From Insurgent to Incumbent: State Building and Service Provision After Rebel Victory in Civil Wars

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From Insurgent to Incumbent: State Building and Service Provision after Rebel Victory in Civil Wars

A dissertation presented by

Kai Massey Thaler

to

The Department of Government
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
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From Insurgent to Incumbent: State Building and Service Provision after Rebel Victory in Civil Wars

ABSTRACT

How do rebel organizations govern when they gain control of an internationally recognized state? I advance an organization-level theory, arguing that ideology affects recruitment, socialization of fighters and followers, and group relations with civilians, creating path dependencies that carry over to shape post-victory state building and governance. I code rebel groups on a spectrum between two ideal types: programmatic and opportunistic. More programmatic organizations’ aims extend beyond power to socioeconomic and political transformation, spurring attempts to expand state reach over and through territory and society. More opportunistic organizations are motivated primarily by power and its potential to provide private wealth, uninterested in public goods. I conduct a theory-testing comparison of three victorious rebel organizations, selected for diversity along the programmatic-opportunistic spectrum despite similar national structural conditions before taking power: the FSLN of Nicaragua (more programmatic), the NRA/M of Uganda (middle ground), and the NPFL of Liberia (more opportunistic). Using data from interviews with 127 subjects and extensive archival research from over 16 months of fieldwork, I find strong evidence supporting the theory, validated by further evidence from cases in Angola and Afghanistan. The theory and findings suggest that understanding the state building strategies and policies of victorious rebel organizations requires examining groups’ foundational ideals and practices and how they are institutionalized while opposing the state.
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Figure 1. Map of Nicaragua

Source: University of Texas Libraries Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection.
Figure 2. Map of Liberia

Source: University of Texas Libraries Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection.
Note: This map is from 1996. Grand Gedeh and Lofa counties have since been divided to create River Gee and Gbarpolu Counties, respectively.
Figure 3. Map of Uganda

Source: University of Texas Libraries Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection.
Figure 4. Map of Angola

Source: University of Texas Libraries Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection.
CHAPTER ONE
Rebelling and Ruling

“…even in danger and misery the pendulum swings.”

Civil wars have a peculiar hold on the imagination, with the descent of territorially bounded states into violent competing factions, the rending of the national social fabric, provoking particular horror and despair. Former French President Charles De Gaulle, a veteran of the two World Wars and fights against his compatriots in the Vichy regime and hardline settlers in Algeria, stated in 1970 that, “All wars are bad, because they symbolize the breakdown of politics itself. But civil wars, in which there are brothers in both trenches, are unforgivable, because peace is not born when the war concludes” (in Armitage 2015, 1829). Families split apart into rival groupings, friends become enemies, and neighbors become suspicious or outright hostile. During the civil war that divided Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, a Bosnian Muslim woman described how relationships with her Croat neighbors deteriorated: “Before, we shared the good times and the bad…we hardly wish anyone good day or good evening anymore. Suddenly people have a different look about them, their faces have changed” (Christie and Bringa 1993).

This social disintegration and variations in the forms and intensity of violence in civil wars have rightly attracted significant scholarly attention and public horror. Academic studies of civil war violence have proliferated in the past two decades (e.g. Cohen 2016; Kalyvas 2006; Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay 2004). Meanwhile, the world’s civil wars have continued a grisly parade of atrocities, whether it is rebel forces amputating civilians’ limbs in Sierra Leone and northern Uganda or conducting suicide bombings in Sri Lanka and Iraq, or government forces directing mass killings and ethnic cleansing of civilians in Sudan and Myanmar or attacking their ‘own’
people with chemical weapons in Syria. Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, the Chair of the United Nations Commission of Inquiry on Syria, accused the parties in the country’s brutal, internationalized civil war, ongoing since 2011, of ignoring “basic notions of humanity,” perpetrating violence with a “Machiavellian disregard for the interests of the Syrian people” (UNOHCHR 2017).

Yet civil wars are about far more than the violence inherent to them.¹ Even Mao Tse-Tung, who famously argued that “Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun” (Mao 1972, 61), also described literature and art as “powerful weapons for educating and uniting the people,” integral parts of the Chinese revolution (Mao 1972, 301). For governments, civil wars represent a challenge to their authority as sovereign rulers of the country, one that must be weathered in order to survive in a position of hegemonic power. For rebel forces, civil wars offer an opportunity to force a rebalancing of domestic political power, and even to seize control of the state. What rebel organizations do with the state if they win, however, varies. As Cuban leader Fidel Castro (1967) forcefully exclaimed at the funeral of his comrade Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara in 1967, for rebels who want to transform society, “Warfare is a means and not an end. Warfare is a tool of revolutionaries. The important thing is the revolution! The important thing is the revolutionary cause, revolutionary ideas, revolutionary objectives, revolutionary sentiments, revolutionary virtues!” Not all rebels are revolutionaries, however. For some, power and the material benefits it can provide are ends in themselves. Fellow dissidents remembered Charles Taylor, who would later lead a successful rebellion in Liberia, dismissing his activist colleagues and saying “You guys are the professors. I’m not interested in ideology. I just want money and I want to be on top” (Schuster 1994, 52).

How do rebels reach the top, though? The majority of rebellions end early on. The peter out, are crushed by state forces or rival armed groups, or are coopted by other forces. Most of these

¹ And it is only a small percentage of fighters who join an armed group because they enjoy perpetrating violence. On this subset, see Mueller (2004).
nascent uprisings never expand beyond a small area of operations and never engage in combat intense enough to enter into the international consciousness or scholars’ datasets (Lewis 2012, 2017). Forming a viable rebel organization tends to be difficult due to a range of issues from collective action problems (e.g. Lichbach 1994), to informational disadvantages vis-à-vis the government (e.g. Lewis 2012), to problems in obtaining material and financial resources (e.g. Hazen 2013). Rebel organizations may draw on prior organizational legacies (Daly 2012), yet armed rebellion, except in the case of military revolt, typically begins in the shadows, with a small, clandestine group of leaders and core supporters.

Rebellion tends to emerge in peripheral areas, where government authority and media reporting remain thin, even in today’s digital world. Even where they move from clandestinity and obscurity into the public eye, organizations may collapse due to in-fighting or splits, competition from other rebel groups, or successful government counterinsurgency efforts. All three of these factors were at play, for instance, in the demise of the Comité Revolucionario de Moçambique (COREMO). COREMO was a liberation movement formed in 1965 that sought to attain Mozambican independence from the Portuguese colonial government and published a sophisticated manifesto and international communiqués (e.g. COREMO 1965). Shortly after its founding, however, the group was beset by leadership disputes and defections to the competing Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Frelimo). COREMO later faced internal conflicts and the fragmentation of a splinter group, and finally Portuguese forces delivered crushing military blows, such that by 1968 the group was “reduced militarily to ‘nuisance status’” and politically clung to life at the fringes of the Mozambican nationalist movement (Marcum 2018, 67–69).

__2__ Rebel organizations that take power on the back of heavy foreign intervention may avoid some of these dilemmas, but also are less likely to have the organization and cohesion to develop a strong government in the aftermath. This has been the case following the toppling of the Taliban in Afghanistan and Muammar Qaddafi in Libya, where rebel alliances took power with significant foreign assistance.
Among those rebel organizations that do gain traction and increased military capabilities, most either are defeated by the government or demobilize as part of a negotiated settlement (e.g. Toft 2009). In Latin America from the 1940s through the 1980s, dozens of rebel movements emerged seeking to either overthrow governments or gain significant political concessions (e.g. Selbin 1999; Wickham-Crowley 1992; T. C. Wright 2001). Government forces (with varying degrees of foreign assistance) defeated most of these groups, even Peru’s powerful *Sendero Luminoso* (Shining Path), which had been active throughout almost half of the national territory and even threatened the outskirts of the capital city of Lima. Meanwhile, while the *Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional* (FMLN) of El Salvador and the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* (FARC) in Colombia both eventually agreed to negotiated settlements after lengthy struggles in which the rebel movements controlled significant portions of the national territory. The famous revolutionary seizures of power by the *Movimiento 26 de Julio* (M-26-7) in Cuba and the *Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional* (FSLN) in Nicaragua were exceptions in the region.

All of this is to say that out of the many rebel organizations that form with the goal of seizing state power or gaining regional independence, only a select few succeed and transition from insurgents to incumbents, governing an internationally recognized state. How do these groups make this shift, though? What determines how a rebel group will govern once in power, and does

---

3 In contrast to Africa and Asia, Latin America from the 20th century on has seen comparatively few sustained violent secessionist movements (Puerto Rico’s sporadic nationalist violence being an exception), though the Americas were rife with secessionist rebellions in the 19th century. See, for instance, Rugeley’s (2010) study of the Yucatecan secessionist rebellion in Mexico.

4 On Sendero Luminoso and Peruvian counterinsurgency, see e.g. McClintock (1998), Palmer (1994), and Stern (1998).

5 On the FMLN, see e.g. McClintock (1998), Montgomery (1995), and Wood (2000, 2003). On the FARC, see e.g. Arjona (2016), Ferro and Uribe (2002), and Sánchez (2003).
it retain characteristics from the civil war period when it moves from opposing the state to controlling it? Not all rebel groups are equal—they possess different ideals, goals, and leaders that can change their trajectories and lead to divergent policies, efforts, and outcomes as groups engage in rebel governance in ‘liberated territory’ and as they rule after gaining control of the state.

Why does rebel victory matter? Since the end of World War II, civil wars have replaced interstate wars as the most prevalent form of large-scale conflict in the world (Gleditsch et al. 2002; L. Themnér and Wallensteen 2012). Though government victories are the most common civil war outcome, between one-fifth and one-third of civil wars since 1945 have ended in rebel victories in which the rebels gained control of the central state or achieved the goal of secession (Fearon and Laitin 2003; L. Themnér and Wallensteen 2012; Toft 2009). Unlike victories by incumbent regimes, which generally exhibit strong continuity between conditions before and after the conflict, rebel victories result in the formation of a new state and/or the creation of a new regime that has the potential to transform political, social, and economic institutions and practices in a country. While negotiated settlements may also create the space for reforms, rebel victory shifts the rebel organization into a position of primacy, with greater latitude to pursue its goals and ideal vision of the postwar state and society.

Little systematic knowledge exists, however, about how rebel groups govern once they take power. These organizations must build a new state apparatus or decide what branches and institutions of the old state to inhabit, abandon, or rebuild. The goals and ideals espoused by organizations and the relations they establish with civilian populations during their time as rebels

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6 As Lewis (2012) demonstrates, the ratio of rebellions to interstate violent conflicts is likely even higher than typically reported in cross-national datasets due to the relatively hidden nature of low-level intrastate conflicts. Large-scale civil wars, however, have become increasingly internationalized as they provide vehicles for powerful foreign states to pursue their interests (Mann 2018).

7 Though see Kubota (2017) on the potential for populations to retain identities tied to rebels after government victory.
are predicted to continue to shape relations with citizens once groups are in power. These issues are of vital importance for understanding rebel actions during civil wars and their implications for post-war governance in cases of rebel victory. They are also of pressing contemporary relevance, as rebels have in recent years taken power or threatened to do so in countries such as Libya, Yemen, and the Central African Republic; secessionists have nearly succeeded in splitting off portions of Mali and Ukraine; and Kurdish separatists have built functioning state-like enclaves in Iraq and Syria, while the same has happened in Somaliland in Somalia.

Building on the literatures on rebel group behavior and state building, I argue that post-civil war state building and governance may best be explained by a theory at the level of rebel organizations (e.g. Parkinson and Zaks 2018; Sinno 2008; Staniland 2014). As Sinno (2008, 3–4) highlights, it is organizations, be they state or non-state, that engage in conflict, strategic interaction, and policy formulation and implementation. Following victory, organizations have unique power among actors to effect reforms and put their ideals and plans into practice, having displaced rivals and possessing a predominance (if not a monopoly) in the legitimate use of force. I argue that the structure of the state and the patterns of governance adopted by rebel groups once they come into power are shaped by the ideas and aims that motivated these organizations as rebels. These preferences are translated into action through the practices and institutions that are developed within the organization and in the group’s relations with the civilian population during the initial civil war period. I distinguish between two ideal types of organizations: programmatic and opportunistic, which are opposite poles on a spectrum, with groups falling somewhere in between. More programmatic groups attempt to achieve long-term goals involving the transformation or reform of existing socioeconomic and political relations, and will try to

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8 I use the terms ‘organization’ and ‘group’ interchangeably to refer to politico-military rebel actors and the subsequent bodies they form after taking power.
incorporate more of the population into the political sphere under their influence. More opportunistic groups are motivated primarily by individual interests and short-term economic benefits, or the use of power for private gain. These ideal types describe distinct organizational logics and imply distinct sets of relations between organizational leadership and their followers and between the rebel group and the civilian population. These organizational logics and relations then shape the state structure and governing practices adopted by a rebel group once it takes power, with more programmatic groups working to expand the reach of the state to implement their political program and more opportunistic groups aiming to use or develop state institutions only insofar as they can provide security and rents for the organization’s leaders and members.

The more programmatic Frelimo, which developed a Marxist-Leninist, nationalist ideology, worked after independence in Mozambique to reorganize society, adopting a state-directed economic model, challenging traditional authorities, and shifting rural populations into collective villages (Coelho 1998; Dinerman 2006; Henriksen 1983; Marcum 2018). To accomplish this transformation requires the development and expansion of the state apparatus. Frelimo leader and Mozambique’s first president Samora Machel envisioned the new revolutionary government’s authority manifested in every corner of the country’s territory, despite Mozambique’s low population density and “difficult political geography” (Herbst 2000, 150). Without building new institutional structures, Machel argued, Frelimo’s victory would be hollow, leaving it sitting in the capital of Maputo “isolated like limbs without a trunk” (Machel 1985, 25 in Herbst 2000).

Alternatively, the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques Pour la Libération du Congo (AFDL), was more opportunistic, its leaders motivated more by gaining personalized wealth and power than by any goals of societal transformation in the former Zaire. The AFDL’s leadership, headed by long-time opposition figure Laurent-Désiré Kabila, swept to power in Kinshasa in 1997.
with little idea for what to do afterwards—beyond filling their own bank accounts. In 1965, Cuban revolutionary leader Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara had arrived in eastern Congo to assist Kabila’s rebel forces, but he found that Kabila “lets the days pass without concerning himself with anything other than political squabbles, and all the signs are that he is too addicted to drink and women” (Guevara 2001, 69). In reflections at the end of the failed campaign in 1966, Che noted that despite Kabila’s strong leadership potential, “a man with leadership skills does not become, ipso facto, a revolutionary leader. One has to be serious, and possess an ideology and a spirit of sacrifice. Until now, Kabila has not shown any of these traits” (Guevara 2001, 244).

After time leading a small rebel faction in South Kivu with some Marxist pretensions—but primarily dedicated to the smuggling and extortion for profit (K. C. Dunn 2002, 55)—Kabila in 1997 came to power as the head of the AFDL, a rebel alliance backed by Rwanda and Uganda. Guevara’s doubts had been correct, however. Kabila became the leader the AFDL more for his reputation dating back to the 1960s than for his ideas or leadership abilities. He worked to centralize and personalize power within the group (Weiss 2000, 4), which looted and pillaged on its way to Kinshasa (Ngolet 2011; Reno 1998). Though some scholars argue that Kabila retained a Maoist or Stalinist ideological vision for top-down, tightly-controlled social transformation, with limited local level popular committees (Ugarriza 2009; Weiss 2000), Kabila instead constructed a weak state apparatus and a cult of personality, failing to transform the AFDL into a political organization rather than a purely military one. Kabila’s rhetoric and practices rarely matched, as “many of Kabila’s initiatives [were] purely rhetorical and never realized” (K. C. Dunn 2002, 66), designed to gain short term economic resources and to protect political power. The lack of a longer-term vision for state building or benefitting the Congolese people led to weak state authority

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9 UN experts reported that Kabila “wielded a highly personalized control over state resources, avoiding any semblance of transparency or accountability” (Turner 2007, 38).
even in core, populated areas of the renamed Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Kabila’s government failed to develop state capabilities beyond coercion and economic extraction.

The concept of organizational type incorporates ideational characteristics of the group, a factor absent in studies focusing on organizational structure (Staniland 2014) and one that depends more on leaders’ agency. The role of ideas in shaping groups’ behavior is an underexplored area in the study of civil war (Gutiérrez Sanín and Wood 2014; Staniland 2014) and state building, and a focus on ideas helps untangle otherwise unexplained variation in wartime and post-war outcomes. I developed a deductive theorization of the role of goals and ideas in group organization and the downstream effects of group type on organizations’ policies and practices. For in-depth study through fieldwork, I selected three cases for variation on a spectrum from programmatic to opportunistic—the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) in Nicaragua (more programmatic), the National Resistance Army/Movement (NRA/M) in Uganda (middle ground), and National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) (more opportunistic). The fieldwork data and experiences led to the clarification and slight modification of components of the theory. This chapter next reviews the existing literature and then lays out the mechanisms through which my organizational theory operates during the period of group formation and fighting as rebels and how it is predicted to affect state building and service provision outcomes when the organizations are in government. The theory improves our understanding of the processes through which rebel organizations’ develop institutions and governing strategies, and what variables shape these decisions, with patterns and preferences established during the period of fighting as rebels carrying over after rebel victory.
Bringing Divided Literatures into Dialogue

This project engages with and expands upon three social scientific literatures: scholarship on civil wars and rebel governance, theories of state building, and studies of post-civil war governance. These fields have largely developed separately. By integrating them, however, I seek to provide a more comprehensive theorization of the arc of a victorious rebellion.

Civil Wars

In the political science literature on civil wars that has arisen over the past two decades, researchers have focused on war onset, wartime dynamics, and wars’ resolution or recurrence, rarely considering civil wars as a process or rebel groups as social organisms, in which factors at the onset or formation may carry through the conflict and continue to affect postwar governance or society. Scholars have explored patterns of rebel group formation and recruitment to understand, as Gurr (1970) put it, “why [people] rebel,” and how armed groups mobilize fighters and followers to sustain their struggle (Gates 2002; Humphreys and Weinstein 2008; Petersen 2001; Reno 2011; Viterna 2013; Wood 2003). Studies of rebel group behavior during civil wars have examined patterns of violence against civilians (Balcells 2017; Cohen 2016; Humphreys and Weinstein 2006; Kalyvas 2006; Weinstein 2007; Wood 2003) and organizational cohesion and fragmentation (Christia 2012; Sinno 2008; Staniland 2014; Woldemariam 2018), demonstrating how and why certain populations are targeted and what enables rebel organizations to stick together or causes them to break apart. Works on how civil wars endure and end focus on how violence is perpetuated through sociopolitical dynamics and bargaining failures and how these barriers are overcome to bring war to an end (Balcells and Kalyvas 2014; Staniland 2014; Toft 2009, 2010; B. F. Walter

10 See Kalyvas (2009), Blattman and Miguel (2010), and Cederman and Vogt (2017) for reviews of the recent literature.
The literature on civil wars has also at times engaged with the political sociology literature on revolutions. Comparative scholars of revolutions, though, have tended to focus more on the causes of revolutions (Foran 2005; Goodwin 2001; Skocpol 1979) than on their consequences (though see Selbin 1999). Studies of revolutionary states largely concentrate on their security forces and foreign relations (Adelman 1985; Gurr 1988; Skocpol 1988; Walt 1996).

State Building

Classic studies of state building have focused on the role of interstate war in stimulating the construction of strong states and the projection of state power throughout a national territory. War is seen as creating a new relationship between the rulers and the ruled (Olson 1993; Tilly 1990) and expanding the extractive capacity of the state (Bates 2010; Rasler and Thompson 1989), with wartime institutions and expansion of state power persisting after hostilities end (Mann 1986). There is conflicting evidence, however, about whether or not this theory is applicable outside of Western Europe (e.g. Centeno 2002; Herbst 2000), nor does this ‘bellicist’ perspective examine the role of internal conflict in state building—though Rasler and Thompson (1989) suggest internal and external conflicts are difficult to separate at times and may have similar effects. Porter (1994), Slater (2010), and Vu (2010) suggest that civil wars may also lead to sociopolitical transformation and state strengthening, while Kisangani and Pickering (2014) found combatting rebels, but not rival states, to strengthen post-colonial African states. Thies (2005, 2006), on the other hand, finds that internal war has weakened states in Latin America.

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11 Levitsky and Way (2012, 2013) and Lyons (2016b, 2016a) are currently engaged in projects on revolutionary regime durability.

12 Rapid state building efforts have tended to involve mass conflict and violence “regardless of regime ideology” (Vu 2010, 243).
Rebel Governance

The civil war and state building literatures have been brought together in a new research agenda on rebel governance. Rebel governance consists of the institutions and patterns of interactions arising between a rebel group and civilians (and outside actors) when the group undertakes functions normally associated with states. Rebel governance scholars build on the classical guerrilla warfare theory of Mao Tse-Tung (1962) and Che Guevara (1961) and seminal works on rebel relations with the population (C. A. Johnson 1962; Popkin 1979; Wickham-Crowley 1987, 1992). They try to understand when and how rebel groups may develop a social contract with civilian populations and begin collecting taxes, providing public goods and services, creating institutions for popular participation, and/or developing and enforcing laws and regulations. Studies have examined the types of institutions rebel groups create in areas under their control and the relationships they create with the population and outside actors in specific cases (Arjona 2014; Blunt 2003; Kasfir 2005; Metelits 2010) and in more generalizable frameworks (Arjona 2014, 2016; Arjona, Kasfir, and Mampilly 2015; Huang 2016b; Keister 2011; Lidow 2016; Mampilly 2011; Staniland 2012). This literature has largely concentrated on governance by rebel groups during civil wars, rather than what groups do with the state when they win, though some existing case studies trace rebel groups from wartime governance to post-war state building (Justino and Stojetz 2016; Lewis 2014; McDonough 2008; Müller 2012; Podder 2014; Pool 2001), and Huang (2016b) presents an analysis of the effects of rebel governance on postwar regime type across different war outcomes. There is increasing interest in studying more broadly and across

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13 Parallel to the study of rebel governance is the more general study of non-state providers of social welfare, a category that can include rebel groups, along with community organizations, for-profit firms, NGOs, and other actors (e.g. Cammett and MacLean 2014).
cases how processes of social transformation and wartime institutions created by rebels during civil wars may persist into the post-war period (Arjona 2014, 2016; Huang 2016b; Wood 2008).

Post-Conflict Politics

Moving to the post-war period, scholars have frequently examined the “conflict trap” (Collier et al. 2003) by which civil wars recur or new wars erupt in post-conflict states. These studies tend to focus on the manner of conflict resolution and peacebuilding or peacekeeping efforts and how they prevent or enable a return to conflict (Call 2012; Licklider 1995; Quinn, Mason, and Gurses 2007; Toft 2009, 2010; B. F. Walter 2004). There is growing recognition, though, that poor governance may contribute to conflict recurrence (Hegre and Nygård 2015; B. F. Walter 2015). There has also been increasing exploration of the institutions and effectiveness of states after civil wars. Related to conflict, the provision of security and stability has been examined as the bedrock of consolidation and governance following civil war (Boyle 2014; Daly 2016; Humphreys and Weinstein 2007; Muggah 2006). The form and type of political regimes has been of interest to scholars of democratization and authoritarianism, who have looked at how civil wars and their resolution in favor of rebels or the government can facilitate either democracy or the consolidation of authoritarianism (Durant and Weintraub 2014; Fortna and Huang 2012; Huang 2012; Tull and Mehler 2005; Wantchekon and García-Ponce 2014; Wantchekon and Neeman 2002), while rebel victory may lead to particularly durable authoritarian regimes (Levitsky and Way 2012, 2013, Lyons 2016b, 2016a). Examinations of rebel group transformation into political parties after civil wars have focused more on regime type and electoral politics, or on groups’ internal reorganization (e.g. Deonandan, Close, and Prevost 2007; Ishiyama and Batta 2011; de
Zeeuw 2007), rather than on the transformation of the state and governance that these organizations may undertake using their new political power.

**Unanswered Questions about Post-Civil War States**

Despite this rapidly mounting accumulation of work on civil wars, state building, rebel governance, and postconflict politics, the question of what form the state takes after civil wars and why, especially after rebel victory, has not been fully explored. As Slater (2010, 5) points out, much of the literature on internal conflicts treats them “as an outcome to be explained—as a product instead of a producer of political institutions.” Toft (2009, 2010) has suggested that rebel victories may lead to more durable peace\(^\text{14}\) and may also lead to some improvements in economic outcomes and more democratic politics (see also Huang 2012, 2016b), at least in comparison to the pre-war regime.

Toft acknowledges, though, that not all rebel groups are the same, and that the peace that prevails under some groups’ victories may not be normatively favorable by Western norms of equality, democracy, and human rights. This is along the lines of Galtung’s (1969) distinction between negative peace (absence of war) and positive peace (improving human security and development).\(^\text{15}\) I argue that the states built by victorious rebels will also diverge in their structures and policy priorities based on the organizational type of the group that comes to power. It is only through looking inside the organizations that seize power that we can understand the variation in state building efforts pursued and outcomes achieved by victorious rebel governments in some of

\(^{14}\) Licklider (1995) and Luttwak (1999) also suggest rebel victory may reduce the likelihood of war recurrence.

\(^{15}\) Though as Samset (2011) and Purdeková (2011) point out in the case of post-genocide Rwanda, an enduring absence of war and improved state building and development outcomes may come in an authoritarian, “repressive peace.”
the world’s territorially largest and most populous countries (Angola, Bangladesh, China, Democratic Republic of Congo) and some of the smallest (Israel, Nicaragua, Nepal).

Outline of the Study

To explain this variation, in the next chapter, I develop my theory of rebel organizational types, providing a more extensive explanation of the organizational ideal types of programmatic and opportunistic. I argue that where a group falls on the programmatic-opportunistic spectrum while fighting as rebels will affect the probability of the extent and type of state building and service provision efforts in which an organization engages once installed as the national government. I discuss the importance of ideology and the consolidation of group leadership in setting organizations’ trajectories and then develop hypotheses about what we should expect more programmatic or more opportunistic groups to do with their power once in control of the state apparatus. I also discuss alternative explanations to test against my theory.

In Chapter 3, I provide more precise specifications of key concepts in the theory, such as organizational type and state building, and measurement strategies to study them. I draw on the work of the political sociologist Michael Mann (1986, 1988, 2008) to distinguish between two types of state power, despotic and infrastructural. Despotic power entails the ability of state elites to impose their will upon the population using or backed by the threat of coercion, while infrastructural power involves the projection of state power throughout the national territory and using influence over and through society to implement elites’ will. Also in this chapter, I describe my research methods and how I selected cases for study—the FSLN in Nicaragua, the NPFL in Liberia, and the NRA/M in Uganda. I then discuss the data sources used in the study of each case.
and the fourteen months of interviews and archival fieldwork I conducted in the three case study countries, plus additional archival research.

Chapters 4, 5, and 6 present the case studies of the FSLN, NPFL, and NRA/M, demonstrating how more programmatic, more opportunistic, and middle-ground rebel organizations formed, fought, and governed. In each case, I trace the organization’s emergence, the consolidation of leadership, and the development of the ideals and goals around which the group was organized, which it used to recruit and socialize fighters and followers. I examine each organization’s rebel governance practices, and then turn to their state building and service provision policies and efforts once in power.

In Chapter 7, I draw together lessons from the three main case studies. As there might be concerns that rebel organizational type is contingent on the country in which rebels are fighting, the type or identity of the regime they are opposing, or the period in which they are fighting, I also conduct a comparison three Angolan rebel groups that formed in the 1960s, all fighting to topple the Portuguese colonial regime and gain control of an independent state. I also briefly discuss the case of the Taliban in Afghanistan and whether and how my theory might apply to Islamist rebel groups. Finally, in the Conclusion, I discuss what lessons we can draw from my theory and the study of rebel victory to inform future research and policymaking.
CHAPTER TWO
Explaining State Building after Rebel Victory

“That was the true test for ideas, the application, when they forfeited the day-dreamy security that gave them license in the schoolhouse. Then philosophy risked becoming something less than ideology, and something greater, something factual and historic for the schoolbooks and the schoolboys to feast on…”


A Theory of Rebel Organizational Types

Theories of rebel group behavior and governance suggest that there is a strong relationship between decisions about group political identity—i.e. goals, political-ideological program, and strategy—and patterns of coercion and inclusion in relations with civilians (Gutiérrez Sanín and Wood 2014; Huang 2012; Kalyvas 2015b; Thaler 2012; Weinstein 2007). Ideology is one of the most contested terms in the social sciences (see Gerring 1997; Leader Maynard and Mildenberger 2018), with a “tangled conceptual history” (Eagleton 1991, xiii) across all disciplines. Here I define *ideologies* as relatively clear, coherent sets of beliefs or ideas that define a constituency and what sociopolitical goals and actions should be pursued in that constituency’s interests, at times with prescriptions as to the strategies best suited for achieving these goals (Gutiérrez Sanín and Wood 2014; Thaler 2012).16 Ideologies may be adopted for instrumental reasons, due to normative commitments, or because of both; either way they carry with them implications for how a group will be organized and what institutions it will build and socialization practices it will pursue internally and in interactions with the population throughout the group’s theater of operations.

16 I move beyond minimalist definitions of ideology that focus only on the definition of membership in a proposed political order (e.g. S. E. Hanson 2010), but that do not require prescriptions for the pursuit of building this order. I build on recent scholarship on the role of ideology in civil wars (Gutiérrez Sanín and Wood 2014; Thaler 2012), but also on the more general definition by Seliger (1976, 11) of ideologies as “Sets of ideas by which men posit, explain and justify ends and means of organised social action, and specifically political action, irrespective of whether such action aims to pre- serve, amend, uproot or rebuild a given social order,” which emphasizes action in addition to ideals.
When an ideology has clear organizational and political strategies built into it, as in Marxism-Leninism, Maoism, or Wahhabism, there may be a road map for leaders to follow in pursuing their goals, yet these transnational ideologies must always be adapted to domestic political contexts, creating different local versions of the ideology that frequently clash, thus making it impossible to ex ante predict the path leaders will take in applying such an ideology. Groups’ leaders do not necessarily construct or draw on an ideology, however, and may seek instead to mobilize followers on the basis of short-term interests, rather than the long-term benefits promised by a proposed political future (S. E. Hanson 2010). Therefore, in examining generally the motives of leaders and the means through which they seek to achieve their aims, I discuss ‘goals and ideas.’

I argue that the goals of group leaders and the ideas they employ to try to reach them affect what type of organization develops and what institutions and practices it develops both internally and in relations with civilians. These goals and ideas will thus have path-dependent effects not only on wartime behavior (Gutiérrez Sanín and Wood 2014; Kalyvas 2015b; Thaler 2012; Weinstein 2007; Zirakzadeh 2002) and post-war regime type (Huang 2012), but extending to patterns of state building and service provision after taking power. In building and testing this theory, I distinguish between two ideal types of rebel groups based on the goals pursued and

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17 See especially Ugarriza (2009) on the relevance of ideology in the post-Cold War era.

18 Early FSLN leaders Plutarco Hernández (1982, 29–36) and Leticia Herrera (2013, 46–53), for example, both describe spending time at the embassies of Cuba, China, and North Korea while studying in Moscow in the 1960s in order to learn about different interpretations and experiences of Communism to adapt to the Central American context, with this and any other attempts to challenge Soviet dogma strongly looked down upon by Soviet authorities.

19 This proposition is in line with Staniland’s (2012) view of civil wars as processes of competitive state building, in which wartime political orders are likely to affect post-war political outcomes.
policies enacted by their leaders and the broader organization while fighting as rebels: programmatic and opportunistic.\textsuperscript{20}

\textit{Programmatic Organizations}

Programmatic organizations attempt to achieve long-term goals that extend beyond taking power to the transformation or reform of socioeconomic and political relations. Ideological principles promoted by leaders guide the groups’ formation and structure, as well as their conduct of war and relations between civilian and military elements, with these principles institutionally transmitted to cadres and civilian constituents though political education and processes of socialization either in rebel camps or through the administration of captured areas.\textsuperscript{21} In territory under their control, these organizations may begin implementing programs and exercising political and economic functions through “rebel governance” before capturing the central state (Arjona, Kasfir, and Mampilly 2015; Mampilly 2011), though the exigencies of war may impede the consolidation of territory and the implementation of such plans until the existing regime is defeated. For example, the \textit{Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional} (FSLN) in Nicaragua had very limited ‘liberated territory’ during its time fighting as rebels, but built an extensive and relatively effective state when it came to power, as detailed in later chapters.

\textsuperscript{20} While the label “opportunistic” and the dynamics of such groups are similar to the characterizations in Weinstein’s (2007) work, I diverge from his typology of “activist” versus opportunistic rebellions because I am examining not only recruitment, participation, and violence perpetration by armed groups’ fighters, but a broader array of political discourse and action by organizations both in rebellion and in government.

\textsuperscript{21} See Wood (2003) Hoover Green (2016), and Oppenheim and Weintraub (2017) on the role of political education in developing cadres’ compliance with leaders’ goals and shifting sociopolitical consciousness. While rationalist economic accounts point to tensions between private interests and the creation of social benefits (see Waldner 1999, 166), ideology can help overcome these barriers to individual and collective action by providing higher order motivations that incentivize the development of public goods. Ideological and social devotion to a cause can facilitate discipline within an organization, though leaders of any type will also benefit from the ability to impose physically and materially costly punishments on followers (see Worsnop 2017).
More programmatic organizations may vary widely from the standpoint of socioeconomic progress and human rights—the Taliban, Khmer Rouge, or Islamic State are far different from Mozambique’s Frelimo or Cuba’s M-26-7 in these areas—but the types of states they build will have similar goals of effecting broad impacts at all levels of social, political and economic life and extending state influence throughout the national territory and society. The population may at times disagree with the organization’s plans for it (Scott 1979) and the group’s conception of what is in the ‘public interest,’ but a programmatic organization will have a comprehensive vision for socioeconomic and political change. Programmatic groups will aim to provide public goods, including and beyond order, to the majority of the population (e.g. Popkin 1979; Stewart 2018; Wickham-Crowley 1987), rather than seeking only private goods for group members or directing public goods to limited constituencies or client groups, as opportunistic groups do (e.g. Azam 2006; Weinstein 2007), aiming to bring more of the population under the central state’s political influence. More programmatic organizations will also aim to gain control over social services such as healthcare and education, extending the scope of the state’s activities.

Opportunistic Organizations

More opportunistic organizations are motivated primarily by expectations of personalized short-term economic benefits, or by the use of power for private gain (Beardsley and McQuinn 2009; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Reno 1998, 2015; Weinstein 2007). These groups do not seek to transform the social, economic, and political lives of the majority of the population beyond a

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22 On the state building and governance strategies of the Islamic State, see e.g. Byman (2016), Revkin (2016), and Revkin and Ahram (2017).

23 In order to sustain support, an organization will need to either a) undertake more popular policies on balance; b) engage in political education to ensure that citizens’ view their interests in line with the group’s conceptions of what is best, or c) derive legitimacy by presenting the organization as protecting the public against threats of worse policies and outcomes from domestic opponents or foreign rivals.
change of government, but instead are concerned with the enrichment and perpetuation in power of members and associates. These groups view the state as a prize to be won, a source of revenue for the group and a fountain of patronage for favored populations associated with the organization.\textsuperscript{24} Opportunistic groups therefore correspond closely to the actors envisioned in economic models of civil war: maximizing profit and privatized interests (Azam 2001; Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Dal Bó and Powell 2009; Grossman 1991; Hirshleifer 1988). They display more limited articulation of ideological principles or political and socioeconomic plans, and socialization of organizational members will be directed mainly at ensuring compliance with leaders’ orders and the utilization of violence, rather than politicization. While groups may profess wide ranging and publicly-oriented goals, there is little sincerity in these pronouncements, and even if such groups have a collective ‘mentality’ and set of attitudes and goals organizing and motivating their members, they will not have a fully formed and entrenched ideology (see Linz 1975, 266–69) that offers “an explicit and desirable picture of the political future” (S. E. Hanson 2010, xiv). At most they possess a “psuedoideology, easily shed when convenient” (Markoff and Baretta 1985, 184).

Despite the lack of a unifying political program, opportunistic organizations can still forge sufficient unity of purpose and military power to gain control of the central state through a number of means. An opportunistic organization may be able to generate popular support simply through its opposition to a hated government. Byron Tarr, a scholar and former government official in Liberia, describes how the autocracy of the Samuel Doe regime predisposed people to support armed groups aiming to topple the government:

\textsuperscript{24} Note that these organizations still value the existence of the central state and its potential power—I am unaware of cases of successful state capture or secession by anarchist rebels intent on dismantling the state, though some groups may succeed through rebellion and resistance in carving out zones of autonomy within existing states (Scott 2009), as in the cases of the Zapatista rebels in Mexico and the anarchist Kurdish rebels in the Syrian enclave of Rojava.
“the preference was to bring political changes through political actions. But as Mr. Doe became progressively more repressive…with killings and so on, it then became clear that the only language that Doe understands…was violence, the gun. That’s how people progressively moved to a preference for armed removal or armed termination of the military regime” (LIB-45).

When a population is so inclined to support armed opposition to the government, group leaders may be able to play on popular grievances and strategically manipulate them to gain support and help their organization gain power, even when the leaders are opportunistic and are not ultimately concerned with public interests and the redress of deeper grievances (see Thaler 2015). Even without gaining significant popular support, an opportunistic organization may be able to defeat the central government if it possesses significant external material aid or benefits from interventions either in the form of direct military intervention by allies, or diplomatic and economic efforts to weaken the incumbent government. The central government and its forces may collapse, facilitating an opportunistic organization gaining control of the state if it is either the only organized non-state military force, or it is able to out-compete other violent or non-violent political actors contending for power.

In terms of what they do with state power, the scope of opportunistic groups’ aims and their direct imprint on society (beyond coercion) are much narrower than those of programmatic groups, as they develop policies and practices to use the state for their own ends of economic extraction and security in power, while largely ignoring the interests of the population at large. Examples of such groups that succeeded in taking control of the central state would be the AFDL in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the NPFL in Liberia, and the Mouvement Patriotique du Salut (MPS) in Chad. More opportunistic groups are not solely an African phenomenon, of course. Scholars have argued that the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was profit-seeking and closely tied to organized crime, using ethnonationalism as a vehicle for private ambitions (Judah 2000; Pugh 2004). Some rebel groups in Southeast Asia have also been more interested in riches
than in developing robust governance structures and practices, with the remnants of the Khmer Rouge, for instance, becoming opportunistic in the 1990s (Berdal and Keen 1997). Different fronts of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and Sendero Luminoso in Peru also turned over time from a more programmatic focus on sociopolitical transformation to prioritizing private profits for their sections of the organization (Weinstein 2007).

Two Types of Power: Despotic and Infrastructural

One lens through which to consider the difference between types is Michael Mann’s (1988) distinction between despotic power and infrastructural power. Despotic power refers to the ability of state elites to impose their will upon society without need for consultation with other social actors, while infrastructural power entails the ability of state elites to penetrate society and use the structures of society to centrally coordinate it towards the desired ends of the state elites. States can engage in activities such as improving literacy and improving physical infrastructure and communications to increase their ability to penetrate society and build infrastructural power. They can use censuses (Lee and Zhang 2016; Soifer 2012a) or increase the dispersion of the state bureaucracy throughout the territory to make the population more “legible” (Scott 1998), allowing for control but also permitting, if the government so chooses, the delivery of goods and services beyond order (Soifer 2013; Soifer and vom Hau 2008). Thus, while both programmatic and opportunistic organizations seek to gain despotic power, a hold over society and an ability to control it by force if necessary, programmatic organizations are also focused on the use of political and social policies and structures to develop infrastructural power.  

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25 Kubota (2017) argues that civilians identify more with groups that have engaged in more extensive rebel governance (most likely programmatic groups), increasing their legitimacy and thus improving their prospects of building infrastructural power if they win.
While ideology may shape goals and is a component of an organization’s political identity (Gutiérrez Sanín and Wood 2014; Kalyvas 2015b), goals may be revealed and borne out through practice more than doctrine (Kasfir 2015, 40), and so group type takes into account not only what organizations claim to pursue and their leaders’ justifications for these pursuits, but also what they put into practice, whether or not they successfully achieve their aims. Furthermore, while one could argue that the distinction between groups is based less on programs and goals than on internal organization, I contend that groups’ aims exist independently of their organizational capacity to carry them out, and that groups’ political programs both shape and may be shaped by their structures and the type of ties they have developed to the population (cf. Staniland 2014). A rebel group could be highly organized, bureaucratized, and have developed vertical ties to the population, yet still only desire and seek to create private wealth and power, rather than implementing broader social, political, economic changes over the population and territory it controls. Finally, organizations may have incentives to write policy programs and stage demonstrations for organizations like the Red Cross to present themselves as concerned with public interests, while primarily directing their energies toward the accumulation of private power and material wealth. Therefore, in coding groups as more toward one end or the other of the group type spectrum, I focus on both the preferences group leaders express through their discourse and organizational literature, and the preferences revealed through organizational behavior and how attempts are made (or not) to put pronouncements into action. This helps to separate cheap talk from more sincere intentions and the costly signal of moving from expression to action.

26 See e.g. Sinno (2008), Johnston (2008), and Staniland (2014) for organizational-structural explanations of rebel group behavior and performance.
From Rebellion to State Building

At the moment of victory, rebel leaders and the organizations they have built face both opportunities and constraints as they navigate the transition from fighting against the state to controlling it. Though there will be variation, given that most rebellions fail (Lewis 2012, 2017), cases of rebel victory are likely to have experienced high levels of violence and state destruction or disintegration, opening up possibilities for victorious rebel groups in deciding how to rebuild and govern. As Kasfir (2015, 25) notes, after victory, organizations have ceased to exercise ‘rebegovernance’ and must now decide which of their practices and institutions to carry over, or if they wish to inhabit and rely upon the structures of the previous state; either way, “they have become different kinds of governments with different pressures and resources, particularly if they receive international recognition as sovereigns.”

Yet the international system and remaining state institutions present both possibilities for and barriers to the achievement of organizational goals, and they may be interacted with and used in different ways. International actors can provide or withhold aid or advice as the rebels-turned-government seeks to establish itself. This assistance may come with conditions or be given freely depending on the provider. Such aid can be useful in building state capacity, but it may also be used to substitute for, rather than complement, state institutions, or may be privately appropriated by leaders as rents rather than directed toward the population. Membership in the international system can constrain organizations as they become subject to a wider range of international laws and norms, yet it also offers access to resources, voice, and influence in international fora. Similarly, the extent that the institutions of the preexisting state persist or have been destroyed can also provide either opportunities or constraints, depending on the context and actors. An existing bureaucratic framework may provide the groundwork for state building projects, with leaders
reforming or expanding institutions, but it may also serve to change or block the former rebels’
goals. Structurally, the maintenance of old state institutions may be the ‘path of least resistance’
and lead the victorious rebels to emulate the pathologies of the government they have just defeated,
or the existing structures could be used only as a foundation to be reformed, avoiding the costs of
beginning state building from ground zero. At the level of personnel, government functionaries
associated with the prior regime may impede the implementation of the rebel organization’s
plans—either blocking changes or acting to prevent the looting of state resources—or their
experience could be key in helping the new government get the state up and running after victory.27

The new constraints of state control are less likely to have effects on the governmental
agenda being pursued and more likely to affect implementation and outcomes, at least in the first
few years in power as the organization adjusts to its new role as the incumbent. Domestic interest
groups will seek to make claims on the new government and international actors will pressure it,
whatever its organizational type, and the organization must decide the extent to which it seeks to
accommodate these claims, can address them within the bounds of its preexisting goals, or rejects
them. The relative power of the pressure group or international actor(s) will affect the likelihood
of policy concessions, or may impede the implementation of the organization’s plans, but, again,
these do not represent a shift in goal orientation and do not foreclose the possibility of attempting
policy implementation. Rather, they place potential limits on the achievement of desired outcomes.

In the face of these pressures from outside the organization, there will be incentives to
consolidate central control and stamp out internal competition. Holding power also provides
incentives for the victorious organization to ensure its unity structurally and in terms of goals and
messaging. While some fragmentation may be tolerable while fighting as rebels as long as the

27 See Vu (2010) on ideological incongruence between new governing elites and inherited bureaucrats impeding state
building.
same broader goals are being sought (Kenny 2010), once in power, an organization must also compete with nonviolent political forces that will stand poised to exploit any division or weakness in the new government to further their own ends, and a more unified structure better enables an organization to pursue its goals (Mosinger 2018).

These opportunities and constraints apply to groups at both ends of the spectrum, and I argue that the ways in which organizations interact with and respond to these opportunity structures will vary depending on the processes of organizational development that took place during the rebel period. It is certainly possible that more programmatic leaders may, upon taking over the state apparatus, decide that the pursuit of private wealth is more important than enacting the vision that they professed and sought to put into place while fighting as rebels. It is also possible that more opportunistic leaders, on taking control of the state, might feel a new responsibility to govern with the interests of a broader public in mind and abstain from private extraction of wealth. These possibilities are highly unlikely, however. The political visions and the institutions of recruitment, socialization, and governance developed by organizations will have carried them to victory, so there is little incentive to change tack at this juncture. A middle-ground organization with a more limited program may have more scope to be flexible and thus is more likely to be responsive to constraints or outside pressures to change the program it is pursuing. Over time, such constraints may provoke a shift in goal orientation and the movement of the organization along the spectrum toward programmatic or opportunistic, though the path dependencies produced by decisions in constructing the organization and cultivating its constituency are likely to endure at least through the first decade in power.
Predicted Governing Behavior

What types of state building decisions will result from state capture by more programmatic organizations? Not all governments pursue state building projects (see e.g. Herbst 2000; Slater 2010; Soifer 2013; Vu 2010), and this will be the key difference between programmatic and opportunistic groups, with only the former seeking to build state infrastructural power. Despotic power is fundamental to the nature of the state, if we follow Weber in viewing statehood as based on a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, and the capacity to mobilize violence in pursuit of their goals is also inherent in the nature of rebel organizations. This coercive power enables the state to attempt to impose its will on society, rather than compromising or investing in less coercive means of influencing the population.\(^\text{28}\)

What is more contested is why state leaders in the developing world choose to invest in efforts to develop infrastructural power, extending the state’s influence through society and throughout the territory (Herbst 2000; Slater 2010; Soifer 2013; Waldner 1999),\(^\text{29}\) when in many developing states, “government sovereignty often does not extend far beyond capital cities” (Vu 2010, 9). The ability to project force and coercive dominance seems a natural goal for victorious rebel leaders, who have come to power through insurrection and thus would be worried about befalling a similar fate, or being on the receiving end of almost inevitable counterrevolutionary pressure from foreign rivals unhappy with the change of the status quo (see Colgan and Lucas 2017; Walt 1996). Yet this does not necessitate the development of infrastructural power, and some leaders may feel they can take advantage of the sovereignty protections offered by the post-World

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\(^{28}\) There will, of course, be societal resistance in the face of such despotic impositions, with power always contested, to a varying degree, between state and society (Migdal 1988, 2001; Scott 1976, 1998).

\(^{29}\) Though Slater (2010, 36) argues that “broadcasting” power over space is less important for state strength than exercising control over economic and social elites.
War II international system, thus avoiding the imperative to develop territorial control felt by rulers in earlier eras (Herbst 2000; Jackson and Rosberg 1982). This is rarely the case, though, for programmatic, revolutionary regimes, who must expect foreign or transnational threats to their newly-gained power (Walt 1996). I argue that the goals held by more programmatic organizations and their leaders of transforming political, economic, and social institutions demand an attempt to build infrastructural power and expand the reach of the state beyond the capital or a small elite stratum.

Victorious rebel organizations may not have propitious conditions for successful state building, given the different constraints that they may face, but this does not preclude them from attempting state building. Soifer (2013) points out the very important distinction between state building efforts and state building success in terms of the development of infrastructural power, noting that the factors behind each outcome may well be different. Attempts to develop new institutions and extend the power of the state may themselves place constraints on the ability to succeed in state building, highlighting the “inevitable limits of power” (Waldner 1999, 1).

More opportunistic leaders will be content with a more despotic state, lacking a vision for changing much beyond their own standing and material circumstances. Prior theories of state building efforts have emphasized the costs of state building and leaders’ calculation of the costs and benefits of building infrastructural power (Herbst 2000; Soifer 2013; Waldner 1999), yet for programmatic organizations, there is an imperative to engage in state building efforts, no matter the costs. These groups have engaged in armed struggle in pursuit of transformational or reformist goals and have indoctrinated followers, built institutions, and developed and promoted policies toward these ends. Programmatic organizations may also feel an obligation to honor a ‘social contract’ created with civilians during the civil war through rebel governance (Wickham-Crowley
Ideologically, they have acted on the conviction that the state, under their control, should be used to affect changes in the circumstances of the broader public, in line with group leaders’ conception of the public good. We should expect programmatic groups’ leaders to maintain this focus even after taking power, for “principled ideologues do not immediately turn into stereotypical Machiavellians the moment they gain control of the state” (S. E. Hanson 2010, xvi).

Programmatic organizations are thus pushed toward a path of attempting to develop infrastructural power, whether or not they succeed. This should be the case regardless of territorial size and buffers against international pressures (Herbst 2000); presence or absence of multiple regional political and economic centers (Soifer 2013); or the degree of internal contention victorious rebels face over their newly-won power (cf. Slater 2010). The expansion of state power and more direct, non-coercive state involvement “in the routinized practices of quotidian politics” (Waldner 1999, 3) requires the increased provision of public goods by the state, incorporating the masses of the population into the state’s sphere of influence and sidelining alternative local or regional power holders by developing loyalty to or dependence upon the state for service provision (Waldner 1999). Engaging with society through state and social organizations and controlling provision of services like education and healthcare are both ends programmatic organizations aim to achieve, and also serve as further means to promote their socioeconomic vision.

**Hypothesized Behavior in Government: Programmatic Organizations**

As noted above, programmatic groups seek to transform the political, social, and economic conditions of the population. Therefore, I hypothesize that much of the bureaucratic emphasis in the new state will be on establishing state influence over social and economic issues and politicizing society, building mechanisms for political education and institutions to geographically
extend state influence and enact the organization’s ideological vision, as well as incorporating more citizens into the security apparatus. A more programmatic organization should expand the spatial footprint of the state through the increased presence of government functionaries and security forces across the territory, so we should see increasing territorial coverage by state personnel and attempts to deliver order and other public goods in ‘brown areas’ (O’Donnell 1993) where they were previously lacking, expanding both despotic and infrastructural power, to use Mann’s (1988) terms. State absence in the periphery is quite common in developing countries, with Herbst (2000, 19) describing rural areas in Africa as lacking “even the most basic agents of the state—agricultural extension workers, tax collectors, census takers…”; O’Donnell (1993) characterizing Latin American peripheries as zones of state territorial absence and a lack of state authority in dispute resolution and governance; and large swathes of Southeast Asia long remaining “zones of weak or no sovereignty” for central states until the late 20th century (Scott 2009, xii).

In order to enact a political-ideological project, more programmatic organizations need to be able to reach into these areas and social spheres to be able to effect desired changes (or at least to attempt them). This requires the development of a corps of cadres loyal to the organization and the program, more than to themselves, in order to evangelize on behalf of the state building project and to seek to engage the population in it. It is only through the political education and organizational structures developed by programmatic organizations during their time fighting as rebels that this becomes feasible. Soifer (2013) argues that one of the key determinants of success in expanding infrastructural power is whether the state deploys outside bureaucrats to areas or instead maintains governance structures in which authority is ‘mediated’ by local elites in a form of indirect rule. I would argue that this is necessary for victorious rebel organizations to even
attempt infrastructural state building, let alone succeed. Controlling the central state means that organizations are responsible for the entire population and territory of the country, yet even if the organization passed through much of the national territory on its march to victory, it is unlikely to have succeeded in extensive popular indoctrination in many areas. For transformational programs to be enacted, rather than coopted or ignored, an organization needs to be able to send ‘true believers’ to try to implement them, which also helps overcome principal-agent problems in the delegation of authority from the center in state building efforts (Fukuyama 2004a), since there is greater clarity and congruence in goals between organizational leaders and followers when they have developed a coherent ideology and extensive political education.

Changing sociopolitical and economic systems and relations across territory and throughout society also requires the ability to access and monitor regions and populations beyond the state’s core areas of influence. More programmatic organizations will thus seek to build physical infrastructure and communications links to peripheral areas to integrate them with the core of the territory (Herbst 2000; Soifer 2013). The extension of roads or railroads and building of ports or airports can facilitate the projection of despotic power by enabling the faster movement of security forces to areas, though they also enable the greater exchange of people, goods, and ideas between regions and make it possible for the state to deliver the supplies and personnel necessary to expand public service provision in areas such as health, education, and sanitation. In order to monitor the population, be it to better serve their needs or to surveil them, a state needs informational capacity, and more programmatic organizations will seek to develop improved capacity to track demography, geography, and socioeconomic status within their countries to facilitate efforts to change social and economic circumstances. Censuses, other surveys, and national identity registration can help in the targeting and delivery of social or economic programs.
and in military conscription efforts, while cadastral surveys and mapping can help in the targeting of infrastructure projects and are necessary for land reform and redistribution programs. Each of these types of activities represents an effort to enhance the administrative capacity of the state (Lee and Zhang 2016; Soifer 2012a). Building out telecommunications capacity allows for the transmission of information between the core and other regions. In one direction, this provides the state with an increased ability to monitor territory and the population, better assimilating and utilizing information collected by its local agents. In the other direction, it lets the state provide more direction to its local agents and also opportunities to transmit political education material over the airwaves and the internet (e.g. Warren 2014), to try to indoctrinate the population.

Beyond increasing physical infrastructural capacity and administrative capacity, more programmatic organizations will seek to increase the scope of activities that the state undertakes (Fukuyama 2004b), creating or reforming state institutions to affect a wide array of political, social, and economic activities and seeking influence over and through civil society, for instance through popular mobilizations or building corporatist organizations. This mobilizing capacity and the delivery of a range of public services represent means for the organization to reach more of the population and involve it in the pursuit of political goals, as well as ensuring that goods and services are delivered in a manner aligned with the organization’s preferences. For example, expanding state control over and delivery of education allows the organization to influence the political content in educational materials, shaping the national mentality. Providing public health services can be a key component of reducing inequalities in society, but state control also offers

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30 Satellites and lower cost drones using remote sensing today offer the ability to conduct mapping and monitoring of territory more easily than in the past, but governments must still decide to invest in the development of this capacity and the expertise necessary to utilize collected information for policy making. Many other administrative activities and services, such as census taking, surveying, and vaccination, still require state agents to physically reach places and populations.
opportunities to determine what types of services will be delivered—groups may, for ideological reasons, decide to provide or deny family planning and reproductive health services or addiction treatment.\textsuperscript{31}

The recruitment and management of agents of the state should also be shaped by a more programmatic organization’s goals of public transformation or reform. Some positions in the bureaucracy may be distributed on a patronage basis to members of the organization in exchange for their service in the civil war or to potential opponents to coopt them, rather than on merit and ability, but the broader emphasis of the organization is on delivery of goods to the population writ large, rather than to itself. Therefore, economic resources should be channeled to the delivery of public goods and services and we should not see the organization’s members accruing significant personal wealth based on their positions. The state requires resources in order to expand its influence, implement programs, and deliver services, and so the diversion of resources to private coffers would diminish the organization’s ability to non-coercively effect change.

\textit{Hypothesized Behavior in Government: Opportunistic Organizations}

More opportunistic groups, on the other hand, will engage in minimal state building, and will largely maintain or ignore preexisting state structures. Building state institutions and expanding state influence are difficult and require significant investments of resources and time (Rueschemeyer and Evans 1985), but opportunistic organizations are driven more by short-term, personalistic concerns and will thus limit these investments. Rather than developing the ‘productive’ capacities of the state and acting in concert with other groups in society, they will use their coercive power ‘conflictually’ (Hirshleifer 1991) to turn the country’s resources to their own

\textsuperscript{31} This marks the extension of state power down to the level of individual bodies, what Foucault (2008) would consider the manifestation of ‘biopolitics.’
benefit and not that of a broader public. More opportunistic organizations will devote resources primarily to two sectors: security and the economy (e.g. Reno 1998). Since more opportunistic groups generally do not establish strong relations with the civilian population and are characterized by individualism within the group (e.g. Weinstein 2007), they will be concerned about the possibility of coups or rebellions and will invest in the creation of a robust internal security apparatus, yet one that is highly controlled by group leaders and that contains counterbalanced forces to help prevent coups. Since the priority is private (i.e. personalized) security, rather than that of the population or ‘nation’ as a whole, there is less incentive to expand the reach of the state and even its security forces into peripheral areas, with geographic focus given to core areas where the organization and its leaders have political and economic interests. While these more opportunistic organizations may create order, it will be a despotic, predatory governance more than entailing the development of a social contract (Reno 2015), acting in a manner validating Tilly’s (1985) conception of war making and state making as a criminal protection racket designed to secure rulers’ power and wealth.

In the economic sector, more opportunistic organizations may build or maintain ministries to manage production and extraction of natural and agricultural resources, or parallel structures may be created to channel wealth to group leaders. We should thus see most resources in the state bureaucracy devoted to resource extraction and security, with investments in infrastructure primarily around resource-rich areas and military installations. Little emphasis will be placed on increasing state penetration of society, beyond coercive power and intelligence collection, or on

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32 By “short-term” concerns, I mean that opportunistic leaders and groups will want to see quick returns to their effort, but this does not mean that they have no long-term goals. Their long-term plans, however, involve continued extraction for private ends. Charles Taylor and the NPFL, for example, had long-term plans of expanding Liberian influence throughout West Africa, but this was aimed at securing access to resources and securing themselves in power, rather than an idea of acting in the “national interest.”

33 See e.g. De Bruin (2014), Migdal (1988), and Quinlivan (1999) on counterbalancing and coup-proofing.
improving social and economic outcomes for the masses. We should thus see limited investment in the provision of public goods and social services, such as education and health. Administrative structures that are developed are likely to be hollow and used for patronage positions rather than public goods provision. Since these more opportunistic organizations will not have the goal of converting or indoctrinating the population with an ideological program, they may be more willing to allow non-governmental or religious organizations to pick up the slack in social service provision, so long as these non-state groups do not seek to undermine the organization’s political authority or interfere in its extraction of resources. The resources of non-governmental organizations and foreign development aid may also be seen as sources of rents to be diverted from public projects towards government officials’ own accounts—sometimes with tolerance from aid donors (Brautigam 2000; Collier 2009; Easterly 2006).

