



Not Impartial: United States Relations With the United Kingdom During the Suez and Falklands Crises

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Not Impartial:

United States Relations with the United Kingdom During the Suez and Falklands Crises

Michael Milzcik

A Thesis in the Field of International Relations
for the Degree of Master of Liberal Arts in Extension Studies

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Abstract

This thesis is an attempt to better understand the decision-making process that occurred within the United States during the Suez Crisis of 1956 and the Falklands War of 1982. Specifically, why did the United States not assist its traditional ally, the United Kingdom, during the Suez Crisis, but chose to aid them during the Falklands War? This is undertaken in this work by reviewing both events under the Model I, II, and III method as described by Graham Allison in his book *Essence of Decision Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. Examining the history behind the two events via these three methods allows for a more complete understanding of the process that ultimately ended with the opposing American decisions. Reviewing both events chronologically and then comparatively, this paper ultimately finds that the decisions to not assist during Suez and to assist during the Falklands was the United States maximizing its perceived benefits. This is within the confines of Model I-Rational Actor Model. The United States sought to prevent the spread of communism within the Middle East during the Suez Crisis, and so looked for allies outside of its traditional partner, the United Kingdom. Later, during the Falklands War, the United States, instead of seeking allies within the South Atlantic, sought to promote the right to self-determination. Ultimately, the decisions made by American leadership tried to best promote American interests, and those interests changed during these time frames, first damaging, and then promoting the Anglo-American *special relationship*.

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Chapter I.

Introduction

In this chapter, I will describe the research problem that is the foundation for this thesis. I will also include a definition of terms commonly used, the historical background to the conflicts, the research methodology used in this work, and finally the research limitations.

Research Problem

The United States' assistance to its allies in the post-World War II era has been inconsistent. While examining the *special relationship* between the United States and the United Kingdom, the United States directly aided the United Kingdom during World War II but provided no such assistance a decade later during the Suez Crisis of 1956. This crisis involved the United Kingdom, France, and Israel, and the combined attempt to re-secure the Suez Canal after Egypt's nationalization. The United States actively campaigned to force a ceasefire within the United Nations.¹ Why then in 1982 did the United States provide covert assistance in the United Kingdom's invasion to retake the Falkland Islands?²

The importance of trust between allies cannot be overstated in international relations. Nations can either rise or fall depending on whether the nation has solid, consistent allies, or as German General Erich von Ludendorff described, are "shackled to

¹ United States, Department of State, Office of the Historian, *U.S. Department of State*, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/suez>.

² Lawrence D Freedman, "The Special Relationship, Then and Now," *Foreign Affairs* 85, no. 3 (2006): 61–73, www.jstor.org/stable/20031967.

a corpse.”³ Examining the reasons why the United States has chosen, or not chosen, to provide aid during two similar, limited armed conflicts, will allow for a greater prediction of future United States actions.

Both the Suez Crisis and Falklands War have been well documented, both because of the nature of modern reporting and the number of after-action reports. During the Suez Crisis, the United States was actively attempting to secure favor with the then Egyptian President Gamal Nasser.⁴ President Nasser despised the British for their control over the French built Suez Canal and had wished to eliminate British influence from the Middle East. Washington, however, wanted Egypt in its sphere of influence to act as a bulwark against the perceived threat from the Soviet Union.⁵ It appears President Dwight D. Eisenhower and his advisers were more concerned with building alliances in the Middle East than assisting America’s old allies. With regards to the Falklands however, it appears the United States, and specifically then President Ronald Reagan, were more concerned with assisting Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher than charming the Argentine Junta led by President Leopoldo Galtieri.⁶

This outline of the two conflicts leaves several unanswered questions regarding post-war Anglo-American relations. What organizations or individuals pushed for action, or neutrality, during these conflicts? Was the threat of a Soviet Intervention as serious of

³ Mesut Uyar, review of *Austro-Hungarian War Aims in the Balkans during World War I*, (review no. 1846) DOI: 10.14296/RiH/2014/1846.

⁴ Louise Richardson, "Avoiding and Incurring Losses: Decision-Making in the Suez Crisis," *International Journal* 47, no. 2 (1992): 370-401. doi:10.2307/40202764.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Gerald W. Hoppo, "Intelligence and Warning: Implications and Lessons of the Falkland Islands War," *World Politics* 36, no. 3 (1984): 339-61, doi:10.2307/2010378.

a threat as it was perceived? Was the United States permanently harming the *special relationship* it had with the United Kingdom when it attempted to gather allies outside of NATO, such as Egypt or Argentina? How important was the American decision to provide or withhold aid to the combatants on the ground? What, if any, impact did political theater and a desire for goodwill have on the United States' decision?

With this thesis, I examine the United States political relationship with the United Kingdom during the Suez Crisis and the Falklands War and try to determine why the United States chose not to assist its ally during one conflict and provided covert aid in the other. For this task, I utilize the Model I, Model II, and Model III methods as described in the second edition of *The Essence of Decision* by Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow.⁷ These separate methods allow for analysis that goes beyond a traditional unitary state model and reviews organizational output, individual politics, and its effect in shaping policy.

The United States, acting to maximize its positive outcomes, and due to senior government leaders' influence, did not aid the United Kingdom, France, or Israel during the Suez Crisis. However, American did assist the United Kingdom during the Falklands War. This divergence was due in large part to the United States' concern for preserving the political imagery and goodwill it had developed in the 1950's Middle East region in order to gain allies within the region. By 1982, these same concerns over political perception on the international stage still existed; however, they did not play as large of a

⁷ Graham T. Allison, and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2nd ed. (London: Pearson, 1999).

role during the Falklands War. The political narrative that developed was one of liberating the oppressed British Subjects, who demanded self-determination.

Definition of Terms

“The Suez Crisis” - “Tripartite Aggression” - “Sinai War” - “Suez Conflict” was a limited armed conflict between the combined powers of the United Kingdom, France, and Israel against Egypt which took place in Egypt in 1956.⁸

“The Falklands War” - “The Falklands Campaign” - “The Falklands/Malvinas War” - “Falklands Conflict” was a limited armed conflict between the United Kingdom and Argentina, which took place in the South Atlantic Ocean theater in 1982.⁹

As originally developed by Graham Allison, to better understand the decision-making process of the United States during the Cuban Missile Crisis, he described three separate Models:

“Model I,” which represents “The Rational Actor” or “RAM,” refers to a method of political science analysis which uses a unitary state as the main actor in international relations. This model assumes that a monolithic state will act to maximize its perceived positive outcomes and will attempt to minimize negative outcomes.¹⁰

⁸ "Suez Canal and Suez Crisis," *Encyclopedia of Western Colonialism since 1450*, *Encyclopedia.com*. <http://www.encyclopedia.com/history/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/suez-canal-and-suez-crisis>.

⁹ "Falkland Islands War," *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*. *Encyclopedia.com*. (February 1, 2017). <http://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences/applied-and-social-sciences-magazines/falkland-islands-war>.

¹⁰ Allison and Zelikow, *Essence of Decision*, chapter 1.

“Model II” represents “Organizational Behavior” or “Organizational Process” and refers to a method of political science analysis that does not see the State as a monolithic organization and instead views the decision-making process as being operated using standard operating procedures (SOPs) and the combined products that separate organizations create.¹¹

“Model III” represents “Governmental Politics” and refers to a method of political science analysis where neither a unitary state, nor a series of organizations are the primary actor in international relations but instead individual people’s political influence, bargaining, and decision making are. This model describes personal and political decision making as, “the act of bargaining along regular circuits among players positioned hierarchically within the government.”¹²

Background

Examples of United States intervention post World War II throughout the Cold War are numerous and well documented. The Berlin Airlift in 1948, the Korean War, the Lebanon Crisis in 1958, the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, the Dominican Civil War in 1965, the Vietnam War, the Invasion of Grenada in 1983, the Iran-Contra Affair in 1985, and the Invasion of Panama in 1990 are but some of the examples that could be analyzed. The United States reasoning and decision-making behind these interventions, however, is often vague, misunderstood, or misinterpreted by casual observers. To understand why

¹¹ Ibid., chapter 3.

¹² Allison and Zelikow, *Essence of Decision*, chapter 5, quotation on 255.

the United States acted as it did, I have chosen two similar armed conflicts during a narrower time period, in which the United States policy had two different results.

During these conflicts the United States had a Republican administration, which was attempting to enlarge its sphere of influence to countries (Egypt during the Suez and Argentina during the Falklands) to prevent the spread of communism.¹³ Both conflicts were viewed by detractors as anachronisms of colonialism,¹⁴ with the Suez Canal being an important strategic colonial asset built by France, and the Falklands islands being a series of small islands deep within the South Atlantic, colonized by both the United Kingdom and Argentina.¹⁵ Finally, both cases from London's perspective were time sensitive. Without quick action in Egypt, the British public would continue to lose interest, and a sense of *fait accompli* would emerge.¹⁶ Similarly, in the later crisis, with the winter approaching in the South Atlantic, a narrow window of opportunity presented itself to the United Kingdom. Without a rapid strike, the Falklands would remain held, and fortified by the Argentinians for months, possibly leading to its annexation.¹⁷

Additional similarities can be explained from the United States' political atmosphere at the time. The United States had just undergone a costly military intervention prior to the Suez Crisis in the form of the Korean War just three years prior.

¹³ Richardson, "Avoiding and Incurring Losses: Decision-Making in the Suez Crisis."

¹⁴ Marlene Dixon, "The Suez Syndrome," *Contemporary Marxism*, no. 9 (1984): V-Xviii. <http://www.jstor.org.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/stable/29765796>.

¹⁵ J. C. Metford, "Falklands or Malvinas? The Background to the Dispute," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* vol. 44, no. 3 (1968): 463-81, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2615026>.

¹⁶ Khalid Mahmood, "British Public Opinion and Suez," *Pakistan Horizon* 15, no. 3 (1962): 204-20, <http://www.jstor.org.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/stable/41392720>.

¹⁷ Sandy Woodward and Patrick Robinson, *One Hundred Days: The Memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group Commander* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997).

The ending of that conflict in a stalemate influenced many policymakers about the feasibility of armed conflict, and the ongoing Hungarian revolution made any decision to assist in the attack of a sovereign state, look comparable to the actions of the Soviet Union in Central Europe.¹⁸ Prior to the Falklands War, the political reverberations of the Vietnam War and policy lessons learned during the Iranian Hostage Crisis were fresh in the minds of those in Washington.¹⁹

An important item to note is the changing state of the *special relationship* that the United States and United Kingdom enjoyed. While much has been written about the strong personal and political ties between President Ronald Reagan and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, in both the press, biography's, and documentaries, less is written regarding Eisenhower's feeling of frustration at the leadership of the United Kingdom, France, and Israel.

