Combating Corruption in Authoritarian Regimes

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Combating Corruption in Authoritarian Regimes

Abstract

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How and why do authoritarian regimes succeed in curbing corruption? Scholars generally assume that autocrats will not curb government corruption because they benefit from it and curbing it would require ceding power to democratic or quasi-democratic institutions. However, authoritarian anti-corruption reform, though not the norm, is too common to be called exceptional and often too impactful to be written off as a political charade.

I find that authoritarian anti-corruption efforts are most likely to succeed when motivated autocrats enjoy high discretionary authority and can command a capable state apparatus. This strong leader–strong state combination is effective because it allows autocrats to employ a decidedly authoritarian playbook for reform. While democracies curb corruption by strengthening institutions like checks and balances and the rule of law, the authoritarian playbook relies on centralized executive power to disrupt entrenched corruption. I find that autocrats curb corruption in order to support broader revolutionary or developmental state-building projects, though they often have other motives as well. Using the authoritarian playbook, autocrats can advance these state-building projects without ceding power and strengthen their regimes. These findings are based on controlled comparisons of nine authoritarian anti-corruption efforts of varying levels of success in China, South Korea, and Taiwan, as well as, to a lesser extent, analysis of cases in 12 other non-democracies. The research for this study included archival research, expert and elite interviews, and the use of written primary and secondary sources in Chinese and Korean.

This study makes several contributions. First, authoritarian regimes often try to curb corruption and benefit from corruption control successes. Second, high discretionary authority is critical to anti-corruption success, suggesting that under certain conditions personalism is an authoritarian asset, rather than a liability. Third, quasi-democratic institutions, like semi-competitive elections, constrain autocrats and hinder anti-corruption efforts. This point cuts against the increasingly common argument that autocrats can manipulate quasi-democratic institutions to strengthen their regimes. Finally, this study’s analysis of authoritarian corruption
control demonstrates the broader point that regime durability depends, even more than on a regime’s origins, on its continuing ability to reform and strengthen itself.
# Table of Contents

Title Page i  
Copyright ii  
Abstract iii  
Table of Contents v  
Acknowledgments vi  

I. Theorizing Corruption Control Under Authoritarianism: East Asia and Beyond 1  
II. The Kuomintang and Taiwan 72  
III. Military Rule in South Korea 142  
IV. The Chinese Communist Party 206  
V. Around the Authoritarian World 306  
VI. Democratic Taiwan and South Korea 361  
VII. Conclusion 386  

Bibliography 393  

Appendix A: Abbreviations for Sources 458  
Appendix B: Primary Sources 460
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Chapter One

Theorizing Corruption Control Under Authoritarianism: East Asia and Beyond

1. Introduction

Scholars generally assume that autocrats will not curb government corruption.\(^1\) The conventional wisdom behind this assumption goes something like this: Autocrats are unlikely to be motivated to carry out anti-corruption reforms because they often rely on distributing spoils and patronage to stay in power, benefit personally from corruption, and can use coercive means to suppress public criticism and unrest.\(^2\) Any putative anti-corruption efforts are likely a cover for the autocrat purging rivals and consolidating power. Even if they did want cleaner government, autocrats would have to face the daunting prospect of giving up substantial power and control to get there. This is because corruption control is achieved, in the consensus view, through democratic institutions: the rule of law, checks and balances, elections, independence for the judiciary and special investigatory committees, government transparency, a free media, public oversight through civil society organizations, and others.\(^3\) Even taking small steps toward

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this democratic approach is usually too threatening for authoritarian regimes. Political
considerations aside, many authoritarian states may simply be too weak or disorganized to carry
out major reform, whether this weakness is a result of endemic corruption itself or any number of
other factors.

While there is much truth in this conventional wisdom, authoritarian anti-corruption
success, though not the norm, is too common to be considered exceptional and often too
impactful to be written off as a political charade. Curbing corruption has been a major agenda
item for many “high-performing” authoritarian regimes. In addition to the oft-cited case of
Singapore’s anti-corruption success, there have since 1945 been dozens of episodes of intense
anti-corruption activity by authoritarian regimes (see Table 1.4).\(^4\) In at least nine cases,
corruption was significantly reduced nationwide, yielding political and economic benefits. In
Taiwan, for example, the Kuomintang (KMT) Reconstruction (1950–52) brought previously
rampant corruption under control as it reformed the beleaguered ruling party, helping lay a new
foundation for regime stability and growth.

Moreover, these authoritarian anti-corruption reforms have not relied on the conventional
democratic approach. Authoritarian regimes with quasi-democratic institutions—conceptualized
variously as hybrid, competitive authoritarian, or semi-authoritarian regimes, among other
terms—have only rarely had anti-corruption success, contrary to what one might expect.\(^5\) In


South Korea, President Park Chung-hee’s anti-corruption efforts were much more successful under the dictatorial Fourth Republic (1972–79) than in the competitive authoritarian Third Republic (1961–72). More recently, corruption has been reduced in Rwanda under President Paul Kagame’s fully authoritarian regime.\(^6\) Quasi-democratic institutions, such as semi-competitive elections or multiparty legislatures, do not appear to have played a major role in these or other authoritarian anti-corruption reforms.\(^7\) This is not to suggest that most or even many fully authoritarian regimes have curbed corruption, but that that is where some of the most effective reforms have taken place.

The disparity between common theoretical assumptions about corruption under authoritarianism and empirical observations raises an important question: How and why do authoritarian regimes succeed in curbing corruption? I find that authoritarian anti-corruption efforts are most likely to succeed when motivated autocrats enjoy high discretionary authority and can command a capable state apparatus. This strong leader–strong state combination is effective because it allows autocrats to employ a decidedly authoritarian playbook for reform. While democracies curb corruption by strengthening institutions like checks and balances and the rule of law, the authoritarian playbook relies on centralized executive power to disrupt entrenched corruption. I find that autocrats curb corruption in order to support broader revolutionary or developmental state-building projects, though they often have other motives as

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\(^6\) I use the terms authoritarian and autocratic interchangeably throughout this dissertation. Authoritarianism, though it was not always the case, has become commonly used as a catch-all term for nondemocratic regimes.

\(^7\) On conceptualizing quasi-democratic institutions, see: Brancati, “Democratic Authoritarianism.”
well. Through the authoritarian playbook, autocrats can advance these state-building projects without ceding power and strengthen their regimes.

The rest of this chapter is divided into four main sections. Section Two lays out the conventional view of why corruption is unchecked in authoritarian regimes and then explains how corruption control works (or fails to) in democracies. Section Three examines each part of my main argument, considers alternative hypotheses, and suggests several theoretical contributions. Section Four discusses my study’s focus on cases in China, South Korea, and Taiwan, and explores why East Asia as a whole may have an unusual concentration of factors helpful for authoritarian corruption control. In Section Five, I explain my methodological approach and sources. Lastly, a short outline of the study rounds out the chapter.

2. Corruption Control under Authoritarianism and Democracy

Corruption is a debated term in academic literature, with definitions ranging from the strictly legal to the cultural to outright questioning of corruption’s conceptual coherence. This study focuses on government corruption, as opposed to business corruption, private citizens stealing from the state, or forms of cultural or moral decline that are sometimes termed corruption. I follow Joseph Nye’s elaboration of the standard definition of an abuse of public office for private gain. He writes that government corruption is “behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public office (elective or appointive) because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) wealth or status gains; or violates rules against the

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exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence.” One modification or clarification I make to this definition is to suggest that the term “government” applies to both public officials and party members in a one-party or party-run state, even if the latter may not hold formal government positions. Such parties carry out many state tasks, giving rise to the term “party-state,” even if a formal distinction and parallel organizational structure are maintained.

**The Conventional Wisdom on Autocrats**

Authoritarian regimes are well-known to have strong political incentives not to curb corruption. Scholars argue that autocrats are unlikely to clean house because trading illicit wealth—or the opportunity to acquire it—for political support is a key strategy to maintain their rule. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith lay out the basic logic in which autocrats allow their supporters to reap the material benefits of corruption in return for loyalty:

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10 To elaborate, Nye’s definition seemingly leaves open the question of party-states. Is the Chinese Communist Party, for example, a “private-regarding…private clique?” If so, no further analysis of its anti-corruption efforts would be necessary. Instead, I categorize the CCP as part of the Chinese state, and do the same for ruling parties in other party-states. Note however that a political party does not become part of the state simply by virtue of dominating the country’s political system for a long time. Therefore, the appropriation of tax revenue by the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan or the United Malays National Organisation in Malaysia is still corruption. This discussion leaves open many questions, such as precisely how enmeshed in the state a party needs to be to qualify as a party-state, but I suggest that this is a necessary distinction to allow for a reasonable discussion of how corrupted a political system is.

11 If for whatever reason there is an authoritarian regime that has never combated corruption because there was so little of it, then this situation is beyond the scope of this analysis. We could ask there why corruption has never emerged, but my project does not address these situations. Two cases of this unusual situation suggested by some scholars are Chile under President Augusto Pinochet and the United Arab Emirates.


“Power leads to corruption and corruption leads to power. As the title of this chapter instructs us, corruption empowers leaders and absolute corruption empowers them absolutely—or almost so….That’s why coalition leaders need coalition members who support them, and why coalition members need opportunities for enrichment if they are to remain loyal to their leader, empowering her to stay on in office, getting and spending money—on them.”

Autocrats agree to turn a blind eye to the corruption of their coalition members and may also order their subordinates to engage in corruption and distribute the proceeds directly. Prominent authoritarian regimes such as Egypt, Russia, and formerly the Philippines, for example, are/were generally in this camp. The exchange of state resources for political support has become so entrenched in many African states that “neopatrimonialism” has unfortunately become a “convenient, all purpose, and ubiquitous moniker for African governance.” At the extreme, states are captured by criminal organizations or simply become so corrupt that the supposed distinction between public and private resources becomes unclear. Even the rare “enlightened” autocrat, who in theory wants to eliminate corruption for the good of the people, may make concessions to corrupt elites who could otherwise turn on them and remove them from power.

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This logic of politically useful corruption obtains, though in a slightly different way, when authoritarian regimes have semi-competitive elections or other quasi-democratic institutions. Autocrats facing elections are well-known to engage in repression, electoral cheating, and media manipulation. Alongside these tactics, they usually deploy their comparative advantage in corruption over the opposition. Their comparative advantage is that as incumbents they can steal state resources, divert foreign aid, and take large bribes from businesspeople to build up an election campaign war chest that the opposition will find it hard to match. In Malaysia, for example, United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) officials for decades engaged in illicit business deals to fund their “rampant use of cold hard cash” for vote-buying.17

In many democracies, especially poor and poorly institutionalized ones, political leaders take a similar approach. Incumbents use state resources or accept bribes to pay for legislators’ votes, pay brokers who can deliver voters, or engage directly in mass vote-buying; opposition parties are left to fight back however they can. In India, vote-buying is common and, as Milan Vaishnav explains, political parties often accept criminals as candidates because they can bring in desperately needed funds.18 Elections in the Philippines are another case in point, at least before and after President Ferdinand Marcos’s imposition of martial law.19

Among authoritarian regimes, personalist regimes are thought to have a particularly bad record on corruption—worse than military, party, or monarchic regimes.20 This could be because

20 Natasha M. Ezrow and Erica Frantz, Dictators and Dictatorships: Understanding Authoritarian Regimes and Their Leaders (New York: Bloomsbury Academic &amp; Professional, 2011), p. 133.; Bueno de Mesquita et al.,
personalist leaders have narrower and less institutionalized bases of support, therefore relying more on doling out material benefits to stay in power.\textsuperscript{21} Or it could be because personalist leaders are relatively unconstrained; a monopoly on power plus no accountability is a recipe for wrongdoing.\textsuperscript{22} This thinking is in line with the old adage, paraphrased from Lord Acton, that “power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.”\textsuperscript{23} Others point to the idea that personalist dictators often believe that they will be in power for a long time, leading them to predate without the fear of reprisals that might constrain other leaders.\textsuperscript{24} Whatever the mechanism, there is agreement on the unfortunate outcomes of personalism.

Beyond political incentives, the conventional wisdom also tells us that autocrats and other regime insiders have private material incentives not to reduce corruption. Many autocrats indeed enjoy accumulating private wealth and luxury items, which corruption helps them acquire. And autocrats are relatively free to discount corruption’s negative consequences for the state and the economy because they do not have to run in fair elections and can suppress public dissent. Bueno de Mesquita cautions, however, that autocrats should only pursue personal enrichment after rewarding the coalition that keeps them in power.\textsuperscript{25} Former North Korean leader

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{21} Bueno de Mesquita et al., \textit{The Logic of Political Survival}.
  \item \textsuperscript{22} Robert E. Klitgaard, \textit{Controlling Corruption} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988); Chang and Golden, “Sources of Corruption in Authoritarian Regimes.”
  \item \textsuperscript{24} Chang and Golden, “Sources of Corruption in Authoritarian Regimes.” On the other hand, many argue short time horizons may lead to greater motivation to predate. See: Mancur Olson, “Dictatorship, Democracy and Development,” \textit{American Political Science Review}, 87 (3) (1993), pp. 567–76.
  \item \textsuperscript{25} Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, \textit{The Dictator’s Handbook}, p. 128.
\end{itemize}
Kim Jong-il, Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe, and Libyan prime minister Muammar Gaddafi come to mind as extreme examples of pursuing private gain at the public’s expense. While it may be possible to posit some political purpose for ostentatious displays of wealth—perhaps Turkmenistan’s President Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov built a huge, golden statue of himself riding a horse to strengthen his cult of personality in a horse-loving country—hidden wealth, like that of Kim Jong-il, is a sign of luxury as an end in itself.\(^\text{26}\) Even if some autocrats do not personally enjoy “the finer things,” they may want to provide them for their spouse, their friends, etc.\(^\text{27}\)

A final point in the conventional wisdom is that autocrats have incentives to deploy anti-corruption measures selectively to attack political rivals and protect loyal allies.\(^\text{28}\) Instead of implementing systematic reforms or new rules for officials, autocrats will focus on specific corrupt actors who have enough power to potentially challenge them, or at most a faction or rogue province.\(^\text{29}\) Accusing officials of wrongdoing is certainly a common method to build momentum for their dismissal, and it has the added benefit of often being true. In President Vladimir Putin’s Russia, for example, systemic corruption is “a highly effective tool for consolidating domestic political control,” in part because it keeps officials “permanently under


the threat of selective punishment." Many high-profile anti-corruption cases in authoritarian regimes are clearly motivated by partisanship. In Malaysia, for example, the UMNO-led government hounded political leader and reform advocate Anwar Ibrahim with accusations of corruption and sodomy in the 1990s and 2000s.

I submit that while some anti-corruption efforts are indeed a cover to purge rivals, others cannot be explained this simply and many combine narrow political goals with broader governance goals. Reforms often go beyond investigations to include new rules aimed at systematically constraining corruption, as will be discussed. Even just looking at investigations, we can note that Chinese president Xi Jinping’s ongoing anti-corruption campaign has produced investigations against more than 2.7 million officials despite him not possibly having that many rivals. Often the only evidence given that purged elites were potential rivals to Xi is that they were purged—a circular logic difficult to refute. Moreover, purging rivals and curbing corruption are not mutually exclusive goals. Democratic leaders also often have narrowly political motives when they launch anti-corruption reforms that “just so happen” to net mostly members of the opposition party. Ultimately, if we assume that all leader-driven anti-corruption efforts are shams, then it becomes difficult to explain the variation in outcomes.

Nevertheless, justifiable doubts about authoritarian corruption control may help explain why there are few broadly comparative or theoretical studies that address the phenomenon, despite single-country studies being common. Kate Gillespie and Gwenn Okruhlik examine 25


announced anti-corruption cleanups between 1970 and 1986 in the Middle East and North Africa and typologize them on timing, motive, and other variables. Leslie Holmes argues that the inability of communist states to curb corruption, in particular in the 1980s, helped bring about legitimacy crises and the fall of communism. Nick Robinson and Nawreen Sattar explain how the problem of corruption is often used to justify coups; coup leaders promise to deliver good governance, but usually do not. Examples include coups in Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Thailand. James Hollyer and Leonard Wantchekon argue that some autocrats, including Park Chung-hee, build anti-corruption institutions to signal that “monetary benefits from bureaucratic office” will be limited, thus deterring opportunistic non-loyalists from entering the bureaucracy. And in the most recent book-length study on the topic, Vineeta Yadav and Bumba Mukherjee argue that autocrats will clean up corruption under organized pressure from opposition parties in alliance with independent business interests. Their case studies are on cleanups in Jordan, Malaysia, and Uganda. Among individual cases in the literature, Singapore’s anti-corruption success has generated the broadest scholarly interest in how an authoritarian regime can achieve clean government.


The Conventional Wisdom on Democracies

The consensus in the corruption literature is that strong democratic institutions are the key to corruption control. These include checks and balances, the rule of law, open elections, judicial independence, freedom of the press, civil society, a culture of activism, transparency, and independent investigatory organs, which could be an auditor-general, ombudsperson, or a legislative committee or commission. In the ideal democratic approach, corrupt officials are constrained by the rule of law and a separation of powers; monitored by a free media and civil society organizations; and punished by an independent judiciary, a special investigatory body, or simply electoral defeat. Transparency International’s influential corruption control source book, published in 2000, brings all of these institutions together and epitomizes this approach. Case studies of successful anti-corruption efforts in democracies often point to these institutions as critical. Without them, the literature commonsensically suggests, anti-corruption reformers will face tremendous obstacles in identifying corrupt actors, punishing them, and enforcing anti-corruption rules or laws as deterrents. As Robert Klitgaard famously argued, “Monopoly +

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Discretion – Accountability = Corruption.” While there are disagreements about the relative importance of the various institutions involved, some version of the democratic approach to corruption control is common. That said, many scholars have set scope conditions on these mechanisms, arguing that new, poor, or weakly institutionalized democracies will be less likely to achieve clean government.

Most autocrats are naturally unwilling to empower democratic institutions that could check their power or end their rule, but some version of the democratic approach is thought to be possible in authoritarian regimes through quasi-democratic institutions. Though they are less

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42 Klitgaard, *Controlling Corruption*, p. 75.

43 All this consensus over the democratic approach does not mean there are no disagreements about how to reduce corruption. One major debate is between those who see small government as cleaner government and those who disagree and caution that privatization can create opportunities for greater corruption. Another division is between those who emphasize the importance of leadership and those who argue bottom-up pressure or cultural change is the real cure. Further disagreements arise over the value of specific anti-corruption tactics. Some scholars advocate quick, dramatic reform—a “big push”—to shift the country to a cleaner equilibrium, while others believe eliminating corruption is a gradual, cultural process of shifting incentives. It is unclear how effective anti-corruption prescriptions tied to international assistance are for recipient countries. Should the Swedish ombudsman (or ombudsperson) become a standard clean governance-promoting institution? Is it a good idea to raise bureaucrats’ wages, as appears to have worked in Singapore?

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45 Brancati, “Democratic Authoritarianism.”
than democratic institutions, quasi-democratic institutions provide some of the same benefits, the thinking goes. Autocrats can use quasi-democratic institutions to tie their hands, credibly committing to not predate on private businesses and to keep corruption low. Semi-competitive elections and legislatures can help regimes better monitor officials, bureaucrats, and businesspeople. Institutions that improve information acquisition, which is important for autocrats on numerous issues, may help inform them about lower-level corruption. These arguments suggest that regimes with quasi-democratic institutions should be able to control corruption better than fully authoritarian ones. The broader context of these claims is a growing political science literature that contends that quasi-democratic institutions strengthen authoritarian regimes in various ways and increase their durability.

In line with this explanation, scholars assessing authoritarian corruption control often credit successes to quasi-democratic institutions and chalk failures up to authoritarianism itself. Yadav and Mukherjee, for example, see quasi-democratic institutions—specifically, opposition parties in multiparty legislatures supported by private business interests—as pushing autocrats to curb corruption. Absent this pressure, autocrats supposedly have little reason to pursue clean government. Improvements in China’s pre-Xi Jinping anti-corruption efforts are sometimes

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attributed to the somewhat better rule of law, transparency, and media freedoms in the 2000s. Critics of the Chinese Communist Party’s efforts, on the other hand, broadly see authoritarianism as the problem and advise China to learn from the democratic approach. Scholars argue that political will from leaders is useful to drive anti-corruption reform, but that in authoritarian regimes it is detrimental. “A leader or regime might overcome some obstacles by coercion, but that sort of ‘will’ can do immense damage to state integrity and will scarcely foster anticorruption strength in the rest of society.” Even scholars who note authoritarian success cases do not attempt to generalize from them. For example, Richard Rotberg’s global study of corruption control includes autocratic success cases, like Rwanda, and rightly highlights the importance of political will by the country’s leadership. Nevertheless, he has one all-purpose list of recommendations very much in line with the democratic approach: “adherence to a robust rule of law and a panoply of legal, judicial, regulatory, and procedural reforms that inhibit bureaucratic discretion...the existence and support of a free and energetic media, the presence of an emboldened civil society, and the actions of an aroused public appraised of its rights and responsibilities.”

In sum, scholars of authoritarianism and corruption find that 1) autocrats have strong political and personal incentives to accept and engage in corruption, especially personalists; 2)
the path to clean government is through strengthening democratic institutions, which authoritarian regimes will not accept, and 3) authoritarian anti-corruption efforts may be explained with reference to quasi-democratic institutions or narrowly political motives, like purging rivals.

3. Explaining Corruption Control Outcomes

This section develops my explanation for how and why authoritarian anti-corruption efforts succeed. First, I unpack the effective combination of unconstrained leadership and high state capacity, which can be simplified as “strong leader–strong state.” I then explain the resulting authoritarian playbook for corruption control and autocrats’ state-building motivations.

*Strong Leader–Strong State*

An autocrat’s leadership can be said to be unconstrained if they have high discretionary control over the regime’s operations and policies. The idea of unconstrained leadership draws heavily from discussions of “despotic power” in Michael Mann (1984, 2008), Dan Slater (2003), and Hillel Soifer (2008). Mann defines despotic power as “the range of actions which the [state] elite is empowered to undertake without routine, institutionalised negotiation with civil society groups.” Mann’s concept captures that some political leaders enjoy direct and discretionary authority over others beyond that granted by laws, bureaucratic norms, or


55 Mann, “The Autonomous Power of the State,” p. 188.
agreement through negotiation.\textsuperscript{56} I follow Slater in broadening the concept to include checks on an autocrat internal to the regime, such as by regime elites or norms limiting executive power, as well as external checks, such as by private economic elites.

Unconstrained leadership helps curb corruption when it allows an autocrat to challenge entrenched interests that otherwise could threaten to withdraw political support. Ideally unconstrained leaders would not need to accept corruption among officials or bureaucrats in return for factional backing, electoral campaign funds, votes, the maintenance of patron-client ties, armed defense of their rule, or the implementation of their policy agenda. In reality, every political leader needs supporters and makes compromises, but some leaders are much better insulated from political demands and have much greater latitude to act. If other regime elites oppose corruption control, then an unconstrained reformer is necessary to push through change. If, on the other hand, regime elites all see corruption as a threat to the regime, an unconstrained leader may still be necessary to resolve a collective action problem or a standoff situation in which no elite is willing to “disarm” their network of corruption first. In addition, an unconstrained leadership may be the only force within an authoritarian system capable of piercing local protectionism on a national scale, which is necessary to address many corrupt government practices that directly affect citizens.

\textsuperscript{56} There is some debate as to whether such strong personal leadership is compatible with infrastructural power, but I ultimately follow Slater in arguing that it can be. The tension that Mann asserts between the two powers is about whether power operates through will and whim, as in his descriptions of despotic power, or through rules and norms, as is the case with infrastructural power. This tension harkens back to the one Max Weber argues exists between charismatic and rational or legal authority. I agree with Mann that there is a tension in the sense that a leader who can break the rules weakens the rules, to put it very simply. However, there is a difference between regimes where the leader’s exceptionalism is replicated at lower levels and turns into a principle of lawlessness that defines the whole system, and political systems in which there are laws and bureaucratic rules but the autocrat can break them or is above them. In this latter case, the strong leader–strong state combination is possible. Max Weber, “The Three Types of Legitimate Rule,” \textit{Berkeley Publications in Society and Institutions}, Summer 1958, Vol.4(1).
Unconstrained leadership may arise in a regime’s origins or develop in a later power consolidation. Regimes with their origins in revolutionary struggle give autocrats the most promising start in claiming discretionary power. One reason for this is that the struggle produces iconic military leaders or national unifying figures who head the new government once the conflict is over.57 Having a revolutionary background gives leaders a massive boost of personal authority. This can be true of founders or initial leaders in democracies as well; American president George Washington is a commonly cited example of a leader who had prestige beyond his formal position.58 In addition, revolutions break the back of “independent power centers” in society, such as private economic elites, which in some authoritarian regimes serve as an external check on an autocrat’s control of the economy.59 Finally, new leaders can benefit from elite cohesion, which may be an outcome of violent struggle regardless of whether the outcome is revolutionary or counterrevolutionary.60

In later leadership consolidations, ambitious autocrats weaken existing institutions that constrained their power, undermine rivals, and find other ways to bolster their personal position, such as by building a cult of personality. If they are authoritarian successors, their ability to consolidate power once in office will be greatly influenced by the extent of the oversight that their predecessor and other retired regime elites or party elders are able to exert over them. If oversight is strong, as indicated by the retention of top regime positions by the predecessor or


their immediate family members, then the new leader will generally be unable to personalize power. In other research, my co-authors and I demonstrate the crucial role of oversight in cases of authoritarian leadership transitions.\textsuperscript{61} In cases where the same autocrat who has already been in office makes moves to acquire more power, it seems that they take advantage of moments of regime weakness, crisis, or transition to leverage a base of loyal support into a power expansion. For example, Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek leveraged his core support within the Kuomintang into a full takeover of the regime after its retreat to Taiwan. The story of Mao Zedong’s rise to paramount leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has some similarities. It was during the retreat known as the Long March (1934–35) that Mao secured the top spot, and during the CCP’s internal exile in Yan’an, Shaanxi Province that he consolidated power fully. In South Korea, Park removed quasi-democratic constraints on his rule by pushing through the Yushin constitution of 1972. He was able to do this because the rising possibility of the opposition taking power in the legislature threatened and unified his junta.

After unconstrained leadership, the second factor to assess is state capacity—a broad term that may encompass many aspects of a state’s ability to get something done: external coercive capacity, internal coercive capacity, extractive capacity, regulatory capacity, distributive capacity, symbolic capacity, etc.\textsuperscript{62} Executing anti-corruption reforms is essentially a combination of two state tasks: gathering information for and carrying out investigations of officials and bureaucrats, and reliably enforcing new laws or rules at the intersection of political


power and economic resource distribution. These tasks come under the regulatory and distributive capacities of the state, which are therefore the most relevant to implementing corruption control. Without state capacity, even a motivated and powerful leader will at most be able to swat at obviously corrupt actors, not gather systematic information on the problem and enforce rules to address it.

The origins of state capacity are complex, with scholars pointing to a wide array of structural and political factors. Most famously, Charles Tilly argues for the state’s origins in war and explains how inter-state conflict incentivizes state-building. Numerous scholars have added to this thesis, challenged it, and tested its applicability in different times and places. Revolutionary struggle can have state-building outcomes through logics similar to those of inter-state conflict, regardless of whether the newly consolidated regime was the revolution or the forces opposed to it. Colonialism can also have dramatic effects on the colony’s state capacity, with exploitative colonialism stripping capacity and settler colonialism tending to build it, though not usually to the benefit of the colonized. Joel Migdal raises the state-society dynamic as a key factor, arguing that massive “social dislocation” weakens society’s ability to resist a

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65 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies.; Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Levitsky and Way, “The Durability of Revolutionary Regimes.”; Slater and Smith, “The Power of Counterrevolution.”

strong state’s penetration and control. From a different perspective, Robert Putnam sees high social capital as assisting state institutional performance and low social capital as hindering it. These are largely structural explanations, but political leadership may also play an important role in driving state-building projects and related macro processes, as Migdal and others note.

With these two elements, the strong leader–strong state combination is more effective, I find, than either personalism (strong leader–weak state) or “hands-tied” authoritarianism (weak leader–strong state). The problems with personalism are commonsensical, but my argument raises the question of whether authoritarian regimes with leaders constrained by a strong bureaucracy and the rule of law would not be better against corruption than those having unconstrained leaders. I agree that full bureaucratism might be effective at slowing the advance of corruption if a low level already exists, perhaps as a holdover from a previous regime. However, without an unconstrained leader there is little hope for aggressive reforms to challenge corrupt interests in an authoritarian regime.


70 The best case to use against this argument and in support of the weak leader–strong state combination might be the relatively rule-bound East German regime, which was often held up as a model of functional communism. It was overall less corrupt than many of its authoritarian peers in Europe and there was never a major, public anti-corruption campaign. But even with advantages like pre-existing wealth, high levels of education, and many would argue a disciplined German culture, the country’s strict laws and strong bureaucracy were not able to prevent a slide into greater malfeasance and abuse of power by officials in the 1970s and 1980s. Anti-corruption measures were half-hearted. After the regime’s end in 1989, East Germans were shocked to learn how much corruption there had been, especially at elite levels. Ousted leader Erich Honecker later faced serious embezzlement charges.

The Authoritarian Playbook

The strong leader–strong state combination allows for an authoritarian playbook for corruption control substantially different from the democratic approach. Democracies harness a desire for cleaner government that can come from the top leadership, a particular branch of government (often the judiciary), the citizenry, or any interest group to which the government is responsive or accountable. By contrast, the authoritarian playbook relies primarily on the will of the top leadership, though leaders may also be pressured by other interest groups or directly by the public through protest. Democratic institutions curb corruption by decentralizing the government’s power across mutually checking organizations or bodies, by constraining power within disinterested laws and rules, by increasing the public’s power to participate in government decision-making and the execution of policies, and by making government more transparent. The authoritarian playbook constrains corruption in a different way: by centralizing power, in order to limit it to actors committed to reform; by disrupting and remaking laws and norms, which challenges entrenched corrupt interests before establishing new standards; by increasing vertical discipline and upward accountability; and by using propaganda, ideology, and psychological pressure to create support and momentum for anti-corruption reforms.

Table 1.1:

302–305.; Mary Fulbrook, The People’s State: East German Society from Hitler to Honecker (Yale University Press, 2005).
All parts of the authoritarian playbook are not used in every successful episode of corruption control, but its traits hang together as a conceptually distinct reform approach.

Corruption control in Taiwan since democratization exemplifies the democratic approach.\(^7\) Since the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) took power in 2000, power decentralization has helped curb corruption. The separation of powers among the branches of government has allowed anti-corruption investigations to proceed against top officials and even the president. Six important laws or acts with anti-corruption functions were passed in the Chen Shui-bian (CSB) administration, three of them known as the Sunshine Laws. Enforcement of these laws was routinized and continued even as the DPP and the KMT alternated power. Democratization empowered civil society groups, such as Citizen Congress Watch, and the public in general to push for corruption control. In 2006, in a show of bottom-up anti-corruption activism, opponents of CSB organized protests called “A Million Voices Against Corruption –

\(^7\) See Chapter Six.
President Chen Must Go.” Clean government was a voter priority in the late 1990s and 2000s, resulting in the initially resistant KMT establishment backing reforms and trying to clean up its image. Greater government transparency reinforced the monitoring abilities of the public, civil society organizations, and the free press. For example, Citizen Congress Watch is able to rate or score legislators’ activities with publicly available information and then provide citizens with profiles of which legislators are the most effective or the most wasteful.

By contrast, the KMT Reconstruction in the 1950s demonstrated the authoritarian playbook in Taiwan. By centralizing power under his leadership, Chiang Kai-shek (CKS) nearly eliminate the factionalism and “disorganization” that he believed had allowed corruption to flourish. Like the reforms of the 2000s, the Reconstruction had helpful institutional changes that continued to constrain corruption after the end of the campaign. But first, CKS had to use his personal authority to force a disruption of the existing institutional arrangements. He created, rearranged, or disbanded state organs, like the Central Executive Committee, and launched a mass party re-registration drive in which his hand-picked Central Reconstruction Committee investigated and trained members. CKS tightened vertical control with the return of the political commissar system in the military, a new and centralized Discipline Committee, and special investigation teams to monitor local bureaucrats. The Reconstruction was not an opportunity for the Taiwanese population to air its corruption-related grievances—which were tremendous—against the KMT. Instead, dissent was quashed and the Reconstruction was supported by pro-regime coverage in KMT-controlled news outlets and propaganda materials party members were required to study about how to keep up discipline.

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72 See Chapter Two.
While the KMT Reconstruction was half a century earlier and used a different approach than Taiwan’s democratic anti-corruption reforms, it also successfully curbed what had been rampant government corruption.

**Autocrats’ Motives**

Why would some autocrats be more motivated to curb corruption than others? Many autocrats can accept the negatives of widespread corruption—less efficient and effective governance, slower economic growth, and public discontent—as long as the problems do not rise to the level of threatening the regime or their rule. For them, corruption may be politically well worth the costs of lost revenue, forgone foreign investment, national brain drain, public unrest, or even a rise in violent extremism. But autocrats with ambitious programmatic goals have good reason to care that corruption does not get out of hand. Whatever their ideology or specific economic plan, they will need an effective government, a strong economy, and some degree of public support. Put another way, government corruption in authoritarian regimes represents

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“agent failure” because officials and bureaucrats are not following the laws or the orders the leadership passes down. Many autocrats let their agents predate or otherwise exploit their positions on the condition that they do not challenge the political center, but autocrats who have ambitious programmatic goals have a much greater need to reduce this agent failure.

Building on this premise, I argue that autocrats are highly motivated to see anti-corruption efforts through to success when they are committed to revolutionary or developmental state-building projects, which corruption control supports. Revolutionary regimes vary in their ideological commitments, but all have ambitious programmatic goals for remaking national politics, the economy, and society. Developmental regimes are quite different, both from revolutionary regimes and often each other, but they share an overriding commitment to state-led advancement of the national economy. State-building can be defined in different ways, but in this study it refers to increasing the size of the state and strengthening the capacity of state institutions and agents—officials and bureaucrats—to execute laws and instructions, handle resources, and manage relations with the public. Revolutionary and developmental state-building projects do not include privatization and the free-market model as a path to economic growth, as with Chile under President Augusto Pinochet, or the economic projects of rentier states, which achieve growth through rents and largely neglect the aspects of state-building unrelated to coercion, as in Saudi Arabia.


This argument about the source of motivations does not challenge the conventional view that autocrats’ primary objective is seeking and retaining political power, but extends it. Staying in power may be the base for a political Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, but beyond this autocrats’ goals vary widely.\(^7\) When staying in power is an end in itself, autocrats respond to threats and show little initiative. Others see political office as a stepping stone to accumulate more power; they wage wars of foreign conquest to increase their territory or building a cult of personality and establish totalitarian rule at home. Some are obsessed with accumulating wealth and material comforts, while others live simply. Some autocrats are ideologues or idealists, taking policy steps that are tremendous risks for accomplishments that do not improve, or may even harm, their material wellbeing. In short, autocrats are people—which is not to say they are necessarily average people. Staying in power may be the most basic goal of autocrats, but it is often not the only one. It is in this context that we should understand some autocrats’ commitment to revolutionary and developmental projects.

While ambitious programmatic goals are a strong motivator, I do not argue that they are the only motivator. In all nine cases of authoritarian anti-corruption success identified in this study, autocrats launch corruption control efforts as part of broader revolutionary or developmental state-building projects. But there are other—often overlapping—reasons why autocrats might try to curb corruption, such as to respond to foreign military threats, pressure from friendly foreign powers, or domestic unrest.

Foreign military threat as an explanation for autocrats’ motivations to curb corruption overlaps significantly with revolutionary and developmental projects, in part because it often

helps trigger those projects.\textsuperscript{78} Chiang Kai-shek’s aggressive rebuilding of the KMT in the early 1950s should certainly be understood in the context of the CCP’s continuing military threat. And Park Chung-hee’s militarized developmentalism was indeed shaped by the threat from and competition with North Korea. Even if corruption control is not explicitly raised, the general idea of state-building or domestic reform being motivated by the threat of war or war itself is theoretically well-developed.\textsuperscript{79} Logically, under military threat, autocrats should have incentives to take reform measures that would otherwise be too risky, too costly, or simply not in their interests.

However, military threat is insufficient as a stand-alone explanation for autocratic motivations. There are many reform episodes that do not make sense to link to foreign military threat, such as Xi’s current campaign in China. At the same time, there are many foreign military threats in the world that should have motivated domestic reforms, including corruption control, but did not. After all, the military threat of North Korea did not lead President Syngman Rhee to build a developmental state in the 1950s or President Chun Doo-hwan to curb corruption in the 1980s. And as Wonik Kim argues, “the external threat thesis can work in an opposite direction. Callahan’s (2003) painstaking work suggests that Burma is poor precisely because of this war


factor, which has entailed the remarkable durability of the Burmese military regime and a persistent low-growth pattern."\textsuperscript{80}

Pressure to curb corruption can come from friendly foreign powers, though this turns out not to have been a major factor in East Asia. Developing countries often receive offers of foreign aid conditional on political or economic reform. Autocrats may curb corruption in order to attract foreign aid or investment, or even simply prestige in the international community. During the Cold War, the United States often tried to shape the domestic policies of its authoritarian allies, including regimes in Indonesia, the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan. However, the overarching goal of supporting strong and strongly anti-communist governments prevented the U.S. from pushing allies too hard and often frustrated attempts to make aid conditional on autocrats carrying out domestic reforms.\textsuperscript{81} In addition, there are many cases of authoritarian reform that seemingly have no direct connection to foreign pressures or even go against foreign advice.

Anti-corruption efforts may also be in response to domestic threats, such as from mass protests or elite discontent. For example, the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests demanded an end to corruption, as well as greater democracy in China. While the CCP leadership chose to brutally repress the student-led movement, it also decided to launch an anti-corruption crackdown after the fact. Yadav and Mukherjee point to discontent among Malaysian economic elites as a key


factor in motivating corruption control efforts starting in the late 1990s. On the other hand, mass protests are not a necessary or sufficient condition for an authoritarian regime to launch anti-corruption measures. And while autocrats may curb corruption to the benefit of some elites, this usually comes at the expense of other elites’ interests in continuing corruption.

Figure 1.1:

**Argument Summary**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commitment to Revolutionary or Developmental Projects</th>
<th>Preeminent Leader from Revolution or Power Consolidation, weak Socioeconomic Elites</th>
<th>Certain types of War, Colonialism, and Social Dislocation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Motivation to Curb Corruption + Unconstrained Leadership + State Capacity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian Playbook</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform Success</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Alternative Explanations**

One theoretically-grounded explanation already mentioned is that quasi-democratic institutions reduce corruption in authoritarian regimes. If this hypothesis is correct, authoritarian regimes with somewhat open and competitive institutions will in general have cleaner government. Also, we should be able to observe these institutions’ anti-corruption mechanisms in action during authoritarian anti-corruption efforts. The weakness of this democratic
institutions hypothesis is that most successful episodes of reform are in fully authoritarian regimes without quasi-democratic institutions, such as China and Cuba. Moreover, the ways in which authoritarian regimes try to curb corruption are much more autocratic than the theory would predict.

A different explanation would be that state capacity is key and will largely determine the level of anti-corruption success regardless of other factors. For example, it could be argued that East Asia has lower corruption than Africa or Latin America not because of regime types or other political factors, but because its countries have higher state capacity. Just as some scholars argue that regime durability or economic growth is determined by the state as much as or more than by the regime, the same might be true for corruption control. I find, however, that strong state capacity is a necessary but not sufficient condition; some regimes with strong state capacity fail to curb corruption. China, South Korea, and Taiwan all have high state capacity by global standards, but also varied corruption control outcomes.

Alternatively, another explanation would focus on regime origins and argue that revolutionary origins predict good corruption control outcomes. Whereas revolutionary origins bestow elite cohesion, organizational capacity, and other helpful properties, regime origins in a coup or a foreign invasion would supposedly not prepare a regime to combat corruption. This hypothesis has two weaknesses, however. One is that it misses success cases in regimes with other origins, including but not limited to counterrevolutionary regimes, like Singapore. The second and more important problem is that it seems to predict uniform outcomes within regimes.

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over time. Change over time is generally a problem in the revolutions literature because regimes are defined by their increasingly distant origins.

In sum, these three explanations all have some merit, but also all leave significant variation unexplained. The best theory should explain both variation across regimes and within regimes over time. My argument, though not a complete departure from theories about state capacity and regime origins, directly challenges the explanation based on quasi-democratic institutions.

**Theoretical Contributions**

Firstly, this study’s findings point to the need to revise common assumptions about the supposed scarcity of authoritarian corruption control and its lack of importance for autocrats. There have been dozens of cases since 1945 in which authoritarian regimes launched widespread investigations into corruption, often alongside legal and bureaucratic reforms, and at least nine cases that were somewhat or very successful. I explain later in the study how these cases were classified and how their outcomes were empirically assessed.

Secondly, this study points to several ways in which autocrats benefit from reducing corruption, especially if reforms need not involve constraining their own powers. While corruption helps keep some autocrats in power, reducing it can also be a path to regime durability. Curbing corruption through the authoritarian playbook provides for more effective government, stronger economic growth, and less public anger over corruption. Anti-corruption reform itself demonstrates a regime’s ability to auto-reform and to reverse internal rot. Moreover, failing to curb corruption can be dangerous, as autocrats themselves often admit.

Thirdly, the idea of the authoritarian playbook cuts against a recent trend in the authoritarianism literature that proposes that quasi-democratic institutions improve the strength
or durability of authoritarian regimes. Rather than being able to manipulate quasi-democratic institutions to their benefit, autocrats attempting to curb corruption find that quasi-democratic institutions constrain them and hinder reform efforts. In general, anti-corruption success occurs in fully authoritarian regimes. Moreover, some cases in this study show quasi-democratic institutions incentivizing greater corruption.

Finally, this study’s analysis of authoritarian anti-corruption reform demonstrates the broader point that a regime’s durability depends, even more than on its origins, on its continuing ability to reform and strengthen itself. In anti-corruption efforts, democracies reform themselves by strengthening democratic institutions, whereas authoritarian regimes reform themselves through an authoritarian playbook. Though not equally successful in general, in both cases, success depends on a regime’s ability at that moment to draw on its own particular institutional strengths. The key ability to reform a regime from within, we can see throughout this study, cuts across regime types and regime origins, and can develop or atrophy over time.

4. Combating Corruption in East Asia

In this section, I justify this study’s focus on certain authoritarian regimes and explain what has and has not yet been examined about their anti-corruption efforts in the literature. I also propose a regional explanation for the origins of unconstrained leadership, state capacity, and state-building motivations in 20th century East Asia. These factors, while by no means limited to the region, have been unusually prevalent there.

*Why Compare China, South Korea, and Taiwan*

East Asia, which encompasses current-day China, Japan, Mongolia, North Korea, Singapore (arguably), South Korea, and Taiwan, is an advantageous region in which to study
corruption politics because its countries are historically interconnected and share many cultural characteristics. Historically, the region was heavily influenced by Imperial China and saw important interchanges of people and ideas between China and other territories. In the late 19th century and early 20th century, Imperial Japan in turn made its mark, shaping the history of every country in the region. In terms of cultural traditions, Confucianism and Buddhism have historically had the deepest influences on East Asia.

One benefit of studying a region with shared cultural characteristics is that corruption is arguably a culturally-inflected concept, with varied interpretations in different cultures. This perspective suggests that cross-regional comparisons may be omitting an important variable: culture. For example, it could be argued that East Asians are for cultural reasons more tolerant of violations of the public-private divide in resources, lessening public anger and therefore the political risk that corrupt autocrats sustain. Indeed, East Asia has certain traditions of gift-giving that are not seen as corruption even though they would be seen this way by many foreigners. Or perhaps Confucian precepts of benevolent autocracy, even long after the fall of the last Chinese dynasty, continue to steer East Asian leaders into taking hardline, moralistic stances against

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83 I refer to post-war Taiwan as a country throughout this dissertation, despite recognizing that disagreements exist on its status. While some critics suggest that Taiwan is not a country because many in the international community do not recognize it as such, this was also true of China from 1949–1971 and rarely if ever prevents the China of that era from being called a country. Instead, I adopt a simple and sensible definition of a country: a territory controlled by a government.

84 Except perhaps Mongolia.

corruption. There are many ways in which cultural understandings of corruption could influence the politics of cleaning it up.

That said, corruption is not so culturally specific that this study will not have lessons that can travel outside of the region. People from all over the world can cite specific “untranslatable” words and practices from their home countries that allegedly demonstrate a culture uniquely permissive of corruption. In general, however, people tend to overestimate how unique their views on corruption are. Supposedly untranslatable concepts usually boil down to the idea that most cultures are very social, value family and personal connections above the law, and do not have a high level of trust for impersonal authority. Rotberg argues that “there is very little evidence that the nature and practices of corruption vary from culture to culture or that the corrupt act itself is viewed more permissively in some societies than in others.”

Despite this region’s historical and cultural connectivity, it has tremendous diversity in both regime types and corruption outcomes. This simultaneous connectivity and diversity has attracted scholarly attention, making East Asia the site of many cross-national corruption comparisons. These studies often compare outcomes across regime types—for example, authoritarian China and Singapore versus democratic Taiwan and Hong Kong. Comparative work with East Asian cases has produced numerous useful typologies of corruption profiles or

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syndromes.\textsuperscript{88} One downside, however, is that cross-regime type comparisons are less likely to highlight differences among nondemocratic regimes, as this study does.\textsuperscript{89}

Within East Asia, authoritarian China, South Korea, and Taiwan form a useful three-way comparison because they share many structural characteristics but have varied anti-corruption outcomes. The People’s Republic of China has a decidedly mixed record on corruption control, with campaigns at different times having had more or less success. By contrast, the authoritarian-era KMT was mostly successful and South Korea’s military government was mostly unsuccessful.

\textbf{Table 1.2:}

\textbf{Key Background Characteristics: Regimes in China, South Korea, and Taiwan}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regime → Characteristic ↓</th>
<th>People’s Republic of China</th>
<th>Republic of Korea</th>
<th>Republic of China / Taiwan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Confucian cultural background</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invasion and at least partial colonization by the Empire of Japan</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Divided” country</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\textsuperscript{89} That said, some East Asia scholars do narrow their scope and flesh out how particular pairings of authoritarian regimes vary on corruption. See: Sun Yan, “Reform, State, and Corruption: Is Corruption Less Destructive in China than in Russia?” \textit{Comparative Politics} 32, No. 1 (1999), pp. 1–20.; Kang, \textit{Crony Capitalism}. 
Recent civil war and a challenging security environment
Developmental leadership
High state capacity
Revolutionary party
Right-wing regime
Small country (size being relevant for corruption control)

Within this three-way comparison, the dyadic relationships are equally interesting. China and Taiwan are a natural comparison for governance outcomes because they used to be a unified country, with all the shared history and culture that that entails. Moreover, the KMT and the CCP are two revolutionary parties that developed in the wake of the Xinhai Revolution (1911), cooperated for years, and, despite ideological differences, shared the mission of modernizing and strengthening China. South Korea and Taiwan shared many of the above characteristics and, unlike China, were small countries with right-wing leaders. The China-South Korea comparison is less clean, though there are also significant commonalities; an old saw has it that Korea is just “Little China.”

Other East Asian countries fit less well or present other challenges for research on the post-1945 period: Japan became a democracy; Mongolia was essentially part of the Soviet Union, though nominally independent; and North Korea, while I make an effort to analyze it in Chapter Six, continues to be difficult to research due to informational constraints about its domestic politics. Singapore is a possibility, but several factors lead me to examine it only as a
minor case. First, Singapore’s corruption control is already widely researched and often cited as an exceptional case of success. I do not want to reinforce the misperception that authoritarian corruption control is a Singaporean fluke. Second, even beyond the issue of corruption, the Singaporean regime is seen as exceptional: “enlightened” authoritarian leadership and multi-decade authoritarian stability with few protests. Third and finally, Singapore has some unusual features as a country that affect its governance, such as its small size, even compared to South Korea and Taiwan, and its status as a city-state. I explain in Chapter Five how the Singaporean case conforms to my theoretical expectations in some ways but challenges them in others.