Leadership and Institutional Inertia in Rebellion and Government

Where does organizational type come from, though? I argue that organizational type emerges when leadership of the organization has been consolidated, such that the organization’s goal orientation and agenda are established. In most rebel organizations there are multiple potential leaders or leadership groups with competing visions for the trajectory of the organization, how they believe it should behave, and what they want it to achieve (Bakke, Cunningham, and Seymour 2012; Clapham 1998, 9–10; Mampilly 2011; Zirakzadeh 2002). This competition may be resolved through compromise between the leaders and the development of a shared organizational plan; the

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34 See Mampilly (2011) on armed group relations with these types of non-governmental service providers, and Brass (2016) and Clough (2017) on developing states relying on NGOs to take up the burden of service delivery. In wealthier Western countries, there has been a trend toward a “hollow” state, in which service provision is funded by the government, but sub-contracted to corporate or non-profit actors to engage in actual service delivery (see e.g. Milward and Provan 2000). A more opportunistic government should differ in not wanting to provide funding and resources for service delivery at all.
elimination of competition either through violent purges or the resignation or expulsion from the group of less powerful contenders; or the fragmentation of the movement into multiple competing organizations. An example of peacefully resolved competition is the reunification of the three ‘tendencies’ of the FSLN, which had been divided over the choice of tactics for their struggle against the government, into a single, cohesive organization with a shared, though still contested, program (e.g. Mosinger 2017; Tirado Lopez 1980). The NRA/M was similarly able to fairly peacefully resolve internal conflicts and maintain unity (Ngoga 1998, 101–2). In the case of Frelimo in Mozambique, the Marxist-Leninist wing of the organization pushed out leaders like Lazaro Nkavandame, Uria Simango, and Mateus Gwenjere who sought to promote an ethnic, racialist, and capitalist vision for the organization (e.g. Manning 2002, 44–46). The NPFL in Liberia was first violently purged by Charles Taylor, with other, more moderate leaders murdered (Ellis 1998, 158–59), and later fragmented, with some members forming the Independent National Patriotic Liberation Front (INPFL), outcomes illustrative of the personalized nature of the organization as the ambition of Taylor and his top lieutenants took precedence over broader aims.

The leader or group of leaders who win out in these struggles have the opportunity to advance their preferences and orient the organization toward their preferred goals. These goals will be endogenous to the sociopolitical dynamics in which the organization arises, but while resource availability (Weinstein 2007), preexisting institutions (Mampilly 2011), and international actors may have some effects on the governance goals and policies adopted by organizations, they do not necessarily outweigh the agency of leaders in pursuing their preferences (e.g. Clapham 1998; Vu 2010, 240).\textsuperscript{35} Leaders’ preferences, which can be organized and articulated as a group’s

\textsuperscript{35} For example, though Mampilly (2011) argues that center-seeking rebel organizations do not need to develop governance structures or deliver goods and services other than order to civilians prior to taking power, center-seeking organizations frequently do so of their own accord (e.g. the NRA/M and the Taliban).
ideology and program, may be developed through personal or collective experiences and traits, education or indoctrination, or instrumental adoption. Preferences always develop through a combination of innate characteristics and interactions with the social and structural environment, and shape the development of sociopolitical institutions downstream (e.g. Druckman and Lupia 2000; Wildavsky 1987).

Yet whatever these preferences’ origins, once a particular set of leaders’ goals begin to orient the organization, they start to form the group in a path-dependent manner, shaping recruitment practices, institutions, and repertoires of contention and governance (see also Gutiérrez Sanín and Wood 2014, 222). Armed group leaders must be able to exert control and direction over their followers’ violent and nonviolent actions, which they can seek to accomplish through material or non-material rewards and punishments, or institution building and mechanisms of socialization (Gutiérrez Sanín and Wood 2014; Hoover Green 2016; Wood and Toppelberg 2017; Worsnop 2017). The type and combination of these mechanisms for shaping organizational behavior will vary from group to group depending on what leaders choose to adopt and implement.36

I focus on leaders because their decisions set the structure and trajectory of the organization and then determine the shape of the post-war political arena and the policies that will be enacted. Leaders may be influenced by the social structures and international political climates with which they interact, yet they retain agency to accept or reject outside pressures, and those who are too susceptible to external influence may be unable to retain their roles or sustain their organizations. Fighters and cadres join organizations for a variety of motivations, many of which may be unrelated and at times opposed to the ideologies organizations espouse at the leadership level (e.g.

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36 Though there are also horizontal socialization mechanisms and practices among lower-level group that affect behavior toward group members and civilians (Wood and Toppelberg 2017).
As an NRA/M fighter and later party cadre wrote:

“…for the majority of us who ended up in the bush, it was not idealistic notions such as democracy that forced us to go there. Museveni and a handful of those with whom he conceived the idea of a protracted people’s war may have been motivated by idealism, but for the majority of us it was the demands of physical survival that forced us into the bush. To paraphrase Amilcar Cabral, we didn’t go to the bush to fight for ideas, for the things in anyone’s head. We fought to win material benefits, to live better and in peace, to see our lives go forward and guard the future of our children!” (Ondoga Ori Amaza 1998, xiv).

If leaders have more programmatic goals, these vertical tensions can be productive if they are understood and adapted to by leaders who then aim to politically educate their followers, or they can lead to fragmentation and parochialism (Scott 1979) if leaders do not act to convince followers to buy into the political program and create a sense of shared interests. Such efforts to convince followers of a broader common purpose are only necessary, however, if leaders have a political program they wish to enact. Discipline is a requisite in any organized armed group, but this can be induced simply through threats of coercive punishment. Opportunistic leaders can thus provide fighters with a pathway to pursue their more personalized aims, with the understanding that punishment will be meted out if the leaders’ personal interests are threatened, since there is little or no sense of obligation to a public beyond the group.

Given recent works on individual fighters’ motivations and also on the motives and role played by mid-level commanders (Lidow 2016; A. Themnér 2015) and how these may lead to subnational variation in the degree to which top-level leaders goals and plans are implemented (Arjona 2016; Lidow 2016), a focus on rebel leaders helps fill out the chain from policy formulation to practical, micro-level execution and the ways in which leaders’ decisions about how to organize a rebel movement may affect their later ability to implement policies through their subordinates. This leadership-centered approach builds on recent works in international relations.
that focus on leaders and how their characteristics may shape policy decisions. Some scholars focus on the constraints institutions impose on leaders (e.g. Chiozza and Goemans 2011; Croco 2015; Debs and Goemans 2010), yet rigorous causal analyses have also pointed to the importance of leaders themselves and their political agency, suggesting the enduring importance of the “first image” (Waltz 1959) in analyzing conflict. While there have long been case analyses of the policy behavior of individual leaders (e.g. A. L. George and George 1998; Goldgeier 1994; Kennedy 2011; Mares and Palmer 2012), recent large-N cross-national studies have found strong effects of individuals on matters of security policy and behavior. For example, leaders’ military experiences or lack thereof affect their willingness to engage in interstate conflicts (M. C. Horowitz and Stam 2014; M. C. Horowitz, Stam, and Ellis 2015; Sechser 2004) or pursue nuclear weapons (Fuhrmann and Horowitz 2015). Leaders’ goals, threat perception, and reputations affect their willingness to pursue a more aggressive foreign policy (Chiozza and Choi 2003; Colgan 2013) or military intervention in conflicts (Saunders 2011) and can affect alliance strength and structures (Colgan and Lucas 2017). Changes in leadership can affect the intensity of ongoing military conflict (B. F. Jones and Olken 2009).

The political economy literature on leaders, meanwhile, suggests that individual leaders can exert significant influence on the form and regime type of political institutions (B. F. Jones and Olken 2009) and the economic development trajectory of a state (Besley, Montalvo, and Reynal-Querol 2011; B. F. Jones and Olken 2005). Earlier work in comparative politics also highlights the importance of individual leaders and their ideological commitments in shaping public policy, institution building, and resource allocation in countries with capitalist or socialist economic systems (Bunce 1981; S. E. Hanson 1997). In the study of state building, Spruyt (1996)

37 See Jervis (2013) for a recent survey of evidence on whether or not leaders matter in international politics and what methods we can use to determine leaders’ independent or contingent effects.
has argued that early modern polities were not predestined to adopt a specific institutional form, but instead leaders made decisions and experimented with different institutional structures before the primacy of the sovereign state was established.

In analyses of postcolonial state building, structural variables are generally given primacy over agency. It is up to leaders, though, to evaluate choices, and leadership characteristics and ideology may still shape their evaluations of constraints and opportunities, costs and benefits. Herbst (2000, 150) includes leaders’ cost-benefit analyses and decision making as one of three key determinants of variation in state expansion efforts in Africa and suggests leaders’ ideological convictions may lead them to ignore structural barriers. Soifer (2013) and Waldner (1999) argue that state building efforts emerged in Latin America, the Middle East, and East Asia where they were seen by state leaders as a means to achieve their desired political and developmental goals, though these authors ultimately privilege structural factors in their arguments.

Situations of war and upheaval are especially subject to the influence of leaders, with Byman and Pollack (2001, 109) arguing that individuals “take on added significance…when institutions are in conflict, or in times of great change.” This claim can be extended to the realm of internal conflict, for civil wars represent, I argue, ‘critical junctures’ in the evolution of states and of state-society relations: times in which structural constraints are relaxed and “there is a substantially heightened probability that agents’ choices will affect the outcome of interest” (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007, 348). Civil wars and their aftermath represent precisely the sort of upheaval that allows leaders to play a more central role in shaping outcomes, as opposed to other times when they may be more constrained.\(^{38}\) War and the attendant weakening or collapse of

\(^{38}\) Dogan and Higley (1998) discuss how crises may lead to regime change, with crises either precipitated by elites or inducing elites to transform the political regime; they mention civil conflict and revolutions among the types of crises that can break down structures and create the possibility for such changes.
political, economic, and/or social institutions presents the permissive conditions creating the
critical juncture, while leaders’ choices provide the productive conditions (Soifer 2012b)
determining how an organization develops and utilizes its power once violence has broken out. In
this path dependent situation, small events and decisions in an early period, during group
organization and through the initiation of fighting, have large, consequential downstream effects
on outcomes of interest in the later period of holding state power (see Pierson 2004). Some of the
process of leadership consolidation and group organization may take place during peacetime,
before violent conflict and the critical juncture open, but the opening of hostilities may unsettle
prior structures and relationships, providing opportunities for maintaining or shifting the course of
the organization.

There has been some attention to leadership and agenda-setting in the sociological
literature on the outcomes of revolutionary social movements and whether or how they consolidate
power (Aminzade, Goldstone, and Perry 2001; Selbin 1997, 1999). In related areas of political
science, Straus (2015) emphasizes the role of leaders in fostering national cultures of tolerance or
intolerance that prevent or enable genocide in transitional regimes, Brass (2003) points to leaders’
roles and incentives in stoking ethnic riots, and Jones (2015) has unpacked the role of leaders in
shaping reform policies in authoritarian regimes.

Leaders in the Civil War Context

The agency of leaders has, however, largely been absent in the literature on civil wars, despite the prominence of individual leaders like T.E. Lawrence, Che Guevara, Mao Tse-Tung,

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39 Recent works on violence and restraint, for example, have focused on the activities of individual commanders and their direct interactions with fighters (Cohen 2016; Hoover Green 2016), but less on the top-level leadership and how and why it develops policies and rules. Huang (2017) and colleagues, however, are currently developing a data set on the background characteristics and political networks of individual rebel leaders.
and Võ Nguyên Giáp in the development of modern theories of irregular warfare (see e.g. Kilcullen 2010; Nagl 2005). Policy makers clearly view leaders as important in shaping the trajectories of rebel organizations, with counterinsurgents aiming to “decapitate” organizations by killing or capturing leaders (Bob and Nepstad 2007; Brittain 2006; M. Freeman 2014; Jordan 2009; Long 2014; Tierney 2015), though this strategy’s effectiveness is debated; states may at times avoid pursuing decapitation because it could result in less restrained violence by insurgents (Abrahms and Potter 2015; Staniland 2015). Prorok (2016) is a rare exception who examines the effect of leaders’ interests—in terms of their fear of punishment—on the likelihood of war termination. The role of leaders’ ideas and goals in shaping rebel organizational development and subsequent policies, however, is ripe for deeper examination. The weight of history and other structural factors in situations of contentious politics depend on how they are “used, adapted, or manipulated” (McGovern 2010, xxiii) by leaders.

In fact, one of the foundations of the late-20th century applied psychology and management literature on leadership is a book on rebel and revolutionary leadership that lends itself well to understanding how leaders form and reinforce more programmatic or more opportunistic organizations. James Downton (1973) in examining rebel and revolutionary leaders developed a typology of transactional versus transformational leadership.40 Transactional leadership is based on a relationship of exchange, with the leader rewarding followers for compliance and fulfillment of specific required tasks. Transformational leadership, by contrast, involves leaders creating a new, “shared vision for the future” (Hater and Bass 1988, 695) and expanding followers’ conceptions of what they can achieve. Transformational leadership motivates followers to advance the broader transformational program by 1) raising consciousness of the value and means of

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40 Ideas developed further by Burns (1978) and Bass (1985).
achieving certain outcomes, 2) pushing followers to “transcend” self-interest in favor of collective benefit, and 3) altering or expanding followers’ conception of their needs and wants with regards with Maslow’s hierarchy of needs (Bass 1985, 20). While leaders may utilize both transformational and transactional leadership at different times (Judge and Piccolo 2004), and many revolutionary movements have both leaders who are more inspirational and others who are more practical (Aminzade, Goldstone, and Perry 2001), transformational leadership can allow for the achievement of more ambitious, larger-scale goals, though it is up to the leader what these goals are. Leaders may also, at times, induce their followers to act in ways that are to the leader’s benefit, but the constituents’ detriment, exercising ‘destructive leadership’ (Padilla, Hogan, and Kaiser 2007). Thus, the aims of rebel leaders and how they shape and are enacted through the organizations they head are key to determining what the organization can and will achieve, while fighting for state power or while exercising it. In conclusion, I argue that the role of leaders in my argument is innovative within the civil wars literature and improves our understanding of how and why organizations develop particular institutions and patterns of governance, which then shape downstream policies and practices.

**Alternative Explanations**

In testing my theory and examining empirical evidence from the cases under study, it is imperative to weigh the explanatory power of other key explanations for the goal orientation or organizational type of rebel organizations, as well as the state building intentions and abilities of governments in developing countries, summarized in Table 2.1 below.

In the area of rebel organizational type, Weinstein (2007) argues that rebel leaders’ decisions about recruitment and how to engage with the population depend on the availability of
natural resources or foreign funding at the founding of the group. Such resources obviate the need for rebels to rely on the population for support as in a classic guerrilla war, and so ideologically-motivated rebel groups should arise only in the absence of such resources, whereas opportunistic rebel organizations will develop where such economic resource endowments are present. Weinstein argues that a reliance in early recruitment on material resources for motivation, rather than grievances or ideological commitments, leads to a path-dependent situation in which opportunistic recruits join an organization and commit increased violence against civilians.

**Table 2.1 Alternative Explanations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Implications for Organizational Development and State Building Efforts</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Material resource availability</td>
<td>• Decisions about recruitment and relations with civilians determined by resources availability after rebel group formation</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| Prior State                   | • State building patterns determined by structures or degree of collapse of preexisting state  
                                 | • State building patterns determined by colonial or pre-colonial state structures |
| Opportunity structures        | • Organizations’ decisions should be based on potential to use grievances or political opportunities to gain domestic and international support |
| Social constituencies         | • Decisions should be based on the interests and structures of the social groups that constitute an organization’s members or supporters |
| Threat severity               | • More severe threats should increase the strength of organizations and increase their state building efforts |
| International Influence       | • International actors’ preferences shape organizational policies and practices |

Weinstein’s model, while useful for understanding patterns of recruitment and violence against civilians among rebel organizations, is overly static, with limited room for the evolution of group type over time—absent severe resource shocks (Weinstein 2007, 282–96)—and also does
not extend beyond violence to broader issues of rebel governance. Nor does it fully account for the agency rebel leaders have in deciding how to control and distribute the resources their organizations possess (see Worsnop 2017). In Liberia, for instance, the NPFL’s initial recruits were motivated by grievances and joined at a time when the organization had little access to Liberia’s natural resources or to external financing, yet the group became more opportunistic over time (see Chapter 5). Colombia’s FARC rebels also evolved over time from highly ideological origins and close reliance on civilian populations to dependence on illicit drugs for financing, and yet many recruits remained ideologically-motivated and are subject to political education, while most of the organization’s fronts have maintained goals of political and socioeconomic transformation (Ugarriza and Craig 2012). It is also rare, though possible, for more opportunistic organizations to shift in a more programmatic direction, especially if there is a leadership change. This occurred in the case of the AFDL in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which became more concerned with good governance and public interests when Joseph Kabila replaced his father Laurent-Désiré Kabila as president (Hesselbein 2007; Pashi 2013; Stearns 2012). If Weinstein is correct, however, we should see leaders and fighters in the early stages of rebel organizational formation and action making decisions about recruitment, socialization, and relations with civilians on the basis of their access to economic resources or lack thereof.

With regard to state building patterns and the ends sought by governments in power, Herbst (2000) would suggest that the pre-war state will determine the structure of the post-war state. If this is the case, we should see continuity in state structures and scope between the old regime and the new regime following rebel victory, with geographic and ethnic barriers to state building impeding both the state the rebels defeated and then the rebels themselves. Colonial or pre-colonial institutions may also play a determining role in what types of institutions are maintained or created.
by rebel groups following victory (Acemoglu and Robinson 2010; Lange, Mahoney, and vom Hau 2006). If this is the case, when any rebel organization takes power, we should expect to see it utilize political structures and institutions that either pre-dated or were created during the colonial period. Slater (2010) points to insurrectionary threats as leading to elite cooperation in state building in Southeast Asia, yet in cases of rebel victory, the old elite has, at least in part, been vanquished, and so in the short term, organizations should be able to engage in state building without the cooperation of the preexisting elite, and can choose to expropriate their resources without the need for a ‘protection pact.’

Reno (2011) posits that rebel organizational type may be determined by the domestic and international sociopolitical environment and the sources of leverage rebel organizations possess to strategically tap into grievances and opportunities at home and abroad in a version of Putnam’s (1988) ‘two-level game.’ Existing sociopolitical opportunities for gaining support and resources, rather than leaders’ goal orientation, would thus explain organizational type. While opportunistic leaders should always seek to exploit those opportunities that will further their acquisition of power and material wealth, if Reno is correct, then we should see leaders adopt political programs only for reasons of political expediency, rather than in response to sincere commitments or grievances, and those leaders who challenge the zeitgeist will be marginalized and unsuccessful in gaining agenda-setting power or developing a robust challenge to the state.

Related to opportunity structures, the degree of weakness and destruction of the prior state apparatus may also affect the goals and organizational development of rebel groups before taking power and when in government. While rebellions can only develop in situations of some degree of state weakness (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Lewis 2012), civil wars may emerge from or result in situations of state failure (Bates 2008; Rotberg 2003), in which central state institutions have
collapsed or severely withered. In collapsed states, there may be fewer constraints to opportunism due to the lack of credible state institutions and there may also be higher costs to institution building because of the low baseline level of capability and resources of remaining state structures. Without other institutions, rebels might seek to assert a tyranny of strength, becoming “stationary bandits” (Olson 1993) extracting resources, but failing to deliver anything beyond protection from violence, rather than reaching a more mutually beneficial social contract with the public. In state collapse situations, however, there is also the opportunity to construct new institutions without the frictions that occur when seeking to mould bureaucrats of the ancien régime into compliance with the victorious rebels' program. The lack of state institutions also does not mean an absence of competition, as non-state community or civil society structures may also oppose or enable organizational action (Arjona 2016; O. Kaplan 2017). The goals of leaders and organizational structures they build can also withstand the collapse of the state they have been opposing: programmatic organizations are not destined to turn to opportunism in situations of state collapse. The Somali National Movement, for instance, remained programmatic and has governed the quasi-state of Somaliland programmatically since the collapse of the Siad Barre regime and the central state of Somalia in 1991 (e.g. Bradbury 2008). If degree of state collapse determines the structure of the state after a civil war, we should expect to see more opportunism and less programmatic goal orientations and behavior when state collapse has occurred.

The structure of the society in which rebels organize and fight may also determine an organization’s structure and who it aims to benefit with its policies and governance (Staniland 2014), and so underlying social dynamics would shape organizational type and policy plans and

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41 A situation of state collapse approximates a Hobbesian environment of anarchy, and while an opportunistic organization occupying stationary seats of power may establish itself as a Leviathan by providing a population with the desired good of order (Hobbes 1996), this is only the most basic step in the establishment of a state: rulers can and do expand the scope of their social contract and the activities they carry out.
behavior. The sectors of the population that support an organization while it is fighting as rebels may make claims upon the organization once it is in power, and their rivals within society may be predisposed to oppose the new government of the victorious rebels. As a subset of the constituency argument, the ethnic structure of a rebel organization and the territory it seeks to control may also shape state building and governance decisions (e.g. D. L. Horowitz 1985; Lijphart 1977; Posner 2005). Ethnic diversity may also disincentivize state building and public goods provision in heterogenous societies (Habyarimana et al. 2009). If ethnicity outweighs organizational type, we should expect to see rebel organizations making decisions primarily on the basis of ethnic cleavages and how to use them to maximize benefits to leaders and their coethnics. Leaders are able to make decisions, however, about the constituencies they seek to attract to their movement and who they seek to serve. These can be narrow or broad constituencies. Even when leaders attract a clear constituency to the movement, they do not necessarily aim to serve that constituency's interests. For example, in the case of the NPFL, members of the Mano and Gio ethnic groups were the main initial recruits of the organization and among its strongest supporters, yet they as groups and their home region did not receive especially favorable treatment of increased state support when the NPFL gained control of the state (see Chapter 5). Similarly, in Uganda, the people of the Luweero Triangle region were left disappointed by the NRA/M’s failure to devote significant resources to their area, despite their support for the organization (see Chapter 6).

The organizational structure of groups may also determine what post-victory institutions they are able to build or governance practices they are able to implement (Johnston 2008; Sinno 2008; Staniland 2014), with rebel regime structures potentially carrying over into their control of the central government (Kasfir 2015, 25). I argue, though, that organizational structure should not affect the scope of leaders’ aims, and organizational structure may be endogenous to leaders’
decisions in pursuit of their preferred goals. Leaders seek to build the organization they believe will best enable them to achieve their aims. This may result in part from underlying social structures (Staniland 2014), but even in the same social setting, different leaders may attempt to build very different types of organizations. A particular organizational structure may also be adopted independent of the particular sociopolitical context due to leaders’ ideological leanings, with Leninist principles of organization (see Selznick 1952) or Maoist structures and strategies (Mao 1962) widely adopted and adapted by leftist movements around the world, for instance.

Facing security threats may also lead victorious rebels to build stronger states. Levitsky and Way (2012, 2013) argue that revolutionary organizations that come to power through violent struggle and then face security threats are more likely to maintain internal cohesion and develop durable regimes. Almost all rebel groups that seize power then face serious domestic and/or international security threats (e.g. Walt 1996), so it is important in testing this explanation to evaluate the relative extent of the threats different regimes faced. The reaction to these threats, however, should in no small part be shaped by the organizational character of the new government and the institutional structures it built and the constituencies it mobilized while fighting as rebels and after taking power. While both programmatic and opportunistic groups may be able to mobilize nationalist sentiment in the face of external threats, internal threats will require the mobilization of preexisting organizational structures, support constituencies, and appeals, which will differ by organization type. Civil opposition will be a limited threat from a regime security perspective, especially with the former rebels’ control over security forces. From a policy standpoint, armed or civil opposition strength matters most if an organization has a program it is

42 There are parallel arguments about political parties, with Van Dyck (2017), for example, arguing that facing stronger opposition and repression leads parties to build strength through institutionalization and socializing activists to be committed to the party organization.
trying to implement and achieve to which opposition is a barrier. Responding to threats requires programmatic organizations to divert resources from efforts to expand infrastructural power and social services toward security, whereas for more opportunistic organizations, there were limited public policy plans in the first place. If level of threat determines the degree of organizational cohesion and pressures for state building experienced by groups, then we should see groups become more likely to try to build infrastructural power the more severe the threats that they face.

Both in the period of fighting as rebels and in power, international aid and the international environment may shape organizational goals and policy formulation. The degree of international influence may depend on an organization’s level of connectedness to international actors and the sway that these actors have over the organization, what Levitsky and Way (2010), in the context of democratization, call international linkage and leverage. For example, the Cold War and flows of funds and weaponry from superpowers enabled certain organizations to engage in more “robust” rebellions than in other time periods (Kalyvas and Balcells 2010), while rebel organizations’ prospects for survival may depend on the ties they develop to foreign states or transnational activist networks (Bob 2005; Coggins 2015; Huang 2016a; M. L. Kaplan 2016; Keck and Sikkink 1998).

Once a rebel organization is in power, international actors may establish mandates for the creation of certain types of state institutions and the practice of specific governance activities as part of peacekeeping operations or conditions of financial loans or aid. Peacekeeping and reconstruction programs by the United Nations, other international organizations, or individual countries may include efforts at security sector reform and/or reform of the justice system (Berg 2014; Call and Wyeth 2008; Paris 2004). Loans from the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, or individual countries are likely to have conditions regulating economic governance, and foreign aid may likewise have strings attached (Brautigam and Knack 2004), for instance United
States programs tied to democratic governance. International norms (Meyer et al. 1997) and treaty obligations, such as those on the protection of human rights (Simmons 2009), may also constrain organizations’ behavior once they are in power (and sometimes beforehand), and may lead to certain institutional design features, for instance in the area of human rights the creation of an independent human rights commission or banning capital punishment. International actors have varied interests, and so in adjudicating the role of international factors in shaping the policies and practices of rebel organizations in opposition to the state and in power, we must look at what international actors attempted to exert influence over organizations or the countries they governed and how this interacted with the interests and actions of rebel leaders.

Throughout the manuscript, I will examine the role each of these factors played in shaping rebel organizational type; rebel leaders’ decision making and policy formulation while fighting against the state; and the state building and service provision policies developed and implemented (or not) once the rebels gained control of the state and were in power. I will highlight how groups’ goal orientation interacted with these other potential explanatory factors to determine when my theorized explanation held independent sway, was moderated by other factors, or was overpowered, helping to evaluate the inferential leverage gained through my organizational type theory.

Conclusion

This chapter discussed the problem of state building and service provision after rebel victory in civil wars and the current state of knowledge. I introduced and developed a theoretical

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Vu (2010, 240), however, argues that we should focus more on domestic, rather than foreign, actors and forces in seeking to explain state formation and state building behavior, as leaders often resist foreign advice and pressures, and “even if they complied with foreign pressure, native elites still had a range of options.”
argument about how rebel leaders’ goals and the ideas that they use to motivate organizations shape patterns of institution building behavior while fighting as rebels, and subsequently, once in charge of the state. Distinguishing between the ideal types of programmatic and opportunistic organizations, I outlined the motives and hypothesized state building and service provision behavior we should see following victory by each type of group, building off of the distinction between despotic and infrastructural power. While all groups will seek to develop despotic power, only organizations further toward the programmatic end of the spectrum will devote effort and resources to building infrastructural power. The next chapter goes into greater depth to define key concepts and specify a strategy for their measurement, before turning to the selection of methods, cases, and data sources to best examine and explain the policies and behavior of victorious rebels.
CHAPTER 3

Concepts, Measurement, and Case Selection

“What ticks you off about the tape recording everything is that it is not loyal to the person who is being interviewed, because it even records and remembers when you make an ass of yourself.” – Gabriel García Márquez, “Interview with Gabriel García Márquez,” int. Peter Stone (The Paris Review, Winter 1981, Issue 82).

Now that the contours of the argument have been outlined, it is necessary to specify with greater precision the key concepts involved, how they will be measured, and how to test the theory. This study is restricted to the post-World War II period, from 1945 on. This is a period in which civil war outstripped interstate war as the most common form of large-scale violent conflict, and is also a period for which significant qualitative and quantitative data are available at both the case and cross-national levels to allow for internally valid case studies and cross-case qualitative and statistical comparisons. Finally, this temporal scope helps ensure contemporary policy relevance. A conflict duration threshold is used to identify civil wars to ensure that rebel groups had time to potentially develop patterns of governance and plans for state building prior to victory, and in all of these cases, total battle deaths surpassed 1,000, in line with many comparative approaches to coding civil war occurrence (see Sambanis 2004).

Rebel Victory

Victorious rebel groups are thus defined as armed organizations that develop outside of state security forces and engage in a sustained conflict against the government lasting at least six months, then gaining total or majority control over the central state or seceded territory for at least
one year after the initial capture of the capital or cessation of hostilities. This is thus a political victory, and may or may not coincide with a military victory. This specification avoids the inclusion of coups in which members of the government and/or security forces depose the executive leadership, and also excludes groups that only briefly capture the capital city but are then expelled and thus do not have the time to control and alter state institutions, such as the Séléka rebel group that briefly controlled the Central African Republic in 2013 and early 2014. I restrict my analysis to groups that become broadly internationally recognized as the government of the state in which they have fought. A number of groups, especially separatists and irredentists, control territory and set up governments (Florea 2014), yet they do not receive broad international recognition and thus do not face the opportunities and restrictions afforded to governments integrated into the international state system. While non-state actors may increasingly be subject to international humanitarian law (Bailes and Nord 2010; Jo 2015) and engage in forms of diplomacy and international trade (Coggins 2015; Huang 2016a; M. L. Kaplan 2016; Mampilly 2011; Reno 1998), only groups in control of recognized states may, among other things, forge or be subject to international treaties; hold membership in international organizations; be responsible for state debt (even if it was incurred under the previous regime); and, most importantly, claim the protections and privileges of sovereignty under international law. A list of cases of rebel victory since 1945 is provided in Table 3.1, below.

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44 See Landau-Wells (2018) on the importance of capturing the capital city for sovereignty in civil wars. There are numerous examples of cases in which a rebel group captured the capital city and gained international recognition as the sovereign power in a country without fully defeating other competing groups, as in the cases of the MPLA in Angola and the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Table 3.1 Cases of Rebel Victory in Civil Wars since 1945

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Opponent</th>
<th>Civil War Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Haganah/Irgun</td>
<td>United Kingdom (Palestine/Israel)</td>
<td>1933-1948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesian People’s Army</td>
<td>Netherlands (Indonesia)</td>
<td>1946-1949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Liberation Army</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>1946-1949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viet Minh</td>
<td>France (Vietnam)</td>
<td>1946-1954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neo Destour</td>
<td>France (Tunisia)</td>
<td>1952-1956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pathet Lao</td>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>1953-1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-26-7</td>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>1953-1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Front de Libération Nationale (FLN)</td>
<td>France (Algeria)</td>
<td>1954-1962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA)</td>
<td>Portugal (Angola)</td>
<td>1961-1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN)</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>1961-1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC)</td>
<td>Portugal (Guinea-Bissau/Cape Verde)</td>
<td>1963-1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Liberation Front (NLF)</td>
<td>South Yemen</td>
<td>1963-1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frente de Libertaçao de Moçambique (Frelimo)</td>
<td>Portugal (Mozambique)</td>
<td>1964-1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF)</td>
<td>Ethiopia (Eritrea)</td>
<td>1964-1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwean African National Union (ZANU)</td>
<td>Rhodesia (Zimbabwe)</td>
<td>1965-1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-West African People’s Organization (SWAPO)</td>
<td>South Africa (Namibia)</td>
<td>1966-1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khmer Rouge</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>1967-1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mukti Bahini</td>
<td>Pakistan (Bangladesh)</td>
<td>1971-1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1974-1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fretilin</td>
<td>Indonesia (Timor Leste)</td>
<td>1974-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forces Armées Populaires/Force Armées Nationales (FAP/FAN)</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>1976-1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic revolutionaries (Khomeinists)</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>1978-1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mujahideen</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>1979-1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Resistance Army (NRA)</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>1981-1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA)</td>
<td>Sudan (South Sudan)</td>
<td>1983-2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mouvement Patriotique de Salut (MPS)</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>1989-1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>1990-1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatian separatists</td>
<td>Yugoslavia (Croatia)</td>
<td>1991-1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taliban</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>1994-1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance des Forces Démocratique pour la Libération du Congo (AFDL)</td>
<td>Zaire (Democratic Rep. of the Congo)</td>
<td>1996-1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Alliance</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>1996-2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo Liberation Army</td>
<td>Yugoslavia (Kosovo)</td>
<td>1998-1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Transitional Council</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>2011-2011</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Measuring Organizational Type

For rebel organizational type to provide useful inferential leverage in generating hypothetical outcomes when groups come to power, it must be measured during the period when they are fighting as rebels. This is a tricky matter when leadership competition is ongoing and policy stances may be shifting, but we can trace the threads of organizational type throughout the rebel period to uncover the process of its development and consolidation. Within a case, we must thus examine 1) who contenders for leadership were; 2) what leader(s) gained hegemony over organizational agenda-setting; 3) the discourse used by leaders, organizational documents, and fighters in the development and presentation of an organizational ideology or set of motives and goals; and 4) how the stated goals and ideas were borne out in practice, or not, in the structuring of the organization and its relations with civilians.

Table 3.2 Coding Rebel Group Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Potential Leaders</th>
<th>• Actors seeking political and military agenda-setting power in the organization and broader anti-government movement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leaders</td>
<td>• Actors controlling organizational agenda</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Discourse         | • Ideals  
|                   | • Stated aims  
|                   | • Policy proposals |
| Practice          | • Organizational structure  
|                   | • Institutions  
|                   | • Use of power and resources  
|                   | • Relations with civilians |

From the founding of the organization, it is thus important to trace the web of leaders or potential leaders. Was there a single dominant leader or group of leaders from the group’s initiation who remained unchallenged and unchanged, or did internal contention arise? What were the interests that different contenders sought to advance? I will examine the historical record and
interview and archival evidence on leaders’ expressed interests, and also what their interests and goals were perceived to be by cadres and outsiders with regard to political and socioeconomic change within society.

The result of this process of leadership formation—and what alternative aims or ideas were forced out\textsuperscript{46}—offer clues as to the intentions of those leaders who consolidate control, but we must also then look at how they seek to implement their agenda. What policies were put into place and how were they carried out on the ground by the organization’s commanders and fighters in relations with civilian communities and attempts to establish rebel governance? Were commanders and fighters acting with the interests of civilians in mind, or did they view civilians only as a resource (or a hindrance) in their quest “to further their interests in profits and to take over the state” (Reno 2015, 266)? It can be difficult to know what exactly happens behind rebel lines or in contested territory during a civil war, yet through use of a variety of primary and secondary sources, we can reconstruct wartime dynamics among leaders, how organizations’ behaved, and what governance institutions were developed.\textsuperscript{47}

I will explore for each group the content and depth of political education of fighters and civilians. For what and whom were recruits told they were fighting? What efforts were made to educate civilians about the organization’s goals and ideals? The degree of political, economic, or social reorganization attempted by a group in areas under its control also serves to reveal preferences. I will examine how organizations administered territory and the extent to which they

\textsuperscript{46} It is possible, however, for organizations to experience some factionalization, but to maintain common goals, as in the case of the FSLN’s split into strategically-differentiated factions in the 1970s. As Kenny (2010, 534) describes, it is possible to have difficulties maintaining the structural integrity of a group as a unified organization, but this can be separate from cohesion, which is “the creation and maintenance of cooperative effort toward the attainment of the organization’s goals.”

\textsuperscript{47} Heger and Jung (2017) and Huang (2016b) have recently compiled cross-national datasets on the types of institutions created by rebel groups.
incorporated local populations in cooperative decision-making, or whether they either imposed their will through force or did not seek to affect preexisting power structures. I will also examine the extent to which organizations attempted to provide social services such as healthcare, education, and social welfare, key social service elements highlighted as common by studies of rebel governance (Heger and Jung 2017; Huang 2016b; Mampilly 2011) and that reveal a concern for the interests of a public outside of the organizations.

State Building and Service Provision

For the dependent variable, we must define and measure state building and service provision. The formation of states and their functioning has long been a focus of political scientists, sociologists, and historians, while a focus on strengthening weak and post-conflict states among the international community and international civil society has led to a burgeoning of examinations of state building strategies and attempts to measure the capacity and activities of states. Drawing on classical theories, Skocpol succinctly defines a state as “a set of administrative, policing, and military organizations headed, and more or less well coordinated by, an executive authority,” with states “first and fundamentally extract[ing] resources from society and deploy[ing] these to create and support coercive and administrative organizations” (1979, 29); these organizations are used to provide the critical public goods of security and administrative-legal order. The state apparatus may act “not only to structure relationships between civil society and public authority in a polity but also to structure many crucial relationships within civil society as well” (Stepan 1978, xii), along the lines of Mann’s (1988) conception of infrastructural power allowing states to work through society. The bases of statehood are thus held to be the extraction and deployment of resources, the provision of security and political order, and the exercise of influence over other
societal actors. In practice, however, juridical statehood may be maintained due to international norms of sovereignty even when the state apparatus largely fails to provide order, does not extract resources, and exercises limited control of society (e.g. Herbst 2000; Rotberg 2003). States that do not or cannot provide these goods within their delimited territory are frequently categorized as ‘failed’ or ‘weak’ (Bates 2008; Rotberg 2003).

How, though, do we go about measuring states and how they are functioning? As Fukuyama (2004b, 21–22) points out, it is important to distinguish between state strength—the “ability of the state to plan and execute policies” within its territory and enforce its will—and state scope—the range of “different functions and goals taken on by governments.” Hanson and Sigman (2013) argue that the central elements of state capacity can be separated into the categories of extraction, coercion, and administration, highlighting the importance of the ability of the state to reach populations and land spread throughout its territory, since state presence and influence are almost always geographically uneven (see Boone 2003; Herbst 2000; O’Donnell 1993; Soifer 2013).

Revenue is fundamental to the ability of states to organize a coercive apparatus and engage in other activities throughout their territory (Bates 2010; Levi 1988; Tilly 1990), and so tax capacity has frequently been utilized as a measure of state strength, one that can also measure the ability of a state to project power within its territory in order to collect taxes (see Lieberman 2002 for a review). Fiscal resources are also, of course, necessary for the supply of public goods. Rebel organizations vary, however, in whether or not they pursue taxation within territory they control, and, as Kasfir (2015, 36) argues, taxation is not necessary for the development of complex structures of civilian administration.\textsuperscript{48} In the post-World War II international order, post-civil war

\textsuperscript{48} See also Wickham-Crowley (2015, 58).
governments (and developing states more generally) are likely to be highly dependent on foreign aid, and so the sources of revenue may not be as important as what the government seeks to accomplish with the funds. More generally, civil wars tend to inhibit the development of fiscal capacity (e.g. Besley and Persson 2008). Furthermore, developing countries, which are most frequently the sites of civil wars, on average have lower taxation rates and capacity compared to more developed countries, regardless of conflict history, and are more likely to rely on easy to collect trade taxes, rather than more effort-intensive income taxes (e.g. Besley and Persson 2014). In the cases of the FSLN, NRA/M, and NPFL, I will therefore focus primarily on the issues of coercion, administration, and the state’s territorial reach, with the latter factoring into the ability of the state to use coercion or to administer the populations within its territory.

Building off of Michael Mann (1988), I separate state capacity into the elements of despotic and infrastructural power. As discussed briefly above, despotic power is the ability of state elites to impose their will upon the population of their territorial state independent of the consent or involvement of civil society—in effect the power of coercion. Infrastructural power, by contrast, is “the capacity of the state to actually penetrate civil society, and the implement…political decisions throughout the realm” (Mann 1988, 113). Infrastructural power involves the ability of the state to work through the population to achieve its gains. Later, Mann clarified first that infrastructural power can be used by the state to exercise despotic power when it wishes to bypass civil society and impose its will—roads facilitate communication and trade, but also the travel of security forces, while censuses and rosters of membership in civil society organizations can be used for targeting repression—and secondly, that infrastructural power can also enable society to exert influence or control over the central state, it is “a two-way street” (1993, 59).49

49 On the interactions of society and state, see especially the work of Joel Migdal (1988, 2001).
Despotic power captures the capacity of the state to impose its authority on populations within its reach. Even in the absence of the development of infrastructural power, despotic power may be used to create order, since, for both rebels (Arjona 2016) and state elites (Huntington 1968; Mann 1988; Olson 1993) order is preferable to disorder, allowing for a more efficient extraction of resources and pursuit of other goals, especially retention of control. I examine how the newly victorious rebels developed and deployed their security apparatuses along four dimensions: structure, strength, territorial coverage, and use. *Structure* captures the organization of security forces in terms of the military, police, intelligence apparatus, and any further special units.50 *Strength* means not only the size but also the technical capabilities of security forces: how many members do they have and how well equipped are they in terms of their materiel and training to carry out the duties assigned to them by their leaders. *Territorial coverage* entails the spread of the security forces throughout the national territory and the ability of the state to use them to project its coercive power across space. Finally, *use* means the ends toward which security forces are employed. While other administrative agents of the state can be employed to try to impose the state’s will, absent societal buy-in and assent, it is only the latent threat of the coercive apparatus that enables enforcement.

Infrastructural power captures the ability of the state to reach across its territory and through society to engage and affect the population to enact state leaders’ aims. One aspect of the state’s reach is physical infrastructure enabling travel and communication, and so I examine efforts to expand transportation and communications infrastructure and how these were targeted or distributed within the national territory. There is also the matter of the state’s human infrastructure: how were government administrative officers distributed throughout the territory and how did the

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50 Divisions within military forces or special units are often created in efforts to counterbalance elements of the security forces and “coup-proof” regimes (De Bruin 2014; Girod 2014; Migdal 1988; Quinlivan 1999).
state incorporate the population, or not, in the process of governing and administration, for example through mass organizations. As Soifer and vom Hau (2008, 226) point out, however, there is a distinction between spatial control and social control, as the presence of state agents in an area does “not automatically translate into the state’s ability to implement policy.” Therefore, the organization of the population is necessary in order to make it simplify society’s complexity and make it legible to the state (Scott 1998), to assert state control over society. We can therefore measure this social component of infrastructural power in part by looking at efforts to increase the administrative capacity of the state through census administration (Lee and Zhang 2016; Soifer 2012a), cadastral surveys, and the development of statistical capacity (J. K. Hanson and Sigman 2013).

It is important analytically and for policy reasons, however, to look not only at the state’s development of infrastructural power, but at the ends toward which it is used: what are the types, quantity, and quality of public goods and services the state aims to provide and succeeds in delivering? Fukuyama (2004b, 21–22) suggests that “We can array the scope of state activities along a continuum that stretches from necessary and important to merely desirable to optional,” with security and order as the most fundamental. While there are many types of public goods that a state may provide, I will restrict my analyses primarily to some of the most fundamental: healthcare and education. These goods are a tangible means for the state to serve its citizens and improve their well-being, and are recognized by the United Nations as basic human rights, though the provision of these goods also can help build allegiance to the regime (La Ferrara and Bates 2001) or to the nation (Darden and Grzymala-Busse 2011), with program content or publicity serving to disseminate explicit or implicit political messaging. The scope of public goods that are delivered does depend in part on the capacity of the state to do so, but many powerful states limit
the scope of their activities and interventions in society, such as the United States (Fortin 2009; Fukuyama 2004b), and a range of states fail to act on their rhetorical promises (e.g. Manion et al. 2017), so public goods provision is therefore a measure of the final output of state intents and actions (Fukuyama 2013). Corruption, a frequently used negative measure of ‘governance,’ is highly difficult to capture, and cross-national measures are likely to be biased (Kurtz and Schrank 2007), but I also discuss in each case the extent to which state revenues are used for public-facing projects in these areas versus for the private interests of those in government.

Table 3.3 Indicators of State Building and Service Provision

| Security Forces and Despotic Power                  | • Structure  
|                                                    | • Strength  
|                                                    | • Territorial coverage  
|                                                    | • Use  
| Physical Infrastructure                             | • Transportation  
|                                                    | • Communications  
| Social Infrastructure and Administrative Power      | • Territorial coverage of government agents  
|                                                    | • Census and survey administration  
|                                                    | • Statistical capacity  
| Public Good and Service Provision                   | • Healthcare  
|                                                    | • Education  

Health and education constitute social welfare goods (Cammett and MacLean 2014). They are among the most basic and essential public services a state can provide, and with civil wars frequently signaling the collapse of health and education systems, their reconstruction is one of the most pressing and vital tasks for a new government to undertake, especially as outcomes in both sectors tend to be intertwined (Albon 2012; Collier et al. 2003; Ghobarah, Huth, and Russett 2003, 2004; Iqbal 2010; Justino 2011; Lai and Thyne 2007; Murray et al. 2002).

In the health sector, I will look at state efforts to improve access to healthcare by increasing the number and location of health facilities and health professionals; other investments in the
health sector; vaccination campaigns; and trends in outcomes related to these efforts. Vaccination campaigns are particularly good examples of the ability of the state to reach populations throughout its territory, and may be accomplished either through direct state implementation using state employees or through mass mobilization, making them a useful measure of administrative capacity and service provision (see Soifer 2012a, 593–94).

In the area of education, I focus on state efforts to improve literacy; to expand access to primary and secondary schooling; the ratio of state versus private provision of schooling; and efforts to expand and/or improve the teaching corps and teacher training. Education builds human capital that can prove useful for economic development, but it also can be used to try to shape a national narrative and identity (Abbott, Soifer, and vom Hau 2017; Darden and Grzymala-Busse 2011) and to enable the state to mobilize citizens and politically engage them through ideological indoctrination.

Less central to the project, I also examine other efforts to improve quality of life and public health. Connection to the electricity grid and the availability of safe drinking water from household taps, public fountains, or wells, for example, represent key infrastructural public goods states often aim to provide and they offer a host of knock-on benefits in terms of education, health, safety, and productivity.

Methods and Case Selection

To test my hypotheses and to analyze the processes through which rebel groups decide upon state building strategies to implement upon victory, I conduct a controlled cross-case comparison. Comparative case studies are ideal for macro-causal analysis when the total number of potential cases is limited, but sufficient to present variation on potential alternative causal
variables (Skocpol and Somers 1980), and the processes to be examined are complex and contingent such that causal inference using statistical analysis is not feasible. Three close, fieldwork-based case studies of rebel groups that won civil wars form the core of the study. Within the case studies, I trace the development of organizational type; the role of organizational type throughout the state building process; what other variables intervened at different points; and how the hypothesized causal variable of goals orientation and ideals interacted with the different contextual settings,\textsuperscript{51} utilizing a process tracing approach (Beach and Pedersen 2012; A. Bennett and Checkel 2014; A. George and Bennett 2005; Hall 2003). This approach also allows for the detailed examination of interaction effects between potential explanatory variables, and close case knowledge combined with a process tracing approach reduces the likelihood of omitted variable bias (A. Bennett and Elman 2006; Mahoney 2000).

I selected the three cases of the FSLN, NPFL, and NRA/M for close examination on the basis of variation in organizational type established \textit{during the period of fighting as rebels},\textsuperscript{52} while maintaining similarity in the background factors of the countries in which these organizations formed and fought and the regimes they toppled to try to control for possible alternative explanations (Slater and Ziblatt 2013), as well as an assessment of research feasibility. Feasibility was assessed on three criteria: 1) the availability of information from primary documents and potential interviewees; 2) my language skills to independently conduct interviews and evaluate sources; and 3) ability to conduct research without danger to myself or informants, or significant government interference.\textsuperscript{53}

\textsuperscript{51} See Falletti and Lynch (2009) on the interaction of causal mechanisms with contextual factors.

\textsuperscript{52} To avoid selecting on the dependent variable (Geddes 1990; G. King, Keohane, and Verba 1994).

\textsuperscript{53} In terms of language skills, I speak and read French, Portuguese, and Spanish. For similar case selection strategies in cross-national comparative case research on civil wars, see Weinstein (2007) and Mampilly (2011).
If civil wars are critical junctures during which the nature of the state and the nature of state-society relations are potentially transformed, then it is necessary not only to examine behavior and events during the war, but also those that may have precipitated the war in the first place or that shaped the type of group that formed to oppose the state. Controlling for these ‘critical antecedents’ (Slater and Simmons 2010), such as prior state strength, history of regimes within the country, or social structure, allows for a more nuanced and clear specification of the workings of causal processes within each case. By breaking down the historical process into the pre-war period, the civil war when the organizations were fighting as rebels, and the period after coming to power,54 and paying explicit attention to the origins and evolution of rebel organizations and important alternative explanatory variables,55 we can examine how divergences in organizational goals and ideologies during wartime and the transition to power affected post-victory institutions and practices.

In each case in the state power period, I focus on the first decade after coming to power, as the legacy of the civil war should mean that during the beginning of this period, structural constraints remain relaxed, the organization may enjoy significant popular legitimacy for toppling the prior government, and there is thus wide scope for implementing transformative programs, if desired. In the NPFL, however, its leader, Charles Taylor, was forced from power after only six years, and so the window of analysis is abbreviated. Given that victorious rebel organizations tend to endure in power for long periods (Levitsky and Way 2013; Lyons 2016b), the initial period after taking power is likely to be when group type and the experience of fighting as rebels holds the

54 I do not use the term “post-war” period, since in most cases of rebel victory, a new civil war or international emerges soon after the assumption of state power (see e.g. Walt 1996).

55 Approximating Lieberman’s (2001) institutional origins and institutional change approaches to comparative historical analysis.
most influence over policy and behavior, with the goals of the organization and its leaders potentially changing over time. Some opportunistic organizations may begin with programmatic pretensions (Mampilly 2011), while the ideological adherence of many programmatic groups diminishes over increasing time in power (R. Lowenthal 1970; Thaler 2012). Leaders’ priorities also tend to change the longer they stay in power (Bunce 1981; Chiozza and Choi 2003), and so in this initial period we should be able to see potential effects of decisions made during the rebel period and to separate them from shifts in goals endogenous to holding power.

Though at times there was factionalization within each of the FSLN, NPFL, and NRA, as rebels they all represented vanguard movements, with relatively strong horizontal ties within the organizations but more limited vertical ties to the population, helping control for a potentially important source of variation (Staniland 2014). The movements also all arose in countries ruled by neopatrimonial authoritarian regimes with poor records of service delivery, though in each case there was a precedent for prior regimes seeking to build greater state influence throughout the territory and society. All three movements sought to gain control of the central state, which, according to Mampilly’s (2011) theory, should have led them to exhibit similar patterns of rebel governance, and thus the divergences observed during the civil wars on this count are not explained. All three organizations experienced tensions in terms of fragmentation and attempts at unification within the anti-government armed opposition during the civil wars. The organizations all enjoyed some foreign support and training, but were unambiguously controlled by domestic national leaders, rather than serving as proxies for foreign powers. All three movements came to power in contexts of political, economic, and infrastructural collapse, inheriting enormous tasks of reconstruction. All three also had to wage new civil wars, this time as the incumbent, very soon after taking power.
There are some key differences across the cases that will be interrogated further while comparing them. The most glaring is that the NPFL came to power through a political victory, rather than outright military victory like the FSLN and NRA/M. NPFL leader Charles Taylor and the NPFL’s political party, the National Patriotic Party (NPP), won internationally-organized elections in 1997 after the signing of a peace accord, yet this victory came in a context in which the NPFL remained the most powerful military actor in Liberia, Taylor threatened to return to war if the NPFL did not win electorally, NPFL fighters intimidated opposition candidates and supporters outside of Monrovia, and many voters thus voted for the NPFL due to its capacity for violence in an effort to avert a return to war and to see what Taylor would do with the executive power he so desperately coveted (e.g. Harris 1999; Lyons 1998). The NPFL and NPP also did not represent a preexisting political party or social movement, and so their legitimacy as political actors was based in their military rebellion. Thus, while the NPFL may not have seized power militarily, it was the organization’s coercive power that led it to control the government.

The organizations also all fought in different regions and different time periods. Central America, East Africa, and West Africa, are, of course, full of differences. Within their regions, however, Nicaragua, Uganda, and Liberia were each among the poorest, most underdeveloped, and most mismanaged countries, if not the worst in these regards. The countries all had histories of strong foreign influence in their politics, with both Nicaragua and Liberia falling under the heavy cloak of US influence for most of the 20th century, while Uganda emerged from British colonialism and experienced a Tanzanian military intervention in the late 1970s.

Temporally, the FSLN fought, came to power, and began governing at the height of the Cold War in the 1970s and 1980s. The NRA/M’s leaders had been involved in military opposition movements against the Ugandan government throughout the 1970s, but only came to power in the
mid-1980s, as the Cold War was beginning to wane. The NPFL emerged from dissident opposition movements active in the 1970s and the core of its initial military forces had survived a failed coup attempt in 1985, but the organization did not begin its fight until late 1989, as the Cold War was reaching its end, coming into government in the mid-1990s in a unipolar world. The world historical context, while a powerful explanation for what sources of funding many governments of developing states enjoyed and the prospects for foreign intervention in their politics, does not necessarily explain differences in the ideals and aims pursued by rebel leaders and whether they were oriented toward public or private interests, either ‘in the bush’ or in power. I will consider this issue in more depth later, but it is worth pointing out that more programmatic rebel organizations came to power in Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Rwanda around the same time the NPFL was fighting in Liberia, while the end of the Cold War also did not mean the end of new leftist rebellions, as Nepal’s Maoists fought a relatively successful civil war from 1996-2006.

Bearing in mind potential differences among the case study contexts, the comparison of these three cases will illuminate the pathways from group formation and goal setting to victory to policy formulation once in power, examining sources of variation to test the posited organizational theory. In the conclusion of the study, I will also consider how group type may evolve and ideological commitments change or wane over the course of time in power, as many programmatic organizations become more opportunistic and leaders more personalistic, an affliction commonly noted, for instance, among the liberation movements of Southern Africa (Melber 2002; R. Southall 2013), as well as in the practices and extended presidencies of Yoweri Museveni in Uganda and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua.

Some readers may have concerns that the national and world-historical contexts in which all of these rebel organizations emerged overdetermined their organizational type, with
circumstances favoring the primacy of leaders at one point on the programmatic-opportunistic spectrum. To attempt to address this issue, I also include in the conclusion a short comparison of the three independent rebel organizations that developed during the Angolan war of independence against Portugal. The *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola* (MPLA), *Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola* (FNLA), and *União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola* (UNITA) all took up armed struggle around the same time in the early 1960s, facing a common enemy within the same territory, yet their leaders took the organizations down very different paths. While independence was a common end sought by all three organizations, their other goals and ideas diverged. I also conduct a brief case study of the Taliban in Afghanistan as an example of a case of victory and government by an Islamist rebel group.

**Data and Sources**

Data on the FSLN, NRA/M, and NPFL draw on a mix of interviews and archival sources from 16 months of fieldwork conducted over the course of five years, as well as information from documentary and secondary sources. Interview details are listed in Appendix B. Given that statistical capacity usually must be rebuilt after a civil war and there are gaps in data collection, it is difficult to conduct subnational statistical analyses of state-building and service provision after rebel victory. I try, where possible, however, to provide descriptive statistics and survey evidence collected at the time to complement qualitative findings. Interviews and documents from the time periods under examination allow for detailed analysis of the processes of decision making, policy formulation, and implementation among top-level leaders within organizations and how these were perceived by their subordinates, civil society members, and outside actors. Full details on fieldwork are provided in Appendix A.
For each case, interviews sought to garner factual and perceptual information about organizational history, ideology, policies, and practices from military and political members of the organizations, non-members who acted as government officials, and civil society members. In archives, I examined documents from the organizations, published speeches, internal and external periodicals, and documents from foreign governments and non-governmental or intergovernmental organizations. This primary research was supported and checked by the existing secondary literature on each case to avoid relying solely on the organizations’ own presentations of facts, which may be biased.

Archival research on the FSLN case was conducted in Nicaragua over the course of six months in five trips between 2013 and 2017, and in the United States in 2014. In summer 2013, I conducted exploratory, off the record interviews with former combatants and academics and visited different parts of the country to learn about their experiences during the insurrection that brought the Sandinistas to power and under the revolutionary government. In Managua, I began examining the collections of the Instituto de Historia de Nicaragua y Centroamérica (IHNCA) at the Universidad Centroamericana (sources are denoted in the bibliography by ‘IHNCA’ or ‘IHCA’ and a call number). On subsequent trips, I continued to mine the materials available at IHNCA. I was able to read through FSLN documents, publications put out by the military and government agencies, memoirs of Sandinista officials and combatants, books by Nicaraguan and foreign scholars and journalists, and national newspapers. Unfortunately, the military historical archives have remained closed to outside researchers during the time I have been working in Nicaragua. I also tried to gather information from the national statistical agency, the Instituto Nacional de Información de Desarrollo, but requested historical data were not delivered, and so I attempted to gather national and subnational statistics where possible from sources at IHNCA and secondary
sources. I conducted 19 interviews with 18 subjects in Nicaragua in summer 2015 and two further interviews were conducted in spring 2017, speaking with former FSLN political leaders, government ministers, and military officers, as well as members of opposition groups, civil society, and academia. I selected interviewees purposively for the roles they had played in the FSLN and government, or for their sectoral expertise. I interviewed former members of the FSLN Directorate (the organization’s highest body), former top military generals, and former ministers of health and education. Historical FSLN leaders currently involved in the government proved unresponsive or unwilling to meet for interviews. Some perspectives are thus missing from interview evidence, though this should be ameliorated by the use of archival and secondary sources that provide the statements and views of persons such as Daniel Ortega, Omar Cabezas, and Edén Pastora.

In the summer of 2014, I looked at the FSLN case through the archival record available in the United States. Given that documents included in archives are necessarily only a sample of those that were originally produced and that the selection of documents included and available is often shaped by political and social concerns (R. H. Brown and Davis-Brown 1998; Burton 2006; Schwartz and Cook 2002), I wanted to see how the FSLN and the government it formed looked from the perspective of an ‘opponent’ and what documents or views might be present in the US, but unavailable in Nicaragua. I spent two months examining documents in the archives of the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, which contained many documents produced by the FSLN and its domestic opponents in Nicaragua, and also examined documents from the National Security Archive, based at George Washington University. These declassified documents from the US State Department, Department of Defense, and intelligence agencies provided an external view of the FSLN and its activities.
In Liberia, I interviewed 102 respondents in 54 interview sessions in the fall of 2015, speaking with former NPFL military officers and government officials, opposition leaders, journalists, and civil society members. The preference of many of the former military officers was for group interviews, though these were only conducted when suggested and agreed to by interviewees. While all non-military interviewees were willing to speak on the record, security and secrecy were clear concerns expressed by many former military interviewees, and so I made the decision not to ask any of these interviewees to state their names while recording or writing notes and have retained their anonymity in the text, reporting only their military positions. This is in line with other interview-based works on Liberia’s civil wars, which omit the names of interviewees who were combatants (Gerdes 2013; Lidow 2016). Given Liberia’s political environment and continuing discussions about the possibility of a war crimes or human rights tribunal being established in the country, omitting names from recordings also acts as a safeguard against future use of the interviews for attempted prosecutions.

The documentary record in Liberia was largely destroyed over the course of the civil war, and so I rely mainly on documents from NPFL leader and former Liberian president Charles Taylor’s war crimes trial before the Special Court for Sierra Leone, declassified US government documents, and news and secondary sources. Through interviewees and other contacts, I was able to examine some rare publications from the 1990s, including a book of NPFL leader Charles Taylor’s speeches during the early years of his presidency (C. Taylor n.d.).

