



Who Does the Night Watchman Work For? And, What Are the Job Responsibilities: The Question of Anarchy in the Regional Balance of Power

Citation

Preston, Angella. 2019. Who Does the Night Watchman Work For? And, What Are the Job Responsibilities: The Question of Anarchy in the Regional Balance of Power. Master's thesis, Harvard Extension School.

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Who Does the Night Watchman Work for? And, what are the Job Responsibilities?:

The Question of Anarchy in the Regional Balance of Power

Angella R. Preston

A Thesis in the Field of International Relations

for the Degree of Master of Liberal Arts in Extension Studies

Harvard University

May 2019

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Abstract

In this thesis, I challenge the existing theoretical understanding of the roles of great powers in regions and clarify assumptions about anarchy by asking the question: Do great powers pacify regions? Miller and Levy argue anarchy is not fully satisfied in the regional balance of power because great powers protect weak nations and leverage peace agreements. Mearsheimer and Waltz challenge this “pacifier” role, arguing instead of great powers as “self-interested” agents with a focus on gaining power in regions through destabilization and balancing wars. I present a case study to analyze the choices of US and USSR leaders to see what role they played in the conflicts in Angola and Namibia at the end of the Cold War until peace was achieved from 1974-2002. My case study challenges the assumption that great powers can reduce anarchy and instead suggests that they can reduce the *consequences* of anarchy. I argue the international system of anarchy encourages the formation of regional balances of power. When a nation acts as an aggressor through attacks, invasions and domination it brings chaos into the system. Without a central authority to respond, nations form balances for protection. Normally, the great powers chose not to “pacify” the distant region; instead, they focused on rivalry. However, when they tried to pacify, there were limits and restrictions. The limits include interference between the global and regional balance of power systems, drawbacks in the methods they employed, and the course of events could be modified by actors in the distant region. Peace proved elusive as actors could disregard agreements and act violently. While great powers appear to have the strength and ability to reduce the consequences of anarchy, they in fact made the region worse and brought neither peace nor security.

Dedication

I dedicate this thesis to my children. May you be anything you want to be.

Acknowledgement

I am thankful for the guidance, patience and on-point feedback from my Thesis Director Stephen Walt who shaped this thesis. Ariane Liazos, my Research Advisor, answered my many questions and smoothed and sharpened the flow of the paper. Harvard and Duke University librarians dispensed a wealth of knowledge to find books and publication. My family and friends have been of great support. My gratitude to my Aunt Diane who always asked me what I learned so far. Of course, I appreciate the supported of Alex, Anna and Amy as I often disappeared into libraries and coffee shops to research and write. The kindness is appreciated.

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Chapter I.

Introduction

In 2003, the author of *Night*, Elie Wiesel, gave a speech on the Day of Remembrance of the Holocaust in the United States Capitol Rotunda titled *Watchman, What of the Night?* Wiesel stated, “In those years there were two great powers in Europe: France and Great Britain. Had they intervened instead of preaching appeasement, there would have been no world war, no Auschwitz.”¹ He later described the United States intervention in the war as “a painful truth” because President Franklin D. Roosevelt “has done great things for America and the world, but when it came to save Jewish lives, he could have done it earlier.”² Wiesel’s words convey the expectations that great powers create peace and foster cooperation as the “night watchman” and “world’s policemen” because of their great strength and resources. Among policymakers and scholars, a tension exists in debates about the role of the United States as a great power — the need to secure its own survival and the ability to secure the rest of the world’s survival. In the Cold War, a reporter asked Secretary of State Henry Kissinger if the United States could

¹ “Remarks by Elie Wiesel,” United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, <https://www.ushmm.org/remember/days-of-remembrance/past-days-of-remembrance/2003-days-of-remembrance/elie-wiesel>.

² Elie Wiesel, "Watchman, What of the Night?" YouTube Video, 12:51, April 2003. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IZVByXtaQxY>.

be the world's policeman in Angola after the failure to play the role in Vietnam. He replied, the phrase "needs some refinement" because "most parts of the world depend on some American commitment."³ The role of great power requires clarification.

The comprehension of the role impacts the next grand strategy choice. After looking down the long, dusty road for the next great power, the United States must make choices about China's military modernization, economic boom, and expansion in the Indo-Pacific region and Russia's increased authority and security agreements in Europe.⁴ In "The Stability of the Unipolar World," William Wohlforth describes the heated debate about the great power role at the cusp of unipolarity — a system in the international world in which there is only one great power with unmatched resources.⁵ In 1992, leaked Pentagon papers proposed a new grand strategy for the United States to prevent another great power from rising.⁶ Scholars reacted to the immense power of the plan. Wohlforth argued the system of one great power would create stability in the world, while Christopher Layne argued nations would challenge the hegemony of the United States

³ Henry Kissinger, "Major topics: Angola and detente," *The Secretary of State*, Bureau of Public Affairs: Department of State (December 23, 1975): 206.

⁴ "Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America," Department of Defense, <https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf>, 2.

⁵ William C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," *International Security* 24, no. 1 (1999): 5. The definition of unipolarity is found in Nuno P. Monteiro, "Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity Is Not Peaceful," *International Security* 36, no. 3 (2012): 9.

⁶ Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," 5.

and the duration would be just a “moment.”⁷ Policymakers questioned the cost and reality of the role as the world’s policeman.⁸ White House Director of Communications Patrick J. Buchanan described it as “a blank check given to all of America’s friends and allies that we’ll go to war to defend their interests.”⁹ Further, *New York Times* excerpts of the Pentagon study stated that the United States would not be the world’s policeman in regions but select “those wrongs which threaten not only our interests, but those of our allies or friends, or which could seriously unsettle the international relations.”¹⁰ The strategy sought to protect both American interests and reduce chaos in the international system. In the final outcome of the debate, the United States became the indispensable leader of the world.¹¹

The primary reason for this debate is the international system of anarchy. Kenneth Waltz describes anarchy as a world without a legitimate authority to prevent and stop

⁷ Layne’s argument is in Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise,” *International Security* 17, no. 4 (1993): 7. Also, see Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” 5.

⁸ Senator Joseph R. Biden stated, “the Pentagon vision reverts to an old notion of the United States as the world’s policeman — a notion that, not incidentally, will preserve a large defense budget.” Found in Patrick Tyler, “The Lone Superpower Plan: Ammunition for Critics,” *New York Times*, March 10, 1992, A12.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Christopher Layne, “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing,” in *The Use of Force: Military Power and International Relations*, edited by Robert J. Art and Kenneth Neal Waltz (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 278.

¹¹ Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” 5.

violence, which requires nations to protect their territorial integrity and sovereignty.¹² John Mearsheimer describes anarchy in straightforward 9-1-1 terms. There is no one to call in times of danger: “It simply means that there is no centralized authority, no night watchman or ultimate arbiter, which stands above states and protects them.”¹³ In other words, nations must secure their own survival. Hans Morgenthau introduced realism theory based on the historical actions of nations to protect themselves known as balance of power theory. Countries gain power primarily through military might and alliances to push back against rivals.¹⁴ Multiple balance of power systems can arise around the world. The global system focuses on threats between great powers and rising powers, while the regional balance of power is a subset of the global system.¹⁵ In *The Origins of Alliances*, Stephen Walt found that states within a region balanced primarily against local and regional threats.¹⁶ I extend his theory to include regional actors balancing against great

¹² Kenneth N. Waltz, *A Theory of International Politics* (Reading: Addison-Wesley Pub., 1979), 102-104.

¹³ Quote is in Robert D. Kaplan, "Why John J. Mearsheimer Is Right (About Some Things)," *The Atlantic Monthly* 309, no. 1 (January 2012): 80. For 911 reference, see John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: Norton & Company, 2001), 51.

¹⁴ Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1954), 3-16, 167-221.

¹⁵ For sub systemic level, see T. V. Paul, "Introduction: The Enduring Axioms of Balance of power Theory and Their Contemporary Relevance" in *Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century*, edited by T.V. Paul, James J. Wirtz and Michel Fortmann (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 5.

¹⁶ Stephen Walt observed the regional system in *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 161-165.

power threats — necessary to accurately understand great power actions in regions.¹⁷

The two balance of power systems have different levels of anarchy. While the global balance of power is anarchic, scholars argue the regional system is deemed not “purely anarchic.”¹⁸

The difference is the pacifying role of great powers to intervene in regions. Jack Levy argues “[i]n particular, the assumption of anarchy — the absence of a higher authority and of any mechanism for enforcing agreements within the system — is not fully satisfied in regional systems.”¹⁹ The implication is that great powers can reduce anarchy in the international system by leveraging agreements. Benjamin Miller adds to the argument that regions are not purely anarchic because great powers play the role of “police, protector, guarantor, referee, broker, enforcer, and banker in regional politics.”²⁰ In other words, great powers are the night watchmen and world’s policeman who create peace and foster cooperation. The exemplary example of peace is the United States’

¹⁷ I extend Walt’s theory to include regions that balance against great power threats. An example is the Little Entente of 1920-1921, when Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia successfully balanced against the Four-Power Pact of Britain, France, Germany, and Italy.

¹⁸ Benjamin Miller, "Theoretical Perspectives on Regional Balance of Power," in *Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century*, edited by T.V. Paul, James J. Wirtz and Michel Fortmann (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 240.

¹⁹ Jack S. Levy, "What Do Great Powers Balance Against and When?" in *Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century*, edited by T.V. Paul, James J. Wirtz and Michel Fortmann (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 46.

²⁰ Miller, "Theoretical Perspectives on Regional Balance of Power," 240.

occupation of Europe after World War II. However, a closer examination finds Europe has experienced several minor wars: the Soviet Invasion of Hungary in 1956, the Turco-Cypriot war of 1974, the war for Bosnia Independence in 1992, Azeri-Armenia war of 1993, and the Kosovo War in 1999.²¹ A more accurate assessment of European peace is there have been no great power wars — no World War III — or a reduction in wars from multi-polarity. The focus on the global system rather than the regional system leaves the reality of great power actions unexplored until recently.

A growing body of scholarship questions the peacemaking role of great powers in regions. Nuno Monteiro finds the structure of the current unipolar system changes alliance formation in “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity Is Not Peaceful.” Since the United States emerged as the only great power, peace-enhancing alliances found in other polarities are unavailable to regional actors — an important method for weaker states to gain protection.²² Wohlforth also acknowledges great powers are usually not inclined to help regional actors. While the preponderance of power in the United States mitigates problems between great powers and major powers, the mitigation applies “with less force to potential security competition between regional powers.”²³ Finally, David Lake argues great powers are less willing to intervene in distant areas due to the costs and burdens of

²¹ “COW War Data, 1816 – 2007,” The Correlates of War Project, <http://cow.dss.ucdavis.edu/data-sets/COW-war>.

²² Nuno P. Monteiro, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity Is Not Peaceful,” *International Security* 36, no. 3 (2012): 21.

²³ Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” 25.

entanglement.²⁴ Yet Lake finds that nations *within* a region are intervening in local conflicts.²⁵ Together, the role of great power protection and peacemaking is in question. The problem is there is no current theory of the regional balance of power to understand the critical role of great powers in regions.

Background

There are contradictory views of balancing behavior in the few studies on the regional balance of power. Benjamin Miller and Stephen Walt studied the Middle East and found regional actors were able to rebuff great power intervention during the Cold War.²⁶ Conversely, Wohlforth found Eurasian nations were unable to balance against Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union, despite rapid changes in strategies, as balance of power would predict.²⁷ Finally, Raju Thomas found great powers took on the same polarities in regions as the global system. During the Cold War in South Asia, the

²⁴ David A. Lake, Patrick M. Morgan, and the University of California Institute on Global Conflict Cooperation, *Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 5.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Walt, *The Origins of Alliance*, 161-165; Benjamin Miller, "The International System and Regional Balance in the Middle East" in *Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century*, edited by T.V. Paul, James J. Wirtz and Michel Fortmann (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 246.

²⁷ William Wohlforth, "Revisiting Balance of power Theory in Central Eurasia," in *Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century*, edited by T.V. Paul, James J. Wirtz and Michel Fortmann (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 214-215.

great powers balanced against each other by joining opposite sides of conflicts which led to similar distributions of power among the regional actors; similarly, in unipolarity one nation in the region held a preponderance of power which matched the global system.²⁸ The case studies by these scholars offer different and complex results. Nations within the region resisted great powers, were unable to rebalance as realism would predict or mimicked the bipolar and unipolar systems. The limitation of the studies is the focus on balancing behavior alone and only a few regions were studied —South Asia, the Middle East, and Eurasia. A gap in the research exists on testing the great power roles presented by theorists to understanding anarchy in regions.

Research Methods

This thesis examines a case study of Namibia and Angola. The timeframe spans a bloodless coup in Angola by a Black Nationalist group that overthrew colonial rule (1974), through the Angolan Civil War, until peace was established in Namibia (1990) and Angola (2002). The period represents the actions of the following United States Presidents and their administration and Soviet leaders: Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, Leonid Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov, and Mikhail Gorbachev.