It is the abundance of personal ties and strategic goals during these crises that makes the Model I, II, III method described in *Essence of Decision* such an effective way to analyze the complex decision of assisting United States' allies. While all three models need to be examined to obtain a better understanding of the history of United States/United Kingdom relations during the Cold War, American strategic goals seem to be the most influential during these conflicts. Both personal influences and organizational output influenced the timeframe, language, and demeanor of the United States' response, but they do not appear to have ultimately change it.

¹⁸ Peter G. Boyle, "The Hungarian Revolution and the Suez Crisis," *History* 90, no. 4 (300) (2005): 550-65, <http://www.jstor.org.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/stable/24428113>.

¹⁹ Christopher Hemmer, "Historical Analogies and the Definition of Interests: The Iranian Hostage Crisis and Ronald Reagan's Policy toward the Hostages in Lebanon," *Political Psychology* 20, no. 2 (1999): 267-89, <http://www.jstor.org.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/stable/3792077>.

Research Methods

I examined the Suez and Falklands conflicts using the Allison's three-models method and ultimately demonstrate that a combination of desired positive strategic outcomes and organizational outputs influence led to the differing United States' decisions during the Suez and Falklands conflicts. To use these research models to the best extent, I broke down my research into two separate phases, with each being associated with all three corresponding models. After these phases, I compared the results from each of the three models and establish my conclusion based on a triangulation among all three. The first phase is a review the primary and secondary sources on the Suez Crisis. Using open source, unclassified American data, I reviewed the United States strategic position on the Suez Crisis. Additionally, I reviewed the personal history of the then secretary of state, president, and other senior officials to provide a better understanding of their personal influences in decision making.

The second phase was to complete the same primary and secondary research on the Falklands War. I examined the strategic reasons for United States covert assistance and reviewed the United States officials' personal influence during the war, including the secretary of state and president. After having reviewed all the information regarding the Suez and Falklands conflicts, I examined the differences between the cases and the major reasons for a split decision.

Although determining the relative contributions of the three models is not the primary objective in this proposed research, I find that Model I proved to be the most useful, with Models II and III providing evidence that helps explain the nuances around decision-making. This hypothesis about the relative utility of the three models will be supported if I can demonstrate that the key reasons for the United States decision to assist

or not assist during these conflicts was due to the perception of the conflicts, as well as the level of desire to expand the United States political sphere of influence.

Research Limitations

To maintain the proper scope of this thesis, I limited the number of works selected to review, especially those of a personal nature. Model III in particular revolves around each senior policymaker's personal politics and bargaining power. It could be easy to delve too far into individual actors 'backgrounds.²⁰ An additional limitation is my lack of language skills, specifically in Spanish and Arabic. However, because the emphasis is on the relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom, it was not as limiting as it would have been in a more encompassing examination of the origins for the Suez and Falklands crises.

²⁰ Allison and Zelikow, *Essence of Decision* 27.



Figure 1. Map of Suez Crisis Area 1956.²¹

Chapter II.

The Suez Crisis

The beginning of the Suez Crisis can be traced to the foundation of the waterway in 1869. The French developer Ferdinand de Lesseps, working within the Suez Canal Company, had received the authorization to establish the canal after the then Egyptian rulers, Said Pasha and Ismail Pasha, agreed to cofound the venture.²² The construction took nearly 10 years and was fraught with manufacturing issues, financing difficulties, and concerns about the use of forced labor. In 1875, with the Egyptian government facing financial difficulties, the Egyptian leaders were forced to sell its shares to the United

²¹ "An Affair to Remember," *The Economist*, July 29, 2006, <http://www.economist.com/node/7218678>.

²² Edward Thomas Rogers, Mary Eliza Rogers, and George L. Seymour, "The Suez Canal," *The Art Journal (1875-1887)*, New Series, 6 (1880): 329-32, doi:10.2307/20569599.

Kingdom.²³ Following the success of the British during the Anglo-Egyptian war of 1822, the 1888 Constantinople Treaty allowed freedom of movements of all nation's vessels and cemented an era of British influence in Egypt.²⁴

With the outbreak of World War I, the Entente Cordial (made up in part by the United Kingdom, France, and colonial possessions) had to station troops in Egypt to repel the Central Powers' attacks on the canal zone via the Ottoman Empire.²⁵ The canal's defense was vital to maintain the Entente's naval connections to their colonies. The defeat of the Central Powers in 1918 and the carving up of the Middle East between the victories Entente allowed the United Kingdom to secure the Suez with permanent garrisons. The post war Egyptian revolution of 1919 led to the notional independence of Egypt, and its removal from being a British protectorate in 1922.²⁶ However, Britain maintained garrisons across Egypt and Sudan and retained control of the canal zone.²⁷

The Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936 was signed, to reduce the displacement of British troops scattered around Egypt and was to be enforced until 1956.²⁸ This, however, did not include garrisons located around the canal zone. With the outbreak of World War

²³ "Canal History," Suez Cannal Authority - Canal History, <http://www.suezcanal.gov.eg/English/About/SuezCanal/Pages/CanalHistory.aspx>.

²⁴ "Constantinople Convention," Suez Canal Authority Constantinople Convention, <http://www.suezcanal.gov.eg/English/About/CanalTreatiesAndDecrees/Pages/ConstantinopleConvention.aspx>.

²⁵ Raphael Nakhla, "The British in Egypt," *Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review* 9, no. 33 (1920): 101-17, <http://www.jstor.org.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/stable/30084005>.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ "The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty Negotiations." *Bulletin of International News* 4, no. 19 (1928): 3-11, <http://www.jstor.org.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/stable/25638431>.

²⁸ "Treaty of Alliance Between His Majesty, In Respect of the United Kingdom and His Majesty The King of Egypt," *The American Journal of International Law* 31, no. 2 (1937): 77-90, doi:10.2307/2213426.

II, the Allies once again had to defend Egypt and the Suez Canal from attacks, this time by the German and Italian armies. The Axis thrust into Egypt via Libya and was rebuffed at the Battle of Alamein and the Suez was not directly threatened again during the war.²⁹

Following the war, Egyptian and British relations deteriorated. The United Kingdom had been maintaining approximately 80,000 troops in and around the canal zone, which antagonized the increasingly nationalistic Egyptian population.³⁰ In October of 1951, the Egyptian Prime Minister Nahas Pasha asked the parliament to repeal the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty.³¹ On January 25th, Egyptian Police officers, located in the city of Ismailia, refused to be removed by United Kingdom troops following accusations by the British of aiding attacks on the British Suez garrison.³² This worsened the already poor relationship between the British officials and the Egyptian people. On July 23rd, the Free Officers Movement led by General Muhammad Naguib and Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser propagated a successful military coup against the Egyptian government, with a focus on independence from the western powers, regional primacy, and asserting its position in the Cold War.³³

²⁹ Adrian Gilbert, "Battles of El-Alamein," Encyclopedia Britannica, <https://www.britannica.com/event/battles-of-El-Alamein>.

³⁰ Collin L. McArthur, *The Suez Crisis: A Multi-Faceted Case Study Essay of National Strategy*, US Army War College, Defense Technical Information Center, <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a182761.pdf>.

³¹ "Repeal of Anglo-Egyptian Treaty will keep British out of Suez" *Advocate (Burnie, Tas.:1890 - 1954)* 10 October 1951: 1 (DAILY), <http://nla.gov.au/nla.news-article91773624>.

³² "Egypt, (British Military Action, Ismailia)," *Egypt (British Military Action, Ismailia) (Hansard, 31 January 1952)*, hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1952/jan/31/egypt-british-military-action-ismailia.

³³ T. R. L, "Egypt since the Coup D'Etat of 1952," *The World Today* 10, no. 4 (1954): 140-49, <http://www.jstor.org.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/stable/40392721>.

Model I Rational Actor Model

Graham Allison's first of three models as described in his book *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* is the Rational Actor Model.

“In its simplest form, the RAM links purpose and action. If I know an actor's objective, I have a major clue to his likely action. By observing behavior and considering what the actor's objective might be, I have a strong hypothesis about why he did whatever he did.”³⁴

Allison writes a list of simplified core questions when reviewing or predicting international events using this Model including:

Assume:

- X is the action of a state
- The state is a unified actor
- The state has a coherent utility function
- The state acts in relation to threats and opportunities
- The state's action is value-maximizing (or expected value maximizing)

Ask:

- What threats and opportunities arise for the actor?
- Who is the actor?
- What is the utility function?
- To maximize the actor's objectives in the specified conditions, what is the best choice?³⁵

The RAM model also has two core concepts: that unitary states are the key actors in international affairs and the state acts rationally and seeks to maximize its benefits.³⁶

With this understanding, why did the United States not aid the United Kingdom during the Suez Crisis? The success of the military coup, and Nasser's eventual

³⁴ Allison and Zelikow, *Essence of Decision* 49.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 27.

³⁶ *Ibid.* 27.

assumption as head of state had reverberations around the world, was of especial concern for the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and France. The West and the East had been locked in an ever increasingly perilous Cold War since the end of World War II, and both blocs wanted to expand their own influence on unaligned Third World nations.³⁷

The United States, seeking to guard itself and its democratic allies from possible invasion by the Soviet Union, founded the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on April 4th, 1949.³⁸ NATO had teething problems, including budgetary and command issues, but grew in value during the Korean War.³⁹ The extension of the organization in 1952 saw Greece and Turkey join. The addition of Turkey allowed for the basing of United States missiles and aircraft that could be used to strike deep into the Soviet Union.

Fearing a Soviet expansion to the Mediterranean or Persian Gulf, with the perceived goal of acquiring a long coveted warm water port, the United States sought a protective coalition.⁴⁰ America struggled to organize a group to protect the Middle East and Southwest Asia. The United States provided aid to the total of \$13 Billion during 1952 and 1953 via the Mutual Security Act to influence and aid its allies. Some of this aid made it to Greece, Turkey, Iran, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Israel, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen.⁴¹ American planners clearly hoped that these expenditures would

³⁷ "Third World," Merriam-Webster.com, [https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/third world](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/third%20world). Nations not aligned with the Soviet Union or the United States.

³⁸ Lawrence S. Kaplan, "NATO and Its Commentators: The First Five Years," *International Organization* 8, no. 4 (1954): 447-67, <http://www.jstor.org.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/stable/2704592>.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Hanson W Baldwin, "Strategy of the Middle East." *Foreign Affairs* 35, no. 4 (1957): 655-65, doi:10.2307/20031260.

maximize its image in the region and both economically develop these nations and influence their leaders to draw them closer to the West. This was undertaken at a time, as noted in the background of the conflict, of diminishing British and French influence in the Middle East. The British's loss of Egypt, and the increasing nationalism in the French controlled Algeria, meant a destabilizing Middle East and a potential power vacuum, which the Soviets could take advantage of.