While many scholars point to Hong Kong’s anti-corruption successes from the 1970s onward as a model for China or elsewhere, I argue that Hong Kong is not comparable because it was not and is not an independent country. Because of its non-independence, Hong Kong’s government in the 1970s faced a political calculus of incentives and risks in corruption control quite different from those of independent autocrats. Unlike Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew or Chiang Kai-shek, the British administrators of Hong Kong who enacted anti-corruption reforms were formally under the authority of another government. It would be more appropriate, therefore, to compare Hong Kong to other subnational units in Great Britain or China. Furthermore, because colonialism complicates regime categorizations intended for independent countries, it is unclear whether British Hong Kong should be classified as authoritarian or democratic. In sum, although the case of Hong Kong should continue to receive scholarly attention and inform our understanding of several aspects of corruption control, its colonial

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entanglement complicates its use to study the relationship between authoritarian politics and corruption.

The bulk of single-country research on corruption control in East Asia is on China. China studies treat corruption as a key political and economic issue throughout the People’s Republic, though there are heated debates about its origins and consequences. What is the primary cause of corruption: the nature of the Chinese economy or the nature of the Chinese state?\(^{91}\) Can the CCP’s anti-corruption efforts in the reform era succeed?\(^ {92}\) Has decentralization increased corruption?\(^ {93}\) Will rising corruption weaken economic growth?\(^ {94}\) What was corruption’s role in the legitimacy crisis that unfolded in China in 1989?\(^ {95}\) And do anti-corruption campaigns help legitimacy by showing that the government is on the case, or actually hurt legitimacy by revealing the extent of the problem?\(^ {96}\)

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This project asks why the CCP has been able to control corruption effectively or not in different periods of its long rule. At the risk of oversimplifying, most scholars agree that corruption in China was widespread in the first half of the century, was muted in the Mao era, and then took off again in the early post-Mao era with rapid increases in the number of cases and the amounts of money involved. The four main anti-corruption campaigns I focus on in China span the major periods of CCP rule: the Mao era, the reform era, and the as-yet-unnamed era that Xi Jinping has ushered in.97

The major campaigns of the Mao era have by now received significant scholarly attention, though not always through the lens of corruption control. The Three Antis–Five Antis Campaign was the first major anti-corruption push after the communist takeover in 1949, targeting first officials and then capitalists as a way to bring cities and their resources thoroughly under the new regime’s control.98 In the early 1960s, the Four Cleans also had a large anti-corruption component. The campaign has been described as Mao’s answer to the sprouting of capitalism and its attendant vices—especially among rural cadres—after the economic disaster and famine in the Great Leap Forward (1958–1961).99


In the reform era, the regime showed a greater tolerance for corruption, even as some clean government efforts continued. Meng Qingli sees corruption “emerging” from 1979–1987, “spreading” from 1988–1997, and “exploding” from 1998–2012. Sun Yan sees a transition happening in 1992, when minor corruption and plan-market arbitrage became high-stakes corruption that worked its way up the CCP ladder. Hsieh Chang-Tai and Pei Minxin both (separately) describe China’s economic system as “crony capitalism.” Andrew Wedeman contrasts “degenerative” and “developmental” corruption before concluding that China is characterized overall by neither. Corruption in the reform era at times aided, or at least did not impede, the key political goal of rapid economic growth. Anti-corruption efforts did not seem to keep pace; even scholars who take the CCP’s efforts seriously conclude that it was largely unsuccessful.

Xi Jinping’s wide-ranging, multiyear anti-corruption campaign, which began in 2012 and is still ongoing, has sparked debates about motives and methods. Theories on the motives for this campaign include that it is about power consolidation, factional conflict, policy advancement, corruption control, party rejuvenation, economic growth, and public legitimacy. To take just one perspective, Li Ling argues that after anger at corruption figured prominently in the 1989

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101 Sun, *Corruption and Market in Contemporary China.*


103 Wedeman, *Double Paradox.*

Tiananmen Square protests, corruption charges replaced nakedly political ones in struggles between top Chinese officials. On the other hand, Arthur Kroeber sees Xi’s anti-corruption efforts as well-intentioned overall, though of course biased and selective with regard to top-level officials. The campaign’s harsh and authoritarian methods have naturally come under criticism by people all around the world concerned about the rule of law and human rights in China, but scholars also criticize the campaign’s methods as ineffective. Yukon Huang argues that the campaign treats corruption as a moral failing and ignores the structural incentives behind the bulk of corrupt behavior. And Pei argues that the CCP’s anti-corruption efforts focus on enforcement at the expense of prevention and do not protect the autonomy of investigatory agencies.

Corruption has been less of a focus in studies of South Korea’s military regimes, though not for lack of subject matter. The authoritative edited volume The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea (2011) explains how the corruption and economic mismanagement of the short-lived Second Republic (1960–61) contributed significantly to the coup in 1961 and specifically to Park’s rise—he was seen as a clean candidate for leadership within the military. Widespread corruption in South Korea under military rule is often overlooked because of the “Miracle on the Han River” economic growth, David Kang

105 Cited in Wong Chun Han, “China’s Xi Jinping Puts Loyalty to the Test at Congress; President Focuses on Party Discipline, as Corruption Crackdown Has Unsettled Chinese Officials,” Wall Street Journal (Online), 2016/3/1.


suggests. One of Kang’s conclusions is that while the Philippines has a much worse reputation than South Korea on the issue, before democratization the two countries were not as different as people think. Comparativists often point out that corruption in South Korea is shaped by the unique relationship between the government and the country’s large chaebol (Korean-style conglomerates). Scholars who write on the chaebol or Korean economic development are well aware of the abundance of corruption in the quarter century of military rule. Existing studies downplay anti-corruption efforts under the military regimes, however. This is understandable given their limited success, but has the unintended consequence of obscuring strong efforts and meaningful improvements, especially in the 1970s.

In Taiwan studies, corruption also does not emerge as a major topic, at least until democratization in the 1990s. After Japan’s defeat in 1945 but before the central KMT leadership retreated to it from the mainland in 1949, Taiwan suffered brutal and corrupt Nationalist rule. Corruption was brought under control in the 1950s through impressive reforms, and clean government endured, though imperfectly. Local government, where the

110 Kang, Crony Capitalism, p. 2.
111 Wedeman, “Looters, Rent-Scrapers, and Dividend-Collectors.”; Johnston, “Japan, Korea, the Philippines, China.”
KMT ruled more indirectly and allowed relatively open elections, had substantial corruption.\textsuperscript{115} But during the transition to democracy in the late 1980s and 1990s, national-level corruption increased rapidly.\textsuperscript{116} Taiwan should be of particular interest to scholars of corruption because of the way that corruption control outcomes have varied sharply across different periods in the KMT’s relationship with Taiwan—ruling it from the mainland, ruling it from Taipei, and then governing it as a democratic political party.

Given the interconnectedness of East Asian countries, to what extent were their anti-corruption strategies learned from each other? Government documents and speeches show that in most cases governments were at least aware of the anti-corruption efforts elsewhere in the region. For example, KMT intelligence reported on the CCP’s Three Antis–Five Antis Campaign in the early 1950s, even acknowledging the enemy party’s effectiveness in reforms.\textsuperscript{117} In a speech in 1969, CKS lauded the South Korean junta’s efforts to improve bureaucratic quality and control corruption.\textsuperscript{118} In that same year, a Taiwanese government report summarized Singapore’s anti-corruption successes and proposed adopting similar measures in Taiwan.\textsuperscript{119} But in most


\textsuperscript{117} Document at repository number 002-110703-00129-007, President Chiang Kai-shek Case Files, Academia Historica Archives, 1953/10, p. 43.

\textsuperscript{118} Document at repository number 020-130600-0001, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Academia Historica Archives, 1969/6/9, p. 66–69.

\textsuperscript{119} “On Singapore’s Anti-Corruption…” / “關於新加坡因設有反貪污…”, President Chiang Ching-kuo Case Files. Academia Historica Archives. The report is undated, but mentions a Singaporean government hygiene campaign that began “last year.” If I am correct in assuming this is the Keep Singapore Clean campaign of 1968, then it stands to reason that this report is from 1969.
cases anti-corruption strategies were not the direct result of authoritarian learning. Foreign
advisers were not brought in from neighboring countries to manage anti-corruption policies, for
example, as occurred at times with Soviet or American advisers for other policies. Much more
significant was what authoritarian regimes in the region were learning from each other about
basic regime organization, as with CKS studying the party structure of the CCP before launching
the KMT Reconstruction in 1950 or Park taking pre-war Japan as a model for his military regime
in South Korea.

Why East Asia Had the Right Conditions

While there have been authoritarian anti-corruption reforms in countries globally, East
Asian countries have had an unusually high concentration of helpful factors. From the 1950s
onward, there was high state capacity in most countries most of the time, often unconstrained
leadership, and many autocrats committed to ambitious state-led projects with revolutionary or
developmental goals. This observation leads me to ask if there is some unified explanation
behind these trends in China, South Korea, and Taiwan, as well perhaps as in other states in the
region. This explanation would necessarily be historical, as many of the authoritarian regimes
that dominated the second half of the 20th century had their institutional roots in the first half.

I posit that Japan’s early modernization and rise to great power status forced neighboring
countries to “step up their game” as well, provoking developments that would later be conducive
to authoritarian reform.120 Following the Meiji Restoration (1868), the Empire of Japan
modernized rapidly; it became unique among non-European countries by achieving significant

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120 I gratefully borrow this apt phrase from “The Power of Counterrevolution” by Slater and Smith, though they are not its coiners.
industrialization before the 20th century. Because of its modernization and the accompanying political, economic, and military changes, Japan exerted strong ideational and material influences over East Asia in the early 20th century. As a “local,” non-Western power, Japan was both more of a threat and more of a model for its less developed neighbors than other colonial powers. Not all East Asian countries sought to explicitly imitate Japan’s development model, but it was impossible to ignore. Japan had at least three kinds of influence that were relevant: direct state-building in its settler colonies, the instigation of revolutionary movements in response to its territorial aggression, and the training and inspiring of future developmental leaders.

Japan engaged in substantial state-building in its settler colonies in Korea (1910–45) and Taiwan (1895–1945). Korea and Taiwan received much more Japanese investment than territories acquired later, which were used more simply for extraction. Though colonialism in Korea was “brutal and humiliating,” it turned the previously weak and “ineffective” Korean state “into a highly authoritarian, penetrating organization, capable of simultaneously controlling and transforming Korean society.”  

121 The colonial government “intervened in the economy extensively, taking upon itself the leading role in creating the ‘spurt’ of industrialization.” 122 Despite “discontinuities following WWII,” Park Chung-hee was able to build on this colonial foundation. 123 Japan also built substantial state capacity in Taiwan, though there was much less


During its half century of rule, Japan “imposed a strong colonial state on Taiwan,” which had not previously had an independent state; now it would have “an administrative structure which penetrated right down to the villages.” The colonial government led economic modernization: “in the late 1930s, Taiwan was still a predominantly agricultural economy. However, its agriculture had been transformed from a traditional sector to a modern sector.” North Korea also benefitted in terms of state capacity—perhaps more, considering that the North was more economically advanced than the South in 1945—but the destructive force of U.S. bombings during the Korean War set it back further. Japanese rule may have also had positive effects on state capacity in Manchuria, though because of its harsh rule and extractive practices in China it cannot be said to have contributed to Chinese state capacity overall. In sum, developmental states in South Korea and Taiwan and the strong state in North Korea after post-war reconstruction all had roots in Japanese colonial state-building. Japanese imperialism triggered the mobilization and aided the growth of three revolutionary parties that eventually put powerful, motivated leaders into office. Two commonly cited structural factors contributing to revolutions are narrow and oppressive rule, especially colonial rule, and state weakness, especially due to military defeats. The Qing dynasty (1644–


129 Theda Skocpol, Social Revolutions in the Modern World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994).; Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions.
1912) had lost wars before, but its loss in the Sino-Japanese War in 1895 was a blow to its prestige and power from which it never recovered. The loss convinced many in China that reforming the Qing was impossible and its overthrow was the answer; a new state would need to be built. The revolutionary Tongmenghui [United League] was founded in 1905. After the Xinhai Revolution, it was this organization that became the core of the new KMT, with revolutionary leader Sun Yat-sen as the “Father of the Nation.” After Sun’s death in 1925, leadership of the KMT passed to his close ally Chiang Kai-shek, who reunified much of China through the Northern Expedition (1926–28) military campaign. Then, Japanese military incursions in the 1930s weakened the Nationalist government and saved the marginal Chinese Communist Party.\textsuperscript{130} Japan’s takeover of large swaths of northern and eastern China and the brutality visited on the local people rallied Chinese nationalism and bolstered the communist revolution.\textsuperscript{131} Revolutionary regimes tend to give individual leaders high prestige and broad discretionary powers, which was true of Mao and CKS when they came to lead China and Taiwan respectively. In addition, Japanese imperialism inspired the Korean guerrilla resistance movement that propelled Kim Il-sung to national fame and then power.

Besides building state capacity and indirectly aiding revolutionary leaders in the region, Japan also taught or inspired many Chinese and Korean elites to embrace state-led developmentalism in their own countries. In this study’s previous discussion of motivations to

\textsuperscript{130} Mao later commented that the Japanese military intervention in China had saved the CCP. See: Li Zhisui, \textit{The Private Life of Chairman Mao: The Memoirs of Mao’s Personal Physician}, 1\textsuperscript{st} ed. (New York: Random House, 1994), p. 568.

curb corruption, I pointed to developmentalism as a broader mission that autocrats use anti-corruption efforts to support but did not develop a theory of why some autocrats have such developmental goals in the first place. While I do not propose a global theory, I would argue that Japan’s rise was a major contributing factor to the prevalence of developmental goals and therefore anti-corruption motivations among East Asian leaders. This is not a novel argument: “The diffusion of authoritarian developmentalism from Japan to South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia and Singapore is…widely known.” As Bruce Cumings writes, Japanese colonialism “goes a long way toward explaining the subsequent (post 1945) pronounced centralization of Taiwan and both Koreas, and has provided a model for state-directed development in all three.”

Japanese influences on key East Asian leaders show this ideational transmission. Park’s experience receiving training at a Japanese military academy taught him that state-led economic modernization brought security and national power, and that the military had a leading role to play. In a sign of things to come, Park reportedly idolized the “daring spirit” and “boldness of vision” of the Japanese officers who subverted democracy in the 1930s. Many educated Koreans of his generation also received Japanese training and took the Empire of Japan as a model of national success, even if they resented its rule in Korea. As for KMT leaders, Sun Yat-

\[\text{References}\]


sen lived in Japan for several years in the early 1900s, using it as an early base of operations. He was very impressed by Japan’s transformation “into a first-class power,” arguing strongly after its victory in the Russo-Japanese War that China should learn from Japan’s rise. The KMT “inherited from Sun Yat-sen a belief in centrally planned economy in which the state would promote industry while China regained its rights…Japan’s development was an obvious model.”

Chiang Kai-shek lived in Japan for some years as well. He also spoke and read Japanese “fairly well,” underwent Japanese military training, and served for two years in the Japanese Imperial Army. Like many, CKS was impressed with the Imperial Army and believed China needed to learn from Japanese discipline and efficiency. In Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew doubted the applicability of Western models of development to his country and instead looked East, especially to Japan. Both in its Meiji-era development and its rapid recovery after World War II, Japan impressed the Singaporean prime minister as a successful—and Asian—model of state-led growth. Singapore is “an important case in which the democratic legacy of British rule was rejected in favor of illiberal rule influenced by Meiji Japan.”

An additional relevant factor, though this cannot be attributed to Japanese imperialism, is that several East Asian countries, at least in the 20th century, lacked major ethnic cleavages. Ethnic homogeneity makes it easier to mobilize revolution and for leaders to adopt ambitious

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“save the nation” programs of any variety. China had many minorities, but the Han were and still are solidly dominant. Japan and Korea are famously ethnically homogenous, though of course if one scratches the surface these kinds of divisions do exist. The largest minority groups in Japan are the Ryukuan people, the Ainu people, and the burakumin, though the latter is somewhat more like a class than an ethnic group. Korea, like China, has regional cultural divisions. Taiwan, besides also having various aboriginal groups, has a large cleavage between Mainlanders (who arrived with the KMT in the late 1940s) and previous residents of the island under Japanese rule. But this post-WWII cleavage is not relevant to CKS’s or his son’s previous education and the development of their revolutionary aspirations on the mainland. By facilitating revolutionary movements and collective action in general, ethnic homogeneity may have contributed to bringing state-building autocrats to power.

5. Methodological Approach

This section explains this study’s methodological approach, case selection, empirical strategy for assessing anti-corruption efforts and outcomes, and use of sources. I employ qualitative, sequencing, comparative-historical analysis, which is the most appropriate approach given the questions addressed and their scope. Comparative-historical analysis is most useful when, as here, research is case-based, “temporally oriented,” and requires a “macroscopic


orientation.”\textsuperscript{143} This study takes a medium number of cases that span several regimes and decades and posits widely-applicable but not universal conclusions. As with other studies using comparative-historical analysis, this work can also be described as “comparative sequential” analysis because the cases are chains of conditions, contexts, and events that I interpret into causal relationships.\textsuperscript{144}

\textit{Cases in East Asia and Beyond}

The cases in this study are authoritarian anti-corruption efforts, not regimes or countries. I focus on major, national-level reforms and campaigns that depart from routine low-level enforcement; these episodes represent the most challenging reforms for autocrats to undertake and have the clearest effect on a country’s overall level of corruption. The purpose of this approach is to allow for case comparisons across regimes and across time within each regime.

The first task, then, is to define and identify major anti-corruption efforts. To qualify, three criteria should be met. First, there should be an announced reform push with corruption control as a stated goal. Second, there should be a surge of at least 50 percent in corruption-related investigations from one year to the next. This can either be a surge in investigations into public officials and bureaucrats generally or, in an elite-focused campaign, a surge in just the number of elites and high-ranking officials investigated.\textsuperscript{145} The reasoning behind requiring a surge is that the reform effort should be distinct from routine anti-corruption enforcement, which

\textsuperscript{143} Kathleen Ann Thelen and James Mahoney, Eds., \textit{Advances in Comparative-Historical Analysis} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), Chapter One.

\textsuperscript{144} Tulia G. Falleti and James Mahoney, “The Comparative Sequential Method” in Kathleen Ann Thelen and James Mahoney, Eds., \textit{Advances in Comparative-Historical Analysis} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

\textsuperscript{145} The starting year of a campaign is the year it was announced, and therefore may be earlier than the year that achieves the surge in investigations.
varies dramatically across countries. Third, there should be at least .01 percent of all public officials and bureaucrats investigated, or, in an elite-focused campaign, at least 100 elites and high-ranking officials should be disciplined. If the number of total public officials and bureaucrats is unavailable for a country in a certain timeframe, I use the standard of .001 percent of the national population. If a regime had been doing nothing against corruption, investigating a small number of low-level officials might not signal a major effort, despite being a quantifiable surge. For that reason, I set minimum thresholds on investigations. The focus is on the number of investigations rather than convictions because in some cases of Failed Reform investigations were substantive but then failed to result in convictions as the campaign was blocked or abandoned.

*Elites and high-level officials* are national-level politicians, cabinet ministers, generals, the heads of major state-owned enterprises, judges/justices of the country’s highest court, close confidantes or politically active family members of national leaders, and top-ranked officials down to and including the vice-provincial/ministerial level (or equivalent officials at the level of government below the national level), or, in a one-party state, party members of equivalent

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146 These three numbers, 50 percent, .01 percent, and 100, are loosely based on the successful experience of the United States curbing corruption in the second half of the 20th century. Corruption control in the United States, though still in need of improvement, has advanced in waves—reforms in the late 19th century, reforms in the 1930s and 1940s, and most recently in a wave of reform in the 1970s. This last wave of reforms, which was in response to major scandals and public anger over corruption, saw the enactment of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (1970), the establishment of the Public Integrity Section in the Department of Justice Criminal Division, and the enactment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (1977), among other reforms. In this critical period between 1970 and 1980, the average annual increase in federal prosecution of officials at federal, state, and local levels for corruption was 43 percent, leading me to suggest that an anti-corruption effort should have at least one year with a 50 percent surge. In 1971, the first year after the passage of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, indictments surpassed .01 percent of all government employees for the first time. In 1976, the first year the Public Integrity Section reported to Congress, convictions against federal officials rose to 101.

status. The vice-provincial/ministerial rank is the commonly accepted cutoff for the designation of high-level official in the Chinese political system. This list excludes many important types of non-regime elites, such as private economic elites, leaders of major religious organizations, celebrities, and so forth. But anti-corruption investigations against these figures usually merit analysis anyway because they also involve regime elites and high-level officials, often as the bribe-takers. Only if corruption is not related to government, as in private business corruption, should it be excluded.

If these three criteria are not met, the announced anti-corruption effort is just an Empty Gesture. This means that while there are promises to curb corruption, the limited actions taken do not meet the minimum threshold to be considered an anti-corruption effort. Examples of Empty Gestures include North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s ongoing “struggle” against corruption, Russian president Dmitry Medvedev’s promises to curb malfeasance in his 2008–2012 term, and Indonesian president Suharto’s sloganeering in the late 1960s.

By focusing on what makes corruption control succeed or fail, this study leaves open the question of when a regime will move past corruption control rhetoric (Empty Gestures) and launch an anti-corruption effort in the first place. In practice, there are many goals—including some quite superficial ones—that are sufficient to motivate an autocrat to order a 50 percent surge in anti-corruption investigations: showing the public that something is being done, virtue-signaling to foreign donors or allies, consolidating personal power through purges, shrinking the


148 See Chapter Five for analysis of these and other Empty Gestures.
government through firings and forced retirements, etc. These are not the kind of state-building goals that I argue motivate autocrats to see anti-corruption efforts through to success, though reforms are often undertaken with multiple goals in mind. Furthermore, even revolutionary or developmental state-building goals are not a guarantee that an autocrat will launch a nationwide anti-corruption effort. In Indonesia, the Suharto era was arguably developmental, but had a high level of corruption and saw only weak government efforts to check it.

While so far corruption control efforts have simply been discussed as successful or unsuccessful, there are in practice two levels of success. Through analysis of cases in East Asia, I inductively arrived at three possible outcomes: Failed Reform, Limited Victory, and Breakthrough. Limited Victory and Breakthrough are the two categories that denote success, though to different degrees. The combination of factors I lay out should allow authoritarian regimes, via the authoritarian playbook, to achieve a Breakthrough or at least a Limited Victory. I discuss how these outcomes are determined later in this section.

Table 1.3:

Corruption Control Outcomes

**Failed Reform**: An anti-corruption effort takes place, but investigations are either backtracked on, abandoned, or left unsupported by the institutionalization of new or strengthened anti-corruption rules.

**Limited Victory**: Offenders are widely investigated and disciplined, and some new or strengthened rules are successfully enforced, but elites and high-level officials are spared from systematic institutional constraints that could curb corruption.

**Breakthrough**: Offenders are widely investigated and disciplined, and new or strengthened rules systematically constrain previous corrupt behaviors by high-level and low-level officials, even if enforcement remains imperfect.

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\(^{149}\) Note that not even a Breakthrough reform leads to a total or permanent eradication of corruption. No system is so strong and flexible that it can predict and absorb all future change in a country—whether change is cultural, economic, political, social, or technological.
Table 1.4:

National-Level Authoritarian Anti-Corruption Efforts (1945–)\(^{150}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Korea 1961–63</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Failed Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China 1962–65</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>Failed Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Philippines 1975</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Failed Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico 1976–77</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>Failed Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran (Pahlavi) 1977–79</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>Failed Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea 1980–81</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>Failed Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico 1982–83</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>Failed Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The USSR 1982–84</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Failed Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba 1986–89</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Failed Reform(^{151})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam 1986–89</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Failed Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia 1997–2004</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Failed Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam 1998–2001</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Failed Reform</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{150}\) The scoring for all cases beyond the main East Asian ones is justified with sources in Chapter Five.

\(^{151}\) Red indicates that the case’s outcome does not conform to my basic theoretical expectations.
Table 1.4 Continued: National-Level Authoritarian Anti-Corruption Efforts (1945–)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1954–?</th>
<th>✓</th>
<th>✓</th>
<th>Failed Reform</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>2004–?</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Failed Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>2005–2009</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Failed Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Failed Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>1955–58</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Unclear, limited information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KMT/Taiwan</td>
<td>1969–72</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Limited Victory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>1973–77</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Limited Victory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>2012–</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Limited Victory, ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KMT/Taiwan</td>
<td>1950–52</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Breakthrough</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>1951–53</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Breakthrough</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>1959–66</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Breakthrough</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>1960–66?</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Breakthrough</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>1999–?</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Breakthrough</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

152 A question mark after a date denotes uncertainty on the date.
This is an incomplete list of authoritarian anti-corruption efforts, but it demonstrates the wide applicability of my argument.\textsuperscript{153} It is possible that there are other success cases that I failed to examine that challenge the theory. However, there are unlikely to be many undiscovered successes in the chosen time period because authoritarian anti-corruption success tends to draw international attention. It is more likely that I have missed failure cases with the conditions that I suggest would predict success. On the other hand, authoritarian regimes with high state capacity are not too common, so any failure case I have missed that should have succeeded has to be in one of a limited number of regimes.

While I discuss many of the above cases in Chapter Five, the main analysis of this study focuses on nine cases in China, South Korea, and Taiwan, which were identified using the same standards. However, because the CCP has had so many reform campaigns with an anti-corruption component, I focus only the largest from each period of CCP rule: two from the Mao era, one from the reform era, and the main one under Xi.

\textbf{Table 1.5:}

\begin{center}
\textbf{Authoritarian Anti-Corruption Efforts and Outcomes}
\end{center}

\begin{center}
\textbf{In China, South Korea, and Taiwan}
\end{center}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textbf{China}
\item 1951–53 The Three Antis–Five Antis Campaign helped the party discipline complex urban areas and curb corruption among bureaucrats and businesspeople. \textit{Breakthrough}
\item 1962–65 The Four Cleans disciplined local officials en masse but failed to enforce new anti-corruption standards. \textit{Failed Reform}
\end{itemize}

1989–90  Despite increases in arrests and anti-corruption rhetoric after the Tiananmen Square protests, reforms were backpedaled and ultimately half-hearted.  Failed Reform

2012–  Xi Jinping’s campaign is much-debated, but has produced positive changes in bureaucratic behavior and disciplined numerous high-level officials.  Limited Victory (ongoing)

South Korea

1961–63  Park Chung-hee purged politicians and civil servants widely, but faced political incentives to limit systematic rules curbing corruption.  Failed Reform

1973–77  The General Administrative Reform disciplined the bureaucracy with purges and new rules, but failed to challenge high-level state-business collusion.  Limited Victory

1980–81  Chun Doo-hwan purged the civil service, but soon abandoned efforts to reimpose the anti-corruption discipline of the 1970s.  Failed Reform

Taiwan

1950–52  The KMT Reconstruction overhauled the party, including membership, and strengthened the regime’s anti-corruption infrastructure.  Breakthrough

1969–72  The Governmental Rejuvenation curbed bureaucratic privileges but did not aim at high-level targets.  Limited Victory

Scoring Anti-Corruption Efforts

Measuring anti-corruption outcomes in a way that allows for cross-national comparison has always been a challenge for scholars. Many comparative studies rely heavily or entirely on polling and survey data about people’s perceptions of corruption, such as Transparency International’s well-known Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). But the CPI and other indexes cannot be used for this study because they are only comprehensive from the mid-1990s onward.

In general, perception-based measures are not ideal to use in comparisons because most surveyed populations have no frame of reference for how corrupt their country is except for their own experiences of the past. The perceptions of outside experts or foreigners with experience doing business in a country may also not be based on comparative knowledge, or may fail to capture the difference between how corruption affects foreigners and how it affects the local population.

Relying on polling to measure corruption across time in a historical study like this one is problematic because polling fails to take into account new knowledge that improves our understanding of the past. For example, the CPI rated Tunisia as one of the least corrupt countries in the Middle East and North Africa in 2010. But the next year, when President Ben Ali fell in the Arab Spring and his family’s massive corruption was revealed, Tunisia’s score dropped from 4.3 to 3.8, recoloring Tunisia into the bright red (indicating widespread corruption) that the CPI uses to shade most of the region on their annually updated map. This progression makes it seem as if Tunisia became more corrupt in 2011, when most likely what happened was that old corruption was revealed in the process of reform. The pre-2011 scores for Tunisia were not changed. Why was the CPI getting Tunisia wrong before 2011? Perhaps because Tunisia’s government treated foreign businesses relatively well and the CPI samples from foreign business leaders in its expert surveys.\footnote{Hannes Baumann, “A Failure of Governmentality: Why Transparency International Underestimated Corruption in Ben Ali’s Tunisia,” \textit{Third World Quarterly}. Feb. 2017, Vol.38(2), pp. 467–482.}
My assessment strategy takes polling into account when it is available, but also draws on government reports and data, interviews of people with firsthand knowledge, and expert analyses. Rather than trying to measure the level of corruption in a given country at a specific moment, I focus on whether anti-corruption efforts created a change in the level of corruption, which is easier to define and observe because it is a change. One potentially problematic assumption in this approach is that anti-corruption efforts are key determinants of a country’s level of corruption, which may not always be accurate. For each episode of anti-corruption reform, I assess investigations, institutions, and impressions. That means assessing to what extent corrupt actors were disciplined, rules were made or strengthened, and reforms created positive perceptions. These three categories are scored on an 11-point scoring system, as explained below, and used to determine whether an anti-corruption effort resulted in a Failed Reform, a Limited Victory, or a Breakthrough.

**Discipline Enforcement**: Beyond the minimum level necessary for a campaign to qualify as an anti-corruption effort, discipline enforcement can be judged on its scope (or breadth), permanence, and vertical reach.

I. If investigations against corruption or related economic crimes were carried out widely within the state and regime, including in a majority of bureaus or ministries or a majority of provinces/states/geographic regions, add 1 point.

   If investigations against corruption or related economic crimes were carried out narrowly, targeting or seeming to target only a political faction, province or state at odds with the regime, or a particular ethnic or religious group, add 0 points.

II. If the vast majority of punishments were enforced with little or no backtracking, add 1 point.

   If investigations were blocked, convictions were later reversed, or there was significant backtracking on actual punishments, add 0 points.
III. If at least 10 elites or high-level officials were severely disciplined for corruption, meaning at least dismissed from all positions of power, add 1 point.\textsuperscript{156}

If elites were avoided in the campaign or elites largely avoided punishment despite credible accusations, add 0 points.

**Rulemaking:** There are broadly three types of reform having to do with institutions, laws, and norms that can directly impact corruption.

I. The creation or reform of organs tasked with anti-corruption work: strengthening the powers to monitor, investigate, or prosecute wrongdoing

II. Institutional measures that eliminate or reform a governmental body or governmental practices plagued with corruption

III. New or revised laws, regulations, or party rules that directly address corrupt practices (sometimes overlapping with Type II)

Reforms in any of these three categories may or may not achieve institutionalization—meaning that the reforms “sink in” or “stick” for at least *five years* after being announced.

Multiple reforms in the same category in the same campaign—for example, two anti-corruption laws passed in the same year and then successfully implemented—do not add more points. However, Type II and Type III reforms are judged as more successful if they systematically address corruption among elites and high-level officials as well as non-elites, for which each can earn an extra point, as below.

Type I reform was successful if changes to anti-corruption work endured and were integrated into the state’s existing anti-corruption infrastructure. (add 1 point)

Type II reform was successful if the measures were not reversed, improper practices continued to be sanctioned, and violators continued to be disciplined. (add 1 point)

\textsuperscript{156} Anti-corruption investigations into elites are often motivated by political concerns unrelated to curbing corruption, but multiple motives can coexist. Even a small number of high-level investigations can signal to other elites that the regime has standards for their cleanliness.
If a Type II reform systematically addressed improper governmental or bureaucratic practices by elites as well as non-elites, add 1 point.

Type III reform was successful if the new or modified rules continued to be enforced, as seen in their usage in anti-corruption investigations or prosecutions. (add 1 point)

If a Type III reform systematically addressed corruption by elites and high-level officials as well as low-level offenders, add 1 point.

**Perceptions:** I examine the state of expert opinion about the outcome of anti-corruption efforts. Expert opinion broadly includes that of scholars with expertise in corruption or the domestic politics of a particular country, foreign intelligence analysts, international or domestic NGOs, and in some cases domestic leaders of a political opposition or independent media. A full score indicating positive perceptions is 3 points, which matches the full score of 3 points in the enforcement and rulemaking sections above, not counting points added for rules addressing elite corruption. The score for somewhat positive perceptions is half of that, 1.5 points.

I. If a majority of experts use words like “success,” “breakthrough,” “effective,” “reformed,” “greatly reduced,” “curbed,” etc. in relation to corruption control, add 3 points.

II. If a majority of experts describe efforts as “somewhat effective,” “partially successful,” “limited success,” having produced a “moderate reduction” in corruption, etc., add 1.5 points.

III. If a majority of experts describe efforts as “failed,” “unsuccessful,” “ineffective,” “abortive,” etc., add 0 points.

**Translating Scores into Outcomes**

*Breakthrough:* a cumulative score of at least **8.25 points (75%)** with at least 1 point in each category.

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157 The choice of expert assessments consulted for this research cannot be considered a random sample of some theoretical set of all expert assessments. Interviews were obtained through a snowball technique beginning from multiple points and based on availability.
Limited Victory: a cumulative score of at least 5.5 points (50%) with at least 1 point in each category.

Failed Reform: a cumulative score of less than 5.5 points or a failure to score at least 1 point in each category.

Figure 1.2:

Select Scoring of Anti-Corruption Efforts

Assessing Unconstrained Leadership

I propose that unconstrained leadership exists in an authoritarian regime if two conditions are met. First, semi-competitive elections and other quasi-democratic institutions must be absent. Leaders may be able to personalize power within authoritarian regimes with quasi-democratic institutions, but they do so through negotiations, quid pro quo arrangements,

clientelism, vote-buying, and generally building a broad network of support through material incentives. This level of compromise, I suggest, is itself a constraint on an autocrat’s ability to challenge corrupt interests. In this study, regimes with quasi-democratic institutions include all those that meet Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way’s definition of competitive authoritarianism, as well as tutelary regimes, such as Iran (under religious elites) and Pakistan (under the military).  

Second, unconstrained leaders must demonstrate control over their regimes, especially regime elites. An affirmative answer to any one of these three questions demonstrates such control.

I. Does the regime leader purge high-level officials from groups other than his own without a reasonably fair trial?  

II. Does the regime leader monopolize decision-making by becoming the head of powerful policy-making bodies or creating ones loyal to himself?  

III. Does access to high office depend on personal loyalty to the regime leader?  

I provide these three different indicators because autocrats may demonstrate their unconstrained leadership in different ways. For example, an autocrat may not feel the need to purge any high-level officials in a particular time period, even though they could. Or an autocrat who cares little for policy may not bother to monopolize policy decision-making. Other signs of unconstrained leadership, though not necessities, may be that the leader has a cult of personality or that their position survives shocks to patronage. These indicators do not establish that an autocrat has unconstrained leadership permanently. Constraints may arise if collective leadership

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is imposed by other elites or quasi-democratic institutions are introduced. A drop in personal authority may also be evident if exiled rivals are brought back into the supporting coalition or autocrats are sidelined during policy discussions that they previously dominated.

A weakness of this simple standard is that it does not tell us about a potentially important aspect of unconstrained leadership: its timing relative to the political regime’s development. The (not novel) idea here is that the formative early years of a regime are the time during which ambitious top-down reforms have the greatest likelihood of succeeding. Regime change almost by definition is the decisive settlement of a power struggle in the interests of one group over others. The leadership’s mandate for reforming the state, if it has one, is therefore strongest in the aftermath of a regime change. After this initial period, even an unconstrained leader will find it more difficult to make as large reforms in the face of new entrenched interests. Applying this logic to corruption control, I find that anti-corruption reforms are likely to be Breakthroughs if they are launched in the first few years of a new regime and Limited Victories if they are launched at other times. Of the nine successful anti-corruption efforts discussed in this study, all fit this pattern except for the KMT Reconstruction, which was in the early formative years of what is often thought of as the KMT’s new post-war regime in Taiwan, and Rwanda’s Breakthrough reforms under Kagame.

Assessing State Capacity

For the purpose of assessing its ability to implement corruption control, a state can be said to have high state capacity if it has high regulatory and distributive capacities. A state can be said to have high regulatory and distributive capacities if it has successfully undertaken nationwide land reform or industrialization and is not temporarily incapacitated by mass violence or famine.
The measurement of state capacity is a thorny issue in the field.\textsuperscript{162} In most cases, scholars are unable to measure the actual capacity of a state to carry out some task ex ante, but rather assess the state’s performance and then infer the level of capacity that must have existed. For example, a state that effectively collects taxes is inferred to have a high capacity for tax collection or in general. There are known weaknesses with this approach, such as that performance is affected by things besides capacity, such as how capacity is deployed by the political system or what the state’s intentions are.\textsuperscript{163} An additional difficulty is that many cross-national datasets of indicators of state capacity do not go back in time far enough to use consistently for this study.\textsuperscript{164}

This project demands only a basic differentiation between high and low state capacity—between states with and without the capacity to carry out wide-ranging anti-corruption reforms ordered from above. A state that successfully implements ambitious economic reforms, such as land reform or industrialization, demonstrates sufficient regulatory and distributive capacity, the two most relevant aspects of state capacity.\textsuperscript{165} In land reform or industrialization, state agents must responsibly handle tremendous economic resources and implement the regime’s ambitious

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vision of redistributing them.\textsuperscript{166} Strong states implemented land reform in China, South Korea, and Taiwan in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Malaysia’s New Economic Policy (1971–1991) was not land reform, but can be thought of as another major redistribution policy that demonstrated capacity. Industrialization, such as in Meiji-era Japan or Indonesia from the 1970s, also puts a state in the high capacity category.

Once there is high state capacity in a country, it usually continues for the long term; large reversals in state capacity have been uncommon since the end of WWII. However, temporary incapacitation can happen if there is mass violence, such as in the case of war within the territory, or a large-scale famine. During the first half of the Cultural Revolution, 1967–71, the Chinese state certainly had the power to coerce people and punish them (internal coercive capacity), but its ability to enforce reforms and rules about the state’s economic behaviors (regulatory and distributive capacities) was weakened. The same is true of the North Korean state during the Arduous March in the mid-1990s.

Using the implementation of land reform or industrialization as a standard is not exact and cannot be used to assess all states at all times. These two kinds of reforms are largely modern phenomena, giving us little purchase on the state of state capacity in previous centuries. An additional issue with this approach is that state-led economic reforms may coincide and be mutually supportive with anti-corruption efforts, making it difficult to avoid endogeneity concerns.

Nevertheless, this standard provides sufficient guidance to sort most modern states into high or low capacity categories. In the 1960s, for example, Taiwan and South Korea had high

\textsuperscript{166} This standard is more relevant specifically to regulatory and distributive capacities than commonly used tests of overall state capacity, such as the execution of a national census. See: Lee and Zhang, “The Art of Counting the Governed.”
state capacity, whereas the Philippines and Indonesia did not. In the 2000s, Rwanda and Ethiopia had high state capacity, whereas Somalia and Sudan did not. In China in the early 1950s, the CCP showed its high state capacity through: a war with the United States fought to a draw, a consolidation of power over a uniquely populous country fractured for decades, and several massive campaigns that reshaped the nation, including land reform, elimination of counterrevolutionaries, social modernization, and economic restructuring. Importantly, this test is more targeted at the aspects of state capacity relevant to corruption control and holds the state to a higher capacity standard than oft-used measures like national census-taking. The results of using my proposed standard roughly align with commonly cited qualitative cross-national assessments of which states have high state capacity.

**A Word on Sources**

This research is based on a wide array of sources: government documents and data, domestic and foreign news reports, 70 interviews with experts and elites, memoirs of participants, and secondary scholarship in Chinese, Korean, and English. I began my search for sources at Harvard University’s excellent Yenching and Fung Libraries, and by exploring the wider Harvard system of online academic resources. While in the United States, I was able to use materials from various officials sources, such as the Department of State, the Central Intelligence

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167 Ledesma, “Land Reform in East and Southeast Asia.”

168 A few dissentions aside, scholars agree that the CCP has continued to have high capacity in recent decades. See: Pei Minxin, *China’s Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006).

169 Lee and Zhang, “The Art of Counting the Governed.”

Agency, the Department of Defense, The National Archives and Records Administration, and several presidential libraries. The primary-source research on North Korea in Chapter Five, for example, is based on DPRK documents seized during the Korean War and now available in the National Archives Collection of Foreign Records Seized, 1675 – 1958, as well as on materials from the Wilson Center Digital Archive.

In East Asia, I conducted research for several months each in mainland China, South Korea, and Taiwan between 2015 and 2019. Overall, I spent more than 16 months in East Asia for this project, excluding trips for language study and other work. I interviewed scholars with expertise on corruption and politics in each country, former high-level officials, current and former anti-corruption investigators, prosecutors, journalists, and NGO activists. This was much easier in Taiwan and South Korea than in China, where interviews were more difficult to conduct and often less revealing. In Taiwan, I was affiliated with the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy in 2018. I gathered materials from Academia Sinica, the Academia Historica Archives, the Kuomintang Party History Archives, National Taiwan University Library, National Central Library, and various government agencies that produce reports and data. In South Korea, I gathered written materials from the National Library of Korea, the Seoul Metropolitan Library, the National Archives of Korea (Daejeon, Sejong, Seongnam, and Seoul branches), and again several government agencies. In China, I was based in Shanghai, where I received generous help from the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences. Besides American archives and interviews, the China chapter draws on materials from collections at the Universities Service Centre for China Studies at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, the Central Commission for Discipline

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171 Many of the Department of State and Department of Defense records were available through the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. In terms of the presidential libraries, materials are cited from The Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, and the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Inspection, the National Library of China, and WikiLeaks. I also examined oral interview recordings held in the National Archives of Singapore.


After this chapter, Chapter Two explains how the KMT went from notoriously corrupt rule in China to reforming itself in Taiwan after retreating there in 1949. Theoretically, Chapter Two highlights the importance of the strong leader–strong state combination. Chapter Three analyzes why South Korea’s military regimes were less successful in curbing corruption, with a focus on constraints on leadership. Chapter Four explains the success or failure of the CCP’s major campaigns against corruption from the Mao era to today. The chapter proposes that greater authoritarianism has helped Xi Jinping curb corruption, within limits, and complicates the commonly proposed dichotomy of a relatively clean Mao era and a rampantly corrupt post-Mao era. In Chapter Five, we see how the theory developed from the major cases in Chapters Two, Three, and Four applies to the wider world of authoritarian regimes, with minor case studies on Cuba, Malaysia, North Korea, Singapore, and Vietnam. Chapter Six examines democratic-era Taiwan and South Korea and describes the multipart impact of democratization on corruption control. Finally, Chapter Seven brings the study to a close by presenting the main conclusions, theoretical contributions, limitations of the study, and recommendations for future research.
Chapter Two

The Kuomintang and Taiwan

1. Introduction

This chapter profiles the Kuomintang and explains how it went from being notoriously corrupt in China to relatively clean after its mid-century retreat to Taiwan. During China’s Republican Era, the KMT failed to curb rampant government wrongdoing and at times even engaged in corruption as a matter of policy. But shortly after the KMT’s defeat in the Chinese Civil War, President Chiang Kai-shek led a successful KMT Reconstruction (1950–52) in Taiwan, which reorganized and strengthened the party, including bringing corruption largely under control. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, unwelcomed diplomatic developments threw the country’s future into doubt, leading CKS and his son Chiang Ching-kuo (CCK) to implement a campaign of Governmental Rejuvenation between 1969 and 1972. This set of reforms brought more native Taiwanese and young people into the party, launched gradual political liberalization, and reversed a troubling rise in bureaucratic corruption. Widespread corruption would only return to Taiwan after the onset of democratization in the late 1980s.¹

This chapter rates the KMT’s anti-corruption efforts on the Chinese mainland and in Taiwan and explains their outcomes. As the Republican Era progressed, it became increasingly obvious that corruption within the KMT’s ranks was robbing the state of much-needed funds; by the 1940s, corruption became an all-encompassing problem that threatened the KMT’s very existence. I argue that the KMT was successful in cleaning house in its post-1949 authoritarian

¹ See Chapter Six.
period because, while the motivation to reduce corruption already existed at the top, only then did the regime develop a strong leader–strong state combination of powers. I argue that while clean government was to some degree a goal in itself, CKS and CCK’s overarching motivation to combat corruption was to advance their broader state-building agenda, which over the course of their long rule was first revolutionary and later developmental. Additionally, the political weakness of Taiwanese socioeconomic elites—especially after the February 28 Massacre in 1947—was an external factor that contributed to CKS’s unconstrained leadership and the ease of anti-corruption reform. In the 1969–72 Governmental Rejuvenation, the same factors allowed for a follow-up Limited Victory against government corruption.

Table 2.1:

**Kuomintang Anti-Corruption Efforts and Rhetoric, 1912–1987**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name and Dates</th>
<th>Strong Motivation?</th>
<th>Unconstrained Leadership?</th>
<th>High State Capacity?</th>
<th>Anti-Corruption Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Nanjing Decade Cleanup”² 1927–30</td>
<td>✅</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Failed Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Wartime Reform Movement” 1944–47</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Empty Gestures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KMT Reconstruction 1950–52</td>
<td>✅</td>
<td>✅</td>
<td>✅</td>
<td>Breakthrough</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governmental Rejuvenation 1969–72</td>
<td>✅</td>
<td>✅</td>
<td>✅</td>
<td>Limited Victory</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

² These names in quotations are descriptions rather than established names for these periods of anti-corruption activity.
The key political conditions that allowed corruption control to succeed developed over time. CKS did not simply inherit revolutionary “Father of the Nation” Sun Yat-sen’s tremendous authority and status when he took over the KMT, but he was also a revolutionary and soon became the victorious leader of the Northern Expedition (1926–28). CKS was able to loosen party constraints on his personal authority somewhat during the New Life Movement (1934–), but his crowning moment, ironically, was during the KMT leadership’s difficult transition immediately after it retreated to Taiwan. CCK built up his authority within the KMT under CKS, shared power with his father through the early 1970s, and then effected a smooth succession. Underlying state capacity in Taiwan was a product of Japanese colonial rule (1895–1945), which had significantly developed the island. The retreating KMT core also contributed its organizational capacity to the formation of an almost new regime.

The rest of this chapter gives a chronological but also analytical account of the KMT’s development and its relationship with corruption in four main sections. Section Two, covering the KMT before Taiwan, introduces the KMT and CKS and analyzes relevant developments in the Republican Era. Section Three, on the origins of the KMT Reconstruction, unpacks the KMT leadership’s motives for reform after the retreat to Taiwan. Section Four, on the KMT Reconstruction and its success, analyzes the reforms of the early 1950s, assesses their outcomes, and considers competing explanations for reform success. Section Five turns to CCK and the Governmental Rejuvenation; it discusses his rise to power and the reasons for and outcomes of the 1969–72 reforms. A brief concluding section reviews the main arguments and alternative explanations and proposes a takeaway for future Taiwan scholarship.

2. The Kuomintang Before Taiwan
The Kuomintang, or Nationalist Party, was formed in 1912, shortly after the fall of the Qing Dynasty. It succeeded the Tongmenghui, the revolutionary party which in turn was created by the union of various anti-Qing dynasty forces in 1905. Its leader was Sun Yat-sen, a unifying figure of tremendous prestige who also served as president of the Republic of China. After Sun’s death in 1925, leadership of the KMT passed to Chiang Kai-shek, a close ally of Sun’s and the first head of the KMT’s influential Whampoa Military Academy. CKS launched the Northern Expedition and reunified much of warlord-controlled China under Nationalist rule. The expedition was put on hold as a purge was carried out against Communist sympathizers and other leftists, but resumed and concluded in 1928. The period of relatively stable rule from CKS’s capital in Nanjing between the Northern Expedition and the Japanese invasion in 1937 is known as the Nanjing Decade. After Japan’s defeat in 1945, full-scale civil war broke out between the KMT and the Communist Party, with the former losing control of the Chinese mainland and retreating to Taiwan in 1949.

