Making Protest Work: Protest Brokers and the Technology of Mobilization

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Making Protest Work: Protest Brokers and the Technology of Mobilization

A dissertation presented

by

Sarah Lockwood

to

The Department of African and African American Studies

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Making Protest Work: Protest Brokers and the Technology of Mobilization

Abstract

Existing theories of protest struggle to explain why some communities regularly turn to protest to express their frustrations and demand change, while other seemingly similar communities do not. In this dissertation, I argue that closer attention to the technology of mobilization helps to explain these patterns, and identify the important role played by protest brokers – intermediaries who connect elites desiring mobilization with communities of potential protesters. Without these brokers, I argue, many elites lack the local knowledge, connections, and reservoirs of trust necessary to mobilize community members, significantly decreasing the likelihood of protest occurrence, and helping to explain where protests happen. Because protest brokers are not homogenous in type, moreover, I argue further that variation at this level also helps to explain geographic differences in the types of protest we observe, leading to predictable variation in protest frequency, variety, and duration, as well as the likelihood of violence, and the mobilization tactics that are likely to be most effective. I test my argument using two original datasets, along with qualitative data from over 26 months of fieldwork in South Africa. My findings highlight the critical role of brokers in protest, with important theoretical and practical implications for our understanding of collective action.
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All mistakes are, of course, my own.
1 The Puzzle of Meso-Level Patterns of Protest

1.1 Introduction

In February 2015, the community of Slovo East, an informal settlement south of Johannesburg in South Africa, was engulfed by violence.¹ Frustrated by the slow pace of service delivery, a local community leader organized a protest in which over two hundred residents took to the streets – barricading roads with burning tires, throwing petrol bombs, and engaging in violent confrontations with the police. When the dust finally settled, one resident had been killed, thirty-four had been arrested for public violence, and several buildings – including the local police station – had been badly damaged by fire.

While Slovo East burned, however, the situation in the neighboring township of Maratiwa was strikingly different. A local businessman called a public meeting, at which he highlighted the poor service delivery in the community, described the benefits of a protest, and encouraged his fellow residents to take to the streets. A time and location were arranged for the protest, those at the meeting agreed to encourage friends and family to attend, and the businessman promised to provide food to anyone who showed up. When the time came, however, the streets were silent, and the frustrated businessman was left alone, with a car full

¹ To protect the identities of my informants, many of whom are regularly harassed by the police, I have changed the names of all individuals and communities throughout this work.
of food, fielding questions from a bemused group of journalists who had been promised an explosive uprising.²

So why was it that the community of Slovo East was able to overcome the collective action problem³ and successfully organize protest, while that of Maratiwa struggled? More broadly: what explains why some communities regularly turn to protest to express their frustrations and demand change, while other seemingly similar communities do not?

Despite the extensive literature that exists on protest, this meso-level variation remains poorly understood (Lancaster 2018). Explanations of protest have typically focused on either individual-level incentives,⁴ or the macro-level environment,⁵ and assumed that variation at the subnational level can be explained by some combination of these. Such arguments struggle to explain the vignette above, however, given the similar profiles of the two communities, and their shared institutional environment.

² It is worth noting at this point that the attempts of the Maratiwa businessman and the Slovo East community leader took place almost simultaneously, and the protest in Maratiwa was actually due to start first. It is therefore unlikely that Maratiwa residents were dissuaded from mobilization by the violent experience of their neighbors.

³ A collective action problem can be said to exist when all individuals in a given group would be better off cooperating, but fail to do so because of their own personal interests (Olson 1965). In the case of protest, for example, community members might all desire a protest, but rationally choose not to take part themselves given the personal costs involved (for example, time, the risk of violence, and the cost of getting to and from the protest location).

⁴ For example variations in the perceived utility of protest (De Figueiredo and Weingast 1999; Gagnon 1995), level of grievances (Gurr 1970; E. N. Muller 1985), resources (Gamson 1975; McCarthy and Zald 1973), and the frames through which individuals view and interpret the world (Gamson and Meyer 1996; Snow and Benford 1988).

⁵ Such as the level of repression (Kitschelt 1986; Tarrow 1996; McAdam 1982), the presence of alternate, meaningful, access points (Brockett 1991; Flacks 2004), and contextual macroeconomic and policy factors (Grasso and Giugni 2016).
In this dissertation, I argue that closer attention to the technology of mobilization helps to explain these subnational patterns of protest. Specifically, I identify the critical role played by protest brokers – intermediaries who connect elites desiring mobilization with communities of potential protesters. I argue that without such brokers many elites lack the local knowledge, trust, and connections necessary to successfully employ their chosen mobilization tactics, significantly reducing the likelihood of protest occurrence in such communities, and helping to explain where protests happen. Because protest brokers are not homogenous in type, moreover, I argue further that variation at this level also helps to explain geographic differences in a range of other variables, including protest frequency, duration, the variety of issues protested, the likelihood of violence, and the mobilization tactics that are likely to be most effective.

1.2 The Puzzle of Meso-Level Patterns of Protest

Between 2004 and 2017 South Africa saw nearly 8,000 community protests. While some communities saw multiple protests a year over a variety of different issues, however, others saw just one or two over the entire period, and the vast majority saw none at all. Despite the extensive literature that exists on protest, very few works explore this sort of subnational variation in any great detail. Rather the literature tends to focus on individual and national level factors affecting protest, and assume that subnational geographic variation can be explained by some combination of these. Such arguments are not entirely convincing, however.

---

6 Community protests are defined here as protests carried out by members of a geographically defined and identifiable neighborhood, and the data comes from the South African Protest Dataset (SAPD) constructed by the author (see Chapter 4 and Appendix B for more information).
At the individual level, for example, the literature identifies a number of different variables affecting protest participation, including biographic availability (Rüdig and Karyotis 2013), the networks an individual is embedded in (Centola and Macy 2007; Varshney 2002), and individual beliefs and cognitions (Meyer 2007). From a geographic point of view, the implication is that areas more prone to protest are likely to have a greater concentration of people with high individual-level predictors. While this provides some explanatory leverage, however, communities with very different protest patterns often look strikingly similar at the micro-level (Kitschelt 1986), and more is therefore needed to fully explain the variation we observe.

Macro-level arguments, similarly, while invaluable for cross-national analysis, often run into problems when applied to the subnational setting. The institutional environment (Eisinger 1973; Meyer 2007), and the level of repression (McAdam 1982; Brockett 1991), for example, have both been shown to affect cross-national protest patterns, but as Varshney (2002) observes these are often not convincing at the community level, where the broad institutional context is typically similar. The same is true for arguments that focus on the contextual macroeconomic environment (Grasso and Giugni 2016), or the configuration of resources at the societal level (Dalton, van Sickle, and Weldon 2009).7

Given the limitations of these arguments, a small, but growing, body of literature has recently developed, focused explicitly on explaining regional and community variations in protest. The literature is still nascent, but many of the works highlight the critical role played by local elites in determining both the locations and timing of collective action (e.g., Dollbaum

7 See also Arce and Rice (2009) for a more general discussion of some of the problems national level arguments have in explaining subnational protest patterns.
2017; Mueller 2018; Von Holdt et al. 2011). As we saw in the case of Maratiwa, however, the presence of elites desiring protest does not inevitably lead to mobilization, even when the elites concerned actively seek to encourage it. The Maratiwa businessman, for example, did many of the things the broader elite mobilization literature has suggested should facilitate protest. He provided information to coordinate and publicize the protest (Mueller 2018), tapped in to local grievances (Hipsher 1996; Williamson, Trump, and Einstein 2018), framed protest as a legitimate and useful strategy (Eisinger 1973; Ekiert and Kubik 1999), offered selective incentives (Hirschman 1984; Olson 1965), and drew on local social networks (Tarrow 1994; Tilly 1978). Despite all of this, however, he was unable to persuade his fellow community members to turn out, suggesting that we need to move beyond our current understandings of elite mobilization if we are fully to understand the impact elites have on the subnational patterns of protest we observe.

1.3 Towards a New Theory: The Role of Protest Brokers

In order to mobilize a protest successfully, elites need to do four key things: First, they need to identify potential participants; second, they need to persuade them to turn out; third they need to coordinate their activities; and finally, they need to control the protest so that the

8 Other factors found to be important include: patterns of local-level grievances (Chan, Backstrom, and Mason 2014); social cues indicating the desirability of mobilization (Doherty and Schraeder 2018); and subnational variations in institutions where these exist (Arce and Rice 2009; Chan, Backstrom, and Mason 2014; Moseley 2018).

9 In a community where the average income is less than US$1,000 per year, and over 30% of residents are unemployed, the provision of food at a protest acts as a considerable selective incentive (income and employment data taken from the 2011 South African Census).
appropriate message is heard, and the desired goal achieved. At each stage, elites need to be able to connect effectively with those they seek to turn out, and local knowledge and the trust of the community are both central to this.

Without local knowledge, for example, elites will find it difficult to identify the people within the community who can be mobilized most effectively, as well as the tactics that will be most persuasive in getting them to turn out. They are therefore likely to end up over-paying for protest at best, and at worst may be unable to mobilize anyone at all. Local knowledge also facilitates the sort of monitoring necessary to discourage free-riders and prevent undesirable behavior, as well as making it easier for elites to provide the information necessary for coordination in a locally appropriate format.

Trust, similarly, is of vital importance at several stages of the organizational process. Without some level of community trust, for example, the information provided by elites to coordinate a protest may simply be ignored, while elite claims about protest goals may be viewed with skepticism (Duffy, Binder, and Skrentny 2010). Many mobilization tactics, moreover, require at least some level of trust to work effectively. The use of act-contingent selective incentives, for example, which is perhaps one of the most common mobilizing strategies (Mueller 2018, 18), almost always requires a strong element of trust if individuals are to believe the promises made. This is especially true when mobilizing elites are responsible for delivering the promised benefits themselves, and protesters are required to engage in the protest activity before receiving them.10

---

10 The sequencing of promise, action, and then payment in such situations creates a time-inconsistency problem, which makes it difficult for elites to commit credibly to the payment (e.g., Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue 2002; Laibson 1997). Along with more formal institutions, trust has been
While some elites are well-embedded in the communities they seek to mobilize, possessing the necessary levels of insider knowledge and trust, however, the vast majority are somewhat removed from those they ask to participate. Elites frequently come from outside of the communities in which they wish to organize protest, and even when they are community insiders they typically have both social and economic distance from the rank-and-file protesters they seek to turn out (Keniston 1968; Mueller 2018; Robnett 1996; Tezcür 2016). As a result, many elites lack the local knowledge, connections and trust necessary to connect effectively with protesters themselves, suggesting the need for some sort of intermediary – an individual able to connect elites with communities, and willing to help them overcome the collective action problem. I call such intermediaries “protest brokers”, and where elites do not have access to such individuals I argue that they are likely to find the challenges of mobilization difficult to overcome, significantly reducing the likelihood of protest in such communities.¹¹

¹¹ identified as one important way this problem can be overcome (Thaler 1981; Andreoni and Sprenger 2012).

¹¹ Note that the role played by these intermediaries is crucially different from that played by people-oriented leaders in the traditional dichotomy between task-oriented and people-oriented organizers (e.g., Aminzade, Goldstone, and Perry 2001; Bales and Slater 1955; Sashkin and Lassey 1983; Sashkin and Rosenbach 1993). While people-oriented leaders are often described as the elites concerned with mobilization, the intermediaries of interest here are not leaders, rather they are the people on the ground who facilitate the goals of the leaders. Similarly, protest brokers are also different from the informal leaders in the formal/informal leader dichotomy (e.g., Etzioni 1961; Gusfield 1966; Smelser 1962). This is because, unlike informal leaders, there is no requirement for protest brokers to be embedded in the same organization as the elites they work for. Informal leaders can thus be considered a type of protest broker, but the concept is much broader.
Variation at the Broker Level

As well as helping to explain the likelihood of protest at the community level, moreover, the existence of protest brokers also helps to explain the types of protest we are likely to see. Protest brokers are not homogenous in type, and variations at this level affect the ways in which the collective action problem is overcome, leading to predictable variation in a range of other variables.

I identify two key dimensions that jointly structure this variation in broker type: the relationship between brokers and elites, and the relationship between brokers and the communities they mobilize. In terms of the first dimension, I classify brokers as either exclusive (when they work with specific elites, and only mobilize protest on their behalf), or non-exclusive (when they arrange protest for a variety of different patrons). At the community level, in contrast, I distinguish between embedded brokers (who are embedded in and mobilize one specific group with a shared collective interest), and their non-embedded counterparts (who mobilize a variety of different groups and networks).

Assuming, for the sake of clarity, that each community is dominated by one broker,\(^\text{12}\) I argue that the variety and frequency of protest in any given location is heavily influenced by the number of ties this broker has to both elites and the community. Communities dominated by either non-exclusive or non-embedded brokers, therefore, will be likely to see more protest,

---

\(^\text{12}\) The assumption of one broker per community allows for the logic of the argument to be drawn out. In reality, of course, communities may have more than one broker present, and it will be necessary, therefore, to map their broker profile in order to fully predict the patterns of protest they are likely to see. The broader project develops this mapping and the associated predictions further, but in this dissertation the assumption of one broker per community is maintained throughout.
over a wider variety of issues, than communities dominated by their exclusive or embedded counterparts.

The effective means of mobilization, in contrast, is influenced primarily by the nature of a broker’s community relationship. Embedded brokers, because of the shared collective interest that unites the group, are more likely to be able to utilize non-material mobilization tactics, such as issue framing and ideology, while non-embedded brokers may have to rely more heavily on material incentives. This, in turn, affects the duration of protests, with embedded brokers better able to sustain lengthy protests as a result of the shared goals of the community group, as well as the typically lower cost of mobilization.

Finally, I argue that the likelihood of violence will also be lower where brokers are exclusive (because the more public nature of the exclusive relationship makes elites less likely to encourage violence), or embedded (where the shared collective interest of the group will reduce the involvement of participants in undesired behavior).

1.4 A Note on Terminology

The theory being advanced here seeks to explain subnational variation in elite-mobilized community protests, and it is therefore worth spending just a little time defining these concepts clearly.

Protest

At its most basic level, the concept of protest can be seen to include any statement or action that is intended to express disapproval or objection. Thus, as Scott (1985) and others have
noted, protests can involve relatively private actions, such as a slave spitting in food, or an individual worker performing tasks unnecessarily slowly, as well as the sort of the large-scale marches and demonstrations that make it into the news (Jasper 2014).

The focus of this work, however, is specifically on protest as a form of collective action that takes place in public, and which is intended to attract attention and disrupt the status quo in order to influence public opinion and push for change.\textsuperscript{13} Crucially, therefore, an event is only considered a protest from the point of view of this project if it includes:

- Collective action aimed at bringing about change by influencing public opinion (differentiating it from battles between gangs, taxi associations and the like).
- A public gathering (differentiating it from petitions, boycotts, and rent strikes).
- And a clear goal related to a community grievance.

\textbf{Community}

In terms of community, the word is used throughout this dissertation to refer to a group of people who are connected to each other through social networks, and who are located in a bounded, geographically identifiable area. The word “community” can be used to refer to all residents of a particular suburb or neighborhood, therefore, but it can also be used to refer to a subgroup of this geographic location, such as the residents of a particular hostel, social group or

\textsuperscript{13} This definition draws on the work of Della Porta (1999), Eisinger (1973), and Koopmans and Rucht (2002) among others.
political party. In every case, however, the group must be able to be geographically located, and the location must fall within a recognized main place in South Africa.\textsuperscript{14}

\textbf{Elites}

Finally, the third concept central to the definition of elite-mobilized community protests, is that of elites. Throughout this dissertation I use this term to refer to individuals who are able and willing to personally bear the costs associated with organizing a protest.\textsuperscript{15} Such individuals may be political or social elites in the more traditional sense of the term, of course, but, as long as they are able to bear the costs of organization, they do not have to be. Crucially, however, they are usually better off than the rank-and-file protesters they seek to turn out, making “elite” an appropriate, if broad, term.\textsuperscript{16} It should be noted, however, that elites in this sense are not necessarily the same people as protest leaders, organizers, or beneficiaries, and these terms are therefore not interchangeable.

It should also be noted at this point that the focus of this project on elite-mobilized protest does not mean that all protests are elite driven. Studies from around the world, however, suggest that many protests do involve significant planning and organization, requiring the presence of an elite prepared to bear these costs, even if they are later described by observers or participants as spontaneous and leaderless (C. Barker, Johnson, and Lavalette

\textsuperscript{14} Main places are a geographic unit used by the South African government for census purposes. For more information see Chapter 4.

\textsuperscript{15} These costs might include the provision of selective incentives, food, or transportation for protesters.

\textsuperscript{16} See Mueller (2018) for a similar argument.
The fact that protests are often organized does not mean that protesters are inevitably being manipulated into participating, however, or that the grievances being expressed are not real. While both of these things can happen, of course, the evidence suggests that the vast majority of organized protests – in South Africa and elsewhere – express genuine grievances, with elites simply channeling and directing frustrations, rather than fabricating them out of thin air (S. Friedman 2019).

1.5 Empirical Strategy

A central challenge to studying protest brokers is that their activities are typically hidden. As a result, it is not possible to obtain data documenting their presence or behavior at any sort of scale. This dissertation therefore uses a pluralistic research approach, which combines an original dataset of national level protest activity, with more fine-grained data on twelve specific communities. These communities were chosen following regression analysis, and include a mixture of typical, deviant and extreme cases. The community level data includes the life histories of 37 protest brokers, as well as over 400 interviews, 36 group discussions, data from participant observation, and an original dataset containing information on over 800 community

17 Indeed Mueller (2018), Polletta (1998) and others argue that describing organized protests as “spontaneous” is often a deliberate tactic used by opponents to discredit the logic, hard work and knowledge behind protests, or even by protesters themselves to romanticize and legitimize their behavior. Friedman (2019) notes, similarly, that any activity in which people cooperate requires at least some element of organization, decrying those who are shocked at the idea of organized protest by stating: “harping on the fact that a protest is organized is like noting that people won’t go to an event unless someone invites them.”
level protests. More information on all of this, as well as the advantages of building from the South African case in particular, can be found in Chapters 4 and 5.

1.6 Broader Implications

This work makes a number of contributions to the literature. First, it advances the small, but growing, body of work that focuses explicitly on explaining subnational variation in protest (e.g., Doherty and Schraeder 2018; Moseley 2018). This has an obvious theoretical value to the literature of course, but it also has an important practical implication as well. Protest is an important tool for social change and government accountability, particularly in regions such as Africa where other forms of government accountability are typically low. Understanding what affects subnational protest is important, therefore, because it provides valuable information to civil society organizations regarding how to mobilize most effectively, and where best to strategically prioritize their limited resources.

Second, by focusing on the technology of mobilization, this dissertation also draws attention to an underlying assumption in the literature that is not always met: namely, that elites desiring a protest will be able to connect credibly and effectively with those they seek to mobilize. Paying attention to the activities of protest brokers, therefore, helps to explain a number of puzzling patterns of protest. It also casts new light on many of our existing theories of elite mobilization – helping us to understand when and why different mobilization techniques will be used, and what they require to work effectively.

Third, while the broad observation that elites sometimes utilize intermediaries to mobilize protest has been recognized before (e.g., Perry 2007; Popkin 1988; and Robnett 1996),
this work moves beyond the anecdotal evidence of these other works, to present more systematic evidence about protest brokers and their types. Rather than seeing the role of these intermediaries as a curiosity of specific movements, times, and places, that is, I argue that they are an important part of protest mobilization more generally, and their centrality to making key mechanisms work, and effect on patterns of protest, therefore deserves greater theoretical attention.

Finally, this work also contributes to a growing literature on the intermediary role of brokers in a variety of political spheres (e.g., Holland and Palmer-Rubin 2015; Koter 2013; Larreguy, Marshall, and Querubín 2016). By extending the concept of brokerage and secondary mobilization to the protest literature, moreover, it introduces an important new variation in brokerage, deepening our understanding of both elite-broker relations, and protest, in important ways.

1.7 Roadmap

The remainder of the dissertation proceeds as follows. The first section develops a new theory of protest mobilization, which focuses explicitly on the role of protest brokers (Chapters 2 and 3). The second section then illustrates various aspects of this theory using data from South Africa (Chapters 4-6), while the concluding chapter reaches beyond the South African case, discussing the activities of protest brokers in other locations, and considering the implications of the theory for the broader social science literature.

Chapter 2 begins the process of theory development by exploring the challenges of protest organization, highlighting the importance of local knowledge and trust to mobilization.
It then moves on to demonstrate that many elites desiring protest lack the local connections
that facilitate this knowledge and trust, suggesting the need for an intermediary – or broker –
to help them overcome the collective action problem. Following this, the third section develops
a deeper understanding of protest brokers, outlining some of their key characteristics, while the
final section discusses their impact on protest location.

Chapter 3 then develops the theory of protest brokers further by outlining two
relationships central to understanding broker behavior: the relationship between brokers and
elites, and the relationship between brokers and the communities they seek to mobilize. It then
distinguishes four types of broker based on these two dimensions – ideological, elite, group,
and independent – and outlines the patterns of protest that each predicts. I focus particularly
here on the impact of broker type on protest frequency, variety, duration, the likelihood of
violence, and the mobilization tactics that are likely to be most effective. This chapter also
discusses some of the factors that affect the emergence of different broker types.

Chapter 4 is the introduction to the second section, which offers evidence in support of
this new theoretical approach. It introduces the case of South Africa, and justifies the empirical
focus on this country. It also provides information on case study selection, and the twelve
communities at the heart of this project.

Chapter 5, in turn, explores the activities of South African protest brokers in practice,
and demonstrates that brokers do indeed play an important role in the mobilization of protest
at a local level, acting as valuable intermediaries between elites desiring protest and the
communities they seek to turn out.
Chapter 6 then returns to the broader question at the heart of this dissertation and asks how this new theory helps us to better understand meso-level patterns of protest. Drawing on the data introduced in Chapters 4 and 5 it tests the arguments put forward in the theory section, and illustrates the ways in which broker type helps to explain some of the patterns of protest we observe.

Finally, Chapter 7 concludes by discussing the implications of this theory for the wider literature, as well as suggesting a number of directions for future research.
2 The Role of Protest Brokers

2.1 Introduction

Having identified the limitations of the current literature, the next two chapters now advance a new theory to help explain subnational patterns of protest. This chapter (Chapter 2) begins the process by exploring the challenges of protest mobilization, and identifying the important role played by protest brokers.

The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I outline the challenges of protest mobilization, highlighting the importance of local knowledge and trust at each stage. I then demonstrate that many elites lack the local connections that facilitate this knowledge and trust, suggesting the need for an intermediary – or broker – to help them overcome the collective action problem. The third section then develops a deeper understanding of protest brokers, outlining some of their key characteristics, while the final section discusses their impact on protest location.

2.2 The Challenge of Protest Mobilization

Mobilizing protest is far from easy. Participants need to be persuaded to give up their time and energy, and, depending on the circumstances, potentially even endanger themselves, all in pursuit of some specified collective goal. In some cases, of course, achieving that goal will have immediate, personal benefits that accrue solely to protest participants, giving individuals a clear incentive to take part. In many cases, however, protests are intended to bring about a change that would benefit both participants and non-participants alike, for example by bringing about a change in the law or encouraging the provision of some sort of public good. If, as in these
examples, the goal of the protest is non-excludable (non-protesters cannot reasonably be prevented from enjoying it), and non-rivalrous (one person’s consumption of the good does not affect another’s), potential participants have a strong incentive to free-ride on the efforts of other people, and to leave all the hard work to them while enjoying the changes their efforts bring about. This results in a collective action problem that makes group mobilization incredibly difficult (Olson 1968).

Over the years, a number of arguments have been put forward in response to this problem, to try and explain the conditions under which collective action occurs, and the different strategies elites can employ to mobilize protest (Brass 1997; Kapferer 1988; Fearon and Laitin 2000; Olson 1965). These strategies include: the provision of act-contingent selective incentives (Olson 1965; D. Friedman and McAdam 1992); the use of compulsion and coercion (Olson 1965; Oliver 1980); and the careful framing of protest to tap into strong beliefs and emotions (Gamson 1992; Snow and Benford 1992). For each of these strategies to work, however, there needs to be an individual or group of individuals who both desire the protest and are willing to bear the cost of employing such tactics. As noted in the introduction, I refer to these individuals as “elites”, and without their presence the tactics themselves present a free-rider problem, and as a result offer little solution to the broader challenge of mobilization.18

18 Note, these elites are slightly different from the “privileged group” discussed by Olson (1965), who are willing to bear the costs of providing a public good unilaterally because they gain more from its provision than it costs them to supply it. In contrast the individuals here are willing to bear some of the costs of protest themselves, but they still require others to join in. Their activity, therefore, focuses on reducing the costs/increasing the benefits of participation for others, rather than bearing all the costs of provision themselves.
2.3 The Role of Elites

In order to successfully mobilize a protest, elites need to do four key things: First, they need to identify potential participants; second, they need to persuade them to turn out; third they need to coordinate their activities; And finally, they need to control the protest so that the appropriate message is heard, and the desired goal achieved. At each stage, elites need to be able to connect effectively with those they seek to turn out, and local knowledge and the trust of the community are both central to this.