A variety of defense designs were imagined by the State Department and Department of Defense, and in 1952 a Middle East Defense Organization was proposed.⁴² Yet Egypt, which was thought to be a critical participant in the organization, was not willing to join it without recovering control of the Suez Canal and was not eager to work with a United States-United Kingdom led pact. This was due to the current problems Egypt had with the British and because Egypt increasingly viewed itself as the main leader of the Arab nations. The proposal was eventually scrapped, and a replacement pact was developed in 1955, this time known as the Baghdad Pact. It comprised Iraq, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom. The United States would eventually join in 1958.⁴³

While this would provide a northern protection of the Middle East and South West Asia, the absence of other Middle East countries, including Egypt and Israel, was a huge hindrance to the West's objective of protecting the area from the Soviet Influence.

⁴¹ Halford L Hoskins, "Some Aspects of the Security Problem in the Middle East," *The American Political Science Review* 47, no. 1 (1953): 188-98, doi:10.2307/1950964.

⁴² United States. Central Intelligence Agency. *Prospects for an Inclusive Middle East Defense Organization*. 17 March 1952.

⁴³ "Baghdad Pact," *International Organization* 10, no. 1 (1956): 212-13, <http://www.jstor.org.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/stable/2704356>.

The Suez, in the hands of an adversarial, Soviet backed Egypt could possibly cut oil trade routes from the Middle East to Europe and the United States. Additionally, this could impose intolerably long and vulnerable supply lines around Africa during a time of crisis or conflict.⁴⁴

The United States therefore rationally desired President Gamal Nasser's support and tried repeatedly during these defense talks to sway him to support the United States. Unfortunately for the United States, Egypt under President Nasser was stubbornly neutral.⁴⁵ During an interview, President Nasser would claim to never support a British led defense alliance and days later would claim the Soviet Union was a terrible threat to the region.⁴⁶ Nasser would play both sides, attempting to purchase arms from the United States by threatening to buy from the Soviet Union, which Egypt eventually did. Egypt's recognition of communist China in May 1956 angered the United States, which disliked the stance President Nasser took and his attempts to play both the West and the East. The United States canceled its halfhearted proposed funding of the Aswan Dam project shortly after.⁴⁷

When the Suez was nationalized on July 26, the United States from the start supported a peaceful solution. The United States had no intention of being viewed as unsympathetic to decolonization and wanted to ensure Egypt did not sway towards the

⁴⁴ Hoskins, "Some Aspects of the Security Problem in the Middle East."

⁴⁵ Elie Podeh, "The Drift towards Neutrality: Egyptian Foreign Policy during the Early Nasserist Era, 1952-55." *Middle Eastern Studies* 32, no. 1 (1996): 159-78, <http://www.jstor.org.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/stable/4283780>.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Silvia Borzutzky, and David Berger, "Dammed If You Do, Dammed If You Don't: The Eisenhower Administration and the Aswan Dam," *Middle East Journal* 64, no. 1 (2010): 84-102, <http://www.jstor.org.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/stable/20622984>.

Soviet Union. President Eisenhower wrote to Prime Minister Eden, stating that⁴⁸ "...the peoples of the Near East and of North Africa and, to some extent, all of Asia and Africa, would be consolidated against the West to a degree which, I fear, could not be overcome in a generation."⁴⁹ The United States consistently stated during the times between the nationalization, and the invasion by the United Kingdom, France, and Israel, that it would not assist in military operations. The United States and particularly the president did not believe a military solution would be a permanent one even if successful, and as the weeks continued, the administration was increasingly pessimistic with the lack of progress that the Anglo-American talks were making; Neither was the White House optimistic about a positive outcome of any military intervention.⁵⁰

To complicate matters for the United States, while negotiations were taking place with the United Kingdom and France, the Hungarian Revolution started on October 23rd, just six days prior to the planned British, French, and Israeli invasion. 50,000 protesters marched in Budapest to demand the withdrawal of Soviet troops and multiparty elections.⁵¹ Washington protested the Soviet crackdown but could do little more than make statements and broadcast pro-western messages.⁵² Short of risking nuclear war, the

⁴⁸ "Baghdad Pact," *International Organization* 10, no. 1 (1956): 212-13, <http://www.jstor.org.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/stable/2704356>.

⁴⁹ Eisenhower to Eden, 3 Sept. 1956, PREM 11/1177, T 381/56, National Archives, Kew.

⁵⁰ Richardson, "Avoiding and Incurring Losses: Decision-Making in the Suez Crisis."

⁵¹ Boyle, "The Hungarian Revolution and the Suez Crisis."

⁵² Evans, Michael, "1956 Hungarian Revolution A History in Documents," *The 1956 Hungarian Revolution*. 2002, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB76/>.

Hungarians were on their own. It seems that the United States would not risk an armed conflict with the Warsaw Pact over an internal Soviet state crisis.

On October 28th, the allied nations prepared to invade Egypt. President Eisenhower was shocked at the prospect. "I have just learned from the press of the 12-hour ultimatum which you and the French Government have delivered to the Government of Egypt... I feel I must urgently express to you my deep concern at the prospect of this drastic actions."⁵³ The next day the invasion commenced. The United States, in an emergency session of the United Nations General Assembly, called for the adoption of Resolution 997 to be approved, which demanded an immediate ceasefire, a withdrawal of all forces, an arms embargo, and the reopening of the Suez Canal.⁵⁴ It was blocked by the United Kingdom and France. Days later, on November 2nd, the Resolution 1001⁵⁵ was adopted and a ceasefire went into effect along with the creation of the United Nations Emergency Force, due in part to the United States refusal to allow International Monetary Fund emergency loans to go to Britain, while still in armed conflict.⁵⁶

Model II Organizational Behavior

The second of the three models described by Allison was the Organizational Behavior Model. A brief description of this model includes the statement, "But a government is not an individual,"⁵⁷ and the statement "Governmental behavior

⁵³ Eisenhower to Eden, 30 Oct. 1956, PREM 11/1177, T 488/5

⁵⁴ "Resolution 997 (ES-I)," United Nations. <http://dag.un.org/handle/11176/205609>.

⁵⁵ "Resolution 1001 (ES-I)." United Nations. <http://dag.un.org/handle/11176/205613>.

⁵⁶ "An Affair to Remember."

⁵⁷ Allison and Zelikow, *Essence of Decision*, 143.

can therefore be understood, according to a second conceptual model, less as a deliberate choice and more as outputs of large organizations functioning according to standard patterns of behavior.”⁵⁸

The Organizing concepts within this model include:

- Organizational actors
- Factored problems and fractionated power
- Organizational missions
- Operational objectives
- Action as organizational output
- Central coordination and control
- Decisions of Government Leaders⁵⁹

A basic example of this model within the context of the period would be the United States State Department and Department of Defense’s reaction to the Hungarian Revolution. While it was the desire for the United States to spread western democracy and to impede the Soviet Union, the governmental institutes’ task with diplomacy and military operations could not find a solution with mediated risks. This was due to the lack of organized partisans, poor terrain for covert operations, and the overwhelming position of the Soviet nuclear and conventional forces on the continent.⁶⁰ So while Model I would express the will of the United States as a unitary actor, Model II views the decision-making process as a combination of the decisions made by organizations within the state. Using this lens, what organizational decisions led to the United States not intervening in the Suez Crisis? The executive branch, the Department of State, and the intelligence

⁵⁸ Ibid., 143.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 166-174.

⁶⁰ United States, US Army G2, *Study Prepared for U.S. Army Intelligence, “Hungary: Resistance Activities and Potentials,” January 1956* (Washington: Georgetown University, 1956), <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB76/doc1.pdf>.

services were the major organizations most influential to the decision of not providing aid to the British, French, and Israeli allies.

From the executive branch of the White House, one of the major factors was development (albeit after the Suez Crisis) of the Eisenhower Doctrine. This doctrine offered the United States' economic and military aid to Middle Eastern countries threatened by an outside power, mainly the Soviet Union.⁶¹ While this doctrine was not explicitly stated prior to the crisis, it had been discussed during the elections. This was a continuation and expansion of a policy created by the United States and specifically the Office of the President to contain Soviet's influence, dating back to the policy of containment. The idea of containing the Soviet Union was first coined a decade prior to the Suez Crisis in 1946, when American diplomat George Kennan wrote "The Sources of Soviet Conduct."⁶² President Harry Truman's March 1947 speech to the Congress and the allocation of \$400 Million in aid to Greece and Turkey established the Truman Doctrine. This would seek to stop the spread of communism, and empower the free people of the world, in a more aggressive way than had been conducted during World War II.⁶³

Because organizations as described by Allison take time to adjust and tend to operate using standard operating procedures and via previous experiences,⁶⁴ it was

⁶¹ A. M. Fitzsimons, "The Suez Crisis and the Containment Policy," *The Review of Politics* 19, no. 4 (1957): 419-45, <http://www.jstor.org.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/stable/1404825>.

⁶² "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs* 25, no. 4 (1947): 566-82, doi:10.2307/20030065.

⁶³ Samuel Kernell, "The Truman Doctrine Speech: A Case Study of the Dynamics of Presidential Opinion Leadership," *Social Science History* 1, no. 1 (1976): 20-44, doi:10.2307/1170931.

⁶⁴ Allison and Zelikow, *Essence of Decision*, Chapter 3.

natural for President Eisenhower to continue and expand the foreign policies of the previous administration. Yet both Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles sought a more active political and economic containment. The Korean War showed in a way that a policy of containment could work but not without allies and not without large cost in both blood and treasure. This large cost showed how difficult and unappetizing intervening is for President Eisenhower and his staff, and Eisenhower believed strongly in the ability of American diplomats rather than just using force.⁶⁵

The Department of State at this time enjoyed a position of power within the Eisenhower administration. The president viewed political and economic power to be more effective in the long term than the Department of Defense, which was contrary to the Soviet Union.⁶⁶ The Department of State had a history post World War II of successfully operating political and financial operations to protect against the Soviet Union. These included the Marshall Plan and within the region the Mutual Security Act. Additionally, America's initial proposal to fund the Aswan Dam was viewed optimistically.⁶⁷

The United States' diplomats during the crisis had a history of cooperation following the World War I and II with the British, French, and later Israeli governments. However, the increasing nationalism within the colonial holdings and the threat of the spread of communism was a wedge between the allies. John Foster Dulles, the head of the State Department, conducted multiple meetings with the British and French following

⁶⁵ Richard M. Saunders, "Military Force in the Foreign Policy of the Eisenhower Presidency," *Political Science Quarterly* 100, no. 1 (1985): 97-116, doi:10.2307/2150862.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Borzutzky and Berger, "Dammed If You Do."

the canal nationalization and stated the policy of the administration was one of no assistance in a forceful retaking of the Suez Canal zone. Secretary Dulles stated it would be an immoral and a reckless action to retake the Suez by force.⁶⁸ Unfortunately for the allies involved, the United States miscalculated the determination of the British and French's desire to use military force. Diplomats within the allies believed that since the United States stood with Britain and France during World Wars, and with Israeli during the 1956 Peace Initiative, it would consistently back its partners.⁶⁹

Once the invasion started, some in London thought that the best the Washington would do is passively condemn the attack to retain face in the Middle East. It was hoped that America would act as a neutral party in an affair primarily between the British and the Egyptians.⁷⁰ The United States State Department's desire for a Middle East free from the Soviet influence, a desire to appear as arbiters of global diplomacy, and the promotion of decolonization were paramount in the minds of American diplomats.⁷¹ Across the Atlantic, the State Department and the British Diplomatic Service were aware of the declining state of the British role in world diplomacy and the rise of an American hegemony within the West.⁷² Uncertain about the viability of the British and French, the State Department perceived that it had to step up in the Middle East and act like a

⁶⁸ Benjamin Nimer, "Dulles, Suez, and Democratic Diplomacy," *The Western Political Quarterly* 12, no. 3 (1959): 784-98, doi:10.2307/443873.