Archival research in Uganda was conducted from January to June 2016, but political tensions around the Ugandan presidential and parliamentary elections meant that only five people were willing to grant interviews during my time there. Evidence from these interviews is used only for brief quotations and examples to support archival or secondary source data. For archival
material, the libraries of the Centre for Basic Research (CBR) and the Makerere Institute for Social Research possessed large collections of books published in Uganda, including collections of NRA/M documents and speeches, as well as reports and working papers difficult to find outside of the country. The CBR also has an archive of newspaper clippings from Uganda’s major newspapers, organized into folders by subject, from about 1989 to the present. I examined the collections on the NRA, the NRM, the National Resistance Council/Parliament, Resistance Councils/Local Councils, education, health, and human rights for the period of 1989 through 1996, mainly from the independent Monitor and government-run New Vision. For newspapers from 1986 to 1989, I visited the Makerere University Library (MUL), paging through full issues of newspapers from this period looking for relevant articles, with the New Vision having the most complete and relevant collection. Additionally, at the Parliamentary Library, I read through transcripts from 1986 through 1996 of the sessions of the National Resistance Council, the legislature established by the NRA/M when they took power, and the Parliament, which took over as the legislature in 1996.

Shadow case study data come from the existing secondary source literature, and, where possible, primary documents from governments and international organizations available online.

Conclusion

This chapter has specified the key concepts needed to explain variation in state building and service provision policy making and implementation among rebels who win civil wars. I have made the case for conducting a comparative study of multiple cases of victorious rebel organizations and described the case selection process and data gathering. I now turn to the development of the three main groups under study, the FSLN, NPFL, and NRA/M, and how their
organizational types were consolidated over the course of their rebellions, shaping their subsequent state building and service provision efforts.
CHAPTER FOUR

From Idealism to Action: The FSLN in Nicaragua

“This was truly a revolution: the annihilation of the armed forces, the disintegration of national institutions, the transformation of institutions, changes in the leadership of the government, of ministers, of everything. The disappearance of parliament. The state was gone, there were only buildings. But the institutions needed to be reestablished, reformed, and given content to work with. At the same time, we had to contend with our limitations and the weight of the history of the country.”

– Lea Guido (N-7)

This chapter examines the case of the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN), a Nicaraguan guerrilla group that, after years of clandestine struggle, took power in 1979 at the vanguard of a broad popular uprising. I argue that the FSLN worked to build cooperative relationships with civilians during its period as a guerrilla movement and once in power developed policies that sought the expansion of state influence territorially and throughout society, a great degree of political inclusiveness, and the delivery of social and economic benefits to the broader population. This was in response to the ideology and organizational ethic that emerged among the leaders of the group and that they institutionalized in the organization. I first discuss the origins of the FSLN and the structures and character of the Nicaraguan state prior to 1979, before turning to the FSLN’s motives and development of plans for state structures and governance in the event of taking power, followed by the implementation of plans and the formulation of policies after power was seized in 1979.

Though scholars during the 1980s and early 1990s conducted valuable research on the processes of state building and development under the rule of the FSLN (see especially the volumes edited by Walker 1982, 1985, 1991a), the political polarization of this era meant that research was frequently colored by political sympathies, and there has been limited reexamination
of the FSLN case in comparative perspective.\textsuperscript{56} There is thus significant space for renewed exploration of the FSLN and the formulation and implementation of policies under its rule.

**The Nicaraguan Context**

Central America’s largest country territorially, Nicaragua’s was long at the whims of great powers, with the United States intervening economically and militarily in Nicaragua with regularity throughout the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, while Great Britain maintained influence on Nicaragua’s ‘Atlantic Coast’ (Gobat 2005; Walker and Wade 2011).\textsuperscript{57} Following independence from Spain, Nicaragua mirrored other Latin American countries in its post-independence political divide between the frequently warring Liberal and Conservative parties, who would often seek external support or intervention. State strength remained ephemeral, with control held instead by various oligarchical families, until the 1860s (Holden 2004, 80–83). Three subsequent decades of rule by Conservative presidents brought relative stability (Cruz 2002), and after a war from 1890-1893, Liberal leader José Santos Zelaya built on the Conservatives’ foundation to centralize power and build out the state (Holden 2004, 84–88). Zelaya’s government sought to extend Nicaragua’s influence across the national territory to the Atlantic Coast, built new transit and communications links, and aimed to develop public education and other services. Zelaya’s state building desires in Nicaragua’s east, however, clashed with US commercial and strategic interests, contributing to his downfall. US Marines intervened in 1909 on the Atlantic Coast and the US gave assistance to Zelaya’s opponents, who successfully toppled him in a rebellion at the end of 1909.

\textsuperscript{56} See Kruijt (2008) for a recent comparison of the FSLN with other, less successful Central American guerrilla groups. Mosinger (2017) examines networks of recruitment and organizational cohesion and fragmentation within the FSLN during its period fighting as rebels.

\textsuperscript{57} While the eastern coast of Nicaragua is along the Caribbean Sea, and the region is sometimes called the ‘Caribbean Coast,’ I follow the historical local convention and refer to the region as the Atlantic Coast.
US Marines came back for good in 1912, propping up the Conservative governments that succeeded Zelaya, which “depended almost completely on the United States for their continued hold on power” (Holden 2004, 87–88). Liberal opposition remained peaceful until 1926, when, in response to a coup by a hardline Conservative general, Liberals launched a rebellion with support from Mexico’s revolutionary government (Holden 2004, 88–89). The arrival of Marine reinforcements in 1927 marked a new phase in the conflict, and most Liberal forces accepted a peace agreement in 1928. Liberal general Augusto César Sandino, however, refused to participate and surrender his arms. Sandino began a nationalist rebellion against the Marines and their Nicaraguan allies, with the Marines organizing and training a new Nicaraguan military, the Guardia Nacional (GN, or National Guard) (Millett 1977; Schroeder 1993; K. Walter 1993). Sandino’s forces managed to evade capture, harassing the Marine occupiers and leading to an eventual US withdrawal in 1933. The occupation’s legacy lived on, however, as the Guardia commander, Anastasio Somoza García, assassinated Sandino in 1934 as he was leaving negotiations. Somoza seized power from 1936, beginning 43 years of control of Nicaragua by the Somoza family. Elder son Luis Somoza Debayle took power following his father’s assassination in 1956, and younger son Anastasio Somoza Debayle replaced his brother after Luis died of a heart attack in 1967, ruling until the regime fell in 1979 at the hands of the FSLN

The FSLN: From Rebels to Rulers

The Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) began as a guerrilla organization in 1961 fighting against the corrupt, sultanistic dictatorial dynasty of the Somoza family. After years of relatively unsuccessful low-level insurgent warfare, the FSLN began to make headway against government forces in the late 1970s after factions within the organization were united and
the group began to focus more on popular mobilization. The FSLN seized power in 1979 at the vanguard of a broad coalition of popular groups and opposition actors, quickly consolidating its control of the new government. Guided across both periods by an ideology of Sandinismo that combined elements of Marxism-Leninism, nationalist anti-imperialism, and liberation theology (e.g. Reed 2002; Vanden 1982) the FSLN began restructuring the state and implementing plans for social and economic transformation that saw the projection of state power to regions that had previously been neglected, especially the Atlantic Coast (Dennis 1981, 1993; Vilas 1988). FSLN state building was challenged, however, by domestic rebellion and foreign interference in the Contra war of the 1980s, with the FSLN ultimately losing power in free elections in 1990 following a peace agreement.

**Group Origins, Leadership, and Rebel Organization**

The FSLN’s 1961 founding followed several years of student organizing and protest by its early leaders. The organization’s primary motivation was the toppling of the dynastic dictatorship of the Somoza family. The Somozas’ rule was characterized by repression, corruption, and close relations with the United States (e.g. Booth 1982; Gobat 2005; Millett 1977; Walker and Wade 2011). The regime provided limited social services, with most provision centered around the capital, Managua, and other cities, and government presence outside of urban areas was only in the form of coercive forces; the eastern half of the country, the Atlantic Coast region, was largely ignored (Millett 1977).

Protest against the Somozas had been limited, but after the assassination of Somoza García in 1956, a new generation of dissidents was invigorated. Among this generation were Carlos Fonseca Amador and Tomás Borge Martínez, two students who became founders of the *Frente*
Sandinista de Liberación Nacional, with Fonseca becoming the group’s chief ideologue and figurehead, while Borge was the only founder to survive to see victory in 1979. Arising out of student movements, in 1961, Fonseca, Borge and other young activists founded the Frente de Liberación Nacional. In 1963, after advocacy from Fonseca, the group latched on to the image of Sandino as a nationalist liberator who had fought on behalf of exploited Nicaraguans against dictatorship and imperialism, adding Sandinista to the name (e.g. Zimmermann 2001). The year 1963 also saw the group’s first efforts at armed struggle against the regime, which ended in failure, as did a series of later offensives during the 1960s.

Early FSLN communiqués were focused primarily on the armed struggle itself, but elements of the group’s ideology and identity began to form and be expressed over the course of the 1960s. A 1960 communiqué from one of the FSLN’s predecessor organizations discussed the need for both armed struggle and the development of popular support, as well as rejecting terrorism and violence against civilians or prisoners (FSLN 1960). Fonseca, in prison in Managua in 1964, described an ideology drawing on the Marxist identification with the impoverished and repressed masses, liberalism’s emphasis on individual rights, and social Christianity’s popular appeal and calls for social change (Fonseca 1964). These strands were combined into sandinismo, the ideological basis for the FSLN throughout its fight and once in power (Gilbert 1988; Nolan 1984; Reed 2002; B. E. Wright 1995), creating a “revolutionary ethic” that drove FSLN members to work for the benefit of the many over that of the few and to largely avoid corruption and human rights abuses (N-1, Dora Maria Téllez; N-4, Joaquin Cuadra; N-6 and N-10, Hugo Torres; N-13, Luis Carrión). The FSLN’s members were socialized, through political education, into a culture of self-sacrifice, with guerrilla commander Javier Pichardo saying, “We had the idea that we would

58 With the Marxist-Leninist component being reduced in influence with the rise of the Terceristas in the FSLN split in the late 1970s (see below).
die along the way…we knew the people would triumph, but that we would not see it” (Baltodano 1999).

The early political development of the FSLN culminated in the release in 1969 of the organization’s “Historical Program,” developed through a process of dialogue and consensus among the organization’s several dozen members at the time (N-18, Oscar René Vargas). This document maintains the organization’s primary focus on the military defeat of the dictatorship, but it also begins to lay out a broader plan for the “for the establishment of a social system that liquidates the exploitation and misery that our people have historically suffered.” The Program emphasizes individual rights and popular participation in politics, as well as outlining specific policy ideas, including a campaign to quickly eliminate illiteracy and improving access to education; reducing unemployment; providing free medical care to the population, building hospitals and clinics throughout the national territory, and undertaking campaigns to eliminate endemic diseases and prevent epidemics; ending corruption; integrating the Atlantic Coast region with the rest of the country; and creating a new military with better discipline and strong relations with the population (FSLN 1969). These themes and program ideas were largely maintained over the course of the next decade as the FSLN survived militarily and began to grow and push toward victory in 1979, and they continued to strongly influence policy once the organization took power. As FSLN guerrilla commander and later general Hugo Torres stated, “this was not an armed group fighting only to take power, but to advance the interests of the people and the working class in general” (N-6).

In the 1970s, the FSLN began to have more military success and to develop closer ties to the population, especially in the aftermath of the devastating 1972 earthquake that destroyed Managua and was followed by the large-scale robbery of reconstruction funds by the Somoza
family and their cronies. The organization developed urban guerrilla cells and support networks, but the majority of forces in the first half of the 1970s were located in rural areas, where the FSLN from 1970 on enjoyed greater success in recruiting peasants, with leader Henry Ruiz saying, “We had found the way to recruit the campesino; we had taken away his distrust of the city man” (Booth 1982, 140–41). The group also engaged in a high-profile hostage taking in 1974 at a party thrown by acolytes of Somoza Debayle, though they were noted for their good treatment of the hostages and in their list of demands included not only the freeing of prisoners and money for the FSLN, but also improved conditions and wages for workers; similarly, after taking hostage members of the National Assembly in 1978, the FSLN commandos’ list of demands included the accession of the government to the demands of protesting health workers, demonstrating solidarity and attempts to ally with the working class (FSLN 1978b; Torres 2005, 116, 417; also mentioned in N-4, J. Cuadra; N-6, Torres). There were the beginnings of dissent within the organization, however, over the best tactics and strategy to topple Somoza Debayle. As FSLN guerrilla and later Chief of the General Staff of the air force Ricardo Pereira saw it, “We could not keep going in the mountains. If you kill 100 guardias in the mountains, no one knows about it. If you kill one guardia in Managua or León, everyone finds out” (N-11).

Growing success in popular mobilization in the cities and the integration of new cadres in the organization’s ranks as the decade progressed led to a split of the FSLN into three ‘tendencies’ around 1975 and 1976, with the organization divided between the Popular Protracted War (GPP) tendency of Tomás Borge and Henry Ruiz, which sought to maintain the foco strategy of rural guerrilla warfare developed by Che Guevara; the Proletarian tendency led by Jaime Wheelock Román, Luis Carrión Cruz, and Roberto Huembes that emphasized the mobilization of workers and joining the urban and rural fronts in the fight and strongly endorsed the creation of a socialist
economic system; and the Insurrectional or ‘Tercerista’ tendency led by brothers Daniel and Humberto Ortega Saavedra and Eduardo Contreras, which focused on pragmatism, seeking to develop alliances with civil society organizations to lay the ground for a broad popular insurrection and advancing a more moderate economic program of a mixed economic system to attract international support. The split was primarily about tactical differences over the best strategy for the defeat of the dictatorship, but ideological issues and interpersonal leadership disputes also played a role (e.g. Booth 1982; Mosinger 2017; Nolan 1984). Fonseca, the FSLN’s leading ideologue and with historical legitimacy as a founder of the organization, was killed in combat in November 1976 after returning to Nicaragua from Cuba, which further opened the door to ideological debate.

There was still significant coordination among the tendencies, and lower and mid-level cadres retained friendships and ties with their compañeros in other tendencies (N-6, Torres). These differences were not fully resolved, but they were smoothed over in early 1979 when Fidel Castro, who had been primarily supporting the foquista GPP, began to trust the Terceristas more and pushed the leaders of the tendencies to unify in order to finally topple Somoza. The regime had been weakened by the growing success of the insurrectional strategy in urban areas, falling domestic support after the 1978 assassination of journalist Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, and declining US support with the Carter administration’s emphasis on human rights. The unification and a quick push to victory were also seen as necessary to avoid any US efforts to intervene unilaterally or

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59 Dora María Téllez says the three tendencies had disagreements in how they “conceptualized the situation of Somocismo—if it was strong, if it was weak, if it was in crisis, or if it was consolidating itself” (N-1).

60 Barbosa Miranda (2009, 309) cites Camilo Ortega Saavedra, the late brother of Daniel and Humberto, arguing in 1977 for continued unity among intermediate and mid-level cadres to maintain the operational capacity of the FSLN.
through the Organization of American States, which might settle the war by installing a new
government that would perpetuate “somocismo without Somoza” (FSLN 1979).61

The political program and goals of the organization had not changed significantly since the
formulation of the 1969 historical program. The all-consuming nature of the war in the face of a
brutal counterinsurgency campaign by the Somoza regime (on repression in this period see Fragoso
and Artucio 1980; IACHR 1978) meant it was difficult to create more concrete plans for
administration in the event of victory or to consolidate liberated areas in which to implement ideas
or experiment with governance (N-1, Téllez; N-13, Carrión; N-15, Jaime Wheelock; N-16, Victor
Hugo Tinoco).62 FSLN student leaders, especially in León, had worked to organize residents of
local poor neighborhoods to advocate for improved health services and the provision of public
water and electricity, and in other cities, especially Managua, the population had begun to be
organized into neighborhood committees to support the insurrection (N-6 Hugo Torres). These
relatively limited experiences, though, were the closest the FSLN had come to implementing its
social and administrative vision prior to the final stages of the insurrection. As the war progressed
between 1977 and 1979, the insurrectional strategy advanced by the Proletarios and Terceristas
paid dividends as the ranks of fighters and collaborators of the FSLN rapidly expanded and broad
sectors of civil society aligned themselves with the FSLN against Somoza in a “multiclass
coalition” (Everingham 1996), while the Terceristas forged strong links with the governments of
Panama, Venezuela, and Costa Rica to gain material aid and diplomatic support.

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61 N-4, J. Cuadra; see also LeoGrande (1979).

62 The FSLN was, in fact, apprehensive about controlling territory before there was sufficient political education or
popular support, with Orlando Loaiza saying that “The people need to participate to create real change. It is not
enough to liberate territory” (García Márquez 1979, 163).
The Terceristas’ efforts to broaden the base of FSLN support had their most concrete effects on policy formulation through the formation of the *Grupo de los Doce* (Group of Twelve), an informal committee of prominent members of Nicaraguan society from backgrounds in business, education, the Catholic Church, medicine, and the law, some of whom were secretly FSLN members, who joined together to issue a proclamation in support of the FSLN in 1977 at the Terceristas’ behest, and who worked to organize middle and upper-class opposition to Somoza to support the regime’s overthrow. These efforts led to the formation of the *Frente Amplio Opositor* (FAO), or Broad Opposition Front, in 1978, which issued a Program of Government calling for the end of the dictatorship, political reforms, and protection of civil liberties, but also for the addressing of some of the country’s social ills, for instance agrarian reform, tackling illiteracy and “urgent action to solve the problems of health and welfare in the cities and countryside in all related to social security, medical and hospital care, and maternal and child health” (Envío team 1984). This mirrored many of the concerns of the FSLN’s Historical Program. The Terceristas themselves retained the principles of the Historical Program in their own policy discourse, with communiqués in 1978 describing among the reasons for the FSLN’s revolutionary struggle: the organization of a more democratic government and non-repressive security forces; the provision of health and education to all; provision of water and electricity for all; and the integration and development of the Atlantic Coast (FSLN 1978a, 1978c, 1978d).

In 1979, the FSLN began making greater military advances than ever before, striking around the Pacific and Central regions of the country and building up underground forces in the country’s major cities, yet political planning remained secondary to the prosecution of the war until June and July 1979, when the defeat of the Somoza regime began to appear not only possible, but imminent. Working with the Group of Twelve, the FSLN in June 1979 organized in Costa Rica
the Junta of the Government of National Reconstruction (JGRN), a five-person transitional government composed of FSLN National Directorate (DN) member Daniel Ortega, leftist activists Sergio Ramírez, from the Group of Twelve, and Moises Hassan (both secretly FSLN members), and more conservative civic opposition leaders Violeta Barrios de Chamorro and Alfonso Robelo. The JGRN began to develop plans for a political transition and the organization of a post-Somoza government, releasing a Program of Government on July 9 outlining plans and memberships for the executive, legislative, and judicial institutions (JGRN 1979).

In July, FSLN forces took control of several cities, including León and Acoyapa, but plans for administration were relatively limited. Efforts focused on establishing order, ensuring the availability of food and water, beginning to meet people’s desires from the restoration of public services, and organizing local governments, usually through committees of trusted collaborators, so that FSLN forces could continue onwards toward Managua and the final defeat of the regime (N-1, Téllez; N-13, Carrión; N-16, Tinoco). In León, Dora María Téllez and her forces, “First organized civil defense committees. Then the Junta de Gobierno named Juntas Municipales that functioned like mayors,” with commanders and the committees working with communities on food and child care, and then seeking to restore electricity and water service (N-1). The rapid collapse of the Somoza regime and the disintegration of its security apparatus in July 1979, however, caught everyone by surprise (e.g. Kinzer 2007, 72–73), and on July 19, the JGRN and the FSLN Directorate were thrust into government and the task of organizing and administering a state and society ruined by years of dictatorship and war.

63 See also Kruijt (2008, 100).
The immediate task for the new government was establishing order. Cities were in ruins and filled with thousands of armed men and women, many of whom had only joined the insurrection in its last few weeks and thus had not been subjected to the discipline of FSLN training or fully subordinated to the control of FSLN commanders, creating a situation of near anarchy (N-1 Dora María Téllez; N-16 Victor Hugo Tinoco; Borge 1980, 86). FSLN leaders were warned of the importance of engaging in political education of all new recruits (Chamorro 1979), but while the guerrilla columns of the FSLN comprised approximately 2,800 cadres in 1979, almost 15,000 Nicaraguans, largely young men, joined the fight in their own cities or on the march to Managua (Kruijt 2008, 35). Political education received a heavy emphasis, however, during the regularization of militia forces and once fighters were organized into the new EPS (N-10, Torres; Barricada 1979a; Dirección Política E.P.S. 1984). There were also continued worries about hardcore Somocista holdouts and the threat posed by external enemies, such as the United States and Central American neighbors, unhappy with the FSLN’s “revolutionary steps” (Barricada 1979a). Once order had been imposed and the armed masses had either been disarmed or incorporated into the new security forces in the military, police, or militias, the broader tasks of governing could begin in earnest.

The final collapse of the Somoza regime and Guardia Nacional came as a bit of a surprise, but the FSLN had the benefit of being able to build off its historical program and the group’s “relative ideological coherence” (N-21, Alejandro Bendaña). Public hopes were high and transformation and rebuilding were the themes of the FSLN’s public pronouncements and policy planning. The new FSLN daily newspaper, Barricada, crowed immediately after the takeover that “This military and political victory of the FSLN has brought our people a true revolution that must
transform—gradually but surely—the social, political, and economic structures of our country” (Barricada 1979h), emphasizing that these were changes “for the benefit of the people” (Barricada 1979a).

The members of the DN and JGRN spent several long days working together to decide the personnel who would be named to head new and preexisting ministries and government institutions. The JGRN was heavily involved in most decision making, though the FSLN had resolved to keep control over decisions relating to ministries that it deemed “strategic” and too important to cede any control over: defense, the Ministerio del Interior (MINT), and the Ministerio de Desarrollo Agropecuario y Reforma Agraria (MIDINRA), as well as significant influence over the Ministry of External Cooperation (N-5, Edmundo Jarquín; N-13, Carrión; N-15, Wheelock). Within the FSLN-controlled institutions, posts were distributed in large part on a basis of creating parity among the Tendencies and ensuring that each Tendency had influence over areas in which it had particular competence: Humberto Ortega and the Terceristas, who had developed the insurrectional strategy that won the war, had hegemony in defense and the new military, the Ejército Popular Sandinista (EPS). Tomás Borge and the GPP, who had long experience in clandestine action and guerrilla warfare, dominated the MINT and efforts for internal security. Jaime Wheelock from the Proletarios, who had an academic background focused on Nicaragua’s economic development, took charge of MIDINRA and the agrarian reform program. Cuban advisors provided assistance, especially in organizing the security forces, but they had less influence in other areas and “respected Nicaraguan autonomy” (N-21, Bendaña), despite US beliefs that Nicaragua under the FSLN would be a Cuban puppet.

64 The division of posts based on competencies and parity helped reduce intertendency tensions and ensure a smoother transition, with Alejandro Bendaña describing the distribution process as characterized by “coherence and collectivism” (N-21).
Government institutions were largely created and rebuilt from the ground up,65 with the FSLN worrying about the loyalties or effectiveness of bureaucratic holdovers from the Somoza era (N-21, Bendaña), though a few lower-level functionaries who had collaborated with the FSLN were retained in the new MINT (Valle 1984). The FSLN cadres given new posts in these institutions did not necessarily have technical training for their new roles, nor were they necessarily certain as to why they were named to their positions, but they quickly adapted and learned on the job. For instance, Victor Hugo Tinoco (N-16) had no background in diplomacy or foreign affairs, yet he was named ambassador to the United Nations. Ricardo Pereira (N-11), with an academic training in psychology, wound up working to organize the new air force. Lea Guido (N-7) was informed on July 17, when entering Managua, that she would be named Minister of Social Welfare and had to ask, “But what is social welfare?” Throughout the government, hundreds of Sandinistas were forced to learn on the go in their new roles. Posts in other ministries, such as the Ministry of Health (MINSA), the Ministry of Education (MINED), and the Ministry of Social Welfare were initially assigned based on technical competence and the idea of continuing to ensure national unity (N-15, Wheelock; N-16, Tinoco). While initial suspicions were suppressed and many lower and mid-level functionaries who had served in these social ministries and other ‘non-strategic’ institutions in the Somoza period and returned to work under the new government, this produced culture clashes at times (N-11, Pereira; N-13, Carrión), and the FSLN planned to replace them over time as a new generation of trained bureaucrats and professionals emerged from the reformed and now more accessible university system (Cabezas Lacayo 1980, 9–10).

The JGRN and DN moved quickly to put its broad preexisting plans into action in key areas of building the power of the new state and expanding the scope of social service delivery:

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reorganizing the security and intelligence forces; seizing lands belonging to the Somoza family and associates and redistributing them; and launching major education and health campaigns, efforts that will be detailed in the next section. The DN also made clear its plans to engage in serious efforts to integrate the Atlantic Coast with the rest of the country politically, economically, and militarily, with Carlos Núñez promising that the FSLN in government would not visit and value the costeños only to demand their votes, as occurred in the Somoza era (Barricada 1979q).

The new government had a clear orientation toward public interests, with JGRN member Alfonso Robelo stating that there was a need for changes in orientation of private sector and public spending from “cold utility” in the direction of social benefit and a “communitarian spirit” (Barricada 1979e).

The desired political pluralism of the revolution began to erode, however, with the resignations of Chamorro and Robelo from the JGRN in 1980 over complaints of excessive DN control of policy and arguments that the FSLN was pushing the new government in a more leftist, centralized direction than they and others in the civic opposition had initially envisioned (Booth 1982; Walker and Wade 2011; Weaver and Barnes 1991). This corresponded with the rise of initial peasant resistance to FSLN policies, especially the agrarian reform program, in the center of the country (Bendaña 1991; T. C. Brown 2001; CIPRES 1991; Horton 1998; MIDINRA 1984); conflicts with indigenous leaders on the Atlantic Coast (Dennis 1993; Hale 1994); and the efforts of the US Central Intelligence Agency and their Argentine allies to organize former Guardia members into an armed opposition force, which would become the military organizational base of the ‘contras’ (see e.g. Kornbluh 1988, 1991).
As the 1980s wore on and the civil war against the contras—the broad name for the set of armed opposition groups (the FDN, MISURASATA, and ARDE)\(^{66}\) comprised of former Guardias, peasants, civic opponents of the Sandinistas, indigenous peoples, and disaffected former Sandinistas—intensified and an economic crisis born of the war, a US economic blockade, and falling commodity prices took its toll, the FSLN struggled to maintain the state it had built and to continue providing social services. Military needs took precedent, though significant efforts were made to protect the gains made in expanding the spread of the health and education systems and the increased access to services available to populations that had been underserved under the Somoza regime.\(^{67}\) Damages during the war due to contra attacks, lack of economic resources for maintenance and supplies, and lack of access to significant regions of the country due to the war undercut the project of expanded state presence and social service delivery, yet in the face of all these difficulties, the achievements of the FSLN in these efforts is still remarkable. The next section examines in detail the FSLN’s state building project in terms of expanding state influence throughout the national territory and society, followed by more detailed discussions of service delivery in the critical areas of education and health, considering both motivations and actions.

**Development of Despotic Power and State Reach**

As mentioned above, the Nicaraguan state under the Somoza regime was largely tied to the benefit of the family in power, with limited state presence outside of major urban areas in the Pacific region, and very limited provision of social services outside of the Managua region, where

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\(^{66}\) *Fuerza Democrática Nicaragüense; Miskitu, Sumo, Rama, Sandinista All Together; and Alianza Revolucionaria Democrática.*

\(^{67}\) N-1, Téllez; N-7, Guido; N-19 Fernando Cardenal; Booth (1982); Arnove (1986); Donahue (1986); Garfield and Williams (1992).
they were primarily accessible only to the wealthy or those tied to the regime (Booth 1982; Millett 1977). The FSLN in its discourse had long discussed the imperative of the creation of a “new Nicaragua in favor of the poorest people, the abandoned and marginalized majority,” in the words of guerrilla leader Oscar Turcios (F. Cardenal 2008a, 62). They fought for a system that would deliver the benefits of the state in terms of public goods and service provision to the majority of the population, those living in rural areas and poor urban neighborhoods, and the FSLN began to develop the concrete plans and the capacity to deliver on these promises.

The first task of the FSLN and the new government in expanding state influence territorially was the organization of security forces to establish the Weberian “monopoly on the legitimate use of force” within the national territory. With the help of Cuban advisors, the FSLN began to transform its guerrilla columns into a more regular army, the EPS, while Panamanian and Cuban advisors helped develop the structures of the MINT and its intelligence and police forces. The EPS began to develop specialized units like other regular militaries and created seven military regions corresponding to the country’s 16 departments to organize the military throughout the territory, while also continuing the revolution’s practice of popular involvement through the creation of Sandinista Popular Militias (MPS) in both urban and rural areas across the country (for the most complete study of the EPS, see Barbosa Miranda 2009, ch.7; see also Gorman and Walker 1985; Walker 1991b). The EPS had less strength in remote frontier regions, the central mountains, and the Atlantic Coast, which were where contra resistance developed and was initially confronted only by poorly trained and armed border guards, militias, and reserve troops (N-4, J. Cuadra; N-10, Torres; N-11, Pereira; Close 1990).

The war grew in 1982 and 1983 due to an initial failure to confront the insurgency with sufficient and properly-prepared forces, as well as increased US funding for the contras. The FSLN
began to recognize these problems, though, and the territorial and societal influence of the EPS soon expanded. The FSLN, by now fully in charge of the government, implemented nationwide military conscription for young men, dubbed Patriotic Military Service (SMP), in 1983. This allowed for the creation of specialized counterinsurgency units, including units designed to keep soldiers in territory with which they were familiar, creating more permanent military presence in many of the areas where the EPS previously held only tenuous control. The implementation of SMP saw a total of 149,950 young men mobilized between 1983 and 1989, while in 1985 mandatory reserve service was created for men aged 25 to 40, mobilizing a total of 175,695 men between 1985 and 1989 (Barbosa Miranda 2009, 369), in a country of 3-3.5 million people. This massive quantity of citizens passing through military training and service does not include members of the militias (which also included women), or the security, intelligence, and police forces of the MINT.

Between regular forces and reserves, the EPS had about 20,000 men under arms in 1983 before SMP began; by 1986, including militia forces, there were 134,000 troops under arms, and in 1990 at the end of the war, the EPS had 87,000 troops. By contrast, the Guardia Nacional under Somoza, which fulfilled both military and police functions, had a much more stable membership and generally had fewer than 10,000 men under arms before peaking late in the 1970s at about 20,000-25,000 men following a recruitment drive attempting to combat the insurrection (Barbosa Miranda 2009; Cajina 1996; Millett 1977). General Joaquín Cuadra, Chief of Staff of the EPS

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68 N-4, J. Cuadra; N-6 and N-10, Torres; N-11, Pereira; N-13, Carrión; Walker (1991b, 89); Horton (1998, 199); Kruijt (2008, 122–23).

69 N-4, J. Cuadra; N-6 and N-10, Torres; N-11, Pereira; N-13, Carrión; Portocarrero (1986); Revista Segovia (1986).

70 The EPS and the government also developed means to enforce conscription, which was highly unpopular among many segments of the population (N-4, J. Cuadra; Cajina 1996, 110), a further manifestation of the coercive power, but also the reach through society developed by the new regime.
during the 1980s, sums up the territorial and societal strength of the EPS, stating that maintaining territorial control is in “the Sandinista DNA, the mode of thinking, the modus operandi. This was forged during the 1980s when there was war on all sides. With the military service [SMP], you needed to know where young people were [to enlist them], since it was obligatory…It’s one thing to have conscription in peacetime, another in war, it’s a whole different ballgame” (N-4).

Beyond the EPS, the revolutionary government had as part of its security apparatus the operatives of the MINT, which included the police, State Security (DGSE), a unit of paramilitary troops for special operations (TPU), and other intelligence offices. The DGSE was in charge of protecting the rearguard and ensuring that no contra activity was able to develop in major cities or in the Pacific coast region, and it was remarkably successful in this, as well as sending several moles to infiltrate the contra leadership and field units (N-4, J. Cuadra; E. Cardenal 2003, 572–73; Kinzer 2007, 179). The TPU were a militarized unit used for occasional combined force operations coordinated with the military. The police, however, were the most visible (and popular) segment of the MINT’s forces, and were spread throughout urban areas and the centers of rural regions. The police developed strong community ties, and their discipline and close relations with the population, in contrast to the much-despised Guardia, helped contribute to rapidly falling crime rates in the first few years of the revolution. Reported crimes dropped from 38,791 in 1980 to a low of 8,522 in 1982, despite a growing population, before increasing again as the war dragged on, but with improved clearance rates (see Table 4.1 below; MINT 1989).

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71 The DGSE was, however, also blamed for the majority of government human rights abuses committed in war zones and contested regions (Americas Watch 1985b, N-14 Aynn Setright; 1985a; Amnesty International 1989).

72 The police motto was “We are the sentinels of the people’s happiness” (N-3, Elvira Cuadra; N-8, Roberto Cajina).

73 Though the reported clearance rate for solving crimes, including violent crimes, improved throughout the 1980s (MINT 1989, 1, 4), suggesting that the economic crisis, rather than declining police effectiveness, may have been responsible for the return of higher crime numbers.
The closeness of police relations with communities was seen as a key achievement for both crime prevention and defense: “There was the creation of an idea of…community policing, of the police being embedded at street levels in communities. This was a necessity for defense to impede the war from entering the cities, and the Contra from establishing any territorial control” (N-5, Jarquín). From the beginning of the FSLN’s time in power, the government emphasized the role of citizens in securing their communities and the political project as a whole, with Tomás Borge saying in July 1979 that, “The best method for the defense of the revolution is the two million eyes of the Sandinista people” (Barricada 1979j).

Table 4.1. Clearance Rates for Crimes in Nicaragua, 1980-1989

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reported crimes</td>
<td>38781</td>
<td>22554</td>
<td>10349</td>
<td>8522</td>
<td>10487</td>
<td>15189</td>
<td>16378</td>
<td>19885</td>
<td>24345</td>
<td>12066</td>
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<tr>
<td>% change in crimes from prior year</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-41.8</td>
<td>-54.1</td>
<td>-17.7</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Clearance rate</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>72.2</td>
<td>71.9</td>
<td>75.8</td>
<td>71.6</td>
<td>74.1</td>
<td>71.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clearance rate for violent crime</td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>74.9</td>
<td>87.5</td>
<td>90.7</td>
<td>90.2</td>
<td>93.2</td>
<td>94.6</td>
<td>95.3</td>
<td>95.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime rate per 10,000 inhabitants</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>67</td>
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Source: MINT (1989, 1, 4).

The FSLN itself, as a party, rather than state institution, also had strong ground-level territorial and societal reach through the Sandinista Defense Committees (CDS), neighborhood-level committees formed shortly after victory that worked on issues such as health and sanitation campaigns neighborhood improvement and beautification, but also functioned as neighborhood

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74 Including homicide, manslaughter, assault, rape, and other “crimes against persons.”
watch organizations to report suspicious activity and coordinate crime prevention with the police, furthering the reach of the developing party-state (Barricada 1979d; N-8, Cajina; N-9, Judy Butler; Booth 1982, 193). The influence and number of CDSs declined over time, but they remained highly influential in urban areas, especially in lower and middle-class neighborhoods where FSLN support was strong (Booth 1982, 193).

After initial difficulties in combatting the contras, the security forces adjusted after the implementation of SMP and waged a highly successful counterinsurgency campaign, preventing the contra forces from ever consolidating stable ‘liberated’ territory within Nicaragua and forcing frequent retreats to rear bases in Honduras in the north and Costa Rica in the south. The MINT was also successful in preventing any attacks occurring in Managua or other major cities (N-4, J. Cuadra; N-10, Torres; N-13, Carrión), a product both of the support and legitimacy the FSLN enjoyed in these areas, but also of the power and societal reach of the security apparatus. In the final analysis, while the FSLN was forced into negotiations that led to the 1990 elections, which the FSLN then lost, the contras had been strategically defeated and would have collapsed without continued US support, completing the reconsolidation of state control in most of the country (N-4, J. Cuadra; N-10, Torres; Cajina 1996; Close 1990). State influence on the Atlantic Coast remained more limited, but the FSLN had negotiated with local leaders to increase local involvement in government decision making, resulting in an undercutting of popular support for Miskito rebels, and eventually agreed to a form of autonomy for the regions of the Atlantic Coast (N-9, Butler; N-13, Carrión; N-15, Wheelock). The project of ‘integrating’ the Atlantic Coast remained unfulfilled or unfinished, but the FSLN had imposed more state authority than ever before in the region, and even after drawing back and agreeing to autonomy, state influence
remained greater than under the Somozas and most earlier regimes, when the Coast was essentially a sphere of British or US influence (Hale 1994; Sollis 2009; Vilas 1988).

**Infrastructural Power and Service Provision**

While security was the first priority after the revolutionary victory, efforts very quickly turned to the establishment of infrastructural power, developing state influence throughout the national territory and organizing society. Despite the FSLN’s limited territorial base while fighting as rebels, they began relatively quickly to undertake efforts to develop nationwide influence and to intervene in Nicaraguan’s political, social, and economic lives through new mass organizations (Cochran III and Scott 1992; Luciak 1990; Serra 1985), state enterprises (Colburn 1990), and communications and infrastructure links. The FSLN created a Commission for the Organization of the Masses that in August 1979 began holding workshops in each department to try to understand local problems for the development of social organizations and unions of workers and peasants (Barricada 1979l), while municipal elections began to be organized in key cities (Barricada 1979m). The FSLN also rapidly centralized previously dispersed student organizations (Barricada 1979g), one of the group’s key bases, into the unified Juventud Sandinista 19 de Julio, which became a key resource for civic mobilization. Corporatist labor unions were articulated with the FSLN, allowing dissent to be channeled and directives from the government implemented (Cochran III and Scott 1992; Connell 2002, 100, 220; Serra 1985).

The above-mentioned neighborhood-level CDS committees provided a further means to organize the population, transmit political directives, and implement the FSLN program through mobilization in education, health, and sanitation campaigns. These initiatives were driven by a combination of the FSLN’s ideological commitments and the experiences of leaders who had lived
and fought in remote rural areas. For guerrilla commanders like Joaquín Cuadra, developing territorial influence was in “the Sandinista DNA, the mode of thinking, the modus operandi” (N-4). As journalist Judy Butler found in speaking with Sandinista militants, in the mountain regions where the guerrilla forces had been active, “There wasn’t much healthcare, there were no schools. Once you got out past a certain point, there was no state…So the idea of bringing healthcare and schools and elevating people was a necessary part of what they wanted to do that Somoza wasn’t doing” (N-9). FSLN guerrilla commander Francisco Rivera recalled how in rural areas they would encounter “Illiterate people without schools, where teachers had never appeared. The did not have electricity or medicine…they had never seen ice, and ships, trains, planes, movies, these were marvels they did not believe if one mentioned them” (Rivera Quintero 1989, 87–88). These enormous socioeconomic and geographic inequalities were what the FSLN set out to remedy.

Beyond the security forces, the government institution that provided the clearest manifestation of the new territorial reach of the state was MIDINRA. One of the first ministries developed and staffed by the FSLN after taking power, within a week of the revolutionary victory, MIDINRA immediately had a focus on expanding state reach, with a Vice-Ministry for the Development of the Atlantic Coast and initial distributions of land to over 1,000 families around León (Barricada 1979b, 1979k). In its role as the primary government institution acting on issues of land and agriculture in a primarily agrarian country, as well as holding the power to seize and redistribute land, MIDINRA had a great influence both politically and geographically (see e.g. Enriquez 1991). According to Jaime Wheelock, the DN member in charge of MIDINRA, the ministry “had a deployment in all of the departments, in all municipalities. It was probably the ministry most spread throughout the national territory and with resources—with trucks, with personnel, with enterprises” (N-15). The ministry organized the expropriation of hundreds of
thousands of acres of agricultural land belonging to the Somoza family and actual or alleged associates or collaborators and redistributed this land, as well as giving official titles to many small farmers and indigenous groups for the first time. From 1978 to 1988, over 48% of the agricultural land in Nicaragua was “reformed” into state enterprises, peasant collectives, or newly-titled smallholder farms and delineated indigenous territories, with over 2.7 million hectares of land having passed into or through the state’s hands (Wheelock Román 1990, 84).

Like the rest of the revolutionary institutions, MIDINRA had difficulties in achieving its goals in the Atlantic Coast and understanding the cultural context in which it was operating. Yet the ministry undertook significant projects in the region around forestry, coconut production, cattle ranching, and other agricultural activities (N-15, Wheelock; Bourgois and Grünberg 1980; MIDINRA 1984) as part of an expanded state role in a regional economy that had previously been dominated by foreign corporations (e.g. Hale 1994; MIDINRA 1984; Sollis 2009; Vilas 1988). A major component of efforts to integrate the Atlantic Coast and other peripheral areas was the construction of new roads and the development of other transport and communications links. At the inauguration of a highway project in November 1979, Victor Hugo Tinoco proclaimed that “Even if the Atlantic Coast did not exist, we would still need to resolve problems of communication, but because [the Atlantic Coast] is ours and because we have a Revolution in progress, we can consider this route an economic, political, and social reference point for our connection with the Caribbean” (Barricada 1979c). Vilas (1988, 124) describes how the FSLN sought to bring the state to the Atlantic Coast in the 1980s:

“The construction of the Río Blanco-Siuna-Puerto Cabezas highway, and the extension of the telephone network to the mining región and Puerto Cabezas, contributed to physically integrating the national territory. Various costeña communities were electrified and potable water and sewer systems improved. Public health and education services improved and expanded.”
Even as the Contra war escalated, the FSLN sought to ensure the presence of government institutions other than the military would extend into the periphery. The extension of transportation, communications, and services was one of the FSLN government’s main selling points in seeking public legitimacy. A 1984 document touting the FSLN’s achievements and outlining its future goals claimed that, “Brigades of workers have brought roads, water, electricity, telegraph and telephone communications to the most remote areas of Nicaragua, reaching even the most remote areas. Television and radio have been brought to the north of the country and the Atlantic Coast…We will continue bringing electricity, drinking water, and communications to the whole country, especially peasant communities and rural centers” (FSLN 1984, 11). The war, economic difficulties, and the problem of road maintenance with Nicaragua’s strong rainy seasons kept the FSLN from achieving all of its desired outcomes in infrastructure expansion, but government ministries indeed continued working to bring the state to the people.75

Given the centrality of agrarian reform to the FSLN’s program, MIDINRA was one of the institutions that still played a large role inside war zones and in resettling displaced rural populations. MIDINRA developed close ties to the military in redistributing land within war zones and arming peasants at cooperatives, while also arming the ministry’s own workers in the face of frequent contra attacks (N-4, J. Cuadra; N-11, Pereira; N-15, Wheelock; N-14, Aynn Setright). In conflict-affected areas, the goal was “not to regress, and to rebuild that which was destroyed” (N-15, Wheelock). The EPS actively sought agrarian reform activities close to war zones, believing that if you “Give this campesino a title to land and a gun, he’s with the revolution” (N-4, J. Cuadra).

Other state institutions attempted to continue operating in war zones, despite the difficult conditions, demonstrating a commitment to continue delivering services to the whole population,

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75 INEC’s ‘Anuario Estadistico,’ published yearly from 1980-1988, contains data on infrastructural coverage.
though adaptation was necessary, for instance sending in mobile teams for vaccinations and medical checkups (N-1, Téllez; Donahue 1986; Garfield and Williams 1992). This conviction to serve and benefit the whole country, and especially the most needy and marginalized, was manifested most visibly in the programs the revolutionary government developed for healthcare and education provision.

*The Transformation of Healthcare*

Healthcare provision under the Somoza regime was largely private and public provision of healthcare was limited to the Managua area; the state social security system covered only 16% of the economically active population, two-thirds of whom were in the service sector, and a total of 8.4% of the general population in a country of over 3 million people (Donahue 1986, 9–13; MINSA 1981, 11–13). Healthcare provision, such as it was, was fragmented among different state institutions, with limited coordination. This was argued, though, to give Somoza opportunities to manipulate healthcare provision, engage in favoritism, and generally use the health system for his own political ends (Donahue 1986, 17). The war had destroyed a great deal of the health infrastructure, and so reconstruction was the immediate priority in the sector following victory, with plans also made to quickly roll out vaccination campaigns (Barricada 1979n).

As part of their vision of creating a more just, equal society in which “Health is a right of every individual” (MINSA 1981), the FSLN and JGRN developed a plan to not only make healthcare free for all Nicaraguans, but to greatly expand access to health services by concentrating on first developing human resources and infrastructural capacity in the areas that had previously been most underserved—rural areas outside of the Pacific region. This was, necessarily a project of state building, for “What does it mean for health to be a right? That the state has an obligation
to provide health services [to the population]” (N-1, Téllez). The first health minister in the new government, César Amador Khûll, described the Ministry’s mission as “bringing health to all corners of Nicaragua” (Barricada 1979i). Toward these goals, JGRN Decree No. 35 was passed on 8 August 1979 to create a single National Unified Health System (SNUS), in line with the primary healthcare model suggested by the World Health Organization, that was seen as the vehicle to “substantially elevate the level of health and well-being of the Nicaraguan people” in response to the harm and neglect inflicted by the Somoza regime (MINSA 1989a, 1–2).

This effort was in many ways a success, leading Lea Guido, Minister of Health from 1980-1985, to state that “There was a great expansion in access to health—economic access, because people did not pay; geographic access, because wherever people were they had access; cultural access because people learned to work in Miskito or English” (N-7). Beyond expanding coverage territorially and demographically, the revolutionary commitment to popular mobilization led to greater popular involvement in health promotion and healthcare provision as part of both special campaigns and everyday service delivery in poor neighborhoods and rural areas. The popularization of healthcare and the emphasis on prevention at times provoked clashes with the professional medical establishment, which emphasized treatment in established hospitals and clinics, though this did not impede the achievement of great qualitative and quantitative health gains during the decade of revolutionary rule.

Under Somoza, the infant mortality rate had hovered around 120 per 1,000 births, though it was estimated at over 200 per 1,000 births in rural areas due to a lack of care and services; this was in comparison in Latin America to rates of 43.7 in Venezuela, 30.3 in Panama, and 19.4 in Cuba (MINSA 1980, 23). Under the new revolutionary government, which prioritized maternal

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76 N-1, Téllez; N-7, Guido; Ortega Saavedra (1985); Donahue (1986); Garfield and Williams (1992).
health, infant mortality fell to 80.2 by 1982 and continued to be reduced to 61.7 in 1988, while overall mortality and life expectancy also improved (see Table 4.2 below; Donahue 1986; Garfield and Williams 1992; MINSA 1989b).

**Table 4.2 Mortality Indicators in Nicaragua, 1977-1988**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mortality Rate (deaths/1000 people)</th>
<th>Life Expectancy</th>
<th>Infant Mortality (&lt;1 year old) /1000 live births</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>121.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>80.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>76.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>61.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Another key area of emphasis was vaccination to prevent infectious diseases. MINSA worked with Sandinista mass organizations and local communities in order to educate the population about the importance of vaccinations and then organized ‘Popular Health Days’ to carry out vaccination and sanitation campaigns throughout the country. This led to massively improved vaccination coverage, for instance with the immunization rate for children under one year of age for measles rising from 15% in 1980 to 43% in 1981, while the rate for polio vaccination jumped in this one year period from 20% to 51%, and reaching 82% in 1982 (see Table 4.3 below; MINSA 1989b). The vaccination campaigns were highly successful, and polio was eradicated in Nicaragua by 1982 (Donahue 1986; Garfield and Williams 1992; MINSA 1989b), accomplishing what the Somoza regime never could (or tried) to do, despite large amounts of US AID assistance.
Table 4.3 Vaccination rate for children younger than 1 year of age in Nicaragua, 1980-1988

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Measles</th>
<th>Polio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


These popular efforts were also accompanied by an expansion and improvement of medical personnel and infrastructure. While there were some efforts to construct new hospitals in chronically underserved areas, including in Matagalpa in the mountains and Bluefields on the Atlantic Coast, the greatest infrastructural expansion was in the construction of smaller health centers and health posts. MINSA developed a concept of health areas, each consisting of approximately 20,000-30,000 people, “with specific geographic limits and served by the basic unit of the Health Center [Centro de Salud],” with the areas then divided into sectors of 3,000 people, each sector served by a health post or mobile units with nurses or ‘brigadistas,’ trained local popular health workers (MINSA 1980, 12–13). This shift to a regional system and the construction of hundreds of new health centers and posts (see Table 4.4 below) was a key component in expanding access to healthcare, as people who had previously waited to seek medical attention until a problem became critical, due to the distance to any health center, could now seek more immediate attention close by and then be referred for more advanced care if necessary (N-1 Dora Maria Téllez; N-7 Lea Guido; MINSA 1980, 15–19).
To staff the expanded health system, the government invested in increased and improved training for doctors, nurses, technicians, and nurse auxiliaries. The number of people per doctor, for instance, fell from 16,700 in 1977 to 15,400 in 1981 and down to a low of 11,100 in 1986, despite the population growing over this period MINSA (1989b). This process was at first uneven, though. Dora María Téllez, Minister of Health from 1985-1990, recalled that “In the early years, the government had trained doctors at much higher rate than nurses or auxiliary nurses, so there was a moment when the quantity of doctors produced was enormous, and the system had to absorb all of these doctors,” though this surplus of doctors was gradually matched by corresponding increases in supporting personnel (N-1).
Healthcare provision worsened over the course of the war, and there were problems throughout the 1980s. The distribution of resources—for instance, the concentration on health in rural areas occurred to the neglect of improving services in urban areas—and attrition among health workers both became ever-larger problems. The revolutionary project succeeded, however, in having health viewed as a right, and one that the state had a duty to protect and serve. Access to healthcare and medical education were vastly expanded, public health as an academic and policy field was brought into existence in the country (N-1, Téllez; N-7, Guido), and significant advances were made in reducing infant and maternal mortality and the rates of numerous infectious diseases (see generally Donahue 1986; Garfield and Williams 1992). These advances in terms of expanded access and qualitative and quantitative improvements in primary health outcomes were paralleled in the area of education.

*Education: Expansion and Popular Incorporation*

As with healthcare, access to educational opportunities had been very low for most of the population under the Somoza regime, with very limited state provision or support of education. Education had long been on the FSLN agenda, with the Historical Program including provisions for “a massive campaign to eliminate illiteracy,” making education free at all levels and obligatory at the primary level, and reforming universities to make them open to all, among other plans (FSLN 1969). This was followed up by the JGRN in Article 3.5 of the Program of Government, which took up these earlier prescriptions and further formalized them (JGRN 1979). The major initiatives undertaken by the FSLN throughout the 1980s sought to treat education as a right, to make education accessible to all, “even in the most isolated place in Nicaragua” (Barricada 1979p), and to develop a new educational model adapted to the characteristics and necessities of the country.
The first step in the expansion of access to education and one of the first major policy initiatives undertaken by the revolutionary government was the 1980 National Literacy Crusade (CNA). The eradication of illiteracy in Nicaragua was seen as an historical mission of sandinismo, drawing on the example of Sandino teaching his troops and campesinos to read and write, and Carlos Fonseca legendarily telling FSLN guerrillas who were training campesinos in the use of weapons, “and also teach them to read” (e.g. MINED 1980a, viii). Combating illiteracy was seen not only as necessary for the development and reconstruction of the country, but also as “a just task, a moral commitment of our Revolution to our people” (Arrien and Matus Lazo 1989, 94).

Minister of Education Carlos Tünnerman began planning the CNA within two weeks of the revolutionary victory (Barricada 1979f). Limited information existed about educational provision or attainment in the country, with Somoza having eliminated regional statistics offices in 1974 (Ocón 1981), so in preparation for the CNA, the FSLN decided to have MINED and the new National Statistics and Census Institute (INEC) organize a literacy census of Nicaraguans over the age of 10, which was in fact the first nationwide census conducted since 1971. UNESCO advisors were convinced that such a census would take two years to organize and complete and cost millions of dollars. Yet MINED recruited members of the Sandinista Youth (JS19) organization to act as enumerators and completed a relatively comprehensive census, though missing a few remote areas, over the course of October-November 1979 for a cost of approximately $10,000 and with a margin of error described by UNESCO as “minimal” (E. Cardenal 2003, 390; F. Cardenal 2008b, 20). The census also provided an opportunity to gather data on the population in rural areas where the Somoza government had not maintained informational capacity, and proved useful for planning for other institutions and initiatives. The census revealed that over 50% of Nicaraguans over the age of 10 were illiterate, with the problem especially acute in rural areas and among those aged
10-14; almost 80% of 10-14 year olds were illiterate in some rural areas (Arnove 1986; MINED 1980a).

With a clearer idea of the size of the task, the JGRN declared 1980 the “Year of Literacy” and government institutions coordinated with MINED to ensure that the CNA could move forward and be successful, launching the five-month campaign in March of that year. The core of the literacy teaching was done by about 50,000 young volunteers, or brigadistas, mainly high school students, who went out into rural areas to live with local families and teach them to read and write, while efforts were also made by tens of thousands of other volunteers to carry out the literacy campaign in urban areas (e.g. Arnove 1986; F. Cardenal and Miller 1981). Educationally, the CNA was a huge success, with illiteracy being reduced from 50.3% to about 23%, with a 1985 national survey finding that illiteracy had only risen to 24.9% five years after the campaign having been reduced in rural areas from 75.4% before the campaign to 40.0% in 1985 (INEC 1990, 54). By late August 1980, the initial literacy campaign had helped over 400,000 people achieve basic literacy, while a later campaign on the Atlantic Coast taught a further 12,664 people to read and write (MINED 1982, 19). MINED also launched widespread adult education and popular education programs in rural areas to try to sustain and build upon the educational gains made during the CNA. The brigadistas also engaged in a variety of other activities, including health promotion and provision of glasses and basic medicines; carrying out a survey of rural workers; collecting information about native plants and animals; recording folkloric traditions; and also improving rural infrastructure. According to MINED, brigadistas built “2,862 latrines, 75 wells, 96 schools, 34 roads, 50 bridges, 37 health centers” (Arnove 1986, 42n26).

MINED claims of a reduction of the illiteracy rate to 12.9% were due to the exclusion from these numbers of people deemed “unteachable or learning impaired” due to blindness, illnesses, old age, senility, or institutionalization (Arnove 1986, 27).
The CNA served not only to improve the literacy and educational opportunities available to a large portion of the population, it also worked as a form of state and nation building. The discourse of the campaign described its unifying and integrating characteristics, telling brigadistas that one of their tasks was to “Contribute to national unity, integrating the countryside with the city, the worker with the student, the Atlantic with the rest of the country” (MINED 1980b, 3). The CNA also represented the first time many urban students had been to rural areas of their own country and the first time many campesinos had interacted with urban Nicaraguans.\(^78\) For the special literacy campaign in late 1980 on the Atlantic Coast, materials were prepared in Miskito, Sumo, and English, bringing state-sponsored educational activity and basic health services to a region that had previously been served almost exclusively by the Moravian Church (e.g. Arnove 1986, 36–37; Vilas 1988, 130). As Arnove (1986, 25) argues, it was these state and nation-building elements that were possibly the most important effects of the CNA, which “was a symbol of justice, of the concern of the new political regime for the most neglected areas and populations of the country. It involved the extension of national authority and services into previously unreached corners of the society.”

Beyond the CNA, state support for education greatly increased over the Somoza era and access to education expanded across the country, incorporating underserved regions and populations, with an emphasis on building new primary schools in rural areas and new secondary schools in small cities that could draw in students from surrounding rural communities (Arnove 1986, 74). Education was a high priority in the first years of the revolution, and so state education spending as a percentage of GDP increased significantly over the Somoza years, rising from 2.6% in 1978 to 3.7% in 1980 and reaching 6.0% in 1984 (see Table 4.5 below).

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\(^78\) N-2 Maria Josefina Vijil; N-3, E. Cuadra; N-19, Fernando Cardenal; N-20, Carlos Tünnerman; Arnove (1986); Cardenal and Miller (1981).
The number of primary schools jumped drastically after the revolutionary takeover, with most growth occurring in rural areas (see Table 4.6 below). Nicaragua shifted from having 2,402 primary schools in 1978, 1,668 (69%) of which were in rural areas, to having 4,061 primary schools in 1983, with 3,444 (85%) in rural areas, with more offering at least up to the fourth grade than ever before (Arríen and Matus Lazo 1989, 496). The increased educational infrastructure was filled by thousands of new students and hundreds of new teachers. Educational enrollment increased dramatically at all levels and types of education (see Table 4.7 below), with primary school matriculation, for example, jumping from 369,640 students in 1978 to over 500,000 by 1982 and continuing to rise throughout the 1980s (Arríen and Matus Lazo 1989, 428). To serve these students, the number of primary and secondary school teachers nearly doubled over the course of the 1980s, while the number of preschool teachers was nine times higher in 1987 (2,454) than in 1978 (272) (see Table 4.8 below).

As in the health system, this massive expansion was not without problems. There were constant concerns about the quality of education, teacher training, and student retention (Arnove
1986; Arrien and Matus Lazo 1989). According to former DN member and Vice Minister of the Interior Luis Carrión, the revolution achieved “expansion of access, at times at the cost of quality. Under Somoza, the quality of education was a little better, but it access was very restricted, the system was very small” (N-13). Educational opportunities in war zones were curtailed as the contras destroyed schools and targeted teachers and adult education instructors for assassination (N-14, Setright; N-19, Cardenal; Armove 1986).79 Yet despite its problems, the expansion of education brought a new level of state services to the population and spread state influence throughout the territory; helped enshrine education as a right, rather than a privilege; and fulfilled the promises of the FSLN’s Historical Program and the Program of Government.

Table 4.6 Primary Schools by highest grade offered, region & area in Nicaragua, 1978-1988

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year and Grades</th>
<th>Urban and Rural</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Rural</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Pacific</td>
<td>Other Regions</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Pacific</td>
<td>Other Regions</td>
<td>Country</td>
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<tr>
<td>1978 Total</td>
<td>2402</td>
<td>1202</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>734</td>
<td>514</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>1668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 4th grade</td>
<td>819</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th or higher</td>
<td>1583</td>
<td>903</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>669</td>
<td>478</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>914</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983 Total</td>
<td>4061</td>
<td>1803</td>
<td>2258</td>
<td>617</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>3444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 4th grade</td>
<td>1586</td>
<td>543</td>
<td>1043</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th or higher</td>
<td>2475</td>
<td>1260</td>
<td>1245</td>
<td>538</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>1937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988 Total</td>
<td>3918</td>
<td>1782</td>
<td>2136</td>
<td>606</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>3312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 4th grade</td>
<td>1241</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>797</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1164</td>
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<tr>
<td>4th or higher</td>
<td>2677</td>
<td>1338</td>
<td>1339</td>
<td>529</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>2148</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Arrién and Matus Lazo (1989, 496).