Identifying Potential Participants

The first challenge elites face is identifying potential participants. That is, elites need to determine who is a member of the affected community, and – crucially – who within that broad community is most likely to turn out given the right incentives.

Identifying the affected community may be relatively easy, of course. For example, someone wanting to organize a protest over the lack of basic services in a Johannesburg township could assume, reasonably confidently, that most people in the township would agree with the need for better services. Identifying the broad community in this case, therefore, may involve little more than determining the geographic boundaries of the township, and locating the people who live and work within these boundaries.

In other cases, however, potential participants may be somewhat harder to identify. Who, for example, is the broad target population for someone who wants to organize a march demanding better access to HIV treatment in South Africa? Presumably those affected by HIV
are potential participants, but who are they and where can they be found? If the target population does not cluster geographically, and is not readily identifiable by some externally visible and unambiguous quality, elites will need to find another way to identify potential participants, and in these cases, local knowledge becomes essential.

Once elites have identified the general target population, moreover, an additional identification problem emerges. Who, within the broad community, will it be most effective for them to target with their mobilization strategy? Not everyone who is affected by an issue is equally likely to turn out to protest, and elites need to target their mobilization strategies accordingly. The Johannesburg township, for example, likely contains many people who are aggrieved at the lack of basic services, but who would be highly unlikely to join a protest – perhaps because they do not agree with protest as a strategy, they are too busy, or they feel they have too much to lose by taking to the streets in this way. Targeting mobilization strategies to this group would be a waste of time, money and effort, and likely do little to increase the likelihood of the desired protest. Once the broad community has been identified, therefore, local knowledge becomes even more essential if elites are to be able to make the most of their scarce resources, and identify not just those potentially available for mobilization, but those, within that group, who are the most likely to actually turn out.
Persuading Participants to Turn Out

Having identified the most effective people to target, elites now face a second problem: getting them to turn out.\(^\text{19}\) As discussed above, however, persuading participants to turn out is far from easy, and mobilizing elites often need to employ a range of tactics to overcome the collective action problem.\(^\text{20}\) These might include: providing act-contingent selective incentives such as money or status gain (Olson 1965, 1977; Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 1995); using social pressure and sanctioning (Olson 1965, 1977; Popkin 1979); activating important social networks (Putnam 2000; Rüdig and Karyotis 2013); generating common knowledge about the likelihood that others will turn out (Baldwin 2016; Doherty and Schraeder 2018; Hollyer, Rosendorff, and Vreeland 2013); and carefully framing issues to convince participants that it is in their interest to take part (Goffman 1974; Popkin 1979; Snow and Benford 1988).

The next stage in mobilization, therefore, involves deciding which of these tactics to employ. Material incentives, for example, may be customary in some situations, while in others providing them may be unnecessary, and in extreme cases may even dissuade committed ideologues from taking part by making the protest seem illegitimate.\(^\text{21}\) Status gain, similarly, may be a useful tactic in some contexts and unhelpful in others, while social networks will vary

\(\text{19}\) It should be noted that protest organizers do not need to mobilize every single protester themselves, and indeed the goal is typically to trigger a cascade of people asking one another to participate (González-Bailón and Wang 2016; Mueller 2018). To trigger this cascade, however, elites do need to persuade a critical mass of people to take to the streets if the mobilization is to be successful.

\(\text{20}\) The argument that grievances alone are rarely enough to mobilize people is well established in the literature on protests and social movements. See, for example, Oberschall (1978), Klandermans (1997), and Wang et al (1993).

\(\text{21}\) For recent examples of the heated controversy that can occur over the use of monetary incentives see Koren (2018), Huppke (2017) and Relman (2018).
in their availability for mobilization. Local knowledge is therefore essential to help elites determine which of the possible tactics is most likely to be effective, and which might be unhelpful or even harm their cause.

Once a protest organizer has decided which tactics to employ, moreover, local knowledge is again critical if they are to be employed successfully. In the case of material incentives, for example, elites need to identify the most effective goods to offer, as well as the appropriate amounts needed to achieve the desired result. Without this information, they are likely to end up over-paying for protest at best, and at worst, may be unable to get anyone at all to respond to their call for action. To successfully employ framing mechanisms, similarly, protest organizers need to be able to accurately identify the most salient issues to tap into, as well as the rhetorical forms and approaches most likely to galvanize action. And local knowledge is similarly important to the successful use of social pressure and sanctioning, as well as the activation of locally important social networks.

And finally, whatever tactic(s) elites decide to employ, a critical stage in using them is convincing participants that the elites concerned will deliver on the promises they have made. That is, potential participants must believe that elites will keep their word on payments, sanctions and so on, and not renge on their promises at a later date (Popkin 1979). This is especially important when protesters are required to engage in the protest activity before receiving any promised benefits, as the sequencing of promise, action, and then payment in

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22 Popkin (1979), for example, in his study of peasants in Vietnam, found that educated urbanites often struggled to mobilize peasants in large part because they did not use symbols and references that were culturally familiar and so were unable to fully convey their ideas to the community.
such situations creates a time-inconsistency problem that makes it difficult for elites to credibly commit to any payment (e.g., Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue 2002; Laibson 1997). Overcoming this problem is often difficult, but trust has been shown to play an important role, and this again emphasizes the importance of local connections to protest organization (Andreoni and Sprenger 2012; Barro and Gordon 1983; Thaler 1981).^{23}

**Coordinating the Protest**

And the challenges do not end there. Once elites have overcome the problems of identification and persuasion, a third problem emerges – coordination. That is, elites must provide the information and resources necessary to enable protesters to coordinate their actions, and to ensure that everyone turns up at the same location at the right time, with the same message, and the right equipment (for example, t-shirts bearing slogans, signs, banners, drums and so forth). As above, local knowledge and trust are again critically important here, as elites must utilize appropriate channels of communication, and also provide the information in a way that potential participants find both credible and trustworthy (Popkin 1979). If the information does not reach the people concerned, or is not believed when it does, coordination will become nearly impossible and a successful protest will be highly unlikely (Duffy, Binder, and Skrentny 2010).

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^{23} Both social proximity and repeated interaction have been shown to promote trust development in relationships (Binzel and Fehr 2013; Engle-Warnick and Slonim 2006; Etang, Fielding, and Knowles 2011; Granovetter 1985).
Controlling the Protest

And finally, elites also need to be able to exert at least some level of control over the protest they have mobilized. The precise level of control both needed and desired will vary considerably from elite to elite, and protest to protest, but at a minimum elites need to ensure that their desired message is heard, and not completely drowned out by excessive violence or hijacked by other causes.\(^{24}\) Ensuring this may not always be possible, of course, but the chances are much higher if elites have access to the local knowledge and trust that will enable them to successfully monitor protesters, identify potential trouble early, and sanction those who step too far out of line.

2.4 The Need for a Broker

As the above section demonstrates, local knowledge and trust are an important part of successful protest mobilization, and elites without them are likely to end up over-paying for protest at best, and at worst may be unable to mobilize anyone at all. Despite their critical importance, however, the elite mobilization literature has generally overlooked these two elements, and assumed that elites will automatically be able to connect credibly and effectively with those they seek to turn out.\(^{25}\) While some elites are well-embedded in the communities

\(^{24}\) As happened, for example, at the speech delivered by Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceauşescu on 21 December 1989, when many of those bussed into the square to applaud ended up protesting the regime with disastrous consequences for Ceauşescu and his government (Almond 1992).

\(^{25}\) There is, of course, a significant literature that tries to understand why participants follow the mobilizational entreaties of elites (see, for example, De Figueiredo and Weingast 1999; Fearon and Laitin 2000; Posen 1993), but this literature focuses on the rational reasons protesters may have to protest, as well as the different techniques elites can use to manipulate these, rather than whether elites possess the necessary connections to engage with communities in the first place.
they seek to mobilize, possessing the necessary levels of insider knowledge and trust, however, a significant number are more removed from those they ask to participate, raising questions around their ability to mobilize protesters themselves.

At their most extreme, elites may come from entirely outside of the communities they seek to mobilize and possess no local ties at all. This is often the case, for example, when the leaders of national or regional groups seek to organize broad protest across a number of communities. For these elites, their outsider status makes it highly unlikely that they possess any detailed local knowledge themselves, and while they may garner a certain amount of trust as a result of their public image, this trust is likely to be weak, and may well be insufficient to overcome the collective action problem.

Even when elites are community insiders, moreover, they still often have both social and economic distance from the rank-and-file protesters they seek to turn out (Keniston 1968; Mueller 2018; Robnett 1996; Tezçü 2016). Elites, by definition, usually enjoy at least some social and/or economic prestige that enables them to bear the costs of mobilization. Rank-and-file protesters, in contrast, are typically less well-off, and this is likely to result in limited social interactions between the two groups.27

To successfully employ the tactics needed to overcome the collective action problem, therefore, the reality is that many elites are likely to need some sort of intermediary to help

26 A significant number of studies have found that unemployed and economically disadvantaged individuals are among those most likely to protest (Alexander 2010a; Amtaika 2013; Lavery 2012; Mattes 2008). Though see Schwartz (2007), and Doherty and Schrader (2018) for challenges to this argument.

them. Someone able to connect them with the communities concerned, and willing to use their knowledge, connections, and reservoirs of trust on behalf of others. I call such intermediaries “protest brokers”, and where elites do not have access to such individuals, I argue that they are likely to find the challenges of mobilization difficult to overcome, significantly reducing the likelihood of protest in these locations.

2.5 Brokers in the Literature

The broad observation that elites occasionally need and use intermediaries to mobilize individuals is, of course, not entirely new. The idea is perhaps best explored and theorized in the voting literature, where electoral or vote brokers have been found to play a key mobilizing role in a variety of different contexts around the world (Holland and Palmer-Rubin 2015; Koter 2013; Larreguy, Olea, and Querúbín 2017; Stokes et al. 2013).

In the collective action literature, similarly, anecdotal evidence on the activities of intermediaries abounds. Elizabeth Perry (2007), in her influential work on protest in 1920s Shanghai, for example, observes that tapping into an “impressive infrastructure of mobilizing networks” was central to the ability of organizers to encourage participation and arrange protest (p.89), while several scholars highlight the important mobilizing role played by political brokers in contemporary Argentina (e.g., Auyero 2001; Szwarcberg 2012; Zarazaga 2014). Popkin’s (1988) local entrepreneurs in Vietnam, Robnett’s (1996) “bridge leaders” in the American Civil Rights Movement, and Sacks’ (1988) “centerwomen” at Duke Medical Center, similarly, all act as critical intermediaries, bridging the gap between elites and the broader population, and helping elites to mobilize collective action for their cause.
While the broad observation is not new, however, this argument moves beyond the existing literature on intermediaries in two key ways. First, unlike the anecdotal evidence of Perry, Popkin and others, it does not see the role of intermediaries in collective action as a curiosity of specific movements, times and places. Instead I argue that they are a frequent part of protest mobilization, and their centrality to making key mechanisms work, and effect on patterns of protest, therefore, deserve greater theoretical attention.

Second, in contrast to the work of Szwarcberg (2012), Zarazaga (2014) and others, this dissertation does not simply look at protest as something that is occasionally organized by political or electoral brokers as part of their broad range of mobilizing activities. Rather, I allow for the fact that some brokers may choose to specialize in the mobilization of protest, and not engage in any other forms of broker behavior, allowing us to explore for the first time the activities of intermediaries not captured by traditional brokerage models.

By building on these two insights – that protest brokers are a frequent part of protest mobilization, and that they may choose to specialize exclusively in mobilizing protest rather than engaging in a wider range of brokerage activities – this work develops the first systematic argument about the role and importance of protest brokers, and in so doing advances our understanding of both elite-broker relations and protest in important ways.

2.6 Key Characteristics of Protest Brokers

A fuller discussion of the characteristics of protest brokers in both theory and practice will take place over the remaining chapters, but a few general points are worth mentioning here. As outlined above, the primary role of protest brokers is to help elites overcome the collective
action problem by providing them with two key things: local knowledge and trust. To be able to carry out their role effectively, therefore, protest brokers need to be strongly rooted in the community concerned, with extensive networks, a wide circle of acquaintances, and detailed, accurate information about the grievances, goals and needs of those they seek to turn out. Both networks and information are central to the ability of protest brokers to mobilize collective action, and it is therefore likely that they will expend considerable time and effort building and maintaining these.

In addition to maintaining extensive local connections and detailed community knowledge, effective protest brokers will also work hard to ensure they are trusted by community members. That is, the community must believe that brokers are being honest about the risks and benefits protesters face, and that they will keep any promises they make around payments and punishments. As noted above, both social proximity and repeated social interactions play an important role in the development of this sort of trust, and once brokers have this trust they will work hard to ensure they do not lose it.

Finally, protest brokers are also likely to have some past experience of community mobilization, in either a participatory or organizing role. This experience is important for both their relationship with elites, and their relationship with potential protesters. For elites, past mobilizing experience provides evidence that the broker knows what he is doing, and has the background and knowledge necessary to successfully organize protest. Without such experience, therefore, it may be hard for brokers to convince elites that they are the right people for the job, especially if there are alternatives available. For the community, similarly, past experience provides important information about the likely success of protest.
organization, helping to reassure potential protesters that other people will also turn out, and providing evidence about the trustworthiness of the broker on prior occasions. Previous community interactions of this sort also help to build reciprocal relationships between brokers and those they mobilize, something which has been found to play an important role in mobilizing voter turnout in other situations (Finan and Schechter 2012; Lawson and Greene 2014; Schaffer and Baker 2015).

Crucially, all three of these characteristics – social embeddedness, local trust, and prior experience of protest organization – require time to develop, making it all but impossible for elites to manufacture a broker on demand, or simply parachute a new broker into an established community. Instead, as the literature on electoral and vote brokers has so convincingly demonstrated, elites are likely to have to work with the brokers and potential brokers they have available in any given location, resulting in important subnational variation in both protest potential and form.

2.7 The Impact of Protest Brokers

So, what does all of this mean for our understanding of patterns of protest? And how does recognizing the important role played by protest brokers help us to explain where protests happen, and the variation we observe in protest frequency, type and strategy? Much of the answer to this will be discussed in Chapter 3, as the idea of variation at the broker level is

28 See Doherty and Schraeder (2018) and Hollyer, Rosendorff, and Vreeland (2013) for discussions of the importance of common knowledge and social cues in protest participation.

29 See Burgwald (1996), Gay (1999), Koster and Vries (2012), Koter (2013), and Stokes (2005) for a discussion of this as it pertains to electoral brokers.
introduced. But the simple presence or absence of protest brokers also has an important effect on subnational patterns of protest, albeit likely a short term one.

As this chapter has argued, many elites are likely to struggle to organize protest in the absence of brokers able and willing to provide them with local knowledge and trust. As a result, communities where such brokers are not readily available will have a lower likelihood of protest occurrence than those where brokers are active and easily identifiable.

This does not mean that communities without brokers will never see protest, of course. First, as discussed above, some elites possess the necessary knowledge and connections themselves, and are therefore able to organize protest regardless of broker availability. Even where this is not the case, however, most communities have the potential to develop protest brokers under the right circumstances. That is, if a strong enough demand for protest organization exists, there is little reason to think that individuals will not eventually rise up to meet this demand. Crucially, however, these individuals have to be locally forged and developed, and cannot simply be parachuted in by elites desiring collective action. Nor can they spring up fully formed at a moment’s notice. As a result, although an elite determined to organize protest in a specific community will undoubtedly be able to eventually find a suitable broker, this will take time and effort, and in the short run the availability of brokers will affect the locations in which we see protest.

Additionally, where elites care less about the specific locations of protest (for example, they are trying to organize nationwide protests, and the specific neighborhoods that join in are less important than the overall numbers they get to turn out), they are likely to utilize the services of readily available brokers, rather than investing a lot of time and effort in developing
new brokers in other communities. As a result, communities with brokers are likely to engage in protest more frequently than those without, and potentially over a wider variety of issues if the broker concerned is prepared to offer his services to a range of different patrons. While the simple presence or absence of a broker does not explain everything, therefore, it does help us to understand some of the subnational patterns of protest we observe, and provides the start of a new answer to the question of why some communities turn to protest so much more frequently than others.
3 Variation at the Broker Level

3.1 Introduction

Having argued that protest brokers play an important role in the organization of protest, this chapter now develops the argument further by exploring the causes and consequences of variation at the broker level.

The chapter proceeds as follows. First I outline two key relationships that I believe are important to understanding broker type – the relationship between brokers and elites, and the relationship between brokers and the communities they seek to mobilize. I then distinguish four types of broker based on these two dimensions – ideological, elite, group and independent – and outline the patterns of protest that each predicts. I focus particularly here on the impact of broker type on protest frequency, variety and duration, as well as the likelihood of violence, and the mobilization tactics that are likely to be most effective. The penultimate section then examines the factors that affect the emergence of these different broker types at the community level, while the final section concludes.

3.2 Variation at the Broker Level

A number of things have the potential to affect broker behavior. Some brokers are likely to be motivated more strongly by ideological goals than others, for example, while those motivated by personal gain may have very different time horizons for their desired pay-offs. A broker’s past experience of protest, similarly, is likely to affect the mobilization tactics he chooses to employ, while the response he expects from the state will be factored in to the type of protest
he designs. While all of these are important in helping us to understand the behavior of protest brokers, however, they are likely to vary not just between protest brokers, but also for a given broker over time. The same protest broker who cares passionately about the ideological goals of the protest he is organizing today, for example, may be more strongly motivated by material incentives next week, while almost all brokers will make some adjustment to their tactics on an on-going basis, as they works out what is effective, and factor in the response of the community and the state on previous occasions.

A more useful way of thinking about variation at the broker level, therefore, is to explore differences that are likely to be more stable over time, and that therefore provide greater analytic purchase on the patterns we observe. Central to this, I argue, are differences in the two key relationships that dominate the broker experience – the relationship between protest brokers and the elites for whom they mobilize protest, and the relationship between protest brokers and the communities they seek to turn out.

**Relationship with Elites**

In terms of their elite relationship, a key distinction can be made between those brokers who work exclusively with a specific elite or group of elites, and mobilize protest solely on their behalf (exclusive), and those who arrange protest for a variety of different patrons (non-exclusive).³⁰

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³⁰ Note, both exclusive and non-exclusive brokers may be contracted by elites solely to help organize protest, or they may organize protest as part of a broader set of activities, such as campaigning and lobbying.
For exclusive brokers, the relationship between elite and broker is both durable and restricted. That is, the broker does not hold the same relationship with any other group of elites, and both elites and the broker perceive the relationship as continuing indefinitely. A condition necessary for the existence of exclusive brokers, therefore, is the presence of a stable elite grouping, capable of forming durable, long-term relationships.

Non-exclusive brokers, in contrast, sell their services to multiple different patrons, and are willing to help a variety of different elites arrange protest. The relationship between elites and non-exclusive brokers is therefore not restricted, and although they may have long-term relationships with some patrons, durability is typically not a necessity. This does not mean that non-exclusive brokers will work for anyone, however, and most will have at least some limits on the types of protest they are prepared to organize.31

In terms of protest variation, the nature of the relationship between elites and brokers has two important implications for the patterns of protest we expect to observe. First, although there will obviously be some variation as a result of the precise goals and ambitions of the elites concerned, communities dominated by an exclusive broker should, on average, see lower levels of protest, over a narrower set of issues, than those dominated by their non-exclusive counterparts. This is because exclusive brokers organize protest in pursuit of just one set of interests rather than several.

Second, while the precise level of violence seen at protests is the result of a complicated relationship between demand (elite desire for violence), supply (the willingness of rank-and-file

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31 For example, they may be unwilling to organize protests in support of certain ideologies, or on behalf of elites from particular identity groups.
protesters to engage in violence), and broker control (the ability and willingness of individual brokers to control violence), exclusive brokers are, on average, more likely to organize protests with lower levels of violence than their non-exclusive counterparts. This is for two reasons: First, because exclusive relationships between elites and brokers are more likely to be publicly known, elites desiring violence may hesitate to request or permit it from exclusive brokers, given the limited deniability they will have if the violence receives public condemnation. The demand for violence is, therefore, likely to be lower for exclusive brokers. Second, when elite patrons do not want violence, the iterative nature of the exclusive relationship gives exclusive brokers stronger incentives to adhere to their wishes, leading to higher levels of broker control.

**Relationship with the Community**

In addition to the nature of their elite relationships, protest brokers also vary in terms of the relationship they have with the networks they mobilize. Drawing on Holland and Palmer-Rubin's (2015) discussion of electoral brokers in this regard, I distinguish here between *embedded brokers* (who are embedded in and mobilize a single tight-knit group with some shared collective interest) and *non-embedded brokers* (who are not beholden to a specific social interest, and mobilize diffuse social networks across the broader community). The difference is subtle but crucial.

An embedded broker is part of a tight-knit, local-level group, whose members are available to be mobilized by elites in pursuit of agreed upon interests. An example might be a community group that seeks to improve the provision of government services in a specific neighborhood, or a local branch of a broader activist movement or political party. As members
of a social interest group, embedded brokers may specialize in the arrangement of protest, or they may organize protest as part of a broader set of activist activity. Crucially, they focus their mobilizing efforts exclusively on the group concerned, and as a result are restricted in the types of protest they can arrange by the group’s interests.

Non-embedded brokers, in contrast, mobilize diffuse social networks across the community, and are not beholden to any specific collective interest. They are, therefore, able to activate different groups for different protests, tapping into a variety of social networks, and reconfiguring their mobilization community as needed. This does not mean that they can organize protest over absolutely any issue, however, as the issue protested must still resonate with at least some segment of their social networks. Their ability to mobilize different groups does reduce some of the constraints from the community side, however, opening up the possibility of protest over a wider range of issues.

As was the case with the broker-elite relationship, the nature of the relationship between brokers and the community also has a number of implications in terms of the patterns of protest expected. First, in terms of protest frequency and variety, communities dominated by an embedded broker should, on average, see lower levels of protest, over a narrower set of issues, than their non-embedded counterparts. This is because, as discussed above, embedded brokers organize protest around one set of community interests, while non-embedded brokers can tap into several.

Second, in terms of their mobilization tactics, embedded brokers are less likely to rely on the payment of material selective incentives than their non-embedded counterparts. This is because the tight-knit nature of the embedded broker’s group makes tactics such as peer
pressure and social sanctions easier to employ, while the shared collective interest increases
the utility of framing, and is more likely to make material payments seem illegitimate (Chong
1991; Kitts 2006; Mueller 2018). This reduced reliance on material incentives, in turn, makes it
less costly for embedded brokers to sustain lengthy protests, and their protests are likely to be
longer on average as a result.

Finally, the presence of a strong group interest and reduced reliance on material selective
incentives combine to decrease the likelihood of violence at protests organized by embedded
brokers. This is because the protesters they mobilize are more likely to care strongly about the
intended goals of any given protest, and less likely to be willing to risk these goals by engaging
in looting or other forms of violence.32

3.3 Four Key Broker Types

Having discussed the relationship between brokers and elites, and between brokers and the
communities they seek to mobilize, Figure 3.1 distinguishes four key types of protest broker
based on these two dimensions, while Figure 3.2 visually summarizes the relationships defining
each broker type. The broker is represented in Figure 3.2 by the letter “B”, while solid lines
represent durable connections, and dotted lines represent relationships that are renegotiated
on an on-going basis. Subsequent sections then present each broker type in more detail.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
32 See Weinstein (2007) for a similar argument in relation to the mobilization of rebels.
Figure 3.1: Four Key Types of Protest Broker

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relationship to elites</th>
<th>Exclusive</th>
<th>Non-exclusive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Embedded</td>
<td>Ideological Broker</td>
<td>Group Broker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-embedded</td>
<td>Elite Broker</td>
<td>Independent Broker</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Figure 3.2: Broker Relationships

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<tr>
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<td>G</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Ideological Broker**

The upper left quadrant of Figure 3.1 represents those brokers who are exclusively linked to one specific group of elites, and who mobilize a tight-knit community group with an agreed upon collective interest. I call them *ideological brokers*, because the need for close issue alignment between their elite patron and interest group means that there is typically a strong ideological element to the protests they organize. The paradigmatic example of an ideological broker is an individual embedded in a social movement, who organizes protests at the direction of movement elites by mobilizing movement members in the community.

An effective ideological broker will care strongly about the goals of the protests he organizes, and as a result is unlikely to demand significant material payment for his activity. Relatedly, the tight-knit structure and shared social interest of his mobilization pool means that he will also not depend heavily on costly individual payments to mobilize them. Rather, he is likely to rely on mobilization techniques such as framing, and the use of nonmaterial selective incentives, including peer pressure or the promise of act-contingent status gains.\(^{33}\) This, combined with the exclusive nature of his elite relationship, makes him one of the most inexpensive options on a per protest basis for elites.\(^{34}\)

Because of the need for strong issue alignment, however, protests will only take place on issues of importance to both sides, and communities mobilized by an ideological broker are therefore likely to see the lowest frequency and variety of protest on average. The involvement

\(^{33}\) For more on the ways in which the promise of status or social esteem can affect participation in contentious politics see Chong (1991), McClendon (2014), and Olson (1965).

