Exploring Diaspora Ties to Homeland Neo-Colonialist Movements: The Case of Chinese Diaspora Influence During the "New Scramble for Africa"

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Exploring Diaspora Ties to Homeland Neo-colonialist Movements:
The Case of Chinese Diaspora Influence During the “New Scramble for Africa”

Lindsey Brooke Walker

A Thesis in the Field of International Relations
for the Degree of Master of Liberal Arts in Extension Studies

Harvard University
November 2018
Abstract

This study explores diaspora group ties to origin countries in ways that broadly empower them to act as state agents of their origin state. This is achieved by examining the case of the Chinese migration to Africa during the “New Scramble for Africa”. The research questions whether diaspora are significant participants of neocolonialist origin state strategy, thereby impacting the agency and opportunities of host country populations. Lastly, it examines how increased institutional capacity of host countries may bolster resiliency against these potential neo-colonialist effects. The study uses quantitative research to explore these questions and employs case studies of South Africa, Mauritius, and Nigeria.

The study finds that the sizable and growing Chinese diaspora has had little evidential impact on local African agency across the continent during the New Scramble for Africa, and are thus not a part of the neo-colonialist dynamics of Chinese foreign policy. It also finds that improved strength of African institutions can reduce the potential impact of foreign non-state actors on individual agency.
I dedicate this thesis to my children, Logan and Sojourner. Their daily example of curiosity, wonderment, joy and innocence has made me a better student in all things academic and beyond.

Also to the love of my life, Wilson, whose faith in me is unwavering. His passionate commitment to our family made this project possible.
Acknowledgements

I am profoundly grateful for the following individuals who have gone above and beyond to help me complete this project under challenging circumstances.

Enormous gratitude is extended to Dr. Doug Bond, lecturer in the Harvard Extension School and research advisor in the Master of Liberal Arts (ALM) program, whose ongoing support has been essential to this project from beginning to end. From the drafting of the research proposal to ushering me through the logistics of many challenges, Doug was always diligent and thorough in his guidance. His devotion to his students’ success is unparalleled and his knowledge, expertise, and leadership are truly appreciated.

My sincere thanks go to Austin Strange, Ph.D. student in the Department of Government at Harvard University and thesis co-director to this project. Austin’s deep expertise on Chinese foreign policies and supervision throughout the writing process were critical to its success. I am extremely grateful for all the time, attention, and detailed guidance he provided. His support, patience and flexibility throughout this thesis were an encouraging light during the height of my most challenging moments.

Thank you also to Prof. Alastair Iain Johnston, the Gov. James Albert Noe and Linda Noe Laine Professor of China in World Affairs in the Government Department at Harvard University and co-director of this thesis, for his oversight of the drafting process and his support throughout this process.
I’d like to finally thank the staff and faculty of the Harvard Extension School for providing their students with exceptional educational and research opportunities, as well as guidance and support.
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NSA       Non-state Actor
SOE       State-Owned Enterprise
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Image 1. A Chinese propaganda poster by designer He Kongde from September 1965 titled: The struggle of all the people in the world against American imperialism will be victorious! Quan shijie renmin fandui Mei diguo zhuyide douzheng bisheng! (全世界人民反对美帝国主义的斗争必胜！)
Chapter I

Introduction to Research

In recent years a great deal of scholarship, media and policy-making attention has been given to the dramatic increase of foreign involvement in the economy and development of the African continent, in particular its natural resources (Yates, 2012; United Nations, 2017; Stiglitz, 2012). These inquiries into the “New Scramble for Africa” (Carmody, 2011), as the phenomena is widely referred to, chronicle a global, African, and especially Western, skepticism of the partnership being offered from powerful foreign nations to African nations in the name of development. After all, the very term “New Scramble for Africa” references the notorious historic European seizure and exploitation of African lands, resources and people. Amongst the African community there is a great hesitation to repeat a history that notoriously trampled the agency and lives of African nations, communities and individuals (Nkrumah, 1965), and exploited them in perverse, irrevocable ways, changing the very course of history for the continent (Yates, 2012) and undermining its ability to determine its own socio-economic destiny in a post-colonial world.

China is at the center of this “New Scramble” and the ensuing global curiosity, and it is, not coincidentally, one of the leading nations of the world in terms of economic and military prowess. The burgeoning scope of Chinese global influence coupled with China’s staggering level of increased engagement with the continent has elicited everything from research centers focused solely on the Sino-African
relationship to an intense academic inquiry on the motives behind them. (Alden and Large 2018; Large 2008; Rich and Recker 2013; Frynas et al 2007) China is undoubtedly having an enormous impact upon a variety of African markets from energy to agriculture: all key elements to the future failure or success of Africa’s economy.

At the heart of this inquiry is whether the motives and activities of the Chinese are in fact a “new” version of colonialism, or in other words, neo-colonialist in their nature. However, the relevant scholarship and media lens has overlooked the impact of the “New Scramble” upon recipient agency; that is to say, very little attention has been paid to the ways Chinese engagement with African nations may constrain the free will of African people on an individual level, despite the fact that agency is a direct measure of this specific type of exploitation. In particular, the unique local footprint made by the settling of a sizeable number of Chinese migrants within African nations as a byproduct of the new Sino-African partnership warrants a comprehensive study. (Large, 2008)

The following chapter outlines my research on the present Sino-African relationship and the ensuing growth of Chinese diaspora in Africa in the context of a “New Scramble for Africa” (a neo-colonialist movement). Included are the research problem, the argument, hypothesized relationship, the justification for the research, and road map for the rest of the thesis.
Research Problem

The central question of this work is whether the goals, activities, and impact of the Chinese diaspora community within the proposed neo-colonialist framework constitute an instrument of neo-colonialist threat in and of itself. Specifically, the research seeks to answer if the presence of the Chinese diaspora community in Africa is a neo-colonialist force by measuring the impact the Chinese diaspora presence has on agency. The research answers the following:

- To what extent does the presence and influx of Chinese diaspora affect the individual agency of Africans and constrain socio-economic choices for Africans?
- Do differences in institutional capacity across African nations have an influence on the extent to which a non-state actor such as the Chinese diaspora can affect individual agency? In other words, do stronger governments protect the individual agency of Africans, thereby making their state more impervious to potential neocolonialist forces?

The Chinese diaspora community within Africa is now a sizeable, economically substantial, and highly visible byproduct of the China-Africa relationship, with reasonable estimates reaching up to 1 million. (Park, 2009) Approximately half have been resettled via their employment with Chinese state-owned enterprises (Tsuruoka, 2017) and the remaining numbers have migrated independent of the state but also in tandem with the growth in Chinese economic engagements on the continent. (Park 2009) Increasing incidents of xenophobic
backlash signal tensions may arise from an impact or perceived impact on local recipient agency, and the differences between realities and perceptions may be challenging to parcel out given the unique ties maintained between Beijing, Chinese SOE’s operating in Africa, and the Chinese migration flow to Africa.

At times the Chinese migration influx, its pace of growth, and the mere presence of ethnic Chinese on the continent are evocative of the precursory phase to the original Scramble for Africa. The sight of imported Chinese laborers, technicians, and tradesmen appears quite similar to the priming period of African society via European settlers spreading “Christianity, Commerce, and Civilization” prior to the Berlin Conference. Further compounding the issue is a significant tension regarding the prioritization of imported Chinese workers by Chinese firms over local African tradesmen, as well as hierarchical abuse of power between Chinese contractors and local workers employed on their projects. Chinese diaspora have therefore become a somewhat controversial and conspicuous aspect of the surrounding conversation on Chinese motivations and strategy in Africa.

Additionally, the Chinese diaspora in Africa taken as a non-state actor, has a complicated influence in the modern African landscape. Non-state actors have an enormous role in Africa (Nyawasha, 2016), especially since the regional power dynamics in Africa are multipolar. A large difference exists between more established, higher capacity African governments and less stable, lower capacity African states, which frequently play a non-central role to the development of local economies and leave power vacuums amongst local populations. Presently, non-state affiliated groups such as multinational corporations, armed militant groups,
and African civil society, have significant influence in the future trajectory and
design of African nations and communities. (Rood and Dinnissen, 2013) Chinese
diaspora groups can vary significantly in their motives for establishing themselves
in a particular African state, (Park, 2009) and many are in an environment rife with
non-state actors exhibiting a profound and overreaching or exploitative influence.

