Defending the Authority of Scripture: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge in Classical Indian Philosophy of Religion

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Defending the Authority of Scripture:
Testimony as a Source of Knowledge in Classical Indian Philosophy of Religion

A dissertation presented
by
Rosanna Picascia
to
The Committee on the Study of Religion
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Defending the Authority of Scripture:  
Testimony as a Source of Knowledge in Classical Indian Philosophy of Religion

Abstract

This dissertation looks at how Sanskrit philosophers grappled with the question of how we acquire knowledge on the basis of what others tell us. In particular, it examines Sanskrit interreligious debates on the epistemic status of testimony, and specifically, religious testimony. I analyze these debates primarily through the work of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, a 9th century Kashmiri Nyāya philosopher, as well as the works of his Buddhist and Mīmāṃsaka interlocutors. Through a close reading and intertextual analysis of these works, I engage historically and philosophically with the key issues in these debates.

In particular, I look at Jayanta’s examination of the following set of related questions: 1) whether, and the conditions under which, testimony is a source of knowledge, 2) why, on the basis of practical factors, religious testimony merits different epistemic treatment than mundane types of testimony, and 3) how to approach the challenge of religious disagreement, particularly, disagreement stemming from mutually conflicting scriptural traditions. In examining these debates, I argue that differences in opinion over the epistemic status of testimony boil down to a disagreement over the proper relationship between the individual epistemic agent and the broader social and practical world. In particular, this disagreement centers on who bears the brunt of epistemic responsibility in testimonial exchanges, the speaker or the recipient, and whether
practical factors, like stakes-considerations and interests, affect the strength of a subject’s epistemic position.

I also approach these debates through the conceptual resources of contemporary epistemology and philosophy of religion in order to help clarify complex Sanskrit philosophical arguments and ultimately underscore the relevance of Sanskrit texts to contemporary discussions. In particular, I argue for the usefulness of certain theoretical frameworks and principles for understanding Jayanta’s work, primarily, the thesis of pragmatic encroachment, which claims that pragmatic factors can affect the level of epistemic support a subject needs for certain beliefs. Additionally, I argue that Jayanta’s unique approach to the problem of religious disagreement, especially his consideration of the socio-practical factors that affect the epistemic status of belief, might help break some of the deadlock in contemporary theorizing on intractable religious disagreement.
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Finally, this dissertation is dedicated my husband, Derrick, who during the tough times is deep in the trenches with me. Despite often getting the worst of me, he brings out the best in me. This project would never have reached completion without him.
Abbreviations

ĀḌ Āgamaḍambara (Jayanta) in Dezső 2005
NB Nyāyabindu (Dharmakīrti) in Malvania 1971
NBh Nyāyabhāṣya (Vātsyāyana) in ND
NBṬ Nyāyabinduṭīkā (Dharmottara) in Malvania 1971
ND Nyāyadarśanam in Tarkatirtha & Nyaya-Tarkatirtha 1985
NM Nyāyamaṇjarī (Jayanta) in Varadacharya 1969
NMGBh Nyāyamaṇjarīgranṭhībhaṅga (Cakradhara) in Sastri 1982
NS Nyāyasūtra (Gautama) in ND
NV Nyāyabhāṣyavārttika (Uddotakara) in ND
PBh Praśastapādabhāṣya (Praśastapāda) in Dvivedin 1895
PS 2 Prāmāṇasamuccaya, Svārthānumāna (Dignāga) in PVSV
PS/PSV 5 Prāmāṇasamuccaya, Apoha (Dignāga) in Pind 2009, Appendix 1.
PV 1 Prāmāṇavārttika, Svārthānumāna (Dharmakīrti) in Gnoli 1960
PV 2 Pramāṇavārttika, Pramāṇasiddhi (Dharmakīrti) in Miyasaka 1971/72
PVSV Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti (Dharmakīrti) in Gnoli 1960
ŚV Ślokavārttika, Codanā (Kumārila) in Kataoka 2011a
TV Tantravārttika (Kumārila) in Jha 1924
Introduction

0.1 Overview

This dissertation examines the interreligious debates on the epistemology of testimony, and specifically, religious testimony, between Buddhist and Brahmanical philosophers of religion in premodern India. In particular, it looks at these debates through the lens of Jayanta Bhafta, a Kashmiri Nyaya intellectual who flourished in the last quarter of the 9th century under the reign of king Sankaravarman (883-902 CE). Through a close reading and intertextual analysis of Jayanta’s works, along with those of his interlocutors, this dissertation engages historically and philosophically with the key issues in these debates. In particular, I look at Jayanta’s examination of the following set of related questions: 1) whether, and the conditions under which, testimony is a source of knowledge, 2) why, on the basis of practical factors,

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1 I will primarily refer to the arguments of Dignaga (480-540), who is thought to be the founder of the Buddhist epistemological tradition, and Dharmakirti (600-660), who is among the most influential Buddhist philosophers in South Asian philosophical history. For a general introduction to Dignaga’s life, work and important philosophical ideas see Hattori 1968 and Hayes 1988. For a general introduction on Dharmakirti’s life, work, and important philosophical ideas see Dreyfus 1997, Dunne 2004, Eltschinger 2010, Franco 1997, and Tillemans 1999.

2 I consider the “Brahmanical” religion to be an ancient, Veda-oriented version of “Hinduism” that emphasized the position of the brahmana (priests/teachers). In addition to taking the Veda as its sacred scripture, Brahmanism also looked to a variety of Vedic-related texts, including law books, epics, and narratives. For a good article on the complicated relationship between Vedism, Brahmanism, and Hinduism, see Heesterman 2005. The Brahmanical religious and intellectual traditions I will primarily focus on are Nyaya and Mimamsa. Nyaya refers to a philosophical system that is based on the Nyayasutra (NS), which was codified around the 2nd century CE, and its commentaries. Philosophers within this intellectual system are referred to as “Naiyayikas.” On the other hand, Mimamsa refers to an intellectual and Vedic ritualist tradition that developed around two foundational texts: the Mimmamsasutra (MS), attributed to Jaimini (2nd century BCE), and the Bhasya commentary on it, composed by Sbara in the 4th or 5th century CE. Philosophers within this intellectual system are referred to as “Mimamsakas.” For a helpful presentation of the names, dates, and major works of key figures in the Nyaya and Mimamsa text traditions see table 1.1 and 1.2 in Raghunathan 2010: 8-9. Both the Nyaya and Mimamsa traditions are part of the Brahmanical “orthodoxy” in the sense that they recognized the authority of the Veda, in contrast to, for example, the Buddhist tradition, which rejects the authority of the Veda.

3 See n.2 above regarding the Nyaya intellectual traditions.

4 Unlike many Indian authors, Jayanta’s dates can be set with relative certainty since he served as a minister to King Sankaravarmin who, according to Kalhana’s 12th century historical and literary chronicle, the Rajatarangini, reigned from 883-902. See Stein 1961 (vol 1): 98-99. For biographical information on Jayanta see the Introduction in Dezsö 2005, Hegde 1983, Kataoka 2007, and Raghavan & Thakur 1964.
religious testimony merits different epistemic treatment than mundane types of testimony, and 3) how to approach the challenge of religious disagreement, particularly, disagreement that stems from mutually conflicting scriptural traditions.

Not only do I investigate these questions within Jayanta’s own intellectual context, but moreover, I look at parallel conversations occurring in contemporary epistemology and philosophy of religion. In doing so, my goal is not only to examine the various concerns, arguments and approaches to these questions today, but more importantly, to underscore the particular philosophical, religious and political concerns that motivate Jayanta’s work and to demonstrate how, despite a difference in context, Jayanta’s arguments are relevant to contemporary conversations. I believe that an analysis of these debates on the epistemology of testimony, both in the contemporary Euro-American context and in premodern India, shows us how we are able to successfully acquire knowledge on the basis of what others tell us and also highlights the divergence of opinion over the proper relationship between the individual epistemic agent and the broader social and practical world. In particular, this disagreement centers on two issues: first, the degree to which acquiring knowledge is a joint venture wherein epistemic responsibility in shared among fellow-cognizers, thereby reducing the epistemic burden placed on the individual knower, and second, whether socio-practical concerns are relevant for determining whether a subject has knowledge, and particularly, whether stakes-considerations raises the level of evidential support an epistemic subject needs for “risky” beliefs.

Since my focus will be on religious beliefs based on testimony, one of the central questions I ask is how testimonially-based religious beliefs, whether from sacred texts or

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5 I use the term “Euro-American” in a cultural and not merely geographical sense. This includes philosophers from countries that have been shaped by European or American culture, such as Australia.
religious authorities, are justified. Relatedly, this dissertation looks at the epistemic and practical challenges of religious disagreement stemming from mutually conflicting testimonial traditions. A second question I ask is whether practical factors have epistemic significance and if so, whether that changes the level of justification required of certain religious beliefs. In particular, I look at how the thesis of pragmatic encroachment, which argues that a difference in practical circumstances, such as a shift in stakes, raises the epistemic requirements of a subject’s knowledge, applies to individually and socially risky religious beliefs. Ultimately, I argue that in his analysis of religious testimony and in particular, the problem of religious disagreement, Jayanta’s consideration of socio-practical factors in determining whether a subject’s belief is justified or constitutes knowledge has much to offer contemporary conversations in epistemology and the philosophy of religion.

0.2 The Relevance of Epistemology to Religious Goals in South Asian Philosophy of Religion

The debate over whether, and the conditions under which, testimony (śabda) is a source of knowledge has been critical to the history of Sanskrit philosophy. Scripture, the example par excellence of testimony, has been central to this debate. This is because it was widely recognized that scripture provides the means to obtain the summum bonum of human life, heaven or final liberation. For ordinary persons, these soteriologically desirable ends were otherwise taken to be epistemically inaccessible. While most South Asian intellectual traditions accepted the authority of at least some scriptures, they analyzed the nature, conditions, and extent of scriptural knowledge very differently.

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Two important developments in 6th- to 7th-century India changed how Sanskrit philosophers discussed scripture and its soteriological value. First, the Buddhist philosopher Dignāga’s *Compendium on the Sources of Knowledge (Pramāṇasamuccaya)* brought about an epistemological turn among Sanskrit philosophers.\(^7\) This resulted in reformulating most philosophical questions into epistemological questions. Another way of saying this is that Sanskrit philosophers like Jayanta were expected to situate their claims about, for example, the authority of a particular scriptural text, within a fully articulated theory of knowledge. As a result, debates about the soteriological value of scripture were transformed into epistemological debates about the epistemic status of testimony, and in particular, religious testimony, which often refers to objects that are empirically unavailable to most people.

A second important development that changed discussions about scripture, and especially the authority of scripture, was the epistemic and practical challenge of “other” religious scripture, which coalesced with the rise of numerous, non-Vedic religious traditions.\(^8\) Despite the fact that as early as the 5th century BCE, Buddhists and Jains already had begun to contest the authority of the Veda, the challenge of other religious scripture and specifically, intellectual interest in how to assess the authority of other religious scripture, became greater by the middle of the first millennium, probably due to the rise of numerous religious sects.\(^9\) As a result, during this time, it became increasingly important not only to defend one’s own scriptural claims against both internal and external criticism, but additionally, to critically engage with the scriptural claims of other religious traditions, either by contesting their authority or finding some

\(^7\) See the Introduction in McCrea and Patil 2010.


\(^9\) In addition to Jayanta’s own philosophical play, the *Āgamaḍambara (Much Ado About Religion)*, which discusses the authoritative status of non-Vedic religious scripture, see Freschi & Kataoka 2012: 7, n.9 for a list of texts around Jayanta’s time that also grapple with this topic.
way to legitimize their authority. Jayanta’s philosophical discussion of testimony as a source of knowledge and, in particular, his defense of the authority of both Vedic and non-Vedic scripture, takes place in this intellectual milieu where epistemological questions held prominence and where a “market” of competing religious traditions not only created the need to legitimize and defend the authority of one’s own religious scripture, but additionally, the need to address the claims, particularly claims to authority, of external religious traditions.

A detailed and systematic study of testimony as a source of knowledge as well as the authority of the Veda and non-Vedic religious texts is found in chapters three and four of Jayanta’s magnum opus, the Nyāyamañjarī (NM). The NM is a “selective” commentary on the Nyāyasūtra (NS) in the sense that it only comments on certain aphorisms, namely, those that provide the definitions (lakṣaṇasūtras) of the sixteen categories (padārthas) and not those aphorisms which present a topic to be discussed (uddeśasūtras) or investigate those topics (parīkṣāsūtras). The NM is divided into twelve chapters (āhnikas) and organized into two main divisions: the sources of knowledge (prāmāṇa), which are covered by chapters one through six, and the objects of knowledge (premeya), along with rest of the fourteen categories discussed in the NS, which are covered by chapters seven through twelve.

Testimony as a source of knowledge forms the subject matter of four out of the twelve chapters (chapters three through six). Chapter three provides a gloss and analysis of the definition of testimony found in the NS and examines a central debate in the epistemology of testimony, namely, the debate over whether testimony is an independent source of knowledge or

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10 This portrayal of the NM as a “selective” commentary is found in Watson & Kataoka 2010: 286.

11 Alternatively, one can view the NM as organized into three main divisions: sources of knowledge (chapters one through six), objects of knowledge (chapters seven through nine), and the remaining fourteen categories (chapters ten through twelve).
whether it is reducible to inference. Chapter four focuses on the authority of Vedic scripture, as well as other, non-Vedic religious texts. Chapters five and six contain more detailed examinations of specific issues that are related to debates on testimony, such as the various linguistic doctrines regarding what words and statements convey.

The structure and content of the NM reveal Jayanta’s primary interest in epistemology, and in particular, testimony as a source of knowledge, as well as in the authority of scriptural texts, particularly the Veda. Not only does the topic of testimony cover almost half the length of the NM, but additionally, in contrast to previous Nyāya authors, Jayanta spends a lot more time commenting on the sources of knowledge, which cover about two-thirds of his work, than on the objects of knowledge and the other fourteen categories delineated in the NS. Moreover, as is clear from the introduction of the NM, as well as chapters three through six, the authority of the Veda is a central concern for Jayanta. Deviating from previous Naiyāyikas, Jayanta claims that the goal of the Nyāya text tradition is to defend and protect the authority of the Veda. In contrast, previous Naiyāyikas claim that the goal of Nyāya is to present an independent means to liberation, that is, independent from the Veda. They claim it does this by providing the type of

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12 For a helpful chart that displays the amount of space Jayanta devotes to each topic, see Graheli 2015: 16. Jayanta devotes approximately two-thirds of the NM to the sources of knowledge, one-sixth of the NM to the objects of knowledge, and the last one-sixth of the NM to the remaining fourteen categories.

13 I use the term “text tradition” along the lines of McCrea & Patil 2010. The notion of “text tradition” is meant to convey the idea of a group of thinkers who, despite holding distinct philosophical positions and worldviews, share a common textual heritage.

14 NM (I, 7.6-7.7): nyāvistaras tu mūlastambhabhūta sarvavidhyānām vedaprāmāṇyarakṣaḥhetuḥ |.

15 See Kataoka 2006 on Jayanta’s break from Nyāya orthodoxy regarding the goal of the Nyāya text tradition. Kataoka’s article provides detailed references to the introductory section of the NM, as well as past commentaries on the NS.
knowledge that leads to liberation, particularly knowledge of the twelve types of objects, including foremost, the soul.\textsuperscript{16}

Because of Jayanta’s consistent portrayal of Nyāya as Veda-orientated, as well as his emphasis on the sources of knowledge, specifically testimony, rather than the objects of knowledge, Jayanta is an ideal source to study with regards to the epistemology of testimony and particularly, scriptural authority. This is in contrast to previous Naiyāyikas who sought to depict Nyāya as an independent branch of learning. For example, Vātsyāyana’s \textit{Nyāyabhāṣya} (NBh) and Uddyotakara’s \textit{Nyāyabhāṣyavārttika} (NV), composed around the 5th and 6th centuries respectively, delineate a four-fold division of sciences (\textit{caturvidyāsthānāḥ}), where each science is independent of the others in terms of content and function. The four sciences, or seats of learning, are as follows: the three Vedas, agriculture, politics, and logic.\textsuperscript{17} In contrast to the first three, the science of logic (Nyāya) teaches the sixteen categories, and in particular, the twelve objects, the knowledge of which leads to liberation. It is particularly in its capacity to provide knowledge about the soul (\textit{adhyātmavidyā}) that Nyāya provides the means to liberation.\textsuperscript{18} However, this leads to a problem: if Nyāya’s uniqueness as a science comes from its ability to

\textsuperscript{16} NS 1.1.9 claims that knowledge of the twelve types of objects leads to liberation. These objects are the soul, body, sense-faculties, sense objects, cognition, mind, activity, defects, rebirth, karmic results, suffering, and liberation. See ND: 180. While Jayanta accepts this, he claims that our knowledge of this fact, particularly, our knowledge of the causal relationship between knowledge of the soul and attaining liberation, is based on the Veda. See NM (I, 22.4-22.9): \textit{ātmāpavargapARYANTADVĀDAŚAVIDHAPRAMEYAYAJITĀNAM TĀVAD ANYAJITĀNAUPAYIKAM EVA SĀKṢĀD APAVARGASĀDHANAM ITI VAKṣYĀMAḥ |...TASYA TR PRAVEASYĀTMĀDE CAH APAVARGASĀDHANATVĀDHIGAMA ĀGAMAṬKANIBANDHANAH |}.

\textsuperscript{17} See NBh and NV ad NS 1.1.1. For example, the NBh (ND: 34.2-35.1) states: \textit{imās tu catasro vidhyāḥ prthakprasthānāḥ prāṇabharām anugrahāyopadīśyante yāsāṃ caturthiham ānvikṣikā nyāvvidyāḥ |}. Likewise, the NV (ND: 35.11-35.13) reiterates and elaborates: \textit{catasro imā vidhyāḥ bhavanti tāṣ ca prthakprasthānāḥ | agnihoṭravanādipaṭrasthānā trayāḥ | halaśakṭidiprasthānā vārtāḥ | svāmyamāṭhyabhedānuvidhāyini daṇḍanītih | sāṃśayādibhedānuvidhāyini ānvikṣikā |}.

\textsuperscript{18} NBh ad NS 1.1.1. (ND 32.2): \textit{ātmādeh khalu prameyasya tatvajitānānāh śreyasādhigamah |}. Moreover, Kataoka 2006: 158 argues that based on the order of enumeration of the twelve objects, it clear that knowledge of the soul is the primary means to liberation and knowledge of the other objects is secondary.
provide knowledge about the soul, then how is it distinguished from the Veda, which also teaches about the soul and therefore provides the same means to liberation? In order to demonstrate that Nyāya does in fact offer unique knowledge, Vātsyāyana highlights the knowledge Nyāya provides of the remaining fourteen categories.

Jayanta takes a different approach and replaces Vātsyāyana’s four-fold division of sciences with the fourteen-fold division of sciences. Jayanta’s classification of the sciences differs from Vātsyāyana’s not only in number, but more importantly, in the scope and function of the sciences. First, Jayanta restricts the scope of the sciences to transcendent objects, which are invisible to most people. Second, whereas in Vātsyāyana’s division of sciences, each science had an independent teaching and goal, in Jayanta’s division, all the sciences work together toward the ultimate goal of heaven or liberation, which is foremost taught by the Veda. In this system, Nyāya has the unique job of protecting the authority of the Veda. According to Jayanta, Nyāya fulfils this task through demonstrating that testimony is an independent source of knowledge, and in particular, through an inference that establishes the reliability of the Veda’s testimony due to it having a trustworthy author.

Jayanta’s reorientation of Nyāya’s purpose as a science that works for the Veda and, in that regard, is subordinate to the Veda, along with the strategy he employs to establish the authority of non-Vedic religious scripture through similar arguments he uses to defend the authority of the Veda, makes him an ideal figure to study the epistemology of testimony and particularly, its soteriological significance. Moreover, the NM, which distinguishes between the

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19 NM (I, 5.1-5.2): *tac ca caturdaśavidham yāni vidvāmsah caturdaśavidhyāsthānāny ācaksate ||.*

various views of the Buddhists, Mīmāṃsakas, and other philosophical text traditions, provides much evidence that Jayanta was conversant in many of the major epistemological, linguistic, and ontological theories of his time.\textsuperscript{21} Relatedly, Jayanta’s work provides the first Nyāya response to the two towering Sanskrit intellectuals of the 7th century: the Mīmāṃsaka Kumārila Bhaṭṭa\textsuperscript{22} and the Buddhist epistemologist Dharmakīrti.\textsuperscript{23} While Dharmakīrti rejected testimony, and thus scripture, as a source of knowledge, Kumārila restricts the authority of scripture to the Veda and texts which are based on the Veda. On the other hand, Jayanta delineates a unique position that argues for the authority of all religious scripture, barring a couple of extreme cases. He develops his views after carefully explicating, critically examining, and drawing out the implications of his interlocutors’ views, often quoting them directly and mounting a sustained defense on their behalf. In fact, Jayanta strives hard to give a comprehensive overview of the multiplicity of views on each topic, acknowledging valid points even when they go against his own position. As a result, one of the goals of this dissertation is to demonstrate that Jayanta’s work, aside from being a valuable source for the investigation of testimony as a source of knowledge, provides a good example of how to conduct such an investigation.

\textsuperscript{21} This is shown in various portions of the NM that have been critically edited by Kei Kataoka. For example, see Kataoka 2003, 2004, 2005, 2008, and 2009. For translations of some of these portions see Freschi and Kataoka 2010, Watson and Kataoka 2010, and Watson and Kataoka 2017.

\textsuperscript{22} See n.2 above on the Mīmāṃsā text tradition. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa was one of the most notable commentators on Śabara’s Bhāṣya commentary. The Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā, which is distinguished from the Prābhākara school of Mīmāṃsā, derives from Kumārila’s interpretation of the Mīmāṃsā text tradition. It is clear from the NM and the AD that Kumārila’s work greatly influenced the structure and content of Jayanta’s works. For examples of different sections of the NM where Jayanta quotes and draws from the ideas of Kumārila see Graheli 2017, Kataoka 2003 and 2008, and Watson & Kataoka 2010 and 2017.

\textsuperscript{23} See n.1 above.
0.3 Bridging of Two Traditions: A Comparative Philosophy of Religions

The dialogical structure that frames Jayanta’s work is critical to understanding the debate on testimony and scriptural authority. In particular, Jayanta defines his own position through a critical examination of rival positions. Therefore, the heart of my dissertation will consist of an in-depth analysis of various debates between Jayanta and his Buddhist and Mīmāṃsaka interlocutors. However, my interest in studying Jayanta’s presentation and analysis of these debates on testimony, and particularly, scriptural authority, is not merely historical, but also, conversational. In particular, I aim to establish a dialogue between Indian philosophy and contemporary Euro-American philosophy. I believe that such a dialogue is critical not only to translating Sanskrit texts into English, but additionally, to comprehending complex Sanskrit philosophical arguments.

First, Sanskrit epistemological texts often rely on specific and complex terminology, where terms are used in multiple ways that depend on context and on particular authors and philosophical traditions. As a result, in order to reliably translate Sanskrit epistemological texts, it is necessary to have precise knowledge of contemporary epistemological theories and terminology so that translations are clear and precise, otherwise it is easy to mispresent Sanskrit philosophical debates. Additionally, without knowledge of contemporary epistemology, it would be hard to communicate with readers who are philosophically interested in the issues discussed in Sanskrit philosophy yet lack the language training necessary to comprehend Sanskrit texts.

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24 For an excellent model of a comparative project in the philosophy of religion see the Introduction in Patil 2009. Many of the methods and goals mentioned in this section are based on Patil’s depiction of a transdisciplinary project that draws from the disciplinary frameworks of religious studies, South Asian studies, and philosophy.

25 For example, see Freschi & Keidan 2017: 276-278 for the various ways the term “artha” (generally translated as “meaning”) has been used in Sanskrit philosophy depending on context and text tradition. More generally, Freschi & Keidan 2017 shows the problem with translating certain terms, whose meanings are nuanced and distinct, as synonymous.
Second, in order to comprehend Sanskrit arguments related to specialized and technical fields, knowledge of that field is necessary. Otherwise, it would be easy for someone who was not well-versed in that field to misinterpret Sanskrit texts. Thus, a lack of knowledge of contemporary discussions on epistemological topics like testimony would make it much harder to correctly comprehend Sanskrit texts that deal with the corresponding topics.\(^{26}\) Relatedly, as the subsequent analysis will demonstrate, many of the problems faced by Sanskrit philosophers are similar to ones faced by Euro-American philosophers in the last century. Thus, knowledge of corresponding contemporary discussions allows thinkers from different contexts to enter into critical philosophical dialogue with the goal of solving shared philosophical problems.

As stated above, this dissertation analyzes arguments regarding testimony as a source of knowledge, along with interrelated topics that particularly focus on religious testimony, such as why, on the basis of practical factors, religious testimony merits different epistemic treatment than mundane forms of testimony, and how to reconcile intractable religious disagreement stemming from mutually conflicting testimonial traditions. I examine these questions through various conceptual and methodological resources. In particular, I utilize, first and foremost, those conceptual resources that Jayanta identifies and employs, such as Nyāya epistemology and the epistemology of his Buddhist and Mīmāṃsaka interlocutors, along with the conceptual resources of contemporary epistemology and philosophy of religion. While there are many places where I bring Sanskrit philosophy into dialogue with contemporary philosophy, I primarily analyze and interpret Jayanta and his interlocutors’ arguments within the intellectual world where they were

\(^{26}\) Freschi & Keidan 2017: 254-255 mentions how the first Sanskritists who dealt with Pāṇini’s grammar lacked the requisite linguistic background to understand Pāṇini’s points. As a result, they failed to appreciate, and some like Whitney even criticized, Pāṇini’s distinction between linguistic forms and functions, a distinction that, only a few decades ago, has been appreciated by contemporary linguistics.
produced. This intellectual world is defined by Jayanta’s written texts\(^\text{27}\) and the texts he refers to, namely, texts within his own tradition, which include the Nyāyasūtras and Vātsyāyana’s commentary on it, and the texts of his interlocutors, which include the works of Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, and Kumārila.

Analyzing and interpreting these arguments within the intellectual world inhabited by Jayanta and his interlocutors requires an understanding of the technical terminology of Sanskrit philosophical idiom, the intertextual space in which such arguments were produced, and the various philosophical concerns motivating Sanskrit philosophers. In order to understand the Sanskrit philosophical arguments as they were intended to be understood, I employ the methodological resources of classical Indology that are associated with the historical and philosophical study of Sanskrit texts. In particular, I utilize a critical, textually-sensitive approach, grounding my analysis philologically by providing translations of and references to the Sanskrit materials I use. I also acknowledge the historical precedents of various arguments being discussed, particularly in light of Jayanta’s unique philosophical contributions to the Nyāya text tradition.

However, it is nearly impossible to reliably translate and understand Sanskrit philosophical arguments without knowledge of contemporary philosophical vocabulary. Moreover, approaching Sanskrit philosophical arguments not merely as historical artifacts, but also, as philosophically significant and relevant arguments, could help illuminate and solve

\(^{27}\) Three extant works are ascribed to Jayanta: his magnum opus on Nyāya philosophy, the Nyāyamañjarī (A Cluster of Blossoms of the Nyāya-tree), its shorter compendium, the Nyāyakalikā (A Bud of the Nyāya-tree), and a philosophical play, the Āgamadambara (Much Ado About Religion). This dissertation will primarily focus on the first and third works. The Nyāyakalikā is thought to be an abridgement of the Nyāyamañjarī with many passages mirroring those of the Nyāyamañjarī ad verbum. For more on the Nyāyamañjarī see the previous section in this Introduction. For more on the Āgamadambara, see the first two sections in the fourth chapter of this dissertation. Jayanta also reportedly wrote several works that are lost, namely, a commentary on Pāṇini’s grammar, and an independent philosophical work, the Nyāyapallava (A Blooming Twig of the Nyāya-tree). For more on Jayanta’s works see Graheli 2015: 11-13 and Raghavan & Thakur 1964: iii-v.
contemporary philosophical problems. Thus, one of my goals is to establish a peer-to-peer conversation between Sanskrit philosophy and contemporary Euro-American philosophy. To do so, in my study of Jayanta’s arguments, I utilize the conceptual resources of the epistemology of testimony, the epistemology of disagreement, and theories of pragmatic encroachment. In my view, utilizing these resources not only makes more accessible the questions and concerns of Sanskrit texts, but additionally, it expands the discussion on the epistemology of testimony and religious epistemology by creating a context in which thinkers from different traditions can enter into dialogue. In particular, I note areas where the methods and conceptual resources used by Jayanta might enrich contemporary conversations. As a result, in addition to contributing broadly to the study of Indian philosophy and philosophy of religion, this dissertation contributes to the particular conversations occurring in the epistemology of testimony, the epistemology of disagreement, and pragmatic encroachment in epistemology.

Moreover, in order to present Jayanta’s work in a manner which reflects its philosophical orientation and yet is accessible to those unfamiliar with Sanskrit philosophical idiom, I select and highlight those aspects of his texts which are most relevant to the particular topics I delineated above, namely, the epistemology of testimony and issues specific to the epistemic status of religious testimony. In doing so, I am, in a sense, reconstructing and bringing together, aspects of Jayanta’s thought which are not directly referenced by him. For example, Jayanta’s critique of the Buddhist reduction of testimony to inference assumes a particular background theory of inferential reasoning as well as knowledge of the Buddhist theory of exclusion (apoha), which explains how conceptual awareness, and particularly, the awareness produced through language, works. Much of this material is not explicitly discussed by Jayanta in the context of testimony as a source of knowledge. Despite this, in order to reconstruct an understanding of
Jayanta’s arguments which is both faithful to his texts and intellectual concerns, but also meaningful to those who lack a detailed knowledge of Sanskrit philosophy, I plan to bring certain ideas, topically and temporally separated, into direct association.

In providing a critical study on Jayanta’s presentation of interreligious debates on the epistemic status of testimony, and in particular, religious testimony, this dissertation contributes to conversations occurring in the philosophy of religion, namely, the epistemology of religious belief and the challenge of religious disagreement. An emerging trend in the philosophy of religion is to apply the tools and conceptual resources developed in contemporary philosophy to studying religious problems. For example, John Greco applies recent developments in the epistemology of testimony to religious testimony,\textsuperscript{28} Aaron Rizzieri applies the principles of pragmatic encroachment to religious beliefs,\textsuperscript{29} and James Kraft applies the tools developed to talk about ordinary disagreement to religious disagreements.\textsuperscript{30} My dissertation is part of this broader trend in that it also uses the resources and tools of contemporary philosophy and applies them to religious problems, while also acknowledging the differences that are unique to religious problems. Ultimately, in providing an analytical study of a Sanskrit text, this project underscores the relevance of Sanskrit texts and the theoretical insights of South Asian intellectuals to the contemporary conversations in the philosophy of religion.

\textbf{0.4 Chapter Summaries}

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\textsuperscript{28} See Greco 2012b.

\textsuperscript{29} See Rizzieri 2013.

\textsuperscript{30} See Kraft 2012.
In addition to this introductory chapter, this dissertation consists of two parts, each containing two chapters. In the first part, I focus on the nature of testimony as a source of knowledge primarily conceived of through Nyāya epistemology. In chapter 1, I circumscribe the topic of inquiry by clarifying a number of important distinctions regarding the nature, scope, and function of testimony. After examining various contemporary definitions of testimony, noting their strengths and weaknesses, I ultimately focus on Jayanta’s definition of testimony. Relatedly, in conceptualizing testimony within a Nyāya epistemological framework, I analyze a number of important Sanskrit epistemological terms and concepts that do not always have contemporary parallels. Lastly, this chapter sets up one of the key debates in the epistemology of testimony, namely, testimony’s reducibility to inference, which occupies the subject of the next chapter. In particular, this chapter introduces the structure and elements of inferential reasoning and clarifies the key terms, figures, and issues at stake in the debate over whether testimony is an independent source of knowledge or whether it is reducible to inference.

Chapter 2 provides a close examination of one of the central questions in the epistemology of testimony, namely, whether testimony is an independent, or autonomous, source of knowledge, or whether it is reducible to inference. In particular, it focuses on two different Buddhist arguments for why testimony can be reduced to inference, along with Jayanta’s counter-responses. This chapter also provides an introduction to the broad framework of Buddhist epistemology and ontology, particularly highlighting the radical distinction that exists between perception, which only apprehends bare particulars, and conceptualization, which associates objects with labels and categories, and, as a result, mentally constructs objects that do not exist external to and independent of the mind.
Lastly, chapter 2 concludes with an analysis of Dharmakīrti’s view of religious testimony. While ultimately rejecting the notion that testimony can provide us with knowledge about real objects, Dharmakīrti explains that when it comes to obtaining our religious goals, we often must resort to scripture since our ordinary perceptual and reasoning faculties are unable to apprehend transcendent objects. Despite proposing a method whereby beliefs based on a scripture that has been rigorously tested are considered acceptable, Dharmakīrti ultimately argues that inferring the reliability of a scripture’s statements on supersensible objects on the basis of the reliability of that scripture’s statements on empirical objects can never amount to bona fide knowledge. Dharmakīrti’s epistemic analysis, and overall rejection, of scripture as a source of knowledge provides an appropriate segue into part 2 of this dissertation, which focuses on testimonial evidence for religious beliefs.

Chapter 3 examines Jayanta’s argument for why religious testimony merits different epistemic treatment than mundane testimony. In doing so, it introduces pragmatic encroachment theories in epistemology and argues that while Jayanta’s epistemology is conceptually different from contemporary theories on pragmatic encroachment, it has many of the same practical implications, namely, the fact that in high-stakes situations, the epistemic subject needs to have a higher level of justification, or epistemic support, for her beliefs than she would ordinarily need to have in low-stakes situations. The second part of chapter 3, in looking at Jayanta’s defense of the reliability of the Veda, examines the particular type of epistemic support needed for beliefs based on religious scripture. In particular, chapter 3 examines two of Jayanta’s arguments for why the Veda is reliable, namely, the partial tests argument and the consensus of exemplary people argument. Important to this discussion is the notion of epistemic authority, and in
particular, the idea that, fundamental to the notion of being an epistemic authority is the
normative power to give pre-emptive reasons for certain beliefs.

Chapter 4 turns to the issue of religious disagreement and looks at Jayanta’s assessment
of the epistemic status of scripture outside the Veda. In particular, it looks at Jayanta’s approach
to mutually conflicting religious scripture and his unique thesis that all religious scripture,
barring a few “extreme” cases, should be considered authoritative. This chapter also underscores
the process by which Jayanta employs the epistemic criteria of his more orthodox opponent, who
only accepts the authority of the Veda and Vedic-related texts, to argue for his more inclusive
thesis. Additionally, in looking at contemporary theories on the problem of religious
disagreement, this chapter argues that Jayanta’s unique approach to the problem of religious
disagreement, especially his consideration of the socio-practical factors that affect the
justification of religious beliefs, might help break some of the deadlock in contemporary
theorizing on intractable religious disagreement.
Chapter 1: Conceptualizing Testimony within Nyāya Epistemology

1.0 Introduction

We live in a world where many of our cherished beliefs come from what other people tell us. We rely on others for our beliefs about current and past events, the ingredients in our food, what medicines to take when we are sick, how to get from location “a” to location “b,” and even our own personal biography, such as the day we were born. However, we are also aware that people are often misinformed or can deliberately mislead us. Given this, when is reasonable to trust what others tell us? Put in another way, how do we acquire knowledge or justified beliefs from the words of others?

One of the central questions in the epistemology of testimony is how we acquire knowledge or justified beliefs from the testimony of speakers. For example, if I tell you that Memorial Church is located in Harvard Yard and, based on my testimony, you form the corresponding belief that Memorial Church is located in Harvard Yard, would this belief be justified and, if true, be knowledge? Or, would you first need to have additional reasons for believing what I tell you, such as evidence that I am trustworthy? In contemporary discussions in the epistemology of testimony, this discussion is often framed in terms of whether testimonial knowledge is reducible to other, more fundamental, sources of knowledge, such as perception.

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31 For now, I take “knowledge” to be justified, true belief. However, as will be seen later on in this chapter, Nyāya’s bivalent epistemology challenges this definition and puts forth an epistemic framework where knowledge is an epistemic state that is separate from justification.

32 For now, I take justification to be something which, when added to true belief, is sufficient for, or close to sufficient for, knowledge. However, for Nyāya, knowledge and justification are treated separately and justification, while required for second order, or reflective, knowledge, it is not necessary for first order knowledge. In the context of a bivalent epistemology, I will discuss justification as being able demonstrate that one’s belief is in fact true, or, produced by a reliable instrument of knowledge.
Those who claim that testimonial knowledge is reducible to more basic sources of knowledge argue that a recipient of testimony must base her belief upon additional reasons, such as the speaker’s trustworthiness, in order for her belief to be justified. As a result, the reasons for accepting a speaker’s testimony boil down to, or reduce to, inferential reasons. On the other hand, those who claim that testimonial knowledge is not reducible to other sources of knowledge argue that a recipient of testimony is justified in accepting a speaker’s assertions merely on the basis of the that speaker’s saying so, provided that she has no evidence indicating that the speaker’s assertions are false.

The issue of whether testimonial knowledge is reducible to other, more basic sources of knowledge inspired a large body of literature among Sanskrit philosophers in first millennium India. By the time Jayanta was writing in the 9th century, thinkers from Buddhist, Mīmāṃsā, and Nyāya text traditions had been systemically debating the status of testimony as a source of knowledge for about three centuries. For these thinkers, the epistemic status of testimony was not merely an abstract philosophical question; instead, it had important implications for religious knowledge. The general consensus among Indian thinkers was that knowledge of supersensible objects, such as religious objects, are only directly accessible to a select few. The majority of people have to rely on scriptural testimony to gain knowledge about important yet inaccessible subject matters.


34 Although the Nyāyasūtra (c. 200ce) provides evidence of the relevance of questions concerning the reducibility of testimony to inference, as well as the Veda’s reliability (see NS 1.1.7 as well as NS 2.1.49 – 2.1.68), it wasn’t until the beginning in the 6th century, with Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya (Compendium on Sources of Knowledge), that Sanskrit philosophers began to systemically critique the works of their philosophical rivals using a shared understanding of the proper epistemic framework for defending and arguing against philosophical claims. For more on this see McCrea and Patil 2010: 5-6.
Jayanta’s presentation of this debate not only sheds light on the particular disputes that occurred within and between different Sanskrit text traditions, but moreover, it highlights the questions and concerns surrounding the social dimensions of knowledge. While the topic of testimony’s reducibility is the focus of the next chapter, this chapter will help set up the debate by providing an introduction to Sanskrit epistemic terms and concepts. It will also define what is meant by “testimony” and clarify the question of testimony’s reducibility. In particular, in an effort to circumscribe our subject of inquiry, the beginning of this chapter looks at various ways that testimony has been defined in contemporary conversations. Here I aim to highlight the fact that the definition of testimony I am most interested in should be able to account for most of our daily communicative interactions and should be framed in terms of one of the primarily goals of these interactions: the transfer of knowledge from the speaker to the recipient.

I will then present Jayanta’s definition of testimony and provide relevant background information on important epistemic terms in Indian philosophy that help clarify not only Jayanta’s understanding of testimony, but also, the general Nyāya epistemological framework. In particular, this chapter will discuss the fact that for Sanskrit epistemologists, 1) the sources of knowledge are factive and inerrant, 2) cognitions, and not beliefs, are the primarily objects of epistemic analysis, and 3) for realists like Jayanta, word and sentence meaning often is identical with the external object denoted. Additionally, in unpacking the question about testimony’s reducibility to inference, this chapter provides a basic introduction to inferential reasoning which if helpful in understanding the arguments discussed in the next chapter. Lastly, this chapter will explain Nyaya’s bivalent epistemology, whereby knowledge and justification are treated

35 The situation is more complicated than this. Jayanta rejects a simplistic version of referentialism since an object that is able to be linguistically or cognitively grasped is different from the concrete object existing in the external world. In particular, see Freschi & Keidan 2017: 278, “In fact, a concrete individual can only be grasped through language insofar as it displays the characteristics of the member of a class.”
separately. Nyāya’s bivalent epistemology provides the theoretical underpinnings for Jayanta’s rejection of testimony’s reducibility to inference, discussed in chapter two, and helps explain why, according to Jayanta, religious testimony merits different epistemic treatment than mundane testimony, discussed in chapter three.

1.1 Defining Testimony

1.1.1 Preliminary remarks and important distinctions

Before examining the epistemic status of testimony, it is important to ask what phenomenon is captured by the term “testimony.” There are a number of important distinctions that serve to specify the type, function and scope, of the testimony I am interested in. The first important distinction is that between natural and formal testimony. While formal, or legal, testimony is given under oath and has admissibility requirements,\(^{36}\) natural testimony is broader in scope and encompasses linguistic communication encountered in everyday situations such as “giving someone directions to the post office, reporting what happened in an accident, saying that, yes, you have seen a child answering to that description, telling someone the result of the last race or the latest cricket score.”\(^{37}\) My interest is in this latter, broader notion of testimony.

A second distinction is made between testimony as a speech act and testimony as a source of belief.\(^{38}\) Under the speech act model, the focus is placed on the speaker’s act of testifying and the conditions and contexts under which such an act is possible. On the model of testimony as a source of belief, the focus is placed on the hearer’s acquisition of belief or

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\(^{36}\) Coady 1992: 26

\(^{37}\) Coady 1992: 38

\(^{38}\) Lackey 2008: 14
knowledge through the statements of others. Under this latter model of testimony as a source of belief, testimony is akin to other, traditionally recognized, sources of belief, such as perception, reason, and memory. While I think that both these elements—the speaker’s act of testifying and the recipient’s acquisition of belief/knowledge—are important parts of testimony, most definitions tend to focus on, incorrectly I think, testimony as a speech act.39

A final distinction can be made between broad and narrow views of testimony. Contemporary discussions in the epistemology of testimony often embrace a broad notion of testimony. Testimony has been labeled as “tellings generally,”40 “people’s telling us things,”41 and “a statement of someone’s thoughts and beliefs, which they might direct to the world at large and to no one in particular.”42 These definitions seem to suggest that any expression of a speaker’s thought that $p$, counts as that speaker testifying that $p$. One problem with too broad a construal of testimony is that such an account does not distinguish between expressions of thought that convey content and those that do not. For example, in certain contexts, statements such as “The weather is nice today,” are merely meant, and taken, as conversational fillers. This is not to say that such cases never qualify as testimony, but rather, that they do not always qualify as testimony. This underscores the notion that the concept of testimony is intimately connected with notion of conveyance of information. A good definition of testimony should take this into account.

39 For example, see Adler 2012: section 1.
40 Fricker 1995: 396-397
41 Audi 1997: 406
42 Sosa 1991: 219
Under a narrower definition of testimony, additional conditions need to be fulfilled before a speaker’s statement can count as testimony. For example, C. A. J. Coady argues that a speaker $S$ testifies by making a statement that $p$ if and only if 1) $S$’s statement that $p$ is evidence that $p$ and is offered as evidence that $p$, 2) $S$ has the relevant authority and competence to state truly that $p$, 3) $S$’s statement that $p$ is directed toward some dispute or unresolved question, and 4) $S$’s statement that $p$ is directed at those who are in need of evidence on the matter. Jennifer Lackey raises three problems with this view, which I think, on the whole, can be addressed. First, Lackey argues that Coady’s view fails to distinguish between “the metaphysics of testimony” and “the epistemology of testimony.” In particular, Lackey argues that, in defining all testimony as reliable testimony, Coady has failed to distinguish between the question “what is testimony?” and the question “what is the difference between good and bad testimony?” Although Lackey’s point seems intuitive, I do not see Coady’s attempt to restrict testimony to “good testimony” as too problematic, especially if our focus is on a specific outcome: successful linguistic communication. In that sense, the nature of testimony is tied to its successful functioning, that is, its ability to produce knowledge. As will be seen later on, Jayanta, and the Sanskrit philosophical tradition in general, defines the sources of knowledge, testimony included, as inerrant. More specifically, a source of knowledge is defined in terms of a process that produces a particular, successful outcome.

Second, Lackey argues that Coady’s definition does not allow a speaker’s testimony to unwittingly become a source of belief for some recipient. This means that posthumously

43 Coady 1992: 42
44 Lackey 2008: 16
45 Lackey 2008: 18
published diaries and journals would fail to be considered testimony if the author had no intention of directing her statements to anyone. While this objection raises a good point about the relevance of a speaker’s intention to the transmission of knowledge, I think that, in most non-controversial cases of testimony, the speaker’s intention to communicate a certain content is a key part of testimony. And there is a reason for that. There is a certain danger in taking statements in private diaries, which were never intended to be communicated to anyone, as instances of testimony since the author’s context and motives related to making such statements are often unclear.

Relatedly, it seems hardly appropriate to label private diary entries, if unreliable, as “bad testimony” especially since they were never meant to convey information in the first place. Finally, Coady’s definition can accommodate for certain sorts of confidential documents, “particularly where the document in question was concerned, for whatever reason, to set the record straight.”46 Thus, while recognizing that private diary entries are a challenge to Coady’s definition of testimony, here too, I do not think that restricting testimony to those instances where the speaker intends to convey a certain content is problematic, especially if the speaker’s intention to communicate is part of what makes testimony a reliable process.

Lastly, Lackey argues that Coady’s view of testimony does not allow for situations where a speaker can testify that $p$ regardless of the epistemic needs of the recipient.47 For example, Lackey believes that a speaker can testify that $p$, even if it is within a context where $p$ is not a disputed or unresolved question. Lackey provides the example of a theist testifying to a group of committed atheists that “There is a God,” despite the fact that, for said atheists, there is no

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46 Coady 1992: 50
47 Lackey 2008: 18
question or doubt in their mind regarding the nonexistence of God. I think that in some sense, we can say that, in this case, between the testifier and the recipients, there is in fact a dispute about God’s existence since one party is challenging the other party’s beliefs. In fact, Coady speaks about situations where a speaker’s statement “creates a context of inquiry or dispute”\(^48\) by conveying an idea that the audience finds contentious. Thus, I think that, under Coady’s understanding of testimony, a mere disagreement between two parties creates a situation where a speaker’s testimony is seen as directed toward a disputed question.

Despite thinking that many of Lackey’s objections to Coady’s definition of testimony have a satisfying response, I do think that they serve to highlight the fact that Coady’s model of testimony focuses more on the speaker’s credentials and intention to communicate a certain content, rather than on the conveyance of information to the recipient. On the other hand, Lackey’s account of testimony encapsulates testimony as both a speech act and a source of belief. First, her account highlights and distinguishes between the roles played by both the speaker and the hearer. Moreover, it does so in a way that presents testimony as having a dual nature: testimony as an intentional act of the speaker and testimony as a source of belief for the hearer.\(^49\) Relatedly, Lackey’s account also distinguishes between the act of communication, \(a\), that a testifier performs, and the informational content \(p\), that the testifier conveys by means of \(a\).\(^50\) The act of communication, \(a\), is construed broadly so that the speaker need not intend to communicate to others, but rather, only intend to express communicable content. In the case of a private diary, while the author does not intend to communicate to others, the author does intend

\[^{48}\text{Coady 1992: 50}\]

\[^{49}\text{Lackey 2008: 27}\]

\[^{50}\text{Lackey 2008: 28}\]
to express communicable content. Informational content $p$ is also construed broadly to mean either the proposition expressed by an utterance or a proposition that is an obvious implication of the utterance.

Lackey presents her disjunctive view of the nature of testimony (DVNT) as follows: “S testifies that $p$ by making an act of communication $a$ if and only if (in part) in virtue of $a$'s communicable content, (1) S reasonably intends to convey the information that $p$, or (2) $a$ is reasonably taken as conveying the information that $p$.51 Lackey claims the “or” preceding the second disjunct is an inclusive “or,” and thus both conditions could, but need not, hold simultaneously.52 While I think Lackey’s distinction between testimony as an intentional act on the part of a speaker and testimony as a source of belief or knowledge for a hearer clarifies two important, but distinct, components of testimony, it is hard for me to envision instances of testimony as including one but not the other component. More specifically, it is hard for me to imagine a scenario counting as testimony where a speaker intends to express thoughts with communicable content $p$, but that expression of thought is not taken as conveying $p$. For example, if only the first disjunct held, then a speaker stating that “Grass is green” while a hearer interprets this statement as conveying the idea that “Bananas are yellow,” would still count as an instance of testimony so long as the speaker reasonably intends to convey the idea that grass is green. Similarly, if I assert “L’erba è verde”—Italian for “Grass is green”—to someone who, unbeknownst to me, only speaks and understands English, I would be testifying that grass is green if I intended to convey this information. It does not matter that the recipient fails to comprehend what I am saying.

51 Lackey 2006: 3
52 Lackey 2006: 3, n. 4.
Thus, I think it is problematic that Lackey’s portrayal of testimony disconnects speaker-testimony (the speaker intending to convey that $p$ through $a$) from hearer-testimony ($a$ is taken by the recipient as conveying that $p$) by requiring that only one of these disjuncts hold for the speaker to have testified that $p$ through $a$. In my opinion, the central aim of testimony is the conveyance or transmission of information to a recipient. Because of this, it makes no sense for there to be speaker testimony without hearer testimony. In characterizing testimony from the perspective of the recipient, I am mainly interested in testimony as an epistemic source of belief, whereby a hearer acquires knowledge or justified belief from either the spoken or written words of others. In the next section, I turn to Jayanta’s definition of testimony and argue that it underscores the central aim of testimony, the transmission of knowledge. In defining testimony as a source of knowledge, rather than mere belief, Jayanta, like Coady, focuses on the conditions that need to hold true for both the speaker and recipient, in order for testimony to be a source of true, justified belief.

1.1.2 The Indian Context and Jayanta’s Definition of Testimony

As stated in the Introduction, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa composed the NM toward the end of the 9th century. Consisting of 12 chapters (āhnika-s), the NM is a treatise on the tenets of Nyāya, which is rooted in NS. Chapters 3-6 deal with issues surrounding the acquisition of knowledge through language. In this chapter and the next chapter, I will be primarily focusing on the first part of chapter 3, which is concerned with defining testimony as an autonomous instrument of knowledge and refuting the thesis that testimony is reducible to inference. While Jayanta’s presentation of this debate draws from material in Kumārila’s Ślokavārttika (SV), for example, see Graheli 2017 where comparable passages in the SV on the reduction of testimony to inference are footnoted.
organizes the material differently and reorients it to serve different purposes, in particular, to argue for Nyāya positions that would be rejected by Kumārila. Noteworthy is the way that Jayanta structures this debate so that its complexity is revealed via increasingly subtler objections and counter-arguments. Each subsection of an argument is influenced by the preceding subsections of that argument, so that Jayanta’s overall argument depends upon the particular sequence of subsections.