²⁸ Raju Thomas, “The South Asian Security Balance in a Western Dominant World,” in *Balance of power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century*, edited by T.V. Paul, James J. Wirtz and Michel Fortmann (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 305-333.

The case study offers three benefits. First, the regional balance of power changes through the conflicts in Namibia and Angola. The research adds knowledge to how, why and what takes place when the balance within a region swings to different actors. Second, Angola and Namibia offer insights into third world countries with unique cultural perspectives in a fight to end apartheid not studied in the literature on the regional balance of power. Finally, the research offers a view during the Cold War in “unofficial” terms. The great powers steered away from expensive and dangerous direct combat through proxy wars in regions by gaining alliances through aid and arms. The analysis examines the impact of these indirect actions in southern Africa.

The thesis analyzed reports from the United States Senate and Congressional Hearings, presidential memos, and peace agreements to understand the reasons behind decisions. Scholarly books, articles and newspapers offered the historical narrative of the events and information about great power protection and leverage.

Limitations

The research has several limitations. First, there is a wide range of actors and opinions in the events of Angola and Namibia. Leaders in African nations, Angola, Namibia, Western groups, Cuba, the United States, the Soviet Union, Congress, the United Nations, non-profits and advocacy groups had different ideas and strategies. I tried to include the broad clash of opinions but may have missed points of view. Second, the information on Angola consists of many United States declassified documents. Scholars initially thought the Soviet Union backed the Cuban troops involved in Angola

until declassified documents revealed Cuba acted alone. At a later date, newly declassified documents may change the conclusions.

Hypotheses

This research seeks to understand the roles great powers play in regions presented by theorists. To tests these, this research asks the question: Do great powers “pacify” regions? One reason that the regional balance of power is thought to “not fully” satisfy anarchy is that great powers play a role of stabilizing and reducing conflict in the system.²⁹ In particular, Benjamin Miller argues great powers protect weak states, and Jack Levy argues great powers enforce agreements within a region. Two competing hypotheses are tested to see if great powers do, in fact, play this role.

H1: Great powers are “pacifiers” who protect weak states and leverage peace agreements. (Miller/Levy)

H2: Great powers are “self-interested” agents who destabilize and compete against rivals to gain more power. (Mearsheimer/Waltz)

The first hypothesis describes the beneficial influences of the great power role as a “pacifier.” Miller argues great powers protect weaker nations, while Levy’s argument

²⁹ Levy, “What Do Great Powers Balance Against and When?” 46.

centers on the great power role to “enforce agreements within the system.” For this research, agreements focus on peace plans as they reduce violence and conflict in regional systems. The extent of influence, Levy acknowledges, may vary in different regions.³⁰

John Mearsheimer and Kenneth Waltz describe the second hypothesis. Great powers play a “self-interested” role in regions to gain power. In *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, Mearsheimer argues great powers historically decrease the strength of a rival through destabilization.³¹ Kenneth Waltz acknowledges great powers act in self-interested ways by involving themselves in balancing-wars to obtain a better global power position.³²

This thesis seeks to understand the “why” behind the actions: in other words, the reasons great powers choose to protect nations and leverage peace. The questions follow a progression: Did the great powers aid weak nations? If so, how did they protect them? Was it effective? Did they leverage peace agreements? Were they successful? The thesis then looks for the reasons behind their choices. For example, great powers can enter a region for a moral obligation to prevent human rights violations or, conversely, to gain more power against a rival. The first would be a motivation for a “pacifier” to protect a weaker state; the second would be a “self-interested” agent seeking more power.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: Norton & Company, 2001), 138-167.

³² Waltz, *A Theory of International Politics*, 205.

Clarifying Anarchy

This research seeks to clarify established assumptions about anarchy in regions and the role of great powers. The first assumption is nations have no one to call in times of danger. John Mearsheimer describes anarchy in these 9-1-1 terms to describe the system without a central authority; however, the definition needs clarification. Great powers and regional actors have the same resources to call for help — alliances and petitions to the United Nations. The difference is that regional actors can call on a nation with immense strength, a great power, which leads to the next assumption.

The second established assumption is great powers can change anarchy in regions. The logic follows that great power leadership in regions transforms them into central authorities that impact anarchy, so less violence means less anarchy. Clarity is needed because great powers do not assume the role of central authority — the system is always anarchic. The difference great powers may have is reducing the *consequences* of anarchy. Because of anarchy, nations seek to secure their survival, which leads to conflicts and violence. Great power strength can reward behaviors that stabilize the international system and punish behaviors that create chaos. When great powers reduce violence, or the consequence of the anarchic system that bring chaos, they are the “night watchman” and “world’s policeman” by fostering peace and cooperation in regions and leads to the third assumption.

Finally, great powers respond quickly to remove aggressors, protect nations and provide peace. In the international world without a central authority, they can respond with speed and decisiveness to swoop in and create calm. This research challenges this assumption.

Argument

In the remainder of this thesis, I argue that the anarchic international system encourages the formation of regional balances of power. When nations act as aggressors through attacks, invasions and domination, they bring chaos into the system. Without a central authority to respond, nations form balances against the aggression for protection. Great powers normally choose not to pacify distant regions; however, when they attempt to do so, there are limits and restrictions in their ability to protect weak nations and leverage peace. The great powers did not see the “aggressor” nations creating chaos; instead, they saw regional conflict as an opportunity to improve their position vis-à-vis a rival great power. The choice led to a great power protecting the aggressor of the region which escalated the conflict to epic levels of violence. Instead of peace and stability, the lack of punishment to the aggressive nations and escalated competition brought death, destruction, and destabilization. While most of these actions were by great power choice, several structural issues limited and restricted their ability to protect local clients or foster peace. The tools and methods they employed proved ineffective, the global balance of power interfered with regional balance, and there was difficulty controlling the myriad of actors in faraway regions. Finally, peace proved elusive as a party could walk away from an agreement and resume violence.

The terms of weakness, protection, and leverage will be explored in the next three chapters. Chapter 2 studies weakness — being without strength or power — and identifies the weak and aggressive nations. Chapter 3 looks at protection as defined as keeping from harm and injury. Outlined are the tools great powers have at their disposal to protect weak nations. Chapter 4 offers an understanding of the different elements of

leverage for peace agreements. Finally, Chapter 5 looks at all the elements together. Each chapter includes the unfolding case study by United States presidential terms. The definitions are introduced sequentially because first, a great power chooses a weak side, then it decides how to protect the nation, and finally, it leverages peace agreements.

Chapter II.

Understanding Weakness

It would seem easy for a great power to choose between weak and strong nations. Stephen Walt describes the vulnerability of weak nations as they “add little to the strength of the defensive coalition” and are “vulnerable to pressure, and can do little to determine their own fates.”³³ The definition of weak seems straightforward — being without power or strength. However, the term is much more complicated because of anarchy. Without a central authority, nations need to protect themselves through the use of power. John Adams, in a letter to Thomas Jefferson, wrote that “[p]ower always thinks it has a great Soul and vast Views, beyond the Comprehension of the Weak.”³⁴ In other words, strength focuses on power which often misses an understanding of weakness.

Weakness needs context in the anarchic world. The major sins that states make in the international system are violent attacks, invasion, and domination because they bring chaos. A nation that commits these sins is the aggressive nation; conversely, the nation who is attacked, invaded, or violated is the weak nation. However, because of anarchy, great powers look through a different lens. The pressure to secure survival fuels competition between great powers as they try to gain more power against a rival through alliances.

³³ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 29, 173.

³⁴ John Adams, *The Adams-Jefferson Letters: The Complete Correspondence between Thomas Jefferson and Abigail and John Adams, 1735-1826* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1971), 463.

The question of this chapter is: Did great powers choose to aid a weak nation? From the events in Namibia, the great powers failed to aid the weak nation. Competition led the great powers to look for strength through alliances. A great power, in this case the United States, backed the aggressor of the region and waged war, which triggered new balance formations. In the chapter ahead, I analyze the choices of the United States and the Soviet Union in Angola and Namibia during 1974-1977. Afterward, I delve deeper into my argument and introduce structural barriers they faced to protect the weak nation. Finally, I present the roles the great powers played.

U.S. President Ford & USSR Brezhnev (1974-1977):

Missing the Weak Nations

The events in Namibia and Angola happened in the backdrop of sweeping changes in Africa as black liberation movements fought for self-determination and achieved the collapse of European colonialism. In 1974, a bloodless coup overthrew Portuguese colonial rule in Angola and collapsed the Portuguese rulership in Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique and paved the way for the two countries to gain independence. The events spread black liberation movements in South Africa and Namibia.³⁵ Most African nations transitioned peacefully to black majority rule as British, French and Portuguese rulers returned home; however, Angola proved difficult as three Black

³⁵ W. James III, *A Political History of the Civil War in Angola, 1974-1990* (New Brunswick: Transaction, 2011), 41-42.

Nationalist movements vied for governmental control.³⁶ The white government of South Africa, as the hegemon of the region, had no intention of yielding power. Instead of withdrawing from their illegal occupation of Namibia, South African leaders extended their cruel apartheid system.³⁷ The changes across the region presented the United States and the Soviet Union with an opportunity to protect the newly independent weak states in the Third World.

Neither great power intervened to help Namibia despite the knowledge of domination. Namibia fit the anarchic definition of weakness because South Africa took advantage of their guarantor status after World War II and dominated the nation. South West African People's Organization (SWAPO), the Namibian Black Nationalist liberation group, formed a balance against the domination; however, South Africa passed oppressive laws and staged illegal arrests and trials to control the country. In 1971, the International Court ruled South Africa illegally occupied the country, and in 1974, SWAPO was named the "sole and authentic representative of the people of Namibia."³⁸

The United States chose not to intervene despite this knowledge. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger conducted a secret study of southern Africa in the 1960s. The

³⁶ Richard J. Bloomfield, *Regional Conflict and U.S. Policy: Angola and Mozambique* (Algonac: Reference Publications, 1988), 24-25.

³⁷ Bloomfield, *Regional Conflict and U.S. Policy*, 76; Piero Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 47-48.

³⁸ Virginia Curtin Knight, "Namibia's Transition to Independence," *Current History* 88, no. 538 (1989): 225-226.

National Security Study Memorandum 39 analyzed the region and gave policy options. As an acknowledgment of the racial tensions, the memo stated “[p]olitically conscious blacks elsewhere in Africa and the world deeply resent the continuation of discrimination” and “identify with the repressed majorities in southern Africa.”³⁹ Despite the anger of apartheid, the administration chose the memorandum’s option 2 which begins, “the whites are here to stay.” Kissinger took a global balance of power view to protect the United States’ tangible interests in the region by adopting the memorandum’s two-pronged strategy to condemn apartheid publicly while quietly relaxing sanctions on South Africa.⁴⁰ As far as Namibia, the administration followed the option to downplay South Africa’s illegal occupation and “encourage accommodation between South Africa and the UN.”⁴¹ Neither great power responded to Namibia’s calls for help.

In the United States, policymakers were divided over which one of the three nationalist movements vying for governmental control deserved U.S. support. The People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) was believed to be the most educated, skilled governing group honestly committed to the welfare of Angolans.⁴² Its

³⁹ *The Kissinger Study on Southern Africa* (Nottingham: Spokesman Books, 1975), 1, 48.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 66-67.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 68.

⁴² Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions*, 358-359.

leader was Agostinho Neto, a quiet poet and doctor with past communist ties.⁴³ The United States Ambassador to Portugal, Stuart Nash Scott, recommended “restraint and moderation” to consider all groups.⁴⁴ Kissinger, instead, saw the situation from ideological and balance-of-power terms. He feared the instability in Portugal would prompt a communist take-over and destabilize the United States-Soviet European balance. In other words, he saw the MPLA as the aggressor based on ideological factors.⁴⁵

Kissinger abruptly fired Nash and established a policy in Angola of non-involvement. From April 1974 to January 1975, the United States withheld aid to Angola with the strategic goal to keep equal power among the three national groups.⁴⁶ Despite all the competition through the heat up and cool down of the Cold War, both the Soviet Union and the United States showed reluctance to support the conflicts in Angola or Namibia. To this point, great power is no guarantee of intervention.

As tension grew in Angola after the coup, the three liberation groups signed the Alvor Accord in January 1975 with pressure from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the President of Kenya. The agreement established a transitional government,

⁴³ Piero Gleijeses, *Visions of Freedom: Havana, Washington, Pretoria, and the Struggle for Southern Africa, 1976-1991* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 41-42.

⁴⁴ Mario Del Pero, “‘Which Chile, Allende?’ Henry Kissinger and the Portuguese Revolution,” *Cold War History* 11, no. 4 (2011): 628.

⁴⁵ Del Pero, “‘Which Chile, Allende?’” 633.