Because the instruments of neocolonialism are diverse and tend to vary
across sectors, non-state actors are especially relevant to the development of Africa,
have the potential for alarmingly exploitative behavior, and are often hidden in plain
sight. The growing Chinese diaspora community in Africa as a byproduct of national
Chinese presence on the continent has become a key contributor to the African
economic and social trajectory and stands to forge a unique role in the era of the
“New Scramble for Africa”. However, their homeland ties to a potentially
exploitative, rising, powerful nation, are often met with the same level of skepticism
that governmental Sino-African alliances are in local communities, and this is
coupled with a time of periodic xenophobic uprising in some African regions. At the
intersection of these dynamics- the growth of indigenous and foreign non-state
actors in Africa and their spheres of influence, the age of modern Africa, and an
abundance of foreseeable economic opportunity on the continent in a few key
sectors- a lot remains at stake for Africans.

The Argument

I hypothesize that in the case of the growing Chinese diaspora community,
this non-indigenous non-state actor cannot reasonably be described as a part of a
“New Scramble for Africa” phenomena. More specifically, my thesis puts forth the following argument:

- Non-indigenous non-state actors within potentially neocolonialist environments such as the Chinese diaspora influx during the “New Scramble for Africa” are not associated with diminishing agency, therefore are not neocolonialist in their nature.

- The economic contributions of non-indigenous non-state actors within potentially neocolonialist environments such as the Chinese diaspora influx during the “New Scramble for Africa” do not negatively affect the self-determination of Africans.

- The stronger institutional capacity an African government has, the greater the protection of individual agency for its citizens during times of potentially neocolonialist movements.

This research uses agency as a key indicator for evaluating whether a non-indigenous non-state actor is in fact an instrument of neo-colonialist influence. It also finds that the strength of institutional capacity will galvanize against the influence of a foreign non-state actor purposed as a neo-colonialist instrument in a modern exploitative context such as “The New Scramble for Africa”. Ultimately the relationship between Chinese diaspora presence in a given African nation and the wider neo-colonialist movement taking place will be insulated by a strong institutional capacity.
Justification for the Research

The conclusions of this research will 1) provide the international community with some answers to the skepticism which persists regarding the actions of powerful nations and their affiliated non-state actors in Africa, namely China. 2) Both illustrate the connections between non-state actors and their homelands and distinguish between the two. It will 3) complement the growing body of IR theory research on diaspora, national identities, behavior and homeland linkages. Furthermore, while the research community has started to approach the questions of impact on recipient agency at the collective (national) level (Volberding and Warner, 2017), and from the influence of other state and sub-state actors such as the aid community (Greenhill, et. al., 2016; Sato, et. al., 20011; Hernandez, 2017), this work will 4) fill a gap in explorations of recipient agency affects by non-state actors and the measurement of those impacts on agency at a societal (individual) level. It will also 5) expand upon the existing research on the topic of recipient government capacity as a potential diffuser of neo-colonialist and exploitative impacts. (BenYishay, et. al., 2016) Finally it will 5) provide the African community with a thorough study of the presence of one type of non-indigenous, non-violent non-state actor, their purpose, and potential viability to African society given variation in institutional strength and capacity.

Altogether, this research has relevance and broader implications to the IR field on multiple levels. Firstly, it combines two understudied but emerging topics of interest in the arena of international development: the demonstrable impact of the activities of the Chinese diaspora in Africa, and the relevance of peaceful non-state
actors in modern African geopolitics and power. It is my hope that this research reveals opportunities for inclusion within African society and a discussion of future economic progress and opportunities, whilst still observing and utilizing the lessons of history within African-European relations that the term “New Scramble for Africa” recognizes. In addition, these findings are of some value in the international scholarly discourse on emerging power dynamics between China and the global community, and the reorganization of the post-Cold war era global system from one of unipolarity to bipolarity. An analysis of public perceptions in Africa of both state and non-state actors and the combined cause and effect dynamics of their actions within the African community is a field of study worth further exploration and of value to both Chinese and African policymakers.
Chapter II

Background of Chinese Diaspora in the Sino-African Relationship

Chinese migration has a notable, long-standing global history. In fact, Chinese diaspora groups are some of the largest and most established around the world. Some of the first Chinese to set foot in Africa can be traced to the 7th century via East African trade relationships with the Tang, Sung and Ming dynasties, though significant numbers of Chinese in Africa did not occur until around the mid-seventeenth century during the Qing dynasty. (Anshan, 2000) This initial movement of forced migration to Mauritius and South Africa’s Cape Colony, was at the hands of Portuguese and Dutch colonialists who held Chinese foreigners as part of their enslaved workforce. (Anshan, 2000)

Later, between 1904 and 1911, another sizable wave of Chinese migration to Africa occurred when over 63,000 contracted mine workers were imported to the Transvaal (Park, 2009). This movement, however, was temporary and almost all Chinese workers during this period were returned to China. Given these early dynamics, perceptions are that enslaved or indentured Chinese established many of the long-standing Chinese diaspora communities in Africa, such as the ones in South Africa and Mauritius. (Park, 2013) However, the Migration Policy Institute notes that during this period of time a slow trickle of independent Chinese entrepreneurs also came to Africa in search of economic opportunity. (Park, 2012) Though not of staggering numbers, their continual arrival over many decades and slow but steady
chain migration patterns eventually laid the groundwork for the development of these diaspora communities. (Park 2012)

Early migrations however, prior to the mid-century and relatively small scale, are not generally regarded as defining of the overall history of Chinese migration patterns in Africa. This is because the Mao era along with the African independence movement, both beginning in and around the 1950's, mark the foundation of the modern Sino-African relationship (Rich and Recker, 2013). Modern migration patterns of Chinese to Africa from this point are more substantial and can largely be traced along the lines of the domestic and foreign politics of both the PRC and African host nations (Park, 2009), thus migration flows between the two countries go hand in hand with the development of the Sino-African relationship. Chinese migration flows in particular, tend to historically follow the foreign economic engagements of the PRC (Park, 2009), a fact that remains quite evident in Africa today.

African Independence, Anti-neo-colonialism, and Mao in Africa

The African independence movement, the bulk of which took place in the post WWII mid-twentieth century, was fueled by a series of African uprisings, social upheaval, emerging nationalist political parties, and student movements. (Iliffe, 2007) During WWII, some Africans had fought as soldiers alongside their colonialist oppressors, and this experience was a catalyst for change as it highlighted the inequality between the rights of those European citizens and the limited rights of the colonized oppressed. (Iliffe, 2007) As a result, African nations began demanding
fuller access to rights and control under their colonialist administrators. Some were granted their request for self-determination while others under more authoritarian oppressors were forced to resort to violent means.

The political and social climate before and during the continent-wide revolution spurred a great deal of African political philosophy. The removal of colonialist power structures left an ideological opening for the introduction of new governance theories, against the global backdrop of a far-reaching Cold War in which democracy and communism were juxtaposed. Chinese communism flouted the capitalist ethos that had underscored colonialist endeavor. This was an especially attractive feature for African communities. (Large, 2008) It also upheld the tenet of anti-imperialism, providing a uniquely non-European option at a time when European power had caused destruction on African lands for centuries.

It was in this climate of African revolution and Cold War power dynamics that the concept of neo-colonialism arose. African revolutionary leaders began discussing and strategizing against its potential force in newly independent African states. Ghanaian revolutionary, statesman, and critical political philosopher, Kwame Nkrumah, published *Neo-colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism* in 1965 at the height of African anti-colonialism revolution. The book defined neo-colonialism and its points of entry into controlling African society:

In place of colonialism as the main instrument of imperialism we have today neo-colonialism. The essence of neo-colonialism is that the State which is subject to it is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside. The methods and form of this direction can take various shapes...More often, however, neo-colonialist control is exercised through economic or monetary means. The neo-colonial State may be obliged to take the manufactured products of the imperialist power to the exclusion of competing
products from elsewhere. Control over government policy in the neo-colonial State may be secured by payments towards the cost of running the State, by the provision of civil servants in positions where they can dictate policy, and by monetary control over foreign exchange through the imposition of a banking system controlled by the imperial power. Where neo-colonialism exists the power exercising control is often the State which formerly ruled the territory in question, but this is not necessarily so...It is possible that neo-colonial control may be exercised by a consortium of financial interests which are not specifically identifiable with any particular State...The result of neo-colonialism is that foreign capital is used for the exploitation rather than for the development of the less developed parts of the world. Investment under neo-colonialism increases rather than decreases the gap between the rich and the poor countries of the world.

