The Process of Building, Sustaining, and Using Cross-Occupational Collaborations

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The Process of Building, Sustaining, and Using Cross-occupational Collaborations

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The Process of Building, Sustaining, and Using Cross-occupational Collaborations

Abstract

Cross-occupational collaboration is difficult, as work and occupations scholars show, but can be overcome in a variety of ways. To better understand cross-occupational collaboration, I propose that researchers look at the process of collaboration: how actors build, sustain, and effectively use cross-occupational collaborations to affect their environments. Chapter 1 examines how actors build cross-occupational relationships, the stuff of collaboration opportunities. Chapter 2 is about how actors sustain collaborative projects. Chapter 3 is about the conditions in which collaborations might create more effective strategies.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

My dissertation focuses on the conditions of, possibility for, and the strategic political effects of, the process of cross-occupational collaboration itself. Specifically, I examine entrepreneurial activity and diverse occupations engaged in that activity. Entrepreneurship is a strategic research site to explore cross-occupational collaboration because it often requires such collaboration as a *sine qua non* of its success. No company or project can be built by one single occupational group; it requires a diversity of skills. Furthermore, even though entrepreneurship requires cross-occupational collaborations, it does not require a uniform amount. As a result, it is a strategic site to see a wide variation of collaborative activity. While an entrepreneur might build relationships with bankers or public officials, it may also build relations with nonprofit managers and computer scientists. Finally, with startups, which have relatively low barriers to entry, I can see a wide variety of positive and negative cases. This variation can help me overcome the lack of negative cases in some of cross-occupational collaborative literature and formulate more robust analysis that is not affected by selection on the dependent variable.

Scholars of work and occupations have shown that differences in status, shared meanings, and expertise stymie collaboration across occupational boundaries (Barley and Tolbert, 1991; Carlile 2004; Faraj and Xiao, 2006; O'Mahony and Bechky, 2008). These three characteristics harm collaboration in the following ways. First, differences in status block collaboration because one group's status derives precisely from hiving off lower-status dirty work and not collaborating (e.g., Abbott, 1988; Bechky, 2003a; Anteby, 2010; Ranganathan, 2013). By collaborating with lower-status occupations as equal partners, status differences diminish, challenging occupational members' senses of worth. Second, differences in shared meanings block empathy and understanding, thereby blocking collaboration (Perlow and Weeks, 2002;

Bechky, 2003b; Bailyn, 2006; Anteby, 2008). By valuing different outcomes, members of different occupations have a difficult time appreciating each other's actions. Finally, differences in expertise block collaboration because experts use incompatible codes, routines, or protocols (Barley, 1986; Carlile, 2002; Bailey, Leonardi, and Chong, 2010; Huising, 2014). This makes it extremely difficult for different experts to communicate effectively and share knowledge with non-members.

Despite these difficulties, organizations can provide tools to foster cross-occupational collaboration (see Okhuysen and Bechky, 2009, for a review). These tools include rules and routines, boundary objects, and common spaces. First, rules and routines foster collaboration by coordinating interdependent groups and make professional responsibilities clear (e.g., Feldman, 2000; Heimer, 2001; Feldman and Pentland, 2003). Without these rules and routines, professionals experience large coordination costs and role conflict. Second, boundary objects -- objects used by multiple occupational groups to coordinate their work, such as a medical checklist that must be used by both nurses and doctors -- foster collaboration (e.g., Star and Griesemer, 1989; Bechky, 2003b; Carlile, 2004; Levina and Vaast, 2005). Medical checklists, for example, can help nurses and doctors to coordinate work easily -- without having to negotiate roles each time. Third, common spaces foster collaboration by allowing cross-occupational team members to build relationships (e.g., Bechky, 2003b; Kellogg, Orlikowski, and Yates, 2006).

What the existing literature has not fully explained well, however, is the temporal process of collaboration. How are collaboration and its tools created in the first place? As Star (2010) discusses in the example of boundary objects, less attention has been paid to how boundary objects come into being in the first place. Similarly, Okhuysen and Bechky (2009) argue that while there is emerging work on the process of integration between different occupations, "such

an emphasis is rarely made explicit…[existing discussions] are typically embedded in discussions of how the mechanisms operate, rather than receiving attention on its own" (494). More work needs to be done to not just examine how these mechanisms operate, but also on how these mechanisms affect the work that is performed. Better understanding these mechanisms can help us understand why existing mechanisms are not always effective in fostering cross-occupational collaboration.

I examine three aspects of this process. First, I study how actors form ties that later have the potential for collaboration. Even before a nurse and a computer scientist, for instance, can collaborate on a project together, they must form an initial relationship with each other. What are the major mechanisms through which these ties emerge? Second, I examine how actors sustain collaborations on a project between organizations. This question is more typical in the literature, except my question focuses on collaborations between organizations. These collaborations do not benefit from centralized planning or hierarchy prevalent in collaborations *within* one organization. Finally, I examine the conditions through which collaboration produced effective strategies. While the first two chapters examine how actors build or sustain collaborations, in the third chapter I ask how the resource combinations in these collaborations led to effective outcomes. I motivate each of these processes and discuss the methodologies I use to investigate them. To review, Chapter 1 is about creating the conditions for collaboration opportunities. Chapter 2 is about sustaining collaborative projects. Chapter 3 is about how actors use collaboration to change the relationship between organizations and their fields more broadly.

My focus on process contributes to the literature in the following ways:

1. I examine how actors build cross-occupational relationships -- the social opportunities -- that have the potential for collaboration, i.e., how do doctors meet lawyers who they may

later collaborate with? Focusing on the process of relationship building helps scholars unpack a theoretical puzzle: homophily is prevalent, so how do people build cross-occupational collaborations in the first place? Additionally, I build on new work in the occupations literature exhorting researchers to examine how diverse occupational members discover and build shared identities.

2. Second, I examine how founders sustain cross-occupational collaborations between organizations, i.e., why do some collaborative projects survive until completion and some fail before completion? Given that this is more well-trodden ground, my contribution is here is mainly methodological. Past research examining collaboration *across organizations* has not sufficiently used negative cases to develop hypotheses. My focus on collaboration across organizations is critical empirically because such collaborations are increasingly predominant.

3. Finally, in cases where collaborations are sustained, I focus on the strategies that arise out of them. What explains the different strategic outcomes of such collaborations?
This focus is critical because I bring to light a mechanism researchers posit is important for collaboration's effectiveness -- the sharing of and recombination of ideas and resources -- yet this mechanism is underexamined. I contribute to this discussion by developing a multi-level account of resource combination by examining how cross-occupational collaborations affect how organizations perceive and use political opportunities to effect change.

I end this chapter with a brief discussion about scope conditions. These conditions are the assumptions that must be true for the hypotheses I generate in my work to apply. I discuss these scope conditions in more detail at the end of each chapter and in the conclusion.

- Chapter 2: The broadening and deepening strategies do not capture the full universe of strategies founders use. These strategies may apply primarily to new, young entrepreneurs in urban coastal areas.

- Chapter 3: Screening and testing may primarily apply to moderately-sized nonprofits working in urban areas and building collaborations across the public, financial, and community development sectors.

- Chapter 4: The theory of cross-occupational collaborations within political opportunities may apply to well-established and local social enterprises – with business and community organizing functions – that navigate local legal regulations.

Chapter 2: How Founders Perceive Cross-occupational Tie Formation

How do entrepreneurs meet people in other occupations? Little research has focused on one necessary prerequisite for these collaborations: cross-occupational tie formation. While there is literature on tie-formation, that literature precisely shows how difficult cross-occupational collaboration is due to homophily and the cultural processes that stymie cross-occupational collaborations (Barley and Tolbert 1997; Carlile 2002; Faraj and Xiao 2006; O'Mahony and Bechky 2008). This chapter responds to DiBenigno and Kellogg 2014, two scholars who study cross-occupational collaborations. They urge more work investigating the processes through which individuals build cross-occupational ties that precede collaboration. Uncovering these mechanisms shed further light on the mechanisms of cross-occupational collaboration and larger social processes of homophily and heterophily.

Furthermore, remarkably little research has specifically focused on founders' experiences and thought processes to better understand their efforts at cross-occupational collaborations. Drawing on in-depth interviews of 30 technology founders in Boston, this chapter explores the context within which, despite expressing difficulties of engaging with others in different occupations, these founders develop strategies that enable such cross-occupational relationship-building. These founders are constant in status and financial resources, all of whom have received neither the backing of prominent organizations nor venture capital financing.

The focus on founders' narratives allows me to engage with theories of entrepreneurial networking (Vissa 2010). I build on Vissa's 2010 model by categorizing the different ways entrepreneurs build their network and by showing how practices to build deeper relationships can actually lead to more broadening of one's network.

These founders' narratives of building cross-occupational relationships, despite the difficulty they faced in doing so, also urge a richer account of cultural orientations about occupations and tie formation. Although occupational homophily does predominate among the population at large, alternative cultural orientations, or frames, emerge under particular circumstances. This chapter argues that a situational approach, examining different strategies to build cross-occupational ties, is a constructive way of reconsidering how culture works in relation to heterophilous network formation. I draw primarily from Swidler (1986) concept of cultural repertoires. Building on earlier insights about the importance of subjective interpretation of human experience as critical for understanding human action (Hannerz 1969; Luckmann and Berger 1964) and aiming to investigate connections between subjective understandings at a group level as "culture" and human action (Geertz 1973), Swidler defines a cultural repertoire as a "bag of tricks" that people draw from that guide their actions. People use different strategies within available culture depending on characteristics of situations (2001: 33–34). The strategies identified in this chapter are part of a broader cultural repertoire about occupations and social networks among founders.

In this sample, three general strategies and two conversational ones emerged that assisted founders in their development of cross-occupational relationships. The first is *informal networking*: Founders find it difficult to meet diverse others, but build relationships by thinking about who they wanted to meet, finding natural settings to increase their chances of meeting their target, and latching onto relationship opportunities when they encountered them. The second is *organizing*: Founders see siloes between occupations as a big issue and work to reduce them by creating opportunities for interaction. The third is *project-finding*: Founders find and latch onto these projects and demonstrate their potential as collaborators. Two conversational strategies

emerged that led to deeper connections between diverse actors. The first is *interest cultivation and discovery*: Founders develop a broad base of knowledge and ask questions to find areas of commonality. The second is *problem-solving*: Founders seek to help others, solve problems, and ask for advice. Although the majority recognized that finding diverse others is difficult, respondents use alternative conceptions when recounting incidents when they were able to meet with those diverse others.

Difficulties in Cross-Occupational Tie Formation

Occupational homophily has been extensively identified in the social network literature. Scholars have found that homophily among occupation and occupational prestige showed roughly the same levels as homophily in religion and sex (Verbrugge and McCarrell 1977;McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001). In a study of startup founding teams, scholars found that occupational homophily was also prevalent. Homophily with respect to both ascriptive and achieved characteristics, in particular gender, ethnicity, and occupation, were widespread. In contrast, functional diversity -- business developers paired with software developers, for instance -- were insignificant and rare. The authors argue that "contrary to Durkheim's familiar argument, pressures for solidarity in these groups do not seem to favor the weak bonds of functional interdependence but instead contribute to functional homophily (Ruef, Aldrich, and Carter 2003).

The sources of occupational homophily are many, but researchers narrowed several critical factors. These include family ties, organizational foci, and cognitive processes of perceived similarity. Family ties are a significant source of occupational homophily because children often mirror what their parents do. Family ties are homophilous and consist of strong, affective bonds that are slow to decay (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001).

Organizational foci refer to focused activity that puts people into contact with one another to foster the formation of personal relationships (Feld 1981). School, work, and voluntary organizations provide the vast majority of ties that are not family-based. As work takes on increasing importance in people's lives, the vast majority of ties are developed within work organizations. It takes more energy to connect with those who are far away than those who are conveniently nearby at work and home.

In addition to factors that promote homophily, there are factors that prevent the opposite: heterophilous relationships. Scholars of work and occupations have shown that differences in status, shared meanings, and expertise stymie collaboration across occupational boundaries (Barley and Tolbert 1997; Carlile 2002; Huising 2014; Faraj and Xiao 2006; O'Mahony and Bechky 2008). These three characteristics harm collaboration in the following ways. First, differences in status block collaboration because one group's status derives precisely from hiving off lower-status dirty work and not collaborating (e.g., Abbott 1988; Bechky 2003; Ranganathan, Khanapurkar, and Divatia 2013). By collaborating with lower-status occupations as equal partners, status differences diminish, challenging occupational members' senses of worth. Second, differences in shared meanings block empathy and understanding, thereby blocking collaboration (Perlow and Weeks 2002; Anteby 2008). By valuing different outcomes, members of different occupations have a difficult time appreciating each other's actions. Finally, differences in expertise block collaboration because experts use incompatible codes, routines, or protocols (Nigam, Huising, and Golden 2014; Huising 2014; Carlile 2002). This makes it extremely difficult for different experts to communicate effectively and share knowledge with non-members.

Culture and Networks Approach to Cross-Occupational Tie Formation Focus on Social Context

Multiple mechanisms promote homophily and prevent heterophily, making cross-occupational tie formation difficult. Yet the culture and networks literature provides several hypotheses about how diverse relationships might form. While this literature does not examine the formation of *cross-occupational* ties specifically, it provides several relevant hypotheses about how people form diverse ties. These factors include participation in occupational "scenes," participation in events unrelated to one's occupational identity, legal requirements, collaborative professional norms, and participation in a context for social interaction.

First, actors who participate in scenes and voluntary organizations can build diverse social ties. Crossely showed that participants of Manchester's punk rock scene, especially its night venue events, formed diverse social ties with musicians, entrepreneurs, producers, and designers. These events focused the attentions of diverse and loosely connected actors -- a mechanism that mirror's Feld's work on social foci (1981) -- and built reputations that eased network formation. Similarly, people involved with hobbies unrelated to their occupations built diverse ties (Lizardo 2006). McPherson (1983b) noted that civic groups integrated people from different ages, while hobby groups integrated a wide array of occupational identities. Second, actors who partake in activities unrelated their occupational identity can build diverse ties (Lizardo 2006). Amateur birdwatchers, for instance, can talk about birds and meet other birdwatchers, who might come from a wide variety of professions. A computer scientist who is also a weekend birdwatcher parallels Kellogg and DiBenigno's (2014) nurse who is also Haitian, an identity intrinsically unrelated to nursing. In both cases, one's cultural toolkit is broadened from one's profession, creating additional vocabularies and opportunities to connect. Lizardo's

discussion thus resonates strongly with Kellogg and DiBenigno's (2014) work. Third, law plays a role because large resource brokers, such as the federal government, use laws to force nonprofits to collaborate across professional sectors to qualify for funds (Small 2009). Fourth, collaborative professional norms are also important. Predominant childcare norms that prioritize holistic care compel organizations to collaborate across sectoral divides (Small 2009: 78-79). Finally, a person who participates in an organization that creates the context for social interaction can form diverse relationships. For instance, childcare centers that forced parents to take their children on trips created the opportunity for these parents to form bonds through a shared experience.

In each of the above hypotheses, while undeniably critical, the focus is predominantly on the context of social interaction, rather than on how individuals perceive how to navigate those interactions. Small and Crossely both focus on events organizations produce so members can interact. Similarly, Small's argument about law and professional norms are still arguments about cultural structures. One is a legal context and the other is a professional context that generally drives social behavior. Lizardo and Kellogg's work most closely aligns with my potential contribution because they focus on how participation affects an individual's cultural toolkits, which can help them connect better with diverse individuals.

Building on Entrepreneurial Networking Models of How Individuals Perceive Cross-Occupational Tie Formation

Some scholars have addressed the gap above (Vissa and Anand 2006). Entrepreneurial networking scholars propose two models examining how founders perceive and form ties. The first model posits that entrepreneurs rely on their existing network for referrals to those who can

provide requisite resources. The referral process, furthermore, accelerates trust with between the entrepreneur and the target. In previous studies (Shane and Stuart 2002; Gulati 1999), entrepreneurs used direct ties or elicited referrals to venture capital investors to get access to financing and build cross-occupational ties.

The second model, proposed by Vissa (2010), posits that entrepreneurs use network broadening and network deepening practices to form ties. These practices imply that actors build new ties on their own, not just through referrals. Network broadening refers to practices that add new ties to one's network. These practices involve reaching out to new people and obtaining information about these new relationships through questions or research. Network deepening, in contrast, refers to practices that increase the strength of one's existing network. These practices involve consistently keeping in contact with existing relationships and overlaying friendships over business ties through socializing and asking personal or hobby-related questions unrelated to work. Vissa's (2010) model challenges the implicit assumption in the first that entrepreneurs simply rely on referrals from pre-existing ties. The passiveness and self-reinforcing nature of the first model is challenged by a model of actors that can engage in reflexive choice (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994).

My findings builds on the second model in three ways. First, I focus on types of network broadening practices. While Vissa's paper examined how network broadening and deepening practices affect the extent to which one relies on referrals, my chapter focuses on what types of network broadening practices exist. For instance, this chapter examines practices such as informal networking, organizing, and project-finding. Vissa, in contrast, does not categorize different types of network broadening activities. All her interviews are simply marked by whether a person broadened their network.

Second, I show that some network deepening practices may assist in the success of one's network broadening. Vissa (2010) theorizes these practices happen distinctly, and looks at how either of these practices affect referrals. She does not look at how the two practices may affect each other. In my research, I see that some deepening practices related to socializing, such as interest-cultivation and problem-solving, can strengthen one's efforts at network broadening. This discussion is absent in Vissa's model.

Better understanding these individual-level perceptual and strategic mechanisms can uncover additional unobserved processes crucial to understand homophily, heterophily, and cross-occupational collaborations (see also Kellogg and DiBenigno 2014: 403 encouraging researchers to model how individuals discover shared identities). This study seeks to decode the patterns of those who vary propensity toward homophily, despite seemingly identical structural conditions, such as status and financial resources. The fact that similarly situated people differ in their strategies has implications for innovation, startup-formation, and job creation in cities. Exploring further how these populations make sense of their experience and options is essential for developing stronger explanations of economic development.

This contribution, furthermore, is important because the processual view of collaboration is one we do not know well. Much of the literature on brokerage is about structure, not process, and one aspect of the process is how people who have an incentive to bridge structural divides do so. This longitudinal perspective is needed because "although many studies consider the effect of network position at T1 on performance at T2, there is virtually no research that explicitly examines how acts of collaboration shape subsequent relationships (Stovel and Lynn 2014). I respond directly to calls for future research that "unpack the sequences of collaboration activity characteristic of entrepreneurial start-ups or other forms of collective action" (Obstfeld 2014).

