: chengjiu 成就; pra√bhū) a form of divine vision whereby he can see out of the celestial spheres of the kāmadhātu and into the depths of rūpadhātu. Kuiji concludes that

However, we regard another’s sensory faculties as real, as those faculties are still capable of activating consciousness [for others]. 故知：雖於他五根，自無發識用，仍許自識變他根也。若言唯變他扶根塵，五根不用。即不變爾者，色界應無鼻舌，鼻舌根亦無發識用故，唯有扶塵。生盲等亦爾者；如生盲人，雖有眼根，本識亦變為眼，睛上有絕，不得發識。雖實他根，還別能發識也。

179 Zhizhou, *Deducing the Doctrines of the CWSL* 成唯識論演祕 (T1833:43.868.b22).
180 Xuanzang’s Chi. is a semantic trans. of his appelation: (MW) “gaining horses by conquest.”
181 Vasumitra’s *Treatise on the Wheel of the Different Tenets* attributes to the Mahasaṅgikas 大眾部 the doctrine “that the five types of physical sensory faculties have the fleshy body and viscera at their core” 五種色根肉團為體 (T1822:41.458.c09). The Sarvāstivādin editors of the *Mahāvibhāṣa* essentially concur with this idea. However, chapter 2, section two of this study looks at how Xuanzang pushes back against the conflation of physical sense organs with the faculties.
Aśvajit’s “divine vision” is not a mysterious “third eye” (Chi.: *di san yan* 第三眼) but the result of his cultivation of insight and concentration. These are among the five skillful faculties required for the “path of insight” (Skt.: *darśana-mārga*) and “the path of yogic meditation” (Skt.: *bhāvana-mārga*).

Vasubandhu devotes an entire chapter to the different forms and strata of sages in the three *dhātus*, the details of which exceed the scope of this present study. It is sufficient to note that the earthly sages bear a maximum number of nineteen faculties. These sages represent a category of humans, who despite the unfavorable conditions within the world, cultivate the five skillful faculties (15-19). Additionally there are spiritually advanced forms of human beings who live in the *rūpadhātu* and *arūpadhātu* and possess the full complement of five skillful faculties by virtue of having been reincarnated into one of these two higher realms. According to Vasubandhu, the reincarnated extraterrestrial sages can realize a maximum of nineteen faculties. He also notes that the maximum number of nineteen faculties refers to “beings of mediocre intelligence (Skt.: *bālas*) in the *arūpadhātu*.”\(^{182}\)

This remark serves as a reminder that even the most advanced forms of human extraterrestials in the rarified *arūpadhātu* have not achieved liberation from the cycle of death and rebirth. According to Xuanzang, abiding by Vasubandhu’s teachings on salvation, holds that the achievement of nirvāṇa entails the relinquishing of all of the faculties, both skillful and unskillful.

In contrast to the extraterrestrial *paripūrins* who evince more than nine faculties and up to

\(^{182}\) AK 2.20a-d runs: “*Bālas* [in the *rūpadhātu*] yoked (yuktah) to the purified forms of body, mind, and vitality, have at minimum, eight [faculties], while those bālas within the *arūpadhātu* are [yoked] with the purified forms of mind, aversion, and vitality.” *Sarvālpairinīśubho ʿṣṭābhīr vinmanah kāyajīvitaḥ* – Skt. text based upon Pradhan, ed., *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*, 51-2. The following line of the subsequent stanza (2.21a-b) is anaphoric upon the subject of *bālas* which carries down from the immediately preceding line: “at the maximum, the *bāla* is yoked to the nineteen, with the exception of the immaculate faculties (20-22).” *Bahubhir yukta ekānnaviśayā malavarjitaḥ* 2.21a-b — ibid., 52.
a maximum of nineteen faculties, Xuanzang's Abhidharma corpus provides examples of human sages with fewer than the sixteen faculties comprised by the nine physical faculties and the five hedonic faculties. Xuanzang's translation of the *Mahāvibhāṣa* gives examples of earthly sages who expiate the faculty of anxiety by way of yogic training.

Although many sages possess more than the nine faculties generically associated with the *paripūrin* in the *kāmadhātu*, certain sages in the *rūpadhātu* and *arūpadhātu* possess fewer than nine faculties. No human in the *rūpadhātu* goes without the faculty of aversion as this faculty constitutes the vital limbic system that sustains emotion and cognition. However, the extraterrestrial sages differ from the earthly sages in that, while the former are born without undesirable hedonic faculties of suffering and anxiety, the latter achieved this status through sedulous practice.

### Section Two: Staying Alive Through the Cooperation of Faculties

What are the ingredients that are necessary to sustain human life? To determine what is lost in death, Xuanzang must determine the factors that are necessary to remain living. He addresses this question by isolating the particular faculties that distinguish a living human body from a dead body. For Xuanzang, who abides by the Buddhist doctrine of no-self, this question raises the additional question of what is removed by death, if not a self.

This section has three parts. The first section focuses on the arguments that Xuanzang mounts in the defense of the third methodological tenet regarding the cooperation of the faculties. By applying this tenet to the definition of death, Xuanzang arrives at the explanation that vitality, proprioception, and the mind are the three factors that make the difference between the living body and the corpse. Xuanzang takes the idea that vitality can be broken down into three discrete factors
that work together to sustain the vital operations of the body: vital power (Skt.: āyur), bodily warmth (Skt.: āśman), and consciousness (Skt.: vijñāna). The second section turns to Xuanzang's arguments to defend the doctrine that consciousness must be distinguished from the other three vital factors because it is crucial for somatic functioning. While it is one of the three vital factors necessary to sustain life, Xuanzang argues that the loss of consciousness results in biological death.

Death as the Loss of Three Faculties of Kāyêndriyam, Vitality and Mind

In his exegesis in determining the nature of life, Xuanzang confronts the question of what differentiates the body and its material organs from a living thing. In addressing this question, Xuanzang applies his three methodological tenets: that faculties are essential to the continuation of life; that no single faculty operates in isolation; and that the cooperation of faculties provides the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for sentient life. By enlisting these three methodological tenets in his analysis of death, Xuanzang concludes that death does not entail the loss of a single faculty. He posits that three faculties comprise the minimum number of faculties that are necessary to life. Anything less results in death.

The Tripod of the Three Faculties

Vasubandhu’s Treasury of Abhidharma elaborates on the three vital constituents of bodily warmth, vital power, and consciousness. These three constituents map onto the three vital faculties of kāyêndriyam, vitality, and mind. In his commentary on Xuanzang's text of the Treasury of Abhidharma, Puguang introduces the example of the tripod (Chi.: ding鼎) of the faculties that sustain life. He writes: “The three vital factors continue operating by mutually supporting each other. They are set up like the legs of a tripod”若爾三法更互相持相續轉故，鼎足而立. Puguang avers that as each of the three legs together enable the tripod to stand, each one of the
three factors together enable life to be sustained. A tripod cannot stand on one or two legs, just as life cannot be sustained by one or two faculties. Puguang continues the metaphor of the tripod to explain the survival and death of an organism. He writes: “If there is no single factor that is annihilated first, then the triad should be permanent and unceasing. If one factor is annihilated, then the other two factors are accordingly annihilated.”

The metaphor of the tripod highlights crucial questions regarding the operational dependency versus the independence of the faculties. Can one faculty cease while others continue? If death is the annihilation of the triad of faculties, which faculty is annihilated first? If each one of the three faculties supply a necessary condition for survival, as well as the sufficient conditions for the continued operation of the other two, will the removal of one faculty cause the death of the entire organism? Will death be slow, or will it be sudden?

Xuanzang's response to the dilemma of the dependence and independence of the faculties is articulated in his translation of the seminal Yogācāra work, the *Compendium of the Mahāyāna* (Skt: *Mahāyāna-samgraha śāstra*: Chi.: *She dasheng lun* 攝大乘論). Xuanzang's translation of this famous Yogācāra śāstra, attributed to Asaṅga, introduces the metaphor of the standing bundle

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183 Lingtai takes up Puguang’s example of the tripod in his *Jottings on Kuiji’s Commentaries on CWSL* (Cheng Weishi Lun Shu Chao 成唯識論疏抄) at X819:50.167.a20-25. Like Puguang, Lingtai concludes that three factors are deprived simultaneously: “If one says that fear is the first thing to desert the body, then the great majority of people who are about to freeze to death would just be pretending to die! Hence, we know that when somebody dies in the kamadhātu, her body is initially deserted by vital power along with the other two [factors; i.e., bodily warmth and consciousness.] ‘When three factors desert the body,’ indicates the desertion of vital force, physical afflictions (kleśas), along with consciousness.” 若言先捨懼者，大有人被凍身雖冷，擬仍不死。故知欲死之時，先捨壽餘二。捨壽，煩惱、及識：三法捨身時者。

184 *Jushe lun ji* 俱舍論記, fascicle 5, (T1821:41.10.b05-7).
of rushes (Skt.: nāḍa-kalāpa; Tib.: mdung kyim;\(^{185}\) Chi.: lu shu\(\)蘆束).\(^{186}\) In the iteration of the simile found in the *Compendium of the Mahāyāna*, the faculties are likened to a bundle of rushes. The bundle stands upright because each rush supports the other rushes. The bundle falls without the cooperation of each of the rushes, just as a human being collapses without the cooperation of each one of its faculties.

Xuanzang adduces the metaphor of the bundle of thrushes, in the *Demonstration of Consciousness Only*, in the context of a discussion about the origin of consciousness. He poses the question: When exactly, does an embryo first evince consciousness in the course of its embryogenesis? Here Xuanzang employs the metaphor of the bundle of thrushes to depict the concept of the aggregation of faculties. Xuanzang implies that the “vital impulses” (Skt.: āyuḥsaṃskāras; Chi.: shou-xìng 壽行) and “consciousness” are bundled.\(^{187}\)

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\(^{185}\) *Tibetan-Himalaya Library Tib. Dictionary* (hereafter, THL) gives among the meanings of the word mdung kyim: “pole tent, shade for travellers made on the wayside by throwing piece of cloth over 3 pikes, frame to lean spears against.”

\(^{186}\) Translation of the pertinent passage in *Mahāyānasamgraha* is based upon Xuanzang’s Chinese, with reference to the available Tibetan version of the text found in Tibetan Derge Tengyur Canon (D 4048: vol. 134, folio/line 6a.7–6b1), titled *Theg pa chen po bsad pa*: “Moreover, ālayavijñāna is simultaneous with and finds its mutual causal basis in the impure dharmas. How is this seen? We liken it to a luminous lamp, within which spark and wick generate burning – spark and wick cooperate mutually in such a way to sustain the burning. We also liken it to rushes in a bundle, each of which mutually supports each other, without toppling over, all at once. It should be observed from these examples that this is the way that the principle of cooperative causal support is. We liken it to how the dharmas of variegated impurity (upasankleśa) provide the causal basis for ālayavijñāna, and likewise, ālayavijñāna provides the causal grounding for the dharmas. Ālayavijñāna is established in order to provide the direct-cause (hetu-pratayaya) for the percept (Skt.: ālambana; dmigs pa).” 復次，阿賴耶識與彼雜染諸法同時更互為因，云何可見？譬如明燈，焰炷生燒，同時更互。又如蘆束互相依持，同時不倒。應觀此中更互為因道理亦爾。如阿賴耶識為雜染諸法因，雜染諸法亦為阿賴耶識因。唯就如是安立因緣，所餘因緣不可得故。 (T31, no. 1594, p. 134, c15-20). Corresponding Derge Tib. text reads: Kun gzhi rnam par shes pa dang, kun nas nyon mongs pa’i choos de dag dus mnyam du gcig gi rgyu nyid du gcig ’gyur ba ji ltar bta zhe na? dper na mar me’i me lce ’byung ba dang, snying po tshig pa phan tshun dus mnyam pa dang, mdung khyim yang dus mnyam du gcig la brten nas mi ’gyel ba de bzhi du ’dir yang gcig gi rgyu nyid du gcig ’gyur bar bta’o, ji ltar kun gzhi rnam par shes pa kun nas nyon mongs pa’i’chos rnam kyis rgyu yin pa de ltar kun nas nyon mongs pa’i’chos rarms kyang kun gzhi rnam par shes pa’i’rgyu’i rkyen nyid du rnam par gzhag ste/ rgyu’i rkyen gzhan mi dmigs pa’i phyir ro.

\(^{187}\) The *CWSL* presentation of the analogy of vital pulses or saṃskāras to the bundle of thrushes appears midway through the famous ten scriptural corroborations of the ālayavijñāna doctrine. While saṃskāras form the second
The Termination of the Three Constituents in Death

Saṅghabhadra and Vasubandhu use the example of the vegetative body for the purposes of examining and isolating the factors operating to keep a body alive. Xuanzang takes up the example and incorporates these earlier analyses into his original compilation, the Demonstration of Consciousness Only, to defend his three methodological tenets. In his explanations of what distinguishes the dead body from the corpse, Xuanzang draws from his translation of the Mahāvibhāṣa, and from the exegeses of the Mahāvibhāṣa by Vasubandhu and Saṅghabhadra. Xuanzang takes up the example of the comatose body on the brink of death cited in these source materials to make his doctrinal points.

In engaging with the example of the vegetative body, Xuanzang enlists the principle that the three baseline faculties: vitality, aversion, and mind, are required for survival. In his auto-commentary on Chapter Two, verse 45 of the Treasury of Abhidharma, Vasubandhu breaks down the faculty of vitality into three constituents: bodily warmth, vital power, and consciousness. Xuanzang references Vasubandhu's doggerel stanza in śloka meter to illustrate that three co-dependent factors are required for the continued survival of all sentient beings. Vasubandhu encapsulates this principle as it plays out in a human body on the precipice of its demise as follows:188

188 The above is in fact an interpolation of the stanza (of unclear provenance) from Vasubandhu's Auto-commentary on his Treasury of Abhidharma AKBh 2.45ab -- Pradhan, ed., Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya, 73. This stanza shows up in both Paramārtha's and Xuanzang's translations of AKBh. Later, the stanza, in slightly modified form, is
Chapter 1: What is Death?

As for vital power (Skt.: āyur), bodily warmth (Skt.: ūṣman), along with consciousness (Skt.: vijñāna), when these three factors (Skt.: dharmas) desert the body, the deserted body is numb, stiff, and insensate like a plank of wood.\(^{189}\)

Xuanzang's translation of this stanza interpolates the original Sanskrit word “stiff” into “stiff as a plank of wood” (Skt.: kāṣṭham) to make a vivid point. He states that the dead body is nothing but an insensate piece of matter. In the picture sketched out by Xuanzang in this stanza, death involves the loss of a body, but also involves much more. Xuanzang’s qualification indicates that “life's desertion of the body” refers to the loss of of three vital constituents of bodily warmth, vital power (Skt.: āyur), and consciousness (Skt.: vijñāna). The inclusion of consciousness indicates that the faculty of mind, one of the six senses that characterize a sentient being, is always present in a living body. The deprivation of consciousness is cotermious with the death of the living organism. For instance, the vegetative body is considered to be sentient, or to evince the

\(^{189}\) In his *Jottings on Kuiji’s Commentaries on CWSL* at X819:50.167.a16-18, Lingtai 靈泰 explains that the Chinese character meaning “stiff” (jiang 僵) portrays “dying whilst lying supine” (fu 死) while “like a board/falling forward” (pu 僵) portrays dying whilst remaining “collected” (he 他). Linggai's gloss on “dying falling forward” involves a double-entendre in the Chinese character, fu, meaning both “like a board,” and “falling forward.” Puguang goes on to explain that “dying whilst remaining collected” roughly means “dying whilst leaning on something” (ce si 侧死); as opposed to “dying whilst lying down.”

\(^{190}\) Doggerel śloka found in AKbh 2.45. Corresponding Skt. text reads: Āyurūṣmātha vijñānaṃ yadā kāyaṃ jahatamāṃ api viddhastadā sete yathā kāṣṭham acetanāḥ|| Pradhan, ed., Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya, 73. Tib.: Beorn ldan 'das kyis 'di skad du /tshe dang drod dang ram shes 'dis/ /gang tshe lus ni 'dor byed cing /bor nas de tsh 'dug pa ni /sems med ji ltar shing bzhin no //zhes gsungs te/ Stanza also appears in Skāndila’s Treatise on Entering Abhidharma 入阿毘達磨論, fascicle 2, 987 stanza twenty-two.
property of *sattvam*, as long as it has a pulse.

Sarvāstivāda doctrine holds that vitality is ultimately constituted in the triad of bodily factors of heat, consciousness, and vital power. Ultimately, Vasubandhu regards vital power as the most basic of the three consituents. In his commentary on the first line of the fourty-fifth stanza of Vasubandhu’s “Discrimination of Faculties,” Yaśomitra glosses “bodily heat” (Chi.: *nuan*暖) as the activity of consciousness which is continuously connected to vitality (Skt.: *jīvitā*). On the topic of the three constituents of bodily warmth, vital power, and consciousness that are required to sustain life, Puguang writes: “This triad is invariably realized by sentient beings in all stages, places and times” 此三於一切處時位等皆定成也. Puguang determines that the compresence of this triad is the *sine qua non* for sentient life. This principle that the presence of these three constituents is an invariable sign of life applies across all three transmigratory realms (Skt. *trādātu*). In sum, these three form the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for the continuation of life in a body.

The Sarvāstivāda teachings posulate that the three constituents of bodily warmth, vital power, and consciousness, desert the body at death. Vasubandhu argues that the compresence of the three constituents in the organism distinguishes being alive from being dead. In his exegesis into death, Xuanzang compresses the concepts of the the three constituents with the three vital faculties and identifies bodily warmth with *kāyêndriyam*, vital power with *jīvitêndriyam*, and consciousness with the mental faculty. For Xuanzang, without each of these three faculties

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192 Commentary on the *Kośa* (*Jushe-lun shu* 俱舍論疏), fasc. 3, (T1822:41.523.b10-11).
193 Cox, *Disputed Dharmas*, 128, explains how this principle must be taken to apply to the immaterial realm in addition to the *kāmadhātu* and *rūpyadhātu*: “Since beings in the formless realm (i.e., *arūpadhātu*) lack a corporeal basis and, therefore, warmth, were it not for vitality, their thought would be without a support. As a force dissociated from both thought and form (i.e., *rūpa*), vitality provides the basis of animation for ‘insentient’ beings in states without thought and the basis of support for beings without a corporeal basis in the formless realm.”
operating together, the organism will not sustain itself. The loss of any one of these faculties is fatal to the organism as a whole. This is his definition of death.

**The Faculty of Vitality is Vital to Life**

In matters of life and death, not all faculties are created equal. The faculty of vitality, or jīvitēndriyam, plays a vital role in Xuanzang's explanation of what is lost in death. The faculty of jīvitēndriyam is lost whenever a living organism dies, regardless of the nature of the organism or its karma. Even here, however, Xuanzang makes it clear that that the presence of vitality alone does not delimit the border between what is dead and what is alive. He maintains this position to preserve the three methodological tenets, and in doing so upholds the Buddhist doctrine of no-self. Xuanzang finds the doctrine of the three consituents of life to be more parsimonious than the mind-body compound dualism of the rival theories represented by the Brahmaṇical Sānkhya and Vaiśeṣika thinkers. While both the Brāhmaṇical and Buddhist traditions support the theory of the faculties as the bearers of life, the Xuanzang rejects the postulate of a soul (Skt: ātman; pums) or person (Skt.: puruṣa) that is separate from the faculties.

Xuanzang holds that the faculty of vitality is not located in any particular part of the body. We cannot see it with the naked eye. Rather, one may validly infer that vitality inhers in the body simply by sensing vital signs such as a pulse. However, the question arises: From where does this mysterious source of power in the body derive, as its presence is known only indirectly, via inference? Vasubandhu postulates that vitality is imperceptible by nature, in that it does not contribute to the percept (Skt.: ālambana; Chi.: suo-yuan 所緣). At the same time, vitality

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194 By “mind-body” compound dualism we mean the general idea that the person is composed of at least two proper parts, a body and a soul. See the definition of compound dualism elaborated in Corcoran, “Introduction: Body or Soul?” In *Soul, Body, and Survival: Essays on the Metaphysics of Human Persons* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 2011), Corcoran, ed., 5-10.

195 The *Great Commentary on the Gate of Logic* compiled by Kuiji cites the following syllogism: “For example, the Sarvāstivāda set out the following counter-inference targeting the Mahāyāna: ‘My faculty of
constitutes the most rudimentary basis for the survival of all organisms. It is the bearer of life.

Puguang follows Vasubandhu and Saṅghabhadra's approach in treating the faculty of vitality as analytically separate from the senses and the body. Xuanzang views vitality as a “factor that is dissociated from the mind” (Skt.: cittaviprayuktasamskāra-dharma; Chi.: xin bu xiangying xing fa 心不相應行法:). He makes a distinction between vitality and the other eight physical or embodied faculties (Skt.: *aṣṭa-rūpêndriyaṇi; Chi.: ba youse gen 八有色根) of the paripūrin. The classification of vitality as separate from the mind and yet analytically distinct from the body is important because it means that the operations of vitality cannot be fully accounted for in purely physical or psychological terms. Vitality is partially physical and partially psychological and is not reducible to either set of explanations. Vitality cannot be viewed as separate or distinct from any of the faculties or the organs of the body.

To demonstrate the invariable presence of the faculty of vitality within a living body, the twenty-seventh fascicle of Xuanzang's Mahāvibhāṣa poses the question: Why does the human being die when the body is severed at the torso or at the head, but not when the hands or the feet are lopped off? The answer, given in Mahāvibhāṣa, is that the hands and the feet do not bear vitality. Destroying the site of vitality will result in death, whereas cutting away the limbs or other organs will change the body, albeit in a drastic way. The destruction of vitality is the mortal blow. The Mahāvibhāṣa states that it is the loss of vitality that determines the loss of the sentient being.

It is the presence of vitality that determines the “number of the sentient being” (Chi.: vitality really exists; because of the fact that it does not present a cognizable condition. We liken this to the way that sound and color are generally granted to be.' This is the realist tenet. It takes the remaining five skandhas, as well as the unconditioned factors, as positive examples (sapakṣas). These have no causal basis as a cognizable condition, but they do exist as material things (rūpas).” 如薩婆多對大乘立自比量云：我之命根定是實有：許無緣慮等，如許色聲等，此實有宗。以餘五蘊，無為等為同品。無緣慮因，於色等有 (T1840:44.125.a21-23).
youqing shu 有情数) or how many organisms are constituted by a piece, or pieces, of organic matter. For instance, two severed halves of an animal do not constitute two separate living individuals. Hence, the faculty of vitality serves as a *principium individuationis*, providing a means of individuating separate forms of biological life.

**Foreclosing on the Houses of the Senses**

Xuanzang's translation corpus and his CWSL are in line with the standard Abhidharma doctrine that the triad of the three faculties — *kāyêndriyam*, vitality, and mind constitute the baseline for human survival. As grounds for this stance, Xuanzang's translations of the *Treasury of Abhidharma* and *Nyāyanusāra* both highlight a key line of verse from Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Abhidharma*, stating that “a sentient being is invariably yoked with the compresent triad of *kāyêndriyam*, vitality, and mind” (2.17cd). 197 *Mahāvibhāśa* reports in the one hundred and forty-second fascicle that “the faculty of vitality cannot supply a basis for all the other faculties” 命根非一切根所依. 198 This means that even in the case of a catatonic body, more than just the singular faculty of vitality is necessary to sustain rudimentary cardio-pulmonary function.

However, possessing a body does not automatically entail the possession of sentience. While the “core faculties” or the “faculties, per se” (Chi.: *genti* 根體) are themselves the root and subserving basis of life, the body is the “house” (Skt.: *āyatana*) of the faculties. According to both Xuanzang's text of Vasubandhu's auto-commentary, and the critical commentary on Vasubandhu’s statements offered by Saṅghabhadrā, the faculty of vitality is operationally dependent on the body,

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196 The *Mahāvibhāśa* discusses the case of disembowelment and why it is fatal, while merely severing the arms or feet may not be, in fascicle 27 at T1545:27.138-39.

197 Pradhan, Abhidharmakośa, 50: *Upekṣājīvitamanoyukto ‘vaśyaṃ trayāṇvītah’/17cd//.

198 T1545:27.749.c7.
but analytically distinct from it for two reasons: because the faculty of vitality exists in the immaterial realm, and because the faculty of vitality is present when one is in the state of mindlessness, for example, annihilative concentration (Skt.: *nirōdhasamāpatti*), a function that is not simply dependent on the mind.\(^{199}\)

In making the claim that the body is necessary but not sufficient for sentient life, Xuanzang draws deeply from Vasubandhu's credo that “six houses are the root of sentient life.” Although the provenance of the above doggerel quatrain cited in Vasubandhu is hazy, it reports upon a doctrine that is attested in both Asaṅga's and Vasubandhu's corpora. In this respect, both Asaṅga and Vasubandhu follow the early Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma account in which all living organisms have the triad of vital qualities (Skt.: *guṇas*; Chi.: *de 德*): heat, vital power, and consciousness.\(^{200}\) What this doctrine entails for the understanding of death is that the dying person loses mental consciousness at the same time that s/he loses basic physiological functions.

In particular, Xuanzang's commitment to the idea that “subliminal” (Skt.: *asamviditaka*; Chi.: *bu ke-zhi 不可知*)\(^ {201}\) *ālayavijñāna*, or storehouse consciousness, motivates him to defend the idea that all living things possess consciousness, albeit in an attenuated or dormant form, as in the case of the catatonic body on the brink of death. However, the perdurance of this “store-house of life” has to have the right kind of cause. What then ultimately sustains life itself?

\(^{199}\) *Nyāyanusāra*, fascicle 13: “As an entity, vital power is a discrete thing that is capable of sustaining heat and consciousness – it is what is designated by ‘the faculty of vitality.’ In this way, it is not the case that the faculty of vitality is operationally dependent on the body [for two reasons]: because of the fact that there exists the faculty of vitality in the immaterial realm and because of the fact that there is also the faculty of vitality when one is in the state of mindlessness (i.e., annihilative concentration), which is not simply due to operations dependent upon the mind.”壽體實有別物，能持煖•識，說為「命根」。如是命根非唯依身轉，於無色界，有命根故。非唯依心轉，處無心位，亦有命故 (T1562:29.404.c21).

\(^{200}\) Like the Latin *virtus*, the Chinese rendering of *guṇa* also bears the senses of both “power” and “quality.”

\(^{201}\) Trīṃśika kārikā 3.b – see edition of Sylvian Lévi, *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi de la Deux traités de Vasubandhu: Viṃśatikā (La vingtaine) accompagnée d'une explication en prose/ et Trīṃśikā (La trentaine) le commentaire de Sthiramati* (Paris: Libraire Ancienne Honoré Champion, 1925), 11.
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In the denouement to the second fascicle of the CWSL, jīvitēndriyam comes to subsume the three constituents of vital power, heat, and consciousness. This move is consistent with Vasubandhu’s line of verse (AK 2.45ab) followed by an especially long auto-commentary on the subject of what jīvitēndriyam ultimately consists in. Ultimately, Vasubandhu will funnel the three dharmas sustained by jīvitēndriyam down to one, namely, vital power (Skt.: āyur). Yaśomitra’s meticulously detailed sub-commentary on Vasubandhu’s words explain that Vasubandhu is compelled to make this move in order to avoid a vicious regress. Yaśomitra explains that where Vasubandhu says that “otherwise there is the unwarranted consequence of their perpetual operation,” he is talking about the dilemma between two competing views. The first view holds that the three factors of life are operationally dependent, and in which case, the collapse of any of the three factors would result in immediate death. This is considered to be an unwarranted consequence (Skt.: prasaṅga), since Vasubandhu’s schema involves both “sudden” (Chi.: dun 頓) and “gradual” (Chi.: jian 漸) ways of dying. The opposing view holds that one must “bite the bullet,” as it were, by admitting that the two factors – bodily heat and consciousness – rely upon the more basic and primitive conditions maintained by the presence of vital power (Skt.: āyur). Ultimately, both Yaśomitra and Xuanzang follow Vasubandhu’s final analysis by endorsing the second view that bodily warmth and consciousness depend ultimately upon āyur, lest they face a vicious regressus ad infinitum.


203 Vasubandhu writes that there is the “unwarranted error of perpetual operation [of the three factors] (nityānvṛtti prasaṅga).” Ibid., Vol. 1, 248.

204 In his commentary on AKBh 2.45ab, Yaśomitra argues that there is no way to avoid the conclusion that there is no persistence of life’s continuum (samtāna) without a fundamental subserving basis or āśraya, based firmly in the qualities and forebearance of the faculty of vitality. See Shastri, ed. Sphutārtha, vol. 1, 248. Yaśomitra comments: “bodily warmth and consciousness are invariably associated (pratibaddha) with vitality (jīvita). Hence, vitality is referred to as the subserving basis (ādhāra) of consciousness and the basis of the two factors’ stability (i.e., the stability of warmth and consciousness). Otherwise there is lent free reign to the infinite regress.” Uṣmaṇo
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Losing Consciousness

Xuanzang's signature argument that loss of consciousness results in death is based on the “ten verifications” (Chi.: shi zheng 十證) of the doctrine of consciousness-only. This set of ten arguments cites two examples that are directly relevant to an understanding of death. These include the example of the vegetative body on the brink of death and the vegative state of the meditator who has obtained the state of “mindless concentration.” Both represent states during which all sensory activity is brought to a halt. Xuanzang uses both examples to demonstrate his third methodological tenet, which holds that at least three faculties, including vitality, are required for survival. Vitality is, quite literally, vital to life because it sustains the biological processes necessary to maintain the body. Xuanzang also claims that the mind is present as long as the body is alive.

The analytical distinction between the body and mind must be upheld in order to defend the doctrine that a body, absent a cognitive faculty, is merely an inanimate object. Schmithausen (1991) has studied how animals in contrast to plants are considered to be sensitive beings. One of the reasons that this is so is the idea, developed in the Abhidharma, that animals evince mental faculties. In the introduction to the “Discrimination of Faculties,” in chapter two of the Treasury of Abhidharma, Vasubandhu writes: “The six houses are the root of sentient life.” 此內六處是有情本 (AKBh 2.5: Etacca ʂađāyatanamaṇaṁ maulaṁ sattvadrayam). The term that Vasubandhu uses is āyatana, or home. Notably, Xuanzang uses the same character to indicate the āyatanas, or

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\text{vijñānasya ca jīvatapratibaddhā pravṛttih/ tasmā jīvamūṣmano vijñānasya cādhāra ucyate sthitthetustayoreva/nityānivṛttrprasanga iti/nityameśāṁ srotaḥ prasajyate.}
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206 Pradhan, ed., Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya, 40.
“houses of the senses,” along with the Sanskrit term, *sthāna*, or “the standing.”207 Xuanzang's translation introduces an ambiguity not present in the original Sanskrit by using same Chinese character — *chu*, meaning “locus” — to render the Sanskrit terms “dwelling” (Skt.: *sthāna*), “residence” (Skt.: *adhiśṭhāna*), and “home” (Skt.: *āyatana*).

Not all residences have equal status in this picture. Within the seminal passages of both works, the mind, while one of the six senses, is different. Unlike the ordinary senses, it is not associated with a physical organ in the body. Mind, however, by definition, is essential for the sustenance of sentient life and for independent action. In his treatment of the issue of the final site of life within the catatonic body, Vasubandhu cites the prevailing view of Abhidharma that the mental consciousness sustained by the mental faculty is the final seat of consciousness before it deserts the dead body (AKBh 3.41).208 The indication that mind is one of six senses is implicit in the earliest sequences found in the ancient Treatise on the Basis of Knowledge and Jñānaprasthāna śāstra. However, the analytical distinction between the body and the mind must hold in order to defend the doctrine that a body, absent a cognitive faculty, is merely another inanimate object. The former is a mere inert vessel without the necessary ingredient for life in its full-fledged sense, a mind to sustain the cognitive life of the sentient being. Vasubandhu's ensuing discussions clarify that the rest of the faculties sprout forth from the six houses as a result of improvements to the senses, the amplification of the body's native capacities, or the development of higher-order cognitive functions based in the mental faculty.

However, there cannot be a mental faculty without a working body in which to inhere. In

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207  Xuanzang uses this same character to indicate both the *āyatanas* or “homes of the senses,” and the Sanskrit term *sthāna*, the standing. Depending upon the context, the latter terminology can indicate either the *bhājanaloka* (according to the third of Vasubandhu's Thirty Stanzas) — the sensory world into which sentient beings are born — or the “firm standing/residence” (*adhiśṭhāna*) or “basis” (*āśraya*) that the faculties find in the body.

208  Pradhan, *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*, 155-156
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the context of the *Jñānaprasthāna*, the sequence of twenty-two faculties is presented with *manēndriyam* succeeding from *jīvitēndriyam* to express the thought that the latter is essential to all animals. Life is the precondition for sentience. Both faculties play active roles in nourishing and regenerating themselves.

Vasubandhu's auto-commentary on stanza 2.22 of his *Treasury of Abhidharma* indicates that “possessing a body-with-faculties” (Skt.: *kayēndriyin*; Chi.: *you gen-shen*有根身) means being endowed with the five ordinary sense faculties in addition to the four included under “bodily faculties.” The latter is understood as an umbrella term for the limbic system common to all animals. *Kāyēndriyam* participates in all manner of bodily functions, such as proprioception, digestion, and excretion, but only when matched with the subserving faculty of vitality and a mental faculty to oversee it.

The CWSL makes a provocative claim about the nature of dying. It equates the vegetative state leading up to biological death with the states of meditative absorption wherein physiological processes are brought to a murmur. Both cases are meant to serve as live examples of the tenet that both body and mind are vital for human survival. The CWSL's treatment of the example of the vegetative body goes on to extend the requirements for the survival of vital power, bodily warmth, and consciousness to other examples as well. Notably, the CWSL applies this triad to an examination of the nature of the “mindless” state of “annihilative concentration.” Griffiths (1986) describes this state in his study, *On Being Mindless*: 211

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209 This particular order of twenty-two faculties is found in fascicle 15 at T1544:26.991.23-5 in the form of the list. Later, Vasubandhu and Sanghabhadra cite this order.


An individual in the attainment of cessation is conceived of as being without all but the most basic autonomic physical functions. All that remains is a certain minimal level of bodily heat coupled with a dormant, but still present, 'life-principle' which seems to mean little more than that the practitioner has the possibility of leaving this condition and restarting normal physical activities, just as a charcoal file, carefully banked and covered with ash, may appear to be dead but can in reality be rekindled without too much difficulty.

Griffiths offers the above explanation in response to the question of how a meditator, after having obtained a state of mindlessness during which neither sensory activity nor thoughts occur, can re-emerge from this state. One cannot simply will one’s self out of the state during which all mental activity has ceased. What is the nature of the consciousness in this state? Cox gives voice to the Buddhist desideratum that mindless states of utter sensory deprivation must be distinct from death: “If life were distinguished from death only by the presence of perceptual consciousness, states without thought would be tantamount to death.”

In response to the worry that consciousness is no longer present in zombie-like states such as that experienced by beings residing in the heavens of the “those celestials lacking thought” (Skt.: *asamjñikīdevas*; Chi.: *wuxiang tian* 無想天), the CWSL makes essentially the same point: “consciousness has not departed the body” (識不離身). The CWSL’s arguments on the subject of dissociative meditative states adduce the example of the practitioner attaining a state of annihilative concentration in which the temperature of the body cools, the heartbeat slows to a murmur, and sensory activity is brought to a halt. This recurring refrain throughout the CWSL

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212 This thought is expressed in the traditional commentarial literature on the *CWSL*. Lingtai expresses it in his subglosses to Kuiji’s commentary on the finale to the 1st fascicle of *CWSL* that takes up the topic of *jīvitēndriyam*: “If you say that when someone dies in the *kāmadhātu*, s/he is first deserted by consciousness, then obtaining either of the two states of mindless concentration would be the same as dying.”

indicates that unless the faculty of mind has been damaged, uprooted, or occluded by something extrinsic, and as long as the faculties of aversion, proprioception, and vitality have not decayed, the human body is still alive in the sense that its ordinary sensory faculties are operable. This conclusion commits Xuanzang to the stance that the mental faculty simply remains dormant in a catatonic body. However, the body is alive because there still exists a sentient being. This sentient being exhibits not only the three embodied faculties of aversion, proprioception, and vitality, but also a faculty of mind, or manêndriyam. At the very least, it exhibits it in the sense that the vegetative body is still breathing and its heart is beating. The reason that the triad is invariably present in a living body is that all three faculties of the mind, proprioception, and vitality, form the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for the body to manage digestion and excretion of waste, with which the body must still deal even in the vegetative state, while the faculty of vitality is a necessary but not sufficient condition. Hence, Xuanzang concludes that all three are needed to sustain the most rudimentary vital processes, because without each and every one, the triad is unsustainable.

The CWSL concludes that within the state of annihilative concentration, all mental disruptions are brought to a halt. However, it also avers that the meditator attaining this depth of concentration is still alive, even in the absence of discernable mental activities and sensations, because the faculty of vitality, the faculty of mind and the faculty of aversion remain operative. Here, aversion stands both for the limbic system in less-advanced forms of life, in addition to the subtle aversive tendencies in highly advanced meditators and attenuated forms of life such as the transitional being (Skt.: upapāduka). The point is that there are always multiple faculties sustaining life at any given moment. This core notion of operational co-dependence between faculties is vitally important for Xuanzang's pluralistic explanation of death in terms of different kinds of final
moments.

However, Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Abhidharma* is clear that death is what happens when the human body no longer possesses the baseline three faculties mentioned above. Xuanzang follows Vasubandhu's explanation to the letter. It is important to note that it is not just the baseline triad described in Chapter Two of the *Treasury of Abhidharma*, stanza twenty-two that is involved in the explanation of death by Vasubandhu. Actually, the entire twenty-two-fold taxonomy of faculties is part of Xuanzang's response to this question, because Xuanzang differentiates what is lost in death based on the the environment or realm in which the being dies and whether the specific sentient being dies gradually or suddenly.²¹⁴

Apart from the embodied but insensible faculty of vitality, the sensory faculties and the mind are also involved in this picture of what death deprives. But what exactly is meant by a “sensory faculty”? The precise referent of the Sanskrit term — *indriya* — is a matter of broad dispute between Brahmanical and Buddhist authors.

It is true that the word for the visual faculty or organ in both classical Sanskrit, Chinese, and Tibetan means, literally, “the eye.” And yet, the Abhidharma rejects the notion that it is the eye, simpliciter, that sees things. Both Buddhist and Brahmanical thinkers recognize that the terminology is to be understood metonymically for the sensory faculty as a whole, including but not limited to the eyeball, the associated optic nerves, and the blood supply. One consequence of this terminological stance for both Buddhist Abhidharma theorists and contemporary proponents of the Brähmanical traditions of *Sāṅkhya* and *Vaiṣeṣika* is that the operation of the faculty is not limited to the physical functions of the organ, but invariably involves a cognitive component as

²¹⁴ Discussion on the “suddenly vs. gradually dying” classification is deferred until the fourth chapter of this dissertation.
well. It is in this respect that Abhidharma teachings concur with the Sāṅkhyā theory, rooted in the Sāṅkhya-kārikas, that the faculty of vision is only capable of seeing things when it works in conjunction with a mental faculty.

The following chapter examines the differences between the Abhidharma and rival Brahmanical taxonomies of faculties, based on Xuanzang's translations of the earliest systematic Abhidharma discussions.²¹⁵ Xuanzang is keenly sensitive to a number of striking similarities between the Buddhist and Abhidharma theories of faculty psychology. Xuanzang's translation of the Vaiśeṣika material from Sanskrit shows that he is well aware of the considerable terminological overlap between Buddhist and Brāhmaṇical taxonomies. However, his translations of Buddhist Abhidharma materials develop counterarguments against a number of charges leveled by rival theorists from the Brāhmaṇical traditions. These Abhidharma discussions are structured in a dialectical way wherein the author (Skt.: siddhāntin; Chi.: lunzhu 論主) must first address the interlocutor's objections. Typically, it is only after any difficulties have been resolved that the author goes on to elaborate the “correct doctrine” (Chi.: zheng-yi 正義). The specific debates here swirl around both the constitution and number of faculties required to sustain life in the sentient organism. These are the “faculties in their proper sense” (Chi.: zheng-gen 正根). A number of parallel items are found in the Sāṅkhyā and the Abhidharma taxonomies of faculties. The

²¹⁵ Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika are the only two Brahmanical interlocutors or pūrvapakṣins represented in Yaśomitra's commentary to the Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya of Vasbandhu, titled Abhidharmakośa-sphuṭārtham. In general, these are only two interlocutors represented in the body of Abhidharma material studied here—the same goes for the CWSL, its Chinese commentaries, and the Yogācāra works attributable to the sixth-century authors Dharmapāla, Śthiramati, and Yaśomitra. Xuanzang's Chinese commentators make mention of, among others, the Jainas, Paśupatas (literally, the “Followers of the Bestial Lord”—a derogatory moniker for Śaivite acolytes), and the Lokāyatara (i.e., Cārvāka) materialists (Chi.: Shun shidao 順世道). However, these later attributions appear suspect. Tucci (1927) includes Mimāṃsaka among the ranks of the the pūrvapakṣins whose views are considered in the “older Buddhist texts”—namely, the translations of Kumārajīva. See Tucci, Pre-Diṅnaga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese Sources (Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1929), xxxii. Tucci cites Kumārajīva’s translation of Śāṭa śāstra, a dialectical work attributed to Āryadeva 提婆. Tucci writes: “At the time of the Śāṭa śāstra... the Nyāya system had not yet originated as a separate school” — Pre-Diṅnaga Buddhist Texts on Logic, xxxiii.
Sāṅkhyaṅkārikās (hereafter, SK) enumerate five ordinary senses (Skt.: prajñēndriyāṇi). This work, attributed to Krṣṇēśvara, also counts five physical faculties (Skt: rūpēndriyāṇi), or the “faculties of action” that include the faculties correlating to the capability to speak (Skt: vak) words (Skt: vacanam), to grasp things to be grasped (Skt: grāhaṇam), to walk to and fro (Skt: caṅkrama) with the legs, or “the faculty of locomotion” (Skt: pādēndriyam), 216 to excrete liquid and solid waste (Skt: pāyur), and to procreate (Skt: ānandam). Xuanzang argues that the differences between the Abhidharma and the Sāṅkhya taxonomies of the faculties outweigh the similarities.

216 The Chi. trans. of this term is wu xing-gen 五行根; or wu ye-gen 五業根. The Sāṅkhya taxonomy standardized in Sāṅkhyaṅkārikā stanzas 27-30 identifies the core capability of the faculty of locomotion with the action of “walking on two legs.” For Skt. text of these verses, see Dutt, ed., Sāṅkhyaṅkārikās, 30-31. However, it is important to point out that the term “locomotion” is construed broadly in this context to cover bodily actions executed by the torso, which means that the faculty of locomotion is not exhausted by just two legs. Although the characteristic action of this faculty — to walk [with the two legs] (pāda, from the root vpad) — the underlying terminology can also literally mean “the leg.” In this sense, the word “leg” is meant as a metonymy for the faculty as a whole.
Chapter 2: Xuanzang on Karma and the Faculties

What is dying? For Xuanzang, death is not simply dying. But what is dying? For Xuanzang, the Abhidharma theory of the indriyas provides a naturalistic way to determine what brings about biological death. As an explanatory account of death, the theory of indriyas does not postulate supernatural entities such as a soul, or a personality that transcends corporeal existence.\(^{217}\)

Hewing to the theory of the faculties and to the doctrine of karma, Xuanzang comes to understand dying as the deterioration of a specific cluster of the faculties borne by an individual. Xuanzang, however, goes on to posit that dying is more than the formulaic loss of a vital triad of faculties, or the disintegration of the organs in the body. He argues that dying is a complex sensory and emotional experience caused by the termination of a set of dynamic interactions between the mental and physical faculties. Karma, the accumulation of the effects of the good and the bad actions taken by an individual over a lifetime, is implicated in the interaction of the faculties at the end of life.

Abiding by the Brāhmaṇical and Buddhist scriptures, Xuanzang determines that karma and the faculties play essential roles in determining the ritual purity, hedonic tone, and timing of dying. The quality of dying is determined by karma and by the specific number, type, and condition of the indriyas\(^{218}\) that are possessed by an individual at the end of life. What an individual does, or

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\(^{217}\) The notion that Buddhism embraces the idea of a personality transcending corporeal existence is found in secondary scholarship. See Lawrence E. Sullivan, *Death, Afterlife, and the Soul* (New York: Macmillan Publishers), 194: “Buddhist texts in general, then, acknowledge the existence of a self as an entity that distinguishes one individual from another, that serves as the center of intellect, will, and moral agency, and that is understood to be the source of human perfection.”

\(^{218}\) Conze mentions and uses translations of “faculty,” “controlling faculty” and “spiritual faculty,” and refers to the five indriya as the “cardinal virtues” — see Conze, ed., *Buddhist Scriptures* (New York: Penguin Classics, 1959). Bhikku Bodhi uses “faculty” — see his translation of *Samyutta Nikāya*, corresponding to *Samyutkāgama* in the Chinese canon, under the title *The Connected Discourses of the Buddha: A Translation of the Samyutta Nikaya*. (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1998), 1509. *The Pāli Text Society Pali-English dictionary* by Rhys Davids & Stede (1921-25), 122-123 contains under the entry for indriya: “Indriya is one of the most comprehensive & important categories of Buddhist psychological philosophy & ethics, meaning ‘controlling
does not do, to nurture the faculties during a lifetime, accounts for the physiological and psychological conditions of the faculties at the end of life. Ultimately, it is the cultivation of the faculties of faith, perseverance, concentration, mindfulness, and wisdom that improves the ritual purity, hedonic quality, and timing of death. In living and in dying, the nurturance of the faculties matters.

For Xuanzang, dying is not the loss of a singular core, self, or soul (Skt.: ātman; pums; Chi.: wo 我). He dismisses the Brāhmaṇical description of dying as the release of an immortal soul from the fetters of the corporeal body and endorses a definition of dying founded on a biological theory of the faculties and karma. Xuanzang vigorously denies the need for any explanation of dying other than the ending of the coordinated action of the faculties. In doing so, he upholds the Buddhist doctrine of no-self.

Xuanzang’s discussions of no-self and the nature of dying demonstrate his sensitivity to the differences and similarities within the doctrines of the Brāhmaṇical traditions of Hinduism and within the Yogācāra and Abhidharma traditions of Buddhism. His mastery of the original Sanskrit texts that represent the Brāhmaṇical Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika traditions allow him to make a trenchant critique of these two classical Indic philosophies. In his exegesis of dying, Xuanzang

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principle, directive force, élan, dynamis’...: (a) with reference to sense-perceptibility ‘faculty, function...’” More recently, Vincent Eltschinger and Isabelle Ratié have expressed reservations about rendering indriya as “faculty.” See their co-authored book, Dharmakīrti’s Critique of the Notions of Self and Person (Vienna: Austrian Academy of Sciences Press, 2013), 203. They sum up the heart of their objection to the translation of indriya as “faculty” as follows: “the rather common translation ’sense faculties’ does not seem relevant either insofar as the sense faculties do not stand in need of any inference: seeing is knowing that one sees, and the Indian philosophers do not mean that we need to infer our sense faculties but rather, that we must infer the existence of the imperceptible instruments (kāraṇa) that make these sense faculties possible. Provide that one keeps in mind that etymologically an organ is a bodily ‘instrument’ and that sense organs are not limited to the perceptible parts called ‘eye,’ ear, etc., the translation ‘sense organs’ therefore appears to us as the least unsatisfactory, given that the indriyas are the (bodily) instruments of perception.” This study resorts to the translation of indriya as “faculty,” while remaining sensitive to the issue raised by Vincent Eltschinger and Isabelle Ratié, Self, No-Self, and Salvation, 203. The rendering of indriya as faculty tries to preserve the notion of the instrumental efficacy (kāraṇatva) of the indriyas that is not limited to the perceptible parts of the physical organs.
deconstructs the arguments in the classical Brāhmaṇical texts that rely upon the presence of an immortal soul to explain the survival of the human body and to define dying. While Xuanzang remains rooted in the theory of the faculties, his theories about dying evolve as he engages with the ideas promulgated by his contemporary Brāhmaṇical rivals. The position held by the Brāhmaṇical theorists is that the indriyas exist for the benefit of a sentient entity or a person (Skt.: *puruṣa*; Chi.: *renwo*人我). Xuanzang addresses the challenges presented by these theorists to defend his position that the theory of the faculties is sufficient to explain survival and dying.

This chapter examines Xuanzang’s investigation into the interaction between the faculties and karma in determining the ritual purity, hedonic quality, and timing of dying. Xuanzang begins with an exhaustive and meticulous analysis of the theories of the faculties and the role they play in dying as they are presented in the ancient sūtras that reprise the teachings of the Buddha. He then examines the Brāhmaṇical doctrines of the Sāṅkhya (Chi.: *Shu-lun* 數論; *Seng-qu* 僧仏) and Vaiśeṣika (Chi.: *Sheng-lun* 勝論, *Weishi shi* 衛世師) traditions. Following his vigorous engagement with the Brāhmaṇical scriptures, Xuanzang examines the views of the faculties held by the Buddhist Personalists. He continues with an analysis of the disputes between the contending sects of the Abhidharma schools and follows with an immersive study of Vasubandhu and the Yogācāra traditions. Xuanzang’s comprehensive examination of the Brāhmaṇical and Buddhist sources on the nature of the indriyas leads him to his precise formulation of the faculties that are implicated in dying and of the role played by karma in the quality and timing of death.

This chapter is divided into two parts. The first section examines Xuanzang’s sweeping analysis of the rival Brāhmaṇical and Buddhist theories on the faculties and karma. His investigation into the scriptures on the indriyas and karma follows a chronological order that begins with the statements of the Buddha and ends with the doctrinal debates held by Xuanzang’s
contemporary scholar monks. The chapter adheres to the order by which Xuanzang conducts his systematic analysis of the *indriyas* and their role in dying. It begins with his analysis of the ancient Āgamas (Chi.: *ajimo 阿笈摩; ahan 阿含), continues with his investigation into the later Brāhmaṇical theories of Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika, and ends with an analysis of the disputes between Xuanzang and his contemporaries within the Buddhist Personalist (Skt.: *Pudgalavāda;* Chi.: *Buteqieluo lun* 補特伽羅論) and Vātsiputriyas (Chi: *Duzi bu* 牠子部) traditions. The second section in this chapter examines Xuanzang’s rebuttal to the Brāhmaṇical and Buddhist theories of dying that are predicated upon the existence of an enduring person who undergoes death and is reincarnated in another body. Xuanzang formulates his rejoinder to the theories of personhood held in the Āgamas, in the Brāhmaṇical theories of Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika, and by his contemporaries by using the theories of dying proffered by Yogācāra Buddhism. Availing himself of the Yogācāra theories of the faculties and karma, Xuanzang determines that no entities are involved in dying other than the faculties and karma. In doing so, he affirms the cardinal Buddhist tenet of no-self.

### Section One: Xuanzang’s Analysis of the Brāhmaṇical and Buddhist Theories on the Faculties and Karma

While residing in Northeast India from 630–640 C.E., Xuanzang immerses himself in the study of the early Buddhist and Brāhmaṇical scriptures and engages in debates with masters from both religious traditions. Upon his return to China, Xuanzang reconstructs the stories of the

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219 The Vibhājyavādins (Pāli: Vibhajjavādins) were an Abhidharma tradition contemporaneous with the Kaśmīri Sarvāstivādins, however, little is known about their doctrines apart from what is preserved in Sarvāstivāda texts — see Lance Cousins, “On the Vibhajjavādins: The Mahiṃśasaka, Dhammaguttaka, Kassapiya and Tambapaṇṇiya Branches of the Ancient Theriyas,” *Buddhist Studies Review,* 18 (2001): 131-82.
Buddha that are located within the Abhidharma texts, researches the teachings of Sāṅkhya into his corpus, and engages in a translation of an important treatise of Vaiśeṣika philosophy, the *Treatise on the Ten Categories of Existence* (Skt.: *Daśapadārtha śāstra*; Chi.: *Shi juyi lun*十句義論) by the Vaiśeṣika master Candramati. In his effort to record and translate the early classical scriptures, Xuanzang examines the Brāhmaṇical and Buddhist theories of dying that are premised upon the existence of a soul, person, or eternal spirit that deserts the corporeal body and results in the end of life.

In this exegesis, Xuanzang looks to the *Sāṅkhyaśāstra*, the ancient scripture of the Sāṅkhya tradition, for the authoritative Brāhmaṇical teachings on dying and the soul. Through extensive study of the *Sāṅkhyaśāstra* and the early commentaries on this text by the sixth-century Sāṅkhya scholar Gauḍapada and the Chinese translator Paramārtha, Xuanzang masters the Brāhmaṇical theories on the topic of dying and reincarnation. The Brāhmaṇical view of dying is captured in the penultimate verse of the seventy-stanza *Sāṅkhyaśāstra*, where it is stated that the departure of the soul (Skt.: *puruṣa*; Chi.: *renwo 人我*) marks the moment of death. Without the animating presence of the soul, the body is said to decompose into its material nature (Skt.: *prakṛti*; Chi.: *zixing 自性*), composed of earth, wind, water, fire, and ether. It then reverts into a primordial state (Skt.: *pradhānavinivṛtti*) whereby the earthly solids of the body return to the earthly elements and the fluids of the body flow back into the water elements. In the process of dying, the soul, in the form of a “subtle or ethereal body” (Skt: *guhyam śarīram, sūkṣmāśarīra*; Chi.: *guīzhī yìqíng lún 胞精之緊論*).

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Translation based upon Paramārtha’s Chinese – *Jīn qíshī lún*, stanza 68ab (T2137:54.1261.c22). Chi. text runs: 捨身時事顯，自性遠離時；決定及畢竟，二獨存得成 (T2137:54.1261.22-23). According to the edition of Dutt, *Sāṅkhyaśāstra*, 60, the corresponding line in the Skt. runs: *Prāpte śarīrabhede Caritārthatvāt pradhānavinivṛttau / ekāntamātyantikamubhayaṁ kailavamāṇo / 68a-d. This Skt. quatrain is in moraic ārya meter with four “legs” or *pādas* per quatrain (i.e. four quarters), the first two legs (a and b, separated by vertical slash here or dāṇḍa) forming a line of verse each has twelve beats or morae, and the second has eighteen morae. Chi. is in five-character-per-line verse. Reference has been made to the Skt. edition of Dutt, *Sāṅkhyaśāstra*, 79, who translates the entire stanza as follows: “After having deserted the body and after the cessation of the Nature, (the Spirit) acquires the salvation which is both certain and final.”
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Chi.: xishen (細身) in possession of the faculty of intelligence (Skt.: buddhindriyam), soars off into the ether (Skt.: ākāsa; Chi.: kong). The soul then migrates through the ether until it becomes associated with a new embryo and begins the process of reincarnation into another bodily form.

Throughout his corpus, Xuanzang deems the Brāhmaṇical theories of the soul as antithetical to the earliest teachings in the Āgamas and seeks to reclaim the Buddhist teaching on the impermanence of the self. He regards the Brāhmaṇical treatment of dying as steeped in the occult and is interested in understanding dying from a more naturalistic and physiologically-based perspective. Ultimately, Xuanzang seeks to banish the entire notion of the Brāhmaṇical spiritual soul from Chinese Buddhism.

In his exegesis of dying, Xuanzang looks first to the Āgamas and examines the teachings of the Śakyamuni Buddha on the topic of reincarnation. He finds that the Buddha consistently relies upon the indriyas to explain what constitutes the locus of transmigration. He then examines the ancient Brāhmaṇical scriptures in the traditions of Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika and attempts to square their theories of karma and the faculties with the views of his contemporaries versed in these traditions. In their explanations of dying, Xuanzang finds that the Brāhmaṇical scholars, past and present, cling to the notion of an enduring person who bears the responsibility for, and the consequences of, the actions performed in the life of the individual. Xuanzang then turns to his contemporaneous fellow Buddhists and finds them attempting to smuggle the soul back into Buddhism under the guise of the “individual,” or pudgala (Chi.: buteqieluo 補特伽羅). The pudgala is described by the Vātsiputrīyas as the part of the individual that becomes reincarnated. It is conceptualized as the locus of karma, or as the container of the bad and good acts that a person commits in a lifetime.221 Xuanzang indicts both the Brahmins and his co-religionists, the Buddhist

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221 As Vasumitra (Shiyou 世友) writes in his Treatise on the Wheel of the Different Systems of Tenets (Skt.: Samayabhedoparacana-cakra śāstra), by the pudgala, the Vātsiputriya mean to indicate the basis for the identity
Vātsiputrīyas, for relying upon an explanation of the pudgala as the bearer of karma. He regards the idea of the pudgala as equivalent to the Brāhmaṇical doctrine of the puruṣa, the unchanging essence of a person. He contends that these ideas are simply “old wine in new bottles” and that both conceptions undermine the canonical idea of no-self.

In the first folio of his CWSL, Xuanzang mounts an assault on the theories that bolster the ideas of the self and personhood within the Buddhist and Brāhmaṇical canons. Xuanzang vigorously contends that the very idea of the self vitiates Buddhism. His work is motivated by a desire to disabuse his rivals of their fundamental misconceptions regarding the nature of dying. To accomplish this, Xuanzang must expel the idea of the supernatural soul from the definition of dying. To lay bare the root cause of what he regards as a mistaken view, Xuanzang appeals to the words of the Buddha (Skt.: Buddhavacana; Chi.: Foshuo佛説) that are preserved in the ancient Āgamas.

The Buddha’s Teachings on the Faculties: The Debates in the Jetavana Park

As a noviate monk in his native China, Xuanzang is exposed to the earliest strata of source material, albeit in fragmentary form, that records important episodes in the life of the Buddha. Xuanzang comes to regard the Āgamas as the authoritative source on doctrinal matters.

The Chinese translations of the Āgamas undertaken by Guṇabhadra preserves the Uttarā sūtra in its intact form. However, the disputes of Uttarā are hardly known in the comparatively scarce body of materials preserved in their original Sanskrit. The figure of “Uttarā the Deva” appears briefly in the Pāli Śaṁyuta Nikāya. For English translation of the elliptical Pāli recension of the Uttarā sūtra, see Bhikku Bodhi, The Connected Discourses of the Buddha (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2000), section 19.99.
Throughout his life, Xuanzang devotes enormous amounts of time to reprising the narratives of the teachings of the Buddha that are described in the early sūtras. Xuanzang is particularly interested in the records of the disputes between the Buddha and Jātiśroṇa and Uttarā, two powerful Brāhmin landholders, on the topic of the indriyas. These debates take place in the Jetavana Park, near the Anāthapiṇḍaka Monastery in the Kingdom of Śravāsti (舎衛國) in the sixth century B.C. The Jetavana Grove is the site one of the most famous monasteries in India and is historically significant as a location wherein the Buddha gives many teachings and engages in important discourses with his followers.

**On the Provenance of the Debates in the Jetavana Park**

The Jātiśroṇa and Uttarā sūtras are attributed to great antiquity by the Abhidharma scholars. The figures of Jātiśroṇa and Uttarā appear in the Chinese Āgamas and in the Pāli Nikāyas, the earliest known records of the homilies of the Buddha. While partial accounts of the Jātiśroṇa debate are found in two earlier Chinese translations of the Vibhāṣa, the full rendition of Jātiśroṇa’s interview with the Buddha on the twenty-two indriyas appears for the first time in the Mahāvibhāṣa translated by Xuanzang. The Uttarā debate with the Buddha in the Jetavana Park first appears in the Samyuktāgama. This translation of the original Āgamas was rendered into Chinese by Guṇabhadra (Chi.: Qiunabatuo 要那跋陀羅), a Sanskritic scholar who was active during the Liu-Song Dynasty in the fifth century C.E. The retranslation and exegesis of the dispute between Uttarā and the Buddha on the topic of the twenty-two faculties in Xuanzang’s Mahavibhāṣa hews closely to Guṇabhadra’s source material.

The most comprehensive descriptions of the audiences of the two Brāhmīns and the historical Śākyamuni Buddha are found in the translation of the Mahāvibhāṣa by Xuanzang. The accounts of the two Jetavana debates in this work are matchless in their extensive documentation.
and their exquisite attention to detail and presentation. Significantly, Xuanzang’s reprisal of the Jātiśroṇa story is immediately followed by his account of the dialogue between Uttarā and the Buddha within the *mise en scène* of Jetavana Park. Using this literary device, Xuanzang links the debates under the umbrella topic of the nature of the *indriya* and fortifies the doctrinal message of the Buddha regarding the taxonomy of the twenty-two *indriyas*.

The debates in Jetavana Park between the Buddha and the two Brāhmin landholders, Jātiśroṇa and Uttarā, focus upon the definition of the *indriyas*. Both Uttarā and Jātiśroṇa pose trenchant questions targeting the nature and constitution of the twenty-two *indriyas* posulated by the Buddha. The two episodes highlight and play upon the meaning of the Sanskrit word *indriya*. *Indriya* is a double entendre that simultaneously refers to an organ of the body and to a faculty. Like the Sanskrit word, the Chinese and Tibetan equivalents (Chi.: *gen* 根; Tib.: *dbang po*) are double entendres that mean both “organ” and “faculty.” The Chinese word *gen* can mean organ, faculty, or “root.” The meaning of “root” is important in this context because it refers to the “root faculties,” or the *indriyas* that possess the capacities for faith, perseverance, concentration, mindfulness, and wisdom. While these *indriyas* are innate, they must be cultivated by a sentient being through disciplined practice to take root and grow into fruition.

The *Jñānaprasthāna śāstra*, the ancient source upon which the *Mahavibhāṣa* is a commentary, does not mention the encounter between Jātiśroṇa and the Buddha. The absence of any mention of Jātiśroṇa in the early sources supports Skilling's (2012) hypothesis that the story

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223 According to *Tony Duff’s Tibetan Dictionary*, *dpang bo* can mean *indra*. Duff’s entry under *dpang bo* reads: “Faculty is appropriate in some cases but in the particular case of the sense-faculties, a better translation is available. In more recent times translators have been using the term ‘faculty’ with less frequency and using terms like ‘(sense) powers’ to translate this term. This is certainly accurate and quite literal to the original Sanskrit. However, these things are, in modern terminology exactly and precisely ‘sensors.’ A sensor is that intermediary which detects an object and provides a message to something more intelligent than itself with information about the detected object.”
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of Jātiśroṇa and the subsequent commentaries on the Buddha’s discourse on the twenty-two indriyas were constructed by the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma scholars in the first or second century C.E. In his study of this sūtra, Skilling (2012) concludes that: “If included in any of the Āgamas, the ‘Discourse on the Twenty-Two Faculties’ (i.e., the Jātiśroṇa sūtra) might have belonged to a Samyuktāgama (although one cannot rule out the possibility that it belonged to either a Madhyamāgama or Ekottarāgama).”224 Skilling compiled a complete translation of the Jātiśroṇa sūtra from excerpts found in Yaśomitra’s Sphūṭārtha, and from Śāmathadeva’s Guiding Commentary on the Treasury (Skt: Upayīka-ṭīka). While both texts are available in a Derge Tibetan translation, only the excerpt from Yaśomitra survives in the original Sanskrit. The dialogue between the Buddha and the Brāhmin Jātiśroṇa appears for the first time in its entirety in the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma literature. 225 Skilling estimates, somewhat conservatively, that the terminus pro quem for the Jātiśroṇa sūtra lies between the second or third centuries C.E., during which time the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma scholars in Kaśmir and Gandhāra compiled the Vibhāṣa compendia. The only extent version of this document is in classical Chinese.

The retelling of the famous story of the audience of Jātiśroṇa with the enlightened Buddha in the Jetavana Park is found in two places in Xuanzang’s Mahāvibhāṣā. It first appears in the second fascicle of the two-hundred-fascicle Sarvāstivāda compendium in the form of a trenchant question posed by Jātiśroṇa to the Buddha. This portion of the Mahāvibhāṣā presents the earliest

224 Skilling, “Discourse on Twenty-Two Faculties,” 137.

225 Skilling, “Discourse on Twenty-Two Faculties,” argues that this sūtra is a polemical recension by the compilers of the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma of ancient Kaśmir and Gandhāra. This textual tradition produced a number of voluminous compendia of tenets, the earliest of which dates back to the 2nd-century C.E. All of these take the form of exegesis on the Jñānaprasīhīna śāstra, which contains material dating back to the 1st-century C.E. Skilling, “Discourse on Twenty-Two Faculties,” 137, writes: to expect to find the “Discourse on the twenty-two faculties” in one or the other Āgama may be mistaken. It is quite possible that the “Discourse on the twenty-two faculties” was never included in an Āgama: that it circulated independently within the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika tradition.”
source material regarding the nature of the faculties and karma. Later in the text, a detailed account of Jātiśraṇa’s questioning of the Buddha on the topic of the doctrine of faculties appears in the preamble to the “Chapter (Skt.: Varga) on the Faculties.” This portion begins in fascicle one hundred forty-two and occupies thirty rolls.226

In the third century C.E., the Indian monk, Saṅghabhūti, translates from Sanskrit into Chinese, a ten-folio version of the Vibhāṣa containing a fragment of the Jātiśraṇa sūtra. In the fifth century C.E., the Chinese monk, Daotai 道泰, collaborates with Buddhavarman (Chi.: Futuobamo 浮陀跋摩), a monk from Central Asia, on a translation of the Vibhāṣa from Sanskrit into Chinese that includes an abridged version of the Jātiśraṇa dispute. Because both texts preserve fragments of the Jātiśraṇa interview with the Buddha, they are of historical significance. In his rendition of the disputes, Xuanzang draws upon these sources, and on the more extensive accounts preserved in the Mahāvibhāṣa.

A more substantial portion of the dispute appears later in Xuanzang’s translation of the Mahāvibhāṣa. This version features Jātiśraṇa’s first question regarding the number of the faculties and includes the obliging response of the Buddha. The content of the response of the Buddha to Jātiśraṇa’s initial inquiry are documented in the works of Vasubandhu and in the writings of two of his earliest Sanskritic commentators, Yaśomitra and Śāmathadeva, recovered by Skilling (2012). However, the Vibhāṣa compendia, extant only in Chinese, provide the sole source that preserves the second question posed to the Buddha by Jātiśraṇa regarding the ultimate constitution of the faculties and their supporting organs. In scale and comprehensiveness, the versions of the debates

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226 The brief listing of twenty-two faculties, in the proper order, is also found in Sthiramati’s Commentary on the Abhidharmakośa, titled Genuine Doctrines of the Abhidharmakośa (Chi.: Apidamo jushe lun shi yi 阿毘達磨俱舍論實義), fascicle five. It is followed sub-commentary that adduces the Jātiśraṇa sūtra: 釋曰。此是何經所說。謂有梵志名曰生測 (emend to 閣)。來詣佛所。歡喜問訊。在一面坐。而白佛言：施設幾根攝諸根盡？佛言：我說二十二根攝諸根盡 (T1561:29.327.a18-21).
in the Jetavana Park recorded by Xuanzang in his translation of the *Mahāvibhāṣa* dwarf all other recensions of this text.

**The Doctrinal Significance of the Debates Between the Buddha and Jātiśroṇa and Uttarā**

The positions taken in the Jetavana Park debates are as follows: The Brahmins, Jātiśroṇa and Uttarā, contend that the *indriyas* require the presence of an executive in the form of a person, or soul, to animate them. This premise directly contradicts the core Buddhist tenet of no-self. The Buddha and his disciples take the position that the faculties, in and of themselves, are sufficient to sustain life. This premise upholds the Buddha's stance that nothing is required to empower the faculties. This conclusion ultimately reaffirms the core Buddhist tenet of no-self. Because the principle of no-self is at stake in the debates between the Brahmins and the Buddha in Jetavana Park, the translations and exegesis of the disputes offered by Xuanzang are of great significance within the Buddhist canon.

**The Story of Jātiśroṇa Versus the Buddha**

The story of Jātiśroṇa and the Buddha begins with Jātiśroṇa asking: “Gautama! How many faculties are there?” Jātiśroṇa strikes an informal tone in this exchange. He calls the Buddha by

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The Mahāvibhāṣa*’s rendition of the initial question of Jātiśroṇa reads: “The Brāhmin Jātiśroṇa walked over to the Bhāgavān’s seat and spoke to the Buddha, saying: ‘Venerable Gautama! How many faculties do you teach about?’ The Buddha said: ‘I teach about twenty-two faculties, starting from the so-called ‘ocular faculty,’ etcetera (*iti vistarāḥ*).’ Budhavarman’s and Daotai’s text reads: “the Brāhmin Jātiśroṇa inquires of the Buddha: ‘Gautama! I simply seek to inquire a few things of you. I wish to hear what you will say to me about them.’ The Bhāgavan tells him: ‘Brāhmin! As you wish, ask away.’ The Brāhmin asks: ‘Gautama! Indriya means ‘faculty.’ But Gautama, how many loci do these faculties have? Each faculty you posit falls under a locus, such that your theoretical posits rest on top of other posits!’ The Bhāgavan replies: ‘You Brāhmin! There are twenty-two faculties, starting from the ocular faculty (i.e., caksurindriyam, the first in the standard listing), and ending with the faculty by which nothing is unknown (i.e.,
his first name, Gautama, and refrains from using the honorific Sanskrit epithet of “Bhagāvan,” “Master,” or the Chinese appellation of “The World-Honored One” (Chi.: Shizun 世尊). The question posed by Jātiśroṇa takes the form of an innocuous request for information from the Buddha regarding the number of faculties that exist within an able human body. The Buddha obliges Jātiśroṇa with his response. In the translation of the Mahāvibhāṣa by Xuanzang, as in the two earlier recensions of this sūtra found in Saṅghabhūti’s translation of the Vibhāṣa from the fourth century C.E., and Daotai’s and Buddhavarman’s translation of the Vibhāṣa from the fifth century C.E., the Buddha proceeds to enumerate the twenty-two *indriyas*, beginning with the ocular faculty and ending with the uncontaminated faculties.

In the retellings of this story found in the two earlier Chinese versions of the Vibhāṣa translated by Saṅghabhūti in the fourth century C.E., and by Daotai and Buddhavarman in the fifth century C.E., Jātiśroṇa asks, “For what reason does Gautama set forth the *indriyas* as theoretical posits, one *indriya* on top of the other?” Here Jātiśroṇa insinuates that the taxonomy of twenty-two faculties postulated by the Buddha is on shaky ground. He presses the Buddha to clarify his stance regarding the nature and number of the *indriyas*. The exchange between Jātiśroṇa and the Buddha on the topic of the *indriyas* begins to bring the differences between the Buddhist and ājñātasyėndriyam, the 22nd in the list).” 世尊告曰：汝梵志。有二十二根。從眼根至無知根 (T1547:28.439.b15-18).

The parallel passage in *Bi posha lun* 4 runs: 問訊世尊，種種語已，在一面坐，而作是言：說諸根者多。沙門瞿曇。說有幾根耶?佛告婆羅門。我說二十二根。謂眼根乃至知已根。如來說二十二根，則攝一切諸根義。婆羅門若有人言：沙門瞿曇所說諸根，我能遮止，更說餘根，但有是言，而無有實。T28, no. 1546, p. 270c, 13-18.

228 Sanskrit text based upon Skilling (2012, p. 488): *indriyāṇi idriyaṇi ti bho Ghautama ucyante/ kati bho Gautama indriyāṇi? kiyatā ca indriyāṇāṃ sangrahā bhavati?*

229 The earliest recension of Vibh precedes this question about how many faculties there are, with an additional challenge by Jātiśroṇa to Buddha. This additional question is not found in Yāsomitra’s clipping or in Śāmathadeva’s version. This earliest presentation, found in *Vibhāṣa (Bi posha lun)* translated by Saṅghabhūti, appears to coalesce the challenges of Jātiśroṇa with those of Uttarā, which occur in different parts of Xuanzang’s translation. Daotai and Buddhavarman’s *Vibhāṣa* (fasc. 4) is the same as Saṅghabhūti’s text in combining the two stories and the questions raised by the protagonists therein.

119
Brāhmaṇical doctrines of the faculties into sharp focus and raises two thorny questions regarding the nature of the faculties. The first question is: how many faculties are there? The second is: what is the relationship between the faculties and the organs in the body?

The Mahāvibhāṣa text records that Jātiśroṇa, prior to his audience with the Buddha, has polled other gurus about their opinions on the exact number of the indriyas in the taxonomy of life forms. He requests that the Buddha position himself vis-à-vis the plethora of theories on the precise number of indriyas, a topic contested by the Brāhmaṇical and Buddhist scholars of the time. For example, while the classical Sāṅkhya scholars postulate a taxonomy of eleven physical faculties, the Vaiśeṣika scholars posit a schema of five faculties that correspond to the five senses. Jātiśroṇa is said to believe in an ornate taxonomy of one hundred and twenty independent faculties, the provenance of which is obscure and somewhat spurious. Here the Mahāvibhāṣa editors imply that the Brāhmin Jātiśroṇa’s belief in this doctrine reveals his lack of sophistication. His naiveté allows him to be positioned as a straw man in the debate with the Buddha.

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230 Xuanzang’s Mahāvibhāṣa delivers a series of plaudits to the Brāhmin Jātiśroṇa before casting aspersions upon his doctrinal position: “According to some the Brāhmin was good-nature, inquisitive and thoughtful. In order to learn about the doctrine of the faculty, Jātiśroṇa has traveled all around in order to undertake the ninety-six paths (of the different gurus), whilst inquiring about the numbers of the various faculties.” 荒野志甚善善。思。隨有所聞，喜便歷問。為知根義，周遍遊歷九六道。問諸根量（T1545:27.729.a11-12）.

231 This architectonic theory of one-hundred-and-twenty-faculties adduced in Mahāvibhāṣa, fascicle 142, classifies sentient beings in each of six gatis on the basis of twenty discrete faculties. They arrive at one-hundred-and-twenty different faculties by multiplying twenty different faculties per gati times six gatis. Mahāvibhāṣa records: “Others further state that there are one-hundred-and-twenty faculties. Namely, there are two faculties each for vision, audition, and olfaction – six in total. The faculties managing gustation, tactition/proprrioception, vitality, the five hedonic faculties, along with the five [skillful] faculties including faith, etc., together amount to twenty-six. Then within each transmigratory destiny (gati) there are another twenty [faculties] for a total of one-hundred-and-twenty [faculties]. They say that the āsuras count as a sixth destiny.” 或復有說。百二十根。謂眼耳鼻各二為六。舌身意命及五受根。信等五根總為二十六。趣各二十為百二十。彼說阿素洛為第六趣（T1545:27.730.a01-5）.

232 “They say that there are one-hundred-and-twenty tīrthika masters [that Jatisrona sought out] – for example, the masters of heaven, nagas, aśuras, humans, etc. – the main point is that these beings experience a range of one-hundred-and-twenty loci. For them, it is naught but the marvelous, subtle body (*guhyaśarīra) that obtains liberation. The Brahmin Jātiśroṇa’s learning covered all of this. The faculties he spoke about were not the same [as ours], which engendered his doubts. He didn’t know what the authentic theory was.”

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agenda-driven editors use the Brāhmin Jātiśroṇa’s unwieldy taxonomy to place the brevity of their list of twenty-two faculties into a more favorable light when compared to the Sāṅkhya theory of eleven faculties, and the far simpler Vaiśeṣika taxonomy of five physical faculties. The dispute between the Jātiśroṇa and the Buddha is enlisted to highlight the concision of the Sarvāstivāda taxonomy of the twenty-two faculties.

After Jātiśroṇa poses the question regarding the number of the faculties, he presses the Buddha with a theoretical question regarding the definition of an *indriya*. The second question is rhetorical and more acerbic in tone: “But Gautama, don't your sūtras also talk about the basis of the faculties?” Jātiśroṇa continues: “Don't your sūtras speak about some physical locus upon which the faculties themselves are based?” Here Jātiśroṇa takes the straw man position that the *indriyas* are located within the organs of the body, but are separate from them. Jātiśroṇa assumes, again somewhat naively, that the Buddha will protest and state that the *indriyas* are different from the organs of the body. Jātiśroṇa himself does not hold to this idea, as he regards it as inconsistent with his understanding of the *indriyas* as distinct and separate from the organs. With this maneuver, however, Jātiśroṇa attempts to trap the Buddha into agreeing that there is a difference between the *indriyas* and the physical basis of the *indriyas* in the organs of the body.

The second question posed by Jātiśroṇa is at the heart of several sensitive issues within the Buddhist doctrine. What exactly is the difference between an *indriya* and a material organ? Is there a constitutional difference between the two? Jātiśroṇa’s question opens an inquiry into the nature of the *indriyas*.

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233 The editors of the *Mahāvibhāṣa* are well aware of this fact. However, they list five faculties postulated by Vaiśeṣika in a different order from the Buddhist taxonomy – “olfaction, gustation, vision, and proprioception/tactition, and audition make five *indriyas*” 鼻舌眼身耳根 (T1545:27.729.c28). This Vaiśeṣikataxonomy is attested in Kumārajīva’s translation of Āryadeva’s *Śāta śāstra*, which reads: “How many *indriyas* do the Vaiśeṣika masters postulate? Response: According to the Vibhaṣa, they only postulate five *indriyas*.”衛世師計幾根？答：婆沙云：但計五根.
of the *indriyas* that includes questions ranging from the distinction between the faculties and the corporeal body to the nature of the faculties held by enlightened beings. These questions include: Are the faculties analogous to parts of the body? Are they organs? What is the difference between a faculty and the body? What is the status of the spiritual faculties possessed by the Buddha and other enlightened gurus? How does Buddhist practice influence the expression or the realization of the faculties?

In response to Jātiśroṇa’s question, the Buddha states that the word *indriya* must be construed in the classical sense, as describing both the faculty and the organs associated with it. The Buddha adopts the ancient duality imbedded in the term *indyria* and does not use the word to refer to the *indriyas* and the organs as separate entities. For example, in the early texts of the Buddhist and Brāhmaṇical traditions, the Sanskrit and Chinese words for eye (Skt.: *caksur*; Chi.: *yen*) refer to the organ of the eye and to the entire visual system. According to Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, a sensory faculty is both a sense organ and the sensory mechanism that receives and processes visual stimuli. Ganeri (2012) writes: “A sense-organ, here, is not something like a nose, but rather a specific quality or capacity which a certain complex matter has; we would now speak, for example, of the olfactory aspect of the exteroceptive system.”

Jātiśroṇa and the Buddha agree on the general principle that the word *indriya* is a synecdoche for an organ and for a sensory capacity. In his response to Jātiśroṇa’s question, the Buddha offers the example of *cakṣurindriyam*, “the organ of the eye” (Skt.: *cakṣur*). The Buddha states that the word *cakṣurindriyam* stands for both the organ of the eye and the capacity of vision. He applies the idea of the cooperative action of the *indriya* in this example, stating that the eye

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needs the eyeball, the cornea, and the associated blood supply within the organs of sight to exercise the characteristic action (Skt.: karman) of seeing visible things (Skt.: rūpas). Additionally, the Buddha notes that the word śrotēndriyam, like the Chinese equivalent, er 耳, synecdochally refers to the auditory organs of the earlobe, the ear-canal, and the entire auditory apparatus. The principle that the Buddha upholds is that, by definition, the word indriya captures the organs, the sensory apparatus, and the activity or capacity that is executed when all parts of a mechanism work together. The Buddha concludes that there is no meaningful difference or distinction between the indriyas and the organs. Importantly, this core principle applies to all twenty-two indriyas, ranging from the baser sensory faculties to the higher spiritual ones.

The elision between the physical or sensory faculties and the spiritual faculties raises a thorny question, however. Do the spiritual faculties have an impure basis in the gross physical organs of the human body? Holding fast to the Buddhist teaching that the body is a “contaminated” (Skt.: sāsrava; Chi.: youlou有漏) vessel, it would follow that if the spiritual faculties sprout forth from the loci of a defiled body, they are also impure. The problem of the defilement of the indriyas is moot within the Sarvāstivāda dogma, however, because the contaminated and uncontaminated indriyas are segregated into discrete categories within the taxonomy. In this schema, the contaminated indriyas include the inborn faculties of able-bodied humans, whereas the uncontaminated faculties refer to the skillful faculties of faith, perseverance, concentration, recollection, and wisdom that are possessed by the Buddha and cultivated via the religious practices of individuals. This allows for a conceptualization of the spiritual faculties as having loci apart from the impure bases of the physical faculties. Because they have separate loci, they can be developed through religious practices and rituals, rather than through exercise or the physical training of the organs of the body. This crucial distinction has large ramifications for religious
practice and ritual in Sarvāstivāda Buddhism and is addressed in the Jātiśroṇa sūtra.

The issues concerning the relationship of the lower sensory to the higher spiritual faculties raised in the Jātiśroṇa sūtra challenge Xuanzang’s theory of the twenty-two faculties. The question of from whence the spiritual faculties emerge casts into question the very nature and existence of the Buddha’s skillful faculties of faith, wisdom, perseverance, recollection, and wisdom. Where are the physical loci (Skt.: āśraya) of the spiritual faculties? Are the operational bases of the spiritual faculties “over and above” the five senses and the physical faculties of the body? Do they grow out of the existing operational bases in the body? According to the position held by Jatiśroṇa, the spiritual faculties must require loci that are separate from the contaminated faculties inherent in the body of an ordinary human. According to the Buddha, the uncontaminated spiritual faculties emerge from loci innate to the body of an ordinary human and are realized through cultivation by religious practice.

In both retellings of the Jātiśroṇa episode found in Saṅghabhūti’s and Buddhavarman’s Chinese translations of the Vibhāṣa, the Buddha flatly rejects Jātiśroṇa’s premise that the spiritual faculties are constitutionally different from the physical faculties of the body. In the debate, the Buddha upholds the position that the spiritual faculties are the natural outgrowths of the innate faculties borne by all humans.

The Jātiśroṇa debate, located in the second fascicle of Xuanzang’s translation of the Mahāvibhāṣa, concludes with the editors (Skt.: siddhāntins; Chi.: lunzhu 论主) weighing in on the distinction between the faculties and their physical basis in the body (Skt.: āśraya; Chi.: suoyi 所依). The verdict rendered by the Mahāvibhāṣa editors is that “the faculty and the physical locus of

235 While in Saṅghabhūti’s version, this inquiry into the relationship of the faculty viz. locus appears in the first fascicle. In the earliest Chinese recension of Vibh, it shows up in the “Sixteenth Chapter on the Loci of Twenty-Two Indriyas” 二十二根處第十六 (fascicle 4 of 14).
the faculty are not different. That *indriya* refers, at once, to both ‘faculty as an entity’ and to the ‘basis of the faculty,’ is not a matter of general-acceptance (*aprasiddha*). It is a false postulate of one’s own tradition.”

The authors of the *Mahāvibhāṣa* go on to aver that any doctrine that posits a difference between the faculty and the locus in which inheres “cannot be a matter of general acceptance” (Skt.: *aprasiddha*; Chi.: *bu jicheng* 不極成) and that to contrive this distinction is to adhere to a false dichotomy. As the straw man, Jātiśroṇa stands firmly behind the position that there is a distinction between the *indriyas* and the organs of the body. He therefore inadvertently endorses the idea that the spiritual powers of the Buddha have a locus in the body.

To the Sarvāstivādin editors of the *Mahāvibhāṣa*, however, the distinction between a faculty and its physical basis in the body is unacceptable. To locate the marvelous powers of the enlightened guru within in the fleshy viscera and the “contaminated” sense organs would be tantamount to a desecration of the spiritual achievements of the Buddha and all other masters. The editors of the *Mahāvibhāṣa* are disgusted with what they regard as an unappealing and unwarranted consequence that flows from the premise that the spiritual faculties are outgrowths of the defiled sensory organs of the body. They contend that the spiritual faculties are the outgrowths of innate *indriyas* that are distinct from the physical *indriyas* and possessed by all.

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236 The verdict of the Mahāvibhāṣa editors on the paradigmatically Vibhājyavāda doctrine presented in fasc. 2 of Xuanzang’s translation is: “Therefore, it should be granted that the five faculties including faith are also unanimously contaminated”故定應許信等五根，亦通有漏.

237 Mahāvibhāṣa 150 contains the following illustration of feats of divine sight: “There are those who are of the opinion that it is precisely the human’s native eye that can be modified into the heavenly eye, which is capable of seeing things in a non-impeded way. This is what is established by the followers of the outside path of Sāṃkhya. 作是說: 即人眼根轉為天眼, 能無障見。此是數論外道所立.

Some are of the opinion that: ‘the human eye’ is equivalent to the eye which arises naturally and by way of modifications through repetitive practice, it can illuminate and clarify what's immediately before the eyes, such that it comes to be rewarded the moniker of ’heavenly.’ 彼作是說: 所起天眼即是人眼。數習轉變，明淨勝前，立以天稱.
the “pure” spiritual faculties, such as the heavenly vision of the Buddha, and the “crude” organs of the body is that the spiritual faculties of the Buddha do not emanate from a sensory organ, such as a third eye. Rather, the spiritual faculties of the Buddha are a result of specific and disciplined practices that enhance or upgrade the innate spiritual indriyas.

In their concluding remarks on the Jātiśroṇa episode, the Mahāvibhāṣa editors reject the analytical distinction between a faculty and its physical locus. They then engage in a series of arguments regarding the nature and the composition of the spiritual indriyas that are possessed by the Buddha and other enlightened masters. This topic is taken up in the second series of disputes between the Buddha and the Kṣatriya-Brāhmaṇ Utterā.

The Story of Utterā and the Buddha in the Jetavana Grove

The story of Utterā (Chi.: Wodaluo 喟怛羅; also written Yuduoluo 郁多罗) and the Buddha begins with Utterā kneeling on one knee and turning the strap of his robe to the right in a gesture of supplication and deference. According to the Mahāvibhāṣa, Utterā, the peripatetic philosopher of “mixed Kṣatriya-Brāhmaṇ stock,” comes to Mahāpiṇḍaka to take part in the challenge laid down to proclaim faculties other than the twenty-two endorsed by Buddha. The Buddha’s

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238 Mahāvibhāṣa 142: “There are those who say that Prajñāśrī is of mixed heritage, having been born to a Kṣatriya and a Brahmaṇ. For example, the mule is born from the stallion and the mare. It is said that this was his caste, and that he had a disciple by the name of Utterā.” 有說。此是雜種：謂從剎帝利婆羅門生，名波羅設利。如從驢馬，所生名騾。如是說者，此是彼姓，彼有弟子名喦怛羅。

239 The Records of Western Territories (Da Tang Xiyu ji 大唐西域記) purportedly based upon Xuanzang’s travelogue records that Utterā hailed from the Kingdom of Culya 珠利耶國 (modern-day Tamil Nadu): “In the western towns not far from the Qielan, lies the spot where the Bodhisattva Āryadeva (Chi. Tipo Pusa 提婆菩薩) debated with the Arhat Utterā.” ）城西不遠有故伽藍，提婆菩薩與羅漢論議之處。Apparently, subsequent to his
disciples, Ānanda and Śāriputra, are present at this audience. The Buddha begins the dialogue by asking Uttarā how his guru, Prajñāśrī (Boluosheli 波羅設利; also written Boluoshi 波羅施 and Boluoshe 波羅奢), exhorts his disciples to “cultivate the faculties in a sagely way” (Chi.: sheng-xiu gen 聖修根).

Xuanzang’s recounting of Uttarā’s audience with the Buddha immediately follows his lengthy presentation of the Jatiśroṇa’s disputes in the the one hundred and forty-second fascicle of the Māhavibhāṣa. The conversation between the Brāhmin Uttarā and the Buddha in the Jetvana Park is preserved in the fifth-century translation of the Sayuktāgama, composed by the scholar monk Guṇabhadra. While he derives much of the content of this episode from the Chinese translation by Guṇabhadra, Xuanzang reprises the incident in greater detail and offers editorial commentary on the ancient sūtra.

Xuanzang links the dialogues between Uttarā and the Buddha, and Jātiśroṇa and the Buddha in the Mahāpiṇḍaka Grove chronologically and thematically. Both episodes are enlisted to develop doctrinal points regarding specific and definitional aspects of the indriyas. The first episode, featuring Jātiśroṇa and the Buddha, focuses on the number of faculties, while the second debate with Uttarā centers on the development of the spiritual faculties. The debate between Uttarā, a disciple of the Hindu Guru Prajñāśrī, and the Buddha homes in on the nature of spiritual faculties, such as “divine hearing” (Skt.: divya-śrotram; tian-er 天耳) and “heavenly sight” (Skt.: divya-cāksur; Chi.: tian-yan 天眼).

Responding to the Buddha’s initial question, Uttarā describes how his guru, Prajñāśrī, advises his disciples to “cultivate the faculties in a sagely way.” Uttara offers the following meetings and instruction under the Buddha, Uttarā had become an enlightened Ārhat, having cultivated the six supranormal abilities (ṣaḍabhiṣṇāṇi)” (T2087:51.931.b13-16).
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enigmatic statement: “Our master is of the opinion that it is something that the eyeball does not see, and a sound that the ear does not hear! Now, that is to cultivate the faculties in a sagely way, as there is nothing to be grasped” 我師作如是說：眼不見色，耳不聞聲，名「聖修根」，無所取故。240

Uttarā then describes Prajñāśrī’s methods of “cultivating the faculties in a sagely way.” These practices include staring at objects for extended periods and other exercises intended to develop visual and aural acuity. According to Uttarā and others, these efforts, when properly executed, result in the attainment of a supramundane sense, such as heavenly vision or heavenly hearing. The realization of a heavenly sense occurs when a “third eye” or a “divine ear” emerges, or sprouts forth, from deep within the body. Additionally, Uttarā believes that superior forms of vision or hearing can be attained only under the supervision of a guru, such as Prajñāśrī, who guides a novitiate through the practices of cultivating the faculties. He states that the achievement of a spiritual faculty “cannot be grasped by the un-initiated.”

240 T1545:27.729.b02-4.

241 Mahāvibhāṣa 142: “Once, Uttarā came to pay audience to the Buddha. Uttarā was delighted, and sat down in front of the Buddha to begin his interview. At that time, the Buddha asked Uttarā: “Does your Guru Prajñāśrī teach you how to cultivate the indriyas in a sagely way?” Uttarā replied: “our Guru has taught us about it.” The Buddha asked: How does your Guru Prajñāśrī teach you to do it?” Uttarā says: “He explains it to us like this: ‘it is what the eye cannot see and what the ear cannot hear – that is sagely cultivation of the indriyas – since there is nothing to be grasped.’” The Buddha immediately rejoined Uttarā in saying: “If that were the case, then the blind person should already have ‘cultivated his indriyas in a sagely way,’ since his eyes do not see anything.” At that point, Ananda was waved over by the Buddha and stood up in attendance upon the Buddha. He had already discerned a response [to Uttarā’s statement], saying: “the deaf should also be innately cultivated in their sagely faculties, since their ears do not detect the sounds.”

Mahāvibhāṣa 142 found in fascicle 11 of the Samyuktagama (T99:2.78.a2-b08): Guṇabhadra’s text contains the further remarks by the Buddha to the audience, once Uttarā has been rendered utterly at a loss following Ānanda’s riposte concerning the incoherence and absurdity of Uttarā’s notion of “sagely cultivation of the indriyas.” This additional text runs: “Then, the Buddha told Ānanda: ‘That (i.e., what Uttarā has said about the method of sagely cultivation) is different from our venerable, sagely dharma that regulates the unsurpassable indriyas.” 當時，世尊告尊者阿難：異於賢聖法，律無上修諸根。Ananda requests of the Buddha: “we humbly entreat the Buddha to teach to the Bhikṣus the venerable sagely dharma – how to regulate the unsurpassable cultivation of the indriyas, and once
Throughout the initial part of his interview with the Buddha, Uttarā maintains that the spiritual faculties are, by definition, extraordinary, and beyond the attainment of persons who are not undergoing training by a guru. The path of “cultivating the sagely faculties” proposed by Prajñāsrī is designed to develop the ability to see that which is not seen with the ordinary eye, and to hear that which is not heard with the ordinary ear. In due time, Uttarā will learn that his representation of the guru's path is vague, cryptic, and misleading, and that his investment in the idea of undertaking the cultivation of the faculties only under the guidance of a guru will get him into trouble. For the moment, however, Uttarā is taken by Prajñāsrī’s alluring promise of attaining heavenly sight and divine hearing under his guidance and supervision.

The Buddha’s teaching that one sees not just with two eyeballs and hears with not just two ears is recorded in the ancient Āgamas. The Buddha states: “The eye, per se, does not actually see things, nor does the ear, per se, actually hear things.” The teachings of the Buddha recorded in the Dirghāgama extend the principle that the authentic faculties engaged in the action of seeing or hearing are not visible. This means, quite literally, that the faculty of vision cannot be seen by the naked eye. Mutatis mutandis, this is true for the faculties of olfaction, gustation, and touch.

Having established that the optic and aural faculties are not what see or hear things in the most literal sense, Uttarā extends this idea to the supramundane faculties and to the Buddha's

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242 For instance, the Buddha makes statements to this effect in the Sayuktāgama version of the dispute between the Brāhmin Uttarā and the Buddha. Here, the Buddha proclaims to ānanda that “the eye (i.e., caksuāyatana) and visible matter present visual consciousness as their perceptual basis (ālambana).” 眼, 色緣生眼識. (T:99:2.78.b22).

243 For the debates on “what sees” within Sarvastivāda Abhidharma, see Dhammajoti, Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, 336-343; also readers may refer to his (2007) study, titled Abhidharma Doctrines and Controversies on Perception (Hong Kong: Center for Buddhist Studies), chapter 2.
sagely faculties. Uttarā begins with the anodyne idea that the vision cultivated by the sages is awesome in terms of its overwhelming power and penetrating scope. He adheres to the premise that the heavenly eyes and divine ears of the Buddha allow him to see things and hear sounds that lie beyond the sensory range of ordinary humans. He then contends that the things seen with the faculty of heavenly vision cannot be detected with the untrained eye.

From the outset, the Buddha and the Brāhmin are quick to point out that the “eye, simpliciter, does not see things.” The “eye” (Skt.: cakṣur) is understood by both parties to stand for the visual organ of sight that is constituted by the eyeballs, the optic nerves, and the associated blood supply. The faculty of sight directs the movements of the eyeball and the activities of the entire visual apparatus, of which the eyeballs are only one part. According to the Buddha’s doctrine of perception, in addition to the visual faculty (Skt.: cakṣurāyatana), two other elements are required to perceive the presence of visible matter. These are a sensible object (Skt.: rūpa) and visual consciousness (Skt.: cakṣurvijñāna). This tenet, which is attributed to the early homilies of the Buddha, is encapsulated in the famous slogan: “Three elements coalesce to generate the sensory experience” (Chi.: sanshi hehe 三事和合).244

Thus far, the Buddha appears to agree with everything that Uttarā has argued. The Buddha concurs that the faculties as entities, per se (Chi.: genti 根體), cannot be seen, in the case of the visual faculty, or sensed, in the cases of the other sensory faculties. Uttarā extends this idea to the spiritual indriyas and adduces that the indriyas of the sages cannot be seen by the naked eye or sensed by the faculties possessed by ordinary humans. The Buddha agrees that “cultivation of the faculties in a sagely way” entails “something that is not seen with the eye or heard with the ear.”

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244 This doctrinal mantra finds its locus classicus in the Samyuktāgama, trans. Guṇabhadra 求那跋陀 觐 the Buddha’s sermon to disciples at the Jetavana Park (T99.2.18-19).
Jātiśroṇa runs into difficulty, however, when he side-steps the issue of the origin and development of the sagely faculties. His argument then becomes mired in the murky territories of third eyes, hidden indriyas, and other phenomena of the occult.