Nkrumah’s description of neo-colonialism at the time was comprehensive and a starting point for examining the ways the revolution for African independence would not yet expunge colonialist power entirely. His descriptions of neo-colonialist manifestations focused on the international banking system and MNC’s acting as state agents in their attempt to further constrain the interests of self-determining African nations. It would prove accurate in the long-term. Nkrumah’s work was considered controversial in the Western world, and received criticism by some African intellectuals as well (Large, 2008), but most African nationalist leaders shared these theories and purpose. Nkrumah’s work loudly set the tone for those nations seeking to productively engage post-colonial Africa. (Rich and Recker, 2013)

As African post-colonial political thought and self-governance was taking shape, simultaneously the Communist party in China was reaching new heights under the leadership of Mao Zedong. Starting throughout the 1950’s, Mao’s Soviet alliance had already begun to dwindle while his reach in Africa and Asia grew. The timing for distancing from Soviet leadership was optimal; independent of Soviet ties Mao was able to project himself as a leader in a global anti-imperialist, anti-neo-
colonialist movement across Asia and Africa during the midst of a worldwide decolonization process (Mitter, 2013). Africa was an important frontier for the spread of Maoist ideology, as well as an opportunity for the PRC to gain international traction in becoming officially and widely recognized over Taiwan. In this regard the well-known Chinese “century of humiliation” likely emboldened Mao’s persona in this endeavor (Mitter, 2013) and set him apart, lending a special credibility and authenticity to his anti-Western, anti-imperialist tone.

Mao’s most notable gesture however, came in a series of steps to signal anti-colonialist leadership and Sino-African alliance when China centered itself as the symbolic leader during the Bandung Conference of 1955. The Bandung Conference essentially established a group of newly independent African and Asian nations as non-associated to the Cold War powers. This was another turning point for Mao and China, as it had initially aligned closely with Stalinism in previous years; the outright proclamation of non-alignment was a turn of events that would further put China shoulder to shoulder in political purpose with participating African nations. Meanwhile, much of the Cold War was still playing out between the United States and the USSR on the African continent during the independence movement. Proxy wars, clandestine interventions, and coercive political maneuvering were rife across Africa.

Importantly, the Bandung Conference also outright condemned colonialism and neo-colonialism in direct terms, outlining this goal in a 10-point declaration which contained a refusal against “intervention or interference” in the affairs of a country including “exerting pressures on other countries” and demanding
“abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defense to serve any particular interests of the big powers.” This language was uniquely direct in addressing the powerful Western colonialist superpowers that had oppressed African and Asian people for so long, and the Bandung Conference was pivotal in its unapologetic tone towards colonialist and neo-colonialist behaviors.

Consolidating his role as a true ideological ally in Africa, Mao’s strategy of foreign aid in Africa began in 1956 with Egypt, the earliest African nation to recognize the PRC, and it came in the form of economic assistance, eventual material supplies for relief of the Suez crisis, as well as manufacturing machinery (Morgan and Zheng, 2017). In Egypt as well as many other strategic nations, Mao frequently sent highly visible Chinese migrant workers with expertise and technical skills complementary to his projects such as managers, equipment technicians, and agricultural specialists (Morgan and Zheng, 2017). In Guinea-Bissau for example, Mao launched diplomacy well before it had even been declared an independent state, and between 1974 and 1990 provided teams of medical professionals for medical assistance and knowledge transfer. (China Internet Information Center) He also built a hospital there amongst other construction projects, making a plan for assistance that was much more comprehensive than usual aid programs. These projects when combined with highly skilled Chinese migrants also provided a personification of the shared ideology: a visual example of a thriving, successful communist society that was well equipped enough to send its various workers around the world to lend their expertise.
His most notable act of solidarity via aid came when, after being approached as an alternative to Western banking resources, Mao offered a significant loan for financing of the TAZARA railway in Tanzania and Zambia. It was the largest infrastructure project and first of its kind to reach land-locked areas in East Africa, (Rich and Recker, 2013) as well as Mao’s most significant development project in Africa, though he would complete many more across various sectors including infrastructure, agriculture, and technology (Park, 2009). These projects came at a substantial relative cost to the PRC and were undertaken in spite of the vast economic and political challenges in domestic policy being faced at home during the Cultural Revolution and the Great Leap Forward (Morgan and Zheng, 2017).

The aid for the TAZARA project came with a substantial loan and also an estimated 150,000 Chinese migrant workers to complete the project. (Cook, et. al., 2016) The massive influx of Chinese was however, only temporary. Under Mao’s rule emigration was generally prohibited, (Wang, 2017) so while the influx of temporary migrant workers was a very conspicuous display of East African relationship-building, they were prohibited from staying by Chinese domestic policy. Generally, all were returned to China once the project was completed several years later. (Park, 2009) This however, was the beginning of what would become a long-standing and widening practice of state-to-state cooperation on local African infrastructure projects employing Chinese migrant workers.

Ultimately all of Mao’s maneuvering was effective with long-term positive consequences for the Sino-African relationship. Not only did he successfully establish China as an ideological ally and true friend of Africa, he avoided Chinese
participation in some of the most destructive proxy warfare on the continent. The African historical memory of Cold War manipulation and divisiveness on African lands therefore remains to this day an attribute of the Western and the former Soviet powers. As a result, the historical alliances formed during the simultaneous post-colonial Africa and Maoist eras, would eventually lead to the modern Sino-African relationship that drives The New Scramble for Africa today, as well as its parallel migration patterns, all of which are distinctly rooted in this established collective anti-neo-colonialist purpose from the 1950’s and ‘60’s. (See example in Image 1.)

![Image 1.](image)

A Chinese propaganda poster by designer He Kongde from September 1965 titled: *The struggle of all the people in the world against American imperialism will be victorious!/ Quan shijie renmin fandui Mei diguo zhuyide douzheng bisheng!*

These dynamics leave China a uniquely preferential position within the power-wielding African landscape today, which is marked by an unprecedented amount of Chinese foreign investment and trade in Africa by wide margins over any other foreign nation. (Large, 2008) Presently, China’s cultural and political distance
from the West is a great asset to China in seeking to broaden its relationship with African nations, despite its own growing accumulation of conspicuous wealth and power. These public perceptions of a path of mutual purpose, originally forged by Mao and perpetuated by Chinese statesmen today, is a long-standing feature of the China-Africa relationship that Beijing has not hesitated to consistently draw upon (Nyiri, 2006) in the twenty first century while building its new alliances throughout the continent and reinvigorating old ones.

An Economically Reformed China in Modern Africa

The legacy of colonialism in Africa post-independence was similar to what Nkrumah had predicted: a drawn out phase of neo-colonialism rife with external political and economic forces that greatly undermined many African nations’ abilities to build infrastructure and fruitful independent economies competitive on a global scale. (Iliffe) Foreign aid schemes, Multinational Corporations (MNC’s), loans from the IMF and World Bank, outside military presence, and even non-indigenous INGO’s have maneuvered in neo-colonialist ways to undermine African self determination.

The resulting impact of colonialism followed by various forms of neo-colonialist interference has led to a great deal of variation in state capacities in present day Africa. Nation-building is a significant endeavor, and the prospects for post-revolution administrations to gain firm political stability and economic footing varied depending upon the degree of exploitation that had taken place during colonialism, the remaining social and political dynamics, as well as the continued
level of neo-colonialist interference. What remained several decades after the transformation to independence was largely a continent that garnered more attention in the public sphere for its various public health crises, violent civil wars and unrest, extreme poverty, government corruption and human rights abuses than for its ability to develop economically. (Iliffe)

By the end of the 1990’s, a consistent flow of Western aid packages consisting of food and other basics had become a standard practice for meeting the basic needs of survival for the populace in many African countries. Western development institutions had extended numerous loans to African nations over the years, but most came with economic conditions that were difficult for African economies facing a great deal of instability to meet, or were tied to other insurmountably challenging accountability measures. (Iliffe) By the late 1990’s many Western investors were eventually deterred by the risks stemming from poor governance, low accountability, high corruption, and civil volatility.

