



Seeking Objectivity in Survey Data: An Analysis of Survey Data

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Seeking Objectivity in Survey Data: An Analysis of Survey Data

Joseph Giesting

A Thesis in the Field of International Relations
for the Degree of Master of Liberal Arts in Extension Studies

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Abstract

Since 9/11, aggressive governmental policies have been justified as being reflective of the public's fear of Islam and Muslims. This fear and discrimination can be summarized as being at the core of the study of Islamophobia and its effects on the world. The sentiment of the public towards Muslim Americans, coupled with a rhetoric of marketable fears, have both generated a cyclical snowball effect of accepted xenophobia and intense politicization of Islam on both sides. The primary purpose of this paper is to explore the phenomenon of Islamophobia through a comparative look at large-scale surveys and their similarities and differences from 2002 through 2018. The guiding question for this thesis is, "How can we define Islamophobia through survey data?" The imperative of this study and many seeking to define Islamophobia through various means is to determine truths and objectivity in a highly politicized realm of study. This thesis finds that such surveys are influenced greatly by political narratives and that thorough qualitative analysis is required for an accurate assessment of objectivity. The concept and definition of Islamophobia will be offered as ground work upon which the narratives that have been employed will be discussed. First, an understanding of the historical context of the Muslim American will be offered as it relates to Islamophobia. An operationalized definition of Islamophobia provides common themes found within the survey research. A framework is developed for individual profiles of survey groups, with which a comparative analysis of several key surveys can be made. This will provide for an understanding of the narratives that present themselves in research and will hopefully offer a way for researchers to get a better understanding of the Muslim American experience as seen through Islamophobia.

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List of Abbreviations

AEDPA	Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
ADG	Abu Dhabi Gallup
ADL	Anti-Defamation League
BBG	Broadcasting Board of Governors
CAIR	Council on American-Islamic Relations
CNN	Cable News Network
CSP	Center for Security Policy
HRF	Human Rights First
IAP	Islamic Association for Palestine
ICM	Independent Communications and Marketing
ISPU	Institute for Social Policy and Understanding
MAPS	Muslims in American Public Square
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NSEERS	National Security Entry-Exit Registration System
NSS	National Security Strategy
OIC	Organisation of Islamic Cooperation
ORC	Opinion Research Corporation
PATRIOT	Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism
PRRI	Public Religion Research Institute
SB1070	Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act
SPLC	Southern Poverty Law Center
SSRS	Social Science Research Solutions, Inc.

TSA Transportation Security Agency

TWA Trans World Airlines

WTC World Trade Center

Chapter I.

Introduction

Islamophobia is defined as the negative attitudes or emotions directed at Muslims and Islam as a whole.¹ In 2010, there were 2,595,000 Muslim identifying people in the United States; this number is projected to increase to 6,216,000 in 2030, as a result of immigration and high fertility rates among Muslim Americans.² This rapidly growing diaspora has been subject to xenophobia, racism and government-sponsored impetuses; policies implemented in the name of national security that in fact threatens to do quite the opposite. Since 9/11, the United States government has become progressively more far-reaching into the lives of American citizens in the name of national security though such policies as the Patriot Act.³ Such aggressive governmental post-9/11 policies have been justified as being reflective of the public. According to a study in 2014 conducted by the Arab American Institute, Muslim Americans have the lowest ratings of favorability among the groups covered in the study.⁴ Furthermore, the same poll suggests that 42% of Americans supported the use of profiling by law enforcement.⁵ While there are many factors that have brought such views to the public, a major one is the media that is consumed every day that result in fear-mongering and blanket stereotypes. Such attitudes

¹ Erik Bleich, "Where do Muslims Stand on Ethno-Racial Hierarchies in Britain and France?" *Patterns of Prejudice*, 43. 379-400. (2009)

² "The Future of the Global Muslim Population" Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, p. 141.

³ Susan M. Akram and Maritza Karmely, "Immigration and constitutional consequences of post-9/11 policies Involving Arabs and Muslims in the United States: Is alienage a distinction without a difference." *UC davis L. rev.* 38 (2004): 609.

⁴ "American Attitudes Toward Arabs and Muslims: 2014," *Arab American Institute 2014:* <http://www.aaiusa.org/reports/american-attitudes-toward-arabs-and-muslims-2014>

⁵ Ibid

allow for the quiet implementation of exclusionary policies with little resistance and have set precedents for further holds on what were once given rights for the American peoples. The sentiment of the public towards Muslim Americans, coupled with the rhetoric marketable fears that have generated a cyclical snowball effect of accepted xenophobia and resultant policies.

Muslim Americans are a varied group that is multi-ethnic, multinational and multi-cultural. Such groups in the United States, according to the ISPU, or the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, includes 18% Arabs, 25% black, 24% white, 18% Asians, 7% mixed, and 5% Hispanic.⁶ While Arab Americans receive much of the perceived discrimination in the United States due to visual perceived cues, others that show visual indicators, even those that are not Muslim are discriminated against.⁷ These issues represent real problems not only for Muslim Americans, but for all Americans. The precedents set now dictate the future direction of the United States. It is only when we can understand the phenomenon of Islamophobia and being able to find truth in the sea of ‘alternative facts’ and statistics is imperative to understanding the state of our country now and what today might mean for tomorrow.

⁶ “American Muslim Poll 2017,” *Institute for Social Policy and Understanding*.
<https://www.ispu.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/American-Muslim-Poll-2017-Report.pdf>

⁷ Germaine H. Awad. "The impact of acculturation and religious identification on perceived discrimination for Arab/Middle Eastern Americans," *Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Minority Psychology* 16, no. 1 (2010): 59. Note* Hindi-Americans, such as those wearing Sikhs are mistaken for being Muslim.

Research Questions, Considerations

The main objective behind this thesis is to offer a review and analysis of current survey-based literature pertaining to Islamophobia. This intent comes from a desire to have an objective assessment of the state of Muslim American perspectives and determine how such perspectives are offered through related groups and literature. Regardless of where these groups stand on the political spectrum, having an idea of their level of objectivity or even just how certain groups err in describing the Muslim American condition is critical to the interpretation of the Muslim American narrative and its effect on the United States as a whole. Groups that may exaggerate Muslim Americans' difficulties created by Islamophobia risk reinforcing negative self-perspectives, while those that downplay their difficulties founded by this phenomenon risk missing the problem altogether. With such considerations in mind, this thesis charts the prominent groups and offers individual and comparative analyses of their findings. My hope is that this thesis can offer a contribution to survey research towards building a Muslim American narrative that avoids misrepresentation of Islamophobia. To do this, I will make use of subsequent chapters to achieve the following:

1. Develop a background context for Islamophobia and a working definition for Islamophobia
2. Determine the most common themes that are found in survey-based literature and offer individual profiles for the major survey groups that pertain to the Muslim American experience
3. Use the developed individual character profiles as the basis for comparative analysis of key Muslim American surveys and groups, which can offer ways to

better understand accurate portrayals of the Muslim American narrative through survey data.

Qualitative analysis of the most prevalent themes as well as the survey and interest groups in which they are found will help determine whether or not they are validly asserted and ultimately whether or not the groups in question help further or hinder the narrative of Islamophobia in the United States. The primary purpose of this paper is to explore the phenomenon of Islamophobia through a comparative look at large-scale surveys and their similarities and differences from 2002 through 2018.

The guiding question for this thesis will be, “How can we define Islamophobia through survey data?” This thesis finds that such surveys are influenced greatly by political narratives and that thorough qualitative analysis is required for an accurate assessment of objectivity. The concept and definition of Islamophobia will be offered as ground work upon which the narratives that have been employed will be discussed. First, an understanding of the historical context of the Muslim American will be offered as it relates to Islamophobia. An operationalized definition of Islamophobia will then be considered, through which identifiers can be found. The most common themes found within the survey research will provide a framework for individual profiles for survey groups and a comparative analysis of several key surveys. This will provide for an understanding of the narratives that present themselves in research and will hopefully offer a way for researchers to get a better understanding of the Muslim American experience as seen through Islamophobia.

Chapter II.

Background of Islamophobia and Theoretical Framework

This thesis will explore surveys for both quantitative and qualitative features to better understand how the information derived from data results in the conclusions that are offered. To do this, it is important to consider the potential causes and factors that can offer a backdrop for inquiry. This chapter provides a contextual overview of events, policies and circumstances that relate to Islamophobia, and are separated by pre-9/11 and post 9/11 'eras.' This context then allows us to work towards developing an operationalized definition of Islamophobia, which is the ultimate purpose of this section.

Pre-9/11 Discrimination, Events and Policy

Understanding the type of discrimination faced by Muslim Americans today requires a contextual understanding of the American social climate before and after the events on 9/11. With the Islamic revolution in 1979 and the TWA hijacking in 1985, prejudice against Muslims found itself in the open with American media outlets presenting an awareness of Muslims in the country. The Gulf War in 1991 and the first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993 saw a surge of anti-Muslim retaliatory acts in the US. Amal Madani, a researcher at California School of Professional Psychology, found that through analysis of newspaper headlines between 1956 and 1997, the United States media portrayed Muslims and Arabs more negatively than that of Western Europeans or Israelis.⁸ This provides an early hint of an American brand of

⁸ Amal Omar Madani. "Depiction of Arabs and Muslims in the United States news media." (2000): 4965-4965.

Islamophobia despite Western Europeans or Israelis living in much closer proximity to Arab or Muslim nations.

The media perpetuation of blanket discrimination against Muslims was apparent in the aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombing, when PBS released a controversial documentary, "Jihad in America," shortly following the incident. This was despite official investigations that concluded otherwise. Regardless, the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) was established following the bombing of Oklahoma City bombing in 1995.⁹ This policy had the capacity to limit habeas corpus rights as well as give the secretary of state the capacity to demarcate any foreign organization as a terrorist group. Importantly, this policy targeted foreigners and non-citizens exclusively, rather than any suspicious target. Implemented in the wake of the Oklahoma Bombing, AEDPA did not directly point a finger at Muslims or Arabs, but foreigners and non-citizens in general. This legislation was reflective of the times- a reification of the stereotypes that existed and the general sentiment of the public towards immigrants. In an early study of religious discrimination, Mohamed Omeish learned that Muslim students found discrimination prevalent in higher education.¹⁰ Altareb also looked at the treatment of Middle Eastern Muslims by non-Muslim students and found that while respondents knew little about Islam, they held definite attitudes towards

⁹ Karen A. Sitterle, and Robin H. Gurwitch. "The terrorist bombing in Oklahoma City." *When a community weeps: Case studies in group survivorship* (1999): 160-189.

¹⁰Mohamed S. Omeish. "Muslim students' perceptions of prejudice and discrimination in American academia: Challenges, issues, and obstacles and the implications for educators, administrators, and university officials." (2000): 0360-0360. *and Social Sciences*, 60, 2-A, 0360.

Muslims.¹¹ Such attitudes suggest that stereotypes existed long before 9/11, perpetuated through other means than extremist acts.