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79 According to MINED, from 1983-1985, “21 schools were totally destroyed, 42 more were damaged, and 120 teachers were killed in fulfilling their duties of staying in communities, providing education to campesinos in conflict zones,” (Arrien and Matus Lazo 1989, 163).
Table 4.7 Educational enrollment in Nicaragua, 1978-1988

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Preschool</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>Higher Ed.</th>
<th>Special Ed.</th>
<th>Adult Ed.</th>
<th>Technical Training</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>513499</td>
<td>9000</td>
<td>369640</td>
<td>98874</td>
<td>23291</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>10463</td>
<td>1876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979-80</td>
<td>589573</td>
<td>18292</td>
<td>411315</td>
<td>110726</td>
<td>28759</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>18137</td>
<td>1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-81</td>
<td>858996</td>
<td>30524</td>
<td>472167</td>
<td>139743</td>
<td>34710</td>
<td>1430</td>
<td>172389</td>
<td>8033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>905742</td>
<td>38534</td>
<td>509240</td>
<td>139957</td>
<td>33838</td>
<td>1591</td>
<td>170410</td>
<td>12172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>979580</td>
<td>50163</td>
<td>536656</td>
<td>158215</td>
<td>35588</td>
<td>1624</td>
<td>187858</td>
<td>9476</td>
</tr>
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Table 4.8 Teachers at each education level in Nicaragua, 1978-1987

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<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Preschool</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>Higher Ed.</th>
<th>Special Ed.</th>
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<td>11307</td>
<td>3532</td>
<td>1299</td>
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<td>651</td>
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<tr>
<td>1980-81</td>
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Discussion

The FSLN developed as an organization with a vision for the transformation of Nicaraguan politics and society, committing to and maintaining a policy of expanding state influence across the national territory and throughout society. The revolutionary government actively sought to build state institutions and to make them work for and provide services to the majority of the population, rather than in service of the FSLN itself or its leaders. Efforts were often unsuccessful
in achieving their desired outcomes, but the state’s resources were focused on public benefits and the expansion of state influence.

In order to carry out its plans, the FSLN built a security apparatus to control the national territory and mobilized large portions of the population to take up arms in defense of the state. It sought to make the people and territory it governed more ‘legible’ (Scott 1998) by increasing the state’s territorial reach and the number of state functionaries and party and mass organization members on which it could rely for work, information, and mobilization. The FSLN also rebuilt the statistical capacity of the state, beginning to carry out limited censuses and national surveys (INEC 1990; Ministerio del Desarrollo Agropecuario 1980; Ocón 1981).

The ability to mobilize the population under arms has been argued to be one of the primary factors behind the rise of states as political organizations in the first place (e.g. Tilly 1985, 1990), and the FSLN once in power sought to turn their guerrillas into an organized state coercive apparatus, building a complex of the military, militias, police, and intelligence services that was much larger than ever previously possessed in Nicaragua. In the mid-1980s, the FSLN was able to implement and enforce conscription, a demonstration of “military penetration” of society (Mann 2008), and parallel to the FSLN’s strong ability to also mobilize mass organizations and tens of thousands of citizens in educational, health, agricultural harvesting, and defense efforts more generally, manifesting what Kasza (1995) terms the “conscription society.” The revolution created “the opportunity to construct a diversity and quantity of social organizations greater than the country had ever had” (N-3, E. Cuadra), and the FSLN was able to involve vast segments of the population in this new, corporatized civil society. Efforts to maintain political pluralism were foreclosed as the war context led to restrictions on press freedom and freedom to assemble, though the FSLN did hold relatively free and fair elections in 1984, and it was more democratic than the
Somoza regime in its incorporation of the majority of the population in the political sphere and through civil society organizations (Cochran III and Scott 1992; Luciak 1990; Serra 1985; Williams 1994).80

State authority was not always evenly spread throughout the territory, and there were significant ‘brown areas’ (O’Donnell 1993) of limited state control in the mountains and on the Atlantic Coast, which closely mirrored the war zones, though these areas were smaller than they had been under the Somoza regime, and the state under the FSLN began to provide services in these areas, having a state presence even if social control was lacking (cf. Soifer and vom Hau 2008, 226). Despite difficulties in achieving full territorial control, the FSLN was able to succeed where its predecessor regime had failed: it did not allow a rebel group to develop territorial bases within Nicaragua or to topple it, despite facing an enemy aided by the hemispheric hegemon. Advances in statistical capacity and development of the ability to carry out censuses are argued to provide useful measures of the “administrative capacity” of a state (J. K. Hanson and Sigman 2013; Soifer 2012a, 593), and while this was an unfinished project for the FSLN, with preparations for a 1982 census never coming to fruition due to the intensifying war (INEC 1990, 1–2), the advances made in this department were still significant. The FSLN also was not plagued by corruption or widespread personal enrichment by leaders. There were isolated incidents of corruption, but they were punished heavily when discovered.81 The revolutionary ethic of the pursuit of benefits for the many over those of the few was maintained throughout the 1980s, and it was not until the time of

80 The autonomy of the mass organizations with respect to the FSLN fluctuated and varied by organization (Williams 1994).

81 N-1, Téllez; N-4, J. Cuadra; N-7, Guido; N-12, Antonio Lacayo; N-19, Cardenal.
the election loss that a minority of FSLN leaders began to seek personal benefits from state resources.\textsuperscript{82}

In terms of service provision, whereas under the Somoza regime, provision of public healthcare and education was left largely outside of the scope of the state, the FSLN made them the primary foci of state social policy. The size of the populations served by the state health and education systems expanded exponentially, as well as the territory in which these services were provided. The large advances made in carrying out vaccination campaigns and increasing the number of people vaccinated against infectious diseases also reflected both the mobilizing and administrative capacity developed by the revolutionary state (Soifer 2012a, 593), as well as the commitment to a widespread distribution of the resources and benefits of the state. These shifts to state service delivery “such as the literacy campaign, the expansion of health services, policies of subsidies and provision of basic food needs…changed people’s perspectives” (N-5, Jarquín), not only delivering concrete improvements, but shifting social consciousness about what the state should do for the people.

\textit{Alternative Explanations}

How does the ideology-focused theory stack up against alternative explanations of rebel organization and state building? Central state authority under the Somozas had been consolidated but relatively hollow, with the dictators maintaining power through clientelism, cooptation, and coercion (Everingham 1996; Millett 1977; K. Walter 1993). Many areas of the country had little state presence, and institutions were at the whims of the Somozas and their associates. The FSLN was unable to directly challenge state authority in much of the country until the final years of the

\textsuperscript{82} N-13, Carrión; N-15, Wheelock; N-16, Tinoco; N-18, Vargas; Close (1999, 2016); Pérez (1992).
uprising, but the Somoza regime and its institutions largely disintegrated in 1979 (e.g. Booth 1982). The security apparatus melted away and Guardia members fled or went underground. Bureaucratic structures remained in some of the government ministries and many Somoza-era civil servants were willing to return to work, but it was precisely in those remaining institutions that the FSLN sought to enact some of the most dramatic changes. As Luis Carrión said, “When Carlos Tunnermann took over the Ministry of Education, there was already a structure, there was already organization, an institution” (N-13), yet this institution was then remade in the service of the FSLN’s ideologically driven goals of mass literacy and universal education. Where institutions remained, they may have aided in the implementation of programs, but they were not preconditions for state building or service provision efforts. MIDINRA was a completely new institution and undertook one of the most difficult tasks of the revolutionary period, the land reform project. Similarly, the construction of mass civil organizations was not dependent on preexisting state structures. The FSLN was also willing to pursue state building and service provision even in the face of serious resource constraints. The organization innovatively used popular mobilization to compensate for a lack of funding and resources, for example in the literacy census and campaign (E. Cardenal 2003, 390; F. Cardenal 2008b, 20).

International threats and influences were a constant factor in the FSLN case, but they did not determine the FSLN’s policies or behavior. From the moment they came into power in 1979, FSLN leaders were concerned with the possibility of an intervention by the United States, which had so fervently supported the Somozas for decades. The Atlantic Coast was considered a “weak

83 FSLN leaders were keenly aware of geopolitical dynamics throughout the rebel period, as well. Humberto Ortega, for example, reports that in April 1978, there were discussions within the organization about the “complex international situation, where the détente between East and West was deteriorating…In this context I pointed out the need to take advantage of Carter’s human rights policy and support for bourgeois social-democratic forces…that situation would not be present for much longer, because crises in Africa and the Arab world were tensioning the international political situation. It is for this reason that we propose the overthrow of the dictatorship in briefest time frame possible” (H. Ortega Saavedra 2004, 342).
flank” where US intervention might concentrate and the FSLN’s revolutionary program was unlikely to receive buy-in due to the region’s historical exclusion and extraversion (N-9, Butler), and so this is where external threat should have been most salient in stimulating state building. The FSLN reacted accordingly in the security sector by building up its coercive capacity in the region, increasing troop presence and ensuring the coast was “full of radar stations” (N-8, Cajina). Noncoercive state building on the Coast, however, had been the intention of the FSLN from the outset, included in the Programa Histórico. Efforts to build infrastructural power and provide social services on the Atlantic Coast and in other peripheral areas were not so much responses to threats as ideological imperatives, necessary to uphold the FSLN’s commitments to marginalized Nicaraguans. The development of mass organizations, similarly, had an ideological basis and was modeled in part on institutions created by other left-wing revolutionary governments.

Where external threat played a significant role in stimulating infrastructural power building, however, was in the development of the Comités de Defensa Sandinista. The CDS model, inspired by Cuban revolutionary committees, was originally put in place to help secure the revolution against subversion and to act as local police, though its policing functions were reduced by mid-1980 (Booth 1982, 193) and the CDSs shifted toward greater concentration on social service delivery and resolving local issues (E. Cardenal 2003, 344–45; Zwerling and Martin 1985, 80). This was, however, a war setting, and the FSLN security apparatus made use of the CDSs to establish networks of informants, “part of a conception of what each person had to do to contribute in a time of war” (N-3, E. Cuadra), and the committees were “also organized for defense in event of invasion if need be” (Zwerling and Martin 1985, 80).84 Similarly, mass organizations provided

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84 Tomás Borge, in a speech discussing mass sectoral and identity-based organizations for youth, women, and workers, also highlighted equally that “The revolution has given the people the democracy of the Comités de Defensa Sandinista, of the armed workers, peasants, and students in the Sandinista Militias” (Borge 1981, 29).
mobilizational resources in combating the internal threats posed by the Contra rebel forces, but this was not their original purpose or motive (e.g. Cochran III and Scott 1992; Luciak 1990; Serra 1985). In many ways, FSLN state building efforts were a cause, rather than an effect, of the Contra threat. The FSLN tried to implement model that affected the “traditions and culture of the peasantry,” challenging patriarchy and local leaders by creating local and zonal councils and including women, while administrative changes were especially drastic among Miskito communities, who had previously been organized by Moravian Church parishes (N-15, Wheelock).85

The experiences of countries like Cuba and Chile under Salvador Allende inspired the FSLN, and international advisers helped to organize new institutions after the FSLN took power, yet the impetus for programs and ultimate decision-making always lay with the FSLN’s leaders (N-15, Wheelock; N-16, Tinoco; N-21, Bendaña). External financing and material aid helped enable the implementation of some state building and service provision efforts, but the FSLN continued trying to maintain social services in remote areas, for instance, even when the war effort and US economic blockade were hobbling Nicaragua financially (LeoGrande 1996; Pastor 2002).

How did ethnicity affect FSLN policies and practices around state building and service provision? Nicaragua is a relatively ethnically homogeneous country, with a clear mestizo majority, living mainly in the Pacific Coast and central regions of the territory, while the smaller indigenous and Afro-Caribbean populations are concentrated on the Atlantic Coast and in the dense, riverine forests of the northeast and southeast. The ethnic and geographic divide of the country would have made it easy for the FSLN government to maintain the Nicaraguan state’s historic stance of power projection in the west of the country and the relative neglect of the Atlantic

Coast, ethnically differentiating the delivery of public goods. Yet precisely due to the organization’s ideological commitment to transform society and to serve all Nicaraguans, the FSLN adopted policies designed to extend state authority to the Atlantic Coast and to serve its residents, including efforts to translate educational materials and health information into indigenous languages and English to increase accessibility and uptake. All of these efforts represented a redistribution of resources from the core to the periphery of the country. FSLN engagement on the Atlantic Coast was at times overly blunt, betraying the group’s lack of roots in the region and paucity of costeño leaders (e.g. Hale 1994; Vilas 1988). Luis Carrión, who headed a Ministry of the Interior commission working on Atlantic Coast issues, reflected that, “We had a minimal understanding of the reality [on the coast]. Of the desires and culture of groups, especially indigenous groups…We tried to transport institutions and structures of the state and municipalities from the Pacific to the coast, but they were not coming from the people, like they had in much of the rest of the country, where it was more natural” (N-13). The FSLN eventually recognized some of the mistakes in its attempt to transplant the state to the Atlantic Coast without working with and through the local population. Beginning in 1984, Carrión and others in the FSLN began working to design autonomy statutes to increase political independence for the Coast and more local leaders were involved in decision making (N-9, Butler; N-13, Carrión). This push toward greater political autonomy, however, did not end efforts to build and maintain the presence of the central state.

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86 Judy Butler, who worked on Atlantic Coast issues during the 1980s at the Centro de Investigaciones y Documentación de la Costa Atlántica (CIDCA), argues that the FSLN made mistakes, “but also bent way over backwards, beyond their instincts, to grant the benefit of the doubt [to leaders] on the Atlantic Coast” (N-9).
Conclusion

This chapter has explored the state building and service provision trajectory of the FSLN, a more programmatic group. The FSLN’s programmatic behavior reflected deep commitments among the leadership of the group to build a strong, capable state that would serve the majority of the population that had been historically neglected, increasing the state’s territorial and societal influence. These commitments were instilled in group members and civilian followers through political education and popular involvement. The FSLN’s state building and service provision efforts were not without errors and resistance, and it is difficult to know how the project would have proceeded absent US interference, yet the FSLN in many ways succeeded in their transformation of the state and its institutions, with the remaking of the security forces and the institutionalization of democratic elections among the key legacies of FSLN rule. The FSLN was also relatively unique among revolutionary regimes in peacefully ceding power after an electoral defeat. After losing power in the 1990 elections, however, the FSLN as an organization lost its programmatic nature, and the party has been transformed into a clientelistic, personalistic machine controlled by Daniel Ortega and his family (Close 2016; Jarquín 2016; Martí i Puig 2009; Thaler 2017). Ortega succeeded in winning the presidency in 2006 and remains in power today.

The FSLN case is particularly interesting in that the group did not control stable territories prior to taking power, limiting the opportunities to engage in rebel governance and experiment with the implementation of policies before controlling the central state. Despite this, the FSLN once in power found themselves burdened with high popular expectations for the transformation that the revolution would bring, suggesting that an “implicit social contract” (Wickham-Crowley 1987) between a rebel group and the population can arise without strong precedents of rebel governance. While there was some competition within the FSLN over the direction of the group
and for control, there was never any effort from the 1960s through the 1980s to turn the organization in a more opportunistic direction. Further comparative research will be necessary to determine if this is anomalous among more programmatic organizations or a normal trajectory.
CHAPTER FIVE

Predation or State Building? The NPFL’s Political-Economic Project in Liberia

“Justice being taken away, then, what are kingdoms but great robberies? For what are robberies themselves, but little kingdoms?...If, by the admittance of abandoned men, this evil increases to such a degree that it holds places, fixes abodes, takes possession of cities, and subdues peoples, it assumes the more plainly the name of a kingdom, because the reality is now conferred on it, not by the removal of covetousness, but by the addition of impunity.”


The National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) has often been examined by scholars as part of the larger context of the civil wars in Liberia (1989-1996 and 1999-2003) and around West Africa more broadly (Adebajo 2002a; Ellis 2007; Gerdes 2013; Kieh 2008; Lidow 2016; Reno 1998). There have also been a number of journalistic examinations of the civil war (Huband 1998) and Charles Taylor and the NPFL more specifically (Dwyer 2015; Waugh 2011). Certain accounts go into some depth about the development of ‘rebel governance’ by the NPFL in the first civil war and also the management of the state under the Taylor government after the 1997 elections (Gerdes 2013; Lidow 2016; Reno 1998, 2015). Different writers have emphasized different aspects of Liberia’s conflict, leading to confusion or incomplete accounts. As Abiodun Alao (1998, x) writes of the first civil war from 1989 to 1996, “it was an internal war with international underpinning; an economic war without respect for economic principles; a personality war by people with conflicting individual personalities; a war with its roots in the Cold War era but with consequences in the post-Cold War period; an ideological war by actors of blurred ideological perception; and an ethnic war without intra-ethnic cohesion.” Acknowledging these contradictions and complexities, this chapter draws together the different strands of the literature and the different aspects of Taylor and the NPFL’s vision to present a more complete picture of the formulation of
the NPFL’s goals and how they were manifested in practice, introducing new evidence from interviews and primary sources and drawing on a theoretical lens focused at the organizational level.

Liberia’s Complicated Ethnopolitical History

The Republic of Liberia was founded in 1847 after settlement by freed slaves from the United States, who were brought to the West African coast under the auspices of the American Colonization Society. The settlers, known as the Americo-Liberians, created a colonial society based along the coast, aiming to gradually expand their power and subjugate the preexisting indigenous population to establish political control and extract labor, echoing the American sociopolitical dynamics from which they had escaped (e.g. Levitt 2005; Liebenow 1969; Lowenkopf 1976; Sawyer 1992). Americo-Liberian rule continued uninterrupted through the second half of the 19th century and most of the 20th century, though periodic indigenous rebellions erupted and were suppressed. In most of the country outside of Monrovia, the only experience indigenous Liberians had with the state was of coercion, forced labor, and taxation (see Munive 2011).

Under the governments of William Tubman (1944-1971) and William Tolbert (1971-1980), the ruling True Whig Party, controlled by Americo-Liberians, began to govern in a more developmentalist manner, seeking to build out state infrastructural power. Slowly but meaningfully, Tubman and Tolbert enacted policies to expand opportunities and access to services

87 The settlers and their descendants are also known colloquially in Liberia as the ‘Congo’ people.

88 There was, for instance, an increasing effort to rationalize the government bureaucracy and develop greater state knowledge of the territory and population through censuses and mapping, even if it did not always improve outcomes (Conteh 1988; J. M. Jones 1986; MPEA 1983). There was also increased involvement of local authorities in the interior in administration, beginning to decentralize power (LIB-37, Emmanuel Bowier).

Beginning with Tubman, services previously concentrated only “in places where the power elite have lived” began to see “some attempt at trickling down services to smaller cities” and towns (LIB-51, Byron Tarr). Mission schools and clinics in rural areas began to be supplemented by government facilities from the 1960s through the Tolbert regime in the 1970s (David 1993, 61; Liebenow 1987), even if much of the periphery remained outside of state influence and interest. The lack of political voice at the center of power, however, frustrated indigenous Liberians, even as a select few student leaders from rural areas were incorporated into the government (LIB-43, Jefferson Kanmoh). Following riots and looting in 1979 over a planned increase in the price of rice, the preferred local staple food, the hegemony of the True Whig Party and Americo-Liberians was finally ended in 1980 through a coup by junior military officers, led by Master Sergeant Samuel Kanyon Doe.

There were initial hopes that Doe’s coup would usher in a new era of political openness and that the inclusion of indigenous people at the center of politics for the first time would bring economic and social benefits to the majority of the population. Doe’s rule, however, quickly devolved into a personalized military dictatorship in which patronage and power were dispensed primarily on the basis of tribal affinity to now-President Doe. From among Liberia’s sixteen indigenous ethnic groups, Doe’s rule was seen as chiefly benefitting his own Krahn tribe, and the Mandingo, a primarily Muslim tribe involved in trading. Resentment and disillusionment grew domestically and among exiles abroad, many of whom had served in positions in the Tubman and
Tolbert administrations, creating the seeds for a new coup attempt in 1985, and later the rebellion of the NPFL in 1989.\footnote{The Doe regime also over time lost the support of the United States, traditionally Liberia’s most important ally, as corruption and human rights violations increased (D. E. Dunn 2009; Duyvesteyn 2004, 54; Lyons 1998, 22).}

**The Origins and Leadership of the NPFL**

One of Doe’s fellow coup-makers in 1980 was Thomas Quiwonkpa, who under Doe’s new People’s Redemption Council government was suddenly promoted to major general and commander of the Armed Forces of Liberia. As Doe consolidated power around himself and a core of his Krahn coethnics, he became uneasy with the popularity of Quiwonkpa, a Gio, in the military, and so tried to demote him in late 1983. Quiwonkpa rejected this demotion and was accused, along with Samuel Dokie, a Mano also from the eastern county of Nimba, of plotting a coup, leading Quiwonkpa to flee the country (Ellis 2007; Gerdes 2013, 31; Huband 1998). With support from exiles and other Mano and Gio Nimbanians angry at their treatment by Doe, Quiwonkpa in 1985 organized a coup attempt, shortly after Doe won sham elections to maintain his hold on power. The coup was crushed and Quiwonkpa killed, however. Doe responded by seeking vengeance on the Mano and Gio in Nimba County, unleashing waves of violent repression and discriminating against Mano and Gio in the military and living in Monrovia. A few coup participants survived from Quiwonkpa’s ‘National Patriotic Forces of Liberia,’ and along with exiles and a large contingent of angry Nimbanians, they continued to search for ways to topple the Doe regime, though it took time for a new military organization to coalesce. A number of potential leaders emerged to head the challenge to Doe, but one ultimately became the figurehead and commander of the new rebel movement: Charles Taylor.
Taylor was the son of an Americo-Liberian father and Gola mother, growing up mainly among the Americo-Liberian community. He attended university, studying business, in the US, where he became involved in exile politics during the Tolbert government. Even during his activist days in the US, Taylor was remembered as highly ambitious (Schuster 1994, 52). Tolbert invited Taylor and other young exile leaders to come back to Liberia in early 1980 for a visit, and so Taylor was in the country when Doe’s coup occurred. Due to his education and the fact that he was married to Quiwonkpa’s niece, Taylor was offered a position in the new government and became head of the General Services Agency, in charge of procurement and distribution for government ministries and agencies. Taylor was unpopular due to a reputation for pushing back on improper use of government property by Doe and others and criticizing government policies, leading to his demotion in November 1983, and then accusations that he himself had embezzled funds. When Quiwonkpa fled that month, Taylor decided he too should leave, eventually landing back in the US. In January 1984, Taylor wrote a secret letter to Doe complaining about his treatment, but also discussing his personal political ambitions to climb higher in the government and suggesting he wanted to challenge Doe in the 1985 presidential elections (Huband 1998, 23–24). Taylor was arrested and jailed in Massachusetts in May 1984, as Doe’s government pressed for his extradition, but he escaped from jail in September 1985 and fled the US, eventually landing back in West Africa in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire.

Several factions existed among the exiles organizing around West Africa, the US, and Europe, with a number of civilian political leaders quitting the government and joining dissident organizations in the mid-1980s, especially after the Quiwonkpa coup’s failure (LIB-40, Emmanuel Bowier; LIB-53, Conmany Wesseh). Opposition groups aiming to overthrow Doe formed in

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90 Taylor also said in 1998 that he had been “practicing for this job (presidency) for the past 22 years,” which would mean since 1976 (Bartuah 1999, 17).
Ghana, Guinea, Senegal, and Sierra Leone. Taylor began to collect his own supporters, both Liberians and dissidents from elsewhere in West Africa. In 1987, now based in Burkina Faso, Taylor began traveling to Libya, seeking the support of Muammar Qaddafi’s regime, which was also the aim of the leaders of other nascent Liberian armed movements forming around West Africa (LIB-47, Byron Tarr; LIB-53, Conmany Wesseh). Taylor sought support from many more established dissident leaders, though there were frequent disagreements. In Ghana, there were concerns over Taylor’s plans for a sustained armed rebellion, rather than a coup, and his demands that “military would determine who would dictate everything…[and] that he would be the head of everything and that everybody could tag along” (LIB-53, Conmany Wesseh).

With the aid of former soldiers Cooper Miller and Prince Johnson, Taylor assembled a group of about 70 men for training in Libya. When a group assembled by exile leader Joe Wiley tried to join them, Taylor treated them as a threat to his control, and tried to send them away (Huband 1998, 53). Taylor grew further frustrated and angered when 100 men organized by another dissident leader, Boima Fahnbullleh, arrived in Libya for training, since he had wanted to be the undisputed leader of the challenge to Doe, and was already determined to become president in a post-victory administration (Ellis 2007, 72; Huband 1998, 55, 57). Dissident leader Tonia King, who in 1989 was affiliated with Taylor and the NPFL, said it became clear that Taylor was uninterested in cooperating with other leaders, realizing “that Taylor didn’t want a democratic organisation, and in fact just wanted something for himself” (Huband 1998, 58).

During this period of late-1980s ferment, Taylor remained mainly interested in leveraging West African political rivalries to gain support and space for mobilization, rather than undertaking thorough political planning or program development for a future Liberia, as was done by the left-
leaning Movement for Justice in Africa (MOJA) and the Progressive Alliance of Liberia (PAL).\textsuperscript{91}

In fact, an early Taylor associate in the NPFL told journalist Mark Huband (1998, introduction) that political planning developed in Libya was based mainly around securing Libyan influence in West Africa, while “MOJA militants and the leaderships of all the Liberian political parties would be eliminated.” This was in part a result of Taylor’s unhappiness with MOJA members’ own overtures to Libya (LIB-53, C. Wesseh). As plans for an invasion accelerated in December 1989, Taylor made NPFL fighters pledge loyalty to him personally (Huband 1998, 59).\textsuperscript{92} He also opened the NPFL to opposition fighters from countries around West Africa. These fighters joined with the understanding that Taylor would return the favor with support in their home countries if they helped him take power in Liberia (Alao 1998, 34; Duyvesteyn 2004, 55), and Taylor also had aid from Burkinabé soldiers, who would remain some of his closest and most trusted troops and bodyguards (Adebajo 2002b; Alao 1998; Howe 1996).

When the invasion came on December 24, 1989, the main NPFL force under Prince Johnson’s command successfully crossed into Nimba County from Côte d’Ivoire. Two other planned prongs of the invasion collapsed, however, and Taylor, after briefly being arrested, fled to Burkina Faso. Burkina Faso under Blaise Compaoré was the NPFL’s most staunch regional supporter,\textsuperscript{93} while Côte d’Ivoire also supported the group until 1993, under the government of Félix Houphouët Boigny (see Adebajo 2002b; Alao 1998). Johnson, a Gio, was able to gather

\textsuperscript{91} Some members of MOJA and PAL had discredited themselves in the popular view, however, by joining the Doe government before returning to opposition and thus were seen as either tainted by association with the dictatorship or overly personally ambitious for power (LIB-45, Byron Tarr; LIB-52, John Richardson).

\textsuperscript{92} Reno (1993, 179) stated that “From the start of his invasion, Taylor has relied upon personal obedience and the use of force to create, protect and discipline his political network…”

\textsuperscript{93} Compaoré allegedly relied on the assistance of Prince Johnson and other early NPFL members in the 1987 assassination of Thomas Sankara that brought Compaoré to power (LIB-28, NPFL general and later SSU commander; RFI 2008).
strong support for the NPFL among the Nimbanians angered by Doe’s military repression against them, and his forces became the nucleus for the NPFL and its operations in Liberia as the civil war began. While the NPFL would later develop extensive commercial ties to foreign companies to exploit natural resources, at this initial stage, recruits were motivated by grievances against the government, which should have placed them closer to the programmatic, “activist” side of Weinstein’s (2007) typology.

**Ideology, Aims, and Rebel Governance**

Prince Johnson established a base around the village of Gborplay, and in the first few months of 1990, gathered and trained Mano and Gio recruits, awaiting weapons Taylor had promised would come from Libya. These weapons finally arrived in March, as did Taylor. As the NPFL forces grew and became better armed, they advanced through eastern Liberia, capturing large swathes of territory and eventually establishing a new primary base at the city of Gbarnga in Bong County, a mining area. For recruits and outsiders alike, the goals of the NPFL were presented as battling to topple Doe, “liberate Liberians who were supposed to be in bondage” (Aning 1998, 17), and create “a new Liberia” through a struggle they considered a ‘revolution,’ though few specifics were offered about what the new Liberia would comprise (Huband 1998, 77).

Former NPFL officers stated that the organization’s aims were to defeat Doe and to end tribalism and nepotism, which were largely understood as Doe’s policies of favoring the Krahn and Mandingo with positions and resources, and his violent repression and discrimination against the Mano and Gio. Deposing Doe was seen as a form of liberation for the Mano and Gio fighters, who told coethnic civilians, “we came to free you people from suppression …You need to be with us to go and move this government from power, because they kill our people” (LIB-3, NPFL
intelligence officer). Prince Johnson recruited fighters by telling them that removing Doe would “give the country to the sovereign people” (LIB-2, NPFL commander), though most early fighters understood this as meaning that Nimbanians would now be in power, maintaining tribalism, but changing the beneficiaries. One NPFL commander said that the organization was fighting to “bring democratic change,” but also that the fight was “To change the government and put a rightful government there. And we were the rightful government,” rather than to hold elections (LIB-4).

Taylor later claimed that the time in Libya infused him and his forces with a “revolutionary and liberating ideology” (SCSL-03-01-T-784 Part I, p.6), yet as Reno (1998, 93) writes, Taylor and NPFL “did not promulgate a political ideology as much as a political theology, an all-encompassing” reverence for power and the desire to hold it. Rather, the NPFL “was simply a vehicle for Taylor’s political ambitions, and it had no clearly defined ideological identity” (Adebajo 2002b, 58). The NPFL motto of “Liberty, Justice, Discipline, Work,” was, according to Reno (1993, 183), “Not to be confused with any developmentalist urge,” but instead focused on “domination of society, accumulation and power.” Even one of Taylor’s staunchest defenders, former NPFL official and Taylor adviser John T. Richardson admits that “Taylor, he had a vision, but he didn’t have the foggiest idea of how to implement [it],” though they also discussed “running Liberia as a corporate entity, rather than a government bureaucracy” (LIB-52).

Consolidation of Leadership

The issue of governmental change and who would be in charge was contentious among NPFL leaders, as well. As mentioned above, Taylor had sought among early NPFL fighters to

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94 According to a survey of ex-combatants, only 10% of former NPFL fighters said they joined because of the organization’s political goals (Pugel 2007).
ensure loyalty to himself, rather than necessarily to a higher cause,95 with leadership hierarchies below Taylor often poorly defined.96 As the rebellion unfolded and the early recruits trained in Libya were supplemented by an ever-growing cohort of disaffected Nimbanians, Taylor felt increasingly threatened. In early June, Elmer Johnson, a former US marine and an NPFL commander who had been involved in a 1984 insurrection attempt against Doe, was found dead behind NPFL lines after the group had captured the port of Buchanan. It was suspected that he was killed on Taylor’s orders because his military experience and combat skills marked him as a threat to Taylor’s leadership (Huband 1998, 111–13). After Elmer Johnson’s death, NPFL secretary general Moses Duopu was also killed, allegedly on Taylor’s orders (Ellis 2007, 84).97 Duopu had told outsiders that the NPFL was run by an Executive Council that would vote to decide who would be the president in case of victory, and stated that he intended to run for president, challenging Taylor’s supremacy in the movement (Ellis 2007, 84).

With the increase in Nimbanians in the NPFL, the ethnic affinity and military prestige enjoyed by Prince Johnson also worried Taylor, who viewed Johnson as “frisky” (LIB-2, NPFL officer) and potentially interested in taking control of the movement. Prince Johnson, on the other hand, was less interested in taking power and becoming president, focusing on toppling Doe and instituting democracy. In May 1990, Taylor had told outside journalists that “We’re going to build the kind of democracy we want. We in the [NPFL] have political ambitions too, and there will be elections when the time is right. The NPFL will be the transition government” (Huband 1998, 99).

95 As Duyvesteyn (2004, 15) points out, ideological programs and personalism can coexist within rebel organizations, but this was not the case with Taylor and the NPFL.

96 When NPFL units captured the Firestone rubber plantation in June 1990, the initial commander had been killed and the NPFL did not quickly name a replacement, which “resulted in several disagreements among individual rebels as they argue[d] about priorities, personal precedence and distribution of looted spoils” (Defense Intelligence Agency 1990b).

97 Also stated in LIB-2, NPFL commander.
Yet Johnson felt Taylor was “overambitious for power” and “wanted to seize and hold power” with himself as president (LIB-44, Prince Johnson). There had already been tensions between the pair shortly after the invasion, and by May, Johnson and forces under his command had effectively separated from the NPFL forces following Taylor (Ellis 2007, 81–82).

The NPFL had been successfully advancing, even reaching the suburbs of Monrovia, and controlled the majority of the national territory, but leadership disputes undermined the group, as Prince Johnson decided in late July 1990 to officially split from the NPFL and Taylor, forming the Independent NPFL (INPFL), rather than risk being killed by his ‘own’ side (LIB-44, Johnson). Johnson has been consistent in since leaving the NPFL in arguing that he split due to Taylor’s dictatorial tendencies, even writing a book called *The Gun That Liberates Should Not Rule*, which calls for democratic government and accountability in the use of resources by the executive branch (P. Y. Johnson 1991). Other interviewees confirmed this was the reason for the break between Johnson and Taylor, and for the INPFL’s separation (LIB-1, NPFL general; LIB-21, ULIMO officer).98 The advance of the NPFL also worried leaders around West Africa, with Ghana and Nigeria pushing for the conflict to be resolved quickly, leading the regional Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to create the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) peacekeeping force. This force vacillated between neutral peacekeeping, active opposition to the NPFL, and tacit cooperation with the group over the course of the conflict (see Adebajo 2002b; Alao 1998; Howe 1996). Taylor and the NPFL opposed the ECOMOG intervention, attacking

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98 Prince Johnson and the INPFL, for their part, claim that they engaged in rebel governance in their areas of operations, “feeding the hungry, medicating the sick and wounded, and sharing clothes and money,” while they also purportedly “opened hospitals and clinics, and an orphanage” (P. Y. Johnson 1991, 9).
peacekeeping forces as they arrived in August 1990, while Samuel Doe and Prince Johnson welcomed the multinational force.\textsuperscript{99}

After the fragmentation of the NPFL and ECOMOG’s arrival, the popular Nimabanian politician Jackson F. Doe, who had crossed over to the NPFL side in early July, disappeared, with allegations that Taylor had ordered his death, fearing he would win any open national presidential election (Ellis 2007, 83–85). During this three month period in mid-1990, other military and political leaders on the NPFL side were allegedly killed by Taylor to preemptively cut off possible challenges to his control and alternative visions for the NPFL, a “purge [that] removed all of Taylor’s most dangerous rivals except Prince Johnson, who had set up on his own” (Ellis 2007, 85).\textsuperscript{100} This centralized and personalized leadership to the point that one former NPFL officer said, “There is no NPFL but Charles Taylor” (LIB-3).\textsuperscript{101} Even after the purge of leading competitors, Taylor “systematically neutralized potential ‘number 2s’” and retained control over military and financial resources in the NPFL to ensure he remained clearly at the top of the group’s hierarchy (Weissman 1996, fn.18).

\textit{Development of Governance}

Despite the split, the rump of the NPFL under Taylor remained powerful, and through late 1990, Taylor consolidated control and presided over a network of NPFL commanders from his

\textsuperscript{99} ECOMOG was beset by tensions between Anglophone and Francophone members of ECOWAS, with the Francophone members generally more sympathetic to the NPFL, while for most of the intervention, Nigeria was seen as the primary actor (Adebajo 2002b, 2002a; Alao 1998; Howe 1996; Mgbeoji 2003).

\textsuperscript{100} See also Kieh (1992, 131). Beyond Jackson Doe, a number of other prominent Nimbanians, who might have contended for the political loyalties of the NPFL’s Gio and Mano majority, were also killed, including David Diwayen, Steven Daniels, and David Toweh (Alao 1998, 34–35).

\textsuperscript{101} When Liberians were asked in a 2010 national survey which individuals or organizations were most responsible for the civil wars that had roiled their country, Charles Taylor was the most frequent answer at 45%, while 37% of respondents names the NPFL (Vinck, Phuong, and Kreutzer 2011, 33).
base at Gbarnga. While Taylor often denied responsibility for the actions of commanders who committed atrocities, he maintained strong communications and intelligence networks and was well aware of events throughout the country (Innes 2005a). After Prince Johnson and INPFL forces captured and killed President Doe in September 1990, Taylor became the *de facto* most powerful person in Liberia. NPFL forces continued to press forward toward Monrovia when possible, at times fighting with the INPFL and with the West African ECOMOG peacekeeping forces that intervened in Liberia beginning in September 1990. Taylor also began, though, to develop an administrative apparatus in Gbarnga, and his nascent shadow government began to attract more educated Liberians interested in working for and with Taylor (LIB-39, George Mulbah). In early 1991, the NPFL created the National Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly Government (NPRAG) to rule over the ‘liberated territory’ they called Greater Liberia, also colloquially known as Taylorland. In 1990-91, the NPFL controlled an estimated 80-90% of Liberia’s territory (Harris 2012, 130–31; Lidow 2016, 100), with the group’s control diminishing over time, but still significant, fluctuating between half and three-quarters of the national territory from 1993 into 1995 (Adebajo 2002b, 127; Lowenkopf 1995, 93).

The NPRAG mimicked the structures of the Liberian national government, with a legislative body filled with selected representatives of Liberia’s counties, government ministries, and centrally-supervised administrators at the regional and local levels (see esp. Gerdes 2013, 64–65). These structures, however, were largely hollow, existing primarily to offer the appearance to domestic and external audiences that Taylor and the NPFL had legitimacy equal to or greater than

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102 Taylor issued general orders for the NPFL, but individual commanders in different areas had a great deal of operational autonomy and resource control (see Lidow 2016; Weissman 1996). Duyvesteyn (2004, 35) describes the war as a context in which “individual leadership stands out as a factor in shaping the factions and their aims during the fighting,” with Taylor’s ambitions for the Executive Mansion and legitimacy driving war dynamics (see also Gershoni 1997, 228).
the internationally-supported Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) that had been set up in October 1990 following Doe’s murder. To an extent, they succeeded in the interior of the country, with IGNU having little territorial or material influence and made up in large part of elites who had fled the country.103 Administration remained controlled by Taylor through “intensely personalized, almost completely de-institutionalized political networks” (Reno 1993, 181). Taylor’s “subordinates held little authority over their designated remits, and the formal hierarchy was frequently bypassed to the benefit of personal connections,” with even NPRAG officials receiving no respect from NPFL fighters (Gerdes 2013, 66) and military officers distrusting more educated, politically-minded people who began working with Taylor in Gbarnga (LIB-39, George Mulbah).104 Steinberg (2011, 95–96) sums up clearly that the NPRAG institutions “were little more than a thin façade. What Taylor really had was personal control over commodity-rich territory.”

Close to Gbarnga and the core of NPFL territory, there was a greater degree of order and ‘normalcy’ for civilians. There was “rudimentary state infrastructure, featuring schools, medical clinics, currency, transportation, and a system of public communications” (Innes 2005a, 294). Civilians were protected and largely able to continue farming or became engaged in resource extraction to benefit Taylor and other NPFL commanders so long as they paid taxes and provided young men as fighters (Ellis 1995, 186), yet elsewhere relations with civilians were almost entirely and brutally coercive (Ellis 2007; Lidow 2016, 124–30; Reno 1995, 113).105 As Innes (2005a, 294) puts it, “Within NPFL territory, living conditions were horrendous, freedom of movement was

103 See e.g. Gerdes (2013), Huband (1998); Reno (1995, 113); LIB-52, John Richardson.

104 See also Reno (2015). Part of the problem was the poorly delineated or professionalized hierarchy below Taylor, with “colonels and generals who can’t write their names, intelligence officers who are illiterate, and field commanders who can’t read a map” commonly encountered (Bourke 1990).

105 In this sense, the NPFL’s use of violence against civilians followed Kalyvas’s (2006) logic of territorial control, with contested zones featuring more indiscriminate violence, and zones of more complete NPFL control seeing targeted violence, often against Krahn and Mandingo civilians.
severely curtailed, and human rights violations were legion.” NPFL commanders would place a military officer in charge of a captured town or district and then name a local as deputy to help administer the area, but control and discretion remained firmly with the NPFL officers. In cases where officers were drawn from the area they were governing, often emerging from preexisting local self-defense groups, there was the possibility for some more benevolent treatment of civilians, but the NPFL still created local conflicts through its inversion of the hierarchy between elders and youths (Munive 2011). Especially further away from Gbarnga, organizational cohesion and direction generally diminished: “Things went wrong because there were no trust, no confidence…Because everybody works not together…It’s everybody doing their own thing” (LIB-11, NPFL colonel). In some regions, for instance near Harbel, NPFL forces showed little interest in controlling and governing residential areas (Defense Intelligence Agency 1990a).

NPFL fighters were always instructed to treat civilians with respect and to protect them. Interviewees concurred that NPFL forces were all instructed on a basic standard operating procedure of “No looting, no raping, no killing,” on possible penalty of death. Unarmed civilians were generally not considered a threat, though their movement was restricted to exercise control and prevent information leaks. One former NPFL general reported, “We have certain places where you cannot go, where it is unsafe for you and myself, where they can easily capture you to make you reveal information about me. I will prevent you to go to such a place” (LIB-1, NPFL general).

106 E.g., “What we did was that after capturing a place, the senior officer in consultation with headquarters, they would maintain a military man there as a military commander. And this military man is also assisted by a civilian that would coordinate the affairs between the military and the civilians” (LIB-5, NPFL general). See also Liberty (1998, 163).

107 See also Johnston (2008) and Lidow (2016).

108 While the NPRAG provided little in the way of services, Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) operated clinics in some NPFL-controlled areas throughout the first civil war, much to the displeasure of ECOMOG (Alao 1998, 157, 162).
The NPFL treated civilians as a resource for labor, supplies, and information, but did not emphasize conversion to a political program or cause.

NPFL officers instructed their troops that on capturing a town, “you first rescue civilians, because civilians are the ones that will give you information, if you have any enemies in the area. So you cannot kill any civilians, because if you kill them, who will work for you? Who will cook for you?” and that “Civilians are the people that are your backbone…If you lose civilians, you will never fight the war” (LIB-1, NPFL general and NPFL colonel). Another NPFL officer and former aide to Taylor concurred that the NPFL needed to protect and find food for civilians because “because they will talk for you [provide information] tomorrow” (LIB-17, NPFL officer and later Executive Mansion official). There were some efforts, as well, to ensure that civilians had access to food and NPFL fighters would occasionally provide medical care to injured civilians (LIB-1, NPFL general). It was only in mid-1990, however, that the NPFL began to develop informal efforts to provide food for civilians and not only fighters, after persistent civilian complaints about abuse and their food being stolen (LIB-52, John Richardson).

At least among Mano and Gio fighters, though, this treatment did not extend to Krahn and Mandingo civilians, who were considered the enemy and often rounded up and killed (e.g. Innes 2005a, 293; Waugh 2011, 132–34), despite the NPFL’s supposed goal of ending tribalism. This situation also held for prisoners, for if “you a POW from Krahn tribe, forget it, you won’t make it” (LIB-28, NPFL general and later SSU commander). Some NPFL fighters at the Firestone plantation in 1990 “expressed the intention to kill all Krahns and Mandingos” (Defense Intelligence Agency 1990a). Sometimes fighters were executed for violating the standing order against harming civilians, but enforcement of rules and regulations varied widely according to

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109 Surviving Krahn and Mandingo in NPFL-controlled areas often joined the NPFL to avoid harm (LIB-16, NPFL officer; LIB-20, NPFL officer).
commander and Taylor and other leaders often protected favored officers and fighters. For instance, in Gbarnga during the NPRAG period, “some guys they would go and in broad day commit these atrocities. And sometimes they want to prosecute them, but Taylor know that this guy was one guy that really fought for me, can I exercise some muscle now and punishing him, and he will go scared straight. So people began to realize that there were some people that were untouchable” (LIB-9, NPFL commander and later AFL officer). These selective punishments for violence against civilians were at times also used by Taylor as excuses for eliminating potential rivals (Reno 2015, 272–73). Taylor adviser John T. Richardson stated that discipline was difficult because fighters were materially motivated: “when rebels are fighting, they move toward capital goals. Rebels will capture a city because it’s got televisions, generators, and things. To keep them still, is a problem, because they want to go capture more value” (LIB-52). This problem was compounded by the inconsistency of disciplinary enforcement and the lack of institutions of control or indoctrination to develop fighters’ commitment to any cause beyond themselves and Taylor. Thus, even if there were policies against harming civilians, in practice the NPFL committed a high level of violence (e.g. Republic of Liberia 1993; TRC of Liberia 2008).110

It should be noted, however, that despite frequent impunity for anti-Krahn and Mandingo violence, the killings were not systematically coordinated by the NPFL leadership, who at times sought to curb such ethnic violence (Lidow 2016, 127).111 Most Liberians seem to have been able to distinguish between the responsibility of individual leaders and armed groups for violence, and the broader ethnic groups these leaders and organizations were seen as representing (Vinck, Phuong, and Kreutzer 2011, 33–34). NPFL fighters from other tribes also were often used as a

110 In a study of the full 1989-2003 conflict period, the Liberian TRC found that the NPFL was responsible for approximately 40% of catalogued human rights violations (TRC of Liberia 2008, 215–19).

111 Ellis (1995, 182) asserts, however, that Taylor “encourage[d] massacres in some cases for political reasons.”
counterbalancing force to monitor and rein in the Mano and Gio fighters (LIB-28). While the NPFL incorporated fighters from a wide swathe of Liberia’s ethnic groups as it advanced throughout the country, inclusion was never made an explicit policy. Ethnic inclusion was adopted pragmatically as useful for gaining new fighters and dividing and monitoring forces, but ethnic exclusion or ethnonationalism were likewise never formal policies. As Duyvesteyn (2004, 86) points out, Liberia’s civil wars were, at their root, not ethnic. Ethnicity in Liberia is fluid (Sawyer 1992, 54) and was instrumentally exploited by a wide range of leaders throughout the wars.

If political organization and civilian-focused administration were not priorities for the NPFL, where were their energies directed? Two motivations were central: 1) personalized accumulation of wealth, and 2) advances on the battlefield and in negotiations to move Taylor and the NPFL closer to taking control of the central government (where they would have access to even greater power and resources). Taylor developed extensive international commercial ties in order to exploit the natural resources present in NPFL-occupied territory, taking advantage of Liberia’s timber, diamonds, iron ore, and rubber (Gerdes 2013; Johnston 2004; Reno 1993, 1998, 2015). Priority was given to securing lucrative resource-producing areas, such as mining regions and the Firestone rubber plantation, and seaports to allow the export of these raw materials and the import of weapons, food, and other supplies. Meanwhile, lower level officers and fighters sought to accumulate private wealth through looting, as they had often been promised during recruitment (e.g. Aning 1998, 17; Ellis 2007). Valuable looted resources tended to be funneled upwards and appropriated by commanders, though, while Taylor rewarded loyal commanders with cash payments (Ellis 2007; Gerdes 2013; Lidow 2016). Estimates of the amount of money available to Taylor and the NPFL vary widely, though the most recent, detailed estimates from Gerdes (2013), while conservative, still suggest that millions of dollars in profits per year—from resource
extraction, looting and extortion, and appropriated development aid—were flowing into NPFL coffers throughout the civil war, under close control by Taylor (see Table 5.1 below).

**Table 5.1 NPFL Profits 1990-1997**

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<td>Profits (US$ millions)</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>16.3</td>
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<td>5.8</td>
<td>13.3</td>
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Source: Gerdes (2013, 103).

Some of this money was assuredly used for military purposes, but an unknown amount also went into the pockets of Taylor and other NPFL leaders. The NPFL did at times engage in the rehabilitation of roads and posted forces to remote areas, but these actions were designed to facilitate and protect the extraction and export of resources and the import of supplies (Gerdes 2013, 253; Lidow 2016, 125), rather than as part of a programmatic expansion of NPRAG influence and provision of public goods.

Economic gain was not the only motivation for Taylor and the NPFL, however, or else they could have contented themselves with controlling much of Liberia’s territory and resources. Despite controlling between 80 and 95% of Liberia’s territory in 1990-1991 (Harris 2012, 130–31; Lidow 2016, 100), the NPFL continued pushing to capture Monrovia, the capital, and to install themselves as the internationally-recognized government, with Taylor as president. This motivation increased, rather than waned, after the death of Doe and the weakness of GNU created a power vacuum at Liberia’s center (Duyvesteyn 2004, 30–31). As Harris (2012, 141, 143) writes, Taylor’s “ambition to be the real president in the Executive Mansion in Monrovia was never in doubt,” and although “there were some economic advantages for remaining in a state of perpetual conflict…Taylor’s personal ambitions overrode this temptation.” Even as they faced increased competition from the newly emerged United Liberation Movement of Liberia (ULIMO) rebel group, other smaller rebel forces, and faced changing stances from ECOMOG depending on its
commander, the NPFL devoted forces to the capture of Monrovia and the Executive Mansion, even against heavy odds. This resulted, for instance, in October 1992’s Operation Octopus (a military disaster for the NPFL), which aimed to defeat in Monrovia the remaining Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) soldiers and the ECOMOG peacekeeping force, who were backed by Nigerian naval and air forces. Following Operation Octopus, ECOMOG Field Commander Ishaya Bakut argued that “It is quite clear that Taylor is not sincere about disarmament nor is he willing to let anything stand between him and the Executive Mansion” (Howe 1996, 158).

The NPFL had a history of reluctance and intransigence in peace negotiations from 1990 onward, either refusing to participate or demonstrating a lack of good faith through its demands or by undermining ceasefires to which it initially agreed (Adebajo 2002b, 108; Alao 1998, 80–82). In 1993-1994, Taylor refused to let NPFL representatives join ongoing peace talks, worried that it would undermine his claims to be the only legitimate contender for the presidency, a stance that led several NPFL officials to challenge Taylor’s leadership and split away in March 1994 and join the first Liberian National Transitional Government (LNTG) (Duyvesteyn 2004; Gerdes 2013, 44–45; Lidow 2016, 123–24). These internal challenges to his control preoccupied Taylor, even as forces opposed to him gathered strength and threatened his headquarters at Gbarnga (Defense Intelligence Agency 1994).

**Peace Negotiations and the Transition to Power**

Taylor only entered into negotiations seriously in 1994 after ULIMO forces had seized Gbarnga; another large anti-NPFL rebel group (the Liberia Peace Council, or LPC) had emerged;
a significant portion of NPFL forces had deserted; and Taylor realized he could not remain in conflict with ECOMOG and still take power. Having once controlled almost 90% of Liberia’s territory, the NPFL’s domain shrunk to about 50% of the country by 1993 (Adebajo 2002b, 127; Africa Confidential 1993). The NPFL, however, “remained the largest, most powerful, and best equipped of Liberia’s warring groups…all other factions combined still did not match it in terms of manpower, weaponry,” with the NPFL in 1994 boasting about 35,000 members to 10,500 ULIMO fighters and 8,037 members of the rump AFL forces (Innes 2005a, 293).

Following losses, but while maintaining significant power and leverage, the NPFL was willing to entertain peace negotiations as a stalling strategy. As Sen. Conmany Wesseh, who was a negotiator for IGNU, saw it, “Every peace conference [Taylor] went to, it was when he perceived a power shift and needed a quick break. Then he would agree and go to the thing. During that period, he used this to mobilize more resources,” getting arms from Libya through Burkina Faso (LIB-53), and consistently refusing to agree to the disarmament of NPFL forces (Adebajo 2002b; Alao 1998). Even in negotiations, Taylor concentrated on ensuring that he could retain political primacy and power over rivals. During the talks to create the second LNTG in early 1996, “Taylor focused on ministries important for the exercise of political power, rather than the extraction of revenues, which he was well prepared to effectively control without official responsibility,” pressing for control over Agriculture, Foreign Affairs, Information, Internal Affairs, and Justice (Gerdes 2013, 52–53), as well as beginning to politically campaign in areas of NPFL control in anticipation of eventual elections (LIB-52, Richardson). Taylor actively presented himself as the most powerful among the interim leaders and used alliances and manipulation to sideline other faction leaders and push himself closer to sole control (Gershoni 1997).
In 1996 and 1997, as peace negotiations moved forward and it was agreed to hold national elections in July 1997, Taylor continued maneuvering to ensure victory for himself and the NPFL. With a ceasefire and peace talks allowing him to enter Monrovia, Taylor sought to co-opt or eliminate rivals and cultivate support, utilizing NPFL control of economic resources and strategic ministries in the transitional government to solidify his political supremacy. As one community leader put it, “when Charles Taylor came, he decided to steal the show, saying I got the money, I got the gold, diamonds, I got the logs, the timbers, the iron ore, everything. So anything, everybody got to talk to me before they talk to you. I want this seat, I want the defense ministry, I want this, and you got to give it because I got a bigger faction than everybody” (LIB-12). When Taylor’s domineering nature led to pushback from Roosevelt Johnson, leader of the Krahn-dominated ULIMO-J faction, in April 1996, Taylor used the pretext of a murder by ULIMO-J forces to try to arrest Johnson and disarm his forces at their base in central Monrovia, sparking a bloody battle known locally as the April 6 War or Camp Johnson Road War. As Taylor centralized power, fear of marginalization also turned common fighters from other factions more aggressively against Taylor. In one instance, this led to an assassination attempt on Taylor in October 1996 by a ULIMO faction at the Executive Mansion in Monrovia, in which Taylor hid in a bathroom until ECOMOG forces could rescue him (LIB-1, NPFL general; LIB-12; Alao 1998, 32; Ellis 2007, 106).

With elections approaching, Taylor “dominated the political environment” (Harris 2012, 153), and the conditions of the election benefited Taylor: there was a short time between negotiations and elections; the NPFL and its newly established National Patriotic Party (NPP) were the largest and best organized party and armed group in the country; and the NPFL still militarily controlled many areas, restricting other parties’ access (Harris 2012, 153–54; Tanner 1998). Taylor worked to push the elections further in his favor by delaying the appointment of the independent
electoral commission and then applying pressure to ensure that the elections would take place as soon as possible, “threatening violence” if there were delays (Innes 2005a, 301; Tanner 1998, 139). The NPP did develop a campaign plan\(^{113}\) and Taylor enjoyed sources of legitimacy beyond coercive power (e.g. charisma, financial clout, and the loyalty of some Nimbanians to him and the NPFL). The NPFL, though, also benefitted from control of the only nationally-available radio station up until a few days before the election, in a country where radio is the primary medium for news and information,\(^{114}\) while a helicopter and local party activists increased the NPP’s geographic projection on the ground, unmatched by any opponents (Innes 2005a, 2005b; Tanner 1998, 138–39).

Taylor and the NPP’s victory in the 1997 elections, however, was strongly based on the NPFL’s coercive power and the pervasive belief that Taylor would plunge the country back into war if he lost the election (Harris 1999, 2012; Lyons 1998; Seyon 1998; Tanner 1998).\(^{115}\) As aid worker Victor Tanner (1998, 138) wrote, Taylor “made it clear that he believes he has a divine mandate to rule Liberia. It was clear to most that he would not take defeat graciously, and that he had the means to go back to war,” despite the presence of international peacekeepers, and that any opponent who might win would have difficulty controlling Taylor. Taylor won 75% of the vote and the NPP won legislative super majorities of 21 of 26 Senate seats and 49 of 64 House seats.

\(^{113}\) Taylor’s former Press Secretary and Information Minister Reginald Goodridge described the campaign platform as having “what we called the 37 principles that covered every aspect of Liberian society, from economics to agriculture to national security, unification of the people…and then effectively what we did was voter education. We put out hundreds of thousands of booklets on voter education, community meetings and things. And basically, people were—the whole drive of this process was to bring prosperity to Liberia in a post-war era” (LIB-50).

\(^{114}\) This advantage in disseminating propaganda and campaign information was bolstered by NPFL forces targeting independent media outlets and transmission facilities (Innes 2005a, 300).

\(^{115}\) Responding to international observers’ certification of the elections as ‘free and fair,’ Tanner (1998, 140) writes that “The whole issue of whether the poll was free and fair begs the real point: a leading warlord was elected with no clear commitment to abandon violence. Many Liberians readily admit that they voted for Taylor because he would have gone back to war had he lost—and there was nothing ECOMOG could have done to avoid it.” See Liberty (1998) for a contrasting view on Taylor’s popularity and legitimacy.
Thus, while the NPFL did not necessarily enter power through a military victory, they achieved a clear political victory in which their coercive power and perceived willingness to continue fighting was a determining factor.

The NPFL and Charles Taylor in Power

Did achieving the goal of taking control of the central government and the presidency change the NPFL and Charles Taylor’s orientation and make them turn toward broader public interests? During his victory speech after the elections, Taylor struck a conciliatory tone, stating that “The good People of Liberia have finally won. You have won. The opposition has won. The International Community has won” (C. Taylor n.d., 22). In his inaugural address in August 1997, Taylor described the NPFL as “the vanguard of an inexorable surge of committed individuals to the task of restoring constitutional government to the Republic of Liberia, we marched to ensure that the Rule of Law would guarantee the pursuit of individual liberties, restructure a collective industry, and accelerate the pace of democratization of the Free Market System,” and he committed to being a president for all Liberians (C. Taylor n.d., 28, 31). Initial cabinet appointments and rhetoric suggested that Taylor was interested in incorporating his former enemies into government and protecting civil liberties like freedom of the press, and observers were heartened by the appointment of well-regarded economist Elie Saleeby as Minister of Finance. The positive rhetoric and appointments, however, were quickly belied by policy decisions and the practice of governance. Taylor was “at times saying all the right things about good governance and economic reform, and at others carrying forth with unreasonable statements and brutally lashing out at opponents, real and perceived” (Tanner 1998, 142).
The documents published and statements made by Taylor were seen as aiming only “to impress foreigners. The extent of commitment that will drive implementation [was] not there” (LIB-47, Tarr). Former rivals found themselves excluded as soon as they questioned Taylor or were perceived as a threat, with Taylor willing to use economic cooptation, but “refus[ing] to more fundamentally integrate his potential rivals by allowing participation” (Gerdes 2013, 254). Key positions politically and financially in the new administration in fact were filled by moving loyal leaders from the NPFL and NPRAG into the central state and parastatals, such as Benoni Urey at the Bureau of Maritime affairs (in charge of the international lucrative shipping registry), Roland Massaquoi as Minister of Agriculture (Gerdes 2013, 134), and Roland Duo at the Oriental Timber Corporation (Lidow 2016, 121), a company half-owned by Taylor that held 70% of Liberia’s forestry concessions (Gerdes 2013, 145).116 What had in fact transpired with the elections was the accomplishment of Taylor and the NPFL’s goals of attaining the presidency and central government control, beginning a rule “marked by [Taylor’s] centrality in terms of both personal control of relations of political domination and appropriation of national economy profits” (Gerdes 2013, 150–51).