While Mao had maintained an increasing and significant stream of foreign aid through the late 1960’s and well into the 1970’s, the death of Mao marked a major transition for Chinese political ideology, as well as domestic and foreign policy. China’s transition to a more open economy and society in the 1980’s under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, included a much more paired down, sustainable, and pragmatic foreign aid strategy no longer based in ideology but more in the open market economy. As a result, aid to Africa plummeted from previous years. (Morgan and Zheng, 2017) During this time, he also reversed Maoist emigration policy, and
migration of mainland Chinese increased drastically though not especially to Africa especially when compared with previous years. (Park, 2009)

While Deng ushered in reforms that would completely reshape the path of the Chinese economy for the better, his aid strategy no doubt affected modern Sino-African relations throughout this period and diplomacy to some degree waned through this time. In the early 1990's the PRC even saw some repercussions from this shallower relationship when previous allies such as Guinea-Bissau began to formally recognize Taiwan over the PRC. The period of leadership following this under Jiang Zemin however attempted to reinstate the previous status quo of Sino-African relations to some extent, with Jiang making efforts to reiterate the long-standing points of mutual ideology through Chinese diplomacy during a 1996 visit to Africa.

China and the Chinese Diaspora in the “New Scramble for Africa”

The Chinese economy gained enormous growth at a breathtaking speed in the new millennium following the “Going Global” strategy beginning in 1999, which encouraged expansion of Chinese SOE’s FDI abroad and new Chinese participation in the WTO. Having planted firm seeds of diplomacy as far back as the mid-century, Beijing turned to Africa to capitalize on the long-standing relationship. This was at a time when most Western investors were fraught with caution over the high-risk possibilities of direct investment. As Morgan and Zheng point out in a 2017 study, Chinese direct investment does not follow the traditional lines of Western practice for risk mitigation in FDI; rather, the PRC uses aid projects and their legacy in Africa
to ensure the success of their “win-win” investments. Thus, the intent to invest in Africa at the close of the 1990’s and into the new millennium required the reignment of diplomatic relations in some areas of Africa as well as a significant increase in aid programs to Africa overall.

In 2000 China hosted the first Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) with four African heads of state in attendance. Just six years later that number would increase to a total of 44 African heads of state participating in the FOCAC. Building upon the good faith Mao established in the 1960’s and 1970’s, Beijing poised itself in the 2000’s as the counter choice to the long-standing tradition of Western trade and finance. The influx of loans and investments to African nations from China came poring in in vastly increasing numbers throughout the next decade. The broader political partnership expanded further in 2011 when China along with other nations backed the initiative to invite South Africa to join the BRIC economic bloc. (Park, 2012)

As has historically always followed, migration patterns of Chinese to Africa exploded via the increased trade and aid strategy. Large groups of migrant Chinese workers linked to state-owned-enterprises began appearing in countries which had previously had no Chinese diaspora community whatsoever such as Burkina Faso and Sudan. (SAIS-CARI) Though many of these workers were temporary, Chinese migration of small business entrepreneurs, traders and service laborers participating in informal markets had increased over the years, as a cultural shift towards migration had accompanied a political one; migration was not just allowed under the more progressive leaders of the PRC, it had become part of a wider
cultural and economic ‘duty’ to one’s country and family. (Nyiri, 2006) Thus many Chinese have come to Africa during this period of time, also known as the New Scramble for Africa, and settled into existing diaspora communities or made new ones in booming numbers and pace.

A Chinese program of development finance in Africa has extended loans totaling US$94.4 billion between 2000 and 2015 (SAIS-CARI) from Chinese contractors and the Chinese government. Just as in other sectors of economic engagement with the continent, the support is widespread with only a few nations excluded, and also concentrated within a handful of African nations. Angola has received over the fifteen-year expanse of the New Scramble for Africa period approximately a fifth of all Chinese loans with a total of US$19.2 billion. Ethiopia (US$13 billion), Kenya (US$6.9 billion), Sudan (US$6.5 billion), Cameroon (US$3.7 billion), Nigeria (US$3.5 billion), and Ghana (US$3.2 billion) were the top funded African states following Angola as of 2015. (SAIS-CARI)

According to aiddata.org, China’s overall official finance to Africa reached a fever pitch in 2009 at US$70 billion and has begun a generally downward trajectory ever since with the exception of an uptick in 2011. The comprehensive dataset of Chinese financing also demonstrates the relationship of Chinese aid to Africa (“Official Development Assistance”) as it closely follows the trajectory of “Other Official Flows” though not comparable in scale. According to aiddata.org, China’s top recipients of aid in Africa since 2000 have been Cote d’Ivoire (US$4 billion), Ethiopia (US$3.7 billion), Zimbabwe (US$3.6 billion), Cameroon (US$3.4 billion), Nigeria (US$3.1 billion), Tanzania (US$3 billion), and Ghana (US$2.5 billion).
Following closely along the lines of aid and economic engagement, media reports state that the number of Chinese migrating to Africa is decreasing slightly in the few years following the downturn of investment and aid and that some with previous plans for lengthier stays are even returning home. (Kuo, 2017) Though there is no proof of a significant exodus of Chinese migrants from Africa at the moment, many could be returning earlier than planned due to the increasing economic opportunities back in China as its economy continues to expand and create more jobs and opportunities domestically. Xenophobia related crimes and fears as well as nativist policies in certain increasingly isolated communities such as those in some parts of the South African Chinese diaspora community, could also become a contributing factor to the deceleration of migration to Africa. (Park, 2012)

A number of industries of Western concern regularly resurface in the hypothetical New Scramble for Africa conversation, most being Africa’s natural resources. The top sectors of Chinese investment as of 2016 were construction, mining, manufacturing, financial intermediation, and information transmission, computer services and software. (SAIS-CARI) African fears loom large that Chinese companies will extract the natural resources Africa possesses during this period under exploitative terms, and that the resulting effects would be a permanent loss of opportunity as mined materials are finite.

Meanwhile a frenzy across Western media, political institutions, and scholarship erupted following China’s stark increase in FDI and aid around 2008 when Chinese FDI commitments reached an all-time peak of US$5.5 billion, surpassing U.S. aid to Africa for the first time. (SAIS-CARI) Across Chinese economic
engagement sectors with Africa from trade and finance to direct investment in various industries, a handful of standout African nations repeatedly attract the largest attention from Chinese investors across the board. While a great deal has been speculated about the Chinese strategy behind this tidal wave of economic engagement, it is clear that some of the macroeconomic effects have been in African favor. Media headlines are turning more recently towards the concept of an African “renaissance” (Hanekom, 2017) as they point towards emerging African economies making compelling headway in GDP and industry leadership through their economic alliances with the Chinese state.