Marcus Schulzke, a Professor of Political Science at University of Albany suggests that such perspectives brewed in the decade before the 9/11 attacks and underscored the idea of, "...irreconcilable cultural difference."¹² After the Oklahoma City bombing, journalist Steven Emerson testified in front of the House International Relations Committee and offered, "Radical Islamist networks now constitute the primary domestic, as well as international- national security threat facing the FBI and other law enforcement agencies."¹³

Despite the erroneous attribution of the Oklahoma City bombing to Muslims, this was, disturbingly, readily accepted by both the American media and public. Just a few years before, the 1993 World Trade Center bombing provoked a similar media reaction, including the *New York Times* in a series called "Muslims in America" that importantly highlighted the growing presence of Muslims and Arabs in the United States.¹⁴ Following the WTC 1993 incident, an American Muslim Council poll found that over 43% of Americans believe that Muslims are religious fanatics, with only 24% disagreeing.¹⁵ While the Iran hostage crisis in 1979 and the TWA hijacking in Lebanon

¹¹ Belkeis Y. Altareb. "Attitudes towards Muslims: Initial scale development." (1997).

¹² Marcus Schulzke. "Creating an enemy: Social militarization in the War on Terror." *Canadian Political Science Review* 5, no. 2 (2012): 157-164.

¹³ Steve Emerson, "The Other Fundamentalists", *NEW REPUBLIC*, June 12, 1995, at 21–30.

¹⁴ Hilal Elver. "Racializing Islam before and After 9/11: From Melting Pot to Islamophobia." *Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs.* 21 (2012): 119.

¹⁵ Hilal Elver. "Racializing Islam before and After 9/11: From Melting Pot to Islamophobia."

of 1985 drew out a xenophobic sentiment, it was the Gulf War and the domestic attack on the World Trade Center in 1993 that saw increased hate crimes and violence at mosques, including bombings, burnings and assaults in California, Texas and Indiana.¹⁶

Attacks by extremists on American soil in particular appears to be what it took to have the public quickly promote aggressive stances against Muslims and Arab-Americans. The idea of the 'internal threat', has, according to Schulzke, "militarized the civil sphere", as well as legitimized the transition of social xenophobia to a security issue.¹⁷ The notion of modern terrorism, or ' sleeper cells ' that have already assimilated and lie dormant until a country is vulnerable, and then use the trust of the community against a host nation, is one of the most problematic aspects of the narrative outfitted against Muslims in the United States. This means that no matter how assimilated an Arab or Muslim American might be, he or she can still be perceived as a dormant threat. Coupled with US officials campaigning for civilian vigilance, such as New York City's, "If you see something, say something," the quiet approval for the everyday citizen's engagement in the 'fight against terror' may have inadvertently lead to more civilian violence with roots in Islamophobia.¹⁸

¹⁶ Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, *The Dynamics of Islamic Identity in North America*, in *MUSLIMS ON THE AMERICANIZATION PATH?* 21, 26 (Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad & John Esposito eds., 1998)

¹⁷ Marcus Schulzke. "Creating an enemy: Social militarization in the War on Terror." *Canadian Political Science Review* 5, no. 2 (2012): 157-164.

¹⁸ Christopher Rivera. "The Brown Threat: Post-9/11 confluences of Latina/os and Middle Eastern Muslims in the US American imagination." *Latino Studies* 12.1 (2014): 44-64.

Non-Terrorist Discrimination towards Immigrants

Another potential variable in indiscriminate prejudice may stem from an economic downturn, as suggested by C.I. Hovland and R. R. Sears.¹⁹ This noncausal indicator was also affirmed by Green, Glaser and Rich, between hate crimes and economic factors.²⁰ This concept is not new, as there have been numerous studies on group conflict theory that suggest that native groups prefer higher status immigrants as lower status immigrants threaten jobs and government benefits.²¹ While this hostility towards lower status immigrants tends to come from those with less education, all citizens, regardless of their own statuses prefer higher status immigrants.²² In a similar vein, those that are ethnically different from the host population are susceptible to discrimination.²³ A similar concept applies to those of different religions than are traditionally found in the host country. In a historically Christian nation such as the United States, Islam can be seen as a 'symbolic threat' to the host society and increase hostility towards the outgroup.²⁴

¹⁹ Carl Iver Hovland, and Robert R. Sears. "Minor studies of aggression: VI. Correlation of lynchings with economic indices." *The Journal of Psychology* 9, no. 2 (1940): 301-310.

²⁰ Donald P. Green, Jack Glaser, and Andrew Rich. "From lynching to gay bashing: The elusive connection between economic conditions and hate crime." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 75, no. 1 (1998): 82.

²¹ Herbert Blumer. "Race prejudice as a sense of group position." *Pacific Sociological Review* 1, no. 1 (1958): 3-7.

²² Charles R. Chandler, and Yung-mei Tsai. "Social factors influencing immigration attitudes: an analysis of data from the General Social Survey." *The Social Science Journal* 38, no. 2 (2001): 177-188.

²³ Christian Dustmann and Ian P. Preston. 2007. "Racial and Economic Factors in Attitudes to Immigration." *The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy*.

²⁴ Raymond Breton. "Intergroup competition in the symbolic construction of Canadian society." *Race and ethnic relations in Canada* 2 (1999): 291-310.Press.

Policies towards outgroups have existed for almost as long as the country itself has existed, starting from the Alien and Sedition Acts in 1798, which made it difficult for immigrants to become citizens, the 1850's, when Catholics, Jews and other foreigners were scrutinized by the Know Nothing Party, and the Japanese in World War II.²⁵ As Hilal Elver, a research professor in global studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara suggests, "History clearly demonstrates that when a democratic government seeks a balance between security and liberty, targeting aliens from a nation or ethnic group defined as the enemy produces little public resistance."²⁶

The Japanese-American experience in the United States during World War II provides a not dissimilar discriminatory legacy to that of Arab-Americans in the United States. That is, while Arab and Muslim Americans were not placed in internment camps, the majority group reaction turned prejudice into policy for both the Japanese and Muslim/Arab-Americans. It was after Pearl Harbor that the United States Government had amassed enough public support to engage in war, as the events of 9/11 gave the green light for the United States to engage in the 'War on Terror.'²⁷ However, one aspect of the discrimination comes to light in the comparison between the two that shows that the United States has in fact evolved in its efficacy in discrimination. Japanese internment was largely justified by overt racism and the lack of Japanese assimilation into U.S. society, but this is not the case with Muslim and Arab Americans.²⁸ This new breed of

²⁵ Eric A. Posner. "Human welfare, not human rights." *Colum. L. Rev.* 108 (2008): 1758.

²⁶ Hilal Elver. "Racializing Islamn before and After 9/11: From Melting Pot to Islamophobia." *Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs.* 21 (2012): 119.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ Eric A. Posner. "Human welfare, not human rights." *Colum. L. Rev.* 108 (2008): 1758.

discrimination is derived from the unique properties of the demonization of terrorism, in which an Arab or Muslim American can be born and have lived in the United States all of his or her life and still be subject to discrimination.

Understanding the Demographic of Today

In the United States, the population is comprised of 13% of foreign born. In 2010, the United States granted legal status to over one million people, or about 0.3 % of the population.²⁹ Of this group, two thirds of those granted permanent status in the United States are either relatives sponsored by a family member, and 15% are accepted on an economic stream.³⁰ Almost 50% of this group in 2010 did not have an occupation or worked outside of home, and about 10% worked in management or professional occupations.³¹ In terms of perspectives on outgroups, 49% of Americans felt that immigration should be decreased while only 34% of Americans felt that it should be kept at the current rate.³² Specifically towards Muslims, 43% of Americans in 2010 showed prejudice towards Muslims, but five years later, showed an increase of 12% in animosity towards Islam.³³ The Pew Research Center confirmed the increase in unfavorable views

²⁹ Office of Immigration Statistics. 2011. *2010 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics*. Washington DC: Department of Homeland Security.

³⁰ Ibid

³¹ Ibid

³² Jens Manuel Krogstad. "On views of immigrants, Americans largely split along party lines." *Pew Research Center* (2015).

³³ Jaweed Saleem. "More Than Half of Americans Have Unfavorable View of Islam, Poll Finds." *The Huffington Post*. April 10 (2015).

towards Muslims, also citing from data that Americans found Muslims unfavorable compared to any other religious group.³⁴

The concept of cultural threat is seen specifically in the Middle Eastern group that is not in comparison to Hispanics as immigrants. In a study by Allison Harell, survey data of immigrants and immigrant attitudes found that race matters less than religiosity.³⁵ Previous studies have reported that visible membership of a vulnerable group is a major determinant of racially or religiously motivated abuse, participants are asked how recognizable they are as members of their religious, racial or ethnic group.³⁶ In a study of the effects of Islamophobia after 9/11, Christopher Allan and Jorgen Nielson found that the single most important factor in determining a victim of attack was their visual identity as a Muslim.³⁷ As a result, Arab and Muslim women are more likely to become targets as they don visual identifiers like the hijab or niqab. Allen and Nielson also pointed out that less important than actually being Muslim is the perception that an individual is Muslim. As such, Sikh men wearing turbans were incidental casualties in discrimination.³⁸ It is clear that perception reigns over all in terms of social conduct towards outgroups, as suggested by the data. According to Banting and Kymlicka, the

³⁴Pew Research Center "Mixed views of initial U.S. response to Europe's migrant crisis." Retrieved from <http://pewresearch.org>.

³⁵ Allison Harrell. "Minority-majority relations in Canada: the rights regime and the adoption of multicultural values." In *Canadian Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Ottawa ON*. 2009.

³⁶Christopher Allen and Jørgen S. Nielsen. "Summary Report on Islamophobia in the EU after 11 September 2001." Vienna: EUMC, 2002.

³⁷ Christopher Allen and Jørgen S. Nielsen. "Summary Report on Islamophobia in the EU after 11 September 2001." Vienna: EUMC, 2002.

³⁸ Ibid.

United States has a very limited degree of both multicultural policies and ethnic representation by the media, as seen with the knee-jerk reaction towards Muslims in the wake of the Oklahoma City Bombing.³⁹

After the Oklahoma City bombing, the media immediately and erroneously attributed the lone attack to Muslim radicalism.⁴⁰ Mehdi Samati in her paper, "Terrorists, Moslems, fundamentalists and other bad objects in the midst of 'us' found that the Oklahoma City Bombing drew more reactions and anxiety than the World Trade Center bombing in 1993 did, despite not being due to Muslim extremism.⁴¹ According to Semati, two important aspects of this event made it as compelling as it was- that the enemy was home grown, and that it took place in middle America, which according to Semati, is touted as being 'more American' by media.⁴² At the time, the notion of such a domestic attack was unfathomable and thus attributed to a foreign attacker, putting blame on Muslim radicalism.⁴³ It was not until 9/11 that such fears were realized in actuality, but the stage was adequately set for the demonization of Islam in 1993. However, there have been many policies enacted directly targeting Muslims after 9/11 that have had a lasting effect on Muslim Americans.

