



Haiti's Disempowerment: A Consideration Towards Social Awareness and Agricultural Development

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Haiti's Disempowerment:
A Consideration towards Social Awareness and Agricultural Development

Veronica Ann Rousseau Hackenbruch

A Thesis in the Field of International Relations
for the Degree of Master of Liberal Arts in Extension Studies

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Abstract

In 2010 a devastating earthquake hit the poorest country in the Western hemisphere, the Caribbean nation of Haiti. Humanitarian aid poured into the country and unintentionally disrupted the agricultural community. I hypothesize that a lack of social awareness by international organizations caused negative impacts in Haiti's agriculture sector after the 2010 earthquake. My thesis attempts to answer the question: why were international aid workers not fully prepared for the outcomes of their actions in post-earthquake Haiti? I use a qualitative approach to test my hypothesis by offering a retrospective viewpoint from my experiences as a native of Haiti along with my research findings. My findings include input by members of the Haitian agriculture sector.

My thesis explores how foreign influence in Haiti has profoundly shaped its current political and socio-economic health and subsequently how the agricultural community has suffered from these influences. Topics such as social connectedness, cultural disconnect, the effectiveness of international aid methods and local aid systems are discussed. My conclusion ultimately supports my hypothesis. The international aid network should consider a socially conscious approach when attempting to engage with the Haitian agricultural community. Recommendations are offered. In order for Haiti to be rebuilt sustainably, the local government, civil society, private sector and international community must all work together for the advancement of the country.

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I would like to express gratitude to Professor Louise Ivers for her kindness and understanding during my thesis journey and extension. Her guidance is what helped form this thesis. Lastly, thank you to Professor Doug Bond for always delivering optimism in his feedback of my progress.

This thesis is dedicated to the victims of the 2010 earthquake in Haiti.

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Chapter I.

Introduction

This research study aims to explore the influences and impacts of the international community on post-earthquake Haiti and its agricultural (AG) community. I will investigate the results and consequences of international organizations' (IOs) involvement and behavior in Haiti's agricultural economy after the 2010 earthquake and identify if IOs were disruptive and how the agricultural community was affected. I hypothesize that factors such as social unawareness, a sense of urgency to deliver aid, and lack of coordination with the government of Haiti (GoH) caused IOs to unintentionally disrupt Haiti's agricultural community.

I will first explain the history of Haiti and its landscape. I will include the country's past agricultural affairs leading up to its current state. I will then discuss the continuous attempts by foreign powers to influence the country starting from its independence. I will also describe the 2010 earthquake and its effects on the socio-economic and political environment. Subsequently, I will highlight the impacts of foreign aid in the disaster-ridden country. I will explain the conditions that led to IOs' involvement with the agricultural community and investigate these conditions from a retrospective standpoint. I will then introduce various perspectives from the agriculture sector and offer suggestions for future occurrences. I will interpret Haiti's social setting and its connection with agricultural practices. I will then analyze IOs engagement in the agriculture sector of Haiti and their regard for its social environment. My research

problem is to understand why international organizations did not arrive with strategies adapted to Haiti's social reality.

Some questions that I answer in my thesis include: how effective were the aid efforts of the international organizations in Haiti? What were the sustainable approaches that provided a positive long-term system for the agricultural community? To what extent did international actors assess the local government's capacity to provide support? Were IOs socially prepared to engage with local Haitian constituents in the agriculture sector? What factors attributed to Haiti's vulnerability leading to negative influences from foreign aid? How aware were the international actors in their cultural knowledge of Haiti? How educated were the IOs in their analysis of priority-based and reality-based assessment strategies? What major impacts did humanitarian aid have on the agricultural community? How effectively did IOs work with Haitian civil society agents? Were aid relief agents and the local government coordinating the arrival of supplies with the resources already available in the country? What impacts did the influx of IOs have on the overall community and the agricultural community? Exploring and answering these questions will lead me to evidence that will either support or refute my hypothesis.

I will investigate the strategies that IOs used to provide disaster relief, their mission tasks and output, and what their accomplishments and oversights were in order to understand the positive and negative effects they had on the local community and environment. I will identify if the influx of international organizations that arrived to offer aid after the 2010 earthquake were coordinated in their efforts to prioritize assets and resources, and how civil society members participated in decision making and implementation. I will also analyze how involved Haitian government institutions were in

disaster relief concerning the agricultural community and how they contributed to aid efforts.

History of Haiti

To fully understand the role IOs play in Haiti, and their impact capacity in the agriculture sector, it is first necessary to learn about the country's past. Christopher Columbus sailed into the lushly-forested Caribbean island of Hispaniola in December of 1492 and discovered the Taino natives (Cook, 2002, p.352). He had unexpectedly uncovered a New World (Wilson, 1990, p.1). Fertile and rich with natural resources, Spanish colonizers recognized the untapped potential of the island and forced the natives to work the land to produce crops for export back to Europe (Dupuy, 1976, p.16).

French pirates arrived in Hispaniola during the seventeenth century. In 1697 the French claimed the west side of the island through the Treaty of Ryswick (Cooke, 2010, p. 161), while the Spanish settled on the east side, what is presently known as the Dominican Republic. The French colonizers formed plantations utilizing the island's natives as a means for manual labor. Haiti produced coffee, cotton, tobacco and sugar that was distributed globally and was consequently referred to as "the Pearl of the Antilles" (McClintock, 2003, p.1). Haiti soon became one of the wealthiest and most lucrative European colonies in the world (Hickey, 1982, p. 362). Agriculture established itself as the mainstay of the Haitian economy, offering a prosperous start for the Caribbean nation. The unfamiliar and harsh conditions of forced labor, however, were burdensome for the natives. The European settlers exposed the vulnerable indigenous people of Haiti to foreign diseases, which killed many of them (Wilson, 1997, p.146).

Slaves were brought from Africa and forced to work the arable soil. Africans were taken against their will from their homeland, crossed the Atlantic to work in a captive environment where strenuous and afflictive surroundings awaited them. A slave revolt would soon ensue.

The Haitian Revolution began in 1791 (Knight, 2000, p.112) as an anti-slavery and anti-colonial insurgency. Influence from the French Revolution also sparked inspiration for the uprising. Ex-slave Toussaint Louverture's guidance aided to the success of the revolt (Blackburn, 2006, p.672). Once in power, Louverture was determined to continue plantation farming as it proved a strong source of income for the Haitian economy and would, in turn, sustain the country. Many ex-slaves did not agree with Louverture's methods for reinstating plantation farming as it reminded them of the duress of slavery (Dubois, 2004, p. 184). The former slaves' opposing ideologies with Louverture's methods to re-establish Haitian agriculture was said to ultimately be the cause of his capture by Napoleon and subsequent death in France. By 1804, the French were defeated by the slaves. The revolutionary leader and Toussaint's successor, Jean-Jacques Dessalines, declared the country a free republic. It was the first successful slave revolt in the Americas (Schuller, 2007, p. 143). Haiti had secured its independence on the battlefield and would soon face social and political obstacles because of it. The country was economically ostracized and forced to pay an indemnity to France in order to be recognized as the Republic of Haiti (Jenson, 2010, p.110). To help pay off its debt, trees were cut and timber was sold and exported, further instilling an ethos of extreme agricultural exploitation within the Haitian culture (Paskett and Philoctete, 1990).

The revolution had destroyed Haiti's agricultural base and its economy. Many newly freed slaves resorted to subsistence farming practices (Lundahl, 1984, p.83). However, Dessalines was also motivated to re-establish agriculture as the country's source of wealth (Lundahl, p. 89). He divided the lands among the peasants and pushed the practice of monoculture farming, depleting the soil of its rich nutrients (McClintock, 2003). Additionally, under the influence of southern states with economies that depended on slavery, the U.S. government (USG) mandated a prohibition on trading and shipping to Haiti, commercially isolating the Caribbean country. In fear that Haiti's slave revolt would arouse the slaves in America's southern states, the prohibition lasted until the American civil war (Hickey, 1982, p. 362). The trade embargo further isolated the newly independent nation from global exchanges as it was trying to build its economy and pay off a debt to France. Many of the products for sale on the market were agricultural goods, illustrating that even in the 1800s, foreign influence was capable of disrupting Haiti's agricultural sector in disregard for its social setting.

Haiti's Landscape

Situated in the Caribbean Sea, Haiti shares the island of Hispaniola with the Spanish-conquered Dominican Republic. Derived from the indigenous Arawak natives, the name *Ayiti* means mountainous land (Geggus, 1997, p.43) and occupies 27,750 km² (CIA, 2018). The country is dominated by mountains which serve as a buffer against deadly hurricanes, and also pose as a risk for dangerous mudslides on eroding mountainsides. Haiti is frequented by hurricanes and tropical storms from the east.

A common proverb in Haitian Creole, “*dèyè mon gen mon*” translated to “behind mountains there are mountains,” describes the rugged landscape from a local perspective. The underlying meaning behind this saying illustrates a cultural mindset. It means that once an individual’s problems have been solved more problems are waiting behind them to be addressed (Cherlin, 2011). The countless mountains of Haiti isolate the country’s varying regions. The majority of provinces are almost rendered inaccessible due to poorly maintained roads and little means of local and regional transportation. Many peasant families depend on income generated by trees sold for charcoal and firewood. The demand for energy through the use of charcoal is a major cause of deforestation in Haiti (Hosier, 1992, p. 132). Reliance on charcoal for energy and the transformation of wood for charcoal has slowly led to deforestation, posing an intractable problem (Maertens and Stork, 2017). Soil erosion is endemic to the country, dating back to the colonial era when monocropping for export and the use of timber for firewood were common practices. Monoculture and subsistence farming practices have led to nutrient depletion and over-cultivation. The inability of the Haitian government to provide guidance and support to farmers has caused subsistence farming to become a popular style of farming.

Foreign Influence

Since the slave revolution of 1804, Haiti has continuously been plagued by an assortment of internal hardships: economic instability, subsequent political insurrections, chronic financial mismanagement, and endless social unrest. The country has also fallen victim to political and economic pressure from various foreign powers. The government has had its sovereignty compromised on multiple occasions by external agents. Haiti is

positioned at the passageway of the U.S. to the Caribbean and Latin America. In a strategic sense, it held access to many trade routes for America. President James Monroe was quick to emphasize the importance of Haiti for U.S. economic and political interests. He applied measures of foreign policy to address the matter. The Monroe Doctrine was issued in 1823, advising European nations to abandon further consideration of recolonizing and influencing any part of the Western Hemisphere (The Library of Congress). The USG used the policy as a tool to influence the Caribbean and Latin America, and ultimately Haiti. This Doctrine was later supplemented by the Roosevelt Corollary. President Theodore Roosevelt signed the Corollary in December of 1904. It specified that the U.S. would “exercise international police power” towards Western countries if they identified any “chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society...” (Theodore Roosevelt, 1904). The U.S. would interfere in situations of external tensions, internal struggles and keep order in the Western Hemisphere. The intentional inclusion of the Corollary on a global perspective was a measure for the U.S. to emit its influence in the Caribbean and Latin American countries without the risk of European intrusion.

In the late 1800s, the USG unsuccessfully tried to lease the Haitian northern city of Môle St. Nicholas for use as a potential naval base. Although Môle St. Nicholas was perceived as a prominent Caribbean point for U.S. geopolitics, the Haitian government would not see eye to eye with agreeing on the terms to lease the city (Himelhoch, 1971, p. 177). Then in 1910, the USG finally attained its leverage in Haiti. President William Taft granted the Caribbean nation a financial loan to alleviate the influence of foreign pressure from its growing international debt. This act placed Haiti in a position of

accountability towards the USG and additionally, provided the USG with insight into the financial health of the country (U.S. Dept of State, 2018). Haiti's insolvency towards rising international debts was an opportunity for the USG to support the GoH and diffuse their power. Haiti needed support financially and politically, and the USG was ready to offer it at a price.

The formative years of the Banana Wars that began in the late 1800s was an effort by the USG to "police" Caribbean countries. To begin, in 1915 Haitian President Vilbrun Sam was overthrown (Schoenrich, 1920, p. 53). The U.S. invaded and occupied the country to restore order from 1915 to 1934. President Woodrow Wilson's decision to occupy Haiti was fueled by the threat of Germany's influence and suggestive soft power in the country's socio-political scene (Suggs, 2002, p.71).