\(^{34}\) See Nollen and Axel (1998) for a discussion of the higher per-project fees typically charged by specialty freelance workers versus their contracted counterparts.
and leadership of the elites will also be clearly identifiable in most cases, and this, combined with the social interests of the protesters, will reduce both the demand for, and supply of, violence. Finally, the availability of nonmaterial mobilization tactics will also increase the potential for lengthy protests.

Unless the goals of the elites and the community group are perfectly aligned, however, the competing interests of the two create a double principal-agent problem. That is, both the elites and the group will try to control the behavior of the broker, but will be unsure about whether the broker faithfully represents their interests. Elites will fear both that the broker is overcharging for his services and that in reality he serves the community group, while the community group will fear they are being underpaid and that the broker serves the interests of the elites. Because of these competing interests, the presence of an ideological broker will only be a truly stable equilibrium where there is perfect issue alignment between the elite and group goals. In the absence of this, there will always be a tendency for the interests of one side to take precedence, leading to a shift toward either elite or group styles of brokerage.

**Elite Broker**

The lower left quadrant of Figure 3.1 represents those intermediaries who are exclusively linked to one specific group of elites, but who mobilize diffuse social networks at the local level, and are not beholden to a specific social interest. They therefore mobilize protest on behalf of the elite interest – hence the name *elite broker*. The paradigmatic example of an elite broker is an individual who is a member of a national political party, but who lives in a community without a
local branch, and therefore organizes protests for party leadership by mobilizing a variety of different local networks.

An effective elite broker has a clear reason to advance the goals of his elite patrons, though this may or may not have an ideological component. That is, he may support the elite interest primarily because he agrees with the policies they are trying to implement, because he is being paid by them, or as the result of some combination of the two. Where payment is the primary motivator, however, elites will face a clear principal-agent problem, and are likely to try and reduce the risk of brokers acting entirely in their own interests by making payments contingent on elite success in some way.

In terms of mobilization tactics, while an elite broker may be able to use mobilization techniques such as framing and the use of nonmaterial selective incentives for some protests, the lack of an agreed upon collective interest among those he mobilizes makes this harder, and the use of material payments more likely. This, combined with the increased likelihood that an elite broker receives some sort of material payment himself, makes him a more expensive brokerage option for elites than his ideological counterpart. His ability to organize protests over a wider range of issues may make him more attractive, however.

In terms of protest patterns, because an elite broker is not beholden to both elite and social interests, he is less restricted in the protests he organizes. His exclusive ties to just one set of elites, however, mean that the frequency and variety of protest is likely to be only marginally greater, on average, than that found in communities with an ideological broker. As with an ideological broker, moreover, the relationship between an elite broker and his patron is likely to be publicly known, and this will help to keep the demand for violence low. His
increased reliance on material incentives to mobilize the rank-and-file, however, is likely to result in a higher supply of violence, leading to a marginally increased likelihood of violence overall. Finally, the reliance of elite brokers on material mobilization tactics will also decrease the likelihood of lengthy protests.

**Group Broker**

The top right quadrant of Figure 3.1 represents those intermediaries who mobilize a tight-knit group with an agreed upon collective interest at the community level, but who are not exclusively linked to any specific set of elites. They are labeled *group brokers*, therefore, because the protests they organize revolve around the group interest. The paradigmatic example of a group broker is an individual embedded in a local community group, who mobilizes members of the group to protest at the direct request of group leaders, but is also happy to mobilize them for other elites as long as it advances the group's cause.

An effective group broker has a clear stake in the goals of the community group, making it less likely he will demand significant material rewards from his activity, while the shared goals of the group also mean that he does not need to depend heavily on material selective incentives to mobilize them. Rather he can employ mobilization techniques such as framing or the use of non-material selective incentives. Because the group broker is not tied to one specific group of elites, however, he is likely to request more from his patrons on a per-protest basis than either ideological or elite brokers. These requests may be in the form of direct payments to him, or commitments to provide future public or club goods to the community. This may well make him a more expensive option for elites to use, although group brokers
likely to vary the amount they charge depending on the level of issue alignment between elite interests and those of the community group.

In terms of protest patterns, the existence of multiple elite patrons means that communities mobilized by group brokers are likely to see higher levels of protest than their ideological counterparts. The strong collective interest of the community group, however, will impose a clear limit in this regard, and will also result in limited issue variety, as well as a low supply of violence by the rank-and-file. Because the relationship between elites and group brokers may be less public, however, the demand for violence may well be higher, resulting in a similar overall likelihood of violence to that seen with elite brokers. Finally, the availability of nonmaterial mobilization tactics will increase the potential for lengthy protests.

**Independent Broker**

And finally, the bottom right quadrant of Figure 3.1 represents those brokers who are not exclusively linked to any specific group of elites, and who mobilize diffuse social networks at the local level. They are therefore referred to as *independent brokers* because they act independently in the mobilization of collective action – organizing protests only when they have personal incentives to do so. A paradigmatic independent broker, therefore, is an individual who sells his community connections and knowledge to a variety of different elites, who each pay him directly for his services.

An effective independent broker has excellent local connections and social networks, and works hard to maintain these. While he may occasionally organize a protest for ideological reasons, he is most likely to demand payment for his services, and at the extreme may make his
primary living organizing collective action on behalf of others. The techniques he uses to mobilize the community will depend heavily on the issue being protested, and where he can tap into grievances and use framing or peer pressure, he will. He is also likely to rely heavily on the distribution of material payments, however, due to his non-embedded nature. As a result of both his own payment demands, and the increased likelihood that he will rely on material selective incentives to mobilize others, independent brokers are typically the most expensive option for elites on a per-protest basis.

In terms of protest patterns, because of the high number of both community and elite ties, communities mobilized by independent brokers are likely to see the highest levels of protest, over the greatest number of issues. Their reliance on material mobilization tactics, however, decreases the likelihood of lengthy protests in communities where they dominate. Finally, violent protests are likely to be highest in such communities for several reasons. First, communities mobilized by independent brokers are more likely to engage in looting or other destructive behavior, due to the personal material interests of the protesters and their lack of shared collective goals. This leads to a high supply of violence. Second, as was the case with group brokers, because independent brokers are not readily identifiable with specific elites, they are more likely to be used when elites actively want a violent protest, leading to higher demand. And finally, if independent brokers do not foresee an iterative relationship with elites, they may have little incentive to expend energy limiting violent and destructive behavior among those they have mobilized, resulting in lower levels of broker control.

Table 3.1 summarizes the predicted patterns of protest for each broker type.
Table 3.1: Predicted Patterns of Protest by Broker Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ideological Broker</th>
<th>Elite Broker</th>
<th>Group Broker</th>
<th>Independent Broker</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Predicted Patterns of Protest</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Frequency</strong></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Variety of Issues</strong></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dominant Mobilization Tactic</strong></td>
<td>Non-material</td>
<td>Material</td>
<td>Non-material</td>
<td>Material</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Protest Duration</strong></td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Short</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Short</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Likelihood of violence</strong></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium (high supply, low demand, high incentives for broker control due to elite relationship)</td>
<td>Medium (low supply, high demand, high incentives for broker control due to shared collective interest)</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the figures above, the broker is represented by the letter “B”, elites by “E”, and groups within the community by “G”. Solid lines represent durable connections, and dotted lines represent relationships that are renegotiated on an ongoing basis.

3.4 Determinants of Broker Type

The previous sections have argued that the type of broker a community has affects the patterns of protest we will see, and this raises an important question: What determines broker type?

The reality is that a complex range of factors are likely to play a role, and exactly how the
prevalence of protest brokers varies with the structure of communities constitutes a rich area for future research. A few general observations can be made, however.

First, returning to the key characteristics of protest brokers outlined in Chapter 2, we can identify two important factors that are likely to facilitate the emergence of protest brokers generally.

First, brokers are more likely to emerge in established communities as opposed to new or transient ones. This is because the residents of established communities have had the time to develop the connections, local networks and trust that underlie the ability of brokers to organize protest. This does not mean the community has to be geographically static, however. Relationships and social networks are the important element, so if a community moves en masse from one location to another (as sometimes happens in South Africa, for example, when residents of informal settlements are moved to new government housing projects)\(^35\), the broker’s networks may well remain in place, enabling him to mobilize protest much as before. If the community is broken up, in contrast, the broker may lose his ability to mobilize a large enough group, reducing the value he can offer to elites.

Second, a history of collective action in the region is also likely to be helpful, as it allows potential brokers to gain the experience that helps both elites and community members trust their ability to organize protest.\(^36\) This does not mean the community itself must have


\(^36\) Of course, potential brokers could have travelled abroad and had critical protest experiences there, but this is likely to be less common than those who gained their experience closer to home.
protested previously, however, just that there should have been some opportunity for the broker to have gained previous, locally verifiable, protest experience.

Once these general conditions facilitating the emergence of protest brokers have been met, however, a number of additional factors then help to determine the specific type of protest broker that is most likely to emerge. Three key factors in this regard are: the structure of elite organizations, the structure of the community, and the degree of openness in the society.

The Structure of Elite Organizations

Exclusive brokers, by definition, require the presence of elites able and willing to develop long-term relationships at the local level, and they are unlikely to emerge in their absence. Whether we see ideological or elite brokers under such circumstances, however, will depend heavily on the structure of elite organizations, with ideological brokers most likely to emerge when organizations privilege the creation of local branches and structures. When elite organizations do not have a strong local presence, in contrast, elite brokers are more likely to develop, unless the community concerned has a home-grown organization whose interests overlap considerably with those of elite players.

Countries where clientelism is prevalent are particularly likely to see the emergence of exclusive brokers, moreover, as clientelism involves precisely the sort of long-term elite relationships that are central to exclusive brokerage. Where clientelist relationships dominate, however, elite brokers are more likely to emerge than their ideological counterparts. This is because broker loyalty is more likely to be based on personal gain in a clientelist system,
resulting in protest organization that revolves primarily around the interests of elite patrons (and the associated personal interests of brokers), rather than any collective community interest. Figure 3.3 summarizes the impact that the structure of elite organizations is likely to have on broker type.

![Diagram of likely impact of the structure of elite organizations on broker type]

**Figure 3.3: Likely Impact of the Structure of Elite Organizations on Broker Type**

The Structure of the Community

While the structure of elite organizations helps to explain the exclusive/non-exclusive split, the structure of the community, in contrast, will affect whether we are more likely to see the emergence of embedded or non-embedded brokers. Key here are the types of social networks that exist in a community, with a particular focus on the varying levels of what Putnam (2000) calls bonding and bridging capital.
Bonding capital refers to the dense, strong ties that exist between close-knit groups of individuals sharing similar characteristics (Darcy et al. 2014; Nichols, Tacon, and Muir 2013; Putnam 2000). It is typically generated by intensive contact, and groups with high levels of bonding capital tend to be socially homogenous, close knit and exclusive (Kavanaugh et al. 2005; Marsden and Lin 1982; Wellman 1992). Bridging capital, in contrast, involves a variety of weak ties that cross across different social groups (Berkowitz 1982; Kavanaugh et al. 2005; Keyes 1969). These weak ties integrate individuals into a broader social setting, and require less time, emotional intensity, intimacy and reciprocal services to sustain (Berkowitz 1982; Fischer et al. 1977; Granovetter 1973; Marsden and Lin 1982).

In terms of protest brokers, communities dominated by the isolated silo-like cliques associated with bonding capital are more likely to see embedded brokers (ideological and group), while communities with a rich associational life dominated by bridging capital have a higher likelihood of seeing non-embedded brokers (elite and independent). This is because non-embedded brokers rely on the ability to mobilize diffuse social networks, something which will be far harder in the absence of bridging capital.

**Degree of Societal Openness**

Finally, the degree of openness and polarization in a society will also affect broker type. In countries where society is deeply polarized or controlled, brokers are more likely to forge exclusive relationships with particular elites and/or community groups. This may be because

---

37 See Granovetter (1973), Kavanaugh et al (2005), and Rademacher and Wang (2014) for more on the differences between the strong and weak ties that underpin these two types of capital.
alternative elites and social groups are not available, it is too dangerous to work for more than one elite or group, or brokers would lose trust and credibility by doing so. In more pluralist and tolerant societies, in contrast, brokers have at least the option of working more broadly, although they may not always choose to do so. A minimum level of social openness is, therefore, a necessary but not sufficient condition for the development of both non-exclusive and non-embedded brokers.

Table 3.2 provides a summary of some of the key factors affecting broker type.
Table 3.2: Key Factors Affecting Broker Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structure of Elite Organizations</th>
<th>Ideological Broker</th>
<th>Elite Broker</th>
<th>Group Broker</th>
<th>Independent Broker</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Broker type requires the presence of stable elites capable of forming long-term relationships?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broker type facilitated by presence of elite organizations with local branches?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broker type facilitated by clientelism</td>
<td>Yes - somewhat</td>
<td>Yes - significantly</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure of the Community</td>
<td>Broker type facilitated by bridging capital?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of societal openness</td>
<td>Broker type requires social openness/plurality?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes – at the community level</td>
<td>Yes – at the elite level</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the figures above, the broker is represented by the letter “B”, elites by “E”, and groups within the community by “G”. Solid lines represent durable connections, and dotted lines represent relationships that are renegotiated on an on-going basis.
3.5 Conclusion

In conclusion, Chapter 2 argued that protest brokers enable elites to connect effectively with rank-and-file protesters, and that elites will struggle to arrange protest in their absence.

Because protest brokers are not homogenous, however, this chapter has developed the theory further by exploring the causes and consequences of variation at the broker level. The next chapters will now test this theory in the South African context.
4 The South African Context

4.1 Introduction

Having outlined the theory of protest brokers, the next three chapters offer evidence in support of this new theoretical approach, drawing on detailed case study evidence from South Africa. This chapter begins the process by introducing the South African context, providing information on case selection, and the twelve communities at the heart of this project. Following this, Chapter 5 explores the role of protest brokers in practice, while Chapter 6 tests the ways in which these brokers affect meso-level patterns of protest.

4.2 Protest in South Africa

The history of protest in South Africa is a long one, reaching back well into the pre-apartheid era. As early as the eighteenth century, for example, evidence exists of petitions being sent to Amsterdam by early settlers to protest the behavior of local officials, while the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw widespread protests and industrial action in the mining industry, as well as increasing protests against segregation and the racialized nature of politics (Beinart and Bundy 1987; Boesken 1969; Thompson 2014; Van Onselen 1982).

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38 Apartheid was a system of institutionalized racial segregation that existed in South Africa from 1948 to 1994.

39 Protests were not limited to areas of white settlement of course, and the nineteenth century also saw protests in predominantly non-white areas over issues ranging from the activities of missionaries (Comaroff and Comaroff 1986) to the increasing dominance of Shaka and his supporters (Hamilton 1992). The overwhelming focus of most histories on the activities of white settlers, however, makes it harder to uncover evidence of protests in these other realms, as well as in the pre-colonial era.
During the apartheid-era, however, a new, more militant form of protest gradually developed, as increasingly repressive and discriminatory laws and practices prompted frequent, widespread resistance (Beinart 2010; Brooks and Brickhill 1980; Thompson 2014). A government crackdown in the wake of events at Sharpeville in 1960 briefly stymied this development, but a series of militant strikes in 1973, followed by the Soweto uprising in 1976, kicked off a new period of nationwide protests, strikes, and boycotts that only intensified as the apartheid state began to weaken and crumble (Bundy 1987; M. J. Murray 1987; Sapire 1992; Swilling 1988).

Following the intense protests of the 1980s and early 1990s, however, the transition to multi-party democracy in 1994 brought a significant decline in civic unrest, as the ruling African National Congress (ANC) enjoyed a honeymoon period, and civil society was weakened by a loss of leadership to the new government (S. Friedman 2019; Madlingozi 2007; Paret 2018). The reprieve did not last long, however, and as the first decade of ANC rule began to draw to a close in the mid-2000s, a new wave of protest developed, described by most observers as the start of something new – a new “rise in direct and antagonistic action” intended by local communities “to convey messages of discontent with matters local” (Alexander 2010b; Atkinson 2007; Booysen 2007; Pithouse 2007).\footnote{\textsuperscript{40}}

Famously described as a “rebellion of the poor” (Alexander 2010b; Alexander and Pfaffe 2014), the high levels of community protest that have been observed in South Africa since this period are widely attributed to three main factors. First, increasing frustration over the unmet

\footnote{\textsuperscript{40} Though see Friedman (2019) for a critique of this argument.}
expectations of the post-apartheid period, which many believed would bring rapid improvements in living conditions and the quality of services (Booysen 2007; Matebesi 2015; Wasserman, Bosch, and Chuma 2016). Second, a growing disillusionment at the failure of democracy to end inequality and the exclusion of the poor (Death 2010; S. Friedman 1997; Pithouse 2008). And third, increased infighting and factionalism within the ruling ANC, which has led to protest becoming a significant tool in local political struggles (Dawson 2014; Harber 2011; Matlala and Bénit-Gbaffou 2012; Siwisa 2008). Indeed, South Africa now experiences a level of protest that is often claimed to be greater than anywhere else in the world, with an estimated eight thousand protests taking place between 2004 and 2017 (Alexander 2012; Alexander and Pfaffe 2014; Roberts et al. 2017).  

4.3 Advantages of Studying the South African Case

Several things make South Africa a particularly good location for this study.

First, as noted above, communities across South Africa engage in a wide variety of protest activity on a relatively regular basis. This increases the chances of encountering protest during research, and being able to observe protest organization directly in different communities.

Second, while the country undoubtedly has a high level of civic unrest, protest patterns in South Africa actually look quite similar to those elsewhere on a number of key dimensions. As Figure 4.1 shows, the country is clearly towards the higher end of the continent in terms of the

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41 The number of protests that take place in South Africa is hotly contested (see, for example, Alexander et al. 2018; Bhardwaj 2016; Lancaster 2018). This data comes from a new author-constructed dataset, the South African Protest Dataset, which codes protests from a wide range of media sources. See Appendix B for more details.
number of citizens who report having been involved in protest, but it is not a complete outlier in this regard, and a number of countries, including Nigeria and Egypt, report roughly similar levels of protest participation.

More crucially, however, a number of studies have demonstrated that protests in South Africa are driven by similar issues to those elsewhere (De Juan and Wegner 2017; Diaz 2017; Mbazira 2013; Wasserman, Bosch, and Chuma 2016), and that they parallel broader trends across the continent (Paret and Runciman 2016; Seddon and Zeilig 2005). While the high level of civic action makes studying protest in South Africa a little easier, therefore, there are strong reasons to believe that findings here will be applicable more widely.

A third advantage of the South African case is that there is significant evidence to suggest that elite-driven protests are an important form of collective action in the country (see, for
example, Bruce 2012; Dawson 2014; S. Friedman 2019; Nwafor 2016). This makes it a useful location in which to study the dynamics of elite mobilization, and thus to test the new theory of protest brokers being advanced here. Again, however, this dynamic of the South African case is largely in line with protest patterns elsewhere, with scholars documenting the important role played by elite patrons in countries ranging from Senegal to Uganda and Egypt (Isaev 2014; Mbazira 2013; Mueller 2018). While the presence of elite-driven protests is important, therefore, it is not so idiosyncratic as to make the country unrepresentative of the region more broadly.

And finally, a fourth important advantage is that protest in South Africa is generally legal, making it easier, safer and more practical to conduct research here than in countries where such activities are banned outright. There are some circumstances under which South African protest can be considered to be illegal, however, typically to do with violence or problems during the notification process,42 and a number of scholars have also highlighted the often heavy-handed repression that surrounds mass action in the townships (Death 2010; Matlala and Bénit-Gbaffou 2012; Southall 2007). As a result, while I interacted extensively with the police throughout my fieldwork, I have, as previously mentioned, changed the names of all brokers and communities throughout this work in order to protect the identities of my informants.

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42 Some forms of protest in South Africa require organizers to notify local authorities in advance, and protests can be deemed illegal if the appropriate notification does not take place, or if the local authority rejects the application. See Stephens and Low (2017) and Postman (2018) for more information.
4.4 Case Study Selection

In order to explore the presence and activities of protest brokers, I selected twelve communities in South Africa in which to conduct in-depth qualitative research. Community selection was guided by regression analysis using a new dataset - the South African Protest Dataset.

The South African Protest Dataset (SAPD)

The SAPD is a new, author-created dataset of community protests in South Africa, coded from media reports, and covering the period 2004-2012. All protest incidents are geocoded, and, crucially, the SAPD also records the locations from which the protesters come, as well as the locations of the protests themselves. This is an important distinction from the point of view of the theory being advanced here, and one which sets the SAPD apart from any existing dataset.

There are, of course, a number of problems with relying on media reports to code incidents of protest in this way. First, not all incidents of unrest make it into the media, and those that do are more likely to be urban, large in size, and violent, creating an inevitable bias in the data (Lancaster 2018; Runciman et al. 2016). Additionally, the information contained in these media reports is not uniform. Some articles contain significant detail on the locations,

\[\text{Community protests are defined here as protests carried out by members of a geographically defined and identifiable neighborhood.}\]

\[\text{For a full list of media sources see Appendix B.}\]

\[\text{It has since been updated to cover the period 2004-2017, but the 2004-2012 dataset was the one used for case study selection.}\]
grievances, and events of the protest, while others may mention little other than the fact that there was unrest in a general area. While these are undoubted problems, however, datasets coded from newspaper reports are widely used in social movement research and, as long as the biases are recognized, have been demonstrated to provide valid, reliable and useful information (Alexander et al. 2018; Koopmans and Rucht 2002).

A more significant problem from the point of view of this study, however, is the fact that not all newspaper reports distinguish between the location of the protest and the geographic community from which the protesters come. For the case study selection, I therefore subset the SAPD to include only service delivery protests – a category of protest in South Africa that tends to be very locally focused, making it reasonable to assume that the location of protest and the community protesting are one and the same.46

Protest Trends

According to the SAPD, the period from 2004-2012 saw 1,258 separate service delivery protest events across South Africa, with protests becoming increasingly common from 2009, with a slight dip in 2011, and a significant increase in 2012 (Figure 4.2).

46 Service delivery protests are protests focused on the delivery of basic services at a local level. This includes protests over the availability, access, price, and quality of electricity, sanitation, and water services, as well as the provision of public housing, road quality, basic education, basic health services and public transport. It does not include protests over unemployment, HIV/AIDS treatment, wages, government corruption, police activity or violence against foreigners (xenophobic riots), except where these issues are named alongside service delivery concerns by those involved. For more information see Alexander and Pfaffe (2014), Booysen (2009), Nleya (2011) and Langa and Kiguwa (2013).
As Figure 4.3 shows, this is roughly comparable to other existing datasets. Municipal IQ, for example, an organization which monitors South Africa’s municipalities across a range of factors, records a slightly lower number of service delivery protests on average, but the trends over time are very similar. The lower numbers are likely due to the more restricted definition of protest used by Municipal IQ (the organization only records protests when they are explicitly against a municipality), as well as the fact that they count protests that take place over multiple days as one protest, rather than following standard practice in protest event analysis and counting each day as a separate event (“3 Key Trends from 2018’s All-Time Service Delivery Protest Record” 2019). Data produced by Alexander et al at the University of Johannesburg,

47 See Rucht et al (1999) and Koopmans et al (2002) for more information on the value of counting each day as a separate protest event.
similarly, shows comparable overall trends, although in this case the number of protests per year is slightly higher on average, in large part because they record “community protests” rather than the slightly more narrowly defined service delivery protests focused on in my dataset (Alexander, Runciman, and Ngwane 2013).48

![Figure 4.3: Data Comparison](image)

In terms of geographic spread, Gauteng and the Western Cape were the most protest-prone provinces over the 2004-2012 period (Figure 4.4), with Gauteng alone accounting for almost a third of the protests recorded.

48 Note – neither Municipal IQ nor the team at the University of Johannesburg make their raw data available for use by other researchers.
At a municipal level, 131 of the 234 municipalities in South Africa (226 local, plus 8 metro) saw protests, although a quarter of these saw only one protest, and eighty-five percent saw fewer than ten. Only nine municipalities had more than twenty protests over the nine-year period (Figure 4.5), and the top three (the City of Cape Town, the City of Johannesburg and the City of Tshwane) are responsible for more than a third of the total between them (482 protests). The City of Cape Town alone is responsible for eighteen percent of the total (223), with the City of Johannesburg a close second at fourteen percent (180).
At a main place level, of the 14,039 main places in South Africa, just 2.7 percent (376) saw at least one protest over the period.49 Almost half of these (188) saw one protest exactly, while roughly two-thirds saw just one or two. Ninety-four percent of main places saw fewer than ten protests, moreover, while only nine communities saw more than fifteen protests over the period (Figure 4.6).