KMT rule throughout the Republican Era, especially in the later two decades, was notoriously corrupt. Malfeasance was by no means confined to the party, but was also rampant within the bureaucracy across different sectors and administrative levels. Much of this corruption was the result of ubiquitous state-business entanglement. On the part of public office holders, there was much abuse of power to extort private businesses and bribe-taking to allow illegal activity. A related problem was that many who were KMT officials or nominally allied under the

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KMT-led government had in fact carved out their own fiefdoms, whether territorially or within a sector of the economy or bureaucracy. This led to yet more corruption, especially embezzlement of taxes and direct predation on the public.

Failed Reform in the Nanjing Decade (1927–37)

While corruption was already a well-known problem, it was not until the victories in the Northern Expedition and the start of the Nanjing Decade that the KMT could hope to address it. In the chaotic 1910s, as warlords carved out areas of control and President Yuan Shikai (1912–16) made a doomed bid to return China to monarchic rule, no single government was sufficiently in control of the country for long enough to enforce national reforms of almost any kind. But by mid-1927, the KMT was in a stronger position to address China’s myriad governance problems, including corruption. By then, CKS had taken the reins of the KMT, begun purging Communist sympathizers, and unified much of the country through military campaigns, including Nanjing.4

The KMT launched several campaigns in this period to punish people who did not support it politically, stole from the government, or mistreated the public so badly that they were a liability. For example, “in May 1927, Nationalist Party branches at the county level were ordered to eliminate all ‘Communists, local bullies, and evil gentry (土豪劣绅), corrupt officials and [their] venal underlings (贪官污吏), and [all] reactionary, opportunistic, corrupt, and evil elements’ from their ranks.” And “on August 18, 1927, the Nationalists amended the penal code by mandating the punishment of ‘local bullies and evil gentry’ in order to ‘develop the spirit of

4 Corruption was also recognized as a key governance challenge by Chinese warlords outside the KMT. Marshal Yan Xishan said in 1930 that corruption control was one of the four principles of his governmental program. His forces were later defeated by the KMT (in August). See: Document 17, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1930, Volume II, 1930/8/15.
party rule and safeguard the public interest’.⁵ Even months before this, a campaign to oppose
embezzlement by local bullies and evil gentry had been launched with a mass rally in Changsha,
the capital of Hubei province, from where it spread to over 20 counties in the province.⁶ There
were also attempts to punish businesspeople who were colluding with officials to evade taxes
and commit other economic crimes, such as the arrest of five salt magnates in Tianjin in October
1928.⁷ In late 1930, the KMT moved to end the lijin (釐金), a form of taxation susceptible to
widespread abuse by local officials because of its easy, decentralized collection.⁸ CKS called it a
burden on the people, “the inveterate foe to honest political administration,” and “the fountain-
head of political corruption.”⁹

The motives for these anti-corruption efforts were pragmatic in light of the country’s
divisions: to retain resources desperately needed to suppress warlord and bandit opposition, and
to win the contested support of China’s corruption-weary populace. Embezzlement by supposed
KMT allies and local officials cut off revenue streams to the central government and turned the
public against the KMT, which was still struggling to exert control over large portions of the
country. Additionally, from a more individual perspective, CKS hated corruption and perceived
it to be a threat to the reunification of China. His many diary entries on the topic show his

⁵ Thornton, Disciplining the State, p. 105.

⁶ Zhu Peng, Study on the Policy of “Evil Gentry” between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party during the National Revolution (Central China Normal University College of History and Culture, 2014), p. 28.


feelings, though this diary should not be read uncritically.\textsuperscript{10} On January 18, 1948, he bemoaned reports of large-scale corruption in Chongqing, writing to himself: “hearing the news, I go pale. I do not know what the prospects are for this revolution. I am overcome with grief.”\textsuperscript{11} He often personally intervened to ensure punishment in big corruption cases. When Lin Shiliang, close associate of the prominent banker and politician H. H. Kung, used his contacts to escape punishment for embezzling 30 million yuan, CKS “intervened and ordered him killed the very next day.”\textsuperscript{12} When the Tianjin salt magnates appealed directly to CKS to free them from arrest, he rebuffed them and the order came down for a thorough investigation of corruption in the salt trade.\textsuperscript{13} He often ordered his generals to clean up military corruption.\textsuperscript{14} Throughout his long political career, CKS benefitted many times from his reputation of personal incorruptibility.\textsuperscript{15}

Despite the severity of corruption and occasional harsh punishments for individuals, the reform measures rolled out in the late 1920s and 1930 were aborted relatively quickly or failed to take hold. This was not because the KMT leadership would not have preferred in theory to


Three scholars who have examined Chiang Kai-shek’s diary extensively believe it to be a useful record of the Generalissimo’s thoughts, though with parts written with posterity in mind. (Author’s interviews in Taiwan, July, 2018.)


\textsuperscript{12} Ma and Xing, “Why is Chiang Kai-shek’s Anti-corruption ‘Lacking Muscle?’,” p. 6.

\textsuperscript{13} Zhou, \textit{Archive Secret}, p. 72.

\textsuperscript{14} Document at repository number 002-010100-00010-074, President Chiang Kai-shek Case Files, Academia Historica Archives, 1928/3/28.; Document at repository number 002-010100-00005-080, President Chiang Kai-shek Case Files, Academia Historica Archives, 1927/1/29.

reduce corruption, but because it still needed—or at least felt it needed—corrupt allies to govern China and stay in power. Much of China was still only shakily under KMT control or ruled by KMT-allied warlords. As Patricia Thornton explains, opponents to “the campaign against ‘local bullies and evil gentry’” within the KMT, like “right-wing Nationalist Party ideologue Dai Jitao,” argued that the party needed cooperation from landed elites to win the support of the local communities that they still controlled. The Central Political Council was afraid of “destabilizing the already fragile state of most county government operations.”\textsuperscript{16} In Hubei, leaders walked back the campaign when they realized that curbing corruption was negatively impacting tax revenue and that the scope was widening to target too many wealthy allies.\textsuperscript{17} Despite CKS’s intervention, the case against the Tianjin salt magnates stalled because of complaints by the Tianjin Merchants Association that finance in the city was being hurt by the investigation, and also because investigators realized that “if investigated thoroughly, it would have implicated lots of important people.”\textsuperscript{18} As for the lijin, despite being officially banned starting January 1\textsuperscript{st}, 1931, it continued to be a “favourite financing tool of local power-holders.”\textsuperscript{19} CKS himself acknowledged failure with some “guilt” in a speech in late 1930: “in spite of the state of corruption into which Party affairs have degenerated...not a single case of impeachment and prosecution of corrupt officials (with the exception of the ringleaders of rebellions) has so far taken place.”\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{16} Thornton, Disciplining the State, p. 108.

\textsuperscript{17} Zhu, Study on the Policy of “Evil Gentry” between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party during the National Revolution, p. 33.

\textsuperscript{18} Zhou, Archive Secret, p. 72.

\textsuperscript{19} Boecking, “Unmaking the Chinese Nationalist State,” p. 290.

These efforts failed for two related reasons: CKS’s constrained leadership and the continued weakness of the state. CKS was eager to curb corruption, at least in principle, but his need for political support and unity was so desperate that it pushed corruption control onto the back burner. His dependence on a diverse coalition of supporters constrained his ability to take reform measures that would have challenged their economic interests. Consider Jay Taylor’s explanation of why CKS retreated from his first stab at an anti-corruption measure: an attempt to centralize military finances in 1925.

“Chiang soon realized that he had to give the fight against corruption much lower priority than that of retaining cohesion and loyalty among his disparate supporters and allies, both civilian and military. He had no choice. Significantly, however, his aborted effort to implement this basic financial reform as soon as he had obtained command of the Revolutionary Army in 1925 does suggest that he was aware of endemic corruption on the mainland…”

Taylor connects CKS’s limited ability to push reforms to the background situation of national fragmentation, which both directly inhibited top-down reform measures and created an all-encompassing need for unity, even with corrupt actors.

After the failed reform attempts in the early years of the Nanjing Decade, the KMT seemed to make its peace with corruption as the price of useful allies and necessary revenue. It was in the Nanjing Decade, for example, that the government established a semi-official, “covert opium monopoly.” In Shanghai, the powerful, drug-smuggling Green Gang could “count on the public cooperation of government agencies such as the Chinese Maritime Customs.” Some scholars go so far as to say that the opium trade, denounced by the government that engaged in it,

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was the issue with “the most potential to cause a disastrous loss of legitimacy for the regime.” Though politically risky and illegal, opium could bring the government much-needed revenue—tens of millions each year. This Faustian bargain, and similar compromises with corruption, were major factors in the KMT’s delegitimization and eventual defeat by the Chinese Communist Party in the late 1940s.

**Chiang Kai-shek’s Power Grows**

Also unfolding during the Nanjing Decade was a KMT movement not directly against corruption but with consequences for the relationship between CKS and his government: the New Life Movement (NLM). The NLM was CKS’s campaign to improve public morality, discipline, and hygiene through a top-down promotion of traditional culture, including Confucianism, and select ideas from Western culture, such as individualism. To enforce these new standards of citizen behavior and thought, CKS moved to increase the state’s control over society, for example by empowering policemen to police social mores and minor public behaviors. Much of the campaign was actually carried out by semi-governmental organizations created by and/or loyal to CKS, such as the New Life Movement Promotion Association. By the end of 1935, the movement had spread to 19 provinces and over 1000 districts.

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Through the NLM, CKS was able to increase his personal control over the regime, leading to fewer constraints on his authority. In the preceding years, CKS’s leadership had hardly been absolute. Because of criticism over his “illegal” and “authoritarian” actions during a conflict with Hu Hanmin, the head of the Legislative Yuan, CKS was temporarily forced to resign his government positions in late 1931, returning in January the following year.\textsuperscript{29} The biggest challenge to CKS’s primacy within the KMT was from left-wing politician Wang Jingwei. Wang had set up a rival KMT government in Wuhan back in 1927, but it had failed almost immediately. Another government was attempted in 1931, but it quickly fell to CKS’s forces. Still, CKS felt that he could not get rid of Wang without displeasing the KMT’s left wing. Wang led various anti-CKS factions during the Nanjing Decade (1927–37), and feuded with CKS even from the premiership of the national government. He finally split with the KMT for good in 1937 and in 1940 accepted an invitation to head the Japanese collaborationist government in Nanjing.

The NLM allowed CKS to sell his self-advancement as modern nation-building, empower his loyalists in quasi-official organizations, and undermine his rivals within the KMT. Many scholars see the NLM as a fascist movement intended to elevate CKS into the position of “absolute national leader, mimicking Hitler in Germany and Mussolini in Italy.”\textsuperscript{30} CKS’s union of traditional culture and a modern European political system led Frederic Wakeman to term the


desired outcome “Confucian Fascism.” Even scholars critical of this term, such as Maggie Clinton, would agree that “departing from the ideals of social reciprocity intrinsic to dynastic strains of Confucian thought, NLM Confucianism stressed top-down chains of command and the unquestioning loyalty of social inferiors to superiors.” Starting around the same time as the NLM, some of CKS’s supporters in the KMT—many his former students from the Whampoa Military Academy—formed the Blue Shirts. This tightly-organized and initially covert group of loyalists made it their mission to make CKS China’s dictator. The Blue Shirts, along with a host of related and sometimes confusingly overlapping pro-CKS organizations, served as foot soldiers in his campaigns. The NLM in particular “meshed precisely with the spirit and program of the Blue Shirts.” While the Blue Shirts disbanded in 1938, groups of core CKS loyalists, some which had been formed even earlier, continued to be influential in the KMT—a fact that helps us understand CKS’s recovery of authority after the KMT’s defeat in the Chinese Civil War.

CKS’s major rivals fell in line with the NLM. “Even the dominant figures of the Kuomintang and the National Government that [sic] belonged to the Western Hills and Reorganization cliques, including Lin Sen and Wang Jingwei, were unable to reject Chiang Kai-shek’s undeniably ‘just’ cause, which resulted in their unanimous participation.”

31 Wakeman, “A Revisionist View of the Nanjing Decade.”


33 Wang, Chiang Kai-shek and Kuomintang Corruption, p. 16.

34 Wakeman, “A Revisionist View of the Nanjing Decade.”


autonomous “provincial ‘warlords’ [such] as Yan Xishan (Shanxi), Han Fuju (Shandong), Long Yun (Yunnan), Liu Xiang (Sichuan), etc., jumped on the bandwagon in succession, not only because of their approval of the movement, but also from a desire to maintain their de facto autonomy by displaying obedience.” CKS’s victory was evident in the fact that he succeeded Wang Jingwei as Premier in December of 1935.37 As Fukamachi Hideo argues, this was “partly due to the status he achieved as a nationally respected leader through the New Life Movement…he successfully raised his status to increase his power.”38 Perhaps the most credible recognition of CKS’s status came from the Chinese Communist Party. The CCP leadership’s initial purpose in build a cult of personality around Mao Zedong was to compete with CKS’s cult of personality.39

*Empty Gestures Against Wartime Corruption*

Years of war with Japan threw Chinese governance into disarray, which only served to loosen the already weak checks on corruption. Though hard numbers are scarce, observers agree that corruption was ubiquitous. Lloyd Eastman states that “without any question, corruption became infinitely greater during the 1940s.”40 Among officials and businesspeople, “depression about the war led to a desire to ‘live rich for now.’”41 When Japan lost, KMT officials retaking major cities had massive opportunities for corruption.42 A top official in charge of taking back

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37 That said, being temporarily kidnapped in the Xian Incident of 1936 was certainly a “constraint” on CKS’s leadership.

38 Hideo, “Prairie Fire or The Gimo’s New Clothes?” pp. 73–74.


42 Ma and Xing, “Why is Chiang Kai-shek’s anti-corruption ‘lacking muscle?’”
Japanese-controlled territory told CKS that “if things keep going this way we will have
recovered national territory but lost the hearts of the people.”\[^{43}\] CKS got word that “corruption
was rapidly spreading throughout the society. Only two months after Japan’s surrender, [CKS]
called in the newly appointed senior officials of Nanking, Shanghai, Peking, and Tianjin and
scolded them for the bad discipline of KMT officers taking over those cities.”\[^{44}\] “The corruption
of high officials” was the “chief cause of the economic chaos.”\[^{45}\] Many American officials in
China emphasized the issue of corruption in their analyses of the KMT’s problems. One noted
that “various Kuomintang officials made private estimates that between a third and a fourth of
what was actually collected from the people reached the government.”\[^{46}\] Another recalled “there
was great corruption in Chiang Kai-shek's political organization. It was increasingly dependent
on cronyism, I think. There was no real vitality in the political organization of Chiang Kai-shek,
of the Nationalist Party. The vital force, politically, was the Communist Party…”\[^{47}\] Even before
the Chinese Civil War began in earnest in 1945, Chinese military commander Li Jishen openly
expressed to U.S. officials his concern that corruption was losing the KMT popular support.\[^{48}\]


\[^{44}\] Taylor, *The Generalissimo*, p. 330. People got angry and started calling the return of these cities to KMT control
“taking” as in theft (劫收) instead of “taking over” (接收), using a kind of wordplay in Chinese where one character
is replaced by another of similar pronunciation.


\[^{46}\] Oral History Interview with John S. Service. Conducted September 12, 1977 in Berkeley, California. Chapters V
through VIII. Harry S. Truman Presidential Library.

\[^{47}\] Oral History Interview with Livingston Merchant. Conducted on May 27, 1975 in Washington, D.C. Harry S.
Truman Presidential Library. See also: Oral History Interview with Edwin W. Martin. Conducted on June 3, 1975 in
Washington, D.C. Harry S. Truman Presidential Library.

\[^{48}\] Telegram to the Department of State from Chungking via Navy, August 16, 1944, President’s Secretary’s File
(Franklin D. Roosevelt Administration), 1933 – 1945, File Unit: China, July-December 1944, Box 27.
In 1944, an anti-corruption, pro-reform movement within the KMT began to gain momentum. Many influential people in this movement, such as Liang Hancao and Gu Zhengding, were from the right-wing CC Clique, which was opposed to CKS having total control of the party. Their first goal was to get rid of H. H. Kung and the economic minister Weng Wenhao, who were both seen as very corrupt. Members of the People’s Political Council (PPC) and the Federation of Democratic Parties advocated wide-ranging reforms, including measures to eliminate corruption, profiteering, excess bureaucracy, and inefficiency in tax collection. The PPC was frustrated by malfeasance and mismanagement “in the Ministries of Finance, Military Administration, Food and Education” in particular, and “recommended by a vote of 112 to 6 that the Minister of Finance not be allowed to serve simultaneously as head of a bank.” A critical mass of important legislative and judicial leaders forced CKS to commit to serious reform in March of 1946. CKS had already tasked General Qian Dajun, Beijing mayor Xiong Bin, and other high-level officials with cleaning up the most troubling corruption. But this was not nearly enough to assuage the “veritable rebellion” that the party leadership faced.

49 Wang, Chiang Kai-shek and Kuomintang Corruption, p. 186.

The American Embassy was even informed of a plot among young officers “to seize Chiang at Kunming upon his return...and force him to issue order for dismissal H. H. Kung, Ho Ying-chin, Chen Li-fu, Chen Kuo-fu, and other unnamed high officials.” However, “Kuomintang sources [were] inclined to dismiss matter as nothing serious.” See: Document 262, FRUS: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, China, Volume VI, 1944/1/24.

54 Document at repository number 002-090106-00017-293, President Chiang Kai-shek Case Files, Academia Historica Archives, 1946/1/11.
The pressure was compounded later that month by strongly-worded articles in the U.S. press by reporter William Newton attacking KMT corruption. The KMT’s belated response was a proposal that all party members would have to re-register and party members and government officials would have to declare their assets—those who did not would be out of a job. This would, in theory, purge the party of corruption, factionalism, and other problems. Additionally, there were plans to have some officials “register property before taking up their positions,” and to have “absolutely no fake or changed names on bank accounts.”

Despite his continued commitment to revolutionary state-building, CKS had good reason to be resistant to this reform movement: it directly threatened his political position. Many reform advocates connected their demands for clean government with demands for more “democratic governance” in the KMT, signaling their opposition to CKS’s autocratic dominance. So even if reformers within the party had convinced the whole KMT leadership that corruption was destroying the country and had to be dealt with, CKS would have had good political reasons to keep from accepting the reformers’ demands. This exemplifies a general point about motivations: anti-corruption efforts in authoritarian regimes led by anyone who is not the autocrat or one of his close allies are almost always seen as too risky by the autocrat, who is after all the leader of the system that reformers are calling corrupt.

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56 Document at repository number 008–010602-00047-036, Vice-President Chen Cheng Case Files, Academia Historica Archives, 1946/4/3.

57 Ma and Xing, “Why is Chiang Kai-shek’s anti-corruption ‘lacking muscle’?”, p. 46.


59 Document at repository number 001-011130-00051-018, Nationalist Government (general documents), Academia Historica Archives, 1946/07/03.

60 Wang, Chiang Kai-shek and Kuomintang Corruption, p. 188.
Motivation aside, CKS’s leadership was again constrained by coalitional politics. CKS could not—or at least believed he could not—afford to lose allies and revenue, even if they were corrupt. The need was especially dire in the middle of a civil war and with the state already falling apart. Curbing corruption, which would entail purging useful military and economic specialists, was thought to come second to political stability. This “need for loyalty” argument applied both to the need to secure the KMT’s position as China’s ruling party and to CKS’s desire to retain his top position within the regime. CKS was, the United States Embassy concluded, a “political hostage to the corrupt system which he manipulates—he cannot institute sweeping reforms without destroying the balance.” The Central Intelligence Agency’s analysts concurred that “the conservative landlord groups from which Chiang derives much of his support would hardly accept the desired reforms.”

Ultimately, the anti-corruption movement failed as the most important reform proposals came to nothing, though some would be resurrected after the move to Taiwan. CKS’s Empty Gestures toward reform were even less substantive than the Failed Reform of the late 1920s, though CKS did take a few small steps, such as firing General Xia Chuzhong for embezzlement. In sum, the reasons for this failure were the reform movement’s challenge to CKS’s position, the continued constraints on his leadership, and the weakness of state capacity, which was exacerbated by the Chinese Civil War.

**Massive Corruption in Taiwan**

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63 Document at repository number 001-016142-00009-057, Chiang Kai-shek Orders and Approvals (2), Academia Historica Archives, 1947/10/22.
Taiwan had at this point already been under KMT rule for several years, since Japan had ceded it to China after being defeated in World War II in 1945. The KMT appointed Chen Yi as the first governor and garrison commander of Taiwan, which administratively became a province. Chen brought thousands of officials from the mainland and took over “virtually all political, administrative, and security posts, including control of all state-run—meaning formerly Japanese private and government-owned—enterprises, which dominated the economy.” The island’s population was initially welcoming of Taiwan’s return to mainland rule, but the mood quickly soured.

KMT governance of Taiwan in the late 1940s was abysmally violent and corrupt. The mainlanders preyed upon the populace and looted public and private assets. “Beginning…in October 1945 the same ineptitude, corruption and exploitation which characterized Chiang Kai-shek’s government on the mainland was evident in Taiwan.” The American general Albert Wedemeyer “reported to the Secretary of State [that] ‘Chen Yi and his henchmen ruthlessly, corruptly, and avariciously imposed their regime.’” Chen Yi himself admitted that in Taiwan “kickback embezzlement is a terrifying contagious disease.” “By the beginning of 1947, these

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64 American diplomat George Kerr, however, protested vigorously to the Truman administration that “Japan had surrendered Formosa to the Allies, and not to China alone.” George H. Kerr, Formosa Betrayed (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 145.


66 Kerr, Formosa Betrayed, pp. 61–96.


褚靜濤，《國民政府收復台灣研究》 (北京：中華書局, 2013), p. 496.
Nationalist officials had taken over or absconded with an estimated $1 billion [USD] in property and other assets.70 In late 1946, an investigation team from the central government arrived in Taiwan and gathered evidence about 68 cases of embezzlement in two ministries.71 A debate took place over whether Chen was himself corrupt or simply unable to control subordinates.72 In any case, besides a few harsh prosecutions there were no efforts made by the KMT leadership to curb corruption.73 In late February 1947, public anger over the KMT’s political repression and economic mismanagement, including corruption, exploded into an island-wide uprising. The government violently put down the uprising in what is now referred to as the February 28 Massacre, killing between 10,000 and 28,000 people.74

After the February 28 Massacre, the KMT made some effort to reform Taiwan’s government. Chen was replaced by Wei Daoming, many of Chen’s top officials were ousted, and some Taiwanese were brought in to replace them.75 The central government also reduced Wei’s authority relative to what Chen had wielded. Lin Hsiao-ting argues that “the decreased provincial authority served as a crucial factor in the final survival of Chiang Kai-shek’s political life in the late 1940s and early 1950s,” when he was not formally head of state but still had some authority.

71 Chu, Research on the National Government’s Recovery of Taiwan, p. 497.
73 Chu, Research on the National Government’s Recovery of Taiwan, p. 498.
74 See: Kerr, Formosa Betrayed, Chapter 12.; Allan J. Shackleton, Formosa Calling, An Eyewitness Account of Conditions in Taiwan During the February 28th 1947 Incident (Taiwan Publishing Company and Taiwan Communiqué, Chevy Chase, 1998).

75 Lin, Accidental State, p. 54.
vis-à-vis the provincial chairman.\textsuperscript{76} In January 1949, CKS replaced Wei with close ally Chen Cheng, but the situation in Taiwan did not immediately change. As Chen Cheng admitted in a speech in February 1949, “many people are saying the government is corrupt and incompetent.”\textsuperscript{77} There was little evidence at the time that the long-standing unhealthy tendencies that had lost the KMT the mainland would not simply continue in Taiwan.

3. The Origins of the KMT Reconstruction

The KMT’s increasingly obvious “loss of China” was a massive blow to Chiang Kai-shek’s prestige, threatening his position as the regime’s leader. By December of 1948, the United States was urging that CKS be replaced.\textsuperscript{78} Also challenging him was the Guangxi Clique, led by Vice President Li Zongren. “The victory of General [Li Zongren] in the contest for the vice presidency reflected popular dissatisfaction with Chiang’s failure to effect reform measures and represented a vote of protest against the ineffectiveness of his Government.”\textsuperscript{79} CKS was “humiliated and maddened” that the party seemed out of his control.\textsuperscript{80} The last straw for many in the KMT was the Communist Party’s successful Huaihai Campaign (Nov. 1948 – Jan. 1949), after which the Nationalist army was no longer able to hold the important Yangtze River defense line. So on January 21, 1949, the Generalissimo “retired” from leading the government and was succeeded by Li.

\textsuperscript{76} Lin, Accidental State, p. 54.

\textsuperscript{77} Document at repository number 008-010401-00003-002, Vice-President Chen Cheng Case Files, Academia Historica Archives, p. 12.

\textsuperscript{78} Lin, Accidental State, p. 74.


\textsuperscript{80} Lin, Accidental State, p. 75.
Perhaps surprisingly, CKS was soon able to bounce back and achieve new heights of dominance and authority in the regime. He managed this by leveraging unofficial and continuing loyalties not affected by his formal retirement in a paradoxically advantageous period of jarring transition for the regime. CKS had been able to appoint several loyalists right before he retired and his orders still meant more than Li’s in some parts of the military. More importantly, many who were not loyal to CKS simply left the KMT altogether, rather than quixotically following the core leadership to Taiwan. The Communists had won on the mainland and the assumption was that the takeover of Taiwan would soon follow; those who had supported the KMT opportunistically or with less than fervent devotion had few good reasons to make the journey. Some key figures whom CKS had relied on to run China but who were seen as deeply corrupt did not move to Taiwan, such as T. V. Soong and H. H. Kung. Some rivals, like Li, fled to the United States, not Taiwan, when their armies were defeated. To make a complicated story simple, Taiwan became the only part of China the Communists did not hold and the Nationalists solidly did, and CKS’s supporters were in Taipei.

Increasing control of the military told the same story. It was only after retreating to Taiwan that the “adequate combination of Party pervasiveness and coercive power was at the disposal of the KMT to enforce its dictates vis-a-vis the military.” CKS was able in 1950 to re-establish a system of political commissars in military units at each level through which the party

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81 Lin, Accidental State, p. 82.

82 Records of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, ORE 7–50, “Probable Developments in Taiwan, 03/20/50,” Record Group 263.

83 The “four big families” that held great economic power in the 1940s in Nationalist-controlled China—the Chiang, Song, Kun, and Chen families—were broken up by the move. See also: Jonathan Fenby, Chiang Kai-shek: China’s generalissimo and the nation he lost (New York: Carroll & Graf, 2004), p. 212.

84 Heinlein, Political Warfare, p. 514.
could control the military. It was only in Taiwan that CKS managed the “centralization of military payrolls...[and] procurement” first attempted in 1925. At the same time, “beginning in early 1950 the secret police [controlled by Chiang Ching-kuo]...purged the military establishment of scores of officers who had been labelled untrustworthy.”

In March 1950, CKS formally returned to the presidency with deep support among the remaining KMT members. He had remained head of the party throughout, which gave him a strong position from which to stage a comeback. Perhaps also CKS’s year out of the presidency showed that no other Nationalist leader had a magic bullet that could stop the CCP’s advance. Upon his return, American observers concluded that “the authority of the President is close to absolute in those matters in which he chose to exercise it.”

**CKS’s Motives for Reform**

The tens of thousands of Nationalists newly arrived in Taiwan found themselves in a precarious geopolitical position, to put it mildly. Besides the hostility of much of the local population, it was commonly assumed among observers, including in Taipei, that communist forces would soon invade the island. The regime was also reeling from the U.S.’s virtual abandonment of its former ally amid attempts to reach out to the victorious CCP. The need to prepare for an invasion was palpable in the early months of 1950.

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Faced with these challenges “both external and internal, [the] KMT national security apparatus under Chiang Ching-kuo began campaigns of terror to root out Communist networks and sympathizers on the island and to extend the reach of their surveillance and cells down to the grass roots.” In the first few months after the official retreat in December 1949, pro-CKS elements in the KMT were “relatively successful in stabilizing Nationalist rule domestically and reestablishing Chiang Kai-shek’s supremacy in the political hierarchy.” In the end, the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 changed America’s mind about defending Taiwan, and China has been successfully deterred from invading the island ever since.

The combination of the loss of the Chinese Civil War and the precarious position in Taiwan led CKS to reflect on past mistakes and to rethink how to build a strong, prosperous, modern, non-communist China under his leadership. The most consequential of his conclusions, at least for the regime, was the urgent need to fundamentally rebuild the KMT. As CKS explained in a speech in 1951: “Ever since our party lost to the Communists two years ago, I have come to believe firmly that if we ever want to destroy the Communists, recover the Mainland, and save our people, we have to first make our various organizations more solid and stronger than those of the Communists” [emphasis in the original]. CKS saw the whole

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92 An alternative view is that it was the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance on February 14, 1950 that changed the U.S.’s position on Taiwan. See: Shen Zhihua, “The Reasons Sino-Soviet Relations Broke Down,” 2012/1. / 沈志华, “中苏关系破裂原因,” 2012/1, (video in Chinese, skip to 25:40): [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rOcdrhGOsEY](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rOcdrhGOsEY)

93 Author’s interviews with two scholars of the period suggest CKS’s reflection was genuine and greatly shaped his future plans.

struggle as a “war of our organization against their organization” [emphasis in the original]. Other KMT leaders came to similar conclusions. Deputy Commander-in-Chief of Taiwan Defense Command Shih Chueh believed that it had been the CCP’s “superior organization” and KMT mistakes that led to defeat. This need for strong organization led CKS to undertake major state-building reforms.

CKS launched the KMT Reconstruction (1950–52) to reform the institutional makeup of the party and its relationship with the state—changes that would define the regime for decades to come. The Reconstruction would centralize and bureaucratize the party, expand the party’s control over Taiwan’s government and society, and promote “Party cells as the basic units of the Party.” With these moves, CKS argued, the party would be able to “eliminate corruption and factions, to bring in younger party members, and to focus on serving society and the masses.” In instructions for the Reconstruction, CKS invoked the party’s revolutionary legacy, the suffering of the Chinese people, and Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People. He argued that the Reconstruction had to be a crucial node and turning point in restoring that

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95 Lin, Paths to Democracy, p. 67. Lin is citing Chiang Kai-shek’s speech “The Principles and Efficacy of Organization.”

96 Record of Interview with Mr. Shih Chueh, Oral History Series, Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1986/1, p. 402.

97 There was even some discussion of whether the party should change its name. See: Document at repository number 002-020400-00041-114, President Chiang Kai-shek Case Files, Academia Historica Archives, 1950/3/17.; Document at repository number 002-090104-00001-310, President Chiang Kai-shek Case Files, Academia Historica Archives, 1950/3/16.


revolution because the party’s failures threatened the people and the party with destruction.\textsuperscript{100} The KMT was not rebuilt from scratch; despite the devastation of the Second Sino-Japanese War and the Chinese Civil War, the transplanted core of the revolutionary party retained significant organizational capacity.

Corruption control was necessary to advance the KMT Reconstruction because CKS understood it to have been a costly failing of the KMT in the past. After “five months” of reflection, CKS concluded that there were five types of KMT mistakes. The first of these, about compromises made, included that “our party is in this dire situation because we abandoned our principles…in politics we compromised with corrupt local tyrants and evil gentry, in the economy we compromised with speculators and monopolists, and in our hearts we became full of defeatism.” The party could succeed in saving the country and the people “only by eliminating corruption,” he argued.\textsuperscript{101} In private as well, CKS wrote that “corruption and discord are the main causes of losing our nation.”\textsuperscript{102} CKS wrote in his diary on March 31\textsuperscript{st}, 1949 that the KMT was being defeated because of its “discipline being in the dust, organizational collapse…failure to set up a cadre system, and cadre corruption and selfishness.”\textsuperscript{103}


\textsuperscript{101} Document at repository number 002-020400-00041-071, President Chiang Kai-shek Case Files, Academia Historica Archives, 1949/7/18.; See also: Document at repository number 002-080300-00034-003, President Chiang Kai-shek Case Files, Academia Historica Archives, 1950/7/27.

\textsuperscript{102} Document at repository number 005-010502-00055-036, President Chiang Ching-kuo Case Files, Academia Historica Archives, Undated.

CKS repeatedly raised the issue in public and promised to address it through the reforms. In July of 1949, for example, he argued that “our fellow party members must no longer behave in such a way as to undo the discipline and make people despise the organization…The reform of the party this time is calculated to take stringent measures against those members who have been proven to be corrupt and opportunistic and have violated law and discipline.”\textsuperscript{104} Part of this quotation was widely repeated in written materials promoting the Reconstruction.\textsuperscript{105} There are many variations on: “the reform’s focus is eliminating corruption, getting fresh blood, thoroughly investigating and reflecting on mistakes, and serving as a model for the people.”\textsuperscript{106} KMT-run newspapers were clear that “because of widespread corruption, we have to reform the government, military, and economy, restore the people’s trust in the government, [and] prevent the military from going off on its own without orders from above.”\textsuperscript{107}

Other Reform Motives?

While the preceding section has basically accepted CKS’s stated reasons for launching the KMT Reconstruction, a common assumption about autocratic reforms is that they are simply a cover for eliminating political rivals. While reasonable for other cases, however, this view is not useful in understanding the KMT Reconstruction and its effects. CKS’s personal power may have increased as the campaign reordered the state to match his wishes, but he already had

\textsuperscript{104} Heinlein, \textit{Political Warfare}, p. 504.


\textsuperscript{106} Qin Xiaoyi, \textit{The History of the Political Development of the Republic of China} (Modern China Publishing House, 1985), p. 1636.

\textsuperscript{107} Central Daily News / 中央日報 (ZYRB), 1950/3/24, p. 2.
unconstrained leadership at its start, and anyway different kinds of goals are not incompatible.\(^{108}\)

When I lay out the achievements of the reforms later in this section, it will become clear that there was too much to this Reconstruction for it to be explained away so simply.

If we believe that corruption control was seriously pursued, it might be logical to assume that this was due to American influence over the KMT. The United States was certainly a desperately-needed military ally and frequently tried to influence developments in mainland China and Taiwan. The U.S. established a military mission to aid the KMT on February 20, 1946 and gave Taiwan nearly $1.5 billion in nonmilitary aid between 1951 and 1965.\(^{109}\) This was a huge sum for the small island, but still less than what the U.S. gave in military assistance.

However, the U.S. played at most a minor role in motivating the KMT Reconstruction. For one thing, the Reconstruction was not what Washington had had in mind. In the early 1950s, the U.S. hoped Taiwan would transition gradually to democracy, not undergo a “quasi-Leninist” reorganization.\(^{110}\) In their communications, U.S. officials explicitly pushed for greater democracy and linked it to the KMT regime’s survival.\(^{111}\) And as Shang Ying points out, the American government had been urging the KMT to curb corruption and other abuses of power

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\(^{110}\) This term to describe the KMT’s regime in this time period comes from Cheng Tun-Jen, “Democraticizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan,” *World Politics* 41, No. 4 (1989), p. 471.

by officials for decades to no avail. Taiwan proved “not to a be a predictable ward,” acting “independent of and sometimes contrary to American interests.”

Furthermore, in early 1950, CKS was planning the Reconstruction at a time when the U.S. was supporting other contenders to take over the KMT and more generally had given the regime up for lost. “The inactivation of the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group—China and the retreat of the Nationalist forces to the island of Taiwan temporarily ended the American program of military aid to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's government.” As a result, the U.S. was not in a position to influence CKS greatly through personnel. The American Chargé D’affaires related in June 1950 that CKS was “recently more bitter than ever against [the] US. As is always case when he is in tight spot and things going badly he shouts over telephone and at visitors, and slams objects about his office.” CKS did not trust those in his regime too closely tied to the U.S; he dismissed Wei Daoming, pressured K. C. Wu to flee to America, and put Sun Liren under house arrest. Despite their repeated efforts, U.S. advisers were unable to convince the KMT to abandon the political commissar system. When interviewed, a former KMT

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114 Secretary of State Dean Acheson was widely, though slightly inaccurately, quoted as saying the U.S. should “let the dust settle” following the Chinese Communist victory on the mainland. This was interpreted as meaning the U.S. was not standing behind CKS. See: James Chace, *Acheson: The Secretary of State Who Created the American World* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), Chapter 20.; Lin, *Accidental State*, p. 141.


intelligence officer who arrived in Taiwan in 1949 and claimed to have extensive experience with early corruption cases flatly rejected the suggestion that CKS’s or CCK’s anti-corruption efforts resulted from American pressure.  

Explanations of corruption control focused on grassroots pressure from society or proto-democratic institutions similarly run into major difficulties. The Nationalist party-state in this period was a model of state autonomy. The cleavage between the newly-arrived mainlanders, who worked in the regime, and the Taiwanese, who mostly did not, was very salient. There had not yet been time to establish strong ties across this divide to the local gentry or businesses either. And Taiwan’s local businesses were not powerful conglomerates that could hold the economy hostage if the government planned unfavorable policies, like South Korea’s chaebol. In fact, one goal of the KMT Reconstruction was to recruit for the party heavily among the local population and establish party representation in various sectors of society. Believing superior CCP organization—even more than military prowess—had defeated him on the mainland, CKS drew his inspiration for the reformed structure the KMT should take from the CCP. The reforms “accentuated [the KMT’s] Leninist characteristics.”

An explanation that holds more water for why the KMT curbed corruption is that military threat necessitated it. CKS himself raised the KMT’s contest with the CCP as a crucial justification for the need to clean out corruption, end factionalism, and generally carry out the reforms he proposed. The official records of his meetings from 1950–1952 show that CKS

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119 Author’s interview, 2018/8/4.


121 Dickson, “The Kuomintang Before Democratization,” p. 43.
personally spent significant time on military affairs and thinking about Communist strengths and weaknesses. This argument does not contradict the general one I advance because in this case military threat motivated state-building and state-building involved corruption control. However, it would be a mistake to collapse CKS’s commitment to state-building into a rational response to threat model. Firstly, CKS’s revolutionary state-building agenda was long-standing, though often frustrated on the mainland. And secondly, the U.S. decision to guarantee Taiwan’s security did not cause CKS to abandon his agenda. CKS did not, for example, slash the military budget to transition to peaceful development, as Japan did after World War II under the Yoshida Doctrine. We can also note that if external military threat led reliably to anti-corruption reform, then authoritarian anti-corruption reform would be very common indeed.

Overall, CKS sought to curb corruption in the early 1950s because it was necessary for the success of a state-building project, in this case the KMT Reconstruction, which in turn reflected CKS’s long-standing commitment to building a strong, modern, anti-communist China. CKS drew “on a long legacy of party reform, going back to Sun Yat-sen, aimed at making the KMT a more effective revolutionary weapon.” This explanation basically accepts and generalizes the stated rationales for the reforms, including reorganizing and centralizing the party, reducing corruption and factionalism, and strengthening the KMT’s influence in society.

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The timing of these measures is best explained not by a change in fundamental KMT goals, but by a change in strategies and opportunities. Many of the anti-corruption measures carried out had been attempted in the past, but the retreat was a major turning point for the regime—almost like a refounding. It does not make sense to say the whole exercise was a façade for CKS to grab power.

4. The KMT Reconstruction and Its Success

In this section, I lay out how the KMT transformed between 1950 and 1952, argue that one of its successes was reducing corruption, and explain why. The Central Reconstruction Committee (CRC), which had vast powers to oversee the Reconstruction, first met in August 1950. CKS personally selected many of its members and sidelined rivals by shunting CC Clique members and other party veterans who might interfere with his plans into the newly created but largely powerless Central Advisory Committee. Notably, the CRC membership was relatively young, averaging 47 years old.\(^\text{126}\) The CRC met 420 times, averaging several times a week.\(^\text{127}\) It launched multiple reforms, with the most fundamental being the dismissal and re-registration of all party members.

Re-registering KMT members en masse was the first step in investigating and cleansing the party. It was not a new idea, having been proposed and promised at least once before, in 1947—but now it would actually happen. Just over 20,000 civilian members re-applied, with the vast majority ultimately being accepted.\(^\text{128}\) Those who did not re-apply were automatically out.\(^\text{129}\)


\(^{127}\) KMT Central Reconstruction Committee Resolution Compilation (CRC Secretariat, Taipei, 1952).


This was an important process of assessment because during the chaotic 1930s and 1940s many people had joined the KMT almost without screening. According to the CRC, the two key reasons for making people rejoin the party were the “chaos of war” and “taking the opportunity to clean those who wavered and were corrupted, and those without solid faith [in the cause].” Now members would all be investigated, mainly for any past disloyalty, corruption, incompetence, or act of “oppressing or exploiting people.” This was also true for new party members, whom the KMT recruited aggressively in this period. The CRC explained that “from now on, our party pays a lot of attention to quality, where quality is cleanliness and being committed to revolution…new members must undergo ‘small group discussion,’ training, testing, and only then can join the party.” By the end of the Reconstruction in October 1952, the total of returning members and new members both civilian and military was around 280,000.

Figure 2.1:

KMT Reconstruction Organization Chart

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Related to the investigation and training of members was the KMT’s reorganization into party cells, which were embedded into governmental bodies and societal institutions to an unprecedented degree. Each cell had “3–11 people,” a reduction from the party branches of 10–50 they replaced. This small size made them more versatile in terms of where they could penetrate. Overall, over 34,000 party cells were established.¹³⁵ These party cells served similar functions to those in the CCP and other communist regimes. “Party cells in government organizations gave the KMT political control over the state apparatus, cells in economic, educational, and social organs allowed the KMT to control and mobilize the population.”¹³⁶ From their positions in schools, overseas communities, military-run businesses, and many other

¹³⁵ Lin, *Paths to Democracy*, pp. 74–75.

¹³⁶ Dickson, “The Kuomintang Before Democratization,” p. 46.
places, party cells served to enforce discipline and “keep the leadership informed.”\textsuperscript{137} In the military, the new political commissars “‘were charged with forming and supervising party cells, conducting political indoctrination, and serving as the party’s eyes and ears in the military.’ Membership drives in 1952–54 tried to recruit at least one member from every squad and to have a party cell in each platoon.”\textsuperscript{138}

The Reconstruction saw previously important bodies disbanded, sidelined, or bypassed. The CRC replaced the Central Executive Committee, which was disbanded. The existing Supervision Commission, which combated corruption and other disciplinary infractions, also ceased operations. Various other central committees were relegated to limbo, shutting out some factions from power forever.\textsuperscript{139} As mentioned, the Central Advisory Committee kept older and less malleable party veterans out of the way. These institutional changes, and the KMT Reconstruction more generally, were planned by the President’s Office, which CKS had created and staffed in the summer of 1949. The declaration of martial law in May 1949, besides having a chilling effect on society and civil liberties, loosened the already weak constraints on the top leadership. CKS was able to bypass constitutional requirements, like having executive orders approved by the legislature.\textsuperscript{140}

Aiming to ensure future discipline, the party created a centralized disciplinary and investigatory apparatus, and placed trained teams in party and state organs to monitor them. The new Discipline Committee coordinated these efforts and oversaw 1,040 cases involving

\textsuperscript{137} Gold, \textit{State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle}, p. 60.


violations of party discipline before August 1952.\textsuperscript{141} Most of these had to do with officials being suspected of aiding the Communists, not corruption, but a powerful mechanism was in place to deter or punish future corruption. The Discipline Committee had subsidiary committees at all party levels and carried out yearly re-registrations of all party members as a compliance measure.\textsuperscript{142} It did not hold back from investigating high-level officials and was aided at lower levels by numerous investigatory teams.

Investigatory teams placed in different sectors and levels were able to accuse cadres of disciplinary violations, pass these accusations up through the Reconstruction Committees one level above theirs (e.g. district reports to county), and then have people thrown out of the party or otherwise punished—all without judicial oversight. Some teams were “roving,” descending on a county and carrying out training in KMT procedures, propagandizing, and investigating discipline. Special teams mobilized from the CRC investigated the government’s work in four areas, “the economy, society, culture, and politics,” and reported directly to the president.\textsuperscript{143} In one monthly report from 1952, the CRC stated that it continued to investigate members and give out registration cards, sent committee members to every county to oversee local campaign work, and held four meetings on small group issues, two on economic issues, and one on party work. They also discussed various random inspections that might be carried out.\textsuperscript{144}

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{141} Dickson, “The Lessons of Defeat,” p. 71.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{142} Chen Zhengmao, “Survival under Defeat: The Nationalist Party’s Reform Movement in Taiwan,” \textit{Journal of General Science of Northern Taiwan Institute of Science and Technology}, (2008), Iss. 4, p. 99.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{143} Feng, \textit{Research on the Chinese Kuomintang Reconstruction in Taiwan 1950–1952}, pp. 64, 110, 133.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{144} Document at repository number 6.41/84, Kuomintang Party History Archives, April 1952.}
\end{footnotes}
Early 1952 saw the launch of a more proactive discipline campaign, in which local cadres were supposed to reveal and report their personal histories, monitor and criticize each other, and “clean themselves.” Indeed, the whole Reconstruction was infused with campaigns aimed to make party members develop intrinsic motivation to support KMT projects and stay disciplined. Party members were supposed to rouse their morale, cultivate a fighting spirit, and make progress by working harder and taking personal responsibility. Adding to the general atmosphere, major papers like the Central Daily News (中央日報) covered the Reconstruction heavily, usually on the front page, for the two years it was underway. Many of the KMT’s campaign-style tactics and methods were similar to those used to spread central government directives to local areas by the CCP on the mainland. After the Reconstruction, the tasks of investigatory teams and Reconstruction Committees were institutionalized, often by the party cells permanently embedded in state organs at all levels.

Also under the umbrella of the Reconstruction, the leadership reformed party-controlled businesses to reduce conflicts of interest. While mainlanders’ connections to local Taiwanese businesses were initially weak, there were some businesspeople who followed the KMT from the mainland to Taiwan. More importantly, the nearly defeated party still managed major enterprises, like its newspapers, broadcasting company, and other propaganda apparatuses. It also managed interests in “insurance, machinery, and textiles.” In 1950, “industrial

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146 Qin, First Draft of the Honorable President Chiang’s Major Events, p. 5072.
147 See Chapter Four.
production” was “almost entirely a government responsibility.” The KMT’s goal in these reforms was to get profits out of its businesses but maintain state autonomy from business interests, in part as an anti-corruption measure. So the CRC rationalized and reorganized the party-run businesses, purposefully dividing ownership and management. They also put in place hiring restrictions, like three-year waiting periods, and especially tight supervisory measures to prevent collusion and theft among employees. These were not the largest reforms, but the issue of party-run businesses is a tricky one for anti-corruption policies, as evidenced by the CCP’s struggle to define the nature of its party-run businesses in China’s reform era.

Finally, one minor policy worth noting is that the KMT restricted officials’ movements until they could be cleared of corruption and other disciplinary violations. The party announced in February 1950 that it was strictly limiting passports for officials to travel abroad, and that officials would need to get Foreign Ministry clearance. Officials could not go to Hong Kong or Macao in their capacity as private citizens and in official capacities would not be allowed to linger. This was explicitly an anti-embezzlement measure.

There are again parallels to anti-corruption efforts by the CCP, which has in recent years tightened restrictions on the rights of certain officials to travel, move their families abroad, and take large amounts of money out of the country.

Table 2.2:

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150 Records of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, ORE 7–50, “Probable Developments in Taiwan, 03/20/50,” Record Group 263, p. 9.


Summary of the KMT Reconstruction’s Main Reforms

1. CKS created a loyal Central Reconstruction Committee with vast authority to remake the party and the state.

2. The CRC made party members reapply in order to screen, investigate, and train them. It also launched a massive drive to expand membership.

3. The KMT was reorganized into party cells, which then penetrated into governmental bodies and society to an unprecedented degree.

4. CKS brought the military firmly under KMT control with a renewal of the system of political commissars and a centralized budget. (This actually started earlier, in 1949.)