Jayanta starts the third chapter of the NM by analyzing the definition of testimony provided in the NS, along with its commentaries. First, he quotes the definition of testimony delineated in NS 1.1.7: “Testimony is the instruction of trustworthy person.” Before analyzing this definition, Jayanta first distinguishes testimony from pseudo testimony, or, cases that appear to be instances of testimony however, instead of leading to knowledge, they lead to doubt, error, or recollection. Although he claims that under one interpretation, pseudo testimony is barred from this definition by the terms “trustworthy person” and “instruction,” in order to make clear that testimony does not give rise to false cognitions, Jayanta argues that this definition should include the fact that testimony produces non-erroneous and definitive cognitions of its object.

For Sanskrit philosophers, cognitions, or awareness-events (jñāna), are the primary objects of epistemic analysis rather than beliefs. One important difference between the two is

54 NM (I, 396.3): āptopadeśaḥ śabdaḥ and NS 1.1.7 (see ND: 173).

55 For many Sanskrit philosophers, knowledge is depicted as a presenting awareness-event rather than a re-presenting awareness-event, such as memory (smṛti). The thinking is that even if memory accurately depicts its object, it does not do so independently, but rather, through a past experience. Mohanty 1966: 37 explains that memory being excluded from the domain of knowledge is rooted more in tradition than in any inherent defect of memory.

56 NM (I, 396.7-396.9): jñānapadasya smṛtijanakasya vyavacchēdāya cārthagrahaṇasya saṃśayeviparyayayajananirākanāya ca vyavasāyātmakāvyābhīcāripadayor anuvṛtitāḥ |
that while an awareness-event refers to an episodic mental state, a belief is often thought of as an attitude we have toward a proposition when we take it to be true. Sanskrit philosophers did not accept a third-realm of mind-independent propositions that were the objects of propositional attitudes like belief. Instead, cognitions were the primary bearers of truth and falsity. A cognitive episode (with conceptual content) has its own logical structure that consists of a subject, a property, and a relation between the two. For example, in the thought “This is a pot,” “this” is the subject, “pot” is the property, and “is” is the relation, which is one of identity. Despite the fact that cognitions, or awareness-events, are not exactly “beliefs,” it is helpful to think of awareness-events as belief-episodes. This is because Naiyāyikas like Jayanta believed that in standard cases of testimony, there is no prior non-committal, belief-free comprehension of cognitive content.

On the other hand, on standard interpretations of linguistic communication, understanding, or belief-free comprehension, and belief are separated. In particular, first we have a belief-less, or non-committal, awareness of what a speaker says, and then, on the basis of some sort of evidence, such as the speaker’s credibility, we believe what that speaker says. On this account, understanding what is said is epistemically prior to believing in, or obtaining knowledge from, what is said. Nyāya is against this two-step account of linguistic communication whereby all belief and knowledge must go through a prior stage of belief-free comprehension. This is not to say that Nyāya thinks we never have commitment-free understanding of utterances, but rather, that in standard and normal cases of linguistic communication, unless we have reason to doubt or disbelieve a speaker’s statements, a belief-episode would arise in a hearer. If that belief-episode


58 For more on this, see Chakrabarti 1994: 120-124 and Matilal 1994: 358-359.
is in accordance with its object, it is a knowledge-episode, or, warranted awareness. Throughout the rest of this dissertation, I will refer to beliefs and knowledge, with the understanding that for Sanskrit philosophers, such states of awareness are episodic.

Another way to talk about knowledge is that it is an awareness-event that is produced by a well-functioning instrument, or source of knowledge (pramāṇa). For Sanskrit philosophers, the sources of knowledge are defined as factive and inerrant. They are the cause of warranted awareness, and are four in number: perception, inference, analogy and testimony. This means that, by definition, no cognition produced by one of these sources of knowledge can be false. Despite the fact that cognitive states of knowledge and error might be phenomenally similar, they are metaphysically distinct. By defining testimony in terms of its successful functioning, that is, in terms of its ability to produce knowledge, all other processes that are phenomenally similar to testimony but do not produce knowledge are instances of pseudo-testimony. Thus, according to Nyāya, defining testimony as a particular source of knowledge means that cases where the statements of a speaker fail to produce knowledge do not amount to instances of testimony.

After quoting the definition of testimony found in the NS, Jayanta proceeds to unpack the meaning of the terms, “instruction” and “trustworthy person.” Jayanta explains that “instruction” refers to the making of a statement which, as a result of someone hearing it, produces knowledge of the object (artha) of that statement. I believe this definition can be

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59 For a good discussion on the idea that pramāṇa-s are factive see Dasti & Phillips 2010.

60 NM (I, 72.11-72.12): pramīyate yena tat pramāṇam iti karaṇārthābhidhāvinah pramāṇasabdāt pramākaraṇṁ pramāṇam ity avagamyate |.

61 NS 1.1.3 (see ND, 85): prayaksānumānopamāṇasabdāḥ pramāṇāni |.

62 NM (I, 399.1-399.2): śrotragrāhyavastukaraṇākā tadarthaprafitīr abhidhānakriyā ittham ṿoke vyāvahārāt |.
expanded to include written statements as well, since the key part of the definition is the power of language, written or oral, to convey knowledge. The Sanskrit term I am translating as “object” in “object of that statement” is “artha.” This is a notoriously tricky word to translate since it has many meanings depending on whether the context is linguistic, epistemological, deontic, or ontological. For instance, Freschi & Keidan cite a span of pages in Arnold 2006 where “artha” is unproblematically translated as “object,” “meaning,” “external object,” “thing” and “referent.”

Oftentimes it is left untranslated. For realists like Jayanta, unless one was specifically talking about mental content, the meaning of words and sentences are the external objects, objective properties, and relations between them which are denoted. However, the situation is slightly more nuanced. In particular, for Jayanta, “artha” is not merely a concrete individual existing in the external world. Instead, as the object of a linguistic expression, “artha” refers to the features of an object that enable it to be linguistically or cognitively grasped.

There are various theories of what sort of entity word-meanings (mostly common nouns like “pot” or “cow”) should be identified with. For realist schools, this debate pivoted around whether these terms referred to particular individuals (vyakti-śakti-vāda) or general properties (jāti-śakti-vāda). Around the 6th century, the Nyāya philosopher Uddyotakara introduced the idea that the meaning of a common noun was a qualified individual (tadvat), however it was Jayanta that discussed this in depth. More specifically, Jayanta argues that common nouns designate an individual endowed with the particular features of its natural kind.

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63 Freschi & Keidan 2017: 262-263. While these authors note that its unavoidable that the term “artha” be translated in various ways, given its multiple shades of meaning, they argue that choices in translation need to be problematized and explained to the reader.

64 See n.35 above.

65 For more on this debate see Ganeri 1999: chapter 3.

66 NM (II, 59.11- 59.12): tadvān iti viśeṣa eva sāmānyavān ucyate |
the meaning of the word “tree” should be understood as having the following logical form: this concrete individual (the particular and variable element), having-treehood (the universal, the constant element). Thus, a concrete individual can only be grasped through language insofar as it displays the particular features of a member of a class. While a word refers to an individual entity, a sentence refers to a complex relational entity. In particular, Jayanta claims that while each word in a sentence first denotes its own meaning (abhidhārtr), the sentence meaning is known through a second capacity of words (tātparyaśakti), the capacity to cooperate with the other words in the sentence to produce the sentence meaning. For example, the sentence, “The cow is white,” means, or refers to, a relational structure whose components are the meanings of “cow,” and “white,” as well as the relationship of inherence that exists between them. It is this structure that the hearer apprehends upon hearing a sentence. Henceforth, I will primarily refer to “artha” as “object,” rather than “meaning” since, as stated earlier, for Jayanta, linguistic expressions refer to individuals, or the relational structures between various individuals, endowed with the particular characteristics of their natural kind.

As long as the sentence uttered by the speaker is well-formed, a belief about its object should form within the hearer. In order for a sentence to be well-formed, three conditions must be met: syntactic expectancy (ākāṅkṣā), semantic fitness (yogyatā), and proximity (samnidhāna). Words that syntactically expect one another must follow the conventional rules of grammar and syntax. For example, while “The hat is on the table” is syntactically appropriate, “Table on is the hat” is not. On the other hand, words that are semantically fit lack

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67 Example from Ganeri 1999: 104.
68 NM (II, 190.8-190.10): padānām hi dvayī śaktir abhidhārtr ca tātparyaśaktiś ca. tatra abhidhārtr śaktir eşām padārtheśūpayuktā tātparyaśaktiś ca vākyārthe paryavasyatīt |. For a deeper discussion on the capacity of words to produce the sentence meaning (tātparyaśakti) see Graheli 2016: 231-262.
69 See Matilal 1994: 355-357 on these three conditions.
material incompatibility between word-meanings. There are two categories of semantic unfitness: first, cases where the objects of a sentence do not fit, such as in the sentence, “The apple is red and not red,” and second, cases where the objects of a sentence are not actually incompatible but are generally not found existing together in the actual world, such as in the sentence, “There is an elephant in the next room.” Lastly, in a well-formed sentence, words must be proximate to one another in time and space. A speaker cannot utter one word, and then, five minutes later, utter the second word, and so on. Instead, the words must occur in quick succession so that the hearer is able to form a unified belief of the object of the sentence. If these three conditions hold, and provided doubt does not arise for whatever reason, Naiyāyikas would argue that, upon hearing a statement, a hearer will form a belief that, if true, would be word-generated knowledge.

A deeper analysis of word and sentence meaning is beyond the scope of this paper. The meaning of words and sentences was a heavily debated topic in ancient India that was related to, but distinct from, discussions on the epistemology of testimony. In particular, what will be important to keep in mind is that while Naiyāyikas like Jayanta upheld a realist theory of meaning, whereby the meaning of words and sentences were generally the objects they stood for, Jayanta’s Buddhist rivals subscribed to an ideational theory of meaning whereby the meaning of words and sentences were the ideas or mental constructs they were associated with. More will be said about this later.

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70 This second example of semantic unfitness is interesting because whether it applies depends not just on the context of the utterance, but also, on the hearer’s belief system, as well as social factors. For example, if my mother said to me, “There is an elephant in the next room,” I would believe her, despite knowing how farfetched it seems. It is unclear to me whether or not I would believe that statement if a stranger were to make it. On the other hand, in situations where the object of the sentence was not something observational, such as the claim “God exists,” despite not being able to completely rule out the possibility of its being the case, I would doubt its semantic fitness based on my other beliefs and commitments. And this would be so regardless of whether the person I trusted most made the statement. For more on the fitness condition and the various ways it can misfire see Matilal 1994: 356-367.
Continuing Jayanta’s analysis of the definition of testimony, after unpacking the term “instruction” in “The instruction of a trustworthy person,” Jayanta then moves on to unpacking the term, “trustworthy person.” To start, he first quotes the characterization of “trustworthy person” provided by Vātsyāyana’s *Nyāyabhāṣya* (NBh), a 4th century commentary on the NS, and then enlarges its scope. According to the Vātsyāyana, a trustworthy person is an instructor who a) directly knows a subject and b) is impelled by a desire to describe that subject according to its nature. Jayanta explains that by “subject” Vātsyāyana is referring to any topic which is able to be taught. Additionally, Vātsyāyana claims that directly knowing an object means perceiving that object in accordance with its nature, or, as it really is. However, Jayanta thinks this is too restrictive. For example, assume A has direct knowledge of X. Vātsyāyana’s understanding seems to rule out cases in which, if A tells B about X and B tells C about X, B can transmit testimonial knowledge to C. This is because B only has indirect knowledge about X. Even though perception is a direct instrument of knowledge, there is no rule saying that a trustworthy person must know a subject matter exclusively via perception. Jayanta instead proposes that a trustworthy person can also know about things she teaches to others via indirect sources of knowledge, like inference and testimony, since they are also valid ways of knowing.

Lackey raises an interesting objection against this “transmission thesis,” or, the idea that, for the hearer to obtain testimonial knowledge that \( p \), the speaker must have knowledge that \( p \). Lackey argues that an unreliable believer can be a reliable testifier. She gives the example of a

71 NM (I, 399.17-399.18): āpto bhāṣyakṛtā vyākhyātāḥ āptāḥ khalu sāksātikṛtadharmaḥ yathādrśṣāśyārthasya cikhyāpayiśāprayukta upādesṭā ca iti. Jayanta quotes the line as it appears in the NBh, See ND (173.3).

72 NM (I, 400.1-400.2): dharma ity upādesṭāvyah kaścid artho vivākṣitaḥ | sāksātkaṇāṇam etasya yathārtham upalambhanam ||.

73 NM (I, 400.3-400.4): na tu pratyakṣeṣaṇa eva grahaṇam iti niyamo ‘numāṇādiniścitārthopadeśino ‘py āptavānāpāyāt.
grade school teacher who, despite personally believing in creationism, teaches evolutionary theory to her students effectively. While Lackey’s example shows that not all cases of testimonial knowledge require the transmission of knowledge from one individual to another, I would argue that there is an important class of testimonial knowledge where a hearer comes to know something on the basis of a speaker’s knowledge and the reliable transmission of that knowledge. In fact, one might argue that this transmission feature of testimony is one way in which testimony is epistemically unique and irreducible to other sources of knowledge, even if not all cases of testimony involve the transmission of knowledge.

According to Jayanta, in addition to possessing knowledge about the topic being communicated, a testifier who wants to communicate her knowledge to others should be impartial and lack bias. Here Jayanta distinguishes between what a person knows and their proclivities toward certain beliefs and ways of thinking. The idea seems to be that you can know something, for example, the fact that the odds of an American being killed in a plane crash are one in eleven million, however, still be terrified of flying on the basis of heavy media coverage of plane tragedies. As a result, if you were in a scenario where you were instructing others about plane safety, you might selectively focus on the evidence of plane crashes and malfunctions. Jayanta’s point is that trustworthy people do not allow their individual biases to influence their assessment and presentation of their knowledge. Although people are not impartial all the time

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74 See Lackey 2008: section 2.3.
75 NM (I, 400.5): cikhyāpayisayā yukta ity uktā viśaratā.
76 Ropeik 2006.
and with respect to all topics, a trustworthy person should remain impartial about the topics she wishes to communicate to others.\textsuperscript{77}

Referring back to the NBh, Jayanta also claims that the term “trustworthy” applies equally to seers, cultivated people, and people outside the normal social order.\textsuperscript{78} In this way, our philosophical analysis of what it means to be “trustworthy” coincides with the way the term is used in ordinary life,\textsuperscript{79} where we call people “trustworthy” even if they are flawed and fallible individuals. For example, even criminals may be trustworthy when testifying. Lastly, Jayanta explains that a “teacher,” is a person who is skilled in explaining a topic.\textsuperscript{80} Here Jayanta is distinguishing between having knowledge and successfully communicating knowledge. A trustworthy person must have both virtues.

Contemporary discussions in the epistemology of testimony also discuss the nature of trustworthiness, specifically in terms of its being a property that allows a hearer “to bridge the logical and epistemic gap between ‘S asserted that P’ and ‘P’.”\textsuperscript{81} It generally consists of those qualities by which we judge a speaker to be both competent regarding a certain subject matter and sincere in her assertion. For example, Fricker states that:

A speaker $S$ is trustworthy with respect to an assertoric utterance by her $U$, which is made on an occasion $O$, and by which she asserts that $P$, if and only if:

(i) $U$ is sincere, and
(ii) $S$ is competent with respect to ‘$P$’ on $O$, where this notion is defined as follows:

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\textsuperscript{77} NM (I, 400.9-400.10): \textit{tasya ca pratipādyे ‘rthe vītarāgatavam iṣyate | sarvathā ca vītarāgas tu puṟuṣaḥ kutra labhyate ||}.

\textsuperscript{78} NM (I, 400.11): \textit{ṛṣyāryamlecchasāmānyaṯa vaktvyaṁ cāptalakṣaṇaṁ}. For the NBh see ND (174.1-176.1).

\textsuperscript{79} NM (I, 400.12): \textit{evam hi loke ‘pi āptoktathā vyavahāro na nāṅksyati |}. For the NBh see ND (176. 1).

\textsuperscript{80} NM (I, 400.6): \textit{upadeṣṭety anenoktam pratipādanakauśalam|}.

\textsuperscript{81} Fricker 1994: 129.
If $S$ were sincerely to assert that $P$ on $O$, then it would be the case that $P$.$^82$

This portrayal of being trustworthy makes it clear that a speaker is trustworthy with respect to particular assertion, not with respect to a speaker’s assertions more generally. In that sense, it is weaker than the everyday notion of a person being trustworthy, whereby the implication of the latter is that a trustworthy person is generally sincere and generally competent with respect to topics about which she makes claims. A person can be untrustworthy in this general sense and still be trustworthy with respect to a particular assertion.

Contemporary philosophers often distinguish trustworthiness from mere reliability. For example, inanimate objects can be reliable, but it would be wrong to say they are trustworthy. Across many accounts, trustworthiness is a trait of persons, rather than inanimate objects or nonhuman agents. For example, Karen Jones argues that the concept of trustworthiness underscores our interhuman dependencies and the unique way in which we respond to them. In particular, she argues that $B$ is trustworthy with respect to $A$ in domain of interaction $D$ if and only if $B$ is both competent with respect to $D$ and directly responsive to the fact that $A$ is counting on her.$^83$ Similarly, Katherine Hawley highlights the interpersonal dimension of trustworthiness by connecting it to the reactive attitude of betrayal and resentment. In particular, Hawley argues that while individuals can serve as reliable guides to the truth through their verbal and behavioral cues, such as their open countenance or probing questions, this reliability does not amount to trustworthiness since being unreliable in these respects does not constitute a betrayal. This is because we do not owe it to others to be reliable in such ways. However,

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$^82$ Fricker 1994: 147.

$^83$ Jones 2012. Jones also explicates a richer notion of trustworthiness whereby $B$ is able and willing to reliably signal to $A$ those domains in which she is and is not trustworthy, thereby taking the burden off $A$ to figure out who to trust regarding which domains.
Hawley argues that in core cases of testimony, making an assertion to an audience involves undertaking a responsibility for what is said. Thus, in these cases, being reliable in making assertions is a matter of trustworthiness. As a result, we would feel resentful toward a person who told us something that was not true. For example, we would feel indignant toward a mistaken liar who just happened to accidently report the truth. In this case, while the mistaken liar would be reliable, she would not be trustworthy.

Jayanta’s approach to trustworthiness also seems to include reliability plus an extra factor. In addition to the speaker’s knowledge of an object, that speaker must also be directed toward others in the sense of being moved by a desire to instruct them in an unbiased fashion regarding matters of which they are ignorant. While his approach does not include a full-blown account of interpersonal relations, I would argue that there seems to be an implicit moral component to trustworthiness. However, it is clear that Jayanta and the Naiyāyikas are striving to develop a definition of trustworthiness that accounts for how we use the term and this means that it cannot be too demanding. For example, even an immoral person can transmit knowledge to others about mundane topics such as the time of day. On the other hand, Jayanta’s definition of trustworthiness also applies to complex cases of testimony, such as religious testimony. In such cases, given the nature of the subject matter, it seems as if a more robust understanding of trustworthiness is needed. In chapters 3 and 4, which focus on religious testimony, we will see Jayanta expand upon what it means to be trustworthy when he speaks of certain religious authorities as social and moral exemplars.

To conclude this section on Jayanta’s analysis of the definition of testimony, I would argue that Jayanta’s definition of testimony serves as a good basis for illustrating the epistemic

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84 Hawley 2017: 236-237.
significance of testimony. First, in defining testimony, as well as the other sources of knowledge, as inerrant, Jayanta is defining testimony in terms of its successful functioning, that is, its ability to produce knowledge. Earlier we saw Coady utilize the same strategy and we saw Lackey criticize it in terms of its failing to distinguish the metaphysical question (what testimony is), from the epistemological question (what good testimony is). In response, I argued that this is not particularly problematic, especially given the common understanding of linguistic communication in terms of its ability to communicate knowledge. I would also argue that successful linguistic communication is conceptually prior to its failure as such.

Second, against Lackey’s characterization of testimony as disjunctive and Coady’s exclusive focus on speaker conditions, Jayanta’s definition of testimony shows a good balance between characterizing testimony in terms of the speaker’s intention to convey communicable content and the communicated content that is grasped by the recipient. In particular, for Jayanta, testimony is not merely the act of a speaker making a statement, but additionally, and more importantly, testimony results in a recipient obtaining knowledge of the object of the statement. Thus, Jayanta’s definition of testimony requires both elements of Lackey’s disjunctive view of the nature of testimony, that is, speaker-testimony and hearer-testimony.

In the remainder of this chapter, I want to set up the debate for one of the central questions in the epistemology of testimony: the question of whether testimony is reducible to inference. There have been a few influential articles that deal with, in differing degrees, Jayanta’s presentation of the reduction debate. My analysis, although influenced by these three articles, will have a different focus and methodology. For example, the way the issues are presented in Matilal 1994 and Taber 1996 are less textually orientated and attempt to capture the

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85 In particular, see Matilal 1994, Taber 1996, and most recently, Graheli 2017.
view of Nyāya as a whole. On the other hand, Graheli 2017 presents an overview of Jayanta’s perspective of this debate, identifies the various positions of Jayanta’s rivals, and references the NM in numerous places. However, while Graheli focuses primarily on Jayanta’s presentation of and response to Vaśeṣika arguments on the reducibility of testimony to inference, I focus on two different Buddhist arguments on the reducibility of testimony to inference. Moreover, I delve deeper into the positions of Jayanta’s Buddhist rivals by looking at their particular views on religious testimony. Lastly, in discussing the question of testimony’s reducibility, one of my goals is to clarify the question of what exactly we mean by reducibility and moreover, to bring contemporary conversations to bear on the topic.

1.2 Setting up the Reduction Debate

1.2.1 Clarifying the Question

One of the central questions in the epistemology of testimony is whether testimony is an irreducible, or distinctive, source of knowledge or whether it is reducible to other more fundamental sources of knowledge, such as inferential knowledge. Despite the large body of literature on this topic, discussions on the reducibility of testimony often lack clarity about key terms and key issues at stake. John Greco teases apart three different questions that often get clustered together in discussions on the reducibility of testimony: a) Is testimony distinctive or nondistinctive? b) Is testimony reason-dependent or reason-independent? and c) Does testimony involve default justification or not?\(^86\) While nonreductionism is portrayed as the position that testimonial knowledge is distinctive, reason-independent, and involves default justification, reductionism is portrayed as the position that testimonial knowledge is nondistinctive, reason-

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\(^{86}\) Greco 2012: 17.
dependent, and lacks default justification.\textsuperscript{87} However, as Greco argues, the answers to these distinct questions need not cluster in such a manner. First, one could argue that testimonial knowledge is both distinctive and reason-dependent. This would be the case if testimonial knowledge required inferential reasons for evidence and there was also something distinctive to testimonial knowledge, such as the hearer’s right to pass the epistemic buck to the speaker after she has exhausted her own justification for the belief.\textsuperscript{88} Moreover, in this case, while testimonial knowledge would be distinctive, it would not involve default justification. Second, testimonial knowledge might be reason-independent, but not involve default justification. This might be the case if testimonial knowledge does not depend on inferential reasons for evidence however it requires a distinctive noninferential faculty, perceptual perhaps, that discriminates between reliable and unreliable instances of testimony. Moreover, if this faculty was distinctive to testimonial knowledge, testimonial knowledge would also be distinctive yet not involve default justification.

Given these various parsings of the meaning of reductionism, how should testimony’s reducibility be understood and what are the real issues at stake in this debate? First, it goes without saying that what is important is not whether testimonial knowledge is in some way distinctive—it is distinctive merely based on the fact that it involves belief based on testimony—but rather, whether testimonial knowledge is epistemically distinctive. Put in another way, does testimonial knowledge merit special treatment in epistemology or should it be analyzed based on familiar resources, such as those associated with inferential knowledge? This way of framing the

\textsuperscript{87} For example, see Fricker 1994: 126-127 and Lackey 2008: chapter 5.

\textsuperscript{88} This is the argument in Goldberg 2006.
question doesn’t confuse distinctiveness with default justification or reason-independence. This is the way the debate is framed in Sanskrit texts.

For example, as will be seen in the next chapter, although Jayanta argues that testimony is epistemically distinct, he does not argue for its default justification. In particular, for Jayanta, testimonial knowledge is justified through the fact that it has been produced by a reliable instrument, the speech of a trustworthy person. The fact that, in most cases, the recipient is not required to critically assess the speaker does not mean that testimonially knowledge is baseless, but rather, that its justification comes from the qualities of the speaker. Furthermore, while Jayanta argues that testimonial knowledge is not reducible to inferential reasoning, in certain cases, in particular, cases where stronger levels of justification are required to support a subject’s testimonial belief, he will argue that inferential reasoning is essential to possessing testimonial knowledge. Thus, it is possible for testimonial knowledge to be distinctive and not invariably linked to default justification or reason-independence.

For Jayanta, testimonial knowledge is epistemically distinctive on the basis of its instrumental cause, that is, the instruction of a trustworthy person. The instrumental cause of testimonial knowledge, the instruction of a trustworthy person, is distinctively social. In particular, while the other sources of knowledge, such as perception and inferential reasoning, create (or extend) knowledge within individuals, testimony transmits knowledge across individuals. As a result, testimony’s reliability is grounded in the virtues of others, not solely the virtues of the subject of knowledge. This in turn removes some of the epistemic burden off the subject of knowledge.

In order to analyze and discuss Jayanta’s presentation of the debate over testimony’s reducibility to inference, some background knowledge on Sanskrit theories of inferential
reasoning, as well as an understanding of Nyāya’s bivalent epistemology, is necessary. These two topics will be discussed in the next two sections. As stated above, Jayanta discusses reductionist arguments from both Buddhist and Vaiśeṣika interlocutors. The next chapter will focus on the arguments presented by Jayanta’s Buddhist rivals. There are some important differences between the inferential reductions presented by the Vaiśeṣikas and Buddhists. In particular, while the Vaiśeṣika inferential reductions focus the similarities between the epistemic objects of inferential and testimonial knowledge, the Buddhist inferential reductions underscore the importance of the speaker’s intention and her trustworthiness. These discussions are complex and require some explaining. All of them are dependent on an understanding inference. The next section will briefly explain the rules and structure of inferential reasoning.

1.2.2 Inferential Reasoning

Inferential reasoning is an instrument of knowledge that is accepted by the majority of Sanskrit philosophers. It seeks to establish the presence of a property to be proven (sādhya) in a particular locus (pakṣa), on the basis of the presence of another property in that locus, the inferential reason (hetu), which is invariably associated with the property to be proven.\(^89\) An example will help clarify this. Upon seeing smoke rising from a mountain, I infer the presence of fire on that mountain. In this example, smoke is the inferential reason, fire is the property to be proven, and the mountain is the locus. In order for this inference to work, there must exist a relation of pervasion (vyāpti) between the inferential reason, smoke, and the property to be proven, fire. This means that wherever the inferential reason is present, the property to be proven

\(^{89}\) A property (dharma) does not need to be a quality, rather, it often is a substance.
must also be present. Graheli presents a simplified formulization of the standard smoke-fire inference:\textsuperscript{90}

1. If x possesses\textsuperscript{91} smoke, x possesses fire \hspace{1cm} (x) (\text{Hx} \supset \text{Sx})
2. This hill possesses smoke \hspace{1cm} \text{Hp}
3. This hill possesses fire \hspace{1cm} \therefore \text{Sp}

In order for an inference to be successful, the inferential reason must satisfy three conditions: 1) the inferential reason must be present in the locus in question, 2) the inferential reason must be present in at least one similar case (\textit{sapakṣa}), that is, a locus other than the locus in question where the property to be proven is known to be present, and 3) the inferential reason must not be present in any dissimilar case (\textit{vipakṣa}), that is, a locus where the property to be proven is not present.\textsuperscript{92} In the inference from smoke to fire, smoke, the inferential reason, satisfies these three conditions. First, smoke is present on the mountain, which is the locus in question. Second, we know that smoke appears with fire in the case of a wood-burning stove in a kitchen. Lastly, smoke is not present where fire is absent, for example, a lake. These elements of inferential reasoning, and in particular, the three marks of the inferential reason, were largely accepted by most Sanskrit philosophers around Jayanta’s time. Inferential reasons that failed to satisfy any of the three delineated conditions were said to be pseudoinferential reasons (\textit{hetu-ābhāsa}). In criticizing the reductions of testimony to inference, Jayanta attempts to show that his rivals have failed to satisfy one or more of these conditions.

\textsuperscript{90} Graheli 2017: 186. This is a modification of Schayer’s original formulization of the Nyāya inference. Graheli’s goal is to present the theory of inference known around Jayanta’s time but one that ignores later developments.

\textsuperscript{91} The relationship of “possession” is best understood as “occurrence-exacting.” It specifies the ontological presence of a property in or on the locus.

\textsuperscript{92} For more information on the triple conditions of the inferential mark, see Patil 2009: section 2.3.2.
As stated earlier, my primary focus will be on Jayanta’s presentation of, and response to, Buddhist arguments concerning the reduction of testimony to inference. Before I turn to that, I want to speak briefly about the basic structure and content of the Vaiśeṣika arguments. The Vaiśeṣika’s arguments on why testimony reduces to inference provide a good example of how certain Sanskrit text traditions conceived of linguistic entities as inferential objects. The basic Vaiśeṣika strategy was to argue that testimony reduces to inference because both have similar epistemic objects and conditions. In particular, the Vaiśeṣikas argue that testimony is reducible to inference since, just like inference but unlike perception, testimony’s epistemic object is generic and unperceived, and moreover, just like inference and unlike perception, testimony is based upon a prior knowledge of the relationship between the inferential reason and the property to be proven, also known as the sign and the signified. For example, just as we infer fire after having seen smoke, similarly, having heard a word, we infer its object. This argument implies that words and statements are inferential markers of their objects, which, for Vaiśeṣikas, just like Naiyāyikas, are generally externally existing objects. Thus, when others inform us about things, the process by which we gain knowledge is, according to Vaiśeṣika, an inferential process. There is no separate, independent method through which we obtain knowledge through language.

Jayanta’s response consists of a number of technical arguments that show that no matter how it is framed, the inference fails to work. First, Jayanta, focuses on words rather than sentences after discarding the possibility that the process by which a sentence conveys its object

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93 NM (I, 401.11-401.12): parokṣāvisayatvaṁ hi tulyaṁ tāvat dvavoy apī | sāmānyavāyativatvaṁ ca sambandhāpekṣaṇādvavoyah ||. See also PBh (213.12-213.15): saabdādīnām apy anumāne 'ntarbhāvaḥ samānavidhivāt | yathā prasiddhasamayasyāsandigdarśanatprāśiddhyanasmaranābhvyāṁ atīndriye 'rthe bhavaty anumānam evam saabdādibhīyo 'pīti ||

94 NM (I, 402.1-402.2): yathā pratyakṣato dhūmaṁ drṣṭvā 'gnir anumāyate | tathaiva śabdam ākārya tadartho 'py avagamyate||.
is inferential. The main reason he gives is that since inference depends on knowledge of a prior relation between the inferential reason and property to be proven (for example, smoke and fire), it would be impossible to explain how we obtain knowledge of newly composed sentences. However, Jayanta argues that even the knowledge provided by single words is not inferential. As stated above, in inferential reasoning, we come to know that a certain locus possesses a certain property, the property to be proven, by virtue of it having another property, the inferential reason. However, Jayanta argues that there is no coherent way to formulate the inference for word-generated knowledge. In particular, he argues that no matter how the inference is framed, that is, whether one takes the words themselves, or the object of the words, the referent, as the locus of the inference, the inference fails.

For example, let’s look at how we might inferentially analyze the knowledge we obtain upon hearing the word “cow.” We might take the word “cow” to be the locus, the natural-kind “cowness” as being the inferential reason, and the individual entity that matches the referent of “cow” to be the property to be proven. In this case, Jayanta argues that there is no relationship between the referent of “cow” and the word “cow” that matches the relationship between fire and the hill in the smoke-fire inference. That is, the referent of “cow” is not ontologically resting in or on the word “cow.” When the reductionist tries to reframe the relation of possession in terms of “being the content of that (tadviṣayatva)” so that the cow is the content of the cognition

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95 NM (I, 404.4-404.8): tatra vākyam anavagatasambandham eva vākyārtham avabodhayitum alam abhinavaviviracitaślokaśravane sati padapadārthasamskratamatiṇām tadarthāvagamadarśanāt. | atah sambandhādhigamamālapravṛttinā numānena tasya katham sāmyasambhāvanā; |

96 For Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, a natural-kind (jāti) is an entity that is eternal and inseparably present in many particular entities. Natural-kinds, though distinct from particulars, inhere in particulars. Earlier we saw that for Nyāya, the artha of a word is a particular qualified by a universal (tadvart). For example, the artha of “cow” would be the particular cow qualified by natural-kind “cowness.” According to Nyāya and Vaiśesika, the natural-kind “cowness” inhere in all particular cows and forms the basis of our classification of the natural kind “cow.” For more information see Potter 2015: 133-146.
generated by the word “cow,” Jayanta argues that this too does not work since the cognition of cow needs to first be produced before it is a property of the word “cow.” And once the cognition is produced, the fact it is a property of the word “cow” is superfluous.⁹⁷

Similarly, Jayanta argues that we cannot structure the inference so that the referent of the word “cow” is the locus of the inference rather than the property to be proven. First, presumably the referent is what we become aware of through the word and thus it cannot be the locus since the locus is something that is already given. Moreover, if the referent of the word “cow” were the locus, and the word “cow” were a property of it, then a person should be able to see this even without knowing the relation between the word “cow” and the referent of the word “cow,” just as a person can still perceive smoke on a hill, without knowing the smoke-fire connection.⁹⁸ But this is not the case.

While there are additional disharmonies that Jayanta points out, such as the disharmony between the invariance concomitance between an inferential sign and the property to be proven, and the conventional relationship between a signifier and the signified, further discussion is beyond the scope of this dissertation. The goal of presenting some of these technical arguments is to illustrate that, according to Jayanta, there are very specific asymmetries between inferential reasoning and testimony, and, as a result, testimony does not reduce to inference as the Vaiśeṣikas wish to argue. As will be seen in the next chapter, what is striking about the Buddhist inferential reconstructions of testimony is that Jayanta ends up arguing that, unlike the Vaiśeṣika

⁹⁷ NM (I, 406.6–406.10): na tāvad arthaviśśatvaṃ sādhyam śailajvalana¨yor iva śabdārthayoh dharmadharminbhāvabhāvāt \| athārthaviśayatvācchhabdasyārthaviśśety ucyate tad ṣapy avyuktam tatpratītijanana¨ antareṇa tadvisayatvānupapatteḥ | prayatau tu siddhāyām kim tadvisayatadvārakena taddharmatvena.

⁹⁸ NM (I, 408.6–408.9): api ca yady arthādhammatayā śabdasya paksādhammatvaṃ bhavet tadā ‘navagatadvāmāgnisambandho ’pi yathā dhūmasya parvatadhammatāṃ grhn̄yāt eva tathā ‘navagataśabdārthasambandho ’py arthādhammatāṃ śabdasya grhn̄yāt na ca grhn̄ātīti ato nāsti paksādhammatvaṃ śabdasyeti ||.
inferential reconstructions, which are unable to fit the structure of inferential reasoning, the Buddhist inferences work, however, what one ends up with at the end of the inference is not considered testimonial knowledge.

Jayanta discusses two different Buddhist portrayals of the reduction of testimony to inference, the first belonging to Dignāga and the second belonging to Dharmakīrti. Unlike Jayanta and his Vaiśeṣika rivals, who were realists, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti were idealists, and thus, according to them, linguistic expressions never refer to external objects. For Dignāga, linguistic expressions refer to, or indicate, mere ideas or images in the mind of a hearer. We can only infer the truth of these ideas after confirming that the speaker is trustworthy. As a result, Dignāga argued that testimonial knowledge is inferential knowledge since one infers the truth of a statement based on the fact that it was uttered by a trustworthy person. On the other hand, according to Dharmakīrti, a sentence refers to the intention of the speaker, rather than an idea of the object. Thus, upon hearing the statement of a speaker, rather than inferring the object of the statement, we infer the intention of the speaker to express something. According to Dharmakīrti, we could never infer the object of the statement because we know that a speaker’s words often fail to correspond to the actual state of things. Moreover, as will be seen in the next chapter, Dharmakīrti rejects the notion that it is possible to confirm whether a speaker is trustworthy. Thus, for Dharmakīrti, another’s words can never lead to knowledge of facts.

Although Jayanta distinguishes between and argues against both types of Buddhist reductions, past scholarship often fails to distinguish between them. Instead, what often happens

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99 NM (I, 403.9-403.10): ata eva hi manyante śabdasyāpi vipaścitah | āptavādāviśaṃvādasāmānyād anumānat ||. Cf. PS 2.5ab: āptavādavisāṃvādasāmānyād anumānatvam

100 NM (I, 404.1-404.2): kiñca śabdo vivakṣāyāmeva prāmāṇyam aśnute | na bāhye vyabhicāritvāt tasyaṃ caitasya līṅgatā ||.
is that one type of Buddhist reduction is highlighted or some type of amalgam position is constructed from the portrayals of a few different Buddhist thinkers and is offered as a generic Buddhist position on the reduction of testimony to inference.\(^{101}\) This is not only inaccurate but moreover, it masks the variety of opinion among distinct Buddhist thinkers on this topic. In distinguishing between Dignāga’s reduction and Dharmakīrti’s reduction I hope to underscore the diversity within the Buddhist tradition on the issue of how testimony reduces to inference. In particular, as will be seen, while Dignāga’s account shares some key features with Nyāya’s account of testimony, specifically its focus on the object of a sentence and on its portrayal of trustworthiness as epistemically important, Dharmakīrti drastically alters this picture by focusing, not on the object of the sentence, but rather, the speaker’s intention, and by rejecting the idea that trustworthiness is epistemically important.

1.2.3 Knowledge in Nyāya: A Bivalent Epistemology

Before turning to these arguments, I want to spend some time explaining Nyāya’s bivalent epistemology. For Nyāya, knowledge is distinguished from justification, which is also known as reflective knowledge, or second-order knowledge. This distinction will prove relevant in chapter 2, when discussing Jayanta’s objections to Dignāga’s reduction of testimony to inference, and in chapter 3, where beliefs based on religious testimony require higher justification than first-order knowledge provides. As discussed above, in order to possess knowledge, or warranted awareness, one must have a presenting-awareness that is in accordance with its object, or, equivalently, produced by a well-functioning instrument. In order to possess knowledge, one is not required to notice or be aware of the fact that one possesses knowledge.

\(^{101}\) For example, see McCrea & Patil 2010: 8, Mohanty 1992: 90-91, and Taber 1996: 21-22.
Another way to phrase this is that knowledge, like awareness-events in general, is not self-luminous. In order to know that one knows, a second-order knowing event is required, namely, reflective-knowledge. Reflective knowledge provides us with an epistemic perspective on a first-order awareness-event by ascertaining that the instrument that produced it was well-functioning.\(^{102}\)

However, knowing that the instrument that produced our first-order awareness event is well-functioning is not a condition for knowledge. Instead, it allows us to determine that we have knowledge. Reflective knowledge, or justification, is only needed when there is a legitimate doubt about whether a certain awareness-event is true or not. Another way of framing this is that reflective knowledge is needed if there is some sort of defeater to one’s belief. Defeaters are understood to be experiences, doubts, or beliefs that a subject has that indicate that a subject’s belief that \(p\) is false or unreliably formed.\(^{103}\) Defeaters to belief can come from oneself or from others. In either case, they need to be removed by certifying that the instrument that produced the belief was indeed well-functioning before one is justified in holding that belief. Thus, for Naiyāyikas, questions about justification and evidence arise at the level of second-order knowledge, not first order knowledge, or knowledge \textit{simpliciter}, which, for Naiyāyikas, is just true belief that has been reliably produced.\(^{104}\) As a result, the Nyāya epistemological framework.

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\(^{102}\) See Patil 2009: 49-51 for more on reflective-knowledge and its relation to first-order knowledge.

\(^{103}\) This is the characterization of a psychological defeater. A normative defeater is an experience, doubt, or belief that a subject \textit{should} have that indicates that a subject’s belief that \(p\) is false or unreliably formed. For more information, see Lackey 2006: 4.

\(^{104}\) See Matilal 1990: 70-72 and Matilal 2002: 159-160. See also Patil 2009: 45, n. 32. Patil argues that according to Ratnakīrti’s Naiyāyikas, one cannot have warranted awareness accidently. In particular, awareness events that are true, but not “produced in the right way” are not warranted.
is labelled a bivalent epistemology on the basis of knowledge and reflective knowledge/justification being treated separately.105

Under this system, the Nyāya theory of knowledge should be seen as a form of externalism, and in particular, a form of reliabilism, while the Nyāya theory of reflective knowledge is a form of internalism, and in particular, a form of internalist foundationalism.106 Along similar lines, Matilal, following Fricker, contrasts a justificational conception of knowledge with a reliabilist conception of knowledge, where the latter excludes a justification criterion. As opposed to a reliabilist conception of knowledge, whereby a belief is knowledge just in case it was produced by a reliable mechanism, a justificational conception of knowledge requires knowers to be able to defend their belief appropriately by operating within the space of reasons. However, like Patil, Matilal argues that the reliabilist conception of knowledge subscribed to by Nyāya also had a justification requirement built into it in the form of the reliability of the instrument that generated knowledge.107

Along similar lines Chakrabarti distinguishes between two levels of justification: justification for knowledge that $p$ and justification for a subject’s knowledge that she knows that $p$.108 As an example of the first level of justification, let’s say I make the claim that there is mail in the mailbox. If someone asks me how I know that there is mail in the mailbox, I could say that


106 See Patil 2009: 34 n. 6 and n. 7. In particular, the Nyāya theory of knowledge is a form of process reliabilism whereby a belief counts as knowledge just in case it was produced by a reliable process, where reliability is defined in terms of a process’s ability to produce true beliefs. On the other hand, the Nyāya theory of justification is a version of access internalism, whereby a subject must be aware of the conditions that constitute a belief’s justification, and foundationalism, whereby justification is noninferential and immediate.

107 Matilal 1994: 363-366. For more information on the justificational conception of knowledge, especially as applied to testimonial knowledge, see Fricker 1987 and 1994.

when I opened the mailbox, I saw mail inside. Although generally unstated, implied in my response would be the belief that I have no reason to suppose that my senses are defective, that I am dreaming, or that I am living in some version of *The Matrix*. This would constitute first-level justification of my knowledge that there is mail in the mailbox, and, in many cases, no further doubts or challenges would arise that would require additional justification for my belief.

However, if someone were to press me further and ask me why I believe what I see, either on this occasion or generally, I would provide inferential reasons for why I trust my senses. For example, I could point to the fact that they generally lead to practical success. In the mail case, I can say that I am able to open the letters and successfully respond to any messages I have received, whether they be bills that need to be paid or an invitation needing a RSVP. This would constitute second-level justification, which enables me to reflectively know that there is mail in the mailbox.\(^{109}\) Thus, while the Nyāya reliabilist conception of knowledge does not preclude justification altogether, the requirement to provide reasons for, or defend, one’s belief only arises at the level of doubt or an outside challenge. In either case, we need to go through the process of ensuring that the instrument that produced our belief is indeed well-functioning. Once this is done, a person is said to be justified in holding the initial belief. However, if no doubt or challenge were present, a true belief that is produced by an accredited instrument, regardless of whether the subject is aware of this fact, is knowledge.

The issue of whether, for Naiyāyikas, knowledge is more than mere true belief, is not as clear cut as it might seem. Not all Naiyāyikas seemed to reject accidentally true beliefs as instances of knowledge. That is, in certain cases, true belief that is acquired through an inappropriate route can count as first-order knowledge. For example, as a counter-example to the

\(^{109}\) Datta 1927: 355 distinguishes between knowledge of facts and knowledge that the former knowledge is true.
Vaiśeṣika argument that testimony reduces to inference, the 14th century Naiyāyika Gaṅgeśa argues that a subject can obtain testimonial knowledge through a mistaken deceiver, that is, a liar who just happens to speak the truth although she intended to deceive her audience. Gaṅgeśa argues that while this could never be inferential knowledge, since there can be no inference of truth from the speaker’s trustworthiness, it would be an example of word-generated knowledge, provided the hearer has no idea that the speaker is a liar. This is because the sentence is well-formed and meets the three conditions of syntactic expectancy, semantic fitness and proximity.110

However, recent interpreters of Gaṅgeśa, clearly uncomfortable with this, argue that in the case of the mistaken deceiver, although the recipient may obtain a belief that is factually correct, it is not regarded as bona fide knowledge because the speaker did not have the appropriate qualifications.111 Another way of framing this is that the belief was not formed through an appropriate route. Despite these recent interpretations, some Naiyāyikas following Gaṅgeśa dealt with Gettier-like counterexamples to knowledge by taking all true beliefs as knowledge and relegating justification to the level of reflective knowledge.112 Thus, regarding the case of the mistaken deceiver, it is only if and when one discovers that one’s belief has been formed on the basis of a compulsive liar that doubt would infect one’s belief and destroy knowledge until further evidence possibly leads one to conclude that the former belief was indeed true. However, unless a doubt or challenge arises, for all practical purposes, true belief is considered knowledge.

112 For example, the 15th century Naiyāyika, Vācaspati Miśra II who, in responding to Śrīharṣa’s criticisms of the Nyāya definition of knowledge, defended knowledge as a true awareness. He argued that true awareness deserved to be called knowledge because it corresponds to God’s perception of things. See Matilal 2002: 159-160.
While there seems to exist good evidence that some later Naiyāyikas might have equated knowledge with truth, I know of no examples from Jayanta, or Naiyāyikas before him, that clarified the status of accidentally true beliefs. Moreover, as seen earlier in his definition of testimony, Jayanta is pretty clear about the fact that testimonial knowledge arises from the words of a trustworthy person, where a trustworthy person is defined as a person who a) possesses knowledge about some subject matter and b) desires to inform others about that subject matter in accordance with that knowledge. Thus, I do not see how, for Jayanta and earlier Naiyāyikas who also upheld this definition of trustworthiness, the words of a deluded liar could give rise to testimonial knowledge.

While Naiyāyikas held that the subject of knowledge need not be aware that she possesses knowledge, and, as result, need not know that her belief was reliably produced, Jayanta’s Buddhist opponents require more epistemic work to be done before a belief can be considered knowledge. For them, knowledge, in most cases, must be reflective knowledge. That is, a knower must be aware of the reasons why her belief is true. In terms of testimonial knowledge, this means a knower must know why any given speaker’s testimony is reliable. The thinking behind this requirement is intuitive. It is clear that not all verbal communication leads to knowledge. For example, we have experienced people who lie or are misinformed about certain subject matters about which they speak. Thus, in order to obtain knowledge from what others tell us, we need to do the extra step of confirming the reliability of the speaker. Once we know a speaker is reliable, we can then infer the truth of her statement. Because of this, inference is a significant, epistemic feature of the knowledge acquired through verbal communication. As a result, testimony should be seen as reducible to inference. This argument and its counter-responses will occupy the topic of the next chapter.
Before turning to next chapter and the issue of the reducibility of testimony to inference, I want to underscore the relevance of this discussion. Why does it matter whether testimony is an independent source of knowledge, or whether it is reducible to more basic sources of knowledge, such as inference? I think one of the main reasons this question is important is that it reveals our intuitions regarding whether knowledge is primarily an individual or social endeavor. That is, whether or not one thinks that testimony is reducible to inferential knowledge seems to indicate whether one believes that the burden of ensuring that our beliefs are true and justified fall primarily on individual knowers or is shared by fellow knowers in our epistemic communities.

Above it was mentioned that for Jayanta, one of the reasons testimony is epistemically unique is that its instrumental cause, the instruction of a credible person, is distinctively social. The thinking is that since knowledge is being transferred from one person to another, the epistemic burden is shared between the speaker and the recipient.

However, if testimonial knowledge is reducible to inference, this would not be the case. In the section on inferential reasoning, it was shown that inference is triggered by the recognition of an inferential mark, which is invariably connected to the property to be proven. Thus, the recipient of testimony has to be aware of the inferential mark, and from this inferential mark, has to infer the presence of the property to be proven. In the case of inferentially obtaining knowledge from another’s statements, the recipient needs to be aware that the speaker is trustworthy (inferential mark) and from this infer that the speaker’s statements are true (property to be proven). On the other hand, nonreductionists like Jayanta argue that unless we have reason to doubt the reliability of a speaker, the extra step of confirming a speaker’s reliability is not necessary for knowledge, and often not possible. Instead, our testimonial belief, if true, counts as knowledge on the basis of the speaker’s qualities, qualities that render her testimony reliable.
1.3 Conclusion

The goal of this chapter was twofold: first, to introduce the topic of testimony, especially as conceived of within the Nyāya epistemological framework, and second, to set up the next chapter’s discussion on one of the central issues in the epistemology of testimony, the question of testimony’s reducibility to inference. Before carving out an appropriate definition of testimony, this chapter sought to clarify a number of important distinctions regarding the nature, scope, and function of testimony. It was explained that the sort of testimony of interest to this dissertation should encompass everyday linguistic communication, underscore testimony’s function as a source of belief, and highlight testimony’s successful functioning, that is, testimony’s ability to produce knowledge. After looking at a few different characterizations of testimony by contemporary epistemologists, noting both their strengths and weaknesses, this chapter then turned to Jayanta’s definition of testimony.