There was a strong French and German presence in Haiti as many expatriates settled and integrated into the elite class. The newly built Panama Canal would be at risk to the U.S. if Germany established a naval base in Haiti, and as World War I raged on, President Wilson decided to take control of the Caribbean nation, an occupation that lasted nineteen years (Michaels, 2004). The U.S. invasion of Haiti had lasting effects on Haitian culture. The Haitian Constitution was updated to establish a Council of State led by the President and also to allow land ownership by non-Haitians (Best, 1994, p. 2). A Gendarmerie, also known as the Garde d'Haiti was created, comprising of Haitians under American authority (Congressional Digest, 1994, p. 224). The formation of the Gendarmerie by the Americans was an attempt to diffuse tension, instill stability and introduce disciplinary influence on the tension-prone society. Once the Haitian officers were fully trained and proved their capacity to uphold power and authority, the U.S.

turned over their control of the force to the Haitian government. Sociologist Ulysses Weatherly noted that the U.S. occupation of Haiti was an “experiment in pragmatism” (Bellegarde-Smith et al., 2015, p. 18), and suggested that Haiti needed support from an outside power for order to be instilled in the country.

The U.S. military occupation of Haiti was viewed negatively by many in the local and international community. American Marines were constantly fighting Haitian guerrilla fighters known as *cacos* in an effort to suppress whispers of civil unrest (Suggs, 2002, p. 72). Conversely, many argued that the occupation brought discipline and stability to the poverty-stricken nation. Henry Lewis Suggs, an American scholar in African American journalism noted, “In fairness, the occupation did have some redeeming qualities such as new roads, buildings, public utilities, economic and educational reforms, and a professionally trained army” (Suggs, 2002, p. 78). Self-management in a post-colonial world was proving to be a challenge for Haiti as the USG’s omnipresence and influence continuously tested its sovereignty.

In 1991 the first ever democratically-elected Haitian president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, was overthrown by a military coup after having served less than eight months of his term (Orenstein, 2007, para 1). Widespread rioting and violence by Aristide’s opponents, cleverly labeled as “participatory democracy” by some, undermined the president’s ability to govern (Constable, 1997 p. 45). Aristide was rushed out of the country with the help of American and French ambassadors (Maingot, 1992, p. 69). The USG and Organization of the American States (OAS) tried to reinstate Aristide to no avail. This led to the USG placing economic sanctions and a trade embargo on Haiti.

Mexico and Venezuela, the country's main suppliers of petroleum, also followed suit by cutting off their petroleum supply (Constable, 1992, p. 49).

The impact of the embargo on Haiti from 1991 to 1994 hit hardest on peasants living at subsistence levels. Local farmers faced difficulty in distributing their crops. Gasoline was scarce and prices were up ten U.S. dollars per gallon, limiting transportation of goods and services to and from rural areas (Haiti Embargo, 1991). Farmers' produce went unsold as deliveries could not be made to local markets nor packed for international export. Agricultural production decreased, and the price of staple crops increased. Over one hundred factories closed, and the assembly industry experienced a decline of thirty-six thousand workers (Gibbons & Garfield, 1999, p. 1499). Peasant families had to re-think their basic living conditions as many could no longer afford school for their children, proper healthcare or food. Peasants resorted to cutting down trees to produce charcoal as an extra source of income and substituted wood for petroleum-based fuels, further exhausting the earth (Gibbons & Garfield, 1999, p. 1500).

The Haitian economy was highly reliant on external support such as foreign aid and international investments; therefore, the impacts of the embargo were deeply felt by all sectors. The sanctions were a threat by the international community on Haiti to restore peace and security, and the socio-economic environment and political institutions of the country were left drained of resources and optimism. The GDP dropped from three billion forty-seven million dollars in 1991 to one billion eighty-eight million dollars in 1993 (WorldBank, 2018), illustrating the extreme reduction in economic and trade

activity that the embargo triggered. The embargo ended in 1994 when Aristide was brought back to Haiti, aided by the U.S.

Although the goal of the embargo was reached, foreign influence in Haiti further deteriorated the local living conditions. In the aftermath of the trade ban, Haitian civilians were left with a loss of marketable resources and a weakened sense of patriotism. However, the impression of political stability was restored. In 1995, the United Nations Security Council elected the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) to establish peace and stability after years of turmoil. The UNMIH also acted as civil police to bring order to the nation (United Nations, 2019).

In 2000, Haitian voters re-elected Aristide as president. However, the policies he tried to implement led to civil unrest. In conclusion, there was widespread and coordinated violence by his opponents that overwhelmed the country's security forces. The uprising forced the president to flee his own country in 2004. Aristide left Haiti on a U.S. chartered flight and resigned his presidency, claiming that the USG had forced him out (Polgreen & Weiner, 2004). With the former president now in exile, the UN Security Council sent an international military force to reestablish order and suppress the armed rebellion (Michaels, 2004).

As illustrated above, Haiti's long-standing political instability and social unrest have been influenced by international actors since the country's inception. From attaining the title of the wealthiest colony in the New World through its agricultural enterprising, Haiti has downgraded to the poorest country in the Western hemisphere, its peasants living off subsistence farming. Some scholars blame foreign actors for the downfall, others on Haiti's capacity limitations. What can be concluded either way is that the

country is in need of sustainable development programs. The following chapters will focus on the aid that was applied to Haiti's agriculture sector, and specifically on aid agencies' awareness of its social state.

Relationship with Foreign Aid

The circumstances by which a country becomes food insecure can result from various factors including; insufficient food production, natural disasters, corruption, poverty, and mismanagement of soil. Therefore, underdeveloped countries are prone to food insecurity due to lack of support and cooperation from their local government and civil institutions. The influence and impacts of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have been a topic of discussion in many international forums, and the convergence of international resources in Haiti's environment has played a role in directing the course of the country's political aptitude, social state and economic capacity. Haiti has popularly been referred to as the "Republic of NGOs" due to the countless amount of aid agencies providing services in the country (Edmonds, 2010).

The Caribbean nation developed a lack of trust towards the international community due to its turbulent past. As far back as the slave revolution, Haiti has dealt with an albatross of debt and resentment towards foreign powers leading to enslavement and oppression. These historic events have built up to foster a negative predisposition towards external authority. The lack of trust has been engrained in the collective upbringing of its people. With the introduction of foreign aid in Haiti, came its influences on the agriculture community. International organizations have established a deep-seated catalyst

in the country's sustainable development and vitality by engaging with the local community. Examples of their influence will be demonstrated in the upcoming chapters.

As the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, Haiti has arguably attracted the highest number of NGOs per capita in the world (Beaubien, 2010). The United Nations (UN) is one of the largest operating IOs in the impoverished nation. The UN has comprehensively managed projects from healthcare to disaster relief, directing humanitarian programs and advising in financial negotiations. IOs sometimes bypass the national government when they decide to assist Haiti. This approach lowers the risk of corruption within the government and mitigates potential bureaucratic complications from government involvement (Kristoff & Panarelli, 2010, p.1). In 2008, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) spent three hundred million dollars in aid, channeled through foreign NGOs (Kristoff & Panarelli, 2010, p.1). NGOs who work directly with their target population typically do not have the obligation to share responsibility with a third party. However, this approach can also produce negative outcomes on the recipient country due to lack of transparency, long-term development, and coordination between organizations on similar mission paths.

Edmond Mulet, head of the U.N. mission in Haiti, estimates that more than 10,000 nongovernmental organizations are working there. "This is the largest concentration of NGOs per capita in the world," he said. "And most of them don't care about coordination. They do their own thing on their own. They don't share what they do. We don't know what they do. And probably they don't want us to know what they do." (Beaubien, 2010)

Sidestepping the local government also sets the stage for IOs to directly influence the aid recipient, abandoning the opportunity for an introduction and understanding of the country's social behavior and setting. Bill Clinton addressed the Haitian Diaspora in 2009 and noted, "Now to be fair, it may be harder here because, with the exception of India,

you have more NGOs per capita operating down there than anybody else, but nobody's got a list, nobody really knows what's going on" (Clinton, Transcript, 2009).

Citizens' respect for and loyalty to their government also suffers when IOs provide services that the government should themselves be providing but cannot due to limited capacity. The effect of IOs supplying needs-based resources to quake victims instead of the government provides them with an intangible authority. Haiti's food comes from three main sources; national agricultural production, private business imports, and international food aid (Haiti National Agr. Plan, p. 8). Introduced in the 1950s, international food aid was created to support American farmer's surplus crops by offering an alternative to storing excess harvest (Clements, Mittal, & Mousseau, 2008, p. 1). It provided Haitians with a source of sustenance, but it also presented the country with an unfortunate opening to over-depend on foreign aid and opened up the opportunity for corruption. Haiti's agricultural demographic is slowly being replaced with a generation that experiences food hand-outs from international donors. The U.S. now provides the largest supply of international food aid (Kushner, 2014, para 20).

A Cultural and Social Disconnect

The theme of social consciousness that I will be referring to throughout my thesis can be described as an awareness of the underlying relationships between the victims of post-earthquake Haiti. The theme takes into consideration an awareness of local communities, networks and civic health. The cultivation of relationships, building of comradeship and stewardship, interpretation of living conditions, efforts to collaborate, consideration for well-being and willingness to understand cultural etiquette, rituals and

social dynamics are all aspects that fall within the context of connecting with a social consciousness. Unfamiliarity with a country's cultural context and social background can cause long-term troubles for IOs and their host country, as my hypothesis suggests.

Dambisa Moyo, an international speaker and the author of the bestselling book *Dead Aid* (2009) explains:

Any large influx of money into an economy, however robust, can cause problems. But with a relentless flow of unmitigated, substantial aid money, these problems are magnified; particularly in economies that are, by their very nature, poorly managed, weak and susceptible to outside influence, over which domestic policymakers have little control. (p.60)

Both local and international forces are said to be at fault in Moyo's analysis. As she points out, international assistance can create and influence negative impacts on an aid recipient. A concrete example of mistrust in foreign aid can be found in a report by ProPublica and NPR. The report revealed an investigation on how five hundred million dollars' worth of fundraising money by the American Red Cross was mishandled in management fees and program costs. It concluded that the Red Cross had spent a large amount of funds on administrative expenses and mismanaged many of the programs that were executed, including a promised housing project in the slum neighborhood of Campêche (Elliott & Sullivan, 2015). These two examples support the first part of my hypothesis in their takeaways; that IOs who lack social awareness towards their recipient country when providing aid can create adverse impacts.

Dambisa Moyo argues that foreign aid worsens poverty and causes more harm to African countries than good. This is due to an over-dependence on aid, confining underdeveloped countries into a cycle of dependency which then leads to corruption and ultimately, increases poverty. She states, "Foreign aid props up corrupt governments –

providing them with freely usable cash” (Moyo, 2009, p. 49). This same vicious cycle is what seems to have transpired in Haiti. IOs have been part of the Haitian economy for decades and are intertwined with civil and government institutions that work on national development. The Oakland Institute, a leading think tank on social, environmental and foreign policy issues, conducted a report on “The Status of International Food Aid” and concluded, “The very purpose of international food aid needs to be questioned as a prominent form of response to hunger” (Clements, Mittal, & Mousseau, 2008, p. 6).

Chapter II.

Impacts of the 2010 Earthquake

On January 12, 2010 the tectonic plates under Midwest Haiti shifted, causing a massive 7.0 magnitude earthquake. In the span of thirty-six seconds opulent homes, overcrowded slums, modern hotels, historic landmarks, and everyday lives had all been destroyed. Haiti had not felt an earthquake this violent in over two hundred years. It was reported that around two hundred and fifty thousand people were killed, and three hundred thousand people had been injured (Reid, 2018). Figure 1 and Figure 2 below are pictures that depict the aftermath of the earthquake.



Figure 1. This photo was taken by Lucien Rousseau of a warehouse he had built to manufacture foodstuff.

Source: Lucien Rousseau (January 2010) Personal Communication.



Figure 2. Photo taken by Lucien Rousseau of crumbled buildings after the 2010 earthquake in Haiti.

Source: Lucien Rousseau (January, 2010). Personal Communication.

What came to be identified as the deadliest earthquake in the Western hemisphere had just taken place and I was sitting at the center of it all. As much of a shock as the earthquake's immediate effects had on the Caribbean nation, the chain reaction of the socio-economic and political events that unfolded afterward rocked the already struggling country into an even more incomprehensible situation. Renowned physician and medical anthropologist Paul Farmer stated,

I have seen many large natural disasters, in my country and in others.
But never has there been one so concentrated in such a heavily populated

part of a densely populated country, one that has devastated a capital city and with this much loss of life and infrastructure. (Farmer, 2011, p. 77)

Figure 3 below taken from USAID reporting, illustrates the magnitude and severity of the quake's tremors (USAID, 2010).