---

49 Main places are the third smallest geographical units at which South African census data is released. The largest such units are provinces, of which there are nine in South Africa. The next units down are the Metropolitan and District Municipalities and there are a total of 52 of these. After this comes Local Municipalities (226), Main Places (14,039), Sub Places (22,108) and Small Areas (84,907). Data at the Enumeration Area (103,576) and Geo-Referenced Dwelling Frame (10.7m) levels are collected, but this data is not released publicly. Main places were chosen as the unit of analysis for this study because they are small enough to be a viable unit for a case study, and also generally correspond to how people talk about locations, making it possible to code protests from newspaper reports with a high degree of confidence. Sub Places in contrast proved too small to accurately locate protests in, while municipalities are too large to be able to conduct useful fieldwork in.
In order to guide case study selection, I used the protest data described above to conduct a series of regressions, in which I regressed protest onto a series of variables identified by the literature as important predictors of community level protest. The goal here was not to test the predictors against each other, but rather to use the regression to guide case study selection by getting a sense of how well existing theories predict the levels of protest in each main place. Table 4.1 summarizes the variables and data used, while Appendix C provides more information on the construction of each variable.

Case Study Selection

Figure 4.6: Most Protest Prone Main Places

Table 4.1 summarizes the variables and data used, while Appendix C provides more information on the construction of each variable.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Supporting Literature</th>
<th>Data Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of protests per main place (count variable)</td>
<td>Dependent variable</td>
<td>SAPD (subset)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of protest per main place (binary variable)</td>
<td>Alternative dependent variable</td>
<td>SAPD (subset)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Booyesen (2007)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Freund (2006)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mattes (2008)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Schwartz (2007)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(measure of relative deprivation)</td>
<td>Norris et al (2005)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(measure of relative deprivation)</td>
<td>Norris et al (2005)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Amtaika (2013)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Doherty and Schrader (n.d.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nie et al (1996)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resnick and Casale (2011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lavery (2012)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mattes (2008)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mattes and Richmond (2015)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arriola (2013)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4.1 (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Supporting Literature</th>
<th>Data Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Table 4.2 shows the results of the main regressions. For Models 1 and 2, the outcome variable is a count measure, reflecting the number of protests per main place. Both models are poisson models, while Models 3 and 4 are logit models, in which the outcome variable is a binary measure recording whether or not the main place saw any protest at all over the period. Models 1 and 3 are run on the full dataset of 14,039 main places, while Models 2 and 4 are run on a reduced subset of the data and include a measure reflecting the number of anti-apartheid protests seen in each main place.\(^{51}\)

\(^{50}\) Funding for this research was provided by a National Science Foundation Grant SES-9196229, Sociology Program: “Racial Conflict in South African and the United States.” Susan Olzak, Principle Investigator. See also Olzak and Olivier (1998), and Olzak et al (2003).

\(^{51}\) The Olivier and Olzak data only covers 1,670 main places. See Appendix C for more details.
### Table 4.2: Regression Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1 (Poisson)</th>
<th>Model 2 (Poisson)</th>
<th>Model 3 (Logit)</th>
<th>Model 4 (Logit)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Service availability</td>
<td>4.73*** (0.21)</td>
<td>3.61*** (0.29)</td>
<td>4.39*** (0.36)</td>
<td>4.72*** (0.65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income (logged)</td>
<td>-0.26*** (0.07)</td>
<td>-0.14 (0.09)</td>
<td>-0.29* (0.13)</td>
<td>-0.43 (0.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main place inequality</td>
<td>9.10*** (0.66)</td>
<td>11.08*** (0.96)</td>
<td>9.68*** (1.18)</td>
<td>14.71*** (2.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal inequality</td>
<td>3.83*** (0.29)</td>
<td>1.19** (0.38)</td>
<td>3.35*** (0.57)</td>
<td>2.85** (0.91)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Unemployment level</td>
<td>0.02*** (0.004)</td>
<td>0.03*** (0.01)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.01)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Education level</td>
<td>0.05*** (0.004)</td>
<td>0.06*** (0.01)</td>
<td>0.03*** (0.01)</td>
<td>0.03* (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage black</td>
<td>-0.01*** (0.001)</td>
<td>-0.01*** (0.002)</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.003)</td>
<td>-0.01* (0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic diversity</td>
<td>2.35*** (0.14)</td>
<td>0.47** (0.17)</td>
<td>2.70*** (0.27)</td>
<td>2.09*** (0.42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of residents under the age of 30</td>
<td>0.03*** (0.004)</td>
<td>0.03*** (0.01)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.01)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of previous protests</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.004*** (0.0002)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.004*** (0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-17.47*** (0.80)</td>
<td>-11.81*** (1.07)</td>
<td>-15.61*** (1.45)</td>
<td>-18.30*** (2.66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>13,896</td>
<td>1,642</td>
<td>13,896</td>
<td>1,642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-$R^2$</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Table reports coefficients. $p$-values reported below coefficients in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 99, 95, and 90 percent confidence levels, respectively.
While a detailed analysis of the regressions and hypotheses is not the main purpose of this section, we can see that all of the variables identified as important in the literature do indeed appear to be at least somewhat significant, with service availability, main place inequality, and a history of protest consistently significant at the 99 percent level. Additionally, if we accept McFadden’s (1978) argument that a pseudo R-squared of between 0.2 and 0.4 represents good fit, all four models also appear to fit the data well, although significant variation still remains to be explained.

Having conducted the regressions, the selection of case study locations was then guided by this analysis, with two imposed constraints. First, I deliberately chose communities from two separate provinces in South Africa – Gauteng, which was (at the time of research) governed by the ANC, and the Western Cape, which was governed by the DA. This was done to ensure that my findings were not restricted to one form of local government. Second, because the case studies were intended to explore the organization of protest, it was also important that a majority of the case study locations had seen at least some protest over the post-apartheid period, and I restricted the options accordingly, selecting only one community that had seen no protest at all.

With these two restrictions in mind, I followed Lieberman (2005) and Gerring (2006, 2008) and initially selected two typical cases and one deviant case in order to allow for model building. The first typical case was located in the Western Cape, while the second typical case and the deviant case were both located in Gauteng.

Following fieldwork in these first three locations, I then selected a further three cases for study, this time selecting one typical case and one deviant case in the Western Cape, and a
single deviant case in Gauteng. The Gauteng community selected was too large to be viable for a single case study, however, so I randomly selected a single sub-place within it.

Having explored three typical and three deviant cases, I then moved on to select two extreme cases for study – one in each province. These were cases that had seen extreme levels of protest in the post-apartheid period, and therefore provided an excellent opportunity to examine whether the dynamics observed elsewhere held in cases of unusually high protest levels. Note that in the case of Gauteng, the main place selected was again too large to be viable for a single case study, so I selected a sub-place within it that also exhibited a high level of protest.

Finally, the remaining four cases were selected in order to further explore key dynamics that emerged during fieldwork. Table 4.3 provides a summary of the twelve communities and their selection criteria.
Table 4.3: Summary of Case Study Locations and Selection Criteria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Selection Criteria</th>
<th>Additional Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Western Cape</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community A</td>
<td>Typical case, Round 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community B</td>
<td>Typical case, Round 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community C</td>
<td>Deviant case, Round 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community D</td>
<td>Extreme case</td>
<td>Some members of Community A were relocated here, allowing exploration of the ways in which mobilization is affected when a community is split.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community E</td>
<td>Exploratory case</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community F</td>
<td>Exploratory case</td>
<td>Some members of Community F were relocated to Community C, allowing exploration of the ways in which mobilization is affected when a community is split.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gauteng</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community G</td>
<td>Typical case, Round 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community H</td>
<td>Deviant case, Round 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community I</td>
<td>Deviant case, Round 2</td>
<td>Randomly selected sub-place within the main place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community J</td>
<td>Extreme case</td>
<td>Extreme sub-place selected for study within the main place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community K</td>
<td>Exploratory case</td>
<td>A civil society group exists which seeks to mobilize both Community K and Community L. This allowed me to study differences in mobilization between two communities, holding the elite constant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community L</td>
<td>Exploratory case</td>
<td>A civil society group exists which seeks to mobilize both Community K and Community L. This allowed me to study differences in mobilization between two communities, holding the elite constant.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.5 Conclusion

Having introduced the case studies, the remaining chapters in this section now draw on these twelve communities to explore the presence, role and impact of protest brokers in practice.
5 Protest Brokers in Practice

5.1 Introduction

Having discussed the South African context, this chapter now explores the activities of South African protest brokers in practice. It is based on over twenty-six months of fieldwork in the Western Cape and Gauteng, with a primary focus on the twelve case study communities introduced in Chapter 4. The chapter begins by introducing the data from these communities in more detail, before providing some basic descriptive information on the thirty-seven brokers at the heart of this study. The rest of the chapter then offers evidence of the following:

1. **Brokers organize protest.** The data shows that brokers do indeed organize a significant amount of protest at the local level. Their reasons for organizing protest vary, as do their levels of participation in other forms of collective action and activism, but all see their involvement in protest mobilization as a distinct role, requiring a specific set of skills and expertise.

2. **Brokers work on behalf of socially distant elites.** In line with the theory advanced in Part 1, the evidence demonstrates that brokers organize protest at the behest of socially distant elites, and use their local knowledge, trust and connections to help them overcome the collective action problem. In addition, the data also confirms that there is important variation in the relationships between brokers and elites, with some brokers working exclusively with one set of elites, while others organize protest for a wider variety of patrons. The impact of this variation will be discussed further in Chapter 6.
3. **Brokers mobilize specific communities.** In addition to their relationships with elites, the evidence also shows that brokers have relationships with specific communities of potential protesters, and that these communities are central to their mobilizing efforts. For some brokers, the community concerned is a single, tight-knit group with a shared collective interest, while others mobilize more diffuse social networks. In all cases, however, the ties and relationships between the broker and community are key, and this results in clear boundaries around the people that each broker is able to turn out.

4. **Brokers know their communities.** In addition to describing the boundaries of the communities they are able to mobilize, my respondents also made it clear that they possess extensive knowledge about the motivations and preferences of individual community members. The evidence shows that they value this information, moreover, and devote considerable amounts of time to both developing and maintaining it.

5. **Brokers care about their reputations.** Finally, brokers are aware that their activities depend on being seen as trustworthy by both elites and the communities they mobilize. They therefore invest significant time, energy, and resources in maintaining this trust, often going to extreme lengths to avoid breaking promises or being seen as anything less than honest.

In sum, this chapter shows that brokers play an important role in the mobilization of protest at a local level, acting as valuable intermediaries between elites desiring protest and the communities they seek to turn out. By distinguishing brokers in terms of these relationships, moreover, we gain a deeper understanding of their activities in this regard, and – as the next chapter will show – we also gain additional leverage on the patterns of protest that we observe.
5.2 Data

The central source of information around which this chapter revolves comes from over twenty-six months of fieldwork in twelve case study communities in South Africa. It includes the life histories of 37 protest brokers, as well as over 400 interviews, 36 group discussions, data from participant observation, and an original dataset containing information on 802 community level protests.52

Life Histories

Between 2016 and 2018 I collected detailed life histories53 for thirty-seven different protest brokers.54 I also spent a minimum of twenty hours shadowing each broker as they engaged with the community, organized meetings, met with elites, and arranged and mobilized protests. The brokers were identified in a variety of different ways, including: asking elites to provide the names of people they had used to help them organize protest; asking protesters to identify the individuals who had mobilized them; spending time at protests and in community meetings; and asking brokers whether they knew of anyone else engaged in the same sort of work. While I tried to identify as many brokers as possible in each community, however, it is likely that there

52 See Appendix A for an overview of this data, including fieldwork dates.

53 For more information on the life history methodology see Bertaux (1981), Cole and Knowles (2001), Geiger (1986), and Murray (2002).

54 It should be noted that “protest broker” is my term for these individuals, and not one they use themselves. When presented with the term and associated description, however, all thirty-seven agreed it substantially matched the reality of what they do.
are still some protest brokers I did not locate. In particular, my recruitment approach means that protest brokers were less likely to be identified if they had not been active recently, or had organized just one or two small-scale protests. The findings should, therefore, be interpreted with these limitations in mind.

**Interviews**

In addition to collecting the life histories of protest brokers, I also conducted over 400 one-on-one interviews with elites and community members.

**Elite Interviews**

Central to the theory of protest brokers is the claim that it is difficult for elites to organize protest on their own. In order to understand how elites mobilize collective action at the local level, therefore, I interviewed 114 councilors, businesspeople, and civil society leaders.

Generating a random sample of elites to interview was challenging, however, because a ready-made sampling frame – that is, a list of elites from which I could draw a random sample – does not exist. I therefore used a number of different methods to identify individuals for interview.

First, a large body of literature suggests that protests in the South African context are often driven by local politics (Alexander 2010a; Bruce 2012; *The Politics of Service Delivery Protests* 2015; Sapire 1992). Local ward councilors for each community were therefore identified using information provided by the Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC), and
combined with the official candidate lists for the 2016 local elections.\textsuperscript{55} I then removed any candidates whose party had not won at least 5 percent of the local vote in the 2011 elections,\textsuperscript{56} and randomly sampled 36 elites from the final list for interview (three in each community).

While local politics is one potential form of patronage for protest brokers, however, they are not the only group of people seeking to mobilize protest. I therefore interviewed an additional 78 elites over the course of my fieldwork, including local businesspeople, community leaders, union leaders, and a variety of other local, regional, and national players. These included elites I met during protests and my time in the communities, those identified as potentially important from media and other reports, as well as those I was referred to in the course of other interviews.

\textit{Interviews with Community Members}

To identify community members for interview, I used a mixture of stratified random sampling and respondent-driven sampling, following the approach used by Scacco (2008). The goal was to build representative and comparable samples of both protesters and non-protesters, while at the same time ensuring I interviewed a large enough number of protest participants.

To create my sample, I randomly selected six households in each community, and interviewed one randomly selected adult (over the age of 18) in each household. These 72

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{footnotes}
\item[55] These were published by the IEC in July 2016.
\item[56] Many smaller parties in South Africa field candidates on paper who are not active locally, and with 205 parties contesting the 2016 election I wanted to focus my elite interviews on those elites most likely to be active at the local level. The only exception here was candidates for the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), which did not exist in 2011, but is now the third largest party in South Africa. All EFF candidates were, therefore, included in the final list.
\end{footnotes}
\end{footnotesize}
respondents were then used as “seeds”, and asked to recruit one protester and one non-protester each. In contrast to a more traditional snowball sampling approach, this method helped to ensure that I interviewed protesters and non-protesters who were comparable in terms of their social networks.57

I conducted 216 interviews in total using this approach, made up of 129 non-protesters, and 87 protesters. Initial interviews were conducted away from protests, in respondents’ homes or other locations, while follow-up interviews (at least one per respondent) were used to explore the dynamics of specific events in more detail. I also interviewed an additional 119 community members over the course of the fieldwork period, all of whom were encountered during protest activity.

**Group Discussions**

In addition to the one-on-one interviews described above, I also conducted three group discussions in each of the twelve communities (thirty-six in total). Each discussion group was made up of between six and fifteen participants, who were selected as follows. First, in each community I randomly selected one elite I had interviewed, and asked them to provide a list of fifteen people they thought I needed to speak with in order to understand protest organization in the community. All fifteen individuals were then contacted, and asked to participate in a group discussion, with a response rate of about sixty-five percent.58 For the second group

57 This is important, because a large body of literature suggests that social networks are crucial to protest mobilization (Goodwin and Jasper 2003; Hirschman 1984; Rüdig and Karyotis 2013).

58 The elites did not participate themselves, although there was nothing to stop them getting information from participants after the event.
discussion, I did the same, but this time asking a randomly selected protest broker to provide
the list\textsuperscript{59}, while for the third group discussion I randomly selected fifteen individuals myself at a
community meeting. Each group discussion was at least one hour in duration, with the longest
lasting two and a half hours, and they were used to explore protest dynamics, and the activities
of brokers in the community more broadly.

**Case Study Communities Dataset**

As part of my fieldwork, I also constructed an original dataset – the Case Study Communities
Dataset (CSCD) – which contains information on protests and broker activity across the twelve
case study communities. Data was collected as follows.

First, the South African Protest Dataset (SAPD), described in Chapter 4, was subset to
include only the twelve case study communities, and extended to cover the period from the
end of apartheid (April 27, 1994) to the end of 2017.\textsuperscript{60} I then worked with each protest broker
to compile a list of the protests they claimed to have organized, and added this information to
the dataset. Where brokers claimed to have organized a protest not contained in the CSCD, I
recorded and verified this information, but added a note to the dataset to indicate that this
information had come from other – non-media – sources. This allowed me to both collect
information on as many different protests as possible, and to subset the dataset to include only

\textsuperscript{59} For the one community where I did not locate any protest brokers, I selected a second elite instead.

\textsuperscript{60} Note, between 2015 and 2017 I was conducting fieldwork in South Africa, and the dataset was
updated on a monthly basis over this period.
those protests coming from media sources in order to explore the percentage of local protests organized by brokers.61

Following this, I sought to verify the involvement of each broker at the protests claimed, seeking a minimum of two supporting sources per event. These supporting sources came from media coverage, interviews with other people, personal observations, documentary evidence such as WhatsApp messages, as well as the analysis of social media sources. The number and type of sources used for verification was then added to the dataset.

And finally, additional information was also added, where possible, on the mobilization tactics used by the brokers, the elite patron, the motivations of this patron, the motivations of the broker, any payments received, the relationship between the elite and the broker, the method through which the elite approached the broker, the community mobilized, the relationship between the broker and the community, the length of planning, and any coordination with other brokers. More information on all variables coded can be found in Appendix D.

**Participant Observation and Cultural Immersion**

Finally, I attended a number of protests and rallies in each community (eighty-three in total), as well as community meetings over a range of issues (fifty-eight). I also spent over five hundred hours engaged in non-protest social activities, including: frequenting local restaurants, drinking spots and shebeens; attending religious services, sports games and cultural events; and

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61 Using both media and broker reported information to calculate this percentage would bias the data in favor of my theory.
participating in community events, family gatherings and celebrations. Immersing myself in the cultural activities of each community in this way enabled me to develop an extensive knowledge of the social structure, politics and grievances of the communities concerned, as well as the trust necessary to conduct interviews around protests, politically sensitive topics and illegal activities.\textsuperscript{62}

5.3 Who are the Brokers?

Across the twelve case-study locations, I identified protest brokers in eleven, with an average of three brokers per community, and a range from zero to five. The breakdown by community and province can be found in Figure 5.1.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure51.png}
\caption{Number of Protest Brokers Per Community}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{62} As discussed in Chapter 4, although protesting is not in itself an illegal activity in South Africa, many protests involve illegal activity, either as the result of a failure to obtain the correct permits, or because of violence and looting.
The mean age of the sample was fifty-one years old, with a range from twenty-seven to seventy-one. Eighty-one percent of brokers were between forty and sixty years of age (Figure 5.2), making them significantly older as a group than the population as a whole, where the median age in the most recent census was close to twenty-five (“Census 2011: Population Dynamics in South Africa” 2015).

![Figure 5.2: Breakdown of Protest Brokers by Age](image)

In terms of gender, the majority of brokers interviewed identified as male, with only seven (19 percent) identifying as female (Figure 5.3). Of these, three stated that they predominantly mobilized women in gender-based organizations, such as the ANC Women’s League, while the remaining four mobilize more broadly.
From an education point of view, eleven brokers (30 percent) reported having completed university, while a further twenty-four brokers (65 percent) completed high school, making the brokers relatively highly educated as a group (Figure 5.4). For those who had completed university, the most common subject studied was social work, followed by religion and politics.

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63 The comparable percentages for the population as a whole are 12 percent and 68 percent (“Educational Enrolment and Achievement, 2016” 2017).
Despite being relatively highly educated, however, the majority of brokers interviewed described themselves as unemployed (65 percent), with only nine (24 percent) reporting any kind of formal employment. The remaining 11 percent (four brokers) described themselves as pensioners, although two of these stated that they continue to do occasional work in the informal sector (Figure 5.5). Of the nine employed brokers, three were engaged as full-time activists for registered organizations, with protest organization just one of several responsibilities. The other six reported working in a variety of different industries – from transportation to education – with four of them organizing protest exclusively within their industry of employ.

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64 The national unemployment rate in 2016 was around 27 percent (Stats SA 2017).
And finally, the breakdown by broker type can be found in Figure 5.6. As can be seen, ideological brokers are by far the most common type of broker in the sample, making up almost half of the group, while the elite and independent brokers are the least common, with just six brokers falling in to each of these categories.
5.4 The Activities of Protest Brokers

Having briefly described who the brokers are, the rest of this chapter will now explore what it is that brokers do, with a particular focus on providing evidence to support five of the central assumptions and hypothesis from the theory advanced in Part 1.

1 Brokers Organize Protest

In the theory being advanced here, the first, and perhaps most obvious, activity of protest brokers is that they organize protest. That is, they work to mobilize groups of individuals at the local level, using a variety of different techniques to persuade them to take to the streets and voice their objections over specific issues. This need not be their primary activity, and indeed for several of the brokers interviewed protest mobilization made up a relatively small part of
their daily lives, but all thirty-seven brokers in this study identified protest organization as something they both do, and are known for doing. Typical comments in this regard included:

I have been an ANC member for a long time. Back before, during that time we call apartheid, I did many things for them. And even now sometimes I still do things like put up posters or help with meetings. But now I organize protest. I talk to my friends and my neighbors and I tell them we will meet tomorrow at this place, and I make sure they come.

Yes, I help to organize protest. That’s what I do. Protest is the only thing that makes change.

It’s not easy to make a protest happen you know. Sometimes people are very angry, and they will come, yes they will come, but other times I must persuade them. I must tell them why it is important. Make them see. I must provide a bus to help them get there or money for the train. I must make the people come. That is what takes the work.

For some brokers, such as the first of the respondents quoted above, their work in protest organization was part of a broader portfolio of activism or collective mobilization, where the focus was on advancing a specific cause, or the interests of a specific group of people. As one broker explained:

I do a lot of things for [union name]. I hold meetings. I help workers when they have grievances. I monitor the labor conditions. And yes, I organize protest too. It’s not the only thing I do, but it’s important. It helps to get what we want.

For other brokers, in contrast, protest mobilization was something separate, and was not accompanied by other forms of activism, or attempts to mobilize collective action or bring about change.

“Organizing protest is my job,” explained one such broker. “That is all. I am good at it, and I make money. But when the job is done I go home. I don’t contact councilors or take people to court. That is for other people. I organize protest.”
Crucially, none of the respondents interviewed utilized the term “protest broker” themselves, with the most common self-descriptions being “activist”, “troublemaker”, “hustler”, and “fixer”. When presented with a description of a protest broker, however, all of those interviewed positively identified with it, and acknowledged that this was work they were directly engaged in. This was a typical response:

Question: Some people say that there are people in this community who organize protest on behalf of other people like politicians or union leaders. Have you ever heard of such people?

Broker: Yes. There are those people of course. Yes. Yes. I am one such.

A broad range of experiences had brought the thirty-seven brokers into protest mobilization, but crucially all had previous experience of protest participation prior to taking on a mobilizing role. As one broker explained:

This is not an easy thing to do. People think it is, but it’s not. That [name], they say, he has an easy job. He just drinks with his friends and then causes trouble. But they don’t see the work. This is a job. Just like being a police [sic] or a teacher. You cannot just wake up one morning and decide to do it. You must learn. You must learn.

When asked how he had learned, he continued:

When I was younger I went to a lot of protests. It was that time we call apartheid and there were many protests. I did not organize them at this time, but I went, and bit by bit I understood. How you must talk with the politicians. With the police. What to say to make the people angry. I saw the organizers were friends with journalists. That the journalists were important so that the police would know people were watching… These were all lessons. Like in a school. I took protest classes. [Laughs]. And now I teach the self-same classes!

While all the brokers interviewed reported at least some history of previous protest participation, however, there was considerably more variation in terms of the ways in which they had shifted from participation to organization. Several brokers, for example, reported
being drawn into a mobilizing role at the direct request of local elites, while for others entreaties by friends and family members, or the promise of personal gain, were key.

Figure 5.7 provides a summary of the primary reason given by each broker for his or her initial move into protest organization.65

![Figure 5.7: What Led You To Organize Your First Protest?](image)

In addition to giving a variety of different reasons for their initial move into protest organization, moreover, brokers also reported a variety of different motivations for organizing their most recent protest. As can be seen in Figure 5.8, the desire to bring about change was listed as an important motivating factor by many brokers, with “improving conditions in the

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65 Where brokers gave more than one reason, they were asked to rank them in order of importance and the top-ranked reason is reported here.
community” the most frequent response, closely followed by “improving the conditions of myself and/or my family”. 66

Twenty-four brokers also identified making money as an important motivating factor, with four respondents claiming to make their primary living through protest mobilization. Indeed, only two brokers stated that they would never accept payment for organizing protests, while thirty-one reported having received at least some personal payment in the past (financial, material or in-kind). 67 The remaining four brokers were clear that they would be happy to accept payments in the future if they were offered. As one broker explained:

66 In answering this question brokers were asked to list all motivations, not just their primary one.

67 Note, this included those brokers who organize protest as part of a full-time activist job.
Question: Have you ever been paid to organize protest?

Broker: No

Question: If someone offered you money to organize a protest what would you do?

Broker: I would celebrate! [Laughs]. I don’t do this for the money, I do it because I want to help my community. But I also have to eat, and times are hard, so I wouldn’t say no.