5. Important national bodies were created, rearranged, or disbanded, like the Central Executive Committee.

6. A new, centralized Discipline Committee embedded itself in party organs at various levels.

7. Special teams organized from the center brought the campaign to local areas: training, investigating, punishing wrongdoing, and reporting up.

8. Party-controlled businesses were reformed to reduce conflicts of interest.

Despite these reforms, it is worth noting that the KMT did not go after corruption at the local level in Taiwan, which by all accounts was common, especially in local elections. There were no national elections in the Republic of China until 1969, and the lowest levels of government were the most open and competitive. While some corruption continued at higher levels after the early 1950s in Taiwan, “it was at the lower levels where it was most rife.”

Clientelism was common in local elections because “the KMT tolerated the existence of

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patronage relations in local areas, but prohibited them from entering the central level or otherwise operating outside their local boundaries.”

There was a lot of corruption in “issues such as the zoning of land and the awarding of contracts for local government.” Why did the KMT allow factional conflict and money politics in local elections? The most important reason was that they did not threaten the center’s power; factions were local and most winning candidates were allied with the KMT-supported faction anyway. Since local factions operated as political machines, they needed resources to run and then to distribute to their supporters, which drove many of them to ally with the resource-rich KMT. Local elections helped maintain social stability in a country with a major social cleavage between Taiwanese locals and mainlanders, who dominated the government. Local elections also helped the KMT legitimize itself as a democracy. This rife corruption, perpetually just below the eye-line of national Taiwanese politics, would have a major effect on the regime’s overall corruption profile during democratization.

**The Reconstruction’s Outcome**

The evidence available suggests that the KMT Reconstruction was successful at corruption control, among other reforms. Crucially, many of the new organizations and institutions created by the Reconstruction endured in some form, blocking or reducing the

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156 Maguire, “Modernisation and Clean Government,” p. 82.


incentives for future corruption. The Discipline Committee, for example, remained a powerful mechanism for investigating and punishing wrongdoing. After the KMT Reconstruction was complete, “the party still continued to hold annual investigations of all party members.”\textsuperscript{160} Party cells continued to spread, routinizing discipline inspections and serving as the party’s eyes and ears in state organs and broader society. The personnel screening and training process established to handle the massive influx of new party members became the standard for future hiring decisions.\textsuperscript{161} Moreover, political control of the military, which backslides in many new regimes, only got stronger over time. In the years immediately after the Reconstruction, about one third of previously unruly and corrupt military personnel joined the party, organizing into party cells within the military’s existing structure.\textsuperscript{162} The major factions from the old KMT never rose again to challenge CKS in any serious way, and exiled corrupt allies from the past were never welcomed back into the party. The informal firewall between corrupt local politics and national politics held; violators of this rule were purged or charged with crimes, like non-KMT politician and activist Lei Chen in 1961, after he tried to unify local leaders into a new party.\textsuperscript{163}

More evidence comes from the KMT’s vigor in investigating and punishing corruption. As other scholars have noted, much of the work of clearing out bad apples was done for CKS by the retreat to Taiwan; the harder task was institutionalizing corruption control. But CKS also showed his resolve by challenging high-level corruption in late 1949 and during the KMT

\textsuperscript{160} Lin, Paths to Democracy, p. 80.


\textsuperscript{162} Tien, The Great Transition, p. 67.

Reconstruction, especially in the military. For example, the discovery of large-scale
embezzlement by General Mao Bang-chu put the leadership in a bind, “since Mao was not only a
senior military officer but also a relative of the Generalissimo.” Risking international scandal,
since Mao was also the regime’s United Nations representative, CKS purged him and ordered
“him to stand trial immediately.” The president showed similar resolve against Mao Renfang
and later Lin Dingli, both high-ups in military intelligence, as well as Lu Chengren, from the
Central Executive Committee. CKS’s in-laws, H. H. Kung and T. V. Soong, did not follow
him to Taiwan, but he at least approved the party’s resolution to expel them. At lower levels in
the party and government, the set-up of the Reconstruction provided for “blanket coverage” anti-
corruption inspection. That is because intrusive examinations for past disciplinary violations of
all varieties were integrated into the party member re-registration, training, and mobilization
process. CKS and other KMT leaders highlighted corruption as a particularly dangerous
disciplinary violation, allowing reports of it to jump bureaucratic levels to reach the center.

The CRC’s own assessments of its work, for what it is worth, were positive. Within the
first year, the CRC claimed that the process of reintegrating old party members and initiating
new ones was successful, and that factionalism was disappearing. In a follow-up report, the
CRC concluded that the “remaking of the party-government relationship was completed,”

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164 Shang, Curbing Corruption, p. 250.
167 Document at repository number 002-080200-00346-011, President Chiang Kai-shek Case Files, Academia
Historica Archives, 1951/05/22.
training and education was “on schedule,” and inspections, including roving inspections had had some success. The work-style of the party, likewise, had “noticeable improvement.”

A third kind of evidence is that the KMT Reconstruction left a positive legacy of reduced corruption that has held up even under the scrutiny of historical hindsight. The KMT’s rampant corruption before 1950, including in Taiwan, was no secret to outside observers. After the reforms, appraisals underwent a transformation, to the point of exaggerating success. *The New York Times*, which had reported on the rampant KMT corruption of the 1940s, reported in 1958 that “corruption [on Taiwan] has been largely stamped out.” Certain, the visibly predatory KMT of the past seemed to have been replaced. “In the mid-1970s, a survey conducted by the *Far Eastern Economic Review* found that: ‘With perhaps one or two exceptions, corruption does not exist at the highest political levels in Nationalist China. The Chinese communists have many appellations for President Chiang Kai-shek. ‘Thief’ is not among them.’” The view among most Taiwan experts, even decades after the fact, points to the reforms being a success, specifically in reducing corruption. One Taiwanese corruption control expert I interviewed compared Taiwan under CKS to “early Singapore,” with corruption “strongly controlled.”

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168 Document at repository number 13297, Kuomintang Party History Archives, August 1951.

169 Document at repository number 13297, Kuomintang Party History Archives, August 1951.


171 Quoted in Shang, *Curbing Corruption*, p. 224.


173 Author’s interview, 2018/6/25.
KMT’s own internal assessment, based on detailed analysis of various aspects of the Reconstruction, concluded that after two years substantial progress had been made.\textsuperscript{174}

There are also indirect signs that the reforms were a success. First, there was not another corruption and economic mismanagement-related uprising by the public. Second, the pace of high-level corruption cases slowed, though there could be many reasons for this. Third, the organized opposition to the KMT that developed in the 1970s was generally not focused on the issue of corruption, though this would later change. In the 1990s and early 2000s, Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party certainly attacked the KMT for its corruption, but the target was usually the recent corruption that had seemed to rise alongside the regime’s political opening.\textsuperscript{175} Naturally, tremendous anger also surfaced over the lack of civil liberties, violations of human rights, and other brutal realities of authoritarian rule.

\textit{Explanations for the Reconstruction’s Outcome}

I argue that CKS’s unconstrained leadership, assisted by high state capacity, allowed the KMT regime to successfully rebuild itself and curb corruption in the early 1950s. CKS’s personal power allowed him to use aggressive tactics to disrupt the corrupt status quo that had settled into almost all parts of the regime. The capable party-state enforced these aggressive reforms, resulting in their institutionalization as checks on official wrongdoing after the Reconstruction’s conclusion. By contrast, democratic institutions are an unlikely explanation for the Reconstruction’s successes. Neither bottom-up pressure nor quasi-democratic institutions

\textsuperscript{174} Document at repository number 002-110701-00011-047, President Chiang Kai-shek Case Files, Academia Historica Archives, July 1952.

\textsuperscript{175} See Chapter Six.
were key in motivating CKS to carry out the reforms, and the most democratic political arena—local elections—was the least affected by these reforms.

Chiang Kai-shek’s strong leadership, recovered after the retreat to Taiwan, drove this major reorganization of the party and the state. There were no institutional constraints on CKS’s personnel choices for the powerful CRC. 176 “All 16 members were hand-picked by Chiang Kai-shek to guarantee that the Reconstruction would serve his interests. The CRC took over all administrative functions that had previously been invested in the Central Standing Committee.” 177 Once excluded from the CRC, the CC Clique had even less power to influence the course of reform. CKS overruling entrenched interests, like the military’s resistance to centralized KMT control, and bypassed institutional constraints, like judicial oversight and legislative approval. On his authority, the KMT purged even some high-level officials and military officers. Shang argues that “the paramount leader [CKS] had great personal influence over government officials because of his overwhelming personal authority and charisma.” 178 The campaign also used propaganda and ideology to keep bureaucrats in line, especially through investigatory teams sent down from the center. Influence on the Reconstruction process from Taiwanese society was limited by the weakness of connections between society and a regime dominated by newcomer mainlanders. CKS purposefully limited the contact between top officials and local elites. 179

178 Shang, Curbing Corruption, p. 232.
A non-state factor that contributed to CKS’s discretionary authority was the relative political weakness of Taiwanese socioeconomic elites. Initially, “the KMT had no ties with Taiwan's gentry, as it had on the mainland, and could therefore harm their economic and political interests without risking its own power base.” The Japanese colonial administration did not lay a strong foundation for large-scale industry in Taiwan, unlike in South Korea; Taiwan was initially and primarily for agricultural production. The economic boom in Taiwan did not begin in earnest until the 1970s, and few local businesses had the financial capacity strong enough to afford such bribes until the late 1980s. Overall, big businesses were “more reliant on the state” than it was on them; businesses that came with the KMT from the mainland had few connections in Taiwan, making them reliant on the state as well. The weakness of these elites constrained their ability to negotiate with CKS on an even footing or push back against the central government’s economic plans. Leading economic reforms is more difficult if a few businesses control a large percentage of the economy, monopolize strategic resources or services, or can mobilize public support.

While CKS was able to exercise unconstrained leadership in the Reconstruction, even greater personal control over the regime was also an outcome of the Reconstruction’s reforms. “Party authority was to be centralized as never before in the hands of Chiang Kai-shek and his

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182 Shang, Curbing Corruption, p. 222.

183 Winckler and Greenhalgh, Contending Approaches to the Political Economy of Taiwan, p. 153.
son, but the change was portrayed as essential to achieve the necessary and long-sought unity.”184 He sidelined rival factions, like the CC Clique, and promoted loyalists into the numerous positions of power vacated or created by the Reconstruction.185 By 1952, CKS became “every bit as much a ‘paramount leader’ in his own (admittedly much smaller) sphere as was Mao on the mainland.”186

State capacity was necessary but not sufficient for the KMT Reconstruction and its anti-corruption success. Such a major reorganization of the party would have led to chaos in a less capable state. Re-registering party members, building party cells, and empowering investigatory teams to penetrate governmental bodies and societal groups are all tasks that demand and demonstrate a high level of administrative/organizational capacity. The KMT also demonstrated its capacity to manage the distribution of resources by reforming party-run businesses and restricting access to the central government for local political machines. If the Reconstruction’s outcomes had come about through a gradual process of improving quality and integrity in existing KMT institutions, then pre-existing state capacity might be a sufficient explanation. But the Reconstruction required leadership. CKS and other KMT leaders planned and executed a remaking of the KMT. High state capacity does not give leaders that authority, and is perfectly compatible with constrained leaders or even collective leadership. Without a paramount leader, which is not to say CKS in particular, it is hard to see how most of the reforms that make up the KMT Reconstruction could have been pushed through.

186 Roy, Taiwan, p. 82.
The KMT’s revolutionary origins contributed to its development of both unconstrained leadership and state capacity, but did not lead automatically to anti-corruption success. Revolutions, Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way explain, “tend to produce a generation of leaders with extraordinary legitimacy and unquestioned authority, which can be used to unify the party and impose discipline during crises.” Under them are mass-based, “unusually disciplined ruling parties, marked by militarized structures, [and] strong partisan identities.”\(^{187}\) However, the KMT was already a revolutionary regime in control of a state during the Nanjing Decade (1927–37), when corruption was rampant. Further consolidation of power by the top leadership and advances in state capacity were necessary. The retreat to Taiwan was in this sense fortuitous, the challenges this relocation posed notwithstanding.

5. Chiang Ching-kuo and the Governmental Rejuvenation

Long before he took over as Taiwan’s paramount leader in the early 1970s, Chiang Ching-kuo was at his father’s side, learning to lead and cultivating his own authority within the KMT. CKS involved his son in important military and political decision-making throughout the 1940s, including tasking him late in the decade with reversing Shanghai’s troublesome inflation and economic mismanagement. After the retreat to Taiwan, CCK acted on his father’s behalf to appoint political commissars in the military, causing the U.S. to complain of his “growing influence” in military affairs.\(^{188}\) Even more importantly, he became head of the secret police, a position which he used to ruthlessly stamp out opposition to his father’s rule, committing grave human rights abuses along the way. As in other cases in authoritarian regimes, leadership of the

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coercive apparatus was a stepping stone to greater power. After a few years as Minister of Defense (1965–69) and Vice Premier (1969–72), he became Taiwan’s premier in 1972, effectively putting him in charge despite his elderly father’s position as president until his death in 1975.

From his time on the mainland, CCK is best known in China for his “tiger-hunting” anticorruption efforts in Shanghai in 1948. Shanghai was seen as representative of China’s many problems in the 1940s: foreign occupation, corruption, opium addiction, crime, prostitution, etc. But CCK’s efforts failed to bring down many “tigers” (meaning elites and high-level officials) because of “vested interests” among the “colluding officials and businesspeople.”189 In particular, the credibility of his tiger-hunting was punctured by his inability to follow through on a particular corruption case—against the Yangtze Development Corporation—that implicated members of H. H. Kung’s family.190 CKS had long shielded Kung from accusations of corruption.

In his first years in Taiwan, CCK built up his own support base and significant personal authority. Already he had close supporters from his time on the mainland: friends from his years in the USSR, supporters from when he ran Gannan in Jiangxi Province (1939–45)—“the most trusted,”—and former students.191 In Taiwan, CCK found that the secret service was in disarray


and that Communists had infiltrated the island with numerous spies, as their own documents later confirmed. CKS had just purged two of the secret service’s factions: the military intelligence group formerly headed by Dai Li “and the party intelligence group…headed by the Chen brothers.” CCK further purged those “not affiliated with him,” brought in old friends, and turned the National Security Bureau into “the core of [his] power and an inner sanctum” for key decision-making. CCK built a ruthlessly effective intelligence service, and because of growing respect for him within the KMT and his father’s support, he had authority beyond his already powerful formal positions. For decades, this was the predominant image of CCK among the Taiwanese: the brutal chief of the secret police. From intelligence, he expanded his profile; soon, he either directly controlled or had allies in the six teams under the Central Committee that were considered the most important in the party, including propaganda, operations on the mainland behind enemy lines, and “political warfare.” Analysis by the United States Embassy suggested that CCK’s organization-building with the Youth Corps and his later advocacy for more young people and Taiwanese people in the party helped him build up his own power and “erode the residual power and influence of the mainlander old guard.” In a win-win, Taiwanization and youthification complemented CCK’s desire to “improve [the KMT’s] efficiency and responsiveness.”


193 Winckler and Greenhalgh, Contending Approaches to the Political Economy of Taiwan, pp. 156–57.

194 Winckler and Greenhalgh, Contending Approaches to the Political Economy of Taiwan, p. 157.

195 Sun Jiaqi, How Chiang Ching-kuo Stole the Nation, pp. 31–34.

CCK continued his power consolidation in the 1960s and early 1970s, rising to a position of unconstrained leadership after becoming premier in 1972. By the early 1960s he had a decisive grip on the military, having placed his allies throughout and purged others or sent them to diplomatic posts abroad. Chen Cheng’s death from cancer in 1965 sped up this process.

“Before he died he advised his followers to dissolve themselves as a faction and to join Chiang Ching-kuo as individuals whenever possible.”\(^{197}\) CCK also began to branch out from military and security fields and “expand his reach into economic affairs.”\(^{198}\) Peng Mengqi, the former city garrison commander in Gaoxiong and another high-profile rival, was sent abroad to be an ambassador.\(^{199}\) The succession was remarkably smooth, with CCK seemingly in full control even before taking the premiership.\(^{200}\) Remarkably, factionalism in the KMT “was subdued” until after CCK’s death in 1988.\(^{201}\) Dissident writer Liu Yiliang, who was later assassinated in the U.S., noted in his biography that when CCK took power in 1972, there was no one who could oppose him.\(^{202}\) Western newspapers reported that he was “solidly in charge.”\(^{203}\)

In April 1975, after CKS’s death, CCK’s position as the leader of the party was confirmed by the creation of and his election to a new party position: “chairman.” The U.S.

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\(^{197}\) Winckler and Greenhalgh, *Contending Approaches to the Political Economy of Taiwan*, p. 159.


\(^{199}\) Winckler and Greenhalgh, *Contending Approaches to the Political Economy of Taiwan*, p. 160.


\(^{201}\) Cheng and Chou, “Informal Politics in Taiwan,” p. 47.


Embassy noted that this move was of dubious legality, but it did not matter. State-controlled television in Taiwan projected CCK’s strength with a “slow pan of the assembled delegates so all could see the vote was unanimous…statements of support appeared from all quarters of the local population: from college youth to aging farmers, from independent politicians to the Young China Party and the Democratic Socialist Party.” The KMT Manifesto promulgated following CKS’s death reaffirmed the party’s commitment to “strong leadership at the center” as one of its five guiding principles.

At the same time, government corruption was making a comeback, though by no means reproducing the large-scale embezzlement and insubordination of the pre-1950 era. Though the KMT Reconstruction had successfully pushed government corruption off the political agenda for over a decade, corruption “came creeping back in.” The Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau’s workload of corruption cases inched upwards over the 1960s, until it was processing around 100 cases a year. Bribe-taking seemed to be spreading among low- and mid-level officials, for example in the judiciary and the customs office. There could be various explanations for this general slide in clean government: bureaucrats were stuck with low wages while the booming economy lifted private enterprises; fears of an imminent communist invasion receded, decreasing incentives for cohesion; and the fact that all campaign-style reforms, even when institutionalized, fade in vigor over time.

204 “Special Central Committee Meeting: CCK Takes Control, 1975/4/29,” State Department cable.
207 Shang, Curbing Corruption, p. 234.
Motives for a New Reform

Beginning in 1969 and culminating in 1972, CKS and CCK carried out a campaign of Governmental Rejuvenation—political reforms since the KMT Reconstruction two decades earlier. It was CKS who initially ordered the Rejuvenation in 1968, but CCK would come to lead it.209 His father made sure CCK was “at the front line of reform” happening within the KMT in the late 1960s in order to stabilize his future rule.210 In broad brushstrokes, the Governmental Rejuvenation was a state-building reform that involved 1) bringing more Taiwanese, more youths, and more educated people into government, 2) gradual political liberalization, and 3) fighting corruption and improving bureaucratic efficiency.

Publicly, CCK presented the Rejuvenation as a way to further the party’s revolutionary principles and speed the recovery of the Chinese mainland. In a speech he made upon becoming premier, CCK explained the connection. His first thought upon taking office, he claimed, was of 1949; “because we lost China we have to get it back… upon becoming premier that is my mission.” The second and third thoughts were that he had a chance to turn things around and work for the people. The fourth thing, therefore, was that he had a chance to “achieve the Three Principles that we believe in…take the ideological ideal and make it a reality.” To do that, CCK argued, there had to be a “Governmental Rejuvenation.”211 These reforms were also presented in

209 Document at repository number 005-010206-00045-003, President Chiang Kai-shek Case Files, Academia Historica Archives, May 1969.


211 Document at repository number 005-010503-00048-002, Important Documents, Speeches, Writings, Manuscripts, etc. Part 2, Academia Historica Archives, 1973.
other high-level government communications as being crucial to “counterattacking and restoring the country” and making Taiwan “a three principles model province.”

The goal of retaking the mainland was increasingly unrealistic, and revolutionary goals were superceded by developmental ones. U.S. intelligence noted in 1975 the declining “frequency and conviction” in the “lip service” paid to retaking the mainland, concluding instead that “Premier Chiang has continued his father’s policy of concentrating on Taiwan’s development and has demonstrated considerable political skills in dealing with the island’s problems.” CKS and CCK wanted to advance state-building to make Taiwan as strong and prosperous a base as possible. CKS evolved less, and continued to say that reforms to the government in Taiwan were “using the methods of reform to achieve the goals of revolution,” citing Japan’s Meiji Restoration as supposedly another such case.

Within that larger agenda, the Governmental Rejuvenation was specifically a response to the threat posed by Taiwan’s weakening international position. In the early 1960s, the growing Sino-Soviet split was “severely undermin[ing] Taiwan’s strategic importance to US security in the region.” By the late 1960s, American president Richard Nixon was openly mulling shifting

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212 Document at repository number 005-010201-00007-018, President Chiang Ching-kuo Case Files, 1972/4/4.; 005-010504-00024-001, President Chiang Ching-kuo Case Files, Academia Historica Archives, 1967/1/06.


214 Scholars interviewed by the author all vouched for CCK’s consistent commitment to development, though a few were doubtful that CKS ever saw Taiwan as more than a temporary base.

The U.S. Embassy in Taipei concluded that “virtually all” Taiwanese wanted Taiwan to be eventually ruled primarily by Taiwanese, while “most” mainlanders desired reunification with the mainland but realized this was “unlikely in the near future.” See: “Views on the Political Future of Taiwan, 1975/10/2,” State Department cable.


the U.S.’s policies on China. There was a great deal of fear in Taiwan that U.S.-China normalization would lead to the U.S. abandoning its promise of military protection for the island. Then the Republic of China lost its United Nations seat in 1971 and the U.S. and China signed the Shanghai Communiqué in early 1972.

The Rejuvenation’s political liberalization aimed to appeal to the United States by emphasizing that Taiwan was at least partially democratic, as opposed to China. Early moves toward political liberalization included new national-level elections and a loosening of political repression. “The regime began gradually to liberalize, allowing more participation, recruiting more Taiwanese to party membership and government posts, and allowing somewhat more freedom of speech.” The supplementary legislative elections in 1969 were an important early step. The government strove to deliver its message of political reform to Nixon. Consider Vice President Yen Chia-kan’s reply when in a meeting in early 1973 Nixon expressed his concern that Taiwan was having “problems continuing your diplomatic ties with many countries.”

Yen: We know we will continue to work hard and face our future and keep the support of our friends. We have had an election of our legislative bodies. We are drawing more and more local people into politics, more younger people. Education is moving rapidly. We are also emphasizing citizenship and vocational education.

Nixon: That’s an excellent move.

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CCK also tried to get the good news across to the U.S., telling the American ambassador in Taipei “that his aim [was] to strengthen Taiwan’s unity and to move toward an open society.”221 The U.S. State Department later assessed that “relations with the United States are the government’s overriding concern.”222

A weakening international position also meant a greater need to shore up domestic support for the regime. A more inclusive government could help, but CKS and CCK also sought to address a general decline in party image. Officials were seen as too old, too lazy, and unresponsive to the public.223 CCK was reportedly personally offended by deteriorating party quality, perhaps because of his “puritanical communist” background and training in the Soviet Union.224 Many anti-corruption measures in the Rejuvenation were very similar to what the KMT assessed to have been Singapore’s successful and widely praised clean government reforms. An internal KMT report written in 1969 credited Singapore’s success to, among other things, striking hard with its anti-corruption bureau and secret police, forcing early retirements, promoting based on merit, raising wages, and simplifying bureaucratic procedures.225 The recommendations of the report, which laid out Singapore’s successes as a model for Taiwan, seem to have been followed. That said, we cannot rule out the possibility that this report was manipulated by the KMT leadership to justify future actions.

221 “Morning Summary of Significant Reports, 1973/08/08,” U.S. State Department cable.

222 State Department Briefing Paper, 1975, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 4, folder “China, Republic of (3),” Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

223 Ma, Chiang Ching-kuo’s Full Record, p. 678.

224 Author’s interview in Taiwan with a retired high-level diplomatic official, 2018/7/19.

225 “On Singapore’s Anti-Corruption…” / “關於新加坡因設有反貪污…”, President Chiang Ching-kuo Case Files, Academia Historica Archives. Note: The report is undated, but mentions a Singaporean government hygiene campaign that began “last year.” If I am correct in assuming this is the Keep Singapore Clean campaign of 1968, then it stands to reason that this report is from 1969.
Though it helped CCK consolidate his status as a new leader, the Governmental Rejuvenation was not simply a cover for purging political rivals. Most of CCK’s measures were against low-level corruption, which posed no immediate political threat to him. Power consolidation was not incompatible with more substantial and institutional reforms, which were not a smokescreen. The Rejuvenation’s Taiwanization and youthification policies succeeded in changing the makeup of the government, for example, though of course they did not resolve long-standing tensions between mainlanders and Taiwanese people. The concurrent beginning of political liberalization also makes it hard to interpret CCK’s efforts as just a power grab. Today, Taiwanese sympathetic to CCK claim he “understood democracy better” than his father and that the commitment to democracy was “always there,” but awaited the changed international context of the late 1960s and early 1970s. By contrast, critics see CCK’s support for political liberalization—a serious reversal for the head of the secret police during Taiwan’s White Terror—as purely strategic.\(^{226}\) But even harsh critics of his rule concede that CCK was not personally corrupt.\(^{227}\)

Nor was the Rejuvenation a result of democratic pressures for reform from below; it came too early in Taiwan’s political development to be attributable to opposition pressure or grassroots protest. After early opposition activity in the 1950s faded or was repressed, Taiwan’s domestic political opposition began to organize again in earnest in the 1970s. Mass protests were

\(^{226}\) Author’s interviews with four Taiwanese scholars, summer 2018.

rare in the early 1970s; mass unrest against the regime and its corruption, which exploded in South Korea in the mid-1970s, was absent in Taipei at the time.

In sum, I argue that the KMT leadership combated corruption in this period as part of the state-building Governmental Rejuvenation, which aimed at securing the regime’s future and the nation’s future in an increasingly threatening international environment. Taiwanization, youthification, corruption control, and political liberalization were the right tools at the time to improve governance and secure a broader base of support for the regime both at home and abroad. Political liberalization might seem like an ideological departure for a non-democratic revolutionary party, but the KMT was in principle dedicated to democracy from the beginning. It would be naïve to believe that KMT leaders had been trying to get to democracy all along and did so once the circumstances were right. Instead, we should see the Governmental Rejuvenation as a strategic choice by a party with few immediate threats but also few good long-term options. CKS and CCK were not under threat of overthrow in 1969 or 1972, but the future of a modern, prosperous, non-communist China, even if just on the island of Taiwan, was under threat.

**Corruption Control in the Governmental Rejuvenation**

KMT slogans for the campaign promised that it would “construct a clean and capable (廉能) modern government and modern country” and an “organized and disciplined democracy.” Various reforms would attempt to increase efficiency, transparency and, as CCK put it, “punish embezzlement heavily, reform the political atmosphere, and purge harmful black sheep.” Of the Ten Principles of Reform that CCK announced for the Rejuvenation, at least half were...

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229 Ma, Chiang Ching-kuo’s Full Record, p. 683.
directly about how public servants should use public resources and remain free from outside monetary influence. The Principles included: a restriction on using public money off-budget for housing construction; a crackdown on luxurious public events, like ribbon-cutting ceremonies; a restriction on blank-check foreign trips by officials and a ban on “receptions” for officials traveling for work domestically; and new rules on civil servants and congratulatory “red envelopes,” which are filled with money and given at weddings and other social occasions.\(^{230}\)

CCK surprised the public with the aggressiveness of his anti-corruption efforts and with his personal involvement in seeing major cases through. In 1969, the Banana Scandal, which was about government-business collusion and the manipulation of one of Taiwan’s biggest exports, led to the removal of the Governor of the Central Bank, Hsu Po-yuan, and more than 50 other officials and businessmen. Hsu was the highest-ranking official dismissed since the early 1950s.\(^{231}\) In the first year after passing the Ten Principles of Reform, some 926 officials appointed or above bureaucratic rank six from within the Executive Yuan and its sub-departments were disciplined.\(^{232}\) Wang Zhengyi received a life sentence for embezzlement, despite being the former Director of Personnel Administration and a relative of CCK’s. Vice-Inspector General of Customs Bai Qingguo was executed. Gaoxiong’s mayor, Yang Jinhu, got five years; his wife got ten. Newspapers show numerous other arrests and cases of officials being disciplined for handing out money at weddings, partying in a state of undress with girls, or other disciplinary violations.\(^{233}\) After CCK instructed the Ministry of Justice to focus on corruption,

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\(^{230}\) *China Times / 中國時報 (ZGSB)*, 1972/6/9, p. 1.


\(^{232}\) Ma, Chiang Ching-kuo’s Full Record, p. 685.; ZGSB, 1972/1/4, p. 2.

\(^{233}\) See for example: ZGSB, 1972/6/11, p. 3.; ZGSB, 1972/7/5, p. 6.; United Daily News / 聯合報 (LHB), 1972/7/11, p. 1.; and ZGSB, 1972/7/12, p. 3.
nearly 3,000 people were disciplined as part of the ‘cleaning of politics’ campaign between 1970 and May 1972, though most of these were not specifically corruption cases and finer data are hard to find.\footnote{ZGSB, 1972/6/19, p. 6.} There was also a planned wave of retirements—3,857 across the whole government—which the leadership used to put in place younger, better educated, and better trained replacements.\footnote{ZYRB, 1973/6/11.}

Many rules announced in this period intended to prevent corruption by changing the lifestyles of officials. Besides the Ten Principles, new restrictions on extravagant spending at weddings and funerals, hosting banquets, visiting nightclubs, hiring prostitutes, and so on combated the profligate lifestyles that the public and the KMT leadership assumed were seducing officials into misusing public funds. A senior officer in the Ministry of the Interior was dismissed just for preparing more than ten tables at his child’s wedding, which exceeded limits set to ensure official frugality.\footnote{Qi, Chiang Ching-kuo’s Life, p. 151.} The most highly publicized anti-corruption actions were the repeated raids on nightclubs, brothels and other leisure establishments, which by early 1973 resulted in the punishment of 1,881 officials.\footnote{LHB, 1973/4/8.} Soon, there were “numerous closings of ‘hostess’ establishments and a steep decline in invitations sent through the mails [sic].”\footnote{J. Bruce Jacobs, “Taiwan 1972: Political Season,” Asian Survey 13, No. 1 (1973), p. 110.} Alongside the disciplining of officials was a major campaign to reward clean officials for their probity. From
January to November of 1971, more than 7,900 civil servants were materially rewarded for having clean records.\footnote{ZGSB, 1972/1/4, p. 2.}

As in the KMT Reconstruction, CCK set up special committees and investigation teams loyal to him to go all over the country and enforce his reforms in party and governmental organs. Pilot projects for the Political Work-Style Rejuvenation, part of the Governmental Rejuvenation, began in Yilan and Xinzhu in 1970.\footnote{ZGSB, 1972/1/24, p. 2.} By mid-1972, it was underway in four cities and Jiayi County. As soon as CCK became premier in June 1972, many more cities and counties set up Political Work-Style teams to investigate disciplinary violations according to the Ten Principles and other new standards.\footnote{LHB, 1972/6/19, p. 2.} Part of the work of these teams involved communicating public grievances up to the leadership, whether they were about specific cases of corruption or broader complaints about the KMT’s rule.\footnote{ZYRB, 1972/6/19, p. 3.} Each of the initial trial cities had three “public opinion small teams,” with a declared mission to “directly ask agricultural workers and ordinary people” about their grievances.\footnote{ZYRB, 1972/6/19.} Relatively, public opinion boxes were set up all around the country. They received 761 complaints in the first year, and over a hundred more complaints directly solicited or “uncovered” by direct interviewing.\footnote{ZYRB, 1973/06/11.} CCK set an example by personally getting involved in going around the country and hearing ordinary people’s grievances. Unlike in many
other cases of authoritarian father-son succession, here the son is said to have had more facility interacting with ordinary people.

CCK made organizational changes and promoted specific new rules to try to institutionalize the Rejuvenation, though these were not as ambitious as the reforms his father had advocated in the early 1950s. The main ones were the Ten Principles, but CCK also ordered members of the Executive Yuan to divest from various business interests.\textsuperscript{245} He then banned bureau heads from simultaneously holding official and private sector positions, or dual positions that could have some other conflict of interest.\textsuperscript{246} Another group of new rules attempted to simplify administration and increase transparency: fewer meetings, simpler laws, simplified central administrative units, and sometimes fewer levels in governmental organs.\textsuperscript{247}

\textbf{Outcomes of the Governmental Rejuvenation}

New anti-corruption institutions curbed corruption among low- and medium-level officials, but did little to constrain elites or high-level officials. The government’s internal accounting concluded that six of CCK’s Ten Principles were fully implemented (1, 2, 3, 4, 8, and 9) and that varying levels of progress were made on the remaining four.\textsuperscript{248} That meant successful implementation of reforms curtailing extra-budget housing for officials, ground-breaking ceremonies, travel expenses, hospitality for visiting officials, higher-level officials attending


\textsuperscript{246} Jiang, Biography of Chiang Ching-kuo, p. 430.; Li and Chen, Chiang Ching-kuo Biography, p. 298.

\textsuperscript{247} The Chiang Ching-kuo Collection, p. 363.; Jacobs, “Taiwan 1972: Political Season.”; and LHB, 1973/6/6, p. 2.

ribbon-cuttings, etc. Government agencies continued to have to report on their progress in enforcing each of the Ten Principles twice a year through the end of the 1970s. For example, the Import-Export Bank of the Republic of China continued to report how it had handled issues like housing for employees, expenses for trips to Japan by managers, and expenses for an opening ceremony in the first half of 1979. The Import-Export Bank even reported what kind of “alternative proper entertainment” it provided to keep employees away from “improper entertainment.”

Beyond the Ten Principles, some rules became routine, while others did not last. We know for example that officials in the transportation department, which had been one of the most corrupt, did follow orders and give up their double posts in the private sector. So did some top officials, like the head of the postal bureau and the head of the Bureau of Merchant Investments. In accordance with the spirit of CCK’s Ten Principles, there were visibly fewer ribbon cuttings and opening ceremonies, and greeting events for officials became less luxurious. And as noted, many leisure establishments did have to close down under the new austerity. The government judged the simplification of bureaucratic procedures to be a success.


251 The Independent Evening Post / 自立晚報 (ZLWB), 1972/7/1, p. 1.

252 ZLWB, 1972/7/1, p. 1.


254 Document at repository number 60/0028, President Chiang Kai-shek Approvals Files, Kuomintang Party History Archives, 1971/12/1.
On the other hand, CCK himself expressed public frustration with the limited anti-corruption success of his reforms. He complained in early 1973 that the government “has not fully succeeded in breaking this bad bureaucratic custom.” In a speech in late 1973, CCK argued that the government was still not “clean enough,” and urged continued efforts. And in 1975 he admitted that, despite his efforts, the practice of sending mass wedding invitations was actually on the rise (which may sound innocent enough but had been identified as a gateway to illicit activity). Despite this admission, however, the Governmental Rejuvenation was a significant step in the right direction. Even beyond the specific anti-corruption activities, the Taiwanization, youthification, and bureaucratic simplification were seen as having brought new energy into the party and state.

Contemporary observers judged the Rejuvenation as moderately successful, and scholars agree, though the academic literature covers the Rejuvenation much less thoroughly than it does the KMT Reconstruction. The American view was very positive; the State Department reported that “since assuming the premiership last May, CCK has proven to be a strong, widely respected leader and has demonstrated considerable political skill…” With “attacks on official corruption and inefficiency, and administrative reforms, CCK has satisfied public expectations of more effective government performance.” The U.S.’s vice ambassador said in a personal capacity that CCK’s reorganization had been very effective, that the promotion of young people had

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257 ZYRB, 1975/3/7, p. 3.

exceeded expectations, and that this was extremely helpful to national unity and governmental reform. He added that American businesses had also praised parts of the reform. The *Far Eastern Economic Review* wrote at the time that CCK “has made a deep impression on the public with his efforts to raise the levels of efficiency and honesty in government,” and that “most sceptics were won over, first by the perceptible improvement in service by government bureaus, then by the all-out crackdown.” “Premier Chiang’s popularity rose as he pushed for increased administrative efficiency, the extirpation of corruption, and the improvement of Taiwanese-Mainlander relations.” “Satisfaction with the state increased further because of efforts made by the KMT in 1971–1977 to reduce corruption and inefficiency.”

Three retired senior official who had worked in Taiwan’s Ministry of Justice as anti-corruption investigators in the 1980s told me that overall discipline among public servants had been better before democratization. One noted that back in the early 1980s, bureau chiefs could not interfere with investigations in their bureaus. As democratization unfolded, bureau chiefs and other senior officials grew more powerful and were able to “not sign off on”—or block—investigations. Also, the merit system for promotions was weakened as more posts were bought and sold. Corruption had been “strongly controlled” by CCK, they argued. These controls weakened and their work was harder when bureau chiefs and legislators became more powerful. This matches a common perception on the right in Taiwan that the KMT system had

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259 Document at repository number 005-010205-00055-014, President Chiang Ching-kuo Case Files, Academia Historica Archives, 1972/6/08.


263 Author’s interview, 2017/8/17.
been “pretty clean” before the Lee Teng-hui administration (1988–2000). On the left, Taiwanese people are more likely to describe the authoritarian KMT party-state as “inherently,” by-definition corrupt, even if “individual” corruption was less common.\(^{264}\)

Even among the budding political opposition to the KMT, known as Tangwai, there was “widespread recognition” of the positive effect of these reforms.\(^{265}\) The *Independent Evening Post* was an outlet for opposition sentiment at the time, though it was occasionally censored by the KMT. Just after CCK became premier in July 1972, an opinion column in the *Independent Evening Post* criticized the government’s reform plans by saying: “there has been a lot of talk but no clear measures. Saying things is a lot easier than getting them done. What kind of government speaks but does not get things done? A government that cannot get things done.”\(^{266}\) A few months into CCK’s reforms though, the tone had changed. The reforms were “good achievements,” which did not “hurt business,” as some anti-corruption measures do.\(^{267}\) An end-of-year editorial gave CCK credit for “taking the wheel in difficult international circumstances” and “making bold reforms” to the government.\(^{268}\) While it is possible that the KMT forced the *Post* to write this, it seems unlikely because: a) they had allowed criticism at the sensitive beginning of CCK’s term, b) political controls were loosening, and c) the praise was not effusive. In June 1975, the *Post* signaled that their opinion had not changed, writing that more than two years out from the Ten Principles, the situation was “greatly improved” and that CCK deserved

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\(^{264}\) Author’s interviews, summer 2018.

\(^{265}\) Newell, *The Transition to the Transition toward Democracy in Taiwan*, p. 324.

\(^{266}\) ZLWB, 1972/7/13, p. 1.

\(^{267}\) ZLWB, 1972/9/17, p. 6.

\(^{268}\) ZLWB, 1972/12/31, p. 1.
credit “for often going down to the people and hearing their problems directly.” Decades later, the few scholars who address the topic concur that “official corruption was reduced somewhat” and that CCK used his power to limit corruption.

Nevertheless, corruption continued unchecked in local government and scandals recurred even at the highest levels from time to time. Like his father, CCK never brought local factions to heel; they had roots too deep in society and as before did not pose a threat to the center. As for high-level corruption, Lin Chia-long explains one major case in 1984:

“Some high-ranking KMT officials were found involved in the bankruptcy of Taipei’s Tenth Credit Cooperative, with tens of thousands of people victimized. This scandal seriously damaged the government's reputation and resulted in the resignations of KMT secretary-general Chiang Yen-shih and two cabinet ministers. This banking scandal upset [CCK] immensely because it reminded many people of the KMT’s corruption history on the Mainland.”

This story points to the continuing problem of corruption, but also the relative rarity of high-level revelations. Only when national-level corruption scandals are scarce should one be so damaging to the government’s reputation.

In sum, we should categorize the Governmental Rejuvenation as a Limited Victory against corruption. In the 11-point scoring system laid out in Chapter One, the Rejuvenation earns a total of 6.5 points for widespread and consistent discipline enforcement, for being viewed as at least a partial success by experts and contemporary observers, for strengthening disciplinary organizations, and for enforcing rules against corruption and governmental practices associated with corruption. The Rejuvenation was not a Breakthrough because of its failure to severely

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269 ZLWB, 1975/6/1, p. 2.


punish corrupt elites, to constrain elites and high-level officials in particular with anti-corruption rules, and to garner more positive perceptions from experts, which is likely related to the first two failings. That these anti-corruption reforms did not go as far as those in the regime’s formative period matches the expectations about reform timing discussed in Chapter One. In this case, there could be various reasons. The leadership may not have needed to do reforms large enough to qualify as a Breakthrough because the corruption problem that CCK faced when coming to power was not as dire as the crisis that his father had confronted, in large part due to the earlier success of the KMT Reconstruction. In addition, the political liberalization launched alongside the Rejuvenation’s anti-corruption efforts may have conflicted with the full exercise of CCK’s autocratic powers and the authoritarian playbook.

*Explaining Continued Reform Success*

The Governmental Rejuvenation was possible through CKS’s and CCK’s unconstrained leadership. While unconstrained leadership usually applies to one person at a time, during the succession we can say that this was a father-son team with unconstrained leadership over their regime. Taiwanization, youthification, and anti-corruption measures were forced on the establishment by the unopposed authority of first CKS—who started the campaign—and then CCK—who drove it home. They had a free hand to arrest corrupt actors, carry out forceful police raids, and bring fresh energy to a tired, non-transparent, and increasingly out-of-touch system. They had the power, for example, to expand (or pack) the National Assembly, Legislative Yuan, and Control Yuan through supplementary elections and presidential appointments. As with CCK’s new cabinet (May 1972), the replacements were generally younger and more often Taiwanese. As discussed above, CCK initiated and personally led many of the anti-corruption measures, such as the political purification campaign. CCK set a good personal example on
cleanliness to his subordinates—an effect enhanced by his personal power.273 His outsized role was reflected in appraisals of the reforms too, which unfailingly identify him as its leading force. As J. Bruce Jacobs wrote in 1973: “Why such major changes with the accession of Chiang Ching-kuo? In the past, those charged with responsibility have often lacked the power necessary,” but “his power made [it] possible.”274

Neither quasi-democratic institutions nor high state capacity are sufficient explanations for the Rejuvenation’s success. Gradual political liberalization was an outcome of the Rejuvenation, not a cause. And while organized political opposition to the KMT was stirring, it would only be later in the 1970s that it could exert substantial pressure on the country’s leadership. There is no doubt that the KMT had state capacity in 1969, though CKS and CCK perceived it to be eroding, in part because the party elites were getting too old. As argued before, capacity serves as a necessary but not sufficient condition. It was not bureaucratic gears turning that launched the campaign, but decisions made by the two leaders. The regime’s ability to do something does not provide any trigger or reason why 1969–72 should have been the time for these top-down reforms.

6. Conclusions

In this chapter, I have demonstrated that my theory of an authoritarian playbook for corruption control captures many aspects of the Kuomintang’s trajectory on the issue. In particular, I have advanced arguments about KMT anti-corruption efforts and their motives, about outcomes, and about the reasons for those outcomes. Initial anti-corruption activity in the

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273 Author’s interview with three Taiwan scholars, July 2018.

late 1920s and mid-1940s in China failed to produce results because Chiang Kai-shek lacked the necessary personal power and the KMT lacked the necessary state capacity. It was only after the retreat to Taiwan that the conditions would align for a Breakthrough: a consolidation of party power in CKS’s hands, the jettisoning of disloyal and corrupt allies from the mainland, and a lean KMT with strong organizational capacity and autonomy from Taiwanese society. The KMT Reconstruction succeeded in remaking the regime and, as part of that project, brought corruption under control. The follow-up Governmental Rejuvenation two decades later brought further successes in improving bureaucratic effectiveness and cleanliness; CKS and CCK were crucial in pushing through the reforms. Taiwan’s story continues in Chapter Six, which explains how corruption increased greatly as democratization advanced in the late 1980s, only to decrease again under pressure from strong democratic institutions.

Common explanations for why corruption control succeeds or fails do not fully explain the KMT’s anti-corruption outcomes. The conventional wisdom that democratic institutions are the key to reducing corruption would lead us to look for the role of quasi-democratic institutions under the KMT. But these institutions were at their weakest during the most successful reform in the early 1950s. In particular, the unconstrained leadership of CKS in the reform process contradicts the notion that corruption control depends upon accountability and constraints on executive power. The KMT did not reform by mimicking democratic reforms, but by employing the authoritarian playbook, which aggressively disrupted the corrupt status quo in party and state organizations. In the case of Taiwan, as elsewhere, high state capacity was a necessary but not sufficient condition; the motivation and leadership of CKS and CCK mattered. This view is in line with the revisionist, generally favorable interpretation of CKS and CCK as leaders promoted
by Jay Taylor and others.\textsuperscript{275} The KMT leadership was not pressured into curbing corruption by the United States or even the Taiwanese public. The military threat of the CCP added urgency to the KMT’s reforms in Taiwan, but is best understood as a contributing factor to a long-standing commitment to state-building. CKS saw the KMT’s defeat on the mainland as evidence of the CCP’s superior organizational capacity, which shaped how he proposed KMT reforms.

Finally, while the analysis in this chapter agrees with and bolsters various findings from other scholarship on the KMT, it also suggests that the Governmental Rejuvenation has been undervalued as an important state-building reform and key link between 1949 and 1987. The Rejuvenation is often absent or barely mentioned in scholarly analyses, which instead cover only the independent threads—e.g. the start of political liberalization, the advance of Taiwanization, or CCK’s succession.\textsuperscript{276} But the Rejuvenation was more than the sum of its parts; it was an actual rejuvenation of the regime and state that strengthened the KMT’s position for later democratization. Its various reforms came together to address or anticipate foreign and domestic criticisms over a lack of political inclusion, political repression, ineffective governance, and growing corruption. It built on the state-building of the KMT Reconstruction, but adapted its goals to meet new challenges that emerged over time. It is hard to empirically show that the Rejuvenation is responsible for the mildness of political unrest and political instability in the 1970s and 1980s, but it is surely the most relevant set of government reforms to that end after that of the early 1950s.


\textsuperscript{276} See: Maguire, “Modernisation and Clean Government.”; Shang, \textit{Curbing Corruption}.
Chapter Three

Military Rule in South Korea

1. Introduction

This chapter profiles South Korea’s military governments and explains why, despite other economic and political achievements, they struggled to control corruption. South Korea’s generals-turned-presidents Park Chung-hee (1961–79) and Chun Doo-hwan (1979–87) launched three main campaigns to curb corruption: a crackdown after the 1961 coup, the General Administrative Reform (GAR) in the mid-1970s, and a second post-coup purge known as Purification between 1980 and 1981. The dire state of corruption in South Korea prior to military rule helped pave the way for Park’s coup, but his post-coup crackdown mostly failed to institutionalize reforms, especially those necessary to discipline politicians and influential businesspeople. Nevertheless, Park did manage to build pockets of meritocracy in the bureaucracy, which would grow over time. After strengthening his political position and centralizing power in the early 1970s, especially through the passage of the Yushin constitution in 1972, Park was able to advance further his ambitious political and economic reforms, including corruption control. The GAR delivered a Limited Victory against corruption: cleaning up the bureaucracy but leaving in place high-level state-business collusion. Shortly after Park’s assassination in 1979, Chun installed himself as the paramount leader and launched a massive shake-up of the political system, including large purges of officials on charges of corruption. The reforms caused a stir, but had little sticking power. The open corruption of Chun’s Fifth Republic exceeded that of the somewhat restrained Park era.

Table 3.1:
I find that corruption control efforts under military rule suffered because the top leadership was often too constrained in its authority to dictate aggressive reforms. Unlike Chiang Kai-shek, Park had not cultivated authority over years as head of a revolutionary party; he came to power in 1961 in a political environment with quasi-democratic institutions checking his authority and rivals with their own power bases. Even after the passage of the Yushin constitution, an external factor continued to constrain anti-corruption efforts: the economic importance of large chaebol. These private economic elites were necessary partners in Park’s developmental projects, which made it difficult to insulate policy-making from their influence. Park controlled, rather than eliminated, the regime’s collusive relationships with chaebol in the 1970s. Chun’s position after coming to power in 1979 was even more politically insecure than Park’s had been in 1961, leading him to rule through deal-making and compromise with a range of other elites. Political incentives to allow corruption were compounded by Chun’s weak motivation to curb it.