Jayanta explicated his definition of testimony in the context of the definition of testimony delineated in the NS and analyzed by the commentaries that preceded his. However, while Jayanta sought to define testimony in a way that aligned with his tradition’s definition of testimony, he also expanded it in places he saw fit. Ultimately, Jayanta defined testimony as the instruction of trustworthy person, where a trustworthy person is defined as a person who not only possesses knowledge about a certain subject matter, but also, wishes to share her knowledge with others in an unbiased fashion. Moreover, this instruction should produce a belief about its object for a recipient of testimony. It was argued that this definition is a good one based on its ability to encompass daily linguistic communication, emphasize testimony as a source of belief for the subject of knowledge, and highlight the transfer to knowledge, which is one of the central goals of linguistic communication.
Moreover, this chapter defined and explained important Sanskrit epistemological terms and concepts that do not always have suitable equivalents in the contemporary context. In particular, this chapter discussed how for Jayanta and other Sanskrit philosophers 1) the sources of knowledge (pramāṇa) are inerrant, 2) awareness-events (jñāna) rather than beliefs are the primarily objects of epistemic analysis, and 3) the meaning (artha) of a statement is, more or less, identical to the object referenced. Relatedly, this chapter clarified Nyāya’s bivalent epistemology, where knowledge and justification (reflective knowledge) are treated separately.

Additionally, this chapter provided a brief introduction on the structure and elements of inferential reasoning and looked at a few inferential reconstructions of testimony provided by Jayanta’s Vaiśeṣika interlocuters. While the primary focus of the discussion on testimony’s reducibility will be on Jayanta’s Buddhist interlocutors and their inferential reconstructions of testimony, the Vaiśeṣika inferences, and Jayanta’s response to them, demonstrates why, according to Jayanta, such inferences fail to work. In contrast, as will be seen in the next chapter, Jayanta’s criticism of the Buddhist inferential reconstructions of testimony has less to do with the structural aspects of the inference and more to do with the end product of the inference, namely, the fact that what is established by the Buddhist inferences is different from what is established by testimony.

Lastly, this chapter sought to clarify the key terms and issues at stake in the debate over whether testimony is reducible to inference. In doing so, this chapter analyzed various ways in which testimony’s reducibility has been defined and established that a key aspect of the debate concerns whether testimony is epistemically distinct or, whether it can be epistemically analyzed using familiar inferential principles. For Jayanta, we saw that testimonial knowledge is epistemically distinct because its instrumental cause is different. That is, the instruction of a
trustworthy person is distinctively social and as a result, the epistemic burden is shifted from the subject of knowledge to the speaker transferring her knowledge. As a result, knowledge is portrayed as a shared endeavor whereby the process of ensuring that our beliefs are true and reliably produced, rather than a burden of the lone knowledge seeker, is shared by a society of knowers.
Chapter 2: Testimony as an Independent Source of Knowledge

2.0 Introduction

This chapter looks at one of the central issues in the epistemology of testimony, namely, whether testimony is an independent source of knowledge or whether it is reducible to more basic sources of knowledge, primarily, inferential reasoning. The previous chapter set up this debate by looking at various ways to define testimony and clarifying the meaning and significance of questions regarding testimony’s reducibility. It is also provided an introduction to Nyāya epistemology, as well as the key players in the debate over whether testimony is reducible to inference. The analysis in this chapter is primarily grounded in the Sanskrit source material, although a dialogue is also created with contemporary discussions on the same topic.

In particular, this chapter examines Jayanta’s presentation of the debate over whether testimony is an independent, or epistemically distinctive, source of knowledge. It focuses on the arguments of two of his Buddhist rivals, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, as well as Jayanta’s counter-responses. While Dignāga’s inferential reconstruction of testimony focuses on the speaker’s trustworthiness as an inferential mark of the truth of that speaker’s statements, Dharmakīrti’s inferential reconstruction of testimony underscores how words are inferential markers, not of the objects they are thought to signify, but rather, of the speaker’s intention to express something. In addition to utilizing the NM to flesh out these two Buddhist positions, I also look at the Buddhist primarily source material to elaborate and expand upon Jayanta’s presentation of the debate.

While Jayanta rejects both Dignāga’s and Dharmakīrti’s arguments, he does not deny that their inferences work, instead, he denies that their inferences lead to what he has been labelling testimonial knowledge. As a result, Jayanta argues that testimony is still an independent source of knowledge, not capable of being reduced to inference. Before delving into this debate,
I first introduce an important Buddhist doctrine, the theory of exclusion (*apoha*), which explains the way Buddhists conceptualize, not only word meanings, but more importantly, all conceptual content. In particular, I focus on Dignāga’s presentation of exclusion since it demonstrates why he believes a person is required to confirm the credibility of the speaker prior to acquiring word-generated knowledge. Examining the theory of exclusion is also useful for understanding the distinction Buddhists draw between perceptual and conceptual objects, and why our conceptualizations of objects could never correspond to a mind-independent reality, as Naiyāyikas like Jayanta claimed they could.

Lastly, as a way of setting up part 2 of this dissertation, which focuses on religious testimony, the final section of this chapter will look at Dharmakīrti’s particular view of scriptural authority. Dharmakīrti is in a unique and challenging position. If he admits that scripture, even Buddhist scripture, is a source of knowledge, he ends up contradicting his central thesis that language never refers to real objects. On the other hand, if he rejects Buddhist scripture as a source of knowledge, he would be rejecting his tradition’s position regarding the authority of the Buddha’s words. In clarifying Dharmakīrti’s position and the various arguments he offers, I will highlight a specific inference that is the target of most of his criticism: the partial reliability inference (*ekadeśasamvādānumāna*). This inference, employed by both Dignāga and the Naiyāyikas in defending the authority of their respective religious scriptures, allows one to infer the truth of scriptural statements referring to supersensible matters on the basis of that same scripture’s reliability on empirical matters.

While Dharmakīrti ultimately rejects the validity of this type of inference, he finds a way to argue that Dignāga’s employment of it is valid whereas the Naiyāyikas’ use of it is invalid. Important in this conversation is the stark contrast between Dharmakīrti’s position and Jayanta’s
position on the epistemic responsibility and burden placed on the individual epistemic agent. While Dharmakīrti argues that an individual should do everything in her power to independently confirm all empirical matters within a scripture before tentatively accepting the claims made by that scripture on supersensible matters, as will be seen in the next chapter, Jayanta argues that this method is too demanding for finite and limited epistemic agents. As a result, Jayanta ends up placing more responsibility upon the epistemic community, and primarily, religious authorities, than on a single epistemic subject.

2.1 An introduction to the Buddhist theory of exclusion (apoha)

In order to understand the Buddhist inferential reconstruction of testimony, it will be helpful to discuss some key features of their epistemic and ontological worldview. In particular, this section will introduce the Buddhist theory of exclusion (apoha), which is not only a theory about word meaning, but also, all conceptual awareness. Last chapter we saw that for realists like Naiyāyikas, the meaning (artha) of a word was the individual object it referred to as endowed with the distinctive features of its natural kind. However, for antirealists like Dignāga, the meaning of a word is a mentally constructed object that does not correspond to anything real or external. The theory of exclusion is primarily discussed in the fifth chapter of Dignāga’s magnum opus, the Pramāṇasamuccaya (PS), and is closely linked to Dignāga’s explanation of why testimony is not an independent source of knowledge.

Dignāga explains how words give rise to their meanings, or mentally constructed objects, in the first verse of PS 5. He states, “Testimony is not different from inference. This is because words denote their objects through the exclusion of other objects, just like the inferential marker

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113 See McCrea and Patil 2006 and 2010 for a good, accessible introduction to the history of the theory of exclusion.
‘being produced’ indicates impermanent objects by excluding those things that are not produced.”¹¹⁴ In this verse, Dignāga argues that words are like inferential markers in that they indicate their objects by excluding all other objects that are different. As an example, Dignāga argues that the generic property “being produced” is an inferential marker which points to, or constructs a class of, impermanent objects by excluding all other objects that are not produced, or not impermanent. He argues that in the same way, a word like “cow,” denotes its object by excluding all objects that are non-cows. In claiming that testimony is not different from inference, Dignāga is saying that the invariable connection that exists between an inferential mark and the property to be proven is the same invariable connection that exists between a word and its meaning, which is determined to be a conceptually constructed object.¹¹⁵ This is similar to the inferential reconstruction of testimony provided by the Vaiśeṣika’s in the last chapter, with one important difference being that the Vaiśeṣikas were realists and thus, the objects words refer to are real and external rather than mentally-constructed.

According to Buddhists, the objects established through inference are generic objects or universals (sāmānyalakṣaṇa). Universals are mentally constructed objects and are involved in all conceptual reasoning. They stand in contrast to the actual objects we experience and interact with, that is, the objects of perceptual awareness. Perceptual objects are unique, momentary particulars (svalakṣaṇa). Looking at the standard smoke-fire inference will help clarify the different roles played by these distinct objects and additionally, the way exclusion works in


¹¹⁵ Dignāga explains this in PSV ad PS 5.33ab (see Pind 2009: A13: yathāiva kṛtakavyudāśena yat kṛtakatvam tat sāmānyam anityatvādigamakam tathā sabdāntaravyavachchedena śaṁde sāmānyam ucayate. tenaiva cārthapratyāvakah \ “Just as the generic property “being produced” indicates objects that are impermanent by excluding objects that are not produced, the generic property of a word indicates its object by excluding the objects of other words. It is by this very process that a word indicates its object.”
conceptual reasoning. According to Dignāga, when we infer fire from smoke, what we infer is not a particular fire, but rather, a universal “fire-in-general,” which is a conceptual construction. Universals like generic fire do not pick out a class of objects that share any real element in common, rather, generic fire is able to refer to particular fires because it excludes all things that are not fire. Thus, while exclusions function like real universals, they are not positive entities with objective reality, which realists like Naiyāyikas attribute to universals. Only the particulars grasped by perception, which is free from conceptualization, are considered to be real entities.

Dignāga argues that words denote objects through this same process of exclusion. For example, the word “tree” does not denote a real tree, rather, it denotes a class of objects that is not non-tree. This generic entity is mentally constructed and does not refer to real trees. Individual trees are utterly unique and distinct from one another. Dignāga also discusses how the inferential connection between a word and its mentally-constructed object is created. In particular, Dignāga explains that we learn how specific words indicate specific objects through ostentation. This happens when a knowledgeable person points to a prototypical example of an object and states the word that refers to that object. For example, in order to learn the connection between “breadfruit tree” and an actual breadfruit tree, an authority points to a breadfruit tree and states “This is a breadfruit tree.” Thus, the connection between word and its object is mentally constructed. However, this connection is then reified and, as a result, the term “breadfruit tree” is applied to all instances of breadfruit tree, despite individual differences among breadfruit trees. Since we cannot establish that this term applies to all cases of breadfruit tree, since there are an

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116 For more on the apoha theory and the problem of universals, both from the perspective of classical Indian philosophy as well as Western traditions, see Siderits, Tillemans, and Chakrabarti: 2011.
infinite number of cases, the viability of this connection depends on the fact that we do not observe the word “breadfruit tree” being applied to objects of other words. As a result, we infer a word’s object through the fact that that word is not applied to the objects of other words, that is, its exclusion from other objects.\footnote{This example appears in in PS 5: 50b-50d (see Pind 2009: A19-A20) and the corresponding commentary in the PSV.}

While Dignāga primarily focuses on exclusion as the meaning of words, he ultimately believed that word-meanings are extracted from the sentence meaning, which is primary and indivisible.\footnote{See Hattori 1980 for more on Dignāga’s theory of sentence meaning.} For Dignāga, what a sentence denotes is an idea or an impression of its object (pratibhā) in the mind of a listener, without reference to an external object. He gives the example of someone conjuring up the idea of a tiger upon hearing the sentence “A tiger is coming,” even when there is no real tiger.\footnote{See PS 5. 47 in Pind 2009: A18, along with the corresponding commentary in the PSV.} These images or vague impressions are different for each person, since each person has had different experiences with words that cannot be communicated. However, these distinct images of the same sentence on the part of different people are included in the same class of images indicated by the sentence since they share with each other the fact that they are distinct, or excluded from, those images produced by other sentences. Dignāga does not spend so much time discussing his theory of sentence meaning or how word-meanings are extracted from a sentence-meaning but this basic understanding will serve our purposes.

Although Jayanta primarily discuses and refutes the Buddhist theory of apoha in chapter 5 of the NM, this basic overview introduces the key features in the Buddhist epistemological and ontological worldview which will help with understanding the motives and reasoning behind Dignāga’s and Dharmakīrti’s inferential reconstructions of testimony. In chapter 3 of the NM,
Jayanta focuses on a different inference Dignāga provides regarding why testimony reduces to inference. Up until now, we saw that, for Dignāga, words are inferential markers of the mentally constructed objects they produce in the mind. However, these objects do not correspond to any mind-independent objects. Given this, how do we distinguish between whether these constructed objects are accepted as “conventionally existent” (samvytīsat), and statements about them conventionally true,\textsuperscript{120} or whether they are completely unreal (bhrāntī)? The next section discusses Jayanta’s presentation of Dignāga’s inferential reconstruction of testimony, whereby, upon confirming the speaker’s credibility, which serves as an inferential marker of a statement’s truth, an epistemic agent is able to confirm that a speaker’s statements refer to conventionally real objects we can fruitfully interact with, instead of completely unreal, mentally-constructed objects.

2.2 Dignāga’s inferential reconstruction of testimony: The speaker’s trustworthiness as the inferential mark of a statement’s truth

Jayanta presents Dignāga’s argument as follows:

And moreover, even if a mere constructed image (pratibhā)\textsuperscript{121} of the object is generated from another’s statement, firm knowledge is produced by knowing that the statement was uttered by a trustworthy person, which is the inferential mark. Therefore, wise people believe that testimony is inference since one can infer the truth of a statement upon knowing it was uttered by a trustworthy person.\textsuperscript{122}

\textsuperscript{120} Buddhist philosophers distinguish between two truths: conventional (samvyrti) and ultimate (paramārtha). Statements that are conventionally true, while not ultimately withstand critical philosophical scrutiny are true in the sense that they are convenient fictions that enable us to function successfully in our ordinary lives. For example, even though the doctrine of momentariness demonstrates that objects are constantly changing and lack the substance we normally ascribe to them, statements concerning the persistence of ordinary objects are conventionally true since they help us navigate life. On the other hand, a mirage would lack even conventional existence and be considered ultimately unreal.

\textsuperscript{121} For a good article on Dignāga’s conception of “pratibhā” as the meaning of a sentence see Hattori 1980.

\textsuperscript{122} NM (I, 403.7-403.10): api ca pratibhāmātre śabdāj jāte ’pi ktracit | āptavādatvalingena janyate niścitā matiḥ | āptavādāvisanvādasāmānyād anumānātā ||.

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Cakradhara, who produced the only available commentary on the NM, the *Granthibhanga*, explains the way this inference is supposed to work. He states that just like we determine the presence of fire upon perceiving smoke, similarly, we determine the truth of a statement upon knowing it was uttered by a trustworthy person.\(^{123}\) The basic idea is that we need to know that a speaker is credible before our testimonial belief is justified and, if true, knowledge. Before that, all we have is a vague impression about the object denoted by the sentence. Thus, Dignāga distinguishes between a preliminary understanding we obtain upon hearing a statement, and the subsequent knowledge that might follow if we determine the speaker to be trustworthy.

Let us look closer at how this inference works. Dignāga explains that the inferential reason is “the statement of a trustworthy person” and the property to be proven is “the truth of the statement.” It seems like the locus is our constructed image of the object. We saw earlier that inferences concern universals, or generic concepts, which, being constructed by the mind, do not refer to objective reality. If this is the case, what would it mean to say our idea of the object is true if our idea does not reflect a mind-independent reality? For Buddhist thinkers, universals like “fire-in-general,” which do not have mind-independent reality, but which were constructed by the mind on the basis of real particulars, where thought to be conventionally real instead of ultimately real. However, not all conceptually constructed objects are conventionally real, for example, in the case of a mirage. Although both a mirage and “fire-in-general” are constructed by the mind and thus do not correspond to any unconstructed object, our awareness of the “fire-in-general,” if based on our awareness of real fires we previously experienced, would count as conventionally real. This is why the fire we infer on the basis of smoke, although mentally

\(^{123}\) NM\(^{Gibh}\) (I, 221.23-221.24): āptavādāvisāṃvādasāmānyād iti yathā dhūmasāmānyād avisaṃvādānāntvāsāmānyād ity arthaḥ |
constructed, is considered valid because it is based on our previous experiences of seeing real smoke and real fire together.

Thus, conceptually constructed objects are considered conventionally real, and statements we make about them, conventionally true, if they are in some way linked to our perceptual awareness of real particulars. However, while we know the objects constructed on the basis of our perceptual awareness states are conventionally real, how do we know whether the objects we construct on the basis of another person’s statements are conventionally real? That is, how do we know that those objects are based on real particulars that the speaker has experienced? We would know this if we confirm that the speaker is trustworthy, thereby establishing that the constructed objects indicated by her statements are based upon real particulars she has experienced. In this inferential argument, the statement of a trustworthy speaker would be the inferential mark of that statement’s truth. Thus, a speaker’s testimony, rather than immediately and independently giving us knowledge, only gives us knowledge through our employment of inferential reasoning. Hence, testimony is reducible to inference.

Jayanta cites PS 2.5ab in his presentation of Dignāga’s position. PS 2.5ab states that testimony is reducible to inference since we infer the truth of a statement on the basis of its being uttered by a trustworthy person. The context of this verse is important because Dignāga is speaking about how we know the truth of statements that refer to nonempirical objects, that is, objects we have not, or cannot, construct on the basis of real particulars. Additionally, Dharmakīrti uses this verse to delineate his own view of scriptural authority. Further discussion

124 PS 2.5ab: āptavādavāsvādāsamānyād anumānānvādbhyo. Similarly, the Vaiśeṣika Praśastapāda, possibly influenced by Dignāga, also claims that the authority of testimony, and in particular, scripture, depends on the credibility of the speaker. See PBh (213.15-213.16): śrutismrtilakṣaṇo ’py āmnāyovaktrprāmāṇyāpeksah tadvacanādāmnāyapramāṇyāḥ. For the dating of Praśastapāda, especially in light of his acceptance of certain aspects of Dignāga’s logical theory, see Matilal 1977: 62-67 and Potter 2015: 282.
of this verse in the Buddhist context will take place below, in the final section of this chapter, when discussing Dignāga and Dharmakīrti’s take on religious testimony. For now, what is important for understanding Jayanta’s use of this verse is Dignāga’s view that testimony is considered inference because we infer that a speaker’s statement is true on the basis of that speaker being trustworthy.

Before moving to Jayanta’s response, I want to look at some contemporary arguments that also claim that to obtain knowledge through linguistic communication, the recipient must confirm that the speaker is trustworthy. In doing so, I want to subsume Dignāga’s view under the broad umbrella of reductionism that typically is thought to have begun with Hume. I also want to present various portrayals of reductionism, all of which have the common element that they require recipients of testimony to possess positive, non-testimonially based reasons for belief. Because of this, reductionists argue that testimony reduces to other, more basic epistemic sources, primarily, inferential reasoning.

Most books or articles discussing the reductionist position mention Hume as the earliest and most explicit characterization of reductionism. Hume writes:

There is no species of reasoning more common, more useful, and even necessary to human life, than that which is derived from the testimony of men and the reports of eye-witnesses and spectators. This species of reasoning, perhaps, one may deny to be founded on the relation of cause and effect. I shall not dispute about a word. It will be sufficient to observe, that our assurance in any argument of this kind is derived from no other principle than our observation of the veracity of human testimony, and of the usual conformity of facts to the reports of witnesses.  

Many contemporary philosophers in the epistemology of testimony take Hume to be saying that hearers must observe a constant conformity between the reports of a speaker and the

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125 Hume 1977: 74.
corresponding facts in order to accept a speaker’s testimony. However, I would argue that this is an especially strong reading of Hume that portrays him as requiring hearers to perform extensive vetting of speakers before accepting what they report. A weaker reading would portray Hume as claiming that testimonial exchanges in general are underwritten by a general inductive argument that facts conform to the reports of speakers. Hume argues that a testimonial belief that is based upon this general inductive argument is based upon adequate grounds.

There are also contemporary arguments which argue that in standard testimonial exchanges, a recipient is justified in believing a speaker’s report on the basis of background evidence regarding the general reliability of testimony. For example, Faulkner and Adler argue that we must defend our acceptance of testimony with positive reasons, however, those reasons need not be connected to specific information about a particular speaker. Instead, we might support our testimonial belief with background evidence we have about the general reliability of testimony. Such background evidence might consist of the following: 1) predominance of truthful testimony, 2) truth as a norm of linguistic communication, 3) the role that reputation and sanctions play in enforcing truth as a norm, 4) general knowledge about which types of speakers and topics are more reliable, 5) social-moral bonds make lying rare. Despite the fact that this type of reductionism does not require the recipient to carefully monitor the speaker, since ultimately it involves the claim that linguistic communication is by and large a reliable source of beliefs, it still is a form of reductionism in that, in order to be justified in holding a testimonial belief, a recipient needs to possess an argument for the reliability of testimony.

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126 For example, see Lackey 2008: 143 and Coady 1992: 80.
127 For a depiction of this “weaker” reading of Hume see Faulkner 1998.
Dignāga’s reduction of testimony to inference is stronger than the accounts mentioned above since it requires a hearer to establish the trustworthiness of a speaker before that hearer is justified in accepting that speaker’s assertion. In this sense, it seems to be more skeptical of testimony and more concerned about the possibility of acquiring false beliefs due to the dishonesty or incompetence of a speaker. For example, Dignāga would certainly question the presumption that truth is a norm, or even regulative ideal, of linguistic communication. We know through experience that speakers have many goals in communicating with others—making conversation, duping others, wanting to seem agreeable, trying to get others to like them, etc. Even if truth were a regulative ideal of linguistic communication, we can easily imagine situations where people fail to live up to such an ideal. For example, not cheating might be a regulative ideal of dieting however it is perfectly conceivable, and in fact, quite common, for dieters to not live up to this ideal. And yet the practice of dieting still exists. The same can be said about linguistic communication.

We saw Dignāga argue that the reports of others give rise to mere mental images of their objects and that, for those images to be validated in the sense of linking up to reality, we need to ascertain that the speaker is credible. While the thought process that gives rise to the speaker’s testimony is also full of generic images that do not directly map onto any mind-independent objects, if that thought process is based upon perceptual experiences of real particular objects, those thoughts would be considered conventionally true. This is what the hearer is trying to confirm upon establishing the trustworthiness of a speaker. Hence, according to Dignāga, a stricter requirement is needed to ensure that a piece of testimony is reliable.

Elizabeth Fricker is one of the most prominent contemporary supporters of a stronger version of reductionism that requires a recipient to carefully monitor the speaker for any signs of
dishonesty or incompetence. She states, “A hearer should always engage in some assessment of
the speaker for trustworthiness. To believe what is asserted without doing so is to believe
blindly, uncritically. This is gullibility.” While Fricker argues that a person can infer a
speaker’s trustworthiness on the basis of the reliability of the speaker’s past assertions, her
preferred way for the hearer to ascertain the credibility of a speaker is to construct a psychology
of the speaker, based on behavioral clues, which would indicate the competence and sincerity, or
lack thereof, of the speaker. While this type of psychological monitoring is typically registered
and processed on a sub-personal level, Fricker insists that a subject should be able to defend her
judgements by referring to this monitoring capacity even if she cannot explain the details of how
this capacity works. Moreover, Fricker’s account allows that, with respect to a certain range of
topics, topics which common sense person theory tells us that people are almost always right
about, such as basic personal facts, the time of day, etc., the default position is to assume the
speaker is competent. Despite this she stresses that, even with respect to these cases, her theory
still differs from nonreductionist theories because it requires the recipient of testimony to always
take a critical stance toward the speaker and be constantly assessing the speaker for signs of
duplicity. 

Overall, I would argue that there is a tension at the heart of the reductionist view of
testimony. If a recipient is required to ascertain the credibility of every source she encounters in
linguistic exchanges, this demanding condition would make testimonial knowledge rare.
Moreover, Joseph Shieber cites evidence from social psychology that suggests that humans are
not good at tracking the competence of speakers and reliably distinguishing between true and

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130 Fricker 1994, especially pages 148-151.
false testimony.\textsuperscript{131} On the other hand, if we impose a laxer requirement where the recipient just needs a few background beliefs concerning the reliability of testimony, then the concern is that the requirement is so minimal as to serve no purpose. For example, on Lackey’s dualist view, “the positive reasons possessed by a hearer need to be such that they render it, at the very least, \textit{not irrational for her to accept the testimony in question}.”\textsuperscript{132} But for Lackey, the avoidance of irrationality is not sufficient for having adequate grounds for belief. She gives the example of a first-time traveler to London, forming beliefs on the basis of reading a local London newspaper. She states:

\begin{quote}
Even if I do not have specific beliefs about British newspapers, I have all sorts of beliefs about England, the people who live there, their government, their social and political values, and so on. Surely, this information is enough to make it not \textit{irrational} to form beliefs on the basis of British newspapers, even if it is not itself fully sufficient for \textit{justifying} such beliefs or for rendering the formation of such beliefs \textit{positively rational}.\textsuperscript{133}
\end{quote}

Thus, Lackey’s positive reasons requirement “merely has to ensure that the hearer’s acceptance of the testimony is rationally acceptable.”\textsuperscript{134} It does not need to justify the belief. The reason Lackey’s positive reasons requirement does not need to be so strict is that on her dualist account, which seeks to combine the positions of reductionism and nonreductionism, the speaker’s report must be reliable and the hearer must be reliably sensitive to the cues of dishonesty or incompetence on the part of the speaker. However, by removing some of the burden off the positive reason’s requirement, it seems as if it there is no more work left for it to do.

\textsuperscript{131} Schieber 2015: chapter 2.
\textsuperscript{132} Lackey 2008: 181.
\textsuperscript{133} Lackey 2008: 181.
\textsuperscript{134} Lackey 2008: 181.
I want to now turn to Jayanta’s response to Dignāga’s reduction. Interestingly, Jayanta agrees with Dignāga in that we can know that our testimonial belief is true (property to be proven) upon knowing that the speaker is trustworthy (inferential reason). However, Jayanta contrasts this knowledge of truth, generated by inference, with knowledge of an object, generated by testimony. Moreover, in response to Dignāga’s claim that, without confirming the credibility of the speaker, testimony only generates mere mental images of its object, Jayanta argues that our everyday experience confirms this isn’t the case and testimony by itself produces definitive knowledge of its object.

2.3 Jayanta’s Response to Dignāga

Dignāga’s argument is that we infer the truth of a statement upon confirming it was uttered by a trustworthy person. Contrary to what one might expect, Jayanta believes this argument is well-formulated and that this type of inference is indeed used to confirm the truth of testimonial belief. However, he argues that the knowledge we obtain upon knowing that a statement is true is not the type of knowledge that is generated by testimony. In particular, Jayanta states:

In fact, by means of the inferential reason “statement of a trustworthy person,” we *confirm* that we have knowledge of the object of testimony, however, it is not the case that our knowledge of the object of testimony is *produced* by that inferential reason. As it was said [by Kumārila], “One thing is truth, which is known through the inferential reason “statement of a trustworthy person,” and another thing is the object a sentence, which is known before its truth. Thus, if we infer the truth of testimony through the inferential reason “statement of a trustworthy person,” how can our knowledge of the object of a sentence also be inferential?”

135 NM (I, 411.3-411.8): āptavādatvahetunā hi śabdārthabuddhe prāmāṇyaṃ sādhyate na tu saiva janyate | yadāha anyad eva hi satyatvam āptavādatvahetukam | vākyārthāś cānya eveha jñātaḥ pūrvataram hi saḥ || tataś ced āptavādena satyatvam anumāṇaḥ | vākyārthāpratvayasyātra katham syād anumānaḥ ||(Varadacharya mentions that this is a quote from the Mimamsaslokavarttika 1.1.7. verses 244-245).
Here Jayanta is distinguishing between knowledge and reflective knowledge/justification, or, knowing we have knowledge. Even if we know we have knowledge once we confirm that the speaker is trustworthy, the knowledge that is generated through testimony—knowledge of the object of the statement—does not require us to confirm that the speaker is trustworthy.

Indian epistemologists often distinguish between a causal condition which is effective in itself and a causal condition which is effective only when it is known. In this case, a statement that is uttered by a trustworthy person is a condition that is effective in itself. That is, it is able to produce knowledge without requiring the recipient of knowledge to know that it is true. Although a person comes to know that her testimonial belief that $p$ is knowledge after she ascertains that the speaker is credible, it is not the case that her belief that $p$ becomes knowledge only after ascertaining that the speaker is credible. The distinction being made here is between knowing that a belief is knowledge, or, is produced by a reliable instrument, and the brute fact that a belief is knowledge, or, produced by a reliable instrument. According to Nyāya, the latter is necessary and sufficient for a testimonial belief to be knowledge.

In the last chapter, we saw that Nyāya distinguishes between first-order knowledge and reflective knowledge. Reflective knowledge, which is needed in situations where there is doubt or disagreement, requires the subject to verify, usually through inference, that she has knowledge by demonstrating her belief was produced by a reliable instrument. However, this extra layer of justification is not necessary for first order knowledge. If it were, attaining knowledge would be rare and needlessly difficult. One of the central objections against reductionism is that it is too intellectualistic since it unreasonably requires people to adduce positive arguments in support of

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their testimonial belief. This objection is often cited in the context of infants and young children, since they lack the cognitive capacity to acquire the types of reasons delineated by reductionists. For example, Greco reasons that unless we want to flat out reject the claim that young children acquire knowledge from their parents or that students acquire knowledge from their teachers and textbooks, it is implausible to require that these sorts of recipients base their testimonial beliefs on the type of inductive evidence reductionists usually require.\textsuperscript{137}

What about the Buddhist concern that unless the reliability of the speaker is ascertained, our testimonial beliefs are mere opinions whose connection to reality remains unsubstantiated? Jayanta’s dismisses this qualm and instead argues that our daily experiences validate the claim that we obtain knowledge of real objects from the reports of others.\textsuperscript{138} We saw above that Hume made a similar claim when he stated that we commonly observe that the reports of others correspond to facts. However, while Hume argued that, to obtain knowledge from the reports of others, a subject must base their testimonial beliefs on a general inductive argument concerning the reliability of testimony, Jayanta argues that testimony itself, that is, the words of a trustworthy person, is able to directly produce knowledge, regardless of whether we are aware of this general inductive argument. We know this because, were any doubts to arise, our knowledge can be confirmed on the basis of daily experience. Jayanta seems to think that Dignāga’s worry about the possibility of statements not linking with reality is unsubstantiated and contrived. We do not need to confirm the veracity of all statements before accepting them as true. Instead, we only need to do so if a legitimate doubt arises regarding the truth of particular statements made by particular speakers. This will be discussed more fully in the next section.

\textsuperscript{137} Greco 2012

\textsuperscript{138} NM (I, 411.11-411.12): na ca prāmāṇyaniścayād vinā pratibhāmātraṃ tad iti vaktavyaṃ śabdārthasaṃpratayasyānumbhavasiddhatvā ||.
To conclude, Jayanta’s response to Dignāga consists of two separate but related arguments: first, knowledge does not require knowing that one knows, or, reflective knowledge, and second, common experience tells us that language connects to reality regardless of whether we have first confirmed that the speaker is trustworthy. The first argument makes use of the distinction drawn between knowledge and reflective knowledge. In referring to this distinction, Jayanta argues that testimony gives us knowledge of facts while inference gives us justification, or knowledge that our first-order knowledge is in fact knowledge. Jayanta’s second argument focuses on the intuitive claim that language refers to objects in the world rather than private thoughts in our mind. On the other hand, Dignāga argues that until we ascertain that a speaker is trustworthy, that speaker’s statements can only refer to mental objects or images we form in our minds. This stance reflects a general Buddhist skepticism regarding arguments that appeal to common sense, since, according to them, the way reality appears to us is often illusory. Moreover, given that language is intimately linked with mental construction, which cannot apprehend ultimate reality, one way to ensure that the objects language points to link up, in some way, to ultimately real objects is through ascertaining credibility of the speaker.

The next section will delve deeper into the Buddhist distrust of language by looking at a figure who argues that words can never refer to objects, even conventionally real objects. In responding to these arguments, Jayanta’s own view becomes clearer. Ultimately, Jayanta argues that faulty speakers rather than faulty words are to blame in situations where language fails to link up to reality. First, I will discuss Dharmakīrti’s reduction of testimony to inference. Unlike Dignāga, Dharmakīrti argues that words, rather than referring to images in the minds of subjects, refer to, or indicate, a speaker’s intention to express something. Afterwards I will focus on
Jayanta’s presentation of and response to one of Dharmakīrti’s central claims, namely, that words, by their intrinsic nature, produce erroneous beliefs.

2.4 The Reduction of Testimony to Inference: Dharmakīrti’s Argument: Words as inferential marks of a speaker’s intention

Earlier we saw Jayanta criticize the inferential argument whereby the words of a sentence serve as an inferential marker of that sentence’s meaning, which, for the Vaiśeṣikas, is identical to the individual, external object, and, for Dignāga, a mental image of an object. In particular, Jayanta demonstrated that such inferences fail to work regardless of whether the words or the objects serve as the locus of the inference. A new strategy was introduced by the Buddhist Dharmakīrti. Dharmakīrti argued that upon hearing a speaker’s statement, we infer, not the object of the statement, but rather, the intention of the speaker to express something. Jayanta delineates Dharmakīrti’s position as follows:

Moreover, a speaker’s statement can only lead to knowledge of that speaker’s intention to speak, not of an external object. This is because, if statements were inferential markers of external objects, there would be deviation. A speaker’s statement is only an inferential marker of that speaker’s intention to speak.139

The deviation referred to is the deviation between a word and its object. For example, we can conceive of a scenario where the same statement is used by different speakers to refer to different objects, depending on the speaker’s intention. Additionally, words are not invariably connected to real objects as seen in situations where a speaker’s report does not match reality. Thus, words can only make known a speaker’s intention to express something. For this inference to work, it

139 NM (I, 404.1-404.2): kiñca śabdo vivakṣāyāṃ eva prāmāṇyam aśnute | na bāhye vyabhicārītvāt tasyām caitasya liṅgatā ||. Compare to Dharmakīrti’s own words in PV 1.213: nāntarīyakatābhāvāc chabdānānam vastubhiḥ | nārthasiddhis tatas te hi vaktrabhiprāyascakāḥ //. “Since words are not invariably connected to real entities, they do not establish real objects. They only make known a speaker’s intention.”
seems as if the speaker would be the locus of the inference, the speaker’s statement would be the inferential marker, and the speaker’s intention would be the property to be proven.

What both Dignāga’s and Dharmakīrti’s inferential reconstructions have in common is that words never directly refer to real objects, instead, they refer to mental states. This is in contrast to realists like Jayanta and the Vaiśeṣikas, who claim that words refer to things in the world. However, for Dignāga, a speaker’s words refer to, or indicate, ideas or images in the mind of the recipient of the constructed object and for Dharmakīrti, a speaker’s words refer to, or indicate, a speaker’s intention to speak. However, while Dignāga concedes that a speaker’s report can, upon confirming the speaker’s credibility, point to conventionally real objects, Dharmakīrti argues that words have no connection to conventionally real objects.

Jayanta’s portrayal of this more extreme position that rejects testimony as a source of knowledge about the world primarily focuses on how language bears no relation to real objects and intrinsically produces false beliefs. Many of the claims he discusses depend on the Buddhist categorization schema delineated above that sharply distinguishes perception, which reflects the true nature of reality, and conceptualization, which relates to constructed universals that are falsely projected onto reality. In this schema, language is intimately related to conceptualization. In fleshing out the Buddhist position, Jayanta focuses on concrete examples where language misrepresents reality. In particular, Jayanta first discusses two objections raised against the Buddhist thesis that words are disconnected from reality and then provides responses to these objections on behalf of Buddhists. The first objection underscores the similarity of perception to testimony in that it sometimes leads to false awareness states. The second objection blames the occurrence of false testimonial beliefs on the faults of the speaker not language itself.
As stated above, Dharmakīrti’s position is that words do not refer, directly or indirectly, to real objects. Instead, words, by nature, give rise to false awareness states. For example, uttering the statement, “A hundred elephants simultaneously stand on the tip of my finger,” gives rise to an awareness state that does not correspond with the real nature of things. The first objection to the position that language generates illusory awareness compares word-generated illusions to perceptual illusions. In particular, this objection claims that perception, which is accepted as an instrument of knowledge by both Buddhists and non-Buddhists, also gives rise to false awareness states. Moreover, while it is well-accepted that our perceptual faculties can produce optical illusions, no one would agree to the blanket statement that perception never links up with real objects.\textsuperscript{140} Jayanta’s Buddhist interlocutor crafts a response to this objection which allows perception, despite giving rise to false awareness states, to still be considered a source of knowledge while testimony is rejected as a source of knowledge. In particular, Jayanta’s Buddhist interlocutor argues that our sensory faculties do not naturally cause such errors, but rather, they only do so if they are damaged as a result of disease, for example, blindness.\textsuperscript{141} This argument tries to distinguish perception from testimony by claiming that perceptual errors are due to occasional defects in the perceptual mechanism while errors due to language are intrinsic to language itself. In particular, since words originate from the constructing powers of our mind, their innate nature prevents them from referring to real objects.

On the other hand, when our perceptual apparatus is functioning normally, it apprehends unconstructed, real objects. This distinction between our sensory and language faculties is

\textsuperscript{140} NM (I, 415.8-415.9): \textit{cakṣurādinām api alikakacacakācākādipraṭītikāraṇatvam asti na ca teṣām arthāsaṁsparśitvān iti.}

\textsuperscript{141} NM (I, 415.9-415.10): \textit{teṣām hi timirādidoṣakalusūtavapuspām tathāvidhayibhramakāraṇatvam na tu svamahimanaiva }. 

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echoed in Shieber’s discussion on the various functions of language. In particular, Shieber examines what Reid labels the solitary and social powers of the mind. Unlike the solitary powers, such as our perceptual faculties, the social powers, such as our language faculties, do not require truth-connectivity since they can be directed at achieving other goals, such as social cohesion. For example, we utter things without intending to express factual claims, such as when we tell jokes and stories, or portray sarcasm. While this evolutionary argument on why language is misleading is different from the argument provided by Buddhists, both essentially argue that, by nature, our perceptual faculties are directed toward truth while our language faculties need not be.

A second objection to the Buddhist rejection of testimony as a source of knowledge claims that when language produces false beliefs, this is due to the defects of speakers, not the intrinsic nature of words themselves. More specifically, this objection argues that the job of words and statements is to express the objects they are associated with, however, if this association does not exist in reality, this is due to either the incompetence or dishonesty of the speaker. Jayanta’s Buddhist interlocutor rejects this argument and provides two examples to support the claim that language, not speakers, is to blame. First, the Buddhist interlocutor points to the example of an untrustworthy, but mute, individual. In this case, despite being untrustworthy, this person is unable to produce false beliefs in another person since she lacks the ability verbally communicate. Second, even trustworthy people can produce false awareness states in others. When a trustworthy person utters the statement, “There are 100 elephants on the

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142 Shieber 2015:119-121.

143 NM (I, 415.11): puruṣadosāņām eṣa mahīmā na śabdānāmiti
tip of my finger,” that statement produces a false awareness in others. The idea here is that a person who is trustworthy could utter a false statement as a joke, out of error, or just spontaneously. This demonstrates, according to Jayanta’s Buddhist interlocutor, that the nature of words, rather than the qualities of speakers, produces illusion and error.

To summarize, Jayanta has just presented two objections to Buddhist arguments claiming that language does not refer to real objects and has provided two counter-responses on the part of his Buddhist interlocutors. While the first objection focused on the fact that other sources of knowledge also might generate false awareness states, the second objection focused on the fact that speakers, not language itself, is to blame for false, word-generated beliefs. The Buddhist counter-response highlighted the fact that words, as opposed to, for example, our perceptual mechanism, intrinsically produce false beliefs regardless of the qualities associated with the speaker. This Buddhist position is noticeably different from Dignāga’s position since we saw Dignāga argue that language has the ability to refer to conventionally real objects depending on whether a speaker has been confirmed as credible. Thus, in cases where language gives rise to false beliefs, Dignāga, unlike Dharmakīrti, would place some of the blame on the speaker who perhaps lacked knowledge of the subject matter being communicated.

On the other hand, Dharmakīrti never authorizes the inference from trustworthy person to true statement. As we will see in the final section of this chapter, Dharmakīrti argues that it is very difficult to assess whether a person is trustworthy. For example, everyday experience illustrates the fact that people we deem trustworthy often err or deceive us regarding certain topics. As a result, there is no reason to assume that someone who has been trustworthy on one occasion will be trustworthy on another occasion, even if the subject matter remains constant.

144 NM (I, 415.11-415.14): doṣavato ’pi purusasya mūkāder anuccāritaśabdasyadasyedrśaviplavotpādanapātavābhāvāt | asaty api ca puruṣahṛdayakālūsyeyathāprayujaṃjānāny anāgulyagrādivākyāni viplavam āvahanty eveti.
Moreover, we do not have access to other people’s mental states nor are we able to infer them on the basis of verbal and bodily cues. Despite the fact that reductionists and nonreductionists alike seem to refer to the absence or presence of these physical cues as indicators of trustworthiness or untrustworthiness, social psychology argues that we are poor readers of these cues. Instead, when Dharmakīrti argues that testimony reduces to inference, the inference he is referring to is one from the speaker’s words to the speaker’s intention to express something. However, the object, or content, of speech, must be confirmed independent of testimony.

It goes without saying that this is a very counterintuitive approach to how we acquire knowledge through social interactions. This account seems to imply that we can never obtain knowledge about countries we have never visited, scientific theories we have not directly tested, and even personal biographical information we could never have witnessed, such as the day we were born. If that is the case, what is the epistemic status of beliefs that we have acquired through others but have not directly verified ourselves? It seems as if, according to Dharmakīrti and other Buddhist thinkers who share his view, these beliefs, even if true, would not be knowledge, but rather, mere opinion. We will talk more about what this means in the final section of this chapter, which raises a major difficulty in Dharmakīrti’s refusal to accept testimony as a source of knowledge, that is, the fact that Dharmakīrti’s thesis rejects the fact that even his own Buddhist scriptural tradition can be a source of knowledge.

Before moving to Jayanta’s response to Dharmakīrti’s position, I want to briefly mention other views that resemble Dharmakīrti’s view. Although this is not a position that is popular today, there are many examples in the history of philosophy where the autonomous individual,

145 Shieber 2015: chapter two examines a large body of evidence from social psychology that claims we are not very good at making predictions regarding the sincerity and competency of other people.
who only accepts what she has discovered for herself through her own cognitive faculties, is portrayed as the ideal knowledge seeker. For example, the idea that one should only rely on one’s own investigative and reasoning powers can be seen in Descartes’ rational methodology and the reason he gives for it. In particular, Descartes states:

But regarding the opinions to which I had hitherto given credence, I thought that I could not do better than undertake to get rid of them, all at one go, in order to replace them afterwards with better ones, or with the same ones once I had squared them with the standards of reason. I firmly believed that in this way I would succeed in conducting my life much better than if I built only upon old foundations and relied only upon principles that I had accepted in my youth without ever examining whether they were true.\textsuperscript{146}

In a similar spirit, Locke, remarking on knowledge, claims:

The floating of other Mens Opinions in our brains makes us not one jot the more knowing, though they happen to be true. What in them was Science, is in us but Opiniatrety, whilst we give up our Assent only to reverend Names, and do not, as they did, employ our own Reason to understand those Truths, which gave them reputation.\textsuperscript{147}

Coady believes that this dismissive attitude toward testimony as a source of knowledge was due to an individualistic ideology that dominated the post-Renaissance Western world.\textsuperscript{148}

Moreover, there is evidence of this way of thinking about knowledge in pre-modern philosophical writing. In particular, Coady mentions that the Greek-medieval tradition often associated knowledge with self-evident first principles. For example, in Plato’s \textit{Theaetetus}, Socrates claims that beliefs obtained from the reports of eye-witnesses could never be knowledge and instead, if correct, could only amount to true opinion. Similarly, Coady points to the tension within the works of both Augustine and Aquinas which, although insisting upon on the importance of testimonial beliefs, views knowledge as either the direct grasp of certain truths or

\textsuperscript{146} Descartes 1988: 26

\textsuperscript{147} Locke & Nidditch 1975 (Bk. 1, Chap. 3): 101.

systematic reasoning on the basis of such truths.\textsuperscript{149} We will see a similar tension in Dharmakīrti’s position on the authority of Buddhist scriptures. That is, while he recognizes that in certain respects, religious testimony is important and necessary, at the same time, he claims that religious testimony can never produce bona fide knowledge.

\textbf{2.5 Jayanta’s response to Dharmakīrti}

In response to Dharmakīrti’s claim that we infer a speaker’s intention from her words, Jayanta argues that while this is true, just like it is true that we can infer the truth of a speaker’s report from that speaker’s trustworthiness, the ability of words to act as an inferential mark for something should be distinguished from its significatory power, that is, its ability to refer to its object. Moreover, unless a word first expresses its object, it cannot inferentially point to a speaker’s subjective thoughts. Thus, Jayanta is not disagreeing with Dharmakīrti’s inference, he is just claiming that this inferential power that words possess is not the particular function of words he is referring to when he speaks about word-generated knowledge. Instead, word-generated knowledge refers to a word’s capacity to refer to its object, and, as Jayanta has shown, in this respect, words do not function as inferential marks. Second, Jayanta argues against Dharmakīrti’s claim that words are, by nature, disconnected from real objects. In particular, he argues that first, this thesis contradicts common sense and our daily experience, and second, when a speaker’s statements lead to false beliefs that do not refer to real objects, this is solely the fault of the speaker, not words themselves.

Jayanta explains:

\begin{quote}
For what is expressed by language is not the speaker’s intention, but rather, the signified object. Language is an inferential mark of a speaker’s intention because it is an effect of the speaker’s intention, just like in the case of ether, but it does
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{149} Coady 1992: 16-21.
not signify the speaker’s intention. After a statement is uttered, first, knowledge of the signified object is produced. However, after that, that statement could also convey, through inference, knowledge of the speaker’s intention. And when the intention inferred does not include the object, what can only be inferred is an intention belonging to a sentient being. However, an intention that is specifically related to the object signified by the statement cannot be inferred unless the object signified by the statement is first known.\textsuperscript{150}

In comparing the inference of a speaker’s intention to the inference of ether, Jayanta is arguing that just as we infer the presence of ether, which is imperceptible, from the perception of sound, which is contained in either, similarly we infer the presence of the speaker’s intention, which is imperceptible, from the perception of language. However, the relation of cause-effect that exists between language and a speaker’s intention is not the signifier-signified relation that exists between a word and the object it denotes. Moreover, Jayanta argues that without knowledge of the object being denoted, the only intention we can infer from a speaker’s statement is the intention to speak. We cannot infer that a speaker intends to express a specific object unless that object has already been signified by language. For example, if a person tells me “The book is on the table,” without knowing what the sentence signified, all I could infer was that behind the sentence, there was a speaker intending to tell me something. I could not say what this “something” was. In order to infer that the speaker is intending to express the fact that there is a book on the table, I would need to know that what the sentence signified.

After arguing that the various ways in which words served as inferential markers is not what is intended by testimonial knowledge, Jayanta responds directly to the unintuitive Buddhist

claim that words never refer to real objects. First, Jayanta claims that our daily experiences confirm that this portrayal of language is completely false. In particular, Jayanta argues:

If verbal communication never produced true beliefs, we would believe the claim that words never referred to real objects. However, when a credible person utters a statement such as ‘There are fruits by the riverbank,’ we know it produces true beliefs of a visible, external object because a person who goes to the riverbank obtains the object of that statement, that is, the fruit.\textsuperscript{151}

The common-sense notion that verbal communication produces knowledge of real objects we interact with is constantly affirmed through our day to day interactions. We saw Jayanta make the same argument with respect to Dignāga’s claim that unless one confirms that the speaker is reliable, a speaker’s report merely indicates vague ideas in one’s mind whose connection to reality is unknown. Thus, the argument that words do not point to real, external objects is contradicted by our experience and our successful interactions with the world.

Jayanta’s Buddhist opponent could respond by asking why Jayanta trusts these successful interactions with the world. It is possible that false beliefs lead to successful results. Consider, for example, the person who mistakes the light of a jewel for the jewel itself, but still obtains the jewel through that false awareness-state.\textsuperscript{152} Similarly, our testimonial beliefs could be false, despite leading to successful interactions in the world. Jayanta’s response to this challenge depends on his theory regarding how we know that a belief we have is true (prāmāṇyavāda). In general, there were two camps of thought on this issue. Some thinkers, like the Mīmāṁsakas,

\textsuperscript{151} NM (I, 416.9-416.13): \texttt{yadi na kadācid api yathārtham śabdaḥ pratyayam upajanayet arthāsaṁsparśitvam evāya svabhāva iti ganyeta | bhavati tu guṇavatpuruṣabhāṣāt nadyāstīre phalāni santi iti väkyāt atiraskṛtabhāyārtho yathārthah pratyayah tataḥ pravṛttasya tadārthapratyayā.}

\textsuperscript{152} See PV 2.57: \texttt{maniprādīppaprabhayor maṇibuddhābhidhāvatoḥ | mithyājñāṇāviśeṣe 'pi viśeṣo 'rthakriyām prati ||. Here Dharmakīrti is comparing two different cognitions: the cognition of the light of the lamp which we take to be a jewel and the cognition of the light of the jewel which we take to be a jewel. He says that while both cognitions are false, one has pragmatic value while the other does not. In particular, when we mistake the light of a jewel for the jewel itself, if we move toward it, we obtain the jewel. Thus, false cognitions can lead to successful practical actions.
advocated the theory that beliefs were intrinsically valid (*svataḥprāmāṇyavāda*), and others, like the Naiyāyikas, advocated the theory that beliefs were extrinsically valid (*parataḥprāmāṇyavāda*). In particular, while Mīmāṃsakas argued that all beliefs are self-evidently true until proven otherwise, the Naiyāyikas argued that the truth of beliefs is not self-evident, but rather, needs to be established by an extrinsic belief based on pragmatic criteria.

