The Essential Role of Simultaneous Interventions in African Civil Conflict Resolution Efforts

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The Essential Role of Simultaneous Interventions in Civil Conflict Resolution Efforts

A dissertation presented

by

Dana Lynn Higgins

to

The Department of Government

in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in the subject of
Political Science

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The Essential Role of Simultaneous Interventions in Civil Conflict Resolution Efforts

Abstract

In an age of collective responsibility, even the most well-intentioned third parties are faced with an impossible choice between the consequences of complacency or the uncertainty of intervention to resolve civil conflicts. When faced with these situations and the desire to act, international actors need an answer to the question of how. Despite the frequency of third party interventions, very little if anything is understood about the interaction between the efforts, which begs the question: how do conflict resolution efforts affect each other in reducing the amount of violence in conflict? Further, what factors or design characteristics are more effective in specific intervention environments? And finally, are certain combinations of actors or intervention types more or less successful in managing conflict?

This project begins to tackle these complex questions by evaluating simultaneous third-party resolution efforts in civil conflicts and the levels of violence following an intervention. The first chapter suggests a new perspective on conflict resolution: simultaneous interventions. The concept of simultaneous interventions is defined as multiple conflict resolution efforts overlapping in time and compared to relevant concepts in the literature, such as multiparty efforts and sequential interventions. Then a theoretical framework is proposed
for understanding how simultaneous interventions affect conflict dynamics, suggesting that they will be more successful in mitigating and resolving violence. Simultaneous conflict resolution efforts are expected to be more successful on average by increasing the input of resources dedicated to conflict resolution, increasing the diversity of skills and experience, and increasing the efficiency of efforts by reducing costs.

The second chapter explores the new perspective of simultaneous interventions empirically, highlighting the potential for uncovering new knowledge in already studied areas of conflict resolution. First, the trends and patterns of simultaneous conflict resolution efforts over time and across different civil conflicts are discussed to illustrate how these interventions occur in practice. An initial look at the effectiveness – or lack thereof as the evidence shows – of simultaneous interventions in mitigating violence is included. Second, the relationship between simultaneous efforts and levels of violence is considered in a broader context, including other intervention characteristics and conflict settings such as levels of violence before the intervention. The types of conflict resolution considered in this project are also detailed and the variations in how simultaneous interventions interact across types is considered.

The third chapter introduces a new concept made possible by the perspective of simultaneous conflict resolution efforts: coordinated interventions. First, the concept of coordination is defined for the literature more broadly and then specifically for this project as common actor involvement. Second, a theoretical framework of how coordinated simultaneous interventions are more efficient in implementing conflict resolution than uncoordinated efforts is proposed. Coordinated interventions reduce competition by coordinating goals and utilize the advantages of division of labor by coordinating implementation. Third, the implementation and consequences of coordinated efforts in practice is explored. After a brief consideration of the patterns of coordination over time and across conflicts, the effectiveness of coordinated and simultaneous efforts in reducing levels of violence in a conflict
is considered in context of intervention characteristics and specific conflict settings.

Finally, the concluding chapter summarizes the main findings and contributions of this project. As the goal is to inspire a new perspective of conflict resolution efforts, this chapter details an extensive research agenda, extending both the theoretical and empirical development of simultaneous and coordinated interventions.
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As this project is the culmination of my graduate work and a transition point in my life, I cant help but think of future generations of brilliant minds - in particular, my nephews: Hollis, Nolan, and Benjamin. I can only hope that they will one day read this project and say to themselves, “I can do better.” I hope future scholars are inspired to do more and tackle the hard questions. I owe special thanks and so much more to my partners, Amy and Bryan, who have been an incredible source of support and encouragement. Their presence has been the shelter in a storm of stressful writing marathons and seemingly never-ending hurdles. They kept me supplied with food - more Caesar salads and Jaffa cakes than I can count - and hugs as needed. I am so fortunate to have them as constant proof that it is possible to finish and to be able to benefit from their wisdom of doing it. Their love and support made this project possible.

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Thank you to the countless people in my life - family, friends, teachers, mentors, and colleagues - who have helped me along the way. I hope to one day repay the favor.
Chapter 1

Multiple Interventions as a Fact of Life for Conflict Resolution Efforts

Despite the decline in outbreak of new civil conflicts in recent years, violent conflict remains a persistent and devastating problem facing the international community. As violence becomes entrenched in a region, external intervention becomes necessary. In an age of collective responsibility, even the most well-intentioned third parties are faced with an impossible choice between the consequences of complacency or the uncertainty of intervention. When faced with these situations and the desire to act, international actors need an answer to the question of how. Such interventions, aimed to at least prevent the escalation of conflict if not resolve the causes of fighting, are increasingly common.

For decades, scholars and practitioners have focused on the strategies and consequences of specific forms of conflict resolution. A large body of literature pulling from many fields of research – political science, law, economics, history, business, and more – searches for that answer by evaluating the success and failures of these different types. Setting aside

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1The data and code needed to replicate findings in this project can be found at Higgins (2019).
2Intervention and conflict resolution are used interchangeably throughout this project. Additionally, conflict resolution is used as a blanket term for conflict prevention, management, and resolution efforts.
differences between those considering conflict resolution an art form and those treating it as a science, the field has produced specific strategies and lessons generalizable to many settings, including violent conflict.

However, this extensive body of work only answers one part of the question of how to intervene. As conflict resolution efforts become increasingly common and failed attempts increasingly visible, a more detailed answer, beyond merely the type of action to be taken, is needed.

More specifically, modern scholarship on conflict resolution efforts should address the question of how to intervene in the context of other interventions. Citing examples such as multiparty mediation in Niger and cooperation among actors in Ivory Coast, scholars note that “there is rarely one single intervening force in armed conflicts” (Croicu et al. 2013, 21). To illustrate, the Burundi civil conflict had 274 mediation attempts alone. Over half of all mediation efforts in violent conflicts include at least two third-party interveners (Bhattarai 2016, 399), making multiple interventions “a fact of life in today’s world” (Crocker et al. 2001, 63). These numbers escalate quickly when considering additional actors and intervention types. The result is the “proliferation” of a strikingly diverse set of actors conducting a variety of resolution efforts in any given conflict (Hansen 2012, 237).

Unfortunately, as scholars, we know very little about how multiple conflict resolution efforts interact or affect the conflicts they attempt to resolve. Scholars too often treat conflict resolution efforts as if they were isolated or wholly independent (Diehl 2014, 489). The prevalence of multiple interventions in a conflict has created an urgent need for rigorous impact evaluation of interrelated conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and peacebuilding efforts (Nan & Strimling 2006, 4). And there is plenty of complexity to consider. Practitioners call for principles and concepts to guide best practices in a context of multiple actors, implementing different strategies in different conflict settings and different phases of conflict (Crocker et al. 2001, 64). This complexity has resulted in a mixed bag of success
and failure for conflict resolution efforts, which compels scholars to rigorously pursue the meaning of the lessons in recent decades of interventions.

Many international actors are interested in intervening to resolve civil conflicts. But these efforts are costly in terms of time and resources and the outcomes often highly uncertain. Despite the frequency of third party interventions, very little if anything is understood about the interaction between the efforts, which begs the question: how do conflict resolution efforts affect each other in reducing the amount of violence in conflict? Further, what factors or design characteristics are more effective in specific intervention environments? And finally, are certain combinations of actors or intervention types more or less successful in managing conflict?

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Finally, the concluding chapter summarizes the main findings and contributions of this project. As the goal is to inspire a new perspective of conflict resolution efforts, this chapter details an extensive research agenda, extending both the theoretical and empirical development of simultaneous and coordinated interventions.
Chapter 2

A New Perspective on Conflict Resolution: Simultaneous Interventions

2.1 Defining Simultaneous as Multiple Interventions that Overlap in Time

The peace process of resolving any conflict is dauntingly complex and seemingly intractable theoretically. However, effectively evaluating conflict resolution efforts and identifying the implications third-party interventions have for peace requires confronting this complexity. This project begins to unpack one aspect of complexity: multiple conflict resolution efforts occurring in the same conflict in the same time period, referred to as simultaneous interventions.

To avoid merely adding another disconnected consideration of specific types of conflict resolution efforts to an already disjointed field, this project suggests a framework of in-
tervention contexts defined by number of actors, number of interventions, and time (see Figure 2.1). As a step towards characterizing conflict resolution efforts by the context of interventions, this framework introduces a new perspective on multiple interventions and also positions such contexts relative to other concepts currently addressed in conflict resolution literature. Out of necessity, existing theories generally address one of the intervention contexts – as does this project – or fail to specify the applicable context. This framework suggests a basis of comparison between these seemingly disparate theories and highlights areas needing more theoretical and empirical attention by scholars.

Despite rarely being directly considered, simultaneous interventions are not a completely new concept to the conflict resolution field. Particularly within studies of mediation, discussions of parallel or multitrack diplomacy refer implicitly simultaneous interventions. Additionally, third parties conducting a specific intervention in a conflict may determine it is necessary to diversify their actions and initiate simultaneous conflict resolution efforts of another type. For instance, thorough interviews with peacekeepers from the United States and Canada revealed that more than half of the peacekeepers interviewed were also conducting low-level mediations between the disputants [Wall Jr & Druckman 2003]. These examples also demonstrate that simultaneous interventions may be conducted by the same actor and may involve the same type of intervention. The important distinction of the simultaneous intervention context is that multiple distinct efforts in a conflict overlap in time.

2.1.1 Comparing Solitary and Simultaneous: One versus Multiple Efforts

The simplest intervention context is that of a single actor conducting a single conflict resolution effort in a solitary intervention\(^1\) however, solitary interventions are frequently

\(^1\)See Figure 2.1 for an illustrative diagram
Simultaneous
Note: more than one actor may be involved in each intervention

\[
\text{Acton}_1 \quad \text{Acton}_2
\]
\[
\text{Intervention}_{1,t} \quad \text{Intervention}_{2,t}
\]

Solitary
\[
\text{Acton}_1
\]
\[
\text{Intervention}_{1,t}
\]

Multiparty
\[
\text{Acton}_1 \quad \text{Acton}_2
\]
\[
\text{Intervention}_{1,t}
\]

Figure 2.1: Types of Intervention Contexts: Simultaneous and others

defined relative to the other intervention contexts. For instance, solitary interventions are conducted by a single actor compared to multiparty interventions which are conducted by multiple actors. Alternatively, a solitary intervention is a single effort compared to the sequential intervention context which is defined by multiple efforts over time. As this project focuses on simultaneous interventions, the solitary intervention context refers to a single intervention – conducted by one or more actors – in a given time period compared to multiple efforts at a time.

One important distinction is between a single intervention by a composite actor and multiple interventions by related actors. Interventions by composite actors - such as an ad hoc or institutionalized coalition of states - are distinct from simultaneous interventions by multiple actors (Böhmelt 2011, 862). International organizations, for instance, are single actors. Thus, the member states contributing to a United Nations mission are part of a solitary intervention by a composite actor rather than each conducting a distinct intervention in the conflict resulting in a set of simultaneous interventions. Further, although 98%
of the African Unions budget comes from international actors - primarily the United States and European Union (Crocker 2016, 266) - these actors are not conducting a simultaneous intervention whenever an AU mission occurs. In other words, actors providing support to third-party interveners - financial, operational and technical, institutional capacity building, or political support - are not inherently considered as distinct interveners themselves (Sanghrajka & Preston-McGhie 2016, 278).

2.1.2 Multiparty Interventions as Multiple Actors Conducting One Effort

Slightly more complex conceptually and significantly more complex practically, the multiparty intervention context can be considered an extension of the solitary intervention context. Both are characterized by a single effort, differing only in the number of actors involved. As Figure 2.1 details, the multiparty intervention context is defined by the presence of multiple actors. However, contrasting with simultaneous interventions which are characterized by multiple distinct efforts, these multiple actors conduct only a single effort in the multiparty intervention context.

Multiparty interventions are becoming increasingly common, particularly in violent conflicts and the growing instances of environmental conflict (O Leary et al. 2005, 183). Norway, for instance, makes a point to intervene to facilitate conflict resolution alongside non-governmental organizations and occasionally with other states or international organizations, as can be seen by the nation’s involvement in multiparty efforts in Central America, the Balkans, the Caucasus, Burundi, Sudan, Sri Lanka, and most famously in bringing about the Oslo Accords between Israel and Palestine (Egeland 1999, 541).

Though not inherently specific to any particular type of conflict resolution, the scope of multiparty interventions is limited in existing literature by “not consider[ing] all third
party peace-building activities” (Hansen 2012, 238). Moreover, literature on multiple actors conducting a single conflict resolution effort has “produced many contradictory claims about its effectiveness and overly derives its conclusions from single case studies” (Böhmelt 2011, 860). Instead of being used more inclusively, the multiparty or coalition concepts are generally applied to mediations and occasionally peace operations. Multinational Force missions (MNF) are also common examples of multiparty interventions. For example, Canada led a temporary multinational force in Eastern Zaire that included forces from countries in North America, South America, Europe, and Africa (Smith & Hay 1999, 96).

Distinguishing multiple simultaneous interventions by related actors from a single, complex intervention by a coalition or multiparty actor can be difficult in practice. For instance, in the Central African Republic, regional and international actors all intervened to resolve the conflict, but split to conduct one set of mediations known as the Bangui Forum and a distinct - even competitive - set of mediations led by Kenya in Nairobi (Sanghrajka & Preston-McGhie 2016, 280). In this case, each mediation was a multiparty effort that also occurred simultaneously, fitting both intervention contexts. Efforts in Guinea, however, took a different form. The African Union, ECOWAS, and the United Nations all intervened to resolve the conflict; however, these three actors formed an international contact group to conduct a single mediation, thereby conducting a single multiparty intervention rather than a set of simultaneous interventions (Sanghrajka & Preston-McGhie 2016, 279).

2.1.3 Comparing Sequential and Simultaneous: Differences in Timing

Like simultaneous interventions, sequential interventions consider the broader intervention context and are defined by the occurrence of multiple conflict resolution efforts. Unlike simultaneous interventions - defined by multiple efforts at the same time - sequential in-
Interventions are defined by multiple efforts occurring over time. Figure 2.2 illustrates how both simultaneous and sequential intervention contexts require multiple efforts; however, while the multiple efforts in a simultaneous intervention context both occur in time $t$, the efforts in the sequential intervention context occur in time $t$ and $t + 1$.

Sequential interventions frequently occur among mediation efforts that are implemented in stages. For instance, the United Nations, led by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative Margaret Anstee, conducted a sequence of three mediation attempts in Angola between November 1992 and June 1993. To illustrate another context, these sequential mediation efforts were concurrent with a good office mission by the Troika - consisting of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Portugal - creating an instance of both simultaneous and sequential interventions (Anstee 1999, 598).

Sequential peace operations in African civil conflicts are also common with a hand-off from one organization to the next as early efforts experience fatigue. Just a few of the many examples include ECOMOG to UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone, ECOMIL to UNMIL in Liberia, AMIB to ONUB in Burundi, ECOMICI to UNOCI in Ivory Coast, AFISMA to MINUSMA in Mali, MISCA to MINUSCA in Central African Republic, and EUFOR to MINURCAT in Chad (Williams 2016, 241-242). In each of these cases, the regional or continental organization’s peace operation handed off responsibilities to a larger and longer-term United Nations effort.

Though sequential interventions are rarely examined directly in the literature, a range of synonymous concepts have been raised in a variety of settings. Sequential efforts are also referred to as stepwise or piecemeal efforts (Mattes 2018) or holistically as trajectories (Owsiak 2014, Weiss 2003). Some theories of conflict resolution, such as islands of agreement, also implicitly refer to sequential interventions (Blum 2007). Additional strategies for intervening sequentially are labelled as incrementalism, gradualism, (Fisher et al. 2011) and, more specifically, the graduated reciprocation in tension-reduction strategy (Kydd
Simultaneous
Note: more than one actor may be involved in each intervention

\[ \text{Actor}_1 \quad \text{Actor}_2 \]
\[ \text{Intervention}_{1,t} \quad \text{Intervention}_{2,t} \]

Sequential

\[ \text{Actor}_1 \]
\[ \text{Intervention}_{1,t} \quad \text{Intervention}_{2,t+1} \]

Solitary

\[ \text{Actor}_1 \]
\[ \text{Intervention}_{1,t} \]

Multiparty

\[ \text{Actor}_1 \quad \text{Actor}_2 \]
\[ \text{Intervention}_{1,t} \]

Figure 2.2: Types of Intervention Contexts: Simultaneous, Sequential, and others
This plethora of terminology in reference to the same phenomenon only contributes to blurring the distinctions between unique intervention contexts.

**Effects of Sequential Interventions on Conflict Violence**

Research on sequential interventions largely focuses on the “downstream consequences” (Owsiak, 2014, 52) - whether they be positive or negative – for the resolution of the conflict. Indeed, scholars have reached differing conclusions on the merits of pursuing incremental or sequential conflict resolution efforts. In addition to detailing differences between the occurrence of simultaneous interventions and sequential interventions, it is worth comparing the expected impact each intervention context has on the conflict. Notably, while many of the purported advantages of sequential interventions are not specific to multiple interventions occurring over time, the time component of sequential interventions may have negative consequences for resolving violence (Weiss, 2003; Abbott & Snidal, 2002; Bose et al., 2007).

Some claim that efforts to adjust behavior gradually over time – particularly making use of issue linkage – build trust and foster international cooperation generally (Abbott & Snidal, 2002). This same idea motivates the graduated reciprocation in tension-reduction strategy, introduced by Osgood (1962) and formalized by Kydd (2007) to apply to conflict resolution specifically. However, many of the mechanisms suggested by proponents of sequential interventions can be generalized to instances multiple interventions, absent the time component. For instance, stepwise or piecemeal mediation is potentially advantageous because of the multiple efforts which separate the conflictual issues, provide more experience with the process of mediation, and avoid domestic backlash (Mattes, 2018, 95, 100; Blum, 2007).