At face value, there is little that is objectionable about Uttarā’s characterization of the sagely faculties. He, along with the disciples of Master Prajñāśrī and the Bhagavān Buddha, agrees that the incremental development and refinement of the supramundane skills that are evinced by the sagely faculties cannot be measured or grasped by the naked eye. Uttarā believes that the heavenly eyesight of the Buddha is pervasive in its scope and penetration and that his marvelous visual powers allow him to simultaneously view enlightened beings in the heavens and hellish beings or nārakas in the eight cold and eight hot Avīci hells. Uttarā concludes that this superior form of vision extends above and beyond the scope of any ordinary “fleshy ball of an eye” (Chi.: routuan yan肉團眼).245 According to the Sarvāstivāda teaching of the Māhāvibhāṣa, the heavenly eye of the wheel-turning king (Skt.: cakravārtin), or the Buddha, can detect sights at a distance of up to four krośas,246 or eighteen miles, and the heavenly ear can perceive sounds up to four kroṇas, or one yojanas, away. Uttarā attributes the heavenly vision of the sage to the cultivation of supernatural indriyas such as third eyes.

The Buddha and the Brāhmin fundamentally agree that the senses grasp their objects, but “are not something to be grasped.” (Chi.: wu suoqu無所取)247 They concur that all indriyas,  

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245 Mahāvibhāṣa 150 describes the scope and range of this power of vision as capable of penetrating “a great chiliocosm,” (Skt.: mahātrihasra: Chi.: da-qian jie 大千界), presumably, the triple chiliocosm which spans roughly 200,400 miles in breadth. This reckoning is according to AK 3.10, wherein Vasubandhu measures the full extent of the chiliocosm to be sixteen hundred thousand leagues (Skt.: yojanas; Chi.: you-xun 由旬), or roughly 200,400 miles. This is based on A.L. Basham’s (1954) reckoning of one yojana (=four krośas) as approximately nine miles. Mahāvibhāṣa adds the qualification that with the “applied practice” (prayoga) of his yogic power, the Buddha's vision penetrates “innumerable, boundless worlds.” 無量無邊世界(T1545:27.767.a28)

246 Under one krośa, Digital Dictionary of Buddhism entry gives: “The eighth part of a yojana, or 5 li 里 [2.5 kilometres]; another less probable definition is 2 li.”

247 T1545:27.729.b03.
ranging from the sensory to the spiritual, are by definition invisible. They part ways, however, regarding the idea that the sagely faculties originate from the *indriyas* that are innate and borne by all humans. Uttarā holds that the sagely faculties emerge from an independent source, and that the marvelous faculties of the enlightened sages are not something that ordinary worldlings can attain by having two working eyeballs and passable eyesight. He implies that we are “born blind in the third eye” and can access the power of this sense only with disciplined practice under the tutelage of a guru. The Buddha states, however, that the spiritual faculties are innate to humans and therefore can be cultivated by anyone. While the Buddha teaches that the *indriyas* are invisible, he also states that they are also endowed with agency and potency. The *indriyas* are involved in all activities of living, from the simplest of hand gestures, to the sagely powers of insight and mindfulness.

The Buddha then delivers to Uttarā and his disciples his homily on the taxonomy of the twenty-two faculties. After listening to the Buddha enumerate the twenty-two faculties, Uttarā admits that he is confused about the status of the spiritual faculties vis-à-vis the ordinary sensory faculties of sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch. Uttarā presses the Buddha on the precise relationship between the bodily senses and the “yet-uncultivated” (Chi.: *wei-xiu* 未修) faculties of concentration, faith, perseverance, recollection, and wisdom. By “yet-uncultivated,” the Buddha refers to the advanced spiritual attainments or the cultivated faculties of the sage.

Uttarā agrees with the Buddha that the expression of these extraordinary faculties is the result of courses of physical training and yogic cultivation. The Buddha diverges from the Brāhmin, however, when he states that the extraordinary *indriyas* do not have a locus in a third eye or in any other mysterious or supernatural faculty. He implies that it is not the case that the unenlightened are born “blind in the third eye” or that their heavenly eye has been occluded. Nor, according to
the Buddha, has their natural ability to open the aperture of the heavenly eye been unnaturally impeded or inhibited. The realization of heavenly eyesight cannot be analogous to sprouting (Skt.: *prabhavah*) another eye. If the Buddha is sincere in his commitment to the naturalistic view of the faculties, then even the most abstract faculties, such as the faculties of concentration and higher gnosis, must have a basis in the physical body with which all ordinary humans are endowed at birth.

The Buddha then waves one hand to beckon his disciple, Ānanda. With this simple gesture, the Buddha demonstrates how the *indriyas*, while invisible, have visible effects. Ānanda immediately comes to the Buddha's side, kneels, and adjusts the left shoulder strap on his robe (Skt.: *kāśāya*; Chi.: *jiasha* 袈裟). The expression on Ānanda's face is serene, and his eyes reflect his ready attentiveness to the Buddha. Uttarā looks befuddled. As he squints back and forth between the Buddha and Ānanda, the meaning of the Buddha’s legerdemain is lost to him. Uttarā is unable to speak.

Ānanda then poses a question to Uttarā. How would Prājñāśrī explain the special cases of gurus born blind and deaf who attain the sagely faculties of heavenly vision and hearing? In responding to this challenge, Uttarā runs into difficulty. His guru, Prājñāśrī, cannot account for how blind or deaf people can achieve sagehood in any way other than through his specific course of practice involving the refinement of the eyes and ears. Uttarā concedes that a congenitally blind person has the innate capacity to attain sagehood. How then is sagehood to be attained if not through the cultivation of existing and intact sensory organs? Ānanda states that for the Buddha's disciples (Skt.: śrāvakas; Chi.: *dizi* 弟子), cultivating the faculties of sagehood entails improving the inborn faculties possessed by all humans. Attaining sagehood does not require locating a third eye or developing *indriyas* that are hidden deep within the body.
Ānanda's question poses a dilemma for Uttarā: Is the eyeball of the sage with divine vision constitutionally different from the eyeball of the ordinary human? Uttarā is faced with two choices: He can admit that development of the faculty of divine sight through the practices taught by Prājñāśrī requires the presence of a third eye that is constitutionally different from the material organ involved in seeing things, or he can swallow an equally bitter pill by admitting that the eyeball of the enlightened sage is the same as the eyeball possessed by an ordinary human.

Ānanda continues to point out the incongruity of Uttarā’s statement that the eyesight of the sage involves developing cultivatable capacities to see things far beyond the purview of an ordinary set of eyes. However, if in achieving something beyond the pale of ordinary, vulgar sensation is the goal, one might try to deprive the base senses and avoid worldly distractions. If one is to attain enlightenment, then one must abstain from the defilement of the sensory world. It would then follow that to cultivate the spiritual indriyas, one must overcome the constraints of the contaminated fleshy eye and peel back the corrupted fleshy ball of an eye to see things in their true light.

Ānanda's second rejoinder has an unforeseen consequence when put into practice. If the ordinary senses contribute to unwholesome attachments to the objects of sensory desire, then the practitioner bent on cultivating the sagely way might be led to deprive, or even destroy, the sense organs that promote desire. Ananda asks Uttarā: For what purpose would you renounce the life of a householder and practice day and night to cultivate the pure practices of being a Brāhmin if you could simply destroy the faculties of seeing and hearing to cultivate the faculties in a sagely way? Would it not be more efficient to gouge out one’s eyes than to spend years abstaining from defilement and practicing purification rituals to attain heavenly eyesight?

Ānanda’s rejoinder to the Brāhmin Uttarā is meant to be a knock-down argument. Uttarā,
again, is at a loss for words. He falls into an insuperable dilemma, as he is unable to reconcile two opposing ideas. The first idea is his religious conviction that humans can become sages by cultivating the faculties with practice and under the guidance of a guru. The second idea is that the faculties of the sage are not constitutionally different from those of an unenlightened person. How then, is it possible to attain sagehood with the insufficient sensory faculties of an ordinary human?

Finally, Uttarā concedes that the sagely faculties must be constitutionally different from the five ordinary sense organs. Uttarā admits that while deaf people are born without functioning auditory faculties, they can develop the sagely faculties. Here, he concedes that the cultivation of the sagely faculties requires more than the honing of the ordinary senses and involves the development of the faculties of faith, spiritual zeal, mindfulness, concentration, and wisdom.

In the Jetavana Park, Jātiśroṇa probes the Buddha with questions regarding the ultimate definition of the indriyas. Uttarā expands this discourse and engages the Buddha in a debate on the distinction between the corporeal body and the faculties. What is at stake in these disputes between the Buddha and the Brāhmīns Jātiśroṇa and Uttarā is the difference between the Brāhmaṇical and Buddhist definitions of the indriya. In his Chinese reprisal of these ancient narratives, Xuanzang provides a spirited and rigorous defense of the Buddhist doctrine of the indriyas and concludes that dying is the direct result of the disintegration of the indriyas. Because the debates are regarded as faithful representations of the words of the Buddha, Xuanzang’s renderings of the debates further his agenda of rescuing the teachings of the indriyas from dilution at the hands of his Brāhmaṇical counterparts and Buddhist co-religionists.

The debates between the Buddha and Jātiśroṇa and Uttarā provide a convenient vehicle by which the Sarvāstivāda editors clarify, reconcile, and advance their doctrinal agenda. The Abhidharma editors enlist the actual words of the Buddha to support their doctrinal rendering of
the taxonomy of twenty-two faculties. The *Mahāvibhāṣa* editors purposefully set up the disputes as polemics. The Brahmins, Jātiśroṇa and Uttarā, play the roles of straw men with whom the Buddha argues fundamental doctrinal points regarding the definition of the *indriyas*. The *Mahāvibhāṣa* scholars make use of this sūtra material for the very deliberate purpose of reconciling the salient differences and similarities between the Brāhmaṇical and Buddhist teachings on the nature of the *indriyas*. Essentially, they are motivated to supplant the eleven-fold taxonomy of the *indriyas* of the Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika masters with their own taxonomy of twenty-two faculties.

Prior to the famous Jetavana Park debates, disputes between the Buddha and Brahmins regarding the number of the faculties appear in the ancient strata of sūtra material. Also preserved within Xuanzang’s *Mahāvibhāṣa* are narratives that describe Brāhmaṇins who come to pay homage and are challenged by the Buddha to find faculties other than the twenty-two enumerated in the taxonomy. The Buddha states: “The twenty-two faculties that I have taught are exhaustive. If you can refute this, then you can go ahead and talk [to me] about other faculties. But you should know that their theories are all talk and make no sense.”248 In his address to an audience of Buddhists and Brāhmaṇins, the Buddha throws down the gauntlet to anyone who can challenge his theory of the *indriyas*. In one account recorded in the *Vibhaṣa* of Saṅghabhūti, the Buddha adds the condition that “Not even a single item may be subtracted from the [list of] twenty-two faculties, otherwise one has only laid bare the twenty-one. If one adds another single faculty, then one has already postulated twenty-three.” 不能二十二根中，減一根，已立二十一；增一已，立二十二三。249 Here the Buddha makes it clear that if a contender is not ready to defend the taxonomy of no more or no less than twenty-two *indriyas*, the edifice of the challenge will collapse, and defeat must be

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248 Xuanzang, *Mahāvibhāṣa* 142 佛言：我說二十二根攝諸根盡。若有遮此更說餘根。當知彼說有言無義 (T1545:27.729.a06-7).

conceded.

While debates regarding the number and the type of faculties are documented in the earliest strata of the Indic sources, the Sarvāstivāda editors of the *Mahāvibhāṣa* enlist the words of the Buddha to further their agenda of supporting their taxonomy of the twenty-two faculties. The problem for the *Mahāvibhāṣa* editors, however, is that their taxonomy appears baroque when placed alongside the relatively streamlined classification of eleven faculties proposed by Sāṅkhya theorists. The taxonomy of the twenty-two faculties espoused by the *Mahāvibhāṣa* editors includes categories of faculties that do not appear in the comparatively economical list presented in the *Śāṅkhyakārikas*. For example, the fourth and fifth categories of the *indriyas* recognized by the Abhidharma Buddhists as faith, perseverance, mindful recollection, concentration, wisdom, and knowledge of past, present, and future are not enumerated in the taxonomy of the *tattvas*, the term used in the *Śāṅkhyakārikās* to describe the faculties. That these more cerebral *indriyas* are reconciled with a concrete and naturalistic understanding of the physiology of the body becomes a constant difficulty for the Buddhist apologetics.

In the Jetavana Park debates, the Buddha, Jātiśroṇa and Uttarā address two fundamental questions: How do the twenty-two faculties form the basis of life? How does the taxonomy of the twenty-two faculties explain the spectrum of all life forms? Xuanzang states that these debates confirm two premises of the Buddha, that life consists of the twenty-two faculties and that the taxonomy of the twenty-two faculties forms a comprehensive explanation for the variation of all

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250 According to the *Śāṅkhyakārikas*, there exist eleven *indriyas* corresponding to the mind, the five senses, and the physical functions (Skt.: *vṛtti*; Chi.: *shi* 事) of the five faculties of physical action (*karmendriyas*). Eliade translates the five *karmendriyas* as “five conative faculties.” See Eliade, M., *Yoga: Immortality and Freedom* (vol. 56). (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2009; First printed 1959), 21. Twelve actions are enumerated under the five cognitive faculties, five *karmendriyas*, and the faculty of mind, including desiring (mind), listening, touching, seeing, tasting, smelling, speaking (*vāk*), grasping, walking (feet), excreting solid and liquid waste, and sexual pleasure.
The stories of the Buddha’s debates with the Brahmans are constructed to develop *reductio ad absurdum* arguments to highlight the unwanted and unwarranted consequences (Skt.: *prasaṅga*) of several arguments posed by the Brāhmaṇs regarding the nature of the *indriyas* and their relationship to the material organs.

The Māhāvibhāṣa Verdict on the Uttarā Dispute With the Buddha

In Xuanzang’s *Mahāvibhāṣa*, the series of disputes between the Buddha and his disciples, Ānanda and Śāriputra, with the somewhat hapless Brāhmin Uttarā is followed by editorial commentary regarding the nature of the *indriyas*. Here the editors take on two doctrinal issues, the first regarding the relationship between the material organs and the “cultivatable sagely faculties” and the second regarding the nature of suffering and the *indriyas*. The doctrinal verdicts rendered by the editors of the *Mahāvibhāṣa* are meant to abjure the distorted views of the Vibhajyavāda, a tradition of Buddhist Abhidharma known as “the makers of analytical distinctions” (Chi.: *Fenbie lün zhē* 分別論者).251 True to their name, doctrinal scholars in this tradition are famous for making picayune distinctions that hold meaning only among themselves.252

The illocutionary force of the challenge posed to Uttarā by Ānanda is intended to place the Sāṅkhya doctrine of the *indriyas* under a light that is unfriendly, to the point of being discriminatory and unkind to people that are not able-bodied. The Sāṅkhya teaching encapsulated in the sacred *Sāṅkhya-kārikās* states that “those whose faculties are defective, such as the deaf, lack

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251 The name of this tradition derives from the verb “to make distinctions” *viśkṛtā*; Chi.: *fenbie 分別*. DDB (accessed 1/10/2016) cites one of their cardinal doctrines to be that the five hedonic faculties are all uncontaminated”五受根皆悉無漏. The Vibh editors, and later, both Vasubandhu and Saṅghabhadra, reject this view.

252 Mahāvibhāṣa, fasc. 2: “The Vibhajyavāda are of the opinion that the reference to *indriya* here [in these two sutras] is to the basis of the faculty, and not to the faculty, per se. Where does this violate our doctrine? What they [the Vibhajyavāda say] is not appropriate reasoning, since it contravenes other scriptures.” T27, no. 1545, p. 8a19-20 分別論者作如是言。此中根名說所依處不說根體。於我何違。彼如是言亦不應理。違餘經故。調餘經說.
the capability to achieve mokṣa through learning."\textsuperscript{253} Underlying this statement is the premise that having the ability to hear the teachings is a prerequisite for liberation. Therefore, the inability to hear precludes the deaf from achieving liberation. The text goes on to enumerate eleven disabilities that are specific to each of the eleven indriyas of the Sāṅkhya taxonomy.\textsuperscript{254} The category of the “impediment to wisdom” (Chi.: zhihai 智害), the disability of the mental faculty, includes seventeen types of mental disorders, any one of which would prevent an individual from attaining liberation.

**On the Relationship Between the Sagely Indriyas and the Material Organs**

In the debates, the Buddha maintains that the total number of independent indriyas is exactly twenty-two. Additionally, the Buddha posits that while the indriyas are neither different nor entirely independent from one another, they are not based in the material organs of the body. While vanquished in the debate by Ānanda, Śāriputra, and the Buddha, Uttarā hits upon an Achille's heel in the Buddhist doctrine of the indriyas regarding the relationship between the physical organs and the spiritual faculties.

The didactic, or illocutionary, outcome of this sūtra is that the Brāhmin Uttarā is pressed to admit that the spiritually cultivated organs of the sage are constitutionally different from the ordinary sensory faculties. Uttarā is forced to defend the untenable idea that the cultivation of divine or heavenly vision is akin to sprouting (Skt.: pra √bhū) a third eye. This raises the question of the locus of the spiritual indriya. If the Buddha’s powers of divine sight are an outgrowth of the innate capacities of vision that are cultivated, and not the result of the emergence of a supernatural third eye, then what is the relationship between ordinary material organs and extraordinary sagely

\textsuperscript{253} Sāṅkhya kārikā-vṛtti of Paramārtha: T54n2137p1257a08.

\textsuperscript{254} 十一根損壞者，謂聾・盲・瘖・嚾・顛・狂・啞・癩・跛・石女・黃門祕上 (T54n2137p1257a06-7).
faculties?

In the two hundred rolls of the *Mahāvibhāṣa*, the editors are forced to contend with this question and to articulate a distinction between the sensory and spiritual *indriya* and the material organs. Their reasoned response to Uttarā’s question on the nature of the faculties is found within the work associated with Xuanzang in the CWSL. Xuanzang is keenly sensitive to the popular opinion that the spiritual powers of the Buddha involve supernatural faculties such as third eyes. Kuiji’s disciple, Zhizhou, expresses the view that the *divyacakṣur* of the Buddha is not supernatural. He proposes that the supernormal powers of vision can be equated to an upgrade of an existing visual system. Zhizhou describes the attainment of *divyacakṣur* as equivalent to upgrading an operating system with a new application for an existing fleshy eye.

The *Mahāvibhāṣa* commentators are then pressed to deal with the questions of how and when the *divyacakṣur* emerges in the organogenesis or the embryogenesis vis-à-vis the faculties. In their discussions on organogenesis, the editors of the *Mahāvibhāṣa* point out that the Vibhayjavāda strictly adhere to naturalistic principles of bodily growth and development. According to the Sarvāstivāda, the same principle holds for the more abstract-sounding “immaterial faculties” (Skt.: *arūpêndriyāṇi*; Chi.: *wuse gen* 無色根), or the five “hedonic faculties” (Skt.: *pañca-vedanêndriyāṇi*; Chi.: *wu shou-gen* 五受根) of joy (Skt.: *muditêndriyam*; Chi.: *xi-gen* 喜根), pain (Skt.: *duḥkhêndriyam*; Chi.: *ku-gen* 苦根), pleasure (Skt.: *suḥkhêndriyam*; Chi.: *le-gen* 樂根), anxiety (Skt.: *daurmanasyêndriyam*; Chi.: *you-gen* 憂根), and aversion (Skt.: *upekṣêndriyam*; Chi.: *she-gen* 捨根). These faculties are understood in strictly naturalistic terms as they evince saliently physical characteristics. As a result, the physiological emergence of these

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255 Zhizhou’s subglosses to Kuiji’s Commentary on the CWSL cites *Mahāprājñā-pāramitôpadeśa* to insist that there is nothing supernatural about the *divyacakṣur*, rather it refers to a bionic “amplification of the physical eye, by which one becomes capable of seeing far into the distance.” 修得天眼在肉眼上。導彼肉眼亦能遠見 (T1833:43.869.a01-2).
faculties is viewed as essentially similar to the development of the five senses of vision, audition, olfaction, gustation, and touch.²⁵⁶

Because they take the position that the sagely faculties are innate, and therefore expressed in utero, the authors of Mahāvibhāṣa must additionally account for how the immaterial faculties are made manifest as well. This brings the question of whether the hedonic faculty of pain is innate and therefore experienced by all humans, including the sages and the Buddha.

The Mahāvibhāṣa editors address this issue by focusing on the question: At what point in interuterine development does the fetus feel pain? The Mahāvibhāṣa editors determine that the proprioceptive, mental, and affective faculties are required for the embryo to experience the sensation of pain. According to Vasubandhu, the development of these faculties takes place during the fifth pentamenster, or between the twenty-ninth and thirty-sixth weeks of pregnancy.²⁵⁷

Vasubandhu concludes that the human fetus evinces hedonic faculties, the faculties necessary to register sensations of pain and pleasure, during the prakhāśa stage, or the twenty-seventh week. Xuanzang supports Vasubandhu’s estimate, as it is solidly based upon earlier Vibhāṣa materials. Based on Vasubandhu’s work, the editors of the Mahāvibhāṣa conclude that the supramundane eye of the sage is observable in the fetus by the fifth pentamester and therefore is an ordinary sense.

²⁵⁶ Vibh 147: “if the non-physical faculties, Skt.: arūpēndriyāṇi; wuse gen 無色根) are not obtained by the embryo, why do the sūtras say that one can detect the heavenly eye (divyacakṣur) [in utero] and the gender it belongs to? 何故經說天眼觀知是男是女？Reply: the sutras simply says that one can.” The discussion goes on to say that the divine faculty of hearing is palpable by the prakhāśa stage (i.e., from the 29 to 36th weeks of pregnancy): “If it [the divyacakṣur] is conceived in the female [embryo], one should already know that in this stage it [the divyacakṣur] is female and not male. In this way, it is said that although the physical faculties (ṛūpēndriyāṇi) are not all obtained in the kalala stage, they are fully obtained by the prakhāśa stage.” 若女入者，復知此位是女非男。如是說者，羯邏藍位未得餘色根。鉢羅奢佉位中方乃得故。

²⁵⁷ Vasubandhu’s AKBh references a doggerel quatrain (śloka-meter) of unclear provenance in his auto-commentary on AKBh 3.19: indriyāṇi ca rūpīṇī vyahjanānyanupūrvāḥ (Shastri, p. 433) – a position that is firmly attested in Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma. Vibh 147 states: “those who say that it’s like that [i.e., the faculty is fully-fledged only by the prakhāśa stage], then the physical faculty is yet unrealized in the kalala stage. They are realized in the prakhāśa stage.” 如是說者，羯邏藍位未得餘色根，鉢羅奢佉位中方乃得故。(T27, no. 1545, p. 751, c21-2).
Chap. 2: What Is Dying?

The Vibhājyavāda interlocutor, cited in fascicle one hundred forty-two of the *Mahāvibhāsa*, avers that the “cultivatable spiritual faculties are uniformly uncontaminated” 皆通無漏. The Vibhājyavādins state that none of the faculties beyond the nine physical ones are infected by the contaminated ground from which they “sprout up.” This stance means that the five so-called “wholesome roots” (Chi.: *shan gen*善根) are not equivalent in status to the “contaminated faculties” (Chi.: *youlou gen*有漏根). Essentially, the Vibhājyavādins and Vātsiputrīyas appear unwilling to admit that the five wholesome roots, three faculties of gnosis, and so forth are reducible to the basic physical faculties with which ordinary humans are born. They “bite the bullet,” as it were, in maintaining that the “contaminated” physical faculties and the “uncontaminated roots” are constitutively different.

According to the *Mahāvibhāsa* Sarvāstivāda editors, although the spiritual faculties are natural outgrowths, each additional faculty cultivated through the course of training derives its power from a subserving basis (Skt.: *āśraya*) in the innate physical faculties, including the five ordinary senses and the three embodied faculties. The Sarvāstivāda editors state explicitly that each of the spiritual faculties is a natural outgrowth of the five ordinary sense faculties. However, the *Mahāvibhāsa* also cites two dissenting positions on the status of the spiritual faculties. Both the Vibhajyavāda and the Vātsiputrīya opinions cited in *Mahāvibhāsa* reject the consequence of this doctrine. Rather, these two traditions maintain that the five wholesome roots of practice, faith, vigor, concentration, recollection, and wisdom are uniformly “uncontaminated” (Skt.: *遍净根*).

258 Vasubandhu reports this view that the cultivatable faculties are “uniformly uncontaminated,” in the twenty-fifth fascicle of his Treasury, in Xuanzang’s translation; for Skt. See Shastri, 1976, vol. 2, 147.

259 Vasubandhu interprets the very same sūtra passage cited by the Vibhājyavādins as inconclusive grounds for the verdict that the five hedonic faculties are immaculate. *Yasya etāni pañcendriyāni sarveṣa sarvāh na santi tamaham bāhyāṁ prthagyanapākṣavasthitam vadāmi* iti (Shastri, 147).
After abjuring this view, the Mahāvibhāṣa editors arrive at the verdict that the five faculties of faith, concentration, perseverance, recollection, and wisdom must be treated as “discretionary” (Chi.: fenbie 分別) indriyas. Because the karmic status of these indriyas is ambivalent, the way they trend is the direct result of training. The text explains that the label of discretionary indriyas applies to the faculties of pleasure, joy and aversion and to the five wholesome roots, including faith. The karmic status of these nine indriyas is ambivalent in that each one can become contaminated, uncontaminated, or karmically neutral (Skt. avyākṛta) in character, depending upon training. For example, the indriya of faith can be misdirected and degenerate into erroneous thinking (Chi.: xienian 邪念) and incorrect cognitions (Chi.: bu zhengzhi 不正知). Individuals who unquestionably follow a guru to the point of physical or moral degradation can fall prey to a contamination of the indriya of faith. The myopic exercise of faith in an unquestioning manner can lead to degradation, as witnessed in many cults in both the ancient and modern worlds.

The refusal of the Sarvāstivāda editors to differentiate between the innate sensory faculties and the immaculate spiritual faculties has consequences for Buddhist practice. The roots of wholesome thinking and conduct are based in the ordinary sensory faculties that are motivated by sensual desires and directed at worldly objects. To defuse the charge that the imperceptible

260 “There are those who say that this is the tenet of the Vatsiputraīyas. The masters of that tradition postulate the highest worldly state to have the five including faith, as its nature (svabhāva). It is only these five faculties that are skillful/wholesome (kuśala) by nature. Because the additional faculties are mixed together with these 5, those [other faculties] also deserve the name of ‘skillful.’ From this reason we know that five faculties are established as the basis of differentiation between all sages, virtuous people, with no recourse needed to other faculties.” 有說：此是犢子部宗，彼部師執世第一法信等五根以為自性，唯此五根是自性善。餘雜此故，亦得善名。由此五根建立一切賢聖差別不由餘根 (T1545:27.8.b10)

261 See Vibh 144 for the identification: (T27, no. 1545, p. 738, a12): 九應分別者，謂意樂•喜•捨•信等五根。

262 Vibh 144 relates: “Eleven of the human faculties are neither acquired via training nor innate (‘untrained’ [aśaikṣa]) – namely, the seven physical faculties (i.e., five senses), along with vitality, suffering, and anxiety.” 十非學非無學者。謂七色命苦憂根.
spiritual faculties are insufficienly anchored in the body, the Vibhājyavāda theorists cited in the *Mahāvibhāsa* claim that the spiritual faculties are distinguished from the physical faculties in how they are realized. In contrast to the uncultivated sensory and hedonic faculties that all able-bodied humans are born with, the generation and refinement of skillful faculties require disciplined practice.

The *Mahāvibhāsa* editors ultimately decide that the faculties of faith, concentration, and recollection have a “firm standing” (Skt.: *adhīṣṭhāna*) in the body. Additionally, they concur that the five wholesome faculties and the three uncontaminated faculties are the root *indriyas* that produce the fruits of “insight” (Skt: *darśana*) with the “cultivation” (Skt.: *bhāvanā*) of the Buddha's course of practice.

**The Faculty of Suffering is Innate**

Toward the end of their discussion of the intrauterine development of the *indriyas*, the *Māhāvibhāsa* editors emphatically state that the Buddha was born with the “faculty of suffering” (Skt.: *duḥkēndriyam*; Chi.: *kugen* 苦根). This powerful statement is meant to place the Buddha on equal standing with all ordinary humans. It is also intended to neutralize the Brāhmaṇical claims that the powers of insight are an outgrowth of supernormal organs that are possessed by few.

Xuanzang follows the Abhidharma doctrine that ordinary humans are born with the faculties of suffering and anxiety (Skt.: *daurmanasyēndriyam*; Chi.: *yougen* 憂根). The editors acknowledge that the Buddha, in his earthly human incarnation, knows the pain of having an impermanent and “contaminated” (Skt.: *sāsrava*; Chi.: *you-lou* 有漏) body. Moreover, the *Māhāvibhāsa* editors acknowledge that the Buddha is intimately aware of the undesirable

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263 This doctrinal view is encapsulated in Xuanzang's translation of Vasubandhu's auto-commentary on AK 2.1: “If one realizes the seven faculties including suffering, namely kāyēndriyam, mind, vitality, and the four hedonic faculties [including suffering], then that excludes anxiety.” 若成苦根定成就七。謂身命意四受。除憂.
psychological experiences of ordinary humans who, like him, bear the faculties of suffering and 
anxiety. With this claim, they highlight how the Buddha, through practice and insight, overcomes 
the aches and pains and emotional suffering associated with having a mortal body. To the 
Māhavibhāṣa editors, the uplifting message that any ordinary human being can be enlightened 
contains the premise that the preexisting conditions for sagehood are present in every human. 

Uttarā is reluctant to accept the idea that the mundane and sagely indriyas are on an equal 
footing because they are inborn. He is concerned that if the sensory and spiritual faculties are 
placed on the same level and said to be inborn and available to all, the achievements of the 
enlightened beings will be devalued. This claim places the exalted status of the sages in peril. The 
Māhavibhāṣa editors, however, argue that the supramundane achievements and mighty spiritual 
faculties of the Buddha are the result of specific modifications and amplifications of the faculties 
that are innate and possessed by all humans. 

There is a doctrinal motivation behind the Sarvāstivādin editors’ placement of the mundane 
and spiritual faculties on an equal standing. This step is intended, very literally, to bring the 
spiritual faculties down to earth, to make them accessible, and to inspire lay people to undertake 
the practices of concentration and insight. The message of the Māhavibhāṣa editors is that all 
people are born with the assets necessary to become sages if they undertake sufficient practice. 
They argue that a supramundane organ such as a third eye is not required to attain sagehood, and 
that everyone is born with the indriyas, the building blocks of sagehood. Xuanzang takes up the 
desideratum, expressed by the Sarvāstivādin editors of the Jātiśroṇa and Uttarā stories, that 
sagehood is available to those who cultivate their innate faculties through spiritual practice. Here 
the Māhavibhāṣa editors, as part of their doctrinal agenda, provide an important doctrinal rationale 
for Buddhist religious practices. If the Buddha is human and can transcend the universal experience
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of suffering with dedicated practice, so too can the ordinary human.

Xuanzang applies this egalitarian approach to the *indriyas* to bolster his view that the twenty-two faculties are all that is necessary and sufficient to explain living and dying. He turns to an examination of the roots of the Brāhmaṇical theories regarding the relationship between the *indriya* and the soul as represented by the Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika schools. Here he develops the naturalistic and non-supernatural approach to the *indriyas* endorsed by the earlier Sarvāstivādin scholars. By engaging with the Brāhmaṇical text-traditions of Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika, Xuanzang takes issue with the doctrine of the soul embedded in the Indic sūtras. He defends the Buddhist position that nothing over and above the faculties is required to explain the nature of life and the process of dying. Importantly, Xuanzang’s investigations of the traditions of Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika further his agenda of expunging the idea of the soul from Chinese Buddhism, once and for all.

**Xuanzang’s Disputes with the Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika Traditions Regarding the Soul**

While at Nālanda University in the Maghada Kingdom of Northern India during the 630s C.E., Xuanzang studies and debates with followers from the ancient Brāhmaṇical traditions, the Hindu philosophical schools of Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika. Xuanzang comes to understand that the Brāhmaṇical and Buddhist traditions agree that *indriyas* are the building blocks of life, and that the destruction of the *indriyas* is implicated in the process of dying. Where the two traditions fundamentally diverge, however, is in the idea that a soul is required to animate the *indriyas*. The Brāhmmins posit the existence of a soul that vitalizes the body, departs the body in dying, and then transmigrates until it finds a body into which it is reincarnated. The Buddhists maintain that no self, person, or entity above the *indriyas* is required for the human being to survive. Therefore, no
self, person, or entity is lost in dying. The doctrine of no-self is central to the Buddhist doctrine.

The fundamental tenet of the Brāhmaṇical traditions of Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika is that the soul bears the essence of life and vitality in the human being. Within both traditions, the soul is upheld as the master of the body. While the Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika schools agree upon a conception of the soul as essential to life, specific aspects of their doctrines differ considerably. For the Sāṅkhya theorist, the soul operates the *indriyas* through the intermediary of the *ahaṅkāra*, essentially an executive faculty that directs other faculties. For the Vaiśeṣika philosophers, the soul is an active agent and drives the *indriyas* by using its capacity for sentience. Both doctrines hold that the soul is involved in the action of sustaining life, albeit in different ways. While the classical Sāṅkhya and the later Vaiśeṣika wholeheartedly concur that dying is defined as the immortal soul’s desertion of the body, they part ways in their conceptions of the soul’s relationship to the faculties of the body.

In the first fascicle of his CWSL, Xuanzang mounts a defense of the Buddhist no-self explanations of death against the rival theories articulated by thinkers from the traditions of Vaiśeṣika and Sāṅkhya. Xuanzang begins this work by surveying the contemporary Brāhmaṇical

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264 Taking a methodological cue from Dasti and Bryant, E. F., eds. (2013, p. 10), *Free will, agency, and selfhood in Indian philosophy* (OUP), and Bryant's essay in this volume (p. 16): “Classical Sāṅkhya” is taken to indicate “the oldest speculative philosophical tradition in ancient India, with clear roots in the *Upaṇiṣads* – e.g., *Svetasvara Upaniṣad*.”

265 Xuanzang's firsthand knowledge of these Brāhmaṇical systems was not limited to the relatively few original Sanskrit works of classical Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika that have survived to the present day. In a series of articles, Honda Megumi mines Paramārtha's and Xuanzang's translations for fragments of an ancient *Sāṅkhya sutra* 僧伽經. See also Tang Yongtong 湯用彤 (1884-1964), who compiles Sāṅkhya sūtra citations from the corpus of the Sui-Dynasty scholar-monk Jizang 吉藏 as well [this compilation, titled “Historical Materials on Indian Philosophy in Buddhist sources from Chinese canon” 漢文佛經中的印度佛教哲學史料 is Tang's posthumous papers, ed. Tang Yi jue 湯一介, *Tang Yongtong quanji* 湯用彤全集, volume 3, pp. 431-503, passim]. Knowledge of ancient Sāṅkhya texts in Xuanzang's time was not limited to the *Sāṁkhyaśāstra*，the oldest work of Sāṅkhya extant in the original Sanskrit. Honda's supposition is that “If the *大莊嚴論經* is written by Asvaghosa, contemporary with the king Kaniṣka, *Seng qie jing* should be earlier than A.D. 100. It is beyond question if *Seng qie jing* indicates a proper name or not.” – “Āryadeva's critique against Sāṁkhya,” p. 12 (Beilheim, 1972).
theorists, and then divides them into doctrinal camps that represent the traditions of Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika. Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika are the only Brāhmaṇical theories or philosophical schools that Xuanzang mentions by name in his Māhavibhāṣa. Both sets of theories share the premise that a non-physical or spiritual aspect of the human is responsible for coordinating the activities of the body. They posit the existence of a “task master” (Chi.: zhu zai 主宰)266 or a “master-mind” (Chi.: xin zhu 心主)267 that is in charge of regulating and coordinating the activities of different parts of the body. The nomenclature of a “dominant master” (Chi.: zhu 主) stands for the notion of an entity that acts as the executive operator of the body.

The idea of an entity that operates the faculties throughout life, and then deserts the body as life comes to an end, pervades the Brāhmaṇical Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika texts. Xuanzang must

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266 Here the term zhu-zai is understood as a form of dependent or adjectival compound (形主) rather than as a coordinative compound, hence this study resorts to the translation as “task master.” There is a clever but untranslatable pun on the Chinese characters zhu – in its adjectival senses as both “predominant/main,” “domineering,” etc. – and its nominal sense as “master” or “overlord.” Kuiji’s subglosses on CWSL break down the word – zhu-zai – into a coordinative compound. Reference has been made to Kuiji’s gloss, cited here with the caveat that is not the only way to construe the Chinese character dyad zhu-zai: “The ātman is likened to the master or the governor. For example, the governor of a country possesses autonomous power. He is capable of oppressing and making determinations [over his subjects]. To possess this “power to oppress and to make determinations [over the subjects]” is equivalent in its meaning to the ātman. Some take “master” to be what the self (ātman) is as an entity. So, [for them], the governor is “mine (i.e., my lord and governor).” So, this governor functions just like a self (ātman). 造曰。我如主宰者。如國之主有自在故。及如輔宰能割斷故。有自在力及割斷力義同我故。或主是我體。宰是我所。或主如我體。宰如我用 (T43n1830p0239c01-4).

267 Puguang’s Study Notes on the Treasury (Jushe lun ji), fascicle 13, offers the following exegesis on the topic of the Brāhman and its unity with Īśvara: “One Lord refers to our singular Lord in Heaven. Some describe him as ‘the Great Brāhman King,’ or as the Great Mahēśvara, etc. The tīrthikas postulate this Lord in Heaven as he who is capable of creating the myriad things. When he desires to create things, he first gives rise to perceptual awareness (buddhi). Once the soul comes to seek after, enjoy, avail itself of worldly objects, it is then reborn into the worldly realms. Some among the Sāṅkhya theorists of the wayfarer (tīrthika) paths posulate a singular soul as the master. Its nature as an entity is simply thought. Desiring after, enjoying and availing oneself of worldly objects, ncecessarily stimulates the awareness/intelligence (buddhi) belonging to the soul. Now, when the soul comes to desire after and avail itself of worldly things in the mundane realm, by its own nature, the soul ever so gradually engenders a process of transformation and becoming reborn into the worldly realm.” 一主謂天真主。或大梵王。或大自在天等。諸外道等計此天主能造萬物。將欲造時先起是覺。欲受用境。然後生諸世間。或數論外道計一我主以思為體。欲受用境時要先起覺我。今欲得受用境界。然後自性漸漸轉變生諸世間。 一主謂天真主。或大梵王。或大自在天等。諸外道等計此天主能造萬物。將欲造時先起是覺。欲受用境。然後生諸世間。或數論外道計一我主以思為體。欲受用境時要先起覺我。今欲得受用境界。然後自性漸漸轉變生諸世間。 Some among the Vaiśeṣika theorists of the wayfarer paths postulate the soul as the agent (karr̦). It is born of various factors (dharmas), but among these, its intelligence is foremost. For this reason they say: ‘One Lord is born with foremost intelligence.’” 有勝論外道計我為能作者。生於諸法。亦以覺為先。後生世間。故言一主先覺而生 (T41, no. 1821, p. 200 b23-29).
engage with the Brāhmaṇical theories of Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika to bolster his claim that nothing other than the faculties is necessary to explain living, and conversely, that nothing other than the loss of the faculties is required to explain dying.

The Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika Positions on the Soul and the Faculties

In his exegesis of dying, Xuanzang studies the ancient source material to gain a deep understanding of the Brāhmaṇical theories of the soul and the faculties. He analyzes the Indic treatise *On the Refutation of Four Hinayāna and Tīrthika Sects* (外道小乘四宗論), attributed to the Mahāyāna Bodhisattva Āryadeva. Extracted from the ancient *Lāṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, this work was translated into Chinese from Sanskrit in somewhat partial segments by the Indian scholar Bodhiruchi (菩提流支) during the century prior to Xuanzang’s life. In his close reading of this treatise, Xuanzang finds that Bodhisattva Āryadeva draws the conceptions of the soul held by the Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika Brāhmaṇical schools into sharp contrast.

Bodhisattva Āryadeva describes the differences between the Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika doctrines as based upon their conceptualizations of the relationship of the soul to the faculty of perceptual awareness (Skt.: buddhîndriyam). The Sāṅkhya scriptures directly imbue the soul with the capacity of *buddhi*, which is defined as perceptual awareness, sentience, or intelligence. The Vaiśeṣika authors treat *buddhi* and the soul as analytically distinct entities.\(^{268}\)

In his Chinese translation of the *Lāṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, Bodhiruchi uses the metaphor of a

\[^{268}\] Bodhiruchi (T1639:32.155.b08-12), *On the Refutation of Four Hinayāna and Tīrthika Sects*, Question: Why do the Vaiśeṣika masters say that all dharmas are different? Response: When Vaiśeṣika masters talk about difference, they say that the soul is different from intelligence. For what reason? Since they state that they are different [dharmas]. Question: For what reason do they say that they are different dharmas? Response: Just as they say that one thing is “white” and that this this is also “mounded.” These are innate properties [of the white mound]. The soul and intelligence are just like this – the same thing that is “mine” is also “intelligent.” 問曰。云何毘世師外道說一切法異。答曰。所言異者。我與覺異。何以故。以說異法。問曰。云何名說異法。答曰。如說此是白此是疊。此是天德。此是天德疊。我與覺異亦如是。此是我此是智故.
“mound of white sand” (Chi: bai die 白疊) to illustrate the differences between the two Brāhmaṇical positions on the relationship between the soul and buddhi, or sentience. Here the “mound of sand” is analogous to the soul, and the “whiteness” of the sand is equivalent to buddhi. According to the Sāṅkhya theorists, the whiteness of the sand is inseparable from the mound of sand, in the way that sentience is inseparable from the soul. According to the Vaiśeṣika interpretation of this metaphor, the whiteness of the mound of sand is an attribute of the sand, in the way that sentience is an aspect of the soul. The distinction is subtle, but important. In the Sāṅkhya tradition, sentience is the very essence of the soul. In the Vaiśeṣika tradition, sentience is an attribute, albeit an important one, of the soul.

Where the two Brāhmaṇical doctrines fundamentally diverge is in the Vaiśeṣika scholars’ conceptualization of “whiteness” and “mound of sand” as discrete and separable properties. Xuanzang is aware that the Sāṅkhya scholars conflate the faculty of sentience with the soul. He is also sensitive to the Vaiśeṣika thinkers’ view of the faculty of sentience as an aspect or an attribute of the soul. He ultimately exploits this distinction to further his agenda of expelling the crypto-Brāhmaṇical idea of the soul from Chinese Buddhism.

Broadly speaking, both the Buddhist and the Brāhmaṇical traditions agree upon the taxonomy of five sensory faculties. The same five sensory faculties are postulated in the Buddhist and in the Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika taxonomies, although in different orders: “The Vaiśeṣika masters also speak of five [cognitive] faculties—olfaction, gustation, vision, and tactition together form five”又勝論者說有五根。鼻舌眼身耳根為五.270 This standard gloss on the five faculties reveals one point of difference between the Vaiśeṣika and Buddhist and Sāṅkhya taxonomies. The

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269 Watson’s (2006, p. 68) prescient comments are worth noting: “The soul confuses himself with this organism, particularly with its highest constituent, the Intellect (Buddhi).”

270 T27, no. 1545, p. 729, c26-7.
Buddhist and the Sāṅkhya count the five ordinary senses as coordinated by a mental faculty (Skt.: *manendriya*) that is listed as the sixth faculty in the taxonomy. Therefore, when compared with either the Abhidharma Buddhist or the Sāṅkhya taxonomy, the Vaiśeṣika taxonomy appears less complicated in that it posits only five sensory faculties. In sum, the five faculties correspond to the five physical senses. Bodiruci’s fifth-century corpus provides a clue to the reason the mental faculty is not included in the Vaiśeṣika taxonomy of five senses. The implication is that the Vaiśeṣika theorists identify *manendriya* with the mind itself. This classificatory distinction is attested in the *Praśāstapādabhāṣya* of Candrānanda,²⁷¹ the oldest work of Vaiśeṣika commentary surviving in the original Sanskrit.

Xuanzang’s comprehensive and detailed account of the differences between the Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika theories of the *indriyas* and their relationship to the soul is based upon his studies of Bodhiruchi and other source materials. To attain a basic grasp of the core Sāṅkhya tenets, Xuanzang relies upon the fluid and precise Chinese translation of the *Sāṅkhya-kārikās* and *vṛtti* prose commentary completed by Paramārtha in 569 C.E. Additionally, Xuanzang looks to the ancient Vaiśeṣika sūtras (Chi.: *Shenglun jing* 勝論經; *Weishi shi jing* 衛世師經) and to the writings of the classical Vaiśeṣika scholar *Candramati* 月慧 (fl.: 450-550 C.E.), for authoritative and unalloyed expositions of the Vaiśeṣika doctrine.²⁷² After returning to China from India in 645 C.E., Xuanzang undertakes a translation of an important work of Vaiśeṣika philosophy, Candramati’s treatise, *The Treatise on the Ten Ontological Categories*, (Skt.: *Vaiśeṣika-

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²⁷¹ Jambuvījaya, ed., *Praśāstapādabhāṣya of Candrānanda*, 28

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daśapadārtha-śāstra 聖宗十句義論). Xuanzang’s translation of this treatise stands as the only full-length work of Vaiśeṣika philosophy extant within the Chinese Buddhist canon.

In his translations and analyses of these texts, Xuanzang formulates his position regarding the distinction between the doctrines of Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika on the relationship between the indriyas and the soul. He continues by contrasting the Brāhmaṇical doctrines with the Abhidharma Buddhist explanations of the indriyas and the soul. Ultimately, Xuanzang’s exegesis of the classical Brāhmaṇical and Buddhist texts bolsters his conviction that the Abhidharma theory of the indriyas offers the most powerful explanatory account of living and dying.

Xuanzang upholds the Abhidharma theory positing that the indriyas and the interaction between them are sufficient to explain the survival of the human. He concludes that no other entities above and beyond the indriyas are required to explain the vitality of life. Applying the principle of ontological parsimony, Xuanzang claims that the Abhidharma-based theory of the faculties offers a naturalistic explanation for life that is unencumbered by the supernatural and superfluous entities that populate the Brāhmaṇical theories of living and dying. Xuanzang broadly contends that the Abhidharma theory of the indriyas is more naturalistic and parsimonious than the rival Brāhmaṇical theories and therefore preferable, because it does not involve occult entities such as an immortal “subtle body” (Skt.: guhya-śarīra/sūkṣma-śarīra; Chi.: xi-shen 細身), a

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273 This work, attributed to Maticandra 慧月 (ca. 450-550 C.E.), promulgates the doctrine of 10 padārthas or categories. The title of this work, extant only in Xuanzang’s Chinese translation of 648 C.E. is reconstructed into Sanskrit as Daśapadārtha-śāstra.


275 The Vṛtti commentary on the thirty-ninth stanza of SK explicates the nature and composition of the subtle body and its relationship to the “gross corporeal body” (sthūlaśarīra) by unraveling the metaphor of the “palaces built by the King for the Prince.” According to explanation of this simile found in the vṛtti commentary, the palaces build by the King for the full usage of the Prince are likened to the crude body in that both fundamentally serve
“psychic person” (Skt.: guhya puruṣa; Chi.: ren-wo 人我), a “bearer of subtle life” (Skt.: jīva; Chi.: ming zhe命者), or an “ego-maker” (Skt.: ahaṅkāra; Chi.: wo-man 我慢) to explain the animation of the body.

In his comprehensive study of the Brāhmaṇical explanations of dying posited by the Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika scholars, Xuanzang comes to reject all of the doctrines rooted in the conception of a spiritual soul (Skt.: ātman) that survives death. Xuanzang finds fault with the notion that the faculties require an executive operator in the form of an ātman, a puruṣa, or an ego-making consciousness (Skt.: ahaṅkāra) to explain the vital animation of the body. He summarily as material provisions for the usage of the soul. The soul plays the role of the master of both the crude and subtle parts of the body: “The subtle body refers to the interior. The crude body refers to the exterior. The hands, feet, head, face, waist, weight and height, these are the full range of the human’s characeristics. 細身名為內。麁身名為外。此細身中手·足·頭·面·腹·背·形·量·人相具足。" Amongst the four Vedic traditions there are those sages/visionaries (ṛṣī) who say: the crude body has six kinds of bases (*āśrayas): three kinds of bases are contributed by the mother, including blood, mustle, and tendon, while three bases are contributed by the father – together these form the six bases of the body.” 四皮陀中有諸仙人說如是言。麁身有六依。血肉筋三種從母生。白毛骨三種從父生。是六依身.

The crude external body serves to provide provisions to the internal subtle body. These are the nutritive inner provisions contained inside the subtle body, provided by the crude body, which emerge during birth and extent until [the subtle body] has departed 以外麁身,益內細身。是內細身，麁身所資，益將出胎時及至已出.

Since the five great material elements (mahats) outside serve as its [the human body’s] basis and original standing, we can liken it [the body] to the King and the Prince, for whom he [the King] supplies all manner of halls and palaces. It is there that he [the Prince] walks, eats, and sleeps. This is just like prakṛti in the way that it serves both the subtle and coarse bodies, providing a stable standing and basis by being capable of producing the five great material elements (mahats).” 以外五大為其住處。譬如王子他為起舍種種殿堂。是處應住，是處應食，是處應眠。自性亦如是。為細身及麁身，作依止處，能生五大.

276 Skt. and Chi. equivalents are based upon Xuanzang’s translation corpus and Paramārtha’s translation of Sāṅkhya-karika, stanza 69 – corresponding to Skt. based upon edition of Sharma Dutt, Sāṅkhya-kārikās, 60-1.

277 Under the Skt. word jīva, Monier-Williams gives a specific definition germane to the early Vedic context: m. the principle of life, vital breath, the living or personal soul (as distinguished from the universal soul.”

278 The standard classical Chinese translation for the word ahaṅkāra —wo-man 我慢 — overlaps between the contexts of Buddhist and Sāṅkhya doctrines. It is fair to say that it is understood in a more derogatory way within the Buddhist context than that of Sāṅkhya, however, for both sets of teachings, ahaṅkara represents an encumbrance to liberation (mokṣa). Wo-man, the standard Chinese term for ahaṅkāra also can mean “self-conceit,” since it is also the term that Xuanzang uses for both ahaṅkāra and abhimāna. In the Buddhist context, abhimāna stands for one of four forms of attachment to the unchanging sense of self. Because of its association with attachment to the ego’s desires, abhimāna is considered to be an obstacle to liberation. However, it must also be pointed out that ahaṅkāra plays a large role in the soteriology of the Sāṅkhya-kārikās as part of the fetters that “shackle” the soul, as it were, inside a mortal human body.
dismisses these views because they rely upon the presence of unobservable entities and veer into the realm of the supernatural and the occult. At the same time, Xuanzang is keenly aware of the irony inherent in his position, as the Abhidharma taxonomy of the twenty-two indriyas contains an ample share of unobservable posits. Xuanzang, however, fiercely insists that the authentic, unalloyed doctrine of Abhidharma Buddhism has no place for supernatural entities of an occult nature. Essentially, he argues that the more biologically-based accounts regarding the survival of the human body provided by the Abhidharma Buddhist theories of the indriya are sufficiently robust to explain the complexity of living and dying.

The Doctrine of the Soul According to the Sāṅkhyakārikās

Xuanzang looks to the teachings of the ancient Sāṅkhyakārikās, the earliest surviving texts of the Sāṅkhya school of Hindu philosophy, in his exegesis of dying and the soul. The texts of the Sāṅkhyakārikās record the oral testimony of the Hindu deity Mahēśvara to the visionary rṣi, Kāpila (phonetically spelled Jiapiluo 迦毘羅), the “Tawny Headed Immortal” (黃赤頭仙人). Composed of seventy succinct stanzas in the noble and lyrical ārya meter, the Sāṅkhyakārika texts illuminate the relationship between the soul and the material world.

In the Sāṅkhya school of Hindu philosophy, the soul is the source of life. According to Sāṅkhyakārikās, the soul is the distinctly separate force that enlivens and animates the indriyas. To accomplish this, the soul must inhabit and operate the body. Therefore, within the Sāṅkhya schema, the soul is composed of the puruṣa, the ahaṅkāra, and the indriyas, or the tattvas. The puruṣa is the source of life and consciousness and the overseer of the body; the ahaṅkāra is the task-master and the intermediary between the puruṣa and the body that motivates the tattvas; and

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279 Monier Williams Skt. Dictionary (hereafter, MW); Kuiji’s Great Commentary on the Gate of Logic (Nyāyapraveśa śāstra) 因明大疏, ed. Mei Deyu 梅德愚, vol. 2 (Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju, 2013), 410.
the *tattvas* are the elements that exert force throughout the body to accomplish the tasks required for living.

In the *Sāṅkhya* doctrine, Mahēśvara says to the prophet Kāpila: “It is naught but the objective *(Skt.: artha)* of the *puruṣa* that provides the cause that performs action *(karaṇam)*” (SK 31c-d).²⁸⁰ While viewed as separate and distinct from the *indriyas*, the *puruṣa* functions to imbue the *tattvas*, via the intermediary of *ahāṅkāra*, with vitality and sentience. Because the *indriyas* are animated by the vital power of the soul, the desertion of the soul at death results in the ultimate and final dissolution of the *indriyas*. Dying is thus defined in the Sāṅkhya doctrine as the departure of the soul from the body.

**The Sāṅkhya Doctrine of Twenty-Five *Tattvas***

The Sāṅkhya scholars build their explanation of living and dying upon the theory of the *tattvas*. The *tattvas* are defined as the fundamental elements that comprise human life and the material world. The classical Sāṅkhya doctrine of the twenty-five *tattvas* *(Chi.: ershi wu di)* is enumerated in the seventy stanzas of the *Sāṅkhya*.*kārikās*. The theory of the *tattvas* provides an explanatory account of how the two basic elements of life — the *puruṣa*, the source of

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²⁸⁰ Dutt, ed., *Sāṅkhya-kārikās*, 31: *Puruṣārtha eva heturna kenacīkāryate karaṇam* || 31||我意是因緣；無有別教作 *(T2137:54.1253.a16-17)*.

²⁸¹ Kuiji’s *Great Commentary on the Nyāyapravesa śāstra* preserves a polemical line of Buddhist anti-Sāṅkhya argument wherein the Buddhist disputant avails himself of the agreed-upon premise that “the ātman is classified under the *tattvas,*” to attempt to discredit the doctrine of the spiritual soul. The negative thesis that it is enlisted to support is that “the ātman must be impermanent.” Specifically, Kuiji classifies this inference as an inference agreed upon commonly within Buddhist traditions. Kuiji further argues that it should withstand the scrutiny of Sāṅkhya opponents because the example provided of “the 23 *tattvas* below *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*” evinces invariable concomitance with the property indicated by the reason *(hetu)* – namely, “belonging to the *tattvas.*” Kuiji states that the inference meets the third criteria for valid reasons in that the “the target property *(sādhya)* is completely absent from the negative example *(vipakṣa).*” In other words, *prakṛti* is considered to be permanent. 如以佛法破數論。云汝我無常，許諸識故。如許大等。此他比量無常之宗。二十三諦為同品。以自性為異品。許諸識攝因。於同異品皆悉遍有。故是他共.
Chapter 2: What Is Dying?

consciousness, and prakṛti (Chi.: zixing 自性),282 the source of matter, or “Ur-matter,” (Watson, 2006) — combine to form a human being. It holds that the nature of the human being is dual and composed of the spiritual aspects of puruṣa and the material aspects of prakṛti. Sāṅkhya means “enumeration” (Chi.: Shulun 數論)283 and references the Sāṅkhya scholars’ penchant for deriving lengthy and “exhaustive classifications” (Skt.: samgrahas; Chi.: she 攝).

According to the Sāṅkhya tradition, Kāpila receives the teachings of the twenty-five tattvas from Mahēśvara, who states: “Those who know these twenty-five tattvas, know the immutable, root cause of nature.”284 With this statement, the deity proclaims that the twenty-five tattvas contain the keys to wisdom and liberation. According to this doctrine, the puruṣa, or the soul, is the first tattva, from which the subsequent twenty-four tattvas evolve.

Because it represents the foundational doctrine of the Sāṅkhya Brahmanical school, Xuanzang must contend with the taxonomy of the twenty-five tattvas. The placement of the puruṣa at the head of the list of the tattvas demonstrates how consciousness, or sentience, comprises the primary element from which all other aspects of the human being evolve.285 Xuanzang takes issue

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282 Chinese nomenclature takes zixing 自性 as equivalent to both pradhana and prakṛti – See Paramartha’s translation of SK stanza 22 reads: | 自性次第生；大我慢十六；十六內有五；從此生五大 Prakṛtermahāhāstato haṅkārastasmād gaṇaśca śodāsakāḥ| Tasmādapi śodāsakāt pañcambhyah pañca bhūtāni||

In its glosses on SK 22.a, the vṛtti prose-commentary on this verse transmitted along with Paramartha’s Chi. translation of said verse takes the Chi. character diad zixing as synonymous for a range of terms: 自性次第者生。自性者。或名勝因。或名為梵。或名眾持。若次第生者。自性本有故，則無所從生.

283 The standard Chinese translation of Sāṅkhya means, literally, “number theory.”

284 “Prakṛti is the immutable, root cause [of life]. The ātman is the knower (jñātṛ). Those who know the sphere of the genuine reality of 25 tattvas, and who know that they are neither increasing nor decreasing, attain determinate and final liberation from the three forms of suffering. As proclaimed in the stanzas on liberation (mokṣa) – if one knows the 25 tattvas, and abides in them in each and every place along the course of practice, in braiding their hair and sideburns, while tonsuring the top of the head, one will no doubt attain liberation.” (自性者無異本因。我者知者。諸人知此二十五真實之境不增不減決定脫三苦。如解脫中說偈。若知二十五隨處隨道住。編髪髻剃頭得解脫無疑 (T2137:54.1245.c05-08).

285 Zhizhou points to an analytical distinction between two different Chinese translations of the second tattva – prakṛti. Zhizhou states that the term “predominating nature” is reserved for pradhana, while self-nature is reserved for prakṛti. In his subglosses on Kuiji’s Great Commentary on the Nyāyaapraveśa, Zhizhou writes:
with the primacy of the sentient self in the *Sāṅkhya* taxonomy, as he sees the *puruṣa* as conflated with, if not equivalent to, the soul. In the *Sāṅkhya* schema, the *puruṣa* is the animator of life, and the first *tattva* upon which all other *tattvas* are stacked. Xuanzang must address the issue of the *puruṣa* in the *Sāṅkhya* taxonomy if he is to further his agenda of expiating the soul from Chinese Buddhism.

The *Sāṅkhya* schema of the twenty-five *tattvas* begins with *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. The primordial elements of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*, according to the *Sāṅkhya* theory, capture the countervailing forces of mind and matter, the dual elements from which all life forms evolve. The first *tattva*, the *puruṣa*, is the center of consciousness and the spiritual nature of the human. The second *tattva*, the *prakṛti*, is the center of material energy, the source from which all matter is composed. *Prakṛti* is composed of the three vital qualities: life (Skt.: *sattva*), passion (Skt.: *rajas*), and ignorance (Skt.: *tamas*). In the *Sāṅkhya* theory, admixtures of these three elements form the personality, the temperament, and the somatic characteristics of the person.

According to Gauḍapada, the earliest Sanskritic commentator on the *Sāṅkhya-kārikās*, the union of the first two *tattvas* of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* is like the union of a “sighted lame man” with a “blind able-bodied man” (Stanza 21). The sighted and the blind men together comprise a human being, with a full range of visual and ambulatory capacities. The analogy constructed by Gauḍapada avers that pure consciousness and matter alone do not comprise an entity. It is the union of the first and second *tattvas* of the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* that creates a human with a full

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“Predominating nature (*pradhāna*) terms that which will realize greatness (i.e., the third *tattva*). Self-nature only terms the unmanifest 23 *tattvas* (below *prakṛti/pradhāna*). When they seek to manifest themselves then they are termed “greatness” *mahat*.” 將成大等亦名勝性者。未變二十三諦但名自性將欲變時即名大等也.

range of sensory, bodily, and psychological functioning.

The third *tattva* in this schema is *mahat*, or the greatness of the universal mind. *Mahat* emerges from the union of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* and describes pure consciousness. *Mahat*, in turn, gives rise to the fourth *tattva*, “ego-making,” or *ahaṅkāra*. Gauḍapada states: “From greatness (Skt.: *mahat*), the ego or *ahaṅkāra* (Skt.: *vaikṛta, taijas*) is born.” *Ahaṅkāra* is the state of mind that interprets subjective experience and the force that enlivens the *tattvas*. *Ahaṅkāra* is the element that mediates consciousness with the activities of the other *tattvas*. It is the task-master that activates the *tattvas* to perform their designated functions. Without the power of *ahaṅkāra*, or ego-making, the transformation of the material elements of *prakṛti* into the organs of the body would not be possible. Stanza twenty-two of the *Sāṅkhyakārikās* enunciates the idea that the transformation of the material elements into a fully-fledged human being is enabled by *ahaṅkāra*. While ultimately responsible for sustaining the body, the *ahaṅkāra* does the bidding of the soul and more specifically the *puruṣa*, the core part of the soul, and the first and foremost *tattva* of the twenty-five *tattvas* in the Sāṅkhya taxonomy.

The fifth though ninth *tattvas* are the units of the material world that are perceived by humans through their senses of hearing, vision, touch, taste, and smell. The tenth through the fourteen *tattvas* are the massive elements of earth, water, fire, wind, and ether that comprise the physical universe. The fifteenth through the nineteenth *tattvas* are the sensory faculties of hearing,

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287 Dingbin’s *Vinaya* commentary provides some elaboration on the process of *ahaṅkāra*’s emerging from the union of the first two *tattvas*: “In first place there is primordial nature (*pradhāna*). Alone, it remains dormant and unaroused. In second place there are the twenty-three *tattvas* including *mahat*, which arouse the perception and awareness. The second *tattva* (i.e., *prakṛti*) is great – this greatness is born out of the transformations of primordial nature. We liken it to the sprout that grows out of the seed – it gradually expands and fleshes out. In the third place is the *tattva* of ego-making, which refers to the ego-making tendencies dependent upon the soul. This is the very nature of the soul. From this very nature, greatness is born.”

288 This is actually Dutt’s (1933, p. 34) translation, with modifications.
vision, taste, smell, and touch. The twentieth though the twenty-fourth tattvas are the faculties of grasping, locomotion, speech, procreation, and the excretion of liquid and solid wastes. The twenty-fifth tattva is the faculty of intelligence. This tattva is the most evolved of the tattvas and oversees the coordinated activities of the sensory, material, and intellectual tattvas.

The twenty-second stanza of the Sāṅkhyakārikās enumerates the sixteen gaṇas, or vikāras, that are produced by the ahaṅkāra under the direction of the puruṣa for the pleasure of the ātman.\(^{289}\) The Chinese translation of gaṇa is tool or apparatus (Chi.: ju具). The Sanskrit translation of gaṇa includes the concept of the tool, but additionally implies that the gaṇa is in the service of, or used by, a superior entity. Within the Sāṅkhya schema, the sixteen gaṇas are produced when the ahaṅkāra binds puruṣa and prakṛti into the tools that are used to execute bodily and cognitive activities. In this process, the gaṇas become the mechanisms used by the ahaṅkāra to generate the activities, such as breathing and moving, that are necessary to sustain human life. The actions of the gaṇas are willed by the puruṣa.

The first five gaṇas in the taxonomy are called the tanmātras (Chi.: weiliang唯量). The Chinese translation of tanmātras is “things that are simply perceived.” The tanmātras correspond to tattvas five through nine, and are composed of the stimuli that are first perceived by the sensory mechanisms and then proceed to activate the sensory apparatus. The taxonomy of the tanmātras includes tactile objects, sounds, colors, flavors and smells. The remaining eleven gaṇas in the

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\(^{289}\) The vr̥tti prose-commentary on SK, stanza 19 enumerates the sixteen gaṇas that are produced by ahamkāra: “Ahamkāra produces sixteen [gaṇas] in sequential order. The sixteen [gaṇas] include, firstly, the five tanmātras. The five tanmātras are sound, touch, color, flavor, and odor. Odorful things are, by nature, things that are capable of being smelt. Then, there are the five ordinary sense faculties. The five ordinary sense faculties are audition, tactition, vision, taste, and smell. Then come the five karmēndriyāṇi. The five karmēndriyāṇi are speaking, grasping, locomotion, procreation, and excretion. Then comes the mental faculty. These are the sixteen [gaṇas] that are born from ahamkāra. Therefore, we say that greatness and ahamkāra make sixteen gaṇas.”慢次生十六。十六者。一五唯。五唯者。一聲二觸三色四味五香。是香物唯體唯能。次五知根。五知根者。一耳二皮三眼四舌五鼻。次五作根。五作根者。一舌二手三足四男女五大遺。次心根。是十六從我慢生。故說大我慢十六。
taxonomy of the sixteen gaṇas correspond to tattvas fifteen through twenty-five and include audition, tactition, sight, taste, olfaction, grasping, locomotion, speech, procreation, excretion and finally the tattva of the mind. These eleven gaṇas correspond to the eleven indriyas, or tattvas fifteen through twenty-five in the Sāṅkhyaakārikās taxonomy of the faculties. Importantly, the eleven indriyas form a line of demarcation in the taxonomy between the human being and the non-human being. Within the Sāṅkhya schema, the eleven indriyas accomplish the physical and mental activities necessary for the generation and survival of the human being. The eleven indriyas bend to the will of the “taskmaster,” or to the ahaṅkāra, and ultimately to the intention of the puruṣa, the first tattva and the supreme “owner” of the body.

The Twenty-Five Tattvas and the Eleven Faculties in the Sāṅkhya System

The Sāṅkhya taxonomy of the twenty-five tattvas is intended to describe the building blocks of life. Beginning with the puruṣa and prakṛti, the taxonomy of the twenty-five tattvas explains how human life, including the material organs, sensory capacities, physical actions and psychological states, evolves from pure consciousness and primeval matter. Within this classical schema, the eleven indriyas are viewed as the elements necessary to perform the functions necessary to sustain human life. The eleven indriyas, or the embodied faculties, are directly involved in the activities of the physical body and the conscious mind.

The Brāhmaṇical taxonomy of Sāṅkhyaakārikās clusters the eleven indriyas of the human being into the five indriyas of physical action (Skt.: pañca-karmēndriyāṇi; Chi.: wu zuoye-gen五作業根), the five indriyas of the ordinary senses (Skt.: pañca-prajñēndriyāṇi; Chi.: 五知根), and the indriya of the mind (Skt.: buddhīndriyam; mānēndriyam). According to the sequence standardized in the twenty-sixth stanza of the Sāṅkhyaakārikās, the five faculties of physical action
include the faculties of grasping [lit., the faculty of hands], locomotion,\textsuperscript{290} vocalization, excretion, and procreation 舌手足人根大遺. The indriyas of the ordinary sense faculties are hearing, tactition, vision, gustation, and olfaction 耳皮眼舌鼻.\textsuperscript{291} The eleventh faculty of the mind oversees and registers the sensations and physical inputs that are generated by the faculties of physical action and the senses.

In his commentary on the twenty-seventh stanza of the \textit{Sāṅkhyaārikās}, Gauḍapada writes: “The faculties of action indicate [the faculties that] perform action. Among these, the voice speaks; the two hands perform all manner of transaction, the two feet move to and fro; the anus operates to excrete solid waste; the generative organ (Skt.: \textit{upastha}) functions to procreate.”\textsuperscript{292} Each description of the five sensory and the five physical faculties in the Sāṅkhya taxonomy is a metonymy for the corresponding physical and sensory apparatus. For example, the legs are metonymical for the physical activity of locomotion, and the ears are metonymical for the auditory apparatus.

In the theater of sensory and bodily activity, the \textit{puruṣa} plays the role of an “observer” (Skt.: \textit{prekṣavat}) or “mere witness” (Skt: \textit{ālocanamātra}; \textit{sākṣitatva}; \textit{draṣṭṛvā}).\textsuperscript{293} In the words of the nineteenth stanza of the \textit{Sāṅkhyaārikās}, the \textit{puruṣa} is “a seer and not a doer” (Skt.: \textit{draṣṭṛtvam akartṛtvabhāva}).\textsuperscript{294} The \textit{puruṣa}, in the metaphor of the theater, sits in the audience. Because it is

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{290} Paramārtha’s \textit{vṛtti} commentary on \textit{Sāṅkhyaārikās}, verse 27, glosses the faculty of locomotion as: “the capability of moving the lower torso below the navel.” 足在下分，能行臍下(T2137:54.1252.b09).
\item \textsuperscript{291} There are various Chinese renderings of these two sets of ten items total, but Paramārtha’s are generally accepted as standard, with minor variations by Xuanzang. See Paramārtha's trans. of Guṇamati's \textit{Lakṣaṇa-sāstra} (Chi.: \textit{Suixiang lun} 隨相論).
\item \textsuperscript{292} Dutt, ed., \textit{Sāṅkhyaārikās}, 27.
\item \textsuperscript{293} These three terms appear throughout the \textit{Sāṅkhyaārikās}, and are roughly synonymous in the sense of “being a mere witnesser.” The locus classicus for this idea, and the first time it appears in the text is at stanza 19, hemistich b in Chinese 我證義成立 (T2137:54.1250.a03); hemistich d in the Skt., see Dutt, ed., \textit{Sāṅkhyaārikās}, 22.
\item \textsuperscript{294} Dutt, ed., \textit{Sāṅkhyaārikās}, 22.
\end{itemize}
essentially a passive observer, the puruṣa requires an intermediary to direct the faculties of the senses and of physical action. This intermediary is “the active one” or the vaiṝtya-ahaṅkāra. The vaiṝtya-ahaṅkāra is viewed as a surrogate for the puruṣa in that it is deputized by the puruṣa to direct the activities of the indriyas. The vaiṝtya-ahaṅkāra is also depicted as an appendage (Skt.: aṅga) to the puruṣa, in the way that the legs are connected to the torso. Because the ātman is composed of the puruṣa and the ahaṅkāra, the vaiṝtya-ahaṅkāra is seen, within this schema, as the active agent of the ātman.

At the heart of the Sāṅkhya税收 taxonomy of the tattvas is the conceptualization of how life comes about and comes to an end. The foundational premise of the theory is that all human and non-human life begins with the union of the puruṣa, or mind, and prakṛti, or matter. As the puruṣa, prakṛti, mahat, and ahaṅkāra work together to enliven the subsequent twenty-one tattvas, various forms of life emerge. Human life begins with the generation of tattvas fifteen through twenty-five in the Sāṅkhya taxonomy, the eleven indriyas. The line of demarcation between human and non-human life is at the fifteenth tattva.

The puruṣa, as the first tattva of consciousness, plays the foundational role of imbuing with life the twenty-four tattvas, including the eleven indriyas that comprise the human being. Because the generation of life implicates of all the twenty-five tattvas in the Sāṅkhya taxonomy, it follows that the process of dying involves the degeneration of the twenty-five tattvas as well. Therefore, if human life begins with the generation of the eleven indriyas, then human dying necessarily begins with the degeneration of the eleven indriyas. Within the Sāṅkhya theory, the departure of the puruṣa initiates the degeneration of the eleven indriyas and therefore the process of dying. In this doctrine, the puruṣa is defined as the creator and the destroyer of the indriyas.
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The Generation of the Eleven Faculties According to the Sāṅkhya Doctrine

The last third of the venerable Sāṅkhya-kārikās is dedicated to a description of how the eleven indriyas are created through a process of ego-creation or ego-making (Skt.: ahaṅkāra; Chi.: wo-man 我慢; wo-zhi 我執). In this process, the soul, in the form of the puruṣa, prakṛti, mahat, and ahaṅkāra, creates the eleven indriyas that together perform the cognitive and physical activities of the human being. Verse twenty-seven of the Sāṅkhya-kārikās states that the formation of the eleven human indriyas involves the ahaṅkāra, or the “ego-maker.” In this picture, the ahaṅkāra does the bidding of puruṣa by impelling the eleven indriyas to take up the tasks involved in the business of being human.

The role of the ahaṅkāra in the creation of the human life is central within the Sāṅkhya theory. This is because the ahaṅkāra is anointed by the puruṣa with the power to imbue the eleven indriyas with the vitality of life and consciousness. The Sāṅkhya-kārikās depict the ahaṅkāra as the agent of the puruṣa who is deputized to imbue the eleven indriyas with the life force that initiates the sensory and physical activities and activates the various appendages and parts of the body. The Sāṅkhya-kārikās also view the ahaṅkāra as the power behind the puruṣa to endow the human being with aspects of consciousness that include self-determination (Skt.: adhyavasāya; adhyavaseya), cognition, and metacognition.

The Degeneration of the Eleven Faculties According to the Sāṅkhya Doctrine

According to the Sāṅkhya doctrine, the degeneration of the eleven indriyas begins with the departure of the first tattva, the puruṣa, from the body. Because all tattvas are animated by the life-giving force of the puruṣa, the removal of the first tattva sets into motion a process by which the subsequent twenty-four tattvas begin to collapse. Dying occurs as the life-giving force of the

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295 Paramārtha, vṛtti commentary on the 15th stanza of Sāṅkhya-kārikas (T2137:54.1248.c29-30): “When the five tanmātras and the eleven faculties die out, there is no differentiation between the five tanmātras. This continues
puruṣa withdraws, causing tattvas fifteen through twenty-five, the eleven indriyas that sustain the life of the human, to disintegrate.

According to the Sāṅkhya tradition, at the time of the biological death of a human, the spiritual soul is liberated from its bodily fetters. In the penultimate stanza of the sacred seventy-stanza Sāṅkhya kārikās, the death of the human is articulated in terms of the loss of the puruṣa and the resultant deterioration of the material body. The time of dying is described in stanza sixty-nine of the Sāṅkhya kārikās and in the early Sāṅkhya commentaries as a gradual process whereby the psychic person survives in the form of the puruṣa and the physical faculties degenerate. In this process, the puruṣa is extricated from the body and released into space in the form of an “ethereal body” (Skt.: guhyāśarīra: Chi.: xishen 細神). The guhyāśarīra is concealed during life. It emerges in the process of dying and provides the puruṣa with a container within which it transmigrates into the ether for reincarnation into another corporeal body. The Sāṅkhya kārikās describe the act of departing the body as requiring the sheer determination (Skt.: adhyavas) and decisive will (Skt: atyāntikam; Chi.: bijing 即竟) of the puruṣa. Once deserted by the puruṣa, the body no longer contains the “mental effort” 296 or the “resolution or determination” (Skt.: adhyavasāya, adhyavaseya; Chi.: jue-ding 决定) 297 to survive. At this point, the body lacks life.

The second line of stanza sixty-nine describes how the corporeal body, once deserted by the puruṣa, decompensates into inert material elements. The abdication of the puruṣa reveals the material and elemental aspects of the body 捨身時事顯 (自性) 298 that do not transmigrate. Paramārtha, in his commentary to the Sāṅkhya kārikās, writes: “What is left behind by biological

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296 Definition found in Sir. Monier-Williams Skt. Dictionary.
298 T2137:54.1261.c22.
death reverts to its primordial state by gradually decomposing into the constituent elements of the earth, water, wind, fire, and ether.”

As described in the Sāṅkhya-kārikās, when the puruṣa departs the body, the process of dying continues with the degeneration of the five ordinary senses. The sensory faculties of hearing, vision, taste, smell, and touch emerge from the five great eternal elements (Skt.: mahābhūtas) of space, fire, water, earth and wind. In the earliest surviving Sanskrit commentary by Gauḍapada and in the Chinese translation and exegesis of stanza sixty-nine, the five elements that compose the material objects of the five sense faculties (Skt.: prājñāndriyāṇi) disintegrate in the process of dying. The senses are thus deprived of their objective bases in the outside environment. Because they are composed of the five tanmātras (wu weiliang五唯量), or “the perceived form of five greatnesses” (Chi.: wu da五大), the senses then undergo a “reversion to the primordial state” (Skt.: pradhānanivṛtti). Essentially they return to their original status as five great elements, or mahabutās. Each great eternal element that makes up part of a sensory faculty is related primarily to one or more tanmātras.

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299 Jin qishi lun, fascicle three, stanza 68 vṛtti commentary (T2137:54.1261.c24): “Right when the body is deserted the karmic factors and non-factors previously produced, are annihilated. Right at this time that the body is deserted, the earthly great elements revert to the corresponding elements outside the body. This continues until the interior cavities within the body have reverted to the corresponding space/ether outside. This continues until the point that the mental faculty has reverted back to the five subtle/sensible elements (tanmātras).” 捨身時者，先所作法非法滅時，正捨此身時。內身有地大。還外地相應。乃至內空亦還空大。五根還五唯，乃至心根，亦還五唯。

300 Dutt, ed., Sāṅkhya-kārikās, 90-91.

301 The five elements have functional integrity with the five sensory organs, which allows us to perceive the external environment. Their presence is the reason for the existence of the senses themselves. However, according to the prose commentaries on Sāṅkhya-kārika 68, with the dissolution of the body the five subtle elements composing the five cognitive faculties (prājñāndriyāṇi) returns to their original basis in the external environment, such that bodily wind is released into the atmosphere, earth-based material returns to the earth, mutatis mutandis.

302 The vṛtti-style prose commentary transmitted by Paramārtha unpacks the rubric of five tanmātras and explains their correlation to five “massive elements” or mahābhūtas. See Jin qishi lun, fasc. 1, (T2137:54.1251.c17-22): “The faculty of audition is produced solely from sound (śabda) and it is of the same kind as the great element (mahat) of space – for this reason it can grasp sounds. The faculty of tactition is produced solely from contact (sparśa), and it is of the same kind as the great element of space/ether (Skt.: ākāśa) – for this reason it can only grasp sounds. The faculty of vision is produced solely from visible material and is of the same kind as the great
wind, and fire. Therefore, the decomposition of the sensory indriyas occurs when the body is abandoned by the mahābhūtas of earth, water, wind, fire, and ether.

The fourth century C.E. Buddhist scholar Guṇamati writes: “Because the five sensory faculties are born out of the five great material elements, when the five sensory faculties are annihilated, they revert into the five great elements of the material world. When the auditory faculty is annihilated, it reverts into ether, and when the ocular faculty is annihilated, it reverts into fire, when the taste faculty is annihilated it reverts into the watery element, smell reverts into the earth, and touch reverts into wind. Therefore, all of these factors [of the indriyas] are eternal.”

The five indriyas of the senses are considered to be eternal because they exist as part of five great elements that make up the physical universe.

As depicted in the penultimate verse of the Sāṅkhyakārikās, the soul, in the form of the psychic person or puruṣa that is encapsulated in a mystical or subtle body (Skt.: sūkṣmāśarīra), survives death. The psychic person does not meet its end with biological death. Rather, at the time of death, the psychic person assumes a new subtle body, thereby avoiding the demise of the gross body. At this point, the body is a corpse, bereft of its animating principle. It returns to its primordial basis in the earth, and the psychic person, in the form of the puruṣa, hurtles off into the ether and the afterlife.

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303 Tattvasiddhi śāstra, chapter 474 (T1646:32.266.b24) describes the case of the auditory faculty: “When the human dies the auditory faculty reverts into the ether”人死耳根還歸虛空.

304 T32n1641p0167a17-19.
The Puruṣa and the Tattvas in the Sāṅkhya System

The Sāṅkhya theory of the tattvas is predicated upon the assumption that the puruṣa functions as the primary animator of the eleven indriyas and the body. In the text of the Sāṅkhya kārikās, the puruṣa is depicted as a charioteer who stands in the chariot of the body, holds the reins of the indriyas, and directs the movement of the chariot and the actions of the indriyas. In this picture, according to Frauwallner (1956, 1973), the indriyas function as the “work horses” who supply the “horse power” required to pull the chariot of the body forward. The ancient metaphor of the puruṣa as the charioteer provides a vivid example of how the Sāṅkhya theorists envision the relationship between the puruṣa, the indriyas and the body. The puruṣa, as the first tattva in the Sāṅkhya taxonomy, is pure consciousness and, by definition, disembodied. Therefore, the puruṣa requires a body and the power of the indriyas to animate life, just as the charioteer requires a chariot and the power of the horses to drive forward.

According to the Sāṅkhya theory, the puruṣa inhabits a living body furnished with senses, faculties for action, and a sentient mind upon which its intelligence relies. The puruṣa is imbued with buddhi, or conscious awareness, by the third tattva in the taxonomy, mahat, or greatness. Buddhi is great because it endows the puruṣa with the intelligence required to operate the faculties in a skillful and coordinated way.

The puruṣa is the core of the Sāṅkhya kārikās explanation of karma and the question of who

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305 See Ratié & Eltschinger (2013, pp. 153-4) for the Sāṅkhya karika commentarial sources containing the formal analogy of how Devadatta drives the chariot in the same way that the purusa “drives” or impels the senses. Ratie and Eltschinger note in particular the Māṭharāvṛtti, a commentary on SK, where Māṭhara specifies that where a bed, a chariot, or a house are for the individual, e.g., Devadatta, who lies in a bed, drives a chariot, and inhabits a house.”

306 Frauwallner, History of Indian Philosophy, trans. Bedekar (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1973), 15, concludes about this simile: “The body is, therefore, like a tool, from the activity of which one concludes about somebody who handles it.” This study contends that the role of the indriyas in this picture is as the “house-power” propelling the whole chariot.
is responsible for the effects of karma. However, the seminal stanzas of the Sāṅkhya tradition make the important qualification that the *puruṣa*, in and of itself, is not an active agent, or a *kartṛ*. Bryant (2013) points out that the important difference between the “Platonic and Abrahamic notions of the soul” is that the idea of the soul, according to the classical Sāṅkhya doctrine, does not directly manifest activities of a cognitive or physical nature.\(^\text{307}\)

While the *vaikṛtya* ego manipulates the eleven faculties and is transformed in the process, the psychic person or the *puruṣa* remains unmodifiable. Paramārtha’s prose commentary to the fifty-fifth verse describes the True Soul (Ch.: *Zhenwo 真我*) as “neither increasing nor decreasing.”\(^\text{308}\) The term True Soul signifies the pure standing, and the seat of the soul within the *puruṣa*, that remains perennially unperturbed by the vacillations of the senses. This unalloyed form of the *puruṣa* provides a *principium individuationis* for the individual human that differentiates her, him, or them from other people.\(^\text{309}\) The *puruṣa* is the essential part of the soul whose presence makes for the continuation of the human individual. The *puruṣa* can thus be regarded as the *sine qua non* for human survival, precisely because it resides only in living bodies and because it

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\(^\text{307}\) Bryant writes: “Unlike the Platonic and Abrahamic notions of soul, there are no psychic functions inherent in the *ātman* in Sāṅkhya. The *ātman* is covered by buddhi, intelligence; *ahaṁkāra*, ego; and *manas*, mind; but these are distinct, separable, and inanimate coverings of subtle *prakṛti* (at to be ultimately and ideally uncoupled from *ātman*, for the latter’s liberation from *sāṁsāra*, the cycle of birth and death, to take place).” This study contends that Bryant’s remarks about the separable of the *ātman* from buddhi – the third *tattva* – apply with respect to the relationship between *puruṣa* and buddhi. E.F. Bryant., “Agency in Sāṁkhya and Yoga,” in M.R. Dasti and Bryant, eds., *Free Will, Agency, and Selfhood in Indian Philosophy* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2013), 7.

\(^\text{308}\) In his *Evolution of the Soul*, the dualist philosopher Swinburne, *The Evolution of the Soul* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1987), 145 argues that “the dualist would claim that souls do feel and believe, even if we do not naturally talk in that way. In ordinary talk perhaps minds, rather than souls, are, however, often given mental predicates – to be said to imagine things or feel weary, for instance.”

\(^\text{309}\) For the Sāṅkhya soul as *principium individuationis* between individuals, see Watson (2006), pp. 60-70; pp. 166-175, *passim*. 

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eventually deserts the mortal body at death.\textsuperscript{310}

In his examination of the relationship between \textit{puruṣa} and the \textit{indriyas}, Xuanzang takes issue with the Sāṅkhya conceptualization of the \textit{puruṣa} as the principal force that directs the activities of the eleven \textit{indriyas} and the body. For Xuanzang, the conceptualization of the \textit{puruṣa} as an animator, director, or charioteer is antithetical to the three central tenets regarding the nature of the \textit{indriyas}: one, that the \textit{indriyas} do not operate autonomously; two, that the coordinated actions of the \textit{indriyas} produce all of the activities of the body, ranging from sensory perception to cognition, and three, that at least three \textit{indriyas} working together are required to sustain life. To Xuanzang, the primacy of the soul within the Sāṅkhya theory conflicts with the core Buddhist theory that views the coordinated actions of the \textit{indriyas} as all that is necessary to explain living and dying.

**Kuiji’s Twenty-Six \textit{Tattva} Taxonomy**

The classical Sāṅkhya doctrine, articulated in the \textit{Sāṅkhyaakārikās}, postulates a set of twenty-five \textit{tattvas} that comprise the range of the physical and psychological activities of a human being. In his commentary on the Sāṅkhya taxonomy of the twenty-five \textit{tattvas}, found in the \textit{Gateway to Logic}, Kuiji, Xuanzang’s prominent disciple, states that, for Sāṅkhya, the “spirit-cum-ātman” (Chi.: \textit{shenwo}) can be fully classified under the \textit{tattvas}.\textsuperscript{311} Within the Sāṅkhya picture, a

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\textsuperscript{310} See Watson, \textit{The Self’s Awareness of Itself}, 60-70, passim, on the Sāṅkhya idea of the soul as the principle for individuating different human beings. Watson traces the evolution of the doctrine of the soul from the early, pre-classical context of the Upanisads and the Bhagavad-gīta, wherein the emphasis lies upon the “unity of Brahman and ātman,” \textit{(Fan Wo he-yi 梵我合一)} to the classical doctrine that postulates the soul as the singular essence of an individual human being.

\textsuperscript{311} In his commentary on the \textit{Nyāyapraveśa śāstra} (T1830:43.252, b26-29) Kuiji explains the spirit-cum ātman in terms of the collection of twenty-five \textit{tattvas} that fall into nine groups. Kuiji writes: “Generally, the twenty five \textit{tattvas} are ninefold: first, there is \textit{prakṛti}; second, there is mahat; third, \textit{ahaṅkāra}; fourth, the five \textit{tanmātras}; six, the five cognitive faculties; seven, the five faculties of action; eighth, the faculty of intelligence; and ninth, the self qua knower.” 廣為二十五諦。一自性。二大。三我執。四五唯。五五大。六五知根。七五作業根。
soul is composed of an admixture of twenty-five *tattvas*, with the soul in the position of utmost primacy.

In his exegesis of the Sāṅkhya taxonomy, Kuiji highlights the idea that the soul is not separate, but rather a collection of all of the *tattvas*. In his schema of the *tattvas*, located in the *Great Commentary on the Nyāyapraveśa šāstra* (Yinming Zhengli lun dashu因明正理門論大疏) Kuiji includes a twenty-sixth *tattva*, the “spirit-cum ātman,” or “the self-as-knower,” that follows the twenty-fifth *tattva* of *buddhîndriyam*, the faculty of intelligence. Kuiji’s twenty-six *tattva* is the intelligent individual that is invested with all of the preceding twenty-five *tattvas* in the classical Sāṅkhya taxonomy.

Kuiji’s taxonomy is significant in that he demonstrates that the soul is not separate or singular, but composed of all twenty-five elements. Paramārtha’s commentary on the fifty-first stanza of the *Sāṅkhyakārikās* refers to the soul as the bearer or the container of the *tattvas*, or the “true soul.” Kuiji equates this terminology with *zhenwo*, or the “spirit-cum-ātman.” The spirit-cum-ātman is distinctly different from the *puruṣa*, the first *tattva*, in that it possesses both a material body and pure consciousness. Unlike the *puruṣa*, it is an active knower and doer of things in life, whereas the *puruṣa* is passive and requires intermediaries to conduct the activities of living. Kuiji’s formulation draws attention to the fact that the soul, as defined in the *Sāṅkhyakārikās*, is composed of many parts and cannot be easily disaggregated from the body and the *indriyas*.

Kuiji’s twenty-six-*tattva* taxonomy is intended to reflect the doctrinal agenda endorsed by

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8. 八心平等根。九我知者. See edition of Mei Deyu 梅德愚 (Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju, 2013), vol. 2, 414; also see Kuiji’s *Study Notes on the CWSL* for this ninefold grouping (T1840:44.117.a13-16).

312 Within this body of exegesis developed across a number of his commentarial works, but laid out most succinctly in his *Great Commentary on the Nyāyapraveśa*, Kuiji slots the 25 *tattvas* into nine categories. The ninth category includes the self *qua* knower, to which he attaches the pejorative label, “spirit-cum-ātman.”

313 *Jin qishi lun*, T2137:54.1258.a08-9.
Chapter 2: What Is Dying?

Xuanzang that views the senses, vitality, and consciousness as encompassed within the entirety of the body. In his conceptualization of the spirit-cum-ātman, Kuiji views the soul in the Sāṅkhya taxonomy as the aggregation of the twenty-five tattvas. Kuiji regards the first tattva, the puruṣa, as pure consciousness, and therefore as insufficient to perform the myriad and complex activities of the soul. Xuanzang endorses Kuiji’s view that the depiction of the Sāṅkhya puruṣa does not provide a robust description of how the soul realizes the activities of living. Additionally, Xuanzang is concerned with what he regards as a misconstrued definition of the soul and the puruṣa and how subsequent philosophers misleadingly and mistakenly conflate the soul with the puruṣa.

Xuanzang intends to discredit the concept of a life-giving spirit that is separate from the indriyas. Kuiji’s phrase spirit-cum-ātman is an inside joke, a tongue-in-cheek jab at the unobservable and occult spirits that he and Xuanzang believe haunt the Sāṅkhya theories. Kuiji’s analysis of the Sāṅkhya schema furthers Xuanzang’s theory that the indriyas alone are required for survival and fortifies their agenda of isolating and expiating the notion of a soul from Chinese Buddhism.

Kuiji’s Sāṅkhya taxonomy of the twenty-five tattvas is illustrated in the following:

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314 This diagram of the 25 tattvas is adapted from an encyclopedic Japanese 19th-century work of exegesis on the CWSL, entitled Crown and Guide to the CWSL (Jpn: Kandō jōyuishiki ron 冠導成唯識論), p. 60, reeto. It is essentially derived from Kuiji’s exegesis on the 25 tattvas located in his Great Commentary on the Nyāyapraśaṇa śāstra.
Xuanzang’s Disputes with the Plain-Spoken Brāhmin at Nālanda University

In his exegesis of dying, Xuanzang must address five central doctrinal issues within the Sāṅkhya theory of the tattvas. Xuanzang draws upon his vast and detailed understanding of the Sāṅkhyaacārikās to undermine these five theoretical linchpins in the doctrine of the Sāṅkhya soul.
These concepts are the idea of the soul as the locus of sensory experience; the notion of the soul as the bearer of the twenty-five \textit{tattvas}; the role of the \textit{ahaṅkāra} in the functioning of the soul; the idea that the soul is endowed with three vital qualities that enable the body to survive: \textit{sattva}, \textit{rajas}, and \textit{tamas}; and finally, the depiction of the soul, or the \textit{ātman}, as the master of the eleven \textit{indriyas}.

As these five ideas form the foundation of the \textit{Śaṅkhya} conceptualization of dying, Xuanzang takes great care to address them within his extensive translation corpus and within his original works, the \textit{CWSL} and the \textit{Demonstration of Consciousness-Only}. To support his argument that the loss of the soul is not necessary to explain dying, Xuanzang must refute the notion of the soul as described within the overarching \textit{Śaṅkhya} theory of the \textit{tattvas}.

In addition to his translation corpus, Xuanzang’s methodical discussions of the \textit{Śaṅkhya} relationship between the soul and the \textit{indriyas} are found in \textit{The Biography of the Tripiṭaka Master Xuanzang}, composed in 665 C.E. by his loyal disciple and acolyte, Huili. While it can be aptly described as a hagiography, Huili’s biography contains the records and transcripts of important testimonies and debates conducted by Xuanzang while he was residing in India. The debate between Xuanzang and Suwen, the Plain-Spoken Brāhmin, held at the University of Nālanda, a large Buddhist monastery in Northern India, between 635 and 640 C.E. is recounted in the fourth fascicle of the biography. This debate is significant in that it provides a succinct representation of Xuanzang’s refutation of the \textit{Śaṅkhya} conceptualizations of the soul.

The Story of the Nālanda Debate

The narrative of this important debate begins when Xuanzang discovers sixty-four theses nailed to the gates of the Nālanda monastery.\footnote{Huili, \textit{Biography of the Tripiṭaka Master}, fasc. 4:: “At that time there was a Lokāyatika materialist who had come [to the University] to raise objections and spark dispute. At that point, he had written forty theses and had hung them from the University gate. They read: “If there is someone who can refute a single one of these theses, then I}
“There is no soul.” Another paper states: “Anyone who can prove the existence of the soul and the afterlife can decapitate me.” The papers are the handiwork of an unknown person proffering the heterodoxy of the Lokāyatika (Chi.: Shunshi dao 順世道) Materialist doctrine.

After no one is either willing or able to mount a response to the challenge of the Cārvāka Materialist, Xuanzang sends a servant, under the cover of darkness, to tear down the theses from the university gate. The servant is discovered and detained by a Brāhmin named Suwen, who also goes by the moniker of “Mr. Plain-Spoken.” The Brāhmin interrogates the servant and demands that he retrieve Xuanzang. Xuanzang appears at the Nālanda Gate and the debate with the Plain-Spoken Brāhmin ensues.

Very little is known about the Plain-Spoken Brāhmin apart from the fact that he engaged in the public debate with Xuanzang and that he was a staunch defender of the Sāṅkhya doctrine. According to Huili, the Plain-Spoken Brāhmin was a free-speech advocate who objected to the removal of the bulletins from the university gate. The actual statements of the Plain-Spoken Brāhmin in the debate are not recorded by Huili. Revealing his doctrinal bias and his unwavering support of Xuanzang, Huili presents only the arguments that uphold the Buddhist positions.
regarding no-soul, and none of the Brāhmaṇical counter-arguments.

In the audience at the dispute with the Plain-Spoken Brāhmin are faculty members from Nālanda University, disciples of Xuanzang and the Yogācāra expert and esteemed mentor of Xuanzang, Sīlabhadra. The debate opens with Xuanzang precisely, and in the proper order, reciting the twenty-five Sāṅkhya tattvas. Xuanzang states: “The Sāṅkhya establish the doctrine of twenty-five elements (tattvas). The great elements (mahats: earth, water, wind, fire, and ether) evolve from prakṛti. Ahaṅkāra evolves out of the mahats. That (prakṛti) produces, in order, the five tanmātras, five mahats [as the sense objects], and eleven indriyas. The twenty-four elements (tattvas) attend to and provide for the soul. They are enjoyed by the soul” 至如數論外道，立二十五諦義，從自性生大，從大生我執，次生五唯量，次生五大，次生十一根，此二十四並供奉於我；我所受用.

