



The Efficacy of Deliberative Democracy

Citation

Celaya, Christopher Michael. 2019. The Efficacy of Deliberative Democracy. Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, Graduate School of Arts & Sciences.

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The Efficacy of Deliberative Democracy

A dissertation presented

by

Christopher Michael Celaya

to

The Department of Government

in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in the subject of

Political Science

Harvard University

Cambridge, Massachusetts

May 2019

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The Efficacy of Deliberative Democracy

Abstract

Social, political, and academic programs that leverage deliberative democratic procedures are lauded for their ability to increase participant knowledge, sophistication, and efficacy. Myriad studies link deliberative programs to increases in these measures, but two major questions remain in the deliberative democracy literature. First, do these types of programs have an impact beyond the effects on those who participate? And second, does the deliberation itself lead to these increases, or some other facet of the associated program? The three projects that comprise this dissertation are an early, and in some ways first, step toward answering these questions. In the first, I observed two promising deliberative programs for their potential political impact and conducted elite interviews with program directors and founders, political officials, and social activists, finding some evidence that these programs can moderately affect political decisions, but that they are much more capable of setting the political agenda and shaping ideology, the second and third faces of power. These observations also revealed an important clue about why differently designed deliberative programs lead to different outcomes in the above measures for participants; deliberators seemed to gain at least as much knowledge from engagement with experts as with fellow deliberators. I conducted a large laboratory experiment to test these two treatments and found, somewhat counterintuitively, that a Q&A session with experts outperformed pure deliberation for increasing knowledge, sophistication, and efficacy, and that deliberation never outperformed the Q&A. Moreover, the Q&A also dramatically outperformed an information-packet only control group, suggesting that the effects ascribed to deliberation were being misattributed. Given that these were counterintuitive results, in the third project I triangulated on them

using a different methodological approach: in-depth participant interviews, qualitative survey analysis, and more observational research. I confirmed that most learning is attributed to engagement with experts, and that almost no knowledge or efficacy increases are attributed to deliberation. There is some evidence that participants made more sophisticated decisions after deliberating, but participants almost unanimously ascribed these decisions to participants with extant knowledge creating a “wisdom of the multitude” effect rather than being caused by deliberation itself.

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Acknowledgements

A great many thanks to my committee for all their support and encouragement: Ryan Enos, Jennifer Hochschild, Jane Mansbridge.

To my amazing research assistant Segan Helle, who in four months' time became an expert on Massachusetts State minimum wage law. To my good friends Aaron Kaufman and Jany Gao for their consistent and reliable support throughout this process.

And to the many Harvard organizations without which I never would have received the requisite feedback and funding to make this work possible: Mind Brain Behavior Interfaculty Initiative, Foundations of Human Behavior, Project on Negotiation, Center for American Political Studies, Institute for Quantitative Social Science, American Politics Research Workshop, Harvard Decision Science Lab, and the Research Design Happy Hour.

1: Deliberative Democracy: Power in Practice

1.1: Introduction

Large-scale deliberative programs capable of impacting real-world policymaking are rare. One of the most promising, and often overlooked, practices of Deliberative Democracy (DD) comes in the form of the New England Town Hall Meeting (Bryan, 2003), but these forms of DD are limited in size as too large a deliberative body becomes unwieldy. As a result, similar programs are essentially non-existent in larger cities, and DD is often treated as niche and insular by much of academia; you don't see articles titled "Comparative Politics...and what else?" or "Against Political Psychology" (Walzer, 2004; Sanders, 1997). Which is unfortunate as the promise of DD is vast. Scholarship shows that deliberation leads to updated policy preferences through knowledge increases (Fishkin & Luskin, 2005). Fishkin (1995, pp. 34) asserts that "a collective process occurs in which the group has a reasonable chance to form its collective, considered judgments." Moreover, List, Luskin, Fishkin, and McLean (2013) find that political deliberation moves participants closer to single-peakedness as a result of information acquisition. Wuthnow (1994) demonstrates that small deliberative groups are more likely to be interested and participate in politics and to reconsider their stance on political issues. In perhaps the most striking finding, Gastil and Dillard (1999) have demonstrated that deliberative discussions increase political sophistication on the part of the discussants. These claims deserve serious consideration. High political knowledge and sophistication are generally only ascribed to the prestigious ranks of the college intellectual and political elites (Converse, 1964), and studies of American politics have largely taken to describing American public opinion as "Uninformed, inconsistent, non-ideological and moderate" (Fiorina, Peterson, Johnson, & Mayer, 2011; Campbell et al, 1980). But while it seems fairly clear that DD

confers a number of potentially beneficial effects for citizen competence and engagement, little is known whether and how these benefits influence American society more generally.

Critics of DD are not wrong to question whether it is worth consideration, and all political science is tasked with answering the notorious “so what?” question. Two relatively recent promising deliberative programs seem likely to provide an answer: the Citizens’ Initiative Review (CIR) and Participatory Budgeting (PB). This paper will provide evidence to show that these large-scale, intensive, and professionally operated deliberative programs have real, observable, and wide-ranging impacts on political actions, decisions, and thinking. Through participant and non-participant observation, and interview research, I will go beyond simply answering whether these deliberative projects have a political impact. I will also delve into the conditions necessary to implement projects like these in the first place. Social engineers intending to leverage deliberative programs first need to know the conditions to implement and sustain them.

I leverage sociological theories of power to test whether the CIR and PB actually have an impact. I find that the CIR and PB have limited but real impact on policymaking and coercive power. However, I also find that these programs are more able to access the *second face* of power, agenda setting (Bachrach & Baratz, 1962), as well as the *third dimension* of power, shaping ideology (Lukes, 2005).

1.1.1: The Citizens Initiative Review

The Citizens Initiative Review is a project designed and organized by the 501(c)(3) Healthy Democracy. The project grew from the Jefferson Center’s Citizens Juries in Minnesota. The CIR is essentially a Citizens Jury designed to digest and regurgitate information surrounding a state’s ballot initiative(s) such that it outputs a statement addressing the merits of the initiative from the value perspective of typical voters (<https://healthydemocracy.org/cir/>). Over the course of three to five days, panelists hear from

experts, advocates, and often political leaders of whom they are permitted and encouraged to ask questions. The CIR is a highly structured deliberative process; panelists bounce from task to task, deliberate in small groups and collectively, prepare, review, and ask questions, and give and discuss constant feedback. The tasks are rigidly administered by trained mediators and facilitators, and there is very little leeway in the timing or choice of tasks. In many ways the CIR is similar to Deliberative Polling (DP) done at the Center for Deliberative Democracy at Stanford, though there are some task differences, and the objective is somewhat different: DP seeks to reveal what an informed public opinion would look like about an issue, CIR is designed to provide a more frame-accessible perspective on an a ballot initiative.

The CIR, when implemented, seeks to educate voters before they vote on a ballot initiative, and as such has a lot of potential to affect political decisions from the bottom up. Healthy Democracy has run several iterations of the CIR in multiple states as demonstrations, and the state of Oregon has established a commission to select at least one initiative in general elections and to convene a citizen panel, and then to issue a statement to the voters. Healthy Democracy conducts demonstrations in eligible states (i.e. states that have an initiative process) and advocates for those states to adopt similar adopt and fund the program in full.

Thus, the CIR seems a promising program for trying to determine whether DD can be a politically efficacious component of American society. It is at least as deliberative as DP, the “Gold Standard (Mansbridge, 2010),” and oftentimes more so, it has a reasonable claim to being able to affect political behavior and policy outcomes, and it is reified in at least one state law.

1.1.2: Participatory Budgeting

Unlike the CIR, PB Projects are profuse and have more obvious impacts. Participatory Budgeting is a process imported from Brazil, where it was first implemented in the 1980s. In the United States, the way

the process works is that a locality, usually a city or district within a large city, will set aside a (relatively small) portion of its annual budget. That portion is given over to the residents of the locality to spend on projects of their own conception and desire. This process takes place over a much longer time period and is much more intensive than the CIR, overall.

There are two potential stages of deliberation in a PB process: during project ideation and in the process of amending the projects to the constraints of the locality. The ideation process is when residents of the locality initially design the projects they would like to submit to the process. While this part of the process offers the greatest opportunity for deliberation to shine as the ideation task is *generative* (Scharmer, 2001), it is also the area that cities find the most difficult to support. The process of conforming the initial ideas is where deliberation is most often practiced during PB. Usually, but not always, a city will recruit volunteers to serve as budget delegates who pour through the initially submitted ideas and assure that they match whatever standard their locality directs. For example, some localities fund their PB process from a portion of the budget that can only be spent on certain projects, such as parks and roads, and not others, such as beautification. Delegates are also often tasked with combining ideas that are similar, or reforming ideas to make better use of space, or to better address a particular need in a locality while retaining the spirit of the proposal.

Thus, despite not always deliberating for ideation, the deliberative efforts of the budget delegates are still more than sufficient to consider PB a deliberative process. PB delegate deliberations for a single year can last as long as the deliberative sessions in a single 3-5 day CIR, which takes place over a few days. But the character of the deliberation is very different in PB. The meetings take place weekly over the course of a few months, and each week delegates only come together for a couple hours. Delegate meetings are much less structured than CIR deliberations, which better serves the purpose of PB. Group sizes also vary a lot more than in the CIR, and groups are often divided by which projects delegates are interested in.

As mentioned, the political impact of PB programs is much clearer than in the CIR. Delegates often whittle down the number of proposals from the hundreds to a few dozen. Their deliberation directly contributes to how ideas are combined, how they are reformed to comport with their locality's strictures, and how they are redesigned to better realize the spirit of the projects.

Thus, PB also seems a worthy candidate to for trying to determine if DD has efficacy. It is highly deliberative, it has definite impacts, and it is instituted more broadly.

1.2: Methods

In order to measure whether these two programs are efficacious, I combine participant and non-participant observational research with elite interviews. I use this mixed-methods approach to help confirm the findings of each method through triangulation (Small, 2011). Thus, I attended two full CIR events for roughly 60 hours of observational research as well as served as a budget delegate for the Cambridge, MA PB program for two years, which entailed about another 60 hours of engagement with that program. To move beyond the limits of personal observation, and to really understand how these programs could be efficacious, I also spoke with the elites involved with each of them. To that end, I interviewed 16 people in 5 different cities. Of course, one concern with interviews is that interviewees don't always have the incentive to be completely forthcoming. Thus, I made an effort to get perspectives from people in diverse roles associated with the two programs, and especially diversity in terms of government workers versus advocates. Thus, I was not only able to triangulate based on my personal observations, I was also able to triangulate *across cases* (Gallagher, 2013). When interviewees with different, and especially conflicting, agendas report the same observations, researchers can be more confident in the accuracy of their responses.

Interviews lasted approximately 56 minutes on average and ranged from 14:26 minutes to 87:35 minutes. Interviews were recorded either using a phone call recorder or a voice recorder application depending on the interviewee's location. Calls were hand-transcribed based on these recordings. Interviewees for this study were guaranteed anonymity, but aliases and the actual roles they held are listed below to provide a coherent narrative. All aliases were randomly generated (via www.fakenamegenerator.com) and any similarity they bear to real persons is completely coincidental:

- I. Barbara Grant: Candidate for a city's Alderperson and Advocate for PB, now manages PB.
- II. Travis Brown: Advocate for a city PB project, played a key role in establishing the program.
- III. Angela Carrico: Facilitator for the CIR.
- IV. Jodie Cabrera: Ex-facilitator for the CIR.
- V. Louis Hernandez: One of the Founders of PB in the United States.
- VI. Jimmy Lane: One of the Founders of the CIR.
- VII. Pauline Mirabal: Program Director of a city's PB program.
- VIII. Renee Jones: One of the Directors of the CIR.
- IX. Darrell Krause: City Manager for a city with a PB program.
- X. Regina Sanders: Budget Director for a city with a PB program.
- XI. Alex Rodriguez: Finance Director for a city with a PB program.
- XII. Ivan Nelson: City Councilor for a city with a PB program.
- XIII. Justin Simmons: Aide to a city councilor in a city with a PB program.
- XIV. Jack McClean: City Council Staff Member for a city with a PB program.
- XV. Ramon Fagan: Budget Director for a city with a PB program.
- XVI. Eleanor Cook: Researcher studying PB nationally.

The main purpose of this study is to explore how deliberative democratic programs can be efficacious. I operationalize efficacy in this context to mean exercising actual political power, specifically the three faces of political power: coercive power, agenda-setting power, and power over ideology. But this study also seeks to dig deeper than merely a descriptive study that states whether these two programs have power or not. It also into how this power plays out, and how it is shared with other political actors. It explores the foundations of this potential power, design choices that sustain it, and where it is likely to go in the future. As such, I developed a codebook (See Appendix A) that guided my analysis of the interviews I conducted, and my own assessment of my observations.

The codebook is broken into four columns. In the first column is the name of the code itself. These codes correspond to the topics listed in the previous paragraph. The second column describes what evidence would look like in support of the associated code. The third column gives interview examples of what fulfillment of the description would look like. The fourth column describes the various methods I used to validate claims in order to minimize inaccurate responses, motivated reasoning, or other intentional and unintentional obfuscation. These included cross-case corroboration, recalled examples, counterfactual examples, identification of a plausible causal mechanism, and corroboration from my own observational research. These validations will be reported in the results section along with the paraphrased and directly quoted interview responses.

As a method of data collection, observational and interview methods are also valuable for theory-building, and for generating and even conducting early testing of new hypotheses (Lynch, 2013). For example, as I observed the two different programs, one of the starkest differences I noticed between the two was how rigidly (CIR) or loosely (PB) the deliberative components were designed. This got me thinking about research concerning DD and how it might map on to the two different programs. In general, it seems as though research projects on the more rigidly structured deliberative programs (such as Deliberative Polling) were the ones that reported increases in participant knowledge (Luskin, Fishkin, & Jowell, 2002) and research projects on less structured deliberation (such as in the National Issues Forum and in research on *flipped classrooms*) were the ones that reported increases in sophistication (Gastil & Dillard, 1999; Smith, Wood, Krauter, & Knight, 2011). This somewhat mapped on to the goals of the CIR (a rigidly structured deliberative program designed for participants to acquire and share knowledge) and PB (a relatively unstructured deliberative program designed for delegates to creatively shape, combine, and discard ideas), and informed some hypothesis testing from the interviews.

This article will proceed in 3 sections. In Section 1, *Implementation*, I will discuss the necessary conditions for a DD project to get off the ground in the first place. This section will discuss funding, staff, trust, and political entrepreneurs.

In section 2, *Sustainment*, I will discuss design elements and technique-sharing between various deliberative projects. This section will serve as a helpful guide to those considering their own deliberative projects.

In section 3, *Power Sharing*, I will discuss the political impact that these projects have had. This section will focus on politicking around these projects (i.e. do political leaders use them to get elected, or are they simply fulfilling an ideological goal) as well as power-sharing (when can deliberation be used to do the legwork of governance). Additionally, this section will reveal instances of deliberation supplementing government rather than simply replacing it. In other words, deliberation is often able to identify and recommend solutions to otherwise unknown or difficult-to fix problems.

1.3: Implementation

In this section I will reveal and discuss the necessary conditions for a large-scale deliberative project like the CIR or PB to come to fruition. These revelations come from extensive interviews informed by my observation of the two projects. This section will be divided into 4 subsections: Overview, Entrepreneurs, Funding, and Buy-In.

1.3.1: Overview

The primary conditions for the success of large-scale deliberative programs are threefold: Political Entrepreneurs, Funding, and buy-in by the community and staff. Louis Hernandez, one of the earliest

Americans responsible for bringing PB to the United States largely drove my expectations about implementation in an early interview:

Most places there's a political entrepreneur whether that's an official, a staff member with some power, who makes it happen. That's one thing. And then, whether it does happen depends a lot on resources, so if there are resources available, especially...for the pot of money but also for the implementation of the process. So there have been some times when there's been a real champion of the process but they haven't had those resources so it hasn't moved forward. Another factors can play into that certainly; community support and pressure can make those resources available or can get someone a political entrepreneur interested in the first place.

Alex Rodriguez, a city finance director, mirroring the above sentiment also suggested the need for buy-in from city staff members; essentially, PB adds to the workload of extant city staff, and generally cities do not hire extra staff to take up the slack. In terms of validation, these responses are corroborated across cases (interviewees), provide examples (seen more in the following sections), and provide a plausible causal story. I have good reason to believe that these claims are accurate.

As the following three sections will make clear there is a three-step process for implementation of deliberative programs. First and foremost there needs to be a political will. This occasionally begins as a grassroots movement, but that movement needs a political leader to take on its cause or it likely won't go anywhere. In the projects I studied these leaders have come in the form of state representatives, mayors, and city councilors/alderpeople. In about half of these instances the political entrepreneurs brought them in as pet projects, and in the other half they were brought to the attention of political leaders by activists.

After the entrepreneur convinces their locality to take on the project, the next necessary condition is funding. This requirement varies dramatically by the type of project being implemented. For example, a single instance of the CIR costs roughly between one-half and one-twentieth of the cost of a single instance of PB, or roughly \$65,000 to \$120,000 for the CIR versus \$200,000 to \$1,250,000 for PB (San

Antonio is currently implementing an even larger PB budget, and many current cities practicing PB increase their budgets each year). It is possible to conduct smaller-scale PB projects, and some schools have with much smaller budgets (\$20,000-\$50,000), but the scale of the impact of these projects also decreases dramatically. Moreover, just from a cost perspective, the CIR is even more efficient in that it affects an entire state, whereas PB projects in the United States (at least for now), are limited to the city or borough level. That being said, funding isn't as straightforward as it seems. Acquiring funding has perhaps been the most difficult challenge for the CIR. They've so far relied on grants and individual invested donors. For a project like PB, funding is more of a "you have it or you don't" situation; for wealthier cities it doesn't seem to take much convincing to allocate the funds and for poorer cities it seems a PB is forever out of reach. For example, Cambridge, MA spends approximately .15% of its total budget on PB, and approximately 1% of its capital budget (Cambridge Budget Office, 2018).

Finally, success requires buy-in from the community and the political leadership otherwise it is unlikely to get off the ground. This also plays out differently depending on the type of project being implemented. The CIR doesn't really require community buy-in in the sense that it requires broad participation for its deliberative activities; the actual levels of community engagement are miniscule compared to the population of any state. But the CIR does need citizen support in justifying the projects to state legislators to guarantee the CIR is politically viable. Thus, the CIR relies on surveys about preferences for the CIR process to convince politicians to support it. On the other hand, the CIR requires a highly dedicated and motivated staff to run a deliberative marathon over the course of up to 5 days. The staff is constantly engaged with participants, and when the participants are querying advocates or experts, the staff is in the background conducting continual assessments of the day and making real-time modifications to the process. This program would not function if they gave lackluster effort. On the PB side, having a dedicated staff is equally important (and one PB program collapsed partly as a result of a disengaged staff, detailed later), but they also need direct community engagement. Citizen

engagement is required along almost every part of the process. Residents of the PB's locality submit the ideas to be considered, they serve as delegates to refine the ideas to make them appropriate to the stipulations of their locality, the citizens vote, and also give assessments. The amount of people involved is still a small part of the overall locality, but in this instance it's actually usually a couple percentage points and as high as 6% in Cambridge, MA.

In addition to these common themes, there are also miscellaneous considerations that are often context-specific but nevertheless might serve as helpful guides to navigating the implementation of a large-scale deliberative project. The following 5 subsections will detail these conditions at greater length.

1.3.2: Entrepreneurs

Interviewees explicitly and tacitly conveyed the need for entrepreneurs to implement these large-scale deliberative programs. I asked City Councilor Ivan Nelson if he knew why some cities that could afford to implement a PB program nevertheless declined to do so. He responded, "No, I don't know. They didn't have me to push it through. I'm serious though, I pushed it through, so..." But this was no idle boast. Pauline Mirabal, the PB program directory in the same city, stated "Councilor [above] is the one who brought it [PB] to Cambridge." The councilor went on to say "I built the political will amongst the city council, the city administration, to attempt something like participatory budgeting, and then the city council passed a vote to appropriate money to hire a consultant to tell us how to do it, and then the consultant came in and totally designed the program to actually go on and implement it." Asked to elaborate what methods were successful for persuading the city administrators, the councilor said, "I worked with my colleagues and sold them on the idea, I worked with the city administration to figure out how we could carve some money out of the budget to figure out how we could fund it, I looked at the likely projects. A bunch of the things proposed in PB are things we would probably spend money on

anyway, it's just that we're breaking it up in time, and so thinking about that and how to get buy in from the city finance staff..." Jack McClean, an aide to a city councilor in another city stated PB "was the particular passion project for a councilmember at the time. It was his last year in office. And he...felt very strong about it being a youth-focused pilot...and youth projects and programs were just a passion of his through his entire time in the council. So he got really excited by that."

As mentioned above, there were also instances of grassroots efforts to move these projects forward. Two activists from different cities, Barbara Grant and Travis Brown, shared their efforts to push these projects forward as well. Both of them outline a similar trajectory as the city staff, starting with an extant movement that they began, then looking for better ways to engage the community. From both of their accounts, it was apparent that the will to implement a PB program was generated from a grassroots movement, but, as mentioned, the program eventually still had to find backing from city government leaders. Barbara made PB a central pillar of her campaign to run for Alderperson, and though she didn't win, her activism inspired the eventual winner of the election to take up the program, and to appoint Barbara as its director. Travis, on the other hand, was largely motivated by an ideological affinity toward participatory democracy, and PB specifically, and eventually planned to start a business that provided resources for other cities interested in hosting their own PB programs. When discussing his efforts, he boldly proclaimed "I sold the s--- out of it," but also summed up his story with an acknowledgement, "somebody's got to push it forward to make it happen, and that's also how to get people to sign into it, and to get the whole city to sign into that."

