



Dependence on Persons and Dependence on Things in Rousseau's Social, Psychological, and Aesthetic Theory

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Dependence on Persons and Dependence on Things in Rousseau's Social, Psychological, and
Aesthetic Theory

A dissertation presented

by

Byron Matthew Davies

to

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Dependence on Persons and Dependence on Things in Rousseau's Social, Psychological,
and Aesthetic Theory

Abstract

Jean-Jacques Rousseau is often associated with a certain political form of relating to another as a person, where a person is seen as a locus of enforceable demands. Nevertheless, as I argue in this dissertation, Rousseau also articulated an *affective* form of relating to another, where relating to another as a person in this sense involves seeing them as a locus of a kind of value that cannot be demanded. I consider the significance of this affective form for Rousseau's understanding of the passion he calls *amour-propre*, as well for his understanding of domination and of the connection between the political and affective realms.

Following an introductory chapter, I argue in Chapter 2 ('*Amour-Propre* and Seeing Others as Persons 1: The *Sauvage*') and Chapter 3 ('*Amour-Propre* and Seeing Others as Persons 2: Society') that, against received readings of Rousseau, there is something intrinsically good about being subject to *amour-propre* (or the desire for consideration from others) in that this passion makes salient to us others' personhood (in the affective sense).

In Chapter 4 ('Domination and Personhood') I consider one way in which the characteristic pathology of the affective realm is the appearance of demands in it. I show how, in a certain kind of domination, the dominator acknowledges the affective personhood of the

dominated and at the same time, by treating the dominated's consideration as the sort of value that can be extracted, is in violation of the very conditions of that acknowledgment.

In Chapter 5 ('Political and Affective Forms of Relating to Another') I outline Rousseau's understanding of the connection between the political and affective forms of relating to another by arguing that Rousseau introduces the former as an essential part of the egalitarian measures he proposes for eliminating the necessity of entering relationships of domination. I then contrast Rousseau's understanding of the connection between the political and the affective realms with contemporary Kantian accounts that condense political and affective phenomena into a single conception of a person.

In Appendix 1 ('Speech, Recognition, and the Insult in Not Being Believed: Rousseau and Adam Smith') I consider the kind of dependence on another person (in the affective sense) involved in speaking to them. I discuss how that dependence is made apparent when we are insulted in not being believed, and I compare the views of Rousseau and Adam Smith regarding that kind of insult.

Finally, in Appendix 2 ('Spectators and Giants in Rousseau and Víctor Erice') I bring Rousseau's notion of acknowledging another as a person (in the affective sense) to bear on an interpretation of the work of the Spanish filmmaker Víctor Erice (*The Spirit of the Beehive*, *El Sur*).

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Dedicated to my family.

Dedicated to the memories of my grandfathers, Stanley Davies and Bruno Kwapis.

And dedicated to Marcela Cuevas Ríos.

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I should note the importance of two courses at Harvard in sparking my interests in—and helping me to get clearer about—the topics of this dissertation: 'Topics in Intersubjectivity', co-taught by Dick Moran and Doug Lavin (where Fred Neuhouser was a guest speaker, and Matt Boyle a crucial participant); and 'Other Minds', co-taught by Dick Moran and Matt Boyle (where Doug Lavin was a crucial participant).

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The first paper in the appendix, 'Speech, Recognition, and the Insult in Not Being Believed: Rousseau and Adam Smith' (forthcoming in *The Adam Smith Review*), is in fact a descendent of two earlier papers: one, on the insult in not being believed, which I wrote for a seminar on the 'second person' organized by Jim Conant and Sebastian Rödl in summer 2012; the other, on 'Rousseau on Intersubjectivity', which I presented at Harvard's Workshop in Metaphysics and Epistemology in spring 2013, and where I received detailed feedback from Dick Moran, Eylem Özaltun, and Mark Richard. I am especially grateful to Jeremy Wanderer for inviting me to bring those papers together for a workshop on the work of Miranda Fricker at the University of Massachusetts Boston in April 2015. I am also grateful for feedback on various versions of the new paper from Micha Glaeser, Allan Hazlett, and Dick Moran, as well as two anonymous reviewers for *The Adam Smith Review*. And I am grateful for questions about the paper from audiences at the 2015 Boston University Graduate Conference (where my commentator was Getty Lustilla) and at a conference on Themes from Smith and Rousseau (organized jointly by the Rousseau Association and the International Adam Smith Society) at the University of Glasgow. I thank Craig Smith, organizer of the latter conference, for his assistance on the paper's way to publication.

The other essay in the appendix, 'Spectators and Giants in Rousseau and Víctor Erice', began as a contribution to the website *Aesthetics for Birds*. I thank Rebecca Millsop for inviting me to contribute to the site and Alexandra King for her essential editorial advice on the essay. I also thank Liz Coffey of the Harvard Film Archive for being so accommodating of my request that I finally see *The Spirit of the Beehive* on 35mm.

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During the last stages of writing this dissertation I learned of the deaths of Tom Fehse and David Pendleton, two people who, in their different ways, made life in Cambridge more meaningful. I will really miss both of them.

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It is for these reasons that I lovingly dedicate this dissertation to my family, to the memories of my grandfathers, and to Marcela.

Abbreviations of Works by Rousseau

- C* *The Confessions*, trans. J.M. Cohen (London: Penguin, 1953).
- DI* *Discourse on Inequality (Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality among Men)*, in *The 'Discourses' and Other Early Political Writings*, trans. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 111-222.
- DPE* *Discourse on Political Economy* in *The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings*, trans. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 3-38.
- DSA* *Discourse on the Sciences and Arts*, in *The 'Discourses' and Other Early Political Writings*, trans. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 1-28.
- E* *Emile, or on Education*, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1979).
- EO* *Essay on the Origin of Languages*, in *The 'Discourses' and Other Early Political Writings*, trans. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 247-99.
- ES* *Emile and Sophie, or the Solitaries*, in *The Collected Writings of Rousseau*, trans. Christopher Kelly (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 2009), vol. 13, 685-721.

- F 'Fragments for a Dictionary of Terms of Usage in Botany', in *The Collected Writings of Rousseau*, trans. Alexandra Cook (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 2000), vol. 8, 100-29.
- G *Geneva Manuscript*, in *The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings*, trans. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 153-61.
- GP *Considerations on the Government of Poland*, in *The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings*, trans. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 177-260.
- J *Julie, or the New Heloise*, in *The Collected Writings of Rousseau*, trans. Philip Stewart and Jean Vaché (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 2009), vol. 6.
- LB *Letter to Beaumont*, in *The Collected Writings of Rousseau*, trans. Christopher Kelly and Judith R. Bush (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 2001), vol. 9, 21-83.
- LD *Letter to d'Alembert on the Theater*, in *Politics and the Arts*, trans. Allan Bloom (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1969).
- LL *Letter to M. l'Abbé Raynal*, in *The 'Discourses' and Other Early Political Writings*, trans. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 29-31.
- LM *Letters to Malesherbes*, in *The Collected Writings of Rousseau*, trans. Christopher Kelly (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1995), vol. 5, 572-83.
- LR *Last Reply to Critics of the Discourse on the Sciences and Arts*, in *The 'Discourses' and Other Political Writings*, trans. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 63-85.
- LV *Letter to Voltaire*, in *The 'Discourses' and Other Early Political Writings*, trans. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 232-46.
- LWM *Letters Written from the Mountain*, in *The Collected Writings of Rousseau*, trans. Judith R. Bush and Christopher Kelly (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 2001), vol. 9, 131-306.
- ML *Moral Letters*, in *The Collected Writings of Rousseau*, trans. Christopher Kelly (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 2001), vol. 12, 175-203.

- N* Preface to *Narcissus*, in *The 'Discourses' and Other Early Political Writings*, trans. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 92-106.
- O* *Observations* [to Stanilas, King of Poland], in *The 'Discourses' and Other Early Political Writings*, trans. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 92-106.
- OC* *Oeuvres Complètes*, ed. Bernard Gagnebin and Marcel Raymond (Paris: Gallimard, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, 1959-69), 5 vols.
- P* *Pygmalion*, in *The Collected Writings of Rousseau*, trans. Christopher Kelly (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 2004), vol. 10, 230-6.
- RJ* *Rousseau, Judge of Jean-Jacques: Dialogues*, in *The Collected Writings of Rousseau*, trans. Judith R. Bush, Christopher Kelly, and Roger D. Masters (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 1990), vol. 1.
- RSW* *The Reveries of the Solitary Walker*, trans. Charles E. Butterworth (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1992).
- SC* *On the Social Contract*, in *The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings*, trans. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 39-152. 'SC: I.4.6.' refers to book I, chapter 4, paragraph 6.

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Figure 3: From *The Spirit of the Beehive* (*El espíritu de la colmena*) (1973). © Elías Querejeta Producciones Cinematográficas S.L. Image courtesy of the Criterion Collection.

Figure 4: From *The Spirit of the Beehive* (*El espíritu de la colmena*) (1973). © Elías Querejeta Producciones Cinematográficas S.L. Image courtesy of the Criterion Collection.

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Figure 8: From *The Spirit of the Beehive* (*El espíritu de la colmena*) (1973). © Elías Querejeta Producciones Cinematográficas S.L. Image courtesy of the Criterion Collection.

1. Introduction

Just as questions about the nature and identity of persons can be understood as among the distinctive concerns of Western metaphysics, so questions about what it is to relate to another *as a person*, as opposed to a thing, can be understood as among the distinctive concerns of Western ethical and political thought, or at least since the eighteenth century. Normally treatments of this topic have focused on a political or legal form of relating to another as a person. Characteristic of this form is that another person is a locus of enforceable demands: just as they can demand certain kinds of conduct from us (in virtue of our also being persons), we can demand certain kinds of conduct from them (in virtue of their being persons).

Modern philosophical treatments of this political form of relating to another as a person emerge directly out of the writing of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and in particular his articulation of

the notion of a 'Citizen' in *The Social Contract*.¹ But Rousseau was keen to circumscribe this form in specifically political contexts. Moreover, as I argue in this dissertation, Rousseau also articulated an *affective* form of relating to another as a person: a form characteristic of the affective realm of our lives, whose defining feature throughout Rousseau's writings is (in contrast with the political realm) the precluding of enforceable demands. (Or rather: the entrance of enforceable demands into the affective realm marks its characteristic pathology.) Thus, under the affective form, seeing another as a person is a matter of seeing them as an independent point of view on oneself, and as a limit on what one can bring about by force.

A central part of my understanding of the affective form of relating to another as a person is Rousseau's concept of *amour-propre*, or the desire for consideration (or recognition) from others. Thus, I will argue that it is through our being subject to *amour-propre* that another's affective personhood is made salient to us. And I have the benefit of being able to build upon excellent recent work on *amour-propre* in English-speaking philosophy, especially work that has departed from received understandings of that passion in arguing that, for Rousseau, it is not in its nature bad: for example, *amour-propre* might take as its object equal standing with others, or might play a role in the exercise of rationality. (I principally have in mind the work of Joshua Cohen, N.J.H. Dent, Niko Kolodny, Frederick Neuhouser, and John Rawls.) But my understanding of *amour-propre* is different from those recent readings in that I do not understand that passion as 'normatively neutral': as in its nature neither good nor bad. (In Chapters 2 and 3 I

¹. Such treatments, especially those of a Hegelian provenance, also tend to locate the origins of this form in Roman society and law (cf. Taylor 1975: 397). Despite the ancient origins of the form, its modern articulations (including Hegel on 'Abstract Right') are strongly influenced by Rousseau's *Social Contract*.

particularly engage with the 'normatively neutral' readings provided by Kolodny and Neuhouser.) Rather, on my reading, there is a respect in which *amour-propre* is intrinsically good, in that being subject to it involves acknowledging others as free, in the sense of independent evaluative points of view on oneself. Moreover, I do not think it is in that passion's nature to motivate us to bring about valuable results (though it may often do that); rather, being subject to *amour-propre* intrinsically involves valuing an already-existing object (namely, another person's perspective on oneself).²

Of course, *amour-propre*, and our relations to affective persons, often take pathological manifestations, and I noted above that the characteristic pathology of the affective realm, for Rousseau, is the appearance of enforceable demands in it. Thus, I will examine *domination* as a central instance of unhealthy *amour-propre*. Domination, in the sense under investigation, presupposes (on the part of the dominator) an acknowledgment of the affective personhood of the dominated. As when a dominator pins the dominated down and demands that they cry 'Uncle', what the former values in the latter is essentially their character as a locus of evaluative consideration or recognition. The dominator simply could not have the satisfactions of domination unless they acknowledged the dominated as a person (in the affective sense). It is in this respect that domination presupposes the essential goodness of *amour-propre* that I will argue

2. Neuhouser has modeled his understanding of *amour-propre* on a Freudian drive (Neuhouser 2008: 176). I believe that the above characteristics of my understanding of *amour-propre* push it closer to an object-relation, where psychoanalytic object-relations theory emphasizes (in W.R.D. Fairbairn's original formulation) 'relationship with the object, and not gratification of impulse', or drive, in its account of 'libidinal striving' (Fairbairn 1952: 60). (For mention of object-relations in connection with Rousseau's account of infant development, see Dent 1988: 71. For how J. David Velleman's 'object-based', as opposed to 'aim-based', theory of love is similar to object-relations theory, see Velleman 1999: 354n61.)

for: it presupposes the acknowledgment of another as an independent evaluative point of view on oneself. But in treating evaluative consideration as the sort of value that can be extracted, the dominator is also in violation of the normative requirements internal to that acknowledgment.

Part of Rousseau's distinctive achievement is his revealing the extent to which domination, in this sense, not only characterizes such familiar cases as relationships between master and servant, but is pervasive throughout social systems in which there are inequalities in private property and inequalities in social status. He also reveals the extent to which seemingly innocuous relationships, such as between benefactor and beneficiary, can be marked by this kind of domination. And in Rousseau's social criticism it is important that he relies on a form of relating to another as a person different from the political one (where acknowledging another as a person involves acknowledging them as a bearer of rights). After all, not every case of domination in this sense (such as what might take place between benefactor and beneficiary) will involve the violation of rights. Moreover, the distinctive pathology of relationships of domination is not that the dominated has their will restricted (as in cases of coercion). Rather, the distinctive pathology of these relationships is that the dominated might have their *mind* restricted, as when a servant or employee actually adopts (as a coping mechanism) positive evaluations of their master or employer. (It is in this respect that Rousseau's writing looks ahead to later social-theoretic treatments of false consciousness.) Therefore, the affective form of relating to another as a person also considerably enriches our terms of normative and social criticism, complementing the vocabulary of rights and duties familiar from the political form.

Indeed, a central claim of this dissertation is that the affective and political forms of relating to another as a person *are* complementary. This is because Rousseau introduces the

political form, under the guise of the 'Citizen', as an essential part of the measures he proposes for preventing and alleviating the conditions that engender relationships of domination. (These measures at least include the right to one's subsistence needs that, for Rousseau, is the mark of citizenship.) That is, in inegalitarian conditions, the affective form can constitute social problems to which the political form is a solution. But the introduction of the political form under the Social Contract is not an 'overcoming' of the affective form of relating to others. In fact, I think we can understand some of Rousseau's proposed measures, such as the public festivals and public prizes he thinks characterize a republic, as political acknowledgments of the significance of the affective form in our lives. (This acknowledgment is especially important in preventing kinds of domination, as Rousseau appreciates the extent to which individuals enter relationships of domination because of the unavailability of diverse sources of consideration from others: for example, when they allow themselves to be dominated so that they can dominate others in turn.) Thus, there is a way in which, for Rousseau, the affective realm constitutes an overlapping part of the political realm, and there is a way in which we cannot fully understand the latter without understanding the former.³

While Rousseau carefully, even if only implicitly, distinguishes between the affective and political forms of relating to others—and also offers a complicated account of the relationship between these forms—a strong tendency of some contemporary Kantian practical philosophy has been to condense affective and political phenomena into a single form of relating to others as persons. At the end of Chapter 5, I will consider two such instances: (1) Sarah Buss's argument

³. Chapters 2-4 focus on the affective form of a person, and only Chapter 5 talks about that form in relation to the political form. Therefore, in Chapters 2-4 uses of 'person' refer to the affective form.

that shame is a way of perceiving the personhood of others, as well as a primitive, pre-reflective form of Kantian respect; and (2) J. David Velleman's argument that love is the 'vivid perception' of another's personhood, where that 'personhood' is the same value as that grounding Kantian respect. I will argue that Rousseau's approach to affective and political phenomena allows him to capture the genuine insights of Buss's and Velleman's accounts—in particular, that there is a way in which our affective relations to others involve the perception of their personhood—while avoiding some of the central problems of the Kantian accounts: including that shame cannot provide a sufficient basis for the 'deontic' (or demand-implicating) character of Kantian respect; and that, despite Velleman's explicit disavowals of this consequence, his account risks rendering love as a 'deontic' phenomenon. Thus, whereas Velleman begins his account of an affective phenomenon such as love with a certain form of personhood—derived from that at play in Kantian respect—and afterwards must account for why love cannot be demanded, Rousseau throughout treats the precluding of demands as the defining feature of the affective realm.

The title of this dissertation is 'Dependence on Persons and Dependence on Things in Rousseau's Social, Psychological, and Aesthetic Theory'. This title derives from my original, and abiding, impulse in writing it: while first reading Rousseau's *Emile* five years ago, I was fascinated in coming across the rich and suggestive summary of his social and psychological theory contained in the formulation, 'There are two sorts of dependence: dependence on things, which is from nature; dependence on men, which is from society'; and, in the same passage, Rousseau's description of membership in a republic as when 'dependence on men would then

become dependence on things again' (*E*: 85/*OC*: 4:311).⁴ Back then I sensed that there must be something deep about Rousseau's writing that could come out of the unfolding of that passage. I am not sure whether I have located what is really deep about that passage in this dissertation, though I can finally present an interpretation of it in Chapter 5. But most importantly, writing this dissertation has allowed me to get somewhat clearer about varieties of dependence on things—including the sense in which the world for the *sauvage* in the original state of nature was a world of 'things'—and varieties of dependence on persons—including the dependence on other persons that we manifest when speaking to them, a kind of dependence I examine in the first essay in the appendix, 'Speech, Recognition, and the Insult in Not Being Believed: Rousseau and Adam Smith'.

Finally, the title also refers to Rousseau's 'aesthetic theory'. This is partly in connection with the attention I have tried to give to issues of dependence on persons and things in Rousseau's 'aesthetic' writings, particularly the writing on the theater (such as the *Letter to d'Alembert*) and the writing on music (such as the *Essay on the Origin of Languages*). But I do not much discuss these writings as contributions to any received questions in aesthetic theory. And what I principally have in mind in referring to Rousseau's 'aesthetic theory' is his contribution to our understanding of the role of the senses in our dependence on persons: specifically in the notion of *seeing* another as a person, and of being *affected* by another as a person: for example, in the peculiar experience—which I take up in Chapter 3 in connection with a moment in Rousseau's *Confessions*—of having one's voyeurism suddenly exposed. That said, I

4. At risk of some distortion of Rousseau's thinking—which is gendered in notorious ways—I have preferred the gender-neutral formulation 'dependence on persons', and throughout this dissertation I rely on gender-neutral formulations except when context demands otherwise.

end the dissertation by looking at some of the ways in which these notions of seeing and being affected by others come up in the cinema. Thus, in the second essay in the appendix, 'Spectators and Giants in Rousseau and Víctor Erice', I try to set up an encounter between Rousseau and a still-living Spanish filmmaker, namely over the sense (emerging out of Rousseau's description of early humans in the *Essay on the Origin of Languages*) of being confronted by another person as like being confronted by a 'Giant'.

2. Amour-Propre and Seeing Others as Persons 1: The *Sauvage*

2.1. Normatively Neutral Characterizations of *Amour-Propre*

At times it can seem that there is not just one philosopher named 'Jean-Jacques Rousseau', but in fact three. First, there is Rousseau as a philosopher of *nature*. This is the philosopher notable for his contributions to botany and anthropology, for his interest in looking to the conditions of an organism's health or flourishing as a guide to a characterization of its nature, and for his interest in 'naturalness' as a term of normative evaluation. Second, there is Rousseau as a philosopher of the *passions*. This is the philosopher concerned with tracing the contributions that certain passions make to human psychology and to present social conditions. Most prominent among these passions in Rousseau's writing is the kind of self-love that he calls *amour-propre*, or the desire for consideration from others. Finally, and perhaps most obviously,

there is Rousseau as a philosopher of *freedom*. This is the philosopher who counted freedom as among the 'constitutive elements of [our] being' (*DI*: 176/*OC*: 3:181); who said that 'to renounce one's freedom is to renounce one's status as a man' (*SC*: I.4.6); and who made the preservation of the freedom of all citizens in a republic one of the central concerns of his political thought.

It can be hard to keep in view all at once these three strands of Rousseau's thinking. Indeed, even when these strands are not treated as incompatible with one another, they are at best given distinct places in readings of Rousseau. Thus, on a common understanding of how his political writings fit together, Rousseau's investigation of humankind under primitive conditions (the so-called 'original state of nature' discussed in the *Discourse on the Origins of Inequality*, or Second Discourse) invites an investigation of that passion, *amour-propre*, responsible for bringing humankind out of those conditions. Moreover, on this understanding, the enslavement and domination characteristic of *amour-propre* demand the introduction of a Social Contract whereby 'each, uniting with all, nevertheless obey[s] only himself and remain[s] as free as before' (*SC*: I.4.6). In other words, on this crude understanding of Rousseau, the themes of *nature*, the *passions*, and *freedom* fit together, but at most sequentially. We lack much of a sense of how they work together at any one of moment in Rousseau's thinking.

The tendency to treat some number of these themes as relatively separate also characterizes even the most sophisticated recent writing on *amour-propre*, and even the writing that complicates the above picture by insisting that *amour-propre* cannot be an altogether bad or unhealthy passion. This is particularly true insofar as these readings are under pressure to provide a 'normatively neutral' characterization of *amour-propre*: one whereby that passion is not in its nature good or bad. As I hope to show here, any characterization of *amour-propre* that does not

take into account its characteristic goodness—namely, the role it plays in our acknowledging others as free persons—risks severing important connections between Rousseau's sense of what it is to investigate something's nature, his application of that method to *amour-propre*, and the role that freedom plays in his investigation of the latter.

For example, according to Frederick Neuhouser's reading of Rousseau, '*amour-propre* is a "neutral" feature of human beings, not intrinsically a force for good [...] but also not only, or necessarily, bad in its consequences' (Neuhouser 2008: 15). Thus, in evaluating instances of *amour-propre* as good or bad, healthy or unhealthy, Neuhouser looks not to criteria internal to the nature of *amour-propre* (as one would look to the nature of what a human lung is or does in order to determine which lungs are good or bad), but rather to criteria apparently external to that nature. For Neuhouser, an instance of *amour-propre* is good only to the extent that it is compatible with the terms of a 'civil association governed by a general will': that is, only to the extent that its satisfaction 'can coexist with the basic requirements of the *happiness* [...] and *freedom* of all our fellow beings'⁵ (Neuhouser 2008: 50-1). These criteria are certainly important in evaluating instances of *amour-propre*, but it is noteworthy that none of them figures, on

⁵ In addition, Neuhouser specifies a number of goods to which *amour-propre* may give rise, such as love and friendship, as well as 'a variety of cognitive and conative capacities without which such 'spiritual' goods as rationality, morality, and self-determination would not be possible' (Neuhouser 2008: 53). But though these goods may constitute the positive potential of *amour-propre*, they do not obviously figure in a characterization of the 'nature' of *amour-propre*, and thus to that extent appear 'external' to that nature. In contrast, according to the reading offered here, the acknowledgment of others as free persons is an ineliminable feature of any characterization of that nature, and is thus 'internal' to it. Another important factor informing Neuhouser's 'normatively neutral' conception of *amour-propre* is his understanding the latter on the model of a Freudian drive (Neuhouser 2008: 176). My present argument that *amour-propre* essentially involves the valuation of another as a free person should thus be compared with (though it does not presuppose) J. David Velleman's argument against Freudian conceptions of love as a normatively neutral drive (Velleman 1999: 349-54).

Neuhouser's reading, in a definition of what *amour-propre* is. Here again, an investigation of the nature of *amour-propre* is conducted relatively separately from an investigation of its characteristic goodness, and from the relationship between such goodness and values such as a freedom.

We can better understand the pressure to provide a normatively neutral characterization of *amour-propre* once we understand that, on recent readings of Rousseau, that passion is asked to play a role in both Rousseau's optimism (his sense of the positive good it could potentially bring about) and his pessimism (his sense of the misery it is in fact responsible for). Since treating *amour-propre* as intrinsically good or bad would, so the thought goes, render either such pessimism or such optimism unintelligible, we have no choice but to characterize *amour-propre* in normatively neutral terms. Or, as Niko Kolodny puts it, in motivating his own 'normatively neutral' characterization of *amour-propre*:

Spell out the principles that would permit men to be good, and it becomes a mystery why men should ever have become bad. Spell out the principles that explain why men are bad, and it seems impossible that they could ever be otherwise (Kolodny 2010): 166).

But as I will aim to show here, this problem—i.e., that if we characterize *amour-propre* as intrinsically good, then we render unintelligible its bad instances—arises only if we do not keep in view, together with our characterizations of *amour-propre*, the role that its characteristic goodness plays in an investigation of its nature, and the connections between such contributions and human freedom.

Neuhouser and Kolodny are surely correct to insist, against traditional readings of Rousseau, that *amour-propre* is not an altogether unhealthy passion.⁶ But they are incorrect in thinking that the best, or mandatory, alternative to those readings is a normatively neutral characterization of *amour-propre*. Thus, I will argue that we can characterize *amour-propre* in intrinsically normative terms, in terms of the positive contribution it makes to human psychology, without ruling out its central unhealthy instances: and, indeed, while providing the beginnings of an account of the latter. That is, there is a good internal to our being subject to *amour-propre*—namely, that in our being so subject, we acknowledge others as persons, as opposed to mere things—and it is exactly this good involved in our being subject to *amour-propre* that can explain that passion's perversions. In particular, it is in response to some of the characteristic difficulties involved in being subject to another's free evaluation that one may be motivated to efface that other's aspect as a free being: that is, to engage in some of the paradigmatic instances of unhealthy *amour-propre*, such as the domination or subjugation of another.

Thus, there are four ideas at the center of this chapter and the following one. (1) For Rousseau, others appear to us as persons, as opposed to things, insofar as they appear to us as free beings: that is, as limits on what we can will, force, or extract (in ways that things are not).

6. In this respect Neuhouser's and Kolodny's readings are similar to those of Christopher Bertram (Bertram 2004: 23), Joshua Cohen (Cohen 2010: 97-130), Laurence Cooper (1999: 122-9), N.J.H. Dent (Dent, 1988, 1992: 33-6, 2005), Terence Irwin (Irwin 2008: 852-65), Michael Locke McLendon (McLendon 2014), Timothy O'Hagan (O'Hagan 1999: 112-124), and John Rawls (Rawls 2008: 191-213). Formulations of the more traditional reading, of *amour-propre* as altogether bad or unhealthy, include Allan Bloom's introduction and notes to *Emile* (*E*: 10, 484, n. 17), Ernst Cassirer's study of Rousseau (Cassirer 1963), and Christopher Brooke's earlier writing on Rousseau (Brooke 2001). More recently Brooke has adopted the reading that *amour-propre* is not altogether bad (Brooke 2010).

(2) It is in the nature of *amour-propre* to make visible or salient to us others' aspects as free, and specifically as beings capable of unforced evaluation. (3) This characterization of *amour-propre* is at once a generic characterization of its nature and an intrinsically normative characterization of that passion, one yielding criteria for its healthy as well as its unhealthy instances. (4) Once we understand some of the difficulties involved in being subject to another's evaluation, this characterization also plays an important role in explaining why individuals are motivated to manifest bad instances of *amour-propre*. Thus, on this reading, we have not only a more thoroughly normative understanding of *amour-propre*, but also one that can help to unite the otherwise seemingly disparate strands of Rousseau's thinking on nature, the passions, and freedom.

2.2. The Original State of Nature

Rousseau depicts humans' earliest existence as peaceful, and this is a manifestation of the idea that all objects of early humans' needs were 'ready to hand' (*'aisément sous sa main'*, *DI*: 143/*OC*: 3:144). That is, the early human (or, as Rousseau calls him, the '*sauvage*') was subject to no desire that could not be satisfied in principle.⁷

7. Throughout I will follow Rousseau in using masculine pronouns to refer to the *sauvage*. Here I use the French '*sauvage*' since the English 'savage' does not capture the full range of connotations it is reasonable to think Rousseau is drawing on: including not only cruelty and primitiveness but also solitariness, asociality, and even a connection to uncultivated plants (Littré 1873-74). I say that the *sauvage* 'comes into' (as opposed to 'reaches' or 'achieves') the status of a social human in order to avoid the suggestion that the movement from the status of *sauvage* to that of social human (or, equivalently, member of nascent society) is in any way teleological or progressive. It is rather a change from one nature to another (whose respective goods are, to some extent, incommensurable with one another), in a sense to be elaborated on in the following chapter.

Man's first sentiment was that of his existence, his first care that of his preservation. The Earth's products provided him with all necessary support, instinct moved him to use them (*DI*: 161/*OC*: 3:164).

According to Rousseau, the desire (or, alternatively, passion or need) that principally governed the *sauvage's* life was the desire for self-preservation, or what he calls *amour de soi*. And we can distinguish two senses in which all objects of the *sauvage's* desires (all of which are manifestations of *amour de soi*) were within the reach of his will: a physical sense and a metaphysical sense. In a physical sense there were no, or at least relatively few, impediments to the *sauvage's* satisfying his *amour de soi* in that he enjoyed an abundance of resources: human industry had not yet spoiled the Earth's 'natural fertility' (*DI*: 134/*OC*: 3:135). But even without such abundance (which was, in any case, fleeting) the *sauvage's* resources were, in a metaphysical sense, at his command: whatever the *sauvage* desired, its attainability, and the satisfactoriness it provided him, depended on nothing but the exercise of his will and the contingent limitations of his abilities. That is, the satisfactoriness of the bare objects of sustenance (such as food and drink) are not spoiled by their being acquired through force. Indeed, *sauvage* or not, our typical way of relating to such objects is through acts as blatantly forceful, and no less satisfying for that, as grabbing. And even when as a matter of fact there is no food about, there is nothing in the nature of what we seek such that we cannot be satisfied by taking the right, and sufficiently forceful, steps toward it.

I am here focusing on just one respect in which the objects of *amour de soi* are metaphysically within the reach of the will: their being objects of satisfaction even when forced. (I will later discuss a further respect, concerning the idea that the objects of *amour de soi* are in

principle substitutable with anything sufficiently and qualitatively similar.)⁸ But these observations help to make vivid the sense in which the world as it presented itself to the *sauvage* was principally a world of things, where things are understood as within the reach of the will in the above respect. Because exercises of his will did not in any way inhibit, and indeed were essential to, the execution of his desires, the *sauvage* was not compelled to acknowledge limits on what such exercises could satisfactorily achieve; the only space relevant to him was a space of things at his command.

Furthermore, the life of the *sauvage* was not only peaceful, but also solitary, and here again we must distinguish between a physical sense and a more interesting metaphysical sense in which Rousseau understood this to be the case. In the former sense, early humans were sufficiently dispersed, and sufficiently provided for on their own, not to require anything more than occasional interaction with their conspecifics. According to Rousseau, '[...It] is impossible to imagine why, in that primitive state, a man would need another man any more than a monkey or a Wolf would need his kind' (*DI*: 149/*OC*: 3:151). Thus, the *sauvage's* physical conditions ensured his independence. But also, and even more interestingly, the nature of the *sauvage's* relations with others of his kind were no different from his relations with things, at least in the sense that every form of satisfaction he sought from other humans could, in principle, be arrived at through force. Seen just as instruments for or physical impediments to his food, sex, and shelter, other humans were to be pushed around, and the objects of *amour de soi* were no less satisfying for having been arrived at in this way. That is, the *sauvage* was 'solitary' also in the sense that he could not see even those of his kind as anything more than instruments or things.

⁸. I discuss this below in Section 4.3.

Thus, insofar as the *sauvage* saw others as instruments for or physical impediments to the satisfaction of his *amour de soi*, he also saw them as things (in the sense that the satisfactions they provided him depended on nothing but the exercise of his will and the contingent limitations of his abilities). And we can understand this as the application of a broader idea, namely that *anything* treated as an instrument for or physical impediment to the satisfaction of *amour de soi* is, to that extent, seen as a thing. After all, we cannot give much sense to the idea that the objects of *amour de soi*, including objects of sustenance such as water, are satisfactorily within the reach of the will unless whatever serves us to get water, or stands in our way of it, is similarly, and without compromising its satisfactoriness, subject to force or manipulation. If water indeed presented itself to the *sauvage* as a thing in the relevant sense, then whatever forceful means he took to get it could not thereby spoil its satisfactoriness. And, as we will soon see in more detail, this included forceful conduct toward other humans.

So far we can distinguish at least three principles governing Rousseau's discussion of early human life.

Thing Principle: For any subject, any source of satisfaction in principle available to exercises of their will and the contingent limitations of their abilities, and no less satisfying for that, is seen as a thing.

Self-Preservation Principle: For any subject, all objects of *amour de soi* are, under that description or aspect, seen as things according to the criterion of the Thing Principle.

Instrument Principle: For any subject, anything seen as an instrument for or physical impediment to the satisfaction of *amour de soi* is, under that description or aspect, seen as a thing according to the criterion of the Thing Principle.

In formulating these principles, I have made the question of whether something is to count as a thing relative to a description, or, more broadly, relative to whatever aspect under which it is being considered. This is because we are centrally concerned with *how* some beings are taken by a subject (in the present case, the *sauvage*).⁹ Moreover, as we will see when we turn to the contrast between *seeing as a thing* and *seeing as a person*, any person might (from some aspect) be seen as thing, particularly insofar as they serve as instruments for or physical impediments to the satisfaction of one's *amour de soi*. And seeing another as a thing under these aspects need not preclude seeing them as a person under others.

Keeping the above principles in mind, I will spend the rest of this chapter providing a more detailed picture of how the world, as it presented itself to Rousseau's *sauvage*, was a world of things, even in his relations with others of his kind. Since the *sauvage* was concerned chiefly with the satisfaction of his own *amour de soi*, others appeared as significant to him only insofar as they bore on the satisfaction of this desire. And under any aspect in which this was the case (following the Instrument Principle), the *sauvage* saw others as things, as sources of satisfaction available to exercises of his will.

In fact, Rousseau describes at least three sorts of relations the *sauvage* bore to others of his kind, none of which are fundamentally different from his relations with things: (1) as sources

⁹. It might be surprising for me to attribute these principles to the *sauvage* when for most of Rousseau's discussion the *sauvage* lacks language and even a capacity to form general concepts (*DI*: 146-9/*OC*: 3:148-51). But I am not claiming that anything in Rousseau's text suggests that the *sauvage* explicitly entertains these principles. In fact, these characterizations of the *sauvage* (as abiding by these principles) should be no more surprising than any claim that a non-human animal responds differentially according to aspects or descriptions that only we (language-users) can articulate. Compare Anscombe's discussions of how not being a language user 'has no bearing' on certain intentional attributions, even to non-human animals (Anscombe 1963: 86-7; 1979a: 221).

of compassion, or what Rousseau calls *pitié*; (2) as sources of injury, and the anger injury can produce; and (3), at least among later-stage and more sophisticated *sauvages*, as objects of psychological understanding, or some incipient 'theory of mind'. Thus, even under the most complex of these aspects, namely (3), others appear to the *sauvage* not as persons but as yet further things.

2.2.1. Others as Sources of *Pitié*

As the desire for *self*-preservation, *amour de soi* includes among its objects the maintenance of one's bodily integrity, and specifically the avoidance of pain. Thus, any way of relating to others as means for the avoidance of one's pain amounts to treating them as instruments for the satisfaction of *amour de soi*, and, at least to that extent, as things. This emerges in Rousseau's discussion of compassion, or *pitié*.

It is understandable that, in depicting the state of nature as peaceful, Rousseau would want to account for why, despite seeing others principally as recipients of force, the *sauvage's* relations to others were relatively non-violent: he had a natural repulsion to seeing others in pain, and consequently a natural repulsion to bringing others' pain about. And though we might think that seeking another's compassion is a central instance of acknowledging their personhood (especially in that it seems to involve desiring a kind of consideration, in some broad sense, of one's own status as a creature in pain), Rousseau is quite clear that for the *sauvage* desiring another's *pitié* was another instance of relating to them as a thing.

According to Rousseau, feeling *pitié* for another is not at all an exercise of freedom (or, for that matter, of reason), but rather 'the pure movement of nature prior to all reflection' (*DI*:

152/OC 3: 155). That is, Rousseau seems to understand *pitié* as a merely mechanical response to others' pain, or to its imminence, and thus also as something 'so Natural that even the Beasts sometimes show evident signs of it': he adds, 'one daily sees the repugnance of Horses to trample a living Body underfoot' (*DI*: 152/OC 3: 154). Thus, it seems, in responding to another with *pitié* the *sauvage* is simply manifesting the effect of a mechanical (or animal) force.

Therefore, for Rousseau, the *sauvage's* seeking another's *pitié*, say through a pain-filled cry, was not at all an acknowledgment of their personhood, but rather a way of forcing them (or at least of trying to force them) to do something. And again, we can put this point in the context of the Instrument Principle: in seeking another's *pitié*, the *sauvage* is treating another as an instrument for the maintenance of his bodily integrity (that is, as an instrument for the satisfaction of his *amour de soi*) and thus, under that description, and to that extent, as a thing.

2.2.2. Others as Sources of Hurt or Anger

Just as the *sauvage* related to others as things in seeking relief from his pain, so he related to others as things insofar as he saw them as *causes* of his pain. Perhaps this is not surprising: even in being kicked or stabbed, it seems we come at the end of a causal sequence whose previous point is a shoe or a knife (that is, a thing). But we should recall that social creatures like us are subject to a peculiarly social kind of pain, namely insult or resentment, and that this pain is one way in which the personhood of others becomes manifest to us. As Rousseau notes in his late-life *Reveries*,

In all the evils [*mals*] which befall us, we look more to the intention than to the effect. A shingle falling off a roof can injure us more, but does not grieve us as much as a stone thrown on purpose by a malevolent hand. The blow sometimes goes astray, but the intention never misses its mark (*RSW*: 114/*OC*: 1:1078).

Insult and resentment are examples of what P.F. Strawson called 'the reactive attitudes': 'reactions to [others'] good or ill will or indifference or lack of concern' (Strawson 1974: 14). That is, they are responses to another's apparent intention toward or opinion about (*their point of view on*) oneself. But the *sauvage* did not care about others' points of view on himself, and consequently (no matter how much pain others of his kind caused him), he did not form reactive attitudes toward them. Rousseau illustrates this point in some of his further characterizations of the *sauvage's* life as peaceful. First, the *sauvage* did not suffer from, and did not participate in, the patterns of vengeance to which insult or resentment can give rise. (According to Rousseau, *sauvages* 'did not even dream of vengeance except perhaps mechanically and on the spot like the dog that bites the stone thrown at him [...]', *DI*: 154/*OC*: 3:157.) And second, in not caring about the pain he suffered as the expression of anyone's point of view on him, even the pain he did suffer from those of his kind was qualitatively different, and it seems more bearable, than much of the pain we social creatures suffer from others:

[...Every *sauvage*] viewing his kind scarcely differently from the way he would view Animals of another species, can rob the weaker of his prey or yield his own to the stronger without considering these acts of pillage as anything but natural occurrences, without the slightest stirring of arrogance or resentment, and with no other passion than the pain or pleasure at success or failure (*DI*: 218/*OC*: 3:219-20).

Again, in seeing others as nothing more than means for his own self-preservation, the *sauvage's* experience of the pain caused by others was qualitatively different from much of such pain as we social creatures suffer it. In this context as well, the world as it presented itself to the *sauvage* was a world of things.

2.2.3. Others as Objects of Psychological Understanding

So far my presentation of the original state of nature suggests that the *sauvage* had no traits or capacities to distinguish him from the non-human animals. But though Rousseau likes to emphasize continuities between early humans and the other animals, he does think that the *sauvage* enjoyed a capacity for free agency, and with it a capacity to modify and improve his own abilities (what Rousseau calls *perfectibilité*, *DI*: 140-1/*OC*: 3:141-2). Thus, with increased industriousness, humans came to interact more frequently with others of their kind, and were consequently motivated, through exercises of the projective imagination, to develop some understanding of the behavior of others.