Park was primarily motivated to curb corruption, I find, because it represented a threat to his developmental state-building mission. Much of Park’s commitment to state-building and his
understanding of state-led developmentalism came from Japan and the Japanese model.\(^1\) Japan’s example influenced many Koreans in this period, especially elites like Park who received training in a Japanese military academy. Also motivating Park’s state-building was South Korea’s political and economic competition with North Korea, which took an early lead in industrialization with communist central planning. Chun Doo-hwan, while also a military man, was in office motivated more simply by staying in power and reaping the personal benefits thereof. Chun’s short-lived anti-corruption efforts were motivated mostly by political concerns unrelated to corruption itself. He wanted to be seen as tough on crime and at the same time used the campaign as an excuse to weaken resistance to his rule. Narrowly political motives are generally insufficient to see authoritarian corruption control through to success, and indeed Chun abandoned substantive reforms once his position was reasonably secure, unlike Park. Chun’s case fits with the conventional wisdom that autocrats do not have sufficient reasons to curb corruption.

That South Korean corruption control was so much less successful than Taiwan’s in the same period may be surprising in light of the two countries’ many similarities. Both were small countries with Confucian cultural backgrounds, endured decades of Japanese colonialism in the first half of the 20\(^{th}\) century, and suffered mass violence at the start of the Cold War—the February 28 Massacre (1947) and the Korean War (1950–53). Both were U.S. allies in divided countries; each faced a rival communist state. Chiang Kai-shek and Park Chung-hee were developmental leaders with military backgrounds, including Japanese training, and were strongly opposed to communism. On the other hand, CKS led a revolutionary party, whereas Park led a

military coup coalition. CKS monopolized power early, while Park early on faced the challenge of semi-competitive elections, factional constraints, and the power of the chaebol. In terms of succession, Chiang Ching-kuo smoothly inherited his father’s position, whereas Chun had to weather the chaotic interregnum after Park’s assassination and consolidate power anew.

The rest of this chapter is divided into three main sections and a short conclusion. Section Two covers Park’s early anti-corruption efforts, including their origins, goals, and outcomes. Section Three analyzes the same aspects of Park’s anti-corruption push in the 1970s, as well as how it was shaped by the Yushin system. Section Four examines Chun’s rise to power, especially in comparison to Park’s, and the short-lived attempt to clean house started in 1980. The concluding section suggests takeaways for the study of South Korea under military rule.

2. The Anti-Corruption Coup of 1961

The Republic of Korea was founded in 1948 after the division of the Korean peninsula between American and Soviet forces. The United States-backed, anti-communist conservative Syngman Rhee became the first president and ruled increasingly dictatorially before being forced out in 1960 by mass protests known as the April 19 Movement. U.S. intelligence found that “public resentment over corrupt practices played an important part in the making of the 1960 revolution.” Then followed the brief and disappointing democratic experiment known as the Second Republic, which was led for less than a year by Prime Minister Chang Myon. He was swept out of power by the May 16th coup in 1961, which began South Korea’s era of military government. Park Chung-hee, one of the coup plotters and a major general in the army, quickly became the new regime’s leader. Park ruled South Korea until his assassination in 1979.

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From the beginning, the country’s widespread corruption was one of the most salient political issues. Writing in the early 1960s, W. D. Reeve described corruption as “deeply ingrained before South Korea achieved independence” and “deeply embedded [and] accepted by society,” noting also that “the theme of governmental corruption has kept on recurring.” The Rhee years saw heavy corruption around the sale of formerly Japanese assets, in the military, between the chaebol and the government, and especially in the allocation of U.S. aid. Another scholar summarized South Korea’s 1950s as “autocracy comingled with party politics and semifascist mobilization, thriving on a system-wide corruption.” After the Korean War ended in stalemate in 1953, corruption and maladministration were constant complaints against the government, which itself acknowledged the problem in public and to U.S. officials. The developmentalism literature often characterizes Rhee’s administration as a “predatory state,” in comparison to Park’s developmental state.

After the impressive, regime-changing success of the grassroots April 19 Movement, hopes were high for the Second Republic. Unfortunately, it quickly became apparent that many

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of the Second Republic’s top officials were also “incompetent and corrupt.”

U.S. officials warned of coming instability due to “the extent and depth of graft, corruption and fraud in the major institutions of Korean society today and the consequent lack of confidence on the part of Koreans, high and low, in these institutions, in themselves, [and] in their own future.”

To summarize a messy transition: Chang’s mismanaged regime failed to live up to the people’s hopes for competent and clean government, opening the door for the military.

By inciting public anger and political chaos, corruption helped the military junta, and Park in particular, to come to power. As Chang’s Second Republic faltered, South Korean “society was waiting for effective leadership.”

Luckily for the coup plotters, the military as an institution was primed to step in. There already existed a deep and pervasive belief within the military that—beyond being responsible for national security—it should have a leading role in state-building and modernization of the economy and society. In Park Chung Hee and Modern Korea: the roots of militarism, 1866–1945 (2016), Carter Eckert explains how the military’s expansive sense of mission was a legacy of the instruction many Korean officers received under Japanese rule. The Imperial Japanese Army had long operated on these principles, and Park was said to be “infatuated” with the Japanese military example.

Combating corruption certainly fell under this state-building ambit, giving a justification for the coup many inside the South Korean military, and some outside it, could accept. Personal accounts by military officers confirm the

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10 Han, “The May Sixteenth Military Coup,” p. 41.

inspiration of the Japanese model from the Meiji Restoration onward for the coup. The military “began to consider itself as the only remaining cohesive, disciplined organization to supplant a politically corrupt and scientifically backward civilian rule.” At a “critical meeting” on November 9th, the nine core coup plotters “decided to use the anticorruption movement as the pretext for the coup.” Coups in which widespread corruption or economic mismanagement are used to justify a military intervention are known as “good governance coups” and have occurred in other countries as well.

Park played the issue of corruption expertly in the lead-up to the coup, using it to vault himself into a leadership position. Han Yong-Sup explains that “it is important not to exaggerate Park’s basis of support within the armed forces at the time of the military coup.” Rather than being some kind of natural leader for the whole military, “Park was the deputy commander of the Second Army, [and thus] not favorably positioned to mobilize troops in the event of a military clash.” But as anger was rising over senior military leaders’ involvement in the Rhee administration’s political corruption, Park made a consequential decision: despite being a general, he broke ranks to throw his lot in with the military reformers. He “joined the young officers and demanded that the army chief of staff, Song Yo-ch’an, resign for having meddled in the 1960 presidential election…transforming him[self] overnight into a leader of national

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14 Han, “The May Sixteenth Military Coup,” p. 46.

Reformist junior officers felt that high-ups in the military were corrupt and that the Chang administration was no better, especially after its “reinstatement of the practice of raising political funds from the military.”

Disappointment on several fronts pushed reformers to seek a nondemocratic solution. They militated for “order” and “viewed the splits and maneuverings of Korean party government as chaos. Their reaction to party politics harked back to that of the Japanese in 1910.” They saw a leader in Park, “as the highest-ranking and oldest active-duty officer…His reputation as an uncorrupted officer projected a better image for the revolutionary group.”

“As a second-tier general, excluded from powerful posts and political crony networks during the 1950s, [Park] was clean on the corruption issue.” From this advantageous position, he began to “transform the society-wide anticorruption reform movements into his vehicle to challenge others of his rank and to build up his own military faction.”

Among the coup plotters, “despite the participation of generals of similar rank, it was Park who controlled the initiative from the very beginning stage of planning for the coup.” He “put himself in the position of coordinating activities of the different segments,” making him “the de facto leader.” He became the hub in a hub-and-spokes coalition; it was decided that Park should be in charge of the coup itself as “commander of the Revolutionary Army.”

After delays and false starts, the coup was finally carried out on May 16th. During a pivotal moment that morning when military police arrived to put down the rebellion, Park gave a “moving speech”

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16 Han, “The May Sixteenth Military Coup,” pp. 42–44.

17 Kim, The Politics of Military Revolution in Korea, p. 60.


19 Kim, The Politics of Military Revolution in Korea, p. 68.

that won them over to the side of the coup. In it, he emphasized the issue of corruption: “We have been waiting for [the civilian government] to bring back order to the country. What a state this country is in. Ministers, including the prime minister, are coming and going with bundles of money in a hotel room to fight over concessions, absorbed in hunting for a political position—what a state things are in. The Liberal Party government, by excelling in corruption and incompetence, is leading the country to the verge of collapse. Unable to bear this government, we shall risk our lives and rise up.”

Park also ordered the seizure of the presidential Blue House. As the coup leaders occupied Seoul later that day, the civilian government’s leaders split; Prime Minister Chang fled, while President Yun Po-son stayed and tried to work with the coup leaders.

Later that day, the coup leaders formed the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR), which had total power over the government and would lead the new regime. Below the SCNR were “elaborate clusters of subordinate councils,” also led by members of the military.

The other leading governmental body set up in the early weeks of the regime was the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA). The KCIA was set up by Kim Chong-pil, a personal ally of  

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23 Henderson, *Korea*, p. 263.
Park and a leading officer from the eighth class of the Korean Military Academy (Park was from the fifth). Kim was also Park’s nephew by marriage, having married the daughter of Park’s older brother. The KCIA began with 3,000 members and rapidly expanded to 370,000 by the late 1960s. 24 Park was only vice chairman of the SCNR, under Lieutenant General Chang To-yong, but his personal connections down the ranks were deeper and broader. General Chang faded in importance while Park, “by getting the young colonels to head the SCNR subcommittees and organize the KCIA…came to control the two most powerful sources of political influence.” The last serious resistance to the coup from within the military was quashed on May 18th “with the arrest of Yi Han-lim,” commander of the First Army in Wonju. 25 Then Chang was arrested on July 3rd, along with almost fifty other officers, “on the charge of conspiring to carry out a countercoup.” 26 Chang’s fall, orchestrated from the KCIA, cleared the way for Park to lead the regime.

As soon as the SCNR was in control, Park prepared to launch a multifaceted campaign of economic reforms. The ultimate goal was to build a high-growth developmental state, though this term had not yet been coined at the time. The military leaders were not well-versed in economics and had not prepared a new economic strategy for South Korea. But the junta was disciplined and effective enough to enforce the “almost immediate utilization” of former prime minister Chang’s old five-year plan, which they took “virtually intact,” while downplaying its

origins. They also made sure to make a play for rural support by issuing a moratorium on usurious debts by agricultural workers. “The Military Revolutionary Committee had publicly stressed the deplorable conditions of corruption and economic stagnation,” and strove to rapidly deliver “visible solutions to these publicized issues.”

The junta claimed that corruption was a major target within the proposed economic and political reforms. It was listed in their official “Six Principles,” which also included opposing communism and promoting Korean unification. The regime cited “illicit accumulation,” meaning the wages of corruption, as “inviting the economic collapse of the country” and creating “in all areas of society, serious harm.” Park declared the urgency of a “surgical strike against injustice and corruption,” and by the end of May the SCNR had promulgated the Illicit Accumulation Act and set up an Illicit Accumulation Committee. In what followed, the SCNR and KCIA unleashed a barrage of investigations, arrests, and new laws meant to prevent corruption—in particular the collusion between businesses and officials that had resulted in unsavory “accumulation” on both sides.

Park’s Motives in Combating Corruption

I argue that Park’s anti-corruption efforts were motivated by his commitment to developmental state-building. There is evidence that Park and his advisers saw curbing corruption as necessary to fulfill the “extremely ambitious goals for which the state was mobilized during Park’s political rule.” Adviser Kim Chung-yum, who later became minister of finance and Park’s right-hand man as chief presidential secretary, recalls that the regime’s high-level economic planners believed that ongoing corruption had to be curbed for South Korea’s first five-year plan to succeed: “To build a strong and rich nation, these illicit funds…must be converted into real, long-term savings and investment resources.” U.S. intelligence assessed that the coup plotters had “long been disgusted with corruption and inefficiency in the government and the military establishment and disillusioned with the lack of progress under civilian rule” and that “they are convinced that the solution of [South Korea’s] many economic, political, and social ills requires rigid public discipline and firm, centralized government control.” In the months after the coup, the government’s anti-corruption efforts seemed to U.S. officials “sincerely designed to root out corruption.” This makes sense given that many of Park’s attempted anti-corruption measures were more institution-building than simply purging elite rivals. In addition, an explanation that takes Park’s stated commitments to state-building

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seriously is more convincing because he kept at it throughout his long rule and went on to lead successful anti-corruption efforts in the 1970s.

Some scholars take the view that post-coup anti-corruption efforts were about purging political rivals and not corruption control. Unsurprisingly for a new authoritarian leader, many of Park’s actions did indeed aim at consolidating his power. Park disbanded political parties and hundreds of social organizations, and banned more than 4,000 politicians from politics for several years. In addition, 2,000 officers were retired, “eliminating those who were disaffected with the coup-makers.” These moves should not be called anti-corruption efforts.

At the same time, however, many of Park’s actions were a mutually-supportive combination of power consolidation and anti-corruption reforms. Park ordered the arrest of chaebol leaders on charges of illicit accumulation, disciplined tens of thousands of low-level civil servants, and set up the Board of Audit and Inspection (BAI) in 1963. Seeing that very low salaries were a major reason for military corruption in the 1950s, Park quickly raised salaries after coming to power. This did not purge any rivals, but presumably helped Park’s popularity in the military. In addition, new laws, committees, and meritocratic standards in the bureaucracy went beyond simply using the corruption label to smear rivals. The anti-corruption component of many reforms is perhaps easily overlooked because the measures were also self-serving.

In late October 1961, the U.S. Embassy in South Korea reported approvingly that the “military government’s efforts to deal with wholesale graft, bribery and corruption in


38 Lee, Park Chung-Hee, p. 287.
government and business, smuggling, large-scale diversion of military supplies, hoodlum terror, and police and press blackmail of individuals are genuine and are producing results.”  

A second report, in December, confirmed that the junta had “produced convincing evidence that they will not tolerate corruption, graft, bribes, smuggling, tax evasion, or political blackmail.”  

Even before the coup, the anti-corruption goals of young officers within the military were well-known. On May 8, 1960, “eight lieutenant colonels from the eighth class of the Officers Candidate School began to contemplate the elimination of corrupt generals by means of a ‘purification campaign’.” They were caught and punished, but similar movements were brewing in other branches of the military, like the marines and navy.  

If not just to purge rivals, were anti-corruption efforts the result of American pressure on the new regime? American influence before the coup was such that South Korea under Rhee has been described as a “client” regime. In 1960, “most of the South Korean budget was made up of the counterpart fund originating from U.S. aid, in addition to the large sum spent directly on the South Korean military through the Military Assistance Program. American advisers were present throughout the South Korean military.” As one U.S. National Security Council staff member wrote in a memo to President John F. Kennedy in 1963: “In short, Korea continues to be our most expensive military satellite.”

41 Kim, The Politics of Military Revolution in Korea, p. 77.
42 Woo-Cummings, Race to the Swift, p. 44.
Despite a heavy presence, however, the superpower’s ability to control the junta’s domestic policies turned out to be limited. The U.S. at first opposed the coup, but soon had to accept that it was a fait accompli. The U.S. pressured the new government to evolve politically in a more democratic direction, but officials noted that “many of our counsels seem to have been ignored” and that the former coup leaders “disregard[ed] our urging.” Park’s “strong nationalistic sentiment militates against easy acceptance of U.S. advice,” the CIA noted. In response to purges by Park, the U.S. Embassy could only advise that “we must let this phase of revolution work itself out.” Park also “effectively resisted U.S. pressure to reduce the size of the South Korean armed forces.” Even “in the economic realm, where the United States appeared to have the resources to make or break Park, the client more often outmaneuvered the patron than was checked and balanced by it.” Kim Taehyun and Baik Chang Jae argue that there was a “failure of the United States in transforming its political, military, and economic resources into power.” America officials did discuss pressuring Park to “deal with corruption” shortly after the coup. However, the campaign against illicit accumulation was already underway by the time the U.S. got its bearings with the new regime.

Park would have been foolish not to respond in some way to public anger over corruption after the coup, but the broader set of ambitious, far-sighted political and economic reforms Park pushed for went beyond a response to any immediate threat to his position from the public. The


public’s responses to the coup had ranged from “acceptance of the coup and military rule to bewildered and confusion as to changes,” with “disenchantment” among many educated people but much of the general public expressing “apathy” or “indifference.” The intellectual magazine *Sasanggye* wrote in its first issue after the coup that they supported “a nationalistic military revolution aiming to wipe out corruption and disorder, to preempt communist subversions, and to guide the future of the nation onto the right path.” But it would not have been their first choice; this takeover was a “last effort” and “inevitable” given the problems of the Second Republic.

Lastly, the North Korean threat undoubtedly contributed to the urgency of Park’s state-building, but is not by itself a strong predictor of anti-corruption reform. As You Jong-sung points out, the threat from the North did not drive the Rhee administration to build a developmental state. Nor did it force Chun to get serious about anti-corruption efforts in the 1980s. The North Korean threat has to some extent been present for the past 70 years. If we take it as a constant, then it is unhelpful in explaining varied outcomes. If on the other hand we break it down and look at specific trends, they do not line up with anti-corruption measures. For example, the North Korean threat receded somewhat with the signing of the North-South Joint Declaration in 1972 and the subsequent inter-Korean talks. This was after North Korea’s

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assassination attempt on Park in January 1968 but long before its terrorism in the 1980s and nuclear revelations in the 1990s. Yet this was precisely the period in which Park’s government launched the GAR, which was the only successful anti-corruption campaign.

**The Campaign and its Outcome**

The junta began its anti-corruption campaign with high-level arrests even before setting up the institutional structure that would support them. “The day after the coup, Park arrested twenty-one business leaders on charges of illicit wealth accumulation. Some younger officers in the junta even called for the execution of some of the chaebol leaders in order to clean up corruption once and for all.”

54 The regime was picking up on widespread anger at chaebol-related corruption, which was manifested in grassroots demands for an anti-corruption campaign following the April 19 Movement.

55 “The entrepreneurs were accused of illegally acquiring state-invested properties, unjustly purchasing state-owned foreign exchange at preferential rates, profiting from unfair bidding, illicitly benefiting from state-distributed foreign loans,” and other crimes. “Under investigation were two of the most successful business tycoons: [Lee Byung-chul], of Samsung, whose illicit wealth was officially estimated at 800 million won…and [Hong Chae-son], of Kumsông Textiles, which later became Ssangyong.”

56 Overall, anti-corruption enforcement rose sharply in 1961:

**Figure 3.1:**

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Illicit profiteers were hit with massive fines. The Illicit Accumulation Committee slapped “58 enterprises with fines and back taxes of 83 million won, U.S. $64 million.” Illicit fortune makers, or profiteers, were explicitly defined as corrupt actors. They were those “who had gained more than 100 million won in illicit profits through lease or purchase of state properties, who obtained a loan of $100k USD in government-held exchange, who got bank loans by making political donations of more than $50 million, who got 200 million won under illegitimate contracts…” According to the junta, 27 businesspeople were fined in August, 24 former officials were fined in September, and “altogether, the Government decision calls for return to the state of about 56.6 billion [won] from those who earned wealth by illicit means.”

Data source: Korea Statistical Yearbook.

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57 FEER, 1961/10/26.


59 Military Revolution in Korea, p. 97.
Within the government, the KCIA disciplined 1,863 high-ranking current or former officials, including dozens of generals for corruption or “anti-revolutionary” activity.\(^60\) For example, by the first week of June, high-profile arrests included “ten former officials…former mayors of Seoul,” “the last two Finance Ministers (Kim Yung-sun and Song In-sang), five retired Generals and 12 businessmen.”\(^61\) The charges included hoarding of overseas assets, illegal profits, and tax evasion.\(^62\) All together, a whopping 41,000 civil servants were cashiered for a mix of corruption-related offenses, but also sometimes just incompetence.\(^63\) Between July and December, the Revolutionary Inspection Division discovered 264 corruption cases involving 713 people, and the SCNR approved their sentencing.\(^64\) The initial burst of reform activity, with its committees, new rules, and arrests, convinced contemporary observers that “the junta took more positive action than the regime of John Chang [Myon] had done in attempting to eliminate corruption.”\(^65\) U.S. intelligence concluded in late 1961 that “Park’s assertion that he moved against the previous government because of its corrupt nature has been generally confirmed by measures the regime has undertaken.”\(^66\)

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\(^{60}\) Kim, *Divided Korea*, p. 235.


\(^{62}\) FEER, 1961/6/8, p. 432.


The Illicit Accumulation Act and its corresponding committee were the main framework to institutionalize the initial anti-corruption efforts. Other reforms that expanded the state’s economic role also aimed to reduce incentives for bribing officials. “The anti-chaebol law and the announcement of the economic growth plan in February 1962, the establishment of governmental control over the financial sector in May 1962, and the currency reforms of June 1962 were all attempts to eradicate the structure of corruption and to promote economic nationalism.”67 The new BAI, though not as powerful as Singapore’s Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau, served as a check on corruption in the bureaucracy and still exists today. Starting in 1963, the BAI reported directly to Park and was “free to ‘descend on any government or quasi-government organization without warning and conduct a detailed inquiry into financial or other activities.’”68

Despite a great deal of motion, the post-coup campaign failed to create systemic change both because the regime backtracked on punishments and because institutional reforms were too minor and/or too weakly enforced to change the incentives for corruption. The result was a Failed Reform. The SCNR released the heads of chaebol who had been arrested, after they pledged “to ‘voluntarily donate’ their entire assets to the SCNR when required for ‘national construction.’”69 Eight of the highest-profile businessmen arrested as illicit profiteers, after being paraded on the front pages of newspapers for weeks, were released after writing a public letter “pledging all their resources.”70 “Once they were released, however, the business leaders back-

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tracked, wavered, pleaded, and even resisted.” After 58 enterprises were hit with fines and back taxes of 83 million won in early August, many “complained they would have to close down,” leading the Illicit Accumulation Committee to announce “that clemency would be granted,” and to cut the bill by nearly half. The Illicit Accumulation Act was amended in October, “permitting illegal accumulators of wealth to turn shares of newly constructed plants over to the Government, instead of making cash payments for fines imposed on them.” The regime’s total retreat from its initial hardline position was most visible in its about-face on the treatment of businesspeople. The Far Eastern Economic Review discovered that “several leading South Korean businessmen…adjudged guilty of illegal profiteering in the past, are now touring the United States and Europe to spearhead their country’s campaign to obtain foreign loans and investments…including Mr. Lee Byung Chul, the wealthiest industrialist and ‘top illegal profiteer’ of the bygone days.”

There was also trouble with the anti-corruption apparatus. The first power-related corruption scandal of the new regime was one of corruption within the Illicit Accumulation Committee’s subcommittees. Kim Chong-pil accused three members of the investigation team, three members of the evaluation team, and the head of the case processing committee of taking bribes to lower the fines certain businesses had to pay for past corruption. The scheme resulted in the national reserves being deprived of some 3.6 billion won. Park apparently had the accused

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71 Kim, “State Building,” p. 95.
72 FEER, 1961/10/26.
73 FEER, 1961/11/23.
74 FEER, 1961/11/23.
75 DAIB, 1961/10/27.
brought in front of him and flew into a wild rage at them.\textsuperscript{76} The committee head was later sentenced to death.\textsuperscript{77}

Furthermore, the KCIA was allowed to flout anti-corruption measures. The KCIA was damagingly found to have been involved in four corrupt schemes to fund the Democratic Republican Party (DRP), Park’s election vehicle. U.S. military intelligence reported that while Park benefitted from “personal integrity, apparent incorruptibility, and fairness,” the KCIA’s “bribery, secret police methods, and interference with cabinet planning” had “begun to create doubt among many segments of the population as to the integrity of the regime's leadership.”\textsuperscript{78}

As a member of the Illicit Accumulation Committee wrote of the KCIA’s corruption in his memoirs, “the revolutionary government that had shouted for old evils to be eliminated committed new evils, and no matter how it tried to explain this to the people, they could not be made to understand.”\textsuperscript{79}

A U.S. intelligence review of the Park era so far in 1970 showed the coexistence of successes and failures. “Under Park’s supervision, South Korea has developed one of the most competent and professional civil and military government structures in Asia…[and] the civil bureaucracy also has gained in effectiveness.” However, “corruption still is an integral part of the governmental process, making the possibility of new national scandals ever-present.”\textsuperscript{80} The CIA’s summary, written just a month earlier, was that Park’s government was “firmly
established and has gained widespread public acceptance for its economic advances and general
stability,” but had ultimately “failed to eliminate” corruption.81 The SCNR’s propaganda was
more one-sided, claiming in late 1961 that corruption had already been addressed:

“Since the military coup, remarkable progress has been achieved. Corrupt elements within the
government have been dismissed. Government offices have been reorganized on an efficient,
businesslike basis. Thousands of redundant government employees who performed no useful
duties and who had secured their sinecures through nepotism, favoritism, or bribery, have
been dismissed.”82

Explaining Corruption Control Failure

Anti-corruption measures failed because Park and his allies in the junta, despite
appearances to the contrary, were not in a powerful enough position to just dictate terms—they
needed funds and wealthy friends. After its initial anti-corruption push, “the junta found that
compromise was necessary.”83 Park’s constraints after the 1961 coup can be seen in three areas:
he had to run for president in unfair but still competitive elections, factional strife continued
within the military, and powerful chaebol were necessary economic partners. For these reasons,
Park lacked the unconstrained authority needed to push through his reforms and sustain the
pressure.

While the Kuomintang regime and Park’s junta both claimed to be seeking or building
democracy during the Cold War, the South Korean Third Republic’s institutions were more open
and competitive.84 Only the Third Republic should be called a competitive authoritarian

81 Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, “Update of South Korea Handbook,” 1970/11/1, Document CIA-
RDP79-00891A000700020001-4.
18.
84 Lee Kang-Rho, “The Legitimacy of the Third Republic (1963–1972) and the Park Chung Hee Government,”
Unlike Chiang Kai-shek, Park had to run for president two years after coming to power in an election that he was not assured to win. Not all other parties and politicians of note were illegal, and not all media was immediately under the junta’s thumb. Park “was forced to work behind a democratic façade.” He needed to appease the United States and also a wary populace that, while fed up with economic mismanagement and corruption, had also been protesting in the streets for democracy. The sudden coup in May, despite successfully installing the SCNR in power, left many of society’s independent institutions intact. Churches, for example, were not brought under control as they were in the PRC, and would become foci of dissent against the regime in the 1970s.

To make sure that Park won elections, the Democratic Republican Party desperately sought funds. Formed by Kim Chong-pil and the KCIA in the summer of 1962, the DRP was at first not well-known and not prepared to effectively compete in the 1963 elections, even with the junta’s ban on thousands—later reduced to hundreds—of rival politicians. The junta wrote election laws that made it necessary to have wealthy backers and “secure secret, illegal donations—something the ruling party could do, but which an opposition party would find immensely difficult.”

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89 Kim, *Divided Korea*, pp. 236–37.

90 Quoted in Kang, *Crony Capitalism*, p. 100.
Even with authoritarian tactics and a patronage system against him, former president Yun came impressively close to winning the presidency in October 1963. Instead, Park won, in part because of his greater rural support. The DRP openly cited “the timely and efficient distribution of campaign funds” as a factor in its success. Also working for Park’s election was the KCIA, which was a key reason for its corrupt schemes. Government-business collusion in the 1960s was largely for financing elections on one side and for obtaining investment opportunities on the other. Over time, “political donations by large corporations to the ruling group were routinized.” So “kickbacks, bribes, and commissions paid by those seeking loans, import and investment licenses, and government contracts…were an important part of the workings” of the regime.

Besides elections, another challenge was that Park and his allies still faced serious factional rivals within the military while carrying out anti-corruption reforms. In the immediate aftermath of the coup, a split was evident between General Chang and others who favored a “quick return to civilian government,” and Park and others who favored extended military rule. In November, the CIA reported that “Pak [sic] is the most powerful figure in the junta, but his freedom of action is limited by factionalism within the ruling group.” Fortunately for Park, the faction with a more traditional view of civilian-military relations was “stigmatized by past

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92 Kim, Divided Korea, p. 253.
93 Kim, Divided Korea, p. 240.; Cole and Lyman, Korean Development, pp. 251–52.
involvement in corruption.” It was not until March 1963 that Park’s allies delivered the “final blow” against rival factions when “[Major General] Kim Tong-ha, Colonel Pak Im-hang, a moderate member of the SCNR, and Provost Officer Yi Kyu-gwang were arrested on the charge of plotting a counterrevolution.” So troubling was the conflict and purging in early 1963 that Park at one point “in tears” even “agreed to step down,” before reversing himself. Gregory Henderson called the incident “eloquent testimony to factionalism’s strength.” The corruption discovered in the Illicit Accumulation Committee subcommittees mentioned earlier was part of the factional conflict between the northern faction (as in military officers from South Korea’s northern provinces) and Park and Kim Chong-pil’s own mainstream/southeast faction. Park had “the almost complete support and allegiance of officers of Southeastern origin.” The illicit funds were ostensibly to support northern chaebol and the northern faction.

A third challenge was the concentrated power of the chaebol. Park’s plans for rapid economic modernization could not proceed without the cooperation of the nation’s leading conglomerates. In the end, capable people were not fired and “lead financiers and industrialists were allowed to operate their enterprises, despite their previous corruption.”

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99 Kim, Divided Korea, p. 247.
100 Henderson, Korea, p. 268.
101 Kim, The Politics of Military Revolution in Korea, p. 156.
role in the economy of chaebol is a Korea-specific legacy of Japanese rule.\textsuperscript{104} Most autocrats in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, including Chiang Kai-shek in the formerly-Japanese Taiwan, did not have to deal with such powerful domestic conglomerates. Chaebol grew dramatically throughout the 1960s and afterwards, so we should be careful when looking back not to overstate their size in 1961. Beyond their importance in Park’s economic plans, the chaebol also provided critical funding for Park and the DRP in elections. Without semi-competitive elections and factional conflict, therefore, he would have been in a stronger position to discipline them.

Park’s regime is today associated more with developmentalism than widespread corruption, but scholars agree that the two coexisted.\textsuperscript{105} Patronage did not undermine state capacity because Park’s use of corruption was mostly strategic; rather than maximizing personal returns, he used corruption to secure his political position and further his reform goals. David Kang explains that “Park carefully orchestrated bureaucratic appointments to allow for both patronage and reform. Cronyism was far from overwhelming and was differentiated by various ministries. This allowed Park to achieve domestic control by buying off supporters and also to create pockets of efficiency.”\textsuperscript{106} In other words, Park created “a professional and yet patrimonial hybrid state bureaucracy,” which was an improvement over Rhee’s administration. For example, “Park refrained from appointing military officers as the banks’ governors. Instead he turned to civilians to lead both the Ministry of Finance and the Economic Planning Board, in sharp contrast to large parastatal institutions under the direction of other state ministries.” Park knew


\textsuperscript{106} Kang, \textit{Crony Capitalism}, p. 85.
“he needed to rely on professional civil servants in the elite ministries for financial and banking management.”

Carving out certain areas of the bureaucracy and raising their quality was Park’s biggest initial anti-corruption success, but patronage in other areas was the cost of achieving it. The result was that “development and money politics proceeded hand in hand.”

Thus, it is important not to exaggerate state autonomy in the 1960s, as comparative studies of developmentalism sometimes do.

**Alternative Explanations for the Failed Reform**

The failure to enforce anti-corruption reforms should not be blamed on the military regime’s lack of democratic institutions or the regime’s military origins. The Third Republic was more democratic, in terms of openness and competitiveness of institutions, than Taiwan until the late 1980s and China at any time under the CCP. The political incentives created by semi-competitive elections actually pushed the regime to engage in corruption. The origin of this regime in a coup and its nature as a military regime may have impacted corruption control performance, but initial conditions alone cannot explain the regime’s evolution and the resulting variation in outcomes over time. Barbara Geddes argues that military regimes “carry within them the seeds of their own disintegration” in the form of internal elite splits and are often led by

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109 Author’s interview with Dr. John Lie via email, 2018/7/16.

110 Democratic institutions were critical, however, in enforcing South Korea’s anti-corruption reforms in the 1990s, as we will see in Chapter Six.
military officers who do not actually want to take or hold power themselves.\footnote{111} But in this case, the junta stayed in power, grew more cohesive, and saw the emergence of a powerful leader.

It is also unlikely that a lack of state capacity doomed corruption control in the 1960s. The basic premise of the developmental state literature, which counts South Korea under Park as a paradigmatic example, is that a strong state guides economic policy in far-sighted ways.\footnote{112} Even if this is an idealized situation for May 1961, the SCNR was not prevented from carrying out industrialization and major governance reforms unrelated to corruption control by weak state capacity. To the contrary, the new regime was able to move swiftly in carrying out major, top-down reforms in the political and economic arenas. Furthermore, the junta’s initial arrests, new anti-corruption organizations, and laws all suggest that the capacity for reform was not lacking so much as the follow-through. The South Korean bureaucracy was less effective in the 1950s after the devastating Korean War, but as You Jong-sung explains, the difference between the bureaucracy under Park and the bureaucracy under Rhee or Chang “has been exaggerated” in the literature. “Meritocracy in South Korea’s bureaucratic recruitment and promotion systems developed gradually over several decades, including during Rhee’s regime as well as the short democratic episode (1960–1961).”\footnote{113} Im Hyug Baeg agrees that “a strong state apparatus had

\footnote{111 Barbara Geddes, “What Do We Know about Democratization after Twenty Years?” Annual Review of Political Science 2 (1999), pp. 115–44.}


\footnote{113 You, “Demystifying the Park Chung-Hee Myth,” p. 535.}
already been established” and was “overdeveloped” relative to civil society “even before the industrialization drive began.”

It is also worth mentioning the role of Japanese settler colonialism in building the modern Korean state and inculcating a kind of “colonial modernity” in society at large.

3. The Yushin Period and the General Administrative Reform

The junta faced increasing public pressure over corruption after the 1963 elections. 1964 was a year of protest as “students and opponents of the government…took to the streets in violent opposition to the government’s alleged corruption and the potential treaty between the Republic of Korea and Japan.”

Within the regime, revolutionary zeal “waned” as “financial irregularities among public officials” increased 30–40 percent across the late 1960s.

Skewering corrupt junta-chaebol dealings, many South Koreans began referring to their country as the “Zaibatsu Republic”—zaibatsu being Japanese conglomerates similar to the chaebol.

Alongside protests against dictatorship and inequality, some targeted corruption. In 1971, “on October 4, Korea University students began a sit-in to demand punishment for corrupt politicians. Included in the list of politicians the students wanted dismissed from office were

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114 Im, “The Rise of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism in South Korea,” pp. 241, 249.


DRP finance chairman Kim Chin-man, KCIA director Yi Hu-rak, and [military] commander Yun P’il-yong.” And the known wrongdoing may have been just “the tip of the iceberg.”

Opposition parties scored points by slamming the government on its malfeasance, threatening to unseat Park through the ballot box. The People’s Party’s Dr. Yu Chin-O, for example, focused on corruption and inequality in his campaigning for the 1967 elections. The New Democratic Party (NDP), led by Kim Dae-jung, prepared for the 1971 elections with “an all-out attack against a wide range of Park’s failures—including government corruption, regional developmental gaps, income inequalities, and external difficulties.” Kim Dae-jung used allegations of corruption and patronage in the regime to bolster his argument that power rotation was healthy. The NDP’s “effective political offensive compelled Park to admit there was government corruption.” Corruption became a major “issue” for the regime in the 1971 elections, as Park himself acknowledged afterwards. The issue was so prominent that even Korean intellectuals, known for their strong advocacy of democracy, were shown in surveys to...
be “far more concerned with the problem of economic justice, the redistribution of income and the elimination of corruption.”

Driven by an increasing electoral threat, Park moved to bolster authoritarianism by forcing through the 1972 Yushin constitution. If Park was already “anxious” at the level of opposition in 1970, the 1971 elections’ results were a flashing danger sign. Even with his illegal election behavior and the regime’s authority behind him, Park defeated opposition leader Kim Dae-jung by barely 940,000 votes. In the legislature, “to Park’s alarm, the NDP had 20 more seats than the minimum (69) required to stop” any amendment to the constitution that would allow Park to serve further presidential terms. He had to act before his political position weakened further.

Some scholars believe that the adoption of the Yushin system was more security-driven than politically-motivated, but this is a minority position in the field. Peter Kwon argues that the important Heavy-Chemical Industry Drive (HCI) and related “defense build-up [of the 1970s] could not have been implemented without the political stability and control provided by the Yusin system.” Park certainly linked internal and external threats in speeches, saying for example: “in history there are two reasons for the fall of countries, external invasion or corruption from inside resulting in division and collapse…if a country is strong and unified inside then it cannot be invaded from outside.” Nevertheless, Kwon concedes that

127 Kim, Park Chung-hee and the Yushin System, p. 36.
contemporary scholars “increasingly…have treated Park’s Yusin reform as more politically-motivated than it was security-driven.” The CIA also judged that the push for the Yusin constitution was connected to the potential threat posed by the growing domestic opposition.

“Park has been contemplating for some time ways to extend his term of office beyond 1975—the limit set by the constitution. His decision to move now may reflect an attempt to settle the matter before opposition and factional maneuvering can develop.”

Park marketed the adoption of the Yusin system as a reduction of unnecessary constraints on government power in order to support HCI, support national security, enhance governance, reduce corruption, and speed growth. The Yusin would allow Park to push past judicial and legislative constraints, as well as the rule of law. As Park himself explained: “If you rely on the rule of law too much, you cannot get things done. Wiping out gangsters is a case in point. If you have important tasks to implement, don’t be constrained by the law!” His “readiness to compromise the law was most evident when he dealt with corruption and organized crime.” The idea that the Yusin system would facilitate impressive top-down reform is right

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in the name, which harkens back to the Meiji Restoration by using the same two Chinese characters for restoration or rejuvenation (維新).

The Yushin system strengthened both Park’s personal control over the regime and the regime’s control over society. In the lead-up to it, “in December 1971, Park crossed the bridge of no return with the declaration of a state of emergency and the enactment of the Special Law for National Security.”134 The new constitution was written in the spring, and in October 1972 Park declared martial law and had the Yushin passed by the Emergency Committee on State Affairs, which according to the new constitution itself had the powers of the National Assembly.135 The Yushin system gave Park the power to dissolve the National Assembly at will, appoint one third of its members, appoint any judge, and stay in power indefinitely without direct presidential elections.136 In short, it was the end of any semblance of democracy. Dissidents termed the regime “the Winter Republic,” a play on the traditional Korean association of spring with political opening and freedom.137 The single most repressive measure was Emergency Decree No. 9, issued by the president in May 1975, which made criticism of the government illegal. Beyond the accumulation of power through formal means, Park also tried to ensure greater personal loyalty, for example by bringing more military officers into governmental—but not bureaucratic—positions. And “consecutive post holdings increased even more…Park tried to


link the destiny of the political elite with his own personal political fate as consciously and as systematically as possible.” The Yushin system provided for its own defense vis-à-vis a hostile public by granting Park the power to issue extraordinary measures, including prohibition of criticism of the Yushin system itself.

In line with his justifications for adopting the Yushin system, Park soon launched the General Administrative Reform. The GAR sought “a National Restoration through enhancement of administrative and political efficiency, elimination of corruption in officialdom, clean-up of social waste and injustice, and valuational and mental revolution. Its action programs cover[ed] three domains: i.e. purification of officialdom; social purification; and mental revolution.” The GAR was initiated and led from the top, with Park keeping a tight grip on the campaign; the two new organizations created to oversee and manage the reforms were the Office of Executive Coordination and the Presidential Inspection Special Aide Office. GAR’s measures to control corruption dramatically increased in “severity and pervasiveness” relative to previous efforts by

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the junta.142 “The main thrust of the movement’s policy was on the elimination of corruption,” especially among those officials who made direct contact with the general public.143

*Park’s Motives in Launching the GAR*

I argue that the GAR followed logically from Park’s long-standing commitment to state-building and aligned with it in both rhetoric and actual policy, which is not to say there were no other motivations. Empowered by the Yushin system, Park launched a reform that furthered the state-building begun in the 1960s and attempted to follow his own rhetoric of national advancement through military-style discipline. In a typical statement on the need for the GAR, Park argued that “to fight the North we need a strong economy, and the biggest hindrances to that are corruption, irregularities, and the degradation of official discipline.”144 In his New Year’s press conference in 1976, Park called combating corruption “a task no less important than economic buildup,” noting that “there are still some tax officials who accept bribes from [the] public.”145 Even though this rhetoric was self-serving, Park was relentless in his drive to build a strong state and promote economic growth, and connected these goals to modernizing the country and defeating North Korea.


145 “President’s New Year Inspections Begin,” 1976/1/26, U.S. State Department cable, Central Foreign Policy Files, The U.S. National Archives and Records Administration.
Several common explanations for anti-corruption motives can be reasonably ruled out in the case of the GAR. Quasi-democratic institutions, which were at their lowest ebb in the Fourth Republic, were not a major factor. Nor is there much evidence that American pressure on the regime played a substantial role. The U.S. opposed the abandonment of democracy ideals that the Yushin system represented. But “it withdrew 20,000 troops from South Korea in the early 1970s” as “part of its effort to pull back from its overseas military commitments,” meaning that “in the context of military withdrawal, the United States was not in a position to proactively engage in South Korea’s domestic political developments.” And despite the general rivalry with North Korea, there was no specific North Korean threat. The two sides announced the North-South Joint Statement in 1972 and engaged in several rounds of talks over the next few years. Also, it was just before or in the early years of the Yushin period that the South passed the North economically. Finally, the GAR was launched after Park’s successful power consolidation and did not aim to purge elite rivals.

Park’s desire to address public anger over corruption cannot be ruled out as a motivator, but this was not a reform won through public protest. The adoption of the Yushin system meant that anti-corruption protests declined in favor of anti-authoritarianism protests and overall state repression of activism strengthened. Paul Chang writes that there were three main complaints that motivated students to come out and lead public protests in the early 1970s: the mistreatment of labor; the government’s intrusions into college campuses, for example to carry out mandatory

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146 Im, “The Origins of the Yushin Regime: Machiavelli Unveiled,” p. 258.

147 Most expert assessments place the moment the South passed the North economically in the mid-1970s, but Andrei Lankov has argued it was actually earlier, around 1970. See NKNews Podcast ep. 1 “NKNews interviews DPRK expert Andrei Lankov on his recent trip to Yanji and more,” Posted Feb 12, 2018.
military training; and the lack of democracy, especially unfair elections. The dramatic decline of corruption-related protest events under the Yushin constitution can be seen below.

**Figure 3.2:**

![Protest Events Against Corruption, 1971–79](image)

Data Source: Event data compiled by Paul Y. Chang from the Korea Democracy Foundation Sourcebook on Korean Protest Events, used with his permission.

Additionally, if addressing public anger was the GAR’s primary purpose, Park would probably have disciplined more high-profile offenders, which is usually how autocrats show off and make anti-corruption efforts seem more consequential than they are.

**Implementing the GAR**

The General Administrative Reform, though formally launched in 1975, began to be implemented almost as soon as the Yushin constitution was adopted. The number of

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investigations jumped into the tens of thousands in 1973 from just a trickle in 1972.\textsuperscript{150} When the Office for Executive Coordination was created in January 1973, one of its five offices, Executive Office #4, was dedicated to “supervising, directing, and implementing” the GAR.\textsuperscript{151}

The GAR disciplined civil servants widely, but focused more on low- and mid-level offenders than elites. In 1975, 21,919 civil servants were disciplined, with 4,178 of those being dismissed from their positions. The campaign grew in 1976, with 51,468 sanctioned—roughly a tenth of all government employees—including 8,194 who were fired.\textsuperscript{152} “Under the slogan that corruption is the first enemy of national security,” this was the biggest cleanup ever carried out by Park. Just by September 1975, “the number of disciplined officials broke down to 2,322 central government officials, 1,815 provincial government employees, 1,839 policemen, and 242 others.” There were 237 bureaucrats grade three or higher who were disciplined.\textsuperscript{153} Ministry of Justice statistics show that police, local officials, education officials, and military personnel were often disciplined for accepting bribes.\textsuperscript{154} The total number of people disciplined in the GAR was over 155,000, though many were simply transferred, docked pay, or given an official warning.\textsuperscript{155}

\textsuperscript{150} “General Administrative Reform Model Civil Servant Reward Recommendation” (Ministry of Government Administration, 1978), p. 7.

“서정쇄신수범공무원포상추천” (총무처, 1978), 페이지 7.

\textsuperscript{151} “Office for Executive Coordination (1973–1998),” Office for Government Policy Coordination.

“행정조정실 (1973–1998),” 국무조정실, \url{http://m.pmo.go.kr/m/office/office02_02d.jsp}


\textsuperscript{153} \textit{Korea Annual, 1975}, p. 31.


\textsuperscript{155} Zhao, \textit{About South Korea’s General Administrative Reform}, p. 100.
17,485 bureaucrats and officials were “expelled or fired.” While not all punishments were harsh, investigations were aggressive, often challenging commonly-accepted standards of legality. At the same time as all these arrests, Park ordered a 50 percent pay raise for almost half a million government employees. This supplemented the 10 percent boost given at the start of the year and a year-end bonus of a month—the first ever. Raising civil servants’ salaries is a common measure taken to increase morale and professionalism, as well as to reduce incentives for corruption.

**Figure 3.4:**

**Bribe-Taking Cases in the Korean Bureaucracy, 1975–78**

- Civil Servants Involved
- Pct. of All Civil Servants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>By Civil Service Grade</th>
<th>No. of Offenders</th>
<th>Pct. of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grade 5</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 4</td>
<td>788</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 3</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 2</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data Source: Zhao, *About South Korea’s General Administrative Reform*, p. 100.

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158 *Korea Annual, 1975*, p. 31.
Several institutions were put in place to solidify the crackdown, with three of the most important being the GAR Almanac, the vertical collective responsibility system, and the double punishment system. The Almanac recorded the crimes and punishments of officials from the GAR, preventing exposed crimes from later being swept under the rug. It was used to block disciplined officials from working in related private sector jobs in the economic boom after being discharged.\textsuperscript{159} It covered most civil servants above a certain rank and included the legislative and judicial branches, though temporary workers were excluded. The Almanac’s coverage was expanded at the end of 1976.\textsuperscript{160} Even for civil servants who left their jobs without being fired, there were new restrictions on taking jobs in related industries within a certain timeframe. For enforcement, job brokers and community leaders needed to be “vigilantly monitored,” even at social gatherings like “picnics” and sporting events.\textsuperscript{161} Vertical collective responsibility meant holding higher-level officials accountable for the economic crimes of their subordinates.\textsuperscript{162} The highest-ranking official in each agency or bureau at each level of government was responsible for clearing his or her “base” in accordance with the GAR.\textsuperscript{163} From the earliest planning, Park made clear that the “key” to the campaign would be the leadership echelon of the bureaucracy.\textsuperscript{164} Under the responsibility system, 21,267 civil servants were disciplined between 1975 and


\textsuperscript{160} CSIB, 1977/3/26.

\textsuperscript{161} CSIB, 1977/2/12.


\textsuperscript{164} Instructions at a National Mayor Magistrate Comparative Administration Conference on 1971/9/17, from A Collection of President Park Chung-hee’s Speeches Vol. 8, (The Presidential Secretariat, 1972).
The policy of double punishment made it easier to punish people involved in corruption; it allowed, for example, a bribe-payer and bribe-taker to both be punished for the same bribe.

And not for the first or last time in an East Asian anti-corruption campaign, the government tried to ban the private use of public vehicles by bureaucrats. Overall, the central government claimed to have developed “more than 700 rules and regulations” for reform.

