The Organization of Conflict in American Local Government

The Organization of Conflict in American Local Government

A dissertation presented

by

Peter Raymond Bucchianeri

to

The Committee on Higher Degrees in Social Policy

in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in the subject of
Government and Social Policy

Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

April 2018

Dissertation Advisor: James M. Snyder, Jr. Peter Raymond Bucchianeri

The Organization of Conflict in American Local Government

Abstract

Politics is fundamentally about conflict: where it takes place, what outcomes are at stake, and how the dividing lines are drawn. At the state and national levels in the United States, political parties are often at the heart of this conflict, using their power to shape the scope and contours of it to achieve their political goals. Yet, despite the key role that parties play in organizing conflict within American politics, the vast majority of the governments in the United States—nearly all at the local level—are either nonpartisan or effectively governed by a single party. How does the presence or absence of parties and party competition influence the nature of political conflict and the policies that successfully emerge from it?

To answer these questions, this dissertation considers the case of municipal government, leveraging a novel collection of legislative records from 170 city and county councils across the United States. In the first chapter, specifically, I consider when, and under what conditions, political parties organize legislative behavior. By examining patterns of roll call voting across local governments, I show that political parties are neither necessary nor sufficient to support the type of stable legislative coalitions that scholars have argued both exemplify party government and enable political accountability from voters. In the second chapter, I use a long time-series of legislative records from the New York City Council to examine the consequences of democratic one-party rule for legislative behavior and public policy. In doing so, I show that—despite one-party rule—politics in New York is both ideological and multidimensional, with intraparty factions that have shifted over time. Finally, in the third chapter, I explore whether and how political parties influence the issue content of the legislative agenda. By coding the policy content of over 375,000 proposed bills, I

show that political parties leverage both their positive and negative agenda powers when institutionalized within the electoral system. However, the differences in the agenda across partisan and nonpartisan governments are relatively small in magnitude, suggesting that party agenda power is either limited or not unique to parties at all.

Contents

Abstract iii

Acknowledgments x

Introduction 1
- 0.1 When do Political Parties Organize Legislative Behavior? . . . 3
- 0.2 How is Legislative Conflict Structured Under One-Party Rule? . . . 4
- 0.3 When and How do Political Parties Manipulate the Agenda? . . . 5
- 0.4 Contributions . . . 6

1 There's More Than One Way to Party: Legislative Coalitions in Partisan and Nonpartisan Governments 8
- 1.1 Introduction . . . 8
- 1.2 Parties, Partisan Elections, and Legislative Conflict . . . 11
- 1.3 Data and Measurement . . . 16
- 1.4 Partisan Elections and Patterns of Legislative Voting . . . 23
- 1.5 Stable Coalitions in the Absence of Parties: Evidence from San Francisco . . . 31
- 1.6 Conclusion . . . 38

2 Conflict and Cleavages Under Democratic One-Party Rule: Evidence from the New York City Council 40
- 2.1 Introduction . . . 40
- 2.2 One-Party Rule and Legislative Factions . . . 42
- 2.3 Background: The New York City Council . . . 46
- 2.4 Data . . . 47
- 2.5 Measurement . . . 50
- 2.6 Voting Cleavages in the New York City Council . . . 53
- 2.7 Sponsorship Cleavages in the New York City Council . . . 57
- 2.8 Intraparty Conflict and Agenda Control . . . 63
- 2.9 Conclusion . . . 64

3 Power at the Margins: When and How Political Parties Leverage Agenda Control 67
- 3.1 Introduction . . . 67
- 3.2 Political Parties, Power, and the Issue Agenda . . . 70
- 3.3 Studying Legislative Behavior at the Local Level . . . 75

3.4 Data and Measurement . . . 77
3.5 The Issue Content of the Legislative Agenda . . . 82
3.6 When and Why do Parties Impede Legislation? . . . 86
3.7 Conclusion . . . 90

A Appendix to Chapter 1: Sample and Measurement 91
A.1 Descriptive Statistics . . . 91
A.2 Baseline Factors Affecting Measurement . . . 93

B Appendix to Chapter 1: Legistar Cities and Counties in Context 95
B.1 How Does the Sample Compare to the Population? . . . 95
B.2 Comparing Included and Omitted Legistar Councils . . . 97

C Appendix to Chapter 1: Results Using Alternative Measures of Fit 100

D Appendix to Chapter 1: Term-Specific Scaling Results for San Francisco 103

E Appendix to Chapter 2: Example Legislation by Category 105

F Appendix to Chapter 2: Consponsoship Scaling in Congress 106

G Appendix to Chapter 3: Topic Coding Process 108

H Appendix to Chapter 3: Full Regression Results 110

I Appendix to Chapter 3: Matching Results 112

Bibliography 114

List of Figures

1.1 Map of All Cities and Counties Included in Sample 19
1.2 Distribution of APRE (1D) for Partisan and Nonpartisan Councils 23
1.3 Bivariate Relationship between Partisan Imbalance and APRE by Election System 27
1.4 Variation in Coefficient on Partisan Elections by Partisan Imbalance 30
1.5 Use of the Term 'Progressive' in San Francisco Chronicle Articles about the Board of Supervisors, 1985 – 2017 33
1.6 One-Dimensional Spatial Model Fit (APRE) for San Francisco Board of Supervisors by Term 35
1.7 Dynamic Ideal Points in One-Dimension for San Francisco Board of Supervisors, 1997 – 2016 37

2.1 Use of the Term 'Progressive' in New York Observer Articles about the City Council, 1998 – 2017 48
2.2 'Nay' Votes by Party 50
2.3 Ideal Points in Two Dimensions from Optimal Classification 55
2.4 Ideal Points in 2 Dimensions from Optimal Classification, Coded by Member Race 56
2.5 Ideal Points in 2 Dimensions from Optimal Classification, with Progressive Caucus Members, 2010–2017 57
2.6 Cosponsorship Ideal Points by Party 60
2.7 Cosponsorship Ideal Points by Race 61
2.8 Cosponsorship Ideal Points by Progressive Membership 62

3.1 Legistar Page for an Enacted New York City Ordinance 78
3.2 Pairwise Correlation Between Bill Topics 81
3.3 Share of All Legislative Items that Received a Final Vote by Government and Year 83
3.4 Distribution of Agenda Topic Share for each Policy Area by Type of Government 85
3.5 Partisan Election Coefficient from Regressions of Policy Topic Share on Government-Level Factors 87
3.6 Difference in Mean Topic Shares for Matched Partisan and Nonpartisan Councils 87
3.7 Estimated Difference in Probability of Bill Receiving a Vote between Partisan and Nonpartisan Councils 89

A.1 Total Number of Councils in Full Legistar Sample by Year 92

A.2 Relationship between the APRE Statistic and Log Total Contested Votes . . 93
A.3 Distribution of APRE Statistic by Council Size Groups 94

B.1 Characteristics of Cities and Counties in Sample and Population 96
B.2 Characteristics of the Legistar Councils that are Included and Excluded from the Analysis 98
B.3 Examining the Stability of the Results across Contested Vote Thresholds . . . 99

D.1 Optimal Classification Ideal Points Estimated Separately for Each Term of the San Francisco Board of Supervisors 104

F.1 Results from 2D W-Nominate Model on Cosponsorships in the 108th Congress 107

I.1 Estimated Difference in Probability of Bill Receiving a Vote between Partisan and Nonpartisan Councils after Matching 113

List of Tables

1.1 Relationship Between Partisan Elections and Legislative Unidimensionality . 25
1.2 Relationship Between Partisan Elections, Competition, and Legislative Unidimensionality 29

2.1 Bill Summary Statistics by Term 49
2.2 Optimal Classification Fit Statistics by Council Term 53
2.3 Sponsor Characteristics and Likelihood of Bill Receiving a Vote 65

3.1 Local Legislation Policy Topics and Sub-Topics 80

A.1 Summary Statistics for Cities and Counties in Sample 91

C.1 Alternate DV: Variance Explained by 1st Dimension 101
C.2 Alternate DV: Percent 'Nay' Votes Correctly Classified 102

G.1 Local Legislation Policy Topics and Bill Search Terms 109

Acknowledgments

This dissertation would not have been possible without the help and support of many people. First and foremost among them is my committee: Jim Snyder, Dan Carpenter, and Ryan Enos. I am grateful for their encouragement, their support, and their guidance along the way. Each of them was generous with their time, listening to my many ideas—whether good or not so good—and constantly challenging me to improve them. It is thanks to them that I am the scholar I am today.

In addition to my committee, I am indebted to many of my colleagues. Thank you for the helpful conversations, for reading pieces of this dissertation, and for attending my talks and offering advice. These incredible people include—but certainly are not limited to—Pam Ban, Riley Carney, Devin Caughey, Chris Chaky, Katie Einstein, Claudine Gay, Mike Hankinson, Jennifer Hochschild, Connor Huff, Sam Imlay, Dominika Kruszewska, Shiro Kuriwaki, Amy Lakeman, Chris Lucas, Gabrielle Malina, Dan Moskowitz, Mike Olson, Max Palmer, Stephen Pettigrew, Tobi Resch, Jon Rogowski, Jack Santucci, Jason Sclar, Anton Strezhnev, Kai Thaler, Chris Warshaw, Shanna Weitz, and participants at Harvard's American Politics Research Workshop, Political Economy Workshop, and Research Design Happy Hour. I am also grateful to the Malcolm Wiener Center for Inequality and Social Policy, the Institute for Quantitative Social Science, and the Center for American Political Studies at Harvard for providing generous support that aided in the development and completion of this project.

To my cohort and fellow graduate students at Harvard: thank you. It still amazes me how far we've come since our first year.[1] For better or worse, you've taught me much of

[1] That we no longer hang out in the basement of CGIS is a major accomplishment in and of itself.

what I have learned in graduate school and this experience simply would not have been the same without you. A special thanks goes out to Connor Huff, Chris Lucas, Dominika Kruszewska, Dan Moskowitz, and Pam Ban. Thank you for your support, your friendship, and for always being willing to celebrate the successes and mourn the failures that come with graduate school and writing a dissertation.

Long before I started this dissertation, my parents, Harold and Renee, and sisters, Lisa and Kristine, taught me the value of education and hard work. I took parts of this lesson perhaps too literally—I promise, no more degrees. Thank you to my family for always believing in me and for supporting me for all these years.

Finally, thank you to my landlord, my best friend, and my soon-to-be wife, Abby. The best thing about graduate school is that it brought me to you. Your eternal optimism, boundless love, and constant support have helped me make it through these past six years. I can't wait for our adventures ahead.

Introduction

> *What happens in politics depends on the way in which people are divided into factions... Every shift of the line of cleavage affects the nature of the conflict, produces a new set of of winners and losers, and a new kind of result.*
>
> – E.E. Schattschneider[2]

Politics is fundamentally about conflict: where it takes place, what outcomes are at stake, and how the dividing lines are drawn. At the state and national levels in the United States, political parties are often at the heart of this conflict, using their central position within government to shape the scope and contours of it to achieve their political goals. In practice, these efforts by parties to organize conflict have created a remarkably one-dimensional political environment in Congress and the state legislatures (Poole and Rosenthal 1997; Shor and McCarty 2011), such that parties have solidified their place as the primary factions within government and, in the process, engulfed or marginalized most other salient divides. This particular 'structure of conflict' within American government is important because it influences the nature of democratic representation, the public policies that emerge from the political process, and the potential for political accountability.

Yet, despite the significance of political parties for American politics, the popular conception of American democracy as a battle between Republicans and Democrats is, in many contexts, overstated. Indeed, of the approximately 90,000 governments across the country, the vast majority of them—nearly all at the city and county level—are either nonpartisan or governed by a single party (Svara 2003). How is political conflict structured in these

[2] *The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America* (1960, p. 60–61)

nonpartisan and one-party environments? Is conflict still divided along a single, highly divisive cleavage as in Congress and other legislatures with competitive parties or do legislative coalitions shift from issue to issue instead?

Existing research on nonpartisan and one-party legislative contexts has generally found little evidence of structure in the absence of two-party competition (Key 1949; Welch and Carlson 1973; Jenkins 1999; Wright and Schaffner 2002; Aldrich and Battista 2002), implying that parties—when challenged—possess a unique ability to organize conflict along a single ideological divide. Yet, nearly all of this work has taken place in the highly partisan state and national contexts, where variation in the presence of parties and the amount of political competition is relatively limited. And in fact, at the local level—where nonpartisan governments are common and large cities are increasingly dominated by a single party—there is good reason to believe that groups besides parties might lend order to the political system. Indeed, scholars have documented a broad range of interest and identity groups that are salient at this level, many of which likely have strong incentives to fill the political void absent parties (Molotch 1976; Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1986; Stone 1989; DeLeon 1992; Sonenshein 1993; Kaufmann 2004; Clavel 2010; Hajnal and Trounstine 2014). What remains uncertain, however, is whether these groups are able to effectively structure conflict in the same manner as parties and—if not—why.

In this dissertation, I contribute to answering these questions by examining the structure of political conflict within the local legislative context. Although scholars of urban and local politics have long noted the significant opportunity for students of political institutions at this level (Peterson 1981; Trounstine 2009, 2010), few scholars have examined legislative behavior and coalition formation within city and county councils and no study has done so with a large, cross-sectional sample. The primary reason for this omission is data availability. Indeed, for the same reason that the local level provides opportunity, it also presents challenges, with municipal legislative records diffusely spread across cities and counties and often stored in difficult to use formats. To overcome this hurdle, I introduce a new set of legislative records from the local level, including over 500,000 unique policy proposals from

a total of 170 city and county councils across the country.[3] Over the course of three papers, I use this data to investigate patterns of legislative behavior within the municipal context, contributing to our understanding of political parties, party competition, and the divides that emerge in their absence along the way.

0.1 When do Political Parties Organize Legislative Behavior?

In the first paper, I consider when, and under what conditions, political parties organize legislative behavior. By examining patterns of roll call voting across local governments, I show that political parties are neither necessary nor sufficient to support the type of stable legislative coalitions that scholars have argued both exemplify party government and enable political accountability from voters. Rather, when the institutional capacity of parties to facilitate democratic accountability is weak, or when that same capacity is developed absent formal parties, legislative behavior comes to be organized in ways counter to existing expectations.

I support my argument using two complementary analyses: first, using the full cross-section of local governments, I construct and examine measures of the dimensionality of legislative voting, showing that there is no difference, on average, in how well a one-dimensional spatial model fits across partisan and nonpartisan governments. This pattern arises as a function of the competitive context in many of the partisan governments in my sample: that is, in the absence of competition, legislative behavior has factionalized, now mirroring the unstructured pattern found in the typical nonpartisan government. This example illustrates that parties, by themselves, are insufficient to fully structure conflict, such that, under the right conditions, partisan legislative behavior looks remarkably nonpartisan.

Second, I examine a long time-series of voting records from the San Francisco Board of Supervisors to explore whether cohesive legislative coalitions are possible in the absence of partisan elections. By all accounts, existing theory would predict that San Francisco, as

[3]The specific contents of this data vary from city to city and so I focus on different subsets of this data for the analyses that follow.

a nonpartisan council completely dominated by ideological Democrats, would see minimal levels of conflict and look more akin to chaotic factions than organized partisan politics. Yet, I show that contrary to this expectation the legislative environment in San Francisco is highly organized, with two distinct progressive and moderate coalitions. This sustained, competitive equilibrium is the result of each respective coalition developing a meaningful brand for voters, thereby enhancing their capacity to provide value to coalition members and constrain their behavior down the line. This case—while rare compared to other nonpartisan governments—illustrates that responsible, party-like coalitions are possible even in the absence of partisan elections.

0.2 How is Legislative Conflict Structured Under One-Party Rule?

In the second paper, I use the case of the New York City Council to explore the consequences of democratic one-party rule for legislative behavior and public policy. New York City represents a perfect test case for understanding the consequences of one-party rule because—in addition to being dominated by the Democratic Party—it has a long history of other salient divides, such as race, borough, class, and ideology. To understand how these divides get reflected within the legislative process, if at all, I scale the roll call votes and sponsorship decisions for five of the council's recent terms. In doing so, I show that politics in New York is both ideological and multidimensional, and I provide evidence of factions within the Democratic Party. These factions are not stable over time, however, as the race-based cleavage that split the council into the early 2000s has evolved into a more ideological progressive-moderate divide.

It is important to note, however, that the manner in which these divides get reflected within government is not identical to a competitive partisan system. Indeed, party remains an important party of New York City politics and explains much of the variance in votes. Rather, the intraparty cleavages that I document emerge primarily in the context of the

legislative agenda, with members of each faction sponsoring legislation together at higher rates. These patterns are not meaningless, however: over the two most recent terms, when the progressive-moderate divide emerged, the majority faction has used its power to keep minority faction bills off the floor, meaning that these intraparty differences have had real consequences for the scope and content of public policy in New York City. Ultimately, the findings in this paper inform our understanding of areas under 'one-party rule' and suggest that conflict in these contexts may often be reflected in which bills reach the floor.

0.3 When and How do Political Parties Manipulate the Agenda?

Finally, in the third paper, I expand my focus to examine how political parties influence the issue content of the legislative agenda. Whereas much of the existing research on agenda power has used measures of partisan roll rates—that is, the share of bills on which a majority of the majority party is in the minority—to isolate the majority party advantage in the agenda process, we know far less about the tangible policy consequences of agenda power, particularly across partisan and nonpartisan governments. In turn, in this paper, I code the policy content of over 375,000 proposed bills across 110 municipal governments and use the results of this coding to evaluate why some bills reach the floor and others do not.

Consistent with existing theories of negative agenda power, I find that bills in some of the most contentious local policy areas are less likely to receive a vote in partisan rather than nonpartisan systems. However, I also find evidence suggesting that parties use their positive agenda power as well, with bills that facilitate position-taking and the provision of particularistic benefits receiving a vote at higher rates. In both cases, however, the absolute magnitudes of these differences are relatively small, typically between 2 to 6 percentage points, suggesting that party agenda power is limited, that parties use it sparingly to account for the potential costs of overzealous agenda manipulation, or that agenda control is not especially unique to partisan coalitions at all.

0.4 Contributions

This dissertation uses new data from a relatively underexplored context to examine fundamental questions about political parties and party competition within American politics. In doing so, it yields three primary contributions. First, papers one and two provide strong evidence in support of Key's (1949) longstanding hypothesis about competition and party cohesion in American legislatures. This finding is particularly important given recent trends toward one-party dominance in American politics. At the state level, for example, there are now 22 states—as of the 2016 election—where one party holds a veto-proof majority in the state legislature. If legislative behavior factionalizes in response to a shrinking out-party in these contexts, as it has in both the Solid South and the municipal contexts examined in this dissertation, then representation and political accountability may suffer. Indeed, if representative voting behavior increasingly deviates from the party brand, voters might not be getting what they bargained for while also facing higher barriers to holding their representatives accountable.

Second, the results in this dissertation challenge our understanding of what a party is and what behaviors are unique to parties. Specifically, papers one and three provide evidence that elite behavior in partisan and nonpartisan systems is not always as different as theory would predict, with specific examples of (1) party-like behavior occurring in nonpartisan councils and (2) many partisan councils mirroring our typical conception of nonpartisan politics. Of course, these examples hardly mean that political parties are unimportant. They do, however, suggest both that further theoretical development is necessary to understand what makes parties unique and that leveraging nonpartisan comparison cases, as Krehbiel (1993) has long argued, is vital to this development moving forward.

Third, while the primary focus of this dissertation is political parties, the context is wholly municipal, and this dissertation makes contributions to our understanding of urban and local politics as well. Notably, papers one and two show that local legislative behavior can sometimes reflect ideological as opposed to group-based divides. This evidence is con-

sistent with recent work suggesting that local policy outcomes are more directly connected to ideology and partisanship (Tausanovitch and Warshaw 2014; Einstein and Kogan 2015; de Benedictis-Kessner and Warshaw 2016). Importantly, however, the ideologies that I uncover in this dissertation do not necessarily mirror the liberal/conservative divide evident at higher levels of government. Indeed, in both San Francisco and New York City I find evidence of progressive and moderate coalitions within government. Given the increasing salience of progressivism across the country, this raises a number of questions, such as how generalizable this pattern of local progressivism is, what its consequences are for local policy and representation, and whether other ideologies might underlie elite political behavior in other contexts.

1 | There's More Than One Way to Party: Legislative Coalitions in Partisan and Nonpartisan Governments

1.1 Introduction

In 1942, E.E. Schattschneider famously argued that the "political parties created democracy and modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of the parties" (Schattschneider 1942, 1). In 1950, the American Political Science Association, in its well-known report on the two-party system, echoed his point, arguing that a nation of 150 million needs parties to be responsible (APSA 1950). Over 70 years later, political parties remain a central and significant feature of American politics, yet democracy today is hardly unthinkable in their absence. Indeed, of the over 90,000 legislatures across the United States, the vast majority of them—nearly all at the municipal level—are elected via nonpartisan ballots (Svara 2003). Existing evidence suggests that this feature of the electoral system has consequences for politics, such that when elections are nonpartisan legislative behavior becomes disorganized and unpredictable (Welch and Carlson 1973; Jenkins 1999; Wright and Schaffner 2002), making it more difficult to hold legislators accountable and thereby diminishing the quality of representation (Davidson and Fraga 1988; Schaffner, Streb, and Wright 2001; Schaffner and Streb 2002; Wright 2008). Yet, while partisan elections have long been thought to be central to this process, the sparse number of nonpartisan legislatures at the state and national level in the United States has limited the number of opportunities to study legislative behavior absent formal parties, and so it remains unclear whether having parties institutionalized within the electoral system is either a necessary or sufficient condition for the formation and

stability of responsible legislative coalitions.

In this paper, I reconsider the role of political parties within government by evaluating the scope conditions under which parties and other groups organize conflict within legislatures. Specifically, I argue that partisan elections are neither necessary nor sufficient to support the type of stable legislative coalitions—characterized by highly predictable, low-dimensional patterns of voting—that scholars have argued enable political accountability from voters. Rather, when the institutional capacity of parties to constrain member behavior and facilitate democratic accountability is weak, or when that same capacity is present absent of formal parties, legislative coalitions come to be organized in ways counter to existing expectations. In particular, I focus specifically on the presence of credible competition and the development of meaningful coalition-based brands, using two complementary analyses to highlight how these factors can either erode or enhance the institutional capacity of parties and other groups to organize cohesive voting coalitions regardless of the type of electoral system.