In his recitation of the doctrine of the twenty-five tattvas, Xuanzang faithfully represents the Sāṅkhya system and demonstrates his mastery of the texts of this Brāhmaṇical tradition. Huili describes how Xuanzang methodically dismantles the premises that undergird the Sāṅkhya definition of the soul, or the ātman, as a puruṣa that is endowed with a material body. In the debate, Xuanzang proves that the soul can neither be conflated with the puruṣa nor separated from the tattvas. He argues that, by definition, the Sāṅkhya soul is embedded within the tattvas and that any attempt to extricate or separate the soul from the tattvas violates a strict interpretation of the Sāṅkhya scriptures.

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316 The Chinese translation for the Sanskrit word tanmātra means, literally, “that which is known to exist merely by virtue of/by dint of being perceptible” (weiliang 唯量).

317 Puguang, Study Notes on the Kośa, fascicle 3 (T1821:41.58.a09-12): “the core of the ego is thought/thinking. By nature it is a mere experiencer/enjoyer but not an agent (kartrī). The remaining 24 tattvas are ‘mine’ (ātmiya). They are what I enjoy and put to use.” 我以思為體。性但是受者而非作者，餘二十四諦是我所。是我之所受用.
As the Nālanda University debate proceeds, Xuanzang uses the internal inconsistencies and incoherencies in the ancient textual material of the *Sāṅkhya-kārikās* to dismantle the Sāṅkhya doctrine of the existence of the soul. In doing so, he furthers his lifelong mission of expunging what he and his supporters regard as supernatural forces in the form of the ātman from Chinese Buddhism, once and for all.

**Debunking the Notion of the Soul as a Locus of Sensory Experience**

The *Sāṅkhya-kārikās* describe the soul, or the ātman, as a subject, or an active agent, that is endowed with the capacity to experience sensory phenomena. In the *Sāṅkhya-kārikās* and in the prose commentary of Gauḍapada, the ātman is described as an “enjoyer” and an “experiencer” (Skt.: bhoktṛ) of the material realm. Within the Sāṅkhya schema, “the twenty-four tattvas essentially serve and provide for the soul—they are what the soul gets to enjoy”.

The Chinese translation of the Sanskrit term bhoktṛ is a two-character compound, that means “to enjoy, and to put to use” (Chi.: shou-yong 受用). A very literal interpretation of this phrase implies that the ātman is the enjoyer and the user of the tattvas. Gauḍapada specifies that the ātman, as the enjoyer and experiencer of sensation, is composed of three parts: the puruṣa, the ahaṅkāra, and prakṛti. The ahaṅkāra serves as the active agent that, together with prakṛti, invests the remaining tattvas with the capacity for sensation. Gauḍapada makes the important distinction that the puruṣa, on its own, is not an enjoyer or experiencer of the sensory world.

After summarizing the doctrine of the tattvas at the Nālanda Gate, Xuanzang turns to the Sāṅkhya teaching of the puruṣa as the “enjoyer and experiencer” of the twenty-four tattvas.

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318 The doctrine that the purusa “experiences” sensations finds its locus classicus in the first line of stanza 17 of Sāṅkhya-kārikas, stanza 17 *saṁghātaparārthatvāt triguṇādiviparyāyādhiṣṭhānāḥ* puruṣo'stī bhokṛtyābāvāt kaivalyārtham pravṛtteḥśca || 17|| (Dutt 1933, p. 20). “Purusa exists in perfect isolation (kaivalya) because of the fact that the activity pravriti [of it] is based upon the inversion of the three qualities, and because of the fact that the compounded things (saṁghāta) exists for the purpose of someone else.”
Demonstrating his penetrating knowledge of the Sāṅkhya-kārīkas to the crowd of acolytes and protagonists attending the debate, Xuanzang faithfully represents the Sāṅkhya concept of the ātman as the subject of sensory experience and as an entity that enjoys and makes use of the tattvas. Additionally, in a rejoinder that appears in the CWSL, Xuanzang returns to discuss the Sāṅkhya concept of the ātman as the user and the enjoyer of the tattvas. Xuanzang and the compilers of the CWSL employ the metaphor of a potter who makes an earthen jar (Skt.: ghaṭa) to enjoy drinking. In this metaphor, the potter represents the soul who uses the tattvas to experience and enjoy the activities of living, in this case the pleasure of consumption.

The CWSL dismantles the notion of the soul as the enjoyer and the experiencer of the tattvas by employing his extensive knowledge of the Sāṅkhya scriptures and by highlighting the internal inconsistencies within the doctrine. The soul within the Sāṅkhya doctrine is viewed as unchanging, eternal, and unsullied. This depiction is incongruent with the picture of the soul as a user of the tattvas and an enjoyer and experiencer of the sensory world. Xuanzang capitalizes on this inconsistency in his metaphor of the soul as the potter. To Xuanzang, the humble potter who creates a cup to enjoy drinking is not equivalent to the immutable and untaintable conception of the Sāṅkhya soul.

Xuanzang avers that the Sāṅkhya conceptualization of the ātman as the enjoyer and the experiencer of the twenty-five tattvas is untenable. His argument is as follows: Because the puruṣa is eternal and unchanging, it cannot be modified by material phenomena. The capacity to experience sensation occurs as the puruṣa becomes linked with the second and third tattvas, prakṛti and ahaṅkāra, and the subsequent twenty-three tattvas. As the puruṣa, prakṛti, and ahaṅkāra activate the tattvas, the ātman, as defined by the embodied puruṣa, obtains the capacity to enjoy and experience pleasure and pain. This involves a modification of the puruṣa and places it at risk.
of contamination from the material realm. Therefore, the depiction of the essence of the ātman – the pure puruṣa – as the enjoyer and experiencer of sensation is incongruent with the definition of the ātman as unchanging, unsullied, and eternal. Xuanzang views the idea of the ātman as the experiencer and enjoyer of the tattvas as inconsistent with Śaṅkhya theory on its own terms.

Xuanzang continues to dismantle the idea of ātman as the enjoyer and experiencer of the sensory world in his translation of the Gate of Logic, a textbook used by schools of Indian philosophy spanning the Buddhist, Brāhmaṇical and Jain traditions. This text includes a three-part syllogism that attempts to prove that the soul, as constituted by the puruṣa and prakṛti, is the locus of experience. A logical argument widely maintained by Śaṅkhya commentators, the syllogism is as follows: The soul is the subject of thinking, the subject of experience and the subject of thinking about experience. The reason for this is that the soul enjoys and makes use of the twenty-three tattvas. The example of this is that the soul makes use of the twenty-three tattvas in the same way the potter makes use of an earthenware cup for drinking.

In his translation of the Gate of Logic, Xuanzang concludes that the three-part syllogism used to prove that the soul is a locus of experience suffers from a logical error. Within the system used to construct a syllogism, the terms and the definitions used in all three propositions: the thesis statement, the reason and the example, must correspond to clear and agreed-upon points of reference. Furthermore, these points of reference must adhere to conventions that are acceptable to both the disputant and the opponent. Specifically, the definitions of the subject and the predicate must be agreed upon if the conclusion based on the three propositions is to stand.

Xuanzang takes issue with the first proposition of the syllogism, “The soul is the subject of thinking.” He charges that the predicate, “thinking,” does not fit the subject, “the soul,” when it is defined as the combination of puruṣa and prakṛti. Given that the activity of thinking is extrinsic
to the material part of the soul, the *prakṛti*, Xuanzang avers that the predicate remains unestablished (Skt.: *aprasiddha*; Chi.: *bucheng* 不成). If, however, the subject formed by the *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* is supplemented with additional *tattvas*, such as the sensory faculties, “thinking” could become an essential quality of the subject. Because the *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* are isolated from the remaining twenty-three *tattvas*, the subject by definition cannot think or experience. Xuanzang points out that the combination of the *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* is too feeble to support the robust content of experience that is associated with the embodied soul of the *Sāṅkhya* *kārikās*. Xuanzang therefore eviscerates the concept of the ātman as the enjoyer and the experiencer by highlighting the error of logic in the syllogism.

In his translation of the *Gate of Logic*, Xuanzang defines the soul or the ātman as the union of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. He uses the pronoun “I (Ego)” (Chi.: *Wo 我*) to capture the idea of the soul as a thinker and an experiencer of the material realm. In using the pronoun “I,” Xuanzang endows the soul with the capacity to think and differentiates the *puruṣa* from the ātman as the experiencer of the twenty-three *tattvas*. With this distinction, Xuanzang demonstrates his fidelity to the *Sāṅkhya* idea of the soul as the embodied *puruṣa*, while highlighting the problem of investing the soul with the capacity for sensory experience and thought. If the soul is, by definition, eternal and unchanging, how can the soul be the bearer or enjoyer of changing thoughts and changing experiences? To a Buddhist, who does not accept the notion that changing thoughts must belong to an unchanging bearer, the burden of proof is not met.

**Debunking the Notion of the Soul as the Bearer of the Twenty-Five Tattvas**

The *Sāṅkhya* *kārikās* explicate the soul, or the ātman, as the bearer (Skt.: *adhisthātr*) of the *tattvas*, the essential elements that compose and sustain life. They depict the soul as a container or vessel with the capacity to store, nurture and maintain the twenty-five *tattvas*. Within the *Sāṅkhya*
schema, the soul is responsible for the cohesion and the restoration of the *tattvas*. Without the presence of the soul, the *tattvas* disassemble and dissolve. In the debate with the Plain-Spoken Brahman, Xuanzang takes issue with the Sāṅkhya notion of the soul as the bearer of the twenty-five *tattvas*.

After reciting the sequence of the *tattvas* to the audience at Nālanda University, Xuanzang proceeds to deconstruct the conception of the soul as the bearer of the twenty-five *tattvas*. His argument is founded upon his strict definition and interpretation of the Sāṅkhya schema of the *puruṣa* as the unchanging Spirit (Skt.: *Brahman*; Chi.: *Fan 梵*) and *prakṛti* as the changing material reality—the first two *tattvas* from which all aspects of the soul and the material body evolve.

Xuanzang dismantles the notion of the soul as the bearer of the *tattvas* with the following argument: If the soul is composed of the *puruṣa*, the first *tattva*, and the subsequent twenty-four *tattvas*, it cannot be the bearer of the *tattvas*. Xuanzang contends that if the *puruṣa* is assigned to the task of containing the other *tattvas*, it will fail because the *puruṣa* is disembodied and therefore cannot bear the *tattvas*. He states: “The *puruṣa* is eternal and unchanging. In and of itself, it is not involved in either supporting or restoring the twenty-four *tattvas*. Only with *prakṛti* can the *puruṣa* bear the rest of the twenty-three *tattvas***.”

Embedded within the Sāṅkhya conceptualization of the soul as the bearer of the twenty-five *tattvas* is the concept of the soul as the bearer of karma. In the Sāṅkhya schema, karma is defined as the good and bad actions, as well as the merits and demerits, accumulated by a person during life. In this picture, the *ātman* is shouldered with the karmic responsibility for the effects of the painful, pleasurable or neutral actions performed by the human being. Xuanzang avers that

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319 *Sir Monier-Williams Skt. Dictionary*: “the one impersonal universal Spirit manifested as a personal Creator and as the first of the triad of personal gods.”
the ātman, when defined as the puruṣa, is, quite literally, not up to the task of bearing karma. This conceptualization of the ātman as the bearer of karma has enormous implications for Xuanzang’s exegesis of dying and death.

Xuanzang concludes that the Sāṅkhyā conceptualization of the soul as the bearer of the twenty-five tattvas is untenable for two reasons. First, because the puruṣa is pure consciousness and disembodied, it requires the capacities of the twenty-four tattvas to bear the soul; second, because the soul is composed of the puruṣa and a material body composed of the tattvas, it cannot simultaneously be the bearer of the tattvas. Xuanzang, therefore, views the Sāṅkhyā theory of the soul as the bearer of the tattvas as internally incoherent.

**Dismantling the Relationship of the Ahaṅkāra to the Soul**

The Sāṅkhyakārikās view the ātman as endowed with the capacity to empower, direct, and coordinate the sensory, physical, and cognitive functions necessary to sustain human life. According to Sāṅkhyā theory, the invisible forces that work for the ātman are responsible for the visible activity of human life. Implicit in this picture is a mysterious “spirit-cum-ātman” (Chi.: shenwo 神我) that pulls the levers that operate the human being. Xuanzang takes issue with the idea of a “ghost in the machine” that works within the body to make human activity possible. For Xuanzang, the notion of the spirit-cum-ātman demonstrates what he regards as an over-reliance on the supernatural and the occult in the Sāṅkhyā explanations of life and death.

The Sāṅkhyakārikās unequivocally state that the puruṣa is “a spectator” (Skt.: prekṣavat) in the theater of the body. As a spectator, the puruṣa does not get involved in the actions of prakṛti or mahat, or in any of activities of the remaining tattvas that transform the material elements into the eleven indriyas that generate and sustain human life. The idea of the puruṣa as the prekṣavat is significant in the Sāṅkhyā doctrine because the puruṣa, by definition, is pure and untainted. Any
activity that requires contact with the material world is executed at the behest of the puruṣa by the ahaṅkāra. In the theater of the body, the ahaṅkāra plays the role of a surrogate who is anointed by the puruṣa to do whatever is necessary in the material world to generate life.\textsuperscript{320} Essentially, the ahaṅkāra is sent by the puruṣa into the defiled material realm to do the dirty work required to sustain life. The puruṣa thus remains undefiled.

In his recitation of the Sāṅkhya doctrine in the dispute with the Plain-Spoken Brāhmin at the Nālanda Gate, Xuanzang adheres to the spirit and the letter of the hallowed nineteenth stanza of the Sāṅkhyaśāstra. Here Xuanzang upholds the Sāṅkhya view of the puruṣa as a prekṣavat, a passive observer. The classical Sāṅkhya texts are consistent and explicit in their position that the puruṣa, simpliciter, is not an agent (Skt.: kartṛtva) or an agentive entity. Sāṅkhya doctrine locates the source of agentive power outside the puruṣa and within the material trappings of the body. In the commentary to stanza nineteen, Yuktidīpikā states: “It [the puruṣa] does not exist in the form of an agent, because of the fact that it is by nature imperturbable (Skt.: aprasava).”\textsuperscript{321} Bryant writes: “To be an agent means to be able to ‘produce’ an action, and this either entails the agentive entity undergoing some internal change or admixture with some other external entity and thereby undergoing change.”\textsuperscript{322} Since the puruṣa is by definition unchanging and eternal, it cannot also be an agent that is involved in the various and changing activities of living.

Gauḍapāda, in his commentary, and Yuktidīpika make the important stipulation that the puruṣa is not implicated in the operation of the corporeal organs of the body. In the Sāṅkhya schema, the puruṣa does not operate the sense faculties or any of the tattvas, including the eleven

\textsuperscript{320} The second line of stanza 67 of Sāṅkhyaśāstra reads, see Dutt, ed., Sāṅkhyaśāstra, 69: Prakṛtim paśyati puruṣaha prakṣakavadavasthitaḥ svasthaḥ//67cd//

\textsuperscript{321} Yuktidīpikā, ed. Tripathi (Krishnadas Academy, 1999), 117: Akartṛbhāvah, aprasavadharmitvāt.

\textsuperscript{322} Bryant, “Agency in Sāṅkhya,” 19.
indriyas that sustain human life. The role of transforming the materials of the world into the organs and activities of the body falls to the “derivative” (Skt.: vaikṛtya)323 ahaṅkāra, also known as the “active” (Skt.: niṣkṛta)324 ahaṅkāra. The vaikṛtya-ahaṅkāra serves the puruṣa as the active agent who is charged with contacting and manipulating the elements of the material world. The vaikṛta ahaṅkāra interacts with the three material elements that activate the eleven indriyas: sattvas, rajas, and tamas. According to Gauḍapāda, only the vaikṛtya-ahaṅkāra can engage in the process of transforming (Skt.: pariṇāma) the material elements into the eleven indriyas. Additionally, the vaikṛtya-ahaṅkāra is involved in the alterations of the external material of the five tanmātras325 that ultimately stimulate the sensory indriyas. For example, the vaikṛtya-ahaṅkāra activates the process of taking in material from the outside world, such as food, and transforming it into nutrients for use by the body.

In the Sāṅkhya schema, neither the puruṣa nor the indriyas are conceived of as possessing agentic power. Kuiji rightly states that the puruṣa is weak 实我用劣.326 It is the vaikṛtya-ahaṅkāra, and the vaikṛtya-ahaṅkāra alone, that possesses the strength and the willpower to activate the indriyas. Charged by the puruṣa with the responsibility of willing the indriyas into the activities required to generate and sustain life, the vaikṛta ahaṅkāra is the power behind the throne. In his Chinese rendition of stanza forty-two of the Sāṅkhya-kārikās, Paramārtha states that “the intentions

323 Kuiji’s comments read: “For the Sāṅkhya masters, the five factors including the eye are (identical to) the five cognitive faculties (pañca-prajñêndriyāṇi). The pillow and the cot are factors formed through the accumulation of five types of sensible objects (Skt.: tanmātras; Chi.: wei-liang 唯量).” 其數論師，眼等五法，即五知根，臥具床座，即五唯量所集成法。(T1840:44.129.b02-3).
324 The word “vaikṛta” is a vṛddhi-derivative from “vi-krt,” meaning “to alter.”
325 For Gauḍapāda’s glosses on SK 25, see Dutt, ed., Sāṅkhya-kārikās, 27. Gauḍapāda’s commentary on this stanza says that “From the derivative ego there proceeds the eleven-fold constituency which is characterized by sattva. Sāttvika ekadaśakah pravartate vaikṛtādahaṅkārīt.
326 Kuiji, Great Commentary on the Gate of Logic, fascicle 3, T1840:44.129.b11.
of the *ahaṅkara* serve as the causal basis (for the *indriyas*)" 我意用為因. 327 This means that the *indriyas*, because they are of a material nature, are modifiable only with the will, intention, and action of the *vaikṛtya-ahaṅkara*. In this picture, the *vaikṛtya-ahaṅkara*, under the direction of the *puruṣa*, recruits the *indriyas* into active duty. This is accomplished by activating the three vital elements of life. Within this schema, the ātman is given the power to sustain and replenish the three vital qualities of life: *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*.

The ātman, described in the Sāṅkhya scripture as the embodied *puruṣa*, is thus a collection of passive and pure and of agentic and defiled elements. This conceptualization is at odds with the picture of the soul as an unchanging and pure entity. Watson (2006, p. 95): describes how, by conflating the *puruṣa* with the Ultimate or True Soul (Chi.: *Zhenwo*), Sāṅkhya assigns active agency to the faculties: “Sāṅkhya souls are completely inactive experiences (*bhoktr*) in the form of pure sentience (*caitanya*): mental occurrences such as pleasure, pain and cognition thus happen not to them but to the psycho-physical organism, in particular, its mental faculties.”

**Debunking the Doctrine of Three Vital Qualities: *Sattva, Rajas and Tamas***

Within the Sāṅkhya taxonomy, the second *tattva*, *prakṛti*, is defined as the primeval substrate from which the three vital qualities that invest the body with life materialize. It is from *prakṛti* that the three primary *guṇas* – *sattva*, life, goodness or pleasure; *rajas*, passion or pain; and *tamas*, delusion or obscurity328 – emerge. Dingbin 定賓, a contemporary of Xuanzang who is known for his prolific scholarship on the Buddhist monastic discipline (Skt.: *vinaya*), states: “By

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327 T2137:54.1255.b05.

328 Xuanzang uses the phonetic renderings of *sachui* 薩埵, *chuici* 塗剌, and *damo* 答摩. Paramārtha uses different phonetic renderings (i.e., *sachui* 薩埵, *luoshe* 蘿闐, and *duomo* 多磨), as well as the semantic renderings as “pleasure” 楽, “suffering” 苦, and “delusion and opacity.” 痴闇.
its very nature prakṛti is composed of the three vital qualities (Skt.: guṇas).”

While each guṇa is distinct, all three are based on the primordial material principle, or “Ur-matter.” According to the Sāṅkhya theory, the three guṇas are present in human beings in various amounts and proportions. The admixture of sattvas, rajas, and tamas is responsible for determining the personality, temperament, and somatic characteristics of the human being. Human beings also have the unique capability to alter the levels of the three guṇas in their bodies and minds through ritual and practice.

Xuanzang precisely and accurately recites the Sāṅkhya theory of the three vital qualities in his debate with the Plain-Spoken Brāhmin at the Nālānda Gate. In his exegetical work, in both his Abhidharma corpus and in his CWSL, Xuanzang demonstrates his fluency in the Brāhmaṇical scriptures and enlists his expert knowledge to highlight the inconsistencies and contradictions in the doctrine. In the dispute at Nālānda Gate, Xuanzang exploits the systemic problems in the theory of the guṇas to erode the credibility of the Sāṅkhya doctrine of the ātman as the bearer of the qualities that distinguish life from the death.

Xuanzang posits that the Sāṅkhya definition of the ātman, as defined by the puruṣa, the prakṛti endowed with the three guṇas and the eleven indriyas, as the container of all that is required for life, is incoherent. In the Nālānda debate, Xuanzang deconstructs the Sāṅkhya conceptualization of the ātman as the bearer of the qualities that distinguish life from death. In his argument, Xuanzang strictly defines and describes the guṇas according to the scripture of Sāṅkhya kārikās, highlights insufficiencies in the theory of the three guṇas to differentiate the

329 Dingbin’s vinaya commentary (X733:42.223.c01-3) states that: “three qualities are the nature of prakṛti. There are three meanings inherent in sattva: ‘august,’ ‘covetous,’ and ‘pleasurable.’ Next, rajas also contains three meanings: ‘naked,’ ‘confused,’ and ‘painful.’ Then, tejasa also contains three meanings: dark, confused, and aversive.”
indriyas, discredits the conceptualization of the ātman as the provider and executive operator of the sensory indriyas, and debunks the notion that the five physical indriyas are dependent upon the guṇas to function. In his systematic deconstruction of the Sāṅkhya theory of the guṇas, Xuanzang decisively concludes that the vital qualities of life are not borne by the ātman. This position is taken by Xuanzang as further evidence to discredit the Sāṅkhya idea that a supernatural soul, in the form of the ātman, is necessary to explain survival.

On the Sāṅkhya Definition of the Three Vital Qualities of Life

In his argumentation against the Sāṅkhya doctrine of the soul, Xuanzang focuses on the seventeenth stanza of the Sāṅkhyakārikās as a cynosure for the Sāṅkhya idea of the soul as the bearer of the vital qualities that pertain to a living thing. As evidence for the existence of the soul, the seventeenth stanza of the Sāṅkhyakārikās cites the presence in the living being (Skt.: sāttvika) of “three different modifications of the three attributes” of the guṇas (Dutt 1933, p. 30).330 In Paramārtha’s Chinese rendition of stanza seventeen, the three guṇas are described as the “branches” of the soul and valorized as the ultimate “roots” of life.

The Sāṅkhyakārikās scriptures elevate sattva among the three qualities or guṇas that animate the indriyas of the body. Monier-Williams defines sattva as “the quality of purity or goodness regarded in the Sāṅkhya philosophy as the highest of the three guṇas or constituents of prakṛti because it renders a person true, honest, wise and a thing pure, clean, etc.” While the word for life in Buddhism is also sattva, the Buddhists attribute a more neutral meaning to the term as compared to the very sanguine Brāhmaṇical interpretation of sattva. In the Sāṅkhya lexicon, the term sāttvika is an epithet for the bearer of life. The term sāttvika is used by Gauḍapāda in his sub-

330 For original Skt. of Gauḍapāda’s commentary see Dutt’s ed., Sāṅkhyakārikās, 21: Trīgunabhāvaviparyayāc ca puruṣabhahutvam siddham This appears as one of three reasons that the soul is particular to the individual – see Watson, The Self’s Awareness of Itself, 60.
glosses on the seventeenth stanza of the Śaṅkhyakārikās to indicate the living human.

The idea of sattva as the highest or the foremost of the three guṇas presupposes a hierarchy that does not capture the Śaṅkhya formulation of the three vital qualities. Rather than being configured as a feudal monarchy, with the sattva in the position of the king who presides over the rajas and tamas, the three guṇas are viewed as a triumvirate. Each member of the triumvirate has equal standing, in that each of the guṇas carries a specific quality that, when combined with the others, enables and activates the eleven, twelve, or thirteen indriyas of the body.331

Although the ancient taxonomy codified in the Śaṅkhyakārikās lists eleven faculties that are tools for the soul, the Śaṅkhyakārikās also contain rubrics of twelve ahaṅkara and thirteen indriyas. The Śaṅkhyakārikās list the “thirteen efficacious tools” of the soul as the five ordinary senses, or prājnendriyāṇi; the five faculties of action, or kārmendriyāṇi; intelligence (Skt.: buddhi), ego-making (Skt.: ahaṅkāra), and mind (Skt.: manas; Chi.: yì).332 The important difference between the rubrics of twelve and thirteen faculties is that the former treats the mind (Skt.: manas) as independent from the other thirteen faculties. All of the Śaṅkhya rubrics list the ordinary senses before the faculties for physical action and highlight the mind as a singularly important and empowering tool for the ātman. The identification of the indriyas as the tools of the ātman is fortified by the Śaṅkhya theory that the indriyas are composed of the three guṇas. The three qualities of sattva, rajas, and tamas are said to account for the variegated functions and different dispositional natures and capacities of the eleven indriyas.

331 See Vṛtti commentary on stanza 36 of Śaṅkhyakārikās (T54n2137p1254a17-23).
332 The Vṛtti commentary to Stanza 32 of Paramārtha’s Chi. trans. of Śaṅkhyakārikās reads: “‘The instrumental tools numbering thirteen,’ indicates the ‘instrumental tools,’ that are spoken of in many places in this treatise. The number is determinate and restricted to thirteen: namely, five cognitive faculties, five faculties for action, buddhi, ahaṅkāra, and manas.”  "作具數十三”者。此論中處處說「作具」，決定唯十三。五知根•五作根、及覺•慢•心等 (T2137:54.1253.b11-19).
In stanza eighteen of the Sāṅkhya-kārikās, the three guṇas are likened to the three sons of a great Brāhmin. Each of the sons has a different disposition: the first is bright and joyful; the second is fearful and averse to difficulties and discomfort; and the third is ignorant and confused. While the temperaments of the sons are separate and distinct, their individual characteristics influence and inform one another. If there is a shift in the balance of power among the sons, the overall dynamic among the three is altered. For example, if the third son becomes more powerful than his older brothers, his ignorance will dominate their interactions.

In his vṛtti commentary, Paramārtha builds upon the metaphor of the three vital, agentive powers and the relationship between the three rival siblings sired by a great Brāhmin.\textsuperscript{333} The metaphor of the three sons of the Brāhmin appears in the context of a discussion on the relationship between prakṛti, the material principle, and the soul. While Paramārtha generally uses examples adduced in earlier commentary by Gauḍapāda in his discussions, the metaphor of the three siblings is unique to this text.\textsuperscript{334} Within this example, the Brāhmin is meant to stand for the singular self and is identified with the soul and its ego-making power (Skt.: ahaṅkāra). The three sons of the Brāhmin are a synecdoche for the interaction between the three discrete factors, or guṇas, that make up the personality of the individual. Just as each of the three guṇas evinces a defining

\textsuperscript{333} The vṛtti commentary to Sāṅkhya-kārikās 18 (T2137:54.1249.e22-27) adduces the example of the Brahmin’s three sons, each characterized by different personality traits based upon the distribution of their three guṇas: “Granted that the personality is one, its three qualities should not contain differences. We liken it to one Brāhmin who sires three sons. One [of the sons] is bright, welcoming, and joyful. Another [son] is trepidatious of difficulties and discomfort. The other [son] is wicked, benighted, and idiotic.若人一者。三德應無異。如一婆羅門生於三子。一聰明歡樂。二可畏困苦。三闇黑愚癡。If their personalities were all the same, when one son becomes joyful, then the other two should be equally joyful. The same should follow for discomfort or idocy. If you say that [the three qualities] can be likened to stringing pearls together or the gum of the myrrh tree (Skt.: *vīśā; Chi.: pixī 毘細), then the personality is unitary. But this doctrine is not correct. It is for this reason that the five references (i.e., the five examples referred to in vṛtti commentary to Sāṅkhya-kārikās, verse 16), are meant to instill understanding that the personality contains plural elements.” 若人一者。一人喜樂一切同喜樂。苦癡亦如是。汝說貫珠及毘細譬。故我一者。是義不然。是故因五義則知我有多。 The analogy of the string of pearls appears in the commentary to the preceding verse, where it is understood to indicate the underlying unity of “many pearls strung together on one string.” 若人一者。一人喜樂一切同喜樂。苦癡亦如是。汝說貫珠及毘細譬。故我一者。是義不然。是故因五義則知我有多。 The analogy of the string of pearls appears in the commentary to the preceding verse, where it is understood to indicate the underlying unity of “many pearls strung together on one string.” 珠多繩一。\textsuperscript{334} This example is found in Paramārtha’s vṛtti commentary, but is not attested in Gauḍapāda’s commentary.
characteristic, each of the three siblings carries a defining temperament.\textsuperscript{335} Separate and distinct, yet fundamentally inseparable and indivisible within a single personality, each of the three qualities engages in the productive cooperation necessary to manifest the quality of the individual. In the Sāṅkhya schema, this karmic activity is willed into action by the soul.

As an alternative to the metaphor of the guṇas as the sons of the Brāhmin, the simile of the three guṇas and the string of three pearls is offered by Gauḍapāda and Paramārtha in their Chinese commentaries on stanza eighteen of the Sāṅkhya-kārikās. In this description, the three guṇas are like three pearls on a necklace. While each of the three pearls is separate and distinct, they are also strung together on a single strand of thread. The three pearls represent the disparate aspects or separate dispositions of the person, while the string represents the unity of the personality. Here the commentaries of Gauḍapāda and Paramārtha emphasize the idea that while the characteristics of the human are composed of the three discrete features of sattva, rajas, and tejas, the personality as an entity is unified. A key hemistich in stanza eleven of this work (SK 11a) states that the "three guṇas are mutually inseparable".\textsuperscript{336}

While all three guṇas are present in each human being, the relative amount of each is said to determine the specific quality, nature, and activities of the indriyas. It is the balance and relative

\textsuperscript{335} Dingbin writes: “If one seeks a comprehensive discrimination between them, then yellow red, and black are the attributes of color. Cupidity, anger, and delusion are attributes of the mind. Pleasure, pain, and aversion are attributes of personal experience. They exist in two stages: firstly, in the primeval stage; and secondly, in the dormant, unaroused stage. The [first two] tattvas are exist throughout the stages of the evolution of mahat and the other twenty-three tattvas [below purusa and prakṛti]. We liken it to the way that the sprout grows out of the seed, gradually increasing in size and becoming fleshed out. The third tattva – ahaṅkāra – which refers to the conceit that is aroused by self-serving – this is what ahaṅkāra is as an entity.”

\textsuperscript{336} Sāṅkhya-kārikās, verse 1, vr̥tti, translated by Paramārtha (T2137:54.1246.a29-30), “The branches of the mahats, etc., are three kinds of properties: sattva, rajas, and tejas. These branched properties depart from the root property [of mahat]; but if not for the root property, they would not be realized.”
proportion of the *guṇas* inherent in the *indriyas* that determine the sensory, physical, and cognitive sensibilities of the individual. Returning to the metaphor of the three sons of the Brāhmin, if the balance of power between the three son shifts over time, the political climate changes as well. For example, if *tejas* predominates over *sattvas*, or *rajas*, the human being will become more phlegmatic in demeanor. Similarly, if *rajas* predominates over *sattva* and *tejas*, the person will become more bellicose in disposition. An increased concentration of *sattva* makes a person more spirited and vivacious in demeanor and more vigorous in his physicality. Although the balance and distribution of the three qualities may change over the life of a person, the presence of the three *guṇas* is an invariable fact of life.

### The Discrimination of One Faculty From Another in Terms of the Three *Guṇas*

The Sāṅkhya theorists suggest that the *ātman* is the container, generator, and operator of the eleven *indriyas*. In this schema, the *ātman* is viewed as the *puruṣa*, the *prakṛti*, the *ahaṅkāra*

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337 *Vṛtti* commentary on *Sāṅkhya-kārikās* 11c (T2137:54.1247.c14-17): “When joy and pleasure predominate, they are capable of overcoming anxiety, confusion, and benightedness. We liken it to the ever increasing light of the sun that is capable of overcoming the moon, stars, etc.”

338 *Vṛtti* on *Sāṅkhya-kārikās*, verse 23 (T2137:54.1251.a19-22): “When sattva increases, it is capable of overcoming rajas and tamas. Then, the ego is joyous and pleased, and hence, evices the four attributes that define sattva.”

339 A doggerel sloka is found in Gauḍapada’s commentary (Dutt, *Sāṅkhya-kārikās*, 15): Rajas forms a pair with *sattvam* and *sattvam* forms a pair with *rajas*. Tamas refers to the pair of both *rajas* and *sattvam*. *Rajas-o mithunaṃ sattvam sattvasya mithunam rajaḥ/ Ubhayoḥ sattvarajasor mithunam tama ucyate|| devibhāgata.
and the eleven *indriyas*. The *ahaṅkāra* is anointed by the *purusa* to transform the three vital qualities of *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas* into the eleven *indriyas*. The three *guṇas* are viewed as the tools and the raw materials used by the *ahaṅkāra*, under the direction of the *ātman*, to create the eleven *indriyas*. Within the Sāṅkhya theory, therefore, the eleven *indriyas* are composed of and enlivened by the three qualities of *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*. Additionally, the Sāṅkhya theorists assume that the visible physical activity of the body is direct evidence of the presence of the three vital qualities of life. Because the three vital qualities of life are viewed as the tools and the materials of the *ātman*, the physical activity of the body is proof of the presence of the *ātman*.

Xuanzang takes issue with the assumption that the physical evidence of the three *guṇas*, the presence of life, passion, and ignorance in the human being, is sufficient to prove the existence of the soul. In discrediting this idea, Xuanzang uses his knowledge of the Sāṅkhya taxonomy to highlight the internal inconsistencies within the Sāṅkhya theory of the *indriyas*. His overarching argument is intended to highlight the over-reliance within the *Sāṅhyakārikās* scriptures on the *ātman* as the entity responsible for the generation and operation of the *indriyas*.

In composing his argument, Xuanzang focuses on the theory of the *guṇas*. At the center of his discomfort with the Sāṅkhya theory of the *guṇas* is this question: How is it possible that the diverse expression of human life originates from the three material substrates of *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*? More specifically, Xuanzang questions how the admixtures of three substances can account for the diverse range of physical activities of the human being and how the presence and the proportions of the three *guṇas* can differentiate one *indriya* from another. In his rationale, Xuanzang focuses on several dilemmas that result in unsavory and unwanted consequences for the Sāṅkhya theory of the three *guṇas*.

Huili’s biography contains a transcript of the reasoned critique of the Brāhmaṇical
taxonomy used by Xuanzang in the dispute with the Plain-Spoken Brāhmin. In the debate, Xuanzang begins by articulating the Sāṅkhya doctrine of the three guṇas. Xuanzang accurately states the Sāṅkhya concept that the proportion of the three guṇas within each of the eleven indriyas determines the differences among them. The Sāṅkhya theory holds that each of the eleven indriyas can be differentiated from the others according to the percentage of the three vital qualities within each indriya. For example, the indriya of seeing is composed of material infused primarily with sattvas, and the indriya of tasting is made of material suffused predominately with rajas.

Xuanzang contends that the idea that the indriyas can be differentiated from one another by the three guṇas is insufficient to explain either the versatility of the indriyas or the complexity of the activities that are executed by the body and the mind. In the Nālānda debate, Xuanzang asserts that the Sāṅkhya taxonomy of eleven faculties contains both conceptual lacunae and redundant posits. He exposes a core vulnerability in the Sāṅkhya theory with a conditional statement: If the indriyas are made of the same three components, then the indriyas should be more similar to one another than different. Huili records the reducio ad absurdum argument formulated by Xuanzang in the debate as follows:

Mahat (i.e., the third tattva in the Sāṅkhya taxonomy) is formed by the three guṇas. If the three guṇas are mutually-identical, then their mutual-identity holds between all three of the guṇas. Granted that the three guṇas are mutually-identical, and that the mutual-identity holds for all of them, it would then be the case that each and every one of indriyas possesses all the equivalent functions. 又此大等各以三成，即一是一切。若一則一切，則應一一皆有一切作用。

Otherwise, if you do not grant that this is so, then for what reason do you adhere to the unitary nature of all indriyas in terms of the three guṇas? 既不許然，何因執三為一切體性？
If one grants that the indriyas are identical, then all indriyas are identical, such that the organs of eating, seeing, etc., are then identical to the conduits expelling liquid and solid waste. Moreover, each indriya would possess the functional ability of one another, such that the organs, such as those used for eating and hearing, should be able to smell odors and to see visible things.”

So, if that is not the case, then for what reason do you still maintain that the three guṇas form all of the indriyas? How could someone of any intelligence establish such a theory?

As recounted by Huili, Xuanzang’s argument is the knock-out blow from which the Plain-Spoken Brāhmin cannot recover. Xuanzang’s final rhetorical flourish forces the Brāhmin to concede the debate. In his concession, the Plain-Spoken Brāhmin drops to his knees and implores Xuanzang to become his guru.

The dilemma that Xuanzang articulates in his riposte to the Plain-Spoken Brāhmin narrowly concerns the relationship of the three guṇas to the eleven indriyas. He opens his statement by articulating the Sāṅkhya theory of the origin of the three guṇas in the third tattva of mahat, or the “greatness of the individual.” In his CWSL, Xuanzang exploits the Sāṅkhya commitment to the equivalence of the evolutionary history of the guṇas and extends the idea to its ultimate and absurd consequence: If the three guṇas are made from the same material, then all of indriyas should

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340 T2053:50.245.b16-21.

341 Huili’s obsequious biography (T2053:50.245.b27-c1) describes the Brāhmin’s emasculating defeat in the debate with Xuanzang: “The Brāhmin was at a complete loss, being without words. He stood up and bowed to Master Xuanzang: “I admit defeat to you, now I take you as my Master to form a compact with you as a disciple.” Master Xuanzang says to the Brāhmin: “Now, say that ‘I shall officially take the surname Shi, son of the Buddha Śākyamuni, and vow to now harm other humans,’ and submit to being my slave, and follow my teaching and charge.” The Brāhmin was delighted, and reverentially followed Xuanzang back to his residence. Those in the audience were naught without words of awe. 婆羅門默無所說，起而謝曰：「我今負矣，任依先約。」法師曰：「我曹釋子終不害人，今令汝為奴，隨我教命。」婆羅門歡喜敬從，即將向房，聞者無不稱慶。
possess the same functions.\textsuperscript{342}

In the Nālānda debate, Xuanzang raises a dilemma regarding the “common activities” (Skt.: \textit{samānyavṛtti}) shared by the eleven human faculties. If one is to faithfully abide by the Sāṅkhya theory of three qualities and agree that these qualities constitute the disposition and function of the eleven \textit{indriyas}, it follows that each of the eleven \textit{indriyas} should possess the same capacities. Xuanzang points out the absurdity of this notion somewhat graphically, noting that the mouth does not smell things, and the ears do not see things. In his oral debates and in his written compilation in the CWSL, Xuanzang maintains that there is an unwarranted consequence in the idea that the blending or comingling of three \textit{guṇas} forms the \textit{indriyas}. The unfortunate collary to this idea is that if the eleven \textit{indriyas} are amalgams of the basic material, it should be impossible to distinguish one \textit{indriya} from another. The \textit{Sāṅkhya-kārikās} attempts to resolve this dilemma by emphasizing that while each \textit{indriya} is composed of the three same ingredients, the proportions of the three \textit{guṇas} vary within each \textit{indriya}. The Sāṅkhya theorists maintain that the variety of functions and the diversity of activities of the \textit{indriyas} can be explained by alterations in the proportions of the three basic ingredients of life.

In the denouement to his remarks on the Sāṅkhya taxonomy of the eleven faculties, Xuanzang makes a scatological joke. He states that if one is to hew literally to the Sāṅkhya doctrine, then the anus and the mouth should be equally capable of expelling solid excrement. Conversely,

\textsuperscript{342} The related passage in the CWSL, fasc. 1 (T1585:31.2c.17-21) reads: “Furthermore, \textit{mahat} is formed by three factors. These the three factors cooperate with and oversee one another such that they become undifferentiated; and if so, the perceptible cause and effect, along with the mahats, and the \textit{indriyas} lose any sense of differentiation from one another. If that were indeed the case, then a singular faculty should obtain all the objective spheres (\textit{vīṣayas}). 又大等法皆三合成，展轉相望應無差別，是則因果唯量諸大諸根差別皆不得成。若爾一根應得一切境。Otherwise, it should be the case that all objective spheres (\textit{vīṣayas}) and all faculties should obtain it, so whatever is visible to the common sense of worldly people that what's alive or not alive, pure and defiled things which are perceived or inferred should be undifferentiated from each other – this is a grave error.” 或應一境一切根所得，世間現見情與非情淨穢等物現比量等，皆應無異，便為大失.
the anus should be able to utter words. Xuanzang uses this rather crude example to highlight the unwanted consequence of failing to establish a more credible principle of individuation between the five faculties of action.

In his CWSL, Xuanzang reprises the *reductio ad absurdum* argument he uses in the disputes with the Plain-Spoken Brāhmin regarding the relationship between the *indriyas* and the *guṇas*. He states that without a stronger theory of the evolution of the *indriyas* and a more robust explanation for the differences in their composition and functioning, the theory of the *guṇas* does not hold. Xuanzang argues that the theory of the three *guṇas* is insufficient to account for the sheer diversity of activity evidenced by the *indriyas*. The idea that the vast, variegated, specific and distinct functions of the *indriyas* emerge from the permutations of three fundamentally similar elements is a weak explanation for complexity of human life. Xuanzang demonstrates that this idea leads to an absurd conclusion. If all *indriyas* are composed of three *guṇas*, then all *indriyas* are essentially the same. Therefore, the diversity of the variegated *indriyas* cannot be explained with the theory of the three *guṇas*.

In his CWSL, Xuanzang formulates the horns of the dilemma in the Sāṅkhya theory of the three *guṇas* as follows: If the three *guṇas* are uniform or “homogenous” (Chi.: *zōng* 總), in that when they combine, their specific identities dissolve, then the *Sāṅkhya-kārikās’* teaching that the *guṇas* are distinct and separate entities is obscured. If the three *guṇas* are “heterogeneous” (Chi.: *bie* 別) in that when they combine, they retain their distinct characteristics and identities, then the *Sāṅkhya-kārikās’* teaching that the *guṇas* are cohesive is violated.

If the three *guṇas* are homogeneous, Xuanzang states: “As entities they should be like their defining characteristics, which fade into one. But both as entities and in their characteristics they
are quite obviously threefold” 體應如相冥然是一，相應如體顯然有三. Xuanzang states: “If you say that the three guṇas are distinct as entities, but similar in their visible characteristics, then you violate the import of your own tenets in that as entities and in terms of characteristics, they are one” 若謂三事體異相同，便違己宗體相是一.

Here Xuanzang raises several thorny questions regarding the nature of the guṇas. Are the three guṇas essentially distinct from one another, or are they the same? When combined, do the three guṇas retain their distinct differences? When combined, do they retain their similarities? The SāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyakārikās describe the three guṇas as basically similar due to their common origin in prakṛti, the second tattva. Whence then do the differences among the guṇas arise?

The SāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚāṅkhyaŚां

The Śāṅkhyakārikās adumbrate a response to these questions. They posit that when the three guṇas are combined, they retain their unique and distinct qualities. Rubenstein (2014) supports this Śāṅkhyya principle in her sweeping study of ancient to modern cosmologies. She states: “Sameness is more ‘allergic’ to mixing than difference is.” Śāṅkhyya theory maintains that the difference between the three guṇas is more “immune” to mixing than the sameness derived from their origin in prakṛti.

Xuanzang does not concur with the conclusion that the distinctions between the three guṇas of sattva, rajas, and tejas are maintained when they are combined. The CWSL cites that “the nature of the three guṇas is basically similar. Because they are similar, the characteristics that they express are also basically similar.” For example, the state of being energetic, or sattva, and the state of being sluggish, or tejas, can be viewed as existing on a continuum of feeling states, rather than as

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343 T1585:31.2.e06.
344 T1585:31.2.e05-6.
distinctly separate feeling states.

Kuiji agrees that the three guṇas lack sharp distinctions and are therefore more alike than different. Because of this, Kuiji posits that the differences among the three guṇas are likely to be diluted when they are combined. He states that the guṇas “as functional entities, are mutually interchangeable, and as such, are equivalent to one another” 体用更互相即. Kuiji builds upon the concerns raised by Xuanzang regarding the mutual equivalence of the guṇas by introducing another dilemma within the theory. He avers that the differences among the guṇas are in name only and that the blending of three similar entities serves to dilute the already subtle distinctions among them. He supports Xuanzang’s position that the theory of the three guṇas is insufficient to explain the differences among the indriyas.

Kuiji extends the problem of mutual equivalence to debunk the claim that the three guṇas determine the differences in human temperaments and dispositions. In the Sāṅkhya theory, the three guṇas combine in various amounts and proportions and, in doing so, form the unique personality and characteristics of an individual. While changes in the physical functioning or in the physical or characterological traits of the human necessarily involve changes in the admixture of the guṇas, these transformations unfold gradually, “without discernable alterations between the present and previous forms” 前與後體無別.

This principle of “indiscriminable” or incremental change is directly relevant to the process of how the three guṇas adhere to form the personality and temperamental disposition of a person. If, for example, a woman named Devadattā becomes more sāttvikā, or vibrant and vivacious, and less tejas, or negative and gloomy, the change in her outward demeanor is attributed to a change

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346 T1830:43.254.b08-9.
347 T1830:43.251.a22.
in the proportions of the guṇas. In this case, the balance between sattva and tejas has changed, with the qualities of sattva becoming more salient than the qualities of tejas. While Devadattā appears to be more vibrant, there has been no sudden change in her overall temperament. This lack of abrupt change is because the essential differences among the three qualities that make up Devadatta’s personality have dissolved through the blending of the three qualities that make up her unique personality. Kuiji, in his analysis of the theory of personality formation through the blending of the guṇas, concludes that the theory of the guṇas is insufficient to explain the subtlety and the variety of the human temperament.

In the CWSL, Xuanzang and his team of compilers critique the Sāṅkhya taxonomy for its over-reliance on the ātman as the activator of the indriyas. Returning to the Sanskrit sources, Xuanzang examines the idea presented by Guṇamati’s (Chi.: Qiunamodi求那摩底; Dehui德慧) Treatise on Definitions (Lakṣaṇa śāstra)348 that the indriyas are merely “efficacious instruments” and cannot function without an ātman, in the form of an embodied puruṣa, to activate and operate them. On the nature of the indriyas, Guṇamati writes:349 “The efficacious instrument is like the ordinary axe, saw, etc. – the efficacious instruments of the craftsperson. Its function is like what serves as the bed, the table, etc. – the mind and faculties are exactly this way: the soul employs them to see visibles and to hear audibles. It is for this reason that we term the mind and faculties efficacious instruments [for the soul]. The ātman takes these up and uses them to see visible things and to hear things. Hence, there are termed efficacious instruments.”

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348 The former is the phonetic transliteration, while the latter is the Chinese translation of his name based upon its semantic meaning.

349 Guṇamati’s treatise found only in Paramārtha's Chi. translation from the 6th century. The full title of this treatise in two fascicles is found in the colophon: Commentary on the Treatise on the Definitions of Things from which are Excerpted The Sixteen Elements (tattvas) 十六諦義出隨相論釋.
This idea is attested in verse twenty-five of the *Sāṅkhya-kārikās*, in which the *puruṣa* is depicted as the operator of the *indriyas*, via the *ahaṅkāra*, the mediator between the *puruṣa* and the body with its full complement of sensory and physical organs. Xuanzang takes issue with this fundamental idea and states that the *puruṣa* is eternal, pure, and unchanging and therefore cannot be involved with the activities of the body.

The CWSL goes on to opine on an inconsistency between the notion of three vital qualities adduced in Sāṅkhya theory and the doctrine of “real-personhood” exemplified in the *puruṣa* or spiritual part of the person. In both the text of his debate with the Plain-Spoken Brāhmin and his CWSL, Xuanzang poses a fundamental challenge to the dualistic Sāṅkhya view. If the spiritual nature of the human is independent of the material qualities of life, then how does the *puruṣa* serve as a legitimate principium of individuation between different humans? An explanation is needed for how the three material qualities of the body, together with the soul, invest the body with the capacity to survive. The ability to survive is vested in the continuous cooperation of faculties throughout the body. It is also one of the capacities that is invested in the body by the soul.

**Xuanzang’s Refutation of the Notion of the Soul as the Master of the Eleven Faculties**

The *Sāṅkhya-kārikās* describe the soul (Skt.: ātman) as the master (Skt.: rājan) of the eleven embodied *indriyas* that are responsible for the sensory and physical actions of the human being. Because they are viewed within the Sāṅkhya schema as the defining components of the human being, the eleven *indriyas* and their relationship to the soul are of doctrinal significance. Therefore,
the conceptualization of the ātman as the master of the indriyas is a crucial organizing premise in the Sāṅkhya theories of life and the nature of death. Because of the centrality of the Sāṅkhya concept of the soul as the master of the activities of life, Xuanzang takes exquisite care first to reconstruct and then to refute this concept in his effort to reinforce his theory of the faculties and uphold the Buddhist tenet of no-self.

In his debate with the Plain-Spoken Brahmin, Xuanzang uses the metaphor of the master and the servant to describe the relationship of the soul to the indriyas as depicted in the Sāṅkhyakārikās. Calling upon his vast knowledge of the Sāṅkhya scriptures, he states: “The twenty-four tattvas can be likened to the servant that attends to the king. The soul is the king, the locus of intelligence, sensory and affective experience. The twenty-four tattvas serve at the pleasure of the king.”

After demonstrating his comprehensive understanding of the Sāṅkhya doctrines of the puruṣa, the eleven indriyas and the ātman at the Nalanda Gate, Xuanzang concludes that the Sāṅkhya conceptualization of the soul as the master of the eleven indriyas is unsustainable. In the formulation of his argument, Xuanzang faithfully represents the Sāṅkhya tenets, and then highlights the inconsistences in the definitions of the key terms. He accurately renders the Sāṅkhya definitions of the puruṣa as disembodied and the ātman as embodied. The ātman, as defined in the Sāṅkhyakārikās, is composed of the puruṣa and the eleven indriyas. Without the puruṣa and the embodied eleven indriyas, the ātman does not exist. Therefore, the ātman cannot be the master of the eleven indriyas. Again, Xuanzang debunks the conceptualization of the soul as the master of the indriyas by emphasizing that the ātman, as defined in Sāṅkhya theory, does not have agentive power without the eleven indriyas.

The Sāṅkhyakārikās clearly state that the eleven indriyas, tattvas fifteen through twenty-
five in the Sāṅkhya taxonomy, empower the soul. It follows that the soul cannot be the master of the indriyas while simultaneously being empowered by them. Xuanzang’s use of the metaphor of the soul as the king of the tattvas in the text of the Sāṅkhyaakārikās illustrates an ideological problem that he sees as coursing throughout the Sāṅkhya theory—the conflated and misconstrued definitions of the puruṣa and the ātman.

Xuanzang references the words of the Sāṅkhyaakārikās that describe the puruṣa as “a mere witness” (Skt.: ālocanamātram) and not an active enjoyer of the material realm. The puruṣa requires the indriyas to, quite literally, get things done. Without being provided for or served by the twenty-four tattvas, the puruṣa is impotent. With this precise definition, Xuanzang contends that puruṣa, in and of itself, is weak and cannot sustain the human body. Without the twenty-four tattvas, the puruṣa, simpliciter, is not enough to sustain life. Life requires the puruṣa, along with the prakṛti and the twenty-three tattvas working together in coordinated activity. According to the Sāṅkhya definition of the ātman, as composed of the puruṣa and the embodied indriyas, the ātman cannot be the master of the indriyas. With this line of argument, Xuanzang highlights the contradiction inherent in the Sāṅkhya theory of the twenty-five tattvas and the puruṣa.

In his exegesis of the Sāṅkhya taxonomy, Xuanzang defines the ātman as the union of the puruṣa, the spiritual aspects of life, with prakṛti, the physical aspects of life. He then extends the metaphor used in the Sāṅkhyaakārikās and states that twenty-three tattvas, rather than the twenty-four enumerated in the Nalanda debate, serve at the pleasure of the soul. Regardless of the number of tattvas pictured as serving the ātman, Xuanzang ultimately concludes that the notion of the ātman as the master of the eleven indriyas is incoherent and representative of a doctrinal flaw that permeates the Sāṅkhya scriptures.

In his discussion of the soul as the master of the indriyas, Xuanzang divides his argument
into two parts: a refutation of the idea that the five cognitive faculties are dependent upon the soul and a refutation of the idea that the physical faculties are dependent upon the soul. The Sāṅkhya theorists argue that the five sensory faculties of vision, hearing, smell, taste, and touch are directed by, and exist for the purposes of, a force outside of the body. Xuanzang refutes this argument by saying that the puruṣa, or the operator of the sense faculties, is a composite of the faculties, and therefore, by definition, not external to the faculties.

The Refutation of the Five Sensory Faculties as Dependent Upon the Soul

The Sāṅkhya theorists state that the five sensory faculties (Skt.: prājñêndriyāṇi), tattvas fifteen through nineteen, require the presence of an agent to direct and organize their activities. Deemed inert instruments within the Sāṅkhya schema, the sensory indriyas require the presence of an agent, or a being outside of the indriyas, to activate, operate and coordinate them. Because the Sāṅkhya theorists define the indriyas as lifeless tools, the faculties must be used by a being who is imbued with sentience, intelligence, or buddhi. In the Sāṅkhya theory, this sentient being is charged with lending purpose and intention to the indriyas. As recorded in stanza seventeen of the Sāṅkhyakārikās and in the commentary on this text by Gauḍapada, the responsibility for operating the sensory faculties is borne by the ātman. The ātman is therefore seen as the force outside of the indriyas that lends purpose and intention to the faculties and allows them to actualize their designated functions.

Within the Sāṅkhya schema, the sentient being that activates the indriyas and imbues them with purpose is defined as non-composite (Skt.: asamḥata), or simple and pure. This reflects the Sāṅkhya assumption that entities that are asamḥata are uniquely able to use entities that are composite (Skt: samhata), or composed of various component parts. In this picture, the ātman is defined as asamhata. The term ātman is used to denote the entire apparatus that is built upon the
puruṣa, the first and foremost of the twenty-five tattvas, in conjunction with prakṛti, the second tattva, mahat, the capacity of intelligence and the ahaṅkāra, the agent endowed with the power to execute the purposes and aims (Skt.: arthas) of the puruṣa. The indriyas in this picture are viewed as composite, or saṃhata, because they are composed of various elements of the material world.

Xuanzang takes issue with the Sāṅkhya postulate that the sensory facilities are dependent on the ātman for two reasons: first, this idea runs counter to his theory of the indriyas, and second, it violates the cardinal Buddhist tenet of no-self. In his extensive analysis of the indriyas and in his exegesis of dying, Xuanzang argues that an executive operator, in the form of an ātman, is not required to enliven or operate the sensory indriyas or to sustain life. In his effort to lend rigor to Buddhist philosophy and to eradicate any vestige of the supernatural from the theory of the indriyas, Xuanzang uses Indic philosophical principles in his rebuttal to the Sāṅkhya postulate of the sensory facilities as dependent on the ātman.

Xuanzang expresses his argument in a three-part syllogism drawn from the Nyayapravesa Sastra, The Treatise on the Gate to Logic, the primer of logic composed by Śankarasvāmin, the protégé of Dignāga. While Xuanzang was not the original author of this Buddhist anti-Sāṅkhya argument, he was the first to translate it into Chinese and to provide the exegetical commentary on the core text of the logical argument. The formal inference attempts to prove the Sāṅkhya doctrine that the soul, as constituted by the embodied puruṣa, operates the sensory faculties. The inference also includes a counter-argument with two points: one, that a non-composite entity cannot control another non-composite entity, and two, that only a non-composite entity with intelligence can control a composite entity. Here the Sāṅkhya theorists assert that the ātman, when defined as a non-composite entity that is imbued with intelligence, is uniquely equipped to use the indriyas. In the Sāṅkhya picture, the indriyas are defined as composite entities without the benefit of sentience.
Because the ātman is conceptualized within the Sāṁkhya schema as non-composite and imbued with intelligence, it has the singular capacity to invest the composite indriyas with intention and purpose.

While the version of this formal inference survives in Sanskrit in the Nyāyapraveśa śāstra composed by Śankarasvāmin, it appears earlier in the Sāṅkhyakārikās and in The Treatise Conforming to Definitions, written by Guṇamati in the fourth century. Although Guṇamati uses the syllogism in the context of a Buddhist polemic against the Sāṅkhya theorists, he reproduces the text of the storied Sāṅkhya argument faithfully in his treatise. In his commentary, he reiterates the Sāṅkhya doctrine positing the ordinary sensory faculties as formally analogous to “tools” or “provisions” for use by the ātman.

A logical argument widely maintained by the Sāṅkhya commentators, the syllogism with the counter-example is as follows:

**Thesis:** The soul (ātman) [site/locus (pakṣa)] is what enjoys (bhoktṛ-in Chi., “lit., enjoys and puts to use” 受用) the eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue and the tactile organs, the sensory faculties (prājñendriyāṇi).

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353 As the argument appears initially in the NP, the main formulation takes the subject to be the “sense organs,” and the predicate to be “exist for the sake of someone else.” The ātman appears in the genitive case, indicating the objective genitive. This actually is Tachikawa’s translation, with heavy modifications, pp. 125-6.

354 The term found in the original Sanskrit text of the Nyāyapraveśa śāstra is ātman. See edition of Dhruva, Nyāyapraveśakāṣṭāstra of Baudh Ācārya Diṅnāga, (Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1930), 5. Qian Yu 虞愚 interpolates the “spiritual soul” as the subject-locus (pakṣa) of the syllogism: “It should be the case that since the pillow of composite nature is something put to use by the the provisional self formed by the combination of five aggregates, it is not something put to use by the non-composite, eternal, spiritual soul (shenwo). On the other hand, since the spiritual person exists eternally from the beginning, being non-composite by nature, it is not capable of putting the eyes to use.” 盖積聚性之臥具，既為積聚性眼之五蘊合和假我所用，絕不為非積聚性常住之神我所用。反之，神我既本有常住而非積聚性，則不能用於眼。— see Qian Yu, Yinming Xue 因明學 (Studies on Hetu-vidyā) (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1999, Reprint in 2007), 27.

355 The Sanskrit text merely has “the eye, etc.” (caksur ādi). The interpolation of the other four cognitive faculties is based upon Kuiji’s reconstruction of the inference.
Reason: Because the five sensory faculties are composites by nature (saṅghātatvāt 積聚性).

Example: Just the way that the ātman used the bed (śayana) or the stool (āsana), etc. 如臥具等。356

Counter-Example: The ātman does not use another ātman. Devadattā cannot control Yajnadattā.

The thesis in the syllogism states that the ātman is the user and the enjoyer of the sensory faculties. Xuanzang translates this as “The eye must serve for the use of another.” The reason in the syllogism states that the five sensory faculties are, by nature, composites. Xuanzang translates the reason as: “This is because of the fact that the eye is a composite thing; composite things always must find use by something else.” 眼等必為他用；積聚性故。 (T32n1630_p0012). The example in the syllogism states that the ātman uses the bed and the stool. The doctrinal implication of the syllogism is that the indriyas depend upon an ātman to operate them and that without the ātman, the activities of indriyas are not actualized. It also posits that the indriyas, because they are by nature composite, require a non-composite ātman to enliven and activate them.

The Sāṅkhya theorists deploy the analogy of the ātman using the bed and the stool to emphasize that without the motivating force of the ātman, the sensory faculties will remain inert. In the example, the bed and the stool are viewed, like the indriyas, as inanimate objects. When a person uses a bed to sleep on, or a stool to sit on, that person puts the bed and the stool to use. Without the person sleeping on the bed or sitting on the stool, the bed and the stool remain unused and therefore inanimate. The bed requires a sleeper and the stool requires a sitter to fulfill their intended functions.

356  Xuanzang’s Chinese says “like the mattress or pillow.”
Within this logical argument, the very existence of the *indriyas* is predicated upon the presence of the *ātman*. The sensory *indriyas* require the *ātman* to obtain their full efficacies. As such, the senses are said to exist as “efficacious instruments” available for the use of the *ātman*. Gauḍapada states that an *indriya* without a soul is like a “mattress” (Skt. *palyāṅka*) without a sleeper a “stool” (Skt.: *āsana*) without a sleeper.

The two premises that undergird the Sāṅkhya logical argument are first that the sensory *indriyas* exist “for the purpose of someone else” (Skt.: *parārtham*), and second that the “someone else” that the *indriyas* exist for is a non-composite entity. In their exhaustive studies of the Sanskrit sources of this inference, Ratie and Elschinger (2013) draw attention to the Sāṅkhya premises regarding composite and non-composite entities. They write that within the Sāṅkhya schema, composite entities “always exist for the sake of an entity distinct from them” (2013, pp. 155-173).

In his *Great Commentary on Nyāyapraveśa*, Kuiji specifies that the five sensory faculties are regarded as composite entities because they are constituted of various material components. Returning to the example in the syllogism, Kuiji states that a bed composed of a solid base, a hard frame, a covering cloth and so forth is a composite entity. He continues that a sense *indriya* is composed of multiple parts and therefore is a composite entity. The sensory *indriya* of the eye, for example, is composed of multiple biological components, including a lens, an iris, a retina, vitreous fluid, various nerves, and liquids such as tears and blood, that function to lubricate and nourish the eye and facilitate the action of seeing.

Because the sensory *indriyas* are defined as composite entities (Skt: *saṁghātatva*) according to the reason presented in the logical argument, they require a non-composite operator.

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357 For this analysis on the composition of the *śayana*, the *sapakṣa* of the inference, see Gauḍapada’s commentary on SK 17. See Dutt, ed., *Sāṅkhya-kārikās*, 20; English trans. by Dutt, *Sāṅkhya-kārikās*, 27-8.
to perform their functions. According to stanza seventeen of the Sāṅkhya-kārikās, the role of the non-composite operator of the indriyas is fulfilled by the puruṣa, in conjunction with mahat and the ahaṅkāra. The Sāṅkhya-kārikās are consistent in their provision that the puruṣa is simple, unitary and non-composite. The abstract puruṣa obtains concrete, physical power only when it resides in a corporeal body and becomes conjoined with the active ahaṅkāra. The stipulation that the ahaṅkāra must be present for the ātman to realize its full physical power and force is consistently maintained in the Sāṅkhya-kārikās. The Sāṅkhya conceptualization of the ātman as non-composite, or āsaṃhata, and simultaneously composed of various elements such as the puruṣa and the ahaṅkāra renders the ātman composite or saṃhat. The definition of the ātman as non-composite thus becomes incoherent on its own terms.

In his recounting of this argument in the Nyāyapraveśa Sastra, Śankarasvāmin notes that the premise that the indriyas serve for the use an entity other than themselves rests upon the assumption that the entity is non-composite. Ratié and Elschinger (2013, p. 161) observe that by adhering to the notion that the operator of the indriyas can only be a non-composite entity, “the Sāṅkhya leaves itself open to the Buddhist assault all the more since the teleological argument is stated in such a way that the puruṣa, understood as pure, uncomposed, and inactive consciousness, ends up being equated with the empirical individuals that the Sāṅkhya itself regards as composed entities.” Here Ratié and Eltschinger emphasize that the vulnerability in the Sāṅkhya argument hinges upon the conceptualization of the ātman as non-composite. Again, the very conceptualization of the ātman as having the power to activate the sensory indriyas renders the ātman non-composite. The crux of the critique of the Sāṅkhya conception of the self as the bearer

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C.f. Yuktidīpikā, where perceptible individuals such as Devadatta are presented as composed entities in contrast with the imperceptible person. See Yuktidīpikā, Tripathi, ed. (Krishnadas Academy, 1999), 89, commentary on Sāṅkhya-kārikās 17.
of the *indriyas* hinges on the theoretical confusion regarding the non-composite and composite nature of the ātman.

Kuiji, and the seventh-century Indian Jain philosopher, Haribhādrasūri, provide crucial critiques of the logical validity of this formal inference. In their commentaries, they conclude that the Śaṅkhya inference is unacceptable because it violates the rules of the science of reasons (Skt. *hetu-vidyā*). Because the syllogism contains terms that are not consistently defined between the Śaṅkhya disputant and the Buddhist opponent, the argument does not hold. More specifically, because of the incoherency of the argument regarding the nature of the ātman, it inadvertently makes the case that the sensory *indriyas* are operated by a composite ātman. In the form of the logical argumentation developed by Dignāga and recorded in the *Nyāyapraveśa śāstra* by Śankarasvāmin, the argument is damaged because the reason and the counter-example express a fundamental inconsistency regarding the nature of the ātman.

Kuiji and Haribhādrasūri focus on the internal incoherence of the Śaṅkhya argument that the ātman is required to operate the *indriyas*. According to both Kuiji and Haribhādrasūri, it is the *ahaṅkāra*,359 under the direction of the *puruṣa*, that provides the motivational force to operate the *indriyas*. This further muddies the Śaṅkhya definition of the ātman as non-composite. Additionally, Kuiji’s analysis of the counter-argument that the ātman cannot operate another ātman highlights an inconsistency in the example that disproves the counter-argument on its own terms. He notes that in the counter-argument, Devadattā is described as an ātman, and therefore by definition is non-composite. It is stated in the text, however, that “Devadattā has both a neck and a throat.” If

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Devadattā has both a neck and a throat, then Devadattā cannot be a non-composite entity. Like the stool that services it, the ātman of Devadattā contains various parts. The counter-argument is therefore internally inconsistent.

From the position of the Sāṅkhya disputant, it could be admitted that a non-composite or asamḥata entity could act on a composite entity via an intermediary. This makes room for the idea that the puruṣa could operate the indriyas via a mediator in the form of a composite ahaṅkāra. However, the ahaṅkāra is an interpolation and is not found in the inference recorded in the original text. It is extraneous and therefore inadmissible in support of the Sāṅkhya argument. Xuanzang, with his meticulous knowledge of the Brahmanical scriptures and the rules of Indic argumentation, refutes the notion of the sensory indriyas as dependent on the soul using the inconsistencies and incoherencies imbedded within the Sāṅkhya doctrine.

The following examination conforms to the order of the Sāṅkhya taxonomy of eleven faculties and to the sequence of Xuanzang’s anti-Brahmanical arguments in turning to the five faculties for action.

**Xuanzang’s Refutation of the Sāṅkhya Doctrine of Five Faculties of Action**

The Brāhmaṇical taxonomy of the Sāṅkhya states that the eleven indriyas, tattvas fifteen through twenty-five, together comprise the human being. Within the Sāṅkhya schema, the five faculties of physical action (Skt.: pañca-karmēndriyāṇi; Chi.: wu zuo-ye gen五作業根), tattvas twenty through twenty-four, are designated to accomplish the five specific tasks deemed essential to the sustenance of human life. According to the sequence of the tattvas that is standardized in the twenty-sixth stanza of the Sāṅkhyaṇakārikās, the tasks of the five faculties of physical action, or

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360 Not only in this case, but in general, one must not conflate the ātman with the purusa because, on contrast to the active ātman inhabiting a body, the disembodied purusa abides in a state of pure consciousness (caitanya) unimpeded by disruptive sensations.
the *karmēndriyāṇi*, are grasping, moving, speaking, urinating and defecating, and procreating.

Within the Sāṅkhya taxonomy, the nomenclature of each of the physical *indriya* is synonymous with the organ and the specific activity with which it is associated. As such, there is a one-to-one correspondence between each physical *indriya* and the biological apparatus that is required to execute its characteristic physical activity. Therefore, within the Sāṅkhya schema, each of the five physical *indriyas* is defined as both an aspect of the body and its intended physical function. For example, the *indriya* of the hand is defined as the faculty of grasping, the *indriya* of the foot is described as the faculty of walking, the *indriya* of the voice box is the faculty responsible for the ability to speak words, the *indriya* of the anus is associated with physical action of expelling liquid and solid waste from the body and the *indriyas* of the female or the male genital organs are known as the faculties of sexual pleasure and procreation.

As postulated in the *Sāṅkhya-kārikās*, each of the physical faculties for action, or the *karmēndriyāṇi*, functions independently. Additionally, each of the faculties for action is viewed as uniquely qualified to perform the activity for which it is specifically designed. Within this schema, the entire apparatus that is required to execute a designated physical function is contained within each specific *indriya* for action. For example, the third *karmēndriyāṇi*, the faculty of speaking, is composed of the individual components of the apparatus that allow a human to utter words. The faculty of speaking therefore includes the lips, teeth, tongue, palate, mouth, larynx, esophagus, abdomen, and all other organs involved in the production of speech. In the Sāṅkhya taxonomy, each of the five physical faculties controls the entire process of a designated physical action independently and without the benefit of collaboration with other faculties. Each *indriya* is viewed as autonomously functioning within this framework.

Xuanzang takes issue with the Sāṅkhya postulate that the highly complex physical
activities of the human body can be explained by the operation of five independent and self-contained facilities. He argues that the Sāṅkhya theory does not provide a sufficient explanation for how the specific physical indriyas accomplishment designated tasks without the coordinated efforts of other indriyas. Additionally, Xuanzang notes that even when the five faculties for physical activity are viewed as operating in a coordinated manner, the Sāṅkhya theory remains hamstrung by redundancies and incoherencies. In his exegesis of dying, Xuanzang is compelled to refute the Sāṅkhya theory of the physical faculties to uphold the Buddhist tenet that the coordinated action of multiple indriyas is necessary to sustain life.

In his effort to bolster his theory of the faculties and refute the Sāṅkhya theory of the five faculties of physical action, Xuanzang turns to the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma texts, to the elaboration of these texts by Vasubandhu and Saṅghabhadra and to his Buddhist contemporary Yaśomitra. The exegeses of the Sāṅkhya theory of the five physical indriyas appear in the Chinese translation of The Treasury of the Abhidharma composed by Xuanzang and in the commentary on this work by Saṅghabhadra. The arguments formulated by Xuanzang to dispute the Sāṅkhya theory of the physical indriyas are additionally taken up by Yaśomitra in his commentary on The Treasury of the Abhidharma.

In his refutation, Xuanzang identifies two considerable problems in the Sāṅkhya theory postulating the karmēndriyāṇi as capable of performing the five physical actions of life. He first takes issue with the conceptualization of the five physical indriyas as operating independently and with autonomous sources of power. He then highlights how the functions of the physical faculties overlap with one another and therefore do not reflect the unique purposes for which they are designed.361 Taken together, these two arguments undermine the Sāṅkhya theory that the five

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361 Saṅghabhadra points out the problem of the overlapping domains of the five faculties for action in his Clarification of Tenets, fasc. 5 (T1563:29.79.6a17-19). This passage is found in Xuanzang’s Chinese translation
physical *indriyas* perform the functions for which they are designed without the benefit of other *indriyas*. Xuanzang concludes that the physical *indriyas* must interact with other *indriyas* to produce the five physical actions enumerated in the *Sāṅkhya-kārikās*. In this examination, Xuanzang reaffirms the three cardinal tenets of the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma theory of the *indriyas*: one, that the *indriyas* do not possess autonomous sources of power; two, that the *indriyas* collaborate with other *indriyas* to perform their designated functions; and three, that this collaboration involves the activity of more than three faculties.

**The Refutation of the Five Physical Indriyas as Capable of Independently Performing the Five Actions**

In the twenty-fifth stanza of the root text of the Sāṅkhya scriptures, the venerable *Sāṅkhya-kārikās*, the five faculties of physical action, or the *karmendriyāṇi*, are enumerated. In his summary of the singular characteristic actions of the five faculties of action, Yaśomitra states: “The Sāṅkhya postulate that the faculties of speech and other actions are to be differentiated from the visual and other [sensory] faculties. The faculty of the hands (Skt.: *pāṇindriyam*) does the grasping, the faculty of the two feet (Skt.: *pādendriyam*) does the ‘walking to and fro’ (Skt.: *caṅkramaṇa*), the faculty of the voice box (Skt.: *vāgindriyam*; Chi.: 語具) does the talking, the faculty of anus (Skt.: *pāvyendriyam*) does the expelling of liquid and solid waste and the faculty of the genitals (Skt.: *upastha*) performs the functions of sexual pleasure and

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of Saṅghabhadra’s work, but not in the Tib. translation: “The error of the confused overlapping (of *indriyas*) refers to the Sāṅkhya establishing faculties which overlap with one another. The error of the confused overlapping occurs because of the fact that the mouth (like the hands) is capable of grasping things and expelling things (i.e., vomitus), and because of the fact that the hand and the legs are both capable of moving forward with force. So, with these examples there is the error of overlapping domains.” “混亂失者，彼所立根應成混亂。口能執取及棄捨故。手足俱有執行用故。有如是等混亂過失。”

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Xuanzang, in his translation of the Abhidharma discussions of the physical indriyas, points out a problem with the Sāṅkhya conceptualization of the faculties of action as possessing the power to function independently. The Abhidharma sources that are preserved in the body of Chinese translations by Xuanzang take up the action of “walking” as a paradigmatic case to demonstrate the problem with conceptualizing the kārmēndriyāṇī as autonomously functioning and self-sufficient. In this example, the Sāṅkhya definition of the physical indriya of walking presents insuperable difficulties that reveal a basic deficiency in the underlying theory. The Sāṅkhyakārikās postulate the faculty of “locomotion,” or pādêndriyam, as one of the five faculties built for action. According to the classical Sāṅkhya taxonomy, the faculty of locomotion, or pādendriya, is distinguished by the characteristic capability of walking. The faculty of locomotion is rooted in the legs and feet and is viewed as the source of the dominant force that is “sufficient to get [the feet, legs and the body] moving and walking” 足於行步.

Enlisting the example of the faculty of walking, Xuanzang asks how, without an executive operator to wield them, the “two feet” (Skt.: padau) can possibly move on their own accord (section 1.4.2). Buddadeva (Chi.: Juetian 覺天), a Sarvāstivāda authority, adduces this argument as follows: Because the physical organs of the feet are “hard to set into motion,” they require the collaboration of the mental faculty to “get going.” Xuanzang and Buddadeva point

363 For Yaśomitra’s text see Shastri, ed., Sphuṭārtha, Sāṅkhyāḥ caksurindriyādīvīyatiṅktāṁ vāgindriyādīṁ kilpayanti–vāgindriyāṁ yena ca vacanaṁ kriyate, pāṇindriyāṁ yena kiñcid drayamādiyate, pādendriyāṁ yena viharanam kriyate, caṅkramaṇamityarthah, pātvindriyāṁ yena purīṣotsargaḥ kriyate, upasthendriyāṁ käyendriyākadeśavyatiriktaṁ yenāndanaṁ sukhaṁśeṣaṁ prāpyate|.


365 In a passage found in Xuanzang’s Mahāvibhāṣa, fascicle 153 (T1545:27.736.b14 ), Buddhadeva writes: “The faculty is, by definition, determinately set so it's difficult to get it into motion.” 根者決定，難可搖動. In other words, it takes some “outside” effort to get the faculty moving and active. Buddhadeva draws the example of “the
out that the feet do not have an autonomous source of power to activate them, and therefore require another *indriya* to initiate the activity of walking. Regardless of how physically fit or well-outfitted they might be, two feet cannot simply “boot-strap” their way up a hill.

Yaśomitra, like Xuanzang, maintains that the capacity for initiating and sustaining movement in the body resides in the kinesthetic apparatus, or the bodily faculty of *kāyêndriyam*. They propose that the faculty of *kāyêndriyam*, which is viewed as unconfined to a specific location in the body, is required for the physical action of moving. Walking, according to the Abhidharma theorists, requires the action or the karma of *kāyêndriyam* in addition to the apparatus of the two feet. In his commentary on the “Discrimination of Faculties,” Yaśomitra states that the physical action of movement comes about with the convergence of three elements: an applicatory intention, a thought “to move the foot,” and *kāyêndriyam*. With this line of reasoning, the Sarvāstivāda scholars highlight the theoretical problems inherent in the Sāṅkhya definition of the five physical *indriyas* as self-sufficient.

The same holds for talking, as more than one faculty is involved in this task as well. In his commentary regarding the limitations of the Sāṅkhya theory of the independent functioning of the physical *indriya* of speaking, Saṅghabhadra writes:

> The stimulation and the emission of speech depends upon the conditions of the lips, teeth, palate, pharynx, larynx, etc., and not on just the voice box (Skt.: vāk), because these do not have different causes and because the mental application and discursive thought are the predominant cause (Skt.: pradhāna-hetu). The hands and armpits, the vocal cords, the windpipe, strings and breath – these are capable of serving as causes because they discharge sounds and words – so we should not just establish the tongue as the vocal faculty. 依脣齒

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image of the mirage” 影像陽焰 to exemplify, like the faculty, something without causal efficacy in the operative sense that *samjñā*, by contrast, carries with it. The real faculty cannot be parasitic on something else.
Sarīghabhādra, in his commentary found in the *Treasury of Abhidharma*, uses the example of the faculty of *vāgindriyam* to critique the Śaṅkhyā postulate of the faculties for action as independent and self-sustaining. According to Sarīghabhādra, the faculty of speaking, narrowly defined in the Śaṅkhyā schema as the voice box, is not sufficiently equipped to generate the various activities involved in the process of uttering sounds. The *vāgindriyam* does not bear the “self-sufficient power” (Skt. *aisvaryaṃ*; Chi.: *zizai-li* 自在力) to speak on its own. He argues that the act of speaking is not limited to the products of the voice box but also includes the actions of the mouth, lips, nose and lungs. Sarīghabhādra makes it clear that the physical action of speaking depends upon not only the *indriya* of speaking, but also other parts of the body and other *indriyas*.

Yāsomitra, in his very precise examination of the case of speaking, pinpoints the methodological problem of causal insufficiency in the Śaṅkhyā schema. He avers that there are multiple variables, including the presence of air in the atmosphere, that affect the physical action of vocalizing. In his Chinese rendering of the faculty of speaking, Xuanzang uses the term “apparatus” (Chi.: *ju* 具) to imply that the faculty of speaking is constituted of a set of provisions that includes the throat, teeth, thorax, lips, and abdomen. In his rationale for using the term *ju*, Xuanzang suggests that the *vāgindriyam* alone cannot be a faculty. In short, the voice box, simpliciter, does not contain the factors that are necessary and sufficient to produce speech. Additionally, the *vāgindriyam* is not capable of drawing upon or activating the other *indriyas* that are necessary and sufficient to execute the action of speaking.

Xuanzang reasons that the problems with the causal insufficiencies in the faculties of

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366 Ny, fasc. 9 (T1562:29.379.11 -14); Also XZL, fasc. 5 (T1563:29.796.08-14).
speaking and walking holds for other faculties of action as well, including the faculties of locomotion and excretion. Additionally, Yaśomitra, Saṅghabhadra and Xuanzang unequivocally reject the idea that complex actions such as speaking meaningful words or negotiating one’s way up a hill require the action of an executive power that exists beyond the faculties. These authors dismiss the idea of an overlord or a chief executive that delegates the work of executing the five physical actions to others and then claims the lion’s share of the credit for their accomplishments.

In his commentary in AKṣh 2.1, Yaśomitra points out an additional reason to discount the Sāṅkhya conceptualization of the voice box as equivalent to the faculty of physical action. He argues that because humans are not born with the ability to utter words, the development of the faculty of speaking involves training, and therefore the action of karma and other faculties. He states: “For as soon as it is born, even without power, it is by way of the trained eye that one sees visibles (Skt.: rūpas), but it is not by way of the eyes that one makes speech. Hence, the voice box (Skt.: vāk) is not warranted to be (serve as a) a faculty because that exceeds the scope of the faculty qua causal factor (dharma).”

In his commentary on Xuanzang’s Chinese translation of the Treasury of Abhidharma, Huiyun, a late seventh-century Buddhist scholar, points out an issue linked to Yaśomitra’s observation. He avers that an activity that requires training, such as vocalizing words, does not refer to an innate human capability. Because the indriyas are viewed within the Sāṅkhya schema as innate to the human, the question of training calls the independence of the faculty of speaking into question.
In his auto-commentary on the first verse of *The Discrimination of Indriyas*, Vasubandhu closely examines the case of digestion, the biological function for which the faculty of excretion, or *pāvyendriyam*, is expressly designed. He adduces this example to demonstrate a fallacy in the Sāṅkhya postulate that the independent faculty of *pāvyendriyam*, or the anus, takes care of the excretion of solid and liquid waste. Vasubandhu proposes that the anus does not accomplish the entire scope of the activities of excretion. He states: “the mouth and the anus share the common function of excretion.” In a rather crude example, Vasubandhu makes the point that because vomitus is expelled by the mouth, the function of excretion is not limited to the domain of the anus. Additionally, Vasubandhu observes that according to the Sāṅkhya theory, the physical action of excretion (Skt.: *pāyurindriyam*) occurs when the muscles of the anus contract to expel waste. Vasubandhu rebuts this idea by pointing out that the anus is not the predominant power source in the activity of expelling waste. He notes that “heavy things always fall in a void; further, wind pushes this matter and forces it to go out.” With this reasoning, Vasubandhu intimates that other physical actions within and outside the body, such as gravity, are responsible for excretion. Therefore, the anus is not the only organ or *indriya* involved in the activity of excretion.

The challenge from the Buddhist Abidhamarikas is aimed at the root of the Sāṅkhya doctrine of the faculties, the premise that the five faculties of action are self-contained, self-sufficient and designed to “go it alone.” The line of attack, however, fails to hit the intended target.

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369 The reason that Vasubandhu further takes up the upasthendriyam (“procreative faculty”) is that Sāṅkhya takes this term to cover both the sexual parts of the organism and part of the faculty of proprioception (*kāyendriyam*). The upastha is thus conceived as “distinct from the male or female organ, which is one part, one locus of the organ of touch (*kāyendriyakadeśastrapurusendriyavyatiriktakalpita*).” In his commentary on Vasubandhu’s *kośa*, Yuanhui points out that part of *upastha* is dominant with respect to both liquid and solid excretion, and those parts of *upastha* corresponding to the sexual organ are dominant with respect to sexual pleasure.

370 Xuanzang’s translates the Sanskrit word *payurendriya* in a derogative way as “the locus of liquid and/or solid excretion” 大小便處. Paramārtha crudely renders this item as “anus”—see Paramārtha’s trans. of Guṇamati’s *Lakṣaṇa-śāstra*: “There are five *kārmendriyāni*: the mouth, the hands, the legs, the anus, and the bimodally-gendered procreative faculty.”業根有五。一口。二手。三脚。四尻。五男女根。
for one reason. The characterization of the *karmendriya* that is formulated by the Buddhists in their rebuttal is based on a misapprehension of the original Sāṅkhya sources. The *vṛtti* commentary to the *Sāṅkhyakārikās*, transmitted along with Paramārtha’s Chinese translation of the scriptures, explicitly states that the hands and the feet are a metonymy for the faculties of grasping and locomotion. Simply put, the possession of two hands does not provide the sufficient conditions for grasping. According to the *Sāṅkhyakārikās*, a single faculty never supplies the sufficient conditions for action. The faculties of action are thus conceptualized in the early Sāṅkhya scriptures as the entire apparatus required to execute the five physical actions.

The Buddhist counterargument to the Sāṅkhya concept of the causal independence of the faculties for action is based on the observation that the physical faculties, simpliciter, do not possess the power to activate themselves. According to the Buddhists, the Sāṅkhya schema does not provide a sufficient explanation for the motivation of the physical faculties. The Buddhists argue that “the physical *indriyas* can only execute tasks in conjunction with the coordinating faculty of the mind (Skt.: *samkalpakaṃdriyam*).”

Returning to the example of walking, the mind is needed to initiate the action of getting the feet moving. Additionally, the mind is needed to sustain the movement of the feet, because the feet cannot coordinate themselves autonomously. Vasubandhu states: “Even with the exercise of the two feet with the heavy element in space, the faculty, as such (Skt. *indriyatva*), does not go anywhere. Because it should be impelled by

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371 *Jin qishi lun* (T2137:54.1251.c22), *vṛtti* commentary on *Sāṅkhyakārikās*, 26: “Five faculties for action have five tasks. When this faculty of gustation is associated with the mental faculty, it is capable of speaking words, sentences, and tasting flavors. When the faculty of grasping (lit., “the hands qua organ”) is associated with the mental faculty it is capable of performing crafts and grasping things, etc. When the faculty of locomotion (pādendriyam) is associated with the mental faculty, it is capable of moving strait forward, etc., and up and down the path. When the faculty of human procreation (*ānandendriyam*) is associated with the mental faculty, it is capable of sexual pleasure and begetting children. When the faculty of solid excretion (*pañorindriyam*) is associated with the mental faculty, it is capable of expelling solid waste.”
wind.” In their critique of the Sāṅkhya conceptualization of the five physical indriyas, the Buddhists conclude that because the physical indriyas are not intrinsically motivated to act, they are not self-sufficient.

**The Refutation of the Five Physical Indriyas As Singular and Unique in Their Functioning**

The Sāṅkhya theorists posit that the five physical faculties are uniquely and singularly designed to accomplish their designated functions. The Abhidharma theorists, in addition to their concerns about the validity of the theory of the self-sufficiency of the five faculties, highlight an inconsistency in the Sāṅkhya concept of the physical indriyas’ specificity of functioning. They point out that the five faculties execute tasks other than those they are expressly designated to accomplish as delineated within the Sāṅkhya taxonomy. The Buddhists enlist this idea in their rebuttal of the Sāṅkhya theory and position the causal redundancy of the physical indriyas as at odds with the conceptualization of the five faculties as self-contained and singular in their functioning. This rebuttal to the Sāṅkhya claims of the self-sufficiency and uniqueness of the physical indriyas is articulated in the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, as well as in the original text of *The Treasury of Abhidharma* by Vasubandhu and its Chinese commentaries.

Within the Sāṅkhya theory, the five physical faculties for action have very specific and singular tasks. For example, the faculty of speech is designed for the vocalization of words, and the faculty of excretion (Skt.: pāvyēndriyam) is designed to expel waste from the body.

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372 Pāyorapi nendriyatvamutsargo gurudravyasyākāše sarvatra patanā| vāyunā ca tatpreraṇāt| AK Bh. 2.6 (Pradhan, 1967 p. 40).

373 On the basis of these observations, Abhidharma commentators try to make the that three of the so-called “faculties for action” – namely, the “faculty of solid excretion” (pāyu), the “faculty of speech,” and “faculty of procreation” – are in fact trivial posits undeserving of the name “faculty.” What these three items have in common is that they were designed for very specific and singular tasks. However, they are well capable of executing tasks beyond those for which they were expressly/specifically designed. Moreover, other faculties are well capable of executing the work for which they were explicitly/expressly designed.
Additionally, within Sāṅkhya theory, each of the faculties of action is viewed as having the capacity to accomplish its designated task without the involvement of other faculties. Within this framework, there is no redundancy among the faculties or overlapping of their functions.

In their painstakingly detailed commentaries on the *Treasury of Abhidharma*, Xuanzang and his prolific disciples and collaborators Puguang 普光 (645?–664 C.E.) and Fabao 法寶 (dates of birth and death unknown) single out the faculties of speech and excretion as particularly flagrant examples of the problem of redundancy within the Sāṅkhya conceptualization of the physical indriyas. The commentaries of Puguang and Fabao appear in their study notes on Xuanzang’s Chinese translation of the *Treasury of Abhidharma*. Here Xuanzang’s disciples demonstrate their lockstep reasoning in lodging the following complaint.  

Presently, we conform to the Sāṅkhya tenet of eleven faculties that generate the activities of five sensory faculties making the counter-argument: [For Sāṅkhya], the “provisions for speech/apparatus of speech” (vāk) refers to the physical tongue (lit. “the fleshy tongue”) which is dominant in speaking. The hands are dominant in grasping things. The feet are dominant in walking. The rectum/anus (Chi. lit., “the locus of expelling solid waste”) is dominant in expelling waste, while the urethra (lit., “the locus of liquid excretion”) is dominant in sexual pleasure. Since either of these two is dominant, they should both be established/postulated as faculties.  

In the Sāṅkhya taxonomy, the fourth faculty, the action of excretion, is defined as “the locus for expelling liquid and solid waste” (Skt.: pāyu; Chi.: dabian-chu 大便處). The word pāyu, used in the Sāṅkhya texts, most literally means anus. Puguang and Fabao observe that the use of

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374 Fabao makes this line of argument at: T1822:41.514.b28-c3; Puguang makes this argument at T1821:41.58.b04-9.
the word *pāyurindriyam*, as enshrined in the *Sāṅkhyakārikās*, is problematic because it does not include the urethra as a locus for expelling liquid waste. To his credit, Xuanzang renders the term *xiaobianehu* (大小便處), which includes both the anus and the urethra. Fabao and Puguang point out the deficiency in this nomenclature to highlight the problem with the specificity of function in the Sāṅkhya texts.

Drawing upon Vasubandhu’s discussion of the capacities attributed by the *Sāṅkhyakārikās* to the faculty of excretion, or *pāvyêndriyam*, in the auto-commentary on the first verse of his “Discrimination of Faculties,” Puguang and Fabao attempt to illustrate the methodological tenet that multiple faculties are involved in all physical actions. They further debunk the Sāṅkhya idea of the singular purpose of the faculty of excretion by arguing that the physiological processes of digestion and the expulsion of waste from the body involve additional faculties and physical forces. They conclude that no single faculty is sufficient to accomplish the vital tasks of excretion. With this observation, the Abhidharma commentators conclude that the theory of the faculty of excretion, as enshrined in the *Sāṅkhyakārikās*, is a trivial posit.

In his polemical sub-commentary on Vasubandhu’s auto-commentary on the first stanza of the second chapter of the *Treasury of Abhidharma*, Saṅghabhadra highlights the problem of redundancy in the Sāṅkhya taxonomy. The arguments leveled by Saṅghabhadra indict the methodological approach of demarcating the faculties based on one specific or characteristic action. Saṅghabhadra writes: “The tongue [in addition to the voice box] is part of the capability of vocalization, and the nose is extensively involved in breathing.”

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375 *Clarification of Tenets*, fasc. 5, and *Nyāyanusāra śāstra*, fascicle 9 contain virtually the same passage, only the final sentence in bold font is found in *Nyāyanusāra* but not in the presentation of the passage: “The gravest error in their (i.e., the Sāṅkhya), is that they establish faculties without restriction or limitation. If the faculty of gustation is distinct from the faculty of speech, then must be granted that the faculty of olfaction is distinct from the faculty of breathing. This is because the tongue provides capability of speaking, and like the nose it is implicated in breathing. If one thing [the tongue] has significant causal efficacy in another thing [breathing], then it will be postulated as a faculty. Thus, the throat and larynx, the teeth, lips, and abdomen are all involved in
does what others are explicitly designed to do is inconsistent with the definition of the faculty in terms of a characteristic task.

Based upon the principle of collaboration among faculties, Vasubandhu concludes that the faculties of proprioception and gustation are involved in the ingestion, digestion, and ultimately the expulsion of piecemeal food. Although they are related in terms of their functioning, the capacities for the ingestion, digestion and the expulsion of food do not form an independent indriya. Vasubandhu concludes that digestion must be explained as an example of an action requiring the coordination of different indriyas.

Puguang and Yaśomitra elaborate on the idea that more than one action of the body falls under the physical action of expulsion. The Mahāvibhāṣa states: “That which is motivated by wind is not [motivated] by the bodily faculty” 風勢所轉非有身根. Puguang develops Vasubandhu’s thought that “wind should not be established because it induces the power of wind to put things out, which has nothing to do with the anus itself.” Yaśomitra elaborates that “heavy food,” because it is “difficult to digest,” is expelled by wind, and not by an independent faculty. He also argues

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Chewing and swallowing, and the matters involved in the assimilaton [of food], etc. All of these elements are dominant [in eating], so they each should be postulated as faculties. Some hold that all of these elements serve as causal basis, and give rise to specific effects, since they are all dominant in action, and as such, should be postulated as faculties. Thus, Kāpila is engaging in puerile games. He shouldn’t admit that the apparatus of speech is an indriya. Since it is not-sufficient without becoming combined together with other indriyas that are in fact the most dominant in the action” 太過失者。彼所立根。應無限量。若舌根異，語根異者，應許鼻根，與息根異。如舌能語，鼻通息故。若此於彼，少有作用，即立為根，是則咽喉，齒脣肚等，於諸吞嚼，攝持等事，有增上故，應立為根。或一切因。於生自果。皆增上故。應並立根。故迦毗羅如童子戲，不應許彼諸語具等根。非足（emended from 定，based upon Gong edition）無雜極增上故 (T29n1562p0379b23-29).

376 Again, Mahāvibhāṣa 131 clearly states that “without the element (dhātu) of wind/air, there should be no movement.” 若無風界應無動搖.

377 Yaśomitra's commentary on the relevant patch of text in Vasubandhu’s AKBh 2.6 in Shastri, ed. Sphuṭārtha, 144 runs: “…and it's set into motion by wind — with that pure (undigested) constituency (śucidravya) [by wind setting it into motion] in the case of something heavy (difficult to digest), precisely on the part of wind there should be that action [taking place], not on the part of the faculty/organ of chewing (pāṭhyindriyam), because it [the action] is not attained [vālabh] by that. vāyunā ca tatprerāṇādīti/ vāyunā tasya gurorśucidravyasya preranā/ vāyoreva tat karma syāt, na pāṭhyindriyasā; tadanupalabdeḥ.
that gravity is involved in the expulsion of waste: “It is in the nature of heavy things to fall downward through an air chamber.” The Abhidharma theorists suggest that the elevation of the anus to the vaunted status of a physical faculty is problematic in and of itself.

The arguments aimed at denying that the voice constitutes its own faculty are predicated upon the idea that the voice cannot be truly innate, as it requires some training to be exercised properly. Not so the faculties of solid and liquid excretion, the fourth karmendriyas postulated in the Śāṅkhya-kārikās. Vasubandhu singles out the dual faculties of excretion as particularly trivial elements posited by the Śāṅkhyya system. However, his criticism is based upon a different reason than the reason used in the cases of the voice and locomotion. Saṁghabhadra cites this as a paradigmatic case to indict all the five faculties for action as resting upon trivial and gratuitous posits.378

The critiques leveled by the Buddhists against the five faculties for action as envisioned by the Śāṅkhyya theorists fall short because the early Buddhist polemics are predicated upon a fundamental misapprehension of the Śāṅkhyya doctrine that is laid out clearly in the Śāṅkhya-kārikās. According to the Śāṅkhya-kārikās, the faculties of action are conceptualized as the entire apparatus required to execute the five physical actions, and not simply singular organs. Garbe379 describes

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378 Samghabhadra writes in fascicle nine of his Nyāyanusāra, in his commentary on the beginning of the second chapter of Vasubandhu’s Treasury of Abhidharma (AK2.1): “Although congenitally blind people hear talk of ‘color,’ they don’t comprehend the different visible characteristics of ‘blue,’ etc. Although the hands can grasp things, they are not established as a ‘faculty,’ because the mouth can also grasp things. The feet are not termed a ‘faculty’ in moving, since snakes, fish, etc., also move but not with feet. The locus of discharging solid waste (i.e., anus/rectum) is capable of expelling things, but it is not termed a ‘faculty,’ since the mouth is also capable of expelling things. Where the mistake of confusing things lies here is in the establishing things as faculties which results in confusion, precisely because the mouth is capable of grasping and expelling things, just as either hands or feet are equally capable of grasping things in their movements. With these [examples], the line of reasoning leads into errore.” 諸生盲人雖聞說色，不了青等差別相故，手於執取不應名根，口等亦能執取物故。足於行動不應名根。蛇魚等類，不由於足有行動故。出大便處，於能棄舍不應名根，口等亦能有棄捨故。雜亂失者，彼所立根應成雜亂，口能執取及棄捨故。手足俱有執行用故。有如是等雜亂過失。

the five kārmendriyāṇi as “something of the mind (Skt.: atīndriyam), to be opened/unfolded from their functions, and not to be confused with the visible organs in which they are situated.” This qualification clearly disaggregates the faculties for action from the crude faculties of the body. In this regard, the understanding of the five faculties for action founded in the Sāṅkhyakārikās ultimately withstands the line of scrutiny of Xuanzang and the Abhidharma critics.