One way to model how individuals build these networks and find shared identities in the first place is to draw from a cultural and microsociological approach. As Swidler (2001) explains, the frames and strategies within people's cultural repertoires are organized around scenes, imagined situations, and stories. Shifts in situations and contexts call up different parts of cultural repertoires (pp.33-34). Accordingly, we can learn more about how these cross-occupational relationships form by exploring people's understandings of specific engagements with people from different professional backgrounds. Structural, individual, and situational factors are fundamental to how culture works, and for understanding human action. Scholars interested in the relationship between diverse professionals should thus explore diversity: If homophily might be a repertoire, how do people understand it, and what are some of the other orientations that trigger people to overcome homophily? The present study extends the study of cross-occupational collaborations by using a microsociological analysis, based on qualitative data, to explore alternative strategies that emerge in relationships with diverse professionals. In effect, the study places more attention on the actors who build relationships. I examine how they form ties, make sense of, and build collaboration networks through the events and organizations they attend. This is critical because it can provide additional unobserved factors that may explain variation in an individual's ability to connect with diverse actors.

These alternative strategies have been suggested in the work and occupations literature, in one paper that connected tie formation to future cross-occupational collaborations. Kellogg and DiBenigno's (2014) found demographic similarities between cross-occupational teams facilitated collaboration. She argues that it played a bigger role than tools used to facilitate collaboration, such as meetings and sign-in sheets. These demographic similarities created the opportunity for members to share similar cultural toolkits, which allowed them to collaborate

effectively. I seek to build on her work, responding to her call to find the process through which individuals find shared social identities to build cross-occupational collaborations (Kellogg 2014). Understanding this mechanism can help ameliorate current gaps in understanding cross-occupational tie formation, revealing unobserved processes that make collaboration successful.

Methods

This study focuses on moments where professionals from different backgrounds encounter and meet each other. I focus on startup founders with few financial resources and little status. For those founders, money and status can mean they just hire diverse professionals through expensive, but traditional means. This chapter, instead, focuses on the organic relationships that have formed and turned into collaborations.

Furthermore, entrepreneurship is a strategic research site to explore cross-occupational collaboration because it often requires such collaboration as a sine qua non of its success. No company or project can be built by one single occupational group; it requires a diversity of skills. Furthermore, even though entrepreneurship requires cross-occupational collaborations, it does not require a uniform amount. As a result, it is a strategic site to see a wide variation of collaborative activity. While an entrepreneur might build relationships with bankers or public officials, it may also build relations with nonprofit managers and computer scientists. Finally, with startups, which have relatively low barriers to entry, I can see a wide variety of positive and negative cases. This variation can help me overcome the lack of negative cases in some of cross-occupational collaborative literature and formulate more robust analysis that is not affected by selection on the dependent variable.

Interviews were conducted in one entrepreneurial hub: Cambridge, MA. These areas have been cited in other studies as prime areas for cross-occupational collaboration. In Boston, for

example, officials of public universities and teaching hospitals built connections between venture capitalists, lawyers, pharmaceutical executives, and entrepreneurs. These university officials collaborated and, as a result, fostered biotechnology clusters, high rates of job growth, and patent development (Powell and Padgett 2013).

The study consist of in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 30 startup founders from January 2015-July 2015. As a screen for financial resources, I targeted startup founders that did not have any angel or venture capital funding. Respondents do not vary significantly in age: from 22 to 35. All startups were technology companies, requiring at least a person with a business background and a technical background to execute. The sample of founders matched the following characteristics. The founders were roughly split evenly between a technology and non-technology background. About ⅔ were from accelerators, while a ⅓ were from referrals from founders within the accelerators. About ⅔ were still continuing their startup, received some kind of award, or achieved some kind of financing success. Finally, ⅔ were from east coast ivy league schools, while ⅓ were from a private first-tier west coast university. See Figure 1 below.

	(social skills)		(sampling)		(lemon)			(lemon)		(social skills)			
	Occupation		Source		Outcome			History		University			
	Tech / Science	Non-tech	Accelerator	Referral	Fail	Award, Funding, Exit, Customers	Sustain	1+ try	Previous Exit/Success	Harvard	USC	Babson	Other Ivy
Total (30)	12	18	21	9	5	21	4	28	2	17	6	2	5

Figure 1: Demographics of Sample

The study gathered data on respondents' experiences with collaborations, their current collaborations, failures and successes, and strategies. The interviews specifically elicited opinions about how respondents approached and developed their collaboration networks. Although talk and action are not equivalent, interviews that obtain narratives of specific events

may partially replace for real-time observation. Interviews allow researchers to understand descriptions of events over long periods of time and are a powerful tool for understanding perceptions. All but a few interviews took place in the startup founders' workplace or home.

Founders were selected using information from maps about the city's main startup organizations and accelerators, aiming to identify high-density clusters of founders. The researcher posted recruitment flyers which yielded 5 respondents. Additional respondents were recruited through managed snowballing: respondents could refer up to 5 participants. The study also randomly sampled from teams in one accelerator, generating 20 interviews. Respondents were not compensated.

Accelerators are highly competitive. According to the coordinators, they accept 20% of applicants who must be enrolled in the school. The typical applicant must have developed a polished pitch, a basic prototype, and, ideally, shown some level of traction.

At the close of each interview, field notes were taken to identify emerging themes. Interviews were transcribed during the meeting. QDA Miner 4 was used to code transcripts in multiple phases, using open, thematic, and selective coding, beginning with broad themes and then focusing on narrower themes as the coding process continued (Charmaz 2006; Wagner 1968; LaRossa 2005). I present the most salient themes in the findings, though other themes emerged more tentatively. With research assistants, I analyzed the transcripts, assured the validity of the argument, and compiled quantifiable descriptive characteristics (Table 1).

Findings

This chapter shows how a sample of financially-strapped startup founders understand their relationship-building efforts with different professionals. Their perception about the

tendency toward homophily is high in the sample: only 2 respondents did not acknowledge the ease in which it is to mainly meet and associate with people with similar professional backgrounds. 2 of 30 had built cross-occupational collaborations previously.

The chapter argues that one way to understand cross-occupational collaboration and tie formation is by examining conditions under which founders defy their own expectations toward homophily and build relationships with professionals with different backgrounds. There are at least three general strategies -- informal networking, organizing, project-finding -- and two conversational strategies -- problem-solving and interest discovery and cultivation -- that emerged from the interviews. These strategies are not exhaustive. Although these strategies can be identified separately, they often intersect and overlap.

<u>General Strategies</u>

In this sample, three general strategies emerged that assisted founders in their development of cross-occupational relationships. The first is *informal networking*: Founders find it difficult to meet diverse others but build relationships by thinking about who they wanted to meet, finding natural settings to increase their chances of meeting their target, and latching onto relationship opportunities when they encountered them. The second is *organizing*: Founders see siloes between occupations as a big issue and work to reduce them by creating opportunities for interaction. The third is *project-finding*: Founders find and latch onto these projects and demonstrate their potential as collaborators.

As the analyses below suggest, these three strategies differ along two dimensions. Natural networkers intentionally seek out specific relationships. In contrast, those who organize and find projects are less intentional about seeking out specific relationships. Organizers often meet people as a byproduct of fixing some problem, while project-finders, in a very related vein, meet

people as a byproduct of working on projects through school, work, or organizations together. The second dimension is the strategy's relationship to the context of interaction. Those who use informal networking often participate in existing events but find spontaneous or casual moments to interact within them. Those who organize often create the settings in which people of different backgrounds interact. They might use social networks from existing organizations due to their leadership positions. Finally, who find projects also work within organizations but find projects that extend for longer durations of contact to work on. Through these random pairings on projects, they meet new, diverse people and form relationships conducive to collaboration. See Figure 2 below.

	Informal networking	Organizing	Project-finding
Initial Definition	(a) think about who they want to meet, (b) find natural settings to increase their chances of meeting those people, and (c) latch onto common interests.	(a) solve problems and (b) create the social context to meet others.	join and work on group projects with previously unknown others
Summary of distinctions	Unlike the other two, the focus is on *intentionally* meeting others, yet building a personal connection.	Unlike the other two, the focus is on solving problems, which creates new opportunities for people to meet each other.	Unlike the other two, the focus is on joining *existing* opportunities to meet *and* work with each other.
Intentionally trying to meet others	Yes. Narrative focuses on brainstorming and targeting specific individuals or types of individuals.	Yes and No. The strategy requires the person to meet others as a means to the end.	Yes and No. The strategy requires the person to meet others as a means to the end.
Trying to meet specific person, or anyone useful?	Either	Anyone useful.	Anyone useful.
Require participation of other actors to help?	No. But some people do get help from other actors to assist their networking process, eliciting information about worthwhile people to connect to.	Yes. Organizing require the collaboration of multiple people.	Yes. Projects require the collaboration of multiple people.
Require participation of organizations?	No. While it is easier to meet people in casual settings through organizational events, these events may not be necessary.	No. While it may be a common strategy to solve a problem by working with organizations, it doesn't require it.	Yes. More likely than not, these opportunities exist through organizations, such as nonprofits, universities, and businesses.
Do opportunities to meet and work together already exist?	Yes opportunities to meet, but not opportunities to work together.	No. The organizer creates them in order to solve a problem.	Yes. opportunities to meet and work together already exist since organizations typically host them.

Figure 2: Comparison of Strategies

<u>Informal networking</u>

People often see those from other backgrounds in a cynical or ambiguous light. However, a few respondents, despite making cynical or confusing statements about people from other professional backgrounds, reframed their beliefs about those individuals. In fact, they embraced ambiguity. In organizational contexts, they (a) think about who they want to meet, (b) find natural settings to increase their chances of meeting those people, and (c) latch onto opportunities to make those relationships focused on common interests in more casual settings. I use the word natural to show how founders create the appearance of casualness to create more feelings of closeness. The goal is to develop personal relationships outside the professional setting. This is the goal, even if the initial meetings are intentional, like those created by "cold calls."

Informal networking, furthermore, can be broken into three categories. On one end is networking that is purely instrumental and exchange-oriented. This is the kind of networking one observe in a networking mixer where cards are exchanged. Respondents have discussed this mode with distaste. On the other is networking that is purely relational and referral-oriented. This is the kind of networking that flows through existing friendships and referrals by existing friends. In the middle is a kind of networking that is instrumental, but does not cause distaste. Respondents in this category appear to use deepening practices, such as interest cultivation and problem discovery. In my sample, I did not find anyone who was an instrumental networker. As I illustrate in the following two sections, these founders either started with instrumental networking and then switched their strategies, or layered their networking with deepening practices.

Purely Instrumental Networking - and people who changed their strategies

Intentionally seeking out cross-occupational actors has its limits. Ashley faced

tremendous difficulty connecting with technology collaborators when she used a purely

instrumental approach.

> Finding the tech team was tedious. I would cold call people on LinkedIn. I searched
> widely. It was disorienting to find the right skillset I needed -- was it HTML, Java, C++?
> The titles were confusing too. I remember calling a UX/UI designer a developer and I had
> a call with her about the role. Right after our call, she went on her linkedin page and
> made fun of me for confusing the two. I felt so bad. My efforts on LinkedIn were tedious
> and terrible.

Much like Michael and Joseph, she thought about who she wanted to meet and made efforts to

meet them. But, unlike Michael and Joseph who thought about natural ways to connect, she

focused her strategies on LinkedIn, a technology platform that can feel very transactional.

Ashley, however, changed strategies after facing many obstacles. She got a lucky break

when she began to reach out to dormant, yet mutual, acquaintances. This mirrors the move to

meet cross-occupational ties through a more natural, spontaneous setting. Ashley explains:

> One day I ran into Chris at my undergraduate college when I was visiting a restaurant.
> We were talking and catching up. He mentioned Paul, one of his best friends. We were
> all part of a religious group, but I didn't get to know them super well because they were
> older than me. But I remember meeting Paul, talking about life and connecting with him.
> My instinct told me to send Paul a message about working with me and just try. Paul
> initially didn't respond. I texted Chris and he said he'd text Paul, who responded soon
> after. We chatted and after asking him questions in my interview with him. I noticed he
> had all the skills I was looking for and the heart to help young people going through life
> issues. He did a lot of stuff in the community and was also from Michigan. I got excited
> when I heard that and I texted 'You're from Michigan!' We had so many commonalities
> and were both big on family, so he was a great tech collaborator.

Through this change in strategy, Ashley's experience matches Michael and Joseph's. Ashley's

experience matches informal networking since she was presented with a chance opportunity from

a friend at a natural meeting place and decided to pursue it. She then connected with Chris on a

deeper level by discovering his interests-- asking him about his interests aside from the topic and

hand and diving deep into commonalities.

Mirroring Ashley's difficulty targeting certain people and trying to meet them, Ben agrees that this initial part of networking can be difficult. If done carelessly, one will not have great results. Instead of networking events, Ben prefers to a different approach that he said led to a "lot of luck" in finding potential collaborators. Ben explains:

> I hate going to networking events. I've done my fair share and they haven't worked out well. They don't attract the right people. A lot of those people don't get how to connect with other people. Instead of networking events, I meet friends of friends, which by far leads to the best relationships and the best luck in hiring. I take an interest in other people, learn about their businesses, and treat them well. I find the best people who get their shit done and are good to work with. Life is too short to work with people you don't like.

Ben's experience mimics the others in this section. He made intentional efforts to reach out to others to find a suitable technology collaborator, talking to friends of friends. Finding one is a common problem many of my founders experienced.

Much like Ashley's experience, he experienced success when he worked through his existing network. He explains how he found his technology collaborator.

> We asked our friends to connect us to relevant people and put in real effort in doing this. Eventually, we found our CTO because I'm a co-owner of a boat, and we were just talking. Nothing was super intentional, just took an interest in them and shared what I was doing. One of my co-owners referred me to the current CTO, who had a great track record and was great to talk to. After him we were able to attract other engineers. It's hard, but the hardest thing is starting.

Ben was eventually presented with a chance opportunity at a natural meeting place -- his boat -- and pursued it. He contacted the CTO, applying his general philosophy of taking a deep interest in other people, mirroring Ashley and other's efforts at interest discovery.

Instrumental with Deepening Practices

In contrast to those who started with traditional instrumental networking practices, the next two founders used traditional networking practices, but layered them with deepening practices that made them more palatable.

Michael, 28, started his conversation about professional differences with his collaborator, Aaron, with, "We're very different. He went to design school and is a techie graphic design nerd. I went to a big private school doing public policy. He's more right brained. I'm left brained. We think in very different ways." Michael and Aaron started a company that works with designers to sell political art to consumers. As his story unfolded, he began to tell me about his approach to meeting diverse people.

> I work to put myself in places where I'll accidentally meet people that I want to meet in the design and media world. I'm active in my startup accelerator. I go to conferences. But it feels like serendipity. I went to a media trade show in Las Vegas, walking around the convention center. I made a lot of great connections. One technology media guy in the industry I met because we were both grabbing a cracker at the same time. It felt accidental and in the moment. Still, obviously it's not totally an accident because I bought the plane ticket to Las Vegas. The way I see it is, 'Hey, there's ten people who are doing cool stuff.' Compare what I do to Aaron, my co-founder. At the company booths, he just wanted to grab business cards from each one. He doesn't enjoy the process. It's better for the business. Ultimately, because my life is pretty routine, I love to mix it up, get new thoughts. Just last night, because this conference is so full of diverse, interesting people, I carpooled with an Iranian technology activist who got blacklisted from the government. I never meet people like that.

In this case, Michael recognizes that there are differences between people from different professional backgrounds. They even meet people differently. But he puts himself in everyday situations where people naturally aggregate to spontaneously meet new people: the elevator, a car ride, or the water cooler. He does so with open arms with an interest in mixing up his daily life. He seeks to learn new things.

Furthermore, Michael, like others who use informal networking, are open to converting these acquaintances into friendships in very casual settings. Referring to people he meets in spontaneous settings, he describes this process:

> The dude I met while getting a cracker invited me to hang out at the hot tub with his friends and comfortably talk about not just whisky but also work. You gotta be comfortable with these invitations and just go. At first, I hesitated for a bit; I won't know anyone. But, I told myself, "Fuck it. There's gonna be a ton of cool people there." I brought one of our posters as a gift. I was involved with student orgs and college fraternities where you mix work and friendship. You're working the group in some sense to get them to come to something or do something, which is critical in the startup world. It's obviously horrible and fraught in power and privilege. I have advantages that I really shouldn't.

Networkers who use informal networking, then, go beyond simply creating more opportunities for oneself to meet. It also involves latching onto opportunities to meet people in more casual settings and talk about work *and* play. They discover other people's interest outside of work and delve deeply into them. For Michael, his previous involvement with organizations made him especially comfortable in this setting -- something that might make others feel inauthentic or uncomfortable.

Joseph, 21, also exhibits the same patterns in informal networking. He thinks about who he wants to meet, finds natural settings to increase his chances to meet those people, and latches onto opportunities to turn those relationships into more casual ones. Like Michael, he begins by acknowledging the differences between himself and more technically driven people like his former collaborator: "CS people can be hard to talk to. Algorithms and puzzles. But I made a pretty conscious effort as a non-CS kid to surround myself with CS people."

> I generally know who the important people are in the field before I meet them. I can develop my friendships to be connected to those people. I often ask my friends, 'Who are the smartest people taking computer science? What's the craziest thing you've heard of?' If you follow that chain of questioning, you start converging on specific groups of

individuals. Then you somehow start meeting them as you notice them around. It ends up feeling very lucky.

He began to build relationships by first being intentional. He asked those in the field for their opinions. Then he thought about who he wanted to meet and where they might hang out.

Joseph further elaborates on his strategy to meet an impressive software engineer in the local ecosystem:

> Take this one guy for an example that I worked with on a small project. I wanted to meet him ages in advance, but there wasn't a right moment. I found out about him after other people kept talking about him. We did a cold call. Then around campus, we bumped into each other and got lunch. The other day, we went to the same startup career conference without planning on it. We saw each other and decided to chat with each other over coffee at a nearby cafe the whole time instead of going to the conference. We really connected. I'm sure there would've been a different occasion we would've come together. But this process of meeting him took the whole of freshman year to come together. We're now collaborating on a technology group.

Like Michael, and perhaps due to his own interest, he hung around various events -- such as a startup conference -- where he could increase his chances of meeting impressive people in the startup ecosystem. When he saw his moment to connect in a more casual setting at a nearby cafe, he built a stronger relationship conducive to collaboration.

These individuals, I argue, exhibited informal networking to solve the challenge of homophily and to increase their opportunities to meet diverse others. Most of them think about who they want to meet, find natural settings to increase their chances of meeting those people, and latch onto relationship opportunities when they encounter them.

Organizing

Organizers build cross-occupational relationships by (a) solving problems and (b) creating the social context to meet others. They set up events or even start initiatives in existing

organizations. Their efforts do not always directly lead to diverse ties; they hear of new inform

or gain status that allow them to build deeper relationships with diverse people.

Organizers are different than natural networkers. Natural networkers speak about their

search for cross-occupational actors as the main activity; it's their primary purpose, even if it is

in the service of solving a problem they face. Organizers, in contrast, speak about how they

encountered cross-occupational actors as a side effect; their primary purpose was to solve a

problem they faced. Organizers rarely discussed how they brainstormed which individuals to

meet. Instead, their narrative focused on getting people to solve a problem. In contrast, natural

networkers, like Michael and Joseph, focused their narrative on meeting individuals in opportune

moments, often within existing events.