Whereas the vast majority of research analyzing the legislative consequences of parties has taken place in the state and national legislatures, in this paper, I turn to the local level instead. To do so, I gather legislative records from 132 city and county councils across the country, including over 500,000 proposed bills and 300,000 recorded roll call votes in total. Unlike data from the state and national legislatures, data on legislative behavior at the local level has never before been systematically collected for such a large cross-section of local governments.[1] While local councils are, of course, different from state and national legislatures along a number of dimensions, extending analyses of political parties to city and county councils presents a significant opportunity for scholars, most notably the ability to leverage the rich social, political, and institutional variation present at this level and thereby hone theories about parties that have been tested almost exclusively in the more hyperpartisan state and national contexts.

[1]Prior work on local legislative politics, which is relatively rare, has typically analyzed data from a handful of cities or for one city over a long time period. For examples, see: Simpson (2001), Austin (2002), Burnett and Kogan (2014), Santucci (2017), and Burnett (2017).

Drawing on this collection of legislative records, I present two complementary analyses designed to evaluate the role of partisan elections in facilitating strong, cohesive legislative voting coalitions. First, using the full cross-section of local governments, I construct and examine measures of the dimensionality of legislative voting. If the use of partisan elections is sufficient to institutionalize strong party-based coalitions, there should be clear differences in how well a one-dimensional spatial model fits across partisan and nonpartisan legislatures. Yet, on average in my data, voting is only marginally more one-dimensional in partisan than nonpartisan legislatures. This pattern is not a function of most nonpartisan governments having stable coalitions akin to what we typically see with parties; rather, many of the governments using partisan election systems at this level simply lack credible out-party competition, the result of which is that voting in these chambers has become disconnected from party. Importantly, this relationship between the amount of partisan competition and disorganized voting is not present within nonpartisan councils, even though recent work has found evidence that these bodies are increasingly populated by partisans and yielding partisan outcomes (Tausanovitch and Warshaw 2014; Einstein and Kogan 2015; Einstein and Glick 2016; de Benedictis-Kessner and Warshaw 2016). This difference between partisan and nonpartisan governments suggests that inadequate competition does not influence legislative behavior by changing the distribution of preferences, but rather weakens the institutional capacity of parties to influence the behavior of their members. This implies that, even when the party brand is strong, if the institutional capacity of parties is weak, legislative conflict will begin to unravel. Thus, party organizations by themselves are not always sufficient to support stable legislative coalitions.

Second, I use a long time-series of legislative records from the San Francisco Board of Supervisors to explore the necessity of partisan elections for cohesive legislative coalitions. By all accounts, existing theory would predict that San Francisco, as a nonpartisan council completely dominated by ideological Democrats, would see minimal levels of conflict and look more akin to chaotic factions than organized partisan politics. Yet, recent work suggests that groups within the city may possess the institutional capacity to support party-like coalitions

(DeLeon 1992; Boudreau, Elmendorf, and MacKenzie 2015). And indeed, I show that—as a result of strong, nonpartisan organizing institutions—San Francisco is a wholly one-dimensional political environment, with legislative conflict organized around a progressive and moderate divide. This sustained, competitive equilibrium is the result of each respective coalition being able to develop a meaningful brand for voters and thereby, in the process, create the opportunity for electoral and legislative accountability. Thus, even in the absence of partisan elections, competitive coalitions that develop the institutional capacity to foster democratic accountability can produce party-like patterns of legislative behavior.

These findings contribute to our understanding of political parties and legislative conflict by identifying the scope conditions under which parties—and their alternatives—facilitate stable legislative coalitions. This is of immense importance not only for theories of parties as institutions, but also practically for the many legislative environments across the United States that do not mirror the competitive, partisan context of Congress. Indeed, the increasing trend towards one-party dominance in state and local legislatures, combined with the significant number of cities and counties across the country using nonpartisan election systems, implies that the context within which legislative bargaining is likely to occur in the future will be increasingly factional, presenting significant hurdles for representation and accountability (Davidson and Fraga 1988; Schaffner, Streb, and Wright 2001; Wright 2008). This paper, however, shows that 'responsible' coalitions are still possible in these contexts, but that there are significant institutional and organizing challenges to overcome along the way.

1.2 Parties, Partisan Elections, and Legislative Conflict

What is a political party? To understand the scope conditions under which political parties enable strong coalitions and, in the process, organize legislative behavior, it is worth starting with this fundamental question. In broad terms, political parties are simply coalitions of politicians and organized interests seeking to win office (Aldrich 1995; Bawn et al.

2012; Downs 1957). While there is some disagreement about the relative role of politicians and interest groups in creating and controlling parties, by most accounts, the end goal remains the same: to use the party to secure office—for yourself or for those favorable to your group—and, in turn, the power to implement policy. The primary challenge for parties, however, is that in order to accomplish this goal they must remain cohesive. Indeed, there is an ever-present collective action problem for parties, such that members will try deviate from the party line when it suits their individual interests even though it imposes costs on other members by making it more difficult to pass majority-favored policy and weakening the party brand (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005). To prevent this challenge from unraveling the coalition, parties institutionalize themselves within the political system, creating and leveraging tools to hold members accountable and thereby protect their power and longevity.

While scholars have documented an array of specific mechanisms through which parties seek to solve this collective action problem, partisan elections hold a particularly central place in the process. Yet, partisan elections do not themselves make a party. Parties can, in theory at least, exist and organize legislative behavior without them (Aldrich 1995; Bawn 1999). Empirically, however, this has rarely been the case, such that in the few available contexts at the state and national levels that scholars have studied, nonpartisan elections yield unpredictable and chaotic patterns of legislative behavior (Welch and Carlson 1973; Jenkins 1999; Wright and Schaffner 2002).[2] Moreover, these patterns align with those found in the handful of studies exploring voting patterns within nonpartisan city councils (Simpson 2001; Burnett 2017) and longitudinal evidence from Congress, in which the two periods where a one-dimensional spatial model does not predict voting at a high rate are precisely the two periods where the party system was largely absent (Poole and Rosenthal 1997).

[2]For a notable exception, see Masket (2016) on the Minnesota State Legislature. It is important to note, however, that while Masket (2016) shows that party was an important factor in Minnesota, given the limited amount of complete roll call data during this time period, it remains unclear whether this cleavage was the primary divide in the chamber or, instead, simply one of many, such as in San Diego (Burnett 2017) and New York City (discussed in Chapter 2).

1.2.1 How Partisan Elections Empower Parties

There are two ways in which partisan elections help parties minimize factional divisions and create stable voting coalitions. First, partisan elections provide for party labels on the ballot. These labels, when meaningful, differentiate the candidates and convey information to voters, which supports the process of democratic accountability (Aldrich 1995; Schaffner and Streb 2002; Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita 2008). As a result, when party labels are absent, voters rely more on incumbency and other heuristics, if they even vote at all (Schaffner, Streb, and Wright 2001; Kirkland and Coppock 2017), which makes it easier for legislators to defect from the party because their fates are ultimately less tied to its electoral brand.

Second, by incorporating primaries and other nominating procedures into the electoral process, partisan elections provide a mechanism through which parties can weed out candidates that are poorly aligned with their platform and goals (Snyder and Ting 2002; Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita 2008; Bawn et al. 2012). This screening process is valuable for parties in that it allows them to limit the heterogeneity of preferences in their member base and thereby decrease the odds of internal dissension down the line. Of course, this screening process is not always perfect; however, on average, parties do appear to see their favored candidate advance to the general election stage at higher rates (Cohen et al. 2008; Hassell 2015). Assuming parties support the 'correct' candidates, then, this screening mechanism should yield more cohesive party coalitions.

Fundamentally, however, these two mechanisms are only a means to an end: ballot labels provide information, differentiate the parties from each other, and enable accountability; screening processes reduce the need for post-election institutional mechanisms to hold members accountable. Yet, in both cases, these ends can either be met without partisan elections or hindered despite them. Indeed, in the same way that parties are only one institutional pathway to representation (Caughey 2018), the most common institutional structures that parties employ to remain cohesive are not the only possible structures to achieve this goal.

Rather, any group that seeks to solidify its coalition needs to find a way to ensure that both ends—information provision to support accountability and institutional capacity to limit preference heterogeneity—are met, and there are likely many different ways to do so.

Consider, for example, the need for information to differentiate each coalition and support democratic accountability by voters: while ballot labels may be the easiest way to meet this criteria, there is good evidence that interest groups can successfully convey information and mobilize voters to help hold politicians accountable, even in nonpartisan governments (Schlozman and Tierney 1986; Moe 2005; Anzia 2011). This process can be further supported by a strong local media apparatus (Snyder and Stromberg 2010; Hayes and Lawless 2015, 2018) and a determined attempt by a party or coalition within a nonpartisan environment to establish a clear, meaningful brand. And in fact, local politics is rife with potential examples of groups that have tried to do this, whether explicitly as slates jointly pursuing elected office (Adrian 1959; Lee 1960; Davidson and Fraga 1988) or implicitly as 'regimes' seeking the capacity to govern (Stone 1989), yet we possess remarkably little evidence about whether these organizational structures can ultimately solve the information problem and facilitate the same type of long-term cooperation on voting as we see from parties.

Similarly, though partisan elections provide clear screening mechanisms to limit party heterogeneity, there is no guarantee these will be successful, particularly if the informativeness of the party brand is minimal (Snyder and Ting 2002). Instead, parties may need to rely on other mechanisms to hold their members accountable, which suggests that—even with party labels—factors that bolster the institutional capacity of parties to reward or punish their members will yield more homogenous voting patterns, while factors that increase the need to use these levers will result in less structured voting. Existing evidence suggests that certain institutional features, such as mechanisms for limiting what reaches the floor (Anzia and Jackman 2013; Jackman 2014), can indeed enhance the power of parties to keep members in line.[3]

[3]In fact, recent evidence from the Nebraska nonpartisan legislature, for example, suggests that this may be true in nonpartisan legislatures as well, as the higher turnover in membership that resulted from the adoption of term limits in Nebraska increased the value of party support in elections, thereby allowing the

In this paper, I focus on one particular feature of the political environment that might weaken the institutional capacity of parties to hold their members accountable: the presence or absence of credible out-party competition. Indeed, competition has a long history within the literature on parties, with early scholars like Key (1949) arguing that competition between parties for office and within government creates the incentive for parties to act cohesively. Key's hypothesis was subsequently supported by a variety of early scholars examining the transition to two-party democracy, particularly in the state legislatures of the South (Havens 1957; Patterson 1962; Broach 1972; Harmel and Hamm 1986); however, the evidence is not necessarily unanimous, with some research showing that party competition does not always produce a highly structured political environment (Jewell 1964; LeBlanc 1969),. In fact, even Key himself noted this in his original description of politics in the South (Key 1949). More recently, scholars have again taken up the question of competition, but most analyses have operationalized conflict in terms of polarization between the parties rather than either cohesion within the parties or the dimensionality of the voting space (Aldrich and Battista 2002; Jenkins 2006; Carroll and Eichorst 2013; Hinchliffe and Lee 2016; Lee 2016).[4]

How does competition affect the institutional capacity of parties to hold members accountable and reduce intraparty heterogeneity? First, the presence of credible out-party competition makes cooperation more important for political outcomes, providing an incentive for the dominant party to institutionalize their organization within the legislature and develop the tools necessary to keep their members in line (Harmel and Hamm 1986). These tools are necessary to prevent intraparty conflict, which might weaken the party brand or

parties to play a stronger role in screening candidates and to demand greater accountability once members were elected to office (Masket and Shor 2015).

[4]For a notable exception, see: Carroll and Eichorst (2013). This distinction between polarization and dimensionality is important for this particular analysis because—though polarization is certainly important—evaluating competition in this manner fails to capture potential changes in intraparty legislative organization. Indeed, as many of the earliest studies of the South noted, one or no-party democracy was largely chaotic, with coalitions shifting from issue to issue. Changes in the ideological distance between the parties along the partisan dimension of conflict would not necessarily capture this legislative factionalization because factionalization implies the presence of other dimensions of conflict in addition to party.

inhibit the passage of policies favored by the bulk of the party (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005). Second, changes in the level of competition alter the incentive structure for individual members of a legislature, decreasing the power of the carrots and sticks that parties may wield. As Patterson (1962) explains, without "party as a reference group, the legislator is likely, consciously or unconsciously, to respond to different pressures in different voting areas" (p. 200). With credible competition, however, these alternate constituencies become less significant because party becomes the primary differentiating factor for a member's electoral prospects. Thus, in many respects, institutional capacity is relative, and so factors like imbalanced competition, which can increase both the heterogeneity of the caucus and the value of incumbency, will diminish the capacity of parties even absent any formal institutional changes.

1.3 Data and Measurement

In the previous section, I argue that coalitions need the institutional capacity to limit heterogeneity and foster democratic accountability to remain cohesive within government. To evaluate these conditions, I ideally need data from a large cross-section of partisan and nonpartisan governments, situated in a diverse array of social and institutional contexts. Variation in the type of electoral system is particularly important for the analysis because without a nonpartisan baseline it is impossible to know whether legislative outcomes are a function of parties as institutions or simply differences in preferences across partisan legislators (Krehbiel 2007, 1993). While previous work has leveraged controlled case studies between partisan and nonpartisan governments at the state and national level to accomplish this, I turn to the local level of government instead. The value of this difference in venue is that it dramatically increases the number of nonpartisan governments available for study, allowing me to move beyond a simple binary comparison.

The primary challenge to studying legislative behavior at the local level is that the costs to gathering information about proposed bills, the legislative process, and roll call votes have

long been considerable, with such information diffusely spread across local governments and often recorded in difficult to use formats. However, as more local governments have shifted public records online, the process of collecting this information has become less burdensome. In turn, in this paper, I draw on a new collection of legislative records from 132 city and county councils.[5] The vast majority of this data was extracted directly from official council websites that city and county clerks use to publicly manage legislative records. In turn, for each government in my collection, I can identify every bill that has been proposed in the council since that government's online system was activated, along with a variety of information about that bill, such as who the sponsor was, how the bill fared in committee, what the final outcome was, and—if it received a vote—how each member voted. While the specific details that are included for each bill can vary somewhat across governments, with smaller governments being less likely to provide intervening legislative information, the records are generally similar because nearly all of the municipalities in my sample use the same record management platform known as 'Legistar'.[6]

Figure 1.1 depicts the full geographic distribution of the cities and counties in the sample, categorized by the type of government. As the map shows, the sample covers a broad cross-section of U.S. municipal governments, containing at least one local government from 31

[5]Specifically, the collection includes 104 municipalities, 22 counties, and 6 consolidated city-counties. The full collection of councils used in this paper a subset of a larger collection of 170 councils. However, I omit all councils with less than 20 contested votes during the sample period. In most cases this is a function of the city only recently having adopted the Legistar platform. In turn, I omit these sparse councils to ensure that I am not finding a highly structured space purely as a result of a limited number of votes. In Appendix B.2 I show that there is no reason to believe this decision biases the findings, with little observable difference between the included and omitted councils and no difference in the findings if I raise or lower the contested vote threshold.

[6]For an example, see: `http://legistar.council.nyc.gov/Legislation.aspx`. The benefit to extracting the data from a legislative management system of this kind is that no complicated text processing is required to isolate the roll call votes, and thus the error rate from the method of collection is effectively zero. However, in some cases, minutes are not recorded for certain meetings—a pattern that does not appear to be a function of the nature of the meeting itself—and in other rare cases, the data is miscoded as it is entered into the system—for example, it might have the wrong committee or be categorized under the wrong bill type—and so errors of this kind may remain. The cities for which votes were not collected through Legistar include: Philadelphia, PA; Washington, DC.; Los Angeles, CA. Although the Philadelphia City Council uses Legistar to manage documents, their system does not record votes, so the data from Philadelphia was extracted via text processing of meeting transcripts. The data for Washington, DC was downloaded in bulk from `https://openstates.org/downloads/`. Los Angeles uses its own platform for posting votes, so the data was gathered directly from each bill page in the same manner as for the Legistar cities and counties.

states and the District of Columbia. On average, the number of local governments included from each state is correlated with a state's population, however, there are exceptions and the sample is not perfectly representative of local governments at-large. For a full comparison of the cities and counties in the sample to the population, see Appendix B.1. In general, however, the local governments included in the sample are larger in size, more diverse, more highly educated, have higher levels of inequality, and have a wider range of functional responsibilities than cities and counties overall. In many ways, these differences make perfect sense: the types of local governments that will opt into a records management platform are precisely those that have more business to manage. Still, despite this imbalance between the sample and population, there is generally less imbalance between the partisan and nonpartisan cities and counties included in the sample, and I try to account for it where possible through covariate adjustment and matching. As a result, though not representative of local governments at-large, the analysis in this paper still represents a broad and informative test of the political consequences of partisan elections.

1.3.1 Measuring the Stability of Legislative Coalitions

In order to examine the relative organization of legislative behavior across local governments, I estimate the dimensionality of voting for each city and county council. Measures of dimensionality are perfectly suited to exploring questions of legislative organization because they capture the stability of legislative coalitions. More specifically, if all conflict is functionally between between two parties or organized around a single ideology, then a legislature will tend to be one-dimensional; if, however, coalitions and preferences are less stable, shifting from issue to issue, multiple dimensions will be required to explain patterns of voting at a similar rate.

To estimate dimensionality, schoalrs typically fit a vote scaling model and then evaluate how well it fits the data using different measures and heuristics. Each of these methods, however, relies heavily on subjective researcher judgment (Aldrich, Montgomery, and Sparks 2014). For example, scholars commonly use fit statistics from the spatial model to compare



Figure 1.1: Map of All Cities and Counties Included in Sample

the relative explanatory power across dimensions, with the idea being that if an additional dimension significantly increases the fit of the model, then that dimension is an important component of legislative conflict. The primary challenge to using this comparative fit method, however, is that there is no fixed cutoff to separate an n-dimensional legislature from an n+1 dimensional legislature, which leaves much of the determination up to the researcher.

In addition, there is also a challenge that arises from the choice of a baseline dimension. For example, if the difference in fit between a one and two dimensional model is small, analysts typically assume unidimensionality regardless of how well the one-dimensional model fits by itself. While this assumption is often sufficient for certain types of questions, it ignores significant variation in how strongly a particular dimension explains patterns of voting. Indeed, both over time in Congress and across the state legislatures, there is broad variation in how well a one-dimensional spatial model explains voting.[7] This relative dimensionality is important because it suggests that some legislatures and some time periods have more noise in their voting than others, which has direct implications for the power of organizations like parties to constrain voting and the ability of citizens to ultimately hold their representative or party accountable. Indeed, while the precise number of dimensions is certainly important, our expectations for voting—and subsequently policy—in two one-dimensional legislatures should be very different if there are large gaps in the explanatory power of that single dimension. In turn, this paper focuses on the relative fit of a one-dimensional model across cities and counties rather than the exact number of dimensions.[8]

To construct such a measure, I first fit a one-dimensional spatial mode for each council

[7] For example, Shor and McCarty (2011) find large differences across states in how well a one-dimensional spatial model fits, with the model reducing classification errors by 80 percent in some states and only 20 percent in others. While they also find that the spatial model correctly classifies about 77 to 93 percent of all votes across states, the low error reduction rate suggests that this stems mostly from lopsided votes. In other words, for a number of states, the spatial model performs poorly at classifying the votes of those in the minority.

[8] Alternatively, one could also estimate the number of dimensions required to explain a specific percentage of the observed vote choices. The downside of this method for an application to local politics, however, is that number of dimensions is capped at the number of council members, which limits the range of variation for small councils.

separately using all of the records in my data from January 2012 through April 2017.[9] To conduct the scaling, I use the nonparametric Optimal Classification (OC) method developed by Poole (2000). The primary difference between OC and the more commonly used parametric scaling methods, such as DW-Nominate and Ideal (Poole and Rosenthal 1985; Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers 2004), is that OC minimizes the number of vote classification errors while the parametric methods maximize the probability of the observed vote choices. As Rosenthal and Voeten (2004) explain, OC is particularly useful in legislative settings where the underlying assumptions of parametric models are not met, such that errors in voting are not independent and identically distributed.[10]

To evaluate the fit of the spatial model, I follow the prevailing norm in the literature and use the 'Aggregate Proportion Reduction in Error' (APRE) statistic. This statistic measures how effective an n-dimensional spatial model is at classifying vote choices compared to a null model where all legislators vote in the majority.[11] Thus, the APRE statistic accounts for the fact that some votes—such as those where many legislators are in the majority—are easy to predict by benchmarking the spatial model against an assumption of unanimity.[12] In turn, if the APRE from a one-dimensional model—which is measured on a zero to one

[9] As Figure A.1 in Appendix A shows, this period aligns with the time period when most of the cities and counties currently using the platform adopted it. While some governments have been using Legistar to manage their online records for over a decade, foucsing on the more recent time period provides for more timely comparisons and ensures that early adopters are not overweighted in the analysis.

[10] Specifically: "...for optimal classification all errors are weighted equally. No single vote decision is likely to make a large difference in an estimate. In contrast, the parametric methods will adjust estimates based on the most serious errors" (Rosenthal and Voeten 2004, p. 622). This, in turn, creates problems when voting is strategic or when party or faction-based pressures vary over time, both of which are assumptions that are difficult to validate in this context.

[11] For all votes in a council we can calculate the APRE as:

$$\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{q}(\text{Minority Votes} - \text{Classification Errors})_i}{\sum_{i=1}^{q}\text{Minority Votes}_i}$$

where Minority Votes_i is the number of legislators voting in the minority for vote i and $\text{Classification Errors}_i$ is the number of misclassified votes from the optimal classifiaction model for vote i (Armstrong II et al. 2014).

[12] Importantly, since the APRE is calculated as the share of the vote classification errors that are reduced compared to the null model, it is relatively insensitive to the number of council members in each city; however, there is a weak relationship between the number of council members and APRE, so I conduct all of my analyses by groups based on council size. The results are identical if I omit these group fixed effects or instead use exact council size fixed effects.

scale—is high for a particular city, the spatial model is effective at reducing the number of vote classification errors that would result if one simply assumed all legislators voted unanimously. In contrast, when low, the APRE signals that the spatial model does not fully explain the variance in votes. Thus, for my one-dimensional application, high APRE statistics indicate a more stable, one-dimensional voting space, while lower APREs suggest a more plural or factional legislative environment.