Xuanzang’s overall argumentation against the Sāṅkhya doctrine of the soul lays bare an Achille’s heel in the Sāṅkhya doctrine. Schterbatsky (1920, p. 3) describes this weakness as the discrepancy between the “eternally-passive” puruṣa and the perennially “active” indriyas that execute the actions willed by the soul. While the puruṣa and the indriyas make up the apparatus that enables the action of the soul, the puruṣa, simpliciter, is portrayed as an inactive witness in the theater of the body. The eleven indriyas of the corporeal body are responsible for the effortful work involved in executing the actions of the soul. The soul emerges from this picture as a collective concept endowed with the powers of the physical body, while its essence – the puruṣa – is passive and inactive. In contrast, the soul depicted in the Vaiśeṣika scriptures is mobile and active.

After dispensing with a comprehensive study of the Sāṅkhya tradition, Xuanzang undertakes an investigation of the classical Vaiśeṣika (Chi.: Sheng-lun 勝論, Weishi shi 衛世師) texts and their commentaries. His immersive studies of the Vaiśeṣika sūtras and the commentary on these texts focus on the theories that posit the soul as the entity that animates the body in life

380 Richard Garbe writes: “Sie sind etwas übersinnliches (atīndriya), aus ihren Functionen zu erschliessendes und nicht mit den sichtbaren Organen zu verwechseln, in denen sie ihren Sitz haben. Unter den Functionen (vṛtti) hat man sich ein Hinauswachsen (sarpaṇa) der Sinne aus ihren körperlichen Sitzen gedacht und ihren Ursprung in dem Individuum, nicht in einem von Aussen kommenden Reiz gesucht.” See Garbe,

381 As Schterbatsky writes: “the position of an eternal passive Soul alongside with an active but unconscious intellect (buddhi) is indeed a very weak point in the Sāṅkhya system, a point which invites criticism.”
and forsakes the body in death. In his analyses, Xuanzang detects the subtle influence of the Brāhmaṇical theory of the soul on Chinese Buddhist philosophy. Concerned about the infiltration of theories that rely upon invisible forces for the animation of the body and for the loss of vitality that occurs in dying, Xuanzang looks for more rigorous and scientific explanations. He attempts to revitalize Buddhist theory by finding accounts of the physical activity of the body and the process of dying that do not depend upon unobservable entities, such as an ātman.

The Vaiśeṣika Conceptualization of the Soul

While residing in India, Xuanzang became concerned with what he believed to be a pervasive attachment within the flourishing Buddhist Pudgalavāda tradition to the Brāhmaṇical idea of an eternal ātman. The Pudgalavāda, one of the five Indic traditions of Buddhism, holds that a person, in the form of the ātman, or an “eternal spirit” (Chi.: shen 神), survives death. During his travels along the Silk Road, Xuanzang noticed the idea of the eternal ātman proliferating among the Brāhmaṇs and the Buddhists practicing in India and Central Asia. Upon his return to China, he witnessed prominent Buddhists perpetuating the idea of a soul as an eternally transmigrating entity.

Xuanzang’s writings consistently deny the existence of any supernatural entity that survives death, whether in the guise of an eternal spirit, a “cloud soul” (Chi.: hun 魂), a “white soul” (Chi.: po 魄) or a “numen” (Chi.: ling 靈). He regards the appropriation of terminology that describes an enduring spirit entity, even when used to forge a rapprochement with Brāhmaṇical or Daoist belief systems, as scripturally unfounded. To Xuanzang, the idea of an eternal spirit is a fundamental misinterpretation of the teachings of the Buddha and contradictory to the Buddhist tenet of no-self.

Alarmed by the attempts of his Buddhist colleagues to smuggle a soul into Chinese
Buddhism, Xuanzang turns to the Vaiśeṣika scriptures to repudiate, and therefore block, a source of the infiltration of the Brāhmaṇical doctrine of the soul into the Buddhist system. Xuanzang’s targeted arguments against the Vaiśeṣika doctrine are driven by his agenda of expiating the soul from the Buddhist picture of dying and death. By doing this, Xuanzang intends to rescue Buddhism from intrusion by crypto-Brāhmaṇical theories that posit the presence of a supernatural person who survives in death.

Vaiśeṣika is recognized as one of the six Brāhmaṇical schools that flow from the Vedic traditions of Hinduism. The name of this philosophical tradition is derived from the Sanskrit word vaiśeṣa, which means “particularity.” Viśeṣa is also the name of the sixth padārtha, or ontological category, within the grand Vaiśeṣika taxonomy that categorizes everything in the universe.382 The foundational scriptures of the Vaiśeṣika school of Hindu philosophy are the Vaiśeṣika Sūtras (Chi.: Sheng lun jing 勝論經). These sūtras record the oral testimony of the sixth-century B.C. Indian sage and visionary Ulūka 優樓迦. A somewhat mythical figure, Ulūka,383 in his uncompromising search for truth, is said to have survived in an isolated mountain retreat by eating millet and other grains. Also known as “the All-Seeing Owl” (Skt.: Ulūka; Chi.: Wenlunjia 喃露迦; Xiuliu 鵂鶹), or the “grain eater in the night,” Ulūka is regarded as the founder of Vaiśeṣika. The written collection of his aphorisms, also known as the Ulūka Sūtras, forms the scriptural basis of the Vaiśeṣika doctrine.

While inheriting the doctrine of the soul from the Sāṅkhya school, the Vaiśeṣika philosophers develop a distinct notion of the soul. Throughout the works of the classical Vaiśeṣika theorists, the soul is envisioned as the substrate holding the vital powers of life, the motivator of

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382 Kumar, On Knowing and What There is to Know (New York: Routledge, 2013), 33-35.
383 Kuji refers to Ulūka using the derogatory epithet “Barn Owl,” implying that he is hermetical. This epithet derives from the semantic translation of Kāṇada’s name, and is not implied in the phonetic transliteration.
the physical activities necessary for living, the restorer and rejuvenator of the body and the bearer of karma. Kaṇāda’s conceptualization of the ātman as the driver of all actions and the substance of life is consistent with his Brāhmaṇical forbearers. The sūtras of Kaṇāda, however, defend the position that the soul, per se, survives death and continues throughout the afterlife until it becomes associated with a new body. Unlike the Sāṅkhya ātman, “in early Vaiśeṣika by contrast, the soul itself migrates” (Watson, 2006, p. 63).

Xuanzang was familiar with the hallowed sūtras of Kaṇāda and was likely introduced to them as a novitiate monk in China. While in India from 630-640 C.E., Xuanzang read the original texts in Sanskrit and a compilation of the Vaiśeṣika Sūtras composed by the sixth-century Vaiśeṣika scholar Candramati. Upon his return to China, he undertook a translation of the Candramati summary of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy and an extensive study of the later commentaries. With the Vaiśeṣika doctrine deeply in his bones, Xuanzang formulated his rebuttal to the Vaiśeṣika doctrinal premise that the soul is necessary to explain survival and death.

The Vaiśeṣika Padarthas and the Ātman

The Vaiśeṣika scholars build their explanation of the existence of life and the ātman on the theory of the padārthas, or the objects of experience. Within the Vaiśeṣika doctrine, the padārthas comprise a comprehensive taxonomy of the basic constituents of reality. The padārthas are defined as all objects that can be known (Skt.: jñeya) and named (Skt.: abhideya). In his exegesis of the Vaiśeṣika theories of life and death, Xuanzang investigates the earlier anti-Brahmanical treatises of Guṇamati that describe the “ontological categories,” the six padārthas, that categorize all aspects of experience (Kumar, 2013). The padārthas are analogous to the tattvas of the Sāṅkhya doctrine. Both taxonomies define the basic ontological and primitive elements of existence in their philosophical canons.
In the first lines of the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtras*, Kaṇāda says: “The goal is knowledge of the padārthas. Knowledge of the padārthas is the comprehensive knowledge of both dharma and tattvas” (Jambuvijaya, 1961, p. 1). Kaṇāda states that the ultimate path to liberation (Skt.: moksha) is disclosed in the padārthas, the system that explains the dharma and the adharma, the merits and demerits that accumulate over the course of present and past lives. According to the Vaiśeṣika doctrine sent down from the prophet Kaṇāda, to know the padārthas means to comprehend a grand taxonomy that explains the nature of the universe (Kumar 2013).

The classical Vaiśeṣika doctrine of the six padārthas is enumerated by Kaṇāda in the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtras*. Huili notes that Xuanzang, in the debate with the Plain-Spoken Brāhmaṇ at the Nālanda gate, recites the first six padārthas in the standard sequence laid down by Kaṇāda. Faithfully reciting the taxonomy, Xuanzang states: “The Vaiśeṣika masters postulate six padārthas: substance (Skt.: dravya), quality (Skt.: guna; Chi.: qiuna 求那; de 德), action (Skt.: karman), being (Skt. bhava); sameness or homogeneity versus difference or heterogeneity (Skt.: samānyaviśeṣa); and inherence (Skt. samavāya).”

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384 Tang Yongtong’s massive survey of materials for the study of Vaiśeṣika preserved in Chinese crossreferences the Vaiśeṣikasutras with both the Dasapadartha sastra and Aryadeva’s Catuhsatakāsastra. His findings show that all of these texts share a fundamental agreement on the sequence of the six padarthas, even as they differ in some of the finer details of the nomenclature. The only discrepancies between Aryadeva’s and Candramati’s texts are due to difference in the translation style of Kumārajīva and Xuanzang. See Tang Yongtong quanji, vol. 2, 183.

385 See Puguang’s *Study Notes on the Kośa* (T1821:41.95.a05): “What is bhāva? It is the padārtha that combines the mixing of dravyas, guṇas, and karman. All of it [bhāva] is graspable by the indriyas.” 何者為有性。謂與一切實·德·業句義和合。一切根所取。

386 Puguang, *Notes on the Kośa*, fascicle 5: “sameness and difference (sāmānyaviśeṣa) refers to the cognition of sameness” (T1821:41.94.b27). Puguang’s point in making this stipulation that the fifth padārtha of sāmānyaviśeṣa refers to the “cognition of sameness and difference,” is that this refers only to the similarities and differences between sentient things – that is, things with “awareness.” Puguang refers to the correct idea that sāmānyaviśeṣa references only sentient things as “sāmānya-viśeṣa with restricted sense,” while he refers to the mistaken idea that it includes also insensate things as “the unrestricted sense.”

387 Daoyi’s sub-glosses on Zhizhou’s commentary on Nyāyapraveśa contains an inferential argument attributable to Vaiśeṣika that attempts to prove the real existence of samavaya qua padarthas: “Vaiśeṣika establishes an inference that the referent of samavāya is something that really exists. Reason (hetu): since it is classified as one of the six padarthas. This is because of the fact that the other five padartha are inferable.”
同異性、和合性，此六是我所受具，未解脫已來受用前六；若得解脫，與六相離，稱為涅槃。In his recounting of the Nalanda Gate debate, Huili reports that Xuanzang attests to the Vaiśeṣika doctrine that the *padārthas* comprise all of the entities that make up the body and the soul, as well as the karma that they generate throughout life. 388 Xuanzang also states: “The six *padārthas* are the range of things experienced by the soul.”

While Kaṇāda enumerates six *padārthas* in the Vaiśeṣika sūtras, other classical Vaiśeṣika texts include a seventh category of non-existence (Skt. *abhāva*) in their taxonomies. Other listings, including the taxonomy of the *padārthas* in Xuanzang’s Chinese translation of Candramati’s treatise, enumerate up to ten *padārthas*. 389 Despite quibbles about the number of *padārthas* in the Vaiśeṣika taxonomy, 390 the sequence and the definitions of *padārthas* one through six – substance, quality, action, being, particularity and inherence–as they are codified in the seminal Vaiśeṣika

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388 Puguang provides some helpful and concise glosses on the third through sixth *padārthas* of the classical Vaiśeṣika taxonomy: “The third [*padārtha*] is ‘action’ (*karman*). It is explained as the action that is motivated by the real “subject” [of action.] The fourth *padārtha* is ‘sameness.’ It is explained as the sameness that describes the sameness pervasive to a discrete entity that is real. The fifth [*padārtha*] is ‘difference’ (*viśeṣa*). It is explained as the difference that discriminates between one real thing and another. The sixth is inherence (*samāvāya*): it is explained as something that is engendered from plural factors and that obtains their causal efficacy.”

389 Frauwallner, *History of Indian Philosophy* (1956, reprinted 1973), vol. 2, 142-5, passim. There is the question surrounding the representativity of this text, since it presents an atypical taxonomy of ten categories or *padārthas*, rather than the more standard six-fold or seven-fold taxonomies, which are attested in original Skt. sources such as the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*. However, Frauwallner's *History of Indian Philosophy* treats the tenfold along with the more standard taxonomies – see volume two of his authoritative synoptic study, the second volume of which covers “the Nature-Philosophical Schools and Vaiśeṣika (vol. 2, 3-180, passim).”

390 Xuanzang’s translation of Candramati’s work differs slightly from the view reported by Xanzang in the transcript of his dispute with the Plain-Spoken Brāhmī at the University of Nālanda. Judging by the record of Xuanzang’s translation of his Treatise on the Ten *Padārthas*, Candramati acknowledges four extra *padārthas* in addition to the six given in the standard sequence: (i.e., *dravya, guṇa, karman, sāmāṇya, viśeṣa,* and *samavāya*). Maticandra enumerates the three additional *padarthas* as (7) *sakti* (potency), (8) *aśakti* (impotency), (9) commonness (edition of Ui Hakuju (1977) reconstructs as “sāmāṇya-viśeṣa”) and (10) *abhāva* as the 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th *padārthas*, respectively. Puguang’s *Study Notes on the Treasury*, fascicle 5 says that the standard sequence of six is “based upon the early to middle-period old masters of Vaiśeṣika”若依勝論宗中先代古師 (T1821:41.94.b29). Although atypical in this respect, Frauwallner, *History of Indian Philosophy*, vol. 2, 104-132, passim, nevertheless takes Xuanzang’s text seriously enough to avail himself frequently of its meticulous discussions of the *padartha* taxonomy in his synoptic investigation of the Vaiśeṣika natural philosophy.
sūtras (1.1.4) are a matter of general acceptance among Vaiśeṣika authorities.

Within the Vaiśeṣika schema, the first two *padārthas*, *dravyas*, and *guṇas*, are regarded as the fundamental building blocks of life. *Dravyas* and *guṇas* are regarded as the two ontological categories of which everything in the universe is composed. The first *padārtha* of *dravya* includes the nine real substances of earth, air, water, fire, ether, space, time, soul, and mind. The second *padārthas* of *guṇas* (Skt.: *guṇapadārthas*; Chi.: *deju yi 德句義*) includes the twenty-four qualities of color, taste, smell, tangibility, number, size, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, haecceity or this-ness, that-ness, awareness, pleasure, pain, desire, anger, effort, weight, liquidity, moistness, impulse, meritorious action, non-meritorious action, and sound.

In the Vaiśeṣika theory, the *dravyas* are further divided into two categories of tangible and the intangible substances. The first four *dravyas* of earth, water, fire, wind, and air are tangible substances, and the last five *dravyas* of space, time, direction, soul, and mind are intangible substances. In the ontological theory of the Vaiśeṣika, the tangible substances composing the four elements of the material world are palpable. Intangible substances are the five elements that cannot be touched and are known to exist because of inferences that are made about their physical presence. In the *Daśapadārtha śāstra*, Candramati adduces the “substance of the jar” to explicate the differences between a tangible and an intangible substance. In Candramati’s example, an earthenware jar is regarded as composed of two parts: the atomic particles of clay that compose the jar and the atomic particles of ether that exist within the inner contours of the jar. The shape, firmness and weight of the clay jar are qualities that are palpable and therefore tangible. The substance of ether contained within the jar does not register with the tactile faculties and is therefore regarded as intangible.

The doctrine that distinguishes between tangible and intangible substances is important to
the Vaiśeṣika theorists because it supports the idea that the visible activities of the body provide evidence or inferential signs (Skt.: *liṅga*) for the presence of the soul. Because the soul is regarded as an intangible substance, the existence of the soul, by definition, must be inferred. The basis for the inference of the soul, according to the Vaiśeṣika doctrine, is in the physical activities of the body. Gunamati faithfully enumerates the five outward signs that indicate the presence of the soul animating the body, according to the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtras*. They are inhalation, exhalation, blinking, eye contact, lifespan, and vitality (Skt.: *āyurjīvitā*).

According to Kaṇāda, each of these outward signs provides dispositive evidence for the existence of a soul. The activities of the body, for example breathing, sensory experiencing and psychological, are proof of the work of the soul. While not all activities of the body are visible, all bodily functions are regarded as direct evidence of the existence of the soul. According to Vaiśeṣika doctrine, both involuntary actions, such as the beating of the heart, and voluntary activities, such as walking up a hill, are enabled by the soul.

While bearing similarities to the Sānkhya doctrine regarding the primacy of the soul in living and dying, the Vaiśeṣika reliance on the theory of the *padārthas* differentiates the two Brāhmaṇical doctrines of the soul. Within the Vaiśeṣika taxonomy, the soul is situated firmly within the first and foremost category of real entities in the universe, the *padārtha of dravyas*, or substance.391 The Vaiśeṣika philosophical treatises unanimously support the foundational premise that the soul is a real substance. Because the soul is a real substance, it bears specific qualities in the way that all substances in the world bear specific qualities. The categorization of the soul as a substance to which qualities adhere is foundational to the Vaiśeṣika idea of the soul as the entity

391 Vijayan, “foreword,” (1992) “*Guna and karma* reside in *dravya*, the first being permanent and the other transient. *Samavāya* is the inseparable relation connecting *guna, karma* and *viśeṣa* with *dravya*. *Viśeṣa* is nothing but the ultimate individuality residing in eternal substances.”
that bears the vital qualities of life.

Based on their ontological theory of the *padārthas*, the Vaiśeṣika theorists envision the soul, or the ātman, as the bearer of the vital powers that provide the essence of life and sustain life in the body. The corporeal body is regarded as an inert compound of the five *padārthas* of earth, water, fire, wind and ether. The body is dependent on the presence of the ātman for the physical support of all activities in life. Kaṇāda, in the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtras*, conceptualizes the ātman as the bearer of the substances of life, including karma and adharma, the source of physical action and the rejuvenator of the body. The soul in the Vaiśeṣika picture is therefore viewed as omnipresent and omnipotent within the body. Because all life processes depend upon the soul, dying results when the animating spirit of the soul begins to leave the body.

**The Nature of the Soul As a Substance in the Vaiśeṣika Doctrine**

The early Vaiśeṣika texts posit the soul as one of the nine forms of *dravyas*, the primary substances of life. The standard Vaiśeṣika taxonomy of the nine *dravyas* (Kumar 2013, pp. 48-9) defended by Candramati in his treatise include earth, water, fire, wind or air, ether, time, direction (Skt: *dik*), soul (Skt.: ātman) and mind (Skt.: manas). The placement of the soul within the category of nine substances by the Vaiśeṣika theorists is doctrinally significant. As a substance, the soul is conceptualized as a substrate to which the qualities that characterize a living being adhere. In this way, the soul is elevated within the Vaiśeṣika doctrine as the bearer of the vital qualities of life (Ch.: *tuoluobiao* 陀羅驃; *shi* 實).

In the early Vaiśeṣika texts (Watson, 2010, pp 144-7, passim) and in Xuanzang’s translation of the *Treatise on Ten Padārthas* by Candramati, the soul is described as the “stable

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392 Candramati lists nine *dravyas* 九實 under the *padārtha* of substance 實句義: [1262c19]一地二水三火四風五空六時七方八我九意。 (1) earth; (2) water; (3) fire; (4) wind/air; (5) space; (6) time; (7) direction (Skt: *dik*); (8) soul (ātman) (9) mind (manas) – these are the nine substances (*dravyas*).
bearer” (Skt.: kāṣṭhādhatṛ) or the “superior bearer” (Skt: adhiṣṭhāṭr) of the vital qualities of life.⁴³ Candra\\m\mat{\text{m}}ati lists the fourteen qualities (Skt. caturdaśaguṇa), extracted from the Vaiśeṣika taxonomy of the twenty-four guṇas that are borne by the soul. They are number, size (Skt.: parimāṇa), “severality,” (Kumar 2013, p. 24), particularity or separateness (Skt. prthaktva), conjunction (Skt.: samyoga), disjunction (Skt.: vibhāga), this-ness, awareness (Skt.: buddhi), pleasure, pain, desire, anger, physical effort including sattva and šakti (Skt.: prayatna) and the merits (Skt. karma) and demerits of actions (Skt.: adharma). While a soul may not evince all fourteen qualities at any one time, it may evolve to possess the full range of qualities. Xuanzang agrees with the Vaiśeṣika premise that the fourteen qualities are unique or “invariably concomitant” (Skt. anvaya) 394 to the ātman. He also avers that, from the Vaiśeṣika perspective, the fourteen qualities of life do not actualize without the substrate provided by a substantial soul.

Of the fourteen properties, the three qualities of “life” (Skt.: sattva), “sentient awareness” (Skt.: buddhi) and “vital potency” or “breath” (Skt.: šakti) are regarded as basic for the survival of human life. While not abstracted into one of the fourteen properties that belong to the soul (Kumar, pp. 78-83, passim), sattva and šakti are subsumed under the quality of prayatna, or physical effort. According to the Vaiśeṣika taxonomy presented by Candra\\m\mat{\text{m}}ati and by later commentators such

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³⁹³ This characterization of the Vaiśeṣika doctrine is found in Yaśomitra’s commentary on AKBh 2.45ab. It is imbedded in a discussion of the relationship between the property of “vital power” (āyur) and its “superior bearer.” Yaśomitra reports a Vaiśeṣika pūrvapakṣin’s argument that āyur, the property in question, must belong to a stable bearer: “For accordingly, there exists something which attaches to the name “disposition” and it exists precisely in the form of “vital power.” But the Vaibhāṣika Master (Ācārya) records, in that it’s merely consisting in that [vital-power] – so it is said on the part of the author (i.e., Vasubandhu, the śāstrakāra) – for that Vaiśeṣika [opponent], this is because of the fact that (1) of the fact that its dispositions of that (i.e., vital power) have a singular nature, (2) because fo the fact that there exists nothing else that is invariably connected with it (i.e., vital power/life) and (3) because of the fact that there exists nothing whose characteristic is being the superior bearer (kāṣṭhādhatṛ), etc., of the conditions [of life]. Yathā hi saṁskāro nāma bhāvāntaramasti, evamāyurapi syāditi, tena tanmatam dūṣayatyācāryah – tasyey tistaraḥ – tasya vaiśeṣikasya tadekatvāt saṁskāraikatvāt pratiyābhibhāvacc| pratibhandhāsyā kāṣṭhāpratibhābhibhāvādilakṣaṇasyābhāvacc|

³⁹⁴ This is also the word meaning “positive” concomitance between properties X and Y in the logical system of hetu-vidyā.
as Vātsyāyana, the quality of sattva is the “vital power” (Chi.: shiyong 勢用) that the human body exhibits during life. Śakti is regarded as the raw power that enables physical actions of the body such as breathing. Buddhi, the seventh quality in the taxonomy of the qualities of the soul, is the power that generates the action of thinking. Taken together, the three qualities of sattva, śakti, and buddhi form the essential components of sentient life in the Vaiśeṣika schema. All three essential qualities inhere in the substrate of the soul. Therefore, when the soul is invested in the body, it imbues the body with the three qualities of life.

The Vaiśeṣika taxonomy classifies the dravyas of the mind and the soul as separate substances. Mind and soul are yoked together by the sixth padārtha of samavāya. Candramati states that a substance retains its specific qualities over time through the “inheritance relation”395 of samavāya. Samavāya is defined as the constant and infinite union that exists between a substance and its specific qualities.396 To illustrate the Vaiśeṣika argument that qualities presuppose a substance or substratum in which to inhere, Watson (2014) cites the example of the color red. Red does not just appear “out of the ether.” It requires an underlying substratum in which to inhere. For example, there is an inherence relationship between the red color of the mango and the mango. The mango retains the red hue of its skin because of the inherence relationship of the quality of the color to the substance of the mango. The concept that the qualities of substances adhere is significant in the Vaiśeṣika theory, as it explains how dravya are grounded while the guṇas may

395 In Candamati’s tenfold taxonomy of padārthas, the eighth padārtha is “commonness” 俱分 – Ui Hakuju reconstructs Sanskrit as “sāmānya-viśeṣa” (1962, p. 118). Candramati’s gloss on commonness runs: “What is the eighth padārtha of commonness? It refers to the nature of dravya, of guṇa, of karma, and its ultimate meaning is inherence (samavāya) between things of earthy nature, or between things of a certain color, or between grasped things, etc.” 俱分句義云何？謂實性·德性·業性·及彼一義和合地性·色性·取性等。The idea is that sāmānya-viśeṣa indicates the commonality between things collected together.

396 A similar argument for the existence of substrata is found in the Sāṅkhya literature. The Sāṅkhya-kārikas use the example of a picture: “Just as a picture does not exist without a substrate, or a shadow without a post and the like, so the linga does not subsist supportless, without the non-specific (i.e., subtle body).” This is Dutt’s (1933, p. 64) translation of stanza XL1.
change over time. For example, when the mango ripens and changes its color from green to reddish-orange, it does not lose its essential “mango-ness.”

Within the ontological system of classical Vaiśeṣika, the mahats are the ultimate constituents that make up the five sensory indriyas and the body. The mahats form the smallest detectable units of matter, and come in five forms: earth, wind, water, fire, and ether. Each of the five sensory indriyas contains a share of each of the five mahats – for example, the eye is made up of elements of earth, wind, water, fire, and ether. So too are the ear and the remaining three sensory indriyas of smell, taste and touch.

According to Vaiśeṣika theory, there is an inherence relationship between the substance of the mind and the substance of a soul. The inherence of the mind in the soul endows the soul with consciousness. The inherence of the soul in the mind and the body and the inherence relationships between the soul, the mind and the body are regarded as the preconditions for life. The dissolution of the inherence relationship between the soul and the mind brings about the death of the human. The fact that a corpse—a body from which the soul has departed—lacks consciousness is evidence within the Vaiśeṣika doctrine that the mind inheres in the soul.

The Vaiśeṣika posit that a human being is composed of a soul, a mind and a body. In his exhaustive listing and painstaking analysis of the fourteen qualities of the soul, Xuanzang posits that each of the qualities of the ātman is responsible for the distinct physical and psychological properties of the human being. As the bearer of the unique traits of the individual, including karma and adharma, the soul makes each person unique. The soul serves to differentiate one individual from another.

397 [0818b02] 同異大有非五根得者即此勝論許五根得如何得大有能有一切物？[但>但]觀境時，即現量得，大有其同異，能同能異一切物。但觀境亦即現得，故是違自現，疑此抄錯應云：佛弟子不許有我故審.
The Soul As an Agent of Action and Restorer of the Body and the Bearer of Karma in the Vaiśeṣika Doctrine

While the Vaiśeṣika theorists inherit the doctrine of the soul from their Sāṅkhya predecessors, the agentic aspects of the ātman are expanded in their formulation. The Vaiśeṣika sūtras describe the soul as the constant and unceasing bearer of the faculties and the vital qualities of life (3.2.1).\(^{398}\) In the Vaiśeṣika schema, the soul is the supporter of life and is responsible for specific bodily functions such as maintaining a heartbeat and breathing. Frauwallner (1956, 1978) describes two stages in the development of the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of the soul.\(^{399}\) In the first stage, the Vaiśeṣika theorists accept the Sāṅkhya conceptualization of a small, thumb-sized soul that is seated in the heart (Skt.: hrdaya). In the second stage, the soul is augmented; it expands to inhabit the whole of the body and it increases its role in motivating and sustaining the physical activities required for life. Within the Vaiśeṣika schema, the soul is regarded as the ultimate agentic power in the body.

Xuanzang is sensitive to the expansion of the role of the soul as an active agent in the Vaiśeṣika theories. In his exegesis and translations of the source material of Vaiśeṣika, Xuanzang highlights the use in the Vaiśeṣika sūtras\(^{400}\) of the metaphor of the “puppet” (Skt. dāruyantra) as an explanation for the soul as the animator of the body.\(^{401}\) In this metaphor, the soul is portrayed

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\(^{398}\) Ātmendriyārthasannikarṣe jnāsyabhāvobhāvaśca manaso dviliṅgam || 3.2.1|| The (1) existence or (2) non-existence of the mind in conjunction with the soul (ātman) and the īndriyas are the two inferential signs [of the presence of the soul]. Reference has been made to the helpful edition of Sinha (1911, p. 124), but heavy modification has been made.

\(^{399}\) Frauwallner, History of Indian Philosophy, vol. 2, 51; Watson, The Self’s Awareness of Itself, 60-70, passim.

\(^{400}\) Tang Yongtong’s (Vol. 3, 271) massive survey of materials for the study of Vaiśeṣikapreserved in Chinese crossreferences the Vaiśeṣika sūtras with both the Dāśapadārtha śāstra and Āryadeva’s Catuḥśātaka śāstra. His findings show that all of these texts share a fundamental agreement on the sequence of the six padarthas, even as they differ in some of the finer details of the nomenclature. The only discrepancies between Āryadeva’s and Candramati’s texts are due to difference in the translation style of Kumārajīva and Xuanzang.

\(^{401}\) Watson, “The Self as Dynamic Constant,” 178 writes that “The Vaiśeṣikas had compared the self as instigator of bodily movements to a puppeteer instigating the bodily movements of a puppet below.” He adds: “Such a notion of an agent standing above the sequence of mental and physical actions is precisely what is denied by the Buddhists.” This example of the puppet and puppetter is derived from Praśāstapāda’s commentary on Vaiśeṣika
as the puppet master who pulls the strings to move the appendages of the puppet body. The soul is the active entity supplying the intention and determination to execute the physical actions of breathing, walking and talking. The Vaiśeṣika posit that the soul is responsible for both the voluntary activities of the body such as talking and walking and involuntary activities such as the heartbeat and digestion. The body is inert and lifeless without the active involvement of the soul.

Additionally, in the Vaiśeṣika schema, the substantial soul is charged with the responsibility of repairing the organs in the body. In his synoptic study of Vaiśeṣika natural philosophy, Frauwallner (1956, 1973) explicates this argument:

The in-and-out-breathing of the body is like the activity of the bellows which presupposes somebody who activates it. The opening and shutting of eyes resembles the movements of a wooden machine which somebody sets into motion. The healing of injuries, ruptures and wounds reminds one of the repairing done in the cases of damages of a house which somebody sets into motion.402

The Vaiśeṣika theorists maintain that the soul is the agent (Skt. kartṛ; Chi. neng zuozhe能作者) responsible for karmic actions. Within the Vaiśeṣika schema, the last two qualities of karma and adarma are said to inhere in the substance of the soul. The soul, therefore, carries the good and bad actions of the human that are accumulated in life. In the Vaiśeṣika picture, the soul becomes the vehicle by which the beneficial or harmful acts of the individual are carried and then transmitted in the cycle of birth.

The Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika Conceptualizations of the Ātman

In his Treatise Conforming to Logic, the Yogācāra author Guṇamati articulates the

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402. Frauwallner, History of Indian Philosophy, vol. 2, 14.
difference between the Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika doctrines of the soul. Guṇamati states: “In the Vaiśeṣika schema, the ātman is an active agent, or a doer of tasks, and an ‘enjoyer or experiencer’ of the tattvas.” “The ātman,” according to Sāṅkhya-kārikās, “is not an agent, but an enjoyer of the tattvas.”

The fundamental distinction between the two Brāhmaṇical conceptualizations is that in the Vaiśeṣika paradigm, the ātman is an actor in the theater of the body and in the Sāṅkhya tradition, the ātman is a passive observer. The Vaiśeṣika soul is more proactive than the observing ātman of the Sāṅkhya.

Xuanzang is sensitive to the similarities and differences in the Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika conceptualizations of the soul and its powers. While the idea of the soul or ātman as the bearer and locus of both physical and psychological qualities is at the core of both the Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika doctrines, the Vaiśeṣika soul is imbued with the direct power to act. According to the Sāṅkhya doctrine, it is never the puruṣa, simpliciter, that performs action, but always the puruṣa, manifest through the power of ahaṅkāra and operating in conjunction with a physical and a mental faculty, that exerts force and executes physical actions.

The Vaiśeṣika essentially agree with Sāṅkhya that the soul is the subject of sensory experience, or bhoktr. However, where the two doctrines disagree is about the motility of the soul. As Adachi points out, even at an early stage in the development of the Vaiśeṣika doctrine, the soul is envisioned as mobile. Additionally, Xuanzang understands the Vaiśeṣika doctrine to hold that

403 The interlocutor (pūrvapaksin) in Paramārtha’s vṛtti to the eighteenth stanza of the Sāṅkhya-kārikās also sums up the difference between Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika doctrines of agency in this way: “The Sāṅkhyan says that the psychic person, per se, is not an agent, but the Vaiśeṣika says that people are agents.” 僧伽說人非作者，衛世師說人是作者.

the soul is the agent of physical actions such as walking, talking and seeing.\textsuperscript{405} Candramati defines the Vaiśeṣika ātman as the “cause of pleasure, pain, desire, effort, good, and bad behavior.” Candramati adds: “the generation and activation of intelligence is the defining characteristic (Skt.: \textit{lakṣaṇa}) of ātman.”\textsuperscript{406}

Xuanzang points out a common flaw in the rival theories put forward by the Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika thinkers: they all rely upon the notion of a non-physical person who lends life and agentive power to the body. Xuanzang concludes that only the faculties are necessary to explain dying. Therefore, he categorically rejects the doctrine of the person as proffered by both traditions of Brahmānical theory.

The fortified conception of the Vaiśeṣika soul as the bearer of the vital qualities of life, a mobile and active agent in the body, the carrier of the good and bad actions of the individual in life and the restorer of the body and its organs is significant because it reinforces the doctrinal importance of the ātman in the Brāhmaṇical canon.

\textbf{Xuanzang’s Arguments Against the Vaiśeṣika Doctrine of the Soul}

The Vaiśeṣika conception of the soul as the bearer of the vital qualities of life and as the agent that activates and restores the body is regarded by Xuanzang as a substantial fortification of the passive ātman conceptualized by the Brāhmaṇical predecessors of the Sāṅkhya tradition. Xuanzang is concerned about the broad appeal of the Vaiśeṣika ātman across India and Central Asia and by the threatened infiltration of the concept of an invisible and all-powerful soul into


\textsuperscript{406} See \textit{Daśapadārtha śāstra}, T2138:54.1262.c29.
Chapter 2: What Is Dying?

Chinese Buddhism. Xuanzang regards the permeation of an omnipotent ātman into mainstream Buddhism as a threat to the original teachings of the Buddha. Xuanzang therefore must contend with the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of the soul to uphold the cardinal Buddhist tenet of no-self and the theory of the indriyas.

In his repudiation of the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of the soul, Xuanzang draws upon his deep knowledge of the Vaiśeṣika scriptures, acquired though years of study in India and through his translation of Candramati’s Daśapadārtha śastra. Xuanzang’s rebuttal is organized around four doctrinal posits regarding the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of the soul: the configuration of the soul as an enduring and immutable substance; the concept of the soul as the composite entity to which the qualities required for life adhere; the idea of the soul as an agent that empowers the body; and the conception of the soul as an invisible force, the existence of which must be inferred from the physical actions of a sentient being. Xuanzang’s refutation of the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of the soul supports his campaign to eradicate the invisible and supernatural forces embodied in the Brāhmaṇical ātman from Chinese Buddhism. Additionally, Xuanzang’s exegesis of the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of the soul lays the theoretical groundwork necessary to situate the theory of the indriyas, supported by the Buddha in the Āgamas, more securely within the Chinese Buddhist canon.

The Refutation of the Soul as an Enduring Substance

In the foundational Vaiśeṣika theory of the padārthas, the soul is defined as the primeval substance, the dravya, to which the vital qualities of the living human being, the guṇas, adhere via the substance of samavāya. The ātman in this schema is conceptualized as a composite entity consisting of the substrate of the soul, the qualities that adhere to the substrate of the soul and the indriyas of the body. Within the overall taxonomy expounded by the Vaiśeṣika, a sentient human being is composed of the real substances of the soul, the mind, the indriyas and the inheritance
relationship\textsuperscript{407} among the three elements. The Vaiśeṣika soul uses the mind and the \textit{indriyas} to execute the physical activities necessary to sustain life. The soul is conceptualized as the active and independent agent that motivates, activates and restores the \textit{indriyas} of the body. The doctrine of the soul as a substance endowed with agentive power over and above the body and the physical organs is thus enshrined within the Vaiśeṣika sūtras.

In his refutation of the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of the soul, Xuanzang begins by questioning the foundational premise that the soul is a substance or a \textit{dravya}. The Vaiśeṣika taxonomy of the \textit{padārthas} places the soul in the category of intangible substances. In his discussions of the Vaiśeṣika doctrine that unfold in the first folio of the CWSL, Xuanzang contends that like the soul, the intangible forms of the physical elements of earth water, fire, and wind are not \textit{dravyas}. Xuanzang asserts that the tangibility of an element is dependent upon the qualities, or the \textit{guṇas}, borne by the substance. This means that the qualities of solidity, wetness, movement (Chi.: \textit{dong} 動), and warmth determine the tangibility of a substance. Xuanzang states that the tangibility of a substance is dictated by the quality of the substance, rather than by its essence. For example, the firmness of a clod of earth is determined by the quality of wetness, the amount of water in the earth, rather than by the substance of the earth. The quality of wetness, however, does not present to the senses as a palpable substance or a tangible \textit{dravya}.\textsuperscript{408} Within the Vaiśeṣika doctrine, however, the \textit{dravya} parts of the physical element are regarded as perceptible by the senses. Because they are tangible, they are regarded as immutable.

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{407} Bronkhorst draws particular attention to the opposition between the Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika regarding the relation of inherence. Bronkhorst shows how the Vaiśeṣikas criticize the Sāṅkhya for disregarding the significance of this relationship. See Bronkhorst, “The Qualities of Sāṅkhya,” \textit{Vienna Journal of South Asian Studies} (vol. 38, 1994), 310.
\item \textsuperscript{408} Daoyi’s 道邑 subglosses on Kuiji \textit{CWSL-SJ} contain the argument that “‘earth as a \textit{padārtha} of substance should not exist independently of the \textit{padārtha} of qualities (\textit{guṇas}), since only the qualities are grasped by the faculty of tactition (\textit{tvagindriyam}) 實句地等應非別德句堅等，以身根所得故 (X814:49.393.b21-22). In Daoyi’s subglosses on Kuiji, this argument is formulated as a formal \textit{anumāna} inference.
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\end{footnotesize}
Xuanzang highlights the incoherence in the Vaiśeṣika premise that an intangible *dravya* is immutable when a *dravya* can be transformed based upon the *guṇas* it bears. In his refutation of the doctrine of the soul, Xuanzang notes the internal inconsistency in the Vaiśeṣika conceptualization of the soul as an intangible substance that is permanent and enduring. According to Xuanzang, the Vaiśeṣika ātman changes based on its qualities. For Xuanzang, the idea of the ātman as eternal and unchanging collapses under the weight of an unsustainable premise.

**The Refutation of the Soul as an Enduring Entity That Bears the Vital Qualities of Life**

In his translation of *The Treatise at the Gate of Logic*, Xuanzang articulates the Vaiśeṣika definition of the ātman as a composite entity. He states: “The Vaiśeṣika disputant establishes the thesis, contra the Buddhist opponent, that the ātman is a collective of causes and conditions 如勝論師對佛弟子立我以為和合因緣. The soul, according to this view, is a collection of at least three parts, a *dravya*, the *guṇas*, and the *samavāya*, or the relationship of inherence between the *dravya* and the *guṇas*. The ātman, by definition, is a collective entity. Xuanzang attests that the definition of the soul as a composite entity is agreed upon by the Buddhist opponent and the Vaiśeṣika disputant in the debate regarding the nature of the Vaiśeṣika soul.

In his refutation of the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of the soul, Xuanzang debunks the idea that the soul, as a composite entity, can rule as an independent sovereign over the body. In other words, he rejects the Vaiśeṣika premise that the soul, when defined as a composite of the body and the mind, can exercise independent power over and above the body and the mind. Xuanzang highlights the contradiction in the Vaiśeṣika definition of the soul as follows: If the soul is composed of the substances of the body and the mind, the soul cannot simultaneously rule as an omnipotent power.

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over the substances of the body and the mind. The soul cannot be a substance that operates the substances of which it itself is composed.

In his critique of the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of the soul in the *Great Commentary on the Gate of Logic*, Kuiji builds upon the inherent contradictions in the definition of the soul as a composite entity that Xuanzang highlights. To Kuiji, the premise of the ātman as a composite entity is flawed. Kuiji bases his rejoinder on the Vaiśeṣika formulation of the soul as a dharmin, or a property-possessor (Skt.: ubhayatra-asiddha; liangju bucheng 兩句不成). Kuiji does not believe that the ātman, as described in the Vaiśeṣika sūtras, is sturdy enough to serve as the substrata to, or the bearer of, the essential qualities of life. His determination regarding the insufficiency of the ātman as a dharmin is based on the lack of positive evidence of the existence of the soul as an independent substance. Kuiji also objects to the Vaiśeṣika premise that the presence of the ātman can be inferred from the physical actions of the human being. Again, he cites a paucity of evidence to validate the soul as a real substance. To Kuiji, the evidence presented in the Vaiśeṣika sūtras of the soul as a composite substance is insufficient to support the Vaiśeṣika picture of a powerful and omnipotent ātman.

Additionally, Kuiji points out that the Buddhist opponent and the Vaiśeṣika disputant in the debate about the soul do not agree on the definition of the ātman as a dharmin. Therefore, the Vaiśeṣika argument for the soul as a composite bearer of life does not meet the criteria of the hetu-vidyā, the system of logic used in the Buddhist-Brāhmaṇical debate.

Watson extracts the basic idea underlying the Buddhist critique of the Vaiśeṣika *drava*:

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410 Kuiji, NP-DS, fasc. 2: The [ātman] as the inherence of causes and conditions does not exist either. It is because the dharmin is not admissible to either party in the debate. Here, the dharmin is not exhaustively grasped within the inference, neither is it exhaustively grasped within the causes and conditions. The totality of the inherence of what is grasped becomes the causes and conditions, hence it [the dharmin =subject: ātman] remains unestablished. If it were otherwise, then it could be established. 和合因緣此亦非有，故法有法兩俱不成。此中不偏取和合亦不偏取因緣，總取和合之因緣故名不成。不偏即成，自亦許有。此中全分及一分，各有五種四句。
“Rather than postulating an imperceptible substance to which the five properties ‘stick,’ it is more parsimonious, argues the Buddhist, to assume that they stick to each other.”

Xuanzang rejects the idea that what defines a quality is being dependent upon a substance or a superior bearer. To Xuanzang, there are other explanations for the adherence of entities to substances, including the property of “stickiness” within the entities themselves. Using this concept, Xuanzang calls into question the Vaiśeṣika posit of the composite *dravya* to which the qualities of life necessarily adhere. He then concludes that the Vaiśeṣika theory that the visible qualities of life necessarily belong to an invisible substratum is not satisfactory or sufficient to explain why these qualities appear in an individual living being. Xuanzang claims that the Vaiśeṣika authors fail to make the case for the existence of this substratum of the invisible soul. There is nothing in this bare substratum of the invisible soul, taken by itself, that would enable us to pick it out as something distinct from other things.

Xuanzang concurs with Kuiji that there are insufficient data to support the Vaiśeṣika idea of the soul as the bearer of the physical and non-physical qualities that are essential to life. He calls into question the foundational premises that the Vaiśeṣika use to support their conceptualization of the soul as the substrate to which the qualities of the soul adhere. In the Vaiśeṣika theory, the relationship of the soul to the qualities of life is analogous to a wall that supports a fresco. The wall is the substratum to which the plaster and pigments that constitute the image of the fresco adhere. Xuanzang, however, disputes the concept that the elements that compose the image necessarily adhere to the fresco. He claims that the plaster and pigments have properties that allow them to adhere to one another rather than to the wall. Xuanzang bases his argument on the Buddhist

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411 For how this ‘sticking to each other’ was elaborated in terms of their forming a causal complex in which they function as co-operating causes (*sahakāripratyayas*) for each other, see Watson, *The Self’s Awareness of Itself*, 57-58.
Abhidharma notion of *samyukta-hetu*,\(^{412}\) or the “stickiness” or “bundleability” that is inherent in properties.

The Vaisesika authors refer to the soul qua substratum as the *guṇin*-the possessor of vital qualities. In his CWSL, Xuanzang uses the terms *dharma* and *dharmin* as synonyms for *guṇa* and *guṇin*. By collapsing these terms, Xuanzang argues that the relationship between *guṇas* and the *gunin*, and between the *dharmas* and the *dharmin*, is not one of ownership. He argues that the qualities of the substance do not belong to the substance. Watson (2014) writes: “By disputing that colours, smells etc. belong to a substance, Buddhism calls into question the very concept of a quality (Skt.: *guṇatva*). The Buddhist define a quality differently – the *dharmin* is not a substrate but the relationships between the properties of a substance.”

In his discussion of the Vaiśeṣika doctrine in the first fascicle of his CWSL, Xuanzang argues that the *dharmin* and dharma are not perceptible in and of themselves. The qualities that pertain to a *dharmin*, however, are perceptible. For example, the “mango-ness” of a mango can be determined by looking at the mango and noticing its orange-red color or by touching the mango and by feeling the smoothness of the skin and kidney-like shape. The qualities of the mango, including its color, size, weight and shape, are perceptible. The substrate that holds the qualities of the mango together, however, cannot be perceived. The mango is therefore known by the qualities it bears, rather than by the substance to which the qualities of the mango adhere. In an extensive analysis of earthy substances (Skt.: *prthivī-dravya*), such as an earthenware jar, the CWSL concludes that “the substantial earth is not ever visible to the naked eyes” 實地非眼所見.\(^{413}\) Here, in the CWSL’s extensive discussions of the six *padārthas* of classical Vaiśeṣika,

\(^{412}\) For the taxonomy of six kinds of *hetus* within the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, see Dhammajoti, *Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma* (Hong Kong: Center for Buddhist Studies, 2007) 189-207.

\(^{413}\) T31, no. 1585, p. 3, a05.
Xuanzang contends that the dharmin and dharma are beyond the purview of sensory perception. Extending his argument, Xuanzang contends that the Vaiśeṣika theory of the soul as an enduring substance is flawed because the qualities carried by the soul are not permanent.

An important point of convergence between the classical Brāhmaṇical theorists of the Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika traditions and the Abhidharma Buddhists is in the definition of the sentient human as composed of both physical and non-physical qualities. Within the Abhidharma doctrine, the non-physical aspects of the human take the form of the sensory and mental indriyas. In the Brāhmaṇical philosophical systems, however, the non-physical qualities of the human are borne by the substrate of the soul. Within the Vaiśeṣika schema, the non-physical aspects of the human being are also regarded as impermanent qualities.

In his meticulous sub-glosses on Kuiji’s The Great Commentary on the Gate of Logic, Zhizhou lists the fourteen qualities that adhere to the substrate of the soul: number, size, particularity, conjunction, disjunction, this-ness, awareness, pleasure, pain, desire, anger, physical effort and the merits and demerits of actions. In this enumeration, Zhizhou’s Subglosses on Kuiji’s Study Notes on the CWSL note that all fourteen qualities are by nature impermanent. He raises two provocative questions: If the soul is defined as the composite of ephemeral qualities, how can it be permanent and enduring? If the physical actions of the individual are the inferential marks of the existence of the soul, how can the ātman be inferred from non-physical qualities? These questions highlight a contradiction in the conceptualization of the Vaiśeṣika soul as enduring, substantial, and omnipotent. Xuanzang concurs with Zhizhou that the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of the soul as a composite and enduring substrate to which the qualities of life adhere is insufficiently supported by the sūtras or by the hetu-vidyā.

414 T43n1833, p. 828, a28-b19.
The Refutation of the Soul as an Agentive Power Over the Body and the Mind

The idea of an agentive power that exists over and above the body and its physical organs is based on the ancient Vaiśeṣika sūtras (5.2.15).\textsuperscript{415} Kaṇāda, in considering the example of a lumberjack cutting a piece of wood with an axe, asks the following question: Where does the agentive power that drives the movements of the arm swinging the axe originate? He states that it is obvious that the arm does not will itself into the action of swinging the axe. The body, of its own volition, is not capable of impelling itself into movement. Therefore, according to Kaṇāda, the motivator and activator of the physical action of swinging the axe is located outside the arm. Specifically, it is located within the ātman.

Xuanzang examines the question of agentive power from the Buddhist position of no-self. In considering the example of the lumberjack, he asks: If there is no self to swing the axe, where does the agentive power to swing the axe originate? Yaśomitra, Vasubandhu's earliest commentator, and Xuanzang, in collaboration with his first- and second-generation disciples, articulate their responses to the question of the ultimate source of agentive power in their exegeses on the \textit{AKBh}.\textsuperscript{416} The Abhidharma doctrine upon which Xuanzang bases his theory of agentive power recognizes the \textit{indriyas} and the axe as sources of instrumental power. The following question remains, however: As both the \textit{indriyas} and the axe need to be empowered to exercise their causal efficacy, without a self in the picture, what serves as the agent? Vasubandhu crystallizes the question as follows: If there is no self, then what performs action? 若我實無，為何造業？ Xuanzang first addresses the question of agentive power in an essay in the ninth chapter.

\textsuperscript{415} For Skt. text see Basu, B. D., ed., \textit{The Sacred Books of the Hindus} (Genesis Publishing Pvt. Ltd., first printed 1911), 981.

\textsuperscript{416} The discussion found in the Prasastapadabhasya considers the case of cutting wood with an axe. Where does the agentive power driving the movements of the axe, originally come from? It is an obvious fact the arm cannot simply will itself into swinging an axe. The body, on its own, is not capable of impelling itself into movement.
of his Chinese translation of Vasubandhu's *Refutation of the Pudgala*. He revisits this puzzle again, and in more detail, in his original CWSL.

The Abhidharma doctrine upon which Xuanzang rests his theory locates the source of agentic power in the multiple constituencies and the coordinated activity of the *indriyas*. The *indriyas* execute the actions of sensory perception and the physical activities of breathing, digestion and excretion without the oversight or the empowerment of an *ātman*. Returning to the example of a lumberjack cutting wood, the Abhidharma editors view the action of the arm swinging the axe as originating in the body of the lumberjack. The pile of cut wood that results from the action of the arm swinging the axe to cut a tree is therefore viewed as “the fruit of human action” (Skt.: *puruṣakāra-phalam*; Chi.: *shiyong guo* 士用果).\(^\text{417}\) In the words of Vasubandhu's auto-commentary translated by Xuanzang: “We reserve the term ‘fruit of human action’ for the product of the agent.” The agent in this picture is the coordinated activity of the *indriyas* of the body, mind and vision. To execute the action of cutting the wood, the body and mental *indriyas* coordinate the movements required to swing the arms; the visual faculty “sizes up” the tree and then tells the mind where to place the strokes of the axe. The pile of cut wood thus becomes the “fruit of human action.” The karma of the pile of wood is created by the coordinated actions of the *indriyas* of the lumberjack and not by an *ātman*.

The concept of the “fruit of human action” is essential to the Abhidharma doctrine of karma and to Xuanzang’s refutation of the Vaiśeṣika theory of the soul. In the Abhidharma picture, human action, empowered by the coordinated activity of the *indriyas*, is responsible for creating the pile of wood. The lumberjack wields the axe, not the *ātman*. In the Abhidharma theory, the agentic

\(^{417}\) In general, the work of human faculties is referred to as “the fruit of human action” (Skt.: *puruṣakāra-phalam*; Chi.: *shiyong-guo* 士用果).
power of producing karma is laid, quite literally, in the hands of the human being. Using the Abhidharma theory of the *indriyas*, Xuanzang refutes the Vaiśeṣika theory of the agentic power of the ātman. According to Xuanzang, the presence of an ātman that would empower the physical activities of the body or carry the good and bad actions of the individual in life is simply unnecessary.

**The Refutation of the Soul as Intangible and Inferable**

Within the Vaiśeṣika theory of the *padārthas*, the soul is placed in the category of intangible substances. Because the soul is regarded as intangible, the presence of the soul must, by definition, be inferred. According to Candramati’s *Daśapadārtha śastra*, to infer the existence of a soul, one must first perceive one of the outward signs “engendered by the combination of the two factors” 二和合生, the *indriyas* and the mind. The visible activity of the *indriyas* and the mind are considered to constitute the ultimate causal bases of the presence of the soul. Therefore, within the Vaiśeṣika schema, the visible activity of the body, such as walking, and the visible signs of sentience, such as wincing when experiencing pain, are regarded as evidence of the soul at work within the body.

Ratié and Elschinger observe that like the Sāṅkhya, the “Vaiśeṣika explicitly argue that the self’s non-perception is no evidence for the self’s non-existence, since this non-perception is due to another cause, namely the self’s subtlety” (2013, p. 139). Here Ratié and Elschinger reference the Vaiśeṣika position that the intangible substance of the soul cannot be perceived because it is subtle, in the same way that ether, another intangible substance in the Vaiśeṣika taxonomy, is subtle. Because ether and the soul are regarded as intangible substances within the Vaiśeṣika taxonomy, they are by definition imperceptible and unseen.
In his study of the Vaiśeṣika inference of the soul, Watson (2006) brings attention to the idea of adṛṣṭa, or the “unseen force.”418 involved in all manner of bodily activities. Adṛṣṭa is understood to explain phenomena such as movement and change; it is the force behind occurrences in the physical realm that are not visible. Within the body, the Vaiśeṣika credits the ātman as the adṛṣṭa behind the unseen bodily processes of breathing and digestion. The Vaiśeṣika sūtras postulate the invisible ātman as the source of power that generates the unseen activities of the “intake and excretion of nutriment into the body, and the samyoga [quality of conjunction] whose effect (Skt: kārya) is the assimilation of food and drink.”419

Although the ātman cannot be perceived directly, the Vaiśeṣika propose that the actions of the ātman are made evident in the visible behavioral manifestations of somatic experiences. The somatic qualities that arrive from the coordination of the ātman, the mind and indriyas of the body include pleasure, pain, desire, anger, effort, potency (Skt.: śakti) and non-potency (Skt.: aśakti).420 In his explication of the Vaiśeṣika theory of the soul, Candramati posits that the external behavioral responses to sensory stimuli can be regarded as evidence of the activity, and therefore the existence, of the ātman. He explains that the presence of the soul carrying the guṇas of pain and pleasure is visible in the behavioral responses of an individual to a physical stimulus. For example, the presence of the soul can be inferred when an individual reflexively withdraws a hand after touching a hot stove. In this picture, the ātman bearing the guṇa of pain registers the

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418 Watson, The Self’s Awareness of Itself, 65 writes that the development of adṛṣṭa forced the Vaiśeṣika to expand the size of the soul from a thumb-sized soul, to a soul pervasive throughout the entire body: “Given that adṛṣṭa as a cosmic force could influence any place in the world, and that all influence, for Vaiśeṣika was through contact, its bearer must be all-pervading. Thus Vaiśeṣika came to give up the restricted size of the soul and brought it in line, in this respect with the soul of the Vedāntins and Sāṅkhya.


420 Daśapadārtha śāstra, “What is visible by the measure of valid perception in the combination of the two factors (i.e., indriya and manas)? That is to say, the objects of pleasure, pain, desire, anger, effort, along with the objects of potency, impotence, inherence, and existence (bhāva).” 二和合生現量云何？謂於樂、苦、欲、瞋、勤勇境、及彼有能、無能、俱分、有性境. (T2138:54.1265.a8-9)
experience of pain and directs the hand to withdraw from the stove.

Xuanzang regards the description of the intangibility of the Vaiśeṣika soul as incongruent with the depiction of an omnipotent and powerful soul in possession and control of the vital qualities of life. Additionally, Xuanzang is deeply suspicious of the doctrinal implications of an invisible, powerful soul that directs the activities of the body and the mind. Xuanzang bases his rebuttal of the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of the soul as an intangible substance on the inconsistencies and weaknesses of the theory. Essentially, he regards the conceptualization of an invisible yet omnipotent soul, the existence of which must be inferred, as insufficient to explain the vital functioning of the body. To Xuanzang, the blinking of the eye does not offer sufficient evidence for the existence of the soul. Ultimately, he concludes that the physical activity of the body and the experience of sentience are insufficient to confirm the presence of an omnipotent ātman.

The Refutation of the Soul as an Eternal Agent

Watson (2014), in his study of Buddho-Brāhmaṇical contestation in which the Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika doctrines play a seminal role, makes the trenchant observation that “within the rationalistic tradition of Buddhist Brahmanical debate…both parties to the debate generally agreed with one another than there exists a non-physical part to the human” (Watson, 2014, pp. 173). The Buddhist and Brāhmaṇical textual traditions upon which Xuanzang relies maintain that a non-physical side to the human individual exists. However, as Watson rightly points out, “this non-physical part was conceived of very differently: by one side as eternally unchanging and by the other as momentary (and as fourfold even in one moment).”

The Brāhmaṇical theorists

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421 Watson (2014) elaborates: “So both sides in this debate are dualists, in that for both there is a non-physical part of us that exists beyond the body and senses and is not brought to an end by death. Only the Ĉārvākas denied that. But the non-physical part was conceived of very differently: by one side as eternally unchanging and by the other as momentary (and as fourfold even in one moment). During life, each moment of consciousness (which is one of the four kinds of mental constituents of a person) is linked to the next moment of consciousness in that it causes
conceptualize the non-physical aspects of the human, such as the soul and the mind, as eternal and unchanging. The Buddhists, however, hold that the human mind and consciousness are momentary and constantly changing.

In his auto-commentary on his Treasury of Abhidharma, Vasubandhu presents one of the most famous arguments for the soul as the agent required for the physical and non-physical activities of life proffered by the Vaiśeṣika. The syllogism is as follows:\textsuperscript{422}

- **Subject Locus:** Cognitions (Skt.:pakṣa) are actions that depend upon an enduring agent (Skt.:sādhya).

- **Reason (premise\textsuperscript{3}):** because all actions require an enduring agent, including both physical actions and cognitive actions.

- **Example:** ‘[I] know’ (ahaṃ jānāmi) and ‘[I] go’ (ahaṃ gacchāmi) are both examples of actions in the relevant sense, such as when we say, ‘I know that jar’ (aham amuṃ ghatam jānāmi), or ‘Devadatta goes’ (Devadatto gacchati). [pakṣa] has the target property (sādhya)].\textsuperscript{423}

\textsuperscript{422}I have referenced Duerlinger's (2003, pp. 279-282) useful exegesis, however, my presentation differs somewhat in presenting Vasubandhu's argument according to the analysis of science of reasons (hetu-vidyā因明), an approach derived from Chinese commentaries on the Kośa). Schterbatsky (note 49, p. 95-6, says that the adversary here is both Vastiputriya and Sāṅkhya.

\textsuperscript{423}Here the logical fallacy resides with the example. The inference is inconclusive because the property expressed by reason (here, “…requiring an agent”) is present in some similar instances and in all dissimilar instances 同品一分轉. For example, a Śabdotpattivādin against a Śābdabhivyaktivādin: “Sound is not a product of agentive effort, because it is impermanent.” Lightning is also impermanent, but it is not the product of human effort. Lightning here serves as a positive example or sapakṣa that disproves the rule that everything impermanent is the product of agentive effort. In the Vaiśeṣika inference in question here, the sapakṣa of “Devadatta’s movement” does not require a substantial, perduring agent. Puguang says: “If one is to posit a person (puruṣa), it is not anything singular. It refers to the continuum of Devadatta’s movement. So-called “Devadatta” is a nominal posit.
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In this syllogism, the Vaiśeṣika forwards the argument that the volitional activities of thinking and walking require an agent, or the presence of an enduring and stable force, to initiate and direct both actions. The cognitions verbalized in the statements “I am experiencing pleasure” \([aham sukhi]\) and “I know that jar” are posited to require the action of an agent. Additionally, the syllogism posits the physical action of walking as requiring the presence of an agent. According to the Vaiśeṣika doctrine, both cognition and physical action presuppose the presence of an enduring agent or a soul.

In his translation of the rejoinder to the Vaiśeṣika syllogism, Xuanzang states that the syllogism does not meet all of the criteria for a valid inference. He notes that the syllogism does not conform to the *hetu-vidyā* for the following reasons:

1. The subject-locus is compatible with the reason – cognitions are forms of action requiring an agent.
2. The example given is compatible with the reason – the proposition “Devadatta goes” expresses an action requiring an agent.
3. There are no counter-examples (Skt. *vipakṣas*) – the flickering of a flame is a movement that does not presuppose an enduring mover, e.g., the flickering flame. Hence, there do exist counter-examples that undermine the principle that all actions require enduring agents.

In his translation of Vasubandhu’s *Refutation of the Pudgala*, Xuanzang attempts to invalidate the Vaiśeṣika inference by showing that the third criterion for valid reasons does not hold in the syllogism. Physical movement does not require an enduring or permanent agent. Movement can be explained in terms of a series of discrete and causally connected events that

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This refutes the example (‘For example, Devadatta moves’). Consciousness also works (as a *sapakṣa*), since it is capable of discerning things. The refutation of the *śādhyā-dharma* is a refutation of things of a single type.” 若假士夫，體非一物，於天授諸行相續。假立天授名故。此破喻也。如天授能行。識能了亦爾。類破法也.
momentarily arise. The idea of momentariness is central to the Buddhist doctrine of no-self.

The Vaiśeṣika hold fast to the notion that all physical and non-physical actions are initiated and maintained by a stable and enduring ātman. Vasubandhu, in his _Refutation of the Pudgala_, returns to the example of Devadatta walking across a room to demonstrate how the requirement of the _atman_ as the agent for physical action and non-physical action is unnecessary. To do so, he invokes the Buddhist idea of momentariness, the theory that all things come into existence and then immediately go out of existence, and in doing so create the illusion of a continuously existing thing. For example, when Devadatta walks across the room, she appears to be a single entity, an agent of action, walking across the room. Vasubandhu states that this is an illusion. Using the Buddhist idea of momentariness, Vasubandhu proposes that as Devadatta walks across a room, each one of her movements is linked to another movement in rapid succession like frames in a film. The continuity of the image of Devadatta walking is an optical illusion. Rather than a single and permanent agent of action, Devadatta is composed of multiple moments of movement linked together. Vasubandhu thus regards Devadatta walking across the room as impermanent.

Xuanzang adduces the example of the momentary flickering of a candlewick to dispute the Vaiśeṣika claim that an agent of action is a singular and enduring entity. The flickering glow of a candle appears as a continuous and unitary flame. The flame, however, consists of multiple small units of flame that follow one another in quick succession. Fabao, Xuanzang’s collaborator on the translation of Vasubandhu’s _Refutation of the Pudgala_, says that the example of the flickering flame disproves the Vaiśeṣika principle that all actions are pre-empted by a lasting agent. In Fabao’s words, “a flicker arises in one place, and then a flicker arises in another place, in rapid succession.” The moving of the flickering candlewick does not need to be explained in terms of a permanent fire that moves from place to place. The movement of one fire is in fact the successive
and rapid arising of “flickers” in one place and then another. The optical illusion gives rise to the experience of “one flicker moving” and superimposes a sense of unity on the momentary and discrete flickers. Fabao writes: “Ordinary people in the world say that the flickering ‘moves,’ but actually that is because it rapidly arises [from one moment to the next] in different places.”

For Xuanzang, the metaphor of the flame illustrates how physical and cognitive actions can be visualized as chains of momentary events. Here Xuanzang aligns with the claim made by Vasubandhu that everything is momentary. Xuanzang extends the concept of momentariness to debunk the idea of an enduring and substantial ātman working invisibly within the body and pulling to animate the human being. To Xuanzang, the Buddhist conception of momentariness provides a more robust explanation for physical and cognitive action than the account of the ātman provided by the Brahmanical scholars of the Vaiśeṣika tradition.

The comprehensive discussions in the CWSL on the Buddhist tenet of no-self that unfurl throughout the entire first fascicle adduce the example of the “whirling firebrand” (Skt. alāta-cakra; Chi: Xuan huolun 旋火輪) to illustrate the idea of no-self. This metaphor of the whirling firebrand is meant to indicate that the continuous image of whirling is an optical illusion. Selfhood is, at root, a chimera, just as the appearance of a circle of fire is an optical illusion generated by the rapid movement of the firebrand from one place to another. Similarly, the sense of a continuous self is an illusion.

424 Fabao writes: “it is the provisional characteristics of the continuum (saṃtāna) that arise in one place after the other and that is called ‘going places,’ even though it is momentarily arising-and-ceasing. ‘The causal basis of moving’ does not refer to a substantial ātman that goes from one place to the next. Rather it is like a flickering candlewick, or a sound that arises-and-ceases from moment to moment. Since it is born again in a different location people in the world say that it ‘moves.’”

425 Dhammajoti, Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, 356, tracks the example of the optical illusion of a fire-wheel (alāta-cakra) resulting from the whirling firebrand to the “Sautrāntikas, represented by Śrīlata.”
The *Pudgalavāda*: The Buddhist Personalists School

In his extensive exegesis of the theories of dying and death put forward by the Śāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika thinkers, Xuanzang identifies the reliance on the notion of a soul that lends life and agentive power to the body as the common flaw within both Brāhmaṇical doctrines. Xuanzang regards the conceptualization of the powerful ātman, who enlivens the body and then deserts it in dying, as based upon internally incoherent and inconsistent premises within the Śāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika doctrines. Additionally, he identifies problems in the theory of the ātman when it is analyzed in terms of the generally accepted principles of Indian logic and philosophy. Xuanzang summarily rejects the doctrine of the ātman as proffered by both traditions of Brāhmaṇical philosophy. In his analysis of the Buddhist and Brāhmaṇical theories of dying and death, Xuanzang concludes that the doctrine of the indriyas, first attested by the Buddha in the Āgamas, provides the most powerful and parsimonious explanatory account of what is lost to the body in dying.

During his engagement with the Brāhmaṇical theories of dying and death, Xuanzang is pressed to defend the Buddhist doctrine of no-self. The challenge presented from the rival Brāhmaṇical theorists and from within mainstream Buddhism lies in the question of the motivating force that generates and sustains life and is therefore lost in dying. Xuanzang takes on the vexing question: If there is no-self, and no ātman, then what is the agent of physical action in the body? Dispensing with the opposition to the Buddhist tenet of no-self presented by the Śāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika theories of the ātman, Xuanzang turns to the challenge found within Buddhism itself. Here Xuanzang notes that the Vātsiputṛīya and the Sammītīya schools of Buddhism, while dismissing the notion of the ātman, assert the presence of an entity (Skt.: *pudgala*) that is defined as the part of human being that carries karma and is reincarnated after death. To preserve the doctrine of no-self and uphold his theory of the indriyas, Xuanzang must contend with the
doctrines of the Vātsiputriya and with the Sammitiya Buddhists who believe in a *pudgala* that endures after death.

The Vātsiputriya and the Sammitiya schools, also known as the *Pudgalavāda*, or the Personalist School, are two of the nearly twenty early Buddhist schools in India. The Sammitiya is considered as a branch of the Vātsiputriya sect. Sammitiya is translated as “The School of Correct Logic.” Of the two Personalist schools, Xuanzang mentions only the Vātsiputriya sect in his corpus. He translates the name Vātsiputriya as the “Followers of the Cow-herder Sect or Path” 犢子道/部. In his *Records of Travel to the Western Regions*, the journals of his travels along the Silk Road, Xuanzang attests to the broad appeal of the *Pudgalavāda* sects. He finds adherents of the *Pudgalavāda* doctrine living in geographical areas spanning from Ghandara in Northwestern Asia to the Empire of the Phnom in Southeast Asia. From his unique vantage point, Xuanzang observes the *Pudgalavāda* sects wielding influence among a large segment of practitioners in the Buddhist world. He regards the reliance of his Buddhist co-religionists on the doctrine of the *pudgala* and the sect’s widespread popularity as a challenge to Chinese Buddhism. In his exegesis of dying and death, Xuanzang therefore must contend with the Personalist doctrine of the *pudgala*.

The doctrine of the *pudgala* as an explanation for karma and rebirth is said to have originated in ancient India around the second century B.C.E., two centuries after the death of the Buddha. Most of the original Indic scriptures of the *Pudgalavāda* have been lost. The literature that depicts the doctrinal positions of the *Pudgalavāda* survives in the form of Chinese translations of their summaries and critiques of their positions from within the opposing Buddhist schools. As these sources are far from neutral, the doctrine of the *Pudgalavāda* is regarded by scholars as largely reconstructed.\(^\text{426}\)

\(^\text{426}\) For the sources of the Vatsīputrīyas as a monastic tradition, see Chau (1954), priestly (1999), and Skilling (2016).
The Vātsiputrīya state that the *pudgala* is composed of the five *skandhas*, the aggregates, or the factors that constitute the physical and mental existence of the sentient being. The five *skandhas* are material form (*Skt.*: *rūpa*), feeling and sensation (*Skt.*: *vedanā*), ideation and perception (*Skt.*: *sañjñā*), mental activity (*Skt.*: *saṃskāra*), and consciousness (*Skt.*: *vijñāna*). In his earliest teachings found the Āgamas, the Buddha attests that no-self is to be found either in or outside the five *skandhas*. The Vātsiputrīya are sensitive to the fact that the *pudgala* veers from the orthodox Buddhist doctrine of no-self and toward the Brāhmaṇical teachings of the substantial entity of the ātman.

While there is a textual lacuna regarding the origins of the *pudgala*, three doctrines robustly and clearly define the doctrine of the *Pudgalavāda*. The *Pudgalavāda* asserts the following: while there is no ātman, the *pudgala* is the part of the individual that is reincarnated after death and reborn through successive lives until enlightenment is attained; the *pudgala* is neither the same as nor different from the *skandhas*; and the *pudgala* is the carrier of karma, the personality traits and the memories of the person. Essentially, the *Pudgalavāda* affirm the reality of an aspect of the self that exists outside the aggregates and transcends death. While the account of the Personalists is clearly at odds with the Buddhist tenet of no-self, the *Pudgalavāda* hold that the doctrine of the *pudgala* provides a plausible account of the way karma is transmitted during reincarnation.

Xuanzang encountered practitioners of the Vātsiputrīya and the Sammitīya schools while studying at the Nālanda University in the Kingdom of Magadha, during his travels and residencies in Northwestern and Central Asia and while residing in his homeland of China. He was acutely aware of how the fundamentally different interpretation of the core Buddhist teaching of no-self set forth by the *Pudgalavāda* was entrenched in India and China. As many of his co-religionists had yet to disavow the teachings of the *pudgala*, Xuanzang’s indictment of the *Pudgalavāda*
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doctrine is significant in the doctrinal development and the history of Chinese Buddhism. In this regard, Xuanzang’s refutation of the *Pudgalavāda* doctrine was an overtly polemical move to reassert the teachings on the *indriyas* and no-self laid down by the Buddha.

The rebuttals to the doctrine of the *Pudgalavāda* are located in Xuanzang’s Chinese translation of the *Refutation of the Pudgalavāda* (Skt.: *Pudgalapratīṣedaprákaraṇa*), the ninth chapter (Skt.: *varga*; Chi.: *pin* 品) of Vasubandhu’s *Treasury of Abhidharma*. This chapter is included in the earliest Chinese versions of the *Treasury of Abhidharma*, but is not commented upon by Yaśomitra or Sthiramati. Refutations of the theories of the Buddhist Personalists are also found in Xuanzang’s translation of Vasumitra’s *Treatise of the Wheel of the Different Divisions of the Tenets* (Skt. *Samayabhedoparacana-cakra śāstra*; Chi.: *Yibu zonglun lun* 異部宗輪論) and in his original work, the *Demonstration of Consciousness-Only*.

In his exegesis of the Vātsiputrīya doctrine, Xuanzang examines, and then proceeds to dismantle, the *Pudgalavāda* notion of the self as a real entity. Xuanzang uses a transliteration of the original Sanskrit word *buteqieluo* 補特伽羅 to translate *pudgala* – the Sanskrit word for an individual. He draws a distinction between the Brāhmaṇical notion of the *puruṣa* – the psychic person --and the Personalist concept of the *pudgala* – the human individual – by highlighting the differences in the provenance of the two concepts. The *puruṣa* is rooted in the Brāhmaṇical context of the Sāṅkhya doctrine, while the *pudgala* is embraced by a wide swath of Buddhist theorists grounded in the Vātsiputrīya tradition of Abhidharma Buddhism. To Xuanzang, both are

427 Although the critical edition of Sthiramati’s AKBh commentary, titled Tattvārtha has not yet been published, it is extant in the Derge Tibetan canon. Jowita Kramer reports (personal communication, Jan. 2016) that it is composed of eight chapters, while it does not include the section on the refutation of the person (*pudgalapratīṣedha*). Scholars do not agree upon the *terminus ad quem* of Yaśomitra’s Spūthārtha, but given that it cites Sthiramati’s commentary, it presumably predates the latter.

428 This text is extant in Tibetan translation under title *Gzhung tha dad pa rim par bklag pa'i khor lo las sde pa tha dad pa bstan pa bsdus pa* (see Derge, Work #4140, vol. 167, folios 154–156), where it is attributed to Vinītadeva (*dul pa lha*).
heterodoxies. Xuanzang very deliberately separates the Buddhist and Brāhmaṇical doctrines in his translation corpus and in his CWSL.

The *Pudgala* According to the Vātsiputrīyas

The Vātsiputrīya posit the presence of real entity, a *pudgala*, that remains constant throughout life and afterwards. In this picture, the *pudgala* bears responsibility for all the good and bad effects of the karma that an individual performs and acquires over the course of a lifetime. The *pudgala* in the Vātsiputrīya schema is conceptualized as the container of karma in the form of an entity that transcends the body and is reincarnated until nirvāṇa is achieved. The conception of an enduring *pudgala* stands in sharp contrast to the Orthodox Buddhist idea of no-self, in which there is no eternal, unchanging or essential self, entity or soul.

The Vātsiputrīya doctrine of the *pudgala* is couched in the teaching of the five aggregates. The Buddha teaches that there is nothing that counts as a self that is included within or outside the category of the five skandhas. The Vātsiputrīya equivocate on this core scripture and support both the view of a self as the totality of the five aggregates and the self as something other than the totality of the five aggregates. The Buddha teaches that there is nothing that counts as a self that is included within or outside the category of the five skandhas. The Vātsiputrīya equivocate on this core scripture and support both the view of a self as the totality of the five aggregates and the self as something other than the totality of the five aggregates. The Vātsiputrīya equivocate on this core scripture and support both the view of a self as the totality of the five aggregates and the self as something other than the totality of the five aggregates. The Vātsiputrīya equivocate on this core scripture and support both the view of a self as the totality of the five aggregates and the self as something other than the totality of the five aggregates.

Vasubandhu encapsulates the *Pudgalavādin* doctrine in the following statements: “The person is neither identical with, nor non-identical to, the five aggregates. In his “Refutation of Pudgala” (Pudgalapraṭiśedha), Vasubandhu takes as a hypothetical the *pudgalavādin*’s reductive supervenience position that the pudgala is neither entirely reducible to, nor independent from *rūpa*: “If the idea is that the *pudgala* and its physical support (*aśraya*) are neither different from nor entirely identical to, then this is to state that all dharmas are non-self. So, since that is the case, *pudgala* is not cognized by mental consciousness. The two conditions of its birth (i.e., *rūpa* and mental consciousness) have undergone definitive verdict. But how can you explain this based upon the rest of the scriptures? The scriptures say: that there is no ātman, yet you adhere to an ātman, what a conceptual mess that is! The scriptures talk about non-self since folks adhere to an ātman. But do you bother to explain the scripture if it doesn’t talk about an ātman? What is non-ātman? Skandhas, āyatanas (i.e., indriyas), and dhātus. These three violate the aforementioned theory of *pudgala* being neither different from nor entirely identical to *rūpa*.
aggregates” and “The self is neither one with, nor different from the material, etc., aggregates.” 我
與色等蘊不一不異. The Sarvāstivādin authority Vasumitra (Chi. Shiyou世友), in The Treatise of
the Wheel of the Different Tenets, translated into Chinese by Xuanzang, writes: “The fundamental
tenet of the Vātsiputrīya is that the pudgala is neither identical, nor separate from the skandhas.”
(Skt.: no tu vaktavyam rūpāṇi vā no vā.)
With their ambiguous interpretation of the doctrine of the skandhas, the Vātsiputrīya hedge their bets regarding the Buddhist position on the non-
existence of an entity of the self that exists outside the five aggregates.

The Pudgalavāda holds that the stability of the personality is due to the clustering of the
five psychological and physical aggregates listed by the Buddha: corporeality, sensation,
perception, impulses, and consciousness. The bundle of states that comprises the person is equated
by the Vātsiputrīya with the pudgala. In this interpretation of the doctrine of the five aggregates,
the pudgala is viewed as essentially bundling together the ephemeral states of the personality of
the individual at any given moment in time. Within the Vātsiputrīya schema, the five changing
states determine the course of the movement and the progress of a person from one moment to the
next moment, and ultimately from one reincarnation to the next. In his Treatise of the Wheel of the
Different Tenets, Vasumitra describes how the Vātsiputrīya devise the doctrine of the pudgala to
formulate a desirable and accessible explanation for how an individual personality persists, given
that the physical and psychological states that make up the individual constantly change. The
pudgala thus becomes the enduring locus of the personality of the individual within the
Vātsiputrīya doctrine.

The posit of the perduring locus of the personality of an individual that is based upon, but
not entirely reducible to, the five aggregates is hashed out by the Vātsiputrīya scholars (Priestly,
1997) in their search for a resolution to the doctrinal issue of how and where karma accumulates over time.\textsuperscript{431} The Vātsiputṛiya locate karma in their conceptualization of the \textit{pudgala}. In his Chinese translation of Vasubandhu’s \textit{Refutation of the Pudgalavāda}, Xuanzang states: “The \textit{pudgala} is what bears the heavy burden” of accumulated karma.\textsuperscript{432} Vasumitra agrees with Vasubandhu in his description of the \textit{pudgala} as the bearer of karma throughout one life and into the next. For the Vātsiputṛiya scholars, the \textit{pudgala} provides a concise explanation for the stability of the personality, the location of accumulated karma in life and the locus of the transmigration of karma into the next life. They justify their unorthodox position on no-self by claiming that the \textit{pudgala} provides an immediate and accessible explanatory account for the Buddhist doctrines of the \textit{skandhas}, karma and reincarnation.

\textbf{Xuanzang’s Rejoinder to the Doctrine of the \textit{Pudgala}}

Xuanzang regards the Vātsiputṛiya doctrine of the \textit{pudgala} as antithetical to the core teachings of the Buddha. In his attempt to block the infiltration of a reified version of the self, in the form of the \textit{pudgala}, into Chinese Buddhism, Xuanzang turns to the Abhidharma Buddhist

\textsuperscript{431} From the wheel of the revolution of the different sects and tenets (\textit{yibu zonglun lun} 異部宗輪論), translated into Chinese by Xuanzang: “If there is a \textit{pudgala} distinct from the plural dharmas, since those dharmas do not perdure from one life to the next, only based upon the \textit{pudgala} can one actually talk about ‘[something] transmigrating [from one life to the next. This is because of the fact that even the followers of the non-Buddhist tīrthika paths can cultivate and obtain the five [out of six] supranormal powers (\textit{abhijñāni}).’” 諸法若離補特伽羅。無從前世轉至後世。依補特伽羅可說有移轉。亦有外道能得五通。The implication of the statement that “even the non-Buddhists can obtain five of six spiritual powers,” is that the followers of the non-Buddhists paths, are limited in their spiritual attainments by retaining “fluxes” – that is “contaminating residues” that bing them to the rebirth in the three realms. The idea that these followers of non-Buddhist paths have hit a “glass ceiling,” blocking their further advancement, is meant to erode the credibility of the personalists’ position that maintains that the \textit{pudgala} is a stable foundation for spiritual development from one life to the next. This is taken to be evidence against the idea that the Buddha became enlightened at one specific time in history and within the lifespan of one individual, since he attained the final spiritual capacities required to obtain enlightenment in his final reincarnation as Prince Gautama in India. In other words, there was no “previously-enlightened” form of the Buddha that existed in the past life as a soul or other sentient being. The Buddha was a unique individual, and escaped the cycle of death and rebirth during the span of one life, and his soul is no longer subject to further transmigration. On the basis of the \textit{pudgala} they can say that something “transmigrates.”

\textsuperscript{432} 若唯五取蘊名補特伽羅。何故世尊作如是說？吾今為汝說諸：重擔取舍重擔荷重擔者。T29n1558p0155a26}}.
authorities. In his rejoinder, Xuanzang looks to Vasubandhu and Vasumatri, both of whom formulate jeremiads against the “schismatics” (Chi.: yizhi 異執) and “aberrant sectarians” (Chi.: yibu異部) who support the doctrine of the pudgala. Judging by the length and the tone of his razor-like *Refutation of the Pudgala*, the doctrine of the Pudgalavāda is Vasubandhu’s bête noir. Additionally, the doctrine of the pudgala is singled out for special rebuke by Xuanzang in his translation of Vasumitra’s *Treatise on the Wheel of the Different Tenets*. Both Vasubandhu and Vasumitra affirm Xuanzang’s position that the desideratum for a pudgala is borne of a clinging desire for a stable sense of self, a position that is antithetical to Buddhism.

In his rejoinder to the Vātsiputrīyas, Xuanzang targets the Pudgalavādins interpretations of the Buddhist scriptures. Essentially, Xuanzang regards the theory of the pudgala as founded on erroneous interpretations of the Buddha’s teachings on the skandhas and the indriyas. These misinterpretations lead the Pudgalavādins to an affirmation of the pudgala as an entity that exists over and above the indriyas. Although couched in the language of Buddhist exegesis, Xuanzang regards the Vātsiputrīyas’ use of the traditional vocabulary of Buddhism and their interpretation of the Āgamas as spurious. For example, in his translation of Vasubandhu’s ninth chapter of the *Treasury*, Xuanzang devotes an entire fascicle roll to an analysis of the roots of the word pudgala and its definition within the Buddhist context.

In his *Demonstration of Consciousness-Only*, Xuanzang pulls no punches in attacking both the tīrthika doctrine espoused by Brāhmaṇical masters and the crypto-Brāhmaṇical teachings expounded by the Pudgalavādins. In this work, Xuanzang isolates the false premises and the erroneous interpretations of scripture used by the Pudgalavādins to support the doctrine of the pudgala. He highlights the misconstructions of Buddhist tenets used by the Pudgalavādins to reassure their misguided adherents. Xuanzang accuses the Pudgalavādins of using the doctrine of
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the *pudgala* to reinforce the desire to cling to a self. He even goes as far as to accuse the followers of the Vātsiputriya sect of bearing false witness to the teachings of the Buddha in the service of perpetuating the crypto-Brahmanical doctrine of the ātman. Ultimately, Xuanzang renounces *Pudgalavada* Buddhism as a bastion of crypto-Brāhmaṇical views that contradict the doctrine of no-self.

**Vasubandhu and Vasumitra on Why the *Pudgala* Does Not Exist**

To combat the doctrine of the *Pudgalavādins*, Xuanzang is compelled to deal with fundamental misinterpretations of Buddhist teachings endorsed by the Vātsiputriya. In his rebuttal, Xuanzang addresses the ambiguity in the *Pudgalavādin* theory regarding the relationship between the *pudgala* and the *skandhas*. Xuanzang also takes on the twin notions of the *pudgala* as the bearer of karma from one life to the next and the *pudgala* as the stable bearer of subjective experiences and memories of the individual.

In his rebuffal of the theories of the *Pudgalavādins*, Xuanzang turns to the teachings of the Abhidharma Buddhists as represented by Vasubandhu and Vasumitra. Xuanzang defends the Abhidharma Buddhist theories positing that karma and the memories of experiences are borne throughout life by the *indriyas*. He upholds the Buddhist teachings that the *indriyas* are the bearers of karma and memories and dismisses the notion of an entity in the form of a *pudgala* that is separate from the *indriyas*. He is adamant that the Abhidharma teachings be upheld and that the crypto-Brāhmaṇical views endorsed by the Vātsiputriya be expunged from Chinese Buddhism.

**The *Pudgala* and The Aggregates or Five *Skandhas***

Following his Abhidharma Buddhist forbearers, Xuanzang regards the *pudgala*, as postulated by the Vātsiputrīyas and the Sammitiyas, as a distortion of the traditional Buddhist doctrine of the *skandhas*. The Buddha teaches that the self is not in the *skandhas*. In his *Refutation*
of the Pudgalavādin, Vasubandhu takes issue with the Vātsiputrīyas’ proposition that the pudgala is neither different from nor the same as the skandhas. The “neither nor” view regarding the relationship between the pudgala and the skandhas is a target for Vasubandhu’s rebuke. Vasubandhu regards the equivocation of the Vātsiputrīya position on the pudgala as unsustainable. He regards their defense of the existence of a substantial self as flimsy and unsupported by the Buddhist doctrine.

Vasubandhu begins his attack on the Vātsiputrīya doctrine by asking: Is the pudgala one of the skandhas, or is it different? He responds with the following statement: If it is the same, then presumably it cannot be a sixth skandha, because the Buddha very clearly spoke of only five skandhas, and took pains to explain why the line at was drawn at five, rather than at six or four skandhas. Here Vasubandhu highlights how the Buddha makes a deliberate point to show that none of the five skandhas contains an enduring self.

After ruling out the equation of the pudgala with one of the skandhas, Vasubandhu follows with a second question: If the pudgala is different from the skandhas, then what is it? He notes that the pudgala is not classified under any of the standard Buddhist taxonomies, including the comprehensive categories of the dhātus or the indriyas. Vasubandhu then asks if the pudgala has an independent existence from the basic classificatory categories in the Buddhist canon. If the pudgala has an independent existence, then the pudgala must be a “real existent” and not merely a “nominal construct” or a façon-de-parler. Here Vasubandhu holds the Vātsiputrīyas to the principle of “nominalism” and argues that if pudgala is a real entity, it must exist in more than in

\[433\] If the pudgala as an entity is something real, then it should be different from the skandhas, since it possesses individual severality. Positing a pudgala would then be like dividing out another skandha. 體若是實應與蘊異，有別性故。如別別蘊。Moreover, something that exists as a real entity must have a cause. Otherwise, it should be an unconditioned thing, and one would end up with the same view as the tīrthikas. 又有實體必應有因。或應是無為。便同外道見。
In the example of one grain of rice, Vasubandhu demonstrates two points: one, that a pudgala is not a real entity and two, that the pudgala exists in name only. He writes: when the Buddha speaks of “one hemp seed; one grain of rice; one bundle in the sūtra, he speaks about ‘rebirth’ upon the basis of worldly custom. Some say that the pudgala is like this in the sense that it can be classified (Skt. *samgraha*) as an existing thing. But these same sūtras do not state that the pudgala is ‘reborn in a new set of skandhas.’”\(^{434}\) In this passage, Vasubandhu recognizes that in the words of the Buddha, the pudgala does not refer to any single, specific thing. The Buddha speaks of “one grain of sand” metaphorically, without intending to reference one singular thing. The grain of sand is a collection of miniscule particles, themselves composed of molecules (Skt.: *aṇus*), and those molecules composed of atoms (Skt. *paramāṇus*). In Vasubandhu’s estimation, the pudgala cannot be equated to a real entity and is a mere façon-de-parler.

In his translation of Vasubandhu’s *Refutation of the Pudgalavādin*, Xuanzang invokes the example of Ananda to illustrate the problem with equating the pudgala to a real entity. One of the epithets for Ananda, the famous and revered disciple of the Buddha, is *Jīvin*, or “he who bears life.” The word *jīvin* means *ātman* and is also one of the words used by the Jaina, a doctrine that is not recognized by Buddhism, to describe the soul. In Vasubandhu’s example, the Buddha’s use of the name *Jīvin* is a sign of his admiration and respect for Ananda.\(^{435}\) Vasubandhu is clear in his rejoinder to the Vātsiputṛīyas that when the Buddha uses the name *Jīvin*, he is not referring to an

\(^{434}\) Xuanzang, trans. AKBh: “as the worldly folk say: ‘there is one sesame seed, one grain of rice, one bundle, one word.’ So we should grant that the pudgala can be classified under this singular mode of existence. Since the sutras abide in the worldly phrases. We do not say that ‘a new aggregate of skandhas arises every time in the world.’” 如世間說一麻一米一聚一言。或補特伽羅應許有為攝。以契經說生世間故。非此言生如蘊新起。T29n1558p0155b19-21.

\(^{435}\) T29n1558p0155c05
The three elements that comprise the Ananda are the standard Buddhist categories of the aggregates, the indriyas and the sensory realms (Skt. dhātus). The word Jīvin in this case refers to the nominal unity of Ānanda. Vasubandhu argues that when the Buddha refers to Ānanda as Jīvin, he is not reifying Ānanda as an eternal and enduring entity. Instead, the Buddha is using the word Jīvin as a façon-de parler. Thus, the word pudgala is merely a façon-de parler for the bundle of aggregates, the indriyas and the dhātus that make up the sentient being. With this example, Vasubandhu uses the words of the Buddha to dismantle the Vātsiputrīyas’ conception of the pudgala as a real and enduring entity.

The Pudgala and the Doctrine of Momentariness

The idea that the personality of an individual is composed of a bundle or an aggregate (Skt. skandha) of impermanent states that change from moment to moment is emphasized by the Buddha in his homilies. According to this core Buddhist teaching, the five aggregates that compose an individual are momentary in that they are reborn and perish from one moment to the next. The five skandhas that make up the sentient individual are thus understood as discrete and ephemeral momentary states that are linked together to create the impression of a continuously existing person. This concept is enshrined by the Abhidharma Buddhists in the doctrine of momentariness. Von Rospatt (1995, p. 4), in his sweeping study of the sources of the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness, draws attention to Vasubandhu’s discussion in the Refutation of the Pudgalavādin in which he enlists the concept of momentariness in his rebuttal against the Buddhist Vātsiputrīyas.

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436 依蘊處界假施設名者謂我非即離蘊處界亦爾然世說言色是我乃至法亦是我但依蘊等假施,設此我名我實非蘊等 (X53n0844p0586c06-7).
and the Brahmanical schools, most notably the Vaiśeṣikas.\textsuperscript{437}

In the arguments directed against the Vastriputriyas, Vasubandhu uses the concept of momentariness to chip away at the entrenched notion that the core features of the individual, such as memory, require the presence of a \textit{pudgala}. The Vastriputriyas contend that the \textit{pudgala} provides the essential function of containing the memories of an individual over a lifetime and into the afterlife. For the Vastriputriyas, the formulation of the \textit{pudgala} as a container explains how the memories of an individual are retained in the face of constant change.

In his \textit{Refutation of the Pudgalavādin}, Vasubandhu dispels the idea that only a \textit{pudgala} can explain the retention of memories.\textsuperscript{438} He states that the theory of the \textit{indriyas} provides a valid explanatory account for the perdurance of memories within the individual personality. Vasubandhu posits that “residual traces,” or \textit{vāsanās}, retain the memories of a sentient being from the past into the present. These \textit{vāsanās} are retained in the \textit{ālayavijñāna}, or the “store house consciousness” located within the \textit{indriyas} and based in the aggregates of the body. Vasubandhu thus argues that presence of the \textit{pudgala} is not required to contain stable memories across the lifetime of an individual.

\textsuperscript{437} Here, the proof of momentariness is formally still directed against the Vatsiputriyas-Sapmatiyas, but, as far as the substance of the discussion is concerned, it is primarily directed against proponents of the Brahmanical schools (notably the Vaiśeṣika).

\textsuperscript{438} In addressing the case of reifying the \textit{pudgala} as the stable bearer of memory, Vasubandhu argues that there is the unwarranted consequence (prasaṅga) of falling into a view of \textit{satkāyadrṣṭi}, namely, that one really exists in a physical body. Vasubandhu writes: “all that has remembered, is remembering, or will remember something is the five upadāna skandhas. Thus, the \textit{pudgala} does not exist. Why do the scriptures seem to state that there exists the corporeal, etc., skandhas in the past? This sūtra that so speaks is revealing that the capability of the saṃtāna is to remember all manner of things. If there were a real \textit{pudgala}, then there would be the capability of the corporeal skandha, etc., in the past. And how would that not fall into the view of \textit{satkāyadrṣṭi}? 寶有已憶、正憶當憶、種種宿住。一切唯於五取蘊起。故定無有補特伽羅。若爾何緣此經復說我於過去世有如是色等？此經為顯能憶宿生一相續中有種種事。若見實有補特伽羅於過去生能有色等。如何非墮起身見失.
The Pudgala As the Bearer of Karma

In his *Refutation of the Pudgalavādin*, Vasubandhu levels a devastating assault on the delusion that leads his co-religionists to cling to the *pudgala*. Vasubandhu’s skillful gambit consists in the rhetorical question: would you willingly and freely assume the terribly “heavy burden” of someone else’s accumulated karma? He sarcastically writes, “I have never seen someone freely elect to carry such a heavy burden!” 439 Vasubandhu implies that no rational person in their right mind would willingly elect to shoulder another person’s heavy and exhausting burden, if given any viable alternative. The *pudgala* is, at heart, selfish, and would be loath to assume the heavy burdens of others on top of those she already has.

Xuanzang’s rebuttal of the pudgala in the CWSL

Throughout the heated discussions with the *pudgalavadin* in the first fascicle of the CWSL, Xuanzang rejects the attribution of both synchronic and diachronic unity to the so-called *pudgala*. In these disputes, Xuanzang stands by his conviction that the *pudgala* is a nominal posit. It is not an enduring or substantial entity. According to Vasubandhu’s final analysis of the Vātsiputṛya doctrine of the *pudgala*, delivered at the end of the final chapter to his *Treasury of Abhidharma*, the *pudgala* can be explained in terms of these three elements. It has no separate existence. While Xuanzang agrees with the Vātsiputṛya understanding of no-self as the disavowal of a soul, he disavows the Vātsiputṛya doctrine that the *pudgala* is a real, perduring entity rather than a merely

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439 AKBh, fascicle 9 — T1558:29.155.b02. Puguang: “The ātman has the capability of bearing it, so it cannot be classified under the skandhas.” 我是能荷，即非蘊攝 (T1821:41.444.b09).
Chapter 2: What Is Dying?