For those brokers who were paid, the most common payments reported were small monetary payments of between 100 and 200 rand (US$7-14), but larger amounts (up to ZAR 1,000 or US$70) were not uncommon. Other benefits reported included food, airtime and data, material goods such as cell phones and laptops, other employment opportunities, support with medical bills or funeral expenses, preferential access to housing and other services, and support for other activities, such as skills training (Figure 5.9). In addition, all thirty-seven brokers also reported receiving money from elites to help cover the expenses incurred in protest organization, including transportation, posters, signs, items such as loud hailers, airtime and data to enable brokers to communicate with the community, and the provision of t-shirts, food, and money for distribution to individual community members.

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68 To put these figures in context, in 2018 the South African Government set the national minimum wage at ZAR 20 per hour, with a few listed exceptions (farm workers, domestic workers and people engaged in expanded public works programs all earn less) (Hisham 2018).
Finally, while the question of what all of this means for patterns of protest will be taken up in more detail in Chapter 6, it is worth noting at this point that of the 802 protests contained within the CSCD, I was able to confirm broker involvement in 441.\textsuperscript{69} In the sample under consideration here, therefore, the evidence suggests that brokers were responsible for organizing approximately 55 percent of all protest, with the number of protests organized per broker ranging from 1-144.\textsuperscript{70}

\textsuperscript{69} As noted earlier, it is likely I did not identify all active protest brokers in the twelve case study communities, making it reasonable to assume the actual number of protests organized by protest brokers is higher.

\textsuperscript{70} Note that some protests contained in the CSCD were organized by more than one broker, hence the discrepancy between the sum of the number of protests per broker (561) and the number of protests in the CSCD organized by brokers (441).
While not all protest is broker driven, therefore, the evidence does suggest that protest brokers are responsible for organizing a significant amount of collective action at the local level, and exploring their activities is, therefore, likely to add considerably to our understanding of this phenomenon.

2 Brokers Work On Behalf Of Socially Distant Elites

In addition to their role organizing protest, a central part of the theory being advanced here is that protest brokers specifically help *elites* to mobilize protest, by providing them with local knowledge, networks and trust. An important assumption, therefore, is that at least some elites do not possess these elements themselves, and that there is a mobilizational disadvantage to this social distance. Interviews with both elites and protesters in South Africa validate these assumptions. As the leader of a civil society organization in Gauteng explained:
It’s not easy to organize protest. You must know the right people and the right things to say, and the people must see you as a comrade. I come from this community, but I only live in one part, and my people are not the people who will protest. It’s hard for me.

A local businessman in the Western Cape expressed similar sentiments:

I have tried to organize protest, but it is very difficult. It takes time, knowledge, and relationships. I don’t have any of these. Why do I not have these things? Because I am a businessman. I live in this place, but I am different from those who protest. I have money and a nice car. These protesters…. we are not the same. And this difference makes it hard.

Notice what these elites are saying. First, they are both clear that local knowledge and trust are of crucial importance in protest mobilization. While both live in the communities they are trying to mobilize, moreover, they are also clear that this alone does not give them the relationships that they need, and in fact both observe that their elite status creates important differences between them and the people they are trying to turn out. Differences that hamper mobilization.

And it was not just these two who reported struggling when they tried to arrange protest themselves. Indeed, of the 114 elites interviewed, I encountered only 18 who claimed to have been able to organize protest directly, and all 18 were clear that it was their local knowledge and relationships that made the difference, and set them apart from the majority of protest patrons. As a local councilor from the Western Cape explained:

I organized that protest myself. Yes. But you must understand these people are my comrades. My brothers. I grew up with them and I have not turned my back. The others... they get a little success and they think they are better than their people... They forget the struggle... They drink with their new friends and only come back to [the township] to sleep. They must not then be surprised when they call, and the people do not answer.
Community members, similarly, were also clear that there was often significant social distance between them and local elites, and that this affected their willingness to take to the streets when elites suggested it. The following responses were typical:

Why would I trust him? He’s a politician. He doesn’t care about us. He knows the pretty words but that’s not enough. Even if I agree with the cause he’s not my comrade. I cannot trust what he says. He says if we protest tomorrow we will get better housing, but I think he just wants to make trouble. It won’t help us.

There are big big problems here in [community]. And the government does nothing. When you go to report it, it’s as if the wind passed by... It’s like blowing out wind if you go to our local officers... They live in their own world; they don’t care about us. And then they tell us we should protest. [Laughs]. Why? Why would we do what they say? They don’t know us. And we don’t trust them.

Indeed, of the 335 community members interviewed, almost 69 percent said that they did not trust their local councilor\(^71\), while 62 percent expressed mistrust of local businessmen (Figure 5.11).\(^72\)

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\(^71\) Note this is largely in line with the results of Afrobarometer surveys in the country, where Round 6 data from 2014/2015 showed that 62% of respondents reported low levels of trust in local government councils (Chingwete 2016).

\(^72\) The question asked: How much do you trust [your local councilor/local businessmen] to represent the needs of the community? With the possible answers being: A lot; Somewhat; Not really; Not at all.
Almost 79 percent, in contrast, reported trusting their local protest broker (Figure 5.12), with most respondents reporting that they trusted brokers to keep their word, and to represent the interests of those who protest.  

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73 The question asked: How much do you trust [insert name here]? With the possible answers being: A lot; Somewhat; Not really; Not at all.
Given these numbers, it is perhaps unsurprising that 70 percent of the elites interviewed reported using a protest broker to organize protest on at least some occasions (Figure 5.13), with a full 67 percent claiming that it was impossible to organize protest without them.
Elites claiming to have used protest brokers in this way included: politicians, councilors and aspiring councilors from most of the major parties (including the ANC, DA, EFF, PAC, and IFP); trade union leaders from industries ranging from the police force to taxi drivers, teachers and janitors; the leaders of civil society groups; local gang leaders in at least two separate communities; and a number of individual businessmen and local notabiles.

The most common reason given by elites for employing these brokers was because they were not able to organize protest without them, but a number of elites also observed that hiring brokers saved them both time and money, as well as allowing them to maintain an often important distance from protest. “It would not be good for me to organize protest directly,” explained one. “So I use [name]. That way I keep my hands clean.”
Elite motivations for trying to arrange protest in the first place also varied widely. Politicians, for example, reported desiring protest for reasons ranging from getting government attention for problems in the community, to helping in internal faction fights and advancing party interests around elections. Union leaders, members of civil society groups, and local businessmen, similarly, reported desiring protests for both community-based and personal reasons, while gang leaders most frequently contracted brokers in order to disrupt activities that threatened their business dealings. As one broker explained:

Broker: Everyone has their reasons, and protest can be very useful for many things. It can help your friends and hurt your enemies. That is why so many people want protest. It brings about change, and that is important.

Question: Can you name some specific reasons elites wanted to organize protest?

Broker: Of course! This one today he wants to become a councilor, so he wanted a protest to show that the community is dissatisfied with the current councilor. This way he will get more money from his party. Another one, some weeks ago, he was a businessman and he wanted electricity for his business, so I arranged a protest over that. There in [neighboring community] they protested, and they got electricity. Why not here?

Note that this is broker is describing a non-exclusive relationship with the elites he organizes protest for, and indeed discussion with all thirty-seven protest brokers confirms that the relationship between brokers and elites can be split into two primary groups – those where the brokers have an exclusive relationship with one elite or set of elites (exclusive brokers), and those where the brokers work with a wider number of patrons (non-exclusive brokers).
Chapter 6 will explore the impact of this distinction on broker activity in more detail.

3 Brokers Mobilize Specific Communities

In addition to their relationship with elites, the theory being advanced here also distinguishes protest brokers in terms of their relationships with the groups they seek to mobilize, and again the evidence from South Africa suggests that there are indeed important differences here.

When asked, all thirty-seven brokers in the sample were very clear about the group or groups that they were able to mobilize. The majority (sixty-eight percent) stated that they exclusively mobilized individuals from a specific group with a shared collective interest (embedded), most commonly the local branch of a political party, trade union or locally-based community group.
Just thirty-two percent claimed to mobilize more diffuse networks (non-embedded), and even here the brokers were very clear that there were limits on the networks they had access to, as this interaction demonstrates:

Broker: I don’t have just one group I mobilize no. Sometimes it’s people from my street committee. Other times people from church. And sometimes different people I know in different ways. It depends on the issue. That determines everything. Once I know the issue, I know who to approach.

Question: So can you mobilize people from across the whole of the community?

Broker: [Laughs] No. No. We are not one people. I can only mobilize the people I know. The people who trust me.

Question: What do you mean by that?

Broker: I can mobilize my people. The people on my lists. On my phone. The people I see every day. The people I grew up with. The people who live like me. I can’t mobilize the hostel dwellers because I am not one of them. I’m not sure if you understand me? The hostel dwellers have their own person. The people in [names an informal settlement in
the community] have their own person. They are not my people. My people are the only ones I can mobilize.

In addition to being clear about the groups they were able to mobilize, moreover, most brokers also indicated that they would be upset if another individual tried to organize protest in their groups, and would act to stop them. The independent brokers were the most militant in this regard:

They would be stealing my job. Food from my table. From my children. That would not be ok. I would have to stop that.

No. No. No. Once someone tried. He was a newcomer and saw I was making money in this way, so he tried. But the community did not follow him. So then I went to his home and I spoke with him. He does not come around here anymore. I hope you understand what I am saying.

In contrast to this level of militancy, most of the other broker types indicated that some overlap in mobilization was to be expected, but they were still clear that there were limits as to what was acceptable. As one broker explained:

Sometimes our people overlap. Like I organize protest among the hostel dwellers, and [name] works for the EFF. Some of my people are also his people. That is fine. But if he is asked to organize protest in the community, not just EFF members, he must come to me. That is our agreement.

Crucially, this broker recognizes that community members have multiple identities, and that they might, therefore, be part of more than one social network, and potentially available for mobilization by more than one broker. But he is also very clear about the limits to this. While he recognizes that another broker might sometimes organize hostel dwellers, that is, he views this as acceptable *only* when that broker mobilizes them as part of a specific, distinct group – in this case, political party members. If the broker is asked to mobilize the hostel dwellers under a different identity – as hostel dwellers, for example – the first broker expects to be approached,
and, by referring to this as an “agreement,” he indicates that this expectation is understood by both parties.

Indeed, in some cases, the agreement between brokers in this regard could be quite formal. In Gauteng, for example, I was shown a written document signed by three protest brokers, laying out not only the circumstances under which each broker expected to be consulted, but also the appropriate fee structure for any resulting alliance, as well as the fines to be levied in the event of any breach of contract.

Even where there were no written agreements, however, every broker I spoke with had a clear sense of not only exactly who they could mobilize, but also any potentially competing brokers in the area, and the conditions under which they would need to work with them. The following was a typical interaction in this regard:

Question: So when you want to organize a protest you mobilize members of the ANC?

Broker: Yes.

Question: Do you mobilize anyone else?

Broker: You cannot stop people from joining a protest, but these are the people I mobilize. Sometimes others turn up, you can’t stop that, but my people are the ANC.

Question: Is there anyone else who mobilizes protest in this community?

Broker: Yes, there are two others. [Names them].

Question: Who do they mobilize?

Broker: [A] mobilizes like me, but for the PAC. [B] mobilizes his people there by the railway.

Question: Are there any ANC members by the railway?

Broker: Yes, of course, yes.
Question: So what happens if you try to mobilize them? Would [B] be okay with that?

Broker: It depends. If I mobilize them as ANC he would be okay. So if they come to my meeting and then they protest as ANC that is okay. If I go to their homes and I ask them to protest for the community then we would have a problem. That is not my community. It would be a big problem.

To summarize, in line with the theory advanced in Part 1, the evidence presented here confirms that brokers have relationships with specific communities of potential protesters, and that these communities are central to their mobilizing efforts. For some brokers, the community concerned is a single, tight-knit group with a shared collective interest, while others mobilize more diffuse social networks. In all cases, however, the evidence shows that the ties and relationships between the broker and community are key, and this results in clear boundaries around the people that each broker is able to turn out.

4 Brokers Know Their Communities

In addition to being able to identify their community, the theory being advanced here also requires brokers to know their community. That is, they must know what grievances exist, the sort of incentives that will persuade people to turn out, their political affiliations, and so on, for it is this knowledge that makes them so valuable to elites.

Evidence that brokers possess such detailed knowledge comes from my interviews with both brokers and community members, as well as observations during protest mobilization. Indeed, when walking round communities with protest brokers, I was repeatedly struck by the familiarity of brokers with “their” people. When indicating a house where a community member lived, for example, one broker in the Western Cape spent almost twenty minutes
talking about the person who lived there. Where he had come from. How many people lived in the house. The number of times the individual had complained to his local councilor about service delivery issues. The social groups and networks he was part of. His political affiliations. Where he could typically be found over the course of the week. How much he earned. What would motivate him to turn out. How likely he was to engage in violence at a protest. How many people he had brought to previous protests. And why it mattered whether or not his mother was well (if she was sick, he spent his free time visiting with her, and would be unavailable for protest mobilization between the hours of 5am and 10pm). When I asked whether he possessed this level of detail on everyone in the community he seemed surprised, and replied “Of course. These are my people. I know them.”

Community members too seemed strikingly accepting of the idea that local brokers possessed detailed knowledge about their lives. “He is my neighbor, of course he knows these things,” explained one, while another noted: “Every day he sees me. He knows what I think.”

In addition to possessing a deep level of knowledge about community members, moreover, the evidence also shows that protest brokers value this information, and devote significant amounts of time to developing it. The brokers in this study, for example, reported that they spent, on average, 4.3 hours a week keeping their knowledge up to date, with strategies reported including: visiting people at home; engaging in social activities; holding or attending community meetings; holding clinic hours where the community can come to talk to them; attending religious services; getting information from other people; deploying other people with the express goal of obtaining information; monitoring social media; monitoring traditional media; and walking around (Figure 5.16).
5 Brokers Care About Their Reputations

Finally, as discussed in Chapter 2, trust is also central to the ability of protest brokers to mobilize protest, and the evidence shows that brokers in South Africa are well aware of this fact, and work hard to maintain their reputations. As one broker explained:

Maybe you don’t think what I do is nice. I organize protest. But one thing you must know about me. I am always honest. Always. Ask anyone. I have to be. If I’m not, people won’t trust me. And then I can’t do my job.

When asked what techniques they used to mobilize protest, not a single broker reported having arranged a protest by lying to encourage people to gather, or misleading people about the grievances that would be expressed during the protest. When presented with media reports suggesting that protests were sometimes organized by telling people there would be jobs available in a location and then encouraging them to protest the lack of jobs when they got
there, or using a loud hailer to announce an urgent party meeting and then telling the media and police it was a protest (two commonly reported scenarios in the media at the time), all thirty-seven condemned the practice.

You only do this if you have no other option.

This shows they were not good at their job. A real comrade doesn’t need to resort to such tactics.

I would be ashamed.

If you do this, you are finished. People may fall for it once, but not twice. You will never organize a protest again.

About a third of brokers (twelve) did report that they had not disclosed the real patron behind the protest on at least one occasion, however, and over half (twenty) said they had hidden the fact that they were making money from protest organization in the past. All were clear that there was a genuine risk to doing this, however, and they were likely to lose support, and the ability to mobilize people, if they were found out.

In addition to trying to be honest, a number of brokers also reported going to more extreme lengths to protect their reputations. One broker in Gauteng, for example, stated that he had borrowed money from a family member to distribute among protesters when an elite failed to pay up. Another, this time in the Western Cape, spent his own money travelling to the city center five days in a row to pressure a local activist group to follow through on a promise they had made to provide t-shirts, after he had, in turn, promised them to the community. For both brokers, the importance of providing the incentives they had promised was well worth the personal cost, and both were very clear that even debt was preferable to gaining a reputation for breaking promises.
And the importance of keeping promises does not just cover promises made in relation to protest, but extends to every area of the brokers’ lives. To provide just one example, I got a call one evening from a broker in the Western Cape asking if I could drive him to the city center because he needed to speak urgently with a local non-profit founder about a workshop the founder had promised to run in the township. This workshop had nothing at all to do with protest (it was about hydroponic irrigation), and the broker’s only connection to the event was that he had introduced the non-profit to a local school teacher who had organized the workshop. When the non-profit pulled out at the last minute, however, the broker was panic-stricken, terrified he would be blamed for the failure, and that this would affect his reputation with the community. “It seems unrelated,” he noted, “but really it’s all connected. If people stop trusting me in one way, they cannot trust me in others.”

5.5 Conclusion

In sum, this chapter supports the argument that protest brokers play a vital role in the organization of protest in South Africa, and provides evidence to support several of the central hypotheses of the protest broker theory. Chapter 6 now returns to the question of what this means for patterns of protest more broadly, and explores the ways in which this new theory helps us to better understand the forms of protest we observe.
6 Patterns of Protest

6.1 Introduction

Having discussed the primary activities of protest brokers, I now return to the broader question at the heart of this dissertation: how does this new theory of protest brokers help us to better understand the patterns of protest we observe?

As outlined in Part 1, I argue that protest brokers affect patterns of protest in two main ways. First, the availability of protest brokers affects the locations of protest – at least in the short term. And second, the type of broker available affects the sorts of protest we see.

Drawing on the data introduced in Chapters 4 and 5, this chapter now tests both of these arguments, and offers evidence of the following:

1. **Broker availability affects the locations of protest.** Where elites do not have access to protest brokers they often struggle to arrange collective action, and this reduces the likelihood that communities will take to the streets. This helps to explain *where* protests happen, especially during large-scale protest action in which elites seek to mobilize large regions simultaneously.

2. **Protests take place more frequently, and over a wider variety of issues, in communities dominated by non-exclusive and non-embedded brokers.** This is because non-exclusive and non-embedded brokers organize collective action around a greater number of interests, increasing both the demand and supply of protest in these locations.
3. **Mobilization tactics are affected by the nature of a broker’s relationship with the community**, with embedded brokers less likely to offer financial payments to protesters compared with their non-embedded counterparts. This is because the tight-knit nature of the embedded broker’s group makes tactics such as peer pressure and social sanctions easier to employ, while the shared collective interest increases the utility of framing, and the likelihood that financial payments will seem illegitimate.

4. As a result of their increased reliance on material incentives, **non-embedded brokers are less able to sustain lengthy protests**, resulting in collective action that is generally shorter on average.

5. And finally, **the likelihood of violence is lower where brokers are embedded or exclusive**. In terms of embedded brokers, this is because the protesters they mobilize are more likely to care strongly about the intended goals of any given protest, and, as a result, less likely to be willing to risk these goals by engaging in looting or other forms of violence. In terms of exclusive brokers, in contrast, the public nature of the broker-elite relationship reduces elite demand for violence, while the iterative nature of the exclusive relationship increases the incentives of brokers to expend energy controlling it.

### 6.2 Explaining the Locations of Protest

The theory being advanced here suggests that collective action should be less likely to occur in communities that do not have a local protest broker, as many elites will find it difficult to connect effectively with the community in their absence. Testing this argument is challenging,
However, because the availability of protest brokers is hard to establish, making it difficult to test the impact of their presence at any sort of scale. While data showing the spread of brokers across the country would be ideal, that is, it does not exist, and is simply not feasible to gather. Broker activity is rarely observable to outsiders, requiring both time and deep levels of community trust to identify. Obtaining this data at any sort of large scale, therefore, would require a significant investment of time and resources – far beyond the twenty-six months of fieldwork that underpins the data presented here.

To deal with this challenge, therefore, this dissertation instead combines a variety of different evidence which, while not definitive, provides strong support for the arguments being advanced.

First, in Chapter 4, I observed that elite-organized protest has been found to be an important form of collective action in South Africa. Given this, it is therefore likely that anything which affects the ability of elites to organize protest will have a significant impact on the locations of protest across the country.

Second, in Chapter 5, I presented evidence showing that elites are often socially distant from those they seek to turn out, and that this social distance makes it harder for them to organize protest. I also demonstrated that broker-organized protest made up over half of the recorded protests in the CSCD, again suggesting strongly that the presence or absence of brokers will have an important effect on protest locations.

This chapter now develops the argument still further, by providing evidence to show that the absence of a protest broker does indeed affect the likelihood of collective action in a community. I do so in three ways. First, I explore examples of failed protest in one community
over time, and use these to show that the availability of a broker affects the ability of elites to organize protest. Second, I explore what happens when a community loses a broker, and demonstrate that the loss of a broker decreases the likelihood of protest, even in a community that has previously protested extensively. And finally, I analyze the activities of elites seeking to organize protests across a large region simultaneously, and show that the availability of brokers helps to determine the communities that respond.

Failed Protest in Maratiwa

Between 2005 and 2015, six elites tried – and failed – to organize a protest in the community of Maratiwa, Gauteng. These included a local businessman who wanted the community to protest the lack of reliable electricity, an aspiring local politician who wanted to organize a protest highlighting the incompetence of the incumbent councilor, and the leaders of a provincial civil society organization who wanted communities across the region to protest against poor service delivery.

So why did these six elites struggle to arrange protest? Potential explanations put forward by the broader protest literature include: a lack of sufficient grievances in the community (Gurr 1970); a failure on the part of elites to employ appropriate mobilization

\footnote{As discussed in the introduction, the names of all communities and brokers throughout this dissertation have been changed.}

\footnote{The other three elites were regional leaders of the Economic Freedom Fighters and the Democratic Alliance, as well as national leaders from COSATU (the Congress of South African Trade Unions).}

\footnote{McCarthy and Zald (1977) would argue that there is always enough discontent to allow for protest under the right circumstances, of course, but following Tilly (1978), Oberschall (1978), Law and Walsh (1983), and others I allow for the fact that protest likelihood is at least partially affected by the level of grievances present.}
tactics (Olson 1965); elements of the institutional environment that might reduce the
tactics of participants (Flacks 2004); the lack of the sort of dense networks that Varshney
(2002) and others have identified as important; and a belief that protest is not an efficient
tactic (Gagnon 1995). While all these explanations likely play some role in protest mobilization,
however, the evidence suggests that they cannot fully explain the failure to mobilize observed
here.

First, while the elites concerned certainly had their own personal reasons for wanting
protest, all of the grievances cited were genuine issues within the community, as evidenced by
a memorandum delivered by residents to the local municipal offices in September 2014. This
memorandum cited poor service delivery (including electricity), corruption in the awarding of
local tenders, and poor local governance as key grievances for residents, and demanded
immediate improvements from the municipality. The fact that the community was able to
mobilize to deliver the memorandum, moreover, suggests that these grievances are powerful
enough to anchor collective action under the right conditions.

In terms of mobilization tactics, similarly, all six elites employed a number of
mobilization tactics that have been identified as facilitating protest in the broader literature.
These included providing information to coordinate and publicize the protest, tapping into local
grievances, framing protest as a legitimate and useful strategy, offering selective incentives
such as food and money, and drawing on social networks (Goodwin and Jasper 2003; Lake and
Rothchild 1996; Olson 1965; Robinson and White 1997; Snow et al. 1986). Despite this,
however, all six elites failed to persuade a critical mass of people to turn out, implying that the
tactics alone are not enough, and that more is needed for elites to overcome the collective action problem effectively.

And finally, explanations focused on the institutional environment, networks, or individual beliefs about protest, are all also largely unconvincing in this case, given that Maratiwa has protested successfully in the past. Indeed, the memorandum of grievances discussed above was handed over to local government during a community protest, over precisely the issues these six elites were trying to mobilize people around. This suggests that the community is available and willing to be mobilized under the right circumstances, and that we need to move beyond our current understanding of elite mobilization if we are to fully understand the patterns of protest we observe.

When asked why they thought their attempts at mobilization had been unsuccessful, all six elites gave a similar answer – they lacked the local knowledge, connections, and trust necessary to allow them to connect credibly and effectively with the community they were trying to turn out. That is, in the language of this dissertation, they lacked a protest broker. As the leader of the civil society organization noted:

It’s not easy to organize protest. You must know the right people and the right things to say, and the people must see you as a comrade. I come from this community, but I only live in one part, and my people are not the people who will protest. It’s hard for me.

The local businessman expressed similar sentiments:

I don’t know the right people here and no-body trusts me. When I organized protest before it was easier. We had comrades on the ground who got people to toyi-toyi. They were the key... we need someone like that here.

And this view was also echoed by members of the community, who, when interviewed about the businessman’s failed protest, stated clearly that they did not trust him. They were skeptical
of his promise to provide food, wary of his personal motivations, and feared that he might be in league with a strongly disliked local councilor. While they agreed with many of the grievances he highlighted, moreover, they were confused by some of the specific examples he gave (relating to business rates and brick manufacturing), and also did not trust him to represent their interests fairly to the media and local government. Their relationship with him, therefore, limited the effectiveness of his mobilization tactics, and made it incredibly difficult for him to organize any sort of collective action.

Supporting the theory of protest brokers still further, moreover, the leader of the civil society organization did eventually manage to arrange a successful protest in 2014, after three failed attempts. And he did so precisely by using a broker – in this case an individual from a neighboring settlement who had the trust, credibility and connections necessary to mobilize a large group of Maratiwa residents.