Interestingly, Dignāga does not mention this issue at all and Dharmakīrti merely says that we know a cognition is true by practice, thus implying that validity is extrinsic. However, later Buddhist commentators differentiated between various types of valid and invalid cognitions and argued that sometimes validity was known extrinsically and other times intrinsically. In general, Buddhists argued that the validity of inference, trained perception, and perception in which there occurs the fulfillment of a purpose, is known intrinsically. On the other hand, perception that is in some way connected to doubt about the object or that has causes of error needs to be ascertained extrinsically, through a subsequent cognition. However, in the example given above regarding the jewel, Jayanta’s Buddhist interlocutor argues that confirmatory knowledge produced by an extrinsic belief does not always imply that an initial belief was true. For example, a person who ultimately obtains the jewel thinks her perception of the jewel led her to the jewel, but in reality, it was her perception of the light of the jewel that led her to the jewel.

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153 Around the time of Jayanta, this debate regarding intrinsic and extrinsic validity had two different aspects: origination of truth (*utpatti* and the apprehension of truth (*jñapti*). I will focus on the latter.

154 PV 2.4d-5a: *svarūpasya svato gatiḥ *|* prāmāṇyaṃ vyavahārena*.

155 For more details see Krasser 2003: 161-164.

156 Based on Dharmottara’s reading of Dharmakīrti, the original intent of the example was to compare a false cognition with an inferential cognition. While both can be pragmatically valid, one is a source of knowledge while the other is not. See Dreyfus 1997: 317-318. It was stated above that inferential cognitions, being generic and constructed by the mind, do not directly correspond to reality. Despite this, they are a source of knowledge because they are based on real particulars and they lead to successful practical actions. On the other hand, the cognition of the light of a jewel which his mistaken for the jewel itself, despite having pragmatic value, is not a source of knowledge because it is not based on an actual jewel. Dharmottara provides a more nuanced interpretation of this
However, if false awareness states can also have pragmatic value, how can confirmatory knowledge distinguish true awareness states from false awareness states?

On the other hand, Jayanta believes that confirmatory knowledge establishes that the initial awareness state was true. For example, if I perceive water, I know that this perception is true if it quenches my thirst. However, Jayanta’s Buddhist rival has essentially hypothesized a possible world where I obtain the water but my initial awareness of that water was false. In later discussions on this topic, a Mīmāmsaka rival will also challenge Jayanta’s doctrine of extrinsic validity. In particular, the Mīmāmsaka critic argues that the doctrine of extrinsic validity would require confirmatory cognitions to have their own confirmatory cognitions ad infinitum. In response, Jayanta argues that confirmatory knowledge does not require verification. Since the practical effects we expected from an object are being experienced, why should we bother examining the truth of that experience if we entertain no doubt about it? Jayanta provides an example to clarify his point. Let’s say we see water from afar and think “This is water.” If we are thirsty, we will want to move to obtain the water. However, we also know that the water can be a mirage. Hence, we might doubt the initiate validity of our belief that what we are seeing is water. However, if we reach the water and are able to drink it, it is hard to doubt the truth of our belief that this is water as the water is quenching our thirst. Since no doubt arises in our mind there is no need examine or inquire into our belief any further.\textsuperscript{157}

\textsuperscript{157} NM (I, 447.4-447.8): \textit{saṃśayābhāvād vā tatprāmāṇyavicārābhāvāh | pravartakaṁ hi prathamaṁ udakajñānam avidyamāne ‘pi nīre mihiramarīciṣu drṣṭamiti tatra saṃśerate janāḥ | arthakriyājñānaṁ tu sālikamadhyavartināṁ}
However, Matilal argues that this is only a practical impossibility, not a logical one since we can imagine that we are dreaming, controlled by Descartes’ evil demon, or are mere brains in a vat à la Hilary Putnam. When push comes to shove, Jayanta ultimately admits that it is possible to doubt any awareness state that has not be confirmed. He also claims that in addition to confirmatory knowledge, which is based on experiencing the effects of a cognition’s object, we can determine that a cognition is true once we have examined all its causal factors and verified that they are without defect. In particular, Jayanta mentions defects connected to a) the object of a cognition, such as being a moving object or being similar to another object, b) the source of light illuminating the object, such as it being too dim, c) the mental and bodily state of the person perceiving the object, such as being too drowsy, hungry or angry, or having visual defects, such as cataracts in both eyes. Once we have demonstrated that such defects do not apply, then we have confirmed that our cognition is true.

Thus, going back to the original Buddhist objection, if we performed a thorough examination of the causes of our initial cognition of the light shining off the jewel that we mistook for the jewel itself, we might realize that the conditions that generated the object of our cognition were flawed, in particular, that the cognitive object they generated, the image of a jewel, is very similar to another cognitive object, that is, the light shining off the jewel. I’m not sure how this would work in practice, that is, how we would distinguish between the two.

\[ bhavet \text{ tadinābhūtam eva bhavaṭīti na tatra saṃśayaḥ } | \text{ tadabhāvān na tatra prāmāṇyavicāraḥ vicārasya saṃśayapūrṇvatakvaṭ } ||. \]

\[ Matilal 1986: 173. \]

\[ NM (I, 448.5-448.11): \text{ kāraṇaparīkṣāto vā tasmin prāmāṇyaṃ niśceṣaṁ } | . \text{ yathoktaṁ bhavādbhir eva prayatmenānvichchanto na ced dosam avagacchem tatrpramāṇābhāvāvāt aduṣṭam iti manvemahi iti (Varadacharya mentions that this is a quote from the Śābarabhāṣyā) } | . \text{ tathā hi viṣayasya calatasādṛśyāḍidoṣavirahah ālokaśya maḷāmasatvādikāraṇavaikalyaṁ antahkaranaśya nīrādyaḥśīṣeśātāmāvāḥ kaśtraprapādyānākulaśāvām īkṣaṇayugalasya timiroṣaḥānāvāṃkalatvamītyādis vayaṁ ca kāryadvāreṇa paropadeśena ca sarvaṁ suṣuṇām } | . \]
cognitions, however, at the very least, it might give us pause and make us aware of problematic conditions in the causal history of our cognitions. However, while Jayanta does acknowledge that examining the causal factors of our cognitions is one way to confirm the truth of our cognitions, he argues that people generally will look for confirmatory evidence instead. This is because people are generally eager to obtain the effects of an object rather than analyze its causal conditions.\footnote{NM (I, 448.16-449.1): \textit{kintu lokāḥ pravartakajñānāntaraṃ phalapṛaptiṃ prati yathā sodyamo drśyate na tathā tatkāraṇaparīkṣāṃ prati | phalajñānam evettham parīkṣyate |}. For example, if I am thirsty and I see water, my first thought is to try to relieve my thirst. Moreover, it is much easier to walk over to the water and attempt to drink it, than it is to analyze whether any of the causal factors that generated my perception of water could have been defective. Additionally, I might simply not know whether a causal defect was present whereas I would know if my perception of water was merely a mirage if the water did not quench my thirst. The important thing to highlight in this response is that, against the Buddhist claim that confirmatory evidence can be false, Jayanta thinks that unless there is some legitimate doubt about the nature of confirmatory evidence, there is no reason to reject it as verifying an initial cognition.

We will now move onto Jayanta’s response to the second main argument raised by his Buddhist rival, that is, the argument that words, not the speaker, are the main cause of false awareness-states generated through language. Jayanta’s general response is that while language might be part of the causal process that gives rise to false beliefs, it is not inherently faulty and if a statement misrepresents the facts it is the speaker who is to blame. Language reveals objects based on conventions that link words to objects. Whether language correctly links up to objects depends on the merits or flaws of the language user.
More specifically, Jayanta rejects the claim that a virtuous person can generate false awareness states by merely uttering, for example, “There are 100 elephants on the tip of my finger.” In particular, Jayanta retorts that a virtuous person would not be so capricious as to utter such an incoherent statement. In fact, a virtuous person would chastise others for uttering such absurd statements. Moreover, if a credible person were to utter such a statement, it would be for the purpose of giving an example of a nonsensical statement rather than using language to convey its primary meaning. Thus, rather than proving that credible people can use language to deceive others, this shows that in many cases, inferring the intention of the speaker is important to determining which meaning, out of multiple possible meanings, is the correct sentence meaning.

Additionally, Jayanta rejects the Buddhist claim that a deceitful individual who happens to be mute is not able to deceive others because she lacks language. Instead, Jayanta argues that such an individual can use gestures to produce false beliefs in others. Thus, the absence of false beliefs is not due to the absence of language, but rather, the absence of flaws in person.

Finally, Jayanta argues that the way we respond to deception shows that we place the blame on speakers not words. For example, if someone tells me “There are fruits by the riverbank,” and I go to the river but do not find said fruits, I would blame the speaker rather than the words that speaker used. Likewise, if I do find said fruits, I would praise the speaker, not her words, as

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161 NM (I, 417.1-417.4): yat tu āpto ’pi kam cid anusāsti mā bhavānabhūtārthaṃ vākyam vādiḥ angulikōfikarighaḥāśataṃ āste iti iti tatretikaraṇāvacchinnasya drṣṭāntatayā śabdaparatveno upādānāt pratiṣedhikaṃvākyatayā yathārtham eva |.

162 NM (I, 417.10-417.11): anuccarlitaśabdo ’pi puruṣo vipralaṁbhakaḥ | hastasaṃjñādy upāyena janayaty eva viplavam ||.
being trustworthy. Thus, in situations of verbal communication, false beliefs result from the flaws of speakers, and not the inherent nature of words themselves.\textsuperscript{163}

In responding to Jayanta’s counter-arguments, the Buddhist interlocutor switches strategies. Instead of focusing on the claim that credible people can utter falsehoods, the Buddhist interlocutor focuses on the fact that speakers, whether credible or not, merely utter words. However, after that, it's the words themselves that produce false beliefs in the mind of the recipient.\textsuperscript{164} The idea seems to be that the speaker is a mere vessel for the transmission of language but it is language itself that is responsible for falsely presenting objects. However, even if this were true, this argument doesn’t establish the Buddhist position that words, by nature, never refer to real objects. On the contrary, one would have to admit that if words alone were responsible for generating false beliefs, they also would be responsible for generating true beliefs. Jayanta retorts:

When a credible speaker utters “There are fruits by the bank of the river,” and it produces a true belief for the recipient, then this too is due to words alone since the speaker merely utters the words. Thus, it cannot be that words by nature never refer to real objects since they produce true beliefs about their objects.\textsuperscript{165}

In concluding his response to the Buddhist interlocutor, Jayanta draws an analogy between language and a lamp. This analogy is helpful in illustrating how Jayanta understands language to function. Thus, it is useful to quote it in full. Jayanta explains:

\textsuperscript{163} NM (I, 417.13-418.4): utpanne ca kvacinnadyādivākyād vijñāne taraṅgingīrīram anusārun anāśūditaphalāḥ pravṛttatābadhakapratyayāḥ puruṣam eva adhiṣṭipati dhik hā tena durātmanā vipralabdho ‘smi iti na śabdam | prāptaphalāḥ ca pumāṁsam eva śāhate sādhu sādhunā tenopadistham iti | atāḥ puṣadadośānvyānuvīdhānāt puṣadāsakṛta eva śabdād viplavaḥ na svarūpanibandhanaḥ |.

\textsuperscript{164} NM (I, 418.6-418.8): puṣasasya hi guṇavato dosavato vā śabdoccaranamātra eva vyāpārah | tataḥ paraṁ tu kāryam śabdāyattam eveti tattvarūpakṛta evāyaṁ vibhramaḥ ||.

\textsuperscript{165} NM (I, 418.9-418.11): tarhi vaktari guṇavati sati saritastire phalāmi sati iti samyakpratyaye ’pi śabdasyatva vyāpārāt puṣasasyoccāranamātre caritārthatvān naikāntataḥ śabdasyārthāsāṁsparśitvam eva svabhāvaḥ |.
Language functions like a lamp. The essence of a lamp is merely to manifest, or reveal, objects. It is not part of its essence to reveal objects correctly or incorrectly. Even if an object is revealed incorrectly, a lamp has not violated its nature since it still has illuminated the presence of an object. Likewise, the essence of language is to reveal, or point to, objects regardless of whether or not those objects are correctly presented. However, there are also differences between the way language and a lamp function. A lamp’s ability to reveal objects does not depend upon a person having learned a conventional relationship that exists between lamps and their objects. On the other hand, language’s ability to reveal objects depends on a person’s having learned the conventional rules that link words with the objects they denote. Since the function of language is merely to present objects, whether that object is presented correctly or incorrectly depends entirely on the virtues or faults of the speaker. For this reason, false awareness states will keep being produced when a person utters “There are 100 elephants on the tip of my finger.” This is because the falsity of the claim does not block the capacity of words to manifest their objects. However, this is not the fault of words.166

In this passage, Jayanta seeks to distinguish the ability of language to present objects from the fact about whether those objects have been presented correctly. In its capacity to manifest objects, language is like a lamp. If I turn on a lamp in a dark room, I perceive a number of objects that I would not have been able to perceive in the dark. However, the mode in which I see these objects can vary. I can perceive these objects in accordance with their nature or I can perceive them incorrectly due to, for example, optical illusions caused by the amount of light present, problems with my perceptual faculties, etc. Similarly, language reveals objects without concerning itself with whether such objects are revealed correctly. For example, when someone speaks, the sentences they construct present certain objects for any given hearer who is well-versed in the language employed. This occurs automatically and, in contrast to the manner in which a lamp reveals its objects, is based upon a conventional relationship between words and

166 NM (I, 418.12-419.3): yad dipavatprakāśatvamātram eva śabdasya svarūpam na yathārthatvam ayathārthatvam vā | viparite ’pi arthe dipasya prakāśatvānātivrtteḥ | ayaṁ tu viśeṣaḥ pradīpe vyutpattinirapekṣam eva prakāśatvam śabdasya tu vyutpattirapekṣam iti | prakāśātmanas tu śabdasya vaktṛguṇadośādhide yathārthetaratve | ata evaṅguliśihārdhikaraṇakarenusatavacasi bādhite ’pi punah punar uccāryamāne bhavati vibhramāḥ prakāśatvarūpānapāyāt | na tv eṣa śabdasya dosāḥ |.
objects that we as language users have learned as children. This is why even sentences we know to be false end up manifesting certain objects, albeit incorrectly.

However, when sentences misrepresent objects only the speaker is it blame. Since language is the medium through which a speaker’s beliefs are communicated, if the speaker’s beliefs are false, then the beliefs acquired by the hearer will be false. It is the speaker’s fault for not ensuring the accuracy of her own beliefs before using language to instruct others. Since words are not naturally connected to their objects, in the way that, for example, fire is connected to smoke so that wherever there is fire, there is smoke, when words produce beliefs about their objects, these beliefs will not necessarily be true. By distinguishing between the capacities of language versus the responsibilities of language-users, Jayanta has constructed an argument whereby the unintuitive Buddhist claim that words never refer to real objects is rejected while the instances where words do not reflect reality is explained by pointing to the shortcomings of individual speakers.

The Buddhist claim that language does not refer to real objects is a result of the radical dichotomy Buddhists draw between perceptual and conceptual awareness. Only perceptual awareness, which is apprehends bare particulars, can be free from error. On the other hand, conceptual awareness, which apprehends generic entities, results from our own fabricating mental processes and thus, the objects we construct do not directly correspond to mind-independent objects. However, we saw that Dignāga argued that upon confirming a speaker’s credibility, the hearer can infer the reliability of her statement and thus the fact that the objects referred to by the statement are conventionally real. This means that they were based on real particulars and have the ability to lead us to real particulars that we can act upon.

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167 The previous chapter mentioned Lackey’s rejection of this “transmission thesis” and her argument for why an unreliable believer can be a reliable testifier. See pages 34-35.
On the other hand, Dharmakīrti rejects the idea that words can ever lead to inferential knowledge about objects. Instead, he argued that from a speaker’s words we can only infer that speaker’s intention to express something. If we want to know whether that speaker’s statement is true and whether the objects referred to are conventionally real, we must use our own reasoning and perceptual powers. Thus, in a sense, a speaker’s statements become a hypothesis that needs further testing by the epistemic agent prior to possibly leading to knowledge. Aside from providing a counterintuitive account of knowledge, Dharmakīrti’s view seems to create a problem for his Buddhist tradition since, in contrast to Buddhist philosophers before him, he appears to reject the notion that Buddhist scriptures can be a source of knowledge.

The final section of this chapter will examine Dharmakīrti’s unique view on the possibility of scriptural knowledge. In highlighting the rigorous demands Dharmakīrti makes on epistemic agents, I hope to underscore Dharmakīrti’s aversion to epistemic risk and his glorification of the autonomous, self-reliant knowledge-seeker. In this next two chapters, I hope to undermine this perspective by showcasing Jayanta’s view, which presents a more subdued conception of cognitive autonomy, and an epistemic worldview that places a larger epistemic burden on our fellow-cognizers.

2.6 Dharmakīrti on Scriptural Knowledge

Dharmakīrti’s and Dignāga’s views on testimony mark a sharp contrast from previous Buddhist thinkers in the Yogācāra text tradition, who accepted testimony as an independent source of knowledge. As we saw above, Dignāga also accepted testimony, in addition to

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168 Until the end of the 5th century, intellectuals belonging to the Yogācāra text tradition, which includes Dharmakīrti and Dignāga, generally accepted three sources of knowledge: perception, inference, and testimony. For early Yogācāra authors, testimony and the other two sources of knowledge contributed equally in elaborations of Buddhist doctrinal issues. In contrast to the nature of philosophical texts after Dignāga, pre-6th century philosophical literature
perception and inference, as a source of knowledge, despite subsuming it under inference. On the other hand, Dharmakīrti rejects testimony as a source of knowledge, instead, arguing that it can only give us knowledge about a speaker’s intention to express something. Thus, no type of scripture, not even Buddhist scripture, can give us knowledge of worldly or other-worldly objects. Dharmakīrti’s unlikely position results from an important thesis in his philosophical worldview, that is, the idea that there is no relation between words and real objects, and the criticisms of his Mīmāmsaka rival, Kumārila, toward Dignāga’s partial reliability inference (ekadeśasamvādānumāna). The partial reliability inference is a type of inference whereby we can infer the reliability of a scripture’s statements on transcendent matters on the basis of the reliability of that same scripture’s statements on empirical matters. As will be seen below, Dharmakīrti also attacks this type of inference when it is used by the Naiyāyikas to establish the reliability of the Veda.\textsuperscript{169} However, in delineating his view on scripture, Dharmakīrti walks a fine line between expressing a view that is consistent with his own philosophical views but one that does not flat-out contradict Dignāga’s position, nor outright reject Buddhist scripture as authoritative.

Dharmakīrti primarily discusses his view on the epistemic status of scripture in the \textit{Pramāṇavārttika} (PV) 1. 213-117, along with his auto-commentary, the \textit{Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti}

\textsuperscript{169} See NS 2.1.68 along with the commentaries in the NBh and the NV.
The PV is a commentary on Dignāga’s PS and, as a result, Dharmakīrti is constantly referencing Dignāga’s definition of scripture. Just prior to the section where Dharmakīrti discusses the epistemic status of scripture, he speaks about different types of inferences. He has just argued that an inference based on non-perception (*anupalabdhi*) cannot establish the non-existence of supersensible object. An interlocutor who holds scripture to be an instrument of knowledge retorts that if scripture is silent about a certain object, that is proof that that object is nonexistent. Dharmakīrti criticizes this view that holds religious testimony as authoritative and argues that words are not connected with real objects. Instead, they only make known a speaker’s intention to express something. However, since this view contradicts what Dignāga said about scripture, Dharmakīrti’s interlocutor raises the following objection:

> Then how is it possible that Dignāga claimed that testimony is inference through the statement “Testimony is inference since, like inference, the words of a trustworthy person are reliable.”

Thus, Dharmakīrti needs to explain why it seems as if his own view is inconsistent with Dignāga’s view. Before examining Dharmakīrti’s interpretation and reformulation of Dignāga’s position, it will be helpful to briefly look at the context around Dignāga’s statement, which appears in PS 2.5ab.

The broader structure of PS 2.5ab concerns the distinction between two types of inferential cognitions, depending on whether the object is empirical or non-empirical. An example of the former would be the fire I infer upon seeing smoke. I am able to infer fire from smoke because I have previously experienced, on multiple occasions, that whenever there is

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170 PV 1.213: *nāntarīyakatābhāvāc chabdānānaṃ vastubhiḥ | nārthasiddhis tatas te hi vakrabhiprāyascakāḥ ||.

171 PVSV 108.1-108.2: *yat tarhi idam āptavādaavisāṃvādasāmānyād anumānatā* (PS 2.5ab) *ity āgamasya prāmāṇyam anumānatvam uktam tat kathaṃ |*. A more detailed translation is discussed below.
smoke, there is fire. An example of the second inferential cognition would be if I infer heaven on
the basis of, for example, another person’s testimony. In this case, since I have never
experienced the object, I come to know a mere concept. At this point, an interlocutor objects and
asks how a cognition whose object is a mere concept with no link to a real object can be
considered inferential knowledge. Dignāga’s response is to argue that words like “heaven,”
whose objects we have never experienced, do not express mere conceptions. Then, in PS 2.5ab,
he states:

Words referring to objects such as “heaven” are considered to be inference\textsuperscript{172} because
they are similar to inferences concerning objects we have verified since the words of a
trustworthy person are reliable.\textsuperscript{173}

Furthering explaining this verse, Dignāga writes in his auto-commentary:

Having grasped the words of a trustworthy person, that cognition of a non-empirical
object is considered an inference because it too is reliable with respect to its object.\textsuperscript{174}

The idea is that when credible people inform us about objects we have not, and possibly cannot
verify, such as transcendent objects, these objects are not mere conceptual inventions that fail to
point to real particulars. We can infer that statements made about such objects are true if we
know such statements were uttered by a trustworthy person. This is because a trustworthy
person’s statement about a transcendent object is reliable, just like that same trustworthy
person’s statement about an empirical object that we have verified.

Thus, it appears as if Dignāga is sanctioning the authority of scripture, as a form of
inference, provided it contains the testimony of a trustworthy person. However, this way of

\textsuperscript{172} Here it should be understood that words are an inference in the sense of an inferential mark.

\textsuperscript{173} PS 2.5ab: āptavādaṁvādaśāmānyād anumānātvaṁ.

\textsuperscript{174} āptavacanaṁ grhiṁvārdhāvisamvādatulyatvāt tasyānumānātatvam uktam. This is based on the reconstructed
Sanskrit in Krasser 2012: 93-94. Krasser bases his reconstruction off of two Tibetan translations of the PS(V) by
Vasudhararākṣita and Kanakavarman, along with Jinendrabuddhi’s commentary in Sanskrit.
reasoning goes against Dharmakīrti’s theory of language and in particular, the idea that words have no connection to real objects. Additionally, the inference that Dignāga utilizes mirrors the inference that Nyāya uses to legitimize scriptural authority, which Dharmakīrti, along with the Mīmāṃsaka Kumārila, criticizes. In particular, Dharmakīrti criticizes the Nyāya inference that argues for the reliability of the entire Veda, including statements it makes about transcendent, and thus unverifiable objects, based on the reliability of one of its empirical parts.

In explicating Dharmakīrti’s view of scripture, especially in light of Dignāga’s position, I want to first discuss Dharmakīrti’s arguments for why the Nyāya partial reliability inference is flawed. Afterwards I want to discuss why Dharmakīrti thinks this flaw does not apply to Dignāga’s similarly structured inference. Ultimately, Dharmakīrti argues that the Buddhist inference regarding scriptural authority is more robust than the Nyāya inference. Despite this, it is clear that Dharmakīrti’s own view is that no matter how robust the method, an individual wanting to infer the reliability of scriptural claims regarding supersensible objects on the basis of a scripture’s partial reliability will never obtain bona fide knowledge.

Dharmakīrti presents the Nyāya inference for the Veda’s overall reliability as follows:

… another person has said that just like the Vedic sentence “Fire removes cold” is true, any other one will also be true because it is part of the same Veda.\(^{175}\)

Dharmakīrti criticizes this inference which infers the reliability of the whole from the reliability of one part (ekadeśāvisamvādana) and labels it an inference “with remainder” (śeṣavatanumāna). That is, the argument based on partial reliability is inconclusive because it

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\(^{175}\) PV 1.330: ...kila īḍrśaṁ satyaṁ yathā agnih śītanodanaḥ | vākyaṁ vedaikadeśaṭvād anyyad apy aparo abravīt ||. Although this argument for Vedic authority resembles that of Nyāya, Dharmakīrti’s commentators label this opponent as another Mīmāṃsaka. See Eltschinger 2012: 18-19 n.39 and 40.
does not rule out the possibility of counterexamples, or, cases where one part of a scripture is true but other parts are false. In particular, Dharmakīrti states:

This inference is an inference with remainder just like the inference that a piece of fruit one has not tasted has the same taste as fruit one has tasted because it has the same color, and like the inference that the rice grains one has not tasted are cooked from the fact that they are in the same pot as rice grains one has tasted. Such an inference has been rejected by Dignāga because the inferential mark deviates from the property to be proven.\textsuperscript{176}

Dharmakīrti’s point is that we cannot prove that the parts of scripture we have not tested are reliable on the basis of the reliability of those parts we have tested since we don’t know whether those untested parts mirror, in their veracity, the tested parts. Similarly, we can’t assume an apple we have not tasted is like an apple we have tasted based on the mere fact that they both are red; nor can we assume that all the rice grains in a pot are cooked on the basis of tasting a few of them.

From this discussion, we can see that first, Dharmakīrti rejects the inference whereby we can infer that something is true about the whole from the fact that it is true about the part and second, Dignāga seems to have employed this type of inference in claiming that we can infer the truth of trustworthy person’s statement about transcendent objects on the basis of that same trustworthy person’s statements about empirical objects we have verified. Thus, not only does Dharmakīrti have to explain to his interlocutor how his thesis that language does not connect to real objects does not contradict Dignāga’s claims regarding scriptural authority, but additionally, he has to explain how Dignāga’s inference is not a version of the partial reliability inference that Dharmakīrti has just critiqued.

In tackling the first issue, Dharmakīrti demonstrates that his thesis does not contradict Dignāga’s statement by explaining why scripture is necessary and thus why Dignāga mentions it

\textsuperscript{176} PV 1.331: \textit{rasavat tulyarūpatvād ekabhāṅgde ca pākavat | ̃śeṣavad vyabhicāritvāt kṣiptaṃ nyāyavidā īḍrśam|}. 
at all. In defending his argument, Dharmakīrti leans on a distinction he draws between ordinary testimonial situations, which refer to mundane objects that can be confirmed through ordinary sense and reasoning faculties, and testimonial situations that refer to transcendent objects, which can never be confirmed through ordinary sensory and reasoning faculties. In approaching the second issue, Dharmakīrti argues that Dignāga’s inference is different from the Nyāya inference because the verification process Dignāga employs in confirming the reliability of a scripture is much broader in scope than the narrow verification process employed by the Naiyāyikas.

First, I want to turn to the practical issue of scripture and in particular, why Dharmakīrti thinks it is necessary. Dharmakīrti explains that the only reason Dignāga said that scripture can be a valid means of knowledge is because people cannot live without relying on scripture. In particular, Dharmakīrti argues that we find ourselves in a situation where we are told, either through scripture or other religious authorities, that engaging in certain actions leads to certain results, which are not perceptible. For example, scripture might tell us that lying, stealing, and murder lead to lower rebirths and that abstaining from these actions leads to higher rebirths. Although it might not be possible for us to confirm this, we might not observe anything that directly contradicts this being the case. If this is so, Dharmakīrti argues that, since we need to act one way or another, it is best to act according to a scripture that has been critically examined and shown to be partially reliable.177 Thus, Dharmakīrti is arguing that our reliance on scripture should only be resorted to in particular scenarios where first, we desire to attain something that is transcendent and cannot be verified, and second, nothing we observe contradicts the presence of that transcendent object. In such cases, our best bet is to rely on a critically examined scripture.

177 See in particular PVSV 108.2-108.6: na ayaṃ puruṣo anāśritya āgamaprāmāṇyam āsitum samarthah | atyaksaphalānāṃ keśāme vinyor mahānuśaṁsāpāpaśravaṇāt tadbhāve virodhādarśanāc ca | tat sati pravartitavye varam evaṃ pravrta iti parīkṣayā prāmāṇyam āha |.
Just what is a critically examined scripture? Dharmakīrti starts off by claiming that a scripture that is worthy of examination is coherent and teaches a proper human aim, as well as a suitable method for obtaining it. If scripture does not consist of these three features, then we should not bother examining it at all. Dharmakīrti then considers what reliability consists of. In PV 1. 215 and along with the PVSV, Dharmakīrti states that we must check scripture in its entirety and first confirm that anything it teaches that can be checked by perception and inference is true. Second, we must confirm that anything it teaches is not contradicted by perception and inference. Lastly, the scripture in question cannot contain any internal contradictions. This means that a scripture’s passages should be consistent with one another. For example, a scripture claiming that demerit consists in defilements, like desire and the actions that result from them, should not advocate practices such as ablutions and fire sacrifice as a means to eliminating those defilements. A scripture’s reliability consists in the fact that it has passed this three-fold test. Such a scripture can be considered reliable regarding its claims about supersensible objects because it is the same scripture that has undergone and passed a rigorous critical examination regarding matters that can be tested.

Thus, in response to the original objector, who questioned how Dignāga’s support of scripture fits in with Dharmakīrti’s thesis that words do not connect with real objects, Dharmakīrti ends up arguing that Dignāga only made such a statement because given that we

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178 PV 1. 214: sambaddhānunopāyaṃ puruṣārthābhidhāyakam | parīkṣādhiṣṭaṃ vākyam ato anadhikṣtaṃ param].

179 PV 1. 215: pratyakṣena anumānena dvividhena apy abādhakam | drṣṭādṛṣṭārthayor asya avisaṃvādas tadarthaḥyoh |

180 PVSV 109.1-109.3: āgamāpekṣānumāne api yathā rāgādirūpaṃ tatprabhavaṃ ca adharmam abhyupagamya tatprahānaḥya snānāgnihotrāder anupadesaḥ | The reason why this would result in an internal contradiction is that Buddhists like Dharmakīrti believe that physical ablutions and sacrifices cannot remove moral defilements.
need to act and given that scripture is our only means for possibly obtaining supersensible objects, it is best to act on the basis of a scripture that has been critically examined. This is why Dignāga stated that we can infer that scriptural statements regarding transcendent objects are true because they belong to the same scripture whose reliability on empirical matters we have confirmed. And even though this inference does not amount to genuine knowledge, it is accepted because otherwise we would not be able to act with regard to transcendent objects. Thus, acting on the basis of a scripture that has been critically examined raises the probability of success even if it does not ensure it.

After this explanation, Dharmakīrti provides a second, less demanding process through which we can confirm that scripture is reliable with respect to transcendent matters. Instead of having to confirm the truth of all empirical claims in a scripture, ensure that there are no internal inconsistencies, and verify that nothing scripture says contradicts perception and inference, we can infer that scripture is reliable with respect to transcendent matters on the basis of its reliability with regard to its principal teachings. This is because what we ought to attain or abandon, as well as the means for doing so, is well established by this teaching. For example, Dharmakīrti explains that since the principal teaching of Buddhist scriptures - the Four Noble Truths - is well established, we can then infer that other statements in Buddhist scriptures are reliable. It is unclear why Dharmakīrti provides a second interpretation of Dignāga’s PS 2.5ab and whether the second interpretation is meant to supplement or replace the first one. I see nothing in Dignāga’s statement on scripture that makes it necessary to test a scripture in all its

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181 PV 1. 216: āptavādāvisamvādasāmānyād anumānatā | buddher agatyā abhihitā parokṣe apy asya gocare |. For various ways this verse has been translated see Krasser: 2012.

182 PV 1.217: heyopādayatattvasya sopāyasya prasiddhitah | pradhānārthāvisamvādād anumānam paratra vā |.

183 Dharmakīrti argues for this in PV 2.
empirical matters before being able to infer its reliability with regard to transcendent matters. This would be a rather demanding definition of scriptural reliability that few would be able to meet. It seems that by directly referencing the Four Noble Truths, Dharmakīrti puts forth this second interpretation to make it easier for his fellow Buddhists to argue for the reliability of Buddhist texts.

Regardless, of which inference one uses, the fact that scripture could be a type of inference still contradicts Dharmakīrti’s thesis that words cannot refer to real objects. However, in order to avoid this outcome, Dharmakīrti concludes this discussion in the following manner:

Thus, Dignāga’s claim that scripture is an inference has been explained in these two ways because there is no other way to proceed. Dignāga was thinking “Since one has to act on the basis of scripture, it is best to act on the basis of scripture that has been critically examined.” However, such an inference is not without its problems since words are not invariably connected with objects. This was already pointed out.\[184\]

Thus, in explaining Dignāga’s theory that scripture is a type of inference, Dharmakīrti did his best not to contradict Dignāga’s words while still remaining faithful to his (Dharmakīrti’s) theory of language. Despite admitting that an inference of this nature is still problematic, Dharmakīrti claims that we have no other option in terms of acting with respect to transcendent objects so we might as well act on the basis of a scripture that has been closely vetted rather than on the basis of a scripture we uncritically accept.

However, not all scriptural traditions are equally valid. We saw this earlier when Dharmakīrti rejected the Nyāya inference attempting to legitimize Vedic scripture. In particular, the Nyāya inference claims that we can confirm the reliability of the whole Veda, including those parts that bear on supersensible matters, by confirming the reliability of one of its parts that bears

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\[184\] PVSV 109.19-109.22: \textit{tad etad agatyā ubhayathā apy anumānatvam āgamasya upavarnitam | varam āgamāt pravṛttāv evaṁ pravṛttir iti | na khalv evam anumānām anapāyam anāntarīyakatvād artheṣu śabdānām iti niveditam etat |}.

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on empirical matters. The problem with this inference is that it fails to rule out counterexamples, or, the possibility that certain parts of the Veda are true while other parts are false. However, as we just saw, this type of inference based on partial reliability was employed by Dignāga, and supported by Dharmakīrti, because, according to Dharmakīrti, people cannot live without religion so acting on the basis of a partially reliable scripture is better than acting blindly. So why does Dharmakīrti reject the Nyāya inference?

Dharmakīrti argues that while both Dignāga and his Nyāya rival utilize the partial reliability inference, the verification procedures they use are very different. In particular, while the Buddhist inference requires one to test all empirical matters referred to in a scripture, the Nyāya inference restricts it to one trivial case. Dharmakīrti explains:

And this description of scripture as inference has been stated by us as well. However, our inference based on partial reliability is valid if and only if one has purified that scripture with respect to what it affirms and what it denies through perception and inference for each and every object capable of being examined. Even though there is no invariable connection between words and objects, it is better to act with respect to uncertain scriptural statements in a scripture that has been confirmed as partially reliable because then they also have the potential to be reliable. But alternatively, a person who has observed that scriptural statements conflict with perception and inference should not act on the basis of that scripture. However, our opponent, having pointed out that the truth of a Vedic statement claiming that fire, an ordinary object, is capable of eliminating cold, infers that all statements in the Veda are true, even though the Veda is mostly false since its statements are contradicted by perception and inference even with respect to empirical objects.  

Here Dharmakīrti is arguing that one only has the right to infer a scripture’s reliability with respect to supersensible matters if one first verifies that all its empirical claims are true. And even then, although the epistemic status of that scripture is still doubtful, it has the potential to be

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185 PVSV 173.26-174.06: uktam ca idam āgamalākṣaṇam asmābhiḥ tat tu sarvasya śakyavicārasya viṣayasya yathāsvam pramāṇena vidhipratisedhaviśuddhau nāntarāyakatva-abhāve api śabdānām arthesu varam samśayitasya vṛttih tatra kadācid avisamvāda-sambhavāt na tv anyatra dhṛtāpramāṇoparodhāsya pruṣāsya pravṛttir iti | yah punah prākṛtaviṣayasya vahneḥ śītaprathītāsāmarthyasya abhidhānam satyārtham upadarṣya sarvam satyārtham āha śāstraṃ śakyaparicchede api viṣaye pramāṇavirodhād bahutaram ayuktam api |.
reliable regarding supersensible claims given its reliability on all other matters. However, Dharmakīrti claims that his rival offers an inference that establishes the Veda’s reliability on the basis of one mere trivial example, for example, the statement that fire removes cold.\textsuperscript{186} Dharmakīrti rejects this method of verification since, by merely requiring the subject to confirm one example of truth, the Nyāya inference ignores all other instances where its scripture is false.

On the other hand, Dharmakīrti argues that the Buddhist method is more rigorous and comprehensive, since it requires more tests to be conducted so that all empirical claims a scripture makes are true and nothing a scripture states contradicts what we already know. However, this raises the additional question regarding the practicality of the Buddhist method. Did Dharmakīrti honestly expect all individuals to verify the reliability of a scripture in this manner? This time-consuming method actually ends up preventing the very thing Dharmakīrti believes it will enable: action. I think Dharmakīrti was well aware of this since he provides a second, much less demanding interpretation of Dignāga’s statement on the reliability of scripture. Interestingly, Dharmakīrti does not mention this alternative strategy when criticizing the Nyāya inference. It is easy to see why. Inferring a text’s reliability on the basis of the reliability of its principal teaching comes dangerously close to the Nyāya inference he criticizes for just relying on one example.

One could conjecture that Dharmakīrti provided these two methods for inferring a scripture’s reliability depending on the audience. The more rigorous method which invokes the three-fold test\textsuperscript{187} is applied to rival scripture, whereas the less demanding method, whereby a

\textsuperscript{186} This example is cited in the NV \textit{ad NS} 2.1.61.

\textsuperscript{187} We can infer a scripture’s reliability provided: 1) everything it states that can be checked by perception or inference is true, 2) nothing it states can be contradicted by perception and inference, and 3) there are no internal inconsistencies.
scripture’s overall reliability is inferred from its principal teaching, is applied to Buddhist scripture. Despite whether or not this is correct, it seems clear that Dharmakīrti recognized the difficulty in squaring the authority of Buddhist scripture with his own theory on the nature of language and reality. One the one hand, he acknowledges that scripture is the only way most people can catch a glimpse into the supersensible, but on the other hand, the words of others, even supposed scriptural authorities, do not link up with reality and, as a result, the best we can do is rely on a problematic inference that does not amount to bona fide knowledge.

The next chapter will discuss Jayanta’s specific analysis of religious testimony and in particular, how it is different from mundane testimony, or testimony regarding ordinary objects. It will also specifically look at Jayanta’s arguments for why the Veda is reliable. While Jayanta does mention the partial reliability inference, he, aware of the criticisms surrounding it, opts to focus on other marks of reliability, in particular, the consensus of exemplary people. Before turning to that topic, I want to first set up this discussion by looking at Dharmakīrti’s arguments for why we cannot use a person’s trustworthiness to secure the truth of that person’s statements. In particular, Dharmakīrti argues that it is nearly impossible to tell whether a person is trustworthy. This is because being trustworthy results from virtuous mental qualities that we cannot directly perceive, infer from behavior, or infer based on past instances of credibility.

After Dharmakīrti presents his two methods for determining how we can infer a scripture’s overall reliability, he argues against rival theories that claim that we can infer a scripture’s reliability on the basis of the trustworthiness of divine or human religious authorities. The inferences criticized by Dharmakīrti and the inference we saw him present above are distinguished based on what they take to be the inferential mark: the reliability of scripture or the reliability of an author. According to Dharmakīrti, we can infer the reliability of those parts of
scripture that refer to supersensible objects on the basis of that scripture’s reliability with regard to its empirical claims. According to Dharmakīrti’s Nyāya rivals, we can infer the reliability of those parts of scripture that refer to supersensible objects if we confirm the reliability of other parts of that scripture that make empirical claims and, on that basis, affirm the credibility of that scripture’s author. Once the author is ascertained as trustworthy, we can then infer that the parts of that scripture we have not tested are also reliable, since they were authored by the same trustworthy person.

However, Dharmakīrti argues that it is nearly impossible to ascertain an individual’s trustworthiness. In particular, he argues:

People engage in truthful or deceitful actions based on virtues or flaws, which are mental properties. Those mental properties, which are supersensible, would have to be inferred on the basis of bodily and verbal actions that originate from them. But these actions, for the most part, are able to be performed intentionally and in a manner that belies their true intentions. This is because people can perform those actions at will and according to different motives.\(^{188}\)

Thus, Dharmakīrti’s argument is that, while people can be trustworthy, it is extremely difficult to know whether a person is being trustworthy since it is nearly impossible to perceive or infer a person’s mental attributes. We might think we can infer a person’s trustworthiness based on their verbal and bodily cues, however, Dharmakīrti points out that people can easily manufacture these cues based on various motives. Thus, the inferential mark in such an inference would be deviating since it appears with both the property we wish to prove, that is, trustworthiness, and the opposite property, that is, untrustworthiness. However, one might retort that we can infer a person’s trustworthiness on a particular occasion based, not on present bodily and vocal cues, but

\(^{188}\) PVSV 110.11- 110.14: caitasyebhyo hi guṇadoṣebhyāḥ puruṣāḥ samyakmīthya pravrtaḥ te ca atīndriyāḥ svaprabhavakāyāvāgyavahārānumeyāḥ syuḥ | vyavahārāḥ ca prāyasāuddhīpūrvam anyathā api kartuṣaṃ sakyante puruṣecchāvṛttitvāt teṣām ca citrābhisandhitvāt |.
rather, on that person’s trustworthiness on past occasions. Dharmakīrti also rejects this proposal, saying:

Just because we have experienced a person being trustworthy at one time, does not mean that that person is always trustworthy. This is because we have seen people who are trustworthy in certain situations, err in other situations and because there is no invariable connection between the verbal activity of a person and the truth.189

Thus, just as bodily and verbal cues do not serve as inferential markers of trustworthiness, neither can a person’s past reliability. This is because first, people can be trustworthy in one situation and lie, or err, in other situations, and second, there is no invariable connection between words and reality. Thus, rejecting the thesis of his Nyāya rivals, Dharmakīrti argues that we cannot rely on the trustworthiness of others to secure the reliability of scripture. In the next two chapters we will look at Jayanta’s arguments for why we can, and oftentimes, need to, rely on others for knowledge.

There are a few important takeaways from this excursion into Dharmakīrti’s view on scripture. First, as we just saw, Dharmakīrti rejects the view of his Nyāya rivals which claims that we can infer the overall reliability of a scripture on the basis of it being authored by a trustworthy person whose reliability in other matters has been confirmed. While he doesn’t reject the fact that trustworthy individuals exist, Dharmakīrti rejects that we can know, through a valid means of knowledge, that a person is trustworthy. Second, despite appearing to uphold Dignāga’s definition of scripture as a form of inference, Dharmakīrti rejects testimony as a source of knowledge because words are not connected to real objects. Third, Dharmakīrti argues that we can only infer the reliability of a scripture’s claims about transcendent objects once we have verified the reliability of that scripture’s claims regarding empirical objects, or, once we...

189 PVSV 167.25-168.1: na hi kvacid askhalita iti sarvam tathā vyabhicāradarśanāt tatpravṛtte avisaṁvādena vyāpyasiṣiddheś ca |
have verified the reliability of that scripture’s principal teaching. Lastly, despite this concession to Dignāga, Dharmakīrti ultimately believes that this inference is faulty, does not amount to true knowledge, and is only resorted to because, if we want to act effectively in an attempt to reach our religious goals, we have no other option. Thus, in remarkable contrast to Dignāga’s claim that scripture is inference, Dharmakīrti states:

   This definition of scripture is accepted because we have no other recourse. There is no verification of supersensible things from scripture and this is why we also said that scripture is not a source of knowledge.\textsuperscript{190}

2.7 Conclusion

This chapter focused on one of the central questions in the epistemology of testimony: whether testimony is an independent source of knowledge or whether it is reducible to inference. In particular, it focused on two Buddhist inferential reconstructions of testimony and Jayanta’s counter-responses. Before discussing the various Buddhist reductions of testimony, this chapter first examined the Buddhist theory of exclusion (\textit{apoha}) and its role in explaining why testimony is not an independent source of knowledge. More specifically, the theory of exclusion helped explain that while words were inferential marks of their meanings, which are their exclusions or mentally-constructed objects, these objects, being generic entities, do not correspond to mind-independent reality. According to Dignāga, in order to know that such objects are based upon, and point to, real objects, we must confirm that the speaker is trustworthy. On the other hand, Dharmakīrti argued that since words do not connect with reality, the only thing we can infer from a speaker’s report is that speaker’s desire to express something.

\textsuperscript{190} PVSV 168.01-168.02: \textit{agatyā ca idam āgamalakṣaṇam iṣṭam | na ato niścayaḥ | tan na pramāṇam āgama ity apy uktam |}.
Against these positions Jayanta argues why, despite the fact that these inferences work, the end result is not what he has been referring to as testimonial knowledge. In particular, Jayanta argues that rather than establishing knowledge of the object of the sentence, Dignāga’s inference confirms the fact that we do indeed have knowledge of the object and Dharmakīrti’s inference establishes the speaker’s intention. Against Dignāga’s inferential reduction, Jayanta argued that, as per Nyāya’s bivalent epistemology, knowledge of knowledge is not required for knowledge simpliciter. Thus, confirming the truth of our testimonial belief by demonstrating that the speaker is trustworthy, while necessary for reflective knowledge, is not necessary for first order testimonial knowledge.

Against Dharmakīrti’s inferential reduction, Jayanta retorts that unless Dharmakīrti is arguing that all we infer is that there is some speaker who desires to express something, where that something is not known, the only way we could know that the speaker intends to inform us about certain objects is if that speaker’s statements first signified those objects. It is only after words signify their objects, that they can then become inferential marks for knowing the speaker’s intentions. Moreover, Jayanta argued against Dharmakīrti’s thesis that words are disconnected from reality. In particular, Jayanta argued that in cases where words appear to misrepresent reality, this is either the fault of the speaker or the result of the instrument of knowledge not functioning properly. For example, since the function of words is merely to present the object it has been associated with conventionally, the responsibility of ensuring that words link up with their objects in reality is the job of the language-user. If words fail to correctly present reality, this is the fault of the speaker. Additionally, in cases where the speaker appears to have used language properly, the testimonial mechanism might not have been functioning correctly, such was when, for example, the same word is associated with different
objects and the recipient misconstrues the intention of the speaker. This also happens with perception, for example, when we experience perceptual illusions, but we would never discount perception as a source of knowledge because of it.

Toward the end of this chapter we saw that Dharmakīrti, despite arguing that testimony is not a source of knowledge, allowed some flexibility for religious testimony. In particular, he argued that we can “infer” the truth of religious claims about supersensible objects on the basis of a partially reliable scripture because we have no other means available to us if we desire to obtain the supersensible objects and ends mentioned in scripture. However, these scriptural beliefs, if true, are not considered bona fide knowledge since they are not fully justified. That is, all we can infer on the basis of a critically examined scripture is that there is a higher chance that claims we have not tested will be true. Moreover, Dharmakīrti also distinguished the Buddhist partial reliability inference from the one put forth by Nyāya. In particular, Dharmakīrti argued that the Nyāya inference bases the Veda’s partial reliability on trivial instances while ignoring all other false statements. On the other hand, the Buddhist partial reliability inference requires the epistemic agent to conduct a thorough investigation of all empirical claims a scripture makes.

The next two chapters will look at Jayanta’s view on the epistemic status of religious testimony. In particular, chapter three will focus on the authority of Vedic scripture while chapter four will focus on the authority of scriptures external to Veda. After distinguishing religious testimony from mundane testimony, Jayanta argues that religious testimony requires extra justification in the form of reflective knowledge. As we saw earlier, this was not required for mundane cases of testimony. However, given that the stakes are higher in cases of religious testimony, Jayanta argues that the level of acceptable epistemic risk for religious testimonial belief is lower. This discussion raises an important question: Do different testimonial scenarios
have different levels of acceptable epistemic risk and thus different justificatory conditions? For example, am I required to do the same amount of epistemic work upon hearing a politician’s speech versus hearing a doctor’s diagnosis? If different testimonial scenarios require different degrees of epistemic work to be done why is this the case? The next chapter will look at the particular case of religious testimony and why scriptural beliefs require more justification than ordinary testimonial beliefs.
Chapter 3: Religious Testimony

3.0 Introduction

In the last chapter, we saw that reductionists such as Dignāga and Dharmakīrti argued that testimony is not an independent source of knowledge and should be understood in terms the epistemic principles governing inferential reasoning. On the other hand, nonreductionists like Jayanta argued that testimony is an independent and epistemically distinctive source of knowledge that cannot be reduced to the epistemic principles associated with inferential reasoning. One issue that might complicate this neat distinction between reductionism and nonreductionism is whether all cases of testimonial knowledge are epistemically homogenous, thereby meriting the same sort of epistemic treatment. Evidence that not all cases of testimonial knowledge merit the same treatment was seen in Fricker’s reductionist account of testimonial knowledge, where certain contexts, reports, and speakers were depicted as more reliable than others, for example, when friends talk about what they had for dinner the night before.\(^\text{191}\)

Greco also rejects a single account of testimonial knowledge and argues that different testimonial interactions place different demands on hearers. In particular, Greco argues that in cases where there is a distinctive social dimension to testimonial exchanges, such as the parent-child or teacher-student relationship, testimony does not reduce to inference. This is because there exist social institutions and social roles that underwrite the reliable transfer of knowledge. On other hand, in cases where no such social mechanism exists, such as cases involving an investigator interviewing a potential witness to a crime, testimony requires inductive evidence and is thus reducible to inference.\(^\text{192}\) As a result, sometimes testimonial knowledge requires a

\(^{191}\) See page 71 above.

\(^{192}\) Greco 2012a and 2012b.
hearer to have extensive inductive evidence and other times, none at all. The thinking is that certain types of testimonial exchanges tend to be more reliable than others, whether this is because there is a social mechanism in place that secures reliability or perhaps there are certain topics about which people are almost never wrong. In such cases, the hearer can acquire knowledge without first gathering inductive evidence about the speaker.

Jayanta also argues that different cases of testimony merit different epistemic treatment. In particular, he argues that certain testimonial beliefs, specifically beliefs acquired from religious testimony, require a higher level of justification. Jayanta’s reasoning for why certain testimonial contexts require a higher level of evidence depends on the link he draws between epistemology and practical reasoning. Because scriptural and other testimonially-based religious beliefs are riskier than mundane testimonial beliefs, we are required to perform more epistemic work and obtain greater justification for them than for beliefs we hold that carry less risk. In particular, Jayanta argues that since Vedic scripture enjoins us to perform costly sacrifices that require much hard work and exertion, beliefs based on the Veda, if wrong, are costlier to us. In such cases, the mere absence of doubt or contradictory evidence is not enough to vindicate testimonial belief, rather, one must have positive evidence of its reliability, that is, we must have confirmatory, or reflective, knowledge.