On the other hand, some scholars contend that the time component is detrimental to overall success. Tackling the various conflictual issues one at a time may result in the belief that the remaining issues are intractable or a hardened stance by disputants – illustrated
by the analogy of a compressed balloon building pressure in areas not yet touched (Blum
2007). Specifically, a successful peace operation may make mediation significantly less
likely because it contains the conflict and “removes the urgency of further intervention”
(Owsiak 2014, 53). More generally, the time component of sequential interventions may
allow potential spoilers to “mobilize and undermine further steps in the settlement process”
(Mattes 2018, 101).

Conflict Trajectories in Owsiak (2014)

Noting the limitations of existing research in only examining a single type of intervention
or a single type of actor, Owsiak breaks new ground in directly exploring the interdepen-
dence between conflict resolution efforts. Conflict resolution trajectories, as introduced by
Owsiak, are the series of non-coercive interventions conducted by one or more states or in-
ternational organizations in a particular conflict. As such, trajectories intend to represent
the entire peace process and history of interventions in conflict as a chain of interrelated
events.

An important distinction of Owsiak’s work on sequential interventions from other the-
ories - such as incrementalism and stepwise resolution – is that he treats these trajectories
as a natural part of the conflict resolution process and objectively evaluates their conse-
quences rather than suggesting sequential interventions as a strategic choice that may or
may not be effective.

In pursuing greater understanding of the peace process over time, Owsiak makes three
simplifying decisions relevant to simultaneous interventions. First, types of interventions
are ranked according to a cost-continuum in keeping with coding practices of recording
only the “highest level” intervention in a given time period. While the precise ranking
is disputable and thus problematic in itself, there is also no direct relationship to the
outcome of interventions. Thus, this assumption is unnecessary to illustrate the intervention
context either in a given time period—simultaneous interventions— or over time— sequential interventions.

Second, Owsiak makes the necessary decision to isolate simultaneous interventions by creating separate trajectories for each instance of simultaneous intervention and omitting entirely cases with greater numbers of simultaneous interventions (Owsiak 2014, 64-5). While this decision makes evaluating interactions over time tractable, it obfuscates any interaction between interventions that overlap in time.

Third, the previous two decisions combine to a problematic assumption regarding simultaneous interventions of the same type. Not only does the separation of simultaneous interventions into distinct trajectories prevent any direct assessment of interdependency, but also trajectories with simultaneous interventions of the same type are coded identically— because of the first assumption— as if only one intervention of that type occurred. In other words, any point in the trajectory of a conflict’s peace process represents any number of that type of intervention at that time.

While the work makes significant progress by directly handling the interdependency of conflict resolution efforts, it offers little in understanding the impact of simultaneous interventions. By directly examining instances of simultaneous interventions, this project avoids these assumptions, further unpacking the complex conflict resolution process. Owsiak calls for contributions to “a more comprehensive understanding of how the international community cumulatively responds” to conflicts (Owsiak 2014, 51). In furthering theoretical and empirical consideration of the interdependence between distinct conflict resolution efforts, the current project on simultaneous interventions similarly seeks to provide a much more realistic picture and should be viewed as complementary to Owsiak’s significant work on sequential interventions.
2.2 More than the Sum of Its Parts: Benefits of Intervening Simultaneously

Violent conflict can emerge between disputing actors for any number of reasons. Even between completely rational actors, peaceful resolution may be precluded by private information, a lack of credibility, and issue indivisibility (Fearon 1995). Third parties use conflict resolution efforts to change these situations with the goal of mitigating and resolving violence. Though conflict resolution efforts come in all shapes and sizes, there are a few identifiable means by which the interventions modify the conditions which brought about conflict.

First, conflict resolution efforts - particularly but not exclusively fact finding missions - collect and disseminate information regarding the conflict status, disputant positions and interests, and likely outcomes. Such information is crucial to the implementation of peace operations, is a useful tool for mediations, and the primary purpose of fact finding missions and good offices. Second, conflict resolution efforts often seek to alter the incentive structure of disputants such that a credible commitment to the cessation of violence is possible, even providing external enforcement mechanisms where necessary (Krasner 1991, 342). Finally, interventions for conflict resolution may provide side payments and link conflict issues to more compatible issues in order to break through the impasse of issue indivisibility.

As multiple interventions in the same time period, simultaneous interventions improve these efforts to resolve violence by providing more input for achieving the goals, more coverage of the conflict issues and area, and greater efficiency overall.
2.2.1 Simultaneous Interventions Provide More Input to Resolve the Conflict

Every conflict resolution effort brings something to the table when intervening to avoid violence, whether it is material resources, international attention, information, or, ideally, all three necessary components. Simultaneous interventions naturally combine these contributions to the goal of conflict resolution, increasing the amount of each component and also the likelihood of all being present. Simultaneous interventions, thus, provide a special opportunity to reduce violence since “only by adding these powers together can third parties - official and unofficial - hope to counteract the strong, pervasive destructive powers that propel conflict” (Aall 2007, 492).

Mediation studies illustrate how these contributions translate to more successful outcomes by enhancing a mediator’s toolbox. Rubin identifies six types of power a third-party mediator may possess to alter conflict dynamics in achieving a resolution to the violence: reward, coercive, legitimate, referent, expert and informational (Rubin 1992). The first two, reward and coercive power, rely on the application of resources in a positive or negative way to disincentivize continued violence. Similarly, legitimate and referent power both invoke the role of diplomatic connections and the value of reputation to alter the incentive structure. Finally, expert and informational power involve the provision of information specific either to the issues under dispute or some uncertain aspect of the dispute itself. Increasing the chances of success, multiple conflict resolution efforts, such as simultaneous interventions, could contribute to these types of power through the addition of material resources, international attention, and information.
Material Resources

The burden of effective conflict resolution efforts on third party actors cannot be overstated. While achieving a sustainable peace often requires resources and dedication beyond what most international actors are willing to provide, resolution efforts attempting even short-term goals – such as violence reduction – demand the dedication of significant manpower, time, and financial and material resources. Former United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Gali in 1995 revealed that the demands on peacekeeping were already far more complex and expensive than ever before (Boutros-Ghali 1995, 5). In fact, modern scholars speculate that no single actor is capable of resolving conflicts effectively and peacefully (Böhmelt 2011, 864). It is important to note that single actors are not limited because there is some minimum threshold of material leverage above that which even the most powerful states or international organizations can provide. Rather, due to the range of disputants and issues involved, the resources necessary to progress conflict resolution efforts may be complex enough to be most effectively accomplished by a combination of actors (Crocker 1996, 188).

Even the United States as the global superpower lacked the resources necessary to progress mediation efforts in the Angola-Namibia peace negotiations in the 1980s. It took the entry of other regional and international actors to add the leverage necessary for negotiations to effectively continue (Crocker et al. 2001, 60). Similarly, scholars and practitioners both tout the advantages of intervention by regional actors; however, as relatively new actors to the international conflict scene, these organizations are generally limited in experience and capabilities. Simultaneous interventions by other actors can overcome these limitations by infusing the resources needed for conflict resolution to succeed (George 1996, 218-219).
International Attention

Multiple interventions by third party actors inherently indicate more widespread attention to a conflict resolution process, meaning a higher salience for the international community. While not guaranteeing success, such international attention can assist through informal pressure to cease violence and may lend greater legitimacy to efforts on the ground. In evaluating the United States’ interventions, Haass proposes that any unilateral intervention should be accompanied by a coalition effort to signal international legitimacy and thus bolster the unilateral intervention’s effectiveness (Haass 1996, 203-204).

As an example, international attention served as a turning point for conflict resolution efforts in Haiti. The Organization of American States mediation efforts in Haiti’s conflict only gained traction after successfully gaining attention from the United Nations which resulted in member states imposing sanctions (Wedgwood 1996, 281).

Information

While much of the knowledge gained by third parties conducting conflict resolution efforts likely remains private, some information is often voluntarily shared with relevant international actors. For example, the United States produced a series of analytical memoranda after each meeting in Tajikistan which were openly shared with the United Nations (Saunders 1999, 171). An effective information capacity is crucial for peace operations, and in the past has made a visibly “invaluable contribution to the operation’s success” (Boutros-Ghali 1995, 11).
2.2.2 Simultaneous Interventions Increase Diversity and Provide More Coverage

While many scholars and practitioners endorse the growing active role of regional organizations in managing conflicts, these organizations to date largely lack the necessary resources to fully implement an effective intervention. These limitations and the need for external interventions were apparent in the 1981 peace operation conducted by the Organization of African Unity in Chad’s civil conflict (Wedgwood 1996, 279). Multiple interventions in a single conflict mitigate these shortcomings through a de facto burden sharing, whether through splitting strategic responsibilities in the process, geographic areas, or conflictual issues addressed.

Though described above as “splitting” responsibilities, burden sharing need not be a collaborative process. A simultaneous intervention may make the unilateral decision to limit its efforts in a specific way so as not to interfere with other interventions occurring at the same time, which the United States and Russia did with the United Nations’ effort in Tajikistan (Saunders 1999, 174). The natural variances between the strengths and abilities of international actors may result in a de facto division of labor when the multiple interventions do not fully coordinate. Even in these circumstances, practitioners of conflict resolution argue that simultaneous interventions provide the resources and means to avoid or prevent the spread of violence (Crocker et al. 2001, 59) by increasing the probability of diverse efforts with broader coverage of the conflict.

The broader coverage—whether strategically, geographically, or topically—made possible by multiple interventions likely has an impact on the spread and intensity of the conflict. Scholars have noted that these efforts within mediation can be an “important catalyst for advancing systemic change” particularly in limiting the spread of conflict to additional regions or issues (Crocker et al. 2001, 60).
Strategies

There are a variety of conflict resolution types - including but not limited to peace operations, mediations, good offices, and fact finding missions. But even within a specific type, a range of strategies in implementing the effort are possible. For instance, mediators may pursue a more hands-off facilitative approach or may choose to more actively manage the negotiation process by using power mediation techniques (Bercovitch et al. 2009). As additional options, third parties conducting peace operations may strategically choose smaller and more passive observation missions, traditional peacekeeping missions, complex multidimensional missions, or more substantial peace enforcement missions (Fortna 2008, 6-7). Further, these are not discrete categories; any given intervention may employ a combination of the mentioned techniques, and actors may shift between strategies within the same intervention. These natural variations in how conflict resolution efforts are implemented yield the advantages of diversity when combined through simultaneous interventions.

Simultaneous interventions increase the likelihood of a diverse set of strategies being employed for the goal of conflict resolution. When tackling the complexity of violent conflicts, simultaneous interventions may have fundamentally different missions and cultures; however, “having different perspectives toward a problem is often a good thing” (Gordon IV & Campbell 2016, 95). Further, research into the effectiveness of conflict resolution efforts suggest theories of which strategies are more appropriate in specific contexts (see the contingency model of third party intervention as an illustrative example), but there is a lack of conclusive findings and uncertainty persists for decision-makers. The advantages of diversity implicit in simultaneous interventions combat this uncertainty by essentially allowing multiple tries to solve the same problem.

Additionally, simultaneous interventions are more appropriate in situations which specifically call for a combination of strategies or types. For instance, Zartman suggests that the grievants and incumbents of a conflict may require different strategies to effectively limit
the production of violence (Zartman 2005, 228). Within mediation, practitioners indicate a combination of different mediation strategies is useful, even in conflicts with protracted or intense violence. Practitioners further identify a range of essential outcomes from applying multiple strategies and approaches, including: softening the attitudes and positions of disputants, creating opportunities for diplomatic interaction between disputants, and building constituencies for peace domestically, regionally, and internationally (Crocker et al. 2001, 62).

In order to drive disputants to end violence, a combination of interventions that both facilitate communication and change structural factors is crucial (Hansen 2012, 238). Such a combination of intervention types, such as peace operations and mediations, are only possible through simultaneous action. Importantly, these combinations are considered “vital efforts to suppress or contain the fighting” (Crocker 1996, 189) drawing a clear link between simultaneous efforts and successful outcomes of violence reduction.

Issues

Parallel mediation is a classic setup which involves simultaneous interventions. In parallel mediation, one or more third parties engage in simultaneous mediation processes each of which is isolated to a limited aspect or issue of the conflict rather than taking on the entirety of the dispute. As a specific version of simultaneous interventions, parallel mediations offer the advantages of burden sharing by dividing the labor along conflict issues. The natural complementarity of parallel mediation efforts is considered more effective in finding a negotiated solution (Hansen 2012, 245).

Empirical examples demonstrate both the advantages of sharing the burden of addressing specific conflict issues among multiple interventions and the consequences of failing to do so. The peace process in Tajikistan has widely been deemed a success and touted as exemplifying the advantages of simultaneous interventions including a diverse set of actors
covering a diverse set of issues at various levels through an “implicit division of labor” (Saunders 1999 172; Crocker et al. 2001 61). It was through the simultaneous diplomatic efforts in Tajikistan that the phrase “multilevel peace process” was coined in October 1996 (Saunders 1999 171). In contrast, the Central American States failed to address the components of the conflict in El Salvador in separate interventions which tanked the negotiation process in 1983 (De Soto 1999 353).

### 2.2.3 Simultaneous Interventions Increase Efficiency Through Indirect Assistance

Not only do simultaneous interventions inherently imply more input of the resources necessary for conflict resolution efforts to succeed but intervening simultaneously also increases the efficiency of each individual effort. Actors intervening simultaneously can directly benefit from other interventions occurring at the same time - even without formal assistance - including but not limited to: sharing costs and risks, borrowing leverage, restructuring domestic and international relationships, gaining entry, and opening new channels of resolution (Crocker et al. 2001 60). The advantages of informal interaction between simultaneous interventions can be loosely grouped into three categories: diminished costs of entry and implementation, the ability to borrow leverage to extend diplomatic reach and political balance, and political cover through risk-sharing.

**Diminishing Costs**

Assuming that each intervention seeks at least in part the resolution of the conflict, the contribution of resources by a simultaneous means less is required of the original intervention to achieve the same goal. This is true regardless of whether that contribution is coordinated to precisely complement simultaneous efforts.
The complex conflict resolution setting of Cambodia provides an illustrative example. Cambodia conducted a large number of independent negotiations with a wide range of international actors - each pursuing a different solution to the same problem. The plethora of mediation efforts “created a certain air of confusion,” however these simultaneous interventions remarkably “became mutually reinforcing” (Solomon 1999, 299).

In evaluating multiparty mediation efforts, Böhmelt reasons that when multiple actors are involved in conflict resolution – also generally true of simultaneous interventions – third parties can expect “smaller shares of the fiscal burden and the political risk” (Böhmelt 2011, 863). Moreover, the advantages of conflict resolution efforts are greatest when costs are kept down by multiple interventions (Haass 1996, 201).

Illustratively, peace operations provide diminishing costs for simultaneous interventions by modifying the dynamics of the conflict. For example, interventions to build infrastructure or de-mine the conflict zone reduce the start-up costs and risk to human lives of additional peace operations (Crocker 1996, 189). Additionally, peace operations can generally ensure safer conditions for international actors as well as change the situation on the ground to provide fresh openings for diplomatic efforts (Crocker 1996, 194).

Mediation efforts offer a prime example of the diminishing costs of additional interventions. An effective mediation requires extensive pre-planning and participants that are familiar with the techniques of negotiation. Practitioners argue that the months or even years of preparation for a mediation require more effort than the time spent at the table and are more deterministic of the outcome. The Indonesian-led Jakarta Informal Meetings (JIM) in the Cambodian conflict illustrate how simultaneous interventions can lessen these costs. The JIM meetings assisted ongoing United States efforts by laying the groundwork for achieving a settlement (Solomon 1999, 314).

Additionally, familiarity with the procedure and principles of negotiation facilitates more effective discussion, increasing the efficiency of any mediation process. However, prac-
titioners note that disputants in civil conflicts unfortunately often lack the training or local institutions to maximize the effectiveness of mediation efforts (Boutros-Ghali 1995; Whitfield 2008, 22). As such, there are diminishing costs to simultaneous mediations, which can “share” the costly learning process. Additionally, mediations which specifically aim to provide training in conflict resolution and reconciliation techniques or develop local institutions improve the conflict dynamics for all simultaneous efforts (Crocker 1996, 190).

The advantages of this training process are apparent in Tajikistan, where an intervening task force led by Russia and the United States selected Tajikistani participants to meet in a sustained mediated process, referred to as the Inter-Tajik Dialogue within the framework of the Dartmouth Conference Regional Conflicts Task Force. The task force intervention provided more input to resolving the conflict by directing international attention – otherwise dominantly focused on ongoing conflicts in Georgia and between Armenia and Azerbaijan – to the disruptive potential of violence in Tajikistan as well as providing more information to conflict resolution efforts on the positions of disputants and potential areas for conflict resolution (Saunders 1999, 166). Additionally, this intervention exemplified the diminishing costs for simultaneous mediation efforts both by pre-planning and training participants.

Through a series of twenty-five meetings over many years, the Inter-Tajik Dialogue paved the way for the simultaneous United Nations mediation according to United States, United Nations, and Tajikistan government officials. Aside from providing irrefutable evidence to Tajikistan’s government that talking to the opposition was possible, the dialogue produced a report entitled “A Negotiation Process for Tajikistan” in March 1994, the first of a series of 14 memoranda (Saunders 1999, 167) demonstrating the productive outcomes of the Inter-Tajik Dialogue for simultaneous conflict resolution efforts. This report formed the basis of the United Nations mediation effort that began a month later, but the Inter-Tajik Dialogue continued its work long after with members arguing: “We played a role in

[Whitfield specifically observes that non-government disputants in particular suffer a disadvantage because government actors have more experience with “diplomatic norms and the rules of the system.”]
starting the negotiations; now we must play a role in ensuring their success” (Saunders 1999, 169).

The Inter-Tajik Dialogue intervention allowed the United States and Russia to train members in conflict resolution and reconciliation practices. Members of the dialogue gained the capacity to design, develop, and sustain a peace process for Tajikistan. These skills were applied beyond the dialogue process itself as three members were also involved in the United Nations mediation and two founded non-governmental organizations that also intervened in the conflict. Specifically, the Inter-Tajik Dialogue members developed skills in structuring the agenda for negotiation to encourage continued participation and the value of tackling the specific issues of the conflict separately (Saunders 1999, 167-169).