⁶⁹ Michael B. Oren, "Secret Egypt-Israel Peace Initiatives Prior to the Suez Campaign," *Middle Eastern Studies* 26, no. 3 (1990): 351-70, <http://www.jstor.org.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/stable/4283378>.

⁷⁰ Ralph Dietl, "Suez 1956: A European Intervention?" *Journal of Contemporary History* 43, no. 2 (2008): 259-78, <http://www.jstor.org.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/stable/30036506>.

⁷¹ G. C. Peden, "Suez And Britain's Decline as a World Power," *The Historical Journal* 55, no. 4 (2012): 1073-096, <http://www.jstor.org.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/stable/23352191>.

⁷² Peden, "Suez and Britain's Decline."

regional leader at the cost of Anglo-American, Franco-American, and Israeli-American relations.

The final organization, which played a key role in the Suez Crisis from the organizational behavior model, is the United States intelligence services, specifically the Central Intelligence Agency. The CIA had been operating in Egypt prior to 1952 and had contacts within the Free Officers Movement prior to the coup.⁷³ It had established an active section within the United States Embassy in Cairo in late 1952, and had been using charm and financial aid to win over the Egyptian leadership.⁷⁴ However, the State Department and intelligence organization's methods were at odds with the British. "The US method for discouraging extremism had focused on establishing close and friendly relations with the Junta; Britain, on the other hand, had followed a more reserved line, ... also maintaining the threat of intervention as a deterrent."⁷⁵ It appears evident that the intelligence organizations within the Middle East were focused on the threat of the Soviets and would overlook the Egyptian Government's continuously changing of positions and the increasing nationalism within the Arab world. Egypt's desperation for American arms and the lack of supplies provided by the CIA, Department of Defense, and State Department led to increasingly aggravated cries from Egyptian officials. Muhammad Hussanein Heikal, President Nasser's trusted adviser, explained that the Arabs wanted a defense against America's friends as well as against its enemies.⁷⁶ By

⁷³ Barry Rubin, "America and the Egyptian Revolution, 1950-1957," *Political Science Quarterly* 97, no. 1 (1982): 73-90, doi:10.2307/2149315.

⁷⁴ Michael T. Thornhill, "Britain, the United States and the Rise of an Egyptian Leader: The Politics and Diplomacy of Nasser's Consolidation of Power, 1952-4," *The English Historical Review* 119, no. 483 (2004): 892-921, <http://www.jstor.org.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/stable/3490692>.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 901.

1954, CIA officers such as Miles Copeland had maintained contact with the officer's movement and President Nasser for years. The CIA even granted (bribed) Nasser with \$3 million, and provided logistical aid, to no effect.⁷⁷

The CIA was more open to providing arms than the State Department and upon discovering the Egyptians looking to purchase Soviet arms pressed for the approval of \$28 million in small arms from the United States.⁷⁸ The State Department worried about a developing arms race between Egypt and Israel and did not push for the sale. Egypt would later procure arms from the Soviet via communist Czechoslovakia, and this became a tremendous strain on the agency's relationship with Egypt. Following the Suez Crisis and the ceasefire in 1956, and due to President Nasser's continued neutrality in the great power struggle, the CIA and State Department came to view Nasser in 1967 as nothing more than a Soviet tool.⁷⁹

Model III Governmental Politics

The final model Allison writes about is Governmental Politics or "bargaining along regular circuits among players position in the hierarchy within the government." If Model I is a strategic view and Model II is an operational view, Model III is a tactical view. It provides the narrowest portrayal when determining how decisions are made. While some individual actors within an organization may be "playing politics with

⁷⁶ Ibid., "America and the Egyptian Revolution," 73-90.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 80.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 83.

⁷⁹ Allen Dulles to George Humphrey, 12 September 1957 and 29 September 1957, Allen Dulles Papers, Princeton University, Princeton, N.J

national security,” it is more likely that individuals have multiple conclusions to the same question in international relations and may change an opinion based on the views of the organization they are a part of.⁸⁰ An example Allison uses is the lack of delegated authority and autonomous organizations within Nazi Germany, resulting in Hitler directly intervening and adjusting decisions of multiple organizations.⁸¹

As I argued in the previous Model II chapter, it seems the important organizations that led to the United States not aiding the British, French, and Israelis were the executive branch, the State Department, and the intelligence services. Of the individuals, the most important players within these organizations were President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles. Both men had evolving opinions of the role of the United States in the Middle East, and both grew increasingly frustrated with the Nasser government. Despite the dim view of President Nasser, neither Eisenhower nor Dulles wanted the allies to use direct action to retake the Suez. Both men tried desperately to explain to the United Kingdom that the United States would not go to war to retake a former colonial position.

Second only to Eisenhower, Secretary Dulles was the most important United States figure in the decision to not intervene. A man of strong determination and an outspoken critic of Communism, he recommended in his book *War or Peace* a rhetorical offensive that would “prevent whole peoples from being broken in mind and spirit, which is what Soviet Communism seeks.”⁸² Secretary Dulles advocated in 1952 for a more active foreign policy against the Soviet Union, a sort of active containment, but believed

⁸⁰ Allison and Zelikow, *Essence of Decision*, 257-258.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 268-269.

⁸² Chris Tudda, *The Truth Is Our Weapon: The Rhetorical Diplomacy of Dwight D. Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2006), 26.

that military force was not the most effective way in the long term to defeat the Soviets.⁸³ He would head the State Department during the Suez Crisis to actively spread democratic, western ideals and provide covert and overt funding to nations that were at risk of sympathy to communism. A crusader of sorts, Secretary Dulles conducted shuttle diplomacy after the nationalization of the Suez. Maintaining the United States position within Egypt and over the Suez was critical to the secretary, but its ends had to justify the means. During the first London Conference in August of 1956, he stated the United States was somewhat independent of the crisis and more concerned about the canal's freedom of navigation.⁸⁴ Dulles pushed for an international association to operate the canal. By September, the second London Conference met. 18 nations agreed to the international operation, with America stating it would not violate Egypt's rules regarding canal pilots nor attack its way through the canal in the event of its blockade.⁸⁵

Both President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles were caught off guard from the initial attack. "I've just never seen great powers make such a complete mess and botch of things," Eisenhower said.⁸⁶ Nine days later, with the ceasefire signed, and with damage done to the *special relation* between the Americans and the British. The United States would need to try and mend the Franco-American relationship, and the Egyptian-Israeli relationship.

President Dwight D. Eisenhower was the main individual actor in United States' politics during the crisis and had the most sway due to his position as president. Born in a

⁸³ Ibid., 27.

⁸⁴ Nimer, "Dulles, Suez, and Democratic Diplomacy," 786.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 791.

⁸⁶ "An Affair to Remember."

small town in Kansas, Eisenhower went to West Point and eventually moved up the ranks during World War II to Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. His war experiences clearly affected him, as he wrote to his father-in-law “the one thing that disturbs me is the readiness of some people to discuss war as a means of advancing peace. To me this is a contradiction in terms; the only excuse for war is when we are certain that our democratic way of life is under direct threat.”⁸⁷ He promoted active globalism and the need for an American presence both in Europe and around the globe, in part to ensure peace and prevent the spread of communism.

There is a debate about the effect that Secretary Dulles had in shaping Eisenhower’s foreign strategy. Some believe the ideological crusader Dulles was dominating the foreign policy debate, influencing the president to take actions whenever and where ever possible from 1953-1959.⁸⁸ With the nationalization of the Suez Canal and an upcoming reelection campaign, maintaining cool heads would pay dividends. The President was strongly anti-communism, both with regards to the Warsaw Pact and the communist governments in the East including the People Republic of China and North Korea. Having witnessed the Korean War’s end in July during his first year in office, he hoped for a long-term solution to prevent the spread.⁸⁹

As stated previously, the decision to not aid the allies during the Suez crisis had lasting affects on both Eisenhower and the ties to the American allies. His poor relations with Prime Minister Eden, his shock at being kept in the dark, his concern over the

⁸⁷ Tudda, *The Truth is Our Weapon*, 32.

⁸⁸ Richard H. Immerman, "Eisenhower and Dulles: Who Made the Decisions?" *Political Psychology* 1, no. 2 (1979): 21-38. doi:10.2307/3791100. 21-32.

⁸⁹ Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The Eisenhower Diaries* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1981), 266-274.

imperial nature of the conflict, and the ramifications of a closed canal all bolstered his resolve to provide no assistance. This is not mentioning the threat of pushing the Middle East towards the Soviets during the ongoing Hungarian revolution. It all proved to be too much. However, in an interview after the conflict in 1965, the former President said, “I should never have pressured Israel to evacuate the Sinai.⁹⁰” Having seen the aftermath of choosing to remain neutral and the lack of progress in the Arab world, the president privately regretted the decision.

⁹⁰ Michael Scott Doran, *Ike's Gamble America's Rise to Dominance in the Middle East* (New York: Free Press, 2017), 239.



Figure 2. Map of British Movement to the Falklands.⁹¹

Chapter III.

The Falklands War

The Falklands War started over the conflict between Great Britain and Argentina dating back centuries. The Argentine claim over the 200 islands, the largest which are named East and West Falklands, can be traced to 1690, after the English Naval Captain

⁹¹ "Falklands, Campaign, (Distances to Bases) 1982." Map. United States Military Academy West Point, <https://www.westpoint.edu/history/SitePages/Western%20Conflicts%20Since%201958.aspx>.