Alice, 28, demonstrates the pattern of solving a problem, which then opened the door to

meet diverse others. As a medical professional, she leads a startup focused on connecting

medical professionals to serve homeless clients. She begins with the barriers to talking with

people from other professional backgrounds: "The silos between social workers, nurses, and

doctors are big. There are cultural barriers where at least the nursing students internalize the idea

that they're somehow less knowledgeable than doctors."

Recognizing these barriers, she organized an event to help people feel more comfortable

meeting each other.

> In a traditional medical lecture, there are no introductions. People sit in groups and leave
> right after. There are no opportunities to build connections with different people. In our
> last talk, I went up to them and asked them if they were nursing students. The
> conversation was a bit hard. I asked them to come closer to the front, but they wanted to
> stick together. For our next meeting, I emailed the group. I said that we should create a
> "Meet and Greet" to introduce each other. We're in the medical school a lot and we're
> like separate people from these nurses. We ended up doing a potluck that went great. We
> shared personal things and heard about the work they were doing. Caitlin, a nurse, was

really cool. She told a very interesting story, about how she used to deal drugs and changed her life, and worked closely with the homelessness population.

Alice recognized a problem of siloing between the nurses and doctors. One traditional meeting format - the medical lecture -- prevented her from meeting and building relationships with nurses and social workers who also came to these meetings. She organized a new event that allowed people to share personal details, which led to more comfort between the two occupational groups.

Despite this positive experience, Alice did not feel it was enough. She left the meeting not feeling as though she had a nurse or social worker to collaborate closely with. She began to make progress on her goal when she made an extra effort to cultivate her interest in the homelessness population and finding a project to participate in. More specifically, she decided to visit the homelessness clinic Caitlin mentioned at the potluck. She reached out to Caitlin, who warmly remembered her efforts at the potluck, and helped her obtain an opportunity that nurses and social workers typically filled. Alice explains how her outreach eventually led her to developing a collaborative relationship with one nurse, Ruby:

> The nurses at the clinic first didn't really talk with me. But me and Ruby connected because we were partnered up to work with one homeless client, Donna. Our relationship felt special and lucky because we met before through one of my events and we were randomly paired with this client. We were going to work together. I started asking her questions about nursing and then about her life: her undergrad, where she grew up, why she chose nursing. Ruby asked me questions too: what med students do and what her experience was like. Ruby was the only friend that I made there. Just like Atul Gawande suggested doctors to do, I found that just asking for each other's names before you work with each other created comfort. I thought how much more we broke silos and allowed people to meet with each other on a personal level.

Her organizing did not directly lead to additional collaborations. But her organizing led to new information -- the existence of the nurse-run homelessness clinic -- that allowed her to develop new diverse ties. Her transition into the clinic was easier because of her organizing efforts; she

became a known figure in the community. Finally, by further cultivating her interest in solving homelessness, she joined a project that allowed her to work closely with a nurse, Ruby, on the same client, leading a deeper relationship.

Unlike Michael and Joseph who focused on meeting those key people from different occupations, Alice found Ruby by participating in an activity she already cared about: homelessness clinic. Furthermore, unlike those those who use informal networking who would meet their desired collaborators by directly reaching out to them, Alice met Ruby in a roundabout way. She organized an event, heard of an opportunity, and followed-up.

Aaron demonstrates the same pattern. He locates a problem -- siloing between organizations -- and he organized people through a design conference at his school.

> It's been an interest of mine to bring people together. At school, I looked around and saw people were super siloed. But then they're missing out on all the amazing things happening around them, opportunities for interdisciplinary learning. When the new dean came to the school, there was a shift. I was running the school's website and social media platform. I used the website's audience to start a conference to get people to stop and look around. This conference got a bunch of student committees to create presentation spaces, to connect artistic practice with physical space, and get people to meet each other. There was a lot of magic surrounding this experience. Through that experience, I met my first co-founder, who was a TED technology fellow. He went to one of my events. We struck up a conversation about this when I sold him my bike, and it went from there.

Aaron saw a problem, worked from an existing organization (his school's website), and used its resources to organize events in the school. While his collaborator didn't come directly from this experience, his reputation increased, leading to additional conversations to deepen relationships with people who attended his event.

There are many similarities between Alice's and Aaron's stories. Both of them focused on solving a problem. Alice was focused on the homelessness population, while Aaron saw a disconnect between designers. And in both cases connections to diverse others did not come

directly. Alice heard of new opportunities and followed-up. Aaron's reputation encouraged new people to talk to him, and he was willing to have those conversations with random people, like his future collaborator that he met by selling a bike to. This suggests that organizing simply increases exposure to new opportunities and people. Requires follow-up to actually make the connection.

Organizers, I argue, solve the challenge of homophily by finding ways to solve problems and then creating the social context to meet others. As emphasized above, this social context in no way guarantees that these organizers will meet diverse others. In both Alice's and Aaron's case, they had to follow-up on opportunities they encountered through their organizing efforts

Project-Finding

The strategy of project-finding involves working on existing group projects with previously unknown others. The strategy of project-finding is different than the strategy of informal networking or organizing. Unlike natural networkers, who intentionally search for specific individuals, project-finders meet diverse others as a byproduct of working on a class, work, or hobby project together. Often organizations sponsor these projects and provide a social context through which people can build or participate in groups. In contrast to organizers, who build *new* groups to solve a problem they care about, project-finders find *existing* groups to solve a problem they care about or to cultivate an interest in some hobby. Project-finders rarely make the effort to bring people together for novel reasons; organizations often create the social context through which people build these groups. Yet, these two categories are similar. For instance, in both strategies, participants build diverse relationships as a byproduct.

Henry, a software developer, started his video game company, which began as a school project. He excelled in a class and eventually worked with other students who had an idea for a startup.

> My co-founder had a game idea that grew from a class. He needed a team to build the thing as he was more focused on the cinematography of the game idea. So he recruited me, which he knew from class as a friend, and his closest friends. We started the project in a class. Meeting him and the other co-founders seemed effortless at the time. I don't know if that's typical. I met him in class. Our project was vetted and tested by the class, and I was chosen as someone who'd contributed a lot to the project. Others came onto the team too, led by my co-founder. He brought people over and I mentioned whether I'd be interested in working with that guy. One of our advisers also came from the class setting. He runs the engineering games program and we were always working at his computer lab.

Henry focuses on his classwork and the relationships that stemmed from his classes. His classes, furthermore, emphasized teamwork, bringing people together to work on projects. In his particular case, one promising project became the seed for a startup and a nexus through which to recruit additional people, often through relationships in class. Unlike the narratives of those those who use informal networking, Henry's narrative is devoid of any personal searching and finding of other collaborators. Instead, it is focused on how he is joining his classmate's project. Unlike those who organized, Henry's narrative is devoid of any personal efforts to bring people together. He was focused on performing well.

Just like Henry, Erik, also a software developer, had a similar experience with project-finding. He also met his cofounder through a class and developed a friendship from that experience.

> My cofounder and I took a couple of classes like the introductory computer science course and a freshman seminar. We worked together a lot in those classes. We ended up building our startup as a final project. I distinctly remember when he first approached me, and told me about his idea to use tablets for customer feedback. We had a lot of shared interests in math and science. We did have differences that I realized later. For instance, he was a lot more sales and business oriented and cared about design. I was more

interested in the technical back-end. We had complementary skillsets. Through working together, we became close friends.

Erik and Henry share similar experiences. They both met their co-founders through technical classes. They became friends through working on these projects. They had complementary skillsets. Neither intended to build relationships with certain people, nor did they seek to solve problems of siloing outside of the classroom. They were narrowly focused on their own projects. Finally, it is worth noting that many those who find projects come from technical backgrounds. Through their classes, they appear to have higher opportunities to participate in collaboration early on and continue to collaborate on future projects.

There can be done too much project-finding, however. In contrast to the experiences of Erik and Henry, Alex had a negative experience with project-finding that hampered his ability to build meaningful cross-occupational relationships. Alex explains:

> The last semester of my MBA program, I volunteered everyday for things. I was president of the startup and technology club, on the committee for graduation week, on the committee for the flummery, and the weekly Thirsty Thursdays despite not having time. I did all this stuff and put in a lot of time to make the experience better for other people. But then something happened. There's this stupid award banquet and I'm running on fumes to organize it. I'm exhausted physically and emotionally. The first thing that I noticed was that I didn't have a name tag. That meant I wasn't nominated for one of the silly awards. I snapped. I was extremely involved, but I was so wrong about having people who cared about me. I felt I lacked deeper relationships with my classmates. I went into a funk asking myself how I could have been so wrong. I realized it was a result of an extreme way of how I'd been living my life, living in such a crazy pressured way. I didn't make time for people. My classmates didn't know me, but rather a character I created. I wasn't real with them. I felt I had no friends.

Despite getting involved with a lot of projects, Alex did not feel he built meaningful relationships with his peers. While the reasons are complex, Alex's comments point to the time pressure he put on himself, which prevented him from engaging with the relationship opportunities that came his way. He became a character instead of a real self. He neglected

opportunities to build relationships in more casual settings aside from his organizational involvement.

Because of the emotional impact that experience made on him, Aaron made significant efforts to change his efforts at project-finding. In particular, Aaron decide to cultivate his interest in improvisational comedy. When I asked him where he tends to meet diverse people, he explains: "I like to meet diverse people by doing things I like doing. I've been doing improv." His statement implies that meeting diverse people is a byproduct of doing an activity he enjoys. Unlike natural networkers who have specific groups of people or individuals in mind, Aaron is open to meeting anyone who also does improv. These people can come from very diverse walks of life. And he is different than organizers who start new groups to solve some problem they care about. In contrast, he simply

Furthermore, Aaron explains how his involvement with improv created many opportunities for interaction in casual settings. These settings often involved conversations about potential business ideas.

> It's very commonplace that after improv, everyone goes to the bar. I really like this tradition. It's an excuse to get to know each other past sitting in class, taking notes, or performing with each other. We already had a common thread. At the bar, I was just bullshitting with my buddies at improv -- a PhD in physics and another business guy -- about how to improve corporate training through improv using our own curriculum. While we're chatting, my friend gets to talking about his friend -- Katie -- who studies educational psychology. We're having a good time and I think we're on the same page. A week later, we're getting coffee, me and my buddies from improv, and Katie. Even though we decided to go our separate ways, we're still talking to each other and keeping in touch. It's not off the table. I'm keeping special contact with Katie. She's very big on people treating each other with respect, and she's excellent. That's her jam. We all came together because of my background in business and katie has the background in education.

In contrast to his experience in business school, his experience with improv showed his desire to engage casually and build more personal relationships. By going to the bar with his group,

instead of missing these opportunities by rushing around to many different projects, he developed new opportunities for collaboration. In particular, his group, perhaps due to his own interest in entrepreneurship, engaged in problem-solving around corporate training. These conversations led him to build a meaningful connection with his "buddies" and, a friend of a friend, Kate, who he remains in touch about possible opportunities in the future.

Ultimately, those who find projects veer towards their interests and work on projects with other people. This creates a natural opportunity to connect with with other occupations. Unlike the relationships that form out of informal networking, these actors are not intentional about meeting specific people: they are following their interest and meetings happen as a by-product. And unlike the relationships that form out of organizing, these relationships occur as a participant, not as a leader.

No Participation: A Negative Case

Before discussing conversational strategies, it is instructive to compare the above founders to Alex, who is building drones and perceived tremendous difficulty in building cross-occupational relationships. In contrast to those who use informal networking, those who organize, and those who find projects, Alex focuses on his own project and does not see the value in engaging with others. This perception hampered his opportunities to build diverse relationships:

> I haven't had many opportunities to meet the co-founders I'm interested in, those who meet my standards and have the skills in mechanical engineering I'm looking for. I did meet someone at a shop once; we were looking for the same parts. But he never followed up and seemed flaky. Plus, I'm always so busy day-to-day. There are 200 things I need to do everyday; it's hard to spend the time. There's a low chance I'll meet the right people, so it's hard to prioritize and take time for that. I remember a housewarming party I attended recently, and there were a bunch of strangers. I talked to some people and didn't follow up with any of them. It was a waste of time. Plus, I'd have to cold call and randomly meet people, and I'm too tired and busy to do stuff like that. I don't even like

> calling a place to schedule an oil change because it's a waste of time. It's generally really easy to put off, even though I know rationally I should be meeting different people.

While Alex does see the value of meeting new people, he finds that his opportunities to do so are not helpful. He mentions meeting people at a shop or at a housewarming party, both of which are natural settings to meet with others. But, unlike those those who use informal networking, he does not discuss his attempts to meet people in a spontaneous, casual way. Unlike those who organized, he does not attempt to bring people together within existing organizations. And unlike those who find projects, he does not work on already existing projects in classes or organizations. In fact, he distrusts the payoff of meeting new people, and precisely does not put himself in situations to meet people. He is focused squarely on efficiency and solving day-to-day problems. There is little opportunity for spontaneous interactions with diverse others in his routine, severely hampering his opportunities for cross-occupational tie-formation.

Conversational strategies

While these general strategies give people opportunities to meet people from diverse occupational backgrounds, it takes an extra step for these relationships to form into accessible ties in the eyes of these founders. A founder might meet someone, but that relationship will become superficial and quickly disappear unless several conversational strategies are used to reach past the surface. The following section explores these conversational strategies that emerged from founder interviews.

<u>Interest Cultivation and Discovery</u>

Even before conversations start, founders develop side interests that allow them to speak and connect about a number of things -- not just their main field of expertise. Often, they develop these interests for their own sake, not as a tool to connect with others. This allows individuals to discover and connect on a number of shared interests, creating further opportunities to connect

past the surface level. Conversations move past a discussion about work and to the various passions and interests that drive people.

Michael, for instance, cites his previous experiences in student organizations as a foundation for his diverse interests. He discusses his previous involvement in student organizations, fraternities, and "going to lots of parties." This allowed him to talk comfortably about whisky in a hot tub and connect with others in a deeper way. Michael has an interest in expensive liquor, one he cultivated from his previous experiences. He believes this ability to talk about diverse topics such as whisky creates "comfort." He acknowledges that "people, especially the decision-makers in the startup world, are more comfortable with people who look like them." Michael did not cultivate interests so that he could connect with others. These interests developed as a by-product of his involvement in student activities from his past.

As already discussed, Alice and Alex also demonstrated interest cultivation and discovery when they found that their organizing and project-finding efforts were insufficient. In Alice's case, her efforts to bring nurses, social workers, and doctors together was only partly successful; she could not point to a meaningful relationship that could lead to a collaboration. She pursued her interest in nursing and addressing homelessness. After being placed on a project with a nurse, she discovered her partner's interests and connected on a deeper level, labeling her a "friend." Similarly, Alex cultivated his interests in improv comedy, after having a difficult experience engaging with others in a wide variety of student life projects. By having casual beers after group work, he built a set of diverse connections that he felt could lead to a collaboration down the line.

Alex furthermore describes why interest discovery is important; it separated potential collaborators from non-collaborators. As a software developer, he was constantly approached by non-technical people to work on a project. He had many conversations, but few of them, except

the current one, led to a collaboration. He describes that many people "just showed him the idea and told him to make it. They weren't asking me questions and trying to understand what my goals were. I didn't want to be a code monkey. I've coded for five years, and I was interested in the bigger picture: software architecture and problem-solving. David was also several steps ahead on his prototype, showed customer interest, and was actually turning his idea into reality." By sharing the various failed attempts to build a relationship with and work with him, Alex highlights the importance of interest discovery as a conversational strategy. It resonates with the commonplace belief to understand first before trying to persuade.

Yet those who cultivate and discover interests are not interested in all topics. While Alice did build relationships with social workers and nurses and cultivated her interests in their fields through homelessness volunteering, she did not extend that same curiosity to those in the business sector such as consulting. Alice, for instance, holds moral judgments against certain occupations, which prevent her from building relationships in those fields. As Alice explains:

> I don't understand consulting; it seems like a rat race. I have acquaintances who are in consulting and they seem cool. But I don't understand those people fully. I don't get what they do and why they're important. I know they tend to align themselves with a set of values, centered around making money. Instead, I trust people who care about homelessness and solving that problem. Maybe a consultant who cares about homelessness would be cool. I haven't seen them though. I want to find people who have the qualities I'm looking for, so I'll spend my time going to a homelessness event, not an event for consultants.

Just like Daniel, Alice appears to demonstrate a lack of interest in business-oriented consultants. Despite not fully understanding what they do, she judges them because they appear to be focused on making money. Yet she maintains that she'd be open to connecting with a consultant who also cares about solving the homelessness problem. Given her limited time, she continues to cultivate interests close to what she knows and values.

While Alice held moral judgments, Daniel, an engineering respondent who created an e-commerce product, did not build relationships with those with humanities backgrounds. He demonstrates his boredom and confusion with a new relationship with a philosophy background.

> Even though I can talk to marketing or other engineering folks, I'm remembering one instance it was really hard to connect with a person who used to be a philosophy major. I had no idea or interest in what they were talking about. I don't even understand what philosophy entails. So I didn't know how to engage with him directly about his major. It's that much harder to relate on an interpersonal level conversationally with people from strong humanities backgrounds. When he told me he majored in philosophy, my mind immediately wanted to switch topics. Our conversation turned around though when we talked about the same kinds of liberal arts classes we took together. We talked about that and complained about the same professors. But then we went off in separate directions and I don't really keep in touch with him. I think my difficulties came from what I said before: the classes you take and the activities you do make all the difference.

Here Daniel lacked an interest in cultivating his knowledge about philosophy. This lack of cultivation prevented him from fully engaging with his acquaintance about philosophy and further developing a connection based on that topic. Even though the conversation turned around when talking about classes, another commonality, Daniel did not perceive this to be a meaningful relationship that could be a collaboration down the line. They didn't keep in touch.

Furthermore, even if one has the will to discover others' interests, those efforts will not always be successful without interest cultivation in that topic. David, a public policy entrepreneur, differs from Alice and Daniel, both of whom lacked to will to discover interests either because they judged other occupations or were bored by another's interests. David, in contrast, was highly motivated to learn about a new acquaintance's interests. But his efforts were stymied from his understanding of the field.

David who prides himself on having a relatively broad knowledge base describes the limits of interest cultivation and discovery. He described his morning routine reading a wide variety of product management, technology, finance, and strategy blogs that appear in his

Feedly, newspaper application program. But he had a hard time connecting with one of his potential teammates at a local hackathon, despite trying to discover his teammates' interests:

> The guy sitting across from me was nice and obviously really smart. He was in medicine and business school, while I was studying statistics. We smiled at each other and I asked him about his work. He told me he was studying neurobiology at the med school. But I couldn't immediately connect with the topic. I asked him a few follow-up questions: how he got into it, what he thought the implications were. But his responses were spare and I could tell he was getting bored with the conversation. I excused myself to get some water.