⁴⁶ Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions*, 360.

combining the three groups, to gain independence from Portugal on November 11, 1975.⁴⁷

Barely two weeks after the Angolan peace agreement was signed, the United States reversed its policy and intervened. In January 1975, at a secret “40 Committee” meeting of the National Security Council, the CIA introduced a covert plan to send \$300,000 in military aid to the leader of the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA), Holden Roberto – one of the groups vying for control of the Angola government.⁴⁸ The CIA wanted to “bolster psychologically our immediate ally” Zaire by funneling funds through Zaire’s President Mobutu to the FNLA.⁴⁹ On the heels of a peace treaty, the U.S. introduced military aid because of a focus on alliances to bolster the global balance of power position. The US formed a balance against the MPLA. So while great powers are called to aid weak nations, they choose whom they want to protect. Instead of a focus on violence and dominance, the United States assisted a friend of a friend.

The plan had drawbacks, as it proved impossible to disguise the amount of aid being sent to the FNLA. Among other things, FNLA leader Holden Roberto used U.S. aid to buy “a Luanda television station and the city’s leading daily, *A Provincia de Angola*”

⁴⁷ John Marcum, “Lessons of Angola,” *Foreign Affairs* 54 (1976): 413.

⁴⁸ George Wright, *The Destruction of a Nation: United States’ Policy towards Angola since 1945* (Chicago: Pluto Press, 1997), 58.

⁴⁹ S. Weissman, “CIA Covert Action in Zaire and Angola: Patterns and Consequences,” *Political Science Quarterly* 94, no. 2 (1979): 282.

in order to restore the conservative voice.⁵⁰ The activity prompted questions in the country — the American consulate investigated the origins of the spending spree.⁵¹

Nathaniel Davis, the new Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, questioned Kissinger's choice. Following his Senate confirmation in March 1975, Davis was surprised to learn about the CIA covert operation.⁵² Kissinger announced a new plan to increase aid by \$32 million for the FNLA and the other Angolan anti-Soviet group UNITA funneled through Zaire.⁵³ Davis disagreed with the option and presented a plan based on diplomacy. Outlined were the consequences of Kissinger's plan, the credibility of siding with UNITA which received aid from South Africa and the embarrassment of being linked with the apartheid regime. In other words, Davis viewed the situation in anarchic terms by seeing South Africa as an aggressive nation, while Kissinger saw in terms of competition. As the months moved forward, Davis sent multiple copies of his plan to the Secretary of State and the President.⁵⁴ In July, Kissinger and Ford approved the secret plan.⁵⁵ The US now formed a new balance with UNITA against the MPLA. In

⁵⁰ John A. Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1969), 257.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Nathaniel Davis, "The Angola Decision of 1975: A Personal Memoir," *Foreign Affairs* 57 (1978): 110.

⁵³ Walter Isaacson, *Kissinger: A Biography* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), 677.

⁵⁴ Nathaniel Davis, "The Angola Decision of 1975," 111, 116.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 117.

response, Davis gave his resignation and later wrote that instead of seeing Angola as an Africa problem, Kissinger seemed determined, to the point of failure, not to give up competition with the Soviet Union.⁵⁶ By backing the primary aggressor in the region, U.S. policy fueled a rising level of violence.

An invasion prompted the MPLA to seek Soviet assistance. South Africa invaded Angola and set up a position just inside their border at the Ruacana Falls to attack SWAPO, the Namibian anti-apartheid group, taking refuge in the country.⁵⁷ The two pro-Western groups, FNLA and UNITA, joined forces against the MPLA in an intense civil war as the Portuguese withdrew from policing the nation.⁵⁸ Because of the violence, the MPLA sought a new balance with the Soviet Union, in addition to the two-hundred thirty Cuban advisors training their military.⁵⁹ In August, Castro appealed to Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev. Brezhnev worried that military aid to the MPLA would upset the United States-Soviet relations and questioned if Angola warranted assistance. He turned Cuba down.⁶⁰ In other words, the global balance of power interfered with the regional

⁵⁶ Ibid., 123-124.

⁵⁷ Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution*, 268.

⁵⁸ For the joining of UNITA and FNLA against the MPLA, see Guimarães, xiv. For Portugal's diminished role, see Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions*, 252.

⁵⁹ Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution*, 270-273. Marcum outlines the great debate among scholars about Soviet involvement and arrival of Cuban troops. CIA reports included Soviet involvement; however, after Portuguese left Angola, the main source of intelligence was FNLA's leader Holden Roberto.

⁶⁰ Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions*, 260.

balance of power as Brezhnev refused to aid a weak nation in case of increased conflict with the United States. Cuba decided to act alone and throughout the fall sent military equipment, advisors, and troops to the MPLA. Together, they held off the FNLA and UNITA.⁶¹

The Civil War in Angola changed on October 14, 1975. South Africa advanced towards the Angolan capital — a column of military troops joined by UNITA and FNLA forces.⁶² John Stockton, CIA desk officer for Angola, acknowledged the United States worked closely with South Africa and urged them to invade Angola.⁶³ The United States formed a new balance against the MPLA. In other words, instead of bringing order, the United States brought disorder, and more violence.

As the MPLA and Cuba held off the invaders in the capital, the Soviets reversed their policy to protect an alliance under threat. In response, the Soviet Union intervened to rescue the new weak party — the MPLA. A balance formed against the South African invasion. The MPLA, backed with Cuban soldiers and new Soviet military arms, pushed UNITA, FNLA, and South Africa troops out of the capital. Newspapers announced the MPLA victory as the “Third World David Humbling the Goliath of Western

⁶¹ Ibid., 264-272.

⁶² Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution*, 269.

⁶³ Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions*, 296. For a perspective from the CIA operation, see John Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story* (New York: Norton, 1984), 188.

Imperialism.”⁶⁴ The MPLA announced Angola as an independent nation. The United States lost credibility for supporting the aggressor of the region and swung many African states to support the MPLA.⁶⁵ In the battle, the Soviet Union successfully played the pacifier role to intervene and prevent the MPLA from being defeated; however, the pacification was primarily to put out a fire the other great power started.

The United States Congress reacted by passing the Clark Amendment that banned all CIA covert aid to Angola.⁶⁶ The United States Congress chose not to side with the aggressor; however, the executive branch still saw the situation in terms of competition. Undeterred, Kissinger sent backchannel messages to Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Iran asking for aid the FNLA funneled through Zaire. Instead of leaving matters alone, Kissinger determined to restore the United States power position by calling on alliances to form a balance against the MPLA and Soviet Union. Saudi Arabia officials replied in a backchannel memo that they would conduct an assessment of the situation but stated that Zaire “has a poor record of dependability” and “General Mobutu retains for himself the best of the military equipment and a substantial percentage of financial subsidies.”⁶⁷ In other words, they viewed Zaire as a nation that took advantage of a great power.

⁶⁴ Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution*, 275-279.

⁶⁵ Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution*, 275.

⁶⁶ Ronald W. Walters, "The Clark Amendment: Analysis of U.S. Policy Choices in Angola," *The Black Scholar* 12, no. 4 (1981): 2.

⁶⁷ Myra F. Burton and Edward C. Keefer, eds, *U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXVIII, South Africa* (United States Government Printing Office: Washington, 2001), 410-411.

The United States Senate weighed in on the events in Angola with a hearing on January 29, 1976. The goal of the hearing was to explain to the United States public the reasons for involvement in Angola. The Senate hearings reassessed the Cold War emphasis on ideology, alliances, great power responsibility, and credibility. The Senate questioned Kissinger at length about the covert CIA military operations and involvement with South Africa in the Angolan conflict.⁶⁸ Secretary of State Kissinger began the hearing by outlining the extensive, danger of Soviet involvement and his grave concern for global stability. Kissinger said the world would avoid a catastrophe if the United States stayed involved: “[p]eace requires a sense of security which depends upon some form of equilibrium.”⁶⁹ In realist terms, Kissinger argued balance of power as the solution for peace. Arms, he argued, aided the helpless citizens in Africa and created an international order to achieve a local balance of force.⁷⁰

The Senate had a different approach. The hearing debated the United States’ dedication to alliances. Senator Percy asked if the United States should be counted on to shoulder all alliance needs in the world. Conversely, Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Ellsworth stated the Clark Amendment’s ban of aid in Angola left alliances questioning

⁶⁸ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, *United States Policy on Angola. Hearing before the Committee on International Relations*, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., January 26, 1976.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 7.

the United States' allegiance as it "created in their minds some area of doubt about our readiness to act in the case of need."⁷¹ In other words, they debated the continued Cold War lens of undeterred dedication to alliances. The hearing moved to the factors of ideology in alliance choice. The United States supported the FNLA, a corrupt group in a geographically remote area of the world that was discovered, after the South African invasion in Angola, to be receiving aid from the communist parties of the People's Republic of China, North Korea, and Rumania.⁷² The hearing pointed out the US did not support UNITA strongly and the President publicly announced he did not oppose President Neto of the MPLA, and prompted the question: "What is all the fuss about?"⁷³ The hearing pointed out the issue was not about Angola but "defined only in U.S.-U.S.S.R. terms."⁷⁴

The conversation struck on the great power role. Kissinger argued the urgent question of the hearing was if America will "resolve to act" responsibly as a great power.⁷⁵ The stability of the system is dependent on mutual restraint, he argued, when one great power acts the other counteracts. The result of a delay is more complex choices

⁷¹ Ibid., 85.

⁷² Gerald J. Bender, "American Policy towards Angola: A History of Linkage," in *African Crisis Areas and U.S. Foreign Policy*, edited by Gerald J. Bender and James S. Coleman, and Richard S. Sklar (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 113

⁷³ United States, *Policy on Angola*, 135.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 16.

at a higher cost.⁷⁶ Senators challenged his thinking. It means, Senator Clark pointed out, that United States' policy is not independent but reactionary. What if the Soviets make a mistake on intervention?⁷⁷ Senator Biden underlined the missing option in Kissinger's theory — non-intervention — always trying to be the “world's policeman” would lead to weakness. Kissinger narrowed the topic “[i]t depends on who we are trying to police. I am not saying we have to police every situation. But we cannot be indifferent to the use of Soviet —”⁷⁸ Senator Biden cut him off and asked for a future conversation to find out if the whole world needs to be involved.⁷⁹ While Biden questioned the extent and effectiveness of the United States actions in faraway places, Kissinger continued to speak of an unsettled competition.

The debate moved to credibility. The impression Senator Tunney got from the hearing is a military loss in Angola would destroy the “very fabric of American credibility around the world.”⁸⁰ Tunney compared credibility, not to alliances or victory

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 2.

⁷⁸ U.S. Congress, Senate, *Angola: U.S. Involvement in Civil War in Angola. Hearing before the Subcommittee on African Affairs*, 99th Cong., 2nd sess., January 29, February 3, 4, and 6, 1976, 47.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 167.

“credibility is an argument based on pride, not policy.”⁸¹ In policy, “[i]t can be self-defeating.”⁸²

In sum, the United State Senate challenged the executive branch’s lens of the events. At the end of the Cold War, the Senate asked new questions and entertained new answers about the priority of competition as a policy choice. The Senate rejected rivalry to justify non-involvement in southern Africa. The hearing concluded with the hope that the information would guide the United States to create a policy for Africa within “an African context.”⁸³

Kissinger continued to try to stop the MPLA’s new leadership in Angola by delaying Angola’s membership to the United Nations. Kissinger reached out to France to form a balance against the MPLA by delaying UN membership as leverage against the MPLA to remove Cuban forces.⁸⁴ Five countries in the Security Council have veto power — China, France, USSR, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America — because “of their key roles in the establishment of the United Nations” and continued

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Ibid., 210.

⁸⁴ Myra F. Burton and Edward C. Keefer, eds, *U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXVIII, South Africa* (United States Government Printing Office: Washington, 2001), 443-445.

“maintenance of international peace and security.”⁸⁵ A veto by one of these members blocks legislation.⁸⁶ France replied, “We really do not have the leverage we think we do. We worked against the MPLA, and the MPLA knows that we worked against them. Our refusal to recognize the MPLA will have absolutely no effect beyond driving them more deeply into Soviet dependency.”⁸⁷ France politely declined. In other words, France refused a new balance of the danger of accelerated great power rivalry.

President Neto of Angola sought to reverse the United States position before the UN vote by clarifying the need for aid. Shortly before the vote, President Neto sent a message to the Department of State outlining a hope for diplomatic relations with the United States, insisting Angola “is no satellite to the Soviet Union.”⁸⁸ Angola relied on Cuba to train the Angolan Army and provide health care — there were only sixty-nine doctors in the country after Portugal’s withdrawal.⁸⁹ Despite Neto’s plea, the United States vetoed Angolan membership. The U.S.’s decision was most likely influence

⁸⁵ United Nations, “Chapter V: The Security Council,” 24 October 1945, U.N. Charter art. 23-27. <http://legal.un.org/repertory/art23.shtml>.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Myra F. Burton and Edward C. Keefer, eds, *U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXVIII, South Africa* (United States Government Printing Office: Washington, 2001), 446-448.