In addition, to ensure that the results presented in this paper are not driven by the choice of fit statistic, I include results for two alternative statistics in Appendix C: the share of the variance explained by the model's first dimension and the percent of the nay votes correctly classified by the model.[13] Higher values of these two statistics indicate a more one-dimensional voting space, and results from both of these alternative specifications align strongly with those presented in the main text.

Finally, while these measures are all invaluable tools for scholars seeking to assess the dimensionality of legislative voting, they are not without drawbacks, particularly if used to compare across legislative contexts. Indeed, for all of the measures presented, there is a modest relationship between the fit of the model and both the size of the council and the number of votes scaled.[14] As a result, whenever possible, I account for these factors by analyzing the patterns within groups of councils that are of a similar size and by controlling for a logged measure of the number of votes scaled. All results are robust to alternative groupings, exact council size fixed effects, alternative transformations of the vote variable, or omitting these measures entirely.

[13]Given that the vast majority of votes in my data are in favor of bill passage, I use the percent of nay votes correctly classified to evaluate fit rather than the percent of all votes. Indeed, for most of the models, the total correct classification percentage is quite high, and so focusing on nay votes only presents a stricter test of fit.

[14]See Appendix A for depictions of these relationships.

1.4 Partisan Elections and Patterns of Legislative Voting

Is the presence of partisan elections sufficient to enable parties to solidify their coalitions? If so, as a byproduct, we should expect that voting in cities and counties using partisan elections should be more one-dimensional, on average, than their nonpartisan counterparts. Figure 1.2 shows the distribution of the APRE statistic, for which higher values indicate a more one-dimensional voting space, for both partisan and nonpartisan councils. While there is some evidence that a small group of partisan governments exhibit highly structured, one-dimensional patterns of voting, there is little difference, in general, between partisan and nonpartisan governments. If anything, it appears that for the bulk of the governments in the sample, the spatial model actually fits better in nonpartisan legislatures. Yet, this comparison is relatively naive, as there a number of government-level factors besides parties that might influence these patterns.



Figure 1.2: Distribution of APRE (1D) for Partisan and Nonpartisan Councils

Table 1.1 presents results from a series of linear regressions estimating the relationship between partisan elections and the unidimensionality of voting in each council, accounting for a variety of political, economic, and social factors that the literature suggests might shape local conflict. First, I include a set of demographic measures to capture the size and diversity of a local area, including a logged measure of the local population, the percent of local residents with a 4-year college degree, and the share of the population that is a racial minority. Second, given the broad variation in functional responsibilities across cities and counties, I include a measure of the scope of government authority (Oliver 2012). To construct this measure, I follow the norm in the literature and use spending data from the 2012 Census of Governments to identify the share of 25 different spending categories for which each local government has positive spending (Hajnal and Trounstine 2014; Anzia 2015).[15] In addition, I also include a logged measure of direct general expenditures to capture the size of government beyond the number of functional responsibilities. Finally, in some models, I either include fixed effects for state to account for institutional variation in the sources of conflict or I weight the observations by the number of votes included in the model to account for variance in the precision of the fit estimates.[16]

As Table 1.1 shows, while the presence of partisan elections does correlate positively with more one-dimensional voting, on average, this relationship is relatively imprecisely estimated and substantively small in magnitude, with the rate of vote classification errors being only about 4 percent lower in partisan governments. This relationship is stable across specifications and—despite the positive coefficient—implies that partisan elections may not

[15]Specifically, the spending categories include: air transportation, corrections, K–12 education, higher education, fire protection, police protection, health, hospitals, highways, housing/community development, libraries, natural resources, parking, parks and recreation, protective inspections and regulations, public welfare, sewers, solid waste management, water transport and terminals, natural resources, liquor stores, water utilities, electric utilities, gas utilities, and transportation utilities. While this measure is likely not perfect because governments have a range of powers beyond simply allocating funding, it is far more comprehensive than other available measures and it correlates with a more power-specific measure Anzia (2015) creates as validation.

[16]More specifically, given that each council votes on a different number of bills, it is possible that the measure of fit—which is itself an estimate—is more precise for the cities an counties for which I have more contested votes. Weighting, in turn, accounts for this by increasing the relative weight of these cities and counties in estimating the coefficients.

always be as instrumental at minimizing factions and facilitating stable coalitions as evidence from the state and national contexts has suggested.

Table 1.1: Relationship Between Partisan Elections and Legislative Unidimensionality

	Aggregate Proportion Reduction in Error (1D)			
		OLS		WLS
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Partisan Elec.	0.04^{+}	0.04	0.03	0.04
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)
% Non-White		0.04	0.03	0.06
		(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.05)
Government Scope		−0.06	0.15	−0.08
		(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.08)
log(Total Population)		0.02	−0.01	0.02
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
% 4-Year College		0.04	−0.001	0.07
		(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)
log(Direct Expenditures)		−0.002	−0.001	−0.004
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
log(Total Votes Scaled)	-0.03^{**}	-0.03^{**}	−0.02	-0.02^{*}
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	0.95^{**}	0.78^{**}	0.85^{**}	0.75^{**}
	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.10)
Council Size FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	No	No	Yes	No
N	132	132	132	132
R^2	0.37	0.40	0.57	0.43

$^{+}$p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01

1.4.1 Competition and the Institutional Capacity of Parties

Why does voting within partisan governments at the local level appear to be no more organized than in their nonpartisan counterparts? Motivated by longstanding predictions about the significance of political competition for legislative coalitions, this section evaluates whether the political context within which each city and county is situated may be moderating the institutional capacity of parties. To do so, I evaluate the relationship between party competition and legislative voting in both partisan and nonpartisan governments. Given recent scholarship showing local politics is increasingly partisan in nature, with preferences

and outcomes strongly related to local partisan context (Tausanovitch and Warshaw 2014; Einstein and Kogan 2015; Einstein and Glick 2016; de Benedictis-Kessner and Warshaw 2016), the primary difference across groups in this comparison is the formal, institutionalization of party organizations. Thus, if there is a relationship between competition and voting in the partisan but not the nonpartisan context, it is likely a function of how competition affects the capacity of parties to leverage these institutions rather than how it affects the preferences of the chamber's members.

Throughout this section, I follow Hinchliffe and Lee (2016) and operationalize party competition as 'partisan imbalance.' To construct this measure, I take the absolute value of the 2008 democratic presidential vote margin for each local government.[17] Thus, a value of 0 indicates local presidential results that were nearly perfectly balanced between Barack Obama and John McCain in 2008, while a value of 1 indicates near perfect one-party voting.[18]

Given the observational nature of the analysis, I first present the simple bivariate relationship between my measures of competition and legislative dimensionality in Figure 1.3, with partisan governments in the right panel and nonpartisan government in the left panel. Since parties are more likely to be active in cities and counties that use partisan elections, we should expect to see the predicted relationship in which parties reduce the dimensionality of conflict on the right but not the left. In the bivariate case, this is precisely the pattern we observe, with essentially no relationship between partisan imbalance and voting patterns in nonpartisan councils but a strong, negative relationship in partisan councils. On the one hand, the relationship documented for partisan councils is consistent with a long literature arguing that one-party dominance will provide the opportunity for intraparty factions to emerge. On the other hand, that there is no relationship for nonpartisan councils means that this factionalization is not a function of homogeneous ideological preferences. Rather, the relationships documented in Figure 1.3 are consistent with a theory of institutional ca-

[17] City-level presidential election returns come from Einstein and Kogan (2015), while county-level returns come from Congressional Quarterly's Elections and Voting Collection.

[18] I use local presidential vote shares as opposed to member-level party identification to account for the fact that many local governments are nonpartisan and thus members may not publicly identify with a party.



Figure 1.3: Bivariate Relationship between Partisan Imbalance and APRE by Election System

pacity, whereby parties in noncompetitive contexts see their formal powers weakened and thus lose their institutional leverage over their members.

Next, to better account for factors that might be confounding the simple relationships presented in Figure 1.3, I conduct a series of multivariate regressions using the one-dimensional APRE as the dependent variable and an interaction between the measure of partisan imbalance and the indicator for partisan elections. Table 1.2 shows the results of these models. The first column shows the initial relationship between controlling only for factors that are likely to affect measurement of fit, such as council size and the total number of votes, while the subsequent three columns incorporate additional covariates and state-level fixed effects. Finally, the fifth and sixth columns test whether the relationship holds when the largest councils (10 or more members) are omitted and when the results are weighted according to the number of contested votes.

Across all models, the relationship between partisan elections and APRE is positive and substantively large. In contrast to the results presented in Table 1.1, which do not account for party competition, we see that voting patterns in local governments with bal-

anced competition and partisan elections can be predicted at a significantly higher rate, with APRE statistics that are .10 to .13 higher, on average. This represents an approximately one-standard deviation increase in APRE when parties are present. However, as the large, negative coefficient on the interaction term shows, the relationship between partisan elections and one-dimensional fit is strongly contingent on out-party competition. In fact, Figure 1.4, which plots the coefficient on partisan elections at all values of partisan imbalance, highlights that for the most one-party dominant cities and counties, the correlation between partisan elections and APRE is as great in magnitude as for relatively balanced local governments but in the opposite direction. This relationship holds when I add additional theoretically-motivated covariates into the model, incorporate exact council size or state fixed effects, run the model exclusively on small councils, or account for potential differences in variance by weighting observations according to their number of votes.[19] As with the simple bivariate depiction in Figure 1.3, this implies that the relationship between competition and voting in these councils is not a function of preferences but instead relates to the institutions that are specific to partisan councils and the relative ability of these institutions to motivate members to vote in unison.

[19]It is also robust to a range of alternative specifications, such as including election type fixed effects, quadratic or cubic measures of total votes scaled, and/or variables related to the average share of the council in the minority.

Table 1.2: Relationship Between Partisan Elections, Competition, and Legislative Unidimensionality

	APRE Statistic					
	OLS					WLS
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Partisan Elec.	0.12^{**}	0.12^{**}	0.13^{**}	0.12^{+}	0.11^{*}	0.12^{**}
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Partisan Imbalance	0.02	−0.01	−0.004	−0.03	−0.03	−0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Partisan Elec * Imbalance	-0.20^{+}	-0.24^{*}	-0.28^{*}	-0.30^{+}	-0.29^{+}	-0.24^{*}
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.11)
% Non-White		0.02	0.02	0.05	−0.01	0.05
		(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Government Scope		−0.06	−0.06	0.15	0.04	−0.08
		(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.08)
log(Total Population)		0.01	0.01	−0.02	0.01	0.01
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
% 4-Year College		0.04	0.04	0.01	−0.004	0.08
		(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)
log(Direct Expenditures)		0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
log(Total Votes Scaled)	-0.03^{**}	-0.03^{**}	-0.03^{**}	−0.02	-0.03^{**}	-0.03^{*}
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	0.94^{**}	0.71^{**}	0.68^{**}	0.78^{**}	0.76^{**}	0.67^{**}
	(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.10)
Council Group FE	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Exact Council Size FE	No	No	Yes	No	No	No
State FE	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Omit Large Councils (>= 10)	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
N	126	126	126	126	98	126
R^2	0.40	0.44	0.53	0.58	0.35	0.46

$^{+}$p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01



Figure 1.4: Variation in Coefficient on Partisan Elections by Partisan Imbalance

1.5 Stable Coalitions in the Absence of Parties: Evidence from San Francisco

Thus far I have presented evidence that partisan elections do not always yield stable and cohesive voting coalitions within legislatures, such that in a large share of local cases, voting within partisan councils is no more organized than in their nonpartisan counterparts. In this section, I consider whether nonpartisan legislatures can ever exhibit the type of highly organized, low-dimensional patterns of voting that scholars have associated exclusively with partisan government and, if so, whether the coalitions that underlie these patterns can be sustained over time. In other words, I ask whether strong, stable coalitions are possible in the absence of institutionalized parties.

To answer this question, I examine the nonpartisan San Francisco Board of Supervisors, a legislative body that is set within a city and county that both scholarly and media accounts have identified as having a unique ideological divide. Indeed, whereas most existing theories of legislative behavior would tend to predict that San Francisco should have a relatively disorganized and chaotic political system, with minimal structure to roll-call voting, academic and media accounts suggest that politics in San Francisco is organized around a broad, ideological divide, with progressives on one side and moderates on the other.

What is particularly notable about the ideological divide in San Francisco is that it exists within an area that is overwhelmingly Democratic, and yet it does not appear to simply be an extension of the liberal end of the liberal-conservative spectrum that is commonly found at the state and national levels. As DeLeon (1992) explains, the progressive ideology in San Francisco is comprised of three different components: liberalism, environmentalism, and populism. In practice, this means that "progressives push for more affordable housing, tighter restrictions on tech companies and higher taxes for corporations. Moderates tend to be pro-development, pro-tech and pro-business."[20]

[20] https://www.sfchronicle.com/politics/article/Progressive-mayoral-candidates-push-to-end-12480360.php

Importantly, the interest groups connected to these issues and ideologies were not necessarily natural allies; rather, over time and with significant effort, activists were able to solidify these interests into a broad-based progressive movement (DeLeon 1992), which appears to be increasingly important for local politics in San Francisco. Indeed, whereas early work argued that progressivism was central to understanding patterns of protest and voting in elections, recent work has documented that the progressive-moderate divide actually maps onto elite preferences across a range of issues (Boudreau, Elmendorf, and MacKenzie 2015). Of course, it is important to remember that—as Wright and Schaffner (2002) show in the context of Nebraska's nonpartisan legislature—ideologically coherent preferences at the elite level are not necessarily sufficient by themselves to create sustained legislative coalitions. Elites may very well have an incentive to campaign as progressives or moderates but then ultimately behave as free-agents once on the Board of Supervisors. Still, that past scholarship has found evidence of such a broad cleavage within San Francisco politics suggests that this is a perfect test case to understand whether stable and cohesive legislative coalitions are possible in the nonpartisan context.

Interestingly, as the progressive movement has grown in San Francisco, the manner in which elites understand and describe city politics has changed as well. This can be seen specifically in patterns of media coverage. For example, Figure 1.5 shows the number of San Francisco Chronicle articles about the Board of Supervisors between 1985 and 2017 that mention the term 'progressive.'[21] As Figure 1.5 shows, while the Board of Supervisors was only rarely described in this manner in the late 1980s and early 1990s, there has been a significant change since that time, with progressive coverage jumping markedly in both 1999 and 2011 and increasingly linearly within those periods. To the extent that news coverage reflects power or significance within politics, as some scholars have recently argued

[21] The newspaper data comes from yearly searches of the NewsLibrary database (`www.newslibrary.com`). In conducting these searches, I follow Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010) and omit all articles that have the following terms in either the headline or author categories: 'editor', 'editorial', 'associated press', 'ap', 'opinion', 'op-ed', 'letter', or 'commentary'. Unfortunately, I do not have access to the full articles, so the primary assumption is that the use of the term progressive does in fact reflect changing patterns of how the media is covering the board's politics. Given how strikingly the increase aligns with the evidence from roll-calls, this assumption seems extremely plausible.

(Ban et al. 2018), then this steep rise in the number of articles characterizing the board's politics in this manner supports the notion that this cleavage is increasingly central for San Francisco politics. Moreover, even though progressives have sought and won election to the board over much of this period, the magnitude of the shift in coverage over time implies that they have been successful in building a unique brand that differentiates them from their moderate counterparts. Indeed, though this process may have occurred slowly over time, it is now embedded into one of the primary mediums through which citizens can learn about important local policy issues. This adds significant value to membership within the group for elected officials and provides the coalition with greater leverage to influence behavior thereafter.



Figure 1.5: Use of the Term 'Progressive' in San Francisco Chronicle Articles about the Board of Supervisors, 1985 – 2017

1.5.1 Voting Patterns in the San Francisco Board of Supervisors

How is legislative conflict structured in the San Francisco Board of Supervisors? Has the progressive-moderate divide that appears central to politics outside the chamber influenced patterns of voting within it? Building off the initial cross-sectional analysis, I begin by examining the fit statistics from the one-dimensional spatial model fit in the previous section. Despite having the third highest number of contested votes across the full sample of local governments—332 since 2012—the spatial model fits remarkably well, with an APRE of .81 and nearly 94 percent of all votes (or 91 percent of nay votes) correctly classified.[22] For comparison, since 1990, the APRE for a one-dimensional spatial model of Congress has hovered around .70 (Aldrich, Montgomery, and Sparks 2014). Importantly, this strong model fit is not isolated to the most recent terms. Figure 1.6 depicts the APRE from a one-dimensional optimal classification model for each term of the Board of Supervisors since the 2000 election, which is also when the city switched to district elections. As the plot shows, the spatial model predicts votes at a remarkably high rate across all terms, with each of the term-specific APRE statistics above .80. Notably, there is a modest increase in the value of the fit statistic over time, which corresponds with the argument that these coalitions have been working to to solidify themselves within the political system over time. Taken together, these individual and aggregate measures of fit show that a one-dimensional model explains the vast majority of the votes in San Francisco and provide significant evidence of a single dominant cleavage within the council.

However, though conflict may be one-dimensional from term-to-term, how stable are these cleavages over time? In other words, do the substantive divides that underlie voting in each term align with existing accounts of politics in San Francisco? To answer these questions, I use the method developed by Martin and Quinn (2002) to fit a dynamic, one-

[22]Relatedly, across all non-unanimous votes, the board averages two to three of its nine members voting in the minority. It is also notable that when examining the regression results from the previous section, the residual for San Francisco is one of the five largest, at approximately .10 across all models. This implies that the model is under-predicting the unidimensionality of conflict in San Francisco, something that we would expect if there was an unobserved group like the progressives shaping politics.



Figure 1.6: One-Dimensional Spatial Model Fit (APRE) for San Francisco Board of Supervisors by Term

dimensional spatial model using all of the votes from 2000 onward.[23] The ideal points from this model, which are comparable over time, are depicted in Figure 1.7.[24] If the progressive-moderate divide is at the center of conflict in the board of Supervisors, we should expect to see members from each group cluster together over time. And indeed, throughout the entire time period depicted, legislators who local reporters typically describe as progressive are on the lower half of the plot, while those considered moderates are on the top half. In addition, the orderings within each wing largely align with those thought to be more or less extreme on this dimension. For example, in their 2016 endorsement of Sandra Fewer for District 1, the San Francisco Bay Guardian (SFBG)—the city's well-known progressive newspaper—noted that the district was previously represented by Jake McGoldrick, who "was mostly with

[23]I conduct the scaling using the implementation of the Martin and Quinn (2002) model in the R package MCMCpack. The estimation is conducted via a Markov Chain Monte Carlo sampler. I run the model for 40,000 iterations total, with the initial 20,000 as burn-in, which typical MCMC diagnostics suggest is sufficient for convergence in this case.

[24]In addition, in Appenix D, I include individual ideal point plots for each specific term.

the progressives... [and] then Eric Mar, who has been a progressive stalwart and leader." The paper also notes that Fewer has "amazingly widespread support, from state Sen. Mark Leno and Assemblymember Phil Ting to Sups. Jane Kim, Aaron Peskin, Norman Yee, David Campos and John Avalos," and that her opponent is "the candidate of the mayor's alliesâĂŞ–London Breed, Scott Wiener, Mark Farrell."[25] Notably, this view of San Francisco politics is not constrained to the progressive side alone. Indeed, the endorsements by the San Francisco Moderates from 2014 and 2016—which include Mark Farrell, Katy Tang, Scott Wiener, Malia Cohen, and London Breed—correspond strongly with what the Bay Guardian describes.[26] Most importantly, however, all of these progressive and moderate endorsements align with the cleavage described in past work and the ideological placements in Figure 1.7.

Thus, political conflict in San Francisco appears to be highly structured, akin to what we might expect from a partisan system with relatively balanced competition on each side. By all accounts, this structure appears to be the result of two coalitions with significant institutional capacity in direct competition with each other. Indeed, that the progressive coalition, which has been the newcomer trying to establish itself during this period, formed out of existing organized interests provided the framework necessary to mobilize voters and thus provide value to elected officials. The moderates, in contrast, had the existing institutional regime supporting the mayor at their disposal, along with an increasingly salient incentive to respond to the progressive threat. This has led to the development of clear, meaningful brands that have been embedded into local news coverage, thereby reinforcing the differences across each group to voters, enabling democratic accountability, and providing further incentive for upcoming politicians to align with a particular faction. Still, the extent to which this type of organization absent parties is possible in other locales remains largely unknown, and future work will need to delve further into unique legislative contexts to evaluate the institutional capacity of other local coalitions and identify when they translate

[25]San Francisco Bay Guardian. "Endorsements-The Case for Six Progressive Supes." https://goo.gl/v5rKQN

[26]San Francisco Moderates. "Endorsements." 2014: https://goo.gl/BLWGmJ. 2016: https://goo.gl/A5UKTo



Figure 1.7: Dynamic Ideal Points in One-Dimension for San Francisco Board of Supervisors, 1997 – 2016

into sustained legislative coalitions and when they do not.

1.6 Conclusion

In this paper, I have argued that partisan elections and, by extension, parties are neither necessary nor sufficient to support the types of stable, legislative coalitions that scholars have argued are central to representation and democratic accountability. The reason that this arises is that parties are, for all intents and purposes, a collection of tools and levers to facilitate the election of its members and the passage of favorable policy. However, as the analysis in this paper has shown, these tools and levers are neither entirely unique to parties nor guaranteed to succeed in every context. As a result, when the relative capacity of parties to leverage these institutions is weak, or when that same capacity is present absent formal parties, legislative behavior comes to be organized in ways counter to what we typically expect of partisan and nonpartisan government.

Specifically, the empirical analysis in this paper shows that when two-party competition is absent, voting patterns in partisan legislatures become less one-dimensional. This means that voting coalitions within each council are more likely to shift from issue to issue. Importantly, this relationship is not present within nonpartisan councils, which suggests that competition influences the institutional capacity of parties rather than changing the underlying preferences of their members. In addition, I also present case-specific evidence from nonpartisan San Francisco, where two all-encompassing coalitions have formed despite the institutional disadvantage of not having labels on the ballot. The case demonstrates that, though the barriers are high, if groups can solve the information and differentiation problem by developing a meaningful brand, they can create value for members that ultimately sustains their coalition. Taken together, these two analyses highlight that the institutional context within which a party or coalition is situated is of immense importance for outcomes. Indeed, absent the institutional capacity to facilitate the type of accountability that a robust democracy requires, then having party labels on the ballot will not necessarily be enough to

keep a coalition intact.