Entrepreneurial leadership was also a necessary component of the CIR. However, the CIR leaders who brought the program into fruition tended to be activists and other interested non-governmental parties. Jodie Cabrera, an ex-facilitator for the CIR who left partly due to ideological differences, suggested that while political entrepreneurs were responsible for creating the CIR, they also relied on requests from government representatives and staffs to bring the program to their state. Thus, even with a fully

developed program ready for implementation, an entrepreneur on the demand-side was still required for the program to be implemented.

This isn't to discount the necessity of a political entrepreneur on the supply-side. Jimmy Lane, one of the founders of the CIR explained how they personally had a hand in bringing building the program from scratch. Echoing Travis, beyond merely designing the program, much of the work Jimmy had to put in concerned getting political leaders in Oregon and Washington State to take up the program initially and to sign it in to law. With the help of two other passionate entrepreneurs, Jimmy hired a lobbyist, got signatures for petitions, and hired a law firm to actually write up a bill. Despite this work nobody in Washington State was willing to take up this program, though Oregon was more amenable (the reasons for which will be explicated later in the Sharing Power section). This serves somewhat as a counterfactual to show that even with supply-side entrepreneurs, without demand-side entrepreneurs efforts to implement these types of programs will likely fail.

Jimmy was also able to implement this project nearly on his own because it was largely self-funded. This partly explains why the CIR wasn't in need of as much political support as PB; most of the legwork could be done without government assistance or funding. Yet funding still remains a crucial challenge for both the CIR and PB, as will be detailed in the next subsection.

1.3.3: Funding

Jimmy goes on to talk about another necessary condition of implementation: funding.

10: "Okay. Good, now I assume that you've understood one of the key things that enabled me to get going with the Citizen's Initiative Review, and it's something that a lot of people failed to do. And that was that when I was born, I selected wealthy grandparents.....the only reason that we were able to go ahead with the Citizen's Initiative Review is the inheritance that I had. Otherwise we never would have made any headway whatsoever...in Australia, Citizens' Juries are being used rather widely, again because somebody...named Luca Belgiorno, has a fortune of some \$200 million. He started something called the New Democracy in Australia and they are promoting Citizens' Juries in a number of different places... Have you ever heard of Everyday

Democracy in the United States...there's another group where somebody with an inheritance has set up a foundation.

Jimmy's account is rife with examples suggesting that a motivated entrepreneur with a large and available bank account is a collectively sufficient condition for the implementation of programs like the CIR. But as Jimmy states, his wealth is not boundless, and while he was personally responsible for designing and getting state support for the CIR, the program itself relies on outside funding for each actual instance of the CIR, usually through grants. Healthy Democracy, the parent of the CIR, is pushing for state legislation to fund the program in Oregon, but no other state has agreed to enshrine the program in law, and even if Oregon does decide to fund it, the CIR will still be limited to a single state. However, states like California and Massachusetts are testing CIRs and I've personally observed interest from a state representative outside of Oregon pushing to implement the CIR in their state.

PB, on the other hand, has very different funding requirements. Not only do PB programs require staff comparable to the CIR, they also require an often sizable chunk of a city budget to fund the programs that the citizens vote on. Additionally, many cities also pay consulting fees to either the Participatory Budgeting Project out of New York (which brought this process to the United States), or to other consultants. Cities also correspond with each other for design features, but that will be covered in the Sustainment section.

City manager Darrell Krause explains that funding for PB will always be at the expense of something else. It would be unlikely for a city without wiggle-room in their budget to take on this kind of project. Darrell recalled talking to staff members from other cities who exclaimed that they would have liked to implement PB, but that other priorities prevented them from doing so. This was confirmed by Alex Rodriguez, stating that PB programs should never come at the cost of sacrificing other programs which address a city need.

But even wealthier cities would like to see a bigger budget for PB. Pauline Mirabal said, “Well I definitely think we need more money for the projects, at least a million. I think as that goes up it will continue to grow because then you’ll see the scope of the projects will get bigger. I really want more people to vote.” Another advantage some wealthy cities may have is that their need to tax the citizens is relatively low, and so they can more easily justify a program like PB, according to Darrell. A sizable portion of Darrell’s city capital budget comes from bonds, and only about 3-4% percent comes from property taxes. Still, not every city is as easily able to allocate the necessary funds. Some cities struggle to find the funds to pay for these projects, and others simply aren’t in a position to allocate funds away from other city operations. Pauline spoke with interested city staff members from at least 8 different cities, and only one, San Antonio (with a city budget of nearly \$3 billion), was able to fund the program.

Two other themes emerged from discussions of funding. First, one consideration a city needs to take into account for a project like PB is how much money the residents of a city actually get to control. While this isn’t directly comparable to the CIR, similarities can be found if this is posed in terms of impact; how much political power are the citizens actually being allocated? Pauline received a lot of feedback from citizens complaining that the amount of money available for PB was actually a tiny fraction of the city’s overall budget, and this is common across cities. But she also warns against this type of thinking as the reason for most of the city’s capital budget is for very important public utilizes, such as sewage, which she thinks would be less likely to win a PB election over other projects. Darrell confirmed that there was a tight balance between offering a meaningful portion of the budget, but still preventing other sacrifices by drawing away too much of the budget for PB.

A second theme was the nature of the allocated money. For example, a city could set aside money for a PB project, but they might only allow the money to go to parks. I ran into several instances of this having an effect, both on whether government employees thought the program was successful, and whether the deliberative components were able to function optimally. Both Pauline and Jack McClean recognized

this limitation. Pauline's PB budget was much less restricted however, limited only to capital projects (projects that could essentially only incur a one-time expense). Jack's PB funding source actually changed from one year to the next, and as a result the restrictions changed as well, and as a result, what had previously been a PB project where the majority of winning proposals addressed human services and homelessness, the following year they were completely unable to do so, and instead were solely limited to parks and transportation projects. Jack concludes by stating, "Having the most flexibility with your funding goes a long way and I think is truer to the spirit of what PB is. That's my number one thing."

Thus funding seems a necessary, but not necessarily sufficient condition for implementing a PB project. The final subsection of implementation looks at a another dimension of PB and CIR that isn't quite necessary of sufficient for a program's implementation, but can certainly affect the ease of the process.

1.3.4: Buy-In

This subsection will be divided into 3 parts. *First*, it will discuss staff in terms of their buy-in. *Second*, it will discuss the buy-in of the volunteer deliberators. And *finally*, it will discuss the buy-in of the community at large.

1.3.4.1: Staff

Darrell Krause mentioned the importance of staff buy-in, or in other words, their emotional investment in their PB program, but was quick to also state that the city probably could have done it anyway. As a city manager, it was telling that Darrell felt he needed to indicate *his* personal buy-in to the staff in order to demonstrate to them that this program was going to receive the support it needed so that they themselves could more confidently invest in it. Alex Rodriguez shares a similar logic regarding department heads. He pointed out that in much the same way that department heads look to the city budget staff to inspire confidence that the program will receive the support it needs, individual budget

delegates (volunteer deliberators) look to the department heads for the same assurances. Regina Sanders, a budget director, confirmed this, stating, “I think you need buy-in from the top. You need an advocate in the department.” Louis Hernandez also spoke directly about the value of an engaged, but also tacitly confirming the idea that it is still possible to implement a PB program without staff buy-in, but, “when it’s missing, it’s a lot harder.” Darrell also suggests some contributing factors to staff buy-in, such as living in the community, a general political culture of seeking citizen engagement, and by perceiving a program like PB better enabling city staff to serve their constituents.

On the other side of the coin, when buy-in by the staff is missing, the program can be a lot less successful. Barbara Grant, a PB advocate and advocate and eventual candidate for Alderperson, shared just such an experience. In her city, officials and staff were only willing to implement PB if Barbara and her partner ran the program as volunteers. City staff engagement was mostly limited to a single Alderperson for vague direction, but beyond that the city didn’t really want much to do with the program. As a result, the program was sluggish, department heads often missed meetings, and the lack of buy-in from the top trickled all the way down to the volunteer delegates, who stopped putting in the required effort, and eventually they decided to end PB that cycle so as not to tarnish the name of the program for potential future iterations.

A lack of buy-in from the top also threatens the success of a CIR. Jodie Cabrera relayed an example where a hosting institution didn’t actually believe in the value of the process of the CIR, they merely wanted to piggyback on its legitimacy to supplement their own claims, and as a result they attempted to tweak the review to suit their own needs, which negatively affected the willingness of the CIR personnel to work with them again.

1.3.4.2: Volunteers

Much like staff, volunteers are also heavily burdened in both programs. This section will discuss some of these challenges and will point to some conditions when volunteer buy-in is more and less successful.

Every person interviewed for PB suggested that the amount and the complexity of the work was a challenge for the budget delegates. Ivan Nelson gave examples of volunteers experiencing “burnout” as a result of the demands of PB. Alex Rodriguez puts it simply: “it’s work!” He explains that much of his city’s efforts around PB are in outreach and community engagement. His observation comports well with my own PB experience, meeting for 2 hours every week for up to 12 weeks, not to mention other volunteer activities associated with the program. PB is almost completely dependent on the labor of community volunteers, and without their buy-in, they will not do the necessary research, site-visits, and will occasionally even drop out of the program altogether. Regina Sanders also echoes this point.

One major theme in the interviews was making the process as simple as possible for volunteers. This is addressed further in the Design section. However, when talking about challenges for volunteers directly, Louis Hernandez stated, “one lesson for me over the past few years is that we needed to provide better support for participants, that this work is still too hard for them...they weren’t able to sustain the level of deliberation that was originally put forward...people that want to get involved but then drop out because it’s not made easy enough for them.” However, Barbara also claimed that with buy-in, volunteers didn’t mind the workload as much, stating “the delegates were so involved they didn’t mind door-knocking because they were excited about it. They’d been working on these projects...they got really into it creating that proposal. So then they wanted to go out and tell people.”

1.3.4.3: Community

Another major factor in implementation was the level of extant community involvement in a locality.

This section also primarily concerns PB.

When asked why they thought they could successfully implement PB in their city, Ivan Nelson suggested, “I just thought it would work here, given the amount of community involvement they have on everything, community engagement we have on most things, that it would be a welcome project, a welcome idea to residents.” Louis Hernandez confirmed this idea, stating, “I think it’s easier for them to be successful if there’s a culture of participation.” He gave the example of PB functioning well in Latin America because of this culture, and being less successful in Eastern Europe because of a lack of a culture of engagement. But as with staff buy in, Louis also didn’t think a lack of community buy-in was an insurmountable problem. Regina Sanders also recognized that in her city “There’s also a zeal for public service here....they’re really invested in seeing what happens here...they’re volunteering on committees and going to panels, and so I think that helps...”

Jack McClean suggested that it is not just a culture of engagement, but also a history of successful community *programs* that can lead to community buy-in. This makes intuitive sense, as it can lead to generalized trust in new programs, mimicking the top-down buy-in model. But Jack also suggested that the very fact of having past successful programs meant that engaged community members could more effectively get involved and increase the success of new ones. When asked if these were members of neighborhood associations or individual community members, Jack said “I mean, both. I think to be engaged in a neighborhood organization you gotta be really motivated. But it was some real passionate people from our neighborhood district council organizations.”

Another major theme in the discussions about community was that of trust. Several interviewees from both projects had a wealth of insights about trust. The first major theme is that in order for a project to be successful, a locality has to trust its residents to make good decisions. If that is the case, a locality will be more likely to implement. Both Pauline considering a PB program and Jodie discussing the CIR suggested that top-down trust in the deliberators was essential to getting these programs considered in the first place. Louis wasn’t willing to go that far, but he did ultimately conclude that having high levels

of trust makes implementation easier. But he also suggests that a program like PB, when successful, can actually increase trust in a city where trust was previously low, and gives the example PB in Vallejo, CA.

On the other hand, as the idiom states, “trust goes both ways.” Interviewees also suggested that the public needs to support the government in order for a large-scale deliberative program to be successful.

Darrell suggests that trust needs to be maintained by implementing what the program promises otherwise it will fail, the community will lose buy-in, and the bottom will drop out. Echoing both Darrell and Jack McClean, Alex Rodriguez also states that when a city has shown that that it has lived up to its promises in the past, the community will be more likely to invest their time and energy in new programs.

Darrell highlighted one strategy for increasing trust: actually going to the outreach meetings himself, as city manager, to demonstrate his support of the program. Regina also highlights the importance of transparency and broad outreach, suggesting that an open process is easier to trust than an obscure one, and that a city reaching out to *all* of its residents can alleviate fears that this program can only serve the needs of select groups.

Finally, Darrell also noted that there also needs to be interdepartmental trust within the government. The budget office, for example, needed to trust the department heads to manage the delegates and to make sure proposals stayed within bounds of the city’s requirements.

1.4: Design and Sharing

In this section I will discuss various design choices different deliberative projects made, and what the outcomes of those different choices were. These choices affect engagement, outreach, quality of deliberation, and accessibility. Additionally I will share some instances of when and how different

deliberative efforts were shared across localities. This section will be divided into six subsections: Level of Structure, Document Design, Feedback, Outreach, Sharing Techniques, and Miscellaneous.

1.4.1: Level of Structure

Based on my personal observations of both programs, I asked interviewees related to both PB and the CIR about how much formal structure was ideal for each program. Should meetings have clear and strict minutes, pre-defined activities, and rigid processes, or should the structure be more flexible, open and forgiving. Surprisingly, most interviewees didn't give much thought to this issue, but those that did comported with my observations. Jack McClean felt that PB most benefited from a program with a balance of structure and openness. He described the process as successful because it was "open within bounds." Angela Carrico and Jodie Cabrera both suggested that the CIR needed more structure. When Angela expressed concern that the program was too strict, her director suggested, "Just tell them we're running a tight ship here." Jodie specifically mentioned that the CIR *was not interested in creative solutions*. The CIR was too task-oriented and served a specific function, and too much openness was a detriment to the process. This claim comported with my hypothesis about strictly structured deliberative programs being better suited to knowledge gains, but there was simply not enough corroboration from the rest of the interviewees to support this claim, and I later addressed it in another project.

1.4.2: Document Design

Jodie Cabrera recommended that the deliberative aspect of the project should be more up front on the (CIR) documentation. As she stated previously, Jodie recognized that the deliberative component of the program conferred a degree of legitimacy upon it, and she felt that if the relevant community knew what went into the program, it would elicit more critical engagement with the output of the program (in this case the actual initiative review).

Additionally, interviewees related to both CIR and PB programs highlighted a need to make their documentation easier to understand. For example, Pauline Mirabal described creating (PB) documentation using pictures for community members with lower levels of literacy. And Jodie recommends getting a consultant to make documentation more user friendly.

1.4.3: Feedback

Regina Sanders suggests after-action meetings are a great time to get feedback. People having just completed the process likely still have it fresh in their minds, and are also in a position of 20/20 hindsight. Jack McClean provided a helpful list of feedback methods. He recommends collecting feedback at *every* event. He also recommends a formal debrief, similar to Regina's recommendation, but he elaborates by recommending both group debriefings and one-on-one meetings for feedback collection. He also ran a workshop involving participants, delegates, facilitators, steering committee members and department staff, lasting 3 hours, to go through the feedback such that it wasn't merely collected then ignored.

1.4.4: Outreach

Interviewees had a lot to say about outreach. Mirroring concerns highlighted in the Document Design section, Louis Hernandez stressed the importance of clear communication. He worried that small disagreements over unclear communication often blew out of proportion and turned into large conflicts that could disrupt the entire process. Once documents and messages are well designed, one generally agreed upon approach to outreach is to "go where the people are." This means housing authorities, business associations, libraries, shopping centers, etc. Pauline Mirabal notes that electronic communication is vital for mass outreach, and that she's been quite effective with internet tools. However, Eleanor Cook, a fellow researcher of PB, warns that too much focus on technological forms of communication can quickly leave citizens of lower means behind.

Once engaged, Pauline suggests keeping an eye out for citizens who want to expand their engagement, and gives examples of past participants applying to volunteer for other city committees. Pauline also notes that framing the program in such a way that highlights personal benefits (i.e. from the PB projects' effects on the community) can increase people's level of engagement.

Commensurate with the section on Buy-In, Regina Sanders claimed that engagement is also important for governmental staff. If they're not engaged, if they don't appreciate the process or think it is valuable they won't put in the time to help it meet its potential.

This subsection will conclude with a brief discussion about the ability of these programs to engage the public. Broadly speaking, PB turnout is low. That being said, at least in some locations PB is able to elicit engagement from potential voting groups that simply cannot engage otherwise. For example, Cambridge does not limit the vote to US citizens, and it opens up the vote to 12-18 year olds. But even within eligible voting groups, some cities did see engagement from groups that don't normally participate at higher levels than groups that do

The CIR is a different story. Participation in the CIR is extremely intensive and applicable for a tiny percent of a state's population, whereas in PB voter engagement is much broader and less demanding. Engagement or the delegates it is roughly as demanding for those in the CIR, though on average PB programs have twice as many delegates as CIRs have citizen deliberators.

1.4.5: Sharing Techniques

One of the primary ways that PB design is shared is through the national Participatory Budgeting Project (PBP) based in New York, NY. This is the organization that brought PB to the United States initially. They currently serve as a consulting group where they go to various cities to help them set up their own PB programs. The founder of this organization is very active in sharing the program's techniques, as well as getting feedback from those collaborating cities. This is confirmed by several different PB projects.

However, Barbara Grant had trouble raising the necessary funds to fully receive the services provided by PBP, and Travis Brown outright balked at the price. Still, Louis Hernandez suggests that the value of something like PBP is that there's a central repository of best practices to help new programs counter common obstacles, and that it's an improvement even on the Brazilian model, which doesn't have a centralized body. Both Travis Brown and Louis Hernandez directly observed international iterations of PB and used those observations to design their own versions of PB, and Travis intends to use those designs to create a competing central repository to the PBP

Another common theme is that as programs mature, they are more likely to collaborate with other cities. For example, having been successful for a few years, the Cambridge PB program saw an increase in other cities reaching out to share best practices.

The CIR, on the other hand, was almost wholly lifted from the Citizens Juries model created by the Jefferson Center. At the same time, Angela Cabrera admits of the CIR that "once we started in on CIRs, every one was an experiment." Because of its unique function, the idea that the CIR cannot rely on advice from similar programs has face validity. However, Renee Jones did point out that the CIR took inspiration from America Speaks!, the Citizen Juries, Deliberative Polling (though Renee also noted that Fishkin wasn't very collaborative at the time), the Citizen's Assembly, and Everyday Democracy.

Ultimately, across the board for both PB and the CIR sharing technologies and techniques has been useful to the successful sustainment of the programs.

1.4.6: Miscellaneous

One helpful design feature of a PB program is to use PB as part of an existing program. One of the cities that implemented PB also uses it in one of their community learning centers as a way to teach language and civics. This leads to a helpful complementarity in that the process helps the students in the center, but the center also helps the process by facilitating participation in PB and increasing turnout.

Moreover, these students have some of the most considered votes in the process because they engage with the ballot for extended periods of time. During the voting phase of PB, I got to see something similar play out first-hand. This comported with my first-hand observations as a “get-out-the-vote” volunteer.

1.5: Politics and Sharing Power

In this section I will discuss the ways that politics affect the implementation and success of large-scale deliberative projects, the political usefulness and value of these projects, both as they might foster goodwill but also as they solve political problems, how power is shared between government and deliberative bodies, and whether deliberative events confer legitimacy on other government activities.

1.5.1: Politics/Power Sharing

This section will discuss some disparate political considerations regarding large-scale deliberative projects. First, it is possible that these projects can actually help to empower residents of a locality that otherwise have little to no political power. But Barbara Grant also suggests a way in which a deliberative program like PB can empower people who are otherwise disenfranchised. Barbara was both advocating for PB and running an election for alderperson in her city. Barbara was affiliated with a political party that was essentially guaranteed to win the alderperson position every year. However, when engaging with people of the opposite political party, Barbara suggested that by supporting PB, voting for her was at least likely to give the out-party members at least some political power whereas without it, they wouldn't be represented at all. In other words, Barbara is claiming that a program like PB confers direct coercive political power over government decisions. However, Eleanor Cook questions the values of these types of claims as dependent on just how much power is given, who it goes to, and whether a city

ultimately has veto power. Usually, she says, those conditions don't tend to favor meaningful empowerment.

Reflexively, this type of program can help political leaders whose partisanship is mismatched to their constituency. PB and similar projects can also help such a leader with networking and engagement.

Travis Brown suggested that the mayor of his city was actually mismatched to the dominant political party, but that he got elected anyway because he was able to offer a program that (at least seemed) was universally empowering.

Finally, one thing that's important to consider is that a project like PB or CIR, especially if and/or when they become public projects, can get in the way or even overshadow of a political leader's normal operations. If that happens, it's unlikely the leaders will continue to support the project. Darrell Krause hinted at this potential problem but, commensurate with earlier claims that a program must not sacrifice other city needs to succeed, Darrell related that his extensive city budget meant that this wasn't a problem for him.

1.5.1.1: Collaborative Power Sharing

This section will discuss the ways that deliberative groups collaboratively share power with political leaders in the CIR and PB settings. This section will largely focus on instances of deliberative groups doing work for government bodies. In other words, how can deliberation be directly useful for governing bodies to increase their efficiency of efficacy? It's important to keep in mind the section on staff from earlier however; PB is unanimously described as creating extra work for a city. Instead, what PB is capable of is *complementing* government work. And that's where PB's efficacy shines. Perhaps surprisingly, the CIR is also useful to government workers in some situations. Darrell echoed a sentiment that was broadly shared by nearly every interviewee in PB:

If you had said to me there would have been so many projects we would have funded that we weren't funding I would have said I'm not sure we could do that, but they have found projects that were not on our radar that have been good for the city, so I think it's been a win for everybody where the city has benefitted from this, the residents have benefitted from this.