Although others of his kind were not for him what they are for us, and he had scarcely more dealings with them than with the other animals, they were not neglected in his observations. The conformities which time may have led him to perceive between them, his female, and himself, led him to judge regarding those he did not perceive, and seeing that they all behaved as he would have done in similar circumstances, he concluded that their way of thinking and feeling fully corresponded to his own, and this important truth, once it was firmly settled in his mind, made him follow, by a premonition as sure as

Dialectics [logic] and more rapid, the best rules of conduct to observe with them for his advantage and safety (*DI*: 162-3/*OC*: 3:166)¹⁰

For all that Rousseau says here, the *sauvage* may have developed, again through considerations of self-preservation, a very sophisticated understanding of the psychology of others, or 'theory of mind'. Nevertheless, though his understanding of others was richer in content than it earlier had been, his relations with others were not fundamentally different from anything previous in the history of his species. That is, he indeed came to see others as minded, but as *things with minds*.

We can understand this as an application of the Instrument Principle, together with the idea that the *sauvage's* relations with others were entirely mediated by concerns about the satisfaction of his *amour de soi*. It is such concerns that motivated the *sauvage* to form rules for predicting the behavior of others, and to project his own inner life onto that of others (so as better to compete or cooperate with them in, say, hunting a stag). And it is also such concerns that characterized his relations with them as those with things. Even in seeing others as minded, the *sauvage* saw others as sources of satisfaction in principle available to exercises of his will, including exercises of force.

As will soon become apparent, the important contrast for Rousseau in these discussions is that between seeing another as a *thing* and seeing them as *free* (or as a *free person*). But none of the foregoing, or the notion of *things with minds*, should suggest that Rousseau understands human mindedness as independent of freedom. As sophisticated as the *sauvage's* 'theory of mind' may be, it may also be, from a metaphysical point of view, thoroughly false: or, insofar as it was

¹⁰. The genders of nouns in the original French make it unambiguous that the phrase 'observe with them' (*garder avec eux*) refers to 'others of his kind' (*semblables*).

developed to further his self-preservation, nothing more than a useful fiction. For all Rousseau says, it may be that the freedom of others, which the *sauvage* cannot grasp, infuses and even transforms all areas of their mentality and behavior.¹¹

In fact, in his own later writings on the topic, Rousseau does characterize the ability to make up one's mind, the ability to form judgments, as an exercise of freedom (*E*: 270-1, 280/*OC*: 4:570-3, 586). And this will have central significance for understanding what it means, according to Rousseau, to violate another's personhood (in the sense of 'person' under investigation). After all, if violating another's personhood is to involve effacing their dimension as a free being, it should not always be understood just as a restriction on another's another practical freedom (their ability to act, or their ability to respond to practical reasons), but also, potentially, as a restriction on their theoretical freedom (or their ability to make up their mind).¹² This is a suggestion that I will return to in Chapter 4. But before then, we must understand just what it is, according to Rousseau, to acknowledge another as free, or as a free person. That is the topic of the following chapter.

¹¹. In other words, I do not think that Rousseau's characterization of the *sauvage's* 'theory of mind' precludes him from holding a 'transformative', as opposed to 'additive' theory of freedom in its relation to mentality, on the model of 'transformative' orders of explanation as defended by Matthew Boyle (Boyle 2016).

¹². This is one of several ways in which Rousseau's writing anticipates later social-theoretic notions of ideology and false consciousness. I return to this topic in Section 4.6.

3. Amour-Propre and Seeing Others as Persons 2: Society

3.1. Amour-Propre and Limits on the Will

We have seen that the *sauvage's* relations with others, however frequent and however informed by an incipient 'theory of mind', were nevertheless (from his perspective) yet further relations with things. They thus resist an easy application of the description 'social relations'. But after time, as Rousseau puts it, 'Everything begins to change in appearance' (*DI*: 165/*OC*: 3:169).¹³

As ideas and sentiments succeed one another, as the mind and the heart grow active, [Humankind] continues to grow tame, contacts expand and bonds tighten. It became customary to gather in front of the Huts or around a large Tree: song and dance, true children of love and leisure, became the amusement or rather the occupation of idle men

¹³. Rousseau refers to this historical moment as 'nascent society' at *DI*: 167, 172/*OC*: 3:170, 176.

and women gathered together. Everyone began to look at everyone else and to wish to be looked at himself, and public esteem [became prized]. The one who sang or danced the best; the handsomest, the strongest, the most skillful, or the most eloquent came to be the most highly regarded, and this was the first step at once toward inequality and vice: from these first preferences arose vanity and contempt on the one hand, shame and envy on the other; and the fermentation caused by these new leavens eventually produced compounds fatal to happiness and to innocence (*DI*: 166/*OC*: 3:169-70).¹⁴

Though it is only several pages later that Rousseau describes the kind of desire introduced in this passage as *'amour propre'*, it should be evident that this moment (when 'men [began] to appreciate each other and the idea of consideration [took] shape in their mind') marks a significant change in humans' mutual relations, relations no longer governed entirely by the Instrument Principle.¹⁵ That is, humans no longer saw others principally as instruments for their own self-preservation; they also came to care about what others thought of them, for reasons independent of what promoted their self-preservation, and indeed for its own sake.

An immediately striking feature of Rousseau's examples of the first manifestations of *amour-propre* is that they are all desires to be seen as having some superlative trait: among them,

¹⁴. Here I have changed Gourevitch's translation of *'l'estime publique eut un prix'* ('public esteem acquired a price') in order to avoid conveying notions of commodification at this stage of the Second Discourse, especially when the social conditions necessary for commodification have not yet appeared in Rousseau's narrative. I have also throughout changed Gourevitch's uses of 'mankind' to 'humankind' wherever Rousseau himself uses the gender-neutral *'Genre-humain'*.

¹⁵. In later characterizing nascent society Rousseau describes it as a moment when *'amour propre* [became] interested' (*DI* 170/*OC* 3:174). This moment should be distinguished from the first appearance of 'pride' (*'orgueil'*), earlier in the Second Discourse, which was manifested in the *sauvage's* feelings of superiority over the other animals (*DI*: 162/*OC*: 3:166). In this context, *orgueil* is unlike *amour-propre* in that it does not take satisfaction in others' thoughts about oneself, but rather in subordinating creatures who may serve as food or as competitive threats (in the pursuit of objects of *amour de soi*). Thus, I think that Lovejoy is incorrect when he asserts that Rousseau uses *'orgueil'* and *'amour-propre'* interchangeably (Lovejoy 1961: 147). This is not to deny some genetic or developmental connection between *orgueil* and *amour-propre*.

desires to be seen as '[t]he one who sang or danced the best; the handsomest, the strongest, the most skillful, or the most eloquent [...].'

As several recent commentators on Rousseau have noted, it would be overreaching to let this feature of these examples define *amour-propre* as such.¹⁶ Indeed, even in desiring to be esteemed for some differential trait one need not desire to be esteemed as the best along some dimension. (One may just want to be seen as a good dancer, or as an adequate singer.) And it seems that desiring consideration from others, placing significance in what they think of one, may at times manifest itself in little more than caring to be noticed, to be considered as deserving attention, among all the items that fill a space.

In fact, if we focus too much on certain features typical of superlative standing, we may miss how the passage above introduces a desire categorically different from what characterized the life of the *sauvage*. Acclaim as the best dancer or singer may bring about residual benefits, among them greater access to food, sex, shelter, and other objects of *amour de soi*. Thus, one's satisfaction in this acclaim may be entirely derivative from one's satisfaction in these benefits, benefits that (at least for the *sauvage*) are no less satisfying for their being arrived at through force. But taking satisfaction in another's opinion of oneself on its own, and independent of these residual benefits, requires seeing it as the exercise of that other's freedom: that is, as the exercise of that other's capacity to form an independent view of oneself. Thus, I want to introduce the following principle:

¹⁶ This is a consequence of those readings of Rousseau that understand healthy manifestations of *amour-propre* as taking satisfaction only in some kind of equal standing (for example, Cohen 2010, Dent 1988, and Rawls 2008). And Neuhaus articulates a view of *amour-propre* according to which that desire can take satisfaction in one's evaluation as something less than the best in some respect (Neuhaus 2008: 102).

Differential Consideration Principle: For any subject manifesting (healthy) *amour-propre*, receiving another's evaluative consideration of one's differential traits is satisfying (of *amour-propre*) only to the extent that it is seen as the exercise of that other's capacity to form attitudes freely.¹⁷

To get at this connection between *amour-propre* and acknowledging another as free, we must look to how, in desiring consideration from another, we desire something that is not merely the product of our own agency, but rather comes essentially from another's point of view.¹⁸ In his study of early-modern treatments of the 'desire for approbation', including Rousseau's, Arthur O. Lovejoy characterizes such a desire as seeking in another a 'thought not [one's] own' (Lovejoy 1961: 92). This is suggestive, but as a formulation of *amour-propre* it does not adequately distinguish the latter from the ways of relating to others as 'things with minds' characteristic of the *sauvage*. Insofar as they serve his private purposes (as instruments), the *sauvage* could very well care about the thoughts of others, and even care greatly about how he himself is taken in by them. (Such 'scorekeeping' of others' opinions is very familiar in instances of both competition and cooperation for the sake of independent ends.) But, however much the *sauvage* may care about the thoughts of others, he cannot be expected to care about how they arrive at those thoughts (that is, whether as products of his own agency or not), just so long as they serve as

¹⁷. This principle concerns 'differential' consideration, as opposed to the non-differential consideration owed another in virtue of their status as, say, a citizen or a human being. (For a similar distinction, see Darwall 1977: 36-49.) I choose to focus on the former because the latter is not yet in play in Rousseau's account of nascent society (as, for him, it requires some kind of civil or political association not yet in existence). But more importantly, not every instance of non-differential consideration is unavailable to exercises of the will in the sense relevant here. For example, we can demand or claim the respect owed us as citizens or human beings without spoiling the satisfactoriness of that respect.

¹⁸. The notion of acknowledgment I draw on here owes much to the writing of Stanley Cavell, especially Cavell 1969. It also owes much to Cavell's observations about how the so-called 'problem of other minds' is taken up in Rousseau, in Cavell 1979: 467.

instruments for his private purposes. Indeed, as we have seen, there is nothing in the nature of the ends the *sauvage* seeks such that their satisfactoriness eludes his exercising his will to arrive at them. And this even includes the thoughts of others.

In contrast, what is distinctive about *amour-propre*, and the attitudes of others valued in being subject to it, is that those attitudes are valued not just for whatever purposes they might serve, but for how they are expressive of an independent point of view on oneself. This means that the satisfaction one takes in such a view is (unlike the satisfaction the *sauvage* might take in the thoughts of others as instruments for his ends) entirely sensitive to one's understanding of how, and for what reasons, it comes about in the other. Thus, if such an attitude is somehow arrived at through one's exercising force on that other, then it is principally expressive of one's own will, rather than expressive of an independent point of view. Moreover, making sense of any instance of *amour-propre* where someone takes satisfaction in their own force or will, as opposed to another's independently formed attitude, seems to require understanding that instance as unhealthy. (Familiarly, another's love of oneself brought about by pill or potion should not be satisfying, and if it ever were, we would have trouble seeing such satisfaction as anything other than perverse.)¹⁹

Therefore, to get at what is distinctive of *amour-propre* among ways of relating to others, we must understand it as indeed valuing *a thought of oneself not one's own*, but, most

¹⁹. Cf. Sartre 1956: 478ff. Someone's taking satisfaction in love brought about pill or potion is usually thought of as the stuff of fantasy, but an important ambition of Rousseau's social criticism, as I understand it, is to show that this perversity (taking satisfaction in the consideration of someone under one's control) is pervasive throughout such very real relationships as those between master and servant, employer and employee, as well as benefactor and beneficiary. I further discuss this theme in the following chapter.

importantly, as valuing such a thought *arrived at independently of deliberate exercises of force on that other*. And here it is important to note that at one point Rousseau defines freedom, among the several different senses he distinguishes, as 'not being subject to someone else's' will (*LWM*: 260/*OC*: 3:841). A reasonable corollary of this definition of freedom is that seeing another as free (at least in some respect, such as their capacity to form attitudes about oneself) requires seeing them (in that same respect) as not subject to one's own will. Thus, being subject to *amour-propre* requires acknowledging another as free in at least that sense: as a source of value whose satisfactoriness depends on its being left up to them, or up to their own independent abilities to form a point of view on oneself. Whereas the *sauvage* was subject to no desire that could not be satisfied in principle by his taking the right (and sufficiently forceful) steps toward its object, the bearer of *amour-propre* must acknowledge limits on what they can satisfactorily achieve, limits whose acknowledgment amounts to an acknowledgment of the freedom of that other whose consideration they seek. Of course, there is much more to seeing another as a free being than seeing them as a source of consideration. (Indeed, for Rousseau, any exercise of judgment or the will ought, in some sense, to be free; *E*: 270-271, 280/*OC*: 4:570-73, 585-86). But by imagining what it would be for *amour-propre* first to emerge, Rousseau suggests that it is through our finding value in what others think of us that their aspects as free beings become salient to us. That is, for us to see others as more than 'things with minds', more than instruments for the satisfaction of our *amour de soi*, their freedom must come to matter to us. And it does so as a distinctive source of (healthy) satisfaction, of the sort sought in (healthy) *amour-propre*.

I will soon (in Section 3.3) explain more fully what I mean by 'healthy' *amour-propre*, but it is important to note that this acknowledgment of another's freedom is a necessary, but not

sufficient, condition on healthily desiring consideration from another. In fact, it reveals how fundamental a condition this should be for our understanding of *amour-propre* that even manifestations of this desire we may think of as unhealthy, in other respects, betray some concern with another's aspect as a free being. For example, certain kinds of vanity (desiring consideration that one takes oneself not to deserve, or for traits one takes oneself not to possess in fact) essentially seek satisfaction in another's free evaluation. It may be a false or exaggerated opinion that our vanity desires in another, but it is an opinion, and thus an expression of that other's capacity to appraise us freely, nonetheless.²⁰ And even desiring to make one's vices known, either masochistically or through some desire for notoriety, betrays a concern for others' evaluation of oneself, and for their aspects as free beings at the very least.

Finally, in making clearer the idea that being subject to *amour-propre* involves acknowledging limits on one's will, it might help to note how different this idea is from other philosophical ideas of volitional limits. Twentieth-century philosophers have spoken of "grammatical" or "conceptual" or "logical" limits on the will: ends whose willing is somehow, in some sense, unintelligible.²¹ (We might count, among these, willing to bring about a true contradiction.) We can also imagine some sense, perhaps 'metaphysical', in which we cannot will to change the past, or to continue our projects after death. In other contexts, Rousseau may be

²⁰. Thus, it will take more than this observation, that in manifesting *amour-propre* we seek an exercise of another's freedom, to articulate what is unhealthy or paradoxical about vanity: for example, the paradox that Nietzsche remarks on in saying that vain people often 'end up *believing* this good opinion [that they have instilled in others] themselves' (Nietzsche 1966: §261).

²¹. For considerations in favor there being 'logical' or 'grammatical' limits on the will, see Albritton 1985: 239-251, and O'Shaughnessy 2008: 53-72.

committed to countenancing some such limits on the will, and perhaps with good reason.²² But whatever these limits are, they should not be understood as limits specifically on the *satisfactory* exercise of the will: that is, even if (*per impossibile*) one could continue one's projects after death, carrying this out would (we expect) not be any less satisfying for its being willed.

In contrast, if one could bring about another's good opinion of oneself through will or force, one should not, insofar as one manifests *amour-propre*, thereby take satisfaction in that other's opinion. Such consideration would be formed on the basis of something (namely one's own will or force) other than this person's evaluation of oneself, and it should not be seen as anything more than one's own doing. Thus, willing, in some sense, *spoils* the satisfactoriness of receiving another's consideration, just as it would not, in the same sense, spoil some fantastic ability to change the past or to continue one's projects after death.²³ And I think this helps in part to account for the special salience and difficulty of being subject to *amour-propre*. Whereas before the *sauvage's* possibilities of willfully acquired satisfaction were in a sense unlimited, now the member of nascent society faces limits on satisfaction with every person he encounters,

²². Christopher Brooke has noted the significance for Rousseau of the Stoic distinction (associated with Epictetus) between what is and what is not within one's power (Brooke 2012: 188-90).

²³. It might seem that I am entitled to a stronger formulation than that willing 'spoils' the satisfactoriness of that consideration valued in being subject to *amour-propre*: namely, that what willing brings about cannot be consideration at all. After all, it might seem, any attitude brought about in that way is formed for the 'wrong kind of reason' for it to count as consideration. Even if this is the case, I will rely on the weaker formulation, especially when contrasting the objects of *amour-propre* (whose satisfactoriness is spoiled by willing) with the objects of *amour de soi* (whose satisfactoriness is not so spoiled).

limits in a sense even more curtailing of the possibilities of willful satisfaction than his own spatiotemporal boundaries.²⁴

3.2. Being Confronted by the Personhood of Another

I now want to argue that, for Rousseau, being subject to *amour-propre*, and thus acknowledging those limits on one's will that I just discussed, amounts to having another's personhood become visible to oneself. That is, another's aspect as a free being first comes to matter to us through our seeing this other as a source of that peculiar kind of satisfaction that cannot be had through force or exercises of the will. Throughout his autobiographical writings Rousseau depicts moments of solitariness, or apparent solitariness, somehow interrupted by the appearance of another person. In his isolation, and especially in his trancelike 'reveries', Jean-Jacques could entertain the fantasy that his powers were limitless: that, as Rousseau puts it, he 'could extend [his existence] over the entire universe' (*RSW*: 81/*OC*: 1:1056).²⁵ But the sudden appearance of another person constitutes the appearance of a limit: specifically, a limit on one's powers of satisfaction, and a limit that becomes salient through one's placing significance in another's free judgment. If we describe these moments as ones of being 'confronted by the

²⁴. For Rousseau, the movement out of the state of nature is characterized not only by the appearance of *amour-propre* and thus (I want to argue) the early human's coming to see others as persons, but also by the early human's knowledge of the prospect of his own death, where before he had only known discrete pain (*DI*: 142/*OC*: 3:143). Derrida rightly understands both moments as involving the acknowledgment of limits, but he seems to go too far in saying that they amount to 'one and the same limit' (Derrida 1997: 187). For reasons presented above, these should be understood as different kinds of limits, at least when understood as limits on the will.

²⁵. Here I follow most Rousseau scholarship in distinguishing between the author of the autobiographical writings ('Rousseau') and their protagonist ('Jean-Jacques').

personhood of another', then a similar description should apply to early humans in their movement into nascent society, and in their first being subject to *amour-propre*. This description perhaps applies less aptly to these moments as they are related in the Second Discourse than as they are related in Rousseau's other great phylogenetic account of human development, the *Essay on the Origin of Languages* (which nevertheless began as a note to the former).

A [*sauvage*] meeting others will at first have been frightened. His fright will have made him see these men as larger and stronger than himself; he will have called them *Giants*. After much experience he will have recognized that since these supposed Giants are neither bigger nor stronger than he, their stature did not fit the idea he had initially attached to the word Giant. He will therefore invent another name common to them and to himself, for example the name *man*, and he will restrict the name *Giant* to the false object that had struck him during his illusion. This is how the figurative word arises before the proper [or literal] word does, when passion holds our eyes spellbound and the first idea which is present to us is not that of the truth (*EO*: 254/*OC*: 5:381).

A good deal is going on in this passage, and indeed much of the *Essay* could be read as an elaboration on it. But it should be clear that it is a myth, or itself a figurative account, of what it is to be confronted by the personhood of another. (Of course, unlike solitary Jean-Jacques confronted by another's appearance, the *sauvage* of the *Essay* is confronted not only by an individual's personhood, but also, and for the first time, personhood *as a general kind*.) The other is frightening to *sauvage* of this passage not (just) because the former constitutes a competitive threat, someone against whom the *sauvage* must compete for objects of *amour de soi*, but principally because he appears to the *sauvage* as another free being. And two observations bear this out. First, this passage is also an account of the first manifestations of vocal speech, a capacity that, Rousseau argues in the *Essay*, humans actualized as a response to their needs to

communicate passions to others. As he puts it, 'Not hunger nor thirst [that is, not the objects of *amour de soi*], but love, hatred, pity, anger wrung [humans'] first voices from them' (*EO*: 253/*OC*: 5:380). In other words, it seems that, for Rousseau, vocal speech, at least in its original manifestations, requires from the speaker an acknowledgement of the personhood of others, and exactly the acknowledgment involved in being subject to *amour-propre*.²⁶

Second, it is tempting to read in the *sauvage*'s seeing others as giants an acknowledgment of what we might call the 'metaphysical size' that persons present in their constituting limits on one's will. That is, the *sauvage* calls these others 'Giants' exactly because this communicates the significance of being confronted by them in their aspects as persons. Earlier, any object of the *sauvage*'s desires could be had, at least in principle, and without spoiling its satisfactoriness, through exercises of the will: any such object was thus within his control, and in that sense 'smaller' than him. But in being subject to *amour-propre*, and thus placing significance in another's free judgment, the early human is confronted by a peculiar source of satisfaction that cannot be had through exercises of the will, that consists in judgments *about him*, and thus constitutes something 'bigger' than his will: namely, a person.²⁷ (With the passage's account of the invention of the word 'man', in place of 'giant', we have a myth of our subsequent history, of

²⁶. This is a complex point in the *Essay*, and I cannot do full justice to it here. Note that it seems to encompass at least two thoughts: (1) vocal speech involves communicating to others passions that are manifestations of *amour-propre*; and (2) vocal speech is itself a manifestation of *amour-propre*, in that it involves desiring consideration from others. I explore these thoughts further in my 'Speech, Recognition, and the Insult in Not Being Believed: Rousseau and Adam Smith' (Appendix 1 of this dissertation).

²⁷. For thoughts on how, in this passage of the *Essay*, the *sauvage* 'cannot but feel frail in the relation to the appearance of the other', see Friedlander 2004: 48-51.

our bringing others down to size: that is, of our coping with the limits that others present, in the better and worse ways that I will soon address.)

So far I have spoken of the notion of being *confronted* by the personhood of another, a notion that the above passage conveys in describing the *sauvage* as *frightened* by others in their first appearance. And the idea that being subject to *amour-propre* may involve being confronted by another's personhood should help to allay the impression that this passion, as 'the desire for consideration from others', must involve actively seeking another's consideration, and also that it must involve desiring consideration from someone of one's antecedent acquaintance. In fact, *amour-propre* may be manifested in an encounter as passive and impersonal as being confronted by a stranger, something vividly brought out when one is caught doing something shameful. Essential to the peculiar character of being overwhelmed by shame is that one cannot help but be concerned with what this other thinks of oneself (even if she is a stranger) and the fact that this person's judgment is outside one's (satisfactory) control only further informs what is often a feeling of helplessness. In feeling shame, one is, perhaps just for a moment, experientially confronted by this other in her aspect as a person.²⁸

This emphasis on confrontation in the first appearance of *amour-propre* might be thought to support the idea that in giving his accounts of human development Rousseau is less interested in giving a reductive account of *amour-propre* (and, correlatively, of our coming to see others as persons) than he is in accounting for this desire's transformative effect (when it does appear). If personhood is something by which we can be confronted, then there may be a sense in which we can come to see others as persons experientially or immediately. And if *that* is the case, it might

²⁸. Cf. Sartre 1956: 347-350ff.

relieve some theoretical pressure on Rousseau to explain out of which more fundamental building blocks our seeing others as persons arose.²⁹

There may be something in this thought, but I will not explore it here.³⁰ And in fact, we are now in a better position to appreciate how it is that, despite his relative emphasis on the transformative effect of *amour-propre*, Rousseau's account of our coming to see others as persons is, in a sense, naturalistic. That is, our coming to see others as persons, and our coming to acknowledge persons as limits on our wills, does not consist in our exercising our powers of reason in abstraction from our desires. (It does not, for example, consist in the application of 'pure practical reason'.) Rather, it consists in our acknowledging the conditions for satisfying a peculiar passion or desire, namely *amour-propre*. In *Emile*, whose titular character's education consists mostly in considerations about what will satisfy his passions, Rousseau writes, 'In vain

²⁹. Kolodny appears to think that there is some such pressure on Rousseau, at least insofar as he provides, on Rousseau's behalf, a characterization of *amour-propre* in terms of configurations of beliefs and desires added onto *amour de soi* (Kolodny 2010). Of course, Kolodny's aiming to provide such a characterization is informed by his assumption that a characterization of *amour-propre* must be normatively neutral: and that is exactly the assumption I am presently arguing against.

³⁰. This thought may help in making sense of an important moment early in *Emile*, when Rousseau describes having seen an infant struck by his nurse, whereupon he showed all the signs of 'resentment, fury, and despair.' Rousseau adds, 'I am sure that a live ember fallen by chance on this child's hand would have made less of an impression than this blow, rather light but given in the manifest intention of offending him' (*E*: 66/*OC*: 4:286-7). Thus, in communicating to the infant her intention to offend, the nurse also communicates to him her personhood (experientially or immediately). I return to this point in my discussion of the infant in Section 4.7.

does tranquil reason make us approve or criticize; it is only passion which makes us act.³¹ And it is not difficult to see how a similar principle (that it is only passion, or considerations about what will satisfy our passions, that *limit* how we act) informs Rousseau's understanding of how others' dimensions as persons may first come to matter to us: we are subject to a passion whose satisfaction requires leaving something up to others' unforced judgments. Again, Rousseau does not attempt to give a reductive account of *amour-propre*. But by locating our seeing others as persons in our being subject to that desire, he thereby thinks of our opening our eyes to this dimension of others (to whatever extent it may also involve the use of reason or reflection) as an expression of our passional or affective natures.

I would now like to introduce an additional principle to this discussion.

Person Principle: For any subject manifesting (healthy) *amour-propre* (and thus subject to the Differential Consideration Principle), anything seen, under some aspect, as a source of evaluative consideration of one's differential traits is, under that aspect, seen as a person.

It is a consequence of this principle, together with the Differential Consideration Principle, that persons are seen as sources of a kind of satisfaction whose satisfactoriness depends on its being an expression of freedom: and thus, depends on its not being willed. It is also a consequence that

³¹. This should not be treated as equivalent to the Humean principle that reason's normative force derives entirely from considerations about what will satisfy the passions (Hume 1978: 415). First, Rousseau's commitment to the above principle seems limited to developmental contexts: the child's education is to consist in considerations about what will satisfy his passions; and the personhood of others first becomes salient to the early human through the latter's being subject to a peculiar passion (*amour-propre*). None of this precludes the possibility of an adult's or a later human's being subject to reason as an independent normative force. Second, for Rousseau, as I aim to argue here, passions may themselves be subject to normative criticism, and in particular to considerations of health and unhealth.

seeing another as a person, under some aspect, excludes seeing them as a thing (in the sense of the Thing Principle), under that same aspect. As I noted in the previous chapter, seeing another as a person under some aspect should *not* exclude seeing them as a thing under a different aspect (notably, as a possible instrument for the promotion of one's self-preservation). But even if that is the case, it does not follow that another's aspects as person and as thing are always equally salient to some subject, or that our seeing someone under one aspect never informs how we see her under another. In fact, it is tempting to think that another's aspect as a person is not just one aspect among many, but rather a principle that organizes how we see them in all their dimensions. When it dawns on us that what we took to be a statue is in fact a living person (when we are confronted by another's personhood in *that* way), we are not suddenly made blind to the aspects this person shares with statues, though how we see those aspects (such as its casting a shadow) is surely informed and animated by our understanding that what we have before us is another free being.³²

Finally, I should note that much of the language I have used in characterizing what it is to be confronted by another's personhood is language that admits of degrees: in particular, if another's personhood is the kind of aspect that can become *visible* to us, or the kind that can become *salient* to us, then we should expect that it is also the kind of aspect that can be more or less visible, or more or less salient. And we may find a concern with this phenomenon, of another's personhood becoming more visible or salient than before, in Rousseau's concern with moments of seeing another without being seen oneself, and the difficult experience of having

³². In his play *Pygmalion* Rousseau explores themes associated with coming to see as a person what one had previously taken as inanimate (*P*: 230-36/*OC*: 2:1224-31).

one's voyeurism exposed.³³ For example, in the *Confessions*, Rousseau describes a moment that took place while, in his youth, he boarded with an Italian shopkeeper, Mme Basile, with whom he became infatuated. At one moment Jean-Jacques enters Mme Basile's room, her door ajar, and at length observes his host embroidering, seemingly unobserved himself: that is, before realizing his exposure by a mirror.

But over the chimney-piece was a mirror, which betrayed me. I do not know what effect this scene had upon her. She did not look at me or speak to me. But, half turning her head, she pointed with a simple movement of her finger to the mat at her feet. I trembled, cried out, and threw myself down where she had pointed, all in a single second. [...] Everything about me betrayed agitation, joy, gratitude, and ardent desire, uncertain of its object and restrained by a fear of displeasing, which my young heart could not dispel (*C: 78-9/OC: 1:75-76*).³⁴

One of the pleasures of voyeurism, as Rousseau knew, is that it includes pursuing one's interest in another person while relieved of the anxieties involved in being exposed to that person's free evaluation and look. Thus, in a sense, the other's personhood, her aspect as a free being, is not *fully* visible or salient to the voyeur, at least when contrasted with the way another's personhood

³³. In *The Reveries of the Solitary Walker*, Jean-Jacques imagines his relief upon being made invisible by the Ring of Gyges (*RSW: 74-84/OC: 1:1050-59*). And in his unfinished sequel to *Emile* Rousseau imagines what it is to take the reverse perspective, of learning that one has been observed, and thus coming to feel newly significant to one's observer (*ES: 707-709/OC: 4:908-10*).

³⁴. For discussion of this moment in the *Confessions* in connection with other moments of voyeurism in Rousseau's writing, see Starobinski 1989.

becomes visible or salient to us when we are so exposed.³⁵ At the same time, the voyeur is under no illusion that their object of interest is a mere thing, and the pleasures of voyeurism would be unintelligible without the risk of exposure: if this other were not the kind of being that could look back at us, and make a free judgment about us, they would not have the interest that they do to the voyeur (namely, as another person). Thus, upon his exposure to Mme Basile by the mirror, Jean-Jacques feels both 'agitation', characteristic of being subjected to another's free judgment, and 'joy', characteristic of being released, despite his anxieties, from a way of approaching another that is, in important respects, lonely.

I will note further below some of the difficulties of being subject to *amour-propre*, and in particular the difficulties of being subject to the free judgment of another. But we can already see a way in which voyeurism, like other ways of hiding from others, is a response to those difficulties. And the important point for now is that the voyeur, despite fully believing in the personhood of his object of interest, comes fully to see this other's personhood (something that may involve, as noted above, coming to feel it, as in feeling ashamed) only when he is himself

³⁵. Thus, Rousseau has available terms to criticize voyeurism (including his own voyeurism), and they involve the less-than-full attribution of personhood to another. But these terms should be distinguished from those terms used to criticize domination, subjugation and other violations of personhood (which presuppose attribution of personhood to another). For a related distinction, between non-attribution of a relevant status and violation of that status (which, when carried out deliberately, presupposes some attribution of that status) see Langton 2011: 233. Obviously the less-than-full attribution of personhood to another, including that involved in looking at another without being looked at oneself, is an inevitable feature of the lives we share with others. For Freud, who understood voyeurism as a fixation upon inevitable features of infantile sexuality, questions of pathology arise only if voyeurism constitutes an individual's established disposition or character (Freud 1953: 155-60). For a classic discussion of the typically gendered character of voyeurism, such as we find in the encounter between Jean-Jacques and Mme Basile, see Mulvey 1975.

exposed. Thus, fully seeing another as a person requires more than looking at her and believing her to be a person; it also requires mutual exposure.

3.3. Healthy and Unhealthy *Amour-Propre*

So far I have focused on those manifestations of *amour-propre* that seek consideration of one's differential traits, and thus, according to the Differential Consideration Principle, consideration that is satisfying only to the extent that it is seen as an exercise of another's free evaluative judgment. But, while introducing that principle, I have wanted to grant that someone may manifest *amour-propre* while nevertheless violating it: that is, while nevertheless taking satisfaction in consideration of one's differential traits that is, somehow, forced or extracted. (As I have noted, one of the characteristic responses to the difficulties of being subject to *amour-propre* is the effacing of another's aspect as a free being.) But how can being subject to *amour-propre* motivate one to efface another's aspect as a free being when it is in the nature of this passion, as I have argued so far, that being subject to it requires acknowledging exactly that: another's capacity to form evaluative attitudes freely?

Thinking this through will require understanding what it is for *amour-propre* to have a 'nature';³⁶ how it is that, in examining its nature, we can arrive at constitutive principles such as the Differential Consideration Principle and the Person Principle; and why it should matter to some subject that they are in violation of those principles, and, thus, somehow, less than fully subject to *amour-propre*. Ultimately, I want to follow other recent commentators on Rousseau in thinking that *amour-propre* admits of healthier and unhealthier manifestations, while also

³⁶. Rousseau refers to *amour-propre* as having a 'nature' at *DI*: 218/*OC*: 3:219.

making clearer what role seeing others as free persons plays in healthy *amour-propre*: that is, in those instances of *amour-propre* that more fully manifest the nature of that passion.³⁷ And in examining these matters, I should note that Rousseau begins the Second Discourse with an epigraph from Book Two of Aristotle's *Politics*:

What is natural has to be investigated not in beings that are depraved, but in those that are good according to nature (*DI*: 113/*OC*: 3:109).³⁸

There are several ways we might understand this epigraph to organize the themes of the Second Discourse, but I want to focus on two ways it might bear on Rousseau's investigation of the nature and good of *amour-propre*. And both of these are elaborations of the idea that an investigation of the nature of *amour-propre* is somehow coeval with an investigation of its good. First, I will look at how an investigation of the *good* of *amour-propre* (how it contributes to the flourishing of social creatures like us) contributes to an investigation of its *nature*. This will require taking seriously the idea that though social humans stand in a lineal relation to *sauvages*, they are nevertheless subject to different constitutive standards, and are thus of a different nature

³⁷. Neuhouser speaks of 'healthy *amour-propre*', usually in contrast with 'inflamed' *amour-propre* (Neuhouser 2008: 16-18, 95-99). Rawls distinguishes between 'natural' and 'unnatural', or 'perverted' *amour-propre* (Rawls 2008: 198-199). And Dent says that *amour-propre* can take on a 'deformed character' (Dent 1992: 35).

³⁸. The original formulation appears in Aristotle 1984b: 1254a35-37. For discussion of how this epigraph informs Rousseau's method as well as his understanding of nature, see Evrigenis 2010: 11-12. See also Starobinski's remarks on this epigraph (*OC*: 3:1285).

than their ancestors.³⁹ Second, in something of a reverse direction, I will look at how an investigation of the *nature* of *amour-propre* contributes to an investigation of its *good* (as well as its bad): that is, how examining its nature can yield standards against which we can understand its healthier and unhealthier manifestations.⁴⁰

Rousseau suggests in several places that nascent society was a time of human flourishing. Thus, he refers to it as 'the happiest and the most lasting epoch', as well as 'the state [which was] best for man', and he says that '[Humankind] was made always to remain in it', and that our movement out of it constituted 'the decrepitude of the species' (*DI*: 167/*OC*: 3:171). Since this is the stage of human development that marked the first appearance of *amour-propre*, any account of how *amour-propre* contributes to human flourishing should begin with an account of the good characteristic of that stage. At the same time, we should be careful in what we mean by 'human flourishing', since, as Rousseau says, 'the goodness suited to the pure state of Nature was no longer the goodness suited to nascent Society [...]' (*DI*: 167/*OC*: 3:170). That is, the *sauvage*, in lacking the features of a member of nascent society (such as being subject to *amour-propre*, or possessing a language) should no more be considered deficient, for lacking those features, than

³⁹. That there has been some such change in human nature since the *sauvage* is, I think, the best way of making sense of the Savoyard Vicar's remark that 'as cannot be doubted, man is by his nature sociable, or at least made to become so' (*E*: 290/*OC*: 4:599). The same formulation appears in Rousseau's own voice at *M*: 196/*OC*: 4:1109.

⁴⁰. This way of approaching the nature and good of *amour-propre* is circular only if we assume that understanding the good of the whole organism requires already understanding the good of the part under investigation. But even if it is circular, it is no more viciously circular than any attempt to understand the role that some part plays in an organic system. Kant later articulated what we might call a 'virtuously circular' conception of what it is to investigate the parts of an organism. For Kant, a living thing's parts are 'combined into a whole by being reciprocally the cause and effect of their form'; and 'each part is conceived as if it exists only through all the others' (Kant 2000: 5:373-74).

should a non-human animal. Otherwise, we would be comparing creatures of two different natures or kinds.⁴¹ And indeed, Rousseau also suggests that the movement out of the state of nature and into nascent society marked a change in the nature of humankind: he says, 'the [Humankind] of one age is not the [humankind] of another age' (*DI*: 186/*OC*: 3:192).

If this is correct, then what is the distinctive good that being subject to *amour-propre* contributes to members of nascent society, and without which they should be understood as deficient, at least when examined according to their natures as social humans? I think we should now understand that at least part of this distinctive good is the ability to see others as persons, an ability we can exercise more or less fully, but one entirely unavailable to the *sauvage*. (In seeing others of his kind as at most 'things with minds', the *sauvage* was not deficient according to some standard; that was the only way of seeing others proper to his nature.) And it should hardly be surprising that Rousseau characterizes the period in which social humans first came to acknowledge each other as persons—that is, the period in which society, in a recognizable sense, first took shape—in terms of flourishing. After all, nascent society was a moment in which the difficulties of being subject to *amour-propre*, though hardly absent, did not yet manifest themselves in violence or subjugation. Indeed, this period of having others' aspects as free beings

⁴¹. See Korsgaard's argument against the coherence of Mill's assertion, 'It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied': an assertion that, according to Korsgaard, depends on considering pigs deficient according to standards and capacities their kind altogether lacks (Korsgaard forthcoming 2018.). As Korsgaard notes, this is consistent with comparing animals of two different kinds according to standards and capacities they share: for example, one or the other may be better at keeping itself fed. Some of Rousseau's comparisons between the *sauvage* and the social human (such as that the life of the former was more peaceful) might be understood according to such shared standards. Other apparent comparisons (such as that the *sauvage* was not prone to resentment) might be understood not exactly as comparing two different kinds, but as noting that one is subject to a pain (resentment) altogether peculiar to the kind of creature it is.

made visible and salient was 'best for man', as Rousseau puts it, exactly because it allowed the human's character as social its fullest expression (an expression unimpeded by violence or subjugation).

Thus, I am arguing that, in examining Rousseau's descriptions of nascent society as a period of flourishing, and in examining a way in which *amour-propre* can be understood as contributing to the flourishing of social humans (namely, as a vehicle for seeing others as persons), we can draw conclusions about the nature of this passion. That is, the feature of *amour-propre* under investigation, its character as a passion that seeks satisfaction in others' expressions of freedom, is not an accidental or contingent feature of this passion, and not just a feature of some peculiar class of its manifestations, but rather central to the contribution this passion makes to the metabolism, as we might put it, of social humans. And here it is important to recall the natural-historical character of much of Rousseau's writing, especially his anthropological notes to the Second Discourse, as well as his contributions to botany (evidently very influential in the period after his death). Thus, Rousseau frequently draws conclusions about the nature of humans on the basis of what contributes to our health or flourishing.⁴² And, unsurprisingly, Rousseau

⁴². It would seem that Rousseau rejects any such thinking in his arguments against Locke's view that humans are naturally monogamous, particularly in Rousseau's statement that 'although it may be advantageous to the human species that the union between man and woman be permanent, it does not follow that it was so established by Nature' (*DI*: 213/*OC*: 3:215-16). But here Rousseau is rejecting the principle that something's being 'natural' follows from its contributing to the flourishing of some organism. (He adds, 'otherwise it would have to be said that Nature also instituted Civil Society, the Arts, Commerce, and everything that is claimed to be useful to man.')

This is different, and much less plausible, than the principle that features of an organism (taking for granted their naturalness) can be defined in terms of their contribution to its flourishing. In offering this kind of teleological explanation (where the nature of an organism's parts are to be explained by their contribution to that organism's characteristic flourishing, but not everything that contributes to an organism's flourishing should be understood as natural to that organism), Rousseau anticipates Hegel 1970: §245Z, 196.

defines parts of plants in terms of the roles they play in the well-functioning of their entire organisms.⁴³

Whatever we think of these particular considerations, or the particular conclusions Rousseau draws from them, we can nevertheless recognize in them a kind of natural-historical thinking central to understanding Rousseau's elaborations on *amour-propre*. Social humans, the kinds of humans our ancestors became upon entering nascent society, flourish when seeing others of their kind as more than 'things with minds', but as persons: that is, they flourish when seeing others as limiting the satisfactory execution of their wills. Moreover, the nature of what we might think of as a 'part' essential to the social human, their desire for consideration from others (*amour-propre*), should be understood in terms of the contribution that passion makes to the flourishing characteristic of their kind (its coming to see others as persons). And if all of this is correct, then we should have a better sense of how to read the two principles concerning *amour-propre* I proffered above, namely the Differential Consideration Principle and the Person Principle. These principles, taken together, state that, for someone manifesting (healthy) *amour-propre*, persons are seen as sources of a kind of satisfaction whose satisfactoriness depends on its being an expression of freedom. Since seeing others as free, in this sense, is essential to the flourishing of social humans (as I have been arguing), these principles provide some understanding of the nature of *amour-propre*.