Borrowing Leverage

Leverage is a crucial component of conflict resolution efforts, and even the strongest states and organizations often lack the necessary political resources to effectively achieve peaceful outcomes. Leverage can include material resources, knowledge or information, diplomatic connections, and more. In general, leverage refers to the ability of a third party to extract commitments from the disputants towards the resolution of the conflict. In the Angola-Namibia peace negotiations, despite its superpower status, the United States needed other regional and international actors to become involved in the resolution process in order to gain the credibility and leverage necessary to create access to the warring parties and move the mediation process forward (Crocker et al. 2001, 60). This process of broadening goes hand in hand with simultaneous interventions, which generally extend the set of actors pursuing peaceful resolution of the conflict beyond that of a solitary intervention.

Simultaneous interventions build the legitimacy and access of conflict resolution efforts by borrowing leverage from other intervening actors. Actors intervening at the same

3See Section 2.2.2 for additional details of the theoretical advantages of a division of labor along conflict issues
time gain benefits from the knowledge, experience, relationships, credibility, and resources (Böhmelt 2011, 863). By borrowing this range of leverage from other simultaneous resolution efforts, intervening actors can create more effective outcomes. Merely having an alternative channel in the conflict improves success by restarting stalled talks and developing support for existing interventions (Crocker et al. 1999, 9). More specifically, the leverage from a combination of interventions can enhance existing efforts in two ways: by extending the diplomatic reach and enhancing the political balance of intervening forces (Crocker 1996, 188; Böhmelt 2011, 863).

Note that this mechanism does not require an intentional partnering of intervening actors. Rather, the interventions by additional actors contribute diplomatic reach and political balance to the conflict resolution process as a whole. In the case of Angola-Namibia, the United States was able to capitalize on these generalized contributions in order to advance the effectiveness of its own intervention without a formal partnership.

Borrowing diplomatic leverage is both commonplace and an effective method to gain credible entry for conflict resolution efforts. The United States, for instance, borrowed credibility from British interventions for its own independent efforts in Zimbabwe, Namibia, Mozambique, Angola, and South Africa (Crocker 1996, 188). Particularly in sensitive areas, approval from a simultaneously intervening regional actor can create access and ease the entry of international actors that would otherwise be considered suspicious and controversial. For example, the United States’ entry to the Gulf War in 1990 was eased, particularly to Saudi Arabia, by the simultaneous diplomatic effort by the Gulf Cooperation Council which condemned Iraq’s actions and lent credibility to foreign involvement (Wedgwood 1996, 283).

Additionally, the rise of regional organization involvement in conflict resolution has been accredited in part to widespread suspicion of the United Nations intentions (? , 18-19). As an example, backlash was expected to any United Nations involvement in Haiti, until
the Organization of American States (OAS) initiated a mediation process. The regional organization maintained a positive image in Haiti and possessed the necessary legitimacy to insert itself in the nation’s conflict. As a result of regional involvement in a distinct intervention, the United Nations was able to benefit from this legitimacy to successfully implement a United Nations-United States peace operation in 1994 (Wedgwood 1996, 282; Crocker 1996, 195).

Because simultaneous interventions enable third parties to broaden their diplomatic reach and political balance, these types of intervention contexts are ideal in mitigating the impacts of spoilers. Common to most conflict situations, spoilers – also called rejectionists – are official or unofficial actors that attempt to “spoil” or counteract the peace process. These actors may simply try to prevent a peace agreement from being reached or more actively alter conflict dynamics to instigate or escalate violence. By broadening the base for diplomatic leverage, simultaneous interventions can successfully isolate spoilers, effectively reducing their base of political support and limiting their ability to reach out to allies (Crocker et al. 2001, 60; Böhmelt 2011, 863).

Risk-Sharing

In addition to the diplomatic advantages with the disputants in the conflict, simultaneous efforts can also provide political cover from their own constituents for third parties engaging in a costly activity known to fail more often than it succeeds. This process of risk-sharing among simultaneous interveners can assist advocates in two ways. First, simultaneous interventions can provide evidence of the merit of intervention when third parties consider initiating or continuing conflict resolution efforts. Second, simultaneous interventions can serve as scapegoats to blame for any shortcomings or failures of the intervention to achieve the constituents’ goals.

For the United States in particular, simultaneous interventions permit the freedom
of conducting unilateral interventions while avoiding the risk of losing domestic support. The simultaneous but separate action by foreign intervenors “helps at home” to overcome domestic resentment at bearing the perceived burden of solving the world’s problems (Haass 1996, 204-205).

The multiple interventions in Cambodia in the 1990s illustrate the role of risk-sharing. United States and United Nations involvement provided political cover for China, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam to intervene which otherwise would have been politically impossible (Solomon 1999, 283). Domestically, the United States Congress was highly critical of ongoing mediation efforts and goals. As a solution to the “domestic political fury,” the United States endorsed an intervention by the United Nations which would provide political cover for the Bush Administration (Solomon 1999, 307).
Chapter 3

New Perspective, New Knowledge: Re-evaluating Conflict Resolution Success in Context of Simultaneous Interventions

3.1 Simultaneous Interventions in Practice and Increased Violence in Civil Conflicts

Theoretically, simultaneous interventions improve the conflict resolution process, but such a relationship may not exist in practice. In order to examine how simultaneous interventions are conducted and affect conflict dynamics in practice, these interventions must be empirically analyzed. To this end, a dataset on conflict resolution efforts was assembled from two sources: the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Managing Intrastate Conflict (Melander & von Uexkull 2011) and Dynamic Analysis of Dispute Management
Third Party Peacekeeping Missions (Mullenbach 2013). These data sources are well-regarded and commonly used in empirical analysis of conflict resolution efforts.

This combination of data sources covers thirty African civil conflicts and over 2,300 conflict resolution efforts between 1993 and 2007. The nations experiencing civil conflict during this period are shown in Figure 3.1. Approximately 150 third parties - including international and regional organizations, developed and developing states, and individuals - conducting a range of conflict resolution efforts are identified in the data.

![Figure 3.1: Map of African Countries Experiencing Civil Conflict, 1993-2007](image)

As the goal is to determine how the design characteristics of a specific intervention - namely simultaneity - alter that intervention’s success in conflict resolution, the unit of analysis is the individual conflict resolution effort. Thus, there are 2,329 observations in the data. Each resolution effort has start and end dates, third party actors involved, and the conflict it targeted recorded along with additional details discussed in later sections. Each intervention is additionally coded as simultaneous ($X_{simul} = 1$) if its conduct overlapped in

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1See Section 3.3 for additional details on types of conflict resolution efforts: peace operations, mediations, good offices, and fact finding missions
time with one or more other interventions in the same conflict or as a solitary effort otherwise ($X_{simul} = 0$). In addition to this binary measure, the number of other interventions and their identifying information is included in order to permit the more extensive analysis discussed in Sections 3.2 and 3.3.

3.1.1 Trends of Simultaneous Interventions in Civil Conflicts

The peace process in each conflict is as varied and complex as the conflicts themselves. Figures 3.2 to 3.5 present a fascinating holistic view of this complexity. Each figure depicts the entire peace process in a single conflict as the set of different types of interventions over time. Each point in the figure represents the initiation of a conflict resolution effort with a line continuing across time until the intervention’s conclusion. The interventions are colored and grouped along the y-axis by the type of conflict resolution effort. By considering the perspective of multiple interventions in this way, patterns of simultaneous, solitary, and sequential interventions become clear.

The early years of conflict in Sierra Leone, shown in Figure 3.2, were dominated by talks, fact finding missions, and good offices, but these efforts were not repeated in later years when only peace operations were conducted. In contrast, peace operations in Somalia, shown in Figure 3.3, were initiated in early years between 1992 and 1995 and – likely due to the failure of efforts like Operation Restore Hope – were not attempted in later stages of the conflict. Other efforts in Somalia interestingly occurred frequently in the early years between 1993 and approximately 1997 but then subsided until 2002 when the peace process saw a resurgence of talks, good offices, and a couple of fact finding missions. Also notable in this resurgence of efforts is a lengthy good office by Kenya in 2003. Although the other good offices by Kenya in Somalia lasted approximately a month each, this example of good

\[\text{Note that some random positioning along the y-axis within each of the four categories has been introduced in order to more accurately display overlapping interventions where possible, but this does not affect each points position in time along the x-axis.}\]
Third parties conducted a cluster of good offices in Angola, shown in Figure 3.4 before 1995 during an early peace operation, but transitioned to solely conducting talks five years later when violence returned. On the other hand, the peace process in Central African Republic contained no good offices in more than ten years. Shown in Figure 3.5, third parties intervening in Central African Republic instead relied heavily on peace operations to resolve the conflict, conducting only a handful of talks and fact-finding missions during the entire conflict. This is a distinctly different approach than the abundance of mediation efforts throughout the conflict in Angola.

In Figure 3.4, peace operations in Angola show a clear example of sequential interventions as the United Nations in this case passed the torch from one operation to the next. Exclusively considering the peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone, shown in Figure 3.2, demonstrates examples of simultaneous, sequential and solitary interventions. The
first two peace operations represent simultaneous efforts conducted by ECOWAS and the United Nations respectively. The second two peace operations were conducted sequentially by the United Nations as UNAMSIL transitioned to the next operation. Additionally, the United Nations operation starting after 2005 is a clear case of solitary interventions as third parties ceased any other attempts at intervention.

**Simultaneous Interventions over Time**

By adopting the perspective of multiple interventions in conflict and orienting empirical observations in this manner, it is possible to observe trends in simultaneous interventions over time across a range of civil conflicts. Although conceptually distinct from solitary interventions, analyzing simultaneous interventions may not be practical and worth the added complexity if they occur only rarely. However, in confirmation of the casual observations of some practitioners and scholars, approximately 90% of the conflict resolution
efforts in the data are simultaneous interventions.

Figure 3.4 displays the trends of third parties initiating simultaneous (the darker blue line) and solitary (the lighter blue line) interventions throughout the 1990s and 2000s. The number of interventions on the y-axis represents the start dates of conflict resolution efforts grouped into three-month periods.

Indeed, Figure 3.6 clearly shows consistently higher numbers of simultaneous interventions than solitary ones initiated across the observed time frame. Additionally, while the concept of simultaneous interventions is relatively new in the literature, Figure 3.6 shows that it is not a new concept in practice.

The number of interventions - both solitary and simultaneous - has been noisy over the observed decades; however, very different trends can be observed in numbers of solitary interventions compared to simultaneous interventions. Despite sharp fluctuations across time, solitary interventions have remained at a fairly constant level ($\rho = 0.06$) while the
Figure 3.5: Conflict Resolution Efforts Over Time in Central African Republic

Figure 3.6: Simultaneous Intervention Trends Across All Conflicts
initiation of simultaneous efforts appears to have gradually increased ($\rho = 0.44$) over the years. Further, although the highest peak of simultaneous interventions corresponds with a dip in solitary efforts, there is not a notable trade-off between the initiation of solitary and simultaneous interventions across the years ($\rho = -0.04$).

Therefore, it does not seem that third parties are collectively abandoning solitary interventions in favor of simultaneous interventions, or vice versa. In context of evaluating the effects of simultaneous and solitary interventions, the persistent levels of both types provide a more sound basis for comparison. The trends of simultaneous interventions over time indicate that simultaneous interventions are not a new phenomenon or likely to disappear as time goes on.

**Simultaneous Interventions by Conflict**

There is also variation in the conduct of simultaneous interventions across the civil conflicts in the data. Third parties made only solitary efforts in some conflicts - Nigeria, Niger, Ethiopia, and Djibouti - while in others - Sudan, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo - third parties conducted over two hundred simultaneous conflict resolution efforts.

Figure 3.7 shows conflicts arranged by the total number of simultaneous interventions in each. On average, approximately seventy simultaneous interventions occurred per conflict, represented by the vertical line. Those experiencing above average numbers are colored light blue while those conflicts with less than average simultaneous interventions are colored dark blue.

In addition to the number of simultaneous interventions, Table 3.1 shows the total number of interventions per conflict and the percent of interventions that are simultaneous. The conflicts represent a variety of simultaneous intervention percentages, though slightly left skewed (mean = 66.73, median = 76.99). While simultaneous interventions are naturally more likely in conflicts with more total interventions, the relationship is not
strong ($\rho = 0.42$).

Figure 3.8 allows a closer look at the initiation of simultaneous interventions across the time span of a conflict. Figure 3.8 shows the density of solitary and simultaneous interventions at a given point in time for six different conflicts. Peaks of the dark blue line indicate a greater proportion of the simultaneous interventions that occurred in the conflict were initiated at that point in time. The same is true for solitary interventions indicated by the light blue line.

This selection of conflicts demonstrates a range of options regarding the timing of solitary and simultaneous conflict resolution efforts. For instance, only simultaneous interventions occurred in Ivory Coast (top-right in Figure 3.8), with most starting early. In Sudan (bottom-right), most of the solitary interventions occurred in the early stages while most
Table 3.1: Percent of Simultaneous Interventions by Conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Simultaneous</th>
<th>All Interventions</th>
<th>Percent Simultaneous</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>58.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>95.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola (Cabinda)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>55.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>96.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comoros (Anjouan)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>71.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>78.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR Congo (Zaire)</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>268</td>
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<td>Ethiopia (Ogaden)</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>75.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia (Oromiya)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>64.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>97.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>75.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali (Azawad)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>66.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>28.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger (Air and Azawad)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>58.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger (Eastern Niger)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria (Niger Delta)</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria (Northern Nigeria)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>82.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal (Casamance)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>42.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>88.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>86.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>608</td>
<td>625</td>
<td>97.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>83.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
of the simultaneous interventions occurred later. The opposite trend occurred in Angola (top-left).

But there is not always a trade-off between simultaneous and solitary initiation. Peaks of simultaneous and solitary interventions overlap in Senegal (bottom-left) and the early stages of Sierra Leone (bottom-middle), indicating that a mixture of simultaneous and solitary interventions were initiated during those years.

Additionally, interventions - whether simultaneous or solitary - are not necessarily clustered at one point in time. Simultaneous interventions in Burundi (top-middle) and both types in Sierra Leone (bottom-middle) demonstrate that the distribution may be multimodal. In other words, simultaneous interventions occurred fairly consistently across the course of Burundi’s conflict. Solitary interventions in Sierra Leone, by contrast, occurred
exclusively at the beginning and end of the observed timeframe.

### 3.1.2 Measuring Violence: Counting Battle-related Deaths by Month

As the goal of conflict resolution efforts broadly is to modify the setting of the conflict in order to achieve peace, this project seeks to identify trends of how simultaneous interventions achieve this goal compared to solitary interventions. There are several approaches currently used to evaluate the success of conflict resolution efforts depending on the context and type of intervention considered.

Analyses of mediation efforts generally focus on the achievement of an agreement between disputants. While many studies simply evaluate mediation success or failure as a binary indicator of a signed agreement (such as [Bercovitch & Houston 2000](#) [Favretto 2009](#)), others account for more nuanced outcomes. These measures typically add categories to account for variations in: how much of the conflict is addressed (partial or full agreement), content of the agreement (conflict issue, ceasefire, agreement to meet again), or compliance of the agreement ([Böhmelt 2011](#)).

In order to effectively evaluate a range of conflict resolution efforts, however, a more universally applicable standard is necessary. In other words, the standard of success must be an outcome that is common across a range of interventions. Peace operations, for example, are not specifically designed to achieve a negotiated agreement. Even mediation efforts, which are generally assumed to seeking a signed agreement, do not necessarily intend to reach an agreement in every intervention ([Faure 2012](#) 6). Using a signed agreement as the measure of success would likely produce biased estimates that systematically undervalue the effect of interventions with other goals - such as peace operations - on conflicts.

Alternatively, quantitative studies across various conflict resolution effort types consider
some measure of duration. While some focus on the amount of time until the conflict ends (such as Sambanis & Elbadawi 2000; Beardsley et al. 2006), others focus on the duration of peace. This duration measure generally indicates time until violence reemerges or the onset of a new conflict (Fortna 2008) and is the most studied outcome of peacekeeping operations (Diehl & Druckman 2010). However, in conducting a survey of existing studies of peace operations and suggesting future research, Diehl suggests that “scholars might then turn to a better specification of the dependent variable than ‘peace duration’” (Diehl 2014, 487).

Just as practitioners face a necessary choice between securing short-term peace and long-term resolution (Owsiak 2014, 55; Beardsley et al. 2006), scholars must also choose the timeframe used to evaluate conflict resolution success. As previously illustrated, many conflicts experience hundreds of conflict resolution efforts over time. It is thus extremely difficult to attribute changes in the duration of violence or peace over many years to a single intervention. While the prevalence of overlapping interventions creates a similar problem for attributing even short-term outcomes, it is likely significantly less than with long-term outcomes (Aall 2016, 15).

Avoiding the limitations of these alternative measures of success, this project chooses to evaluate the effect of resolution efforts on violence in the immediate aftermath of the intervention. Unlike using signed agreements to indicate success, this measure is ideal as “a core goal of every peace operation” and “common in . . . all forms of conflict management, including . . . mediation attempts” (Diehl 2014, 486). Moreover, third parties may have different approaches and preferences over the resolution of the conflict which would make alternative measures problematic. However, despite these differences, “all local and external third parties agree that violence should cease immediately” (Bhattarai 2016, 417).

More specifically, the outcome of conflict resolution efforts is measured as the sum total of battle-related deaths in the three-month period following the conclusion of the intervention.

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3External intervention in this case includes coercive, active involvement as a disputant in the conflict, not purely conflict resolution efforts.
vention. This narrow window minimizes the complications introduced by large numbers of other conflict resolution efforts. In comparison to the long-term duration measures, this measurement of conflict resolution success additionally avoids problematic assumptions regarding the specific beginning and end dates of a conflict and subjective decisions about whether the re-emergence of violence is a continuation of a previous conflict or the initiation of a new conflict.