Interest cultivation and discovery is obviously not a panacea. In David's case, who prided himself as relatively well-read and curious, he asked a few questions but could not engage with the other person's interests well enough. Sometimes there is not a connection, and it could be due to a myriad of random forces: both parties are tired, bored, or distracted.

Ultimately, interest cultivation and discovery consists of founders (a) developing their own interests and (b) discovering what interests new acquaintances have. These efforts have led to unexpected opportunities to connect beyond one's occupational identity, on commonly held interests or in new casual settings.

Problem-solving

In their eyes, relationships are not based on pure exchange. Rather, they are based on helping to solve other people's problems. Or they might pitch and rally various individuals to help them solve their own problems. It is in the goal of solving some problem, rather than some purely individualistic motive, that frames their conversation.

Julia, for instance, discusses the conversation style of problem-solving:

> We would only discuss news, and then he would say 'i wonder if there's a opportunity in this space to do X.' I'd respond by saying that's stupid, but how about this? This kind of conversation is really common amongst his friends. They're all small business owners and always trying to improve. The other day we were having dinner, with his best friend.

i like your watch. we should swap watches. we could start a company out for this. they would just throw out fun ideas, and go through the process of seeing if it makes sense, if it would be profitable, funding and capital. i'd be like well you're not going to be able to sell this back to the watch seller. the whole idea is that watches should be unique. But his friend will argue -- this is not for the younger regular demographic and have more money. In business school you see this a lot.

Problem-solving becomes a game. To these founders, they enjoy thinking of new ways to approach problems and improve how things are already done. This becomes part of the banter that sustains friendships. This conversational style, according to Julia, contrasts sharply with her non-entrepreneurial friends, who focus more on complaining and less on problem-solving.

David, a business-oriented entrepreneur focused on addressing the construction industry, also focuses on problem-solving when discussing his efforts at connecting with others:

It's so important to share your vision, the problem and the solution. Your collaborators need to understand the problem you're trying to solve first. If they don't, I talk them through it, and how together we can solve it. I suggest they speak to friends who are in the field I'm solving to reiterate the importance of the problem. When they hear from a person they know and trust, it sells itself.

David is well-versed in the problem and the pain it causes. He has extensively talked to people in the field and is very confident that they agree with the problem. This approach he believes was critical to his ability to build relationships, even though he started as an international student with "zero connections."

Joe's approach resonates with Julia's and David's. He discusses his difficulties in connecting with people and found that problem-solving greatly helped him create a social excuse to talk to new people.

Forming connections is extremely hard if you don't have a reason to do it. But being able to talk to someone about what you're doing is not networking. It gives you something to come back to. There's a founding story for your relationship, which is super powerful. Part of the reason i'm working on a project is to give me a reason to chat to people. I can still just ask for advice. It's a lot easier to agree to a ten-minute phone call. People love giving advice. If you give them an opportunity to do so, they dive right at it.

For Joe, problem-solving gives him access and an easy conversation topic. He notices that people love giving advice because it makes them feel important and it gives them an opportunity to validate their ideas.

Of course, not everyone engages in problem-solving. Julia, because she once used to be a pre-medical student, now has many friends who are doctors. She contrasts the behavior of her medical friends with that of her co-founder's. The medical professionals behavior, in her perception, is linked to fewer relationships that lead to collaboration.

> Amongst my medical friends, you don't see them throwing out ideas and trying to improve. Instead, they just say 'I hate the system.' They get frustrated and don't look for solutions. They focus on coping and what they can do best in the situation. They don't work together to build solutions. Instead, my entrepreneurial friends say, 'This sucks. How can I change it?' There's a difference between my groups because of training and personality. If you work in small businesses, your day-to-day is more fluid; it's not structured. You can take on four roles on any given project because you don't want to be limited in your definition of it. In medicine, in contrast, you are by definition taking on a structured way of thinking. You have to structure your entire career before you start practicing.

In Julia's perception, her doctor friends do not problem-solve. This in turn reduces opportunities to work together and create solutions. Julia argues that their training and outlook on their career structures their approach. Whether this generalization holds is an empirical question. But we see that even within this chapter, Alice, a medical professional, is building relationships to create solutions for homelessness.

While Julia's example illustrates a case in which people don't engage in problem solving, a different case illustrates that problem-solving has its limits. Jason, a co-founder with a software engineering background in virtual reality games, talks about how problem-solving can be overwhelming and unhelpful in sparking a collaboration. He explains:

> Now that I've been in the virtual reality space for a while, I know what I'm doing. I'm in demand because there are comparatively fewer programmers than designers and business

people. Technical guys are getting pitched all the time. In fact, I've already likely been pitched your idea already. Pitching randomly to me might work if you're charming, but it's unlikely to be effective. Instead, show, not tell. There's a friend I got connected with as a teacher at General Assembly [a local startup education center]. He didn't just tell me what he was doing. He prototyped, got stuff done, implemented his idea, and showed me how many customers he had. I was better able to frame myself in that. That's why I've stopped attending Founder Dating events [an event that brings together potential founders to start projects and companies together]. You'll get pitched a bunch of shit. Non-tech guys are looking for tech guys, like a bunch of guys going into a bar hitting on girls. It's not going to be helpful.

Jason illustrates the perils of problem-solving with a stranger. If the apparent purpose of the conversation is just to pitch, Jason begins to evaluate it in a more rigorous way. He expects finely tuned ideas demonstrating some measure of success and clarity. In contrast, Julia and Alex are able to present less formed ideas because it happens in the context of a pre-existing relationship. With Julia, problem-solving happens with friends over the dinner table. With Alex, problem-solving happens with friends at the bar after improv class.

To talk to strangers, several of our cases focus on the frame of advice-seeking on a problem, rather than pitching a solution to a problem. Joe, above, discusses how problem-solving gives him a reason to talk to people. But instead of pitching, he asks strangers he contacts for advice. Similarly, Michael discusses how he recruited a veteran licensing manager from a major company. Since the "perfect person fell onto his lap," he knew he had to impress. He attributes his success in collaborating with her to asking her for advice. "It was the adage: ask for money, you get advice. Ask for advice, you get money. We opened the dialogue with her and she broke down the work simply and clearly. We asked for advice on our licensing problem: what we should do, who we should talk to, what our strategy should be."

In sum, talking about problems is another tool that founders can use in addition to discovering interests. Problem-solving can become a conversational game to allow people to provide their opinion and improve what already exists.

<u>Humor</u>

When people meet for the first time, there are often uncomfortable silences or ambiguities. Humor is often used to break these silences and provide another perspective on self. Connecting on humor is a way to connect past work and a static identity.

David discusses how important humor is to his conversations with people from different backgrounds.

> I met with a person at a bar, who ended up connecting me to a construction magnate important in the field. I just opened up to them and asked about what they did. He asked me where I from and said I said Australia. We then talked about his business. He invited me to a charity dinner afterwards, where I sat next to a construction magnate. He thought he was a breath of fresh air because everyone else is the same and just tells them what they want. He was willing to say that guy's business was shit. Also making fun -- you have two kids, you should get a vasectomy. And actually -- led to some really fun conversation, and we connected afterwards.

While humor can be risky, David employs it to build trust and have fun. David pursue conversations not just to build relationships but to amuse himself and make things fun. This can make things fun for the other person and lead to additional relationship-building.

Aaron also discusses the importance of humor in his relationship-building. He brings up an example of technical and business co-workers he became close to, one of which became a collaborator on a future project.

> We liked pranking each other. We went to the grocery store, get a cake, and write something silly on the cake. We'd put that cake on the table in each other's office. We caused a little embarrassment, but no real harm. I've had other coworkers, and they were just my coworkers. Instead, here, we had a good understanding of how we operated. We enjoyed each other's company and I wanted to keep interacting with them.

In this case, we see that humor can further break down barriers and lead to a desire to further interactions. In David's case, humor was helpful in connecting with a powerful stranger. In Aaron's case, humor helped him better know his coworkers who were in different fields.

In sum, humor can be a powerful tool to break down barriers and create deeper connections. Respondents sensed that humor allowed them to see each other as more than "coworkers" or the stranger. Getting past this stage could increase opportunities to build relationships that form into collaborations.

Discussion and Conclusion

This chapter examined how founders perceive how to to build cross-occupational ties, despite the processes facilitating occupational homophily. The findings encourage scholars to expand the study of cultural orientations about the networks toward situated culture, or the culturally available strategies that emerge when orientations operate in real-life situations. I argue that founders deploy at least three alternative strategies to navigate organizational settings and form cross-occupational ties: informal networking, organizing, and project-finding.

This approach provides initial responses to some questions that remain unanswered in the cross-occupational collaborations literature. First, in my investigation of cross-occupational tie formation, my findings support the second model. Entrepreneurs do use network broadening practices. They don't rely purely on referrals from pre-existing network contacts, even though referral strategies do play an important role. Deductively speaking, referrals are not the best tool to form cross-occupational ties, since referrals are often given by closely-trusted others who are often similar to the founder. Such referrals can reinforce homophily and not help entrepreneurs find cross-occupational ties.

My findings illustrate several micro-strategies through which entrepreneurs broaden their networks. Vissa (2010) does not examine the varied lived contexts through which entrepreneurs broaden their networks; she surveys their openness to meeting people at conferences and networking meetings. In contrast, my findings show three main strategies -- informal

networking, organizing, and project-finding -- through which entrepreneurs navigate lived

contexts within organizations and other social groups and form cross-occupational ties.

In contrast to Vissa's (2010) model in which the two are discussed as independent

practices, my findings also show that founders use network broadening and deepening tactics at

the same time. Broadening and deepening, according to Vissa, actually lead to very different

performance results. Through my inquiries, I uncovered that founders that used both practices

perceived that they were better able to build cross-occupational ties. Take, for instance,

Michael's experience. He met media executives at a trade conference, thereby broadening his

network. The same day, he was invited to and attended casual settings -- like a hot tub gathering

-- and talked about personal topics -- like family and whisky. In Vissa's conceptualization, these

are two separate practices. Due to the interactive nature of network broadening and deepening, I

instead use a different model that does not make "broadening" and "deepening" the prevalent

characteristic. Instead, I focus on what entrepreneurs do -- natural network, organizing, and

project-finding-- and the conversational tactics that can lead to perceptions of closeness and

continued relations.

<u>Limitations</u>

There are several limitations of this exploratory study. One is that we know little about

the frequency at which founders used the strategies identified in this chapter. Although the study

inquired about situations in which cross-occupational collaborations were not invoked during the

data collection process, instances were certainly omitted. It is extremely difficult to gain an

accurate sense of "the denominator"—the number of times a person could have formed a

relationship but did not with data collected using retrospective surveys or interviews—as any

number acquired through retrospective methods would likely be tainted with recall bias (see,

e.g., Smith and Thomas 2003). The current study's primary empirical contribution is to provide understanding of founders' explanations of their engagement with the cross-occupational relationships which, research shows, is non-negligible. The study cannot, however, explain the average or modal responses to these relationships. In future research, this design could perhaps be expanded to better capture which strategies are more or less salient over time.

Second, this study focused on founders who lacked financial resources and status. While focus on this critical population sharpens the focus on strategies, it is a limitation as well. High status founders are not studied, and they may approach cross-occupational relationships in different ways from my sample. What, if any, are the heterogeneous cultural conceptions of other occupations for these groups? Are their strategies similar to low status founders', or are there other ways that these groups understand how to build relationships across occupations? Additionally, though this study did not detect systematic differences based on other variants such as age or gender, it is conceivable that different strategies would manifest differently among 20-year-olds than among 50 year-olds (Bosick et al. 2012). These might be fruitful topics for further study.

Scope conditions

Importantly, these strategies do not capture the full universe of strategies founders may use. There are several scope conditions to be aware of. First, as discussed in the methods section, my founders were overwhelmingly students and recent graduates in coastal metropolitan areas, part of accelerator programs, and were building startups for the first time. Furthermore, as the case material suggests, building cross-occupational ties did not come easily for these founders. Many struggled to build relationships and some even failed to do so in the end. As a result, these practices cannot be generalized beyond this sample.

It is important to note, for instance, that these practices may not be generalizable to other groups of entrepreneurs. One group might be highly-experienced or networked entrepreneurs, such as family entrepreneurs, entrepreneurs who build spin-offs from existing companies, or serial entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs in these groups may have access to long-standing cross-occupational ties built over previous collaborations. In these cases, screening and testing, as discussed in the second chapter, may be a more salient issue.

How much homophily do we need to assume?

I end this section discussing how much homophily is necessary for my question to be a contribution. One might argue that cross-occupational collaborations are pervasive because homophily amongst founders is generally not very high. As a result, these practices are mundane and not significant.

In response, I provide two pieces of evidence. Ruef (2003), for instance, discusses how occupational homophily is pervasive among small businesses founding. Second, even if these founders may be homophilous is one area, such as race or class, my case material suggests that my founders experienced problems building these collaborations and, as a result, these practices are limited in scope to those who fit my sample characteristics.

Regardless of the level of homophily among my founders, they experienced difficulty building these cross-occupational collaborations. For nearly all, starting a collaboration could not occur with a simple phone call. These ties had to be cultivated over time because they perceived their existing network to be homophilous. See, for instance, Ashley's finding a chief technology officer despite searching Linkedin and Alex's difficulty finding a reliable co-founder for his company. As a result, my findings are limited by another scope condition. The practices I

uncover may be salient for inexperienced founders who faced at least some difficulty

overcoming homophily and building cross-occupational collaborations.

Chapter 3: Trust-building Practices in Cross-Occupational Collaborations

What practices build trust in cross-occupational collaborations? Cross-occupational collaborations play an important role in regional development and are thus a critical research site. In Silicon Valley and Boston, for example, officials of public universities and teaching hospitals built connections between venture capitalists, lawyers, pharmaceutical executives, and entrepreneurs. These university officials collaborated and, as a result, fostered biotechnology clusters, high rates of job growth, and patent development (Powell and Padgett 2013). Similarly, in Rust Belt cities, local Boy Scout club leaders and university officials connected managers of nonprofits and manufacturing plants. These cross-occupational collaborations led to new economic ventures, such as the Lehigh Valley Partnership, which innovatively addressed the Rust Belt economic crisis (Safford 2004). Existing literature, then, establishes that cross-occupational collaborations can be a critical driver of regional innovation and development, and, ultimately, productivity and job growth.

Yet cross-occupational collaboration is difficult. Scholars of work and occupations have shown that differences in status, shared meanings, and expertise stymie collaboration across occupational boundaries (Barley and Tolbert, 1991; Carlile 2004; Faraj and Xiao, 2006; O'Mahony and Bechky, 2008). These three characteristics harm collaboration in the following ways. First, differences in status block collaboration because one group's status derives precisely from hiving off lower-status dirty work and not collaborating (e.g., Abbott, 1988; Bechky, 2003a; Anteby, 2010; Ranganathan, 2013). By collaborating with lower-status occupations as equal partners, status differences diminish, challenging occupational members' senses of worth. Second, differences in shared meanings block empathy and understanding, thereby blocking collaboration (Perlow and Weeks, 2002; Bechky, 2003b; Bailyn, 2006; Anteby, 2008). By

valuing different outcomes, members of different occupations have a difficult time appreciating each other's actions. Finally, differences in expertise block collaboration because experts use incompatible codes, routines, or protocols (Barley, 1986; Carlile, 2002; Bailey, Leonardi, and Chong, 2010; Huising, 2014). This makes it extremely difficult for different experts to communicate effectively and share knowledge with non-members.

[But scholars have also found that, despite these difficulties, when organizations provide certain tools to foster collaboration, cross-occupational collaboration can be successful (see Okhuysen and Bechky, 2009, for a review). Boundary objects—objects used by multiple occupational groups to coordinate their work—can support the translation of meanings and the negotiation of status across occupational boundaries (e.g., Star and Griesemer, 1989; Bechky, 2003b; Carlile, 2004; Levina and Vaast, 2005). Also, common spaces can help promote communication and camaraderie among team members (e.g., Bechky, 2003b; Kellogg, Orlikowski, and Yates, 2006).] What they have not explained well, however, is why collaboration can still be fostered despite the absence of any of these tools. This chapter demonstrates that the answer may lie in trust-formation practices, which are actions groups take to build trust.

Few studies have investigated trust-formation practices in collaborations between members of different occupational groups. Cross-occupational collaboration scholars typically do not report or theorize about these trust-formation practices, even though these practices may have shaped the collaboration (or lack of it) that they observed. For example, absent are the trust-formation practices of occupational groups in the cross-occupational collaboration between Barley's (1986) radiologists and technicians or among Faraj and Xiao's (2006) trauma team members. And though Kellogg, Orlikowski, and Yates (2006) and Bechky (2003a) referred to

coordination practices, such as display, representation, and assembly among members of the different occupations they studied, they did not specifically examine trust-formation practices.

Trust is seen as an intermediate factor that increases the success of collaborations and should be considered as an outcome of focus in the cross-occupational collaboration literature. Trust is considered essential for the creation and sharing of knowledge in a reciprocal way (Hatak and Roessl 2010). As trust grows, collaborators are increasingly willing to risk themselves, by disclosing important information, relying on others' promises, or sacrificing immediate rewards for future gain (Parkhe 1993). Davenport et al. (1999) have found that where research interactions are embedded in social exchange relationships and mutual obligations, trust may reduce the impact of differences in organizational culture. Trust is thus a significant intermediate mechanism (van de Ven and Ring 2006; Dodgson 1993; Uzzi 1997) and is critical for cross-occupational scholars to consider trust-building practices.

Scholars of innovation management have found that trust formation is not just due to contextual factors, such as tie strength or partner reputation, but also due to the use of trust-formation practices (Bjerregaard 2009). Trust-formation practices are useful in examining the evolution of collaboration. These practices include screening which actors to work with before the collaboration begins (also called "contact-making practices" in the literature) and testing the viability of the relationship during the collaboration (also called "dispute-management practices" in the literature). Looking at micro-level strategies recognizes that collaboration is full of

practices that can shape networks that simultaneously constrain actors (Jarzabkowski, 2003; Johnson et al., 2007; Whittington, 2006; Certeau, 1984; Bourdieu, 1977).[1]

Scholars have identified several practices that promote more trusting intergroup dynamics. The first are screening practices, which are approaches to partner selection. The idea is that collaborators who select partners they like will have an easier time trusting them. Collaborators use several criteria for select their partners, such as the opportunity to combine complementary ideas, skillsets, or resources (Bjerregaard 2009). Collaborators, furthermore, might simply use pre-existing ties to build a project or use more time-consuming strategies, such as cold calling a huge list of researchers. According to Bjerregaard (2009), both strategies were seen as successful to participants.