The findings in this paper raise important questions about the nature of representation and the extent to which strong partisan and nonpartisan coalitions facilitate better representation than government without these bodies. Indeed, while scholars have certainly noted the challenges and flaws in representation in partisan governments at the state and national level in the United States (Gilens 2014; Broockman and Skovron 2018; Lax and Phillips 2012), it remains unclear whether legislators in nonpartisan governments are more or less responsive, have less distorted views of their constituents preferences, or are ultimately represent the views of all of their constituents equally. Indeed, in some respects, if voters tend to be 'moderates' on average, such that they are not necessarily constrained to a single ideology (Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2005; Broockman 2016), then the fact that coalitions with significant institutional capacity reduce conflict to fall along a single dimension may actually impede the quality of representation. Still, there is no guarantee that the structure of the issue space that appears in the absence of stable coalitions can yield better results, particularly if high dimensionality leads to as much policy instability as early scholarship predicts (Key 1949).

In addition, these findings contribute to our understanding of how political competition influences legislative behavior, providing novel evidence that changes in the dimensionality of legislative conflict correspond with levels of competition. This conclusion is particularly important in the modern American political environment as governments at both the city and state level are increasingly dominated by a single party. Further research is needed, however, to understand whether these changes in legislative behavior actually lead to substantive shifts in the direction of public policy and, if so, whether different patterns of voting or underlying shifts in the agenda are driving this change.

2 | Conflict and Cleavages Under Democratic One-Party Rule: Evidence from the New York City Council

> *The mayor was obviously frustrated he didn't get everything he wanted from the legislative session. Welcome to Albany... There is something that we have in Albany that you don't have here in New York City, which is called a Republican house... New York City, it's basically a City Council that is overwhelmingly Democratic. So you don't have to deal with those annoying issues of partisanship and getting two sides, two parties to agree.*[1]
>
> – Andrew Cuomo, Governor of New York

2.1 Introduction

What happens to democracy when one party rules? In 1949, when V.O. Key released his infamous book *Southern Politics in State and Nation*, his answer to this question was that one-party rule could produce a type of factional politics that inhibited democratic governance, but that this result was hardly guaranteed (Key 1949). Since that time, however, little work in American politics has considered either the causes or consequences of one-party rule. At first glance, this lack of research makes intuitive sense: with the decline of the Solid South in the 1960s, the foremost example of one-party rule was gone, and scholars of U.S. politics naturally lost interest. Yet, beneath the federal and state levels of government, one-party rule is undoubtedly still present in the United States. In fact, in urban politics,

[1] Nahmias, Laura. 2015. "Cuomo: De Blasio 'obviously frustrated' over failed agenda". Politico. `https://goo.gl/gQGeWc`

it is often the norm, with Democrats holding the overwhelming majority of political offices in large cities.[2]

Despite Key's early work, the conventional wisdom would suggest that overwhelming partisan homogeneity leads to decreased conflict and efficient government. However, it is unclear why this is necessarily the case. Large cities in the United States, though limited by state and federal government constraints (Peterson 1981), exercise a significant amount of authority on a range of issues—from education to public safety to economic growth—that directly impact their residents' quality of life. In turn, even though big city governments generally do not have to address significant partisan opposition, the scope of the issues that they deal with and the potential for bias in the redistributive system suggest ample space for conflict (Oliver 2012). This conflict has the potential to split the dominant party into factions, which align on questions related to state and national politics but diverge on all or a subset of local issues. The source and ultimate consequences of this potential conflict, however, is less clear.

In this paper, I identify these dimensions of conflict for one particular large city: New York. While a number of studies have examined the nature of political conflict and the structure of political attitudes in communities across the city (Katznelson 1982; Kim 2003; Arnold and Carnes 2012), I focus instead on the dimensions of conflict in the city council specifically, because the vast majority of city policy—with the exception of executive action by the mayor—must ultimately be passed by this body. To conduct my analysis, I draw on a rich new collection of legislative records from the New York City Council, including information about every city council member and every bill proposed since 2002. In particular, I pay close attention to potential divides within the majority party itself to identify whether one-party government is necessarily factional.

My analysis shows that politics in New York is both ideological and multidimensional in nature, and I provide evidence of factions within the Democratic party. These factions

[2]This is generally true for large cities regardless of whether the city has an officially partisan political system or not.

are not stable over time, however, as the race-based cleavage that split the council through the 2000s has been overtaken in the two most recent terms by a progressive-moderate divide. Importantly, this intraparty conflict is not identifiable from roll-call votes and is only found in sponsorship records. Moreover, these divides appear to reflect tangible differences in preferences over policy as evidence from the two most recent terms shows that progressive caucus members have seen their bills reach the floor at both higher and lower rates, depending on the caucus affiliation of the council speaker. This suggests that intraparty conflict—in New York City, at least—is fundamentally a battle over what reaches the agenda, as parties continue to see value in unified, partisan action on the chamber floor.

2.2 One-Party Rule and Legislative Factions

When should we expect one-party rule to produce factional politics? Key (1949) hypothesizes that factions develop within a government as a function of party threat. Specifically, Key argues that when a jurisdiction dominated by one party has partisan opposition present—whether it be in the form of competitive elections or an organized, coherent minority party—members of the majority party will defer more to their leadership and the party will remain cohesive. However, when partisan opposition is especially weak or missing entirely, Key asserts that factional politics will become increasingly likely. While intuitive, Key admits that this theory only generally explains the patterns of factionalism that he observes in the South, and notes that other factors may also be important for how politics is structured. More recent work, however, has found evidence in support of Key's hypothesis, showing that the two parties are more polarized, encounter more conflict, and are more cohesive when levels of interparty competition are relatively high (Aldrich and Battista 2002; Jenkins 2006; Carroll and Eichorst 2013; Hinchliffe and Lee 2016; Lee 2016).

If a lack of competition fosters instability within parties, what types of factions should we expect to develop in these contexts? While Key (1949) remains agnostic on this question, Jewell (1964)—writing in the wake of *Baker v. Carr* in the South—argues that as racial and

economic out-groups win representation in government, intraparty factions will develop in one-party governments.[3] Since that time, however, little work at the state level in American politics has delved into this question. Yet, a number of urban politics scholars have looked at the relationship between different types of cleavages and local representation, and thus this literature can provide some idea about the dimensions along which conflict might be structured when competition is absent.

First, it is worth considering the role of partisanship in shaping the scope of conflict and the nature of policy outcomes in city government, even given one-party rule. While scholars have long noted that "there is no Republican or Democratic way to pick up the trash," given the strength of partisan identification (Campbell et al. 1960), it is possible that having any minority party representative in office could activate a partisan (or ideological) cleavage. Although little work has looked at city council partisanship, a number of papers have examined the effects of mayoral partisanship, finding little evidence of an effect of party control on city finances or policy (Ferreira and Gyourko 2009; Gerber and Hopkins 2011). Yet, recent work has begun to challenge this conclusion, providing evidence that local officials' preferences vary with partisanship (Einstein and Glick 2014, 2016), that party control matters for how cities tax and spend (de Benedictis-Kessner and Warshaw 2016), and that the policies enacted by cities correspond with local preferences (Tausanovitch and Warshaw 2014; Einstein and Kogan 2015). Moreover, research on nonpartisan legislatures suggests that when parties are present, they structure the dimensions along which conflict occurs (Welch and Carlson 1973; Jenkins 1999; Wright and Schaffner 2002). Taken together, these findings imply that partisanship, or ideology more broadly (DeLeon 1992; Clavel 2010), should not be written off as a source of conflict, because even small doses of partisan or ideological difference have the potential to influence political outcomes.

However, while a small minority party may be the source of factionalism in cities, it is also possible that one-party rule causes a decline in the salience of partisan cues, which

[3]Relatedly, he notes that these factions should be most evident by looking at primary elections and roll-call votes.

might allow factions based on other salient features to form (Wright 2008). In fact, research has shown that even meaningless groups lead to conflict (Tajfel 1970), so—if party does not explain patterns of legislative behavior—we should expect another salient characteristic to do so. Of the various cleavages discussed in the literature, race is the most likely candidate to fill the void of party. Indeed, Hajnal and Trounstine (2014) argue that race is the 'dominant factor' in voting at the local level. Whether race has an effect beyond the ballot box, however, is less clear. Given that the size of the Black and Latino populations in many urban areas has grown over time, increasing contact between generally segregated racial groups might be sharpening the racial divide (Shah and Marschall 2012; Kaufmann 2004; Enos 2014). However, studies of minority incorporation into the political system at this level have yielded mixed evidence. On the one hand, scholars have shown that political incorporation of racial minorities into the formal political system leads to gains in certain policy areas, increases in hiring of minority contractors, and greater diversity within public agencies (Sass and Mehay 2003; Hopkins and McCabe 2012; MacManus 1990). On the other hand, Browning, Marshall, and Tabb (2002) temper these findings, noting that being elected might not be enough. Rather, they argue that racial minorities need to be incorporated into the governing regime in order to secure policy gains.

Of course, evidence of policy gains (or a lack thereof) from minority incorporation hardly implies that this will be a significant cleavage in government, but it does suggest that race has the potential to become an important dimension of conflict. We might expect, however, that the salience of a racially based cleavage—or any other cleavage for that matter—might vary over time. For example, Kaufmann (2004) argues that voting in cities can be explained by a theory of group interest, in which decisions at the ballot box are made as a function of localized group threat. Thus, when voters perceive high levels of interracial conflict, we are more likely to see voting polarize by race. However, when perceptions of intergroup conflict are low, partisanship will explain patterns of voting. In particular, in the case of New York, Kaufman argues that racially polarized voting has long been present in mayoral politics, and

that it has fueled the election of Republican and non-minority mayors over time.[4] In turn, if local politicians' actions in government are aligned with their voter's preferences and racial polarization is indeed a significant feature of New York voter's political calculus, we should expect evidence of racial cleavages in the New York City Council over time.

Beyond race and partisanship, scholars have also posited other features of local politics as either significant cleavages or the true foundation of political power. For instance, early work on urban politics found evidence that business interests dominated local government (Hunter 1969; Stone 1989), though an alternate strain of the literature has conceptualized this divide more in terms of economic growth (Peterson 1981; Molotch 1976). Alternatively, given the particularistic nature of local policy, it is also easy to imagine divides based on geographic regions, tenure of residence, or the mayoral regime. Still, it is also possible that the fluid nature of the issue space in cities might lead to a pluralist type of government, with shifting coalitions in which different factions represented in government achieve policy success on different issues (Dahl 1961). If this pluralist description is true, it is unlikely that roll call votes or sponsorship records would yield any meaningful divides, and estimates of the number of dimensions involved in council politics should be large.

Regardless of the factions that arise, however, some will question whether city councils are worthwhile institutions to explore. Indeed, many of the early theories of political power in cities focused on groups outside of official government institutions, arguing that the formal government structures were insufficient to govern effectively (Stone 1989). Yet, I contend that writing off such institutions is misguided. While unelected actors certainly influence local policy and provide support for implementation, ultimately, policy changes require the approval of the legally defined institutions within a city. In turn, if cleavages exist, there is no reason to think that these do not filter up into the legislative body. Of course, as the strength of an institution changes, the extent to which we might observe strong factions may also change; however, this problem is unlikely to be the case in big-city governments. Moreover,

[4]Kaufman (2004) notes that David Dinkin's election as the first African American mayor of New York was brought about by favorable circumstances in 1989, but that his subsequent loss 4 years later is in line with this racially polarized hypothesis.

even if local councils are weak and unelected actors have a sizable amount of influence within government, the growing availability of data on lobbying and campaign finance at the local level provides new ways to shed light on extra-governmental influence, particularly when paired with data on policy proposals, bill sponsorship decisions, and roll-call votes.

2.3 Background: The New York City Council

Given the vast number of local governments across the United States, why, specifically, do I focus on New York City? From a theoretical perspective, New York provides an outstanding test case for a number of reasons. First, like most large cities, it is dominated by Democrats, with no more than 5 Republican members out of 51 total members in each session since 2002. In addition, New York City's government is both high-profile and highly professionalized, implying that the scope of conflict and potential for bias in the distribution of local services is large (Oliver 2012). Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, the New York City Council possesses a number of clearly plausible cleavages that are well identified already.

For example, New York state voting rules allow candidates for political office to run on multiple party tickets.[5] In turn, a number of Democrats in the city (and state) are technically elected as part of the Working Families party, while a handful of other members are elected as part of the Independence, Conservative, and Liberal parties.[6] In addition to these 'third' parties, New York has a racially diverse group of council members, five clearly defined regions (its boroughs), and a handful of official caucuses that members may choose to join. Specifically, these include the Progressive caucus, LGBT caucus, Women's caucus, Jewish caucus, and the Black, Latino, and Asian (BLA) caucus. These groups were all formed as a means to represent each particular interest, and all include a nontrivial number of members. The BLA caucus, for example, includes 26 of the council's 51 members as of

[5]This means that candidates who run on multiparty tickets will have their name show up multiple times on the ballot, and that voters get to choose under which party heading to vote for that candidate.

[6]In the sessions earlier in the range of my data, a handful of candidates also won election on the 'Right-to-Life' party ticket, but this party has largely disappeared in the years since.

2015.

The Progressive caucus, which was formed in 2010 as a direct response to the city's 'plutocratic policies,' appears to be a particularly powerful actor within New York City politics if recent media reports are to be believed.[7] Indeed, after only one term the caucus doubled in size and elected one of its members—Melissa Mark-Viverito—as Speaker of the Council.[8] This sudden assent to power is reflected in shifting patterns of media coverage in the city. Figure 2.1 depicts the number of New York Observer articles about the city council between 1998 and 2017 that mention the term 'progressive.'[9] While the term was essentially nonexistent in articles prior to 2010, since that time, there has been a steady increase in its usage. Unsurprisingly, this change aligns precisely with the emergence of the progressive caucus and peaks with the election of Mark-Viverito as speaker. Recent work in political science has argued that patterns of coverage of this kind can be used to identify power within politics (Ban et al. 2018) and so this presents suggestive evidence of an important cleavage in New York City. Still, whether the changes in coverage reflects a meaningful political divide and not just a campaign tactic remains unclear. What is clear, however, is that New York City is hardly devoid of potential for conflict, and there is good reason to believe that at least some of the groups described here may drive the divisions within the political process.

2.4 Data

To measure these cleavages and identify which is the most important for political outcomes I gather a long time-series of council records. This data, which was compiled from the

[7]Chen, David W. 2010. "Dozen Council members Form a Bloc for Liberals." *New York Times.* `https://goo.gl/D2r6Rv`

[8]Barkan, Ross. 2014. "City Council's Progressive Caucus Nearly Doubles in Size." *New York Observer.* `https://goo.gl/WBS1qq`

[9]The newspaper data comes from yearly searches of the NewsLibrary database (`www.newslibrary.com`). In gathering this data, I follow Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010) and omit all articles that have the following terms in either the headline or author categories: 'editor', 'editorial', 'associated press', 'ap', 'opinion', 'op-ed', 'letter', or 'commentary'.



Figure 2.1: Use of the Term 'Progressive' in New York Observer Articles about the City Council, 1998 – 2017

council's legislative home page,[10] includes all of the bills that were proposed in New York City between January 2002 and December 2017, whether or not they received a vote. Specifically, for each bill, the data includes the name of all sponsors, the bill's title, a description of the content, the date it was filed, whether it was ever voted on, and—if applicable—the roll call votes.[11] Table 2.1 shows summary statistics about the overall distribution of proposed bills across each term. The distribution of bills by type is largely stable over time, with the sole exception being the 2014 term, for which I have incomplete data. In addition to these legislative records, I also use term-specific data on every member elected to the council from 2002 onwards, including their partisanship (major and minor party), incumbency status, borough, race, and caucus membership.

While this data is an exciting new resource to measure behavior and factionalism within

[10] `https://nyc.legistar.com/Legislation.aspx`

[11] For specific examples of the content of these bills, see Appendix E.

Table 2.1: Bill Summary Statistics by Term

Term Start	Introduction	Land Use	Resolution	State Leg. Resolution	Communication	Other	Total Bills	Voted On	> 2.5% Nay
2002	.22	.25	.25	.07	.17	0	3574	1752	71
2004	.26	.26	.24	.08	.13	.03	3817	1960	88
2006	.21	.28	.22	.04	.21	.03	6772	3505	268
2010	.27	.26	.25	.01	.17	.04	5796	3107	165
2014	.42	.24	.24	0	.05	.05	3782	1936	108

Note: Examples of each type of bill are provided in Appendix E.

the city council, it does not come without challenges. Political scientists have long used scaling techniques to estimate the spatial locations of members and to understand the dimensions of conflict in legislatures (Poole and Rosenthal 1985; Poole 2000; Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers 2004); however, the potential concern with using these methods in local legislatures is that if the agenda is tightly controlled, such an analysis may not yield evidence of divisions despite their existence. In other words, the 'second face of power'—that is, the ability of powerful groups to keep contentious issues off the agenda—may make roll call votes meaningless (Bachrach and Baratz 1962). Indeed, Figure 2.2, which shows the percent of each member's votes that are recorded as 'Nay' for the 2010 term, implies that many bills are passed absent any objection. While Figure 2.2 only depicts the data for 2010, this pattern is consistent across terms. This individual level trend, naturally, results in only a small share of bills seeing multimember opposition.[12] For example, the final column in Table 2.1 shows the total number of bills in each term with at least 2.5 percent of the council voting 'Nay'. On average, across councils, no more than five percent of bills meet this criteria. While this low objection rate may be indicative of high ideological agreement and an absence of factionalism within the New York City Council, it may also be evidence of strong agenda

[12]It is worth noting, however, that the share of bills that pass unanimously in New York is not significantly larger than Congress, where we see stark divisions in roll call voting.

control. In turn, I first proceed by scaling members of the New York City Council based on roll call votes and then analyze patterns of cosponsorship in an effort to fully uncover the city's political structure.



Note: Parties are coded Blue for Democrat, Red for Republican, and Green for Working Families. All Working Families members are Democrats, but not all Democrats are Working Families.

Figure 2.2: 'Nay' Votes by Party

2.5 Measurement

To examine the structure of legislative voting in New York, I use Poole's (2000) method of Optimal Classification to analyze roll call votes for the five council terms starting in 2002,

2004, 2006, 2010, and 2014. Though scholars typically tend to use parametric methods such as DW-Nominate (Poole and Rosenthal 1985, 1997) or IDEAL (Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers 2004) for scaling the ideological positions of legislators, I use Optimal Classification here instead. The primary reason for this choice is that parametric methods require assumptions about errors in voting that are unlikely to hold in situations with unequal discipline across parties and when party switches correlate with changes in voting (Rosenthal and Voeten 2004).[13]

In the case of New York's City Council, both assumptions are likely violated. First, given the overwhelming dominance of the Democratic party, the value of discipline is likely much higher for Democrats than for Republicans. Second, there are a number of switches in party over time—primarily a Democrat or Republican being added or dropped by a third party—which may induce changes in voting patterns as the candidate will incur pressure from an additional partisan source. By using Optimal Classification, assumptions about the error structure can be avoided, because the method simply seeks to minimize the number of classification errors, with all errors weighted identically (Rosenthal and Voeten 2004).[14]

How does Optimal Classification work? In the simple one-dimensional case, imagine a process where three legislators vote on ten bills. If each legislator votes according to his or her ideal point and we assume no errors in voting, we can find the true ideological rank ordering by calculating the classification error percentage for each of the three possible orderings of the legislators. Then, conditional on the ordering that minimizes the number of errors, we can order the cutpoints for each of the ten bills bill (that is, the dividing line between voting one way or another) to further minimize the error percentage. If there are no errors, iterating over this process will yield the true rank ordering. However, even

[13] Rosenthal and Voeten (2004) discuss three other violations of parametric assumptions in their application to the French Fourth Republic, but none are relevant here.

[14] Indeed as Rosenthal and Voeten (2004) explain: "...for optimal classification all errors are weighted equally. No single vote decision is likely to make a large difference in an estimate. In contrast, the parametric methods will adjust estimates based on the most serious errors, such as Rightists voting with the Communists against increased expenditures for colonial wars, which may well be the result of a strategic calculus to overthrow a centrist cabinet." (p. 622)

with error, or when done in multiple dimensions, the method has been shown to recover spatial locations well (Poole 2000). The key difference between Optimal Classification and parametric methods is that the former minimizes the number of voting classification errors, while the latter maximizes the probability of vote choices. In many cases, these processes yield similar answers, but here I choose to use Optimal Classification as it evades making assumptions that may be problematic.[15]

The downside to using Optimal Classification is that for one-dimensional models it only recovers a rank ordering of members, which can then make it difficult to recover ideal points. However, evidence suggests that voting decisions in New York City are multidimensional, which lessens this concern.[16] For example, Table 2.2 shows fit statistics for one and two-dimensional spatial models fit to data from each council term. Looking at the baseline percentage of correctly classified votes in the first three columns, we see that the model is classifying 95 percent or more of the votes across terms, such that there is relatively minimal gain from adding a second dimension. Yet, the downside to the using the baseline classification percentage as a fit statistic is that if most votes are unanimous or lopsided—which is the case for New York City—it may overstate the success of the model. And in fact, when we account for these features, we see a different pattern. Looking at the aggregate proportion reduction in error (APRE) statistic, for example, we see that the one-dimensional models yields statistics between .54 and .74. This means that the spatial model reduces classification errors at rates between 54 and 74 percent compared to a null model where all voters are assumed to vote in the majority. Notably, when a second dimension is added, we see significant gains in classification power, up to an additional 20 percent.[17]

[15]Still, results from using W-Nominate are substantively similar, and, if anything, the partisan differences shown are depicted in Figure 2.3 are even more stark.

[16]The reason for this is that in the multidimensional context, OC can narrow down the location to specific bins, which makes it easier to estimate specific ideal points.

[17]It is worth noting that the initial classification percentages are relatively high, and would fall on the upper range of what Shor and McCarty (2011) find in looking at state legislatures. However, that the addition of the second dimension improves fit so significantly suggests that it is a worthwhile addition to the spatial model.