Darrell goes on to say that:

[PB has] also put us in the position where there may be something that didn't get funded from PB that we think's a good initiative that we can look at in our capital process. We take a look at that as well if it's something we should be adding. That's how we've looked at it.

In other words, PB is locating projects *for* city government that, even when PB voters do not prioritize them, the city will decide to fund.

PB unquestionably increases the workload for government employees. However, considering a counterfactual world where a city wants to implement a participatory budgeting project for whatever reason, it is here that PB in its current conception can save time and money. In the Entrepreneur section I relayed multiple responses about political leaders wanting to increase engagement. Any effort to do that will be costly. In that sense, PB can actually lower the cost by making use of citizen-deliberators instead of using city-staff to fully vet the submitted ideas. In such a scenario, a lot of government work is completed by PB projects. As Alex Rodriguez put it, PB "really is a delegate-driven process." Travis Brown's ultimate goal of creating his own PB consultancy firm is also in the spirit of lowering costs and effort by city officials.

Jack McClean also gives several examples of delegates doing the work of city workers, and in some instances, doing it better. He relays an anecdote where citizens are better able to identify a need for curb ramps than city officials because they bring unique and often community-based experiences.

Across the board, PB interviewees lament the actual increase in work PB programs add, and all extoll the value of the volunteers to do most of that work. On the CIR side, Jimmy Lane indicated that the CIR was

useful to state officials because it did something that legislative powers could not: put some form of control on the initiative process. Jimmy suggested that state officials are actually often fed up with the initiative process because it takes power out of the hands of state representatives and puts it directly in the hands of the demos. Jimmy explains that initiatives are extremely popular, and efforts to dismantle them are political suicide. However, because of its legitimacy and popularity, the CIR is able to put at least some form of control over the initiative process that the public supports. Here is a causal process identified with face validity, and is also corroborated by Jodie Cabrera. Though she previously worked for the CIR, Jodie parted ways due in part to ideological differences, so her corroboration along with the plausible description by Jimmy suggest that this is a valuable program for state legislators to gain a measure of control that they previously lost. These accounts of the initiative process comport with literature on the subject, such as David Broder's *Democracy Derailed* (2001). What this suggests is that deliberative projects are most likely to be successful when they can complement the work that governing bodies already do, and that in well-designed programs such as PB and the CIR, they do. Here, it is important to note, however, that it is ideological control (the third dimension of power) that the CIR exerts.

1.5.1.2: Contentious Power Sharing

On the other hand, when power is shared, there's always the potential for struggle. This section suggests that sharing power isn't always mutually beneficial. A first example comes from Barbara Grant discussing how the public *moved* a politician to support PB because they saw it practiced in another ward. Obviously, as far as contentious politics goes this is fairly mundane, but it is important to remember that these programs are fragile, and in fact this is one of the cities where PB became unsuccessful. Perhaps more problematic is the struggle outlined by Angela Carrico. She shared a CIR anecdote where political activists were getting visually frustrated with deliberators because the deliberators weren't falling for their soundbites. She related instances of the CIR both leading to

participants to ask questions beyond what the activists were trying to limit the conversation to (agenda-setting power) and also rejecting the framing of the activists (ideological power). Jimmy Lane corroborates this idea of the CIR holding ideological power. He gives the example of a group of powerful liberal lobbyists called “Our Oregon” that vehemently opposed the CIR because they wanted sole power to frame messaging on ballots and were threatened by the CIR, the sole purpose of which is to reframe ballot initiative language.

Louis Hernandez and Ramon Fagan also expressed concern that activists would end up competing with PB programs, and in Ramon’s case, his borough’s PB program was completely subverted by a PTA group that was too well-organized and won all the PB votes, excluding everyone else from the process and ultimately destroying buy-in from the bottom-up.

1.5.1.3: Miscellaneous

This subsection has several idiosyncratic contributions. An unintended benefit of a program like PB is increased communication. Pauline Mirabal said, “I also think [PB] works as a giant communications device for the city...so even if your idea doesn’t get chosen, even if you’re not a delegate working on it, all 608 ideas are circulated to the various departments...” Ivan Nelson echoed these sentiments as well. When asked about the projects proposed by PB delegates, revealed that many PB projects that didn’t garner enough votes to be implemented by the program were nevertheless implemented by the city because the process communicated good ideas.

Collaboration is also a useful outcome, especially when deliberative bodies are complementing extant government work. Each party can learn and assist the other and form a solid complementarity. Pauline stated that the delegates and the city departments were equal contributors to the process, and each learned and benefited from the other. Regina Sanders gives an example of the decision on where to

place a bicycle washing station as more of a discussion between delegated and city officials more than a struggle for power.

1.5.1.4: Concluding Remarks

Thought my interviews, it was very clear to me that large-scale deliberative projects do have some coercive power, and a fair amount of agenda-setting and ideological power as well. The latter are possible because these types of programs have perceived legitimacy, and because they are designed with outreach in mind. These are not theoretical improvements to democracy, they are actual programs driven by engaged leaders and their constituencies, consisting of abundant deliberation, and are powerful political entities.

1.6: Projections and Conclusions

So where are these deliberative projects likely to head in the future? Are these flukes, destined to crumble, or do they have some staying power? According to Pauline Mirabal:

PB is definitely spreading. It started in Brazil forever ago, but I think 2009ish was when it came up to the US, but yeah, there's so many other communities that are getting involved and launching their own processes, I think that will continue to grow. But also not just municipalities, some schools are trying to do it, I think Universities should, we give them enough money...

Jokes aside, this seems correct. PB has initially spread rapidly, and while the number of cities that can afford to do this is limited, that limit is nowhere near being approached yet. Louis Hernandez agrees:

I think there's increasing demand, or at least increasing interest because people increasingly feel they don't have a voice in government. Partly because they're able to have a voice in so many other spheres more effectively, because of new technology or communications, that division is starker. 50 years ago it was hard to influence corporations or your government or organizations. There's other ways that you can engage with and feel like you have a voice in, you know, what flavor of cereal is made. People are seeing that comparison more, they're seeing that they have

a voice here, but not in government, and I think that's partly why there's more interest and demand now of government...

This can also be seen in the number of new cities reaching out to learn more about the process. Pauline and Regina Sanders also relayed several anecdotes about other cities reaching out to them for more information on PB, and as mentioned earlier, both California and Massachusetts were exploring adopting the CIR at the time of this writing.

My impression is that there was less optimism for the success of the CIR. Which is unfortunate but understandable. As this chapter discussed, the CIR is much more likely to have political opponents. It is somewhat abstract in a way that something like PB is not, so it can be hard to garner general voter enthusiasm about the process. The CIR also requires a completely dedicated staff; it is not something that can be done in some spare hours by already employed officials. Additionally, that staff needs to be highly trained, much more so than was outlined by Pauline concerning PB facilitators. Still, Oregon does have a CIR commission as a state law, which in a sense is more durable than any city policy, and the process itself may be funded soon from state coffers, which would almost guarantee that it remains a permanent institution. It is hard to understand why the state hasn't funded it already, given the estimated cost is roughly \$65,000 per initiative – chump change for a state budget – unless one considers the potential power that something like the CIR can wield.

2: Deliberation vs Q&A: Focused questioning outperforms

deliberation for increasing knowledge, sophistication, and efficacy

2.1: Introduction

Empirical research on deliberative democracy (DD) and other deliberative programs promise an abundance of benefits to those who participate. Among these are increases in knowledge (Fishkin and Luskin, 2005), sophistication (Gastil and Dillard, 1999; Druckman, 2001), and political efficacy (Morrell, 2005; Min, 2007) for those who participate. However, deliberative projects are multi-faceted events, and little research has been done to isolate the causal mechanism(s) involved in deliberative democracy that lead to these empirical outcomes. Because deliberative projects by necessity involve numerous participants over a substantial timeframe they are one of the most costly forms of political participation. If a single facet of a deliberative program can accomplish the same thing as all the components combined, politicians, advocates, and researchers would have good reason to reprioritize and redesign the programs they use to accrue the same benefits.

This study aims to identify the causal mechanisms contained within deliberation by presenting the results of a large-scale laboratory experiment. Typical deliberative experiments will compare a deliberative conversation to an information-packet only condition, a comparison that does not adequately control for most of the facets of a deliberative project. To address this research problem, this study compares deliberative conversations to both an information packet and a question and answer session in order to control for the different parts of a deliberative event.

2.1.1: Deliberative Democracy

In the broadest terms, deliberative democracy is the practice of people coming together to discuss an issue or a group of issues before expressing their policy preferences leading to a binding agreement. If this language sounds vague, it is with good reason. There are questions as to what constitutes the normatively best type of conversation (e.g., should everyone have equal time, should manipulative language or falsehoods be corrected?), who can participate (e.g., should political elites deliberate equally with the citizens they govern, should identities be anonymous?), how to present an issue (e.g., should participants be provided an information-packet beforehand, and who should create it?), what to do with the outcomes (e.g., should deliberators have political power; if so, should the majority opinion be enacted?), etc.

Deliberation researchers and theorists provide compelling evidence that deliberative programs can help citizens develop the sophistication necessary to make informed political decisions. Proponents of DD claim that it leads to updated policy preferences through the acquisition of information (Fishkin and Luskin, 2005). Moreover, political deliberation moves participants closer to single-peakedness as a result of information acquisition (List et al, 2013; Farrar et al, 2010). Perhaps most importantly, deliberative researchers have demonstrated that deliberative conversations increase political sophistication (Gastil and Dillard, 1999; Druckman, 2001). Deliberation also leads to increases in internal political efficacy (Morrell, 2005) and can prevent or reduce group polarization under certain conditions (Sunstein, 2002; Chambers, 2003).

The importance of a relatively short deliberation effecting these changes cannot be overstated. Political science does not paint a rosy picture of citizen competence (Campbell et al, 1980). The seminal work by Philip Converse (1964) suggests that only a small percentage of “elites” are capable of both consistency (maintaining an opinion on an issue over time) and constraint (the ability to recognize that issues are ideologically similar), and American public opinion has been described as “Uninformed, inconsistent, [and] non-ideological” (Fiorina et al, 2011).

Fishkin and Luskin (2005) lay out some requirements for good political deliberation. Arguments should be informed (supported by factual claims), balanced (by contrary arguments), conscientious (respectful in speech and reception), substantive (based on the content, not the source) and comprehensive (presenting all relevant sides). Additionally, Gutmann and Thompson (2004) suggest that good DD requires that participants give reasons for their arguments, that those reasons are accessible to all participants through relatable arguments, that outcomes are binding decisions, and that decisions are always open to challenge (pp. 3-6). Joshua Cohen (1989) claims that good deliberation requires independent association, power to shape institutions, and participants with divergent aims who consider the process a legitimate decision-making institution, and take the claims of other participants seriously. Virtually every conception of DD provides a list of pre-requisites followed by a list of outcomes. This becomes a major problem for identifying the causal mechanisms associated with deliberative democracy. What if, for example, all of the benefits of DD could be obtained by merely exposing political decision-makers to contrary arguments? It would still appear that deliberation caused the changes in knowledge, sophistication, and efficacy, but we could not know whether exposure to the contrary arguments or other facets of the deliberation that produced the effects. This issue is highly relevant from a policy perspective because good randomized citizen deliberations are both expensive and time-consuming. One deliberative program, the Citizens' Initiative Review, can cost over \$75,000 for a single ballot measure (interview, 2018 in Celaya forthcoming) and a single Deliberative Poll (DP) can cost hundreds of thousands of dollars (Gray, 2009). If there are other avenues to the benefits ascribed to DD, time and money may be better allocated elsewhere. Thus, a controlled trial identifying the causal mechanisms at work during deliberation should inform policy about the institution.

Three characteristics almost all current practices of DD make it a costly endeavor. First, DD requires people to come together. For programs looking to recruit a representative sample from a broad region (such as is done in the CIR and DP), the cost of travel is enormous. It is true that not all deliberative programs seek

such a sample, and this cost can also be via online deliberation, but these options represent trade-offs that deliberative programmers might want to avoid. Second, deliberation takes time. Deliberative programs generally span between a couple hours and several days, and participants are almost always paid for their time. Programs seeking a representative sample of participants from a region are even more expensive because they usually require an even greater number of deliberators. Third, deliberative programs require infrastructure. These can range from large conference rooms to entire buildings. While space is often donated for deliberative programs, many of these programs end up having to rent space for their events.

Because the specific component of deliberation that leads to increases in knowledge, sophistication, and efficacy has not been clearly identified, it is possible that some of the aforementioned costs are unnecessary. For example, because proponents of DD claim that both hearing competing arguments *and* interpersonal engagement are key components of DD, these two features are often taken together without question. If, however, solely watching a deliberation on television (hearing competing arguments) can obtain increases in knowledge, sophistication and efficacy without the need for interpersonal engagement, deliberative democracy can become a lot more accessible for a lot less effort by just hosting more deliberative news programming. Even if interaction is important, there are multiple forms of interaction, many of which are much easier to implement than a deliberative body. If participants can get the same benefits of deliberation from a question and answer session, deliberation again becomes wasteful. Deliberative Polling (DP) at Stanford's Center for Deliberative Democracy is considered the gold standard for deliberative projects (Mansbridge, 2010). DP is an ambitious and well-functioning program with demonstrable benefits to participants. But not every deliberative endeavor is designed in this way, and for researchers, political leaders, and other advocates who may not have the resources to replicate this process, research on more isolated forms of political conversation can be invaluable. An interested party with limited funds having to decide what elements to triage in order to come in under budget might

want to know how those elements operate in isolation, especially relative to each other, and if the elements function at all in isolation. This project can provide clarity for future deliberative programs.

2.1.2: Conversation and Sophistication

Claus Otto Scharmer (2001) distinguishes between two types of conversations: “explicit knowledge” conversations, in which people either make statements or ask questions and receive answers, and “implicit knowledge” conversations, in which people deliberate and generate new information. Explicit knowledge conversations require little or no creativity and thus are unlikely to lead to greater sophistication; the entirety of the conversation consists of what is already in the interlocutors’ heads. Implicit knowledge conversations, on the other hand, are *generative*; the process of recognizing and reacting to the perspectives and values of others demands a deeper engagement that is more likely to lead to sophisticated thinking about an issue (Jaworski and Scharmer, 2000). In this analysis, the *type* of conversation causes the different levels of complexity in thinking about issues. Building on this theoretical framework, I compare a question and answer session (explicit knowledge) with a deliberative one (implicit knowledge). Although real-world conversations aren’t nearly so black and white, Scharmer’s theory suggests that these different types of commonly occurring conversations should still lead to measurable differences in sophistication gains.

Evidence from “flipped classroom” research supports the theory that deliberative conversations can produce knowledge generation, not just knowledge sharing. Congruently with Scharmer’s theory, Smith et al (2011) demonstrate that peer conversation leads participants to come up with correct answers to conceptual questions, even when none of the members in that conversation knew the answer initially. These peer conversations do a good job of isolating the deliberative component of DD. However, like most experiments in deliberative democracy, this study uses a single group pre-test/post-test design for deliberation only, without an equally interactive control group such as a question and answer session.

Also congruently with Scharmer's model, Gastil and Dillard (1999) claim that deliberation functions as an especially effective education tool because deliberators can see the consistency of others' thoughts, will be corrected by those more knowledgeable when they themselves are inconsistent, will receive reinforcement when they express their opinions and have them confirmed, and will be able to make inferences based on what they hear. The limited nature of explicit conversation reduces the opportunity to express opinion and reflect on responses.

2.2: Experimental Design

To help identify the causal conversation mechanism responsible for individual sophistication, efficacy, and knowledge gains, this project presents evidence from a large-scale laboratory experiment conducted using the facilities and subject pool at the Harvard Decision Science Lab (HDSL). For illustration of the laboratory space, see Appendix B.

This study consisted of three treatment groups: a deliberative conversation group, a question and answer (Q&A) conversation group, and an information-packet only control group. Based on past experimental, interview, and participant and non-participant observational research (Celaya forthcoming) as well as the limitations of the lab, I recruited 15 subjects for each conversation treatment session. Due to concerns about subject drop-off after recruitment, for the conversation treatment groups I randomized at the session level instead of the individual level. I clustered errors at the session level to account for this choice.

Preliminary power calculations based on similar studies suggested that I would need approximately 100 subjects per treatment to obtain significant results. Maximum participation would have reached 105 participants in the deliberative and Q&A treatments, and 126 in the packet-only control group. I over-recruited for the control-group based on expected drop-off, but experienced more drop-off than expected. Each session averaged 18.5 participants per session, with a maximum of 24 and a minimum of 14. Accordingly, I ended up with 104 subjects in the deliberative treatment group, 103 in the Q&A group,

and 63 in the control group, leaving the study somewhat underpowered. Because of the randomization procedures, I was not able to collect more control-group subjects at a later date. For more details about assignment to treatment groups, see Appendix C.

Once assignment to groups was complete, the study proceeded as follows. Subjects were checked in to the lab and were read instructions from a script (See Appendix D). The *information-packet only* subjects followed a lab research assistant into the packet-only area and from there to the workstation that corresponded to their ID badge designation. The packet only area workstations were preset with a survey already open. The survey consisted of pre-test survey questions, then a built-in information-packet about minimum wage laws, and post-test questions. The survey itself was created on and administered through Qualtrics. The questions tested levels of political knowledge, sophistication, and efficacy regarding minimum wage law. Knowledge questions asked subjects to answer factual questions about the minimum wage. Sophistication questions measured how well subjects could recognize multiple argument frames, and how well they could recognize whether policy stances were liberal or conservative. Efficacy questions were commonly asked questions in the political science literature about subjects' perceived competence to meaningfully engage with politics, and their perception of their potential impact on political decisions. More details can be found in Appendix E. Both the Q&A subjects and the deliberation subjects followed me to the discussion area and were given instructions to use their time to "try to determine what you think the Massachusetts minimum wage should be." In both treatment groups subjects had access to an expert, a research assistant who had acquired sufficient knowledge of minimum wage law, theory, and politics for the study. (I tested the expert's skills both in a pre-pre-pilot focus group and in two laboratory pilot sessions, and confirmed that she was sufficiently knowledgeable and consistent to successfully fulfill the role. Only one comment from the entire sample suggested that the expert did not have enough information, and even this seemed caused by how often the expert had to state that research has not yet

answered a particular question, not because she herself did not have the answer to that question. Most lauded the expert's abilities.

The goal of controlling for as many facets of the treatments as possible informed the decision to have an expert available to both the Q&A and the deliberative group. Session sizes were also controlled for, the time allotted for each treatment was held constant, and the study took place in the exact same location for the two treatment groups. Although treatment had originally been designed to last 2 hours, the pilot studies demonstrated that subjects ran out of questions and things to discuss at about the 1.5 hour mark, so the treatment length was reduced. Subjects were exposed to the same level of monitoring in both treatment groups, and even the information provided by the expert was held as constant as possible: in both conditions the expert only answered factual questions and did not share their own opinions or offer unsolicited information.

The deliberative treatment was designed as a very open-ended conversation. Aside from the initial instructions (See Appendix D), deliberative subjects were largely free to try to determine where they would like to set the Massachusetts minimum wage in whatever fashion they could think of. The deliberative treatment groups were thus much more heterogeneous than the Q&A treatment groups. Some of the deliberative sessions used their time to do little more than to ask questions of the expert with little deliberation beyond that. Other deliberative sessions were much more active than the Q&A sessions, with some innovating their own learning structures such as polling the room. The Q&A sessions, on the other hand, were homogenous.

The survey was primarily designed to test increases in three things: political sophistication, political efficacy, and political knowledge. For the sophistication and efficacy questions, a difference-in-differences model compared within-subject change across treatment groups. For the knowledge questions, a post-

test only analysis determined if subjects in any group were significantly closer to the correct answers after treatment.

2.2.1: Dependent Variables and Analyses

The independent variable for every model in this study used a binary treatment: deliberation as a treatment with Q&A as a control, deliberation as a treatment with info-packet as a control, and Q&A as a treatment with info-packet as a control. The dependent variables, sophistication, knowledge, and efficacy, appear below in square brackets.

To measure sophistication, subjects were first asked how much they supported (on a 5-point Likert scale) eight policy positions designed to either be solidly liberal or solidly conservative. These responses were then combined using Pew's method of creating an ideological score (Pew Research Center, 2018) [Ideology]. Ideological constraint is one form of political sophistication (Gastil and Dillard, 1999; Converse, 1964). Subjects were also asked to identify argument frames related to the minimum wage law in two ways. First, they were asked to list as many impacts as they could think of that a change in the minimum wage would have on society [Impact] (Lau and Schlesinger, 2005). In addition, I created a new measure of frame-recognition, which asked subjects to list as many minimum wage features as they could think of that politicians might highlight or ignore for political gain [Frame]. The total number of items they could list served as a proxy for frame-recognition. Impact and frame questions allowed for up to ten open-ended responses. All three of these measures, Ideology, Impact, and Frame, were analyzed separately as they represent different forms of sophistication.

To measure political efficacy I used a standard battery of well-tested efficacy questions (Niemi et al, 1991) of two types, internal political efficacy [Internal_Eff] and external political efficacy [External_Eff]. I also included a proxy for internal political efficacy used in past deliberative research (Gastil et al, 2016), which

asks subjects how much more information they think they need in order to make a decision [Info_Need]. All efficacy questions used a 5-point Likert scale.

For the sophistication and efficacy measures, I used linear regression analysis to determine the difference in differences between pre- and post-test dependent variable measures across binary treatment groups. The models comparing deliberation to Q&A were clustered at the session level for robustness. A positive result means that the treatment outperformed the control.

To measure knowledge, subjects were asked to recall the highest planned minimum wage of any of the United States [Highest_Planned]. Subjects whose answers were closer to the correct number were considered to have better knowledge than those whose answers were further. Subjects were asked other factual questions about minimum wage policies, but unfortunately the answers to those questions changed during the duration of the experiment due to changing minimum wage laws and those data were discounted.