Jayanta’s view shares some important similarities with contemporary theories of pragmatic encroachment in epistemology, or, the thesis that practical factors are relevant for determining whether an individual has knowledge. In this first part of this chapter, I discuss the dichotomy Jayanta draws between religious and mundane testimony as well as look at how practical factors and stakes-based considerations might factor into whether or not an agent has knowledge or requires a higher level of justification for her belief. The second half of the chapter
then turns to at Jayanta’s analysis and defense of the reliability of Vedic scripture. In particular, I look at three different arguments Jayanta employs to establish the reliability of Vedic scripture: proof of God’s existence, partial reliability of the Veda through empirical tests, and the consensus of exemplary people. Jayanta’s demonstration of God is similar to the cosmological and design arguments for God’s existence.\textsuperscript{193} In attempting to prove God’s existence, along with his extraordinary attributes, Jayanta aims to show that the Veda has a trustworthy author and is therefore reliable. There has already been much good work on the Nyāya proof of God and, as the proof primarily focuses on the nature and structure of inference, I will not spend time discussing this argument.\textsuperscript{194} Instead, I will primarily focus on the second and third argument.

The second argument Jayanta delineates is similar to Dharmakīrti’s partial reliability inference, whereby one can infer the truth of scriptural statements regarding transcendent objects based on the truth of scriptural statements regarding empirical objects. However, there is an important distinction. Jayanta argues that we are able to infer the reliability of scriptural statements regarding transcendent objects if we have evidence that such a scripture was composed by a trustworthy person. On the other hand, Dharmakīrti argued for the possible reliability of scriptural statements regarding transcendent objects on the basis of that scripture’s reliability with regard to empirical objects, not because of evidence regarding the author’s credibility. The difference here is important since on Jayanta’s view, the epistemic burden is primarily placed on the author of a text. Thus, once the author’s credibility is established, the epistemic agent need not continue assessing the text for reliability.

\textsuperscript{193} See Patil 2009: 57-58.

\textsuperscript{194} For an examination of some of the core Nyāya arguments on the nature and existence of God, along with rival counter-arguments, see Patil 2009: chapters 2 and 3 and Dasti 2011.
On the other hand, on Dharmakīrti view, the epistemic burden in solely placed on the epistemic agent who must assess the reliability of all scriptural statements regarding empirical objects rather than share that burden with the author. Moreover, as will be seen, Jayanta’s Mīmāṃsā rivals also object to Jayanta’s partial reliability inference and in particular, to Jayanta’s claim that statements are true because they authored by a credible person. Instead, Jayanta’s Mīmāṃsā interlocutor argues that it is impossible to know whether Vedic scripture was authored by a trustworthy person and instead, statements are true because they accord with the facts. Interestingly, Mīmāṃsakas like Kumārila, while upholding Vedic testimony, were often dismissive of human testimony, believing that people are mostly dishonest.¹⁹⁵ This is why the Mīmāṃsakas are reluctant to rely on a generic property of trustworthiness, which not only is hard to find in humans, but moreover, is not able to be perceived in an invisible author that is associated with a text.

Lastly, when assessing the epistemic status of scripture outside the Veda, Jayanta mentions another criterion for how one can assess that a scripture is reliable, the consensus of exemplary people. More specifically, Jayanta argues that a text is reliable if it is accepted by “great” or “exemplary” people. The reasoning behind this principle is that people who we consider to be epistemic, religious, and moral authorities are better at arriving at the truth in these domains than we are. Thus, we can infer a text is reliable if such authorities accept it. This raises the question regarding who exactly counts as an epistemic authority. As will be seen in the next chapter, while Jayanta initially restricts the definition of an exemplary person to only include those individuals within his own Vedic tradition, he later enlarges this scope to include authorities within different religious traditions.

¹⁹⁵ ŚV Āśīrśeṣa 144ab: sarvadā cāpi puruṣāḥ prāyeṇāṅtarvādinah
3.1 Mundane versus Religious Testimony

Jayanta first introduces the distinction between mundane testimony and religious testimony in the introduction to the NM. After his initial benedictory verses, Jayanta presents the subject matter of his text, draws the connection between his text and the subject matter, delineates the appropriate audience for his text, and explains how the instruction provided in his text helps realize a specific goal. In the Indian scholarly tradition, there are four marks that make for a good beginning to an instructive text (śāstra): a clearly defined subject matter (viṣaya), a relation between the text and the subject matter (sambandha), an appropriate audience for the text (adhikarin), and a realizable goal implicit in a text’s instructions (prayojana). In ticking off these marks, Jayanta begins by delineating two different types of goals that people have and the two distinct means for obtaining those respective goals. Knowing the connection between our goals and how to obtain those goals is important. This is because, as Jayanta claims, prudent people know that the only sure way to obtain their goals is by knowing the right means to those goals. As a result, they first seek after a suitable means.

Jayanta explains that there are two different types of goals or ends, those that are perceptible and those that are imperceptible, and, as a result, there are two different types of means to match these distinct types of goals. Food is an example of something perceptible we desire to obtain. We learn the means to obtaining food by observing the behavior of more experienced people or through trial and error. For example, we learn what types of things are...

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196 Gerow 2008: ix.

197 NM (I, 4.9-4.11): iha preksāpūrvavakārināḥ purusārthasampadam abhivāṇchantaḥ tatsādhanādīhigamopāyam antareṇa tadavāptin amanyamānāḥ tadupāyāvagamanimittam eva prathamam anveṣante |
edible through watching what other people eat or, we might accidentally eat something that is not edible and learn that it is not food. These objects we seek are perceptible because we directly experience them. In order to obtain them, we only need to rely on our ordinary reasoning and sensory abilities. We would not turn to scripture in order attain such mundane objects.\(^{198}\) However, when it comes to knowing the means to obtaining imperceptible objects we desire, such as heaven and liberation, Jayanta argues that religious testimony is the only means available to ordinary people. While advanced spiritual practitioners and sages, through intense meditation, are able to directly perceive the nature of and means to obtaining supersensible objects, ordinary people, whose vision is marred by innate delusion, can only resort to scripture.\(^{199}\)

Thus, the first distinction Jayanta makes between ordinary and religious testimony is the nature of their objects. While ordinary testimony, along with perception and inference, is concerned with mundane objects that are often easily verified, religious objects or ends, such as heaven and liberation, are inaccessible through the ordinary sources of knowledge. If we truly desire to obtain such objects, then, as we saw Dharmakīrti argue in the last chapter, scripture is our only means. Jayanta divides scripture (\textit{śāstra}), conceived of broadly as any branch of learning that helps us attain ultimate ends,\(^ {200}\) into fourteen branches: the four Vedas, the six auxiliary Vedic works (grammar, astronomy, phonetics, ritual instructions, prosody and etymology), the \textit{dharmaśāstras} (law books), the \textit{pūrāṇas} and \textit{itiḥāsa} (narratives), the Mīmāṃsā

\(^{198}\) NM (I, 4.11-4.13) \textit{dṛṣṭādṛṣṭabhedena ca dvividhaḥ puruṣārthasya panthāḥ | tatra dṛṣṭe viśaye suciraprārūḍhavṛddhavahārasiddhānvyatirekādhiṣṭigataśādhanabhāve bhojanādāv anapekṣitaśāstrasya eva bhavaṁ pravrūṭtiḥ.}

\(^{199}\) NM (I, 4.15-4.18): \textit{adrśte tu svargāpavargamātre naisargikamohāndhatamasaviluptālokasya lokasya śāstram eva prakāṣāḥ | tad eva sakalasadupāyadarśane divyam caksur asmadādeḥ na yoginām iva yogasamādhijñāṇādyupāyāntaram api iti | tasmād asmadādeḥ śāstram eva adhigantavyam ||}

\(^{200}\) NM (I, 7.14-8.1): \textit{vidyāsthānatvaṁ nāma caturdaśānāṃ śāstrānāṃ puruṣārthasādhanajñopāyatvam evocyate | vedanāṃ vidyā taccu na ghaṭādheidanāṃ api tu puruṣārthasādhanavedanaṃ vidyāyāḥ sthānāṃ aśrayaḥ upāya ity arthaḥ |.
literature, and the Nyāya literature. While the Veda directly provides instructions on how to achieve the sumnum bonum of human life, the other branches work in service of the Veda, helping to elaborate, interpret, or prove Vedic claims. However, Jayanta claims Nyāya literature supports the foundation of the all fourteen branches of knowledge since it establishes the authority of the Veda. This is a critical task since the authority of the Veda is discredited by bad philosophers and their fallacious reasoning. As a result of the criticisms levied at the Veda, why would any prudent person, whose confidence has been shaken, want to carry out what the Veda teaches, which requires great effort and wealth?

Here Jayanta outlines one of the most important tasks of Nyāya philosophy: to defend Vedic scripture against the unfair attacks of rival traditions. He specifically argues that only Nyāya is up to this task. He quickly dismisses the system of logic (tarka) of other text traditions such as the Sāṅkhyists, Jainas, and in particular, the Buddhists and the Cārvākas (materialists). He argues that these systems are not capable of defending the Veda and some of them even contradict the Veda. On the other hand, the logic of the Vaiśeṣikas is included with Nyāya logic since it is very similar. Lastly, while Jayanta includes Mīmāṃsā as one of the fourteen branches of knowledge, he argues that its principle task is interpreting the Veda rather than defending its truth. In fact, he criticizes the Mīmāṃsā method of defending the truth of the Veda. Briefly stated, Mīmāṃsakas argue that cognitions are intrinsically valid (or true “of

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201 In delineating the 14 branches of knowledge, Jayanta quotes from the Yājñavalkya Smṛti (Book 1, verse 3). See NM (1, 8.5-8.6): purānatarkamīmāṃsādharmaśāstrāṅgamsirītāḥ | vedāḥ sthānāni vidyānāṁ dharmasya ca caturāsā iti |

202 NM (1, 7.6-7.9): nyāyavistarastu mūlastambhabhūtaḥ sarvavidhyānāṁ vedapramāṇyarakṣāhetuḥ | vedēsu hi dustārkikaracitakutarkaviplāvitapramāṇesu sīthiliśtāsthāḥ katham īva bahuvittavyāyyāśādhyāṁ vedārthānuṣṭhānam ādriyeran sādhavaḥ |

203 Jayanta is primarily referring to inference (anumāna), which is used to confirm the truth of perceptual and testimonial beliefs.
themselves”) unless they are contradicted by another cognition or known to have a defective cause. According to the Mīmāṃsakas, the Veda can have neither of these two flaws since first, the Veda is the only source of knowledge that deals with dharma and thus it, cannot be contradicted by another source of knowledge, and second, the Veda, being eternal and authorless, lacks any defect in its cause.

While Jayanta criticizes this argument on many grounds, this discussion is beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, the point I want to stress is that Jayanta believes that no source of knowledge, including perception, is conclusive unless it is corroborated by an external proof. Regarding testimony, this means that we only know our testimonial beliefs are true if we have confirmed them ourselves through experiencing the effects of the object (such as if we find the basket of fruits by the riverbank) or, if we are unable to, or simply do not want to directly confirm the belief ourselves, we can confirm it by verifying that the speaker is trustworthy. This notion that we need an additional cognition to know that we have knowledge is the Nyāya doctrine of extrinsic validity, which was mentioned briefly in the last chapter. By criticizing the Mīmāṃsā doctrine of intrinsic validity right from the start of his text, Jayanta demonstrates to the reader that first, the Veda needs defending since its authority is being

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204 According to Kumārila, Jayanta’s primary Mīmāṃsaka opponent, dharma consists of the materials, qualities and actions known through Vedic injunctions which lead to the supreme end, heaven. See ŚV codanā 191: śreya hi puruṣapātih sā dravyagunakarmabhiḥ | codanālakṣaṇābhī sādhyaḥ tasmātīṣyeva dharmatā ||. Moreover, since dharma is future (since it concerns an action’s link to a future end), it cannot be known through the other instruments of knowledge. See ŚV codanā 115: bhaviṣyatāḥ na drṣṭaṃ ca prayākṣāsyas ātman ṛga ṛgasya manāgapi | sāmarthyāṃ nānumānāder lingādirahite kvacit ||.

205 See also Taber 1992 regarding the doctrine of intrinsic validity and in particular, how it was used to defend the authority of the Veda.

206 NM (I, 10.7-10.9): na hi pramāṇāntarasamaṁvādādārydhyaḥ antaraṇaḥ prayākṣādīṇy api pramāṇabhāvaḥ bhajante kumuta tadadāhāvītāt eṣa śabdaḥ.
attacked by many rival traditions, and second, only the Nyāya text tradition of capable of adequately defending the Veda.

From this discussion, a second difference emerges between religious testimony and mundane testimony. The Veda needs defending since no reasonable person would abide by its injunctions while its truth has not been confirmed. The idea is that, in comparison to ordinary testimonial beliefs, Vedic beliefs require a higher level of proof since we risk losing a lot if these beliefs are false. This notion is underscored a couple of pages later, when Jayanta distinguishes a religious practitioner performing Vedic rituals on the basis of Vedic testimony and a student studying a text on the basis of the initial statements of that text, which declare its subject matter and purpose. Regarding the latter, Jayanta claims that all instructional texts should begin with a statement of their subject matter and purpose since people would not begin studying a text if they lacked knowledge about these two items.

However, an interlocutor objects and questions how we know from merely reading the initial statements of a text, regarding the text’s subject matter and purpose, that such statements are indeed true. Do we know from just reading those statements? Or do we know from a certain type of argument? It seems as if we could never know whether a text actually accomplishes what it says it will accomplish unless we first read the entire text. However, if Jayanta wants to argue that it is reasonable to commence studying a text from a position of doubt regarding that text’s purpose, then similarly, we should be able to engage in Vedic rituals prior to confirming the Veda’s reliability.²⁰⁷

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²⁰⁷ NM (I, 13.15-14.5): nanu prayojanaparijñānam ādau śrotṛṇāṃ kutastyām iti cintyam kim asmād eva vākyāt uta yuktītah vākyaṃ tāvad anīścitapramāṇāṃ kathāṃ prayojananiścayāya prabhavati | saṃsāyād vā pravṛttau vedārthe ‘pi tathaiva syād iti śāstram anārabdhavyaṃ syāt || yuktītah prayojanāvagamaḥ śāstre sarvasminndhāte sati sambhavati netaratheti.
Jayanta’s response to this objection contrasts the risks involved in commencing the study of an ordinary text, for example, a text on political science, and performing difficult and costly religious rituals. When a student reads the first sentence of a political science text, she comes to know the purpose of the text. Moreover, she begins studying the text because there is the possibility of a worthy goal, for example, learning about the subject matter. On the other hand, if the truth of the Veda is not initially established, performing ritual actions on its basis, which require undergoing many difficulties, is not reasonable because there is the possibility that the endeavor is worthless. The contrast here is between undertaking an action which is easily accomplished and requires little effort and expenditure, and undertaking an action which is very difficult, time-consuming, and costly.

Regarding the study of an ordinary text, prudent people know within several days, by merely reading the text, whether the text is useful or not. In such cases, it is not rational to scrutinize every claim because otherwise no one would start studying a text. For example, if a student wasn’t sure whether a book’s introductory section on its subject matter and purpose were true, and as a result, decided against reading the book, there is a good chance the student would end up losing a lot of knowledge. This is why in the last chapter Jayanta argued that it is reasonable to act on the basis of testimony even if we have not first determined that the speaker is trustworthy. Unless the recipient of testimony has concrete doubts or defeaters to her testimonial belief, she can take her belief to be “innocent until proven guilty.” In particular, the last chapter looked at a scenario where an individual was told that there were fruits by the

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208 NM (I, 14.7-14.10): ādīvākyād eva śrotuḥ śāstraprāyojanaparijñānām arthasamśayāc ca śravane pravṛttih | vede hy asiddhaprāmānaye mahākleśeṣu karmasu | na anarthaśaṅkyāḥ yuktam anuṣṭhānapravarthānām ||

209 NM (I, 15.3-15.6): śṛṇvanta eva jānanti santaḥ katipayair dinaiḥ | kim etat saphalām śāstraṁ uta mandaprayojanam | sāksmekṣikā tu yady atra kriyate prathamodyame | asau sakalakartavyavipralopāya kalpate ||
riverbank. Based on this testimony and on the fact that nothing contradicted this report, it is rational for that individual to go to the riverbank if she desired to acquire the fruit. In such cases, there is no pressing need to garner evidence for the testifier’s credibility and in fact, doing so one a daily basis would lead to less human activity and as a result, the lack of fulfilment of many goals.

In addition to the example of a student commencing the study of a text, Jayanta provides another example where people should not fret too much about verifying every piece of testimony they encounter, otherwise nothing would get accomplished. In particular, Jayanta claims that when one is sick and sees a doctor, one generally does what the doctor prescribes. However, if sick people were constantly doubting the advice of doctors, they would remain sick more often. Thus, people should not be overly scrupulous in undertaking tasks (on the basis of testimonial beliefs) that are easy and that have worthy goals merely because they are not one hundred percent sure that such an undertaking would fulfil the expected goal. Moreover, if we scrutinized everything that anyone ever told us, most of our goals would remain unaccomplished. When believing and acting upon a piece of testimony involves low risk and little effort, it is rational to do so unless the recipient has a legitimate doubt based on some sort of evidence that the speaker is untrustworthy.

To conclude this discussion, we have mentioned two important distinctions between religious testimony and mundane testimony. First, religious testimony is concerned with a class

\[ \text{NM (I, 15.7-15.8): ārto hi bhiṣajaṁ prṣtvā taduktam anutiśṭhate | tasmin savicikitsas tu vyādherādhikyam āpnuvāt.} \]

\[ \text{A concern here might be that we cannot be obligated to believe something if belief is not under our control. I think Jayanta reasonably assumes that we can exercise reflective control over our beliefs, even if we do not exercise reflective control over our beliefs all, or even most, of the time. For example, we notice that we rationally reflect on our beliefs during times of conflict and doubt. Moreover, in resolving those conflicts we generally refer to various norms of belief, such as obtaining truth and avoiding falsehood.} \]
of objects that is inaccessible to most people through ordinary sensory and reasoning powers. These imperceptible objects are thought to include the supreme goods of human life, goods like heaven and liberation, which are generally considered more valuable than the temporary objects we concern ourselves with. In claiming that our only means to knowing such objects is through religious testimony, Jayanta is not only underscoring the importance of religious testimony, but moreover, he is highlighting the relevance of his own text tradition, whose primary goal is to demonstrate and defend the truth of the Veda.

It was stated earlier that Jayanta’s Mīmāṃsaka rivals argued that the Veda’s validity does not need defending since its intrinsic validity cannot be negated. Thus, they argue, Jayanta is just wasting his time inquiring into a matter that has already been settled. Jayanta’s response to this objection reveals not only the purpose of Nyāya literature, but additionally, its intended audience. Jayanta replies that the goal of the Nyāya literature is to remove false notions and doubts, and thus, the intended audience of Nyāya treatises are those individuals who possess false or doubtful beliefs regarding the reliability of the Veda. As a result, the intended audience of Nyāya treatises would not be those individuals who already know the Veda is reliable. According to Jayanta, there are four types of people: people who, regarding a certain subject matter, have no beliefs, doubtful beliefs, false beliefs, or verified beliefs. Among them, wise people have verified beliefs. The Nyāya literature is intended for the three other types of people. In particular, Nyāya provides knowledge to an ignorant person, removes uncertainty from a person with doubtful beliefs and dispels error from people with false beliefs.

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212 NM (I, 11.8-11.9): *nanu vedaprāmāṇyaṁ nirvicārasiddham eva sādhavo manyante iti kim atra vicārayatnena na saṁśayaviparyāsanirāsārthatvāt*.

213 NM (I, 12.1-12.4): *bhavati ca catusprakārah puruṣaḥ ajñaḥ sandigdhaḥ viparyastaḥ niścitamatiś ca iti | tatra niścitamatir esa munih amunā śāstreṇa ajñasya jñānam upajanayati saṁśayānasya saṁśayam upaharanī viparyāsaṁ vyudasyati iti tān prati yuktaḥ śāstrārambhaḥ ||.*
Jayanta states that wise people who already have knowledge about the reliability of the Veda, could have ascertained their beliefs in a number of ways, for example, by performing austerities, conciliating the gods, or through repeated study of other texts.\textsuperscript{214} The idea seems to be that through these actions, people gain insight, perhaps through yogic perception or inferential reasoning, into reliability of the Veda. In either of these scenarios, a wise person could have ascertained the reliability of the Veda without the use of Nyāya literature. However, since there seem to be other ways of acquiring the knowledge that Nyāya proclaims to provide, Jayanta’s interlocutor questions the relevance of Nyāya literature. In response, Jayanta emphasizes that since different people have different minds, as a result, some might be drawn to the Nyāya method of demonstrating the reliability of the Veda. On the other hand, those who are not philosophically-inclined might prefer engaging in certain actions that also could lead to the same knowledge. Jayanta’s treatise, and the Nyāya literature in general, is useful for those people whose error, doubt or ignorance is removed by it.\textsuperscript{215} It doesn’t matter that other works or activities can also lead to the same result for other people.

A second important point that comes out of this discussion is the fact that, according to Jayanta, different epistemic principles apply to religious versus mundane cases of testimony. In particular, Jayanta argues that beliefs based on religious testimony require a higher level of epistemic support, or justification, than more mundane beliefs. This is because scripturally-based beliefs are riskier in that they often effect our lives in a deep and meaningful way. For example, Jayanta argued that performing Vedic rituals on the basis of Vedic testimony is costly, time-consuming and requires much exertion. Thus, if such testimonial beliefs were false, we risk

\textsuperscript{214} NM (I, 12.6-12.7): sa tu tapahprabhāvād vā devatārādhanād vā śāstrāntarābhīyāsād vā bhavatu |

\textsuperscript{215} NM (I, 12.10-12.12): vicitracetasaś ca bhavanti puruṣā iti uktam | yeṣām ita eva ājñānasamśayaviparyayā vinivartante tān prati etat praṇayanaṃ saphalam iti.
losing a lot more (money, time, labor) than we would lose if our testimonial belief concerning fruits by the riverbank were false. As a result, we first need to determine that the Veda is true prior to engaging in the actions it prescribes. This way of thinking showcases the close relationship between knowledge and practical reasoning for Jayanta. In particular, Jayanta argues that, in many instances, scriptural beliefs are more costly if wrong. As a result, they require a higher level of epistemic support than mundane testimonial beliefs. In order to obtain this support, we need reflective knowledge, which is generally inferential knowledge, which verifies that the belief we hold is in fact true.

The link between knowledge and practical reasoning has also been emphasized by a group of contemporary epistemologists. The next section highlights contemporary views on pragmatic encroachment in epistemology. Pragmatic encroachment in epistemology opposes traditional approaches to knowledge in that it argues that practical factors, and not merely truth-conducive factors, effect whether or not a subject has knowledge. I will argue that Jayanta’s epistemology, which hinges on the bifurcation of knowledge and justification, is able to account for why practical interests have epistemic significance in a way that leaves most traditional views of knowledge in place.

More specifically, Jayanta argues that in high stakes situations, such as situations involving the performance of Vedic rituals where the cost of error is high, it is not rational for a subject to act on the basis of a belief that has not been confirmed. Instead, in such cases, reflective knowledge, or a higher level of justification, is needed. However, practical considerations do not affect knowledge itself. Knowledge, which earlier was said to be a true belief produced by a correctly functioning instrument, is still dependent on truth and reliability conditions, which are grounded in factors outside a subject’s range of potential experience. On
the other hand, reflective, or confirmatory, knowledge, which we said was a second order cognitive state directed at a first order belief, was likened to justification. It concerns the level of epistemic support an agent needs for a belief and, as such, it is affected by practical considerations.

Another way to put this is that in high stakes situations, a subject needs a greater degree of epistemic support for certain beliefs before those beliefs can be acted upon. In these situations, it is not enough for a subject’s belief-forming faculties to be reliably functioning, but additionally, that subject needs to know that they are reliably functioning. One of the advantages of Nyāya’s bivalent epistemology is that it underscores the distinction between the following two issues: what makes a belief true (knowledge) and how an agent knows that belief is true (justification). Since knowledge arises as a result of an appropriate causal connection between an epistemic agent and her environment, the goal of studies into knowledge is to define the nature of this connection which reliably produces true beliefs. On the other hand, since justification concerns reasons provided in defense of belief, the goal of studies into justification or reflective knowledge is to define how we know a belief we hold is true, or, that an appropriate connection holds between a subject and her environment. Although a high stakes situation requires us to know that a belief we hold is true, it does not change what it means for a belief to be true. For example, testimonial knowledge still refers to a true belief produced by the words of trustworthy person. However, in high stakes situations involving testimonial belief, a subject needs to know that her belief is true and thus needs to know that the testimony she accepts has been stated by a trustworthy person.

On the other hand, pragmatic encroachment theories focus primarily on how practical interests, such as stakes considerations, affect knowledge directly. As a result, when justification
is affected by practical considerations so too is knowledge. The higher the stakes, the harder it is for a subject to know. The next section will delineate the central concepts in pragmatic encroachment theories and discuss common objections to pragmatic encroachment. It will also locate Jayanta’s view within this group of theories that argue for the epistemic significance of practical factors. In particular, the next section will argue that Jayanta’s theory regarding why reflective knowledge (justification) is needed in high stakes situations, while conceptually different from pragmatic encroachment theories, has many of the same practical implications while also leaving most traditional views about knowledge, namely, that is only affected by truth-conducive factors, in place.

3.2 Knowledge and Practical Reasoning: Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology

To probe deeper into the question of why different testimonial scenarios might warrant different epistemic treatment it helps to think about why we even have a concept of knowledge in the first place. In the last section, it was stated that a unique feature of many classical Indian texts on epistemology is the fact that their introductions almost always mention the connection between knowledge, which is the subject-matter of epistemological texts, and the attainment of human goals. While some authors claim that knowledge in general is useful for attaining any human objective, other authors focus on how knowledge leads to the attainment of specific goals. For example, the first two verses of the NS state that knowledge of the sixteen categories (which is the subject matter of the NS) ultimately leads to the supreme goal of human life,

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216 For example, see NB 1.1: *samyagjñānapūrvikā sarvapurusārthasiddhir iti tad vyuptādyate* (“The accomplishment of any human goal is preceded by knowledge. Therefore, this will be investigated in this treatise”). In his commentary, Dharmottara explains that Dharmakīrti is stating the purpose and subject-matter of his treatise. In particular, Dharmottara states that the subject-matter of Dharmakīrti’s treatise is knowledge and the purpose of the treatise is to help people accomplish any aim they have. See NBṬ (5.1-7.3).
We also saw Jayanta argue that scriptural knowledge in particular is essential to attaining the supreme good of human life and that the task of Nyāya, and thus his text, is to defend the authority of scripture.

This understanding of how Sanskrit authors conceptualized knowledge, especially in terms of its purpose and practical relevance, helps us understand what Jayanta might be up to in giving practical interests epistemic significance. This idea of giving epistemic weight to practical considerations has also been gaining traction in contemporary epistemology under the name of pragmatic encroachment. Pragmatic encroachment in epistemology is the notion that practical factors, in addition to truth-relevant factors, such as the evidence one has for the belief that \( p \) or the reliability of the process that produced belief that \( p \), affect whether a subject’s true belief amounts to knowledge.\(^{218} \) Whether a subject has knowledge has also been framed in terms of what a subject ought to do, thereby directly linking knowledge to practical reasoning. For example, Fantl and McGrath have argued that whether a subject knows that \( p \) depends in part on whether a subject should act as if \( p \).\(^{219} \) In contrast to pragmatic encroachment, traditional accounts of knowledge, also labelled “epistemological purism,” argue that only purely epistemic factors affect whether a subject has knowledge. Thus, if two epistemic subjects share the same epistemic position with respect to a proposition \( p \), they are alike in their position to know that \( p \), regardless of any non-epistemic factors that might be involved.\(^{220} \) Moreover, traditional theories

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\(^{217} \) NS 1.1.1 (see ND: 27):
\[ \text{pramāṇaprameyasāmyaprayojanadṛṣṭāntasiddhāntāvavatarnārādajalapavitaṇḍāhetvābhāsacchhalaśātini grahasthānānām tattvajñānānānileśyasādhiṣṭiḥ || and NS 1.1.2 (ND: 69):
\[ \text{duḥkhaṇaprajāprājapratidāsīmahyājñānānām uttarottarāṇéyapavargaḥ.} \]

\(^{218} \) For example, see Fantl & McGrath 2007 and 2009, Hawthorne 2004, and Stanley 2005. For pragmatic encroachment on religious knowledge see Rizzieri 2013.

\(^{219} \) Fantl & McGrath 2007: 559.

\(^{220} \) Fantl & McGrath 2007: 558
in epistemology argue that while a subject’s stakes in the situation might indirectly affect the belief component of knowledge, for example, excessive worry might lead to doubt, it cannot otherwise make a difference to whether one knows.

On the other hand, pragmatic encroachment theories argue that the more at stake for the subject, the more difficult it is to obtain knowledge. This group of views is sometimes called “subject-sensitive invariantism.” Although the notion of “subject-sensitive” is meant to highlight the role a subject’s practical context plays in the presence or absence of knowledge, one might argue that non-practical factors can also be “subject-sensitive.” For example, “purist” theories about knowledge can also be considered subject-sensitive in the sense that the epistemic features of a subject’s context are what matters in determining whether a subject has knowledge. On the other hand, the notion of “invariantism” is meant to distinguish these sorts of views from another category of views that fall under the name of “contextualism.” The latter category of views, sometimes called “attributor” or “semantic” contextualism, argues that ascriptions of knowledge are context-sensitive. That is, the truth-value of sentences containing the word “know,” will vary depending on different conversational contexts. Typically, contextualists distinguish between everyday contextual standards, where skeptical possibilities are not relevant, and skeptical contextual standards, where skeptical possibilities are relevant. Because of this, the same sentence which has the form “S knows that p” can have two different truth values depending on the attributor’s context.

The theories of pragmatic encroachment that I am interested in are not tied to the semantic commitments of contextualism. In fact, many theories argue that the factors in an

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221 Fantl & McGrath 2007: 561, n. 5.

222 Duncan 2002, particularly, sections 1 and 2.
attributor’s context do not affect the standards that must be met by a knowledge attribution. Instead, the truth of a knowledge attribution depends on the practical situation of the subject of knowledge, not the attributor of knowledge. This means that the truth-value of an ascription of knowledge will be the same regardless of what context it is uttered in, hence the “invariantism” in “subject-sensitive invariantism.” However, theories of pragmatic encroachment and theories of contextualism are not necessarily inconsistent, after all, one could think that a subject’s practical interests determine whether or not that subject has knowledge and also that what it means to “know” varies across different conversational contexts. Given this, I prefer to use the term “pragmatic encroachment” rather than “subject-sensitive invariantism” so as to remain neutral toward contextualism and to highlight the distinctly pragmatic factors that play a role in determining the presence or absence of knowledge.

Many of the commonly cited arguments against pragmatic encroachment claim that it is counterintuitive. It seems strange to claim that a subject’s practical interests in a matter affect the strength of her epistemic position. After all, these factors have no impact on any truth-relevant dimensions of the matter. For example, I know that I was born in New York. However, if someone bet me one billion dollars against my one penny that I was not born in New York, do I all of a sudden not know that I was born in New York? Pragmatic encroachment theories seem to imply that, under the right conditions, that is, when the stakes are high enough, knowledge of any proposition can be destroyed. On the other hand, pragmatic encroachment helps explain our intuitions in certain cases like the following bank scenario, where a shift in stakes seems to raise

\[\text{223 Compare to Hawthorne 2004: 176, n. 37. He states, “It is also worth reflecting on the fact that for pretty much any proposition of which we are convinced, we will be inclined to accept a bet against it given the right odds and reckon ourselves perfectly rational in doing so. (For example, I would happily bet a penny against a billion dollars on not having being born in England, and on the falsity of the law of noncontradiction.”}}\]
the epistemic requirements needed for a subject to have knowledge with respect to specific propositions.

*Bank Case A (Low Stakes).* Hannah and her wife Sarah are driving home on a Friday afternoon. They plan to stop at the bank on the way home to deposit their paychecks. It is not important that they do so, as they have no impending bills. But as they drive past the bank, they notice that the lines inside are very long, as they often are on Friday afternoons. Realizing that it isn't very important that their paychecks are deposited right away, Hannah says, “I know the bank will be open tomorrow, since I was there just two weeks ago on Saturday morning. So we can deposit our paychecks tomorrow morning.”

*Bank Case B (High Stakes).* Hannah and her wife Sarah are driving home on a Friday afternoon. They plan to stop at the bank on the way home to deposit their paychecks. Since they have an impending bill coming due, and very little in their account, it is very important that they deposit their paychecks by Saturday. Hannah notes that she was at the bank two weeks before on a Saturday morning, and it was open. But, as Sarah points out, banks do change their hours. Hannah says, “I guess you're right. I don't know that the bank will be open tomorrow.”

Our intuitions in this scenario would be that, in Bank Case A, Hannah is right to claim that she knows the bank will be open on Saturday, and in Bank Case B, Hannah is also right to claim that she *does not* know the bank will be open on Saturday, despite the fact that her epistemic position has not changed. The only thing that has changed is that in Bank Case B it is very important that Hannah and Sarah deposit their paychecks by Saturday. It is because of this that Hannah needs a stronger level of epistemic support regarding whether the bank will be open on Saturday.

This example exemplifies Fantl and McGrath’s practical condition on knowledge whereby a subject knows a proposition only if that subject is rational to act as if that proposition were true. The underlying premise here is that knowledge is constitutively connected to action so that one should only act on what one knows. Moreover, the way we appraise the behavior of

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225 See also Hawthorne 2004: 30: “one ought only to use that which one knows as a premise in one's deliberations.” Hawthorne qualifies this in footnote 77. There he claims that if a subject has no clue about what is going on, she may take certain things for granted in order to prevent paralysis, especially if she needs to act quickly. Moreover, in situations where the distinction between “p” and “probably p” is irrelevant, “p” can be used as a basis on which to act even though the subject only knows that “probably p.”
others and justify our own actions demonstrates that the concept of knowledge is intrinsically tied to the rationality of action. For example, if Hannah and Sarah were tourists in a new city trying to get to a restaurant with time-limited reservations, and if Hannah chooses not to ask for directions, but rather, attempts to get to the restaurant on the basis of a “hunch” she has on where it is located, it would not be surprising if, upon not arriving at the restaurant and losing their reservations, Sarah chided Hannah’s decision, arguing that she should not have acted on the basis of a hunch since she lacked knowledge about the restaurant’s location. Similarly, our intuition that knowledge is the basis for action helps explain why, in Bank Case B, we do not think it is rational for Hannah to act on her belief that the bank is open on Saturday. That is, since we do not believe she knows that bank will be open on Saturday, we do not think it is appropriate for her to act without knowledge.

Thus, our use of knowledge-citations in criticizing or defending actions provides evidence of the intimate link between knowledge and action. Despite this, it is possible, some say, to analyze scenarios like the bank case, in ways that do not invoke pragmatic encroachment. For example, we can either argue that Hannah does not possess knowledge in either bank scenario depicted above, due to a lack of sufficient epistemic support, or, that Hannah is justified in both bank scenarios even though she may lack knowledge in Bank Case B for reasons that pertain to the belief condition. If we want to claim that Hannah does not possess knowledge in either Bank Case A or Bank Case B, we would be placing extremely high demands on knowledge so as to lead to skepticism. Hawthorne subsumes those views which hold that nearly

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226 For more examples on how we use knowledge-citations to defend or criticize actions, thus showcasing our commitment to the principle that we should only act on the basis of what we know, see and Fantl & McGrath 2007: 561-564 and Hawthorne & Stanley 2008: 571-574.
all of our ordinary positive knowledge ascriptions are false under the label of “skeptical invariantism.” Although my goal here is not to argue against skepticism, a view that declares false most of our knowledge seems highly implausible to me. Thus, as a working hypothesis, I will leave radical skeptical concerns aside.

Much more plausible is the argument that, in both bank cases, Hannah has justified belief and, as a result, either has knowledge in both cases or, lacks knowledge in Bank Case B because she lacks the belief that the bank will be open on Saturday. Regarding the former option, some might argue, as Timothy Williamson has, that Hannah has knowledge in Bank Case A and Bank Case B, however, in high-stakes cases, instead of mere knowledge, knowledge that one knows is required for rational action. I will discuss this option below since it is very similar to Jayanta’s own view. On the other hand, proponents of the view that Hannah lacks knowledge in Bank Case B might argue that once a person becomes aware of the costs of being wrong, her confidence is shaken and thus she fails to believe fully enough for her belief, if true, to be considered knowledge. Kvanvig proposes something like this when he argues that a crucial feature of knowledge involves the belief that inquiry into the matter at hand is legitimately closed. However, if we think that further inquiry would not be a waste of time and effort, our belief is undermined. According to this theory, Hannah would lack knowledge in Bank Case B because she does not believe the matter at hand is legitimately closed.

Kvanvig’s way of characterizing the scenario seems to offer an elegant diagnosis of the problem without alluding to pragmatic features. However, what if we tweaked the scenario so

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228 Williamson 2005.
229 Kvanvig 2004.
that Hannah’s confidence was not shaken and thus her belief not undermined? For example, under Kvanvig’s proposal, if Hannah were not aware of, or worried by, the stakes involved in Bank Case B, would she automatically know that the bank was opened on Saturday? It seems odd claiming that Hannah obtains knowledge by becoming more ignorant. Moreover, if we stipulated that in Bank Case B, Hannah was very confident in her belief that the bank will be open on Saturday, would being more confident in the face of high stakes give her knowledge? I would argue that in Bank Case B, even if Hannah was overly confident in her belief that the bank would be open on Saturday, she would still lack knowledge because the epistemic support she has for her belief is too weak given the stakes in the situation.

On the other hand, let’s say that, in Bank Case A, Hannah did have some doubt and uncertainty regarding whether the bank would be open on Saturday. Would this in itself undermine knowledge? Is it prima facie the case that firm belief or unwavering confidence is necessary for knowledge? I would argue that it cannot merely be the presence of worry and concern that defeats knowledge, otherwise, people who are simply more prone to worry and anxiety would typically have less knowledge than people who are not. For example, would a nervous test taker lack knowledge if she provides the right answers but doubts those answers are right due to a shaken confidence? At the very least, we can say that the answer is not obvious. However, in this scenario, were the test-taker to simply calm down and let her confidence match what the evidence supports—i.e. the fact that she is well-prepared for the test—we would not deny that she has knowledge since her beliefs are true and justified.\(^\text{230}\) Thus, it seems as if the best way to explain why Hannah lacks knowledge in Bank Case 2 is that, given the high stakes

\(^{230}\) Nervous test-taker example taken from Rizziere 2013: 23.
of the situation, she needs more evidence to be justified in her belief that the bank will be open on Saturday.

I want to speak more about the concept of doubt and in particular, the way Indian authors characterized doubt in connection to knowledge and action. However, first I want to discuss the second alternative to interpreting the bank cases, that is, the idea that Hannah has knowledge in both cases however, in Bank Case 2, she does not know that she knows, which is required in high stakes scenarios. Knowing that one knows that $p$, which earlier we termed “reflective knowledge,” requires a subject to have more epistemic support for $p$ than merely knowing that $p$. In particular, we saw Jayanta explain reflective knowledge in terms of being able to defend what one knows through inferential reasoning or through our experience with an object’s practical effects. For example, regarding a speaker’s testimony that $p$, a recipient knows that she knows that $p$ if she has confirmed $p$ herself by virtue of the practical effects of $p$, or, if she has verified that the speaker who asserted $p$ is trustworthy. Moreover, Jayanta argues that in situations where the stakes are high, reflective knowledge is required before we can rationally act and reason on the basis of our belief. Similarly, this alternative to pragmatic encroachment argues that Hannah, despite knowing that the bank will be open on Saturday, needs knowledge of her knowledge because of the high stakes in Bank Case 2.

One might object to this argument by questioning whether it would be rational for Hannah to act as if the bank were open on Saturday even after she went through a process of

\[231\text{ For example, if } p \text{ is “There is a glass of water on the table,” one way I can have reflective knowledge of this statement’s truth is if I am able to go up to the table, pick up the glass of water, drink the water, and have the water quench my thirst. This would be confirmatory knowledge since I confirmed my knowledge of } p \text{ through experiencing the effect or result of } p.\]

\[232\text{ Williamson also explains that if the stakes are high enough, prudent individuals will engage in third-order reasoning about whether they can trust their second-order reasoning, which regards whether they can trust their first-order reasoning. See Williamson 2005: 233.}\]
reflection whereby she delineated the evidence she had for the bank being open on Saturday, thereby demonstrating that she knows that she does indeed possess knowledge. For example, let’s say that Hannah’s evidence would be her memory that the bank was open on Saturday two weeks ago. From this, she infers that it will be open again this Saturday. To make this argument stronger, let’s say that Hannah has been to bank on Saturday on five separate occasions. As a result, she notices an invariable connection between it being Saturday and the bank being open. While she knows it is possible that banks change their hours, she has no evidence indicating that this has happened. In this case, would Hannah know that she knows the bank is open?

I think people may have split intuitions on this case. On the one hand, I think that some people might argue that, upon recalling five instances where the bank was open on Saturday, Hannah does have reflective knowledge that the bank will be open on Saturday. On the other hand, others might argue that given the high stakes, Hannah does not have reflective knowledge since it would not rational for Hannah to act as if she knows the bank is open on Saturday even if it has been open on previous Saturdays. One reason why we might think Hannah lacks second-order, or reflective, knowledge in this scenario, is that we do not think she has first-order knowledge that the bank will be open on Saturday. Thus, pragmatic encroachment would still center on knowledge, not knowledge of knowledge.

I think Jayanta would analyze this situation by focusing on the doubt that enters into the picture when Sarah mentions the fact that banks do change their hours. Prior to this, Hannah would possess knowledge that the bank was open on Saturday if she had a true belief that was produced by reliable instrument of knowledge, in this case, inferential reasoning. Moreover, if she reflected upon this knowledge and had no legitimate doubts on whether the bank would be open on Saturday, then, I would argue that according to Jayanta, Hannah had fulfilled her
obligation in this high stakes situation. According to Jayanta and the Naiyāyaikas, the process by which we review the evidence we have in order to claim that we have knowledge is fallible.\textsuperscript{233} While new evidence could always appear and change our claim as to whether we really have knowledge, this should not stop us from reviewing the evidence and acting upon the information that we have. However, in this case, Sarah introduces doubt into the situation by arguing that banks sometimes change their hours and, to remove that doubt, Hannah would need to confirm that the bank will not be changing its hours. This requires evidence beyond the inferential evidence she had previously, since that evidence just indicated that the bank is usually open on Saturday, not that can never be not open on Saturday. In order to remove that doubt Hannah could call her bank and, if she knew them to be credible, ask whether they will be open on Saturday.

One of the downsides of the separation between knowledge and reflective knowledge is that it becomes hard to see the value of having a concept of knowledge since all the epistemic work is being done at the level of reflective knowledge. For example, I might know that the bank will be open on Saturday in the sense that my belief is true and produced by a reliable instrument, however, unless I reflect upon the truth of my belief or the reliability of the instrument that produced it, I have no way of knowing the epistemic status of the belief upon which basis I reason and act. Moreover, unless some sort of doubt arises, or, according to Jayanta, we are in a high-stakes situation, I am not required to look for epistemic support for my belief. While an advantage of this view is that it legitimizes most of our daily actions, which usually occur seamlessly without requiring reflective knowledge, a disadvantage of this view is that, not stopping to consider whether the beliefs I hold are well-supported might lead me to take

\textsuperscript{233} On fallibility, see Potter 2015:158.
more actions that have unfavorable consequences. Despite the fact that given Jayanta’s bivalent epistemology, his analysis of the bank cases makes pragmatic encroachment more about reflective knowledge than about first order knowledge, in either case, the practical implications are similar. That is, both Jayanta and contemporary theories on pragmatic encroachment claim that high-stakes scenarios require the subject to have a higher level of justification for $p$ in order to reason and act as if $p$.

I want to now reflect back on the conversation regarding doubt, knowledge, and action. Previously, we had discussed the fact that our subjective feelings of doubt do not necessary preclude knowledge. For example, we mentioned the case of the nervous test taker who knows the test material but whose confidence is shaken right before the test. Most of us would not claim that the nervous test taker loses her knowledge due to pre-test jitters. So, what type of doubt actually undermines knowledge? Doubt is listed as one of the sixteen categories in the NS. Because of its importance, the nature, varieties, and causes of doubt were discussed by various Nyāya philosophers. Despite divergences in opinion among the commentators of the NS, doubt was generally understood to be a cognitive state in which the mind oscillates between two mutually incompatible predicates referring to the same subject.\textsuperscript{234} One example often discussed is a perceptual cognition of a dark blur in the distance which appears to be either a person or a tree. In this case, a single subject, the dark blur, is qualified with incompatible predicates (person-ness and tree-ness) and the epistemic agent cannot determine a distinguishing property, such as the property of possessing limbs, which would settle the matter. One way to resolve this situation would be for the epistemic agent to move closer to the vaguely visible object so as to distinguish its features.

\textsuperscript{234} See Mohanty 1965.
According to Nyāya, doubt is the impetus of philosophical inquiry. Unlike the hyperbolic doubt of Descartes, doubt, as defined by Nyāya, arises from a particular situation where the epistemic agent is aware of conflicting beliefs regarding a certain subject matter—whether those beliefs are generated internally or by an external adversarial challenge—and wants to know the truth of the matter. Whereas doubt instigates philosophical inquiry, knowledge, and more specifically, reflective knowledge, which is the goal of philosophical inquiry, ends it. Moreover, we saw that knowledge is put in the service of practical goals. Thus, it seems as if Nyāya philosophers would also agree with general pragmatic encroachment maxim that one should only act upon that which one knows. But is it really the case that most of our actions are based upon this higher-order, reflective knowledge? Is reflective knowledge needed every time we act? If not, what is the epistemic status of beliefs we act upon which we have not verified?

In contrast to other Naiyāyikas who argued that reflective knowledge, or justification, often precedes actions, Jayanta argues that in the case of mundane beliefs, action often precedes justification and, as a result, most of our actions arise from cognitive states that would be characterized as “doubt.” In particular, Jayanta explains that when a cognition initially arises, we do not know whether it is true. Earlier, we described this as the view of extrinsic validity, or, the notion that the truth of a cognition is not manifested from that cognition but

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235 For example, Vācaspati and Udayana argued that the success of past actions justifies not only the beliefs upon which they were based, but additionally, other, similar beliefs which have not been confirmed. Matilal 1986: 165-166 provides a helpful example of this. Matilal explains that if every morning I see a cup of tea in the kitchen, I do not always need confirmatory behavior (such as holding the cup and drinking the tea), to know that my perception is true. Instead, I can infer its truth based on the fact that my perception of the cup of tea is like many other perceptions I have had before whose truth I have confirmed. Vācaspati calls this the tajjātiyatā inference, or, inference from likeness. Uddyotakara also argued the same thing however he used the premise of beginningless saṃsāra to argue that all beliefs have been verified by past actions. See Shida 2004: 118-119.

236 In this section, I intentionally use more neutral term “cognition” (jñāna) over “belief” since it sounds strange to say that our belief that p, or our attitude of regarding p as true, is really a cognitive state of doubt. However, Jayanta ultimate argues that a cognitive state in which we regard of p as true, has nothing to do with whether that state should be labelled a doubt.
rather, comes from a subsequent confirmatory cognition. Until we confirm the truth of a
cognition, we are in a state of doubt regarding that cognition’s truth. Jayanta states that by doubt
he means nothing more than a cognition whose truth has not been verified and thus, its nature as
true or false has not been determined.\(^{237}\) It is clear that Jayanta’s definition of doubt applies to
mental states that do not subjectively feel like states of doubt. To explain, Jayanta states:

Doubt is not experienced however it is logically postulated with respect to repeated
objects since we do not recall what particular feature of a cognition is invariably
concomitant with its truth. This is because when a cognition arises, the cause for
ascertaining whether it is true or false is absent and all the causes that produce doubt are
present. For example, when a cognition arises, the property “being a cognition” which is
common to both true and false cognitions, is the only property that is evident at that time,
just like, when a person sees a vertical blur in the distance, the only property that is
evident at that time is “being upright,” which is common to both a person and a tree. At
that time, there is no particular property of the cognition which is invariably linked with
its truth. And if we do not grasp any particular property which is linked with a
cognition’s truth, when a cognition of an object arises, we recall that in the past,
whenever cognitions of objects have arisen, they could be either true or false. Thus, the
totality of causes that produce doubt is present. As a result, how could that cognitive
state not be considered a doubt? \(^{238}\)

The reasoning in this passage is as follows: Before we confirm whether our
cognition about object \(p\) is true, our past experience tells us that it is possible to have true or false
cognitions about \(p\). Moreover, there is no particular feature of our cognition that allows us to
know our cognition about \(p\) is true at the time it arises. Since this is the case, when a cognition
about \(p\) arises, it is characterized by two opposing predicates, being true and being untrue, and as
a result, it should be labelled a doubt. Thus, for Jayanta, doubt is not a subjective feeling of

\(^{237}\) NM (I, 442.6-442.7): \(\text{prāmāṇyāgraṇaḥ} \text{ eva anadhyavaśyaśvabhāvaṃ saṃśayaśabdena iha}
\text{vyapadeksyāmaḥ}/.