“nominal” construct.\textsuperscript{440}

The first fascicle of the CWSL proceeds to break down the “core” self as postulated by the opponents into its constituent elements. The expressed goal of this portion of Xuanzang’s text is to “analyze away the self.” While holding steadfastly to this belief in the non-substantiality of the self, Xuanzang’s CWSL asserts that there must exist a subject of action over and above the plural constituency of elements (Skt.: \textit{dravya}) formed by the five aggregates (Skt.: \textit{skandhas}) constituting the individual.

A famous part of the opening passage of this section reads: “we come to call the various characteristics of the self the possessor of sentience and life” (我種種相，謂：有情命者等).\textsuperscript{441} According to the beginning of the CWSL, the sense of self arises only once the unreal aspect of unity has been superimposed on the multiplicity of dharmas, specifically on the five constituents to which one clings, which intrinsically lack these features.

Later on, the CWSL turns to the question of from where exactly the egocentric notion of a “self” as opposed to “other” arises. The authorial voice or \textit{siddhāntin} of the text observes that if we just concentrate on the evidence of our immediate experience without involving other concepts, all that we find given are momentary physical and mental events.\textsuperscript{442} If there were a real \textit{ātman},

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\textsuperscript{440} AKBh, fascicle 9: “As said in the \textit{Sūtra on the Ultimate Meaning of Emptiness}: ‘There exists karma and the matured effects of karma (vipāka). The agent is imperceptible. It refers to the capability of deserting this set of skandhas and continuing within that set of skandhas. It is merely a nominal posit based upon dharmas. The Buddha has already refuted it (i.e., the self as agent).’ 如勝義空契經中說：有業有異熟，作者不可得，謂能捨此蘊及能續餘蘊。唯除法假。故佛已遮 (T1558:29.155.b25-7).

\textsuperscript{441} CWSL, fascicle 1 (T31.1585:31.1.a25).

\textsuperscript{442} The CWSL makes the argument that the \textit{ahampratyaya} should not be based upon \textit{ātmadrsti} 我見, because the \textit{ātmadrsti} is itself a product of the manas 末那. In his comment on this patch of text, Kuiji formulates a reductio ad absurdum that that \textit{ahampratyaya} is not a veridical cognition in two inferences. Kuiji sums up the gist of these two inferences: Kuiji explains: ‘The (1) first inference in this section excludes that the noetic aspect of cognition (i.e., because it is construed through the manas), is not capable of generating an immediate apprehension of Self, while the (2) second inference in this section excludes that the cognitive-support [presented in I-cognition (ahampratyaya)] is definitely not the Real Self.此破「能緣不緣我起」；次破「所緣定非實我」。Kuiji, \textit{CWSL-SJ}, fasc. 1, T1830:43.249.a12. The first inference is: (1) Your view of the Self presenting itself as the
then it would be enduring. If there were a real soul, it would present to direct perception: we would be able to see, hear, smell, taste or touch it. The essence of Kuiji's *reductio ad absurdum* argument is that if the soul were real, it would present in immediate awareness (Skt. *pratyakṣa*). Because the soul is never directly perceived, it cannot be real, because anything that is real must have perceivable effects.

In Xuanzang’s CWSL, the minds of sentient beings are composed of eight distinct regions of consciousness. The first through fifth regions are the sensory consciousnesses of sight, sound, smell, taste, and tactition; the sixth is mental consciousness, or the realm of the mental *indriya*; the seventh is the sense of self-awareness, or the *manas*; and the eighth region is the *ālayavijñāna*, the subconscious mental repository of memories and other experiences. Within Xuanzang’s taxonomy, self-awareness originates in the *manas*, the locus of self-awareness. Among the eight layers of consciousness, the *manas* is negatively tinged, as it gives rise to egotistical desires.

The CWSL goes on to diagnose the source of the mistaken idea of the *pudgala* at a deeper level than that of ordinary perception by the five senses. Xuanzang’s text explains the genesis of the self as based on the separation between subjective “interiority” and objective “externality.” *Manas* is the locus of the sense of self, according to Xuanzang. He avers that the adhesion to the unchanging individual, in form of the *pudgala*, is the root of the delusion based in *manas*, the object of cognition (*pakṣa*), does not present a Real Self. Because the cognition that presents itself as the object is itself conditioned (*hetu*) by the previous cognition, just like the cognitions that present the Self and external material things as the object (*dṛṣṭānta*). The second in this pair of inferences is: (2) The cognitive-support (*ālambana* 所緣) presented through self-view (=*āmadrṣti*) (*pakṣa*) is not the Real Self. Because this cognition presenting the Self is itself conditioned (*hetu*), just like the various material and physical elements (*dharmas*) which present the cognitive-support (*dṛṣṭānta*). The object of cognition: *pudgala*, the object of cognition: *pakṣa*, does not present a Real Self. Because the cognition that presents itself as the object is itself conditioned (*hetu*) by the previous cognition, just like the cognitions that present the Self and external material things as the object (*dṛṣṭānta*). 

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443 In the seventh āhnika of his *Nyāyaśāstra*, the 9th-century Kaśmīri Nyāyaśāstra philosopher Jayanta Bhaṭṭa described the Buddhist position of svasaṃvedana and elaborated an extensive refutation of the Buddhist counterargument against the Brāhmaical doctrine of *ahampratyaya* – see Watson (2014).
negative part of conscious experience. The separation between interiority and externality is an illusion rooted in the seventh consciousness, or *manas*. Xuanzang explains that this dichotomy results from one of two processes: either the *manas* falsely superimposes the notion of an egocentric and continuing selfhood onto the constantly shifting sixth consciousness, or *manovijñāna*, or the *manas* falsely superimposes the notion of a self onto the relatively stable eighth consciousness, or *ālayavijñāna*. For Yogācāra Buddhism, cognitions that are mediated through the *manas* are distorted, as the *manas* is the locus for the creation of mistaken views of selfhood. Hence, both of these processes that generate an egocentric adhesion to the self are contaminated by illusion and delusion.

Xuanzang says that the *pudgala* is self-awareness and the locus of a stable sense of self, craving and attachment. As the source of self-conceit, it is wedded to arrogance. Eradicating the *manas*, the level of consciousness that is laced with negative attachments, is the focus of the practice for the CWSL. Thus, the CWSL locates the discussion on the notion of the *pudgala* firmly within the context of an investigation into the nature of consciousness and the *manas*.

While the discussion of the *pudgala* in the first fascicle roll of the CWSL takes issue with the construct of the *pudgala* as a “stable” container of karma, the more intricate and scholastically oriented critique of the *pudgala* found in the fourth roll of Xuanzang’s work brackets the *pudgala* into one of four kinds of unwholesome “craving” and “attachment” to the “enduring self.” Here, Xuanzang offers what we might call a “psychoanalytic” reading of the *pudgala* as part of the individual religious practitioner’s subconscious mind.

This latter part of the critique of the *pudgala* is psychoanalytic in the sense that it offers treatment for the unwholesome clinging to the *ātman* in terms of the penultimate “stage of yogic insight” within the five-stage model of the Buddhist path of Yogācāra. The topic of the Yogācāra
model of the Buddhist path (Skt.: mārga) in five stages exceeds the limits of this study. It is sufficient to point out that it relates to the “limits” of the śravakayāna, the advanced practitioners who fail to achieve the eighth stage in the Bodhisattva path. While the pudgala impedes the practice of these Bodhisattvas, they can overcome the spiritual impasse by contemplating the changing and ephemeral nature of the consciousness of “matured” (Skt.: vipāka; Chi.: yishou) mental states. The particularly “mature” or entrenched sense of adherence to the continuing pudgala needs to be overcome and ultimately eradicated. Xuanzang’s argumentation against the Vatsiputraīyas aims to divest his co-religionists of their deluded attachment to the pudgala. In short, there is no need to stick by the pudgala to preserve the Buddhist teachings on karma and its accumulation over a life-cycle. For Xuanzang, the idea that something comes to an end when biological death occurs does not mean that this something is a soul, or a person, or any individual thing characterized by a singular personality.

There is, in short, no need for a pudgala to explain dying. Xuanzang’s CWSL illustrates a practice meant to overcome the attachment to the pudgala, a deep-seated illusion based on the manas, the seventh consciousness and the locus of negativity in the sentient human.

Section Two: Xuanzang’s Redefinition of Dying in Terms of the Faculties

What is dying? Based on his extensive analyses and translations of the Brāhmaṇical and Buddhist texts, Xuanzang determines that dying is the deterioration of a collection of indriyas and not the release of a spiritual entity (in the form of a puruṣa, an ātman, or a pudgala) from the body. In his exhaustive examinations of the Brāhmaṇical and Buddhist canons, ranging from the early

\[444\] CWSL 9: “[0024b10] Here, the idea [of ālayavijñāna] is divided into three parts: firstly, the view of ātman associated with the pudgala. Firstly, there is the view of atman associated with the pudgala; secondly, there is the view of atman associated with the dharmas; and thirdly, there is the wisdom associated with the nature of uniformity.” 此意差別略有三種。一補特伽羅我見相應。二法我見相應。三平等性智相應.
Āgamas to the Brāhmaṇical theories posited by the Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika sects and the doctrines of the Buddhist Personalists, Xuanzang comes to endorse a definition of dying founded on the Abhidharma and Yogācāra theories of the indriyas. Xuanzang vigorously denies the need for spiritual entities above and beyond the indriyas to explain what is lost in dying. In doing so, he upholds the Buddhist doctrine of no-self. Xuanzang’s exegesis of the question of dying is of doctrinal and historical significance in Chinese Buddhism. While recognized as a pilgrim and a translator of the Indic scriptures, Xuanzang has not yet been acknowledged as the philosopher who protected the foundational doctrine of no-self from dilution during the transmission of Buddhism from India to China.

Throughout his exegesis of the scriptures, Xuanzang reconciles Buddhist theories with non-Buddhist theories on the doctrinal matters of life and death. In his press to uphold the doctrine of no-self, Xuanzang is motivated to provide an account of living and dying that does not reify a spiritual entity. To do so, he supports the Abhidharma and Yogācāra theory of the indriyas as a biologically-based and parsimonious account of living and dying that does not rely on the postulate of a supernatural entity. For Xuanzang, the theory of the indriyas provides a rational account of how the body survives. Importantly, it preserves the core Buddhist tenet of no-self.

To defend the Buddhist doctrine of the indriyas, Xuanzang must confront the challenge, leveled by rival theorists, that the indriyas are merely substitutes for a soul. Here Xuanzang needs to address two thorny issues regarding the nature and descriptions of the indriyas and the soul: one, like the Brāhmaṇical ātman, the twenty-two indriyas are intangible and invisible; two, like the Brāhmaṇical ātman, the indriyas are viewed as agents of purposive action and the bearers of life. In his rebuttal, Xuanzang must dispute the claim that the indriyas are proxies for perduring entities such as the puruṣa, the ātman, or the pudgala. In the CWSL and in their commentaries on the
Brāhmaṇical and Buddhist Abhidharma texts, Xuanzang and his first- and second-generation disciples elaborate on the important theoretical distinctions between the Brāhmaṇical and Buddhist theories of the *indriyas* and the soul.

The first issue Xuanzang must address is that the *indriyas*, the bearers of life, are invisible. Very much like the descriptions of the *puruṣa*, the ātman or the pudgala found in the Brāhmaṇical and the Buddhist Personalist literature, the *indriyas* are “hidden within the body” and beyond the direct scrutiny of the senses. Xuanzang must confront the charge that in their intangibility, the *indriyas* too closely resemble the *puruṣa*, the ātman or the pudgala. Here he must differentiate the imperceptible and invisible *indriyas* from the equally imperceptible and invisible soul. As his colleague Kuiji puts it, Xuanzang must defend against the rival critique that the mysterious faculties that operate the body are nothing more than an ātman masquerading in Buddhist garb.

The second critical issue in the defense of the theory of the *indriyas* regards the nature of the *indriyas* as the agents of physical activity in the body. Here Xuanzang must uphold the theory that the *indriyas*, in and of themselves, are the sources of vitality and the sustainers of sentient life. To support this theory, Xuanzang must address his rivals’ contention that the *indriyas* resemble the organs of the body too closely. In his rebuttal, Xuanzang must differentiate between the activities of the *indriyas* and the functions of the physical organs in the body. In making this distinction, Xuanzang determines dying to be the deterioration of the vital *indriyas* rather than the weakening and ultimate demise of the physical organs within the body.

The two challenges leveled by the rival thinkers pose a threat to Xuanzang’s position that the process of dying does not involve a soul. In his rebuttal, Xuanzang addresses the question of the intangibility of the *indriyas* and finds that the premise of invisibility is accepted by both the Brāhmaṇical theorists and the Sarvāstivāda Buddhists. While Xuanzang concurs with his rival
theorists regarding the invisibility of the *indriyas*, he rejects the notion that intangibility of the faculties necessarily equates them to the equally intangible soul. He argues that inferring the existence of the *ātman* from the physical activities of the body is not equivalent to inferring the presence of the *indriyas* from observing the physical actions of a sentient being.

Xuanzang then confronts his rivals’ critique that the physical activity required to sustain life can be explained by looking at the workings of the organs of the body rather than by drawing inferences about the activities of the *indriyas*. Here Xuanzang is pressed to articulate the causal efficacy of the *indriyas* as separate from the operating functions of the physical organs. Xuanzang makes the case that the organs of the body do not operate without the *indriyas*. In his rebuttal, he explains how the organs of the body work together with the faculties to sustain the physical activities required for survival. In making the distinction between the *indriyas* and the organs, Xuanzang also defines the difference between a living body and a corpse. In his translation corpus and in the CWSL, Xuanzang discusses dying as a sequence involving the loss of the sensory *indriyas* followed by the decay of the physical organs. To Xuanzang, dying begins with the deterioration of the *indriyas* rather than with the departure of the soul from the body.

**On the Invisibility of the Indriyas**

In his effort to uphold the Buddhist principle that dying does not require the presence of the soul, Xuanzang is pressed to address a host of issues regarding the invisibility and intangibility of the *indriyas* and the soul. In rejecting the presence of a soul in his explanation of what sustains the body in life and what is lost to the body in dying, Xuanzang must clarify that he is not replacing the unobservable posit of an *ātman* with the equally unobservable posit of an *indriya*. To defend the theory of the invisibility of the *indriyas*, Xuanzang turns to the classical texts of the
Brāhmaṇical and Buddhist traditions.

According to the doctrine attested by the Buddha in the Āgamas, the twenty-two indriyas form the set of factors that are necessary and sufficient for the survival of the sentient human being. The indriyas are responsible for the overall functioning of the sentient body and are charged with maintaining bodily activities, which range from rudimentary actions like breathing to the higher processes of cognition. However extraordinary and marvelous the outwardly visible actions of the indriyas may be, the Abhidharma teaches that the activities of the faculties occur in an invisible theater within the body. While many of the processes that the indriyas actualize within the body are visible, the indriyas themselves are not.

In his exploration of this topic, Xuanzang finds that the description of the indriyas as invisible and insensible is supported by the Brāhmaṇical Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika doctrines. The ancient Sāṅkhya sūtras also state that the faculties are “like something hidden just beyond plain view, such as by a thin wall”覆障故不見. The Brāhmaṇical doctrines...
hold that the *indriyas* are insensible and that the soul, the director or executive operator of the *indriyas*, is intangible and invisible as well.

The Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika Brāhmaṇical theorists agree that the faculties are not located inside the organs of the body or in any other determinable location. Additionally, they concur that the presence of the faculties is known because the work of the faculties is undeniably “seen and heard.” In the first hemistich of the eighth stanza of the *Sāṅkhyakārikās*, Kapila states: “It is because the *indriyas* are subtle that they are not visible. But it is not that the *indriyas* lack visible conditions” 性細故不見 非無緣可見. With the phrase “visible conditions,” Kapila refers to the observable physical effects that occur because of the actions of the invisible *indriyas*. The Vaiśeṣika inherit the premise of the insensibility of the *indriyas* from the Sāṅkhya theorists. In his śūtras, the sage Kanāṇḍa places the ātman in the category of intangible substances that cannot be perceived directly. The Vaiśeṣika posit that the ātman cannot be seen heard, smelled, tasted or touched. Within the Vaiśeṣika schema, because the ātman is invisible, the *indriyas* that are borne by the ātman are also invisible.

Long before the ascendance of Xuanzang into the inner circle of Buddhist scholars at the Imperial Court, Vasubandhu examines the paradox inherent in the idea that that the sense faculties are by definition insensible. In his *Thirty Verses on Consciousness-Only*, translated into Chinese by Xuanzang, Vasubandhu states: “It is not unseen in the place where it invisible” (Skt.: *na dṛste'smin sa drśyate*). In this hemistich, Vasubandhu refers to the perfected nature (Skt. *parinispāṇṇa-svabhāva*) that resides in all things. His statement also applies to the intrinsic nature (Skt.: *svābhava*) of the *indriyas*. Vasubandhu concludes that the *indriyas* are unseen, yet are known to exist by the observation of their visible functions.

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446 Trimśika, see edition of Levi (1927, p. 3).
Xuanzang finds ample support for the insensibility and the existence of the *indriyas* in the venerated texts of the Sāṅkhya and the Vaiśeṣika and in the teachings of the Abhidharma Buddhists. Ultimately, Xuanzang concludes that the invisible and the intangible nature of the *indriyas* does not preclude their existence within the body. The existence of the *indriyas* is known by inferring from the observable physical actions of the sentient being.

**On Inferring the Existence of the *Indriyas***

The Buddhist and the Brāhmaṇical scholars agree that the observable activities of the body provide direct evidence for the work of the *indriyas*. Additionally, the Abhidharma Buddhists and the Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika theorists converge in their recognition of inference as the epistemological instrument to be used to prove the existence of the *indriyas*. To support his theory of the *indriyas*, however, Xuanzang must address two additional issues related to the inference of the faculties. The first matter regards how the sensory *indriyas* are inferred as separate and distinct from the sensory organs in the body. The second issue relates to how the *indriyas*, unlike the physical or sensory faculties, are inferred when they do not have a physical locus in the body.

When Xuanzang postulates that a plural constituency of *indriyas* is essential to life, he must address the nagging question of how the presence of the *indriyas* is known. Because the *indriyas* are intangible, they evade sensory detection. To illustrate this point, the *Mahāvibhāṣā* adduces the example of the creature that retreats into its burrow to avoid a predator. The example of a warm-blooded creature eluding detection in a burrow is meant to illustrate the elusive nature of the true *indriya*. Like nocturnal animals that only come out to forage under the cover of darkness, the *indriyas* remain hidden from plain view. This metaphor highlights the point that although the *indriyas* cannot be detected, they remain active within the recesses of the body.
Xuanzang is aware of the paradox inherent in the fact that the sensory *indriyas* cannot sense themselves. According to Xuanzang, the loci that correspond to the sensory *indriya* cannot be detected via ordinary sensory perception. Additionally, Xuanzang observes that while the sense faculties are not equivalent to the dusty and defiled organs of the material body, the *indriyas* need a locus, or a home, within the body. Each *indriya* requires an āsraya, or a place of shelter or refuge, in the way that a mouse avoiding a predator requires the safety of a burrow. In his exegesis, Xuanzang turns to the Abhidharma teachings to address the question of how the sensory *indriyas* can be inferred as separate from the organs that provide them with an āsraya. He also addresses the question of how the non-physical *indriyas*, such as kāyēndriyam, or vitality, are known through the instrument of inference.

In the codified teachings of the Abhidharma, the faculty of vision is described as both a physical and an intangible *indriya*. While separate from the organs of the visual apparatus, the *indriya* of vision can be directly associated with the organ of the eye. The Abhidharma scholars point out that we do not see our faculty of vision when, for example, we look out a window and see a person. They also state that we do not touch the *indriya* of vision when we poke a finger into an eyeocket and feel an eyeball. The Abhidharma scholars hold that we infer the presence of the faculty of vision when we see things. Essentially, we infer the existence of the sensory *indriya* of vision when we look out a window and see a person and are cognizant of the innate capacity to do so. The *indriya* of vision thus is inferred from the subjective experience of seeing.

Vasubandhu, in his *Refutation of the Pudgalavāda*, offers a definition of the inference of the sensory faculties. He states that the existence of the sensory faculties can be extrapolated from the brute fact that humans have eyesight, or possess the capacity to see things.\(^447\) Vasubandhu

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\(^447\) Vasubandhu develops this inference in a number of places, but most prominently in his “Refutation of Personhood” (Skt.: *Pudgalaviniścaya*; Po wo pin 破我品), appended to his AKBh as a “ninth” varga or chapter to his Treasury.
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acknowledges that while the *indriya* of vision may be invisible, the effects of the *indriya* of vision are not invisible. In his translation of the definition of inference presented by Vasubandhu, Xuanzang interpolates additional and helpful explanations from the otherwise terse Sanskrit text. Xuanzang writes:

Some say that the five ordinary sense faculties are obtained through inference. They set up an inference as follows: “although there exist a multitude of conditions, the fruit would not exist if there were not the specific condition. The fruit comes to be where the conditions are not found wanting— for example, the sprout (i.e., the fruit) is born from the seed.

或比量得如五色根。言五色根比量得者。如世現見。雖有眾緣，由闕別緣，果便非有，不闕便有；如種生芽。

So, when seen in this way, even when there is the vivid object displayed to the mind when there is the condition of the attention (manaskāra), that vivid object does not arise in the blind and deaf, but arises in those who are neither blind nor deaf. As such, it definitely arises as a specific condition in cognition, depending upon whether the condition is absent or present.

From this fact it is verified that the true soul (ātman) does not exist as a separate entity. The soul, independent of the five aggregates, does not exist at all, judging by either of the two measures of valid knowledge – perception and inference.

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449 Translation of this passage based upon Xuanzang’s Chinese. The corresponding Skt. text reads (Pradhan, Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya, 461: *Anumāṇaṃ ca tadyathā paścānām indriyāṇāṃ / tatra etad anumāṇam – sati kārane kāraṇāntarasābhāve kāryasyābhāve drṣṭo bhāvo ca punarbhavas tadyathā aṅkulasya/.

450 Reference has been made to Stcherbatsky’s English translation — see his “Soul Theory of the Buddhists” 11-12 and de la vallée pouissin’s French translation translation of this passage (L’Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu, vol. 5, 231-2), but major modifications have been made.
In his validation of the use of inference as proof of the existence of the five sense indriyas, Vasubandhu relies upon the idea that the effects of the sensory faculties are tangible and palpable. To Vasubandhu, the noticeable effect of the indriya of vision, for example, is in the fact that we see things. At the same time, Vasubandhu notes that we do not perceive the actual visual faculty when we look out a window and see a person. Instead, when we look out a window and see a person, we infer the presence of the visual faculty.

In his argument on the inference of the five sense faculties, Vasubandhu concludes that while the five sensory faculties are the subjects of valid inference, the ātman is not a subject of valid inference. Vasubandhu thus differentiates the rationale for the inference of the sensory faculties from the inference of the ātman. He emphasizes that while the physical activities of the body provide direct and valid evidence for the existence of the sensory indriyas, the activities of the sensory faculties cannot be used to infer the presence of an ātman.

Xuanzang heartily endorses Vasubandhu’s argument supporting perception and inference as evidence for the existence of the sensory indriyas. In his CWSL, Xuanzang appeals to the straightforward observation that while we can see the eyeball of another person, we cannot see our own eyeball when we look out a window at the other person. When we look out a window and

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451 Song, Yuan, and Ming editions all delete second character 起.
452 Skt. text from Pradhan, ed., Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya, 461: Saty eva cābhāsaprāpte viśaye manaskāre ca kāraṇe viśayavigrahaṃ sāyāhāvo dṛṣṭaḥ pūnāca bhāvo ‘ndhabadirādīnānmanandhabadhirādīnāṃ ca/
453 Skt., ibid., 461: Atras tatra api karāṇāntarasāyāhāvo bhāvaś ca niścīyate/ yacca tatkāraṇāntaraṃ tadindriyamityetadaunmānaḥ| na caiva mātmano’sūti nāsyātmā/
454 The key passage in CWSL 2 runs: “there is a doctrine which holds that one is merely capable of presenting the basis [in the organ], because of the fact that the faculty of another is not something experienced by oneself. As
see another person, we see the material organs of the other person; we see their eyes. We do not, however, detect the “subtle” sense faculties of the person, as the visual *indriyas* are not visible. By extension, we do not hear the faculty of audition of another person because the *indriya* of audition is inaudible. Similarly, others’ faculties of smell, taste and touch are undetectable by the sensory *indriyas*. In the CWSL, Xuanzang makes the further claim that if we could perceive the sensory faculties of another person, we would be able to detect them even after the death of the person.

The idea that the existence of the sensory faculties can be inferred from the observable physical effects of sensory perception clearly applies in the case of the physical *indriyas*. The inferential linkages between looking out a window and seeing a person and the actions of the visual *indriyas* are quite clear to the Brāhmaṇical and Buddhist philosophers. The rationale for retaining the distinction between the *indriya* and the organ, however, is as follows: While a sense organ is directly observable, the presence of the sensory *indriya* is inferred by a “constant conjunction” (Skt.: *saṃbandha*) with a specific sensory-organ. The eyeball and the ear, for example, are directly involved in the activities of seeing and hearing, as well as with other activities requiring sensory perception, such as walking and talking. Building upon the theories set forth by previous Abhidharma authorities, Xuanzang develops the view that the *indriyas* include but are not limited to the physical organs. In this respect, Xuanzang follows the Abhidharma doctrine that holds that a physical faculty, for example the faculty of vision, is, in a qualified and restricted sense,
detectable to the human eye. The connection between the organ of the eye and the visual indriya can be confirmed, yet the indriya of vision is not solely composed of an eyeball.

In his analysis of the epistemological instrument of inference, Xuanzang must address the special case of the non-physical faculties. How is the presence of the faculty of kāyendriyam, or vitality, a faculty that does not provide direct and observable sensory data and is not in constant conjunction with an organ, to be inferred? According to the glosses found in the Mahāvibhāṣa, the faculty of proprioception – kāyendriyam – is fundamentally insensible. The faculty of kāyendriyam is not associated with a physical sensory activity; it is not conjoined with a specific organ; and it cannot be directly linked to an observable behavior in the same way that the visual indriya can be associated with looking out a window and seeing a person. Xuanzang and his disciples, however, aver that the beating of the heart is an invariable sign of the presence of vitality in the body. Kāyendriyam is defined as the indriya responsible for maintaining rudimentary and vital life processes such as cardio-pulmonary functioning. Xuanzang therefore extends the principle of inference to confirm the existence of the non-physical faculties. While the non-physical faculties, such as kāyendriyam, may not have a specific locus in the body associated with its functioning, signs in the body, such as a pulse, are deemed sufficient to confirm their existence. Xuanzang therefore extends the epistemological instrument of inference to the non-physical indriyas as well. That kāyendriyam exists can be validated by the brute fact that humans breathe. To Xuanzang, the existence of kāyendriyam is inferred from an observation of the beating of the human heart.

The theory regarding the invisibility of the indriyas is thus enshrined within the Buddhist and Brāhmaṇical canons. While the reasoning and the overarching explanatory accounts for death differ broadly, the Buddhist and Brāhmaṇical scriptures converge in the confirmation of the indriyas as essential to survival. Hence, both doctrines regard the destruction of the indriyas as
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fatal to sentient life. Xuanzang develops constructive explanations of the nature of dying as the deprivation of the *indriyas* in his extensive corpus of Abhidharma translations. Dying, according to Xuanzang, involves the body’s deprivation of at least three *indriyas*. Here Xuanzang supports the explanation offered by Vasubandhu in his auto-commentary that a fatal blow to the operation of the three *indriyas* is equivalent to a fatal blow to a living sentient being. While the number of the *indriyas* involved in the loss of life may exceed three, it is granted that the sensory *indriyas*, along with the organs of the body, perish when organism dies. In his analysis of the role of the *indriyas* in the sustenance of life and in the loss of functioning that occurs in dying, Xuanzang comes to understand that the presence of an entity, over and above the *indriyas*, in the form of a *puruṣa*, an *atman* or a *pudgala* is not required to explain what sustains the body in life or what is lost in dying.

**On the Collective Action of the Indriyas**

According to the Abhidharma teachings, the *indriyas* work in collaboration with other *indriyas* to enable the physical activities of the body required to sustain sentient life. The Abhidharma doctrines also hold that the *indriyas* are analytically distinct from the corporeal body. The *indriyas* are conceptualized as independent from, and not reducible to, the organs of the body. Unlike in the Sāṅkhya schema, where the *puruṣa* plays the role of the director of the physical actions of the body, or in the Vaiṣeṣika paradigm, where the *ātman* executes the functions required for living, in the Abhidharma doctrine, it is the collective action of the faculties that sustains life. While in the Brāhmaṇical theories, a perduring entity directs or executes the activities of the body, in the Abhidharma doctrine nothing above or beyond the *indriyas* directs or conducts the tasks of living. The *indriyas* do not require an overseer or taskmaster. The Mahāvibhāṣa editors note that the Brāhmaṇical doctrines posit an enduring entity, such as an *puruṣa* or an *ātman*, who sits on the
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throne of the body: “whatever the servant does, gets credited to the king.” 如臣所作，得王作名. In the equalitarian theory of the Abhidharma Buddhists, however, no single entity, not even another indriya, plays the role of a king. The indriyas work in collective action to conduct the activities required for life.

The Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma doctrine makes it very clear that no indriya works alone. In the Abhidharma schema, no indriya is the sole actor responsible for accomplishing an activity in the body, regardless of the specificity of the task. This means that no single faculty is solely held accountable if and when something in the body goes wrong. To explicate the shared responsibility of the functioning of the indriyas, Xuanzang adduces the metaphor of a jailbreak in his translation of the Mahāvibhāṣā. In this metaphor, a prisoner is presided over by a warden 獄正 and guarded by a turnkey 守門獄卒. The prisoner represents the body, and the warden and the guard represent the indriyas. The warden and the turnkey share equal responsibility for overseeing the prisoner. If the prisoner escapes, neither the warden nor the turnkey bears sole responsibility for the jailbreak. One of them failed to discharge his duty, but neither can be held solely liable for the mishap because they work together to house and guard the prisoner. In his translation of texts of the Mahāvibhāṣā, Xuanzang states than no faculty can be singled out for failing to execute the task to which it is assigned. Using the metaphor of the jailbreak, Xuanzang illustrates how the ordinary actions of living, such as walking and talking, require the efforts of more than one indriya. Therefore, the responsibility for failing to take a step, or for failing to utter a word, is shared by

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455 T27n1545p0334a03.
456 This metaphor shows up in the original context of excluding saṃjñā or perception from the list of twenty-two faculties, because of the fact that “it does not attain the status of the dominant thing in sensation (vedanā).” With regard to sensations of pain, pleasure, etc., the factor of saṃjñā does not evince a dominant role. If the domain of pleasure is the prison, then saṃjñā is unqualified to serve as warden. It could serve as a turnkey subordinate to another dominant factor. However, for the reason that bearing indespensible dominant power is the very definition of ind yam, perception is excluded from the list. [T27, no. 1545, p0736, c01].
more than one faculty. Because the Abhidharma doctrine holds that the *indriyas* work in collective action, when an action is not executed, no single faculty is blamed for a malfunction in the body.

The theory of the collective action of the *indriyas* eliminates the role of the supernatural entity as the director and executor of the functions required for living. The Buddhist Abhidharma literature transmitted by Xuanzang upholds the view that faculties alone constitute the necessary and sufficient factors required to sustain life. No self or other entity is required, as only the *indriyas* are needed to sustain the vital sources of life throughout the body. Xuanzang provides the theoretical rationale for eliminating the role of the *puruṣa*, the *atman* or the *pudgala* in the theater of the body. As he develops his defense of the Buddhist doctrine of the faculties and the theory of the collective action of the *indriyas*, Xuanzang fortifies his definition of dying as the destruction of more than one faculty.

**On the Distinction Between the *Indriyas* and the Body in Dying**

In his exegesis of dying and death, Xuanzang must address the issue of what, quite literally, differentiates being dead from being alive. The Brāhmaṇical Vaiśeṣika and Sāṅkhya scholars, like the Buddhist Abhidharma theorists, agree that the possessing a body is not equivalent to having a sentient life. By enlisting the philosophical law of contra-positives, the Brāhmaṇical and the Buddhist theorists explain that because having a body is not equivalent to being alive, the loss of a body is not equivalent to being dead. The Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya and the Buddhist theories converge in holding the assumption that the condition of the body alone is not sufficient to make the distinction between a living being and a dying being. Xuanzang contends that it is the condition of the *indriyas* that determines the difference between living and dying.

Xuanzang concurs with his Brāhmaṇical and Buddhist forbears that dying is not simply the
loss of the corporeal body. For Xuanzang, dying entails the loss of the sensory *indriyas* that work in collective action within the body to support and sustain sentient life. Because the sensory *indriyas* are analytically separate from the body, the condition of the *indriyas* and the condition of the body are both implicated in the process of dying. To support his doctrine that the *indriyas* determine the difference between living and dying, Xuanzang must make a clear conceptual distinction between the enlivening activities of the *indriyas* and the grounding provided by the material viscera, the blood and guts, of the corporeal body.

To substantiate his claim that dying results from the loss of *indriyas* rather than from the deterioration of the material body, Xuanzang must differentiate the activities of the *indriyas* from the functions of the bodily organs. To do so, he contests two concepts about the relationship between the *indriyas* and the body that are put forth by his rival theorists: that the *indriyas* are more similar to the organs than different from them, and that the *indriyas* depend upon a corporeal body to support them and are therefore not wholly separate from the body. To fend off these challenges, Xuanzang must first make the case that the faculties are separate and distinct from the organs in the body. He then must prove that the āśraya, the loci of the *indriyas* in the body, provide secure bases for the *indriyas* but are not vital to their functioning. Xuanzang concludes that the sensory *indriyas*, along with the corporeal body in its entirety, are implicated in dying. In his examination of the differences between the material body and the *indriyas*, Xuanzang turns to the ancient Brāhmaṇical sūtras and to the *Mahāvibhāṣā* texts.

The distinction between the *indriyas* and the body centers on the thorny and much-disputed issue of the relationship between the *indriyas* and their physical location within the body. The positions held by the Brāhmaṇical Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika theorists and Buddhist Personalists are that the *indriyas* are borne by the puruṣa, the ātman or the pudgala, respectively.
The questions of where the *indriyas* are located and borne are addressed by Xuanzang in his translation of the denouement to the final fascicle of the *Mahāvibhāṣā* (200). Here Xuanzang adduces a sūtra that articulates the variety and the range of the rival non-Buddhist views on the question of the bearer of the *indriyas*. The sūtra is in the form of a tetralemma:

There are followers of outside paths (tīrthikas) who postulate that the (1) bearer of life is identical to the body, (2) [while others postulate] that it is different from the body. (3) [Others postulate] that the bearer of life not simply the body, or that (4) it is no different from the body. 如契經說：有外道執命者即身，命者異身，命者非即身，命者非異身.

Ultimately, the “the house of critical editors” (Chi.: *pingjia* 評家) of the *Mahāvibhāṣā* rules out each corner of the tetralemma. The editors conclude that life is neither identical to nor entirely independent from the state of having a body.

**On Sattva, the Indriyas and the Body**

Xuanzang must address the question of what carries the essence of life, if it is not a *puruṣa*, an ātman, or a *pudgala*. In his effort to eliminate supernatural entities from Buddhism, Xuanzang argues that the essential and vital qualities of life are carried within the *indriyas* of the body. Xuanzang endorses the Abhidharma Buddhist doctrine wherein the faculties bear the essence of life and the survival of the body requires the presence of multiple faculties working in collective action. Within the Abhidharma schema, the *indriyas* are entrusted with carrying *sattva*, the essence of life, unlike in the Brāhmaṇical doctrines, in which *sattva* is carried by a substantial entity or soul.

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457 *Mahāvibhāṣa*, fascicle 200, T1545:27.1002.c29-a1.

458 The crux of the dilemma is also found in AKBh 9, within the initial part of Vasubandhu’s discussion on the *pudgala*. 
The Abhidharma Buddhist doctrines teach that to be alive means to evince *sattva*. The Buddhist interpretation of the Sanskrit word *sattva* resembles the constructions of the term held by the Sāṅkhya and the Vaiśeṣika Brāhmaṇical schools and by the tradition of Jainism. The Indic scriptures describe *sattva* as the vital quality that distinguishes sentient forms of life from insensate objects. Within the Brāhmaṇical and the Jain traditions, the relationship between *sattva* and sentience is linear. To have *sattva* means to have sentience, or to have life. Additionally, there is a one-to-one correspondence between having *sattva* and possessing a soul. Therefore, to have *sattva* is to have sentience, life and a soul.

The Buddhist Abhidharma doctrine endorsed by Xuanzang does not equate the presence of *sattva* with the presence of sentience or life (Skt.: jīva)\(^{459}\) in the same way that it is conceptualized by the Buddhists or the Jains. In the Abhidharma schema, *sattva* is equated with the vitality of life but is not equated to life itself. Instead, the life-giving force of *sattva* is carried within the *indriyas* that work in collaboration with other *indriyas* within the body to sustain sentience. In the Abhidharma doctrine upheld by Xuanzang, the life-sustaining quality of *sattva* is carried by multiple *indriyas* and not by the soul.

Xuanzang upholds the Buddhist doctrine, attested in the ancient Āgamas, that entrusts the faculty of *jīvitēndriyam* with the responsibility of bearing the qualities of vitality necessary to sustain life. While the faculty of *jīvitēndriyam* bears *sattva*, it does not sustain life on its own. In the Abhidharma doctrine, no single faculty bears the burden of sustaining life, not even the faculty of vitality. At least two other faculties are present with *jīvitēndriyam* to sustain the physical and cognitive activities that are required to sustain sentient life.

Xuanzang concurs with the Sarvāstivādin authors of the *Mahāvibhāṣā* regarding the

\(^{459}\) *Jīva* is the term used to indicate the soul in the *Tattvārtha sūtras*, the earliest scriptures of Jainism.
definition of *sattva* and the description of how it is borne in the body by the *indriyas*. Additionally, Xuanzang endorses the Abhidharma doctrine that the faculties, including the non-physical *indriya* of *jīvitêndriyam*, are separate and distinct from the body. Unlike a sensory *indriya* with an associated sense organ, *jīvitêndriyam* does not have a direct association with an organ in the body. Because it is an *indriya*, however, *jīvitêndriyam* has a locus in the body and yet operates independently from the body. While the vitality of life belongs to the *indriyas* and is independent from the organs of the body, it is located and protected by the *āsraya* in the material body.

The *Mahāvibhāṣa* editors conclude that life cannot be defined by the possession of a body. The doctrinal implications of this stance are significant. In making a clear distinction between sentience and the materiality of the body, the *Mahāvibhāṣa* Buddhists direct the religious practitioner toward adopting a detached attitude to the body. The Buddhists acknowledge that the subjective experiences of both pleasure and pain come with the possession of the body and the sensory faculties. The *Mahāvibhāṣa* discussions illuminate how the possession of a physical body presents obstacles to enlightenment. This doctrine is rooted in a deeply ingrained understanding of how the perception of belonging to a body in the present is linked to the perception of belonging to a body in the past. The CWSL is unequivocal in asserting that clinging to a body is an affliction of the mind. It is an unwholesome grasping of something that is changing and impermanent in nature.

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VsG of YoBhu hyperbolically says that “among the sixty-two views leading to rebirth in a bad transmigratory destiny, *satkayadrsti* is the root and source of all of these views held by followers of wayward paths.” 又諸外道薩迦耶見以為根本。有六十二諸惡見趣.

461 *Digital Dictionary of Buddhism* (accessed January 23, 2018): “Also one of the five views which in turn comprise one component of the six afflictions (Tib.: *jig lta, jig tshogs la lta ba*).” CWSL, T1585.31.22a4.
On the Indriyas as Composed of More Than One Dravya

In their examinations of the visual faculty, the Buddhist and the Brāhmaṇical scholars conclude that the eyeball exhibits qualities associated with all five of the massive physical elements of the world, or dravyas. The eyeball contains material aspects that are warm like fire, solid like the earth, fluid like water and gaseous like the wind. It also contains empty space, and therefore the element of ether (Skt. ākāśa). The Brāhmaṇical and the Buddhist scholars concur that the indriyas are composed of the dravyas. The only point of contention regards the inclusion of the fifth element of ākāśa, or ether. While the Buddhists dispute the presence of ākāśa, in every other way the two traditions are in lock step in declaring that the indriyas are composed of dravyas.

In his analysis of the distinction between the indriyas and the material body, Xuanzang closely examines the Brāhmaṇical theories that posit the soul as a substance, or a dravya, to which the mental and physical indriyas adhere. Xuanzang articulates a scathing denunciation of the doctrine of the soul as a material substance in his public disputes with the Plain-Spoken Brahmin. In the text of this debate, Xuanzang indicts the Vaiśeṣika doctrine for postulating the existence of a substantial soul that is said to exist over and above the sum of its parts. He concludes that the conceptualization of an ātman that is composed of the very qualities that it said to direct and execute is invalid. Xuanzang argues that if the soul is composed of the substances of the body and the mind, it cannot simultaneously rule as an omnipotent power over the substances of the body and the mind. Xuanzang therefore illuminates the internal inconsistencies in the Vaiśeṣika description of the soul as a material substance to which the indriyas adhere.

In addition, Xuanzang disputes the Vaiśeṣika posit that the indriyas carried by the soul are unitary, permanent and enduring. In the Vaiśeṣika taxonomy, the first padārtha, the category of the dravyas, includes the nine types of substances that form the building blocks of life. In the
Vaiśeṣika tradition, the first five *dravyas*-the real substances of earth, wind, water, fire and ether-form the five *indriyas* of vision, hearing, taste, smell, and touch. While each of the five *indriyas* is composed of admixtures of the five elements, each *indriya* is composed of a primary *dravya*. For example, fire is the predominant *dravya* in the *indriya* of vision, and the faculty of hearing is largely composed of ether. In the Vaiśeṣika doctrine, a composite substance is also viewed as a single substance. While a mango is composed of multiple *dravyas*, the entirety of the mango is viewed as a single *dravya*, or a single substance. Therefore, the Vaiśeṣika view a composite *indriya* as one *dravya*. The interpretation forms the basis of the Vaiśeṣika doctrine that the ātman, while composed of multiple substances, forms a single entity.

Xuanzang and the Abhidharma commentators Sthiramari and Yaśomitra concur with the Brāhmaṇical theorists in conceptualizing the *dravyas* as the fundamental material elements of the world. They also agree that the *indriyas* are composed of multiple *dravyas*. Where the Abhidharma and the Brāhmaṇical theorists diverge, however, is in the idea that a composite of *dravyas* is equivalent to one *dravya*. To illuminate this point in the CWSL, Xuanzang invokes the analogy of one soldier in an army. The Vaiśeṣika view the soldier as a *dravya* and the army as a *dravya*. To Xuanzang, the soldier would be equated to a *dravya*, but the entirety of the army composed of multiple soldiers would not. The Buddhists firmly contend that one *indriya* cannot be equated to one *dravya*. Instead, the Buddhists posit that each *indriya* is composed of nine *dravyas* and that no composite *indriyais* a single material substance.

The Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma scholars, like Vasubandhu in his *Treasury* and in his later Yogācāra discussions, delve into the definition of the *dravyas* and into the relationship of the *dravyas* to the *indriyas*. In his translations of the work of the Brāhmaṇical and the Buddhist theorists, Xuanzang is sensitive to the subtlety inherent in the differences between the Vaiśeṣika
and Abhidharma interpretations of *dravyas*. In his translation, he attempts to draw clear distinctions between the Vaiśeṣika interpretation of the *dravyas* as composite materials that are construed as singular substances from the Buddhist conception of the *dravyas* as composed of multiple materials that are not singular substances. Xuanzang attempts to avoid confusion by using different Chinese characters to translate the Vaiśeṣika and the Buddhist doctrines of the *dravyas*.

For the Vaiśeṣika context, Xuanzang uses the Chinese character *shi* 實, or “real things,” to translate *dravya*. Where the word appears in the Buddhist Abhidharma context, Xuanzang uses the Chinese character *shi* 事, or “constituent things.”

Within his translations of the Buddhist works, Xuanzang consistently translates *dravaya* as “constituent things” to capture the Buddhist sense of the *dravyas* as composed of multiple entities. In this translation choice, Xuanzang realigns the theories of the *indriyas* away from the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of the *indriyas* as enduring material entities and toward the Buddhist theories of multiplicity, momentariness and impermanence. In his choice of words, Xuanzang defends against the importation of enduring substances such the ātman into Chinese Buddhism.

**On the Nine Dravyas**

In the auto-commentary on the twenty-second stanza of the second chapter of his *Treasury of Abhidharma*, Vasubandhu characterizes the *indriyas* as composed of admixtures of nine *dravyas*. The *dravyas* that compose the *indriyas*, as enumerated by Vasubandhu, are the atoms (Skt.: *paranamu*) of the four elements of earth, water, wind, and fire; the molecules (Skt.: *anus*) of the

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462 In contrast to the treatises of Abhidharma Buddhism, Sāṅkhya taxonomy includes space/ether within their periodic table of the physical elements. This idea is also found in the earlier treatise of Harivarman, translated by Kumārajīva during the fifth-century C.E., the Tattvasiddhi śāstra (Chi.: Cheng shi lun 成實論). Fascicle two of the Tattvasiddhi brackets the issue of the status of the fifth element within the context of Buddhho-Brāhmaṇical contestations: “Granted that the non-Buddhists speak about five great elements, by eliding one of them (i.e., space/ether) we therefore speak of four.” 以外道人說有五大。為捨此故說四大 (T1646:32.261.a21-2).
four elements of colors, smells, tastes, and tactile sensations; and the dravya of proprioception, or kāyendriyam. In this taxonomy, the ninth element of kāyendriyam is responsible for endowing the inert material elements of the indriyas with the capability of movement.

As described by Vasubandhu, the dravya of kāyendriyam has the capacity to create sound or vibration (Skt.: śabda). With the vibrations created by the śabda, the inert atoms and molecules that comprise each indriya begin to move. Within the body, śabda lends motility by creating reverberations or sounds around the joints and the organs. The vibrations or sounds of śabda initiate the involuntary movements of the heart and the voluntary motion of the limbs. Sabda is conducted through the body by the “element of wind” (Skt. vāyur; Chi.: feng 風). Because śabda is carried by the dravya of kāyendriyam, it is thought to stimulate the life-giving activity of the breath (Skt.: prāṇa; Chi.: ) of life.

The interaction between sound and wind in animating the body beguiles both the Brāhmaṇical and the Buddhist theorists. The commentaries penned by the first- and second-generation disciples of Xuanzang preserve a voluminous record of exegetical disputes regarding the relationship between the sound carried by air and the motility of the body.463 Essentially, the Sāṅkhya, the Vaiśeṣika and the Buddhists Vaiśeṣika agree on two points: that sound is carried by air or by wind, and that sound and wind are responsible for sustaining the vital activities of life by initiating and sustaining movement. Without sound and wind there would be no breath, heartbeat or capacity to stand upright and move. Puguang clearly states that the ninefold constituency of faculties that constitute a living human body requires the wind element to operate the joints and to

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463 Both parties to the Buddhist Sāṃkhya debate agree that sound must be carried along by air – lit., “wind (Skt.: vāyur; Chi.: feng 風),” Hence, it is generally accepted that space is basic medium of audition for both Buddhism and Sāṃkhya. However, unlike Sāṃkhya, the Vaiśeṣika doctrine maintains that space/ether (ākāśa) [variously translated] forms the basic medium of sound. Without space, the faculty of audition is occluded and cannot pick up any audible sounds. For example, sounds are muffled underwater because of the preponderence of the water atoms which distorts the transmission of sound in some places and disrupts it altogether in others.
replenish and restore the organs.

In his *Treasury of Abhidharma*, Vasubandhu appeals to the power of the wind element in *kāyêndriyam* to argue that the addition of the ninth *dravya* makes the difference between insensate matter and sensate life. To Vasubandhu, a “dead clod of earth has eight *dravyas,*” and a piece of living flesh has nine. In the words of Shentai (fl. third quarter of the seventh century CE), one of the collaborators with Xuanzang on both Abhidharma and Yogācāra translation projects, “eight *dravyas* are coexistent in the mountains and rivers.” Shentai rightly points out the significance of the differential between nine and eight *dravyas*, based upon Vasubandhu’s *Treasury of Abhidharma*, as the difference between inert matter and living, breathing flesh. Vasubandhu claims that the added ingredient of *kāyêndriyam* makes a big difference – literally, the difference between a living human and a cadaver. The addition of the ninth *dravya* is of doctrinal significance as the Buddhists posit that the *kāyêndriyam* endows the inert elements of the material world with *sattva*, or sentience.

**On the Element of the Wind**

The doctrines of the Sāṅkhya, the Vaiśeṣika and the Abhidharma Buddhists share the idea that the element of wind plays a vital role in sustaining life. Whether it is termed *prāṇa*, the “vital breath,” or the “great wind element” (Skt.: *vāyurdhātu*; Chi.: *fengjie* 風界), the Brāhmaṇical and the Buddhist theorists agree that wind is required for survival. The Buddhists, however, part ways with the Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika Brāhmaṇś, who posit the necessary presence of an invisible entity charged with directing the process of taking in and expelling wind through the oral and nasal orifices of the body. In contrast, Xuanzang contends that invisible entities are not required to

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464 Shentai, Xuanzang’s translation collaborator, writes: “within this karmic realm, without the sound, there is no faculty, even when there are the eight *dravyas* within the mountain, within the rivers, and so on....” 此在欲界無聲無根生山河地等八事 (X836:53.33.b07).
sustain the process of circulating life-giving wind throughout the body.

At first blush, the Sāṅkhya theory of *prāṇa* (Chi.: *ponafeng* 婆那風), or the vital breath, appears akin to the Buddhist concept of the “great wind element.” In both doctrines, *prāṇa* and *vāyur* are omnipresent throughout the body. The Brāhmaṇs and the Buddhists agree that *prāṇa* and *vāyur* initiate and sustain the vital movements of the organs, such as the beating of the heart and the peristalsis of the intestines; they concur that *prāṇa* and *vāyur* activate the limbs and joints to promote locomotion; and they agree that *prāṇa* and *vāyur* sustain all of the body’s functions through the essential and life-giving activity of breathing. Gauḍapada and Paramārtha adduce the analogy: “*praṇa* is like a bird in a cage, lending motion to all.” Gauḍapada states: “it is called *prāṇa* because of breathing.”

The Sāṅkhya list five different types of wind that stimulate and replenish the body. These are *prāṇa*, *apāna*, *samāna*, *udāna* and *vyāna*. Although all of the five forms of wind are necessary to sustain life, the dissipation of *prāṇa* is seen to hasten the dissolution and eventual demise of the body. All eleven faculties in the taxonomy of the *indriyas* enumerated in the *Sāṅkhyakārikās*, the five sensory faculties, the five physical faculties and the mental faculty, require the continuous circulation of wind to sustain their activities within the body.

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465 See Gauḍapada’s commentary on *Sāṅkhyakārikās*, verse 29. For Skt. text see Dutt, ed., *Sāṅkhyakārikās*, Paramārtha’s vṛtti reads: “*Prāṇa* lends motion to all thirteen indriyas” 以波那風動故，十三根皆動 (T2137:54.1252.c13-14). English translation from Dutt, trans., *Sāṅkhyakārikās*, 43.

466 Gauḍapada, commentary on *Sāṅkhyakārikās* (Dutt, ed., *Sāṅkhyakārikās*, 31): Prāṇat prāṇa ity ucyate!

467 Paramārtha’s vṛtti on *Sāṅkhyakārikās*, verse 29 (T54.2137.1252.c15-22), offers the following explanation on the characteristics of the five types of wind: “When *apāna* is predominant, it induces weakness and feebleness in the human being. 阿波那風者，見可畏事即縮避之，是風若多，令人怯弱.

*Samāna* causes one to gain in self confidence and to believe that “I am powerful and that I am rich, etc.” 優陀那風者，我欲上山，我勝他不如.

*Vyāna* causes a human being to separate herself from others, without a place to rest. With the ever-so-gradual decrease of this find, part by part of the body seem dead, and when this wind has finally extinguished, the human being...
Additionally, the Sāṅkhya-kārikās posit the active ahaṅkāra, the chief executive operator of the ātman, as the agent charged with supplying the “impulse” (Skt.: prerāṇa) required to stimulate the circulation of the five winds. As the “possessor of the power of wind” (Skt.: vāyurbalina), the ahaṅkāra is endowed with the responsibility of circulating the wind throughout each region of the body.\textsuperscript{468} Therefore, within the Sāṅkhya doctrine, the ultimate force for impelling and circulating the life-giving force of the wind throughout the body is the ahaṅkāra, operating under the direction of the ātman.

The Buddhist Abhidharma literature, upon which Xuanzang bases his position, endorses the Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika view that wind is a vital factor in the body. Vasubandhu states: “without the element of wind, and sound carried by wind, there is merely the eight-fold insensate constituent.” In his auto-commentary on this statement, Vasubandhu states that airborne sound is a necessary condition for life because sound and wind initiate and sustain the voluntary and involuntary physical actions of the body. In fascicle ninety of his Mahāvibhāṣa, Xuanzang endorses Vasubandhu’s contention that movement does not occur in an airless vacuum. They agree

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\item[468] In its exegesis upon the second line of the 29\textsuperscript{th} stanza of Sāṅkhya-kārikās, the Yuкиtīpīka says that the mode of activity of the same causal efficacy (sāmānyakaranavṛttiḥ), mentioned in the stanza, that motivates all the five winds is ultimately supplied by the niṣkriya part of ahaṅkāra, and ultimately, by ātman. The Yuкиtīpīka ultimately derives an explanation about the power source driving the wind based on the tvagindriyaḥ, that is, the faculty of tactition, along with the five faculties of physical action (karmendriyaḥ), and the faculty of intelligence, that supply the components of the apparatus to drive the wind throughout the body in the five different forms of vital wind necessary. This power source in the ātman is individual; non-delimitable within the body, and it is non-pershable, nor ever wavering (avikampyam). This functioning of the faculty of intelligence is the role of the ātman, the rest of the components of the apparatus to move the wind throughout the body falls to the crude material body— that s the external body and not the subtle body. See Yuкиtīpīka, commentary on Sāṅkhya-kārikās, verse 29. For pertinent Skt. passage see edition of Shiv Kumar and D.N. Bhargava, Yuкиtīpīka, a commentary on Īśvarakṛṣṇa's Sāṅkhya-kārikā (2 vols., Delhi 1990-1992), 37.
\end{enumerate}
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that wind, or vāyur, is required to spark motion, and that without air circulating within the joints, the body remains inert. Puguang appeals to the ultimate verdict of the Mahāvibhāṣa in concluding that “without wind, there is no movement.” The Buddhists therefore concur that wind is involved in all manner of movement throughout the body and is therefore a necessary condition for life.

While the Buddhists concur with the Brāhmaṇical theorists about the life-giving qualities of wind, they diverge from the classical Sāṅkhya thinkers on two important points: the source of the winds and the role of the ātman in circulating wind throughout the body. First, within the Buddhist treatises familiar to Xuanzang, the winds are thought to originate outside the body. Because the winds come from the dusty material realm, they are regarded as potential pathogens (Salguero, 2016). When brought into the body from the outside, the winds can stimulate unwholesome or defiled states in the body and in the mind. The fifth-century Buddhist-layman Juqu Jingsheng 沮渠京聲, in The Essentials of the Secret Antidote to Meditation-Sickness 治禪病祕要, writes that the winds are the sources of mental disturbance. He contends that the suffusion

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469 Puguang, Notes on the Kośa: “We conform to the doctrine of the house of editors of the Mahāvibhāṣa, which holds that there exist four kinds of great elements never separate from sound (śabda). So, on the basis of the four kinds of great elements never being separate from sound, how does one get to say that in all cases, the four kinds of great elements are necessarily never independent from sound. If one is saying that the [different] kinds of great elements are pervaded by sound’s emission, then that reverts to what was already refuted by the house of editors of the Mahāvibhāṣa.”

470 Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya, fasc. 30, in Xuanzang’s translation (T1558:29.158.c10-13) reads that: “pleasure and desire give rise to intial moment of thought and subsequent mental application. The initial moment and thought give rise to effort (prayatna). Effort stimulates the wind. Wind stimulates bodily action.”

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of the body with the winds of āpana induces restlessness, even mania, in an afflicted individual.  

Second, instead of the ātman directing the ahaṅkāra behind the scenes to circulate wind throughout the body, Xuanzang proposes that the guidance of wind is provided by three indriyas working in collaboration. They are the indriyas of the mind, kāyendriyam, and aversion. Abiding by his first methodological tenet regarding the nature of faculties, Xuanzang maintains that no executive operator is necessary to conduct and guide wind throughout the body. The indriyas working together are sufficient in and of themselves to support the vital activities required to sustain life.

With the propositions that the winds originate outside of the body and are pathogenic rather than benign and that the winds are guided within the body by the indriyas, rather than by a soul, Xuanzang firmly differentiates the Buddhist doctrine of wind from the Brāhmaṇical doctrine codified in the Sāṅkhyakārikās. Again, Xuanzang defends the Buddhist position that, rather than an ahaṅkāra guiding the wind at the behest of an invisible or supernatural ātman, the indriyas working in collaborative action are responsible for circulating the vital quality of wind throughout the body. Additionally, with the example of the wind, the Abhidharma Buddhists highlight how the vital activities of the body are accomplished through the collective action of more than one indriya rather than by the singular activity of a substantial and enduring entity.

**On the Collective Efficacy of the Indriyas**

In his *Treasury of Abhidharma*, Vasubandhu discriminates between the Brāhmaṇical

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471 [0333b05] This Liu-Song Dynasty translation identifies āpana with the “root cause of the bad influences from outside, that motivate the heart-mind inside by reverberation of sound. This induces the four-hundred-and-forty veins to adapt to the heat-mind’s rapid pace and to act in a disorganized manner.” 「若有行者行阿練若修心十ニ, 於阿那般那因外惡聲觸內心根, 四百四脈持心急故一時動亂。」Chengguan 澄觀 enlivens this picture of āpana entering the body by writing that “The āpana winds motivate the heart-mind to sing, dance, or go through any number of myriad alterations.” 風動心故或歌或舞作種種變” (T1736:36.334.b15).
notion of the *dravyas* as singular substances and the Buddhist conception of the *dravyas* as composed of composite and multiple materials. In making this important distinction, Vasubandhu highlights the Buddhist proposition of the collective efficacy of the *indriyas*. Here he attempts to decouple the Brāhmaṇical notion of an ātman, a single entity composed of the material *dravyas* that works alone to operate the body, from the Buddhist concept of the *indriyas*, multiple entities made of composite materials that work collectively to operate the body. To illustrate the difference between a singular substance and the collective power of the *indriyas*, Vasubandhu adduces the metaphor of the ant hill. In the *Treasury of Abhidharma*, Vasubandhu states that an ant hill is not a simply a thing, or a substance. An ant hill is the product, or the aggregate, of the collective power of the colony of ants.

Throughout the auto-commentary to the *Treasury of Abhidharma*, Vasubandhu rebukes his Brāhmaṇical opponents for attempting to use the word *dravya* as a mass noun, rather than as a plural count noun. Vasubandhu insists on using the word *dravya* a plural count noun to reflect the multiplicity inherent in both the material composition and the collective power of the *indriyas*. Vasubandhu stipulates that the Buddhist use of the term *dravya* does not carry the substantivalist connotations of the *dravyas* conceptualized in the Vaiśeṣika taxonomy of the *padārthas*. The substance of Vasubandhu’s polemic is that anyone who seeks to equate the *indriyas* with a single substance, or a single action, is simply looking in the wrong doctrinal place. Vasubandhu upholds the Buddhist premise that the *dravyas*, while ontologically elemental, are ultimately collective in both nature and function. Therefore, the word *dravya*, in the Buddhist context, refers to the collective power of the *indriyas* rather than to the power of a single substantial entity. The *indriyas* are *dravyas* not because they are substantial things, but because they have collective power.
On the Material Aggregates of the *Indriyas* and the *Skandhas*

In his auto-commentary to the twenty-second stanza of the second chapter of his *Treasury of Abhidharma*, Vasubandhu describes the material constitution of the faculty. He makes it clear that an *indriya* is a “material aggregate” (Skt.: *rupasaṃghāta*; Chi.: *se-ju* 色聚).\(^{472}\) A material aggregate is a collection of various material particles and is “subtle in all respects” (Skt.: *sarvasūkṣmo hi rūpasamghāṭah*) \(^{473}\) In this schema, the word *rūpa*, or material, refers to simple matter, or the primitive ontological building blocks of life. The word *saṃghāta*, or aggregate, refers the collection of molecules that comprises the *indriyas*.

This principle of multiplicity in the constitution of the *indriyas* is addressed by Kuiji’s prolific disciple Huizhao 慧沼 (648–714). In his exegesis of the multiple material aggregates of life, Huizhao concludes that sentient life is composed of two-hundred fifty-two particles (Skt.: *paramāṇu*). In his rationale, Huizhao states that two-hundred fifty-two *paramanu* form one visible particle or (Skt.: *aṇu*). Huizhao offers the mathematical derivation of \(6 \times 6 \times 7\) to derive an *aṇu*, the smallest magnitude of matter that is visibly detectable.\(^{474}\) Each *aṇu* is a septad that consists of one molecule in the center, flanked by additional molecules on each of the six sides. Using Huizhao and other authoritative Abhidharma sources on the doctrine of the material aggregate, Xuanzang concludes that the corporeal body and the *indriyas* are aggregates of materials and not

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\(^{472}\) Xuanzang’s translation of AKBh 2.22 reads (T1558:29.18.h22-25): “the material aggregate is called an ‘aggregate’ in that it is subtle in all aspects. This is to show that nothing is more subtle than this. Where there is a material aggregate in the *kāmadhātu*, there may be no indriyas and no sound. The eightfold constituency (of earth, water, wind, and fire and their material derivatives or *upadāna-rūpas*) arise simultaneously and without any more, or any less constituents. Why is this constituency eightfold? This refers to the four kinds of massive elements (of earth, water, wind, and fire), along with their material derivatives (*upadāna-rūpas*) of color, smell, taste, and tangibility. There are no indriyas without wind, even where there are aggregates of atomic particles.”

\(^{473}\) Pradhan, ed., *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*, 52.

\(^{474}\) See Dhammajoti, Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, 260-272, *passim*, for more in-depth discussion on the composition of the septadic *aṇu*. 
Xuanzang concludes that aggregate materials obtain their power through collective action. To demonstrate the collective power of the aggregate materials, in his *Mahāvibhāṣa* Xuanzang cites the example of the power of a hand curled into a fist. In this example, the fist is composed of skin, bones, and ligaments. The individual elements of the fist, such as the large bone in the thumb, do not have the power to smash the clay pot. The collective power of the skin, bones, and ligaments that make up the fist, however, can break the pot. The power of the fist is simply defined as the constituent power of its parts. Xuanzang extends this metaphor to demonstrate the collective power of the *indriyas*. In his theory, no *indriya* evinces independent causal efficacy over and above the other *indriyas*; instead, the agentive power of the *indriyas* is obtained through collective action.

**On the Indriyas and the Skandhas**

In his auto-commentary on the twenty-second verse of the second chapter of his *Treasury of Abhidharma*, Vasubandhu avers that the *indriyas* are explicable in terms of the five aggregates or *skandhas* attested by the Buddha. The five *skandhas* include the physical aggregate of the corporeal body (Skt.: *rūpaskandha*) and the four non-physical, or psychological, aggregates of hedonic experience (Skt.: *vedanā*), perception (Skt.: *saṃjñā*), psychological impulses (Skt.: *saṃskāras*) and consciousness (Skt.: *vijnana*). In the *Treasury of Abhidharma*, Vasubandhu reconfigures the Abhidharma taxonomy by placing each of the twenty-two *indriyas* into one of the five categories of the Buddhist *skandhas*.

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475 This analogy is introduced in *Mahāvibhāṣa*, fascicle 93, and attributed to the Dārṣṭāntikas (T1545:27.796.b08-9): “They [i.e., the Dārṣṭāntikas 輸喻者] liken it [sentient life (*sattva*)] to the combination of five fingers provisionally designated as ‘a fist.’ Apart from these [fingers] there is no fist.” 如五指合名之為拳。離即非拳故非實有.

476 CWSL 4 (T1585:31.20.a03) avers: “the five faculties including vision, etc., are all classified under the internal loci – the physical aggregate (*rūpaskandha*)” 眼等五根皆是色蘊內處所攝.
In his taxonomy, Vasubandhu groups the five sensory *indriyas*, the two female and male reproductive *indriyas* and the *indriya* of vitality under the aggregate of the rūpaskandha of the corporeal body. He places the five hedonic *indriyas* under the second skandha of vedana; the five cultivatable *indriyas* under the skandha of saṃjñā; and the three *indriyas* of gnosis under the two skandhas of saṃskāras and vijñāna. By classifying the *indriyas* within the skandhas, Vasubandhu binds the Buddhist doctrine of the five aggregates to the Abhidharma theory of *indriyas*. Additionally, he succeeds in reducing the baroque enumeration of the twenty-two *indriyas* to a streamlined and parsimonious taxonomy of five categories.

In his exegesis of the theory of the *indriyas*, Xuanzang returns to the teachings in which the historical Śākyamuni Buddha describes the living, breathing human as composed of five aggregates, or a “bundle of five parts” (Skt.: pañcaskandha; Chi.: wuyun 五蘊). Xuanzang adheres to the reconfiguration of the taxonomy of the *indriyas* into the five skandhas constructed by Vasubandhu. He regards Vasubandhu’s taxonomy as doctrinally important in that it brings the original teachings of the Buddha into congruence with the theory of the *indriyas*, and offers a simplified and approachable explanation of the *indriyas* to Buddhist practitioners. Xuanzang is sensitive to the importance of the sūtras of the skandhas, as they are specific to Buddhism and not recognized within the Brāhmaṇical traditions of Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika.\(^\text{477}\) By endorsing the taxonomy of the skandhas constructed by Vasubandhu, Xuanzang reorients the theory of the *indriyas* toward the original teachings of the Buddha.

In his CWSL, Xuanzang revisits the intricate classification of the twenty-two *indriyas* into

\(^{477}\) See Kramer, ed., *Pañcaskandhaka vibhāṣa*, “Introduction,” xix: “Sāṅkhya only regard rūpaskandha as ātmīya (‘mine’), and all the other four skandhas as ātman. He [Sthiramati] thus claims that for the Sāṅkyas the self is not only identical to vijñāna but also consists of the factors accompanying the mind.”
the eighteen sensory spheres (Skt.: dhātus) configured by Vasubandhu in the *Treasury of Abhidharma*. Vasubandhu organizes the eight physical faculties: the five sensory faculties, the faculty of vitality, and the two bi-modally gendered faculties of reproduction into the sphere of the five senses. He places the remaining fourteen psychological faculties, including the *indriya* of the mind, in the sphere of mental activity. In his effort to simplify the ponderous classification of the faculties proffered by the Abhidharma theorists, Xuanzang makes two modifications to the taxonomy. First, he subsumes the male and female reproductive *indriyas* and the *indriya* of *jīvitendriyam* under the *indriya* of *kāyendriyam*. He then groups the psychological faculties: the five hedonic *indriyas*, the five cultivatable *indriyas* and the three *indriyas* of gnosis under the *indriya* of the mind, or *manendriyam*. Xuanzang thereby reduces Vasubandhu’s taxonomy of eight physical and fourteen psychological faculties to six core faculties (Skt.: śaṣṭāṇi rūpêndriyāṇi). The six *indriyas* in the taxonomy of Xuanzang thus include the five physical senses of sight, hearing, taste, smell, *kāyendriyam*, and the mental faculty of *manendriyam."

Xuanzang then proceeds to reconcile the Buddhist doctrine of five *skandhas* with the

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478 This determination is delivered by way of a denouement to chapter one of the *Treasury of Abhidharma* (T1821:41.55.c02-3) on the topic of the dhātus: “The aforementioned twenty-two faculties are factors that are, in part, categorized under (samgraha) the twelve internal sense spheres (dhātu) among the eighteen spheres, and in part, categorized under the sphere of dharmas (dharma, i.e., the sphere of the mental objects). This is because one part of the twenty-two *indriyas*, namely the latter three (faculties of gnosis), and the eleven faculties including *jīvitendriyam* are categorized under the dharmadhātu.” 如是所說二十二根。十八界中，內十二界，法一分攝。法一分者。命等十一，後三一分。法界攝故。內十二者。眼等五根，如自名攝。 The mental faculty in its full extension is exhaustively classified under the seven dhātus. The other three dhātus partially classify the mind (manas) and mental consciousness (manovijñāna). The bimodally-gendered faculties of female and male procreative faculties are categorized as one part of *kāyendriyam*. This will be explained in detail in the next chapter. For now, we conform to the doctrine that regards the rest of the physical sensory spheres including five sensory spheres as partially categorized under the five sensory realms. These are dhātus and not *indriyas.*”意根通是七心界攝。後三一分意意識攝。女根男根即是身界一分所攝。如後當辯。義准。所餘色等五界，法界一分，皆體非根。 This passage is repeated, verbatim, by Saṅghabhadra in both his *Nyāyanusāra śāstra* and his *Clarification of Tenets* (XZL). There survives a Tibetan translation of the latter that contains part of this passage at D 4091: vol. 141, folio/line 109b.7-8.

479 This gloss appears first in AKBh 3 七有色者。眼耳鼻舌身女男根。色蘊攝故(T1558:29.15a18); Saṅghabhadra simply repeats this gloss in Ny 9 at T29n1562p0380b17.
configuration of the six indriyas. To align his enumeration of the indriyas with the Buddhist teachings of the five skandhas, he makes two revisions. He clusters the five physical senses under the aggregate of the rupaskandha, and then distributes the functions of the indriya of manēndriyam across the four psychological aggregates of hedonic experience, perception, psychological impulses, and consciousness. In distributing the complex functions of the mental faculty within each of the four psychological aggregates, Xuanzang highlights a central tenet of Abhidharma Buddhism: that all sentient creatures have a mental faculty. Within this schema, all human and non-human animals bear the faculties of vitality, or jīvitēndriyam, and proprioception, or kāyēndriyam.

**On the Six Indriyas in the Ultimate Sense**

By consolidating the six indriyas into the five skandhas, Xuanzang preserves the original teachings of the Buddha and simplifies the Abhidharma schema. With this deft exegetical maneuver, Xuanzang arrives at the six core faculties, the “indriyas in the ultimate sense” (Chi.: sheng-yi gen 勝義根) that comprise the essential elements of life. Xuanzang defines the six “ultimately real” (Chi.: sheng-yi you 勝義有) faculties as omnipresent within the sentient being in that they are not limited to specific physical functions, organs, or locations within the body. He concludes that the taxonomy of the six ultimately real indriyas contains all of the elements necessary and sufficient to sustain sentient life.

In deriving the six real indriyas, Xuanzang succeeds in paring down the unwieldy taxonomy of twenty-two indriyas; anchoring the theory of the indriyas within the authentic teachings of the Buddha Śākyamuni; identifying the core (Chi.: genti 根體) or primary indriyas

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480 For example, the Mahāvibhāsa editors already detail the condensed set of “fourteen core faculties,” attributed to the Sarvāstivādin master Dharmatrāta. Dharmatrāta arrives at this figure of fourteen by subsuming the eight “provisional faculties” under the previous fourteen. The eight provisional faculties in this scheme are the five cultivatable faculties, and the three faculties of higher gnosis, which Dharmatrāta subsumes under the faculty of
from the list of twenty-two; and neutralizing the doctrinal tension inherent in the Sarvāstivāda
definition of the *indriyas* as indistinct from their loci in the body. By stipulating that the sensory
*indriyas* and the psychological *indriyas* are separate, Xuanzang lays the groundwork for his theory
that dying is the result of the loss of the *indriyas* rather than simply the deterioration of the material
organs of the body.

The derivation of the six ultimate faculties is a theoretical advancement that is unique and
original to Xuanzang. The desideratum to simplify the lengthy taxonomy of the twenty-two
faculties, however, has a long history within the Brāhmaṇical and Buddhist traditions. Xuanzang
stands on the shoulders of Vasubandhu, Saṅgabhadra and numerous other Sarvāstivāda thinkers in
creating this exegetical innovation. For example, attempts to pare down the unwieldy taxonomy
are evident in the early discussions by the Sarvāstivādin scholars of ancient Kaśmir and Gandhāra.
These opinions are recorded in Xuanzang Chinese translation of the *Mahāvibhāṣa*.

In his effort to simplify the complicated list of twenty-two *indriyas*, Xuanzang is sensitive
to the efforts made by the early Sarvāstivāda scholars to prioritize and categorize the primary
faculties that are essential to sentient life. For Xuanzang, the distinction between the primary
*indriyas* and the subordinate *indriyas* relies on distinguishing the “core faculties” from the
“nominal” items in the list of twenty-two *indriyas*.\(^\text{481}\) In determining what constitutes a “faculty in

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\(^{481}\) In *Nyāyanusāra śāstra*, fascicle 9 (T1562:29.380.b01), Saṅghabhadra makes the determination to arrive at a
baseline number of seventeen *indriyas* forming the “core group of faculties” for two reasons: (1) since the two
gendered faculties (7-8) can be reduced to *kāyendriyam* and (2) since the three uncontaminated faculties of *gnosis*
can be subsumed under the rubric of the “nine faculties” – namely, “mind, pleasure, joy, aversion and the five
hedonic faculties including faith (11-15)” 意樂喜捨信等五根. This passage is also attested in Saṅghabhadra’s
*Clarification of Tenets* (XZL), but only in Xuanzang’s Chinese version (T1563:29.796.c14-16), not in the Tibetan
translation.
Chapter 2: What Is Dying?

Xuanzang, in his *Mahāvibhāṣa*, lays out three diverging opinions given by the Sarvāstivāda scholars Ghoṣavarman (Chi.: Lūshafamo 唐沙筏摩), Saṅghavasu (Chi.: Sengqiefasu 僧伽筏蘇), and Ghoṣa (Chi.: Miaoyin 妙音).

Saṅghavarman proclaims that *manēndriyam* is the only true faculty. He accords this hallowed status to *manēndriyam* because the actions of *manēndriyam* are internal and pervasive in the body. Because *manēndriyam* is required for sensory perception (Skt.: ālambana) and for cognition, it is of ultimate importance in all aspects of sentient life. Saṅghavasu holds that there are six faculties in the ultimate sense of the word, the five ordinary senses and vitality (Skt.: jīvitēndriyam). He argues that these six *indriyas* form the root and source of sentience (Skt.: sattvamūlam) in the living being. Ghoṣa largely agrees with Saṅghavasu’s reasoning but includes the bimodally gendered faculties to make a list of eight ultimately real faculties. The implications of Saṅghavasu’s and Ghoṣa’s view is that the mind is not an independent faculty and the functions of sentience are performed by the five senses and vitality.

As discussed above, Xuanzang ultimate pares the list of the *indriyas* in the ultimate sense down to six items, the five senses together with the mental faculty. In pronouncing the six faculties as the “*indriyas* in the ultimate sense,” Xuanzang underscores the idea that the five sensory *indriyas* of sight, hearing, smell, taste, and kāyēndriyam, together with the *indriya* of the mind, provide the bases for all sentient life. Xuanzang follows the teaching of Vasubandhu in letter and

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482 Sarvāstivāda denotes these basic faculties as the “faculties in their ultimate sense” 勝義根. Buddhavarman renders this terminology as *shi yigen* 實義根 in his translation of *Vibhāṣa*.

483 *Mahāvibhāṣa*, fasc. 142 (T1545:27.732.a04-5): “Bhadānta Ghoṣavarman is of the opinion that only these six *indriyas* are internal, pervasive, and present to the percept (ālambana).” 尊者寠沙筏摩作如是說：唯意一種是勝義根，是內、是遍、有所緣故.

484 *Mahāvibhāṣa*, fascicle 142 (T1545:27.732.a26-27): “Bhadānta Saṅghavasu is of the opinion that only these six faculties are the faculties in the ultimate sense — namely, vision, audition, olfaction, gustation, tactition, and mind, since these are the root of sentient life” 尊者僧伽筏蘇作如是說：唯命等六是勝義根，所謂眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、命，有情本故.
in spirit by positing that the five ordinary senses, along with the mental faculty, constitute the “houses” (Skt.: āyatana; Chi.: chu 處) of sentient life. For Xuanzang, the metaphor of the “six houses” encapsulates his theory of the indriyas and his definition of sentient life. In his metaphor of the “six houses,” or “chu,” Xuanzang illustrates how the six faculties form the foundation, or the home base, for the nurturance and sustenance of the body. Xuanzang uses the word chu to describe how the six indriyas sustain and restore sentient life. He eschews the use of chu to refer to a literal place or a physical locus within which an indriya resides in the material body.

By availing himself of the metaphor of the “six houses,” however, Xuanzang risks muddying an important technical distinction between the Abhidharma and the Yogācāra Buddhist teachings. In the Abhidharma doctrine, the word indriya simultaneously refers to an indriya and to the locus of the indriya within the body. There is no distinction between an indriya and the locus of the indriya. Within the Yogācāra doctrine, however, the word indriya refers specifically to the pervasive, invisible, and omnipresent aspects of the indriya, and does not include the locus of the indriya within the material body. Therefore, within the Yogācāra schema, there is a distinct dichotomy between the ultimately pure indriya and its impure locus.

The Sarvāstivāda editors of the Mahāvibhāṣā vigorously endorse the position that there is no distinction between the indriyas and their loci in the body. They take great pains to debunk the heterodox position held by the Abhidharma Vibhājyavādins that the six core faculties are separate and distinct from their loci in the material body. Xuanzang, therefore, must reconcile the positions of the Sarvāstivāda and the Abhidharma Vibhājyavādin theorists. In his exegesis of the doctrine of the indriya and its locus, Xuanzang employs the metaphor of an animal and its burrow. Here he

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485 The Chinese character chu 處, means “locus.” As noted above, it is Xuanzang's Chinese translation for various Skt. terms, including “standing” (sthāna) and “house” (āyatana).
Chapter 2: What Is Dying?

illustrates a confusion in the Abhidharma doctrine that defines the *indriya* and the locus as indistinct. He notes that an animal and its burrow are not one and the same. The burrow is the home of the animal and is distinctly different from the animal itself. By extension, the “dusty houses” that “house” the *indriyas* are not the *indriyas* themselves, and therefore should not be misconstrued as such.

In enlisting the Yogācāra distinction between *indriyas* and their loci, Xuanzang invites controversy, as his position appears to uphold the unorthodox position held by the Abhidharma Vibhājyavādins, a view that is dismissed, tout court, by the Sarvāstivādin editors of the *Mahāvibhāṣa*. To support his position that there is an analytical distinction between the *indriya* and the locus, Xuanzang turns to Vasubandhu’s doctrine regarding pure matter (Skt.: *rūpaprasāda*) and impure matter (Skt.: *auarika*) found in the *Treasury of Abhidharma* and in *Treatise on the Five Aggregates* (Skt.: *Pañcaskāndhaka śāstram*).

**On Pure Matter and Impure Matter**

In the context of a discussion regarding the intangibility of the *indriyas*, found in the ninth chapter of his *Treasury of Abhidharma*, Vasubandhu addresses the subjects of pure matter (Skt.: *rūpaprasāda*) and impure matter (Skt.: *audārika-rūpa*; Chi.: *cuse 蠟色*) as they relate to the *indriyas* and to the organs of the body. Vasubandhu posits that both pure matter and impure matter are real. He discriminates, however, between pure matter that is “pellucid” and transparent, and impure matter that is crude and substantial. Pure matter is invisible and not perceptible to the senses, whereas impure matter can be seen and touched.

In making this distinction, Vasubandhu posits that the *indriyas* are invisible because they are composed of the pellucid and transparent material of pure matter, whereas the organs of the body are visible because they are composed of the crude and substantial material of impure matter.
Because the *indriyas* are composed of pure matter, they are “non-indicative”\(^\text{486}\) (Skt.: *avijñapti*; Chi.: *wubiao* 無表) in that they do not communicate to the senses and cannot be detected by an untrained eye.\(^\text{487}\) Without specific training, a sentient being does not have the ability to detect the “non-indicative” *indriyas* of another sentient being. For example, the ordinary, untrained sentient being cannot see the visual *indriya* of another sentient being.\(^\text{488}\) The organ of the eyeball, however, because it is composed of crude constituent matter, is visible to another sentient being. Detecting the organs of the body does not require anything other than the five ordinary senses. In making this distinction, Vasubandhu illustrates how pure matter can only be perceived by the mental faculty of a sentient being who is skilled in meditation.\(^\text{489}\)

Kuiji, in his comprehensive exegesis of Xuanzang’s *Treatise Investigating the Five Aggregates*, posits that the “pure faculties are known to exist via inference” 比量知有清淨色根. According to Kuiji, the fleshy abode of the pure *indriya* is palpable, but the pure *indriya* that issues forth from the fleshy abode does not communicate its presence in a palpable way.\(^\text{490}\) Kuiji thus avers that while the material organs are directly perceptible, the existence of the pure *indriyas* must be inferred. Xuanzang concurs with Kuiji’s interpretation of Vasubandhu’s conceptualization of the *indriyas* as composed of pure matter and develops the idea that because the *indriyas* are

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486 Sanderson (1994) translates *avijñapti* as “non-communicator.”

487 Sanderson (1994): “the *avijñapti* is perceptible only to the mind and not to the senses.”

488 Puguang writes in his *Study Notes on the Kośa*: “Avijñapti-rūpa is not a [simple] material aggregate of atomic practices.” 非極微聚，即無表色 (T1821:41.70.b12). Puguang says that the non-indicative material is not a collection of ordinary atomic particles. Rather it consists in a collection of pure material particles.


490 Kuiji records the view of the Mahāsāṅghikas in his *Study Notes to the Treatise on the Wheel of the Different Tenets* (異部宗輪論述記): “the five physical faculties all exist as balls of flesh; they are not differentiated in terms of pure matter. Hence, because they are not pure matter, they do not directly reach the object”五色根皆肉團為體；無別淨色，非淨色故，根不得境 (X844:53.580.13-14). What does reach the object for the Mahāsāṅghikas, if not the faculty? Kuiji replies: “Hence, it is consciousness that is capable (of reaching the object) and not the faculty” 故識能了非根有能 (X844:53.580.c17).
invisible, their existence must be inferred from the visible activities conducted by a sentient being.

In his exegesis of the composition of the *indriyas*, Xuanzang concludes that the six “ultimately real” *indriyas* are composed of pure matter. He concurs with Vasubandhu’s description of the *indriyas* as composed of pellucid material that is constitutionally different from the inert matter of the body and the organs. Within this schema, the *indriyas*, because they are constituted of pure matter, can transform and develop. Like the lotus blossoms emerging from the murky water and mud of a pond, the ultimately real *indriyas* flower into purity and enlightenment from the impure material of the corporeal body. In his conceptualization, Xuanzang posits that the six pure *indriyas* are not confined to an immutable and defiled state in the corporeal body. He thereby lays the groundwork for the doctrinal idea that the seeds for spiritual transformation lie within the pure *indriyas*.

Xuanzang uses the macabre case of the self-immolating monk who has completed the path of insight and meditation to demonstrate the difference between the spiritual aspects of the pure *indriyas* and the mortal body. When the ārhat self-immolates, death comes about when the *indriyas* are relinquished by the ārhat and final nirvāṇa is reached. Nirvāṇa entails the cessation of the *indriyas*. The ashes of the ārhat’s body then return to the dusty material world.

**On Why the Indriyas Are Not Organs**

The theory of the ultimately pure nature of the *indriyas* finds its full expression in the...
extensive Yogācāra texts translated by Xuanzang. The distinction between pure and impure matter undergirds the Yogācāra definitions of the *indriyas* and the organs of the body as separate and distinct. In his exegesis of the *indriyas* and the impact of karma in dying, Xuanzang comes to wholeheartedly endorse the Yogācāra distinction between the *indriyas* and the corporeal body.

The Abhidharma Buddhists and the Brāhmaṇical Śāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika theorists concur in the ancient definition of the sense faculty as including the sensory organ and “the faculty in its ultimate sense” 勝義根. For example, the Sanskrit word *cakṣur* and the Chinese equivalent, *yan*, both mean the sense organ of the eye. The Abhidharma scholars take the organ of the eye, the *cakṣur* or the *yan*, as metonymical for the faculty of vision. In the Sarvāstivādin schema, the organs that contribute to the operative action of the *indriyas* are, by definition, one and the same. Xuanzang does not rest comfortably with the direct equation of the *indriyas* to their corresponding organs. He therefore takes issue with the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma teachings that abjure the ontological distinction between the two.

In his exhaustive examination of the Brāhmaṇical and Buddhist definitions of *indriya*, Xuanzang concludes that there are two separate and distinct senses of the word. He is sensitive to, and respectfully acknowledges, the duality in the Sanskrit definition of *indriya*. The ancient sense of the word simultaneously encompasses the *indriya* and the corresponding organ of the *indriya*. Xuanzang notes the that two senses of the word *indriya* are embedded in the Chinese equivalent of the word, *gen*根 (Japanese: *kon*). In his methodological commitment, however, Xuanzang restricts the word *indriya* to the “faculty in its proper sense” (Chi: *zhengyi gen*正義根, exclusive of the corresponding physical organs.\(^{492}\) Kuiji concurs with Xuanzang that “the pellucid faculty

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\(^{492}\) Yokoyama Kōitsu 橫山綱一, *Yuishiki De Yomu Hannya Shingyō – Kū No Jissen 唯識でよむ般若心経--空の実踐 (*Reading the Heart Sūtra According To Consciousness-Only: Emptiness In Practice*) (Tokyo: Daihō Rinkaku 大法輪閣, 2009), 228-31, passim refers to the former as the “biological organ” and the latter term, which
does not experience the dust of the physical organ.”

Throughout his catechistic CWSL, Xuanzang holds that the word *indriya* refers only and precisely to the faculty. By defending the distinction between the ultimately real and “pure” *indriyas* and the “organs of ephemeral dust,” Xuanzang resuscitates the Vibhājyavādin stance and rejects the Sarvāstivāda elision of the two senses of the *indriya*.

Xuanzang concludes that the Yogācāra definition of the pure *indriya*, as separate from the organ, is more theoretically rigorous. In his exegesis of dying, he stubbornly adheres to the analytical distinction between “the faculty in its ultimate sense” (Chi.: *shengyi gen* 勝義根) and the defiled physical organ. He concludes that the inert material organs lack the causal efficacy to accomplish the physical actions required to sustain sentient life. Instead of the inert “blood and guts” of the human viscera, the faculties, constituted in pure or pellucid matter (Chi.: *jing-se gen* 淨色根), initiate and sustain the activities of sentient life.

The analytical distinction between the pure matter of the *indriyas* and the impure matter of the organs thus determines what bears life and what ultimately is lost in dying. This theoretical distinction between the faculties and the organs is the crucial ontological factor in Xuanzang’s

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493 In his *Study Notes on the CWSL* (T1830:43.289.c09-11), Kuiji orients his explanation on the pellucid physical faculty within his discussion on the third (3) type of objects confirmed to exist by logical reasoning (*yukti* 證成道理). This class of objects is separate from those forms of objects (1) immediately perceived (*pratyakṣa*) and those objects (2) “commonly experienced by ordinary folk” 世共 across the world.

494 In his Commentary on the *Śata śāstra*, the Sui-Dynasty exegete Jizang (T1827:42.245.c6-c10) presents two interpretations of what the “heart-mind” refers to according to the Sāṅkhya taxonomy. The first is that the “heart-mind” is located within the human heart, and is fundamentally a physical thing constituted in five kinds of material elements. The second is that the “heart-mind” is not limited to the “fleshy” heart, and thus includes a mental aspect not limited to just the physical elements. There are two explanations of the mental faculty of balance—the first takes it to be composed out of the fleshy heart, made up of the five massive elements. The other takes it to not be constituted out of the derivatives of the material elements. In examining Kāpila’s treatises, it appears that the mind stands for the capability to discriminate things in mental consciousness.” 五業根劣故具五大而成。心平等根有二釋。若是肉心具五大所成。心識之心非大所造。撫迦毘羅論。是心識之心以能分別故也.
argument that dying results from the deterioration of the faculties rather than from the destruction of the organs. Additionally, the distinction of the pure indriyas from the impure organs lays the conceptual foundation for the Yogācāra theory of the modifiability of the indriyas through karma. The Yogācāra theorists posit that because the indriyas are not bound by the material confines of organs of the body, they can be transformed through karma.

On the Indriyas and Conspecific Seeds

The Yogācāra theorists base the concepts of the power, capability and mutability of the indriyas on the theory of the seeds (Skt. bījas). In this theory, the indriyas are composed of seeds made of transparent or pellucid matter. In the CWSL, Xuanzang uses the word “seed” (Skt.: bija or ankula) to refer to the inherent potency (Skt.: śakti; Chi.: shiyong 势用) and capabilities (Skt.: samārthya 功能) of the indriyas. Xuanzang attributes the origin of the theory of the seeds and the indriyas to the “Sautrānikas” scholars. While the status of the Sautrānikas as a separate school or textual tradition is contested, it is generally agreed that the Sautrānikas provide the primary source material upon which the theory of seeds is based. Xuanzang heavily draws upon this “proto-Mahāyāna” source material in developing his Yogācāra theory of the indriyas and sentient life. Xuanzang uses the theory of seeds to illustrate how the specific powers and capacities of a sentient being either emerge or remain fallow through the action of karma. To Xuanzang, the theory of seeds provides an explanatory account of how the variegated and changing bundles of “specific qualities and capacities” (Skt.: samārthyaviśeṣa; Chi.: gongneng chabie 功能差別) that

495 The reason that this study opt for the translation of “physical faculty” instead of “organ” for the key term in discussion here – rūpēndriyam (Chi.: 有色根) – is that Sarvāstivāda taxonomies include their correlative – namely, the arūpendriyāṇi – lit., “immaterial faculties” (Skt.: *arūpendriyam; Chi.: wu-se gen 無色根).

496 Hirakawa’s (1973, part two, p. 93) Chi. to Skt. index of the AKBh gives a variety of Skt. terms for which the Chi. word gongneng serves as equivalent, including, but not limited to samārthya, śakti, kārita, and prayatna.

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characterize and sustain the sentient being are expressed throughout life.

Xuanzang looks to the Yogācāra teachings of Vasubandhu in his later career (Gold, 2014) and to the corpus of Asaṅga, in formulating his explanation of the power and capabilities of the *indriyas* in terms of seeds. While drawing upon these sources, Xuanzang contributes to the Abhidharma doctrine with his theory of “contaminated” (Chi.: *youlou zhongzi* 有漏種子; Skt.: *sāsravabīja*) and “uncontaminated” seeds (Chi.: *wulou zhongzi* 無漏種子; *anāsravabījas*). Specifically, he expands upon the Yogācāra theory of seeds to illustrate how the *indriyas* can be either improved or degraded.

In his interpretation of the Yogācāra schema, Xuanzang posits that each *indriya* is composed of a mixture of uncontaminated and contaminated seeds. The expression of the seeds depends upon how a sentient being cultivates the specific type of seed in an *indriya*. For example, with the practice of wholesome behaviors, the uncontaminated seeds of the *indriya* of the mind are expressed in the form of wisdom, knowledge and an overall improvement in standing in the moral universe. However, if the contaminated seeds in the *indriya* of aversion are cultivated with immoral actions, they are expressed in the form of moral and physical degradation.

In his theory of seeds, Xuanzang makes the important doctrinal point that the innate or inherited *dhatu* and karmic disposition of a sentient creature are modifiable through either the cultivation of the uncontaminated seeds through wholesome practices or the elimination of the expression of contaminated seeds through the diminishment of unskillful behaviors. Within this framework, all sentient beings can improve their moral status through karmic action.

In his CWSL, Xuanzang makes an analytical distinction between the faculty as an entity (Chi.: *genti* 根體) and the physical standing (Chi.: *gen suoyi chu* 根所依處) of an *indriya*. The text postulates that the faculty and the ultimate physical expression of the *indriya* are determined
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by “conspecific seeds 共相種.” As the gloss in the CWSL indicates, and as corroborated by Yāsomitra, conspecific seeds (Skt.: aṅkulas) stand for capabilities that are specific to a species and expressed in conspecific traits. The term “conspecific seeds” coined by Xuanzang is notable because it appears for the first time in the Chinese translation corpuses of Paramārtha and Xuanzang. Although it first appears in Paramārtha’s Yogācāra translations, the term is widely used by Xuanzang.

With his innovation of the term “conspecific seeds,” Xuanzang illuminates how the traits expressed by a species are modifiable through the cultivation of uncontaminated seeds and the recession of contaminated seeds. For Xuanzang, the theory of the seeds provides support for his doctrinal belief that biology is not destiny. Xuanzang avers that the quality of life, as well as the quality of dying, can be improved through spiritual practice.

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498 I have not located a Sanskrit equivalent for this term “conspecific seeds.” In the Tibetan parallel (D 76-49) to the passage in Paramārtha’s (T31, no. 1593, p. 117, c09-15) and Xuanzang’s Chinese translations of *Mahāyānasamgrāha-śāstra (MsG) (at T31, no. 1595, p. 178c, 28) that identify the “seed” (Chi.: zhongzi; Tib.: sa pon) with “conspecific characteristics” (Chi.: gongxiang), the Tib. simply has thun mong (lit., “common property,” “commonality” – see Derge (hereafter, D), sims tsam (mind-only) section, work number 4048: vol. 134, folio/line 12a.5 for MsG passage; for corresponding commentary in *Mahāyānasamgrahōpanibandhana // Theg pa chen po bsus pa'i bshad sbyar, attributed to Asvabhāva, see D 4051: vol. 134, folio/line 218a.6 Neither the MsG nor its two extensive commentaries by Asvabhāva and Vasubandhu, titled *Mahāyānasamgrāha-śāstra-bhāṣya (MsGBh) are extant in their original Skt., although there are Tib. and Chi. versions of these texts. While the Chi. versions of these texts contain mention of the “seeds of conspecific character” 共相種, the Tib. versions of these texts do not contain explicit mention of this compound term – namely, “seeds of conspecificity.” In the Tib. texts of the śāstra itself and in Asvabhāva’s and Vasubandhu's and commentaries, the “common characteristics” are identified with the “seeds of the common sensory world or bhājanaloka (Tib.: snod kyi 'jig rten gyi sa bon). But nowhere in the Tibetan versions of these texts are the two compounded together as one nominal or compound term (Skt.: samāsa). Given these facts, my conjecture is that gongxiang zhong appears to be a coinage of the Chinese translators – Paramārtha and Xuanzang.

499 Yāsomitra gives two terms in his gloss on the word bīja – “capability” (samārthya) and “potency” (śakti) see Sphūṭārthā Abhidharmakośa-Vyākhyā, ed. Shastri (Varanasi: Baudhika Bharati Series, 1970), 173. This gloss appears in the context of Yāsomitra’s exegesis on AK(Bh) 2.22 – for original passage in the verses of Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośa and auto-commentary (AKBh), ed. Pradhan, Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya, 52-3. This is parallel to the discussion of bīja in fascicle 5 of the CWSL which takes up the mention of “seed” in various earlier works to indicate both “potency” (śakti) and “capability” (samārthya) – see T31, no. 1585, pp. 19-20.
On the Ālayavijñāna or Storehouse Consciousness

Within the conceptual scheme articulated by Xuanzang in the CWSL, the ālayavijñāna, or the “storehouse consciousness,” serves as the bearer of the uncontaminated and contaminated seeds, or bija. The ālayavijñāna refers to the container within which the seeds of karma, or the thoughts and actions of the sentient being, are stored. Schmithausen (1986) attributes the origin of the doctrine of the ālayavijñāna, as the “basic constituent of the living being,” to the early Yogācāra sources, more specifically to the corpus of Asaṅga.500 Schmithausen writes: “ālayavijñāna is nothing but a hypostasis of the seeds.”501 Here Schmithausen describes the concept, first articulated by Asaṅga, of the ālayavijñāna as the underlying repository of seeds that potentiate the consciousness of the sentient being. Xuanzang faithfully adheres to this meaning throughout his work on the doctrine of ālayavijñāna.