However, discussion surrounding the potential neo-colonialist pressures of Africa engaging with China to this staggering degree has not ceased, and the scrutiny of Chinese economic engagements in Africa is often passed on to the Chinese diaspora in Africa who have reached their own unprecedented numbers in recent years. Furthermore, the predictable social and political realities on the ground that all groups from modern mass migrations tend to face abroad are heavily compounded by the PRC’s unique relationships with the group. The Chinese state's blurred lines and clear linkages between “win-win” dual aid-investment strategies, state run enterprises and imported workers, and the vast migration outflows of Chinese headed overseas have fostered sincere claims that the Chinese diaspora are in some ways behaving as agents of the Chinese state in a larger, intentional neo-colonialist state strategy.
Contemporary Chinese Diaspora Dynamics in Africa

Estimates put the total Chinese diaspora in Africa today to (at least) somewhere between 580,000 and 1 million (Park, 2009) though migration is slowing with decreased rates of investment and aid. By far the largest Chinese diaspora community resides in South Africa at somewhere between 200,000 and 400,000, spread across Johannesburg-Pretoria. (Park, 2009) Nigeria also has a quite considerably sized population made up of a good deal of contracted Chinese worker migrants. (Park, 2009) Other notable populations include Angola, Algeria and Mauritius with upwards of several thousand Chinese diaspora in both urban concentrations and spread across rural landscapes. (Park, 2009)

While the makeup of Chinese diaspora groups across the globe is diverse from nation to nation, their reasons for migrating appear to remain uniform in purpose. As noted by Poston and Wong (2016), Chinese emigration patterns today follow well-established historical patterns. (Poston and Wong, 2016) According to the 2016 study by Poston and Wong, the most common is the Huashang pattern, which can be broadly categorized by merchants and traders emigrating with the purpose of starting new business in foreign countries. This archetype fits the proposed profile of Chinese migration to Africa based on Western anxieties fairly well; the Chinese migrant portrayed as a hybrid adventurer-entrepreneur is strongly featured in the alarmist brand of mainstream literature on the topic. (Nyiri, 2006)

The historical ability of Chinese Huashang migrants to build successful businesses in foreign lands has some notoriety in host countries of Chinese
diaspora. (Poston and Wong, 2016) Outliers amongst this group especially- those reaching exceptional heights in industry or who have otherwise gained a celebrity status for their local achievements inside the host country- typify a version of the Chinese diaspora which may be seen as economically threatening. Moreover, a relationship exists between the relative success of the migrant’s business venture and the strength of homeland connections between the individual and China. (Poston and Wong, 2016) If it holds true that stronger homeland connections may reduce or interfere with an integrated transnational identity, then it is plausible that the more conspicuous Chinese Huashang migrants abroad tend to be those who find superlative business success in their host countries.

The reality of the Huashang migrant however, appears to be overwhelmingly unexceptional. In many cases the small consumer goods markets that spring up around Chinese diaspora communities remain insulated and self-contained, (Park, 2012) selling Chinese goods which otherwise would not have made it to the wider local market thereby expanding consumer options. Furthermore, market competition exists almost exclusively between each other. (Laribee, 2008) In low and medium income nations, with less government infrastructure, Chinese Huashang also tend to participate in the informal economy in high numbers in ways that support the activities of the local non-migrant traders.

attempts to explore the makeup of the Chinese diaspora, their reasons for migrating to low and medium income African nations, and above all suggests a strong linkage for the Chinese diaspora as an agent of the Chinese state. This indeed seems to be, more generally, the direction of mainstream media speculation and anxiety over increased Chinese diaspora in Africa. Works like this depict the Chinese migrant as adventurer-explorer, capable of exploitation in a way that is rather evocative of colonial era European Christian missionaries and settlers.

While migration patterns of Chinese to Africa since 2001 have greatly accelerated, the scholarship on Chinese migration tend to tell a more contextual story. As of 2011 only 0.6% of the entire population of Chinese overseas resided in African nations. (Poston and Wong, 2016) Furthermore, this was an increase over a decade of just 0.2%. (Poston and Wong, 2016) The vast majority of Chinese diaspora reside in Asia and almost two thirds of Chinese diaspora lived in just four countries as of 2011: Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, and the United States. Poston and Wong, 2016) Notably, these do not include any African nations.

However, the Chinese diaspora presence in smaller, lower population African nations is important and made more conspicuous by their proportion of the local population depending on the level of urbanization and their geographical dispersion. Their ability to be a high-impact group on the local population therefore is profound. In highly populated, less urbanized Nigeria and Ethiopia (UNEC, 2016) for example, a large Chinese diaspora population may be less conspicuous as their community is small relative to the numbers and geographical spread throughout rural areas. In highly populated, highly urbanized South Africa (UNEC, 2016) on the
other hand, a sizeable Chinese diaspora community has more visibility due to their proximity with the indigenous host country population. The South African Chinese diaspora community in particular is also well known for their sizable, multi-generational, long-standing history as a cohesive community and their highly concentrated population.

Integration is another factor affecting the dynamics and differences between Chinese diaspora communities across African states, as well as their visibility and perceptions in the wider African community. Many nations with a long history of receiving sizable migrant populations over the centuries have highly developed programs for processing and integrating new migrants into local society (UNEC, 2016). While diaspora groups have now become globally recognized as a significant power-wielding change agent for development (Mogan and Tan-Mullins, 2009), the numbers of Chinese diaspora, their activities, and ties to homeland have not been carefully tracked by their own government. Furthermore, the reverse is true in low capacity African governments with little or no infrastructure for engaging with or even capturing basic data on the migrant community within their country. For this reason, conducting accurate studies on the Chinese diaspora community has been at times challenging.

Chinese Diaspora and African Host Country Relations

As the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2017 International Migration Report points out “despite the significant benefits of migration, some migrants remain among the most vulnerable members of
society...some endure human rights violations, abuse and discrimination.” The Chinese diaspora who have arrived during the New Scramble for Africa tend to be cast by scholarship, media, and nativist politicians in three altogether unfavorable roles: 1.) as a direct labor threat to the local job market (as in the case of Huashang traders and merchants or those workers relocated by Chinese MNC’s), 2.) as a collective grouping that can be used to intensify xenophobia in order to curry local political favor (Postel), or 3.) as a potential agent of the Chinese state and Chinese neo-colonialist strategy. (Postel)

The social and political implications of these categories run deep. As a 2016 study by Hannah Postel points out, some African politicians have seized upon the opportunity provided by the loose migration data in many African states to incite xenophobia for self-serving political purposes. Some of these efforts have resulted in outbreaks of xenophobic violence, especially in countries with strained job markets where migrants are perceived to interfere with local opportunities. One of the more notorious examples of scare tactic rhetoric is that of the late Zambian politician Michael Sata who in 2006 claimed a grossly inflated figure of 80,000 Chinese diaspora at the height of election season, while more thorough, accurate estimates have since put the 2006 figure of Chinese diaspora in Zambia to between 4,000 and 15,000. (Postel, 2016) The inaccuracy however does not appear to have stopped this figure from being widely circulated as a reasonable estimate of the Chinese diaspora population in Zambia. (Postel, 2016)

Examples like Zambia’s abound during the peak period of Chinese economic engagement and increased Chinese migration to Africa in the New Scramble.
Furthermore many instances of xenophobic violence, for example the 2015 outbreak in South Africa in 2015 which took the lives of 22 migrants, have made Chinese diaspora communities more isolated from society, in turn only further propagating the myths surrounding their roles in local African communities. Meanwhile a great need exists for parceling out the realities of the activities and impact of the Chinese diaspora in the New Scramble for Africa, capturing their potential contributions to local societies as an independent but related actor to the Chinese state, and mitigating any potentially negative local impacts.
Chapter III
Research Methodology and Analysis

The following chapter outlines in detail how the methodology was developed and applied to the research problem. It also discusses the selection of case studies and their role in the methodology. Lastly it discusses the limitations of the selected methodology for investigating the research problem.

Methodology Approach

This research asserts the following:

1.) Non-indigenous non-state actors within potentially neocolonialist environments such as the Chinese diaspora influx during the “New Scramble for Africa” are not associated with diminishing agency, therefore are not neocolonialist in their nature.

2.) The stronger institutional capacity an African government has, the greater the protection of individual agency for its citizens during times of potentially neocolonialist movements.

And in doing so examines the following research questions:

1.) To what extent does the presence and influx of Chinese diaspora affect the individual agency of Africans in shaping future socio-economic outcomes for the continent?
2.) Do differences in institutional capacity across African nations have an influence on the extent to which a non-state actor such as the Chinese diaspora can affect individual agency? In other words, do stronger governments protect the individual agency of Africans, thereby making their state more impervious to potential neocolonialist forces?

For this exploration, a conceptual framework was designed based on agency theory from an individual standpoint. This framework allows for the use of agency as a novel shorthand tool to understanding the research problem in the context of neocolonialism and could likely be employed in others like it to discuss the impact of foreign forces on local populations and governing bodies.