⁴³. This is characteristic of the definitions in the 'Fragments for a Dictionary of Terms of Usage in Botany' (F: 100-129/OC: 4:1831-50). Alexandra Cook disputes Rousseau's authorship of this dictionary (Cook 2012: 298-308). It is nevertheless striking that a dictionary bearing such definitions would be attributed to Rousseau. (And Cook's position is a minority one, as she herself acknowledges; Cook 2012: 298.)

When I introduced those principles, I specified that they concerned *amour-propre* in its healthy manifestations. But we may now be in a position to see how that specification was, in a way, unneeded (at least depending on the context). That is, these principles both state something about the nature of *amour-propre* and, in virtue of that, state criteria for the healthy instances of that passion.⁴⁴ It is a familiar philosophical idea, one we should not be surprised to find Rousseau following in a natural-historical investigation of social humans, that an investigation of something's nature may yield principles regulating its flourishing.⁴⁵ Thus, if we take the Differential Consideration and Person Principles to characterize the nature of *amour-propre*, then a desire for consideration from others is more fully an instance of that passion, and, correlatively, a healthier instance of it, to the extent that it involves an acknowledgment of others' aspects as

⁴⁴. Thus, as I understand it, the label 'healthy *amour-propre*' exemplifies what Anton Ford calls 'essential generality' (Ford 2011: 76-104).

⁴⁵. Rousseau, in the voice of the Savoyard Vicar, contemplates whether our currently-recognized moral standards are 'healthy', or contribute to our well-being, based on whether they can be derived from our 'nature': 'If [currently-recognized] moral goodness is in conformity with our nature, man could be healthy of spirit or well-constituted only to the extent that he is [morally] good [according to those currently-recognized standards]. If it is not and man is naturally wicked, he cannot cease to be so without being corrupted, and goodness in him is only a vice contrary to nature' (*E*: 287/*OC*: 4:595-6). The same passage appears in Rousseau's own voice at *M*: 193/*OC*: 4:1106. Philippa Foot has argued that we can derive norms regulating human goodness from considerations about 'what kind of a living thing a human being is' (Foot 2001: 51). The Savoyard Vicar is in effect entertaining the truth of what Michael Thompson, in a commentary on Foot, has called the acceptance of 'logical and local Footianism' (the respective claims that such regulative principles can be derived from something's nature, and that this is true in the specifically human case) and the rejection of 'substantive Footianism' (the rejection 'in the human case of either benevolence or prudence or justice'). (Thompson counts among those who accept logical and local Footianism, and reject substantive Footianism: Callicles, Thrasymachus, Hobbes, Gide, and perhaps Nietzsche; Thompson 2003). I am here claiming that Rousseau also accepts logical and local Footianism, and that there is an extent to which he is a substantive Footian, at least insofar as there are norms (having to do with acknowledging others as free) coming out of our being subject to *amour-propre*.

free beings. This should be apparent not only from looking at the internal standards for *amour-propre* that those two principles yield, but also from the reasons, which we just examined, for understanding these principles to characterize the nature of that passion as such. If seeing others as free beings contributes to the flourishing of social humans, then that is only further reason to consider manifestations of *amour-propre* as healthy to the extent that they involve just that: acknowledging others as free beings.

3.4. Toward an Explanation of Domination

I now want to explain how *amour-propre* can be understood as intrinsically good, in sense specified above, without ruling out bad instances of it: and, indeed, how the characteristic goodness of *amour-propre*, its involving the acknowledgment of others as persons, can figure in explanations of the central bad instances of that same passion (in particular, kinds of domination of others). And it is important to note that the introduction in humans of a capacity, even one that obviously contributes to our flourishing, does not preclude the introduction with it of new difficulties, or new anxieties about how that capacity could go wrong. For example, learning to walk can bring with it the new possibility of, and new anxieties about, tripping. And learning to speak can similarly bring it a whole host of heretofore unavailable difficulties and anxieties, including about misspeaking and of being misunderstood.⁴⁶

Therefore, it should hardly be surprising that being subject to *amour-propre* can at once involve the good of acknowledging others as persons as well as certain characteristic difficulties and anxieties about being the object of another person's independent point of view. And perhaps

⁴⁶. Cf. Jeremy David Fix, 'Conditions of Agency' (ms).

no philosopher but Rousseau so vividly depicts those anxieties, and perhaps nowhere more vividly than in his autobiographical writings. For example, in the *Confessions*, Rousseau describes the difficulties of exposure involved in conversation.

I cannot understand how a man can have the confidence to speak in company. For not a word should be uttered without taking everyone present into account, without knowing their characters and their histories, in order to be certain of not offending anyone (*C* 114/*OC* 1:113).

That is, in multilateral conversation, one may need to negotiate the expectations and susceptibilities of several others, all manifestly outside one's control: a burden that often renders Jean-Jacques silent. And in an evocative moment early in the that same book, Rousseau recounts his youthful anxieties in going out in public to buy something to eat.

As I come to the pasty-cook's I catch sight of the women behind the counter and can already imagine them laughing amongst themselves and making fun of the greedy youngster. Then I pass a fruiterer's, and look at the ripe pears out of the corner of my eye; the scent of them tempts me. But two or three young people over there are looking at me; a man I know is standing in front of the shop; I can see a girl coming in the distance. Is she not our maidservant? [...] As my discomfort grows my desire increases. But in the end I go home like an idiot, consumed by longing and with money enough in my pocket to satisfy it, but not having dared to buy anything (*C* 45/*OC* 1:36).

Here Rousseau draws specific attention to the anxieties involved in taking oneself to be looked at by others; in caring about how one may be seen by others (for example, as a 'greedy youngster'); and in feeling exposed to strangers as well as acquaintances. And as Rousseau suggests with irony, one may at times feel more impatient to be relieved of these anxieties (and to return to

privacy) than to be relieved of the anxieties of hunger. Thus, whether in conversation or in simply leaving one's home, the difficulties of public exposure may be paralyzing.

But in recounting his own social anxiety and social paranoia, Rousseau insists that, as keenly as he felt the difficulties of *amour-propre*, he never manifested those difficulties violently or through dominating others. For example, Jean-Jacques's anxieties about conversation may have led him to offend others, but each offense was nothing more than 'the mechanical effect of [his] embarrassment', and of the sort to be excused (*RSW 54/OC 1:1034*). In other words, Rousseau's autobiographical writings are *confessional* in that they describe their author's embarrassments in being exposed to other independent points of view. But they are also *self-vindictory* in their insistence that Jean-Jacques did not manifest these difficulties in effacing others' aspects as free (in dominating others) but at most in yet further social embarrassments. (We have already noted Rousseau's interest in non-violent, but perhaps nevertheless embarrassing, forms of relief from the difficulties of full exposure to others: including strategies of hiding from others, and especially forms of voyeurism.)

If we can understand these moments in Rousseau's autobiographical writings as making a conceptual point—that the characteristic anxieties of *amour-propre* need not execute in violence or domination—then we might better understand what other conditions, including conditions of

power over others, are required for such violent execution.⁴⁷ And if domination can be understood as motivated by such anxieties, and facilitated by conditions of power over others, then we will have seen how the motivations behind a central bad instance of *amour-propre* in fact draw upon that passion's characteristic goodness: namely, the acknowledgment of others' independent points of view. Indeed, the Second Discourse makes clear that domination and similar evils do not come about only from the introduction among humans of *amour-propre*, but from that passion in interaction with certain artificial social conditions, principally the introduction of private property. For example, in his description of the first appearance of *amour-propre* in nascent society, Rousseau suggests that this appearance was at most 'the *first step* [...] toward inequality and vice', and that 'the fermentation caused by these new leavens eventually produced *compounds* fatal to happiness and to innocence' (*DI* 166/*OC* 3:170), where, as he specifies later, those compounds also consist of private property and the inequalities in accumulation that its first appearance makes possible (*DI* 161, 168-170/*OC* 3:164, 171-74).⁴⁸

We do not need to be concerned here with Rousseau's specific story (drawing on the invention of metallurgy and agriculture) about how private property originated. Rather, what we

⁴⁷. In reading Rousseau's autobiographical writings as making such a conceptual point, I thereby disagree with Axel Honneth's claim that those writings are difficult to reconcile with optimism about the potential of *amour-propre* (Honneth 2012: 625). I also thereby think that Neuhouser is overly concessive to Honneth when he suggests that we might 'understand these later writings as belonging to a different philosophical project from the one set out in *Emile*, *The Social Contract*, and the Second Discourse' (Neuhouser 2014: 73n13). In fact, on my reading, the conceptual point made in the autobiographical writings is logically stronger than that made in (for example) Rousseau's characterizations of nascent society, in that it suggests that *amour-propre* need not manifest in violence even in a context (in this case, eighteenth-century Europe) otherwise characterized by domination.

⁴⁸. For further discussion of Rousseau's 'fermentation' analogy, and of how *amour-propre* works together with private property to generate inequalities, see Neuhouser 2014: 79-80.

should now imagine is that the appearance of private property—by making those lacking it, or thereby having their needs go unmet, dependent on owners of it—generates, on the part of owners, a kind of power over others: specifically, a kind of power where the difficulties and anxieties characteristic of *amour-propre* (not in their nature violent) typically execute in domination. For example, whereas outside such relationships the anxieties involved in being the object another's independent point of view might result in falling silent in conversation, or in a paranoid slouching home from the store, inequalities in private property make available to owners (or, in a feudal system, lords) special patterns of domination that, when motivated by these anxieties, are indeed an expression of *amour-propre*, including: demands of expressions of flattery or supplication from their dependents; threats of violence or of the withholding of material needs unless their dependents supply them with the desired consideration; and an understanding, even if not entirely conscious to all parties, that their dependents' livelihoods are conditioned on their reliably supplying such expressions.⁴⁹ After all, if the anxieties characteristic of *amour-propre* are those involved in acknowledging that the satisfactions of consideration are, in being expressive of another's independent point of view, outside one's willful control, then it is

⁴⁹. In this account of domination we can understand Rousseau as having 'politicized' early-modern criticisms of flattery and court life familiar from writers such as Pascal and La Rochefoucauld. (Cf. Force 2003: 215). It can sometimes seem that the contemporary interest of Rousseau's account is limited by its origins in such pre-capitalist or feudal conditions. (Cf. Neuhouser, 2014: 225.) Nevertheless, recent developments in capitalism, especially the proliferation of the service economy, can be understood as having made available to the ordinary customer opportunities for domination, such as the forced extraction of expressions of flattery from the service worker, of the sort traditionally associated with the owner or lord. For an account of the service economy that draws on the idea that such forced flattery is meant to satisfy the customer's *amour-propre* (in specifically Rousseau's sense), see Brewer 2011: 275-97. I return to this topic in Section 4.6.

easier to understand the desires of the owner or lord who seeks relief from those anxieties by forcing or extracting expressions of consideration from their dependents.

Therefore, the characteristic difficulties and anxieties in acknowledging another as having an independent point of view on oneself can explain (together with the facilitating conditions of the sort generated by inequalities in private property) some of those motivations (by an owner or lord) to restrict the freedom of their dependents. In particular, it can explain some of those restrictions not as motivated by the desire for just any end, but specifically as motivated by *amour-propre*. Also, our account of the nature of *amour-propre*, and our understanding of the Differential Consideration and Person Principles as specifying the constitutive standards of that passion, gives us the resources not only to explain the motivations behind such domination, but also to criticize it: the dominator values the differential consideration of the dominated (and thus to that extent acknowledges the dominated as a person), but in treating (even if not entirely consciously) that consideration as the sort of value that can be forced or extracted, the dominator is in violation of the very conditions of that acknowledgment. However we want to describe this violation—as 'irrational', as an 'internal contradiction'—Rousseau has at least given us reasons for seeing it as unhealthy, and as compromising one's status as a social human.⁵⁰

3.5. The Constitutive Standards of *Amour-Propre*

We are now in a better position to see how, in order to understand how domination is an unhealthy instance of *amour-propre*, we do not need to look to standards outside the nature of

⁵⁰. Regarding the 'alien causes' that make passions 'harmful' to us, Rousseau says: 'They alter the primary goal and are at odds with their own principle. It is then that man finds himself outside of nature and sets himself in contradiction with himself' (*E*: 213/*OC*: 4:491).

amour-propre, but rather principally to the constitutive standards of that very passion. In other words, determining just why domination has its characteristically unhealthy character does not require, as on Neuhausser's reading, looking to the terms of a 'civil association governed by a general will' (Neuhausser 2008: 50); it only requires an account of what *amour-propre* is, in its connection with acknowledging others as free. (This also means that the norms informing a critique of domination should be relevant to anyone in virtue of their being subject to *amour-propre*, and not just in virtue of their being possible members of such a civil association.) Moreover, looking to the constitutive standards of *amour-propre* in order to determine its healthy and unhealthy instances renders less significant the problem that Kolodny formulated in motivating his own 'normatively neutral' account of *amour-propre*: that in treating that passion as intrinsically good, we make unintelligible its bad instances. Once we understand a characterization of the nature of *amour-propre* as yielding its constitutive standards, standards to which its manifestations may more or less fully live up, then we can define that passion in terms of its good without ruling out (and indeed, while providing an account of) some of its central bad instances.

In summary, an investigation of the *good* of *amour-propre* (how it contributes to the flourishing of social creatures like us) contributes to an investigation of its *nature*. Furthermore, an investigation of the *nature* of *amour-propre* (particularly one informed by the latter investigation) contributes to an investigation of its *good* (as well as its bad): that is, its healthier and unhealthier manifestations. Of course, the normative terms I have used to characterize Rousseau's understanding of *amour-propre*, ones of health and unhealth, normally have their homes in talk of organisms. And in applying these terms to *amour-propre* and the social human, I

have not meant this as a departure (or too much of a departure) from their normal usage. After all, *amour-propre* is, I have argued, a 'part' of a specific organism, the social human, a part that contributes centrally to the latter's health. But we social humans (who are capable of reason and reflection) are distinctive among organisms in that notions of health and unhealth not only apply to us, but also may be applied *by us*, including to ourselves and others of our kind. And I hope these observations can help us better understand Rousseau's own terms of criticism, including his engagement with notions of pathology, and especially what has come to be known as 'social pathology'.⁵¹ After all, if restricting another's freedom is a core manifestation of unhealthy *amour-propre*, and if the latter idea has the sense I have given it here, then the characterization as 'pathological' or 'unhealthy' of social conditions that involve the systematic domination of persons may be more than merely figurative.

Finally, I want to return to a point I made earlier in this chapter (in Section 3.1), namely that the acknowledgment of another's freedom is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition on healthily desiring consideration from another. (There I pointed out that certain manifestations of *amour-propre* we might think of as unhealthy, such as vanity, or a desire for notoriety, nevertheless betray some such acknowledgment.) And I think I can now put this point in a slightly different way: for all I have said here, there may be vicious manifestations of *amour-propre* whose character as vicious cannot be derived from that passion's constitutive standards (including the Differential Consideration Principle and the Person Principle), and which must be understood according to different normative criteria.⁵² At the same time, there may also be

⁵¹. Some recent writings in this connection include Honneth 2007: 4-11, and Neuhouser (ms.).

⁵². Thus, I do not expect these principles to yield every criterion for 'inflamed' *amour-propre* that Neuhouser lists (Neuhouser 2008: 90-92).

standards constitutive of *amour-propre* other than those I have examined here, including ones that can be derived from the conditions for the social human's flourishing. But these concessions only further underscore the centrality of acknowledging another as a free being for Rousseau's understanding of *amour-propre*, a centrality exhibited in the persistence with which he turns to concerns about effacing others' aspects as free beings in his social criticism. And we can now approach that social criticism with an eye, not just to how *amour-propre* figures in it, but also to how it weaves together Rousseau's thinking about nature, the passions, and freedom.

4. Domination and Personhood

4.1. Characterizing Domination

In this chapter, I am interested in further articulating a distinctive way of treating a person as a thing: what I will call, to some extent following Rousseau himself, 'domination' (*DI*: 158, 171, 183/*OC*: 3:161, 175, 188; *E*: 48, 66-68/*OC*: 4:260-2, 286-90). Domination is distinctive in that it is principally motivated by the passion Rousseau calls *amour-propre*, or the desire for consideration from others. Since, as I have argued so far, desiring such consideration from another essentially involves acknowledging that other as a person (in their dimension as a free being), such acknowledgment is not incidental to, or somehow 'forgotten', in cases of domination. Rather, the satisfaction that domination affords, however pathological, just consists in acknowledging another as a free being (as a source of free consideration), but specifically as a free being to be restricted and made subject to one's own will.

For example, think of a child pinning their sibling down and demanding that they cry 'Uncle'. If they are to take satisfaction in the other's cry of 'Uncle', it is essential that they somehow acknowledge the other as a person: and, specifically, as a person capable of recognizing *them*. What they are seeking is an expression of their evaluative capacities. It is not something they seek from inanimate objects, and it is not even something they can seek in the other merely mechanically: for example, by extracting it with an electroshock device. What the dominator seeks is an expression of the other person. And yet there is a sense in which the dominator is nevertheless treating the other as a thing: by pinning the other down, and demanding that they cry 'Uncle', they are interfering with the other's capacity for free, evaluative expression, all the while acknowledging them as the sort of being capable of such expression.

One of my concerns here is to make sense of this seemingly paradoxical idea, central to understanding domination, of acknowledging another as a free being exactly in the course of restricting their manifestations of free agency. And once again I will turn to Rousseau's writing for an account of *amour-propre*: and, in particular, for an account of how the peculiar satisfactions that passion seeks (from another free being), together with the difficulties and anxieties involved in being subject to another's free judgment, can explain someone's being motivated to dominate another. Domination is a manifestation of *amour-propre* that nevertheless seeks relief from that passion's characteristic difficulties, and may also involve taking positive pleasure in overriding another's dimension as a limit on one's will. Thus, while domination may involve some restriction on the other's freedom (and here opens some of our terms for criticizing it), it is nevertheless the form of treating a person as a thing whose satisfactoriness consists in keeping the other's personhood fully in view.

The topic of domination also takes us squarely into the social-critical character of Rousseau's Second Discourse, for among the social ills that book identifies is the pervasiveness of general relations characterized by and sustained by domination (including at least, but certainly not restricted to, those of master and servant). That is, Rousseau is not only interested in those features of human psychology, principally our being subject to *amour-propre*, that can account for discrete instances of domination (as in forms of coercion or vengeance); he is also interested in the social conditions, among them the appearance of private property, that, together with the difficulties characteristic of *amour-propre*, can account for the pervasiveness and institutionalization of domination-based relationships. In other words, domination is not just something that happens in modern societies; it is among their characteristic and structural features.

As we will see, Rousseau's interest in the institutional character of domination also has the effect of enriching his terms of normative criticism. That is, when relations of domination come to characterize a society, domination not only becomes a frequent or recurring feature of individuals' lives; it also comes to have something of a self-perpetuating character, and it can involve a degree of participation even among the dominated. Moreover, general relations of domination (like those of master and servant) may involve restrictions on the dominated's practical freedom, or their ability to set their own ends, but also, perhaps even more disturbingly, restrictions on their theoretical freedom, or their ability to make up their mind. Rousseau is well-known for thinking that modern social conditions can engender in individuals something of a 'divided self', one side of which (outer expression) is oriented towards the expectations of others. But a further theme of his writing is the pervasiveness of cases where 'division' is not the

apposite picture at all, and just because one's (inner) judgment is wholly motivated by one's dependence on another. And we will want to examine just what it is about general relations of domination, including the satisfactions they afford the dominator, and the dependence they engender in the dominated, such that the latter's judgment can be, in some sense, at the former's behest.

I will begin (in Section 4.2) by introducing domination as a way of treating a person as a thing specifically concerned with another's evaluative consideration of oneself, and I will introduce it in contrast with other kinds, other instances of subjecting another to one's will, in which another's evaluative consideration is, at least in contrast, more incidental. I will also (in Section 4.3) distinguish between different kinds of domination, among them discrete instances of domination (such as those involving coercion and vengeance) and, most relevant for present purposes, general relations of domination. I will then (in Section 4.4) turn to the role that domination plays in Rousseau's account of 'nascent society' and its decline. Here I will show how Rousseau introduces discrete instances of domination (particularly vengeance) as among the typical responses to the difficulties involved in seeing another as a person. And I will then (in Section 4.5) examine the artificial social conditions (particularly, the rise of private property) that account for those asymmetrical dependence relations (such as those between master and servant) characterized by domination, and that also render domination as among the large-scale and characteristic features of society. I will also examine (in Section 4.6) how a distinctive pathology of general relations of domination is their making the dominator capable of restricting the dominated's ability to make up their mind, thus providing Rousseau with an account of a kind of 'false consciousness'. Finally, (in Section 4.7) I examine Rousseau's account of the origins of a

desire for domination in infancy, and what role the infant's apprehending the personhood of his caregivers plays in that account.

4.2. Domination Distinguished from Objectification

I will begin with an initial characterization of the notion of domination relevant to this chapter.

Domination: X is dominated by Y to the degree that Y^* applies force (including claims to right) to X^* with the aim of satisfying Y^* 's desire for differential consideration from X^* .⁵³

I have suggested that what makes domination distinctive among ways of treating persons as things is that it involves, at least in comparison, a full acknowledgment of another's personhood. In my previous chapter, I argued for a connection between (1) acknowledging another's personhood, (2) desiring differential consideration from another, and (3) being subject to another's free evaluation. For us creatures subject to *amour-propre*, another person's dimension

⁵³. I use the symbol '*' next to variables in order to specify: (1) that an individual instantiating one variable is represented to the individual instantiating the other variable according to a consistent representation wherever '*' occurs. This is in order to rule out as cases of domination (in the relevant sense) instances where, say, Y applies force to Cicero with the aim of receiving differential considerations from Tully, but where Cicero and Tully are (unbeknownst to Y) identical. I also use it in order to specify: (2) that an individual instantiating a variable represents themselves according to a consistent representation wherever '*' occurs. This is in order to rule out as cases of domination (in the relevant sense) instances where, say, Oedipus applies force to X with the aim of satisfying the desire for differential consideration of the slayer of Laius, but where Oedipus and the slayer of Laius are (unbeknownst to himself) identical. This usage is inspired by Castañeda's 'he*' variable (Castañeda 1966). If it were my main concern here, I would want to offer a more perspicuous presentation of domination along the lines of Michael Thompson's presentation of promising, telling, and other relations between 'you' and 'I' in Thompson (ms.).

as a free being becomes most salient in our coming to care about that other's judgment of us (including in our being subject to that other's gaze). In other words, seeing another as a person is not (just) a matter of applying certain 'monadic' predicates to that other; it is a matter of acknowledging that other as a limit on one's will, and a limit made most salient in one's being subject to that other's free judgment.⁵⁴

These are limits whose acknowledgment is constitutive of seeing another as a person, but also limits one can violate. And here it is important to distinguish between: (a) failing to acknowledge these limits (or failing to acknowledge another as a person), and (b) violating these limits (where violation presupposes acknowledgment of these limits, or attribution of personhood to another).⁵⁵ I will refer to (a) as 'objectification' and (b) as 'treating persons as things'. Objectification may be willed or unwilled, and it may come in degrees: indeed, in the previous chapter (in discussing Rousseau's engagement with voyeuristic themes), I suggested that we can understand voyeurism as among the (deliberate, but non-violent) strategies for evading a full acknowledgment of another's personhood. As we can see from this example (not to mention the various kinds of bureaucratic handling of persons as 'cattle'), not all cases of non-attribution of personhood to another should be resolved into cases of innocent mistake.⁵⁶ And we already have available terms for criticizing objectification. (The systematically objectifying human is

⁵⁴. Accounts of personhood suggesting such a 'monadic' account include those of Harry Frankfurt (Frankfurt 1971) and P.F. Strawson (1959: 87-116). Michael Thompson contrasts his own 'relational' conception of personhood with the 'monadic' accounts of Frankfurt and Strawson (Thompson 2004: 354).

⁵⁵. See Rae Langton's similar distinction between 'non-attribution of autonomy' and 'violation of autonomy' (Langton 2011: 233).

⁵⁶. Rousseau occasionally complains of modern politicians' treating individuals 'like cattle' (*DSA*: 18/*OC*: 3:20; *DI*: 182/*OC*: 3:187).

compromised as 'a social human', in the sense of the previous chapter.) But we should nevertheless distinguish between the evasion of limits and their violation, as well as our terms for criticizing each, even in cases that may involve some degree of mixing or interplay between the two.⁵⁷

Part of what is interesting about domination, as it appears here, is that it precludes any kind of objectification (in the above technical sense): to the extent that one is dominating another, that other's personhood is fully in view, in the sense that one's focus is the satisfaction afforded by that other's differential consideration. That is, domination involves violating the limits constitutive of acknowledging another as a person, exactly in the course of acknowledging those limits. Part of my concern here will be to make sense of the satisfaction such violation might afford. (It may at least involve relief from the difficulties of being subject to another's effectively free judgment, as well as positive pleasure in overriding those limits.) But for now I should note that our focus on domination helps to render somewhat more concrete talk of 'treating persons as things', and why it is that violating another's status as limit on one's will should be understood as treating her specifically 'as a thing'.

In my discussion of Rousseau's conception of the original state of nature, I claimed that the world, for the *sauvage*, was principally a world of things: he sought no source of satisfaction unavailable (in principle) to exercises of his will. It was in this sense that the *sauvage*'s will was

⁵⁷. Thus, we will want to take into account cases when an objectifier is somehow motivated to forget or deny another's personhood, and precisely in order to ease themselves into behavior that would constitute a violation of the other's personhood (were they to acknowledge the other's personhood more fully). For an understanding of 'reification' as the motivated forgetting of a prior acknowledgment of another, see Honneth 2008.

unbounded.⁵⁸ And with the appearance of *amour-propre* in nascent society, humans came to acknowledge personhood as a distinctive metaphysical space, a space limiting one's will, and made salient in one's valuing the manifestations of another's freedom.⁵⁹ But the violation of such a space can be understood as treating a person as a thing in that, in valuing such manifestations of another's freedom, one at the same time treats them as sources of satisfaction that can be forced or extracted (thus inviting comparison with the way that things, and the satisfactions they afford, can be extracted). And domination seeks to extract not just any manifestation of another's freedom, but what we might think of as its paradigmatic manifestation to oneself, or the one through which, when manifested, another's personhood is made most salient: their differential consideration (of oneself). In this respect, domination is the way of treating a person as a thing in which that other's personhood is most fully in view.

In articulating this idea, that in domination another's personhood figures *fundamentally*, it might help to note that domination typically displays a peculiarly communicative and intimate character. Even in cases where neither party sees the interaction or relationship explicitly in terms of domination, something is typically communicated, however implicitly, by the dominator to the dominated: for example, that something is at stake (the dominated's livelihood, her bodily integrity) over whether they will manifest consideration in the desired way.⁶⁰ Moreover,

⁵⁸. It is also in this sense that, in the moments of solitariness given expression in the *Reveries*, Rousseau could entertain the fantasy that his will was limitless, that 'he could extend [his] existence over the entire universe' (*RSW*: 81/*OC*: 1:1056)

⁵⁹. Neuhausser refers to this distinctive 'space' as 'a second external world—the world of social or intersubjective phenomena' (Neuhausser 2008: 135).

⁶⁰. For the sake of clarity, I here use masculine pronouns in referring to dominators and feminine pronouns in referring to the dominated.

domination will also typically involve (between the parties) some acknowledgment of each other's identities. It matters to the dominator that he be known to the other as the desired object of her consideration. (If it is consideration he seeks, he cannot figure in the interaction as a mysterious force lurking in the background.)⁶¹ And in seeking consideration from the dominated, he invests something in the latter *in particular*. In other words, the dominated's consideration is not an end to which she is an incidental means, and for which anyone else (suitably situated) would do just as well. Rather, the end that the dominator seeks (the other's consideration) resides, so to speak, in the expressions of this particular other. In this perverse way, domination involves an acknowledgment of the other as an end in herself.⁶²

This communicative and intimate character of domination contrasts with many other instances of what is typically understood as treating a person as a thing: specifically, restrictions on another's freedom for some end other than an expression of her consideration of oneself. Take coercing someone for a payment. Insofar as the payment (and not the other's consideration) is my primary aim in coercing another, the satisfaction I take in getting it is independent of my communicating my identity to my victim. (In fact, the effectiveness of my attempts at coercion may depend on my keeping my identity, as source of these threats, a secret.) Moreover, my

⁶¹. Thus, though domination in this sense shares features with torture (including the communication to the dominated or torture victim that they are somehow at the whim of the dominator or torturer), it is nevertheless different in that one of the distinctive features of torture is that the torturer may indeed figure as such a mysterious force. As David Sussman puts it, 'The victim knows nothing of her torturer other than what he wants her to know, save that he is at best indifferent to her rights and interests' (Sussman 2005: 8).

⁶². Similarly, Thomas Nagel describes a view according to which 'extremely hostile behavior toward another is compatible with treating him as a person—even perhaps as an end in himself' (Nagel 1972: 64). Also, Bernard Williams (in a point he owes to Nietzsche 1966: §229) notes that cruelty requires a 'fully conscious awareness' of others with feelings like oneself (Williams 1972: 60).

victim's particular identity may be immaterial to that satisfaction: anyone suitably situated may indeed do just as well for my purposes. (I need not invest myself in *this one*.)

Coercion is normally understood as an instance of 'treating a person as a thing', in a sense not too far from the one I assigned it above: it involves interfering with some manifestation of another's freedom (their ability to set her own ends) for one's own purposes. That is, it seems that it should count as a violation of another's personhood, and one that requires attributing some dimension of personhood (a free will, an ability to set their own ends) to another. After all, familiar cases of coercion do not typically involve the specific violence of physical intervention, but rather the presentation of a scenario to a person capable of deciding what is in their interest, however limited their options (thanks to the coercer's tactics). In this way, a coercer interferes with his victim's manifestations of freedom exactly in the course of acknowledging that other as a free being (or at least as having a will).

At the same time, this acknowledgement is rather limited, or of a somewhat different kind, than that required in cases of domination. For example, we can coerce artificial entities (nations, corporations), and this surely informs our occasional understanding of them as artificial 'persons'.⁶³ And there seems to be a tighter connection between domination and natural personhood, and especially a natural person's expressive capacities (typically manifested in the body). Coercion need not involve exposure to another's capacity for evaluative consideration of oneself: indeed, a coercer may prefer to keep the other out of view altogether. In contrast, it is exactly such capacities (for evaluative consideration) that the dominator seeks to render subject

⁶³. David Sussman makes a similar point in distinguishing torture from coercion, and in arguing that 'we could not in principle torture this sort of artificial person who lacks any distinct sort of emotional or affective life' (Sussman 2005: 9).

to his will. The pleasure of domination consists in some (forced) manifestation of evaluative consideration: for example, a cry of 'Say Uncle,' or a particular look in the other's eyes. If such expression is not forthcoming, something is missing for the dominator.

Obviously, coercion is not the only instance of violating another's personhood for a further end. For example, other instances may more obviously involve some interference with another's theoretical freedom, or her ability to make up their mind. (Think of popular depictions of brainwashing for political purposes.)⁶⁴ But in any case, these instances, as well as instances of coercion, require some attribution of freedom or personhood to the other (the ability to set one's own ends, the ability to make up one's mind), but they do not require the full or peculiar kind of attribution necessarily involved in domination (or any other interaction involving exposure to another's capacity for evaluative consideration). We can perhaps put this by saying that some violations of personhood (for further ends) are compatible with a degree of objectification, in the above sense (and where domination is *incompatible* with such objectification). But the more important point is that there is a contrast between such instances of 'treating persons as things' and domination, and specifically in the kind or degree of attribution of personhood to another that the latter requires.⁶⁵

⁶⁴. Such brainwashing is rather different from the restrictions on theoretical freedom that will concern me in Section 4.6, and that involve some degree of participation on the part of the dominated.

⁶⁵. Whether we should consider this a difference in kind or in degree is a matter of what sort of attribution of personhood we mean to contrast with that required for domination. When it is that required for coercing an artificial 'person', such as a corporation, it seems to be a difference in kind. When it is that required for coercing a natural person (and thus also a person whom one can also dominate) it seems to be a difference in degree. (Domination seems to require a further degree of attribution of personhood to another than does mere coercion.)

Before going on to characterize domination in somewhat more concrete terms, I would like to make two further remarks about how that notion is appearing in my understanding of Rousseau. First, there can be something surprising about the comparative weight that Rousseau places on domination among varieties of wrongful treatment, and even among varieties of treating persons as things. After all, coercing another's will (for a further end) is at least as familiar a manifestation of violence as anything Rousseau refers to as domination. We might be able to account for this emphasis in terms of Rousseau's particular approach to questions of right (of what determines the conditions for wronging another, as well as against what one can claim a right): namely, that such questions are largely determined by the provisions of our membership in a social contract.⁶⁶ (Rather than an evasion of such standardly 'ethical' questions, this is an expression of Rousseau's understanding that such questions have a specifically political character, and so have little content outside the context of political and material problem-solving.)⁶⁷

But even in assigning questions of right such a particular context, Rousseau makes available other terms of normative criticism, typically drawing on a conception of our natures (including our natures as social humans) and the flourishing characteristic of them. (In addition to assigning that political context to questions of right, Rousseau writes, 'What is good and

⁶⁶. Rousseau says of right that it 'does does not come from nature [but] is founded on conventions' (*SC*: I.1.1) and that 'conventions [are] the basis of all legitimate authority among men' (*SC*: I.4.1). Also: 'For the law precedes justice, not justice the law' (*G*: 160/*OC*: 3:329). As Joshua Cohen states things: 'the foundation of rights in a political community is the general will itself [...] and not a set of claims that are prior to or independent of the common good' (Cohen 2010: 82).

⁶⁷. Cf. Lavin (forthcoming). On the terms of the social contract as a product of political and material problem-solving, see *SC*: III.9.1-3.

conformable to order is so by the nature of things and independently of human conventions', *SC*: II.6.2.) And among those terms, as we have seen, are those flowing from our being subject to *amour-propre*, and the conditions for treating another as a free being (in the sense made available by our being subject to that passion). These are the terms allowing us, for example, to characterize domination as involving the acknowledgement of another as a free being exactly in the course of restricting her manifestations of freedom. Thus, whatever one thinks of Rousseau's particular approach to notions of right, and of his interest in examining domination even among social humans not (yet) bound by the provisions of a social contract, one consequence of this approach is his bringing out the significance of domination in its connection to those other concepts: centrally, that of acknowledging another as a person or free being.

Second, not all instances commonly classified as those of domination, and not even those seemingly motivated by *amour-propre*, have the special character I am giving that word here. For example, whatever terms we might draw on for criticizing my vanquishing an opponent before an audience, they might not always include those of acknowledging another as a person in the course of violating that other's personhood. That is, my opponent might figure as a mere occasion for my impressing something upon an audience of others, and I might care little about the manifestations of evaluative consideration (toward me) on my opponent's part. In the imagined scenario, I do not care about how I am taken by my opponent, but rather about how I am taken by my audience, and the scenario thus lacks the distinctive (and occasionally puzzling) character of cases of domination in which I care about the dominated's manifestations of personhood (toward me). Nevertheless, the narrower sense of 'domination' should not be irrelevant to understanding such a scenario, at least by way of contrast. (Thus, on the broader

sense of the term, and in contrast with the narrower sense, domination is compatible with a degree of objectification toward the dominated.)

Moreover, domination, as understood here, inheres between individuals, rather than between groups or other social or institutional entities (notably, classes, races, genders, and nations). Some such entities surely dominate others (in a broader sense of 'dominate'), and one of my aims here is to draw on Rousseau for an understanding of domination that can contribute to the sorts of critical projects (including criticisms of contemporary capitalism) in which that broader sense is normally used. Thus, as with the case of vanquishing one's opponent before an audience, this narrower sense of 'domination', while excluding the other senses, can nevertheless be used to illuminate them. And here we find in Rousseau's writing on domination, as I understand it, nothing more than a characteristic feature of sophisticated philosophical projects, that of organizing phenomena around a particular concept (here, that of domination in its specific connection to *amour-propre* and seeing others as persons) while remaining sensitive to the phenomena less straightforwardly subsumed under it.⁶⁸

4.3. Kinds of Domination

I will now say something about the specific kinds of domination that guide my discussion of Rousseau (as well as the notions of force that inform them). In explaining the notion of freedom made salient in our desiring another's consideration, I have contrasted free consideration with the sorts of responses we can extract from another (and without spoiling their

⁶⁸. Even in setting his friendly interpretation of the Second Discourse within the context of discussions of class conflict, Friedrich Engels treats enslavement as a relationship between 'two men' or 'two wills' (Engels 1894: Chapter 10).

satisfactoriness) through exercises of the will: including both physical force and claims to have a right to such a response. Of course, physical force and claims to right are rather different kinds of exercises of the will, especially in that the latter presuppose some acknowledgment of the other as a free being capable of recognizing the relevant claim as a reason for acting. But they are similar in that the satisfaction that differential consideration affords cannot be extracted by either means: or, when one does take satisfaction in forced differential consideration, we expect that there must be something pathological about that instance, as well as something requiring explanation. Specifically, if either kind of exercise of the will were to be effective, that would involve some interference in the other's ability to make up their mind, or to form a judgment about oneself on the basis of one's merits (rather than something external to those merits: namely, the application of force.)

In discussing domination, I understand it as involving just such satisfaction, or at least as seeking it, and among my aims here is to try to make such satisfaction intelligible, particularly when the dominator might even acknowledge some impotence or ineffectiveness in applying force (with the expectation of differential consideration) against another person. I also aim to articulate under what conditions (particularly, in what relations, such as those between Master and Servant) such force might even be made effective. Thus, I want to distinguish between particular instances of domination and general relations of domination, and, among the former, I want to distinguish between those that *look forward* to differential consideration (in that the dominator applies force to communicate the expectation of such consideration) and those that

look backward (in that the application of force amounts to vengeance for the consideration that has not been forthcoming).⁶⁹

Forward-looking particular instance of domination: An interaction characterized by threats by Y^* against X^* conditioned on X^* 's supplying differential consideration of the desired sort to Y^* . (To distinguish these threats from those made for some end other than a manifestation of differential consideration, I will call these 'd-threats'.)

Backward-looking particular instance of domination: An interaction characterized by vengeance by Y^* against X^* elicited by X^* 's not supplying differential consideration of the desired sort to Y^* .

General relation of domination: Relation entered into by X with Y , on pain of X 's having her needs go unmet, somehow conditioned on X^* 's supplying differential consideration to Y^* .

It may be the case that no one participating in such instances or relations of domination understands them in exactly those terms. (One aim of Rousseau's social criticism is of course to unmask that character of seemingly innocuous relationships, such as those between employer and employee, as well as benefactor and beneficiary.)⁷⁰ Note also that there is an internal

⁶⁹. My terms 'forward-looking' and 'backward-looking' are inspired by Anscombe's characterization of revenge as a 'backward-looking' motive (Anscombe 1963: 20).

⁷⁰. Rousseau writes about the potentially pathological character of inegalitarian benefactor-beneficiary relationships, consisting all of 'obligations on the other' side, and which he contrasts with friendship among equals (*C*: 433/*OC*: 1:466; see also *C*: 466, 572/*OC*: 1:502-3, 619; *E*: 233-4, 348-9/*OC*: 4:520-2, 683; *RSW*: 74-84/*OC*: 1:1050-59). For discussion, see Force 2003: 218-21; Starobinski 1988: 283-6. I do not mean to deny that there must be some sort of knowledge requirement on parties participating in domination in any of the above senses. That is, for a case to be one of domination, one of the parties must know themselves to be doing something to the other, and the other must know this as well, even if neither party understands what is going on in terms of domination.

connection between forward- and backward-looking instances of domination, in that what a d-threat threatens is indeed vengeance of the sort specified as backward-looking. (Incidentally, that vengeance may itself amount to nothing more than yet further d-threats.) And again, the notion of 'force' that appears throughout these varieties of domination is not always the same. A dominator might d-threaten physical force against another, or he might threaten some arrangement of circumstances unbearable to the dominated (either one of which can be the threatened punishment that substantiates his 'claim to right'). (As we will see, this helps to establish the sense in which general relations of domination are fundamentally d-coercive: social conditions will have made such arrangements, which the dominator, often unknowingly, can exploit.)