Figure 3. Earthquake- affected areas and population movement in Haiti.
Source: United States Agency for International Development (USAID). (2010). Earthquake-affected areas and population movement in Haiti. Retrieved from https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/02.10.10_-_USAID-DCHA_Haiti_Earthquake_Mapbook_29.pdf

Haiti gained international attention on January 12 because of its devastatingly high death toll and destruction. Many countries rushed to provide aid; IOs and donors filled the country with food, water, and rebuilding materials. Unknowingly however, IOs caused an imbalance when they arrived with the intent to help Haiti. Bringing aid and

provisions for the quake victims indirectly created a problem; a ripple effect which resulted in many local farmers losing their main source of income. The new ease of access to food caused local food sellers and suppliers to lose sales as people were finding alternative ways to feed themselves. Eventually farmers could no longer sell their produce as customers had reverted to IOs for food (Clements et al., 2010, p.9).

Social Impacts of the Earthquake

I will break down the evident and profound impacts of the 2010 earthquake in a multi-faceted approach. My explanation will include the social impact of the aftermath on the urban and rural environment, the economic consequences on Haiti's industrial platform and the political disturbance that followed.

The social implications of the disaster displaced over six hundred thousand people who left the capital city of Port-au-Prince to seek refuge in the countryside where their families resided (Cohen, 2010, p. 2). The relocation of internationally displaced persons (IDPs) strained many host families' resources. Before the quake, food insecurity was already an issue, affecting six out of ten people. Also, the majority of the Haitian population was surviving on less than two U.S. dollars a day prior to January twelfth (OXFAM, 2010, para 6). Those living in rural residences who practiced storing seeds for future planting and farming seasons had to reallocate these seeds for consumption as their household capacities were reaching a new limit due to the unexpected circumstances of the quake. (Cohen, 2010, p. 15).

Fifty-eight percent of Haitians do not have adequate access to food making it one of the most food-insecure countries (Cohen, 2010, p. 9). The harvesting of wood as a

cash crop for charcoal production and subsequent use of charcoal for household cooking fuel are practices that have led to deforestation in Haiti. In addition to the damaging practice of charcoal production, after the earthquake, farmers lost planting seeds, farming tools, and agricultural shelters. The lack of strong agricultural policies, electricity and cooking fuel, the mismanagement of food storage capacity, and the absence of sustainable farming techniques, rudimentary tools and financial barriers influenced the increase of charcoal use and deforestation for peasant farmers with little to no means. The quake's disruption of fuel supplies and electricity led to an increase in reliance on charcoal for cooking — especially in cities and towns where alternative fuels were available before the quake.

The earthquake proved true the pre-existing concern that Port-au-Prince was an overpopulated and excessively congested hub for the provision of jobs, healthcare, higher education and government services. A population imbalance had slowly built up in the capital over decades of political and economic instability. The strained limits of its poor infrastructure had exposed citizens to the resulting destruction created by the earthquake. Rapid urbanization created the hazards involved in a lack of building code reinforcements and weak public infrastructure, ultimately leading to a substantial degree of death and destruction. The Inter-American Development Bank suggested that the 2010 earthquake resulted in the highest rate of destruction in modern times, with an estimate of eight to fourteen billion U.S. dollars in cost (Cavallo, Powell, & Becerra, 2010, p.14). After assessing a more powerful 8.8 magnitude earthquake that hit Chile on February 27, 2010, it was noted that Haiti's earthquake, although much less powerful, had reported over two hundred thousand more deaths and more destruction (Farmer, 2011, p. 326).

The UN along with five other organizations arranged for a focus group of quake survivors to receive feedback for reconstruction under the project titled “Voice of the Voiceless” (UNDP et al., 2010). One of the concluding remarks was that many Haitians preferred to work where their homes were, regardless of how far from the capital they were located. They requested the rebuilding efforts to emphasize a fairer distribution of public works and infrastructure around the country (Farmer, 2011, p. 278). They needed sustainable jobs and educational opportunities to be created in other areas besides the capital, an overall decentralization of public institutions. This intention would alleviate pressure in the capital and would also provide a more holistic approach to rebuild in less congested areas for Haitian citizens. The UN’s efforts to provide a socially conscious solution for the victims’ livelihoods was a positive effect from the disaster.

Leslie Voltaire, an urban planner and consultant for Haiti’s post-earthquake development effort, indicated that Haitians suggestively place themselves in a mindset of “intentional isolation” (Farmer, 2011, p. 360). Due to its oppressive history emerging from colonialism and foreign dominance, Haitians have continuously been wary when it comes to their involvement with the international community. On a global scale, the idea of “intentional isolation” places Haiti at a disadvantage with other developing countries because it faces opportunity losses regarding social benefits, economic opportunities and political relationships. After the earthquake however, Haiti’s leaders opened up to the international community and to those providing support and aid.

This thesis discusses how the earthquake’s immediate and long-term effects transformed and engaged the social order of Haiti in a complex manner. Through my own experiences I have seen IOs arrive to provide disaster relief and aid, accompanied by

foreign currency, languages, and cultural behaviors. Hand in hand with the arrival of IOs came job opportunities for locals as well as interactive prospects with the international community for the private sector. I believe that the circumstantial environment created by the disaster and IOs immersion in the Haitian culture caused an opening for local civilians to become involved with their foreign counterpart. As priority-based disaster relief assessments were conceived and executed to rebuild the already poverty-stricken nation, foreign influence percolated into Haitian culture, later to be gauged.

The media attention of Haiti's post-earthquake destruction elicited an influx of humanitarian aid from countries around the world, including urgent deliveries of disaster relief supplies and aid personnel. Airplanes filled with donations and aid workers arrived causing a flurry of confusion and became a logistical challenge for the damaged Toussaint Louverture International airport. Many people present at the airport during the immediate aftermath could recount what they witnessed. Scenes included a crowded tarmac filled with commercial, military and private aircrafts arriving with humanitarian aid supplies in an uncoordinated dance to unload materials for distribution and pick up evacuees to reverse their trip. The U.S. Air Force was summoned to take charge of the airport and Lt. Col. Brett Nelson recounted that "Planes landed just about anywhere" (Shaughnessy, 2010). The airport normally handled twenty-five flights daily, but after the earthquake seventy-four flights were recorded in a day's time (Shaughnessy, 2010).

Director of DHL's Humanitarian Operations, Chris Weeks stated,

There was a great deal of confusion, the small central airport was not equipped to handle the thousands of people and mass quantities of incoming goods. Because of damage to the airport itself, some flights had to be diverted to the nearby Dominican Republic. There was no-one to coordinate this unprecedented flow of people and supplies. As a result, assistance was slower than it needed to be in getting to those affected. (UNDP, 2018)

The devastatingly high death toll, the number of injured victims and the damages from the quake created a sense of urgency to help that was felt worldwide. From Monaco to Canada, disaster relief funds were collected, and volunteer applications were submitted. However, the sudden arrival of humanitarian aid personnel, donation materials, funds and supplies proved to be a challenge for Haiti because it was not prepared for the unprecedented degree of aid that appeared. The fragile state's limited structural capacity and inefficiency to facilitate distribution channels for emergency responders proved to be one of the biggest post-earthquake challenges (Margesson and Taft-Morales, 2010, p. 26). These obstacles inadvertently produced long-term consequences. The inadequate dexterity and coordination of the GoH to perform post-earthquake logistical maneuvers caused many IOs to bypass and neglect local participation in the diagnosis, execution and evaluation of humanitarian efforts (IEG 2010, p.1). The GoH was reported to have only received one percent of the nine million dollars' worth of humanitarian post-earthquake aid (Ramachandran & Walz, 2015, p. 27), a reflection of its inability to operate in coordination with the international community.

The relationship that citizens of Haiti have towards its government is noted by many scholars to be characterized as distrustful and guarded. With a history of political and social uprisings, the majority of peasants have held a wary attitude towards the government and the urban elite.

Populations living in slums are particularly vulnerable to crime and violence, as armed gangs base their operations in shanty towns. Cité Soleil, the largest and most famous slum in Port-au-Prince houses between 200,000 and 300,000 people, most of whom live in extreme poverty. (Rencoret, Stoddard, Haver, Taylor, & Harvey, 2010, p. 12)

Haiti is one of the most marginalized countries in the world. In 2012 the country held a Gini coefficient of .61 (WorldBank, 2018), illustrating the uneven social barriers between the peasant farmers and urban class. Many have felt neglected and excluded by the institutional decision-makers. This outlook is a result of the imbalance in public and social infrastructure (Cohen, 2010, p. 2).

As foreigners adapting to a host country suffering from the effects of a disastrous earthquake, foreign aid workers in post-earthquake Haiti had a challenging task ahead of them. Many were assigned to serve in Haiti for a lengthy period of time and had to interact, integrate and connect with locals to effectively offer and manage relief services. Their past experiences and personal backgrounds were generally well rounded, and salaries attractive. To the IO personnel, their status as an aid worker was directly correlated with a pre-established standard. To the local civilian in need of communicating for basic needs however, the IO personnel whom they interacted with and connected with on a regular basis represented a superior foreign influence. Thus, illustrating the juxtaposition of two very different social factions undertaking a correlated task, one perspective on the contributing end and the other on the receiving end. This connection caused friction in various levels of the Haitian social community.

As a personal experience many years after the earthquake, I needed a private driver to assist with my daily commutes and errands. My search was met with multiple rejections as I was repeatedly told that my initial starting salary offer was too low. This came as a surprise to me as my offer was an average amount of what would have been expected before the quake. I soon learned that many drivers looking for work anticipated being paid much higher because of their previous jobs. Their previous jobs consistently

meant, working for an IO which paid Haitians workers a much higher rate than they would have received for the same services before the quake. At the time I was hiring, many IOs had already left Haiti, leaving their drivers looking for work. The drivers that were left behind were reluctant to receive a lower salary than what they were accustomed to receiving from IOs. This story illustrates the resulting tip in socio-economic balance and friction caused by the hiring practices of IOs. This story also exemplifying an unfavorable effect on wages in the local labor market. If IOs had been more socially conscious of their impact on the labor market, the issue of fluctuating wage wars could have been avoided or mitigated.

Another challenge Haiti faced after the earthquake in relation to IO involvement was the issue of land ownership. Dating back to the post-colonial era, Haitian culture regarded owning land as a prestigious and coveted asset. Land was passed down informally through multiple generations and used for farming, raising livestock and building family homes. However, land title documents were commonly forged, and sometimes land was seized by the government for obscure reasons. As a result, when purchasing or transferring real estate, proof of ownership often required lengthy bureaucratic processes and even litigation to sort out the legitimate owners. IOs trying to purchase real estate for placement of housing, agriculture, schools, public buildings and the like, would face this problem, concluding that the issue of land ownership was a complicated obstacle (Durandis, 2012).

Haitian law does not obligate landowners to register their titles with the National Land Registry Office of Haiti (ONACA) (Kushner, 2015). Additionally, the registry office was destroyed in the earthquake, and with it, the paper-based records it kept. This

was a problem for IOs who planned to purchase land for agricultural improvements and rebuilding infrastructure. Vice president of Habitat for Humanity, Elizabeth Blake stated, “Literally, no one had the answer for how you buy and sell property in Haiti” (Ferreira, 2013). An overhaul of the archaic land laws was needed for redevelopment of the agriculture sector to take place.

Economic Impacts of the Earthquake

Haiti was already in a fragile economic position at the time the earthquake struck in 2010, ranking 129th out of 141 in the Index of State Weakness in the Developing World (Satterthwaite & Moses, 2012, p. 20) and 12th out of 178 countries in the Failed States Index (Fund for Peace, 2009). With a population of just under ten million people in 2009, the majority of Haitians live on less than two U.S. dollars a day (World Bank, 2009). The state provides limited resources to its citizens. Additionally, one of the leading major sources of capital into the country is remittance transfers from Haitians living abroad to their local relatives. Remittance transfers accounted for one-fifth of the total GDP in a report dated 2010 by the National Public Radio (Clemens, 2010, para 7). After the earthquake, IOs brought foreign currency into the Haitian economy, disrupting the market-based economic system. Additionally, personal remittance transactions jumped from twenty percent of the total GDP in 2009 to twenty-two percent in 2010 (World Bank, 2019). Haiti’s post-earthquake economic framework was in the wake of experiencing the power of a surge in foreign currency.