For comparison, in looking at the state legislatures, Shor and McCarty (2011) find that a two-dimensional model only improves fit by 10 percent or more for four of the 50 states. Finally, when looking at the share of correctly classified nay votes in the final three columns, which again better accounts for the lopsided nature of council roll calls, we see a similar pattern as with the APRE.[18] In turn, there is strong evidence that political conflict in the New York City council is multidimensional in nature, justifying the use of a two-dimensional model.

Table 2.2: Optimal Classification Fit Statistics by Council Term

Term	**Classification %**			**APRE**			**Nay Classification %**		
	1D	2D	Diff.	1D	2D	Diff.	1D	2D	Diff.
1998–2001	0.973	0.984	0.011	0.720	0.837	0.117	0.801	0.906	0.105
2002–2003	0.975	0.987	0.012	0.738	0.856	0.118	0.788	0.891	0.103
2004–2005	0.963	0.987	0.024	0.644	0.876	0.232	0.703	0.890	0.187
2006–2009	0.952	0.969	0.017	0.544	0.703	0.159	0.644	0.764	0.120
2010–2013	0.971	0.985	0.014	0.679	0.839	0.160	0.754	0.880	0.126
2014–2017	0.978	0.988	0.010	0.725	0.854	0.129	0.773	0.899	0.126

2.6 Voting Cleavages in the New York City Council

For each term between 2002 and 2017, I estimate ideal points using the two-dimensional Optical Classification algorithm. Figure 2.3 displays the results of this process. Members are represented by the first letter of their party, with Working Families Democrats coded as 'W' and Conservative Democrats coded as 'C'. Each point is also colored by party. The first striking commonality across plots is that in each term at least one of the dimensions appears to be a liberal/conservative divide. In four of the terms, this divide loads onto

[18]The reason for the lower classification rate in 2006 (75% of 'Nay' votes) is unclear, but it may stem from the actions of Council Member Charles Barron, who was the lone member to vote against re-electing incumbent Speaker Christine Quinn to lead the council that term. Quinn subsequently stripped Barron of his committee chairmanship and his 'lulu' stipend (which is essentially an income supplement), provoking a term of anti-regime proposals and voting from Barron

the first dimension, while in 2006 it falls on the second dimension. In turn, in each term, we see Republican legislators on the right (or top) and Democrats on the left (or bottom). In addition, we see Working Families members generally interspersed among the blue D's, which makes sense as they are also Democrats after all. However, in each year the mean Working Families member ideal point on this dimension is further left than the mean ideal point for a 'pure' Democrat. This affirms the idea that this dimension represents the liberal/conservative continuum as we would expect Working Families members to be, on the whole, the more liberal members of the Democratic party. That being said, the separation between parties on this dimension is not perfect, as we occasionally see Democrats further right than might be expected in a particularly divided body, like Congress.

While Figure 2.3 provides evidence that the first dimension primarily relates to the traditional liberal/conservative divide, the meaning of the second dimension (or for 2006, the first dimension) is less clear. What makes this dimension especially difficult to discern is that it fluctuates from term to term—suggesting it may change over time—and does not lead to any clear subgroups within the Democratic party, such as those based on race, borough, or third-party membership. For example, as Figure 2.4 shows, race is only loosely correlated with this dimension across terms, with 2006 being perhaps the most clear division. Similarly, Figure 2.5 depicts an equally uncertain image for members of the progressive caucus in 2010. Overall, these uncertainties reflect the downside to using roll call scaling in an environment with a sparse number of contentious votes and overwhelming partisan voting. Indeed, the results presented up to this point may be taken as evidence of a cohesive Democratic party, or, consistent with research on Congress, they may also indicate that the majority's ability to prevent divisive issues from reaching the agenda keeps conflict out of the official voting record (Katznelson and Mulroy 2012).



Note: Democrats: 'D' (blue); Republicans: 'R' (red); Working Families (Democrats): 'W' (purple); Conservative (Democrats): 'C'

Figure 2.3: Ideal Points in Two Dimensions from Optimal Classification



Note: White: 'w' (red); Black: 'b' (black); Hispanic: 'h' (blue) ; Asian: 'a' (blue)

Figure 2.4: Ideal Points in 2 Dimensions from Optimal Classification, Coded by Member Race



Note: Democrats: 'D' (blue); Republicans: 'R' (red); Conservative (Democrats): 'C' (pink); Progressive Democrats: 'P' (green)

Figure 2.5: Ideal Points in 2 Dimensions from Optimal Classification, with Progressive Caucus Members, 2010–2017

2.7 Sponsorship Cleavages in the New York City Council

While agenda control may prevent particular dimensions of conflict from being addressed on the legislative floor, it does not eliminate this conflict from the record entirely. Indeed, as New York Councilman Mark Levine explained in 2015:

> The fact that on almost every piece of legislation that we pass, there was pretty lopsided majorities... shouldn't be confused with being proof that there was not a really spirited debate... [The dissenters] felt like they aired their concerns, they saw the bill was going to pass, and they all of a sudden wanted to be on the side of the speaker and the majority.[19]

Thus, many council members in the minority see value in adhering to the party's agenda, so long as they have the opportunity to have their voices heard. In turn, in this section, I use

[19]Trangle, Sarina. 2015. "Now a dominant force, the Progressive Caucus finds its vision complicated." *City & State, New York*. `https://goo.gl/mxWsvY`

data on one particular avenue through which councilmembers may signal their preferences: bill sponsorship. While studies of cosponsorship at the congressional level have debated the meaning of this action (Fowler 2006), in this case, I argue that cosponsorship reflects both a social and ideological connection between legislators, and that differences in cosponsorship patterns are substantively meaningful.

To simplify my analysis, I focus on two groups of Democrats that are strong contenders to form intraparty factions: racial minorities and—from 2010 onward—progressive caucus members. Why these two groups? First, as Kaufmann (2004) has argued, "racial group conflict has been a persistent feature of New York City politics since the 1960s" (p. 7). This stems in part from the fact that minority groups have long been incorporated into the formal political system in New York, with a number of representatives in the council and other boards or borough-specific offices. However, Kaufmann argues that racial conflict also results from the city's old machine-structure, as a number of forms of patronage remain in existence.

In contrast, the progressive caucus is a remarkably recent addition to the New York political system, forming at the beginning of the 2010 council term. However, the group has quickly grown in power, doubling in size after one term and also electing one if its members to be speaker of the city council in 2014 after a deal with members from Brooklyn.[20] Moreover, the rise of the progressive caucus in New York aligns with similar groups in other large cities, suggesting that this may stem from a national movement within the Democratic Party.[21] Regardless, if either of these groups are indeed factions within the New York City Council's Democratic delegation, the analysis should yield clear patterns of in-group members cosponsoring with each other more frequently.

To measure the extent to which members cluster in groups of cosponsors, I scale sponsorship decisions using a two-dimensional W-Nominate model(Poole and Rosenthal 1985). A

[20]Campbell, Colin. 2013. "Melissa Mark-Viverito Declares Victory in Speaker's Race." *New York Observer*. `https://goo.gl/gFKRq2`

[21]See: `http://localprogress.org/`

parametric method is appropriate for a model of cosponsorship in New York as these types of legislative actions do not suffer from the same biases as votes.[22] However, throughout this analysis, I drop all bills classified as 'Land Use' by the City Council as the procedure for these bills being brought to the floor is relatively rigid and the sponsors are nearly always members of the Land Use Committee.

Figure 2.6 shows results from scaling bill cosponsorships in two-dimensions for each term, with the ideal points colored by party. Approximately 80% of all sponsorship decisions are correctly classified by the model.[23] Across all terms, the results by party are largely similar to those from the vote models, with only weak partisan clustering, driven primarily by Republicans. This is somewhat surprising as we might have expected Working Families Democrats to have a clear ideological reason to sort together, and it suggests that this party exists largely for electoral reasons.

In contrast, when looking at the results by race in Figure 2.7, we see clear divisions over time. Indeed, in both 2002 and 2004, we see a sharp division between white and minority council members. This division holds into 2006, though the cleavage appears to grow weaker, with a handful of white members beginning to sponsor with minority council members more frequently. Interestingly, by 2010, the racial divide has largely disappeared. This evidence suggests that the racial conflict that earlier scholars described as defining New York politics may no longer be as significant as it once was. Instead, as Figure 2.8 shows, a progressive/moderate divide is now the primary intraparty division within the New York City Council. This division starts small in 2010, with 12 progressive members clustered together in space, and expands to be a significant divide by the 2014 term. Importantly, this divide is not merely a replication or subset of the race-based split identified in earlier terms under a different name, as the figures show that the coalition is made-up of both white

[22] All scalings are robust to a number of different methods, however.

[23] As with the vote analysis, this number is somewhat imbalanced, as over 90% of the choices not to sponsor are correctly classified, while only 40-50% of the decisions to sponsor are. This low number is to be expected, however, given the more variable nature of sponsorship and the small number of cosponsors, on average. Moreover, this classification rate is actually higher than running the same model on Congress. For comparison, I include results from a cosponsorship model on the 108th Congress in Appendix F.



Note: Democrats: 'D' (blue); Republicans: 'R' (red); Working Families (Democrats): 'W' (purple)

Figure 2.6: Cosponsorship Ideal Points by Party



Note: hite: 'w' (red); Black: 'b' (black); Hispanic: 'h' (blue) ; Asian: 'a' (blue)

Figure 2.7: Cosponsorship Ideal Points by Race

and non-white council members.

Though we observe clustering by race and caucus over this time period, these patterns of cosponsorship do not necessarily imply factions within the Democratic party; for example, it is possible that council members who are socially friendly may reach out to their friends when they need sponsors. This theory would be observationally equivalent with a theory of factional government. How do we know the difference? First, given that we see the cleavage structure change over time, it is less likely that bill sponsorship is purely a social action, particularly given that the council is largely dominated by incumbents. Second, qualitative evidence from the most recent speaker election suggests the progressive caucus is indeed acting strategically as a group, negotiating as a block of members, punishing its detractors by revoking committee chairmanships, and actively distributing funds to progressive candidates for the council. Third, if the cleavages identified in this section were to influence which bills got voted on, it would suggest that group membership is more than just a social bond. In the next section, I explore this third implication in greater depth.



Note: Democrats: 'D' (blue); Republicans: 'R' (red); Progressive Democrats: 'P' (green)

Figure 2.8: Cosponsorship Ideal Points by Progressive Membership

2.8 Intraparty Conflict and Agenda Control

If the observed differences in sponsorship patterns are indeed reflective of intraparty conflict in New York City, this conflict will likely be reflected in the legislative agenda. Indeed, scholars of state and national legislative politics have long argued that parties use their agenda powers to keep divisive issues off the floor, in an effort to ensure that a majority of the majority party approves of any bill that ultimately receives a vote. In turn, in New York City, we would expect that members of the minority faction would be less likely to see their bills receive a vote in any given term. In the case of the progressive caucus, in particular, this literature on agenda power would imply that council members who joined the caucus in its initial term—when it was only a small fraction of the chamber's membership, with minimal power and relatively more liberal ideas—would likely see their bills reach the floor at a lower rate. However, once the caucus took power in 2014, this pattern should reverse itself, with members of the caucus being more likely to have their bills on the agenda.

To evaluate this hypothesis, I aggregate all of the bills from the cosponsorship analysis and code them for whether or not they received a vote. I then link each bill to data about the bill's primary sponsor, including their party, incumbency status, borough, race, and whether they were a member of the progressive caucus or not. I also identify the committee that the bill was referred to and note the specific type of legislation (resolution or ordinance). Table 2.3 presents results from a series of linear probability models using the indicator for whether a bill was voted on as the dependant variable. I include all of the sponsor and bill level variables in these regressions and cluster the standard errors by member-term. Across all models the primary coefficient of interest is the indicator for whether the sponsor was a member of the progressive caucus.

The first two columns of Table 2.3 show results for the 2010 and 2014 terms only. Despite a relatively small number of clusters (members), we see patterns consistent with the hypothesis that progressive members were punished in 2010 and rewarded in 2014, seeing their bills receive a vote at rates 4 percent lower and higher than non-caucus members in each

term, respectively. To improve power and leverage the modest amount of within member variation in progressive caucus membership, in column 3 I use data from all five terms dating back to 2000. To account for differences across terms, I include term fixed effects, along with an interaction between the progressive indicator and the 2010-2013 term effect. Once again, we see patterns that are consistent with a theory of intraparty agenda control. Despite the increase in the number of members, the point estimates in column 3 remain somewhat imprecise, but suggest that progressive caucus members were nearly 5 percent more likely to see their bills hit the floor than moderate Democrats in 2014 compared to 3 percent less likely in 2010.

2.9 Conclusion

In this paper, I have explored the dimensions of conflict in New York City, arguing that Democratic dominance does not preclude the presence of factional politics. In doing so, I find evidence of a multidimensional voting space explained primarily by a liberal-conservative divide. However, I also find that roll call votes do not provide a complete picture of the cleavage structure of New York; indeed, when I analyze patterns of cosponsorship, I find evidence of two divisions within the Democratic party: a race-based divide in the 2002, 2004, and 2006 terms, and a progressive divide from 2010 onward. Importantly, these divides appear to be reflective of internal battles over the agenda, with patterns of agenda control showing that progressive caucus members have seen their bills reach the floor at different rates compared to non-caucus members over the past two terms.

What explains the changing landscape of politics in New York? Unfortunately, the answer to this question remains unclear; however, two mechanisms seem particularly plausible. First, the rise in progressivism may be a direct result of the Occupy Wall Street movement, which started in New York in the wake of the recession, and advocated for policies that would address the staggering amount of income inequality present in the city. This message aligns strongly with the Progressive Caucus's 'Statement of Principles,' in which they

Table 2.3: Sponsor Characteristics and Likelihood of Bill Receiving a Vote

	Dependent variable:		
	Bill Received a Vote		
	2010 Term	2014 Term	All Terms 2000+
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Progressive	−0.041	0.042	0.049*
	(0.046)	(0.028)	(0.029)
Progressive * 2010-2013 Term			−0.081
			(0.050)
Democrat	0.054	0.104	0.119**
	(0.109)	(0.091)	(0.052)
Incumbent	0.071	0.036	0.029
	(0.050)	(0.025)	(0.019)
Speaker	0.619***	0.463***	0.375***
	(0.039)	(0.042)	(0.058)
Black	0.072	0.050	−0.014
	(0.046)	(0.037)	(0.020)
Hispanic	0.146**	−0.017	0.026
	(0.060)	(0.030)	(0.027)
Resolution	−0.057*	−0.121***	−0.027*
	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.016)
State Leg. Resolution	0.801***	0.605***	0.143**
	(0.089)	(0.093)	(0.064)
Constant	0.960***	0.315**	0.805***
	(0.133)	(0.123)	(0.067)
Committee FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Boro FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Term FE	No	No	Yes
Observations	2,087	3,575	13,849
Councilmembers	52	51	111
R^2	0.488	0.378	0.454
Residual Std. Error	0.362 (df = 2037)	0.396 (df = 3523)	0.370 (df = 13786)

Note: Robust standard errors, clustered by member-term *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

advocate for "creating a more just and equal New York City, combating all forms of discrimination, and advancing public policies that offer genuine opportunity to all New Yorkers, especially those who have been left out of our society's prosperity."[24] Such a protest-driven mechanism would suggest that the rise of progressivism in New York is largely a bottom-up phenomenon. However, it's also possible that progressivism has trickled-down from the federal level as Democrats nationally responded to the financial crisis. In this case, the argument would be that as the Democratic party at the national level has become increasingly receptive to progressive ideas—and perhaps divided along progressive lines itself—this cleavage has pushed downward precisely to the areas that are most dominated by Democrats. Indeed, were credible partisan competition present, we might anticipate a much more unified Democratic front. However, which of these explanations, if either, is correct remains unclear. In turn, future work should examine the causes of this progressive shift more closely in both New York and one-party cities broadly.

[24] http://nycprogressives.com/statement-of-principles/

3 | Power at the Margins: When and How Political Parties Leverage Agenda Control

He who determines what politics is about runs the country, because the definition of the alternatives is the choice of conflicts, and the choice of conflicts allocates power

– E.E. Schattschneider[1]

3.1 Introduction

How the legislative agenda is constructed and obstructed is central to understanding political and policy outcomes in the United States. Indeed, the power to determine the scope of potential legislative conflicts, whether by moving issues forward in the lawmaking process or by preventing them from progressing at all, is a significant advantage within politics. Existing evidence suggests that political parties—and the majority party, in particular—are best situated to wield this power, using it specifically to keep internally divisive issues off the floor and, in the process, ensure that policy tends to reflect the preferences of a majority of their members (Cox and McCubbins 2005, 1993). Yet, while this negative agenda power is well-documented in both Congress and the state legislatures (Gailmard and Jenkins 2007; Cox, Kousser, and McCubbins 2010; Carson, Monroe, and Robinson 2011; Anzia and Jackman 2013; Jackman 2014), it remains unclear whether it is unique to political parties as institutions or is instead a feature of legislatures broadly. Indeed, agenda power does not necessarily require parties, and yet existing research on the agenda process in

[1] *The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America* (1960, p. 66)

the United States has focused primarily on the influence of the majority and minority party within partisan legislatures rather than differences in the agenda processes across partisan and nonpartisan governments.

In this paper, I delve into the second and third 'faces of power' in American politics to understand whether and how political parties influence the content of the legislative agenda. That is, I ask whether the distribution of bills that is either proposed or receives a vote within a legislature changes in the presence or absence of political parties. In doing so, I break from existing research in this area in two important ways: first, instead of making the majority party the focus of my analysis, I examine the differences in the agenda process between partisan and nonpartisan governments. The value to this approach is that it provides greater leverage to understand whether outcomes within the agenda process are a function of institutions and organized coalitions or individual preferences (Krehbiel 1993, 2007). Second, whereas much of the existing research on agenda power has used measures of partisan roll rates—that is, the share of bills on which a majority of the majority party is in the minority—to isolate the majority party advantage in the agenda process, we know far less about the tangible policy consequences of agenda power. In turn, I focus specifically on the substantive issue content of the legislative agenda, measuring the extent to which some issue areas are systematically more or less likely to receive a final vote in the presence of institutionalized party power.

The challenge to undertaking a study of this kind is that it requires a large set of nonpartisan legislatures to use as comparison cases within the analysis. No such set of governments exists at the state or national level in the United States.[2] To rectify this problem I turn to the local level of government instead, where approximately 80 percent of the nearly 90,000 municipal governments[3] across the country use nonpartisan elections

[2]Indeed, historically, there are only three cases of nonpartisan governments at the state or national level in the United States: the Confederate Congress, the Minnesota state legislature (1913 to 1974), and the Nebraska state legislature (1934 to present).

[3]See: `https://www.nlc.org/number-of-municipal-governments-population-distribution`

(Svara 2003).[4] Specifically, I gather agenda records from 110 city and county councils across the United States, a collection which includes over 379,000 proposed agenda items in total. By coding the policy content of each item, I am able to account for both the institutional and substantive features of the lawmaking process that may influence a policy proposal's ultimate fate. In addition, it also allows me to test theories about when parties should use their positive and negative agenda powers or whether they have particular incentives to use their agenda power in certain issue areas, such as those that are more habitually contentious or those that allow for greater position-taking among members.

Drawing on this new data, I first show that the issue content of the local agenda is nearly identical in partisan and nonpartisan governments. In other words, there are essentially no differences in what is proposed in the presence or absence of institutionalized parties. This is not a function of many nonpartisan governments having party-like coalitions or parties at the local level being particularly weak, as the first chapter of this dissertation has shown there is substantial variation in the cohesiveness of coalitions across partisan and nonpartisan governments at this level. Rather, the similarity in the agenda across governments suggests that parties either lack the power or incentive to prevent bills from being proposed. Indeed, though some theorists argue that power can often be exercised by creating powerlessness (Lukes 1974; Gaventa 1982), I find no evidence to support this claim in practice within legislatures. And indeed, this should hardly be surprising: even if the majority party has total control over its own members, creating an environment where it is costly to propose bills that are out-of-step with the party, the presence of two-party competition creates both an incentive and mechanism for these issues to ultimately make it onto the agenda in some form.

What happens, however, once a bill has been proposed? Despite little evidence of a difference in the content of the local agenda, I find clear differences in the types of issues that make it through the legislative process in partisan and nonpartisan governments. Con-

[4]This does not include the approximately 50,000 special districts, including school districts, across the country, the majority of which are also nonpartisan and often have their own legislative bodies.

sistent with existing theory, I find that bills in some of the most contentious local issue areas—redistribution, economic development, and public infrastructure—are less likely to receive a vote when parties are present. However, this negative agenda power is not the only way parties manipulate the agenda. Indeed, in the same way that parties have an incentive to constrain the agenda in contentious areas, they also have an incentive to expand it in others, particularly those that provide opportunities for position-taking and the provision of particularistic benefits. In practice, this means bills related to licensing or permitting, commendations, or issues areas where the government does not actually have policy authority, are more likely to receive a vote. In practice, however, the magnitude of these relationships—both positive and negative—are small, suggesting that agenda power operates largely at the margins within legislatures, with parties heeding the potential costs of overzealous agenda manipulation (Richman 2015).

The rest of this paper proceeds as follows: first, I discuss theories of power in the legislative context, developing clear predictions for how the substantive content of the agenda should change in the presence of parties. Next, I provide background on city and county councils and motivate the use of these bodies for research on legislative behavior. Third, I discuss the source, scope, and scale of the legislative records in my collection and document the process of coding policy content. Fourth, I present empirical results on how the presence of institutionalized parties influences the policy content of the agenda and the likelihood that a bill receives a vote. Finally, I discuss the implications of my findings and consider potential avenues for future research.

3.2 Political Parties, Power, and the Issue Agenda

Scholars of American politics have long sought to understand who holds power in government and how they wield it, proposing three specific types of power that are significant for political affairs. The first, and most easily observable, is simply the power to make decisions or to influence decision-making—in other words, the power to get things done.

The second, typically associated with Bachrach and Baratz (1962), is the ability to prevent issues, projects, or policies from advancing in the political process. As Bachrach and Baratz (1962, p. 948) explain:

> Of course power is exercised when A participates in the making of decisions that affect B. But power is also exercised when A devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing social and political values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the political process to public consideration of only those issues which are comparatively innocuous to A.