In terms of civil rights and inclusion, in a December 1998 speech, Taylor stated that

“On the exercise of basic civil and human rights, the administration is very conscious that stifling of freedom of speech, of association and of movement is one of the vices that produced the civil war. Therefore, our attitude is that, we in government may not agree with what people say about government, but it is better for people to say what they wish than to stop them from saying it. We may not like your friends, but it is our duty to protect your right to associate with them. Where you go is none of anybody’s business, as long as you do not bring harm to him or her” (C. Taylor n.d., 284–85).

116 See also Munive (2011, 369–70) on NPFL commanders’ control of resource extraction companies.
Yet in practice, critical journalists and human rights activists were persecuted and even tortured (Harris 2012, 137). Even an article in a journal produced by the Ministry of Information acknowledged intimidation of journalists by security forces under Taylor (M. B.-W. Freeman 1999).

**Developing Despotic Power**

Instead of engaging in efforts to expand the infrastructural power and social service delivery capacity of the Liberian state, Taylor concentrated on the development of the security forces and coercive power. The prioritization of security was made clear from the beginning of Taylor’s time in office, with an official statement in January 1998 saying “that 82% of the new state budget would be devoted to national security,” a number that was walked back amid public outcry (Tanner 1998, 143). As with the economic sector, Taylor sought to establish strong personalized control over security forces to prevent challenges to his power and protect his own interests, including building influence throughout West Africa. Rep. Jefferson Kanmoh suggests that Taylor was elected with the expectation he would “use that power to justify the numerous sacrifices that were made through the destruction of property, destruction of life, to reconcile our people and put in programs to rehabilitate those areas and facilities and lives that were destroyed. Open up the country to new opportunities for our people. But instead he was still entrenched and inspired in what we call military expansionism and building a political empire within this sub-region” (LIB-43). The limited control over security forces in terms of human rights carried over into power, as well. While there was some moderation initially, “the soldiers and security forces

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117 In an interview, Hassan Bility, a journalist from the *Analyst* newspaper and later a human rights advocate, described in detail the attempts by Taylor’s government to censor his coverage and Bility’s subsequent torture and exile (LIB-41).
behaved not the exact way they behaved during the war, but very close to that. They grabbed people, they would beat up people, they would shoot people in the street” (LIB-41, Hassan Bility).

Taylor sought to maintain personal control over security policy and isolated it from other aspects of government. Even as Taylor supported rebel movements throughout West Africa and sent former NPFL fighters to support the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels in Sierra Leone, he did not involve the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Former Foreign Minister Monie Captan stated that, “Taylor didn’t like to discuss those issues with the cabinet. He had a second tier of people that he dealt with on those things…There were times we would ask to bring this to the cabinet and discuss it and he said no. He thought it was a security issue that didn’t concern us” (LIB-48).118 Former Minister of State for Presidential Affairs Jonathan Taylor agreed that, “[Charles] Taylor himself, he had been through a war in the past, so a lot of stuff he managed himself with his Minister of Defense and chief of staff” (LIB-49). These interventions abroad, however, damaged Liberia and Taylor’s international reputation and led to restrictions on aid and trade with the country, which would have been useful if NPFL leaders were primarily interested in state building and development. The Taylor government’s support for the RUF in Sierra Leone drove a wedge between Liberia and the US, which had initially been open to working with Taylor (e.g. Adebajo 2002b, 93), but pulled back. The US was “skeptical because of the past history with [the NPFL]” (LIB-50, Reginald Goodridge), and regional stability was a priority, with Undersecretary of State Thomas Pickering on a June 1998 visit to Taylor threatening “severe consequences” if involvement in Sierra Leone did not cease (LIB-49, Jonathan Taylor; D. E. Dunn 2012, 24). Taylor, however,

118 Former Minister of Information, Culture, and Tourism and key Taylor adviser Reginald Goodridge described the situation as Taylor having different “layers” of cabinet members and advisers: “You have the boardroom cabinet members, you have the kitchen cabinet members, you have the restroom cabinet people, and then you have the bedroom cabinet people” (LIB-50). Prince Johnson suggests that Taylor wanted to install allied governments in Liberia’s neighbors to ensure they would deny sanctuary to the Liberian opposition, thus allowing Taylor to control or eliminate rivals within Liberia (LIB-44).
had come to power “thinking of making himself a czar or something of West Africa…There was a time when he bragged at a press conference, he said that Liberia had the best ground force in West Africa” (LIB-41, Bility), and he refused to accede to international demands to curb regional interventions.

**Force Proliferation and Counterbalancing**

During the first civil war, Taylor had engaged in efforts to ‘coup-proof’ his forces through personal loyalty and creation of multiple parallel units, and this was replicated when he became president. After the peace talks and elections, it had been agreed that the Armed Forces of Liberia under the new regime would incorporate members from all of the warring factions, so Taylor’s former enemies were included, as well. This made the loyalty of the new AFL suspect, and so Taylor worked to block any ECOMOG-administered restructuring of the AFL (Adebajo 2002b, 235), entrusted key security positions to loyal NPFL commanders, and created new, personalized units. As the proliferation of units suggests, Taylor “never had explicit confidence in anybody. If Charles Taylor established a group today, he would establish another group to serve as watchdog for that group” (LIB-18, NPFL officer and later SOD commander).

Shortly after becoming president, Taylor created the Executive Mansion Special Security Unit (SSU) as his praetorian guard, which was later transformed into the Anti-Terrorist Unit

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119 Taylor at times put foreign fighters in charge of his personal security (Gerdes 2013, 77), and he developed a cult of personality among the child soldiers in his ‘Small Boy Units,’ or SBUs (e.g. Ellis 2007).

120 AFL soldiers who had been in the organization a long time remained in spite of their distrust of Taylor. As one AFL captain said of Taylor, “All the traits that were inside him, we knew, but nothing we can do. He were not coming in the interests of the people” (LIB-33).

121 After seeing President Laurent Kabila killed by one of his own bodyguards in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the constantly-suspicious Taylor replaced his own security detail (Adebajo 2002b, 236).

122 Also known as the Special Security Service (SSS).
(ATU), under the command of Taylor’s son Chucky, a US citizen who became known for his brutality and unpredictability (see esp. Dwyer 2015). Elite NPFL units were also repurposed and renamed as paramilitary units to protect resource extraction operations and economically important infrastructure, such as logging operations and ports (Gerdes 2013, 139–40). Elite and personalized units enjoyed superior resources and prestige to the AFL, which grew marginalized and was unable to develop a professional ethic. Taylor purged over 2,000 AFL members in 1998 (Adebajo 2002a, 70), in a move to consolidate his and former NPFL officers’ control and reduce the influence of soldiers who had been in the military under Doe. A former AFL colonel said the dismissals were “done ethnically. People who were close to Doe government,” and that while discharged soldiers were given a US$75 severance payment, they were harassed by Taylor’s forces, increasing their sense of insecurity and disaffection and sowing seeds for new rebellions (LIB-34), which emerged in 1999 with the invasion of Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD). Those NPFL fighters who were folded into the AFL received worse equipment and pay than their peers in other units, and those in Taylor’s specialized units were “not having too much respect for the AFL. We were all in the faction [NPFL], but when Taylor sent us in the AFL, they come down, they not have too much regard for us” (LIB-26, NPFL colonel later in AFL).

The ATU was developed as an elite force and expanded beyond the SSU’s original executive protection function to become an all-purpose special forces unit for suppression of dissent around Monrovia, as well as undertaking frontline combat against rebels once the second civil war began (e.g. Dwyer 2015). ATU fighters had better equipment than the AFL troops and were paid salaries of US$150 per month, always receiving pay, even when other government employees received their salaries very irregularly. The ATU grew to about 5,000 men and as

123 See also Gerdes (2013, 140).
LURD expanded and advanced, Taylor began relying more heavily on the ATU forces. He trusted them “Because the ATU were private soldiers, who were taking $150 in salary every month and one bag of rice. At the end of the day, we had control of them. But the AFL, we never had control of the AFL. That’s why we never assigned the AFL. They were not taking pay, hell no, they will not work on anything” (LIB-29, NPFL general and later ATU commander). The ATU were also used to police other security forces, interrogating and sometimes executing those suspected of disloyalty or committing crimes (LIB-27, NPFL general and later ATU officer).

The G-2 unit, which had been the intelligence wing of the NPFL, was expanded when Taylor became president and served as a personalized intelligence service and protection service for key regime figures and business partners (Gerdes 2013, 140). Within the Liberian National Police, Taylor established the Special Operations Division (SOD), also known as ‘Sons of the Devil,’ as a personalized unit made up of NPFL veterans, “purposely established so as to secure his interests at the level of the police” (LIB-18, NPFL officer and later SOD commander). SOD was used to persecute opposition politicians and activists, “to deal with whosoever that opposes Charles Taylor at the time, who will go against Charles Taylor at the time,” and SOD officers were placed in the police command structure throughout the country to ensure Taylor’s control and access to information (LIB-18, NPFL officer and later SOD commander).

With the expansion of the second civil war, Taylor and his government also created militias to fight in outlying counties, largely composed of former NPFL fighters, but gradually expanding to include new recruits, especially in 2001 and 2002 (Lidow 2016, 109). These forces had limited formal training (Pugel 2007, 42), but they were used rather than the diminished and untrusted AFL, for they served Taylor directly, rather than acting “for the state” (LIB-32, NPFL captain and later militia commander). The lack of training and influx of new recruits, however, meant that the
militias were more susceptible to desertion than other units, with some members eventually flipping and joining rebel forces or switching sides after capture (LIB-18, militia officer and later LURD officer). The militias also did not enjoy the pay of the ATU or SOD, instead receiving food and sometimes clothing (LIB-29). While the different security forces were at times able to coordinate and work together, the resource disparities also bred jealousy and some militia forces attacked the ATU when it began moving out into ‘their’ territories (LIB-19, NPFL officer and later ATU deputy commander). These internal disputes are simply another manifestation of the personalism and parochialism of the NPFL and Taylor’s regime, undermining collective security and the possibility for state building and development.

These characteristics proved to be the undoing of Taylor and the regime he had established. Taylor’s lust for power and economic control led to interference and the sponsorship of rebellions in neighboring countries, turning the international community definitively against him and leading to increased support for rebels in Liberia. The lack of an ethos in the NPFL beyond personal enrichment and loyalty to Taylor became clearer as more of the Taylor government’s forces deserted and rebel forces grew during the early 2000s, culminating in 2003 in a siege of Monrovia and Taylor’s decision, after lengthy and intense international pressure, to resign and go into exile in Nigeria. Amidst this environment of repression and insecurity from 1997 to 2003, non-coercive state building and government service provision were largely ignored by the Taylor administration.

**State Building and Services: Rhetoric without Action**

What were the Taylor administration’s plans regarding state building and provision of public goods and services? Taylor’s domestic policy was supposed to be built around “five pillars of Reconstruction and Development (National Security, Strong Economy, Agriculture, Education
and Health)” (C. Taylor n.d., 37). At his trial at the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Taylor’s defense team argued that he “was the head of a government that was fully functional and engaged in functions domestic and diplomatic, economic and social, all for the betterment of the Liberian people,” and that “Priorities in the Liberian budget under Taylor were development, property renovation, and education; defence was sixth in order of priorities” (SCSL-03-01-T-1248, pp.48-49). In July 1998, the new government held the ‘Vision 2024’ conference to set planning priorities for the next 25 years, but Taylor blamed a lack of progress since the elections on international donors (C. Taylor n.d., 256–57). Political historian Joseph Saye Guannu argues that the conference had no follow-up in terms of policy, and served only as a signal of Taylor’s intention to “still be in power in 2024” (LIB-35). The conference was seen as devoid of substance and the plan written after as “just pieces of paper” (LIB-47, Nkomo Duche). The one component of state building that the NPFL prioritized was communications, seeking to monopolize radio and newspapers to control information flows (Innes 2005a). They used the communications network, however, to promote Taylor and the organization, rather than emulating previous governments that sought to develop radio networks for nation building by promoting a vision of national unity across regions and ethnicities (Innes 2005b, 244).

Taylor’s supporters claim that he had major plans for economic and infrastructural development and improvement of education, but that these were derailed when the LURD rebellion against him began in April 1999. Taylor “tried to control Liberia so that people could benefit. He started road building, but no one let him finish” (LIB-4, NPFL general), for “what development can you carry on when you have to worry about the safety of the people?” (LIB-4, NPFL general later in SSU). They argue that “war as you know is very expensive, so he will not
be catering to the citizens and to buy ammunition to protect the people” (LIB-13, NPFL deputy commander).

Another common refrain is that the international community did not give sufficient help to Taylor’s government and did not fulfill its aid promises (Captan 2000; C. Taylor n.d., 256–57). While much of the over US$200 million pledged by donors in 1998 at the first donor conference of Taylor’s presidency was never delivered, this was due to the failure of the government to meet established conditions for the consolidation of order and protection of human rights (Gerdes 2013, 151), and relations with donors deteriorated significantly after Taylor’s involvement in the civil war in Sierra Leone became clear (LIB-49, Jonathan Taylor). NPFL officers also blamed the war for a later lack of international aid, with one general saying, “most of those donors, they don’t come in the country…when there is war in the country, they won’t trust you to give you money, maybe they think you will take the money and run away” (LIB-5). This lack of assistance is in turn blamed for the government’s lack of concrete development policies or implementation of them: “The international community was restricting. There were great changes going to come in” (LIB-35, NPFL captain and later militia commander).

In fact, however, Taylor’s government did receive substantial (for the size of the national budget) international assistance, with tens of millions of dollars in development assistance provided per year (see Table 5.2 below), not counting billions of dollars in debt relief. Good relations were generally maintained with the development funding arms of the European Union, Taiwan, and USAID, as well as many NGOs, despite political tensions and Taylor being “obstinate” about establishing better relations with the international community (LIB-36, Nathaniel Barnes). Libya and Taiwan provided substantial cash support, according to former Foreign Minister Monie Captan, but “When that cash came in, it didn’t make its way through the
formalized budget. And that cash, a lot of it was personalized. It was leader to leader…so it wasn’t those institutional type of arrangements where you can capture the assistance and know where it’s going to go” (LIB-48).

Table 5.2 Official Development Assistance to Liberia, 1997-2002

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Development Assistance (US$ millions)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
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<td>1998</td>
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<td>2001</td>
<td>38.48</td>
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<td>2002</td>
<td>53.51</td>
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Source: OECD, in Gerdes (2013, 236).

Supporters also cannot blame a lack of state building or social service provision efforts on legislative intransigence. Taylor enjoyed the vast presidential powers granted by the 1986 Constitution, which was “tailor-made for Samuel Doe, allowing [Taylor] personal discretion over a large slice of the national budget and handing him the power to appoint even minor-level officials” (Tanner 1998, 146). Even when the legislature, with its NPP majority, passed bills to improve service provision and accessibility (see below on education), the Taylor administration lacked the political will to implement them, and failed to rebuild the data gathering and analysis capacity of the government to facilitate policy implementation.¹²⁴

Social Policy and Social Services

There is little evidence, though, of any sincere attempt to enact social policies or undertake the development of non-coercive state organs or capacity, even before the eruption of the new civil war. While resources were scarce, the opportunities for action afforded by the collapse of the

¹²⁴ The statistical capacity of government ministries, under the leadership of the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs, had been expanded and highly developed during the 1970s and 1980s (MPEA and UNDP Liberia 2006, 36–37).
preexisting state meant there was a wide scope to pursue infrastructural and social service development. As one disappointed NPFL commander said, “We were expecting that to happen, to build roads and schools and things, but it didn’t happen that way. Charles Taylor only focused on war…his only plan was to rule the country as president” (LIB-1).\textsuperscript{125} The Ministry of Information sought to highlight development projects undertaken by Taylor’s administration during his first year in office, but this was largely limited to the restoration or renovation of certain government buildings, roads, and hospitals around Monrovia (Developments in Liberia 1999).\textsuperscript{126} A reported increase in school enrollment appears to have resulted from the end of the first civil war, the demobilization of child soldiers, and the return of displaced persons, more than active government policies. This lack of emphasis and investment in service provision occurred against a backdrop of lavish personal spending by top NPFL and government officials, for instance Taylor’s acquisition of “a £5 [million] presidential jet…that failed on its maiden journey” (Tanner 1998, 143).

In preparation for a donor conference on post-war reconstruction in April 1998, Taylor’s government, along with international actors, prepared a ‘National Reconstruction Plan’ noting that “Social services available to the population in the areas of health and education are virtually decimated. Whatever remains is considerably compromised in quality and accessibility” (C. Taylor n.d., 47). There was thus a vast opportunity for Taylor to deliver on his rhetoric and make the Liberian state serve all its citizens, breaking with patterns historically favoring Americo-Liberians

\textsuperscript{125} Liberians in general highly value and desire social services: in a 2010 national survey, 56% of respondents mentioned health as a high priority and 45% mentioned education, the two most-chosen answers, while 69% said the government should prioritize education and 40% mentioned health services, the first and third most-chosen answers, respectively (Vinck, Phuong, and Kreutzer 2011, 27).

\textsuperscript{126} An NPFL general stated that there were planned projects for development in the interior of the country, but that with the start of the war, “basically most of the things were centered around Monrovia” (LIB-5). Taylor reportedly gave jobs to people on a farm he possessed in Gbarnga and built some schools around Gbarnga (LIB-3, NPFL officer; Munive 2011, 371), but there is no evidence of this as part of a broader interior development plan.
or, under Doe, the Krahn (e.g. Azango 1997; Kieh 2007). Under Doe and during the first civil war from 1986-1993, for example, healthcare spending only made up 5% of the state budget and education 11% on average, and up through 1995, the majority of the population, especially in rural areas, lacked reliable access to healthcare, sanitation, and safe water (UNICEF 1996). Yet while Taylor (n.d.) in speeches emphasized the need to repair and expand the healthcare and education systems, efforts in these sectors came more from international actors than from the government.

Healthcare

Dr. Peter Coleman, who served as Minister of Health under Taylor and through the interim government after the second war, described the health system built up under Presidents Tubman and Tolbert as having declined under Doe as government contributions to healthcare diminished (LIB-46). Coleman stated that approximately “80 percent of the health infrastructure of the country” was destroyed during the first civil war, and in 1998, “we had less than 60 health facilities functional, and basically it was around Monrovia,” so an enormous reconstruction and rehabilitation program was required (LIB-46). Especially in rural areas, many Liberians were left to rely on traditional medicine or the occasional visits of ‘black baggers,’ roving doctors with questionable qualifications. A 1998 polio vaccination campaign was planned and funded entirely by international organizations (C. Taylor n.d., 274–75). A 2000 polio vaccination campaign reportedly reached over 900,000 Liberians (Captan 2000), but this was with institutional

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127 The Mano and Gio people of Nimba, who hoped to be rewarded for their support of Taylor in the invasion and first civil war were sorely disappointed by his failure to channel resources to them in a similar manner of ethnic favoritism (LIB-41, Prince Johnson; LIB-47, Nkomo Duche).

128 See David (1993) on ‘black baggers’ and rural health provision in Liberia.
prompting and implementation by the World Health Organization as part of a global campaign against polio in conflict-affected countries (Tangermann et al. 2000).

Former Minister of Health Coleman argues that Ministry staff had a strong will to carry out their duties and worked to begin reconstruction after Taylor came into the presidency, but funding was lacking: “I had to fight with my Minister of Finance for money, even for immunization. There were things I couldn’t do, my hands were tied;” this funding shortfall led to a heavy reliance on international organizations and NGOs to undertake the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the health sector (LIB-46). By the end of the civil war, international NGOs and religious groups remained the providers of the vast majority of health services in Liberia (Derderian, Lorinquer, and Goetghebuer 2007). One policy change pursued by the Taylor government was the 2001 decision to introduce user fees for health care. In an impoverished, war torn country, this pushed healthcare further out of reach for the majority of the population, with “disastrous effects;” when fees were suspended in 2003, clinic staff saw marked increases in the number of consultations and in people seeking vaccinations (Derderian, Lorinquer, and Goetghebuer 2007, 19).

Data gathering during the first civil war and Taylor’s administration was difficult (Tsimpo and Wodon 2012b, 60), but by most accounts, the lack of government interest in healthcare combined with the conflict to stall or reverse progress in health indicators. From 1960 to 1990, the under-5 mortality rate declined from 288 per 1,000 to 235, before dipping to 217 per 1,000 in 1994; by the best estimates of UNICEF, however, it climbed back to 235 deaths per 1,000 in 1997 and remained at that level through Taylor’s time in office up until 2003 (UNICEF 1996, 1999,

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129 Even after the transition period following Taylor’s 2003 resignation, Médecins sans Frontières officials reported in 2007 that “77% of all medical care in Liberia is currently provided by international NGOs and faith-based organisations” (Derderian, Lorinquer, and Goetghebuer 2007, 19).
2005). Statistical increases in access to healthcare during the 1990s and early 2000s were “due to the ‘NGO effect,’ not state policy” (Kieh 2007, 85), as the state was content to leave provision gaps to be filled by other actors. While Liberians in urban areas had more access to private clinics, in rural areas, where people traditionally have relied on government clinics or traveling doctors, the lack of government investment was particularly impactful, and the long distances to travel to reach a health facility deterred many rural residents from seeking care during and after the conflict (Tsimpo and Wodon 2012b, 65–67, 72).

Life expectancy slid from 55 years in 1985 to 47.7 years in 2000 (Kieh 2007, 86), before averaging 42.5 years over the 2000-2005 period (UNDP 2006, 287). This and other declines cannot be considered exclusively Taylor and the NPFL’s responsibility, but they did much to precipitate and little to arrest Liberia’s negative health trends. The NPFL government’s failure to address infrastructural problems also exacerbated public health risks. For instance, effort was not put toward building up public water and electricity provision to repair damage from the first war and ensure access to these utilities. Even in Monrovia and surrounding Montserrado County, the wealthiest part of the country, there was no public electricity, piped water provision, or sanitation from when Taylor came into office up until 2006 (Kun 2008; Republic of Liberia 2008, 16, 29; Tanner 1998, 134), increasing risks of road accidents, house fires, and water-borne illnesses.

The Taylor administration’s failure to invest in healthcare or to try to maintain and rehabilitate facilities and personnel levels had a long, unfortunate effect. The loss of facilities and human capital during the conflict, combined with government disinterest to hamper medical education, exacerbating Liberia’s shortage of trained medical personnel (Challoner and Forget 2011). The NPFL left the country with a severe and lasting deficit of medical personnel, with only

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130 Life expectancy in 1999 was 42.3 years, before climbing back up to 48.3 in 2005 after the civil war ended (MPEA and UNDP Liberia 2006, 67).
“a total of 4,000 health workers, as compared to 13,000 recommended by the World Health Organization” in 2007 (Tsimpo and Wodon 2012b, 60). A 2006 study found that Liberia had “only 51 Liberian physicians and 297 nurse midwives (excluding trained traditional midwives) to cover public health needs. Out of the 325 health facilities available before the war, about 95 percent were partially or wholly destroyed,” while in another survey, only 10% of communities reported having a health facility, leaving half the population without an easily accessible health facility (Republic of Liberia 2008, 30). The lack of expansion of healthcare infrastructure under Taylor meant that, even after extensive rehabilitation and construction after 2003, there were still only 354 “functional” health facilities in 2008 (Republic of Liberia 2008, 110). Improvements in healthcare indicators after Taylor’s resignation in 2003 were due not only to the end of the conflict, which played a major role, but also “the restoration of basic services in some areas and increased immunization” (Republic of Liberia 2008, 30), issues the NPFL government had largely ignored.

Education

Similar neglect characterized the education sector when the NPFL gained power. Education access had expanded between 1970 and 1985 as the Tolbert government emphasized the sector, with an increase in enrolments, schools, and the number of teachers; though facilities, supplies, and personnel increases failed to keep up with demand and the quality of instruction was highly uneven (Azango 1997; Liebenow 1987, 162, 243; Nagel and Snyder 1989, 4–6). Prior to the start of the civil war in 1989, Liberia had about 2,400 schools with 12,000 teachers on the government payroll; by 2003, at least 80% of schools were no longer functioning, teacher training institutes had been destroyed, and thousands of teachers had fled the country or abandoned the profession (Dukuly 2004). Rep. George Mulbah, who worked with Taylor in the NPRAG and has...
remained loyal to the NPFL’s NPP political party, reports that improvements in schooling at the beginning of Taylor’s presidency came due to significant international assistance (LIB-39). There was impetus among some involved in the government to improve education, but it was not prioritized and was left mainly to religious and non-governmental organizations. Government resources were generally not put toward the expansion or maintenance of educational facilities or teacher training. The national educational curriculum was revised in 1996, prior to Taylor taking office, but then not changed during Taylor’s time in office (Dukuly 2004). The NPFL’s lack of desire to transform Liberian society meant that the government had little incentive to take advantage of education’s potential to shape the national consciousness. The legislature passed a bill in 2001 to make primary education free and compulsory, but the government failed to put resources behind this (Tsimpo and Wodon 2012a, 37). A bill passed in early 2002 to put 25% of the government budget toward education likewise never came to fruition. As a science teacher in Monrovia put it, “Pronouncements are made on the matter of education, but are never implemented” (Dukuly 2004). Instead NGOs, religious organizations, and communities picked up the slack, but even with this assistance, many young Liberians, especially among the poor and in rural areas, were left without access to schooling due to their reliance on government service provision (Tsimpo and Wodon 2012a). Taylor also actively forbid the creation of schools in internally displaced persons (IDP) camps, “on the grounds that he did not want to encourage dependency,” meaning refugees who fled to camps abroad had better access to education than Liberians who remained within the country (Heninger et al. 2006, 8).

As with healthcare, education data are of poor quality for the civil war period and little scholarship on Liberian education was published during this period (Tsimpo and Wodon 2012a,
but international organizations’ reports offer some insights. From 1986 to 1993, the gross primary school enrolment ratio was 51% for males and 28% for females, a rate that was unchanged for 1990 to 1996, while the gross secondary school enrolment ratio was 31% for males and 12% for females from 1986 to 1993 (UNICEF 1996, 1999). From 1998 to 2001, “there was an expansive increase in enrollment (289,883 to 794,337), schools (1,507 to 3,135) and primary teachers (9,659 to 17,210),” but this educational recovery after the end of the first war came primarily due to the efforts of “communities and development workers,” not the government (Heninger et al. 2006, 6). According to UNICEF statistics, whose reliability during a time of conflict may be questionable, primary school enrolment increased greatly over the 1996-2003 period, with net enrolment at 70%, with 79% of male and 61% of age-appropriate female children enrolled in school, while large numbers of older children also sought primary education (UNICEF 2005).

The availability of education from nongovernmental sources does not necessarily appear to have led to increases in literacy, however. The Liberian government in 2004 put the country’s literacy rate at 28% (Dukuly 2004), while in 2006 the UN estimated adult literacy at 37%, slightly lower than the 38% adult literacy rate reported by UNICEF for 1995 (Heninger et al. 2006, 10; UNICEF 1999). Conflict-related disruptions and lack of investment in the education system throughout the 1990s and early 2000s made Liberia “one of very few countries with a high percentage of people under 20 years old in which more adults than children are literate” (Heninger et al. 2006, 8, 10), even in spite of the pre-conflict education system’s myriad flaws.

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131 Under Doe, while education officials believed data gathering was important for policy making, the quality of data they gathered from schools was quite low and unreliable (Chapman 1991).

132 Gross enrolment ratio measures total number of children enrolled at an educational level regardless of age, divided by the total age-appropriate population for that educational level, while net enrolment ratio measures age-appropriate children enrolled at an educational level divided by the total age-appropriate population for that educational level.
Those students who were able to attend school were obtaining a relatively low quality of education. A 2001 assessment found that “only 42 percent attained the minimal levels of learning achievement” (Heninger et al. 2006, 6), amidst little curriculum development, poor teacher training, and inadequate supplies and facilities. Under the NPFL government’s watch, there was “virtually no state-sponsored teacher training in Liberia,” as public teacher’s colleges were not rebuilt and provided resources (Heninger et al. 2006, 13).

The failure to rebuild or maintain the education system under the NPFL government combined with the effects of the conflict to restrict educational access. In 2005, a study found that over “30 percent of public and 24 percent of community schools were totally destroyed, and a further 16 percent of public and community schools experienced major damage,” and about 35% of the population had never attended any school (Republic of Liberia 2008, 111). The conflict contributed heavily to lack of access to education, but the NPFL government also failed to undertake any effort to address cost or geographic barriers to education, despite some legislative will. Costs were the key barrier to educational access: among households who had never sent children to primary school in 2007, 75.5% of urban residents and 55.6% of rural residents cited cost as the primary reason (Tsimpo and Wodon 2012a, 40). By contrast, when Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf’s administration took power in 2006, they quickly moved to make primary schooling free and compulsory, and reduced fees for public secondary schools, implementing policies Taylor’s government never did (UNICEF 2011). These changes sent primary school enrolment rates shooting up by 82% from 2005/6 to 2007/8 and sparking a 16% increase in secondary school enrolment (Republic of Liberia 2008, 111–12). The Taylor administration’s lack of effort to build out the educational system geographically meant that distance to schools also remained a problem.

133 At the tertiary level, both the conflict and a lack of government investment by the Doe and Taylor governments negatively impacted higher education institutions. See e.g. Barclay (2002), Seyon (1997), and Topka (1991).
in rural areas, where 29.5% of households surveyed in 2007 said schools being too far away kept them from enrolling children in primary school (Tsimpo and Wodon 2012a, 40).

**Use of Government Resources**

Winning an election and becoming *de jure* responsible for looking after the interests of the Liberian people did not lead to a change either of heart or of policies and practices for Taylor and the NPFL. Instead, “It merely gave him political, legal, and military cover to pursue looting by other means” (Adebajo 2002b, 231). In practice, welfare was primarily addressed by the NPFL through patronage employment for select people, though often with heavily delayed or deferred pay (e.g. LIB-52, John Richardson; LIB-1, two NPFL generals), and subsidizing or giving away basic necessities, especially around Monrovia. As journalist and human rights activist Hassan Bility related, “there was not much social policy…Everything was about security…about securing his personal economic interests and those of his cronies. Everything else was about security, improving the security, securing the regime” (LIB-41). Jonathan Taylor, Charles Taylor’s cousin, who served as Minister of State for Presidential Affairs from 2000-2003, said that “Nothing really much was happening in terms of development, because the priority for [Charles Taylor] was nationally security…Everything was secondary. If teachers were not being paid, whatever” (LIB-49).

Despite claims that the government was serving the Liberian people, as the Coalition for International Justice wrote, “Although the official national budget of Liberia fluctuated between $80 million and $87 million a year from 1997 to 2003, the public budget figures were essentially meaningless. They reflected neither real government revenues nor real expenditures. Most years,

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134 In interviews, former NPFL officers, scholars, and civil society members all concurred that a large source of Taylor’s popularity was that food and fuel were cheap around Monrovia during his presidency.
virtually none of the money budgeted for infrastructure, health, education or rebuilding was spent on the designated activities” (CIJ 2005). Taylor sought to maintain personal control over state revenues and expenditures, creating parallel structures and companies run by cronies (CIJ 2005; Gerdes 2013; Lidow 2016). He pressured the National Assembly to give him “sole power to conclude commercial contracts for exploiting strategic commodities, the clearest sign of his determination to use the trappings of sovereignty to plunder resources” (Adebajo 2002b, 236–37).

What taxation was carried out occurred in an informal manner. The government sought advances from timber and mining companies that might have concession payments due later in the year in order to finance immediate needs, saying “we know you have $50,000 or $100,000 coming in two months, but we have this emergency, so look, we want you to go ahead and advance this money” (LIB-49, J. Taylor). Nathaniel Barnes, who returned from the US to serve as the Minister of Finance under Taylor from 1999 to 2001, said that he had to lie to Taylor to prevent him from diverting public resources for private use:

“I used my naïveté as a public servant to get away with some things. He would say to me, ‘I need half a million dollars immediately.’ And I would say, ‘Oh, Mr. President, I wish you had called fifteen minutes earlier, but I just took that amount and bought Liberian dollars to pay salaries.’ And then I put the phone down and run and do it” (LIB-36).

The proliferation of parallel financial institutions and parastatals with ties to Taylor and other NPFL leaders makes it difficult to determine the financial resources that were privatized during this time, but Taylor is estimated to have controlled between US$25 million and US$105 million per year during his time in office from 1997-2003 (CIJ 2005; Gerdes 2013), with large amounts presumed to have been sent abroad. During Taylor’s trial, prosecutors discovered documents linking Taylor to a personal bank account used for the diversion of what should have been state revenues, containing millions of dollars of unexplained deposits (SCSL-03-01-T-911-1, pp. 9-16). Veteran journalist Philip Wesseh argues that Taylor retained popularity by providing
his followers basic necessities, while using suppression of press freedom to hide corruption and a lack of progress in development: “He had monopoly, he had certain control over the economy. But you could not talk anything, so people didn’t know that there were problems there…He has a charisma, people like him, but the performance were not up to standards…he couldn’t deliver. Let people see something being done, there was nothing he can show” (LIB-38).

Discussion

While I have argued in this chapter that the opportunistic nature of the NPFL and the more personalistic aims of Charles Taylor and other group leaders explain the lack of investment in infrastructural power or social services under NPFL government from 1997 to 2003, other explanations must also be considered. Prior state structures played little role in determining the state building and development trajectory of Liberia once the Taylor government came into power. The Liberian state decayed under Doe and completely collapsed during the first civil war in the early 1990s, so there was little bureaucratic inertia that would have held back a state building project. Though the extremely low baseline of state capacity and resources would certainly have made state building difficult and results slow to achieve, it did not preclude the new government from engaging in state building efforts. This is supported by the NPFL’s limited, “predatory” rebel governance (Reno 2015). While fighting as rebels, the NPFL enjoyed significant financial and personnel resources, territorial control, and the presence of educated supporters wanting to work with Taylor and the organization (LIB-39, George Mulbah; LIB-52, John Richardson).\textsuperscript{135} This could have enabled the pursuit of a more robust governance apparatus or public goods provision,

\textsuperscript{135} The NPFL in the early 1990s boasted “some of Liberia’s most experienced politicians in men like Laveli Supuwood, Tom Woewiyu, Sam Dokie, and Ernest Eastman” (Adebajo 2002b, 58), who either split, were forced out, or, in Dokie’s case, killed, as Taylor worked to maintain personalized power.
if the NPFL wanted. The NPFL’s limited rebel governance in favorable circumstances suggests that political will, rather than resources or capabilities lies closer to the root of the NPFL’s lack of state building and service provision efforts once in power.

One possible line of argument is that Taylor and the NPFL did not engage in more extensive state building efforts because they had very short time horizons and simply wanted to accumulate as much wealth as possible. Yet while Taylor took a different tack from long-run thinkers like the Sandinistas and Museveni, he was not planning a short-term money grab. NPFL forces continued to push on to Monrovia, despite controlling most of Liberia’s natural resources in the early 1990s, seeking national and international recognition, rather than accepting a stalemate and quasi-independence, along the lines of the southern Sudanese in the 1990s and 2000s or the Iraqi Kurds after the First Gulf War. Taylor was not planning to get rich quick and then flee into exile: he aimed to become the president for life, remaining in power for decades (LIB-35, Joseph Saye Guannu).136 Taylor also had long-term irredentist goals of creating a cross-border ‘Greater Liberia,’ capturing territory, resources, and influence throughout the Mano River region (Sawyer 2004; Silberfein and Conteh 2006, 355; Tanner 1998, 140–41), but for the benefit of himself and other NPFL leaders and associates, rather than for a project of social transformation like those envisioned by transnational Islamist groups.

Extensive internal and external threats could have provided an impetus for state building, yet they were instead used as excuses for a lack of rebel governance, state building efforts, or development progress under the NPFL and Taylor. The ECOMOG intervention and the split of Johnson and the INPFL are unlikely to have changed the goal orientation of the NPFL and the plans it would pursue once in power. Taylor and the core of commanders he maintained around

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136 Even after he was forced to resign and flee into exile in 2003, Taylor sought to manipulate and influence politics in Liberia (Hoffman 2006).
him were already set on an opportunistic path from the beginning of the conflict, angering Johnson and frustrating ECOMOG commanders and negotiators, leading to their conflicts. On taking power, the NPFL had to contend with more organized military competitors than the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, though a similar degree of contestation as the NRA/M in Uganda. The NPFL did not engage in serious rebel governance or state building efforts in ‘Taylorland’ during the first civil war when they controlled the majority of Liberia, and they remained the most powerful armed faction in Liberia throughout that conflict and through the peace talks and elections in 1996 and 1997. While it could have further bolstered the organization’s international legitimacy to protect human rights and provide services in controlled territory while fighting as rebels, this was not prioritized.

During the initial years of relative peace under Taylor’s administration from 1997 to 2000, there was little public investment beyond the security forces and this did not change when the second civil war escalated. Taylor also manufactured serious external threats through his interventionism among Liberia’s neighbors, especially Sierra Leone and Guinea (e.g. Sawyer 2004), and drew the antagonism of the United States. The Sandinistas’ support for Salvadoran rebels and the NRA/M’s sponsorship of Southern Sudanese rebels and intervention in the Democratic Republic of the Congo did not prevent either group, however, from pursuing more robust state building programs than the NPFL. The degree of internal or external threat, overall, appeared to do little to sway Taylor and other NPFL leaders from their preferred path of building up their bank accounts, rather than the state apparatus.

Outside of direct threats, how did the external environment condition the NPFL’s aims or state building efforts? It could also be argued that because it formed around the end of the Cold War, when ideology had declined and was no longer a factor in superpower support, the NPFL
was never likely to have adopted a more programmatic line and so opportunism was bound to win out, in line with the ‘new wars’ literature (Collier 1999; Kaldor 1999; Mueller 2004).\footnote{137} While Doe was initially a Cold War ally of the US, the US lost interest in supporting him (e.g. D. E. Dunn 2009), as with Somoza’s earlier loss of support in Nicaragua, and while there was initial US distaste for Taylor, officials “privately admitted that they could have learned to live with him” and the NPFL (Adebajo 2002b, 93). There was therefore little Cold War-related pressure keeping the NPFL from adopting a more publicly oriented program (or even embracing socialism).

The decline of the Soviet Union reduced incentives to adopt the mantle of Marxism-Leninism, yet other rebel organizations in sub-Saharan Africa in the late 1980s and early 1990s still adopted more publicly oriented programs and engaged in more extensive state building once in power, as with the NRA/M in Uganda, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front, the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front, and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (Lyons 2016a, 2016b).\footnote{138} These organizations built new structures for popular participation, concentrated on development of infrastructural, rather than solely despotic power, and have created both stronger states and higher levels of public goods provision (though becoming more corrupt and authoritarian over time). Meanwhile, the ideological influence of Muammar Qadaffi’s Libya, which offered training and arms to the NPFL during the 1980s and throughout the conflict, was minimal. NPFL interviewees never mentioned the \textit{Green Book}, Qadaffi’s tract, as having played any role in the organization’s training or thinking. The \textit{Green Book} in fact advocates for direct democracy and

\footnote{137} See Kalyvas (2001) for a critique of this literature.

\footnote{138} The political victory of the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist in 2006 suggests that globally, programmatic and even ideological leftist organizations can still win civil wars.
Qadaffi’s government engaged in extensive institution-building to politically organize the population (Ibrahim 2009), in contrast to the NPFL.\footnote{Marks (2017) finds that in Sierra Leone, the RUF were similar to their Liberian patrons in enjoying Libyan support, but failing to adopt any of Qadaffi’s \textit{Green Book} ideas.}

During the first civil war, the NPFL consistently rejected international pressures to negotiate or disarm,\footnote{Even the NPFL’s sponsors and allies had little sway over the organization. Adebajo (2002b, 103) writes that the failure of Ivorian pressure to bring concessions from Taylor and the NPFL in peace agreements in Geneva in 1992 “was the final proof—if any was needed—that the NPFL puppeteer’s residence was in Gbarnga and not Abidjan, Yamoussoukro, or Geneva.”} and once in power, Taylor disregarded the incentives to avoid repression and to govern in a less blatantly opportunistic manner in order to secure international aid. The international intervention of ECOMOG had forestalled NPFL victory in the early 1990s; international actors organized peace negotiations and Liberia’s elections; and international organizations and donors held the purse strings to potentially aid Liberia in pursuing reconstruction and development projects. If ever there was a case in which international political and economic incentives should have led a new government to change its policies and practices, it should have been in Liberia.

After acrimonious relations with regional hegemon Nigeria during the initial years of the first civil war, the NPFL developed a much better rapport with Abuja once Sani Abacha came into office in 1993 (Adebajo 2002b; Alao 1998), so this barrier was lowered when Taylor came into the presidency. Taylor and the NPP government did not have any ideological opposition to the prevailing liberal economic agenda of Western donors and international financial institutions. Taylor had assiduously cultivated international media attention and public opinion while the NPFL were fighting as rebels (Ellis 2007; Innes 2005a). Yet once in office, Taylor preferred to continue seeking resources from the same illicit channels that had enriched him and other NPFL leaders during the first civil war (Global Witness 2001; Johnston 2004; Reno 1993, 1998), thus avoiding
demands for good governance or other political reforms, and engaged in military adventurism that damaged his international reputation and led to increased threats to Taylor’s hold on power. He actively disregarded the demands of the US and other donors to curtail Liberian interference around the Mano River region, leading to cutoffs of resources. When Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf came into office in 2006, she embraced international donors and received significant resources with which to engage in extensive state building efforts (Gerdes 2013, 256). Further, as the cases of Uganda under the NRA/M and Rwanda under the RPF suggest, Western states are willing to continue providing resources for state building and development efforts in spite of authoritarianism or international military interventions if a government is in agreement with or accepts some political or economic conditions.

Did Liberia’s ethnic heterogeneity keep the NPFL from pursuing state building and service provision efforts? Ethnic exclusion characterized the majority of Liberia’s history from its founding, as Americo-Liberian elites suppressed indigenous groups. Samuel Doe’s dictatorship then politicized ethnicity between the country’s tribes in the modern, national context, showering patronage on his own Krahn group and their Mandingo allies. While the majority of the NPFL’s early fighters were Mano and Gio and these fighters engaged in revenge-fueled violence against Krahn and Mandingo civilians, Taylor and NPFL leadership decried tribalism and the NPFL also relied on foreign fighters with no stake in Liberia’s interethnic relations (Alao 1998, 34). The NPFL punished many fighters who engaged in ethnic revenge killings, while cultivating a multiethnic organization without a clear ethnic mission. One early NPFL general from the Kru tribe described how “Taylor executed a lot of these Gio tribe for [killing Krahn],” while Taylor “invested in those of us from different tribes to monitor their operations” (LIB-28). The purge of Nimbanian officers and politicians in the early 1990s and the split by Prince Johnson and the
INPFL further helped ensure that the NPFL did not become a Mano and Gio ethnic project, while many high-ranking IGNU officials, strongly opposed to the NPFL, were Mano and Gio, as well (Alao 1998, 35). Taylor himself was half Americo-Liberian and half Gola and, as noted above, sought to present himself differently to different audiences, sometimes playing up his education in the US and the Taylor family’s Americo-Liberian heritage, and at others emphasizing the indigeneity of his maternal roots (Harris 1999, 446; Huband 1998, xviii–xix; Sawyer 2005, 37). Taylor and other top NPFL leaders were loyal primarily to themselves, not to their ethnic groups, and this was reflected in the post-victory government, for instance, not even engaging in state building and service provision efforts for the Mano and Gio peoples who had propelled them to victory. Liberia’s wars were not so much an ‘ethnic conflict,’ as manifesting the “elite manipulation of ethnicity to advance group interests” (Alao 1998, 34).

Conclusion

The NPFL provides an illustration of an opportunistic organization in action, first as rebels and then controlling the central state. The NPFL, once a loose organization of dissidents and former soldiers aiming to overthrow a dictator, became, over time, a project for domination and resource extraction for personal benefit, with Charles Taylor at the top of the pyramid. As Gerdes (2013, 60) writes, “The NPFL was dominated by Charles Taylor to the extent that it could be considered his personal endeavor; the faction and its leader were inextricably linked. The imposition of Charles Taylor as leader had little to do with structural characteristics but his personal strategy and tactics.” Taylor’s “preoccupation with establishing unhindered personal control” (Reno 1995, 113) was a common characteristic across the NPFL’s periods as rebels and in government. Yet it did not have to be this way. Despite his later military and electoral success,
Taylor was initially unpopular (Gershoni 1997, 199), and his primacy in the NPFL was not preordained. There were a number of potential leaders who could have emerged at the head of the organization and shaped its trajectory. Whether one views leadership consolidation as occurring through “a series of coincidences,” as NPFL leader Tom Woewiyu later claimed (Ellis 2007, 74), or sees the purges and split in the NPFL as a product of Taylor’s quest for personal control, the end result was Taylor’s supremacy in the NPFL and the enactment of his kleptocratic vision in a group whose initial recruits had in fact been motivated by grievances, as they joined an organization with limited material resources. Self-interest and intransigence ultimately proved to be “one of the undoings of the Taylor administration. He never found a way, in the first instance to make peace with Washington, and secondly, to make peace with his neighbors” (LIB-50, Goodridge), as Taylor rejected international demands to cease military intervention in Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Côte d’Ivoire.

Within Liberia itself, the Tubman and Tolbert regimes offered earlier examples of the efforts to implement reforms and construct state infrastructural power. The NPFL had the opportunity to implement similar policies while controlling ‘Greater Liberia’ and while in government, but with Taylor at the helm, the goal orientation of the organization did not change. As was the case when Doe seized power, Taylor’s ascension was a case, as Liberians would say, of “Same taxi, different driver” (Lowenkopf 1995, 100). Taylor and the NPFL did not offer a new political and economic vision of society, but rather fought “over whose hands the economic power would rest in” (Duyvesteyn 2004, 85). Taylor showed a remarkable ability to put plans into action on the battlefield, but failed to turn his pro-democracy and developmentalist rhetoric into concrete policies and programs in Greater Liberia or the Executive Mansion, missing an opportunity to reshape the Liberian state and make it serve the people. Instead, Taylor’s promises of a renaissance
proved hollow and his time in power short-lived, but the Liberian people have continued to suffer the consequences of his destructive reign, a paradigmatic example of the enduring governmental dysfunction that opportunistic organizations entrench.
“We take from every system what is best for us and we reject what is bad for us.”

In this chapter, I examine the NRA/M case in depth. The NRA/M represents a middle ground case: not as programmatic as the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, but not nearly as opportunistic as the NPFL in Liberia. While a number of its leaders had early backgrounds in leftist circles and were enamored of Marxism-Leninism, the NRA/M developed a more moderate program, centered around what it called the ‘Movement’ ideology. The organization did not seek to transform Ugandan society, but rather to reorganize political structures and representation, largely leaving social and economic structures intact. These changes, narrower than those sought by a more programmatic organization, demanded central political control and efforts to secure a hold on that power, but not necessarily the expansion of the state’s reach throughout society and territory.

During the NRA/M’s rebellion, they developed ‘Resistance Committees,’ governance structures that transformed local-level political participation and representation, and were concerned with civilian well-being, but the organization generally did not seek to expand into direct service provision. The NRA/M once in power retained this vision and practice of a more limited role for the state, content to leave some regions with little noncoercive state presence and not seeking to develop corporatist mass organizations, while building despotic power through the construction of a robust security apparatus. At the same time, however, the organization and its leaders, with Yoweri Museveni most prominent among them, did possess a conception of the national interest that included a broader public, and they generally sought political power more than private wealth.
After discussing the historical context of post-independence Uganda, I describe the historical background of the NRA/M and its early leaders, and the organization’s formation and initiation of rebellion in 1981. I then turn to NRA/M’s leadership structure, ideological development, and the development of organizational institutions and practices during the ensuing civil war. I discuss the context in which the NRA/M came to power in 1986, and then turn to how the group governed and approached state building and service provision, before discussing alternative explanations and what we learn from the NRA/M case.

Uganda’s Early History

The territory that makes up present-day Uganda was ruled and fought over by a number of different tribes and kingdoms, with the most prominent being the northern Bunyoro kingdom and the southern-central Buganda kingdom. British explorers and missionaries arrived in the area in the second half of the 19th century. Subsequently, Buganda, Bunyoro, and other regions were all claimed as a British protectorate of Uganda by 1897. British colonialism was less intensive in Uganda than in some other regions, with a decision made to allow peasants to retain use of common lands, rather than claiming them as plantations for settlers. Ugandan peasants were encouraged to grow cotton and coffee for export, while European and South Asian settlers ran processing, trading, and other commercial enterprises. Boasting a long coastline along Lake Victoria and the headwaters of the Nile River, Uganda was renowned for its geography, climate, central location,

This introductory section draws on a number of sources. The most complete account of Ugandan history from the precolonial era to the contemporary period is Reid (2017), while Byrnes (1992) offers a history up through the 1980s. For historical accounts of Uganda’s first decades after independence, see Karugire (1996) and Kasozi (1994). For political analyses, through different theoretical lenses, of independence, the first Obote government, and the beginnings of military rule in the 1970s, see Kasfir (1976), Mamdani (1976), and Mittelman (1975).
and agricultural fertility, leading Henry Morton Stanley, British writers, and later Winston Churchill, to dub Uganda “the Pearl of Africa.”

Following World War II, British administrators gradually gave more and more power to Ugandans within the government and offered greater educational and economic opportunities to Ugandans. Numerous factions within the country began clamoring either for more power or for independence from British rule, though there was not a large-scale rebellion or heavy colonial repression, as occurred in Kenya with the Mau-Mau revolt and the British response. Negotiations in 1961 led to self-government in internal affairs in early 1962, before full independence was achieved in October of that year.

At independence, Uganda was one of the more developed countries in the region, enjoyed prosperous agricultural productivity, and featured one of the continent’s best institutes of higher education in Makerere University. Political divisions, however, undermined the country’s seemingly stable economic prospects. Buganda had been granted limited autonomy within independent Uganda, and two of the country’s most prominent early political parties were primarily Baganda: the more moderate Democratic Party (DP) and more conservative, Baganda monarchist Kabaka Yekka (KY) party. The first elected Prime Minister of independent Uganda, though, was Milton Obote, a member of the north-central ethnic Langi group, and leader of the Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) party.

Obote initially respected Bugandan autonomy and sought to forge alliances with the Baganda by naming their king, or kabaka, Mutesa II, as president. Tensions were rife in the coalition government, with limited trust and battles over the distribution of resources, culminating in a power grab by Obote in 1966. Obote suspended the Constitution, arrested a number of Cabinet ministers, and, in a severe escalation, sent government troops to arrest the kabaka, who fled into
exile. Obote consolidated executive power, dissolved the autonomous rights of Buganda and other historical kingdoms, and ended Uganda’s first brief democratic experiment. Obote tried to implement populist interventionist economic policies to shore up support for his government, but he increasingly relied on the military to secure his control, and in 1971, Army Commander Idi Amin deposed Obote in a coup.

With little education or non-military experience, Amin ruled through impulse and repression. One of his most consequential policy decisions was the expulsion of the South Asian community from Uganda, who had previously formed the country’s commercial and entrepreneurial class. This was initially popular, since many Ugandans saw it as a reclaiming of the country’s resources for its citizens, but the expulsion contributed to an economic collapse, as the army officials who took over Asian businesses mismanaged them, and Amin’s government allowed national infrastructure and services to atrophy. The economic disaster led to the development of a thriving black market and the rise an informal economic system known locally as magendo (Kasfir 1983). Amin’s penchant for violence helped to suppress domestic dissent and revolts, but he overstepped in external relations. In 1978, as domestic pressures mounted against him and segments of the army were challenging Amin’s authority, he launched an invasion of Tanzania, attempting to annex part of the Kagera region. Tanzania responded forcefully, and along with Ugandan dissident groups the Tanzanian military swept into Uganda in January 1979. By April they had captured Kampala and forced Amin into exile. Negotiations among Ugandan political parties and the forces who helped depose Amin led to elections in 1980. It was these elections that sparked the formation of the NRA/M.
The Origins of the NRA/M

Like many other rebel organizations, the NRA/M had its roots in older rebel movements. The group’s founder, Yoweri Museveni, was a student activist in the 1960s and a member of Obote’s UPC party, but then tacked left while studying at the University of Dar es Salaam and visiting liberated areas of Mozambique held by Frelimo rebels in the late 1960s (Museveni 1971, 1997). After Idi Amin seized power, Museveni organized a small rebel force called the Front for National Salvation (FRONASA). Museveni formed FRONASA with a core of school friends from his home region of Ankole in western Uganda; the group attempted infiltrations of Uganda from Tanzania, but failed to generate success or a wider rebellion throughout the 1970s, maintaining a small set of members and supporters, largely from Museveni’s Banyankole ethnic group (Kasfir 2000, 63; Museveni 1997, 54–71). The organization also incorporated a significant group of Banyarwanda—Rwandan Tutsi refugees who had been living, mainly in western Uganda, for years. Included in this group was future Rwandan rebel leader and later-President Paul Kagame.

Drawing on his ties to Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere, Museveni helped revive FRONASA to participate in the Tanzanian-led invasion that toppled Amin in 1979. By this time, Museveni’s leftist leanings had mostly faded, and, according for former FRONASA and NRA officer Pecos Kutesa (2006, 53), members of FRONASA were motivated less by grand ideals than by personal security and ending Amin’s repressive rule. FRONASA came together with the Obote-led Kikosi Maalum and the smaller Save Uganda Movement and Uganda Freedom Union to form the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF). After the UNLF helped remove Amin in April

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142 See Daly (2012) on the organizational legacies of prior rebellion.
1979, however, the constituent forces split again. A series of weak, ineffective interim presidents presided over Uganda until parliamentary elections were held in December 1980.\textsuperscript{143}

The elections were contested by two of the historical pre-Amin political parties, Obote’s UPC and the Democratic Party (DP), while the other two parties permitted in the contest were the Conservative Party—a reborn version of the Baganda nationalist Kabaka Yekka—and the small, Museveni-led Uganda Patriotic Movement (UPM). The UPC had advantages from the outset in funding, name recognition for the party and Obote, media coverage, and preexisting networks of party activists and supporters, while in late 1980, the military began intervening more in favor of Obote. Despite being largely unknown in much of the country, Museveni, who had been Vice-Chairman of the powerful Military Commission in the transition period, was convinced that he and the UPM could win the elections (Kasfir 2000, 63; Willis, Lynch, and Cheeseman 2017, 222). When the elections took place in December, Obote and the UPC emerged as the winners, in a vote certified as “valid” by the Commonwealth Observer Group mission, despite evidence of electoral manipulation and military intimidation of voters in DP strongholds (Willis, Lynch, and Cheeseman 2017). Museveni’s UPM only won one seat in Parliament. He immediately rejected the election results as fraudulent, though it is highly unlikely that the little-known UPM would have performed significantly better in a fair election and Museveni, through his role in the Military Commission, would have been aware of most of the preparations for the vote (Omara-Otunnu 1987, 155). While the DP grudgingly accepted the results and became the main opposition in Parliament, Museveni decided to return to the battlefield, beginning the five year Bush War that eventually carried him and his followers to power.

\textsuperscript{143} See Gertzel (1980) for details on this period of instability.
Museveni gathered his close FRONASA comrades who were still around Kampala to take up arms again as the People’s Resistance Army (PRA), while UPM members and followers became the group’s early civilian support network (Simwogerere 1996). Initially only twenty-seven members, the PRA’s first plans, put into action in February 1981, called for attacking a military academy in Kabamba in Mubende District, before retreating into the heart of Buganda to try to gather more forces (Weinstein 2007, 69).

Leadership

From the beginnings of the organization, Museveni was the clear center of gravity in the NRA/M. He had brought fighters together in FRONASA, led the UPM, and organized the initial PRA mobilization. In the first several months of the Bush War, “everybody looked to [Museveni] for advice and direction at critical moments” (Ondoga Ori Amaza 1998, 39). In FRONASA, Museveni had been frustrated by the slowness and indecision of collective planning efforts (Museveni 1997, 80), but as the NRA/M grew, he and other early leaders recognized the necessity of more formalized and distributed leadership structures. Consultations among the group in 1981, reportedly initiated by Museveni himself (Ngoga 1998, 101), “established the principle of the indispensability of collective leadership and that of the necessity for the movement to develop its collective leadership capacity in the course of the struggle,” instituting regular collective, nonhierarchical meetings for all members to discuss organizational strategy and tactics (Ondoga Ori Amaza 1998, 39–40). These discussions led to the creation of the group’s top-level commanding body, the National Resistance Council (NRC), in charge of decisions about military

144 Of an incident in which two FRONASA members were killed, Museveni writes, “From that day on, I learnt to be more assertive in my decision-making. Originally, the group had been consultative—every decision arrived at by consensus. But this practice was dangerous when it applied to military situations. This is the problem in young revolutionary groups—the belief in collective decision-making” (Museveni 1997, 80).
operations and outreach efforts to the civilian population to organize supply and intelligence networks.

Between February and June of 1981, the PRA remained a small organization, enabling the maintenance of collective leadership as the group developed civilian contacts and worked with them to create “committees” for supplying the rebels with food, information, and potential recruits in the ‘Luwero Triangle’ region of Buganda where the group was based (Kasfir 2005, 281; Weinstein 2007, 69). Structures within the organization also became more formalized in mid-1981 after the PRA merged with former President Yusuf Lule’s Uganda Freedom Fighters (UFF).

The UFF was primarily a Baganda organization, which gave the resulting National Resistance Army and its political wing, the National Resistance Movement (together the NRA/M) greater ties to the population in Buganda, making it easier to attract support and recruits (Kasfir 2000, 63). Lule became the political head of the combined organization and Museveni the military commander, but the NRC remained the “supreme political organ” of the NRA/M and was expanded to 52 members, with sub-committees for: i) finance and supplies, ii) politics and diplomacy, iii) publicity and propaganda, and iv) external operations (NRM 1990, 18–19). The NRC, in different structures, has remained the top collective body in the NRA/M and the post-victory political system, and the early NRC’s inclusion and filtering of diverse interests helped to shape the ideology and goals of the organization, and the ways in which it appealed to and governed civilians in its areas of influence.

**Ideology and Aims**

Even for those early members who did not believe, like Museveni, that Obote had rigged the 1980 elections, Obote’s return to power suggested a stabilization of the preexisting political
and economic system, with few prospects for reform. They were convinced that “there remained no other method of transforming the country’s socio-economic basis apart from armed struggle” (Ondoga Ori Amaza 1998, 21). Early NRA/M officer Fred Mwesigye stated that “We didn’t go to the bush because of rigged elections. It was a trigger due to historical problems: an undisciplined army, political problems and corruption; the economy was destroyed” (U-2).