International intervention played a major role in Haiti’s economy as food aid and subsidized goods were distributed either below market cost or freely donated to quake

victims. Even those who were not quake victims would take advantage of the free aid and move into refugee camps for the complimentary food (Attkisson, 2010, para 6). This caused a price fluctuation for locally produced, traded and exported goods. The introduction of foreign goods affected the export market and ultimately, the national economy and agriculture markets. The lack of price regulation for local goods also added pressure to Haiti's economic status as many small businesses, including peasant farmers, suffered (Haiti Grassroots Watch, 2013).

Political Impacts of the Earthquake

Since its independence from France, the GoH has had a challenging time instilling order in Haiti. Its political performance has continuously been characterized as corruptive and unstable. Weak public infrastructure and poor allocation of government funds have reflected the lack of prioritization on fundamental platforms such as education, healthcare, agriculture and construction standards. After the earthquake, the deficiencies in infrastructure were emphasized and caused a major hindrance for the relief effort.

Fourteen of the sixteen government ministries were destroyed during the 2010 earthquake including the presidential palace and the headquarters of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) (Katz, 2013, p.1). The MINUSTAH suffered the greatest loss in UN history including many of its senior leaders (Rencoret et al., 2010, p. 21). On a bureaucratic level, the immediate effects of the earthquake demonstrated the vulnerability and helplessness of the local government as it was incapable of governing and exercising order into the devastated nation. Prioritizing immediate needs versus long-term sustainable projects was a challenge for Haitian

authorities (Farmer, 2011, p. 92). There were no set national emergency procedures for natural disasters effectively executed and given that many official government buildings had been destroyed with staff still inside, Haiti's government became powerless, leaving victims to fend for themselves. "Their government, paralyzed by its own losses, was incapable of assisting them, so they dug their loved ones out of the rubble with hammers and axes and even their bare hands. As food and water became scarce, they divided small rations among themselves" (Farmer, 2011, p. 268).

The post-earthquake aid effort was a balance of power between the local Haitian agencies and the international community in a struggle of sovereignty. Coordination for humanitarian aid and implementation of sustainable development projects were put into action by IOs and multilateral agencies, leaving national players such as the government, on the sidelines (Rencoret et al., p.19). Radio journalist Michel Montas-Dominique explained his pre-earthquake initiative to offer a voice to peasant associations and coffee growers alike, "It was about *chanje leta*, changing the state, from a predatory one into one that provided services to its population" (Farmer, 2011, p. 272). The GoH was considered an obstacle to productive cooperation, leaving IOs with an incentive to work around them. President René Préval lamented that IOs needed to work better together in order to efficiently manage the relief effort and help survivors (Zengerle & Frank, 2010).

Chapter III.

Bound by History

An American sociologist named Robert Merton identified and popularized the social theory of unintended consequences. He classified the rationale supporting the results of an unanticipated outcome into three determinants; ignorance, error, and the immediacy of interest (Merton, 1936). The determinant of ignorance can be applied to explain the anemic state Haiti could not climb out of even after IOs' countless efforts of unsuccessful project development implementations. Haiti's agriculture sector was already in a weak state before the earthquake struck, but post-earthquake disaster relief aid further deteriorated its environment due to IO's behavioral dispersion. The failure of many aid relief agents to adapt to Haiti's social and economic climate and instead to project their own attitudes and philosophies was a major cause for unintended consequences.

The determinant of error is depicted in the countless failed sustainable development projects throughout the Haitian agrarian community. The immediacy of interest can be applied to explain the urgency in which post-quake foreign aid arrived. This third factor validates the inattention or lack of awareness faced in capacity assessment programs within the Haitian agriculture sector in completing agenda tasks. Applying Merton's three determinants to IOs' behavior towards the agriculture community clearly captures its post-earthquake condition.

Examples of IO Disruption in Haitian Agriculture

The evolving trajectory of international aid initiatives that cycle through Haiti has resulted in chronic occurrences of structural agricultural challenges. Haitian peasant farmers are susceptible to foreign intervention and have had their food sovereignty tested, undermined, and weakened resulting in the loss of marketable resources. The term “food sovereignty” is outlined by Via Campesina at the 1996 World Food Summit as “the right of peoples to define their own food and agriculture” (Windfuhr & Jonsen 2005, p. 13). Haiti’s food sovereignty and agricultural practices have been a consistent debate within the national and international forum. The practice of farming in rural Haiti has continuously been undermined by government deficiencies and humanitarian involvement in practices. Whether by soft or hard power, foreign agents have had a great influence on the unprincipled capability of Haiti’s agriculture sector. Examples follow below.


In the early 1980s, fear of African Swine Fever triggered the U.S. to request exterminating the Haitian Creole pig population (Farmer, 2006, p. 37). Concerned that the epidemic would further spread throughout North America; the American, Canadian and French pork producers established a pork eradication and development campaign known by its French acronym PEPPADEP or Programme pour l’Éradication de la Peste Porcine Africaine et pour le Développement de l’Élevage Porcine, to eliminate Haiti’s estimated one million and three hundred thousand pigs (Farmer, 2006, p. 38). The decision to wipe the entire Haitian pig population was a cause for serious concern as Haitian peasantry regarded the ownership and cultivation of a pig as an investment for financial security, to be preserved and cared for unless an appropriate occasion requested otherwise (Aristide, 2000, p.12). Once the swine extermination was completed, the U.S.

brought in American pigs from Iowa as replacements.

The replacement of Creole pigs with an American alternative referred to as *kochon blan* or foreign pig (Farmer, 2006, p. 40), was a catastrophic transition for the Haitian peasantry. The substitute pigs had a difficult time adjusting to their new environment. They required sheds built to specific standards, expensive food, and special care, demanding more resources and attention than their original counterparts. The adaptation did not fare well for pig owners who were unprepared to take on their newfound burdensome livestock. The unsuccessful results of the PEPPADEP campaign reverberated throughout the country. Haitian families could no longer afford to send their children to school because they could not care for the *kochon blan* properly (Aristide, 2000, p. 12). In Elizabeth Abbott's book *Haiti: A Shattered Nation*, it was noted that vendors of school supplies reported a decline in their sales and school registration dropped forty to fifty percent after the PEPPADEP campaign (Abbott, 2011, p. 274). The operation further impoverished the country, creating tension towards the international community.

The U.S. subsidization of rice in the mid-1990s is another case example where foreign intervention impaired the agriculture sector of Haiti. In 1988, Haiti's domestic rice output accounted for forty-seven percent of its rice consumption. Twenty years later, domestic output only accounted for fifteen percent of local consumption (Weisbrot et al., 2010, p. 1). The decrease in price is a direct impact of the introduction of American rice in the Haitian economy. Figure 4 below provides a visual of the price fluctuation in domestic versus imported rice pricing collected before and after the 2010 earthquake (Weisbrot et al., p. 3).

Haiti: Domestic and Imported Rice Prices, 2009 – 2010



Sources: Coordination Nationale de la Sécurité Alimentaire 2010.

Figure 4. Haiti: domestic and imported rice prices, 2009-2010.

Source: Weisbrot, M., Johnston, J., and Ray, R. (2010, April). Using Food Aid to Support, Not Harm, Haitian Agriculture. *Center for Economic and Policy Research*. Retrieved from <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/6904127.pdf>

Although the subsidy helped to facilitate the rice farmers in Arkansas and boosted the profits for Haitian rice importers, it disrupted the sales of local rice farmers. The decision to subsidize imported rice destabilized the social and cultural setting of Haiti by weakening the local farmers’ trade and transforming the image of support from foreign agents. The trade policy generated a food surplus in the local markets which subsequently created a price fluctuation in the local economy. The competitively priced imported rice was a more attractive and cheaper option for consumers.

Access to an inexpensive imported alternative drove many Haitian rice growers and sellers out of the market (OXFAM, 2008). Dating back to the West African food

regimen, rice is a basic staple in the Haitian diet and provides nourishment for its consumers so that they could perform daily laborious activities. In 2016, it was approximated that eighty percent of Haitians consumed rice. The country has now become one of the top importers of American rice (Cochran et al., 2016, p.11). Had Americans been more careful in channeling resources through a trade reform, and not focusing on their political agenda, local farmers would not have faced such a disruption in their cultural lifestyle.

The World Bank estimated that after the subsidy was implemented, tens of millions of dollars were spent in excess for rice consumption (Arias & Carneus, 2011, p. 4). The deterioration of domestic rice production in Haiti and the increase in rice imports subsequently led to an increase in rural poverty and reliance on imports (Doyle, 2010). Many Haitian farmers called this policy *plan lanmo* meaning “death plan” (O’Connor, 2013). NPR interviewed a rice farmer named Mirana Honorable who illustrated the impact the rice tariff had on her family. She explained that because of the disruption in her rice business, she was forced to make a tough decision. Her choices were to sell her rice to make enough money to allow her children to go to school or keep the rice to put on the table for her family (Davidson & Kenney, 2013).

Haitian rice growers were never able to re-establish a strong market for local production of their harvest. The decision to inject American rice into Haiti’s local markets devaluated the sales of its domestic counterpart and discouraged farmers’ perception of international food aid. According to USAID, sixty percent of the total Haitian population are farmers, yet fifty percent of food is still imported (Gambrill, 2018). The decrease in revenue for local rice farmers subsequently aided their decision to

migrate to the capital city of Port-au-Prince. The resulting displacement of agrarian families to urban communities presented an increasing risk to the decline of agriculture. Bill Clinton openly apologized for pushing the rice subsidy, he signed the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 (O'Connor, 2013) and announced, "It may have been good for some of my farmers in Arkansas, but it has not worked. It was a mistake...I had to live everyday with the consequences of the loss of capacity to produce a rice crop in Haiti to feed those people because of what I did; nobody else" (Katz, 2010c).

A post-earthquake incident that further deteriorated Haiti's food security and sovereignty relating to an unawareness of the surrounding social environment relates to the agribusiness giant, Monsanto (La Via Campesina, 2010). Monsanto, with support from USAID, donated four hundred and seventy-five tons of vegetable and corn hybrid seeds to Haitian farmers to help improve the country's agricultural output (La Via Campesina, 2010). The generous donation troubled the local community. Due to the special care that would be required to plant the donated seeds, they would be impractical for local farmers (Garth, 2013, p. 128). The hybrid seed option needed synthetic fertilizers, adding to the cost of cultivation, and therefore increasing the purchasing price. Also, the seeds could not be stored for an extended period of time which meant that farmers would have to repurchase more seeds in the following years (La Via Campesina, 2010). Monsanto's attempt to remodel Haiti's agricultural production system was met with resistance by the local community. Ten thousand peasants marched against the cause. Chavannes Jean-Baptiste the leader of the biggest grassroots organization in Haiti, Peasant Movement of Papaye (MPP), disputed the donation of seeds and called it "a very

strong attack on small agriculture, on farmers, on biodiversity, on Creole seeds . . . and on what is left of our environment in Haiti” (La Via Campesina, 2010). He also noted, “In Haiti, people each year conserve their own feed for the next year. But USAID doesn’t want to promote this kind of agriculture” (Kushner, 2012, para 24).

The Haitian peanut is considered a durable crop for farmers to plant, making it a favored choice for arable and arduous soil. In 2016, the U.S. Department of Agriculture planned to ship five hundred metric tons of American peanuts to Haiti (Wood, 2016). Many local grassroots groups opposed the donation or “dumping” and called it a threat to local agriculture. They feared it would endanger the financial sustainability of the economy and jeopardize peanut farmer’s livelihoods (Open Letter, 2016, p. 2). In an interview with the National Public Radio (NPR), Dr. Louise Ivers, senior health and policy advisor for Partners In Health stated, “We’re not talking about big business owners being put at risk by an input of peanuts, we're talking about small, very poor farmers that are very dependent on a single crop. We really believe the dumping, or donation, whatever your perspective, will have negative consequences” (Leschin-Hoar, 2016). Dr. Ivers, along with many other vocal advocates of humanitarian aid, advised against shipping peanuts to Haiti, they seemed apprehensive of its underlying impacts on the Haitian society.