The practical challenge of measuring a hypothetical construct like agency is in finding its observable value. Agency is defined as the ability to carry out one's own will, or in the words of philosopher James Griffin, “we human beings have the capacity to form pictures of what a good life would be and try to realize these pictures.” It is individually possessed, and the philosophical underpinnings of the term suggest that it is inherently universally endowed rather than outwardly achieved or bestowed by others. The practical observational translation of agency is therefore expressed either by the protection of that capacity through upholding basic human rights, or alternatively, it can be inversely represented by the social, economic or political barriers to an otherwise unfettered free will. For the purpose of this study, the former expression of agency is used.
Empirical Analysis

Given this conceptual framework for agency, the measurement for the dependent variable in exploration of the first assertion will be reflected by the Mo Ibrahim Index for African Governance metric of “Participation and Human Rights”. As good governance factors uphold and protect individual agency, this measure will be empirically indicative of the degree to which an individual’s ability to pursue their social, economic, and political free will is ensured by the state. The “Sustainable Economic Opportunity” metric of the Mo Ibrahim IIAG will also be used as a dependent variable to measure the affect on socio-economic opportunities. These values will summarize altogether the level to which agency is expressed or constrained within a given African nation.

The explanatory variable used in this analysis was the size of the Chinese diaspora taken from the year 2011. This is sourced from the John Hopkins SAIS China-Africa Research Initiative labor data set which provides the level of Chinese contracted workers in 53 African nations. This data on the numbers of Chinese workers in African nations is used to segment and analyze those Chinese migrants who possess homeland ties with the larger Chinese economic engagement strategy via registered employment with a Chinese enterprise, from those who migrated to Africa to work in the informal sector as traders or merchants (also known as Huashang). As Huashang migrants have no compelling, direct evidential ties to the Chinese state beyond citizenship (Poston and Wong, 2016; Park, 2009), they can reasonably be omitted from the data set; they are conclusively not agents of the state to any degree without an investigation of links to a neo-colonialist movement.
This study will employ R statistical computing for the empirical analysis section of the study.

Case Studies

Given wide variations across the data set in host country institutional capacity and levels of economic engagement with the Chinese state, three case studies have been selected: South Africa, Mauritius, and Nigeria. Case studies are employed to zero in on diaspora growth within individual countries by using time series data across the height of the New Scramble for Africa. This examination of the data explores if conclusions drawn from the larger data set hold true across individual countries when using a time series for the ‘Chinese diaspora’ variable. Altogether this method assists in understanding how changes in the level of diaspora may impact agency locally within a given African nation.

Selection of case studies was based on several factors. Firstly, the relevance to the global conversation on the New Scramble for Africa was a key determinant. Size and growth of the Chinese diaspora during the New Scramble for Africa was also taken into consideration. Taken altogether, the example’s ability to demonstrate how the variation in state capacity, size of the national economy, degree of the modern Chinese economic engagement, and makeup of the local Chinese diaspora community all make for a dynamic situation, and may affect the level of influence for non-state actors, was paramount to selection.

South Africa has what is probably the most notorious Chinese diaspora community across Africa. It has historically been notable for being the largest by a
significant margin. Within the New Scramble for Africa period we have also seen the size of the South African Chinese diaspora community increase greatly, and the ways in which this historically cohesive community interacts with each other change. The type of migrant based on motivations and activities that the South African economy attracts however remains largely unchanged.

Mauritius also has a long-standing notable Chinese diaspora community. The Chinese were some of the earliest settlers and traders to Mauritius. There is a long-standing utilization of the Huashang merchant migrant within the existing business networks and for this reason the business climate was already considered “China-friendly” prior to the New Scramble. The diaspora economy there is also considered more closely linked with the larger national economy. Lastly, the Mauritian Chinese diaspora community is also one of the most mutually culturally integrated across Africa; for example, Mauritius has historically celebrated the Chinese New Year as a national holiday.

Nigeria makes for a compelling case due to its sudden growth in Chinese diaspora during the New Scramble for Africa. Prior to the New Scramble, Nigeria had an extremely negligible Chinese diaspora population. As of 2011, it had the third largest.

Research Limitations

A study of the Chinese diaspora presents several data challenges. The primary limitation was locating reliable sources of data to accurately perform an analysis on and draw conclusions to any reasonable degree. State-reported Chinese
data has been notoriously problematic and often intentionally embellished or underreported. Further compounding this problem, is the issue of data specifically on Chinese migration. Aside from migration flows related to SOE’s, the tracking, and moreover accurate tracking, of existing Chinese diaspora communities and their activities, and emigrating Chinese nationals is difficult to find. On the other hand, with regard to African reported data assessing Chinese diaspora in African nations, there are often problematic or limited collection processes and a lack of formalized public reports for these figures. Some of these problems stem from lack of administrative infrastructure or government capacity for capturing and maintaining such figures.

More generally, the very nature of capturing migrant or “diaspora” data is notoriously complicated by the process of defining and assigning identity. (Park, 2009) “Migrants” tend to be traceable by movement from nation to nation, visa permits, etc. “Diaspora” on the other hand can be left to self-identify based on their level of generational removal from the original migrant family member, or their cultural national identity and level of cultural integration within the host state. Altogether, these problems suggest that research in this field has a ceiling for the breadth of empirically based conclusions that can accurately be drawn on the topic and a limited amount of explorations and topics can be pursued in the first place.
Chapter IV.

Research Findings

The following chapter investigates the hypotheses put forth in the previous chapter by applying the described methodology. This chapter also provides a discussion of the how the quantitative analysis was carried out as well as a presentation of the findings. Lastly it discusses and includes the selected case studies.

Empirical Analysis and Findings

R statistical programming language was employed to perform statistical analysis on the central research questions, exploring the relevance between the relationships of the following variables: local individual agency (dependent), socioeconomic prospects (dependent), size of Chinese diaspora (independent), and institutional capacity of African host countries (independent). The following chapter provides a discussion of how this statistical analysis was carried out to explore the hypotheses, reports complementary findings from selected case studies, and reports the findings of all research conducted for this study.
Question 1. Findings

The first research question in this study (Q1) is to what extent does the presence and influx of Chinese diaspora affect the individual agency of Africans in shaping future socio-economic outcomes for the continent? The main explanatory variable is the presence of Chinese diaspora. The dependent variables tested are individual agency and socioeconomic prospects. Linear regression was used for both cases, essentially exploring two premises of the question that a.) Chinese diaspora could have an affect on individual agency, and that b.) the group could have an affect on socioeconomic opportunity.

As discussed in previous chapters of this study, the Chinese diaspora have a diverse makeup across African states. Overseas Chinese possess various motivations for relocating to Africa and pursuing different economic activities within the host country. They also have varying degrees of homeland ties. Examining whether Chinese diaspora are participant in a larger Chinese neo-colonialist strategy, or any Chinese foreign policy for that matter, mandates that the segments of Chinese diaspora which are known to have no state ties be excluded from the data for lines of statistical questioning. Per the discussion provided previously in Chapter II, this study finds that the Chinese migrant community across Africa identifying or reported as Huashang do not maintain state ties nor does the state maintain oversight or influence over them. It also finds that taken altogether as a group, Huashang diaspora, chain migrants, and transit migrants of Chinese origin in Africa during the New Scramble for Africa do not follow patterns of migration purpose or
diaspora activity historically consistent with exploitative colonialist or neo-colonialist migration movements.

Chinese diaspora with explicit state ties are thus the most relevant group for this study. The only group of Chinese diaspora that have migrated during the New Scramble for Africa with state ties substantial enough to merit any suggestion for the possibility of being state agents, are those directly relocated via contracted work in Africa (including Chinese State-Owned Enterprises and other Chinese firms). Furthermore, government contracted worker are the only classification of Chinese diaspora in Africa which has a potentially colonialist or neo-colonialist pattern from a socio-historical outlook. As a result, the appropriate data for this investigation excludes those migrating for and participating in informal markets, chain migration, and transit migration. Labor data from the John Hopkins SAIS China Africa Research Initiative reported by Chinese contractors is therefore used for the variable “Chinese diaspora”. Hereafter discussion of “Chinese diaspora” in the Question 1 Findings and Question 2 Findings sections of this chapter will therefore refer to those who have migrated as a worker under Chinese and other contracts.