³⁹ Kieth Banting and Will Kymlicka, eds. *Multiculturalism and the welfare state: Recognition and redistribution in contemporary democracies*. OUP Oxford, 2006.

⁴⁰ Christopher Allen and Jørgen S. Nielsen. "Summary Report on Islamophobia in the EU after 11 September 2001." Vienna: EUMC, 2002.

⁴¹ Mehdi Semati. "Terrorists, Moslems, fundamentalists and other bad objects in the midst of 'us'." *Journal of International Communication* 4, no. 1 (1997): 30-49.

⁴² Mehdi Semati "Terrorists, Moslems..." pp 30-49

⁴³ Ibid.

The Actions of Political Leaders in the US

Horowitz suggested in 1985 that the actions of political leadership during economic decline greatly affect aggression towards outgroups, or minority groups, and that political leaders have encouraged out-group resentment by highlighting economic inequalities.⁴⁴ It seems entirely reasonable then, that political leaders could highlight cultural, ethnic or religious differences of an outgroup to sway public opinion, particularly in times in which the public would feel most vulnerable, such as after a catastrophic event. Frustration and anger are typical responses to catastrophic events and in their grieving process, can direct anger and frustration towards the perceived perpetrators.⁴⁵ Bar-Tal and Labin found that even short-term major events can drastically affect racial stereotypes.⁴⁶ Such conditions could be ripe for targeting a particular outgroup to dispel the public's frustration and need for reparations.

President Donald Trump effectively utilized Islamophobia to garner support for his election campaign. When Anderson Cooper of CNN asked Trump if he believes Islam is at war with the West, he simply replied, "I think Islam hates us."⁴⁷ In very few words, Trump affirmed his belief in Huntington's 'Clash of Civilizations' in that he understands our relationship with Islam as an 'us versus them', a misguided sentiment

⁴⁴ Donald L. Horowitz. *Ethnic groups in conflict, updated edition with a new preface*. Univ of California Press, 2001.

⁴⁵ Eliezer Witzum and Ruth Malkinson. "Death of a leader: The social construction of bereavement." *When a community weeps: Case studies in group survivorship* (1998): 119-137.

⁴⁶ Daniel Bar-tal and Daniela Labin. "The effect of a major event on stereotyping: Terrorist attacks in Israel and Israeli adolescents' perceptions of Palestinians, Jordanians and Arabs." *European Journal of Social Psychology* 31, no. 3 (2001): 265-280.

⁴⁷ David Sherfinski. "Donald Trump: 'I Think Islam Hates Us.'" *Washingtontimes.com*. The Washington Times, March, 10, 2016.

shared by many xenophobic Americans. By focusing on demonizing the outgroup, he pandered to those who were effectively seasoned by fear for security and feel threatened by the imposition of the outdated notion of orientalism.⁴⁸

However, this is not new, as George W. Bush pandered to the security fears of the American people in justifying war abroad and the Patriot Act at home. As Yasser Ali, a Professor at Berkeley suggests, cyclical attention to security issues has worked effectively for Republicans in terms of addressing security issues by pushing a particular group into the open for scrutiny and scapegoat.

Post 9/11- fear of Terrorism and the Patriot Act

In a Gallup poll several weeks after the attack on the World Trade Center on September 11th, a majority of Americans expressed a desire to require special checks for all Muslims, Middle Easterners and Arabs, regardless of whether or not they were citizens. Following the 9/11 attacks, the federal government enacted the Uniting and Strengthening America By Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (PATRIOT Act). This new legislation, which was passed through Congress and both houses with overwhelming support gave almost unbridled authority and access to the Federal government for its War on Terror. This allowed the US Government to use wiretaps without warrants, authorization for unilateral executive detention, and access to private citizen records in the name of security. The US Justice Department detained over 1,200 people without legal basis or charges against

⁴⁸ Christopher S. Saladin "What do Donald Trump and John Quincy Adams have in Common? Islamophobia." (2016)..

them. Reflective of Japanese interment during World War II, this policy was implemented through prejudice based on race and national origin criteria. In 2002, over 83,000 Muslim men were forced to register and fingerprint for interrogation by immigration agents in the U.S.

Immigration Law was used aggressively and with a zero-tolerance policy towards Muslims and Arabs post 9/11. Before September 11th, the United States had come a long way in terms of immigration law enforcement and racial profiling, but the attack undid the work in short time.⁴⁹ The National Security Entry-Exit Registration System, or NSEERS, required immigrants from 26 countries- twenty-five of which were Muslim countries to register specially and be subjected to fingerprinting upon entry to the United States, and also required annual reregistration.⁵⁰

Susan Akram of BU Law & Kevin Johnson, a Professor of Law at UC Davis investigated the alarming coupling of civil rights and immigration law in their piece, “Civil Rights of Arabs and Muslims After 9/11.”⁵¹ In May of 2002, Congress passed the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Reform Act, which was meant to improve visibility of non-citizens that were in the United States on student and other types of visas.⁵² This

⁴⁹ Susan M. Akram and Maritza Karmely, “Immigration and constitutional consequences of post-9/11 policies Involving Arabs and Muslims in the United States: Is alienage a distinction without a difference.” *UC davis L. rev.* 38 (2004): 609., 2001: The targeting of Arabs and Muslims. *NYU Ann. Surv. Am. L.*, 58, 295.

⁵⁰ Groups Voice Racial Profiling Concerns Over Plan to Fingerprint, Track U.S. Visitors, 70 U.S.L.WK. 2793 (2002)

⁵¹ Susan M. Akram and Maritza Karmely, “Immigration and constitutional consequences of post-9/11 policies Involving Arabs and Muslims in the United States: Is alienage a distinction without a difference.” *UC davis L. rev.* 38 (2004): 609., 2001: The targeting of Arabs and Muslims. *NYU Ann. Surv. Am. L.*, 58, 295..

⁵² Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-173, 116 Stat. 543 (2002).

was a response to the fact that many of the September 11th airplane hijackers had entered the country on student nonimmigrant visas. In addition, the Justice Department implemented “Operation Absconder” several months earlier in an effort to remove 6,000 Middle Eastern men residing in the United States.⁵³ These two policies, placed under the State Department, were virtually immune from judicial review and any nationality-based discrimination.⁵⁴ In addition, the federal government made it difficult for Muslim American detainees to reach their attorneys that could provide legal advice, sometimes deeming them ‘enemy combatants’, which excluded them from the judicial right to an attorney or even knowing what charges they were facing.⁵⁵

The Aviation and Transportation Security Act made U.S. Citizenship a prerequisite for serving as an airport security personnel, which served contradictory to the fact that even immigrants could be conscripted into the military and be required to be stationed at airports- just not as TSA personnel.⁵⁶

Another change in power that occurred due to 9/11 was the federal government’s power over immigration enforcement.⁵⁷ Once having had full control over the immigration process, the Bush Administration deferred power to state and local levels

⁵³ “Focusing on Removal of 6,000 Men from Al Qaeda Haven Countries.” DOJ Legal Opinion Would Broaden Use of State, Local Personnel in Immigration Enforcement *INTERPRETER RELEASES* 115 (2002).

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ U.S. Says It Halted Qaeda Plot to Use Radioactive Bomb, *N.Y. TIMES*, June 11, 2002, at A1.

⁵⁶ Steven Greenhouse, Groups Seek to Lift Ban on Foreign Screeners, *N.Y. TIMES*, Dec. 12, 2001

⁵⁷ DOJ Legal Opinion Would Broaden Use of State, Local Personnel in Immigration Enforcement, 79 *INTERPRETER RELEASES* 519 (2002); Susan Sachs, Long Resistant, Police Start Embracing Immigration Duties, *N.Y. TIMES*,

that were unfamiliar with immigration law.⁵⁸ This resulted in civil rights violations and continues to threaten civil rights not only for Muslim or Arab Americans but for other foreign nationals, particularly Mexican-Americans through such means as deportation or like Arizona's SB1070.⁵⁹

A study by A. Awadi showed the discrimination faced by Arab-Americans and Muslims in all aspects of life.⁶⁰ There were notable difficulties in education, career opportunities, family situations and incidents in the workplace. First generation respondents were more tolerant of the injustice of the Patriot Act, as they had faced persecution in their homelands. Second generation Arabs and Muslims, however, were not as forgiving, as they felt their citizenships as Americans were threatened by rules and regulations. There was an acknowledgment by this group that to assimilate, they would have to accept that elected officials would continue to perpetuate a negative image of their people.

The Pew Research Center found that from the beginning of the Patriot Act, almost 49% of Americans felt that it was worth the sacrifice in freedom to ensure safety for the people, but this number had dropped to 11% by 2004.⁶¹ Sally Wesley Bonet, in her article, "Educating Muslim American Youth in a Post 9/11 Era: A Critical Review of

⁵⁸ Susan M. Akram and Maritza Karmely, "Immigration and constitutional consequences of post-9/11 policies Involving Arabs and Muslims in the United States: Is alienage a distinction without a difference." *UC davis L. rev.* 38 (2004): 609., 2001: The targeting of Arabs and Muslims. *NYU Ann. Surv. Am. L.*, 58, 295.

⁵⁹ Matthew Purdy, Bush's New Rules to Fight Terror Transform the Legal Landscape, *N.Y. Times*, Nov. 25, 2001

⁶⁰Ali G. Awadi. "How the events of 9/11 shaped the lives of Arab American Muslims in American society." PhD diss., Walden University, 2014

⁶¹ "Muslim American, Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream," *Pew Research Center* (2007).

Policy and Practice” found that while the Patriot Act was guised as a blanket security protocol, it in fact targeted Middle Eastern Americans and Muslims under the veil of a “measure of security.”⁶² This included privacy violations of both young and old, and invasion of privacy by way of excessive investigation and went as far as detaining Muslim and Middle Eastern Americans against their will. With such a large percentage of the United States population being suspicious of their own countrymen, it is no surprise that this could result in discriminative violence and hate. By further delineating Muslim or Arab Americans as the “others,” it seems that there is almost a conditioning of this group of people by its own government and people to accept and make a concession to being ‘second class citizens’ in their own country. Bonet adds in terms of the dehumanization of Muslim or Arab-Americans that while Western women are seen as free, independent, and of their own agency, Muslim women are seen as, “silent, passive, invisible and victimized.”⁶³ That is, Muslim and Arab-Americans are presented as so far removed from the American tradition that it is not possible to perceive them as both American and Muslim.

Arizona SB 1070- Ramifications of Poor Policy

The “Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act,” or SB 1070 of 2010 is considered by some to be the harshest immigration law implemented in the United States, and provides insight into the psychological and sociological problems of

⁶² Sally Wesley Bonet. "Educating Muslim American youth in a post-9/11 era: A critical review of policy and practice." *The High School Journal* 95, no. 1 (2011): 46-55.