For the knowledge measures I used linear regression analysis to determine the difference in means of the post-test dependent variable measures across binary treatment groups. These were factual questions that had correct answers. In order to measure whether a treatment group was significantly closer to the correct answer, I regressed the binary treatment variable on the absolute value of the difference between subjects' responses and the correct value. If the resulting coefficient is positive, it means that the treatment groups' responses were *further* from the correct answer. A *negative* coefficient means that the treatment outperformed the control.

2.2.2: Hypotheses

This study was pre-registered in Evidence on Governance and Politics (*egap*) on May 8, 2018 (#20180508AA) prior to any data collection, and all hypotheses were recorded therein.

Past research demonstrates that some as yet identified component(s) of large deliberative projects, such as Deliberative Polling (DP) and the Citizens' Initiative Review (CIR), lead to increases in political knowledge, political sophistication, and internal political efficacy. But most deliberative programs incorporate some form of information impartation. Accordingly it is unclear what causal mechanism produces these increases. Some deliberative projects (such as DP and CIR) are highly structured, with rigidly scheduled times for deliberation, questions and answers, and reviewing materials, while others are more open-ended (such as the scholarship on flipped classrooms and the National Issues Forum studied by Gastil and Dillard). Much of the evidence that deliberation produces knowledge increases derive from the structured types of deliberative programs, while evidence of sophistication gains tends to derive from the more open-ended types. I thus hypothesized that my Q&A treatment would produce greater knowledge gains and my deliberation treatment would produce greater sophistication gains. I hypothesized that both would show greater knowledge and sophistication gains over an information-packet only control group due to theoretical and evidentiary priors. I also hypothesized that deliberative subjects would show greater increases in political efficacy based on Morrell (2005). I did not have prior expectations for the effects of a Q&A treatment due to a dearth of research on this type of conversation, so aside from the hypothesized increases in knowledge, I had no reason to think that Q&A would increase sophistication or efficacy. This led to the following three hypotheses:

H1: Q&A participants will have greater knowledge gains than deliberative participants, but both will increase relative to participants who only read an information-packet.

H2: Deliberative participants will have greater sophistication gains than Q&A participants, and only the deliberative group will show any increase relative to the information-packet.

H3: Deliberative participants will have greater gains in internal and external political efficacy than Q&A participants, and only the deliberative group will show any increase relative to the information-packet.

2.3: Results

Results from the difference-in-differences and difference in means analyses generally support Hypothesis 1, but the relationships are the opposite of expected for Hypothesis 2 and 3 (See Table 2.1). Although not all measures are significant, the Q&A sessions were significantly better than the deliberative sessions at increasing at least one measure of sophistication [Frame]. Subjects in the Q&A sessions also increased their levels of external efficacy [External_Eff] significantly more than those in the deliberation sessions. Q&A subjects also felt a greater reduction in the need for more information than deliberative participants [Info_Need]. For the most abstract knowledge question [Highest_Planned], Q&A subjects were also significantly closer to the correct answer than were the deliberative subjects. Thus, Q&A outperformed deliberation any time a significant relationship is obtained.

Table 2.1

IV	Beta	SE	95%CI	P	N
SOPHISTICATION					
Ideology	0.11	0.11	[-0.14,0.36]	0.35	207
Impact	-0.1	0.17	[-0.46,0.62]	0.55	207
Frame	-0.34	0.15	[-0.66,-0.02]	*0.04	207
EFFICACY					
Info_Need	-0.3	0.14	[-0.61,0.01]	†0.06	207
Internal_Eff	-0.19	0.15	[-0.52,0.13]	0.22	207
External_Eff	-0.32	0.12	[-0.58,-0.05]	*0.02	207
KNOWLEDGE					
Highest_Planned	0.36	0.13	[0.08,0.64]	*0.02	207

*Regression results comparing deliberation to Q&A. Errors are clustered at the session level for robustness. Betas for the sophistication and efficacy results are the standardized difference in differences for deliberation relative to Q&A. A positive Beta means that deliberation outperformed Q&A. Beta for the knowledge results is the difference in the distance from the correct answer between treatments. A positive Beta means deliberation was less effective. † indicates $p < .1$, * indicates $p < .05$, ** indicates $p < .01$.*

Comparisons between the conversation treatments (both deliberation and Q&A) and the information-packet control also support Hypothesis 1, but again produce results in the opposite direction from

Hypothesis 2 and 3 (See Tables 2.2 and 2.3). Table 2.2 shows that the deliberation groups outperformed the information-packet groups on at least one measure of political sophistication [Ideology], but the evidence relatively weak.

Table 2.2

IV	Beta	SE	95%CI	P	N
SOPHISTICATION					
Ideology	0.31	0.16	[-0.01,0.63]	†0.06	134
Impact	0.23	0.21	[-0.18,0.64]	0.27	134
Frame	-0.33	0.21	[-0.44,0.38]	0.87	134
EFFICACY					
Info_Need	0.1	0.21	[-0.31,0.51]	0.62	134
Internal_Eff	0.16	0.21	[-0.25,0.57]	0.44	134
External_Eff	-0.08	0.21	[-0.49,0.33]	0.69	134
KNOWLEDGE					
Highest_Planned	-0.32	0.5	[-1.31,0.67]	0.53	134

*Regression results comparing deliberation to info-packet. Betas for the sophistication and efficacy results are the standardized difference in differences for deliberation relative to the info-packet. A positive Beta means that deliberation outperformed the info-packet. Beta for the knowledge results is the difference in the distance from the correct answer between treatments. A positive Beta means deliberation was less effective. † indicates $p < .1$, * indicates $p < .05$, ** indicates $p < .01$.*

As should be expected from Table 2.1, the Q&A treatment performs better relative to the information-packet control than the deliberative treatment. The Q&A treatment significantly outperformed the information-packet control on two political sophistication measures (Ideology and Frame) and a knowledge measure (Highest_Planned). Again, the Q&A treatment is not outperformed on any measure.

Table 2.3

IV	Beta	SE	95%CI	P	N
SOPHISTICATION					
Ideology	0.81	0.19	[0.43,1.19]	**0.000	125
Impact	0.37	0.23	[-0.1,0.83]	0.12	125
Frame	0.41	0.23	[-0.05,0.87]	†0.08	125
EFFICACY					
Info_Need	-0.36	0.23	[-0.1,0.83]	0.12	125
Internal_Eff	0.2	0.24	[-0.27,0.66]	0.40	125
External_Eff	0.23	0.23	[-0.24,0.69]	0.34	125
KNOWLEDGE					
Highest_Planned	-1.43	0.39	[-2.2,-0.65]	**0.000	125

*Regression results comparing Q&A to info-packet. Betas for the sophistication and efficacy results are the standardized difference in differences for Q&A relative to the info-packet. A positive Beta means that Q&A outperformed the info-packet. Beta for the knowledge results is the difference in the distance from the correct answer between treatments. A positive Beta means Q&A was less effective. † indicates $p < .1$, * indicates $p < .05$, ** indicates $p < .01$.*

2.4: Discussion

Overall, it appears that a question and answer type of conversation is likely to lead to greater increases in political knowledge and sophistication than either a deliberative conversation or exposure to an information-packet. There is also some evidence that both deliberation and a question and answer type of conversation will lead to greater sophistication increases than an information-packet only. Finally, a question and answer session also outperforms deliberation in increasing political efficacy, but neither are significantly better than mere exposure to an information packet. What might explain these results?

In analyzing the processes in the different conversational treatments, I noticed that in the deliberation sessions the participants often provided factual or theoretical answers to questions that in the Q&A sessions participants asked the experts. This effort might have divided the deliberators' time and attention between information-seeking and discussion, whereas the Q&A subjects were much more focused on just the facts. The Q&A session did not allow subjects to relate their own experiences, examples, concerns, opinions, etc. to the groups, but many subjects in the deliberative setting engaged in these activities. It is

possible that given more time the deliberative subjects would have made gains equal to or greater than the Q&A subjects, but this would still represent a loss in efficiency. This finding may shed light on how future researchers may want to measure sophistication. Although the deliberators in this study did not outperform the Q&A subjects on the ideological and framing measures of sophistication, they were often able to contribute collectively what the trained expert provided. This mutual knowledge provision resembles what transpires in a flipped classroom environment (Smith et al, 2011).

This study does not confirm Scharmer's theory. Perhaps it did not measure "sophistication" accurately. It did, however, measure sophistication in the ways typical of past political science research. A textual analysis of the dialogue within the deliberations groups might generate new potential measures of sophistication. This study also opened an avenue for future research, which might test whether deliberative groups can collectively provide the same answers to questions that an expert can.

It is also worth asking why neither the deliberative nor the Q&A group affected its participants on any efficacy measure relative to the information-packet. The efficacy measures are the most rigorously tested of all the measures used in this study, and other studies have shown that deliberation leads to increases in internal political efficacy (Morrell, 2005). If an information-packet is as successful at increasing political efficacy as a more involved and more expensive conversation, that would be useful information for program designers interested in efficiency. However, this study also suggests that if a project intends for other reasons to incorporate conversation, a Q&A conversation will lead to greater efficacy increases than a deliberative one.

The implications of this study suggest that questioning and being answered by experts probably has the greatest causal effects on knowledge and sophistication gains derived from deliberative programs. Researchers, political actors, and advocates who simply want to increase sophistication or knowledge may find it more efficient to hire an expert to answer questions than to set up a deliberative forum. There may

well be other reasons to prefer deliberation to a question and answer session, such as when soliciting citizen feedback, but this study shows that Q&A will probably lead to greater increases in knowledge, sophistication, and efficacy.

3: Breaking apart Deliberative Programs: Deliberation does little in the way of increasing political sophistication, knowledge, and efficacy

3.1: Introduction

Social, political, and scholarly programs that incorporate deliberative democratic procedures result in a variety of benefits to participants. Deliberation is claimed to increase knowledge (Fishkin & Luskin, 2005; Barabas, 2004), sophistication (Gastil & Dillard, 1999; Smith, Wood, Krauter, & Knight, 2011; Mellers et al, 2015), and efficacy (Wuthnow, 1994, Morrell, 2005; Min, 2007; Knobloch & Gastil, 2014) which leads to increased political engagement (Lane, 1959; Harder, 2008). However, these findings represent an interesting puzzle. Deliberative Democracy (DD) is a broad label for a wide range of differently designed practices, many of which also have drastically different goals. Moreover, these designs are usually complex bundles of many different strategies, not all of which are deliberative in nature. The puzzling element of DD is that the aforementioned benefits do not obtain consistently across the differently designed programs. This calls into question whether deliberation is actually doing the work, or whether it is some other facet of these programs. For example, these programs almost always include experts for questioning, rich information packets, audience monitoring, sunk costs, and discussion facilitation *in addition* to deliberative elements. What if mere exposure to experts explains the aforementioned increased measures?

Some scholarship has ventured into this “black box” (Kuyper, 2018) to try to better understand the causal mechanisms operating in these deliberative programs. For example, Farrar et al (2010) demonstrate that the effects of deliberation are more likely to obtain when salience around an issue is low. Grönlund, Setälä, and Herne (2010) find that measures of knowledge, readiness to engage, and

trust are more likely to occur when deliberators are also tasked with forming a collective statement rather than simply making a decision on a secret ballot. But these and other (e.g. Andersen & Hansen, 2007; Christensen, Himmelroos, & Grönlund, 2017; Neblo, Esterling, Kennedy, Lazer, & Sokhey, 2010) efforts to explore the causal mechanisms of deliberative programs never question whether the deliberation *itself* is actually responsible for the observed measures; they assume deliberation is doing the causal work and merely look for conditions which can moderate the effectiveness of the deliberation. Only one deliberative experiment (Celaya, forthcoming) has isolated deliberation as a form of conversation and compared it to another common feature of deliberative programs: a focused Question & Answer (Q&A) session with an expert. Celaya found that the Q&A treatment consistently outperformed the deliberative treatment in increasing political knowledge, sophistication, and efficacy, further calling into question how much work the deliberative aspect of these programs is doing.

This puzzle and these contradictory findings call for a new round of theory-building regarding the empirical effects of deliberative democracy. As such, this project leverages participant and non-participant observation, survey, and interview research on two deliberative programs – Participatory Budgeting and the Citizens’ Initiative Review – to reach back into the black box of deliberative programs in order to generate new testable hypotheses about their effects. Commensurate with Celaya (forthcoming), this project finds that increases in political knowledge, when they occurred at all, were the result of engagement with experts and individual research efforts rather than from the deliberative elements of these projects. This project also finds no evidence that the deliberative elements of these programs led to increased political engagement, but did reveal several themes relevant to these programs overall that could elicit or dissuade further similar political engagement. Participants reported a decreased likeliness of engagement when the program’s impacts were perceived to be low, when the impacts were limited to certain groups, when peer deliberators were thought to have an agenda (thus reducing their incentive to earnestly consider the arguments of others), and when the level of discussion

facilitation was either too strict or too lenient. There is also some evidence that sophisticated thinking happened at the group level as a direct result of deliberation.

3.2: Case Selection

Deliberative Democracy (DD) is the practice of people coming together to discuss an issue (or a group of issues) before expressing their policy preferences about said issues leading to a binding agreement. I selected Participatory Budgeting (PB) and the Citizens' Initiative Review (CIR) as exemplars of this practice for the following reasons. *First*, both are highly focused on *policy* issues. PB is a city/borough-level program designed to allocate a portion of a locality's annual budget to the control of its citizens. Citizens develop policies on their own or collectively, citizen volunteers deliberate with each other to refine the policies such that they meet the locality's strictures, and then citizens vote directly (using a ranked voting system) on which policies they would like implemented. The CIR is a state-level program where citizen deliberators consider a ballot initiative. The purpose of each iteration of the CIR is to generate an information packet for voters that is framed to represent the values of the typical voter (as opposed to typical ballot summaries, which are often framed by advocates or elites). These reviews complement, but do not replace, typical ballot summaries.

Second, they are both highly *deliberative*. I closely observed two CIRs and served as a budget delegate for a city's PB program for two years and have collectively observed them for approximately 120 hours (split almost evenly between the two); during both I observed that deliberation drove much of the process (though in different ways, and to different ends). Moreover, I interviewed several key founding members of each program: one of the original founders of the CIR, and both the founder of the Participatory Budgeting Project (the primary organization responsible for bringing PB to the United States) as well as the political leaders that brought PB to the city where I served as a delegate, all of

whom attested to the importance of deliberation to the process. In the CIR, participants deliberated about how to proceed with the process itself, about which questions to ask experts, about the features of the initiative under consideration, and for sequential check-ins. In PB, deliberation often happens during the idea-generation phase (when policies are originally designed), during the budget delegate meetings (this is where most of the deliberation was envisioned by the founders), and even occasionally during the voting process as delegates would bring voting information to community centers and answer voter questions.

Third, these programs led to clear and clearly powerful *binding agreements*. CIRs are designed to be mailed to every voter in a state, bringing a measure of *ideological power* (Lukes, 2005) back into the hands of the citizen reviewers. The empowerment in PB is even more pronounced; citizens get to design, promote, shape, and choose projects that their locality will fund and implement. Moreover, these empowering outputs of PB and the CIR obtain as a direct result of deliberation, making this a relatively easy test of deliberation's ability to lead to knowledge and efficacy increases.

Fourth, engagement with *experts* is a large component of both of these programs. Celaya (forthcoming) found that focused Q&A sessions with experts outperformed deliberation in increasing knowledge, sophistication, and efficacy. If Q&A is the causal mechanism responsible for these increased measures, it would make little sense to explore this causal mechanism in deliberative programs that lacked an expert Q&A element.

Within the CIR and PB I reached out to every participant I was allowed access to. For the CIR, that meant every participant that had previously indicated to Healthy Democracy (the parent organization of the CIR) that they would be willing to participate in follow-up research. This ended up only being 15 participants for the two most recent CIRs (both taking place in the second half of 2018). For PB, I limited my interviews to participants in my own city. Two factors informed this choice. First, having also

participated in this city and in the same period, I had a much better sense of context. I could more easily understand what interviewees described about the process and I could better verify their claims with my own participant-observation. This did mean that a few (3) interviewees recognized me from my own participation, but my sense is that they only considered me a professional acquaintance and their responses closely matched those from participants who had never met me. The second reason for limiting my interviews to local PB participants was that in-person interviews are generally preferable to telephone or other computer-based interviews (Mosley, 2013, p. 7-8). I ended up reaching out to a total of 64 PB participants. The disparity between the two programs is largely due to the lower overall rates of participation in a CIR as compared to PB. CIRs host an average of about 20 participants whereas the PB program I participated in hosted roughly triple that amount, though those are broken up into 5 different committees, so the deliberative bodies are actually smaller in PB. The total response rate for both programs was almost exactly 1/3, and as such I ended up with 5 interviewees from the CIR, and 21 interviewees from PB, for a total of 26 interviews. No new themes emerged after about the 15th interview of PB participants (despite continual attempts to explore new causal mechanisms), and as such I am confident that I was able to reach saturation (Guest, Bunce, & Johnson, 2006). Unfortunately that is not the case for the CIR participants, and as such I will only use those 5 interviews to triangulate (Small, 2011) with my observational research and with PB interviewee responses.

3.3: Methods

The purpose of this study is twofold. *One*, I wanted confirm the experimental findings of Celaya (forthcoming). One of the main shortcomings of experimental research is poor external validity (Lucas, 2003), or in other words, what happens in a lab is not necessarily the same thing that would happen in the real world. One strategy to get around this problem is to triangulate using a different

methodological approach. Focused interviews of real-world participants in deliberative programs are especially appropriate to this task for three reasons. *First*, deliberation in a laboratory may not accurately represent a real-world program. Research subjects know that the context they are in is primarily one focused on research, and not some other outcome. This can lead to demand effects where subjects try to guess the purpose of the research and provide biased measures as a result, or simply might not take the experiment seriously as they would in a real-world version of the context being measured (Orne, 1962). In a real-world context, participants in deliberative programs never have reason to suspect the ostensible purpose of the program is research-related in the first place. *Second*, the type of people who generally sign-up for research subject pools are not necessarily the same type of people who sign up to volunteer in real-world deliberative programs. If the former respond differently to a deliberative treatment than the latter because they are different types of people, the results of a deliberative laboratory experiment might not mean anything outside of a laboratory setting, *even if the laboratory setting perfectly mimics the real-world program in every other way*. *Third*, interviews are a particularly apt research method to complement quantitative research. The *thickness* of interview data can enhance the validity of quantitative findings because they are better able to provide “information about context, process or mechanism, and that contributes to distinctive leverage in causal inference” (Brady & Collier, 2004: pp. 227-228). This makes interviews useful to either triangulate and confirm the results of a quantitative study, or to suggest that a previous causal relationship is spurious (Martin, 2013: pp. 121-122).

Two, I also wanted to explore other potential causal mechanisms contained with deliberative programs that might lead to increases in political sophistication, knowledge, and efficacy. Interviews are a particularly useful method for exploring new causal mechanisms (Hochschild, 1981: pp. 24-25; Lynch, 2013: 35-36). Because interviews are sequential, promising responses early on in the interview process can be used to generate new question for later interviewees. Perhaps more importantly, interviewees

responses can be used to confirm each other as a form of cross-case validation (Gallagher, 2013: 194). For example, if two interviewees make roughly similar claims, I can reword the second interviewee's claim in the language of the first to verify they are actually making the same claim. Conversely, if two interviewees make contrasting claims, I can follow up with the latter interviewee by saying "it's interesting that you say that. I've heard some people say the same thing as you, and others have said the complete opposite. Why do you think people are coming to different conclusions about this topic?" This can allow the interviewer to further dig into a specific causal process. For example, one of the more promising leads I followed up on was the idea that some people came in to volunteer with Participatory Budgeting because they had a specific policy they wanted to work on and to get passed, and that they occasionally acted strategically in order to get said policies passed. One interviewee seemed to think that this was a major problem, and called into question the value of the program as a whole. However, I started asking other participants about this problem, and many participants recognized that some people did come in with a specific proposal or agenda in mind, but after engaging with the process for the first few weeks, they came to respect the process above their own agenda and treated all the proposals fairly. This was true for both participants who said that they came in to PB because they had a specific proposal they were interested in and for those who had no priors. But that is not all they revealed. Many also suggested that having a proposal they cared about wasn't problematic because it gave volunteers the motivation to work harder, which also made them more invested in the process.

Interviews took place between February and April of 2019. I interviewed PB participants for the 2017 and 2018 cycles, both programs ending in December. I interviewed CIR participants (via telephone) in an August, 2018 Oregon CIR and a September, 2018 California CIR. The average interview length was 44:30 minutes with a minimum of 23:42 minutes and a maximum of 61:02 minutes. Interviews were semi-structured and generally following an interview schedule (See Appendices F and G), but allowed interviewees ample opportunity to redirect the conversation when they were motivated to do so. I

conducted several rounds of cognitive testing (Collins, 2003) on the interview schedules and one practice interview with a personal acquaintance who had also volunteered as a PB budget delegate before any data was collected. Cognitive testing is usually only indicated for survey questions which are more rigid and which if misunderstood cannot be corrected as easily as interview questions, however, I find the process useful for testing constructs. For example, my original schedule asked about “political knowledge” as it related to “confidence,” but several cognitive testing respondents felt the term was too vague and jargony, and as such I just started asking about confidence directly, which was much more germane to the interviewees’ experiences.