In a moment I will discuss how these species of domination appear, even if only implicitly, in Rousseau's account of nascent society and its decline in the *Second Discourse*. But before doing so, I want to say something connecting backward-looking instances of domination to the so-called 'reactive attitudes', and also something about how these species of domination can be understood as introducing a further dimension to the notion of treating a person as a thing. Manifesting reactive attitudes such as insult and resentment is not always pathological.⁷¹ On the contrary, insult may be the appropriate response to someone's betraying an objectionable attitude toward oneself along some aspect one cares about, or ought to care about (as when false stereotypes inform another's rejection of one's testimony or promise).⁷² Moreover, since reactive attitudes respond to another's point of view on oneself, feeling insulted may display one's

⁷¹. Again, the term 'reactive attitudes' originates with P.F. Strawson (Strawson 1974).

⁷². See my 'Speech, Recognition, and the Insult in Not Being Believed: Rousseau and Adam Smith' (Appendix 1 of this dissertation).

acknowledgment of the other's personhood, as well as that one cares about them (at least to the extent of caring what they think of oneself).⁷³ Such feelings, when reasonable, can also be a reasonable basis for avoiding another, or even for bringing a relationship to a close.

But some expressions of insult are indeed pathological, especially when the insulted can be understood as punishing, or as retaliating against, the other for betraying an undesirable attitude. There may be no universal rule for distinguishing between healthy manifestations of insult and such retaliation (especially whenever such matters should be left up to negotiation between the relevant parties). Nevertheless, we should at least distinguish between manifestations that involve thwarting the other's ends, and thus leave the other disappointed, and those that involve interfering with the other's ability to set her own ends, and thus inflict upon her the particular violence of coercion or manipulation.⁷⁴ The (perceived) insulter may want to go on with the insulted just as before, and it may only be healthy (for either party) for the latter to break ties and disappoint that desire. Such disappointment need not be understood as retaliation, and again, to the extent that a feeling of insult governs the insulted's behavior, may betray a peculiar kind of care or acknowledgment of the other person. But these responses contrast with others (from deliberate infliction of pain to interrupting the other's labor) that,

⁷³. As Philip Fisher argues, anger can show that 'the person who has slighted us mattered to us. The flaring up of anger informs us about how much we care for this person's regard, and how injured we are by any sign of contempt on his or her part' (Fisher 2001: 192).

⁷⁴. Arthur Ripstein makes a similar distinction between 'interfering with the *purposiveness* of another person and interfering with that person's *purposes*': 'I can interfere with your purposes in a variety of ways—I might occupy the space that you had hoped to stand in, make arrangements with the person you had hoped to spend time with, and so on. Actions that affect you in these ways leave your purposiveness intact, because you still have the ability to determine how to use what you already have, and you are still the one who gets to determine how it will be used. All I have done is change the world in which you act' (Ripstein 2009: 41).

while perhaps nevertheless betraying that same kind of care, are interfering and, thus, paradigmatically retaliatory.

Again, for Rousseau, questions of right (and thus questions about whether some apparent case of retaliation wrongs the perceived insulter) are largely determined by the provisions of our membership in a social contract. But that does not mean that (outside that specific context) we lack normative terms for criticizing apparent cases of retaliation, particularly the terms flowing from our being subject to *amour-propre*, and including the vocabulary of domination and treating persons as things. And in fact examining cases of vengeance and retaliation against a perceived insult can help to bring out a further dimension of treating a person as a thing (and how domination is an instance of that): namely, that the dominator treats the other's expressions of personhood as though they were fungible with or replaceable by exercises of force.

This point becomes clearer if we recall a difference between the frustrations characteristic of *amour de soi* (and what it is to be denied some desired 'thing', in the sense introduced earlier) and those characteristic of *amour-propre*. Objects of *amour de soi* are within reach of the will, not only in that the satisfaction they afford is in no way spoiled by its being brought about by force, but also in that they are in principle replaceable: when the apple I desire has been snatched from me, any other qualitatively similar apple will do just as well.⁷⁵ In contrast, in desiring another's differential consideration, the insult typical upon having that desire frustrated is in no

⁷⁵. This helps to account for why the *sauvage* was less prone to quarrels than those later social humans capable of envy (*DI*: 154-6/*OC*: 3:157-60). It is also central to Rousseau's distinction between physical love, to which the *sauvage* is subject, and moral love, to which he is not: 'The Physical is this general desire that moves one sex to unite with the other; the moral is what gives this desire its distinctive character and focuses it exclusively on a single object, or at least gives it a greater measure of urgency for this preferred object' (*DI*: 155/*OC*: 3:157-8). See also *E*: 429-31/*OC*: 4:796-9.

way made up for by the consideration of yet another person (in some relevant way) qualitatively similar to the one I care about. As welcome as the differential consideration of yet others might be, none of them can make up for the insult elicited by *this one's* thwarting of my *amour-propre*. This idea, that such insult is not subject to correction or replacement in the same way that the denial of a 'thing' can be, may be among those informing Rousseau's writing in *Emile* that 'it is in the nature of man to endure patiently the necessity of things but not the ill will of others' (*E*: 91/*OC*: 4:320). And it helps to bring out the way in which our being subject to *amour-propre* can make visible or salient to us another's dimension not only as a free being, but also as a particular individual (as opposed to merely a bearer of general, shareable traits).⁷⁶ In coming to care about the other's differential consideration, they are valued as a source of non-exchangeable satisfaction, namely that afforded by their consideration alone.

To his credit, Rousseau acknowledges the extent to which treating others as replaceable objects of *amour-propre* may be, while usually criticizable, nevertheless a typical and perhaps even inevitable feature of our affective lives, especially when it comes to dealing with varieties of heartbreak. (Themes of replacement and substitutability figure centrally in Rousseau's writing on romantic love, and particularly in his autobiographical writings.)⁷⁷ But that only underscores what is peculiarly pathological (and peculiarly violent) about treating insult as though it can be

⁷⁶. Whatever norms this dimension of being subject to *amour-propre* yield, they should (it seems) at least include aesthetic ones: that is, those governing how we perceive other persons, and specifying that we perceive them as somehow more than bearers of general traits. Georg Simmel articulates some such norms for seeing others, such as that we see them as unifying general traits in a non-repeatable way (Simmel 2005: 61-110).

⁷⁷. For example, in the *Confessions* Rousseau says of his lover and later wife Thérèse Levasseur, 'What I needed, in short, was a successor to Mamma [his earlier lover, Françoise-Louise de Warens]; [...] I found in Thérèse that substitute that I needed' (*C*: 310-311/*OC*: 1:331-2).

corrected by force. We might say of the jilted lover who seeks to replace their beloved with someone relevantly similar (who seeks to correct for their insult or heartbreak in *that* way) that they are objectifying or commodifying the objects of their *amour-propre*, or that they are somehow fetishizing their memories of their beloved.⁷⁸ Nevertheless, that should contrast with cases of vengeance or retaliation: cases that, by involving one's punishing another for the perceived insult (or heartbreak), and satisfying one's *amour-propre* through that means, can be characterized as one's treating the other's expressions of personhood as replaceable (not by those of another person, but by an exercise of one's own will or force). That is, in those cases, one treats such an exercise of force (that typical of our relations to 'things') as a satisfactory substitute for the desired consideration of another person.⁷⁹

I said of this aspect of vengeance against a perceived insult, its involving such a substitution of force for expressions of personhood, that it yields another sense in which cases of domination (particularly backward-looking ones) can be understood as involving the treatment of a person as a thing. Indeed, we can see a concern with some kind of distortion or illusion in Rousseau's writing on varieties of vengeance, and especially his writing against the practice of dueling: the practice of seeking 'satisfaction', through force, to make up for a perceived insult. (In a polemic against dueling in the *Letter to d'Alembert*, Rousseau speaks of 'the wildest and most barbarous opinion', namely that 'a man is no longer a cheat, rascal, or slanderer', and that

⁷⁸. This may include 'objectifying' the other in my above technical sense: that is, less-than-fully attributing personhood to another. That is, insofar as seeing another as a particular individual is internal to seeing them as a person, seeing another as merely a bearer of replaceable traits may be understood as objectifying in the above sense.

⁷⁹. Marc Shell writes of Rousseau's criticism of any 'common denominator' allowing for the exchange of 'objects' with flattery or expressions of consideration (Shell 1978: 119).

'falsehood is changed into truth [...] as soon as all this is maintained sword in hand', *LD: 73/OC: 5: 67*).⁸⁰ And it is tempting to count among these distortions or illusions whatever may motivate one's taking satisfaction in applying force against another in retaliation for her not manifesting consideration in the desired way. After all, it is exactly a manifestation of their personhood, of their being the sort of individual capable of considering oneself, that one acknowledges in the course of treating such manifestations as though they were satisfactorily exchangeable with applications of force.

Of course, the duelist or retaliator may take unalloyed pleasure in such an application of force, and we will want to locate just what is pathological about that. But at the same time, it is hard to shake the suspicion that these cases of vengeance, like other cases of domination, are such as to unravel (for the dominator) under a full view of what is going on. And it is hard to shake the related suspicion that particular or discrete instances of domination, of the sort I have been discussing, cannot be lastingly satisfactory (for the dominator) in the way that we can expect of even other kinds of domination, especially what I have been calling 'general relations of domination' (like those between Master and Servant). These suspicions will guide my discussion as I return to the text of the Second Discourse and to Rousseau's understanding of the role that domination plays in 'nascent society' and its decline. And in particular, these suspicions will guide my discussion of why it is that, though there is an extent to which we can expect particular instances of domination in any social order, it is only with a specific kind of

⁸⁰. In a discussion of dueling in *Julie*, Rousseau says with irony: 'Thus virtue, vice, honor, infamy, truth, falsehood, can all derive their essence from the outcome of a duel' (*J: 125-6/OC: 2:154*).

dependence (for Rousseau, that brought about by private property) that domination might be among the structural or institutional features of society.

4.4. Particular Instances of Domination

In the previous chapter, I remarked that Rousseau understands nascent society, the period in which humans first manifested *amour-propre*, and thus first manifested the status of social creatures, as 'the happiest and the most lasting epoch', and the one that was 'best for man' (*DI: 167/OC 3:171*). Part of what he seems to mean by this is that nascent society was characterized by comparatively few interferences in what we might think of as the functional role of *amour-propre* (importantly, its role in our manifesting the status of social creatures), and principally among those interferences the treatment of persons as things. (By thus imagining and making vivid a society lacking such interferences, Rousseau is able to make the case that the evils characteristic of them are in no way essential to manifesting *amour-propre*, but can rather be accounted for by artificial social conditions, among them the appearance of private property.)

One of my aims here is to locate in just what way domination should be understood as such an interference in the functional role of *amour-propre*, and it is important to note at least two dimensions of that functional role: the functional significance of our being subject to that passion, and the functional significance of our having it satisfied. I have already said something in the previous chapter about the importance of our being subject to the desire for others' differential consideration, and how in being so subject (and meeting the conditions expressed in the Differential Consideration and Person Principles), we thereby manifest our status as social humans. That is, to the extent that we manifest the capacity to see others as free beings, we

thereby manifest the flourishing characteristic of our specifically social kind. But we can also see how having that desire satisfied, and satisfied by another free being, can make its own distinctive contribution to our well-being. Differential consideration is, indeed, differential: when granted it, one is picked out from among whatever else may be occupying a space (persons as well as things), and thus in that sense one has one's existence substantiated or confirmed.⁸¹ And in contrast with the effects one may produce on things (say, by making artifacts), and thus in contrast with those effects that are merely extensions of one's own will, another's differential consideration comes manifestly from outside: it is a kind of confirmation or substantiation of one's existence that we can only expect from another free being. Thus, anyone who had this desire thwarted systematically—anyone who could not enjoy such confirmation by another's expressions of freedom—would be lacking an important human good.

My claim is that when Rousseau calls nascent society 'the happiest and the most lasting epoch', and 'the one which was best for man', he is describing a condition in which there were comparatively few interferences in the functional role of *amour-propre*, along either dimension, and thus a condition in which there were comparatively few impediments to the flourishing characteristic of our specifically social kind, and to the satisfactions afforded by being 'picked out' by other freedoms. And this allows him to locate which factors, including the appearance of private property, contribute to the pervasiveness of domination in the modern social conditions

⁸¹. Dent writes, 'It is the desire, the need, to come to be to yourself, and for others, a "human presence" that *amour-propre* expresses' (Dent 1988: 24). And Neuhouseer writes of *amour-propre*, '[...T]o achieve recognition is to acquire a confirmed existence for others as a 'real', effect-producing subject', and that '[...A] person who lacks standing in the eyes of others is, in some meaningful sense, a "nobody"'(Neuhouseer 2008: 73-74).

against which he is comparing nascent society.⁸² But though there were comparatively few such impediments in nascent society, we cannot attribute to Rousseau the claim that there were no impediments, or no instances of domination, at all. Indeed, we must make sense of how nascent society was at once a condition of (comparative) flourishing and a condition in which domination very frequently took place. After all, shortly after describing the first appearance of *amour-propre* in nascent society Rousseau says:

As soon as men had begun to appreciate one another and the idea of consideration had taken shape in their mind, everyone claimed a right to it, and one could no longer deprive anyone of it with impunity. From here arose the first duties of civility even among [*Sauvages*], and from it any intentional wrong became an affront because, together with the harm resulting from the injury, the offended party saw in it contempt for his person, often more unbearable than the harm itself. Thus everyone punishing the contempt shown him in a manner proportionate to the stock he set by himself, vengeance became terrible, and men bloodthirsty and cruel (*DI*: 166/*OC*: 3:170).⁸³

⁸². That Rousseau is interested in separating out which artificial factors (including private property) contribute to the effecting of certain evils (when combined with the conditions of nascent society) is clear from his 'fermentation' analogy (*DI*: 166/*OC*: 3:169/70). (For fuller discussion of this analogy, see Neuhouser, 2014: 79-80.) Moreover, Rousseau's descriptions of nascent society (as 'the happiest and the most lasting epoch' and 'the one which was best for man') may be superlative, but that is not incompatible with their being comparative. Indeed, in context, their character as comparative is even more apparent: '[...] this period in the development of human faculties, occupying a just mean between the indolence of the primitive state and the petulant activity of our *amour-propre*, must have been the happiest and the most lasting epoch. The more one reflects on it, the more one finds that this state was the least subject to revolutions, the best for man [...]' (*DI*: 167/*OC*: 3:171).

⁸³. Here Rousseau uses the word '*sauvage*' to refer to an individual in primitive conditions but nevertheless subject to *amour-propre*. (He elsewhere uses the word in this broader sense; *DI*: 166, 167/*OC*: 3:170, 171.) This contrasts with the narrower sense in which I have used '*sauvage*', namely to refer to a member of the original state of nature. (My usage would be awkward if it did not have a basis in Rousseau's description of members of the original state of nature.)

Even if this passage does not quite suggest that the appearance of domination is a necessary consequence of the appearance of *amour-propre*, it least suggests that there is something Pollyannaish or unrealistic (about our picture of social humans) in expecting the former not to accompany the latter non-accidentally.⁸⁴ And though here Rousseau only explicitly mentions backward-looking instances of domination (that is, 'vengeances') it seems that the kinds of violence he focuses on here are particular instances of domination in the sense specified above: desiring 'consideration' from another, claiming a 'right' to it, and punishing that other when deprived of it. (Since this passage is describing a stage of society prior to the introduction of notions of right and duty via a social contract, this 'right', and also the 'duties of civility' discussed here, are no more fully moral rights or duties than, say, what inheres between duelists when one party claims a right to another's consideration, on threat of violence, and thus expects that consideration as though it were the other's duty to manifest it.)

The appearance of such particular instances of domination in nascent society is hardly surprising when we recall that, though being subject to *amour-propre* makes an important contribution to the flourishing characteristic of social humans, it also involves certain distinctive difficulties and anxieties. These are the difficulties involved in being subject to another's free judgment, in placing significance in sources of satisfaction altogether outside one's will, and they are those that, as we saw in the previous chapter, Rousseau makes most vivid in his

⁸⁴. Among the concerns of Books I and II of *Emile* is to locate the psychological factors, particularly as they arise in the upbringing of children, that render the desire for domination a common (and non-accidentally so) manifestation of *amour-propre*. Since one of the aims of *Emile* is also to show how such domestic causes of domination are preventable, Rousseau's allowing that domination accompanies the appearance of *amour-propre* non-accidentally in no way abrogates his well-known claim that all human evils are in principle preventable or ameliorable (*LV*: 234/*OC*: 4:1061). I explore this topic more fully in Section 4.7.

autobiographical writings. Of course, one aim of Rousseau's autobiographical writings (their exculpatory aim) is to show that such anxieties need not execute in violence.⁸⁵ (Rousseau insists that, in his own case, they found expression in nothing more violent than varieties of hiding and voyeurism.) And one effect of the appearance of private property, and its making available new kinds of domination (as we will see), is its multiplying the available means for seeking relief from just those difficulties involved in being subject to another's free judgement. But the above passage, in describing a stage of society prior to the appearance of private property, suggests that no specific institutional arrangement, other than the gathering of social humans, is required in order for particular instances of domination (as opposed to general relations of domination) to take place, and even for them to be widespread.

In other words, no specific institutional arrangement, other than the gathering of social humans, is required to allow for individuals to retaliate against those others who deny them the consideration they desire (or for them to issue d-threats out of the desire for such consideration).⁸⁶ If among the difficulties involved in being subject to *amour-propre* are those of acknowledging limits on what one can will with satisfaction, and of subjecting one's satisfaction to another freedom, it will hardly be surprising (Rousseau seems to say) that 'as soon as the idea of consideration [takes] shape in their mind', individuals will (absent domestic or other psychological remedies) seek to override those limits through maneuvers such as vengeance and

⁸⁵. For example, Rousseau says in the *Confessions*, 'Being excitable by nature, I have felt angry, even enraged on the spur of the moment, but never has the desire for revenge taken root within me' (C: 540/OC: 1:585).

⁸⁶. Of course, specific institutional arrangements will lead to the proliferation of greater varieties of domination, just as technological and others advancements make available further means of vengeance and of offering d-threats.

d-threats. But even once these floodgates (facilitating particular instances of domination) are open, and even once 'vengeances [become] terrible', such conditions, while certainly not amenable to the absolute flourishing of social humans, are nevertheless amenable to their comparative flourishing, or are more amenable than the conditions brought about by the (later) appearance of private property.⁸⁷

This will become somewhat clearer when I turn, in a moment, to the general relations of domination whose existence, according to Rousseau, private property facilitates. But before then I want to note a couple things about particular instances of domination, as they figure in the stage of human society under discussion. First, central to what is pathological about these instances is the dominator's taking satisfaction in some application of force (or threat of force) as a suitable substitute for another's differential consideration. Thus, as so described, there is something impotent or ineffective about vengeance and d-threats: so long as we understand consideration as a manifestation of theoretical freedom, of the other's ability to make up their mind, and thus as something that (in some sense) in its nature cannot be brought about by force, the dominator may indeed take satisfaction in such applications of force, but the latter will typically figure as disappointing substitutes for consideration (so long as the dominator maintains a full view of what is going on). That is, whatever the dominator extracts, we cannot understand it as

⁸⁷. In fact, there is a very specific sense in which nascent society is amenable to the absolute flourishing of social humans. Taking seriously Neuhausser's distinction between Rousseau's social remedies for the inflammation of *amour-propre* (laid out principally in *The Social Contract*) and his domestic remedies (laid out principally in *Emile*), nascent society offers a picture of the absolute flourishing available to social humans within the compass of social remedies. (As noted above, it is in Books I and II of *Emile* that Rousseau locates the preventable psychological factors contributing to the desire for domination, including those kinds of domination described in his account of nascent society.)

consideration in the full-blooded sense, at least not without some explanation of how the dominator is able to render his applications of force effective in extracting consideration from another. Therefore, the dominated's character as a free being, and specifically as a theoretical freedom, enjoys some integrity even in the course of the dominator's vengeance or d-threats. (As we will see, it is central to the distinctively pathological character of general relations of domination that they allow for a sense in which such force can be rendered effective in extracting consideration.)

Second, as frequent and as violent as particular instances of domination might be, it is in their nature to be interactions taking place within society, or to constitute discrete 'parts' of a society; and this contrasts with the way in which general relations of domination will figure as among the large-scale, structural features of society: that is, the way in which they can be understood to characterize a society as a whole.⁸⁸ When Rousseau describes the moment when 'vengeances became terrible, and men bloodthirsty and cruel', he might be imagining a condition in which vengeance is as common as can be, but he is not yet imagining a condition in which participating in domination (either as dominator or dominated) is somehow a social necessity, or a requirement of being embedded in society. And it is by showing that the introduction of private property transforms the whole of society in exactly that way, and makes a necessity of general relations of domination, that Rousseau is able to articulate some of the peculiarly pathological features of such relations. And in this way Rousseau can show that nascent society, however

⁸⁸. Durkheim, in his lectures on *The Social Contract*, attributes to Rousseau sensitivity to such a contrast: '[...] Rousseau was keenly aware of the specificity of the social order. He conceived it clearly as an order of facts generically different from purely individual facts' (Durkheim 1960: 83).

frequently characterized by particular instances of domination, was nevertheless a condition of comparative flourishing.

4.5. General Relations of Domination

How do general relations of domination come about, and what are their characteristics? Rousseau can be read as addressing these questions in his account of the decline of nascent society and the origins of the (inegalitarian) state. This account, which occupies most of Part II of the Second Discourse, consists of four main stages:

(A) Divisions of land and accumulations of land by particular individuals as a result of the inventions of metallurgy and agriculture (*DI*: 167-71/*OC*: 3:171-6).

(B) The period of social instability Rousseau calls 'the most horrible state of war' (*DI*: 172/*OC*: 3:176). During this period particular individuals' claims to their land rest on nothing but force and what Rousseau later calls the 'right of the stronger' (*SC*: I.3), thereby inviting competing claims and exercises of force against them (*DI*: 171-3/*OC*: 3:176-7).

(C) A period of social stability as a result of a social compact established by landowners with other members of society, principally their dependents. The main aim of this compact is to codify a legally-recognized right to their presently-existing property, but because it replaces the 'right of the stronger' with such property rights, it promises to end the 'state of war'. Consequently, this compact is attractive to all, and enjoys universal consent (*DI*: 173-81/*OC*: 3:177-86).

(D) Whatever universal legal equalities established at (C) prove brittle under political pressure from the landowners whose inherited private property the state protects. The latter, or at

least a proper subset of them, establish themselves as a permanent administrative class. This terminates in their enjoying higher legal status than other members of society (*DI*: 181-6/*OC*: 3:186-91). Thus Rousseau calls 'Arbitrary Power' the 'ultimate stage' of government, or at least of those governments established in order to protect previously-existing (inegalitarian) private property relations (*DI*: 179/*OC*: 3:184).⁸⁹

Instead of dwelling on each of these stages, I will organize my discussion around the three kinds of inequality at play throughout this process, and how each gives rise to general relations of domination: (1) inequalities in material wealth; (2) inequalities in formal or legal status; and (3) inequalities in means of differential consideration.⁹⁰ Each of these is important not just because it gives rise to distinctive possibilities of 'personal dependence', and thus distinctive possibilities for domination (*SC*: I.7.8); but also because each is a kind of inequality that (as I will show in the following chapter, particularly in Section 5.3) Rousseau aims to address in the political system he provides in *The Social Contract* and related writings.

(1) Among the inequalities engendering domination are those in material wealth, especially those brought about when particular individuals are able to accumulate private

⁸⁹. In Rousseau's summary of those social developments following the 'state of war', (C) figures as the 'first term', the transition from (C) to (D) figures as the 'second term', and (D) figures as the 'third and last' term: 'If we follow the progress of inequality through these different revolutions, we will find that the establishment of the Law and Right of property was its first term; the institution of Magistracy, the second; the conversion of legitimate into arbitrary power the third and last; so that the state of rich and poor was authorized by the first Epoch, that of powerful and weak by the second, and by the third that of Master and Slave, which is the last degree of inequality, and the state to which all the others finally lead, until new revolutions either dissolve the Government entirely, or bring it closer to legitimate institution' (*DI*: 182/*OC*: 3:187).

⁹⁰. (1) and (3) are at play throughout (A)-(D), but (2)—inequalities in formal or legal status—only becomes significant at (C), and especially so at (D).

property at the expense of others, thereby leaving the latter dependent on those individuals for their subsistence. This is the circumstance Rousseau describes in the Second Discourse as when

[Once] inheritances had increased in number and size to the point where they covered all the land and adjoined one another, men could no longer aggrandize themselves except at one another's expense, and the supernumeraries whom weakness or indolence had kept from acquiring an inheritance of their own [...] were obliged to seize or to receive their subsistence from the hands of the rich; and from this began to arise, according to the different characters of the poor and the rich, domination and servitude, or violence and plunder (*DI: 171/OC: 3:175*).

Here Rousseau is describing a specific moment in human history, following the appearance of private property, when already-existing natural inequalities (such as inequalities in 'strength', and in access to natural resources, *DI: 170/OC: 3:174*) allowed for the accumulation of private property by some at the expense of others. But we should also understand Rousseau as describing a standing problem, one characterizing the present, whenever there are significant inequalities in wealth, and the distribution of private property is out of variance with human need: those lacking the resources of owners will become dependent on their 'particular wills', and enter general relations of domination: relations in which having one's needs met is conditioned on supplying differential consideration to a superior (who is in a position, as owner of private property, to supply one's needs).

Note that though Rousseau is describing the dependence of one class (non-owners) on another (owners of private property) for their subsistence, the domination he is accounting for is not just between classes or supra-individual entities. Rather, this dependence will tend to execute in general relations of domination between individuals, as when a bondsman must supply

differential consideration to a lord in order to have his needs met. I believe it is this kind of domination, as opposed to domination between classes, that Rousseau is referring to when he says (in the passage following the one just quoted) that 'The rich, for their part, had scarcely become acquainted with the pleasure of dominating than they disdained all other pleasures' (*DI*: 171/*OC*: 3:175).

(2) Also among the inequalities engendering domination are those in legal status, including those that codify, in the legal system, the inequalities in material wealth described in (1). According to Rousseau, the introduction of private property was for its owners an unstable condition so long as their right to property rested on 'the right of the stronger' (i.e. their ability to defend their property by physical force) rather than a legally recognized right.

Regardless of how they painted their usurpations, [owners of private property] realized well enough that they were only based on a precarious and abusive right, and that since they had been acquired solely by force, force could deprive them of them without their having any reason for complaint (*DI*: 172/*OC*: 3:176).

This results in two subsequent historical developments: (C) and (D) above. First (C), owners establish a social compact with their dependents in order to codify in law a right to their already-existing property. (Rousseau explains why the appearance of non-arbitrary law would have seemed to dependents to be in their interests, and thus why they would have consented to such a compact; *DI*: 173/*OC*: 3:177). Second (D), since such a compact codifies the legal rights of owners to their already-existing property (without any kind of redistribution), whatever 'formal equality under the law' this compact effects is inherently precarious: owners use their greater political power (afforded by their greater material resources, themselves codified under the law)

to bend the application of the law in their favor. According to Rousseau, this inevitably leads to some enjoying greater legal status than others.

[That] is how Chiefs, having become hereditary, grew accustomed to regard their Magistracy as a family possession, to regard themselves the owners of the State of which they at first were only the Officers, to calling their Fellow-Citizens their Slaves, to counting them like Cattle among the things that belonged to them, and to calling themselves equals to the Gods and Kings of Kings (*DI*: 182/*OC*: 3:187).

Again, Rousseau is describing a specific moment in his speculative human history, and one that, by drawing on a feudal model, can presuppose greater stability in ownership of land (across hereditary lines) than is sometimes the case under capitalism. But he is also describing a general tendency whenever there are significant material inequalities (or whenever distributions of private property are out of variance with human need): formal equality under the law will be precarious, ultimately terminating in the formal inequalities he calls 'Arbitrary Power' (*DI*: 179/*OC*: 3:184). And I think we should understand such arbitrary power as making available distinctive kinds of general relations of domination. Thus, Rousseau describes the worst instances of such systems as those in which 'the subjects have no other Law left than the will of the Master, and the Master no other rule than his passions' (*DI*: 185/*OC*: 3:191): and among those passions, we can suppose, is *amour-propre*. That is, it is hardly surprising when someone of higher legal standing exploits others' dependence on them (for example, that others must satisfy their commands, at risk of being in violation of the 'law') in order to satisfy their desire for differential consideration. And we do not even need to imagine Rousseau's limiting case of a society with 'no other Law left than the will of the Master'; such general relations of domination

are a standing risk characteristic of any society where the desires of particular individuals, as opposed to the shared general interests of all, determine the content of the law.

(3) Finally, among the inequalities engendering domination are also those in means of differential consideration: that is, the unavailability of a wide range of means of satisfying one's need for differential consideration that do not themselves involve domination. In systems characterized by (1) and (2), owners of private property and administrators of inegalitarian states have a disproportionate influence over what the available means of differential consideration are.⁹¹ This is because, thanks to the structures of power they administer—and especially because these structures allow for multiple hierarchical levels, where some who command over others are in turn commanded over by others—they can promise those who would occupy middle terms in that hierarchy opportunities for domination over others (on the condition of their being dominated by those occupying higher positions). Thus, Rousseau says:

Citizens let themselves be oppressed only so far as they are swept up by blind ambition and, looking below more than above themselves, *come to hold Domination dearer than independence*, and consent to bear chains so that they might impose chains [on others] in turn (*DI*: 183/*OC*: 3:188, my emphasis).⁹²

And elsewhere Rousseau remarks on 'a little upstart [who] gives himself a hundred masters in order to acquire ten valets' (*LWM*: 261/*OC*: 3:842).

⁹¹. Note that there is a kind of nested structure in (1), (2), and (3), suggesting the primacy that inequalities in material wealth play in Rousseau's account: (1) plays a role in bringing about and sustaining (2), and both (1) and (2) play roles in bringing about and sustaining (3).

⁹². Here Rousseau uses 'citizen', as he does throughout the Second Discourse, to refer to members of civil society, as opposed to 'citizen' in the specific sense of referring to members of the society of the General Will (to be explored in the following chapter).

We have already seen in (1) and (2) how general relations of domination characterize the large-scale features of a society, such that participation in them (either as dominated or dominator) is unavoidable: at least, in the case of the dominated, it is unavoidable insofar as one is to have one's subsistence needs met (under 1) or not be in violation of the law (under 2). In these respects, general relations contrast with particular instances of domination (either forward-looking or backward-looking), which at most constitute discrete parts of a society. But (3) brings out a way in which, under general relations of domination, the dominated can be *actively* participatory: one can enter, or maintain one's position in, such relations (whether knowing their character or not) based on little more than the promise of dominating others.⁹³ (And here we see how general relations of domination can constitute self-perpetuating systems, again in contrast with particular instances of domination: so long as a general relation of domination allows for middle-terms or middle-managers, it will give rise to yet further relations of domination, which both help sustain it and form its constituent parts.)

⁹³. On this point, Rousseau should be compared with Marx on how the ruling class maintains an antagonism between English workers and Irish workers: 'The ordinary English worker hates the Irish worker as a competitor who lowers his standard of life. In relation to the Irish worker he regards himself as a member of the *ruling* nation and consequently he becomes a tool of the English aristocrats and capitalists against Ireland, thus strengthening their domination over *himself*' (Marx 1975; Marx connects this phenomenon to the domination by poor whites against black former slaves in the U.S.). As always when comparing Rousseau and Marx, we should keep in mind that whereas Marx tends to focus on domination between supra-individual entities, principally classes, Rousseau tends to focus on domination between individuals (which nevertheless has principally class-based expression). Also, in contrast with Marx, nothing like the notion of 'surplus value' plays a significant role in Rousseau's understanding of domination. This has the consequence that, whereas Marx emphasizes the *exchange* side of 'domination' (such that the capitalist exchanges the surplus value taken from the worker for their own purposes), Rousseau tends to emphasize the role of the dominator as *consumer* of differential consideration.

4.6. Domination and False Consciousness

We are now in a position to see how general relations of domination facilitate restrictions on the dominated's theoretical freedom (or their ability to make up their mind). At the end of the Second Discourse Rousseau discusses 'the sociable man' who, 'always outside himself, is capable of living only in the opinion of others and, so to speak, derives the sentiment of his own existence solely from their judgment' (*DI*: 187/*OC*: 3:193). Here Rousseau only offers a broad way in which 'society' might encourage someone to form views based on the expectations of others as opposed to their own independent judgment. But I think that other considerations in Rousseau's writing allow us to appreciate how this phenomenon takes a distinctive shape in general relations of domination, how it has distorting effects on the capacity for objective judgment of both dominator and dominated, and how it can put the dominated in a position of 'false consciousness'.⁹⁴

For example, in the *Letter to d'Alembert* Rousseau criticizes the theater as a site of commerce insofar as it encourages the spectator to 'buy' expressions of sentiment from the actor, who is thereby constrained to flatter the preexisting expectations of the spectator.

What is the profession of the actor? It is a trade in which he performs for many, submits himself to the disgrace and the affronts that others buy the right to give him, and he puts his person publicly on sale. I beg every sincere man to tell if he does not feel in the depths of his soul that there is something servile and base in this traffic of oneself. [...] What, then, is the spirit that the actor receives from his estate? A mixture of abjectness, duplicity, ridiculous conceit, and disgraceful abasement which renders him fit for all sorts of roles except for the most noble of all, man, which he abandons. [...A]n actor on the

⁹⁴. Throughout this discussion it is good to keep in mind Rousseau's own experience working as a servant and in a variety of subordinate positions. Cf. Starobinski 1988: 282-3.

stage, displaying other sentiments than his own, saying only what he is made to say, often representing a chimerical being, annihilates himself, as it were, and is lost in his hero. And, in this forgetting of the man, if something remains of him, it is used as the plaything of the spectators (*LD: 79-81/OC: 5:72-4*).⁹⁵

It should be evident that when Rousseau talks about the actor's 'annihilating himself', he is not making so superficial a point as that an actor is often absorbed in a part he is playing. Rather, in characterizing the actor as 'duplicitous', 'abased', and 'saying only what he is made to say', Rousseau is characterizing someone as absorbed *in his role as an actor*. (Compare Sartre's well-known discussion of the waiter: 'But what is he playing? We need not watch long before we can explain it: he is playing at being a waiter in a café', Sartre 1956: 59).⁹⁶ Therefore, we can perhaps take Rousseau's discussion of the actor as emblematic of any sort of transactional relationship (not just that between spectator and actor in the commercial theater) in which a dependent is made a 'plaything' of those on whom they depend for their subsistence, or for their other needs.

It is characteristic of Rousseau to say that relationships of 'dependence' engender 'vices', and that by them 'master and slave are mutually corrupted' (*E: 85/OC: 4:311*).⁹⁷ Thus, understanding the nature of general relations of domination requires understanding just how those relations are bad for both dominator and dominated. And I think we can specify at least

⁹⁵. I will return to Rousseau's criticisms of the commercial theater in my essay 'Spectators and Giants in Rousseau and Víctor Erice' (Appendix 2 of this dissertation).

⁹⁶. For a comparison between Rousseau and Sartre on 'bad faith', to which I am indebted, see Griswold 2018: 165n24.

⁹⁷. I will return to this passage, and consider more fully its surrounding context, in the following chapter (Section 5.4). Obviously this passage is consistent with the idea that the slave (or dominated) fares worse in such relations. For elaboration of a similar idea in critical theory, see Geuss 1981: 87.

part of this 'mutual corruption' when we take into account the structure of that (forced) flattery typical of such relations: (1) that it can put the dominator in a position of 'ideological illusion', or of holding systematically false beliefs as a result of the flattery of the dominated; and (2) that it can put the dominated in a position of 'false consciousness', or of forming attitudes on the basis of the dominator's expectations (typically, not consciously on that basis).⁹⁸

(1) Regarding the 'ideological illusion' of a dominator: it would be good to consider a treatment of flattery by Pascal, whose *Pensées* we know Rousseau read with interest.⁹⁹ Pascal observes that as someone becomes more powerful (as they climb 'each rung of fortune's ladder'), they surround themselves with more people whose interest consists in encouraging that individual's beliefs in pleasing falsehoods (or in averting them from unpleasant truths). Thus, Pascal mentions

this false delicacy which makes those who have to correct others choose so many devious ways and qualifications to avoid giving offense. They must minimize our faults, pretend to excuse them, and combine this with praise and marks of affection and esteem. Even then such medicine still tastes bitter to self-love, which takes as little of it as possible, always with disgust and often with secret resentment against those administering it.

The result is that anyone who has an interest in winning our affection tends to avoid rendering us a service which he knows to be unwelcome; we are treated as we want to be treated—we hate the truth and so it is kept from us, we desire to be flattered and so we are flattered, we like being deceived and so we are deceived.

This is why each rung of fortune's ladder which leads us up in the world takes us further from the truth, because people are more wary of offending those whose friendship is most

⁹⁸. My use of 'ideological illusion' and 'false consciousness', and my understanding of their difference, comes directly from Shelby 2003: 166, 170. Shelby's use of 'false consciousness' of course derives from Engels's letter to Franz Mehring (Engels 1978a: 766).

⁹⁹. See Mitchell 1993: 637n1. Mitchell says that Rousseau likely read the Port-Royal edition of the *Pensées*, which indeed contains the passage quoted below (Mitchell 1993: 641).

useful and whose enmity is most dangerous[...T]elling the truth is useful to the hearer but harmful to those who tell it [...] (Pascal 1995: 348-50).¹⁰⁰

Pascal is not attentive, to the degree that Rousseau is, to the ways in which dependence on the powerful can constitute a kind of domination, or the role that private property plays in engendering relations of domination. But Pascal's observations are strongly consonant with Rousseau's own associations between politeness and falseness (*DSA*: 8-9/*OC*: 3:8-9; *LL*: 29/*OC*: 3:31; *N*: 100, 103/*OC*: 2:968, 972; *O*: 46/*OC*: 3:51); with Rousseau's remarks about the 'deceitful veil of politeness' characteristic of the social relations he observed (*DSA*: 8/*OC*: 3:8); as well as with Rousseau's appreciation of the numbers of people required to sustain the lifestyles of the rich and powerful, thereby enshrining them in closed social worlds (*E*: 344-54/*OC*: 4:678-91). Thus, Rousseau says that 'One of the miseries of rich people is to be deceived in everything' (*E*: 56/*OC*: 4:273). And in a moment of imagining what his life would be like while rich, Rousseau says, 'A porter and some lackeys are poor interpreters. I would not want to have these people always between me and the rest of the world' (*E*: 347/*OC*: 4:680); and it is reasonable to think that Rousseau does not just mean that such servants would interfere between him and the world *practically*, in that they would be poor executors of his will; but also that they would interfere

¹⁰⁰. Compare with another author familiar to Rousseau, La Rochefoucauld: 'We dislike praising, and we never praise anybody except out of self-interest. Praise is a subtle, concealed, and delicate form of flattery which gratifies giver and receiver in different ways: the latter accepts it as the due reward of his merit, the former bestows it so as to draw attention to his own fairness and discrimination' (La Rochefoucauld 1959: §144). La Rochefoucauld's remarks on flattery contrast significantly with Rousseau's in that they principally derive from his observations of the aristocracy and thus of flattery between relative social equals. Related to that difference, there is less sensitivity in La Rochefoucauld to the idea that self-falsification might go deeper than surface expressions of flattery (cf. La Rochefoucauld 1959: §152, 158). La Rochefoucauld is nevertheless highly sensitive to the idea that our own motives are often opaque to us.

between him and the world *epistemically*, in that their flattery and politeness would constitute a veil between Jean-Jacques and an accurate understanding of his surroundings (as they bear on him). Of course, we would expect a rich person who is sufficiently cynical, or sufficiently attentive to the nature of these relations, to see past the expressions of flattery of their servants or dependents. But it is not difficult to imagine a social world closed to such a degree—and marked by the supplications of dependents to such a degree—that even such cynicism is insufficient to facilitate access to unpleasant truths.¹⁰¹

(2) If it is characteristic of general relations of domination that the dominated is compelled to please or flatter the dominator, then what might the consequences of that be for the dominated? What does Rousseau mean when he says that the actor, in the position of the dominated, 'annihilates himself' (*LD*: 81/*OC*: 5:74)? I think that a truly innovative feature of Rousseau's writing, one that points to later treatments of false consciousness, and of how subordination to the powerful can restrict one's theoretical freedom (one's ability to make up one's mind), consists in his suggestion that dependents are rewarded not just for surface expressions of flattery, but also for surrendering (typically, not consciously) part of their capacity for forming independent attitudes and judgments.