⁶³ Sally Wesley Bonet. "Educating Muslim American youth in a post-9/11 era: A critical review of policy and practice."

discriminatory public policy in immigration law. Arizona SB 1070 required any aliens above the age of 14 to have registration documents at all times and made it a misdemeanor should anyone be caught without them. It also allowed for police officers to attempt to determine an individual's immigration status by way of "lawful stop, detention or arrest" should there be reasonable suspicion.⁶⁴ Similarly to the Patriot Act, this piece of legislation relied on profiling of Mexican-Americans to "attrition through enforcement," as stated within the legislation of SB 1070.⁶⁵

A study by T. Lopez provided a qualitative analysis of the effects of SB 1070 on Mexican-Americans, its target constituents in Arizona.⁶⁶ Findings in the analysis offer parallels to the Muslim American experience with the Patriot Act, suggesting that the problems that arise within their communities are correlated to the discriminating policies.

The study found that the Act greatly affected not only those receiving direct discrimination, but also those in the immediate proximity, particularly families. Mexican-American experiences in this regard could be taken into account when considering the multiplicative experiences of Muslim Americans. In one example, Lopez cited a respondent's family situation in which the tension over SB 1070 caused his parents to separate, which forced their daughter to drop out of college to support her parents.⁶⁷ Schools in Arizona reported increased stress-related health issues resulted by aggression and anger in many youths over SB 1070.⁶⁸ Peggy Thoits, a researcher in

⁶⁴ Arizona SB 1070, §1.

⁶⁵ Arizona SB 1070, §1.

⁶⁶ Tomas Lopez. "Left back: The impact of SB 1070 on Arizona's youth." *University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona* (2011).

⁶⁷ Tomas Lopez. "Left back: The impact of SB 1070 on Arizona's youth."

⁶⁸ Ibid.

sociological stress found that ‘stress proliferation’ is a rippling psychological effect caused by a stressor that can multiply over time, particularly if the stressor agitates an individual in early life.⁶⁹ In addition, ‘stress proliferation’ affects those around an individual, as Lopez discovered in his study.

Both the Patriot Act and SB 1070 forced lifestyle changes on their respective targets and affected those around them. Lopez’s documented experiences and Thoits’ assessment of stress suggests a clear impact on the groups being targeted, and also how this may similarly affect Muslim Americans. The biggest casualties of either policy were the youth, or second-generation groups.⁷⁰ While first generation immigrants may be callous to persecution, second generation groups are confused, angry or upset about being considered second-class citizens in the country of their birth which exacerbates the distress felt in an individual’s immediate social circles.

2010 Oklahoma Save Our State

In 2010, Oklahoma passed a constitutional amendment, Save Our State Amendment that was purportedly designed to prevent Sharia Law from taking over their state, despite less than one percent of Oklahoma being home to Muslims.⁷¹ Over 70% of Oklahomans chose to approve the ballot measure.⁷² A Muslim citizen promptly filed

⁶⁹ Peggy A. Thoits. "Stress and health: Major findings and policy implications." *Journal of health and social behavior* 51, no. 1_suppl (2010): S41-S53.

⁷⁰ Sally Wesley Bonet. "Educating Muslim American youth in a post-9/11 era: A critical review of policy and practice." *The High School Journal* 95, no. 1 (2011): 46-55.

⁷¹ Ali, Y. (2012). Shariah and citizenship—How Islamophobia is creating a second-class citizenry in America. *California Law Review*, 1027-1068.

⁷² Andrea Elliott, The Man Behind the Anti-Shariah Movement, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2011, at A1.

suit, stating that the amendment was a transgression of the Establishment Clause.⁷³ A federal judge in Oklahoma agreed, filing permanent injunction to the amendment. While the amendment itself was not successful in being codified into law, it gave way to more than two dozen state legislatures that would attempt to follow a similar path. In Tennessee, a legislative proposal made the use of Sharia Law a felony, carrying a sentence of up to 15 years in prison.⁷⁴ Missouri offered a similar proposal that would also impose on the First Amendment, championed by Representative Don Wells, who suggested that Sharia Law is comparable to polio virus.⁷⁵ Despite understanding that such pieces of legislation are not constitutional and were being turned down, the precedent of having them ‘on the record’ is concerning.

The Future of Islam in the United States

The Council on American-Islamic Relations emphasizes that, “Islamophobia is the new face of an old hate that has targeted minorities throughout our nation’s history.”⁷⁶ While this statement by CAIR offers a somewhat underwhelming account of previous discriminatory practices in the United States, Islamophobia is certainly front and center as today’s new hate. As with discrimination against others in the past, Islamophobia and

⁷³ Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Temporary Restraining Order & Preliminary Injunction at 3, *Awad v. Ziriax* (Awad I), 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (W.D. Okla. 2010) (No. 10-CV-01186-M).

⁷⁴ Bob Smietana, Tennessee Bill Would Jail Some Shariah Followers, USA TODAY (Feb. 23, 2011, 11:58 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2011-02-23-tennessee-law-shariah_N.htm.

⁷⁵ Rudi Keller, Shariah Likened to Polio, COLUMBIA DAILY TRIB., Mar. 17, 2011

⁷⁶Council On American-Islamic Relations & University of California Berkeley Centr for Race and Gender. “Same Hate, New Target: Islamophobia and its Impact in the United States.” Jan.. 2009–DEC. 2010 (2011)

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the perpetuation of discrimination against Arabs and Muslims rests in the hands of political leaders and people of particular influence. Canada has an official policy of multiculturalism in terms of racially relevant policy and has had a higher support for immigration and less animosity towards Muslim immigrants.⁷⁷ In an era of globalized information, the existence of rampant Islamophobia by way of misinformation may be perplexing to some. This highlights the importance of public policy and the influence of political figures on the public. With effective multicultural policies, the United States could truly become the melting pot that it claims to be, and nullify the sentiment of Huntington's 'Clash of Civilizations.'

The decentralization of immigration law enforcement poses civil rights threats in the future if policy is not changed towards a more effective solution in which local and state officials are better informed of immigration law.

Defining Islamophobia

While Islamophobia is a commonly used term today in both scholarly and public spheres, the definition itself has remained ambiguous in scope and definition.

Understanding Islamophobia in an evolutionary context, rather than a political one is key to any relative qualitative discussion. The term first saw usage in the latter 1990s and early 2000s by NGO's, organizations and political activists to underscore rhetoric and discrimination against Islam and Muslims in the Western world. It was described in the 1997 Runnymede Trust, an Islamophobia study group report, as a, "...useful shorthand

⁷⁷ Allison Harrell. "Minority-majority relations in Canada: the rights regime and the adoption of multicultural values." In *Canadian Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Ottawa ON*. 2009.

way of referring to dread or hatred of Islam—and, therefore, to fear or dislike of all or most Muslims.”⁷⁸ In the context of the United States, Mehdi Semati, a professor at Northern Illinois University, defines Islamophobia as a, “single unified and negative conception of an essentialized Islam, which is then deemed incompatible with Euro-Americanness.”⁷⁹ This demarcation of Islamophobia as being specifically defined by a Western ideal is attributable to how the term has remained charged for political use. It has been used to describe anti-Muslimism by Muslim leaders and by politicians to portray sensitivity towards Muslims while implementing antithetical policies.⁸⁰ In addition, the term Islamophobia implicates all of Islam, despite being used often in the context of extremists of Islam. Some academics have suggested getting rid of the term entirely because it is politicized and serves little use for comparative or academic inquiry.⁸¹

The common denominator amongst varying definitions is, according to Bleich, that this points out the social problem of Islam and the general fear surrounding it.⁸² It is then safe to suggest that Islamophobia can be comparatively analyzed in a similar fashion to racism, homophobia, or even Anti-Semitism in the sense that there is a blanket discrimination towards a particular group. According to Goertz, there are three types of

⁷⁸ Runnymede Trust. (1997). *Islamophobia: A challenge for us all*. London: Author.

⁷⁹ Mehdi Semati. "Terrorists, Moslems, fundamentalists and other bad objects in the midst of 'us'." *Journal of International Communication* 4, no. 1 (1997): 30-49.

⁸⁰ Maleiha Malik. "Anti-Muslim prejudice in the West, past and present: An introduction." *Patterns of Prejudice* 43, no. 3-4 (2009): 207-212.

⁸¹ Erik Bleich. "What Is Islamophobia and How Much Is There? Theorizing and Measuring an Emerging Comparative Concept," *American Behavioral Scientist*. 55: 12, 1535-1540. 2011

⁸² Evidence from public opinion surveys, 1988-2008. *Patterns of Prejudice*, 43, 379-400.

relationships between indicators and concepts.⁸³ The first is a concept that causes an indicator, the second is an indicator that causes a concept, and the third is a noncausal relationship.⁸⁴ Because of the ‘blanket’ or ‘indiscriminate’ nature of Islamophobia, the last, a noncausal relationship, should be most considered. The best indicators, according to Goertz, are measures that take survey or interview data from questions that reveal the indiscriminate negative sentiment, in this case, against Islam or Muslims. Mir Islam and Mirna Jahjah, in their article studying young Australian perspectives towards Islam in *Social Behavior and Personality*, also found that affective measures are more reliable predictors of attitudes towards racial groups than that of perceived threat, relative deprivation or stereotypes.⁸⁵

While such analytic methods would effectively determine that discrimination has actually occurred, there is limited usefulness in terms of a systematic comparative analysis. However, Bleich suggests that some non-causal indicators also function as causes: politicians or prominent figures making anti-Muslim statements not only indicate the presence of Islamophobia, but also the compounded effect of amplification to the public.⁸⁶ Therefore, looking at public figures and resultant policies and legislation in a

⁸³ Gary Goertz. *Social science concepts: A user's guide*. Princeton University Press, 2006.

⁸⁴ Ibid

⁸⁵ Mir Rabiul Islamu and Mirna Jahjah. "Predictors of Young Australians' Attitudes Toward Aboriginals, Asians and Arabs." *Social Behavior and Personality: an international journal* 29, no. 6 (2001): 569-579.

⁸⁶ Erik Bleich. "What Is Islamophobia and How Much Is There? Theorizing and Measuring an Emerging Comparative Concept," *American Behavioral Scientist*. 55: 12, 1535-1540. 2011/ Evidence from public opinion surveys, 1988-2008. *Patterns of Prejudice*, 43, 379-400.

given amount of time, in addition to survey data provides the most chance of clearly looking at indicators of Islamophobia for the purposes of comparative analysis.⁸⁷

Bleich's consideration of non-causal indicators serving as causes justifies the consideration of certain aspects of the broad venue for Islamophobia. This includes the pre- and post- 9/11 events and policies that have been implemented that directly concern Muslims in the United States as well as Arizona SB1070 and the case of the 2010 Oklahoma Save our State. This background context serves to contribute towards an operationalized definition of Islamophobia, which is discussed further in the following chapter.

⁸⁷ Erik Bleich. "What Is Islamophobia and How Much Is There? Theorizing and Measuring an Emerging Comparative Concept," *American Behavioral Scientist*. 55: 12, 1535-1540. 2011

Chapter III.