John Strong first sighted the island group.⁹² In 1764, the French governor Antoine Louis de Bougainville established the first settlement.⁹³ Due to the Spanish claim of all of South America not under the control of the Portuguese, the Spanish bribed Bougainville to evacuate. Follow this, British under Commodore John Byron established Port Egmont on the island and by 1769, having already removed the French, the Spanish demanded the British removal.⁹⁴ Following harsh diplomatic rhetoric, the western island was allowed to stay under British control. The British, who found the island economically unfeasible and defendable, abandoned the unpopulated island in 1774.⁹⁵

By 1810, the Provinces of La Plata (later Argentina) became independent from Spain and reasserted their rights over the area of control Spain previously held around their borders. By 1820, the government sent Colonel Daniel Jewitt to claim possession of the islands and declared a moratorium on fishing via foreign governments.⁹⁶ Argentina established a settlement in 1828 and officially declared itself the successor of Spanish claims. The settlement under the Hamburg merchant Louis Vernet seized three United States fishing vessels as he claimed the ships violated Argentine's sovereignty. The United States sent the USS Lexington to burn the settlement, and the islands remained uninhabited for two years. By 1833, the British reasserted their claims on the island and

⁹² Peter Calvert, "Sovereignty and the Falklands Crisis," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 59.3 (1983): 405-13, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2618794>.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ J. C. Metford, "Falklands or Malvinas? The Background to the Dispute," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 44.3 (1968): 463-81, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2615026>.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Calvert, "Sovereignty and the Falklands Crisis," 405-413.

from that year onward, the islands were governed by the British as an official Overseas Territory of the British Empire.⁹⁷

Politics in Argentina became increasingly militaristic from the start of the 20th century. Several military juntas or governments came and went from 1930 until 1976, with periods of democratic rule. The Argentine population grew increasingly frustrated with instability and the endless threat of military coercion, not unlike the role of the Egyptian Army in Egyptian politics. Socialists under the group Monoceros clashed with the newly formed military junta, which was established after a coup led by General Jorge Videla.⁹⁸ This conflict resulted in a “dirty war” in which approximately 11-15,000 people were killed from 1976-1980, and thousands more “disappeared.”⁹⁹ After several cabinet shakeups within the Junta, President Leopoldo Galtieri assumed leadership of Argentina in December of 1981.¹⁰⁰

With low popularity and a weak economy, President Galtieri looked for a way to stabilize his position.¹⁰¹ A group of Argentine scrap metal workers landed on the uninhabited island of South Georgia and raised the Argentine flag on March 19, 1982. In response, the British sent a group of Royal Marines aboard the HMS Endurance to remove the flag.¹⁰² With part of the garrison on the Falklands being transported to South

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ David Pion-Berlin, "The Fall of Military Rule in Argentina: 1976-1983." *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 27, no. 2 (1985): 55-76, doi:10.2307/165718.

⁹⁹ Mark J Osiel, "Constructing Subversion in Argentina's Dirty War," *Representations* 75, no. 1 (2001): 119-58, doi:10.1525/rep.2001.75.1.119.

¹⁰⁰ Pion-Berlin, "The Fall of Military Rule in Argentina: 1976-1983," 55-76.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

Georgia, Galtieri approved the plan for naval invasion of the Falklands, and the invasion started on April 2nd.

Model I Rational Actor Model

The question now is why did the United States choose in this example to provide limited aid to the United Kingdom during the Falklands War and not obstruct the British? To recap the important items to review when using Model I: what are the actor's objectives in the specified conditions, what is the best choice? There exist two core concepts, that unitary states are the key actors in international affairs and the state acts rationally and seeks to maximize its benefits.¹⁰³

Prior to the start of the conflict, the United States had been actively resisting the Soviet's influence in South America. The establishment of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 proclaimed the American protection by forces of arms from foreign (European) invasions.¹⁰⁴ This offer of protection continued after World War II when the threat of an invasion did not come from European powers but communist revolutions. America had a history of intervention in Latin America ranging from the Mexican-American War from 1846-1848 to the Spanish-American War in 1898. The Panama Canal became a vital United States strategic interest because it was a growing naval power, thanks in part to the acquisition of former Spanish territories. The United States intervened within the Mexican Revolution and conducted operations within several Central American countries

¹⁰² Alberto R. Coll, and Anthony C. Arend, *The Falklands War: Lessons for Strategy, Diplomacy, and International Law* (Boston: G. Allen & Unwin, 1985).

¹⁰³ Allison and Zelikow, *Essence of Decision*, 27.

¹⁰⁴ Watt Stewart, "Argentina and the Monroe Doctrine, 1824-1828," *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 10, no. 1 (1930): 26-32, doi:10.2307/2506184.

during the Banana Wars, a series of conflicts within Central America. The Cuban Revolution eventually reignited the United States' desire to keep the Americas within its hegemony.¹⁰⁵

Keeping American hegemony within the South and Central America meant preventing the rise of communism. The limited amount of Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine launched nuclear weapons made acquiring bases closer to the continental United States important for the Soviet nuclear parity early in the Cold War.¹⁰⁶ The Cuban Missile Crisis ended the Soviets ability to place offensive weapons in Cuba but showed that leftist movements within Latin America could be cultured and developed. To counter these socialist movements, the United States undertook several covert strategies to support anti-communist leadership, including, in this case, selling weapons and aircraft to the Argentine Junta. Additionally, America became a contributor to Operation Condor, a series of intelligence sharing and covert operations across South America.¹⁰⁷ This caused America to be involved in several questionable activities, including the Argentine "dirty war."

This covert support in South America and Argentina was not without its controversies. As noted during the Suez Crises, America wished to continue to be regarded as a moral authority, and while it desired an elimination of socialist movements, it was concerned over the abuse of human rights. The mass disappearances and killings that occurred from 1976 to 1982 were quickly condemned by the then US Ambassador to

¹⁰⁵ Christopher Sabatini, "Will Latin America Miss U.S. Hegemony?" *Journal of International Affairs* 66, no. 2 (2013): 1-14, <http://www.jstor.org.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/stable/24388282>.

¹⁰⁶ Allison and Zelikow, *Essence of Decision*, 92.

¹⁰⁷ Patrice J. McSherry, "Operation Condor: Clandestine Inter-American System," *Social Justice* 26, no. 4 (78) (1999): 144-74, <http://www.jstor.org.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/stable/29767180>.

Argentina Robert Hill. “I explained to him (Argentine Foreign Minister Cesar Guzzetti) that there was a good deal of sympathy in the United States for the Videla government but that when such acts as ...the recent mass murder in Pilar went unpunished, it was difficult for Argentina’s friends to argue that the government was doing all it should to get the situation under control.”¹⁰⁸

By the time of the crisis, America was involved in a balancing act. It was attempting to find a peaceful solution regarding the sovereignty of the Falklands, trying not to alienate the military junta, maintaining the *special relationship*, and supporting human rights. The most important of these was finding a quick peaceful solution to the armed conflict, which would maximize both the *special relationship*, and the anti-communist junta’s positions.

Secretary of State Alexander Haig wrote to the Foreign Secretary Lord Peter Carrington on March 31st of the desire to remain impartial and act as an intermediary in an attempt to defuse the situation shortly after the Argentine flag raising on South Georgia.¹⁰⁹ To maximize the prospect of peace, it was vital America be regarded as neutral, given the historic *special relationship*, which had improved significantly since the Suez Crisis. This was in part due to the decolonization that had taken place across the imperial powers. The distant Falklands islands, with a population of approximately 2000 and nearly 8000 miles from Britain, were of minimal American strategic value. The prize

¹⁰⁸ United States. Department of State. American Embassy Buenos Aires. *National Security Archive*, August 20, 2002, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB104/Doc1%20760920.pdf>.

¹⁰⁹ United States Office of the President, White House, *National Security Archive*. August 20, 2002, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=329502-19820331-letter-from-the-secretary-haig-to-lord>.

the United States could seize from a swift end was an increased goodwill with both Argentina and the United Kingdom.

The State Department conducted shuttle diplomacy between London and Buenos Aires, even after the initial British fleet sailed for the Falklands. The United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 502 (1982), which demanded an immediate cessation of hostilities and the removal of Argentine forces.¹¹⁰ Diplomacy, however, was not progressing, and the United States wanted to ensure that in the event of war, the British would have access to United States aid. Prime Minister Thatcher's strong stance and quick action in sending the fleet limited the options of the United States. President Reagan and Prime Minister Thatcher had a famously close relationships and the Reagan government saw the conflict in many ways in the same terms as the United Kingdom. The clear-cut response was that it was an illegal action, and the United States would back the United Kingdom as much as it possibly could short of declaring open war.¹¹¹

Given the forceful actions of the United Kingdom and while maintaining the appearance of neutrality, the United States agreed to several covert assistances to the United Kingdom, in part due to the tremendously complicated action the invasion would be. As one member of the National Security Council staffer mentioned, "it will clearly be a close-run thing."¹¹² The use of the United States military facilities located on Ascension

¹¹⁰ Security Council resolution 502, *The Falkland Islands (Malvinas)* (13 April 1982), available from <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/Resolution/GEN/NR0/435/26/IMG/NR043526.pdf>.

¹¹¹ Stephen Benedict Dyson, "Cognitive Style and Foreign Policy: Margaret Thatcher's Black-and-White Thinking," *International Political Science Review / Revue Internationale De Science Politique* 30, no. 1 (2009): 33-48, <http://www.jstor.org.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/stable/20445174>.

¹¹² United States Office of the President, White House Situation Room, *National Security Archive*. By Rentschler. August 20, 2002. <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=329523-19820409-talks-with-thatcher-on-falklands>.

Island¹¹³, supplies, intelligence,¹¹⁴and sanctions.¹¹⁵ After conducting naval exercises with the United States Navy, The fleet's commander Admiral Sandy Woodward stated he met a American Air Force colonel on Ascension who was instructed "to give the Brits every possible assistance, but to not, under any circumstances, get caught doing so."¹¹⁶ Britain was also moved to the head of the line for the AIM 9L Sidewinder air-to-air missile which to Woodward made clear "without those AIM 9L the Sea Harriers (British carrier-based aircraft) would not have been good enough. The special relationship was alive and well."¹¹⁷As the conflict continued, and the British lost several of ships, the United States grew increasingly frustrated with the Argentines. The enforcement of military sanctions ended the appearance of neutrality. The landing on May 21st of British forces, and the June 14th capture of Port Stanley ended with the surrender of the Argentine forces.¹¹⁸

Model II Organizational Behavior

Viewing the Falklands with the Model II lens, what organizational decisions led to the United States not intervening in the Falklands War? Like the Suez Crisis, the executive branch, the State Department, and the intelligence/defense services were the

¹¹³ "Fleet Within Weeks of the Falklands," *The New York Times*, April 17, 1982, <https://www.nytimes.com/1982/04/17/world/fleet-within-week-of-the-falklands.html>.

¹¹⁴ Lisa L. Martin, "Institutions and Cooperation: Sanctions during the Falkland Islands Conflict," *International Security* 16, no. 4 (1992): 143-78, doi:10.2307/2539190.