⁸⁸ Myra F. Burton and Edward C. Keefer, eds, *U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXVIII, South Africa* (United States Government Printing Office: Washington, 2001), 477-478.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

because of questions during Ford's re-election campaign about his commitment to stop communism.⁹⁰

Anarchy in the Regional Balance of Power

The chapter examined if and how great powers choose weak nations. There are five reasons great power chose not to protect the weak nations. Additionally, structural factors limited their pacification.

Choice

First, great powers can choose not to intervene. Great powers can choose to do what they want when they want — even when nations are in trouble. While great powers shoulder the responsibility to right violations in the international system, they can choose non-involvement at any time.

Second, great powers missed the weak nation. Great powers assessed the situation through a global balance of power competitive lens. Both great powers intervened to aid an alliance's friend. The United States aided Zaire for the FNLA, and the Soviet Union aided Cuba for the MPLA. In each case, they missed the weak nation of Namibia.

Third, great powers can side with an aggressor. The US stood on the side of the aggressor of the region despite South Africa's violence, invasions and domination. Kissinger prioritized the global balance of power above concerns of aggression.

⁹⁰ Kathleen Teltsch, "Waldheim Expresses His Regret At Veto Barring Angola in U.N.," Special to the New York Times. *New York Times*, June 25, 1976, 4.

Fourth, great powers can wage war. The United States instigated a war in the shadow of a signed peace agreement. Focused on global power, the United States sought more power for a win against the other great power. In this case, the US alliance escalated chaos in the regional system through violent attacks and broken territorial boundaries.

Fifth, great powers create new weak sides. South Africa's attack on Angola, with the backing of the United States, created a new weak side — the MPLA. The action pulled in the other great power and formed a new balance. At this point, the Soviet's engagement escalated great power competition.

Limitations

Great power competition prevented protection of a weak state. Cuba's request to the USSR to aid the MPLA was rejected initially because of United States-Soviet relations. The USSR could have acted; however, a fear of retaliation by the United States prevented them from forming a balance until violence escalated.

Roles

The great powers primarily acted as self-interested agents. When they intervened, they aided alliances rather than the weak nations. The US aided the aggressor of the region, South Africa, pulling in the USSR to start a balancing war so both are "self-interested" agents. The Soviets successfully protected the new weak party, the MPLA, from the South African invasion to be a "pacifier" as Miller argues. The action put out

the fire the other great power started. Instead of creating stability within the region, the great powers escalated conflict.

Chapter III.

Understanding Protection

Protection means to keep safe from harm or injury. United States President Theodore Roosevelt outlined the idea of great power as protectors in his 1910 Nobel Prize lecture. Great powers “honestly bent on peace” may intervene in the world, Roosevelt argued, “not only to keep the peace among themselves but to prevent by force if necessary, its being broken by others.”⁹¹

Great powers have tools at their disposal to protect. I present seven tools of protection introduced by various theorists and the drawbacks to each. No tool is a guarantee of success. The reason for this list is to outline the breadth of tools available to great power. Often times, great powers use force because of their great strength which leaves other types unused or under-used. In the case study of President Carter, the United States pivoted policy to protect the weak states of Namibia and Angola based on human rights concerns; however, credibility concerns at the UN, mediation problems, and global alliances prevented protection of the weak nations.

In this chapter, I ask the questions: Do great powers protect weak nations? How? And, is it effective? Below are the protective tools, followed by the actions of the great powers in Namibia and Angola from 1977-1981. Finally, I review the choices of the great powers and introduce the roles the great powers played.

⁹¹ Frederick W. Haberman, ed., *Nobel Lectures – Peace: 1901:1925* (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1972), 105.

Force

Force uses military weaponry, aid and training to protect people from harm. Great powers actively use force through troops and weaponry or “encourage other countries to take the lead in checking rising powers” — a concept introduced by Mearsheimer and Walt as off-shore balancing.⁹² Furthermore, great powers can approve mandates through the UN to deploy Peacekeeper soldiers internationally.⁹³ The consequence of using force is the high cost of human life and defense spending. Additionally, force is no guarantee of success nor does it resolve the original problem.

Creditability

Great powers see credibility as vital. In Stephen Walt’s, *The Origins of Alliances*, concerns about credibility often made great powers overly committed to alliances. Walt found an extreme focus on image led to “counterproductive excesses” of dedication to alliances.⁹⁴ Despite worrying about their own credibility, great powers have the power to bestow credibility through words and legislation on other nations. Public comments increase credibility in the world’s eyes. A great power’s cooperation with a weaker nation

⁹² John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, “The Case for Offshore Balancing: A Superior US Grand Strategy,” *Foreign Affairs* 95, no. 4 (2016): 71.

⁹³ “What Peacekeeping Does,” United Nations, Peacekeeping, accessed August 21, 2018, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en>.

⁹⁴ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 282-283.

relays a message to adversaries; in contrast, great power condemnation emphasizes actions that upset the international system.

Besides public comments, legislation offers legitimacy. Nationally, and internationally through the United Nations, legislation offers worldwide recognition through resolutions or condemnations. Resolutions condone actions by acknowledgment of territory, governing groups, and sovereignty. In contrast, condemnations put pressure on a nation to end violence, occupation, and human rights violations. The limitations of credibility are public comments and legislation may upset other alliances, and words can easily be ignored.

Threats and Promises

Threats and promises rely on future behavior. Stephen Walt outlines the predominate nature to form alliances in response to aggressive actions in the balance of threat theory. Traditionally, alliances were thought to form because of the balance of power; however, his research found nations aligned due to a threat. Threats include the possible use of violence or a commitment to do X if Y happens; in other words, in the event of X, a great power will respond with a negative consequence Y. Conversely, a promise is often a security agreement to commit a great power to do X if Y happens. For example, Kaiser Wilhelm promised “faithful support” to Austria-Hungary after the assassination of their Archduke Franz Ferdinand and Duchess Sophia at the hands of

Serbians.⁹⁵ In other words, if Austria-Hungary invaded Serbia (X), Wilhelm promised German military involvement (Y).

The effectiveness of a threat or promise is the strength of the commitment. A great power can break a promise or fail to keep a threat. Additionally, Walt's research predicts in balance of threat theory that alliances will form — a dangerous consequence. For example, Kaiser Wilhelm kept his promised blank check to aid Austria in an attack on Serbia but set off war across Europe when Russia responded.⁹⁶

Information

Information offers protection from danger — intelligence is powerful knowledge. In the international world of anarchy, knowledge of a rival's intentions or actions offers time for defense or to warn an ally. Intelligence reports, provided at the right time, may stop the next step of an opponent; however, information may not reflect the true nature of events, and may not be trusted.

⁹⁵ For alliance formation in reaction to threats see Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 5. For Kaiser Wilhelm, see John G. Stoessinger, *Why Nations Go to War* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 6.

⁹⁶ Stoessinger, *Why Nations Go to War*, 6-11.

Restrictions

Restrictions attempt to curtail aggressive behavior through sanctions and disarmament. Sanctions impose a cost on an aggressive nation through trade, financial endeavors, commodities, travel/flight, arms, and diplomatic relations.⁹⁷ Great powers may enact sanctions through legislation nationally or seek cooperation with the United Nations (UN). If through the UN, great powers can approve or veto sanctions. The collective action of the international community places a spotlight on the behavior. The effectiveness of sanctions rests on *if* the restriction changes the offending behavior — a nation may decide to live without the sanctioned items or find a go-around. For example, the United Nations sanctioned North Korea to deter its nuclear program through financial and commodity restrictions; however, China continued to purchase coal and allowed two North Korean banks to operate on their mainland.⁹⁸ Furthermore, sanctions have caused humanitarian crises of “widespread malnutrition and disease” as seen in Iraq during the 1990s.⁹⁹

Another restriction is disarmament — a mutual drawing down of arms. Great powers can initiate these among themselves or with other states. The word spans both

⁹⁷ David Cortright and George A. Lopez, *Smart Sanctions: Targeting Economic Statecraft* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002), 4.

⁹⁸ Farnaz Fassihi, “U.N. Report Says North Korea Sanctions Failed to Halt Nuclear Program,” *Dow Jones Institutional News* (March 6, 2017): 1.

⁹⁹ Cortright, *Smart Sanctions*, 1-2.

disarmament or arms control with a broad meaning to include testing, weaponry, acquisition and transparency.¹⁰⁰

Peace

Peace is the active goal to keep a nation in its original form without violence. Methods of peacemaking are ceasefires and peace agreements. Great powers may stop violence and promote peace through negotiation to end conflicts among nations. However, great powers may struggle to find acceptable terms for a peace agreement or sustain durable peace.

U.S. President Carter & USSR Brezhnev (1977-1981): Credibility on the Line

United States President Jimmy Carter took office in January 1977 with a new focus on Africa for economic and political reasons. Economically, the 1973 oil embargo shifted the United States supplies to Africa with one in every eight gallons of gas from Nigeria alone. A political shift in the United Nations membership changed as newly independent countries tilted the balance of power away from Western nations and towards post-colonial, Communist and Latin American countries — of which a third

¹⁰⁰ Jozef Goldblat, *Arms Control: A Guide to Negotiations and Agreements* (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1994), 3.

were African.¹⁰¹ The change, accompanied by Carter's childhood experiences, brought a new perspective and policy for Africa. The struggle for black majority rule was reminiscent of African American Civil Rights racial struggles in Carter's home state of Georgia.¹⁰² The administration moved away from the US-Soviet rivalry to one based on human rights and self-determination.¹⁰³ In southern Africa, Carter prioritized Rhodesia and Namibian independence, the end of apartheid and normalization in diplomatic relations with Angola.¹⁰⁴ The United States now recognized Namibia as the weak state and devised a plan to protect the country.

The solution had two purposes: first, to secure Namibian independence and second, to diminish tensions in the United Nations. At the time Carter took office, South Africa had developed a Namibian solution called the Turnhalle Framework. Under the plan, South Africa would supervise Namibian elections — a new government would be formed “in name only” as the South Africans would continue control of the country.¹⁰⁵ At the United Nations, there was a divide on how to deal with South Africa's illegal

¹⁰¹ Nancy Mitchell, *Jimmy Carter in Africa: Race and the Cold War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016), 5. See Jochen Prantl for information on the Contact Group in "Namibia: Group of Three and Western Contact Group," in *The UN Security Council and Informal Groups of States* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 104.

¹⁰² Mitchell, *Jimmy Carter*, 11-14.

¹⁰³ Paule E. Masters, “Carter and the Rhodesian Problem,” *International Social Science Review* 75, no. 3/4 (2000): 25.

¹⁰⁴ Mitchell, *Jimmy Carter*, 15, 139, 484.

¹⁰⁵ Gleijeses, *Visions of Freedom*, 53.

occupation and apartheid oppression. The African states introduced condemnations and sanctions against South Africa, while the Western allies wanted to work out a peace agreement and avoid sanctions to protect British and France financial holdings in South Africa. The conflict forced the Western states, including the United States, to cast vetoes to stop the condemnation.¹⁰⁶ The United States lost credibility for Carter's human rights emphasis with each veto. A new policy required finesse between the two groups.

The United States new ambassador sought to protect regional and global partners and the United States' credibility in the United Nations. Carter appointed Andrew Young as the new U.S. Ambassador of the United Nations. An active civil rights leader and the first African-American chosen for a cabinet ranking position, he proposed a new solution. The Western Contact Group known as the Five — the United States, France, England, West Germany, and Canada — would operate “alongside but not in” the UN framework to negotiate Namibia independence with South Africa.¹⁰⁷ The group could pressure South Africa for a settlement and gain time, thereby, avoiding credibility issues.¹⁰⁸

The United States choice to work outside the UN bolsters my argument that great powers fail to reduce the consequences of anarchy. Although the U.N. is not the ultimate authority, it does reflect an organization tasked as a worldwide mediator in conflicts to reduce chaos. In other words, it is an institution that is supposed to help resolve conflict

¹⁰⁶ Prantl, “Western Contact Group,” 118.

¹⁰⁷ Gleijeses, *Visions of Freedom*, 52-53.

¹⁰⁸ Prantl, “Western Contact Group,” 120.

and identify aggressor nations. By working outside this framework, the Five were free to delay legal condemnation and sanctions without pressure to change alliances or dependence on South African goods. Without any punishment on South African violence, oppression increased and the regional system became more disorderly and violent.