I also conducted non-participant observation of two iterations of the CIR, and participant observation of two iterations of PB as a budget delegate. These observations were conducted before the interviews took place. They guided the interview schedule formation, and also served as another form of triangulation; if interviewees’ responses comported with my own experiences, I had more reason to consider them valid, and when they did not, I was motivated to dig deeper so as to better understand their distinct experiences. Participant observation is also considered useful in its own right as a method of studying how social structures function in people’s daily lives (Kubic, 2009: p. 28). For example, as an observer of PB, I witnessed great but mostly unsuccessful efforts to make the program beneficial for underserved parts of the community, and this also informed my interview schedule. As a brief methodological aside, my experience in conducting both participant and non-participant observational research revealed a trade-off I have not encountered in scholarly work that practitioners ought to be aware of. Ethnographers base much of their work on the idea that reality is socially constructed (Wedeen, 2002), and that building rapport is essential to helping those being observed to feel at ease and thus to act naturally (Fenno, 1978: pp. 263-274), and participating in the same activities as those being observed can both better illustrate the social reality being constructed and can demonstrate to those being observed that they can trust you. But the trade-off is that if the activity is intense, it can

actually detract from one's ability to observe in the first place. This was particularly true of PB, where budget delegates were presented with a demanding workload almost every week. I certainly became intimately familiar with the process, but I was less able to observe how others interacted with the process. Observing the CIR was the exact opposite. I was able to gain a fairly holistic view of the ways the participants were engaged, but my depth of understanding regarding their experiences was much more limited; I *saw* what they did, but I didn't *feel* what they felt. This leads to two suggestions. If one's research objective is to study a process, participant observation seems more appropriate, but if it is to study a population, less engagement might be indicated (but a researcher's judgment should ultimately decide). Also, if the process is extremely involved, it might interfere with one's ability to observe at all, which would defeat the purpose.

Finally, I conducted a small survey at a California CIR in 2016. The sample was too small to conduct convincing quantitative analyses, but answers to some of the open-ended survey questions were revealing and can supplement the findings from the few CIR interviews I was able to conduct (See Appendix H for the survey questions).

Once interviews were collected and transcribed, I organized responses into recurrent themes. This allowed me to both test my hypothesis regarding expert Q&A and knowledge/sophistication gains, and also provided insights which informed new hypotheses. In order to avoid priming interviewees, I never asked directly about their engagement with city officials, though I did ask follow-up questions whenever they brought it up. I hypothesized that when interviewees were asked what they learned about local politics that they would organically bring up their engagement with city officials. This is also a difficult test for expert engagement as the topic would have to be broached unprompted; if most or even many of the interviewees brought up such engagements on their own, this would serve as a strong validation of my experimental results. Here I am using general notions of engagement with city officials to proxy for the kind of expert Q&A tested in Celaya (forthcoming). I also specifically asked about the deliberative

component of the program. Because public deliberation is generally recognized as a pro-social activity, and because potential acquiescence bias would likely lead participants to claiming deliberation was responsible for change even if it actually was not, this study set up a relatively easy test for deliberation to lead to increases in political sophistication, knowledge, and efficacy, the alternative hypothesis of this study and the expected hypothesis in DD scholarship.

But beyond hypothesis testing, I also wanted to explore other potential causal mechanisms within deliberative programs that could lead to increases in political sophistication, knowledge, or efficacy. To that end, I asked questions about how interviewees innovated during participation in their program (and what enabled said innovation), what they learned during the process (and how they learned it), and whether and how participation in their respective programs led to further political engagement as a direct result of their participation. I also wanted to explore whether it was the deliberative program as a whole, or specifically the deliberative element of the program, that was leading to these increases. I developed a codebook (See Appendix I) with codes for each of these questions, descriptions of the codes, example quotes for support of the code, example quotes for non-support of the code, and validation measures. Based on an initial assessment, I coded for four new causal mechanisms that interviewees suggested would lead to greater efficacy/engagement gains: how impactful the deliberative program was, how broadly those impacts were distributed, whether fellow participants had a personal agenda, and the nature of the facilitation of the discussions.

3.4: Results

This section will present the results of observational, survey, and interview research on the CIR and PB.

This section will be broken up into three main subsections. In the *first* subsection, I will report the results of the confirmatory hypothesis testing regarding deliberation's likeliness to increase measures of

political sophistication. In the *second*, I report deliberation's likeliness to increase political knowledge, and in the *third*, its likeliness to increase political efficacy and engagement. In the latter two of these subsections, I also present evidence for alternative causal mechanisms linking deliberative *programs* to increases in the aforementioned measures, and suggest new hypothesis to test.

Each section will present summary statistics in graphical form. These are not meant to serve as inferential comparisons, merely to give a sense of how many interviewees associated with each viewpoint represented. These graphs take two forms. The first six graphs represent the hypothesis testing component of this study. They ask the following 6 questions (commensurate with the codebook in Appendix I):

1. Did sophistication increase as a result of the *program*?
2. Did sophistication increase as a result of *deliberation*?
3. Did knowledge increase as a result of the *program*?
4. Did knowledge increase as a result of *deliberation*?
5. Did efficacy/engagement increase as a result of the *program*?
6. Did efficacy/engagement increase as a result of *deliberation*?

Each of these graphs provide a count of how many interviewee's gave an affirmative answer (Y), how many gave a negative answer (N), how many had nothing to say (N/A), and how many gave mixed answers (Mixed). Not every question had every answer type.

The remaining four graphs correspond to new potential causal mechanisms associated with deliberative programs. The four mechanisms follow:

1. The level of *impact* determines engagement and efficacy.
2. The *breadth* of impact determines engagement and efficacy.
3. Participants with a *personal agenda* determines engagement and efficacy.
4. The quality of group facilitation determines engagement and efficacy

For each of these graphs, three counts are reported. First, the total number of interviewees claiming this causal mechanism is responsible for efficacy/engagement increases. Second, the total number of people

that described how this mechanism could *increase* efficacy and engagement. And third, the total number of people that described how this mechanism could *decrease* efficacy and engagement. Because some interviewees explicated ways that a mechanism could both increase and decrease engagement and efficacy, the total doesn't always equal the sum of the other two counts.

3.4.1: Sophistication

I find some evidence that deliberative programs *and* deliberation itself lead to sophisticated thinking about political issues. This finding is commensurate with some deliberative scholarship (e.g. Gastil & Dillard, 1999; Smith, Wood, Krauter, & Knight, 2011; Mellers et al, 2015), but there are two caveats. The first is that only nine of the 26 total participants were able to link sophistication to the program at all (See Figure 3.1), and only eight linked it directly to deliberation (See Figure 3.2). For the section, I operationalize “sophistication” as participants reporting coming up with innovative or creative ideas to complete the assigned tasks of their deliberative program that they would not have otherwise, and especially that would not have been developed without their deliberations. This would include examples such as PB delegates finding innovative ways to craft proposals to fit within the mandates of the city’s capital budget when the initial submission did not originally, and CIR participants recalling memorable instances of particularly creative language use on the review as could, for example, bridge partisan gridlock around an issue.




Figure 3.1: Number of interviewees linking deliberative *program* to increases in sophistication




Figure 3.2: Number of interviewees linking *deliberation* to increases in sophistication

Though this is a minority of respondents, this is still some evidence that interviewees are seeing the value of deliberation regarding sophistication. However, for the other *potential* causal mechanisms, I used a cutoff of at least half of the interviewees bringing up a mechanism unprompted for me to consider generating a new hypothesis. Answers about sophistication *were* prompted, and as deliberation is considered pro-social, I would have expected greater numbers of respondents to attribute sophistication gains to it.

The other caveat here is the nature of the sophistication gains. Typically, when political scientists are considering sophistication, they are thinking in terms of individual gains, such as the ability to recognize policies in ideological space (Converse, 1964; Campbell, 1980) and to recognize multiple argument frames (Druckman, 2001; Lau & Schlesinger, 2005). The link between these types of gains and deliberation is that deliberation is a *generative* form of conversation (Scharmer, 2001); participants have to think harder about the values of others, which highlights different argument frames and belief-systems. But this is not commensurate with what interviewees reported.

Instead, interviewees reported three features that facilitated sophisticated thinking. The first, and closest in conception to Scharmer, was the openness of the process itself. While only three interviewees brought up this mechanism, it is one inherent to deliberation that something like a focused question and answer session cannot mimic. Another way to think about this is that in order for a program volunteer to be creative, they have to have room for creativity. One PB interviewee explained, "There was a lot of room for amending proposals. The descriptions we were given were brief. We paid attention [to the descriptions] and never totally changed [them], but we *did* try to be expansive with them." They then went on to describe how fellow deliberators developed a plan to make a needle drop-off program more feasible within a capital budget by partnering with local organizations. Another said "There was a great amount of leeway to change projects if you needed to. We changed the bike repair stations to make them more practical for the city."

But the majority of interviewees (five out of eight) that linked deliberation directly to sophistication referred instead to the value of diversity of experience and perspective. One PB delegate stated:

Non-city officials are better than city officials for PB. They bring in perspective, think outside the box, bring experiences from their jobs, their hobbies, and that affects how much they contribute. It's like crowdsourcing. Delegates designed the mobile stage when the city was having a hard time finding a permanent location.

Others mentioned expertise, knowledge to persuade, and specific examples of participants who had worked on similar projects in the past (e.g. planting trees, working in libraries) as useful for designing good policies. Openness and a diversity of opinions is indeed a theorized strength of deliberation. James Fishkin asserts that during deliberation “a collective process occurs in which the group has a reasonable chance to form its collective, considered judgments – to give its public voice, if you will, to the topic in question. Arguments on rival positions get an extended hearing, and each side has a chance to answer the other. The same information is available to all” (Fishkin, 1995: pp. 34). But according to Scharmer, this is not *generative* because the knowledge already existed; it was merely shared. The key difference is in Fishkin’s conceptualization of deliberation as a *collective* sophisticated body, and Scharmer’s more *individual* conception. Thus, if one’s objective is to use a body of volunteers to collectively innovate (as is the objective of something like PB), deliberation seems at least somewhat useful. But one should also be careful not to exaggerate the benefits of their deliberative program as they do not seem to make individuals into more sophisticated thinkers. This also comports with Celaya (forthcoming), which measured individual sophistication gains, and not group gains.

But even there, not all interviewees agreed. One PB delegate found occasional use for deliberation when selecting a process to best approach a task, but stated, “Usually it wasn’t necessary.” Another worried that “People would argue for a project, back and forth; it was a waste of time, except for the experts.” Another was even blunter. When asked whether PB led to creative thinking, they responded “Not from talking to each other.” That being said, only two interviewees specifically discounted deliberation as a pathway toward sophisticated thinking.

One last interesting result is that none of the five CIR participants had anything to add about sophisticated thinking, whether from the program generally or the deliberation specifically. A sample of five interviewees is much too small to infer relationships with any reliability, but it does hint at another hypothesis worth testing; the differences between the *objectives* of deliberative programs might make

them more or less amenable to sophistication or knowledge gains. This question also inspired Celaya's experiment (forthcoming) and has led to surprising fruitful results. The CIR is not designed for participants to be creative, just for them to learn and restate; PB does leverage delegate creativity. But again, a larger and more systematic approach would be required to test these differences.

3.4.2: Knowledge

Deliberative participants were much more likely to ascribe gains in knowledge to their participation in the program (See Figure 3.3). 19 out of 26 interviewees described at least some form of knowledge gain from participation in a deliberative program, and only 5 specifically stated that they did not learn anything from the process. However, not one interviewee was willing to claim that they learned something specifically from deliberating with their peers (See Figure 3.4). As with sophistication, the majority (22/26) had almost nothing to say about the relationship between deliberation *itself* and knowledge. Three specifically said that they did not learn anything from the process, and only one even gave a partial admission that deliberation was connected to knowledge gains, stating "Learning was 65-35, 65% from [city] officials [35% from deliberation], what [city officials] had to say about policies. It was fascinating, complex. I saw myself in that role in the future." Even here, when pressed the interviewee is unable to give examples of the kind of learning that happened in the deliberative sessions, and immediately goes back to talking about what they learned from the city officials. Given the pro-social nature of deliberation and the threat of acquiescence bias, not to mention plentiful extant scholarly research linking deliberation to knowledge gains, these results are extremely surprising.




Figure 3.3: Number of interviewees linking deliberative *program* to increases in knowledge




Figure 3.4: Number of interviewees linking *deliberation* to increases in knowledge

But if participants aren't learning anything from the deliberative aspect of their participation, what are they learning from? By far, the most common response (12/20 who said they learned something, including the one "Mixed" answer) was that both PB delegates and CIR participants learned from city officials and experts. A PB delegate said, "I really liked that the engineer came in; we got to talk to experts. The consultations were really effective. Tweak, consulting, tweak, consulting. This was one of the most effective parts of the program."

One feature of PB is something called “speed-consulting,” where delegates get to meet representatives (often heads) of the various city departments, such as Public Works, Community Development, Human Services, etc. Delegates spend two four-hour sessions engaging with city officials to help refine their assigned projects. 11 of the 12 PB interviewees who reported knowledge gains from PB were associated with city officials referenced these two relatively short engagements. (This process was not available for CIR participants, two of which also claimed learning was associated with the program generally). One delegate said, “We learned a lot about the city, mostly from city resources, not from talking to each other. For example, they gave us maps that created a sense of community...learned about city governance...Speed consulting was great, very knowledgeable leaders.” It is important to note that these findings comport with Celaya (forthcoming); most participant learning happened through expert engagement, not through group deliberation.

The next most common form of learning came from individual research. Four PB delegates specifically referenced learning through their own research. Interviewees claimed that they learned “how to gather information,” and that they could “figure it out” if they faced a new problem in their city. They described visiting sites, taking pictures, getting feedback from city officials and other relevant organizations (e.g. talking to electricians about electric vehicle charging-stations).

Others described more generalized learning. One PB delegate said, “I learned ‘where there’s a will, there’s a way.’” Another stated, “I learned that politics is an actionable thing that doesn’t require official affiliation.” A CIR participant said, “[I learned] the cycle to actually get something on the ballot. The wording had to be correct, it was grueling. Is it accurate? That whole process there I found enlightening.” However, these miscellaneous knowledge claims were not attached to any kind of process, and so are not useful for generating hypotheses about causal mechanisms linking deliberation to knowledge gains. A PB delegate best sums up this section:

I learned what kind of projects were simple and which were complicated. I learned from researching sites, during site visits. From requesting records from the government, how the information is out there but not centralized. I learned some from the facilitator, *not much from other delegates* [emphasis added]. The part I remember most is *talking to city officials* [emphasis added].

One CIR survey respondent also corroborated that they primarily learned from the research process, and did not mention the deliberative element of the CIR.

3.4.3: Efficacy/Engagement

Deliberative participants were also somewhat more likely to ascribe increased engagement and efficacy to their participation in the program (See Figure 3.5), but much like increases of knowledge, not a single participant in either program reported increasing their engagement or their confidence (a proxy for efficacy) as a direct result of deliberating (See Figure 3.6). However, unlike with the results for sophistication and knowledge (diverse perspectives and official engagement, respectively), no single hypothesis stands out to best explain how engagement with deliberative programs can lead to increased efficacy and engagement. The one thing that can be said with confidence is that deliberation *itself* is not perceived as responsible for efficacy and engagement increases.

This section links efficacy and engagement because the former is shown to lead to the latter (e.g. Lane, 1959; Harder, 2008), and for my purposes I am interested in efficacy only in as much as it does lead to engagement. As such, for the purposes of exploring a causal mechanism, I treat efficacy as equivalent to engagement, though they are of course distinct concepts and are not always interchangeable.




Figure 3.5: Number of interviewees linking deliberative *program* to increases in efficacy/engagement




Figure 3.6: Number of interviewees linking *deliberation* to increases in efficacy/engagement

Analyzing interviewee responses has led to four potential causal mechanisms which can both elicit more engagement from potential volunteers or dissuade them. These mechanisms follow:

Impact: When a program is perceived to have a high level of impact on their community, people will be more likely to think their participation will make a difference (efficacy), which will result in them becoming more engaged. When they perceive the impact as being low, they will be less likely.

Importantly, having a greater impact is always better.

Breadth of impact: For some, merely having a large impact is not enough. Participants in deliberative programs tend to worry that the impacts of a program are not evenly distributed, especially toward underserved communities. This is especially important for programs like PB, which are designed to extend direct democratic power to their constituents. Having an unbalanced impact subverts one of the primary principles of deliberative democracy; that every voice matters (Gutmann & Thompson, 2004: pp. 133-137). As with impact, greater breadth of impact is always thought to be better.

Personal agenda: This mechanism is somewhat different than the others in that its effects are not generally agreed upon. Some deliberators worry that participants with a personal agenda will subvert the process; they will place their agenda before their honest engagement with the process, and the program becomes vulnerable to politics as usual. Other deliberators feel that anything that can increase motivation to volunteer should be considered a good thing; people with an agenda will work harder, research more, and generally exert more effort into making their work as useful as it can be. Respondents provide good evidence for both sides of this mechanism.

Facilitation: This mechanism is also somewhat different than the others in that ideal facilitation is more about balance than about one or several techniques over others. Deliberators were demotivated to engage when the deliberative discussions were too rigidly structured, and when they were too unstructured. In the former condition, a best-case scenario is that deliberators become like cogs in a machine; they woodenly move from task to task without any say in the process, and thus without any buy-in. In a worst-case scenario, the tasks themselves are detrimental to completing the goals of the project, and the rigidity of the process means that deliberators cannot amend them, which, as discussed previously, is one area in which deliberation might be particularly useful. In the latter condition – not enough structure – deliberators will spend too much time deliberating about the process itself. They have to build the process from the ground up. In a best-case scenario, some deliberators take leadership

roles and eventually move the process along. In a worse-case scenario, the process becomes more central to the program than the actual goals, and deliberators get frustrated with the lack of progress.

I arbitrarily chose “half the sample” (13 interviewees) as the cutoff for highlighting a theme for consideration as a causal mechanism responsible for linking a deliberative program to efficacy/engagement. As long as an interviewee mentioned the theme, it did not matter whether they viewed the theme as likely to increase or to decrease efficacy and engagement and in fact, some actually explained how a theme could both increase and decrease efficacy and engagement. Once a theme was highlighted I assessed the face validity of the theme based on the causal arguments made by interviewees, and on passing that assessment, I recommended each theme for future hypothesis testing.

3.4.3.1: Impact

16 out of the 26 interviewees mentioned impact as an important factor in deciding to continue engaging in programs like the CIR and PB; 13 said that being part of an impactful program would encourage their involvement, and 9 said that low impact discouraged them from participating (See figure 3.7).




Figure 3.7: Number of interviewees linking *impact* to increases in efficacy/engagement

The relationship between engagement and the impact of a program is relatively straightforward, and is an excellent proxy for external efficacy. External efficacy is a measure of how much of an effect one feels their political behavior will have on society. One PB delegate echoed this logic almost verbatim, "My goal was to support programs with a valuable impact." Another stated, "This is a *great* way to get involved in the community. It lets you do something tangible, it impacts people in your own community...it gives you a little control over the purse strings." And still another said, "Having a big budget is a big draw...people turn out because it feels like you're helping the democratic process." Another delegate stated, "The biggest impact is folks getting their voices heard. I probably wouldn't be as engaged [without that impact]."

Others also expressed how a lack of impact dissuaded them from future engagement. When asked why they did not plan to get engaged with the next PB cycle, one delegate said:

It doesn't feel like putting my energy would be impactful. Skill sets don't cater to this type of work, it will happen without me, other places need me...It was a system within which working was too limited. I like to apply myself to data analysis, environmental impact...[PB is] too limited.

Another said "PB doesn't have as much power as it seems, that left a sour taste in my mouth," and still another said that a lack of impact was a "downer." Another delegate who decided not to participate again in the following cycle said, "There are more effective ways to improve the city than PB."

In my first cycle as a PB delegate, I worked hard on a project to install night lights and canine drinking fountains in several of my city's dog parks (as a dog owner, I actually had a minor vested interest in this proposal). Though this project was not ultimately selected by the voters, I did feel as though I accomplished something meaningful by even getting this proposal on the ballot. It is not surprising that some people would think that \$100,000-range projects are a pittance for a relatively wealthy city, but for young professionals (and graduate students like myself), these types of projects are not easily obtained outside of the charitable contributions of wealthy patrons or independent government action.

In my second cycle I had the opposite reaction. I originally worked on a proposal to increase trash, recycling, composting, and cigarette butt disposal containers. The city was already planning to upgrade the trash and recycling containers, and so the main value added for me (in other words, the real impact), was in the composting and the cigarette butt disposal bins. But near the end of the process, the city officials unilaterally decided that the composting and cigarette disposal bins would be more trouble than they were worth, and cut them out of the project. From my perspective, this transformed the project from one with substantial value-added to one that was a waste of PB funds (as the city was already going to make the trash and recycling upgrades eventually). Other interviewees shared this concern. One delegate said, “One frustrating thing about the process was that we spent a lot of time [on some projects] but the city just shut them down.” Another was much blunter, “PB doesn't have real power. The amount of funds are a tiny fraction of the budget. It's miniscule. The funds are also siloed, they aren't part of the actual budget. *And the city has complete veto power* [emphasis added]”

CIR survey respondents also mentioned the impact of the program unprompted. “I felt this kind of process gives the people a voice and greater impact on issues that affect them. Recently, the complete 180° turn we've seen in politics has left me feeling uneasy, but this process makes me hopeful.” Another stated “I came to a better understand that regular citizens could impact democracy if they become informed.”

3.4.3.2: Breadth

15 out of 26 interviewees mentioned breadth as an important factor in their decision to continue to engage in programs like the CIR and PB; 8 said that being part of a program with broad impacts would encourage them to get/stay involved, and 8 said that low breadth of impact discouraged them from participating (See figure 3.8).




Figure 3.8: Number of interviewees linking *breadth* to increases in efficacy/engagement

The breadth of a program’s impact is less intuitively related to willingness to engage with it. The concern with breadth is likely the result of the type of people that select into volunteering in local government in the first place. But at least for real-world deliberative programs (as opposed to laboratory deliberation for research purposes), this is exactly the population deliberative programmers are likely to engage with normally, and so knowing what drives this admittedly self-selected population toward engagement is highly relevant. Another potential hypothesis this section suggests is that the more distant the program is from a community, the less likely participants will be driven to conceive of the program as needing to serve every member of that community. PB delegates were heavily concerned with this issue, CIR participants were not at all.