Averaging two billion and four hundred million dollars yearly, the U.S. is the largest provider of international food assistance (Barrett et al., 2017). The policy of cargo preference for food aid (CPFA) that the USG implements requires that fifty percent of all U.S. food aid must be shipped on U.S. flagged cargo vessels. This benefits the U.S. because they charge higher rates, although the vessels are older, smaller and slower than

their competitive equivalents. The American Enterprise Institute identified that because of the CPFA, one million eight hundred thousand fewer people are left hungry around the world. (Barrett et al., 2017). The CPFA in conjunction with the many examples presented above, help to support part of my hypothesis; that the international community, with a heavy focus on the U.S., appealed to their political agenda more so than to the priority-based needs of Haiti's ailing economy and agriculture, leaving social awareness behind in their initiatives.

The inattention to Haiti's environmental practices, social setting, and a lack of market study research, consequently led to further deterioration of the agriculture sector as seen in the examples presented above. Merton's determinants can be applied to understand the series of events within the swine extermination, rice subsidy, peanut and seed dumping in Haiti. Ignorance in learning about the existing environment of the Creole pig and its cultural representation led to the failure of the adaptation for the *kochon blan*. The subsidy implemented for rice growers in Arkansas was a clear example of immediacy of interest towards American farmers and their pushing of a political agenda. Lastly, error in an analysis of the local Haitian peanut market depicts the cause that led to the decision to ship or 'flood' Haiti's peanut market.

IO's interests in Haiti has cultivated undesirable effects with many in the agricultural community. The evolving international policy agendas influencing Haiti's domestic activities negatively affected the nation's outlook regarding foreign aid. An example can be demonstrated in the cholera epidemic that struck Haiti right after the earthquake. Many believe it was foreign aid workers that brought the disease. The cholera epidemic that struck Haiti in October 2010 was one of the worst outbreaks in

recent history, killing over eight thousand people and affecting over two hundred thousand (CDC, 2014). The outbreak further deepened the rift between IOs and the Haitian locals. It also impacted the agriculture community in that many people consequently preferred to consume imported food over domestically produced food (Katz, 2013).

The continuous failure of and misfortune in the Haitian community due to weak political and civic performance in addition to the integration efforts of foreign assistance continuously exhaust the economy, agriculture and its people. With the disaster of the earthquake that struck Haiti in 2010 came an even greater debate, as many possibilities for international engagement were presented. Would the international community have enough social awareness to successfully restructure Haiti's ailing agriculture sector? The examples presented above predicted otherwise.

Post-Earthquake Behavior

USAID conducted a study on the international redevelopment plans in the Haitian agricultural sector after the earthquake. Close analysis and reports revealed a lack of sustainability in many project cases. Certain projects that IOs implemented were task-based and not designed for long-term application. Another concern identified an over-dependence on foreign aid. Farmers and locals alike were adapting to a lifestyle subject to relief support and abandoning their sense of self-reliance and independence (USAID, 2012). This notion of dependency is considered dangerous for a resource-deficient country.

IOs and the GoH were criticized for being unreliable in their collaboration efforts during the post-earthquake rehabilitation phase. The shortcomings of the relief efforts were identified in various aspects. Many IOs bypassed local agents and implemented their projects for their donors and beneficiaries without addressing the practices, political environment and social structure of its host country.

Aid dependence means that the government lacks the means to pursue development policies. Take the Ministry of Agriculture. Its sources of funding are so many, dispersed, small, and fickle that Michel Chancy, the deputy minister, says he is unsure of its total budget. (Economist, 2010)

The disconnect in social relationships between the international community and the local populace was deep-seated. An example of the lack of collaboration was apparent in the UN debriefing meetings during the redevelopment phase. The meetings were conducted in English when many of the local participants only spoke and understood Creole. Sometimes less than a quarter of the participants in the meetings were Haitian (Kramers, 2015, para 13). As described by journalist Gotson Pierre;

These Haitian organizations wanted to be heard after the earthquake, but it was difficult for them. Often there was scant attention from the international aid organizations to what they had to say,” he said. “All relief and rehabilitation work was being planned at the level of United Nations clusters. Holding the meetings in English, even if Haitians were present, added a language barrier. In some sectors, less than a quarter of staff involved was Haitian. (Kramers, 2015)

The GoH, with its history of poor national governance, did not provide enough support to protect the agricultural community, which currently accounts for twenty-two percent of the country’s total GDP (IndexMundi, 2018). Their integration efforts with IOs to pool resources for the best possible disaster relief outcome were not met with complete success. In his account of the post-earthquake situation, Paul Farmer noted that the fact

that the Minister of Culture and Communication was still using a satellite phone two weeks after the quake spoke volumes about basic emergency needs (Farmer, 2011, p. 88).

Debate on IO Engagement

The debate on international assistance in Haiti has been an extensive one. Due to its corrupt nature, filled with chronic impediments, social instability, and economic volatility, the Caribbean nation has continuously cycled through political gridlocks, social unrest and pressures with economic freedom. IO engagement in the local community and agriculture sector after the 2010 earthquake enhanced Haiti's pre-existing problems and caused a paradigm shift in the discussion of foreign aid.

Danielle Fuller-Wimbush in her (2014) dissertation on Haiti stated:

Haiti is, in many ways, the poster child of failed foreign aid, the result of ineffective donor practices and poor national governance. A long history of colonialism, occupation, and foreign influence on domestic policies, has left many Haitian citizens leery of foreign assistance. The lack of trust in outsiders is rivaled only by the lack of trust in their own government. (p.1)

Fuller-Wimbush analyzes that local governments and IOs must sometimes battle within their own entities to reach their local humanitarian goals. Phillippe Mathieu, OXFAM Country Director in Haiti, expressed a cautious view of IOs' involvement in the underdeveloped environment. In an effort to pinpoint the international community's fault in agriculture, Mathieu explained:

Currently, US rice subsidies and in-kind food aid undercut Haitian farmers at the same time as the US government is investing in Haitian agricultural development... The international community must abandon these conflicting trade and aid policies in order to support the growth of Haiti's fragile rural economy. (Stephenson & Denyer, 2010)

Mathieu identifies trade policies being an issue in which the international community is responsible for. He examines how the Bumpers Amendment set by the U.S. is a counterproductive legislative act for the Haitian economy. The Bumpers Amendment does not allow U.S. aid agencies the power to help any foreign agricultural producer that would interfere with American product export in global markets. This Amendment limits aid to certain crops and therefore does not allow a straightforward approach to assist the Haitian agricultural community (OXFAM, 2010).

The Haitian president at the time of the earthquake, René Préval, had a very similar view of international involvement in Haiti. He stated in a news conference: “I will tell him (Obama) that this first phase of assistance is finished. If they continue to send us aid from abroad -- water and food -- it will be in competition with the national Haitian production and Haitian commerce” (Bigg, 2010, para 4). He continued to explain that donations of food and water were a big support for over one million two hundred thousand people affected by the quake but that in the long run if they continued to send donations, the economy would suffer. Préval’s acknowledgment of the various social and economic impacts of foreign aid supports the claim that engaging in humanitarian aid with international actors must be done consciously and with the recipient’s best interest in mind.

I conclude that Préval, Mathieu and Moyo all share the same apprehension that international assistance has had negative impacts on its host country. Préval touches on the competition that occurs between foreign assistance and local Haitian food production because of the influx of food provisions (Bigg, 2010). Mathieu focuses on trade policies that push farmers out of the economic loop (OXFAM, 2010). Moyo points at the attitude

of over-reliance and dependency on food aid as a problem that food assistance causes. She also explains how an introduction of large sums of money into the economy encourages corruption in government circles which consequently leads to the failure of donated funds reaching their intended purpose (Moyo, 2009). Each of these viewpoints shed light on a different angle in which international organizations are capable of disrupting the local community, and more specifically, the agricultural community through social unawareness.

The UN reported that a total of over thirteen billion dollars had been allocated for rebuilding projects in Haiti up to the year 2020 and as much as three billion dollars was donated from the private sector (USGAO, 2015, p.1). However, it was mentioned in multiple official documents that much of the funds pledged never made it to their proposed programs. Analysts explained that the distribution structure for the funds was inefficient, as there were reportedly weak accountability measures and transparency limits in some development projects (Angulo et al., 2015, para 13). A confluence of factors, including information sharing and donor to recipient channels were uncoordinated resulting in unsuccessful programs.

However, there has been an international response on the matter. In 2013, the Food Assistance Convention was created from its predecessor, the Food Aid Convention. It is a global comeback to fighting hunger worldwide. Each member country pledges to make annual commitments to contribute and set guidelines and standards for the efficient and effective distribution of food aid. Members of this convention include Denmark, Canada, Russia, Switzerland, and the U.S. The Food Aid Convention is one of the only

legal instruments that pledges a minimum amount of food aid to deserving countries (Clements, Mittal, & Mousseau, 2008, p. 8).

Another initiative called The Sphere movement, was formed in 1997 to create a “human rights handbook.” It is the oldest humanitarian initiative (Sphere, 2019). Standards were established for humanitarian efforts such as water supply and sanitation, nutrition, food aid, shelter and health (Satterthwaite & Moses, p. 17). Sphere expressed the need to support existing government structure in a disaster response event, demonstrating that an importance on the affected population’s dignity was valued (Satterthwaite & Moses, p. 15). An emphasis on social awareness is noted in this initiative.

Haiti made an effort to collaborate with the international community during the post-disaster rehabilitation phase by forming the Haiti Interim Reconstruction Commission (HIRC) a few months after the earthquake (Action Plan, 2010). This directive was created to oversee, manage and handle the many agents and funds involved in the planning and development of the immediate needs of the community and the long-term reconstruction efforts. The commission was co-administered by Haitian Prime Minister Jean-Max Bellerive and the UN special envoy to Haiti, former U.S. President Bill Clinton (CBS/AP, 2010). The purpose of the HIRC was to act as a “clearinghouse” for the recovery efforts as well as to reassure donors that their contributions would be managed effectively (Farmer, 2011, p.156). The Haitian government also headed a Post Disaster Needs Assessment report (PDNA). Published by the World Bank, the report summarized the overall impact and damage to the nation’s infrastructure and environment. It highlighted two stages of rebuilding. The first stage was an eighteen-

month priority-based disaster relief approach, the second stage focused on rebuilding initiatives for longer-term sustainable development projects (Govt. of Haiti, 2010, p. 5). The PDNA was a collaboration with the World Bank, United Nation (UN), Inter – American Development Bank, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, and the European Commission (Farmer, 2011, p. 91). The report summarized that the agriculture and fishing sector had needs totaling forty-one million dollars.

Funds for the HIRC were acquired through the International Donors Conference, titled “Towards a New Future for Haiti”, and organized by the UN and the U.S. in collaboration with the GoH. Held at the UN headquarters in New York, one hundred and forty countries were represented at the Conference. The PDNA report was introduced and discussed. Points that were stressed included the need for temporary housing and sanitation, as well as plans to establish trade schools, encourage children to return to school, provide self-sustaining agricultural practices, strengthen building codes and rebuild communities (World Bank, 2010a).

Several outreach programs were initiated in crafting the PDNA including “The Voice of the Voiceless.” A consultation was done by the UN team in Haiti and the Office of the Special Envoy with constituents of rural areas that had no power of reaching the right channels to share their concerns and post-quake needs (Office of Secretary-General, 2010). In conclusion, the global cooperation effort pledged over nine billion dollars towards a relief fund (United Nations, 2010). The HIRC was then tasked with allocating the donations to specified projects addressed in the PDNA. The HIRC would be a test to evaluate if the effects of foreign aid could really work. The Haiti Reconstruction Fund

(HRF) worked in conjunction with the HIRC as a funding program. It was established in a partnership of the GoH and the international community.

Some participants in the HIRC protested to the Board expressing that information sharing was not in favor of Haitian representatives. There was also a lack of consultation with grassroots organizations, showing a discontinuity in the collective interest of the mission (Bernadel, 2011). Governed by foreign agents, the commission gave power to external proxies for them to restore the quake-ridden country. Some international members were even resistant to the creation of the HIRC because they would not be able to manage their own donations.

The Action Plan for the Recovery and Development of Haiti was created as part of the PDNA. A blueprint that focused on an overall progressive strategy, the Plan was an opportunity to not only rebuild the country but also to improve its economic and social state. Input from citizens of all classes including farmers from rural areas was collected to ensure success as part of a sustainable approach. Measures were established for accountability and transparency (Action Plan, 2010).

The Action Plan was a way to help Haiti out of what Voltaire called “intentional isolation” (Farmer, 2011, p. 360) as mentioned in chapter two. Voltaire was appointed as envoy to the Secretary-General of the UN. He had been involved in the GoH since the early 1990s and oversaw the reconstruction efforts (Desvarieux, 2010). He understood that Haiti’s dependence on the international community had to progress towards a self-reliant system.