Theoretical Framework and Research Design

This chapter begins with a sequence of reasoning as an application of the line of inquiry provided in the previous chapter. By defining Islamophobia operationally, the indicators that result present a gateway for analysis. This analysis is achieved through these indicators, which include:

- the thematic application of conclusions and questionnaire design of individual survey groups,
 - how they fare comparatively with that of other survey groups
- the consideration of their respective affiliations and group attributes.

Line of Inquiry

By following the line of inquiry that seeks to answer the essential questions required for defining Islamophobia, this paper initially looked to the Runnymede Trust, a British think tank whose main objective is fighting race inequality.⁸⁸ This study offered 8 key attributes that can characterize the nature of Islamophobia and making determinations as to whether or not the objects of inquiry exhibit open or closed views:

Table 1. Runnymede's Open and Closed Model of Inquiry.

<i>1. Whether Islam is seen as monolithic and static, or as diverse and dynamic.</i>
<i>2. Whether Islam is seen as other and separate, or as similar and interdependent.</i>

⁸⁸Paul Gordon and David Rosenberg. *Daily Racism: The Press and Black People in Britain*. Runnymede Trust, 1989.

3. <i>Whether Islam is seen as inferior, or as different but equal.</i>
4. <i>Whether Islam is seen as an aggressive enemy or as a cooperative partner.</i>
5. <i>Whether Muslims are seen as manipulative or as sincere.</i>
6. <i>Whether Muslims criticism of 'the West' are rejected or debated.</i>
7. <i>Whether discriminatory behavior against Muslims is defended or opposed.</i>
8. <i>Whether anti-Muslim discourse is seen as natural or as problematic.</i>

However, this set of questions, while important to consider, does not offer a line of inquiry that is useful for the purposes of comparative analysis or for determining changes over time. Operationalization is an important factor in determining a definition for the concept of Islamophobia for the purposes of quantitative analysis.

Bleich attempted to offer a solution to the difficulties offered by the Runnymede Trust line of inquiry and attempted to develop a set of attributes that could help social scientists address such issues as changes over time and for including the Muslim Diaspora as a whole and across the various social groups that contain the Diaspora (2011).⁸⁹ He defined Islamophobia as, "...indiscriminate negative attitudes or emotions directed at Islam or Muslims," which built atop Runnymede's open and closed perspective concept but offered more inclusive considerations of prejudice which opened up parameters for empirical study. Specifically, Bleich said that instead of pointing to

⁸⁹ Erik Bleich. "What Is Islamophobia and How Much Is There? Theorizing and Measuring an Emerging Comparative Concept," *American Behavioral Scientist*. 55: 12, 1535-1540. 2011

determinant factors that could help identify Islamophobia, one could possibly use ‘non-causal indicators’ as identifiers of the phenomenon of Islamophobia.

Goertz founded this framework of inquiry and splits it into a three-tiered model. It includes at the base level ‘Islamophobia,’ as the phenomenon itself. On the second level, Islamophobia is defined. For Bleich, that would be the broader group of ‘negative attitudes or emotions’ directed at Muslims and Islam as a whole.⁹⁰ The third level Bleich recognized through Goertz’s original framework in the context of Islamophobia is what completed the ‘operationalization’ of inquiry by offering ‘indicators’ that could be the basis for empirical study.⁹¹ This is the main concept that is used in making determinations of themes. By Bleich’s strategy, there is emphasis on the parameters of study, or what is considered acceptable for his format of questioning.

Parameters

Bleich’s model and definition of Islamophobia went beyond the abstractions that founded the basis of studies of Islamophobia and required that despite the influence and weight of anecdotal or circumstantial accounts in the discussion of Islamophobia, it is only empirically founded evidence that could provide a basis for academic study and questioning. Armed with questions separated by themes, the three-tiered approach is designed:

⁹⁰ Erik Bleich. “What Is Islamophobia and How Much Is There? Theorizing and Measuring an Emerging Comparative Concept,” *American Behavioral Scientist*. 55: 12, 1535-1540. 2011

⁹¹ Gary Goertz. *Social science concepts: A user's guide*. Princeton University Press, 2006.

Table 2. Stages of Islamophobia.

<ul style="list-style-type: none">• <i>Stage 1</i>: Islamophobia as a phenomenon
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• <i>Stage 2</i>: Definition of Islamophobia: Negative attitudes or emotions directed at Muslims and Islam as a whole.
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• <i>Stage 3</i>: Indicators (non-causal) of negative attitudes or emotions directed at Muslims and Islam as a whole.

From this, the following becomes the primary research question that can satisfy the idea of an operationalized inquiry: “How are the (4) themes most commonly offered as conclusions reflected in the surveys available?” By having the same set of ‘indicators,’ for the sets of data available for analysis, the themes can serve as the consistent variables by which the different data sets can be explored for differences. In this way, a determination can be made as to the set of attributes that can help find the key differences in the methodology, analyses, or conclusions that act as identifiers for this study.

Research Framework Themes and Methodology

Of the types of subject matter that presented themselves in the different surveys, the following themes were chosen for both importance in defining Islamophobia and for how often they showed up in the literature.

Table 3. Four Attributes for Study.

1. **Experiences with law enforcement:**
Are conclusions made about the experiences of Muslim Americans with law enforcement reflective of the surveyed Muslim American experiences and relevant data?
2. Discrimination:
Do the reported attitudes and experiences of surveyed Muslim Americans substantiate the claims made in regards to the conclusions made of prejudice towards Muslim Americans?
3. Attitudes towards the US and US Society:
Do the reported experiences of surveyed non-Muslims reflect the conclusions and intensity of negative sentiment towards Muslims and Islam?
4. Terror and Crime:
To what degree are the conclusions made in terms of an increased risk of violence against Muslim Americans shown through survey data? Are they realistically representing the problem? Are Muslim Americans discriminated against? And to what extent?

Using these four themes as ‘identifiers’ for the validity of the surveys, I hope to discover how the surveys analyzed and their individual characteristics might result in the types of conclusions that are made. More specifically, I want to find out if the conclusions that are made in the different surveys are adequately supported by the statistical evidence that they are based off of, and if that statistical evidence itself is offered in an objective way. The themes offer a way to qualitatively assess the different important topics in Islamophobia across the board of surveys and gain an understanding of the different way the themes are engaged, as well as how they are affected by their individual character profiles. My hope is that this research will offer a way to determine whether or not the surveys analyzed are offered in an objective way. In both cases, I

hope to find common attributes that allow for future researchers to better sift through surveys that can provide objectively grounded conclusions for study.

Research Design

The research design for this thesis is one that includes both qualitative and quantitative attributes that should provide a clearer picture of the relationship between statistical data and the interpretations that come from them. First, the individual survey groups will be given character profiles, which includes the following attributes:

1. Overview: General Information about the Group Question
2. Finances and Facilities: Information that is available about the funding, investment and /or facilities available to the group
3. Survey Introduction and Attributes: A brief description of the survey/s that were explored
4. Potentially Confounding Variables and Thoughts: Considerations given the group in question, its financial backing and survey attributes

The following section will offer a comparative look at the questionnaire and conclusion design. Specifically, the four themes will offer a way to look at how different key surveys with information available engaged the different subject matters that pertain to Islamophobia. These four themes offer a way to determine the key differences that make the surveys unique and lead into a comparative consideration of the attributes and questionnaire designs.

Adaptation of Internal Consistency Analysis

The methodology used in this paper is an adaptation of internal consistency analysis as described in Biemer and Lyberg's "Introduction to Survey Quality."⁹² My thesis takes from this book a methodology of validating survey data by "... comparing two or more variables collected in the same survey that are known to be strongly intercorrelated to determine whether they are indeed correlated to the extent expected." This method of determining whether or not the information acquired from respondents is consistent has been used in survey analysis to offer an internal "audit" of the data being collected. For example, a respondent may be asked, "How many times have you been stopped by a TSA employee while traveling in the last 12 months?" Later in the interview, the interviewer might ask, "Can you recall how many times you were questioned by law enforcement at an airport in the last year?" Resulting data would be able to determine if the numbers align. This thesis design offers a similar concept, but across multiple surveys. The four different themes provide a way to analyze multiple surveys and decide whether or not the data in each survey is reflected in their respective conclusions. Biemer and Lyberg's strategies towards internal consistency offer additional 'checks' by way of correlation that contribute to this thesis design, suggesting "... gathering data on variables collected in a survey that measure very different characteristics but for which the relationship between the variables is known." This thesis will make use of such correlations, allowing for a variation of Biemer and Lyberg's

⁹² Paul Biemer, and Lars E. Lyberg. *Introduction to survey quality*. Vol. 335. John Wiley & Sons, 2003.

internal consistency check that is given a range of applications that is limited by a justifiable correlation between the variables being discussed.

Good and Bad Surveys

One of the primary objectives of this thesis is to offer assessments in terms of the quality of surveys, both in terms of questionnaire design and in regards to the conclusions being offered from them. In doing so, some surveys being analyzed will be purposefully integrated as poor designs to show the differences for comparison. Surveys are cited and emphasized as the basis of particular viewpoints, so it is important to understand if they are the means or the end. In other words, is the survey design developed to further a point or be the starting point in determining some phenomenon?

In addition to making determinations based on quantitative analysis, I will also be looking at qualitative aspects of each particular survey. Specific attributes, such as the research group of the survey, the companies outsourced for poll implementation, the people funding the survey, and even idiosyncrasies of particular surveys will be considered for how they may influence the findings of the surveys. While the weight of each of these attributes cannot be determined quantitatively for comparison, their consideration will provide a way for readers to take account of their attributes, which offers awareness for interpreting the results of the studies.

Recap and Overview

In summary, I would look to survey response data and the conclusions derived from them within (10) surveys to offer a comparative look at commonly used sources within the past decade and half on the topic of Islamophobia. By using quantitative and

qualitative assessment techniques, I hope to determine differences and similarities among the surveys analyzed and offer insight into how conclusions pertaining to the effects of Islamophobia are derived. The four themes offered consist of variables for study across the different surveys and provide the basis of quantitative study. The theme of discrimination, and its statistics and conclusions, for example, would be cross-referenced across survey examples to give future researchers examples of the different types of surveys that were found in research. Muslim respondent data that has to do with discrimination and the conclusions derived from each of the surveys would offer an idea of the scope of study for each of the surveys and how grounded the respective conclusions are in terms of their data. This would include both data from Muslim American respondents and non-Muslim respondents. Qualitative elements such as the source of funding, research design, the research team and the outsourced data collection methods would be analyzed for each of the surveys and be taken into account in the conclusions offered in my paper.

Chapter IV.

Individual Survey Group Profiles and Analysis

This section provides individual character profiles for prominent groups with vested interest in Muslim Americans, and that offer surveys and/or conclusions towards the narrative of the state of Muslims in the United States. It is designed with the following chapter in mind by offering character attributes that can supplement comparative analyses. The following groups comprise the main elements of analysis, with this section being offered as part literature review and part individual analysis. While it does not represent the entirety of available groups that pertain to Muslim Americans and Islamophobia, it provides a broad and diverse range of the most influential players that are invested in some way or another in the continuing trends of Islamophobia. Comparative analysis of influential survey groups requires an understanding of what makes them unique, which can be found in their individual attributes.