The data for the explanatory variable, taken from the John Hopkins SAIS China Africa Research Initiative Labor Dataset, includes 53 African nations circa 2011. These data were sourced from the following: the China Statistical Yearbook, National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Annual Bulletin of Statistics of Contracted Projects, Almanac of China’s Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, China’s Trade and External Economic Statistical Yearbook. The data used to represent individual agency is taken from the Mo Ibrahim Index of African
Governance measure of Participation and Human Rights. The data used to represent socioeconomic opportunity is taken from the Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance measure of Sustainable Economic Opportunity.

An initial correlation study yields a low correlation coefficient of agency as a function of Chinese diaspora of -0.1673255. This suggests a weak but negative relationship between the variables. However, a graphical analysis of one of the variables suggests some outliers in Chinese diaspora may have a significant influence on these results:

![Boxplot of Chinese Diaspora](image)

**Figure 1. Boxplot of Chinese Diaspora**
Six data points are outliers as is shown by the boxplot. From a further visualization provided by a scatterplot, it is evident that the two largest outliers (Angola at 41,693 and Algeria at 36,562) appear to have a potentially significant affect on the rest of the data.

![Agency v. Chinese Diaspora](image)

Figure 2. Scatterplot of Agency v. Chinese Diaspora

The p-value of the linear model between agency and Chinese diaspora is 0.2265 indicating that the relationship between the variables is not statistically significant. The outliers Angola and Algeria (at 41,693 and 36,562 respectively) may be influencing the linear relationship.
Next, an investigation of the relationship between Chinese diaspora presence and sustainable economic opportunity were examined. The initial correlation study yields a low correlation coefficient of agency as a function of Chinese diaspora of -0.04187081 with a p-value of 0.7637. Again there is a strong visual case for outlier interference from the graphical analysis of sustainable economic opportunity when plotted against Chinese diaspora.

Figure 3. Scatterplot of Sustainable Economic Opportunity v. Chinese Diaspora

Taken altogether, it appears that the operative premises of Question 1 that a.) the number of Chinese diaspora have an influence on agency and that b.) Chinese
diaspora also influences sustainable economic opportunity, have no evidence of correlation within the data. Therefore, we can conclude from the Q1 data study that, at least based on these descriptive correlations, there is no obvious macro-level effect of the presence of Chinese diaspora during the New Scramble for Africa on individual African agency, at least based on the measures used for the dependent and explanatory variables discussed above.

Question 2. Findings

The second exploration of this study seeks to answer: do differences in institutional capacity across African nations have an influence on the extent to which a non-state actor such as the Chinese diaspora can affect individual agency? In other words, do stronger governments protect the individual agency of Africans, thereby making their state more impervious to potential neocolonialist forces? Central to this question is the premise that institutional capacity has an influence on agency. The Q2. correlation study will examine this potential relationship using institutional capacity as an explanatory variable and agency as the dependent variable. As described in the Q1. study, the data used to represent individual agency is taken from the Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance measure of Participation and Human Rights. The variable for institutional capacity is represented by the Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance Overall Governance Score.

An initial visualization of the data suggests a fairly clear indication of linear correlation between the variables:
A further summary of the variables reveals a correlation between them of 1.122 and a p-value of < 2.2e-16. Therefore the study indicates a statistically significant, positive relationship between the two variables. The linear model proposes that for every increased unit in institutional capacity growth (via good governance as reflected by the Mo Ibrahim IIAG), there is an increased support for individual agency (via upholding of human rights and participation) by 1.112 units. The linear relationship is modeled by the following graph:
Altogether it appears that there is a rather strong relationship between the variables. Therefore we can at least tentatively suggest that African institutional capacity can potentially protect and uphold the agency of individual African citizens. Future tests could assess whether those protections of individual agency can bolster resiliency against agency diminishing forces, including neo-colonialism.
Case Studies

The above statistical analyses are descriptive in nature. This section employs case study analysis that build on these descriptive correlations and unpack the relationship between diaspora, government capacity and individual agency more closely. The use of case studies is an important tool in critically evaluating the potential for agency to be impacted by the presence and growth of Chinese diaspora throughout Africa. The reasons for this are twofold. Firstly, there is a great deal of variation and diversity in this study’s relevant variables, both of institutional capacity between African states and of the size and makeup of their Chinese diaspora populations. Secondly, as discussed above, the examination of the data in the course of empirical analysis provides no evidential relationship between agency and Chinese diaspora. This does not however, definitively mean that none exists, but rather that none was evidenced from the data and importantly, some strong outlier cases of massive Chinese diaspora size appear to have an influence on the explored relationships.

Therefore, empirical analysis above provides an initial framework from which to explore case studies that are representative of the continent-wide African state experience with the New Scramble for Africa; those states that have absorbed large numbers of Chinese migrants whilst interacting in rather varied ways with the accelerating Chinese economic policy and growing Sino-African relationship. Though the data employed for the Q1 study is some of the most reliable available, within the data set and explored correlations, the nuance of how these very diverse diaspora groups may be interacting with their individual host country may be
overlooked. The following countries were selected for their representation of distinct Chinese diaspora communities: South Africa, Mauritius, and Nigeria.

A statistical test was carried out for each using a time series dataset for the variables of the single host country data point used in the Q1 study that encompasses the duration of the New Scramble for Africa (which for the purposes of this study begins in approximately 2009). In other words, the correlation with agency and Chinese diaspora influence was studied at a micro level to examine if the findings and generalizations of the Q1 study still hold true. Each of these cases is discussed below.

South Africa

In considering the case of South Africa, this study’s Q1 approach for exploring the potential relationship for Chinese diaspora as agents of neo-colonialist state strategy is applied using the same data but over a series of time (2009-2016). The time period was chosen based on data availability and what years best represent the peak of Chinese economic engagement and diaspora increase during the New Scramble for Africa. An initial correlation study for a linear model of agency in South Africa over 2009-2016 yielded a low correlation of -0.0002011. This suggests that there would be an incredibly low explanatory relationship between the growth of Chinese diaspora over the period of the New Scramble for Africa and agency if the relationship was significant. However, a summary of the linear model concludes that the p-value is 0.2981, meaning that there is not a statistically significant relationship between the variables of agency and Chinese diaspora.
within South Africa. These findings are consistent with the findings of the initial Q1 study.

**Mauritius**

In considering the case of Mauritius, again this study's Q1 approach for exploring the potential relationship for Chinese diaspora as agents of neo-colonialist state strategy is applied using the same data but over a series of time (2009-2016). The findings were again overwhelmingly consistent with the findings of the original Q1 study. The correlation between the variables of individual agency within Mauritius and the variable of Chinese diaspora was only -0.0001563, suggesting hardly any influence could be explained by the presence and growth of the Chinese diaspora in Mauritius over the years of the New Scramble for Africa. Furthermore, a linear model between the variables yields a p-value of 0.3413. Once again, there is no statistical significance between the two variables and we can safely conclude that in the case of Mauritius there is again no evidence of Chinese diaspora growth having an influence on the agency of Mauritians locally.

**Nigeria**

In the case of Nigeria, we have again applied the principles of the Q1 study in order to examine if agency of Nigerians locally is influenced by Chinese diaspora presence and growth over the New Scramble for Africa period (2009-2016). Our findings are once again consistent with the findings of the Q1 study, that there is no evidential relationship between Chinese diaspora and an influence on individual
agency. A correlation analysis returns the value of 0.001812, once again providing a very low explanation of agency based on Chinese diaspora increase. Furthermore, the linear model returns a figure of 0.3413 for a p-value with no statistical significance. This suggests that there is no evidence of a relationship in which the agency of Nigerians is being influenced by the growth of Chinese diaspora locally.

Summary of Findings

The results of the Q1 study taken together with the findings of the case studies analysis for South Africa, Mauritius, and Nigeria suggest overwhelmingly that there is no evidential relationship existing between the increase in the Chinese diaspora community in Africa and the agency of individual Africans over the peak years of the New Scramble for Africa. This suggests that to whatever degree Chinese diaspora may or may not be directly participating in or be broadly tied to a neo-colonialist origin country movement or more generally origin country foreign policy strategy, they are not having a neo-colonialist impact as a group.
Chapter V.