Angola became the protector of anti-apartheid and anti-dictator liberation groups. After MPLA's win against South Africa, Angola became a safe-haven. Namibians and South African black liberation groups formed headquarters and refugee camps in Angola to escape South African apartheid. Zairian refugees formed camps to escape the violent, dictatorial rule of Zaire's President Mobutu. On March 8, 1977, Zairian refugees left Angola and invaded Zaire through the province of Shaba to overthrow President Mobutu. President Neto of Angola approved the plan reluctantly because the Zaire government continued to launch attacks on Angola. A new balance formed as Zairean refugees, with Angola's approval, push back against the violent attacks of Zaire. When the exiles advanced quickly against Zaire's weak army, President Mobutu made the event an international crisis, asking for military aid from Western nations, stating the enemy was Cuba most likely backed by Soviet communists.¹⁰⁹

The incident challenged Carter's human rights policy. Carter, embarrassed by Zairian military failures, economic collapse and President Mobutu's "corrupt, repressive" leadership, was constrained by the United States' past actions. A CIA operation had established Mobutu as president in Zaire.¹¹⁰ The choice came down to protecting the

¹⁰⁹ Gleijeses, *Visions of Freedom*, 39.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 54. On CIA initiative, see Mitchell, *Jimmy Carter*, 166.

Zairian refugees or continued support to the Zaire president. The Carter Administration authorized \$2 million in “military supplies, but no arms or ammunition” mostly “tents, medicine and food” to Zaire.¹¹¹ *The Washington Post* and Congress wanted to know if the aid matched Carter’s human rights strategy. An editorial questioned the response: Were there “shades” of Henry Kissinger and the “whole balance-of-power gang?”¹¹² Congressional leaders expected an explanation and the administration answered — the aid protected the “unity and territorial integrity” of Zaire.¹¹³

The United States asked other nations to intervene in the situation to protect Zaire. France and the United States urged Morocco to intervene in the situation in an offshore balancing approach. Morocco formed a new balance against the Zairean refugee invasion. Morocco’s quick action saved President Mobutu and the Zairian government.¹¹⁴

Carter pushed Mobutu to clarify the event, as the CIA intelligence reports found Cuba was not involved and matched Havana’s denial.¹¹⁵ Instead, the Zaire government unleashed new attacks on Angola and brutalized their citizens, as tens of thousands of

¹¹¹ Gleijeses, *Visions of Freedom*, 54. Supplies listed in Mitchell, *Jimmy Carter*, 168

¹¹² Mitchell, *Jimmy Carter*, 169.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 169-170.

refugees sought safety in Angola.¹¹⁶ Because the United States did not punish an aggressor, they were free to increase violence. While the United States focused on global concerns, they failed to acknowledge the growing disorder in the system. The United States canceled Angolan diplomatic talks as a consequence of Shaba I.¹¹⁷

In April 1977, the Western Contact Group's threat of sanction brought South Africa to the negotiation table. The Five, following the UN Resolution 385, insisted on a settlement with free and fair elections in Namibia to be supervised by the United Nations and withdrawal of South African troops.¹¹⁸ SWAPO, the Namibian black liberation group agreed; however, South Africa demanded administration of the lucrative Walvis Bay and resisted United Nations presence in Namibia.¹¹⁹ The negotiations moved forward slowly.

The Western Group's settlement, however, was questioned for protecting South Africa from sanctions. By May 1977, SWAPO accused the Western Contact Group of impeding the negotiations with the motive to "bail South Africa out of her political predicament."¹²⁰ African groups in the United Nations wanted the Five to work within the United Nations Security Council to ensure legitimacy. One reason was the negotiation process had an adverse impact on Namibia and Angola as US intelligence found South

¹¹⁶ Gleijeses, *Visions of Freedom*, 53.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 57.

¹¹⁸ Prantl, "Western Contact Group," 124.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 129-132.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 125-126.

Africa had a “tried and true tactics of thump and talk” — when South Africa negotiated their violence increased.¹²¹ In September 1977, Steve Biko, a popular black national movement leader, died in South African police custody without medical attention after a “savage beating.”¹²² His death marked the twentieth prisoner death in over a year and a half and resulted in international protests. South Africa continued their onslaught and closed South Africa’s largest black newspaper and banned eighteen movement organizations.¹²³

The United States failed adequately to protect both global and regional alliances. The African groups presented four mandatory sanctions before the United Nations Security Council because of South Africa aggression. In other words, they wanted to form a balance against South African violence. Carter held sanctions as unnecessary “[w]e have made it clear to South Africa that sanctions will be applied . . . if progress is not made.” Carter saw the Western group negotiations process moving towards a settlement, so sanctions were unnecessary; however, Young disagreed and sent a letter to the administration “a carrot-and-stick policy needs an occasional stick” and favored strong sanctions. To delay the action, the Carter administration pressed Britain and France for a narrower arms sanction. Undeterred, the African groups called for a vote. The United States cast the last of the three vetoes against sanctions on South Africa.

¹²¹ Gleijeses, *Visions of Freedom*, 520.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 95.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 53, 520.

Andrew Young emphasized the United States resolve to end apartheid remained “undiminished” and announced an arms embargo while quoting Steve Biko “racial justice will come to South Africa.”¹²⁴ Within the week, the United States introduced Resolution 418, an arms embargo, which passed unanimously — a decision the African groups resented for being too light and the Western nations resented for being too heavy-handed.¹²⁵

On analysis, the actions of the Western group reveal a structural reason great powers were unable to pacify a region. The global balance of power interferes with the regional balance of power — the US delayed action to protect an alliance partner’s economies and the US’s global power position.

UN members questioned United States’ credibility in the Namibian plans. In April 1978, the Western Group presented their proposal for Namibia independence to the United Nations Security Council. The settlement included three items deferred to a later date — Walvis Bay, the size of UN involvement, and withdrawal of the South African Defense Forces. SWAPO rejected the proposal. Credibility was on the line as the proposal did not gain the support of the General Assembly because SWAPO and the United Nations wanted a more prominent role in the negotiations. The Council provided a separate resolution that protected the territorial integrity of Walvis Bay to Namibia and continued to debate changes.¹²⁶

¹²⁴ Ibid., 335-336.

¹²⁵ Ibid., 336.

¹²⁶ Prantl, “Western Contact Group,” 128-129.

A Zairian invasion led the United States to blame Cuba for the attack. In May 1978, Zairian refugees invaded Zaire again to overthrow President Mobutu with Neto's approval because of continued attacks on Angola.¹²⁷ The rebels took the capital easily; although, a quick response by France and Belgium regained the country — a balance formed against the Zairean refugee invasion. Castro contacted the Carter administration to assure the US that Cuban troops were not involved; however, several hours later White House officials announced Cuban and Soviet involvement in the attack — despite intelligence the Zairian exiles acted alone.¹²⁸

South Africa attacks a Namibian refugee camp in Angola. Planes rained 20,000 pounds of bombs on the camp, and a young refugee described the scene as “white things falling from the sky” and “[w]e thought it was candy” from President of SWAPO Sam Nujoma.¹²⁹ After 1,200 bombs fell, South African Defense Force paratroopers landed in Angola. Unaware of the Cuban base ten miles away, the South African military scrambled as Cuban soldiers fought alongside Namibians. Cuba responded by forming a balance against the attack. The violence killed over six-hundred Namibians.¹³⁰

The United States refused to alter anti-sanction actions or condemn South African actions. Carter assured the press, “South Africans claim that it was just a retaliatory raid

¹²⁷ Gleijeses, *Visions of Freedom*, 55-56.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, 57-59.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 60.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, 60-61.

against the SWAPO force . . . and they've claimed to have withdrawn” and concluded with “we hope it’s all over.”¹³¹ The Cubans interpreted United States non-action as a sign to South Africa that they can “repeat acts of aggression like this again and again” and increased their troops.¹³²

The rising violence prompted President Neto to seek US protection. With South African attacks more frequent, President Neto sought protection from President Carter for Angola and Namibia. Top officials from each nation met to discuss the situation — the United States wanted Cubans and Soviets out of Angola, but Angola needed them for protection against South Africa. The nations could not agree.¹³³ With the refusal of aid by a great power, Neto turned to Castro for protection of Namibia, deciding the Namibian conflict “is also our struggle.”¹³⁴ In the summer of 1989, as Neto battled cancer, he urged Namibia back to mediation with the Western Group. On September 10, 1979, Neto died, and Dos Santos became the President of Angola with Cuba’s insistence on continued military protection for the nation.¹³⁵

Despite the intensity of the violence, the Western group failed to issue sanctions to protect Namibia. The Five submitted the adapted Resolution 435 to the United

¹³¹ Ibid., 62.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Ibid., 100.

¹³⁴ Ibid., 103-104.

¹³⁵ Ibid., 113-115.

Nations, and the UN made changes despite dissent from the leadership in South Africa. The Western Group was responsible to pressure South Africa to agree to the new Resolution 435. United States officials planned to fly to Pretoria, the capital of South Africa. The Carter Administration disagreed on directives — National Security Advisor Brzezinski believed the issue was “not South Africa, but Cuba and the Soviet Union” connecting communism to the Namibian problem while UN Ambassador Andrew Young wanted sanctions on travel and food.¹³⁶ Carter thought “pressing South Africa too far” put the United States on “shaky ground.”¹³⁷ In the final decision, Vance left the United States with an earnest letter from Carter and a carrot of a possible White House invitation.¹³⁸

The Western Group arrived in Pretoria in October 1978. The South African government leaders were belligerent and claimed unequal treatment by the Five — insistent on an impartiality package that would “terminate SWAPO’s observer status at the UN” and funding to the group after independence.¹³⁹ South Africa explained their plans to hold elections and “persuade” election workers to cooperate with the UN.¹⁴⁰ The

¹³⁶ Ibid, 152-158.

¹³⁷ Ibid., 152.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Prantl, “Western Contact Group,” 134.

¹⁴⁰ Gleijeses, *Visions of Freedom*, 150.

Five insisted the plan was not acceptable; however, the group did not sanction South Africa.¹⁴¹

During the December 1978 Namibian elections, there was massive intimidation against Namibians by South Africans. News organizations reported voting irregularities, deportation, and torture. The South African group, the DTA, won in what was described by a South African newspaper as “[a] giant victory for democracy.”¹⁴² South Africa continued to occupy Namibia as the Western Group continued to seek a settlement.¹⁴³

Carter’s mixed signals became a stumbling point in the 1980 elections. The link of Cuban involvement in Shaba II backfired as Carter lost approval in the polls — from November 1977 to mid-April of 1978 ratings dropped 18% — a key reason was the perception that he failed to stop “Cuba and Soviet adventurism” in Africa.¹⁴⁴ The threat of Cuba in Angola and Ethiopia and Soviet activity instilled fear in Americans without a clear challenge by the administration. “Cuba became a symbol of the administration’s weakness” and left the United States unprotected in the public’s mind.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴¹ Ibid., 151.

¹⁴² Gleijeses, *Visions of Freedom*, 154-155.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 59.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., 165.

Anarchy in the Regional Balance of Power

As shown through the case study, a great power's efforts to protect local states inevitably affect the regional balance of power. While Carter wanted to protect the weak state of Namibia, carrying that plan out proved complicated. The case study has implications on the roles great powers to pacify regions.

Choice

Great powers can avoid peace-making organizations. The United States, as a great power, was able to work outside of United Nations protocol and forestalled credibility factors that might have pushed the Five towards sanctions. The United Nations publicly exposed the United States dedication to alliances and failure to punish an aggressive nation.

Great powers can break promises. The Western Group formed because the Five had collective sanction power. However, they failed to back up their threat to protect their global power position.

Limitations

The global balance of power interferes with the regional balance of power. Despite the choice to protect human rights violations, the Carter administration protected the global balance of power alliances. Britain and France's financial interests sustained their global power levels.

Additionally, great power protection tools may be ineffective. The one sanction brokered by the United States and the African groups was an arms sanction. The tool,

mild in comparison to financial, food and travel embargoes, had no lasting change. A compromise to satisfy global alliances and regional actors did not deter South African actions; instead, the area experienced more violence due to Botha's "thump rule."

Roles

Carter fails all roles. While he tried to be a "pacifier" by leveraging sanctions in mediation through the Western Group as Levy theorizes, in the end, he failed to follow through on sanctions which led to violence in Namibia. Nor is he a "self-interested" agent because he chose not to initiate a balancing war with the Soviet. In Angola, the Soviet Union acted as a "pacifier" against the South Africa invasion on the Namibian camp in Angola through Cuba. The Soviets were aware military aid to Angola would be an action of a "self-interested" agent to gain power. The Soviet Union played the role of a "self-interested" agent and a "pacifier."

Chapter IV.

Understanding Leverage in Peace

Kenneth Waltz writes that “[t]o explain war is easier than to understand the conditions of peace.”¹⁴⁶ With great power’s responsibility to establish peace agreements, it is best to understand leverage in mediation. Leverage is a term rarely defined in mediation scholarship.¹⁴⁷ Strength seems to ensure leverage. Military strength, vital resources, financial stability, and alliances would benefit great powers in peace agreements. Despite the strength, however, leverage is complicated. Studies show the success of great power relies on the effectiveness of the methods they use and the “the genuine willingness of the parties.”¹⁴⁸ In other words, peace is not a guarantee because of power.