CAIR: Council on American-Islamic Relations

The Council on American-Islamic Relations is a Washington D.C. based non-profit organization and offers the mission statement, "...to enhance understanding of Islam, encourage dialogue, protect civil liberties, empower American Muslims, and build coalitions that promote justice and mutual understanding." The CAIR foundation states that its current purpose is primarily to educate and advocate Muslim causes using media relations, education and advocacy, voter-registration and government relations. Founded in 1994, CAIR has tried to present itself as the go-to civil rights organization for Muslim

Americans, but this has been met with difficulty due to controversial associations the organization has with several groups and causes. Since 1995, CAIR has offered an annual report outlining the Muslim American status. 2009 was the last consecutive year that this annual report was offered before an internal restructuring occurred, with the annual report being relaunched in 2017.

This well-funded organization has 29 offices, 65 spokespeople and 35 lawyers and is based in Washington, D.C. Just to gain an idea of the types of funding that they receive, in 2015, the CAIR Foundation raised \$3.3 million and spent a total of approximately \$2.7 million in lobbying efforts and services towards the Muslim American community. CAIR has received consistent contributions from the Rockefeller Philanthropy Advisors and the Tides Foundation since 2008. In terms of breakdown of funds, CAIR in the same year spent \$353,000 in communications, or advertisements that depict Islam and Muslims in a positive light, and one-hundred thousand towards government relations.

CAIR's Civil Rights Report 2017 offers primarily anecdotal submissions of the difficulties of Muslim American life, along with self-cited reports and incidences that are logged to describe the difficulties and prejudices offered to Muslim Americans. It also discusses previous CAIR statistics, but no raw data or questionnaires. Its sources are through an online complaint system, email, or telephone and data is stored in an independent case-management system.

CAIR has been accused of being associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, which itself has been convicted of financing terrorism. In 2007, United States Federal prosecutors designated CAIR as a co-conspirator along with the Holy Land Foundation,

which was convicted of financing terrorism. The U.A.E. designated CAIR a terrorist organization in 2014, and several members were arrested on charges pertaining to terrorism. CAIR avoided denouncing the IAP (Islamic Association for Palestine), which itself is considered a Hamas affiliated anti-Semitic organization, as well as other Palestinian organizations that the United States and International Community isolated and/or condemned.

This organization has been met with some serious accusations and controversy because of its affiliations with what are considered terrorist organizations by the United States. While analysis of the survey data and questionnaires will make certain how this connection affects their annual reports, it can be said that they are proponents of offering a picture of Muslim Americans in a positive light. Whether this is achieved through an objective methodology is to be seen.

CNN: Central News Network

CNN is a popular news media outlet boasting a viewership rating amongst many media platforms. It is widely known and considered to be a primary news source, and therefore panders to a broad and influenceable group. However, they don't simply offer news and their interpretation of events, but the group also offers its own statistics and conclusions pertaining to culture, religion, social issues, and national debates on issues on current issues. One such example of their foray into empirically-based conclusions is their 2017 Muslim American Poll, which was outsourced through the ORC, or Opinion Research Corporation. They implemented a study on the subject of Muslim Americans telephone interviews outsourced through ORC.

Founded in 1980, CNN is a subsidiary of Warner Media, by AT&T.

CNN offered a telephone-interview based survey related to Islamophobia and also thoughts on Trump as president. While being an impressively large organization with a seemingly solid basis for non-partisanship, a quick glance at the format of the interview and its attributes makes for little objectivity in terms of the presentation and execution of conclusions based on the numbers. Furthermore, the wording of the questions within their questionnaire offers a solid backdrop for a discussion on the effects of methodology on final results.

The implementation of survey by telephone is different from that of the other surveys offered by survey groups in this thesis, in that it offers less thorough results than an in-person interview. It remains to be seen, but the controversy surrounding CNN and an understanding of the meager sample size offers little promise for a comprehensive and objectively based survey and resultant conclusions. Sensationalism is a concern for this group.

CSP: The Center for Security Policy

The CSP was founded in 1988 by a group of thirty security policy advisors, led by Frank Gaffney. Gaffney, a former Reagan Defense Department Official, founded this organization that deals with public policy organization pursuant of “securing freedom”. This group has been wrought with controversy, with some suggesting that it is biased in its data analytics and intent with what statistics are produced.

Finances and Facilities:

This group, despite its controversy, has a very impressive list of donors that fund their operations. The list includes Boeing, General Dynamic, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, General Electric, and Raytheon. These top tier defense companies sit alongside various right-wing groups, think-tanks and foundations in supporting the CSP. The Scaife foundation, a conservative group, contributed an estimated 3 million dollars to the CSP from 2001 to 2009.

In 2015, the CSP released a nation-wide poll studying Muslim adults in the United States. The polling was outsourced to WomanTrend, and featured a dynamic sampling method which was used to select participants and allegedly minimize bias and improve consistency. However, this was based on a previous survey schematic that allowed previously participating respondents to opt-in and contribute their information.

The CSP's relationship to lucrative and powerful companies, both in terms of defense and general industries offers little in the way of assurances that their data would be a formidable place to begin research. Their opt-in approach and use of WomanTrend raises further questions as to whether or not their surveys would be considered as reliable sources.

GALLUP Polls, ADG (Abu Dhabi Gallup)

Gallup, Inc. is a major American and global performance-management consulting company that was founded by George Gallup in 1935. It offers its efforts in both analytics and consulting for leaders and organizations to tackle civic and social issues, boasting over 80 years of experience. Through their analytics, they state that they have managed to help leaders and organizations resolve pressing problems and have

contributed to resolutions in many problem areas. The ADG, or Abu Dhabi Gallup, is a subsidiary branch of Gallup that itself offered statistics and analytics pertaining to Muslim Americans and conditions for Muslims around the world.

This organization has 30 offices in over 20 countries, and is well funded. Recent funding includes such groups as the BBG, or Broadcasting Board of Governors, which itself is held accountable to 6 bipartisan Senate and House committees as a federal agency.

2011 Report: Gallup released a report called *Muslim Americans: Faith Freedom and the Future*, which was a report based on a nationally representative study of Muslim American perceptions and perspectives on major religious groups in the United States. The evaluations included were comprised of three years of evaluations and covered 2,482 respondents. Surveys were done over telephone and included self-identifying Muslims. Abu Dhabi Gallup's NPC study offered meagerly supplemented data and key findings that were not reflected in the data itself. Despite being technically affiliated with Gallup, their operations seem to be disconnected and not associated to the main Gallup analytics group.

Gallup's affiliation to the BBG offers questionable sources for funding, in addition to the type of survey that is offered. The main survey offered was based on a non-randomized sample of the population, and therefore was not applicable nationally. Furthermore, the data was highly skewed and a read-through allowed for inference that the conclusions were developed with a bias on the actual data itself.

ISPU (Institute for Social Policy and Understanding)

The ISPU was developed in response to the 9/11 attacks and the expected need for Muslim American empowerment, with consideration for the discrimination and fallout that was anticipated when the twin towers fell. This group offers objectives such as the pursuit of objective, solution-seeking research and empowerment for Muslim Americans towards pluralism and democracy in the United States. Their public policy research examines issues that can contribute to nonprofit leaders, media and policy makers towards a more informed understanding of the Muslim American community.

Finances and Facilities:

ISPU is stationed in Washington DC as well as Dearborn, MI and is funded by various organizations and individuals. One such entity is the Alwaleed Bin Talal foundation, which has funded the ISPU with almost \$350,000 annually. Alwaleed is known for his sizeable contributions to Muslim advocacy around the world. All told, Bin Talal has offered over 2.4 billion towards initiatives that pertain to the rights of both middle-easterners as well as Muslims alike.

2016 Report: The ISPU's report *American Muslim Poll 2018: Pride and Prejudice Featuring the First-Ever National American Islamophobia Index* was considered for its 'Islamophobia Index', as well as its aspirations towards being a nonpartisan, nationally representative study of groups in the United States. The report offers comparisons and trends for Americans and deals with issues such as non-Muslim perceptions and Muslim-perceptions on each other. Surveys in the past have been outsourced to SSRS, or Social Science Research Solutions, as well as Triton Polling and

Research. Interviewing over one thousand respondents, surveys were issues through both the internet and telephone interviews.

Again, the funding associations can be seen as offering hurdles for objectivity, and the wording of the survey seems very charged. The dichotomous options within the survey itself offer for more sensational results at the expense of accuracy. However, working in the ISPU's favor is its impressive number of interviewees, listed as 2,481. This telephone-based interview and random sampling works in its favor. Furthermore, its use of Pew Research Center data offers an excellent backdrop for comparative analysis.

Pew Research Center

Pew Research Center is considered a non-partisan fact tank whose purpose and objective is to inform the public and non-profit leaders about attitudes, issues and trends that are pertinent to current politics and events. This engagement of issues includes opinion polling, content analysis, demographic research and data-driven social science research. Created as a project in 1990 by a Times Mirror newspaper company, Pew has developed a mantra of 'just-the-facts' and considers itself as neutral and independent in terms of offering information for the public.

Pew classifies as a 501C tax-exempt non-profit organization and is a subsidiary group of Pew Charitable Trusts. Funded largely by grants, Pew sustains itself as an independent group and provides yearly reports that are commonly used in conventional media in the form of statistics or other literature that utilizes their data to contribute to narratives that are currently of interest for the world.

Pew's 2017 survey titled *U.S. Muslims Concerned About Their Place in Society, but Continue to Believe in the American Dream* offers findings pertaining to U.S. Muslims specifically. This comprehensive survey is by far the longest of surveys offered that have been considered in this thesis. Furthermore, it has no elements that are outsourced to polling or survey companies and offers the most randomization within the questions being offered in the questionnaire. It serves as the gold standard for surveys in both comprehensiveness and its application of conclusions derived from data and serves as an excellent bar for available surveys to the public.

Chapter V.

Comparative Analysis Through Attributes and Questionnaire Design

This section provides a comparative analysis of the different groups presented in the previous section. First, a layout of the various types of questions is offered, along with the benefits and negatives of each type. What follows is a content and design analysis of particular survey groups in their respective questionnaires and conclusions upon which they are based. This is achieved by cross-referencing these aspects by way of the four attributes offered in Chapter 3. In tying the conclusions and questionnaires by theme, a common denominator for discourse of the different surveys is possible. It must be mentioned that despite having common themes, the different survey groups engaged both the questionnaires and the conclusions in different ways, using different types of data. During research, the following types of questions were presented, with benefits and negative aspects to each:

Table 4. Survey Question Types.