¹⁰¹. Rousseau's *Letter to d'Alembert* is significant as a comparatively early registration of the ways in which culture (in Rousseau's case, the commercial theater) can get caught up in such structures, thereby enforcing the 'ideological illusion' of its consumers. (Often in the *Letter to d'Alembert*, the spectator occupies the role of the master, and the actor occupies the role of the servant.) Of course, Rousseau was not yet in a position to see the role that mass culture, facilitated by mass communication, would play in enforcing such 'ideological illusion'. I have in mind here the contributions of Adorno and Horkheimer (Adorno and Horkheimer 2002: 94-136; also the essays collected in Adorno 1991). Only at the end of writing this dissertation did I learn of the recent publication of Alessandro Ferrara's study of Rousseau and critical theory (Ferrara 2017), which surely demands attention when it comes to these issues.

It is possible to miss this feature of Rousseau's writing if we focus too much on those moments that emphasize, in social relations, a division between one's 'real self' (as we might put it) and one's outer display. Thus, in a moment in the Second Discourse accounting for the effects of the first appearance of private property, and the competition it engendered, Rousseau says, 'for one's own advantage one had to seem other than one in fact was. To be and to appear became two entirely different things' (*DI*: 170/*OC*: 3:174). This is of course a real phenomenon in competitive environments, and it is not surprising to see Rousseau emphasize it there. But elsewhere Rousseau examines the more interesting and disturbing circumstances in which 'division' is not the apposite picture—in which 'being' and 'appearing' are not separate—exactly because one's 'being' is determined by the demands of 'appearance'. Thus, in *Emile* Rousseau says of 'the man of the world' that he is 'whole in his mask': 'What he is, is nothing; what he appears to be is everything for him' (*E*: 230/*OC*: 4:515). And Rousseau is especially sensitive to ways in which a demand for 'outer' politeness can have 'inner' manifestations: 'The more the inside becomes corrupt, the more composed does the outside become' (*LR*: 65/*OC*: 3:73).

Admittedly, in the passages I just quoted, Rousseau does not characterize these 'inner' effects as specifically the effects of domination, but rather as characteristic of being embedded in the social relations of his time: of being, respectively, a 'man of the world' and a person 'of Letters'. That said, we should always keep in mind the unmasking ambitions of Rousseau's social criticism, and his attempts to show that domination characterizes even seemingly innocuous

relationships in 'society', like those between benefactor and beneficiary.¹⁰² Moreover, it is not difficult to see how this issue, of surrendering one's capacity to form independent attitudes and judgments for the sake of flattering others, is especially acute in the case of, say, a servant's attitudes regarding their master. And here I want to draw on an illuminating recent discussion by Talbot Brewer of what he calls 'alienated emotions', connected to the 'emotional labor' demanded in the contemporary service economy. Brewer remarks on the importance in the service economy of displaying certain 'positive' emotions (paradigmatically, emotions displaying deference and differential consideration of the customer), but most importantly emotions that come across as *authentic*. Thus, Brewer notes (quoting from Arlie Hochschild's classic sociological study of the service economy) that flight attendant trainees were told during a Delta Air Lines training session, 'Your smile is your biggest *asset* [...] I want you to go out there and use it. Smile. *Really* smile' (Brewer 2011: 279, quoting Hochschild 1983: 4). Very recently, in a case taken to the U.S. National Labor Relations Board, a longtime employee of a Trader Joe's in Manhattan was fired in part because his smile was considered not sufficiently 'genuine' (Scheiber 2016).

Brewer points out that, as sociologists have examined, a coping mechanism common among those employed for some time in a service-sector job is to form exactly those emotions and attitudes that the job demands that they project.

¹⁰². A suggestion like Rousseau's, that the social expectations of the world 'of Letters' have effects on the real attitudes and personality of its members, was later taken up by Lukács in his discussion of the journalist under capitalism: 'Here it is precisely subjectivity itself, knowledge, temperament and powers of expression that are reduced to an abstract mechanism functioning autonomously and divorced both from the personality of their "owner" and from the material and concrete nature of the subject matter in hand' (Lukács 1971: 100). For further treatment of such 'self-reification', see Honneth 2008: 63-74.

[Sociologists have found] that the longer workers stay on the job, the more likely they are to make over their emotional registers so that they actually feel job-appropriate emotions, and that those who remake their emotional registers in this way find their work less burdensome than those who engage in mere surface acting. What these findings suggest is that permitting one's emotions to be made over so that they express the interests of another person (i.e. the corporation) is a common coping mechanism for those who engage in corporate forms of emotional labor (Brewer 2011: 280).¹⁰³

This mechanism informs Brewer's characterization of 'alienated emotions': when we are alienated from our own emotions, we do not relate to them as expressive of our own evaluative perspectives on the world, but rather as instruments 'to be reshaped in service to desires for pleasure or wealth or professional success' (Brewer 2011: 295). I will not here take up every part of Brewer's rich account of the harm of emotional labor, and of how, according to him, such labor interrupts 'the ongoing task of clarifying one's evolving sense of how it would be good to live, by pressing a crucial constituent of that activity [namely, the formation of emotions] into the service of one's pecuniary interests' (Brewer 2011: 295). I only want to insist on the reality of this phenomenon, and to suggest that it was a reality Rousseau was especially attuned to in his understanding of domination and servitude, and of the way in which a subordinate could be motivated to manifest differential consideration to their superior: not just in that they might

¹⁰³. Among the sociological studies Brewer cites on this matter are Tracy 2000: 15-6; Gross 1998; Pugliesi 1999: 147; and Brotheridge and Grandy: 2002.

manifest a surface display of differential consideration, but also in that (through a mechanism likely opaque to them, or to everyone involved) they might manifest the very attitude itself.¹⁰⁴

I now want to return, then, to the issue of *amour-propre*. Throughout I have argued that unhealthy *amour-propre* (or at least the unhealthy *amour-propre* under investigation) violates the constitutive standards of that passion: it involves violating another person's status as free in the course of acknowledging them as free (while valuing their differential consideration). I have therefore examined domination in order to understand its attractions (why anyone is motivated to restrict another's freedom in the course of acknowledging them as free) and to yield terms for criticizing domination (coming out of unhealthy *amour-propre*, and the importance of *amour-propre* for our status as social humans). And in employing such terms of criticism, two questions will typically arise: (a) whether some interaction or relationship is indeed a case of domination; and (b) whether the dominator is in a position to recognize that as the character of the interaction or relationship.

And here some important differences have emerged between particular instances and general relations of domination. General relations allow for a degree of control (even, as we have just seen, over a subordinate's capacity for forming attitudes or judgments) that particular

¹⁰⁴. Brewer's discussion allows us to see, despite the fact that Rousseau's criticisms of domination and inequality are informed by a feudal model (and thus cannot take fully into account the domination and inequality characteristic of an impersonal market; cf. Neuhouser 2014: 225), that such criticisms nevertheless have enormous application in the case of the service economy, whose proliferation has rendered more widely available the domination characteristic of 'master' and 'servant'. As Brewer says, in connection with Sarah Tracy's sociological research on cruise lines: 'The effect of this concerted emotional labor is to deliver up, at a price that is within reach for upper-middle-class Westerners, a level of continuous, detailed, and deferential personal service that has historically been a mere fantasy for anyone not born an aristocrat or appointed a colonial governor' (Brewer 2011: 282; cf. Tracy 2000).

instances such as revenge and d-threats do not; they also allow for varieties of control that can extend for as long as a subordinate's entire lifetime.¹⁰⁵ In these respects, the attractions of domination to a dominator, embedded in such a relation, are more intelligible than they are in the case of someone engaged in revenge or issuing d-threats: a master employing a servant over a lifetime will have influence over the latter's attitudes in ways that will make them less likely to run up against Rousseau's dictum (particularly applicable in the cases of revenge and d-threats) that 'force [has] no power over minds' (*LD: 67/OC: 5:62*). Also, the extended nature of general relations of domination allows for patterns of complicated emotions, including what may be a servant's very real love for a master—which may be reciprocated in a very real way—such that recognition of the relationship as one of domination, if that is what it is, will be especially fraught, opening up kinds of resistance and bad faith less familiar, say, in the case of revenge against someone for their bad opinion of oneself. That said, nothing in the nature of either particular instances or general relations of domination is such that the satisfactions of domination, for the dominator, cannot unravel under a full view of the interaction or the relationship: that is, under a full view of its involving a restriction on the freedom of someone otherwise acknowledged as free. It might be especially painful for a master to appreciate that character of their servant's love for them (for example, its involving a kind of false consciousness), but it is hardly an unfamiliar phenomenon when the master then looks on the satisfaction they take in their servant's differential consideration with a newly critical eye.

¹⁰⁵. Obviously, a case of revenge can be extended across a long period and involve many composite parts, as with Tom Ripley's revenge against Jonathan Trevanny for insulting him in *Ripley's Game* (Highsmith 1974). But it is notable that even in that case the revenge takes on the character of a general relation of domination.

At the same time, my understanding of *amour-propre* must take into account the fact that often, in either particular instances or general relations of domination, the satisfactions of domination will not unravel under a full view of what is going on, and that for some dominators those satisfactions exactly depend on a full understanding of the circumstance and maybe even of its irrationality. Thus, someone might take complete satisfaction in their revenge against another's low opinion of them while knowing very well that this will not change the other's mind. They might rather take pleasure in that revenge for its own sake, and know that the other's forming a good opinion of them would in fact remove the very occasion for their perverse pleasure. Furthermore, a master who came to understand that their servant's love for them likely rested on false consciousness, or was somehow motivated by that servant's dependence on them, might then not look at that relationship with a newly critical eye, but might instead take even greater satisfaction in knowing that their power over that servant was so extensive as to render even the latter's capacity for forming attitudes as under their influence.¹⁰⁶ In other words, pointing to an irrationality in domination—its involving attempts (successful or not) to extract something (differential consideration) whose satisfactoriness depends on its being unforced—is still a rather limited form of normative criticism; it will not speak to everyone. But even if we cannot always expect the satisfactions of domination to unravel, we do (thanks to Rousseau, according to the arguments of the previous chapter) have an understanding of the respects in which a dominator is compromised as a social human, and thereby compromised in their

¹⁰⁶. This is just an extreme version of what Brewer seems to imagine is often the case with emotional labor in the service economy, namely that the service is calculated so that the customer can take satisfaction in the worker's degree of deference, such that the latter must feign emotions: 'A spontaneous and heartfelt smile does not indicate a deferential attitude or a subservient posture toward its object. A forced smile often does' (Brewer 2011: 281).

flourishing.¹⁰⁷ It involves violating the constitutive standards of a certain good, characteristic of our specifically social kind: namely, the good of acknowledging others as independent points of view.

Finally, it is important to note that in several places Rousseau says that presently-existing institutions put us 'in contradiction' with ourselves (*E*: 40, 213/*OC*: 4:249, 491). Indeed, in *The Social Contract* he says, 'All institutions which put man in contradiction with himself are worthless' (*SC*: IV.8.17). And in the *Discourse on Political Economy* he appears to associate not being in such a contradiction with acting 'in conformity with the maxims of [one's] own judgment', something he says (most provocatively) is afforded by following the dictates of the general will (*DPE*: 10/*OC*: 3:248).¹⁰⁸ There is an obvious self-contradiction or self-division involved when circumstances demand (for example, in order to secure employment) that 'to be and to appear [become] two entirely different things' for oneself (*DI*: 170/*OC*: 3:174). But I think we can see a kind of self-contradiction, not just in such divorces between being and appearing, but also when the demands of appearance dictate one's very judgment, or when we are 'whole in [our] mask' (*E*: 230/*OC*: 4:515): it is, at least, a contradiction between external demands (particularly those of a dominator or master) and the requirements of having a capacity for forming independent attitudes or judgments. And in moving into my discussion of Rousseau's positive political philosophy in the following chapter, I will try to take seriously Rousseau's idea

¹⁰⁷. For arguments that Rousseau was concerned to articulate a notion of objective flourishing, and not just a notion of subjective happiness or desire-satisfaction, see Hasan 2016.

¹⁰⁸. The full passage is as follows: 'It is to law alone that men owe justice and freedom. It is this salutary organ of the will of all that restores in [the realm of] right the natural equality among men. It is this celestial voice that dictates the precepts of public reason to every citizen, and teaches him to act in conformity with the maxims of his own judgment, and not to be in contradiction with himself' (*DPE*: 10/*OC*: 3:248).

that the 'principles of political right' he proposed aim to alleviate such self-contradictions among citizens: at least in the attractive sense that they render less necessary the dependence on particular others that engenders domination (and thus the above kinds of self-contradiction).¹⁰⁹

4.7. Domination and the Infant's Apprehension of Persons

I want to end this chapter by filling in a lacuna in my account of Rousseau's understanding of domination. I have claimed that Rousseau locates the origins of general relations of domination in the appearance of private property. I have also claimed that, in contrast, no specific institutional arrangement—other than the gathering of social humans—is required for humans to manifest particular instances of domination (i.e. revenge, d-threats). This was how I understood Rousseau's account of the first appearance of *amour-propre* in nascent society, when 'vengeances became terrible' (*DI*: 183/*OC*: 3:188): for Rousseau, it appears overly optimistic to suppose that particular instances of domination, such as revenge, would not (as a non-accidental matter) accompany the appearance of *amour-propre*. Earlier (in Sections 3.4 and 4.4) I accounted for this in terms of the idea that being subject to *amour-propre* involves certain characteristic difficulties and anxieties, coming out of being the object of an independent point of view. But these difficulties and anxieties are not in their nature violent (as Rousseau insists in his self-ascriptions in his autobiographical writings). So—and this is the lacuna—when they are violent, what explains their appearance as such? If we cannot appeal to specific institutional

¹⁰⁹. For fuller discussion of Rousseau's notion of being in contradiction with oneself, but a discussion whose understanding of Rousseau's positive prescriptions contrasts significantly with the one offered in the following chapter (particularly in its emphasis on patriotism as a means of resolving such self-contradiction), see Melzer 1980.

arrangements (as we can in explaining general relations of domination), what further non-institutional factors explain occurrences of particular instances of domination?

Therefore, in this section I will present my understanding of how, according to Rousseau's account of infant development in *Emile*, the desire for domination—or, as he puts it, the 'spirit of domination' (*E*: 67/*OC*: 3:288)—appears as a consequence of certain factors of infant psychology, in interaction with certain environmental factors. According to this account, the infant must cope with his environment through trying to control it (via a principle of infant psychology that Rousseau calls the 'active principle', *E*: 67/*OC*: 4:289); but then any person who appears in his environment *qua* person—that is, who appears to him as a source of differential consideration—also appears to him as something to be controlled; therefore, that person appears to him as something to be *dominated* (in exactly the sense of 'domination' examined in this chapter: where domination presupposes acknowledgment of the dominated as a source of differential consideration).¹¹⁰

Of course, this account can seem only to make matters more confusing; for, in locating the desire for domination in infant development, it seems to make the appearance of that desire inevitable for us humans, thereby running afoul of Rousseau's well-known thesis that humanity is in its nature good.¹¹¹ I will thus consider how two commentators (N.J.H. Dent and Frederick

¹¹⁰. Throughout this section I will follow Rousseau in using masculine pronouns to refer to the infant.

¹¹¹. In his second letter to Malesherbes, Rousseau says, 'man is naturally good and [...] it is from these institutions alone that men become wicked' (*LM*: 575/*OC*: 1:1135-6). In his *Letter to Beaumont* Rousseau says, 'The fundamental principal of all morality about which I have reasoned in all my Writings [...] is that man is a naturally good being' (*LB*: 28/*OC*: 4:935). And in *Rousseau, Judge of Jean-Jacques*, Rousseau says that 'The *Emile* [...] is nothing but a treatise on the original goodness of man' (*RJ*: 213/*OC*: 1:934). Cf. Cohen 2010: 97.

Neuhouser) have addressed versions of this problem as it arises in their own readings of *Emile*. I will end the section (and my discussion of domination) by contrasting my reading with theirs, in the respect that, on my reading of Rousseau, an infant's exposure to other persons—*qua* sources of differential consideration—is not a developmental inevitability (even in the infant's reliance on caregivers). Rousseau in fact allows for a variety of other ways that the infant can interact with others—ways that do not require seeing others as sources of differential consideration—including, as we saw in Rousseau's account of the *sauvage* (in Section 2.2.3), interacting with others as 'things with minds'. Therefore, this reading allows us to respect the categorical nature of Rousseau's injunction to the caregiver, 'keep him [the infant] in dependence on things' (*E*: 85/*OC*: 4:311), while also rendering Rousseau's surprising injunction minimally plausible.

For Rousseau, the infant's development is guided by what he calls the active principle: the infant becomes acquainted with his environment, and comes to understand his relationship to it, through activity, and specifically through trying to control his environment:

A child wants to upset everything he sees; he smashes, breaks everything he can reach. He grabs a bird as he would grab a stone, and he strangles it without knowing what he does (*E*: 67/*OC*: 4:288).

But this creates a standing risk that, insofar as the infant is exposed to other persons (and of course the infant depends on persons—caregivers—to meet his subsistence needs), he will see them also as objects to be controlled. And this is exactly what Rousseau says in his elaboration on the active principle:

At the same time that the Author of nature gives children this active principle, by allowing them little strength to indulge it, He takes care that it do little harm. But as soon *as they can consider the people who surround them as instruments depending on them to be set in motion*, they make use of these people to follow their inclination and to supplement their own weakness. That is how they become difficult, tyrannical, imperious, wicked, unmanageable—a development which does not come from a natural spirit of domination but which rather gives one to them, for it does not require long experience to sense how pleasant it is to act with the hands of others and to need only to stir one's tongue to make the universe move (*E: 67-8/OC: 4:289*, my emphasis).

Indeed, there is good reason to think that the notion of 'people' or 'persons' that Rousseau relies on in this discussion is the notion of a person as a source of differential or evaluative consideration. Immediately after the above passage describing the active principle's role in generating a 'spirit of domination', Rousseau says, 'Dominion awakens and flatters *amour-propre*' (*E: 68/OC: 4:289*). Thus, it seems, the origin of *amour-propre* in the infant takes place in the course of the infant's dominating others (particularly his caregivers). (In other words, *amour-propre* thus appears in the infant as an unhealthy manifestation of that passion. It would indeed be surprising if the first appearance of *amour-propre* in infant development were unhealthy; this point informs my understanding, to be elaborated on momentarily, that Rousseau is not describing an inevitable or essential feature of infant development.)

But even more important for understanding this—that the dominating infant has been exposed to other persons *qua* sources of differential consideration, which he then seeks to control—are the particular examples Rousseau provides illustrating the origins of a desire for domination. Thus, Rousseau talks about how 'brutal nurses' sometimes strike an infant whose tears will not relent.

I shall never forget having seen one of these difficult cryers thus struck by his nurse. He immediately kept quiet. I believed he was intimidated. I said to myself, 'This will be a servile soul from which one will get nothing except by severity. I was mistaken.' The unfortunate was suffocating with anger: he had lost his breath; I saw him become violet. A moment after came sharp screams; all the signs of the resentment, fury, and despair of this age were in his accents. I feared he would expire in this agitation (*E*: 65-6/*OC*: 4:286; cf. *E*: 97-8n/*OC*: 4:329-30).¹¹²

Though Rousseau does not make entirely explicit that the infant's 'resentment, fury, and despair' manifest in a desire for domination,¹¹³ what is clear is that Rousseau is describing a way in which another person's evaluative or differential consideration (in this case, the nurse's anger) can be communicated to the infant. Thus, Rousseau contrasts this kind of communication with how the infant experiences the impersonal pain of a 'live ember'.

I am sure that a live ember fallen by chance on this child's hand would have made less of an impression than this blow, rather light but given in the manifest intention of offending him. (*E*: 66/*OC*: 4:286-7; cf. *RSW*: 114/*OC*: 1:1078).

I am not here concerned with what psychological principles entitle Rousseau to think that an 'intention of offending' can be communicated to an infant in that way: i.e. through being deliberately struck. (Rousseau's point is reminiscent of Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.'s famous remark in *The Common Law* that 'even a dog distinguishes between stumbled over and being

¹¹². See also Rousseau's description of actually-existing practices of child-rearing: 'A child cries at birth; the first part of his childhood is spent crying. At one time we bustle about, we caress him in order to pacify him; at another, we threaten him, we strike him in order to make him quiet. Either we do what pleases him, or we exact from him what pleases us. Either we submit to his whims, or we submit him to ours. No middle ground; he must give orders or receive them. Thus his first ideas are those of domination and servitude. Before knowing how to speak, he commands, before being able to act, he obeys' (*E*: 48/*OC*: 4:261).

¹¹³. Neuhouser treats this passage as concerning 'the birth of fury and spite', where he understands that as different from the origin of domination (Neuhouser 2008: 138-40).

kicked'; Holmes 2009: 2). Rather, I am concerned with showing that Rousseau thinks that another's *personhood* can in some way be communicated to the infant: and it is their personhood specifically in the sense of their being an independent, evaluative point of view on him. Moreover, it is exactly this personhood that the infant (in being subject to the active principle) seeks to control, and thus—according to the sense of 'domination' under examination in this chapter—seeks to dominate.¹¹⁴

This way of framing things already suggests how I want to exonerate Rousseau of the charge that his account of infant development is incompatible with his thesis that humanity is in its nature good: the appearance of a desire for domination in infants is indeed avoidable—insofar as exposure to the personhood of others (in the specific sense of evaluative points of view on the infant) is an avoidable part of infant development. But it is notable that other commentators on Rousseau have taken his account to render some kind of desire for domination as an inevitable consequence of the infant's dependence on other people for his subsistence. Thus, in a reading of Rousseau heavily indebted to the psychoanalytic theories of Melanie Klein, N.J.H. Dent argues that the infant inevitably passes through (or works through) a 'paranoid position' characterized by the infant's 'paranoid fantasy' that he is surrounded by malicious wills: 'Our first apprehension projects a world animated almost through and through by wills intent upon spiting us' (Dent

¹¹⁴. In this chapter, I have suggested that particular instances of domination are typically such as to cause frustration for the dominator, especially since 'force [has] no power over minds' (*LD*: 67/*OC*: 5:62). Indeed, in *Emile* Rousseau writes extensively about how the child's 'spirit of domination' will tend to result in frustrated desires (*E*: 87-8ff/*OC*: 4:314-5ff).

1988: 72).¹¹⁵ Therefore, the infant's 'spirit of domination', and his wanting to control his caretakers, is an expression of his need to protect himself from the persecuting wills that occupy his fantasy (and, in the case of the 'brutal nurses' who strike him, reality). Dent's Kleinian reading does not specifically address Rousseau's active principle. In contrast, Frederick Neuhouser offers an account of the 'inflammation' of *amour-propre* (and its manifestation in a 'spirit of domination') in which the active principle plays a central role. According to Neuhouser, 'What the crying infant discovers is that she can make use of the forces of adults not only to satisfy her needs to be fed, dried, and held but also to make the world bear the imprint of her whims and thereby satisfy her active principle' (Neuhouser 2008: 133).¹¹⁶ Since Neuhouser reads Rousseau as thinking that this way of satisfying the active principle (through commanding others) is universal among infants, this informs Neuhouser's understanding that, for Rousseau, 'the desire to dominate is a permanent possibility for the species—one that is, as it were, built into the human condition' (Neuhouser 2008: 130).

¹¹⁵. Dent particularly draws on Klein 1975. In her later work, Klein calls this position the 'paranoid-schizoid' position, in contrast with the 'depressive position' or 'depressive-reparative position'. Though Dent does not mention the active principle, I suspect that part of Rousseau's account of that principle informs Dent's understanding of the infant's world as 'animated almost through and through by wills intent upon spiting [him]': in that account Rousseau says that the infant 'senses within himself [...] enough life to animate everything surrounding him' (*E: 67/OC: 4:298*). But there Rousseau is not obviously attributing a paranoid fantasy to the infant, but rather describing how the infant 'animates' his environment in the sense of trying to control it, as when 'he smashes, breaks everything he can reach.' It is also true that Rousseau later says, of the child who 'believes himself to be the owner of the universe' that he 'sees ill will everywhere' (*E: 87/OC 4:314*). But there Rousseau is describing a degenerate case, not something that is to be true of all children.

¹¹⁶. Neuhouser emphasizes, to a degree I do not here, the active principle as leading the active subject to stamp the world with 'expressive significance' (Neuhouser 2008: 133).

Dent and Neuhouser are of course highly attentive to the importance of squaring Rousseau's account of infant development with his thesis that humanity is in its nature good. And in line with their readings they do not aim to show that the desire for domination is an avoidable part of that development; they instead aim to show (in Dent's case) that that desire in fact plays a positive function in infant development, or at least (in Neuhouser's case) that that desire, and its negative effects, can be ameliorated. Thus, in his elaboration of the infant's persecution fears, Dent says, 'this predisposition does not represent something out-and-out damaging, which should therefore be eliminated if possible' (Dent 1988: 73). Indeed, in a further application of Melanie Klein's ideas to Rousseau, Dent says that the paranoid position makes available to the infant (who has the psychological resources to work through that position) the possibility of a subsequent 'reparative guilt' allowing for 'reparative restoration': a disposition 'to restore the person he thinks he has hurt and damaged' (Dent 1988: 76). Dent adds, 'It is a significant part of this structure, normally called the depressive-reparative position, that the infant's disposition and power to effect restoration is experienced as tangible proof of his own creative power to effect good' (Dent 1988: 123).¹¹⁷ And in Neuhouser's account, he distinguishes between 'the mere ability to take pleasure in domination' (which he takes to be inevitable, according to Rousseau) and 'an enduring tendency to seek some part of one's sense of self through domination' (which he takes to be avoidable, according to Rousseau). Thus, on Neuhouser's reading, Rousseau's child-rearing measures aim, not to prevent the appearance of any desire for domination (or any ability

¹¹⁷. Therefore, the depressive-reparative position plays a large role in Dent's understanding of the development of *pitié* (or compassion) in *Emile* (Dent 1988: 113-142).

to take pleasure in domination), but to prevent 'the more or less entrenched disposition of an imperious or tyrannical character' (Neuhouser 2008: 137).

Dent's and Neuhouser's readings, in their different ways, have the benefit of making Rousseau's account of infancy plausible and attractive. At the same time, it is hard to see how these readings capture the categorical nature of some of Rousseau's injunctions to the caregiver (meant to prevent the appearance of a desire for domination). In particular, it is hard to see how they capture Rousseau's categorical injunctions against the infant's being exposed to the personhood of others, and the categorical nature of his statements that the infant's education should be an education 'from things' (*E*: 38/*OC*: 4:247).

Keep the child in dependence only on things. [...] Never present to his indiscriminating will anything but physical obstacles or punishments which stem from the actions which he will recall on the proper occasion (*E*: 85/*OC*: 4:311).

Before the age of reason one cannot have any idea of moral beings or of social relations (*E*: 89/*OC*: 4:316).

Let him see this necessity in things, never in the caprice of men (*E*: 91/*OC*: 4:320)

It is important for a child to do nothing because he is seen or heard—nothing, in a word, in relation to others (*E*: 92-3/*OC*: 4:322).

In contrast, on the reading recommended here, there is nothing surprising about these injunctions, as they amount to saying that the infant should ('before the age of reason', and thus as long as he is subject to the active principle) be kept from exposure to persons *qua* sources of differential consideration: that is exactly what the infant sees as an object to be dominated. This of course does not mean that the infant should be kept from exposure to other humans, or from

his caretakers; but his relations to them will be relations to *things*, in the sense of the Thing Principle of Chapter 2: sources of satisfaction in principle available to exercises of his will.

Dent and Neuhouser likely do not pursue this sort of reading because it can strain credibility. The infant is, of course, dependent on persons for his survival; and it would seem better to emphasize those moments when Rousseau is attentive to that reality (even if that renders the desire for domination an inevitable part of infancy) as opposed to when he appears to engage in the fantasy that the infant can be dependent only 'on things'.¹¹⁸ But again, my reading does not require that the infant be somehow independent of caregivers (according to Rousseau). It rather stresses that every caregiver bears aspects as *thing* (as source of satisfaction available to the will) and as *person* (as source of differential, evaluative consideration); and that, if the infant is not to develop the desire for dominating persons (specifically, in the sense of sources of such consideration), only his caregiver's aspect as thing should be made salient to him.

To make this reading more plausible, we should keep in mind two previous observations regarding things and persons. (1) As we saw in the case of the *sauvage* (in Chapter 2), seeing others *as things* (in the sense of the Thing Principle) is compatible with a variety of ways of relating to other humans: as sources of *pitié* or compassion (Section 2.2.1); as sources of hurt (Section 2.2.2); and even as objects of psychological understanding, as in the *sauvage's* incipient 'theory of mind' (Section 2.2.3). Therefore, when Rousseau says that the infant's relationship to his caretaker is 'purely mechanical' (*E*: 213/*OC*: 4:492), we should recall just how much relations

¹¹⁸. Dent's and Neuhouser's readings do address Rousseau's related injunction that his pupil Emile should be raised outside of society (Dent 1988: 76-7; Neuhouser 2008: 172-4). But they mainly see this measure as limiting the evils of the child's natural desire for domination, as opposed to an attempt to eliminate that desire altogether.

to humans, seen as things, can encompass, including—as we saw in the case of the *sauvage*—relations to others as 'things with minds'. (2) I claimed in Section 3.2 that an outcome of Rousseau's understanding of the personhood made salient in our being subject to *amour-propre* is that seeing another as a person (in the sense of a source of differential, evaluative consideration) admits of degrees: fully seeing another as a person, in that sense, requires being fully subject to their evaluative gaze. If that is indeed the case, then *not* seeing another as a person also admits of degrees: the requirement that the infant not see others as persons is an ideal that the caregiver can more or less perfectly fulfill. Indeed, regarding this requirement (that the child is to be kept apart from social relations until the 'age of reason'), Rousseau says, 'I show the goal that must be set; I do not say that it can be reached. But I do say that he who comes nearest to it will have succeeded best' (*E: 95/OC: 4:325*).¹¹⁹

How, then, is this requirement to be executed in child-rearing? Rousseau allows for a great deal of indeterminacy here: 'It is my design not to enter all the details but only to expound the general maxims and to give the examples for difficult occasions' (*E: 97/OC: 4:329*). But the general contours of his account emerge through his idea that the caregiver should focus on satisfying the subsistence needs of the infant, and avoid indulging the infant's whims (or indulging the caretaker's own whims, insofar as they depart from the task of fulfilling the subsistence needs of the infant): 'One must, in the help one gives them, limit oneself to the really

¹¹⁹. Rousseau also suggests that he is articulating an ideal, which the caregiver can more or less perfectly fulfill, when he says, 'I hold it to be impossible to bring a child along to the age of twelve in the bosom of society without giving him some idea of the relations of man to man and of the morality of human actions. It is enough if one takes pains to ensure that these notions become necessary to him as late as possible and, when their presentation is unavoidable, to limit them to immediate utility' (*E: 97/OC: 4:329*).

useful without granting anything to whim or to desire without reason' (*E: 68/OC: 4:290*). The central idea here is that going beyond meeting the infant's subsistence needs opens up the possibility of communicating to him differential consideration.¹²⁰ We saw a paradigm of this in the case of the nurse's indulging their own whim by striking the crying infant (and thereby communicating their anger to him). But Rousseau's thought seems to be that differential consideration (and thus the personhood of the caregiver) could be communicated to the infant by indulging his whims as well. (Roughly, whereas striking the infant communicates negative evaluative consideration to the infant, indulging his whims communicates to him a kind of positive evaluative consideration: at least in the sense of communicating to him that his whims are valuable.) In the following passage Rousseau gives an especially clear example of how the caregiver can avoid communicating their evaluative consideration by avoiding both indulging the whims of the crying infant and indulging their own whims (in the manner of the 'brutal nurses' who strike the crying infant):

[...] when they cry from whim or obstinacy, a sure means of preventing them from continuing is to distract them by some pleasant and most striking object which makes them forget that they wanted to cry. Most nurses excel in this art; and, well controlled, it is very useful. But it is of the most extreme importance that *the child not perceive the intention to distract him*, and that he enjoy himself *without believing that one is thinking of him*. Now this is where all nurses are maladroit (*E: 69/OC: 4:291-2*, my emphases).

Here it is evident how much Rousseau thinks being able to carry out the injunction 'keep the child in dependence only on things' (*E: 85/OC: 4:311*) is a matter of practical mastery, as

¹²⁰. Just after saying that 'Dominion awakens and flatters *amour-propre*', Rousseau says, 'Thus whim succeeds need' (*E: 68/OC: 4:289-90*).

opposed to following specified precepts. But it is also evident how much Rousseau thinks that a central goal of child-rearing—and the meaning of that injunction—is to keep the child from apprehending the personhood of the caregiver, either in the respect of his apprehending their 'intention' toward him, or (most importantly, as a case of evaluative consideration) in the respect of his 'believing that [the caregiver] is thinking of him.' And this goal seems motivated by Rousseau's sense that, however distant the ideal of preventing a desire for domination might be, it is not an unintelligible one.¹²¹

Again, Dent's and Neuhouser's readings are very attractive as (in their different ways) they both find in Rousseau an independently plausible account of infant development. But I think that a reading like the present one—emphasizing the possibility of the infant's relations to others in their aspects as things, as opposed to their aspects as persons—best allows us to capture the categorical nature of Rousseau's radical and distinctive idea that the child's education should be 'from things' (*E*: 38/*OC*: 4:247). It also best allows us to capture the role that Rousseau's account of infancy plays in his elaboration of the thesis that humanity is in its nature good. (Rousseau later said that 'The *Emile* [...] is nothing but a treatise on the original goodness of man', *RJ*: 213/

¹²¹. In the foregoing I have not said anything about Rousseau's suggestive remarks connecting what, for some infants, is a desire for domination, with what, for others, is a desire for servitude (*E*: 48/*OC*: 4:261). But we might suppose that, at least in cases where a caregiver (like the 'brutal nurses') subjects the infant to their whims, this need not terminate in the infant's desiring to dominate the caregiver, but might rather initiate a dynamic struggle between the infant and the caregiver, which can either terminate in the infant's desiring to dominate or in his submitting to the whims of his caregiver. For a psychoanalytic account of the origins of submissiveness that relies on the idea of a dynamic struggle for recognition between infant and mother, see Benjamin 1988: 51-84. Rousseau describes a dynamic struggle between child and nurse at *E*: 97-8note/*OC*: 4:329-30.

OC: 1:934).¹²² But, ultimately, what we should draw from all this is that acknowledging another as a person (in the sense of a source of differential, evaluative consideration) figures fundamentally in Rousseau's understanding of domination, even as it might take place in the earliest years of our existence.

¹²². Since my reading does not require understanding being subject to *amour-propre* as a necessary condition of the infant (but rather understands that passion as 'awakened' and 'flattered' in the course of the contingent but highly common birth of a desire for domination in the infant), my reading also allows us to make sense of Rousseau's claim that *amour-propre* does not appear for Emile (who is free from a desire for domination) until after infancy: i.e. not until after he has been weaned from the active principle. (Dent and Neuhouser, who understand being subject to *amour-propre* as a necessary part of infancy, read Rousseau's claims about Emile as aberrant, in light of his account of infancy; Dent 1988: 73; Neuhouser 2008: 135n21. I prefer to avoid this consequence, even if my reading does not render fully plausible Rousseau's surprising claim that Emile is not subject to *amour-propre* until adolescence; *E*: 235/*OC*: 4:523.) In the Introduction I noted that I invite a comparison between *amour-propre* (on my reading, in its role in our apprehending the personhood of others) and an 'object-relation' in psychoanalysis (where object-relations theory emphasizes 'relationship with the object, and not gratification of impulse' in its account of 'libidinal striving', Fairbairn 1952: 60). But part of what sets Rousseau apart from object-relations theory is that he treats the appearance of what we might call 'object-relations' (through being subject to *amour-propre*) in infancy as a degenerate case. And of course, what historically separates Rousseau from object-relations theory is the Freudian revolution and the appearance in Western culture of the idea of the normalcy of infantile sexuality. Thus, in understanding the appearance of the passions (including *amour-propre*) in the infant as degenerate, Rousseau is speaking from his historical situation.

5. Political and Affective Forms of Relating to Another

5.1. Introduction

I have argued that, for Rousseau, there is a good essential to our being subject to *amour-propre* in that, in valuing another's differential consideration, we thereby value them as a person in an important sense: (1) as an independent point of view on us, whose consideration cannot be satisfactorily extracted by force; and (2) as an individual, whose consideration cannot be satisfactorily exchanged with anyone else's. I have also argued that although *amour-propre* is essentially good in the way that it opens our eyes to the personhood of others, it also brings with it characteristic difficulties and anxieties. These difficulties and anxieties are not in their nature violent (as Rousseau insists in his own self-characterizations in his autobiographical writings). But they tend to result in domination—in the forced extraction of differential consideration from

a dependent—whenever inequalities in status and inequalities in private property generate conditions of unavoidable dependence on another individual.¹²³

Thus, this form of relating to a person is *affective* in that acknowledging another as a person requires caring about them (at least to the extent of caring what they think of oneself); and in that such acknowledgment characteristically involves affective anxieties about exposure to an independent point of view. Moreover, this affective form of relating to a person, as a source of differential consideration, connects Rousseau's phenomenological descriptions of what it is to encounter another as a person, or to be startled by the presence of another (found in works such as the *Essay on the Origin of Languages* and *Reveries of the Solitary Walker*), with his political concerns about domination as the characteristic pathology of inegalitarian societies.

At the same time, this cannot be the only form of relating to a person at play in Rousseau's writings; and it cannot be the only form required for understanding the political significance of relationships of domination. After all, the creation of the Social Contract brings with it, as an essential condition of its aiming at the freedom and equality of all its parties, an artificial, *political* form of relating to a person, namely that characteristic of relating to a Citizen. This invites comparison with the affective form of relating to a person, as acknowledging another as a fellow citizen also requires valuing them as a source of consideration: namely, as a source of that consideration involved in having one's rights respected. But it is fundamentally different as this kind of consideration is *non-differential*. That is, the consideration valued in acknowledging another as a citizen is not consideration of one's differential traits (say, evaluation of one's

¹²³. They also tend to result in an infant's acquiring a desire for domination so long as he is made subject to *amour-propre* (through exposure to the personhood of others) while still subject to the active principle. See Section 4.7.

qualities as a singer or dancer, or any other qualities that pick one out from the manifold); it is consideration of those rights one shares in virtue of belonging to the manifold of citizens.

In fact, the affective and political forms of relating to a person are complementary, in that Rousseau introduces the notion of a citizen in order to articulate terms for preventing and alleviating relationships of domination (which, as we have seen, draw on the affective form of relating to a person and its characteristic anxieties). Therefore, these two forms stand in a *genealogical* relationship. One is introduced, or would be introduced under the Social Contract, in order to address the artificial social conditions that exacerbate the problems of the other form. They also both have claim to be forms of relating to a *person* insofar as they stand in an *analogical* relationship. Under both forms, acknowledging another as a person involves acknowledging them as free and as a non-fungible individual. But whereas the 'freedom' acknowledged under the affective form is the other's independent point of view on oneself (independent of one's exercises of force on that other), the 'freedom' acknowledged under the political form is that acknowledged in the recognition of their rights, reciprocal with their recognition of one's own rights, as codified in the law. And whereas the 'individuality' acknowledged under the affective form is that of the other as a source of non-fungible consideration (such that the insult when their consideration is not forthcoming cannot be made up for by anyone else's consideration), the 'individuality' acknowledged under the political form is that of the other whose claims to right cannot be exchanged for anyone else's: it is in this sense that the rights and duties codified under the Social Contract are 'deontological'.

In this chapter, I will attempt to further articulate these analogies between the affective and political forms of relating to a person, and just how these analogies arise from the latter's

role in the Social Contract as a solution to the problems of domination. And I will also pay attention to some ways in which the Social Contract gives rise to a form of relating to a person, embodied in relations to citizens, that invites comparison with our relations to *things*, in the sense articulated in Chapter 2: things as sources of satisfaction in principle available to exercises of the will. For while acknowledging another as a citizen requires acknowledging them as free (in the sense that their rights constrain one's behavior), it also involves seeing them as sources of consideration—namely, their respect for one's own rights—satisfactorily within reach of the will. Our claiming rights against another citizen does not spoil the respect that comes about as a result of that claim. And while acknowledging another as a citizen requires acknowledging them as an individual (in the sense that their claims to right cannot be exchanged with anyone else's), it also involves seeing them, in a certain sense, as *general*. The only features of their identity relevant to the question of whether they respect our rights, or whether we can claim a right against them, is their instantiating the general descriptions of the law. And when we must demand a right to something we need, anyone suitably situated to satisfy that need (or instantiating the same general descriptions of the law) will serve just as well in supplying us with that 'consideration'. Therefore, I will argue that it is with a view to these ways in which a citizen is, like a 'thing', a source of satisfaction available to the will, and also 'general', that Rousseau describes his vision of republican government as one in which 'dependence on men would then become dependence

on things again' (*E*: 85/*OC*: 4:311).¹²⁴ In other words, it is in these respects that there is something *impersonal* about the political form of relating to a person.