In the CWSL, Xuanzang postulates the ālayavijñāna as the container of the seeds from which the biological and physical aspects and the psychological and moral dimensions of sentient life emerge. For Xuanzang, the “variegated capacities” (Skt.: samārthyaviśeṣa; Chi.: gongneng chabie 功能差別)502 that are necessary for the sustenance of the biological and psychological life of the organism grow from the seeds stored in the ālayavijñāna. In his conceptualization, the ālayavijñāna is identified with the indriya of vitality, or the jīvitēndriyam. Xuanzang posits that the “proximate seeds” (Chi.: qin-zhong 親種), or the seeds that potentiate the capabilities directly required for the survival of the sentient being, are located within the indriya of vitality.503

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501 Ibid., 34.
502 Skt. reconstruction from Hirakawa, Index to AKBh (Chi.-Skt.), Vol. 1, 63.
503 CWSL, fascicle 7: “The faculty of vitality is solely based within the seeds proximate to the root consciousness.” 命根但依本識親種 (T1585:31.41.a13).
Xuanzang avers in the second fascicle of the CWSL that ālayavijñāna is “indeterminate” (Skt.: avyākṛta) in that it can potentiate seeds of a wholesome or an unwholesome nature. Therefore, for Xuanzang, the doctrine of ālayavijñāna imbues the doctrine of karma with an important psychological dimension. Within this schema, both contaminated and uncontaminated seeds reside in the ālayavijñāna until they are cultivated or eliminated. Thus, according to Xuanzang, karma is carried in the storehouse consciousness, as it is cultivated or eliminated through the intentions and actions of the sentient being throughout life. This idea is of doctrinal importance within Buddhism as it lays the theoretical rationale for the range of spiritual practices intended to cultivate good karma through meritorious action and eliminate harmful karma through the observance of wholesome practices.

As the bearer of the seeds that potentiate the physical and psychological dimensions of sentient life, the ālayavijñāna can be considered as equivalent to the “subconscious” (Skt.: asaṃviditāka). In this conceptualization, the ālayavijñāna operates out of the awareness of the sentient being. Xuanzang avers that the ālayavijñāna continuously supports the vitality of the body and consciousness throughout life. He also posits that the ālayavijñāna maintains sentience in the state of dying, or “the state of becoming deceased” (Skt.: cyutyāvasthā or maraṇāvasthā). The presence of the storehouse consciousness explains why a sentient being maintains faint traces of consciousness at the end of life. As the organs of the body and the sensory indriya deteriorate in dying, ālayavijñāna maintains the baseline cardio-pulmonary functions, as well as states of consciousness, however vegetative. Therefore, the loss of the indriya of vitality, in which the ālayavijñāna is predominantly present, is equivalent to the loss of sentient life.

In his exegesis of dying, Xuanzang enlists the doctrine of ālayavijñāna to articulate how karma and the faculties determine the hedonic quality, ritual purity, and timing of dying. In
providing an explanatory account of the involvement of both physical and psychological suffering in dying, Xuanzang offers doctrinal guidelines for alleviating the physical and psychic pain of dying. He then turns to examine the Yogācāra authors to understand how improving the *indriyas*, through practice and training, can alleviate the pain of dying. In addressing the question of what dying is, Xuanzang comes to understand that a good death requires a good life.
Chapter Three: Xuanzang on the Karmic Quality of Dying: The Good, the Bad, and the Karmically Neutral

What is dying well? During his comprehensive investigation of the theory of the indriyas, Xuanzang concludes that dying involves much more than the formulaic loss of the faculties, or the deterioration of the base material organs of the body. During his crossing of the deserts of Central Asia, Xuanzang witnessed the deaths of others, had near-death experiences of his own, and became acutely sensitive to the physical and psychological suffering involved in dying. Throughout his life, Xuanzang looked to the Indic texts for guidance from the Buddha and others in coming to terms with his existential fear of dying. In the work of the Yogācāra authorities, Vasubandhu and Asaṅga, he locates a theoretical foundation for an understanding of dying in terms of the deterioration of the indriyas. In the work of Asaṅga, Xuanzang finds descriptions of a five-stage program of yogic training and ritual observances that are intended to enhance the physical and spiritual fitness of the sentient being and thereby improve the possibility of dying well. Following Asaṅga’s definition in the Basis for Yoga Practitioners, this study takes the “good” death to be the death for which one has “well prepared” (Chi.: tiaoshun 調順). By contrast, the “bad” death (Chi.: bushan si 不善死) is one for which the deceased cannot be said to have been prepared. 504

With his examination of the scriptures, Xuanzang concludes that a complex interaction between the indriyas and karma influences the ritual purity, hedonic tone, and timing of dying. Xuanzang ultimately comes to understand that the number, the type, and the condition of the indriyas that are borne by a sentient being at the end of life determine the quality of dying. Because karma, or the actions that a sentient being undertakes in life, is implicated in the condition of the

504 Jonathan Parry adopts this definition of “good” versus “bad” deaths in his study, “Sacrificial Death and the Necrophagous Ascetic,” in Death and the Regeneration of Life, Maurice Bloch and Jonathan Parry, eds. (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press), 76.
faculties, the quality of dying is necessarily informed by karma. In his examination of the Yogācāra texts, Xuanzang finds doctrinal support for practices that are intended to improve the quality of dying through the cultivation of the *indriyas* of faith, perseverance, concentration, mindfulness, and wisdom. Xuanzang devotes a substantial portion of his philosophical writings to exploring the practices and rituals by which the condition of the *indriyas* are improved. This explication takes Xuanzang into an exploration of how karma and merit (Skt.: *puṇya*), the “spiritual capital”\(^{505}\) that is accumulated through generous actions and deeds, are involved in dying.

According to the Buddhist law of karma, every thought, deed, or action generates a force of energy in the form of a reaction. For example, a meritorious gesture that brings happiness to another person returns in the form of positive energy, or good karma. A deleterious action that harms a sentient creature exerts a force that comes back in the form of negative energy, or bad karma. Merit is produced through activities, such as sponsoring rituals and religious works (Skt.: *dāna*), donating food to monks and nuns, and meditating and maintaining wholesome thoughts. Demerits (Skt.: *pāpa*; Chi.: *zui* 罪) are incurred through negative and harmful actions, the primary example of which is the killing of sentient creatures. The mechanism of merits and demerits operates under the Buddhist law of karma whereby merits produce good karma and demerits incur bad karma. The system of merits and demerits is akin to a spiritual balance sheet, in which good deeds are assets and bad deeds are liabilities. In this system, the maintenance of a positive balance of meritorious actions and deeds contributes to the growth toward enlightenment of a sentient being and to an improvement in the quality of dying.

Xuanzang defines merit as the spiritual “resources” (Chi.: *cai* 財) that are accumulated by a sentient being during life. Xuanzang employs the character *cai* to conceptualize merit as a

resource that can be amassed through meritorious actions or depleted by deleterious or harmful activities. In his exegesis of dying, however, Xuanzang concludes that the theory of merit does not provide a full explanatory account of the karmic standing of a sentient being approaching death, or of the type of dying experienced. Through his examination of the Buddhist and Brāhmaṇical literature, Xuanzang concludes that karma, rather than merit, plays the primary role in determining the quality and the timing of the end of life. Because dying is determined by the indriyas, and karma influences the conditions of the indriyas, karma, according to Xuanzang, is the mediating force in determining the quality of the end of life. Therefore, by improving the indriyas through cultivation, a sentient being can assuage the suffering attendant with dying.

Enlisting Yogācāra theory, Xuanzang postulates that that the indriyas can be cultivated by nurturing the uncontaminated seeds located within the indriyas with the nutrients of meritorious practices and actions. The indriyas can also be improved by depriving the contaminated seeds of the fertilizer of deleterious and unwholesome activities. Xuanzang avers that karma, the actions that a sentient being does or does not perform to cultivate the indriyas during a lifetime, directly influences the condition and the quality of the indriyas at the end of life. Because karma, and to some extent merit, are implicated in the manifestation of the seeds that are expressed in the quality of the indriyas at the end of life, karma and merit are involved in all expressions and types of dying. With the Yogācāra theory of the indriyas, Xuanzang upholds the core Buddhist tenet that karma is involved in all ways of dying.

Xuanzang looks to the Abhidharma textbooks of Vasubandhu and Saṅghabhadra and to the later Yogācāra works of Asaṅga for authoritative analyses of the impact and scope of karma upon dying. While Vasubandhu, Saṅghabhadra, and Asaṅga have different doctrinal and sectarian agendas, the three scholars concur that two factors are implicated in dying: the genetically-
determined life expectancy of an organism’s species and karma. Xuanzang also examines the role of karma in dying due to “inescapable imbalances” (Skt.: viṣamapariḥṛ: Chi.: bu-ping bu-heng 不平不横), or random and accidental events. In his analysis of dying from inescapable imbalances, Xuanzang finds the principle of “just deserts,” the notion that retribution for prior actions is served at the end of life, to be enshrined within the doctrine of karma.

Xuanzang concludes that the timing and the hedonic tone of dying can be improved in two ways: by undergoing courses of yogic training designed to improve the five skillful indriyas of faith, perseverance, mindfulness, concentration, and wisdom, and by observing rituals that accumulate spiritual merit. In his analyses of the Yogācāra texts, specifically the work The Basis for Yoga Practitioners by Asaṅga, and the Mahayana sūtras, Xuanzang distills a pragmatic set of guidelines, grounded in the original teachings of the Buddha, to aid the sentient being searching for relief from existential anxiety and to improve the quality of dying.

With his exegesis and translations of the Abhidharma and Yogācāra texts, Xuanzang follows through on his intention to bring the teachings and the rituals of the Buddha, in their unalloyed form, into Chinese Buddhism and philosophy. His commitment to a faithful transmission of the original teachings, as represented in the Indic scriptures, is demonstrated by his scrupulous adherence to the sūtras. With his meticulous analyses and translations of the Abhidharma and Yogācāra teachings of Vasubandhu and Asaṅga, Xuanzang endeavors to eliminate the core discrepancies within the Abhidharma and the Yogācāra Buddhist doctrines, while making the pragmatic and egalitarian practice of Yogācāra available to the Tang Chinese.

This chapter follows the sequence, order, and logic employed by Xuanzang in his examination of the discussions of merit, karma, and the quality of dying found in the Mahavibhāṣa, and in the corpora of Vasubandhu, Saṅghabhadra, and Asaṅga. It is divided into four sections: the
first section describes Xuanzang’s exegesis of the Abhidharma and Yogācāra discourses on the role of merit in the timing and the quality of dying: the second section examines Xuanzang’s analysis of the five stages of yoga, articulated by Asaṅga, and the practices of merit and meditation found in the Medicine Buddha Sūtra (Skt. Bhaiṣajyaguru-sūtra; Chi. Yaoshi jing 藥師經); the third section describes Xuanzang’s taxonomy of the three moral grades of dying: dying skillfully, dying unskillfully, and dying in neither a skillful nor an unskillful way; and the fourth section describes Xuanzang’s explanation of how the fear of death can be overcome through the observance of specific yogic practices and rituals.

Section One: On the Roles of Merit and Karma in the Quality of Dying

In his exegesis on the nature of merit, karma and the quality of dying, Xuanzang looks to the Mahāvibhāṣa and to the commentaries on the Abhidharma texts by Vasubandhu and Saṅghabhadra. The Abhidharma authorities in the Mahāvibhāṣa make it clear that specific types of dying are caused by a “poverty of merit” (Skt.: puṇyakṣepa; Chi.: fujin 福盡).506 Vasubandhu, in the Treasury of Abhidharma, and Saṅghabhadra, in his commentaries on the Abhidharma texts, diverge in their positions regarding the role of karma and merit in different types of dying. Saṅghabhadra, for example, posits that dying from the terminus of a normal human lifespan, or from an accident or random event, does not always involve merits, demerits, or the moral failings of a sentient being. In contrast, Vasubandhu, and ultimately Xuanzang, conclude that merit and karma are involved, to a greater or lesser degree, in the dying of all sentient beings.

For a detailed account of the role of merit in determining the quality of dying, Xuanzang

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506 Xuanzang’s Chinese also means “utter exhaustion of merit.” Xuanzang’s rendering of puṇyakṣepa as “poverty of merit” captures the monetary metaphor embedded in the system of merits and demerits.
returns to the Yogācāra authorities, and specifically to the work of Asaṅga. Here he finds that Asaṅga concurs with Vasubandhu in the supposition that merit is pervasively involved in all types of dying. In his examination of the Abhidharma texts, Xuanzang concludes that merit plays an important, yet circumscribed, role in determining the moral purity, the hedonic tone and the timing of dying. With his analysis and translation of Asaṅga’s *Basis for Yoga Practitioners*, however, Xuanzang comes to appreciate and then to articulate the omnipresent role assumed by karma in defining the quality and timing of dying of all sentient beings.

Xuanzang buttresses his explanation of the comprehensive role played by karma in dying by enlisting the principle of “the scale of karma” (Skt.: *tulāprānta*; Chi.: *cheng* 秤; Tib.: *sang*), introduced by Asaṅga in the *Basis for Yoga Practitioners*. Here, Asaṅga presents a paradigm in which karmic merits and karmic demerits form a spiritual balance sheet of credits and debits. In this system, karmic merits are accumulated over a lifetime, and then used as down payments toward a benign death, a mild afterlife and a heavenly rebirth. In his study of Buddhist ethics, Keown (2005) describes the double-entry accounting of Buddhist merits and demerits in terms of a system of “spiritual capitalism.” The coin of the realm in “spiritual capitalism” is the benevolent donation, or the *dāna*. Asaṅga affirms that the practice of making donations to the sangha, attested by the Buddha, creates the “spiritual capital” necessary to obtain a good death and afterlife.

Across his translation corpus, Xuanzang emphasizes the point that the good and bad karma accumulated over a lifetime ineluctably determines the quality of dying of a sentient being. Xuanzang views the type of death granted to a sentient being as the “just deserts” for a life lived

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508 Keown, Buddhist Ethics, 7.
in either a meritorious or a non-meritorious way. In his exhaustive examination of the role of karma in dying, Xuanzang comes to wholeheartedly endorse the central Buddhist tenet that karma plays a dominant role in determining the timing and the quality of dying.

**The Mahāvibhāṣā on the Four Ways of Dying in the Prajñāpāramitā Śāstra**

In his translation and exegesis of the Prajñāpāramitā śāstra, The Treatise on the Correct Postulates, located in the one-hundredth folio of the Mahāvibhāṣā, Xuanzang examines the role that the presence or absence of merit plays in the type of dying experienced by a sentient being. Surviving only in the Mahāvibhāṣā and in Treasury of the Abhidharma, the Prajñāpāramitā śāstra is one of the six fundamental texts in the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma tradition of Buddhism. The Prajñāpāramitā śāstra is revered as the touchstone source for discussions on the effects of merit and vitality in dying in Buddhism.

The ancient Prajñāpāramitā śāstra contains a catuṣkoṭi (Chi: si ju 四句), a four-part logical argument, that articulates the permutations of dying in terms of two variables: vitality and merit. Buddhist scholars, including the Mahāvibhāṣā editors Vasubandhu, Saṅghabhadra, and ultimately Xuanzang, excerpt the catuṣkoṭi from the Prajñāpāramitā śāstra in their exegeses of the implications of merit and vitality in dying. In this ancient treatise, types of dying are categorized according to the natural lifespan of a sentient being, as demonstrated by the presence of vitality, and to the karmic standing of a sentient being, as evidenced by the merits and demerits accumulated by the end of life. The enumeration of the four categories of dying, presented in the catuṣkoṭi in the Prajñāpāramitā śāstra, is posited as an exhaustive classification of all possible types of death experienced by sentient beings.

In his translation of the catuṣkoṭi in the Prajñāpāramitā śāstra, found in the Mahāvibhāṣā,
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Xuanzang classifies the four types of dying in the following tetralemma.\textsuperscript{509}

1. Dying due to the exhaustion of vitality and not to a privation of merit. This type of death occurs when a sentient being belongs to a species endowed with longstanding merit and a short life. \textit{Upapādukas}, who reside in the \textit{rūpadhātu}, serve as examples of beings who perish shortly after birth, yet bear significant merit. The abundance of merit held by an \textit{upapādukas} is manifested in the achievement of a rebirth into the deva heavens of the \textit{rūpadhātu}.

2. Dying due to a poverty of merit (Skt.: \textit{punyakṣepa}). This type of death occurs because of the specific moral failings of a sentient being. For example, after slaying several members of a caravan in a robbery, a thief is killed by his accomplices to obtain the ill-gotten treasure. The death of the thief is attributed to the poverty of his spiritual resources resulting from the demerits he has amassed by killing sentient beings.

3. Dying due to privations of merit and vitality. This somewhat rare type of dying occurs when the specific moral failings of a sentient being coincide with the natural depletion of vitality at the end of life. For example, after many years of oppressing his subjects, an ancient and tyrannical king has a heart attack while whipping his servant with a cane.

\textsuperscript{509} The full passage is found in \textit{Mahāvibhāṣa}, fascicle 20: “Moreover, the \textit{Prajñāpātī śāstra} says that, in the first place, there are those who die due to the utter exhaustion of vitality, and not due to merit. These are the deaths of beings belong to a specific species with short life, but longstanding merit. Those beings, in the next life, will not die because of the exhaustion/poverty of merit, but because the exhaustion of vital power (\textit{āyur}). In the second place, there are those beings who die because of the exhaustion of merit and not because of the exhaustion of vital power. For instance, there are those beings with little merit but abundant vital power. They die because of the exhaustion of merit and not because of the exhaustion of vital power. In the third place there are those dying due to the exhaustion of both merit and vital power. For instance, there are those beings with little longevity and little merit. They die due to both the exhaustion of vital power and the exhaustion of merit. In the fourth place there is dying neither to the exhaustion of vital power, nor to the exhaustion of merit. For example, there is a type of sentient beings with longstanding vitality and much merit. When they die, although both merit and vitality are not exhausted, in meeting with inescapable imbalances they meet their demise.”
king’s type of dying is attributed to the poverty of his spiritual resources and to the privation of vitality due to his advanced age.

(4) Dying due neither to privations of merit nor to privations of vitality. This type of dying is caused by a random event or an accident. For example, after being bitten by a snake in a remote desert region, a young camel driver dies before he can receive treatment to save his life. The death of the camel driver falls into the category of a random event and is not determined by either the status of his merit or the loss of his natural vitality.

The four ways of dying enumerated in the Mahāvibhāṣa translation of the Prajñapti śāstra by Xuanzang illuminate how merit and vitality impact the timing of the death of a sentient being. In this taxonomy, some ways of dying result from a poverty of spiritual merit due to an overabundance of demerits, and other types of dying are due to the natural depletion of the vitality of a sentient being. Vasumitra, in his commentary on the Prajñapti śāstra, adds that the timing of dying can be influenced by bad karma that is accumulated in prior incarnations. Often the accretion of bad karma is due to demerits collected though the killing of sentient life in a previous incarnation. Here, Vasumitra makes the important point that the length of the life varies according to the merits or the demerits amassed in the prior lives of a sentient being.

In their final verdict, the Mahāvibhāṣa editors determine that merit plays a role in some, but not all, ways of dying. Merit is implicated in types of dying that involve an extreme poverty

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510 Mahāvibhāṣa, fasc. 20: “Vasumitra says that the length of the a human’s lifespan is not the matured result (lit., ‘the spiritual fruit’) of killing animals in a past life. Since the eight faculties shared by humans and devas (i.e., life, aversion, mind, and five ordinary senses (for this identification, see T27n1545p0762b25), hence these transmigratory destinies [of the human and deva] are skillful conditions of the matured result of good karma (since they are more desirable than any of the other destinies). But the karma created in a past life by someone else [when reborn into these destinies] can produce the effect that impacts the karma that unravels the full lifespan of the individual. For as a sutra says, since their karma of the skillful path can be enjoyed and undertaken by the human being at age ten, the sons or daughters they beget will gain additional lifespan of twenty years.” 尊者世友說曰。人中壽量短者。非殺業異熟果。以人天趣命等八根是異熟者。唯是善業異熟果故。然造業者皆在人中先造能引人壽量業。次後復造害生命業。此業與前作損害事。前業應受二十年壽。由後損害但受十年。故人壽短促非彼異熟果。如契經說。十歲時人由能受行善業道故。所生男女壽二十歲 (T1545:27.103.a13-20).
of merit, or when the exhaustion of merit co-occurs with a loss of vitality. To continue his investigation of the interaction between vitality and merit in the timing of dying, Xuanzang turns to an exegesis and translation of the *Prajñāpañci śāstra* by Vasubandhu located in the *Treasury of the Abhidharma*.

**Vasubandhu on the Four Ways of Dying in the *Prajñāpañci Śāstra***

In chapter two of the *Treasury of Abhidharma*, titled “Discriminating the Faculties,” Vasubandhu examines the role of spiritual merit in the timing and the quality of dying. Saṅghabhadra contributes detailed exegesis to this account of the role of spiritual merit in dying in his *Treatise Conforming to the Correct Logic of Abhidharma*. In his translations of these two texts, Xuanzang returns to the two central questions addressed in the *Prajñāpañci śāstra*: What do ways of dying have to do with the exhaustion of merit? What do ways of dying have to do with the exhaustion of the natural lifespan? Xuanzang’s translation of Saṅghabhadra’s presentation of the question posed by the *Prajñāpañci śāstra* reads:

> We now examine whether one dies from the exhaustion of vital power (Skt.: āyur), or due to other reasons. Do sentient beings die from the exhaustion of vital power, or to the exhaustion of merit? Or due to other reasons?

> 今復應思。諸有死者。為壽盡故。為有餘因。諸有死者，為壽盡故？為有餘因？

In his translation of the *Treasury of Abhidharma*, Xuanzang cites the original *catuskoti*, located in the *Prajnāpañci śāstra*, verbatim, and weaves Vasubandhu’s exegesis regarding the

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connection between merit and vitality into the text. In his analysis of the ways of four ways of
dying, Vasubandhu provides the philosophical rationale to support the idea that merit and vitality
are connected. Xuanzang, in his exegesis and translation of the Prajñāpti śāstra text by
Vasubandhu, determines that because merit and vitality are intertwined, the moral status of the
sentient being is an important variable in determining the quality and the timing of dying.

While the Mahāvibhāsa editors lay out the catuṣkoṭi in terms of merit and vitality,
Vasubandhu uses the two variables of jīvitāsamskāras and āyuhsamskāras in his taxonomy of the
four types of dying. With his choice of jīvitāsamskāras and āyuhsamskāras, Vasubandhu shifts
the Mahāvibhāsa taxonomy of dying away from a moral or spiritual frame, into a naturalistic and
biologically-based paradigm. Xuanzang is acutely aware of the exegetical move made by
Vasubandhu toward providing a rigorous classification of the types of dying that is based on the
biological and developmental aspects of sentient life. In his Chinese version of the text by
Vasubandhu, Xuanzang translates jīvitāsamskāra as the “force of vitality” (Chi.: ming xing 命行),
the innate life force that determines the natural life expectancy of a sentient being. He translates
āyuhsamskāra as the “vital power” (Chi.: shou xing 壽行), the biological life force that revitalizes
the indriyas during the lifetime of a sentient being.

In his precise translations of the two aspects of vitality that are involved in dying, Xuanzang
emphasizes the formulations of jīvitāsamskāras as innate and static and of the āyuhsamskāras as
developmental and dynamic. Xuanzang’s translation choices diverge markedly from those
employed by Paramārtha in the earlier Chinese version of the catuṣkoṭi. Paramārtha captures the
concept of vitality using the Chinese character ming 命, and does not make a translation distinction

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512 As Yuanyu 元瑜, the author of the only extant Chinese commentary on the Nyāyanusāra śāstra, points out,
Xuanzang’s deviations from Paramārtha actually pertain to the original import of the Prajñāpti śāstra see
Yuanyu’s commentary on Nyāyanusāra śāstra (X0843:53.543c08).
between jīvitāsaṃskāras and āyuḥsaṃskāras. Xuanzang, however, with his use of ming xing and shou xing, disambiguates the concept of vitality. While the difference may appear to be splitting hairs, Xuanzang, as the translator, exegete, and agenda-driven promoter of the doctrine of Vasubandhu, makes an important point. While both jīvitāsaṃskāras and āyuḥsaṃskāras are located within the indriya of vitality, they are involved in determining the time and quality of dying in very specific and different ways. Xuanzang posits that while some aspects of dying are deeply rooted in genetics and past karma and cannot be changed, other aspects of dying can be altered by improving karma through the reduction of non-meritorious actions and the adoption of meritorious practices.

In his analysis of the Prajñapti śāstra, Vasubandhu makes a distinction between dying from the loss of jīvitāsaṃskāras, the vital force that determines the life expectancy of a sentient being, and dying from the loss of āyuḥsaṃskāras, the vital power that rejuvenates and restores the indriyas. Xuanzang identifies jīvitāsaṃskāras as the conspecific or genetically endowed determinate of dying, and āyuḥsaṃskāras as the ontogenetic or developmental factor that is implicated in dying. Together, jīvitāsaṃskāras and āyuḥsaṃskāras dictate the timing and quality of dying.

Within the schema of Vasubandhu, because it is biologically determined through the genetic and prior karmic endowment of the sentient being, jīvitāsaṃskāras is immutable. Jīvitāsaṃskāras cannot be “discarded” (Chi.: she 捨) or otherwise modified by the activities performed by a sentient being during a lifetime. Simply put, the natural life expectancy of a sentient being is determined by its genetic and prior karmic endowment.

513 Paramārtha’s rendering of verse AK 2.45ab states: “āyur is identical to jīvita” (T1559:29.184c07). Later on, in the auto-commentary to this verse (AKBh 2.45ab), Paramārtha combines the characters shou and ming together to render the Sanskrit word āyur (T1559:29.185.a10). These translation decisions serve to demonstrate that Paramārtha is not sensitive to the analytical distinction between āyur and jīvita.

514 Translation from Cox, Disputed Dharmas, esp., 297.
creature cannot be altered through karmic activity. Āyuḥsamkāras, however, the vital power that infuses the indriyas with vitality throughout life, is mutable and can be developed and enhanced by the actions or karma performed by a sentient being.

By enhancing the store of āyuḥsamkāras, a sentient being can extend life and improve the quality of dying. Merit, because it is viewed within the Buddhist doctrine as a means by which the indriyas are cultivated, is therefore a mechanism by which the repository of āyuḥsamkāras can be increased. While practices that alter merit are part of the mechanism, Vasubandhu ultimately concludes that modifying the quality of the indriyas has the greater impact in the timing and quality of dying. Concurring with Vasubandhu, Xuanzang posits that practices that change the conditions of the indriyas also modify āyuḥsamkāras, and thereby alter the quality and timing of dying.

Saṅghabhadra notes that āyuḥsamkāras, because it is malleable, can be discarded or retained by a sentient being. In this description, the agency of a sentient being is involved in the determination of whether to engage, or not engage, in practices that build the stores of āyuḥsamkāras. According to the Agamas, the Buddha chooses to discard, rather than to retain, his reserves of one hundred fifteen years of āyuḥsamkāras. By electing to live within the life expectancy determined by jīvitāsamkāras, the Buddha highlights his status as an ordinary human. In emphasizing his humanity in this manner, the Buddha teaches his disciples to refrain from clinging to aspects of the material world. By accumulating and then discarding āyuḥsamkāras, the Buddha demonstrates that all humans possess the agency to determine how they live and die.

In his formulation of the catuṣkoṭi of the four ways of dying in the Prajnāpti śāstra, Vasubandhu lays out how jīvitāsamkāras and āyuḥsamkāras contribute, in different ways, to the determination of the lifespan of a sentient being. In his translation of Vasubandhu’s commentary

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515 Cox, Disputed Dharms, 297.
to the *Prajñāpti śāstra* taxonomy, Xuanzang writes:

The *Prajñāpti śāstra*\(^{516}\) says: Dying from the exhaustion of āyuḥsaṃskāras is different from dying from the exhaustion of merit (Skt.: puṇya). All the forms of dying are included in the tetralemma as follows:\(^{517}\)

施設論 言 有壽盡故死，非福盡故死，廣作四句。

(1) The first is [dying] due to the exhaustion of the natural lifespan of the sentient being (i.e., jīvitāsaṃskāras).

In the first lemma of the catuṣkoṭi, Xuanzang describes dying that results from the termination of the natural lifespan of a specific class of sentient being. This type of dying occurs when the genetically determined life force of jīvitāsaṃskāras is depleted. Kuiji cites the example of a human being who dies at one hundred one years of age. While the lifespan of this sentient being is long, it is within the range of the natural life expectancy of humans living in the continent of Jambudvīpa.

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\(^{516}\) The *Prajñāpti śāstra* belongs to the six fundamental Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma texts and is the only of these works that was not translated by Xuanzang 玄奘 and his team in the seventh century. See cf. Willemen, Dessein, and Cox, *Sarvāstivāda Scholasticism*, 189, fn. 145. It belongs to the six-fold group of fundamental Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma texts called “the Abhidharma texts that are like six feet” (Skt.: satpādābhidharma; Chi.: Liufen apitan 六分阿毘曇, e.g. according to Kumārajīva (鳩摩羅什) at T1509:25.70a14). See Lamotte, *La Traité de la grande vertu de sagesse* (English translation by Migne Chodron), 881. The *Prajñāptiśāstra* is the only of the fundamental Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma texts that was translated into Tibetan. See Willemen, Dessein, and Cox, *Sarvāstivāda Scholasticism*, 211, fn. 4. It shows some resemblance to the cosmological sūtra of the Dirghāgama (T1, no. 30) and the *Lokasthānābhidharma śāstra* 立世阿毘曇論 (Taishō No. 1644), as the title is reconstructed by Radich (*Digital Dictionary of Buddhism*, accessed May 3 2018) which itself also shows all the characteristics of a sutra.

\(^{517}\) Tib.: *Tshe zad bar 'chi bar 'gyur la bsod nmas zad bas ma yin pa yang yod ces bya ba mu bzhis gsungs te*. D 4090: vol. 140, folio/line 79a.6-79a.7

\(^{518}\) Skt.: *Prathamā koṭiḥ – āyurvipākasya karmanah paryādānāt*. Pradhan, *Abhidharmakośabhasya*, 75. Tib.: *mu dang po ni tshe rnam par smin pa can gvi las yongs su gtugs pa las so*. D 4090: vol. 140, folio/line 79a.7
(2) The second is [dying] due to the deprivation of the vitality [necessary to maintain the survival of the sentient being], being the effect of the power of karma (i.e., āyuḥsāṃskāras). 第二句者，感富樂果業力盡故。519

In the second lemma, Xuanzang describes dying that results from the deprivation of the vital power of āyuḥsāṃskāras. Dying in this category does not involve jīvitāsaṃskāras, the genetically pre-programmed life force that determines the natural life expectancy of a sentient being. The second type of dying occurs when a sentient being is suddenly deprived of the vital power that sustains and replenishes the vital organs of the body and the indriyas. For example, a young camel driver dies of dehydration after being stranded in a desolate desert region during a windstorm. The deprivation of āyuḥsāṃskāras, due to the dehydration of his bodily organs, is the cause of death. His natural life expectancy, or jītivāsaṃskāras, is not involved in his unfortunately premature death. Xuanzang unravels the meaning of the third lemma in his translation of Vasubandhu’s auto-commentary in the Treasury of Abhidharma:

(3) The third is [dying] due to the co-occurring deprivation of jītivāsaṃskāras and āyuḥsāṃskāras.

第三句者，能感二種業俱盡故。520

In the third lemma, Xuanzang depicts a type of dying that is brought about by the simultaneous and fatal deprivation of jītivāsaṃskāras and āyuḥsāṃskāras. This third category describes dying that occurs when the loss of vital power and the natural life expectancy of a sentient being converge.521 For example, a ninety-year-old caravansary

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519 Corresponding Skt. text reads: dvitīyā – bhogavipākasya. Pradhan, Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, 76. Tib.: gnyis pa ni – longs spyod rnam par smin pa can gyi las yongs pa gtugs pa las so, D 4090: vol. 140, folio/line 79a.7.


521 Puguang’s Study Notes on the Treasury (T1821:41.102.b2-11) provide some useful points of clarification on the third lemma in Vasubandhu’s presentation found in his auto-commentary on AKBh 3.45ab (T1821:41.102.b02): Puguang poses the question: Does one die at the time of the exhaustion of vital power, since merit is also exhausted? Or is it indicated that one dies at the time that both are exhausted? Puguang responds: “We resolve and cast aside this difficulty by expressing the idea as follows: the space where vital power is yet unexhausted yet merit is exhausted permits of the experience of suffering, and permits of being still alive. In the space where vital power is exhausted, yet merit is unexhausted, there is no further living allowed. By this reasoning, we know that at the time that both are exhausted, merit no longer is capable of furnishing the capacities necessary for
owner dies when he breaks his hip while attempting to mount his camel. He is not able to recover from the broken hip because he lacks reserves of āyuḥsamskāras due to his advanced age. Here, the injury to his body, and his natural life expectancy are involved in his unfortunate, yet timely, death.

(4) The fourth type [of dying] is due to an extraneous “imbalance” that one cannot avoid (i.e., inescapable imbalance).

In his translation of the fourth lemma of Vasubandhu’s catuṣkoṭi, Xuanzang describes a type of dying that is brought about by “inescapable imbalances” (Skt.: visanamaparivṛṭ; Chi.: bu-ping bu-heng 不平不横), or by accidents or random events. This is dying due to the deprivation of neither jītivāsamśkāras nor āyuḥsamskāras. That is, this type of dying is due neither to the loss of vital power nor to the termination of the natural life expectancy of the sentient being. For example, Yajñādattā, at the age of twenty-seven, stumbles into a bullpen while intoxicated, and is gored by a bull. He is unable to access medical care and dies from a loss of blood. Here, Yajñādattā’s death is due neither to reaching the end of his genetically allotted average lifespan of sixty to one hundred years nor to a moral failing. While Yajñādattā has placed himself in harm’s way by over-indulging in alcoholic drink, there is no causal link between his alcohol intake and his death. Because he is unable to access medical care in time to address his loss of blood, Yajñādattā very quickly drains his reserves of vital power and dies.

Vasubandhu avers that Yajñādattā, because of his reckless behavior, bears some responsibility for his unfortunate and premature death. In his exegesis of the fourth lemma of the

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Chapter 3: What Is Dying Well?

catuṣkoṭi, Vasubandhu notes that dying due to inescapable imbalances often involves a loss of āyuḥsamskāras that is causally linked to a privation of merit. In his commentary on the catuṣkoṭi, Vasubandhu develops his theories on the important roles played by merit and karma in restoring and maintaining the reserves of the vital power of āyuḥsamskāras.

Asaṅga on the Three Ways of Dying

Asaṅga, in The Basis for Yoga Practitioners, poses the question: “How does one die?” (Skt.: katham cyavyate?). The presentation of the root causes of dying located in the translation of Asaṅga’s Basis for Yoga Practitioners by Xuanzang is essentially in lock step with the accounts found in the earlier Treasury of Abhidharma, composed by Vasubandhu.  

In his taxonomy of dying, however, Asaṅga winnows the catuṣkoṭi enumerated in the earlier account of the Prajnāpātimūrti śāstra from four to three categories of dying. Asaṅga coalesces the exhaustion of the lifespan and vital power into one category. The reconfiguration of the taxonomy by Asaṅga is doctrinally significant in that it serves to amplify the role played by merit in determining the lifespan of a sentient being. Asaṅga lists the ways of dying as follows:

Dying due to the exhaustion of the lifespan (Skt.: āyuḥ-kṣepā; Chi.: shoujin; Tib.: tshe zad pa). This type of dying is due to the exhaustion of the natural lifespan of a sentient being, as determined by genetic and biological factors. For example, a ninety-five year-

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523 Xuanzang, trans., Yogācārabhūmi śāstra: 云何死？謂由壽量極故而便致死。此復三種：謂壽盡故、福盡故、不避不平等故，當知亦是時非時死；或由善心、或不善心、或無記心. Corresponding Skt. found in Bhattacharya, ed. Yogācārabhūmi, 15: katham cyavate? /parimitāyuṣkatavya/tatpunar maraṇam āyuḥkṣepād viśāmāparihārataś ca kāle ‘pyakāle ‘pi veditavyaṃ kuśalacittasya api ake ukṣalacittasya avyākṛtacittasya api?/ Tib.: (D 4035: vol. 127, folio/line 8a.3-4): Itar ‘chi ’pho bar ’gyur zhe na. tshe’i tshad yod bar ’gyur roi‘ chi pa de yang dge pa’i sms dang sdan ba dang/ mi dge pa’i sms dang ldan pa da dang du ma pstan ba’i sms dang ldan pa yang rung ste. tshe zad pa dang/ psod nmas zad pa dang. yang nga pa ma spangs bas dus dang dus ma yin par rig bar bya’o/.

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old woman dies from influenza during an epidemic. Due to her advanced age, she does not have the stores of vital power that are necessary to battle the illness.\(^{524}\)

(1) Dying due to the exhaustion of merit (Skt.: \textit{punya-ks\={e}p\={a}t}; Chi.: \textit{shoujin} 福盡; Tib.: \textit{bsod nams zad pa}).\(^{525}\) This type of dying is due to the specific moral failings of the sentient being, as determined by the balance of merit and karma accumulated from past and present lives. For example, a fifty-year-old caravansary owner, dies of a heart attack while packing his camel bags. In a prior life, he has hunted and killed tigers for sport. His relatively untimely death is due to the demerits and poor karma he has amassed in his prior life. Purṇavardhana’s commentary on Vasubandhu’s \textit{Kośa}, titled \textit{Commentary Conforming to the Definitions of the Treasury of Abhidharma (Abhidharmakośaṭīkālakṣaṇānusāriṇī)}, postulates that this form of dying has as its causes the gradual maturation (Skt.: \textit{vipāka}) of karmic seeds over the lifespan.\(^{526}\)

(2) Dying due to an inescapable imbalance (Skt.: \textit{viṣamāparihrātaḥ}; Chi.: \textit{bu-bi bu-pingdeng}

\(^{524}\) Yogācārabhūmi, Manobhūmi section (D 4035: vol. 127, folio/line 8a.4): tshe zad pa ji lta bu yin zhe na/di lta ste/’di na kha cig ji ltar ’phangs pa’i tshe ril gyis zad par gyur nas/ chi ’pho ba ste/de ni dus la bab na ’chi ba zhes bya’o’./

\(^{525}\) See Dullyun’s \textit{Study Notes on the Yogācārabhūmi}: “One dies because of indulging to the extent that stable food and clothing are wanting.” 舍定衣食闕, 橫緣故死 (T1829:43.9c07). Corresponding Tib. text of \textit{Yogācārabhūmi} reads: “what is the exhaustion of puṇya? It is dying and transmigrating because of the loss of well being due to a moral failing.”; bdod nams zad pa ji lta bu zhe na/di lta ste/di na kha cig yo byad med pas ’chi ’pho ba lta bu yin no/ D 4035: vol. 127, folio/line 8a.5.

\(^{526}\) Pānāvardhana’s \textit{Abhidharmakośaṭīkālakṣaṇānusāriṇī} reads: “Dying in this way has to do with the nature of the maturation (\textit{vipākatva}) of the spiritual resources (Skt.: \textit{upabhoga}; Tib.: \textit{longs spyod}) that have become mature -- this is dying simply due to the exhaustion of āyur. When having viewed the loss of spiritual resources, and with the arising of the cause which “depletes the āyur” the capabilities are also depleted. This is because of the fact that the capabilities are depleted of āyur and because of the fact that the spiritual resources have been depleted. Tib.: de’i tshe rnam par smin pa can gyi las gang yin pa de longs spyod kyi rnam par smin par ’gyur bas/tshe zad pa kho nas ’chi ba yin no/ tshe zad na zhes bya ba rgyas par ’byung ba la/ longs spyod zad na tshe yod pa yang ltos nas longs spyod zad pas ’chi bar bya ba la/ nus pa yod na tshe zad na bzlog par bya ba med pa’i phyir/longs spyod zad pa ’chi bar bya ba la nus pa de’i phyir/ D 4093: vol. 144, folio/line 177a.5-6.
This type of dying is due to neither the exhaustion of the natural lifespan or to the moral status of the sentient being. For example, a twenty-year-old man is bitten by a rattle snake while walking in a remote area and dies before obtaining treatment. His untimely death is neither due to the exhaustion of his life span or to moral failings.

In his exegesis of the *Prajñapti śāstra* and the interpretations of the text by the *Mahāvibhāṣa* editors Vasubandhu and Asaṅga, Xuanzang concludes that the way a sentient being lives profoundly affects the way that being dies. He then turns to closely examine the role of āyuḥsaṃskāras, merit and karma in the specific case of dying from “inescapable imbalances.”

**Commentary on the Category of Dying From “Inescapable Imbalances”**

In *The Correct Logic of Abhidharma*, Saṅghabhadra analyzes and provides commentary on the catuṣkoṭi of the four ways of dying rendered by his contemporary Vasubandhu. While he faithfully reproduces the catuṣkoṭi enumerated in the *Prajñapti śāstra* in his text, Saṅghabhadra critiques the analysis of āyuḥsaṃskāras made by Vasubandhu in four categories of dying. In his interlinear comments, Saṅghabhadra avers that Vasubandhu, by implicating āyuḥsaṃskāras in dying from inescapable imbalances, overextends the role of āyuḥsaṃskāras and introduces a redundancy into the tetralemma. Saṅghabhadra states that the logical argument presented by Vasubandhu is compromised by the implication that āyuḥsaṃskāras is involved in the categories of dying depicted in lemmas two and four.

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527 i.e., “Untimely” 非時 (akāla) death. Kuiji explains: “Inescapable and unbalanced entails that due to other conditions, one dies in a perverse way.” 不避不平等，則餘緣枉橫死 – see Kuiji’s *Concise Comentary on Yogācārabhūmi* (Yuqie shidi lun liè zuan 瑜伽師地論略纂), fascicle 1, T1829:43.9.b27.
Vasubandhu, however, in his exegesis on the relationship between merit and āyuḥsamskāras, determines that the loss of āyuḥsamskāras incurred through the depletion of merit is involved in dying by inescapable imbalances. The commentary by Vasubandhu regarding the interconnection between āyuḥsamskāras, merit and karma is found in the Treasury. Here Vasubandhu argues that because merit replenishes āyuḥsamskāras, when merit becomes depleted, the life force that restores and rejuvenates the organs and the indriyas is simultaneously diminished.

The analysis of āyuḥsamskāras and merit by Vasubandhu is in the interlinear notes on the third type of dying in the catuṣkoṭi. Vasubandhu writes:

> Also, the third way of dying should ultimately be explained in terms of the desertion of impulses that replenish vital power.

又亦應言捨壽行故. 528

Within the stage in which one's lifespan is exhausted, merit (Skt.: puṇya) is exhausted in death; as there is no further causal capacity [in the body]. 529

壽盡位中，福盡於死，無復功能.

Hence, one dies when both (vital power and merit) are exhausted, so, as such, it is called “dying because of the exhaustion of both (vital power and merit).”

故俱盡時有死，說為俱盡故死。 530

In this passage, and in his discussions on the topic of dying from imbalances, Vasubandhu

528 Skt.: āyurutsargācetvāvatavyam? na vaktavyamāyuḥkṣayādeva tanmaranām; prathamakotyantargamāt.

529 Sanskrit reads: “Once the merit is exhausted when one dies, one no longer has any causal capability (sāmarthyam) left.” See Pradhan, Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya, 75: kṣīne tvāyupi puṇyakṣayasya maraṇe nāsti sāmarthyam/ Tib. (D 4090: vol. 140, folio/line 79b.1.): Tshe zad na bsod nams zad pa 'chi bar bya ba la nus pa med do/de lta bas na gnyi ga zad na gnyi ga zad pa las 'chi bar bshad do/ Paramārtha poses the last line of this passage as a question: “once vitality and merit are exhausted, what capacity is left [in the body]? 若壽盡已盡福業盡，於死有何能？

530 T1558:29.26.e02-4.
articulates his theory of āyuḥsamकārās, merit, and karma. Vasubandhu posits that because vital power fuels the activities that sustain life, including respiration and cardio-pulmonary functioning, dying occurs when the sentient being runs out of āyuḥsamकārās. Without the fuel of āyuḥsamकārās, the life-sustaining work of the indriyas comes to a halt. Dying becomes imminent.

The process by which merit restores āyuḥsamकārās is based on the Yogācāra theory of the indriyas. Vasubandhu and his commentator Yaśomitra propose that merit plays a crucial role in the regeneration of the store of āyuḥsamकārās located within the indriyas. According to Yaśomitra, the seeds embedded in the indriyas flourish into the vital power of āyuḥsamकārās when nurtured with karma and merit. By engaging in meritorious action, a sentient being continuously waters the seeds that grow into the vital powers that sustain the indriyas and the organs of the body. Therefore, when the seeds that grow into the capacities of the indriyas are not nurtured or cultivated with meritorious actions and practices, the vital power of āyuḥsamकārās withers and the sentient being perishes. Vasubandhu concurs with Yaśomitra’s observation that the depletion of seeds, and the resulting diminishment of the store of āyuḥsamकārās, portend imminent death.

Because performing merit nurtures the vital seeds and replenishes the vital power of āyuḥsamकārās, merit necessarily influences the timing and quality of dying. Therefore, even in a case of dying due to imbalances, merit plays a role in determining the amount of vital power a...
sentient being has in reserve to recover from a random or untimely life-threatening injury. Vasubandhu also intimates that running out of āyuḥsamśkāras is involved in dying due to the depletion of jītivāsamśkāras. This occurs when a sentient being, nearing the end of an expected lifespan, no longer has the reserves of vital power necessary to sustain the activities of the organs and the indriyas. Therefore, by continuously contributing to the reserves of āyuḥsamśkāras though meritorious practices, a sentient being prolongs life and improves the quality of dying.

In his translation and exegesis of the catuṣkoṭi on the four ways of dying in the Prajñapti śāstra, Xuanzang endorses the theoretical link between merit, karma, and āyuḥsamśkāras made by Vasubandhu and avers that the moral standing of a sentient being is involved in the quality and timing of dying. Vasubandhu provides Xuanzang with the philosophical rationale to support practices designed to accrue merit, and thereby stave off dying or improve its quality. This leads Xuanzang to an investigation of the practices articulated by Asaṅga in The Basis for Yoga Practitioners and the rituals to extend life that are described in the Mahāyāna texts.

Section Two: On Dying Well with Merit and Yoga

After his exegesis of the interaction between merit, karma, and dying, Xuanzang conducts a comprehensive examination of the practices that postpone dying or ensure a good death and afterlife. He begins by examining the harbingers of dying described by Vasubandhu in the Treasury of Abhidharma, entitled “Discriminating Worldly Things.” He then turns to The Basis for Yoga Practitioners, by Asaṅga, for edification on how to prepare for dying. In his translation and exegesis of the work of Asaṅga, Xuanzang examines how life can be extended by increasing the repository of āyuḥsamśkāras through an accumulation of merit and the practice of yoga. Xuanzang notes that the Buddha offers a paradigmatic case of how āyur can be accumulated
through meditation and meritorious practices. To make the practices by which dying can be postponed available to the Tang Chinese, Xuanzang translates the sūtra of the Medicine Buddha (Skt. Bhaiṣajyaguru-sūtra; Chi. Yaoshi jing 藥師經) obtained during his travels in the Western Regions.\(^\text{532}\) Using the example of dying from imbalances, Xuanzang examines how creating merit and practicing yoga can ameliorate the suffering associated with sudden death. In his translation and transmission of these texts, Xuanzang follows through on his doctrinal agenda to bring the teachings of the Buddha, in their unadulterated, into mainstream Chinese Buddhism.

**The Five Signs of Imminent Death According to Vasubandhu**

Xuanzang begins his analysis of how dying can be postponed by identifying and defining the markers that portend the death of a human being. In his discussions on the physiology of dying and death found in the third chapter of the *Treasury of Abhidharma*, entitled “Discriminating Worldly Things,” Vasubandhu enumerates the five bodily signs that are predictive of the imminent death of a human being. In presenting the “five major signs of irreversible decline” (Skt.: pañca-maraṇanimittāni; Chi.: wu da shuai xiang 五大衰相; Tib.: ‘chi lta snga), Vasubandhu lists the characteristics indicating that a human being is advancing irrevocably and irreversibly toward death. This taxonomy is first articulated by Vasubandhu and then reprised by Xuanzang in his translations of the *Treatise Conforming to Correct Logic* and the *Treatise Clarifying Abhidharma Tenets*, by Saṅghabhadra. Vasubandhu’s enumeration of the five grave signs of irreversible corporeal decline include: incontinence, weight loss, massive sweating from the armpits, bodily stench, and discomfort sitting upright.

\(^{532}\) I render the title of this important scripture – the Bhaiṣajyaguru Sūtra, for short – as the Medicine Buddha Sūtra following the Chinese, although we note that in the Sanskrit, there is an untranslatable pun on the word Bhaiṣajya (derived from the word bhiṣaj – lit., “healer/physician”) which has both the senses of “healing efficacy,” and “medicinal remedy.”
In his rendition of the five major signs of irreversible decline, Saṅghabhadra offers clarifications and qualifications of the doctrines on dying formulated by Vasubandhu. In his presentation of the five major signs of grave physical decline, located in the Treatise Conforming to the Correct Logic of Abhidharma (Abhidharma Nyāyanusāra śāstra), Saṅghabhadra writes:\textsuperscript{533}

There are five signs that indicate the grave decline of a being.

復有五種大衰相現\textsuperscript{534}

Firstly, the clothing of the being induces torment and becomes filthy and stained.

一者衣染埃塵

Secondly, the body of the being becomes withered and physically enervated (Skt.: √glai).

二者花鬘萎悴

Thirdly, sweat pours from the armpits (Skt.: kakṣa) of the body of the being.

三者兩腋汗出

Fourthly, a fetid odor pervades the body of the being.

四者臭氣入身

Fifthly, the being becomes restless and is unable to sit comfortably.

五者不樂本座

Saṅghabhadra adds the following:\textsuperscript{535}

\begin{itemize}
\item These five signs of irreversible decrepitude are enumerated in \textit{AKBh}, chapter 3 (Shastri, vol. 2, p. 405); as well as in \textit{Ny}, fascicle 30 and in Xuanzang’s trans. Saṅghabhadra’s XZLT41n1822p0614a0809, fasc. 15. However, they are absent from the Tib. translation of XZL.
\item Paramārtha adds: 必不免死 prior to the list.
\item Ny 30 T29n1562p0514b17-18; XZL, fasc. 15; T41n1822p0614a08-9.
\end{itemize}
The appearance of these five signs indicates most certain death. It is understood that meeting with these dire conditions is irreversible.

Within the trajectory to death, the five signs of grave decline are preceded by the six minor signs of physical degeneration. The lesser signs of corporeal decline include: groaning, pallor, excessive perspiration, loss of mental poise or alertness, squinting of the eyes, and constricted pupils. In his translations of the five signs of minor decline proffered by Vasubandhu in the *Treasury of Abhidharma*, and in the two commentaries on the *Treasury of Abhidharma*, by Saṅghabhadra, Xuanzang notes that the lesser forms of decline do not herald an irrevocable course toward death. While a sentient being may recover from the minor signs through proper medical intervention, the five signs of irreversible decline mark the entrance into the final stage of dying.

Although the five minor signs of physical decline are manifested by humans, non-human mammals and devas, the major signs of imminent death appear only in human and non-human mammals living in the *kāmadhātu*. The minor signs of demise are exhibited by humans in the *kāmadhātu*, and to the celestial devas in the outermost *Trayatrimśika* heavens of the great triple trichiliocosm. Humans and devas, because of their virtuous karmic births into the Pure Lands,

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536 Xuanzang’s translation of Vasubandhu’s AK Bh 3.43cd lays out the five minor signs of physical decline as follows: “There are those who say that the major signs of grave decline resemble the three kinds of disasters. There is no severing of the marmāṇī in the devas. However, at the end of life, the devas display the five kinds of minor decline. Firstly, in dressing in clothes and ornaments they emit disagreeable sounds. Secondly, the brightness of the body and countenance suddenly turns ashen. Third, perspiration drenches the body. Fourth, quickness of mind dullens. Fifthly, the pupils constrict and the eyes squint. These are the five signs that indicate one may or may not die.”

537 *Nyāyanusāra*, fascicle 30: “It is said in summary that there are five [signs of grave decline]. But how do you know that these five signs do not apply to all? It is known by logic and the sagely teaching. Among the teachings there is a sutra that says: Sometimes, the devas of the Trayatriṃśika Heavens sit gathered together in the Hall of Skillful Dharma to communally receive and enjoy the joy of the dharma. Among those devas, there is somebody whose life comes to an end because of both natural lifespan and merit have been exhausted. The one dying cannot get
experience quick and painless deaths. Mortals on earth, however need to accumulate good merit and karma to obtain the type of benign death automatically awarded to devas.

In his translations of the Yogācāra corpus of Asaṅga, Xuanzang links the doctrine of karma, and the idea of just deserts codified within, to the different ways a sentient being dies. Xuanzang’s translations of Asaṅga’s *Basis for Yoga Practitioners* and *Compendium of the Mahayana Teaching*, depict, down to the gory details, how sentient beings bent upon misspending their lives with unskillful behaviors and thoughts come to reap the “bitter fruit of suffering” (Chi.: *ku-guo*苦果).

**Xuanzang on Extending Life Through the Practices of Yoga and Merit**

In his comprehensive analyses of the Buddhist texts, Xuanzang finds doctrinal support, beginning with the teachings of the Buddha, for practices and rituals that create merit, restore āyuḥsamskāras, and improve the quality of the *indriyas*, and in doing so, postpone dying. Using the Yogācāra theory of the *indriyas* and the doctrinal foundation on the roles of merit and karma in dying provided by Vasubandhu in the *Treasury*, Xuanzang undertakes an exegesis to determine how the quality of the *indriyas* is improved by enhancing the stores of āyuḥsamskāras. In his examination of the practices that restore and rejuvenate āyuḥsamskāras, Xuanzang turns to two texts: *The Basis for Yoga Practitioners* by Asaṅga and the *Medicine Buddha Sūtra*. In his translation of *The Basis for Yoga Practitioners*, Xuanzang refines a set of five guidelines designed to aid the practitioner searching to improve the quality of dying and reduce the fear that is attendant upon the end of life. In his detailed study and translations of the *Medicine Buddha Sūtra*, Xuanzang

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(T1562:29.514.b15-20)
Chapter 3: What Is Dying Well?

describes the “worldly benefits” (Chi: xianshi liyi 現世利益)\textsuperscript{538} that are received by both the participants in and the recipients of end-of-life rituals. In his translations and exegeses of these texts, Xuanzang identifies how the practice of yoga and the observance of rituals that are designed to accumulate merit improve the quality of dying.

Substantial portions of the translation corpus of Xuanzang are devoted to examining the factors that either hasten dying or prolong the life of a sentient being. Xuanzang predicates the path to extending life on the Yogācāra theory of the indriyas. Here Xuanzang avers that improving the quality of the indriyas, particularly the faculty of vitality, favorably impacts the timing and the quality of dying of a sentient being. Therefore, by improving the indriya of vitality, dying can be postponed.

Yaśomitra, in his commentary on the Treasury of Abhidharma, and Puguang, in his study notes on the Chinese translation of the Treasury of Abhidharma, aver that the indriya of vitality contains both conspecific, or sabhāgatā, and species non-specific, or non-sabhāgatā, components. Together these two factors determine the totality of the lifespan of a sentient being. The sabhāgatā portion that is embedded in the indriyas determines the quantity of jīvitāsamskāras held by a specific species of sentient being and is genetically pre-ordained. The non-sabhāgatā components determine the amount of āyuḥsamkāras that is stored in the indriya of vitality.

The quantity of āyuḥsamkāras is determined by the specific actions, or the karma, accumulated over the course of a life. The degree to which a sentient being can cultivate and augment āyuḥsamkāras, or vital power, is not predetermined at birth. Because jīvitāsamskāras is written into the genetic code of a species, the extension of the life of a sentient being is only possible by enhancing āyuḥsamkāras. Xuanzang invests heavily in the distinction between

\textsuperscript{538} Xuanzang, trans. Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra 大般若波羅蜜多經 (Da Bore poluomi duojing) T220:7.780a12.
āyuḥsaṃskāras and jīvitāsaṃskāras to provide the doctrinal support for the mechanism by which
dying can be postponed. Hence, Xuanzang regards the work of extending the mortal lifespan of
a singular sentient being as specifically connected to the accumulation of āyuḥsaṃskāras.

Xuanzang finds the theoretical basis for the mechanism by which āyuḥsaṃskāras is built
and restored in The Basis for Yoga Practitioners. Here Asaṅga introduces the theory of the “field
of good merit” (Skt.: puṇya-kṣetra) located in the ālayavijñāna (Chi.: alaiyeshi 阿賴耶識), the
store house of consciousness. The seeds (Chi.: zhòngzǐ 种子) of āyuḥsaṃskāras are buried in the
“root consciousness” (Chi.: běnsī 本識) of the ālayavijñāna. When the seeds buried within the
subliminal layers of consciousness are suffused (Chi.: xùn xī 熏習) with the fertilizer of either
meritorious, or non-meritorious actions the indriyas are impacted. Because dying is the result of
the deterioration of the indriyas, the quality and timing of dying is contingent on the condition of
the indriyas.

In his exploration of the ways to extend life, Xuanzang notes that meritorious actions
nurture the seeds located in the field of good merit of the ālayavijñāna. Taking up an example
offered by Sthiramati, Xuanzang posits that constructing a stūpa nurtures the good seeds in a
karmic field of merit. Sthiramati states that the practice of dāna, for example making donations to
build a Buddhist stupa, sponsoring the reading of a sūtra, or doing other forms of religious work,
cultivates the seeds of ālayavijñāna that restore āyuḥsaṃskāras and in turn prolong life. In the

539 Cox, Disputed Dharmas, renders āyuḥsaṃskāras as “life force” and jīvitāsaṃskāras as “vital force.” She
translates part of Nyāyanusāra, fascicle 5, that treats the topic of the difference between the two. See Disputed
Dharmas, 297, sect. 18.5.

540 Fascicle 5 of Sthiramati’s commentary on the Summary of Abhidharma by Asaṅga reads: “The vital power has
no determinate limit for the sentient being. For else why would the Bhagavān say: at the beginning of the kalpa
cycle the indriyas are great and superabundant in power. Vital power is extended. Now the sentient beings these
days have declined and it is hard even to get to ten years old sometimes when one dies from the exhaustion of
merit (puṇyākṣaya), but not because of the average lifespan. If one erects a stupa in a temple then one can extend
one’s vital power.” 壽若無定限者。世尊何故作如是說。劫初諸根大種殊勝。壽即延長。今時漸劣故壽難
至于十歲。福盡即死。不因命也。修故塔寺能延其壽 (T1561:29.328.a22-25).
Indic scriptures, Xuanzang finds doctrinal support for the idea that the practice of yogic meditation and the performance of religious rituals function to accumulate merit, restore \( \text{āyuḥsaṃskāras} \), and ultimately extend the lifespan of a sentient being.

**Restoring \( \text{āyuḥsaṃskāras} \) Through Meditation To Extend Life: The Example of the Buddha**

To Xuanzang, and to all Buddhists, the life of the historical Buddha offers an inspiring example of how a mortal human being extends his life through a disciplined practice of meditation and meritorious action. In the *Sphūṭārtha* commentary, found in chapter two, verse nine of the *Treasury of Abhidharma* (AKBh 2.9), Yaśomitra recounts how the Buddha, though the practice of meditation, extends his life by two hundred human years. According to Yaśomitra, from the age of thirty-one onwards, the Buddha repairs to Vaiśālī during the monsoon season and meditates.\(^{541}\)

Through the practice of meditation for three months every year, over the course of over fifty years, the vital power of the Buddha “surges” (Skt.: \( \text{āyurutsarjanam; ut√sṛj} \)).\(^{542}\) By replenishing and rebuilding his stores of \( \text{āyuḥsaṃskāras} \), the Buddha adds over one hundred years to his genetically-endowed human life expectancy.

As recorded in the Āgamas, and corroborated in the *Mahāvibhāṣa* and by Yaśomitra in his commentary in the *Treasury*, the Buddha discards the vast portion of his \( \text{āyuḥsaṃskāras} \) and dies at the age of eighty-five. The Buddha never “cashes in” on his investments of merit attained through years of meditation.\(^{543}\) By electing to deduct one hundred fifteen years from his available lifespan of two hundred years, the Buddha teaches his followers to refrain from indulging in

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\(^{541}\) Shastri, *Sphuṭārtha*, vol. 1, 154.

\(^{542}\) Shastri, *Sphuṭārtha*, Vol. 1, 154, commentary on AKBh 2.10ab: “It should be said: The Bhavagān is the one who has let surge the vital power whose causal ground (\( \text{adhiśṭhāna} \)) is different from vitality.” eva\( \text{n tu vaktayam bhaviṣyat – bhagavān jīvitāny adhiśṭhām āyāmsy uṭṣrṣṭavān/.} \)

\(^{543}\) Ibid., 1.155.
practices that foster an unwholesome clinging to the material world. For Xuanzang, the story of the Buddha illustrates the doctrinal point that the augmentation of the natural lifespan is available to monastics and laity alike. The example of the Buddha demonstrates how the path of meditation and yoga can extend the life of the ordinary human.

**Revitalizing Ālayavijñāna Through Merit to Extend Life and Improve Rebirth: The Example of King Prasejanjit**

As documented in the āgamas, King Prasenajit (Chi.: Bosini Wang 波斯匿王), suffering from a host of debilitating ailments, is expected to die within a matter of weeks. Intent on extending his life, the king invites the Buddha into his kingdom, and heeding the Buddha’s advice, sponsors the production of several stūpas in his kingdom. With his meritorious acts to the Buddhist community, the Buddha promises that the King will be able to extend his life and, despite the accumulation of bad karma generated by numerous acts of killing sentient beings, will be able to secure a heavenly rebirth. After his death, the story records that the King is reborn into the vaunted celestial kingdom of the Trayatrimśika Heaven, wherein he resides for a thousand years. Here King Prasenajit, by planting new seeds, and by watering existing seeds in the fallow fields of good merit, revitalizes his ālayavijñāna. By replenishing his stores of āyuhṣamśkāras with good karma, the King increases his life expectancy and achieves a heavenly rebirth. The example of King Prasenajit demonstrates how the meritorious activity can extend the life of the ordinary human.

Using the Abhidharma and Yogācāra theories articulated by Vasubandhu in the *Treasury of Abhidharma* and by Asaṅga in *The Basis for Yoga Practitioners*, Xuanzang posits that the life of a sentient being can be extended or curtailed by actions that impact the balance of karma.

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544 See the discourses between King Prasenajit and the Buddha in *Ekōttarikāgama* 增壹阿含經, translated by Gautama Samghadeva 瞿曇僧伽提婆, fasc. 32. (T.125:2.725-26).
Xuanzang avers that the life expectancy of a sentient being can be altered through the judicious management of the fields of merit that restore the stores of āyuḥsamskāras in the indriya of vitality. Enlisting the foundational doctrines of Yogācāra Buddhism, Xuanzang shores up his position that the lifespan of an ordinary human being can be extended (Chi.: yanshou 延壽) through yogic practices and rituals that garner merit.

Building the Resilience of the Indriyas Through Yoga Training: The Basis for Yoga Practitioners

Throughout his exegesis and translation corpus, Xuanzang is pressed to find ways for the Buddhist follower to prepare for, and ameliorate the fear of, dying. After investigating the types of dying experienced by sentient beings and examining the theoretical linkages between merit, karma and dying, Xuanzang looks to Asaṅga for guidance on how to prepare for the end of life. In The Basis for Yoga Practitioners, Xuanzang finds a means by which the fear of dying is ameliorated and the quality of dying improved: meditative insight (Skt: darśana-mārga; Chi.: jiandao 見道). Within the path of yoga articulated by Asaṅga, Xuanzang finds a means by which any sentient being can strengthen the indriyas and improve and extend the final stages of life. Xuanzang notes that the practice of meditative insight is available to sentient beings of any moral station in life and does not require monastic training, a guru, or the possession of supernormal bodily capacities or skills. Given the crucial role of faculty development in the path of insight (Skt.: darśana-mārga), and his desideratum to design this path to be nearby to as many as possible, Xuanzang was pressed to come up with an account of how the prerequisites to the course of practice are none other than the faculties one was born with and a desire to improve them.

As one dedicated to the cultivation of the spiritual path of Buddhism, Xuanzang is committed to the idea, first attested by the Buddha, that the indriyas can be cultivated and improved
by the accumulation of the skillful and unskillful actions. In *The Basis for Yoga Practitioners*, Xuanzang finds the doctrinal rationale and methodological vehicle to demonstrate how the practice of yoga can be used to improve the quality of the *indriyas* and ameliorate the psychological and physical pain of dying. The yoga of dying involves training the five spiritual *indriyas* of faith, perseverance, concentration, mindfulness, and wisdom to quiet and subdue the *indriyas* of suffering and anxiety. By using the meditative insight (Skt. *darśana-mārga*) described by Asaṅga, the sentient being overcomes the fear of dying by counteracting the *indriyas* of anxiety and suffering with the *indriyas* of concentration and skillful aversion. When the capacities of the skillful *indriyas* are amplified, the hedonic faculties of suffering and anxiety attendant with dying are quelled. With Asaṅga’s text, Xuanzang finds a means by which ordinary human beings, without the benefit of extraordinary spiritual prowess or training, can attenuate suffering and stress at the end of life. The yoga of dying enlists the power of our better angels, as it were, to rein in the afflictions of suffering and anxiety. Importantly, the path of meditative insight is available to any sentient being who chooses to undertake the practice.

According to the Yogācāra tradition, during a meditation, Asaṅga visits the Tusita heavens and receives teachings from the Maitreya Bodhisattva. Asaṅga’s recording of this testimony is the *Yogācārabhūmi śāstra*, the comprehensive description of the Yogācāra path to enlightenment. The first section of *The Basis for Yoga Practitioners* describes the Yogācāra path, the sequence of five steps that are required to tame the body and the mind. By following the path, a sentient being ultimately overcomes the primordial fear that is associated with dying. The five stages of the Yogācāra path, as attested by Asaṅga, are:

1. The stage of preparation (Chi.: *ziliang wei*),\(^545\) during which the yogic practitioner

\(^545\) CWSL, fascicle 7 describes the practices undertaken during the stage of preparation: “the stage of preparation refers to the arousal of aspiration and forbearance (*adhimukti*) to attain enlightenment and arises from the
undertakes the practice and develops initial practices.

(2) The stage of applied practices (Chi.: jiaxing wei 加行位), during which the yogic practitioner further cultivates the two faculties of knowing the past and the present. During this stage, the practitioner gains leverage over anxiety.

(3) The stage of attaining proficiency (Chi.: tongda wei 通達位), during which the two faculties of knowing the past and knowing the present take sprout.

(4) The stage of cultivation (xiuxi wei 修習位) during which the groundwork for cultivating the faculty of knowing the future is laid.

(5) The stage of completion (Chi.: jiujing wei 究竟位), the final stage during which the ingrained faculties of anxiety and suffering are eliminated and the spiritual fruit of immediate contemplation of the Noble Truths. The final moment of the stage of preparation extends to the adamantine-like samādhi that has the nine uncontaminated faculties including faith and the five skillful faculties, along with pleasure, joy, mind, and subtle aversion, having the faculty of knowing past lives at their nature.

The so-called ‘stage of preparation’ extends from the stage of not having yet achieved the (of liberation) conducive to penetrating insight, up to the accumulation of all of the skillful indriyas. This is because this is the stage of fundamentals during which one is capable of engendering skills far and wide. In these three initial stages (i.e., the stages of preparation, of applied practices, and of attaining proficiency), the practice has at its nature [the mind together with] pleasure, joy, subtle aversion, and the five skillful indriyas including faith, perseverance, concentration, mindfulness, and wisdom. The latter rubric of faculties refers to the nine uncontaminated faculties (jiu wulou gen 無漏九根), the complement of faculties that the practitioner evinces during the stage of observing the truth of the path. For the identification of this ninefold rubric see Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra (Chi.: Da zhidu lun 大智度論), T 1509.25.234b27.

546  CWSL, fascicle 7 depicts the path of prayoga as follows: “Secondly, the path of applied practices refers to the path of the development of three uncontaminated faculties refers to the four stages of gnosis starting with ‘warmth’ 煖位, the ‘tipping point’ 頂位, ‘patience’ 忍位, and the ‘stage of highest worldly wisdom’ 世第一法, since these are all stimulated by and proximately brought forth during this stage of fundamentals.” 二、加行位。世第一位。謂煖頂忍世第一位法近能引發根本位故(T1585:31.41.a17-18).

547  CWSL, fascicle 7: “In the stage of prayoga, the quest for and verification of subsequent forebearance (adhimukti) over disconsolation and dejection means that there still is the faculty of anxiety.” 加行等位。於後勝法，求證愁感，亦有憂根(T1585:31.41.a20).
enlightenment is reaped.

In his meticulous reconstruction of the scripture, Xuanzang brings this important Yogācāra text to the people of the Tang dynasty in an approachable form. He thus provides an alternative to the complex and baroque Mahāyāna expressions of the Buddhist mārga, or the path of ten stages, known as the Bodhisattvabhūmis, practiced by Chinese Abhidharma practitioners. While hewing closely to the text of Asaṅga, in his rendering of the five steps of the Yogācāra path, Xuanzang enfolds the ten Bodhisattvabhūmis into a simpler yet foundationally-sound guide for the Buddhist practitioner.

In his translation of The Basis for Yoga Practitioners, Xuanzang pays exquisite attention to how the practitioner accumulates good and neutralizes bad karma, enhances the physical and mental capacities necessary to tolerate the distress of dying, and ultimately overcomes the fear of dying through the observance of rituals. Xuanzang offers Chinese readers a five-stage program of meditation practice that is designed to improve the physical and psychological fitness of the individual. The training of the mind to degrade and eventually eliminate the inborn faculties of suffering and anxiety is crucial to the explanation of spiritual fruition and “just deserts.”

Xuanzang’s work on the yoga of dying is instructive and pragmatic. For example, he admonishes gravely ill practitioners to avoid thoughts of anger, greed, covetousness, delusion, and conceit. He enjoins the sick and dying to avoid latching onto unskillful behavior patterns and thinking during the important stage of dying. He also instructs practitioners to take a long view, as the cultivation of good seed may take more than one lifetime to reach fruition.

548 Sthiramati’s commentary on Asanga’s Summary of the Abhidharma reads: “What are the different sicknesses operating the the mind? these are sevenfold: they are 1) craving; 2) anger; 3) delusion; 4) conceit; 5) incipient thought (vitarka); 6) subsequent mental application (vicāra) and 7) sparc defilements. These are the different sicknesses within the pudgala.”
Xuanzang finds the stages of the Yogācāra path to enlightenment, as articulated by Asaṅga, to be congruent with the pragmatic and egalitarian orientation of the people of the Tang Dynasty. In the picture of Yogācāra Buddhism held by Xuanzang, the practice of yoga is not reserved for the sages or monks living within the spiritual confines of a monastery, but is accessible to all sentient beings.

In addition to investigating how the practice of yoga provides a pathway toward ameliorating suffering at the end of life, Xuanzang explores how an improvement in merit factors into the quality of the end of life. The idea of adding to the store of merit through the performance of religious work is not original to Xuanzang, Asaṅga, or to Mahāyāna Buddhism. References to practices that build merit through dāna are found in the Āgamas, in Vasubandhu’s Treasury of Abhidharma, and in the commentaries on the Treasury of Abhidharma by Sthiramati and Yaśomitra. Xuanzang addresses the practices by which merit can be improved in his exegesis and translation of the Medicine Buddha Sūtra.

**The Medicine Buddha Sūtra**

While visiting a monastery in Bamiyan, Gandhāra, Xuanzang studies with Abhidharma scholars, and reads the scriptures of the Medicine Buddha, one of the three Buddhas in the Mahāyāna pantheon. The Bhaiṣajyaguru Buddha, or the Healing Buddha, is a bodhisattva, a “being whose essence is enlightenment itself.” According to the scripture, the status of bodhisattva is conferred onto the Bhaiṣajyaguru when, because of his compassion, he defers entering the ultimate bliss of nirvāṇa to save sentient beings near the precipice of death. The Medicine Buddha Sūtra (Skt.: Bhaiṣajyaguru-sūtra; Chi.: Yaoshi jing 藥師經),\(^{549}\) is composed of the twelve vows (Skt.:

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\(^{549}\) I render the title of this important scripture – the Bhaiṣajyaguru Sūtra, for short – as the Medicine Buddha Sūtra following the Chinese, although we note that in the Sanskrit, there is an untranslatable pun on the word Bhaiṣajya
praṇidhāna; Chi.: yuan 頌) taken by Medicine Buddha. Upon attaining enlightenment, the Healing Buddha dedicates himself to spiritual purity, wisdom, and to saving beings from physical suffering, psychological pain, natural disasters, poverty, starvation, and lapses in judgement and conduct.

Xuanzang carries the *Medicine Buddha Sūtra* from Gandhāra to China for study and translation. In his exegesis of the *sūtra*, Xuanzang articulates the protocols for rituals based on the vows of the Healing Buddha. These rituals that are intended to expiate the physical and mental suffering of a sentient being facing impending death. The translation of the *sūtra* by Xuanzang is an important inspiration and doctrinal source for a widespread set of end-of-life practices and rituals in China and East Asia. In a study of early-medieval deathbed practices, Stone (2016) links Japanese rituals such as meditating, counting rosary beads, and formal rituals for the Amitābha Buddha and Medicine Buddha\(^550\) to the Tang practices described by Xuanzang. The translation of the *Medicine Buddha Sūtra* by Xuanzang stands as the most popular version of the venerated Buddhist *sūtra* in East Asia.

In his translation of the *Medicine Buddha Sūtra*, Xuanzang describes the rites of the *Medicine Buddha*, a ritual intended to help the beneficiary avoid the nine sources of untimely death (Chi.: *jiu hengsi* 九橫死). To perform the ritual, the family and friends of the dying person gather around the deathbed and recite the *sūtra* forty-nine times. The ritual aims to ward off the disease and engender peace and well-being in the sick and suffering person and thereby delay the demise

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\(^{550}\) Stone’s (2016) book is not limited in scope to pre-mortem rites, and includes a variety of post-mortem rites as well, including the famous “seven-seven” memorial rites observed on the seventh day of the week for two fournights following one’s loved-one becoming deceased. See Stone, *Right Thoughts at the Last Moment*, 369. The timing and observance of these rites is laid bare in Xuanzang’s translation of the *Medicine Buddha sūtra*. 

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of the recipient by “extending the date” (Chi.: yanshi 延時) of death.

Xuanzang enjoins the “women and men of good faith” (Chi.: shan-nan xin-nü 善男信女) to sponsor the production of spiritual paraphernalia, such as sūtra pillars (Chi.: fan 婆), banners and elaborate candelabra, to use in the performance of the rite of the Medicine Buddha. 551 Within this opulent setting, the lapis lazuli image of the Medicine Buddha, with one hand indicating the “no-fear posture,” (Skt.: abhayamudrā) is placed near the suffering person. For the rite to be efficacious, the participants must observe the “eight purification disciplines for lay people” 八齋戒 and avoid sources of mortal hazard 七日七夜受八分齋戒552 during the seven day and night duration of the ritual.

Xuanzang states that the observance of the rites of the Medicine Buddha has “worldly

551 The passage in Xuanzang’s translation of the Medicine Buddha sutra gives the elaborate, and sumptuous, ritual protocol to obtain deliverance from calamities (T14n0450p0407c01-14): “Liberation Bodhisattva says: “Bhādānta! If there is someone sick and one wishes to alleviate their illness, one should maintain the eightfold lay precepts for ritual purification for seven days and seven nights, and to make offerings, based upon one’s ability, of food and paraphernalia to the Bhikṣu, and at six ‘o’-clock, daily, and nightly, to bow to and make offerings to the Bhagavān Healing Buddha Bhaiṣajyaguru, one should recite this sutra forty-nine times, and then light forty-nine lamps. One should [also] produce seven statues of Tathāgatas and set out the sevenfold candelabra out together in front such that each candlebra is big and massive like a chariot wheel. Continue this for forty-nine days, such that the lamplight is never flagging, then produce a sūtra banner of five variegated colors, with length of forty armslengths, unfurl it and set free forty-nine types of sentient beings – now then, you can gain the deliverance from calamities! And no longer be harassed by malignant demons or ghosts!” 救脫菩薩言:「大德!若有病人,欲脫病苦,當為其人,七日七夜,受持八分齋戒,應以飲食及餘資具,隨力所辦,供養苾芻僧;晝夜六時,禮拜供養彼世尊藥師琉璃光如來;讀誦此經四十九遍;然四十九燈;造彼如來形像七軀,一一像前各置七燈,一一燈量大如車輪,乃至四十九日,光明不絕;造五色綵幡,長四十九搩手,應放雜類眾生至四十九;可得過度危厄之難,不為諸橫惡鬼所持.

552 Medicine Buddha sūtra, trans. Xuanzang (T450:14.407.a07-16): “Moreover, Mañjuśrī, if a woman or man of pure faith arrive at a place where her/his body can no longer serve heaven, s/he must single-mindedly take refuge in the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Saṅgha, to maintain the prohibitions and the precepts, such as the five precepts, the ten precepts, the four-hundred Bodhisattva precepts, the two-hundred-and-fifty Bhikṣuṇī precepts, without violating them. When faced with fear of falling into one’s death and into a bad transmigratory destiny, if s/he only concentrates and recollects the name of the Medicine Buddha, and makes obeisant offering to him, then s/he will definitely not fall into the three bad transmigratory destinies (of the non-human animals, the pretas, and the hellbourne beings or narakas).「復次，曼殊室利！若有淨信善男子、善女人等，乃至盡形不事餘天，惟當一心歸佛、法、僧，受持禁戒，若五戒、十戒、菩薩四百戒、苾芻二百五十戒、苾芻尼五百戒，於所受中或有毀犯，怖墮惡趣，若能專念彼佛名號，恭敬供養者，必定不受三惡趣生.
benefits” (Chi.: xianshi liyi 现世利益) for the recipient and for the participants in the ritual. While it extends the date of death and attenuates the physical and psychological suffering of the sick or dying person, it also provides patrons of the ritual with a means of building merit through dāna. Recitation of the Medicine Buddha Sūtra is used to help heal the sick, alleviate labor pains, and restore sight in the blind and hearing in the deaf.

Xuanzang’s translation of the Medicine Buddha Sūtra promises a host of benefits for those who choose to undertake and sponsor the elaborate Medicine Buddha rites. The myriad of benefits obtained with proper observation of the rites are expounded throughout the sūtra text. The worldly benefits include the promise of happier rebirths for some, and the assurance of a less stressful death for others. For the beneficiaries of the rituals, the concrete benefits include improvements in health and vitality, and the extension of life, in certain cases, by years. The ability for laypeople to receive these benefits is predicated upon avoiding sources of mortal hazard by adhering to the eight precepts for purification.

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553 Xuanzang’s translation of the Medicine Buddha Sūtra (T450:14.407.c28-3) reads: “At that time, Ánanda inquired of Liberation Bodhisattva: ‘Son of good family! How can one augment the lifespan than is already exhausted?’ Liberation Bodhisattva replied: ‘Bhādānta! Don’t you know about the nine kinds of inescapable imbalances proffered by the Buddha?’ If one were to sponsor the production of sutra banners and candelabra of the continuation of life, then in cultivating all this merit and good qualities, even when the lifespan is becoming depleted, one does not undergo the suffering or maladies!”

554 Xuanzang’s translation of the Medicine Buddha Sūtra (T450:14.407.a12-16) reads: “Or, when a woman is about to give birth, and is experiencing the pains of childbirth, if she is able to recite the name of the Medicine Buddha and bow to him, in order render reverent devotion to him, then she will gain reprieve from all sufferings and pangs of childbirth. The child born will be fully-able-bodied, noble in mien and build, good and pleasant looking, intelligent, immune from minor diseases. No non-human forces will capture their life force.”

555 Restoring vision and hearing in the blind and deaf are acts undertaken under the sixth vow made by the Healing Buddha (T450:14.405a25-9).
The Path to Avoiding Inescapable Imbalances as Attested by Asaṅga and the Medicine Buddha

In his translation of *Medicine Buddha Sūtra*, Xuanzang revisits the discussion of the category of dying from inescapable imbalances introduced by Vasubandhu and Asaṅga. He poses the question asked by the Medicine Buddha: Why does one die from inescapable imbalances? 云何不避不平等故死？Xuanzang reprises the list of the “nine ways of dying due to inescapable imbalances” first enumerated in *The Basis for Yoga Practitioners*. The original listing by Asaṅga includes: excessive consumption of food, consumption of unwholesome food, insufficient digestion of food prior to the next meal, consumption of raw food without proper elimination, retaining digested food, insufficient knowledge of either harmful or beneficial practices, untimely actions and indulging in untimely actions (Skt.: *akālacārin*), or impure actions (Skt.: *abrahmacārin*). While the enumeration by Asaṅga is weighted toward untimely deaths due to the improper ingestion and elimination of food, Xuanzang’s list in the *Medicine Buddha Sūtra* describes hazards that are congruent with the life experiences of the practitioner in China.

Why do you die due to inescapable imbalances? As has been explained by the World-Honored-One, inescapable imbalances refer to nine causes: What are the nine? They are 1) Excessively consuming, 2) consuming unwholesome food, 3) not yet digesting before eating the next meal, 4) consuming raw food without expulsion, 5) retaining digested food 6) not being near doctor or medicine 7) not knowing what is harmful or beneficial for yourself 8) untimely acting 9) indulgence in untimely acting (akālacārin) or improper acting (abrahmacārin). This is called dying in an untimely way.\(^{556}\)
Chapter 3: What Is Dying Well?

In the *Medicine Buddha Sūtra*, Xuanzang identifies the nine ways of the dying from inescapable imbalances as follows: getting sick without available medical treatment 得病無醫, being executed as a criminal 王法誅戮, having vital energy (Chi.: *qi* 氣) stolen by a ghost 非人奪精氣, burning in a fire 火焚, drowning 水溺, being bitten by a wild animal 惡獸啖, falling off a cliff 堕崖咒呪, eating poison, and dying from starvation or dehydration 饑渴.

Woven into his translations of the taxonomies of dying from inescapable imbalances found in *The Basis for Yoga Practitioners* and in the *Medicine Buddha Sūtra* is the counterintuitive premise that dying from random imbalances can be prevented. In his translation of Asaṅga’s list, Xuanzang avers that dying from inescapable imbalances sometimes involves “conditions that are extraneous” (Chi.: *yu yuan* 餘緣) to the natural lifespan or to the karma of the sentient being. For example, some beings meet their demise due to random and exceedingly unfortunate events, as in the case of the historical Buddha, who died from food poisoning. Other sentient beings die due to the inaccessibility of medical care during a time of acute need. In both examples, dying is due neither to a natural cause nor to a moral failing of the sentient being. Xuanzang illustrates ways of dying that range from dying from natural disasters to dying from corporeal execution, the predicate of which is the involvement of the sentient being in immoral activities. Xuanzang avers that dying from imbalances, like all other ways of dying, can be postponed by practicing the instructions given by the Medicine Buddha and by obtaining merit in years prior to dying.

In his translations of Asaṅga’s five steps of yogic practices and the *Medicine Buddha Sūtra*, Xuanzang makes the case that dying from inescapable imbalances can be avoided by taking the proper steps to prepare for dying. These steps include the applied practices comprised in the yogic
practice in five stages offered by Asaṅga, or through certain ritual interventions for the sick and dying presented in the Medicine Buddha Sūtra.

Section Three: Three Karmic Valences of the Mind in the Dying Sentient Being: Good, Bad, and Neutral

The earliest and most venerated portion of the Yogācāra scripture on the nature of dying is called the Manobhūmiḥ, or The Basis of Mind. The Manobhūmiḥ is located near the end of the first folio of The Basis for Yoga Practitioners. In his exegesis and translation of this ancient text, Xuanzang depicts, in vivid detail, the rewards and the consequences that are incurred by either engaging in or eschewing the preparation necessary for dying well. The Manobhūmiḥ provides the scriptural support for the claim made by Xuanzang throughout his translation and exegetical corpus that karma pervasively and decisively determines the quality and the timing of dying.

The Manobhūmiḥ, states that the karmic standing or the state of mind (Skt.: citta; Chi.: xin 心) of a sentient being, leading up to and during the time of dying, determines the course of dying. The karmic state of the mind of the sentient being describes the capacity to practices of skillful aversion, concentration, and mindful recollection while dying. According to Asaṅga, the mind of a sentient being at the end of life holds one of three karmic valences that reflect a mental disposition toward good, bad, or neutral thoughts and behaviors. The karmic grade (Chi.: pin 品) depends on the balance of good and the bad karma that the sentient being carries at the end of life. In his translation of the Manobhūmiḥ by Asaṅga, Xuanzang presents the three karmic grades of dying as follows: dying with skillful state of mind (Chi.: shanxin si 善心死), dying with an unskillful state of mind (Chi.: bushanxin si 不善心死), and dying with an indeterminate or neutral state of mind (Chi.: wujixin si 無記心死).
Skillfully Dying

Asaṅga begins his account of the three ways of dying with a description of what it means to die in a skillful way. In the *Manobhūmiḥ*, he poses the following questions: How does one die with a skillful mind? How does one approach the final moments of life in a skillful way? The definition of dying skillfully is as follows:

How does the skillful mind die? Sometimes in dying the individual can remember teachings that have been learned previously. Sometimes the individual can remember the teachings when reminded by others.\(^{557}\)

At the time the individual remembers the skillful teachings, such as the teachings on faith, and so forth, crudely-formed perceptions arise in the mind. When the subtle perceptions of outside things arise in the dying mind, the dying mind returns to an indeterminant state.

Why does the mind return to an indeterminate state? If the dying mind cannot recall the skillful practices that are learned during life, then the individuals from the outside will not be able to restore the memories of the skillful practices for the dying mind.

云何善心死？猶如有一將命終時。自憶先時所習善法。或復由他令彼憶念。由此因緣。爾時信等善法現行於心。乃至麁想現行。若細想行時。善心即捨。唯住無記心。所以者何？彼於爾時。於曾習善亦不能憶。他亦不能令彼憶念。\(^{558}\)

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\(^{557}\) Tibetan has *sems dang ldan par 'chi 'pho* (D 4035: vol. 127, folio/line 8a.7) —lit., “How does the skillful mind die and transmigrate?”

\(^{558}\) Corresponding Skt. text from Bhattachārya, *Yogācārabhūmi*, 18: Kathaṃ kūśalacittāś ca cyavate? Yatha api iha ekatyo mriyamānaḥ pūrvān dharmān smarati | pareṇa vā punaḥ śārayate | yena asya tasmin samaye kuśalāḥ śraddhādayo dharmāḥ cittasamudācaranti | te punar yāvā audāriksaṃjñā pravartate | sūkṣme punaḥ saṃjñā-praśāreṇa kuśalam cittaṃ vyāvartate | avyākṛtam eva cittaṃ santiṣṭate | tathā hi | satasmin samaye pūrva abhyastam ca kuśalam abhogaṃ kartum asamartho bhavati parair api śārayitum asākyaḥ || Tib. (D 4035: vol. 127, folio/line 8a.7-b1) reads: Dge ba'i sems dang ldan par 'chi 'pho ba ji lta bu yin zhe na,'di lta ste,'di na kha cig 'chi ba'i tshe/dge ba'i chos sngon kun tu bsten pa rnam dran nam/gzhan gyis dran par byas kyang rung ste/de'i tshe de la dad pa la sogs pa dge ba'i chos gang dag sems la kun tu spyod pa de dag ji srid du 'du shes rags pa 'byung ba'i bar du'o/dge ba'i sems dang ldan par 'chi 'pho ba ji lta bu yin zhe na'di lta ste'di na kha cig 'chi ba'i tshe/dge ba'i chos sngon kun tu bsten pa rnam dran nam/gzhan gyis dran par byas kyang rung ste/de'i tshe de la dad pa la sogs pa dge ba'i chos gang dag sems la kun tu spyod pa de dag ji srid du 'du shes rags pa 'byung ba'i bar du'o.
Asaṅga, as rendered in the translation by Xuanzang, avers that dying skillfully requires the ability to maintain a calm state of mind in the face of impending death. When facing mortality, the sentient being who carries out the pure practices of yoga during life is more likely to be able to sustain a state of mind of “brightness and clarity” (Chi.: 明利 ming li) and resist a mental state of “confusion and opacity” (Chi.: 昏劣 mei lie). Xuanzang notes that the maintenance of a clear and serene state of mind is “advantageous” (Chi.: 利 li) rather than “disadvantageous” (Chi: 不利 buli). Xuanzang employs a pun in that the Chinese character li, simultaneously refers to “mental acuity,” and to “advantageousness.” In his *Summary of Abhidharma*, Asaṅga reprises how the skillful mental states of “brightness and acuity” in the face of death are predicated upon the maintenance of the skillful teachings a sentient being has learned through a life time of practice and cultivation.

Retaining a state of mind of “brightness and clarity” in the face of impending death requires preparation and practice. Those who die well possess a single-minded resolution and conviction that is honed by practice and cultivation. Dying well requires an ability to focus on tasks such as tranquil meditation (Skt.: śamathā), mindful absorption (Skt.: samādhi), or the recitation of the name of the Buddha, or a revered bodhisattva. The practice of dying skillfully requires honing and enlisting the *indriyas* of faith, concentration, aversion, and memory.

Dying skillfully requires the ability to utilize the skills of faith and concentration to quell the activation of the faculty of anxiety that occurs when a sentient being faces mortality. The *indriyas* of anxiety and suffering are genetically pre-programmed to recoil at the signs of dying and death. Without learning the skills required to regulate the faculties of anxiety (Skt.: daurmanasyāndriyam) and suffering (Skt. duḥkhāndriyam), the actions of these hedonically undesirable faculties will be exacerbated at the end of life. The cultivation of the *indriyas* of faith
and concentration, through the practice of yoga, reduces the natural and innate anxiety and fear that is associated with dying. When the *indriyas* of faith and concentration are functioning well at the end of life, the process of dying is less stressful.

The practice of dying skillfully requires the ability to efface sensations, however subtle, from outside the mind. This requires enlisting the faculty of concentration and using the “pure objects of faith” to maintain a laser-like focus through the physical and mental trials of dying. According to the discussion in the seventh fascicle of Xuanzang’s CWSL, the pure objects of faith “take the form of the aspirations” (Skt.: *abhilāśākāra*; Chi.: *xiwang* 希望). Spiritual aspirations are used as lodestones to guide the sentient being toward meritorious thoughts and actions and away from impure objects or distractions in the material world. This, again, requires an ability to enlist the *indriyas* of concentration and mindfulness that have been honed by practice prior to the end of life.

Dying skillfully requires an ability to regulate the unskillful affective states (Skt.: *anuśayas*) of torpor, vexation, and the “six root afflictions,” or *kleśas* 根本六煩惱, of craving, anger, ignorance, pride, irresolution and deluded views. The six root afflictions originate within the mind and the body and function to divert the dying mind from meritorious action and thought. Xuanzang, in his CWSL, views mastering the affective state of vexation as central to dying skillfully. He regards the unwholesome factors of greed, anger, and delusion as rooted in “hostility and resentment” (Chi.: *fen hen* 忿恨). By enlisting the faculty of aversion, the sentient being discards

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559 CWSL, fascicle 6 (this is essentially a paraphrase and elaboration on Vasubandhu’s gloss as found in Xuanzang’s translation of the *Pañcaskandhāka* (T1612:31.849.b8-9): “What is vexation? The nature of vexation is, first and foremost hatred and aversion. It has seeking after violent contact in a aggravated way, and contumaciousness as its nature. The encumbrance consists in the non-vexation to stings it refers to the violent contact recollected and manifest in tactile sensation that conditions the mind already to be aggravated and to cry out violently in a crude sound that curses and casts aspersions on others. This encumbrance is consists partially in anger and partially in resentment. It is basically no different from the affliction of anger (*dveṣa*).” 云何為惱。忿恨為先追觸暴熱恨
unskillful mental states and overrides the sensations of pain that impinge upon the equanimity and mental clarity that are necessary for dying skillfully.

Xuanzang highlights how dying skillfully means exercising the faculty of recollection to mindfully recall and implement the yogic practices that have been practiced routinely prior to dying. Asaṅga recognizes that even the most single-minded and committed sentient being may suffer from limits in the ability to recollect actions and practices due to dementia. For this reason, Asaṅga avers that an individual who is dying skillfully can be assisted by others in the practice of yoga.560

Xuanzang states that there is no doubt or irresolution (Skt.: samśaya; Chi.: yi 疑) in the mind of the skillfully dying. This is because the sentient being who is dying skillfully does not fear the consequences of karma and is able to resist an unwholesome desire to cling to material pleasures or to the pain of sentient life. The practice of the yoga of dying results in the relinquishment of the unwholesome thoughts and behaviors that create suffering in the mind of the sentient being on the brink of death.

Unskillfully Dying

Asaṅga continues his account of the ways of dying with a description of what it means to die poorly. In his translation of the Manobhūmiḥ, Xuanzang defines dying unskillfully as follows:

How does an unskillful mind die? Sometimes in dying the individual remembers unskillful practices previously learned.
Sometimes in dying the individual remembers unskillful practices by being reminded by others.

At that time the individual remembers the unskillful practices, confusion, resentment, and unskillful thoughts enter the dying mind. Coarsely-formed and subtle perception arises, as described in the previously well-explained discussion [of the skillful mind].

云何不善心死? 犹如有一命将欲终, 自忆先时串习恶法, 或复由他令彼忆念; 彼於尔时贪瞋等俱诸不善法现行於心, 乃至麁细等想现行: 如前善說。又善心死時, 安樂而死, 將欲終時, 無極苦受逼迫於身。惡心死時, 苦惱而死。將命終時, 極重苦受逼迫於身。562

Asaṅga describes the exceedingly painful experiences that are incurred in approaching death with an unskillful mind. For the sentient being who is unable to maintain a calm and resolute state of mind when facing mortality, the pain and suffering attendant on dying beleaguer the body and the mind.563 In his vivid descriptions, Asaṅga contrasts the subjective experiences of those

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562 Skt. text from Bhattacārya, ed., Yogācārabhūmi, 18: katham akuśalacittaś cyavate / yathāpihaikatyo mriyamāṇḥ svayam eva pūrvābhyaśtan akuśaladharmān samanuprato / varaḥ va śāmīyate / tasya tasmin samayelobhādisahagatā akuśaladharmāḥ citesamudararanti yāvad audārikīsāṃjñaḥ…iti pūrvavat sarvaṃkuśalavat / Tib. (D 4035: vol. 127, folio 8b.2-5): mi dge ba'i sens dang ldan par 'chi 'pho ba ji lta bu zhe na? 'di ltar 'di na kha cig 'chi b'ai tshe, mi dge ba'i chos sngon goms pa mams dran nam, gzhan dag gis dran par byas kyang rung ste, de'i tshe de la chags pa la sogs pa mi dge ba'i chos gang dag sens la kun tu spyod pa de dag ji srid du 'du shes rags pa rgyu ba'i bar du'o zhes bya ba thams cad dge ba'i skabs snga ma dang 'dra'o/de la dge ba'i sens dang ldan par 'chi na ni/bde bar 'chi bas 'chi bar 'gyur te,'chi kar de'i lus la sduh bsgnal gyi tshor ba drag po 'byung bar mi 'gyur ro/mi dge ba'i sens dang ldan par 'chi na ni, sduh bsgnal ba'i 'ching bas 'chi bar 'gyur te, 'chi kar de'i lus la sduh bsgnal gyi tshor ba drag po 'byung bar 'gyur ro.