In the first edition of the NRA/M’s newsletter, in August 1981, the organization took inspiration from prior revolutions elsewhere in the world, arguing that they were invoking the “right of rebellion against tyranny” (NRM 1990, 2). Already at this time, the group laid out a program for governance after the overthrow of Obote, calling for 1) the restoration of democratic, multiparty politics, including “re-establishment of an effective administration both at the central and local government levels;” 2) the reform and rebuilding of disciplined security forces concerned with citizens’ interests; 3) the “revitalisation” of the economy; and 4) the writing of a new Constitution, “based on the popular will” of an elected Constituent Assembly (NRM 1990, 20–21). The aim was not to transform the political and economic system in a social revolutionary sense, redistributing power over the means of production and its benefits, but instead to create “accountable structures” and eliminate “oppression, predation, and irresponsibility” (Brett 1993, 36). This vision suggested that Uganda’s problems were more an issue of the interests of those in power than of the country’s underlying social and economic structures.

During the armed struggle, the NRA/M organized its political goals into a concise ‘Ten-Point Programme’ (Museveni 1986, 44–75; NRM 1986). The Ten-Point Programme outlines the organization’s plans as such:

1. Democracy
2. Security
3. Consolidation of National security and elimination of all forms of sectarianism
4. Defending and consolidating National Independence
5. Building an independent, integrated and self-sustaining national economy  
6. Restoration and improvement of social services and the rehabilitation of the war-ravaged areas  
7. Elimination of corruption and misuse of power  
8. Redressing errors that have resulted in the dislocation of sections of the population and improvement of others  
9. Co-operation with other African countries in defending human and democratic rights of our brothers in other parts of Africa  
10. Following an economic strategy of mixed economy

This relatively limited program of political and economic stabilization and reform differed greatly from the transformative ideology and policies of Frelimo in Mozambique that had originally fired Museveni’s imagination (Museveni 1971). In Uganda, battling against Obote, Museveni—whether for personal or pragmatic reasons—became “deradicalised by armed struggle…less and less of a socialist” (Mazrui 2000, 128) and retreating to an ideology of liberal nationalism (Rubongoya 2007, 66). The NRA/M’s initial core of more leftist supporters, who had “spoken the language of anti-imperialism and socialism” (Brett 1993, 1), began to moderate as well, or risk marginalization. When an American journalist in late 1981 asked the NRA/M’s Secretary of Political and Diplomatic Affairs what the group’s ideology was, he responded simply, “Democracy is our ideology. We want to establish Democracy first. Since we want to unite with many groups, in fact all groups, fighting against Obote, we cannot incline on a particular ideology” (NRM 1990, 64). Elijah Mushemeza, an academic and NRA/M ideologue, described the group as having an ideology “based in democracy, economic prosperity, resisting anything that would undermine human rights or anything opposed to humanity” (U-3). Pragmatism and the broad ideal of anti-sectarian national unity thus shaped the NRA/M’s political program more than any fully-developed ideology. This is not to say, however, that the NRA/M’s program was not popular. To the contrary, former NRA/M political official Miria Matembe called the Ten-Point Program “a

145 This rightward shift continued throughout the NRA/M’s first decade in power from 1986-1996 (Rubongoya 2007, 102).
real people’s manifesto,” emblematic of an organization that sought “fundamental change rather than a change of guards” (U-4).

The international political environment in the late Cold War period might have closed off some opportunities for forging a more socialist path, but Museveni seems to have outgrown his youthful enthusiasm for Marxism-Leninism in favor of centrist, pragmatic liberalism. Marxism-Leninism never attracted significant support among the Ugandan population after independence (Mazrui 2000, 131–32), and Museveni throughout the Bush War and first five years in power emphasized that the NRA/M sought to remain independent of the Cold War rivalry and political-economic divide. According to Fred Mwesigye, in the Cold War context, “we don’t want anyone to dictate who is our friend and who is our enemy,” and so the NRA/M was willing to engage with “anyone who can be useful” (U-2). In 1984, Museveni signaled a willingness to work with the World Bank, IMF, and foreign capitalist investors while discussing a “mixed economy” (New Vision 1990). Shortly after victory, in March 1986, Minister of State for Defence Ronald Batta stated that “it is not our idea to define our policy between capitalism and socialism” (Larkin 1987, 163). In 1990, Museveni cast aspersions on other African political organizations “opportunistic[ally]” presenting themselves as left-wing or right-wing during the 1980s to attract support, saying the NRA/M “refused to join these opportunists. We refused even to recognize the so called leftist-rightist categorization” (Museveni 1992, 187). Whether or not there was retrospective bias at work, NRM political commissar Jotham Tumwesigye claimed in 1996 that “There was no Marxism” in the NRA/M during the Bush War and that there was “no anti-IMF, World Bank” sentiment (Mwesige 1996).

One of the NRA/M’s main diagnoses of prior politics in Uganda was that it was excessively polarized around ethnic and partisan lines, undercutting national unity and the possibility of
building a more functional state. Eriya Kategaya, who had been with Museveni since the FRONASA days and became a leader in the NRA/M, stated that “The National Resistance Movement is of the strong view that religious and tribal or ethnic differences are not the enemies of the people of Uganda; these differences are not obstacles to unity of the people of Uganda. What is the obstacle to the unity of Uganda is the lazy-minded politicians and opportunists who exploit these differences for their selfish ends” (NRM 1990, 123–24). This ideal of unity served instrumentally to appeal to Ugandans across the nation who were tired of the dysfunction of the post-independence political system, while the NRA/M leaders’ “commitment to egalitarian, non-sectarian, non-coercive popular support” (Kasfir 2005, 291) shaped the institutions and practices that they built to recruit and socialize fighters and to govern civilian populations.

**Recruitment, Socialization, and Rebel Governance**

The PRA and then NRA/M’s efforts to build ties to civilian communities in the Luwero Triangle were undertaken at first by reaching out to trusted older men known to be opposed to the Obote government; these men acted as intermediaries who would help recruit younger men to act as couriers or spies and begin to build support for the organization (Tidemand 1994, 68–69). As knowledge of the group grew and they developed more trust, the NRA/M would work with its local contacts to organize a ‘resistance committee’ to procure a more steady supply of food, intelligence, and vetted recruits. By late 1981, the NRA/M had managed to expand its influence in Luwero, and more villagers sympathized with the organization as the military’s blunt counterinsurgency efforts harmed them. At this time, a senior NRA/M political officer reported that the group had organized 35 committees made up of “hard core supporters. There are people
who are determined to support us. They have had their property looted and destroyed, but all the same they support us” (NRM 1990, 64).

The resistance committees were initially ad hoc networks developed through the NRA/M’s initial contacts in a village. The group quickly realized, however, that reliance on one or a few individuals created vulnerabilities. Eriya Kategaya recalled that “there was a problem that if you picked upon a wrong man in the village that would be the image of the Movement...That is when we decided that the leadership in these villages should be elected” (Tidemand 1994, 82). This democratic experiment was not originally planned (Museveni 1997, 134), though it was quickly embraced by both the NRA/M and communities, with Kategaya arguing that it was “logical, natural,” given the NRA/M’s commitment to democracy at the national level (Tidemand 1994, 82). The resistance committees, later renamed resistance councils (RCs), also helped to displace the power of government-affiliated chiefs who had previously held authority in many rural areas (Burkey 1991; Ddungu 1993; Kasfir 2005), and offered opportunities for greater political engagement by women, though youth engagement with the NRA/M was largely as fighters, rather than participation in RCs (Tidemand 1994, 77).

Through the RCs, the NRA/M sought to attract recruits committed to their collective project of toppling the Obote regime and creating greater popular involvement in politics. The organization did not offer material inducements, and instead tried to build adherence to the NRA/M political program, as well as providing recruits with “pleasure in agency” (Wood 2003) in fighting the Obote regime. Political education was a high priority for NRA/M leaders in socializing recruits and building civilian allegiance to the organization, seeking both discipline and to create a sense of a broader national political mission of inclusion and economic development (Kabweyere 2000; Museveni 1997; Weinstein 2007). NRA/M commander Fred Mwesigye recalled that, “Political
education [came] first. Convince the people to support you and teach them about the country’s problems” (U-2).

Museveni had been impressed when he visited Mozambique by Frelimo’s political education program and how it incorporated peasants into the organization’s political project (Museveni 1971). He wanted to ensure that similar efforts took place in the NRA/M to build political consciousness and create a shared organizational ethos that would enable the NRA/M to achieve its aims (NRM 1990, 146), for “In addition to a gun, the guerrilla must be armed with an ideology of change” (Kabwegyere 2000, 105). Political education was initially focused on ‘demystifying the gun’ and making the NRA a force in service of the civilian population, in contrast to the security forces of prior regimes. For both troops and civilians, political education was aimed at creating political attitudes that were “nationalistic, patriotic, anti-imperialist, democratic, informed, progressive and pro-people,” according to academic and later NRA/M government official Tarsis Kabwegyere (2000, 105).

What did this look like in practice? At first, Museveni and other NRA/M leaders personally presided over political education (Weinstein 2007, 141), but then, to systematize and formalize political education, the NRA/M created a Political Commissariat and developed a clear Code of Conduct for members to govern how they behaved and how they interacted with the civilian population. This helped to clarify the organization’s relations with civilians and specified punishments for violating the code, as well as making clear for civilians that the NRA/M was supposed to be serving them (Ondoga Ori Amaza 1998, 41–44). Fighters needed to “subordinate their individual and/or group interests to the demands of the political objectives and intentions of the struggle” (Ondoga Ori Amaza 1998, 43).
Political education was seen as especially important from 1982 onwards. An early wave of politically-motivated recruits, often more educated and urban, had subsided, while the NRA/M’s ranks swelled with Luwero peasants motivated by victimization at the hands of government forces and UPC youth gangs (Schubert 2006, 99–100). To try to ensure that the NRA/M’s ideals were internalized, the political commissars held mandatory daily political education sessions for fighters, while seminars and speeches to civilians sought “to enlighten them about the reasons for the war and the methods of the struggle” (Kabwegyere 2000, 105). The uptake of these ideas was, predictably, uneven, but they served to legitimize the NRA/M more for the civilian population (Kasfir 2005, 285); to undercut critics who viewed the group as purely militaristic (Ondoga Ori Amaza 1998, 43); and to build discipline within the organization (Weinstein 2007, 141–45).146 New fighters, even if they had prior combat experience, were also sent to a special training unit where instruction consisted of military training for half the day and political education for the rest, aiming to ensure respect for civilians. Ideally, according to one commander interviewed by Weinstein (2007, 141–42), the political education would also create a sense of “Comradeship…where one is willing to die or sacrifice for the common good…where the individual is not above the interests of the majority.” Even recruits who were not politically-motivated in the first place internalized the Code of Conduct’s admonitions to prioritize civilian interests and work toward collective goals (Schubert 2006).

This emphasis on political education and civilian welfare remained constant throughout the Bush War. When the military was on the ascendancy in 1983-1984 and the NRA/M was retreating, unable to protect civilians, the organization tried to help civilians escape Luwero to secure refugee

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146 See Hoover Green (2016) and Oppenheim and Weintraub (2017) on how political education offers a means of instilling command and control in an armed group that may be more powerful than material inducements, purely military training, or coercive punishment.
camps, under the guidance of elected RCs (Kasfir 2005, 288–89). In 1985, Museveni sent a letter to all units demanding that “All NRC members, [commanding officers] and [Political Commissars] should ensure that all our officers and men understand these facts about our struggle” against repression and sectarianism to “help to counter the confusion which can be caused by opportunists who joined the struggle hoping to use it for their own selfish interests” (Museveni 1992, 146).

When the NRA/M decided that year to expand beyond the Luwero Triangle to Uganda’s west, establishing a new base in the Rwenzori mountains, the organization “reactivated its commitment to civilian participation and democratic village governance, and invested significant energy in political education and elected village committees,” holding rallies to tell civilians “we have brought you peace. The next ‘war’ is yours. You have to guide the masses” (Kasfir 2005, 289–90).

This second, western front provided a successful testing ground for the expansion of the RC system and the resonance of the NRA/M’s political ideas outside of Buganda (Burkey 1991, 3–4; Ddungu 1993, 377–78).

Throughout the Bush War, RCs not only functioned as conduits for supplies, information, and recruits to the NRA/M, they were developed as full-fledged local governments, a first taste of local democracy for rural Ugandans. The experience of RCs was heterogeneous across regions of NRA/M influence, but RCs undertook a wide variety of administrative tasks autonomously or in cooperation with the NRA/M, including issuing travel passes, dispute resolution, developing local security through road blocks and militia patrols, and providing for refugees (Ddungu 1993). Where government officials and chiefs once held sway, the RCs had powers of “legislation, implementation and adjudication which had until then been the preserve of appointed officials and party nominees” (Burkey 1991, 3–4). Resistance councils as an institution thus came to symbolize

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147 Arjona (2016) argues that dispute resolution is the foundation for any rebel governance effort.
the NRA/M’s ideal of popular empowerment and political change during the rebel period, uprooting the prior “regime of dictatorship” of omnipotent village chiefs (Mamdani 1988, 1173–74).

These ideals and institutions established by the NRA/M would continue to shape their policy planning and governance strategy once they transitioned in 1986 from rebel movement to governing movement.

**Transition to Power**

The NRA/M’s success in gaining civilian support and wresting territorial control from government forces precipitated Obote’s downfall, but it was in fact the military who pushed the president from power. Soldiers from northern Uganda historically dominated the military, and tensions among northern ethnic groups had grown during the war. Obote promoted officers from his own Langi ethnic group, at the expense of the more numerous Acholis, who also felt they were given more difficult and dangerous combat assignments (e.g. Mutibwa 1992, 161–63). In July 1985, the Acholi military commanders Tito Okello and Bazilio Olara-Okello overthrew Obote, and named Tito Okello as president.

Initial hopes that the fall of Obote would bring an end to the conflict were dashed, however. Okello was able to coopt a number of smaller anti-Obote rebel movements, releasing their followers from prison and integrating them into the armed forces (Mutibwa 1992, 168–70). The NRA/M remained skeptical, however, that Okello and his military clique were prepared to institute political reforms, while Okello and other Acholi military leaders thought the NRA/M was trying to push northerners out of power (Tripp 2010, 47), so fighting continued. NRA/M commander Pecos Kutesa (2006, 207) describes the organization’s lack of faith in Okello and the military to
advance political change: “They thought the sole aim of going to war was...gaining part of the political cake. As far as they were concerned, all of us had taken up arms because only the Langi clique of UPC was ‘eating’. What a fallacy! We had gone to the bush, not only to change the status quo, but also to sweep away the entire system.”

Negotiations between the NRA/M and the Okello government yielded a tentative peace agreement in December 1985, but the lack of trust between the two sides meant fighting continued (Tripp 2010, 151–52). The NRA/M continued pushing forward in consolidating territory and building administrative structures, for instance establishing an interim government in Fort Portal in western Uganda in October 1985, with the NRC as the primary decision making body (Kutesa 2006, 218; Mutibwa 1992, 172). NRA/M forces in November continued advancing toward Kampala and cut off key land routes between the capital and the western region of the country. Government soldiers increasingly deserted or joined the NRA/M, and conditions in Kampala worsened due to lack of supplies and looting by Okello’s forces (Katumba-Wamala 2000, 168). As the NRA/M gained more ground and came close to seizing power in 1986, its planning focused on issues of security and economic recovery, such as the formulation of a ‘Minimum Recovery Programme’ to stimulate the economy (NRM 1990, ii). In January 1986, the NRA/M launched a final offensive, capturing Kampala on January 26. Okello and portions of the military fled northward, continuing to fight into March, before withdrawing into southern Sudan,148 while other troops either returned to their homes or surrendered to the NRA/M and were eventually vetted for inclusion in a new, reorganized military.

The NRA/M came into office in a country devastated by decades of misrule, repression, and war. An estimated 800,000 people were killed in politically-related violence between 1971

and 1985 (Tripp 2004, 4), with hundreds of thousands more wounded, imprisoned, or displaced. The economy was shattered with infrastructure and croplands destroyed, high inflation, per capita income almost 60 percent lower than in 1971 (Kiyaga-Nsubuga 2004, 89), and the informal magendo economy predominating (Flanary and Watt 1999, 517; Larkin 1987, 162). Security was still tenuous in most areas.

For the NRA/M, capturing power “marked the beginning rather than the end of the revolution...an opportunity and the challenge to translate the convictions and promises of the NRA’s five-year armed struggle into reality,” according to Pecos Kutesa (2006, 259). Yet this was not a full-fledged social revolution. While basic guidelines for governing were provided by the Ten-Point Programme, as Phares Mutibwa (1992, 179) stressed, this was “of course no more than a guide to the philosophy of the NRM leadership—it says nothing about how the movement’s aims are carried out in practice.” In practice, the NRA/M prioritized security and economic revitalization, above all else. Museveni stated in 1989 that “When we captured power, we decided to start the huge job of rehabilitation by attending to eight priority areas: 1. Defence; 2. Agriculture; 3. Roads, railways and water transport; 4. Commercial trucks; 5. Repair of light goods industries in order to save foreign exchange; 6. Repair of utilities, especially electricity and water for industrial use; 7. Restoration of construction capacity; 8. Restoration of storage capacity” (Museveni 1990, 8). Social welfare was to be, at most, an externality resulting from these other priorities.

The NRA/M became the national government after operating mainly in the Luwero Triangle and the western mountains, and so “No previous Ugandan political organisation was less well-known” on taking power or held such a limited preexisting social base (Kasfir 2000, 63). The NRA/M thus needed to legitimate its power with a wider audience than ever before, and the
solutions it chose were to try to incorporate other social and political groups into the new
government, and to institutionalize the resistance council structure nationwide. The broad-based
new government brought in new actors in coalition with the NRA/M, especially from the Buganda-
centered DP, while the National Resistance Council became the national legislative body.
Museveni, acting as president, presided over the cabinet, and elections were held for the NRC,
though candidates could not run based on partisan affiliation. This maintained the NRA/M’s
principle of nonsectarianism that it preached during the Bush War, while the embrace of outside
politicians in cabinet positions gave both greater legitimacy through broadened representation
outside the NRA/M’s Banyankole core and offered opportunities to expand patronage networks
(Tripp 2010, 48–49). During the first decade in power, according to Augustine Ruzindana, “There
was a lot of collectivity, consultation, and attention to values” (U-1). Museveni and core NRA/M
leaders retained the final say in policymaking, however, and a Banyankole-Baganda alliance
remained predominant in the government, much to the displeasure of northerners, who felt their
power had been usurped (Lindemann 2011).

The NRA/M did not necessarily preach or seek to enact equality politically and
economically so much as to deny differences existed among citizens or political groups. The idea
of ‘inclusiveness’ for all Ugandans within the NRA/M’s ‘Movement,’ was designed “to distinguish
the NRM from all previous parties and governments by characterizing them as inherently sectarian
and thus incapable of ruling Ugandans democratically,” leading to both the ban on political parties
and the denial of class differences (Kasfir 1998, 58). This negation of difference, however, kept
the NRA/M from effectively redressing inequalities and truly working to affect and represent the
interests of a broader proportion of the population, either by creating order and security throughout
the entirety of the national territory or by providing widespread public goods. The NRA/M built a
new political system, but not a new, united Ugandan national identity, depending instead on the security apparatus to hold the country together.

**Establishing and Expanding Security**

Museveni promised in his new role as president in 1986 that he and the NRA/M would bring ‘fundamental change’ (Museveni 1992), but the environment of instability, poverty, and uncertainty when the NRA/M came into power meant that, like almost any government, security was an immediate priority. As Sjögren (2013, 102–3) argues, the new government faced threats to Uganda’s “fundamental statehood” and so needed to act “to secure a minimum of political and economic stabilisation in terms of security and resource extraction within a very volatile political context.” Museveni himself clearly recognized that the long-term legitimacy of the NRA/M government depended on providing security. In a 1989 speech, Museveni (1990, 53) characterized security institutions as the most important:

“I can describe the State by pointing out that it has certain pillars which if they do not exist, you will not have a viable State. Some of the pillars of the State are the Army, the Police and other security organs such as the intelligence services, the prisons, the judiciary, the Civil Service, and the legislature. These pillars are crucial to the existence of a State and to prevent its disintegration. The State should guarantee security of person and property. If it cannot do that, why should people owe it allegiance?”

While the NRA/M’s own troops provided a basis for new security forces, the group had only operated in the center and west of the country and needed reorganization after a large number of military deserters and bandwagon supporters joined the group during the final march toward Kampala. NRA/M forces chased the remaining Okello loyalist forces to the country’s northern periphery by April 1986 (see above), while at the center, Museveni and other NRA/M commanders developed plans for securing the national territory.
The NRA/M’s troops became the heart of the new military, which retained the name ‘National Resistance Army’ until 1995, when it was renamed the Uganda People’s Defence Force. Though some former members of the prior military were integrated into the new force, most northern officers and troops had fled back toward their home region during the takeover, and many in northern and eastern Uganda “viewed the new government with suspicion—some as a military regime with a southwestern base” (Sjögren 2013, 110–11). The continued resistance of Okello loyalist forces in the north after the NRA/M takeover and the development over the next decade of multiple insurgencies in northern and eastern Uganda contributed to the NRA/M military’s continued legitimacy deficit in much of these regions. NRA forces numbered around 10,000 when the NRA/M took power (Republic of Uganda 1990a, 126), and this number doubled and then rapidly expanded until, around 1989, there were almost 80,000 soldiers (Weinstein 2007, 68). As the military ate up an increasing percentage of the budget, there were pressures to demobilize, though this was a slow process, beginning in 1993 (see Table 6.1 below).

Table 6.1 National Resistance Army estimated strength (personnel), 1986-1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>20,000</td>
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<td>1988</td>
<td>35,000</td>
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<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>50,000</td>
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</tbody>
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After a brief suspension during the takeover, police forces resumed operations in urban areas in early February 1986, under NRA/M supervision (Weekly Focus 1986d), though the next
month, Museveni admitted that “in many areas, neither the police force nor the administration is functioning” (Museveni 1992, 32). After accounting for those officers who had abandoned their posts following the Okello coup or the NRA/M takeover, the national Ugandan Police Force (UPF) was left with only 3,000 officers at this time. The Minister of the Interior told legislators in December 1986 that the institutional rot in the UPF required significant changes, having: “been misused, mismanaged, and in many respects neglected. It suffered from political abuses. As a result, the Police Force deteriorated to levels where it could not deliver the expected services to the general public” (Republic of Uganda 1986a, 106–7). The process of police reform took place in stages, but by 1996, the UPF had 17,000 officers, standardized training, and increased equipment (Kabwegyere 2000, 48). This force was still far too small for a robust presence in rural areas across Uganda and faced constant shortfalls of equipment and arms, a source of complaints among legislators and ministers (e.g. Republic of Uganda 1990a, 2, 17, 78–81). In response, the NRA/M decided resources should be devoted elsewhere and decentralized policing authority by tasking local RCs with the administration of law and order in their communities (Lewis 2012; Tidemand 1994).

The NRA/M government tried to be broad-based not only in power-sharing, but also in its intelligence collection, continuing the wartime function of RCs not just as local administrations, but also as the eyes and ears of the government at the grassroots level. This usage was especially prevalent in the restive north (Branch 2011, 69). In rural areas where police and military presence has been thin, RCs functioned as the primary security providers, a “citizens’ intelligence system,” as Museveni put it in his inauguration speech in 1986 (Museveni 1992, 22–23). The increased use of RCs for intelligence gathering over time contributed to a clear decline in the capacity of rebel groups to organize as intelligence networks grew denser (Lewis 2012). In rural areas where
rebellions or armed cattle raiding occurred, this decentralization of the state’s coercive capacity was extended to the creation Local Defence Units (LDUs), village militias designed to offer greater security. The LDUs were under-resourced and under-trained, however, and parliamentarians and citizens expressed concern about their lack of uniforms, unclear chain of command, and limited articulation with the military and police (Nsambu 1993; Republic of Uganda 1991b, 251, 315).

Across the security sector, from the military down to local RCs and militias, political education remained a priority. Building on structures established during the Bush War (Bell 2016, 504–5; Kabwegyere 2000, 106–7), in the transition to power, the military established a Central School for Political Education where officers would undertake four-months of classes “such as ‘Introduction to Political Education,’ ‘Revolutionary Methods of Work,’ and ‘The Importance of Ideological Development for Leaders’” (Bell 2016, 505). The military also maintained the Bush War institutions of political officers in units and consultative meetings across ranks. These practices helped to build cohesion in the military, enabled it to integrate former rebel fighters, and enforced norms of civilian protection (Bell 2016). Over time, however, emphasis on these institutions began to erode, with fewer intake classes at the political education school and consultative meetings becoming rare, contributing to a decline in forces’ identification with the NRA/M project and weakening discipline (Museveni 1994b; Ondoga Ori Amaza 1998, 51).

Political and military education programs were extended beyond the military to NRA/M partisans and citizens more generally. Courses called mchakamchaka were organized throughout the country, designed to politically engage citizens, but also to give them basic military training. Initially targeted toward civil servants who were expected to pass on their training in their home areas, the NRA/M in the early 1990s expanded the training to all high school students, before suspending the classes in 1993 (Kayunga 2001, 91–94). Rubongoya (2007, 64) argues that these
courses helped gain trust by showing that the government was willing to help citizens learn “to defend themselves against state tyranny,” versus the military predation of the past. Museveni presented *mchakamchaka* in this light, saying such citizen military training was a continuation of the Bush War-era effort to “demystify” and “democratize” guns among peasants, for “Tyrannical rulers would never do such a thing because their existence depends on the mystification and monopolisation of the gun” (Museveni 1992, 97).

Yet resistance against state tyranny was not the goal so much as legitimacy and the creation of a stronger capacity for rural defense and counterinsurgency. In 1989, Minister of State for Defence Maj. General Elly Tumwine stated that “it is the government’s intention to train all able bodied and willing Ugandans in political education and military science, in a bid to enable them to defend themselves internally, fight anti-people elements in their society and remain a reserve force in case of external attacks” (Tumwine 1989). Between 1986 and 1991, approximately 60,000 people graduated from *mchakamchaka* courses, but from 1991 on, courses expanded (Lewis 2012, 237–38). The uptake of political concepts from *mchakamchaka* courses was not always high, but handling weapons was reportedly popular (Joseph 1993). The courses came to serve as structured settings to press civilians in unstable areas not to support or join rebel movements, while also building the government’s surveillance capacity by screening and monitoring individuals, and recruiting some to serve as informants for the military and intelligence services or to join as full members (Lewis 2012, 238–39).

Despite efforts to build citizen intelligence and security networks at the ground-level, the NRA/M government did not achieve an even distribution of coercive capacity throughout Uganda’s territory, and it is unclear that this was truly a goal or priority. Museveni criticized prior governments’ failure to establish authority in regions like Acholiland and Karamoja to stop cattle
raiding (Museveni 1992, 182), yet areas suffering from cattle raiding in fact saw sudden withdrawals of military forces, leaving LDUs alone to defend their towns with limited supplies and no logistical support. The military abandoned large areas of northern and eastern Uganda to rebels and cattle raiders (Ochan 1989), failing to protect hundreds of thousands of people. This led many residents of these areas and outside scholars to conclude that the lives of Acholi and other northern peoples did not concern the NRA/M government (Branch 2005, 2011). In 1991, the military organized new militias in Acholiland called Arrow Groups, only to abandon them once they were set up, poorly trained and vulnerable to attack (Branch 2011, 72–73). Overall military strength was not the issue so much as force distribution, since at the same time the military was failing to defend domestic territory, it was willing and able to engage in peacekeeping operations abroad and adventurist intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

**Political Reform and Infrastructural Power**

As noted above, security, the bedrock of statehood, remained the NRA/M’s highest priority. Yet with general security in the national core achieved after taking power, what else did the NRA/M seek to accomplish with the state apparatus? Democracy and economic development were the principal aims espoused by NRA/M leaders and the Ten-Point Programme. While developed endogenously as part of the war effort, RCs were fully-embraced as the institutional manifestation of the NRA/M’s commitment to democracy. The plan to rebuild the economy called for developing economic independence through import-substitution industrialization and having a mixed economy with “the majority of economic activities being carried out by private entrepreneurs – small, medium and even big – with the state, however, taking part in selected
fulcrum-like sectors” (NRM 1986), aiming more for liberalism than the socialism many had originally ascribed to Museveni.

The RC system was a major advance in the structural spread of state influence throughout the national territory, with Hansen and Twaddle (1991, 4) describing the creation of local-level elected governments as a “revolutionary change in politics” in Uganda. The NRA/M in power committed to RCs as the building block for governance, creating a system with five tiers, from RC1 at the village level to RC5 at the regional level, and the national legislature, the NRC originally envisioned as the top of a political pyramid. Ddungu (1993, 368–69) highlights four views of the RCs’ in operation:

“The bureaucratic view sees RCs as mere appendages of civil service created to implement government policy more effectively…The democratic view, on the other hand, sees RCs as more of popular organs created to counter and hold in check abuses of the civil servants and all other state functionaries: that is, as organs of the people…The third view sees RCs as organs of one political group, NRM, with its socialist proclivity. This is the view held by organized political parties…The fourth view which could be taken as the semi-official version take RCs as organs of the people, organs of the Movement, and organs of the state.”

The full picture was something of an amalgam, and RCs varied over time and space in how they were used by the national NRA/M government and how responsive they were to the people they were designed to represent (Burkey 1991; Ddungu 1993; Tidemand 1994).

The transition of the NRA/M from rebels to rulers created an opportunity for the organization to make policies at the national level, whereas they had previously been more fragmented, and so politics and policymaking grew increasingly distant from the grassroots level of the original RCs. The NRA/M’s occupation of the state apparatus also reduced the scope of RCs’ authority from almost all everyday governance during the Bush War to “uniting people, propagating NRM policy, reconciliation of disputes, promotion of self-help projects, maintenance of law and order in their areas and moral rehabilitation” (Ddungu 1993, 377–78). Rather than
providing opportunities for bottom-up criticism or innovations, RCs became the bureaucratic machinery for implementing top-down directives, a situation legally institutionalized in 1987 in the Resistance Councils Statute, which subordinated the RCs to the national Minister of Local Government and appointed District Administrators. Minister of Local Government Jaberi Bidandi Ssali said when he came into office in 1989, he was “charged with transforming RCs and connecting them at different levels,” but power generally rested at the center, with the NRA/M national government (U-5). The pattern of creating lower-level structures for citizen participation and then subordinating their voices to national-level leaders’ plans was repeated in the constitutional reform process in the late 1980s and early 1990s, in which an impressively wide consultative exercise was largely ignored by central elites (Furley and Katalikawe 1997). Despite these problems, RCs made the central state more present in the lives of citizens by dispersing administrative responsibility beyond the individual chiefs of the past, while for the state, RCs provided capacity for local-level political mobilization and helped render citizens more legible through their intelligence function.

RCs, though, were the primary state or NRA/M-affiliated institutions through which the new government sought to organize the population. The NRA/M government did not seek to build unions or other mass organizations to exert corporatist influence over civil society, as the FSLN did in Nicaragua. To give just one example, women were integral in the NRA/M struggle in the Bush War and grew in their influence and participation in formal politics from 1986 onwards, yet the NRA/M government did not develop a nationwide women’s organization (Ottemoeller 1999; Tripp 1994, 2001). While politicians engaged with women as potential sources of support (Ottemoeller 1999) and tried to “coopt women and youth into state structures” (U-4, Matembe), the NRA/M government did not generally seek greater social influence through the women’s
movement. Attempts at cooptation were easily rebuffed and an autonomous, diverse civil society sector emerged instead (Tripp 2001). Other new government institutions for accountability were developed, such as a human rights commission and inspector general (U-1, Ruzindana; U-4, Matembe; Flanary and Watt 1999, 515; Rubongoya 2007, 15–16), but these were geared more towards controlling the bureaucracy than developing influence over and through the population at large.

For the NRA/M, economic reconstruction and development, rather than economic transformation, was the main priority, and they were willing to make a rapid reversal when initial policies performed poorly. The Ten-Point Programme called for a mixed economy, and Museveni in 1984 stated that he envisioned this as “largely based on private production by peasants but also by middle classes in certain sectors like commerce and industry plus state participation in selected areas on the basis of profitability” (New Vision 1990). The NRA/M faced challenges from the outset, however, in rebuilding an economy damaged by war and corruption and gaining control over the informal magendo economy (Larkin 1987, 163). A year after victory, Museveni (1992, 45) stated that the government was not only committed to rehabilitating the economy, “but also to effecting fundamental economic changes so that our economy best serves the interests of the majority…by restoring the social and economic infrastructures and by creating conditions for expanded economic production.” Yet he remained vague about how, specifically, this would be accomplished, and early government efforts to rehabilitate the economy tended to focus on large-scale investment, with little attempt to tackle poverty (Ssewakiryanga 2008). One year into NRA/M rule, the government had “yet to adopt a national budget or draft any major guidelines for the future economy of Uganda” (Larkin 1987, 163). Group leaders denied “that there were any basic
economic cleavages dividing Ugandans” (Kasfir 1998, 58), and even the more left-leaning NRA/M leaders “wanted to reform rather than dismantle the existing apparatus” (Brett 1994, 64).

The initial plan was a set of ‘Interim Economic Measures.’ These called for some state intervention in the economy, modeled on Jerry Rawlings’ policies in Ghana, and comprising a two tier exchange rate for essential goods and others; revising upwards producer prices and interest rates; and giving some parastatals monopolies on internal and external marketing of a number of products, while privatizing other parastatals (Kiyaga-Nsubuga 1997; Loxley 1989). This economic program, however, was not accompanied by structural changes, bankrupted the already struggling country through a failure to include revenue generation measures, and lacked deep commitment among top NRA/M leaders (e.g. Loxley 1989). It was quickly abandoned within a year for liberalization and structural adjustment, in cooperation with international financial institutions (IFIs). Sjögren (2013, 119, 148) argues that the move to economic liberalization was a “bitter pill for the NRM to swallow,” but necessary “to guarantee a revenue basis for stabilisation and recovery,” with pro-liberalization forces largely triumphing from 1992 on, entrenching capitalism as the dominant economic paradigm of the NRA/M (Brett 1994, 64). The NRA/M, however, moved relatively quickly into the IFIs’ embrace, both reevaluating their own economic plans and recognizing that liberalization was necessary to secure external support, a two-sided process of domestic ‘learning’ and external compulsion (Kiyaga-Nsubuga 1995, 256–57, 1997). Museveni himself had actually expressed openness to working with IFIs and foreign investors as early as 1984, stating that he could “work with anybody including the IMF providing the terms are right” (New Vision 1990), so the shift toward liberalization was perhaps not as radical as Sjögren and other observers thought. The lack of changes in the underlying structure of the economy led

149 Critics of the NRA/M argue that leftist rhetoric among some leaders was merely a façade, a useful presentation of the group’s aims while it sought political dominance without plans for economic change (e.g. Nabudere 1990).
Mamdani (1988, 1163) to conclude that even with the move from intervention to liberalization, in the first years of the NRA/M government there was no “substantive shift in the socio-economic programme” [emphasis added].

The embrace of liberal economics was so complete that by 1993, Uganda’s economic model was “one of only very few in sub-Saharan Africa today to which the donors, and particularly the World Bank, can point with some pride” (Independent Working Group 1993, 10), despite corruption and mismanagement in the process of privatizing parastatals (Tangri and Mwenda 2001). There was a reduction in the neopatrimonial mode of resource distribution of past governments (Kjaer 2004, 407), despite credible accusations of ethnoregional favoritism of Westerners and Buganda (Branch 2011; Lindemann 2011; Omara-Otunnu 1987, 176–78). Underlying economic systems, however, remained largely the same, and much of the country was left behind by the rising macroeconomic tide. A decade into NRA/M rule, a representative from the central Mpigi district protested in a legislative session that “when I was going through the Budget that we are about to debate, you will find that those that have got more are actually facilitated more and those that are poor in the rural, remote areas, even the little they have is somehow being taken away” (Republic of Uganda 1996a, 104).

Beyond security, ‘democracy,’ and economic development, the other items that had been included in the Ten-Point Programme were never strongly emphasized during the Bush War and remained limited priorities for the NRA/M after coming to power. There was general success, at least in the first decade in power, in cutting down on corruption, but the project of “settling the Karimojong,” the semi-nomadic northern herding tribe, and further developing the north was given little effort beyond the counterinsurgency against the Lord’s Resistance Army and other groups.

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150 Though this dedication to anti-corruption efforts eroded significantly from 1993 on (Flanary and Watt 1999; Tangri and Mwenda 2001, 2008).
Economic recovery through macro-level development and reform was expected to lift up the poor, rather than the NRA/M directly implementing pro-poor measures such as land reform (Ssewakiryanga 2008, 74–77),\(^{151}\) while improvement of public services likewise remained more on the NRA/M agenda in terms of rhetoric rather than practice.

**Social Services**

The NRA/M never considered social service provision a strong priority, building on a mixed legacy of post-independence Ugandan governments when it came to providing healthcare, education, and other services. Service provision under colonialism had been provided mainly by Christian missions, which set up schools and hospitals, though service availability was geographically concentrated in more urban areas and Buganda, and traditional medicine and education remained the norm in much of the territory (Sjögren 2013, 62–63). In the first post-independence decade, there was increased investment in service provision as income from coffee exports increased, but the healthcare remained focused on curative care in hospitals (Sjögren 2013, 81–82), while education was primarily funded and organized by parents and nongovernmental actors (Wiebe and Dodge 1987).

The Amin regime increased government investment and expanded the number of facilities in the health and education sectors from 1971-1975, but from 1975-1986, through the second Obote regime and the brief Okello government, delivery of services and service quality rapidly deteriorated, though physical infrastructure expanded or remained steady (Nagubuzi 1995). The improvement of social services was the sixth point in the Ten Point Programme, with a focus on

\(^{151}\) Despite years of land pressure and peasant agitation, the NRA/M government only passed a limited land reform bill in 1998, after the move to electoral politics (Carbone 2005, 6–7; Gibb 2013; Green 2006; Okuku 2006). Gibb (2013) provides the most complete account of the history and politics of land tenure policies, practices, and reforms in Uganda.
increasing the number of medical practitioners and access to drugs, as well as aiming to “wipe out” illiteracy and work towards universal primary and secondary education (NRM 1986). The NRA/M thus came to power professing support for widespread access to healthcare and universal primary and secondary education, yet efforts to deliver on these goals were more sporadic and limited, as the government prioritized other sectors. In 1990, following a peace accord and the temporary calming of conflicts in the north, legislators tried to put pressure on leadership to increase spending on services. Representative Kisamba Mugerwa, whose constituency of Luwero was devastated in the Bush War, but saw slow reconstruction efforts, argued that there was a need to balance budget priorities, since “Defence is allocated 10 billion [Ugandan shillings]. The only Ministry following it nearer is Education which is five billion, otherwise, and Health two billion,” and so following a peace accord, “it is important that we synchronise this expenditure and we have to sustain defence but we have now to uplift Health and Education which are equally very fundamental” (Republic of Uganda 1990b, 19–20). Unfortunately for Mugerwa, his admonition was largely unheeded, as conflict resurged in the north and the NRA/M leadership retained a more limited interest in service delivery.

At times, even the organization’s rhetoric about social services was weak. In the foreword to a compilation of NRA/M newsletters from the rebel period, Museveni reflected on the organization’s successes both as rebels and in power, emphasizing the economy, democratization through RCs, and security, but not mentioning social services on the whole, or health and education specifically (NRM 1990, i–iii). Free public services were held up as an ideal, yet the NRA/M repeatedly deemed them too expensive or not feasible, instead promoting a model of cost-sharing, with the government offering some subsidies, in line with the organization’s liberal economic

*Healthcare*

While vaunted for Museveni’s pragmatic approach to HIV/AIDS at a time some African governments were ignoring it as a public health crisis, there was in fact limited meaningful effort by the NRA/M government to expand healthcare infrastructure or access. The NRA/M was building on weakened foundations left by its predecessors. From the mid-1970s under Amin through the Obote II and Okello governments, there was a steady deterioration of health infrastructure and the loss of capacity through the attrition of health care providers driven abroad or into other sectors by miniscule salaries and poor working conditions, with NGOs stepping in to try to fill gaps in primary healthcare (Sjögren 2013, 95–96, 123). When the NRA/M took power, “structures for health care were dilapidated, and the government…embarked on a strategy for state reconstruction from a vulnerable political position, within weak state institutions and with very limited resources” (Sjögren 2013, 102). Decades of instability and conflict had seen Uganda’s infant mortality rate and disease burden rise, while repression and war had contributed to death, disabilities, and poor management of epidemics (Macrae, Zwi, and Gilson 1996, 1096–97).

In 1986, as the NRA/M came into power, the UNICEF representative in Uganda suggested two possible paths for the rehabilitation of the health sector in Uganda: “to rebuild the health service to its 1970s levels of functioning, or to more radically redefine it to meet equity and sustainability objectives…a major restructuring of health provision in favour of the rural poor and a reappraisal of health financing strategies” (Macrae, Zwi, and Gilson 1996, 1098). The NRA/M discursively endorsed the expansion of primary healthcare provision as a priority, with Deputy
Minister of Health James Batwala in December of 1986 stating that, “we are going to continue to invest into the active treatment for curative treatment, but our emphasis is going to go into preventive and promotive measures” (Republic of Uganda 1986b, 92). In practice, however, the NRA/M was less interested in an intensive reorganization of health provision or undertaking a new set of state duties that would require the expansion of state infrastructural power, opting instead to renew the previous health model, with selective efforts to improve primary care.

The newly established Health Policy Review Commission (HPRC) in 1987 issued broad recommendations for the reconstruction of the existing, curative-focused health system, as well as working to develop primary healthcare capacity. There were funding difficulties across the entire government and a severe shortage of healthcare personnel, but there was also a “lack of political interest in the health sector,” with little effort to implement the Commission’s recommendations until 1991, when a ten year plan for the health sector was published (Macrae, Zwi, and Gilson 1996, 1101; Okuonzi and Macrae 1995, 126). A great deal of healthcare provision was left to NGOs, and donors often duplicated or bypassed existing healthcare structures, creating redundancies and parallel institutions in the health sector (Okuonzi and Macrae 1995; Sjögren 2013, 134). There was, in general, a division of labor in the health sector, with the Ministry of Health funding and managing hospital and specialist care, often with loan funding, while nongovernmental organizations handled the development of primary care. The Ugandan National Programme on Immunisation (UNEPI), for instance, was funded by UNICEF and run by

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152 The ratio of physicians to the population worsened from 1 to 11,000 in 1965 to 1 to 28,000 in 1991. By 1991, Uganda had twice as many people per physician compared to the developing country average (Ministry of Health 1993, 8).

153 Government investment in hospitals often fell short, however, with many facilities under-resourced, understaffed, or falling into disrepair during the NRA/M’s first decade in power, with donor intervention necessary to revive facilities (Kiwanuka 1996; New Vision 1989; Ocan 1989; Odeke 1992; Omunyokol 1993; The Star 1989; Weekly Topic 1993a).
Save the Children, with cooperation from local health workers at the level of implementation (Macrae, Zwi, and Gilson 1996, 1098), with the Ministry of Health setting goals and reviewing progress (New Vision 1986). UNEPI did successfully increase national immunization coverage and maternal and infant mortality were also reduced, achievements trumpeted by Museveni in speeches (Museveni 1992, 72; Muwanga 1993, 40). The scale of improvements was disputed, however, amid suspicions of over-reporting of patients immunized and underreporting of mortality (Macrae, Zwi, and Gilson 1996, 1099), while immunization rates declined in the early 1990s as donor-supplied facilities broke down and external funding dried up (Amooti 1994; Bitangaro 1995; Lamwaka 1996).\textsuperscript{154} Improvements in preventive care were also undermined by continuing structural problems. The government’s difficulties in expanding the public provision of water, for example, with shortages of clean water persisting throughout the country in the late 1980s and only 18\% of the rural population having access to clean water in 1989 (Republic of Uganda 1989b, 137–40; Wasike 1990), contributed to disease outbreaks and impeded sterilization procedures at health facilities (Republic of Uganda 1988, 54–58).

There was also a failure to fully integrate RCs into healthcare planning and implementation beyond the construction of local health posts, overlooking an opportunity to increase the Ministry of Health’s articulation with the population and to facilitate the implementation and uptake of policies throughout the country.\textsuperscript{155} In 1986, the initial NRA/M Minister of Health, Ruhakana Rugunda, announced plans for local, democratically elected ‘Health Unit Committees’ to increase

\textsuperscript{154}Immunization uptake was also uneven, due to lack of education about immunization, failures by immunization teams to reach communities when they were supposed to, and the distance many Ugandans would have needed to travel to reach an immunization center (Baguma 1988; Weekly Topic 1993b).

\textsuperscript{155}There were some district-level health education trainings for RC officials on public health fundamentals, but these were not systematically implemented throughout the country on a regular basis (Republic of Uganda 1991a, 203; Weekly Topic 1989). RCs reportedly maintained good relations with NGOs in the health and sanitation sectors, since they would provide services that were otherwise absent and would stay out of local politics (Kwagal 1998, 122–23).
popular participation in health policy, preventative measures, and primary healthcare provision (Rugunda 1987), but these plans were never brought to fruition on a national scale. NRA/M cadres and doctors complained in newspaper commentaries in 1989 that the government should establish a Secretary for Health post at all levels of the RC system to build community involvement and improve preventive care (B.A. 1989; Bugembe 1989). Museveni in 1989 argued that “through the RC system the NRM Government had found a practical solution” to implement primary healthcare plans throughout the country (Kagoro 1989), yet the greatest public health engagement came through schools, as a health education curriculum was established for primary school students beginning in 1989 (Financial Times 1989). Overall, there was a government bias toward healthcare delivery in urban settings and rural trade hubs (Macrae, Zwi, and Gilson 1996, 1100; Sjögren 2013, 137–38).\(^{156}\)

Prime Minister Samson Kisekka admitted in a 1990 speech that in immunization and rural healthcare gains, “the rural grassroot is fully involved with the assistance of mainly NGOs,” rather than the government (Kisekka 1992, 61–62).\(^{157}\) Okuonzi and Macrae (1995, 130) described Uganda as having “no clear health policy framework” between 1986 and 1991, with the government giving “freedom…to international agencies to operate their own micro-policy environments.”

The lack of government investment in and attention to primary healthcare lays bare the division of power within the government and the lack of interest in healthcare for Museveni and other top NRA/M leaders. Zak Kaheru, an early NRA/M member who later became Minister of Health in 1989, spoke in a 1986 legislative debate about the need to “concentrate on simple

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\(^{156}\) Despite this urban bias, in the 1990s, residents of Kampala, the wealthiest area in the country, were still “not much healthier than the poor lot in the rural areas, looking at infant deaths and malnutrition figures” (Amooti 1995).

\(^{157}\) Community health worker training tended to be funded and organized by NGOs (e.g. The Star 1993), with occasional government programs supplementing this.
facilities” and “pay much more attention to preventive primary health care” (Republic of Uganda 1986a, 40–41). Kisekka, the Prime Minister at the time, was a medical doctor, and stated in December 1987 that he was “one of the believers in prevention being better than cure,” and that “We have gone on spending big sums of money in developing what we call curative services when in fact the alternative would have been done at less than half the price” (Kisekka 1992, 163). Though Kisekka and Kaheru had been involved in the external wing of the NRA/M in exile during the Bush War, they were not part of the inner circle of leadership, and so, even if sincere in their commitments to preventative healthcare, they were unable to push the government to prioritize it once the NRA/M came into power.

The NRA/M’s first budget, in 1986/87, funded the Ministry of Health at only 6.4% of its 1970 level, a ratio that improved only to 16.1% by 1988/89 as political and economic stability increased; only 4% of government expenditures in 1986/87 were on the health sector, a quarter of the international average for low income countries (Macrae, Zwi, and Gilson 1996, 1097). Within the budget, spending was skewed toward curative, rather than primary healthcare. The constant difficulties the government experienced in financing healthcare, even with donor assistance, led to efforts to introduce user fees for historically free public healthcare—based on the argument that patients were already paying informal fees demanded by poorly-compensated health care workers—though attempts to implement a new fee system were repeatedly delayed and blocked (Ablo and Reinikka 1998, 25; Ministry of Health 1990; Okuonzi and Macrae 1995, 127). By 1992, health spending was still at only one-fourth the level “recommended by the World Health Organisation for developing countries,” a problem the Ministry of Health (1993, 4) blamed on

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158 The NRA/M government’s pattern of spending more heavily on curative care rather than preventive care—despite rhetoric promoting primary healthcare—was mirrored by their neighbors in Kenya in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Therkildsen and Semboja 1995, 13).
“underfunding of government services and the low level of coverage.” Existing funding was heavily skewed, with donors funding 77% of total health spending in 1992/93, but the government funding 64% of hospital expenditures (Ablo and Reinikka 1998, 24). Health coverage, meanwhile, was highly geographically uneven, with the conflict-affected north especially underserved, and large percentages of the population nationwide living more than 5 kilometers from a health unit where they could receive essential drugs and immunizations (see Table 6.2 below).

Table 6.2 Percentage of Ugandan Population within 5km Radius of Facility Receiving Essential Drugs and Immunization Services, 1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>% of Population within 5km</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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These systemic issues led to a policy shift in the 1993 National Health Plan (NHP). The World Bank in 1992 conditioned a loan for the preventative care-focused Community Health and AIDS Project on the charging of user fees for government-provided healthcare, pushing the fee-for-service model into practice (Okuonzi and Macrae 1995, 128). The following year, the NHP report concluded that “the state’s role in the health sector should be redefined from provider to policy maker and supervisor of various private providers,” with some limited state provision of preventative care (Sjögren 2013, 155–56). This solution was produced not only by donor concerns for fiscal sustainability, but also the NRA/M government’s liberal bias in favor of markets over state intervention in services and industries (Nagubuzi 1995, 203–4; Sjögren 2013, 155–56). Following this shift in the health care model, and as politics became more open and competitive, the NRA/M government sought to reemphasize its commitment to primary healthcare, promoting

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159 The effective re-privatization of healthcare provision led to a resurgence in importance of church-affiliated mission hospitals as government hospitals became more expensive (Nagubuzi 1995, 204).
“self-help” projects to be funded by the decentralization of tax revenues (Ministry of Health 1993; Museveni 1994a, 40), “involving communities in management and maintenance of health care and facilities” (Bitangaro 1993).

There remained, however, a lack of direction and follow-through from the central government, which was content to reduce its responsibilities and retreat from direct service provision, but also offered relatively little guidance to implement community-level programs. Local governments, meanwhile, struggled to fund projects, remaining reliant on grants from the central government and donors, making local capacity building difficult (Ablo and Reinikka 1998, 25–26).

By the mid-1990s, while healthcare spending overall had increased about 2.5 times from 1991 and 1996 (Ablo and Reinikka 1998, 24), nearly two-thirds (64%) of Uganda’s healthcare funding was still provided by NGOs, rather than the government (Harrison 2001, 668–69). In 1995, government officials reported that about 85% of Uganda’s health budget was still going to hospitals, and only 15% toward primary healthcare, demonstrating a failure to realign spending with the government’s supposed priorities in the health sector (Mugisa 1995). Legislators in 1996 were still bemoaning the lack of funding for healthcare and how it was negatively impacting health workers and the quality of care. Representative James Makumbi, who was Minister of Health in from 1991 to 1995 and was affiliated with the NRA/M during the Bush War, stated that, “we have heard comments about poor staffing, shortages, lack of efficiency, lack of ethics, but what has created this? I wish to state that at the very root of it all is money,” even as the country retained heavy donor support (Republic of Uganda 1996b, 585–86). In 1996, Minister of State for Information Dr. Phillip Byaruhanga decried the fact that health spending remained at about half
the level recommended by the WHO for developing countries, issuing yet another call for improved primary healthcare delivery (Namutebi 1996).

For all its difficulties in the health sector, Uganda under the NRA/M was viewed internationally as a success story for its HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment efforts at a time when many other countries were ignoring or downplaying the burgeoning health crisis. The NRA/M saw their predecessors take little action after the epidemic was identified in 1982 (Kaleeba 1993), and were reportedly convinced when they took power that it was “wise to open the gates to national and international efforts to control AIDS” (Kisekka 1992, 69). The new government began hosting international workshops on HIV/AIDS (Focus 1987), but Museveni’s stance on the seriousness of HIV/AIDS as a national problem was ambiguous until 1988, when he began speaking out more frequently about the epidemic and the need for medical, political, and social action to combat the spread of the disease (Parkhurst 2001, 24–26).

Yet despite Uganda’s comparatively good efforts, the NRA/M government was also halting and inconsistent in its rhetoric and programs, part of its overall discomfort with responsibility for primary health care and preventative care. At the launch of the Aids Treatment Research Fund in April 1988, Kisekka said the government was “declaring a war against AIDS in Uganda,” but the government contributed less than US$10,000 to start the fund (Kisekka 1992, 77–78). While some scholars and practitioners emphasize Museveni’s personal role in pushing HIV/AIDS prevention policy forward and helping stem the epidemic (Parkhurst 2001; Youde 2006), his role was in fact more complicated. Museveni promoted abstinence, rather than condom use, for instance, denigrating his fellow Ugandans as ignorant illiterates: “Condoms are not prohibited, but we are not making a campaign in their favour. The problem is the ignorance of the population. 90% of

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160 Though HIV/AIDS appears to have emerged in Uganda in the late 1970s (Parkhurst 2001, 21).
Ugandans don’t know how to read or write. If you tell them to use condoms, they don’t know how to follow the instructions for their correct use” (Muwanga 1993, 40–41). Beyond dismissing condoms as a solution, at an international AIDS conference, Museveni also promoted the use of traditional herbal medicine (Museveni 1992, 274–77), though he did not earn the same rancor for these stances as his much-maligned later peer, Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, did.

Despite these shortcomings, the willingness of Museveni and other NRA/M officials to speak out about HIV/AIDS, rather than denying the disease’s existence or danger, and the establishment of national and international cooperative institutions, such as the Uganda AIDS Commission, were better than the policies and performance of many of Uganda’s neighbors (e.g. Parkhurst 2001; Putzel 2004). These interventions helped change behavior (Parkhurst and Lush 2004), and likely saved tens of thousands of lives.

While the NRA/M made strong rhetorical commitments to improving healthcare and investing in primary healthcare systems that could benefit all Ugandans, their actions did not demonstrate committed efforts to follow through with these promises. The NRA/M claimed to be working toward “the establishment of a decent living for all Ugandans,” but as Susan Dicklitch (1998, 70) aptly noted in the mid-1990s, “With an estimated recurrent expenditure on health less than US$2 per capita per annum, the spending priorities of the regime seem to be mixed up.” Uganda had moved from aspirations for a functioning, publicly provided health system to de facto total privatization. As Asiimwe et al. (1997) described it, Uganda exhibited “the absence of a public health system. Almost all elements of the system which were once public have been incorporated into the private business activity of the health workers. Drugs which are supplied to public health units become the private property of health workers who resell them in their own private premises ranging in character from their homes to established medical clinics. Public health facility premises have become the sites on which private transactions for health service delivery are conducted...The result is that very few free services are delivered in the public health facilities, and almost none at all are delivered to the poor.”
This pattern of lofty rhetoric from the NRA/M coupled with only modest actions for public benefits\footnote{NRA/M issues with policy coordination and follow-through have continued to impede Uganda’s healthcare progress, for instance undermining efforts to reduce malaria infections and lower infant mortality rates since 1995 (Croke 2012).} was mirrored in the education sector.

\textit{Education}

The NRA/M recognized the importance of education and its potential for nation-building, with government strategy documents deeming national unity and the promotion of civic values and duties as key aims of the education system, but at least an equal emphasis was placed on the economic benefits of education and literacy to contribute to national development (Republic of Uganda 1986b, 76, 1992). The NRA/M made frequent rhetorical commitments to expanding educational access and ensuring universal primary and secondary education, but such educational expansion was not in fact pushed to the front of the agenda until 1996, when the political system opened up to allow greater competition and universal primary education, still without full state support, became a campaign promise of Museveni. The organization also entered power with Uganda’s government aid to education privileging higher education over primary education. As Wiebe and Dodge (1987, 7) pointed out, “primary schooling is provided on a fee-for-service basis, secondary schooling is partially subsidized and university education is completely subsidized, all of this despite the fact that a good primary educational programme for all children probably benefits a society more than anything else in the long run.”\footnote{In the 1988/89 school year, the average expenditure per pupil was 11 times higher for secondary schools than for primary schools, and 183 times higher for Makerere University (Khan 1991, 20).} The debate over when or how to achieve universal primary education would dominate the education agenda throughout the
NRA/M’s first decade in power, though for Museveni and top officials, it remained a lesser concern.

At the end of the Bush War, the NRA/M declared that as part of its reconstruction plan for the Luwero Triangle, children in the region would receive free primary education (Wiebe and Dodge 1987, 7), though it is unclear to what extent this promise was fulfilled, as much of the rehabilitation program for Luwero went unaccomplished (Kiwanuka 1994; Monitor 1996). In budget debates in 1986, Minister of State for Education John Ntimba declared the Ministry of Education’s chief aims to be to “effect the universalization of education beginning with the primary school level,” and to eradicate illiteracy (Republic of Uganda 1986b, 76). Museveni in 1989 said, “I would like everybody to know that it is an NRM long-term aim to ensure free universal and compulsory primary and, when possible, secondary education. We cannot, however, undertake such a task in the present state of the economy” (Museveni 1992, 57). The following year, Museveni again spoke of the necessity of universal education, arguing that “We must aim at providing universal education up to the twelfth year of school” not only in Uganda, but in all African countries (Museveni 1992, 195).

Yet even as rising school fees caused some parents to pull their children out of school (Financial Times 1990; The Citizen 1990), the NRA/M was constantly pushing off into the future any implementation of aims for universal and free education. In 1991, Museveni stated that “We must have a strategy which will optimize the scarce resources we have and make sure that by the year 2002, every child in Uganda will go to school for at least eight years” (Museveni 1992, 110). In 1992, however, after the economy had improved, Museveni argued that “Although education must be universal and compulsory this must be attained through the possibility of cost sharing and not free” (Muwanga 1993, 33). Parents and members of the media grew concerned about the
government’s apparent lack of interest in education, with one 1989 editorial noting that, “Surprisingly to date, the government seems not to be taking a keen interest in the running of schools. More often than not, schools are left to the parents to run” (The Guide 1989).

Despite these mixed signals about the government’s commitment to universal education, there was some expansion in the number of government-aided schools in the country and the number of students served by these schools. The government struggled to keep up with population growth and demand, however, and teachers were often untrained or undertrained, especially in primary schools. In 1986, 60% of primary school teachers were not formally trained (Republic of Uganda 1986b, 78), while in 1989, nearly 47% of primary school teachers and 46% of secondary school teachers were still not formally trained; meanwhile a large number of ‘ghost teachers’ swelled the Ministry of Education’s payroll, but did not actually teach (Khan 1991, 9–10; Republic of Uganda 1989a, 103). The Ministry of Education’s own dysfunction further impeded improvements in the sector, with an internal report in 1987 decrying “the appalling situation” of education system, saying “the running of the Ministry continues to worsen and has almost gone to the dogs” amidst problems with fraud, overpayment, negligence, abuse of authority, and payment for fake students and employees (New Vision 1987).