The third face of power, which in many ways is an off-shoot of the second, refers to the power to prevent issues from ever being raised at all (Lukes 1974; Gaventa 1982). Whereas the second face typically refers to the formal mechanisms through which an issue can be blocked from the agenda, the third face makes this power obsolete by simply making it too costly to propose. In other words, it creates powerlessness.

These forms of power are directly relevant for understanding the legislative process, and scholars have naturally sought to find evidence of them in both the congressional and state legislative contexts. The negative agenda power associated with the second face, in particular, has received a sizable amount of scholarly attention, with Cox and McCubbins (2005) formalizing it within the party cartel model and linking the use of negative agenda power specifically to the majority party's incentive to limit divisive issues from reaching the floor. The majority party's motivation to do this is twofold, in that doing so both protects the longevity of the coalition by minimizing the number of especially divisive votes and also ensures that, if the party enforces it, a majority of the majority party will support whatever policy ultimately sees a vote. Subsequent work in both Congress and the state legislatures has found similar evidence of the majority party using their negative agenda power to protect these interests (Gailmard and Jenkins 2007; Cox, Kousser, and McCubbins 2010; Carson, Monroe, and Robinson 2011), with much of this work finding that specific institutional arrangements empower parties to accomplish this task (Diermeier and Vlaicu 2011; Anzia and Jackman 2013; Jackman 2014).[5]

[5]For more skeptical arguments about majority party agenda power, however, see Schickler and Pearson

What remains less clear, however, is how specifically these tools are used to alter the substantive distribution of bills and issues that reach the floor and whether the use of agenda power is distinct to parties at all. Indeed, there is a vast literature on the value of parties as institutionalized coalitions, arguing that parties help members secure better outcomes by binding diverse interests together for the long term (Aldrich 1995; Bawn 1999; Bawn et al. 2012). Moreover, when parties are absent, these coalitions largely tend to disappear (Jenkins 1999; Wright and Schaffner 2002). Thus, there is certainly good reason to believe that institutionalized party organizations would be useful in trying to wield the levers of agenda power. Yet, given the recent work highlighting the role of specific, seemingly nonpartisan institutions like strong committees and control of the calendar by the legislative leader in empowering parties (Anzia and Jackman 2013), it is also possible that individuals and groups within nonpartisan governments can leverage these tools as well.

Empirically, even if nonpartisan governments are themselves uninteresting to scholars, understanding the agenda process within them—and how it compares to the process in partisan governments—is crucial to measuring party power. Indeed, as Krehbiel (2007) argues, "in the absence of a nonpartisan baseline model, inferences about majority party power are tenuous" (p. 2). The reason for this is that in many cases preferences may very well drive legislative outcomes despite the presence of parties. By comparing partisan governments to a nonpartisan baseline, however, scholars gain better leverage on the effects of parties as institutions themselves. In turn, if there are no differences between partisan and nonpartisan governments at any stage of the agenda process, then it would call into question the existing theoretical framework which suggests that parties constrain the agenda as a means to keep their coalitions cohesive.

The bulk of the existing evidence, however, suggests that in many contexts party agenda power is substantial (Gailmard and Jenkins 2007; Cox, Kousser, and McCubbins 2010; Carson, Monroe, and Robinson 2011; Anzia and Jackman 2013; Jackman 2014). Combined with recent work showing that local nonpartisan governments—despite being more ideologically

(2009) and Krehbiel, Meirowitz, and Wiseman (2015).

partisan than previously thought (Tausanovitch and Warshaw 2014; Einstein and Kogan 2015; Einstein and Glick 2016)—often lack strong legislative coalitions, the most theoretically sound prediction is that the agenda should differ across partisan and nonpartisan governments. If true, the question then becomes how specifically does the use of agenda power by parties alter the substantive issue content of the agenda. Most of the existing evidence has documented the presence of a majority party advantage through the use of roll rates, which are measured as the share of bills on which a majority of the majority party votes in the minority. The challenge with roll rates, however, is that while they may provide evidence of party power, they provide relatively little information about the substantive issues that gain or lose as a result of this power. And indeed, understanding on what issues parties use their agenda power and whether it alters the broader portfolio of policies that a legislature considers has important policy ramifications. While some scholars have documented particular issue areas on which political parties have tended to leverage this power—notably slavery and civil rights (Weingast 1998; Noel 2012)—no existing work has developed or tested theoretical predictions for how agenda power should affect the issue content of the policy agenda in the aggregate.

The clearest predictions based on existing research is that parties should seek to prevent bills within contentious issues areas from reaching the floor, with the goal being retaining a cohesive coalition (Cox and McCubbins 2005). If this is the case, then we should expect a lower share of bills from these areas to reach the floor. In the local context, specifically, this likely means policies that deal with economic development, redistribution, large-scale infrastructure projects and management, or policies that may increase costs for a large set of constituents. While early work in urban politics has argued that local politics is generally less confrontational, particularly on economic issues (Peterson 1981), the benefits and costs of economic growth are not typically equally distributed, and so economic and financial issues can be significant sources of conflict (Molotch 1976).This may be particularly true for bills and issue areas that affect geographically segregated communities differently, as race and class have both been shown to be importnt local cleavages that are exacerbated by

spatial segregation (Hajnal and Trounstine 2014; Trounstine 2016; Oliver 1999; Bucchianeri and Weitz 2018). Yet, while there is a good theoretical reason to expect to fewer bills in these contentious areas reach the floor in partisan governments, agenda control does not come without potential electoral costs (Richman 2015), and so we should not expect the power to be used excessively. As a result, if parties manipulate the agenda, they will likely do so at the margins, blocking the small percentage of bills that create significant challenges for their members. In turn, the absolute magnitude of the difference between partisan and nonpartisan governments in how often contentious bills see the floor should be relatively small.

While much of the scholarly literature has focused on negative agenda powers, parties also, in theory, have positive 'first face' agenda powers that they can use to support policies that help specific members or their coalition broadly. And indeed, in the same way that the party cartel model fuels the prediction that parties have an incentive to use their negative powers on certain types of issues, parties also have an incentive to use their positive powers to ensure the survival of specific legislative proposals. Specifically, and to the extent that parties and legislative institutions are indeed tools to facilitate reelection (Mayhew 1974), we should expect bills that facilitate position-taking, divide the majority and minority party clearly, and permit the provision of particularistic benefits to constituents to see the chamber floor at a higher rate. For local politics, in particular, bills of this kind are likely to be ceremonial in nature; to deal with licensing, permitting, or geographically specific city services; or to fall within issues area for which the local government does not actually have policy authority. This final category—the specific policy contents of which are typically determined by state governments—is one where local governments can call for popular policies or changes to be enacted but do not actually need to suffer the costs of implementation or potential failure. In other words, these areas provide precisely the type of position-taking opportunities that would benefit a partisan, reelection-seeking coalition. Moreover, unlike in nonpartisan governments where there may be a similar incentive to use these types of bills for position-taking and particularistic benefits, the institutional capacity of party coalitions

provides the power necessary to ensure that these types of bills do in fact progress forward in the legislative process.

3.3 Studying Legislative Behavior at the Local Level

The vast majority of research on legislative politics in the United States has taken place in Congress and the state legislatures. What, then, is the value of examining the legislative process at the local level? First and foremost, local governments are important actors for the development and implementation of public policy. Indeed, according to the Census, local governments—meaning all cities, counties, towns, and special districts—spent nearly 1.6 trillion dollars in 2010,[6] employing over 14 million government workers in the process.[7] Importantly, this spending, along with local government policymaking in general, is not limited solely to issues like police protection and waste management, which have traditionally been considered exclusively local issues; rather, local spending and policymaking cover a diverse array of policy areas, from economic development and transportation to infrastructure and public health. Moreover, in recent years, local governments have begun to push the boundaries of their policy authority, passing local ordinances related to issues like climate change, the minimum wage, and immigration, among others.[8]

This broad range of authority and increasing willingness to engage with issues that have traditionally been in the domain of state and national politics have led to recent findings that local governments are more partisan than originally thought. Indeed, while early work argued that local governments should be generally non-ideological (Peterson 1981), recent evidence suggests that partisanship and partisan ideology matter for local policy, even in

[6]Barnett, Jeffrey L. and Phillip M. Vidal. 2013. "State and Local Government Finances Summary: 2010." *United States Census Governments Division Briefs.* `https://www.census.gov/prod/2012pubs/g10-alfin.pdf`

[7]"State and Local Government Employment: Monthly Data." `https://goo.gl/37z18Q`

[8]Notably, this trend has not been restricted purely to the largest cities in the country, with many small cities and towns also considering these types of ordinances, particularly those that deal with social or environmental issues.

the large number of nonpartisan local governments (Tausanovitch and Warshaw 2014; Einstein and Kogan 2015; Einstein and Glick 2016; de Benedictis-Kessner and Warshaw 2016). Moreover, analyses of roll-call voting within local councils have found that both parties and, in some cases, nonpartisan ideological groups can form cohesive, long-term coalitions that produce low-dimensional patterns of legislative behavior. This suggests that internal legislative dynamics have the potential to be of significant importance for local politics, while the increasing trend towards ideological issues and ideological governance suggest that local governments may be more comparable to other levels than early early scholars imagined.

When these recent trends are coupled with the fact there are nearly 40,000 municipal governments across the United States, situated in a variety of political and institutional contexts not always present at higher levels of government, it becomes clear that local governments present a significant opportunity for scholars of political institutions and legislative behavior (Trounstine 2010). Indeed, the analysis in this paper would not be possible at a similar scale at the state or national level because there are only three historical or modern cases of nonpartisan governments at these levels to use as comparison cases. Yet, despite the value of studying local legislative bodies, the sheer number of them has created challenges for data collection, which is why only a handful of studies to date have used local roll calls or agenda items in their analyses, the majority of which have had to focus on a small number of local governments over a short period of time (Simpson 2001; Austin 2002; Burnett and Kogan 2014; Santucci 2017; Burnett 2017).[9] In this paper, I begin to rectify the challenges of data availability at the local level by gathering a new source of legislative records to facilitate research on local councils moving forward.

[9]This, of course, does not diminish their contribution, but simply makes it difficult to leverage many of the tools and methods now being employed at the state level to take advantage of the cross-sectional variation.

3.4 Data and Measurement

In total, the data used in this paper covers 110 cities and counties across the United States, including 810 unique government-years of data and over 379,000 unique legislative proposals. All of this data was gathered directly from official government websites that local councils use specifically to manage their legislative agendas. In contrast to the majority of local governments, which tend to post semi-structured minutes files for each individual meeting, all of the local councils in my sample use a searchable platform called 'Legistar' that records the entire legislative process for a proposed bill. Thus, for each of the agenda items in my data, I know when the item was proposed, what its current status is, which legislative body is currently in control, and what actions have occurred thus far, such as whether the proposal was amended, recommended in committee, or withdrawn. Figure 3.1 shows an example of what this looks like for an ordinance related to evictions in New York City.[10] While not all local governments record the intervening legislative process with the same detail as New York—both because of recording practice differences and levels of professionalism—I nevertheless have a number of potential pieces of information for each municipality in my data to determine whether a bill ultimately received a vote.

Importantly, the benefit to collecting data from a source of this kind is that I am able to see bills and resolutions that were proposed but did not ultimately receive a vote. This is valuable because many studies that have considered agenda power, particularly those that use roll rates, only focus on final passage votes and implicitly assume but do not actually measure changes to the agenda. Accounting for the full proposal distribution, however, eliminates the problem that arises from only focusing on final passage votes and guarantees that any differences observed are indeed due to changes in the what legislators are voting on. However, to some extent, and perhaps for some cities more than others, I am still relying on city clerks to record all proposed bills into the system as opposed to simply recording final action. As a result, there may be some mismeasurement of this kind—that is, where bills

[10]Too see the full platform for New York City, see: `http://legistar.council.nyc.gov`.



THE NEW YORK CITY COUNCIL
Corey Johnson, Speaker
LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH CENTER
Sign In

Council Home | Legislation | Calendar | City Council | Committees

RSS Alerts

Details | Reports

File #:	Int 1164-2016 Version: A	Name:	Information regarding unlawful evictions.
Type:	Introduction	Status:	Enacted
		Committee:	Committee on General Welfare
On agenda:	4/20/2016		
Enactment date:	2/15/2017	Law number:	2017/012

Title: A Local Law to amend the administrative code of the city of New York, in relation to information regarding unlawful evictions

Sponsors: Corey D. Johnson, Stephen T. Levin, Ritchie J. Torres, Donovan J. Richards, Margaret S. Chin, Inez D. Barron, Deborah L. Rose, Vincent J. Gentile, Karen Koslowitz, Rafael Salamanca, Jr., Robert E. Cornegy, Jr., Vanessa L. Gibson, Rafael L. Espinal, Jr., Helen K. Rosenthal, Ydanis A. Rodriguez, Brad S. Lander, Annabel Palma, The Public Advocate (Ms. James)

Council Member Sponsors: 18

Summary: The bill would require the Human Resources Administration (HRA) to provide rental subsidy recipients with a written statement explaining the protections of Section 26-521 of the Administrative Code, which prohibits unlawful evictions. The bill would require HRA to provide the notice when the applicant initially applies for the subsidy and at any point HRA determines to be appropriate. If the applicant chooses, HRA may send the notice electronically.

Attachments: 1. Legislative History Report, 2. Summary of Int. No. 1164-A, 3. Summary of Int. No. 1164, 4. Int. No. 1164 - 4/20/16, 5. April 20, 2016 - Stated Meeting Agenda with Links to Files, 6. Committee Report 10/6/16, 7. Hearing Testimony 10/6/16, 8. Hearing Transcript 10/6/16, 9. Proposed Int. No. 1164-A - 2/2/17, 10. Committee Report 1/31/17, 11. Hearing Transcript 1/31/17, 12. February 1, 2017 - Stated Meeting Agenda with Links to Files, 13. Hearing Transcript - Stated Meeting 2-1-17, 14. Minutes of the Stated Meeting - February 1, 2017, 15. Fiscal Impact Statement, 16. Int. No. 1164-A (FINAL), 17. Mayor's Letter, 18. Local Law 12

History (15) | Text

15 records | Group | Export

Date	Ver.	Prime Sponsor	Action By	Action	Result	Action Details	Meeting Details	Multimedia
2/16/2017	A	Corey D. Johnson	City Council	Recved from Mayor by Council		Action details	Meeting details	Not available
2/15/2017	A	Corey D. Johnson	Mayor	Signed Into Law by Mayor		Action details	Meeting details	Not available
2/15/2017	A	Corey D. Johnson	Mayor	Hearing Held by Mayor		Action details	Meeting details	Not available
2/1/2017	A	Corey D. Johnson	City Council	Sent to Mayor by Council		Action details	Meeting details	Not available
2/1/2017	A	Corey D. Johnson	City Council	Approved by Council	Pass	Action details	Meeting details	Not available
1/31/2017	*	Corey D. Johnson	Committee on General Welfare	Hearing Held by Committee		Action details	Meeting details	Not available
1/31/2017	*	Corey D. Johnson	Committee on General Welfare	Amendment Proposed by Comm		Action details	Meeting details	Not available
1/31/2017	*	Corey D. Johnson	Committee on General Welfare	Amended by Committee		Action details	Meeting details	Not available
1/31/2017	A	Corey D. Johnson	Committee on General Welfare	Approved by Committee	Pass	Action details	Meeting details	Not available
10/6/2016	*	Corey D. Johnson	Committee on Housing and Buildings	Laid Over by Committee		Action details	Meeting details	Not available
10/6/2016	*	Corey D. Johnson	Committee on Housing and Buildings	Hearing Held by Committee		Action details	Meeting details	Not available
10/6/2016	*	Corey D. Johnson	Committee on General Welfare	Laid Over by Committee		Action details	Meeting details	Not available
10/6/2016	*	Corey D. Johnson	Committee on General Welfare	Hearing Held by Committee		Action details	Meeting details	Not available
4/20/2016	*	Corey D. Johnson	City Council	Referred to Comm by Council		Action details	Meeting details	Not available
4/20/2016	*	Corey D. Johnson	City Council	Introduced by Council		Action details	Meeting details	Not available

Figure 3.1: Legistar Page for an Enacted New York City Ordinance

for some cities are not included in the sample because they were discussed but not formally proposed or scheduled for any legislative activity. Of course, this problem is not unique to this particular analysis; rather, it is endemic to studies of the legislative agenda. However, at the very least, state sunshine laws, which provide for public access to the lawmaking process, should minimize the magnitude of this concern. In addition, where possible, I account for baseline government-level recording practices by using random effects for each government.

3.4.1 Coding Policy Content and Policy Outcomes

To examine how parties shape the issue content of the agenda, I first code all of the proposals in my data set by policy area and status within the legislative process. While there are a number of machine-learning based methods to code topical content, preliminary testing of a supervised text model yielded poor results, largely due to the differences in formulaic bill language across cities—that is, the similar language that bills from Chicago, for example, use regardless of policy content drove government-specific as opposed to topical matches. Instead, I use a simple, dictionary-based method that codes each proposal for membership in a set of 12 nonexclusive policy categories. Thus, for the public safety topic, for example, I code a bill as falling within this policy area if it includes any of the following terms: “public safety", “police",“law enforcement", “sheriff", “jail", “prison", “fire", “firefight", “theft", “violence", “weapon", “crime", “gun", “criminal", “graffiti", “offender", “predator", “terror", “homeland". The full list of policy topics, along with the different subtopics that are included within them, is shown in Table G.1. In addition, a complete list of the search terms used for each topic can be found in Appendix G.[11]

Interestingly, though the bill topics are not mutually exclusive, meaning that any given bill can be coded as multiple topics, there is relatively minimal correlation between topics. Figure 3.2 depicts each of the pairwise correlations for all of the topics included in Table

[11]Note that in some cases, I excluded bills from a topic if they matched my initial search but included an additional term. For example, when searching for parks and recreation bills, I included the term “park" but also dropped all bills with the word “parking". Excluding bills in this manner was necessary to prevent mismatches from terms with multiple meanings or common roots.

Table 3.1: Local Legislation Policy Topics and Sub-Topics

Topic	**Included Sub-Topics**
Commemorative	Tributes, Commendations, Memorials
Education	K–12, Community Colleges, Universities
Economic Development	Growth, Improvement Districts, Urban Renewal, Jobs
Fiscal	Budget, Appropriations, Taxes, Contracts, Bonds, Wages
Health & Human Services	Public Health, Hospitals, Homelessness, Treatment Centers
Land Use	Zoning, Building Codes, Variances, Conditional Use Permits
Licenses	Liquor Licenses, Inspections, Permits
Parks & Recreation	Parks, Playgrounds, Pools, Beaches, Sports
Political	Appointments, Elections, State/Fed. Legislation, Charter Amend.
Public Safety	Police, Fire, Corrections, Crime, Terrorism
Public Transportation	Subway, Buses, Taxis, Ridesharing, Ferries, Bike Paths
Utilities	Electricity, Gas, Sewers, Telecom

G.1. As the correlation plot shows, the strongest correlation exists between issues related to land use and economic development at .43, which makes sense given that many of the economic development bills relate to specific building projects or growth zones. All of the remaining topic-to-topic correlations are below .20. This suggests that, for the most part, the coding process was successful in identifying unique policy areas, and that the results presented in subsequent sections are unlikely to be driven by cross-topic correlations.



Figure 3.2: Pairwise Correlation Between Bill Topics

In order to code the status of each bill, specifically whether or not it made it to the floor and received a final vote, I start by using the bill-specific status indicators from Legistar. Unfortunately, these are not standardized automatically by the hosting platform, so there are approximately 6,000 unique statuses across all governments. In addition, in a small

percentage of cases, the statuses may not reflect the most recent action. In turn, I proceed by first coding any bill that clearly passed, failed, or was vetoed as having received a vote. For the purposes of this analysis, I consider a bill that passed on a first reading but was not brought up for an additional reading as not having received a final vote because it was, for whatever reason, killed during the legislative process. Similarly I code any bill that was tabled, withdrawn, laid over, or any other similar legislative term as not having received a vote. For all remaining statuses, which includes things like “in committee" and “agenda ready," I assume that the bill is either in progress, which will be accounted for by year-specific fixed effects, where applicable, or that it never received a final vote despite not having been coded explicitly. The one exception to this is bills that are coded as being on the consent agenda but lack an indicator that the bill ultimately passed. In these cases, I assume the bill remained on the consent agenda unless I have information to suggest otherwise. Finally, I cross-check all of the unclear statuses with the most recent set of actions for each bill and update the status if the action information indicates the bill progressed further than the primary status indicates. Ultimately, after completing this procedure, 89 percent of all bills, resolutions, appointments, and contract items received a vote, with, as Figure 3.3 shows, quite a bit of heterogeneity across cities and over time. Note that the decline in voting-rates in 2017 for many of the governments in my sample stems directly from the large number of bills that remained active in the legislative process at the time the data was gathered.

3.5 The Issue Content of the Legislative Agenda

What does the distribution of proposed legislative items look like in partisan and non-partisan councils? That is, does the policy content of what is proposed differ in the presence or absence of parties? On the one hand, if party power is all-encompassing, such that they can create an environment where there are costs to proposing a bill that is out-of-step with the majority of the party, we should expect to see differences in the issue content of the agenda in partisan and nonpartisan governments. On the other hand, given the potentially



Figure 3.3: Share of All Legislative Items that Received a Final Vote by Government and Year

more routine nature of local politics, combined with the incentive for legislators to propose bills that benefit them personally, parties may have little ability or desire to wield this power in practice. In this section, I show that this latter description of legislative politics is more accurate for understanding what gets proposed, with few differences in the content of the agenda across partisan and nonpartisan governments.

To see this in practice, Figure 3.4 plots the distribution of topic shares for each policy area by type of government. That is, for each city and county in my data, I calculate the mean share of all bills that are coded as a specific topic and plot the distribution of this statistic for all cities and counties. If the scope of the legislative agenda in partisan and nonpartisan governments tends to be similar, these distributions should largely overlap. And indeed, this is precisely what Figure 3.4 shows. While there is certainly some imbalance across partisan and nonpartisan governments, particularly for Utilities, Licenses, and Parks

and Recreation, these imbalances are generally quite small.