Figure 3.9: Monthly Battle Deaths Over Time in Guinea-Bissau

Trends of Violence in Civil Conflicts

Measures of violence in the conflicts are taken from the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset (Croicu & Sundberg 2015; Melander 2013) which contains individual violent event level data. Despite significant efforts to accurately identify and record information, conflict settings remain complex. Missing information and misinformation in these contexts mean high uncertainty plagues attempts to objectively measure conflict dynamics. Because of
the inherent uncertainty in the timing of violent acts as well as the effectual beginning and end of interventions, individual violent events are aggregated to the conflict-month level. In other words, violence in a given conflict for this project is measured as the sum total of best estimated counts of battle-related deaths per month.

African civil conflicts during this time period experienced varying levels and patterns of violence. Aggregating the individual events of violence allows an examination of these patterns over time in the data. Figure 3.9 shows an example of battle-related deaths over a few months in Guinea-Bissau. Violence in the conflict lasted less than a year, shown on the x-axis, and peaked at 110 deaths, shown on the y-axis, in June 1998.4

Figure 3.10 shows examples of more commonly expected patterns of violence. Violence was protracted over many years in both Burundi and Algeria, but was generally concentrated around a single peak and consistently present throughout. Despite the similarities in trends of violence, it is worth noting these conflicts experienced very different levels of violence, shown by the values of the y-axis.

Figure 3.11 shows a variation on the pattern of violence seen in Burundi and Algeria. Rather than being concentrated around a single peak, battle-deaths in these conflicts exhibited an ebb and flow over time. For instance, in Sudan (center), monthly battle-deaths exceeding 500 occurred more than ten times spanning the two decades of violence. Additionally, as shown in Uganda (top) and Sierra Leone (bottom), the ebb and flow can show different global trends, with violence generally declining in Uganda and two peaks of violence in the middle of the time period in Sierra Leone.

Unlike the ebb and flow of violence in Figure 3.11 which exhibit persistent low-levels of violence between the peaks, some civil conflicts experience phases of violence with pauses. Figure 3.12 shows examples of civil conflicts experiencing phases of violence. These conflicts have clear breaks when no battle-deaths occur for years, as occurred between 1996 and

4Note the values of both axes change across conflicts shown in the Figures.
2001 in Angola (second from top). This pattern exists in conflicts experiencing high levels of violence, as in Angola, and even with very low levels of violence, as in Central African Republic (bottom). Additionally, a comparison of the conflicts in Figure 3.12 show variation in the re-emergence of violence. The violent episodes may be a severe peak, as in 2007 Somalia (top) and 2006 Chad (second from bottom), or more gradually as in 1998 Angola.
Figure 3.11: Monthly Battle Deaths Over Time in Uganda, Sudan, and Sierra Leone
Figure 3.12: Monthly Battle Deaths Over Time in Somalia, Angola, Chad, and Central African Republic
Finally, some conflicts show extended periods of no battle-deaths. Figure 3.13 show examples of conflicts that subsided for many years before violence returned. No violence occurred in Liberia (top) for almost a decade before a return to peaks of 100 battle-deaths a month since 2000. Similarly, in Democratic Republic of Congo (bottom) – after an extremely deadly period of violence in the 1990s, exceeding two-thousand battle deaths in a single month - violence ceased for years until gradually returning in 2007.

In order to consider the impact that simultaneous interventions have on civil conflicts, the monthly aggregated battle-death information is matched to the conflict’s interventions. Table 3.2 shows the average number of battle-related deaths, the largest number of deaths in a single month, and the number of interventions in each conflict over the time period. While there is a positive relationship between the amount of violence and the number of interventions, neither higher average levels of violence ($\rho = 0.48$) nor greater maximum counts of battle-deaths ($\rho = 0.54$) have a strong relationship with the number of interventions in the conflict.

### 3.1.3 Simultaneous Interventions and an Estimated Increase in Violence

Empirical analysis in this project centers around the relationship between simultaneous interventions and levels of violence in civil conflicts. Simultaneous interventions are defined as conflict resolution efforts that overlap in time in a given conflict, and this indicator serves as the main explanatory variable of interest. Violence is measured as a count of battle-deaths in the three-month period of the conflict after the conclusion of the intervention and is the outcome variable for all analysis. Because this outcome is a count variable, it differs greatly from the normal distribution which underlies standard linear regression models. As such, a count model is more appropriate. For this project, the models used
Table 3.2: Interventions and Monthly Battle Death Information by Conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Monthly Average Deaths</th>
<th>Monthly Max Deaths</th>
<th>Interventions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>6.67</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>20.94</td>
<td>1400</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola (Cabinda)</td>
<td>2.85</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>11.45</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>6.52</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>48.05</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comoros (Anjouan)</td>
<td>56.00</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>16.18</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>7.75</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR Congo (Zaire)</td>
<td>81.84</td>
<td>2363</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia (Ogaden)</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia (Oromiya)</td>
<td>8.43</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>28.22</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>56.09</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>28.08</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>13.51</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali (Azawad)</td>
<td>12.40</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>4.74</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger (Air and Azawad)</td>
<td>8.17</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger (Eastern Niger)</td>
<td>6.50</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria (Niger Delta)</td>
<td>18.33</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria (Northern Nigeria)</td>
<td>7.57</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>23.32</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal (Casamance)</td>
<td>9.83</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>19.58</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>57.37</td>
<td>1017</td>
<td>625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>11.08</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>9.92</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
for empirical analysis rely on an underlying negative binomial distribution. The negative binomial is appropriate for counts which tend to be right-skewed. Additionally, in this case, counts of battle-deaths exhibit overdispersion ($m = 222.37, sd = 452.44$). Overdispersion, or difference between mean and standard deviation, makes the Poisson distribution - an-
other common choice for count models and a specific version of the negative binomial - inappropriate because it relies on a single estimate for both mean and standard deviation.

For ease of understanding, the results of empirical analysis in this project are generally presented in terms of the predicted number of battle-deaths after intervention. In other words, based on the statistical model of patterns observed in past conflicts, the figures display the average amount of violence expected in a hypothetical conflict after simultaneous and solitary conflict resolution efforts. The bars around these displayed estimates represent 95% prediction intervals.

In addition to these figures and in order to provide more detail of the models components, a coefficient plot will be included for some analyses. These plots will display the estimated change in outcome from a single unit change of each variable included in the analysis, holding all else constant. Coefficient plots are included in order to provide a more holistic view of the model. These plots generally demonstrate which factors have a positive relationship (increasing violence) or negative relationship (decreasing violence) with the outcome. Additionally, when the factor has a relationship with the outcome that can be said is non-zero with 95% confidence (ie- the coefficient is statistically significant), the estimate is colored blue; otherwise, the estimate is in red.

Contrary to the hopes of those conducting conflict resolution efforts and theoretical expectations of the contributions of interventions, simultaneous interventions empirically have a positive relationship with the number of battle deaths after intervention. In other words, conflicts experience higher levels of violence after simultaneous interventions compared to solitary interventions. More specifically, Figure 3.14 shows the predicted number of battle deaths in the three months following simultaneous (indicated by the blue point and line) and solitary (indicated by the green) interventions based on the simple binary

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5Note that because a negative binomial distribution is used, the estimated coefficients are the estimated change in outcome on a log scale. Because a log scale is not easily interpreted, results are primarily presented as predicted values.
Figure 3.14: Predicted Battle Deaths After Simultaneous and Solitary Interventions

model. The expected number of deaths from conflict after simultaneous interventions is 109.54 greater than after solitary interventions, a 90% increase in violence.

While this estimate provides a dismal view for the positive impact of conflict resolution efforts, further analysis is necessary before shutting the door. The puzzling initial results beg the question: why are more interventions less successful at reducing levels of violence than a single intervention? Intuition and existing research suggest a few possible explanations, including several that insulate interveners from the blame of heightened violence suggested by these findings. First, other factors may be at play that coincide with the
occurrence of simultaneous interventions. Some possibilities include the characteristics of
the conflict setting and other intervention design decisions. Similarly, it may be that si-
multaneous interventions occur more often in the hard cases, those that are more likely to
experience high levels of violence regardless of conflict resolution efforts.

Finally, the interaction of the simultaneous interventions themselves may be important.
Drawing on existing perspectives, the type of conflict resolution effort - and resulting com-
binations – may modify how successful simultaneous interventions are in reducing levels of
violence. If a more frequent combination of certain types were counterproductive, even if
other combinations succeeded in dissipating violence, simultaneous interventions on aver-
age would appear to increase violent behavior. Each of these possible explanations will be
considered in the rest of this chapter.

3.2 Knowledge of Intervention and Conflict Contexts:
Conditions Under which Simultaneous Interven-
tions Affect Violence Differently

3.2.1 Setting the Stage for Simultaneous Interventions: Relevant
Conflict and Intervention Characteristics

The setting of conflict resolution efforts may alter the effectiveness of simultaneous inter-
ventions in reducing the level of violence. For instance, factors relating to both the size
and terrain of a nation experiencing civil conflict can create a more challenging setting for
implementing conflict resolution efforts and for third parties to prevent violence. Particu-
larly if simultaneous interventions are more likely in more difficult settings, these factors
should be taken into account.
Details on the conflict and country in which the intervention takes place are included from the PRIO-GRID dataset (Tollefsen et al. 2012), a collection of spatial data from a variety of sources. The data contains highly disaggregated information, spatially oriented into subnational grids. Because most conflict resolution efforts are oriented towards the entire conflict rather than individual regions, this project aggregates the spatial data to the level of the country using Gleditsch and Ward country codes (Gleditsch & Ward 1999). Thus, all the specific grids associated with a given country are summed or averaged as appropriate to generate measures of the conflict setting for each intervention. With the exception of population, these measures are time invariant.

Additional conflict resolution characteristics were coded using the intervention data to consider simultaneity among other intervention characteristics.

**Land Area**

The land area for a particular intervention is measured as the sum of square kilometers belonging to the country experiencing civil conflict, calculated using oblate spheroid assumptions (Weidmann et al. 2010). Conflicts over a larger land area may be more difficult for a conflict resolution effort to address. While this could mean greater chances of success for simultaneous interventions, the greater expanse may dilute the progress of ground efforts and require more input for similar levels of output as in smaller states. Additionally, states with greater territory may inherently have more diverse issues and disputants to be resolved.

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6 An extension of this project evaluating conflict resolution efforts at the subnational level would be a valuable contribution.

7 Notably missing from this selection of design characteristics is the type of conflict resolution effort, which is considered separately in Section 3.3.
Population

Population is measured as the sum of persons estimated in the conflict territory taken from the History Database of the Global Environment (Klein Goldewijk et al. 2011; Klein Goldewijk et al. 2010). This measure is only available in certain years: 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2005. Given these limitations, for each conflict resolution effort, population is recorded as the most recent estimate available prior to the beginning of the intervention.

Like the expected variance in intervention effectiveness based on the geographic size of a conflict area, the population of a nation experiencing civil conflict may impact the implementation of conflict resolution. For instance, a larger population may present a greater challenge in preventing violence, as there are more people present that could be involved. A greater population could also alter the costs and availability of information, both important factors in implementing an intervention.

Population is also useful in interpreting the outcome and likelihood of an intervention occurring. Levels of violence before and after a conflict resolution effort are measured as absolute counts of battle-deaths incurred. However, third parties evaluating the severity of a civil conflict may be more attentive to the relative amount of violence. In other words, fifty battle deaths in a populous nation – such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (2005 population of 53,258,331) – may not be evaluated the same as in a less populous nation – such as Sierra Leone (2005 population of 5,445,054). Thus, population may alter the probability of third parties intervening in the first place.

Urbanization and Travel Time

Urbanization is measured as the percent of land covered by urban area, following the FAO land cover classification system used by Globcover (Bontemps et al. 2011). Each grid

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8The author includes this argument and measure for thoroughness, but finds this perspective on the value and loss of human lives morally lacking.
indicates a proportion that is under artificial use and these proportions are averaged for all grids in a country to generate a measure of urbanization.

An estimate of travel time by land in minutes to the nearest major city, defined as more than 50,000 inhabitants, is included as an additional measure of the infrastructure and urban development in a conflict region. These estimates, averaged over the country, are taken from a map of accessibility developed for the European Union using network analysis on a combination of sources collected between 1990 and 2005 (Uchida & Nelson 2009). This measure not only captures the spread of urban centers across the country but also the ease with which disputants and third parties can travel between them. By reducing barriers to the start-up and spread of conflict resolution efforts, such development could minimize the resource and coverage advantages of simultaneous interventions over solitary efforts.

**Mountain Area**

Using the same reasonings of ease of start-up and spread but with the opposite expected relationship, a measurement of rough terrain is included. Mountain area is measured as the percent of land covered by mountainous terrain based on elevation, slope, and local elevation range taken by UNEP’s Mountain Watch Report (Blyth 2002). This percent is averaged across all grids associated with a state in civil conflict. Mountainous terrain may be associated with an increase in violence in civil conflicts as the terrain is difficult to traverse by third party interveners and provides shelter for rebel groups. Mountains divide territories into distinct regions which may create an opportunity for simultaneous interventions to be more successful than a solitary intervention. Especially for peace operations, rough terrain increases the application and need for resources (Williams 2016, 247). As discussed in Section 2.2.2, third parties conducting simultaneous interventions can divide labor regionally, making the physical barrier of rough terrain less relevant to the implementation of conflict resolution efforts.
Simultaneous Number

As each observation may overlap with more than one other conflict resolution effort, the number of simultaneous interventions is also considered. Extrapolating from work on the size of groups conducting multiparty mediation, the number of simultaneous interventions may have a curved relationship with intervention effectiveness where additional interventions increase success only up to a point (Böhmelt 2011, 860). Using the same procedure as with the binary simultaneous measure, for each conflict resolution effort, a count of how many other interventions in the same conflict overlap in time with it is also recorded. The median number of simultaneous interventions is four, but in one case, an intervention experienced more than two hundred simultaneous interventions. The case is a three year peace operation in Sudan during which over two hundred mediations were conducted.

Sequence Number

Based on the best available starting information for each intervention in a conflict, the conflict resolution efforts are ordered, and a sequence number is recorded. Conflict resolution efforts occurring later in the sequence may be able to capitalize on the progress and efforts of earlier interventions. In fact, the cumulative process of conflict resolution is considered important for success (Zartman 2005, 214). If learning actors are expected to repeat successful strategies and avoid unsuccessful ones, then interventions occurring later in the sequence should on average have more success in mitigating violence (Owsiak 2014, 66).

Alternatively, early interventions in the peace process, those with low sequence numbers, can be more effective due to lower costs and greater efficiency. For example, it is estimated that early intervention in Bosnia would have cost third parties approximately $10.8 billion compared to the some $53.7 billion actually spent in later interventions (Brown & Rose-
In contrast, interventions later in the process, those with higher sequence numbers, may be confronted with fewer options for action and a conflict setting worsened by greater irreparable losses (Zartman 2005, 201).

**Time Since Previous Intervention**

The amount of time in months since the previous intervention – if a previous intervention exists – is also recorded. This measure indicates the spread of conflict resolution efforts over time and can be understood as an additional measure of the “intensity” of the peace process.

**Intervention Duration**

The duration of the intervention is measured as the number of months between the start and end dates. Intervention duration likely relates both to the likelihood of simultaneous interventions occurring and the amount of violence after intervention. Shorter conflict resolution efforts offer fewer opportunities for concurrent interventions, reducing the likelihood of simultaneity. Additionally, more temporary interventions have less opportunity to effectively change conflict dynamics. The amount of violence after the conclusion of the intervention is also more likely to be driven by levels of violence before the intervention when the amount of time between these two measures is short.

### 3.2.2 Seeing the Bigger Picture: Simultaneous Interventions and Increased Violence in Context

A new model of battle deaths is estimated using the measure of simultaneous interventions in context of the conflict and intervention characteristics discussed above. Using this new

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9. The book provides a detailed account of the costs of conflict resolution efforts and a persuasive argument for early intervention, supported by dollar estimates and cost comparisons.

10. If the observed intervention is the first effort, then a placeholder value of 999,999 is used.
Figure 3.15: Predicted Battle Deaths After Simultaneous and Solitary Interventions in Context of Country and Intervention Characteristics
model, Figure 3.15 shows the estimated amount of violence after simultaneous (indicated by the blue point and line) and solitary (indicated by the green) conflict resolution efforts. Setting aside the variations in the other factors included in the model, a conflict resolution effort which is simultaneous experiences in its aftermath an estimated 41.8 battle deaths more than a solitary effort. In other words, controlling for the context of the conflict and other characteristics of the intervention relating to timing, conflicts still experience on average higher levels of violence after simultaneous interventions compared to solitary interventions.

![Coefficient Estimate Plot](image)

**Figure 3.16: Estimated Coefficients for Model Including Country and Intervention Characteristics**

Figure 3.16 contains a coefficient plot to allow a more detailed consideration of the specific factors included in the model. Excepting both measures of simultaneous interventions, land area, and urbanization, all the factors in the model have a negative relationship with the outcome, meaning higher levels correspond with lower levels of violence after interven-
tion. The blue points indicate factors whose relationship with the outcome of violence can be said is non-zero with 95% confidence. The red points indicate factors where there is not enough information to accurately estimate the relationship with violence or the relationship is close enough to zero that it cannot be distinguished with confidence.

**Simultaneous Number**

![Graph showing the modeled relationship between number of simultaneous interventions and predicted battle-deaths after intervention.](image)

**Figure 3.17: Predicted Battle Deaths Across Number of Simultaneous Interventions**

In addition to a simple measure of whether simultaneous interventions occur, the number of simultaneous interventions is also considered. Current observations in the literature suggest that the number of simultaneous interventions has an inverted u-shaped relationship with successful conflict resolution ([Böhmelt 2011](#)). Given this expectation, a polynomial of simultaneous number is included. The polynomial permits a curved relationship if relevant. Figure 3.17 shows the modeled relationship between number of simultaneous interventions and predicted battle-deaths after intervention. In agreement with the numerical results
which show that the squared term of simultaneous number does not have a statistically non-zero relationship with the successful mitigation of violence, Figure 3.17 reveals a relatively linear relationship. Though additional analysis and exploration is needed to conclude that no u-shaped relationship exists outside the observations in this sample, the polynomial is not relevant in this analysis. Conflict resolution efforts with larger numbers of other interventions overlapping in time do experience higher levels of violence in the aftermath. In other words, like the occurrence of simultaneous interventions, more conflict resolution efforts appear to leave conflicts with more not less violence.