\(^{238}\) NM (I, 440.6-440.14): \(\text{yat tu nānubhūyate saṃśaya iti --satyam-- ananubhūyamāno }'\text{pi nyāyād abhyaste viśaye}
\text{vinābāvasmaraṇāt sa parikalpyate nīścayanimittasya tadānīm avidyamānatvāt} | \text{saṃśayajananhetos ca}
\text{sāmagṛyāḥ sannihitavat} | \text{tathā hi yatā }'\text{ṛhetarārthasādhāraṇo dharmo bodharūvatvam ērūdayatvādivat tadā}
\text{prakāśata eva }'\text{nā ca prāmāṇyāvinābāvī viśeṣāḥ kaścana tadānīm avabhāti | tadagrahane ca}
\text{samānavadharmedagamprabodhyamānāvāsanādīhīna tatsahacaritaparyāyānubhūtaviśeṣasmitīt api saṃbhavaty}
evetoṭiyaṃ sā saṃśayajananī sāmagṛi sannihitaeveti kathāṃ tajjanyāḥ saṃśayaḥ na syāt |
uncertainty we have toward objects or mental states, rather, it is the logical fact of a cognition of an object being indeterminate, or not verified, with respect to it truth. Moreover, to remove this doubt, we require reflective knowledge. Until we infer the truth of our cognition from our appraisal of the evidence, we are in a state of doubt regarding the epistemic status of our cognition, even if we “believe” it to be true. Jayanta believes this wider notion of doubt characterizes all awareness states until they have been confirmed as true or false. This is in contrast to Naiyāyikas like Uddyotakara, Vācaspati, and Udayana, all of whom argue that in familiar situations, repeated beliefs can be justified on the basis of past confirmations. A corollary of characterizing all cognitions that have not been verified as states of doubt is that most of the time, we end up reasoning and acting on the basis of cognitions that are doubtful.

Is it problematic that many of our actions take place on the basis of doubtful cognitions? Most of the time, no. Jayanta argues that justification is not very important in our daily life since we get by just fine by acting upon doubtful cognitions. Moreover, if we always waited to act until we confirmed our cognitions, life would come to a standstill. We saw this attitude in Jayanta’s rejection of the idea that testimony is reducible to inference. In particular, Jayanta argued that we are rational in holding testimonial beliefs, and reasoning and acting on their basis, without first confirming those beliefs by verifying the credibility of the author. Earlier in this chapter, we looked at various examples where an epistemic agent either sought to acquire something, whether it was fruit, knowledge from a text, or relief from an illness from a testimonial belief that was not verified. In all of these cases, Jayanta argued it was better for the epistemic agent to reason and act on the basis of an unconfirmed testimonial belief, provided she had no doubts or defeaters to her belief, than it was to seek after additional confirmation the

239 See footnote 235 above.
belief was in fact true. This is because everyday life is mostly feasible without confirming the truth of our beliefs. As a result, we need not waste our time and effort to do so.

In fact, in a debate with his Mīmāṃsaka interlocutor over whether validity is intrinsic or extrinsic, Jayanta claims that in many everyday situations, since justification is often not necessary, it doesn’t matter whether validity is extrinsic or intrinsic since we do not need to confirm that our beliefs are true before reasoning and acting upon them. On the other hand, the intrinsic versus extrinsic debate is important when it concerns non-mundane beliefs, such as Vedic beliefs, which prompt actions that are difficult, require much effort, and are costly. Jayanta argues that in such cases, validity is definitely extrinsic and thus, it would be irrational for us to engage in Vedic activities without first verifying the truth of our belief.

It bears mentioning that Jayanta was probably the first Naiyāyika to pay very close attention to the justification of Vedic beliefs, especially as it compares to the justification of other types of beliefs. For example, in the introductory section of the NM, Jayanta not only discusses the importance of verifying Vedic beliefs, but additionally, he explains why Vedic beliefs merit a different type of epistemic treatment than mundane beliefs. The Introduction in this dissertation also discussed how Jayanta’s Vedic-orientated approach to the task of Nyāya was a break from Nyāya orthodoxy. Moreover, we saw Jayanta specifically argue for why, in contrast to mundane beliefs, scriptural beliefs need to be verified prior to reasoning and acting on their basis. On the other hand, his predecessors Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara, do not underscore the importance and uniqueness of Vedic beliefs in the introduction of their commentaries nor in

240 NM (I, 435.16-436.3): pratyākṣādiṣu dṛṣṭārtheṣu prāmāṇyaniścayam antareṇa eva vyavahārasiddhes tatra kim svataḥ prāmāṇyaṁ uta parataḥ iti vicāreṇa na naḥ pravojanam anirṇaya eva tatra śreyāṁ/ adṛṣte tu viṣaye vaidikasya aganitadravinīvitaranādikleśasādhyesu karmasu tatprāmāṇyāvadhāraṇam antareṇa prekṣāvātāṁ pravartanam anucitam iti.
specific sections of the NS that deal with Vedic testimony. Additionally, Vācaspati, who was at least a younger contemporary of Jayanta, follows Jayanta in arguing that Vedic beliefs need to be confirmed prior to acting on their basis.

To summarize, Jayanta argues that many of our daily actions take place on the basis of cognitions that would be label “doubts.” This is because, given that we have not confirmed the truth of these cognitions, we are uncertain as to whether they are true or not. Despite this, actions arising from doubts are not problematic since in daily life, we get by just fine on the basis of cognitions we have not been verified. The findings of this discussion can be applied to the bank cases. First, Jayanta would argue that, if Hannah has not verified her belief in either Bank Case 1 or Bank Case 2, such beliefs would technically be considered doubts. However, in Bank Case 1, since Hannah suffers no loss in not depositing her check (since she has no impending bills), Jayanta would argue that it is acceptable for Hannah to act on the basis of a doubt. However, Bank Case 2 is a different story. Although the contrast Jayanta makes above between the mundane and non-mundane regards everyday objects versus religious objects, I do not think it is theoretically impossible to apply Jayanta’s reasoning on high-stakes situations to scenarios outside of religious cases. For example, Bank Case 2 is a high-stakes situation since it is necessary for Hannah to deposit her check by Saturday in order to pay her bills. Thus, the doubt

241 Both Vatsyāyana and Uddyotakara discuss Vedic beliefs in the context of NS 2.1.68. See ND:565-571.

242 On the controversy regarding the dating of Jayanta and Vācaspati see Muroya 2016:299-302. In particular, Muroya shows that Anantalal Thakur wrote that the 11th century Naiyāyaika Udayana shows that Vācaspati refers to the ideas of Jayanta, thereby making Vācaspati at least a younger contemporary of Jayanta. On the other hand, Diwakar Acharya raises questions about Udayana’s reliability but claims that we can at least deduce that in the first half of the 11th century, Jayanta was regarded as anterior to Vācaspati.

243 For more information on Vācaspati’s view on justification and action, especially as compared to Jayanta’s view, see Shida 2004: sec. 5. Vācaspati, who Shida places after Jayanta chronologically, gives almost the same exact explanation that Jayanta gives in arguing for why Vedic beliefs need prior justification. In particular see Shida 2004: 120-121, n. 14. I think it is very plausible that Vācaspati was influenced by Jayanta, although I won’t argue for that here.
she has regarding the truth of her belief needs to be removed. Regardless of whether or not
Hannah actually *feels* doubt about whether the bank will be open on Saturday, she needs to
confirm it will be open on Saturday prior to acting on the basis of her belief. This might mean re-
visiting the evidence she has on why she believes the bank will be open on Saturday and, if it is
insufficient, obtaining additional evidence that rules out the possibility that the bank could be
closed on Saturday. For example, if she knows her bank to be trustworthy, she can call and ask
them if they will be open on Saturday. Or, she can deposit her check today and simply endure the
annoyance of long lines since, frankly, the mild annoyance generated by this seems quite
minimal in comparison to the high-stakes situations Jayanta discusses. Once at the bank, Hannah
could also inquire into whether bank hours on Saturday ever change, for example, during
holidays. While finding out whether the bank ever changes their hours won’t help Hannah in this
particular situation, it will help her in future situations in which she faces a similar dilemma.

Although this ends my excursion into pragmatic encroachment and the relation between
knowledge, doubt, and action, these issues will come up again in the next chapter. In this section,
I explained and argued for the basic premise of pragmatic encroachment, namely, the notion that
practical factors have epistemic significance. Afterwards I argued that Jayanta’s distinct
approach to mundane cases of testimony versus religious cases of testimony should be seen as
based in the general premises of pragmatic encroachment theories, with the difference being that
Jayanta specifically claims that practical factors affect whether or not reflective knowledge, or
justification, is needed, not first order knowledge. This distinction is made on account of
Nyāya’s bivalent epistemology, where knowledge and justification are separated. While
Jayanta’s thesis is different from the thesis that first order knowledge is affected by stakes
considerations, I argued that the practical implications of these two theses are very similar. The
bottom line for both Jayanta and contemporary pragmatic encroachment theorists is that a subject’s beliefs in high-stakes situations require a higher level of justification than they do in low-stakes situations.

Up to now, Jayanta has argued that beliefs based in religious scripture require greater epistemic support than mundane, non-religious beliefs. In particular, he argued that a person needs to know that the Veda is reliable before she can reason and act on its basis. In the final section of this chapter, I want to discuss the process by which Jayanta establishes that the Veda is in fact reliable. For Jayanta and the Naiyāyikas, since the Veda is a type of testimony, its reliability is determined by confirming the trustworthiness of its author. However, Jayanta’s Mīmāṃsaka opponent objects to this, arguing that it is impossible to establish that the Veda’s author is trustworthy given the fact that the author is not someone we can perceive today or someone that has been perceived in the past. Jayanta argues for the credibility of the Veda’s author, and thereby the reliability of the Veda, through a series of argument that, taken together, are intended to support his thesis. In particular, three arguments stand out: first, proof of God’s existence, second, the Veda’s partial reliability, and third, the consensus of exemplary people.

Jayanta aims to establish the existence of an intelligent creator, God, with extraordinary qualities, like omniscience, and argues that God is the only plausible candidate for authorship of the Veda. As a result, Jayanta argues that the Veda’s reliability is secured through God’s extraordinary virtues. Jayanta’s proof of God should be seen as a combination of the cosmological argument and argument from design. These arguments are interesting in their own right however, as stated above, I will focus on Jayanta’s latter two arguments, namely, that the Veda’s author is reliable due to 1) partial tests on empirical matters and 2) the consensus of great people. In discussing these arguments, I hope to underscore the different ways that various
Sanskrit authors approach authority, especially as this concerns the balance between individual effort in obtaining knowledge and our reliance on others for knowledge. Earlier, we saw Dharmakīrti emphasize the importance of individual effort in epistemic endeavors and downplay the necessity of relying on others for obtaining knowledge. Jayanta’s Mīmāṃsaka interlocutors are also skeptical of human authority and the authority of divine beings whose existence cannot be corroborated. Against these two rival positions, Jayanta ultimately argues that, in many cases, rather than attempting to figure out the truth ourselves, we are better off, epistemically speaking, relying on those we deem better than ourselves at attaining the truth.

Before delving into Jayanta’s arguments, I want to mention the importance of audience for Jayanta. In this section of the NM where Jayanta argues for the reliability of the Veda on the basis of its having a trustworthy author, Jayanta’s primary opponent is a Mīmāṃsaka interlocutor who already agrees with Jayanta regarding the authoritative status of the Veda. As a result, Jayanta does not spend too much time arguing that the Veda is in fact reliable, since it is a point both he and his rival agree upon. Instead, Jayanta primarily focuses on showing why the Veda is reliable. While Jayanta argues that the Veda is reliable because it has a trustworthy author, his Mīmāṃsaka interlocutor rejects this reasoning and instead, argues that it is neither possible to demonstrate the Veda has an author, nor is the Veda’s having an author necessary to its authoritative status. Moreover, as will be seen in the following chapter, Jayanta’s Mīmāṃsaka interlocutor rejects Jayanta’s openly pluralistic position regarding the authority of most non-Vedic religious texts. Knowing in advance that one of Jayanta’s primary rivals also belongs to the Brahmanical orthodoxy, helps us understand why Jayanta chooses to focus on certain arguments and approaches rather than others.
3.3 Why the Veda is Reliable

One of the central arguments of the last section was that in high-stakes situations, it is not rational for a person to act on the basis of unconfirmed beliefs. Regarding testimonial belief, this means that the recipient needs to first confirm the credibility of the speaker before she reasons and acts on the basis of a speaker’s statements. Oftentimes, we have evidence of a speaker’s credibility based on past experiences where we have directly confirmed the truth of that speaker’s assertions. Hence, we reason that since we demonstrated that speaker S was credible in past situations, we can infer that speaker S will be credible in future situations. Jayanta argues that the inference from an author’s credibility to the veracity of her claims works because of the invariable concomitance between a person’s credibility and the truth of her assertions.

However, regarding the Veda, how would we confirm the credibility of an author who first, is not present, and second, speaks about imperceptible objects whose truth we could never directly confirm? Jayanta’s approach to this dilemma is to rely on a number of interconnected arguments, together which, he argues, support his claim that the Veda is reliable because it was authored by trustworthy person, God. Earlier it was stated that Jayanta constructs an inferential argument establishing the existence of God and God’s extraordinary attributes, such is his trustworthiness, but that this argument will not be the focus of this dissertation. Suffice to say that this argument is meant to reject the Mīmāṃsakas’ claim that the Veda is authorless. Jayanta also argues that the Veda must have an author by pointing to fact that, by being an arrangement of sentences, the Veda must have been authored by a rational agent. I want to leave these arguments aside and focus on Jayanta’s argument that the Veda is reliable on the basis of partial tests and the consensus of exemplary people. As we saw in the last chapter, the partial test inference with respect to the Veda demonstrated that once we have determined the author’s
credibility by confirming some of the empirical claims in the Veda, we can then infer that the Veda as a whole is reliable since it was authored by a trustworthy person. Jayanta argues that this inference works because of the invariable concomitance between trustworthy people and true statements. As an example, Jayanta points to Ayurvedic texts—texts on traditional Indian medicine—to show that trustworthy people speak the truth. Jayanta also proposes a second way we can infer that the Veda’s author is credible, namely, because exemplary people accept and follow the Veda.

According to Jayanta, these arguments, along with additional arguments that the Veda contains no falsehoods or contradictions, demonstrate that the Veda is reliable because it was composed by a trustworthy author with extraordinary, superhuman qualities. In the remainder of this chapter I want to focus on the argument from partial tests and the argument from the consensus of exemplary people. In particular, I want to focus on the link Jayanta draws between the virtues of an author and the reliability of that author’s statements, as well as his argument for why, in certain scenarios, we should forego our own epistemic investigations and instead, rely on those we deem epistemically superior to ourselves. This discussion reveals how Jayanta conceives of the role of the individual epistemic agent in relation to the broader social context. In particular, Jayanta argues that in certain knowledge endeavors, individual agents can and should shift the burden of responsibility from themselves to other agents deemed more competent.

To start the discussion, Jayanta’s Mīmāṃsaka interlocutors raise an objection to Jayanta’s claim that the Veda is reliable because it has been authored by trustworthy person. They state: If you say the Veda is reliable because it was authored by a trustworthy person, how do you in fact know that the Veda has a trustworthy author? We cannot perceive the fact that the Veda is
authored by a trustworthy person like we can perceive that a hill contains smoke. Moreover, we cannot infer that the Veda was authored by a trustworthy person since there is no inferential marker belonging to the Veda that indicates it has a trustworthy author. Given this, how can we say the Veda has been authored by a trustworthy person? In response, Jayanta tries to show that we know the author of the Veda is trustworthy because we can infer the author’s general credibility from partial tests we conduct on the Veda. This inference works, Jayanta argues, because of the invariable concomitance between credible speakers and reliable statements. Once we infer that the author of the Veda is trustworthy, on the basis of empirical instances we verify, we can then infer the overall reliability of the Veda, even regarding those statements we have not, and sometimes cannot verify, namely, those statements which refer to transcendent objects.

To demonstrate the link between credible speakers and reliable statements, Jayanta points to the Āyurveda, a text on traditional Indian medicine which he claims is the work of a well-known, human author, Caraka. For example, Jayanta states that we can observe the efficacy of medicinal herbs referred to in the Āyurveda. As a result, we know that those statements we tested in the Āyurveda are reliable. And the reason that those statements are reliable and correspond to reality is because they were uttered by a trustworthy person. Thus, from this we come to know that whenever a trustworthy person speaks, what she says will be reliable. Upon knowing the invariable concomitance between credible speakers and reliable statements, we then know

\[\text{NM (I, 603.6-603.7): } \text{nanu āptotatvasya hetoh paksadharmatvam katham avagamyate na pratyaksena kṣonidharadharmatvam iva dhīmasya vedānām āptaprāṇitavatvam avagamyate.}\]

\[\text{NM (I, 603.10-603.12): } \text{nāpy anumānam asminnarthe lingābhāvāt prāmāṇye hi vedasya āptotatvam liṅgam | āptotatvānuṇita tu na lingātaram upalabhāmaha iti kutastavā paksadharmatvanīścayāḥ |.}\]

\[\text{NM (I, 604, 14-15,17-19): } \text{vyāpti punar asya hetoh āyurvedādīvākṛtyeṣu niścīyate | pippalipatolamūdāder apy ausadhasya ithām upayogī idam abhīmatam īśādyate | ...pratyaksena tasyārthasya tathā niścayāt arthāśīvāṃvāditvam nāma prāmāṇyam pratipannam tace cedam āptavādaprāyuktam | ataḥ yatrāśīvādāvatvam tatra prāmāṇyam iti vyāptir grhyate ||}\]
that the statements in the Āyurveda which we have not tested are also reliable. This is because we have determined that the author of the Āyurveda is trustworthy. In applying this reasoning to the Veda, we can infer that Vedic statements regarding transcendent objects are reliable on the basis of the Veda having a trustworthy author. Additionally, one way we can know the Veda has a trustworthy author is on the basis of partial tests, like those that were conducted on the Āyurveda.247

Jayanta’s strategy here is to establishing the pervasion relation between credible authors and reliable statements by pointing to an example, the Āyurveda, which he believes the Mīmāṃsakas will accept. However, Jayanta’s Mīmāmsaka interlocutor disagrees on why exactly Āyurvedic statements are true. In particular, the interlocutor argues that the Āyurvedic statements we have confirmed are not true because they are uttered by a trustworthy person—something we cannot verify—but rather, because they accord with perceived facts.248 That is, upon witnessing the efficacy of medicinal herbs discussed in the Āyurveda, we know that the Āyurvedic statements pertaining to those herbs are true. They are true because they accord with the facts, not because they have been uttered by a trustworthy person.

At this point, Jayanta makes an important distinction. He argues that we can test, or verify, that statements are true by perceiving that they accord with the facts, however, such

247 Jayanta’s use of the Āyurveda example to establish the reliability of the Veda is noticeably different from past Nyāya authors like Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara. In particular, Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara claim that the reliability of the Veda is ascertained by the fact that the same seers who uttered the Veda also uttered the mantras and herbal remedies of the Āyurveda. Since the reliability of the Āyurveda, or parts of it, has been directly verified, then, based on the general trustworthiness of these seers, we can also infer that the claims they made about the Veda, which are not able to be directly verified since they concern transcendent objects, are also true. See NBh and NV in relation to NS 2.1.68 (in ND: 565-571). In contrast to this approach, Jayanta claims that the Āyurveda is the work of omniscient seers like Caraka, while the Veda is authored by God. Thus, Jayanta mentions the Āyurveda for the sole purpose of establishing the invariable concomitance between reliable speakers and the true statements, which he then applies to establishing the reliability of the Veda.

248 NM (I, 605.6-605.7): nanu āyurvedādau prāmāṇyaṁ prayyakṣādisaṁvādāt pratipannam nāptapraśāṇyāt |
statements do not acquire their truth this way. Instead, statements are true because they are uttered by trustworthy people. While, we can determine that statements are true on the basis of observing that they correspond to the facts, the arising of a statement’s truth is due to it having a good cause.\textsuperscript{249} I think Jayanta’s distinction between the metaphysical aspect of a statement’s truth and the epistemological aspect of a statement’s truth is helpful. If statements become true only when they are verified, this would mean that statements which have not been verified, even if they accord with reality, would not be true. This would lead to dire consequences, especially since we have many true beliefs about objects we have not, and sometimes cannot, directly verify.\textsuperscript{250} Instead, Jayanta wants to argue that if a statement has been uttered by trustworthy individual, even if we have not personally verified that statement, that statement will be true because it is rooted in a good cause, the credibility of its author. Similarly, if a statement has been uttered by a dishonest person, even if we have not personally verified that statement, we should doubt its truth because it has it has a bad cause.

However, Jayanta’s Mīmāmsaka rival reject this explanation and retorts that we could never determine whether works like the Āyurveda have been composed by a trustworthy author. The only thing we can know is that the statements of the Āyurveda we have tested are true. Moreover, those statements in the Āyurveda which our experience contradicts, should be

\textsuperscript{249} NM (I, 605.8-605.10): \textit{naitad evam pratyaksādīsaṃvādāt tan nīścīyatāṃ nāma prāmāṇyam utthitam tu tat āptoktatvāt | pratyaksādāv api arthakriyājñānasaṃvādāt prāmāṇyasya jñāptiḥ | utpattis tu guṇavatkārakāryaṇy āptoktatvāt

\textsuperscript{250} Related to this is William James’ notion that most of our truths live on a credit system. See James 1907: 206-209. James argues that we have not directly verified most of the true beliefs we hold. Instead, these beliefs are considered indirectly verified in the sense that nothing challenges them, that is, these beliefs lead to no frustration or contradiction. However, James argues that these beliefs must be directly verified somewhere by somebody, otherwise the whole system of truth collapses. I think James and Jayanta have different conceptions on what it means for a belief to be true. James believes a true idea is an idea we can verify and corroborate. While Jayanta agrees that we (or someone) can verify and corroborate all true beliefs, he does not think that this is what a belief’s truth consists of. Instead, a belief is true because it has a good cause, not because that belief led to a good result (even though true beliefs do lead to good results).
considered false. As an example of a false statement in the Āyurveda, Jayanta’s Mīmāṃsaka interlocutor points to the following sentence: “A person who uses the somarājī plant lives a thousand years.” Thus, in contrast to Jayanta, who wants to rely on the qualities of the author to establish the reliability of the Āyurveda, his Mīmāṃsaka interlocutor argues that first, we cannot determine whether the Āyurveda has an author, and second, the way we determine the reliability of Āyurvedic sentences is through the experimental method.

However, Jayanta sees a couple of problems with the Mīmāṃsā argument that associates truth with verification. In particular, Jayanta argues that the experimental method cannot constitute the basis of the Āyurveda’s reliability because it has very limited scope. For example, how would a person conduct these tests? Would a person test Āyurvedic claims on oneself or on another person? If a person conducts an experiment on another person, does the result hold universally or merely for a particular person at a particular time? In our limited life span, it is impossible to know the variety of diseases, their causes, their conditions of the amelioration, and the ways that different substances affect people with different bodily conditions. For example, a substance which might alleviate an illness in one person who has a particular constitution might produce no effect, or even a harmful effect, on a different person with a different constitution. People in the world are innumerable, as are diseases and the substances which counteract diseases. Due to practical and theoretical limitations, it is impossible for ordinary people to directly confirm the truth of all the medical and scientific propositions they claim to know.

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251 NM (I, 605.16-605.21): nanu evam api na yuktam āptoktatvasya tatra pariccheddttum aṣākyatvāt | anvayavyatirekamūla eva āyurvedavākyānāṃ prāmāṇyam nāptakṛtam | anvayavyatirekau ca yāvaty eva drṣyete tāvaty evārthe prāmāṇyam yathā hariṇāvādyāvādyārthe | yatra tū tayor adarśanāṃ tatrāprāmāṇyam yathā somarājyuqayogē sāmāḥ sahasraṃ jīvyate iti].

252 NM (I, 606.1-606.7): tad idam anupapannam anvayavyatirekāyoh grahitum aṣākyatvāt | tau hi svātmati vā grahitum śākyete vyākyantare vā vyākyantare ‘pi sarvamāḥ kvacid eva vā vyaktiviśeṣe sarvāthā saṃkṣaṭo ‘yam panthāḥ | vyādhīnāṃ tannidānāṃ tadupacayāpacayānāṃ tadupāsamoṣāyānāṃ aṣadhānāṃ
a result, Jayanta concludes that a person who is able to know the details of every disease, medicinal remedy, bodily constitutions, etc., must be omniscient. Moreover, ordinary people, due to their limitations, cannot rely on their own efforts in confirming the reliability of statements, but rather, must rely on the virtuous qualities of the others who are epistemically superior.

Jayanta’s response is a direct attack on the experimental method as a way to establish the truth of claims that, in Jayanta’s opinion, are beyond the capability of finite, limited humans. Instead, he introduces omniscience as a way to resolve the dilemma created by the impossibility of using the experimental method to know all there is to know about the medical sciences. On the other hand, in order to avoid claiming that the medical sciences have an author and that that author must be omniscient, the Mīmāṃsakas introduce the idea that bodies of knowledge can be eternal and authorless. Some background knowledge is helpful here. Mīmāṃsakas hold that certain traditional bodies of knowledge, such as the medical sciences, the science of grammar, and others, rather than having been authored, have been handed down throughout time through many different preceptors. Such teachings have no beginning (anādi) and are eternal. While Jayanta characterizes Caraka as an omniscient sage who is able to directly intuit all medical knowledge, his Mīmāṃsaka interlocutors reject omniscience and argue that Caraka, and other purported authors of ancient scientific texts, are not omniscient sages, but rather, teachers who merely expound upon the pre-existing medical science that has been passed down continuously from generation to generation. However, the information being passed down must have a good root, otherwise it could just be information being passed down by ignorant people. For example,

\[
tatsamyogaviyogaviśeṣānām tatparimāṇānām tadsavīrvipākānām desakālapuruṣaśābhādena śaktibhedasya ekena janmanā grahitum aśakyatvāt |
\]

NM (I, 607.19-607.20): tasmāt sarvajñapraṇīta evāyurvedah |.
while the tradition of grammar is based on the usage of experts, the tradition of the medical sciences is based on experimentation. However, if the treatises on grammar were to contradict the usage of experts, Mīmāṃsā would argue that the treatises are wrong. Similarly, if one were to find that something in the medical texts that contradicts our experience, it too would be false.\footnote{NM (607.1–607.7): \textit{athocyeta anādir evaivaśī cikitsakasmṛti vyākarānādīsmṛtivat | saṃkṣepavistaravvakayai
carakādayah kartāraḥ na tu e sarvadarśīnaḥ | na ca smṛtāv andhparamparadosāḥ samālātvāt | yathā
vyākarānasmrteḥ śiṣṭapravayo
gūlam evam iḥānvavavyatirekau | śiṣṭavrodhe sati yathā mulavirodhini
pānīnyādīsmṛtir apramāṇam tathā cāhuḥ iha na bhavat anabhidhānāt iti | evam vaidyāsmṛtir api
anvayavyatirekaviruddhā na pramāṇamīti |.}

This argument depends on certain vital components of the Mīmāṃsā worldview, namely, that the universe has always existed in its current form, and that language is eternal and does not require an author.\footnote{Taber 1992 argues that a rigid realism forms the basis of many important (Bhāṭṭa) Mīmāṃsā doctrines. While he focuses primarily on the doctrine of intrinsic validity (\textit{svatah prāmāṇya}), he argues that the Mīmāṃsā tendency to adhere strictly to appearances (the world always existed in its current form) informs the doctrine of the authorlessness of the Veda, the eternality of language, and the rejection of omniscience.} While Jayanta argues against these two theses, I will not discuss it here. The main point I want to stress is that the Mīmāṃsakas disagree with Jayanta’s inference whereby the Āyurveda is reliable because it is uttered by a trustworthy, let alone an omniscient, person. Instead, they argue that the true statements in the Āyurveda are the statements that have been verified by many people over countless millennia, and have been passed down from preceptor to pupil from time immemorial. However, Jayanta criticizes this deference to the experimental method. He even claims that even an expert like Caraka would not be able to ascertain all the properties of all substances discussed in the Āyurveda by the mere experimental method alone since it is extremely limited. Rather, Jayanta argues that, up until today, we have only conducted a small number of experiments on a portion of the medical sciences. Noticing that the results confirm what was written in the Āyurveda, we infer the truth of the entire Āyurveda and act on
its basis. We infer that the rest of the Āyurveda is true because we infer that its author is not only trustworthy, but omniscient.

When it comes to scriptural texts, Jayanta, as other Naiyāyikas before him, links the text’s reliability to the author’s extraordinary knowledge. This is one way to respond to the criticisms of the partial reliability inference. As we saw in this chapter and the last, this partial reliability inference was criticized by both Buddhists and Mīmāṃsakas. In particular, both groups were critical of an inference that claims to establish an author’s credibility with respect to statements regarding transcendent objects on the basis of that author’s credibility with respect to statements regarding empirical objects. The fact that a person is credible with respect to X does not mean that that same person is credible with respect to Y. Thus, as if in response to these critiques, Naiyāyikas like Jayanta tie the author’s reliability to the author’s superhuman qualities, such as omniscience. Jayanta is arguing that through the partial tests conducted on both the Veda and Āyurveda, we do not merely know that the authors of these texts are reliable, but additionally, we learn that they are omniscient. This is because there is no way such authors could have obtained their knowledge merely on the basis of the experimental method.

I want to mention a few things about Jayanta’s reliance on omniscience and partial tests as a method to confirm the reliability of religious texts like the Veda. First, Jayanta’s employment of the partial reliability inference differs from Dharmakīrti’s employment of it. While Dharmakīrti requires an epistemic agent to test all the empirical claims in a scripture before she is justified in believing what that scripture claims about nonempirical matters, Jayanta seems satisfied with the epistemic agent merely confirming a few instances of a scripture’s

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256 NM (I, 607.10-607.14): yadi hy anvavayavatirekābhhyāṃ aśeṣadravyaśaktīr niścītya carakādibhir viracitam śāstram itiḍrāsam anvavayavatirekītvam uc yat tad apavyāktam adyaty vēvan ṛav anvavavatirekau vayam upalabhunām śaknumāḥ tāvadbhhyāṃ tābhhyāṃ ekadeśasamvādāt prāmānyakalpanāt tatra pravartatām na tu tāvan tuḥ śāstrasā nūlam bhavitum arhataḥ |.
reliability on empirical matters. This is because, on that basis, we can then infer the credibility of the author and on that basis, infer the reliability of the entire text. One might ask if Jayanta is being irresponsible in claiming that we can infer the reliability of an entire text on the basis of a few confirmed instances of the author’s credibility. My sense is that, unlike Dharmakīrti, Jayanta scoffs at the notion that requires people to go around testing all the empirical claims that they grew up knowing. That seems to be asking too much of people who most likely do not have the time and resources to do so such in-depth testing even if they wanted to, to say nothing of the fact that most people would not be motivated to do so especially if they have no reason to doubt their deeply ingrained beliefs.

However, I think the main reason Jayanta adopts the partial tests argument is because it was supported by Naiyāyikas before him and because it does not require much work from the epistemic agent. While this method does require the epistemic agent to confirm a few instances of a scripture’s reliability, it seems as if the bulk of the epistemic work is negative in nature, that is, the epistemic agent should not be aware of any empirical instances in a scriptural text that have been proven false. Moreover, while Jayanta supports the partial tests argument, which requires the epistemic agent to conduct her own tests, he is much more interested in the argument where one infers the reliability of a scripture on the basis of the virtuous qualities of others, whether they be exemplary people who follow and accept a religious text or an author whose omniscience as been inferentially demonstrated.

I will not discuss the plausibility of superhuman qualities like omniscience, however, I do want to focus on the rationality of relying on the epistemic virtues of others, rather than ourselves, in verifying certain claims. This brings me to the third argument Jayanta employs in arguing that the Veda is reliable. In particular, Jayanta claims that the Veda is reliable because
exemplary people agree that it is reliable. Jayanta’s Mīmāṃsā rival, Kumārila, had already
mentioned this as a criterion of reliability, although, after much discussion, ultimately rejects it
because it is too relativistic. However, Jayanta’s use of it seems to be one of the first times it
was employed by a Naïyāyika. Moreover, Jayanta’s definition of an exemplary person
ultimately ends up being much more liberal and inclusive than Kumārila’s definition of an
exemplary person.

Jayanta discusses the criterion of exemplary people in chapter four of the NM, primarily in
the context of discussing the epistemic status of scripture other than the Veda. This discussion
follows Jayanta’s discussion on the proof of God and the reliability of the Veda. The chronology
here is important because topics that appear later in the NM often presupposes the conclusions
drawn in earlier discussions. As will be seen later on, some of the arguments Jayanta employs in
establishing the reliability of non-Vedic scripture depend on his proof of God and his arguments
regarding the authority of the Veda. In the context of discussing the authority of non-Vedic

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257 See the conversation in TV: 182-203. In TV: 203, Kumārila summarizes his position as follows, “That which is
taught in the Vedas and Smṛtis—if this is not contradicted by the practice of good men, such practice can be
accepted, as an authority for Dharma; but whenever there is the least contradiction of the said teachings, then, as
there would be a contradiction among the authorities, the practice can never be admitted to have any authority in
matters relating to Dharma.” Thus, for Kumārila, a text is only authoritative if it is based in the Veda, which is self-
validating.

258 Halbfass 1991: 25 claims that in the Nyāya text tradition, it was only after Uddyotakara (c. 6th century CE) that
the criterion of the consensus of exemplary people became a prominent argument for the authority of the Veda.
Freschi & Kataoka 2012: n 16 claims that the argument about the consensus of exemplary people was introduced in
the Nyāya tradition as a criterion for the validity of the Veda by either Jayanta or Vācaspati. In fn 242 and 243, I
hypothesized that Jayanta precedes Vācaspati and that Vācaspati was probably influenced by Jayanta. Therefore, in
this case, I would also hypothesize that the criterion of the consensus of exemplary people was probably introduced
in the Nyāya system by Jayanta.

259 For example, see TV: 182-203 for Kumārila’s commentary ad Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.3.7, which discusses the nature
and authority of exemplary people. In the initial part of Jayanta’s analysis on the epistemic status of all religious
scripture, Jayanta’s description of an exemplary person agrees with most of what Kumārila says. For example, both
claim that an exemplary person must belong to the Brahmanical tradition and abide by the norms set out in Vedic
literature. Thus, foreigners or individuals belonging to other religious traditions are not included in this definition.
However, in the concluding section of his argument, Jayanta ends up expanding upon his vision of who counts as an
exemplary person and includes those individuals outside of the Vedic tradition.
scripture, Jayanta first mentions the criterion of exemplary people in order to demonstrate why certain types of non-Vedic scripture, such as Buddhist scripture, are not reliable. In this regard, Jayanta argues that we know a text is reliable if it is accepted by exemplary people. Exemplary people accept the reliability of Veda and related Vedic texts, such as the Purāṇas and Dharmashastras, along with texts that, while not based on the Veda, do not openly contradict it. However, Jayanta argues that exemplary people do not accept Buddhist scripture since it contradicts the Veda. As a result, Jayanta claims that Buddhist scripture was not composed by a trustworthy person, but rather, arose from a different source, such as from an ignorant or greedy author. Thus, the acceptance or rejection of a scripture by exemplary people is a reliable indicator of whether that scripture is reliable.

At this point, an objector challenges Jayanta to explain just what he means by an “exemplary person.” In particular, the objector asks who counts as an exemplary person. For example, does an exemplary person look or act in a certain way? Moreover, Buddhists could also claim that people they deem exemplary, such as Buddhist monks, accept and follow Buddhist scripture, thus indicating its reliability. These objections raise many good questions. First, how do we define an “exemplary” person? Is there an objective set of criteria regarding who counts as “exemplary,” or can we disagree about what features make a person “exemplary” and whether or not a person actually instantiates those features? As Jayanta’s objector points out, Buddhists would disagree on what makes a person exemplary and who exactly counts as an exemplary person. As a result of this disagreement, how can we use the criterion “accepted by exemplary people” as a reliable indicator of which scripture is trustworthy?

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260 Freschi & Kataoka 2012: Section 5.2.2.1 of Part 2 and NM (I, 637.18-638.3).

261 Freschi & Kataoka 2012: Section 5.2.2.1 of Part 2 and NM (I, 638.19-638.24).
In his response, Jayanta puts forth a narrow definition of what it means to be an exemplary person. In particular, he states, although there are no specific physical traits that characterize such a person, an exemplary person is one who follows *varṇāśramadharma*.\(^{262}\)

*Varṇāśramadharma* is a Vedic principle whereby individuals are categorized according to four social classes (*varṇa*), determined by birth and occupation, and four age-based stages (*āśrama*), based on different duties and responsibilities expected of a male during the different periods of his life. This principle captures one of the central teachings of the Brahmanical orthodoxy,\(^{263}\) despite the fact that, among Brahmanical philosophers, there were often disagreements regarding specifics, such as whether all social classes all qualified to enter all the life stages. Moreover, this principle of fixing lifestyles and livelihood did not go unchallenged. It was resisted by Buddhists and other renouncer/ascetic groups that challenged the Brahmanical social order.\(^{264}\) This will be mentioned in the next chapter where Jayanta tackles the problem of religious disagreement.

In saying that an exemplary person must belong to the social structure delineated by *varṇāśramadharma*, Jayanta is claiming that people who are located outside of this system, such as foreigners, or people who are shunned by society due to “grievous sins” could not considered exemplary people.\(^{265}\) What is interesting is that although this definition seems narrow and restrictive, Jayanta argues that followers of non-Vedic religious traditions, such as Buddhists, implicitly and unknowingly accept *varṇāśramadharma* and thus the Vedic definition of an

\(^{262}\) Freschi & Kataoka 2012: Section 5.2.2.2 of Part 2 and NM (I, 638.24-638.25).


\(^{264}\) For a detailed study of the āśrama system see Olivelle 1993. See Aktor 2017 for an overview of the *varṇa* system as presented in Dharmaśāstric literature.

\(^{265}\) Olivelle 1998 looks at classical Dharma texts that refer to purity and social hierarchy. He argues that the term pure/impure, while almost never used in reference to a social group, is used to refer to groups who have breached the social order and hence are outside of established society.
exemplary person. In particular, Jayanta claims that although Buddhists claim to reject the Brahmanical worldview, they still abide by it, for example, by avoiding contact with those considered outside the social system (caṇḍālas and other untouchables). Moreover, regarding actions that are forbidden by the Veda because they do not abide by purity laws, Buddhists tend to perform these actions in secret because they are afraid of disrespecting exemplary people who abide by Vedic principles. This is taken as evidence that Buddhists still respect the Veda for why else would they act in such a manner. Moreover, Jayanta claims that Buddhist texts copy the Veda in that they extol the same virtues lauded in the Veda, such as non-violence and truthfulness. Thus, Jayanta concludes that even the Buddhists agree with this definition of an exemplary person, even if they do so in secret rather than openly.266

Thus, from this discussion, it is clear that Jayanta does not think that the definition of an exemplary person is up for negotiation. What is interesting is that Jayanta does not examine or question the authority of varṇāśramadharma, and, as will be seen in the next chapter, other Vedic obligations or prohibitions that comprise the status quo.267 The content of dharma, or Vedic obligations, belongs to the realm of the unseen, which is revealed by scripture. However, Jayanta does argue for the rationality of the basic premise of varṇāśramadharma by arguing for the reality of universals, which accounts for and helps explain the four main social classes.268 Moreover, Jayanta has argued that non-Vedic traditions, such as Buddhism, agree that an

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266 Freschi & Kataoka 2012: Section 5.2.2.2 of Part 2 and NM (1, 638.14-639.14).

267 There is a very interesting section in the Āgamadambara, discussed in the next chapter, where Jayanta, in speaking about caste universals such as “brahminhood” suggests that the status quo should not be questioned. In this respect, see ĀD: 239, “Are such caste universals as ‘brahminhood’ perceptible in the same way as the genus universal ‘cowness’ or differently?": such deliberation about the true state of affairs is beside the point, it makes no difference. The status quo, established in all doctrines and for everyone, should not be speculated about in this way.”

268 Jayanta argues for the reality of universals in the first part of chapter 5 of the NM. There he is primarily arguing against the Buddhist theory of apoha (exclusion), which explains the basis of all our conceptual awareness without postulating real universals.
exemplary person should abide by the Vedic model of social rules regarding appropriate behavior and lifestyles. As evidence, Jayanta points to the fact that Buddhists still follow Vedic rules, such as avoiding contact with groups that reject social norms and performing Buddhist rites in secret so as to avoid judgment on the part of exemplary people. Moreover, since much of the moral content of Buddhist scriptures resembles Vedic content, Buddhists still implicitly uphold Vedic virtues. As a result, Jayanta argues that Buddhists tacitly agree with the Vedic conception of an exemplary person. If this is the case, and if exemplary persons uphold Vedic scripture while rejecting scripture that contradicts the Veda, like Buddhist scripture, and if the consensus of exemplary people indicates whether or not a text has a trustworthy author, then it would follow that the Buddhist scriptures are not reliable.

I want to delve deeper into this notion of an exemplary person, and in particular, epistemic authority figures, or, those we deem better suited than ourselves at arriving at certain truths. While Jayanta’s discussion of an exemplary person raises a lot of questions, I want to focus on two: first, who counts as an epistemic authority figure, and second, how should an epistemic authority’s belief or testimony that \( p \) fit with other evidence we might have for or against \( p \)? Regarding the first question, as we just saw, Jayanta restricts epistemic authority figures to those people who abide by the Vedic social order. Such a person would uphold the socio-ethical worldview of Jayanta’s religious and intellectual tradition. However, as would be assumed, many individuals would disagree with Jayanta’s conception of an epistemic authority figure. As we will see in the next chapter, even Jayanta himself ends up expanding his definition of an exemplary person so as to include those individuals esteemed by other religious traditions, even if outside the Vedic worldview.
Regarding the second question, what happens in cases where we believe that a person we take to be an epistemic authority is wrong? Does the epistemic authority’s testimony and beliefs always trump our own, or is there a way to adjudicate between these two conflicting sources of evidence? We saw this issue arise in Jayanta’s debate with his Mīmāṃsaka interlocutor on the reliability of the Āyurveda. In particular, Jayanta’s rival points to an example where an Āyurvedic prescription has been proven false, despite the fact that we have some evidence of the author’s trustworthiness. The particular prescription claimed that a person who consumes the somarājī plant will live a thousand years.\textsuperscript{269} The Mīmāṃsakas use this example to argue that contra-Jayanta, only the statements we confirm are true while the statements we disprove are false. Additionally, this example shows why we cannot assume the truth of all statements in the Āyurveda on the basis of its partial reliability.

Jayanta’s response to the Mīmāṃsakas’ counter-example highlights his deference to authority even in cases where it seems as if that authority is wrong. Jayanta argues that statements in the Āyurveda are not falsified if, for example, a certain medicine is not properly administered or a person taking the medicine does not have the right constitution. The fault is with the agent or the act, not with the Āyurveda. To further convince his Mīmāṃsaka interlocutor, Jayanta points to Vedic prescriptions, which the Mīmāṃsakas take to be authoritative, and argues that they too are open to the same charge. For example, the Veda claims that if one were to perform the Kārīrī rite, rain will result. However, what if rain were not to occur? Would the Veda only be partially true? A partially true Veda would not be acceptable to a Mīmāṃsaka. Instead, Jayanta’s Mīmāṃsaka interlocutor would most likely argue that the Veda’s statement about the Kārīrī rite is true and the absence of rain is due to a defect in the conditions.

\textsuperscript{269} See page 154 above.
of the sacrifice, such as a defect in the performer of the ritual, the ritual act itself, or in accessories of the sacrifice. In a later section of the NM, where Jayanta deals with objections to the authority of the Veda from non-Vedic traditions such as Buddhism, Jayanta also claims that some rituals produce results that do not immediately appear. If a result does not immediately appear it is assumed that a powerful negative action a person has committed either in this life or a previous life counteracts the fruition of the present ritual.

Thus, Jayanta argues that the same sort of response that the Mīmāṃsakas would give to counter an objection regarding the Veda’s authority in instances of purported counter-examples, can be similarly applied to the Āyurveda. If a particular action enjoined by either the Āyurveda or the Veda does not yield its respective result, why would only the Āyurveda be considered defective? Jayanta’s reasoning is that once we establish that a person is trustworthy through verifying a certain number of their statements, we can infer that other statements they make, those we have not verified, are also true. For example, when it comes to the Āyurveda, we should always defer to Caraka so long as we believe that Caraka is trustworthy. Even if we think we have found evidence of the falsity of certain claims in the Āyurveda, most likely we have committed some human error. Thus, Jayanta essentially seems to be arguing that, at least in certain domains, such as the domain of religious knowledge, we should always defer to a person we deem to be an authority figure, regardless of whether their testimony contradicts other evidence we might have for or against a belief. In situations where we believe we have evidence that the authority is wrong, more often than not, it is we who have made a mistake.

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270 NM (I, 608.11-608.16): yady evam katham tarhi somarājyādīvākṣyeṣu vyabīcāraḥ vyabīcāre ca dharatīyām ity uktam naśa doṣah karmakartrśādhanavaigunyāt eṣu vyabhicārābhaviṣyati | vaigunyāt ca karmasu mīmāṃsakasya samāṇa guṇaḥ || kāriyādau kā te vārtā yasyāṁ na syādiṣṭau vrṣṭiḥ | vaigunyam cet kartrādīnām atrāpy evam śakyam vaktum ||

271 NM (I, 652.12-656.11).
I want to explore the merits of this position by looking at how a contemporary thinker, Linda Zagzebski, grapples with questions of epistemic authority, and in particular, what it means to believe on the basis of authority and why we might be justified in doing so. In her work, Zagzebski delineates principles of epistemic authority that are modeled off of the principles developed by Joseph Raz in his defense of political authority. One of Zagzebski’s main goals is to show that if political authority is compatible with autonomy, so too is epistemic authority. There are two central theses I want to discuss in connection with a defense of authority: the Pre-emption Thesis and the Justification Thesis. The Pre-emption Thesis for epistemic authority is a thesis about what it means to believe on the basis of an authority. It states that to believe on the basis of an authority, or that authority’s testimony, one must take the authority’s belief or testimony as one’s reason for belief, replacing all other reasons one might have for or against that belief. On the other hand, the Justification Thesis tells us why we should believe on the basis of authority. It states that the authority of another person’s belief or testimony for me is justified by my conscientious judgement that I am more likely to form true beliefs and avoid false ones if I believe what the authority believes or testifies to than if I try to figure out what to believe by myself.

According to the Pre-emption Thesis, fundamental to the notion of authority is the normative power to give pre-emptive reasons for believing that \( p \). The authority’s belief or testimony that \( p \) is not just one among many reasons for believing that \( p \)– it is the reason one believes that \( p \). Zagzebski explains that the Pre-emption Thesis does not mean that a person consciously decides to let one reason pre-empt all other reasons for belief, rather, it is a statement

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272 In particular, I’m referring to Zagzebski 2012, 2013 and 2016.

273 These two theses are described in Zagzebski 2012: chapter 5, Zagzebski 2013, and Zagzebski 2016: section 2.
about what a rational person ought to do.\textsuperscript{274} Still, some might resist this thesis and inquire into why an authority’s belief cannot simply count as one piece of evidence that can then be added to, perhaps even weighing heavier than, other reasons a subject has for or against belief. The reason this would not work is that it would result in a person having fewer true beliefs overall. The reasoning is as follows: there are certain domains where I know that an authority is right more often than I am. Thus, if I merely tilt the balance in the authority’s favor, that is, if I merely add a certain weight to the authority’s verdict over mine, then, while in certain cases this would result in a reversal of my own independent judgment, in other cases it would not. What would end up happening is that in those cases where I endorsed the authority’s judgment, my rate of mistakes would decline and end up equaling that of the authority’s rate of mistake. However, in those cases where I opposed the authority’s judgment, my rate of error would remain unchanged and, as before, greater than that of the authority. This demonstrates that, only upon allowing the authority’s reasons to preempt my own will I end up having more success in acquiring true beliefs.\textsuperscript{275}

But what if the authority makes an outrageous claim? Zagzebski gives the example of a physician telling a patient to take 4,000 pills every hour for the rest of that person’s life.\textsuperscript{276} While Zagzebski argues that this surely is a reason to reject a person as an authority, it is not a reason to reject the Pre-emption Thesis. For why this is the case, we need to look at Zagzebski’s Justification Thesis, which explains why it is rational to believe on the basis of authority. In

\textsuperscript{274} Zagzebski 2013: 300-301.

\textsuperscript{275} Zagzebski 2012: 114-115 and 2013: 301-302. Zagzebski cites an amusing empirical study not only demonstrating that preemption leads to better results but also that certain animals, such as rats and pigeons, learn this better than humans. For example, if a rat learns that one choice is better than another, it will always select that choice, whereas humans will try to assess probabilities. As a result, humans performed worse than the animals.

\textsuperscript{276} Zagzebski 2012: 116 and 2013: 302.
particular, it states that I should take someone as an epistemic authority if I conscientiously judge that I am more likely to acquire true beliefs and avoid false ones if I believe what that person believes or testifies to than if try to figure out the matter on my own. Thus, it is my conscientious reflection that decides who counts as an authority. Moreover, my decision to label someone an authority can be withdrawn if I have a defeater to this belief. However, so long as I conscientiously believe that someone is better than me at obtaining the truth in some domain, I have very good reason to take that person’s belief that $p$ as pre-empting all other reasons I might have for or against $p$. In doing so, I am serving my own epistemic ends. One of Zagzebski’s goals is to show that authority, rather than conflicting with autonomy follows from it. The idea is that the basis of my trust in the authority is myself, and in particular, my conscientious judgement that the authority is better equipped than I am at attaining the truth in certain domains.

However, Zagzebski admits that, as it stands, the Justification Thesis is not always sufficient to justify believing on the basis of an epistemic authority. For example, if the authority is only slightly more likely to arrive at the truth than I am, this might not be enough to justify my deferring to that authority. Rather than a qualification on the Justification Thesis, this point merely shows the difficulty in being confident that another person is epistemically superior to oneself in a certain domain. There is also the challenging case of multiple competing authorities, all of whom are more likely to arrive at the truth than I am but none of whom I have more reason to trust than the others. In this scenario, we could defer judgement or we could make a judgement based on other reasons we might have for belief. For example, truth might not be the only end to consider. We also have practical and communal ends. After conscientiously
reflecting on the matter it might happen that one authority comes out on top.\textsuperscript{277} I will speak more about multiple competing authorities, and in particular, scriptural traditions, in the next chapter. What would someone like Jayanta have to say about the Pre-emption Thesis and the Justification Thesis? In certain epistemic contexts, Jayanta seems to agree with the thesis that establishes an authority’s normative power to give others pre-emptive reasons for belief. For example, as was seen above in the example concerning the Āyurveda, Jayanta argues that in many cases our own abilities in certain fields are inadequate for arriving at true beliefs. Even if we think we have good reasons for why an authority’s testimony is wrong, so long as that we remain committed to taking that person as an authority, we should accept that authority’s testimony. In a sense, that authority’s testimony should preempt other reasons we might have for or against a belief. Of course, Jayanta also viewed the author of the Āyurveda as omniscient and thus incapable of error. In most cases, we do not believe that authorities are omniscient and thus pre-emption is much harder to accept since people we take to be authorities, despite having a better track record at getting at the truth, also make mistakes.