It is essential to know the different types of leverage available. To guide the analysis, I introduce two types — one from mediation scholarship and the other from international. Great powers generally assume the role of leverager because of their vast resources to punish or reward parties in conflict. The goal of leverage in peace

¹⁴⁶ Kenneth Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” *International Security* 25, no. 1 (2000): 8.

¹⁴⁷ Lindsay Reid, “Finding a Peace That Lasts: Mediator Leverage and the Durable Resolution of Civil Wars,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61, no. 7 (2017): 1404.

¹⁴⁸ Richard Jackson, “Successful Negotiation in International Violent Conflict,” *Journal of Peace Research* 37, no. 3 (2000): 340.

agreements is to settle conflict and war; however, there are drawbacks. In this chapter, I ask: What type of leverage did great powers use to create peace agreements? And, was it effective? From the case study of the Reagan years, the United States was unabashed about siding with the aggressor in their mediation in peace agreements to pursue competition at the global level — oblivious to the destruction left in their wake. At each new escalation, neither great power stood down; instead, they anted up to higher levels of violence. While there were attempts to leverage peace, the great powers faced problems with actors complying with the agreement.

First, I explain two types of leverage. Then, I apply the knowledge to the case study of the Reagan years in Namibia and Angola from 1981-1988. Finally, I introduced my argument before introducing the roles the great powers played.

Bargaining Skills

Mediation requires a skill set for peace agreements. Bargaining skills offer the ability to shape incentives to produce peace through knowledge, information, fairness, experience, commitment, organizational control, charisma, credibility, and creative alternatives.¹⁴⁹ Great powers place less emphasis on these because of their strength.

¹⁴⁹ Paul Kirgis, “Bargaining with Consequences: Leverage and Coercion in Negotiation,” *Harvard Negotiation Law Review* 19 (2014): 72; Roger Fisher, “Negotiating Power: Getting and Using Influence,” *American Behavioral Scientist* 27, no. 2 (1983): 153.

Carrots and Sticks

In International Relations, leverage is described in carrots and sticks — an if (X) then (Y) agreement. Carrots are the promises of a reward for a peace commitment, while the stick is a punishment for non-compliance.¹⁵⁰ For example, Stephen Van Evera advocates peace in the Middle East through Israel's withdrawal from specific parts of Palestine. In the plan, "[c]arrots should include the prospect of large economic aid to cover the cost of adjusting Israeli defenses to new borders and the prospect of a formal alliance with the United States — perhaps even a NATO membership — if Arab-Israeli peace is achieved. As a stick, the United States should explain that no U.S. government can remain allied to another government that pursues policies that harm U.S. national security."¹⁵¹ In the plan, an agreement led to the carrots of economic aid and a possible NATO membership while the stick was a lost alliance with the United States.

Coercion

Great power leverage can be coercive because, as Kirgis notes, "the ability to impose consequences on a counter party entails the potential to coerce."¹⁵² While some leverage is reasonable, a great power mediator crosses the line when it takes advantage of

¹⁵⁰ Joseph S. Nye, "Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power," *Foreign Affairs* 88, no. 4 (2009): 160.

¹⁵¹ Stephen Van Evera, "Assessing U.S. Strategy in the War on Terror," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 607, no. 1 (2006): 19.

¹⁵² Kirgis, "Bargaining with Consequences," 73.

another party's vulnerability and harms or injures.¹⁵³ In other words, strength can impose costs on the defenseless. Thucydides offers a warning about leverage in the historical actions of Athens at Melos. The Athenians, bolstered by great strength, offered the people of Melos a choice of servanthood or death — a coercive choice because it took advantage of the Melians' weakness and caused them harm. Thucydides offered a warning to future civilizations with the thought-provoking Athenian line: "knowing that you and everybody else, having the same power as we have, would do the same."¹⁵⁴ Great power leverage can pass a line to coercion.

U.S. President Reagan and the Soviet Union (1981-1988): Flawed Leverage

President Reagan entered office with a firm global strategy of offensive realism. Reagan disavowed the Cold War containment mentality. Instead of maintaining balance with the Soviets, the administration wanted to swing the global balance of power in favor of the United States by weakening Soviet alliances and destabilizing pro-Communist governments.¹⁵⁵ In Angola, one of Reagan's first actions was to try to repeal the Clark

¹⁵³ Ibid., 77.

¹⁵⁴ Andrea Tschemplik, eds, *The Republic* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 395.

¹⁵⁵ M. McFaul, "Rethinking the 'Reagan Doctrine' in Angola," *International Security* 14, no. 3 (1989): 102. For the specific strategies of Reagan, see Donald Rothchild, "The U.S. Foreign Policy Trajectory on Africa," *SAIS Review* 21, no. 1 (2001): 182-183. On balance of power, see Sewery Bialer and Joan Afferica, "Reagan and Russia" *Foreign Affairs* 61 (1982): 249.

Amendment banning military aid. The president made it clear he wanted to aid the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) led by Jonas Savimbi to replace the Angolan government. However, Congress denied Reagan's attempt.¹⁵⁶

Without aid, Reagan's sought to destabilize the third world Angolan economy, pressure South Africa through closer ties, and leverage a peace settlement. First, the US administration planned to weaken the Angolan economy, limit US military exports, and downgrade foreign currency so the UNITA movement could gain control of Angola.¹⁵⁷ The second strategy sought specific leverage with South Africa. Reagan appointed an academic scholar with a Ph.D. in African studies, Chester Crocker, to be the new Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, in part because Crocker had written a prominent article ("South Africa: Strategy for Change") that recommended a plan Crocker termed constructive engagement.¹⁵⁸ Constructive engagement meant pursuing closer ties with South Africa in order to influence its behavior. In particular, Crocker argues the United States should foster a "reliable and mutually respected" diplomatic relationship with South Africa to change the apartheid system constructively. Past

¹⁵⁶ James, *A Political History of the Civil War in Angola, 1974-1990*, 153-154.

¹⁵⁷ Mcfaul, "Reagan Doctrine," 105.

¹⁵⁸ J. Davies, *Constructive Engagement: Chester Crocker & American Policy in South Africa, Namibia & Angola, 1981-8* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2007), 326. For Crocker's background, see L. M. Thompson, "The Study of South African History in the United States," *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 25, no. 1 (1992): 37.

administrations had pushed South Africa aside.¹⁵⁹ The United States policy, he argued, “should not recognize the grant of ‘independence’” to black South Africans without “a meaningful test of opinions of those affected by such action.”¹⁶⁰

Crocker specifically addressed the type of leverage the United States needed to wield to change apartheid — a pressure rather than a punishment. A stronger alliance between South Africa and the United States offered leverage by being sensitive to local concerns. If the United States left, according to Crocker, “no one else will take our place.”¹⁶¹ In practice, the United States would condemn South Africa’s apartheid policies while distancing from specific repellent South African actions or apartheid violence.¹⁶² The United States would follow Reagan’s lead and empathize with the white government of South Africa.¹⁶³ The continued arms embargo, Crocker argued, pressed South Africa to change their apartheid attitudes and Namibian occupation; however, drastic calls to end apartheid through sanctions were ineffective leverage in regional conflicts. He believed sanctions were permanent punishments that carried “a heavy price tag” and often “erode rather than strengthen future influence and flexibility.”¹⁶⁴ In other words, the

¹⁵⁹ Davies, *Constructive Engagement*, 350.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 348.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 351.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, 350; Gleijeses, *Visions of Freedom*, 194.

¹⁶⁴ Davies, *Constructive Engagement*, 351.

US sided with the aggressor of the region and chose not to use leverage against aggression; instead, reason and close ties would convince South Africa to give up their violence and domination.

In office, Crocker's announce a pre-determined solution for Namibia, termed linkage, which raised concerns over coercion. The solution linked southern African regional problems with the global balance of power. To deal with the conflicts in Angola and Namibia, Cuban withdrawal from Angola was a prerequisite for South African withdrawal from Namibia.¹⁶⁵ The peace settlement fulfilled the United States global and regional strategies despite the loss of protection to the country of Angola or Namibia. The plan raised concerns of coercion by Namibians, Angolans and the international community as South Africa had illegally occupied Namibia since 1966, long before Cuban troops were in Angola, without any United States concern. French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson expressed grave outrage about connecting the two events "it is not appropriate the Namibian people should serve as hostages" to meet the United States foreign policy goals.¹⁶⁶ Despite the concerns, Crocker continued the strategy.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁵ Vernon V. Aspaturian, "Gorbachev's New Political Thinking and the Angolan Conflict" in *Disengagement from Southwest Africa: The Prospects for Peace in Angola and Namibia*, edited by Owen Ellison Kahn (New Brunswick: The East-South Relations Series, 1991), 4.

¹⁶⁶ Kenneth Mokoena and Nicole Gaymon, *The Angola Crises: The United States' Role* (Washington, D.C.: National Security Archive, 1991): 14; James S. Coleman and Richard L. Sklar, "Introduction," in *African Crisis Areas and U.S. Foreign Policy*, edited by Gerald J. Bender, James Smoot Coleman, and Richard L. Sklar (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 18-19.

The solution points to a lack of pacification by the great powers. Instead of dampening the consequences of anarchy, great power competition led to a pre-determined solution that met the United States global needs at the expense of regional actors. The weak nation of Angola was asked to surrender their protection to make a great power stronger. Leverage was used against the weak party instead of against the aggressor of the region.

In April 1981, Crocker gathered opinions on the Namibian solution. After meeting with twelve African nations to gain insight, he visited South Africa. South African Prime Minister Botha raised concerns about policy decisions after Namibia's independence. The South African government was concerned about the guarantee of white minority land and property privileges. Crocker, however, refused to meet with SWAPO. The United States began to write a constitution for Namibia with the South Africans, despite contradicting the UN Resolution 435 that laid a constitution in the hands of the Namibians. South African Prime Minister P.W. Botha visited the White House and met with President Reagan and Secretary of State Alexander Haig. The South Africa-American diplomatic goal sought an international solution without any consequence to Pretoria's interests.¹⁶⁸

The United States excluded the UN recognized people of Namibia, SWAPO, in settlement talks. A plan without the fair input of both parties missed critical information

¹⁶⁷ Davies, *Constructive Engagement*, 351.

¹⁶⁸ National Council of the Churches of Christ in the United States of America, *Namibia: The Crisis in the United States Policy toward Southern Africa* (Washington, D.C.: Trans Africa, 1983), 20-21.

for acceptance. Without the voices of the Namibian independence group, the agreement held the views of South Africa and the United States. The new policy protected Pretoria's interest and brought widespread accusations of racism from African countries, international organizations, Namibians and black South Africans. Despite these concerns, over the next seven months, Crocker worked with South Africa on a constitution to protect white South African privileges. Once the US finished writing the Namibian constitution, a final copy was sent to SWAPO who rejected the plan because of a lack of input and concerns about the electoral system.¹⁶⁹

South Africa attacked SWAPO bases in Angola, incurring Soviet wrath. South Africa made its goal clear: "to destroy ANC and SWAPO bases not only in Angola, but in other southern African nations as well."¹⁷⁰ In March 1982, flush with cash from a trade deal with the United States, South Africa launched "Operation Super" into Angola, killing 200 SWAPO members and confiscating 16 tons of SWAPO supplies. To justify actions, South Africa announced the assault focused on destroying the Soviet supplies sent to aid the Namibian black liberation movement.¹⁷¹ From March through October of

¹⁶⁹ National Council, *Namibia*, 22-25. "Critics in Africa and elsewhere argued that this new U.S. policy was clearly racially and economically motivated and that it identified U.S. interest with those of white South Africa rather than with the legitimate aspirations of the 1.5 million people of Namibia whose land South Africa illegally occupied, or with the 22 million ruthlessly dominated black people inside South Africa."

¹⁷⁰ James, *A Political History of the Civil War in Angola, 1974-1990*, 177.

¹⁷¹ Robert Fatton, "The Reagan Foreign Policy toward South Africa: The Ideology of the New Cold War," *African Studies Review* 27, no. 1 (1984): 66; James, *A Political History of the Civil War in Angola, 1974-1990*, 156-157.

1982, South Africa launched numerous attacks on SWAPO forces, infrastructures, communities and military sites in Angola.¹⁷² In response to the attacks, the Soviet Union increased military aid to two billion dollars and Cuba increased troops by 7,000.¹⁷³

As U.S. leverage failed to stop South African violence, the Soviets leveraged military might and brought in the United Nations. The increased South African offense in Angola brought a Soviet-Cuban balance. At the United Nations, the Soviets presented detailed satellite photographs of a planned South African attack on Angola. To prepare, Soviets increased shipments of SAM-8 anti-aircraft missiles. Cuba increased troops. As expected, South Africa aggressively attacked SWAPO bases in Angola, wiping out Angola's 11th Army Brigade. In response, Russia gave a public warning linking South Africa's aggression with western imperialism. South Africa backed down momentarily, giving the Soviets time to prepare a sophisticated air attack with pilots from Cuba, the Soviet Union, and East Germany.¹⁷⁴ In December 1983, South Africa launched Operation Askari against SWAPO bases in Angola. The attack led to a United Nations

¹⁷² Gleijeses, *Visions of Freedom*, 189.