Semantic differential	
In a semantic differential scale, each end of the scale marked is with different or opposing statements.	
Example:	
<i>“On a scale from 1 to 7 where 1 is least and 7 is most, how would you describe the US sentiment of islamophobia?”</i>	
Pros:	Cons:
Can assess an intuitive or conceptual response to a product or service	Depending on the number of options, it can be difficult for respondents to choose a response
Easy to compile results	

Can be hard to gauge the meaning of responses — one customer may classify a 2 minute wait as “long”, another could classify the same wait time as “short	
Does not address the issue of “why”	
Multiple choice questions	
Multiple choice questions ask the respondent to choose between two or more answer options. Questions can be as simple as “yes/no” or can give a choice of multiple answers.	
Example:	
<i>Where would you prefer to live given the political climate?</i>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>A. Western US</i> <i>B. Central US</i> <i>C. Eastern US</i> <i>D. Northern US</i> 	
Pros:	Cons:
Easy to answer	May not give the respondent the answer they want (in the above question, for example, the respondent might not want to go on vacation in Canada at all)
Allows you to easily compile and analyze results	Does not address the issue of “why”
Paired comparisons — Respondents must choose between two alternatives.	
Example:	
<i>“On average, when you are pulled over by a police officer, are you or are you not harassed?”</i>	
Pros:	Cons:
Can assess rank ordering of objects and identify degree of difference between objects	Limited number of options
Forces discrimination among alternatives	Does not address the issue of "why"
	Tends to have decreased reliability for mid-range responses
Forced preference rank order — Respondents must choose among several alternatives.	
The forced-preference ranking approach requires sequential ranking from high to low until all factors are ranked.	
Example:	

<i>"Look at the things that you feel have contributed to discrimination for Muslims in America."</i>	
Pros:	Cons:
Enables identification of "best" and "worst"	Limited number of alternatives
Forces discrimination among alternatives	Does not address the issue of "why"
	Can be fatiguing for respondent
Dichotomous questions	
Respondents must choose between two alternatives.	
Example:	
<i>"In the past 30 days, have you seen or heard any advertising for _____ ? Yes or no?"</i>	
Pros:	Cons:
Quick	Does not allow for a certain degree of sensitivity and differentiation
Does not allow for ambiguous answers	
Open-ended questions	
Open-ended questions ask respondents to supply their own answer. No pre-defined answers are given, so respondents are free to write what they want.	
Example:	
<i>"What could we do to make your experience more enjoyable?"</i>	
Pros:	Cons:
Allows respondents to define central issues	Time consuming for respondents
Addresses the issue of "why"	Difficult to compile and analyze results
	Asking more than one question at once can confuse results
	Asking leading questions can makes results less reliable

Questionnaire and Conclusion Analysis

The groups chosen in this section were analyzed by way of the theme attributes offered in Chapter III: Experiences with Law Enforcement, Discrimination, Attitudes Towards the US and US Society, and finally Terror and Crime. The inclusion of all groups mentioned in the previous chapter was impossible because of the varying degrees

of transparency that were available for the given survey group. The following surveys, CAIR's 2018 Civil Rights Report: Targeted,⁹³ ISPU's American Muslim Poll 2017⁹⁴ and Pew's U.S. Muslim Full Report 2017⁹⁵ were chosen as the most recent comprehensive publications available, for their influence, scale of population that was offered, and unique individual attributes that made them effective examples for study. While CAIR did not have the actual questionnaire available, it was included because of its influence and formidable 'war chest' of finances and capability, as well as serving as an exemplary 'poorly served' survey. The following analysis is separated into four categories, one for each of the theme attributes offered in previous sections. These themes are then analyzed comparatively for each of the respective reports that have been used, and help show the differences in methodology and engagement. Syntactical, methodological and strategic differences are highlighted throughout these sections.

Law Enforcement

The theme of law enforcement and the conclusions made about the Muslim American experience was discussed in various questions, namely that of engagement of

⁹³ "2018 Civil Rights Report: Targeted," *Council on American-Islamic Relations* (2018).
https://www.cairoklahoma.com/wpcontent/uploads/2018/04/CAIR_2018_Civil_Rights_Report.pdf

⁹⁴ "American Muslim Poll 2017," *Institute for Social Policy and Understanding* (2017).
<https://www.ispu.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/American-Muslim-Poll-2017-Report.pdf>

⁹⁵ "U.S. Muslim Full Report 2017," *Pew Research Center* (2017).
<http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2017/07/25171611/U.S.-MUSLIMS-FULL-REPORT.pdf>

violence, concerns by law enforcement about terror, and the number of assaults by law enforcement groups. The different groups engaged the issue in different ways.

ISPU⁹⁶ engaged this theme through questions that discussed the ‘right’ of engagement of violence on civilians. A discussion of the coverage of their questionnaire presented the question as follows with the immediate prior question pertaining to the military, “...some people think that an individual to kill civilians is sometimes justified”⁹⁷, Both questions were presented as multiple-choice options. The sequence of questions that were put in immediately after general questions about faith was fairly abrupt and offered a shock value for a respondent. This could alter the interviewee’s response in the sense that they would mentally recoil at the strong nature of the question.

Pew Research, on the other hand framed the question surrounding law enforcement and potential terrorists in a more neutral way. This included framing the question as, “When law enforcement officers have arrested Muslims in the U.S. suspected of PLOTTING terrorist acts, do you think [READ; RANDOMIZE], or do you think [INSERT]?”⁹⁸

This was presented in a multiple-choice format as well, but the randomization of portions through the interviewer offers an extra degree of randomness towards

⁹⁶ “American Muslim Poll 2017,” *Institute for Social Policy and Understanding* (2017).
<https://www.ispu.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/American-Muslim-Poll-2017-Report.pdf>

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ “U.S. Muslim Full Report 2017,” *Pew Research Center* (2017).
<http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2017/07/25171611/U.S.-MUSLIMS-FULL-REPORT.pdf>

objectivity. In addition, the placement of the question was not as jarring as the way ISPU’s methodology could be seen as being in its current format.

CAIR offered various different anecdotal incidents surrounding the interactions of Muslim Americans with law enforcement, which offered powerful stories of individuals. However, their strategy might pull at the emotions of those reading, but it is not empirically based. However, they did cite this in terms of the question surrounding law enforcement:

Table 5. Council on American-Islamic Relations 2018 Civil Rights Report Excerpt.

TOTAL	FBI	TSA	CBP	USCIS	ICE	Multiple
540 incidents in 2016 for instigation of harassment by governmental agencies	accounted for 62 percent	accounted for 15 percent	accounted for 12 percent	accounted for 4 percent	accounted for 2 percent.	5 percent of cases multiple federal government agencies were involved.

While the breakdown was thorough and powerful, the lack of a raw data section by which this information was received and that the data source was ambiguous was problematic. It did not suggest what types of ‘incidents’ these were logged as, making it difficult to ascertain the level of harassment that was observed or reported.

On Discrimination

The theme of discrimination came up in many questions, but all the groups offered specifically the Muslim American experience in terms of accounting for number of incidences and/or the discussion of the sentiment towards Muslim Americans by

others. The thematic question reads: Do the reported attitudes and experiences of surveyed Muslim Americans substantiate the claims made in regards to the conclusions made of prejudice towards Muslim Americans?

The ISPU engaged the theme of discrimination through a tally of the various groups and how they felt about discrimination, offering such conclusive findings as,

A higher proportion of Muslims (61%) than any other faith group (or the non-affiliated groups) report experiencing religious discrimination. Women, Arabs, and the young are the most likely members of the community to experience religious discrimination. Muslim women (75%) also report experiencing more racial discrimination than women in the general public (40%), whereas Muslim women and those in the general public are on par in terms of gender discrimination.⁹⁹

These results were informative and eye opening. However, there was little distinction made as to whether or not “more discrimination” included an option within their multiple-choice question that could be used either way:

Table 6. Pew Research Center. U.S. Muslim Full Report 2017.

<i>How often, if at all, have you personally experienced discrimination in the past year because of your religion?</i>
<i>(READ LIST. ENTER ONE ONLY)</i>
<i>1 Never</i>
<i>2 Rarely</i>
<i>3 Occasionally</i>
<i>4 Regularly</i>
<i>(DO NOT READ) Don't Know/Refused</i>

This format does not make clear whether or not ‘rarely’ is offered as part of the in-group or out-group of receiving discrimination, and therefore may simply include all and would exaggerate the ‘level’ of discrimination. Pew Research engaged the theme of discrimination in a different way:

⁹⁹ “American Muslim Poll 2017,” *Institute for Social Policy and Understanding* (2017). <https://www.ispu.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/American-Muslim-Poll-2017-Report.pdf>

Table 7. Pew Research Center. U.S. Muslim Full Report 2017.

Just your impression, in the United States today, is there a lot of discrimination against [INSERT; RANDOMIZE, BUT NEVER ASK ITEM a LAST], or not?
In the United States today, is there a lot of discrimination against [INSERT NEXT ITEM], or not?
How about [INSERT NEXT ITEM]? [REPEAT ONLY AS NECESSARY]:
In the United States today, is there a lot of discrimination against [INSERT], or not?]

The ‘items’ of reference included groups, such as: a. Jews b. blacks c. Muslims, with the response categories by asking one of the following options: *Yes, there is a lot of discrimination, 2 No, not a lot of discrimination, 9 Don’t know/Refused (VOL.)*

Not only did Pew offer multiple variations to randomize the question, it also specifically offered multiple choice questions that suggested a “lot” of discrimination versus “a little.”¹⁰⁰ Despite having less multiple choice options, the Pew question was far more effective given that their conclusions matched the questions in the questionnaire.

CAIR engaged this theme in a charged, yet ambiguous way. It offered,

Following Donald Trump’s victory in the U.S. presidential election, a number of direct attacks on students, ranging from verbal harassment to physical violence, were recorded. Especially pronounced were incidents where female students who wear headscarves were targeted. In the week immediately succeeding the election, CAIR recorded 17 incidents of female students being threatened, attacked, and their religious attire touched, pulled, or forcibly removed at a school or on a college campus.¹⁰¹

¹⁰⁰ “U.S. Muslim Full Report 2017,” *Pew Research Center* (2017). Accessed at: <http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2017/07/25171611/U.S.-MUSLIMS-FULL-REPORT.pdf>

¹⁰¹ “2018 Civil Rights Report: Targeted,” *Council on American-Islamic Relations* (2018). https://www.cairoklahoma.com/wpcontent/uploads/2018/04/CAIR_2018_Civil_Rights_Report.pdf

Instead of offering statistics, CAIR suggested that “a number” of incidents were recorded, but does not substantiate how, when, or through what source the information was available.¹⁰² Similarly, the ‘records’ that are referenced leave little in the way of specifics, as CAIR in their 2017 report suggest that they have their own ledger, but reference their own information and other statistics without specifying which it may come from.¹⁰³ This offers difficulty for those trying to understand just how strong or weak a particular problem might be.

On Sentiment

This theme provided a platform on which Muslim Americans could discuss sentiment, both towards in and out groups. The reported experiences of surveyed non-Muslims reflect the conclusions and intensity of negative sentiment towards Muslims and Islam?