To enforce all these new rules and otherwise monitor the bureaucracy, the campaign deployed numerous “temporary organizations” in every government bureau at the central and provincial levels. Each bureau formed a General Administrative Reform Promotion Committee, with the vice bureau chief as the chair, the secretary for planning and management as the vice-chair, and committee members appointed by the chief of the bureau. At the central and provincial levels, each bureau had some combination of “a Special Investigation Team, a Confirm-and-Check Team, a Special Task Force, a GAR Promotion Committee, a Secret Inspection Team, an Irregularities Correction Special Team, etc.” Above all these was the Executive Decree Organization and Preparation Committee, which coordinated campaign activity but unlike the lower committees was written into law and was intended to be

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167 Kyunghyang News / 경향신문 (KHSM), 1976/2/18.

168 “General Administrative Reform,” Ministry of Culture and Public Information, 1976, National Archives of Korea, Number: C11M34142.


permanent.\footnote{CSIB, 1975/12/28.} Even after temporary organizations were phased out or receded in importance, this was not the end of the reform effort, which transitioned into routine enforcement.\footnote{Compared to cases in Taiwan and China, the GAR’s committees and inspection teams were not given as much leeway to take control of bureaucracy even at the height of the campaign; they supervised rather than commandeered internal investigations.} Regular reports about the campaign’s progress and specific activities, like worker inspections, continued to be reported up to central organs quarterly through 1979.\footnote{See for example: “General Administrative Reform Progress Report 1978, 3rd quarter,” State Administration and Administrative Adjustment Office. / “行政刷新推进状况报告 1978 年度 3/4 期分,” 国务管理行政调整室.; “General Administrative Reform Progress Report 1979, 1st quarter” Workplace Information Collection. / “1979 年도 ¼ 分기 서정쇄신 추진 상황보고” 사업장정보집. For both: National Archives of Korea, Number: BA0158332. / 국가기록원, 관리번호: BA0158332.}

Other institutional reforms could address corruption indirectly. In 1975, the government “revised or repealed 475 laws and regulations” to reduce red tape and streamline the bureaucracy. Reportedly, the government discovered that in some cases bureaus needed 19 forms to complete routine tasks, like issuing licenses, and that routine tasks “could take up to 110 days.”\footnote{Korea Annual, 1975, p. 31.} In addition, Citizen Complaint Offices set up in dozens of cities passed information up to a central Citizen Complaint Committee.\footnote{Kim Hong-zhou, Research on Seoul City Civil Servants’ General Administrative Reform (Yonsei University Publishing, 1980), p. 22. 金洪周, 《 서울특별市 公務員의 庶政刷新에 관한 研究》 (연세대학교발행, 1980), 페이지 22.} The Ministry of Home Affairs implemented a six-part plan to address citizen complaints, resulting in ten laws and 15 presidential decrees addressing problems the public faced.\footnote{Kim, Research on Seoul City Civil Servants’ General Administrative Reform, p. 30.}
Later stages of the GAR broadened the campaign out from the state and attempted to use propaganda to change societal norms of corruption. The GAR aimed to “eradicate societal wrongdoing and corruption,” as well as any “anti-social, anti-country, Yushin-resisting, civilian life-violating…behavior.” The most ambitious mission of the campaign was a “mental revolution,” which meant instilling the values of “diligence, self-help, cooperation” and having the people arm themselves with the proper “perspective, anti-Communist spirit…and value system.”\(^1\) Millions of South Koreans received “education” on this “mental revolution” and “training” on how to support the GAR.\(^2\) Civil servants underwent “mental/spiritual education.”\(^3\) If the campaign could make the public internalize opposition to luxurious and undisciplined lifestyles, the logic went, corruption would decline and economic efficiency would increase.\(^4\) We can see in these propaganda tactics how state control of the media and societal discourse contributed to the overall campaign effort.

**Anti-Corruption Outcomes**

The General Administrative Reform was a Limited Victory; its successes can be seen in the wide-ranging purges of the bureaucracy, new and improved rules against corruption and governmental practices associated with corruption, institutionalized monitoring of indiscipline, and somewhat positive assessments by experts. Indirect evidence for anti-corruption success also comes from rising bureaucratic quality.\(^5\) The campaign’s limitations were mainly in its lack of

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4. Rafique-Rahman, “Legal and Administrative Measures Against Bureaucratic Corruption in Asia,” p. 120.
high-level prosecutions and the absence of rules that could constrain corruption among elites and high-level officials, which often involved collusion with chaebol “greased by cash.”

Discipline enforcement in the GAR was not only broad—cutting across the whole bureaucracy—but also relatively permanent. The GAR brought on a wave of disciplined civil servants appealing their cases, but statistics show that even as appeals increased, their success rate dropped throughout the campaign (see below). The GAR Almanac remained a constraint on “revolving door” corruption for disciplined officials, though restrictions on working in related private industries did not apply to the many officials who left public jobs for other reasons.

Table 3.2:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Success Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977 (first quarter)</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The rising prevalence of meritocratic recruitment for top bureaucrats shows a rise in bureaucratic quality in this period. Between 1961 and 1970, 40 bureaucrats above the section chief level—29 percent of the total—were recruited through civil service examinations, as opposed to out of the military or through other procedures. Just between 1971 and 1975, however, 54 bureaucrats came in through examinations—61 percent of the total hired; the overall percentage between 1971 and 1979 was 57 percent. In a separate measure of bureaucratic

\[\text{Table 3.2:} \]

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
Year & Success Rate & Year & Success Rate \\
\hline
1974 & 33\% & 1977 (first quarter) & 17.8\% \\
1975 & 20\% & 1976 & 15.8\% \\
\hline
\end{tabular}


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183 Author’s interviews with four scholars of South Korea’s authoritarian period. Summer 2018.; “The Plus and Minus of Korea,” 1976/11/5, State Department cable, Central Foreign Policy Files, The U.S. National Archives and Records Administration.

quality, tax collection improved after 1972.\textsuperscript{185} The Yushin system “engendered an atmosphere conducive to the formation of an extremely cohesive and powerful bureaucracy.”\textsuperscript{186}

The GAR received moderately positive or mixed reviews in expert assessments.\textsuperscript{187} The campaign “has seen many successes, as everyone knows, but corruption is still around us.”\textsuperscript{188} It was “at least partly successful.”\textsuperscript{189} The GAR overall fell “short of a satisfactory level…but the visible components of administrative corruption have significantly been reduced.”\textsuperscript{190} “Wrongdoing was markedly reduced,” concluded a 1977 study from Seoul National University (SNU). The study cited the feedback of bureau reports passed up to central organs about the campaign and, as indirect evidence, the “unprecedented scale,” vigor, and consistency of government action. In a nationwide survey—the quality of which cannot be independently verified—79.4 percent of 2,400 respondents in December 1976 said that corruption had been reduced significantly or somewhat.\textsuperscript{191} Andrew Wedeman agrees that Park “vigorously

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{185} Ha Tae-su, “Analysis of Revision of Government Organizational Law in the Opening of the Yushin Regime: Reasoning and Interpretation Based on the Political and Economic Background,” \textit{Korean Policy Studies}, 10.2 (2010), pp. 435, 442.
\item \textsuperscript{187} Author’s interviews with two corruption control researchers in South Korea, January 2019.
\item \textsuperscript{188} Kim, \textit{Research on Seoul City Civil Servants’ General Administrative Reform}, p. 1.
\item \textsuperscript{189} Author’s interview with Dr. You Jong-sung, 2018/7/17.
\item \textsuperscript{190} Oh, “The Counter-Corruption Campaign of the Korean Government (1975–77),” p. 344.
\item \textsuperscript{191} Wu Xihong, “Focusing on the Work of Corruption Control in the Administrative System” in \textit{Treatises on Administration} (Seoul National University Graduate School of Public Administration, 1977), pp. 124–25.
\end{itemize}
prosecuted corruption among low-ranking officials.” The GAR also simplified procedures for tasks such as getting travel money and paying business fees. However, the SNU studies cautiously, the “government…exaggerates the achievements.” Park claimed publicly in January 1977 that “it is true that the campaign achieved many results,” including increasing the public’s level of trust in civil servants. But in a separate speech later in 1977 he complained that the GAR did not meet its full goals and “the pathogen of disorder remains in society.” Other assessments agree that the “rejuvenation achieved in the bureaucracy…did not spread to the society at large.”

Official American assessments were positive, even excessively so. The annual Human Rights Report - Korea sent to Congress by the State Department in early 1978 reported that “the [South Korean] government has conducted an intense campaign which virtually eliminated low-level corruption and significantly reduced it at the higher levels.” It noted that this campaign was “impressive and important for public support.” The Human Rights Report, including the assessment of South Korea’s anti-corruption efforts, was strongly criticized in an open letter to President Jimmy Carter from Korean critics of the Park government. The letter argued that in


193 Kim, Research on Seoul City Civil Servants’ General Administrative Reform, p. 20.


praising the reduction in corruption, the State Department was “closing its eyes to the violations of human rights, while patronising a regime which is trampling human rights.” Nevertheless, the State Department continued to praise the Park administration’s enforcement of anti-corruption measures in drafting the 1978 Human Rights Report on Korea.

Elites and high-level officials were in fact able to continue with established corrupt practices, although it is worth noting that the centralization of power around Park in the Yushin period almost certainly shrank the number of participants in high-level corruption. An “increasing concentration of power on the president meant increasing concentration of clientelistic resources.” The cancellation of direct presidential elections, for example, lessened the need for broadly distributed payoffs. In the economic sphere, Park gained the upper hand over the chaebol, meaning he needed their donations less and had more authority to direct them. His plan to advance HCI fueled the rapid growth of his select few chaebol into the massive conglomerates Koreans associate the term with today. This is why Michael Johnston characterizes South Korean corruption in this period as an “elite cartel.” The Yushin system, as Im writes, “stunted what potential the Third Republic had for democratization, but it was at


the same time one of the factors that contributed to South Korea’s transformation into a model East Asian developmental state.”

This narrowing of corruption does not imply a reduction of the amount of money involved, which may well have grown because of the rapid economic growth in the 1970s—this would be difficult to establish definitively.

**Explaining the GAR’s Outcomes**

The GAR’s successful execution depended on Park’s unconstrained leadership of the regime in the 1970s. Park ordered the reform, created the organizations that would lead it, kept those organizations close, and used his executive decrees and influence over the legislature to write the GAR’s rules and regulations. Yun Tae-bum summarizes the style of Park’s anti-corruption efforts as: “revolutionary promises, generalized and politicized purges, broad policy implementation, leadership by the Blue House, and the use and empowerment of temporary organizations.”

“More than legal measures, [the campaign] was mainly driven by politically strategic presidential orders.”

Park’s consolidation of power undercut much of the leverage corrupt actors in the government had over him, helping prevent the backsliding that characterized anti-corruption efforts in the early 1960s. The leadership echelon of the bureaucracy, the prime location for patronage appointments, became relatively dispensable. The inability of these high-ranking bureaucrats to even collectively check the leader can be seen in the enforcement of the

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204 Im, “The Origins of the Yushin Regime: Machiavelli Unveiled,” p. 234.

205 “The annual contributions by the top chaebol to Park are known to have increased, reaching 500 to 600 million won (about 1.7 to 2.5 billion won in 2000 constant prices) during the late Yushin period.” Source: You, Democracy, Inequality and Corruption, p. 132.


vertical responsibility system, which held heads of bureaus accountable for the crimes of their subordinates. Scholars have noted the importance of Park’s individual leadership in other reforms carried out in this period. For example, “both the [expanded] Saemual movement and the formulation and implementation of [Park’s chaebol plan] bypassed existing bureaucratic structures by creating new ones directly responsible to the president.”208 The Economic Planning Board and the Ministry of Finance were bypassed in policy-making in favor of the Presidential Secretariat and the Office for Executive Coordination.

Motivated and empowered leaders still need strong state capacity to carry out reforms, which Park had. The GAR—itself a state-building campaign—was possible through the existing capacity built up in the 1960s and earlier. Implementing the new rules of the reform required bureaucratic discipline, organization, and general professionalism. Implementing even a small anti-graft measure like the new “daily settlement of accounts” system throughout the whole government would be a challenge in most developing countries.209 The bureaucracy also had to absorb unusually high personnel turnover. While the importance of state capacity is uncontested in the literature, this factor alone does not explain why a reform succeeds. In the case of GAR, sufficient state capacity had been in place for years, if not decades; it was the top leadership’s political will and authority propelled the reforms.

Park embraced many elements of the authoritarian playbook for corruption control in the GAR. Park centralized power, giving himself more of a free hand to challenge corrupt interests in the government and reducing the necessary scope of strategic patronage. He disrupted and


209 “Special Report / General Administrative Reform: Results of One Year,” p. 28.
remade governing institutions, meaning dismantling, reorganizing, or sidelining state organizations; creating new organizations, sometimes temporarily, that were empowered to monitor and investigate existing ones; and issuing executive decrees that overrode existing laws and procedures to create higher anti-corruption standards or improve enforcement. Park also tightened vertical discipline. By designating organizations personally loyal to him as the command centers of anti-corruption efforts, Park increased his control over public officials who were previously only indirectly his subordinates or were distant from the center under several layers of bureaucratic authority. Loyalists in roving inspection teams were empowered to pass information directly to the center, avoiding possible bureaucratic inertia or defensiveness in the face of scrutiny. At the same time, lower-level officials were brought under more direct supervision by their superiors. Lastly, Park used state propaganda and his own rhetoric to portray corruption as an attack on the nation. Corruption was, in his telling, the cause of myriad economic, political, social, and military ills. Through this rhetoric, spread through the GAR’s education and training, the regime strove to create a social atmosphere conducive to successful reform.

Finally, it would have been difficult for corruption control efforts to achieve a Breakthrough in the 1970s because of the political and economic influence of private socioeconomic elites, especially the heads of the chaebol. Park’s leadership of the regime was less constrained than ever in the 1970s, but he had to compromise with the rapidly growing private sector. To advance his developmental goals, Park continued to have to treat chaebol leaders as essential business partners, with all the quid pro quo that this close relationship implied. Kang calls the politicians and economic elites under Park “mutual hostages.”

Kang, Crony Capitalism, pp. 96–121.
most likely time for Park to establish a different kind of relationship with the chaebol would have been at the beginning of his rule after the 1961 coup, before the chaebol became so dominant, but it was an insurmountable challenge even then for reasons discussed above. As with other anti-corruption efforts begun outside the early formative years of a regime, the GAR remained a Limited Victory. The main failing of the GAR in the 11-point scoring system is that it did not use new or improved rules to constrain high-level corrupt practices. Nevertheless, the Park era is rightly reputed to have been better for corruption control than the regimes that came before (Rhee and Chang) or immediately after (Chun and Roh).\textsuperscript{211} The independent power of socioeconomic elites continues to be a challenge in anti-corruption efforts in South Korea today.

4. Chun Doo-hwan and the Purification Campaign

Park Chung-hee was assassinated on October 26, 1979 by the director of the KCIA for unclear and possibly personal reasons. In the aftermath, the group of elites “that supported Park’s authoritarian developmental coalition first rallied behind Kim Chong-pil and after May 1980 behind Chun Doo-hwan.”\textsuperscript{212} Chun, an influential army general, was put in charge of the KCIA and the investigation into Park’s assassination. He soon leveraged this position and his influence over the Hanahoe—a secret faction Park had allowed him to cultivate within the military—to sideline Acting President Choi Kyu-ha and take over the regime. Chun declared martial law in May 1980 and stepped down from the military to become president in September. Within a few

\textsuperscript{211} Author’s interviews with several scholars of South Korea, including Dr. Martin Hart-Landsberg, Dr. Eun Mee Kim, Dr. John Lie, and Dr. You Jong-sung. Summer 2018. See also: You, “Demystifying the Park Chung-Hee Myth,” p. 540.

months of Park’s assassination, Chun had “filled the power vaccum [sic]” and “emerged as the most powerful figure in South Korea.”\textsuperscript{213}

Much of the public felt robbed of the chance to institute a democratic system after the sudden fall of Park’s regime, and protests quickly arose. Unlike the mild response to Park’s coup in 1961, the public was angered by Chun’s coup, giving him an immediate “legitimacy problem.”\textsuperscript{214} Chun was “core elite” in the military—even more of an insider than Park, who had been a marginal elite before 1961.\textsuperscript{215} “The first few months after Park’s death were a time of euphoria;” Choi “cautiously began to dismantle the Yushin system.” The student protest movement, which had been effectively repressed, “changed dramatically when a new school year began in March 1980.” Soon, “the streets of Korean cities witnessed daily demonstrations calling for the end of martial law, speedy democratization under a new constitution and the removal of Chun.” Labor activists were also turning more militant. On May 15\textsuperscript{th}, “fifty thousand students gathered in front of Seoul Station” and a serious fight with riot police followed.\textsuperscript{216} Chun declared martial law and ordered the arrest of hundreds of protesters. The biggest resistance was in Kwangju, a major city in the southwest with a proud history of political protest and activism. The Kwangju Uprising, as it became known, met lethal repression by Chun’s regime—hundreds of civilians were killed and thousands more were wounded, though precise numbers are unknown.

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{213} Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, “Political Reconstruction in South Korea: A Difficult Road,” 1980/5/14, CIA-RDP85T00287R000101140001-6.
\item\textsuperscript{214} Author’s interview with Dr. You Jong-sung, 2018/7/17.
\item\textsuperscript{216} Clifford, Troubled Tiger, p. 149–54.
\end{itemize}
The brutal crackdown cast a dark shadow over the Fifth Republic that never dissipated, regardless of how quickly the economy grew in the 1980s.

Chun was willing to carry out lethal repression to stay in control, but also tried to appeal to the public with governmental reforms, including mass disciplining of corrupt officials under the label of “Purification” (정화). Like Park before him, Chun justified his takeover by promising that a military-led regime would bring order, progress, and clean government. “Like Park, he also set up a quasi-revolutionary body to bypass the normal bureaucracy.”

On May 31st, Chun established the Special Committee for National Security Measures (국보위국보위) (SCNSM) as the chief governing organ for his regime. The initial aims of the SCNSM included eliminating opposition to the government on security grounds, wresting control of academia from “north Korean puppets,” stopping the corrupt political wind of the times, and combating drug trafficking. In early June, the SCNSM “inaugurated its purification campaign with a nine-point guideline promising to ‘purge impure elements,’ ‘rectify amoral business activities,’ and ‘purify the nation by rooting out various social vices’.”

Chun later explained that part of SCNSM’s missions was to eliminate “power-related wrongdoing” and “purify the political atmosphere polluted by corruption, scheming, flame-fanning, and libel.” Another SCNSM statement summarized the goals: “eliminate iniquity, irregularities, and corruption in officialdom, clean up political power-related illicit fortune-making and social evils.” But many

217 Clifford, Troubled Tiger, p. 163.
219 Clifford, Troubled Tiger, p. 164.
South Koreans had “grown cynical about periodic announcements of wiping out corruption among government officials and politicians. Thus, few people appeared stunned by the martial law command’s anti-graft announcement on June 18.”

_C Chun’s Motives for the Purification_

Chun’s involvement in and acceptance of corruption was a marked departure from Park’s behavior. “For all his faults, Park had never allowed his family to profit personally from his position. Unfortunately, the Chun and Lee families [his wife’s family] set an example of egregiously corrupt behavior that still undermines the Korean social contract.” Wedeman writes that “after Park, corruption no longer served purely political purposes and the amount of money that ended up in the pockets of individual leaders increased dramatically. Chun and Roh pocketed upward of a third of what they collected.” Whereas Park had colluded with chaebol in ways that benefitted his political party, the chaebol, and the economy, Chun plundered. “By the mid-1980s, this heavy financial burden of corruption had led the chaebol into open conflict with Chun.”

Chun’s malfeasance in office went far beyond minor personal corruption or strategic, temporary acceptance of corrupt allies for political support. As came out at his trial in 1996, Chun pressured companies into paying him massive bribes and embezzled public funds through

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222 FEER, 1980/7/4.
223 Clifford, _Troubled Tiger_, p. 287.
225 To explain why Chun was more corrupt than Park, scholars Kim Dongryul and James Christopher Schopf point to the issue of time horizons—Park’s were long, while Chun’s were short. Author’s interviews, September 2018.
226 Hart-Landsberg, _The Rush to Development_, p. 236.
multiple channels. “Prosecutors said Mr. Chun had admitted receiving nearly $900 million for a slush fund while he was President,” and that at least $275 million of that met the legal definition of bribery.\(^{227}\) Chun was convicted of treason, mutiny, and corruption; his death sentence was commuted, however. Previously, in 1988, his younger brother had been convicted of embezzling $5.8 million and had gone to prison.\(^{228}\) The problem was not confined to the leader and his family; “many senior officials in the Chun and Roh administrations—including a dozen ministers, a dozen senior military officers, half a dozen presidential advisers, the chief justice of the Supreme Court, the speaker of the National Assembly, the chief of the National Police Administration, the mayor of Seoul, and a host of other officials were subsequently charged.”\(^{229}\)

While the personal use of corruption does not disqualify a leader from being a reformer, this kind of rampant embezzlement by numerous family members and cronies makes it difficult to accept that Chun had any sincere anti-corruption goals.

There is little to suggest that Chun’s motives for the purification campaign went beyond securing his position in power by weakening rivals and putting on a political show for the public. The campaign helped Chun control two groups of potential rivals: politicians and military officers. The CIA reported that South Korean politicians “generally regard the young general’s rise to power as a threat to their own prospects and to the nation's political liberalization program. Students are highly suspicious of Chun’s motives and have begun calling for his ouster.”\(^{230}\)

It is unsurprising, therefore, than 800 politicians were barred from participating in


politics for several years, including almost all National Assembly members, though some successfully appealed the decision. The elites purged in the Purification were “a clever mix of corrupt politicians and genuine members of the opposition.” Many were former close allies of Park, and at least a few of them might have succeeded Park had Chun not, such as Kim Chong-pil or chief of staff and former KCIA director Lee Hu-rak. Others were cabinet ministers, former cabinet ministers, and DRP members and aides to the former president. A former economic adviser of Chun’s interviewed for this study explained that Chun knew that focusing on the issue of corruption would help justify his purges of the government and bureaucracy. “Cleansing” the government of “illicit accumulators” might help ameliorate high “social distrust.”

Purification and its Outcomes

Chun’s wide-ranging purification campaign shook the state, but ultimately should be rated as a Failed Reform. Unprecedently broad investigations and arrests were undermined by an unambiguous failure to institutionalize anti-corruption reforms. The campaign had, moreover, virtually no effect on expert opinion.

Scores of high-level military officials, politicians, and senior bureaucrats were charged with corruption and a mix of others political and economic crimes. The Far Eastern Economic

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234 Author’s interview with former adviser to Chun, January 2019.
Review noted that “one of [Chun’s] first aims appear[ed] to be elimination of endemic corruption from the bureaucracy.” But the dizzying speed and unprecedented scale of the purge—12 percent of high-level officials and 19.3 percent of vice-ministers—created tremendous uncertainty. “Among bureaucrats in Seoul, a common greeting, only half in jest, is, ‘How nice it is to see you again this morning’—as if routine meeting these days are in doubt.” The most visible early act was the arrest of nine high-level public officials, including Kim Chong-pil, Lee Hu-rak, and and Lee Se-ho, former army chief of staff, for corruption and related charges. The details of their cases were splashed on the front pages of newspapers for weeks. The government recovered from them some 85.3 billion won and eventually let them go. The SCNSM “anti-corruption squad” removed 232 senior officials, almost all from the executive, including one cabinet minister, five vice-ministers, three provincial governors, six National Assembly members, etc. Common crimes included accepting valuables in return for business favors, embezzlement of public funds, speculation on real estate or antiques, and providing private loans to businesses at high rates in one’s own jurisdiction. Chun purged more than 300 officials from the KCIA for being “corrupt and incompetent.”

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236 FEER, 1980/7/18.

237 “Special Committee for National Security Measures White Paper,” p. 34.

238 The Washington Post (hereafter WP), 1980/7/20: https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1980/07/20/hundreds-more-held-or-fired-in-s-korean-purge/729117a5-de2c-4ea7-a02d-7455d7d2a16a/?utm_term=.eb07f4f78db8


240 Nam, South Korean Politics, p. 233.


242 FEER, 1980/7/4.
Audit and Inspection...tendered their resignations.243 5,237 low- and mid-level officials were forced to leave their posts.244 By early 1981, some 8,000 civil servants had lost their jobs and 130,000 others had received clemency for minor disciplinary violations.245 Within the bureaucracy, special attention was paid to tax officials, the police, and bureaucrats in economic departments.246 Outside of government, at the broadest level of the Purification, more than 40,000 people were disciplined for corruption, smuggling, violence, and other anti-social behaviors.247

The Purification was accompanied by some proposals to institutionalize anti-corruption reform, but they did not go far. A former Hanahoe member and top adviser to Chun recalled in an interview that “the corrupt bureaucracy had to be fired...so we did [the Purification] not legally, but with power.”248 The Public Servant Ethics Law (PSEL) (1980) supposedly required officials to register and publicly disclose their personal assets and any gifts they received. But despite the “initial threat,” punishments for noncompliance were not specified and the law was ultimately not enforced.249 The new rules were opaque and “ineffective.”250 The Ethics Law also

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243 FEER, 1980/7/18.
245 FEER, 1981/1/30.
248 Author’s interview, January 2019. This statement is not a translation, but rather was said in English.
tried to put limits on where civil servants could work after leaving the government, but with no success.\footnote{Park, “National Government Anti-Corruption Reform Measures,” p. 108. On other problems with the law, see: Yun Tae-bum, “Public Ethics and Conflicts of Interest” [translation given], in Kim Byung-sup and Park Soon-ae, Eds., \textit{Corruptions in Korea: Diagnoses and Prescriptions} (Seoul: Parkyoungsa, 2013), pp. 117–19. / 윤태범, “공직자의 윤리 확보와 이해충돌의 방지,” 김병섭, 박영사, \textit{한국 사회의 부패: 진단과 처방} (서울: 박영사, 2013), 페이지 117–19.} Chun was still talking about implementing that part of the law in 1986.\footnote{\textit{Yonhap News} / 연합뉴스 (YHN), 2013/8/5.} Similarly, the Act on Real Name Financial Transactions passed in the National Assembly in December 1983, but it was watered down and implementation was put off.\footnote{Jon S. T. Quah, \textit{Curbing Corruption in Asian Countries: An Impossible Dream?} (Singapore: ISEAS Pub, 2013), p. 326.} the PSEL was overhauled in 1993, under the democratically elected President Kim Young-sam (KYS). The KYS administration implemented anti-corruption proposals from the military period that were then not properly enforced, such as the real-name financial transaction system and registration and disclosure of officials’ assets. It also expanded the scope of targets for such reforms.\footnote{The 1990s reforms will be discussed in detail in Chapter Six.}

Chun’s purification campaign has not made much of a mark on scholarship. News reports in domestic and foreign media show that it appeared dramatic at the time but in retrospect has been overshadowed by the Fifth Republic’s brutal repression, especially of the Kwangju Uprising, and by Chun’s own involvement in corruption. In rare praise for the Purification, Kim Seok-Ki suggests that Chun’s initial emphasis on “eradicating corruption from the nation’s political and bureaucratic sectors” led to increased “standardization” and “decentralization” of many decisions made in the bureaucracy.\footnote{Kim Seok-Ki, \textit{Business Concentration and Government Policy: A Study of the Phenomenon of Business Groups in Korea, 1945–85} (ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 1987), p. 247.}
were swift and significant accomplishments in the “elimination of illicit accumulators,” the “purification of bureaucrats,” and the “establishment of national discipline.” Experts on Korean history and politics, however, do not agree.

Chun’s efforts suffered not only from his weak motivation but also from the fact that his leadership was constrained, even compared to Park’s in the early 1960s. Chun’s need to curry favor with multiple groups incentivized the use of corruption. After Park’s assassination, “all parties—including Chun—appear to recognize that a return to the excessive controls of the Park era would not be acceptable to the Korean people.” Pressure to not rebuild the Yushin system would come from U.S. officials as well. While presidential elections were indirect, Chun still needed substantial funds to build up his Democratic Justice Party (DJP), which kept him in power and assured legislative victories. Former advisers of Chun’s, when asked about his corruption, justified it as necessary to win elections. The DJP grew quickly by offering new members cash bribes: “local party officials or candidates sponsored ‘membership training meetings,’ at which scores of people acquired instant ruling party membership and 100,000 won (US $150) each.” Vote-buying was also widespread. Even within the military, Chun “does not seem automatically to have his way in his dealings with the military; he is rather considered a

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256 Chun, Chun Doo- hwane Memoirs v. 1, p. 557.
259 Author’s interview with a close associate of CDH’s during his presidency, January 2019.
first among equals, with important decisions being made by a small group of his close supporters
in a collegial fashion.\textsuperscript{262}

Comparisons between Park’s commitment to state-building and Chun’s personal greed
raise the question of whether anti-corruption outcomes come down to idiosyncratic personal
differences. Individual characteristics can certainly predispose some leaders to attempt
governance reforms and others not, but structural factors still matter. Firstly, attempts are not
outcomes, which are determined by much more than the choices of even a powerful leader.
Secondly, for virtually all autocrats, political survival takes priority (or at least precedence) over
pursuing other goals. This means that without some level of political security, differences in
personal preference on questions of policy will be flattened. Finally, the emergence of leaders
with revolutionary or developmental state-building commitments is not random. East Asia in the
20\textsuperscript{th} century was particularly fertile ground for such leaders for historical reasons, as discussed in
Chapter One. Chun Doo-hwan, the leader of the last new authoritarian regime in East Asia as of
this writing (April 2019), was a break from that pattern.

5. Conclusions

This chapter demonstrates that South Korea was less effective at corruption control under
military rule than the KMT-led regime in Taiwan because of three factors: the greater political
constraints on South Korea’s top leadership, the concentration of private economic power in the
hands of the chaebol, and, in Chun Doo-hwan’s case, weak motivation to curb corruption. Park
Chung-hee was motivated to reduce government malfeasance primarily because of his
developmental state-building mission, which grew out of his appreciation for the Japanese

\textsuperscript{262} Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, “Political Reconstruction in South Korea: A Difficult Road,”
model. But facing semi-competitive elections, factional conflict, and powerful private business interests, Park backtracked on his initial anti-corruption efforts. He used strategic corruption in his relations with businesses, politicians, and the public to secure his political position. The passage of the Yushin constitution loosened constraints on Park’s power, which aided corruption control efforts. The General Administrative Reform curbed bureaucratic corruption but largely avoided addressing wrongdoing by elites. After Park’s assassination in 1979, Chun did not curb governmental wrongdoing, but rather oversaw its increase. His leadership was much more constrained than Park’s in the Yushin period, increasing incentives to rely on corruption. Moreover, his motives in launching an anti-corruption campaign in 1980 were narrowly political.

The analysis in this chapter suggests at least two South Korea-specific takeaways for future scholarship. First, though Park is often described as a “dictator” throughout 1961–79, I find that his leadership within the Third Republic was substantially constrained in ways that shaped his policy choices.\(^{263}\) And second, anti-corruption efforts under military rule, even if unsuccessful, were important political developments deserving of much greater scholarly attention than they have received. Park’s post-coup anti-corruption efforts were an integral part of his developmental agenda and should not be dismissed out of hand.\(^{264}\) Despite its contributions to South Korea’s developmental state, the General Administrative Reform has also often been overlooked, especially in English-language scholarship. Even Chun’s short-lived


\(^{264}\) E.g. Kang, *Crony Capitalism*, p. 119.
purge of the government and bureaucracy had lasting political and economic effects worthy of further analysis.\textsuperscript{265}

\textsuperscript{265} His former advisers were keen to convince me of this point.
Chapter Four

The Chinese Communist Party

1. Introduction

This chapter profiles the Chinese Communist Party’s recurring struggle against corruption and explains why some of its efforts have been successful while others have not. As with Taiwan and South Korea in previous chapters, I find that authoritarian anti-corruption success in China has depended on a strongly motivated and unconstrained leadership being able to command a capable state apparatus. While the PRC has generally had high party-state capacity, the top leadership has often been constrained in ways that prevent it from effectively commanding this capacity and following through on reform plans. Motivation to curb corruption has often been high, reflecting corruption control’s inclusion in the CCP’s revolutionary and developmental state-building projects. But we can also see that even an individual leader’s motivation can rise or fall as goals or situations change. Overall, the CCP has been less effective at curbing corruption than the KMT was in authoritarian Taiwan but arguably more effective than South Korea’s military regimes.

The CCP has viewed corruption among party members as a critical challenge almost since its founding. In the early 1930s, Mao Zedong—not yet chairman of the party—launched the party’s first anti-corruption campaign of note in the southeastern revolutionary base known as the Jiangxi Soviet. After winning the Chinese Civil War and declaring the establishment of the

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People’s Republic of China (PRC), the party faced the monumental tasks of rebuilding and governing. In the early 1950s, the Three Antis–Five Antis Campaign (三反五反运动) allowed the CCP to address corruption and reorder China’s complex urban centers. In the early 1960s, after the humanitarian tragedy and economic failure of the Great Leap Forward (GLF), the party leadership tried to stamp out bottom-up capitalism and rural cadre corruption with the Four Cleans Campaign (四清运动). The widespread chaos created by the Cultural Revolution in the late 1960s provoked violent state crackdowns on all forms of indiscipline. Economic crime, which had flourished in the turmoil, came under attack by the harsh One Strike–Three Antis Campaign (一打三反运动) (1970–71).

In the post-Mao era, the politics of corruption have become more complicated and the task of controlling it arguably even more important for the CCP. China’s Reform and Opening under Deng Xiaoping brought rapid growth and social change, but also a dramatic rise in corrupt behaviors. Deng led three campaigns in the 1980s to reverse the trend to little avail. The last of these crackdowns was precipitated by the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, in which protesters called for greater democracy and an end to rampant official malfeasance. In the 1990s and 2000s, anti-corruption campaigns were less significant and, following the general trend of political liberalization, the CCP experimented with a more democratic approach to corruption control. But rather than establish clean government, these reform efforts exposed the weakness of party discipline in an increasingly open political environment, contributing to a sense of slow-motion crisis within the party. Since 2012, Xi Jinping’s sweeping, multiyear anti-corruption campaign has been part of and a strategy for achieving his overarching mission in office: to reverse political trends under his predecessors and restore party discipline and party control over the state and society.
The CCP’s major anti-corruption successes are the Three Antis–Five Antis Campaign, which was a Breakthrough, and Xi’s ongoing campaign, which has already achieved a Limited Victory. The later Mao era (after the Leap) and the reform era saw several Failed Reforms, usually because the government ramped up anti-corruption investigations but then failed to enforce new rules or clean government norms. At other times, Chinese leaders have announced anti-corruption campaigns but then not significantly increased enforcement. This is either because their efforts were blocked or because the campaign was not national in scope. Less than Failed Reforms, these cases are Empty Gestures.

Table 4.1:

**Major Anti-Corruption Efforts in the People’s Republic of China**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name and Dates</th>
<th>Strong Motivation?</th>
<th>Unconstrained Leadership?</th>
<th>High State Capacity?</th>
<th>Anti-Corruption Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Three Antis–Five Antis 1951–53</td>
<td>✅</td>
<td>✅</td>
<td>✅</td>
<td>Breakthrough</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four Cleans 1962–65</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✅</td>
<td>Failed Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One Strike–Three Antis 1970–71</td>
<td>✅</td>
<td>✅</td>
<td></td>
<td>Failed Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Campaign Against Economic Crime” 1981–82</td>
<td>✅</td>
<td></td>
<td>✅</td>
<td>Failed Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Party Work-Style Rectification” 1986</td>
<td>✅</td>
<td></td>
<td>✅</td>
<td>Failed Reform</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2 This list excludes many campaigns that were announced but did not meet the minimum threshold of a 50 percent rise in annual anti-corruption enforcement discussed in Chapter One—e.g. Empty Gestures in 1993, 1995, 2005, 2009. Fluctuations in the number of elite and high-level officials prosecuted for corruption were so common in the reform era that for the sake of manageability I did not include any cases on that basis alone. In addition, I exclude the campaign in the Jiangxi Soviet in the early 1930s because even rough data on its discipline enforcement are not available.
Following this introduction, Section Two of this chapter focuses on the pre-PRC period of the CCP. It seeks to explain the origins of Mao Zedong’s powerful leadership, his and other CCP leaders’ motives for pursuing corruption control, and the CCP’s high state capacity. Section Three covers the Three Antis–Five Antis Campaign. Section Four analyzes the Four Cleans and the One Strike–Three Antis campaigns. Section Five investigates ineffective anti-corruption efforts in the 1980s under Deng, while Section Six focuses on the quasi-democratic approach pursued in the 1990s and 2000s. Section Seven examines Xi’s signature anti-corruption campaign. Lastly, I propose two takeaways for future research on Chinese corruption control.

2. The Chinese Communist Party and Mao Zedong

The CCP was founded in July 1921 by a small circle of intellectuals and grew rapidly in membership throughout the 1920s. It joined with the larger Kuomintang and was a major left-wing influence until anti-communist leader Chiang Kai-shek moved to violently purge CCP members in April 1927. After Mao’s abortive rebellion known as the Autumn Harvest Uprising (秋收起义), the CCP retreated into various parts of southern China, where it increasingly drew support not from urban workers but from peasants. When Nationalist forces encircled its rural bases, the CCP retreated on its famous Long March (1934–35) across the country. In its new northwestern base at Yan’an in Shaanxi Province, the CCP again grew rapidly and won popular support in the late 1930s and early 1940s. After Japan’s defeat in World War II in 1945 and the
withdrawal of its forces from China, the Chinese Civil War broke out in earnest between the KMT and the CCP. The CCP drove the KMT off the Chinese mainland and founded the People’s Republic of China in the fall of 1949.

Initially inspired by the Russian Revolution, the CCP was committed to radically transforming the Chinese state, economy, and society in line with the principles of Marxism-Leninism. The Russian Revolution provided an attractive model of how a formerly great but now “backward” society humiliated by foreign powers could dramatically remake itself to be strong and modern. In the troubled decades after the Xinhai Revolution (1911), educated Chinese debated the relative merits of various foreign models and ideologies that could be borrowed or adapted to build a new China, including anarchism, Christianity, communism, democracy, and fascism. The CCP and the KMT shared the goal of unifying and modernizing China, but had starkly different visions of how to go about it. As in other communist states, the CCP aimed to become the sole legitimate political force in China and eliminate or co-opt unfriendly or independent social classes, political parties, private organizations, etc. Economically, the CCP aimed to rapidly industrialize and otherwise develop the country under state socialism. While the mission of growth was similar to that of capitalist developmental regimes, state socialism entailed central planning and public control of the bulk of industries. Socially, the CCP aimed to control civil society (if such a foreign term is appropriate in China), mobilize the masses, and

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mold public consciousness to align with its principles and ideals. While the strategies taken to
achieve these goals changed over time, these aims did not fundamentally change until the reform
era began after Mao Zedong’s death in 1976.

Mao, who had attended the CCP’s First National Congress in 1921, established himself
as the preeminent Communist leader during the party’s tumultuous early decades. After leading
the failed Autumn Harvest Uprising in 1927, Mao’s relationship with the party leadership
deteriorated and he came under repeated criticism for his unorthodox emphasis on peasant
mobilization among other issues. But as the CCP suffered repeated setbacks, it increasingly
embraced Maoist tactics and policies. At the Zunyi Conference in January 1935, which occurred
during the Long March, Mao became the de facto leader of the communist movement. He was
able to use dissatisfaction with the strategic choices of other leaders, especially Bo Gu and
Comintern representative Otto Braun, to push them aside. Mao further consolidated his power in
the Yan’an period—a revolutionary interlude of isolation, austerity, and popular support later
romanticized as embodying communist ideals. David Apter and Tony Saich explain how Mao
outmaneuvered several other prominent figures in the movement, including Zhang Guotao,
Wang Ming, Wang Shiwei, and Liu Zhidan, and criticized them without acknowledging his own
errors. It was also in Yan’an that the party began to build Mao’s cult of personality. Arguably
the most important development in terms of Mao’s status was the Yan’an Rectification
Movement (延安整风运动) (1942–44), the first in what would become a CCP tradition of
rectifications: internal party movements that combine ideological, political, and coercive tactics

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7 Daniel Leese, *Mao Cult: Rhetoric and Ritual in China’s Cultural Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University
to reorder power. The Yan’an Rectification Movement, over which Mao “exercised almost total control,” ended overt challenges to Mao’s authority in the party, established many of Mao’s policies and views as party doctrine, and allowed Mao Zedong Thought to be enshrined in the new party constitution.⁸ This successful rectification would become a model for future CCP reforms and was studied by Chiang Kai-shek as well.⁹ After October 1949, Mao’s cult of personality was propagated throughout China, along with Soviet leader Joseph Stalin’s.¹⁰

To carry out the CCP’s revolutionary projects, Mao and the rest of the leadership would need strong state capacity (or proto-state capacity, before 1949). The party experienced numerous setbacks and defeats in its decades of revolutionary struggle, but these tribulations also screened members for loyalty and taught the leadership how to organize and mobilize supporters with relatively scarce resources. In the Yan’an period in particular, the party “tightened its organizational form” in terms of the party, the government, and the army, while also expanding its membership.¹¹ One key factor in its revolutionary success was the CCP’s ability, which the KMT lacked, to penetrate the natural village and rally peasant support.¹² The CCP did not wait until 1949 to begin implementing its agenda; it successfully led land reform and rural

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development projects throughout the 1940s in areas already under its control. Most dramatically, the CCP demonstrated high capacity in its come-from-behind military victories. Many observers inside and outside China were shocked that the KMT, which was in control of most of China in 1945, could lose the Chinese Civil War to the CCP, which had been a marginal power in terms of manpower and territorial control only a decade earlier. In the early months of the People’s Republic of China, the CCP’s organizational skills were on display in taming inflation, restoring law and order, and stamping out residual resistance, whether from KMT agents, ethnic minority groups, or intellectuals. The U.S. State Department concluded in 1951 that the new regime had quickly brought “efficiency,” and that the “bureaucracy has been built up to the extent that it touches the daily activities of practically every Chinese individual.”

On the specific issue of capacity to control corruption, the CCP’s development had begun in the early 1930s in the Jiangxi Soviet, with the party’s first major anti-corruption campaign.15 Soon after the Soviet’s establishment in November 1931, the official newspaper Red China reported alarming cases of corruption, including dozens of embezzlement cases in just one small county.16 Cadres reportedly used embezzled funds for speculative business, including

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the resale of items like salt that were in desperately short supply. Some cadres “falsified accounts, forged documents, or destroyed incriminating evidence in order to embezzle public funds.” Promising harsh punishments, Mao launched a campaign against “corruption,” “waste,” and “bureaucratism” in the party (反贪污浪费运动). The campaign was an early test of capacity and a learning experience for the CCP’s discipline inspection system, which was based on the Soviet Union’s and was first institutionalized in 1927. The Worker-Peasant Inspection Committee (WPIC), which headed several province-level disciplinary supervisory commissions, “issued a series of directives concerning the scope, targets, and reform methods of the campaign.” In addition, it was during this crackdown that the CCP established its auditing agencies at various levels. The campaign had several characteristics that would feature in the party’s later anti-corruption efforts: the heavy use of inspection teams sent to local areas to investigate corruption, the establishment of temporary organizations to lead the campaign, greater reliance on party decrees than laws, and even mass participation. The WPIC reported in


March 1934 that an investigation into the Soviet’s central organs had resulted in 29 cadres being tried in court and three being dismissed from their jobs.\(^\text{23}\) Apart from this and the announcement of some rudimentary anti-corruption decrees, it is not clear what success the campaign might have had; it was interrupted by the CCP’s retreat from the area in October 1934 to escape KMT encirclement.

Despite the CCP’s prior corruption control experience and state capacity, after 1949 the general mess left by the retreating KMT and the challenges of a complex governance transition created fertile conditions for corruption among party members. As discussed in Chapter Two, in the 1940s, the KMT regime became “one of history’s most corrupt governments.”\(^\text{24}\) Without exaggerating the CCP’s relative cleanliness, we can say that many CCP members had endured years of austerity in revolutionary struggle. As a result, as party leaders acknowledged, many party members could not resist the corrupt and luxurious lifestyle of the city.\(^\text{25}\) Throughout 1950, official media reported a trend of new corruption by party members and in areas under their authority.\(^\text{26}\) Government reports concurred; one report from July 1950 related that many counties in the northwestern Ningxia Province had a “very chaotic and severe” situation of embezzlement


and waste. Politburo member Gao Gang raised concerns about the prevalence of corruption among CCP members in a speech in August 1951, arguing that they must have been “contaminated” by the holdover bureaucrats, merchants, reactionaries, etc. Put in less ideological terms, it is clear many party members took advantage of their new powers and the insecurity of private businesses after the civil war to engage in a variety of predatory or collusive behaviors.

3. The Three Antis–Five Antis Campaign

This section describes how Mao launched the Three Antis–Five Antis Campaign (or simply Three Antis–Five Antis) to address these problems and advance his and the CCP’s revolutionary state-building mission. I argue that this campaign was, like the contemporaneous KMT Reconstruction in Taiwan, a Breakthrough success in curbing corruption. I attribute this success to the combination of Mao’s unconstrained leadership, his strong motivation in pursuing corruption control to further broader goals, and the CCP’s high party-state capacity, which together allowed for an authoritarian playbook of reform. Despite the Three Antis–Five Antis’ success, corruption rose again several years later because of the disastrous Great Leap Forward.

27 “Ningxia’s counties have a very chaotic and severe situation of corruption and waste of money and grain,” 1950/7/22, The Database for the History of Contemporary Chinese Political Movements, 1949–. (hereafter ZDZYSS).

28 Chen and Chen, “The ‘Three-Anti’ and ‘Five-Anti’ Movements in Communist China,” p. 11.; The charge of “contamination” would be widely repeated in government reports during the campaigns. E.g. “Study the Tongxian County Party Committee to focus on the experience of investigating corruption and waste,” Editorial in Construction, 1951/11/12, ZDZYSS. / “学习通县地委重点检查贪污、浪费的经验,” 《建设》编辑部, 1951/11/12, ZDZYSS.
In October 1951, Mao launched the Three Antis Campaign (三反运动), which combined a focus on corruption and economic mismanagement with a broader effort to penetrate and reform urban areas. Its name meant that the campaign was anti-corruption, anti-waste, and anti-bureaucratism. After decades of emphasizing the rural over the urban, the CCP needed to build support in cities and learn how to govern them. The campaign was a way for the CCP “to grapple with the complex influence of urban life on the governing elite.” Only through this campaign did the CCP become a “truly revolutionary force” for urban citizens. The campaign contributed to state-building in multiple ways: purging questionably loyal holdover bureaucrats, building urban CCP networks and recruiting activists, advancing the state takeover of private industry, recovering illicit funds for the state treasury (in part for the war effort), strengthening trade unions, centralizing the CCP’s own economic activity, mobilizing the urban public into CCP campaigns, and checking corruption among CCP members during the transition.


There was a trial run for the campaign in Manchuria, where the term “three antis” was used by Gao Gang, but Mao made it national policy.

The Chinese words 贪污 [tanwu] and 腐败 [fubai] are both often translated as “corruption,” but the first can also refer to embezzlement or theft of state assets while the second sometimes specifically means bribery.


Mao viewed corruption control as a necessary project to advance the revolution, as well as a way to show the public that CCP rule would be different from KMT rule.\(^{33}\) Mao argued that if corrupt actors were not purged, there would be “damaging effects in the future.” “If we don’t carry out the Three Antis, the party will go bad (变质)...if it isn’t implemented within a decade, the Communist Party will turn into the Nationalist Party.”\(^{34}\) Therefore, Mao proposed, there should be a “big clean up of the whole party” to prevent the “extreme danger of many party members being corroded by the bourgeoisie.”\(^{35}\) The “struggle against corruption, waste, and bureaucratism should be seen as just as important as the struggle against counterrevolutionaries.” In many statements, Mao connected cleaning up corruption to class struggle and to economic advancement.\(^{36}\) In early 1952, for example, he instructed Beijing’s party committee to “take this opportunity [corruption control] to make a resolute counterattack...to the capitalist class’s rampant attack on this issue in the past three years.”\(^{37}\)

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\(^{33}\) The CCP’s relative cleanliness, real or not, had long been a point of propaganda. Back in Yan’an, Mao had argued to U.S. officials that KMT corruption was the reason it could not withstand Japanese attacks. See: Document 491, FRUS: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, China, Volume VI, 1944/11/8.