When [the leader] first came to us asking us to protest we didn’t trust him," one protester explained. “But when our old friend asked we knew it would be ok. We trusted him you see. We knew he would do the things he promised and that the protest would make the right noise and help us not just the leader. He is a man that can get people to turn out.

The case of Maratiwa, therefore, suggests that elite desire and the availability of a mobilizable community are not, on their own, enough to overcome the collective action problem. Rather, the ability of the elite to connect credibly and effectively with rank-and-file protesters emerges as an essential determining factor, without which the collective action problem often remains insurmountable. Where elites do not have access to a broker, therefore, it is likely that they will struggle to arrange protest, and this, in turn, will affect where protests happen. As Maratiwa shows, however, this does not mean such communities will never see protest, of course. Some
elites may have access to a broker in a community, while others do not, and brokers can also come into being over time – especially if there is strong demand for them. Because brokers require extensive community knowledge and trust, however, they must be forged locally, and cannot just be parachuted in by elites on a whim. While brokers may spring up in response to strong elite demand, therefore, this is likely to take time, and the availability of protest brokers will, therefore, affect the locations of protest in the short term at least.

**The Loss of a Broker in Khomas**

As well as studying examples of failed protest, communities that have lost a broker also provide useful evidence of the ways in which broker availability shapes patterns of protest. Khomas in the Western Cape is one such community.

Khomas is an informal settlement, located within a much bigger, older township. It contains around 1,700 shacks, and lacks most basic services. Residents use illegal electric connections to power their homes, sewage runs down the streets, and many residents have to relieve themselves in the bushes due to a lack of functioning toilets.

Residents have moved to Khomas for a variety of reasons over the years, but one particular neighborhood is dominated by families who moved to the area together, after they lost their homes during floods in 2016. These residents all come from the same nearby community, and in the two years prior to their move many of them reported having engaged in a number of protests over living conditions, services, crime and jobs. As one resident put it: “We were angry and no-one was listening, so we protested. We protested over everything. We wanted people to see us. To see how we were living.”
When these residents moved, however, it was a move forced by necessity, and did not result in any improvement in living conditions.

The government didn’t find us homes. We moved from hell to hell.

There was sewage everywhere in the house when the flood came. Everywhere. I couldn’t live there like that... [snorts] Not that this is better.

No-one should have to live like this. Other people lost their homes and they got new homes. Better homes from the government. But we got this. Nothing changed.

Despite little improvement in their living conditions, however, the residents of Khomas did not take to the streets in protest in their new settlement in quite the same way. Many of the people I spoke with talked about the need to protest, and when members of shack dwellers groups, civil society organizations, and political parties came to the settlement and called for the community to rise up they were greeted with enthusiastic cheers. But nothing ever came of it. The community seemed apathetic somehow. Very different from the community they had left.

One evening, after yet another meeting at which political leaders had called for protest to rousing applause, I asked a group of young men whether they were going to take to the streets as requested. “Of course, yes, of course,” one replied. I probed further: “Do you think other people in [Khomas] will join you?” The young men looked surprised. “Oh, we won’t protest here,” one explained, “no-one protests here. We protest with [broker’s name].”

The broker they named organized protest in the community they had moved from, but was not one of the group that had relocated. Attending the protest he organized a few days later, I recognized over forty members of the Khomas community – all of them toyi-toying, burning tires and throwing stones on the N2. “These are my people,” the broker explained
when I asked why he thought the Khomas community protested here, rather than in Khomas.

“They don’t have anyone to organize protest over there. [Laughs]. I cannot be in two places at the same time. So they come here.”

As I watched the media arrived – photographers and reporters from a number of local newspapers. And as they walked around, conducting interviews, taking photographs and observing the protest, the Khomas residents made a point of differentiating themselves from the rest of the protesters. As community members began to explain the reason for the protest – the poor living conditions they were forced to endure – Khomas residents shouted that it was about poor living conditions in Khomas too. As one newspaper team began to pack up, they found themselves surrounded by a group of six Khomas residents anxiously checking that they had understood this was a joint protest, and that the conditions in Khomas were just as bad. A photographer heading off to see the living conditions in the broker’s community was angrily asked why he was not going to Khomas as well, and several protesters demanded to see evidence in a journalist’s notebook that he had written down Khomas, and was not just focusing on the community where the protest was taking place.

Later on, as we were walking back to Khomas, the protesters I was with expressed anger that their concerns had been sidelined – something they claimed happened every time they turned out to protest now. I asked them why they didn’t protest in their own community, where it would be harder for the grievances of another community to dominate, and the answer was simple: there was no-one to organize it. There were elites who wanted protest, and individuals prepared to turn out, but no-one able or willing to do the actual work of mobilization. The work necessary to get people to protest. When the community had moved,
they had lost their broker. He had stayed behind, and without him there was no-one to coordinate the collective action. No-one with the knowledge, networks and trust to persuade enough people to turn out. No-one willing to expend the time and energy necessary to mobilize protesters. And no-one with the connections to elites that enabled the original broker to provide selective incentives to those who turned out. One of the Khomas group admitted that he had in fact tried to organize a protest himself a few months back, but only twelve people turned up, so he called it off.

“It’s hard,” he noted. “You think organizing a protest is easy, but only a few people came. I was ashamed. I don’t think anyone else believed it was a real protest. [“I didn’t,” another protester muttered]. “Organizing protest is like a job,” the first protester continued, “you need contacts and skills. People must know you can do it. People must trust you. People must know you. Without that you’re just a troublemaker with a stone. [He laughed, picking up a stone and throwing it at a passing car]. That’s me. I make trouble… But others must organize it.”

As this case shows, therefore, the loss of a broker has clearly affected the ability of the community in Khomas to overcome the collective action problem. As in Maratiwa, there is no shortage of elites calling for protest, and there are also clearly people willing to engage in protest under the right circumstances. But without a broker the connection between the two is lacking, and this has significantly limited the protests that have occurred.

**Large-Scale Protest Action in the Western Cape**

Finally, the third case study supporting the importance of protest brokers comes from a period of sustained mass action that took place in the Western Cape in 2010. During this period,
widespread protests in the region were called for by three provincial organizations – the Western Cape branch of the shack dwellers’ movement Abahlali baseMjondolo, the local leadership of the ANC Youth League, and the local leadership of the South African National Civic Organization (SANCO) – who all sought to make the Western Cape “ungovernable” in order to protest the appalling living conditions endured by many communities (Robins 2010; Cape Times 2010). Interviews with members of the ANC Youth League from this time provide important insights into the ways in which broker availability shaped the resulting patterns of protest.

The call for widespread protest began on May 25, 2010, when Loyiso Nkohla, secretary of the ANC Youth League’s Dullah Omar region called on young people across the Western Cape to engage in violent protest over their living conditions.77 Quoted in the Cape Times, he said: “This is not a joke. We are serious... We are calling on all young people to do this, especially those living in informal settlements. We are going to destroy everything” (Mtyala and Hartley 2010).

SANCO leaders soon joined in the calls for protest, and on October 1, 2010 Abahlali baseMjondolo announced that they were declaring October as the “month of informal settlement strike,” and urged informal settlements throughout Cape Town to “take to the street and barricade” in order to “make the whole City of Cape Town ungovernable” and “create chaos throughout the City” (“Urgent Call” 2010).

Despite the widespread nature of the calls to protest, however, not all communities responded in the same way, with a large number of informal settlements and townships

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77 Dullah Omar was an anti-apartheid activist and government minister, whose name is used by the ANC to refer to the Cape Metro region.
remaining entirely peaceful. Once again, the availability of brokers helps to explain the patterns we observe here, with communities without brokers proving much harder for elites to mobilize.

As two ANC-YL members explained:

Member 1: We wanted to mobilize in all of these communities, but we didn’t know anyone in [community 1] or [community 2]. We tried and we tried, but we couldn’t find someone. And then in the newspaper they said these communities were happy because they didn’t protest. [Laughs]. They weren’t happy. We just couldn’t find anyone!

Member 2: You know it all depended on where we had contacts. Some places it was easy. We knew the people to call up and they could go to the people and say, “let’s protest”. But in other places it was much harder. Let me give you an example. Me myself, I went to [community 3], and I met with [broker name]. We talked and we had a beer and the next day 200 people were burning tires. 200 people! You must believe me... Later I went to [community 4]. I spent a whole day trying to persuade them to join the revolution and they were keen. But I had no-one to have a beer with. Do you understand what I am saying? It was just me talking to people. And they never protested. Not once. This whole community. And you must see the way they live. Shit everywhere. No electricity. Water flooding in. Rats. But they never protested. Never.

Member 1: And sometimes we didn’t even try. We didn’t know the community. We had no contacts. So we just left them, and hoped they would rise up on their own.

Notice what these quotes are saying. The Youth League wanted to mobilize protest in as many communities as possible, but in some communities it was simply harder for them to do so. If they did not know someone – a broker – who could mobilize people on their behalf, they had to go to communities themselves, and expend considerable energy persuading people to protest – energy that did not necessarily guarantee results. The availability of brokers, therefore, seems likely to have had a significant effect on the resulting patterns of protest in this case, with some communities not targeted at all because of the lack of a broker, and others targeted unsuccessfully in their absence. While protests brokers were not the only thing determining the communities that protested over this period, of course, the evidence does suggest strongly,
once again, that the availability of protest brokers is an important factor helping to explain where elite-mobilized protest happens, and the geographic patterns of protest that result.

**6.3 Explaining Elements of Protest**

Having provided evidence to support the argument that the availability of protest brokers affects the locations of protest, I now turn to the second part of my argument: that the type of broker available affects the sorts of protest we see.

As a reminder, I classify brokers in terms of two key relationships: their relationship with elites, and their relationship with the communities they mobilize. In terms of the first dimension, I classify brokers as either *exclusive* (when they work with a specific elite or group of elites and only mobilize protest on their behalf), or *non-exclusive* (when they arrange protest for a variety of different patrons). At the community level, in contrast, I distinguish between *embedded* brokers (who are embedded in and mobilize one specific community group with a shared collective interest), and their *non-embedded* counterparts (who mobilize a variety of different groups and networks across the broader community). This results in four key broker types, and the predicted patterns of protest outlined in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1: Predicted Patterns of Protest by Broker Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predicted Patterns of Protest</th>
<th>Ideological Broker</th>
<th>Elite Broker</th>
<th>Group Broker</th>
<th>Independent Broker</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relationship with Elites</td>
<td>Exclusive</td>
<td>Exclusive</td>
<td>Non-exclusive</td>
<td>Non-exclusive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship with Community</td>
<td>Embedded</td>
<td>Non-embedded</td>
<td>Embedded</td>
<td>Non-embedded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variety of Issues</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominant Mobilization Tactic</td>
<td>Non-material</td>
<td>Material</td>
<td>Non-material</td>
<td>Material</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest Duration</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Short</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Short</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood of violence</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium (high supply, low demand, high incentives for broker control due to elite relationship)</td>
<td>Medium (low supply, high demand, high incentives for broker control due to shared collective interest)</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the figures above, the broker is represented by the letter “B”, elites by “E”, and groups within the community by “G”. Solid lines represent durable connections, and dotted lines represent relationships that are renegotiated on an on-going basis.

**Protest Frequency and Variety**

In terms of protest frequency and variety, the theory being advanced here argues that communities mobilized by non-embedded and non-exclusive brokers will, on average, see more protest over a wider variety of issues than their embedded and exclusive counterparts. This is
because non-embedded and non-exclusive brokers organize protest around a greater number of interests, with the potential demand and supply of protest increasing as a result.

The relationship is not quite as clear cut as this, of course, as some elites may desire more protests over a wider range of issues than others, while some community groups may be willing to protest more or less broadly. But all else being equal, where a protest broker organizes protest for more than one elite and/or is able to mobilize multiple social networks, then the theory suggests that we should see a greater frequency of protest, over a wider variety of issues.

Data from the Case Study Community Dataset (CSCD) provides support for this argument. Figure 6.1 shows the average number of protests per broker by relationship type, and we can see that, in terms of pure numbers, non-embedded and non-exclusive brokers organize significantly more protest than their embedded and exclusive counterparts.

Figure 6.1: Relationship Type and Number of Protests per Broker
In terms of variety, similarly, the evidence again seems to support the theory being advanced here. Figure 6.2 breaks down the average number of issues by relationship type, and again we can see that the type of broker does seem to matter, with non-exclusive and non-embedded brokers typically engaging in protest around a wider variety of issues than their exclusive or embedded counterparts.

![Figure 6.2: Relationship Type and Variety of Issues](image)

An important question remains, however: is this relationship causative or simply correlative? That is, are non-embedded and non-exclusive brokers simply more likely to arise in locations that are protest prone for other reasons, or does the broker type, in some way, actually affect the patterns of protest directly?

While the reality is that the relationship between broker type and community propensity to protest is likely to be complex and multi-directional, there is at least some
evidence to suggest that protest frequency and variety are not being driven exclusively by community type.

First, as discussed in Chapter 5, many geographic communities have more than one broker, and the same residents may be mobilized by different broker types on different occasions. If the causal relationship went exclusively from community type to broker type, however, we would expect to see more homogeneity here, suggesting that the type of broker is not entirely determined by the community.

Second, evidence from interviews and observation also suggests that non-exclusive brokers, on occasion, actually create a need for their services in order to attract elite patrons. To provide just one example, Lindiwe, an independent broker from the Western Cape, described an occasion in 2009 in which she began to spread rumors around her community that an aspiring local councilor was planning to organize a protest against an incumbent member of his own party. These rumors were entirely made up, but Lindiwe hoped they would encourage at least one of the two individuals to engage her services, allowing her to earn some money in order to help pay her mother’s medical bills. “I didn’t care which,” she explained, “but I thought if I told these stories maybe at least one of the two would wake up and decide a protest was necessary.”

Crucially Lindiwe was not the only one to report engaging in this sort of action, with roughly a third of the non-exclusive brokers in the study admitting to similar behavior. While not conclusive, of course, this strongly suggests that non-exclusive broker types do not simply

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78 This observation is in line with similar observations made by Cohen (1975) in relation to political brokers in Newfoundland.
arise in response to high levels of local demand, they also manipulate that demand directly, exerting their own influence on the patterns of protest we observe.

**Mobilization Tactics**

As well as affecting the frequency and variety of protest, the theory being advanced here also suggests that the type of broker present in a community will affect the mobilization tactics used, with embedded brokers less likely to rely on the payment of material selective incentives than their non-embedded counterparts. This is because the tight-knit nature of the embedded broker’s group makes tactics such as peer pressure and social sanctions easier to employ, while the shared collective interest increases the utility of framing, and is more likely to make material payments seem illegitimate.

Once again, the data seems to support this argument. While all thirty-seven brokers report using framing tactics to mobilize protest, that is, embedded brokers were almost twice as likely to report using non-material act-contingent incentives as their non-embedded counterparts, while non-embedded brokers were far more likely to report using material incentives (Figure 6.3).
Again, the sample size is small, so the findings here are suggestive rather than conclusive, but qualitative data from both interviews and participant observation also adds additional support for the hypothesis.

In Gauteng, for example, I followed one embedded broker, Bheki, as he mobilized four different protests among his community group. In each case Bheki relied primarily on the shared collective goals of the group to arrange his protest, along with non-material selective incentives, such as peer pressure. His calls to protest all began with a passionate speech at the “People’s Parliament” – a local bus station where community members gather – and he spent significant time beforehand planning how best to present the protest in order to tie it most clearly to community grievances. He also kept a careful list of everyone who attended his protests, publicly praising those who turned out, and querying the absence of group members during group meetings, or by visiting their homes or favorite drinking spots. Bheki actively
sought to shame those members who did not turn out on these occasions, moreover, and he
selected the locations for conversation that he believed would make them the most
uncomfortable. When discussing his mobilization tactics he observed:

We are one community and we have one goal, and that helps with mobilization. If this
one doesn’t protest then people notice, and we know he isn’t committed to the goal. He
loses respect. He loses friends. Maybe he even loses help when he needs it. It’s a high
cost.

When I asked whether he ever paid protesters, moreover, Bheki was extremely scornful of the
idea.

Why would I do that? My people protest because they care. It would be an insult to pay
them. It would imply they did not care. That the problems weren’t real. How could we
hold our head up if we only protested for money? We want change. Change is the only
payment that matters.

And many other embedded brokers expressed similar views. Most of them stated that they had
never paid protesters directly, although offering food or t-shirts to those who turned out was
common. And where direct payments were reported, they were usually intended for very
specific purposes – such as transport or to cover lost wages – and were not portrayed as
payment for protesting itself. Only three embedded brokers (out of twenty-five) reported
regularly paying people in a more direct manner, and even these three claimed that they could
still organize protests without such payments – they just used them as a quick and easy way to
swell the numbers.

In contrast to this, most non-embedded brokers in the sample reported using material
incentives on at least some occasions. Mavo, a non-embedded broker from the Western Cape,
was typical in this regard. He distributes money and food quite openly to those who turn out,
with the biggest cut typically going to what he refers to as his “task team” – a group of close
friends who help him with the legwork of protest organization. Although he also reports using non-material incentives and framing on occasion, the community has come to expect payments from him, and I never witnessed a protest in which at least some money did not change hands. Indeed, Mavo could only remember a couple of occasions when this had happened himself, both of which were very early on in his career.

Once or twice, yes, I organized protest without paying people. But then I organized a protest over a new shopping center. People did not want to come so I offered some small money. After that, I must always offer money. Even if people are very angry they still ask for the money. Just a small amount you know. It is not much. Just enough to buy a little food or some drink. But they expect it.

Crucially, once Mavo had paid protesters to turn out on one occasion, they began to expect it on others, making it almost impossible for him to organize protest today without making at least some small payments. And similar comments were made by almost all of the non-embedded brokers. Some had offered payments right from the beginning, others had come to it later, but for all twelve non-embedded brokers – once they had made their first payments it was very difficult to go back.

Of course, it is important to note that non-embedded brokers, on average, organize more than twice as many protests as their embedded counterparts, and this may well affect the mobilization tactics they use. Over time, for example, an active broker, may well exhaust the willingness of community members to turn out, and be forced to employ other methods – such as financial payments – to persuade them. Two things suggest that this is not the whole story, however. First, brokers like Mavo typically report that they resorted to the payment of protesters quite early in their protest organization, and always because they were organizing a protest they did not believe they could get enough people to turn out for otherwise. This
suggests that it was not usually protester fatigue that led to payments, but rather the issue
being protested, and the corresponding lack of a shared collective interest to mobilize
protesters around.

Second, and supporting this claim, the broker who organized the second highest
number of protests in the CSCD – Andile – was in fact an embedded broker, who mobilized
members of the ANC Youth League for both ANC elite and other patrons. Despite organizing at
least seventy-one separate protests, however, I could find no evidence that Andile had ever
paid his protesters to turn out. Like Bheki he predominantly used framing, passionate speeches,
and peer pressure to organize regular protests over a range of different issues. He did
occasionally provide food at protests, but when he did so he always made it clear that this was
coming from the elites concerned (or on a couple of occasions from supporting members of the
wider community), and community members confirmed that this was neither a regular
occurrence, nor something that particularly affected their attendance calculus. While the
number of protests may affect the likelihood of needing to resort to material payments,
therefore, it is not inevitable, and the relationship between the broker and community emerges
as a significant factor.

**Protest Duration**

As a result of their increased reliance on material incentives, the theory being advanced here
also suggests that it is more costly for non-embedded brokers to sustain lengthy protests,
resulting in protests that are shorter on average than those organized by their embedded
counterparts. Demonstrating this using data from the CSCD is difficult, however, as newspaper
articles rarely report the length of protests. Interviews with both brokers and elites provide at least some support for the argument, however. As a trade union leader in the Western Cape explained:

   Question: Do all fixers [his label for protest brokers] cost the same?

   Elite: No. Some fixers are more expensive than others. It depends on many things.

   Question: Like what?


   Question: So some fixers pay people to protest?

   Elite: Yes. Not all fixers, but some do. And when they pay then I must cover those costs, so the protests are more expensive. Especially if you want a big protest or a long one.

   Question: So some protests cost more?

   Elite: Yes. Of course. It’s simple economics. If the fixer pays each protester ZAR 10 to protest for two hours. Then a four-hour protest costs ZAR 20 per protester and so on. Of course it’s not quite that simple. The prices do not work quite like that. There are discounts and so on. But you get the idea.

   Question: Does price affect the sorts of protest you ask for?

   Elite: Yes of course. Sometimes I would like to have protests that shut down the [township] for days, like they do there by [community name]. Those get a lot of attention. But that would be very expensive. So mostly they are shorter. A few hours. Sometimes you get one that goes viral and continues long time, but normally they are shorter.

A civil society leader from Gauteng described a similar situation when asked about a protest he had recently called for in several different communities.

   Elite: [Community name] was the most expensive of course. That [broker name] he is always expensive. But then he has to pay many people when he organizes a protest.

   Question: Do the others not have to pay people?

   Elite: No. Just [broker name].
Question: Why do you think that is?

Elite: I guess because the people he mobilizes do not care about the community in the same way. Some of them do, but not all. So they must have a reason to protest. And money is a good reason.

Crucially, this elite is clear that not all brokers pay their protesters, and he also suggests that – in keeping with the argument advanced above – that the relationship between the broker and the community is a key factor here. That is, where brokers mobilize a close-knit group with a shared collective goal (specifically around improving the community), the elite argues that brokers are less likely to need to pay them, resulting in a lower cost to the elite. When asked if the broker concerned charges the same amount for all protests, moreover, the elite continued:

Elite: No – it depends on the length of protest, and the size. If you want lots of people or a very long protest then you must pay more.

Question: Why?

Elite: Because he must pay more. That is why the protest in [community name] was shorter than in the other areas. Because I must pay him, and I could not afford a long protest.

Brokers, similarly, were also clear that protest duration was affected by the mobilization tactics they employed, with those relying on material incentives finding it harder to sustain lengthy protests. During a conversation between three neighboring protest brokers, for example, the only non-embedded broker in the room bemoaned this very fact.

Most of my protests are very short. If you pay people to protest they will be watching the clock the whole time. As soon as time is up most of them they leave. It’s like a job for them. These guys [gesturing to the other two] they have it easier. Their people really care about the issues so they will stay. No matter how long it takes they will stay. If it rains. Whatever. This guy [gestures at an embedded broker] he organized a protest last year that shut down the whole place four, five days. That would be hard for me. It would cost a lot of money. I could do it of course, but it would be expensive. Sometimes
people want that, but usually just a few hours is enough. So my protests are short. [Laughs]. It does mean I can fit them in though!

Likelihood of Violence

Finally, while the precise level of violence seen at protests is the result of a complicated relationship between demand (elite desire for violence), supply (the willingness of rank-and-file protesters to engage in violence), and broker control (the ability and willingness of individual brokers to control violence), the theory being advanced here argues that the likelihood of violence is affected by the type of broker organizing the protest.

In terms of demand and control, for example, I argue that exclusive brokers are, on average, more likely to organize protests with lower levels of violence than their non-exclusive counterparts, for two main reasons. First, because exclusive relationships between elites and brokers are more likely to be publicly known, elites desiring violence may hesitate to request or permit it from exclusive brokers, given the limited deniability they will have if the violence receives public condemnation. The demand for violence is, therefore, likely to be lower for exclusive brokers. Second, when elite patrons do not want violence, exclusive brokers have greater incentives to expend energy adhering to this wish, due to the iterative nature of the exclusive relationship. This, in turn, leads to higher levels of broker control.

In terms of supply, in contrast, the presence of a strong group interest, and reduced reliance on material selective incentives, both decrease the likelihood of violence at protests organized by embedded brokers. This is because both they, and the protesters they mobilize, are more likely to care strongly about the intended goals of any given protest, and less likely to
be willing to risk these goals by engaging in looting or other forms of violence. Interviews with brokers, elites and protesters validate all three of these claims.

*Elite Demand For Violence*

First, the evidence is clear that violence is sometimes desired by elites for strategic reasons. A local councilor in the Western Cape, for example, argued during an interview that “sometimes violence is the only way to make government listen,” while a civil society leader from Gauteng described in detail the role that violence plays in ensuring a protest gets enough attention: “Of course I don’t want to see people hurt, but sometimes violence is necessary,” he explained. “Without violence it’s hard to get the media interested, and without the media it’s hard to get anyone else interested. Government does not pay attention to protests that do not disrupt. You must disrupt. This does not always mean there must be violence of course. Sometimes you can disrupt with symbolism or by choosing the location and the time carefully. But sometimes – sometimes – you must use violence. There is no other way.”

Journalists covering protest in South Africa, similarly, often stress the involvement of elites in inciting violence, and the benefits they gain by doing so. During a violent protest in Eldorado Park in Gauteng in 2017, for example, a local elite (Jerome Lottering) was widely believed by the media to have encouraged extensive violence in order to strengthen his hand during a visit to the United Nations, while Basil Douglas was earlier accused of inciting violence during protests in the same region as part of a personal political battle (Davis 1994; Whittles 2017a, 2017b).