ISPU engaged this subject matter through semantic differential. In terms of negative sentiment that might be perceived by Muslim respondents, the questionnaire stated,

¹⁰² “2018 Civil Rights Report: Targeted,” *Council on American-Islamic Relations* (2018).
https://www.cairoklahoma.com/wpcontent/uploads/2018/04/CAIR_2018_Civil_Rights_Report.pdf

¹⁰³ Ibid

Table 8. Questionnaire Example.

“Please indicate how much you agree or disagree **with the following statements, where 1 means you strongly disagree and 5 means you strongly agree.**”¹⁰⁴

INSERT & SCRAMBLE STATEMENTS

a. When I hear that a member of my faith community committed an act of violence, I feel personally ashamed.

b. I believe my faith community is more prone to negative behavior than other faith communities.

c. Being a member of my faith community makes me feel out of place in the world. e. I often hide my faith identity for fear of prejudice.

d. Most people want me to feel ashamed of my faith identity.

e. Most people associate negative stereotypes with my faith identity.¹⁰⁵

The conclusion that came from the above question was offered in their findings:

“Roughly equal percentages of Muslims say they either strongly agree or somewhat agree that “most people associate negative stereotypes with my faith identity.”¹⁰⁶

While randomization of the question order was offered through the interviewer, the questionnaire offers difficulty by the insertion of “most” into the dichotomous relationship between agreeing or disagreeing with sentiment. In this instance, simply offering a scale to the conception of negativity of other people would have been good enough. Instead, there was ambiguity in the question structure and is received poorly as described in the “Question Type Chart” for questionnaires “Con” section, given at the beginning of this chapter.

¹⁰⁴ “American Muslim Poll 2017,” *Institute for Social Policy and Understanding* (2017).
<https://www.ispu.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/American-Muslim-Poll-2017-Report.pdf>

¹⁰⁵ Ibid

¹⁰⁶ Ibid

Pew on the other hand, developed this question by discussing sentiment in a much more straightforward way.¹⁰⁷ Their question developed on a scale-based format that allowed respondents to simply ‘rate’ the intensity of contentment in terms of sentiment with the Muslim community in the United States. By allowing for a scaling to occur, Pew avoids the difficulties of twisted multiple-choice options that allow for more sensational answers from respondents. This in turn can result in sensational ‘conclusions’ and findings, which is apparent in CAIR’s discussion of the theme.¹⁰⁸

On Terrorism

The final thematic element discussed the views of non-Muslim parties towards their perspectives on what dangers are posed by Muslim potential terrorists. The question reads: To what degree are the conclusions made in terms of an increased risk of violence from Muslim Americans shown through survey data? Are they realistically representing the problem? Are Muslim Americans discriminated against? And to what extent? ISPU offers this question in the following form, with randomization only offered through the multiple-choice queries:

Table 9. Questionnaire Example.

- a. Most Muslims living in the United States Are more prone to violence than other people**

¹⁰⁷ “U.S. Muslim Full Report 2017,” *Pew Research Center* (2017).
<http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2017/07/25171611/U.S.-MUSLIMS-FULL-REPORT.pdf>

¹⁰⁸ “2018 Civil Rights Report: Targeted,” *Council on American-Islamic Relations* (2018).
https://www.cairoklahoma.com/wpcontent/uploads/2018/04/CAIR_2018_Civil_Rights_Report.pdf

- b. Most Muslims living in the United States Discriminate against women**
- c. Most Muslims living in the United States Are hostile to the United States**
- d. Most Muslims living in the United States Are less civilized than other people**

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The wording of this question offers results that may be more charged than it should be. Rather than offering that “most” Muslim Americans are prone to violence, it could offer forced preference rank order or semantic differential. In not doing so, they do, however, get to release more spectacular findings, as shown in their findings that, “Muslims are more likely to agree with the sentiment that Muslims are “more prone to violence than other people (18%).” Pew offered a much more muted semantic differential instead of a difficult multiple choice, and asked

Table 8. Questionnaire Example.

In your opinion, how much support for extremism, if any, is there among Muslims living in the U.S.? [READ] ¹¹⁰

- 1 A great deal
- 2 A fair amount
- 3 Not much [OR]
- 4 None at all 9
- [VOL. DO NOT READ] Don’t know/Refused.

¹⁰⁹ “American Muslim Poll 2017,” *Institute for Social Policy and Understanding* (2017). <https://www.ispu.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/American-Muslim-Poll-2017-Report.pdf>

¹¹⁰ “U.S. Muslim Full Report 2017,” *Pew Research Center* (2017). <http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2017/07/25171611/U.S.-MUSLIMS-FULL-REPORT.pdf>

CAIR offered simply that the question selection for all four themes offers a trend and relationship among three large players in terms of engagement of and attribution of survey data.¹¹¹ CAIR did not offer any findings pertaining to this theme.

Through a layout of the various types of questions appropriated by theme, along with the benefits and negatives of each type, this portion of the paper offers examples of the major types of data presentations that were found in my research. A content and design analysis of particular survey groups in their respective questionnaires and conclusions upon which they are based offered an analytical common denominator for discourse of the different surveys is possible.

¹¹¹ “2018 Civil Rights Report: Targeted,” *Council on American-Islamic Relations* (2018). https://www.cairoklahoma.com/wpcontent/uploads/2018/04/CAIR_2018_Civil_Rights_Report.pdf

Chapter VI.

Conclusions

Defining Islamophobia through research into survey data unveiled both the difficulties and the nuanced, yet important differences that are critical to further analysis. Initial forays into the survey data in research on Islamophobia offered seemingly powerful and convincing data on various aspects of the narrative for Muslim Americans today. However, an analysis of just the findings in the previous chapter offer hints to the direction and narrative of the survey groups in investing the time to research these kinds of things. With a consideration of the individual survey profiles, it becomes even more clear what intent the survey groups in question might have and how they can achieve their goals. The conclusions offered here consider the three recent examples of surveys in their methodologies and questionnaire formats, and then discuss the individual profile attributes that can further identify the narratives that they are trying to paint.

ISPU's questionnaire and findings seemed to be just as good as Pew's at first, given how the themes were engaged in a similar way. However, it was not the case as it was seen in the previous chapter. Despite having very impressive investment and offering that they are trying to be as unbiased as possible, it was somewhat apparent that the way the questionnaire was shaped could provide for the results that they may have wanted. For example, the sequence of questions might seem like a very small detail worth overlooking, but placed next to Pew's, it can be seen that many of the questions simply could have been worded better. In addition, the intensity of many of the questions

(for example, placing: most Muslims are _____” and making the question a semantic differential type can be straining on the respondent). The use of double negatives within the question are confusing as well. When questions are confusing, it can unintentionally rest on the interviewer’s accidental emphasis on certain words to skew a question or the results entirely. The difficulties offered in this way can be avoided at the expense of demanding more from the interviewer, whether it be with more directions or with specific requirements for intonation or style of inquiry. It is easy to see that between ISPU and CAIR, ISPU would certainly seem like the less partisan and biased type of survey. It is when ISPU is placed next to Pew that it really seems that ISPU’s survey could use improvement.

With consideration for the background attributes of the different surveys, the differences become even more pronounced. CAIR’s affiliation with questionable groups such as Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood suggest that may be less scrupulous about details within their own data presentations, relying on emotional response and charged opinions to rile a reader to join their cause. This was apparent in how many anecdotal offerings they had. They were very compelling because of how personal the stories were, but this is a difficult place to begin for those researching empirical foundations for further study. If CAIR is on the extreme end of such data output, then ISPU sits in the middle. This organization has received substantial funding from groups that while not controversial like those of CAIR, certainly have vested investment in seeing certain things be promoted. Pew, however, has rested on being known as unbiased and therefore place more emphasis on their presentation as unbiased and empirically based. In addition, their funding is primarily received as grants. However, even Pew should not be

seen as unwaveringly unbiased or free from bias. A thorough analysis of multiple well established, research-based organizations with consideration for motivated public opinion, politics, international relations, and societal issues provide the best way to study surveys. This has not changed, even with consideration for the different eras of Islamophobia.

Similarities and Differences Amongst Surveys: Post 9/11- 2018

Over the course of the observed data surveys conducted from 2002 to 2018, there has been a moderate change in the way Muslim American data and information gathering has been implemented within between group and within group similarities and differences. A large side effect of increased research on Muslim Americans can be the widespread animosity which contributed considerably to the study of Muslim Americans after the 9/11 atrocity added either to the research,

Despite each survey having been focused on the studying U.S. Muslim American population and their involvement in public life, it proves difficult to pinpoint two unassociated research organizations who used similar methodology and came up with the same conclusions. Each research design had similarities, such as questions regarding demographics, conducted interview questions involving time specific events, policies, and beliefs that remain monogamous to that year. However, many things did not align with another such as sample population gathering, information retrieval methods, and lastly, the use of semantics.

Raw data made available by some research organizations allowed side by side analysis of each organizations findings be compared to its raw data. Its analysis revealed

that data interpretation is of subjective opinion, that may or may not be manipulated for the researcher's benefit.

Finishing Thoughts

The imperative of this study and many seeking to define Islamophobia through various means is to determine truths and objectivity in a highly politicized realm of study. All groups can be seen as trying to write their own narrative, whether because they have something to gain, or maybe have something to lose. In the wake of 9/11, people feared what they did not understand and were quick to group the problem to that of religion and differences. The discrimination that have been offered and what have loosely been defined as Islamophobia is only part of identifying the problem. The United States is still struggling with concepts like racism, discrimination and prejudice. It is only natural that this is observable even in the microcosms of survey analysis. But there is something to gain from every incident, good or bad. Even though a qualitative consideration of ISPU suggests that ISPU might potentially have some clandestine and biased motive, it cannot be disputed that the ISPU had the most coverage in terms of the number of respondents considered, and some questions and paths of inquiry work just like Pew's in terms of output from the questions in their respective questionnaires. One can similarly consider that the wealth of research available today on Islamophobia is a product of the sudden discrimination that warranted the foundation of such groups that advocate for Muslim Americans that did not exist before 9/11. Discrimination against Muslim Americans existed before 9/11, and made far worse after. But the silver lining is that these issues that must be faced eventually for the United States to be the land of the free, and it is

through making informed decisions and building on the right information that this will be possible.

Limitations

One of the most important considerations in terms of limitations is the breadth of the subject matter. The survey groups include both those that administer surveys exclusively, such as Roper and ISPU, and defer the consideration of conclusions to others such as Zogby. Some groups such as CAIR offer conclusions from multiple surveys, which include some that are their own and statistics based on others. Those survey groups that were tested for the ‘four attributes’ did so in varied ways. While I managed to group questions to their respective categories, the questionnaires and conclusions were executed in different ways. In addition, my use of the Bleich model and its non-causal indicators offers additional variability and includes numerous attributes that can all be considered important towards a consideration of the surveys and survey groups. It is due to such variance that this thesis is offered as a primarily qualitative discourse of Islamophobia and analysis of the way groups engage the subject matter.

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