Examples of this mechanism also exist in the social networks and culture literature. The low-income black employees in Smith's (2010) research amply used these screening practices when deciding *whom* to refer. While these employees decided not to refer members from their own community, they did refer immigrants who the employees believed would work hard and follow the American Dream faithfully. Their perception of immigrant workers influenced these employee's referrals and thus helped explain larger job-hiring patterns in urban areas, in which immigrant workers dominate food and retail service. In other words, the use of a screening strategy – one based on the potential employee's work ethic – shaped their desire to build a relationship between the immigrant and the large firm. Smith would suggest that organizations that perceive some actors as "worthy" are potential collaborators. These judgments about worthiness occur prior to and during the collaboration itself and thus influence the nature of

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[1] http://search.proquest.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/docview/211790321/fulltextPDF/27FE2F528E854091PQ/1?accountid=11311

one's collaboration. While these actors do appear to increase diversity in one sense, that of demography, these collaborators reduce diversity in another sense, by referring workers with characteristics they perceive are linked to strong work ethic.

The second practice involved testing practices that reduced tensions arising from differences in goals or culture. One prominent strategy was a "trial-and-error" learning process of testing new ideas and partnerships during the collaboration. Bjerregaard (2009), for instance, discussed how one startup collaborator, a business partner, failed in their initial interactions to share information. Instead of focusing just on how to achieve research results, the business partner focused on relationship-building and learning about the research partners' work. This change in strategy, the business partner believed, bridged gaps between research and business groups on the project.

[This mechanism resonates with adaptive learning theory, actors tend to interact in iteratively and adaptively rational ways. Thus, tacit knowledge both guides interactions and evolves through looping effects with experiential learning from those interactions (March and Olsen, 1976). While the evolution of R&D processes is likely to be difficult to predict (van de Ven et al., 1999), experiential knowledge from prior collaborations may generate shared tacit and practical knowledge about communication and collaboration with a specific partner and facilitate future interactions. Thereby, iterative adaptations to new information on basis of learning processes during collaboration may serve to reduce the impact of institutional gaps impeding cross-occupational collaboration (Cyert and Goodman, 1997).]

This chapter also answers Bjerregaard's (2009: 173) calls for researchers to go beyond creating typologies and examine the social dynamics of groups in a longitudinal setting. Such an approach would better trace the mechanisms of each strategy to trust. Furthermore, with various

negative cases that such longitudinal settings afford, the scope conditions of the import of these strategies could be better identified.

This chapter finds that by promoting these two practices (screening and testing), trust can better be formed across occupational boundaries. By screening, I mean the process through which some organizations are chosen to collaborate due to various criteria of worth, such as reputation or the similarity of organizational cultures. As Smith makes clear, these screening strategies set criteria of worth, helping individuals determine which ties to deepen in a project. One cannot build bridges between all possible social ties and must, instead, choose some of these ties. By testing, I refer to processes through which actors vet collaborators and negotiate the shape of the relationship. As Bjerregaard (2009) and Zuckerman (1999) make clear, actors use testing strategies to overcome hitches and breaks in the collaborative process that their screening strategy did not foresee.

Method

In this section, I demonstrate how my examination of South Loan (SL) is ideally suited to examine how individuals can manage cross-occupational collaborations. The chapter is a case study on how, over a protracted process, collaboration first failed and then succeeded as a result. This makes clear that collaboration is a dynamic process, one likely to work when actors respond and alter their strategies -- through screening and testing -- in light of changing circumstances.

In order to examine the formation of trust within South Loan, I draw on historical comparison, and archival materials from the organization, and, importantly, perceptions from key strategists across time to generate grounded theory. I examined South Loan because, as an urban social enterprise, is forced to collaborate across different occupations for different projects.

I examine SL across time so that I can keep organizational characteristics constant and use its projects and their associated political experiences as case comparisons (Eisenhardt 1989).

SL Is An Ideal Case To Explore The Formation Of Trust Across Occupations

In this section, I demonstrate how SL is an ideal case to examine my model because of its occupational diversity. Yet, I show how holding organizational characteristics constant helps us engage with factors critical to screening and testing.

Professional Organization. SL is part of a long legacy of community development organizations, which started in the 1977 with the passage of the Community Reinvestment Act. This Act mandated that banks service their entire area, preventing them from discriminating against underserved areas of the market in the pursuit of profit. Bolstered by the CRA, CDFIs emerged as a response by community developers to service the credit needs of underserved communities and help them access economic opportunities. Historically, these banks tied together occupations with nonprofit and finance backgrounds. CDFIs main initiatives involve the financing of residential real estate and small businesses. In the case explored here, SL increased the purchasing power of its clients looking to purchase their first homes, providing an alternative to predatory lenders who target underserved communities. In order to achieve their goals, CDFIs require cross-occupational collaborations to raise financing, provide loan counseling, and sell their loans. Financing requires collaborations with banks while loan sales involve collaborations with public agencies and nonprofits to counsel and sell their loans.

Organizational Characteristics Constant throughout Cases. Due to this case design, organizational characteristics are held constant. First, consider that it is a one-year time frame between SL's first collaboration and SL's subsequent collaboration in which it experienced more trust between occupations. I asked interviewees about this one-year time period. I found that

these characteristics remained constant across the variables I reviewed. There was neither change in staff size nor hiring and socialization policies (Battilana and Dorado 2012). As a result, organizational characteristics are likely not the prime cause of SL's ability to change its outcome in the trust formation process.

Qualitative Data Collection to Observe Cross-occupational Collaborations and Political Opportunities

Qualitative methods are useful for this study because they equip the researcher to gain a deep understanding of the occupational groups and political context SL operates within. I can engage with how actors perceived existing dynamics and opportunities and how these changed across time. Among the 1-year timeframe, I saw how SL changed its screening and testing practices which connected to various degrees of trust amongst its diverse collaborators.

During this time, I interviewed staff members, board members, and city officials. My interviews were semi-structured, but also open-ended enough to allow some questions to evolve with the research project (Strauss and Corbin 1998). My initial questions included understanding their role in the organization and the major obstacles and opportunities the organization faced. I would then ask them specific challenges related to working with their partners or in their environment. I also ensured that I spoke with at least one actor from each sector to not only triangulate their understandings of the events, but also to see how their perspective in a different sector influenced their understanding of the events.

Respondents were selected using information from the CEO of each CDFI about who was involved with the organization. I then used referrals from the CEO to obtain respondents. I yielded 100% of interviews from those involved. See Figure 3 below.

	Banking	Public	Lead Nonprofit	Other Nonprofit
South Loan	2	2	4	2

Figure 3: Summary of Respondents

At the close of each interview, field notes were taken to identify emerging themes. Interviews were transcribed during the meeting. QDA Miner 4 was used to code transcripts in multiple phases, using open, thematic, and selective coding, beginning with broad themes and then focusing on narrower themes as the coding process continued (Charmaz 2006; Glaser and Strauss 1967; LaRossa 2005). Through using the constant comparison method (Glaeser and Strauss 1967), I highlighted parts of my interview transcripts where I saw major patterns throughout the cases. For instance, I had a code for "Bringing in the Right People," with sub-codes for "methods" and "reputation." This popular code is mentioned in some form by all interviewees. As a result, it became one of my central findings and part of the screening and testing model. In order to link certain practices with the perception of trust, I use previous understandings of trust (Bjerregaard's 2009) to inform my coding. In particular, I coded high levels of conflict and negative judgments about other parties as signals of distrust. I present the most salient themes in the findings, though other themes emerged more tentatively. Furthermore, I used a time-ordered matrix to reduce relevant information and ordered the elements of cross-occupational collaboration, bricolage, opportunities, and strategic outcomes in a process to test my expectations (Miles and Huberman 1994: 119). The idea of a time ordered matrix resonates with existing systematic process analysis methods in historical institutionalism (Sewell 1996; Hall 2006; Hall and Taylor 1996; Ganz 2000; Bennett and Checkel 2012) and process analysis in organizational strategy research (Langley 1999).

How Screening and Testing Helps Collaborations Build Trust

In this section, I discuss how screening and testing relationships played a critical role in South Loan's collaboration across time.

<u>South Loan: No screening and testing before the launch of the product</u>

South Loan did not screen and test pre-launch. This was due to the top-down nature of the collaborative model they participated in. This limited the extent to which South Loan could initially filter and manage its social relationships; most of those efforts were predefined for them. Because of this structural context, South Loan faced a significant challenge with each of its cross-occupational collaborations, which are highlighted below. SL was still able to overcome these challenges by screening and testing. This however gave the collaboration less time and intensity to focus on contextual challenges, which slowed down its loan production. See Figure 4 below

	South Loan
Screening and Testing before product launch	No opportunity because timetable and collaborators were set for the CDFI.
Corresponding Level of Trust (Perception that collaboration is running smoothly with each collaborator)	Low. Severe conflict with lender and counseling agency.
Post-launch: Screening and Testing after product launch	Yes. Screening and testing to renegotiate roles and find alternatives to lender and counseling agency.
Corresponding Level of Trust (Perception that collaboration is running smoothly with each collaborator)	High

Figure 4: Summary of South Loan

One of the striking aspects of their collaboration was how quickly it started. The CEO of the nonprofit collaborator, Terry, called it a "big flash." When I asked her to recount the major events from start to finish, the regional coordinator of the collaboration, Jackie, noted:

> We weren't part of the envisioning process. However, we were invited to attend a launch event in another major city, which helped us prepare for the launch in our city.

While they did get a chance to observe a different launch site before their own, they only had a week and a half to improve upon the process they saw previously.

In addition to the lack of time, they could not control another aspect of this collaboration: the target geographic area. Terry noted that the geography of the program was restricted to just the inner city; it did not include the wider metropolitan area where they had much more familiarity. This meant that South Loan had to work with an unfamiliar counseling nonprofit. She felt powerless against this restriction that was placed upon them, which was decided through agreements between the partnering bank and state agency about the appropriate boundaries of the program.

Because of these external constraints around the timing and the geographic area, South Loan was ultimately not able to choose who they worked with (screening) and negotiate differences in needs (testing) before the launch of the program.

Challenges to Trust: South Bank and Counseling Agency

Unanimously, all the collaborators agreed that they had problems with their private banking partner South Bank. One of the first challenges they presented was the sense that South Bank was not as competent and the culture was not as professional compared to those of South Loan. One of the managers at South Loan complained:

South Bank had a terrible process. Terrible customer service. Under-trained or untrained loan officers. That was a disaster in the beginning. At the product launch conference, while it was very organized, we did not reach the goal. South Bank put more confusion out there and thus made the product launch expo not as beneficial to actual borrowers and clients. That wasn't something we initially felt we could do something about.

Not being able to screen out this collaborator beforehand was detrimental once the collaboration started. Because it was now in the launch period, customers were receiving incorrect information. As customers gave negative feedback to the broker, South Loan, the organization began to harbor more negative feelings about the experience. The coordinator for the program discussed how the mistakes South Bank made began to tarnish their reputation and they had to act quickly to resolve these mistakes.

The problems with their collaborative partners did not stop there. Mary discussed how one of South Loan's nonprofit counseling partners faced internal conflicts, especially because the CEO was going through transition. Mary recalled that the nonprofit's CEO missed meetings with her after she drove 200 miles to meet the CEO. Mary complained:

Our national organization has standards. You assume those standards are being kept at the minimum. It's not always the case. We should've done the homework. This particular organization went through a major management change in the middle of this. Some things you cannot help. This made it more difficult.

Mary believed that the counseling partner's incompetence hampered the capacity of the collaboration as they found that their quality standards were not being met. Another officer went as far as to call the agency "too dull" to realize the benefit of the collaboration. Yet without being able to work with this agency, the South Loan would be severely disadvantaged. It was their only point of contact in the new geographical area. Without such a contact, processing loans could take an additional week, a time delay that would harm the relationship with their clients.

After the launch of the product, South Loan used screening and testing to overcome distrust

The structural context placed the collaboration onto a tentative start with two major challenges to trust. The program was on a timetable that did not give the organization time to prepare and tap into its local knowledge and networks. There was limited pre-launch search and testing. Once the South Loan launched its collaboration, the group faced a number of significant challenges with each of their partner organizations. These challenges were eventually overcome by using screening and testing practices.

Screening and Testing: Alternatives to South Bank

To address the situation, South Loan searched for alternatives. South Loan's manager, Mary, described how bringing this problem up to the group allowed one of its partners, South State Housing Agency, to search for and contribute alternative relationships that could ameliorate the problems it faced with South Bank. She illustrated:

> Our state housing agency had other lender partners. Those lenders are already trained in the ways we're comfortable. It's very easy money, so we grabbed ahold of it, and our production went out the door through those partners. South Bank made hiccups, but we had alternatives. Our housing agency played a key role because they had access to all these other partnerships and alternatives. They recommended a lending team of the most incredible and professional people. They're dedicated and passionate about what they do. They're not dragging their feet. I haven't had to encourage them at all. Once we talk about an idea, they're so professional and all about doing it. Before I even get to it, the schedule is done and implemented.

Working with diverse actors allowed the collaboration to tap into alternative lending resources it would otherwise not have. Once the collaboration had access to these alternative lending sources with similar cultures and training, the collaboration was able to overcome conflict and regain trust with its collaborators.

But because South Bank was a major funder, South Loan had to approach them tactfully. Mary describes how she did not simply drop South Bank and put it on a no-call list. Instead, she urged South Loan "to solve quality issues, which helped us work as a team." Meanwhile, South Loan encouraged its officers to work with alternative lending sources that their state housing agency provided. Through this switch, South Bank's market share of loans dropped from 100% to 33% of the loans, while other alternative partners made up the difference.

Yet, South Loan's move to work with different lenders came with additional obligations. It had to address its lenders' needs to sell more loans and different kind of loans core to their business model. The CEO of South Loan explained:

> One lender suggested that we provide a 203k loan on top of our second mortgage loan. The 203k loan lets homeowners borrow money to repair their houses. While this wasn't a popular loan for most lenders, the 203k loan was an important part of our new lender's business model. So our lender came up with the product, and we layered it on top of our existing loans. We realized that it could help our clients afford additional homes, by giving them money to fix-up homes others were ignoring in our competitive housing market. The bank was excited about this. This loan has been very, very successful in helping our clients access homes affordably.

In this case, the bank suggested the 203k loan because it was an important part of its business model. South Loan realized the 203k loan could support its mission. South Loan responded to the bank's need to sell more loans by including the loan as part of its offering to clients. By applying one practice from the banking industry, the collaboration was able to increase its loan production.

Screening and Testing: Alternatives to the counseling agency

To overcome the challenges of the counseling agency, the interviewees again referred to the same testing process: dropping, understanding needs, and then finding alternatives. The manager at South Loan described:

Because our nonprofit partner was very weak, we had to rely on our partners to pick up the slack. Very wisely in the beginning, we were able to pick up a staff person and hire her as an on-the-ground management partner. She was referred to us by someone our CEO knew very well; we knew she had a good track record. Ultimately, we hired someone with skin in the game in our target city. We shifted the counseling responsibility to her. That made a huge difference because we could have tried to be cheap and have done it bare bones. Carol, our CEO, knew we had to have someone responsible for the collaboration itself. That's Jackie, the regional coordinator, to us. She's formed great relationships for everyone. She's the general go-to person, who's put out fires for us. That was the key thing.

Because of the time crunch, South Loan needed to act quickly to find a replacement in the new geographic area they were launching their product. Aware of this gap, they again moved to reduce their reliance on the relationship with the loan counseling nonprofit. They hired an outside consultant to coordinate their efforts at the new location. They hired this consultant through a previous positive relationship. Even though South Loan had an incentive to save money by not doing so, in hindsight, they believe it was the right decision. Without the outside consultant, it would have been much harder to encourage the collaboration to trust its partners.

Testing: Responding to the needs of the state housing agency

In addition to testing their relationship with the counseling partner, South Loan also tested its relationship with its state housing agency. By obtaining and responding to feedback, South Loan was able to ameliorate concerns before they grew further. South Bank's lead manager explained:

Everyone knows that the agency is a 10,000-pound gorilla and it doesn't move quickly. Our leverage was that we've been doing a lot of business with them, so we had a great relationship with them. It was easy for us to get the meeting and the attention we needed. When we finally got involved, I personally called my contact, who immediately said, 'Oh no not this program. If I hear about this program one more time, I'm gonna explode.' South Loan and the larger national collaboration have been putting a lot of pressure on the Federal department to get the loan program approved quickly. The staff was irritated. I had to tell South Loan, 'Ok, please stop the phone calls. Let me handle this.' I had to tell the department that South Loan wasn't hiding information, but rather that they didn't have it yet. Through my contact, I got the entire staff in the room for a meeting and told them that South Loan wasn't trying to pull the wool over their eyes. South Loan, on the

flipside, thought I was keeping them out of the loop. So, at the same time, I'm keeping South Loan warm and fuzzy, assuring them I'm on their side.

This manager explicitly talks about the relationships she brought to the collaboration as her bank became involved. Because she works closely with the state department, she was able to transfer the benefits of her previous relationship to the collaboration. From her reflection, one could tell that she was able to navigate the internal politics adeptly by addressing the agency's key concerns and building trust among all parties.

Outcome: Improved Trust

Because of the structural context of South Loan's collaboration, it was unable to implement screening and testing early on. South Loan was on a strict timetable. As manifested by the interviews, the early part of the collaboration involved two key challenges to trust -- with South Bank and the counseling agency -- that led to decreased trust. South Loan eventually screened and tested, which involved renegotiating roles and finding new actors who could fill needed roles. Terry, the nonprofit counselor CEO, re-emphasized this point:

> The impact of our start was that the entire project was put on a different timetable – lagging. We were severely behind. I blame the hiccups in the marketing and the lack of communication. We were left out of it and I was the only point of contact. But now we're making up for it. Now with our new hires and collaborators, we're on a new track. We can finish the remaining 150 grants.

Indeed, all the interviewers answered that building trust was a major priority for a future project.

The process of screening and testing allowed South Loan to work with new collaborators it respected. For instance, one South Loan manager praised the new lender:

> Thank you for making us look good, Invest South. This is the team of the most incredible and professional people. They're dedicated and passionate about what they do. I love working with them.

The tone of their collaboration with the new lender clearly switched from "terrible" to "dedicated and passionate."

Similarly, the tone of their collaboration with the new counseling agency also changed. The new partner inspired trust as someone who has "formed great relationships for everyone...she's the general go-to person, who has put out fires for us." Again, the tone of the collaboration turned from one centering in "dullness" and incompetence to general enthusiasm and trust.

Discussion and Conclusion

Cross-occupational scholars have not explained well why collaboration can still be fostered despite the absence of boundary objects, common spaces, and demographic similarities (Star and Griesemer, 1989; Bechky, 2003b; Kellogg and DiBenigno 2014). This chapter demonstrates that one answer may lie in trust-formation practices, which are actions people take to build trust. Few studies have investigated trust-formation practices in collaborations between members of different occupational groups. Trust is seen as an intermediate factor that increases the success of collaborations and should be considered as an outcome of focus in the cross-occupational collaboration literature. Scholars of innovation management have found that trust-formation is not just due to contextual factors, such as tie strength or partner reputation, but also due to the use of trust-formation practices (Bjerregaard 2009). Yet Bjerregaard (2009: 173), in particular, calls for researchers to go beyond creating typologies and examine the trust-formation practices in a longitudinal setting. Building on this literature and its calls for methodological improvements, this chapter uses qualitative methods and case comparison to investigate two community banks and their trust-formation practices across time. By promoting two practices

related to previous literature ("screening" and "testing"), collaboration participants perceived that trust was better formed across occupational boundaries.