Population and Travel Time

Additionally, it is worth exploring the characteristics of the conflict setting in which interventions take place. Figures 3.18 and 3.19 show predicted amounts of violence after solitary and simultaneous conflict resolution efforts across a range of values for two of these characteristics: population and travel time.

A larger population has a negative relationship with violence after an intervention, meaning conflicts taking place in countries with larger populations experience on average less violence after a conflict resolution effort. This relationship holds regardless of whether the intervention is a solitary effort or occurs simultaneously; however, Figure 3.18 show how the expected difference between simultaneous and solitary efforts changes as the population of the country experiencing civil conflict grows. While there is a difference of approximately 146 battle-related deaths between simultaneous and solitary interventions in contexts of small populations around a half-million, that difference in predicted violence becomes almost indistinguishable in large populations of approximately 45 million.

The model also suggests that conflict resolution efforts in more rural conflict settings experience less violence. Although simultaneous interventions maintain higher levels of violence in the aftermath than solitary interventions across the range of this factor, longer...
Figure 3.18: Predicted Battle Deaths After Simultaneous and Solitary Interventions Across Population Sizes
Figure 3.19: Predicted Battle Deaths After Simultaneous and Solitary Interventions Across Average Travel Time
travel times to the nearest city on average across a country experiencing civil conflict see lower numbers of battle-deaths after intervention. Note this relationship is true regardless of population size and amount of urbanization in the country. Arguably, travel time captures the level of infrastructure and ease with which third parties can traverse the conflict zone to mitigate violence. However, greater infrastructure also means disputants can more easily travel to highly populated areas increasing the likelihood of violent events. These results suggest that simultaneous interventions may be more inhibited in successful conflict resolution by the lack of infrastructure and easy travel than solitary interventions.

3.2.3 Choosing the Hard Cases: Simultaneous Interventions in More Violent Conflicts

The result of higher levels of violence observed after simultaneous interventions compared to solitary interventions may not be puzzling if more third parties choose to become involved in the more violent conflicts. Either because they tend to receive greater international attention or because the consequences of conflict are more dire, the more challenging cases — conflicts with higher levels of violence — may attract more actors. In confirmation of this, past examples show that the number of third parties and intervention structures increased following each major outbreak of violence (Bhattarai 2016, 417).

The complexity of conflicts with more deaths may contribute to third party decision to intervene independently or alongside other efforts, naturally resulting in a larger number of interventions in conflict periods which have higher levels of violence. Moreover, by extension of more interventions occurring, it is more likely that independent efforts overlap in time; thus, a simultaneous intervention is more likely in conflicts with higher levels of violence. If this were the case, then the observed puzzle is not due to a failure on part of the interveners but instead simply indicates multiple efforts are made to tackle the hardest
problems.

**Implications for Other Relationships**

Problematically, this kind of selection effect is extremely difficult to model or account for. The process and rationale used by third parties to intervene is obscured from outside observation. Additionally, it is impossible to ascertain the timeframe policymakers use to determine when to intervene, whether the previous month’s death count or the previous two months’ or an indeterminate projection of future violence.

However, if third parties are selecting to intervene in more violent conflicts, a few observable relationships should exist. First, if more interventions occur in more violent conflicts, then a positive correlation should exist between the number of interventions and the level of violence. Second, if the large number of battle deaths observed after simultaneous interventions is due simply to the conflict itself being more violent, then higher levels of violence in the period before an intervention – when third parties would reasonably be choosing to intervene – should correlate with the observed higher levels of violence after the intervention.

Figure 3.20 shows the relationship between the amount of violence in a conflict and the number of simultaneous interventions. If indeed third parties are drawn to intervene simultaneously in more violent conflicts, then there should be an obvious relationship. As can be seen in Figure 3.20, there is not a clear positive pattern in the observed intervention. The levels of violence prior to the intervention and the number of simultaneous efforts have a negligible relationship \( r = 0.059 \), shown by the line in Figure 3.20.

Figure 3.21 shows the relationship between the amount of violence before and after intervention. If higher levels of violence after simultaneous interventions are a result of third parties taking on the hard cases, then there should be a strong relationship in the number of deaths across time. However, as can be seen in Figure 3.21, this is not the
Figure 3.20: Relationship between Number of Simultaneous Interventions and Violence Before Intervention

Figure 3.21: Relationship between Violence Before and After Intervention
case. Far from the perfect correlation shown by the black line, violence before and after intervention has only a weakly positive relationship \( (r = 0.219) \), shown by the blue line in Figure 3.21.

**More or Less: Simultaneous Interventions and Increased Violence Across Intensity Levels**

Although the above results are suggestive that third parties conducting simultaneous conflict resolution efforts are not simply taking on the hard cases, the level of violence shortly before the initiation of an intervention is relevant to the conflict setting. Including a measure of the violent context in which the interventions take place enables estimation of how many battle-deaths are likely to occur after a simultaneous intervention compared to a solitary intervention given the same level of violence when they started.\(^{11}\) The resulting levels of violence after simultaneous interventions is re-estimated along with a measure of violence beforehand: the three-month sum of the number of battle deaths immediately before the start date of the conflict resolution effort.

Figure 3.22 compares the predicted number of battle-deaths after a solitary intervention and a simultaneous intervention based on the model including the complete set of conflict and intervention characteristics as well as a measure of violence before the intervention took place. Holding levels of violence and the other conflict and intervention characteristics constant, simultaneous interventions are expected to have on average 37.4 battle deaths more in the aftermath than solitary efforts.

The addition of violence before intervention does not greatly change the estimated impact on conflict dynamics nor, as can be seen in Figure 3.23 change the other esti-

\(^{11}\) An important caveat to this understanding is that these estimates would be extrapolations - inferring relationships beyond the scope of available data - if simultaneous interventions do select into the hard cases. In other words, if the conflict resolution efforts initiated during periods of low violence are different in some way not accounted for here and that way is related to the likelihood that the effort is simultaneous than those efforts initiated in periods of more violence, then the following results are essentially comparing apples and oranges.
Figure 3.22: Predicted Battle Deaths After Simultaneous and Solitary Interventions in Context of Levels of Violence Before Intervention, Conflict Setting, and Intervention Characteristics
Figure 3.23: Estimated Coefficients for Model in Context of Levels of Violence Before Intervention, Conflict Setting, and Intervention Characteristics
mated relationships. The number of battle-deaths before an intervention has a positive relationship with the number of battle-deaths after an intervention. As expected from the correlation measures, the relationship is very small but statistically significant with 95% confidence.

![Graph](image)

Figure 3.24: Predicted Battle Deaths After Simultaneous and Solitary Interventions Across Levels of Violence Before Intervention

To provide a clearer picture, Figure 3.24 shows the predicted violence after solitary and simultaneous interventions across a range of violence prior to the intervention. Regardless of the level of violence before intervening, simultaneous conflict resolution efforts consistently have higher violence in the aftermath compared to solitary interventions.
3.3 Knowledge of Intervention Types: Varying Success of Conflict Resolution Strategies when Occurring Simultaneously

3.3.1 Conflict Resolution Types: Scope and Trends

Conflict resolution efforts are most commonly studied based on the specific type of effort. Scholars tend to specialize in the occurrence and implementation of one type which has yielded a wealth of literature on when and how third parties conduct certain conflict resolution efforts. When considering the interaction of multiple interventions, the type of efforts cannot be ignored. This project considers four specific types of interventions: peace operation, fact finding mission, good office, and mediation. The frequency of these interventions over time is show in Figure 3.25. Mediation efforts occur most frequently, but all conflict resolution types occur with some consistency across time.

Of particular interest for this project is how conflict resolution types relate to simultaneity. Table 3.3 displays the number of simultaneous and solitary interventions observed in each category of conflict resolution type.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3.3: Distribution of Simultaneous Interventions Across Types</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Good Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solitary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simultaneous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Additionally, Figure 3.26 shows the relationship between type and simultaneity over time. The dark blue lines in Figure 3.26 show the distribution of simultaneous interventions of that type over time; whereas, the light blue lines show the same for solitary interventions. With the exception of a noticable shift towards simultaneous good offices in later years,
most conflict resolution types have relatively similar distributions of simultaneous and solitary efforts.

Before considering the implications of different types of simultaneous conflict resolution efforts, the scope of each category is more clearly defined.

**Peace Operation**

Peace operations have a variety of definitions and understandings in scholarly literature. Often categorized into traditional and multifunctional or multidimensional peace operations, defining peace operations are particularly difficult given the variety of actors and mandates involved (Brown & Rosecrance 1999, 14). In addition to the traditional distinction, peace operations may also be called peacekeeping, peacebuilding, peace enforcement, peacemaking, and more (Diehl 2014, 487). Operations may be implemented by a single state, an ad hoc coalition of states, a regional organization, or most frequently an international organization.

This type of conflict resolution is used to tackle a wide range of military, political, and economic problems. Existing research suggests that peace operations are particularly successful at preventing future violence and maintaining periods of peace (Fortna 2008) (Doyle & Sambanis 2006). Although noting the limitations of peace operations in making peace, Doyle & Sambanis observe that a United Nations deployment can increase the effectiveness of missions conducted by states or regional organizations, suggesting that simultaneous peace operations may be more effective at mitigating violence than solitary efforts. Additionally, in a conflict setting, diplomatic efforts such as good offices and mediations without military support from a peace operation is “folly” (Zartman 2005, 228), suggesting that simultaneous peace operations may increase the effectiveness of other conflict resolution efforts.

Observations of peace operations are taken from DADM’s Third Party Peacekeeping
Figure 3.25: Trends of Conflict Resolution Types over Time

Figure 3.26: Trends of Simultaneous and Solitary Conflict Resolution Types over Time
dataset, which contains 61 individual interventions in this project’s conflicts (Mullenbach 2013). In considering the role of simultaneous interventions, peace operations are defined in the data according to three criteria: type of personnel, command and control, and function (Mullenbach 2013, 107). Key characteristics include the deployment of primarily military personnel to preserve or enhance the security of a conflict environment. Notably, this definition intends to exclude military interventions and civilian-driven humanitarian efforts.\(^\text{12}\)

**Fact Finding Mission**

Fact finding missions are conflict resolution efforts intended to collect and establish the accuracy of information regarding the conflict, disputants, or relevant third parties. Despite a generally common purpose - finding the facts - these efforts can be quite varied. Ranging from a single person to large missions, fact finding interventions typically have a specific mandate seeking certain information, such as determining the causes of conflict, the role of external states, or investigating human rights abuses among many others (Brown & Rosecrance 1999, 12). Although more common in the early stages of conflicts as violence is first emerging, fact finding missions appear in every stage of the peace process, attempting conflict prevention, management, and resolution. As expected, fact finding missions contribute information which can be used to more successfully conduct simultaneous conflict resolution efforts.

**Good Office**

The vagueness of good offices suits practitioners who need a flexible, umbrella category to supply a range of diplomatic needs; however, the varied activities and mandates make good offices difficult to identify and evaluate by scholars. For the purposes of this project,

\(^{12}\)Full details of the datasets definition are available in Appendix A
good offices generally refer to diplomatic efforts that do not fit into talks or fact finding missions, rather good offices are understood as efforts to facilitate but not participate in mediated efforts (Melander & von Uexkull 2011). In other words, good offices generally provide resources and diplomatic access to the peace process. Good offices may open new negotiation avenues (Crocker et al. 2001, 63) enhancing the effectiveness of simultaneous efforts in resolving the conflict and mitigating violence.

**Mediation**

A mediation is a diplomatic effort when a third party participates in or facilitates negotiations between the disputants in a conflict. Third parties frequently conduct various forms of mediations as it is considered a low cost effort and easy way to be seen as doing something to fix the problem (Owsiak 2014; Brown & Rosecrance 1999, 12). Though there has yet to be a comprehensive study detailing the mechanisms by which mediation succeeds in resolving conflicts and mitigating violence, the conflict resolution effort is widely studied (Greig & Diehl 2012; Beardsley 2012; Bercovitch & Houston 2000). For this project, mediations are talks in which the disputants negotiate in the presence of a third party (Melander & von Uexkull 2011).

### 3.3.2 Mixing and Matching: Type Matters for Simultaneous Interventions and Violence in Civil Conflicts

**Intervention Types**

In the data, each observation represents a specific intervention which may or may not overlap in time with other interventions. For each observation, the type of conflict resolution effort is recorded as one of the previously described categories in a set of four indicator variables. These variables take a value of 1 if the observed intervention is that type of
conflict resolution effort and 0 otherwise. Because these categories are mutually exclusive, only three of the four indicators of type are included in analysis. This is to avoid perfect collinearity - meaning that knowing the value of three of the indicators perfectly informs what the value of the fourth is – which biases the results. The estimated effects are then to be understood as the expected change in violence for the indicated type of conflict resolution effort compared to the missing category, in this case good offices.

Based on a model including conflict and intervention characteristics, previous levels of violence, and the specific type of intervention, Figure 3.27 shows the estimated effect of simultaneous interventions compared to solitary interventions on levels of violence in a conflict.

![Figure 3.27: Predicted Battle Deaths After Simultaneous and Solitary Interventions, Regardless of Type](image)

Beyond any variations in the effectiveness of specific types of interventions, simultaneous conflict resolution efforts have on average 114.4 more deaths in the three months after the
intervention is complete than solitary efforts. This suggests that a conflict resolution effort that overlaps in time with other interventions is expected to leave a conflict with more violence than an intervention that was the only effort at that time, regardless of what type of effort is made. Broadly speaking, these combined results suggest a persistent negative impact from multiple interventions in the same time and conflict.

To further unpack the variations among simultaneous interventions of different types, an interaction term is included in the model. Whereas the previous model estimated the average effect of an intervention being simultaneous, the interaction model estimates the specific impact of each type being simultaneous. In other words, the interaction captures the effect that an intervention of a specific type has on the conflicts violence when that intervention is simultaneous and solitary.

Figure 3.28 displays the results of this interactive model. Notably, simultaneity results in higher predicted levels of violence across most of the intervention types, consistent with the average results in Figure 3.27. The exception to this trend is among fact finding missions, though there is not enough information to have confidence in the negative relationship. Despite the consistent trend of increased violence after simultaneous interventions, type does matter.

Good offices, peace operations, and mediations are all expected to leave conflicts with more violence when occurring simultaneously, but the difference from solitary efforts varies across the types. Mediations that overlap in time with other interventions are expected to have 37.9 more battle deaths in the aftermath than solitary mediation efforts. On the other end of the spectrum, peace operations that overlap in time with other interventions are expected to have 134.79 more battle deaths than a solitary peace operation. Similarly, good offices are expected to have 114.36 more battle deaths after a simultaneous effort than a solitary effort.
Figure 3.28: Predicted Battle Deaths After Simultaneous and Solitary Interventions of Different Types

**Simultaneous Types**

The type of the observed intervention is not the only relevant strategy to consider. For any given conflict resolution effort, the type of other interventions overlapping in time with the given effort may be relevant. Most simply, this effect can be thought of as the change in violence when adding a specific type of intervention to any conflict resolution effort. Figure 3.29 details the estimated coefficients of the model including types of simultaneous efforts. It is notable that the type of the observed intervention has no discernable relationship with the resulting levels of violence once accounting for the simultaneous interventions.

Rather than being compared exclusively to solitary efforts - those with no other interventions overlapping in time - interventions with a specific type of simultaneous effort is
compared to any intervention that does not overlap in time with that type. This includes both solitary efforts and simultaneous interventions that overlap only with other types of interventions. Additionally, unlike the indicators for conflict resolution type above, all four categories for type of simultaneous intervention are included. An observed conflict resolution effort may have more than one type of other interventions occurring simultaneously or none at all, meaning the categories of simultaneous type are not mutually exclusive or completely informative.

Figure 3.30 highlights variations between the different types of simultaneous interventions. Whereas types in Figure 3.28 referred to the observed intervention only, Figure 3.30 explores the type of the overlapping interventions and how that type alters the effectiveness
of the observed intervention. Note this effect is averaged across types of the observed intervention, so estimates are only for changes in the type of simultaneously occurring efforts. Additionally, these estimates are only for the presence of simultaneous types and cannot be extrapolated to how many simultaneous interventions occurred.

![Graph showing predicted battle deaths across types of simultaneous interventions](image)

Figure 3.30: Predicted Battle Deaths Across Types of Simultaneous Interventions

Considering lower levels of violence after intervention as success, conflict resolution efforts occurring simultaneously with fact finding missions and peace operations are expected to be more successful than solitary efforts or efforts occurring only with other types of simultaneous interventions. A conflict with an intervention of any type that overlaps in time with a fact finding mission is expected to have on average 43.3 fewer battle-related deaths than an intervention of any type that did not have a simultaneous fact finding mission. Interventions with a simultaneous peace operation are also predicted to have 43 fewer deaths in the aftermath. As peace operations are primarily intended to prevent violence, it is not
surprising that peace operations have a more distinguished effect in reducing the amount of violence than the other more diplomatic efforts.

In contrast, interventions with a simultaneous good office or mediation - both more diplomatic types of conflict resolution efforts - leave conflicts with higher levels of violence. An intervention overlapping in time with a good office will have on average 37 more battle deaths in the aftermath than a solitary effort or intervention occurring simultaneously with other types of efforts. An intervention with a simultaneous mediation is expected to leave a conflict with 49.2 more battle-deaths.

These results demonstrate that interventions are not independent, and characteristics of completely distinct efforts can alter how successful an intervention is in mitigating violence. Much more exploration is needed to identify the nature of that dependency and more clearly establish how interventions affect each other.
Chapter 4

New Perspective, New Concepts: Coordination among Simultaneous Interventions Changes Outcomes

4.1 Understanding Coordination as Common Actor Involvement

4.1.1 Coordination in Conflict Resolution Literature

As the international community is faced with rising numbers of interventions - and the resulting consequences for conflict resolution - the question of how to manage conflict management has emerged as a pressing issue. Some interaction between distinct conflict resolution efforts has become inevitable and efforts are already being made to construct positive interactions through coordination. For example, “partnership peacekeeping” has become “the norm on the [African] continent” (Williams 2016, 239).