The political form of relating to a person has long outlived Rousseau's articulation of it in *The Social Contract*. Famously, features of it appear in Kant's moral philosophy and in the idea of a person as to be treated as an end in themselves (and in that sense as 'free') and as 'above all price' (and in that sense as 'individual' and 'non-exchangeable') (Kant 1997: 4:429, 4:434). Nevertheless, however heavy his debt to Rousseau, Kant detached this notion of personhood from the specifically political context Rousseau assigned it: as a notion essential to alleviating the social conditions engendering domination, where domination is a pathological response to acknowledging another's personhood (in the affective sense).¹²⁵ In other words, Kant detached the political form of relating to a person (or the conception of a person he derived from

¹²⁴. In Section 5.4 I will also stress the differences between relating to citizens and relating to things, as the respect in which a citizen is a source of satisfaction available to exercises of the will (where the relevant kind of willing is claiming a right) is limited by the mutual rights we share with fellow citizens. But within the realm of relations that those mutually-recognized rights constitute (based on our shared needs), fellow citizens are indeed sources of satisfaction available to claims to right.

¹²⁵. Of course, a kind of requirement of non-domination figures in Kant's Formula of Humanity, or Humanity Formulation of the Categorical Imperative: 'So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means' (Kant 1997: 4:429). But in saying that Kant detached Rousseau's political form of relating to a person from the specific political context Rousseau assigned it, I mean that Kant did not understand domination in the peculiar sense Rousseau understood it (as acknowledging the dominated as a source of differential consideration) or in the expansive sense Rousseau understood it (such that even relations between benefactor and beneficiary can count as 'general relations of domination') as the *specific problem* to which the categorical imperative (and its characteristic form of relating to a person) is a solution. At least, that is not a feature of those readings of Kant that understand the categorical imperative as the form of rational willing (Korsgaard 1996, 1997; Engstrom 2009).

Rousseau's notion of a citizen) from its connection to the affective form of relating to a person, as Rousseau imagined it.¹²⁶

This is not the place to defend this reading of Kant's moral philosophy, or to argue that this feature of it is a defect (which it may not be).¹²⁷ But I do believe that it has had the effect of leading contemporary Kantians not always to distinguish clearly the affective and political forms of relating to a person. This is especially true insofar as they have tried to connect, on the one hand, the feeling of 'reverence' (*reverentia*) that Kant thought characteristic of respect for others (Kant 1991: 6:402) with, on the other hand, emotions—such as shame and love—better thought-of according to the affective form. I will close the chapter by discussing two such instances: Sarah Buss, who thinks that feeling shame allows one to 'bootstrap' oneself into respect for others; and J. David Velleman, who thinks that love is the maximal optional, and respect the minimal required, response to one and the same value ('personhood'). Rousseau is extremely attentive to the insight, articulated by Buss and Velleman, that there are emotional responses through which we appreciate the personhood of others. But by having available the resources to distinguish the affective from the political forms, Rousseau is able to capture this insight while

¹²⁶. I think that the young Marx also detached what he called Rousseau's notion of 'the abstraction of the political man' from that context in his critical remarks on Rousseau in 'On the Jewish Question' (Marx 2000: 64; see also Marx 1973: 83). When we situate the political form of relating to a person in this context, and particularly in relation to domination, some of Marx's disagreements with Rousseau can be understood as exaggerated. (For the idea that the young Marx exaggerated his disagreement with Rousseau, see Della Volpe 1970: 105-6; Leopold 2007: 270.)

¹²⁷. In fact, a distinction much like Rousseau's distinction between the affective and political forms resurfaces in Kant's distinction between 'The Doctrine of Right' and 'The Doctrine of Virtue' in *The Metaphysics of Morals* (Kant 1991). I am inclined to think that the actual Kant, particularly in *The Metaphysics of Morals*, may have been more Rousseauist, in important respects, than many contemporary Kantians.

avoiding these theories' characteristic problems, including that (1) shame cannot provide a model for respect insofar as the latter is a 'deontic' attitude, i.e. something another is in a position to *claim*; and that (2) in understanding respect and love as responses to one and the same value, Velleman in fact risks rendering love as a deontic attitude, or as something one can require from another. (Velleman explicitly disavows that consequence, as when he calls love an 'optional' response to another's personhood; my argument will consist in showing that he is not entitled to that disavowal.)

As I hope to show here, Rousseau not only more clearly distinguishes the affective and political forms than contemporary Kantianism sometimes does; he also provides a rich account of their relationships, both genealogical and analogical.

5.2. Two Ways of Relating to Another

In several places Rousseau distinguishes between our relations to others as sources of differential consideration (which we cannot claim or force, at least not satisfactorily) and our relations to others as sources of non-differential consideration (that consideration owed to us as citizens, which we can indeed claim from others). Typically these discussions appear in two different contexts: (1) Rousseau's arguments against attempts to ground political authority in paternal authority, based on his observation that our 'duties' to paternal authorities are in fact expressions of gratitude, and thus (unlike political duties) differential and (in some sense) optional; and (2) Rousseau's arguments against attempts to change public opinion (particularly about some well-known individual's 'honor') through the force of law rather than through the presentation to the public of reasons of the right kind (i.e. reasons speaking to the public's

capacity for differential consideration, and thus respecting their capacity for forming opinions expressive of independent points of view).

For example, in the Second Discourse Rousseau argues (against such theorists as Robert Filmer and Jacques Bénigne Bossuet) that our obligations under the law (whether just or unjust) cannot be derived from 'Paternal power' (or the son's obligations to his father) as these are entirely different kinds of relations.

[The] son, perfectly independent of the Father, owes him only respect and not obedience; for gratitude is indeed a duty that ought to be performed, but it is not a right that can exacted (*DI*: 177/*OC*: 3:182; cf. *DPE*: 4-5/*OC*: 3:242-4; *E*: 234/*OC*: 4:521).

That is, the 'duty' the son owes to his father is of a different kind than that owed to another (or to the state) under the law in that, as an expression of gratitude, it is *gratuitous*. Though the father may expect such an expression of gratitude as a return for his services, and it is in that sense that it is 'owed' to him out of duty, this is unlike a duty of right insofar as it is (1) differential (since only particular individuals are recipients of our gratitude), and (2) optional (since we choose who receives our gratitude).¹²⁸ Indeed, the gratuitous character of 'duties' of gratitude becomes clearer once we appreciate that, however much a father may expect expressions of gratitude from his son (and however much outside observers would expect it from him on the father's behalf), his having to force or extract such an expression would spoil its satisfactoriness for the father. In other words, gratitude is like any other expression of differential consideration in that, however

¹²⁸. In order to distinguish properly the son's duties from duties under the Social Contract, which can be directed to particular individual insofar as they satisfy general descriptions of the law that others do not, we might need to understand (1) in a sense that is insignificant without (2).

much it may be expected, its satisfactoriness for its recipient depends on its being unforced. (Again, this character of gratitude does not abrogate the idea that there is a specific sense in which one may be 'owed' gratitude, or in which it is appropriate to expect it from another, as well as feel a peculiar insult when it is not forthcoming.)¹²⁹ And, for reasons that will be discussed more fully below, this contrasts with the kind of 'force' legitimated under the law (at least under the Social Contract), as neither what one can claim as a right, nor its satisfactoriness, can depend on the 'gratuity' of another.

We see a similar distinction in those contexts where Rousseau insists that 'public opinion is not subject to constraint' (*SC*: IV.7.7) and that 'force [has] no power over minds' (*LD*: 67/*OC*: 5:62). For example, in the *Letter to d'Alembert* Rousseau discusses the intractability of public opinion to attempts by the sovereign to change it by force: say, by outlawing a negative opinion about a well-known individual.

If the whole people has judged that a man is a poltroon, the king, in spite of all his power, can declare him brave all he wishes and no one will believe a bit of it; and the man, passing then for a poltroon who wants to be honored by force, will be only the more despised (*LD*: 68-9/*OC*: 5:63).

Here Rousseau is more concerned with illustrating the powerlessness of the sovereign over public opinion than he is with questions about what would constitute satisfying differential consideration. (He nowhere explicitly takes into account that not only is the king ineffective, and self-defeating, in his attempts to change public opinion by force, but also that the satisfactoriness

¹²⁹. I discuss this issue, and that peculiar kind of insult, more fully in the paper 'Speech, Recognition, and the Insult in Not Being Believed: Rousseau and Adam Smith' (Appendix 1 of this dissertation).

of such a change in opinion, for the man thought a 'poltroon', depends on its being unforced.)¹³⁰ Nevertheless, what Rousseau is describing here are two different ways of relating to others: as objects of force (including claims to right), and as expressive of independent points of view. Thus, Rousseau insists on the importance of the 'art' of changing public opinion, an art which 'has nothing to do with violence' (*LD: 69/OC: 5:64*).

What I am claiming is that in both of these contexts Rousseau is drawing on two different forms of relating to others as persons: politically and affectively. And in each of these contexts Rousseau must draw on these two forms in order to diagnose some error resting on their confusion, or on the misapplication of one to a matter only appropriate for the other. In the case of theories grounding political authority in paternal authority, it is a misapplication of the affective form to a specifically political matter: the consideration 'owed' to a father is differential and optional (since the father cannot 'exact' it from the son), and thus of a different kind from the kind of consideration (what can be 'exacted' as a matter of right) meant to be explained. To see things otherwise (as Filmer and Bossuet did) is, in a sense, to see a political person (under these theories, the sovereign) as an affective one. And in the case of political attempts to change public opinion by force of law (and threat of punishment), it is a misapplication of the political form to a specifically affective matter: the public's differential and optional consideration of some

¹³⁰. That is, for that man the satisfactoriness of such a change of opinion *for its own sake* depends on its being unforced. It may nevertheless be perfectly satisfying in terms of the further, residual benefits that the change in opinion provides. In Section 3.1 I noted that it might seem that I am entitled to a stronger formulation than that force 'spoils' consideration, in that any attitude brought about through deliberate force is formed for the 'wrong kind of reason' for it to count as consideration. I nevertheless throughout rely on the weaker formulation, especially in contrasting the objects of *amour-propre* (whose satisfactoriness is spoiled by deliberate force) with the objects of *amour de soi* (whose satisfactoriness is not so spoiled).

individual tends to be resistant to attempts by the sovereign to treat it as the kind of consideration that can be changed or 'exacted' as a matter of right. To see things otherwise (as a despotic king might) is, in a sense, to see affective persons (bearers of public opinion) under an inappropriately political guise.¹³¹

But to get at the broader significance of this distinction (beyond Rousseau's diagnosing these errors), we must keep in mind the role that *amour-propre* plays (according to the arguments of Chapter 3) in our acknowledging the personhood of others (in the affective sense): that to see others as persons (under the affective form) is to see them as sources of a peculiar kind of satisfaction (differential consideration) that cannot be forced, including by claims to right. Moreover, we must connect this insight to the fact that in his positive political writings Rousseau characterizes the political form of relating to a person (as in relations to the 'Citizen') as an essential component of a political system that is (unlike those discussed in the above contexts): democratic (at least in that the law takes into account the interests of all citizens) and egalitarian (at least in that the law takes into account all citizens' interests equally).¹³² In other words, the political form of relating to a person that Rousseau most fully articulates is not one where a political person, rightfully owed consideration, is identical with an individual king, or where political persons are nothing but a proper subset of the parties to the Social Contract; rather, to

¹³¹. Here I use 'despotic' in the sense of Rousseau's 'Despot', who 'puts himself above the laws themselves' (*SC*: III.10.10).

¹³². I am here using 'democratic' in the sense that the Sovereign consists of everyone subject to the laws. This contrasts with Rousseau's more usual use of 'democracy' as referring to a government or administration of all people, in which 'the Prince and the Sovereign [are] nothing but the same person' (*SC*: III.4.1). It is clear that in the above contexts Rousseau is discussing non-democracies in both senses. (In his discussion of the man thought a 'poltroon', Rousseau is reacting to previous attempts by Louis XIV to change public opinion: *LD*: 67/*OC*: 5:62, 152n53.)

see another as a person (under the political form) *is* to see them as party to that contract. We must now see why that is so, and just what relationship that political form bears to the affective one.

5.3. The Citizen and the Affective Conception of a Person: A Genealogy

On my reading, Rousseau introduces the political form of relating to a person (under the guise of the 'Citizen') as an essential part of the conditions for preventing and alleviating the inequality (in both private property and political status) that engenders relationships of domination (in the sense of the previous chapter). That is, it is through its playing that role that the following aspects of the political form emerge: (a) seeing another as a citizen involves seeing them as a source of non-differential consideration, which one may claim as a matter of right; (b) seeing another as a citizen also involves seeing them as having interests that the law must take into account, and which are non-fungible with anyone else's interests; and (c) these relationships of 'seeing' are reciprocal, in that seeing another as a citizen also involves seeing them as owed non-differential consideration from oneself, and also as owing oneself respect for one's own non-fungible interests.

To see how these aspects emerge as a solution to the problem of domination, we should recall (from 4.5) some of the conditions typically resulting in relationships of domination.

(1) Formal inequalities in political and legal status, such that legislation takes into account the interests of some (such as masters) over others (such as slaves) (*DI*: 185/*DI*: 3:191).

(2) Material inequalities in wealth, such that some must depend on others (in particular, owners of private property) in order to have their needs met. Rousseau also argues, in his

discussion of the deficient social compact of the Second Discourse (codifying already-existing private property relations) that (2) will typically lead to (1): there is a general tendency for owners of private property to use their political power to bend the law in their favor, thereby effecting formal as well as material inequalities (*DI*: 172-3/*OC*: 3:176-7).¹³³

(3) An overly partial distribution of sources of differential consideration, such that some are motivated to enter relationships of domination in order to receive differential consideration (otherwise unavailable to them), either from their dominator or (as a middle terms in a hierarchy) from dominating others (*DI*: 183/*OC*: 3:188). The latter phenomenon (allowing others to be dominate so that they themselves can be dominated) is part of the way in which general relations of domination constitute a self-perpetuating system.

Again, all of these conditions, by facilitating general relations of domination, draw on the affective form of relating to a person: domination is a typical response (in social systems characterized by these three conditions) to the difficulties and anxieties of being the object of an independent point of view.¹³⁴ In order to understand how the introduction of the political form of relating to a person under the Social Contract addresses these conditions, we must understand just how the Social Contract, as part of its ambition of securing its 'two principal objects,

¹³³. Moreover, in *The Social Contract* Rousseau argues that, without limitations in material inequality, formal equality is 'only apparent and illusory; it serves only to maintain the poor in his misery and the rich in his usurpation' (*SC*: I.9.8n). Here I use 'social compact' to refer to an agreement among several individuals; I use 'Social Contract' to refer to the actual egalitarian contract that Rousseau articulates in *The Social Contract*. For a related distinction between compact and contract, see Hasan 2016: 411-4.

¹³⁴. As I discuss in the previous chapter, I do not mean for this characterization of domination to capture all politically relevant senses of 'domination' (outside of a treatment of Rousseau): for example, domination between classes. Rousseau tends to focus on domination between individuals (which nevertheless have class-based expression).

freedom and *equality*' (SC: II.11.1), makes the alleviation and prevention of these three conditions among its central aims.¹³⁵ Each of the below measures can be understood as introducing different kinds of equality (formal, material, and an optimally partial distribution of sources of differential consideration) in order to secure individuals' independence from the particular wills of others: 'so that every Citizen be perfectly independent of all the others, and excessively dependent on the City' and its laws (SC: II.12.3).¹³⁶

(1') The Social Contract establishes formal equality under the law, both in the sense that the law makes no distinctions among categories of individuals, and also in the sense that the law takes into account the fundamental interests of all individuals. This is part of what Rousseau means when he says that the general will must 'issue from all in order to apply to all' (SC: II.4.5): in taking into account the fundamental interests of all individuals, it must thereby be general in content, or not 'pronounce judgment on a particular man or fact' (SC: II.4.6). Otherwise, this would be to make the law partial to some individuals over others, and 'Every condition imposed on each by all cannot be onerous to anyone' (LWM: 261/OC: 3:843). Therefore, the generality of the law precludes a condition in which some individuals' interests determine the content of the law in ways leading to (either *de facto* or *de jure*, as when masters and slaves have different legal statuses) others' dependence on their wills.

¹³⁵. Rousseau describes the following as 'the fundamental problem to which the social contract provides the solution': 'To find a form of association that will defend and protect the person and good of each associate with the full common force, and by means of which each, uniting with all, nevertheless *obey only himself and remain as free as before*' (SC: I.6.4, my emphasis).

¹³⁶. Note that the kind of 'independence' under discussion here is what Rousseau calls 'civil freedom', which Rousseau contrasts with 'personal dependence' (SC: II.11.1). In the following section I will discuss Rousseau's distinction between civil freedom and moral freedom.

(2') The Social Contract also establishes material equality, in at least two respects. First, private property is alienated to the community so that it may be distributed according to human need (*SC*: I.9, II.11.2). Second, inequalities in wealth are limited so that 'no citizen be so very rich that he can buy another, and none so poor that he is compelled to sell himself' (*SC*: II.11.2).

(3') A less obvious, and less commented-upon, kind of equality the Social Contract introduces is that of an optimally fair and impartial distribution of sources of differential consideration. In a way, this measure follows from (1') in that every individual has a fundamental interest in—indeed, a need for—having their desire for differential consideration satisfied. Rousseau says, 'to provide for the public needs is a clear consequence of the general will, and [one of] the essential [duties] of government' (*DPE*: 23/*OC*: 3:262); and we can recall from the previous chapter, in my discussion of the 'functional role of *amour-propre*', that anyone who had their desire for differential consideration thwarted systematically would be lacking a fundamental human good. But this measure can also seem in tension with (1') in that it is difficult to see how, if the law must be general in content, it can secure anything like a 'right' to a kind of consideration that, by its very definition, involves being picked out differentially from among the manifold (and moreover, whose value consists in its being unforced, and thus not available to claims to right). I will return to this concern below, and to how it has likely led some liberal commentators to downplay this aspect of Rousseau's thinking. But for now I want to note that Rousseau articulates his vision of such an optimally impartial distribution (of sources of differential consideration) in his accounts of the public festivals and public prizes characteristic of a republic (*GP*: 179, 181-2, 186/*OC*: 3:955, 957-9, 962-3; *LD*: 125-37/*OC*: 5:114-21) and of systems of rewards for services rendered to the state (*DI*: 221-2/*OC*: 3:222-3; *GP*: 227/*OC*:

3:1006-7). And we should not lose sight of the role these measures can play in addressing problems of domination: when differential consideration is in these ways publicly available, it is less likely to be seen as a scarce good that can be secured only by entering into relations of domination (either by seeking it from a dominator, or by seeking it in dominating another).¹³⁷

A social compact introducing these measures will help to secure its members from 'personal dependence', particularly of the sort that facilitates domination (*SC*: 1.7.8).¹³⁸ But for these measures to be meaningful, for them to prevent or alleviate conditions of personal dependence or domination, the Social Contract must introduce a kind of relationship (among members of the community) structured according to reciprocally acknowledged rights. Rousseau begins his account of how the Social Contract structures the relationships of its members when he says that all of the contract's clauses 'come down to just one':

¹³⁷. (1')-(3') are very similar to, and my formulations of them directly influenced by, the measures that Neuhausser describes as Rousseau's measures to secure personal independence through dependence on the General Will (Neuhausser 1993: 387-91). But in place of my (3') Neuhausser proposes that, for Rousseau, 'the community itself [becomes] a source of the esteem sought by individuals as a consequence of their *amour-propre*. Law accomplishes this by ensuring that individuals enjoy an *equality of respect* as citizens' (Neuhausser 1993: 90). Though this earlier formulation is ambiguous (and owes something to Dent's influential suggestion that egalitarian conditions could be satisfactory of *amour-propre*; Dent 1988: Chapter 2), Neuhausser has more recently, and convincingly, argued that such conditions cannot alone be satisfactory of *amour-propre* (Neuhausser 2008: 59-70). Moreover, Neuhausser has imagined conditions in which 'it is possible for all to desire to be the best (in some non-trivial respect) [as in varieties of competition] and at the same time satisfy their *amour-propre* to a rationally acceptable degree' (Neuhausser 2008: 102). My (3') is influenced by Neuhausser's later formulations.

¹³⁸. Indeed, it is in the sense of securing against this kind of 'personal dependence' that, Rousseau says, one can be 'forced to be free': or, constrained by the laws in order to avoid such dependence. '[...] whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be constrained to do so by the entire body: which means nothing other than that he shall be forced to be free; for this is the condition which, by giving each Citizen to the Fatherland, guarantees him against all personal dependence' (*SC*: 1.7.8). For discussion of this point, see Neuhausser 1993.

[Namely,] the total alienation of each associate with all of his rights to the whole community: For, in the first place, since each gives himself entirely, the condition is equal for all, and since the condition is equal for all, no one has any interest in making it burdensome to the rest (*SC*: I.6.6).

Rousseau does not here specify all of the respects—that is, (1')-(3') above—in which this condition is 'equal for all'. But he does state that this social compact (involving the alienation of rights to the community, so as to structure rights according to the fundamental interests of all) amounts to the creation of a 'moral and collective body': 'which its members call *State* when it is passive, *Sovereign* when active', and whose members 'individually call themselves *Citizens* as participants in the sovereign authority, and *Subjects* as subjected to the laws of the State' (*SC*: I. 6.10). In other words, with the creation of this body members of the Social Contract relate to one another as 'Citizens' insofar as their fundamental interests determine the content of the law (that is, insofar as they constitute the Sovereign), and, correlatively, as 'Subjects' insofar as they are subject to that law (determined by the fundamental interests of all members).

In a helpful account of the above passage from *The Social Contract*, Joshua Cohen makes clear that when Rousseau talks about the 'total alienation' of rights, he is not saying that members of the Social Contract lack rights, but exactly the opposite of that.

In a society with a general will, there is shared acknowledgment that certain fundamental interests of each member ought to be respected and advanced [...] Construing rights as claims that ought to be acknowledged by others, then, the existence of a general will requires the acknowledgment of rights, because it implies a shared recognition of the requirement that those fundamental interests are to be protected, and of the supremacy of this requirement in regulating association. [...] The point, then, of Rousseau's remark about the total alienation of rights is precisely *not* that members of the political community lack rights, but that they claim those rights *as members, and that all the*

rights are founded on the common good, understood non-aggregatively (Cohen 2010: 83).¹³⁹

When Cohen says that these rights are 'founded on the common good, understood non-aggregatively' (or understood 'distributively'), he means that the common good (from which these rights derive) is not, as in varieties of utilitarianism and consequentialism, to be understood as the aggregate of individuals' pleasures or particular goods. Rather, in taking into account the fundamental interests that all members of the Social Contract share, the general will secures citizens' rights to have those interests respected: that is, the general will 'distributes' certain general rights on the basis of those shared interests. Therefore, unlike in classical utilitarianism, the general will cannot justify the thwarting of any citizen's fundamental interests on the ground that it would promote 'the common good' (understood aggregatively). In fact, on a *distributive* understanding, there is no 'common good' above and beyond respect for citizens' rights. And, as Cohen notes, Rousseau says of the suggestion that the government may 'sacrifice one innocent person for the sake of the many' that it is 'one of the most execrable maxims that tyranny ever invented [...] and the most directly contrary to the fundamental laws of society' (*DPE: 17/OC: 3:256; Cohen 2010: 41ff*). It is in this sense, that no one's fundamental interests may be justifiably 'exchanged' for anyone else's benefit, that the rights and duties codified under the Social Contract are 'deontological'.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁹. A classic treatment of rights as claims (and thus of the sort of connection between the two that Cohen is presupposing in this passage) is Feinberg 1970.

¹⁴⁰. For the notion that the 'common good' consists of the agreement of citizens' interests, see *SC: II.1.1*. Rawls also understands that 'the fundamental laws of [the social contract] are not to be founded on an aggregative principle' (Rawls 2008: 230).

Therefore, the creation of this artificial body, the Sovereign, involves the creation of an artificial form of relating to a person, the Citizen, whereby seeing another as a fellow citizen involves seeing them as bearing fundamental (and non-fungible) interests that one must respect, and also as required to respect one's own fundamental (and non-fungible) interests. As this formulation suggests, seeing another as a citizen is reciprocal: the general requirements to which one is bound in virtue of that relation are the same general requirements to which any other is bound with regard to oneself. Rousseau says, 'there is no associate over whom one does not acquire the same right as one grants him over oneself' (*SC*: I.6.8), and, he adds, 'The commitments which bind us to the social body are obligatory only because they are mutual' (*SC*: II.4.5). This is a consequence of the generality of the Sovereign's laws (which cannot 'pronounce judgment on a particular man or fact', *SC*: II.4.6), and of the requirement that 'it is never right for the Sovereign to burden one subject more than another' (*SC*: II.4.9).

Rousseau in fact allows for a great deal of indeterminacy in what these rights are that structure relations between citizens (*SC*: III.9.1). But, as we have seen, we can render his account somewhat more determinate by taking into account what will prevent and alleviate conditions of domination. And this returns us to the question of measure (3'), and of in what sense citizens have a 'right' to differential consideration. Above I claimed that it is with the aim of providing an optimally fair and impartial distribution of sources of differential consideration that Rousseau introduces, in writings such as the *Letter to d'Alembert* and *Considerations on the*

Government of Poland, the public festivals and public prizes he thinks characterize a republic.¹⁴¹ Some liberal commentators on Rousseau have distanced themselves from what they see as 'communitarian' measures meant, as Judith Shklar puts it, 'to remind men of their public role' (Shklar 1969: 20).¹⁴² Similarly, some Marxist commentators have characterized these as 'superstructural' measures meant to 'inculcate virtue' (Levine 1993: 179).¹⁴³ But even if these descriptions are accurate, we should not see them as exhausting the role of these measures in Rousseau's thinking. In particular, we must keep in mind just how these measures have liberating ambitions, in that they help to alleviate one of the conditions (namely, the unavailability, or merely narrow availability, of sources of differential consideration) that, for Rousseau, can motivate individuals' participation in relations of domination. If in fact these measures have the effects of strengthening community or of inculcating virtue, we might rather see these as

¹⁴¹. Rousseau says of ancient games and festivals that they 'increased [citizens'] self-esteem' (*GP*: 181/*OC*: 3:958). Describing republican festivals, Rousseau says, 'Every year we have reviews, public prizes, kings of the harquebus, the cannon, and sailing. Institutions so useful and so agreeable cannot be too much multiplied; of such kings there cannot be too many' (*LD*: 126/*OC*: 5:115).

¹⁴². It is in connection with measures like these that Joshua Cohen, who also quotes Shklar, talks about Rousseau's 'communitarian political sociology' (Cohen 2010: 5). Cohen says that though he does not find Rousseau's communitarian strands especially attractive, they are a 'powerful presence' (Cohen 2010:5), and that Rousseau's combination of liberal political tendencies and communitarian sociological tendencies might suggest that these traditions 'share more common ground than we sometimes suppose' (Cohen 2010: 22).

¹⁴³. Likewise, Althusser describes these measures as a 'flight forward into ideology' meant to 'restore the "purity" of the individual conscience [...] in a society which is threatened by the pernicious effects of "particular" groups' (Althusser 1970: 155-6). The most interesting of Marxist commentators on Rousseau on differential rewards is Della Volpe, who sees Rousseau as aiming to solve 'the problem of an equality which is *universal* and yet *mediates persons*', and even sees in 'Rousseau's highly original anti-leveling egalitarian spirit' anticipations of Marx's notion of an inegalitarian ideology of 'equal right' in *Critique of the Gotha Programme* (Della Volpe 1970).

secondary effects of measures whose primary purpose (keeping in mind that the two principal objects of the Social Contract are '*freedom* and *equality*', *SC*: II.11.1) is to liberate citizens from inegalitarian (or domination-engendering) conditions.¹⁴⁴

Nevertheless, even after taking into account the *liberating* (in addition to *communitarian* or *virtue-inculcating*) ambitions of (3'), there is still a worry about its intelligibility, particularly in light of what Rousseau himself has taught us about the importance of distinguishing between political and affective ways of relating to others. After all, the value of differential consideration consists in its being, of course, differential, and not the sort of consideration one can (with satisfaction) claim as a matter of right. And this contrasts with the ways of relating to others, as citizens, that the formation of the Sovereign brings about: namely, as objects of a kind of non-differential respect (owed to all in virtue of their instantiating the general descriptions of the laws) that one can indeed claim, and without spoiling its satisfactoriness, as a matter of right. (Any condition that could not be satisfactorily claimed as a matter of right would be outside the scope of the shared, fundamental interests that the common good 'distributes' in securing rights for each citizen.)

From these reflections it does indeed follow that no citizen can claim a right to a particular instance of differential consideration.¹⁴⁵ But it does not follow that no citizen can claim

¹⁴⁴. For a fascinating and nuanced account of how the communitarian and virtue-inculcating ambitions of these measures actually played out in history, namely in the Rousseau-inspired republican festivals of the French Revolution, see Dart 2003: 99-138. Dart claims that these festivals were more directly influenced by Rousseau's fictional description of the wine festival in Clarens in *Julie* (*J*: 492-99/*OC*: 2:601-11) than by the *Letter to d'Alembert* or *Considerations on the Government of Poland*.

¹⁴⁵. Obviously, a citizen may claim a right to a reward for a service rendered to the state so long as that reward, as the publicly acknowledged compensation for that service, is codified in a general law. Rousseau addresses this possibility at *DI*: 221-2/*OC*: 3:222-3.

a right to a general system of impartially distributed differential consideration (or, at least, a right to a general system that is less partial or discriminatory than the presently existing one). Moreover, it does not follow that no citizen can claim a right to a general system that makes available a wide variety of sources of such consideration. This is similar to what Rawls says in his account of the 'social bases of self-respect':

Now it may be thought that these stipulations [coming out of the idea that self-respect is a 'primary social good'] cannot be generally satisfied. [...] Yet this surmise is mistaken. [...] in a well-ordered society anyway, there are a variety of communities and associations, and the members of each have their own ideals appropriately matched to their aspirations and talents. [...] Thus what is necessary is that there should be for each person at least one community of shared interests to which he belongs and where he finds his endeavors confirmed by his associates (Rawls 1971: 441-2).¹⁴⁶

Here Rawls discusses self-respect (or 'self-esteem', he adds, Rawls 1971: 440), whereas we are examining one of its sources: differential consideration. (That differential consideration is a source of self-respect, in Rawls's sense, is an outcome of the previous chapter's discussion of the 'functional role of *amour-propre*'.) Moreover, Rawls does not talk about a right to self-respect but rather about the latter as 'primary good', to which a 'well-ordered society' provides a variety of means. But is a variety of such means, as a general feature of society, something that a citizen can claim as a matter of right? I do not think this idea is at all unintelligible. What a citizen *can* claim is a right against violations of laws meant to ensure a variety of sources of differential consideration. (This should be compared with violations of principles of what Rawls calls 'fair

¹⁴⁶. Neuhouser has also compared Rousseau on *amour-propre* with Rawls on the social bases of self-respect (Neuhouser 2014: 214-5).

equality of opportunity', Rawls 1970: 73.¹⁴⁷ These violations are especially clear when we take into account systems of differential rewards that discriminate—to take just one example—in favor of white people.)¹⁴⁸ Therefore, though a citizen cannot in that way claim a right against another member of the Social Contract (when it comes to particular instances of differential consideration), they can claim a right against institutional officers whose roles require that they uphold such laws (requiring fairness in the distribution of differential rewards).¹⁴⁹

In the previous section, I argued that Rousseau distinguishes between an affective form of relating to a person (understood as a source of differential consideration) and a political form of relating to a person (understood as a source of non-differential consideration). What is emerging is a complicated relationship between these forms. Here I have shown that these forms at least stand in a genealogical relationship: the political form is an essential part of the solution that Rousseau proposes to problems to which the affective form gives rise in inegalitarian conditions: namely, problems of domination. But also, in order for Rousseau to provide a comprehensive solution to problems of domination—including the domination that comes about as a result of unfairness and insufficient impartiality in the distribution of differential rewards—the affective form provides part of the *content* of the political form. That is, under the Social Contract, citizens

¹⁴⁷. For a discussion of Rousseau in connection with Rawls's notion of fair equality of opportunity, and a treatment of the connection between the latter notion and freedom from domination, see Neuhaus 2014: 219-21.

¹⁴⁸. Of course, even fair equality of opportunity is compatible with unequal outcomes (at least those outcomes compatible with following fair procedures), and—though the state can guarantee fair procedures—it cannot guarantee a minimum amount of differential consideration to all.

¹⁴⁹. Note that the fact that some individuals face duties (that others do not) in virtue of the institutional offices they hold is consistent with Rousseau's requirement that the law not name any particular individual, as general terms describing such offices may nevertheless figure in laws with general content.

are owed the non-differential consideration constituted by the existence of a fair system of differential consideration. Thus, one cannot fully understand the political form, or Rousseau's complete articulation of it, without understanding the affective way of relating to another person.

5.4. The Citizen and the Affective Conception of a Person: An Analogy

In the previous section, I explored a sense in which the affective and political forms of relating to a person stand in a genealogical relationship. In this section, I want to note some ways in which we are entitled to describe both as ways of relating to a *person*, in that they also stand in an analogical relationship: under both forms, acknowledging another as a person involves seeing them as a source of consideration, as well as free and as a non-fungible individual (albeit in different senses of 'consideration', 'free', and 'non-fungible'). Nevertheless, the senses in which, under the political form, acknowledging another as a person involves acknowledging them as free and as a non-fungible individual invite comparison with relations to *things* (in the sense that, according to Chapter 2, the world of the *savage* was a world of things). This helps us to account for why Rousseau likens membership in a republic to 'dependence on things' (*E*: 85/*OC*: 4:311), and it helps us to locate the ways in which the political form is an 'impersonal' form of relating to a person.

We have seen (according to what, in Chapter 3, I called the Differential Consideration and Person Principles) that acknowledging another as a person, under the affective form, involves acknowledging them as free, in that they constitute an independent point of view on oneself, and the satisfactoriness of their differential consideration depends on its being left up to

their independent powers of evaluation: that is, on its being unforced. Likewise, acknowledging another as a person, under the political form, involves acknowledging them as free, but in at least two (related) respects, corresponding to the two main (politically relevant) senses of 'freedom' at play in *The Social Contract*: civil freedom and moral freedom. The essential point here is that a free citizen (a) makes their own laws, whose content enjoins us to (b) respect their independence.¹⁵⁰ Thus, acknowledging another as a citizen involves acknowledging them as (a) self-legislating, and as (b) independent. Rousseau refers to (a) as 'moral freedom' and to (b) as 'civil freedom'.

Regarding (a) 'moral freedom': Rousseau characterizes this as 'obedience to the law one has prescribed to oneself' (*SC*: I.8.3): and indeed, for Rousseau, a law that takes into account the shared interests of all in some sense 'issues from all' (*SC*: II.4.5).¹⁵¹ Therefore, in acknowledging another as a fellow citizen, one acknowledges them as free at least to the extent that one understands their interests as constituting the 'common good' that the general will distributes in the form of mutually-recognized rights. Note that this understanding of moral freedom does not require the stronger reading suggested by Rousseau's formulations: acknowledging another as a citizen does not require seeing them as actually following the laws that 'issue from all'. It only requires seeing them as among those whose interests constitute the content of the law.

¹⁵⁰. My formulation here is inspired by Korsgaard 1997: xxviii.

¹⁵¹. Of course, this is not all that Rousseau means to include under the notion of 'a self-prescribed law' in the Social Contract. But I think that his further specifications—regular assemblies, the idea that the General Will cannot be represented (*SC*: II.1.2, III.13.1, III.15.5-6)—in fact figure, not as substantive further requirements in order to make actual a self-prescribed law, but rather as requirements contained in the idea of a law that takes into account the shared interests of all. In other words, for Rousseau there are anti-paternalist measures contained in the very idea of a legitimate Sovereign (composed of all citizens). For discussion of Rousseau's anti-paternalism, see Neuhauser 2014: 127-34.

The way in which such self-legislation constitutes a kind of freedom becomes clearer when we understand how, for Rousseau, the content of a law that 'issues from all'—and thus incorporates the fundamental interests of all—also secures citizens from 'personal dependence', or from subjection to the particular wills of others (*SC*: II.11.1). This security from the particular wills of others is what Rousseau calls (b) 'civil freedom'. Therefore, acknowledging another as a fellow citizen involves acknowledging them as free at least in the sense that the law (incorporating the fundamental interests of all) limits one's rightful conduct toward that person: it limits one's (permitted) conduct to that which respects the other's 'personal independence', and it puts the other in the position of being able to claim a right against conduct going outside those limits.¹⁵² Thus, though only in the case of acknowledging another as civilly free does their character as a limit on one's conduct become salient, their civil freedom is an outcome of their moral freedom (of the law's issuing from their interests).

A further analogical relationship between the affective and political forms concerns the idea that in acknowledging another as a person one acknowledges them as a non-fungible individual (albeit in different senses). We have seen in Chapter 4 that a peculiar feature of the insult characteristic of being denied the differential consideration that one values in another is that the consideration of no other individual (not even one bearing sufficiently similar general traits) can make up for it: such insult is expressive of one's valuing *this* person's differential consideration. It is in this way that, under the affective form, acknowledging another as a person

¹⁵². This is different from the limit that another (affective) person constitutes, and which is made salient in our being subject to *amour-propre*. In particular, the latter kind of limit does not (by itself) endow anyone with the power to claim a right against its violations. Instead, its violations amount to instances of unhealthy *amour-propre* (and the violator is compromised in their status as a social human).

(as a source of differential consideration) involves acknowledging them as more than a bearer of general traits, but also as an individual. Moreover, we have seen in the previous section that the requirements of conduct toward others that the Social Contract introduces are 'deontological' in that the General Will 'distributes' rights on the basis of all citizens' shared interests rather than on the basis of an aggregative understanding of the common good. (This informs Rousseau's insistence that under no condition may an innocent person be sacrificed for the sake of the many, *DPE: 17/OC: 3:256*.) Therefore, under the political form of relating to a person that Rousseau inscribes in the 'Citizen', acknowledging another as a person involves acknowledging them as an individual in the sense that they are valued as more than a bearer of, say, units of pleasure that can be aggregated across persons, but principally as having certain fundamental, non-negotiable interests. (In fact, then, acknowledging others as citizens also requires acknowledging them as 'separate persons', in the sense of Rawls's famous objection to classical utilitarianism: Rawls 1971: 22-7).

This last point—that a citizen is a locus of fundamental, non-negotiable interests, and that the role of rights under the Social Contract is the recognition of those interests—needs emphasizing. Throughout I have argued that the affective form of relating to another person yields certain characteristic norms: including those of acknowledging another as more than a bearer of general traits, but also an individual. But a peculiar feature of those norms is that nothing in our affective relations grants others the power to claim rights against us. In fact, there is even something self-directed about those norms insofar as what is at stake in our following them is our own capacity for receiving differential consideration that is both healthy (in light of our status as social humans) and satisfying. Therefore, though there are senses in which, under

both the affective and political forms, one is required to acknowledge another as an individual, only under the latter form is that acknowledgment something the other has the power to claim: in the specific sense of their being able to claim from others respect for their fundamental, non-negotiable interests.

A list of similarities between two phenomena is not always philosophically fruitful. Nevertheless, what I have tried to note here is a pattern in Rousseau's thinking—across affective and political phenomena—about what it is to acknowledge another as a person: under both forms, it involves seeing another as (in different senses) a source of consideration, as free, and as a non-fungible individual. It is also important to keep in mind the differences between the two forms, and the respects in which there is something 'impersonal' about the political form of relating to a person, even inviting comparison with *things* (in the sense of Chapter 2). To appreciate this, we will need to take into account a rich and complicated summary that Rousseau provides (in *Emile*) of his own political thinking.

There are two sorts of dependence: dependence on things, which is from nature; dependence on men, which is from society. Dependence on things, since it has no morality, is in no way detrimental to freedom and engenders no vices. Dependence on men, since it is without order [In a note to this clause, Rousseau adds that in *The Social Contract* 'it is demonstrated that no particular will can be ordered in the political system.']*¹⁵³, engenders all the vices, and by it, master and slave are mutually corrupted. If there is any means of remedying this ill in society, it is to substitute law for man and to arm the general wills with a real strength superior to the action of every particular will. If the laws of nations could, like those of nature, have an inflexibility that no human force could ever conquer, dependence on men would then become dependence on things again; in the republic all of the advantages of the natural state would be united with those of the

¹⁵³. In the note Rousseau refers to *The Social Contract* by its second title, *Principles of Political Right*.

civil state, and freedom which keeps man exempt from vices would be joined to morality which raises him to virtue (*E*: 85/*OC*: 4:311).