¹¹⁵ "U.S. Sides with Britain in Falkland Crisis Ordering Sanctions Against Argentines," *The New York Times*, May 1, 1982, <https://www.nytimes.com/1982/05/01/us/us-sides-with-britain-falkland-crisis-ordering-sanctions-against-argentines.html>.

¹¹⁶ Woodward, Sandy, and Patrick Robinson, *One Hundred Days: The Memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group Commander* (Hammersmith, London: HarperPress, 2012), 86.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 87.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 306-332.

major organizations most influential to the decision to covertly aid the United Kingdom during the war.

The most important organization that helped shape the assistance of the British during the war was the executive branch. The Reagan government was one of remarkably strong convictions. President Reagan was a staunch anti-communist whose admiration had a “stand with ordinary people who have the courage to take up arms against communist tyranny.”¹¹⁹ The executive and specifically the president saw international global defense as a clash between good and evil. The use of the term “evil empire” for the Soviet Union was a straightforward stance against the communist country and set the term for the future increase of United States military strength. He ordered a buildup of all branches of the Department of Defense, and the increased use of covert operations, designed to defend the interests of America, and its allies.¹²⁰

This buildup and increased lethality posture came after the end of Vietnam and the Jimmy Carter administration, which saw a drastic drawdown of military spending and a period of national malaise. The Reagan Doctrine, which again was another addition to the executive branch, was one of global support for the struggles of anti-communist groups. While the term was coined after the Falklands War, the principle was to aid groups from the Far East to South America in resisting communist influences via covert

¹¹⁹ *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1987, 2 vols.* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1989), 2: 977-92; *ibid.*, 1988, 2 vols. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1990), 2: 1381-84.

¹²⁰ Larry M. Bartels, "Constituency Opinion and Congressional Policy Making: The Reagan Defense Build Up," *The American Political Science Review* 85, no. 2 (1991): 457-74, doi:10.2307/1963169.

and overt means.¹²¹ Unlike the policy of containment, the Reagan doctrine would aggressively seek to overpower and ultimately end the Cold War, either via farfetched projects such as the 1983 Strategic Defense Initiative or supplying Contra and Mujahedeen rebels with weapons and supplies.¹²²

By the start of the crisis, the executive juggled several views about the conflict but ultimately decided on a pro-British stance. While Secretary of State Haig acted as shuttle diplomat, the United States Ambassador to the United Nations Jeane Kirkpatrick had a soft spot for the Argentine government and argued for neutrality.¹²³ Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger desired to provide the British with all the aid it needed, including the USS Iwo Jima, an amphibious assault ship (small aircraft carrier) should the British lose an aircraft carrier.¹²⁴ President Reagan's affinity for Prime Minister Thatcher, and the executive's belief in the clear morality of right and wrong, convinced the administration to covertly support the British, while advocating for a ceasefire.

The State Department during the Falklands crisis was constantly playing catchup. The fact that Prime Minister Thatcher had ordered the Royal Navy to prepare an invasion two days after the occupation meant that a diplomatic solution was on a rapidly ticking clock. The United States understood the seriousness of the United Kingdom's position and never asked the British to slow the fleet in order to negotiate a peaceful

¹²¹ Chester Pach, "The Reagan Doctrine: Principle, Pragmatism, and Policy," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 36, no. 1 (2006): 75-88, <http://www.jstor.org.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/stable/27552748>.

¹²² *Ibid.*

¹²³ "Jeane Kirkpatrick," *The Economist*, December 23, 2006, <https://www.economist.com/node/8447241>.

¹²⁴ Sam Lagrone, "Reagan Readied U.S. Warship for '82 Falklands War," *USNI News*, February 5, 2013, <https://news.usni.org/2012/06/27/reagan-readied-us-warship-82-falklands-war-0>.

solution.¹²⁵ This meant that when President Reagan instructed Secretary Haig to conduct shuttle diplomacy on April 7th and visit both Buenos Aires and London, he had until the British fleet made it to the islands. The primary goal of the department was to find a solution between the two that would allow the United States to maintain friendly relations with both. However, it was clear from the start where much of the State Department stood. During the secretary's meeting on April 8th with Prime Minister Thatcher, Secretary Haig is reported as saying, "we are not impartial. Certainly, we were not impartial on the UN resolution and the president was not impartial in his telephone call to Galtieri ... there is no issue on which the prime minister had not backed the U.S. The Secretary said that we face a critical, common problem: 'we must do all we can to strengthen you and your government.'"¹²⁶

While the secretary and the president may have felt sympathetic to the British cause, there was still concern over the position of Argentina. Both the intelligence services and the State Department worried about the possible Soviet involvement in the conflict if the Argentines could not find additional equipment, such as aircraft and anti-ship missiles in the event of an embargo or blockade. Additionally, Argentina, while attempting to stir international sympathy, had declared the seizure of an anti-colonialist act given its claims over the islands dated back to the foundation of the country. In an interview with CBS Face the Nation, Ambassador Kirkpatrick stated views not unlike the juntas. "The Argentines, of course, have claimed for two hundred years that they own

¹²⁵ Alberto R. Coll and Anthony C. Arend, *The Falklands War: Lessons for Strategy, Diplomacy, and International Law* (Sydney: Unwin Hyman, 1985), 106-117.

¹²⁶ United States Department of State, *National Security Archive*, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=329527-19820410-secretarys-meeting-with-prime-minister>.

these islands. Now, if the Argentines own the islands, then moving troops into them is not armed aggression.”¹²⁷ Haig completely disagreed with Kirkpatrick’s views on Argentine use of force but was more focused on avoiding armed conflict than the sovereignty of the isolated islands. William Clark, the National Security Advisor, had to “balance things out or try to between Haig and Jeane, almost on a daily if not hourly basis.”¹²⁸

After the failure of a proposition on April 27th to President Galtieri by the United States, the United Nations, and the president of Peru, the hope for a peaceful settlement was coming to an end. The Argentine position was not willing to retreat from the island without a guaranteed conference about the transfer of sovereignty, and the British refused to negotiate while the Falklands was still under occupation. By May 1st, the United States imposed sanctions on the Argentines, and American support went from covert to openly supporting the British, delighting the United Kingdom and anglophile members of the United States government, including Department of Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger. Secretary Haig would eventually resign from the administration in June, in part due to his clashing with the Department of Defense. It seems that the victory by the United Kingdom had reinforced the *special relationship* and bolstered those within the administration that viewed hard power as an important American asset. Following the Falklands, the United States would conduct one of the largest peacetime increases in military and intelligence spending in its history.¹²⁹

¹²⁷ "The US & the Falklands War (1): The US 'tilt' towards Britain (30 Apr 1982)," Margaret Thatcher Foundation, 2018, <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/archive/us-falklands.asp>.

¹²⁸ "William P. Clark Oral History, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; Secretary of the Interior," Interview by Knott, Miller Center, November 02, 2017, <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-oral-histories/william-p-clark-oral-history-assistant-president>.

Model III Governmental Politics

The Falklands War, like the Suez, involved several high-powered individuals with differing views. Among the most important actors during this crisis on the American side were President Reagan, Secretary Weinberger, Ambassador Kirkpatrick, and Secretary Haig. While the president had ultimate authority, his advisors' opinions carried merit as the president was allegedly as a hands-off leader who focused on the big picture.

President Reagan, born on February 6, 1911, was a son of a businessman and came from a traditional Christian family. Like President Eisenhower, he was a decent student, graduating from Eureka College with an emphasis on sociology. After school, he then went on to work in the radio and film industries starring in several films, achieving moderate success. He was drafted after the attack on Pearl Harbor. After the war, he continued to work in the media until running for Governor of California as a Republican, having changed political parties. His change was in part because of his belief that the Republicans would be tougher on communism, and more pro-capitalist. This belief was due in part to his experience working in the media for General Electric; having traveled to more than 130 plants speaking about free enterprise.¹³⁰ Following two terms in office, Reagan ran against the sitting President Ford and lost. Trying again in 1980, he beat President Jimmy Carter by a wide margin, winning 44 states.

His outspoken anti-communist stance is partly why the Falklands conflict was more complicated than if the Argentines had a socialist or left leaning government.

¹²⁹ Kathrine Blakeley, "Defense Spending in Historical Context: A New Reagan-esque Buildup?" Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, November 8, 2017, <https://csbaonline.org/reports/defense-spending-in-historical-context>.

¹³⁰ Tomas Kellner, "Lights, Electricity, Action: When Ronald Reagan Hosted 'General Electric Theater,'" GE Reports, February 19, 2018, <https://www.ge.com/reports/ronald-reagan-ge/>.

Propping up the Argentine Junta was an important strategic move to ensure communism did not spread in South America, even after the allegation of human rights abuses. However, the *special relationship* had never been stronger since the Suez crisis, due to the rise of Margaret Thatcher and the Tory Party, which was viewed with glee by the Republicans and the president. Both Thatcher and Reagan were anti-communist, free market, social conservative leaders who viewed the *special partnership* as critical for the defense of democracy.¹³¹

As described previously, the president always wanted a peaceful solution, even as the fleet arrived near the Falklands, writing to Prime Minister Thatcher on April 15th, “we are also grateful for the receptivity you have shown to our efforts to find a common ground between your country, one of our closest allies, and Argentina, with whom we would like to be able to cooperate in advancing specific interests in this hemisphere.”¹³² But ultimately following the failure of diplomacy and the lack of options with the fleet preparing to engage, the president threw his lot with British.

A main advocate for providing aid to the United Kingdom was the Secretary of Defense Weinberger, who like the president, was an anti-communist but also an anglophile. Having served in World War II and worked for a variety of government positions including working under Governor Reagan in California, Secretary Weinberger was from the same school of thought as the president. He was not concerned with the view that supporting the United Kingdom would lead to increased Soviet influence.¹³³

¹³¹ Charles G. Leathers, "Thatcher-Reagan Conservatism and Schumpeter's Prognosis for Capitalism," *Review of Social Economy* 42, no. 1 (1984): 16-31, <http://www.jstor.org.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/stable/29769191>.

¹³² "Falklands: Reagan Letter to MT (account of Reagan's Conversation with Galtieri)," Margaret Thatcher Foundation, <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/122859>.

His animate support for the British was in fact a hindrance to Secretary Haig's ability to negotiate. His position was always that it was about self-determination for the Falkland Islanders, and he viewed it as a precedent to other powers, specifically the Soviet Union, that naked aggression could be successful. This notion must have been reinforced after the Iran Hostage Crisis, which ended only after President Reagan came into office. "The U.S. action was based not on the fear that our ally would be defeated, but a fear that aggression would succeed and a resolve that the very strong, decisive and admirable action that Britain was taking should not go unrewarded."¹³⁴

It is understandable that the Secretary of Defense would be more prone to taking action, but Weinberger's pro United Kingdom stance was countered by that of the United Nations Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick. She was much more willing to concede that British and American interests are often similar but can diverge. Kirkpatrick, having earned a PhD from Columbia and then attended the University of Paris, saw it as necessary to coordinate with governments that might be counter to Western ideals. Having worked for the Reagan campaign, she became United Nations Ambassador despite being a registered Democrat. Kirkpatrick was one within the administration that believed aligning with the United Kingdom during the crisis would alienate South America and undo the efforts the United States had made in earning goodwill.¹³⁵ She was a pragmatist who thought it was better to achieve United States national interests over

¹³³ "Falklands: United Kingdom Washington to FCO ('Falklands: Soviet-Argentinian Collusion')," Margaret Thatcher Foundation, 2002, <https://www.margarethatcher.org/document/134954>.