Government spending on education fluctuated in the late 1980s, with the percentage of total government spending devoted to education rising in 1987/88 to 12.5% from 10.7% in the NRA/M’s first budget in 1986/87, before falling back to 10.9% in 1989/90 (Khan 1991, 15). During this time period, the government was providing at least some assistance to the majority of

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163 In Northern Uganda, war frequently disrupted educational provision and damaged facilities (e.g. Republic of Uganda 1988, 27). In Kitgum district between 1993 and mid-1996, 70 teachers were killed, 152 students abducted, seven primary schools burnt down, and 14 schools closed due to the LRA conflict (Moro 1996a), while in Gulu district in 1996, about 40% of registered primary school students were no longer attending school and dozens of schools were closed (Allio 1996; Moro 1996b).
educational institutions in Uganda, but approximately 30% of educational services were provided by non-governmental organizations and charity groups without public assistance (Bitamazire 1991, 22). At the local level, teachers’ salaries were often paid or supplemented by parent-teacher associations. Primary and secondary school enrolment from 1987-1996 remained relatively stable according to official government data (Ablo and Reinikka 1998, 6; Tumusiime 1992, 110), but funding was rising, prompting questions about the effectiveness of education funding and where additional resources were going. In fact, a survey by World Bank researchers of 250 government-aided primary schools in 19 districts found official national statistics for the 1991-1995 period to be highly implausible, with enrolments actually rising 60% during the period and the student-teacher ratio rising from 26:1 in 1991 to 37:1 in 1995 (Ablo and Reinikka 1998, 6–7). Despite increasing government spending on education, parents’ contributions to salaries, supplies, and building rehabilitation and maintenance doubled between 1991 and 1995, suggesting continued inadequacies in government investment, while over 70% of government grant funding supposed to be provided for each student never actually reached the schools (Ablo and Reinikka 1998, 10, 13).  

The continuation of the model of cost sharing between government and parents in and of itself also presented barriers to the achievement of mass education. The government argued that the country’s macroeconomic weakness and dependence on agriculture made it difficult to fund education fully. Minister of Education Amanya Mushega in 1989 tried to pour cold water on calls for universal education, arguing against the idea “that Uganda is a very rich country and hence can more or less afford to run and sustain a welfare system,” calling it instead a “backward neo-colonial

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164 One legislator in 1990 was sympathetic to the Ministry of Education’s problems in stopping the misdirection of resources, arguing that increased funding and transportation for the Ministry’s inspectorate was needed to stem losses (Republic of Uganda 1990b, 50–51).
economy in the back yard of the world capital system” (Republic of Uganda 1989b, 36). These same economic factors, however, made it difficult for peasants and the urban poor to afford school fees—precluding the increased literacy and educated workforce the government deemed necessary for economic development (Julius 1993). Rural schools, where parents on average could not contribute much to education funding, faced great difficulties in educating their students, who fared worse on national exams than their urban and semi-urban peers (Kawamara 1993; Lucima 1993; Mirembe and Kaheru 1994). The government consistently blamed lack of funds for shortcomings in the education sector, as when Minister of State for Primary Education Joyce Mpanga said in 1989 that, in response to school overcrowding in Kampala, parents would need to contribute more for new classrooms, since “government funds alone are not enough to fully finance school projects in the country” (Wanzusi and Azabo 1989).

As the 1990s began, the NRA/M government faced increasing pressures to deliver on its promises of universal education, but there were continued excuses and attempts to push policy implementation further into the future. Various commissions continually called for at least universal primary education, with a 1992 government white paper suggesting 2003 as a goal for implementation, but “there was no immediate increase in government commitment to primary education during the early 1990s,” and the Constituent Assembly rejected adding a right to free primary education as a provision of the 1994 Constitution (Stasavage 2005, 58). When the 1992 white paper’s recommendations finally came up for debate in the legislature in 1994, the Ministry of Education made clear that while it supported moving toward universal primary education, it was not prepared to abandon cost-sharing, at least for “capable parents,” moving gradually to increase

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165 In the lead up to the Constituent Assembly, a mock Children’s Assembly organized by the National Council for Children agreed that “the State should provide compulsory basic education, that there should be no cost-sharing in higher institutions of learning in order to afford every citizen equal opportunity to attain the highest education standard possible” (Republic of Uganda 1994, 209), even if their older counterparts later rejected the idea.
government funding for primary school fees by 2000 (Obbo and Kabusingye 1994). Amany Mushega claimed that some cost sharing was necessary to promote equality, saying that “Those who can afford should contribute while those who cannot afford will be looked after by the state. If education is made free for all the poor will still be marginalized” (Akiiki 1994).

As the political system began to open up, however, with the legalization of opposition party electoral participation, universal education moved back onto the agenda as a campaign promise for Museveni and the NRA/M before the 1996 elections. In a 1994 election manifesto, Museveni announced plans “to make primary education universal and vocational by 1997,” with parents being responsible for school uniforms and stationery for their children, while the state would pay for teacher training and salaries, facilities, and textbooks (Museveni 1994a, 34–35). Even through 1995, however, Museveni’s economic liberalism made him reluctant to increase state funding for education, to the frustration of some NRA/M members. Museveni instead promoted the idea that infrastructure development should be prioritized, “based on the logic that road building would facilitate participation in the market economy, allowing Ugandans to earn income which could be used in part to pay school fees,” while denigrating education as a “non-productive” economic sector (Stasavage 2005, 58–59).

In the lead up to the 1996 elections, Museveni made explicit the promise to provide government-funded primary education for up to four children per family. Even with this bold shift in stance, though, education remained a low priority: “improvement in education was listed as only the fifth of seven bullet points on the back of Museveni’s published manifesto” (Stasavage 2005, 59). The positive public reception of the shift toward universal primary education, however,

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166 The model of promising major service provision expansion before an election was replicated by Museveni in the lead ups to the 2001 elections, when he promised a new high level health center in each subcounty, and the 2006 elections, when he promised universal secondary education (Tripp 2010, 188).
convinced government officials after the election to follow through and to give the sector greater emphasis and investment throughout the late 1990s, despite the misgivings of some external donors (Stasavage 2005, 68–69). Museveni himself was quick to claim credit in his 1996 State of the Nation Address to open Parliament, suggesting that the government was well-prepared for a roll-out of universal primary education and reducing or eliminating cost-sharing, because “Over the last ten years, we have been able to carry out a number of experiments in providing cheap or free education to the children of the poor rural families,” naming military schools, eight schools around Lake Mbuuro, and one school in Kisozi as examples (Republic of Uganda 1996a, 47–48).

Illiteracy remained a problem that the NRA/M government did not tackle head on. Earlier governments had engaged in literacy campaigns beginning in 1964 and continuing through the early 1970s, but there was not sustained, systematic support for literacy education (World Bank 2001, 5–6).167 The NRA/M began meeting with UNESCO after coming to power, beginning discussions about a renewed literacy effort. While meeting with UNESCO representatives in 1988, Deputy Minister of Information and Broadcasting Maumbe-Mukwana complained that “Lack of communication equipment hinders the [Ministry] from effectively combating illiteracy in the country,” while the visiting experts noted a lack of coordination across government ministries and NGOs (Rwakaara 1988). The NRA/M government did begin to undertake some literacy education efforts (Mugote 1989), but never in a coordinated, nation-wide manner, and adult literacy was only included on a government priority list in 1991-1992, when the government was seeking to secure UNESCO support (World Bank 2001, 6).

167 Literacy education programs in Uganda admittedly faced difficulties stemming from the diversity of languages spoken in the country and questions about the extent to which education English or Swahili should be prioritized as a national language (Kendrick et al. 2006; Kwesiga 1994).
With donor assistance, a pilot program called Integrated Nonformal Basic Education (INFOBEPP) began in 1992 to teach functional literacy to adults in portions of eight districts (World Bank 2001, 6), but efforts to scale up were slow in materializing. In a 1995 speech on International Literacy Day, Prime Minister Kintu Musoke reiterated the commitment, dating back to the Ten-Point Programme, “to eradicating illiteracy in order to enhance development,” and announced the inclusion of literacy education in political education and mchakamchaka courses, but he lamented that 45% of men and 55% of women over the age of 10 remained illiterate (Onyango-Kakoba 1995). The initial success of INFOBEPP finally led in 1996 to the development of the National Functional Adult Literacy program, aiming to expand programs from the eight districts to 26 of Uganda’s 45 districts by the end of 1998. However, “the programs operate[d] only in small parts of a district,” reaching only 140,000 participants, while a variety of NGOs also carried out literacy education to accommodate the high level of demand nationwide (World Bank 2001, 7–9).

Education for the NRA/M remained viewed through the lens of development and human capital, rather than being seen as a good in its own right. Education spending was, in fact, positively correlated with Uganda’s economic output (Musila and Balassi 2004) and universal primary education was eventually implemented, but a greater emphasis on education earlier in the NRA/M’s time in power could have yielded larger and faster increases in literacy and educational access.
Discussion

The NRA/M came to power following decades of dictatorship, conflict, and the collapse of the Ugandan central state. The Ugandan legal scholar Joe Oloka-Onyango (1993, 513) argues that the NRA/M was presented with a unique opportunity:

“It is highly unlikely that the Ugandan people will ever again have the opportunity to revisit the historical experience of tragedy and crisis that we have lived through, and to attempt to make amends and reconstruct the constitutional framework of governance that we live under. In short, should the current exercise prove a failure, it is doubtful that another opportunity shall present itself with such varied meeting of the necessary social, political and economic factors to allow for as serious a consideration of the varied issues involved. With an exercise such as the present one of reformulating and reconstruction [of] our perceptions to the idea of constitutions and constitutionalism, this is an opportunity that should not be by-passed.”

Around this critical juncture, how did the influence of the NRA/M’s rebellion-era ideology, practices, and goals compare to that of other factors that could have shaped post-victory state building and service provision efforts?

Alternative Explanations

Prior state structures could have been a serious constraint on the NRA/M, but the preexisting state apparatus had largely ceased to function by the middle of the Bush War, and the ancien régime military disintegrated and fled north. Some colonial administrative legacies remained, but as Museveni put it in 1991, “the arrangements the British left in place were abandoned” by the post-independence Obote and Amin governments, who then “failed to think of institutions with which to replace them” (Museveni 1992, 94–95). There was thus a large scope for rebuilding and reshaping the state and society. The NRA/M showed a willingness to push for structural change in politics and administration by building the resistance council system throughout the country, yet this impetus for transformation did not extend to social and economic change.
International political pressures and influence on Uganda in the late 1980s and early 1990s were also weaker than those experienced by other developing states. As detailed above, the NRA/M was careful to avoid entanglement in Cold War politics or debates about capitalism versus socialism. Once in power, the organization was also able to largely ignore the democratization agenda being advanced by the US, other Western powers, and non-governmental organizations (e.g. Carothers 1999; Levitsky and Way 2010). As Susan Dicklitch (1998, 95) argued, “Uganda is one of the few countries in Africa that can brush off political liberalization, and still have the strong backing of the IFIs and foreign donors. Why? Because Uganda is also one of a handful of African countries that has fully embraced economic liberalization.”

Through strategic alliances and good relations with international institutions and Western powers, the NRA/M could forge its own path in domestic policy, even pushing back against donor conditionality when desired. The initial period of IFI assistance from 1987 to 1992 had limited conditions placed on aid, and there was often resistance to donor demands or two-way policy dialogue between the NRA/M and international donors throughout the first post-victory decade, rather than the forcible imposition of external policies and restrictions (Dijkstra and Van Donge 2001).

Unlike the NPFL, the NRA/M did construct an ideology. This Movement ideology was relatively well defined, and embraced the ideas of liberalism, or more accurately neoliberalism, in rhetoric and governance. This ideology, however, did not compel the NRA/M to try to build infrastructural power for two reasons: its content and the preexisting political-ideological landscape in Uganda. First, neoliberalism, as applied in Uganda and more broadly in the post-World War II West and the post-Cold War world, is premised on individual freedoms and limited

168 Bill Berkeley (1994, 22) concurred, writing that “Almost alone among African leaders, Museveni has managed to secure broad international support while defying Western pressure for multi-party democracy.”

169 This “uneven compliance” with IFI conditionality is not necessarily unusual. See e.g. Akonor (2006).
state intervention in economic and social life. Thus, to the extent that ideology drove the NRA/M, it was an ideology biased against the expansion of state infrastructural power. Secondly, Uganda was a country in which prior state structures and sociopolitical discourses were already shaped by liberalism, which was prominent in the post-independence period and survived as the predominant popular ideological leaning up through the Obote and Amin regimes (Engholm and Mazrui 1967; Mazrui 2000). There was thus little reorganization of the state and society needed or desired by the NRA/M in order to implement neoliberal political and economic policies. More conservative ideologies embracing neoliberal economic tenets can still be adopted by more programmatic groups and compel them to build infrastructural power, but only where the future or ‘return to the past’ that they desire demands the transformation or uprooting of existing societal structures. This was the case, for instance, in Franco’s Spain (a victory for rebel military forces) or Pinochet’s Chile (a military coup government), where ideologically-driven, right-wing conservative governments sought to transform society by clawing back reforms and uprooting ‘socialism’ (Payne 1987; Weld 2018).

Did the security threats faced by the NRA/M affect the type or form of state building and service provision efforts the group attempted? The repeated and varied rebellions faced by the NRA/M government after taking power (Day 2011; Lewis 2012) certainly created resource constraints, as military funding ate up money that could have been used for social spending (Mutibwa 1992, 196). Externally, the NRA/M faced threats from Sudan, which sponsored rebels in the north, and poor relations with Kenya that at times threatened to spill over into active conflict (Khadiagala 1993). As detailed above, even if the NRA/M had freely available the resources it was

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170 For reviews of the thinking and practice of neoliberalism, see e.g. Amable (2011), Harvey (2005), and Larner (2000). For analyses and critiques of definitions and uses of the term ‘neoliberalism,’ see e.g. Boas and Gans-Morse (2009) and Thorsen (2010).
using for the military, it did not have the political desire to build infrastructural power or take state responsibility for service provision. The security threats faced by the regime also did not lead it push for more extensive state control throughout the entirety of the national territory. The NRA/M remained content to maintain some ‘brown areas’ (O’Donnell 1993) within Uganda, even choosing to leave portions of the north to the mercies of the Lord’s Resistance Army (Branch 2005, 2011), all while sending the military off on interventions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and on peacekeeping missions in Liberia and Somalia.

One explanation that might hold some more explanatory power in the Ugandan case is the role of ethnic politics in shaping the distribution of resources and the social and geographic direction of state building and service provision efforts. Did Uganda’s ethnic heterogeneity dissuade the NRA/M government from pursuing more extensive state building and service provision efforts and did the ethnic composition of the group affect the targets of such efforts? As Omara-Otunnu (1987, 176–78) and later Lindemann (2011) highlighted, the NRA/M as a rebel group and in government was dominated by Banyankole and Banyarwanda from Western Uganda and Baganda from central Buganda, to the exclusion of northerners. The NRA/M also sought to maintain the support of the Baganda, who had been instrumental in success during the bush war, by making ethnic appeals and promises, such as the 1993 restoration of the Kabaka, the Baganda king, as a government-recognized cultural figure on the national stage (Dicklitch 1995; Kasfir 2005).

The NRA/M had been convinced from early on in the Bush War, however, that it could transcend ethnicity and engage in state building in spite of Uganda’s ethnic heterogeneity. As noted above, in 1983, early NRA/M leader Eriya Kategaya stated that the organization believed ethnic

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171 Rubongoya (2007, 12) argues that after 1996, distribution of political posts to placate or gain the support of ethnic groups replaced the prior attempt to maintain diversity among government elites on an ideological and political basis.
differences were only barriers to national unity when exploited by politicians, and that the NRA/M simply needed to study state building in other multiethnic states to succeed in overcoming these divisions (NRM 1990, 123–24). Kategaya further suggested that the conflict offered an opportunity to remake state and society in Uganda, “to start afresh and start on a strong foundation” (NRM 1990, 125–26). The NRA/M sought to respect ethnic differences, most prominently through the recognition of historical tribal kingdoms as holders of symbolic power, but they denied kings political power, retaining control over political structures and resources (e.g. Mazrui 2000; Okuku 2002; Rubongoya 2007). Even in Northern Uganda, where citizens have long accused the NRA/M government ethnic bias, the NRA/M has shown that it is capable of engaging in state building and service provision when it so chooses (Branch 2011). Ethnic concerns thus should not have prevented the NRA/M from seeking to build state infrastructural power or expanding government service provision if the organization had been more committed to doing so.

**Interview Limitations and Future Research**

Further interview research on the NRA/M case could strengthen the findings and add crucial details about decision making within the organization. I conducted five months of field research in Uganda from January to June 2016. This time period, however, overlapped with the country’s highly contentious presidential elections. There were high tensions and government repression before and after the elections. The history and ideology of the NRA/M were also key issues in the campaign between the NRA/M’s historical leader and incumbent president Yoweri Museveni and his main challenger, former NRA/M medical officer and official Kiiza Besigye. In this environment, most current and former NRA/M political and military elites were unwilling to be interviewed. The government also delayed until late May my permission to conduct research.
outside of the capital, Kampala. I therefore was only able to conduct five interviews, which I use for anecdotal and illustrative, rather than probative, purposes, here. Additional interviews would allow for further exploration of alternative explanations, as well as more direct questioning about the theory and my current findings.

**Conclusion**

Reflecting on the NRA/M almost a decade after it came to power, Mamdani (1995, i–ii) argues that the organization retained its emphasis on practical issues rather than developing a more robust ideology: “It is perhaps this pragmatism, this belief in the omnipotence of tactics, that accounts for the NRM often found sleeping with strange bed-fellows and changing partners without prior discussion or subsequent consultation…a pragmatism that judges everything by results, nothing by principles.” The NRA/M did come to power with a set of ideas and aims involving the remaking of the political system, but the group from the outset never dedicated itself to more thoroughgoing social and economic change. The idea among some more left-wing supporters of the NRA/M that the group’s aims were not just to replace the political system, but also to achieve “a social revolution” by improving all citizens’ lives and opportunities, was never fully embraced by the core leaders, and especially Museveni. Ali Mazrui (2000, 133) argues that the unique Movement system put in place by the NRA/M was an audacious political experiment, creating “an economy without state involvement; a state without political parties; and…monarchies without power. Keeping the state out of the economy is designed to maximise market returns; keeping political parties out of the state system seeks to minimize ethnic rivalries; withholding power from the kings seeks to promote constitutional monarchies in an African context.” Like many experiments, it had mixed, and at times unintended, results. The RC system
created meaningful political opportunity and change in terms of representation, and eventually, from 1992, decentralization shifted governmental control of resources at the subnational level (e.g. Lambright 2011; A. Nsibambi 1998). Yet there was far from a revolutionary change in Ugandan society. Today, even the most optimistic NRA/M supporters must acknowledge that socioeconomic transformation has been highly uneven. In the words of Ondoga Ori Amaza (1998, 226), there have been “improvements of a quantitative, rather than qualitative nature,” since social and economic structures have not changed to be “more responsive to the basic needs of the people.”

The NRA/M retained strong influences from the Bush War period, which leaders frequently evoked. In a speech to the NRC in 1989, Museveni called for the same collective work ethic of the rebel period to be renewed: “You should, therefore, take an active interest in the experiences and history of the NRM, especially the Army. Together we can consolidate and develop this experience and thus be able to close some of the loopholes which are still causing drawbacks” (Museveni 1990, 55). The organization’s wartime experience and ideology were based around displacing political elites and structures, replacing them with the Movement and RC system, rather than shifting social and economic relations. Thus while professing general ideals that all citizens should benefit from the system of government they sought to implement, once in Kampala, the NRA/M’s more liberal tendencies kept it from pursuing the type of state building project that would build infrastructural power beyond organization’s central and western bases. It was instead willing to leave portions of the country to hopeful ‘development’ or militarized order-provision when necessary. Gaps in noncoercive engagement with the north (Branch 2005, 2011; Shaw and Mbabazi 2007) were accompanied by a piecemeal approach to the establishment of

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172 Shaw and Mbabazi (2007) make the case that there are two Ugandas, “a developmental state in the ‘South’” and a fragile, fragmentary state in the ‘North.’
state influence elsewhere, which has had long-term consequences for socioeconomic equality and outcomes.

Critiquing common perceptions of Uganda as a development ‘success,’ based on macroeconomic indicators and urban infrastructural improvement, Ben Jones (2009, 8–9) argues that Uganda has in fact become a fragmented archipelago of islands of infrastructure and service provision:

“These islands are the ‘project villages,’ the district capitals, Kampala, a few hotels, the clinics where international pharmaceutical companies trial new drugs, and the flower and vegetable air freight businesses situated next to Entebbe airport. Each of these islands depends on a relationship to outside sources of capital, rather than to the rural economy. In between these islands there is the rest of the country which, for the most part, is far from ‘development.’”

Rather than the ‘independent economic development’ the NRA/M envisioned in the Ten-Point Programme, foreign capital and foreign aid have remained vital to Uganda’s functioning (B. Jones 2009; Obwona 2001), despite the expansion of domestic revenue collection (Therkildsen 2004). NRA/M political and military leaders largely have not personally enriched themselves, or have disseminated wealth through party structures and patronage networks (Tripp 2010, 129–31), yet this has still perpetuated fragmentation and inequalities in resource distribution.

The NRA/M ultimately proved better at resisting for the nation than uniting and serving it once in power. This is not to say that a more interventionist Ugandan state would have provided better outcomes for all. By failing to pursue nationwide infrastructural power, however, and leaving the state as a distant or more coercive actor in many Ugandans’ lives, the NRA/M contributed to the persistence of the fragmentation and sectarianism against which it once fought.
CHAPTER SEVEN

Discussion and Extensions

“For every force there is a counterforce. Violence, even well intentioned, Always rebounds upon oneself.”

How do the characteristics and behavior of rebel organizations as they fight against the government shape their behavior when they achieve success, gaining control of the state? In the previous three chapters, I have presented evidence from cases of rebel victory in Nicaragua, Liberia, and Uganda to demonstrate how, in each case, the ideals and goals around which the FSLN, NPFL, and NRA/M were built led to divergent rebel governance practices during their insurrections and divergent state building and service provision efforts in their first decade after victory. The groups followed these different paths even as they all faced armed challenges to their newly-held power. In this chapter, I discuss the findings from the three cases in comparison with each other.

I then present brief studies of additional similar cases of victorious rebel organizations, which offer opportunities to probe the external validity of the findings from the three main cases. To demonstrate the rebel organizational type is not overdetermined by the context in which rebel organizations form and fight, I conduct a comparison of three Angolan rebel organizations, which developed in the same period, fighting in the same nascent country, against the same government, and all of which aimed to gain central control of the state apparatus. I also briefly discuss the less similar case of the Taliban in Afghanistan to examine whether or how my theory applies to rebellion and government by Islamist rebel movements.
Findings from the Fieldwork Cases

Across the three cases of the FSLN, NPFL, and NRA/M, I have traced the path along which the groups’ different ideologies led them to recruit and socialize members in different manners; to treat civilians in their areas of operations differently while fighting as rebels; to formulate varied policies and plans for governing if they were to succeed in taking power; and to pursue divergent visions for the post-victory state once they captured power. While all three groups aimed to develop the security apparatus, securing despotic power, they varied in the degree to which they sought to build infrastructural power, to extend the state beyond elite circuits in the national core to reach across the territory towards the periphery and to reach throughout society.

The FSLN in Nicaragua

In Nicaragua, the FSLN formed with a relatively clear vision for socioeconomic change beyond the toppling of the Somoza dictatorship, seeking to redress longstanding exclusionary relationships between the state and its poorest citizens, especially those in rural areas and on the remote Atlantic Coast. Despite internal rivalries and power shifts within the organization (Mosinger 2017), the FSLN retained coherent goals for how to restructure society in the aftermath of victory and followed through on these plans. This occurred despite the organization controlling little ‘liberated’ territory during their time fighting as rebels, giving them limited governing experience prior to coming into power. The FSLN pursued the construction of new institutional structures to organize the population in mass organizations and at the local level; it sought to extend the state’s presence to rural areas and the Atlantic Coast; and it aimed to expand the scope of state activities to encompass the provision of social services like healthcare and education. It is difficult to assess the counterfactual of how FSLN governance might have evolved had the Contra War not
been extended by US backing, or how the organization might have governed if it remained in power beyond 1990. The extent of the organization’s state building and service provision efforts, and its inclusion of previously marginalized or ignored populations and regions, however, represented a sharp break from prior political patterns in Nicaragua.

The effects of the FSLN’s time in power and the consolidation of the revolutionary changes they sought to enact have been more mixed. The democratically elected governments that succeeded the FSLN in the 1990s and early 2000s sought to systematically roll back the state expansion that occurred under the FSLN, implementing a neoliberal vision of politics and society (see e.g. Close 1999, 2016). The return of the FSLN to power in 2007, led by revolution-era President Daniel Ortega, may have sparked hopes for a return of revolutionary visions for more programmatic, pro-poor politics. Yet this was not the same Ortega and the same FSLN. They have instead used revolutionary rhetoric as a cover for neoliberal economic policies, clientelism and crony capitalism, and the entrenchment of Ortega and his family in power in an increasingly authoritarian manner (Close 2016; Jarquín 2016; Thaler 2017). As discussed below, it is unclear the extent to which Ortega was constrained by the collective leadership structures of the FSLN during the insurrectional and revolutionary periods, or if he had a change of heart and mind following the FSLN’s loss of power in 1990. Either way, the result has been the reappearance of a model of neopatrimonial dictatorship disturbingly reminiscent of the Somoza regime the FSLN fought so hard to topple.173

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173 The current Ortega regime has, thankfully, been less violently repressive, thus far, than the Somozas’ dictatorship was. There are concerns, however, about increasing violent suppression of protests and opponents (Romero and Martínez 2017; Tórrez García 2018), and as of May 10, 2018, youth protests and police repression are rocking Nicaragua, sparked by the announcement of government plans to cut social security benefits and subsequently broadening to calls for democratization.
The NRA/M in Uganda

The NRA/M in Uganda developed a moderate, liberal ideology aiming to change the nature of political representation and participation in the country, yet with less interest in transforming social and economic structures. This came despite Yoweri Museveni and other leaders’ earlier interest in Marxism-Leninism, as over time Museveni and those in positions of power within the NRA/M abandoned any ideas of more extensive societal transformation. This may have been a pragmatic, political-strategic decision, though it may just as well have been the result of changes in personal beliefs, the abandonment of youthful radicalism and idealism. Beginning during the rebellion, the NRA/M built new political institutions through the local Resistance Committees, which changed once in power into the Resistance Councils (later Local Councils) and were scaled up to different governmental levels, offering the state increased ability to reach throughout the national territory (Kasfir 2005; Ottemoeller 1996; Tidemand 1994). After gaining control of the central state in 1986, the NRA/M put in place a system of “No-Party Democracy,” with elections for local and some national level officials, but restricted competition, a break from the past (Carbone 2003; Kasfir 1998), and built up the despotic power of the state. Yet there was little effort to develop the power of the state through civil society organizations or to deliver social services, and the state’s presence and practices in the north of the country remained almost entirely coercive.

While the FSLN and the NPFL, closer to the more programmatic and opportunistic ends of the organizational type spectrum, both lost their holds on power within eleven years and six years of victory, respectively, the NRA/M survived its first decade in power and has endured to the present. In 2016, when I was conducting fieldwork in Uganda, the NRA/M marked thirty years since victory, with Yoweri Museveni winning a less-than-free election to gain another six years in office. As domestic pressures for more open politics grew after the NRA/M’s first decade in power,
the organization began to take state building and service provision more seriously. The shift toward universal primary education happened as Uganda shifted to more fully competitive elections (Stasavage 2005), leading to a doubling of primary school enrolment from 2.64 million students in 1995 to 5.3 million in 1997/98 (Republic of Uganda 1998, 160). There were discussions of an expansion to universal secondary education in the lead up to the 2001 elections (Stasavage 2005, 63), during which Museveni also promised an expansion of health infrastructure in every district, but Museveni finally followed through with plans for universal secondary education ahead of the 2006 elections (Tripp 2010, 188). It required electoral concerns, rather than any ideological drive, for the NRA/M and Museveni to increase their service provision efforts.

There was also limited NRA/M effort to engage in infrastructural power building or to otherwise move beyond the use of force in establishing central government influence in northern Uganda until the 2000s, when greater attention was paid to socioeconomic development in the region (Branch 2011; A. R. Nsibambi 2014, chap. 4). As Tripp (2010, 162) puts it, during the 1980s and 1990s, the NRA/M government “abdicated virtually all responsibility to the people in the northern and northeastern third of the country,” while feelings of neglect have continued to persist in other regions where the government has paid little attention (e.g. B. Jones 2009; Leopold 2005). As in Nicaragua under the contemporary Ortega regime, the NRA/M in Uganda has gradually grown more personalized under Museveni, with former partisans who are considered threats or who felt it was their turn to lead pushed out. Yet the opposition has been weakened and the government has built enough institutional clout and economic dynamism that its continued durability is hard to doubt.\footnote{See Abrahamsen and Bareebe (2016), Bareebe and Titeca (2013), Khisa (2016), and Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey (2016).}
The NPFL in Liberia

The NPFL in Liberia formed with some ideological diversity and debates over goals within the organization, but this was stamped out as Charles Taylor centralized and personalized power. As Taylor and remaining leaders prioritized their own empowerment and economic interests and failed to develop plans for governing in the event of victory, the organization recruited less disciplined, more self-interested fighters and spurned opportunities to engage in pro-civilian rebel governance in favor of profits (Gerdes 2013; Lidow 2016; Reno 2015). This pattern of prioritizing personal interests over those of the Liberian people continued as the NPFL came into power with the victory of Taylor and the NPFL’s NPP political party in the hastily arranged 1997 elections. These elections took place under the shadow of NPFL military power: it was broadly understood that the NPFL was the most powerful military faction in the country and would return to war if they lost the elections (Harris 1999; Lyons 1998), as UNITA did in Angola in 1992.

The NPFL had developed little clear plan for how to govern beyond toppling Samuel Doe’s dictatorship, and Taylor proved impervious to domestic or international pressures to restrain his or other NPFL leaders’ warlord tendencies. They repressed dissent, looted natural resources and the national treasury, and stoked regional conflicts, in part to acquire further resource wealth. The state apparatus was not really rebuilt, so much as certain state and parastatal institutions were repurposed for the private benefit of NPFL leaders and associates, while the rest of the state was enervated and under-resourced. The Liberian state functioned primarily to extract resource wealth and to militarily secure Taylor’s hold on power. These patterns of corruption, exclusion, and militarization, what the NPFL claimed they were fighting against Doe to end, helped to spark new rebellions that eventually forced Taylor and the NPFL from power in 2003, leaving the country in shambles, while the security forces had difficulty protecting even their stronghold of the capital of...
Monrovia. The civil war largely ended after Taylor stepped down, with the former NPFL fighters and politicos loyal to Taylor and their own interests more than to any larger ideals or cause. Taylor’s NPP has a limited electoral constituency today despite surviving as a party (see below), and many former NPFL commanders have cultivated their own personal networks, reliant on personal wartime ties, rather than a shared NPFL identity (Lidow 2016; A. Themnér 2015). After two years under a highly corrupt transitional government, Liberians in 2005 elected Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, Africa’s first woman president. Sirleaf’s government was able to consolidate state authority and build up new or renewed institutions like the Liberia Revenue Authority, and, with significant help from international peacekeepers, maintain security and stability. State service provision remained limited and there was heavy international and NGO involvement in state building and service provision, but overall Sirleaf’s government devoted far more effort in these areas than its predecessors (Gerdes 2013), despite continuing corruption, and in January 2018, Sirleaf oversaw the first peaceful, democratic transfer of power in Liberia’s history (Spatz and Thaler 2018).

Comparative Insights

Three key insights are worth highlighting in looking across these three cases of the FSLN, NRA/M, and NPFL. First, organizational type does not appear to depend on resource availability or scarcity faced by rebel groups as they develop and seek recruits. Weinstein’s (2007) elegant and parsimonious theory suggests that rebel organizations with early access to material resources can offer economic inducements to followers that allow them to recruit quickly and crowd out competing organizations, but at the cost of more predatory behavior toward civilians that is sustained throughout the conflict. The case of the NPFL, however, complicates this picture. The
group’s early core of fighters were actually more ‘activist’ and aiming (somewhat credibly) to replace Doe’s government with a more democratic one (P. Y. Johnson 1991), but they were then sidelined by Charles Taylor, who used his access to external resources to maintain followers, but also killed off rivals. It was, in fact, politically motivated Mano and Gio fighters, seeking revenge for past repression by the Doe regime, who were responsible for a great deal of violence against civilians during the first years of the war, despite efforts by the more opportunistic, economically-motivated Taylor to curtail such unsanctioned violence. Thus it was not initial access to resources, as predicted by Weinstein, that shaped the NPFL’s goals and ideals, but the commitments of Taylor and those leaders he cultivated around him. The group’s lack of restraint from violence against civilians, meanwhile, was not really due to an information asymmetry about recruits’ preferences (cf. Weinstein 2005): the NPFL specifically invaded Nimba and recruited Mano and Gio fighters because of their enmity for the Doe government, and so commanders were well aware of their recruits’ desire for revenge against Doe’s perceived Krahn and Mandingo support base.

Perhaps Weinstein’s (2007) ‘crowding out’ mechanism does not necessarily operate specifically at the intergroup level, but rather can also operate within rebel organizations in competition among commanders. If this is the case, it is not only material resources, but also personal and political appeals and networks that matter in shaping who gains decision-making power within an organization and can determine its policies and program. Gerdes (2013) argues that it was not just material resources or violence that allowed Taylor to rise to the top of the NPFL, but also the power of personal charisma. This factor may have been at work, as well, in the NRA/M, where Yoweri Museveni was the driving force in the group, as well as having led prior rebellions, and he and his associates were able to use their power to limit the influence in the group of those like Chango Machyo who wanted a more expansive, socialist political and economic
project. In the FSLN case, Mosinger (2017) demonstrates how control of recruitment networks and resonance of personal political commitments help explain the relative decision-making influence of different leaders within the organization during the rebel period. Leaders with access to outside resources and support lost some of their influence due to other leaders who had networks of personal and ideological affinity, for example through shared commitments to Liberation Theology.

Second, rebel territorial control does not predict effective state building or administration after capturing the central state. Rather, the quality and intent of rebel governance, which is guided by an organization’s motivating ideals and goals, provides a better indicator of what post-victory governance will look like. The FSLN had, relatively, the least degree of territorial control during the rebel period of any of the three organizations. The FSLN only gained sustained control of any significant, populated territories in the final months of the conflict against the Somoza dictatorship, when the long guerrilla war expanded into a popular uprising. While the organization did try to put its ideals into practice in rural areas, through cooperative relationships with peasant families and literacy lessons, and by organizing urban followers for protests and communal service provision, they did not have a chance to build new administrative structures.

The NRA/M had consolidated liberated territory in the Luwero Triangle after its first year of fighting the Obote II regime and while the group’s ideology had been somewhat vague about the form that its ideals about democracy would take, focusing initially on grievances surrounding the allegedly fraudulent 1980 election. Though Resistance Committees were initially developed to gather food and supplies for the NRA/M fighters, they were embraced as a potential new form of

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175 In 1988, Machyo, then the Minister for Reconstruction and Social Development and one of the NRA/M’s more dedicated Marxists, argued that “After winning the physical war of liberation the NRM/NRA has yet to fight the ideological battle” (Asedri 1988).
local administrative structure and elections were organized as a means of upholding democratic principles (Burkey 1991; Ddungu 1993; Kasfir 2005; Ottemoeller 1996; Tidemand 1994). There was, however, a desire among many in the military wing of the NRA/M to avoid involvement in civilian affairs, granting wide autonomy to the RCs in non-military matters (Kasfir 2005, 287–88), forgoing opportunities to engage in service provision or more extensive ideological indoctrination. The RCs gave the NRA/M an institutional infrastructure on which to build after taking power, and the organization sought to replicate the RCs nationwide and to scale the model upwards at different levels of representation. The NRA/M, however, retained a less interventionist stance than the FSLN when it came to social life and the economy, using the RCs more for basic administration and the delegation of responsibility away from the central government, rather than as local-level nodes of state infrastructural power like Nicaragua’s Comités de Defensa Sandinista (CDS).

The NPFL enjoyed the largest degree of territorial control while fighting as rebels, yet the organization’s administrative apparatus remained skeletal. Even when the NPRAG was established in Gbarnga as a ‘shadow government,’ this was more for external appearances than to actually try to govern. Though the NPFL provided a degree of order in the areas it controlled, this was a largely coercive and extractive order, with a great degree of variation depending on the whims of different commanders (Lidow 2016; Reno 2015). Many Liberians likely appreciated the greater degree of predictability in their lives and some protection from the predations of the Doe government’s forces. The NPFL, however, established only the most rudimentary form of governance in its territory, akin to Hobbes’ (1996) vision of rulers providing protection at the earliest stage of the development of a social contract, in exchange for citizens giving up rights and resources; but the NPFL then gave nothing more in return, while continuing to extract resources and labor. Having controlled territory therefore did not prepare the NPFL to govern effectively or
manage a state apparatus so much as it reinforced the group leaders’ and members’ convictions that they could personally do well out of war and acquiring greater power. The organization came into power with little plan for how to govern and little desire to build a state that would serve the broader Liberian public.

Finally, international security played a mixed role in affecting state building efforts and outcomes. All three organizations, once in power, engaged in some degree of external military intervention, but they were also on the receiving end. The FSLN, due to its ideological affinity with the FMLN rebels in El Salvador, provided them with covert support, to the anger of the Salvadoran government and the United States. The US, Argentina, and Honduras, meanwhile, sponsored Contra rebel forces, and the CIA engaged in covert operations aimed at toppling the FSLN government in Nicaragua from its hard-won position in power (Kornbluh 1988, 1991; LeoGrande 1998). Much of the FSLN’s construction of its security forces aimed at deterring or reacting to US aggression, at times to the detriment of effective counterinsurgency when facing extant domestic threats (Gorman and Walker 1985; Walker 1991b). The organization’s infrastructural power building efforts would likely have been undertaken in the absence of external threats, however, due to the FSLN’s ideological commitments to social inclusion and benefits for the poor majority of the population. Anti-FSLN foreign intervention did, however, undercut state building and service provision efforts, taking resources away from public goods provision, destroying infrastructure and communications, and making it difficult to deliver services in conflict-affected regions.

In Uganda, the NRA/M faced a number of different rebellions, but the most deadly and troublesome one was that of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Northern Uganda, which enjoyed sponsorship from Sudan. The NRA/M government responded by increasing its coercive
power in Northern Uganda and by providing support to South Sudanese rebels, but it was not spurred to try to build infrastructural power or to win over the northern population’s ‘hearts and minds’ with service provision (Branch 2005, 2011). The NRA/M also sponsored the successful AFDL rebellion led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila in the DRC, but then turned on Kabila (as did his Rwandan supporters), sending armed forces into the DRC to combat eastern Ugandan rebels, but also providing military commanders and troops with opportunities for profit (Ngolet 2011; Prunier 2008; Stearns 2012). Meanwhile, Ugandan forces’ participation in peacekeeping missions abroad (and today counterterrorism initiatives) have helped to keep Western donors happy and quiescent about Uganda’s lack of political liberalization, while also directing resources outside the country that could have been used for more extensive state building or state-directed development at home.

The NPFL came to power in Liberia, like the FSLN, with a strong distrust of regional powers. In the case of the NPFL, this was directed toward Nigeria, feeling that the ECOMOG military intervention had forestalled an earlier NPFL military victory. Relations with Nigeria had improved, however, in the later years of the first civil war (Adebajo 2002b; Alao 1998), and the NPFL’s primary international threat was of its own making. While still fighting as rebels, the NPFL helped the RUF launch its rebellion against Sierra Leone, and this pattern of sponsorship of rebels abroad continued once Taylor and the NPP had been elected (e.g. Sawyer 2004). This support for rebels throughout the region led to retaliatory policies among Liberia’s neighbors, who either supported or provided safe haven to groups seeking to topple Taylor. These interventions abroad reflected the NPFL’s opportunistic nature, driven by personal rivalries Taylor had with other governments and also by a desire to exploit natural resources lying beyond Liberia’s borders. These external interventions occurred against a backdrop of little effort to build up Liberia’s state institutions or to work for the public benefit, so the resources used for military activity and rebel
sponsorship are unlikely to have been used for state building or service provision in the absence of interventions.

**Revisiting Alternative Explanations**

Why do we expect the wartime organizational characteristics as outlined above to continue to have relevance and influence in shaping practices and policies once an organization seizes power? When a rebel organization seizes power through a civil war, it tends to take over a state that has collapsed and largely ceased to function. As the predominant coercive and political force on the scene, the organization has broad powers at this critical juncture to shape the political arena and implement policies in pursuit of its goals. Rebel groups that seize power also tend to defeat highly unpopular regimes, and so they enjoy an initial endowment of popular goodwill and legitimacy.

**Prior Institutions**

To be clear, victorious rebels are not presented with a tabula rasa when they seize the state. Many segments of the bureaucratic apparatus may remain intact (Skocpol 1979) and in some cases, such as in Iran, elements of the security forces persist. Ancien régime bureaucrats, while they may create bottlenecks or subtly resist the policies of the organization, will not change its goal orientation and can easily be pushed out (or worse) if they try to overtly block policy implementation, while more cadres are shifted into the bureaucracy. An ideal Weberian monopoly on the legitimate use of force is also unlikely to be achieved immediately as counterrevolutionary forces loyal to the deposed regime or opposed to the rebels’ program or practices frequently arise, and foreign powers may also interfere or attack (Walt 1996). Yet even in the face of security
challenges and the integration of some members of the former state apparatus, rebel organizations can still act on their characteristic inclinations. The FSLN, NRA/M, and NPFL all faced new rebellions and external threats and conflict shortly after taking power. Even as it faced an economic blockade and a rebellion heavily sponsored by the United States, the FSLN continued to support expanded health and education systems and carry out agrarian reform programs, even in war zones, though funding for these programs fell over time due to security spending. The NRA/M continued to expand the political infrastructure of Resistance Councils, even trying to implement them in the restive north of the country where the new government had little support or legitimacy and where rebellion quickly emerged. The NPFL, meanwhile, remained devoted to the protection of opportunities for resource extraction.

*International Forces*

This pattern holds for the influence of external actors, as well. While one might expect organizations to be forced to moderate and modify their policies and behavior in response to international pressure, organizational type still strongly matters. The degree to which international factors mediate the effect of group type depends in part on an organization’s level of connectedness to international actors and the sway that these actors have over the organization, what Levitsky and Way (2010), in the context of democratization, call international linkage and leverage, but organizations often ignore the advice or demands of external actors and find ways to subvert their designs. This is the case even for organizations that were heavily backed or created by foreign powers, such as the opportunistic *Alliance des Forces Démocratique pour la Libération du Congo* (AFDL), which was formed by Rwanda and Uganda under the leadership of Laurent-Désiré Kabila, who turned on his sponsors once he was in power in the renamed Democratic Republic of
the Congo. In Uganda, even after the NRA/M in 1987 accepted the structural adjustment plans of the Bretton Woods institutions to stabilize the economy, “it was not until the early 1990s that the pro-liberalisers in the government got the upper hand in the internal NRM struggle over reform directions” (Sjögren 2013, 148), with significant internal debate about policy and a lack of full implementation of the financial institutions’ plans. In Liberia, meanwhile, Charles Taylor and the NPFL’s non-state commercial ties allowed them to ignore international diplomatic pressures about human rights and meddling in the affairs of other countries in the Mano River Basin region (Reno 1995, 1998), with the international community of states lacking leverage over the organization and Taylor unwilling to temper his ambitions and control his troops and surrogates.

Social Structure, Ethnicity, and Constituencies

The constituencies among which organizations operate as rebels and the structure of their relations could also have downstream effects (Staniland 2014). Yet looking just at the cases of the NRA/M and the NPFL, it is clear that divergences exist. Museveni and other early NRA/M leaders were largely ethnic Banyankole from western Uganda, yet the war was fought mainly in the central Luwero Triangle, the heartland of the large, cohesive Baganda people. After taking power, efforts were made to accommodate Baganda political demands, such as the restoration of their king, the kabaka, and to extend social services in the region, as with other areas. Charles Taylor was raised as an Americo-Liberian and lived in the US for a significant period, though his mother was an indigenous Gola; the NPFL’s early recruits, however, were mainly Manos and Gios from Nimba County in the interior, who had been heavily subjected to the military regime’s repression. While some Mano and Gio fighters materially benefitted from the NPFL’s control of their region and
eventual control of the state, efforts at sociopolitical or economic reform were not made in Nimba despite Nimbanians’ role in the fight and large population.

Across all three cases, ethnic concerns did not appear to be major factors in shaping state building or service provision efforts. Liberia is quite diverse, but while the NPFL was happy to welcome Liberians of all ethnicities as fighters, it did not deliver the benefits of the state even to certain ethnic groups clientelistically. Mano and Gio fighters and followers who thought their groups’ time on top had come were instead disappointed. In Uganda, the NRA/M demonstrated a willingness to use state resources for public purposes, yet restricted the scope of its intervention in society. Ethnic biases did, perhaps, lead to state neglect in the north of Uganda, though there were many pockets of state absence throughout the country (Branch 2011; B. Jones 2009; Leopold 2005).

**Origins of Organizational Type in the Angolan War of Independence**

In this section, I compare three Angolan rebel organizations in order to allay concerns that the adoption or survival of specific type of organization is not contingent upon the time in which it is fighting, the type of government it is combatting, the country in which it is active, or the polity it wishes to control.176 These are the Movimento Popular de Libertação da Angola (MPLA), the Frente Nacional de Libertação da Angola (FNLA), and the União Nacional para a Independência Total da Angola (UNITA). All three were center-seeking groups that aimed to topple the Portuguese colonial regime and to govern an independent Angolan state.177 I do not examine the secessionist Frente para a Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda, which sought and continues to fight

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176 The section on the MPLA draws in part on Thaler (2012).

177 On Portuguese policies and responses during this period, see esp. Bender (1978) and Marcum (1969).
for the independence of the oil-rich exclave of Cabinda, separated from the rest of Angola by the DRC.

*The Three Organizations in the War for Independence*

The MPLA formed out of an alliance of leftist and nationalist organizations that joined forces in 1956, with a diverse leadership group composed of black, *mestiço*, and white Angolans (Marcum 1969). Under collective leadership, with poet and activist Agostinho Neto as the organization’s president, the MPLA in the 1950s and early 1960s was involved largely in nonviolent activism and organizing in favor of independence, though it claimed responsibility for directing a November 1961 riot and attack on a prison in Luanda to free incarcerated nationalists. The MPLA’s original manifesto called for “‘a single front of all the anti-imperialist forces of Angola,’ setting aside for this purpose all considerations of political opinion, social status, religious beliefs, or philosophical views,” though these efforts at unification were largely unsuccessful (Marcum 1969, 30–31).

The group reorganized in 1962 as violence by the FNLA and Portuguese reprisals heightened the crisis in territory, with the MPLA adopting a program seeking not only independence, but also embracing the group’s roots in the Angolan Communist Party and calling for socioeconomic transformation. Though Chabal (2001, 226) describes the MPLA as “from its inception strongly (orthodox) Marxist,” Neto took a more pragmatic stance, believing that Marxist-Leninist goals and principles needed to be adjusted to the Angolan context (Andrew and Mitrokhin 2006, 444–45, fn.45). In manifestoes and printed and radio propaganda, the MPLA proclaimed a program aiming to achieve “No more exploitation but minimum guaranteed wages and equal pay for equal work; an end to discrimination on the grounds of race, ethnic origin, sex or age; and free
public health and education” (Wolfers and Bergerol 1983, 109), clear breaks from the exploitative, repressive colonial regime. This leftist program enabled the organization to receive Soviet and Cuban support during the independence war (Domínguez 1989, 131–32; Stevens 1976). While the MPLA’s support base was concentrated among the mestiço and Mbundu populations, the organization consistently espoused ideals of interethnic and interracial unity, even arguing against the targeting of white Portuguese settlers, policies that were followed on the ground (see Thaler 2012, 557–58). There were tensions within the organization, as some members argued for more ethnically-specific appeals, leading to the departure of leading Bakongo and Ovimbundu members in 1968 (Marcum 1975, 5), though the remaining MPLA leadership continued to espouse a non-ethnic line. The organization did suffer from continuing factional conflicts between different leaders up until independence, but Neto and his allies were able to retain core control over decision-making power (Malaquias 2007; Marcum 1969).

In 1963, the MPLA began guerrilla operations against the Portuguese in Cabinda, expanding from 1964 to 1966 into mainland Angola and carving out a degree of territorial control that allowed the group to start implementing some of its goals for sociopolitical reorganization (Brinkman 2003a, 308; Fortunato 1977; Marcum 1969). The Portuguese strategy of resettling civilians and isolating them in collective villages called aldeamentos made it difficult for the MPLA to consolidate significant populated liberated zones, yet they sought to free civilians from the aldeamentos and also forcibly resettled some civilians to establish their own collective villages in this “war for people” (Brinkman 2005; Davidson 1975, 28). Where the MPLA had territorial control, they established village committees in the kimbos, protected villages, near guerrilla bases, and provided literacy lessons and medical care (Davidson 1975, 26–29; Wolfers and Bergerol 1983, 109), and the MPLA in 1968 began holding “regional party conferences inside the country”
Clandestine committees were also established in urban areas, providing an organized base and nascent administrative structures in cities and towns closer to independence (Wolfers and Bergerol 1983), while the MPLA also spread its ideas into areas where it was not operating through radio broadcasts (Pearce 2012, 450). There were strict prohibitions on violence against civilians, which the MPLA took seriously, punishing violations, and the organization engaged in political education both to indoctrinate fighters and to build adherence from the population (Davidson 1975; Thaler 2012, 558; Wolfers and Bergerol 1983, 67).

During this early period of the conflict, the MPLA was competing, sometimes violently, with the FNLA. Founded in 1956 by Holden Roberto as the União dos Povos do Norte de Angola and then renamed two years later the União das Populações de Angola UPA), the organization initially held separatist goals of reestablishing the historical Bakongo kingdom, with Roberto as its leader. In 1960, Roberto rejected overtures from the MPLA to form a united anti-colonial front, giving only tepid acknowledgement that efforts against the Portuguese should be coordinated, in line with his earlier rejection of offers of aid from Senegalese and Portuguese Marxist-Leninists (Marcum 1969, 43, 67–68). Yet by this time, Roberto had also shifted the UPA toward national aspirations and proclaimed support for ethnic unity, arguing in a radio broadcast that “Angola was not ‘a composite of tribes’ but ‘one nation’” (Marcum 1969, 86–87).178

Following a wave of violence against Portuguese settlers organized by the group in 1961, the organization officially became the FNLA in 1961, after a merger with a nationalist organization, reinforcing a shift to national-level aims. There was little effort to establish a clear political program beyond the end of Portuguese rule, as Roberto “reserved all considerations of ideology, and in an operational sense, political education, for sometime after Angolan

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178 The UPA sought to build interethnic bridges by naming Rosario Neto, an Mbundu, as an official in its office in exile in Léopoldville in the newly-independent Congo (Marcum 1969, 84). See also Brinkman (2003b, 199–200)
independence,” a stance that saw the FNLA seek and take weapons from whatever countries would provide them, and also recruit former Portuguese soldiers (Marcum 1975, 7 emphasis original). The FNLA failed to leave its Bakongo ethnonationalism behind, however, and did not significantly appeal to or aim to include other Angolans, remaining throughout its first decade “strongly tribalist” (Stevens 1976, 138). The organization put on a multi-ethnic face when it was politically expedient, yet Roberto only truly trusted other Bakongo as close advisers and non-Bakongo in the group fell aside in moments of heightened conflict and contestation (Marcum 1975).

After the initial outbreak of violence, the FNLA began attacks on the MPLA in northern Angola (Brinkman 2003b, 198; Marcum 1969, 210–21), allegedly in exchange for US support (Wolfers and Bergerol 1983, 3). The FNLA sought to gain external legitimacy by establishing the Governo Revolucionário de Angola no Exílio (GRAE) in the newly renamed Kinshasa, with the Ovimbundu student activist Jonas Savimbi as the foreign minister. The GRAE achieved an initial coup by securing the recognition of the Organization for African Unity as the representatives of the Angolan independence movement, but this was walked back and the OAU later recognized the MPLA as an equally legitimate liberation movement (Ekaney 1976, 226; Whitaker 1970, 19). Savimbi was able to arrange for Chinese support to counter the Soviet support of the MPLA, but he took the Chinese contacts and resources with him when he split from the FNLA (Stevens 1976, 139).

UNITA was founded in 1966 and was led from the outset in a “unified and unchallenged” (Collelo 1991, 32) manner by Savimbi, who left the FNLA in 1965 after delivering the scathing indictment that “Roberto was an American puppet and a tribalist, and that in the absence of a

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179 Roberto had made political contacts among some Mbundu in the late 1950s (Marcum 1969, 66), but did not cultivate them.
programme the FNLA was mercenary in spirit” (Stevens 1976, 138). Savimbi further accused the Roberto of “monopolizing the revolutionary movement and decision-making as if they were his business alone,” and sought increased armed activity within Angola, versus the FNLA’s stronger focus on the GRAE as a government-in-exile (Ekaney 1976, 225–26). Meanwhile, Savimbi viewed the MPLA with suspicion (Heywood 1989, 52). UNITA’s social base was in the south of Angola among the Ovimbundu ethnic group, who had a long history of nationalist mobilization against Portuguese rule (Heywood 1989; Marcum 1969). UNITA’s pretensions to being a nationalist independence movement necessitated some non-Ovimbundu support, and the group sought to attract other young Angolans unhappy with their status in the MPLA or FNLA (Heywood 1989, 53), with UNITA’s constitution calling for “a government proportionally representative of all ethnic groups, clans, and classes” (Collelo 1991, 32).

Though UNITA had a clear core constituency among the Ovimbundu and an enduring interest in the cause of Ovimbundu nationalism (Heywood 1989), the group developed as a more personalized project for Savimbi, with policies shifting according to his “ideological flexibility” (Maier 1997, 5). This personalism was consistent with Ovimbundu cultural norms, and Savimbi sought to tap into Ovimbundu spiritual traditions and the model of the “hunter-king” (Heywood 1998), though he presented himself far differently to external audiences. The broader Ovimbundu nationalist movement had local leaders “who had established independent churches, clinics, and especially schools, where the lore of the guerrillas was integrated into the curriculum,” and as UNITA received increasing Ovimbundu recruits in the late 1960s and beginning of the 1970s, they began replicating these structures in villages in liberated zones (Heywood 1989, 53–54). UNITA’s plan was to set up a system of elected village councils reporting up to an elected central committee (Collelo 1991, 32), though in practice Savimbi retained top-down control. While Savimbi would
claim “that Unita was not an organisation for only one ethnic group” and did incorporate Lundas and Chokwes (Heywood 1989, 54–55; see also Pearce 2012), in practice there were limited further overtures to other ethnic groups, or non-rhetorical attempts to establish UNITA as a more national, non-ethnic organization during the independence struggle, beyond a few small, allied ethnic groups.

Savimbi’s main qualities, as Bender (1981, 59) writes, were “driving ambition to be president of Angola, an ability to tell foreigners what they want to hear, and bitterness about mulattos and whites in Angola.” This fed not only enmity toward the multiracial MPLA, but also ideological swings, from Savimbi denouncing US imperialism and spokespeople presenting UNITA as Marxist-Leninist, to claims of Maoism, to seeking and relying upon white and US support (Bender 1981, 59–60; Marcum 1975; Wolfers and Bergerol 1983). UNITA’s proclaimed affinity for Maoism earned it limited Chinese support, and the group in the late 1960s received some Cuban training and arms (Domínguez 1989, 131–32), but it was quick to shift around in the political winds. As Marcum (1975, 8) notes, in 1974, Savimbi, “never one to be bound by the yoke of political consistency, dropped all Maoist rhetoric, and campaigned for support among Angola's 325,000 whites,” who he had previously derided. Evidence also emerged of secret agreements between UNITA and Portuguese intelligence (Heywood 1989, 49). This willingness to change UNITA’s ostensible ideology rapidly in response to openings for support is emblematic of the organization’s opportunism, as in the post-independence period it adopted anti-communism and later Christian democracy as the group’s ideological cladding.

Where UNITA’s operations overlapped with those of the FNLA and MPLA in the late 1960s, internecine fighting emerged, and as its status began to slip, the FNLA concentrated more

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180 Cuba pulled its support for UNITA in response to the group’s continued fighting with the MPLA and refusal to form a common front (Domínguez 1989, 131–32).
and more on attacking its rival nationalist organizations. This included opening a new eastern front in 1969 (Whitaker 1970, 20–21), breaking from an earlier tacit truce between the FNLA and UNITA (Marcum 1975, 10, fn.63). This was symptomatic of larger patterns in the conflict, in which the MPLA concentrated most on attacking Portuguese forces, while its competitors were somewhat more concerned with their fratricidal struggle. In 1961, a US diplomat who met Savimbi reported he “showed much more animosity toward other rebel groups in Angola than he did against the Portuguese” (Bender 1981, 59), a stance that continued. As Ciment (1997, 41) reports, Portuguese intelligence documents attributed “nearly two-thirds of all guerrilla attacks to the MPLA and over a third to the FNLA, but just 4% to UNITA.”

*Independence and Civil War*

The Portuguese ceased to be any group’s focus, however, following the April 25, 1974 military coup in Portugal that deposed the Salazar-Caetano *Estado Novo* regime, installing in its place a group of younger military officers unhappy with the long, draining colonial wars. The new government made clear that it was planning to grant independence to Portugal’s colonies, and began withdrawing troops and administrative personnel from Angola. As the Portuguese prepared to withdraw and independence loomed in 1975, the three armed factions engaged in negotiations organized by the OAU, agreeing in the January 1975 Alvor Accord to put forward slates of candidates for a transitional government, to hold elections in October for an independence date of November 11, 1975, and to establish joint national armed forces. There was little trust among the three sides, however, and the period between the Portuguese coup and the planned elections was marked by an arms race and a scramble to consolidate territory. Each group solicited increased foreign support, with the FNLA receiving aid from China, the US, and Zaire; the MPLA receiving
Soviet and Cuban aid; and UNITA getting help from Zambia, France, West Germany, and South Africa, and likely the US, as well (Marcum 1975; Noer 1993; Stevens 1976, 141–42). While some negotiations were continuing and MPLA and UNITA officials claimed they supported elections, the mistrust and history of violence between the groups created a security dilemma in which no group was willing to disarm or felt confident that the winner of an election would treat them fairly and honor the Alvor Accord (Rio Tinto 2017).