It would take nothing less than a comprehensive account of Rousseau's political thinking to make sense of every part of this passage. Nevertheless, we are already familiar with a number of its main ideas: (a) that the primary problem that the Social Contract aims to remedy is the necessity of depending on the 'particular will' of another person (that is, the kind of dependence that engenders relations of domination); (b) that such relations of domination are harmful to both dominator and dominated (and so 'master and slave are mutually corrupted'); and (c) that the Social Contract introduces measures (including legally guaranteed egalitarian measures) that both secure 'personal independence' (what in *The Social Contract* Rousseau calls 'civil freedom') and institute a kind of 'morality' (the obedience to a self-prescribed law that he calls 'moral freedom').¹⁵⁴

But what is especially interesting about the above passage is that Rousseau characterizes dependence on the law (that the General Will issues) as 'dependence on things', and that he explicitly compares it with the 'dependence on things' characteristic of the *savage* in the original

¹⁵⁴. In the above passage Rousseau also refers to the law as 'having an inflexibility that no human force could ever conquer.' What he seems to understand by such inflexibility is a consequence of the 'generality' of the law: that no 'human force' (i.e. no individual) can bend the law in their favor, or to the disadvantage of others (*SC*: II.4.9). But in *The Social Contract* Rousseau also says, 'The inflexibility of the laws, which keeps them from bending to events, can in some cases render them pernicious, and through them cause the ruin of a State in crisis.' Thus, 'it is a very necessary foresight to sense that one cannot foresee everything' (*SC*: IV.6.1). Presumably this is something that the government (as administrator of the law, in contrast with the sovereign, which makes the general law) must take into account in its application of the law to particular circumstances. Here Rousseau should be compared with Aristotle on the virtue of equity: of being able 'to say what the legislator himself would have said had he been present, and would have put into his law if he had known' (Aristotle 1984a: 1137b20-24).

state of nature. And we are able to render this comparison more precise when we recall the Thing Principle from the discussion of the original state of nature in Chapter 2:

Thing Principle: For any subject, any source of satisfaction in principle available to exercises of their will and the contingent limitations of their abilities, and no less satisfying for that, is seen as a thing.

Though, under the political form, acknowledging another as a person involves acknowledging them as free (in the above-mentioned senses), it also involves seeing them as a source of satisfaction available to exercises of the will (and thus as manifesting the Thing Principle) in the following narrow way: the respect that we can claim as a matter of right from fellow citizens is not spoiled by our so claiming it (where the act of *claiming* is understood as an exercise of the will).¹⁵⁵ This follows from the fact that the General Will 'distributes' rights based on the shared interests of all: and, in constituting the 'common good', those interests must be of the right kind to be distributed in the form of a right that one can claim. Any interest that would be spoiled in virtue of its being claimed could not, therefore, be understood as constituting the 'common good' (rendered distributively).¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁵. Of course, even in emphasizing this analogy between citizens and things, it is important to keep in mind that citizens (unlike things) do constitute limits on our willing, as we share with them mutually-recognized rights. But within the realm of relations that those rights constitute (based on our shared needs), a fellow citizen is indeed a source of satisfaction available to claims to right (just as we are to them).

¹⁵⁶. Again, the notion of a 'right' to differential consideration must be rendered carefully. The fundamental interest that partly constitutes the common good is not exactly differential consideration itself, but rather the interest of having a fair general system of differential consideration.

Moreover, there is a peculiar sense in which, under the political form, in acknowledging another as a person one relates to them as 'general', much as the *sauvage* relates to things as general: for the *sauvage*, any two qualitatively similar sources of satisfaction are equally good. (It is no loss to have one's apple snatched, so long as a qualitatively similar one is available.) This is similar to the mutual relations among citizens in that, whenever there is a question of whether another citizen is respecting one's rights (or whether one is respecting theirs) the only features of their identity relevant to that question are the ways in which they instantiate the general descriptions of the law. (For example, if a citizen claims a right to medicine that others have in excess, any two citizens meeting that general description—of having the medicine in excess—will satisfy that citizen's claim.) After all, as we have seen, in order that the law not be burdensome to any particular individual, and in order that it not favor any 'particular will' (*SC*: II. 4.9), the law that the General Will promulgates cannot 'pronounce judgment on a particular man or fact' (*SC*: II.4.6). Thus, there is a way in which, when we relate to each other as citizens, we relate to each other as nothing more than general conduits for the satisfaction of our shared fundamental interests.¹⁵⁷

As I have tried to argue, the introduction of the political form of relating to a person under the Social Contract is not an 'overcoming' of the affective form of relating to a person. For reasons given in Chapter 3, the affective form is deeply bound up with our status as social

¹⁵⁷. The very fact that the general will distributes, rather than aggregates, our shared fundamental interests into mutually-recognized rights allows for the possibility of relating to fellow citizens as such general conduits while acknowledging them as also bearing rights, and thus as also limiting our conduct (in accordance with their own fundamental interests). Thus, there is also here a disanalogy between relating to a citizen and relating to a thing; the individual presents themselves as *individual* insofar as their fundamental interests cannot be sacrificed for any purpose.

creatures, and with the idea that other persons constitute independent points of view on us. It is neither desirable nor possible for that to be 'overcome.'¹⁵⁸ Rather, the political form of relating to a person is an essential part of the egalitarian measures meant to limit the possibility that relating to another—affectively—occasions domination. And among these egalitarian measures are even, as I argued in the previous section, a fair system of widely available differential rewards. Nevertheless, for the reasons just given, the General Will structures relations among citizens in an *impersonal* way. The 'impersonality' of the political form of relating to a person has turned out to be a complex issue. But I want to close this discussion by simply noting that the two ways in which relating to others as citizens invites comparison with relating to things (their being sources of respect that one can claim, and their being general conduits for the satisfaction of fundamental interests) also show how the availability of relating to others politically constitutes relief from the anxieties characteristic of relating to others affectively: anxieties that, as we have seen, play a central role in Rousseau's explanation of domination. In relating to others *strictly* as citizens, such anxieties are no more intelligible than in our dealings with things.¹⁵⁹

5.5. The Relationship between the Political and the Affective: Some Contrasts with Kantianism

¹⁵⁸. Relatedly, Rousseau says of the passions (including *amour-propre*, thanks to which the affective form of relating to a person is made salient to us) that it is 'an enterprise as vain as it is ridiculous to want to destroy them' (*E*: 212/*OC*: 4:490-1).

¹⁵⁹. Compare with Cavell's remark that 'the idea of a duty toward others as human beings might itself be a restriction of my knowledge of their existence' (Cavell 1979: 435; cf. Buss 1999: 549).

While a legacy of Rousseau's understanding of personhood is that we must trace the relationships (including both genealogical and analogical) between an affective and a political forms of relating to a person, a characteristic tendency of some Kantian writers has been to operate with a univocal notion of 'personhood', or of seeing another as a person, across treatments of both affective and political phenomena.¹⁶⁰ Again, I think that the origin of this divergence between Rousseau and Kantianism lies in Kant's own apolitical rendering of Rousseau's political form of relating to a person: his retaining important features of that form—including our seeing other persons as free (especially in the sense relevant to what Rousseau calls 'moral freedom') and as non-fungible (as in Kant's characterization of a person's dignity as their being 'above all price', and their admitting of 'no equivalent', Kant 1997: 4:429, 4:434)—while detaching that form from the specifically political context (having to do with domination) that Rousseau assigned it. And again, I am not interested in arguing that this is by itself a flaw in

¹⁶⁰. I think this has even included broadly Kantian interpretations of Rousseau. For example, Rawls refers to Rousseau's 'conception of a person as a normative idea', which he identifies with 'our common human nature [...] and the fundamental interests and capacities appropriate to it' (Rawls 2008: 228). I of course have no problem with attributing such a conception of 'our common human nature' to Rousseau. But I do suspect that Rawls's attribution to Rousseau of a single 'normative' conception of a person informs his suggestion that non-differential political consideration (what Rawls calls 'a principle of reciprocity') could be satisfactory of *amour-propre*. (Neuhouser has convincingly argued against such an approach to *amour-propre*; Neuhouser 2008: 59-70). Again, I think we find a more subtle approach to differential consideration, and a sensitivity to the idea that non-differential consideration alone cannot be satisfying, in the early Rawls's writing on the 'social bases of self-respect' (Rawls 1971: 440-6). In *Justice as Fairness: A Restatement*, Rawls distances himself somewhat from his earlier treatment of the 'social bases of self-respect', noting that *A Theory of Justice* was ambiguous over whether self-respect is 'an attitude'. The 'social bases of self-respect' Rawls then lists are indeed 'forms of reciprocity', i.e. sources of non-differential consideration: 'the institutional fact that citizens have basic rights, and the public recognition of that fact and that everyone endorses the difference principle, itself a form of reciprocity' (Rawls 2001: 60). For the idea that Rawls's lectures on Rousseau are more aligned with his later writing, particularly *Justice as Fairness*, see Brooke 2015: 435.

Kant's approach to personhood.¹⁶¹ But I do think that once we have distinguished between the affective and political forms (as Rousseau treats them), then we are spared much of the awkwardness of those contemporary Kantian approaches to personhood that attempt to collapse affective and political phenomena into a single conception of seeing another as a person. These include contemporary Kantian accounts that begin with an affective phenomenon (such as shame, in the case of Sarah Buss's writing) in order to make intelligible the notion of Kantian respect (the respect owed to all other persons). And they include contemporary Kantian accounts that, in something of a reverse direction, begin with what we have been calling the political form (the notion of a person owed Kantian respect) in order to make intelligible an affective phenomenon (such as love, in the case of J. David Velleman's writing).

A notable shared feature of both Buss's writing on shame and Velleman's writing on love is the weight they place on Kant's identification between respect and a certain feeling, particularly a feeling associated with seeing or looking, namely reverence (Kant 1991: 6:402). Indeed, Buss and Velleman think of shame and love, respectively, as emotions through which we perceive the personhood of others. But I think that their particular way of establishing a connection between affect and Kantian respect for persons, without sufficient attention to the different senses of 'person' (for example, as a source of differential consideration) that can be at play in different contexts, is what ends up distorting these accounts' otherwise compelling insights about affective phenomena.

¹⁶¹. Again, a distinction much like Rousseau's distinction between the affective and political forms resurfaces in *The Metaphysics of Morals* (Kant 1991).

5.4.1. Buss on Shame

Sarah Buss characterizes shame as a 'natural disposition to *see* one another *as respectable*', and she says that 'shame is respect in its primitive, prereflective mode' (Buss 1999: 520, 537). In other words, for her, shame is a kind of Kantian respect, where treating others with respect is a matter of accommodating 'our ends to the ends of others' (Buss 1999: 535). The reason Buss thinks that shame has this character, as a primitive, prereflective kind of respect, is that in feeling ashamed one cannot help but appreciate that there are other evaluative perspectives besides one's own.

In becoming conscious of oneself as an object in the world, one experiences the abrupt demotion of one's self from its exalted position as the point of view from which everything in the world derives its value. [...] To experience shame is to experience oneself as *for another*; it is to 'confess' that there is more to the significance of one's activities than their significance *relative to one's personal perspective*. [...] [Shame] makes [moral] consciousness possible by making it possible to regard the evaluations of others as directly relevant to the value of one's own pursuits (Buss 1999: 525, 526, 528).¹⁶²

Moreover, Buss thinks that this way of approaching shame allows us to address a certain moral skeptic, at least about 'categorical imperatives': 'We need merely point out to the skeptic that he, too, has had an experience [namely, shame] whose content is incompatible with his skepticism' (Buss 1999: 540). For Buss, any skeptic about the legitimacy of another's claim on our respect who also feels shame before that other (and thus acknowledges 'the nonstrategic relevance of another person's evaluative judgments', Buss 1999: 536) is guilty of a kind of practical contradiction.

¹⁶². With the word 'confess', Buss is drawing on Sartre 1956: 350.

It should hardly be surprising from my discussion (in Chapter 3) of shame in connection with *amour-propre* that I find something very attractive (from a Rousseauist perspective) about Buss's account. There I argued, by drawing on moments in Rousseau's autobiographical writings in which Jean-Jacques is startled by the presence of another, or embarrassed at having his voyeurism exposed (*C*: 78-9/*OC*: 1:75-6), that when we feel ashamed the character of *amour-propre* as revealing the (affective) personhood of another is especially apparent. I also argued that what shame can reveal to us is the presence of an independent point of view on us, one that is outside of the satisfactory control of our will, and that attempts to override the 'limit' so revealed amount to bad or unhealthy *amour-propre* (and a compromise on our condition as social humans). Thus, a Rousseauist should be happy to accommodate the idea that shame makes salient to us evaluative perspectives other than our own, as well as the idea that with that come certain normative consequences.

But the immediate worry, then, should be whether that is a sufficient basis for arriving at a notion of Kantian respect. After all, the personhood that shame reveals to us is (according to the arguments of Chapter 3) affective: it is the notion of a person as a source of differential consideration. This is why the kind of consideration from another we care about when feeling ashamed is not just outside our forceful control, but also outside what we can claim as a matter of right. Moreover, there is no expectation that the acknowledgment of another involved in shame is mutual or reciprocal: that is, there is no apparent requirement (normative or otherwise) that, when feeling ashamed before another, and thereby acknowledging them as a person, they must (as a matter internal to this encounter) acknowledge oneself as a person as well. Indeed, often in shame we are made to feel 'an object', suggesting that there is indeed no incoherence, in

either party, in one's feeling ashamed before another who sees oneself as nothing but an object, a thing, or a non-person.¹⁶³ An absence of mutual acknowledgment does not render an interaction deficient as a case of shame, but may in fact be paradigmatic of shame. (Again, this does not mean that there are no normative consequences in acknowledging another as a person when feeling shame. It means only that there is nothing in shame by itself suggesting that the acknowledgment must be reciprocal.)

Furthermore, we have seen that there is available a related but different form of relating to a person, the political form, which may or may not be identified with Kantian respect, but which involves, in contrast, seeing a person as a source of non-differential consideration—which can be claimed as a matter of right, and which is indeed reciprocal. That is, in acknowledging another as a person in this different sense, there *is* a normative requirement that they acknowledge oneself as a person, in this sense, as well. (Something has gone wrong, internal to an interaction's character as an acknowledgment of rights, when that acknowledgment is only one-sided.) Therefore, if we want to capture the insight that feeling ashamed involves acknowledging another as a person, then it seems we will want to keep these forms—*affective* and *political*—separate. And we do not yet have reason to think that the political form of relating

¹⁶³. In his famous discussion of shame, which Buss in fact draws from, Sartre extensively discusses, as a feature of shame, one's being made an 'object' (Sartre 1956: 341-4). But Sartre employs a technical understanding of 'object', distinguished from 'subject'—derived from the grammatical *object* and *subject*—thereby suggesting that being made an object is a necessary feature of shame. My point above is that (in contrast with respect) non-recognition of a person does not render an interaction deficient as a case of shame. This point does not depend on the idea that being made an 'object' (in some sense other than the grammatical one) is a necessary feature of shame.

to a person, or any of its characteristic features (such as reciprocity, or the availability of consideration one can claim as a right), is at play in shame.

In some ways, this point (that the evaluative perspectives on oneself valued when feeling shame may be an insufficient basis for full Kantian respect) is little different from Buss's own avowed divergences from Kant. Thus, some of the above may be what she means in calling shame not an *unqualified* form of respect, but respect in a 'primitive, prereflective mode'. And Buss distances herself from Kant in her not wanting to ground respect in 'something impersonal', namely the impersonal reason in which all subjects participate, but in something 'irreducibly personal', namely another's point of view on ourselves and our motives (Buss 1999: 546). (In other words, Buss may not even be seeking to account for the reciprocal character of Kantian respect, if that is to be understood as bound up with 'impersonal' reason.) Nevertheless, by not distinguishing between the affective and political forms, and by supposing there is just one relevant form of relating to a person (which feeling shame makes salient to us), Buss gives the impression that her account of shame yields more (particularly, more under the label 'personhood') than it in fact does. In particular, she gives the impression that it yields a notion of respect with the 'deontic' character (of rights over oneself that others have the power to claim) we have seen as distinctive, not of the affective form that shame and other manifestations of *amour-propre* make salient, but of the political form of relating to a person. (Buss talks about 'respecting one another's rights' as a minimal response to the 'sublime' or awe-inspiring character of other persons made salient in shame, Buss 1999: 548).¹⁶⁴

¹⁶⁴. Kant's own account of grounding rights in the categorical imperative is of course considerably much complicated than this (Kant 1999: 6:205-372).

Therefore, a Rousseauist interpretation of Buss's argument would state that nothing in her account of the ends or personhood that shame reveals to us has taken us outside the realm of the affective form of relating to a person. This is not at all to say that an examination of shame has no normative upshot, or no upshot concerning how we should treat others. But the only norms we should expect from such an account are those flowing from the nature of *amour-propre*: particularly, that in manifesting healthy *amour-propre* one acknowledges the status of others as independent points of view on oneself. For Rousseau: if we want to understand what grounds the rights of others (as opposed to what makes one's conduct toward others pathological, according to one's own status as a social human)—that is, if we want to understand what gives others the power to make claims against oneself—nothing short of a *contract* between oneself and others will supply that. Though he is rarely associated with the issue of moral skepticism, Rousseau was indeed concerned to show what interest we have in obeying what he called 'principles of right'.¹⁶⁵ But his way of doing that was not to attempt to prove that those principles are somehow already primitively contained in our affective responses to others.¹⁶⁶ It was, rather, to attempt to show

¹⁶⁵. 'I shall try always to combine what right permits with what interest prescribes, so that justice and utility not be disjoined' (*SC*: I.1.1). In the Geneva Manuscript of *The Social Contract*, Rousseau aimed to show that his account of principles of right, unlike Diderot's, could address a kind of skeptic asking 'what interest I have in being just' (*G*: 3:286). For discussion, see Bertram 2004: 45-52.

¹⁶⁶. Moreover, and again in contrast with the ambitions of some Kantians (notably Korsgaard 2009), Rousseau does not attempt to show that those principles are somehow conditions constitutive of agency. Rousseau attempts to show that such principles are in our interest, insofar as avoiding 'personal dependence' and relations of domination is in our interest. This is why he aims to show how relations of domination are bad for both dominator and dominated: or how 'master and slave are mutually corrupted' (*E*: 85/*OC*: 4:311). I discuss some features of this 'mutual corruption' in Section 4.6.

that our affective responses to others (in inegalitarian conditions) generate problems, principally domination, to which only egalitarian principles of right are the solution.

5.4.2. Velleman on Love

In a series of papers, J. David Velleman has argued that love is a matter of 'vividly perceiving' another's personhood (Velleman 1999, Velleman 2008).

Iris Murdoch says that 'love is the extremely difficult realisation that something other than oneself is real'—that *someone* other than oneself is real, I would say, in the case of love for a person. A sense of wonder at the vividly perceived reality of another person is, in my view, the essence of love (Velleman 2008: 199).¹⁶⁷

Part of what that means, according to Velleman, is that love 'arrests our emotional defenses' against another person, 'leaving us emotionally vulnerable' to them (Velleman 2008: 201). Thus, in vividly perceiving another's personhood, 'our emotional defenses toward [them] have been disarmed', leaving us open to feeling toward them 'sympathy, empathy, fascination', but also 'hurt, anger, resentment, and even hate' (Velleman 1999: 361).

The audacious character of Velleman's view consists in the fact that he identifies the 'personhood' of another that we vividly perceive in love with the very same 'personhood' grounding Kantian respect:

The Kantian view is that respect is a mode of valuation that the very capacity for valuation must pay to instances of itself. My view is that love is a mode of valuation that this capacity *may* also pay to instances of itself. I regard respect and love as the required

¹⁶⁷. Velleman is quoting Murdoch 1997: 215.

minimum and optional maximum responses to one and the same value. [...] According to my hypothesis, the value to which we respond in loving a person is the same as that to which we respond in respecting him—namely, the value of his rational nature, or personhood (Velleman 1999: 366, 371).

For Velleman, this theory is attractive in its avoiding any appearance of incompatibility between love and impartial morality (especially the impartial morality of Kant's moral philosophy): love no longer appears as a partial response to other persons on the basis of values other than morality, but as a response to the very same value grounding moral respect: their being a 'rational will' (or a person). Thus, the selective character of love (that we love some persons as opposed to others) is to be accounted for not in terms of the value or personhood (under that conception of personhood) to which love is a response, but in terms of the empirically manifested qualities that serve as 'signs' of that value (Velleman 1999: 197). This has resulted in Velleman's offering deep and interesting arguments aiming to show that such empirically manifested qualities can constitute 'signs' of someone's value as a self-existing end; that what we value in love is nothing other than the person's status as a self-existing end; and that the fact that all persons are self-existing ends (that they have what Kant calls 'dignity') precludes their admitting replacements in value: 'What makes something truly irreplaceable is a value that commands appreciation for it as it is in itself, without comparison to anything else, and hence without substitutions' (Velleman 1999: 369).

Just as with Buss's treatment of shame as a way of perceiving another's personhood, I think there is something very attractive (from a Rousseauist perspective) about Velleman's treatment of the idea that there are affective responses to others (whether or not we want to call them 'love') through which we vividly perceive another's personhood. Indeed, many of

Velleman's characterizations of our 'emotional disarmament' before another person are consonant with Rousseau's treatment (discussed above in Sections 3.2 and 3.4) of the anxieties involved in *amour-propre*, particularly those involved in being the object of another's independent point of view (and thereby, according to the arguments of Chapter 3, appreciating the other's personhood more fully than otherwise). Moreover, I have argued that in valuing another as a source of differential consideration, we thereby value them as a non-fungible individual (though my argument rested on what satisfying differential consideration consists in, and not, as in Velleman's case, on the Kantian notion of the 'rational will' and its inherent dignity). Most importantly, Velleman has influenced my understanding of *amour-propre* (as involving the appreciation of another's personhood) through his development of the idea that 'the end of an action can be a person rather than an envisioned result' (Velleman 1999: 356). On such an 'object-based', as opposed to 'aim-based', model of valuing, valuing is to be understood as a response to an already-existing end (or 'object'), rather than as aiming to produce something valuable. And this is exactly how I have understood the way in which, in our being subject to *amour-propre*, we value others as independent points of view on ourselves: when we are motivated by *amour-propre* to bring about new results, it is 'for the sake' of such independent points of view. (This is why exercises of force on the mind of another, in order to satisfy *amour-*

propre, would violate the constitutive principles of that passion: it would involve bypassing exactly the 'object' for the sake of which *amour-propre* motivates us to do things.)¹⁶⁸

Nevertheless, in supposing that the personhood of another we appreciate through love is the very same as that grounding the respect we owe to others (as persons), Velleman risks rendering love as a species of respect, and thus rendering it as a 'deontic' attitude: or an attitude one can demand from another, and which the other can be blamed for withholding.¹⁶⁹ This is of course what Velleman means to deny in the above-quoted passage: in comparing respect and love, he says that they are the 'required minimum' and 'optional maximum' responses to another's personhood (Velleman 1999: 371). And it is clear enough how Velleman arrives at the idea that love is the 'maximum' response to another's personhood; the emotional disarmament before another that Velleman thinks characteristic of love indeed goes well beyond the response to another we think characteristic of respect. But it is not clear what entitles Velleman to the statement that that response is 'optional'. After all, if love is a response to the very same value as that grounding respect (which can be demanded), and if we suppose that, as an objective matter, some individual manifests that value ('personhood'), then what error is that individual making in

¹⁶⁸. Note that this means that Rousseau's social philosophy should never be understood in such simplistic terms as its aiming to promote the acknowledgment of others as (affective) persons. Rather, Rousseau's social philosophy introduces measures that render unnecessary a certain kind of dependence on particular others, where that dependence can engender violations on the conditions of acknowledging others as (affective) persons (the violations on those conditions characteristic of domination). Put another way: Rousseau's social philosophy takes for granted our valuing others as sources of differential consideration, and aims to limit the pathological manifestations of such valuing; it does not treat instances of such acknowledgment as results to be brought about.

¹⁶⁹. Here I use 'deontic attitude' in Darwall's sense: 'Unlike blame and resentment, which presuppose some authority to make claims and demands of others and hold them accountable for compliance, love is not a deontic attitude. Even in friendship, love is nothing we can claim or hold others to account for' (Darwall 2015).

demanding from another the maximal response to that value? How is it not a consequence of Velleman's theory that emotional disarmament before another's personhood is, despite our expectations, something one can be blamed (at least by that individual, when it matters to them) for withholding?

Velleman appears to be aiming at addressing this sort of worry when he accounts for the selectivity of love in terms of the fact that our emotional resources, and thus the resources allowing for emotional disarmament before others, are scarce.

One reason why we love some people rather than others is that we can see into only some of our observable fellow creatures. The human body and human behavior are imperfect expressions of personhood, and we are imperfect interpreters. [...] We are constitutionally limited in the number of people we can love; and we may have to stop short of our constitutional limits in order to enjoy the loving relationships that make for a good life (Velleman 1999: 372).

But it is hard to see how bringing up this idea (that we are imperfect in our appreciation of others' personhood, and our emotional resources are limited) is favorable to Velleman's view. This much was granted in my framing of the objection when I noted that it may be that only some are motivated to blame others for withholding their love. Thus, the objection does not require imputing to Velleman's view the consequence that it renders a 'universal right' to love, or a right that everyone has an interest in securing for all. Moreover, when we think about other scarce resources (such as clean water and adequate healthcare), their character as 'scarce' does not abrogate the idea that those denied them can, without error or unintelligibility, demand them. At most (though not always) their character as 'scarce' figures as an excusing condition when that perfectly intelligible demand cannot be met. Therefore, pointing out that there is scarcity in our

emotional resources with regard to others does not (assuming Velleman's view that love is the maximal response to the same value as respect) make love have less of a deontic structure; rather, it just makes that structure more complex, and more similar to our actual deontic relations with others (particularly those arising in an economy).

Furthermore, it would be surprising if it were only a feature of our emotional resources (awaiting only a science-fiction refueling of our currently scarce ones) that accounted for the optionality and selectivity of love, as opposed to something about the nature of love itself. Velleman accounts for that optionality and selectivity only in terms of our 'imperfection': we are imperfect in displaying personhood before others, and we are imperfect in interpreting it in others. But might that imperfection be overcome? It seems that Velleman's view is consistent with the idea that in paradise (or some kind of paradise), where our emotional resources are plentiful, love can be (intelligibly, without error) demanded from another. And (however distant such paradise might be) that indicates that something important about our affective responses to other persons, and their precluding demands, has been lost sight of here.

Rousseau's writing suggests a way of approaching these issues, and of capturing the notion of 'vividly perceiving' another's personhood, that does not force these problems on us. And again, this is because Rousseau does not condense relations of right and affective relations with others into a single conception of a person. The (affective) personhood of another made salient in our being subject to *amour-propre* is not the same as the (political) personhood with

which we stand in relations of right under the Social Contract.¹⁷⁰ Thus, there is no question of whether the acknowledgment of others as affective persons—as objects of our *amour-propre*—can ground a demand from them that we 'fully' value them as sources of differential consideration, or that we fully expose ourselves to the range of emotions concomitant with valuing them in that way. (Rather, someone who values another as a source of differential consideration, and who violates that other's status as an independent point of view, manifests unhealthy *amour-propre*, and is thereby compromised as a social human.) And I think we can account for this difference between Rousseau and Velleman in that, whereas Rousseau begins with the idea that the precluding of demands defines the affective realm—an idea that throughout informs his writing related to seeing others—Velleman begins with a prior notion of personhood (inherited from Kant) and then must thereafter account for the optionality and selectivity of love.¹⁷¹

That said, an interesting feature of Velleman's view, at least in its earlier formulation, is that it may have implicit in it a distinction much like that between the affective and political forms of relating to a person, as well as an understanding that love (in Velleman's sense) must be a response to something like the former. Thus, Velleman occasionally speaks of 'the object of love' as 'the manifest person':

¹⁷⁰. Thus, Rousseau's approach to these issues suggests an immediate answer to a question that Velleman theory faces, namely, 'What good is there in going beyond the required minimum of respect, when love puts one in touch with the very same value at play in such respect?' The affective form of relating to a person indeed puts one in touch with a value other than that at play in the political form, namely another person's character as an independent point of view on oneself.

¹⁷¹. Throughout his writings Rousseau recurs to the idea that constraint is inimical to such central areas of our emotional lives as love (*E*: 228, 349/*OC*: 4:513, 683-4), pleasure (*C*: 183-4/*OC*: 1:189-90; *E*: 316/*OC*: 4:638; *RSW*: 74-88/*OC*: 1:1050-9), and play (*E*: 148/*OC*: 4:403-4).

The immediate object of love, I would say, is the manifest person, embodied in flesh and blood and accessible to the senses. The manifest person is the one against whom we have emotional defenses, and he must disarm them, if he can, with his manifest qualities. Grasping someone's personhood intellectually may be enough to make us respect him, but unless we actually *see* a person in the human being confronting us, we won't be moved to love; and we can see the person only by seeing him in or through his empirical persona (Velleman 1999: 371).¹⁷²

Here Velleman's formulations suggest that the object of love is a *person* related to (and perhaps even spatiotemporally coextensive with) the intelligible person to which respect is a response; but it is a person in a different ('manifest', 'empirical') sense. Read this way, Velleman would no longer run the same risk of rendering love as a 'deontic' attitude. But then there is a tension in Velleman's view between (1) his attempt to show that love and respect respond to the same impartial value, and (2) his attempt to preserve love's status as 'optional'. If Velleman's formulations in the above passage push him toward (2) and away from (1), then they also push him closer to the view that I have here drawn from Rousseau's understanding of *amour-propre*. And that would make our affective relations with others 'moral' in a rather different way than Velleman set out to prove.

My objections to Buss and Velleman have rested on the idea that their accounts of our affective lives do not sufficiently distinguish between the affective and political forms of relating to a person that Rousseau consistently, even if only implicitly, differentiates. But my point is not at all that Rousseau is a dualist over a matter where Buss and Velleman (and perhaps other

¹⁷². Interestingly, these sorts of formulations ('manifest person', 'empirical persona') are absent from Velleman's later treatment of love (Velleman 2008), perhaps suggesting that Velleman was later sensitive to something like the following concerns.

contemporary Kantians) are something like monists. And Rousseau's achievement in this area is not simply that he draws a distinction. It is rather that he offers a rich account of how the political form of relating to a person emerges out of the affective form of relating to a person (and out of the problems that the latter generates in inegalitarian conditions); that he offers a rich account of their analogical relationships, and of how they both (in different ways) implicate the issue of consideration, as well as the acknowledgment of another as free and as a non-fungible individual; and that, ultimately, the affective form even forms part of the content of the political form, insofar as a right to a fair system of differential consideration is among the rights acknowledged under the Social Contract. I do not think it is too bold to expect, of some of the most compelling systematic accounts of the relationship between the affective and the political, that they will be variations on Rousseau's.

5.6. Conclusion: 'The Administration of Things'

Few philosophers have been as fortunate as Rousseau in their readers and appropriators. We can count among those who engaged directly with Rousseau—just in the century after his death—Adam Smith, Kant, Godwin, Wollstonecraft, Hegel, Shelley (both Mary and Percy Bysshe), Kierkegaard, Marx, and Engels. The last of those names has been something of an unspoken hero in this dissertation, for it was in my finding an echo of the above-discussed passage in Rousseau's *Emile* ('dependence on men would then become dependence on things again', *E*: 85/*OC*: 4:311) in Friedrich Engels's *Anti-Dühring* ('the government of persons is replaced by the administration of things', Engels 1947, Chapter 2) that I became confident of the

importance of exploring the role of the former as an organizing principle in Rousseau's thinking.¹⁷³ The full Engels passage is here:

As soon as there is no longer any social class to be held in subjection; as soon as class rule, and the individual struggle for existence based upon our present anarchy in production, with the collisions and excesses arising from these, are removed, nothing more remains to be repressed, and a special repressive force, a state, is no longer necessary. The first act by virtue of which the state really constitutes itself the representative of the whole of society—the taking possession of the means of production in the name of society—this is, at the same time, its last independent act as a state. State interference in social relations becomes, in one domain after another, superfluous, and then dies out of itself; the government of persons is replaced by the administration of things, and by the conduct of processes of production. The state is not 'abolished'. *It dies out*. This gives the measure of the value of the phrase 'a free people's state', both as to its justifiable use at times by agitators, and as to its ultimate scientific insufficiency; and also of the demands of the so-called anarchists for the abolition of the state out of hand (Engels 1947, Chapter 2).

Though Engels's book throughout bears explicit references to Rousseau, and (in great contrast with Marx's own treatments of Rousseau) insists on the latter as a precursor of historical materialism, I am now less confident that this was a deliberate allusion to *Emile* on Engels's part. (For one thing, the phrase 'the government of persons is replaced by the administration of things' was earlier spread by the followers of Saint-Simon, and so the allusion, if it was one, was at best heavily mediated.) Nevertheless, a fuller comparison between Rousseau and Engels would raise important issues that I have not been able to touch on here: for example, the extent to which

¹⁷³. Engels later gave the phrase even wider currency in his popular pamphlet *Socialism: Utopianism and Scientific* (Engels 1978b: 713).

Rousseau also understood popular sovereignty, or a society of the General Will, as requiring movement away from administration 'by persons'.¹⁷⁴

But this comparison would also raise questions about technology, as what Engels is describing here (in contrast with anything Rousseau wrote) are the democratizing effects of a level of technological development thanks to which the state's repressive forces (which, at the stage Engels is describing, have been seized by the proletariat) are unnecessary. And so a government by persons gives way to administration via technology.

Indeed, I imagine that quite a few people would be surprised that, in a dissertation on Rousseau's treatment of our dependence on persons and our dependence on things, I have nowhere addressed his views on technology, or on our dependence on it. I largely avoided the topic because for most of the time writing this dissertation I did not see its relevance for those parts of Rousseau's psychological and social theory that most interested me; also, for most of that time, I associated any emphasis on that topic with readings of Rousseau as a primitivist or Luddite—readings of Rousseau that had no attraction for me. But now I somewhat regret deemphasizing this topic, and I wonder what the results would have been had I been more attentive to it, for example, in my reading of Rousseau on nascent society, on the rise of private property, and on the forms of domination that it engenders.

¹⁷⁴. That there is an extent to which Rousseau may be committed to such a view has been argued for by Andrew Levine (Levine 1987: 25-84). Especially relevant here is Rousseau's characterizing a democratic government as one in which Prince and Sovereign 'being nothing but the same person, form, so to speak, nothing but a Government without a Government' (*SC*: III. 4.1.). Rousseau describes this as a 'perfect' Government, but thereby one 'not suited to men' and their vices (*SC*: III.4.8).

My reason for saying that is not exactly because I now can no longer share Engels's optimism about the democratizing effects of technological development (though I do think such optimism made much more sense during his time than presently).¹⁷⁵ And it is not exactly because I share Rousseau's pessimism (if that is indeed his attitude toward technology—an attribution that in any case risks anachronism). Rather, I have come to think that the notion of a citizen, with which I have spent so much time in this chapter, has revealed itself to be very brittle when placed under pressure from various new kinds of technological administration, especially by private corporations (but throughout abetted by the state). That is, there is good reason to think that the state *is* presently withering away, and that the repressive forces replacing it are those of the likes of Apple and Uber. (And with this, 'the citizen' has given way to 'the customer'.)¹⁷⁶ But what is especially alarming is that some of the most vocal opposition—or rather, merely ostensible opposition—to these developments, especially apparent lately in the United States, have come from the side of racist nationalism, and a correspondingly racist understanding of a 'citizen'.

I end this dissertation on persons and things by saying that I think there is a very big problem here.

¹⁷⁵. Or rather, any basis for technological optimism today is very different than in Engels's time. For the prediction that digital technology will be a kind of 'agent' of the overthrow of capitalism, see Mason 2015.

¹⁷⁶. 'The political strategy behind ride-sharing lies in pitting the figure of the consumer against the figure of the citizen' (Saval and Tortorici 2017). 'In understanding [Apple's refusal to help the FBI crack iPhone encryption] as a form of protective noblesse oblige, Apple customers revealed nothing so much as their willingness to become customer-subjects of Apple Nation™' (Osterweil 2017).

Introduction to Appendixes

The following two essays build further upon the 'affective' form of relating to a person treated in the foregoing chapters, while also connecting that form to further political topics. Both essays discuss the often-debilitating consequences of our being the object of another person's independent point of view, and of how the consideration we value in others is outside of our willful control (at least if it is to be satisfactory).

The first essay, 'Speech, Recognition, and the Insult in Not Being Believed: Rousseau and Adam Smith', examines some of those consequences as they bear on speech, and in particular speech in its 'illocutionary' dimension. In it I show that both Rousseau and Adam Smith examine ways in which, in speaking with others, we depend on others for recognition, and how insult is the characteristic response to the denial of that recognition. I argue that, for Smith, such a denial of recognition, like that involved in ingratitude, cannot be a matter of 'injustice', though we ourselves might want to locate other normative vocabulary to criticize conditions where individuals are systematically disbelieved. I also argue that, though Smith focuses on individual

psychological maneuvers for coping with being disbelieved, Rousseau offers a number of collective political proposals in order to limit the social significance of that phenomenon (and to limit the social significance of being dependent on 'capricious minds').

The second essay, 'Spectators and Giants in Rousseau and Víctor Erice', presents 'readings' of two films by the Spanish filmmaker Erice, one of which, *The Spirit of the Beehive* (*El espíritu de la colmena*), takes up (I claim) the question of what it is to be the object of another's point of view, and how that might be characterized as feeling oneself before a 'Giant'. It is a film about the beginning of the Franco regime, made in the waning years of that regime, and thereby establishes symbolic connections between a child's achievement of personal sovereignty and the precarious sovereignty of a people. Just as Rousseau has been remarkably fortunate in his philosophical admirers, he has also been remarkably fortunate in the filmmakers who have made informed references to him: including John Berger and Alain Tanner (*Jonah Who Will Be 25 in the Year 2000*), Jean-Luc Godard (*Le gai savoir*), Chris Marker (*Sans soleil*), Matías Piñeiro (*The Stolen Man*), Alain Resnais (*La vie est un roman*), Éric Rohmer (*La collectionneuse*), and Andrei Tarkovksy (*The Mirror*). But if Rousseau's spirit fully permeates any filmmaker's work, it is Erice's, even if his films (unlike these others) never mention Rousseau once.

A feature uniting these two essays is the significance that Rousseau's *Essay on the Origin of Languages* plays in each. This brings to mind just how under-explored that text remains in English-speaking philosophy, and just how rich it is in suggestions about the affective component of seeing another as a person.

Appendix 1. Speech, Recognition, and the Insult in Not Being Believed: Rousseau and Adam Smith

A1.1. Introduction

Telling someone something involves a kind of dependence on them. Specifically, it involves a dependence on their capacity for recognition. This dependence is perhaps most apparent when that recognition is not forthcoming: when we are insulted at not being believed. A concern for the connections between speech, recognition, and dependence on others (made apparent in cases of being insulted) in fact has a deep philosophical history. And among the central figures in that history are two philosophers closely associated with the idea that among our distinguishing traits as social creatures is that we are subject to a desire for recognition from others: Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who calls this desire *amour-propre*; and Adam Smith, whose *Theory of Moral Sentiments* is principally concerned with our desire for the sympathy of others,

and more specifically what he calls the 'approbation' of others. Consequently, I am here interested in presenting what are, to my mind, under-explored moments in these philosophers' writings in which they discuss speech, and particularly testimony, as manifestations of this desire for others' recognition.¹⁷⁷ As we will see, reading Rousseau and Smith together on these topics can not only help to illuminate what is distinctive about the insult in not being believed, and how that insult is revelatory of the nature of illocutionary acts such as telling; it can also help to locate what sort of role in our vocabulary of normative and social criticism recent talk of 'testimonial injustice' should play.¹⁷⁸

I will begin by summarizing Rousseau's understanding of *amour-propre*, and especially the way in which, as I read Rousseau, desiring another's recognition involves acknowledging that other in their aspect as a free being. I will then turn to Rousseau's fullest exploration of speech, the *Essay on the Origin of Languages*, and Rousseau's characterization of vocal speech as an expression of our passional or affective natures. I will argue that in this essay Rousseau is gesturing at the way in which speech, and especially what we would today call the illocutionary dimension of speech, involves desiring the recognition of an audience. (In a normal case of testimony, the speaker desires that the audience notice that they are telling them something, and also desires that the audience accept their testimony.) Since the characteristic response to the thwarting of *amour-propre* is insult, this understanding of Rousseau should put in context the feeling of insult appropriate upon having one's speech act rejected.