This approach provides initial responses to some questions that remain unanswered in the trust-formation practices literature. Bjerregaard's (2009: 173) called for researchers to go beyond creating typologies and examine the social dynamics of groups in a longitudinal setting in order to trace the mechanisms of each strategy to trust.

First, this chapter creates stronger evidence of a mechanistic linkage between these practices and the formation of trust in cross-occupational collaborations. While causal mechanisms cannot be completely established due to the research methods, I show how screening and testing helped South Loan build more trust. Using a longitudinal setting just as Bjerregaard suggested, I showed how a lack of screening of testing was linked to a lack of trust in South Loan. A corresponding use of screening and testing was linked to more trust in the second phase of its collaboration.

Second, this chapter showed how screening and testing can help manage cross-occupational collaborations. Screening can start very early, much before a collaboration launches its product. Yet even in a scenario with very little time, as in the case of South Loan, screening and testing allowed it to navigate challenges to trust that come with difference and create a more productive model. Furthermore, screening and testing created the organizational foundation for the lending collaboratives to utilize diverse actors to overcome new environmental challenges that threatened to dismantle the whole enterprise.

These two contributions also build theories about cross-occupational collaborations. Few studies have investigated trust-formation practices in collaborations between members of

different occupational groups. Cross-occupational collaboration scholars typically do not report

or theorize about these trust-formation practices, even though these practices may have shaped

the collaboration (or lack of it) that they observed. In asking these questions, we are better able

to see how collaborators carefully examine the cultural fit of potential collaborators, especially if

these collaborators come from diverse backgrounds (Smith 2009). For instance, South Loan

eventually realized that South Bank was not the ideal banking collaborator, noticing how their

practices and understanding of their target market diverged. But by finding alternatives and

renegotiating roles, the collaboration was able to reinstate trust within the group. My primary

contribution to the cross-occupational collaborations literature is to demonstrate how specific

practices – screening and testing – play a critical role in the ability of brokers to build trust

between actors from different occupations.

Limitations

There are several limitations of this exploratory study. One is that we know little about

the frequency at which collaborators used the strategies identified in this article. Although the

study inquired about situations in which screening and testing were not used, instances were

certainly omitted. It is extremely difficult to gain an accurate sense of "the denominator"—the

number of times a person could have formed a relationship but did not with data collected using

retrospective surveys or interviews—as any number acquired through retrospective methods

would likely be tainted with recall bias (see, e.g., Smith and Thomas 2003). The current study's

primary empirical contribution is to provide understanding of collaborators' explanations of their

engagement with screening and testing in cross-occupational relationships which, research

shows, is non-negligible. The study cannot, however, explain the average or modal responses to

these relationships. In future research, this design could perhaps be expanded to better capture which strategies are more or less salient over time.

Second, I enumerate several scope conditions important to this study's discussion of screening and testing. This study focused on collaborators with similar financial resources and status. These were moderately-sized nonprofits accredited by national organizations. While focus on this critical population sharpens the focus on strategies, it is a limitation as well. Extremely wealthy CDFIs were not studied, and they may approach cross-occupational relationships in different ways from my sample. What, if any, are the heterogeneous cultural conceptions of other occupations for these groups? Are their strategies similar to moderately-sized nonprofits, or are there other ways that these organizations understand how to build relationships across occupations? Additionally, though this study did not detect systematic differences based on other variants such as race or gender, it is conceivable that different strategies would manifest differently among CDFIs that are all African American or CDFIs with all male staff would use different strategies. (see Bosick et al. 2012). These might be fruitful topics for further study.

Chapter 4: Political Opportunities and Cross-occupational Collaborations Shape Effective Bricolage

When is bricolage effective? Bricolage refers to how actors respond to resource constraints and ambiguity by blending resources in new ways (Levi-Strauss 1966; Campbell 2004, chap. 3; Crouch 2005, chap. 3; Douglas 1986, pp. 66-67; Levi-Strauss 1966, pp. 16-33; Cambpell 2005: 56).[2] In his synthesis of organizations and social movements theories (Davis, Scott, McAdam 2005), Campbell (2005, 2007) named bricolage as an important source of institutional change and innovation (Campbell 2007; Dacin, Goodstein, Scott 2002; Stark 1996). For instance, Garud and Karnoe (2003) discuss how Danish engineers employed bricolage by incorporating new resources, such as lightweight materials and newer designs imported by foreign engineers, into a basic low-speed wind turbine. Clemens (1996, 1993) discussed how labor organizers blended fraternities with military militia to create the craft-based union.

But, up to this point, analyses of bricolage have not considered the interaction between organizational and contextual factors. Strategic management scholars argue that discussions about organizational strategy require a multi-level discussion: "there is a significant deficiency in strategic explanations because agents and their actions and interactions play a crucial, indispensable role not only in how routines and organizational capabilities originate in the first place, in how they are subsequently maintained, revised or replaced, but also in how routines and

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[2] Bricolage has been called many names: Transposition, leveraging resources across fields. I engage with the term 'bricolage' in particular because of its history within institutional theory. Furthermore, groups sometimes cross boundaries between logics and reorganize them. A large literature attempts to explain this phenomenon, using a wide range of synonyms including bricolage, hybridity, bridging, blending, brokerage, borrowing, recombination, transposition, and translation, hybrid organizational logics, selective coupling, recombinant properties (for instance: Blute 1979; Douglas 1986; Campbell 2007; Rao 2005; Cziarnawska and Sevon 1996; Sewell 1992; Dobbin 1994; Hanna and Freeman 1989; Lamont and Molnar 2002; Aldrich 1979, Axelrod and Cohen 2000, Pache and Santos 2010; Battilana and Dorado 2012, Stark 1996)

organizational capabilities affect firm behavior and firm performance" (Abell 2007 and Felin and Foss 2005, 2006). Such discussions will clarify the conditions through which bricolage is successful, contributing to both organizations and social movement theory.

To make this contribution, I hypothesize that bricolage will be successful when (a) there are open political opportunities and (b) people collaborate across occupations during those political opportunities. In this chapter, bricolage refers to the blending of strategies used by different occupational groups. For instance, community organizers focus on mass mobilization while real estate developers focus on presentations and financial analyses. When the two come together, bricolage occurs.

First, external political opportunity structures create an opportunity for bricolage to overcome threats and affect decision-makers' resources (McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly 2001; Kay and Evans 2008). I define open political opportunities as open political forums where decision-makers are legally bound to attend, gain community input, and vote on projects. This definition aligns with the "issue-specific" signal model of political opportunity (Meyer and Minkoff 2004), in which they see political opportunities as invitations to mobilize. For the civil rights movement, they found the following factors important in the signal model: activation of agency budgets, previous civil rights protests, presidential and media attention, and supportive supreme court rulings. My definition directly aligns with their model. Just like the activation of agency budgets, an open political forum activates the planning agency's budget and rule-making process. Just like previous civil rights protests and supreme court rulings, the open political forum Saxton Developers faced was preceded by protests and an unfavorable planning ruling. Finally, just like presidential and media attention during the civil rights movement, the open political forum mandates the attendance of aldermen and planning officials. Since the forum became a highly

publicized event, major newspaper outlets in the city covered the event. As a result, this put a

sharp focus on aldermen's behavior at this event, potentially affecting their chances at re-

election.

Second, internal occupational groups form multiple, and potentially competing modus

operandi derived from broader occupational cultures about how to perceive opportunities, solve

problems and, crucially, include or exclude certain actors in the strategic process (Dobbin and

Kelly 2010). Collaborations generate new group efficacy (Kellogg 2010).[3] They also influence

the perception and use of political opportunities. This move helps scholars gain a more analytical

understanding of bricolage, particularly when and how bricolage successfully shapes political

outcomes. I define collaborations as moments when occupationals attend the same strategic

meeting within the organization to deliberate on how to respond to problems. I define divisions

as moments when occupationals do not strategize together before responding to problems

because they fall back on pre-defined roles within the organization.

To examine this model of bricolage, I need an organization that engages with (1) a

political process with decision-makers and opponents and (2) diverse professionals who can

engage in bricolage. Saxton Developers provides such a case. I show how occupational divisions

within the organization influenced how the organization responded to three threats against its

first development (First Ave) and half of its second (Second Ave). By examining SD's three

failures as negative cases, I show that neither political opportunities nor occupational

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[3] Kellogg borrows and reformulates from the social movements literature the concept of the "free space" (Gamson 1996; Polletta 1999) to describe small-scale settings—such as the women-only consciousness-raising groups of the feminist movement or the black churches of the Civil Rights movement—that are isolated from the direct observation of defenders of the status quo and allow for interaction among reformers apart from daily work (from Kellogg 2009).

collaborations *alone* are sufficient for successful bricolage. Next, I show how the two occupationals began to collaborate within the context of an open political opportunity. By doing so, the developer overcame threats and positively influenced decision-makers who approve its development proposals. I finally conclude with the implications of my model. It signals the need to derive more testable hypotheses looking at how organizational-level factors interact with contextual ones to shape an organization's success in the regulatory process.

Political Opportunities and Cross-occupational Collaborations Shape Bricolage

The current literature on bricolage neglects to analyze an organization's multiple occupational groups. Garud and Karnoe, for instance, focus entirely on engineers, ignoring their interaction with other occupational groups, such as managers and lawyers. There is even less discussion about how collaborations between groups lead to variations in bricolage. As a result, current models of bricolage do not equip scholars to understand how organizations have strong occupational modus operandi, a prescribed way of solving problems that draw from occupational standards (Dobbin and Kelly 2007; Tilcsik 2010; Espeland 1998; Kellogg 2009). These modus operandi shape the possibilities and successes of bricolage.

The importance of these modus operandi for bricolage is hinted in one study in the organizations and social movement literature. Kellogg discusses how occupational groups that collaborate across positions and background can better overcome their opponents (Kellogg 2010). Kellogg neither uses a theory of bricolage, nor does she focus on the use of different resources that different *occupational* groups possess. Yet she highlights group advantages obtained by bringing together actors from different occupational positions. This suggests that collaborations between diverse occupations within an organization result in bricolage.

Furthermore, the importance of political opportunities for bricolage is hinted in the social movements literature. The success of a tactic depends in large part on the political opportunities in which these tactics are employed (Evans and Kay 2008). Open opportunities, such as elite division and public support can lead to successful projects. Bricolage – as the combination of multiple strategies – can be effective when it alters the resources on which decision-makers depend. And these resources can be altered when organizations combine strategies in new ways. Drawing from this, I hypothesize that bricolage will be successful when (a) there are open political opportunities and (b) people collaborate across occupations during those political opportunities.

The interaction between organizational factors and context is critical because it helps scholars better understand the mechanisms through which bricolage is effective. One one hand, as Jasper (1999) argues, some theorists prioritize the importance of political opportunities, without making links to the organization. On the other, much of the bricolage literature focus primarily on internal dynamics, without examining the dynamic political opportunities that surround it. By tracing when organizations blend and in which contexts they blend, scholars can create more hypotheses about the mechanisms of effective bricolage.

Alternative Theories that Explain How to Successfully Navigate Legal Regulation

I review theories that may also predict my same outcome: success in political contention.

Organizational Characteristics. Some scholars argue that certain organizational characteristics are key.[4] I show, however, in my methods section that organizational characteristics did not vary across the cases examined. "Characteristics" indicate descriptive

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factors, such as staff size, elite status, and hiring and socialization policies. Institutional theorists, for instance, expect that staff size might matter for success because such organizations have more resources and have greater contact with decision-making bodies (Edelman 1992). Other theorists, such as Duffy, Binder, and Skrentny (2010), expect that elite organizations within one arena can push decision-makers to accept their proposals. Finally, business scholars, such as Battilana and Dorado (2012), expect changes in socialization and hiring policies can lead to greater cohesion and success. These policies include efforts by managers to get groups to work with each other earlier on and to hire people who do not yet have strong occupational affiliations.

Differences in Elite and Popular Opposition and Support. Zooming out, other scholars argue that political conditions affect the organization's ability to succeed. In particular, open political opportunity structures are hypothesized to lead to better success. I show, however, in the final section of my findings that, while support does vary, these differences in support cannot explain SD's political advantage.

Methods

In order to examine occupational collaborations or divisions within the organization and changes in political opportunity structure, I draw on participant observation, historical comparison, archival materials from the organization, the city, and local newspapers, and, importantly, perceptions from key strategists across time to generate grounded theory. I examined SD because, as an urban social enterprise, it naturally employs multiple professions, must navigate a politically-charged regulatory process to complete its projects, and exists within a gentrifying neighborhood. The first element allows us to engage with multiple occupational modus operandi and the latter two elements allow us to engage with changing political

opportunities. I examine SD across time so that I can keep organizational characteristics constant and use its projects and their associated political experiences as case comparisons (Eisenhardt 1989). The sequence of the research was as follows: (1) I volunteered and observed SD before and after its Second Ave project; (2) I collected data from my participant observation, interviews, and archives to uncover SD's First Ave project which failed, while Second Ave succeeded; (3) I examined the data to determine the process by which a difference in outcomes occurred.

SD as an Ideal Case to Explore occupationally and Politically Mediated Bricolage

In this section, I demonstrate how SD is an ideal case to examine my model because of its occupational diversity and constant engagement with political opportunities with varied success. Yet, I show how holding organizational characteristics constant helps us table those considerations and engage with the factors important to my model of bricolage.

Professional Organization. SD is part of a long legacy of community developer corporations, which started in the 1960s after the Civil Rights Movement. Historically, they have tied together community organizing and real estate development, by attempting to marshal economic resources for underserved communities. This approach includes (1) the development and preservation of affordable housing units, taking them off the speculative real estate market, (2) community organizing to promote policies that enhance affordable housing. This mission maps onto SD's two main occupational groups. First, RED handles affordable housing development. While only three staff members are involved in this relatively small department, their projects' fees, contracts, and grants contribute nearly 90% of SD's operating budget. As a result, the real estate department has historically been central to the organization and SD's reputation in Saxton. Second, CO does not generate money, but rather sustains campaigns to

influence affordable housing policies. Community organizers spend most of their time interfacing with other people or developing materials that facilitate their political outreach.

Regular Engagement with Political Opportunities. The primary decision-makers in the regulatory process are Saxton's planning bureaucrats, which are appointed by the Mayor and approved by the city's legislative body, the board of aldermen. The actors here implement a number of the city's publicly regulated technical activities, such as zoning, planning, and infrastructure development. Saxton's legislative officials, such as the aldermen, constitute another group of decision-makers. They pass citywide ordinances that can formally direct its bureaucracy to perform specific tasks, such as changing its licensing policy for taxis. They are popularly elected every four years and thus formally represent its constituents, which have been separated into nine wards of the city. Importantly, they have the formal authority to review who can sit on the planning board.

Changing Political and Demographic Context. Voting citizens, Saxton's public station, local newspapers, and a slew of advocacy organizations form the major participants of this group. Most importantly, the Saxton's demography, especially around the neighborhood that encompasses Saxton Developer's work, has gone through considerable income and educational upgrading in the past 20 years. This upgrading has foreshadowed the opponents SD has had to face in its two recent developments. In the neighborhoods affecting First and Second Ave, the household median income was $30,000-$35,000 (adjusted to 2000 dollars). In 2010, the household median income ranges from $50,000-$75,000. In 1980, 20-30% of residents had less than a high school degree. In 2010, Saxton's share of residents without a high school degree dropped to 8%. Thus, three decades after it was founded, SD is no longer situated in the same demographic context. All interviewers alluded to these demographic changes, pointing to three

main groups that inhabit Saxton. These include the old Saxton residents, the wealthier newcomers and professionals, and ethnic immigrant populations. SD's changing demographic contexts shadow the difficulties it would face in its upcoming regulatory battles.

Organizational Characteristics Constant throughout Cases. Due to my longitudinal case design, organizational characteristics are held constant. First, consider that it is a two-year time frame between First Avenue's initial proposal and SD's first positive result during the Second Avenue process. I found that these characteristics remained constant across the variables I reviewed. There was neither change in staff size nor hiring and socialization policies (Battilana and Dorado 2012). While elite status is harder to measure, Binder, Skrentny, and Duffy (2010) categorize elite status through the connectedness of members who lead an organization and the resources it has. Again, by these metrics, SD did not change. As a result, organizational characteristics are likely not the prime cause of SD's ability to change its outcome in the development process.

Qualitative Data Collection to Observe Cross-occupational Collaborations and Political Opportunities

Qualitative methods are useful for this study because they equip the researcher to gain a deep understanding of SD's occupational groups and political context. Qualitative methods allow me to examine how actors perceived their internal and external dynamics, and how those perceptions may have changed across time. I started observing the change process two months before the SD initiated its Second Avenue project, which allowed me to establish a baseline. I watched, in varying intensity, the entire process unfold for almost two years afterward (October 2011-August 2013). I saw how SD changed its internal occupational collaborations, its political strategy, and its use of open forums, all of which connected to varying political outcomes.

For the first three months, I engaged in an effort to develop trust, immerse myself in the site, and document the day-to-day practices of both occupational groups through participant observation and interviews. During this time, I interviewed staff members, board members, and city officials. My interviews were semi-structured, but also open-ended enough to allow some questions to evolve with the research project (Strauss and Corbin 1998). My initial questions included understanding their role in the organization and the major obstacles and opportunities the organization faced.

From December 2011-August 2013, the research concentrated on the organization's internal dynamics. Here, I began to engage with the opposition group, inquired about the organization's past failure with First Ave, and analyzed archival material to start developing comparisons across time. I totaled 41 formal interviews (see appendix for details). For participant observation, I spent on 5-8 hours during the school year, and an average of 10 hours a week at SD's office and participating in a variety of events, including internal biweekly meetings (N=25), community forums (N=4), and other miscellaneous events (N=15), such as doorknocking and leadership training programs. After the drop off in political activity in June 2012, I reduced my involvement to various meetings, check-ins with staff, and up ticked my involvement right before the final decision by the zoning board in August 2013.[5] This active participation in their organization's efforts facilitated my interviews and data gathering. Staff knew me by name and expected my regular attendance at meetings. By developing this trust

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[5] To clarify, a planning board vote is taken first and then passed onto the zoning board. The mayor appoints both of these actors. From my understanding, the final zoning decision was delayed due to a variety of technical issues, such as the decision to work with a for-profit developer, increase the number of units, and various other issues. It may be the case that more minor public opposition played a role in this delay, but any public opposition was substantially reduced after SD's response to the fourth threat.

across main leaders, staff members talked frankly with me during my interviews about internal dynamics.