After many smaller clashes throughout the year, tensions broke on November 10, the day before scheduled independence, when the FNLA, backed by white Portuguese settlers and Zairean and South African forces, attacked the MPLA, making a push toward the capital of Luanda. The MPLA, with help from newly arrived Cuban forces, was able to stop the attack at the Battle of Quifandongo, protecting Luanda, where they declared independence the next day. At independence, there were still three competing groups, all claiming to be the legitimate governors of Angola: “MPLA backed by Cuban troops controlled Luanda, the capital, and little else; UNITA controlled Huambo, the second largest city and several southern provinces with South African help while FNLA, supported by Zairian troops, held the northern provinces” (Malaquias 2007, 39). The MPLA received recognition as the legitimate government from Cuba and Eastern Bloc countries, and despite US pressures, the majority of African countries quickly followed behind Nigeria’s leadership, with no African state recognizing the FNLA or UNITA’s claims to power (Noer 1993, 777). After a brief, failed attempt at an alliance with UNITA (Wolfers and Bergerol 1983, 48–51), the FNLA gradually collapsed between 1975 and 1979, losing its foreign bases in Zaire and other international support and with domestic supporters dispersing.

The MPLA now acted as the central government, though its authority and ability to project power beyond urban areas and the coast remained limited. Where it developed influence, however,
the MPLA began engaging in an extensive state building project, in line with its ideology and the policies it proposed during the independence war. Creating a single, fused party-state, the MPLA engaged in political education of those citizens in areas under their control and built mass organizations for laborers, women, and youth that were mobilized in literacy and public health campaigns, as well as providing conduits for government directives and information (Pearce 2012; Wolfers and Bergerol 1983, 116–21). The economic model was also transformed, as the MPLA sought to effect a transition from the capitalism of the colonial regime to state-led socialist industrialization (Ferreira 2002; Young 1988). Facing insurgencies from FLEC and UNITA and South African intervention, this project of infrastructural power building was also intimately tied in with the establishment and expansion of the security apparatus. Conscription provided opportunities for further political education and the MPLA presented the military as defenders of the nation and partners in national development (Ferreira 2002; Pearce 2012). The MPLA worked to involve the population in defense and to further extend its reach through society and the national territory through the establishment of popular militias, counting (officially) hundreds of thousands of members with military and civil defense training (Wolfers and Bergerol 1983, 121–22). The organization also worked to deliver social services to the population, expanding access to free healthcare and education and undertaking mass literacy and vaccination campaigns (Wolfers and Bergerol 1983, 111–16). Education was seen as so integral to the MPLA political project that “Schoolteachers could sometimes obtain exemption from military service on the grounds that teaching was a ‘frontline activity’” (Pearce 2012, 456).

After a series of losses against combined MPLA and Cuban forces, UNITA regrouped in the central highlands in late 1975, held together by Savimbi’s charisma and appeal to his Ovimbundu base, as well as South African intervention. Savimbi aimed to frustrate MPLA state
building efforts in central Angola and to maintain Ovimbundu peasant support, and sought to build local administrative structures similar to the Protestant Ovimbundu villages UNITA emulated during the independence war (Heywood 1989, 58–60). The organization’s political appeal was strongest among those who “had never experienced the control of any political movement other than UNITA” (Pearce 2012, 454). By the late 1980s, UNITA’s territories in the central highlands, now also housing some non-Ovimbundu, reportedly included local schools and health centers funded by timber and diamond revenues, organized by UNITA representatives in exchange for village leaders providing food, recruits, and intelligence, with more organized, state-like structures around the group’s capital at Jamba (Heywood 1989, 60–61; Pearce 2012, 457–59). In some regions further from Jamba, however, UNITA demanded civilians provide fighters with food, but offered little in the way of protection or services in exchange (Brinkman 2003b, 213–14).

The depth of UNITA’s commitment to multiethnic politics or a deeper ideology, however, remained unclear even in the late 1980s, with its press tours and propaganda possibly a façade, and the organization continuing to make common cause with the apartheid government of South Africa and conservatives in the US. Among the Ovimbundu, Savimbi continued to [appeal] to black resentment of whites and mulattos in positions of power” in the MPLA government (Bender 1981, 61). In political education in UNITA’s core territories, the organization established a civil vision of receiving services in exchange for giving labor or food to UNITA, presenting the order the group established at Jamba in opposition to the “predatory” MPLA, but with little broader vision for societal transformation that might expand its appeal (Pearce 2012, 457–59). With the agreement in 1988 for Cuban and South African forces to withdraw, even a relatively sympathetic author argued the conditions made clear that,“Unita’s brand of nationalism can only survive on unfaltering support from the United States” (Heywood 1989, 65). This suggests that UNITA had
still largely not convinced non-Ovimbundu Angolans that it had a clear vision for governing Angola as a whole, beyond the Protestant conservatism the group pitched to Washington.\textsuperscript{181}

As the conflict dragged into the late 1980s, the MPLA’s ideological commitment eroded and UNITA became more openly predatory and personalistic. Malaquias (2007, 20) laments that the MPLA over time “abandoned its commitment to people-centred ideals in favour of a more elitist and, ultimately, kleptocratic system of governance,” what Hodges (2001) termed “petro-diamond capitalism.” Ziemke (2008, 74) argues that “Over time, the ideals of Marxism, nationalization, and socialism by MPLA elites receded and the rawest form of capitalism [was] embraced for the way in which it could line their pockets.”

War weariness and foreign pressure led both sides to the negotiating table, resulting in the 1991 Bicesse Accords and elections in 1992. When Savimbi did not win a majority in the first round of the presidential election, he refused to participate in a runoff and returned to the battlefield; from this time on, UNITA focused more on exploiting the population and extracting natural resource wealth, abandoning the possibility of peacefully entering politics (Malaquias 2007, 2010; Stedman 1997). UNITA retained some support from civilians who had historically lived in areas under the group’s control (Pearce 2012), but many more abandoned the group in the face of its violence and increasing hardship, while the MPLA engaged in both forced resettlement and outreach to local leaders to break popular ties to UNITA. When Savimbi was killed in an ambush in 2002, UNITA’s remaining leaders agreed to a ceasefire and eventual demobilization, suggesting that the historical leader’s personal ambitions had remained paramount so long as he held decision-making power within the organization. The MPLA continues to rule Angola, with

\textsuperscript{181} Bender (1981, 66–67) asserts that Savimbi retained commitments to a socialist economic system into the early 1980s, but beyond having organized collective systems for food provision during the independence war (Collelo 1991, 32), there is little credible evidence that UNITA’s socialism ran any deeper than its other ideas or that it sought an economic system with collective benefits, rather than privileging the Ovimbundu.
UNITA, now proclaiming itself as Christian Democratic, the main opposition party. Politics have remained tightly controlled and highly corrupt (e.g. Soares de Oliveira 2015), though there are possibilities for some opening following the replacement in 2017 of President José Eduardo dos Santos, in power since Agostinho Neto’s death in 1979.

_Angola Discussion_

The cases of the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA reveal how organizations formed in the same context can adopt divergent sets of ideals and practices. While all three organizations enjoyed foreign support during the independence war and fought in a natural-resource rich setting (though these were difficult to exploit commercially), they took very different approaches to their relationships with the population and their visions for a post-victory society.

The FNLA had goals for Bakongo political predominance in a post-independence Angola, but developed little political program beyond this and only instrumentally included other ethnic groups. Its “national claims hardly went beyond the rhetorical sphere” (Malaquias 2007, 59) and the group did not aim to develop close ties to the population or engage in governance. As Henriksen (1976, 379) puts it, the FNLA “neither implemented fundamental social changes nor re-organised the rural population within its operating zones.” Roberto, as the group’s leader, consistently sought to maintain personal dominance in the FNLA and the broader nationalist movement, to the detriment of the organization’s competitiveness within Angola (Malaquias 2007, 60–62). These factors place the FNLA toward the more opportunistic end of the organizational type spectrum.

UNITA changed official ideologies like changing hats, and there was little sincerity in the group’s external discourse and presentation. As Young (1988, 166) put it, “no one now takes Jonas Savimbi’s ‘Maoist’ past seriously.” The organization did have a core interest in the advancement
of the Ovimbundu people and tapped into symbols and discourses with meaning to Ovimbundu peasants (Heywood 1989, 1998), and UNITA affinity became a durable political identity in rural central and southern Angola where the group was active (Pearce 2012). The group sought to replicate the forms of social organization previously established by Protestant communities among the Ovimbundu in the central highlands and delivered rudimentary social services, though the village committees UNITA established were mainly to support the organization; sociopolitical life was otherwise not a great concern, and this was the adoption of preexisting structures rather than the creation of a new model in Angola. UNITA presented its political-administrative model as one that it could apply to the rest of Angola, but the organization remained exclusionary. This exclusion was based not only on prejudice against non-black Angolans, but also on the conviction of Savimbi that “the Ovimbundu represented the majority, UNITA represented the Ovimbundu, Savimbi led UNITA, therefore he was destined to rule Angola;” consequently, “UNITA rarely demonstrated great concern about the means used to arrive at the decolonization process and, for that matter, post-colonial power. All that mattered was to get there” (Malaquias 2007, 68). The lack of serious planning for what UNITA wanted to do with power allowed flexibility in seeking foreign support, but also kept UNITA a primarily military organization, making it difficult to appeal nationally when the group first tried to enter electoral politics in 1992.

Weinstein (2007, 283–87) rightly notes that UNITA grew more opportunistic and violent over time, decreasing its reliance on civilians and focusing more on natural resource extraction. While Weinstein argues that UNITA was initially an ‘activist rebellion,’ I consider the group initially in the middle ground, though slightly more opportunistic due to the ethnically limited vision for UNITA’s intended beneficiaries and the focus on Savimbi’s personal empowerment over other political goals. The trend towards increased opportunism may have resulted, as
Weinstein (2007, 283–87) suggests, due to shifting resource endowments, though I would argue that the frustration of Savimbi’s aspirations to post-independence rule were the trigger. The willingness to suddenly drop Chinese support and ostensible Maoism for appeals to white Portuguese Angolans and US and South African allies came as Savimbi worried about consolidating his political position.

Lastly, the MPLA had the clearest ideology of the three organizations, developing a Marxist “political culture” and an open commitment to state socialism (Young 1988, 167). This was reflected in the MPLA’s commitment to racial and ethnic inclusion, its political education efforts, and its attempts to develop new governance structures and deliver services in regions where it consolidated some degree of control, challenging not only the colonial regime, but also traditional social structures (Henriksen 1976, 382–83). The group maintained a Marxist-Leninist sociopolitical program throughout the War for Independence, and put it into action during its first decade in control of the state, seeking to build infrastructural power in order to implement a vision for the state-led reorganization of society. These efforts were impeded by the war, and, over time, by the MPLA leadership’s retreat from their initial ideals in a more opportunistic direction of continued authoritarian control, but increased private benefits.

**Leadership Structure**

Jonas Savimbi’s hegemony within UNITA and his role as a veto player in Angola’s peace process, or the centrality of Charles Taylor in the NPFL in contrast to collective leadership in the FSLN, suggest that perhaps I have underplayed the ultimate importance of leadership structure, whether the leadership that emerges is collective or individual. Leadership structure is likely endogenous to whether the leaders who emerge are more programmatic or opportunistic, with
opportunists acting in a personalistic manner and programmatic leaders seeking to affect broader collectivities, but ideological programs and personalism can coexist within rebel organizations (Duyvesteyn 2004) and programmatic leaders may stay relatively true to their publicly-interested principles even when enjoying more individualized power, as in the case of Fidel Castro in Cuba. Opportunistic rebel organizations appear unlikely to have collective leadership, yet if we look to their analogues in coup-making groups of military officers, there is still variation on the basis of the goal orientation of the officers. For instance, military regimes in Gambia, Liberia, and Sierra Leone were characterized by opportunism and lack of institution building—and increasing concentration of power in the hands of one individual (Kandeh 1996)—while in Peru, for example, a military government led by Juan Velasco Alvarado instituted social and economic reforms for the benefit of the masses and expanded the scope and reach of the state (Einaudi 1973; A. Lowenthal 1975).

Thinking further about leadership structure, a few points are worth raising. First, having a single leader as the primary node of decision making within an organization increases the potential variance of the group’s ideals, goals, and policies. Among rebel organizations that held significant influence, this has been the case in both more programmatic and more opportunistic groups. The more programmatic Sendero Luminoso in Peru, had some collective leadership, but developed a cult of personality around primary leader Abimael Guzmán, and saw fractures, sharp changes of tactics and goals, and eventually almost complete collapse after Guzmán was captured in 1992; this came despite having challenged the government throughout the country, operating in 21 of 24 departments in 1991 (e.g. L. Taylor 2017). In Angola, UNITA suffered a similar collapse when long-time leader Jonas Savimbi was killed, with the country’s long civil war ceasing almost immediately after his death.
Among the cases of rebel victory, we can look at the AFDL in the Congo as an example where leadership was personalized by Laurent-Désiré Kabila, and when he was killed and succeeded by his son, Joseph, the new leader was able to shift the governing program in a slightly more programmatic direction when compared to the more entrenched opportunism of Kabila père. In Liberia, when Charles Taylor stepped down and left into exile, the NPP, the political party he had built out of the NPFL rebel organization, endured, but drastically lost public support. In 1997, Taylor won 75.3% of the presidential vote and the NPP captured 21 of 26 Senate seats and 49 of 64 House of Representatives seats (Harris 1999, 436). Eight years later, in 2005, after Taylor’s fall, the NPP won a mere 4.1% of first-round presidential ballots, 3 of 30 Senate seats and 4 of 64 House seats.¹⁸²

In a more programmatic organization, the FSLN and its legacies raise interesting questions about how collective leadership might act to constrain individuals with divergent goals. During the rebel period of the 1960s through 1979, the FSLN always maintained collective leadership, and this carried over into the group’s time in power from 1979 to 1990, with the National Directorate making collective decisions about the organization’s goals, strategy, and policy around a clear set of ideologically motivated priorities. It is impossible to know what Daniel Ortega’s personal motivations were during the periods of rebellion and the revolutionary government, and the degree to which he was devoted to the collective ideology and cause of the FSLN. In retrospect, some FSLN cadres argue that Ortega’s more personalist motivations became clear after victory, when he was elected president in the 1984 elections, and sought to use this role and its symbolic weight to consolidate power and become the primus inter pares among the FSLN leaders in the Directorate (N-16, Victor Hugo Tinoco; N-21, Alejandro Bendaña). After the FSLN left power in

1990, Ortega has steadily centralized power in the FSLN as it shifted from ruling to opposition party, pushing out rivals and moving away from the organization’s revolutionary policies and roots (Close 2016; Thaler 2017). It is certainly plausible that had Ortega been able to break free of the collective power structure of the FSLN to impose his own will in an earlier period, the FSLN’s state building and service provision efforts may well have looked quite different, and much less programmatic.

More generally, the cases examined in this study suggest that leadership structure can affect organizations’ trajectories and the potential elasticity of their policies and behavior, yet it is unlikely to be determinate. More programmatic organizations can have more collective or personalized leadership structures. A collective leadership structure, however, can increase the likelihood of continuity in the group’s ideals, goals, and practices in the event of leadership turnover. Frelimo in Mozambique, for example, had a well-developed, organizational apparatus and collective leadership structure such that the group was able to maintain its commitments and cohesion despite the assassination of founding president Eduardo Mondlane in 1969 and the likely assassination in 1986 of Samora Machel, one of Mondlane’s successors and the first president of independent Mozambique (e.g. Marcum 2018). More opportunistic organizations, by contrast, are more likely to experience centrifugal tendencies toward the centralization of power around a single leader and the casting off of competitors. An ideal of personal empowerment and benefit makes it hard to sustain coalitions and the pursuit to collective goals. Without a hegemonic leader to impose order within an organization, it would be extremely difficult to coordinate and divide the spoils of plunder without the group descending into chaotic infighting.\textsuperscript{183}

\textsuperscript{183} I am grateful to Taylor Boas for lending clarity on this point.
Islamist Organizations

The cases examined so far in this study generally organized around secular ideologies, or ideologies that contained religious elements, but were not explicitly focused on them (i.e. Liberation Theology in the FSLN’s Sandinismo or Protestant social organization for UNITA). Religion, however, is a central focus of the ideologies of many rebel organizations, who seek to restructure society in accordance with their interpretations of religious law. In the contemporary period, since the turn to the 21st century, Islamist rebel groups, often seeking the implementation of strict religious law and, frequently, the abolition of existing state boundaries, have comprised not only the majority of religious rebels involved in civil wars, but the majority of rebel organizations overall since 2003 (B. F. Walter 2017b). Can my organizational theory of rebel ideology and post-victory state building and service provision apply for Islamist groups? As a plausibility probe, we can examine the case of the Taliban, who emerged as a rebel organization in 1994, captured the capital of Kabul in 1996 and ruled Afghanistan until 2001 when the rebel Northern Alliance pushed them out of Kabul with heavy support from a US-led intervention.

The Taliban in Afghanistan

Afghanistan in the 1980s was one of the great battlegrounds of the Cold War, with the US funding and arming the Mujahedin rebels who fought against the Soviet-backed regime of Mohammed Najibullah, which fell in 1992. This led to anarchy, with a nominal government in Kabul holding little power. The Taliban initially formed in 1993 out of younger men who had been educated in madrassas in Afghanistan and Pakistan that advocated for a strict interpretation of the Koran, teaching their taliban (students) about “the ideal Islamic society created by the prophet Mohammed 1,400 years ago and this is what they wanted to emulate” (Rashid 2001, 23). The early
leaders of the organization were unhappy with the descent of Afghanistan into warlordism and banditry, and they chose to label themselves as the Taliban to signal “that they were a movement for cleansing society rather than a party trying to grab power” (Rashid 2001, 22–23). After initially organizing in September 1994 and seizing weapons the next month, the organization became more active, gathering followers and earning the support of Pakistan, which had grown tired of warlords impeding cross-border trade. The Taliban helped free a Pakistani trading convoy that was being held captive near Kandahar, and then swept through Kandahar, disarming militias, burning opium poppy fields, and establishing strict order based on Islamic law and tribal customary law (Gohari 2000; Matinuddin 1999; Rashid 2001; Sinno 2008, 226–27; Sullivan 2007). The Taliban’s ideology not only motivated the group, it also provided a transnational mobilizational resource, allowing the group to attract volunteers from beyond Afghanistan (Goodson 2001, 83). The initial campaign that captured Kandahar began a Taliban push toward Kabul, seeking to chase out warlords standing in their way and imposing the group’s version of Islamic law in areas under their control.

A collective central council (shura) in Kandahar, led by Mullah Omar, by mid-1995 controlled over half of Afghanistan, including outside traditional Pashtun areas (Matinuddin 1999, 41–42; Sinno 2008, 228), before the Taliban captured Kabul in September 1996, increasing their international legitimacy.\(^\text{184}\) Leadership became more centralized by Mullah Omar over time, reducing the autonomy of regional commanders and councils (Rashid 2001; Sinno 2008, 247). In Taliban-controlled areas, the members of the organization generally governed civilians directly, rather than setting up new civilian political institutions (Rashid 2001). The group’s leaders were sincere in their beliefs and practices, though often to the detriment of the population’s physical

\(^{184}\) Only Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates officially recognized the Taliban as the government of Afghanistan, but they were generally considered the de facto rulers of the country from about 1996.
security. Taliban commanders continued to live austerely, not seeking personal enrichment despite the availability of funds from external sponsors, the drug trade, and control of routes for other international trade, but they did not initially have a vision for rebuilding or reorganizing the economy, leading to unemployment and food insecurity (Maley 2009, 195; Matinuddin 1999, 38). As the Taliban gained greater control, they regulated and taxed economic activity, overseeing “a criminalised economy in which the revenues they obtained…came largely from activities the wider world viewed as illicit,” such as transnational smuggling and the opium trade (Maley 2009, 197). These revenues were not designed to benefit the Taliban themselves, though there were certainly instances of corruption (Ghufran 2001; Rubin 2000, 1799).

To Western eyes the social vision of the Taliban may appear “odious,” delivering “suspect benefits” (Reno 2015, 267), yet the organization’s leaders were acting in what they believed to be the public interest, and foreign pressures did not lead them to deviate. The Taliban was dominated by Pashtuns, but such “ethnicisation [was] an unintended and counter-productive result of regionalisation, rather than a strategy of mobilization” (Dorronsoro 2005, 258). The organization tried to “foster a multi-ethnic movement by stressing its Islamic credentials” and using symbols, for example on its flag, that call for “all Muslims to unite” (Mampilly 2015, 94). Afghanistan’s small non-Muslim population was not seen as part of the Taliban’s ideal society, but there was a degree of tolerance of them, even if life was still extremely uncomfortable (PBS 2001). While women’s freedom was severely and violently curtailed (e.g. PHR 1998), the Taliban still considered women part of their constituency and believed they were protecting women from impurity and dishonor. The brutal punishment of criminals, through amputations and executions, was considered the application of Koranic law, administered through a “three-tiered judicial system” (Sinno 2008, 247).
This was a comprehensive effort to remake Afghanistan’s culture and society, reshaping life for all of the country’s citizens. The order established by the Taliban was significantly based on fear (Maley 2009, 195–96), and the organization’s troops and police were quick to use their coercive capacity, yet the Taliban also sought to develop infrastructural power, using social institutions to achieve its goal of the establishment of an Islamic state. The Taliban thus “transformed themselves from a movement into a ruling government” (Ghufran 2001, 470).

War and disorder “had destroyed much of Afghanistan’s social capital as communities and institutions were dispersed or destroyed” (Rubin 2000, 1794), but the Taliban, enjoying social networks and prestige stemming from their madrassa education, as well as ethnic ties, were able to both build new institutions and draw on knowledge of those that remained. Sinno (2008, 236–45) details how the Taliban carefully used their knowledge of Pashtun society and kinship ties to win over local leaders and militia commanders and to tap into the power of Pashtun cultural symbols, and then established local councils and drew on clerical networks to administer areas (Dorronsoro 2005, 270–75). Institution building was slow, and despite Taliban claims in 1997 to have functioning ministries for issues such as education, refugees, and planning, the initial priority was security and order. Other aspects of society were expected to fall into place if Islamic law was followed, hence the Taliban’s three stated aims in 1997: “restoration of peace; collection of weapons; implementation of the shariah” (Matinuddin 1999, 41–43). As Roy and Zahab (2004, 14) put it, the Taliban’s political plan consisted of “the Shari’a, the whole Shari’a, and nothing but the Shari’a.”

This paucity of further planning and the group’s “administrative incompetence” impeded outcomes in establishing noncoercive authority at first (Sullivan 2007, 102), but the Taliban’s leaders adjusted, establishing councils and appointing provincial governors and local
administrators (Ghufran 2001, 473–74; Rubin 1999, 81). In the 90 percent of the country that they controlled from 1997 until the 2001 US invasion (Ghufran 2001; Sullivan 2007, 103), the Taliban remade social life, including service provision. One of the most drastic changes was the restriction of women’s access to education, which the Taliban presented as a temporary measure, until they could develop a ‘suitable’ syllabus in line with their values, as was also done in revolutionary Iran (Ghufran 2001, 475–76; Rubin 1999, 90). Men’s education was modelled on the madrassas where the Taliban themselves had studied. Access to healthcare was similarly restricted for women in line with the Taliban interpretation of Islamic law (though slightly loosened by 1998), while healthcare provision was otherwise regulated and relatively limited beyond urban areas and NGO clinics (Carlisle 1998; Cook 2003; Faiz 1997; Reyburn et al. 1997).

In a short period of time, the Taliban managed to overcome barriers to collective action and organization that had hobbled other groups’ aspirations for control of Afghanistan (Sinno 2008; Sullivan 2007), thanks in large part to the cohesion and purpose provided by the Taliban’s strict Islamist ideology. Exercising significant despotic power, but also building influence through clerical networks, tribal structures, and new administrative councils, the Taliban transformed life in the majority of Afghanistan in line with their vision of a state ruled by Islamic law. The Taliban nearly succeeded in gaining control of the entire national territory, assassinating Ahmed Shah Massoud, commander of the organization that was the “last bastion of resistance” (Sinno 2008, 249), on September 9, 2001. It took heavy US intervention after the September 11 attacks and the Taliban’s refusal to hand over Osama bin Laden to dislodge the Taliban from power.

The Taliban’s treatment of women and those who did not share their interpretation of Islam is normatively reprehensible, yet the organization was implementing a vision that it genuinely believed was in the best interests of these groups and Afghan society as a whole: it was a
programmatic group. The Taliban had a clear, coherent ideology, and though plans for post-victory governing were relatively limited, they were based in an ideological conviction that shari’a on its own could organize society. The Taliban thus worked to ensure that its interpretation of Islamic law could be implemented throughout its territory by developing control over and through society. While the group was sent on the run from late 2001, its continued persistence and presence as a both an armed actor and a political force, most prominently operating a “shadow judiciary” (Giustozzi and Baczko 2014), attest to the legitimacy and social embeddedness the Taliban were able to build.

Recognizing Islamist Diversity

There may be temptations to view contemporary Islamist rebellions or those jihadist groups with aspirations to transnational governance as an exceptional or different phenomenon in the larger study of civil wars (B. F. Walter 2017b), but I concur with Kalyvas (2015a) that there is more to be gained than lost by considering Islamist rebel groups in broader comparative perspective. An Islamist orientation may commonly carry reputational associations of trustworthiness and purity (Cammett and Luong 2014), but Islamist groups can also differ vastly in the content of their ideologies, their goals, and how inclusionary or exclusionary they are in their visions of who may be members of their ideal polities.

Some groups may only consider adherents of the same sect as members of their ideal polity (e.g. ISIS's Sunni supremacism), others may embrace Muslims more broadly, while still others may seek to govern based on Islamic principles, but embracing non-Muslims as part of their

\footnote{One could examine groups with extremist religious ideologies across religions (e.g. Berman and Laitin 2008; Iannaccone and Berman 2006), though as Kalyvas (2015a) suggests, it may be more fruitful to compare groups on the basis of their goals and the degree to which they wish to transform society, e.g. comparing radical Islamist and radical Marxist-Leninist organizations as both “revolutionary.”}
constituency. Hezbollah in Lebanon, which remains an armed organization but also engages in electoral politics, delivers services primarily to members of the (Shiite) organization, but also is willing to provide services to outgroup members, including non-Muslims (Cammett 2011; Cammett and Issar 2010). Sufi Muslim organizations were “the most prevalent forces of armed anti-colonial struggle in the Islamic world” (Motadel 2014, 16), and where Sufi organizations hold strong political influence today, they tend to be more inclusive in their governance (Stepan 2012). Ethnonationalist organizations in Muslim-majority regions, like the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) may also make alliances with more religious civil society organizations or adopt more religious discourse and policy frames, while not having government under Islamic law as a central goal (Barter 2015). The Taliban case therefore shows how my theory may apply to an Islamist organization, but as with any other ideological orientation, we should be careful in making generalizations about Islamist or even ‘jihadist’ organizations, which can be very diverse in their interpretations of Islam and how they wish to govern.\textsuperscript{186}

\textsuperscript{186} This caution about generalization applies to examinations of regime types and politics more generally in Muslim-majority countries (see e.g. Stepan and Robertson 2003).
CHAPTER EIGHT

Conclusion

“You never know beforehand what people are capable of, you have to wait, give it time, it’s time that rules, time is our gambling partner on the other side of the table and it holds all the cards of the deck in its hand, we have to guess the winning cards of life, our lives…”


In this study, I have developed a novel theory, tested it through three close case studies, and briefly tested the theory’s internal validity through the Angola comparison and its generalizability through the Taliban case study. If we divide the programmatic-opportunistic spectrum into thirds, the addition of these further cases provides a full set of cases as shown in Table 7.1 below.

**Table 8.1 Cases by Rebel Organizational Type**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programmatic</th>
<th>Middle-Ground</th>
<th>Opportunistic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FSLN in Nicaragua</td>
<td>NRA/M in Uganda</td>
<td>NPFL in Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPLA in Angola</td>
<td>UNITA in Angola</td>
<td>FNLA in Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taliban in Afghanistan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To more systematically test the generalizability or limits of the theory cross-nationally would require more extensive quantitative data, developing rigorous criteria for coding the different components of rebel organizational type and relevant rebel behavior. Existing datasets on rebel governance offer information on the output side of rebel organizational type and how groups’ interact with civilians (Heger and Jung 2017; Huang 2016b; Stewart 2018), yet a gap remains in understanding rebel organizations’ ideologies and their proposed plans for how to govern. Compiling better data on the discourse side of rebel ideology—through examination of rebel group documents, press statements and coverage, accounts from group members and civilians in rebel areas, and the secondary literature—will provide a better understanding of the components of rebel
group ideologies, moving beyond general political labels like Marxist or Islamist, and will permit more systematic research on rebel organizational type and its impacts.

**Implications for Future Research**

What lessons should scholars of civil war, state building, and political development draw from this study? One of the primary goals has been to make the case for the importance of ideology in shaping rebel group policies and behavior during fighting or after victory. Ideology is not a singular or constant cause of actions by rebel organizations or governments, but ideas can have powerful effects on decision making, and I join others (e.g. Gutiérrez Sanín and Wood 2014; Staniland 2014) in calling for continued work on ideology in civil wars. Including ideology as a variable that is taken seriously can also help us understand when it may be overshadowed by other, more salient factors (e.g. Seymour 2014). When examining ideology, however, we must be careful not to conflate discourse alone as signaling ideological adherence. Ideology in general is not mere ‘cheap talk,’ as Walter (2017a) would have it, but some groups’ rhetoric and deeds may diverge significantly, or they may undertake no efforts to put ideas into action. A full consideration of ideology should therefore include both discourse *and* practice.

Relatedly, ideologies and ideological adherence are not static (Thaler 2012). A group’s ideological program may evolve, or behavior may deviate from discourse without the articulation of a new set of ideals and goals. By looking at a relatively short time window after rebel victory, I tried to hold ideology somewhat constant, though it is clear looking beyond the first decade in power that victorious rebel organizations from the Communist Party in China to the NRA/M in Uganda have evolved as organizations and shifted ideologically from their original programs. Especially for more programmatic organizations, there seems to be a trend from stricter ideological
adherence and maintenance of the original program towards increasing opportunism and
corruption over time (with the MPLA in Angola being a case in point). With victorious
programmatic organizations forming particularly durable, long-lived regimes (Levitsky and Way
2013; Lyons 2016b), increased comparative study of ideological evolution and decay could
provide valuable insights.

Following on this, rebel victory remains an understudied phenomenon. There is (rightly) a
great deal of research on civil war termination in general and on negotiated settlements, yet
government victories and rebel victories have utility as analytical categories with varying effects
on postconflict political, social, and economic life (Huang 2016b; Toft 2009). The consideration
of the causes or impacts of rebel victories or government victories, however, should be integrated
into a process-oriented view of civil wars (Armitage 2015; Staniland 2014; Wood 2008). One way
to do this is to treat civil wars as critical junctures, moments of contingency in a state and society’s
history and development that can have long-lasting effects. Civil wars open up possibilities for
transformative change, but they can also reinforce existing dynamics. As Fidel Castro proclaimed,
“a revolution is not a bed of roses…a revolution is a fight to the death between the future and the
past” (Castro 1961).

A final note for academics, especially in international relations as a discipline or subfield,
is a reminder to examine domestic sources of postwar stability and the interests of domestic actors.
Civil wars have long been internationalized and embedded in global political, social, and economic
processes, and this continues to be the case (Armitage 2017; Mann 2018). When a state becomes
a battleground, the agency and interests of its citizens are often lost in the geopolitical shuffle.
Studies of conflict resolution and postconflict state building in international relations tend to focus
on the effects and interests of international actors (e.g. Call 2012; Paris 2004; Sisk 2013). Equal
attention, however, should be paid to the domestic potential for postconflict state building and stabilization, and the desires civil war-affected populations.

**Policy Implications**

The question of the how variation in rebel organizations affects the type of state they might build in the event of victory remains an important one for policymakers, as shown, for instance, by the World Bank’s (2017, 112, 130–32) most recent World Development Report including discussion of how wartime institutions affect post-war governance and development. Counterinsurgent governments themselves take seriously questions of rebel governance and the potential for rebel organizations to develop legitimate authority that challenges and may potentially usurp that of the central state. Ciro Martinez and Eng (2018) argue that the Assad government’s aerial bombing campaign in Syria, with significant Russian aid, has aimed in large part to disrupt and destroy rebel provision of food and healthcare as threats to central state authority.

Governments and regional organizations considering partisan intervention in a civil war must weigh the potential state building strategy and governing orientation a rebel organization might implement if it took power. In the case of the Syrian civil war, there were significant debates among Western actors about whether and how to support “good rebels” to counter the Assad regime and the Islamic State/Daesh (e.g. Lynch 2013; Yassin-Kassab 2013). Among the myriad other armed actors that have emerged during the conflict, how might different groups govern if they were to emerge victorious? My theory offers one potential means to tackle this question, but caution should be the order of the day. Civil wars are constantly evolving and it takes sustained observation, significant data, and contextual knowledge to make reasoned inferences about rebel
organizations. Comparisons are difficult because we must look closely and deeply within cases and organizations to understand social dynamics and dig past discourse toward sincere intentions. This is a task requiring linguistic and area studies knowledge, something the US in particular has neglected (C. King 2015).

Even if we possess the requisite local knowledge to use the theory to infer the type of state building a rebel organization might pursue if it gained power, this does not provide a key to which groups will govern ‘best.’ Though more programmatic organizations are more likely to build infrastructural power, which holds greater potential for stability, infrastructural power is value neutral: it depends how it is used. An organization like the Taliban can use its infrastructural power to pursue ends that those who value human rights find abhorrent. Even the relatively more benign FSLN’s attempts at state building and service provision on Nicaragua’s Atlantic Coast and in rural areas were seen by many people in those regions as manifestations of structural violence, alien ideas and models imposed in violation of their preexisting lifeways (Bendaña 1991; CIPRES 1991; Hale 1994; Horton 1998). Any stability produced by rebel victory likely comes at the cost of the centralization of power and authoritarian tendencies over time (Levitsky and Way 2012; Lyons 2016a). Even if there may be some initial increases in democratic institutions or inclusion (Huang 2016b; Toft 2009), autocratic decision-making and the closure of power are to be expected, even where elections are adopted. As Augustine Ruzindana, a former official in the NRA/M government in Uganda, put it, “All regimes that capture power through armed struggle have the same structure...there is on the horizon the possibility of losing or giving up power. That eventually affects their behavior because they have to retain power” (U-1).

Finally, this study has, for reasons of concision, abstracted away many of the violent details of civil war and state consolidation in the cases discussed. Civil wars are, inherently, violent
processes, and we would do well in academic and public discussions not to lose sight of this. War may be “a force that gives us meaning” (Hedges 2002) within social and political systems, but it comes with terrible physical and mental costs. State formation and state building, too, are rife with coercion. Geostrategic debates and academic tomes alike must face this human toll, and our work should continue striving to reduce it.
APPENDIX A

Fieldwork

Fieldwork and data collection for this project has taken place over the course of several years, with time in the field spent conducting interviews, examining documents, books, and periodicals in archives and libraries, and gaining a personal understanding of the social and political dynamics and the human and physical geography of the countries I am studying.

The FSLN Case

I began working in Nicaragua in the summer of 2013, spending about two and half months based in León and Managua conducting preliminary research on the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional, focusing during that period on the FSLN’s development, its ideology, and the security apparatus it constructed once in power. I spoke with former combatants and academics, and visited different parts of the country to learn about their experiences during the insurrection that brought the Sandinistas to power, and during the state building project and civil war that unfolded in the decade afterwards. In Managua, I began examining the collections of the Instituto de Historia de Nicaragua y Centroamérica (IHNCA) at the Universidad Centroamericana. I was able to read through FSLN documents, publications put out by the military, memoirs of Sandinista officials and combatants, and books by Nicaraguan and foreign scholars and journalists.

In the summer of 2014, I continued focusing on Nicaragua, but through the archival record available in the United States. Given that documents included in archives are necessarily only a sample of those that were originally produced and that the selection of documents included and available is often shaped by political and social concerns (R. H. Brown and Davis-Brown 1998; Burton 2006; Schwartz and Cook 2002), I wanted to see what documents on the FSLN were
available in the United States and how the organization and the government it formed looked from the perspective of an ‘opponent.’ I spent two months examining documents in the archives of the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, which, as an institution opposed to socialism and communism, devoted great effort to the collection of materials on leftist movements and governments during the Cold War period, including the FSLN. I also examined documents from the National Security Archive, based at George Washington University. These declassified documents from the US State Department, Department of Defense, and intelligence agencies provided an external view of the FSLN and its activities.

The following summer, in 2015, I returned to Nicaragua for three months, after a brief exploratory trip in March. Once again, I began in the archives of the IHNCA. With the broadening of my project from one focused on the security sector to one examining a broader set of issues related to rebel organizational development, state institutions, and social services, I examined a different set of documents, articles, and books in the archives.

I also conducted 20 interviews with former FSLN political leaders, government ministers, and military officers, as well as members of opposition groups, civil society, and academia. Some interviewees I contacted by email, and others I was connected to through friends or other interviewees. Rather than pure snowball sampling, I selected interviewees purposively for the roles they had played in the FSLN and government, or for their sectoral expertise. I was able to interview former members of the FSLN Directorate (the organization’s highest body), former top military generals, and former ministers of health and education. A number of people with whom I wished to speak were ill during my time in the country, and so I was unable to meet with them. I was, however, able to interview Antonio Lacayo Oyanguren, former Minister of the Presidency during the Chamorro government that followed the FSLN in 1990, and Father Fernando Cardenal, the
leader of the FSLN’s literacy campaign and later Minister of Education, before their unfortunate deaths in 2015 and 2016, respectively. Following the receipt of informed consent, interviews were recorded. No interviewees requested anonymity. In one case, an interviewee asked for his/her comments to remain off the record, and so the interview has not been cited, though it was still informative. Interviews were conducted in private homes or offices. Interview recordings were transferred to a secure cloud storage account and a password-protected flash drive.

I also returned to Nicaragua in March 2017 for two and a half weeks to conduct further interviews, as well as follow-up research in the IHNCA archives, examining collections of the official FSLN *Barricada* newspaper from the initial years of the revolution, from 1979-1980. Most interview requests, unfortunately, were ignored or turned down, and so I was only able to conduct two interviews.

*The NPFL Case*

From September to December 2015, I conducted fieldwork in Liberia on the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). The country and the entire Mano River Basin region were just emerging from the worst Ebola virus outbreak in history, and up until the summer, there were concerns that I might not be able to go to Liberia to conduct research that year. The outbreak had largely been contained, however, other than a few isolated cases in June and July, with the country declared Ebola-free again in early September. I was based in the capital, Monrovia, the seat of government and home to about one-fourth of the country’s population.

Monrovia is a sprawling city and can be quite hard to navigate, as well as having very bad roads, so a friend who had previously conducted research in Liberia before put me in touch with a driver. Through the Center for Applied Research and Training, I was connected with a university
student who served as a research assistant. Both the driver and assistant helped me get the lay of the land in Monrovia and through some of their contacts, I began to conduct interviews with former NPFL officers, as well as some former Armed Forces of Liberia officers. Interviewees were found through snowball sampling.

The preference of interviewees was often for the interviews to be conducted in groups. Group interviews were only conducted when suggested and agreed to by interviewees. After explaining the project and receiving the informed consent of interviewees, I asked each person for a brief description of his/her role and experience in the NPFL or AFL, before continuing on to more specific interview questions about the dynamics and policies of the NPFL, with individuals able to respond when they wanted. I attempted to ensure that each person who wanted to could respond to each question. Interviews took place in private homes or private rooms in restaurants. Almost all interviews were recorded, though on two occasions, interviewees requested that a recorder not be used, and so I took handwritten notes instead. Having formerly been in a military organization, security and secrecy were clear concerns expressed by many interviewees, and so I made the decision not to ask any of these interviewees to state their names while the recorder was on (and did not write them down when taking handwritten notes). This is in line with other interview-based works on Liberia’s civil wars, which omit the names of interviewees who were combatants (Gerdes 2013; Lidow 2016). Given Liberia’s political environment and continuing discussions about the possibility of a war crimes or human rights tribunal being established in the country, omitting names from recordings also acts as a safeguard against future use of the interviews for attempted prosecutions. All interview recordings and notes were put in an encrypted cloud file storage account and on an encrypted flash drive as soon as I returned home each day.
Among these former combatants, many of whom remain poor, I was repeatedly told that “information is not free,” and that if they were giving me data about their lives and experiences, I had to give them something in return. I thus decided to give interviewees either US$3 and a soft drink or US$4. The amount of the payment was never disclosed during interviewee recruitment or before the interview was completed, and I described it as a token of my gratitude for interviewees’ participation. There were occasional complaints from those who knew that non-governmental organizations often paid more and provided food for participation in workshops, but most interviewees were grateful and some even tried to refuse the money.

The rest of my time in Liberia was spent focused on interviewing current and former government officials, civil society members, and academics, who were selected in a purposive sample. I sought out politicians and bureaucrats who had been involved with the NPFL during its time as rebels and those who had joined the government when the organization was in power, interviewing many former government ministers and current senators and representatives. Due to scheduling issues, I was not able to speak to some prospective interviewees, but overall my expectations were exceeded. I was aided greatly in setting up interviews with senators and representatives by a journalist in the Capitol Hill press corps. This set of political, civil society, and academic interviewees was willing to be recorded and speak on the record, though I took similar precautions to secure the recordings of their interviews. Interviews took place in private offices, homes, or private rooms of restaurants. No monetary compensation was provided for these interviewees, though if an interview took place in a restaurant, I would pay for one coffee or soft drink for the interviewee. I conducted a total of 54 interviews with 102 subjects.

I visited the national archives in Monrovia, but the documentary record in the country from the period of interest is extremely thin following years of dictatorship and civil war. There are
some demographic records, and commercial records from property sales and international shipping, but little in the way of governmental documents from the civil war period or the time the NPFL was in power, at least according to the archivists and other researchers to whom I spoke. Most ministries’ records are missing or disorganized and decayed. Through interviewees and other contacts, I was able to examine some rare publications from the 1990s, including a book of NPFL leader Charles Taylor’s speeches during the early years of his presidency. Given that the secondary literature on the NPFL is also thinner than that on the FSLN and NRA/M, I supplement my in-country research through analysis of documents and transcripts from Charles Taylor’s trial in The Hague by the Special Court for Sierra Leone, whose records I collected during the summer of 2016.

The difficulty and expense of travel within Liberia and the concentration of people and resources in Monrovia meant that I did not travel beyond the counties immediately bordering Montserrado (the county in which Monrovia is located). These shorter trips, however, were still useful to see the distribution of resources and infrastructure outside the capital. The presence in Monrovia of people drawn from every part of the country—not to mention a quarter of the Liberian population—meant that I am confident I was still able to get relatively representative information about the experiences of different regions during the first civil war and under Taylor’s presidency.

The NRA/M Case

In January 2016, I went to Uganda, seeking to replicate my research model by seeking out both interviews and archival sources on the National Resistance Army/Movement (NRA/M). I arrived prior to the national parliamentary and presidential elections in mid-February. In meetings with several academics and former government officials, I was repeatedly told to wait until after
the elections to seek interviews. Those in government or now in the opposition, and also those in civil society, would be wrapped up in campaigning and election analysis, and so few would have time for an interview, or their responses and views would be shaped by the contemporary political context, rather than related to the historical era on which I wanted them to respond and reflect.

The elections, however, turned out to be far more contentious than expected. A few days before the vote, the leading opposition candidate, Kiiza Besigye, was detained while trying to reach a rally at the campus of Makerere University. His supporters, and those of us on campus near the main gate, were tear gassed, while some were also shot with rubber bullets and one man was killed with live ammunition. On election day, there was clear evidence of fraud and efforts at voter suppression in opposition-leaning areas, leading to further unrest amidst a heavy police presence. In the aftermath of the election and the announcement of the results (a victory for President Yoweri Museveni of the NRM), there was high tension, with heavy deployment of police and soldiers, and helicopters flying over Kampala. In the following weeks, the opposition appealed the election results and many opposition leaders were held under house arrest, while large encampments of soldiers and police remained throughout Kampala. The US Embassy in Uganda and the US State Department took a highly critical stance toward the government, expressing concern about the legitimacy of the elections, which provoked a strong reaction from the president. It thus appeared somewhat more suspicious that I was a young American asking about political issues related to the ruling party and security forces. I was counseled by local academics and friends to continue waiting until after the appeals had concluded and the situation calmed down to seek interviews.

In late March and early April, I decided the political environment was sufficiently settled to start seeking interviews and I attempted to contact relevant current and former government officials and military officers, the key actors to whom I wanted to speak. I was able to conduct
three interviews, but I received no responses from others I contacted. For many people in Uganda, it is difficult to find addresses or phone numbers. Contacts I had made earlier during my time in the country were happy to speak informally and suggested other people to potentially interview, but were unwilling to put me in touch with them directly, and the few interviewees likewise did not connect me to further potential interviewees in the manner of a snowball sampling procedure.

To try to push the process forward, I hired a fixer who often worked with journalists and was well connected to government and former government sources. I gave him a list of 40 potential interviewees to contact and seek out. He first left letters at the offices of those for whom he had contact information, but received no responses within two weeks. He then began contacting the assistants of interviewees or contacting the interviewees directly by phone or text message (SMS). Many did not respond, and those who did either declined, were busy, or said to wait until after the presidential and parliamentary swearing in ceremonies in May, when the new government would be installed. In the lead up to the swearing in, however, political tensions rose once more, with Besigye again detained, and then, after staging a parallel swearing in ceremony online, arrested and charged with treason. Security deployments remained heavy and the government flew fighter jets over Kampala on what it claimed were ‘test flights.’ Finally, at the end of May, a few more people responded to interview requests, but the timing only worked out to speak to five people total before I had to leave the country. Interviews took place in private offices.

Given the paucity of interviews, I only use interview evidence for brief quotations and examples, and if it can be buttressed by other primary or secondary information. Interviews were not recorded and I instead took handwritten notes, feeling that this was more appropriate given the political environment. I then typed up interview notes and saved them on an encrypted cloud account and a secure flash drive.
With all of the difficulties with conducting interviews, I devoted my time to research in the libraries and archives. The libraries of the Centre for Basic Research (CBR) and the Makerere Institute for Social Research possessed large collections of books published in Uganda, including collections of NRA/M documents and speeches, as well as reports and working papers difficult to find outside of the country. The CBR also has an archive of newspaper clippings from Uganda’s major newspapers, organized into folders by subject, from about 1989 to the present. I examined the collections on the NRA, the NRM, the National Resistance Council/Parliament, Resistance Councils/Local Councils, education, health, and human rights for the period of 1989 through 1996, mainly from the independent *Monitor* and government-run *New Vision*. For newspapers from 1986 to 1989, I visited the Makerere University Library, paging through full issues of newspapers from this period looking for relevant articles, with the *New Vision* having the most complete and relevant collection. Additionally, at the Parliamentary Library, I read through transcripts from 1986 through 1996 of the sessions of the National Resistance Council, the legislature established by the NRA/M when they took power, and the Parliament, which took over as the legislature in 1996.

The government restricts access to documents under fifty years old in the government archives, and during my time in Uganda they were not willing to take my requests until my research proposal had been approved by the President’s Office for Research. These approvals, which are necessary for research in districts outside of Kampala, were stalled, however, during the elections and their aftermath, and were only finally granted in April, at which point I was concentrating on securing interviews in Kampala. In the various libraries and archives, however, I had been able to access documents from a number of relevant ministries and government agencies. Given the late granting of approval for research outside of Kampala, I was unable to conduct significant research
elsewhere in the country, but I was able to visit numerous regions of the country to observe differences in the levels of development and manifestations of state presence and power.
## APPENDIX B

### Interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Subject Names/Positions</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N-1</td>
<td>June 19, 2015</td>
<td>Dora María Téllez, Comandante Guerrillera; FSLN Political Commissioner for Managua (1979-85); Vice-President of Council of State (1980-84); Minister of Health (1985-90)</td>
<td>Managua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-2</td>
<td>June 19, 2015</td>
<td>María Josefina Vijil, Juventud Sandinista leader; education scholar</td>
<td>Managua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-3</td>
<td>June 23, 2015</td>
<td>Elvira Cuadra Lira, security scholar</td>
<td>Managua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-4</td>
<td>June 23, 2015</td>
<td>Joaquín Cuadra Lacayo, Comandante Guerrillero; General and Chief of Staff of EPS (1979-90); Vice-Minister of Defense (1980-90)</td>
<td>Managua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-5</td>
<td>June 24, 2015</td>
<td>Edmundo Jarquín Calderon, economic adviser and Ambassador to Spain and to Mexico</td>
<td>Managua</td>
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<td>N-6</td>
<td>July 1, 2015</td>
<td>Hugo Torres Jimenez, Comandante Guerrillero; Vice Minister of Interior (1979-82) and Secretary of Consejo del Estado (1980-82); General and director of political directorate of EPS (1982-90)</td>
<td>Managua</td>
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<td>N-7</td>
<td>July 1, 2015</td>
<td>Lea Guido, FSLN militant and women’s leader; Minister of Social Welfare (1979-80); Minister of Health (1980-85); other government posts (1985-90)</td>
<td>Managua</td>
</tr>
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<td>N-9</td>
<td>July 6, 2015</td>
<td>Judy Butler, journalist, solidarity activist, and editor of NACLA Report on the Americas; journalist and editor at Center for Documentation on the Atlantic Coast (CIDCA) from 1983</td>
<td>Ticuantepe</td>
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<td>N-10</td>
<td>July 7, 2015</td>
<td>Hugo Torres Jimenez (2)</td>
<td>Managua</td>
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<td>N-11</td>
<td>July 8, 2015</td>
<td>Ricardo Pereira, FSLN militant; Second in Command of EPS Directorate of Political Education;</td>
<td>Esquipulas</td>
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<td>N-12</td>
<td>August 8, 2015</td>
<td>Antonio Lacayo Oyanguren</td>
<td>Chief of Staff of the Air Force until 1985</td>
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<tr>
<td>N-13</td>
<td>August 11, 2015</td>
<td>Luis Carrión Cruz</td>
<td>Luis Carrión Cruz, leader of Proletarian Tendency and Comandante de la Revolución; member of Dirección Nacional; Vice-Minister of Defense (1979-80); Vice-Minister of Interior (1980-88); Minister of Economy, Industry, and Commerce (1988-90)</td>
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<tr>
<td>N-14</td>
<td>August 12, 2015</td>
<td>Aynn Setright</td>
<td>Antonio Lacayo Oyanguren, political opponent of FSLN; Minister of the Presidency (1990-95)</td>
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<tr>
<td>N-15</td>
<td>August 13, 2015</td>
<td>Jaime Wheelock Román</td>
<td>Jaime Wheelock Román, leader of Proletarian Tendency and Comandante de la Revolución; member of Dirección Nacional and Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform (1979-90)</td>
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<tr>
<td>N-16</td>
<td>August 14, 2015</td>
<td>Victor Hugo Tinoco</td>
<td>Victor Hugo Tinoco, Comandante Guerrillero; Ambassador to the UN (1979-80); Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs (1981-90)</td>
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<td>N-17</td>
<td>August 14, 2015</td>
<td>Arturo Cruz Sequeira</td>
<td>Arturo Cruz Sequeira, Contra political leader</td>
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<td>N-18</td>
<td>August 18, 2015</td>
<td>Oscar René Vargas</td>
<td>Oscar René Vargas, early FSLN militant and leading FSLN ideologue</td>
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<tr>
<td>N-19</td>
<td>August 20, 2015</td>
<td>Fr. Fernando Cardenal</td>
<td>Fr. Fernando Cardenal, member of Grupo de los Doce; leader of National Literacy Crusade (1979-80); Minister of Education (1984-90)</td>
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<tr>
<td>N-20</td>
<td>March 15, 2017</td>
<td>Carlos Tünnerman Bernheim</td>
<td>Carlos Tünnerman Bernheim, member of Grupo de los Doce; Minister of Education (1979-84); Ambassador to the United States (1984-88); education scholar</td>
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<tr>
<td>N-21</td>
<td>March 20, 2017</td>
<td>Alejandro Bendaña</td>
<td>Alejandro Bendaña, Ambassador to the UN (1981-1982); Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry (1984-1990); historian</td>
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<td>5 October</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>NPFL, then SSU and ATU during Taylor presidency NPFL, then pro-government militia during Taylor presidency NPFL, then pro-government militia during Taylor presidency NPFL</td>
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<td>LIB-2</td>
<td>7 October</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>NPFL, then joined INPFL, then rejoined NPFL</td>
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<td>LIB-3</td>
<td>7 October</td>
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<td>NPFL, then NSA during Taylor presidency NPFL, then ATU during Taylor presidency NPFL NPFL</td>
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<tr>
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<td>NPFL</td>
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<td>11 October</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>NPFL, then SSU during Taylor presidency NPFL, then pro-government militia during Taylor presidency</td>
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<td>LIB-7</td>
<td>12 October</td>
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<td>NPFL, then ATU during Taylor presidency NPFL NPFL NPFL</td>
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<td>12 October</td>
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<td>NPFL, then AFL during Taylor presidency NPFL, then ATU during Taylor presidency</td>
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<td>12 October</td>
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<td>Former AFL, then joined NPFL, then AFL during Taylor presidency</td>
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<td>14 October</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Former UNHCR refugee official, was refugee in Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea</td>
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<td>14 October</td>
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<td>NPFL, then SSU during Taylor presidency</td>
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<td>14 October</td>
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<td>Former AFL colonel, left before war, rejoined AFL during Taylor presidency</td>
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<td>NPFL, then on Executive Mansion staff during Taylor presidency</td>
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<td>19 October</td>
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<td>Former AFL, then joined NPFL, then police during Taylor presidency</td>
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<td>NPFL, then LURD during Taylor presidency</td>
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<td>INPFL, then joined NPFL, then LURD during Taylor presidency</td>
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<td>21 October</td>
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<td>NPFL, then AFL during Taylor presidency</td>
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<td>NPFL, captured and joined LPC, then AFL during Taylor presidency</td>
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<td>INPFL, then policy during Taylor presidency</td>
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<td>NPFL, then pro-government militia during Taylor presidency</td>
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<td>INPFL, then joined NPFL, then AFL during Taylor presidency</td>
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<td>LIB-25</td>
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<td>NPFL, then AFL during Taylor presidency, War widow of NPFL officer</td>
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<td>LIB-26</td>
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<td>NPFL, then AFL during Taylor presidency, Former journalist from NPFL areas</td>
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<td>NPFL, then military police during Taylor presidency, NPFL, then SSU during Taylor presidency</td>
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<td>LIB-31</td>
<td>27 October</td>
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<td>LIB-32</td>
<td>28 October</td>
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<td>NPFL, then pro-government militia during Taylor presidency</td>
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<td>LIB-34</td>
<td>29 October</td>
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<td>LIB-35</td>
<td>31 October</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Joseph Saye Guannu, political historian and professor, University of Liberia and Cuttington University</td>
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<td>LIB-36</td>
<td>2 November</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Nathaniel Barnes, Minister of Finance (1999-2002) in Taylor government</td>
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<td>LIB-37</td>
<td>3 November</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Rev. J. Emmanuel Bowier, historian, former government minister</td>
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<td>Sinkor</td>
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<tr>
<td>LIB-38</td>
<td>4 November</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Philip N. Wesseh, journalist</td>
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<td>LIB-39</td>
<td>10 November</td>
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<td>Rep. George Mulbah, NPP Vice Chair, worked with Taylor in Gbarnga and became superintendent for Bong County in Taylor government</td>
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<td>LIB-40</td>
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<td>Rev. J. Emmanuel Bowier (2nd)</td>
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<td>Sinkor</td>
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<td>LIB-41</td>
<td>13 November</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Hassan Bility, journalist and human rights advocate</td>
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<td>LIB-42</td>
<td>13 November</td>
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<td>Kenneth Y. Best, journalist</td>
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<td>LIB-44</td>
<td>17 November</td>
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<td>Sen. Prince Y. Johnson, former NPFL general and INPFL commander-in-chief</td>
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<td>LIB-45</td>
<td>18 November</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Dr. S. Byron Tarr, social scientist, former political activist and government minister</td>
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<td>LIB-46</td>
<td>19 November</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Sen. Dr. Peter Coleman, Minister of Health and Social Welfare in Taylor government</td>
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<td>LIB-47</td>
<td>20 November</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Dr. S. Byron Tarr (2nd) Nakomo Duche, legal scholar and former UN official</td>
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<td>23 November</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Monie Captan, Minister of Foreign Affairs (1997-2003) in Mamba Point</td>
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<tr>
<td>Number</td>
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<td>Subject Names/Positions</td>
<td>Location</td>
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<td>LIB-49</td>
<td>24 November</td>
<td>Dr. Jonathan Taylor, Minister of State for Presidential Affairs (2000-2003) in Taylor government, professor and dean at University of Liberia</td>
<td>Capitol Hill</td>
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<tr>
<td>LIB-50</td>
<td>27 November</td>
<td>E. Reginald Goodridge, Deputy Minister of State for Presidential Affairs and Press Secretary, later Minister of Information, Culture, and Tourism in Taylor government</td>
<td>Mamba Point</td>
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<td>LIB-51</td>
<td>2 December</td>
<td>Dr. S. Byron Tarr (3rd)</td>
<td>Congo Town</td>
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<tr>
<td>LIB-52</td>
<td>2 December</td>
<td>John T. Richardson, former NPFL commander and political official, Minister of Public Works and National Security Advisor in Taylor government</td>
<td>Sinkor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIB-53</td>
<td>9 December</td>
<td>Sen. Conmany Wesseh, former student leader and peace negotiator, member of IGNU</td>
<td>Capitol Hill</td>
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<tr>
<td>LIB-54</td>
<td>11 December</td>
<td>Rev. J. Emmanuel Bowier (3rd)</td>
<td>Sinkor</td>
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Table B.3 Uganda Interviews

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<th>Location</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U-2</td>
<td>March 30, 2016</td>
<td>Lt. Col. Fred Mwesigye, founding NRA/M guerrilla; UPDF officer; Member of Parliament</td>
<td>Parliament, Kampala</td>
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<td>U-3</td>
<td>April 8, 2016</td>
<td>Elijah Mushemeza, Constituent Assembly and Parliament member (1994-1996); NRA/M political official; academic</td>
<td>Kamwokya, Kampala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U-4</td>
<td>May 23, 2016</td>
<td>Miria Matembe, NRC and Constituent Assembly member; Minister of Ethics and Integrity (1998-2003); human rights lawyer</td>
<td>Lugogo, Kampala</td>
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