¹³⁴ Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, "My Falklands War and Theirs," *The National Interest*, no. 18 (1989): 11-20, <http://www.jstor.org.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/stable/42894640>.

¹³⁵ Lawrence D. Freedman, "The Special Relationship, Then and Now," *Foreign Affairs* 85, no. 3 (2006): 61-73, doi:10.2307/20031967.

lofty goals. To her there was a difference between authoritarian leaders who could or could not ultimately make the gradual progression to traditional liberal, Western democracies.¹³⁶

Her views clashed with pro United Kingdom members like Secretary Weinberger, who saw the ideological struggle, much like the president did, as one of good vs evil. She was hesitant to take up this struggle and help the British as she stated, "I enjoyed a marvelous working relationship with the British ambassador. But to work with the U.K was to come quickly to understand that in the UN the British regularly gave higher priority to relations with the EC (European Commission) and the Commonwealth than to relations with the United States."¹³⁷ She ultimately could not achieve a peaceful solution to the crisis, and the British press lambasted her for her neutral stance.¹³⁸

Secretary Haig represented a middle ground between Kirkpatrick and Weinberger. Haig, having graduated from West Point, served in both the Korean War and the Vietnam War, earning the Distinguished Service Cross. Haig served under President Richard Nixon and later as NATO Supreme Allied Commander. Haig became the Secretary of State after a contentious nomination process and was much more prone to diplomacy. In February, while meeting with then Foreign Secretary Peter Carrington, he asked if the islands could not be ceded to Argentina and then leased back on a long-term lease, not unlike Hong Kong.¹³⁹ His shuttle diplomacy took him both to Buenos Aires and London

¹³⁶ Seymour Maxwell Finger, "The Reagan-Kirkpatrick Policies and the United Nations," *Foreign Affairs* 62, no. 2 (1983): 436-57, doi:10.2307/20041826.

¹³⁷ Kirkpatrick, "My Falklands War and Theirs," 61-73.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, 15.

multiple times but found limited success. The Galtieri government, thrilled with the popular support of its invasion, could not be persuaded to anything less than sovereignty and did not expect the United States to let true harm come to Argentina given the previous year's warm relations. Returning the islands would mean the end of the government. The British were polite with the secretary but accepted no change of the Falkland's sovereignty. Personally, he believed in the rights of the British to the Falklands but saw war as unacceptable. It did not help that negotiations over the sovereignty of the islands had gone on for years prior to the invasion with few successes. Furthermore, Galtieri was an agent of the Junta but not an all-encompassing ruler.¹⁴⁰ Political infighting between the civilian and military governments, as well as within the military Junta, had been going on constantly during and prior to the crisis.

Secretary Haig ultimately believed in a more neutral diplomatic policy, even if his belief was that the United Kingdom was in the right. He was reluctant to pressure the Argentine government with American sanctions or military assistance to the United Kingdom, and personally had much riding on a successful outcome of the negotiations. With the failure of diplomacy, and the start of the war, his political future looked dim. With little concrete to show for his two years in the Reagan White House, Haig "resigned" to be replaced by Secretary George Shultz.

¹³⁹ "US: United Kingdom Washington Telegram to FCO ('Secretary of State's Meeting with Mr. Haig: Falkland Islands') ['Our Aim Was to Keep the Dialogue Going and Avoid a Crisis']," Margaret Thatcher Foundation, 2014. <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/150041>.

¹⁴⁰ Frank Leith Jones, "Haig's 'Waterloo': Lessons from A Failure in International Mediation," *International Journal on World Peace* 30, no. 3 (2013): 7-29, <http://www.jstor.org.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/stable/24543758>.

Chapter IV.

Comparison

With this last chapter prior to the conclusion, I will review both the Suez Crisis and Falklands Wars using each of the three models separately. This will allow a more detailed comparison of how Model I, Model II, and Model III guided decision making as a methodology.

Model I Rational Actor Model

Having covered both the Suez and Falklands, what comparisons could be made between how these conflicts guided the decisions of the United States within the confines of Model I? The most important goal of both governments at the time was the defeat of communism and the threat posed to the United States and its allies. The Suez Crisis represents the period when the United States was most concerned with the Soviet's influence. The detonation of the Soviets first nuclear device at that time was a recent memory, occurring only seven years prior to the crisis. The first major commitment of resources to create Soviet cruise missiles and ICBMs occurred before the Suez Crisis in May of 1946.¹⁴¹ Combine that with the recent end of the Korean war, which saw nearly 150,000 casualties, and only ended in a stalemate, the doubts of the United States were understandable. The ongoing Hungarian revolution only added to the sense that the primary goal was to remain focused on self-determination and freedom from communism.

¹⁴¹ "Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers, 'Questions of Reactive Weaponry'," May 13, 1946, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Published in Sergeev (1994), 227-233. Selected, edited, and annotated by Asif Siddiqi, and translated by Gary Goldberg. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121064>.

That is not to say however that the United States during the Falklands War were not also concerned about communism but not to the same degree. The Vietnam War much like the Korean War was another war of containment and remained fresh in the minds of policy makers and the public. With 200,000 casualties and an outraged war weary citizenry, it had a lasting impact on United States policy. The arms race, which progressed since 1949, resulted in both the United States and Soviet Union possessing approximately 25,000 and 30,000 nuclear weapons, respectively.¹⁴² Much like the Suez period, the Soviets were also conducting offensive military actions during the Falklands, specifically the ongoing invasion of Afghanistan and supporting socialist movements within Africa, South America, and East Asia. The United States would go on to actively counter many of these. While tensions were high in 1982, the United States perceived that threat of the Soviet Union was of greater importance in 1956.

The next issue facing the United States at a national level during both talks was that of imperialism and national image. 1956 was still a time of imperial powers with Britain, France, Portugal, and Belgium still having territories within Africa and Asia. The United States emerged from World War II distinctly more internationally focused on promoting Western democratic values. It gave independence to the Philippines in 1946, and the prevailing nature of the Truman Doctrine and the Eisenhower Doctrine focused the United States on allowing self-determination as a way of fighting off Soviet influence. This was in direct opposition to the remaining imperial powers, who were reluctant to go about decolonization. While the United Kingdom released some of it

¹⁴² Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, "Global Nuclear Weapons Inventories, 1945-2010," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 66, no. 4 (November 2, 2016): 77-83, <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.2968/066004008>.

colonial holdings such as India and Pakistan, others it was unwilling to. France, having fought and lost to regain control of Indochina, signed the 1954 Geneva Conference and relinquished its control. The same year, an independence revolution started in French-controlled Algeria. America it seems would have to appear neutral to court newly forming nations to its alliance. Imperialism was to die.¹⁴³

As these nations decolonized, the United States saw the potential benefit in working with these countries to align them with the West and prevent Soviet influence. Washington's relations with the former imperial powers improved as its subsidiary states were given independence and the perceived wounds of the Suez Crisis became more distant. How could the United States argue for self-determination in Eastern Europe if Western Europe still ruled vast, far off territories? By 1982, most former imperial possessions had been given independence either violently, like Suez, or peacefully transferred, like Canadian Newfoundland.

The debate over colonialism during the Falklands was less acute and less critical. It is true that Argentina viewed the conflict in terms of returning a rightful territorial claim, but the difference was that the Falkland Islanders never viewed themselves as Argentinians. How can a nation still be considered an imperial power if its subjects overwhelming support its rule? It is not unlike the United States and Puerto Rico, satisfied to maintain the status quo. "The people of the Falkland Islands...have a right to determine their own allegiance," Prime Minister Thatcher would stress.¹⁴⁴ Perhaps the

¹⁴³ Steven Metz, "American Attitudes Toward Decolonization in Africa," *Political Science Quarterly* 99, no. 3 (1984): 515-33, doi:10.2307/2149946.

¹⁴⁴ Denzil Dunnett, "Self-Determination and the Falklands," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 59, no. 3 (1983): 415-28, doi:10.2307/2618795.

outcome would have been different had the islands not been permanently populated. Ultimately, however, the United States championed self-determination, and it was a major factor that differentiates the two conflicts.

While both conflicts involved ideas of decolonization and self-determination, the Falklands War was clearly viewed by the United States as the one more in synched with its political goals. The cost benefit analysis conducted by the United States during both conflicts was clearly influenced by time and diplomacy. What differentiates the two is the timeframe the United States had to operate in prior to Britain's use of force. The Suez Canal was nationalized on July 26th, and the operation to retake the canal started on October 29th.¹⁴⁵ While France and Israel planned for a military option in the beginning of August, Britain planned in secret, and was only asked to be a part of the allied offensive in the Protocol of Sèvres much later on October 22nd.¹⁴⁶ The three allies worked together but also very much separately, and all had differing aims for the objective. The United Kingdom was looking to retake the canal and remove President Nasser. The French were looking to end Nasser's involvement in Algeria and regain national pride in the canal they helped build. And Israel was seeking security from the Arab League, which threatened its national security.

Unfortunately for the Allies, this long delay between the start of the crisis and the first public direct actions would cause intense harm to their international image. The British public grew more divided and apathetic as the crisis continued. The international

¹⁴⁵ Anthony Adamthwaite, "Suez Revisited," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 64, no. 3 (1988): 449-64, doi:10.2307/2622851.

¹⁴⁶ Louise Richardson, *When Allies Differ: Anglo-American Relations during the Suez and Falkland Crises* (New York: St. Martin's Press), 67.

community grew increasingly frustrated and a sense of *fait accompli* was felt by both the British public and the global opinion.¹⁴⁷ This was only exacerbated when the allies finally attacked in secret on October 29th. This delay was a major factor in the poor international reception of the conflict. The Falklands War, however, had the opposite trajectory. Within two days, plans were devised to retake the islands, and the fleet was sailing within the first weeks. It was a gamble for the United Kingdom and Prime Minister Thatcher, as Prime Minister Eden was removed from the government following Suez, and it was likely she would be removed as well. However, this gamble was a calculated one, and relied on *violence of action* to retain domestic and international support. Had Eden not removed the United Kingdom forces prior to the nationalization or had prepared for a military operation within the first weeks, the outcome might have been more positive for Britain. The slow decision-making conducted by the United Kingdom government during Suez thus was a handicap compared to the rapid deployment of forces during the Falklands crisis.