Finally, to verify my understanding of First Ave and political opportunities, I used archival materials. These archives helped me verify events and perceptions garnered through interviews and guided the context for historical happenings. The first type of archives was internal SD meeting and organizational documents (N=200). The second type were articles from five major local newspapers (Saxton Journal, Saxton News, Saxton Post, Saxton Scout, and Saxton Voices) from the past five years, examining articles covering SD's work (N=60). I also accessed secondary historical sources about Saxton, such as Images of America: Saxton (1997) and research reports sponsored by Saxton City Council (N=23). Finally, I accessed the organization's tax Form 990 to verify financial and staff data across three years.

Analysis of Failure in First Ave and Success in Second Ave

After the opposition's drop-off in political activity in the summer after SD's bricolage of multiple resources within the development forum, I began to analyze my data and contrast the two cases of failure and success. To analyze my qualitative data, I use the constant comparison method (Glaeser and Strauss 1967). I sifted through my work to link relevant logics at play ("Real Estate Development" or "Community Organizing") and began to locate the different ways these logics were organized in specific moments to distinguish First and Second Ave's internal dynamics. I identified concepts such as "community organizing inclusion", "technical responses", "First Ave dynamics", and "Second Ave dynamics." Furthermore, I used a time-ordered matrix to reduce relevant information and ordered the elements of cross-occupational collaboration, bricolage, opportunities, and strategic outcomes in a process to test my expectations (Miles and Huberman 1994: 119). The idea of a time ordered matrix resonates with

existing systematic process analysis methods in historical institutionalism (Sewell 1996; Hall 2006; Hall and Taylor 1996; Ganz 2000; Bennett and Checkel 2012) and process analysis in organizational strategy research (Langley 1999). I will now describe how initial division SD's occupations shaped its bricolage against the threats it faced.

Findings

I hypothesize that bricolage will be successful when (a) there are open political opportunities and (b) people collaborate across occupations during those political opportunities. In this first section of my findings, I provide a look into the occupational divisions within SD, which initially prevented collaboration. In this division, the real estate department exclusively led the process of development. As a result of their exclusive control, SD was unable at first to adapt to new political threats.

How Occupational Divisions Shaped Saxton Developer's Initial Strategy

The real estate and community organizing groups have clear boundaries. These organizational boundaries shaped community organizing's participation in the strategic process, thus shaping the form of bricolage used. Each of the interviewees mentioned the boundaries between the two, demonstrating that these differences play an important part in the cultural understanding of the organization's daily life.

Actors of both the real estate department (RED) and community organizing (CO) department recognized this division. For instance, Jason, the director of RED, commented, "On our housing projects, we usually took the lead and organizing played a secondary role." Michelle, a community organizer, also concurred, "There's this subtle culture of secrecy. I can't put my finger on it. We just report things to each other, but don't really fill each other on the

process of what's going on." These perceptions illustrated that even SD, a relatively small

organization with common goals, experiences occupational boundaries within the organization.

Furthermore, these boundaries dictated each group's scope of legitimate work. When

asked about what it is like when CO and RED interact with each other, Molly, the director of

CO, pointed out the differences between the two scripts:

> A lot of the difference is in process. Real Estate has a certain timeline. Checklists. Ours is true community involvement, which requires more time and meetings, which can throw off their timeline. They're dealing with money. We deal with people. For developers, it would be easier to, yes, have a community process, but to curtail it. 'Here's some plans; do you like it or not?' We [as CO] don't want the community to just sign-off, but to shape more of what happens.

Here, Molly contrasted the tactic of working with people with the tactic of dealing with money.

She discussed how real estate couldn't do what the organizers do.

Jason, as the director of RED, concurred with Molly's observations, providing a

viewpoint from the other side. He drew a boundary about who legitimately can lead the

development process.

> Organizers look at what does the community wants or needs. Real Estate looks at that too, but we also have to look at what we can actually do. We're subject to tax credit programs and Section 8 regulations. I'll give you a perfect example. Today, we were talking about a piece of property, Star Market off Broadway. While organizers were talking about what to do with this property, I thought, 'Great, but it's owned by a private developer. You're probably not gonna get very far with him.' I mean, they're obviously gonna try and it's important. But I don't think there will ever be a real estate project because of the way that it works out.

Jason emphasized RED's ability to deal with practicalities, while CO appeared to act

idealistically. In this case, community organizers discussed an object typically in his domain: a

piece of property. In reference to their approach to the development project, he hinted at the

community organizer's naiveté in trying to lead the process of real estate development.

CO's and RED's use of different tactics has also created political dilemmas. These dilemmas further divided the two occupations within the organization. RED's development projects are dependent on the city for funding. When CO provoked decision-makers through mobilization or protest, RED believed CO threatened the viability of its real estate projects, which funds the entire organization. For instance, all Real Estate respondents noted how one of CO's campaigns, "Jobs for Saxton" angered the mayor, a key decision-maker. Organizers sent postcards to the Mayor in support of affordable housing. In one meeting, the Mayor allegedly stood up from his desk and yelled loudly at SD members, berating them for their actions and promising political backlash. While acknowledging the work was important, Jason, for instance, argued that the Jobs campaign fell outside of SD's scope. Their role in keeping Saxton affordable was to develop housing, not to advocate for jobs, as the community organizers believed. By doing so, Jason challenged whether or not this work should be a part of SD's organizational identity.

Molly, the director of the CO, agreed that there are political consequences to what her group does. "There's a saying in development," Molly said with a smile, "Don't bite the hand that feeds you." Community organizers, in contrast to real estate developers, agitate and challenge city governments, which provide the very funding developers require. But she found such practices necessary if inequality, and the policies that sustain it, are to be challenged.

<u>Saxton's Three Initial Threats Illustrate the Insufficiency of Internal and External Factors in Explaining the Ability to Navigate Legal Regulation</u>

In this section, I demonstrate how this initial division of labor provides the organizational context for SD' strategic responses against the three first threats it faced in First and Second Ave. These three threats provide a slew of negative cases that allow us to examine the theories

reviewed earlier, demonstrating that internal and external factors alone are insufficient. In Threat 1, SD maintains occupational divisions and RED attempts to use a bricolage of occupational political strategies by bringing in technical and community resources. However, their efforts are unfruitful and criticisms against their project do not diminish. In Threat 2, these occupational cleavages dissolve temporarily so that CO collaborates with RED. The organization again uses technical and community resources, but the effort again remains unfruitful, linked to the rejection of the First Ave permit. In Threat 3, occupational cleavages return and RED again attempts to bring in technical and community resources, but threats simply continue to mount. See Figure 5 below.

	First Ave Project	Second Ave Project
Description	• 6-unit apartment complex • Targeted Low-income families within 80% of Area Median Income. • Located than less than half a mile away from Saxton Square.	• 45-unit apartment complex • Targeted Low-income (as designated by Saxton Housing Authority) Saxton residents who fall within 80% of Area Median Income. • Located less than half a mile away from Saxton Square.

Figure 5: Summary of First Ave versus Second Ave Projects

Threat 1: RED Used Bricolage Unsuccessfully

RED's Exclusive Strategic Control. As illustrated by the previous section on occupational divisions, the development process has been in the domain of RED, which exclusively led the First Avenue process. Indeed, in February 2011, RED won a bid from Saxton Homeless Coalition to build a 6-unit housing complex. The director, Jason, notes that they designed and sold their project as an environmental and social benefit for the community. It would be powered by solar panels and would only house homeless families.

RED's Bricolage within an Open Political Opportunity. Developers organize a technical forum with community input – a well-developed strategy among real estate developers. They bring together their technical capacity, but also draw in community residents to gain their support around their proposed development.

Due to the activation of the agency and the attention given by decision-makers and the media, this event likely qualifies as a political opportunity under Meyer and Minkoff's signal model. During this forum, RED invites local residents as well as aldermen and planning officials to comment on their proposal. Local media outlets also cover the event. In response to these comments, RED typically takes these comments to its architect and engineers and revises its proposal to meet community needs. Once these revisions have been implemented, RED typically can demonstrate community approval. With this approval, RED can stress its community involvement to legislative and bureaucratic officials. Utilizing these diverse political resources increases the likelihood of obtaining a permit to build the proposed development.

RED's perceptions about the use of the Planning Forum, a Political Opportunity. While the use of this political opportunity is an important part of RED's toolkit, RED's use of it has been to keep up a reputation and develop symbolic support. The CEO of SD, David, comments on these forums:

> [RED] relies on two things. First, generally being nice, transparent community-based guys. Two, just being able to give technical responses to questions and issues as they rise and work those through with people.

RED's perception and use of the forum was limited to a tool to increase their reputation and expedite the approval process by answering questions in a technical matter. While their use of the forum exhibits elements of bricolage – by bringing together technical expertise and public support – they maintain a perception of the forum as a site for reputation building, not mass

mobilization and political action. As we will note later, their perception and use of the forum changed with COD's involvement during Second Ave.

Outcome. However, this strategy failed, ultimately backfiring by creating more space for criticism. I call these opponents Threat 1. At this forum, it was a small minority of critics who vocalized parking, traffic, and density concerns. The forum also included one important group of decision-makers, aldermen, who resided over the wards in which SD built its developments. They criticized the density of the building RED proposed, even though it was within the zoning limits of the neighborhood. The critics cited that more units would increase traffic on an already highly congested street. RED took these criticisms seriously and interpreted them as a problem that could be overcome with their usual approach: technical revisions. Consulting with their architect, they increased the parking spots for the development to four spots. SD also increased the size of the parking lot so that cars would not back up into First Avenue, which is one of Saxton's busiest streets, and spark traffic problems.

Threat 2: Cross-occupational Collaboration Had Little Effect

Cross-occupational Collaboration. Despite their efforts, SD received notice about a possible permit rejection from the Zoning Board. CO initiated a small campaign to raise awareness. In response to this possibility, the two occupational groups collaborated through multiple internal staff meetings. Led by the community-organizing department, the organization discussed a variety of responses. Some directors, like Earl, the head of the real estate committee, wanted "to lick [their] wounds and just move on – why expend more energy and make more enemies?" Others wanted to sue the city. The participants finally agreed to use the possible rejection to expand SD's message about the affordable housing crisis. Focusing on their message, Molly explains, meant that they would hold the aldermen and planning board

accountable. Specifically, they generated public awareness about their failure to support homeless prevention and highlight the affordable housing crisis in Saxton.

Bricolage In a Closed Political Opportunity. By the time CO got involved, however, the development forums had ended and the board was about to make a decision. In response, SD created an affordable housing forum and protested in front of city hall. The signal model likely will not characterize this as a political opportunity due to the absence of official attention and agency activation -- the official commenting period was closed.

Despite this closed political opportunity, SD blended several strategies. First, SD used mobilization tactics to rally in front of city hall for several days in light of the possible rejection. While four newspaper articles were written about the event, the coverage dropped immediately after the first day. The Zoning Board rejected their proposal, citing overwhelming community opposition and density concerns. Earl pointed out that "things got weird" at the end, with four aldermen increasingly voicing dissatisfaction with the project. Sean, one alderman, criticized SD, saying "You don't go ahead and move forward on a project without talking to the people who have the pulse of the neighborhood." In direct response, SD blended technical and mobilization strategies to organize a forum for the city's aldermen, to expand their message. Created in collaboration with both real estate and community organizing, this forum highlighted an affordable housing crisis by inviting speakers to discuss recent findings about Saxton's housing price trends. SD organized a large number of residents to attend, while presenting technical reports and data to encourage aldermen to change their outlook on affordable housing. Again, SD attempted to bring in multiple resources from the technical side and the community side.

Outcome. This approach also failed. It failed to reverse the Zoning Board's ruling or substantially impact political opportunities. Reflecting on the forum, Molly recalls that only two

aldermen actually attended and left within the hour. Despite its new role in development, CO's community organizing strategy, in her mind, appeared to have little direct effect on the political situation.

Threat 3: RED Returns to Bricolage With Negative Results

RED's Exclusive Control and Resuming Bricolage Within an Open Political Opportunity. Despite this setback, SD continued to push forward on new projects. In this second case, RED again took exclusive control over the development process. Much like the first threat, this was a political opportunity because of official and media attention as well as the activation of the planning agency.

This time they developed a proposal for a multi-million dollar project: a 40-unit affordable housing unit I call Second Ave. SD reverted to the same practices as it did in First Ave. RED initiated and led the project exclusively. Without COD's involvement at the strategic level, they selected a site, designed a proposal, and organized a community process. RED invited local residents, aldermen, and planning officials to demonstrate their reputation and symbolic community involvement.

Outcome. Unfortunately for SD, the following events mirrored its experience with First Ave. Middle-class homeowners who were suspicious of the affordable housing development came to attend the community forum. They again criticized the development based on four common concerns: traffic, density, parking, and safety. Again, RED mirrored its technical approach in First Ave. It jotted down all of these concerns, promised to address them in its next iteration of the project proposal, and gave them to their contracted architects and engineers to incorporate.

<u>Cross-occupational Collaboration During Open Political Opportunities Led to Effective</u>

<u>Bricolage</u>

In my documentation of the final threat below, I show how SD again responded with

grassroots mobilization. This time, however, the mobilization occurred when the political

opportunity structure was open, that is, SD could still deploy bricolage of different occupational

strategies within the development forum to influence decision-makers and overcome opponents.

Internally, SD used this bricolage effectively because it collaborated, changed the perception of

the political opportunity's use, and deployed multiple resources within an open political

opportunity, the planning forum.

<u>Threat 4: Both Cross-occupational Collaboration and Bricolage with Community Organizing</u>

<u>Occurred within an Open Political Opportunity</u>

In December 2012, an organized group of business owners and homeowners, named

Saxton Rising (SR) vehemently challenged the development. Much like the first threat, this was

a political opportunity because the planning forum was still open. Officials and media were

paying attention, and the planning agency was activated.

It was the first time in SD's history that it ever faced *organized* opposition. Mary

recounts:

> The meeting was derailed by a mob of angry neighbors wearing red armbands, yelling
> and accusing David about how much money we'll make, or how much we will ruin the
> neighborhood by bringing more of 'those' people in. After one woman told the audience
> how she wanted but could not financially afford to live in Saxton with her fiancé, an
> angry man shouted, 'I want to live in Lincoln, but I can't, so maybe you should go
> somewhere else.' Others publicly criticized us for making a profit of the development.
> Others charged that David made a 6-figure salary, which is untrue. Even the aldermen in
> presence seemed to take side with the angry neighbors. In organizer's parlance, we lost
> that night.

Mary reflects how SD staff felt overwhelmed and caught off guard. SR's hostility shut down the meeting. Right after First Ave, SR's negative reaction and their lack of a response shook the organization's foundations. In development, the community feedback process is a central moment that proves to decision-makers that local residents are invested and support the project. This mass mobilization against the project struck a major blow to the project's political feasibility.

Cross-occupational Collaboration. During Second Ave, RED again took the reins around the development process despite its past failure. However, community organizing interrupted their exclusive control much more quickly. Community organizing participated on a strategic level within three months of Second Ave's initial proposal, compared to nearly seven months later for First Ave. While these absolute times are important, what is more important is COD's involvement within the open political opportunity structure. Keep in mind the development process had not yet ended. The planning board's verdict was to come many months from now.

During this collaboration, all interviewees recall a new informal work team within the organization to coordinate their resources and plan their response together. Reflecting on RED's and CO's partnership, Catherine, the assistant director of Real Estate, discusses the relationship between the two departments after Saxton Square Rising's appearance:

> Our relationship is more cohesive now since this campaign, Everyone's Saxton, came out. We held joint meetings in both departments saying, 'We were blind sighted.' The organizing department came up with the idea of Everyone's Saxton and brochures. Jason and I reviewed all the content. They organized the company that did the website, but we had the budget to see if it all works.

Previously, the two departments would consult each other on an ad-hoc basis. Now, the two worked as part of a team to strategize their response within the development process. Both departments had specific, yet interdependent roles. Community organizing initiated outreach

ideas, while real estate department came up with the facts and held the money to fund these ideas. The work team created the internal organizational context for the successful application of the community organizer's mass mobilization within a technical forum.

New Perceptions about the Political Opportunity. Importantly, the team reconceptualized their understanding of their imminent planning forum. Whereas in Highland the planning forum was a ritual way to get basic community support and regulatory approval, RED and CO leaders saw the planning forum as a tool to influence city decision-makers. Their understanding of the opportunity shaped their bricolage. As Jason explains:

> With CO, we realized the goal is to move this conversation away, as in the past, from just general affordable housing support in general and toward improving our building. We will use the process to keep our level of support, convert neutrals, and mitigate hostile leaders and residents. Unlike before, we've given our supporters red T-shirts to signal unity and met with them 1-on-1 before the meeting. We let opponents know through the process that they know we're not going away.

Infused with the ideas from community organizing, real estate changed how to examine their routine political opportunity. Indeed, attention to the process itself helped them consider how to use the space to advance support for the project and a signal to decision-makers that SD's efforts to gather support would continue indefinitely. As we see, this reconceptualization aided their future efforts, created sustained attention on decision-makers, and led to perceptions about SD's political advantage.

Use of Bricolage During an Open Political Opportunity. In response to this threat several months later in March 2012, SD blended technical presentations with grassroots mobilization *within* the development forum. As I recall, the meeting was extremely polarized. "Are you for or against?" A woman with an orange Saxton Square Rising sticker asked as soon as I stepped into the lobby, which rumbled with chatter behind her.The board of aldermen and planning officials

sat apart from the audience behind a long oak table. Every seat was taken. People lined the far right and left walls, sitting on the ground to watch the presentations. I joined the group at the left wall and glanced out at the audience. Even a newcomer could tell the room was starkly divided. On the left block of chairs were Saxton Square Rising supporters, with their red stickers on their jackets, shirts, and sweaters. On the right block were SD supporters, who donned their dark blue T-shirts and neon stickers. But SD supporters were the majority. They not only sat in the chairs, but they also crowded in groups near the walls and the backdoor. I counted approximately 83 in support of SD and 54 in support of Saxton Square Rising. SD clearly out-organized SR this round.

The meeting started with SD's proposal. When Jason stood up to talk, he opened up a powerpoint presentation with a large list of changes the team had made in response to SR's previous criticisms. He handed the microphone to the architect, who presented graphics illustrating the building's modern design. The traffic engineer then stood up to present his research over the past couple of months. His team counted the number of cars that passed through the neighborhood. Using this data, he projected that traffic would not increase significantly. Amidst his presentation, I saw SR supporters shaking their heads.

Now it was time for public comment. This was when opponents typically smashed SD's new housing proposals. This time SD came prepared. They trained community leaders to speak in favor of the proposal. They also arranged for translators so that Portuguese and Spanish residents could speak in their native tongues. SD leaders nabbed the first few slots. They spoke passionately in favor of diversity and against rising housing prices. After their speeches, SD supporters cheered and clapped loudly. SD supporters were speaking more at the podium, while SR supporters peppered their comments between every few SD supporters.

Outcomes within the Meeting. Toward the end of the meeting, in contrast to their tone in the previous meeting in December, SR supporters, such as Ashley, spoke cautiously during the public comments section.