563 Skt. text from Bhattacārya, ed., Yogācārabhūmi, 18: katham akuśalacittaś cyavate / yathāpihaikatyo mriyamāṇḥ svayam eva pūrvābhyaśtan akuśaladharmān samanuprato / varaḥ va śāmīyate / tasya tasmin samayelobhādisahagatā akuśaladharmāḥ citesamudararanti yāvad audārikīsāṃjñaḥ…iti pūrvavat sarvaṃkuśalavat.

tatra kuśalacitto mriyamāṇaḥ sukharamāṇaḥ mriyate / tasya pragāḍhāduḥkhiḥvedanāḥ käyanāvākramaṃ māraṇāntikāḥ /akuśalacitto mriyamāṇaḥ duḥkhamāranāṇaḥ mriyate / pragāḍhāḥ ca asya duḥkkhā vedanāḥ käye'vakramaṇāntikāḥ.

Tib. (D 4035: vol. 127, folio 8b.2-5): Mi dge ba'i sens dang ldan par 'chi 'pho ba ji lta bu zhe na? 'di ltar 'di na kha cig 'chi b'ai tshe, mi dge ba'i chos sngon goms pa mams dran nam, gzhan dag gis dran par byas kyang rung ste, de'i tshe de la chags pa la sogs pa mi dge ba'i chos gang dag sens la kun tu spyod pa de dag ji srid du 'du shes rags pa rgyu ba'i bar du'o zhes bya ba thams cad dge ba'i skabs snga ma dang 'dra'o/de la dge ba'i sens dang ldan par 'chi na ni/bde bar 'chi bas 'chi bar 'gyur te,'chi kar de'i lus la sduh bsgnal gyi tshor ba drag po 'byung bar mi 'gyur ro/mi dge ba'i sens dang ldan par 'chi na ni, sduh bsgnal ba'i 'ching bas 'chi bar 'gyur te, 'chi kar de'i lus la sduh bsgnal gyi tshor ba drag po 'byung bar 'gyur ro.
who die skillfully with those who die unskillfully. For example, while a sentient being who dies with a skillful mind may experience benign visual phenomena, the being with an unskillful mind may see disturbing images at the end of life. Xuanzang writes:

In the case of the dying skillful mind, there are untroubling visible phenomena, but in the case of the dying unskillful mind, there are troubling visible phenomena.

又善心死者見不亂色相。不善心死者見亂色相. 564

Xuanzang notes that for the sentient being approaching the end of life unskillfully, states of delirium and hallucinations are common. When bad karma outweighs the good, the hallucinations can be terrifying and vivid.

At the end of life, the unskillful mind is flooded with thoughts of greed, anger, and delusion that make the process of dying psychologically terrifying and physically painful. Asaṅga, in his “fire and brimstone” pronouncements in *The Basis for Yoga Practitioners*, promises a suffering-laden rebirth for those who die with a mind bent upon unskillful mental states and behaviors. Before the painful reincarnation, however, the sentient being undergoes a gradual course of dying during which horrific imagery is projected onto the unskillful mind. The production of this phantasmagoric imagery is the unique function of the storehouse consciousness, or the ālayavijñāna. At the end of life, the memories stored within the ālayavijñāna are reactivated and projected onto the unskillful mind. The narrative thread of greed, anger, keeping company with immoral people, adhering to improper doctrines, and engaging in perverse thinking begins to unravel and take the form of horrific images. Xuanzang states:

564 Skt. text from Bhattacārya, ed., Yogācārabhūmi, 18: kuśalacittasya punar mriyamāṇasya avyākulaṃ rūpadarśanāṃ bhavati / akuśalacittasya tu vyākulaṃ rūpa-darśanāṃ bhavati// Tib.: dge ba'i sems dang ldan par 'chi ba ni gzung mthong ba 'khrul par mi 'gyur ro/mi dge ba'i sems dang ldan par 'chi ba ni gzung mthong ba 'khrul bar 'gyur ro/.
When someone with a high measure of bad karma dies, sweat spews from their pores. Their hair stands on end because of the monstrous images they behold. Their limbs tremble. They void stool and urine. Their eyes roll back. They flail, with saliva and foaming at the mouth. Then there is a reincarnation corresponding to the monstrous phenomena.\textsuperscript{565}若作上品不善業者。彼由見斯變怪相故。流汗毛竪，手足紛亂，遂失便穢。捫摸虛空翻睛咀沫。彼於爾時，有如是等變怪相生。

Xuanzang concludes that a life poorly lived produces a frightening death and an afterlife of suffering. Dying unskillfully is the “just deserts” for the bad karma accumulated during a life misspent.\textsuperscript{566} In his exegesis of dying skillfully and dying unskillfully, Xuanzang avers that all sentient beings have the potential to obtain a benign and peaceful death by practicing meritorious actions and yoga during life, or to suffer a horrific ending by engaging in unmeritorious acts and ignoring the yoga of dying.

**Dying in a Karmically Neutral Way**

Asaṅga completes his account of the three ways of dying with a description what it means to approach dying with an indeterminate state of mind. In his translations of the *Manobhūmiḥ*, Xuanzang takes care to carve out the third type of dying in the taxonomy laid out by Asaṅga, the category of “karmic indeterminacy” (Skt.: *avyākṛta*; Chi.: *wuji*無記). Xuanzang avers that the

\textsuperscript{565}Skt. text from Bhattacārya, ed., *Yogācārabhūmi*, 18: Tatra adhimātrākuśalakāriṇasthadviktanimitadarśanāt prasvedā sa jáyate / romakūpebhya sūyakaś ca bhavati / hastapādavikṣepādayaś ca bhavanti / mūtrapurīpotsargaś caabhavati / ākāśaparāmarśanam akṣiparihārvatanaṃ mukhataḥ phenaniḥsraṇām ityevanbhāgīyā dharmā upadāyante.

\textsuperscript{566}Yixing’s text of the *Pervasive and Constant Vow of the Ten-Leveled Bodhimanda* (X1470:74.258c24) reads: “How does one die with an unskilfull mind? When someone dies one initially recalls the unskilfull practices previously learned. Sometimes memory is instilled from outside. At that time, the unskilfull factors of clinging, anger and delusion are manifest immediately to the mind, up to an including the crude and stuble objects of perception manifest as if right before the eyes. Now this is dying with an unskilfull mind. 如人命將終。自憶先時串習惡法。或復由他人引起憶念。彼於爾時。貪嗔癡諸不善法現行於心。乃至麤細等想。現行於前。是為不善心死.
status of karmic indeterminacy means that at the time of dying, the karmic tendencies of the mental state of the sentient being have not been determined. The indeterminate mind stands in the balance and can be tipped toward a benign or a painful death, depending on the actions taken by the sentient being at the end of life.

Asaṅga poses the following question: How does one die with an indeterminate, or a karmically neutral, or avyākta, mental state? He writes:

Dying with an indeterminate mind means that one’s practices are neither skillful nor unskillful. Or one does not undertake any practices at all. When one is about to meet one’s final moments of life, one cannot recollect anything. Nor can others induce recollection. Then, the neither skillful nor unskillful mind, dies. One does not die peacefully, nor does one die with much vexation. In this state, some humans independently recall the good dharma that they have practiced. Some, in meeting their final moments, cannot remember anything – and moreover, there is no one available to remind them who is dying, and induce recollection of these practices. Furthermore, when an individual [pudgala] who has acted in a wholesome or unwholesome way is about to die, s/he may spontaneously remember the wholesome or unwholesome [dharmas] that s/he previously cultivated, and that may lead to further memories. At that time, her\'his mind will tend to register those of her\'his repeated habits that were most dominant. The rest are entirely forgotten.\(^567\)

In the depiction of dying with an indeterminate mind, Asaṅga identifies three factors that

\(^{567}\) This translation has made reference to that of Lusthaus (2013, p. 591) however, very heavy modifications have been made.

\(^{568}\) T1579:30.281.c01-05.
are specific to this category of dying. The first is that the state of the memory of the indeterminate mind is vague and the ability to recall practices is impaired. The second is that dying with an indeterminate mind is hedonically neutral in that it is neither particularly benign nor particularly painful. The third is that the conditions of the mind can be either improved by carrying out skillful practices or remain unimproved by eschewing rituals and yogic practices.

In his *Summary of Abhidharma* Asaṅga is in lock-step with the earlier Abhidharma commentators in their assessment that consciousness at the time of dying is subtle and faint. Therefore the indeterminate mind of a sentient being facing mortality struggles to recall meritorious practices. Additionally, the sentient being with an indeterminate mind is not able to rely upon others to remember the yoga of dying. Asaṅga notes that while the indeterminate mind is subtle and faint, it is filled with mental experiences. As in other types of dying, the quality of

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570 Saṅghabhadra says in his *Clarification of Tenets* (T1563:29.848.c1-6), in response to the question of what constitutes a morally-indeterminate manovijñāna at the end-of-life: “Although manovijñāna contains mental states associated with three types of sensation (i.e., painful, pleasurable, and neither-painful-nor-pleasurable), yet, at the time of dying or becoming reincarnated there is only neutral sensation. The nature of this [neutral sensation], depending upon the time of dying or becoming reincarnated consists in two kinds of sensations: pain and pleasure. The nature of the sensation that is extremely clear and advantageous does not conform to the nature of consciousness at the time of dying or of becoming reincarnated. The very definition of consciousness at the time of dying or of becoming reincarnated is “opaque” (literally, “not-clear”), since at these times, consciousness is faint and opaque” 意識雖具三受相應。而死生時唯有舍受非苦樂受。性不明利。順死生時，苦樂二受。性極明利，不順死生。非明利識有死生義。以死生時必昧劣故。This is a gloss unpacking the meaning of description of the morally-neutral mind – exercising upekṣā is the precondition for coalescing the sense of clarity and advantageousness that carries one through the end-of-life stage.

571 Xuanzang’s translation of Sthiramati’s commentary on Asaṅga’s *Summary of Abhidharma* (T1606:31.722.a05-12) reads: “Dying with an indeterminate mind means, that one dies with clarity and mental acuity or one dies without clarity and mental acuity. For some [dying indeterminately], either set of conditions [of clarity and mental acuity] are absent. Some implement applied practices (prayoga) without effort, and give rise to the indeterminate mind at the end of their life. Those [who apply applied practices] are referred to here under the “skillful,” etc., mind in dying. One should know that, like the explanation of the unskillfully dying mind, the [neutrally] dying mind has its basis in the attachment to the states corresponding with ātman. This is the teaching pertaining to the stage of the end-of-life.”
the mental projections experienced by a sentient being nearing death is due to the balance of karma. Asaṅga proclaims that if good karma outweighs the bad, the mental images that are experienced at the time of dying will be benign, rather than frightening.

In his exegesis and translations of Manobhūmiḥ, Xuanzang concludes that the psychological and physiological experience of dying is determined by the mental condition, or the quality of the thoughts and behaviors, that are held in the mind of the sentient being approaching the end of life. He avers that the mental condition of the sentient being is determined ineluctably by karma. With this theoretical groundwork in place, Xuanzang turns to investigate practices to achieve a benign and peaceful course of dying. He finds that improving the course of dying necessarily begins by learning how to overcome the biologically pre-programmed fear of death that is innate to all sentient creatures.

Section Four: Overcoming the Fear of Dying

While encountering his own and others’ near-death experiences during his pilgrimage throughout the Western Regions, Xuanzang engages in a search to understand the fear of dying. In his translation corpus and exegesis of the Indic texts, Xuanzang devotes himself to an exploration of the etiology of existential anxiety. Based upon his subjective knowledge and the observations of others who encounter mortality during his travels, Xuanzang stipulates that the fear of dying is experienced by all human beings. He surmises that all sentient beings, even those who die skillfully, must contend with the primitive and innate fear of dying. Xuanzang therefore concludes that, in the face of impending death, all sentient beings have a basic and “primal desire (Skt.: sahabhūṭṛṣṇa; Chi.: jusheng ai 俱生愛)” to cling to life.⁵⁺⁷⁻ In the Viniṣcayasamagrahaṇī

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⁵⁺⁷⁻ As Lingtai’s commentary on CWSL (X819:50.276.b13-15) reads: “Because the nine types of dying minds are associated with inherent desire (Sahabhūṭṛṣṇa). Therefore, we know that they are based in contamination, because
section of Asaṅga’s *Basis for Yoga Practitioners*, “the unhinged pudgala” (Chi.: *fangyi puteqieluo 放逸補特迦蘿*) is contrasted to the collected state of mind of the Bhikṣu going into the stage of dying. Here, Asaṅga’s *Basis for Yoga Practitioners* enjoins yogic practitioners to avoid “perpetually dying” by undertaking a series of practices aimed at liberation from dying, and from the whole process of death and rebirth, or *samsāra* (Chi.: *shengsi 生死*). Asaṅga’s *Basis for Yoga Practitioners* stipulates, that, if one does not die well in the present life, this may or may not be because of karma from a past life. Furthermore, whether or not one cultivated well and died well in a past life is not determinative that one will not die well in this life.

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573 Translation based upon Xuanzang’s translation of the passage in *Viniścayasamagrhaṇī* “How is it that one devoted to the zealous study of the Vinaya, a Bhikṣu, is vigilant at the third watch (of the Vinaya), that is, a Bhikṣu? At the end of life, his mind is acutely composed (Tib.: *drag po mngon par ’du byed*). In meeting the end, he dies with mind composed and bent upon the skillful dharma. He says to himself: ‘I, Bhikṣu, am dying with recollection of the perception of the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Saṅgha’ He should die with a mind bent upon skillfulness, and so, in all ways, thus guard and protect the mindfulness: When the Buddhist follower faces the time of dying, essentially, in brief it is good to maintain the skillful state of mind at the time of dying with the recollection focused on the perception of the Buddha. This is a good way of dying. And it is a good way of becoming reborn into the next life. One should, at the third watch of the Vinaya, as a faithful follower of the Buddhist vinaya modestly go about it like that without being non-vigilant (Skt.: *apramāda*).”

574 Yogācārabhūmi (T1579:30.379.a23-4): Those with vigilance (*pramāda*) do not leave traces behind in dying, the unhinged leave traces behind. Those who are vigilant do not die again. The unhinged will die perpetually (*saṃsāra*). 無逸不死跡；放逸為死跡；無逸者不死；縱逸者常死.

575 Dullyun’s commentary cites the opinion of Kuiji that provides some clarity on the *Yogācārabhūmi* poem from fascicle 18 (T1579:30.379a23-4): “If there are unhinged pudgalas who do not presently prepare for dying, then since they have died without preparing in the past, then they will not prepare well for dying in the present or in the future. Master Kuiji says: this refers to the cultivation of the truth of the path along the path involving...
Xuanzang’s examination of the existential fear of death begins with his translations of the *Mahāvibhaṣa* texts and culminates in his later, and original, work found in the CWSL. In his exegesis of the *Mahāvibhaṣa*, Xuanzang isolates and identifies the three primary components of the fear of dying: the fear of no longer living, the fear of being in the end stage of life and the fear of being reincarnated into a life ridden with pain and suffering. Continuing in his translation of the *Mahāvibhaṣa*, Xuanzang examines how the Buddha, during the culmination of his meditation under the bodhi tree, overcomes Māra, the embodiment of the unskillful emotions of greed, hate and delusion. Xuanzang regards the resistance of the temptations of Māra to be the greatest achievement of the Buddha, and a lesson to all sentient beings. Later, in his CWSL, Xuanzang revisits the problem of existential anxiety experienced by all human beings in a discussion of the three elements of clinging, anger, and delusion. Throughout his exploration of the ancient sūtras, Xuanzang illustrates how ordinary humans, residing in the dusty *sahā* world of the *kāmadhātu*, possess an ingrained fear of dying inculcated by experiences of pain and suffering in past lives.

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576 *Mahāvibhaṣa*, fascicle 26 (T27n1545p0386b21-22) Question: who has fear? The sage? The ordinary human (pṛthagjana) or both? *問異生聖者誰有怖耶。有作是說。異生有怖聖者無怖.* Response: The ordinary human has fear, but the sage has no fear. *所以者何? 聖者已離五怖畏故。五怖畏者: 一、不活畏。二、惡名畏。三、怯眾畏。四、命終畏。五、惡趣畏.*

577 CWSL, fascicle 4 (T1585:31.22.c10-15): The *kleśas* necessarily carry along with them, inherently, the subsidiary *kleśas* (*anukleśas*). Hence, the word, *kleśa* is sufficient to communicate along with it the subsidiary *kleśas*. 煩惱必與隨煩惱俱。故此餘言顯隨煩惱.

There is a doctrine which holds that there are five *anukleśas* that are omnipresent along with all polluted mental states. For instance, the *Summary of the Abhidharma* holds that depression and disconsolation, unfaithfulness,
The story of the Buddha, however, offers the hope that suffering at the end of life can be transcended by mastering the fear of dying. *The Basis for Yoga Practitioners* offers the hope that, even if one has not prepared for dying, and has undergone painful ways of dying in the past life, there is room in the present life to die better than in a past life. There is room, in this present life, to die better than one has already died in a past life.\(^{578}\)

**The Three Fears**

According to the taxonomy laid out in Xuanzang’s *Mahāvibhāṣa*, the three forms of fear related to dying are as follows: the fear of no-longer living, the fear of suffering at the end of life, and the fear of reincarnation into a life of suffering.

The subject of the fear of dying appears in chapter twenty of the *Mahāvibhāṣa*, within an examination of how suffering arises from clinging to the *skandhas*, the five aggregates that constitute the physical and mental existence of a sentient being. The *Mahāvibhāṣa* editors place the fear of dying in the context of a discussion of the five *skandhas* to highlight the primacy of this fear for sentient beings.\(^{579}\) Here, the *Mahāvibhāṣa* editors construct a fivefold taxonomy of the types of fears experienced by human beings. The five forms of human fear are as follows:

1. The fear of no longer living.

\(^{578}\) *Yogācārabhūmi, Viniścayasamagrahaṇī*, fascicle 18: “If one, in the present life, prepares well for dying, then at the time of dying, since in the past one has already died, and since one did not prepare well for dying then (in the past life), in the present life, it is not because one did not prepare for dying (in a past life) that one does not die well. In the future life dying well is not because of whether one has already died well in a past life, nor is it because one has *not* died well (in a past life)” *於現在世，由調善死，而正死時，由過去死已死，於過去世，亦由不調善死，於現在世不由不調善死而死。於未來世不由調善死，不由不調善死而死。* [T30n1579p0379b10-13].

\(^{579}\) *YBh*: Those with vigilance (*pramāda*) do not leave traces behind in dying, the unhinged leave traces behind. Those who are vigilant do not die again. The unhinged will die perpetually (*in samsāra*). 無逸不死跡 放逸為死跡 無逸者不死 經逸者常死 [T30n1579p0379a23-4].
(2) The fear of public humiliation.

(3) The fear of massive crowds.

(4) The fear of suffering in the final stage of life.

(5) The fear of being reincarnated into an unhappy place.

The Mahāvibhāṣa editors aver that dying, in general, is a primary source of fear for sentient beings. On the list of the five basic fears of human beings are three variables directly related to dying: the fear of no longer living, the fear associated with the pain and suffering of nearing the end of life, and the fear of being reborn into an incarnation of pain and suffering. The Mahāvibhāṣa text also posits that the five forms of fear are encumbrances that obstruct the path toward enlightenment.

In the discussion of the primary fears of the human being, the Mahāvibhāṣa editors consider the “appropriating skandhas” (Skt.: upadānaskandhas), the aggregates that account for the bodily desires, or the urges to “appropriate” (Skt. upadāna) food, sex, and material objects for pleasure. The fear associated with the relinquishment of the possessions and sensory pleasures of the material realm is regarded as a form of suffering for sentient beings. The root of this type of suffering is found in rāga 貪 the “greedy clinging” to the sense of well-being that feeds the “appropriating skandhas.” The Mahāvibhāṣa editors identify a deeply ingrained aversion to the loss of possessions (Skt. trṣṇa) as central to the fear of no-longer living. No-longer living involves facing the inevitable of loss of mortal pleasures.

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580 Dessein (2008, p. 22): for the Vaibhāṣikas, the general state of defilement (kles’a), the contaminants (anus’aya) envoked by it that lead to mental misconduct (manodus’carita) and the actual bad actions (akus’ala karman) that proceed from this, form an interconnected chain, linking defilement to a life-stream.

581 Puguang, Study Notes on the Kośa (Jushe lun ji), fascicle 15: “fear of no longer living is one of five types of fear that the sage overcomes. One does not cling to life at the end, thus one is without the fear of the end of life.” 聖人不畏不活無不活畏 不戀命終故無命終畏 (T1821:41.250.a02-3).
In his analysis of this portion of the Mahāvibhāṣa text, Xuanzang avers that the egotistical part (Skt.: ātman) of the sentient being is invested in the preservation of the material objects and sensory pleasures of life. According to Xuanzang, this is due to the illusion that the “owner” (Chi.: zhu 主) of material things is permanent and unchanging. The Mahāvibhāṣa editors posit that the covetous seeking and clinging to pleasurable objects perpetuates the delusions of a permanent self. Therefore, the fear of loss is driven by the chimera of an ego, ātman, or self, to whom the material possessions and pleasures of life belong.

Xuanzang diagnoses the clinging to bodily desires and material objects as based in the mistaken view of satkaya, the idea that the ātman is embodied. The embodied ātman is denied by Buddhism. Instead, according to Buddhist teachings, the stream of the conscious mind (Skt.: saṃtāna) provides the continuity of the sentient being. Thus, in his analysis of the fear of dying, Xuanzang upholds the tenet of no-self.

**The Buddha Overcomes the Fear of Dying**

In his translation of the Mahāvibhāṣa chapter on the skandhas, Xuanzang includes the story of the Buddha defying the assault of the demon Māra, the embodiment of unskillful emotions, to quell (Chi.: tiāofu 調伏) his fear of dying and obtain enlightenment. Xuanzang uses this episode in the life of the Buddha to make the doctrinal point that while the fear of dying is ingrained in all human beings, it can be overcome by enlisting the five indriyas of faith, concentration, perseverance, mindfulness, and wisdom. In the story of his temptation, the Buddha uses the five cultivatable indriyas to vanquish the demon Māra, the symbol of the fear-based obstructions to enlightenment. In mastering his fear of dying, the Buddha obtains liberation from the cycle of rebirth and death.
In this famous episode of the life of the Buddha, the Māra sends his three daughters to Siddhartha Gautama while he is meditating under the bodhi tree to entice him to relinquish his quest for spiritual enlightenment. The daughters are the embodiments of the three poisons of craving, aversion and delusion. By enlisting the five skillful indriyas, the Buddha maintains his faith, focus, perseverance, mindfulness, and wisdom and stays the course of meditative insight. While the women shimmer with beauty, the Buddha sees through their glittering exteriors to their “skin, bones, and sinews.” From the enlightened perspective of the Buddha, the “three courtesans” sent by the Demon Māra are no more alluring than “three fetid cadavers.” By reining in, or “yoking” (Skt.: xi 繫) the temptations and distractions sent by Māra, the Buddha effaces the fear of dying and the cravings that sustain this fear. At this point, the Buddha is beyond fear because he is not subject to the cravings that are sustained by the illusory notion of continued survival in a defiled human body.

In his exegesis of the Mahāvibhāṣa, Xuanzang underscores the doctrinal message that the cultivation of the five indriyas allays the fear of dying that is the fundamental obstruction to liberation. By following the path of the Buddha, the sentient being opens the possibility of seeing

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582 Mahāvibhāṣa 135: As the sūtras say: the three feminine forms of māra emanated several hundred female forms. These were young girls, pregnant, and non-pregnant women, middle-aged women and old women in the number of several hundred. Moreover, they were naturally comely and resplendent in their emanations and tempted the Bodhisattva to pay a visit with them, telling the Bodhisattva (i.e., the Buddha-to-be): “Come hither and I wish to consort with you.” The bodhisattva did not accept, and quit the scene with shame and contrition by causing them in his thinking to become old and frail. 如契經說。有三魔女各化作多百女身。所謂童女產未產女。中女老女。其數容百。又自化身種種嚴飾。為惑媚故詣菩薩所。謂菩薩曰。可起沙門。我等今來願相適事。菩薩不受。尋令彼身作衰老形羞慚而退。How do you know that it is so? I once heart that the Bhadānta Upagupta stood upright in meditation in the dhyāna absorption, but was cajoled by the demon Māra, then he knew it was Māra In order to quell her (the demon Māra), by way of his supranormal powers he transformed the women into three dead bodies. And he yoked these around the neck of King Māra. The dead snake, dead dog, and the dead person are the extreme shame of kind māra, no matter what means he tries, he cannot remove them. These three are the three corpuses that hung around his neck and even when Māra quickly changed their smell, it goes without saying that the monks were afraid of him. In order to remove the dead bodies Māra jumped into a well and then soared off into the sky.” 云何知然。曾聞尊者鄔波毱多。端身靜慮魔為嬈弄。便以花鬘冠尊者頂。尊者出定驚怪念言：“此誰所作尋？”則知此是魔所為。為調彼故則以神力化作三屍。繫魔王頸。所謂死蛇死狗死人。於是魔王極懷慚恥。種種方便欲去不能。所繫三屍纏遶其頸。轉急轉臭僧伽所。為脱屍故。便陷入地更出騰空。
through the illusions of the material world, relinquishing unwholesome impulses and dispelling the fear of dying that obstructs the path to enlightenment. The path to enlightenment is thus available to all who cultivate the *indriyas* through meditative insight.

In his commentary on the tenth verse of the second chapter of Vasubandhu’s *Treasury of Abhidharma*, “The Discrimination of Faculties,” Yaśomitra concurs with Xuanzang regarding the centrality of craving in the subjective experiences of fear and suffering in dying sentient beings. Yaśomitra enlists the story of the temptation of the Buddha to illustrate how the demon Māra embodies the fear of a painful course of dying and the fear of suffering in an afterlife that is unknown. Both Yaśomitra and Xuanzang use the life of the historical Buddha to make the doctrinal point that the fear of dying, and the fear of an unknown afterlife, can be subdued by cultivating the skillful *indriyas*.

**The Root of the Fear of Dying: Clinging, Anger, and Delusion**

In his original work in the CWSL, Xuanzang conceptualizes the fear of dying as a pre-programmed aversion to suffering that is based on experiences of dying in past lives. Xuanzang views the subliminal awareness of the pain of past lives as rooted in the *ālayavijñāna*, the storehouse consciousness of the sentient being. The trace memories of pain and suffering endured in prior lives that are stored in the mind inform the subjective experiences of sentient beings dying in the here-and-now. Sentient beings *know* that rebirth entails re-death. Xuanzang notes that the life of the Buddha illustrates how the mastery of the fear of dying results in liberation by breaking the cycle of death and rebirth.

In fascicle five of the CWSL, Xuanzang formulates a taxonomy of one hundred eight mental and bodily afflictions that contribute to the fear of dying in a sentient being. He states that
the fear of dying is generated by the three poisons (Skt. *sandu* 三毒) that form the primary *kleśas* of craving, aversion and delusion. According to Xuanzang, when the six sensory *indriyas* of vision, hearing, taste, smell, touch, and the mind are exposed to the toxins of craving, aversion, and delusion, they become afflicted in six negative ways. The six afflicted states of the *indriyas*, or the “six major afflictions” (Chi.: *da fannao di fa* 大煩惱地法), are unfaithfulness, sluggishness, disconsolation, excitability, unconsciousness, and forgetfulness. When, for example, the *indriya* of mindfulness or perseverance is afflicted by disconsolation, a secondary wave of fear is released into the mind of the dying. The one hundred eight mental and bodily afflictions therefore contribute to the fearful mental state of the dying sentient being.

The taxonomy of the one hundred eight afflictions (Skt.: *anukleśas*; *sui fannao* 隨煩惱) provides the doctrinal support for the practice of the rites of contrition that are observed in Mahāyāna Buddhism. In this ritual, the practitioner holds the Buddhist rosary of one hundred eight beads that represent each one of the afflictions. Through chanting and recitation while holding the beads, the practitioner expiates the bad karma generated by the three poisons and battles the one hundred eight fears of dying. Xuanzang recommends this practice for the living as well as for those facing dying, as it is meant to cultivate the five skillful *indriyas* that aid the skillfully dying mind.

**Indeterminacy and Dying in a Skillful Way**

In his discussion of the primary fear of dying in the CWSL, Xuanzang introduces the idea that a sentient being who has accumulated a share of bad karma in life can improve his or her moral circumstances in the final days and hours of life. Improving the moral and hedonic quality

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583 The alternative derivation for the number of 108 kleśas is arrived at by the sum of ten declivities 十纏 and ninety-five factors of bondage 九十五結.
of dying entails deactivating the unskillful *indriyas* of anxiety and suffering, and activating the skillful *indriyas* of faith, concentration, perseverance, mindfulness, and wisdom. This concept is based on the idea of the indeterminacy of mind, which avers that even the mind of a deluded sentient being can be improved at the end of life.

In his analysis of the moral grades of dying, Xuanzang develops a taxonomy of the “nine moral grades of minds” (Chi. *jiuzhong mingzhong xin* 九種命心) of sentient beings who approach the end of life with an accumulation of bad karma. This taxonomy is based on two variables: the degree to which the skillful and unskillful *indriyas* are developed and the degree to which the quality of the mind and the body is in an unwholesome state due to the activation of the *indriyas* of anxiety and suffering and the inactivation of the skillful *indriyas*. There are nine grades of mind of sentient beings who have accumulated a portion of bad karma at the end stage of life. The first group is the three states of mind 三品 where anxiety and suffering are present and producing unwholesome thoughts and actions 不善能發業. The second set of six states 六品 of mind is where anxiety and suffering are present but not producing unwholesome thoughts and actions 不能發業. According to Kuiji’s⁵⁸⁴ and Dullyun’s⁵⁸⁵ exegeses (contained within their respective commentaries on the *Yogācārabhūmi*) on the term,⁵⁸⁶ these nine moral grades are all impedimentary morally-indeterminate (Skt.: *nivṛtāvyākṛta*; Chi. *Youfu wuji* 有覆無記) in nature. This means that all nine moral grades of mind but the final result of dying has not been determined (*avyākṛta*), although spiritual impediments are definitely present.

The doctrinal significance of the taxonomy is important in that Xuanzang posits that even sentient beings with a high portion of bad karma have the potential to improve their karmic

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⁵⁸⁴ T1585:31.44.b24.
⁵⁸⁵ T1828:42.321.c6
⁵⁸⁶ As it appears in the CWSL at T1585:31.25b (contained within their commentaries on the *Yogācārabhūmi*).
standing at the end of life.

What is Karmic Indeterminacy?

For Xuanzang, who follows the spirit and the letter of Vasubandhu’s teaching in Chapter Three of the *Treasury of Abhidharma*, on “Discriminating Worldly Things,” the “state of dying” (Skt.: *cyutirbhava*) comes at the end of a life and before the afterlife. Thirty stanzas later, Vasubandhu elaborates upon the qualities of the state of dying. In this stanza, Vasubandhu depicts the moral and amoral qualities manifested by the dying sentient being:

Rupture of the skillful roots or retaining them, detachment or loss of detachment, dying and becoming reincarnated, all of these are regarded as mental consciousness. Dying and becoming reborn are naught but aversive sensation.  

The above stanza describes the moral state of dying indeterminately. It demonstrates this indeterminacy by laying out two sets of alternatives: first, dying after having severed the skillful roots or retained the skillful roots; second, dying with a contaminated state of mind or dying with a pure state of mind. Dying is characterized as “naught but aversive” for two reasons. First, aversion represents a state of indeterminate karmic and hedonic quality. Raw aversion – the primal

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587 Shastri, *Sphuṭārtha*, vol. 2, 418-9
sense of recoiling in the face of pain – can be transformed into a skillful sense of retiring indifference in the face of pain. Second, the sense of aversion accounts for the “hazy and faint” (Chi.: mei lie 昧劣) nature of sensation in the dying being. According to the explanation Xuanzang develops, the morally neutral non-impedimentary conditions one finds oneself in during the stage of death make room for adjustment – changes for the better or worse.

In Xuanzang’s *Mahāvibhāṣa*, this category of avyākṛta applies to deaths and transmigratory rebirths, in addition to indriyas and their interrelation. In this Sarvāstivāda conceptual schema, the exercise of the “skillful-cultivatable indriyas” (Chi.: shanxiu gen 善修根) and the “skillful exercise” of indeterminate indriyas is thought to eventually lead toward higher rebirths, and thus the prospect of achieving salvation, while “unskillful” actions do not.

In Xuanzang’s understanding of karma as cetanā or intentional activity – because physical and verbal actions are thought to be merely an expression of some inner intention – physical and verbal actions are not thought to have the karmic quality of good or bad in and of themselves, but are rather considered to be of indeterminate karmic quality. Accordingly, a karmically neutral death is a death of neither positive nor negative hedonic quality. It is neither particularly painful nor particularly peaceful. A karmically neutral death is a avyākṛta or karmically indeterminate way of dying that has already happened – that is, the sentient being has already died in a way that is neither hedonically nor morally bad or good.

In his glosses on indeterminate ways of dying, Asaṅga expresses the thought that within

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590 *Mahāvibhāṣa*, fascicle 155: “Question: For what reason do all sentient beings at the end of life, and at the moment of conception, necessarily abide in aversive sensation?” 問：何因緣故一切有情命終結生必住捨受.

Reply: the five kinds of hedonic sensations do not have haziness or faintness as their mode of operation (ākāra). But aversion sensation in the state of dotage is not hazy or faint. For example, dying or the state of becoming reincarnated, they abide in aversive sensation in meeting the end of life or in becoming reincarnated. 答：於五受中，無有行相昧劣。如捨受者。於十時中，無有昧劣。如死、及生時者，故住捨受命結生.
such scenarios, there is room for improvement as well as for deterioration. The basic thought that Xuanzang extracts from the *Summary of Abhidharma* gloss is that “intrinsically neutral” refers to things that are basically not of a karmic nature, in the sense that they are not related to good or bad karma. The *Summary of Abhidharma* is a seminal work of Asaṅga that is cited heavily in Xuanzang’s CWSL. Xuanzang thus treats it as a work of Mahāyāna Abhidharma—a bridge text from the earlier Abhidharma to the Yogācāra portions of Asaṅga’s corpus. According to the understanding of intrinsic karmic neutrality established by Asaṅga in this work, factors include vitality, conspecificity, name (Skt.: nāman; Chi.: ming名), syllable (Skt.: kāya; Chi.: wenshen文身), and sentence (Skt: vyāñjana; Chi.: jushen句身). These factors are neither inherently bad nor inherently good—rather, they are invested with a moral dimension with a specific intention—whether skillful, unskillful, or neither. For example, having vitality is not inherently good or bad, it is just a brute fact of life. The same is true of conspecificity. Some species populating certain

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591 Within the CWSL’s discussions the topic of the four moral grades of kuśala, akuśala, impedimentary, and non-imedimentary avyākṛta is introduced within the subject of the path of learning and of no-learning. (śaikṣyāśaikṣyamārga). The text (T158:31.27.a17-24) reads: “the paths of learning (śaikṣya) and not-involving-learning (asaikṣya), can, in sum, be divided into four portions: the skillful, the unskillful, the impedimentary and the non-impedimentary – i.e., the two forms of moral neutrality in hedonic experience (vedanā).”

592 These factors are neither inherently bad nor inherently good—rather, they are invested with a moral dimension with a specific intention—whether skillful, unskillful, or neither. For example, having vitality is not inherently good or bad, it is just a brute fact of life. The same is true of conspecificity. Some species populating certain
are considered to be more spiritually advanced than others, but belonging to a given species is not a trait that bears an intrinsic moral shade. It is how one lives within that dhātu that imbues the dhātu factor with a particular moral tinge.

The other distinction introduced in the corpus of Chinese exegesis on Vasubandhu's Treasury is the distinction between “impedimentary moral indeterminacy” (Skt.: nivṛtāvyākṛta; Chi.: youfu wuji 有覆無記) or “non-impedimentary” determinacy (Skt.: anivṛtāvyākṛta; Chi.: wufu wuji 無覆無記). Impedimentary moral indeterminacy describes entering the stage of dying under the conditions decreed by the course of prior karma. Non-impedimentary moral determinacy describes the conditions that are modifiable or subject to improvement, either by yogic practice or by ritual intervention at the end of life.

Xuanzang’s translation of Asaṅga’s Summary of Abhidharma offers an eightfold taxonomy of the definitions of avyākṛta factors. Other authors derive further distinctions within the category of avyakṛta, but moral impedimency (Skt.: nivṛtā; Chi: youfu 有覆) and non-impedimency (Skt.: anivṛtā; Chi.: wufu 無覆) are the most general twofold distinction. The various sub-distinctions

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593 Nyāyanusāra śāstra 30 (T1562:29.514.a11-12); also passage found in XZL 15: “Since ārhat have profound disaffection towards future rebirth. Therefore, at the end of their life, they eschew the causal basis of skillful karma and reside only within the impedimentary or impedimentary neutral states, since the power (śakti) of those states is weak. The ārhat conforms to the opaque, weak state [of neutrality] in severing the mind, and thus attaining nirvāṇā, abiding only within the two forms of karmic neutrality (i.e., impedimentary and non-impedimentary).”

594 Abhidharmakosādaśāstra says that four faculties are the last to terminate in the case of gradually dying with a morally-neutral mind: “When one meets the end gradually with a morally-neutral mind, the final to desert the body are the faculties of proprioception/tactition, the mind, vitality, and aversion.” 無記心漸命終時，最後舍四根，身•意•命•護根。The prolific 6th-century scholiast Jingying Huiyuan clarifies: “If one is on course for upward rebirth when dying out from the kāmadhātu, one’s the five faculties are necessarily deserted, namely, the faculty of tactition, mind, life, aversion, and the bimodally-gendered faculty. How many faculties are deserted by the bimodally gendered human [within the kāmadhātu]? This is because those with dual-gender (dvivyāñjanam) do not graduate by becoming reincarnated into a higher realm.” 諸阿羅漢。深厭當生。故命終時。避彼因善。唯二無記。勢力劣故。順於昧劣相續斷心。故入涅槃。唯二無記.

594 Abhidharmakosādaśāstra says that four faculties are the last to terminate in the case of gradually dying with a morally-neutral mind: “When one meets the end gradually with a morally-neutral mind, the final to desert the body are the faculties of proprioception/tactition, the mind, vitality, and aversion.” 無記心漸命終時，最後舍四根，身•意•命•護根。The prolific 6th-century scholiast Jingying Huiyuan clarifies: “If one is on course for upward rebirth when dying out from the kāmadhātu, one’s the five faculties are necessarily deserted, namely, the faculty of tactition, mind, life, aversion, and the bimodally-gendered faculty. How many faculties are deserted by the bimodally gendered human [within the kāmadhātu]? This is because those with dual-gender (dvivyāñjanam) do not graduate by becoming reincarnated into a higher realm.” 諸阿羅漢。深厭當生。故命終時。避彼因善。唯二無記。勢力劣故。順於昧劣相續斷心。故入涅槃。唯二無記.
Chapter 3: What Is Dying Well?

and hairsplitting analyses of the concept of *avyākṛta* lie beyond the scope of this limited study.\(^{595}\) CWSL glosses the term “impedimentary moral neutrality” as indicating the capability to present two forms of impediment of the practitioner: “firstly, it can obstruct the pure dharma of s/he bent upon the sagely path (Skt.: *āryamārga*), and secondly, it can shade over the clear mind and render it impure.” 有覆無記:覆謂染法，障聖道故，又能蔽心，令不淨故.

So, based upon the picture presented in *The Basis for Yoga Practitioners*, the work of a “mature” Asaṅga – what, if anything, can the dying human mind to tilt the scale in its favor, even in the final moments of one’s life? Xuanzang’s accounts of dying in a neutral way unfurl in his translation of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, later adopted into a ritual manual compiled by the Esoteric Buddhist scholar and translator Yixing 一行 (683-727). In Yixing’s text, titled, the *Rites of Contrition for Negative Karmic Recompense 罪報懺悔*,\(^{596}\) the neutral way of dying features in a discussion of the mechanics of “contrition” (Chi.: *chanhui* 懺悔). In fact, Yixing quotes, verbatim, the *Yogācārabhūmi*’s description of the moral psychology of the neutral ways of dying. In this ritual text, Yixing extracts the idea of dying in a karmic-neutrally way found in Xuanzang translation of *The Basis for Yoga Practitioners*, and weds this description of dying to the idea of deathbed contrition. The thought is that even those who make contrition for past misdeeds upon their deathbed can achieve the result of a more peaceful course of dying.\(^{597}\) This result can be

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595 For the definition of *avyākṛta* according to Sarvāstivada Abhidharma, see Dhammajoti (2007, pp. 539-41), “Determinate and Indeterminate Karma” (Section 14.3 of Chapter Three “Karma and the Nature of its Retribution”).

596 This text attributed to Yixing is found in a later Song-Dynasty compilation, entitled, Guide for the Contrition Rites of the Pervasive and Constant Vow of the Ten-Leveled Bodhimanda of the Sea- Seal on the Buddha’s腹部 sūtra 大方廣佛華嚴經海印道場十重行願常循禮懺儀, fascicle 12.

597 Yixing adapts Xuanzang’s *Yogācārabhūmi* into rites of contrition for the dying. This text mentions the indeterminate dying mind’s need to “make contrition for retribution for bad acts:” “The indeterminately dying mind is fogged under and inalert. Although it is not overly vexed in dying, it is not particularly peaceful either. There is a need to make contrition for bad karmic recompense.” 無記心死者，昏懵不惺。雖非苦惱死，亦非安樂死。罪報懺悔 (X74n1470p0259a08).
achieved through the proper practice of contrition, which entails repenting for any negative actions one may have done in present or past lives, to clear karmic obstacles that may be causing worldly difficulties:

However, the experience is more troubling with the scenario in which the sum of the bad karma slightly outweighs that of the good, and yet nothing is done to rectify that unfortunate situation. If unskillful karma predominates, the passage of death in a karmically-indeterminate mental state (Skt.: *avyākṛta-citta*) consists in terrifying darkness succeeded by bright light. In the final moments of life, the dying person relives these experiences of various unskillful actions in the form of departing visions. Asaṅga pronounces the fate of those who started out in an indeterminate state that has taken a turn for the worse as follows:

受盡先業所引果已, 若行不善業者。當於爾時, 受先所作諸不善業, 所不愛果之前相, 猶如夢中見無量種變怪色相。依此相故薄伽梵說. 598

When that fruit of previous actions is exhausted, and the effects are realized, as for the doer of unskillful actions, he first experiences the previous signs of the undesired fruit of unskillful actions, and as if dreaming of those unskillful actions, he experiences the monstrous 变怪 manifold visible phenomena of this [undesired fruit] – this was taught through implicit meaning (Skt.: *sandhā*) by the World-Honored-One:

若有先作惡不善業, 及增長已, 彼於爾時如日後分, 或山山峯影等, 懸覆遍覆極覆。當知如是補特伽羅從明趣闇. 599

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598 Bhattacarya, Yogācārabhūmi, 18: kurvann upayukte tasmin pūrvakarmākṣiptephale 'kuśalakarmakārī iha pūrvakṛtasya aksalasya anistaphalasya karmanāḥ pūrvanimitthī pratyanabhavati /tadyathāsvapna iva anekavikṛta rūpadarśanam asya bhavati/Tib. (D 4035: vol. 127, folio/line 9a.2-9a.3 ): sngon gyi las kyi 'phangs pa'i 'bras bu de spyad nas 'chi ba'i dus byed pa de'i tshe mi dge ba'i las byed byed pa ni mi dge ba snag byas pa'i mi sdug pa'i 'bras bu'i las kyi snga las mams 'dir myong bar 'gyur te….

599 Bhattacarya, Yogācārabhūmi, 18: yad asya pūrvakaṃ pāpakam aksalaṃ karma kṛtāṃ bhavaty upacitaṃ tat tasya tasmin samayesāyāhnakālaiva parvatānāṃ vāparvata-kūṭānāṃ vā chāya iva avalambate 'dhyavalambate/bhilambate ca / iti // ayaṃ ca pudgalo jyotistamaḥpārayaṇo veditavyaḥ /de sngon sdig pa mi dge ba'i las byas sheng bsags par gyur ba gang yin pa de'i tshe de la pyam red kyi dus tse ri mams sam. rī'i rtse mo mams kyi grib ma bzhin bab cing. lhak par 'phap la mngron du…/bab par 'gyur ro zhes gsungs te. gang zak de na snang pa nas mun kyod du 'go pa lta pur rig par bya'o. D 4035: vol. 127, folio/line 9a.3-9a.4.
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If one’s unskillful karma consisting of previous bad actions predominates (over the good), then at evening time shade is seen as if veiled by jagged mountain-peaks covering over everything with shade.’ – thus it was said – it should be known that this person hastens from darkness into light.

The thread of past karma – the bad karma – is unraveled as if “before the very eyes” of those dying with a mind bent upon unskillful karma. According to Zhizhou, the three lower moral grades of humans beings: lower-high, lower-middle, and lower-lower, are subjected to these departing visions. For Xuanzang, who abides by the Mahāyāna teachings disclosed by Asaṅga on the ālayavijñāna, all of the variegated kinds of experiences in dying, including the vivid departing visions of light and shade, are contained within the ālayavijñāna, the root consciousness of the individual sentient being.

According to the doctrine of ālayavijñāna, when we perform actions, we have sensory impressions, which are combined in the form of the variegated seeds stored up in the ālayavijñāna

In Chinese, the Sanskrit “hanging cloth” becomes “shadows cast by jagged mountain peak” [0210a12] Bhattacharya, Yogācārabhūmi, 19, glosses kṛṣṇasya kutaśya in the Skt.: as “a sort of blanket made of goat hair.” Chengjing’s sub-commentary on Kuiji’s commentary on The Basis for Yoga Practitioners reads [0210a13] When one is about to die there are three images that appear as one vision. They are the image of the two peaks of mountain casting shade. When the three other kinds of shade cast down upon the dying that refers to the individual mind of he/she with bad karma and the visions that manifest with the setting sun by the mountains, peaks, and the shadows cast down by “mountains.” But the mountains are not real mountains. They are the reflections of mountains. Since the bad karma gains entrances into the human being in the state of dotage, he/she sees the sun setting across the mountains in the stage of end-of-life, and the inverted reflections (of the sun) are different in their moral grade. The sunset emerging (from the mountain peaks) is a genuine vision. The rest are reflections, but general reflections. In sequence, there are the shadows falling, pervading, and obscuring light Those with lower, middle, and upper grades of karma see different things. 將沒時有三影現一見, 山影覆二峯倒影像; 三餘類懸覆揔意云臨命終時, 由先惡業故自心, 变見於日没時, 所有諸山、及山峯等倒覆影像名山等影非有實山。日照發影名山影也。以先惡業者從明入闇故, 見日輪將欲沒時, 及倒覆像不同善者, 見日出時所有眾相體皆正也。其所現中少影多影、及普遍影。如次懸覆遍覆極覆顯。下中上三品所見各不同也

Kuiji records in his commentary on the Yogācārabhūmi: “When one belongs to the lower (three) grades of karmic standing, the immediate phenomenal characteristics appear like the shadows cast by mountain peaks hanging down. When one belongs to the middle (three) grades, the mountains pervasively cast overbearing shadows. For some belonging to the lower grades, the phenomenal characteristics (of dying) are like the back shadow of the setting sun casting overbearingly. These are all the immediate phenomenal characteristics of future rebirth that appear in the dying as effects of prior bad karma.” 下品惡業者。當相如峰影懸覆。中品如山遍覆。上品如日後分極覆。或下品如日後分影覆。中品如山遍覆。上品如峰影極覆。此是將命終時由先惡業所見當果相.
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– literally, the “storehouse consciousness” (Skt.: cangshi藏識). In this functional capacity of the storehouse consciousness, ālayavijñāna retains all the memories and mental impressions of past events in the form of the latent seeds. These impressions remain dormant or inert for most of the time in the form of the seed, but manifest continuously in those dying with a mind bent upon unskillful and unwholesome thoughts. They recycle mental impressions, forming the departing visions and creeping sensations experienced by the dying. Death is not the same kind of unconscious state as dreamless sleep, because ālayavijñāna has deserted the person in death, but it is merely dormant in sleep. For Xuanzang, ālayavijñāna represents the dormant capacities that distinguish death from biological life.

Xuanzang concludes that all ways of dying ultimately fall under the remit of karma. In his exegesis on the nature of the fear of dying, Xuanzang argues that this karma explains why all sentient beings, both human and non-human animals, recoil at dying and death. He argues that we are biologically programmed to recoil in aversion from dying. However, at the same time that he emphasizes the ingrained and preconditioned nature of the fear of death, Xuanzang offers a constructive program for overcoming the fear of dying through practice. Having confronted death through the first-hand experience of near-death scenarios, Xuanzang is aware of the issue of “sugar-coating” the reality of mortality by minimizing the pain and suffering of the dying. Xuanzang’s Abhidharma teachings codified in his translation of the Mahāvibhāṣa proclaim that “fear” (Skt.: bhaya) is rooted in the uncertainty and anxiety” that bubble up in the mind facing dangerous and taxing circumstances. In particular, the Sarvāstivāda authority on these matters,

602 Mahāvibhāṣa 75: “The Honorable Master (Bhādāntācārya) Vasumitra is of the opinion that fear belongs only to the kāmadhātu, whilst subtle aversion pervades all three realms (trīdhātu); He is also of the opinion that fear pertains to affliction, whereas subtle aversion pertains to the skillful roots (kuśalamūlāni).” 復作是說。怖唯染污法通三界，He is also of the opinion that fear is only either contaminated or non-impedimentary morally-neutral; whereas subtle aversion is only skillful. 復作是說。怖通染污無覆無記願唯是善.
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Vasumitra, takes pains to separate the mental state of fear from that of subtle aversion. The crux of the difference is that subtle aversion is fear transformed from an unwholesome or karmically-indeterminate moral grade into a skillful moral grade. The erosion of fear comes about through gaining some distance from an irresolute and begrudging attitude towards danger and threats. This is fear transformed into the skillful state of retiring and subtle aversion. The faculty of aversion, when skillfully employed, can undermine the unwholesome tendency of fear and modify brute fear into a retiring sense of disinterest and tranquility.

In contrast to dying poorly or dying neutrally, during which little effort is made to improve the conditions of one’s way of dying, dying well involves the neutralization of the unwholesome activation of the hedonic faculties. The skillful ways of dying all involve the states of faith, concentration, and the recollection of wholesome practices. These states are manifested and sustained by the corresponding “wholesome faculties” or “skillful roots” (Skt.: kuśalamūlāni) – the five uncontaminated faculties of faith, spiritual perseverance, mindful recollection of practices, concentration, and wisdom. 603

Throughout his CWSL, Xuanzang develops the theory that the karmic grade of the indriyas indelibly impacts the karmic quality of the way a sentient being dies. He focuses on the hedonic faculty of aversion in his discussion of overcoming the fear of dying. This is because of the particular nature of the indriya of aversion. The indriya of aversion is regarded as morally

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Bhādantācārya proclaims that: fear refers to the burning desire to gain distance from one’s uncertainties and anxieties. Once one has gained precious distance from one’s hatred of bad things, that is termed ‘subtle aversion.’ Hence, there is a difference between hatred and subtle aversion.”大德說曰。於衰損事深心疑慮欲得遠離說名為怖。已得遠離深心憎惡說名為厭。如是名為厭怖差別 (T1545:27.386.b12-18).

603 The 6th-century scholiast Jingying Huiyuan 淨影慧遠 derives his explanation from the Abhidharmahṛdaya. It is basically the same as the explanations found in Xuanzang’s Jñānaprasthāna and Mahāvibhāṣa. See Jingying Huiyuan’s Treatise on the Doctrine of Mahāyāna 大乘義章: “If one is dying with a mind bent on skillfulness, then just as in the aforementioned moral-neutrally ways, across each and every threshold [between life and death], in each and every case, the applied practice adds on an additional five [skillful] faculties including faith, etc.” 若善心中而命終者，如上無記，一一門中，皆悉加於信等五根, (T44, no. 1851, p. 559, c27-9).
indeterminate in that it can be either a skillful or an unskillful condition, according to its activation. For example, the unskillful use of the indriya of aversion manifests in cringing in the face of pain, while the skillful use of aversion manifests in the equanimity of the mind of the Buddha.

Aversion, as distinguished from faith, concentration, perseverance, and aversion, is an avyākṛta faculty, or a faculty that is morally indeterminate. It is because of this avyākṛta status that aversion is grouped together with the hedonic faculties and not with the skillful faculties of faith, concentration, perseverance, mindful recollection, and wisdom. This means that aversion can be applied to wholesome ends, which means enlisting aversion to counteract the negative karma and impurities accumulated by the hedonic faculties when free rein is given to unskillful purposes. For example, Xuanzang states that the cultivation of aversion is necessary to combat the fear of dying by overcoming anxiety. Anxiety is the fourth of the five hedonic faculties and is not avyākṛta.

Xuanzang builds his yoga of dying upon the literature of both Abhidharma and Yogācāra luminaries in the Buddhist tradition. For Xuanzang, the way to start to overcome one’s fear of dying consists in subordinating the faculty of anxiety. The way to quell the unwanted aggravation of the ingrained faculty of anxiety is to activate the countervailing force of one’s better angels, as it were – the skillful faculties of faith, concentration, and spiritual tenacity.

In both the Abhidharma and Yogācāra systems of the Buddhist path or mārga, the practitioner strives to curb the “immediately manifest activity” (Chi.: xianxing 现行; Skt: sam√ud) of the faculty of anxiety by counteracting the faculty of anxiety with the “wholesome” activities of the faculty of faith, spiritual perseverance (Skt. vīryēndriyam), concentration (samādhīndriyam), and aversion (Skt. upēkṣēndriyam) in the wholesome sense. This wholesome sense of upēkṣēndriyam is distinct from the tainted or contaminated sense of upēkṣēndriyam when it refers to the brutish sense of aversion that earthly animals – both humans and otherwise – show when
they cower in the face of pain. The doctrinal basis for the Medicine Buddha deathbed practices for a skillful way of dying is to help overcome anxiety by converting aversion into its pure and sublime sense of retiring indifference to pain and discomfort.

The Medicine Buddha rites elaborated in Xuanzang’s translation of the Medicine Buddha sūtra promise that “if one is able to make a reverent offering with the manifold/many marvelous offerings to the Lapis-Lazuli-light World-Honored Healing Tathāgata, then all the nightmarish bad signs, including all sorts of inauspicious signs, will cease and one will not be afflicted by them in dying.” This gleaming promise offers the hope of a better way of dying even for those dying in destitute conditions. Even if one is poverty-stricken and unable to give monetary offerings to the Saṅgha, observing reverent devotion to the Medicine Buddha in moments of need can tangibly improve the conditions of one’s final hours.

Counteracting Fear and Anxiety with Equanimity

Equanimity is the skillful manifestation of aversion. During the course of dying, the practitioner may be beset by depression and disconsolation created by the faculty of anxiety in conjunction with the mental faculty, and the sense indriyas. According to Sthiramati’s commentary on Asaṅga’s Summary of the Mahāyāna, as well as Asaṅga’s auto-commentary on his own Basis

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604 Daehyeon’s 太賢 commentary on Medicine Buddha sūtra essentially provides a paraphrase of (T450:14.406.c20-a6) in the Medicine Buddha sūtra: “If this person (someone) is able to make a reverent offering with the manifold/many marvelous offerings to the Lapis-Lazuli-light World-Honored Healing Tathāgata then all the nightmarish bad signs including all sorts of inauspicious signs will cease and one will not be afflicted by them in dying. This also goes for those who fear of drowning, being cut by knife or killed by poison, falling from cliff, malevolent stampeding elephant, or lions, tigers, wolves, bears, poisonous snakes, malicious ants, centipedes, scutigores, or mosquitoes. If they are capable and achieve mindfulness in recollection of heart/mind and reverently make devotional offering to the Buddha, she gains liberation/reprieve from all manner of fearsome things.若能至心憶念彼佛恭敬供養一切怖畏皆得解脫. From Daehyeon’s Ancient Jottings on the Original Vow of the Medicine Buddha 本願藥師經古迹, fascicle 2, T1770:48.260.c07-13.
for Yoga Practitioners or his Treatise Glorifying the Sagely Teaching (Chi.: Xianyang shengjiao lun 显扬圣教論) both critical primary sources transmitted and translated by Xuanzang and later incorporated into his CWSL, upeksa provides the singular antidote (Skt.: pratipaksa; Chi.: duizhi 對治) to fear. Upeksa, or aversion in the skillful sense, also directly counteracts other mental impediments, fear foremost among then, that suffuse the mind with a generalized sense of anxiety and unease in the face of mortality.

Asaṅga’s Basis for Yoga Practitioners spares little gratuitous detail in depicting the horrific ways deluded and impure sentient beings suffer. In contrast to these undesirable scenarios, the desirable scenario occurs when the yogic practitioner activates the faculty of aversion or upeksendriya in a skillful way. This faculty exercises its power to countervail and erode the unwholesome aversion to physical pain, and to replace and restore that unwholesome form of aversion with a retiring sense of indifference and equanimity. Upeksendriya has both wholesome and “unwholesome” applications. Hence, it is classified as one of the faculties of a karmically neutral or indeterminate nature. Whereas the activation of upeksendriya in a benighted worldling may only reinforce her\his unwholesome detestation of and aversion to painful stimuli, in the enlightened sage, the faculty of aversion works in a wholesome way to efface aversive tendencies

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605 Xianyang shengjiao lun reads: “Those without fear still have to, from time to time, observe and perceive it, since without corroboration in experience there is no observing it and no perceiving it. Those born without a sense of trepidation and fear have a withered heart with a vapid lack within it. Thus, when it repeatedly arises, the mind does not cling or become attached to it and excises, and severs it, discarding and effacing it.”

606 Sthiramati’s commentary on Asaṅga’s Summary of Abhidharma: “When the (i.e., Asaṅga’s) text speaks about the antidote to fear it refers to the desire that is overly terrified of other sentient beings. The antidote is established for all sentient beings by way of the mārga that will guide and save all (sentient beings). ‘Two times two’ refers to the different causal bases of the fourfold noble truth in (two) different ways as pure and impure, since the lokottara mārga (pertaining to the first two noble truths) and the worldly path (Skt.: laukika-mārga) as twofold path together with the two fold way of vipaśyanā and samathā, each are multiplications (of two things) that can be corroborated (in the sūtras).”
and to maintain a calm and collected attitude towards the bodily pain experienced throughout life, and especially at the end of life, during the states of being chronically sick or dying.

In addition to the positive role of the faculty of aversion – *upekṣéndriyam* implemented towards spiritually constructive ends – the five cultivatable skillful faculties of faith, concentration, perseverance, mindful recollection, and wisdom are involved in the way the human sages approach their inevitable mortal death. In addition to the hedonic faculty of aversion, the two faculties of faith and concentration play a dominant role in neutralizing the aggravation that the individual suffers due to the inborn faculties of anxiety and suffering. The Abhidharma literature that Xuanzang transmits to China is unequivocal in the judgment that all humans, regardless of geographical circumstance or social standing, are born with an ingrained sense of anxiety aroused by the inborn faculty of anxiety or *daurmanasyéndriyam*.

The final chapter of this study explores another way to overcome the fear of dying. This way involves becoming reborn into the realms of subtle material wherein sentient beings are reborn without the unwholesome and undesirable faculties of suffering and anxiety. These benign realms, containing comparatively little suffering and pain, include the pure lands of the Buddhas – most famously, the Western Paradise of Amitābha. While Xuanzang recognizes the popularity of the cults of rebirth in the Amitābha Pure Land, his Bhaiṣajyaguru rites for the sick and dying highlight the benefits of becoming reborn both in the southern pure land of the Healing Medicine Buddha and, as his hagiographer Huili confirms, in the Tuṣita Heaven of the future Maitreya Buddha.607

Although Xuanzang professes a plurality of possible preferred destinations for his future rebirths, one thing is certain: “rebirth in the Pure Land of Amitābha is not for mere *prthagjanas*

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and ordinary rubes, since I worry that they would have difficulty cultivating and completing it.\textsuperscript{608}

Xuanzang’s dismissal of the Amitabha cult on the basis of its inferior practicability for “mere mortals like me” is an irony not found in later Japanese followers of the Amitabha cult, judging by Stone’s (2016) recent groundbreaking findings on deathbed rituals in medieval Japan. By contrast, Xuanzang promoted the cults of the Future Buddha and the Medicine Buddhas on the basis of their more general practicability. In the throes of dying, Xuanzang musters the energy to faithfully recite two verses from the Tuṣita Heaven Pure Land sūtras. However, in life, Xuanzang’s promotion of the deathbed rituals designed around the central figure of the healing Bhaiṣajyaguru — or the Medicine Buddha, as he is most commonly known in China, Korea and Japan — lead him into a discussion of the ways to improve the quality of dying for the majority of Buddhist followers.

\textsuperscript{608} Ibid., T.2122:53.406.a5: 彌陀淨土恐凡鄙穢修行難成。
Chapter Four: On Dying the Pious Death

What is a pious death? In the minutes before his death, Xuanzang summoned up the last of his vital energy and recited two stanzas from the *Tuṣita Buddha* sūtra. According to his biographer, Huili, Xuanzang chanted the sūtra to attain reincarnation into the highest realm of the *kāmadhātu*, the heavenly domain of the *Maitreya Buddha*, the successor to the present Buddha. Xuanzang devotes a vast portion of his exegesis of dying to an examination of what it means to die well. While investigating the variety of descriptions of dying given in the Indic scriptures, Xuanzang observes that by attending to the condition of the *indriyas*, the physical and psychological suffering of dying that is innate to all sentient beings can be ameliorated.

Within the Indic texts, Xuanzang finds support for the idea that an improvement in the quality of dying, in this life or the next, is attainable. Xuanzang avers that the possibility of improving the quality of dying well in this lifetime, or of increasing the chance of being reborn into a realm in which the experience of dying is benign, remains available to all sentient beings, up to and during the end of life. In his analysis of the scriptures, Xuanzang concludes that it is possible for sentient beings, including those burdened with bad karma, to increase the possibility of dying well in the present life or in future incarnations by engaging in practices that improve karmic standing.

With the Yogācāra doctrine of the *indriyas*, Xuanzang finds the theoretical foundation for spiritual practices that are intended to improve the possibility of dying well. For Xuanzang, dying well means dying quickly, and with a minimum of mental anguish and physical pain. Dying well is equated to dying skillfully through the cultivation and development of the five skillful *indriyas* (Skt.: *kusalamulāṇī;* Chi.: *shanxiu gen* 善修根) of faith, perseverance, concentration, mindfulness and wisdom. To die skillfully, the sentient being converts the *indriya* of aversion into a sublime
form and counters the physical and psychological manifestations of the *indriya* of anxiety with the five skillful *indriyas*.

Xuanzang acknowledges that aside from the exalted case of the Gautama Buddha, the psychological and physical aspects of suffering that are concomitant with dying for sentient beings living in the *kāmadhātu* cannot be eliminated entirely. He holds firm, however, to the idea that a sentient being who conditions the skillful *indriyas* with meditation and other wholesome practices increases the likelihood of facing dying with clarity of mind and equanimity. Additionally, the cultivation of the skillful *indriyas* through the path of insight increases the possibility of being reborn into a benign incarnation and a favorable transmigratory realm.

Within the Buddhist cosmology, the transmigratory realm, or the *dhātu*, into which a sentient being is born dictates the range of possibilities of dying that a being will face. From his studies of the *Mahāvibhāṣa* and his analyses of the commentaries of Vasubandhu and Saṅghabhadra on the *Treasury of Abhidharma*, Xuanzang concludes that the quality of dying varies widely within the three environmental realms of the *kāmadhātu*, the *rūpadhātu* and the *arūpyadhūtu*. The type of dying is determined, to a large extent, by the *indriyas* that are innate to the sentient being who lives within a specific *dhātu*. For example, a sentient born into the earthly realm of the *kāmadhātu* will experience physical and psychological distress while dying because the *indriyas* of anxiety and suffering are innate to beings who reside in the *kāmadhātu*. The spiritually-advanced sentient being who is born into the Pure Lands of the *rūpadhātu*, however, will have a quick and painless death, because beings in the *rūpadhātu* are born without the *indriyas* of anxiety or suffering. Moreover, unlike the sentient beings in the dusty *Sahā* world, inhabitants of the *rūpadhātu* need not worry about a “gradual process of dying” (Skt.: *kramacyuti*; Skt.: *jiānsī* 漸死) that is ridden with physical pain, terrifying visions of a gruesome nature and emotional
distress. Beings in the rūpadhātu die quickly, and without physical or mental torment.

Xuanzang acknowledges that obtaining a skillful death may not be possible, either because a sentient being does not cultivate the indriyas prior to or during dying, or because the being is born into a dhātu in which a painful way of dying is predetermined. He posits that two factors determine the type of dying experienced by a sentient being: conspecific factors (Skt.: sabhāgatā; Chi.: tongzhong fen 同衆分) and non-conspecific factors. Conspecific factors are the innate biological and genetically pre-programmed variables that allow a sentient being to live in, and adapt to, a specific dhātu. They include the type and the number of indriyas that are borne by a sentient being living within a specific environmental realm. Non-conspecific factors include the experiences and the behaviors that the sentient being engages in from conception until the moment of death. Xuanzang avers that genetics and development are involved in how a sentient being lives and dies and that karma is implicated in the expression of both factors. In his analysis of the Buddhist doctrine of karma, Xuanzang concludes that karma is ineluctably related to the conspecific and non-conspecific factors involved in the dying of a sentient being.

The exegesis of dying takes Xuanzang into an exploration of the role of karma in determining the quality of dying and the placement of sentient being into the transmigratory realm after death. Xuanzang concludes that karma is implicated in the quality of dying in two ways. First, because the balance of good and bad karma that is accumulated by a sentient being determines the condition of the indriyas at the end of life, karma dictates the moral and hedonic quality of dying. Second, because the balance of karma dictates the conspecific variables, such as the type and

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609 Kritzer (1998, p. 30) characterizes the Buddhist doctrine of karma, as the exclusive province of mental consciousness. Kritzer writes: “Whereas Buddhists have always been concerned with the karmic legacy of the past, which is essentially a matter of consciousness, people today, and not just scientists, focus on the transmission of genes, a material or physical process that is yet somehow not completely antithetical to Buddhist notions of karma.” The literature surveyed in this section is concerned with karmic legacy, the phylogenetic and ontogenetic impact of karmic from past lives.
number of indriyas carried by a sentient being in a specific realm, karma determines the type of
dying that is experienced by that being. For example, sentient beings that are born into the realm
of the kāmadhātu, as opposed to those living in the rūpadhātu, carry the indriyas of suffering and
anxiety. Dying skillfully in the Sahā world, unlike dying well in the Pure Lands, therefore requires
training of the indriyas with meritorious practices.

Throughout his comprehensive analyses of the Abhidharma and Yogācāra texts, Xuanzang
concludes that karma plays a decisive and pervasive role in determining the way a sentient being
dies and the dhātu into which a sentient being is reborn. While the transmigratory realm determines
a range of possibilities for how a sentient being dies, karma dictates the dhātu into which a sentient
being is reborn. Xuanzang postulates, however, that while karma is the ultimate authority, a
sentient being has agency in determining the moral and hedonic qualities of the last stages of life.
Therefore, by choosing to improve the mental condition of dying by accumulating good karma, or
by neutralizing bad karma, a sentient being improves the quality of dying and the placement into
the next realm of rebirth.

Enlisting Yogācāra theory, Xuanzang posits that the seeds of good karma can be cultivated
through yogic practice and merit, even in the last minutes and seconds of life. By sponsoring or
receiving rituals, a sentient being may improve the spiritual indriyas, the quality of dying and the
afterlife. Xuanzang explains, however, that if the seeds of spiritual enlightenment do not bear fruit
in the form of a benign death in this life, they may in another incarnation. Ultimately, Xuanzang
concludes that a sentient being can influence the karmic balance, in this life and the next, through
the practice of yoga and meritorious actions.

This chapter is composed of four sections. The first section examines the impact of the
karma accumulated in past and present lives on the course of dying. The second section turns to a
discussion regarding the definition of the term “state of dying” (Skt.: cyutirbhava) and the process of dying as determined by the Yogācāra scholars. The third section examines how the number and quality of the indriyas carried by different species of sentient beings within the three transmigratory realms influence the experience of dying. The conclusion of the chapter is devoted to an examination of the impact of karma on the dying body and the consciousness of the sentient being.

The Impact of Present and Past Karma on Dying

In his exegesis of dying and karma, Xuanzang ascertains that the type of dying experienced by a sentient being is determined by the indomitable force of karma. In his investigation into the process of dying, Xuanzang turns to the description of dying articulated by Vasubandhu in the Treasury of Abhidharma. In the first line of the thirteenth stanza of Chapter Three, “Discriminating Worldly Things” (Skt.: Lokanirdeśa; Chi.: Fenpin shipin 分別世品), Vasubandhu states that the process of dying is shaped by the good and the bad karma that is accumulated by a sentient being at the end of life. In his translation of this stanza, Xuanzang describes how the karma amassed during the current life and the karma inherited from past existences (Skt.: pūrvabhava) determine three things: the way a sentient being dies, the course of the intermediate state between incarnations, and the placement into the species and the dhātu of the next life. Xuanzang makes it clear that the dharmas, or the causal factors that determine the moral status of the sentient being in present and past existences (Skt.: pūrvakālabhava), regulate the process of dying, the quality of the intermediate state between incarnations, and the station into which a sentient being is reborn.

In his translation of the description of dying in the Treasury of Abhidharma by Vasubandhu, Xuanzang writes:
Dying is the state created by the presence of prior karma, from which it draws forth. It is the state before the moment of becoming reincarnated and after death.\(^{610}\)

Eकाक्षेपादसाविषयः पुर्ववकालबहवकऽति

Sa punar maranāt pūrva upapattiśanāt parah\(\) 3.13a-d (Shastri, 1976, vol. 2, p. 422)\(^{611}\)

In his translation, Xuanzang locates the moment-to-moment process of dying within the transmigratory lifecycle and the prior incarnations of a sentient being. He posits that the entirety of the karma accumulated by a sentient being, in the past and in the present, influences the final moments of the present life and the transition into the next life. In his lyrical Chinese translation of the five-character-per-line verse (Chi.: wuyan ju 五言句), Xuanzang uses the character 印, \(\text{印}\) to describe how dying “draws forth spiritual fruit.”\(^{612}\)

In this translation of 印, Xuanzang highlights how the process of dying draws forth the totality of the karma that is borne by a sentient being and transforms it into either a spiritual reward or a karmic retribution. The seeds of the good karma that a sentient being plants in current and past lives produce a benign death, afterlife and rebirth. Conversely, the fruit of bad karma planted during past and present lives manifests in a painful death, and a less than benign afterlife and reincarnation.

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\(^{610}\) This translation is based on de la Vallée Pouissin, L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu, Vol. 2, 45): “Etant projeté par le même acte qui projette la purvakabhava, c’est-à-dire l’être de la destinée a venir aprés sa conception, l’être intermédiaire a la forme de cet être. Celui-ci est antérieur à la mort, postérieur à la conception.” That is to say the being of destiny to come after its conception, the intermediate being has the form of this being. (Vol 2: 45) This is anterior to death, posterior to conception. sa punar maranātpuṛva upapattiśanātparāh // 3.13cd – “Existence in a previous time (Skt.: pūrvakālabhāva) refers to that existence prior to death; and resides in the moment after rebirth.” 本有謂死前：居生剎那後 (Pradhan, p. 125; T29, no. 1558, p. 45, c11-12).

\(^{611}\) De ni 'phen pa gcig pa'i phyir, sngon dus srid 'byung sha tshugs can, de ni 'chi ba'i sngon rol te, skye ba'i skad cig phan chad do/, D 4089; vol. 140, folio/line 7a.7.

\(^{612}\) Hirakawa, AKBh Index, vol. 1, 12.
The Cycle of Rebirth and Karma

In a commentary on Chapter Three in the *Treasury of Abhidharma* by Vasubandhu, Yaśomitra vividly illustrates the impact of karma inherited from prior lives. Yaśomitra uses the example of a nāraka, a hellish being, who because of bad karma accumulated in a “past existence,” or pūrvabhava, dies in utero. Yaśomitra claims that the case of the stillborn nāraka demonstrates how karma dictates the type of dying experienced by all sentient creatures, including those born and reborn into ephemeral and short-lived life forms. In the *Sphuṭārthābhidharmakośa*, a line-by-line commentary on the *Treasury of Abhidharma*, Yaśomitra states: “Even if the nāraka dies in utero, in the intermediate state, the nāraka will take to the womb of another mother.” Yaśomitra writes that the vicious cycle of birth, death and reincarnation will continue until the bad karma carried by the nāraka is “burnt off” (Chi.: shao ye 燒業).

Throughout his exegesis on the impact of karma on dying, Xuanzang steadfastly maintains


614 Yaśomitra writes: “Even if he dies out in utero, the nāraka within the intermediate state will take to [another] mother’s womb.” Yadi garbhastho ’pi mriyeta tasya nārako 'ntarābhavo mātuḥ kukṣiṁ nirdahet.

615 *Mahāvibhāṣa* 70T27n1545p0362a12:

Question: What form does the antarābhavin take, given what he/she/it was in the previous life (pūrvabhava)? It is admitted that the womb of one bitch can contain five beings in various transmigratory destinies at once. Since [for the nāraka], hell arises right before the eyes, how can he avoid scalding the bitch’s womb [upon conception of the nāraka in the new embryo], granted the previous life (of the nāraka) in the hells contains its share of raging fire that burns and scalds things? 問：若中有形狀如當本有？一狗等腹中容有五趣中有頓起。既有地獄中現前。如何不能焚燒母腹？地獄本有多為猛火所焚燒故。

Response: this being (i.e., the nāraka becoming reborn) was not perpetually burning in the previous life. Sometimes the being was wandering deeper into the hells, or in other (i.e., cold) hells. As the +Praḥātiśāstra says: sometimes narakas return to life and a cool breeze gradually arises as the being returns to life. At this time, how much more does the being have sentience and thought in becoming reborn, let alone in the present life, so how much more so in the intermediate state? It is supposed that if one grants that the nāraka is perpetually burning, then how is the intermediate being (of the nāraka in the previous life) subtle in its embodiment, as it imperceptible and intangible. The fire of the nāraka is like this - since the karma (of the mother and of the embryo) are exclusive, the mother should, like the nāraka itself, not be burnt (during conception).” 答：彼居本有亦不恒燄。如暫遊增，或餘地獄。施設論 說：有時等活捺落迦中。冷風暫起有聲唱言等活等活。爾時有情尋復等活。本有尚然。況在中有。設許恆燄如不可見亦不可觸。以中有身極微細故。火亦應爾。諸趣中有難居一腹非互觸燄，樂所遮故。母腹亦爾故不被燄。
that the moral grade of dying can be improved through the retention and the cultivation of the five skillful indriyas of faith, perseverance, concentration, mindfulness and wisdom. The promise of a better death in this incarnation, and of the liberation from the endless cycle of birth and death, remains available to all sentient beings, including those who are freighted with bad karma, as in the example of the very unfortunate nāraka.

Dying and the Agency of the Sentient Being

In a description of the “state of dying” (Skt.: cyutirbhava; Chi: moyou 沒有), found in the translations of the Mahavibhāṣa and the Treasury of Abhidharma, Xuanzang describes how a sentient being up to, and during the very last moments of life, possesses the agency to modify and enhance moral standing. By the “state of dying” the Abhidharma and Yogācāra scholars refer specifically to the final moments in the life of a sentient being.

Throughout his exegesis of dying, Xuanzang makes the point that a sentient being can either improve the quality of dying by conditioning the five skillful indriyas or maintain the karmic status quo by neglecting to cultivate the indriyas. In his translation of the Treasury, Xuanzang describes how a sentient being can chose to either retain, or to discard the skillful indriyas, and thereby alter the hedonic and moral quality of dying during the transitional moments between life and the hereafter.

Throughout his analysis of cyutirbhava in the Treasury of Abhidharma, Xuanzang defines dying as a state of consciousness over which a sentient being has a modicum of control and self-determination. In his translation of the verses by Vasubandhu on the state of dying, Xuanzang describes the mind of a dying sentient being as in a state of moral indeterminacy. While in an indeterminate state, a sentient being may elect to sever or to retain the roots of the indriyas of faith,
perseverance, concentration, mindfulness and wisdom. This choice determines whether a sentient being dies in an impure and contaminated or in a pure and uncontaminated state of mind.\textsuperscript{616} Xuanzang avers that both conditions of mind depend upon the choice a sentient being makes to either cultivate or detach from the skillful \textit{indriyas}.

If a sentient being elects to discard the skillful \textit{indriyas}, the balance of karma carried by the sentient being at the time of dying directs the moral quality of dying and the placement in the afterlife. Kuiji, in his commentary on \textit{The Basis for Yoga Practitioners}, writes that the decision to retain or discard the skillful \textit{indriyas} is, for the sentient being, a “maintain it or break it moment” (Chi.: \textit{duan hu} 斷續).\textsuperscript{617}

The \textit{Mahāvibhāṣa} editors enumerate a list of the “four types of unskillful actions” (Skt.: \textit{akuśala}; Chi.: \textit{si bushan 四不善})\textsuperscript{618} that constrain a sentient being from executing practices that improve or restore the skillful \textit{indriyas} at the end of life. This taxonomy is endorsed and refined by Vasubandhu, Saṅghabhadra and Asaṅga. The taxonomy of the four types of unskillful actions presented by Xuanzang in his translation of \textit{The Basis for Yoga Practitioners} includes:

\begin{quote}
How many of the twenty-two faculties are contaminated and how many are uncontaminated? 二十二根幾有漏幾無漏。信等五樂喜護意或有漏或無漏。後三根一向無漏。The three hedonic faculties of pleasure, anxiety and suffering are invariably contaminated. The ten contaminated faculties are vision, hearing, olfaction, gustation, male and female procreation, vitality, anxiety and suffering 十根有漏。眼耳鼻舌身男女命憂苦。
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
T29n1558p0088c17 In AKBh, fascicle 17, Xuanzang describes the “make it or break it scenario” for the \textit{icchāntika} as “either one may elect to follow the paths of ten ways of evil, or not.” The Yogācārabhūmi reads: “What is retaining the skillful roots? It refers to (three conditions) as they keep the \textit{indriyas} keen: one must see relatives and friends that cultivate good merit and karma; One must make an audience with a skillful and good man who teaches the correct dharma; and one must make a decisive determination when having doubt and irresolution. This is the way one restores and retains the skillful indriyas [0281a29] 云何續善根。謂由性利根故。見親朋友修福業故。詣善丈夫聞正法故。因生猶豫證決定故。還續善根。
\end{quote}

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\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{618} Nyāyanusāra, fasc. 6: provides an alternate classification in terms of clinging, anger, conceit, and irresolution 貪瞋慢疑 T29n1562p0392c15-24.
\end{quote}
Chapter 4: What Is a Pious Death?

(1) Actions that are unskillful for the attainment of enlightenment. These actions include obstinacy, or an unwillingness to engage in the disciplined practices that foster the skillful indriyas.\(^{619}\)

(2) Actions that reflect mental states of poor moral character (Chi: zixing bushan 自性不善) These actions include angry outbursts that demonstrate a brazen and shameless disregard for the well-being of others.

(3) Actions that are associated with unskillful states of mind (Chi. xiangying 相應不善) These actions include violent or aggressive actions that are aimed at harming others.

(4) Actions that are contaminated because they originate from an unskillful indriya. These are actions that are derived from an unskillful indriya such as anxiety and include actions that demonstrate mental or physical restlessness, such as excessive perspiration and bodily shaking (Chi.: dengqi bushan 等起不善).

In Chapter Two, “Investigation of Faculties,” of the Treasury of Abhidharma, Vasubandhu posits that the skillful indriyas are never lost, unless a sentient being actively and deliberately chooses not to engage in the work required to retain them.\(^{620}\) Throughout his translation corpora and original CWSL, Xuanzang proposes the cultivation of the skillful indriyas through meritorious action and yoga as the path to a better life, death and afterlife.

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\(^{619}\) Mahāvibhāṣa, fascicle 51 reads: “Being skillful in the ultimate sense of the word means anything that leads to unease about the cycle of birth-and-dying (saṃsāra).” 謂勝義不善即是生死不安隱故名不善 (T1545:27.263.b08).

\(^{620}\) Jñānaprasthāna, fascicle 15 – “Those who have severed the skillful roots have at the maximum thirteen, and at the minimum, eight [faculties].” 斷善根者，極多十三，極少八 (T1544:26.997.a18). Mahāvibhāṣa, fascicle 150 cites this explanation, verbatim, and indicates that the total of thirteen denotes all twenty-two indriyas, with the deduction of the three uncontaminated indriyas that do not pertain to “those who have severed the roots of morality.” The minimum of “eight indriyas refers to the faculties of the body, mind, and vitality, and the five hedonic faculties.” 八者，謂身•命•意、及五受根 (T1545:27.767.b19). The text further states that “this is the same for those undergoing the gradual course of dying, along with the hellish beings (Skt.: nārakas), and those who have lost either of six physical sense faculties.” 即漸命終、及在地獄、已失六色根者 (T1545:27.767. b20).
Dying Well Through the Cultivation of the Indriyas

In his elaboration of the state of dying, Vasubandhu homes in on the *indriya* of aversion as central to the condition of mental consciousness, or the moral and hedonic state of mind, of the dying sentient being. In his translation of the text of the *Treasury of the Abhidharma*, Chapter Three, verse thirteen, Xuanzang describes the state of dying and being reborn as, “naught but aversive” (Skt.: *upekṣa+eva*). Here Xuanzang depicts the content of the mind of a sentient being in the state of dying as consisting of aversive reactions to sensory stimuli. These include the conscious awareness of painful bodily sensations, as well as the negative thoughts that pass through the mind of a sentient being undergoing the process of dying. According to the Yogācāra doctrine, the status, or the condition of the *indriya* of aversion (Skt.: *upekṣendriyam*) plays an important role in determining the moral tone and hedonic quality of dying. Xuanzang comes to conclude that the state of consciousness of the sentient being determines the quality of dying.

The *indriya* of aversion, in a primitive and uncultivated state, manifests in the psychological experience of distress, and the behavioral response of recoiling, when a sentient being encounters an aversive stimulus. The uncultivated form of the *indriya* of aversion creates the disturbing physical and psychological responses that are experienced by a sentient being during the process of dying. The *indriya* of aversion, however, can be trained to respond to pain without either the behavioral reaction of flinching, or the response of negative thoughts. Xuanzang avers that the *indriyao* of aversion can be cultivated to respond with retiring indifference to the negative physical sensations that occur during the demise of the physical body during the process of dying.  

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621 *Mahāvibhāṣa*, fascicle 155 contains the following query and response: “Question: For what reason do all sentient beings at the end of life, and at the moment of conception, necessarily abide in aversive sensation? 問：何因緣故一切有情命終結生必住捨受.”
Additionally, the primitive state of the indriya of aversion accounts for the “hazy and faint” (Chi.: mei lie 味劣) mental status of a dying sentient being. By altering the indriya of aversion through the cultivation of the indriyas of concentration and mindfulness, the psychological torpor associated with the state of dying can be mitigated. The sentient being who transforms the indriya of aversion into its subtle form, therefore reaches the end of life with equanimity, acuity and clarity of mind.

In his analysis of the Abhidharma stanzas of Vasubandhu and the Yogācāra work of Asaṅga, Xuanzang determines that the cultivation and retention of the skillful roots (Chi.: xu shangen 續善根) require constant maintenance on the part of the sentient being, throughout life and during the final moments of dying. Maintaining the skillful indriyas entails associating with spiritual people (Skt.: kalyānamitras), engaging in meritorious practices and rituals and continuing to refine the spiritual indriyas of faith, concentration, perseverance, mindfulness and wisdom.

In his exegesis of the Abhidharma and Yogācāra scriptures on the state of dying, Xuanzang substantiates the claim that a sentient being can improve the quality of dying and the afterlife by choosing to cultivate the skillful indriyas. This is accomplished through the practice of yoga and the execution of rituals that build merit and replenish the stores of karma carried in the indriyas. By living meritoriously and following the path of yoga, a sentient being accumulates the karma that is necessary to die, and to be reborn, well. Throughout his exegesis of dying, Xuanzang upholds the Buddhist tenet of karma, while sending the hopeful message to practitioners that a sentient being with moral determination can improve karmic standing and the quality of dying and

Reply: the five kinds of hedonic sensations do not have haziness or faintness as their mode of operation (Skt.: ākāra). But aversion sensation in the state of dotage is not hazy or faint. For example, dying or the state of becoming reincarnated, they abide in aversive sensation in meeting the end of life and in becoming reincarnated.”

答：於五受中，無有行相昧劣。如捨受者。於十時中，無有昧劣。如死，及生時者，故住捨受命終結生 (T1545:27.787.b07-10).
On the Difference Between Dying and Death

Throughout his exegesis of dying and death, Xuanzang endeavors to preserve the Buddhist doctrines of no-self and karma in their pure and undiluted forms. The Buddhist doctrine of no-self states that there is no permanent or unchanging self. Everything in the universe, including dying, is momentary and impermanent. Within Buddhism there is no ending and no death. The translation decisions and analyses of the distinctions between dying and death that Xuanzang makes throughout his translation corpora and original writings reflect his efforts to uphold the Buddhist doctrine of no-self. Additionally, Xuanzang holds that karma is pervasively and ineluctably involved in determining how a sentient being dies. In his analysis of the timing of dying, Xuanzang avers that a sentient being with good karma is rewarded with a quick and relatively painless death, and one with bad karma assumes the consequences of immoral activity in the form of a long-drawn-out death. In his discussions regarding the distinction between dying and death, Xuanzang finds the doctrinal and the philosophical rationale to support the core Buddhist doctrines of no-self, impermanence and karma.

In his examinations of the Treasury of Abhidharma by Vasubandhu and the commentaries on this text by Yaśomitra, Xuanzang critically assesses the differences between “dying” (Skt.: cyav; Chi.: mo 沒) and “death” (Skt.: māraṇam; Chi.: si 死). Throughout his corpora, Xuanzang makes specific translation choices that are intended to clarify the distinctions between dying and death. In his exegesis of the Treasury of Abhidharma, Xuanzang analyzes the difference between dying as a process and dying as a state of completion that results in the death of a sentient being. Additionally, Xuanzang investigates the temporal components of dying and death in a discussion
about “dying slowly” (Skt.: kramacyutiḥ; kramamrti) and “dying quickly” (Skt.: sakrdmrti). For Xuanzang, the Buddhist doctrines of no-self, impermanence and karma are at stake in maintaining the analytical distinction between dying and death.

**On the Definitions Between “Dying” and “Death”**

To preserve the Buddhist doctrines of no-self and impermanence, Xuanzang maintains that dying is different from death. To Xuanzang, the distinction between dying and the state of being dead is significant in terms of the doctrine of the Buddhist cycle of life (Skt.: bhavāṅga). Within the Buddhist cycle of life, the process of dying is the final stage of living. The state of being dead, however, begins with the first moment after death and gives rise to the first state in the endless cycle of birth and death. Within the doctrine of the Buddhist cycle of life, dying is a state of consciousness that is linked to the next moment of consciousness. There is no permanent or enduring self that is lost in dying, or in the state of being dead.

Throughout his translations, Xuanzang makes specific distinctions between the word “dying” (Skt.: ścyav; Chi.: mo没) and the word “death” (Skt.: māraṇam; Chi.: si死). Xuanzang uses the word cyuti to describe the process of dying. Cyuti is derived from the past participle of the root “to fall away” (Skt.: ścyav). Implicit in the word cyuti are the dual constructions of dying as a process (noun) and dying as an ending (past participle). In his commentary on the *Treasury of Abhidharma*, Yaśomitra glosses the word cyuti with the past participle “has died/fallen away” (Skt.: cyutam) to designate dying as both an ongoing process and the completion of a process. In both senses of the word cyuti, dying is depicted as a moment-to-moment process, rather than as an

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622 Feldman points out that the word “dying,” like the word “winning” is ambiguous in it carries a “process” sense and a “success” sense: “A runner may be winning (process sense) even though it turns out that he does not win (success sense).” See Feldman, “On Dying As a Process,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 50, no. 2 (1989), 375.
event with a finite ending. Vasubandhu uses the word *cyutirbhaṭaṇa* to describe the “state of dying,” and *maraṇakṣaṇaṇam* to denote the “moment of death,” the point in time at which a sentient being goes from the state of being alive to the state of being dead.623

Xuanzang uses the word “death,” *si* 死, corresponding to the Sanskrit word *māraṇam*, to describe the state that a sentient being occupies between life and the afterlife. *Māraṇam* comes from the root “to decease” (Chi.: √mr). Kuiji, in his meticulous line-by-line commentary on the translation by Xuanzang of The Basis for Yoga Practitioners, distills three meanings from the Chinese character *si*, or “death.” The first sense of *si* refers to “the exact time of death, namely the final moment of a life”;624 the second describes the “state of being dead,” up until the moment of becoming reincarnated into a new embryo;625 and the third meaning of the word captures the moment prior to “the moment of death,” or the final moment in the process of dying. In his interpretation of the word *si*, Xuanzang captures the Buddhist concept of momentariness. Death is

623 Vasubandhu discriminates the four ways of talking about the Buddhist teaching of dependent-co-arising, in terms of the moment (Skt.: *kṣanika*), stage (Skt.: *avāsthika*) and state (Skt.: *bhava*). Vasubandhu also divides the life-cycle into four “states”: the state of the previous life (Skt.: *pūrvabhāva*), the state of becoming reborn (Skt.: *upapattiḥbhāva*), i.e., gestation, the state of death/dying (Skt.: *maraṇabhāva*), and the intermediate state (Skt.: *antarābhāva*), the discarnate afterlife or *bardo*. The phrase “state of death” is an application of the latter life-cycle analysis to the classification of a death as “serial” (Skt.: *āvasthikaḥ*; Chi.: fen-wei 位) or “momentary” (Skt.: *kṣanikaḥ*; Chi.: cha-na 刹那). The *Tattvasiddhi śāstra* of Harivārman (hereafter, TatSid) adduces the same four-fold analysis of the cycle of repeated deaths and reincarnations throughout lifecycles. “Our scriptures speak of four states of being: state of previous life, state of dying, intermediate state, and state of becoming reborn.” 又經中說四有。本有・死有・中有・生有 (T1646:32.256.b18-19).

624 Kuiji writes in his commentary on the *Yogācārabhūmi*: “‘Death’ has three meanings: Firstly, the exact moment of death, that is to say, the final moment of a life. The CWLS states that this consciousness consists in the storehouse consciousness. And the *Treasury of Abhidharma* states that death is the final moment of a mind, up (but not including) the moment of rebirth. It is of indeterminate karmic nature. 死有三位心：一正死。即末後剎那，唯識論說為第八識。對法論說死有末心。生有初剎那。中有初剎那。唯無記性 (T1828:42.321.b10-12).

625 Sanghabhadra’s *Clarification of Tenets* reads: “There are four types of states for the sentient being. Firstly, there is the intermediate state, the doctrine of which has been explained above. Secondly, there is the state of being reborn (i.e., pre-natal state). Thirdly, there is the state of being in a past life. Excluding the moment that one is reborn, the states prior to one’s death are four-fold. The state of dying refers to the final thought-moments [of a life]. If you have not gained full independence from sensual desires, then the intermediate-state (i.e., the afterlife) will definitely befall you. In this case, there are four distinct stages during a single life-cycle.” 有情趣位分四種：一者中有。義如前說。二者生有，謂於諸趣結生剎那。三者本有。除生剎那，死前餘位，四者。 死有，謂最後念。若有於色未得離貪，此有無間中有定起，即於一生位別分四 (T29, no. 1563, p. 837, c10-23).
conceptualized as a moment-to-moment transition rather than as a final or permanent state of being or non-being.

**On Ageing, Dying and Death in the Buddhist Cycle of Life**

In their analytical discussions of aging and dying as a stage in the Buddhist cycle of life, the Abhidharma scholars focus on the differentiation between dying and death. Within the Abhidharma Buddhist schema, the moment of biological death is viewed as the beginning of the afterlife, and not as part of the present life of the sentient being. Hence, for Xuanzang, the definition of aging and the relationship of aging to dying and death are crucial because “aging-and-death,” or *jarā-māraṇam* (Chi.: *lao si* 老死), is the link that precedes rebirth in the twelve-link cycle of dying and rebirth in Buddhism.

The Buddhist teaching of the twelve links of dependent co-arising (Skt.: *nidāna*; Chi: *zhi* 支) describes the chain of the twelve causal events (Skt.: *pratītyasamutpāda*; Chi.: 緣起) that result in the endless cycle of rebirth and suffering. Each of the twelve links on the chain gives rise to a condition, which in turn gives rise to another condition, and another condition. The twelfth link circles back to the first, thus forming a continuous cycle of rebirth and re-death. Ignorance, followed by mental formations, form the first two links on the chain, with senescence and death forming the penultimate link on the never-ending cycle of the twelve-fold chain. The link of aging-and-death is followed by the final link of rebirth. By breaking the chain of continuous death and rebirth, nirvana, or liberation from suffering, is attained.

In his translation of the *Pratītyasamutpāda sūtra* 緣起經, Xuanzang explicates the glosses on *jarā-māraṇam*, the link on the Buddhist chain of existence that combines aging and death. The *Pratītyasamutpāda sūtra* poses the question: Why is death (Skt.: *māraṇa*) linked to old age? Why
is death (Skt.: māraṇam), one of the most crucial borders in the cycle of human life, not a separate link in the chain of dependent co-arising?

The answer provided to this question in the Pratītyasamutpāda sūtra and by Xuanzang in the CWSL is that senescence, in and of itself, is not a sufficient condition to give rise to the next link in the chain of dependent co-arising. Taken together, old age and death, or māraṇa, provide an inclusive category of the condition for the arising of the next link in the cycle of life. The union of old age with death in the link on the chain is intended to take the deaths of all sentient beings into account in the Buddhist lifecycle, including those who do not live to old age. For example, a stillborn fetus, who experiences death but not aging, requires a place on the chain of dependent co-arising. Therefore, by placing aging and death together as the eleventh link, all deaths of sentient beings are included in the chain of dependent co-arising.626

In his Treasury of Abhidharma, Vasubandhu analyzes each link in the twelve-fold chain in the Buddhist teaching of dependent co-arising. He examines the twelve links in four ways: the moment in which the link occurs (Skt.: kṣanika), the position of the link in the cycle (Skt.: avāsthika), the relationship of the discrete event of the link to other links on the chain (Skt.: prakārṣikaḥ) and the link as a state of existence in the Buddhist life-cycle (Skt.: saṃbandhikaḥ).627

In his translation of the paradigm presented by Vasubandhu, Xuanzang posits that each of the

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626 CWSL: “When the body is destroyed and life ends we call that ‘death’ – senescence/aging (Skt. jāra) is not necessarily present, so it is annexed to death to establish the link (Skt.: nidāna).” 身壞命終，乃名為死，老非定有，附死立支 (T1585:31.43.c26).