Due to its oppressive past and history of scandalous NGO activity, Haiti has grown wary of foreign authority. The Action Plan was a solid initiative to assist with

short-term relief and long-term advancement. The government and international community vowed to “build back better” together (Clibbon, 2010). The Plan assessed the damage of the earthquake at an estimated number of over seven billion dollars, equivalent to one hundred and twenty percent of the country’s 2009 GDP (Govt. of Haiti, 2010, p. 7). Highlighted were recommendations that would boost the national production of local foods.

The plan’s main objectives are: (i) increasing the supply of agricultural food products in the country, by making agricultural inputs available in the various production areas and by improving distribution channels, (ii) defining strategies to integrate displaced persons, (iii) improving access to food by increasing the circulation of money through job creation in rural areas, (iv) integration of national production and food aid, (v) preparing for the next hurricane season with a wider perspective. (Govt. of Haiti, 2010, p. 23)

An example of Haiti’s willingness to work with the international community leading to opportunity for its people can be noted in OXFAM’s initiatives. OXFAM worked with Haitian agriculture organizations to provide local food kits during the post-quake relief period (Gluck, 2012). They sought out post-disaster priorities and executed a project using local resources. This example provides evidence that there were organizations who were socially aware of Haiti’s agricultural atmosphere.

Over fifty percent of the Haitian workforce is involved in agriculture and the sector is considered as having the highest potential for local production and economic growth (Govt. of Haiti, 2010, p. 22). However, the unrestricted exploitation of Haiti’s natural resources by locals and foreign constituents has made the re-development phase a challenge. Deforestation and overfishing are two practices that the Action Plan acknowledged as vulnerabilities to be addressed. As of today, the efforts of the Action Plan have been slow to progress. Many of the goals established were executed on a short-term basis as opposed to a long-term sustainable program (World Bank, 2014).

Another initiative, the Haiti Task Force, was created to evaluate the progress of the agricultural redevelopment efforts. Formed by the Board for International Food and Agriculture Development (BIFAD), along with USAID, the Haiti Task Force evaluated the food and agriculture environment, reviewed a USAID managed watershed program (WINNER) and provided a strategic proposal for renewing the stressed agriculture sector (McVey et al., 2012). It was concluded that a lack of sustainability and continuity of project movement was present. It was also noted that the exclusion of Haitian parties added to the lack of sustainability within the project scope. Inaccessibility to new technologies and credit loans were other issues identified by the Task Force in the agriculture sector.

The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) also assembled a report by creating a Real-Time Evaluation (RTE). The evaluation was meant to examine the post-earthquake response towards Haiti and learn from the experience. It was also made available to inform and update decision-makers about the post-quake relief effort (Binder et al., 2010, p. 7). Farmers were interviewed in the creation of this report, amplifying a voice for the susceptible community. The report underlined the shortcomings of the aid efforts. The report established a diagnosis of needs and how these needs would evolve. In addition, it explained how to strengthen existing capacities in the local community (UNICEF, 2010, p.8).

To assist the agriculture community, the GoH stressed an initiative called the National Agricultural Investment Plan (NAIP). The NAIP was financed by the GoH, the private sector and international donors and was geared towards the rehabilitation of the agricultural sector. The focus of the NAIP was on irrigation and watersheds with

attention on export crops. The total cost of the NAIP would be seven hundred and nine million dollars (World Bank, 2012, p. 20).

Chapter IV.

The Aid Network

The two hundred-billion-dollar global aid industry (Kumar, 2019, p. 120) can be perceived as a participatory process between countries in need of specialized support and each of the aid organizations working within the countries. This participatory process requires identifiable determinants that generally come in the form of mission goals. The determinants are a result of analytical assessments created by the aid organization, which provide a strategy to reach a mission goal. The assessments offer actionable tasks that are adaptive to an environment to reach a conclusive and ameliorated outcome. A host country can be perceived as a “complex adaptive system” (Hobbes, 2014, para 69), sensitive to foreign intervention and international relations. Introducing a foreign constituent to a country’s environment will disrupt the existing course of its social practices and dynamic relations, whether in a positive or a negative fashion.

In my research so far, I have concluded that foreign aid in Haiti’s post-earthquake agricultural community had both positive and negative impacts. The positive impacts of humanitarian assistance were the results of adaptive planning and background investigation of the environment leading to effective output. Examples of positive impacts include post-disaster relief of urgent needs being met such as food and medical needs (Chambers, 2017), logistical and material support being provided for immediate clean up and reconstruction (Weisenfeld, 2011, p. 1100), and immunization distribution to prevent the outbreak of contagious diseases (Weisenfeld, 2011, p. 1102). The negative effects include disruption to the agriculture sector resulting from a lack of understanding

of the country's social environment and political climate. IOs also underestimated the lack of communication frequency within Haiti's environment including between its cities, the political sector, public agencies and social classes. I will illustrate a few examples of positive and negative impacts to compare how farmers were affected by disaster relief and the series of events leading up to these impacts. In this way, I hope to provide a clear understanding of the consequences of IO initiatives in Haiti and how a lack of social awareness hindered the relief effort's successes.

Donor-Recipient Relationship

The disconnect towards Haiti's agricultural priorities in the foreign aid world caused a rift between locals and aid workers. Not only did many IOs lack the background knowledge of post-quake priority-based needs to support the rebuilding of the agriculture sector, but the Haitian government was observed to be a vulnerable figure in the relief effort. Ineffective infrastructure, lack of self-sufficiency, as well as political and financial instability, heightened the country's candidacy for international attention and aid. The extent and depth of the quake's destruction combined with a corrupt political system framed Haiti as a helpless nation.

IOs post-quake presence provided temporary support to Haiti that the government could not offer. Their presence and efforts created a power shift in favor of foreign aid agencies as a substitute for the local people to depend on. Ineffective public administrative skills towards quake victims did not materialize into a social safety net as it should have. The absence of this security exposed the agrarian community to unfavorable conditions such as economic stagnation. Farmers had to work around

technological immobility, inattention to available resources and market access and continuous land degradation, obstacles that were amplified after the quake.

Two months after the earthquake, relief aid organizations were still struggling to transform their resources from disaster relief to rehabilitation (Farmer, 2011, p. 149), proving that the country's structural condition was an obstacle during the aid efforts. "Many others made herculean efforts to help. But it was hard, even in the first days, to link the goodwill offers to the critical needs in Haiti because so much of what was needed and expected by medical volunteers was unavailable" (Farmer, 2011, p. 70). Journalist Gotson Pierre illustrated the disconnect in cultural context in his own way:

There is a Haitian rhythm, a Haitian way of doing things. It's not something technical, it's a cultural problem whereby timeframes do not correspond with local reality," he said. "If you try to push through a six-month project without taking into account local constraints, you won't be ready when your six months have passed. (Kramers, 2015, p. 9)

In her book, *Inside Foreign Aid*, author Judith Tandler points to a problem in organizational policies as a cause for the dissociation of American foreign aid workers with the recipients of their aid. She explains that many international aid employees are not encouraged to purchase or consume domestic products in their host country which often leads to a separation of cultural connection in their daily routine (Tandler, 1975). Additionally, the USG created an incentive in the form of the Foreign Differentials and Allowances to encourage U.S. employees to work overseas (USGS, 1989). Eligible employees assigned to overseas positions could receive benefits, allowing them to feel the securities of their home country at no additional cost. This incentive provided the circumstance for foreign aid workers to disconnect and isolate themselves from their host country (Tandler, 1975, p. 32).


Tendler's analysis of foreign aid policy ties into my hypothesis. She explains a setting for which the U.S. does not prioritize social awareness as part of its humanitarian aid design and execution. As an aid worker, immersing oneself into the country's social and cultural setting provides a wholesome perspective of the structural problems and social dynamics within. Alienation from the host country's way of life leads one to reject or simply miss the social aspect of the host's relationship subtleties and undercurrents in daily routines, further instilling a disconnected mindset. The Foreign Differentials and Allowances practice of receiving benefits from home provides the opportunity to detach from the host country and offers the unfortunate potential to miscommunicate priority-based needs.

Similarly, anthropologist Mark Schuller noted that aid agency practices would inadvertently strengthen inequalities by offering access to advantages for aid workers unavailable to locals (Schuller, 2009, p. 93). He explained that globalization "commodifies cultural differences" leading to xenophobic nationalism (Schuller, 2009, p.84). He continued that Haiti had attained a *klas ONG* or "NGO class" due to their privileged and insulated lifestyles and that this class consequently affected the behavioral habits of the general population (Schuller, 2009, p. 92). These two authors highlight a fundamental issue that aid agencies were culpable of fostering, a lack of connection between aid workers' mission goals and their daily practices and motivations. The solution-oriented strategies IOs created were not aligned with the collective interest of the local environment. This issue of social unawareness is what led to the polarization of international aid and its disconnect with local priorities in Haiti, and specifically Haitian

farmers. The top-down organizational directive for aid was proven ineffective in the agriculture sector in many cases, as seen in the examples detailed in this chapter.

Pledges

To recognize a positive outcome from post-earthquake Haiti is to say that it created a potential opportunity for rebuilding the country anew. Foreign aid plays a significant role in the economy's health, agricultural output and legislative development. Haiti had amassed a large debt throughout its political lifespan, and after the 2010 earthquake many countries and organizations canceled their debt, including the World Bank (World Bank, 2010c). Numerous countries and IOs pledged millions in rebuilding efforts. In September of 2014 it was noted that USAID alone allocated one billion and seven hundred thousand dollars towards the reconstruction effort (USGAO, 2015, p. 7). More than half of the allocated funds were pledged to health and food security services (USGAO, 2015, p. 7). Figure 5 below taken from the U.S. Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Requesters, illustrates the fiscal activity and proactive approach USAID spearheaded (USGAO, 2015).



Source: GAO analysis of USAID funding data. | GAO-15-517
Note: GAO defined obligations as orders placed, contracts awarded, and similar transactions during a given period that will require payments during the same or a future period. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) categorizes these as "subobligations," because it considers these funds to have been obligated through a bilateral agreement with Haiti to deliver assistance.

Figure 5. USAID funding for Haiti earthquake reconstruction as of September 30, 2014. *Source:* United States Government Accountability Office. (2015, June). *Haiti Reconstruction: USAID Has Achieved Mixed Results and Should Enhance Sustainability Planning*. GAO-15-517. Retrieved from <https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/670616.pdf>

The UN recounted that a total of over thirteen billion dollars had been allocated for rebuilding projects in Haiti up to the year 2020 and as much as three billion dollars was donated from the private sector (USGAO, 2015, p.1). However, it was mentioned in multiple official documents that much of the funds pledged never made it to their proposed programs. Analysts explained that the distribution structures designed to receive the funds were inefficient, as there were reportedly weak accountability measures and transparency limits in certain development projects (Angulo et al., 2015, para 13). A confluence of factors, including information sharing and donor to recipient channels were uncoordinated resulting in unsuccessful programs.

A Voice for the Weak

Led by the Office of the Special Envoy and the UN, the project titled “The Voice of the Voiceless” was an initiative to involve the local Haitian community towards the rebuilding effort. Mothers, farmers, factory employees, small traders, unemployed, families from rural areas and many other vulnerable groups were engaged in the project (Farmer, 2011, p. 93). The idea behind this endeavor was to improve the rebuilding effort by addressing the issue of marginalizing the weak. Tackling this problem would aid in sustainably developing the country. Focus group consultations were done regularly to bridge the gap between locals and decision-makers. The project was based on the belief that locals of a country know what is best for their own communities, and that

development assistance and donation funds should be allocated to their needs (Voice of Voiceless, 2010).

In conclusion of “The Voice of the Voiceless” program, five key takeaways were defined. Firstly, that local participation of surveys would be distributed in all parts of the country, from every social class; the rural and urban demographics; to eradicate the practice of exclusion from the rebuilding efforts. The second conclusion was the suggestion for decentralizing public infrastructure and involving local management in the reconstruction of the country. This would be necessary for sustainable development and would relieve pressure from the overpopulated areas, creating jobs in potentially new areas. A third conclusion realized was to invest in the Haitian people, from agriculture to jobs to education (UN, 2010, para 42). The main idea behind this assessment was for Haitians to be able to assume their familial responsibilities as well as gain food sovereignty and security.