> I think everyone should have the right to live there. We came off wrong. Knowledge is power – we need more to understand this. A lot of us are confused right now, and rightfully so.

After the comment, SD members clapped loudly and SR members were silent. As a SR supporter, Ashley's comment clearly upset the divisive comments of the previous speakers.

Aldermen, too, acted differently, shifting their tone. Bruce, for instance, actively spoke out in support. He shared a personal story after the public comments.

> I've had kids that I've raised in the city looking for affordable apts. My son and wife looked for apartments on First Avenue. They can't afford their own home.

Other aldermen emphasized how objections should be incorporated, instead of highlighting how the project still could be blocked if necessary.

Finally, a major local newspaper, the Saxton Scout, ran two guest editorials from SD supporters. Both highlighted the desperate need for affordable housing in the area and the importance the Second Ave project would play into that. The Scout ran a public poll that asked how people felt about the 181 Project. Out of 316 participants, 81% were in support, while 17% were against. The poll demonstrated major public support for SD's efforts. With this mobilization, SD was able to start turning the tide against their opposition.

In line with their reconceptualization of the political opportunity, SD initiated several more community forums. Each time, they mobilized a large group of supporters, while SR's supporters dwindled. As Jason notes in future meetings: "They didn't have as many supporters as before, and didn't have much to say. They didn't expect our mobilizations to happen and we

were able to address their concerns about height to a certain extent." The forum became a tool to

show decision-leaders that SD supporters were 'here to stay.' Indeed, in contrast to one-time

media coverage in First Ave, these efforts led to sustained media coverage about the project

across the next year.

Perceptions about the SD's Bricolage. The real estate department, the leaders of the local

opposition, and a swing voter on the planning committee all point to the critical role of SD's

ability to blend community mobilization with its technical negotiations. Bricolage worked with

the right occupational actors taking ownership of the strategy and it occurred within an open

political opportunity. Jason, the director of Real Estate, reflects on COD's organizing ability:

> At the beginning we floundered a little bit. We didn't have Mary [the housing community organizer] involved. We mostly ran the show. In Second Ave, that worked terribly. Supportive folks poorly attended the first couple of meetings. We had a lot of opposition. So we learned from that that, organizing has a good role in development.

Jason, too, points out how RED "ran the show" during the beginning of the Second Ave project,

which led to negative consequences for their project. Without the organizing group, the real

estate group was not able to rely on simple goodwill to draw supportive members. Instead, the

open process drew hostile members who overshadowed 'supportive folks.' By coordinating with

the organizing department and using their mobilization tactics, SD was able to better influence

decision-makers.

Jim, an SR founder and organizer, described how SD's organizing of the grassroots

public influenced Aldermen's perceptions about their voters:

> Unfortunately, it's very hard to get many of our supporters to come out to city hall. Even though SD's support in Saxton Square is far less, they draw on the whole city. So, their ability to call in the other side of town and have 100 people show up, makes a very big difference, especially since a lot of the Aldermen are not out here in Saxton Square everyday. It was also unfair. They got to present new building material in the meeting for the first hour. We didn't get that chance.

He perceives that SD's ability to leverage grassroots support, even though these supporters may not all be from Saxton Square, as a huge advantage. To Jim, as their opponent, SD's ability to create an impression of support is especially important to the Aldermen, who are one of the key decision-makers in the development process.

Finally, Mike, the planning committee members who changed his vote in favor of SD's project, comments on SD's ability to mix in both technical ability and community capacity.

> In a negotiation that's good, someone is going to feel screwed. But what more could I have asked for? Saxton got back to me and met the parking requirements, cut some units, and also clearly has much support.

Mike's point helps us better understand when a mix of strategies could help. RED's casual use of community input, as Jason notes above, hurt them. However, when they included grassroots mobilization with technical alterations, SD influenced this swing voter who felt SD had effectively gained both public and technical support.

Implications: How Cross-Occupational Collaboration Within an Open Opportunity Led to Effective Bricolage

So why did the bricolage work this time and not before? As Figure 6 illustrates, a key difference between SD's mobilization in Second Avenue and First Avenue was that political opportunities were still open. The development forum, a site for decision-making and planning, was still open for access. In the failure of First Ave, SD's mobilization occurred when the political process was already closed. The really happened in front of City Hall. No aldermen or zoning officials attended. Similarly, SD attempted to influence aldermen by creating their own educational forum. But without the incentives of a pressing development proposal, only a couple of supportive aldermen briefly stopped by.

Collaboration or Division | **Bricolage of Professional Strategies** | **Outcome**

First Ave

T1 — Feb '10 — Real Estate led (no Organizing) → Technical Alterations, community input → Continued Criticism (Failure)
Political Opportunity Open (Development Forum and proposal in process)

T2 — Sept '10 — Organizing led collaboration → Mobilization, educational forum → No Impact (Failure)
Political Opportunity Closed (No development forum or proposal in process)

Second Ave

T3 — Oct '11 — Real Estate led (no organizing) → Technical Alterations, community input → Continued Criticism (Failure)
Political Opportunity Open (Development Forum and proposal in process)

T4 — Dec '11 — Organizing led collaboration → Mobilization, technical alterations, community input → Drop-off Opposition, Support (Success)
*Political Opportunity Open (Development Forum and proposal in process)*

Figure 6: Time ordered matrix with layer that shows open or closed opportunities for all four threats

Furthermore, internal occupational divisions prevented the use of community mobilization earlier. Actors initially accepted that the real estate department handled the planning and construction of the organization's development projects. This foreclosed the possibility that community organizers would be prepared, which is evident from Molly comments:

> When we did get wind of the fact that [First Ave] might not go through, we did a push and a rally to get our people out. But it was too little, too late. It was a wake-up call. Real Estate always has projects in its timeline. We realize we can't even take small projects for granted. It helps to work with the community ahead of time.

From her comments, we can tell that real estate is always working on a stream of projects, the details of which the organizing department is not always aware. Furthermore, this lack of attention led to a late start. The organizing department delegated responsibility to the real

estate department. Only when failure became imminent did community organizers realized that they should participate.

<u>Implications for Reviewed Theories</u>

First, the cases confirm past work, showing us that bricolage of professions' political strategies is not sufficient for success. RED attempted to bring in both the grassroots public, by inviting community residents who have voting power, and technical and economic resources, by proposing a development project that could renew a struggling area of the neighborhood. The strategy simply opened up more criticism against their project. The effectiveness of this technique does not change in the later case. Indeed, in Second Ave, we see RED attempting to use the same technique, leading to the same result: more criticism and eventually community mobilization against the project itself. Community organizers also attempted to bring together multiple strategies simultaneously. They used a rally and an educational forum featuring technical matters, inviting housing policy experts, advocates, and aldermen to attend. However, unlike the success of the environmental activists in using this technique during the NAFTA negotiations in Evans and Kays' account, SD perceived its forum to have little direct impact.

The events also allow us to show that neither cross-occupational collaboration nor open political opportunities alone are sufficient explanations. On the first, Kellogg (2010) argues that this collaboration creates collective efficacy and ultimately strategic advantage against one's opponents. In the case provided, we also see that such collaboration is insufficient for a positive outcome. The two professions came together to strategize in response to the failure, yet their efforts had little direct impact on the rejection and the buy-in from the aldermen and planning board. On the second, we see that open political opportunities, as manifested through open

forms, were present in Threat 1 and Threat 2. Yet, these opportunities simply led to more opposition against their proposed projects.

I also argue that differences in elite or public opposition do not sufficiently explain the cases drawn here. Scholars might argue that more elite or public support during Second Ave allowed SD to win. Yet, the composition of the neighborhood did not significantly change. Nor did the aldermen and planning and zoning officials who were in power. In fact, SD during Second Ave actually faced the most public opposition and official dissatisfaction it had ever received in its history. Despite this, SD obtained a positive outcome through its bricolage. Therefore, it is unlikely that differences in elite or public opposition is the sole lever that explained SD's positive outcome.

Next, one might argue that the failure of First Ave directly explains the success of Second Ave. Hostile community members and officials may have lost their steam, so to speak. After rejecting the first proposal, they may have gotten complacent with the second. This is an unlikely explanation, however, as outward opposition only increased over time. Despite this renewed energy, SD maintained its political advantage during Second Avenue.

Discussion and Conclusion

One research question guided this study: When is bricolage effective? I hypothesize that bricolage will be successful when (a) there are open political opportunities and (b) people collaborate across occupations during those political opportunities. The model brings attention to occupational modus operandi within the organization and how this shapes the organizational context for actors to perceive threats and formulate solutions. This modus operandi can exclude or include certain actors in the strategic process. When certain actors are included, the team can

perceive and use political opportunities in new ways. This thus shapes the form of bricolage used and the political advantages one may gain through a regulatory process.

Furthermore, the model demonstrates how open political opportunities provide the context for new strategies to be received. Certain opportunities provide direct access to decision-makers, such as aldermen, and planning officials. They grant permits and approve how to allocate resources in the neighborhood. Yet, these opportunities open up vulnerabilities, by opening access to opposition groups who can shut down these meetings and harm the entrepreneur's efforts in front of decision-makers. By linking the two processes together, I formulate a more cohesive understanding of how bricolage may be generated and how bricolage interacts with the outside environment.

My model also contributes to bricolage by examining how actors who are *not* at the regulatory fringes can enact bricolage. While Baker and Nelson (2005) specifically examine ventures that discard laws in order to enact bricolage, I look at a venture that is enmeshed in regulation. These actors can enact effective bricolage under certain conditions. Thus, I propose another condition of bricolage that Baker and Nelson (2005) did not fully discuss: collaboration across occupational groups. An understanding of this internal dynamic links with Rao's concern that 'there is little research on how actors creatively tinker with techniques from rival categories infused with competing logics' (2005: 987).

An understanding of this internal dynamic also has implications for opportunity recognition, another key concept in entrepreneurship research (Philips and Tracey 2007). As SD integrated both CO and RED into its strategy, SD reconceptualized an opportunity it already knew. The implication, then, is not just about recognizing opportunities, but also about *how* one recognizes an opportunity and how one perceives the utility of that opportunity. In SD's case,

RED followed Greenwood's (2002) claims about institutional entrepreneurs who question the utility of dominant practices about real estate development.

My findings also have implications for institutional theory. Organizational research tends to focus on the primacy of internal dynamics, such as collaborations, or skills such as leadership and creativity. Institutional research tends to focus on the primacy of institutional pressures, which largely determine organizational responses. This study suggests that it is critical to understand how organizational and contextual levels of analysis interact.

Thus, to better understand organizational strategy, a researcher might explore these two levels of analysis. First, on an organizational level, the researcher could explore competing ideas and interests within organizations. Second, the researcher could link these competing ideas and interests to the outside contexts in which the organizations commit its work. The study thus enriches institutional theory with a notion central to Hedstrom and Swedberg's (1998: 19) notion of a specific kind of social mechanism: the micro-macro link, or the transformational mechanism. The occupational collaborations within are transformed into a collective bricolage, whose effects can, at least temporarily, shift political patterns against affordable housing in the community.

Finally, my findings have implications for the study of urban inequality. In line with existing efforts to bring in organizational theory to the study of cities (Sampson 2012; MacQuarrie and Marwell 2009; Patillo 2007; Small 2006; Levine 2013), I place my focus on the regulatory dynamics that influence how resource are allocated in cities through urban development. Increased income and racial segregation flow from the decisions of these legal processes, as officials approve the location of luxury, market-rate, and low-income housing. As my findings demonstrate, not all organizations are equally effective at navigating these

regulations – even the same organization, like SD, can lose and win projects. In political contests, some organizations can negotiate their internal diversity and obtain advantage over their competitors, thus shaping the future of that neighborhood. My work thus offers another possible process, in addition to deficits in capital and job opportunities, which shape neighborhood stratification (Wilson 1990; Wilson 2009). This process is the unequal distribution of organizations that can effectively strategize to overcome their competitors and navigate institutions. Future questions can arise out of this discussion. For instance, how do internal dynamics relate to inter-organization collaborations in the city and how does this shape bricolage and advantage?

Limitations and Future Research

The research has inherent limitations, all of which are opportunities to extend the analysis further. For one, it is a case study of a single organization. Although I created multiple comparisons through the use of multiple events, the setting is still specific to one organization and the institutional context of development. This limits its generalizability. Future research could utilize surveys to randomly sample across a wider variation of social enterprises to discern their use of bricolage. Additionally, surveys could potentially measure success differently, without using the crude measure of good result or negative result, as I have done. Unfortunately, my sense is that no such survey exists, which is why qualitative research was used in this case. Furthermore, regardless of research method, I would propose that we study whether mechanisms I identify could operate in different contexts that have multiple occupational groups, such as a financial firm or government agency. The case selection method also could be transported to different contexts. Selecting the cases based on "independent variable", such as the potential to

use multiple strategies and collaborate across positions, is useful in stemming bias, even though this increases the risk of null findings.

In my model, I have focused on political outcomes, bracketing the mechanisms that lead to collaboration or division. Given that occupational collaboration or division is critical, future research could better examine the factors that lead to collaboration or division and how these connect to strategic outcomes. For instance, Battilana and Dorado (2012) study how microfinance organizations bring together occupations from commercial and community backgrounds by utilizing hiring and human resource policies that build a coherent organizational culture.[6] Okhuysen and Bechky (2009) list several conditions, such as accountability and predictability, which facilitate coordination in organizations. However, few have connected these to external strategic outcomes, though some work in the institutional logics literature has pointed in that direction (Pache and Santos 2010, 2012).

I enumerate several scope conditions for my theory. The theory may apply to social enterprises – with business and organizing functions – that navigate regulations. While development is the site of one field, organizations in healthcare, pharmaceuticals, neighborhoods, and Federal civil rights commissions all must get approval from decision-making bodies. Furthermore, the regulatory process may need to involve the public and/or the media. These two aspects are important for the signal model of political opportunities. My proposed mechanism is also relevant for social enterprises, which often employ multiple occupations. When occupations collaborate shape an organization's ability to invent new actions and influence decision-makers in new ways. Finally, the organization is relatively well-established,

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[6] Rich discussions across various literatures already exists on this question (see: Kellogg 2009; Gray and Wood 1991; Battilana and Dorado 2012; Lawrence and Lorsch 1967)

having been around for 30 years. As a result, these mechanisms may not apply to very new organizations.

My findings have more general implications for researchers, who wish to develop testable hypotheses and deepen their understanding about how organizational dynamics can influence political outcomes. Practically, my findings also inform how organizations can not only empower and allocate resources for the most marginalized groups in our cities, but also increase their profit and performance. Developers are a primary actor in building cities by engaging in a complex regulatory process. Thus, the lessons drawn from this case can inform how other organizations, from healthcare companies to local neighborhood associations, can better engage their regulatory regimes that moderate their success.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

The goal of this dissertation has been to contribute to a shift in our understanding of how cross-occupational collaborations form. Whereas prior research has importantly highlighted the role of cross-occupational structures in shaping outcomes, the chapters in this dissertation advance our understanding of collaboration process -- in particular, the variety of practices actors use to meet, build trust with, and strategize with people from different occupations. As detailed in the preceding chapters, findings from these studies contribute to research on: (1) cross-occupational collaborations; (2) social movements theory; and (3) urban sociology.

Themes

The dissertation also points to several promising directions for future research. Here, I highlight three themes that might motivate future work.

The practices of entrepreneurial networking

This dissertation -- for instance, the first chapter on how founders meet actors from different occupations -- only scratched the surface of how entrepreneurs build relationships. It builds on Vissa's (2010) work on entrepreneurial networking. Further work in this vein could illuminate additional basic questions. Who is more likely to use specific kinds of network deepening or broadening practices? When are certain practices more effective in building relationships across divides? Such insights might help entrepreneurs and other relationship-builders better navigate divides between occupations and activate sources of innovation.

Trust-formation practices

This dissertation -- for instance, the second chapter on how actors build trust amidst cross-occupational collaboration -- only scratched the surface of how entrepreneurs build relationships. It builds on Bjerregard's (2010) work trust-formation practices. Further work in

this vein could illuminate additional basic questions. Who is more likely to use specific kinds of screening and testing practices? When are certain practices more effective in building trust amidst cross-occupational collaborations? Such insights might help entrepreneurs and other relationship-builders better navigate divides between occupations and activate sources of innovation.

<u>More causal explanation and hypothesis testing.</u>

This dissertation primarily used qualitative methods to uncover mechanisms that connect how actors build new relationships or build trust with people from different occupations. Through case comparison and process tracing, my studies hint at the link between the number of practices illuminated and the outcome of trust and effectiveness. Yet none of these studies allow for causal identification of these effects. To overcome these issues, I see the potential utility of obtaining large-n observational data. Large-n observational data might be obtained by conducting a large-scale study of entrepreneurs and how they formed their networks.

Scope Conditions

I also provide scope conditions that apply to my three chapters. These scope conditions derive from specific characteristics of my sample.

<u>Chapter 2</u>

Broadening and deepening strategies I discuss do not capture the full universe of strategies founders may use. There are several scope conditions to be aware of. First, as discussed in the methods section, my founders were overwhelmingly students and recent graduates in coastal metropolitan areas, part of accelerator programs, and were building startups for the first time. Furthermore, as the case material suggests, building cross-occupational ties did

not come easily for these founders. Many struggled to build relationships and some even failed to do so in the end. As a result, these practices cannot be generalized beyond this sample.

It is important to note, for instance, that these practices may not be generalizable to other groups of entrepreneurs. One group might be highly-experienced or networked entrepreneurs, such as family entrepreneurs, entrepreneurs who build spin-offs from existing companies, or serial entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs in these groups may have access to long-standing cross-occupational ties built over previous collaborations. In these cases, screening and testing, as discussed in the second chapter, may be a more salient issue.

Chapter 3

I enumerate several scope conditions important to this study's discussion of screening and testing. This study focused on collaborators with similar financial resources and status. These were moderately-sized nonprofits accredited by national organizations. While focus on this critical population sharpens the focus on strategies, it is a limitation as well. Extremely wealthy CDFIs were not studied, and they may approach cross-occupational relationships in different ways from my sample. Additionally, though this study did not detect systematic differences based on other variants such as race or gender, it is conceivable that different strategies would manifest differently among CDFIs that are all African American or CDFIs with all male staff would use different strategies. (see Bosick et al. 2012).

Chapter 4

I enumerate several scope conditions for my theory of cross-occupational collaborations and political opportunities. The theory may apply to well-established and local social enterprises – with business and organizing functions – that navigate regulations. While development is the site of one field, organizations in healthcare, pharmaceuticals, neighborhoods, and Federal civil

rights commissions all must get approval from decision-making bodies. Furthermore, the regulatory process may need to involve the public and/or the media. These two aspects are important for the signal model of political opportunities. My proposed mechanism is also relevant for social enterprises, which often employ multiple occupations. When occupations collaborate shape an organization's ability to invent new actions and influence decision-makers in new ways. Finally, the organization is relatively well-established, having been around for 30 years. As a result, these mechanisms may not apply to very new organizations.

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