However, the consensus of exemplary people, which Jayanta uses as a criterion for establishing a text’s reliability, seems to refer to non-omniscient individuals. Earlier he defined exemplary people as those who abided by a certain moral and social code that was accepted by the Brahmanical orthodoxy. This definition covers a large swath of people and is not restricted to sage-like beings like Caraka. In such cases, I think Jayanta would argue that a belief being accepted by a group of exemplary people is just one among other reasons one might have for holding a belief. Despite viewing the consensus of exemplary people as an “authority,” I do not think Jayanta would argue that this would preempt all other reasons we have for or against a belief.

\textsuperscript{277} These challenging cases are mentioned in Zagzebski 2013: 300 and Zagzebski 2016: 21-22.
belief. For example, as will be seen in the next chapter, when Jayanta ultimately argues for the authority of all sacred texts the consensus of exemplary people is just one reason among others which he gives. Thus, it seems as if, for Jayanta, something like the Pre-Emption Thesis might only apply to epistemic authorities taken to have superhuman qualities, like omniscience.

Before concluding this chapter, I want discuss the concept of religious authorities, or authority figures within certain religious communities. While Jayanta’s notion of exemplary people need not specifically refer to religious authorities, given the fact that he discusses this concept in the context of defending the reliability of the Veda and other scriptural traditions, it seems as if many of those labelled exemplary people, would be religious authorities. In Zagzebski’s discussion of epistemic authority, we saw that she bases the justification of authority on an individual’s reasons for acting and believing, and, as a result, given individual differences, people who are authorities for one person will not necessarily be authorities for another person. However, in discussing religious authority, Zagzebski explains that there are certain people who are authoritative for a group of people who are bonded together through their acceptance of teachings that have been transmitted by an authority structure that is recognized as best set up to transmit such authoritative teachings into the future. Religious authorities can be both epistemic and practical since they direct people’s beliefs as well as their actions. In addition to being justified through the individual ends it helps people within the religious community attain, such as individual salvation, religious authority is also justified in reference to a community’s communal ends, such as aiding people outside the community. In this sense the community is like an extended self. 278

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278 For more on Zagzebski’s concept of religious authority see Zagzebski 2012: chapter 9 and 2016: section 4.
Moreover, religious authorities often teach people what their individual ends are. In this sense, the authority of a religious community is often more extensive than an individual epistemic authority. For example, we adopt certain individual ends, such as salvation, by belonging to a religious community. This means that in many cases, the authority of a religious community is justified through ends that one has adopted on the basis of the religious community. Is this a problem for individual autonomy? Not necessarily. Throughout our life, the process of self-reflection and self-governance often involves a modification or addition to our ends. As a result, we can choose to adopt certain ends on the basis of authority. In this way, Zagzebski argues, the selection and modification of ends on the basis of authority is still grounded in our autonomy.

While Jayanta is not particularly interested in defending individual or communal ends on the basis of individual autonomy, as we will see in the next chapter, important to Jayanta is the issue of the individual autonomy of diverse, and often conflicting, religious traditions. Jayanta was living at a time when there were multiple religious traditions co-existing, each with a distinct set of scripture and authority figures. One of the main topics that will be discussed in the next chapter is the issue of religious disagreement and in particular, disagreement that stems from mutually conflicting scriptural testimony. If distinct religious traditions each claim that their scripture is reliable and their religious authorities trustworthy, how does one approach this issue, both epistemically and practically? While Jayanta is concerned about the truth of the matter, that is, which scriptural traditions are reliable, he is also concerned about the practical issue, that is, how are distinct, and sometimes mutually conflicting, religious traditions to coexist. Although the assessment of the social impact of certain religious beliefs and practices is mentioned in chapter four of the NM, it is brought out more forcefully in Jayanta’s philosophical play, the
Āgamaḍambara (ĀḌ). There, Jayanta’s practical aims are brought to the forefront when the main character is forced to deal with disturbing and antisocial religious practices.

3.4 Conclusion

This chapter had two broad goals: first, to analyze the epistemic distinction Jayanta draws between mundane and religious cases of testimony in light of pragmatic encroachment theories, and second, to look at Jayanta’s defense of Vedic authority, and the concept of epistemic authority more generally. In terms of the first goal, I started off by looking at the introductory remarks to the NM, which underscored the importance of linking epistemic matters to practical goals. In particular, Jayanta emphasized the importance of scriptural testimony, especially the Veda, and argued that it was one of the only means for ordinary people to access imperceptible objects and ends, such as heaven and liberation. However, since Vedic beliefs, if wrong, would result in great harm to the individual, Jayanta argued that it was not rational to act or reason on the basis of Vedic testimony which has not been confirmed.

Because of the different risks associated with mundane versus scriptural beliefs, Jayanta argues that such beliefs merit different epistemic treatment. In particular, beliefs based on religious testimony require a higher level of justification. In defense of this distinction and in order to show its relevance in contemporary studies, I discussed pragmatic encroachment in epistemology, and specifically, the notion that practical factors, such as stakes considerations, have epistemic significance. While there are conceptual differences between theories of pragmatic encroachment and Jayanta’s epistemology that depend on, in particular, Jayanta’s bifurcation of justification and knowledge, I argued that many of the practical implications were the same. In particular, both Jayanta and contemporary theorists of pragmatic encroachment
argue that a subject requires more epistemic justification for her belief in situations where she has much to lose if her belief is false.

This then led into a conversation about doubt, knowledge, and action. In particular, I looked at Jayanta’s definition of doubt, where doubt is characterized as any cognitive state which whose truth has not been confirmed. Although Jayanta argued that acting and reasoning on the basis of doubtful cognitions is fine when it comes to mundane cognitions, since the risk is little and we get by just fine in everyday life employing cognitions whose truth we have not confirmed, it is dangerous when it comes to non-mundane beliefs, and primarily, scriptural beliefs. This is because, since we have much to lose if we end up being wrong about such beliefs, it makes rational sense to confirm those beliefs before utilizing them in practical reasoning.

The second part of this chapter discussed the process by which doubt is removed from scriptural beliefs, and in particular, beliefs based on the Veda. Here I primarily focused on two main arguments Jayanta employs in establishing the Veda’s reliability: partial tests and the consensus of exemplary people. Regarding the partial tests’ argument, Jayanta argued that we can infer that the Veda as a whole is reliable, and in particular, the portions of the Veda that deal with transcendent objects, after we have confirmed the reliability of the Veda’s empirical claims. From establishing the truth of empirical statements, Jayanta argues that we can infer that the author of the Veda trustworthy and from that, infer that the statements that author makes about objects we cannot verify are also true.

On the other hand, Jayanta’s Mīmāṁsaka interlocutor rebuffs his arguments, rejecting the notion that statements are true because they have been composed by a trustworthy author and instead, arguing that statements are true because they have been confirmed in experience. Jayanta’s response to this object underscores the distinction between what makes a belief true
and how we determine a belief is true. Moreover, we saw Jayanta emphasize the limited scope of the experimental method, praised by the Mīmāṃsakas, and argue that, as a result, many authors of scriptural texts must be omniscient. Important in this conversation is Jayanta’s insistence on our need to rely on those we deem epistemically superior than ourselves in obtaining knowledge that is out of reach for finite, limited humans. This notion of relying on the virtuous qualities of others to infer the truth of scriptural statements ties into the second criterion Jayanta uses to demonstrate the reliability of the Veda: the consensus of exemplary people. In particular, Jayanta argues that we can infer a text’s reliability on the basis of whether it is accepted or rejected by exemplary people. We saw that Jayanta delineated a specific definition of an exemplary person, namely, a person that followed the Brahmanical social and moral code delineated in Vedic texts, and argued that even those belonging to non-Vedic tradition implicitly accept this definition.

Delving deeper into the notion of what makes a person an epistemic authority and moreover, how one is justified in taking another person as an epistemic authority, this chapter looked at Linda Zagzebski’s work on epistemic authority, and in particular, her Pre-emption Thesis and Justification Thesis. Zagzebski argued that taking someone as an epistemic authority means that their testimony or belief that \( p \) should pre-empt all other reasons we have for \( p \). Moreover, believing on the basis of authority is justified if I conscientiously believe the I am more likely to attain true beliefs and avoid false ones if I follow the authority rather than attempt to figure out the matter on my own. It was argued that Jayanta seems to accept some version of the Pre-Emption Thesis, at least in certain cases of religious authority. In particular, we saw Jayanta argue, against his Mīmāṃsaka interlocutor, that Caraka’s trustworthiness, and more specifically, his omniscience, trumps any evidence of falsity we may think we have found in the Āyurveda.
The final chapter delves deeper into the notion of religious authority. In particular, it analyzes Jayanta’s approach to mutually conflicting scriptural traditions. In doing so, it highlights Jayanta’s use of epistemic, pragmatic, and social considerations in his defense of a unique, pluralistic thesis, namely, the authority of all religious traditions.
Chapter 4: The Challenge of Religious Disagreement

4.0 Introduction

The goal of this chapter is twofold: first, to examine Jayanta’s approach to the problem of religious disagreement, and second, to argue that Jayanta’s stance that practical considerations should affect how we approach religious disagreement might help break some of the deadlock in contemporary theorizing on intractable religious disagreement. To accomplish these goals, this chapter looks closely at the section in the fourth chapter of the NM where Jayanta discusses the authoritative status of non-Vedic religious scripture. I will refer to this as the section on the Sarvāgamaprāmāṇya (SĀP), which refers to the view that all religious scripture is authoritative. I will also look at Jayanta’s philosophical play, the Āgamaḍambara (ĀḌ), or, Much Ado About Religion, on the particular issue of religious diversity and disagreement. While there are many parallel passages in the SĀP and the ĀḌ, the SĀP is primarily framed in terms of the theoretical problem of religious disagreement while the ĀḌ underscores the concrete, practical problem of religious disagreement. Despite this, I would argue that both works have the same intellectual rival—a certain Mīmāṃsaka-based view that only upholds the authority of the Veda and Vedic-related texts—and a similar strategy—the employment of both Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā criteria of authority to slowly enlarge the scope of what counts as an authoritative text.

279 I take this designation from Freschi & Kataoka 2012: 4, n 3.

280 Dezső credits the Sanskrit scholar Alexis Sanderson for the English translation of the title of this text. See Dezső 2005: 22, n. 35.

281 In terms of relative chronology, the NM is thought to predate the ĀḌ. The ĀḌ quotes a verse in the NM and claims that it is a wise saying of Jayanta. The verse is found in NM (I, 640.17-640.18) and is mentioned in ĀḌ: 229. For more information see Dezső 2005: 16 and Raghavan and Thakur 1964: xxvi.
I will begin this chapter by examining how Jayanta frames the problem of religious disagreement, and in particular, the ubiquity of diverse and conflicting religious scripture. Moreover, I will take a closer look at the nature of Jayanta’s primary intellectual rival since this affects his portrayal of and approach to the problem. Afterwards, I will introduce the problem of religious disagreement as it has been discussed in the contemporary context. In particular, I want to look at how religious disagreement is typically subsumed under general epistemic disagreements, as well as three main responses to epistemic disagreement. Looking at contemporary theories on the problem of religious disagreement not only sheds light on how this issue has been approached today, but moreover, it underscores Jayanta’s unique approach to the problem of religious disagreement, especially in terms of his consideration of relevant social and practical factors.

While in the contemporary context, the discussion is typically framed in terms of whether religious disagreement is a challenge to religious belief and whether it is rational to maintain one’s belief in the face of significant peer conflict, Jayanta’s discussion assumes the authority of the Veda and then raises the question about the authority of non-Vedic scripture, particularly scripture that conflicts with the Veda. Thus, for Jayanta, the problem of religious disagreement is the problem of whether other religious scripture hold the same authority as the Veda. Additionally, in contrast to contemporary assessments of the problem of religious disagreement, where the focus is on epistemic factors that pertain to rational belief, Jayanta’s assessment also considers how practical factors affect the epistemic significance of scriptural beliefs.

In looking at Jayanta’s portrayal of the problem of religious disagreement, and in particular, his approach to religious texts outside the Veda, I will primarily follow the format of the SĀP, since it is more straightforward in its presentation of Jayanta’s view. Along the way, I
will add relevant information from the ĀD. In assessing the authoritative status of non-Vedic texts in the SĀP, Jayanta first looks at texts closest to the Veda before branching out to texts that are more removed from the Veda, including texts that outright contradict the Veda. This chapter aims to highlight the process by which Jayanta uses his opponent’s own criteria for a text’s authority to gradually get his opponent to enlarge the scope of religious texts considered authoritative. Important in this conversation is Jayanta’s focus on practical goals in this discussion, such as getting his interlocutor to agree that a large number of non-Vedic texts are authoritative, despite whether this position is based on Nyāya or Mīmāṃsā criteria for authority.

While Jayanta’s overall position is that all sacred texts, barring some exceptions, should be considered authoritative, he doesn’t propose this right away. After getting his Mīmāṃsaka interlocutor to agree to the authority of texts that do not outright contradict the Veda, he, at first, concedes the fact that texts which do contradict the Veda, such as Buddhist and Jain texts, should not be considered authoritative. This hostility toward text traditions that contradict the Veda is humorously depicted in the ĀD, where Buddhist and Jain monks are presented as intellectually deficient and morally depraved. Additionally, the ĀD presents Naiyāyikas and Mīmāṃsakas as joining forces to defeat common enemies who reject the authority of the Veda. This is in line with Jayanta’s overall strategy of trying to win over his more orthodox intellectual rival by underscoring the similarities in their position and by combining both Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā arguments.

The last section of this chapter will present Jayanta’s ultimate thesis on the problem of religious disagreement: the idea that all religious texts, barring a few extreme cases, are authoritative. Jayanta presents this solution as a compromise between the Brahmanical orthodoxy and the socio-political reality of the time. Jayanta’s thesis is unique in terms of its scope, and in
terms of its incorporation of both Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā criteria for authority. After presenting this position, I will discuss the following two objections to Jayanta’s argument: first, the idea that mutual contradictions between distinct scriptural traditions invalidates their authority, and second, the concern that Jayanta’s thesis makes any and all religious texts authoritative, including those that express extreme and antisocial views.

4.1 The Problem of Other Religious Scripture in the Context of the SĀP and the ĀḌ

In the SĀP, Jayanta introduces the problem of other religious scripture after his proof of the existence of God and his demonstration that the Veda’s reliability is based on it having a trustworthy author, namely, God. At this point, an interlocutor questions whether the process by which the Veda has been determined reliable can also be used to demonstrate the reliability of other religious texts. If not, what about other religious traditions who claim that their own scripture is also authoritative? If the same process can be applied to other religious scripture then it would seem that other religious scripture would be false since they contradict each other and the Veda. In responding to this objection, Jayanta first distinguishes between two categories of religious texts: texts that are more similar to the Veda, such as the Pūrāṇas, Itihāsas, and Dharmaśāstras, and texts that are more removed from the Veda, such as Jain, Buddhist, and Śaiva texts. Ultimately, Jayanta will argue that the same criteria that establish the authority of the Veda and Vedic-related texts can also establish the authority of texts far removed from the Veda.

282 See Freschi & Kataoka 2012: 28 (section 1).

283 These texts are considered part of the corpus of Smṛti literature, or, the “remembered tradition,” as opposed to Śruti literature, such as the Veda, which is “heard” or “revealed.” Smṛti literature concerns a variety of topics and appears in variety of forms, such as epic literature, narratives regarding ancient history, texts on law and social conduct, and poetical literature.
Similar to the SĀP, the ĀḌ also addresses the authoritative status of religious texts outside the Veda. As Jayanta’s only extant literary work, the ĀḌ is a four-act satirical play that centers on the problem of religious diversity, especially in terms of how the coexistence of diverse and often conflicting religious traditions fits in with the politics of the ruling sovereign of Kashmir, king Śaṅkaravarman (883-902 CE). While there are numerous parallel passages in both the SĀP and ĀḌ, one main difference between the two texts is that the ĀḌ focuses more on problematic religious traditions whose beliefs and practices could upend the social order. The ĀḌ’s focus on the more negative elements of religion, as well as on the need to purge society of such aspects, can be explained by pointing to the distinct goals of these texts. While the SĀP is more interested in the theoretical problem of the epistemic status of religious scripture outside the Veda, the ĀḌ is primarily concerned with the concrete social problem of diverse religious traditions, especially those which contain deviant religious practices.

In particular, the SĀP focuses more on the abstract problem of religious disagreement in the form of conflicting religious texts and the particular criteria used to determine which texts are authoritative. On the other hand, the ĀḌ relays the story of king Śaṅkaravarman’s minister of religious affairs, Saṅkarṣaṇa, who is tasked with riding society of socially dangerous religious traditions. Thus, in the ĀḌ, there is a real, concrete problem of how the various religious

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284 Śaṅkaravarmin’s dates are reconstructed on the basis of Kalhana’s Rājata raṅgini, a 12th century historical and literary chronicle on the various dynasties that ruled Kashmir. For more information on this text see Stein 1961, volume 1, especially the Introductory sections that deal with the Rājata raṅgini as historical literature.


286 Intellectual interest in epistemic status of religious texts originated around the middle of the first millennium CE and grew stronger around Jayanta’s time. For example, Freschi & Kataoka 2012: 7, n. 9 mentions a few texts around Jayanta’s time that discuss approaches to the diversity of religious scripture, in particular, Yāmunācārya’s Ágamaprāmāṇya on the authority of the Pāncarātra, Abhinavagupta’s Tantrāloka chapter XXXV, and Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṭṭha’s commentary on Sadyojyotis’ Mokṣakārikā. See also footnote 168 for a similar note as it relates to Buddhist apologetics.
traditions, each with its own distinct scripture and observances, should coexist. The lead character, Saṅkarṣaṇa, belongs to the orthodox school of Mīmāṃsā and has just finished his Vedic studies. In the first two acts, he is very eager to condemn and ridicule those religious traditions that are hostile toward the Veda. In particular, Saṅkarṣaṇa criticizes the epistemic flaws of Buddhist and Jain doctrine, as well as the moral character of Buddhist and Jain monks. However, despite this, ultimately Saṅkarṣaṇa does not deem Buddhist and Jain doctrine and practice to be a significant threat to the socio-religious order.

In act three, Saṅkarṣaṇa teams up with a Śaiva professor of Nyāya in order to defeat a common enemy, the irreligious Cārvaka materialist, who, along other problematic religious cults, is considered a significant threat to the established socio-religious order. While the Śaiva professor follows Śaiva scripture, which many orthodox brahmans reject, he also upholds the authority of the Veda, albeit on the basis of reasons that are different from, and even opposed to Saṅkarṣaṇa’s reasons for the authority of the Veda. Despite this, the main message of the scene is that it is best to ignore a few minor differences between different orthodox traditions who accept the Veda for the sake of coming together to defeat a common enemy whose practices and beliefs are socially disruptive.

In the final act, it is clear that Saṅkarṣaṇa has lost the trust of followers of the Vedic orthodoxy who shun the teachings and practices of all extra-Vedic traditions. Moreover, he faces a person dilemma between his own duty as a Mīmāṃsaka to reject all non-Vedic scripture and his particular devotion to his God, Viṣṇu. Thus, he needs to decide whether to reject or uphold the Bhāgavata religious texts, which are followed by those who are devoted to Viṣṇu, such as the queen, but rejected by orthodox Mīmāṃsakas. Ultimately, it is the great Nyāya scholar Dhairyarāśi who is the final arbitrator between those who belong to the Vedic orthodoxy and
those who belong to non-Vedic religious traditions. In his closing monologue, Dhairyarāśi argues for the authority of all religious scripture, utilizing both epistemic and socio-pragmatic criteria. In particular, Dhairyarāśi argues that, in order to be considered authoritative, religious scripture must be both reliable and nonthreatening.

Like the ĀD, the SĀP also argues for the authority of all religious scripture and does so by relying on both Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā criteria for authority. There is also the same emphasis on practical and epistemic factors when determining which scriptures should be considered authoritative for specific groups of people. Thus, while at certain points the two texts seem to have different foci, whether on religious texts or extreme religious practices, both texts ultimately make similar arguments, utilize similar strategies, and underscore the same perspective regarding the problem of religious diversity and disagreement. Moreover, both texts focus on the same intellectual rival, an orthodox Mīmāṃsaka who is hesitant and often antagonistic toward extra-Vedic religious scripture. Jayanta’s goal is to convince this rival that all religious scripture is authoritative. Jayanta’s own personal view, which he mentions but does not prioritize in terms conceptualizing religious disagreement, is that God, as the author of all religious scripture, takes on various forms and propounds different teachings out of compassion for limited human beings with different mental capabilities and needs. Thus, distinct religious scriptures accord with the dispositions and needs of different people.

However, one can imagine that this argument would not be convincing to an opponent who rejects the existence of God or rejects God as the author of the sacred scripture. As a result, in addition to using Nyāya epistemic criteria, Jayanta also argues for the authority of non-

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287 The fact that in the ĀD, the Mīmāṃsā protagonist embraces Viṣṇu in secret seems to indicate both that some Mīmāṃsakas did in fact accept the existence of God and moreover, that this position was rejected by many followers of the Vedic orthodoxy.
Vedic religious scripture on the basis of epistemic criteria accepted by orthodox Mīmāṃsakas and, in particular, criteria they use to defend Vedic texts they take to be authoritative. It is important to emphasize that, in this discussion, Jayanta is not attempting to undermine his opponent’s logic by arguing that his opponent’s epistemic principles are faulty, but rather, he is trying to demonstrate that his opponent’s own epistemic principles support the authority of all religious scripture. Moreover, Jayanta’s strategy is primarily defensive rather than offensive in the sense that he does not actually detail the particular argument demonstrating the reliability of each and every non-Vedic scripture, but rather, he focuses on rebutting objection to the unreliability of non-Vedic scripture on the basis of Mīmāṃsā epistemic criteria.

In discussing Jayanta’s approach to the problem of religious disagreement there are a couple of points to keep in mind regarding his intellectual context. First, as indicated above, the authority of the Veda is taken for granted. While Jayanta argues for the Veda’s reliability elsewhere in the NM (discussed in the last chapter), his primarily interest in the SĀP and ĀḌ is the authoritative status of religious texts outside the Veda. Second, the problem of diverse religious scripture is not merely a theoretical problem, it is a practical problem. As a result, in addition to epistemic criteria for authority, Jayanta also focuses on practical considerations that affect the epistemic status of religious texts. Third, given the nature of the epistemic evidence available, Jayanta is able to argue for the authority of religious scripture on the basis of both Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā epistemic criteria. In particular, Jayanta is able to argue that there are good grounds for supposing non-Vedic scripture has a reliable author (Nyāya criteria) or has a basis in the Veda (Mīmāṃsā criteria).

As was discussed in previous chapters, Jayanta argues that the object of many important religious beliefs is imperceptible to most people. As a result, it is much more difficult to know
religious objects than it is to know everyday objects that are easily verifiable. For example, we cannot directly verify that God authored the Veda or that the Buddha is trustworthy; instead, we have to rely on indirect sources of evidence, such as inference and testimony. One consequence of this is that the nature of the evidence might support multiple conclusions. For example, Jayanta argues that, given the nature of the epistemic evidence, most religious scripture should be considered equal in rank in the sense that there is no reason to say one is stronger or weaker than the other. However, this doesn’t mean that the evidence supports the reliability of any and all religious scripture. Instead, Jayanta introduces socio-pragmatic criteria that affect the reliability of religious scripture. In particular, Jayanta argues that if acting on the basis of particular scriptural beliefs would cause great social harm, then, given the greater risk of accepting those scriptural beliefs, the level of justification for them should be much higher. Thus, the practical factors that are relevant to Jayanta’s discussion of religious disagreement are given epistemic significance. Ultimately, Jayanta will argue that for certain extreme scriptural beliefs, the nature of the evidence cannot support that level of justification required, and, as a result, those scriptural traditions would not be considered authoritative.

Practical factors are generally not mentioned in contemporary discussions of the problem of religious disagreement. Instead, the focus is on truth-relevant conditions for belief and what rationality requires in a situation where epistemic peers disagree. I want to now turn to the conversation. In particular, I want to underscore two main contemporary approaches to religious disagreement based on whether, when faced with significant peer religious disagreement, some sort of doxastic change is required. While Jayanta’s position is closest to those that maintain no doxastic revision is rationally required, I ultimately want to argue that Jayanta’s inclusion of
practical requirements would add depth to this conversation by specifying those instances where doxastic change is required.

### 4.2 The Problem of Religious Disagreement in the Contemporary Context

The central question in contemporary discussions on the problem of religious disagreement, which is often called the problem of religious diversity,\(^{288}\) is whether some sort of doxastic revision is required on the part of a subject when faced with a disagreeing epistemic peer.\(^{289}\) Recently, epistemologists have been approaching this issue by utilizing the tools developed to discuss ordinary epistemic disagreement.\(^{290}\) The idea is that both ordinary disagreements and religious disagreements are similar because, in the face of a disagreeing opponent, they force the epistemic subject to consider the fact that she might be wrong. I will first look at the general problem of disagreement before turning to religious disagreement. My goal is to identify the key issues that animate this discussion as well as outline particular perspectives of on the issue. I will then look at how the conclusions about ordinary disagreements are applied to religious disagreements.

Not all types of disagreement are problematic and not all types of disagreement involve an epistemic peer. For example, I might think that it is going to rain today because I recently

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\(^{288}\) For example, see the titles in the bibliography in Basinger 2015. In characterizing the issue, Kraft 2012 refers to both religious diversity and religious disagreements, especially in the Introduction. Additionally, he specifies on page 109 that “religious disagreements take place in a context of general epistemic and metaphysical approaches to religious diversity.”

\(^{289}\) I take the term “epistemic peer” from Kelly 2005, who states on page 168, n. 2 that he borrowed the term from Gutting 1982. In particular, under Kelly’s use of the term, epistemic peers not only share the same evidence which bears on the matter at hand, but also, the same general epistemic virtues, like conscientiousness in assessing that evidence.

\(^{290}\) For example, see Greco 2012b, Kraft 2012, and Lackey 2014.
watched the news, however, my friend, who has similar intellectual capabilities, disagrees with me because a few days ago the weather report said it would be sunny today. This is a simple case where I have more evidence, the updated weather report, than she does and, upon presenting her with the new weather data, I would assume that she would change her belief. In another situation, two people, one of whom is noticeably intoxicated, disagree over the amount each person has to pay of a restaurant bill that has been split evenly. In this case, the epistemic capabilities of the intoxicated individual are not equal to the epistemic capabilities of the sober individual, and moreover, a calculator should easily solve this dispute.

While these are noncontroversial examples of disagreement, where one party enjoys a clear epistemic advantage, the more interesting cases of disagreement are those in which neither party enjoys such an advantage. These are cases in which there is no good reason to think that one side of the dispute has more or less evidence than the other or is more or less capable at analyzing that evidence. These are cases that involve disagreement among epistemic peers. In the generally accepted definition of an epistemic peer, two individuals are epistemic peers with respect to some issue if 1) they share all evidence that bears on the issue (evidential equality) and 2) they are equals with respect to their abilities that are relevant to interpreting that evidence (cognitive equality). Of course in actual situations there will rarely be an exact equality of evidence and abilities. Thus, whether two individuals are considered epistemic peers will largely depend on how liberal the standards are for epistemic peerhood in any given context. If such standards are very demanding, it could be that no two individuals ever qualify as epistemic peers.

291 These two traits—evidential equality and cognitive equality—are found in most definitions of epistemic peerhood in contemporary literature on the epistemology of disagreement. For example, see Kelly 2005: 168, n.2, Christensen 2007: 210-211, Greco 2010: 73, Kraft 2012: 72, Christensen & Lackey 2013: 102, and Lackey 2014: 302.
peers.\textsuperscript{292} For our purposes, I will assume a notion of epistemic peerhood that is sufficiently liberal. This will allow us to say that there are many cases of significant religious disagreement which cannot be resolved by merely assuming the parties involved are not truly epistemic peers.

There are two general positions on disagreement between epistemic peers: the position that peer disagreement does not mandate any doxastic change and the opposing position that peer disagreement does mandate some sort of doxastic revision. The first view asserts that I can continue to rationally believe that $p$, even when faced with an epistemic peer who believes that not-$p$. While some like van Inwagen have explained this position by pointing to private incommunicable evidence that is accessible to one party but not the other,\textsuperscript{293} others like Thomas Kelly point to the fact that, despite a general epistemic parity, I can maintain that on this particular situation I have done a better job assessing the evidence than my epistemic peer.\textsuperscript{294} Despite these different explanations, proponents of this view agree that the mere fact that I disagree with an epistemic peer does not mandate significant doxastic revision on my part.

On the other hand, the second view claims that, without having any reason independent of the disagreement itself for thinking that I have an epistemic advantage over my peer, it is irrational for me to maintain undiminished confidence in my belief that $p$ when faced with an epistemic peer who believes that not-$p$. In such a situation, some theorists like Richard Feldman recommend both parties suspend belief relative to $p$,\textsuperscript{295} while others like David Christensen and

\textsuperscript{292} For example, compare Greco 2010: 73-74 and Lackey 2014: 312-314. While Greco argues that people in different religious traditions (and particularly testimonial traditions) never share the same epistemic position and thus are not epistemic peers, Lackey ties epistemic peerhood to whether or not both parties are equally justified in their beliefs regarding the matter in question, even if they do not possess exactly same evidence or epistemic virtues that bear on the matter in question.

\textsuperscript{293} See van Inwagen 1996.

\textsuperscript{294} See Kelly 2005.

\textsuperscript{295} See Feldman 2011.
Adam Elga argue for splitting the difference between both beliefs and meeting somewhere in the middle. Either way, there should be significant revision to one’s belief in the face of peer disagreement.

With this in mind I want to specifically turn to the question of religious disagreement. While the epistemologists mentioned in the previous paragraph do not specifically focus on religious disagreement, many of them compare religious disagreement to other types of controversial disagreement, such as disagreement over political, philosophical, and moral beliefs. For example, Thomas Kelly questions why most discussions about the epistemic challenges of disagreement have taken place in the philosophy of religion, since, he argues, there is nothing unique about the challenges of religious disagreement that would not also apply to disagreements that are prominent in everyday life, especially in philosophy.

Christensen offers a more nuanced approach in arguing that disagreements are not equally distributed. Instead, while certain areas, such as religion, morality, and politics are rife with disagreement, others, like our everyday conceptions of the world and certain mathematical beliefs, are not. In explaining why this is so, Christensen claims that intractable disagreement often appears in areas where epistemic conditions are bad, such as when evidence is meager or when, due to our intellectual or emotional limitations, where are unable to correctly assess the evidence. In such contexts, Christensen argues that the epistemically rational position would be to hold the disputed beliefs with less confidence. Although arguing for a similar position,

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296 See Christensen 2007 and Elga 2007


298 Christensen 2007: 214-216. Interestingly, Christensen notices an epistemic downside to this position, namely, that knowledge might be better advanced when people have irrationally high levels of confidence in their hypotheses.
Feldman speaks in terms of all-or-nothing belief rather than in terms of Christensen’s graded model of belief. As a result, Feldman argues that in controversial cases of disagreement, where the evidence is insufficient to begin with, the epistemically appropriate attitude is a suspension of belief by both sides.\textsuperscript{299}

While epistemologists started discussing the epistemic challenges of disagreement around the mid-2000s, philosophers of religion were discussing this topic more than a decade earlier. For example, William Alston, argues for the rationality of CMP (Christian mystical perceptual doxastic practice), after adopting a “worst case scenario,” where there are no significant, independent reasons for preferring CMP to other religious rivals. In particular, he reasons that, since there is no neutral, noncircular way of settling the dispute, we should just sit tight with the beliefs we have, which have guided us well in the world and which were formed through firmly established doxastic practices.\textsuperscript{300} Similarly, Alvin Plantinga argues that religious disagreement need not reduce the support I have for my religious belief. However, instead of focusing on the ability to provide better reasons for preferring my belief (or doxastic practice) to the alternatives, Plantinga argues that beliefs get their positive epistemic status from being formed by a properly functioning faculty.\textsuperscript{301} In particular, he claims that one’s religious belief can be warranted even if one cannot provide better reasons for it than for an opponent’s belief. In cases of religious disagreement, we can maintain, like Thomas Kelly argues, that somehow our disagreeing peer has made a mistake.\textsuperscript{302} In support of this view, Plantinga references our moral intuitions. He

\textsuperscript{299} Feldman 2011: 155-156.
\textsuperscript{300} See Alston 1991: 270-272.
\textsuperscript{301} See Plantinga 2000: chap 6.
\textsuperscript{302} In this respect, see also Bergmann 2015. Bergmann speaks about the possibility of rationally demoting someone who used to be considered an epistemic peer to an epistemic inferior with respect to \( p \), even if you think that person is intelligent and virtuous, and her beliefs are rational.
argues, we don’t lose confidence in or justification for many of our moral intuitions even when faced with a peer who disagrees with us.\textsuperscript{303} Opposing this view, Phillip Quinn argues that if one is to rationally retain one’s religious belief in the presence of compelling rational alternatives, one is required to provide better reasons for one’s belief than for an alternative belief.\textsuperscript{304}

Similar to Quinn, David Basinger proposes Basinger’s rule: “If a religious exclusivist wants to maximize truth and avoid error, she is under a prima facie obligation to attempt to resolve significant epistemic peer conflict.”\textsuperscript{305} In clarifying his rule, Basinger explains that while the first attempt to resolve tension between epistemic peer conflict should involve the presentation and evaluation of evidence, in the religious realm there is seldom an evidential base for resolving disputes. Despite this, a religious exclusivist should still assess the reasons why she and her epistemic peer hold the beliefs that they do. Once she has submitted her beliefs to serious assessment, a religious exclusivist can be justified in maintaining her belief.

Opposing Basinger’s Rule and the necessity of reassessing the rationality of one’s belief in the face of peer disagreement, Jerome Gellman underscores the notion of rock-bottom beliefs, or foundational beliefs that are “governors of our epistemic lives.”\textsuperscript{306} Rock-bottom beliefs, regardless of how they were formed, are not subject to further assessment but rather, are themselves the starting point of assessment. Gellman argues that Basinger’s Rule is too strong if the religious belief in question is a rock-bottom belief. In particular, Gellman argues that religious beliefs may stay rationally unreflective in the face of peer disagreement, and

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item See Plantinga 1997.
\item For a good presentation of the Quinn-Plantinga debate over the epistemic challenges of religious disagreement see Kraft 2006.
\item Basinger 2000: 45.
\item Gellman 1993: 354.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
furthermore, such beliefs may be invoked to counter opposing religious claims. Despite Basinger’s objection that our foundational beliefs change over time, often as a result of epistemic peer conflict, Gellman reasons that we cannot subject all our beliefs to critical scrutiny. Instead, Gellman upholds an epistemic strategy that is based on his grandmother’s advice, “If the wheel doesn’t squeak, don’t oil it.” This means that beliefs that do not “squeak” can form the unreflective basis for assessing beliefs that do “squeak.” Moreover, whether or not one’s individual religious beliefs “squeak” depends on the epistemic situation of individual believers.

In arguing that a religious exclusivist is under no obligation to reassess the rationality of her religious belief in the face of unresolved peer disagreement, Gellman criticizes an overly optimistic conception of rationality that presumes there is a general consensus for rational thinking. Instead, Gellman argues that people disagree over how to weigh epistemic criteria for rational belief. This is because principles developed for rational belief sometimes clash with our most cherished beliefs. When this happens, we have to find some sort of equilibrium between our principles and our beliefs. To illustrate this phenomenon, Gellman points to G.E. Moore’s claim that his belief in the existence of his hand held greater epistemic weight than any rules of rational reasoning that would deny him that belief. Thus, Gellman reasons, why should it count against the religious exclusivist that the epistemic criteria she favors is not commonly accepted?

To summarize, while Alston, Plantinga and Gellman all defend the right of a religious exclusivist to maintain her religious belief in the face of epistemic peer conflict, they do so on different grounds. Alston’s view is based on there being no neutral way to adjudicate between

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epistemic peers in religious disagreement, while Plantinga’s view is based on the proper functioning of a Christian’s belief-forming faculties. On the other hand, Gellman’s view underscores the concept of rock-bottom religious beliefs and a conception of rationality whereby one is under no obligation to reassess one’s foundational beliefs in the face of disagreement.

Although Jayanta will also argue that it is rational to maintain one’s religious belief in the face of significant peer religious disagreement, his strategy is to first minimize the significance of religious disagreement, and second, to argue that religious disagreement itself does not automatically invalidate one’s religious beliefs, especially religious beliefs that have equal evidence of reliability. In doing so, Jayanta incorporates some of the thinking presented above, however, framed around 1) his own unique theological take on why diverse religious scripture appear to disagree and 2) his interlocutor’s more orthodox view that only Vedic-based texts are authoritative. Moreover, since Jayanta is cognizant of the fact that he and his Mīmāṃsaka interlocutor differ in their evaluation of epistemic criteria regarding, for example, what makes scripture authoritative, Jayanta frames his thesis on the basis of epistemic criteria his opponent finds acceptable. One of the reasons Jayanta is able to do this is because the nature of the epistemic evidence in matters of religious authority is such that it can be accommodated by various epistemic criteria. However, in contrast to exclusively focusing on epistemic criteria for rational belief, Jayanta argues that practical considerations, such as the stakes involved in acting as if a particular religious belief were true, have epistemic significance. This has the effect of raising the level of justification required for beliefs that have risky consequences.

Before turning to the Indian context, I want to discuss one contemporary view that argues for reducing the justification one has for one’s religious belief in the face of significant epistemic peer disagreement. James Kraft argues that while the justification we have for our religious
beliefs may hold in a number of challenging situations, it isn’t adequate for epistemic peer religious disagreement and, as a result, in such contexts, our confidence in the justification for our religious beliefs should be reduced.\textsuperscript{309} In particular, Kraft argues that this reduction follows from two principles that also apply in ordinary epistemic disagreements: the Principle of Conservatism and the Conservatism Frustrater.\textsuperscript{310} The Principle of Conservation claims that we should retain our beliefs if no decisive grounds arise for questioning their justification. On the other hand, the Conservatism Frustrater claims that the justification one has for a belief is eroded upon recognizing that there are relevant symmetries between oneself and another person which makes error possibilities relevant. This occurs in the face of intractable peer disagreements, when one realizes that the source of support one has for one’s belief cannot anticipate and avoid all the error possibilities it needs to.

Kraft discusses three distinct responses to the Conservatism Frustrater: refutation, detour, and resignation.\textsuperscript{311} Refutation stances argue that even if one’s belief is not better epistemically situated than one’s peer, this does not lead to decisive grounds for questioning the justification of one’s belief. Alston’s incommensurable epistemic situation and Basinger’s rock-bottom beliefs would be examples of refutation strategies. On the other hand, a detour strategy might acknowledge that there are decisive grounds for questioning the justification of one’s belief if there are relevant symmetries between oneself and another person, however it detours around this by showing there are no relevant symmetries. This is seen with Plantinga’s error theory

\textsuperscript{309} Kraft 2012: chapter 8.

\textsuperscript{310} For a discussion of these principles and their applicability to epistemic disagreements see Kraft 2012: chapter 4.

\textsuperscript{311} Kraft 2012: chapter 8.
about why people might not have a properly functioning sense of the divine and his notion of unshakable moral intuitions, both of which are viewed as symmetry breakers.

On the other hand, Kraft argues against both these responses, claiming that they don’t take religious diversity seriously enough nor do they acknowledge the creative challenge of a true epistemic peer. Instead, Kraft advocates a policy of resignation toward the Conservatism Frustrater. A resignation stance acknowledges that there is no way to retain full justification for one’s religious belief amidst epistemic peer disagreement. For Kraft, the word “resignation” implies a readiness to endure a less than ideal situation, along with the sense that something is truly lost, in particular, the justification one had for one’s religious belief. While this reduction in justification does not imply that there is no justification for one’s religious belief, it does demonstrate that one’s justification does not hold in the extremely challenging situation of epistemic peer religious disagreement.

After considering these various approaches to epistemic peer disagreement, and, in particular, peer religious disagreement, I want to turn to Jayanta’s discussion of the issue. In particular, I will look at Jayanta’s strategy of convincing his intellectual rival to accept his thesis that, despite religious disagreement, and in particular, the conflict between the Veda and non-Vedic scripture, most religious scripture should be considered authoritative. This means that followers of the various scriptural traditions are justified in maintaining full confidence in their religious beliefs. This position is similar to the nonreductive positions mentioned above however, in addition to relying on epistemic criteria, and in particular, criteria that link a text’s reliability to the trustworthiness of its author or to its basis in the Veda, Jayanta also discusses socio-pragmatic criteria for authority. This adds an extra layer to epistemic peer disagreements.

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312 For more on the resignation response and its different varieties see Kraft 2012: 145-152.
whereby the evaluation of a belief’s justification includes practical factors in addition to truth-relevant conditions.

While chapter three of this dissertation discussed how stakes-conditions affect the level of support needed for religious beliefs, the next section will look at practical factors that can undermine the justification of religious belief. In particular, Jayanta argues that religious beliefs that violate well-established socio-moral norms are not justified. I will argue that the reason for this is that practical factors raise the level of justification required for a belief. In the last chapter, we saw Jayanta argue that it is not rational for an agent to act as if the Veda was true by, for example, engaging in Vedic rites with the hope of a certain result, without prior confirmatory knowledge that the Veda is a trustworthy source of knowledge. Another way to put this is that an agent’s belief in Vedic claims regarding the efficacy of certain rites is justified only if it is rational for that agent to act as if those Vedic claims regarding the efficacy of certain rites are true. Similarly, Jayanta will argue that different religious traditions are justified in holding their scriptural beliefs only if it is rational to act as if those beliefs are true. However, acting on the basis of religious beliefs that would cause great social harm raises the evidential support required of those beliefs. Moreover, given the less than ideal nature of religious evidence, such religious beliefs, Jayanta would argue, could never be justified.

4.3 Jayanta on Religious Disagreement: The Equal Rank of All Religious Scripture

Jayanta has two primary goals in his discussion of religious disagreement: to soften the exclusivists within his own Brahmanical traditions and to condemn followers of socially problematic religious traditions. His ultimate position on religious diversity has been labelled pluralistic rather than inclusivist since he accepts the authority of all religious traditions rather
than uniquely privileging the authority of his own religion over other religions. While this is true and Jayanta does argue, against the exclusivist followers of Vedic orthodoxy, that all religious scriptures hold equal rank with respect to the epistemic evidence, Jayanta also renounces those religious traditions that violate the socio-religious order that, in many respects, is dictated by the Vedic orthodoxy. Thus, in the sense that specific Vedic ethical norms become the measure of a religious tradition’s authoritative status, Jayanta’s position broadly lines up with inclusivism. That is, while other religious traditions can be considered authoritative, in order to be considered as such, they must abide by certain rules established by the Vedic orthodoxy.

Jayanta’s view on religious diversity and religious disagreement is fleshed out in view of a specific rival position, that of a more orthodox Brahmanical philosopher, and with a specific practical problem in mind, that of deviant religious practices that threaten the Brahmanical worldview. In this section, I want to discuss Jayanta’s arguments against his Mīmāṃsa rival’s more exclusivist position, and additionally, how he attempts to convince that rival to accept the more liberal position that grants authority to most religious texts. In doing so, I want to underscore a couple key features of Jayanta’s strategy that showcase his practical tendencies in attempting to bring his rival closer to his own position. First, in arguing for a more inclusive position regarding the authority of non-Vedic religious scripture, Jayanta demonstrates that he is not tied to Nyāya-based reasons for why certain religious scripture is authoritative. Instead, Jayanta utilizes a variety of arguments and strategies to help bring his rival to his own position.


314 On inclusivism, see King 2008: 831. “While inclusivists are committed to the superiority of their home religion, they allow that alien religions may contain more by way of truth and transforming power than is typically granted by exclusivists.”
Second, Jayanta prefers to team up with his intellectual rival in order to defeat more socially dangerous rivals. In particular, the ĀḌ depicts a scene where Saṅkarṣaṇa, the Mīmāṃsaka protagonist, joins forces with a Śaiva professor of Nyāya to defeat a materialist philosopher who rejects the authority of the Veda.\footnote{ĀḌ: 140-189 (act 3).} Despite the fact that they employ different epistemic criteria to prove the reliability of the Veda, the Mīmāṃsaka and Naiyāyika work together to reject the views of those who repudiate the Veda. However, as both the SĀP and ĀḌ indicate, there are different degrees of hostility toward the Veda, some more acceptable than others. To start, I will follow the two-fold division of religious scripture that Jayanta delineates in the beginning of the SĀP, based on whether the scripture in question is close to the Veda, in terms of content and prescriptions, or more removed from the Veda.

In terms of texts that are close to the Veda, Jayanta includes the *smṛti*, or scripture that forms part of the “recollected tradition,” as opposed to the Veda itself, which is called *śruti*, or, scripture that is “directly heard/revealed.” The first thing to note here is that both Jayanta and his Mīmāṃsaka rival agree on the authority of *smṛti* texts, however, they base that authority on different epistemic criteria. While Jayanta delineates a number of different Mīmāṃsaka-based arguments for why *smṛti* texts are authoritative, all of them boil down the fact that the *smṛti* are somehow rooted in the Veda.\footnote{Freschi & Kataoka 2012: section 2.1.1. The Mīmāṃsaka-based arguments claim that *smṛti* texts have a Vedic root based on the presumption (*arthāpatti*) that there is no other plausible root for *smṛti* texts.} On the other hand, Naiyāyikas like Jayanta, while also upholding the authority of *smṛti* texts, argue that *smṛti* is authoritative because it has a reliable author. In particular, Jayanta argues that, similar to God, *smṛti* authors like Manu are able to directly perceive, through a form of yogic perception that is rejected by Mīmāṃsakas, which
specific actions, such as performing particular sacrifices, lead to which specific results, such as the attainment of heaven.317

The important point in this discussion is that Jayanta does not seem to care which argument, or epistemic criteria, is used to defend the authority of smṛti literature. Since Jayanta’s goal is to convince his more orthodox interlocutor to enlarge the scope of scripture considered authoritative, given that both he and his Mīmāṃsaka interlocutor agree on the authority of the smṛti literature, why be attached to the Nyāya view of what makes the smṛti literature authoritative? Does it matter, Jayanta wonders, whether we say smṛti is authoritative because it is based on the Veda or because it is based on the perceptual knowledge of a reliable author? So long as both parties agree that smṛti is authoritative, Jayanta sees no reason to not accept the Mīmāṃsaka criteria of reliability.318 I see this as evidence that the practical goal of agreeing on which texts are reliable is more important than arguing about the epistemic criteria upon which this reliability is based. Moreover, it fits in with Gellman’s thesis that rational people can disagree over valid epistemic criteria.319

What about in cases of conflict between the Veda and smṛti literature? Jayanta discusses three different Mīmāṃsaka-based responses to the scenario where smṛti contradicts the Veda: a) the view that the Veda ranks higher and thus invalidates the smṛti, b) the view that neither are invalidated and one has the option of which to follow, and c) the view that there is no conflict and the reason prescriptions between the two appear to conflict is that different prescriptions

317 Freschi & Kataoka 2012: section 2.2.1.

318 See Freschi & Kataoka 2012: 33. “Else, [a different opinion could be]: What is the use of [this] attachment (abhinivesa) [to the Naiyāyika view]? [We could accept the Mīmāṃsaka view instead, namely:] Because the recollected tradition is based on the Veda.”

319 Gellman 2000: 409, “…there is no expectation that valid epistemic criteria for rational reasoning, save for a basic few, will be commonly accepted.”
Jayanta himself seems to favor the last option as he uses this argument a number of times later on in the text, especially in relation to explaining how a single God can author seemingly contradictory scriptures. However, Jayanta also defends the second option, which claims that when the Veda and smṛti prescribe different ritual practices, people have the option of choosing which to follow. Here it is clear that the conflict or disagreement between the Veda and the smṛti is primarily between religious practices. While doctrinal contents also factor in, they are secondary, and the focus is on the content of prescriptions. For example, rice and barley are prescribed by the Veda and Dharmaśāstra (a type of smṛti) respectively, as the ritual substance in the full- and new-moon sacrifice. Which one is correct? Which one should the performer employ? Do both lead to the intended result, for example, heaven, or does only one lead to the intended result? Would this be considered an epistemic disagreement? In contemporary discussions of epistemic disagreement, disagreement centers around beliefs and the question of whether or not it is rational to maintain certain beliefs in the face of significant peer disagreement.

Another way to put this is that disagreement is generally framed is in terms of propositions. For example, Feldman claims that when he states that there is a disagreement between two parties, he means that there are certain propositions that one party affirms and the other party denies. Moreover, since both parties hold incompatible beliefs, it is not possible for both sides to be correct. Feldman also distinguishes apparent disagreements from genuine disagreements. Certain disagreements, such as disagreements over various moral or social issues,

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320 Freschi & Kataoka 2012: sections 2.1.2 and 2.2.2.
321 See Freschi & Kataoka: section II.4.3.
322 Feldman 2007: 141.
like pornography, are merely apparent. In particular, Feldman explains that while those “against” pornography think it has harmful consequences and those “for” pornography do not think it should be illegal, there is no real disagreement about specific propositions.\(^\text{323}\) Of course, as Feldman recognizes, this case can easily be framed as a genuine disagreement about, for example, whether and what particular restrictions should be placed on pornography. I suspect that many other social or moral disagreements deemed “apparent” can also be turned into genuine disagreements.

Moreover, Feldman notices that mere differences among people of different religious traditions do not always amount to genuine disagreement. In particular, he comments on the fact that while people belonging to different religious traditions engage in different religious practices, this is not a genuine disagreement about the truth of specific propositions. As seen above, many of the disagreements Jayanta focuses on concern religious practices, particularly ritual prescriptions and, as will be seen later, extreme, socially-dangerous practices. However, even in this case, I believe that many of these scenarios can be reinterpreted as differences in beliefs. For example, regarding the conflict between Vedic prescriptions and smṛti prescriptions, which often concern procedural elements of certain rites, many of these rites are performed with a goal in mind, such as attaining heaven or other benefits enjoyed in this lifetime. As a result, these differences in prescriptions can be reframed in terms of whether or not certain prescriptions are true in this sense of whether they lead to the intended result (i.e. Performing the Agnihotra sacrifice leads to heaven). These propositions could also become more nuanced by including the various elements of the ritual such the objects used, the procedure, the qualifications of the sacrifice, etc.