One challenge with simply comparing the baseline policy distributions is that doing so fails to account account for other features of these governments, such as their size or the number of policy areas over which they actually have authority. To better adjust for these factors, I conduct a series of linear regressions for which the dependent variable is the share of a city or county's bills that are coded as a being a specific policy topic. On the right hand side, in addition to an indicator for whether the government uses partisan elections, I also include a collection of institutional and demographic factors that are likely to influence the content of the local agenda, including the form of government, whether there is a chief appointed officer, the log total number of council members, if the mayor has veto power, the scope of government authority,[12] and census estimates for total population, share non-white, percent with a college degree, and log total amount of direct general expenditures. Figure 3.5 shows the coefficient on partisan elections from each of these models, along with 95% confidence intervals. In addition, to improve the quality of the individual comparisons, Figure 3.6 presents simple difference in means estimates (Partisan - Nonpartisan) for a subset of 42 matched councils.[13] Regardless of method, the results show minimal evidence of a difference in agenda content across partisan and nonpartisan governments, rejecting the null hypothesis in only one of the 24 empirical tests. Moreover, on average, the point estimates are relatively small, with nearly all of the point estimates being less than or equal to 2.5% in absolute magnitude.

In many ways, these results should not be entirely surprising—indeed, given the individual nature of American political campaigns, legislators have an incentive to propose bills

[12]I follow Hajnal and Trounstine (2014) and construct this measure by taking the share of the 25 different spending categories in the 2012 Census of Governments for which each local government has positive spending. These spending measures include: air transportation, corrections, KâĂŞ-12 education, higher education, fire protection, police protection, health, hospitals, highways, housing/community development, libraries, natural resources, parking, parks and recreation, protective inspections and regulations, public welfare, sewers, solid waste management, water transport and terminals, natural resources, liquor stores, water utilities, electric utilities, gas utilities, and transportation utilities.

[13]For the matching analysis, I match on a policy-specific measure of spending—e.g., whether the government had any positive education spending when evaluating the education topic—instead of the aggregate scope measure.



Figure 3.4: Distribution of Agenda Topic Share for each Policy Area by Type of Government

regardless of what their party prefers. Moreover, perhaps unique to local governments, the rigidity of many of the issues that get put on the agenda—licensing, permits, land use decisions, contracts—means that the aggregate agenda should be similar regardless of whether parties are present. Still, the results suggests that—to the extent that parties wield power over the agenda—they largely do not do it by preventing introductions. The next section, however, considers whether parties can manipulate the agenda after a bill has been proposed.

3.6 When and Why do Parties Impede Legislation?

While parties may lack the ability or desire to prevent bills from being proposed, do they manipulate what ultimately receives a vote? If so, what are the substantive policy consequences? If existing theory is correct, we should expect to see bills in contentious policy areas receive a vote at a lower rate in partisan governments (Cox and McCubbins 2005). In addition, given the incentive that parties have to facilitate the reelection of their members, there is also good reason to expect that bills that allow for position-taking or provide particularistic benefits to constituents should receive a vote at a higher rate when parties are present.

To evaluate these hypotheses, I model the likelihood that a bill receives a vote as a function of both the policy area and the same battery of government level covariates as used in the previous analysis. In addition to these variables, I include year fixed effects and interactions between the indicator for partisan elections and each policy area. I include the interactions to estimate the policy-specific differences in the likelihood of receiving a vote across partisan and nonpartisan governments. I estimate the model in two ways, using OLS with standard errors clustered by municipality and fitting it hierarchically with varying intercepts for each government. The value of fitting a hierarchical model for this application is that it allows me to include the full battery of covariates while also accounting for unobserved city or county-level factors that may influence the baseline probability that a bill receives a vote in each particular context. Accounting for this variation is particularly



Figure 3.5: Partisan Election Coefficient from Regressions of Policy Topic Share on Government-Level Factors



Figure 3.6: Difference in Mean Topic Shares for Matched Partisan and Nonpartisan Councils

important given the differences in recording practices across governments. For some of the hierarchical models included in Appendix H, I follow Bafumi and Gelman (2006) and include the average topic share for each city and county government as a group-level covariate to account for potential correlation between the individual-level covariates and group-level intercepts. In addition, to account for more systematic differences between partisan and nonpartisan governments and to improve the quality of the comparisons, I conduct the same analysis within policy area for a matched set of 42 councils. The results of this analysis, which are included in Appendix I, are generally consistent with those presented in the main text but less precise given the smaller sample size.

Figure 3.7 depicts the estimated difference in the probability that a bill within a particular policy area receives a vote between partisan and nonpartisan councils. Full regression results can be found in Appendix H. Unlike the estimates of agenda content, Figure 3.7 shows quite a bit of variation in the likelihood that a bill receives a vote across council types, both positive and negative. Notably, there is a modest difference in the uncertainty of the estimates for some policy areas depending on the estimation strategy. However, despite this, the magnitudes of the estimates are quite consistent across models. Specifically, bills related to public utilities and health and human services are both less likely to see a vote in partisan councils. Both of these areas are particularly contentious local issues. Health and human services, for example, is often redistributive in focus, including programs and spending targeted at hospitals, homelessness, and treatment centers. Similarly, the bills related to utilities are also relatively contentious, often involving spending on large public infrastructure projects or decisions about rates and financing.

In contrast, the bills that are likely to see the floor at a higher rate include those that are related to licenses, commendations, and—to a lesser extent—politics and education. The increase in these areas is consistent with the theory that parties will help their members by facilitating position-taking and the provision of particularistic goods. Indeed, licenses tend to be relatively narrow in scope and benefit specific individuals; commemorative bills are an opportunity to celebrate individuals and communities or support issues of particular



Figure 3.7: Estimated Difference in Probability of Bill Receiving a Vote between Partisan and Nonpartisan Councils

concern to constituents; political issues, the bulk of which are appointments, often stand to benefit the party directly; and education is an issue for which few local councils actually have direct authority but many constituents have a significant interest.

Ultimately, the evidence in this section is consistent with existing theories of partisan agenda control, but also shows that agenda power is not restricted solely to impeding legislation; rather, in issue areas that either benefit the party directly or have the potential to benefit majority party members in their reelection efforts, parties permit a larger share of legislation to reach the floor. This contributes to our understanding of legislative agenda power by showing that parties leverage their institutional advantages differently depending on the policy context and that, in many instances, this means they favor some policy over others.

3.7 Conclusion

How do political parties shape the issue content of the legislative agenda? In this paper, I have argued that political parties leverage both their positive and negative agenda powers to manipulate the agenda for the gain of their members. Specifically, drawing on a large collection of legislative records from a diverse set of city and county councils, I show that in partisan governments agenda items within contentious issue areas are less likely to reach the floor, while those that facilitate position-taking and the provision of particularistic benefits are more likely to. This evidence is consistent with existing theory that parties seek to keep divisive issues off the agenda (Cox and McCubbins 2005); however, it also suggests that these existing explanations are incomplete. Indeed, while much of the literature has focused on the majority party's use of negative agenda power, I show that positive agenda powers are important as well. In many ways, this should not be surprising: in the same way that parties have an incentive to constrain the agenda when it prevents internal discord, they also have an incentive to expand it when it will benefit their members electoral prospects.

In addition, though this paper finds evidence in support of party agenda power, it also suggests that agenda power is, by and large, limited in scale. That is, agenda power is certainly important for legislative outcomes but employing it too frequently comes with potential costs (Richman 2015), and so parties only use it for the small percentage of bills that present significant challenges for their members. Of course, it is possible that this might be different at the state or national level. Indeed, many of the issues that come before local governments are relatively rote in nature—approving individual land-use requests and small contracts, for example—and so future work should consider the substantive policy consequences of agenda power at other levels to better understand the scale at which parties can alter the issue agenda.

A Appendix to Chapter 1: Sample and Measurement

A.1 Descriptive Statistics

Table A.1: Summary Statistics for Cities and Counties in Sample

Statistic	N	Median	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Population	132	74,542	352,881.80	948,252.90	4,958	8,175,133
Percent Urban	132	1.00	0.94	0.16	0.15	1.00
Percent Non-Hispanic White	132	0.65	0.61	0.21	0.12	0.96
Percent Black	132	0.08	0.13	0.14	0.005	0.64
Percent Hispanic	132	0.12	0.18	0.16	0.01	0.75
Median Rent	132	892	936.34	259.18	526	2,001
Percent HS Grads	132	0.88	0.87	0.07	0.60	0.99
Median HH Income	132	50,955.5	56,942.48	19,949.55	26,734	131,723
Percent HH Poverty	132	0.12	0.13	0.06	0.03	0.36
2008 Dem. Vote Share	126	57.86	58.04	16.32	22.91	94.57
City Ideology	83	−0.11	−0.14	0.33	−1.00	0.60



Figure A.1: Total Number of Councils in Full Legistar Sample by Year

Figure A.1 shows the total number of cities and counties in my sample using Legistar over time. As the trend shows, most of the cities and counties using the platform adopted it in the past few years, and so I restrict the sample to this period (2012 onward) to ensure that I am comparing a similar set of local governments during a time span when they were nearly all using the service.

A.2 Baseline Factors Affecting Measurement

Figure A.2 shows the relationship between the log total number of votes included in the scaling model and the resulting APRE for the model. Regardless of the council size, we see a modest negative relationship between these two measures, such that the scaling model does not fit as well in councils with a high number of votes. Similarly, Figure A.3 shows the distribution of APRE councils that are of a similar size. While there is considerable variation within each of these groups, the median APRE decreases with the size of the council. While this may be a function of council size making it easier or harder to come to negotiate and come to a consensus, it also is likely reflective of the fact that in small councils, there are simply fewer potential orderings of ideal points possible, which means the model should improve fit. As a result, I account for both of these measurement-related factor throughout the analysis.



Figure A.2: Relationship between the APRE Statistic and Log Total Contested Votes



Figure A.3: Distribution of APRE Statistic by Council Size Groups

B | Appendix to Chapter 1: Legistar Cities and Counties in Context

B.1 How Does the Sample Compare to the Population?

How similar are the cities and counties that use Legistar to management their council records to those that do not? To answer this question, I first gather data on all cities and counties with a population of 4,500 or higher. I use this population threshold because the smallest municipality in my sample of 132 cities and counties (Indian Wells, CA) has a population of 4,958, and there are a significant number of cities across the United States that are smaller than and may not be comparable. Indeed, dropping all cities and counties below this value eliminates 70 percent of municipalities but only 5 percent of the U.S. population living in incorporated areas.

After subsetting the data to a comparable population, I next compare the distributions of all municipal governments in the sample and population across 6 background characteristics. These include: total population (logged), percent non-hispanic white, percent urban, percent of residents with a 4-year college degree, the gini coefficient (measuring local income inequality), and my measure of government scope. As Figure B.1 shows, there are substantial differences across these two groups, even after omitting the smallest of municipalities in the population. Specifically the cities and counties in my sample are—to varying degrees—larger in size, more racially diverse, more urban, more highly educated, more unequal, and govern in a broader range of policy areas. In many ways, however, this makes sense: content management platforms are not free, and so only cities that are large, with broad authority and relatively more engaged constituents are likely to sign on. Thus, the results in this

paper should be interpreted primarily as applying to these types of local governments.



Figure B.1: Characteristics of Cities and Counties in Sample and Population

B.2 Comparing Included and Omitted Legistar Councils

At the time of data collection, 180 cities and counties used Legistar to manage their legislative records. Since these governments adopted the service at different times, with many only doing so recently, there were a number of cities with only a small number of contested votes. As a result, I only included cities and counties in the main analysis if they had at least 20 contested votes. A cutoff of this kind is necessary to ensure that the scaling results are not simply a function of noise from a small number of votes. To evaluate the consequences of this decision, in Figure B.2, I compare the baseline features of the cities and counties that are included and excluded from the analysis. As the plot shows, there is very little difference between the governments that are included and excluded as a result of this criteria.

Next, to identify whether the specific choice of cutoff affects the results, I estimate a series of regressions that are identical to those presented in Table 1.2, Column 2, but with thresholds for the minimum number of contested votes that range from 10 to 50. In Figure B.3, I plot the coefficient on partisan elections and the interaction between partisan elections and partisan imbalance from each these regressions, along with 90 and 95% confidence intervals. The x-axis on the plot indicates the threshold for inclusion in the sample—so, a value of 30 means all cities and counties with at least 30 contested votes are included—and the y-axis corresponds with the value of the coefficient. The text at the bottom of the plot indicates the sample size. Despite increasingly smaller samples, the point estimates for both coefficients are remarkably stable across all thresholds. This suggests that the specific threshold and composition of the sample that results from it is unlikely to be driving the results.



Figure B.2: Characteristics of the Legistar Councils that are Included and Excluded from the Analysis



Figure B.3: Examining the Stability of the Results across Contested Vote Thresholds

C | Appendix to Chapter 1: Results Using Alternative Measures of Fit

Table C.1: Alternate DV: Variance Explained by 1st Dimension

	Percent of Variance Explained by 1st Dimension					
			OLS			WLS
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Partisan Elec.	0.21^{**}	0.21^{**}	0.23^{**}	0.16	0.21^{*}	0.21^{**}
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.07)
Partisan Imbalance	0.10	0.09	0.10	0.04	0.13	0.08
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.08)
Partisan Elec * Imbalance	-0.44^{**}	-0.48^{**}	-0.53^{**}	-0.39	-0.56^{*}	-0.47^{**}
	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.27)	(0.26)	(0.17)
% Non-White		-0.06	-0.06	0.03	-0.08	-0.01
		(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Government Scope		-0.04	-0.02	0.16	0.05	-0.07
		(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.13)
log(Total Population)		-0.01	-0.01	-0.05	-0.03	-0.005
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
% 4-Year College		-0.05	-0.04	-0.10	-0.08	0.003
		(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.11)
log(Direct Expenditures)		0.03	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.02
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
log(Total Votes Scaled)	-0.08^{**}	-0.08^{**}	-0.09^{**}	-0.06^{**}	-0.09^{**}	-0.07^{**}
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	0.97^{**}	0.82^{**}	0.76^{**}	0.79^{**}	0.73^{**}	0.77^{**}
	(0.07)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.22)	(0.19)	(0.16)
Council Group FE	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Exact Council Size FE	No	No	Yes	No	No	No
State FE	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Omit Large Councils (>= 10)	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
N	126	126	126	126	98	126
R^2	0.53	0.54	0.59	0.64	0.49	0.52

$^{+}$p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01

Table C.2: Alternate DV: Percent 'Nay' Votes Correctly Classified

	Percent of Nay Votes Correctly Classified					
	OLS					WLS
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Partisan Elec.	0.07*	0.07*	0.07*	0.10*	0.06	0.06*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Partisan Imbalance	0.01	0.01	0.004	0.01	−0.0003	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Partisan Elec * Imbalance	−0.13+	−0.14+	−0.16+	−0.26*	−0.14	−0.13+
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.07)
% Non-White		−0.01	−0.01	0.03	−0.02	0.001
		(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Government Scope		−0.02	−0.02	0.05	0.03	−0.02
		(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.06)
log(Total Population)		0.002	0.001	−0.01	−0.01	0.003
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
% 4-Year College		−0.01	−0.02	−0.03	−0.06	0.01
		(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
log(Direct Expenditures)		0.005	0.01	0.004	0.01	0.004
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
log(Total Votes Scaled)	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	0.001	−0.01	−0.004
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	0.93**	0.87**	0.86**	0.93**	0.91**	0.84**
	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Council Group FE	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Exact Council Size FE	No	No	Yes	No	No	No
State FE	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Omit Large Councils (>= 10)	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
N	126	126	126	126	98	126
R^2	0.26	0.27	0.40	0.39	0.24	0.27

+p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01

D | Appendix to Chapter 1: Term-Specific Scaling Results for San Francisco

In order to see the patterns of conflict within San Francisco more clearly, Figure D.1 depicts ideal points estimated separately via optimal classification for each term of the San Francisco Board of Supervisors since 2000. One reason to do this is because we might be concerned that the dynamic, one-dimensional model shown in the main text, by virtue of model the member changes over time, may be overstating the degree of continuity in the political system. In turn, examining the patterns of conflict individually by term ensures that the stable coalitions in we see in the dynamic plot do not shift at different points over this time period and in a way that the dynamic model is unable to capture. Looking across all of the terms depicted in Figure D.1 we see strong evidence that the progressive-moderate divide has been a significant feature of San Francisco politics over the past eight terms. Specifically, in each term, we see that progressives tend to clump together on the left, moderates on the right, and those members that media reports depicted as being in-between or provided no clear information about faction affiliation as being relatively central. Notably, we see some evidence of polarization increasing over this time period, with progressives and moderates being further apart and less likely to overlap during the most recent three terms. This pattern should not be too surprising given the modest increase in the term-specific APRE statistics (shown in Figure 1.6) over this time period.



Figure D.1: Optimal Classification Ideal Points Estimated Separately for Each Term of the San Francisco Board of Supervisors

E | Appendix to Chapter 2: Example Legislation by Category

Introduction: *"A Local Law to amend the administrative code of the city of New York, in relation to requiring motion detectors for commercial buildings."* (2008: Alan J. Gerson)

Land Use: *"Application no. 20115581 TCM, pursuant to Âğ20-226 of the Administrative Code of the City of New York, concerning the petition of Da Silvano Corp. d.b.a Da Silvano to continue to maintain and operate an unenclosed sidewalk cafe located at 260 Sixth Avenue, Borough of Manhattan, Council District no.3. This application is subject to review and action by the Land Use Committee only if called-up by vote of the Council pursuant to Rule 11.20b of the Council and Âğ20-226(g) of the New York City Administrative Code."* (2011: Leroy G. Comrie)

Resolution: *"Resolution urging the Department of Education and the Department of Sanitation to immediately implement school recycling programs in all New York City public and private schools."* (2009: Bill De Blasio)

State Legislation Resolution (SLR): *"State Legislation Resolution requesting the New York State Legislature to pass a bill introduced by Assembly Member Stringer A.1099, "An ACT to amend the administrative code of the city of New York, in relation to requiring child safety seats in taxicabs and liveries.""* (2005: Joel Rivera)

F | Appendix to Chapter 2: Consponsoship Scaling in Congress

Is scaling cosponsorship decisions an effective method to recover legislative cleavages? One simple way to validate the method is to test it in a context where the divides with the legislature are more well known. In this section, I apply the same scaling procedure that I used on the New York City Council to the House of Representatives from the 108th Congress. As FIgure F.1 shows, the estimated ideal points from using cosponsorship in this context depict a legislature that aligns strongly with our understanding of Congress, such that, in general, Democrats tend to work with Democrats and Republicans tend to work with Republicans.

There are two areas where the cosponsorship model diverges from the results of vote scaling models in the same context. First, the amount of polarization between the parties appears far less severe when using cosponsorship decisions as opposed to votes. Second, even though the model correctly classifies nearly 90 percent of the sponsorship decisions, its relative predictive power is quite modest, accurately classifying only 35 percent of the affirmative decisions to sponsor and reducing classification errors by only around 20 percent (compared to a null model where all members behave identically). In many ways, these divergences make sense: there are far more bills proposed than receive a vote and most bills have only a few sponsors, making accurate classification quite difficult. However, despite these challenges, the model still reproduces the well-known partisan divide in Congress, which suggests that we can still learn about legislative behavior using these methods.



Figure F.1: Results from 2D W-Nominate Model on Cosponsorships in the 108th Congress

G | Appendix to Chapter 3: Topic Coding Process

The following 12 topics are not mutually exclusive. Searches were performed independently for each topic. In some cases, spaces and regular expressions were added to limit mismatches (e.g., searching for " tribute|^tribute" instead of "tribute" prevents a match on the word "contribute" and matches "tribute" at the beginning of a sentence.) Please see the replication file, when published, for exact modifications of this kind.

The initial lists of search terms for commemorative and fiscal bills were drawn from Volden and Wiseman (2014) and Fouirnaies and Hall (2018), respectively. These lists were subsequently supplemented and adjusted for the local context. Lists for the other 10 terms were developed iteratively, starting with bills from the relevant committees (where applicable) and bills within specific clerk-coded topics (only available for a small subset of cities).

Table G.1: Local Legislation Policy Topics and Bill Search Terms

Topic	**Bill Search Terms**	**Excluded Terms**
Commemorative	expressing support, urging, condol, commemorat, honor, memoria, congratul, recogni, public holiday, rename, for the private relief of, for the relief of, medal, mint coin, posthumous, encourag, provide for correction, to name, redesignat, doubt, to rename, retention of the name, tribute, commend, in remembrance	senate, assembly, legislature, legislation
Education	education, school, teach, classroom, curriculum, college, university, student	
Economic Development	economic dev, community dev, business dev, business improv, redevelopment, jobs, job training, urban renewal, revitiliz, capital proj	
Fiscal	budget, finance, appropriat, expenditure, tax, taxes, taxation, fiscal, bond, fund, $[1-9], revenue, bonds, grants, contract, receipt, compensat, fee , salary, wage, payment, deduct	
Health & Human Services	hospital, human serv, health, medical, patient, substance abuse, treatment center, nursing, emergency shelter, group home, homeless	
Land Use	zoning, land use, conditional use, variation, variance, planning co, buidling code, master plan, development, hous	
Licenses	licens, permit, fee, service charge, surcharge, inspection	fee simple, fee parcel
Parks & Recreation	park, recreation, swim, beach, playground, sport, snowmobile, amusement, boat, leisure, firework, creek, trail, hiking, hike	parking, car, vehicle, trailer
Political	political, partisan, election, elected office, precinct, polling place, appointment, appoint, campaign contrib, campaign finan, campaign lit, home rule, charter amend, charter ordinance, legislature, state gov, state legis, governor, assembly bill, state assembly, general assembly, state house, senate, federal gov, federal legis, congress, president trump, president obama, president bush, donald trump, barack obama, george bush, house of representatives	
Public Safety	public safety, police, law enforcement, sheriff, jail, prison, fire, firefight, theft, violence, weapon, crime, gun, criminal, graffiti, offender, predator, terror, homeland	
Public Transportation	transportation, fare, transit, subway, taxi, taxicab, rideshar, pedicab, ridership, ferry, helicopter, commuter rail, commuter bus, bikeway, bicyc, bike	cafe
Utilities & Public Works	utilities, utility, public works, electricity, sewerage, sewer, telecom	

H | Appendix to Chapter 3: Full Regression Results

Table H.1: Regression Models for the Probability that a Bill Receives a Vote

	Bill Received Final Vote			
	Linear Hierarchical			OLS, Clustered SEs
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Partisan Elections	−0.005	0.001	0.005	−0.002
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Political * Partisan		0.04**	0.04**	0.05
		(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.12)
Fiscal * Partisan		0.01**	0.01**	0.03
		(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.02)
Public Safety * Partisan		−0.03**	−0.03**	−0.01
		(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.02)
Land Use * Partisan		−0.02**	−0.02**	−0.02
		(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.03)
Utilities * Partisan		−0.19**	−0.19**	−0.19
		(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.12)
Parks & Rec * Partisan		0.001	0.001	−0.01
		(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.02)
HHS * Partisan		−0.06**	−0.06**	−0.06*
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Education * Partisan		0.03**	0.03**	0.03
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Licenses * Partisan		0.07**	0.07**	0.08**
		(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.03)
Econ. Development * Partisan		−0.02**	−0.02**	0.01
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)
Public Transit * Partisan		−0.01+	−0.01+	−0.01
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Commemorative * Partisan		0.05**	0.05**	0.05
		(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.04)
Mayor-Council Form of Gov.	−0.09**	−0.09**	−0.11**	−0.08**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Mayor Veto Power	0.05+	0.05+	0.05	0.05+
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Chief Appointed Officer	−0.04	−0.04	−0.05	−0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)
log(# of Councilmembers)	−0.004	−0.01	−0.02	−0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.01)
Government Scope	0.21*	0.21*	0.24*	0.13*
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.06)
% Nonwhite	0.03	0.03	0.03	−0.12*
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)
log(Total Population)	0.03+	0.03	0.03	0.02*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
% 4-Year College	0.06	0.06	0.03	0.07
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.08)
log(Direct Gen. Expenditures)	−0.02	−0.02	−0.02	−0.02+
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Constant	0.73**	0.74**	0.76**	0.86**
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.06)
Topic FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Gov.-Level Topic Averages	No	No	Yes	No
Year FE	No	No	No	Yes
N	379,919	379,919	379,919	379,919
R^2				0.07
Log Likelihood	−69,150.53	−67,881.61	−67,884.64	

+p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01

I | Appendix to Chapter 3: Matching Results

To better account for differences across electoral environments, this section present results from matching similar partisan and nonpartisan governments together before conducting the analysis. Specifically, I match councils based on a set of five baseline attributes: form of government (mayor-council or council-manager), share of the population that is non-white, total population (logged), direct general expenditures (logged), number of council members (logged). In addition, for the policy areas that map directly onto a specific spending categories in the Census of Governments—public safety, parks and recreation, health and human services, and education—I also match on an indicator for whether the government has any positive spending in the related spending categories.