¹⁷³ Pamela Falk, "Cuba's role in Southern Africa - the Angola-Namibia Negotiations and the Future of Superpower Conflict in the Region," in *Disengagement from Southwest Africa*, edited by Owen Ellison Kahn (New Brunswick: The East-South Relations Series, 1991), 100.

¹⁷⁴ Peter Vannerman, "Soviet Foreign Policy for Angola/Namibia in the 1980s - A Strategy of Coercive Diplomacy" in *Disengagement from South West Africa: The Prospect for Peace in Angola and Namibia*, edited by Owen Ellison Kahn (New Brunswick: The East-South Relations Series, 1991), 72-73.

condemnation against South Africa — the United States now cast the only veto.¹⁷⁵ With each attack, the great powers balanced with greater aggression.

The military action pushed parties to the negotiation table, however, enforcing the agreement proved difficult. For the first time, Cuban and Angola confronted South Africa's aggression on the battlefield and triggered diplomatic talks held in Lusaka.¹⁷⁶ In December 1983, South Africa's Prime Minister P.W. Botha and Chester Crocker established a ceasefire with an agreement of South Africa's withdrawal from southern Angola.¹⁷⁷ The meeting had two priorities: to dampen the international condemnation for South African destabilization in southern Africa and to show success for constructive engagement. A Joint Commission established a monitoring system of South Africa's withdrawal. The first withdrawal, set for March 1984, passed without any action and a new meeting was scheduled to resolve problems. Throughout the talks, Prime Minister Botha linked South African illegal occupancy of Namibia to Cuba. During the delay, Cuba strengthened its troops and Soviet weaponry arrived daily in Angola.¹⁷⁸

The escalating tensions prompted the United Nations to intervene. At the beginning of 1984, United Nations Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar mediated

¹⁷⁵ Bender, "American Policy towards Angola," 122.

¹⁷⁶ Vannerman, "Soviet Foreign Policy for Angola", 74.

¹⁷⁷ Bender, "American Policy towards Angola," 123.

¹⁷⁸ James, *A Political History of the Civil War in Angola, 1974-1990*, 158-159. Vannerman, "Soviet Policy for Angola," 76.

the South African withdrawal from Cunene, Angola.¹⁷⁹ In November 1984, the United States furthered the mediations and announced a “delicate phase” between Angola and South Africa. Crocker negotiated an agreement for a reduction of troops.¹⁸⁰ Angola presented the UN Secretary-General the plan which included a reduction of Cuban troops by half, Namibia independence outlined in UN Resolution 435, and a ban on South Africa aid to UNITA. However, South Africa did not abide by the plan. By April 1985, the United States submitted a different proposal to the UN — altering Cuban troop withdrawal and increasing support for UNITA. South Africa released a statement that it would leave Angola territory but threatened violence to SWAPO members entering Namibia.¹⁸¹ Instead of calming the matter at the regional level, the negotiations included more actors at higher levels. In essence, the submission undercut the authority of the United Nations.

Ineffective leverage failed to stop South African’s escalating violence and desolation. In May 1985, South African commando troops were captured on their way to sabotage the Gulf Oil installation in Angola owned by American businesses. The United States, embarrassed by South African actions, deterred negotiations.¹⁸² In an odd twist of

¹⁷⁹ Pamela S. Falk, “Cuba in Africa,” *Foreign Affairs* 65 (1987): 1090.

¹⁸⁰ James, *A Political History of the Civil War in Angola, 1974-1990*, 159.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 159-161.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, 161.

war, the United States Oil companies hired Cuban soldiers to protect their reserves from South Africa — the United States alliance.¹⁸³

Instead of protecting the weak state and leveraging peace, the great powers ravaged the region. At the end of Reagan's first term, the conflict in Angola resulted in the country using 60-80 percent of government income from oil productions to fund the defense budget. Food was scarce, and currency inflation led to widespread poverty and hunger with no end to warfare in the foreseeable future.¹⁸⁴ The US leverage against Angola effectively destabilized the third world country, and the lack of leverage against South Africa increased violence.¹⁸⁵ Despite this fact, Secretary of State George Shultz touted the continued negotiations of "constructive engagement" as a diplomatic success.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸³ J. Frynas and G. Wood, "Oil & War in Angola," *Review of African Political Economy* 28, no. 90 (2001): 593.

¹⁸⁴ James, *A Political History of the Civil War in Angola, 1974-1990*, 214-215; Reginald Herbold Green, "Hunger, Poverty and Food Aid in Sub-Saharan Africa: Retrospect and Potential," *Disasters* 10, no. 4 (1986): 288, 290.

¹⁸⁵ James, *A Political History of the Civil War in Angola, 1974-1990*, 214.

¹⁸⁶ Bender, "American Policy towards Angola," 117.

U.S. President Reagan, USSR, and UN (1985-1989):

Leveraging Force

Michael Gorbachev, the new leader of the USSR, called for a focus on domestic concerns, while Reagan increased military aid. Gorbachev's plan contradicted traditional Soviet ideology of expansion, with a new political strategy focused on domestic issues. Expensive expansionist endeavors overstretched the country, Gorbachev argued, and his foreign policy stance would be "determined by domestic policy" with "activities aimed at improving our country."¹⁸⁷ Reagan, on the other hand, aimed at Moscow. After successfully repealing the Clark Amendment, Reagan announced \$15 million in covert aid to UNITA and their leader Jonas Savimbi.¹⁸⁸

The heightened involvement by the United States prompted a change in Soviet, Angolan and Cuban strategy. Angola canceled negotiations with the United States and sought the United Nations to mediate, breaking ties with the United States. In May, Angolan President Dos Santos signed an agreement with Mikhail Gorbachev for support of the MPLA. Castro reaffirmed his commitment to supply troops to end the apartheid system.¹⁸⁹ With each move of the great powers to increase aid, the other great power

¹⁸⁷ Mcfaul, "Reagan Doctrine," 116.

¹⁸⁸ James, *A Political History of the Civil War in Angola, 1974-1990*, 214; Gleijeses, *Visions of Freedom*, 296.

¹⁸⁹ James, *A Political History of the Civil War in Angola, 1974-1990*, 214.

refused to back down and aimed for more involvement at higher stakes. The United States entered the fray by sending U.S. Stinger anti-aircraft missiles to Angola.¹⁹⁰

The escalation of violence and protests against apartheid brought the US Congress to leverage sanctions. In 1986, Congress stepped in to challenge the executive branch actions in southern Africa. The introduction of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 rejected the constructive engagement policy of the Reagan Administration. As oppression and violence worsened in Namibia and South Africa, growing demonstrations, sit-ins, and civil disobedience forced further actions from Congress as the public saw South Africa as the aggressor. Congress created legislation to ban South African products, airline travel, business tax incentives, and banking deposits.¹⁹¹ In other words, the United States legislative branch leveraged the stick of sanctions against the aggression of South Africa, while the executive branch leveraged the stick of destabilization and military aid against Angola.

President Reagan vetoed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act with a statement regarding the potential impact on black South Africans. He said, “[u]sing America’s power to deepen the economic crisis in this tortured country is not the way to reconciliation and peace.”¹⁹² Sanctions, Reagan argued, would add “misery” to black

¹⁹⁰ P. Vannerman, *Soviet Strategy in Southern Africa: Gorbachev’s Pragmatic Approach* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1990), 53-55.

¹⁹¹ Donald Culverson, “The Politics of the Anti-Apartheid movement in the United States,” *Political Science Quarterly* 111, no. 1 (1996): 145-146.

¹⁹² United States, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Ronald Reagan* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Print. Office, 1982), 1279.

citizens with fewer jobs and a rise in hunger and would lead to “deprivation, chaos, and violence.”¹⁹³ However, his actions of destabilization contradicted his concern. Congress overrode the veto.¹⁹⁴

The Soviets leveraged military might against South Africa for a Namibian settlement. In 1987, the Soviets decided on a massive offense. Against Castro’s warning of retribution by South Africa, USSR flew in weaponry, aid, and advisors. The Soviets expenditures reached a billion a year and brought tanks, missiles, helicopters, and troops on twelve flights daily to the capital of Angola. Soviet generals at the highest level established management, planning, and oversight of military action in Angola from July through November. The attack on UNITA, per Castro’s prediction, brought in 3,000 South African troops and air force. The battle brought the Soviets little success to capture UNITA areas; however, the conflict exposed a weakness in the South African air force.¹⁹⁵

Namibia’s destabilization by South Africa convinced Cuba to leverage military might. South Africa’s military objectives and the United States actions had successfully destabilized neighboring states and ignited devastating economic and social disruption. 100,000 South African soldiers terrorized Namibians, causing Namibians to flee the

¹⁹³ Ibid., 1-2.

¹⁹⁴ Congressional sanction followed American business and non-profit boycotts on South African goods; however, in Namibia the impact was negligible. It would be eight years before Nelson Mandela won the first multiracial election in 1994. Kenneth A. Rodman, "Public and Private Sanctions against South Africa," *Political Science Quarterly* 109, no. 2 (1995): 314.

¹⁹⁵ Vannerman, “Soviet Foreign Policy for Angola/Namibia in the 1980s,” 76-77.

country.¹⁹⁶ By late 1987, Castro met with President Dos Santos in Moscow to plan a new aggressive strategy against the South African base in Angola near the Namibia border. The plan focused on the weakness of the South African air force. Plans were made to replace inexperienced Cuban troops with seasoned soldiers. The stage was set for the largest battle in Africa in over a century. Neither great power was willing to lose the unsettled great power competition.¹⁹⁷

The Cubans focused on South Africa's air weakness. The Cubans and Angolans lured the South Africans into a conflict. The Angolans announced at the highest level there would be no more increases to Cuban troops. Again, an Angolan cabinet minister, over a BBC broadcast, reiterated no Cuban soldiers would be in Cuito Cuanavale. While the rainy season in Angola often delayed war, UNITA and South Africa attacked Cuban and Angolan troops at Cuito Cuanavale in January 1988. General Sanchez, a Cuban commander, led the defense from an airfield near the battle site. The African National Congress (ANC) and SWAPO tracked whereabouts of South African troops through mobile radar and sent the information to guide Cuban air strikes. The Soviets, Cubans and black liberation groups held Cuito Cuanavale at a substantial cost of UNITA and South African lives.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁶ David Goodman, "South Africa Digs in for a Long Stay," *The Nation* (May 11, 1985): 56; Hasu H. Patel, "Peace and Security in changing South Africa: A Frontline View," *Africa Insight* 22, no. 4 (1992): 27.

¹⁹⁷ Vannerman, "Soviet Foreign Policy for Angola/Namibia in the 1980s," 76-77.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 79-80.

The battle continued for months without a clear winner or loser, escalating the cost of a prolonged war without a guarantee of victory. South Africa, for the first time, sustained heavy casualties. The stalemate signaled a change in the regional balance of power. South Africa no longer held a more significant share — there was balance. To swing the regional balance of power in favor of Black Nationalist movements, Cuba ordered up 10,000 more troops. As neither side was guaranteed a win, South Africa and Angola started secret talks to work out a settlement outside the United States framework.¹⁹⁹

The USSR began mediation with the United States. The Soviets negotiated terms directly with the United States from March through the Reagan-Gorbachev Summit in Moscow during June 1988.²⁰⁰ An intense dialogue between the two opposing great powers spanned all expert levels. The Soviets favored negotiation and took on an observer status, not directly involved, as they would not negotiate with South Africa.²⁰¹ Russia viewed negotiations, historically, as a competitive process — a “new dimension of the problem.”²⁰² While the Soviets underscored an explicit goal of peace, they leveraged

¹⁹⁹ Ibid., 80.

²⁰⁰ Ibid., 151.

²⁰¹ Ibid., 80-81.

²⁰² Ibid.

the stick of continued aid, a billion dollars a year for Angola and an additional five billion to Cuba raising the cost of war. By May, Cuba entered the negotiation.²⁰³

In June 1988, Cuba leveraged their military power, albeit funded by the USSR, to swing the regional balance of power. Acting alone, Cuba focused on the stations at Calueque dam — the water and electrical center for northern Namibia. Cuban moved into the South African territory and flew over their military bases. While the action proved a stalemate, it exposed a threat to the South African military bases in Namibia and swung the balance of power in favor of Black Nationalist movements. The attack broke off peace talks during June 1988.²⁰⁴

The Soviets leveraged military action and diplomatic ties for a settlement. Soviets supplied technologically advanced air defense weaponry, missile batteries, advanced radar system, and upgraded air bases while Cuba brought in 5,000 more troops. Despite all the warfare, the great powers would not back down from force. Negotiations resumed for five months. The Soviets contacted the United States daily and leveraged military aid while urging Cuba and Angola to find a settlement. In other words, they employed two methods — first, bargaining skills to find out what each side wanted while encouraging compromise and the stick of continued warfare. Despite the excessive leverage, South Africa failed to withdraw from Namibia in 1988 after an agreement.²⁰⁵

²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴ Ibid., 83-84.