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79 See Weinstein (2007) for a similar argument in relation to the mobilization of rebels.
While some elites—such as the ANC-YL members quoted earlier in this chapter—are happy to be publicly associated with their calls for violence, however, many elites prefer to be able to maintain some distance from violence, in order to avoid public condemnation. Both Lottering and Douglas, for example, moved quickly to counter allegations that they had incited the violence that broke out, despite the clear benefits it brought to both of them. And even the ANC-YL leadership quoted above were eventually forced to distance themselves from the public calls for violence they had made, as the result of public outcry and political fallout (Mtyala 2010).

Given this, it is perhaps unsurprising to find that elites are more likely to request violence from protest brokers when they believe that their relationship with the broker is not publicly known. That is, when they believe it is less likely that they will be directly associated with the violence. And this, in turn, is more likely to be the case, when the broker is non-exclusive, and organizes protest from a variety of different patrons. As one ANC councilor explained:

Councilor: Mostly when I want to organize a protest I use one of our people.

Question: Are there times when you don’t?

Councilor: Yes.

Question: Can you give an example?

Councilor: Last year I wanted to organize protest around the toilet issue. But there were many protests going on at that time and they were very violent. I knew this protest would be ignored if it was too quiet. So I went to [broker name] who I know well, and I asked him to organize it instead.

Question: Why did you go to him instead of one of your people?
Councilor: I did not want my name associated with the violence. That would have been very bad for me before the elections. [Broker name] organizes protest for many people so I had cover.

*Community Supply of Violence*

In terms of the community supply of violence, similarly, the evidence again supports the theory being advanced here – that the use of material selective incentives increases the likelihood of violence in protests organized by non-embedded brokers. As one protester explained, following a protest in which I had observed him looting a local store and throwing stones at the police:

Protester: I think this protest is about jobs [it was], but I’m not sure. I was just paid to come here with my friends and cause trouble.

Question: Were you paid to loot the spaza shop and throw stones?

Protester: Nooo... but I was paid to protest. I came here to make money, and now I have all this food as well. It’s just more money.

Question: And the stones?

Protester: That’s just fun!

A non-embedded broker, similarly, described the increased likelihood of violence he experienced when he paid protesters to turn out:

Broker: That protest you came to yesterday; did you see the two groups?

Question: Which two groups?

Broker: [Smiles] One group was burning tires and throwing stones at the police. The other was holding signs and toyi-toying.

Question: I think I remember. Did you mobilize both groups?

Broker: Yes

Question: Why do you think they behaved so differently?
Broker: The first group came to the protest because I paid them. That’s the only reason. They came to make money. They like to cause trouble. So every time they protest like this they will burn tires or throw stones. The other group, they care about the housing. I didn’t pay them; they came because they want to get new houses. So they were not violent. They know if they are violent [the councilor] he will see and maybe they will be pushed down the list. Because they care they are not so violent.

As well as the effect of material incentives, moreover, the evidence also shows that the presence of a strong group interest also decreases the likelihood of violence at protests organized by embedded brokers. As one embedded broker explained:

It’s not that we never have violence, but the message is important. It can be helpful to burn tires or throw stones – it gets people’s attention. But if someone is hurt, or a building is burnt down then no-one cares about the message any more. We all know that. So we are careful.

The same broker went on to explain proudly that this community had never engaged in xenophobic violence, despite the presence of a large number of Somali and Ethiopian shopkeepers. “It’s not that there is no anger against them,” he explained. “But we know if we kill them or loot their shops people will just see us as dangerous. They will not see how bad things are.”

And this argument was echoed by members of this broker’s community, and also by one of the Ethiopian shopkeepers I interviewed. “Before I had a shop in Alexandra,” he explained, “but when the violence came they burnt it. Even though I was still inside. [His face and arms are visibly scarred]. Then I moved here, and it has been okay. When they are planning to toyi-toyi here [broker name] tells me and I close the shop and leave the area. Then I come back and reopen once it is over. It’s not a good way to live, but it’s better than in other places. Here the protest is about living conditions. That’s all they care about. They don’t want to be seen as xenophobic. It’s important to them. And that keeps me safe.”
Broker Control of Violence

And finally, the evidence also supports the argument that the relationship between brokers and their elite patrons affects the incentives that brokers have to expend energy controlling violence. As an exclusive broker from the Western Cape explained, for example, while he permits some looting and destruction of property at protests he organizes, the civil society group he mobilizes protest for have clear limits on the amount of violence that is appropriate, and he believes he would lose his job if he did not adhere to this. This leads him to engage in a variety of activities to control or curb violence, resulting in very predictable levels of violence at his protests, which only rarely threatens to spiral out of control.

While such claims were common among exclusive brokers, however, all thirteen non-exclusive brokers, in contrast, indicated that they put different amounts of energy into controlling violence, depending on their relationship with the elite concerned, and their expectations about future opportunities. When Mavo, the independent broker discussed above, expects additional protest contracts if the protest goes well, for example, he reports that he works far harder to control violence than if he believes it to be a one-time transaction. As a result, while some of the protests he organizes see little to no violence, others see widespread looting, and still others significant property destruction and threat to human life.

6.4 Conclusion

In sum, this chapter tests some of the central predictions of the protest broker theory being advanced here, and provides evidence to support the argument that protest brokers affect the patterns of protest we observe in two main ways. First, it shows that the availability of protest
brokers affects the locations of protest – at least in the short term. And second, it demonstrates that the type of broker available affects the sorts of protest we see. This illustrates, once again, the additional analytic leverage gained by focusing explicitly on the role of protest brokers, and the differing ways in which they help elites to overcome the collective action problem.
7 Conclusion

7.1 Introduction

Having presented both theory and evidence, this final chapter now revisits the main arguments and findings of this dissertation, and discusses their implications for a number of important debates in the broader social science literature. It begins by summarizing the work so far, before describing the implications of this dissertation for our understanding of protest, elite mobilization, and political brokerage, as well as for civil society more widely. Finally, the concluding section looks beyond the South African case, and suggests a number of fruitful directions for further research.

7.2 Revisiting the Argument

Existing theories of collective action struggle to fully explain the community level patterns of protest we observe around the world. Specifically, they are unable to explain situations like the one this dissertation opened with – where two seemingly similar communities respond to attempts at elite mobilization in strikingly different ways.

In this dissertation, I argue that closer attention to the technology of mobilization helps to explain these patterns, and identify the important role played by protest brokers – intermediaries who help elites to connect credibly and effectively with the communities they seek to mobilize. Drawing on two original datasets of community level protests in South Africa, along with over twenty-six months of fieldwork, I show that many elites do not possess the local knowledge, connections or trust necessary to effectively mobilize protest, and that the
presence of protest brokers therefore increases the potential for collective action, helping to explain where protests happen.

Protest brokers are not homogenous in type, however, and I therefore argue further that the kind of brokers elites have access to affects the types of protests we observe, with broker type associated with predictable variation in a range of factors – including protest frequency, variety and duration, as well as the mobilization tactics used, and the likelihood of violence.

Specifically, I identify two key relationships that structure broker type – the relationship between brokers and their elite patrons, and the relationship between brokers and the communities they seek to mobilize. In terms of their relationship with elites, I classify brokers as either exclusive (when they work with specific elites only), or non-exclusive (when they arrange protest more widely for a variety of different patrons). At the community level, in contrast, I distinguish between embedded brokers (who mobilize one specific group with a shared collective interest), and non-embedded brokers (who mobilize a wider variety of social networks). Combining these two dimensions results in four primary broker types – ideological (exclusive and embedded), elite (exclusive and non-embedded), group (non-exclusive and embedded) and independent (non-exclusive and non-embedded) – with each type associated with a slightly different pattern of protest (Table 7.1).
Table 7.1: Predicted Patterns of Protest by Broker Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predicted Patterns of Protest</th>
<th>Ideological Broker</th>
<th>Elite Broker</th>
<th>Group Broker</th>
<th>Independent Broker</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relationship with Elites</td>
<td>Exclusive</td>
<td>Exclusive</td>
<td>Non-exclusive</td>
<td>Non-exclusive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship with Community</td>
<td>Embedded</td>
<td>Non-embedded</td>
<td>Embedded</td>
<td>Non-embedded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variety of Issues</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominant Mobilization Tactic</td>
<td>Non-material</td>
<td>Material</td>
<td>Non-material</td>
<td>Material</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest Duration</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Short</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Short</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood of violence</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium (high supply, low demand, high incentives for broker control due to elite relationship)</td>
<td>Medium (low supply, high demand, high incentives for broker control due to shared collective interest)</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the figures above, the broker is represented by the letter “B”, elites by “E”, and groups within the community by “G”. Solid lines represent durable connections, and dotted lines represent relationships that are renegotiated on an on-going basis.

In terms of the variety and frequency of protest, for example, I show in this dissertation that communities dominated by non-exclusive or non-embedded brokers are likely to see more protest, over a wider variety of issues, than communities dominated by their exclusive or embedded counterparts. This is because the variety and frequency of protest is affected by the number of ties a broker has (represented by the solid and broken lines in the images above),
with brokers possessing a higher number of ties organizing protest around a larger number of interests.

The effective means of mobilization, in contrast, is influenced primarily by the nature of a broker’s community relationship. Because of the shared collective interest that unites the group, I show that embedded brokers are more likely to be able to utilize non-material mobilization tactics, such as issue framing and ideology, while non-embedded brokers have to rely more heavily on material incentives. This, in turn, affects the duration of protests, with embedded brokers better able to sustain lengthy protests as a result of the shared goals of the community group, as well as the typically lower cost of mobilization.

Finally, in terms of the likelihood of violence, I show that this is lower where brokers are either exclusive or embedded. This is because the more public nature of the exclusive relationship makes elites less likely to encourage violence, while the shared collective interest of an embedded broker’s group reduces the involvement of participants in undesired behavior. Additionally, both embedded and exclusive brokers have a strong incentive to control any undesired violence that does occur, as a result of the long-term, iterative nature of their relationships.

7.3 Protest Brokers and the Literature

Having briefly reviewed the main arguments and findings of this dissertation, I turn now to examine some of their implications for the broader social science literature.

The first, and perhaps most obvious, contribution this dissertation makes is to the literature on protest, where it joins a growing number of works that focus explicitly on
explaining subnational variation in collective action (e.g., Doherty and Schraeder 2018; Moseley 2018; Von Holdt et al. 2011). In so doing, it helps to draw attention to some of the limitations of existing arguments, and particularly the ways in which many of the classic theories of protest have been problematically assumed to apply at the meso-level.\textsuperscript{80} As well as highlighting the importance of understanding subnational protest variation, however, this dissertation also advances our understanding of this variation directly, by introducing the concept of protest brokers – intermediaries who help elites to connect credibly and effectively with the communities they seek to mobilize. As Chapter 2 has noted, of course, the observation that individuals sometimes act as intermediaries in the organization of protest and collective action is not entirely new, with intermediaries observed in contexts ranging from 1920s Shanghai (Perry 2007), to 1950s America (Robnett 1996), and contemporary Argentina (Auyero 2001). Where this work differs from the existing literature, however, is by moving beyond anecdote, passing observation, and the idea of intermediaries as a curiosity of specific times and places, to develop the first theory and testable framework around the role that these intermediaries play, as well as their centrality to making key mechanisms work, and their resulting effect on patterns of protest.

The second major contribution this dissertation makes is to the literature on elite mobilization, where it draws attention to a previously understudied element – the technology through which elites and protesters connect. Previous works have tended to assume that elites will be able to connect credibly and effectively with those they seek to mobilize, and, as a result, have focused primarily on factors affecting the willingness of elites to bear the cost of

\textsuperscript{80} See Chapter 1 for a more detailed discussion of this.
mobilization, or the participation incentives of the rank-and-file. As the vignette with which this dissertation opened demonstrates, however, elite desire and the availability of a potentially mobilizable population are not, on their own, enough to overcome the collective action problem. The focus of this dissertation on the “how” of protest organization, therefore, not only improves our understanding of subnational patterns of protest, but also casts new light on existing theories of elite mobilization, nuancing our understanding of the mobilization techniques elites have available, as well as the factors affecting their successful deployment.

Thirdly, this work also adds to a burgeoning literature on political brokers around the world (e.g., Auerbach and Thachil 2018; Stokes 2005; Stokes et al. 2013). While most previous works focus primarily on the role that brokers play in voter mobilization, however, this dissertation expands the concept of brokerage to the protest literature, opening up a significant new research agenda, and inviting deeper consideration of the ways in which elites connect with the general public, and the potential linkages that exist between these different spheres.

Finally, as well as contributing to the academic literature, this dissertation also has a number of important practical implications for civil society. Protest is a critical tool for social change around the world, particularly in regions – such as Africa – where alternative forms of democratic accountability are typically low (Gamson 1975; Lohmann 1993; Piven and Cloward 1979; Wouters and Walgrave 2017). Understanding what affects the likelihood of protest at a local level is important, therefore, because it provides valuable information to civil society organizations regarding how to mobilize most effectively, and where best to strategically prioritize their limited resources. Additionally, by drawing attention to the ways in which the technology of mobilization affects the types of protest we see, this work also provides valuable
information regarding different forms of protest organization, increasing the likelihood that those desiring protest will be able to mobilize effective, impactful action.\textsuperscript{81}

\section*{7.4 Beyond the South African Case}

Protest, collective action, and political violence are not unique to South Africa, of course, and this dissertation therefore concludes by briefly considering the applicability of this new theory beyond the South African case, and suggesting some ways in which future works might fruitfully develop the arguments presented here.

As discussed in Chapter 4, there have been a number of benefits to focusing exclusively on the South African case in this work, especially during these initial stages of theory development and testing. That said, however, there is no reason at all to believe that the phenomenon of protest brokers is limited to South Africa in any way. Indeed, while this is, to the best of my knowledge, the first work to directly focus on the phenomenon, observations around the role of intermediaries in the broader literature suggest that protest brokers may in fact be a relatively frequent occurrence.\textsuperscript{82} Future research could, therefore, fruitfully explore

\textsuperscript{81} Significant evidence exists supporting the argument that some types of protest are more effective at bringing about change than others. Madestam et al (2013) and Gillion (2012), for example, show that protest size matters, with large protests more likely to draw attention, while Gamson (1975), Gillion (2012), Piven and Cloward (1979) and others argue that contentious protests are more likely than peaceful protests to succeed, as they increase the bargaining power of the group concerned and force the issue into the public sphere (though see Simpson et al (2018) and Wasow (2017) for a challenge to this argument).

\textsuperscript{82} See discussions above and in Chapter 2 for more information on works that mention intermediaries in this way.
the phenomenon in some of these other locations, probing the scope conditions further, and analyzing factors affecting the emergence of different brokerage types.

Along similar lines, while the focus of this work has been exclusively on the role that brokers play in the organization of protest, the challenges this argument makes to classic theories of elite mobilization suggests that the idea of brokerage could also be applied to other forms of elite-mobilized political violence, including civil wars, ethnic conflict, and riots. Closer attention to the role of brokers could, therefore, improve our understanding of political violence more broadly, casting new light on the ways in which elites connect with those they seek to mobilize, and suggesting new ways of tackling violent conflict around the world.

Finally, in addition to exploring the role of brokers in other countries and other forms of collective action, future work could also fruitfully explore the microfoundations of the protest broker phenomenon more fully. This could include, for example, experiments to test the effect that social distance has on mobilization, or the importance of trust to the provision of selective incentives, as well as the role that local knowledge has on mobilization. A deeper understanding of factors such as these would help to expand our understanding of the phenomenon in important ways, allowing us to further explore the impact that protest brokers have on collective action, and the ways in which they affect the subnational patterns of protest at the heart of this study.
Bibliography

“3 Key Trends from 2018’s All-Time Service Delivery Protest Record.” 2019. Press Release. Municipal IQ.


## Appendix A: Data Overview

**Table A.1: Data Overview**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>More Information</th>
</tr>
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</table>
| South African Protest Dataset  | - National level, geocoded dataset of community protest events in South Africa.  
- Coded from forty-nine media sources.                                                                 | Appendix B       |
| Case Study Communities Dataset | - Contains details on protest events in twelve communities in South Africa (six in Gauteng, six in the Western Cape).  
- Coded from forty-nine media sources, supplemented by social media, data from interviews, fieldwork, and personal observation. | Appendix D       |
| Life Histories                 | - Detailed life histories of thirty-seven protest brokers located in eleven communities in South Africa (six in the Western Cape, and five in Gauteng).  
- Collected by the author between 2016 and 2018.                                                                                           | Appendix E       |
| Interviews with Elites         | - Interviews with 114 councilors, businesspeople and civil society leaders, from twelve communities in South Africa.  
- Collected by the author between 2016 and 2018.                                                                                           | Appendix E       |
| Interviews with Community Members | - Interviews with 335 community members from twelve communities in South Africa.  
- Collected by the author between 2016 and 2018.                                                                                           | Appendix E       |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>More Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Group Discussions                         | - Data from thirty-six group discussions (three in each of the twelve case study communities).  
- Collected by the author between 2016 and 2018.                                                                                                              | Appendix E        |
| Participant Observation and Cultural Immersion | - Observations and data from 83 protests and rallies, 58 community meetings, and over 500 hours of engagement in non-protest social activities in the twelve case study communities.  
- Collected by the author between 2015 and 2018.                                                                                                              | Appendix E        |
| Additional Data                           | - Data from the 2011 South African National Census.  
- Data on apartheid-era protests from Olzak and Olivier.                                                                                                      | Appendix C        |
Appendix B: South African Protest Dataset Codebook

The South African Protest Dataset (SAPD) contains information on community-based protests that occurred in South Africa between January 1, 2004 and December 31, 2012. Community-based protests are defined here as protests carried out by members of a geographically defined and identifiable neighborhood.

To be considered a protest for this database, the event:
- Must involve more than one person
- Must involve a public gathering of some sort. That is, it cannot just involve talk about protests, voicing concerns in a meeting (no matter how explosively), calling for protests, a petition (without a march or gathering to deliver it), people being “up in arms”, protest resignations and so on.
- Must be aimed at protesting a specific issue or set of issues. It cannot just involve vigilante violence or looting.
- Must have happened at the time of the newspaper report, not just be planned.
- And, as the interest here is in the spatial patterns of protest, the location must be given.

The primary sources of information for this dataset are the archives of forty-eight South African newspapers, along with the archives of the South African Press Association (SAPA). The full list of sources, in alphabetical order, is:
1. Beeld
2. Business Day
3. Business Times Tanzanie
4. Cape Argus
5. Cape Times
6. Citizen
7. City Press
8. Daily Dispatch
9. Daily News
10. Diamond Fields Advertiser
11. Die Burger
12. Die Vrye Afrikaan
13. Enterprise
14. Express
15. Farmers Weekly
16. Financial Mail
17. Finweek English
18. Finweek (Fin and Tegniek)
19. Independent on Saturday
20. Joernala Eietydse Geskied
21. Leadership SA
22. Mail and Guardian
23. New Era
24. Newsweek
25. Ons Stad
26. Padlangs
27. Pretoria News
28. Rapport
29. Saturday Argus
30. Saturday Star
31. Servamus
32. South African Press Association (SAPA)
33. Sowetan
34. Star
35. Sunday Argus
36. Sunday Independent
37. Sunday Times
38. Sunday Tribune
39. The Herald (Ep Herald)
40. The New Age
41. The Times
42. The Weekender
43. This Day
44. Time
45. Volksblad
46. Vrystaat Sake Bulletin
47. Weekend Post
48. Witness
49. Zuid-Afrika

**Search Methodology**
The primary searches were done using the SA Media database and the South African Press Association archive, with additional searches in the individual newspaper archives as needed.

**Search Procedure**
Using the search interface, select the appropriate search term
- For English language newspapers, this is “protest”
- For Afrikaans language newspapers, this is “protes”

Select appropriate date ranges (1 January 2004 to 31 December 2012), and click “search”.

**Sorting Procedure**
Sort the results by publication date (ascending). Begin with oldest listed story and proceed chronologically. Discard if not relevant. If relevant, capture as much data as possible as outlined.
below. If the headline seems relevant, but the newspaper article is unreadable, record it, including the headline, date and newspaper to be checked in the archives later.

**Coding Procedure**
This section describes the variables in the SAPD, along with information on coding. In each case -99 indicates that the information is unknown.

**eventid**
Each event must be given a unique event ID, made up of the initials of the coder and then a five-digit number beginning with 00001 and proceeding sequentially.

- Do NOT change the eventid given to an event – even if you later find an event that precedes it. Just continue to number each event as you find it. So the first protest recorded by a coder with the initials “ZL” takes ZL00001 and the second ZL00002, even if the second comes chronologically before the first.
- For this dataset, an event is defined as a protest carried out by members of a specific community on a specific day
  - Where multiple protests happened on the same day in different communities each community should be given a separate event ID.
  - Where residents travelled from different communities to protest together (and these communities are reported), each community should be given a separate event ID.
  - Where protests last more than one day, each day should be given a separate event ID.

**date**
List the day, month and year for the event (DD/MM/YYYY). If the exact date cannot be identified, this should be the best approximation of the date, using the following rules:

- If it says “last week” or “two weeks ago” with no other information put the event on the Wednesday of the week concerned, and code time_precision as 2.
- If the report appeared in the newspaper concerned on a Saturday or Sunday, then count “last week” as the week immediately preceding it. If is appeared on a Friday or before, then count “last week” as the previous week.
- If no date is mentioned but report implies it was recent (e.g. “Residents protest service delivery in Langa”), or says “this week” with no other information, assume previous day, and code time_precision as 2.
- If “last month” with no other date information or “in February” etc., put on the 15 of the month indicated, and code time_precision as 3.
- If “last year,” with no other date information, do not include the event.

**day / month / year**
Record the day, month, and year of the protest in individual columns

**time_precision**
1 = Date explicitly mentioned in report
2 = Date approximated from report (accurate to within a week)
3 = Date approximated from report (accurate to within a month)

actors1/actors2/actors3/actors4
Record any named participants or groups mentioned as involved in the protest. If more than 4, put a note in the notes column

numinjury
Record the best estimate of the number of people injured in the event.
- If multiple sources list different figures, the most recent figure should be used
- If multiple sources on the same date and no way of determining which is the most recent, use the mean number and put a note in the note section indicating: “mean used for numinjury”
- If no injuries recorded, code as 0 (“Clashes” do not count as injuries, unless injuries are specifically mentioned)
- If injuries are mentioned, but no indication of number, put -99
- If the report states “more than X number” injured – record X

numdeath
Record the best estimate of the number of people killed in the event.
- If no death mentioned, code as 0
- If death happened after the event, but attributed to the event, include it.
- If multiple sources list different figures, the most recent figure is used.
- If multiple sources on the same date and no way of determining which is the most recent, the mean number is used, and put a note in the note section indicating: “mean used for numdeath”
- If report states that deaths occurred, but the exact number is not given, put -99
- If the report states “more than X number” killed – use X

numarrest
Record the best estimate of the number of people arrested in the event.
- If no arrests mentioned, code as 0
- If multiple sources list different figures, the most recent figure is used.
- If multiple sources on the same date and no way of determining which is the most recent, the mean number is used, and put a note in the note section indicating: “mean used for numarrest”
- If report states that arrests occurred, but the exact number is not given, put -99
- If the report states “more than X number” arrested – use X

issue (text)
List all grievances mentioned in relation to the protest.
issuecat1
The first issue mentioned as the reason for the protest
1 = service delivery (generally)
2 = water
3 = public transport
4 = refuse and sanitation
5 = land and housing (including evictions)
6 = roads and infrastructure (including street lighting, and e-tolls)
7 = municipal management and corruption
8 = electricity
9 = education
10 = health
11 = policing and crime (including specific crimes, violence against women and children, and gangsterism, but not arrests of protesters)
12 = politics and elections
13 = working conditions and wages
14 = unemployment
15 = national government
16 = ignored grievances
17 = arrests of protestors
18 = environment
19 = LGBTQ issues
20 = disability issues
21 = food prices
22 = other
-99 = no issue mentioned

issuecat2
The second issue mentioned as the reason for the protest. If none – leave blank
1 = service delivery (generally)
2 = water
3 = public transport
4 = refuse and sanitation
5 = land and housing (including evictions)
6 = roads and infrastructure (including street lighting, and e-tolls)
7 = municipal management and corruption
8 = electricity
9 = education
10 = health
11 = policing and crime (including specific crimes, violence against women and children, and gangsterism, but not arrests of protesters)
12 = politics and elections
13 = working conditions and wages
14 = unemployment
issuecat3
The third issue mentioned as the reason for the protest. If none – leave blank
1 = service delivery (generally)
2 = water
3 = public transport
4 = refuse and sanitation
5 = land and housing (including evictions)
6 = roads and infrastructure (including street lighting, and e-tolls)
7 = municipal management and corruption
8 = electricity
9 = education
10 = health
11 = policing and crime (including specific crimes, violence against women and children, and gangsterism, but not arrests of protesters)
12 = politics and elections
13 = working conditions and wages
14 = unemployment
15 = national government
16 = ignored grievances
17 = arrests of protestors
18 = environment
19 = LGBTQ issues
20 = disability issues
21 = food prices
22 = other
-99 = no issue mentioned

issuecat4
The fourth issue mentioned as the reason for the protest. If none – leave blank
1 = service delivery (generally)
2 = water
3 = public transport
4 = refuse and sanitation
5 = land and housing (including evictions)
6 = roads and infrastructure (including street lighting, and e-tolls)
7 = municipal management and corruption
8 = electricity
9 = education
10 = health
11 = policing and crime (including specific crimes, violence against women and children, and gangsterism, but not arrests of protesters)
12 = politics and elections
13 = working conditions and wages
14 = unemployment
15 = national government
16 = ignored grievances
17 = arrests of protestors
18 = environment
19 = LGBTQ issues
20 = disability issues
21 = food prices
22 = other
-99 = no issue mentioned

issuecat5
The fifth issue mentioned as the reason for the protest. If none – leave blank
1 = service delivery (generally)
2 = water
3 = public transport
4 = refuse and sanitation
5 = land and housing (including evictions)
6 = roads and infrastructure (including street lighting, and e-tolls)
7 = municipal management and corruption
8 = electricity
9 = education
10 = health
11 = policing and crime (including specific crimes, violence against women and children, and gangsterism, but not arrests of protesters)
12 = politics and elections
13 = working conditions and wages
14 = unemployment
15 = national government
16 = ignored grievances
17 = arrests of protestors
18 = environment
19 = LGBTQ issues
20 = disability issues
21 = food prices
22 = other
-99 = no issue mentioned

If more than five issues are mentioned in the report – record the first five, and then note the remaining issues in the “note” column, using the following phrase: “Additional issues protested”

Edesc (text)
Very brief description of the event.

protestloc
Record the location of the protest as given in the report.
- Provide as much detail as possible.
- If the report says, “Community Y protested”, with no other location mentioned, record Community Y as the location.
- If the protest is a march from one place to another, record the locations in which the protest began and ended if both are mentioned.
- If two locations are mentioned – record as two separate events
- If no location at all mentioned do not include event

community
Record the location of the community that is protesting. That is, the location from which the protesters come. This may be the same as the protestloc, or it may be different.
- Provide as much detail as possible.
- If the report says, “there was a protest in Community Y”, with no other location mentioned, record Community Y as the community, and code com_precision as 2
- If two locations are mentioned – record as two separate events
- If no location at all mentioned do not include event

com_precision
1 = community protesting explicitly mentioned in report
2 = community protesting assumed from report

latitude
Record the latitude of the community protesting.

longitude
Record the longitude of the community protesting.

mainplace
Record the name of the main place in which the community is located (as of the 2011 Census).

mp_code
Record the 2011 Census main place code for the community.