¹⁷⁷. Some other connections between Rousseau and Smith on the desire for recognition from others have already been noted by Frederick Neuhouser (Neuhouser 2008: 230-1, 248, 263).

¹⁷⁸. Recent contributions to the topic of 'testimonial injustice' have included the work of Miranda Fricker (Fricker 2007: 9-29) and Jeremy Wanderer (Wanderer 2012).

But I also want to draw our attention to some ways in which having one's speech act rejected is different from other instances of having one's *amour-propre* thwarted: for example, when one is denied the love that one seeks. In addressing an audience, we expect that the audience owes us a response; and when the expected response is not forthcoming, it is easier to see ourselves as wronged, or as subject to an injustice, than, say, when our love has not been reciprocated. And I think it is observations of this sort that motivate Adam Smith, whose *Theory of Moral Sentiments* was likely influenced by Rousseau,¹⁷⁹ to explore responses, such as gratitude, that we can think of ourselves as *owed*, especially in the context of our addressing a second person, but whose satisfactoriness consists in its being an expression of the other's freedom: that is, in its not being forced. And I will argue that this character of second-personal exchanges can account for the peculiar frustration of a speaker whose testimony has been rejected, and that it can account for Smith's interest in questions about testimony, particularly his assertion, toward the end of the last edition of *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, that 'It is always mortifying not to be believed' (Smith 1976:VII.iv.26; henceforth abbreviated '*TMS*').¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁹. Smith wrote the first English review of Rousseau's *Discourse on the Origins of Inequality* (Rousseau *DI*: 111-222/*OC*: 3:111-223) in his 'Letter to the Authors of the Edinburgh Review' (Smith 1980: 242-54). Recent work on Smith's engagement with Rousseau include that of István Hont (Hont 2015), Charles Griswold (Griswold 2010, 2018), and Dennis Rasmussen (Rasmussen 2008).

¹⁸⁰. Though Smith does not himself make this explicit, any discussion of the 'insult' or 'mortification' in not being believed should presuppose a context of testimony about ordinary factual matters that the speaker can be expected to know about. Therefore, I am not here considering contexts such as argument or debate in which the speaker might make assertions without aiming for others' belief in those assertions, and in which other kinds of insult (such as the insult in not being listened to or paid attention to) are nevertheless possible. For discussion of such other contexts of assertion, including those in which the 'convincingness of what is said [...] need not depend at all on the assumption that the speaker himself believes what he is saying', see Moran 2005b: 343-7.

For reasons I will give below, Smith would be resistant to talk of 'injustice' in this context. But this way of looking at the insult in not being believed better allows us to comprehend the specific kind of humiliation involved when someone is (persistently, or for systematic reasons) disbelieved on the basis of their social status. I will close by noting some ways in which Rousseau's egalitarian political prescriptions can be understood as having the effect of limiting the social significance of that humiliation, or at least of limiting the social significance of our being dependent on another's capricious judgment about our trustworthiness.

A1.2. Rousseau on *Amour-Propre*

As early as in the *Discourse on the Origins of Inequality* (or Second Discourse), Rousseau distinguishes between two kinds of self-love: *amour de soi*, or the desire for self-preservation, and *amour-propre*, or the desire for recognition from others. And in that work Rousseau characterizes our being subject to *amour-propre* as among the traits that mark us out, among the animals, as specifically social creatures. While the solitary *sauvage* of the Second Discourse had no concern but his own self-preservation,¹⁸¹ it is with the emergence of what Rousseau calls 'nascent society', and with it the first appearance of *amour-propre*, that we first came to care what others think of us, how they take us, and what standing we have in their eyes (*DI*: 167, 172/*OC*: 3:170, 176).

¹⁸¹. Throughout I will follow Rousseau in referring to the *sauvage* using masculine pronouns. I also use the French '*sauvage*' since the English 'savage' does not capture the full range of connotations it is reasonable to think Rousseau is drawing on: including not only cruelty and primitiveness but also solitariness and asociality (Littré 1873-74).

And I think we can better understand the way in which being subject to *amour-propre* distinguishes us as social, at least among those creatures also concerned with their own self-preservation, once we appreciate how being subject to this passion requires acknowledging others as free beings (and in ways that being subject to *amour de soi* does not). For the *sauvage*, all forms of satisfaction were 'ready to hand', not just in that he enjoyed abundant resources, but also in that he was subject to no desire that no could not satisfied, at least in principle, through exercises of his will (*DI*: 143/*OC*: 3:144). The food and shelter he sought as means to his self-preservation could be had, at least in principle, through taking the right, and sufficiently forceful, steps toward it. Even if as a matter of fact there was no food available to the *sauvage*, there is nothing in the nature of food such that he could not get it, and be satisfied by it, through force. Moreover, since the *sauvage* related to others of his own kind principally as means to his own self-preservation, his relations to them were less-than-fully social: he saw them as he saw any other objects of *amour de soi*, as sources of satisfaction available to the will.

But with the rise of nascent society, and the appearance of *amour-propre*, everything changes (Rousseau *DI*: 165-7/*OC*: 3:170-2). And this is because, in being subject to *amour-propre*, one thereby sees others as sources of a kind of satisfaction (that is, recognition) whose satisfactoriness depends on its being unforced, on its being left up to the other person. Familiarly, love brought about by pill or potion is not satisfying, and neither is any kind of recognition that is forced or extracted. Thus, in desiring recognition from another, one thereby acknowledges that other as more than an instrument for one's self-preservation, but also as a free being. Of course, recognition as, say, the best singer or dancer may bring about residual benefits, among them the objects of *amour de soi*, such as greater access to food and shelter. But one of Rousseau's

characteristic insights is that recognition is something we may desire for its own sake, independent of these benefits: something familiar from the insult we feel upon being denied the recognition we seek.¹⁸²

Indeed, one of Rousseau's philosophical achievements is his making vivid the categorical difference between the frustrations we feel when *amour-propre* is thwarted and those we feel upon being denied food, shelter, and other non-positional goods. Exactly because denied recognition may reflect something about oneself, or another's judgment about oneself, it may be the appropriate object of insult or resentment, and in a way that the frustrations of hunger (unless brought about by another's spite or contempt) would not.¹⁸³ Moreover, insult of this sort is frustrating because it cannot be corrected, either by force or by claiming a right against it. Even supposing one could force another to appreciate one's talents, the satisfactoriness of that recognition would be spoiled in one's knowing that it had been brought about by force, including claims to right. Thus, it is in this sense that feeling insulted at the denial of recognition involves acknowledging the freedom of another (specifically, the other whose recognition one seeks).

A1.3. Amour-Propre and the Origins of Vocal Speech

I now want to turn to Rousseau's *Essay on the Origin of Languages*, and to how in that work Rousseau can be read as exploring the intersubjective dimension of speech, and in

¹⁸². Neuhouser argues that 'having *amour-propre* means that we value the favorable opinion of others as a non-instrumental good' (Neuhouser 2008: 35).

¹⁸³. Similarly, Niko Kolodny says of this contrast between *amour-propre* and *amour de soi*, 'The sort of dissatisfaction that one feels when brute nature resists the satisfaction of one's Preservative *Amour de Soi* [...] lacks this interpersonal or communicative register. It is mere anxiety and pain, which finds no expression in demands or objections [...]' (Kolodny 2010: 175).

particular the ways in which speaking to another is necessarily a manifestation of *amour-propre*. Like many philosophers, Rousseau thinks that speech distinguishes us from the other animals (*EO*: 248/*OC*: 5:375). Since he also thinks that what distinguishes us as specifically social creatures is our being subject to *amour-propre*, that would be reason enough to explore the connections between speech and the desire for recognition from others. And indeed, Rousseau seems to think of the historical development of vocal speech as motivated by more than physical needs (that is, our being subject to *amour de soi*) but also by the desire to communicate our passions to others. As he says in the *Essay*, '[...N]eeds dictated the first gestures and the passions wrung the first voices' (*EO*: 252/*OC*: 5:380).

Of course, that bare description of speech, as a vehicle for communicating passions, does not yet distinguish human speech from the passionate cries of non-human animals. But Rousseau makes explicit that such animal cries, say of pain or pleasure, do not involve anything like the acknowledgement of their audiences as free beings that we have seen as characteristic of human social relations, and of humans' being subject to *amour-propre*. Even in crying out to another of his kind, according to Rousseau, a non-human animal sees that other as little more than an instrument for its own self-preservation: for example, as a source of relief from its pain (something that need not engage the freedom of the hearer, and may even be brought about mechanically). In contrast, in describing the earliest manifestations of human vocal speech, Rousseau characterizes a speaker as seeking not just any response from her audience, and not just any response for which speaking is an incidental means, but specifically recognition of

herself as a speaker, and by the audience in his capacity for understanding.¹⁸⁴ Among other things, Rousseau says that the 'primary aim' of the first manifestations of vocal speech was to communicate passions 'to the ear as well as to the understanding'; and that in such speech passion seeks 'to communicate itself' (*EO*: 255/*OC*: 5:383).

I want to suggest that here Rousseau is describing moments of address familiar in directed speech, and especially speech in what we today call its illocutionary dimension. Speech acts such as telling and promising seek another's recognition in at least two respects: what I want to call *notice* and *acceptance*. First, in telling someone something, or in making a promise, one seeks the audience's notice of oneself as addressing her, and in particular notice that one's address has the specific illocutionary character (as testimony, as a promise) that it has. Second, such speech acts seek *acceptance*, and in particular those responses from the speaker (being believed, having one's promise accepted) that these acts have as their constitutive aims. If one is telling someone something, in a full-blooded sense of 'telling', one aims to be believed.

Twentieth-century philosophers such as Elizabeth Anscombe and J.L. Austin have noted that there is a distinctive insult involved in not being believed.¹⁸⁵ And more recently the philosopher Jeremy Wanderer has distinguished between having one's testimony ignored (or gone unnoticed) and having one's testimony rejected, and Wanderer has argued that there is a distinctive connection between rejection, in this sense, and insult (Wanderer 2012). Rousseau is

¹⁸⁴. Here, for clarity, I use feminine pronouns to refer to the speaker and masculine pronouns to refer to the audience.

¹⁸⁵. Anscombe says, 'It is an insult and may be an injury not to be believed. At least it is an insult if one is oneself made aware of the refusal, and it may be an injury if others are' (Anscombe 1979b: 150). And Austin says, 'If I have said I know or I promise, you insult me in a special way by refusing to accept it' (Austin 1979: 100).

less-than-fully attentive to these distinctions, and for reasons that, as I will suggest in a moment, may account for Adam Smith's somewhat more complicated elaboration on matters of speech. But for now I want to note that, if directed speech (and in particular illocutionary address) should be understood as somehow, in its nature, risking the insult of rejection, then that should help to specify the sense in which Rousseau understands human vocal speech (as opposed to the cries of the other animals) as passionate.

That is, such speech is passionate not just in the sense that it involves the communication of passions to others, but also in that it is itself the manifestation of a peculiarly human passion: *amour-propre*, or the desire for recognition from others. And this emerges when we see that, in telling someone something or in making a promise to another, one seeks a response (and in particular, acceptance of one's word) that is essentially an expression of the audience's dimension as a free being. Even if one could force another to believe oneself, or to accept one's promise, one would nevertheless feel dissatisfied at having to resort to force in order to bring about a response (another's acceptance of one's word) that ought to be free. And even if such force brought about the residual benefits of having one's word accepted, it would hardly make up for the insult appropriate upon seeing that the audience's unforced acceptance of one's word is not forthcoming.

A1.4. Adam Smith and Mortification

As exciting as we might find Rousseau's understanding of the role in speech of the desire for recognition from others, there is also something disappointing about it, or at least as presented here. In the way that I have presented things so far, the insult in not being believed (or

in having one's promise rejected) may be little different from those feelings of insult appropriate upon any other thwarting of one's *amour-propre*: say, learning that another holds a low opinion of oneself, or (perhaps) coming to understand that another will not reciprocate one's love. But the nature of testimony and promising as forms of address make their rejection, and the insult appropriate upon their rejection, manifestly unlike these cases.

This may become clearer when we consider the contrast between having one's testimony rejected and coming to learn that another person, whose opinion of oneself one cares about, thinks of oneself as unreliable or insincere: for example, through hearsay or through reading this in their diary. Even if we grant that a feeling of insult may be appropriate in the latter instance, it seems to lack the distinctive character of insult appropriate upon *active* rejection that we see in former. The insult appropriate in the former instance is that frustration familiar from learning that one is not thought of as well as one would like to be; that in the latter is the frustration familiar from having one's claim upon another person actively rejected.

If Rousseau's writing on *amour-propre* does not sufficiently make this distinction between forms of insult, a striking feature of Adam Smith's *Theory of Moral Sentiments* is its attention to a distinction much like this one, and particularly as it arises in directed speech. Toward the end of the last edition of *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Smith presents a discussion of what he calls 'rules of veracity', and in the course of which he asserts, 'It is always mortifying not to be believed, and it is doubly so when we suspect that it is because we are

supposed to be unworthy of belief and capable of seriously and willfully deceiving' (*TMS*: VII.iv.24).¹⁸⁶

To be fair, in this discussion of Smith's, considered very locally, there is little attention to the distinctive insult (or 'mortification') involved in having one's testimony actively rejected. Thus, Smith accounts for this mortification in terms of an insult to one's standing very much like any other instance of being thought badly along some dimension one cares about: in this instance, one is mortified at being thought unreliable or insincere. Therefore, other than Smith's specific emphasis on our desire to be believed, and as what he calls 'the instinct upon which is founded the faculty of speech', there is little, it seems, to distinguish Smith's discussion from Rousseau's treatment of vocal speech as a manifestation of the desire for recognition from others. In neither case, it appears, is there much sensitivity to the idea that there is a distinctive insult in having one's testimony rejected.

But things look very different when we bring this discussion together with Smith's treatment of the nature of gratitude (earlier in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*). And here it is important to note that gratitude invites comparison with the responses sought in illocutionary acts, such as telling and promising, in that it is necessarily a response to a kind of directed

¹⁸⁶. An important background for any Scottish Enlightenment discussion of testimony, including Smith's, would have been the debate, initiated by David Hume's essay 'Of miracles' (Hume 2000, 10.1-41: 83-99) over the justification for believing in miracles on the basis of testimony. Both Hume's 1748 essay and George Campbell's 1763 response to it (Campbell 1827) preceded the last edition of *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1790). I am here in effect arguing that Smith's distinctive contribution to Scottish Enlightenment discussions of testimony was to bring out its intersubjective character, which was largely absent from Hume's and Campbell's discussions, and which is made apparent in his treatment of the 'mortification' in not being believed. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for bringing to my attention the importance of this larger context for Smith's discussion.

address: paradigmatically, the giving of a gift. No matter how well one may think of someone, one cannot manifest gratitude toward that person unless they have done something *to* one.¹⁸⁷ Moreover, in overtly giving a gift to someone, one expects an expression of gratitude, and one is insulted when such an expression is not forthcoming. (It is easy to see this as a kind of rejection, even if it need not involve the overt return of the gift.) At the same time, there is something paradoxical about the familiar idea that one is *owed* another's gratitude. After all, what we normally take ourselves to be owed, such as a monetary debt, is something that can be forced or extracted from another, including by claiming a right to it, without spoiling its satisfactoriness. But another's gratitude is unsatisfactory unless it is unforced—indeed, unless it is, in a sense, *gratuitous*—in just the way that we have seen as characteristic of satisfactory recognition.

Smith captures some of these points—and in particular, the equivocal nature of gratitude as something one is owed and as something that, to be satisfactory, must be an expression of freedom—by suggesting that it occupies a kind of 'middle ground' between observations of 'justice', which can be forced, including through claims to right, and acts of 'beneficence', which cannot. While 'Even the most ordinary degree of kindness or beneficence [cannot] be extorted by force' (*TMS*: II.ii.2.7), according to Smith, justice is that virtue 'of which the observance is not left to the freedom of our wills', and whose violation is 'the proper object of resentment, and of punishment' (*TMS*: II.ii.1.4). But Smith adds that among the so-called 'duties of beneficence', whose observation cannot be extracted, those of gratitude are in a sense 'less free' than those of

¹⁸⁷. Cf. Haakonssen 1989: 63. Despite this, according to Smith, someone other than the recipient of the gift or assistance might take an 'indirect sympathy' in the latter's gratitude (*TMS* II.i.5.2). Such an 'indirect' or 'spectator's' sympathy is, according to D.D. Raphael, 'a perception that, if he were in [that person's] situation and were helped, he would have the same feeling of gratitude' (Raphael 1985: 30).

friendship, generosity, and charity, and exactly because gratitude is the sort of response we can see ourselves as owed. Smith says, 'We talk of the debt of gratitude, not of charity or generosity, nor even of friendship', at least when friendship has not been 'complicated with gratitude for good offices' (*TMS*: II.ii.1.3).¹⁸⁸

I want to insist that Smith's attention to responses (in this case, gratitude) that we can be seen as *owed*, while at the same time expecting them to be manifestations of the other's freedom, can help illuminate his later discussion of the 'mortification' in not being believed, and why there is a distinctive insult in having one's word rejected. And this requires seeing how in testimony one makes a claim upon another person, and in a way that invites comparison with the claims characteristic of 'justice' in Smith's sense: in particular, when, citing the requirements of justice, one makes a claim upon another person that they behave toward one, or refrain from behaving toward one, in a certain way (at risk of punishment or some sufficiently strong affront).

What these interactions (testimony, claiming a right) share are features characteristic of second-personal address.¹⁸⁹ When another recognizes that one is making such a claim of right upon them, the possibilities of ignoring that address, or letting it go unnoticed, are no longer available to the audience. Upon recognizing the nature of the address, the audience must either

¹⁸⁸. That gratitude is a gratuitous response we can nevertheless see ourselves as owed is among the issues taken up in Georg Simmel's essay 'Faithfulness and Gratitude' (Simmel 1950). Indeed, it would be fruitful, I expect, to compare Smith and Simmel on gratitude more fully elsewhere. Note that for Smith another respect in which gratitude occupies a 'middle ground' between justice and beneficence is that its characteristic 'rules' are both less determinate than those of justice and more determinate than those of beneficence and friendship. (See *TMS* III.6.9 and Griswold 1999: 193).

¹⁸⁹. The notion of second-personal address is important to the work of Stephen Darwall (Darwall 2006). That the notion has some application to testimony has been explored by Benjamin McMyler (McMyler 2011), Jeremy Wanderer (Wanderer 2012), and Richard Moran (Moran 2013).

accept the speaker's claim (and follow through on the requested behavior) or reject it. Indeed, the audience can try to ignore the speaker's claim, but, in the context of the address, to ignore the claim *is* to reject it. And this point can help to account not only for the sense in which one can be 'owed' certain responses in the context of an address, but also for the distinctive insult involved in, say, not being believed. Again, this insult is categorically different from that involved in (merely) meeting another's disapproval, and exactly because of its appearance in the context of an address: that insult inheres not (only) in one's being thought of in lesser terms than one would like, but also in the audience's having rejected one's claim upon them.

At the same time, testimony is unlike a claim to right in that what the speaker seeks is a manifestation of the audience's freedom. In discussing gratitude, Smith captures this point, about the essentially free nature of certain responses from others, in somewhat different terms than Rousseau does. As I have presented Rousseau's views, another's recognition of oneself is satisfactory only to the extent that it is unforced. According to Smith, it would be improper, or bring dishonour upon oneself, to extract another's gratitude by force.¹⁹⁰ But on either understanding of the freedom we seek in these responses, the recognition of oneself involved in being believed, is, despite the sense in which one may be 'owed' such recognition, nevertheless up to the audience, and outside one's powers of extraction. And this point may further account for the distinctive insult (and indeed, when it is on the basis of one's gender, race, class, gender or sexual identity, disability, or other social status, the *humiliation*) in not being believed. If the recognition involved in being believed is unlike those responses one can claim as a matter of right, in that it cannot be extracted, then that only underscores the humiliation, and sense of

¹⁹⁰. Most importantly for Smith, it would bring upon the disapproval of the impartial spectator.

powerlessness, of those who are (persistently, and for systematic reasons) disbelieved, especially when the audience is (persistently, and for systematic reasons) unresponsive to their powers of persuasion.

A1.5. Concluding Remarks: Political Consequences

There is a way in which this last point can be taken as an expression of skepticism about the idea of epistemic or testimonial injustice (as it has emerged in recent philosophy), and I want to try to avert that way of taking what I am saying. Smith's understanding of justice, as what can be extracted by force, may be an overly narrow one, and it should not preclude other understandings of the word 'justice', including ones more appropriate to the idea of epistemic injustice, as it has been elaborated on, mostly notably, in Miranda Fricker's recent work (Fricker 2007).¹⁹¹ And even if we do want to maintain an association between justice and what can be extracted by force, that should not preclude our using other terms of normative criticism to characterize a society in which people of a certain status are systemically disbelieved: including vocabulary of humiliation, objectification, dehumanization, and social pathology.

In any case, my concern so far, in turning to two philosophers (Rousseau and Adam Smith) well-known for their writing on the desire for recognition from others, has been to use the idea of such a desire, and its conditions for satisfaction, to illuminate what is distinctive about the insult in not being believed. If a consequence of this discussion has been that a narrow sense of 'justice' is inapplicable to understandings of that insult, another consequence (I hope) is that

¹⁹¹. Michelle A. Schwarze and John Scott have recently discussed Smith's narrow use of the term 'justice' in comparison with broader uses (Schwarze and Scott 2015: 469-472).

nothing short of a concern for the systematic nature of the humiliation of not being believed (on the basis of one's status) will address that social ill.

As it happens, a concern with the systematic nature of such humiliation may take us deeper into Rousseau's positive political philosophy, and its emphasis on equality, than I have so far been able to do here. And there is an important contrast between the sorts of positive prescriptions that Smith offers, at least as they bear directly on the humiliation in not being believed, and those we can attribute to Rousseau. For Smith is especially vivid in his depictions of the psychological toll that not being believed can incur on the falsely accused in criminal cases. As he says of the innocent man, 'brought to the scaffold by the false imputation of an infamous or odious crime':

He is struck with horror at the thoughts of the infamy which the punishment may shed upon his memory, and foresees, with the most exquisite anguish, that he is hereafter to be remembered by his dearest friends and relations, not with regret and affection, but with shame, and even with horror for his supposed disgraceful conduct: and the shades of death appear to close round him with a darker and more melancholy gloom than naturally belongs to them (*TMS* III.2.11).

Like elsewhere in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Smith is clear about the extent to which our well-being depends upon our not being thought badly by others, even independently of the consequences of our being so regarded: the falsely accused feels a peculiar shame apparently separate from the prospective fear of punishment. Also, consummate with that book's tendency to emphasize individual psychological maneuvers over collective political prescriptions, Smith recurs to the idea that whatever consolation the falsely accused may enjoy consists in the

exculpation, or approval, of an internalized 'other': the impartial spectator, who knows that the accused has done no wrong, or 'Those vicegerents of God within us [who] always reward obedience with tranquility of mind, with content, and self-satisfaction' (*TMS* III.5.6). (It is therefore not surprising that Smith suggests, in the case of someone permanently pinned to a false accusation, 'Religion can alone afford them any effectual comfort' [*TMS* III.2.12].)

And this is where Rousseau's positive prescriptions constitute an important contrast with Smith's. As it happens, Rousseau is not unconcerned with individual psychological manoeuvres for addressing one's own humiliation, or one's being falsely accused. (These concerns are most prominent in Rousseau's autobiographical writings, and especially in the expressions of his late-life attempts to achieve solace in the face of accusations and humiliation.)¹⁹² But, even when Rousseau's positive political prescriptions do not bear directly on criminal cases, they are nevertheless, in contrast with what Smith offers, *political*: they aim at general and collective solutions, including ones with the consequence of limiting the significance of not being believed, and of being falsely accused, in our lives.¹⁹³ For Rousseau, one of the central aims of the social

¹⁹². These include Rousseau's suggesting, at the beginning of *The Reveries of the Solitary Walker*, that by submitting to the fate of his humiliation, he is free from the disappointments of hoping for a relief from it (*RSW*: 2-3/*OC*: 1:996-7). They also include his entertaining the thought that his insulters 'were nothing more than automatons' (*RSW*: 114/*OC*: 1:1078).

¹⁹³. Darwall argues that for Smith there is an egalitarian structure immanent in ordinary moral accountability (Darwall 1999). But this is very different from the sort of egalitarianism we find in Rousseau's positive political prescriptions, and especially different from the material egalitarianism that Rousseau advocates: including both the limiting of inequalities in wealth and the alienation of private property to the community so that it can be distributed according to human need (*SC*: I.9, II.11.2). Indeed, we might think that it is exactly because Rousseau cannot find that sort of egalitarian structure in ordinary moral accountability (that Smith does) that he advocates egalitarianism as a specifically political program. (Rousseau thinks that ordinary moral accountability favors the wealthy; *DPE*: 31-2/*OC*: 3:272-3). For differences, and occasional commonalities, between Smith's and Rousseau's attitudes toward material inequality, see Colletti 1972: 155-63.

contract, and a consequence of the kinds of equality it introduces, is to eliminate unneeded forms of dependence on particular individuals: 'so that every Citizen be perfectly independent of all the others, and excessively dependent on the City' and its laws (*SC*: II.12.3). Indeed, as Frederick Neuhouser characterizes Rousseau's view, the law in an egalitarian republic 'protects individuals from capricious wills' (Neuhouser 1993: 389). But we should also understand such a law as aiming to protect individuals from capricious *minds*: that is, it aims to protect individuals from being in circumstances in which their livelihoods are overly dependent on another's judgment, including whenever it is a question of their being believed.

Neuhouser, in his reading of Rousseau, understands the social contract as 'restructuring dependence' both in the formal equality that it introduces (that all citizens are equal under the law) and in the material equality that it introduces (that 'no citizen [be] so poor that he is compelled to sell himself' [*SC*: II.11.2]) (Neuhouser 1993: 388-90). Of course, Rousseau is not so utopian as to think that political measures could eliminate all pathological forms of dependence on others, and neither should we attribute to him the expectation that the social contract would eliminate every pathological form of dependence (for example, individual instances of blackmail or coercion) in which dependence on another person's judgment of one's trustworthiness plays some role. Rather, I want to close by noting how both kinds of equality (formal and material) can be understood as limiting the social significance of the phenomenon of not being believed, and especially the phenomenon of not being believed on the basis of one's social status.

First, in the case of the formal equality that the social contract introduces: since, for Rousseau, the law applies to all citizens and makes no exceptions among them,¹⁹⁴ the applicability of the law to a particular citizen should not depend on any other individual's perception of their trustworthiness. Even in cases when someone is falsely accused of a crime, the formal equality of the law helps to protect them from extralegal proceedings (that is, ideally, proceedings other than what all citizens would consent to, knowing their own susceptibility to false accusation). And it helps to protect them from what an individual may capriciously will based on their judgment of the trustworthiness of the accused (specifically, it helps to protect against cases of vigilante justice).

Second, in the case of the material equality that the social contract introduces: because the social contract aims to supply for the subsistence of all so that no one will be forced to sell themselves (and thereby be subject to the capricious will of a master),¹⁹⁵ no one's capacity for subsistence should, likewise, depend on any other individual's perception of their trustworthiness. Thus, the social contract will protect one's capacity for subsistence even when perceptions of untrustworthiness, including those occasioned by one's social status, prevent one from securing employment.

I will not here attempt to improve upon those commentators on Rousseau who have linked these political considerations to the issue of recognition: that is, those who have written on

¹⁹⁴. For example, Rousseau says that the general will must 'issue from all in order to apply to all' (*SC*: II.4.5); also, 'Every condition imposed on each by all cannot be onerous to anyone, and the worst of Laws is worth even more than the best master; for every master has preferences, and the Law never has any' (*LWM*: 261/*OC*: 3:843).

¹⁹⁵. This is part of what Rousseau means he says that 'to provide for the public needs is a clear consequence of the general will, and [one of] the essential [duties] of government' (*DPE*: 23/*OC*: 3:262). Cf. Neuhaus 1993: 389.

how these political measures are necessitated by the peculiar kinds of dependence wrought by *amour-propre*, and on how these measures might themselves be satisfactory of *amour-propre*.¹⁹⁶ Moreover, these considerations are for the most part independent of the idea, which I have tried to make sense of through examining both Smith and Rousseau, that there is a peculiar insult in not being believed. After all, we do not need to see that there is such a peculiar insult, let alone that it is made possible by features of second-personal address, in order to appreciate that a consequence of Rousseau's egalitarian prescriptions is the limiting of the social significance of our being dependent on another's capricious judgment about our trustworthiness. Nevertheless, through examining together Rousseau's and Smith's views on speech and recognition, I hope we can appreciate the importance of keeping in view at once two perspectives on the phenomenon of not being believed: (1) its appearance within the context of second-personal address, and the peculiar insult, and sense of helplessness of the part of the disbelieved, that that context affords; and (2) its appearance as a kind of dependence on the capricious judgment of another, whose social significance can be limited through egalitarian measures. If we only read Smith and Rousseau apart from each other, then we might miss how deeply important both of these perspectives are.

¹⁹⁶. I especially have in mind the work of Joshua Cohen (Cohen 2010: 97-130), N.J.H. Dent (Dent 1988 and Dent 1992: 33-6), Frederick Neuhauser (Neuhauser 1993: 390-1, Neuhauser 2008), and John Rawls (Rawls 2008: 191-213).

Appendix 2. Spectators and Giants in Rousseau and Víctor Erice

It is tempting to think that cinema somehow has a prehistory in philosophy. That is, among those philosophers who pre-date the invention of cinema, there are some whose very spirits seem to inform the medium itself, making their connections to particular films, even if only implicit, seem especially fated or necessary. Strikingly, these are often philosophers somehow opposed to theater and 'theatricality', and known for harshly depicting the effects of sitting isolated in the dark. (The well-worn comparisons between cinema and Plato's Myth of the Cave come to mind.)¹⁹⁷

Among such philosophers is surely Jean-Jacques Rousseau, an eighteenth-century philosopher who asked what it is to be spectator of, as well as a spectacle for, other persons. For Rousseau, among the characteristic features of our social lives is our caring to be noticed, which in turn involves our acknowledging others as capable of noticing us: as creatures that, unlike mere things, can subject us to their evaluative gaze. That is, for Rousseau, we cannot make spectacles of ourselves without acknowledging or, in a sense, also making spectacles of others.

¹⁹⁷. For example, Baudry 1986.

At least, this is one way of understanding the role of 'spectacles' in Rousseau's various accounts of the origins of sociality in humans: either phylogenetic (as in the *Discourse on the Origins of Inequality* and the *Essay on the Origin of Languages*) or ontogenetic (as in his educational treatise and novel *Emile*). But 'spectacles' come up even more directly and literally in his criticisms of the theater (especially in his *Letter to d'Alembert* on 'spectacles'), and especially in his insistence that, if there is anything good in the acknowledgment of one another as spectacles, it is perverted in the institution of the theater, where spectacles are entirely bought and the expressions of persons (the actors) are sold.

On Rousseau's understanding of the theater, the actor, under force of his dependence on the spectator for his livelihood, must 'counterfeit' himself, or put his person 'publicly on sale' (*LD: 79/OC: 5:73*). That is, the actor must falsify himself, not just in the sense that he must play a character, but also in the sense that he must be false to the spectator: he flatters the latter's capacity for identification or pity. For example, Rousseau refers to the Greek despot Alexander of Pherae:

who dared not attend the performance of a single tragedy for fear that he might be seen to moan with Andromache and Priam, but who listened without emotion to the cries of so many citizens daily being murdered on his orders (*DI: 152-3/OC: 3:155*).

In a reversal of Aristotle's views on the theater (according to which the catharsis of tragedy has beneficial effects), Rousseau thinks that among the theater's pathological effects is its exhausting one's capacities for being a sympathetic spectator:

[Has] he [the spectator] not acquitted himself of all that he owes to virtue by the homage which he has just rendered it [in watching a play]? What more could one want of him? That he practice it himself? He has no role to play; he is no actor (*LD: 25/OC: 5:24*).

Thus, insofar as the theater is a locus of buying and selling, the spectator becomes an unsympathetic master and the actor an alienated laborer. (In Rousseau's vision of popular sovereignty, and the entertainments permitted in an egalitarian republic, there will be no distinction between spectator and actor, any more than between master and servant: 'let the spectators become an entertainment to themselves; make them actors themselves; do it so that each sees and loves himself in the others so that all will be better united.' [*LD: 126/OC: 5:115*]).

It goes without saying that the theater and the cinema are not the same thing. But it is interesting that whereas for Rousseau the theater (at least outside republican entertainments) is a site for the failure of mutual acknowledgment, for the Spanish director Víctor Erice, the cinema is where some of the most important identifications take place.

Indeed, both of Erice's two fiction features (*The Spirit of the Beehive* [*El espíritu de la colmena*], from 1973, and *El Sur*, from 1983) boast scenes in movie theaters, and both involve their protagonists' finding their capacities for identification awakened in the cinema, or around the cinema. For example, in *El Sur* eight-year-old Estrella (Sonsoles Aranguren) follows her father (a disillusioned republican teacher persecuted under Franco) to the cinema, where he is watching a film featuring an actress whose name ('Irene Rios') Estrella has found written over and over again in his papers. Estrella later finds him in a café composing a letter to that same actress, or at least that is what she imagines: the voiceover narration of older Estrella gives way to the voice of her father's letter, leaving it ambiguous whether we are hearing its real or its imagined contents. When her father notices Estrella observing him, the voiceover of her later self

again takes over: 'Now I understand that he reacted as if I'd caught him doing something wrong.'
Estrella's following her father to the movies serves as a kind of primal scene, a mysterious suggestion of something about her prehistory, one that at least allows her (even if only in recalling the moment years later) to give context to his emotional unavailability.



Figure 1. The cinema as site of identification: *El Sur*.



Figure 2. *El Sur*: 'Now I understand that he reacted as if I'd caught him going something wrong.'

Themes of identification in the cinema organize *The Spirit of the Beehive* even more explicitly. Set on the Castilian Plain in 1940, just after the defeat of republicanism in the Spanish Civil War, *The Spirit of the Beehive* opens with six-year-old Ana (Ana Torrent, in her very first role) joining her older sister in a rustic, makeshift cinema for a screening of James Whale's 1931 *Frankenstein*. Throughout the twenty minutes or so in which scenes from *Frankenstein* appear, Erice particularly focuses on the monster's encounter with a young girl, whom he kills by throwing into a pond (naively thinking she will float like the flower petals he had just seen her tossing in). Here Ana is invited to identify with at least two others, both, like her, still very innocent in the ways of the world: a child and a monster (or a child-like monster).



Figure 3.



Figure 4. *The Spirit of the Beehive*: Ana identifies with both the child and the monster.

Thinking through the importance of Ana's identifying with a monster, as I'd like to do, will require understanding how Rousseau's writing on spectatorship and *The Spirit of the Beehive* do seem to speak with one another, and even more deeply than by way of contrast. And among the film's particular connections to Rousseau is a shared association between feeling a spectacle and feeling confronted by a Giant. (I should note that at least part of this connection is by way of Mary Shelley: the literary scholar David Marshall has argued convincingly that Rousseau's writing was a profound influence on the author of *Frankenstein*, informing the notions of savagery, exile, and indeed spectatorship rife in that novel [Marshall 1988].¹⁹⁸) For example, in a passage in the *Essay on the Origin of Languages*, Rousseau imagines the early human's (the *sauvage's*) first confrontation with others of his kind:

¹⁹⁸. Marshall is especially helpful in his developing the idea of Mary Shelley's reading of Rousseau as a kind of primal scene: as her attempt to understand her pre-history through understanding her Rousseau-influenced parents, Mary Wollstonecraft (who died after giving birth to her daughter) and William Godwin.

A [*sauvage*] meeting others will at first have been frightened. His fright will have made him see these men as larger and stronger than himself; he will have called them *Giants*. After much experience he will have recognized that since these supposed Giants are neither bigger nor stronger than he, their stature did not fit the idea he initially attached to the word Giant. He will therefore invent another name common to them and to himself, for example the name *man*, and he will restrict the name *Giant* to the false object that had struck him during his illusion (6).

The *sauvage* is frightened by others of his kind not just because they threaten his physical integrity, or serve as competitive threats, but also because they render him a spectacle, the object of their gaze. Rousseau is describing the birth of sociality, and the *sauvage* sees others as Giants because they are significant to him: he cares about how he is taken in by them. (When he identifies with them, and comes to see them as fellow creatures, it is because he comes to see them as thinking the same of him.)¹⁹⁹

Similarly, *The Spirit of the Beehive* is throughout informed by a child's confrontation by a Giant. Ana's fascination with Frankenstein's Monster, the way the movie stays with her (as movies do), typifies her relationship with anything else large, adult, and masculine: a republican fugitive she discovers in hiding, her own (like Estrella's) emotionally unavailable father. It also typifies her relationship with anything else that can look back at her, or confront her with an independent point of view.²⁰⁰ This is most obvious when, in a schoolroom exercise, she must

¹⁹⁹. In his reading of this passage, Stanley Cavell writes, 'A natural reading of Rousseau's scene is to take the savage man to be frightened by one who is frightened upon meeting *him*. (It is of the essence of this passage of initial human confrontation to see that everything said about either the one or the other is true of both.)' (Cavell 1979: 467).

²⁰⁰. Regarding the idea that the eyes can be loci of the passions, Rousseau says of the adolescent Emile: 'His eyes, those organs of the soul which have said nothing up to now, find a language and acquire expressiveness. [...] He senses already that they can say too much' (*E*: 212/*OC*: 4:490).

guess what is missing from a mannequin called 'Don José'. Only when provoked by her older sister can she see that Don José is missing his eyes. And only when restoring his eyes to him does she feel the significance of being looked upon: that, unlike the lungs or the stomach (which Don José had also had missing), the eyes evaluate, they judge, they take a point of view. As Dr. Frankenstein knew, building a Giant can be scary, because it can look back at you. (Later in the film we see a portrait of Franco hanging on the same schoolroom's wall.)



Figure 5. 'Now Don José can see.'

The men in Ana's life (her father, the republican fugitive) are Giants because they could not remain mere spectacles (just as, in her later hallucinatory visions of Frankenstein's monster, the latter could not just stay up on the screen): they also make a spectacle of Ana. In fact, it seems less apt to characterize Ana's response to these Giants as horror than as fascination or identification: she can feel their fear, including their fear of her, as when she startles the republican fugitive in his hideout. She goes to sleep, and her image fades into his, underscoring her identification with him. Having once seen him as a Giant (he's hiding in the hut where her

sister told her she could find Frankenstein's monster), she now sees him as a fellow creature. (What she doesn't know is that the Francoists will soon exterminate him like a rat.)



Figure 6. Ana blends into the republican.

These identifications reach an apex when (startled by her father's learning of her encounter with the fugitive) she runs away from home, and, finding a pool of water, her reflection in it becomes the very image of Frankenstein's monster. Like Rousseau's *sauvage*, she no longer feels small before a Giant, but understands him to be just as significant, or insignificant, as she is. In watching her image transform into his, she indeed transforms into a Giant; but she also, by virtue of that, renders the Giant a child. That is again the poignancy of the Monster's encounter with the young girl (in the 1931 film, the scene that Ana is, in these hallucinations, replaying): again, the monster and the child are both innocents, both are receiving their early education in things; if one is more dangerous, that's only because he's fated to be bigger. (Since Ana's older sister typically bullies and provokes her, her fantasy of meeting the monster might also be her fantasy of equality, of having a true peer.)



Figure 7.



Figure 8. Ana blends into the monster.

Of course, so long as Ana can only see herself through the Giants that surround her, she also lacks much a sense of who she is. (Rousseau, who later in life was accused of being a monster, begins his last work, *The Reveries of the Solitary Walker*, asking, in desperate retort to

these accusations, 'What am I?' [*RSW*: 1/*OC*: 1:995]) But that just underscores the importance of Ana's return home from her exile (from her own solitary walks), and how that return constitutes an achievement of sovereignty: after waking up from a deep sleep (she's had a 'very powerful experience', a doctor says, ambiguously) she declares out of her window (and to the world) 'I am Ana' ('*Soy Ana*'). Until then those words had been the province of others: her older sister had instructed her to use them to invoke Frankenstein's monster (Beetlejuice-like or Candyman-like, but using Ana's own name, and thus emphasizing her identification with him). Only now can she hear herself in those words.

Thus, a film made in the waning years of the Franco regime ends with a child's declaration of sovereignty after a period of exile. Having only seen herself through others, or through her identification with Giants, she finally becomes a spectacle for herself. Or rather: in contrast with Rousseau's spectator, Ana does have a 'role to play'. For Ana, finally coming to say 'I' means, as with the participants in republican 'spectacles', being actor and spectator at once.



Figure 9. '*Soy Ana*': Ana declares her sovereignty.

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