The fourth point was a recommendation to administer “responsible aid”, meaning aid directed by the local community and not international agents in order to encourage the country’s vision of sovereignty. This would be done by boosting agriculture, microfinancing and other public mechanisms. Lastly was a decision to highlight the value of the Haitian people’s dignity and equality (Voice of Voiceless, 2010). During the course of the project, it was noted that the Haitian people demonstrated strength and resilience in their calamitous circumstances. They also presented continued faith in their religion, along with a sense of solidarity among one another. These reflections focus on a powerful sense of community and courage needed to move forward towards a new and progressive Haiti.

A restorative approach to agriculture was stressed in “The Voice for the Voiceless.” The report underlined agriculture as a priority during the rebuilding stage for international and local agents. It was revealed that many Haitians would rather work in agriculture in their hometown than work an informal job in overpopulated cities (Voice of Voiceless, 2010, p.6). The business of agriculture could sustain a family in a rural area, allowing them to support themselves and invest in their endeavors while working on their land. Overall, the project created a positive initiative for the rebuilding efforts towards a sustainable future. It also demonstrated to the local community the preparation and planning that IOs were capable of activating in order to provide a needs-based, priority oriented, development initiative.

Locals have also taken initiative to improve their country after the quake. An example can be found in the efforts of Pierre Fouché. Haitian native Fouché was in the process of completing his Ph.D. in earthquake engineering from the University of Buffalo (UB) when the 2010 earthquake hit Haiti. He was in a unique position to help his country, as there were very few Haitians who majored in earthquake engineering. He decided to raise awareness about the poor and unregulated building standards in Haiti using channels such as CNN and the National Public Radio. Fouché then worked with UB to provide professional development seminars in Port-au-Prince on buildings designed to withstand earthquakes. He reached over five hundred Haitian architects and engineers (Hsu). Fouché’s decision to raise awareness on the downfalls that led to the quake’s destruction was a powerful decision that allowed him to reach many people who could potentially rebuild the country with improved building codes. The inadequate building practices amounted to seventy percent of collapsed buildings during the earthquake (OAS, 2010,

para 6). Fouché's initiative to raise awareness on an issue he was capable of addressing and educating others on demonstrates the effectiveness of a socially conscious approach to rehabilitation.

Negative Impacts

An example of the detachment between IO and Haiti's rehabilitation priorities came in the form of the Agriculture Trade Development Act of 1954. The Act was created keeping in mind the expansion of U.S. markets (Kushner, 2012, para 17). It highlighted the U.S. incentive for food aid and cited a yearly minimum expenditure of food aid (Kushner, 2012, para 17). The Act stated that it would identify opportunities for export of U.S. agricultural commodities and "augment the marketing and disposal of agricultural products" (Agricultural Act, 1954). The language used in the Act insinuates that policymakers prioritized American farmer's arrangements over the food aid recipient's needs, supporting my hypothesis towards the tendency of excluding social awareness in aid discernment.

USAID, the largest single donor of food (Weisenfeld, 2011), spent one hundred and forty million dollars on a food distribution program in 2011 that benefitted U.S. farmers and ultimately hurt Haitian farmers (Kushner, 2012, para 1). The Pulitzer Center's Jacob Kushner criticized their food aid effort, explaining that USAID's donation of planting seeds and food were all part of an internal incentive and that the motivation to offer resources was fueled by an economic agenda. In reference to this massive post-earthquake U.S. food distribution, board member for the Haiti Justice Alliance Nathan Yaffe spells out the situation, "The evidence suggests that U.S. foreign aid is structured

around our economic needs rather than the humanitarian needs of people we're supposed to be helping" (Kushner, 2012, para 4).

As of 2012, forty-seven million dollars' worth of food vouchers were distributed, and almost all of the vouchers were spent to buy cheap rice and other commodities that had been imported from the U.S. (Kushner, 2012, para 11). Twenty-six metric tons of rice were imported every month for this program, providing for eighty percent of the country's consumption (Kushner, 2012, para 11). According to the 2013 USAID-BEST Analysis, the U.S. gave twenty-two and a half million dollars of food vouchers to one hundred and seventy-nine thousand post-earthquake victims (HGW, 2013). This program demonstrated that the IOs offering food assistance caused an imbalance in local agribusiness by providing an alternative to locally-sourced rice.

ROPADAM was one of seven organizations that signed a four-page document denouncing the program in July 2012. The organizations said they were shocked that their communities had been targeted since, according to Haitian government documents, "not one of the communes is classified as having 'extreme hunger.'" (HGW, 2013)

Another example of an IO distributing food vouchers while bypassing the social environment of Haiti was done by the humanitarian group CARE in support of USAID. CARE distributed food vouchers in 2011 in Haiti's southern peninsula to the province of Grande Anse after Hurricane Tomas. Haiti Grassroots Watch (HGW) investigated the program and found significant flaws. The Grande Anse region at the time of program implementation was going through its harvest phase which meant its fruits and vegetables would go unsold. Food aid recipients would not purchase from farmers when they were being handed food vouchers (HGW, 2013, para 8). The social disconnect here can be attributed to the negligence of harvest phases and conscious action towards local farmer's livelihoods. The priority for the program was to provide food but the method to achieve

this priority was done to benefit the organization, not so much the local farmer. The food items available for purchase with the vouchers were promoted to be locally produced but after inspection of multiple food stores, the HGW concluded that most of the available items were imported. Spaghetti, oil and rice were among the items for purchase (HGW, 2013, para 20). A member of a farmers' cooperative, Vériel Auguste commented, "They call the program 'Down with Hunger,' but to me, it's a 'Long Live Hunger' program" (HGW, 2013, para 30).

Humanitarian Aid as a Tool

International aid has come under scrutiny in recent years due to its questionable practices, failed results and lack of transparency. The mantra to think globally and act locally has helped to differentiate the successful aid programs and the failed projects. When an IO thinks globally and acts locally, they are approaching a host country with a solution-oriented strategy that is based on the country's specific needs. An example of this can be found in "The Voice of the Voiceless" program, where peasant farmers and vulnerable population demographics were chosen to participate in reconstruction effort discussions. An aid organization that thinks globally but does not act locally can be justified as using the "top-down" approach. They are not taking the time to be socially conscious and, in many cases, are fueled by their own political or organizational intentions and processes. An example of this can be seen in the American rice subsidy act that was presented earlier.

In her book *The Crisis Caravan*, Linda Polman explains that humanitarian aid agencies are viewed as tools for political and military strategies and proposes to hold them

accountable for their actions. She lays out examples of the power of food aid and its negative effects on several warring nations, calling international aid “involuntary collaborators” (Polman, 2010, p. 174). Danielle Fuller-Wimbush on her dissertation about Haiti stated, “What we see in Haiti, and in development projects around the world, is that when aid money is disbursed and giant development firms move in, aid becomes a business” (Fuller-Wimbush, 2014, p. 157). Fuller-Wimbush offers up the notion that prominent global agents are keen on taking advantage of the morally-tuned consciousness and leading power that international aid yields. Moyo also discourages the excess of aid money, insinuating that it fuels corruption and economic calamity, as explained earlier.

Many organizations have identified the human desire to help others in need and have used the ability to harness that need to solicit donations and fund programs to achieve political and humanitarian goals. For such governments, international aid can be viewed as a political tool that supports agribusiness producers. Their power is characterized by sending surplus crops abroad to resource-poor nations. This exchange helps to leverage influence with foreign governments in pursuit of various economic and political interests. In turn, constituents are satisfied with their elected government representatives and tax dollars because they understand that they have supported aid being provided to a vulnerable population. Former director at Oxfam Nicholas Stockton suggests that humanitarian aid has morphed into its own economic existence and attempts to add an ethical meaning to the term. He stated to Newsweek in 2005, “There’s a market for good works, and it’s big business. Call it the ‘moral economy’ if you like,” (Polman, 2010, p. 39).

The Peasant Movement of Papaya (MPP) is one of the most successful local peasant movements of Haiti. Boasting sixty thousand members, the MPP was founded in 1973 in the Central Plateau (Grassroots International, 2019). As a grassroots movement, the MPP tackles issues related to agriculture, food sovereignty and climate change. The leader of the MPP, Chavannes Jean-Baptiste explained that the MINUSTAH had offered to purchase some of the lands MPP held and that the “MPP is fighting against Haiti being taken by others” (Deakin, 2014, para 33). This statement suggests that foreigners’ ownership of Haitian land was an undesirable outcome for local farmers.

The nomenclature surrounding foreign aid and IOs as a whole has gained significant momentum since the post-earthquake redevelopment initiative. A foreigner’s sense of social awareness towards Haiti’s cultural environment can be examined and discussed, lending valuable lessons to future episodes. The following chapter will present first-person accounts of residents and those who work in Haiti. I will explore their experiences in the Haitian agricultural community, involvement with international agents and challenges with cultural boundaries related to the earthquake. These accounts will help to support my hypothesis that IOs were socially unaware of the agriculture system in their post-earthquake development projects, leading to adverse impacts on local Haitian farmers.

Chapter V.

Observations of Social Awareness in Agriculture

To gain some perspective on the topic of my thesis, I submitted a questionnaire to three constituents in the agricultural community who provided me with comprehensive narratives and unique viewpoints. The three candidates consisted of a farmer, an anthropologist, and a non-profit organization engaged with local farmers. The observations that were collected allowed me to form a robust assessment of the post-earthquake agriculture sector from various angles. The cumulative summary gathered by the three respondents suggests that agriculture is the foundation of the Haitian economy. It also indicates that the local and international communities must both address Haiti's structural weaknesses and food security needs in order for the country to move forward as an independent nation. Lastly, my evaluation of the responses supports my hypothesis that IOs lack of social awareness during the post-earthquake disaster relief food assistance efforts in Haiti disrupted its agricultural sector. The recommendations offered call for a shift in focus from viewing Haiti as a food aid recipient to a nation that should be capable of realizing food sovereignty for itself through the empowerment of its nation. As the ideological proverb goes, "Give a man a fish and you feed him for a day, teach a man to fish and you feed him for a lifetime."

The politicization of IO activity in Haiti over food aid has transformed into a polarized debate. On one end of the IO discussion is the belief that the humanitarian effort towards emergency food aid benefits disaster victims. On the other end of the discussion is the conviction that too much food aid creates a dependent system and

benefits more the IOs and farmers with a surplus of crops to distribute. As I will illustrate in this chapter, the direction to where food aid is headed should focus on an understanding of the social context of the Haitian lifestyle, its oppressive history, local environment, fragmented social structure and sustainable future. Haiti's lack of connection to a broader range of relationships with global markets distorts the link between the commercial value of local crops and the country's economic capacity.

Haiti's agricultural market makes up twenty-five percent of its GDP and is occupied by approximately one million farms as of 2011 (MANRRD, 2011, p. 3). However, fifty percent of Haiti's food is imported (Gambrill, 2018) as mentioned earlier. According to the PDNA, the earthquake's damages and losses to the agricultural sector totaled over thirty-one million dollars including loss of irrigation channels, storage and transformation facilities and various services of the Ministry of Agriculture (WorldBank, 2010, p. 96). The country as a whole faced damages and losses of seven billion eight hundred million dollars, equaling one hundred and twenty percent of the post-earthquake 2009 GDP (USDS, 2011, p. 4). The World Bank also estimated that eleven billion five hundred million dollars would be needed to rebuild the country (USDS, 2011, p. 4). Figure 6 below, created by USAID, depicts the distribution of various types of humanitarian assistance around the country. Even though the epicenter of the earthquake was detected in the capital city of Port-au-Prince, foreign aid was dispersed throughout the country in a nationwide effort to provide disaster relief aid (DesRoches et al., 2011, p. 16).




Figure 6. FY 2010 USG humanitarian assistance to Haiti for the earthquake
 Source: DesRoches R., Comerio, M., Eberhard, M., Mooney, W., and Rix, G. (2011).
 Overview of the 2010 Haiti Earthquake. *Earthquake Spectra*: 27(S1), S1-S21.

Respondents

The first respondent in my research is a Haitian farmer. He has worked with an international sugar company that employed a significant amount of Haiti’s workforce and an international tobacco manufacturer, both based in Haiti. This respondent’s background includes providing technical help to other local farmers. Financing heavy machinery, setting up irrigation systems and providing fertilizer were a few projects that he was

involved in. He explains that international donors “fall into the trap of pitting the haves against the have-nots instead of trying to work with both groups to unify them and make them work together.” He continues by stating that many international donors believe that the “haves” exploit the “have-nots” and try unsuccessfully to set up projects that end up failing due to unsustainable circumstances. The tobacco company he worked in offers an example of the opposite being true, where big business and local farmers cooperate so that they can work in a sustainable structure for each other’s benefit. “They really don’t understand the realities of the Haitian agricultural sector and come with the attitude that they have to protect the small farmers from the big bad guys.”