Research Conclusions

This chapter details the conclusions of the study, drawing upon the research findings outlined in the previous chapter. The chapter discusses the theoretical implications of the findings as well as, their policy implications. I then address some limitations of this study, and suggest areas for future research considerations.

Theoretical Implications

This study put forth two main hypotheses and the empirical findings were generally consistent with both. First the analysis in this study found that non-indigenous non-state actors within potentially neocolonialist environments such as the Chinese diaspora influx during the "New Scramble for Africa" are not necessarily associated with diminishing agency of host country individuals, and are therefore not neocolonialist in their nature. Second this study found that the stronger institutional capacity of African governments, can potentially help protect individual agency for its citizens during times of potential vulnerability from external influences such as neo-colonialist movements.

These conclusions imply that mass migration movements by diaspora from disproportionately strong global powers, while likely impactful on local areas in many ways, do not necessarily undermine local citizens’ free will, choices, and ability to carry out that free will. Furthermore, mass migration movements such as
these are likely unaffiliated with neo-colonialist powers and foreign policy strategies of their origin countries. A follow up implication of this is that fear of diaspora groups may be relatively unfounded. The second theoretical conclusion implies that for African nations facing foreign non-state modes of agency constriction (neo-colonialism), a strategy of institutional capacity building exists for the protection of the local citizenry.

Policy Implications

This study is an analysis of the impact and power dynamics between foreign non-state actors hailing from countries of disparate power and the local populations of those host countries. The findings and theoretical implications indicate that there is a significant amount of policy review and policy intervention that both African states and China could implement and benefit from. The merits of increased institutional capacity are already a growing interest in the field of international development and within the governing bodies of developing countries. A clear opportunity exists in the current Sino-African cooperative relationship for reevaluation of aid strategy and long-term, truly “win-win” cooperation. The power distribution and exploitation issues China is suspected of in Africa could be put to rest to some degree by implementing aid policy geared toward African institutional capacity building, thereby strengthening the good governance of those institutions so that they may become protective forces for potential neo-colonialist impacts.

Furthermore, policy opportunities clearly exist in the management of emigration on the Chinese side and immigration on the African side. The capture of
diaspora data and information could be cooperatively addressed so that both groups could harness the potential of the Chinese diaspora in Africa to their benefit and to the benefit of those in the Chinese diaspora population. Those who are participating in informal markets, migrating without working through and being accountable to properly governed national channels, and those who live in fear of xenophobia all operate on the margins of African society. Without proper governmental accountability of and to these diaspora groups, all parties will lose a great deal of strategic economic and social opportunity. They will also to some extent, always be overlooked by the research community who cannot access information about them and include them in studies and analysis that represent their realities and interests, thus in turn effecting the most efficient and productive relevant policies.

Limitations of the Study

This study has several important limitations that I discuss in this section. Firstly, the data collection and availability on Chinese migration in Africa has had many shortcomings during the period of the New Scramble for Africa. This is not unique to African states or China, but rather is part of a larger global challenge of collecting migration and mobility data which suffer from high levels of incompleteness (International Forum on Migration Statistics, 2018). It does appear that data availability is rapidly improving, especially as more scholarship and institutions turn their efforts towards monitoring of this phenomena. (Postel, 2017)

On the African side, the challenge exists largely within African institutional capacity for data sharing and related avenues for publication and dissemination
more so than it does as a matter of data collection (Postel, 2017). This is a problem that will likely become less severe with increased institutional capacity and an increased cognizance and collective interest in how the Chinese migration influx is influencing society. On the Chinese side, there is strong evidence of initiative to increase migration monitoring and engagement, such as the Chinese initiated collaboration with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to open a Liaison Office in Beijing in 2007 (International Organization for Migration). China has presently reached a new height of emigration outflow and as the second highest recipient of remittances globally (International Organization for Migration), has a development related interest in the topic.

Secondly, this study relies on the assumption that to some degree, Chinese state strategy has engaged in foreign policy within Africa that could be termed “neo-colonialist”. The reason for this is to provide a form of shorthand. While we know some instances of Chinese engagement have been exploitative and that the form they take (e.g. financing of loans) fits those described by Nkrumah in 1965 as neo-colonialist, the sheer breadth and variety of state engagements since the New Scramble for Africa began means that it would be an insurmountable task to identify whether or not each one constitutes a form of neo-colonialism in and of itself. Rather, it is more efficient to then assume the accusations of a New Scramble are the de facto position, while searching broadly by study design for explicit signs within the phenomena of neo-colonialism (such as the indicator of diminished agency).

This operative assumption is to some degree limiting. Firstly, it is difficult to nearly impossible to speak of the variety of Chinese economic, cultural, and
diplomatic engagement in Africa in aggregate from a purpose-driven perspective. Though an overarching state strategy and long-term goals clearly exist, the facets of how and why a particular approach to engagement may be adopted by various Chinese state actors is not fully parceled out by this particular study since that is not in fact, the purpose of this research. There exists a wide range of various instruments of Chinese foreign policy in Africa during the New Scramble for Africa and each are best examined individually in order to assess the drivers behind them and overall impact on local populations. Furthermore, while evidence can be gathered and analyzed on the topic, the state strategies in foreign policy of powerful nations tend to be rather clandestine and thus the eventual goals and linkages may always be more visible in hindsight.

Future Research Possibilities

These limitations notwithstanding, there are also exciting future avenues that follow from this study. The applied philosophical approach to understanding neo-colonialism adopted in this study is novel and thus provides ample room for further exploration. This could be achieved by exploring/conducting the following:

- Further use of empirical proxy measures for understanding agency in local populations affected by the affiliated non-state actors of any origin country of disparate power.
- Surveys of human subjects on the topic of agency within locally affected populations.
• Employment of bias removing methodologies that segment populations by those most affected by neo-colonialism.

• Studies of collective (national) agency that focus on constrictions of choice faced by the state and how they are passed down to their citizenry.

Research to expand the understanding of potential ties diaspora groups have to homeland foreign policy is another avenue for further expansion on this study. As the world is increasingly confronted with the profound size and affects of mass migration movements, nations will be continually confronted with the issues of transnational identities and origin country allegiances and how those may impact local populations. An informative expansion of this research topic would be:

• Studies of how different variables in the makeup of diaspora groups with clear ties to homeland foreign policy strategies differ in impact on host population agency (e.g. by strength of religious ethos, ideologies, push and pull factors, features of their origin country such as level of development or civil unrest).

Chinese diaspora based studies that lend to the dearth of data collection and dissemination regarding Chinese diaspora flows, diaspora makeup based on economic activities, and diaspora makeup based on push and pull factors would be a welcome addition to this topic of research, including:

• Archival research for the collection and dissemination of finely detailed Chinese visa data in African nations.

• Field research conducting elite interviews of top-level Chinese diplomats and businessmen in Africa on the topic of Chinese diaspora activities.
Final Conclusions

With this study I sought to both critically challenge the claims in scholarship and media of Chinese in Africa being used as part of a larger continent-wide exploitative, empire-building, neo-colonialist Chinese state strategy, and to create a shorthand tool for indicating the presence of growing neo-colonialism in African host countries (or any host country of disparate power for that matter) that can be observed empirically. In the rush to understand the aims and impact of China's growing role in the developing world, especially in Africa, media reports and policymakers often bundle the Chinese government, economic enterprises and other commercial actors, and diaspora working and living in developing countries into an oversimplified label of “China” that obscures important differences in the objectives and capabilities of these actors. In particular, up until now, the unique identity and role (or lack thereof) of Chinese diaspora in China's African policy goals has remained woefully understudied in the literature.

Altogether the findings conclude that there is little strong evidence, at least on the surface, of Chinese diaspora groups acting as state agents of Chinese foreign policy, nor of Chinese diaspora having a neo-colonialist (agency diminishing) influence in their African host countries. In addition this study explored the potential relationship between institutional capacity of the African host countries and their potential to mitigate the influence of neo-colonialism, and found that there is indeed a relationship between increased institutional capacity of African governments and the mitigation of negative influence on agency, thus providing a
policy solution to bolster against foreign neo-colonialist actors within host countries and protect local populations from their worst affects.
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