\(^{35}\) “Mao Zedong’s Instructions for the Three Anti and Five Anti Struggle,” 1951/1/30, ZDZYSS.

\(^{36}\) “Mao Zedong’s Instructions for the Three Anti and Five Anti Struggle,” 1951/12/8, ZDZYSS.


218
corruption efforts in the early 1950s were linked to larger, long-term goals as the CCP set up a
“new China.”

In early 1952, the Five Antis Campaign (五反运动) was started as a companion to and
largely merged with the Three Antis, creating the Three Antis–Five Antis. While the Three Antis
was more about government officials, the Five Antis focused more on businesses. The Five Antis
opposed bribery, tax evasion, laxity at work, embezzlement, and the theft of economic reports.
Mao gave the campaign eight goals, many of which overlapped with the Three Antis’ goals and
contributed to the CCP’s penetration of cities and increased regulation of urban economic
activity. The goals included “thoroughly investigate the situation of private industry and
commerce,” “clearly delineate the boundary between the working class and the bourgeoisie,”
“clean up the five vices [the antis] and eliminate speculation,” and “set up party chapters and
strengthen party work among the workers and employees of large and medium private
enterprises.” In some areas, there were slightly different versions of the Three Antis–Five
Antis. Shanghai briefly launched a Four Antis Campaign (四反运动) against bribery, fraud,
violence, and tax evasion, which expanded to “five antis” in February 1952.

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39 “Mao Zedong’s Instructions for the Three Anti and Five Anti Struggle,” 1952/3/5, ZDZYSS.

40 “Mao Zedong’s Instructions for the Three Anti and Five Anti Struggle,” 1952/3/5.

Was the Three Antis–Five Antis a way for Mao to consolidate his power, as is the case with many autocrats’ anti-corruption efforts? We cannot rule out personal power accumulation as a motive, but this alone would be insufficient to explain the reforms. Mao did not purge any elites who could be considered his rivals in the campaign. The first purges among top officials after the revolution were only in 1954 with the Gao Gang Affair. Furthermore, Mao had already consolidated a high degree of personal power before the campaign. This does not mean that Mao did not benefit from leading such a major campaign, but only that it would be a mistake to dismiss the broader implications of these measures for governance and the Chinese economy.

**Three Antis–Five Antis Reform Measures**

Between 1951 and 1953, officials, civil servants and businesspeople were investigated and disciplined widely. Three main groups were targeted with anti-corruption investigations: holdover bureaucrats from the KMT regime, CCP members, and private economic elites and businesspeople—especially “managers of factories and other businesses.” In his first move against high-level corruption after the founding of the PRC, Mao ordered that two high-ranking CCP officials in Tianjin, Liu Qingshan and Zhang Zishan, should be executed for corruption. Nationwide there were reportedly 105,916 people disciplined in the Three Antis alone—investigations had reduced the number from 292,000—for economic crimes involving more than 10 million yuan. In total, 1.23 million people were found to be corrupt or have made “a corrupt error,” including 202,683 party members. Because of its economic focus, the campaign was

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43 Spence, The Search for Modern China, p. 536.

initially described as an “inseparable part of the production and thrift movement (增产节约运动),” but later outgrew that campaign.45

Table 4.2:
Investigating Corruption in the Three Antis–Five Antis46

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City or Province</th>
<th>Corruption Uncovered (No. of offenders)</th>
<th>No. of “Tigers” Uncovered</th>
<th>Illicit Funds Recovered in the Three Antis (in new RMB)</th>
<th>Businesses “half or more in breach of the law” (%)</th>
<th>Businesses “half or more in breach of the law” (#)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beijing City</td>
<td>21,878</td>
<td>1,122</td>
<td>2,210,000</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
<td>6,981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fujian Province</td>
<td>20,623</td>
<td>1,931</td>
<td>2,800,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guangzhou City</td>
<td>14,335</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>22.4%</td>
<td>10,240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiangxi Province</td>
<td>18,950</td>
<td>1,154</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>2,758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai City</td>
<td>36,464</td>
<td>1,275</td>
<td>3,780,000</td>
<td>32.0%</td>
<td>44,820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shenyang City</td>
<td>20,143</td>
<td>1,563</td>
<td>3,036,700</td>
<td>25.7%</td>
<td>9,230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xian City</td>
<td>4,375</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>506,091</td>
<td>23.4%</td>
<td>4,264</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Implementation of the Three Antis–Five Antis varied across regions, but was generally characterized by top-down control, ad hoc organizations, mass mobilization of party members and the public, and extensive propaganda work. Once orders were received from the center, regional and local governments set up organizations to lead the campaigns in their areas. Production and Austerity Committees (PAC) and Austerity and Inspection Committees (AICs) were set up at various levels of government, along with an assortment of subcommittees, inspection teams, and work teams. PACs and their subordinate institutions, along with special courts established for the campaigns, had wide-ranging powers to investigate, fine, arrest, and punish officials.\(^\text{47}\) Other “regular institutions” at the same level of government had to defer to these new bodies.\(^\text{48}\) Nanjing’s PAC organized 30 inspection supervision teams.\(^\text{49}\) In Shanghai, the roughly 81,000 people working in the Five Antis Campaign were divided into thousands of local committees, small and medium inspection teams, and small and medium work teams.\(^\text{50}\) As in other campaigns, party cadres recruited activists from the general public to mobilize more people and to lead denunciations and investigations of targets. More than 40,000 activists were selected in Shenyang, Liaoning Province, for example.\(^\text{51}\)


\(^{51}\) Wang, “A Summary of Liaoning’s Three Antis–Five Antis Campaign.”
While mass mobilization might seem to suggest bottom-up enforcement, the center remained in control. For example, factory workers were organized into unions and empowered to launch investigations against their bosses, but workers and their unions were soon brought “firmly under the control of…higher authorities.”52 In Shanghai, Nara Dillon explains, workers had early on been given free rein to use the campaign to attack management, but were later “held back” by authorities; in March 1952, “12,000 government and military cadres were brought in” to take control.53

Propaganda work was a priority in the regime’s early years. The CCP had “developed an elaborate system of persuasion, involving social, economic, legal, and psychological pressures, and the operations of an extensive and highly coordinated propaganda apparatus.”54 In the Three Antis Campaign, this apparatus was put to work teaching people the importance of corruption control within the new economic system, guiding them in self-criticisms, and stoking and guiding public indignation at local cases of wrongdoing.55 Employees in joint venture private financial industry nationwide attended on average over 30 criticism sessions during the campaign, while managers averaged more than 40.56 Such heavy indoctrination, on top of state-run media and activities for numerous other campaigns, aimed not only to disincentive

52 Lieberthal, Revolution and Tradition in Tientsin, p. 173.
“西北局宣传部关于报纸‘三反’‘五反’宣传的检查报告,” 1952/2/20, ZDZYSS.
corruption, but also to change “consciousness” and “wrong ideas”—as defined by the regime—so that people would not want to engage in corruption. 57

Reports to the central government from lower levels explained how the cleanup was implemented in phases. The precise order and content of these typically three to five phases varied, but the main tasks were organizing campaign leaders and workers, leading study of the campaign and its goals, mobilizing the masses to join the campaign, guiding self-criticism and reflection, investigating accusations of wrongdoing and recovering stolen assets, and implementing new standards and practices to institutionalize positive outcomes. 58 This rather abstract description does not do justice, however, to the campaign’s often dramatic execution. CCP propaganda could whip activists into a frenzy against capitalists accused of past abuses of power, and its harsh investigations led many, especially businesspeople, to commit suicide. 59 Suicides reportedly averaged over ten a day in Shanghai during the Five Antis Campaign. 60

**Anti-Corruption Outcomes**

The Three Antis–Five Antis’ success is reflected in its thorough discipline enforcement, rulemaking and institutional reforms, and positive assessments from scholars and experts. There

57 Gao Gang, “Fully carry out the Production and Austerity Campaign, further deepen the struggle against corruption, waste, and bureaucratism (Report),” 1951/10/26, ZDZYSS.


59 Wu, Record of the Three Antis–Five Antis Campaign, p. 240.

was success in all three three types of rulemaking in the 11-point scoring system laid out in Chapter One: improvements to the investigatory and prosecutorial powers of organs tasked with anti-corruption work, elimination or reform of government practices plagued by corruption, and the enforcement of new or improved rules against corruption. In addition, we can see that some reforms to corrupt government practices systematically constrained high-level officials as well.

Investigations and disciplinary actions against corrupt actors were not limited to some rival faction of Mao’s or a handful of low-level officials, but were carried out throughout the state and in large numbers. While the highest-ranking elites were not targeted, there were investigations of officials at the provincial level and heads of state enterprises. Jilin Province’s governor Zhou Chiheng was dismissed for various charges of abuse of power and economic mismanagement, “the governor and vice governors of Jiangxi undertook self-criticism, as did Party secretaries in Hebei,” and half a dozen mayors were removed. The recovered assets and fines collected overall were considerable: 2 trillion yuan of an estimated 6 trillion corrupt assets, though this number cannot be independently verified. By the end of 1951 alone, the CCP had reportedly recovered 600 billion yuan in illicit funds, which is equivalent to 60 million yuan after the 1955 currency devaluation. While there was a slow-down in the Three Antis Campaign around March 1952 and some businesses were granted greater leniency in payment schedules, by all reports enforcement of discipline was thorough and often harsh. After setting high quotas for the number of corrupt “tigers” to be caught, Mao had to clarify that lower-level offenders should

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63 Wu, Record of the Three Antis–Five Antis Campaign, p. 336.

64 General Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, 1952/3/21, CIA-RDP82-00457R010900340008-0.
not be treated too punitively.\textsuperscript{65} In instructions to the South Central Bureau in March 1952, for example, Mao walked back the earlier goal of executing 70,000 people in each province.\textsuperscript{66}

The campaign led to the buildup of the party-state’s anti-corruption capabilities. The anti-corruption infrastructure of the campaign did not dissipate afterwards, but transitioned into enhanced routine anti-corruption enforcement.\textsuperscript{67} In 1953, the “supervision apparatus underwent a major expansion: not only was each county required to set up a supervisory agency but government financial agencies of provinces and large state enterprises were also required to establish internal supervision offices.”\textsuperscript{68} In September 1954, The People’s Supervision Committee became the Ministry of Supervision under the State Council. In addition, new organizations at lower levels within the party were established to continue monitoring cadre behavior, such as the “[democratic] life meeting system, austerity system, and inspection and report system.”\textsuperscript{69}

The campaign effected major reforms to governmental organizations and practices that were seen as highly corrupt. The CCP’s “agency production” (机关生产) was a system of decentralized industrial and commercial activity undertaken directly by the party and party-led

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{66} “The Central Office sends the South Central Bureau matters that should be noted on the Three Anti and Five Anti meeting minutes being published in Party publications (Excerpts),” 1952/3/22, ZDZYSS. / “中央办公厅转中南局三反五反座谈会要在党刊登载时应注意事项的通知（节录）,” 1952/3/22, ZDZYSS.
\item \textsuperscript{67} “The Central South Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China approved the report of the Central South Bureau’s Disciplinary Inspection Committee on cadre corruption after the Three Anti Campaign,” 1954/5, ZDZYSS. / “中共中央中南局批转中南局纪律检查委员会关于‘三反’运动后干部贪污情况的报告,” 1954/5, ZDZYSS.
\item \textsuperscript{68} Lü, \textit{Cadres and Corruption}, pp. 64–65.
\item \textsuperscript{69} Wang, “A Summary of Liaoning’s Three Anti–Five Antis Campaign,” p. 35.
\end{itemize}
agencies to address financial problems and food shortages in the late 1930s and throughout the
1940s. This model allowed for substantial flexibility and mobility of production in wartime, but
ran into problems in the post-1949 transition. In the new China, as Bo Yibo informed Mao, this
un-standardized model created ballooning opportunities for abuse, “corruption and waste.”
Following the State Council’s “On the Decision for Unified Handling of Agency Production”
(Feb. 1952), agency production was successfully phased out, except for some factories and
businesses still under control of the military. Production was increasingly centralized and
forced into budget constraints decided from the center. This meant that high-level officials, such
as those in charge of ministries, provinces, and cities, were forbidden from drawing from these
financial resources at will. Similar problems also emerged with the “supply system” (供给制),
the old, ad hoc system for distributing resources to party members. The supply system’s
coexistence alongside the more standard salary system in the early 1950s “became a source of
cadre misconduct and corruption.” The supply system was effectively reformed to centralize
and regularize the distribution of wages within the party, though the wage system continued to
evolve long afterwards.

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73 “Guidelines and tasks for financial work in 1952,” 1952/1/15, ZDZYSS.
74 Lü, Cadres and Corruption, p. 37.
75 Yang, “From Supply System to Job Rank Salary System.”
New and revised anti-corruption rules used throughout the campaign persisted. “The People’s Republic of China’s Rules for Punishing Corruption” (Apr. 1952) defined different economic crimes, specified punishments based on the degree of corrupt behaviors, and explained the handling of seized illicit assets. This key anti-corruption law became a reference and basis for cases long after the campaign ended; it was abolished and replaced only in 1987 by a decision from the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress. Anti-corruption rules developed in the campaign quashed businesses’ ability to bribe officials, although here the primary goal was extending party-state supervision over industry and not addressing the issue of corruption. Even so, businesses were classified according to their alleged level of bribery, tax evasion, or theft—“On the Standards and Methods for Classifying Businesses in the Five Antis Campaign” (Mar. 1952)—and thoroughly disciplined and reformed. Related restrictions aimed to insulate the state from private industry, such as state enterprises being required to obtain the approval of the relevant PAC before partnering with a private business on an important construction project or work order.

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Other rules Mao approved were not necessarily meant to outlive the campaign: “On the Four-part Standard for Defining the Boundary Between Waste and Corruption,” “Supplementary Instructions on the Problem of Distinctions in Punishing Small and Medium-Scale Corruption,” “Several Rules on Handling the Problems of Corruption and Waste in the Five Antis Campaign,” “Several Rules About Mistakes in Handling Corruption and Waste and Overcoming Bureaucratism,” “Rules on Recovering Illicit Funds” (issued by the Central Austerity and Inspection Committee), and others.\(^8\) There is some evidence that these rules were generally enforced through to the conclusion of all campaign tasks, which in most places was in 1954 or 1955 at the latest. There are numerous subnational government reports claiming successful enforcement of these rules and success in curbing corruption, though they should be regarded with skepticism. Many are quite detailed about the number of activists recruited, study sessions and self-criticisms held, investigations conducted, punishments carried out, funds recovered, etc.\(^8\) Positive reports are made more believable by the existence of reports that also point out “problems” in certain localities: difficulty mobilizing the masses, as reported in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region; overly violent treatment of suspected offenders and confessions extracted through torture, as reported in Sichuan Province; inappropriate confiscation of property, including “even children’s toys;” and incomplete repayment of embezzled funds by offenders, with for example 1,193 businesses in arrears at the end of 1954 in Wuhan City.\(^8\) In

\(^8\)Mao’s Writings Since the Founding of the State, pp. 60, 174, 282, 319, 327, 410.


\(^8\) “Three Antis Campaign Briefing,” 1952/2/5, ZDZYSS.; “三反运动简讯,” 1952/2/5, ZDZYSS.; “Beating tigers in Guangzhou’s financial and economic system has been slow work, and the Five Antis Campaign in the business
another example of the campaign’s limitations, it was suspended in rural areas during spring plowing season because it took too much energy away from critical agricultural work.83

Scholars largely view corruption control in the Three Antis–Five Antis as successful.84 They write that “bribery ceased to play a large role in tax evasion,” “corrupt practices involving the private sector such as bribery and profiteering were contained, if not eliminated,” “monitoring and supervisory mechanisms” were put in place, there was “a thorough rooting out” of the five vices (of the Five Antis), and that there were “thorough investigations of offices and enterprises.”85 Taiwanese and American intelligence at the time judged the campaign a success, though they focused on how the CCP was establishing its power, not on corruption control. The KMT assessed that the campaign had “clearly changed the spirit” in China—accusations were

84 Michael Sheng has a rare dissenting view, at least of the Three Antis Campaign. In his “revisionist” account, Mao so mismanaged the campaign that it “endangered both the military’s effectiveness and the economic well-being of the country.” See: Michael M. Sheng, “Mao Zedong and the Three-Anti Campaign (November 1951 to April 1952): A Revisionist Interpretation,” Twentieth-Century China, 32:1, 2006. Sheng is convincing when he argues that Mao bypassed other leaders and personally dominated the campaign, but is on less solid ground discussing the campaign’s problems. Certainly, Mao was a poor planner, had an imprecise conception of corruption, demanded an unrealistically high number of arrests, and acted dogmatically throughout the campaign. But these charges do not show that the campaign was a failure in reducing corruption. The negative economic effects of the campaign Sheng points to were real, such as a decline in tax income, but hardly surprising given the context of a hostile takeover of a capitalist economy by a communist regime.
flying and fancy restaurants had no more business.\textsuperscript{86} The Central Intelligence Agency concluded that “in carrying out the three- and five-anti’s campaigns, the Communists were successful in controlling the middle class and in eliminating its economic power. The Communists collected vast sums through fines.”\textsuperscript{87} The U.S. State Department listed the Three Antis–Five Antis as among the key early CCP policies and called it “unquestionably sobering” that the new communist regime had “been able to accomplish so much.” The speed at which China had become a “centralized, tightly controlled, and militarized police state in the image of the Soviet Union has surprised many observers.”\textsuperscript{88}

\textit{Explaining the Breakthrough}

Commonsensically, we can say that state capacity was essential to implementing this complex and multifaceted campaign nationwide. The CCP was able to rely on its flexibility, discipline, and organizational capacities to crack down on corrupt actors and disrupt and remake existing institutional structures in ways that reduced corruption. In turn, cleaner government and structural reforms begun in the campaign contributed to greater state capacity in the future.

But the Three Antis–Five Antis also owes its success to Mao’s revolutionary mission and unconstrained leadership. Mao saw corruption control as necessary to advance his revolutionary goals, which after 1949 involved substantial state-building to prepare the CCP to govern China, to help it penetrate socially complex cities, and to take control of economic activity in preparation for central planning. Despite claiming to be against “bureaucratism,” the campaign

\textsuperscript{86} Document at repository number 002-110703-00129-007, President Chiang Kai-shek Case Files, Academia Historica Archives, 1953/10, p. 43.


was essentially bureaucracy-building. Throughout, Mao had the personal power to set goals for enforcement and push the campaign past all obstacles. “The [Three Anti] campaign was the brainchild of Mao, who dictated the decision process…single-handedly.” 89 In 1952 alone, Mao personally responded to and gave guidance on more than 150 reports about the campaign from different bureaus, regions, localities, and officials. 90 He instructed provincial leaders that “in every agency that disposes of large amounts of money and materials, there must be a large number of grafters,” and urged them to find these “big tigers.” 91 He set targets for the number of officials who should be punished in each region, threatening that leaders who failed to meet quotas could be labeled rightists or corrupt themselves. 92 When Minister of Finance Bo Yibo and other officials questioned Mao’s decision to execute Liu Qingshan and Zhang Zishan for corruption, Mao overruled them and insisted on the maximum punishment. 93

Finally, with this strong leader–strong state combination, the campaign took a decidedly authoritarian playbook to cleaning house. Many of the reform measures listed above exhibited key indicators of an authoritarian playbook: centralizing power, disrupting and remaking institutions from above, tightening vertical control rather than promoting horizontal checks, and propagandizing rather than allowing transparency. One part of the campaign that combined all


91 Quoted in Lü, Cadres and Corruption, p. 52.; Mu, “An Outline of Liaoning’s ‘Three Anti’ and ‘Five Anti’ Campaigns.”


four of these aspects was the penetration and elimination of “independent kingdoms” (独立王国).\textsuperscript{94} Independent kingdom is the CCP’s term for when an official personally monopolizes the power and resources of an administrative unit under their control. The spread of these independent kingdoms in the early 1950s was an extreme form of the general problem of “departmentalism,” which the campaign treated as a “serious transgression.”\textsuperscript{95}

4. Later Mao: The Four Cleans and the One Strike–Three Antis

In this section, I argue that these two later anti-corruption efforts under Mao were largely Failed Reforms, though there remain some unknowns regarding the One Strike–Three Antis. The Four Cleans (1962–65) failed because new constraints on Mao’s leadership gave rise to infighting over the nature of the campaign and resistance from lower levels. In addition, Mao ideologically rejected state-building as a goal of the campaign, creating a conflict between his utopianism and his motivation to curb rural corruption that the latter ultimately lost. In the One Strike–Three Antis (1970–71), on the other hand, Mao had regained his unconstrained leadership and had a basic state-building motive, but the state suffered from capacity problems as a result of the Cultural Revolution.

In early 1958, Mao Zedong unveiled the Great Leap Forward, a radical program of collectivization and rural industrialization intended to catapult China into the ranks of developed nations. Instead, the poorly-conceived GLF brought economic catastrophe and the world’s largest famine—at least 36 million deaths, according to one authoritative calculation.\textsuperscript{96} This

\textsuperscript{94} Teiwes, “Politics & Purges in China,” p. 96.

\textsuperscript{95} Lü, Cadres and Corruption, p. 49.


The failure of the GLF produced a collapse of discipline that “widely infected the lower levels of the party,” led to decision-making based on local material needs, and resulted in a great deal of personal profit-seeking among officials.\footnote{Document 96, \textit{FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China}, 1965/8/5.; Wang Yonghua, \textit{Research on the Four Cleans Campaign: A Case Study of Jiangsu Province} (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2014), p. 29. / 王永华, 《“四清”运动研究: 以江苏省为例》 (北京: 人民出版社, 2014), p. 29.} Documents captured in a KMT raid of Lianjiang in Fujian Province in 1964 show that the Chinese government was highly concerned with five kinds of problems relating to local cadres: allowing partial decollectivization in agriculture, a return of “feudal customs and practices,” a “general decline in cadre moral,” the rise of “misappropriation” and other “corrupt practices,” and the increased “boldness” of “former landlords, rich peasants, counterrevolutionaries, and ‘bad elements’” in trying to undermine collectivization.\footnote{Richard Baum, \textit{Prelude to Revolution: Mao, the Party, and the Peasant Question, 1962–66} (Columbia University Press, 1975), pp. 12–13.} Corruption was widespread among rural cadres, who in some areas had “sunk to the level of no organization and no discipline.”\footnote{“Mao Zedong’s speech on the Four Cleans Campaign at the Central Committee,” 1963/5, ZDZYSS. / 毛泽东在中央会议上关于四清运动的讲话,” 1963/5, ZDZYSS.} In May 1963, Mao acknowledged that “there are some spotless cadres, but we can’t say there are too many.”\footnote{Fujian Lianjiang County Bandit Party Documents and Their Analysis (Taipei: Kuomintang Taiwan Post Office Reprint, 1964). / 《福建連江縣匪方文件及其研析》 (臺北: 中國國民黨臺灣區郵政黨部翻印, 民國 53 ); Richard Baum, \textit{Prelude to Revolution: Mao, the Party, and the Peasant Question, 1962–66} (Columbia University Press, 1975), pp. 12–13.} Other CCP leaders,
especially those who had circumvented official channels to conduct their own private investigations of the rural situation, agreed that the problem was severe.\textsuperscript{102}

Because the GLF had been largely Mao’s policy, the ensuing disaster hurt his standing in the party and placed greater constraints on his personal power in the early 1960s. The “disastrous impact of the Great Leap Forward...shattered belief in Mao's infallibility.”\textsuperscript{103} At the elite level, other leaders openly challenged Mao’s policies and got away with it. Defense Minister Peng Dehuai famously did not get away with criticizing Mao at the 1959 Lushan Conference, but First Vice Chairman Liu Shaoqi was able to do so at the important Seven Thousand Cadres Conference in early 1962. Roderick MacFarquhar argues that Mao probably realized in 1962 “that he could no longer rely upon the man he had placed in the post of General Secretary [Liu] to ensure the loyalty of the party to himself.”\textsuperscript{104} Liu’s challenge represented a more collective resistance to Mao than Peng’s had. Perhaps for this reason, Mao was not (yet) in a position to purge Liu. With Mao temporarily chastened, the initiative and leading role in determining government policy—called the “first line” in CCP parlance—fell to Liu Shaoqi, Vice Premier of the State Council Deng Xiaoping, and First Secretary of the Beijing Municipal Party Committee Peng Zhen.\textsuperscript{105} Just as significant as developments at the elite level were those below. After the


\textsuperscript{103} Leese, \textit{Mao Cult}, p. 254.

\textsuperscript{104} MacFarquhar, \textit{The Origins of the Cultural Revolution: Volume 3}, p. 261.

\textsuperscript{105} Han Gang, “Liu Shaoqi and the Four Cleans Campaign,” Lecture, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Cultural Research Centre, 2012. 韩钢, “刘少奇与四清运动,” 讲座，香港科技大学 人文社会科学学院 文化研究中心, 2012, (video in Chinese, skip to 20:42): \url{https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HGHLTuHZG_w}

GLF, “the party bureaucracy was no longer a tool that would yield to all of [Mao’s] wishes.”

His initial calls for a nationwide anti-corruption campaign in September 1962, for example, frustratingly produced only tepid responses from the party bureaucracy and a good deal of foot-dragging in the following months.

Local economic experimentation and the breakdown of cadre discipline sparked serious reflection within the party and a partial policy retreat. To assess the economic situation, Liu, Deng, and Peng brought in Vice Chairman Chen Yun, the head of the Central Finance and Economic Commission who had tried in the 1950s to moderate Mao’s Leap and whom Mao had politically isolated. Chen recommended formally accepting much of the grassroots experimentation with decollectivization, in particular devolving farm output quotas to households (包产到户). The other leaders could see the immediate benefits produced by partial decollectivization and agreed with Chen’s recommendations. This was a sign of the “political regime being forced by growing discontent to start relaxing its stringent rules.”

But Mao deeply opposed “revisionist” reforms; for him, collectivization was “probably the central issue of Chinese politics.” As U.S. intelligence noted, Mao “expressed bitter resentment of the ‘revisionist’ domestic policies forced on him by the collapse of the Leap.” He believed that “the extreme permissiveness of the early 1960s should…not have been

106 Leese, Mao Cult, p. 254.
108 Han, “Liu Shaoqi and the Four Cleans Campaign,” 23:45.
extended or permitted to become institutionalized once the immediate crisis had passed—as it appeared to have passed by the time of the Tenth Plenum in September 1962.”  

At the Tenth Plenum of the Eighth Party Congress, Mao tried to reassert his power. The result was a communiqué released in late September that advocated a more hardline economic policy reflecting Mao’s views. 

Concerned with the problems in rural areas and the party’s ideologically suspect response to them, Mao developed the Four Cleans, which began as the Socialist Education Movement ( 社会主义教育运动) and is sometimes also called that. In large part because of the GLF’s outcomes, a new anti-corruption effort was necessary less than a decade after the Three Anti—Five Anti. The main motivation for the new campaign was ideological: to defend the revolution from revisionism with a crusade against capitalism in the countryside, and the bureaucratization and abandonment of class struggle within the party. Concretely, this would entail rectifying the work-style of lower-level cadres and enhancing political education to eliminate the tendencies discussed above. Much of this rectification would be achieved through class struggle,

112 Baum, Prelude to Revolution, p. 163.


which had been critical in Land Reform a decade earlier and to which Mao urged the leadership to renew its commitment in the Four Cleans. Class struggle was both a means and an end: it would change cadres’ behaviors and shape their thinking while itself being a revolutionary, ideology-affirming practice. Ideological motives aside, the campaign’s attacks on lower-level officials for varied wrongdoing also served to shift some of the responsibility for the GLF’s failure off of Mao’s shoulders.\textsuperscript{116}

Combating corruption was one goal among others in the Four Cleans, but it was important because of how corruption was connected to and exacerbated ideological problems among cadres and the public. It weakened discipline by luring cadres with the material benefits of capitalism and turned the public against local representatives of the CCP; Mao believed that “since cadres could be bribed for three catties of pork or a few packs of cigarettes, only class struggle could prevent revisionism.”\textsuperscript{117} Cadres were being dissuaded from the cause, Mao lamented: “At present you can buy a [party] branch secretary for a few packs of cigarettes, not to mention marrying his daughter.”\textsuperscript{118} The Former Ten Points (前十条), promulgated by Mao in May 1963 as the first of three key policy documents, argued that cadre corruption was the “most prevalent source of peasant dissatisfaction with the existing rural leadership,”\textsuperscript{119} “Corruption and theft” were “primarily a contradiction between the cadres and the masses.”\textsuperscript{120} For example, one

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[116]{Patricia M. Thornton, Disciplining the State: virtue, violence, and state-making in modern China (Harvard University Press, 2007), pp. 131–32.}
\footnotetext[117]{MacFarquhar, The Origins of the Cultural Revolution: Volume 3, p. 336.}
\footnotetext[118]{Quoted in Teiwes, Politics and Purges in China, p. 418.}
\footnotetext[119]{Baum, Prelude to Revolution, p. 24.}
\footnotetext[120]{“Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Several Issues in Current Rural Work (Draft),” Compilation of Important Historical Documents of the CCP, Series 25: The first half of the 1960s, Vol. 2. [hereafter ZLWZH 25.x], p. 12.}
\end{footnotes}
much-resented practice was “using the back door,” in which cadres used their privileged positions to improperly obtain scarce or expensive commercial goods. As the name Four Cleans suggests, four aspects of local government were singled out as urgently needing to be “cleaned”: accounts, workpoints, granaries and warehouses, and finances.  

The Four Cleans was a complicated campaign that shifted course more than once following the release of key policy documents: The Former Ten Points (1963), the Latter Ten Points (1964) (十条), and the Twenty-three Articles (1965) (二十三条). After Mao’s initial call in September 1962 for the campaign that would become the Four Cleans did not produce the desired effect, he raised the stakes with the Former Ten Points. What had begun as a mild reproach of wayward rural cadres would grow into an unprecedentedly—at least since Land Reform—thorough class struggle against bureaucratism, corruption, and capitalism. The Latter Ten Points, drafted under Liu but theoretically in line with Mao’s wishes, made two consequential changes to the campaign: expanded its investigatory scope and strengthened top-down party control. The above-mentioned “small” Four Cleans were superseded by the “big”


123 “[Mao Zedong’s] Speech on the Siqing Campaign at the Central Conference,” 1963/5, ZDZYSS. “[在中央会议上关于四清运动的讲话],” 1963/5, ZDZYSS.

124 The Latter Ten Points owe a debt to Liu’s wife Wang Guangmei’s private investigation of local conditions in Taoyuan, Hebei Province, which revealed major problems with the campaign’s implementation. See: Lin Xiaobo
Four Cleans: politics, economics, organization, and ideology. Increased party control was evident in the “all power to the work teams” line, which put work teams sent from higher levels in charge of the campaign and by extension much of rural government. For reasons discussed below, Mao disagreed with the centralization and top-down spirit of the Latter Ten Points. Very much in response, Mao announced his Twenty-three Articles in January 1965. The Twenty-three Articles embodied a shift in Mao’s thinking regarding the campaign that had actually occurred earlier—namely, that the Four Cleans was not primarily a matter of curbing rural cadres’ malfeasance, but a struggle against “power holders within the party going the capitalist road.” To defeat these capitalist-roaders, Mao sought to put the masses in charge of the campaign. The Twenty-three Articles thereby exposed to the public conflicts brewing among the leadership, especially between Mao and Liu Shaoqi, and presaged the intra-party strife of the Cultural Revolution.

The campaign was carried out in several steps in each locality, as previous campaigns had been, but there were shifting instructions from the central government. In northern Hebei Province, for example, a pilot of the campaign was launched in Baoding City in 1962, within which the goals were first to address the “evil” trend of individual farming, then to propagandize...
widely, such as by teaching about the Sixty Articles of Agriculture (农业六十条), then to rouse activists to investigate wrongdoing in production teams. After an initial successful implementation, the campaign was reproduced elsewhere throughout Hebei. When the targets of the Four Cleans expanded in 1964, work teams carried the campaign out more aggressively and with more focus on class status. Their standard approach was to: 1) enter a locality, visit the poor, hear their stories of hardship, and organize a revolutionary class team; 2) mobilize the masses, select activists, and educate cadres to “take a bath” (to get clean of wrongdoing); 3) launch class struggle and clean the class ranks; 4) rectify organizations, elect new cadres, establish rules and regulations, and establish class files.\(^\text{129}\)

As in the Three Antis–Five Antis and other campaigns, propaganda and psychological pressure were important. One common obstacle that work teams encountered was the reluctance of many among the masses to criticize cadres and assume responsibility for production themselves for fear that after the campaign ended they would be blamed or suffer retribution. This, after all, had happened after past campaigns. Easing this fear required careful propaganda.

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about the campaign and reassurances that activists would be protected.\textsuperscript{130} A work team’s report from a township in northeastern Heilongjiang Province explained how its members used psychological “pull” and “push” techniques to allay the public’s fears and convince them the campaign would “save” them.\textsuperscript{131} As for cadres, making them write detailed confessions and promises to perform better in future was a way to persuade them to accept the state’s narrative of their crimes. One template began: “From today, I resolutely make a clean break with capitalism…”\textsuperscript{132} A deeper problem faced by the Four Cleans was that after the GLF many rural residents actively preferred decollectivization, or at least less radical policies than full collectivization.\textsuperscript{133} Party propaganda tried to use the issue of corruption to change minds by associating corruption with capitalism and collectivism with wealth.\textsuperscript{134}

\textit{Campaign Outcomes}

The Four Cleans was a Failed Reform, as can be seen by the metrics of discipline enforcement, rulemaking, and perceptions. While enforcement was broad, few elites and high-level officials were punished. Charitably, we can say that the campaign enforced some reforms of corrupted government practices, such as the distribution of workpoints. But the attempts to

\begin{footnotes}
\item[130] “Basic Summary of the First Socialist Education Movement in Linchuan County (Draft),” ZLWZH 25.19, pp. 17–18.
\item[131] “Basic Summary of the Small Four Cleans of the Taxi Brigade,” ZLWZH 25.19, p. 82.
\item[134] Yang Liwen and Lü Mao, “The Propaganda and Practice of ‘Common Wealth:’ a case study of Shaanxi Province’s Yan’an County,” Journal of Chinese Communist Party History Studies, 2009 Iss. 3, p. 82–89.
\end{footnotes}
strengthen institutional oversight and enforce anti-corruption rules were highly inconsistent. Perceptions of the campaign by experts and by Mao himself suggest it was a failure.

The campaign’s strongest points were the extent of disciplinary actions undertaken and the growth of party membership throughout. Incomplete national statistics from early October 1963 suggest that there were more than 20,000 cases of corruption, theft, or speculation involving over 1,000 yuan or non-monetary resources of equivalent value. The campaign only expanded its targeting from there. Statistics compiled in 1966 show that there were 11,650 cadres with Four Cleans-related problems in the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region alone. In Jiangxi Province, which is in Southeast China, the majority of cadres were discovered to have some disciplinary problem—mostly the misuse of resources. For this later period in the campaign, local numbers are easier to obtain than national totals. In Zhanjiang Port at the southernmost tip of Guangdong Province, 101 cadres were removed for corruption, theft, and speculation, and 34,400 yuan was recovered. At the same time, “the CCP admitted 940,000 new members (in 1965) and 3.23 million (in 1966), most of whom had been activists in the campaign.” Some party and government reports pointed to party-building successes as a result of the campaign, but these should not be taken at face value given the discrepancy between what

135 Guo and Lin, *The Record of the Four Cleans Campaign*, p. 90.
136 Thornton, *Disciplining the State*, p. 155.
138 “The Zhanjiang Port Authority’s Initial Summary of the Four Cleans Struggle,” 1965/11, ZLWZH 25.21, p. 121–22.
local governments reported and what the national leadership said about the campaign’s progress.

The most prominent rural organizations empowered by the Four Cleans were the Poor and Lower-Middle Peasant Associations, but these were highly inconsistent in their ability to monitor rural cadres and check corruption. In the later stages of the campaign, these associations were meant to take over for party activists sent to a locality and take the lead in developing collective production, conducting investigations against cadres, and all other aspects of the campaign. Peasant associations must “dare to supervise cadres.” But local cadres were in many cases able to resist giving up their powers. Once the work teams sent from higher levels left, the peasant associations often reverted to being low-level groups. In addition, the associations were mostly set up only in 1965 and 1966, at the tail end of the campaign after Mao had shifted his focus away from the Four Cleans. Instead of supervisory organizations, they became warring factions in the Cultural Revolution.


142 Baum and Teiwes, Ssu-ch’ing, p. 32, Appendix D.

143 Wang, Research on the Four Cleans Campaign, p. 248.

On the other hand, there were at least some reforms to rural economic management, such as in the four target areas of the small Four Cleans, that went into effect. Workpoints, for example, were a very common source of corruption; people would manipulate them in varied and creative ways, such as by giving themselves points for work done on “June 31st.” The campaign improved the distribution of workpoints both in terms of transparency and accounting. A report from Haiyang City in Shandong explained that in the reformed workpoint system points had to be consistent in how they were assigned or recorded; needed to be clear, specifying down to individual person and household, and for what; and “must be explained orally to the people in case they can’t read.”

Mao himself judged the Four Cleans to have been unsuccessful at nearly every step. “The countryside has undergone several rectifications, but it never gets rectified,” he complained in June 1963. At several points he made comments to the effect that fully one third of the country or one third of government units were controlled by class enemies engaging in revisionism. It was Mao’s increasing frustration with the campaign that convinced him to shift its focus onto the party establishment in 1964. This new mission found its expression in the Twenty-three Articles. By May 1965, Mao was certain that “just doing the Socialist Education Movement cannot fully

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145 “Basic Summary of the First Socialist Education Movement in Linchuan County (Draft).”; “The Zhanjiang Port Authority’s Initial Summary of the Four Cleans Struggle.”

146 “Work Briefing #21,” 1964/12/8, ZLWZH 25.4, p. 3. / “工作简报 21 期,” 1964/12/8, ZLWZH 25.4, p. 3.; Baum and Teiwes, Ssu-ch’ing, p. 18.

147 “Work Briefing #21.”

solve the problem.” Mao had openly lost interest in the campaign even though it was still underway in many localities.149

Scholars have similarly judged the campaign unsuccessful, with a consensus view being that its unresolved problems and tensions developed into the Cultural Revolution.150 Patricia Thornton writes that “regardless of what the aims of the central leadership may have been, or how they may have diverged, the Socialist Education Movement can hardly be counted as a success.” She also finds that popular evaluations were “overwhelmingly negative.”151 Lowell Dittmer refers to it as “the unsuccessful Socialist Education Movement.”152 Ahn Byung-joon finds the anti-corruption component of the campaign to have been ineffective.153 Michel Oksenberg notes that the implementation of the campaign obviously “displeased” Mao.154 Richard Baum likewise concludes that it ultimately ended in “failure.”155 U.S. intelligence assessed that “by 1965 the rectification movement was faltering badly,” and “probably no disciplinary movement of the party was so thoroughly honored in the breach.”156 Elizabeth Perry and Merle Goldman write that “disappointment over the party's inability, and in some cases

155 Baum, Prelude to Revolution, quote on the book jacket.
refusal to police itself during the Four Cleans set the stage for the even more draconian Cultural Revolution.”

**Reasons for Reform Failure**

Constraints on Mao’s leadership, as seen in unresolved conflicts among elites and resistance to his directives at lower levels, prevented the campaign from going according to plan. In particular, Mao and Liu’s disagreements about how and why the campaign was necessary confused its implementation. While Liu and others sought to strengthen the central party’s control over rural areas by sending down work teams, Mao opposed this centralization, increasingly distrusted the party apparatus, and insisted that the masses take the lead. At some point in late 1963 or early 1964, Mao decided that the party establishment itself was the root of his frustrations. This major turning point in his thinking set Mao on the path to attacking high-level party officials during the Cultural Revolution. As a result, the Four Cleans went from being about peasant-cadre relations—as Liu and others seemed to prefer—to a general struggle of socialism versus capitalism. In this struggle, a broader set of officials was targeted for more varied offenses, taking the focus off of corruption. This can be seen in the expansion from the small Four Cleans, which had all been economic in nature, to the big Four Cleans, which included political, organizational, and ideological issues. Mao argued in late 1964 that “even clean officials in the old dynasties were pernicious.”

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158 Han, “Liu Shaoqi and the Four Cleans Campaign,” 58:16.

159 Ahn, *Chinese Politics and the Cultural Revolution*, p. 112.
Even when the leadership agreed, lower levels of party and government—not to mention private citizens—were resistant. In 1962 and 1963, local communities “frequently attempted to subvert, sabotage, and derail…efforts to penetrate and remake the local political scene.”\textsuperscript{160} Many rural cadres resisted “actively, by threatening or buying off villagers, or passively, by quitting their positions.”\textsuperscript{161} The Lianjiang documents captured in 1964 show that the CCP knew that cadre non-responsiveness was a key reason for the lack of campaign progress.\textsuperscript{162} A clear measure of non-compliance was that “the practice of assigning quotas or land to small groups continued” throughout the campaign, despite re-collectivization having been at the very top of Mao’s list of goals.\textsuperscript{163}

Constrained leadership aside, Mao’s ideological motives for the campaign might also have proven problematic for corruption control even if he had had his way.\textsuperscript{164} Mao’s vision of class struggle and increasing distrust for party bureaucracy led him to resist party/state-building as a central component of the campaign. I say resist because other leaders advanced a strategy against corruption more in line with my proposed general authoritarian playbook: centralized and top-down, with temporary organizations empowered to penetrate and disrupt local institutions and remake them. Mao wanted “revolutionary” believers among the masses to criticize and challenge rural cadres and ultimately take control of rural governance. This utopianism contained a basic tension between on the one hand the wish to curb capitalistic practices and the corruption

\textsuperscript{160} Thornton, \textit{Disciplining the State}, p. 164.

\textsuperscript{161} Lü, \textit{Cadres and Corruption}, p. 127.

\textsuperscript{162} \textit{Fujian Lianjiang County Bandit Party Documents and Their Analysis}, p. 12.


\textsuperscript{164} Perry and Goldman, \textit{Grassroots Political Reform in Contemporary China}, p. 12.
rampant in rural communities and on the other hand the demand that this somehow be done without strengthening bureaucracy and party control. While it is true that the Three Antis Campaign had also attacked excessive bureaucracy, Mao had in practice overseen the thorough bureaucratization of a guerrilla CCP into a ruling CCP. But in the early 1960s, state-building was not Mao’s goal for the Four Cleans and his relationship with the party bureaucracy was more conflictual.

_The One Strike–Three Antis Campaign_

Mao launched the Cultural Revolution, an all-enveloping political and social movement that defined China between 1966 and 1976, to purge the political and ideological impurities that he believed had grown within the party establishment. Mao mobilized the masses to challenge power holders within the party who he believed had betrayed the revolution, leading to a breakdown of social order and mass violence in the late 1960s. It was, in MacFarquhar’s apt term, a national “cataclysm.”[^165] The movement changed course in 1969, leading to a period of military ascendancy and tremendous state violence in the name of restoring order. The Cultural Revolution shifted again after the stunning death of Mao’s chosen successor, Vice Chairman of the CCP and Minister of National Defense Lin Biao, following an alleged coup attempt in 1971.[^166] The military’s dominance was checked and the rest of the Cultural Revolution was much less violent. Mao’s death in 1976 and the subsequent arrest of the radical Gang of Four closed the door on further revolution.

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[^165]: The CCP admitted as much after the fact, calling the Cultural Revolution a ten-year catastrophe (十年浩劫).

[^166]: For a credible account that disputes there was any coup attempt, see Jin Qiu, _The Culture of Power: The Lin Biao Incident in the Cultural Revolution_ (Stanford University Press, 1999).
The onset of the Cultural Revolution brought the return and even expansion of Mao’s unconstrained leadership. It is generally acknowledged that the movement’s early phases were “the peak of Party Chairman Mao Zedong’s reign in China.” The nation would “rush wherever Chairman Mao points,” as a slogan of the time instructed. It was in this period that Mao’s Little Red Book of his famous quotations was widely distributed. Coverage of Mao in official media, already copious, reached new levels of saturation. And the personality cult around the Great Helmsman was one of the most intense in the 20th century, outdone perhaps only by Kim Il-sung’s in North Korea. One young participant in the Cultural Revolution explained that when he and his middle-school classmates heard Mao on the radio calling for them to rise up and make revolution, it “brought tears to my eyes…as if we had heard the voice of God.” More concretely, Mao’s unconstrained leadership can be seen in his ability to purge many high-level officials who had troubled him just a few years before, such as Liu Shaoqi. As Mao pushed aside old allies in the party, he elevated the military’s profile, a transition epitomized by Lin Biao’s rise to the position of presumptive successor.

Alongside his expansion of personal power, Mao’s attacks on the party establishment temporarily undermined state capacity and halted economic growth. The Cultural Revolution brought “near civil war in many parts of China” as rival factions all swearing allegiance to Mao fought each other in the streets. There was both a “popular insurgency against “party-state

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cadres” and a “widespread rebellion” by lower-level cadres against their superiors, which together “destroyed the civilian state in early 1967.” Many government institutions were systematically purged of technical expertise under the theory that “experts” were of dubious loyalty to Mao and the revolution. Economic production came under the control of revolutionary committees, which by 1971 had “evolved into groups led by the top military or Party leaders in the plant, composed of pliant delegates who had survived the previous years of investigation and purge by not rocking the boat.” They were “empty institutional shells” that “could not handle all the necessary administrative work.” Mainstream scholarly estimates of the death toll of the Cultural Revolution range from 400,000 to several million. Even analysts advocating a revisionist view in which the decade was not uniformly disastrous admit that the most chaotic period between 1966 and 1969 saw a major economic downturn. The general chaos eventually became too much even for the man who advocated “continuous revolution,” leading Mao to shift to policies that reined in the masses and empowered the military to restore order and rebuild the state. The most important of these repressive measures were the Cleansing the Class Ranks Campaign (1968–69) and the following year’s One Strike–Three Antis.


174 Meisner, Mao’s China and After.


The One Strike–Three Antis aimed to repress insurgency and rebuild the damaged state; it targeted corruption as part of this mission, making it the largest anti-corruption campaign of the Cultural Revolution. The “strike” of the campaign was political, targeting counterrevolutionaries; the “three antis” were economic, opposing “corruption and theft,” speculation, and waste. CCP leaders were alarmed by reports of all manner of corruption proliferating in the breakdown of order. Premier Zhou Enlai in particular was frustrated by the sorry state of production and “anarchy” in enterprises, and took the shift in Mao’s thinking as an opportunity to advocate a discipline-restoring anti-corruption campaign. It was time for the party to “crush the class enemies’ attack in the economic field.”

In February 1970, the central government announced a series of measures “to prevent corruption, theft, and speculation, and to not give class enemies any opening to exploit,” such as banning private economic activity (production and commerce) and increasing controls and monitoring on lower-level economic management (such as in danwei). That said, the campaign’s “main subject matter” seems to have been the one strike rather than the three antis, reflecting the need to put political repression ahead of economic reform.

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Available figures show that in 1970 alone the campaign resulted in the arrest of some 284,000 “traitors,” “spies,” and “counterrevolutionaries.” These terms were sometimes used flexibly, meaning that this figure does not exclude targets prosecuted for economic crimes. Party instructions “on cracking down on counter-revolutionary destructive activities” issued in 1970 note that some “counterrevolutionary elements” are those who “engage in graft, embezzlement, and speculation, and sabotage the socialist economy.” A report in the same year from Nanhua County in Yunnan Province shows the mixture of economic and non-economic issues uncovered in the campaign: “some [wrongdoers] are a bourgeoisie faction; some are corrupt, thieves, or speculators; some watch pornographic shows or sing dirty songs; some are anarchists…some embezzle construction fees, public fees, medical fees,” etc.