The international community’s desire to address “complex conflict systems requires a
complex, multifaceted response” (Aal 2016, 16). However, coordination is needed to make those responses effective (Crocker 2016, 271). Research on conflict resolution “must therefore grasp connections between a multiplicity of organizational actors on the international level and the implementation level” (Junk 2012, 247).

This pressing issue has gained attention among practitioners as well as scholars of international relations, negotiation and conflict resolution, development, humanitarian relief, and security studies (Nan & Strimling 2006, 1). In response to the issue of coordination, practitioners have produced a body of literature predominantly focused on how to strategically achieve coordination, while a few scholars have examined instances of coordinated interventions in specific case studies.

In addressing coordination between interventions, practitioners of conflict resolution have focused on mechanisms to promote coordination. Generally from the perspective of the international community but also including non-governmental organization and civil society efforts, authors argue peacemakers “must focus on achieving coordination” (Nderitu 2016, 233). This work rarely includes empirical analysis to confirm the implicit assumption that coordination has a positive impact on the peace process. Instead, practitioners engage in detailed and informed theoretical discussions of the conditions and contexts in which coordination is more likely to occur as well as how interested parties can manipulate those conditions to foster coordination (Whitfield 2008, Roberts & Bradley 2005).

On the other hand, scholarly work discussing the interaction of conflict resolution efforts has largely been based on the experience of a handful of conflict interventions (Bhattarai 2016, 400). For example, previous work analyzing case studies include conflicts in Georgia-Abkhazia (Nan & Garb 2006), Tajikistan and Ecuador-Peru (Hansen 2012), Nepal and the Philippines (Bhattarai 2016), and Australia’s interventions in Bougainville, East Timor, and the Solomon Islands (Gordon IV & Campbell 2016). The availability of these detailed
case studies is invaluable to developing consistent understandings of what is and what is not coordination, but it is not possible to identify trends such as how coordination alters conflict dynamics. As such, these accounts are “a starting point” for more rigorous and systematic research (Hansen 2012, 246; Böhmelt 2011, 864).

Scholars argue “there is no doubt” that tensions and interactions between actors at various levels complicate conflict resolution efforts across the board (Aall 2016, 16), but previous literature has largely ignored how these actors interact and coordinate their efforts (Böhmelt 2011, 859). There is an unmet “need for rigorous empirical analysis, not only of coordination efforts, but of the broader processes coordination is intended to support” (Nan & Strimling 2006, 3). Any research combining theoretical and empirical contributions in a systematic way is “surprisingly rare” (Böhmelt 2011, 860).

By adopting the perspective of simultaneous conflict resolution efforts proposed here, more thorough empirical evaluation of concepts such as coordination are possible. This project aims to begin the process by advancing a theoretical framework on the advantages of coordinated simultaneous interventions and empirically analyzing the short-term effect coordination has on levels of violence.

4.1.2 Coordination in Practice: Defining the Concept

Unsurprisingly the ways in which conflict resolution efforts have attempted coordination are varied, making it a difficult concept to clearly define. Some authors contend that coordination is “when diverse third parties realize they have similar intervention goals” (Bhattarai 2016, 417) while others argue more is needed for true coordination.

Although having compatible interests may be one component, a more thorough consideration of coordination includes both organizational and political components. Identifying coordinated efforts generally includes a range of options: resource and information shar-

\[\text{crocker et al. (1999)}\]
ing, formal partnerships, joint planning, coherent strategy, and division of labor (Bhattarai 2016; Nan & Strimling 2006; Crocker et al. 2001; Whitfield 2008). Additionally, coordinated interventions will diminish the possibility that other third parties will undermine the peace process (Crocker et al. 2001, 65).

In the more formal versions of coordination, third parties have occasionally formed ad hoc groups to conduct interventions in a given conflict. These coalitions include contact groups, groups of friends, friends of a country, and implementation or monitoring groups (Whitfield 2008, 20-21; Bhattarai 2016, 401). Moreover, each type of group has developed sets of norms regarding coordination. For instance, Friends of a country generally focus on sharing information and mobilizing international attention and resources, such as in the Central African Republic and Guinea-Bissau (Bhattarai 2016, 401).

The dynamic between the African Union and the United Nations provides but one example of successful institutionalized coordination. The partnership between these organizations is “arguably broader and deeper than any other actor” and spans a range of institutional and operational levels (Williams 2016, 248). Cooperation extends from both headquarters through all levels to field missions, includes annual consultations, joint field assessments and mission planning, a 10-year resource sharing initiative, and the formation of several bodies to coordination the implementation and logistics of efforts (Williams 2016, 248).

Offering perhaps the most concise definition of what activities are entailed in coordination, Bhattarai suggests that coordinated interventions are when “third parties – regardless of their origin, power status or role - make attempts such as consultation, coalition and network formation, division of labor, resource sharing and joint planning to work together in various phases of an armed conflict” (Bhattarai 2016, 398). These activities serve as a foundation to identify coordinated efforts for this project.
**Alternative Concept: Subsidiarity**

One approach to confronting the plethora of conflict resolution efforts is coordination through subsidiarity. Subsidiarity as a principle encourages international actors to coordinate their interventions by taking turns, starting with those most proximate to the conflict (Aall 2016, 13). For an African civil conflict, regional economic communities would conduct the first attempt to resolve the conflict, followed by the African Union and then the United Nations, with actors overlapping as needed.

However, subsidiarity as a guiding principle has its limitations. Subsidiarity relies on the abilities and interests of proximate actors as a starting point for resolution efforts. Additionally, success of the principle requires international consensus and smooth hand-offs. Both requirements suffer in practice, meaning subsidiarity “cannot provide a sound and acceptable basis for … peace interventions in Africa” (Nathan 2016, 166).

Subsidiarity dictates that the most proximate actor leads initial conflict resolution efforts. Starting with more proximate actors for intervention in African civil conflicts risks actors with limited capacity and expertise as well as interventions driven by divisive partisan interests rather than a goal of preventing violence (Nathan 2016, 166). Specifically, regional economic communities and neighboring states have partisan interests which can be a liability to the entire peace process (Nathan 2016, 164; Zartman 2016). The partisanship of first level actors - applauded as potentially motivating quick response and opening new channels for negotiation by proponents of subsidiarity - is “a curse as much as a blessing” (Nathan 2016, 167).

Rather than coordination of simultaneous interventions, subsidiarity primarily involves coordination of sequential interventions. Such sequencing requires smooth transitions in order to maintain progress. Empirically, however, “problems of handoff between one peacemaker and the next are all too frequently encountered” (Böhmelt 2011, 864). Transitioning between actors commonly foments misunderstandings and conflicting interpretations about
implementation. Additionally, a lack of international consensus on subsidiarity as a guiding principle has meant that it has been inconsistently applied, resulting in the confusion and competing interventions the principle is intended to avoid (Nathan 2016, 166).

These complications of subsidiarity are not easily corrected, meaning that “subsidiarity and proximity in peacemaking are not an unqualified good” (Nathan 2016, 166). But, coordinated simultaneous interventions can augment limited resources, temper partisan interests, and preclude the need for hand-offs. Rather than pursue the guiding principle of subsidiarity and encourage the international community to pass responsibility from one actor to the next, peacemakers should focus on coordination and partnership (Nathan 2016, 167).

**Alternative Concept: Hierarchy**

One suggested solution to the complications of simultaneous interventions is to establish a hierarchy among international actors or the conflict resolution efforts themselves.

Systematically applying the concept of hierarchy among interventions fits well into existing academic theories of escalating intervention (for example, see Owsiak 2015) and approaches of recording only the highest level of intervention in a given time period. However, the advantages of the concept - such as division of labor and unified strategy - are not limited to hierarchical systems. Additionally, these alternatives may avoid hierarchy’s implicit assumption that more interventionist efforts - such as peace operations - are improvements over “lower level” efforts - such as good offices.

Hierarchy can also be established on a case-by-case basis through established leadership among the third parties intervening. This concept was the inspiration behind the appointment of a United Nations Secretary General’s Special Representative to most conflicts (Boutros-Ghali 1995). Particularly when there are multiple tracks of negotiation with no common actors, a clear leader and delegation of authority may be important to the
peace process (Crocker et al., 2001, 57).

However, establishing an authority figure in a context of conflict is not without risks. Leadership is only effective when there is consensus on who the leader is as well as a general willingness to follow. In practice, one institution asserting its authority to assume a leadership role flares tensions among third party interveners and may be viewed as “impos[ing] its vision and operating methods on others” (Aall 2016, 16).

The calls for leadership among simultaneous interventions primarily seek the efficiency advantages of a clear division of labor and shared goals (Crocker 1996). These are advantages of coordination, for which leadership is but one means to the end.

4.1.3 Common Actor Involvement as Coordination

Despite its importance to conflict resolution efforts, scholars lament the lack of “solid theoretical/policy framework or any standard and identifiable set of indicators that could assist us in recognizing the occurrence of third-party coordination” (Bhattarai 2016, 403).

Evaluating the consequences of coordination in a systematic way is impaired in at least two ways. As discussed above, coordination as a concept is somewhat fluid with a range of plausible definitions. Further problematizing the study of coordination is the general secrecy with which the international community conducts conflict resolution efforts.

This combination of factors necessitates the use of a proxy measure, an observable indicator which ideally closely maps coordination. For this project, coordination is measured as occurring when simultaneous interventions have at least one common actor involved $(X_{coord} = 1)$. By contrast, if simultaneous conflict resolution efforts have completely unique sets of actors, then they are considered uncoordinated $(X_{coord} = 0)$. 88
Coordinated

Note: more than one actor may be involved in each intervention

\[ \text{Actor}_1 \]
\[ \quad \text{Intervention}_{1,t} \quad \text{Intervention}_{2,t} \]

Simultaneous

Note: more than one actor may be involved in each intervention

\[ \text{Actor}_1 \quad \text{Actor}_2 \]
\[ \quad \text{Intervention}_{1,t} \quad \text{Intervention}_{2,t} \]

Solitary

\[ \text{Actor}_1 \]
\[ \quad \text{Intervention}_{1,t} \]

Multiparty

\[ \text{Actor}_1 \quad \text{Actor}_2 \]
\[ \quad \text{Intervention}_{1,t} \]

Sequential

\[ \text{Actor}_1 \]
\[ \quad \text{Intervention}_{1,t} \quad \text{Intervention}_{2,t+1} \]

Figure 4.1: Types of Intervention Contexts: Coordinated, Simultaneous, and others
Coordination Proxy: Common Actor Involvement

Common actor involvement is a well-suited proxy for an initial test of the coordination concept. It is a conservative measure that is unlikely to identify simultaneous interventions as coordinated when they are not. In other words, it is unlikely that interventions with a common actor would have incompatible goals; further, having common membership between interventions ensures a common pool of information and resources. However, this advantage comes at a price. The proxy is limited since common actors in simultaneous interventions is not a requirement for coordination. Thus, the indicator is likely missing instances of coordination between unique sets of actors. Though this is unfortunate and should be addressed in future studies, the missing instances of coordinated interventions likely means any effect identified here is smaller than the actual impact coordinated interventions have on levels of violence.

The extent of what qualifies as “involvement” is worth noting. Coordination is likely to occur when the actors actually implementing the effort are common between those simultaneous interventions. In contrast, simply having common membership between international organizations for instance does not ensure coordination. As an example, the member states of the regional economic communities in Africa are also members of the African Union and members of the United Nations, but “the fact that there is overlapping membership . . . has not necessarily helped to smooth relationships among the institutions” [Aal, 2016, 12]. This distinction is largely because being a member of an organization does not necessarily mean decision-making over every intervention made by that organization.

An alternative way to capture coordination of interventions is the compatibility of the interventions’ stated goals. Not all conflict resolution efforts publicly announce their intentions at the outset, introducing a strategically selected missingness. Setting aside the difficulties in quantifying this compatibility, such a measure also fails to align fully with coordination. Additionally, “competition abounds” even among those interventions “who
formally espouse the same ends” (Whitfield 2008, 20). Compatibility of intervention goals is but one aspect of coordination.

**Interventions with Common Actors are Coordinated**

When interventions have a common actor involved, many of the mechanisms of coordination occur naturally meaning “very little coordination actually needs to occur” (Hansen 2012, 245). In other words, instances of simultaneous interventions with common actors likely demonstrate the characteristics of coordination - and the resulting outcomes for the conflict - without needing institutionalized or formal coordination efforts. In this sense, common membership of interveners is also a signal of the less observable efforts to coordinate simultaneous interventions.

Common actors in simultaneous interventions inherently means there is a common informational basis on which the interventions will be designed and implemented. A lack of common basis promotes incompatibility among the actors involved in simultaneous efforts. This incompatibility limits the utility of the actor and creates “sensitivities to be managed and negotiated in addition to those of the conflict parties” (Whitfield 2008, 22). Simultaneous interventions with a common actor have a clear point of focus rather than permitting the distractions of various competing initiatives. In Angola for example, the involvement of the United Nations’ Special Representative, Maitre Alouine Blondin Beye, across negotiations in the peace process was an overriding element that was key to the effectiveness of conflict resolution efforts (Crocker et al. 2001, 58). Further, the fact that the same actor chose to be involved in distinct simultaneous interventions indicates a higher level of compatibility between the interventions in terms of the goals and implementation strategies.

Simultaneous interventions with common actors also inherently achieve many of the unobservable conditions for coordination. Analogously, the branches of a peace operation
are distinct but dependent functions which require careful coordination for the success of the
peace operation as a whole. Specifically, the performance of the peace operation depends on
the development of links “based on the reciprocity of trust and respect” between the distinct
branches (Junk 2012, 250). A common actor involved in simultaneous interventions of any
type is more able to generate these links between the interventions goals and strategies but
also subsumes this need for trust and respect.

A crucial aspect of coordinated interventions is consistency. Consistency and homogeneity
of the intervening parties - specifically Libya, Indonesia, and Saudi Arabia – contributed
to coordination and success of conflict resolution efforts in the Philippines. These three
nations monopolized the efforts, consistently involved in simultaneous and sequential inter-
ventions across different stages of the peace process (Bhattarai 2016, 414). Common actors
conducting conflict resolution efforts ensures greater consistency. Identifying this impor-
tance over twenty years ago, former Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Gali emphasized
the need for common actors across simultaneous interventions by the United Nations and
regional actors in order to maintain consistency and coordination (Boutros-Ghali 1995, 21).

4.2 It’s Better Together: Advantages of Coordination

4.2.1 Coordinated Goals Increase Coherence by Tempering and
Unifying Interests

Common intervention goals among diverse third parties is a crucial component of coordi-
nation (Bhattarai 2016, 417). In fact, failure to agree on “a consistent and coherent agenda
for peace” doomed conflict resolution efforts in Angola (Böhmelt 2011, 264). Coordinating
the goal and vision of conflict resolution efforts has the advantage of narrowing in a con-
structive way. The compromise necessary to achieve a common goal 1) tempers the side
interests of third parties and 2) presents a unified position by the international community to the disputants. The process of tempering and unifying expectations avoids exploitation by either the third parties or the disputants as well as achieving a coherent agenda for conflict resolution.

**Tempering Avoids Side-Tracking**

The coordination process, in achieving a common goal for peaceful resolution, has the added advantage of tempering narrow interests of the participating actors, enabling a more inclusive goal and avoiding the distractions of special interest driven outcomes (Zartman 2005, 211). For a peace operation, actors pursuing individual goals “creates division within the force, adds to the difficulties ... and increases the risk of casualties” (Boutros-Ghali 1995, 10).

Third party interventions in civil conflicts, even purely for the purposes of conflict resolution, must be sensitive to the government’s right of sovereignty. Coordination between simultaneous interventions creates a level of transparency and informal oversight of potentially contentious interventions.

This transparency can build credibility with the disputants and prevent misperceptions of intentions (Wedgwood 1996, 277). Additionally, a balance of actors in a set of simultaneous interventions can achieve “neutrality” in politically divided areas through a process of coordinating goals. This solution was proposed by peacemakers in the United States as a solution for the controversial conflict resolution efforts in Cambodia (Solomon 1999, 292).

An intervention’s credibility with disputants is crucial to achieving its objectives. Uncoordinated interventions with disparate goals leave the impression that conflict resolution efforts are serving the policy objectives of third parties rather than prioritizing peace. This impression “inevitably undermines ... legitimacy and effectiveness” (Boutros-Ghali 1995, 292).
A coordinated intervention, with the de facto oversight from partnering actors, lessens the risk that intervening states abuse the right to enter by overstaying or acting beyond the invited mandates (Zartman 2005, 13). While there may be implications for short-term violence in particularly egregious violations, third-party abuse undermines the credibility of conflict resolution efforts and potentially contributes to destabilization in the region, both having a deteriorating effect on sustainable peace.

Unifying Avoids Forum-shopping

The advantages of diverse opportunities have limits. The influx of a large number of third party actors in disparate efforts can undermine rather than demonstrate a determination for resolution. United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon emphasized that competing rather than coordinating these efforts allows disputants to go forum shopping and play peacemakers against each other. The fragmentation of the third party approaches to resolve the conflict is thus projected into the dispute and further complicates efforts to reduce violence (Böhmelt 2011, 860).

For example, despite the overwhelming show of interest, the sheer number of mediations and lack of coordination between them in Burundi’s civil conflict undermined the international community’s claimed commitment to peace as each special envoy had a “special agenda.” As a result, these initiatives largely failed to address the problems and prevent further violence (Crocker et al. 2001, 57).

Scholars and practitioners urge conflict resolution efforts to be guided by a principle of coherence (Crocker 1996, 190; Whitfield 2008, 20; Nan & Garb 2006). In a positive example, the coordination and coherence of interventions in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict positively influenced the establishment of durable conflict resolution networks (Böhmelt 2011, 863). Not only will coordination among interventions present a unified front to
the disputants, but will also deter interventions that would be counterproductive to the coherent goal formed (Wedgwood 1996 277).