²⁰⁵ Ibid., 85.

The immense strength of a great power could not sustain commitments to peace. Anarchy, the international system without a central authority, lacks a court to haul away or arrest parties who break commitments.

New negotiations were set up in November after the United States elections signaled the end of the Reagan presidency. Again, South Africa and Cuba tentatively agreed to troop withdrawals. After four decades of no contact, the Soviets increased their influence in leverage by negotiating privately with South Africa.²⁰⁶

The United Nations became the leverager of peace. In December 1988, at the end of Reagan's presidency, a meeting was set in Brazzaville, Congo to verify the peace agreement. Cuba and South Africa agreed on troop withdrawals — although the United States would not release the schedule publicly. Despite the agreement, one area lay unresolved, Walvis Bay, as South Africans continued their control. The most crucial point of the resolution was mediation no longer lay in the hands of great powers. All mediation and implementation of peace were now moved to the United Nations.²⁰⁷ The peace process was left in flux when South Africans suddenly left after Deputy Soviet Foreign Minister Adamishin met with South African Foreign Minister Botha.²⁰⁸

At Brazzaville, Crocker clarified the type of leverage he used to bring South Africa to an agreement and stated, "I think it is wrong to say that South Africa became

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

²⁰⁷ William Claiborne, "Cuba, Angola, South Africa Sign Accord," *The Washington Post* (1988): A1.

²⁰⁸ Vannerman, "Soviet Foreign Policy for Angola/Namibia in the 1980s," 85-86.

persuaded because of inferior military position. It is more accurate to say that anything has a price, and they are willing to pay the price if everyone is willing to do it.”²⁰⁹ In other words, leverage for Crocker was everyone compromising. The strategy failed to take into account the chaos and devastation in the international system. At the event, Crocker announced the end of the Reagan administration’s mediation. The agreement, he said, “signifies the end of a sad chapter in Africa’s modern history and the beginning of a new chapter.”²¹⁰

The United Nations mediated through violence until Namibian independence. In January of 1989, both Cuba and South Africa withdrew their first troops. The Security Council announced on April 1, 1989, the implementation of Resolution 435. For peace, the UN secretary-general arranged a cease-fire to prevent conflict between South Africa and Namibia. Hours after the cease-fire was signed, South African forces gunned down 300 SWAPO forces crossing into Namibia. South Africa argued the Geneva Protocol outlined in Article 5 required the removal of all South African troops before SWAPO entered Namibia. A UN Joint Commission meeting discussed the matter. At South Africa’s request, with Cubans and Angolans present, a decision was made to confine SWAPO troops to their bases during withdrawal and resume Resolution 435. An example of reducing the consequences of anarchy, the UN resolved an incident of violence

²⁰⁹ Claiborne, “Cuba, Angola and South Africa Sign Accord,” A1.

²¹⁰ Constantine Menges, “The Angola/Namibia Agreements – Likely Results and Policy Implications,” in *Disengagement from Southwest Africa: The Prospect for Peace in Angola and Namibia*, edited by Owen Ellison Kahn (New Brunswick: The East-South Relations Series, 1991), 152.

without further balancing and violent attacks. As South African forces continued to withdraw, Namibian refugees poured back into their country. By June, South African troops were down to 1,500.²¹¹

The United Nations oversight led to a peaceful election. Namibia held their election from November 7th through the 11th with UN oversight. During the election, there was one UN supervisor for every 412 Namibian voters. Over 97% of Namibians voted. The results were 57.32% of the votes to SWAPO and 29% of votes to the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, formed by the South Africans. A two-thirds majority guaranteed the winner would write the constitution. Without the margins, the two parties drafted the constitution together.²¹²

Anarchy in the Regional Balance of Power

Leverage in peace agreements offers an understanding of how great powers can reduce the consequences of anarchy in the regional balance of power. The Reagan administration was unabashed in their pursuit to destabilize the region to gain more power against the USSR. While Namibia gained independence, the leverage and competition left the region in destruction, as neither great power backed down to bring peace or stability.

²¹¹ Ronald F. Dreyer, *Namibia and Southern Africa: Regional Dynamics of Decolonization, 1945-90* (London: K. Paul International, 1994), 189-192.

²¹² *Ibid.*, 192-193.

Choice

First, great powers can coerce. The solution to link the two events delayed Namibian's independence and punished Angola despite South Africa aggression. The solution bolstered the US's global balance of power level; however, the two weakest states in the region paid the price.

Second, great powers may delay peace processes. A peace mediator is expected to want a settlement. The United States, however, continued to delay the settlement by introducing a pre-determined peace plan, writing a constitution, and submitting a new peace plan to fulfill their foreign policy goals.

Limitations

Great powers faced limitations in leverage. In the United States, the Reagan administration started with a clear plan for leverage, a closer relationship with South Africa to influence the country to change. The plan was flawed leverage as there was no cost to aggression. Conversations and closer ties only condoned South African behavior. Additionally, leverage was hard to gauge. The United States Congress applied too little leverage through Anti-Apartheid sanctions and resulted in few immediate changes in South Africa. On the other side, Cubans attack on South African bases in Namibia caused too much leverage as peace talks abruptly stopped. For the USSR, the billions of dollars in military leverage in Angola did not guarantee peace and escalated costs for the nation on the verge of collapse.

Great powers are limited in controlling actions in faraway regions. While the great powers sought to influence events, the myriad of actors in the far away region led to unexpected outcomes. Even though the United States backed South Africa, the South African Commando team tried to attack American Oil supplies in Angola. While the Soviet Union sought balance between the great powers, Cuba acted alone to swing the regional balance of power in favor of Black Nationalist movements. The great powers tried to guide the direction of events; however, regional actors could quickly change the course.

Restriction

Finally, peace is often outside great power control. Parties at the bargaining table are expected to want peace. However, South Africa strategically delayed peace for twelve years. While leverage pushed the country to the table, throughout the process, the white South African government agreed and walked away. Peace did not serve their purpose. The anarchic system lacks an authority to make parties comply.

Roles

The US qualifies as a “self-interested” agent by engaging in a balancing war against South Africa and destabilizing Angola as Waltz and Mearsheimer presents. The strategy of leverage, closer ties with South Africa, does not qualify as a “pacifier.” The USSR played both roles by pouring billions of dollars’ worth of military aid and weaponry into Angola to protect the weak nations in anarchic terms and mediate with leverage as a “pacifier”; however, the Soviets did so as a “self-interested” agent in a

highly escalated balancing war. While Namibia gained independence, the great powers primarily played the self-interested agents and left the region in desolation.

Chapter V.

All Together Now

Throughout this study, the goal was to learn about weakness, protection, and leverage to understand if the great powers pacified the region and reduce the consequences of anarchy. The nations that attack, break territorial boundaries and oppress are often portrayed as “aggressors” while the objects of these actions are seen as victims: the “weak” nations. In the chapter ahead, I describe the last events of the conflict in Angola. The collapse of USSR left the United States as the only great power. Bush backed an aggressive party while Clinton aided the weak side based on anarchic terms and leveraged several methods for peace. The final events of Angola are an example of the limits of the anarchic system. Finally, I outline the roles great powers played.

U.S. Presidents H.W. Bush, Clinton, George W. Bush (1988-2002):
Change

By 1990, Angola was left in “egregious” devastation.²¹³ Ten percent of the population, or over one million people, were killed in the war or from war-related injuries. Angola experienced the highest amputee rate per capita in the world from land mines sold to all sides of the conflict. South African and UNITA’s rampage, backed by US military aid, destroyed most “health clinics, hospitals, schools, bridges,

²¹³ George Wright, “The Clinton Administration’s Policy toward Angola: An Assessment,” *Review of African Political Economy* 28, no. 90 (2001): 565.

telecommunications facilities, rail lines, and electric grids.”²¹⁴ Over four million people, or half the population, were displaced and a million more fled to neighboring countries.²¹⁵

In May 1991, the two sides of the Angola Civil War signed the Bicesse Peace Agreement. The mediators were George W. H. Bush’s administration, Portugal, and the Soviet Union. However, the agreement left the parties to oversee the changes. At the time the United Nations managed the election, only 6,000 of the 160,000 soldiers in Angola had demobilized.²¹⁶ Dos Santos gained 49% of the votes and Savimbi 40%. Savimbi accused the MPLA of election fraud and started a violent conflict that killed 300,000 Angolans.²¹⁷ Although oversight groups found no irregularities, the United States policymakers argued the MPLA should share power with Savimbi. A long-time alliance of the United States, Savimbi’s reputation as “a warlord whose consuming passion was absolute power” in Africa was absent in the strategy.²¹⁸ Herman Cohen, President Bush’s Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, placed responsibility on

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ Ibid.

²¹⁶ Stephen John Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,” *International Security* 22, no. 2 (1997): 36-37.

²¹⁷ Ibid., 39.

²¹⁸ Ibid. On Savimbi, see Gleijeses, *Visions of Freedom*, 27.

both parties and called for new peace negotiations to include UNITA's security.²¹⁹ In other words, the U.S. saw in terms of alliance partners.

In 1992, United State President Clinton switched sides and supported the MPLA.²²⁰ By 1993, the Clinton administration extended recognition to the government of Angola. The goal was to "balance" the groups as leverage for UNITA to accept the UN negotiated peace plan with the MPLA.²²¹ Additionally, Clinton condemned UNITA for violence, collapse of the election, and disruptions in negotiations. The US enforced an arms sanction in 1993, and a travel and banking sanction in 1997 as leverage for not reaching a peace settlement. President Clinton showed support for President Dos Santos of Angola with an invitation to the White House and a promise of \$100 million of aid for the nation through the UN. From 1993 to 2000, the US increased humanitarian aid to \$500 million.²²² In other words, Clinton chose to protect the weak side, leveraged peace through recognition and used several tools to protect the MPLA. Despite all the pacifier actions, Savimbi amassed weapons from diamond mine sales, disregarded cease-fires, and continued violence in Angola.²²³ Violence escalated from 1992 through 2002, and at times, over a thousand people died a day. The Angolan conflict was named the World's

²¹⁹ Wright, "The Clinton Administration," 565.

²²⁰ Ibid., 567-568.

²²¹ Ibid., 570.

²²² Ibid., 571-572.

²²³ Ibid.

Worst War by the United Nations.²²⁴ When Savimbi died in 2002, the country of Angola finally found peace.²²⁵

Anarchy in the Regional Balance of Power

From this chapter, Bush, again, protected the aggressor of the region and violence increased. Under Clinton, despite intense efforts to pacify, violence increased. Only after the violent party died, Angola achieved peace.

Restrictions

Despite great power strength, the anarchic system offers no way to haul away a violent actor. Even with all the tools to protect and leverage peace, a great power was powerless to stop violence. A pacifier role is no guarantee of success.

Roles

Under Bush, the great power failed to be a “pacifier” as the agreement had no leverage for compliance — African nations were no longer of intense interest as great power competition subsided. President Clinton acted as a “pacifier” to protect the weak

²²⁴ Cindy Shiner, "The World's Worst War," *Africa Report* 39, no. 1 (1994): 15. Also see Sara Darehshori, *Selling Justice Short: Why Accountability Matters for Peace* (Human Rights Watch, 2009), 66-67.

²²⁵ Darehshori, *Selling Justice Short*, 67-68; Gleijeses, *Visions of Freedom*, 502.

side through military aid, condemnation of the aggressor, and sanctions through the United Nations, although violence escalated.

Chapter VI.

Conclusion

Elie Wiesel asked a question on the Day of Remembrance about great powers. With two great powers in Europe, why were Jewish lives not saved? From this study, overriding competition led great powers to focus on alliances rather than reducing chaos, multiplying new balances. A great power's alliance with aggressors, along with rivalry escalated violence in the region to epic levels in a battle of the century as the aggressive nations attacked, invaded and dominated other nations which added chaos to the system. Instead of stabilizing southern Africa, great powers refused to yield against their rival. Results challenge Miller and Levy's argument great powers reduce anarchy's impact. Particularly, great powers normally chose not to protect weak nations or leverage peace, especially in the far-away region with many actors. They acted self-interested. In sum, although a great power's strength and resources appear to have the capability to reduce consequences of anarchy, actually, they made the region worse, and were unable to bring enduring peace, stability or decreased local competition.

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