\(^\text{323}\) Feldman 2007: 142.
Despite this, it could be that disagreements about seemingly conflicting prescriptions end up being apparent in the sense that Jayanta indicated above, that is, the intended result can be achieved by either prescription and one has the option to choose which prescriptions to employ. In other cases, it might be argued that only one of the prescriptions leads to the intended result. Thus, when Jayanta speaks about conflicts regarding different religious prescriptions, I would argue that first, many of these disagreements can be framed in terms of disagreements about beliefs and second, that Jayanta believes most of these conflicts can be resolved by employing the notion of option. However, Jayanta also discusses conflicting religious practices he deems socially dangerous. In such cases, Jayanta underscores how practical factors, such as risky or harmful behaviors that result from acting as if certain religious beliefs were true, can reduce the reliability of religious beliefs.

After discussing the authority of smṛti literature, Jayanta moves onto religious scripture which are more removed from the Veda. He divides this category into two: scripture, such as Śaiva and Pañcarātra religious texts, that does not openly conflict with the Veda despite containing different prescriptions than the Veda, and scripture, such as Buddhist and Jain religious texts, which contradicts and criticizes the Veda. The status of this second group of texts is controversial and, in both the SĀP and ĀḌ, Jayanta seems to present two different perspectives on it. Ultimately, Jayanta rules in favor of the authority of Buddhist and Jain scripture however, not without first criticizing their doctrines as false and practices as immoral. The prelude to the final act in the ĀḌ illustrates the controversy over non-Vedic religious traditions and the antagonism that was felt on the part of some orthodox Mīmāṃsakas. In this prelude, a Vedic officiant laments the ubiquity of heterodox religions, lumping the followers of those religions that openly conflict with the Veda, such as Buddhists and Jains, with those
followers of religions that are neutral with respect to the Veda, such as the Śaivas and Pañcarātras. In particular, the latter group are criticized for pretending to be orthodox brahmans, despite having their own set of religious scripture and abiding by different doctrine and practices. Additionally, the Vedic officiant criticizes the king’s minister of religious affairs, Saṅkarṣaṇa, who, despite being a follower of the orthodox Mīmāṃsā tradition, has not banned these extra-Vedic religions.

On the other hand, the Vedic officiant’s colleague, the Vedic instructor, attempts to mollify his worries by arguing that religious diversity is not something over which to get upset. In particular, the Vedic instructor argues that the ubiquity of these heterodox religious traditions does not affect the lives of those in the Vedic orthodoxy. Instead, those belonging to the Vedic orthodoxy will continue to conduct Vedic rites while maintaining their distance from those who adopt different doctrines and practices. Moreover, the Vedic instructor explains that in regards to their own Saṅkarṣaṇa, he is merely propitiating the king and queen, who are devoted to the religions of Śiva and Viṣṇu respectively. Thus, for practical reasons, Saṅkarṣaṇa must uphold the authority of certain heterodox religions. Lastly, and most importantly, the Vedic instructor also claims that extra-Vedic religions are powerless if they transgress the Vedic socio-religious order. 324

This conversation reveals the disagreement between orthodox followers of the Vedic religion over how best to approach the diversity of religious and scriptural traditions. While some like the Vedic officiant seem to abhor the ubiquity of extra-Vedic religious traditions, others like the Vedic instructor seek to allay the concerns of orthodox Mīmāṃsakas, arguing that the existence of non-Vedic religious traditions are at worst a minor annoyance since the various

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324 For the conversation between the Vedic officiant and the Vedic instructor see ĀD: 192-199.
religious traditions go about their own business and keep their distance from one other. And then there is Saṅkarṣaṇa who, in tolerating the wide variety of non-Vedic religious traditions, is presented as merely doing the king’s bidding. However, non-Vedic religions can only maintain their authoritative status provided they do not egregiously violate the Vedic socio-moral order. Thus, practical and political concerns clearly inform the Vedic instructor’s portrayal of the situation.

In the SĀP, Jayanta first looks at non-Vedic scripture that does not openly conflict with the Veda. Moreover, he argues for its authority on the basis of Mīmāṃsā epistemic criteria. For example, Jayanta argues that scriptures such as the Śaiva and Pañcarātra scriptures are authoritative because beliefs formed on their basis are not doubted, subsequently invalidated, nor have their basis in a defective cause, such as greed or delusion. As was seen in the last chapter, the Mīmāṃsakas accept the intrinsic validity of cognitions, whereby cognitions should be taken as authoritative unless there is evidence invalidating them, such as having a defective cause or being contradicted by a subsequent cognition. Moreover, Jayanta also combines these arguments with Nyāya-based criteria for authority. In particular, Jayanta claims that the Śaiva and Pañcarātra scriptures are authoritative because they: 1) are authored by God, a reliable author, 2) partially agree with actual states of affairs, and 3) are accepted by exemplary people who also accept the authority of the Veda. And while Śaiva and Pañcarātra scripture prescribe different rites than the Veda, this should not be seen as conflicting with the Veda since, as seen above in the discussion regarding the apparent conflict between the Veda and smṛti, one has the option to perform either of these rites.

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325 Freschi & Kataoka: 2012, section 5.1.1.

326 Freschi & Kataoka 2012: section 5.1.1. and 5.1.2.
My interest here is not in the specific details of Jayanta’s arguments for the authority of non-Vedic scripture since, first, Jayanta does not flesh out these arguments here, and second, the structure of these arguments reflects the arguments for authority and reliability discussed in the previous chapter. Instead, I am interested in Jayanta’s overall approach to the problem of religious disagreement when faced with a more orthodox interlocutor who is less tolerant of non-Vedic scripture. By utilizing the Mīmāṃsakas’ own criteria for authority, Jayanta is implying that it would not be rational for a Mīmāṃsaka to reject as authoritative certain non-Vedic scripture which do not explicitly contradict the Veda. While Jayanta still argues on the basis of Nyāya epistemic criteria for a scripture’s reliability he moves seamlessly between the various criteria for authority, almost as if saying, “Take your pick, any of these various epistemic criteria will establish certain non-Vedic scripture as authoritative.”

This joint effort between different Brahmanical text traditions is put on display in act three of the Āḍḍ. There the Mīmāṃsaka Saṅkarṣaṇa arrives at the ashram of abbot Dharmaśiva, a Śaiva professor of Nyāya. Saṅkarṣaṇa seeks to assuage the fears of the virtuous Śaiva ascetics who are concerned since they notice that the king is driving certain Śaiva ascetics out of the kingdom. Saṅkarṣaṇa reassures the abbot and his followers that the king is supremely devoted to Śiva and is only banishing those depraved Śaiva ascetics whose religious beliefs and practices violate the social and religious order. After this, the anti-religion Cārvāka/Lokāyata Vṛddhāmbhi enters. He laments the fact that King Śaṅkaravarman allows numerous religious traditions to exist and waste away the wealth of the kingdom. He hopes to set the king on the

327 AD: 144-151.

328 While the earliest nomenclature of the tradition of Indian materialism was Lokāyata (this-worldly philosophy), after the 6th century, the names Cārvāka, and even Brhaspati, became associated with the school. While both figures are sometimes hypothesized as founders of the school, it is not clear whether such individuals existed. See Gokhale 2015: 12-18.
right path, one which is focused on worldly prosperity as opposed to religious aims. In order to do so, he starts to debate Dharmaśiva and Saṅkarśaṇa, with the goal of arguing against the existence of God, the afterlife, and the authority of the Veda.

What occurs next is a division of labor between the Naiyāyika Dharmaśiva and the Mīmāṃsaka Saṅkarśaṇa, wherein both utilize their own traditions respective arguments to defeat the materialist skeptic who seeks to rid the kingdom of all religion. Dharmaśiva starts with his proof for establishing God. Many of these arguments appear in the fourth chapter of the NM, which, among other things, argues for the existence of God on the basis of inference. After some back and forth between Dharmaśiva and Vṛddhāmbhi, scripture is mentioned as another way to demonstrate God’s existence. However, at this point, Dharmaśiva, clearly exasperated, passes the torch to Saṅkarśaṇa, saying “I am tired; will you please enlighten him?”

Saṅkarśaṇa then proceeds to provide Mīmāṃsā-based arguments for the authority of the Veda, such as arguments based on the doctrine of intrinsic validity, which, interestingly enough, Jayanta spent a good deal of time rejecting in chapter four of the NM. The motivation for joining forces, combining both Nyāya and Mīṃāṃsā arguments and epistemic criteria for authority, is clear: work together to defeat a common enemy. Dharmaśiva elaborates:

Whether we should rely on this way of proving the validity of the Veda that you [Saṅkarśaṇa], sir, have shown, or whether it is better to follow the train of thought that “the sacred tradition is authoritative because it is His word,” and “it is valid because the trustworthy-person is authoritative, similarly to the validity of spells or texts about medicine;” this is a private quarrel among ourselves. Let us leave it aside. First you too must completely refute the Veda-hating unbelievers of this ilk.

When arguing for the authority of Śaiva scriptures on the basis of both Nyāya and Mīṃāṃsaka epistemic criteria, Jayanta’s message to his more orthodox interlocutor is clear:

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329 ĀḌ: 179.

330 ĀḌ: 187.
Rather than focusing on minimally significant doctrinal differences that exist between different text traditions who accept the authority of the Veda, we should team up to defeat those who openly contradict and criticize the Veda along with the Vedic socio-religious order. Both the SĀP and the ĀḌ initially seem to suggest that Buddhist and Jains also belong in this latter group. For example, in the SĀP, after affirming the authority of certain non-Vedic texts which are not openly antagonistic toward the Veda, Jayanta proceeds to reject the authority of non-Vedic texts which explicitly contradict and denounce the Veda. Once again, Jayanta uses a combination of Mīmāṃsā- and Nyāya-based arguments to demonstrate that texts such as Buddhist and Jain scripture are not reliable. While the Mīmāṃsā-based arguments focus on invalidating criteria such as the fact that such texts contradict the Veda, the Nyāya-based argument points to the fact that exemplary people do not agree on the reliability of Buddhist and Jain texts. The last chapter discussed the criterion of the agreement of exemplary people as an indicator of a text’s reliability. In particular, according to Jayanta, an exemplary person is one who upholds varnāśramadharma, or the duties and responsibilities based on one’s social class and age-based stage. Moreover, Jayanta argues that non-Vedic religious traditions such as Buddhism also implicitly accept this Vedic conception of an exemplary person, since they perform certain practices prohibited by the Veda in secret (out of shame) and since much of the moral content of Buddhist scriptures mirrors that of the Veda.\textsuperscript{331}

Buddhist and Jain rivals are also encountered in the ĀḌ where they are humorously depicted as intellectually inferior and morally depraved. At the beginning of the play, the Mīmāṃsaka Saṅkarṣaṇa claims his goal is to “humiliate the enemies of the Veda.”\textsuperscript{332} He does

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[331] For a more detailed discussion of Jayanta’s notion of an “exemplary person” see pages 159-163 above.
\item[332] ĀḌ: 53.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
this through debating Buddhist and Jain monks and by exposing their moral vices such as greed and lust. For example, the Āḍ depicts a lavish Buddhist monastery with large temples, golden Buddha statues and an abundance of offerings of perfume, flowers and incense. Saṅkarṣaṇa is repulsed by what he sees going on in the monastery, such as monks failing to purify themselves before eating, monks from different social classes eating together, monks flirting with attractive maidservants, and wine masquerading as fruit juice. He exclaims, “Clearly this is not a seminary for ascetics, this is a royal garden.” Similarly, Jain monks are depicted as hypocrites, practicing unnecessary religious austerities while simultaneously chasing after Jain nuns.

Despite this negative depiction, what is clear in these various passages is that while Saṅkarṣaṇa argues that Buddhist and Jain doctrines are false and their actions vile and immoral, he does not deem them significantly threatening to the established socio-religious order. As a result, he defeats them in debate, points out their moral hypocrisy, but then moves on to scrutinize other religious sects deemed more dangerous. Moreover, in the last act of the play, the great Nyāya scholar Dhairyarāśī ultimately argues for a more open and tolerant position. Like the final thesis presented in the SĀP, the closing monologue in the Āḍ argues for the authority of all scripture, including Buddhist and Jain texts, on the basis of both Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā criteria for authority.

Before going over the final phase in Jayanta’s argument, namely, the demonstration that all religious scripture is authoritative, I want to take a closer look at how the Āḍ paves the path for this argument. Earlier, when looking at the prelude to act four, we saw two different perspectives on the problem of religious disagreement, first, the perspective of the Vedic

333 Āḍ: 55.
334 Āḍ: 85-95 (prelude to act two).
officiant who condemned the presence of numerous heterodox religious traditions and second, the perspective of the Vedic instructor who sought to allay the fears of the Vedic officiant. In the beginning of act four, Saṅkarṣaṇa explains the problem of religious disagreement in terms of his own personal dilemma. In particular, Saṅkarṣaṇa does not know what stance to take on non-Vedic scripture since he has one foot inside the Vedic camp, and does not wish to offend the Vedic orthodoxy, and the other foot in the Bhāgavata camp, since he is a worshipper of Viṣṇu. Explaining his predicament, he laments:

Boy, I am in a tight cor
orner, for: Those who adhere to the teaching of the Blessed Viṣṇu Nārāyaṇa…how shall I say with this tongue of mine that their worldview is false? But, if I don’t, how could I stand before the learned whose intellect is completely occupied by the three Vedas?\(^{335}\)

As Saṅkarṣaṇa is pondering this, an assembly of scholars from the various religious traditions have gathered to discuss the dispute between those followers of the Veda and the followers of other religious traditions. Moreover, the great Nyāya scholar Dhairyarāśi is solicited by the queen to be the arbiter of the affair. Dhairyarāśi ultimately argues for the authority of all religious scripture, barring a few exceptions, on the basis of both Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā epistemic criteria, while simultaneously letting it be known that his personal view is that God is the author of all religious scripture and has assumed various forms, whether it be Śiva, Viṣṇu, the Jina or the Buddha, for the welfare of all sentient beings. This position maps onto the content and strategy assumed in the SĀP. In Dharyarāśi’s speech and in the related section in the SĀP, I want to focus on how Jayanta utilizes the Mīmāṃsakas’ own epistemic criteria for authority to argue for his thesis that most religious scripture is authoritative. He essentially argues that any criteria the Mīmāṃsakas put forth to establish the authority of the Veda can equally apply to the

\(^{335}\) ĀḌ: 203.
scripture of other religious traditions. Moreover, any flaw or doubt the Mīmāṃsakas find in non-Vedic scripture can equally apply to the Veda. In the final section, I will look at some pragmatic criteria Jayanta proposes that serve to break the epistemic deadlock so that not just any and all scripture is considered authoritative.

One of the central objections raised against Jayanta’s thesis that all religious scripture is authoritative is the claim that non-Vedic religious texts cannot be authoritative since they mutually contradict one another.\textsuperscript{336} My sense here is that the objector is not arguing that mutual contradictions among sacred texts by themselves render those texts unauthoritative, but rather, mutual contradictions along with the fact that the evidence does not favor the claims of one text over another. For example, Jayanta cites the following verse of Kumārila as an exemplification of this view: “If the Buddha is omniscient, what is the evidence that Kapila is not? [Else, both are omniscient, [but then] how could there be distinct opinion among them?”\textsuperscript{337} The argument here is that if two religious traditions claim that their leader is omniscient, and provide evidence that purportedly supports both claims, how is it possible that both leaders teach different doctrine and that both doctrines be reliable? Given the fact that it is not possible for both scriptures to be right since they conflict and given that there is no evidence that establishes that one scripture is more reliable than the other, both scriptures should not be considered authoritative, and beliefs formed on their basis, should not be justified.

Jayanta’s main response to this objection focuses on minimizing the extent and significance of the contradictions that exist between distinct religious scripture and also arguing

\textsuperscript{336} See ĀD: 227, “Surely all scriptures without exception are mutually contradictory for we do not see any common subject matter therein. How could we accept that they were created by one man? Or how could they be authoritative when they annul each other?” For a nearly identical framing of this objection in the SĀP, see Freschi & Kataoka 2012: 40 (section 6.1.1.).

\textsuperscript{337} Freschi & Kataoka 2012: 41.
that mutual contradictions by themselves do not invalidate religious texts. First, Jayanta claims that “it is not the case that one text invalidates another, since they have an equal rank (kakṣa), having been composed by a reliable author, and since one does not grasp any other reason [to say] that one is weaker [than another].”338 This position is similar to Alston’s thesis that when faced with significant peer religious disagreement, it makes the most sense to retain full confidence in one’s initial belief, which was obtained through a doxastic practice that has significant self-support, since there are no neutral reasons for preferring one belief over the other.

The striking element about Jayanta’s argument is that he is claiming that non-Vedic religious texts have just as much evidence of reliability as does the Veda (“they have equal rank”). He argues for this on the basis of both Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā epistemic criteria. For example, in the ĀḌ, Dhairyarāśi claims that just as the Mīmāṃsakas argue for the authority of the Veda on the basis of its authorlessness and eternity, so too can the same arguments support the authority of other religious texts.339 Moreover, since the Mīṃāsakas accept that the Veda branches out into many different recensions, we can say that other religious scriptures form particular recensions of the Veda.340 On the other hand, one can also argue that that non-Vedic religious texts obtain their authority from being based on the Veda, just like smṛti scripture. In particular, just like the Mīmāṃsakas infer a Vedic root for smṛti texts, not directly knowing the

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338 Freschi & Kataoka 2012: 40.

339 ĀḌ: 233, “Or suppose instead that the Vedas are beginningless and that they become authoritative by themselves alone... we have no clear memory of an author in this case [in the case of other religious scripture] either. “

340 ĀḌ: 235, “Nor do I say that there are five or six Vedas, here, for their number is well known to limited: they are only four. But they diversely branch into many recensions, so let this Pañcarātra be one of their particular recensions.”
particular Veda upon which they are based, the same argument can be applied to non-Vedic religious texts like Buddhist scripture.\footnote{Freschi & Kataoka 2012: 44, “Nor does one directly grasp a Vedic text which is the root of the recollected traditions of Manu, etc. [just like one does not grasp it in the case of Buddhist texts, etc.]. But if one assumes [a Vedic root] out of inference, the same [holds true] also in the case of the other sacred texts.”}

However, if the Mīmāṃsakas argue that the prescriptions in non-Vedic texts conflict with prescriptions in the Veda, one can reply that this conflict is also seen between the Veda and the smṛti, and yet the Mīmāṃsakas still uphold the authority of the smṛti. Moreover, it makes much more sense to postulate a Vedic basis for non-Vedic scripture than to postulate another root, such as mass delusion on the part of the many competent people who accept such texts.\footnote{ĀḌ: 243, “If neither yogic perception nor even the Veda were the basis of all these teachings, such as that of the Jina, Kapila, or the Buddha, how could delusion be the cause of their unlimited reproduction, acknowledged by many Aryas?”} On the other hand, if the Mīmāṃsakas want to maintain that greed or some other unvirtuous root is the source of non-Vedic scriptural beliefs, one can retort that the same can be said of Vedic scriptural beliefs since, for many Vedic priests, the Veda is a means of their livelihood.\footnote{ĀḌ: 243, “Or if you say that greed and the like are the visible source in this case, the heterodox will retort that the Veda is also a means of livelihood.”}

Dhairyarāśi summarizes his position by declaring:

However many arguments of whatever kind you put forth in order to establish the authority of the Veda, they are equal in value with respect to other religious doctrines as well…Religious scriptures are authoritative because they have been enunciated by a truthful, trustworthy person, or by themselves, like the Veda, inasmuch as they have no beginning, or because they are in harmony with Vedic tradition, like Manu’s teaching.\footnote{ĀḌ: 245.}

Thus, through these arguments, Jayanta has established that in terms of Nyāya or Mīmāṃsā epistemic criteria for authority, the Veda and non-Vedic religious scripture hold equal rank. The same type of evidence used to validate the testimony of the Veda applies equally to non-Vedic

\footnote{Freschi & Kataoka 2012: 44, “Nor does one directly grasp a Vedic text which is the root of the recollected traditions of Manu, etc. [just like one does not grasp it in the case of Buddhist texts, etc.]. But if one assumes [a Vedic root] out of inference, the same [holds true] also in the case of the other sacred texts.”}

\footnote{ĀḌ: 243, “If neither yogic perception nor even the Veda were the basis of all these teachings, such as that of the Jina, Kapila, or the Buddha, how could delusion be the cause of their unlimited reproduction, acknowledged by many Aryas?”}

\footnote{ĀḌ: 243, “Or if you say that greed and the like are the visible source in this case, the heterodox will retort that the Veda is also a means of livelihood.”}

\footnote{ĀḌ: 245.}
texts. Similarly, the same type of evidence used to invalidate the testimony of non-Vedic scripture equally applies to the Veda. By arguing on the basis of both Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā criteria for authority, Jayanta is arguing that it is rational to believe that the Veda and non-Vedic texts are authoritative on the basis that they have trustworthy authors or on the basis that they are beginningless and have no author. The evidence supports both propositions.

In addition to demonstrating that the Veda and non-Vedic scripture have equal rank when it comes to the evidence, Jayanta also tries to minimize the extent and significance of the conflict between these two groups of texts. He does this in two ways: first, he diminishes the importance of mutual conflict by pointing out that it also exists within the Veda itself and between the Veda and smṛti, and second, he argues that while there exist different religious paths, there exists no conflict with regard to the central goal of religion: emancipation and final bliss. Regarding the first point, earlier we saw that Jayanta and his Mīmāṃsaka interlocutors resolve cases of conflict between the Veda and smṛti literature by upholding the authority of both, yet utilizing the notion of “option” to resolve any tension. Thus, by whatever method the Mīmāṃsakas propose to resolve the conflict between texts they take as authoritative, this method can also apply to any conflicts between the Veda and non-Vedic texts.345

Moreover, Jayanta argues that mutual conflict among religious scripture concerns minor points rather than key points, like the central aim of human life, which all religious texts agree on. He states, “With regard to the highest human goal, there is no contradiction among scriptures, since all reach the very same reward: deliverance. Nevertheless, differing salvific paths are taught, according to the intellect of the beings to be favored.”346 Moreover, Jayanta

345 Freschi & Katoka 2012: 40, “The contradiction in general, by contrast, is not important, since one notices mutual contradictions even among the Vedic sentences, whose validity is admitted [by all].”

346 ĀDH: 229
argues that all religious traditions claim that knowledge is the means to attain the final human end and, despite disagreeing on the particular content of that knowledge, this knowledge concerns knowledge of the self (ātman). However, aware of the fact that Buddhists reject the notion of the self, Jayanta remedies this by arguing that Buddhists merely have set up another notion, whereby ultimate reality is equated to the flowing stream of consciousness, which is tantamount to the self. The only difference, Jayanta argues, is that while the self is permanent in the sense that it does not change throughout time, the stream of consciousness is permanent in the sense that, despite constantly changing, it continuously flows. While many Buddhists would disagree with Jayanta’s innovative take on their conception of the ultimately real, his goal here is not to convince Buddhists, but rather, his more orthodox Mīmāṃsaka interlocutor that Buddhism shares many elements in common with Vedic religion. In particular, Jayanta hopes to convince his Mīmāṃsaka interlocutor that any mutual conflict that exists between the Veda and non-Vedic scripture is merely apparent or, otherwise, not a deal-breaker.

However, a new concern emerges. It appears as if Jayanta has extended the category of “authoritative scripture” to virtually any and all religious texts. In particular, it seems as if, according to Jayanta, any religious text can be said to have a reliable author (Nyāya criteria) or have its basis in the Veda (Mīmāṃsā criteria). The worry is then that even religious texts that

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347 Freschi & Katoka 2012: 40, “To elaborate: Heaven (apavarga) is described in all systems as something to be reached. Knowledge is described in all as the means to reach it. In contrast, the [systems] differ as for the content of [such] knowledge. Even in this regard, there is for the most part no dissent among the many [systems] as for the fact that [such knowledge] regards the self (ātman).”

348 Freschi & Kataoka 2012: 40 “But the translucent reality consisting of cognition which is accepted by them, is exactly tantamount to the self (ātman), since it is independent, namely, [in Buddhist terms,] it does not rely on anything else. And the distinction lies [only] in the fact that one is immovably permanent (the self) and the other (the cognition) is permanent as a flow.”

349 Freschi & Kataoka 2012: 47, “I hear (kila) that some deceiver, after bringing whatever has been written in an old book, announces “This is a great Text.” One would have to assume a reliable author even for it! Alternatively, one would have to say that the one [or] the other Vedic sentence is its root.”
are socially dangerous and profess extreme views would still be considered authoritative. The next section of this chapter will discuss Jayanta’s response to this objection. Ultimately, Jayanta argues that each individual religious tradition is justified in maintaining and preserving its own teachings and practices so long as it abides by certain socio-pragmatic criteria which prevents it from violating the accepted socio-moral order. After discussing Jayanta’s socio-pragmatic criteria for authority, I want to look more generally at Jayanta’s underlying belief that practical concerns have epistemic significance and, in particular, how it might inform contemporary conversations on religious disagreement.

4.4 Jayanta’s Socio-Pragmatic Criteria for Authority

In the SĀP and ĀḌ, Jayanta introduces his socio-pragmatic criteria for authority after a particular concern emerges. An objector remarks that Jayanta’s thesis reaches too far and allows any religious text, however worthless or dangerous, to be considered authoritative. We saw above that Jayanta argued for the reliability of various religious texts on the basis of different epistemic criteria. The driving force behind Jayanta’s arguments is his belief that the nature of the epistemic evidence regarding the Veda is equal to that of other religious scripture so that if we assume, like his Mīmāṃsaka interlocutor does, that the Veda is reliable, we necessarily have to affirm the reliability of non-Vedic scripture as well. However, this objection raises a valid concern that Jayanta’s standard of evidence, which he claims is based on both Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā criteria for authority, seems to allow any and all religious claims, no matter how outrageous, to be considered authoritative.

In response, Jayanta proposes a set of epistemic and non-epistemic criteria by which all sacred texts must abide. A similar list of these criteria is found in both the SĀP and the ĀḌ. In
order to be considered authoritative, a religious text must: a) have a widely acknowledged tradition that does not appear totally unprecedented, b) not be based on greed or delusion, c) be embraced by exemplary people, d) avoid socially unacceptable practices, and e) lack outlandish or overly inconsistent content.\footnote{For a summary of these criteria in the SĀP see Freschi & Kataoka 2012: 47-48 and in the ĀḌ see ĀḌ: 247.}

We have already been introduced to some of these criteria. For example, Jayanta discussed the criteria of “being accepted by exemplary people” in the last chapter and used it as evidence for the reliability of the Veda. Zagzebski also made a similar argument in claiming that it is rational to defer to those we consider more epistemically competent than ourselves since, by doing so, we maximize our changes of attaining more truths. Moreover, the requirement that a religious text’s content not be overly inconsistent maps onto the criteria that a text must partially agree with states of affairs, also discussed in the last chapter. Lastly, the criteria that a text must not be based in greed, delusion, or any other unwholesome root links up to the Mīmāṃsā-based criteria for authority, where a text must be free of any defect in its causes. However, there are two new criteria that emphasize the social and practical aspects of authority. First, Jayanta claims that, in order to be considered authoritative, a religious text must have a widely acknowledged tradition and its teachings cannot be totally unprecedented. Second, and the criterion I will focus on most given its prominence in the ĀḌ, a religious tradition cannot proclaim teachings or prescribe practices that are socially dangerous or violate the most basic social norms.

Jayanta provides examples of religious traditions that fail to meet the pragmatic criteria for authority. In particular, he focuses on sect of the Black-Blankets (Nīlāmbaras),\footnote{Based on what is written in the NM and ĀḌ, the Black-Blankets were a religious sect in which men and women engaged in the practice of being wrapped up together in a single black cloth and performing hidden and illicit actions under this cloth. Both texts claim that king Śaṅkararvarmin beat, killed and banished this sect from his kingdom. Not much else is known about this sect. For more information see the endnote 2.121 in ĀḌ: 280.} and the
disreputable Śaiva ascetics which were mentioned earlier. The SĀP and ĀḌ both mention the sect of the Black-Blankets, named for a practice wherein a man and woman are wrapped up together in a single black cloth under which they perform sexual actions. Jayanta states that the teachings and practices of these traditions should not be considered authoritative since they: a) are novel and unprecedented, b) violate the socio-religious order, and c) are thought to be invented by a dishonest rogue.\(^{352}\) As a result, king Śaṅkaravarman has banned them.

The ĀḌ provides much more details than the SĀP about the condemned religious traditions whose authority should be rejected. For example, regarding the Black-Blankets, at the end of act two, Saṅkarṣaṇa laments the existence of this “great evil.”\(^{353}\) He explains:

> There is no purity in their words, their vile bodies also lack cleanness, their minds always delight in inconsiderate, utterly despicable behavior…. If what they [the Black-Blankets] are singing about becomes too widespread, the established conduct of social estates and life-periods [i.e. varṇāsramamadharma] will be ruined beyond measure. \(^{354}\)

Saṅkarṣaṇa vows to inform the king of this disastrous situation, knowing that the king will have some solution in mind, “especially since he has the honorable Bhaṭṭa Jayanta by his side.”\(^{355}\) In fact, in the prelude to act three, Jayanta delineates the fate of these so-called socially depraved sects through a conversation between two Śaiva adepts. While earlier we saw Jayanta defend the authority of Śaiva texts, which he claimed accept and abide by Vedic doctrine, here he condemns followers of esoteric Śaiva cults, who engage in anti-social behavior. Desző explains how there were two types of followers in the Śaiva religion: those whose only religious goal is liberation,

\(^{352}\) Freschi & Kstaoka 2012: 48 and ĀḌ: 117-121.

\(^{353}\) ĀḌ: 123.

\(^{354}\) ĀḌ: 121.

\(^{355}\) ĀḌ: 123. I read this as implying that Jayanta himself supports the solution proposed for extremely offensive religious sects.
which earlier we saw Jayanta proclaim as the religious goal that unifies all religious traditions, and those whose goal is to acquire superhuman powers in this world and enjoy the rewards of those powers in this life and the next.\textsuperscript{356} In certain literary works, including the Āḍ, these adepts (sādhakas) are depicted as evil magicians who practice black magic in cremation grounds. In fact, in the prelude to act three, the two Śaiva adepts are called “Skeleton-Banner” and “Crematory-Ash.”\textsuperscript{357}

The prelude to act three depicts the fear and anxiety of those followers of religious traditions that violate the established socio-religious order. Jayanta and king Śaṅkaravarman are portrayed negatively and the situation for certain groups of ascetics is so dire that they plan to flee the kingdom. One particular passage eloquently explains the predicament of certain ascetic groups. Skeleton-Banner laments to his colleague, Crematory-Ash:

King Śaṅkaravarman’s cruelty is public knowledge. That brahmin, his adviser, the wicked Jayanta is even rougher than he. They nabbed the mendicant Black-Blankets, beat them to jelly, and expelled them from the kingdom, on the ground that they were outside Vedic religion. And if any other mendicant is caught who is outside Vedic religion, he’ll be beaten up, killed, thrown in jail, or slain. Are we not one of them? We drink booze, eat meat, have women. Don’t we observe the same religious discipline as the Black-Blankets? So now let us hide our adept-dress, and move on with rapid steps, unnoticed in this darkness.\textsuperscript{358}

This passage makes clear that the official policy of the kingdom is to expulse those religious orders that significantly threatened the Vedic worldview. Despite Jayanta’s generally favorable account of Śaṅkaravarman, the 12th century Kashmiri chronicler Kalhana underscores Śaṅkaravarman’s cruelty and tight control over religious and fiscal matters.\textsuperscript{359}

\textsuperscript{356} Āḍ: 281-282, n. 3.1.

\textsuperscript{357} Āḍ: 129-137

\textsuperscript{358} Āḍ: 131.

\textsuperscript{359} For more information see Kalhana’s negative portrayal of Śaṅkaravarman see Stein 1961 (vol. 1): 207-216. For a summary of this, see Dezső: 16-19.
Based on the examples above, the socio-moral criteria Jayanta relies on are loosely based in *varṇāśramādharma*. I say loosely because, as seen above, only the Black-Blankets and a few esoteric Śaiva practioners are excluded from being able to claim authority for their scriptures while other religious groups, such as the Buddhists and Jains, which Jayanta criticizes for their violation of *varṇāśramādharma* can still claim authority for their scriptures. Moreover, as indicated in the passage above, examples of violating socio-moral norms include drinking alcohol, eating meat, and illicit sexual activity. These offenses are also mentioned in the moral codes for many non-Vedic religions, including Buddhism and Jainism. Initially it is somewhat perplexing that, while Jayanta mocks Buddhist and Jain monks for engaging in the three vices mentioned in the passage above, his ultimate position is to uphold the authority of the Buddhist and Jain religion. I would guess that the difference between the Buddhist and Jain religions on the one hand, and the Black-Blankets on the other hand, is that the official doctrine and practice of the former religions abide by many basic Vedic norms even if there are occasions, often in secret, where these norms are subverted. On the other hand, the religion of the Black-Blankets seems premised on publicly repudiating the Vedic order.

Thus, from this it is clear that while Jayanta’s socio-pragmatic criteria do ultimately restrict the number of religions that can be considered authoritative, they only end up eliminating “extremist” traditions. This is clear from the fact that even those religious traditions that, in some sense, violate the Vedic worldview, such as the Buddhist and Jain traditions, are accepted as authoritative. In this sense, Jayanta’s view is unique in its acceptance of mostly all sacred

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360 For example, see Jaini 1979: 157-187 and Cort 2001: 24-29 on the vows taken by Jain lay people and monks. Similarly, see Harvey 2000: 67-96 on the five precepts followed by Buddhist lay people, as well some distinguishing monastic precepts. Both the Jain vows and the Buddhist precepts include, among other things, refraining from meat, alcohol, and illicit sexual activities.
traditions as authoritative and in its minimization of the contradictions that exist between distinct religious traditions. Despite arguing for his thesis on the basis of his more orthodox rival’s criteria for authority, it is clear that many Mīmāṁsakas would reject the notion that all religious scripture is authoritative and reliable. For example, although Kumārila, acknowledges instances where non-Vedic scriptural teachings are decent and pedagogically useful, he never argues for their legitimacy and authority. Additionally, he even claims that the laudable principles that do exist in non-Vedic religious scripture are traceable to the Veda and that non-Vedic religious traditions have simply misunderstood and distorted the basic Vedic teachings.361

The socio-pragmatic criteria proposed by Jayanta raise the question of whether Jayanta views the authority of religious texts primarily in epistemic terms or in practical terms. That is, does Jayanta believe these criteria point to the truth or rationality of scriptural beliefs or merely to the practical and political benefits of scriptural beliefs, such as societal harmony? It is clear that Jayanta is interested in both epistemic and practical goals. Earlier, we saw Jayanta explain the importance of scripture as a source of knowledge in terms of practical goals. In particular, for Jayanta, the ultimate goal of human life is to attain heaven and final liberation. As the only means by which most people can attain this goal, scripture becomes extremely valuable not only because it sheds light on the truth, but moreover, and probably more importantly, because it tells us what to do in order to attain the ultimate human end.

Despite this, scripture is not reliable or authoritative because it leads us to the ultimate goal of human life, but rather, because, according to Nyāya epistemic criteria, it was authored by

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361 For example, see TV 1.3.4 (in TV: 180-181). Regarding the authority of non-Vedic scripture, Kumārila states, “…even when some of their declarations are found to be in keeping with the teachings of the Veda, we do not accept them as a valid means of knowing dharma….even the few Vedic truths that we find in their works are so mixed up with the rest, that they lose themselves in these, and so become equally unacceptable to us….consequently, so long as even such truths are found only in works of the Bauddhas, and not in any of the above enumerated Vedic Sciences, they remain unacceptable to us.” Relatedly, see Halbfass 1991:60-62.
a reliable person. Similarly, other religious texts are reliable and authoritative for the same reason. Given this, how does Jayanta’s socio-moral criteria indicate that a particular religious text has a reliable author (Nyāya epistemic criteria) or has its basis in the Veda (Mīmāṃsā epistemic criteria)? In order to address this question, I want to refer back to chapter three of this dissertation, which, among other things, discussed pragmatic encroachment in epistemology and argued that whether one’s belief is justified or constitutes knowledge is affected by practical factors. In particular, it was argued that a person’s belief that \( p \) is justified only if that person is rational to act as if \( p \). In the Bank Cases that were discussed, it was argued that Hannah was not justified in believing that the bank would be open on Saturday since it would not be rational for her to act as if the bank would be open on Saturday, given her impending bills. Similarly, we saw Jayanta argue that it would not be rational for an individual to engage in difficult, costly, and physically demanding Vedic rites if those actions were based on testimonial beliefs that were doubtful, i.e. not confirmed.

Moreover, regarding the epistemic conditions, we saw Jayanta argue that all religious texts hold equal rank with respect to the epistemic evidence establishing their authority.\(^{362}\) In particular, on the basis of both Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā epistemic criteria, Jayanta argued that all religious texts have equal evidence regarding their reliability and thus beliefs formed on their basis are equally justified. However, now a situation has been introduced where the stakes involved make it riskier for religious traditions such as the Black-Blankets to act as if their beliefs were true. This is because, according to Jayanta, a great harm would result from acting in ways that upend the social order. In contrast, no great harm results if religious traditions such as

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\(^{362}\) See ĀḌ: 245, “However many arguments of whatever kind you put forth in order to establish the authority of the Veda, they are equal in value with respect to other religious doctrines as well.”
Śaivism, act on the basis of beliefs that, while different from Vedic beliefs, do not upend the social order. Thus, the justification required on the part of the latter set of beliefs is not elevated.

However, the stakes involved in acting on the basis of beliefs that upend the social order raise the standard of evidence required of those beliefs. It would be one thing if followers of “extreme” religious sects had knowledge-level justification for their religious beliefs, even if such beliefs entailed socially dangerous consequences. However, as seen in the last chapter, Jayanta argued for why religious testimonial beliefs differ from mundane testimonial beliefs both in the justification required and in the confirmability of their objects. Regarding the latter, Jayanta argued that many important religious objects are invisible and thus, unable to be directly confirmed by most people. Additionally, in delineating his own personal view that God is the author of all religious scripture, Jayanta acknowledged that the disagreement among religious teachings is based on the fact that God assumes different forms and teaches different doctrines according to people’s diverse mental capabilities and needs. All this leads me to believe that, according to Jayanta, the justification we have for religious beliefs is never as high as the justification we have for mundane beliefs that can be easily and directly verified. However, Jayanta never outright claims this.

Additionally, it is telling that Jayanta does not actually demonstrate that non-Vedic scripture, like Buddhist scripture, is reliable, like he did with the Veda. For example, he does not provide direct evidence that the Buddha is trustworthy. Instead, it seems clear that Jayanta’s primary focus is on rebutting Mīmāṃsā objections to the unreliability of non-Vedic scripture by arguing that, just as the Mīmāṃsakas find a way to resolve contradictions and other purported flaws in the Veda, the same principles can also be applied to non-Vedic texts. However, Jayanta also argues that the level of justification should be much higher for religious beliefs that entail
practices which would substantially revise our conception of morality or would damage societal relations. Prior to stakes-considerations, the nature of the evidence might be such that, provided a normal level of justificatory evidence, there are multiple, epistemically-adequate conclusions that can be drawn about the reliability of different religious scripture. I believe this is why Jayanta is able to propose arguments both for and against the reliability of Buddhist and Jain scriptures. However, the level of evidence required for religious beliefs that, in Jayanta’s assessment, entail a great social harm, is much higher. For example, whereas prior to stakes-considerations, one’s level of justification might support the thesis that a certain author is reliable, after stakes-considerations, one might realize that one cannot rule out the possibility that the author is ignorant or fabricating false doctrines.

I want to now raise the question about using stakes-considerations in contemporary discussions on religious disagreement. If practical considerations change the level of support required of certain beliefs, then even a disagreement among epistemic peers, whereby both individuals have similar epistemic capabilities and access to the same or similar evidence, might result in one side being more justified than the other. For example, earlier we saw Gellman argue for the rationality of the religious exclusivist position in the face of significant peer religious disagreement. In particular, he argued that it is perfectly rational for our religious rock-bottom beliefs to stay unreflective. However, at the very end of his article, Gellman notes potential dangers in his position, one of which is the fact that it might result in a lack of tolerance toward religious beliefs that that are different from our own. Since this is a position Gellman wants to avoid, he states:

Yet I realize that the contented exclusivisit position might be unjustifiably used to slide into positions I would want to reject. Hence, I close with an appeal that philosophical
defences of contented religious exclusivism always be accompanied by declarations of religious tolerance.\textsuperscript{363}

Gellman’s “appeal” seems like an ad hoc addition to his thesis to avoid the negative consequence of intolerance, despite acknowledging that intolerance can still be rational (“True enough, my contented exclusivist may rationally believe that all religions other than the home religion are works of the devil”\textsuperscript{364}). In this situation, what if we were to propose that the risks involved in embracing intolerance raise the level of evidence required for beliefs that promote intolerance? In certain cases, this might result in the fact that the level of evidence required to make certain religious beliefs justified is not attainable. Similarly, earlier in this chapter we saw Christensen and Feldman argue that in a situation of intractable disagreement between epistemic peers, the epistemically rational position would be to either suspend one’s belief or hold it with reduced confidence. However, I would argue that in cases where the epistemic evidence seems to support, on the basis of normal levels of justificatory evidence, multiple beliefs, practical factors might shed light on the situation by raising the justification required of certain beliefs, in particular, those with risky consequences.

I believe that practical considerations can also apply to Alston’s “doxastic practice” approach to epistemology, which focuses on identifying which of our belief-forming practices are reliable and thus capable of justifying beliefs formed on their basis. In \textit{Perceiving God}, Alston argues that despite there being no non-circular way to assess the reliability of our belief-forming practices, it is practically rational to engage in socially established doxastic practices,

\textsuperscript{363} Gellman 2000: 416-417.

\textsuperscript{364} Gellman 2000: 416.
including religious practices, and regard them as reliable provided they are not demonstrably unreliable or deficient in any other way. According to Alston, an example of unreliability would be if a practice yielded massive inconsistency between its outputs or between its outputs and a background system of belief that compromises the override system. However, what if a doxastic practice’s deficiency was also measured in terms of it yielding beliefs that were risky, pragmatically speaking? Could that raise the level of justification required for that practice? If so, it could reduce the rationality of engaging in that doxastic practice, and likewise, the justification conferred on beliefs formed through such a practice. Thus, when Alston argues that there are no neutral grounds for epistemically preferring one doxastic practice and its output to another, I would argue that if epistemic rationality is affected by pragmatic criteria then there might be more common ground than suspected. While I would not argue that this will always be the case, it at least opens another avenue for approaching intractable religious disagreement.

One thing to note is that pragmatic criteria is a product of tradition. For example, we saw that Jayanta’s socio-pragmatic criteria is based on varṇāśramadharma. While this means that there might not be universal agreement regarding pragmatic criteria, both Gellman and Jayanta’s analysis of religious disagreement indicated that there is not always universal agreement even regarding epistemic criteria. While Gellman argued that rationality undetermines our overall set of epistemic criteria, thus allowing for a religious exclusivist to be rational, Jayanta employed both Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā epistemic criteria in demonstrating his thesis that all religious

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365 Alston 2000: 194, “My main thesis in this chapter, and indeed in the whole book, is that CMP [Christian Mystical Perceptual Doxastic Practice] is rationally engaged in since it is a socially established doxastic practice that is not demonstrably unreliable or otherwise disqualified for rational acceptance.”

366 Alston 2000:175, “A firmly established doxastic practice is rationally engaged in provided it and its output cohere sufficiently with other firmly established doxastic practices and their output…I have suggested that our most familiar and basic doxastic practices pass all these tests. They are sufficiently socially established to be accorded the status of prima facie rationality. They escape disqualification by massive and persistent internal or external contradiction, and their claims are reinforced by significant self-support.”
scripture is authoritative. Moreover, Jayanta’s engagement with another tradition’s epistemic criteria proves that rigorous discussion and debate can still occur when a rival accepts different epistemic principles. This bodes well for disagreement that might exist over practical criteria as well. In particular, while recognizing the importance of tradition in shaping our view of, for example, social evils, we can simultaneously subject this tradition to public scrutiny. Gellman’s account, which argues that it is rational for a person’s rock-bottom beliefs to remain unreflective, provided they do not “squeak” for her, does not seem to allow for this.

On the other hand, Jayanta not only engages with the various critiques that other traditions levy at Vedic traditions, but also, he ultimately argues against the position of his more orthodox rival, who only recognizes the authority of the Vedic tradition. Moreover, Jayanta’s employment of varṇāśramadharma, that is, the Vedic tradition’s socio-moral code, is nuanced. For example, we saw that, despite that fact that some traditions, such as Buddhism and Jainism, seemed to violate varṇāśramadharma, they were still ultimately considered authoritative since this violation did not seem to result in such a great social harm. This seems to indicate some flexibility on Jayanta’s part regarding his stance on the ultimacy of his own tradition’s socio-moral code. Lastly, Jayanta also focuses on similar socio-moral principles that unite the diverse religious traditions. For example, toward the end of his speech, Dhairyarāśi claims, “People have always praised piety, common to all sacred traditions, which consists in nonviolence, sincerity, contentment, purity, self-control, munificence, compassion, and the like.” Thus, Jayanta underscores the common ground between diverse religious traditions that serves as the backdrop to the conversation about social evils. These are just some examples of how Jayanta’s focus on the epistemic significance of practical factors, as well as his recognition of the importance of

367 Ṛṣṭ: 237.
tradition and the public scrutiny of tradition, can apply to contemporary conversations on the
topic of religious disagreement. While more research on the topic is needed to provide a more
nuanced and detailed response, I think this provides a plausible avenue to pursue in hopes of
breaking some of the deadlock in contemporary theorizing about religious disagreement.

4.5 Conclusion

This dissertation started off by examining the status of testimony as an independent
source of knowledge and concluded with an analysis of a particular problem within the
epistemology of religious testimony, namely, the challenge of religious disagreement. By way of
conclusion, I want review one of the central themes of this dissertation, namely, the link between
epistemology and practical interests. In the Introduction to this dissertation, I spent some time
discussing the relevance of epistemology to religious goals in South Asian philosophy of
religion. In particular, I underscored the challenge created by the rise of numerous non-Vedic
religious traditions and Jayanta’s use of epistemology, particularly, the epistemology of
testimony, to conceptualize and legitimize the authority of Vedic scripture.

Relatedly, chapter three of this dissertation looked at Jayanta’s delineation of the two
types of goals that people have and the two distinct means for attaining those goals. In particular,
Jayanta argued that while our ordinary sense and reasoning faculties can lead us to perceptible
objectives, such as food and nourishment, the only way that most people can obtain invisible
objectives, such as the goals discussed religious texts, is through scripture. This connection
between epistemology of testimony and the attainment of the highest human ends helps explain
Jayanta’s reorientation the Nyāya text tradition from a branch of learning that is independent of
the Veda, to one whose main goal is to defend the Veda, thus securing the authority of religious testimony and as a result, the means to an important human goal.

The idea that scripture is often the only means for obtaining knowledge about ultimate ends like liberation was also claimed by one of Jayanta’s primary rivals, the Buddhist Dharmakīrti. In chapter two of this dissertation, we saw Dharmakīrti attempt to resolve the tension between his epistemology, and in particular, his notion that language can never provide knowledge of real objects, and his belief that knowledge of the highest Buddhist goals, which, for most people, is not attainable through ordinary sensory and reasoning faculties, is only accessible through scripture. While Dharmakīrti argues that scriptural beliefs about transcendent objects that we have not, and probably cannot, directly verify, can be rational provided that a scripture has been critically and rigorously analyzed in all its empirical aspects, he ultimately concludes that such scriptural beliefs can never amount to bona fide knowledge.

The link between epistemology and practical reasoning was also emphasized in Jayanta’s arguments for why religious testimony merits different epistemic treatment than mundane types of testimony (chapter three) and in his reason for rejecting the authority of certain types of scriptural beliefs, namely, those beliefs the embracing of which could upend the socio-religious order (chapter four). Regarding the former topic, Jayanta argued that the stakes involved in acting as if a certain belief were true affects the level of epistemic support required of that belief. For example, since acting as if Vedic beliefs were true leads to great expenditure and requires much effort and exertion, it would be unreasonable to act as if Vedic beliefs were true unless we obtained greater justification for them through confirmatory, or reflective, knowledge.

Regarding the latter topic, Jayanta argued, on the basis of both Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā epistemic criteria for the authority of a text, which is based on a normal level of justificatory
evidence of reliability, that most religious scripture should be considered authoritative. However, in cases where the stakes are raised, such as when there are great risks attached to accepting certain religious beliefs, the level of justification required of those beliefs is raised so that further evidence is required in order for them to be justified. More specifically, Jayanta argued that a great social harm would result in acting as if the religious beliefs of the Black-Blankets were true. As a result, such religious beliefs are not authoritative since they cannot obtain the level of epistemic support required to be justified.

As stated in the Introduction to this dissertation, one of my goals was to establish a dialogue between Indian philosophy and contemporary Euro-American philosophy. The motives behind my goal are twofold: first, I argued that such a dialogue was critical to translating and comprehending Sanskrit texts and second, I underscored the desirability of creating a space where thinkers from different contexts can enter into critical philosophical dialogue with one another. In providing an analytical study of the debates that took place on the epistemology of testimony, and in particular, religious testimony, as seen through the lens a particular Sanskrit philosopher, I see my project as contributing to that goal by underscoring the relevance of Sanskrit texts and the theoretical insights of South Asian intellectuals to contemporary conversations in the philosophy of religion. In particular, as the last section of this chapter demonstrated, I believe that Jayanta’s unique approach to the problem of religious disagreement, especially his consideration of the socio-practical factors that affect the justification of religious beliefs, offers a new avenue of approach for contemporary theorizing on intractable religious disagreement.
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