**municipality**
Record the municipality in which the community is located (as of the 2011 Census).
- The lowest municipal level should be recorded. That is, either Metropolitan or Local (not District).

**mun_code**
Record the 2011 Census municipality code for the community.

**province**
Record the province in which the community is located (as of the 2011 Census).

**pr_code**
Record the 2011 Census province code for the community.

**geo_precision**
1 = community accurately located
2 = some concern about location (for example, there is more than one community with a similar name in the area, the community includes more than one main place, or there was difficulty locating the community on the map)

**sources**
List all sources by name, separated by semi-colons.

**note**
Use this space to provide additional information, such as irregularities in reports, any difficulties in coding and so on.
Appendix C: Data Used for the Regression Analysis in Chapter 4

Number of Protests Per Main Place
- Data from the South African Protest Dataset (see Appendix B), subset to include only service delivery protests.
- Count variable reflecting the number of protests that took place between January 1, 2004 and December 31, 2012.

Presence of Protest in a Main Place
- Data from the South African Protest Dataset (see Appendix B), subset to include only service delivery protests.
- Dummy variable created to indicate whether a main place saw any protest between January 1, 2004 and December 31, 2012.
- 0=no, 1=yes.

Service Availability
- Data from the 2011 South African National Census, aggregated to the main place level.
- Reflects the average service availability per main place.
- Combines data on the presence of 1) toilets; 2) electricity; 3) piped water; and 4) refuse removal.

Income (logged)
- Data from the 2011 South African National Census, aggregated to the main place level.
- Measures the average income per main place, using the census proxy values for each income bracket.

Main Place Inequality
- Data from the 2011 South African National Census, aggregated to the main place level.
- Number of households in each income bracket used to calculate a Gini coefficient, measuring the level of inequality inside the main place.

Municipal Inequality
- Data from the 2011 South African National Census, aggregated to the main place level.
- Average income per main place used to create a Gini coefficient measuring the level of inequality at the municipal level.

Unemployment Level (main place average)
- Data from the 2011 South African National Census, aggregated to the main place level.
- Measures average unemployment level per main place
Education (main place average)
- Data from the 2011 South African National Census, aggregated to the main place level.
- Measures average education level per main place.

Percentage Black
- Data from the 2011 South African National Census, aggregated to the main place level.
- Reflects the percentage of the population that identifies as black South African.

Ethnic Diversity
- Data from the 2011 South African National Census, aggregated to the main place level.
- Herfindahl index created using language data. 83

Percentage of Main Place Residents Under the Age of 30
- Data from the 2011 South African National Census, aggregated to the main place level.
- Age data used to calculate the percentage of main place residents under the age of 30.

History of Previous Protests
- This data was collected by Johan L. Olivier in 1990, and used by Olivier and Olzak in two subsequent papers: Olzak and Olivier (1998), and Olzak et al (2003). 84
- It records the number of incidents of “ethnic collective action” in 84 Magisterial Districts in South Africa during the period 1970-85. 85
- Magisterial Districts from 1990 do not align neatly with the 2011 Census main places. To align the data, therefore, I did a proportional intersection using GIS data from both the 1990 and 2011 Censuses.
- As this is not a national level dataset, regressions using this data were only run on the subset of main places for which Olivier collected data (1,670 main places).

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83 The Herfindahl concentration formula is: \( ELF = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^{n} s_i^2 \) where \( s_i \) is the share of group \( i = 1, ..., n \).

84 Funding for this research was provided by a National Science Foundation Grant SES-9196229, Sociology Program: “Racial Conflict in South African and the United States.” Susan Olzak, Principle Investigator.

85 “Ethnic collective action” in this case means protest events at which specific ethnic claims or grievances were made. This includes both pro- and anti-apartheid protest events.
Appendix D: Case Study Communities Dataset

The Case Study Communities Dataset (CSCD) contains information on protests and broker activity across the twelve case study communities.

Data was collected as follows:

- The South African Protest Dataset (SAPD), which covers the period January 1, 2004 to December 31, 2012 was subset to include only the twelve case study communities.
- It was then extended to cover the period from the end of apartheid (April 27, 1994) to the end of 2017. The coding here followed that of the SAPD (see Appendix B), with the following exceptions:
  - For the periods April 27, 1994 to December 31, 2003, and January 1, 2013 to December 31, 2014, the coding procedure was identical to that used for the SAPD, except that the searches included the names of the specific communities (each community was searched for individually).
  - The SA Media database has a gap between January 1 and May 31, 2015, so for this period the archives of each newspaper were searched individually.
  - On March 31, 2015 the South African Press Association closed down, and this source was therefore not available from April 1, 2015 on.
  - In November 2015 the African News Agency was set up as a partial replacement for the South African Press Association. This source was therefore included for the period from November 2015 to December 2017.
  - Between 2015 and 2017 the dataset was updated on a monthly basis.
- Having extended the dataset, I then worked with each protest broker to compile a list of the protests they claimed to have organized, and added this information to the dataset.
- Where brokers claimed to have organized a protest not found in media reports, I recorded and verified this information, adding a note to the dataset to indicate the source, and to allow the data to be subset to exclude these protests if desired.
- Following this, I sought to verify broker involvement at each of the protests claimed, seeking a minimum of two supporting sources per event. These supporting sources came from media coverage, interviews with other people, personal observations, documentary evidence such as WhatsApp messages, and social media. The number and type of sources used for verification was added to the dataset.
- Finally, additional information was also added, where possible, on the mobilization tactics used by the brokers, the elite patron, the motivations of this patron, the motivations of the broker, any payments received, the relationship between the elite and the broker, the method through which the elite approached the broker, the community mobilized, the relationship between the broker and the community, the length of planning, and any coordination with other brokers.
- A full list of variables can be found in the codebook below.
**Case Study Communities Dataset**

**Codebook**

**eventid**
- For all events contained in the SAPD, the SAPD unique event ID should be retained.
- Events added to the CSCD only should be given a unique event ID made up of the lowercase letter “x” followed by the initials of the coder and then a five-digit number beginning with 00001 and proceeding sequentially.
- Do NOT change the eventid given to an event – even if you later find an event that precedes it. Just continue to number each event as you find it. So the first protest recorded by a coder with the initials “ZL” takes xZL00001 and the second xZL00002, even if the second comes chronologically before the first.
- For this dataset, an event is defined as a protest carried out by members of one of the twelve specified communities on a single day
  - Where multiple protests happened on the same day in different communities each community should be given a separate event ID.
  - Where residents travelled from different communities to protest together (and these communities are reported), each community should be given a separate event ID.
  - Where protests last more than one day, each day should be given a separate event ID.

**date**
List the day, month and year for the event (DD/MM/YYYY). If the exact date cannot be identified, this should be the best approximation of the date, using the following rules:
- If it says “last week” or “two weeks ago” with no other information put the event on the Wednesday of the week concerned, and code time_precision as 2.
- If the report appeared in the newspaper concerned on a Saturday or Sunday, then count “last week” as the week immediately preceding it. If it appeared on a Friday or before, then count “last week” as the previous week.
- If no date is mentioned but report implies it was recent (e.g. “Residents protest service delivery in Langa”), or says “this week” with no other information, assume previous day, and code time_precision as 2.
- If “last month” with no other date information or “in February” etc., put on the 15 of the month indicated, and code time_precision as 3.
- If “last year,” with no other date information, do not include the event.

**day / month / year**
Record the day, month, and year of the protest in individual columns

**time_precision**
1 = Date explicitly mentioned in report
2 = Date approximated from report (accurate to within a week)
3 = Date approximated from report (accurate to within a month)

**actors1/actors2/actors3/actors4**
Record any named participants or groups mentioned as involved in the protest. If more than 4, put a note in the notes column

**violence**
Record whether there was any violence at the protest or not.
0 = no violence recorded
1 = damage to property only
2 = people injured

**numinjury**
Record the best estimate of the number of people injured in the event.
- If multiple sources list different figures, the most recent figure should be used
- If multiple sources on the same date and no way of determining which is the most recent, use the mean number and put a note in the note section indicating: “mean used for numinjury”
- If no injuries recorded, code as 0 (“Clashes” do not count as injuries, unless injuries are specifically mentioned)
- If injuries are mentioned, but no indication of number, put -99
- If the report states “more than X number” injured – record X

**numdeath**
Record the best estimate of the number of people killed in the event.
- If no death mentioned, code as 0
- If death happened after the event, but attributed to the event, include it.
- If multiple sources list different figures, the most recent figure is used.
- If multiple sources on the same date and no way of determining which is the most recent, the mean number is used, and put a note in the note section indicating: “mean used for numdeath”
- If report states that deaths occurred, but the exact number is not given, put -99
- If the report states “more than X number” killed – use X

**numarrest**
Record the best estimate of the number of people arrested in the event.
- If no arrests mentioned, code as 0
- If multiple sources list different figures, the most recent figure is used.
- If multiple sources on the same date and no way of determining which is the most recent, the mean number is used, and put a note in the note section indicating: “mean used for numarrest”
- If report states that arrests occurred, but the exact number is not given, put -99
- If the report states “more than X number” arrested – use X
issue (text)
List all grievances mentioned in relation to the protest.

issuecat1
The first issue mentioned as the reason for the protest
1 = service delivery (generally)
2 = water
3 = public transport
4 = refuse and sanitation
5 = land and housing (including evictions)
6 = roads and infrastructure (including street lighting, and e-tolls)
7 = municipal management and corruption
8 = electricity
9 = education
10 = health
11 = policing and crime (including specific crimes, violence against women and children, and gangsterism, but not arrests of protesters)
12 = politics and elections
13 = working conditions and wages
14 = unemployment
15 = national government
16 = ignored grievances
17 = arrests of protestors
18 = environment
19 = LGBTQ issues
20 = disability issues
21 = food prices
22 = other
-99 = no issue mentioned

issuecat2
The second issue mentioned as the reason for the protest. If none – leave blank
1 = service delivery (generally)
2 = water
3 = public transport
4 = refuse and sanitation
5 = land and housing (including evictions)
6 = roads and infrastructure (including street lighting, and e-tolls)
7 = municipal management and corruption
8 = electricity
9 = education
10 = health
issuecat3
The third issue mentioned as the reason for the protest. If none – leave blank
1 = service delivery (generally)
2 = water
3 = public transport
4 = refuse and sanitation
5 = land and housing (including evictions)
6 = roads and infrastructure (including street lighting, and e-tolls)
7 = municipal management and corruption
8 = electricity
9 = education
10 = health
11 = policing and crime (including specific crimes, violence against women and children, and gangsterism, but not arrests of protesters)
12 = politics and elections
13 = working conditions and wages
14 = unemployment
15 = national government
16 = ignored grievances
17 = arrests of protestors
18 = environment
19 = LGBTQ issues
20 = disability issues
21 = food prices
22 = other
-99 = no issue mentioned

issuecat4
The fourth issue mentioned as the reason for the protest. If none – leave blank
issuecat5
The fifth issue mentioned as the reason for the protest. If none – leave blank
1 = service delivery (generally)
2 = water
3 = public transport
4 = refuse and sanitation
5 = land and housing (including evictions)
6 = roads and infrastructure (including street lighting, and e-tolls)
7 = municipal management and corruption
8 = electricity
9 = education
10 = health
11 = policing and crime (including specific crimes, violence against women and children, and gangsterism, but not arrests of protesters)
12 = politics and elections
13 = working conditions and wages
14 = unemployment
15 = national government
16 = ignored grievances
17 = arrests of protestors
18 = environment
19 = LGBTQ issues
20 = disability issues
21 = food prices
22 = other
-99 = no issue mentioned
17 = arrests of protestors
18 = environment
19 = LGBTQ issues
20 = disability issues
21 = food prices
22 = other
-99 = no issue mentioned

If more than five issues are mentioned in the report – record the first five, and then note the remaining issues in the “note” column, using the following phrase: “Additional issues protested”

broker1/broker2/broker3/broker4
Record the name(s) of the broker(s) who claim to have organized this protest. If more than four brokers claim to have organized the protest, place a note in the note column with more details. If no broker, leave blank.

broker1verif/broker2verif/broker3verif/broker4verif
Is the involvement of the broker verified by at least two sources?
0 = no
1 = yes
-88 = not applicable

broker1source/broker2source/broker3source/broker4source
Record the sources confirming the involvement of each broker.
-88 = not applicable

brokercoord
If more than one broker was involved, record how they coordinated their activities.
-99 = unknown
-88 = not applicable

elite
Record the name and profession of the mobilizing elite if known. If not known, leave blank.

elitemotiv
Record the motivations of the mobilizing elite if known.
-88 = not applicable

elitebrokerrel
Record the relationship between the mobilizing elite and the broker (exclusive or non-exclusive).
-99 = unknown
-88 = not applicable
eliteapproach
Record the way in which the elite approached the broker to request the protest.
-99 = unknown
-88 = not applicable

brokerpayment
Record whether the broker was paid for organizing the protest or not.
0 = no
1 = yes
-99 = unknown
-88 = not applicable

Brokerpaymenttype
Record the type of payment the broker received for organizing the protest.
-99 = unknown
-88 = not applicable

communitymob
Record the community group/networks mobilized if known.
-99 = unknown
-88 = not applicable

combrokerrel
Record the relationship between the community and the broker.
-99 = unknown
-88 = not applicable

mobtactics
Record the mobilizing tactics used by the broker if known.
-99 = unknown
-88 = not applicable

planninglength
Record the length of time spent planning the protest (in days).
-99 = unknown
-88 = not applicable

edesc (text)
Very brief description of the event.

protestloc
Record the location of the protest as given in the report.
- Provide as much detail as possible.
• If the report says, “Community Y protested”, with no other location mentioned, record Community Y as the location.
• If the protest is a march from one place to another, record the locations in which the protest began and ended if both are mentioned.
• If two locations are mentioned – record as two separate events
• If no location at all mentioned do not include event

**community**
Record the location of the **community that is protesting**. That is, the location from which the protesters come. This may be the same as the protestloc, or it may be different.
  • Provide as much detail as possible.
  • If the report says, “there was a protest in Community Y”, with no other location mentioned, record Community Y as the community, and code **com_precision** as 2
  • If two locations are mentioned – record as two separate events
• If no location at all mentioned do not include event

**com_precision**
1 = community protesting explicitly mentioned in report
2 = community protesting assumed from report

**latitude**
Record the latitude of the community protesting.

**longitude**
Record the longitude of the community protesting.

**mainplace**
Record the name of the main place in which the community is located (as of the 2011 Census).

**mp_code**
Record the 2011 Census main place code for the community.

**municipality**
Record the municipality in which the community is located (as of the 2011 Census).
  • The lowest municipal level should be recorded. That is, either Metropolitan or Local (not District).

**mun_code**
Record the 2011 Census municipality code for the community.

**province**
Record the province in which the community is located (as of the 2011 Census).
**pr_code**
Record the 2011 Census province code for the community

**geo_precision**
1 = community accurately located
2 = some concern about location (for example, there is more than one community with a similar name in the area, the community includes more than one main place, or there was difficulty locating the community on the map)

**sources**
List all sources by name, separated by semi-colons.

**SAPDsource**
Record whether the protest was recorded by the media sources used to code the SAPD.
0 = no (information on the protest came solely from another source)
1 = yes

**note**
Use this space to provide additional information, such as irregularities in reports, any difficulties in coding and so on.
Appendix E: Interviews and Focus Groups

The following data was collected between 2015 and 2018. All interviews were semi-structured in approach, and conducted in English.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data Type</th>
<th>Description of Sample</th>
<th>Dates of Collection</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>37 life histories</td>
<td>All protest brokers identified in the twelve communities</td>
<td>2016-2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>114 elite interviews</td>
<td>36 elites (three per community) randomly sampled from a list of local ward councilors combined with the official ward candidates for the 2016 local elections. Note, candidates were only included if their party had won at least 5% of the local vote in the 2011 elections, with the exception of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) which did not exist in 2011 but is now the third biggest political party in South Africa. All EFF ward candidates were therefore included.  78 elites across the twelve communities, made up of a mix of local businesspeople, community leaders, union leaders, and a variety of other local, regional, and national players. Identified: - During protests and time in communities - In media and other reports - Referred to in the course of other interviews.</td>
<td>2016-2018</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

86 South Africa uses a mixed-member proportional representation system at the local level, in which half the seats in each municipality are elected using the first-past-the-post system in single member wards, while the other half are allocated along PR lines. The candidates included here were those for the single-member wards only.
Table E.1 (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data Type</th>
<th>Description of Sample</th>
<th>Dates of Collection</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community interviews</td>
<td>216 community members identified as follows:</td>
<td>2016-2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- 72 randomly sampled adults (six per community – see below for more information) were interviewed, and then used as seeds.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Each “seed” then recruited one protester and one non-protester for interview.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- This resulted in a total of 216 respondents, made up of 129 non-protesters, and 87 protesters.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>119 additional community members were also interviewed over the course of fieldwork, all of whom were encountered in a protest setting. These 119 were purposely selected to illuminate specific elements of mobilization, and chosen on the basis of their perceived ability to speak to these elements.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36 group discussions</td>
<td>3 group discussions per community. Each made up of between six and fifteen participants (fifteen were invited in each case, but the response rate varied).</td>
<td>2016-2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- One in which the participants were chosen by a randomly selected (previously interviewed) local elite.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- One in which the participants were chosen by a randomly selected protest broker in the community. For the one community without a protest broker, a second elite was chosen to select the participants.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- One in which the participants were randomly selected by the author following a community meeting (see below for more information).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participant Observation</td>
<td>83 protests and rallies</td>
<td>2015-2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Cultural Immersion</td>
<td>58 community meetings</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>500 hours of non-protest social activities across the twelve communities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Sampling Procedure for Community Interviews
To select the 72 randomly sampled adults (six per community) the following approach was used. Within each community, six GPS starting points were randomly chosen. Beginning from each starting point, a random direction and the number of houses to count off were provided by smartphone (ODK Collect). Because of the variety of housing types that exist in all twelve communities, the term “houses” here includes formal houses, informal shacks, and hostel units. Once the appropriate house was reached, the phone assigned a gender to be selected (alternating by interview), and randomly selected a specific adult of that gender after ranking household members by age. Where a house had backyard dwellers living in the yard, these were included as household members. I conducted one “call back” for respondents who were initially unavailable, and otherwise sampled replacements, from new households via the same random walk procedure, using the previous household as the new start location. Where the selected adult declined to participate (N=7), a new household was chosen via the same random walk procedure, again using the previous household as the new start location.

Sampling Procedure for the Author-Selected Group Discussion in Each Community
To select fifteen participants for the author-selected group discussion in each community, a random number generator was used to select fifteen numbers between one and fifty. At the second community meeting I attended in each location I then used these randomly selected numbers (different numbers in each community) to identify fifteen people by the order in which they arrived at the community meeting.

List of Interviews
Community A
- 4 protest brokers
- 3 political elites (ward councilors and candidates for election)
- 7 other elites
- 18 randomly selected community members
  o 8 protesters
  o 10 non-protesters
- 11 community members encountered during protest
- 3 group discussions
  o 1 where the participants were elite selected
  o 1 where the participants were broker selected
  o 1 where the participants were author selected

Community B
- 4 protest brokers
- 3 political elites (ward councilors and candidates for election)
- 3 other elites
- 18 randomly selected community members
  o 7 protesters
  o 11 non-protesters
- 13 community members encountered during protest
  - 3 group discussions
    - 1 where the participants were elite selected
    - 1 where the participants were broker selected
    - 1 where the participants were author selected

**Community C**
- 4 protest brokers
- 3 political elites (ward councilors and candidates for election)
- 7 other elites
- 18 randomly selected community members
  - 6 protesters
  - 12 non-protesters
- 10 community members encountered during protest
  - 3 group discussions
    - 1 where the participants were elite selected
    - 1 where the participants were broker selected
    - 1 where the participants were author selected

**Community D**
- 5 protest brokers
- 3 political elites (ward councilors and candidates for election)
- 4 other elites
- 18 randomly selected community members
  - 9 protesters
  - 9 non-protesters
- 10 community members encountered during protest
  - 3 group discussions
    - 1 where the participants were elite selected
    - 1 where the participants were broker selected
    - 1 where the participants were author selected

**Community E**
- 4 protest brokers
- 3 political elites (ward councilors and candidates for election)
- 9 other elites
- 18 randomly selected community members
  - 7 protesters
  - 11 non-protesters
- 12 community members encountered during protest
  - 3 group discussions
    - 1 where the participants were elite selected
    - 1 where the participants were broker selected
where the participants were author selected

Community F
- 3 protest brokers
- 3 political elites (ward councilors and candidates for election)
- 3 other elites
- 18 randomly selected community members
  o 8 protesters
  o 10 non-protesters
- 14 community members encountered during protest
- 3 group discussions
  o 1 where the participants were elite selected
  o 1 where the participants were broker selected
  o 1 where the participants were author selected

Community G
- 4 protest brokers
- 3 political elites (ward councilors and candidates for election)
- 12 other elites
- 18 randomly selected community members
  o 8 protesters
  o 10 non-protesters
- 11 community members encountered during protest
- 3 group discussions
  o 1 where the participants were elite selected
  o 1 where the participants were broker selected
  o 1 where the participants were author selected

Community H
- 0 protest brokers
- 3 political elites (ward councilors and candidates for election)
- 11 other elites
- 18 randomly selected community members
  o 7 protesters
  o 11 non-protesters
- 3 community members encountered during protest
- 3 group discussions
  o 2 where the participants were elite selected
  o 1 where the participants were author selected

Community I
- 4 protest brokers
- 3 political elites (ward councilors and candidates for election)
- 5 other elites
- 18 randomly selected community members
  - 7 protesters
  - 11 non-protesters
- 10 community members encountered during protest
- 3 group discussions
  - 1 where the participants were elite selected
  - 1 where the participants were broker selected
  - 1 where the participants were author selected

**Community J**
- 2 protest brokers
- 3 political elites (ward councilors and candidates for election)
- 4 other elites
- 18 randomly selected community members
  - 7 protesters
  - 11 non-protesters
- 5 community members encountered during protest
- 3 group discussions
  - 1 where the participants were elite selected
  - 1 where the participants were broker selected
  - 1 where the participants were author selected

**Community K**
- 2 protest brokers
- 3 political elites (ward councilors and candidates for election)
- 6 other elites
- 18 randomly selected community members
  - 6 protesters
  - 12 non-protesters
- 11 community members encountered during protest
- 3 group discussions
  - 1 where the participants were elite selected
  - 1 where the participants were broker selected
  - 1 where the participants were author selected

**Community L**
- 1 protest broker
- 3 political elites (ward councilors and candidates for election)
- 7 other elites
- 18 randomly selected community members
  - 7 protesters
  - 11 non-protesters
- 9 community members encountered during protest
- 3 group discussions
- 1 where the participants were elite selected
- 1 where the participants were broker selected
- 1 where the participants were author selected