When interviewees discussed breadth, they almost exclusively referred to underserved communities. One PB delegate, who had previously mentioned that they worked with and were mostly concerned about the homeless, said, “PB addressed broad needs. They did a good job of trying to get ideas from everyone. Anyone can vote...Nobody there would make it a hostile, threatening environment. The initial ideas do show a concern for underserved community members, like homelessness.” Two delegates mentioned that they joined their specific committee so that they could work with more diverse people.

PB has three main phases for volunteers. Outreach at the beginning for idea collection, budget delegates to winnow and refine the proposals collected in the initial outreach phase, and then a second outreach phase to get out the vote. Once delegate said that they would not serve as a delegate again because they were not able to engage with as much of the community, but they did say that they would continue in their role on the outreach committee. "I liked outreach more. I talked to more people, worked with residents. It was more interactive." They later went on to explain that this is where engagement is needed the most. This sentiment was shared by others, who were concerned that a lack of breadth was failing to serve the community. A specific concern is with the nature of PB. Because the process is limited to capital projects, PB cannot fund anything that requires recurring expenses, such as a shelter for the homeless. According to one delegate, "Citizens wanted different things [than what PB could provide], but they didn't understand the limitations. PB doesn't mesh with these needs, such as homelessness." The same delegate went on to say, "There was also no follow-through in connecting with minorities. The effort wasn't sustained. This was most important for idea generating – we'd have a better understanding of what they are concerned about, what they think are the needs of the city. This would trickle up to mid-level PB staff, community development would hear about it." Another echoed this sentiment, "PB needs to address larger aspects that residents discuss as being problems, such as housing." Another rhetorically asked, "Who has electric cars? Only rich people. PB is not well-equipped to address social justice."

This potential mechanism also comports with my experience. One of the most moving aspects of serving as a delegate for me was volunteering in the get out the vote phase. I spent time at both a senior center and a learning center for children (PB programs often allow children to vote on the projects). In both instances, it was heartening to engage these citizens in a community process, especially the ESL youth groups. The PB program I served with exerted great effort to reach out to these typically unengaged parts of the community, going so far as to print materials in more than a dozen languages, and having

even more available on the program’s website (that ESL students could access in the learning centers). Others had the same experience. One was impressed how “PB reached out to the community, they have a strong online presence, and they prepare documents in multiple languages.” Another lauded, “PB was exciting because it was YA (young adults) being active - what other opportunities would there be for them?”

3.4.3.3: Agenda

20 out of 26 interviewees mentioned a personal agenda as an important factor in their decision to continue to engage in programs like the CIR and PB; 12 said that participants with a personal agenda was a problem for the process, and 12 said that a personal agenda was beneficial to the process (See figure 3.9).




Figure 3.9: Number of interviewees linking *agenda* to increases in efficacy/engagement

During the exploratory phase of this project, I encountered an anecdote where a PB project in a wealthy locality completely collapsed because the PTA there was extremely effective at solving the collective action problem and each year controlled which ballot proposals would win. This led to others disengaging from the process, which meant no volunteers for outreach and to serve as delegates, which

meant the process became impossible. The other side of that coin is that having a personal agenda is often what motivates people to get engaged in these kinds of programs to begin with. Deliberative programs would do well to caution against invested actors subverting their process, but also finding a balance that lets their participants strive to meet their own goals. This is not limited to PB. One of the greatest (and only) complaints about the CIR was an imbalance in perspective. One CIR participant complained “The information presented to us was biased: the experts gave more pro than con arguments.” This concern was almost perfectly echoed by another CIR participant, “Viewpoints weren't equally represented, [the experts were] biased - the yes side had more information than the no side.” PB delegates had similar concerns. One stated, “One group member submitted an idea, then they kept pushing for that idea. It wasn't even a capital project...I lost some confidence...This is also one reason I didn't join the streetsmarts committee. Cyclists are very active, they push their projects.” Another delegate confirmed the concern with cyclists stating, “I was originally interested in joining the streetsmarts committee. Then I learned that it was...dominated by the passionate cyclists.” In my own observational research notes, I wrote of PB:

One concern with the PB process is that people quickly developed vested interests in some of the projects they were working on. This appeared to lead to some motivated reasoning when it came to which projects should be rated as having a greater impact or benefit to the city. This also seemed to lead to some projects receiving much more attention from the delegates, and others being more easily dismissed. I also found myself acting this way. However, none of these decisions are made without deliberation, where even the staunchest of advocates for a project were still required to give reasons for these decisions, which were subject to scrutiny and rebuttal. This did lead to some friction and mildly heated arguments, but they were all resolved amicably.

Others also expressed this understanding; having an agenda was a potential threat, but overall everyone took the process seriously. One said, “Many people had other agendas...Some were explicit about it. They did things that would be useful for their reasons, but it didn't detract from the system.” Another observed, “People came in excited about a project, but it wasn't contentious at all.” Tellingly, another

delegate said, “I discovered that a lot of people [joined PB] pursuing their own individual ideas; that's what got a lot of people to volunteer in the first place...That didn't jade me, I kind of expected that.”

Clearly there is some threat to the process from people intending to wrest power from these programs to serve their own purposes, but those threats seem only to apply when they come from groups. The PTA and cyclist examples are telling. In my first cycle I also had to limit my efforts to certain parts of the city because housing associations were known to be too powerful and would not allow dog-park activities near their homes. But with one exception, no interviewees seemed concerned when *individuals* had a specific agenda, or a specific project they wanted to progress.

3.4.3.4: Facilitation

15 out of 26 interviewees mentioned facilitation as an important factor in their decision to continue to engage in programs like the CIR and PB; 7 explained how facilitation motivated their likelihood to engage with the process, and 10 explained how facilitation could dissuade engagement when done poorly (See figure 3.10).




Figure 3.10: Number of interviewees linking *facilitation* to increases in efficacy/engagement

Facilitation seems to matter primarily as a function of impact. People who praised their facilitators did so because they allowed the process to function without interruption, and those who were turned off by their facilitator found them to be obstructionists rather than *de facto* facilitators. I was (un)fortunate that for both my observations of the CIR and my participation in PB, every facilitator did just that: facilitated the process. Facilitators for the CIR were highly experienced professionals and not a single participant in the process had anything but praise for them. PB facilitators were more of a mixed bag. One PB delegate was so convinced of the importance of facilitation that they were moved to engage directly because of it. "The facilitator made a big difference. I am planning to sign up to be a facilitator for next year because of how important it is." When facilitation worked, it seemed to be a combination of subtle guidance combined with mostly hands-off encouragement. Specifically, some delegates pointed to the freedom to develop the procedures to meet the program's goals as being particularly valuable. "[The facilitator] used a blend of teaching us how to think about guiding our decisions about what's best for the community, but also directly about what was best for the community...We were guided and given the freedom to facilitate ourselves." Another stated, "It was unstructured, but we decided the structure early on. It was facilitated, self-imposed structure, and we all agreed to it." During my observational research of the CIR, one of the facilitators echoed the importance of giving participants room to design the process:

We had a very intentional and prescriptive process for small group deliberation originally that had to do with the small groups being self-facilitated which I really liked because we were basically taking people through a demonstration, what that would look like, guidelines for people about how to self-facilitate, and they learned how to do that in small groups, which I thought was really valuable.

The facilitator went on to explain that this process was also important for participant buy-in, or in other words, investment in the process.

However, there was also a danger of too little structure. Some described it as an annoyance, such as “The meetings were too unstructured. There were so many awkward pauses. Nobody wanted to take leadership.” Others agonized that the whole process was broken. “My friend's committee was too process oriented. They couldn't agree on the process, too much process for processes! They couldn't find any way to break [the proposals] down.” Others worried that these processes were too time-consuming and disallowed “freedom to work on the proposals.” A common theme for interviewees concerned with facilitation was the rigidity. Facilitators that essentially stuck to a script denied even the potential for deliberative groups to shine. People did not have time to engage with each other, to get to know each other, and had trouble buying into the process. One participant who served for multiple years and who had experienced variation in facilitator quality had an especially pertinent insight, stating that the first cycle was fixed and rigid, and highly micromanaged. The second year started off a little slower, but they designed their own process which ultimately ended up being more efficient than the first cycle. Another delegate who experienced similar variation stated:

The second year the facilitator was very rigid. It was a waste of time, we would talk about the highlights of the week, whenever we deliberated we had to discuss every single project with the rest of the group, it took a lot of time.

One last theme that came up in the context of facilitation is the potential for proactive deliberators to take control. When facilitators were described only as being hands-off, but when a delegate assumed control, the process was still likely to function well. This was especially true in situations where veteran delegates (from past cycles) were present and familiar with the process. But this did not always occur.

3.5: Conclusion

Scholars, activists, and policymakers exert substantial effort studying and implementing deliberative programs. Following Celaya (forthcoming), this is the second study to specifically test deliberation *as a form of conversation* as the causal mechanism responsible for participant increases in political sophistication, knowledge, and efficacy/engagement, and it is the second to conclude that the deliberative component of deliberative programs is not responsible for these increases.

This paper makes two key contributions. *First*, it serves as triangulation of the results of Celaya (forthcoming). Not only did interviewees fail to ascribe any relevant benefits to deliberation, the majority proactively suggested that most of their learning came from interaction with experts. In the CIR, this was during a formal Q&A session as a group with advocates and experts. In PB this was during the “speed-consulting” sessions when participants spent two four-hour meetings as individuals or in small groups (2-3) rushing to and from different city department representatives to help them design the projects they were assigned to. *Second*, this project has highlighted some key hypotheses about how future deliberative programs (and likely other direct democracy programs as well), can elicit future engagement and knowledge and sophistication gains.

This leads to two recommendations. *One*, if proponents of deliberative programs support them specifically and solely because they are interested in some combination of increases in political sophistication, knowledge, and/or efficacy/engagement, they might consider designing a different type of program where there is less focus on deliberation and more on engagement with experts. *Two*, I suggest new tests for best practices of deliberative programs for those who want to include deliberation for other reasons, such as the claim (Gutmann & Thompson, 2004: p. 18) that deliberation is valuable as a democratic system because it relies on moral principles, rather than on neutral concepts, which maps closely to the purpose of the CIR. PB interviewees suggested that working on an impactful program motivates them to work harder (including learning more through individual research), and perceptions of low impact have dissuaded other participants from participating in later cycles. Others also suggested


that the program primarily served already well-to-do residents, which is where the program was least needed, and which also turned them away, if only somewhat. Both CIR and PB participants reported being turned off by biased participants and experts with personal political agendas, but at least in PB others reported that having an agenda actually made for better participants, as they were willing to put in more time and effort to make the projects as effective as possible. And finally, both CIR and PB participants reported that facilitation was a key factor. The few CIR interviewees all lauded the facilitators, so much so that two of them brought the process into their daily lives. PB participants were mixed, and revealed that there was an important necessary balance between too rigid facilitation, and too lax. Too rigid made participants feel constrained and made them feel like they weren't able to contribute. Too lax made meetings inefficient as participants endlessly debated and nothing seemed to get done. This problem was mitigated somewhat by delegate veterans from previous years who took control early on, but not all committees were fortunate to have such delegates. It should be repeated that this paper does not claim that the interviewee claims are verified; this was an exploratory component of this study and as such only suggests new hypotheses to test. Ultimately, deliberative programs are costly endeavors. This project provides clarity on when such programs are appropriate, and suggests some data-guided tests to help determine how best to design these programs when they are appropriate.

Appendices

Appendix A: Power in Practice Codebook

Code	Description	Example	Validation
<u>Implementation Conditions</u>	Interviewee indicates necessary and/or sufficient conditions for the initial implementation of a deliberative program, allowing it to exercise potential efficacy.	"Some of the reasons why it doesn't work on other communities is that they just don't have the money. That's the number 1 reason. We've talked to [multiple cities] and it's really nice to talk through this, but some just can't, don't have the money and don't have the staff to support it."	Corroborated by multiple interviewees. Interviewee provides illustrative real-world examples. Interviewee is able to provide counterfactual examples. Interviewee describes an associated causal process with high face validity.
<u>Design Features for Program Sustainment</u>	Interviewee explains how design features of a deliberative program contribute to its maintenance, allowing it to sustain potential efficacy.	"I think there's one specific area that should probably be loosened up, and that is the, you know rather than imposing very strict sort of ground-rules there should be more buy-in and development of the ground-rules, they should spend just a little bit more time with the group developing their own customs, ground-rules"	Corroborated by multiple interviewees. Interviewee provides illustrative real-world examples. Interviewee is able to provide counterfactual examples. Personal observation confirms claim.
<u>Sharing Strategies across Programs</u>	Interviewee claims that part of a program's success is based on information sharing between similar programs.	"In Latin America, I lived in Rosario Argentina for 6 months, and that was the biggest inspiration for the process that we've used here, where there were delegates that were developing projects, there was a full public vote unlike in Porto Alegre where that wasn't a feature of the process. So those two elements of a subset of residents developing projects and everyone invited to vote were things that were carried over from Rosario"	Corroborated by multiple interviewees. Interviewee provides illustrative real-world examples.
<u>Power Sharing</u>	Interviewee reveals how a deliberative program is able to exert directive or coercive power (1st face), agenda-setting power (2nd face), or ideological control (3rd face) in the realm of government policymaking.	"I came across a couple people who said, 'I'm not going to vote for you because I'm republican,' and I'd actually say to them, 'right now, because you're a republican, you're not being represented at all in your government, because you're not getting a representative, but with participatory budgeting, at least you're getting some say because you participate in that process and get more choice than you're getting now if we're just living in a representative democracy.' And they seemed to actually like that"	Corroborated by multiple interviewees, especially interviewees with conflicting agendas. Interviewee provides illustrative real-world examples. Interviewee is able to provide counterfactual examples. Interviewee describes an associated causal process with high face validity. Personal observation confirms claim.

Appendix B: Laboratory Setup



Appendix C: Session Assignment

Assignment to the control group occurred as follows. There were 14 total experimental sessions. In pairs, those were randomized into 7 deliberative and 7 Q&A sessions. For each of those sessions, a list was generated with 24 unique alphanumeric designators. The order of these designators was pre-randomized, and the designators themselves corresponded to the workstation numbers in the lab as well as to ID badges that I made for participants (see below) 15 of those designators corresponded to workstations in the discussion area, and 9 of them corresponded to workstations in the packet only area. The designators correspond with the gray-colored workstations in Appendix A. When subjects initially showed up to the lab, they were told by the lab staff to remain in a waiting-room area until the study began. I waited until 5 minutes after the designated show-up time to maximize turnout, then proceeded to hand out ID badges to participants. If 24 subjects showed up, then I handed all the badges out counter-clockwise in the waiting-room area. Because the designator order was pre-randomized, I didn't worry about what time people showed up and where they were positioned in the room. If less than 24 subjects showed up, I would cross out designators from the pre-randomized list equal to the number of missing subjects. In such instances, I would cross out designators associated with the packet only area before crossing out any of the discussion area designators. It is important to note that this crossing out occurred after a count of subjects was made and before any badges were allocated, and once the count was made, no further subjects were allowed to participate if they showed up late. This scheme allowed me to randomly assign participants into either one of the discussion treatment groups or into the information-packet only control group while still maximizing the number of subjects going to the two discussion groups. Thus, while I did have to cluster errors when comparing the deliberation treatment to the Q&A, I did not need to do so when comparing the deliberative treatment to the information-packet group, nor when comparing the Q&A group to the information-packet group. Because I had to cluster errors when comparing the deliberation treatment group to the Q&A group, it made the most statistical sense to maximize these sessions anyway as there was a greater chance they would be underpowered.

6/20/2018 D	
Seat ▼	Order ▼↑
B10	1
B12	2
C5	3
C3	4
B8	5
C7	6
C8	7
B9	8
C6	9
C9	10
C1	11
A7	12
A6	13
B11	14
A8	15
A4	16
B7	17
A5	18
A9	19
C2	20
A3	21
C4	22
A1	23
A2	24

Appendix D: Experiment Script

DELIBERATION SCRIPT

Setup:

Waiting room area:

Consent Forms

Randomization Spreadsheet

Participant ID Badges

Lab area:

Computers (with Instrument Open)

Note Pads

Pens

Payment Forms

Debriefing Forms

Moderator:

Payment

Sessions will be pre-randomized as either Deliberative or Q&A sessions. The session will begin with the MODERATOR in the waiting-room area and the EXPERT outside the lab area. Subjects will show up and take a seat in the waiting-room area. Attendance will be cut off 10-minutes after the start time. Once attendance is cut off, those who showed up will be randomized into either a conversation group or an info-packet group using the Randomization Spreadsheet. Once randomized, the MODERATOR will give subjects a Consent Form linked to their treatment group, and a Participant ID Badge. The LAB RESEARCH ASSISTANT will lead the info-packet group to their lab stations to begin the survey immediately. The MODERATOR will then lead the subjects to the lab. The EXPERT will come in to the lab area after subjects answer the pre-test survey and read the information-packet, which is contained within the survey instrument. Once in the lab area subjects will fill in seats based on their Participant ID Badge. Note Pads and Pens will be placed at each Computer station for the conversation group only. Debriefing Forms and Payment Forms will be kept separately in a box near the exit and will be handed out to the conversation group participants as they leave. Once the conversation group members sign the Payment Forms, the Moderator will give them Payment. Info-packet group participants will return to the waiting room area to sign Payment Forms receive Payment from one of the lab research assistants.

(Start in waiting-room area)

[Moderator] (Randomizes participants using the Randomization Spreadsheet) Thank you all for participating in this study. For this study please do not speak to each other and please silence your cell

phones and don't use them for the rest of the study. I'll give you a moment to do that while I hand out some forms (**Hands out Consent Forms and Participant ID Badges**). I just handed out the **Consent Forms** and **Participant ID Badges**. If your **Participant ID Badge** starts with a B or a C, you will participate in the longer study, which pays \$50 for about 3 hours. If your **ID Badge** starts with an A, you will participate in the shorter study, which pays \$20 for about 30 minutes. Please take a moment to read and sign the **Consent Form** and then hand it back to me. (**Collects Consent Forms and waits for everyone to finish**). Your **ID Badge** number matches the number on one of the computer stations in the computer lab. If your **ID Badge** starts with an A, please head to the A room now and answer the survey questions on your computer terminal. Once you finish your survey you will collect your payment from [Peter/Sarah] (LAB RA). (**Waits for the info-packet group to leave, then addresses the conversation group**) The rest of you please follow me to the Discussion Area for some more instructions. (**Leads subjects to the Discussion Area between lab-rooms B and C**)

[Moderator] This is the Discussion Area. This is where each station is labeled (**Moderator points to the label on the closest station**), and these labels match your ID badge. Most of the content of this study will focus on the **minimum wage**. This study has three parts. First, you will go to your assigned station and begin the survey that's open there. Within the survey there's also an information packet. You'll want to read that packet carefully, because the second part of the study will be a group discussion. You can use the note pad at your station to write down your thoughts, examples, and questions you might have about the minimum wage. You might want to consider how the minimum wage affects society, the pros and cons of changing the minimum wage, and the values that might make people support or oppose a change. The discussion session will last one and a half hours, which is a pretty long time, so as you're reading through the information packet, use the note pad at your station to write down whatever thoughts, questions, concerns, opinions, or examples you might have. Once you come to the part of the survey that tells you to stop, leave the survey open and come back here to the discussion area. The goal of the discussion is to try to determine what you think the Massachusetts minimum wage should be. You'll have the opportunity to discuss this with each other, to ask questions, and to share your experiences. Once the discussion is over, in the final part of the study you will answer the same survey questions again along with a few more. You may now go to your station and begin your survey. (**Moderator paces the lab looking for questions, and waits until all participants return**)

[Moderator] (**Informs those waiting to continue to come up with questions on their note pads until everyone returns**) For the next part of the study you will discuss the minimum wage law with each other. This is your opportunity to learn what others think about the minimum wage and share your own thoughts. If you want to speak, please raise your hand and I will bring the microphone to you. Please allow whoever is holding the microphone to finish speaking and if you want to respond I'll bring the microphone to you next, so that only one person is speaking at a time (**Expert enters the lab area**). If there are any questions you had about the information packet or any other questions about research on the minimum wage, Segan has studied the minimum wage in great detail and will be available to answer your questions. Segan is only here to provide factual information and will not give any opinions or judgments; those are yours to make. You will have about one and a half hours to do this. You may continue to write notes and questions during this time. We will begin now, please raise your hand when you are ready and I will call on you. (**Moderator takes questions, handles the mic, makes sure**

participants are following the rules, reminds them to stay on track when questions go off topic, and calls on people to participate. Expert answers questions.)

[Moderator] Okay, time is up (Expert leaves). Please hand me your **Notepads and Pens** (Collects **Notepads and Pens**). For the last part of the study, you will move back to the computer with your ID number. In order to proceed with the survey you will need to enter the number 360 into the open field, then on the next screen you will need to enter your Participant ID number again. Once you are finished please bring all your materials to me and I will give you your **Debriefing Form** and **Payment**. Please go to your station, enter the number 360, and finish your survey. (Moderator moves toward the exit door and prepares the Debriefing Forms and Payment, and hands them out to participants after they sign the Payment Forms and turn in their Participant ID Badges.)