627 Vasubandhu writes in his auto-commentary to 3.24: “there are four ways to make distinctions within the (twelve links of) dependent co-origination. 又諸緣起，差別說四.

Firstly, moment-to-moment. 一者，剎那.

Secondly, invariably-linked (Skt.: saṃbandhikaḥ). 二者，連縛.

Thirdly, staged (Skt.: avāsthikaḥ). 三者，分位.

Fourthly, sequential (Skt.: prakārṣikaḥ).” 四者，遠續 (T1558:29.48.e08-10).
twelve links in the chain of dependent co-arising can be analyzed using the four modes. For example, the link of jarā-māraṇam, aging and death, can be analyzed in the following four ways:

(1) As two “moments” (Skt.: kṣaṇikaḥ). Here aging and death are conceptualized as two moments in the life of a sentient being. Moment one is ageing, and moment two is dying.

(2) As grouped together into one independent and discrete stage (Skt.: avāsthikaḥ) in the life of a sentient being. Here aging and dying are grouped together as one link on the chain.

(3) As two conjoined states in the life-cycle (Skt.: sambandhaḥ). Here aging and death are conceptualized as one, non-momentary state in the Buddhist life-cycle.

(4) As related to the previous link on the chain of living in a healthy and able-bodied way and to the future link on the chain of reincarnation. Here the link of ageing and death is viewed as adjacent to other links on the chain (Skt.: prakārṣikaḥ).

For Xuanzang, the discussion of aging and death in terms of the four modes is doctrinally significant in that it serves to defend the analytical distinction between dying and death. The collation of aging with death within the eleventh link on the chain upholds Xuanzang’s point that death cannot be equated to dying. Dying is understood as an impermanent state, and death is viewed as the impermanent state of no longer being alive. In the teaching of the Buddha on the chain of dependent co-arising, aging and death unfold in successive moments, as two parts of a gradual process that ends with the aging and death of a being and gives rise to the next stage in the cycle of life, rebirth.

On the Distinction Between Living, Dying and Being Dead

In his exegesis of the process of dying and the transition to the next link of the chain of co-arising, Xuanzang determines that state of dying belongs to the last moments of the state of being
alive. The moment of death, or the state of being dead, is defined as the moment of the afterlife that immediately precedes rebirth. To support the distinction between the process of dying and the moment of death, Xuanzang analyzes the four states of the Buddhist lifecycle as enumerated by Vasubandhu in Chapter Three of the *Treasury of Abhidharma*. Vasubandhu divides the lifecycle into four “states” (Skt: *bhavas*):

1. The state of being alive in past lives (Skt.: pūrvabhava; Chi.: benyou 本有).
2. The state of being dead (Skt.: maraṇabhava; Chi.: siyou 死有). This is the moment during which a sentient being dies.
3. The intermediate state between corporeal incarnations (Skt.: antarābhāva; Chi. zhongyou 中有). This describes the discarnate afterlife, or the bardo, the state a sentient being occupies between corporeal reincarnations. During this state, the sentient being exists as an intermediate being, or as an upapāduka.
4. The state of being reincarnated (Skt.: upapattibhava; Chi.: shengyou 生有) This is the state during which the sentient being is reincarnated into a new life, in the form of an embryo.

Xuanzang employs the four states of the Buddhist lifecycle analysis by Vasubandhu to emphasize that rebirth is preceded by a process of dying, and that the moment of death is linked to the moment of rebirth. Here he upholds the Buddhist of no-self, impermanence and reincarnation – the idea that because a being is reborn, the being has already died.

**On Dying Suddenly and Dying Gradually**

In his translation of the *Treasury of Abhidharma*, Xuanzang introduces two ways of dying:

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628 What is the state of being dead? The state of being dead is different from the time of dying since it has four *skandhas* at its nature, rather than five *skandhas*. T27n1545p0959a22-23. The *Mahāvibhāṣa* continues with an explanation of the karmic purity or impurity of the four states of the life-cycle, concluding that only the state of becoming reincarnated (i.e., the state of prenatal development) is contaminated. The other three states of the lifecycle are indeterminate in nature, that is, neither contaminated nor uncontaminated.
“dying gradually” and “dying suddenly” (Skt.: sakṛtmāranam; Chi: dunsī 頓死). The temporal distinction he makes between dying gradually and dying slowly involves the doctrine of karma. A sentient being dies gradually when the indriyas clustered in specific groups slowly cease to function. This type of dying occurs, for example, when a sentient being experiences a long illness. Conversely, a sentient being dies suddenly when the indriyas shut down “in a single moment” (Skt.: ekakṣaṇam; Chi: yi chana zhong 一剎那中). This type of death is brought about by a sudden and traumatic blow. In general, dying slowly is regarded by the Abhidharma theorists as more physically and emotionally painful than dying suddenly.

According to Xuanzang, a sentient being can die suddenly in any one of the three dhātus (Chi.: tong sanjie 通三界). Although the moral logic of karma applies to all ways of dying, the classificatory distinction between suddenly or gradually dying depends upon environmental or dhātu-based factors. Although a sentient being with an inferior moral standing is more likely to have a painful and gradual course of dying, factors other than poor karma can result in dying gradually. When perishing suddenly, and with the skillful faculties intact, the sentient being is considered to have a good death. Hence, the type of the faculties that perish together determine both the moral and hedonic quality of the dying of a sentient being.

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629 Mahāvibhāṣa 90 describes a view that holds that at the very moment of death, the skandhas of the afterlife already arise: Question: does one receive a body during the intermediate state? Reply: one does receive a body but it is rapid and imperceptible. Hence there are those who are of the opinion that the in the initial moment of the afterlife the intermediate skandhas arise and the dead skandhas are annihilated. In the final moment of the afterlife, the skandhas of becoming reincarnated arise. This process is rapid an imperceptible. 問:此等為受中有身不?答: 受中有身,然以迅速,難可覺知故作是說:初一剎那死有蘊滅中有蘊生。後一剎那中有一蘊滅生有蘊生。由此迅速難可覺知.

630 A passage Xuanzang’s translation of AKBh 3.41 appears to state that jīvitēndriyam is the final faculty to meet its demise before the sentient being enters into the “state of being dead” (Skt.: maranabhava). However, the original Sanskrit text of this sentence in question mentions only āyur, without explicit mention of jīvitēndriyam or any other faculty. Both Xuanzang’s and Paramārtha’s translations of this sentence, however, interpolate jīvitēndriyam into the text: Skt. itarathā hi tasyāyaśah ksayān maranabhavah prasajyeta.  Paramārtha:若不爾。此中由命根盡。應別立死有. Xuanzang: 若異此者，中有命根，最後滅時，應立死有.
Vasubandhu, Saṅghabhadra and Xuanzang portray dying suddenly as more desirable than dying gradually. The Buddha, for example, is said to have died suddenly, or “in a single moment.” In his exegesis of dying gradually and dying suddenly, Xuanzang upholds the Buddhist doctrine of karma. According to Xuanzang, the sentient being who dies suddenly enjoys the reward of a life well-lived in the form of a benign and relatively painless process of dying, whereas the being who dies slowly and painfully reaps the consequences of bad karma in the form of a protracted and painful process of dying.

**What Is Dying Painfully?**

In his analysis of dying, Xuanzang examines the existential question of why dying is painful for sentient beings. This inquiry takes Xuanzang into a discussion of two questions related to the process of dying: What happens to the body during the process of dying? How does the body register the physical sensations of pain associated with dying? In his analysis of the physical process of dying, Xuanzang returns to the Yogācāra theory of the indriyas and to the roles that the “vital spots,” (Skt.: marmāṇi), the faculty of vitality, and the conscious awareness of physical sensation (Skt.: manovijñāna) play in the process of dying.

According to Vasubandhu, the organs of the body are sustained by the three humors (Skt.: tridoṣa) of wind (Skt.: vāyur), bile (Skt: pitta), and phlegm (Skt.: kapha). The three humors are generated by the “vital spots,” or the marmāṇi, located within the organs of the body. The marmāṇi supply the corporeal body and the indriya of vitality with the life-giving humors that support, restore and revitalize the physical processes that sustain the sentient being.

When a part of the body is mortally damaged, the marmāṇi in the area of the injury are “severed from the living body” (Skt.: √chid; Chi.: duan 斷; Tib.: ‘chad). This causes the three
humors to “spill forth” (Tib.: bzlog) into the cavities of the body. As the humors bleed out from the marmāṇi, the organs near the original injury shut down and the activities of the indriya of vitality begin to terminate. At this point, a domino effect takes hold, and the organs throughout the body gradually and sequentially begin to cease functioning. The indriya of vitality, no longer restored by the humors, ceases to sustain the life-giving physical and mental functions of the body.

An injury to the marmāṇi initiates the process of gradual dying by depriving the faculty of vitality of the three life-sustaining humors.\(^{631}\) The marmāṇi are connected throughout the neurological system of the body and are part of the physical indriyas that sustain sensory consciousness (Skt.: manovijñāna) within a sentient being. In his commentary on verse forty-two in Chapter Three of the Treasury of Abhidharma, Xuanzang states that a sentient being experiences the physical sensation of pain through the manovijñāna, the mental consciousness of bodily sensation. When the marmāṇi are severed from the organs by a traumatic blow to a part of the body, the manovijñāna become activated and convey the physical sensation of pain to the conscious mind of a sentient being.\(^{632}\) As the marmāṇi, the indriya of vitality, and the systems of the body begin to fail, the network of manovijñāna registers the sensations of pain and discomfort from all parts of the body to the mind. Finally, as the marmāṇi and the indriya of vitality

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\(^{631}\) The Treatise on the Basis of Gnosis (T1544:26.1023.c22) contains a question and response about the fatality of severing the marmāṇi: “For what reason does one experience the border of death? Reply: it is because the marmāṇi sever the faculty of vitality which is destroyed. But how does this match with that one will say that one experiences the border of death? Reply: this matches with saying that the marmāṇi sever the faculty of vitality which is destroyed. What sensory sphere does this event belong to? And with how many consciousnesses is it associated with? [1023c22] 云何死邊際受?答:由此末摩斷命根滅。齊何當言死邊際受?答:齊此末摩，斷命根滅。何處攝。答:法處。幾識相應.  

Reply: it is associated with kayavijñāna and manovijñāna. Initially, it is associated with kayavijñāna, then, finally, it is associated with manovijñāna.” 答身識意識。初末摩斷受。身識相應。最後受。意識相應.

\(^{632}\) Nyānanusāra śāstra (T1562:29.514.a13-15), fascicle 30: Although visual consciousness is based in the physical indriyas, since it has no particular direction, what so much the more for the mental consciousness? Although it is based in kāyendriyam, as for the teaching that kāyendriyam perishes from the physical loci, manovijñāna and kāyendriyam, are rapidly and completely annihilated from no other place (than the indriyas).  

眼等諸識。虽依止色根。尚無方所。況復意識?然約身根滅處說者。若頓死者。意識身根。欻然總滅。非有別處. 
deteriorate and cease to function, *manovijñāna* begins to retract, thereby causing the sentient being to lose consciousness of physical sensation. As the vitality of life and consciousness depart the body, a corpse is left behind. To Xuanzang, this is the moment of death.

In the *Treasury of Abhidharma*, Vasubandhu describes how *manovijñāna* is lost gradually as a sentient being undergoes the severing of the vital spots from the corporeal body. Here Vasubandhu lays out a central Yogācāra tenet, that the presence of consciousness is equated with life in a sentient being, and the loss of consciousness is equated with death. In a commentary on the forty-second and forty-third verses in Chapter Three, “Discrimination of Worldly Things,” in the *Treasury of Abhidharma* by Vasubandhu, Xuanzang states that the trail of the deprivation of consciousness from the body leaves insensate, dead material behind. Here, Xuanzang concurs with Vasubandhu in that once consciousness departs the body, all that remains is a corpse.

**Dying and the Departure of Consciousness**

Xuanzang continues his analysis of the process of dying with an investigation of the theories of Vasubandhu regarding the roles played by *manovijñāna* and karma in determining the realm and the species into which a newly deceased sentient being is reborn. In an auto-commentary on verse forty-two, Chapter Three, of the *Treasury of the Abhidharma*, Vasubandhu addresses the departure of consciousness that occurs during the process of dying and the transition of consciousness into the next species and *dhatu* of the afterlife. Here he postulates, that the location in the body, from which *manovijñāna* departs, is significant in that it predicts the species, and the *dhatu*, into which newly deceased sentient being will be reborn. Vasubandhu acknowledges that karma plays an invariable role in determining from what part of the body *manovijñāna* exits.

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633 This is the presentation found in AKBh 9 3.42cd-43-cd. This passage is also found, verbatim, in Ny and XZL of Saṅghabhadra.
Karma is therefore ineluctably involved in the placement of the deceased being into a species and transmigratory realm.

In his auto-commentary of Chapter Three of the *Treasury of Abhidharma*, Vasubandhu describes the three destinations and the types of species, into which a sentient being who dies gradually within the *kāmadhātu* is reincarnated. According to Vasubandhu, a sentient being can be reborn into one of the realms of the *kāmadhātu* or the *rūpadhātu* in the form of a human, a non-human animal, a *nāraka*, a *preta* or a deva. In verse forty-two in Chapter Three of the *Treasury of Abhidharma*, Vasubandhu enumerates the taxonomy of rebirth into two realms of the *kāmadhātu* and the *rūpadhātu* as follows:

*Adhoga,* “She Who Goes Below,” is one who will be reborn into a lower realm [this includes non-human animals and *nāraka* in the *kāmadhātu*].

A human (Skt.: *nṛ*), is one who will be reborn into the human realm [this includes humans in the *kāmadhātu*].

*Suraga,* “She Who Goes Among the Gods,” is one will be reborn into a heavenly realm [this includes a deva in the *kāmadhātu* or the *rūpadhātu*].

Having explained how humans dying within the *kāmadhātu* follow one of three transmigratory tracks, Xuanzang, in his translation of Chapter Three, verse forty-two in the
Treasury of Abhidharma by Vasubandhu, assigns the final locations of manovijñāna, or mental consciousness, to specific parts of the body. In the schema outlined by Vasubandhu, the locations in the body from which consciousness departs correspond to the three tracks of rebirth. Vasubandhu describes the tracks of beings with different transmigratory destinies in Chapter Three of the Treasury of Abhidharma as follows:

When dying is gradual, manovijñāna departs from the feet, the navel, or from the heart, according to whether the being is going downward, going among men, going among devas or not being reborn. Water spills from the marmāṇis.

According to Vasubandhu, the balance of karma, held by the sentient being at the end life,

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636 Monier-Williams under “sura” gives —“god, deity, divinity.”

637 This is de la Vallée Poussin’s, L’Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu, vol. 2, 135, translation, with modifications: “Quand la mort est graduelle, le manas meurt dans les pieds, au nombri, dans le coeur, suivant que l’être va en bas, chez les hommes, chez les Suras, ou ne renaît pas. Les parties vitales sont fendues par Teau. etc.”

638 The Sanskrit text leads up to the stanza 43a-d (Shastri, 1976, vol. 1 p. 403) with the following question and response concerning the final indriya to decay in a “sudden death”: atha mriyamāṇasya kasmin šarīrapradaśe vijñānāṁ niruddhyate? sakṛṇmarāṇe samanaskanāṁ kāyendriyaṁ sahasā ’ntardhiyate.

639 D 4089: vol. 140, folio/line 8b.3.
determines the location from which mental consciousness, or *manovijñāna*, leaves the corporeal body. In his analysis of transmigration, Xuanzang concurs with Vasubandhu that the location of the body from which *manovijñāna* departs is dictated by the karma carried by the sentient being while dying. In his CWSL, Xuanzang posits that the *manovijñāna* of a sentient being who dies with predominately good karma, departs from the upper part of the body and the *manovijñāna* of a sentient being with poor karma, departs from the lower portions of the body, including the feet.

The final location in the body from which consciousness disappears is said by Vasubandhu and Xuanzang to indicate the species into which the deceased will be reborn. For example, in the taxonomy of transmigration articulated by Vasubandhu, if *manovijñāna* leaves from the feet, the sentient being is reborn as a *naraka* or a *preta*; if it departs from the navel, the being is reborn as a human, and it if transmigrates from the heart, the being is reborn as a deva.

In his auto-commentary to the 42nd verse of Chapter Three of the *Treasury of Abhidharma*, Vasubandhu states:

For those moving downward [through the transmigratory destinies] *manovijñāna* departs from the two feet.

For those moving toward human rebirth, *manovijñāna* departs from the navel.

彼識最後，兩足處滅。若往人趣，識滅於臍.

According to the assignments made by Vasubandhu, and corroborated by Saṅghabhadra, the consciousness of dying human being who is destined to be reborn in a lower realm in the form of a non-human animal or *nāraka*, departs from the feet. For the dying human being who is reentering an incarnation as a human, consciousness deserts the body from the navel. Regarding the transmigration into a lower realm, Vasubandhu states:
Chapter 4: What Is a Pious Death?

As a sentient being gradually dies, *manovijñāna* first departs from the heart and then from the feet. *Manovijñāna* perishes in this sequence when a sentient being is going to an unfavorable transmigratory destiny. This called going downward.

若漸死者，往下人天，於足齊心。如次識滅，謂墮惡趣，說名往下.  

In the discussion of karma and the departure of consciousness, Xuanzang is pressed to consider the cases of sentient beings who are destined to be reborn into higher realms, and those who have attained liberation from the cycle of rebirth and dying and therefore will not be reborn. These include humans who will be reincarnated into a celestial realm as a deva, and ārhat, sentient beings who have attained liberation from the mortal bondage of dying and rebirth through the disciplined practice of mediation over multiple incarnations. For the devas heading toward the heavens, and the ārhat, destined for nirvāṇa, the last stand of consciousness is in the heart. Xuanzang states:

For those who will be reborn as devas and for those who will no longer be reborn (i.e., the ārhat), consciousness departs from the heart.

Other masters say that the final seat of consciousness prior to the death of the ārhat is the head. This is because the faculty of proprioception is annihilated first in the feet, then in the heart and finally in the head. Once the faculty of proprioception is destroyed, *manovijñāna* departs [from the head].

若往天中。識滅心處。諸阿羅漢。說名不生．

彼最後心。亦心處滅。有餘師說。彼滅在頂正命終時。於足等處。身根滅故。意識隨滅．

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640 Corresponding Skt. text reads: *Tevaṃ yathāsaṅkhyaṃ paḍayornābhyaṃ hṛdaye ca vijñānam sannirudhyate* — Pradhan, *Abhidharmakośa*, 156. Corresponding Tib. text of AKBh reads (D4090: vol. 140, folio/line 143a.5-143a.6): *De dag gi rnam par shes pa ni grangs bzhin du rkang pa dang/lte ba dang/snying gar ‘gag go.*

In his translation of the depiction offered by Vasubandhu of the transmigration of the consciousness of the devas and the ārhat, Xuanzang, identifies a dispute between the Sarvāstivāda masters and Vasubandhu and Asaṅga regarding the location of the final seat of consciousness. Vasubandhu and Asaṅga locate the departure of manovijñāna from the heart, whereas the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma masters locate the departure of consciousness from the head of an ārhat. According to Huili’s biography, in Xuanzang’s case, consciousness finally departed from the head, such that Xuanzang’s head became rosy in the final minutes before his death. This is taken as an extremely auspicious sign. However, its final analysis of the departure of consciousness from the body of the ārhat, Xuanzang’s translations of Vasubandhu’s Treasury of Abhidharma and of Asaṅga’s Basis for Yoga Practitioners, in that in the case of the enlightened ārhat, consciousness departs from heart.

In the evolution of his thinking regarding the departure of manovijñāna from the body Xuanzang ultimately comes to conclude that the consciousness of a dying sentient being in the kāmadhātu departs not from the feet or the navel, but the heart. He concurs with the Yogācāra masters, Vasubandhu and Asaṅga, in positing that for all humans, regardless of their karma or future rebirth, the final seat of manovijñāna in the body before death, is the heart, the most fundamental, and precious organ of the body. In making this distinction, Xuanzang departs from

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642 D 4090: vol. 140, folio/line 143a.6: Yang mi skye bas na mi skye ba ste/ dgra bcom pa dag go/de dag gi nram par shes pa snying khar ‘gag go/
643 D 4090: vol. 140, folio/line 143a: Gzhan dag na re spyi bor zhes zer ro/
644 See Huili’s Biography of the Tripiṭaka Master, fascicle 10 at T2053:50.277.b07.
645 Dullyun writes in his meticulous Study Notes on the Yogācārabhūmi (T1828:42.322.a11-25): “The ancient Abhidharma commentaries transmitted from long ago maintain that, if one plants the seeds of good karma, then consciousness gradually departs from the head. 普來相傳。若種善漸冷至頭面即死.
Chapter 4: What Is a Pious Death?

Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma scholars and aligns with the Yogācāra masters.

**Dying in the Three Dhātus**

In his translation corpora, Xuanzang preserves a taxonomy, composed by Vasubandhu and Saṅghabhadra, that enumerates the ways all sentient beings die within the Buddhist cosmology. Within this taxonomy, the sentient beings who live within the three dhātus of the universe (Skt.: traidhātu), the kāmadhātu, the rūpadhātu and the arūpadhātu, are categorized according to the number and type of indriyas that are lost in dying. Following the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma theory of the indriyas, Vasubandhu and Saṅghabhadra hold that the type of dying experienced by a sentient being is dictated by the species and by the dhātu into which a being is reborn.

In verse twelve of Chapter Two in the Treasury of Abhidharma, Vasubandhu lists the number and the type of indriyas that are lost by sentient beings dying within each of the three dhātus. Vasubandhu writes:

If the bad karma predominates, as in the preta, consciousness first departs the head, then from the bowels.

若造惡業生鬼中者。從頭漸冷至腹即死.

For the tiryāṅc, consciousness departs from the knees.  

若生畜生至膝即死.

For those born into the hells (i.e., nārakas), it also departs from the knees – here, there is no decisive corroboration in the scriptures. Also, the old version (i.e., the version of the MsG translated by Paramārtha) explains: If good karma predominately arises, then consciousness departs from the upper half. If good karma predominately arises, it will depart from the lower half and the cold sensation should travel upward. If bad karma predominately arises then the consciousness should depart from the upper half and the cold sensation should travel downward.  

若生地獄至脚即死。即皆無文證。又舊世親釋云。若作善業所起冷觸定應向上。若造惡業所起冷觸定應向下.

Some people base their explanation upon the faculty of tactition – if one is born into a good transmigratory plane (gati), then consciousness departs from the feet, and gradually deserts up through the head, at which point one dies.  

有人即觸云。若生善趣從足漸冷至頭方死.

If one is born into a bad transmigratory plane then consciousness departs from the head and gradually desert the body through the feet, at which point one dies. This treatise (Yogācārabhūmi) does not contain this explanation. But we trust in human experience (renqing) to base the explanation on the presence of ālayavijñāna at the initial moment of conception and its final resting place and locus in the fleshy-heart. Consciousness’s desertion of this fleshy heart is called ‘death.’”  

若生惡道從頭漸冷至足方死。此由未見此論故。信自人情。據實阿賴耶識初受生時。最初託處即名肉心。若識捨肉心即名為死.
Dying annihilates numerous indriyas.

In the immaterial realm (Skt.: arūpadhātu), dying annihilates three indriyas: jīvitēndriyam, manēndriyam and upekṣēndriyam, the faculty of aversion (Skt.: upekṣā).

In the subtle material realm (Skt.: rūpadhātu), dying annihilates eight indriyas: the five sensory indriyas of vision, hearing, taste, smell and touch, and the indriyas of jīvitēndriyam, manēndriyam and upekṣēndriyam.

In the kāmadhātu, if dying is sudden, eight, nine or ten indriyas are annihilated: the five sensory indriyas, the indriyas of jīvitēndriyam, manēndriyam and upekṣēndriyam and the two procreative indriyas. (The number of indriyas lost is determined by the number of the indriyas of procreation possessed by a sentient being. A sentient being who is androgynous and does not bear either of the gendered procreative indriyas, will die with eight indriyas. A sentient being who carries the procreative faculties of either the male or the female gender will die with nine indriyas. A sentient being who is a hermaphrodite, and bears the procreative faculties of two genders, will die with ten indriyas.)

In the kāmadhātu, if dying is gradual, thirteen indriyas are annihilated: the four indriyas of kāyēndriyam, jīvitēndriyam, manēndriyam and upekṣēndriyam, the four hedonic indriyas of joy, suffering, pleasure, and anxiety and the five skillful indriyas of faith, perseverance, mindful recollection, concentration and wisdom are annihilated. 646

646 I have presented the Sanskrit here along with Xuanzang’s Chinese, but I have based my translation on Xuanzang’s Chinese version, which diverges considerably from both the Sanskrit and Tibetan texts, both in content and presentation. Xuanzang’s rather compacted quatrain corresponds to 2.15-16ab in the Sanskrit and the Tib. – for Skt. text see Pradhan, ed., Abhidharmakośa 76; for Tib. text see D 4089: vol. 140, folio/line 4b.2.

647 Corresponding Skt. reads (Pradhan, Abhidharmakośa, 48): Nirodhayaty uparamān na arūpye jīvitaṁ manahṣupekṣāṁ caiva rūpe' śtau kāme daśa nava aṣṭa vā| 2.15. Kramamṛtyau tu catvāri śubhe sarvatra pañca ca| 2.16ab. Tib. (D 4089: vol. 140, folio/line 4b.2-3.): Gzugs na drug go gong mar gcig|gzugs med dag tu 'chi ba
In his translation of the auto-commentary by Vasubandhu on the taxonomy of dying, and in his original compilation, the CWSL, Xuanzang articulates detailed descriptions of the types of dying experienced by sentient beings that live within the three transmigratory realms. These include precise descriptions of the deaths of the spiritually-evolved sentient beings who inhabit the “immaterial realm” of the arūpadhātu, and the “subtle material realm” of the rūpadhātu. With his elaborations of the benign deaths and the happier rebirths of the beings who reside within the heavenly realms of the rūpadhātu and arūpadhātu, Xuanzang provides inspiration to the Buddhist practitioner who aspires to a better death and rebirth by improving the balance of karma.

The accounts of dying offered by Saṅghabhadra in his two texts, Treatises on the Correct Logic of Abhidharma, and the Clarification of Correct Tenets, and by Vasubandhu in the Treasury of Abhidharma, support the premise that the spiritually and physically refined beings who reside in the rūpadhātu and arūpadhātu, lose fewer indriyas in the process of dying than sentient beings in the kāmadhātu. Sentient beings who are reborn into the higher realms are regarded as physically attenuated because they are born without the indriyas of procreation, the sensory indriyas, or the indriyas of suffering and anxiety. Because they lack the hedonic indriyas that generate the psychological distress and physical pain associated with dying, beings that are born into the rūpadhātu and arūpadhātu die with a minimum of physical pain or mental distress.

Dying in the Kāmadhātu

The kāmadhātu, one of the three realms of the Buddhist cosmology, is the transmigratory realm of sensory desire into which many of humans are reborn. The kāmadhātu consists of three environments: the four continents of the earth, (Skt.: Jambudvīpa, Uttarakura, Godaniya,
Purvavideha), the eight hot and eight cold hells below the surface of the earth, and the six heavens above the earth, including the exalted Tusita heaven. The six genera of sentient beings that live across the three realms of kāmadhātu include: humans, non-human animals, devas, pretas, or “hungry ghosts,” nārakas, or “hellish beings” and upapādukas, or beings in transitional states between corporeal incarnations. While humans are reborn into the earth and the six heavens, non-human animals are reborn only into one of the four continents on earth. The devas are reborn into one of the six heavens above the earth, including the exalted abode of the Thirty-Three Celestials (Skt.: Trayatrimśika; Chi.: Renli tian 仞利天). Pretas are reincarnated into one of the four continents of the earth. Nāraka are reborn into one of the sixteen hells below the earth. Upapādukas are reincarnated into one of the six heavens. The most desirable incarnation within the realm of the kāmadhātu is that of a deva in a celestial heaven. The least favorable incarnation is that of a nāraka reborn into one of the six hot hells below the earth.

Dying Suddenly and Dying Gradually Within the Kāmadhātu

In the Treatise on the Correct Logic of Abhidharma, Saṅghabhadra describes suddenly dying in the kāmadhātu as the synchronous deprivation of eight, nine or ten indriyas. In his analysis, Saṅghabhadra follows the fifteenth and sixteenth verses in Chapter Two, “Discrimination of Faculties,” of the Treasury of Abhidharma, in which Vasubandhu describes the number of indriyas that are lost by a sentient being dying suddenly in the kāmadhātu. Here, Vasubandhu specifies that the number of indriyas lost in dying suddenly is determined by the gender of the sentient being. In his analysis of dying suddenly in his Treatise Clarifying Abhidharma Tenets, Saṅghabhadra writes:

When a being dies suddenly in the kāmadhātu, ten, nine or eight indriyas are annihilated.
When a hermaphroditic being dies, ten indriyas are annihilated (the five sensory indriyas, mind, and vitality) and the female and male procreative faculties. When a male or female
being dies, along with the eight indriyas, the faculties of male or female procreation are annihilated. When an androgyne dies, eight indriyas are annihilated.

欲頓死時。十九八滅。二形十滅。謂女男根及前說八一形九滅。無形八滅。648

In the *Commentary on the Vital Spots of the Illuminating Treasury of Abhidharma* (Skt.: *Abhidharmakośamarmapradīpa*), Dignāga, the great sixth-century Buddhist philosopher and Abhidharma exegete, discusses the rubric of ten, nine or eight indriyas that are destroyed when a sentient being dies suddenly.649 In his analysis of the number of faculties lost in dying suddenly, Dignāga, subsumes the four hedonic indriyas of joy, pleasure, pain and anxiety under the category of the five sensory indriyas. This brings the total number of faculties lost by a sentient dying suddenly in the kāmadhātu to a total of twelve, thirteen or fourteen indriyas, depending on the gender of the sentient being. By including the hedonic faculties in his rubric, Dignāga, makes important doctrinal point, that dying in the kāmadhātu involves the faculties of pain and anxiety. Therefore, both dying suddenly and dying gradually in the kāmadhātu, involve a measure of physical and mental pain and suffering.

In the *Treatise Conforming to the Correct Logic of Abhidharma*, Saṅghabhadra describes two stages in the process of dying gradually in the kāmadhātu.650 In the first stage, thirteen faculties

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648 Passage appears in Xuanzang’s translation of *Treatise Clarifying Tenets*, fascicle 5 at T1563:29.798.a23-24 and in his translation of *Nyāyanusāra śāstra*, fascicle 9 at T1562:29.382.b11-12. Corresponding text in the Tib. translation of Saṅghabhadra’s *Treatise Clarifying Tenets* reads (D 4091: vol. 141, folio/line 114a.1): dod pa'i khams dag tu 'chi na/ mtshan gnyis pa zhig na ni/ brygyad po de dag dang/ pho dang/ mo'i dbang po dang dbang po bcu 'gag go/ mtshan gcig pa zhig yin na ni dgu'o/mtshan med pa zhig yin na ni brygyad de.

649 Dignāga writes in his *Commentary on the Vital Spots of the Abhidharmakośa* (D 4095: vol. 147, folio/line 113a.4): “Where there exists the mind associated with skillfulness, manēndriyam is associated with abstemious (abhakṣa) form of upekyêndriyam, together with vitality, pleasure, and the five skillful faculties.”/yid bde ldan yang/gang zhig yid bde ba'i dbang po dang ldan pa de yang gdon mi za bar btang snyoms dang/srog dang/yid dang/bde ba dang/yid bde ba dang/dbang po lnga dang ldan no.

650 Māhāvibhāṣa 150: “The eight refer to the five hedonic faculties, kāyêndriyam, jīvitêndriyam, and manēndriyam, for example, those in the Jambudvīpa who have severed the skillful roots. Pūrvavideha and Godānīya are the same. 八者。謂身命意五 受根。即斷善者漸命終位如鴻部洲。毘提訶洲、瞿陀尼洲亦爾 (T1545:27.767.e01-3). For the Uttarakuru, the minimum is thirteen and the maximum is eighteen. The eighteen refer to the androgyne without the three uncontaminated roots. The thirteen refer to kāyêndriyam, jīvitêndriyam,
are annihilated: the five sensory *indriyas* of sight, hearing, taste, touch and smell, the *indriyas* of procreation, and the four hedonic faculties of joy, pleasure, anxiety, and suffering. In the second stage, the four faculties of *kāyendriyam*, *jīvitendriyam*, *mānendriyam*, and *upekṣendriyam* are destroyed in one fatal blow.

In his translation of the description of dying gradually by Saṅghabhadra, found in the *Treatise According to the Correct Logic of Abhidharma* and the *Treatise Clarifying Tenets*, Xuanzang writes:

If the sentient being dies gradually, the four faculties of body, vitality, mind and aversion are the final *indriyas* to fail. The *indriyas* all fail at one time 若漸死時，身命意捨四根後滅。此四必無前後滅義.

Human beings who die gradually within the *kāmadhātu* bear at least thirteen faculties at the time of their demise. These include the five sensory *indriyas*, the five hedonic *indriyas* and the *indriyas* of vitality, mind and procreation. Xuanzang regards the thirteen *indriyas*, as the basis for dying gradually. The activation of the hedonic *indriya* during dying means that the sentient being who dies gradually will experience bodily pain and psychological suffering.

Xuanzang avers, however, that by cultivating the skillful faculties of faith, perseverance, concentration, recollection, and wisdom, a sentient being alleviates the physical pain and psychological distress associated with dying. The sentient being who dies skillfully, therefore, dies with eighteen faculties: the five sensory *indriyas*, the five hedonic faculties, the *indriyas* of mind, *manendriyam*, the five skillful faculties, including faith (and the other four senses along with the procreative faculty) that gradually perish.

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653 Saṅghabhadra is here reporting an explanation found in AKBh 2.22 (T1558:29.17.a16) and also corroborated in *Nyāyānusāra*, fascicle 9, within its sub-commentary on the auto-commentary of Vasubandhu.
vitality and procreation and the five skillful indriyas of faith, perseverance, mindful recollection, concentration and wisdom. For example, the Buddha died bearing a total of eighteen indriyas.

The number of thirteen faculties is regarded as the line of demarcation between human and non-human animal life in the kāmadhātu. Within the kāmadhātu, dying deprives non-human animals of fewer faculties than humans. Humans die with more faculties than their animal counterparts in the kāmadhātu because humans, unlike non-human animals, have the choice to cultivate the five skillful faculties, during life and while dying.

**Special Cases of Dying in the Kamadhātu**

In the *Treasury of Abhidharma*, in Chapter Three, “On Discriminating Worldly Things,” and in his commentary on Chapter Two, “Discrimination of Faculties,” Vasubandhu describes the types of dying experienced by sentient beings who inhabit various environments within the kāmadhātu. The beings described by Xuanzang in his translations of the texts by Vasubandhu, range from the spiritually-advanced beings who reside in the Uttarakuru, the snowy “Continent of

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654 The Mahāvibhāṣa reads “this is the same (the eightfold assignment) for those undergoing the gradual course of dying, along with the hellish beings (Skt.: nārakas), and those who have lost either of six physical sense faculties.” 郡漸命終、及在地獄、已失六色根者 (T27, no. 1545, p. 767, b18-20).

655 Neither Saṅghabhadra nor Vasubandhu spell out the details here in terms of the specific figures and scenarios for non-human animals. However, Xuanzang’s Mahāvibhāṣa provides some detail regarding the definition of death for animals: “those born viviparously, ovipariously, or through incubation meet their end gradually with the gradual desertion of the 6 types of physical faculties.” 胎·卵·濕生漸命終者，漸捨眼等六種色根 (T1545:27.464a03). The six deprived by the deaths of non-human animals include the ocular faculty (“vision”), four other physical faculties (tactition, audition, gustation, and olfaction), and vitality. The rest of the explanation in Vibh 90 runs: It is said that it is from the hands or from the feet, and so forth, that the bodily faculty is gradually deserted. If all of the atomic particles of the bodily faculty is deserted, then that's the end of life. In the case of hellish beings, the limbs and joints disintegrate, and the dissipation extends to all parts of the body's faculties. ”於身根中亦有漸捨，謂手足等。若捨一切身根極微即便命終；若地獄中解諸支節，乃至糜爛亦有身根 (T1545:27.464.a04-6). The pertinent section of Mahāvibhāṣa, fascicle 90, fills out some the details on the topic of how many faculties are deprived in different kinds of animals. Specifically, the above rubric of six faculties excludes the procreative faculties, since both humans and non-human animals born into these realms are androgyynic by nature. The bimodal gendered form only changes whether or not an additional two (for the hermaphrodite) or only an additional one gendered faculties are deprived. Sentient beings dying out from the realm of pure matter and the immaterial realm lack bimodal gendered faculties. Those kinds of sentient beings populating the arūpyadhātu are androgynous by nature – lit., “born with no bimodal gender” (無二形).
Eternal Beatitude” to the morally-degraded beings, or *icchantikas*, who live in the “Dusty Saha World” of the *Jambudvīpa*. The discussion of special sentient beings highlights how the quality and the number of faculties lost in dying differs among species living within the four continents of the *kāmadhētu*.

In his analysis of dying among different species Xuanzang finds evidence to support the doctrinal theory that the moral status of the *indriyas* at the end of life determines the type of dying experienced by a sentient being, as well as the *dhētu* into which a sentient being is reborn. With the depictions of the types of dying of sentient beings across the *kāmadhētu*, Xuanzang underlines the doctrinal message that all sentient beings have the opportunity, agency and choice, to improve the balance of karma, up to, and during the end of the life.

**Dying in the Continent of Uttarakuru**

The spiritually-evolved beings of the *Uttarakuru* are androgenic. Unlike in the *Jambudvīpa*, the region where human beings live, the sentient beings in the *Uttarakuru* do not possess the *indriyas* of procreation. Because of their high level of spiritual evolution, and because they possess bodies that are resistant to the splitting of the “vital spots,” or the *marmāṇi* that generate the pain associated with dying, beings in the *Uttarakuru* die suddenly, and without excessive physical pain or mental anguish. When an androgenic and spiritually-evolved being dies in the *Uttarakuru*, seventeen *indriyas* are annihilated: the five sensory *indriyas*, the five hedonic *indriyas*, the five skillful *indriyas*, mind and vitality.

In *The Basis for Yoga Practitioners*, Asaṅga notes that, because sentient beings in the *Uttarakuru*, lack the *indriyas* of sexual gratification and procreation, they are free from the yoke of sexual desire, that functions for many sentient beings as an obstacle to enlightenment.\(^{656}\) In the

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\(^{656}\) Xuanzang, trans., *Yogācārabhūmi*, fascicle 1 — T1579:30.282.a04-5.
Chapter 4: What Is a Pious Death?

Mental Basis (Skt.: Manobhūmiḥ), Asaṅga states that humans within the Uttarakuru, “die with their skillful faculties about them” (Skt.: sêndriyam; Chi.: jugen 具根). Here Asaṅga observes that, because humans in the Uttarakuru are free from the distractions and compulsions of sexual desire and craving, they spend more time cultivating the skillful indriyas. The attention to the skillful indriyas allows the beings in the Uttarakuru to experience benign deaths and favorable afterlives.

Dying as an Icchāntika

In the sixth verse of Chapter Two of the Treasury of Abhidharma, and in his auto-commentary on this text, Vasubandhu describes a group of humans who are regarded as morally-degraded or “incorrigible” (Skt.: icchantika). In the Mahāyāna sūtras, the epithet, “one having severed the skillful roots,” is granted to the icchantikas (Chi.: yichanti 一闡提; yichandiqie 一闡底迦). The icchantikas are depicted throughout the Indic scriptures as “lacking in any shred of desire” (Skt.: icchā+anta) to cultivate moral thoughts or behaviors.658

In his Basis for Yoga Practitioners, Asaṅga interprets the renunciation of the skillful indriyas demonstrated by the icchantikas as volitional. The icchantikas, rather than listening to the

657 Basis for Yoga Practitioners, Manobhūmiḥ section: “Moreover, when sentient beings die out from the rupyaḥdhatu, they still have their faculties about them. In the kāmadhātu, beings die out with or without their faculties about them. Those dying purely with the practices for liberation are termed ‘preparing well for dying.’ Those dying in an impure way with the practices not for liberation are termed ‘preparing well for dying.’” 又色界沒時皆具諸根。欲界沒時隨所有根或具不具。又清浄解脫死者。名調善死。不清浄不解脫死者。名不調善死。名不調善死。T30n1579p0282a03-5.

658 The epithet, “one having severed skillful roots” would become synonymous with the icchantikas (Chi.: yi-chan ti[一] 閡提) described in Mahāyāna sūtras. The icchantikas are the incorrigibles – those who, by very definition, “any shred of desire,” to cultivate any form of morality. This is a characteristic doctrine about which Xuanzang is adamant. His tradition of East Asian Yogācāra would stalwartly stand by it, even in the face of criticism from other text-traditions of East Asian Buddhism (i.e., Tiantai, Huayan, Chan, etc.), which all assert universal (i.e., non-exclusive), access to enlightenment for all sentient beings. These traditions look to the later Mahāyāna sūtras to derive this doctrine – in particular, the Lotus and the Nirvāṇa sūtras – rather than the Abhidharma and Yogācāra śāstras. See Karashima, Seishi. 2007, “Who were the icchantikas?” Annual Report of the International Research Institute for Advanced Buddhology, 67–80.
Chapter 4: What Is a Pious Death?

Teachings of the Buddha or heeding the spiritual advice of others, (Skt.: kalyāṇamitra) are driven by base cravings and sensory desires. The recalcitrant and refractory icchantikas inhabit the kāmadhātu and not the spiritually advanced realms of the rūpadhātu or the arūpadhātu.

In his commentary on The Basis for Yoga Practitioners, Kuiji lists six conditions that lead a sentient being to become an icchantika with no hope for salvation. These are:

1. Using the indriyas for the harmful purposes
2. Using the indriyas to satisfy sensory desires
3. Associating with people of poor moral character
4. Lacking in shame or remorse about engaging in morally impure behavior
5. Maintaining grossly distorted views
6. Lacking compassion for other sentient beings

Asaṅga’s Basis reads at (T30n1579p0281a22-24) “What is severing the skillful roots? It refers to realizing the highest grades of bad karma by being bent upon the immediate indulgence of sensory desires. It is because one follows along with bad people, because one makes machinations about the perfect formulation of distorted views, because one is bend upon performing all manner of malicious acts with no fear of repercussions, and because one is without shame or compassion.”

Kuiji enumerates six conditions that can lead to the degrading and the ultimate loss of the skillful root. These are:

1. Firstly, the keenness/dullness of faculties
2. Secondly, being bent upon sensual pleasure and bad conduct
3. Thirdly, meeting with bad fiends
4. Fourthly, gravity of distorted views
5. Fifthly no compunction about bad conduct
6. Sixthly, demonstrating benevolence towards sentient beings. The keenness of faculties refers to internally thinking and formulating thoughts that lead to fiercely distorted views. They are not scared of nefarious conduct, nor do they arouse thoughts of benevolence or compassion.

Kuiji’s commentary on YBh: “If one associates repeatedly with bad people and follows along in their ill conduct being bent upon indulging in sensory pleasures, one can cut off the skillful roots. They must whet the skillful faculties and then cut them off. The dull (as opposed to keen) faculties would not be capable of so broadly engaging in ill conduct and indulging in sensory pleasures.”

Kuiji’s commentary on the Yogācārabhūmi reads: “Some take pleasure in hurting and harming other sentient beings without giving them any aid or help. By the power of this action, the icchāntika severs the skillfull roots. By the conditioning power of this karma the icchāntika also follows along with bad people.”

Vibh 150 cites this explanation, verbatim, and indicates that thirteen denotes all twenty-two, with the deduction of the three uncontaminated faculties not pertaining to “those who have severed the roots of morality.”
Kuiji and Xuanzang maintain that all humans have the choice to either retain, or to discard the skillful faculties in the process of dying.\(^{664}\) In his commentary on the discussion of the icchantikas, found in The Basis for Yoga Practitioners, Kuiji posits that, by refusing to cultivate the skillful indriyas, the icchantika shoot themselves in the spiritual feet. Paraphrasing Vasubandhu’s Treasury of Metaphysics,\(^{665}\) Kuiji writes:

The body of the icchantika must die and be reborn to regain the skillful indriyas. Then we will see if they break the precepts again or not.

要身壞後，方續善根。見壞戒或不壞等. \(^{666}\)

In an auto-commentary to Chapter Two of the Treasury of Abhidharma, Vasubandhu writes:

The icchantikas die gradually with eight faculties: the five hedonic faculties of joy, suffering, pleasure, anxiety and aversion,\(^{667}\) along with mind, proprioception and vitality. First, they lose the other six physical faculties (i.e., the five senses of vision, hearing, taste and smell, along with aversion and the faculty of procreation).\(^{668}\)

八者謂五受根、及身·命·意。即失六色根已斷善者. \(^{669}\)

\(^{664}\) Kuiji’s commentary on Yogācārabhūmi paraphrases the Abhidharmakośa: “Fascicle seventeen of the Treasury of Abhidharma says: are those who are not capable of retaining the skillful faculties within the present body? This excludes only from those bent upon the nefarious conduct, having been reborn from one of the hells.” 俱舍第十七云：於現身中能續善不？亦有能續。除造逆人，彼人定從地獄將沒 (T1828:42.320.c27-28).

\(^{665}\) T1558:29.89.b27-8.

\(^{666}\) T1558:29.89.b27.

\(^{667}\) Puguang’s commentary enumerates this collection of eight faculties that defines the subject of death for some beings in the rūpyadhātu “if residing in the stage of non-perception (asamjñā), one possesses only the nine, namely, five hedonic faculties along with mind, life, and aversion.” 若非想地中，唯有八根，謂信等五，意·命·捨.

\(^{668}\) AKBh 2.20. For Skt. text see Pradhan, ed., Abhidharmakośa, 51: pañcabhir vedanādibhiḥ, kāyamanojīvitaś ca.

\(^{669}\) T1545:27.767.b12-13.
Dying with the assignment of the eight indriyas borne by the icchantikas is regarded as distinctly unpleasant, as it involves a high quotient of pain as well as aversive sensations and psychological distress. By failing to exercise the skillful faculties, the icchantikas suffer the dire consequences of poor karma and reap bitter fruit at the end of life.

**Dying as a Deva**

Among the six heavens of the kāmadhātu are the vaunted Pure Lands in which the devas, or celestial beings, reside. The devas live in a happier abode and have longer and less stressful lives than humans who reside in in the Jambudvipa. Devas have a minimum of seventeen indriyas, including the five sensory indriyas, mind, vitality, the five hedonic faculties, and the five cultivatable skillful faculties. Devas who possess the faculties of procreation bear up to eighteen faculties. Because they have highly developed skillful indriyas, devas in the celestial heavens experience painless and quick deaths.

In their commentaries on the *Treasury of Abhidharma*, Sthiramati and Pūrṇavadhara list the five reasons the celestial beings do not experience painful deaths: devas die suddenly; they do not experience the splitting of the vital spots from the body and the spilling of the three humors; they approach the final moments of life with resolution and moral conviction (Skt.: bhrāntā);
they do not undergo the five signs of the grave and decline; and their bodies decay rapidly and without the release of copious amounts of liquid (Tib.: *chu*; Chi.: *shui 水*) into the environment.  

Devas are perishable and subject to rebirth. Unlike humans in the earthly realm, however, devas have less opportunity to accumulate merit while living in the celestial heavens.

**Dying as a Ārhat**

In Chapter Six, “Discriminating the Sages,” in the *Treasury of the Abhidharma*, Vasubandhu depicts how Ārhat, humans who have perfected the path of learning, die in the *kāmadhātu*. Vasubandhu describes the ārhat as dying in a “karmically neutral state”  

Purñavardhana’s commentary on *Abhidharmakośa*, D 4093: vol. 144, folio/line 329, b.4-5, reads: “Where it is said that the three destructions of the sensory world (*bhājanaloka*) are qualitatively similar in their cause, it refers to the three destructions of being destroyed by fire, being destroyed by water, and being destroyed by wind. What it means by the devas being exempted from this destruction is that they die suddenly and that they later undergo rebirth in a spontaneous reincarnation (of an *upapāduka*). This is because of the fact that the devas can efface the confusion at the end of life and that they do not take on the five signs of great physical decline. Those going towards the hells of uninterrupted suffering also excepted (i.e., *nāraka*s), but they constantly undergo the rupture of the marmāṇi (in the hells).”


**Dying in the Rūpadhātu**

The *rūpadhātu* is one of the three realms of the Buddhist universe. It is composed of sixteen...
celestial spheres (Skt.: sejie shiqi tian 色界十七天), or heavenly regions, and is occupied by humans, devas and upapādukas. The rūpadhātu is known in the Mahayana Buddhist tradition as the Pure Lands, and reincarnation into it is regarded by Buddhist practitioners as a favorable rebirth. Beings that are reborn into this dhātu have benign deaths and opportunities to work toward enlightenment.

The three famous texts of the Trans-East-Asian Pure Land tradition (Skt.: jingtu sanbu jing 淨土三部經) adduce an example of humans becoming reborn by “sprouting forth” from a golden lotus blossom pedestal 金蓮花坐 that floats above a crystalline lake of seven jewels within the Pure Land (Skt.: Buddhakṣetra; Chi.: Fo cha 佛剎) of Amitābha. The Pure Lands are located within the rūpadhātu. In the celestial sphere of Abṛiha, known in Chinese as “the heaven containing no worries” (Chi.: wufan tian 無煩天) humans are born without the undesirable hedonic faculties of suffering and anxiety.

Humans and devas in the rūpadhātu possesses a minimum of three faculties and a maximum of fifteen faculties and do not bear the indriyas of suffering, anxiety or procreation. Human and devas born in this dhātu carry the hedonic faculties of pleasure, joy, and aversion, the sensory faculties of vision, hearing and touch and the indriyas of mind and vitality. They are also born with the five spiritual faculties of faith, concentration, perseverance, mindful recollection of practices, and wisdom, and the three faculties of gnosis: knowing the past, knowing the future and knowing the past, present and future simultaneously. Because sentient beings in the rūpadhātu do not have noses or mouths, they take in nutrition through kāyendriyam, the indriya of

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675 See the description of the higher grades of rebirth in the Amitāyus Vizualization Sūtra 佛説觀無量壽佛經 and also the translation of the shorter and longer recensions of the Sūtra of the Golden Land of Bliss or Sukhāvatīvyūha by Gómez, titled The Land of Bliss. Sanskrit and Chinese versions of the Sukhāvatīvyūha sūtras, 183-4.

676 CWSL, fasc. 4: “Having a nose and a tongue is only part of the bondage to the kāmadhātu”鼻舌唯欲界繫 (T1585:31.20.a06). Also see Dignāga, Abhidharmakośamārammaprādiṣṭha (AKMP), D 4095: vol. 147, folio/line 113a.3: “When a dying mind is associated with the visual indriya but is without desire, then there are the faculties
proprioception. Additionally, because they do not procreate in the rūpadhātu, humans and devas are reborn through the “spontaneous transformation” of an existing upapādukas.\footnote{Dignāga, Marmapradīpa (D 4093: vol. 144, folio/line 123a.3): “In the rūpyadhātu there are eight fold and they are said to be reborn via spontaneous rebirth. Such it is said in detail in the śāstra (i.e., AKBh).” Zugs na brgyad de dag go/de nyid la rgyu smras pa ni/ rdzus te skye ba thams cad ni/zhes bya ba rgyas par 'byung ba ste/.”} Sentient beings who die in rūpadhātu are either reborn into the kāmadhātu or the rūpadhātu or break the cycle of death and rebirth and achieve nirvāṇa.

Xuanzang, following the fourteenth verse of Chapter Two of the Treasury of Abhidharma, determines dying in the rūpadhātu to be the deprivation of the eight indriyas of mind, vitality, the sublime form of aversion and the five skillful indriyas. In the Commentary on the Vital Spots of the Illuminating Treasury of Abhidharma, Dignāga concurs with Vasubandhu in noting that beings dying in the subtle realms lack the faculty of anxiety and suffering. Therefore, beings in the rūpadhātu die suddenly and without psychological pain or physical suffering.

**Dying in the Arūpadhātu**

The arūpadhātu, or the “formless realm,” is the highest spiritual realm in the Buddhist universe. The exalted realm of the arūpadhātu is populated by human sages, devas and upapādukas who are enlightened but have not yet attained nirvāṇa. Beings who reside in the arūpadhātu have long and pleasant lives enjoying the fruit of their good karma. The arūpadhātu is composed of four transmigratory stations, as attested in Āgamas:

1. The locus of limitless space 空無邊處 (Skt.: ākāśa-anantya-āyatana): Beings who live in this locus the consciousness of limitless space.
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(2) The locus of limitless consciousness 識無邊處 (Skt.: vijñāna-anantya-āyatana): Beings who live in his locus experience consciousness that is not limited by time.

(3) The locus of emptiness 無所有處 (Skt.: akiñcanya-āyatana): Beings who live in this locus experience a state in which there are no physical things.

(4) The locus of neither perception of non-perception 非想非非想處 (Skt.: naivasamjñāna-asamjñā-āyatana): Beings who live in this locus experience a state in which no ideas or physical things exist.

Humans who reside in the fourth heavenly locus of the arūpadhātu, the asanājñikīdevas, or “the state of sensory deprivation” possess the three faculties of mind, vitality and the sublime form of aversion. Vasubandhu describes the celestials who life in fourth abode as deeply absorbed in a state of “perceptionless samādhi” (Skt.: asanājñikāsamādhi; Chi.: wuxiang ding 無想定). He avers that a human being can enter perceptionless samādhi by dying in a state of non-perception. This requires subduing the indriyas of anxiety, suffering, joy and pain and cultivating the indriya of concentration.

Humans in the arūpadhātu die with eight faculties: the five skillful indriyas, mind, vitality and the sublime form of aversion. Beings in the arūpadhātu can improve the moral and hedonic quality of the way they die by exercising the five skillful cultivatable faculties of faith, perseverance, concentration, mindful recollection, and wisdom. In his translation of the Treasury of Abhidharma, Xuanzang notes that while humans and devas beings in the arūpadhyadhātu die without the five senses, because they possess the indriya of subtle aversion, they retain traces.

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678 Vasubandhu’s text of AKbh commentary on 2.20cd runs: strīpumindriye duḥkhe cāmalaṃ ca hitvā 'iti varttate| manojīvitopēsendriyāni śraddhādīni ca pañca|. Only the last part, “the remaining eight unite those yoked to the immaterial realm,” is corroborated in the Skt. text. Xuanzang’s Chinese translation of this passage in Vasubandhu’s auto-commentary reads: 無色如前, 除三漏. 女. 男憂. 苦, 並除五色.及喜. 業根. 准知餘八根通無色界繫. 應意. 命. 捨. 信等五根. This explanation is “cribbed,” verbatim, in Nyāyanusāra śāstra, fascicle 5 (T1562:29.381.c09) and Clarification of Tenets, fascicle 9 (T1563:29.797.c05).
of discomfort during their quick deaths.

The Special Cases of Dying in the \textit{Arūpadhātu}: \textit{Rāgins} and \textit{Vairāgins}

In “Discriminating Sages,” Chapter Six of the \textit{Treasury of Abhidharma}, Vasubandhu describes how sages die in the \textit{arūpadhātu}. He identifies two types of sages: \textit{rāgins}, or beings “who have not yet transcended desire” (Chi.: \textit{wei liyu-zhe} 未離欲者), and \textit{vairāgins} (Chi.: \textit{liyu-zhe} 異欲者), or beings “who have gained detachment from worldly desires.” Kuiji, in his commentary on \textit{The Basis for Yoga Practitioners}, lays out the four ways a sentient being detaches from worldly desire to attain the spiritual status of the \textit{vairāgin}.\footnote{Kuiji’s commentary on the \textit{Yogācārabhūmi} reads: “There are four conditions for becoming a \textit{vairāgin} – firstly, the maturation of the \textit{indriyas}, sages and ordinary humans (Skt. \textit{prthagjana}); secondly, listening to the appropriate dharma; thirdly, gaining distance from the obstructions; and fourthly, giving rise to the correct way of thinking. Only, then [when these conditions are met] can one gain distance from sensory desires. Being a \textit{vairāgin} consists of wisdom. [0008c03]} They are:

(1) Cultivating the skillful \textit{indriyas}.

(2) Listening to the correct dharma.

(3) Detaching from the cognitive and behavioral encumbrances to spiritual cultivation.

(4) Contemplating reality as it really is.

As depicted in the \textit{Basis of Mind} section in \textit{The Basis for Yoga Practitioners} by Asaṅga, the \textit{rāgin} remains entangled in sensory desire and thus contains traces of attachment to the cycle of living and dying.\footnote{\textit{Mahāvibhāṣa}, fascicle 30 reads: “the \textit{rāgin} sage in the contaminated state enters into the correct \textit{samādhi} in departing life; knowledge of the truth of suffering and of types (\textit{anvaya}) have already arisen [while dying].” 聖者未離欲染人正性離生。苦類智已生 (T1545:27.476a19).} \textit{Vairāgins}, who are free from sensory desire, die quickly with their skillful faculties about them and are released from the cycle of death and rebirth.

In the ninth and tenth fascicles of the CWSL, Xuanzang states that the \textit{vairāgins} who reside
in the arūpadhātu die in a sudden and relatively painless way because they do possess the indriyas of suffering, or the two faculties of bodily sensation, kāyendriyam and manendriyam. The dying of the vairāgin involves the loss of ten faculties: the five skillful faculties, the mind, sublime aversion, vitality, and the hedonic faculties of joy and pleasure. All of the faculties of the vairāgin are brought to an end quickly, resulting in a sudden and painless way of dying. For dying is the stage immediately before final nirvāṇa.681

Karma and Consciousness

In The Basis for Yoga Practitioners and in the Compendium of the Mahāyāna, Asaṅga states that the final seat of consciousness for all humans, regardless of their karma, is in the fleshly heart (Skt.: hṛdaya; Chi.: xin 心) of the sentient being. Xuanzang, in his CWSL, ultimately follows Asaṅga and concludes that once consciousness departs the heart of the sentient being, all that remains is a corpse. The termination of the human heartbeat thus marks the ending of one life and the beginning of the next in the Buddhist cycle of birth and death.

After a comprehensive examination of the Abhidharma canon on the nature of dying, Xuanzang turns to The Basis for Yoga Practitioners and to the Compendium of the Mahayana by Asaṅga to investigate the Yogācāra theories on consciousness and the physiology of dying. The Yogācāra philosophers develop two core ideas regarding the role of consciousness at the end of life: that the final resting place of consciousness in the dying sentient being is in the heart, and that

681 Dullyun’s commentary on Yogācārabhūmi mentions the opinion of one “Master Jing who says that ‘Although the ārhat prepares well for dying, he dies now without having prepared for dying in a past life. Since he does not stand ill-prepared for dying now, he will not be reborn into the future.’” 景師云。羅漢今身雖調善死，此死亦由過去不調善死故有今死，於現在不由不調善死而於未來俱不由死，以更不生故 (T1828:42.421.c27-a1).

682 For Skt. text see Bhattacharya, ed., Yogācārabhūmi, 18: Yatra ca kalaladeśe tadvijñānaṃ sammūrcchitaṃ so 'syā bhavati tasmin samaye hṛdayadeśah/ Xuanzang, trans., YBh: 又此羯羅藍，識最初託處，即名肉心。如是識於此處最初託，即從此處最後捨 (T1579:30.283.a18-20).
the final form of consciousness that persists in the sentient being is ālayavijñāna, the “storehouse consciousness” that contains memory and karma. While ālayavijñāna is a subliminal form of consciousness, it is omnipresent in the sensory or cognitive activities of the sentient being, and is responsible for the vestigial consciousness of the sentient being in the final moments before death.

Xuanzang formulates his theories of consciousness and dying is his final and original work, the *Cheng weishi lun*, or CWSL. While initially intended as a catechism of the Yogācāra tenets prepared by Xuanzang for his disciples in Chinese, the CWSL provides a synthesis of the Abhidharma theories and Yogācāra philosophy of Asaṅga and Dignāga. Within the CWSL, Xuanzang addresses the impact of karma on consciousness at the end of life and articulates his original theory that ālayavijñāna accounts for the last traces of consciousness experienced by the sentient being on the brink of death. In his exegeses of consciousness and dying, Xuanzang explores the explanation of the loss of consciousness that is articulated by Asaṅga in the Yogācāra texts; analyzes the nature of ālayavijñāna; and investigates the premise asserted by Asaṅga, in the “Mental Basis” in the *Basis for Yoga Practitioners*, that the subliminal consciousness is the part of the sentient being that transcends the body in dying and is reincarnated in another body.

Xuanzang comes to endorse and elevate the idea, first presented by Asaṅga, that ālayavijñāna is the form of consciousness that transmigrates from one life to the next. In the CWSL, Xuanzang decisively concludes that that karma is implicated in the consciousness of the sentient being and responsible for determining the quality of dying and the afterlife. In his analysis of karma, Xuanzang offers to the Buddhist practitioner the hope that by improving karma through the practice of yoga, the conscious experience of dying can be improved.
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The Loss of Consciousness

Xuanzang begins his exploration of consciousness and dying with the question: What is the nature of consciousness at the end of life? To address this question, Xuanzang returns to the descriptions of consciousness leaving the body that are given by Asaṅga in the *Basis of Yoga Practitioners* and the *Compendium of the Mahāyāna Teaching* and by Vasubandhu in the *Treasury of Abhidharma*. In his analysis of these texts, Xuanzang homes in on a discrepancy between the two depictions of how consciousness departs the body during dying. While Asaṅga avers that the final seat of consciousness for all humans is in the heart, Vasubandhu posits that there are three ways for consciousness to depart the body, and that the departure of consciousness from the heart portends that the newly deceased being will obtain a higher rebirth. The dispute between the two Yogācāra luminaries pulls Xuanzang into taking a closer look into how consciousness departs the corporeal body.

Asaṅga, in the *Compendium of the Mahāyāna Teaching*, and Vasubandhu, in his

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683 Zhizhou is sensitive to this discrepancy. He writes that the sequence of marmani differs between the *Abhidharmakośa* and the *Yogācārabhūmi*, and between the various sūtras of the Buddha: “However, all sentient beings are not equivalent (in this matter of the marmāṇi). Sūtra on the Threefold Realm (*Tridhātuka Sūtra*) says: When the human is in his last hours and will be reborn into the Avīci Hell, the numinous consciousness escapes from the feet. For those reborn as animals, consciousness escapes from the knee. For those falling into the realm of the hungry ghosts, consciousness departs from the abdomen. For those reborn as humans, consciousness leaves from the heart. For those reborn as gods (Skt. devas), consciousness escapes from the eye. Why is this sūtra (on the Threefold Realm) different from the Foundation for Yoga Practitioners (*Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra*)? Because the *Compendium of the Māhāyana* (*Māhāyana-saṃgraha-sūtra*) takes the skin, and the Foundation for Yoga Practitioners take the cavity of the heart, from which consciousness finally vanishes.”

684 Xuanzang’s translation of the passage from the *Compendium of the Mahāyāna* reads: “Asaṅga’s Treatise [of the Compendium of the Mahāyāna] says that whether the cold sensation is based in the upper or lower part of the body depends upon good and bad karma. If one does not believe in ālayavijñāna, then none of that is possible. For this same reason, if one departs from all of the matured consciousness of the seeds (in ālayavijñāna), then the arising of the saṃkheśas would not be possible.”
commentary on this text, agree that karma dictates the course of dying and the location of the departure of consciousness from the body. Asaṅga states that during dying, consciousness migrates to the upper regions of the body and ultimately departs from the heart. According to Vasubandhu, if a sentient being dies with a balance of good karma, consciousness departs from the lower parts of the body, and if the sentient being dies with a balance of bad karma, consciousness departs from the upper half of the body. Xuanzang endorses the positions held by both Yogācāra theorists that the departure of consciousness from the body during dying depends upon the balance of good and bad karma in the individual. He also supports the idea that the specific location of the departure of consciousness from the body predicts the course of future rebirth.

In the Mental Basis section of The Basis for Yoga Practitioners, Asaṅga holds that consciousness departs from the heart regardless of the balance of good or bad karma held by the sentient being. He states:

When one who has performed bad actions approaches the end-of-life, consciousness withdraws the support from the upper part of the body. The upper part of body becomes cold. Then consciousness withdraws up to the region of the heart.

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685 Xuanzang’s translation of the passage from Vasubandhu’s commentary on the Compendium of the Mahāyāna reads: “When one is about to die consciousness departs from the lower or from the higher part of the body depending upon whether the karma is good or bad. This is because those who create good karma must rise up (in the transmigratory ranks, i.e., attain a better rebirth), whereas those who create bad karma must go down. If you don’t allow that ālayavijñāna exists as the maintainer (upadāṭr), then what is the basis of the slowly-creeping cold sensation in the dying? It is because of that fact that ālayavijñāna is the capability of maintaining (this sensation). Sometimes consciousness departs downwards, sometimes upwards, but always in a series – the cold sensation exists in the deserted area.”

Paramārtha’s translation of this passage in MsG and the MsGBh reads similarly to Xuanzang’s: 論曰。正捨壽命離阿黎耶識。或上或下。冷觸不應得成。

[0171c04] 釋曰。是人於死時中。若有善業。定應向上。若有惡業。定應向下。若汝不信有本識。云何得有所依瀰冷？阿黎耶識能執受故。或下或上。如其次第。隨所捨處。身即有冷 (T1597:31.333.a10-14).
When one who has performed good actions approaches the end of life, consciousness withdraws its support from the lower part of the body. The lower part of the body becomes cold. Then consciousness withdraws up to the region of the heart.

The final location of consciousness is in the heart. When consciousness withdraws to the heart, the whole body becomes cold.

In his description, Asaṅga describes how the accumulation of karma determines the physiological experience of the sentient being in the process of dying. If the good karma predominates over the bad karma held by a sentient being, as consciousness travels to the heart, the upper half of the body becomes cold; if the bad karma outweighs the good karma, then the lower portions of the body become cold. The evacuation of consciousness registers physiologically as the loss of bodily warmth. As consciousness withdraws from the extremities of the body and coalesces in the region of the heart, bodily warmth gradually vanishes, leaving portions of the body cold.

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686 Bhattachārya, ed., Yogācārabhūmi, 16: *Tataś cyutikāle ‘kuśalakarmakāriṇī tāvad ārdhva-bhāgād viṁśānām āśrayam muṇciti/urdhva bhāgo vā asya śātiḥbhavati/ sa punas tāvan muṇcati yāvadd hṛdayapradeśām*. Tib. text reads (D 4035: vol. 127, folio/line 9b.7-10a.1): *De bas na re zhig mi dge ba'i las byed byed pa rnams ni 'chi 'pho ba'i tshe rnam par shes pas ro stod nas lus 'dor bar byed de/de'i ro stod grang mor 'gyur ro/de yang snying gar thug pa'i bar du 'dor bar 'gyur ro/legs pa byed byed pa rnams kyi rnam par shes pas ni/ro smad nas lus 'dor par byed de/de'i ro smad grang mor 'gyur ro/de yang snying gar thug pa'i bar du 'dor bar 'gyur te/snying gnas rnam par shes pa 'pho bar rig pa bya'o*.

In the CWSL, Xuanzang presents an account of gradually dying in which he determines that ālayavijñāna, the subliminal layer of consciousness, is a form of consciousness that registers the physical sensation of coldness during the process of dying gradually. Xuanzang states:

With the gradual approach of death, depending upon either the good, or the bad karma held by the sentient being, sensations of cold arise, from either the lower or the upper portions of the body. The sentient being registers the sensation of cold through ālayavijñāna. The operating consciousnesses of the five senses (Skt.: pravṛttivijñānas) no longer register the sensation of cold. The five operating consciousnesses of vision, hearing, taste, smell and touch have their basis of consciousness in the body and do not register the cold. 688

又將死時,由善惡業,下上身分,冷觸漸起。若無此識,彼事不成;轉識不能執受身故。眼等五識,各別依故,或不行故.689

In the account presented in the CWSL and in the translation of the Summary of the Abhidharma, Xuanzang concurs with Asaṅga that if the good karma outweighs the bad, consciousness departs from the “upper part of the body” (Chi.: shen shangfen 身上分), or the arms, the chest and the upper abdomen. If the bad karma prevails over the good, then consciousness deserts the body from the “lower part of the body” (Chi: shen xiafen 身下分), or the feet, legs and lower abdomen.

In his study notes on the CWSL, Zhizhou, the disciple of Kuiji, offers two scenarios for the process by which consciousness departs the body. In the first version, Zhizhou states that when bad karma predominates over good karma, ālayavijñāna retreats from the lower part of the body, lodges in the heart, and then ultimately departs from the upper part of the body and the heart at the

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688 Translation is mine, loosely based on Wei Tat’s helpful edition. See Wei Tat, trans., Ch’eng Wei-Shih Lun: The Doctrine of Mere-Consciousness by Hsüan Tsang, Tripiṭaka Master of the T’ang Dynasty (Hong Kong: The Ch’eng wei-shih lun Publication Committee, 1976). Heavy modification, however, has been made.

689 CWSL, fascicle 3, T1585:31.17.a13-16.
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same time. In the second scenario, when good karma predominates over bad karma, consciousness retracts from the lower part of the body and coalesces in the heart. Consciousness gradually fades from the upper part of the body and then departs from the heart during the moment of death. Here, Zhizhou avers that the impact of karma on the retraction of ālayavijñāna from the parts of the body is a matter of timing, but that for all sentient beings, regardless of karmic standing, consciousness leaves from the heart. Zhizhou posits that in either scenario, the departure of ālayavijñāna from the heart marks biological death.

In the Basis of Yoga Practitioners and the commentary by Zhizhou, it is determined that ālayavijñāna is the last form of consciousness in the body prior to death. During the process of dying, ālayavijñāna sustains the vital life functions, such as the beating of the heart up to and

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690 Zhizhou writes in Deducing the Doctrines of the CWSL (Cheng weishi lun yan mi 成唯識論演秘), fascicle 3: “There are two explanations: the first says that the sensation of cold of external phenomena are different in their upward or downward direction and that consciousness within the place of the heart directs the upward or downward direction, and that consciousness vanishes suddenly at one time.” 有二釋: 一云: 外相冷觸下上不同, 識於心處與其上下, 一時頓捨 (T1833:43.885b27-29).

691 In Zhizhou’s Deducing the Doctrines of the CWSL: “The second says that as for those who do good, consciousness gradually vanishes from the lower part up to the fleshy heart, and then later consciousness from the upper part. Doing bad and overturning good, comes from this fleshy heart, and it is in fact the last thing to vanish, and the upward or downward direction depends upon the previous character of that ālayavijñāna's giving up on life, but downward and upward are not opposed in principle. 二云: 若造善者, 從下漸捨, 至肉心藏, 後從上捨。造惡翻善, 由此肉心, 實最後捨, 上下據彼捨命前相, 理亦無違 (T1833:43.885b28-c2).

692 Zhizhou writes in his Deducing the Doctrines of the CWSL: “We clarify: so based upon what can it be known that the scriptures rely on the external phenomena? In discussing sensation coming up or going down; externally it is also not absent. How is the Māhāyana-samgraha śāstra which speaks of the ‘heart-mind,’ different from the Basis for Yoga Practitioners which takes the ‘cavity of the heart’ (as the final locus of consciousness)? We aver that it [this sensation] is simply from outside of the skin—thus we know the convergence; at some pains we can indeed follow it. 詳曰: 准何得知, 錯依外相? 論觸上下, 外亦不無。如何《攝論》唯就膚內? 又經言心, 何異《瑜伽》所謂心藏? 斷唯皮外; 故知所會; 難可憑准。Now we further explain: the scripture accords to the existing differences between sage, unenlightened being, superior, and inferior, in speaking of the desertion of phenomenal experience. By principle, it is in fact the place of the heart that is the last to be abandoned. We don't rely upon inside or outside the skin to differentiate [between different beings]. The three phenomena are: abandoning from down; abandoning from up; and abandoning from the middle. These are the same as gradually going up or down from the Basis for Yoga Practitioners, etc. It is just that the sūtra and śāstra exhibit differences in presentation, but their doctrines are not contradictory.” 今復釋云：經約聖凡勝劣有別分云捨相, 理實心處, 最後捨也。不據皮膚內外差異, 三相下捨; 二相從上; 一正捨處。同《瑜伽》等上下漸等。但是經論開合有別, 義不違也 (T1833:43.885.c07-14).
during the last moments of life.

The Role of Subliminal Consciousness in Dying

In his CWSL, Xuanzang describes ālayavijñāna as the “subliminal” (Skt.: asaṃviditaka; Chi: bu kezhi 不可知) form of consciousness that exists outside the awareness of the sentient human being. Xuanzang enumerates the eight types of consciousness of the sentient being as follows: visual consciousness (Skt.: cakṣurvijñāna; Chi: yanshi 眼識), auditory consciousness (Skt.: śrotavijñāna; Chi: ershi 耳識), olfactory consciousness (Skt.: grhāṇavijñāna; Chi: bishi 鼻識), gustatory consciousness (Skt.: jihvāvijñāna; Chi: sheshi 舌識), tactile consciousness (Skt.: kāyavijñāna; Chi: shenshi 身識), mental consciousness of sensation (Skt.: manovijñāna; Chi: yishi 意識), self-reflexive consciousness (Skt.: manas; Chi: mona 末那) and storehouse consciousness (Skt.: ālayavijñāna; Chi: alaiyeshi 阿賴耶識). Yamabe writes: “ālayavijñāna is not only a subconscious layer supporting the surface mind but also a latent physiological basis supporting the body.”693 The ālayavijnana, in this reading consistent with Xuanzang, is the psycho-physical basis or āśraya of the physical and sensory indriyas of the body.

According to Xuanzang, the eighth form of consciousness, ālayavijñāna, is responsible for maintaining specific biological states in the body, including dreamless sleep; annihilative concentration (Skt.: nirūdhasamāpatti), a form of meditative absorption wherein all sensory activities come to a halt; and the vegetative state of the body that occurs during the final moments before dying. Ālayavijñāna is described as subliminal because it does not manifest in response to a percept (Skt.: ālambana; Chi: suo yuan yuan 所緣緣) in the way that visual consciousness or auditory consciousness responds to an object outside the body and registers the response to the

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sentient being. Instead, ālayavijñāna activates the autonomic physical and cognitive functions of
the body without stimulation from the external environment. In addition to maintaining the
autonomic cardio-pulmonary functions, ālayavijñāna is present in the form of a hazy
consciousness during vegetative states at the end of life. Xuanzang regards the departure of
ālayavijñāna, rather than the loss of manovijñāna, or the consciousness of physical sensation, as
the marker of biological death for the sentient being.694

In The Basis for Yoga Practitioners, Asaṅga describes the subliminal state of
consciousness provided by ālayavijñāna, as follows:

When the physical sense faculties are not impaired, ālayavijñāna, exists below the
conscious mind. Ālayavijñāna contains the seeds of the forthcoming moments of mind.

\textit{tasya... rūpiṣv indriye(ṣv avi)pariṇaṭeṣu pravṛttivijñānābājaparigrhitam ālayavijñānam
anuparataṁ bhavati ...}695不變壞諸色根。中有能執持轉識種子阿賴耶識. 696

Here Asaṅga describes ālayavijñāna as the omnipresent and primal source of
consciousness for all sentient beings. When a sentient being is gradually dying, the gradual decay
of the body causes the sensory consciousness of manovijñāna to recede. Ālayavijñāna, existing
below the conscious mind, maintains the rudimentary physical functions and the vital organs of
the body as well as the memories and traces of consciousness of the dying sentient being. The final
“moment of becoming deceased” (Skt.: maraṇakṣaṇam) comes about with the final and complete
evacuation of ālayavijñāna from the body.

694 Lingtai formulates an inference encapsulating this thought: “Your final moments of life are definitely not
constituted in manovijñāna, because the cognitive support of manovijñāna is not apprehended in experience
(reason), like jīvitendriya (example).汝命終時，定非意識，意識所緣不可得故，如命根也.
(X0819:50.276.b19-20)

695 Skt.: text with emendations based upon Schmithausen, "Some Remarks on the Genesis of Central Yogācāra-

In the CWSL, Xuanzang posits ālayavijñāna as the last form of consciousness to depart the corporeal body. He states:

According to the Abhidhārma scholars, subtle mental consciousness, of manovijñāna, is present at the moment of conception, and at the moment of death. The movement of this type of consciousness is not detected by the sentient being. One should know, however, that the consciousness at moment of conception and the moment of dying is not manovijñāna, rather it is the eighth consciousness of ālayavijñāna. It is generally established (Skt.: prasiddha; Chi.: jicheng 極成) that manovijñāna is not present at the moment of conception or at the moment of death.

Xuanzang therefore diverges from the Abhidhārma scholars with his claim that ālayavijñāna, rather than manovijñāna, is the form of consciousness to depart the body at the end of life.

On the Role of Ālayavijñāna in Dying

In his effort to uphold his position that ālayavijnana is the sole form of consciousness present during the process of dying, Xuanzang is pressed to rule out the position taken by the Abhidhārma scholars that manovijñāna is the last form of consciousness in the sentient being. In scrolls three and four of the CWSL, Xuanzang presents arguments to support his position that, ālayavijnana sustains the sentient being at the end of life, after sensory consciousness, or manovijñāna, leaves the sensory organs of the body. In this discussion, Xuanzang determines that consciousness does not end when the sensory organs deteriorate and cease to register sensory stimuli. As the five consciousnesses that are associated with sensory organ, stop operating,

697 CWSL, fascicle 3, T1585:31.17.a10-12.
ālayavijñāna continues to sustain the vital functions of life: the beating of the heart, breathing and the vestiges of consciousness in the body. As the sentient being gradually dies, the work of sustaining the rudimentary vital functions of life falls squarely to ālayavijñāna. 698

In the CWSL, Xuanzang develops a reductio ad absurdum argument to prove that the continuation (Skt.: xiāngxū 相續) of the physical functions of the body at the end of life are not maintained by manovijñāna. In his line of reasoning, Xuanzang determines that because the activity of manovijnana depends upon the presence of the sense organs of the body, manovijñāna, by definition, cannot sustain the organs of the body at the end of life. The beating of the heart, breathing and the trace memories of consciousness that are present in the dying sentient being are therefore maintained by a form of consciousness other than manovijnana. In the CWSL, Xuanzang uses a six-part hetu to combat the argument presented by the rival Abhidhārma scholars that manovijñāna is present during the last moments of life. The counterarguments presented by Xuanzang are as follows:

(1) Manovijñāna is not located in a stable place within the body.

(2) Manovijñāna is located in the sensory indriyas of the body.

(3) Manovijñāna does not present a continuous series of sensation. It only presents the sensation that is associated with the specific sensory indriya.

(4) Manovijñāna is interrupted when the sensory indriyas decay.

(5) Manovijñāna is produced from stimuli that are outside the body.

(6) Manovijñāna only operates one sensory indriya at a time.

In developing his argument, Xuanzang gives three specific reasons manovijñāna is not the last form of consciousness at the end of life. He states that manovijñāna cannot register the

698 Kuiji notes that some schools of Buddhism recognize forms of life that are insensate 無識之儔.
sensation of coldness that is associated with the process of dying; that manovijñāna is not always present in the body; and that manovijñāna becomes detached from the sensory indriyas during the process of dying. Xuanzang then positions ālayavijñāna as the last form of consciousness in the body. He writes:

The sixth consciousness (of manovijñāna), is not always present in the body. This is because it does not abide stably in a sensory sphere in the body.

Ālayavijñāna is present in all indriyas of the body and continues in a perpetual series.\textsuperscript{699}

Kuiji, in his study notes on the CWSL, concurs with Xuanzang that manovijñāna, because it is attached to the sensory indriyas in the body, cannot be the last form of consciousness within the body. Kuiji writes:

The connection of manovijñāna to the organs of body is severed during the process of dying. Therefore, the operations of manovijñāna are constantly changing and interrupted. While gradually dying, the sentient being is conscious of a continuous sensation of coldness. Manovijñāna, because it is severed from the sensory indriyas, cannot register the sensation of coldness.

\textsuperscript{701}CWSL-SJ, fascicle 4, T1830:43.365.c12.
In the CWSL Xuanzang states the continuous sensation of cold is not registered by *manovijñāna*. Xuanzang states:

It is not the case that the sensation of coldness of the dying body is registered by manovijñāna. Only the maturing consciousness of *ālayavijñāna*, continues to operate and sustain the dying body. As parts of the body are abandoned by *manovijñāna*, the sensation of coldness gradually spreads across the body. At this point *ālayavijñāna* is sustains the vital power, heat and consciousness of the body. The parts of the body that *ālayavijñāna* registers as cold are no longer alive. Although *ālayavijñāna* senses the dead areas, it no longer sustains or supports these regions of the body. The eighth consciousness of *ālayavijñāna*, is therefore established [as the last form of consciousness in the gradually dying body].

不應冷觸，由彼漸生。唯異熟心，由先業力。恒遍相續。執受身分。捨執受處，冷觸便生。壽煖識三不相離故。冷觸起處，即是非情。雖變亦緣而不執受。故知定有此第八識. 702

The CWSL states that because the functioning of *manovijñāna* is interrupted by the deterioration of the sensory organs, it cannot register the coldness of the body that occurs in the process of gradually dying. Xuanzang avers that, at this point in the process of dying, *ālayavijñāna* because it remains intact as the organs in the body decay, is responsible for registering the sensation of coldness in the body. The CWSL adduces this consciousness of cold in the final moments of a mortal life, to argue for the existence of *ālayavijñāna* throughout life, even up to the very end. The difference between *ālayavijñāna* when the sentient being is thriving, and when it is entering its decline, is that it remains omnipresent in all areas of the body during periods of thriving, while it becomes attenuated during the stages of dying. The ongoing presence of *ālayavijñāna* is evident in the activities of respiration, circulation, the beating of the heart, and the hazy vestiges

of consciousness that the sentient experiences up to the very moment of death. Xuanzang ultimately concludes that ālayavijñāna is the final repository of consciousness prior to dying. At the moment of death, ālayavijñāna disaggregates from the body, and continues on into the afterlife, leaving the no longer sentient body in its wake.

In his description of dying in the CWSL, Xuanzang maintains that the presence of the vital physiological qualities that are supported by the three indriyas of vitality, mind and kāyendriyam provide direct evidence for the presence of ālayavijñāna. In his exegesis of dying, Xuanzang determines that ālayavijñāna sustain the three vital factors that compose the indriya of vitality that are required to sustain life (Skt.: uṣman), vital power (Skt.: āyur), and consciousness (Skt.: vijñāna). When ālayavijñāna is no longer sustains the indriya of vitality, the vital functions of the body cease, and the sentient body is dead.

Ālayavijñāna as the Locus of Transmigration

The compilers of the CWSL determine that ālayavijñāna is the form of consciousness that is present at the moments of conception and death. This text states that ālayavijñāna is the “locus of transmigration that links one life to the next.” It reads:

Furthermore, if not for ālayavijñāna, it would make no sense for the sūtras to speak of the transmigration through the four kinds of mortal births and the five transmigratory planes. This is because apart from this consciousness there would be no locus of transmigration.

In his description of the moment of death, Xuanzang states that ālayavijñāna departs from the heart of the sentient being. During the time between death and reincarnation, ālayavijñāna

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703 T1585:31.16.b03-4.
exists as a disembodied form of consciousness. In this transmigratory state, ālayavijñāna carries the good and bad karma of the deceased being in the form of seeds (Skt.: bīja; Chi.: zhong zi 種子). During this transmigratory period, alayavijñāna hurtles through space until it inseminates a new embryo (Skt.: pratisaṅdhikāla; Chi. jiesheng shi 結生時) with the seeds of the karma of the recently deceased sentient being. The karma of the deceased sentient being is thus retained and then transmitted to a new life through ālayavijñāna.

In the CWSL, Xuanzang explains the process of reincarnation in terms of the Buddhist theory of the five skandhas. At the moment of death, the corporeal skandha becomes separated from the four other skandhas of the sentient being. As it becomes disaggregated from the enlivening force of the other four skandhas, it ceases to live. The four remaining skandhas persevere for forty-nine days in the form of the disembodied consciousness of ālayavijñāna until they become associated with another living corporeal skandha. To Xuanzang, this is the process of rebirth.
Conclusion: On Dying and Rebirth Without a Self

Using a textual analysis of the Abhidharma and Yogācāra translation corpus of Xuanzang and his colleagues, this study examines the exegetical process by which he, and his Tang Buddhist team of translators and scholars, come to a conceptualization of death and dying that does not involve the loss of an enduring entity or self. In their massive translation projects, Xuanzang and his team reconcile the Buddhist doctrine of the indriyas with the tenet of no-self. In their exegesis, Xuanzang and his coterie, come to view dying in terms of a process of deterioration, and death in terms of the ultimate loss, of a triad of indriyas that sustain sentient life. With the theory of the indriyas, Xuanzang and his colleagues provide a rationale for how the quality of dying can be improved through practices that activate and enhance the spiritual indriyas. Ultimately, in their development of the Buddhist theory of the indriyas, Xuanzang and his cohorts conceptualize death as the termination of a process in which the three indriyas of kāyendriyam, vitality, and mind cease sustaining the vital life functions of the body. This provides the theoretical basis for Xuanzang, and his coterie of translators and scholars, to formulate within their extensive Abhidharma and Yogācāra translation corpus, definitions of dying and death that do not rely upon a single entity in the form of a soul, or an ātman, that sustains life, or is lost in death.

Employing a source criticism research methodology, this study compares the translations of the Abhidharma and Yogācāra masterworks, conducted by Xuanzang and his collaborators in the seventh century, with the earlier translations in Chinese, and the received versions of the same texts in Sanskrit and Tibetan. This study supports the work of Stone (2016) and Watson (2014), in finding that Xuanzang, and his coterie of translators, in their Chinese versions of the

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Abhidharma and Yogācāra texts, draw a sharp distinction between the Brāhmaṇical and Buddhist doctrines on dying and death. It finds that, in their translations of these texts, Xuanzang and his colleagues, make it clear that what survives dying and death is, not the ātman, as depicted in the Brāhmaṇical scriptures, and in the early Chinese renderings of the Abhidharma and Yogācāra texts. This research builds upon the findings of Stone (2016) and Watson (2014), in highlighting how, in their translations of the Abhidharma and Yogācāra treatises, Xuanzang and his colleagues realign the Chinese Buddhist conceptualizations of dying and death with the ancient Indic teachings on no-self and impermanence.

In their translations of the Abhidharma and Yogācāra corpus, Xuanzang and his collaborators develop and refine the theory of the indriyas, as part of their sustained effort to expiate the Brāhmaṇical concept of the ātman, and Buddhist concept of the pudgala, from the Chinese Buddhist texts. This study supports the findings of Stone (2016) and Watson (2014) by demonstrating how Xuanzang, and his Tang scholars and scribes, attempt to expiate the ātman from their translations and exegeses of the Brāhmaṇical and Buddhist scriptures of dying and death. In extends the findings of Stone (2016) and Watson (2014) by demonstrating how Xuanzang and his collaborators replace the ātman, with the Abhidharma theory of the indriyas, in their explanatory accounts of dying and death. Specifically, this study validates Stone (2016) and Scherbatsky (1919)\textsuperscript{706} in finding that Xuanzang and his cohorts, eschew the use of the word ātman unless specifically referencing the Brāhmaṇical concept of an enduring entity that bears the karma of a sentient being and transcends death. In addition to the removal of the ātman from the Buddhist discussions of dying and death, this study points out that Xuanzang and his translators refrain from

using the term *pudgala* unless referring to the Brāhmaṇical teaching of the soul.

With their exacting methodology and translations of the Buddhist scriptural teachings on dying and death, Xuanzang and his coterie of followers and translators strengthen and fortify the core tenets of no-self, karma, and reincarnation for Chinese Buddhism. They accomplish this by: enlisting the Abhidharma theory of the *indriyas* to explain what is lost in dying, if not a self, *ātman* or *pudgala*; by employing Indic logic to dispute the Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika conceptualizations of an *ātman* that carries karma and survives death; by describing, in meticulous detail, how karma impacts the hedonic and psychological experience of a dying sentient being; and by describing how a sentient being, by improving the quality of the spiritual *indriyas*, can obtain a better death and rebirth.

This study uses a source criticism methodology to illustrate how Xuanzang and his translation team, fortify the doctrine of the *indriyas*, enlist Indic logic, explicate the role of karma in dying and provide the theoretical and doctrinal support for the practice of yoga and deathbed rituals. For example, by comparing the CWSL with the earlier Abhidharma treatises available in Chinese translation, such as the *Vibhāṣa* from the fourth and fifth century, this study demonstrates how Xuanzang, in his specific enumeration and descriptions of sequence of *indriyas* involved in dying, supports the doctrine of the *indriyas* as explanation for what is deprived in death.

By comparing the Abhidharma translations by Xuanzang, with the Brāhmaṇical treatises of Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika, the Chinese translations of Paramārtha, and the received versions of the *Sāṅkhya-kārikās* in Sanskrit, this study demonstrates how Xuanzang and his collaborators use the rules of logic and debate, known as *hetu-vidyā*, developed by the great Indian philosopher, Dignāga, in their analyses of the early Indic sūtras and śāstras. In the CWSL, and in their exegesis of the Buddhist and Brāhmaṇical texts, Xuanzang and his colleagues apply an unparalleled
methodological rigor, derived from one of the greatest minds of sixth-century India, to formulate their rebuttals of the doctrine of the spiritual soul. For example, in their refutation of the Śāṅkhyā doctrine of the twenty-five tattvas, Xuanzang and his colleagues abide by the Indic rules of logic demanding that, if an argument is to be valid, the premise must be confirmed by the opponent and the disputant.

By comparing the translation of the *Treasury of Abhidharma* by Xuanzang and his coterie, with the previous Chinese translation by Paramārtha, and the received modern editions in Sanskrit and Tibetan, this study illustrates how Xuanzang uses the concept of āyuḥsaṃskāras to explicate how the process of dying can be improved through the practice of meditation and meritorious actions. A detailed conceptualization of āyuḥsaṃskāras does not appear in either the earlier version by Paramārtha, or in the received Sanskrit and Tibetan translations of the *Treasury of Abhidharma*.

Xuanzang avails himself of the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma theories of Vasubandhu to demonstrate that even sentient beings freighted with bad karma, can obtain a benign death by exercising the spiritual indriyas. This finding is based on a comparison of the translation of the *Mahāvibhāṣa* by Xuanzang, with the earlier Chinese translations of this text by Samgavarman, the received Sanskrit and Tibetan versions of the *Treasury of Abhidharma* and the *Commentaries of the Abhidharma* by Dignāga and Sthiramati that are extent in the Tibetan Derge canon. In their *Mahāvibhāṣa*, Xuanzang and his collaborators, enumerate the number and the type of indriyas that can be cultivated through practice to obtain a good death. While the taxonomy of the spiritual indriyas is explicated in many of the early Indic texts, in his meticulous rendering of the theory of the twenty-two indriyas, Xuanzang describes how the attainment of a better way of dying, through the cultivation of the spiritual indriyas, is available to all sentient beings.
By comparing the translations of the Abhidharma corpus by Xuanzang and his colleagues, to the early Chinese translation of the Mahāvibhāṣa by Samgavaramin and Daoti, this study finds that the systematic taxonomy of the ways dying in terms of the indriyas born by a sentient being appears, in its full form, in the version of the Mahāvibhāṣa composed by Xuanzang with his translation team. In the Mahāvibhāṣa, Xuanzang and his team systematize the categories of dying in terms of the indriyas, karmic status, species, and transmigratory realm of the sentient being. The meticulously detailed description of the types of indriyas that are lost in the processes of dying gradually or suddenly is not elaborated in earlier versions of the Mahāvibhāṣa.

Throughout his translation corpus, and compilation of the CWSL, Xuanzang upholds the Buddhist tenets of no-self, karma, and the fundamental idea that reincarnation does not involve an embodied or enduring ātman. In his exegeses of death and dying, Xuanzang incorporates the Buddhist notions of momentariness, impermanence, and consciousness-only into the discussions of dying and death in the Chinese texts. Using the theory of the indriyas, Xuanzang confirms that all sentient beings, including the Buddha, are born with both the limitations of inherited karma, and the innate capacity to expand spiritually and thereby transcend the attachments to the unstable aspects of the material world that cause suffering. The promise of spiritual growth and the attainment of enlightenment is available to all sentient beings through the improvement of the spiritual indriyas of faith, perseverance, concentration, mindfulness, and wisdom. In his discussion of karma and reincarnation, Xuanzang sends the important message, that any sentient being, regardless of karmic endowment, can improve the quality of dying and afterlife, by cultivating the indriyas.

In his body of translations of the Buddhist sūtras and śāstras, Xuanzang enriches the theoretical grounding for the rituals and practices that are intended to improve the course of dying.
and rebirth. With his theory of the *indriyas*, Xuanzang confirms that, because humans are born with the faculties of pain and suffering, the physical and psychological distress of dying can be eased, but never eliminated. Through his analysis of the early Indic texts, however, Xuanzang finds ways in which a sentient being can approach death with an equanimity and clarity of mind that reduces the subjective experiences of anxiety. A sentient being can improve the quality of dying by following the spiritual path of yoga and by engaging in practices and rituals that garner merit. In his exegesis of the texts of dying and death, Xuanzang finds pragmatic solutions to address the existential fear of death that is innate to all sentient beings.

In his later compilation, the CWSL, Xuanzang articulates how theory of the *indriyas* is intertwined with the core Buddhist doctrine of the *skandhas*, the five aggregates that comprise a sentient being. In this work, Xuanzang explicates the nature of the *indriyas* in terms of the five *skandhas* and conceptualizes reincarnation in terms of the perseverance of the consciousness of the sentient being, in the form of the *ālayavijñāna*, into the afterlife. This research identifies how Xuanzang and his collaborators, expand the Yogācāra theory of the continuum of karma and the *skandhas* into a formulation of the survival of the sentient being that upholds the core tenet of no-self. It demonstrates how, in their exegeses and translations of the Abhidharma and Yogācāra Buddhist texts, Xuanzang and his coterie of scholars, extend the doctrine of the survivability of death without recourse to an ātman or a *pudgala*. Future investigators into the translation corpus of Xuanzang will find a robust theory of the survivability of the sentient being in terms of the doctrine of the *skandhas*.

By retrieving and translating the Indic scriptures, many of which survive to the present day only in the Chinese translations composed by his team, Xuanzang, the scholar-monk, and pilgrim, and polymath of the early Tang Dynasty, realigns Chinese Buddhism with its Indic textual origins.
By retrieving the Buddhist scriptures from India, and by translating the Indic masterworks with his coterie of scholars and scribes, Xuanzang banishes the Brāhmaṇical ātman, and the Buddhist pudgala, from the Chinese Buddhist canon and provides the doctrinal foundations for rituals and practices that are deeply immersed in the spiritual message of the Buddha.
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\[MW = \text{Monier-Williams Online Sanskrit Dictionary (2008 Revision). Online Version:} \ \text{http://www.sanskrit-lexicon.uni-koeln.de/monier/}.\]

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