He continues by describing the anticipation Haitians felt when the international community arrived after the earthquake. They hoped IOs would fund the reconstruction and redevelopment of the country as well as boost job creation. The respondent explained that IOs focused mostly on reconstruction, creating short-term jobs. The increase in job opportunity attracted the rural population causing many to migrate to Port-au-Prince. However, once the reconstruction phase was completed, the capital city was left with many unemployed Haitians with no future job prospects. The short-term jobs had brought more people to Port-au-Prince. Many jobless Haitians gravitated to join local gangs, increasing the insecurity of the city. Consequently, because of the insecurity and instability issues the country faced and still currently faces today, the agriculture community has suffered. The gangs of Haiti have terrorized the country on many occasions, leaving the government helpless, and in turn, de-stabilizing the economy. This resulting effect is what the respondent calls a “Somalization of Haiti” referring to the 1993 civil unrest that led to lawless events in Somalia.

The second respondent is an anthropologist and also a local of Haiti. Her expertise involves reviewing agriculturally based business plans and conducting value chain and impact assessments in the agricultural field. When asked about how her experience with the international community has shaped her view of its influence on Haiti's agriculture sector, she responded that it has "systematically underestimated the potential of farmers and growers in Haiti. As a result, they disrupt local production systems with unsustainable interventions that have repercussions for several years, even generations." Her response indicates that she has experienced an imbalance between IO perception of agricultural needs and the realistic priorities that the agricultural community faces.

She states that donors view Haiti with a specified "poverty alleviation lens" and that their interventions are tailored towards income-generating strategies and improving lifestyles without considering the local community's priorities. Although the ultimate goal of an aid mission is to alleviate poverty, the focus of donors was more geared towards their individualistic project objective rather than a cohesion towards a whole – of– sector approach. She continues by providing a post-earthquake example to illustrate the disparity between international funders and local agriculture projects.

A well-known American aid agency funded an incubator run by the anthropologist I contacted. The funder decided that the solution for poverty was the formation of jobs via training and business creation. Their measure for success was calculated as the number of hours of training received. However, the discrepancy formed when the respondent's measure was calculated differently. For her, success was measured by the participant's level of engagement. She determined that the inflated metric used by

the funder resulted in a misrepresentation of the factual realities of the project, leading to a detrimental analysis.

This respondent has observed that IOs continuously persist to standardize agricultural production. The creation of commercial opportunity for export and the continuation of importing aid relief has brought inferior seeds and disrupted the local markets. In conclusion, Haiti has turned into an import-dependent consumerist nation. Since the earthquake, there has been a stronger sense that the *blan*, or foreigner, does not have all the answers to Haiti's problems. This, in turn, has transformed farmers' perspectives. They have become more conscientious about accepting aid. She recommends that development agencies should engage with local growers to understand their structural design and risks. In turn, the agencies will succeed at providing long-term sustainability.

My questionnaire was also sent to a non-profit organization (NPO) that works heavily in the farming community, training farmers and purchasing their crops. This NPO has six agronomists embedded in various communities around the country and provides support through training, implementation and seed loans. They have packaged fifteen percent of their meals domestically based on price competitiveness and quality of product from local farmers. They believe that there is a need for greater coordination with the international community along with better access to markets, and improved packing and delivery methods. They commented that the Haitian agricultural community is fractured, in need of financing services, and that the international community is a critical part of its growth.

The first respondent introduces the idea that donors act according to their belief that big business in Haiti does not support smaller vendors (local farmers). In their experience, the opposite is said to be true. This example supports my hypothesis that a lack of understanding of Haiti's social capacity skewed IOs' vision of the country, influencing IOs' decision making and actions. He noted that to his knowledge, the international community had a negative influence on the agricultural sector. The contribution of a massive import of staple goods such as corn, rice and beans after the earthquake were all items that could grow in Haiti. These items take two to four months to produce. He recommended that IOs should have started importing a limited amount of food and gradually decreased imports while supporting small Haitian farmers. They could have done this by assisting with fertilizers, seeds and better financing options to realize higher yields. This method would have helped the needs of the country for food while also helping the agricultural sector to support itself and grow.

The second respondent suggested that the need to standardize agricultural production or a "one size fits all" approach, deteriorates farming techniques and disrupts the agriculture sector. This example touches on my earlier point about how IOs must approach food aid by thinking globally and acting locally. She adds that farmers are wary to trust international figures and their initiatives. Lastly, she provides an illustration that supports my hypothesis in her explanation of a "poverty alleviation lens". IOs interpretation of Haiti's socio-political and economic landscape and their inherent desire to provide aid has proven to miss the desired effects.

Global Versus Local Practices

Haiti has been defined as an impoverished country with a depleted agricultural output that used to be the foundation of its economy. Since Haiti's independence, the structural framework of agricultural productivity has digressed from the colonial plantations that created an export-driven economy to a post-colonial *lakou* system in the rural regions focusing on subsistence farming. The word *lakou* in Haiti means courtyard. This system was created as a form of defiance towards the colonial plantation farming concept where several families would build their homes and live in a communal set up to share one main courtyard and grow crops for direct consumption (Merilus, 2015).

After Haiti became independent, the *Lakou* forcefully emerged as a space of resistance for the former slaves as well as an environment to establish economic equality among individuals and to avoid dominant capitalist exploitation. The former slaves perceived the plantation economy as the representation of the system that uprooted them from their relatives and friends in West Africa and enslaved them for the economic benefits of the colonial masters. (Merilus, 2015, para 2)

This system provides an arrangement in which the residing families harvest their own crops, forming a small-scale subsistence sharecropping lifestyle. Haiti's current *lakou* farming model offers food security for its residents as well as a sense of community, well-being and a place to share and practice the religion of their ancestors, Voodoo. However, because of the subsistence practices, this system isolates the majority of the country from global markets and impedes economic growth. The *lakou* lifestyle has provided peasant farmers with a social safety net against the local government and the international community.

A Social Consciousness

A social consciousness can be defined as awareness of society (Cooley, 1907, p. 676). Social awareness and its connection to IO post-earthquake actions with food aid play a major role in Haiti's agriculture scenes. The correlation of social awareness to post-earthquake food distribution efforts identifies IO intentions and their behavior towards the people and specifically, the farmers of Haiti. The issues that the farming community faced were not entirely addressed by IOs. Examples include the influx of food aid that led to a disruption of local farmers' pricing and sales, the accounts of the respondents to my questionnaire, and the conclusion that Haiti needs a rehabilitation of its identity. Labeled as a struggling and underdeveloped country, Haiti constantly receives food aid. This practice should not be considered a continuing habit, and IOs should not provide food aid without consulting local constituents beforehand. Moyo's belief that aid can have corrosive effects in Africa (Al Jazeera News, 2018), easily applies to Haiti's food aid initiatives. The classification of Haiti as a constant recipient of food aid by the international community and media must change in order to transform the country from a food-insecure country to a food sovereign nation. Haiti should instead be characterized as a potentially capable global trading agent that requests support and encouragement from the international community in order for it to realize its capacity.

Conclusion

My thesis paper lays out inclusive research on the interactions between the international community and Haiti before and after the 2010 earthquake. Haiti's violent revolution resulting in its independence was fueled by the lack of awareness and respect for its majority population, the African slaves. Due to its value as a profitable

agriculturally-based territory, France was unwilling to recognize the social setting of which it had created in Haiti. France's error led to its ultimate defeat and release of Haiti as a free black nation.

IOs' overarching effects on the agriculture sector have been characterized as fragmented and underwhelming in the Haitian community. The respondents of my questionnaire pointed out several issues with IO initiatives in the agriculture sector. IO support presents a separation between disaster relief needs-based food assistance and a disruptive and unsustainable method for food dependency. The "poverty alleviation lens", the misconception that big businesses cannot integrate with smaller vendors, and the constant recommendation by local organizations to provide better coordination of food aid programs are all various underlying representations towards a lack of social awareness of Haitian lifestyles. To ameliorate the issue of food dependency and disruption to the agricultural community, IOs, donors and foreign governments should consider the social interactions, issues, and relationships that the local community has with one another and with the international community. In this way, they will achieve a holistic solution-oriented approach in their efforts to leave a humanitarian footprint in Haiti.

The respondents' recommendations include initiating communication and analytical assessments before IOs embark on a food aid expedition to a foreign country in order to identify support on existing efforts of their recipient's environment. Working with the government as oppose to undermining governance capacity mitigates the opportunity for a social disconnect. From a local perspective, Haiti's government and local leaders should communicate to the international community the priorities it has of

needs-based vulnerabilities to grow as an agriculturally-based economy. Haiti has a young and growing workforce; six out of ten Haitians are below the age of twenty-five (Worldbank, 2015). The GoH needs to emphasize the importance of education in order to utilize and strengthen the upcoming generation's productivity and capacity. The GoH should encourage and boost civic participation in agriculture and set pre-determined emergency food aid requirements.

From a global perspective, implementing analytical metrics to assess impact performance, providing farming tools, improving transportation methods and enhancing the growth of income-generating crops and fertilizers are all suggested and necessary initiatives to guide Haiti towards a more prosperous future. Lastly, boosting agriculture in the export sector would add value to the country's economy and morale. If IOs could guide Haitian growers to manufacture, package and export their locally grown food, this would help the country gain a step up in the global economic forum. This effort could be done by providing standards for presentation of packaging, benchmarks for planting and growing, as well as hygiene regulations with handling produce. Communication with the international community and comprehension of local needs go hand in hand as the key to unlocking Haiti's agricultural potential.

Haiti's agriculture was the power behind its depiction as the "Pearl of the Antilles." This sector has allowed a strong dogma to form in its culture, leading agriculture to become the driving force of the country's existence. As demonstrated throughout the paper, Haiti's agricultural strength has succumbed to multiple phases of foreign influence, such as the colonial plantation period and post-earthquake disruptive conditions. Ultimately, Haiti has digressed from a dominating prosperous farming

economy to the image of an apologetic “build back better” campaign and *lakou* subsistence farming structure. Applying Merton’s social theory can help one to understand the series of unintended consequences that occurred in the agriculture sector leading to this regression, insinuating a lesson that was repeatedly overlooked.

I explored IOs engagement that radically influenced the course of Haiti’s re-development and social structure. Highly reliant on external agents, the Haitian agriculture sector has had to struggle through decades of environmental degradation, stunted growth, inaccessibility to markets and a limitation of resources (Shamsie, 2012). Tandler, Moyo, Kushner and the other various authors noted in the previous chapters have supported the notion that Haiti must not continue to accept foreign aid the same way it has in the past. By understanding the country’s social environment, IOs can benefit from more effective development program output.

I believe the reason Haiti suffered from the inadvertent misfortune in the agricultural sector after the 2010 earthquake was because the country was not prepared to receive such an influx of food aid. IOs and the local government did not know how to handle the abundance of food and the logistics that came with it, considering the disastrous environment they were in and combined with the country’s weak infrastructure. A second reason for the disruption was due to an oversight of the local conditions by the IOs who were unfamiliar with how their actions would impact the community. IOs should have the experience to manage disaster relief logistics. A reason for the disruption in the agricultural sector was due to the unawareness of social practices and concerns. Also, because the majority of Haiti’s agricultural community lives off of subsistence farming, they were extremely vulnerable to the disaster’s effects. The

government must help the farming community to transition to commercial farming so that farmers may gain control of their own sector. One example on how the local government could assist the farming community would be to provide better access to markets by improving the transportation and distribution systems from farms to markets.

My advice for the international aid community would be to encourage close communication with local communities of Haiti in order to provide needs-based resources and aid. Therefore, IOs will create a strong working relationship with government officials, but more importantly, with rural communities. In this way, they will organically develop a comprehensive understanding of what is needed for post-disaster relief. Targeting the agriculture community directly would ensure that the right type of food assistance is provided directly to the receiver.

I point to many negative impacts international organizations have made in Haiti throughout this paper. Having personally witnessed the destruction of the 2010 earthquake, I can state that if it were not for the assistance of international organizations, Haiti would not have been able to move past the first stage of emergency relief as quickly as it did. Aid workers saved lives, provided food and medical assistance and rebuilt homes. The purpose of my research is simply to shed light on a perspective to a problem that needs to be solved, the international aid and development conundrum.

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