Q&A SCRIPT

Setup:

Waiting room area:

Consent Forms

Randomization Spreadsheet

Participant ID Badges

Lab area:

Computers (with Instrument Open)

Note Pads

Pens

Payment Forms

Debriefing Forms

Moderator:

Payment

Sessions will be pre-randomized as either Deliberative or Q&A sessions. The session will begin with the MODERATOR in the waiting-room area and the EXPERT outside the lab area. Subjects will show up and take a seat in the waiting-room area. Attendance will be cut off 10-minutes after the start time. Once attendance is cut off, those who showed up will be randomized into either a conversation group or an info-packet group using the Randomization Spreadsheet. Once randomized, the MODERATOR will give subjects a Consent Form linked to their treatment group, and a Participant ID Badge. The LAB RESEARCH ASSISTANT will lead the info-packet group to their lab stations to begin the survey immediately. The MODERATOR will then lead the subjects to the lab. The EXPERT will come in to the lab area after subjects answer the pre-test survey and read the information-packet, which is contained

within the survey instrument. Once in the lab area subjects will fill in seats based on their Participant ID Badge. Note Pads and Pens will be placed at each Computer station for the conversation group only. Debriefing Forms and Payment Forms will be kept separately in a box near the exit and will be handed out to the conversation group participants as they leave. Once the conversation group members sign the Payment Forms, the Moderator will give them Payment. Info-packet group participants will return to the waiting room area to sign Payment Forms receive Payment from one of the lab research assistants.

(Start in waiting-room area)

[Moderator] (Randomizes participants using the Randomization Spreadsheet) Thank you all for participating in this study. For this study please do not speak to each other and please silence your cell phones and don't use them for the rest of the study. I'll give you a moment to do that while I hand out some forms (Hands out Consent Forms and Participant ID Badges). I just handed out the **Consent Forms** and **Participant ID Badges**. If your **Participant ID Badge** starts with a B or a C, you will participate in the longer study, which pays \$50 for about 3 hours. If your **ID Badge** starts with an A, you will participate in the shorter study, which pays \$20 for about 30 minutes. Please take a moment to read and sign the **Consent Form** and then hand it back to me. (Collects Consent Forms and waits for everyone to finish). Your **ID Badge** number matches the number on one of the computer stations in the computer lab. If your **ID Badge** starts with an A, please head to the A room now and answer the survey questions on your computer terminal. Once you finish your survey you will collect your payment from [Peter/Sarah] (LAB RA). (Waits for the info-packet group to leave, then addresses the conversation group) The rest of you please follow me to the Discussion Area for some more instructions. (Leads subjects to the Discussion Area between lab-rooms B and C)

[Moderator] This is the Discussion Area. This is where each station is labeled (Moderator points to the label on the closest station), and these labels match your ID badge. Most of the content of this study will focus on the **minimum wage**. This study has three parts. First, you will go to your assigned station and begin the survey that's open there. Within the survey there's also an information packet. You'll want to read that packet carefully, because in the second part of the study you will have the opportunity to ask questions of an expert on minimum wage law and theory. You might want to consider how the minimum wage affects society, the pros and cons of changing the minimum wage, and the values that might make people support or oppose a change. The question and answer session will last one and a half hours, which is a pretty long time, so as you're reading through the information packet, use the note pad at your station to write down whatever questions you might have. Once you finish reading the information packet, the survey will tell you to stop. Leave the survey open and come back here to the discussion area. The goal of the question and answer session is to try to determine what you think the Massachusetts minimum wage should be. Once the session is over, in the final part of the study you will answer the same survey questions again along with a few more. You may now go to your station and begin your survey. (Moderator paces the lab looking for questions, and waits until all participants return)

[Moderator] (Informs those waiting to continue to come up with questions on their note pads until everyone returns) For the next part of the study you will ask any minimum wage questions you have to an expert (Expert enters the lab area). This is Segan, and she has been trained as an expert on minimum wage law and theory. If you have a question for Segan, please raise your hand and I will bring the microphone to you. Once you've asked your question, please allow Segan to complete her answer without interrupting; you can ask a follow-up question once she's done by raising your hand again. Segan is only here to provide factual information and will not give any opinions or judgments; those are yours to make. For this session you should only ask questions. Please do not make arguments or share your opinions; save those for the survey. You are allowed to listen to each other's questions, and to ask Segan follow-up questions, but you are not allowed to answer questions yourself or to share your thoughts, opinions, or recommendations with others. You will have about one and a half hours to do this. You may continue to write notes and questions during this time. We will begin now, please raise your hand when you are ready and I will call on you. (Hand the floor over to the Expert. Moderator makes sure participants are following the rules, reminds them to stay on track when questions go off topic, and calls on people to participate. Expert answers questions.)

[Moderator] Okay, time is up (Expert leaves). Please hand me your **Notepads** and **Pens**. For the last part of the study, you will move back to the computer with your ID number. In order to proceed with the survey you will need to enter the number 360 into the open field, then on the next screen you will need to enter your Participant ID number again. Once you are finished please bring all your materials to me and I will give you your **Debriefing Form** and **Payment**. Please go to your station, enter the number 360, and finish your survey. (Moderator moves toward the exit door and prepares the Debriefing Forms and Payment, and hands them out to participants after they sign the Payment Forms and turn in their Participant ID Badges.)

Appendix E: Survey Instrument

Section 1

Please refer to your ID badge and enter your participant ID number below.

ID number

Click NEXT to continue.

Instructions:

Please answer each question to the **best of your ability**.

Please only use the computer for the survey.

Please **do not talk** or use your **cell phones** or other mobile communications devices while taking this survey.

Section 1A

Section 1, Part 1: Minimum Wage Knowledge Questions

For these questions, please answer in American **dollars** and **cents** using a **decimal point**. Please do not use any symbols such as a dollar-sign.

What do you think the Massachusetts per-hour minimum wage **should be**?

\$

Do you have a **strong preference** about what you think the Massachusetts per-hour minimum wage should be?

No Preference

- Moderate Preference
- Strong Preference

What is the **current** Massachusetts per-hour minimum wage?

\$

What is the current US **federal** per-hour minimum wage?

\$

What is the **amount** of the **highest** minimum wage of **any state**?

\$

What is the amount of the highest **planned** minimum wage of any state that is already signed into law?

\$

If you had to take a guess, what do you think the **75th** percentile **household income** is in the United States? In other words, what is the household income amount that is higher than 75% of all other households?

\$

If you had to take a guess, what do you think a 52-inch high-definition Samsung TV costs?

\$

Section 1B

Section 1, Part 2: Minimum Wage Consideration Questions

For questions about considerations, please select whether you agree or disagree with the following statements:

Wages should be based on individual merit:

- Strongly Disagree
- Somewhat Disagree
- Neither Agree nor Disagree
- Somewhat Agree
- Strongly Agree

The US government should help determine and enforce a living wage:

- Strongly Disagree
- Somewhat Disagree
- Neither Agree nor Disagree
- Somewhat Agree
- Strongly Agree

Individuals are responsible for bargaining for their wages:

- Strongly Disagree
- Somewhat Disagree
- Neither Agree nor Disagree
- Somewhat Agree
- Strongly Agree

The best way to raise wages is to lower taxes and decrease government regulations:

- Strongly Disagree
- Somewhat Disagree
- Neither Agree nor Disagree
- Somewhat Agree
- Strongly Agree

Wages should be determined by the labor market:

- Strongly Disagree
- Somewhat Disagree
- Neither Agree nor Disagree
- Somewhat Agree
- Strongly Agree

The minimum wage should be increased:

- Strongly Disagree
- Somewhat Disagree
- Neither Agree nor Disagree
- Somewhat Agree
- Strongly Agree

Wages should be based on individual needs:

- Strongly Disagree
- Somewhat Disagree
- Neither Agree nor Disagree
- Somewhat Agree
- Strongly Agree

Workers should collectively bargain with companies for their minimum wage:

- Strongly Disagree
- Somewhat disagree
- Neither Agree nor Disagree
- Somewhat agree
- Strongly agree

Section 1C

Section 1, Part 3: Consequences

For the next questions you will list **as many** answers as you can think of (up to ten). Please only write **one answer** per box. Please read the directions **carefully** and answer to the **best of your ability**.

Please list up to 10 ways that an **increase** in the minimum wage would **impact** society. Please list **as many** as you can.

What are some features of the minimum wage debate that **politicians** could **highlight** or **ignore** for political gain? Please list **as many** examples as you can (up to 10).

Section 2

Section 2: Attitudes about Politics

For the following questions, please select the answer that best fits you.

How much **more information** do you need to make a good decision about where to set the Massachusetts state minimum wage?

- A great deal more
- A lot more
- A moderate amount more
- A little more
- I already have enough

How much do you **trust** others in this study to consider your interests in addition to their own when deciding on the Massachusetts state minimum wage?

- A great deal
- A lot
- A moderate amount

- A little
- None at all

Do you think it's more important to compromise or stick to your beliefs?

- Much more important to stick to your beliefs
- A little more important to stick to your beliefs
- An even mix of both
- A little more important to compromise
- Much more important to compromise

Generally speaking, do you think most people can be **trusted** or you can't be too **careful** in dealing with people?

- You can trust most people
- I'm not sure
- You can't be too careful

How often do you trust **the US government** to do what is right?

- Never
- Only some of the time
- Most of the time
- Just about always

Section 3

Section 3: Personal Assessment

For the following questions, please select the answer that best describes your position.

"I consider myself to be well qualified to participate in politics."

- Strongly Disagree
- Somewhat Disagree
- Neither Agree nor Disagree
- Somewhat Agree
- Strongly Agree

"I feel I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing the US."

- Strongly Disagree
- Somewhat Disagree
- Neither Agree nor Disagree
- Somewhat Agree
- Strongly Agree

"People like me don't have much say about what the US government does."

- Strongly Disagree
- Somewhat Disagree
- Neither Agree nor Disagree
- Somewhat Agree
- Strongly Agree

"I feel that I could do as good a job in public office as most other people."

- Strongly Disagree
- Somewhat Disagree
- Neither Agree nor Disagree
- Somewhat Agree
- Strongly Agree

"I think that I am better informed about US politics and government than most people."

- Strongly Disagree
- Somewhat Disagree
- Neither Agree nor Disagree
- Somewhat Agree
- Strongly Agree

"There are many legal ways for citizens to successfully influence what the US government does."

- Strongly Disagree
- Somewhat Disagree
- Neither Agree nor Disagree
- Somewhat Agree
- Strongly Agree

Midway Break

INFORMATION PACKET

For the next phase of the study you will be reading an **information packet** about minimum wage law and theory. This packet will provide you with information you might find useful to help you decide what you think the Massachusetts minimum wage should be. Scroll down to read the packet. Once you finish reading the information packet, please continue on with the survey.

Minimum Wage Information Packet

What is minimum wage?


A minimum wage is the lowest dollar amount employers must pay workers for each hour of work they complete.

Minimum wage across the U.S.

U.S. Federal Minimum Wage:	\$7.25/Hour
Massachusetts State Minimum Wage:	\$11.00/Hour
Highest State Minimum Wage (WA):	\$11.50/Hour
Lowest State Minimum Wage (Several):	No Minimum
Highest Proposed Minimum Wage:	\$15.00/Hour

*All jobs covered under the Fair Labor Standards Act are required to pay the Federal Minimum Wage even if the state minimum is lower.

Minimum Wage by U.S. State as of July 1, 2018




Who Are Minimum Wage Employees?

Who works most minimum wage jobs?

- retail workers
- cashiers
- office clerks
- registered nurses
- customer service representatives
- food preparation and service workers


Women are slightly more likely to work at minimum wage jobs than men.

Minimum Wage by Education



- Less than High School
- High School Only
- At least Some College

Percentage at the minimum wage by Age



Did you know?

When unemployment is high employers have more flexibility to lower wages because there is more competition for jobs.

Massachusetts is close to full employment, and that helps keep wages high.

Massachusetts Fact Sheet

**The
Massachusetts
unemployment
rate is 3.5%,
lower than the
national rate of
3.9%**

**A raise in the MA
minimum wage
to \$15 per hour is
projected to
affect 30% of the
state's workforce**

**As of 2017,
small businesses
employed nearly
47% of the
Massachusetts
workforce**

**Approximately
18% of MA
employees work
part-time; twice
as many women
work part-time as
men**

Minimum Wage and Poverty


Poverty Statistics

The U.S. poverty line (yearly):
\$12,060 for an individual
\$16,240 for a family of two


MA minimum wage earnings:
\$22,880 (yearly)

Percentage of MA residents
below the poverty line:
10.4% (3.9% are employed)

Percentage below the Poverty Line by Age and Sex



Percentage below the Poverty Line by Race



Research on Poverty

A 10% hike in minimum wage
can reduce poverty by 2.4%

However, those who are
unemployed or who work
fewer hours make up a large
portion of the poor and are
often unaffected by raises in
the minimum wage, possibly
explaining the small 2.4%
reduction.

Minimum Wage and Unemployment

Employment Research

1992 study showed that an 80¢ increase in the minimum wage did not decrease employment in the restaurant industry.



A 2007 study showed that overall a minimum wage increase would lead to some job loss, but this working paper was never published.



Even more convincing research in 2010 supported the finding that increasing the minimum wage doesn't reduce restaurant jobs.



How do employers adjust?

Increase Prices:	Strong research support for this
Cut low-skilled jobs:	Research supports this overall, but not in restaurants
Reduce Hours:	Some research support for this
Reduce Turnover:	Some research support for this
Compress Wages:	Some research support for this
Increase Efficiency:	Some research support for this
Reduce Profits:	Some research support for this in the U.K., not the U.S.
Reduce Benefits:	Research is mixed on this
Go out of Business:	Research shows this for low rated restaurants only

The Three Minimum Wage Camps

No Change/Reduce

Supported By:

Business People
Economists

Arguments:

Small businesses could be harmed
Some jobs are designed to be temporary
Fear of increased prices
Poverty should be addressed by welfare

Half of the Median Full-Time Wage

Supported By:

Researchers
Think Tanks

Arguments:

This is a common level around the world
(MA is already at this level)
\$15 would be too dramatic an increase
This helps link wages to prices more generally

Fight for 15

Supported By:

Activists
Politicians
Worker Groups

Arguments:

Wages aren't keeping up with productivity
Costs of living are increasing, especially in cities
Can be done incrementally so businesses can adjust
Can best counteract inequality and poverty

Ultimately this is a Complex Issue

Minimum wage policies aren't limited to those supported by the three camps listed above

Use this information packet to help you decide where you would like MA's minimum wage

Note that a change in the minimum wage has multiple and complex effects beyond just worker pay

Make sure you've looked through this information carefully before progressing to the next part of the study

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27. Shira Schoenberg, "It's Business vs. Business in Massachusetts \$15 Min Wage Fight." MassLive. Sept. 20, 2017.

Are you finished reading the information packet? You will not be able to return to it beyond this point.

- Yes I am ready to move on
- No I would like to go back and read more

Section 1A Repeat

Instructions:

Please answer each question to the **best of your ability**.

Please only use the computer for the survey.

Please **do not talk** or use your **cell phones** or other mobile communications devices while taking this survey.

Section 1, Part 1: Minimum Wage Knowledge Questions

For these questions, please answer in American **dollars** and **cents** using a **decimal point**. Please do not use any symbols such as a dollar-sign.

What do you think the Massachusetts per-hour minimum wage **should be**?

\$

Do you have a **strong preference** about what you think the Massachusetts per-hour minimum wage should be?

- No Preference
- Moderate Preference
- Strong Preference

What is the amount of the highest **planned** minimum wage of any state that is already signed into law?

\$

If you had to take a guess, what do you think a 52-inch high-definition Samsung TV costs?

\$

What is the current US **federal** per-hour minimum wage?

\$

If you had to take a guess, what do you think the **75th** percentile **household income** is in the United States? In other words, what is the household income amount that is higher than 75% of all other households?

\$

What is the **amount** of the **highest** minimum wage of **any state**?

\$

What is the **current** Massachusetts per-hour minimum wage?

\$

Section 1B Repeat

Section 1, Part 2: Minimum Wage Consideration Questions

For questions about considerations, please select whether you agree or disagree with the following statements:

Workers should collectively bargain with companies for their minimum wage:

- Strongly Disagree
- Somewhat Disagree
- Neither Agree nor Disagree
- Somewhat Agree
- Strongly Agree

Wages should be determined by the labor market:

- Strongly Disagree
- Somewhat Disagree
- Neither Agree nor Disagree
- Somewhat Agree
- Strongly Agree

The minimum wage should be increased:

- Strongly Disagree
- Somewhat Disagree
- Neither Agree nor Disagree
- Somewhat Agree
- Strongly Agree

Individuals are responsible for bargaining for their wages:

- Strongly Disagree
- Somewhat Disagree
- Neither Agree nor Disagree

- Somewhat Agree
- Strongly Agree

The US government should help determine and enforce a living wage:

- Strongly Disagree
- Somewhat Disagree
- Neither Agree nor Disagree
- Somewhat Agree
- Strongly Agree

Wages should be based on individual merit:

- Strongly Disagree
- Somewhat Disagree
- Neither Agree nor Disagree
- Somewhat Agree
- Strongly Agree

The best way to raise wages is to lower taxes and decrease government regulations:

- Strongly Disagree
- Somewhat Disagree
- Neither Agree nor Disagree
- Somewhat Agree
- Strongly Agree

Wages should be based on individual needs:

- Strongly Disagree
- Somewhat Disagree

- Neither Agree nor Disagree
- Somewhat Agree
- Strongly Agree

Section 1C Repeat

Section 1, Part 3: Consequences

For the next questions you will list **as many** answers as you can think of (up to ten). Please only write **one answer** per box. Please read the directions **carefully** and answer to the **best of your ability**.

Please list up to 10 ways that an **increase** in the minimum wage would **impact** society. Please list **as many** as you can.

What are some features of the minimum wage debate that **politicians** could **highlight** or **ignore** for political gain? Please list **as many** examples as you can (up to 10).

--

Section 2 repeat

Section 2: Attitudes about Politics

For the following questions, please select the answer that best fits you.

How much do you **trust** others in this study to consider your interests in addition to their own when deciding on the Massachusetts state minimum wage?

- A great deal
- A lot
- A moderate amount
- A little
- None at all

How often do you trust **the US government** to do what is right?

- Never
- Only some of the time
- Most of the time
- Just about always

How much **more information** do you need to make a good decision about where to set the Massachusetts state minimum wage?

- A great deal more
- A lot more
- A moderate amount more
- A little more
- I already have enough

Generally speaking, do you think most people can be **trusted** or you can't be too **careful** in dealing with people?

- You can trust most people
- I'm not sure
- You can't be too careful

Do you think it's more important to compromise or stick to your beliefs?

- Much more important to stick to your beliefs
- A little more important to stick to your beliefs
- An even mix of both
- A little more important to compromise
- Much more important to compromise

Section 3 repeat

Section 3: Personal Assessment

For the following questions, please select the answer that best describes your position.

"I feel I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing the US."

- Strongly Disagree
- Somewhat Disagree
- Neither Agree nor Disagree
- Somewhat Agree
- Strongly Agree

"I think that I am better informed about US politics and government than most people."

- Strongly Disagree
- Somewhat Disagree
- Neither Agree nor Disagree
- Somewhat Agree
- Strongly Agree

"I feel that I could do as good a job in public office as most other people."

- Strongly Disagree
- Somewhat Disagree
- Neither Agree nor Disagree
- Somewhat Agree
- Strongly Agree

"There are many legal ways for citizens to successfully influence what the US government does."

- Strongly Disagree
- Somewhat Disagree
- Neither Agree nor Disagree

- Somewhat Agree
- Strongly Agree

"People like me don't have much say about what the US government does."

- Strongly Disagree
- Somewhat Disagree
- Neither Agree nor Disagree
- Somewhat Agree
- Strongly Agree

"I consider myself to be well qualified to participate in politics."

- Strongly Disagree
- Somewhat Disagree
- Neither Agree nor Disagree
- Somewhat Agree
- Strongly Agree

Demographics

Section 5: Demographics

For the following questions, please select the answer that best describes you.

What is your year of birth?

What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you have received?

- Less than high school degree
- High school graduate (high school diploma or equivalent including GED)
- Some college but no degree
- Associate degree in college (2-year)
- Bachelor's degree in college (4-year)
- Master's degree
- Doctoral degree
- Professional degree (JD, MD)

Are you Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino or none of these?

- Yes
- None of these

Choose one or more races that you consider yourself to be:

- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> White | <input type="checkbox"/> Asian |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Black or African American | <input type="checkbox"/> Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander |
| <input type="checkbox"/> American Indian or Alaska Native | <input type="checkbox"/> Other |
| | <input type="text"/> |

What is your sex?

- Male
- Female

How many years have you lived in the United States?

Please indicate the answer that includes your entire yearly household income before taxes.

- Less than \$10,000
- \$10,000 to \$19,999
- \$20,000 to \$29,999
- \$30,000 to \$39,999
- \$40,000 to \$49,999
- \$50,000 to \$59,999
- \$60,000 to \$69,999
- \$70,000 to \$79,999
- \$80,000 to \$89,999
- \$90,000 to \$99,999
- \$100,000 to \$149,999
- \$150,000 or more

Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or something else?

- Republican
- Democrat
- Independent
- Other
- No preference

End Block

Section 6: Final Remarks

For the following questions, please provide your insights.

In your own words, what do you think was the purpose of this study?

Do you have any other comments?

Thank you!

You have come to the end of this survey. Please collect all your belongings and **return to the waiting room** and receive a debriefing form and payment from the lab staff.

Powered by Qualtrics

Appendix F: PB Interview Schedule

Hello, and thank you for (taking my call and) agreeing to let me interview you.

Before I get started, I wanted to make sure you had a chance to read through the consent form.

So I'll tell you a little about my research and I'll let that guide my questions, and depending on your answers I might ask some follow-up questions. And if any of my questions don't make sense, please let me know and I'll be happy to ask them in a different way. Does that sound good?

Great! So I'm primarily interested in how community programs can affect people in three different ways. First, I want to know what people can learn from these programs. Second, I want to know how participation in these types of programs can lead to other types of participation in community and local government programs. And third, I'm interested in how these programs affect your perception of your community.

General Questions:

To get started, can you tell me how you got involved in PB in the first place?

Was there a specific project or topic you wanted to work on?

So first, just in general, what was your impression of Participatory Budgeting? What's the most important thing you learned as a result of participating in Participatory Budgeting?