After matching, I have a total of 42 councils, split evenly between treatment and control. For each policy area, I then estimate a single regression. I specify the model in the same manner as in the main text, but I omit the controls for each policy area beyond the specific area under investigation. I omit these additional controls to account for the smaller sample size. All standard errors are then clustered by government.

Figure I.1 depicts the coefficient on partisan elections for each of these policy-area specific regressions. As in the main text, we see negative, statistically significant coefficient estimates for bills related to both utilities and health and human services and a positive estimate for license bills. In contrast to the main text, however, the matching analysis shows no evidence of a difference for commemorative bills or political bills.

Figure I.1: Estimated Difference in Probability of Bill Receiving a Vote between Partisan and Nonpartisan Councils after Matching

Bibliography

Adrian, Charles R. 1959. "A Typology for Nonpartisan Elections." *Western Political Quarterly* 12 (2): 449–458.

Aldrich, John H. 1995. *Why Parties?: The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America*. University of Chicago Press.

Aldrich, John H., Jacob M. Montgomery, and David B. Sparks. 2014. "Polarization and Ideology: Partisan Sources of Low Dimensionality in Scaled Roll Call Analyses." *Political Analysis* 22(4): 435–456.

Aldrich, John H., and James S. Coleman Battista. 2002. "Conditional Party Government in the States." *American Journal of Political Science* 46(1): 164–172.

American Political Science Association, Committee on Political Parties. 1950. "Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System." *American Political Science Review* 44 (3): i–xi.

Anzia, Sarah. 2015. "City Policies, City Interests: An Alternative Theory of Interest Group Systems." Goldman School of Public Policy Working Paper.

Anzia, Sarah F. 2011. "Election Timing and the Electoral Influence of Interest Groups." *Journal of Politics* 73 (2): 412–427.

Anzia, Sarah F., and Molly C. Jackman. 2013. "Legislative Organization and the Second Face of Power: Evidence from U.S. State Legislatures." *The Journal of Politics* 75 (1): 210–224.

Armstrong II, David A., Ryan Bakker, Royce Carroll, Christopher Hare, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. 2014. *Analyzing Spatial Models of Choice and Judgement with R*. CRC Press.

Arnold, R. Douglas, and Nicholas Carnes. 2012. "Holding Mayors Accountable: New YorkÕs Executives from Koch to Bloomberg." *American Journal of Political Science* 56(4): 949–963.

Ashworth, Scott, and Ethan Bueno de Mesquita. 2008. "Informative Party Labels with Institutional and Electoral Variation." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 20 (3): 251–273.

Austin, Rory Allan. 2002. "Seats That May Not Matter: Testing for Racial Polarization in U.S. City Councils." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 27(3): 481–508.

Bachrach, Peter, and Morton S. Baratz. 1962. "Two Faces of Power." *American Political Science Review* 56:4: 947–952.

Bafumi, Joseph, and Andrew Gelman. 2006. "Fitting Multilevel Models When Predictors and Group Effects Correlate." Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Polititcal Science Association, Chicago, IL. https://goo.gl/7WWmmz.

Ban, Pamela, Alexander Fouirnaies, Andrew B. Hall, and James M. Snyder. 2018. "How Newspapers Reveal Political Power." *Political Science Research and Methods*: 1–18.

Bawn, Kathleen. 1999. "Constructing "Us": Ideology, Coalition Politics, and False Consciousness." *American Journal of Political Science* 43(2): 303–334.

Bawn, Kathleen, Martin Cohen, David Karol, Seth Masket, Hans Noel, and John Zaller. 2012. "A Theory of Political Parties: Groups, Policy Demands and Nominations in American Politics." *Perspectives on Politics* 10(3): 571–597.

Boudreau, Cheryl, Christopher S. Elmendorf, and Scott A. MacKenzie. 2015. "Lost in Space? Information Shortcuts, Spatial Voting, and Local Government Representation." *Political Research Quarterly* 68(4): 843–855.

Broach, Glen T. 1972. "A Comparative Dimensional Analysis of Partisan and Urban-Rural Voting in StateLegislatures." *Journal of Politics* 34 (3): 905–921.

Broockman, David E. 2016. "Approaches to Studying Policy Representation." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 41(1): 181–215.

Broockman, David E., and Christopher Skovron. 2018. "Bias in Perceptions of Public Opinion among Political Elites." *American Political Science Review*: 1–22.

Browning, Rufus P., Dale Rogers Marshall, and David H. Tabb. 1986. *Protest Is Not Enough: The Struggle of Blacks and Hispanics for Equality in Urban Politics* . Berkeley: University of California Press.

Browning, Rufus P., Dale Rogers Marshall, and David H. Tabb. 2002. *Racial Politics in American Cities (3rd Edition)*. Pearson.

Bucchianeri, Peter, and Shanna Weitz. 2018. "Income Segregation and the Provision of Local Public Goods." Working Paper.

Burnett, Craig M. 2017. "Parties as an Organizational Force on Nonpartisan City Councils." *Party Politics*: 1–15.

Burnett, Craig M., and Vladimir Kogan. 2014. "Local Logrolling? Assessing the Impact of Legislative Districting in Los Angeles." *Urban Affairs Review* 50(5): 648–671.

Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes. 1960. *The American Voter*. University of Chicago Press.

Carroll, Royce, and Jason Eichorst. 2013. "The Role of Party: The Legislative Consequences of Partisan Electoral Competition." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 38(1): 83–109.

Carson, Jamie L., Nathan W. Monroe, and Gregory Robinson. 2011. "Unpacking Agenda Control inCongress: Individual Roll Ratesand the Republican Revolution." *Political Research Quarterly* 64 (1): 17–30.

Caughey, Devin. 2018. *The Unsolid South: Mass Politics and National Representation in a One-Party Enclave*. Princeton University Press.

Clavel, Pierre. 2010. *Activists in City Hall*. Cornell University Press.

Clinton, Joshua D., Simon Jackman, and Douglas Rivers. 2004. "The Statistical Analysis of Roll Call Data." *American Political Science Review* 98:2: 355 – 370.

Cohen, Marty, David Karol, Hans Noel, and John Zaller. 2008. *The Party Decides: Presidential Nominations Before and After Reform*. University of Chicago Press.

Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1993. *Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House*. University of California Press.

Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2005. *Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives*. Cambridge University Press.

Cox, Gary W., Thad Kousser, and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2010. "Party Power or Preferences? Quasi-ExperimentalEvidence from American State Legislatures." *The Journal of Politics* 72 (3): 799–811.

Dahl, Robert A. 1961. *Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City*. Yale University Press.

Davidson, Chandler, and Luis Ricardo Fraga. 1988. "Slating Groups as Parties in a "Nonpartisan" Setting." *Western Political Quarterly* 41 (2): 373–390.

de Benedictis-Kessner, Justin, and Christopher Warshaw. 2016. "Mayoral Partisanship and Municipal Fiscal Policy." *Journal of Politics* 78 (4): 1124–1138.

DeLeon, Richard. 1992. *Left Coast City: Progressive Politics in San Francisco, 1975–1991*. University Press of Kansas.

Diermeier, Daniel, and Razvan Vlaicu. 2011. "Parties, Coalitions, and the Internal Organization of Legislatures." *American Political Science Review* 105 (2): 359–380.

Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. 1st ed. Harper and Row.

Einstein, Katherine Levine, and David M. Glick. 2014. "Mayoral Policy Making: Results from the 21st-Century Mayors Leadership Survey." Report. Boston Univeristy Initiative on Cities.

Einstein, Katherine Levine, and David M. Glick. 2016. "Mayors, Partisanship, and Redistribution: Evidence Directly from U.S. Mayors." *Urban Affairs Review*: 1–33.

Einstein, Katherine Levine, and Vladimir Kogan. 2015. "Pushing the City Limits: Policy Responsiveness in Municipal Government." *Urban Affairs Review*: 1–30.

Enos, Ryan D. 2014. "Causal Effect of Intergroup Contact on Exclusionary Attitudes." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America* 111:10: 3369 – 3704.

Ferreira, Fernando, and Joseph Gyourko. 2009. "Do Political Parties Matter? Evidence From U.S. Cities." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*: 399-422.

Fiorina, Morris P., Samuel J. Abrams, and Jeremy C. Pope. 2005. *Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America*. Pearson Longman.

Fouirnaies, Alexander, and Andrew B. Hall. 2018. "How Do Electoral Incentives Affect Legislator Behavior?" Working Paper.

Fowler, James H. 2006. "Connecting the Congress: A Study of Cosponsorship Networks." *Political Analysis* 14: 456–487.

Gailmard, Sean, and Jeffery A. Jenkins. 2007. "Negative Agenda Control in the Senate and House:Fingerprints of Majority Party Pow." *The Journal of Politics* 69 (3): 689–700.

Gaventa, John. 1982. *Power and PowerlesPower: Quiescence & Rebellion in an Appalachian Valley*. University of Illinois Press.

Gentzkow, Matthew, and Jesse M. Shapiro. 2010. "What Drives Media Slant? Evidence from U.S. Daily Newspapers." *Econometrica* 78 (1): 35–71.

Gerber, Elisabeth R., and Daniel J. Hopkins. 2011. "When Mayors Matter: Estimating the Impact of Mayoral Partisanship on City Policy." *American Journal of Political Science* 55(2): 326-339.

Gilens, Martin. 2014. *Affluence and Influence: Economic Inequality and Political Power in America*. Princeton Univesity Press.

Hajnal, Zoltan, and Jessica Trounstine. 2014. "What Underlies Urban Politics? Race, Class, Ideology, Partisanship, and the Urban Vote." *Urban Affairs Review* 50:1: 63 – 99.

Harmel, Robert, and Keith E. Hamm. 1986. "Development of a Party Role in a No-Party Legislature." *Western Political Quarterly* 39 (1): 79–92.

Hassell, Hans J.G. 2015. "Party Control of Party Primaries: Party Influence in Nominations for the US Senate." *The Journal of Politics* 78(1): 75–87.

Havens, Murray Clark. 1957. *City Versus Farm? Urban-rural Conflict in the Alabama Legislature*. Bureau of Public Administration, University of Alabama.

Hayes, Danny, and Jennifer L. Lawless. 2015. "As Local News Goes, So Goes Citizen Engagement: Media, Knowledge, and Participation in US House Elections." *Journal of Politics* 77 (2): 447–462.

Hayes, Danny, and Jennifer L. Lawless. 2018. "The Decline of Local News and Its Effects: New Evidence from Longitudinal Data." *Journal of Politics* 80 (1): 332–336.

Hinchliffe, Kelsey L., and Frances E. Lee. 2016. "Party Competition and Conflict in State Legislatures." *State Politics and Policy Quarterly* 16(2): 172–197.

Hopkins, Daniel J., and Katherine T. McCabe. 2012. "After It's Too Late: Estimating the Policy Impacts of Black Mayoralties in U.S. Cities." *American Politics Research* 40:4: 665 – 700.

Hunter, Floyd. 1969. *Community Power Structure: A Study of Decision Makers.* The University of North Carolina Press.

Jackman, Molly C. 2014. "Parties, Median Legislators, and Agenda Setting: How Legislative Institutions Matter." *The Journal of Politics* 76 (1): 259–272.

Jenkins, Jeffery A. 1999. "Examining the Bonding Effects of Party: A Comparative Analysis of Roll-Call Voting in the U.S. and Confederate Houses." *American Journal of Political Science* 43(4): 1144–1165.

Jenkins, Shannon. 2006. "The Impact of Party and Ideology on Roll-Call Voting in State Legislatures." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 31(2): 235Ð-257.

Jewell, Malcolm E. 1964. "State Legislatures in Southern Politics." *The Journal of Politics* 26:1: 177–196.

Katznelson, Ira. 1982. *City Trenches.* University of Chicago Press.

Katznelson, Ira, and Quinn Mulroy. 2012. "Was the South Pivotal? Situated Partisanship and Policy Coalitions during the New Deal and Fair Deal." *The Journal of Politics* 74(2): 604Ð-620.

Kaufmann, Karen M. 2004. *The Urban Voter: Group Conflict and Mayoral Voting Behavior in American Cities.* University of Michigan Press.

Key, Jr., V.O. 1949. *Southern Politics in State and Nation.* New York: Knopf.

Kiewiet, D. Roderick, and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1991. *The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process.* University of Chicago Press.

Kim, Claire Jean. 2003. *Bitter Fruit: The Politics of Black-Korean Conflict in New York City.* Yale University Press.

Kirkland, Partricia A., and Alexander Coppock. 2017. "Candidate Choice Without Party Labels:: New Insights from Conjoint Survey Experiments." *Political Behavior*: 1–21.

Krehbiel, Keith. 1993. "Where's the Party?" *British Journal of Political Science* 23(2): 235–266.

Krehbiel, Keith. 2007. "Partisan Roll Rates in a Nonpartisan Legislature." *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 23: 1–23.

Krehbiel, Keith, Adam Meirowitz, and Alan E. Wiseman. 2015. "A Theory of Competitive Partisan Lawmaking." *Political Science Research and Methods* 3 (3): 423–448.

Lax, Jeffrey R., and Justin H. Phillips. 2012. "The Democratic Deficit in the States." *American Journal of Political Science* 56 (1): 148–166.

LeBlanc, Hugh L. 1969. "Voting in State Senates: Party and Constituency Influences." *Midwest Journal of Political Science* 13 (1): 33–57.

Lee, Eugene C. 1960. *The Politics of Nonpartisanship: A Sutdy of California City Elections*. University of California Press.

Lee, Frances E. 2016. *Insecure Majorities: Congress and the Perpetual Campaign*. The University of Chicago Press.

Lukes, Steven. 1974. *Power: A Radical View*. Macmillan.

MacManus, Susan A. 1990. "Minority Business Contracting with Local Government." *Urban Affairs Review* 25:3: 455–473.

Martin, Andrew D., and Kevin M. Quinn. 2002. "Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953Ð1999." *Political Analysis* 10(2): 134–153.

Masket, Seth, and Boris Shor. 2015. "Polarization without Parties: Term Limits and Legislative Partisanship in NebraskaÕs Unicameral Legislature." *State Politics and Policy Quarterly* 15(1): 67–90.

Masket, Seth E. 2016. *The Inevitable Party: Why Attempts to Kill the Party System Fail and How they Weaken Democracy*. Oxford University Press.

Mayhew, David R. 1974. *Congress: The Electoral Connection*. Yale University Press.

Moe, Terry M. 2005. "Teacher Unions and School Board Elections." In *Besieged: School Boards and the Future of Education Politics*, ed. William G. Howell. Brookings Institution Press.

Molotch, Harvey. 1976. "The City as a Growth Machine: Toward a Political Economy of Place." *American Journal of Sociology* 82:2: 309 – 332.

Noel, Hans. 2012. "Which long coalition?The creation of theanti-slavery coalition." *Party Politics* 19 (6): 962–984.

Oliver, J. Eric. 1999. "The Effects of Metropolitan Economic Segregation on Local Civic Participation." *American Journal of Political Science* 43 (1): 186–212.

Oliver, J. Eric. 2012. *Local Elections and the Politics of Small-Scale Democracy*. Princeton University Press.

Patterson, Samuel C. 1962. "Dimensions of Voting Behavior in a One-Party State Legislature." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 26 (2): 185Ð-200.

Peterson, Paul E. 1981. *City Limits*. University of Chicago Press.

Poole, Keith T. 2000. "Non-Parametric Unfolding of Binary Choicce Data." *Political Analysis* 8:3: 211–232.

Poole, Keith T., and Howard K. Rosenthal. 1985. "A Spatial Model for Legislative Roll Call Analysis." *American Journal of Political Science* 29:2: 357 – 384.

Poole, Keith T., and Howard K. Rosenthal. 1997. *Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting*. Oxford University Press.

Richman, Jesse. 2015. "The Electoral Costs of Party Agenda Setting: Why the Hastert Rule Leads to Defeat." *American Journal of Political Science* 77 (4): 1129–1141.

Rosenthal, Howard K., and Erik Voeten. 2004. "Analyzing Roll Calls with Perfect Spatial Voting: France 1946–1958." *American Journal of Political Science* 48:3: 620–632.

Santucci, Jack. 2017. "Party Splits, Not Progressives: The Origins of Proportional Representation in American Local Government." *American Politics Research* 45(3): 494–526.

Sass, Tim R., and Stephen L. Mehay. 2003. "Minority Representation, Election Method, and Policy Influence." *Economics & Politics* 15:3: 323–339.

Schaffner, Brian F., and Matthew J. Streb. 2002. "The Partisan Heuristic in Low-Information Elections." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 66: 559–581.

Schaffner, Brian F., Matthew Streb, and Gerald Wright. 2001. "Teams Without Uniforms:The Nonpartisan Ballot inState and Local Elections." *Political Research Quarterly* 54 (1): 7–30.

Schattschneider, E.E. 1942. *Party Government: American Government in Action*. Rinehart & Company.

Schattschneider, E.E. 1960. *The Semisovereign People*. Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Schickler, Eric, and Kathryn Pearson. 2009. "Agenda Control, Majority Party Power,and the House Committee on Rules,1937Ð52." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 34 (4): 455-490.

Schlozman, Kay Lehman, and John T. Tierney. 1986. *Organized Interests and American Democracy*. Harper Collins.

Shah, Paru R., and Melissa J. Marschall. 2012. "The Centrality of Racial and Ethnic Politics in American Cities and Towns." In *Oxford Handbook on Local Politics*. Oxford University Press.

Shor, Boris, and Nolan McCarty. 2011. "The Ideological Mapping of American Legislatures." *American Political Science Review* 105(3): 530–551.

Simpson, Dick. 2001. *Rogues, Rebels, And Rubber Stamps: The Politics Of The Chicago City Council, 1863 To The Present*. Westview Press.

Snyder, Jr., James M., and David Stromberg. 2010. "Press Coverage and Political Accountability." *Journal of Political Economy* 118 (2): 355–408.

Snyder, Jr., James M., and Michael M. Ting. 2002. "An Informational Rationale for Political Parties." *American Journal of Political Science* 46(1): 90–110.

Sonenshein, Ray. 1993. *Politics in Black and White: Race and Power in Los Angeles.* Princeton University Press.

Stone, Clarence N. 1989. *Regime Politics: Governing Atlanta, 1946 – 1988.* University Press of Kansas.

Svara, James H. 2003. "Two Decades of Continuity and Change in American City Councils." Report. Commission by the National League of Cities.

Tajfel, Henri. 1970. "Experiments in Intergroup Discrimination." *Scientific American* 223: 96 – 102.

Tausanovitch, Chris, and Christopher Warshaw. 2014. "Representation in Municipal Government." *American Political Science Review* 108:3: 605–641.

Trounstine, Jessica. 2009. "All Politics Is Local: The Reemergenceof the Study of City Politics." *Perspectives on Politics* 7 (3): 611–618.

Trounstine, Jessica. 2010. "Representation and Accountability in Cities." *Annual Review of Political Science* 13: 407–423.

Trounstine, Jessica. 2016. "Segregation and Inequality in Public Goods." *American Journal of Political Science* 60(3): 709Ð-725.

Volden, Craig, and Alan E. Wiseman. 2014. *Legislative Effectiveness in the United States Congress: The Lawmakers.* Cambridge University Press.

Weingast, Barry R. 1998. "Political Stability and Civil War: Institutions, Commitment and American Democracy." In *Analytic Narratives*, ed. Robert H. Bates, Avner Greif, Margaret Levi, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, and Barry R. Weingast. Princeton University Press.

Welch, Susan, and Eric H. Carlson. 1973. "The Impact of Party on Voting Behavior in a Nonpartisan Legislature." *American Political Science Review* 67(3): 854–867.

Wright, Gerald C. 2008. "Charles Adrian and the Study of Nonpartisan Elections." *Political Research Quarterly* 61:1: 13 – 16.

Wright, Gerald C., and Brian F. Schaffner. 2002. "The Influence of Party: Evidence from the State Legislatures." *American Political Science Review* 96:2: 367–379.