Failure to coordinate interventions and unify around a coherent goal has extensive consequences, even beyond those specific simultaneous interventions. Specifically, incoherence in conflict resolution reduces effectiveness, increases costs, saps the credibility of international actors, and even undermines the peace process as a whole (Whitfield 2008 20). While coherence is a useful principle even in solitary interventions, the importance is compounded in cases of simultaneous interventions (Crocker 1996 190).

In Cambodia, it was the variety of opportunities repeatedly offered by regional actors attempting at least seven distinct interventions\(^2\) that opened the door to forum shopping by the disputants (Crocker et al. 2001 57).

Additionally, in the aftermath of the Cold War, a failure to coordinate a coherent goal for conflict resolution created missed opportunities for preventing additional violence in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Many international actors were involved - including the United States, Russia, the United Nations, and Sweden - but the simultaneous interveners failed to coordinate their goals. This lack of coordination allowed disputants to “shop around” and no resolution was found at that time (Maresca 1996 256-257).

More broadly, the United Nations, the African Union, and regional economic communities (RECs) provide a range of relevant conflict resolution actors for civil conflicts in Africa. Even with a common goal of preventing violence, these intervening actors “sometimes have substantially divergent interests, strategies and normative preferences in relation to a particular conflict and its resolution” (Nathan 2016 157).

These situations are “rife for exploitation by conflict parties” as the disputants can play the interventions against each other to “extract the maximum advantage” (Whitfield 2008 20). Such exploitation likely extends the violent periods of time as disputants search for the

\(^2\)There were recurrent open attempts by Australia, Indonesia, Japan, and Thailand, while China, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam behaved likewise behind the scenes.
best offer, reduces the likelihood of reaching a cessation of violence that is satisfactory to the disputants, and makes interventions more costly for third parties attempting to prevent violence.

4.2.2 Coordinated Implementation Increases Efficiency by Dividing Labor and Pooling Resources

Despite “a stated common vision of continental peace and security, African leaders often do not have the same priorities. They differ in their understanding or interpretation of particular crises, and often offer different or competing solutions” (Cilliers & Gnanguénon 2016, 138). It is in these contexts that coordination among intervening actors becomes crucial. While coordination of the goals of the interventions can create a “common vision,” only through sustained coordination of the process can intervening actors avoid the pitfalls of competing solutions. Even when charged with similar mandates, such as the Nepal Peace Trust Fund and the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund in Nepal, differing institutional ideologies mean coordination through the process of implementation is not a given (Bhattarai 2016, 412). Coordinating the process by dividing labor between simultaneous interventions can distribute responsibilities such that each actor can address their personal priorities in pursuit of the common vision. Additionally, process coordination can allay concerns of different understandings or perspectives by providing a common basis of information.

With the rising role of the African Union and regional economic communities in conflict resolution, the critical challenge is to more closely coordinate. In response, these organizations are developing procedures for more frequent consultations, developing integrated strategic approaches, and coordinated structures when simultaneously involved in conflict resolution, where “responsibilities and duties are allocated on the basis of who can best serve
them” (Cilliers & Gnanguenon 2016, 151). The importance of coordinating on the process of conflict resolution is illustrated by the failure in implementing the Bicesse Accords in Angola. Between 1991 and 1993, mediators from a range of actors – regional organizations, global powers, and former colonizers – failed to realize the optimistic promises of the agreement for lack of a “consistent and coherent agenda for peace” (Böhmelt 2011, 864). As of 1995, the clear advantages of coordinating interventions has led the United Nations to develop procedures for the close cooperation between United Nations-led efforts and those of over 1000 non-governmental organizations for conflict resolution purposes (Boutros-Ghali 1995, 21).

There are two aspects of coordinating implementation that enable coordinated conflict resolution efforts to decrease the risks of competition and increase the efficient and effective resolution of violence. First, coordinated interventions align strategies by strategically dividing the labor of resolution between the simultaneous interventions. Second, coordinated interventions achieve a common base by pooling resources dedicated to reducing violence.

Division of Labor

When simultaneous conflict resolutions occur, the distinct interventions, “whether taken by one actor . . . or by several actors, must be coordinated” (Zartman 2005, 14). For scholars and practitioners alike, this coordination involves a clear division of labor (Boutros-Ghali 1995, 19; Zartman 2005, 14; Bhattarai 2016, 415; Hansen 2012, 260). Such a clear division allows each actor the flexibility to pursue peace in its own role but also ensures such actions are in support of each other. For example, the respective Friend, Core, and Troika mechanisms in African civil conflicts could pursue strategies individually based on their respective relations with the disputants; however, in the successful cases, these mechanisms were coordinated in interventions to “divide incentives and points of pressure upon the parties” behind a common vision of peace (Whitfield 2008, 22).
Such divisions of labor exist in many forms related to conflict resolution currently. Within mediation, Track I and Track II - also known more broadly as parallel mediation - are simultaneous interventions that may involve coordination to divide responsibilities along issue areas, strategies, or personnel. Peace operations often serve to bridge civil-military relations. Non-governmental organizations rarely intervene alone, generally acting to support more “official” interventions or coordinate with other non-governmental organizations through alliances and networks (Nan & Strimling 2006, 2).

- **Complementarity** Coordinated simultaneous interventions are characterized by complementarity which avoids overlap and institutional rivalry (Boutros-Ghali 1995, 21) which would add rather than prevent conflict and distract from the pursuit of peace. Complementarity is critical to the utility of simultaneous interventions (Whitfield 2008, 22). Specifically in implementation, conflict resolution efforts are hampered by competing initiatives and the resulting complexity of existing problems (Cilliers & Gnanguéné 2016, 138). Competition among simultaneous efforts creates significant tension between peacemakers and has extremely harmful consequences for the management and resolution of conflict (Nathan 2016, 157).

A division of labor specifically avoids the risk of overlapping and duplicating efforts, which confuse the efforts of each individual intervention (Hansen 2012, 260). Overlapping efforts are not only a waste of opportunities to prevent additional death and destruction but also can be exploited by the disputants to further entrench the conflict (Whitfield 2008, 19) (Boutros-Ghali 1995, 19). As shown in the civil conflict in Tajikistan and the Ecuador-Peru border dispute, parallel mediation efforts have been more effective, particularly those which have divided structural and social-psychological strategies (Hansen 2012, 260).

Overlap will inevitably exist in interventions as each intervention must be able to function independently. Moreover, regional and international organizations will overlap in ca-
pabilities and mandates for conflict resolution. It is not the overlap itself, but the lack of coordination to account for the overlap that becomes problematic in simultaneous interventions (Cilliers & Gnanguènon 2016: 145). While coordinating simultaneous interventions can achieve a complementarity which increases the effectiveness of conflict resolution efforts, developing such complementarity is “likely to remain an ongoing struggle”; “yet not to try is not an option” (Whitfield 2008: 23).

- **Specialization** Modern conflict resolution efforts are undertaken by a range of actors at various levels: state, multilateral, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations. These actors have various levels of knowledge and experience with aspects of the peace process and with the disputants of a particular conflict (Whitfield 2008: 20). In East Timor, multiple actors intervened and divided the labor based on contributions. Regional actors - such as Australia, New Zealand, and Japan - contributed material resources for a peace operation while the United States and United Kingdom contributed diplomatic expertise for mediation (Whitfield 2008: 22). Rather than defer responsibility for action to actors with the greatest capabilities, the international community should take responsibility for the peace process and “think in terms of comparative advantage” (Zartman 2005: 211). In other words, Zartman is suggesting implicitly that actors in the international community have specialized roles when it comes to conflict resolution and should capitalize on these advantages through a division of labor.

Additionally, international actors may have specialized relationships with one side of the dispute. Coordinating interventions with such international actors from both sides creates a balance that can increase the effectiveness of negotiation and bring credibility to efforts to prevent violence. Such combinations were effective in El Salvador and Guatemala, where the United States leveraged its relationships with the governments in intervening while Mexico leveraged its relationships with the insurgents (Whitfield 2008: 22).
For example, coordination between interventions in Sudan was able to effectively utilize the special connections and experience each actor had with the area. The Troika group of states and the United Kingdom intervened with historic knowledge of the northern half of Sudan. The United States intervened with leverage in the southern half. Norway intervened as a relatively neutral actor providing common ground for both sides (Whitfield 2008, 22).

Similarly, the suggested coordination of efforts by regional and international actors is effective because of the specialization of each actor permitted by a division of labor. Zartman asserts that some conflicts may best be handled by the involvement of regional actors and in some cases non-governmental organizations (Zartman 2005, 13, 211). Regional actors often carry legitimacy with the disputants whereas international actors can bring resources and international attention to the efforts.

The African Union developed a “Memorandum of Understanding,” which went into effect in 2007, specifically designed to capitalize on the advantages of specialization from a division of labor in conflict resolution. The Memo recognizes the “comparative advantage” of dividing responsibilities in cooperation with African regional economic communities (RECs), where each actor plays its “appropriate part” for an “integrated ‘operational structure’ of partly decentralized institutions and instruments” (Cilliers & Gnanguén 2016, 144-145). In other words, the memo attempted to formalize a procedure for coordination among multiple interventions to capitalize on the special advantages each party could bring.

Pooling Resources

To achieve the goal of preventing and reducing violence, conflict resolution efforts require significant financial, material, political, and informational resources.

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3 See section 2.2.2 for additional details on the merits of simultaneous interventions by regional and international actors.

4 See section 2.2.1 for more details on the importance of additional resources for effective conflict resolution.
decision-makers face challenging fiscal and political realities, it is necessary for international peacemakers to find ways to increase the frugality and simplicity of coordination in order to achieve positive outcomes (Hansen 2012, 238). There is a consensus that no single third party has the resources necessary to resolve the violence in modern conflicts, making simultaneous interventions and coordination between them vitally important (Parry 2004). In dealing with the necessary multiple interventions, scholars argue that “a minimal level of coordination, such as information sharing and joint analysis” should be standard practice, and, particularly in long-term efforts, third parties should engage in resource sharing and collaborative initiatives (Bhattarai 2016, 401; Nan 2003).

Thus, sharing resources – of any type – is a key component of coordination for conflict resolution. Simultaneous interventions can more effectively reduce violence through the pooling of these necessary resources for a more efficient allocation and overall increased effectiveness. Pooling resources for conflict resolution efforts has two advantages for third parties in preventing violence. Pooling between simultaneous interventions shares both the rewards of successfully soliciting donations from outside actors and the responsibility of effectively allocating the resources.

- **Soliciting Outside Assistance** Some states and almost all non-state interveners rely heavily on money, equipment, and sometimes personnel from outside actors as practical necessities for an organized operation. When multiple actors intervene in a civil conflict, the appeal to outside actors for those resources becomes a competitive process. Interventions in the conflicts of Nepal and the Philippines illustrate the consequences of failing to coordinate. During periods of low violence, simultaneous interventions competed for resources and recognition rather than coordinate and pool their resources for collective use (Bhattarai 2016, 417). The competition over resources added confusion and conflict to the already highly uncertain and complex conflict setting.
The pooling of resources advantage applies beyond the material or financial. Coordinated interventions can uniquely amass diplomatic resources, such as the “political will” and “muscle” to bring disputants to the table. By pooling the diplomatic resources of interveners, coordinated efforts have even opened new channels of communication for the disputants to negotiate a cessation of hostilities on their own (Bhattarai 2016, 400; Crocker et al. 2001).

The pooling of resources is even more important for some actors involved. Though regional organizations are growing in experience and recognition with natural advantages of flexibility and local credibility over international actors, they largely lack the necessary political, informational, material, and - perhaps most clearly - financial resources to fulfill the desired roles in conflict resolution. The African Union, for instance, has expanded its mandate to absorb greater responsibility for maintaining stability on the continent, however, the organization has taken on “formidable conflict management challenges without possessing any big sticks or many tasty carrots” (Cilliers & Gnanguênon 2016, 145). Such limitations have forced the organization to develop an “innovative policy approach” (Cilliers & Gnanguênon 2016, 145) which largely consists of partnering and coordinating with other interventions to pool the collective resources.

Efficient Resource Allocation One crucial aspect of conflict resolution efforts is the ability to manipulate the disputant’s incentives to pursue conflict. Intervening actors attempt to add costs and benefits, provide additional information, and credible alternatives to convince disputants to abandon the choice of violence. While a range of coordination is possible between simultaneous interventions - from simple communication to full integration of activities - any form of coordination increases the “understanding and efficacy of resource allocation” (Strimling 2006, 94).

Coordination of resources between simultaneous interventions implies cooperation in
obtaining and applying limited resources to achieve violence reduction and resolution. The positive ties of coordination “enhance communication flows and resource sharing” and facilitate more effective interventions to reduce violence (Böhmelt 2011, 867). Moreover, applying sanctions, incentives, guarantees and conditionalities in a coherent way in the absence of coordination among third parties is “remarkably difficult” (Whitfield 2008, 20).

This process of coordination is vital to “minimize negative interactions, address gaps, increase efficiency and realize opportunities for synergy” (Nan & Strimling 2006, 2). Coordination thus enables interventions to avoid overlap or counter-productive efforts - wasting precious resources - as well as promote complementary and constructive efforts - making the limited resources go further.

While this is particularly true of fungible resources, such as money, it can also apply to the costly efforts of collecting and verifying information or of building and strengthening political connections and credibility. For instance, the presence of multiple mediators – such as when there are simultaneous interventions - can “create synergy due to combined efforts” making these coordinated efforts more effective than a solitary intervention in getting disputants to the table and reaching an agreement to halt violence (Böhmelt 2011, 860-861). The “synergy” Böhmelt refers to is the combination of political and informational resources each mediator has, including but not limited to diplomatic connections, experience with conflict resolution, and knowledge of the particular conflict area, disputants, or issues.
4.3 Coordinated Interventions in Practice and Decreased Violence in Civil Conflicts

4.3.1 Trends of Coordinated Interventions in Civil Conflicts

Much like simultaneous interventions, third parties have coordinated conflict resolution efforts across the considered time span. Figure 4.2 shows the total number of solitary, uncoordinated simultaneous, and coordinated simultaneous interventions over time across conflicts. Although most interventions occur simultaneously (shown in the dark blue line), only a small portion of those simultaneous efforts are coordinated (shown in the light green line). Additionally, despite sharp changes in the short-term, the general trend of simultaneity and coordination is relatively consistent over the decades.
Figure 4.3: Most Frequent Third Party Interveners by Type

Because the process of coordinating simultaneous conflict resolution efforts is not easily observed much less systematically measured, this project relies on a proxy measurement for coordination: common actor involvement. It is assumed that simultaneous conflict resolution efforts with a common base of third party participation will be somewhat more coordinated in terms of goals and implementation than simultaneous efforts with completely different actors. Given this assumption, it is particularly relevant to consider who the third party actors are.

A total of 152 actors were involved in the 2,329 conflict resolution efforts in this project. Figure 4.3 details the thirty most frequently involved third party actors. Unsurprisingly, the United Nations tops the list by being involved in 542 interventions. Given the set
of conflicts are African civil disputes, the second most frequent third party conducting resolution efforts is also unsurprising as the African Union with 273 interventions. As a global power, the United States is the most involved non-organization actor followed closely by the regional power of South Africa.

In addition to the actors involved in the highest numbers of conflict resolution efforts, Figure 4.3 shows the breakdown of these actors by type. International and regional organizations, such as the United Nations and African Union, are shown in light blue. The most common state actors are shown in green, with African states in light green and other states - predominantly the United States and European nations - are shown in dark green. Notably, a single individual conducting conflict resolution efforts (shown in dark blue) is among the top 25 most frequently involved actors. Nelson Mandela conducted 35 conflict resolution efforts, primarily mediations, across several African civil disputes.

### 4.3.2 Coordinated Interventions and an Estimated Decrease in Violence

The presence of common actors involved in simultaneous interventions is expected to create conditions of coordination between the efforts and increase the effectiveness of conflict resolution efforts in mitigating violence in the conflict. Using the same estimation model as described in evaluating simultaneous interventions, the following results evaluate the consequences of coordinated simultaneous interventions for conflict dynamics.

#### Coordination in Context of Other Intervention Characteristics

Coordinated efforts are first evaluated in context of other intervention characteristics – including simultaneity, number of simultaneous, number in sequence of peace process, intervention duration, time since the previous effort, and intervention type - as well as levels

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5See Section 3.1.3 for details
of violence before intervention.

Figure 4.4 reveals the predicted levels of violence expected after solitary, simultaneous, and coordinated interventions. Consistent with the initial analysis of simultaneous (shown in blue) compared to solitary interventions (shown in green), simultaneous conflict resolution efforts that are uncoordinated are expected to have 184.1 battle deaths in the three months following intervention. However, the presence of common actors in the simultaneous efforts - coordinated interventions, shown in purple - are expected to have 99.87 battle deaths, a 45.75% decrease from uncoordinated simultaneous interventions.

As can be seen in Figure 4.5, coordinated interventions have a negative relationship with the amount of violence following interventions. Additionally, this relationship is statistically
significant, meaning it can be said to be non-zero with 95% confidence.

**Coordination in Context of Specific Conflict Settings**

Coordinated efforts are next evaluated in context of the conflict setting – including land area, population, urbanization, mountainous terrain, and travel time - as well as levels of violence before intervention.

Figure 4.6 reveals the predicted levels of violence expected after solitary, simultaneous, and coordinated interventions. Consistent with the previous results, simultaneous interventions (shown in blue) are expected to have higher levels of violence in the aftermath than solitary efforts. Additionally, coordinated efforts (shown in purple) are expected to
have lower levels of violence.

However, these point estimates should be taken with extreme caution. Figure 4.7 reveals that neither simultaneity nor coordination has a statistically significant relationship, meaning that neither can be distinguished from zero with confidence. In other words, it is very possible that no discernable relationship exists between coordinated efforts and levels of violence in a conflict. There is not an even distribution of coordinated efforts across the civil conflicts in this analysis. These results could mean that coordination only seemed relevant because coordinated simultaneous efforts occurred in certain types of conflicts. If coordination only or primarily occurs in certain conflict settings, then there would not be enough information to compare coordinated efforts to uncoordinated efforts. The wide in-

Figure 4.6: Predicted Battle Deaths for Coordinated Efforts in Context of Conflict and Intervention Characteristics
terval indicated by the line around the point estimate of coordination in Figure 4.6 suggests precisely that there is not enough information to accurately narrow the range of possible levels of violence.