What about the program do you think worked best?

What about the program do you think worked worst?

What was your general impression of the other participants in PB?

Did any of them stand out, and if so, what made them stand out?

Were any of your conversations with the other participants particularly memorable?

Did you learn anything from these conversations?

Can you think of others who participated in the program that might have had a different impression than you?

If so, how do you think they felt about the program?

Why do you think they might have felt that way?

(PB) When you were part of the Participatory Budgeting program, which committee and subcommittee you were on?

Why did you select this committee?

Changes in thinking:

Now I'm going to ask some questions about the ways that you think about politics today.

(PB) Participatory Budgeting deals with local-level policies, so I'm mostly interested in your thoughts about local politics.

Generally speaking, how do you feel about local government today?

Can you say more about why?

How have your experiences in Participatory Budgeting shaped the way you feel about local government?

Could you give an example?

How did you think about local government before your participation?

Now I want to ask about your thinking about two features of government: decision-making and policies.

How did your participation in Participatory Budgeting change the way you think about local government decision-making?

How did your participation in Participatory Budgeting change the way you think about the policies your local government ultimately adopts?

Are there any other features of government you can think of that that Participatory Budgeting changed your thinking on?

Thank you so much for these answers! Now I want to ask about *you*.

Since participating in Participatory Budgeting, would you say you feel more or less confident when trying to understand political issues?

I'm now going to talk about two different ideas that scholars have about confidence, and I want you to tell me how well these describe you.

Some researchers argue that when people learn about how government programs work, they will be more likely to understand complex issues and will feel more confident when participating in politics. Others say that the more understanding you have, the more you will realize how complex issues really are and that you will feel less confident in your participation. When you think about what you learned by participating in PB, would you say that either of these perspectives apply to you, both of them, or neither?

Please explain.

Can you think of any specific examples of a time when you heard about a policy discussed in the news and it made you think back to your participation in Participatory Budgeting?

If yes, what did you think about?

How did your experience shape how you thought about the policy?

Are there any other instances you can think of when you changed your political thinking as a result of your experience in Participatory Budgeting?

Please take as much time as you need to answer.

Changes in behavior:

Finally, I want to ask you about your political engagement.

When you participated in PB, you were exposed to a lot of information about the topic before you made any decisions. How well did that process work for you?

Can you say more?

How did PB influence the way you look up information on government policies?

Can you give some examples?

I'm also interested in the kinds of innovation budget delegates bring to the program. What parts of the process did delegates have room to innovate and when was innovation more difficult?

What part of the process, if any, helped your ability to innovate?

Can you think of any especially creative ideas that delegates came up with?

Can you describe how they came up with these ideas?

In Participatory Budgeting you also talked to other participants before you made any decisions. Has this since encouraged you to talk to others when trying to understand political issues?

[If so] Who do you generally talk to? And how do you talk to them for example Facebook...?

[If not] Do you think PB make you *less* likely to talk to others, and why?

How has your participation in PB encouraged you to get engaged in other types of political behavior, such as voting, rallying, canvassing, or even discussing politics on the internet?

Can you tell me more about that?

[If not] did PB make you less involved, and why?

Since participating in PB, what other events have you participated in where people were discussing politics, like a town hall meeting?

Do you think you were you motivated to go to that event because of PB? [If so], How so?

How did your PB experience influence your behavior in later events?

We're almost finished, just a couple more general questions: Can you think of any other ways you changed because of your experience in PB? [Pause]. Many political scientists are interested in the effects of these programs, so if you can think of any way at all that your experience in PB has changed your thoughts or behaviors, I would love to hear about it.

Thank you so much for talking with me! If you have any other thoughts on PB, any feedback about the interview questions, or if you have any questions for me, please let me know.

[Pause, allow time for final thoughts]

Thank you so much, I really appreciate your time!

Appendix G: CIR Interview Schedule

Hello. Thank you for taking my call and agreeing to let me interview you.

Before I get started, I wanted to make sure you had a chance to read through the consent form.

So I'm finishing up a PhD program at Harvard. I study programs where citizens talk to each other before making political decisions. Because of your participation in the Citizen's Initiative Review, I'm interested in two general topics. First, I'd like to find out whether your thinking about politics has changed because of your participation in the CIR. Second, I'd like to find out whether your political behavior changed because of your participation in the CIR. To find out, I'll ask some basic questions and then follow-up when necessary. If any of these questions aren't clear, please let me know and I'll be happy to ask them in a different way. Sound good?

General Questions:

So first, just in general, what's was your impression of the Citizen's Initiative Review? What's the most important thing you learned as a result of participating in the Citizen's Initiative Review?

What about the program do you think worked best?

What about the program do you think worked worst?

What was your general impression of the other participants in CIR?

Did any of them stand out, and if so, what made them stand out?

Were any of your conversations with the other participants particularly memorable?

Did you learn anything from these conversations?

Can you think of others who participated in the program that might have had a different impression than you?

If so, how do you think they felt about the program?

Why do you think they might have felt that way?

Changes in thinking:

Now I'm going to ask some questions about the ways that you think about politics today.

(CIR) The CIR deals with state-level policies, so I'm mostly interested in your thoughts about state politics.

Generally speaking, how do you feel about state government today?

Can you say more about why?

How did your experiences in the Citizen's Initiative Review shape the way you think about state government?

Could you give an example?

How did you think about state government before your participation?

Now I want to ask about your thinking about two features of government: decision-making and policies.

How did your participation in the Citizen's Initiative Review change the way you think about local government decision-making?

How so?

How did your participation in the Citizen's Initiative Review change the way you think about the policies your town ultimately adopts?

How so?

What other features of government can you think of that that the Citizen's Initiative Review changed your thinking on?

Thank you so much for these answers! Now I want to ask about you.

The first thing I want to ask about is confidence.

I'm now going to talk about two different ideas that scholars have about political knowledge, and I want you to tell me how well these describe you.

Some researchers argue that when people learn about politics they will be more likely to understand complex issues and will feel more confident when participating in politics. Others say that the more understanding you have, the more you will realize how complex issues really are and that you will feel less confident in your participation. When you think about what you learned by participating in the CIR, would you say that either of these perspectives apply to you?

Please explain.

Can you think of any specific examples of a time when you heard about a policy discussed in the news and it made you think back to your participation in the Citizen's Initiative Review?

If yes, what did you think about?

Do you think your experience shaped how you thought about the policy?

In what way?

Are there any other instances you can think of when you changed your political thinking as a result of your participation in the Citizen's Initiative Review?

Please take as much time as you need to answer.

Changes in behavior:

Finally, I want to ask you about your political behavior.

When you participated in the Citizen's Initiative Review, you were exposed to a lot of information about the topic before you made any decisions. How well did that process work for you?

How did the CIR influence the way you now look up information on government policies?

Can you give some examples?

I'm also interested in the kinds of innovation participants bring to the program. What parts of the process did participants have room to innovate and when was innovation more difficult?

What part of the process, if any, helped your ability to innovate?

Can you think of any especially creative ideas that participants came up with?

Can you describe how they came up with these ideas?

In the CIR you also talked to other participants before you made any decisions. Has this since encouraged you to talk to others when trying to understand political issues?

[If so] Who do you generally talk to? And how do you talk to them for example Facebook...?

[If not] Do you think the CIR make you *less* likely to talk to others, and why?

How has your participation in the CIR encouraged you to get engaged in other types of political behavior, such as voting, rallying, canvassing, or even discussing politics on the internet?

[If so] Can you tell me more about that?

[If not] did the CIR make you less involved, and why?

Since participating in the CIR, what other events participated in any other events where people were discussing politics, like a town hall meeting?

Do you think you were you motivated to go to that event because of the CIR?

Did anything you learned at the CIR influence your behavior in later events?

We're almost finished, just a couple more general questions: Can you think of any other ways you changed because of your experience in the CIR? [Pause]. Many political scientists are interested in the effects of these programs, so if you can think of any way at all that your experience in the CIR has changed your thoughts or behaviors, I would love to hear about it.

Thank you so much for talking with me! If you have any other thoughts on the CIR, any feedback about the interview questions, or if you have any questions for me, please let me know.

[Pause, allow time for final thoughts]

Thank you so much, I really appreciate your time!

Appendix H: CIR Survey Questions

California CIR – Drug Pricing Limits Ballot - Day 3 Evaluation		Participant ID _____		
<u>For each of the following questions, please circle the answer that best reflects your views.</u>				
Was EQUAL TIME given to both pro and con sides today?				
Those in SUPPORT received more time	Both sides had EQUAL time	Those OPPOSED received more time		
How important a role did YOU play in today's panel discussions?				
Not at all Important	A little important	Moderately Important	Very Important	Extremely Important
Would you say you had sufficient OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS YOUR VIEWS today?				
Definitely No	Probably No	Unsure	Probably Yes	Definitely Yes
When experts or other CIR participants expressed views different from your own today, how often did you CONSIDER CAREFULLY what they had to say?				
Never	Rarely	Occasionally	Often	Almost Always
How often did you feel that other participants treated you with RESPECT today?				
Never	Rarely	Occasionally	Often	Almost Always
How often did you have TROUBLE UNDERSTANDING or following the discussion today?				
Never	Rarely	Occasionally	Often	Almost Always
How often today did you feel PRESSURE TO AGREE with something that you weren't sure about?				
Never	Rarely	Occasionally	Often	Almost Always
How often did one or a few of the same participants SET THE AGENDA rather a broader group effort?				
Never	Rarely	Occasionally	Often	Almost Always
How often did you feel that other participants WITHHELD INFORMATION in order to get their way?				
Never	Rarely	Occasionally	Often	Almost Always
Use the scale below to indicate how often you SPOKE UP TODAY compared to the other citizen panelists.				
MUCH LESS than others	A LITTLE LESS than others	ABOUT AS OFTEN as others	A LITTLE MORE than others	MUCH MORE than others
Sometimes people do a kind of quiet deliberation just inside their heads. Today, how often did you find yourself THINKING ABOUT THE BALLOT MEASURE without saying anything?				
Never	Rarely	Occasionally	Often	Almost Always
How MUCH MORE INFORMATION do you need to make a good decision on whether to support or oppose this ballot measure?				
I need A LOT MORE	I need A LITTLE MORE	I already have ENOUGH		
<i>(survey continues on other side)</i>				
1				

How MUCH MORE INFORMATION do you need to make a good decision on whether to support or oppose this ballot measure?

I need A LOT MORE I need A LITTLE MORE I already have ENOUGH

At this point, how much would you TRUST your fellow panelists to consider your interests in addition to their own?

Not at all Weakly Moderately Strongly Very Strongly

The following questions ask how you think about POLITICAL ISSUES more generally.

Once you've made up your mind, do you find it useful or pointless to listen to other people's arguments?

Almost always
pointless Sometimes
pointless Sometimes
useful Almost always
useful

Do you think it is more important to compromise or stick to your beliefs?

Much more A little more An even mix A little more Much more
important to stick to important to stick to of both important to important to
your beliefs your beliefs compromise compromise

Generally speaking, do you think most people can be TRUSTED or you can't be too CAREFUL in dealing with people?

Most people I'm not You can't be
can be trusted sure too careful

How often do you trust the government to do what is right?

Never Only some of the time Most of the time Just about always

For the next questions, circle the answer that reflects how the CIR was conducted over all three days.

Looking back over the past three days, how would you rate your OVERALL SATISFACTION with the CIR process?

Very Dissatisfied Dissatisfied Neutral Satisfied Very Satisfied

Please rate the performance of the CIR process on each of the following criteria.

EXAMINATION AND SUMMARIZATION of important information about the measure.

Very Poor Poor Adequate Good Excellent

Consideration of the VALUES AND DEEPER CONCERNS motivating those IN FAVOR of the measure.

Very Poor Poor Adequate Good Excellent

Consideration of the VALUES AND DEEPER CONCERNS motivating those OPPOSING the measure.

Very Poor Poor Adequate Good Excellent

Weighing the most important ARGUMENTS AND EVIDENCE IN FAVOR OF the measure.

Very Poor Poor Adequate Good Excellent

Weighing the most important ARGUMENTS AND EVIDENCE OPPOSING the measure.

Very Poor Poor Adequate Good Excellent

(survey continues on next page)

Please indicate how accurately each of the following statements describes how YOU feel.

“I consider myself to be well qualified to participate in politics.”

Disagree Strongly	Disagree Somewhat	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree Somewhat	Agree Strongly
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“I feel I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing our country.”

Disagree Strongly	Disagree Somewhat	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree Somewhat	Agree Strongly
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“People like me don’t have much say about what the government does.”

Disagree Strongly	Disagree Somewhat	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree Somewhat	Agree Strongly
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“I feel that I could do as good a job in public office as most other people.”

Disagree Strongly	Disagree Somewhat	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree Somewhat	Agree Strongly
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“I think that I am better informed about politics and government than most people.”

Disagree Strongly	Disagree Somewhat	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree Somewhat	Agree Strongly
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“There are many legal ways for citizens to successfully influence what government does.”

Disagree Strongly	Disagree Somewhat	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree Somewhat	Agree Strongly
----------------------	----------------------	-------------------------------	-------------------	-------------------

If you noted any concerns about the CIR process in your responses, please explain them in the space provided. You may also use this space to write additional comments about the CIR process that you want the staff to hear.

(survey continues on other side)

For the following questions, please think about the ALL THREE DAYS you have spent at the CIR.

How DIVERSE WAS THE RANGE OF OPINIONS you heard in the CIR discussions this week?

NOT AT ALL diverse A little diverse Somewhat diverse VERY diverse

How much did the CIR process help you SYMPATHIZE WITH THE CHALLENGES of other people?

Not at all A little Somewhat Quite a bit A great deal

How much did the CIR process help you UNDERSTAND THE PERSPECTIVES of other people?

Not at all A little Somewhat Quite a bit A great deal

How often did you have an OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS YOUR VIEWS in the small group discussions?

NOT nearly enough ALMOST enough JUST enough MORE than enough

How comfortable did you feel EXPRESSING WHAT WAS TRULY ON YOUR MIND during this week's CIR?

VERY A LITTLE Neither comfortable A LITTLE VERY
uncomfortable uncomfortable nor uncomfortable comfortable comfortable

Regardless of whether or not fellow CIR participants agreed with you, how often did they RESPECT what you had to say this week?

Never Rarely Sometimes Often Always

Overall, how important a role did YOU play in this week's CIR discussions?

Not at all A little Moderately Very Extremely
Important important Important Important Important

How much did you learn from participating in the CIR process this week?

Nothing A little Some things A great deal

Did you change your opinion on this issue as a result of the discussion, or are your views mostly the same?

My views are entirely My views are mostly My views changed My views changed
the same as before the same as before somewhat completely

At previous CIRs, some panelists have had conversations with each other about the ballot measure during breaks and outside the meeting room. How much influence did those informal talks have on your views during the CIR?

I DID NOT I participated Those conversations Those conversations
PARTICIPATE but was influenced me influenced me
in such discussions NOT INFLUENCED A LITTLE A GREAT DEAL

If you participated in any outside conversations, which of the following were you doing in those conversations?

Please CHECK ALL that apply.

- | | |
|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Exchanging new information | <input type="checkbox"/> Trying to get others to see my point of view |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Clarifying information I had already learned | <input type="checkbox"/> Agreeing with panelists who shared my views |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Exchanging opinions with others | <input type="checkbox"/> Developing or writing KEY FINDINGS and ARGUMENTS |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Getting to know others on a personal level | <input type="checkbox"/> Professional networking with others |

(survey continues on next page)

During break time or after hours, some panelists have conducted their own research on the ballot measure. Please circle the answer that best represents the amount of outside research that you conducted.

I DID NOT conduct
outside research

I conducted a LITTLE
outside research

I conducted A LOT
of outside research

If you DID conduct outside research, how much influence did that research have on your views about the measure?

I conducted outside
research but was
NOT INFLUENCED

I conducted outside research
and was influenced
A LITTLE

I conducted outside research and
was influenced
A GREAT DEAL

For the following questions, we wish to remind you that the information you provide in these surveys is strictly confidential. Any personally identifying information is removed once data are recorded. You will not be identified personally with any of the responses given.

Before you participated in the CIR, what was your position on this measure?

Strongly
Opposed

Somewhat
Opposed

Not sure/
Undecided

Somewhat
Supported

Strongly
Supported

At the end of the CIR process, what is your position on the ballot measure?

Strongly
Oppose

Somewhat
Oppose

Not sure/
Undecided

Somewhat
Support

Strongly
Support

How confident are you on your position on the measure?

NOT AT ALL Confident

SOMEWHAT Confident

VERY Confident

Regarding your choice to support or oppose the measure, ON WHICH DAY DID YOU DECIDE how you would vote?

First day

Second Day

Third Day

Which of the following best describes HOW YOU MADE YOUR FINAL JUDGEMENT on the measure this week?

My vote represented
MY OWN views

My vote represented EQUALLY
myself AND the people of our state

My vote represented the
PEOPLE of our state

If an uninformed voter reads the CIR statement, how do you think they would choose to vote on the measure?

Definitely
AGAINST

Probably
AGAINST

Not sure/
Undecided

Probably
IN FAVOR

Definitely
IN FAVOR

How much CONFIDENCE DO YOU THINK EXPERT PANELISTS HAD in your panel's ability to produce a strong and reliable Citizens' Statement?

NO
Confidence

VERY LITTLE

SOME

A LOT

COMPLETE
Confidence

(survey continues on other side)

Appendix I: Codebook with examples

Code	Description	Example	Negative Example	Validation
Involved because of PB	Subjects are able to explain how some feature of PB motivated or enabled them to be become more active in city governance or community volunteering	"I advocated for my family to vote in the next PB cycle, I even helped them vote, and encouraged others to get involved in PB, and to submit new ideas."	"I already attended city council meetings before PB. I deliberated before at IBM."	Gives examples, Validated across cases, Able to identify a causal mechanism, explains why deliberation didn't have an effect, matches observations
Involved because of deliberation	Subjects are able to explain how the deliberative aspect of PB motivated or enabled them to be become more active in city governance or community volunteering	No examples	"After talking to people in the Citizen's Review, I realized that a lot of issues weren't worth arguing about. I became less obstreporous. Also, I realized there were valid opinions on both sides, and that made me less likely to argue with people as well."	Gives examples, Validated across cases, Able to identify a causal mechanism, matches observations
Knowledge from PB	Subjects are able to explain how participation in PB made them more knowledgeable about local government.	"There was some learning from PB. Just being inside, seeing the power centers, things like that. Also, the issues were simple and accessible, easy to learn, so I did feel more confident."	"I already attended city council meetings before PB. I deliberated before at IBM. I didn't really learn anything."	Gives examples, Validated across cases, Able to identify a causal mechanism, explains why deliberation didn't have an effect, matches observations
Knowledge from Deliberation	Subjects are able to explain how the deliberative aspect of PB made them more knowledgeable about local government.	No examples	[Did you learn anything from the other delegates?] "Not from talking to each other."	Gives examples, Validated across cases, Able to identify a causal mechanism, matches observations

Code	Description	Example	Negative Example	Validation
Innovation Examples	Subjects discuss when the program leaves room for innovation and whether and how the process facilitates innovation	"Non-city officials are better than city officials for PB. They bring in perspective, think outside the box, bring experiences from their jobs, their hobbies, and that affects how much they contribute. It's like crowdsourcing. Delegates designed the mobile stagewhen the city was having a hard time finding a permanent location."	[One respondent suggested "homeless kits" as an example of innovation from deliberation. Another respondent claimed credit for that idea and showed it was submitted before the cycle even began.]	Gives examples, Validated across cases, Able to identify a causal mechanism, matches observations
Impact mechanism for increasing involvement	Subjects describe how the IMPACT of the program motivated their willingness to get involved.	"I originally got involved because I wanted to learn about the city and improve the community."	"We didn't get a final say. Bike lanes turned out to be too expensive so the city dumped it."	Gives examples, Validated across cases, Able to identify a causal mechanism, matches observations
Breadth mechanism for increasing involvement	Subjects describe how the BREADTH of the program motivated their willingness to get involved.	"My sense of community was stronger after interacting. It was good to see other highly motivated, well-educated, enthusiastic community members that cared. People work on what's closer to their heart...Also PB reached out to the community, they have a strong online presence, and they prepare documents in multiple languages."	"Self-selected people were all the same. Community engagement was negative."	Gives examples, Validated across cases, Able to identify a causal mechanism, matches observations

Code	Description	Example	Negative Example	Validation
Agenda mechanism for increasing involvement	Subjects describe how INDIVIDUAL AGENDAS motivated their willingness to get involved.	"Folks with an agenda were still very engaged in the process. This was one of the better public groups. People came in excited about a project, but it wasn't contentious at all."	"Experienced people take a position and make sure it gets attention. This seemed like a very effective approach to getting what they wanted. I was surprised at the projects that actually got selected... These people aggregated and accepted information to advance their cause."	Gives examples, Validated across cases, Able to identify a causal mechanism, matches observations
Facilitation mechanism for increasing involvement	Subjects describe how the FACILITATION of the program motivated their willingness to get involved.	"The third cycle worked well. [The facilitator] used a blend of teaching is how to think about guiding our decisions about what's best for the community, but also directly about what was best for the community. In a way we were guided and given the freedom to facilitate ourselves."	"The facilitator wasn't particularly helpful. [They] blocked freedom - they were just moving through the agenda. There wasn't enough time to discuss and flesh the ideas out."	Gives examples, Validated across cases, Able to identify a causal mechanism, matches observations
Misc mechanism for increasing involvement	Subjects describe how MISCELLANEOUS features of the program motivated their willingness to get involved.	"[PB had] decent people running the show. Definitely increased my trust in the city."	"Wasn't long enough, we lacked time for discussion in small groups. It felt rushed."	Gives examples, Validated across cases, Able to identify a causal mechanism, matches observations

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