Model II Organizational Behavior

For both conflicts, given that they were between two state actors, the main organizations were governmental. The executive branch and State Department were both the primary organizations with input from both the Department of Defense and intelligence services. The executive branch was the most important in the ultimate decision making, with the State Department doing the most to attempt diplomacy.

¹⁴⁷ Adamthwaite., "Suez Revisited," 449-64.

The governments during these periods had several similarities. Both President Eisenhower and Reagan were Republicans, both believed in preventing and eliminating communism, and both were in their first terms. The Eisenhower Doctrine was a continuation of the Truman Doctrine, and the Reagan Doctrine was an expansion of the Carter doctrine. All focused on preventing the spread of communism, but Reagan's was the largest in scope.

During the years just prior to the Suez Crisis, the goals of the executive branch were focused on diplomacy. Attracting allies to thwart communism was the goal of the Eisenhower government. This was not dissimilar to the Reagan Government, which also believed in the same sort of general principles of self-determination as President Eisenhower, but the 1982 executive branch was much more inclined to support military or intelligence options. The focus on diplomacy by the Eisenhower executive included financial or humanitarian aid. President Eisenhower originally offered aid to support the Aswan Dam and would have provided weapons to Egypt if it had agreed not to attack Israel. The Reagan Whitehouse supplied arms to several anti-socialist movements from Afghanistan to South America, including Argentina. In 1956 and 1982, the executive branch understood the power of the United States aid dollars, but they would have separate targets. Following the fall in the Pound Sterling after the start of the Suez Crisis, the Bank of England had to sell its dollar reserves to maintain its \$2.80 exchange rate.¹⁴⁸ Eisenhower used his treasury secretary to threaten the British via the International Monetary Fund with an ultimatum: pull United Kingdom troops out or let the sterling

¹⁴⁸ James M. Boughton, "Was Suez in 1956 the First Financial Crisis of the Twenty-First Century?" IMF.org. 2001, <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2001/09/boughton.htm>.

collapse. It was a strong political statement, and it worked. Compare this to the Reagan administration, which used its economic power to sanction the Argentine Junta of weapons and supplies. Reagan's sanctions let the world know the United States stance was not neutral but "tilted" towards the British.

The State Department during both conflicts, like the executive, had the same general principles as described previously. The departure comes from the two managers of the department, Secretary Dulles and Haig. Secretary Dulles, however, maintained a much stronger personality. His influence over the president insured the department would play a primary role in public policy. With his brother Allen Dulles working as the head of the CIA, it insured a strong connection between intelligence and diplomacy. John Dulles's career lasted both of Eisenhower's terms, and his stance against President Nasser influenced and informed the executive.¹⁴⁹ This contrasts with the poor showing of the State Department during the Falklands' War. Secretary Haig's State Department was not the same policy influencing organization it was under Dulles. Haig himself was tainted from being a part of the Nixon administration, and the State Department was no longer the monolith in making foreign policy. With Argentina occupying the islands, the State Department's shuttle diplomacy conducted by Secretary Haig did not achieve its results. Haig did not know if he was to be a negotiator or a mediator.¹⁵⁰ While the president supported peace, he was the main supporter of Prime Minister Thatcher and was being influenced by his supporters within the United Kingdom and Secretary Weinberger. Following the end of the Falklands War, Secretary Haig was replaced by Secretary

¹⁴⁹ Immerman, "Eisenhower and Dulles: Who Made the Decisions?"

¹⁵⁰ Jones, "Haig's 'Waterloo': Lessons from A Failure in International Mediation," 25.

George Shultz, who lasted for the remainder of the Reagan administration. The State Department under Secretary Shultz would be revitalized, and by the end of his term, and the fall of the Berlin Wall, the State Department enjoyed a new prominence.

Model III Governmental Politics

The final comparison using Model III is that of the difference between the two men in the executive at the time. What were the political differences between President Eisenhower's relationship with Prime Minister Eden and President Reagan's political considerations with Prime Minister Thatcher? What were the political ramifications of these two individuals' decisions? This was an important aspect to the ultimate discussion of the United States on whether to provide aid or not.

As previously described, President Eisenhower had a poor political relationship with Prime Minister Eden. From the start of the crisis, Eisenhower was in communication with Eden consistently. He stated repeatedly that the position of the United States was against military intervention, and President Eisenhower foresaw the damage to the image of the Western democracies. Writing to Prime Minister Eden on July 31st, Eisenhower stated, "I am convinced, most of the world, would be outraged should there be a failure to make such (diplomatic) efforts. Moreover, initial military successes might be easy, but the eventual price might become far too heavy."¹⁵¹ The United Kingdom and Prime Minister Eden in particular was not moved and insisted that President Nassar was a "Hitler on the Nile." Both men were aware of the efforts of appeasement the Allies had made to Germany prior to the start of World War II, and Prime Minister Eden did not

¹⁵¹ Dwight Eisenhower, "35. Letter From President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Eden," U.S. Department of State. July 31, 1956, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d35>.

want a repeat. Eden wrote in September 1956 to Eisenhower saying “The difference which separates us today appears to be a difference of assessment of Nasser’s plans and intentions and of the consequences in the Middle East of military action against him. You may feel that even if we are right, it would be better to wait until Nasser has unmistakably unveiled his intentions. But this was the argument which prevailed in 1936 and which we both rejected in 1948.”¹⁵²

President Eisenhower saw President Nasser as a pain whose attempts to play both sides were tiresome, but a new Adolf Hitler he was not. Both men understood the goals of Nasser as being the hegemonic power in the Arab world but differed on how to confront him. Eisenhower knew supporting war would damage his chances in the upcoming reelection in November and damage America’s image abroad, especially within the United Nations. President Eisenhower drafted Prime Minister Eden a response letter reading in part, “to resort to military action when the world believes there are other means available for resolving the dispute would set in motion forces that could lead, in the years to come, to the most distressing results.”¹⁵³ With the concerns over the possible tarnishing of the American image abroad, and the worry about pushing Nasser into the arms of the Soviet Union, Eisenhower continued to plead for peace. Even after the invasion, Eisenhower wanted a peaceful ending and what he predicted, namely, an international backlash, occurred; resulting in Britain’s humiliation.

¹⁵² Anthony Eden, "181. Message From Prime Minister Eden to President Eisenhower," U.S. Department of State. September 6, 1956, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d181>.

¹⁵³ Dwight Eisenhower, "190. Draft Message From President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Eden," U.S. Department of State. September 8, 1956, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d190>.

President Reagan's political and personal relationship with Prime Minister Thatcher was completely different. Both Reagan and Thatcher were conservative, devolution, anti-communist hawks who got along famously well. Having met years prior to the Falklands War in 1975, the President hand wrote to Thatcher, "...please know you have an enthusiastic supporter out here in the colonies."¹⁵⁴ Reagan and Thatcher would go on to develop an alliance of equals. Their ideological similarities allowed for cooperation on a variety of fronts and renew the *special relationship*, which had deteriorated after the Suez Crisis. From the start of the conflict, President Reagan was personally supportive of Prime Minister "Maggie" and understood that self-determination was critical in the Cold War to prevent the spread of communism. His strong personal and political connection to Thatcher and his understanding that a failure in South Atlantic would mean the end of the Thatcher Government meant his support for the British cause. After receiving news of a planned Argentine invasion, President Reagan spoke with President Galtieri personally and via Secretary Haig to try and prevent the invasion. After the invasion, as described previously, the president, while desiring peace, never tried to take any steps that might hinder the British and ordered aid to the British fleet. Following the victory, he personally praised Prime Minister Thatcher in a personal letter. "The news of your victory in the South Atlantic is most welcome. I look forward to working with you on a lasting solution to the situation there, and to cooperation on the many other tough challenges facing the West."¹⁵⁵

¹⁵⁴ Ronald Reagan, "Cold War: Reagan Letter to MT," Margaret Thatcher Foundation. 2003, <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/110357>.

¹⁵⁵ Ronald Reagan, "US: Reagan Message to MT (thanks for Hospitality during State Visit to United Kingdom)." Margaret Thatcher Foundation. 2013, <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/123386>.

This intense personal and professional relationship, compared to President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Eden, helped in influencing the decision to provide aid to the British. It certainly helped to keep Thatcher in power, and even today, the cornerstone of the Falklands is the idea of the right to self-determination. A referendum in 2013 on whether to remain a British Overseas Territory ended with 99.8% of the Falkland Islanders voting yes with turnout above 90%. Only three Islanders voted no.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁶ Caroline Wyatt, "Falklands Referendum: Voters Choose to Remain United Kingdom Territory," *BBC News*, March 12, 2013, <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-21750909>.

Chapter V.

Conclusion and Future Research

Two primary reasons exist for why the United States intervened against the United Kingdom's actions during the Suez Crisis and positively during the Falklands War. The first is the national threat, or professed threat, of the Soviet Union. The second is the desire to uphold America's self-perceived view as a moral arbiter of freedom and self-determination.

No single model given within Graham Allison's book *Essence of Decision* can explain why the United States chose the intervention options it did, but Model I, the Rational Actor Model, plays the largest role in my analysis. It is not to say that after having reviewed these events, Models II and III were not helpful but rather the United States, it seems, acted more unilaterally than not. The actions taken by individuals and groups were largely in general agreement. The United States found itself within a state of crisis with its closest ally in 1956 and 1982, narrowed its options, and made a decision.

This decision was to maximize its own benefit, even to the detriment of a trusted ally, which in 1956 meant going against the British and in 1982 supporting them. During the Suez Crisis, this desire to maximize its benefit was to maximize its strategic influence and to recruit allies within the region. Should America have assisted Britain, it would be viewed as another imperial power and may have alienated the region. America desired a speedy end to minimize the damage the crisis could do both on Middle Eastern opinions of NATO and the *special relationship*. During the Falklands War, the United States sought to join with Britain and its self-described cause of self-determination.

Championing self-determination would allow the United States to build goodwill within the international community and wield its pro-independence stance against the Soviet Union.

Both the Suez Crisis and the Falklands War are both enormous subjects, and much has been and could be written about them. The Graham Allison method for understanding decision making put forward in *Essence of Decision* is a useful one in international political events such as these. Ultimately, there is not one answer for why the United States made the choices it did, but the perceived threat of communism and self-determination are good candidates for the critical reasons. For future research, it would be interesting to go further into lasting impacts of the two crises, including the Six-Day War and increased Soviet involvement in the Middle East and Africa. I would be interested in reviewing the continued claims on the Falklands by Argentina and what, if any, impact the 2013 referendum had on the Argentinian peoples' perception of the Islands. Could a transfer of sovereignty to Argentina, but with an Argentine guarantee of independent local government, be a solution? What are the possibilities of a federacy arrangement as a long-term solution?

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