![Figure 4.7: Estimated Coefficients for Coordinated Efforts in Context of Conflict and Intervention Characteristics](image)

Figure 4.7: Estimated Coefficients for Coordinated Efforts in Context of Conflict and Intervention Characteristics

Though these results are not conclusive and merit further investigation, they collectively suggest that coordinating simultaneous conflict resolution efforts can contribute to an interventions success in mitigating violence. This provides a positive outlook for the many practitioners interested in taking action to resolve civil conflicts.

In fact, practitioners have already embraced the necessity of coordination. Arguing that although coordinated efforts are becoming more common, it remains lacking on issues related to the causes of conflict (Bhattarai 2016, 419). Further, even more urgent situations
dont ensure that third parties will engage in coordinated action (Bhattarai 2016, 411). Because of these gaps and an inherent believe in the advantages of coordinating conflict resolution efforts, practitioners have focused on developing strategies for achieving coordination. These strategies include distinguishing coordination between actors interested in similar issues and coordinating interventions to achieve a common mandate (Bhattarai 2016, 417-418). Alternatively, fostering engagement with non-official actors - such as non-governmental organizations and community leaders – may bring in additional efforts and coordinate the efforts across a range of actors (Aall 2007, 488).
Chapter 5

One Step at a Time: Progress Made and Where to Go Next

5.1 Implications of New Perspectives on Simultaneous Interventions

The occurrence of multiple interventions is a fact of life in conflict resolution. It is time for scholars to move past recognizing this fact and to begin exploring the its implications for third parties implementing conflict resolution efforts and the consequences on the conflicts themselves.

Given that conflict resolution is a strategic process, it may be expected that interventions are generally successful in obtaining their goals. Further, multiple interventions might be expected to be even more successful. Third parties conducting simultaneous interventions have the potential advantage of diverse resources, experiences, and abilities to contribute to resolving the violence. The advantages of diversity and additional input from multiple advantages is expected to increase the efficiency of conflict resolution efforts in mitigating violence. However, as observed within African civil conflicts between 1994 and
As of 2014, this potential has not been realized. Simultaneous interventions systematically leave conflicts with more violence than if only one intervention had occurred. Additionally, this detrimental outcome holds true even when accounting for variations in other intervention design choices and a range of conflict settings.

An exploration of the implementation of multiple efforts cannot ignore how these interventions interact. In order to realize the advantages of multiple efforts, simultaneous interventions may only be successful when those efforts are coordinated. The concept of coordination covers a wide range of activities, some observable and some not. The involvement of common actors between simultaneous efforts is one, observable way to consider coordination. While it seems safe to assume that common involvement indicates a certain level of compatibility between goals and strategies of simultaneous interventions, it certainly is not a pre-requisite, meaning that this measure likely underestimates the advantages of coordination. As observed in African civil conflicts, coordinated simultaneous interventions are generally expected to have fewer battle-deaths than efforts that are not coordinated. The direction of this relationship holds across various intervention characteristics and conflict settings, but there is not enough information to confidently conclude that coordinating interventions will produce lower levels of violence.

The goal of this project is to urge scholars and practitioners alike to adopt a new perspective when it comes to multiple conflict resolution efforts. Rather than dodging the issue - which is at times necessary - the field can and should confront this daunting problem head on. By taking these first steps at theoretically and empirically grappling with simultaneous interventions, this project is intended to demonstrate that the problem is not intractable. In fact, not only is directly handling the complexity of multiple interventions possible but it is extremely fruitful. This new perspective shows that there is more to learn in the areas of conflict resolution that are already being studied and additionally points to entirely new areas to explore.
5.2 Advancing a Research Agenda on Simultaneity and Coordination in Conflict Resolution

5.2.1 Simultaneous Interventions

First, this project considers only one specific way in which simultaneous interventions might alter conflict dynamics. As a first step, evaluating simultaneity in terms of short-term violence reduction has its advantages. To summarize, this outcome is a shared goal across multiple conflict resolution types and can most clearly be attributed to an individual effort. Despite these advantages, additional outcomes should be considered. A variety of options exist within the current literature, including time to agreement, type of agreement, time to conflict end, and conflict reemergence. Future research on simultaneous interventions should evaluate the impact on these important outcomes as well.

Conflict resolution comes in many shapes and sizes – even more than current typology of peace operation, fact finding mission, good office, or mediation conveys - each with its own standard of success. Evaluating these efforts should similarly consider a variety of outcomes to “reflect the differences in mission purposes” (Diehl 2014, 488). Even efforts of the same type may not be implemented to achieve the same outcome. For instance, a mediation effort may be implemented in order to achieve a full resolution of the conflict, to minimize short-term casualties, to address a single core conflict issue, to address a tangential issue, or to change the nature of the relationship between the disputing parties on an interpersonal level, among many many other options. Peace operations similarly have frequently been classified as traditional or peace building, but individual operations have specific mandates that encompass a wide-range of activities, which cannot be effectively captured in a single outcome measure.

Such variety is daunting to scholars attempting to objectively evaluate conflict resolution
efforts across different settings and implementations. Developing the perfect measure of conflict resolution success that is equally applicable to any effort and is also observable seems unlikely. A more productive avenue may be to consider a range of outcome measures at the same time. Identifying this problem in research of peace operations years ago, Diehl observes that “the problem is that many analyses never look beyond this standard for success to the other goals that peacekeeping operations pursue. Thus, at best, such studies deal with only one indicator of one dimension of peacekeeping outcomes” (Diehl 2014, 486).

This new perspective of simultaneous interventions can be applied to foundational research on the specific types of conflict resolution to uncover new trends and relationships. To illustrate, Fortna’s excellent work developing a theoretical understanding of how peace operations alter the re-emergence of violence would be an excellent place to start. Her work considers a wide range of complicated factors that both relate to the occurrence of peace operations and how those operations alter conflict dynamics. But omitted from consideration is the role other conflict resolution efforts played during those peace operations. Applying the new perspective suggested here builds upon Fortna’s solid foundation and offers new answers to her books seemingly simple question: Does Peacekeeping Work?

Owsiak’s work on conflict resolution trajectories provides another area ripe for expansion with the perspective of simultaneous interventions. Already emphasizing the importance of interactions and dependencies between interventions, an expansion to the scope of multiple interventions in trajectories by including a direct consideration of simultaneous interventions is appropriate. Further, coordination may be a concept that applies to sequential interventions as well. Efforts that are intentionally and specifically sequenced may be more successful than those that are not. Though this research agenda would be complex, the full picture results would be truly groundbreaking.
5.2.2 Coordinated Interventions

Considering simultaneous interventions can reinvigorate existing areas of research by offering a fresh perspective, but perhaps even more promising is the virtually untouched area of coordination. Though certainly not a new concept in conflict studies or international relations more broadly, the role of coordination in conflict resolution efforts has certainly been underdeveloped. A new perspective on conflict resolution that considers simultaneous interventions puts new concepts such as coordination front and center. Applying the well-developed findings on coordination games, international cooperation, and organizational theory to the context of simultaneous conflict resolution efforts can itself generate a lifetime of research. In addition to encouraging scholars to do precisely that, additional questions surrounding coordination among third parties conducting conflict resolution will be explored here.

These questions fall into two general categories: 1) what conditions make coordination more or less likely to occur, and 2) what the positive or negative consequences of coordinated efforts are, alternatively understood what conditions make coordinated interventions successful.

Likelihood of Coordination

The timing of simultaneous interventions in a conflict may be an important factor for effectiveness. The concept of ripeness is well-established in the conflict resolution literature as the ideal time for third parties to intervene. Although ripeness in this case may not mean a mutually hurting stalemate, a ripe moment required for the emergence of coordination may exist (Bhattarai 2016, 418). The characteristics of ripeness in terms of coordination and any actions that third parties may take to generate coordination ripeness should be further explored.

The amount of violence in a conflict is an important factor for identifying moments ripe
for coordination. Third parties are more willing to coordinate efforts during episodes of heightened violence in civil conflicts, but show much less enthusiasm when peaks of violence have subsided (Bhattarai 2016, 400). Thus, coordination may be more likely and may even take a different form when the human toll of conflicts is high.

More specifically, an important advantage of coordinated efforts is the addition of various forms of resources dedicated to conflict resolution. The timing of simultaneous interventions may determine what third parties are able to contribute which would alter the mechanism and emergence of coordination between those simultaneous efforts (Whitfield 2008, 22).

Time may be an important factor in another way. Rather than timing in the conflict, interactions over time between sets of actors may create a learning process through which coordination emerges. Actors attempting to implement conflict resolution efforts in the same space and time for the first time may resort to “considerable improvisation” in learning how to work together. However, through observations of individual cases, “it is clear that, over the span of these operations, intragovernmental coordinating mechanisms matured considerably” (Gordon IV & Campbell 2016, 89). Research on this topic could draw from literature on repeated interactions, learned behavior, and norm development in international relations. Further research could develop the theoretical understanding of coordination away from a binary condition and towards a broader process.

Who conducts simultaneous efforts may be just as important for coordination as when they occur. Unsurprisingly, third parties with “negative ties” may be unable to “establish a culture of coordination” (Böhmelt 2011, 867). Even if conducting simultaneous conflict resolution efforts with similar goals, these opposing actors will face extensive communication and implementation difficulties. By contrast, third parties with positive ties or greater similarities may be more likely to coordinate during simultaneous interventions. Further theoretical and empirical development is needed to identify precisely what constitutes pos-
itive and negative ties in the context of conflict resolution, particularly given the variety of actors conducting interventions.

In addition to the ties between multiple actors conducting simultaneous interventions, the size and status of individual actors may promote or impede coordination. The proposed theory of coordination in this project glosses over the number of actors involved. Coordination, particularly defined as common actor involvement, does not necessarily mean multiple actors though that is generally the case. A select membership for coordinated efforts - such as four to six (Whitfield 2008, 22) - may be important for maximizing effectiveness. While the advantages of added resources and diverse expertise for simultaneous interventions implicitly assume multiple actors are involved, further research is needed to explore the ideal number of actors.

Despite the likely increase in available leverage, the involvement of large organizations or powerful states may preclude the flexibility needed to implement coordinated efforts. Large-scale operations are slow-moving and often overburdened at initiation with a diverse range of engagements, making them difficult to coordinate with other interventions (Kriesberg 1996). In fact, the lack of involvement by global and regional powers may encourage coordinated efforts and may be a “crucial reason why the process worked well” in the past (Bhattarai 2016, 417).

**Consequences of Coordination**

In addition to enhancing or preventing the likelihood of coordination between simultaneous efforts, the make-up of third parties may also impact the effectiveness in mitigating violence. A wide range of actor types conduct conflict resolution: international organizations, developed and developing states, ad hoc coalitions, non-governmental organizations, even individuals. Additionally, among the relevant organizations, there are different levels: international, regional, and local. Further theoretical development and empirical analysis
is needed to consider the possible combinations of these actors and how effectively they may coordination conflict resolution efforts. Specifically, research is needed to test the proposed mechanisms of coordination effectiveness, such as the diversity advantage. In other words, do combinations of diverse types of third parties contribute to the success of conflict resolution efforts to contribute to the rising conflict?

Further, are specific types of actors more or less effective in coordinating simultaneous interventions? Regional participation may be a prerequisite for successful coordination. For instance, the role of Mexico in Central American conflicts and Australia and New Zealand in East Timor had a positive effect on conflict resolution efforts (Whitfield 2008, 22). Additionally, given the growing frequency and understudied role of regional actors, research on regional organizations such as the African Union are an excellent place to start.

More broadly, third parties adhering to democratic norms may have more success in mitigating violence. As peaceful resolution of conflicting interests is an important norm of democracy (Dixon 1994), mediators from democratic states or representing organizations guided by democratic norms are “more likely to settle their disputes peacefully” (Böhmelt 2011, 868; Bercovitch & Houston 2000). Additionally, having a common set of norms may foster more efficient coordination, improving the effectiveness of conflict resolution efforts. It should be noted that, despite lacking an inherent norm of peaceful settlement, autocracies also share a common structural background which may enhance coordination (Böhmelt 2011, 868).

This project considered coordination as defined by common actor involvement in simultaneous interventions, but as discussed in Section 4.1 the coordinated interaction of multiple conflict resolution efforts can take many forms. As the concept of coordinated simultaneous interventions is further explored, so should these other versions. The following serves as a couple of examples with both theoretical and empirical implications that deserve further attention.
First, an extensive case study of the unique relationship between the United Nations and the African Union in resolving African civil conflicts is warranted. These two actors have developed institutionalized coordination mechanisms that are “broader and deeper than any other actor” (Williams 2016, 248). The theoretical scope of this project does not extend to variations between de facto and institutionalized coordination, making it unchartered territory for future scholars. A thorough consideration of the interaction between simultaneous conflict resolution efforts conducted by the United Nations and the African Union before and after 2005 - when institutional mechanisms came into effect across multiple levels of the organization - may highlight variations in coordination and its implications for conflicts.

Second, many scholars and practitioners suggest leadership as a solution to the problem of lacking coordination (Crocker et al. 2001; Whitfield 2008, 22). Further research should consider the role of leadership or hierarchal structuring in coordinating simultaneous interventions. Specific to peace operations, Roberts & Bradley suggest theoretical expectations for three distinct organizational structures: market, community, and command. This theoretical framework is well-conceived and relevant to the coordination of distinct conflict resolution efforts. However, there is not yet an empirical evaluation of these structures and their effectiveness in mitigating violence. Similarly, the believed advantages of leadership inspired the creation and consistent appointment of a United Nations Secretary-General Special Representative to specific civil conflicts. The individuals filling these roles have had mixed success, but warrant closer evaluation in context of providing a leadership role as one of many alternatives in coordinating simultaneous conflict resolution efforts.

Just as important as identifying when and how coordination succeeds in conflict resolution, future research should not overlook the question of when coordination should not occur. Despite the arguments in Section 4.2, coordinated efforts may be “neither feasible nor desirable” in situations when “effectiveness, credibility and/or security depend on
clearly independent relationships” (Nan & Strimling 2006). Theoretically and empirically identifying when these situations arise is valuable knowledge for scholars and practitioners alike.

5.2.3 Prerequisites of Empirical Analysis

The most likely context for influential relationships between individual conflict resolution efforts is when those interventions overlap in time. Problematically, currently available time series data tends to record overlapping interventions as a single intervention of the highest level. The most interventionist type of effort – for instance a peace mission would be considered more interventionist than a mediation effort – is recorded and any other interventions in that time period are omitted. Further, multiple intervention efforts of the same type are conflated as equivalent to a single effort even if they are independently implemented.

Extensive work within the literature on mediation alone confirms how problematic such an assumption is. At times, pursuing multiple tracks of mediation efforts contribute to reaching an agreement and a peaceful resolution by building trust at multiple levels and allowing for different settings. At other times, multiple mediation efforts may work at cross-purposes in building trust and credibility for a durable peace agreement as different concessions are made at the separate tables. Despite the uncertainty in how multiple efforts may affect the outcome of the conflict, it is clear that simultaneous efforts - even of the same type – are not equivalent to single efforts and should be recorded as unique situations.

Not only do these tendencies throw away a large amount of relevant information and falsely create equivalencies across time periods, but they also preclude an accurate evaluation of the series and overlapping sets of conflict resolution efforts that make up the peace process. An extensive effort to merge existing intervention-level data and data collection effort to fill in missing observations across conflict resolution types and actors is a
prerequisite for any systematic consideration of simultaneous interventions.

5.3 Final Words

There is a definite art to the design and conduct of conflict resolution efforts, the nuances of which no empirical study to date has been able to capture. This project is no exception. Rather than dictate the intricate day-to-day decisions that practitioners must make, this project aims to uncover underlying trends and generalizable implications of one specific aspect of conflict resolution design: intervening simultaneously. By adopting a perspective of simultaneous interventions, uncover new ways to understand the complexity of the peace process and provide guides to forward-thinking practitioners to apply in conjunction with their immeasurable experience. In truth, this project is a first step, a crude consideration of a complicated interaction. Much more attention is due to the nuances of how third parties interact when conducting simultaneous conflict resolution efforts.
Appendix A

Intervention Type Definitions

A.1 Definitions taken from the UCDP MIC Dataset

Codebook (Melander & von Uexkull 2011)

Direct talks These talks take place face to face between the two primary parties of the dyad in the presence of the third party

Good office The third party does not actively engage in direct talks with the parties but only facilitates talks (provides venue, facilities, etc.). The third parties are other than the ones participating in the talks.

Fact finding Officials having the purpose of establishing the facts of a matter, e.g., whether human rights abuses, instances of violence, or violations of cease-fires have taken place. Is only coded as fact-finding when referred to as such in the source. Start date is when the officials arrive on the ground, i.e., are deployed.

Permanent observers (not included in analysis) A mission with a permanent office, carried out by the UN, IGOs or individual states, with the stated purpose to observe and/or support a peace process or conflict situation, but without any operational duties involving uniformed personnel having an official status as military troops, military observers
or civilian police.

A.2 Definitions from Third Party Peacekeeping in Intrastate Disputes (Mullenbach 2013, 107)

Peacekeeping Using the three criteria (type of personnel, command and control, and functions) discussed above, third-party peacekeeping is defined as the following: the deployment of military and/or civilian personnel by one or more third-party states, frequently but not necessarily under the auspices of an international organization, into a crisis, conflict, or post-conflict situation for one or more of the following security-related functions: (1) maintaining law and order (military personnel or civilian police); (2) monitoring a ceasefire agreement (military or civilian personnel); (3) verifying the disarmament, demobilization, or disengagement of combatants (military personnel); (4) protecting the delivering of humanitarian assistance (military personnel); (5) providing security for specific groups, events, or locations, such as refugee camps, government officials, elections, or major airports (military personnel or civilian police); and (6) maintaining a buffer zone (military personnel).
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