While in-depth research on the One Strike–Three Antis is limited, the campaign seems to have been unsuccessful in curbing corruption because of its diversion into factional conflict, misidentification of targets, and excessive violence—all issues that suggest a failure of state capacity. To be clear, there was no lack of coercive capacity in early 1970, as evidenced by the campaign’s thorough repression, but problems with implementing the anti-corruption part reflected the damaged regulatory and distributive capacities of the Chinese state. The campaign was from the beginning vague about how it should be carried out and whom it should


183 “Report on the One Strike–Three Antis Campaign Launched by Nanhua County’s Culture and Education Front,” 1970/9/6, ZDZYSS.

184 Coercive capacity is just one of several aspects of state capacity and as argued in Chapter One is by itself insufficient to implement corruption control.
target, which contributed to biased and self-serving implementation by officials.185 “Like the May Sixteenth conspiracy, many of the charges [in the One Strike–Three Antis] were trumped up.”186 “In many places, the campaign was completely intertwined with factional in-fighting among officials and activists.”187 The misidentification of targets is a problem in all anti-corruption work, but here it was extreme. In Mian County in Shaanxi Province, for example, the campaign uncovered corruption to the tune of “160,000 yuan in cash, 50,000 in grain tickets…speculation 14,000 yuan of speculation profits.” But it later turned out that “all the cases were wrongful.”188 Even the party center admitted in early 1972 that some public security officers had mismanaged cases, resulting in “false cases and mistaken cases, maligning good people, and letting enemies go.”189 Reports from Taiyuan City in Shanxi Province did not paint a rosy picture: sloppily handled and wrongful cases, forced confessions, motivated reasoning and framing people, and a spirit of “better to be overly strict than too lenient.” Some participants were engaging in illicit behaviors while campaigning against them (边反边犯), whereas other participants were simply tired of the campaign and wanted to go home.190


186 Dikotter, The Cultural Revolution, p. 236.

187 Lü, Cadres and Corruption, p. 129.


Andrew Walder and Su Yang estimate that the Cultural Revolution caused between 750,000 and 1.5 million deaths, and that the “vast majority” of casualties occurred during the 1968–71 period.\(^{191}\) In that period, the One Strike–Three Antis was associated with the second biggest spike in violent events, after the Cleansing the Class Ranks Campaign.\(^{192}\) Walder and Su’s data and several anecdotal accounts suggest that the violence of the One Strike–Three Antis was far in excess of what would have been necessary to quell disorder and not targeted accurately at actual threats to the state.\(^{193}\) Moreover, it is not clear that any concrete, lasting anti-corruption institutions were established by the campaign.

In sum, the One Strike–Three Antis was unsuccessful in curbing corruption despite Mao’s unconstrained leadership and the goal of state-building—or rather rebuilding—following his purge of the party establishment and recognition of the resulting disorder. Corruption control seems to have floundered because of weakened state capacity following the highly destructive early phase of the Cultural Revolution. However, much research remains to be done about this short but lethal campaign.

**Figure 4.1:**

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\(^{192}\) Walder, “Rebellion and Repression in China,” p. 519.


5. Deng Xiaoping and Three Reform-Era Campaigns

This section discusses Deng’s leadership of China (1977–89) and three campaigns that addressed corruption in the early reform era: a campaign against economic crime in 1981–82, a party work-style rectification in 1986, and the post-Tiananmen crackdown in 1989–90. I find that these campaigns were all unsuccessful. In part, this was because new constraints on the post-Mao leadership allowed the party-state bureaucracy to resist policies that contradicted its interests, which were in exploiting the country’s economic reforms for private gain. Deng was a tremendously successful reformer, but he generally promoted reforms through persuasion, not coercion. In addition, weak anti-corruption motivation hindered the post-Tiananmen crackdown, as discussed below.

Mao Zedong’s death on September 9th, 1976 was the end of an era. In the complex political maneuvering that followed, Mao’s more radical allies in the party were arrested or
sidelined and twice-purged veteran revolutionary Deng Xiaoping emerged as the country’s paramount leader. Deng launched wide-ranging liberal economic reforms that continued and evolved over the next three decades.\textsuperscript{194} Deng’s agenda should be characterized as developmental; China moved away from a planned economy but preserved the guiding hand of the state to pursue rapid growth.\textsuperscript{195} These reforms, beginning from regional experiments and transitional institutions, came to transform China and touch every aspect of society. Deng ruled from 1977 until 1989, when he began to hand power over to his chosen successor, Jiang Zemin.

Despite being the propelling force on economic reforms and unchallenged leader of the country throughout the 1980s, Deng was not Mao. Rather than become an unconstrained leader, Deng shared the regime’s power, especially among members of the Politburo Standing Committee.\textsuperscript{196} This was partly by choice, as the horrors of the Cultural Revolution had convinced Deng and many others in the party who had been personally affected that Mao’s one-man rule should not be replicated. In a key speech to the Politburo in August 1980 entitled “On the Reform of the System of Party and State Leadership,” Deng criticized the Cultural Revolution, the past “over-concentration of power,” “patriarchal methods, life tenure in leading posts and privileges of various kinds.” He announced a major reduction of party and government leaders holding concurrent positions, himself stepping down as Vice-Premier “so that more energetic

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\textsuperscript{194} Some argue persuasively that the Xi administration marks the beginning of a post-reform era. E.g. Elizabeth C. Economy, \textit{The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese State} (Oxford University Press, 2018).
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comrades can take over.”

Deng also criticized cults of personality, and for himself “would not tolerate the cult of personality that Mao happily indulged in.”

The constraints on Deng’s leadership were not only self-imposed. Deng had to work around substantial conservative resistance to his economic reforms, often led by Chen Yun. Chen popularized the famous metaphor that the economy should be controlled like “a bird in a cage.” Ezra Vogel argues that Deng adopted the principle of “sidestep[ping] conservative resistance through experimentation.” For example, on the issue of Special Economic Zones, Deng “could not have gotten the support to introduce such policies for the entire country, but it was far harder for conservatives to oppose experiments.”

“Four times…he personally initiated or endorsed efforts to overhaul China’s overcentralized, ossified leadership system; in all four instances intense factional strife, combined with mounting economic difficulties, compelled him to abort the project.”

Beyond just the reformer-conservative split, Deng was also constrained by party and bureaucratic resistance to policies that did not benefit local interests.

It is well-known that Deng’s Reform and Opening caused or at least contributed to a major rise in corruption in the 1980s. Gordon White wrote in 1996 that “there is a consensus

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among all shades of opinion both in China and abroad that politico-bureaucratic corruption, defined simply in terms of the abuse of public office for private gain, has increased during the era of market reforms in terms of the numbers of people involved, their seniority and the financial scale of abuse.\textsuperscript{202} Julia Kwong argues that corruption in the reform era should be compared unfavorably to the 1950s in particular, and that corruption in China was shaped like a “parabola” from the 1940s through the 1980s.\textsuperscript{203} Large-scale economic transitions almost inevitably create opportunities for corruption, and China’s liberalization was no exception.\textsuperscript{204} The introduction of new economic rules of the game for some parts of the country but not others and some sectors or bureaus but not others created massive incentives for arbitrage.\textsuperscript{205} Transitional institutions used in the reform process, like the dual track system and Township and Village Enterprises were plagued by corruption.\textsuperscript{206} As some Chinese were becoming rapidly wealthy, bureaucrats’ salaries rose only gradually throughout the 1980s, incentivizing bribe-taking.\textsuperscript{207}


\textsuperscript{203} Julia Kwong, \textit{The Political Economy of Corruption in China} (Armonk, N.Y.: MESharpe, 1997).


Deng was not prepared to give up his ambitious reform agenda to prevent a rise in corruption, but within the constraints of the reform agenda he did want to minimize corruption. Cleaning house would assist Deng’s developmental mission by preventing officials from turning liberalization into a license for predatory behavior and rent-seeking, as well as blunting criticism of the reforms from conservatives and the public. Conservatives tried to use the issue of corruption to slow reforms, arguing that corruption was caused by “Western influences brought about by the economic opening” and was weakening party discipline. “Early in the 1980s, Chen spoke of corruption as a matter of life and death of the party.” Deng and other reformers agreed that the problem was severe, but argued that the only way forward was to combat corruption while continuing and deepening economic transformation. Throughout the 1980s, Deng’s references to corruption in his speeches show that he understood that corruption was growing, that conservatives saw it as grounds to slow reforms, and that the public’s reaction was “revulsion.” He called for the party to “grasp Reform and Opening with one hand and punish corruption with the other.”

Some analysts argue that corruption aided Chinese growth and even furthered Reform and Opening in some ways. On the one hand, corruption can help businesspeople get around burdensome regulations and may motivate officials to allow more free market activity in order to

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skim greater amounts off the top. But on the other hand, corruption also leads to non-productive behaviors, like predation, rent-seeking, and officials trying to block further reform in order to keep hold of their petty regulatory powers. Arthur Kroeber explains that “allowing some degree of official corruption was the deal that the leadership offered to officials in order to marshal their support for reforms,” but also that this “tacit license to steal was not unlimited.”

For the purposes of this study, whether corruption was on balance good for growth in the 1980s is less important than the fact that Deng believed that too much corruption could threaten his reform agenda and urged the CCP to curb it. In the last estimate, Deng led successful economic reforms and created high levels of growth very much despite rising corruption.

**The 1981–82 and 1986 Campaigns**

The campaign against economic crime launched in 1981 and the party work-style rectification launched 1986 both aimed to support Deng’s developmental reform agenda and to address growing public anger over official privilege and corruption. While both campaigns created momentum and produced large annual increases in nationwide anti-corruption investigations, they were not “Maoist-style mass movements.” Both faded away without making progress against growing corruption.

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212 This study does not go into why that was possible, but Andrew Wedeman provides smart analysis in *Double Paradox: Rapid Growth and Rising Corruption in China* (2012).

the party organ established in 1978 to be in charge of rooting out all forms of indiscipline, reported in February 1983 that it had sent some 30,000 offenders to prison, expelled 5,500 party members, and “recovered 320 million yuan in cash and goods.”

But the post-Mao leadership had become less capable of forcing the bureaucracy to undertake unpleasant reforms. While many localities willingly embraced Reform and Opening, which was lucrative for them, they often resisted and avoided anti-corruption reforms. Knowing this, on January 11th, 1982, the Central Committee decided to send trusted high-level officials (Xi Zhongxun, Yu Qiuli, Peng Chong, and Wang Heshou) to provinces with SEZs to make sure that they took anti-corruption and anti-smuggling efforts seriously. But in April 1982, the Central Committee and the State Council “introduced a series of differentiations whose hair-splitting served to lessen the impact” of the campaign’s initially harsh penalties. Reports of “resistance, uncertainty, retaliation, unconcern and perfunctoriness” came out in official media. Provincial reports “revealed some of the confusion and hesitation.” “Rural collective enterprises worried that they would be cut off from their sources of raw materials and their developments stultified.” Melanie Manion notes that “some local party leaders refused to take the campaign seriously,” and “a number of government departments and localities substituted fines for criminal punishment in cases of economic crimes…[which] undermined deterrence.” CCDI Secretary Wang Congwu gave a report on the campaign’s progress at the CCDI’s second


221 *Chen Yun Chronicles*, p. 330.


223 Manion, *Corruption by Design*, pp. 175–76.
plenum, in March 1983. After a pro forma reference to the campaign’s “achievement,” Wang claimed that there remained “holes” in the system of regulations, education for the campaign had “not sunk in,” and in some localities there was a “relaxed mood” inconsistent with the spirit of the “struggle.”

The party leadership soon tried again, launching a campaign in early 1986 to rectify party work-style, including corruption. The mid-1980s had seen an “upsurge in official misconduct, including criminal corruption;” “1984 and 1985 were years of ‘rampant economic crime,’ according to the chief procurator.” In late 1985, the party identified “six unhealthy winds” blowing in the country. Several party leaders raised the issue of problems in work-style and growing indiscipline at the “Eight Thousand Person Conference” of the central organs held in January 1986. Following speeches by Deng, Chen, General Secretary Hu Yaobang, Secretary of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission Qiao Shi, and others calling for reform, the Central Committee, State Council, and CCDI announced a series of crackdowns and stricter penalties for offenders: on the misuse of official overseas travel (Jan. 23), cadres traveling domestically at public expense (Feb. 1), illicit commercial activity by governmental organs and cadres (Feb. 4), speculation and fraud (Jan. 15), the importation of foreign cars for illicit resale,

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225 Manion, Corruption by Design, p. 177.

226 “Notice on resolutely implementing the instructions of the Central Committee and the State Council on correcting unhealthy practices,” 1985/11/26, Reported in People’s Daily.

and wasteful “entertainment” of visiting officials. Anti-corruption enforcement, which had declined after the 1981–82 campaign, shot up to a new high of more than 49,000 in 1986.

This campaign was even more short-lived than before. “The campaign against economic crime has fallen far short of the mark so far. After an initial flurry of highly publicized crackdowns, chiefly involving officials in the provinces and municipalities...[the] campaign fizzled.” By May or June 1986, “the anticorruption effort clearly began to wind down to a much gentler focus on improper (not criminal) conduct.” Elites and their relatives got off particularly easy, despite the fact that official privilege in connection to corruption was a major concern of the public’s and a rhetorical target in leaders’ speeches. Politburo member Hu Qiaomu’s son Hu Shiying got away with the legal equivalent of a slap on the wrist despite major corruption allegations thanks to the help of his father and other influential party elders. Fu Yan, daughter of Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress Peng Zhen, was not indicted despite serious allegations of corruption. In a rare counterexample, former naval commander Ye Fei’s daughter Ye Zhifeng was sentenced to 17 years in prison in 1986. Nor had corruption been noticeably reduced lower down the rank and file, as party leaders would admit just two years later; many of the same specific offenses targeted in the campaign had to be

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228 Guo, “The Five Anti-Corruption Campaigns in Post-Mao China.”

229 Wedeman, Double Paradox, p. 96.


231 Manion, Corruption by Design, p. 179.


targeted again in 1989. Foreshadowing that year’s crisis, students demanding democracy and reforms to curb social ills led demonstrations in several major cities in December 1986.  

1989: a Corruption Crisis and a Crackdown

This section analyzes the government’s post-Tiananmen crackdown and concludes that it was a Failed Reform in terms of corruption control.

Demanding greater democracy and an end to corruption, an unprecedented student-led movement occupied Tiananmen Square in Beijing between April 15th and June 4th. The protests began with small gatherings to mourn the death on April 15th of former general secretary Hu Yaobang, who was seen as a liberal reformer but had been ousted by conservatives two years earlier. The protests, which soon spread to other cities, were supported by many Beijing residents and captured global attention through coverage by foreign reporters who happened to be in Beijing at the time.

While most famous abroad for their calls for political reform, the protests were also about the public’s anger over corruption. Zhao Ziyang, who succeeded Hu as general secretary and continued some of his policies until being ousted himself in 1989, notes in his memoirs that “there was a lot of dissatisfaction with corruption back then, so commemorating Hu Yaobang provided a chance to express this discontent.” “Most of the students were demanding the punishment of corruption and the promotion of political reform, and were not advocating the


overthrow of the Communist Party.” The idea that “linked the students more strongly to the general population of Beijing” was not democracy but bringing “an end to corruption.” In a survey of 111 bystanders to the movement asking which were the most important goals of the movement, 82 percent responded ending corruption. The CIA assessed that the protests were “symptomatic of public dissatisfaction with the leadership because of its unwillingness to make the political system more responsive to public concerns and inability to control growing official corruption, nepotism, and inflation.” Even the infamous “26 April Editorial” in the official People’s Daily—a harsh condemnation of the protests that angered protesters further—claimed to stand with the “vast majority of students who sincerely wish to get rid of corruption and advance democracy.”

Protesters had many slogans and messages emphasizing their disgust with government corruption. For example: “Publicize government officials’ wealth;” “Mao Zedong’s officials were clean, the Gang of Four’s were brave, and Deng Xiaoping’s are millionaires!” “Economic chaos is the inevitable outcome of government corruption and impotence;” “The biggest and sharpest contradiction in China today is between the filth of corrupt officials and the interests of the masses;” “Today’s China has filth everywhere; it’s time for a big clean-up;” and “Corruption

236 Zhao Ziyang (Author), Adi Ignatius (Author, editor, translator), Bao Pu (Editor, Translator), Renee Chiang (Editor, Translator), Prisoner of the State: The Secret Journal of Premier Zhao Ziyang (Simon and Schuster 2009), pp. 17, 79.


and Mistakes Are the Root of ‘Disturbances’.” 

This last message was in response to accusations from official media that protesters were creating a “disturbance.”

It may seem that regime-threatening protests over corruption like those in Tiananmen Square should create a strong motivation for an authoritarian regime to clean house, but I find that such defensive motivations are in fact relatively weak. Substantial anti-corruption efforts challenge established political and bureaucratic interests, and therefore at least in authoritarian regimes need to be forced on the establishment by a powerful leadership. But in the face of mass protests, the leadership is more reliant on the establishment than usual to suppress dissent; naturally, it is extremely difficult for any leader to take on the public and the political establishment at the same time. What tends to happen instead is that leaders make a show of curbing corruption until the crisis is over but spare the establishment in return for support. In short, the threat posed by the protests can paradoxically make it harder for the regime to solve the problem that caused the protests.

The CCP leadership’s first response was to acknowledge the need to curb corruption, even in private. Conversations and speeches by party leaders during and after the 1989 protests that were leaked and later published in The Tiananmen Papers (2002) show broad consensus, at least in principle. In this collection of documents, we find that at least ten top CCP leaders spoke of the need to curb corruption in connection with the protests. The people’s anger over corruption was perceived to be a major threat that “could indeed have grave consequences for the

240 Tiananmen Square Incident Materials Collection [天安门资料集], Harvard University’s Harvard-Yenching Library, Boxes 6–8 and 14–17, various files.

Party and the nation,” in the words of Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection Qiao Shi.  

But statements by top leaders suggest that the crackdown that followed the protests was primarily defensive—focused on overcoming a specific corruption-related public relations crisis. Leaders sought a crackdown on corruption to “restore the Party’s image,” restore “Party prestige in the eyes of the people,” and to be able to “face the people.” Deng himself spoke of using a small number of high-level arrests as showcases of intent to clean house, rather than discussing new rules that could be put in place to curb corruption or explaining how corruption control could further economic reforms. On May 31st, at the height of the crisis, Deng told Premier Li Peng and First Vice Premier Yao Yilin that the party needed to make an “explanation” to the people about corruption: “We’ve got to win back the people’s trust. We should take a couple dozen cases of corruption, embezzlement, or bribe taking-some at the province level and some national-and pursue them vigorously and swiftly.” A leaked assessment from the U.S. Embassy with intelligence based on discussions with China’s Ministry of Justice, concluded that “the PRC views the anti-corruption campaign as key in its efforts to regain the confidence of the Chinese people.” The momentum for a new anti-corruption crackdown spanned the reformer-conservative divide in the leadership, with reformers like Zhao Ziyang and conservatives like Li Peng in significant agreement.

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242 Qiao Shi was still the Secretary of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission, but had also become the head of the CCDI in 1987.

243 These quotations are from The Tiananmen Papers, as cited above.

Besides assuaging public anger, the post-Tiananmen crackdown was also a way to purge disloyal party members and exact retribution for the protests. The party began by “isolating and criticizing” some 250 “liberal-minded leading cadres” who had supported the student protesters. In Beijing and elsewhere, “party members and cadres were required to give detailed accounts of their actions—and the actions of their coworkers—throughout the period of the spring disorders.” Baum explains that much of this campaign to root out those who had supported the wrong side was thwarted by a “tacit conspiracy of silence” and the fact that many within the party, including at high levels, had supported the students.245 But the party succeeded in ousting many of Zhao’s reformist allies. Zhao himself had already been removed from his position as general secretary and would live the rest of his life under house arrest. Conservatives had wanted Zhao to step down for years, but only after the Tiananmen Square protests was the pressure enough to unseat him.246

Despite much of the crackdown being overtly political at the elite level, it also produced more anti-corruption investigations than any other campaign before or after in the reform era. In the initial burst of the campaign, “20,794 criminals were arrested, 482.86 million yuan was recovered, and 36,171 officials surrendered themselves to the anti-corruption agencies from 15 August 1989 to 31 October 1989.”247 A record 77,432 economic crime cases were filed by the Procuratorate in 1989, up from 32,626 the previous year.248 Wedeman’s summation of official statistics shows that there were more than 60,000 cases filed relating to graft, bribery, and

245 Baum, Burying Mao, pp. 315–16.
246 Zhao, Prisoner of the State, pp. 233–44.
misappropriation in 1989, and even more in 1990.\textsuperscript{249} High-level officials and major state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were not spared investigations, but as mentioned these tended toward selective enforcement. Liang Xiang, the governor of Hainan Province, and two State Council ministers—all of whom were associated with Zhao—were accused of corruption and removed from all government positions.\textsuperscript{250}

In the weeks after the bloody June 4\textsuperscript{th} crackdown, the regime put forward strict new rules to curb corruption and official media made a big show of investigations into economic crime. Children of senior cadres were forbidden from engaging in commercial activity and new restrictions were placed on the private use of public cars, the importation of foreign cars, and foreign travel by officials. In addition, high-ranking officials would no longer be allowed to entertain guests in their homes at public expense.\textsuperscript{251} The new motto for officials would be “hard work and plain living.”\textsuperscript{252} The Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate asked those guilty of corruption to turn themselves in in return for clemency, but only within a short time frame before harsher penalties would apply.\textsuperscript{253} Alongside these measures, to show it

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\item \textsuperscript{249} Wedeman, \textit{Double Paradox}, p. 129.
\item \textsuperscript{250} Baum, \textit{Burying Mao}, p. 318.
\item \textsuperscript{252} \textit{Boston Globe}, 1989/7/29, “China announces corruption crackdown.”
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was serious, the party leadership staged public sentencings and summary executions of corrupt officials. 1990 was a high-water mark for executions in China overall. These “most graphic examples” of the regime’s tough response to economic crime were widely reported.\textsuperscript{254}

Despite the rhetoric and large number of investigations, the ambitious new rules to curb corruption did not stick and the CCP pulled its punches on convicting allegedly corrupt officials. As numerous scandals and attempts by the party to revise and reissue similar restrictions in the following years and decades demonstrate, the children of senior officials largely did not get out of business. And despite new rules, the rampant overuse of public cars continued in the 1990s.\textsuperscript{255}

Continuing the trend of corruption control in the reform era, “only a handful of high-level officials were indicted or brought to trial.” Liang Xiang and the two ministers were spared prosecution. By the end of 1991, there had been only one prosecution at the ministerial level and 34 at the provincial level.\textsuperscript{256} The U.S. Embassy noted that the campaign was “largely of rhetoric -- with plenty of loopholes for well-connected cadres and their relations,” at least in the initial weeks.\textsuperscript{257} In hindsight, experts do not see the campaign as any kind of anti-corruption success, arguing instead that corruption continued to rise—or even rose faster—in the early 1990s.\textsuperscript{258} In 1994, Deputy Procurator-General Liang Guoqing frankly assessed that corruption was “worse than at any other period since New China was founded in 1949. It has spread into the Party,

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\textsuperscript{254} The Standard (Hong Kong), 1989/9/21.


\textsuperscript{256} Baum, *Burying Mao*, p. 318.

\textsuperscript{257} “PRC Goals After Tiananmen: The Official View from the Ministry of Justice.”

government, administration and every part of society, including politics, economy, ideology and culture’.”

6. The Failure of a Quasi-Democratic Approach

This section describes how the CCP continued to combat corruption in the 1990s and 2000s but did so under a more collective leadership style, with less aggressive campaigns, and with some borrowing from the democratic approach to corruption control. These three developments, though welcome news to many critics of China’s authoritarianism and experts on government integrity, did not produce effective corruption control. Though the political liberalization of the Jiang-Zhu and Hu-Wen administrations hardly constitutes a thorough test of the possibility of a democratic approach to corruption control under authoritarianism, its failure is suggestive. In all likelihood, the CCP would have to go much further in a democratic direction for this to be a fruitful anti-corruption strategy. This point reinforces the argument made in previous chapters about poor corruption control under competitive authoritarianism, such as in South Korea’s Third Republic or Taiwan in the 1990s.

The events of June 4th notwithstanding, the political liberalization which had begun under Deng Xiaoping early in the 1980s accelerated in the 1990s and 2000s. Though a far cry from democratization, liberalization came to affect nearly every aspect of CCP rule. Media, both traditional and social, become more open and commercial. Civil society organizations multiplied and were allowed to become more independent. The party allowed direct elections at the village level and in some townships. Private businesspeople were accepted into the party as members, along with other previously excluded groups. Religious affiliation boomed as restrictions on faith

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were lifted, even on politically sensitive Christianity. Religion was just one area in which China opened its doors to a new range of foreign influences and connections. Overall, governance became more open, more consultative, more representative, less centralized, and less violent.\(^\text{260}\)

Deng’s constrained leadership developed into a system of collective leadership under Jiang and then Hu.\(^\text{261}\) Even after his retirement in 1989, Deng retained significant influence behind the scenes as a revered party elder and powerbroker. It was Deng, along with a group of other party elders, who elevated Hu Jintao to the position of Jiang’s presumptive successor for 2002. But Deng also “pushed for the establishment of a new collective leadership” with Jiang as its “core.”\(^\text{262}\) Jiang and Hu did not monopolize decision-making in their administrations; they both left “economic and social management portfolios to the Premier[s] (Zhu Rongji 1998–2003 and Wen Jiabao 2003–2013).”\(^\text{263}\) In 2003, Andrew Nathan described the incoming Hu-Wen administration’s leadership as “politically balanced in representing different factions in the Party.” It was lacking “one or two dominant figures, and is thus structurally constrained to make decisions collectively; and that is probably as collegial as any political leadership can be.”\(^\text{264}\) Alice Miller argued that “the structure and processes of the Politburo Standing Committee under Hu Jintao have…appeared to reflect the goal of reinforcing consensus-based decision-making


under oligarchic collective leadership.”265 Neither Jiang nor Hu had a personality cult or even the legitimacy that came with having personal revolutionary experience, which Deng had enjoyed. These leaders accepted succession according to norms and both stepped down in a basically orderly fashion at the end of their mandated terms in office.

This is not to say, however, that there was no power accumulation and elite conflict in these decades. Jiang cultivated his Shanghai Gang faction and surprised observers with his influence over the military and state institutions, especially after Deng’s death in 1997.266 Hu had the Youth League—his own, rival faction—but was overshadowed by Jiang and arguably was “never able to accumulate enough power to become yibashou [the boss].”267

Several anti-corruption campaigns were announced in the 1990s and 2000s, but they were all relatively minor or targeted. “Since the Chinese government shifted from a campaign-based to an institutional approach in the mid-1990s, there have been no really major anti-corruption campaigns.”268 Campaigns announced in 1993, 1995, 2005, and 2009, for example, were not accompanied by significant (50 percent) increases in nationwide prosecutions.269 These anti-corruption announcements were all Empty Gestures, though this label may seem too harsh if we consider subnational successes the campaigns might have had in certain localities or against certain types of corruption. Whereas in the 1980s “Chinese leaders sought drastic reductions in


267 Fewsmith, “Authoritarian Resilience Revisited,” p. 9. Joseph Fewsmith holds the minority view that collective leadership was actually never established under Jiang or Hu.


the overall high volume of corruption,” in the 1990s they were “more selective in their

demands.”270 Lowell Dittmer exaggerates only a little when he writes that “though the war on
corruption continued” under Jiang, “no new institutional countermeasures or policy initiatives
were adopted to deal with the problem.”271 It was not “that Jiang and Hu ignored the challenge of
corruption, but rather that they were unable to maintain any momentum” against it.272

Nevertheless, it is worth noting that there was a gradual rise in investigations into the
corruption of party elites, even if enforcement for such high-level cases continued to be
selective.273 Politburo member and mayor of Beijing Chen Xitong became the highest-ranking
official convicted of corruption after being dismissed in 1995 along with several of his
associates. This rare purge of a Politburo member was widely interpreted as part of a factional
conflict between Jiang Zemin’s Shanghai Gang and the “Beijing clique.”274 After its political
clout began to decline around 2002, the Shanghai Gang was left increasingly vulnerable to
charges of corruption.275 In 2006, Politburo member and Shanghai party boss Chen Liangyu (no
relation to Chen Xitong) was dismissed for misuse of the city’s pension fund and other
corruption and abuses of power. This time it was probably loyalty to Jiang and conflict with Hu

270 Manion, Corruption by Design, p. 168.


272 Saich, Governance and Politics of China, p. 354.

273 Fu Hualing, “The Upward and Downward Spirals in China’s Anti-Corruption Enforcement” in Mike McConville
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China, 9, No. 25 (2000), pp. 479–84.; Tien Hung-Mao and Chu Yun-Han, Eds., China Under Jiang Zemin (Lynee

Harper, 2010), Chapter Five.
and Wen Jiabao that did him in. Dismissals of provincial-level officials on corruption charges rose throughout the 2000s and reached a reform-era record annual high of 15 in 2009. This was partly as a result of a Hu-led attack on officials in the “Guangdong Gang.” U.S. intelligence noted in 2008 that there was a rise in high-level prosecutions in China’s Northeast, but that “a concerted effort to combat the region’s corrosive official corruption does not seem to be at work.”

The anti-corruption investigation closest to the heart of power, however, came in 2012 against Bo Xilai, the party boss in the important Chongqing Municipality and a contender for promotion to the Politburo Standing Committee. Bo had made waves in Chongqing with “neo-Maoist” rhetoric and a broad anti-crime campaign, which included anti-corruption investigations. Bo was also controversial because of his self-promotion and unconcealed political ambitions, which are generally frowned upon in the party. Bo’s position was undermined after February 2012, when it was revealed that Chongqing’s deputy mayor and police chief Wang Lijun had leveled shocking accusations of corruption and involvement in a murder case against his boss to officials at a U.S. consulate. The highly public scandal embarrassed the party leadership and

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sealed Bo’s fate. He was ousted from his positions, stripped of party membership, and sentenced to life in prison.

Political liberalization in these two decades shaped China’s anti-corruption strategy, bringing it closer to the democratic approach. This trend could be seen in the government’s moves to strengthen the rule of law, accept greater input on corruption control from private media and the public, and improve governmental transparency. In addition, there were other developments in corruption control in this period that were not inherently authoritarian or democratic, such as improved training and funding for investigators, bureaucratic reorganization and streamlining, and the increased use of audits to discover potential cases of malfeasance.281

The CCP leadership increasingly recognized the need for a stronger legal system and at least partial rule of law under party rule. In the 1990s, the regime began “more systematic legal reforms, in which building a professional, efficient, and fair legal system was the essential goal.”282 In this vein, there were meaningful improvements in the right to counsel, the presumption of innocence, pretrial detention, specialist participation in law-making, courts “exercising interpretive functions of the law,” state laws against corruption (as opposed to party regulations), laws regarding compensation for victims, and other areas. Judicial independence,


Some scholars point to decentralization as a reform-era trend that has affected anti-corruption enforcement positively or negatively, but decentralization in the sense of center-provincial or local relations—as opposed to in the sense of checks and balances at the national level—is not inherently democratic or authoritarian and is not included in my characterization of the democratic approach. See: Mayling Birney, “Decentralization and Veiled Corruption under China’s ‘Rule of Mandates’,” World Development, January 2014, Vol.53, pp. 55–67.; Gong Ting, “Managing Government Integrity under Hierarchy: Anti-Corruption Efforts in Local China.” Journal of Contemporary China 24, No. 94 (2015): 684–700.

though still limited, improved significantly in these decades, which also influenced anti-corruption enforcement.\textsuperscript{283} The urgency of the problem of corruption itself “helped to accelerate administrative and legal reforms…and in this way corruption has indirectly contributed to the rise of a new legalistic culture.”\textsuperscript{284}

As restrictions on private media were relaxed, the CCP “benefitted from an active watchdog media that helps keep local officials in check, although it is largely blocked from serious reporting on malfeasance at higher levels of government.”\textsuperscript{285} “Chinese news coverage…is in the midst of something of a golden age,” Howard French noted in late 2007.\textsuperscript{286} This was “largely due to the rapid growth of investigative reporting since the early 1990s.”\textsuperscript{287} The spread of internet access meant that “negative reports and criticism of local officials, especially relating to corruption, social justice, or people’s daily experiences, are now being exposed and nationally distributed…and can resonate broadly.”\textsuperscript{288} And since the early 2000s, citizen activists have been creating websites to report on corruption. “Jiang Huanwen, who runs the China Civilian Report Website, has reported nearly 4,000 cases of wrongdoing by officials and led some of them (e.g. a vice mayor in Yunnan Province) to be punished.”\textsuperscript{289} Some subnational governments


\textsuperscript{286} NYT, 2007/12/7, \url{https://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/07/world/asia/07china.html}

\textsuperscript{287} Lorentzen, “China’s Strategic Censorship,” p. 410.


implemented rudimentary public accountability systems. In Huizhou City in Guangdong, the public was invited to comment on the performance of public officials. “Starting in 2002, the three officials with the greatest number of negative comments were required to have special interviews with the disciplinary commission. Any official who appeared on the complaints list for two years in a row would lose his job.” This system was later adopted in other cities, including Zhuhai, Zhanjiang, and Chaozhou.\(^{290}\)

Lastly, the quality of information about its decisions and operations the government chose to disclose to the public improved markedly, especially in the 2000s. In April 2007, the State Council published regulations on “Open Government Information” (政府信息公开条例) (OGI), which “provide the legal basis for China’s first nationwide government information disclosure system.” Among the main reasons for adopting this transparency reform were “enhancing trust between the public and the government [and] curbing government corruption.”\(^{291}\) The national OGI regulations were preceded by experimentation with greater transparency at lower levels. In 2000, the CCP expanded OGI initiatives in 2000 from the village to the township level and in 2003 “to include higher-level municipal governments.”\(^{292}\)

Transparency initiatives and other aspects of a more open approach to clean government reform appeared to be a secular trend, but the Xi Jinping administration undertook a major course correction.


7. Xi Jinping: The Return of the Authoritarian Playbook

This section discusses Xi’s ongoing anti-corruption campaign, which I argue employs a throwback authoritarian playbook and has already produced a Limited Victory. I further argue that the campaign’s success owes a great deal to the same combination of factors that made the Three Antis–Five Antis effective in the 1950s. The main limitation of the campaign, as reflected in this study’s scoring system and common expert opinion, has been in enforcing rules that systematically restrain elites and high-level officials from corruption, despite the large number of elites disciplined.

By the end of Hu Jintao’s second term, there was a growing sense within the CCP that corruption was rampant and feeding a “severe organisational crisis.” Problematic not only in itself, corruption contributed to rising social unrest, environmental problems, the “stagnation” of the Hu-Wen administration, and a general “sense of malaise.” Premier Wen Jiabao was “widely criticized as a weak premier who failed to pushed through key economic reforms [and] tolerated bloat in the [state-owned enterprises] and rampant official corruption.” A full half of Chinese surveyed in 2012 before the start of Xi’s term listed corrupt officials as “a very big problem, up 11 percentage points since 2008.” Hu himself highlighted the issue in his report to


295 Kroeber, China’s Economy, p. 18.

the 18th Party Congress in November 2012, arguing in no uncertain terms that mishandling it "could prove fatal to the Party, and even cause the collapse of the Party and the fall of the state." He had voiced nearly identical worries at the CCP’s 90th anniversary celebration the previous year.

General secretary of the CCP from November 2012 and president of China from March 2013, Xi Jinping wasted no time in launching a far-reaching anti-corruption campaign that would become the signature policy of his rule. In his first speech to the Politburo as general secretary, Xi “denounced the prevalence of corruption and said that officials needed to guard against its spread or it would ‘doom the party and the state’.” In December 2012, the new administration put forward an Eight-point Code (八项规定) for party members to avoid extravagance and undisciplined behavior, especially in their relations with the public. The campaign has been carried out primarily by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, which saw its investigatory powers enhanced in several rounds of reforms. In late 2012, Deputy Party Secretary of Sichuan Province Li Chuncheng became the first senior official brought down by

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300 As others have also noticed, Xi’s Eight-point Code is very similar in content to Chiang Ching-kuo’s Ten Principles of Reform (1972), which is discussed in Chapter Two. See: ZGSB, 2013/5/8, [https://www.chinatimes.com/cn/realtimenews/20130508003170-260409](https://www.chinatimes.com/cn/realtimenews/20130508003170-260409)
the CCDI as part of Xi’s campaign. Starting in 2013, the number of anti-corruption investigations into officials rose sharply, and as of late 2018 totaled more than 2.7 million.

**Xi’s Motives and Constraints**

I find that Xi has pursued corruption control as part of his broader mission to restore party discipline and reassert party leadership over China’s state and society. This mission, which has been the defining theme of his time in power, is a response to what Xi saw as a crisis of the CCP’s ability to rule in the 2000s. Policy failings, including the failure to curb corruption, are of course nothing new for the CCP. The crisis was instead that the policy failings of the Hu-Wen administration were unfolding in a period of unprecedented political liberalization and retreat of party control over the state and society. A similar combination of policy failings and weak party leadership in an increasingly liberal atmosphere, many CCP leaders believe, led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. This is why, as many commentators have noted, the Xi administration has reversed course on political liberalization and made a partial return to the revolutionary, Maoist tradition of rule. In his first term, Xi oversaw myriad policy changes in this direction: a rollback of privatization (国退民进), tightening party control over SOEs, and a crackdown on

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304 Michael Auslin, “Rejuvenation, Muddling Through, or Manning the Pumps? Xi Jinping and China’s Turning Point,” *Asia Policy* Vol. 13 No. 4, October 2018.
The anti-corruption campaign strengthens party discipline and organization, making Xi’s vision of expanded party power possible and averting the crisis. While I find that to be the main motivation, corruption control, as always, has other benefits: appeasing public discontent, aiding the leader’s power consolidation within the regime, and supporting economic growth, at least in the long run.

There is understandably much skepticism about Xi’s motives in this campaign because anti-corruption efforts in China and elsewhere have often coincided with attacks on political rivals. As Joseph Fewsmith writes, “charging one’s opponents (or their close followers) with corruption – a charge that seems increasingly true of most officials – had become the weapon of choice for political maneuver” in the mid-1990s. As for political bias in Xi’s campaign, Pei Minxin writes that “not a single colleague who has worked closely with Xi before his ascent to

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307 Also, the campaign weakens resistance within the state to the Xi administration’s policy goals. Whatever Xi’s other policy goals, however, he has not yet pivoted away from the issue of corruption. See: Pei Minxin, “How Xi Jinping Can Sustain His Anti-Corruption Drive,” 2014/1/16, China-US Focus.; Kroeber, China’s Economy, p. 222.; Wang and Zeng, “Xi Jinping: the game changer of Chinese elite politics?” Official Chinese media often say anti-corruption efforts will assist reform. E.g. Xinhua [新华], 2015/2/28, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2015-02/28/c_127526991.htm


power has been investigated or arrested during the five-year campaign."\(^{309}\) Similarly cynical, Willy Wo-Lap Lam is a leading proponent of the idea that the lens of factional struggle best explains the anti-corruption campaign and much of Chinese elite politics.\(^{310}\)

Why, then, should we not conclude that this campaign is a cover for Xi’s personal power consolidation? In fact, I submit that it is; Xi has clearly used this anti-corruption campaign to strengthen his position. This power consolidation and the broader party/state-building mission have proceeded hand in hand. The point is that personal power consolidation is an _insufficient_ explanation for this campaign. I make three points as to why. Firstly, while some particular investigations against elites may be purely political, the campaign’s investigations have by now burst the bounds of targeting any one faction, social group, sector of the economy, region, or type of official.\(^{311}\) Personal vendettas or factionalism can at most explain only part of this now six-year campaign that has disciplined millions.\(^{312}\) Secondly, the complex reforms enforced by the campaign go far beyond power consolidation, including everything from limiting how many dishes public servants can order at restaurants to how city-level SOEs manage their accounts to streamlining reporting rules for lower-level committees involved in anti-corruption work. Xi’s campaign looks very different from typical autocratic uses of corruption as a smear against rivals

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\(^{310}\) Willy Wo-Lap Lam, _Chinese Politics in the Era of Xi Jinping: Renaissance, Reform, or Retrogression?_ (Routledge, 2015).

\(^{311}\) Others suspected that the campaign was a way for Xi to weaken opposition within the bureaucracy to other important policy goals, to which he would shift attention after a brief stab at corruption. With the campaign having focused on corruption as long as it has, that no longer seems likely. See: Youwei, “The End of Reform in China: Authoritarian Adaptation Hits a Wall,” _Foreign Affairs_, May/June 2015.; SCMP, 2017/10/16, [https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/2115285/dont-hold-your-breath-xi-reform-chinas-economy](https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/2115285/dont-hold-your-breath-xi-reform-chinas-economy)

\(^{312}\) Li, _Chinese politics in the Xi Jinping era_, p. 23.; Andrew Hall Wedeman, “Xi Jinping’s Tiger Hunt: Anti-Corruption Campaign or Factional Purge?” _Modern China Studies_ Vol 24, Iss. 2 (2017), pp. 35–94.
just to consolidate power. And thirdly, based on the seriousness and unusual scope of investigations, not to mention the length of the campaign, most scholars have concluded that curbing corruption is among the main goals of Xi’s campaign.\(^{313}\)

Xi began as a relatively constrained leader, but consolidated his power rapidly, in part through the anti-corruption campaign. The “fifth-generation leadership” that came into power alongside Xi was largely not of his choosing and therefore it was widely presumed that the norms of collective leadership that had defined the previous administrations would continue to apply.\(^{314}\) Some China analysts were suggesting that Xi would be “a very weak leader” who would “need to compromise.”\(^{315}\) Xi began to subvert these expectations by approving a graft probe against former Politburo Standing Committee member Zhou Yongkang. With tight control over the fearsome anti-corruption campaign through his deputy and CCDI chief Wang Qishan, Xi deterred any open challenge from within the party establishment.\(^{316}\) In late 2013, Xi pushed major institutional reforms that strengthened his policy-making power. A new National Security


\(^{314}\) As late as 2015, some analysts saw Xi as still “well within the trappings of collective leadership.” Alice L. Miller, “The Trouble with Factions,” *China Leadership Monitor*, 2015/3/19, [https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/clm46am-2.pdf](https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/clm46am-2.pdf)


Commission was created with Xi at the helm. He moved decision-making from existing state channels to new ad hoc bodies, such as “leading small groups” each in charge of a particular governance agenda.\(^{317}\) The newly-created Central Leading Group on Comprehensively Deepening Reform (中央全面深化改革领导小组), which Xi headed, “is in some ways a shadow State Council.” In his first term, Xi personally headed eight leading small groups.\(^{318}\) Xi has become the head of so many party organizations that he has been called the “chairman of everything.”\(^{319}\) Late 2013 also saw the first major propaganda push to build up a new cult of personality that ultimately seeks to put Xi above all previous CCP leaders except Mao.\(^{320}\) With hindsight, we can see that Xi had already consolidated significant power before 2015. He continued to strengthen his position with two key moves around the end of his first term. In a rare honor, the 19\(^{th}\) Party Congress approved the insertion of Xi Jinping Thought into the party constitution in October 2017. And in March 2018, the National People’s Congress allowed for the removal of presidential term limits, theoretically allowing Xi to rule indefinitely.

While many analysts have been surprised at the seeming ease with which Xi consolidated his power, the constraints on Xi’s leadership were from the beginning weaker than has generally been acknowledged. A key but underexamined constraint on authoritarian personalization is the


\(^{318}\) Christopher K. Johnson, Scott Kennedy, and Qiu Mingda, “Xi’s Signature Governance Innovation: The Rise of Leading Small Groups,” 2017/10/17, Center for Strategic and International Studies. This and other leading small groups were later renamed “commissions.”


oversight that retired leaders, party elders, or other non-ruling elite from the previous generation exercise over an autocrat newly in power. Oversight from party elders helped hold in place the collective leadership of the Jiang and Hu administrations. Both the Deng-Jiang and Jiang-Hu transitions involved “staggered retirement,” in which the predecessor lingered in powerful positions, such as chairman of the Central Military Commission, to oversee the new administration. Deng remained popular and authoritative within the party after stepping down, despite his lethal response to the Tiananmen Square protests, and was often consulted on major decisions up until close to his death in 1997. Jiang also had a second life after his retirement as a powerbroker and respected party elder.

Fortuitously for Xi, he was able to begin his first term with far less oversight from either Hu or Jiang than they had had from their predecessors. Hu’s leadership was widely seen as overshadowed by the still-powerful Jiang and at least partly for this reason not strong enough for the challenges China faced. Hu’s ineffectiveness and the desire in the party for change may have contributed to Hu giving up the chairmanship of the Central Military Commission and all other key posts promptly at the end of his two terms. Xi “took advantage of social demand for reform coordination” to centralize power. Jiang might have exercised more control over Xi, especially since he was instrumental in putting Xi in power in the first place. However, by 2012,

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324 Li, Chinese Politics in the Xi Jinping Era, p. 13.

Jiang had formally been retired for almost a decade, was 86 years old, and had reportedly suffered heart failure the previous year.\(^{326}\) His health problems sparked rumors, which would recur, that he had died. Jiang’s declining influence in the fifth generation leadership was arguably evident when Bo Xilai broke ranks to make a dramatic and party-damaging bid for power before Xi’s ascension. This scandal, according to some analyses, allowed Xi to portray himself as the only possible protector of the party in a time of elite strife and thereby justify his power consolidation.\(^{327}\) In sum, the lack of oversight by party elders at the start of his term gave Xi advantages in power consolidation that his immediate predecessors did not have.

### The Campaign and its Outcomes

The most attention-catching aspect of Xi’s campaign has been the explosion of anti-corruption investigations against high-ranking officials—more than 212 in Xi’s first term.\(^{328}\) Many analysts have noted that Xi broke the informal norm of immunity from anti-corruption probes for Politburo Standing Committee members by opening an investigation against retired security chief Zhou Yongkang in August 2013.\(^{329}\) Zhou was only one of several “big tigers” brought down in the campaign, including former vice-chairmen of the Central Military

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\(^{327}\) Author’s conversation with Joseph Fewsmith, 2018/10/6.

\(^{328}\) Generally, to qualify as a “tiger,” an official must be at the “deputy ministerial or deputy provincial level” or higher. See, for example “Guidelines of the Secrets Protection Committee of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Senior Cadres’ Party Conservation and State Secrets,” *News of the Communist Party of China* [translation given], 1990/12/13. / “中共中央保密委员会关于高级干部保守党和国家秘密的规定,” 中国共产党新闻, 1990/12/13, [http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/71380/71387/71590/4855405.html](http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/71380/71387/71590/4855405.html); This is also the standard used for the data in “Visualizing China’s Anti-Corruption Campaign,” *ChinaFile*, [http://www.chinafile.com/infographics/visualizing-chinas-anti-corruption-campaign](http://www.chinafile.com/infographics/visualizing-chinas-anti-corruption-campaign)

Commission Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong, former chief of the General Office of the CCP and a close adviser to Hu Jintao Ling Jihua, and Vice-Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference Su Rong.

Below the highest-profile cases, this complex campaign has shifted its focus regionally and sectorally over time. The first regional inspections, in 2013, rooted out corruption in “Jiangxi, Hubei, Inner Mongolia, Guizhou, Chongqing, China Grain Reserve Corporation…China Publishing Group, The Export-Import Bank of China, and Renmin University of China.” As inspections continued across the country, often doubling back to the same places to keep up the pressure, the number of investigations grew annually through at least 2018. In late 2014, China was captivated by the news of an “officialdom earthquake” in Shanxi Province, where scores of top provincial officials were prosecuted for corruption—the highest concentration of any province relative to its size. In 2015, SOEs were a major focus of the campaign and targets of inspection teams. In November 2015, it was announced that the People’s Liberation Army’s vast commercial activities, which are well-known avenues of corruption, would be discontinued. In 2016, the military deployed its own anti-corruption inspectors for the first time. In March 2018, the National People’s Congress approved the


333 James Mulvenon, “PLA Divestiture 2.0: We Mean It This Time,” China Leadership Monitor, No. 50 (2016). As the title of this piece suggests, this is not the first time the CCP has tried this particular reform.

creation of a new, overarching anti-corruption body to police not only the wrongdoing of China’s roughly 90 million party members, as the CCDI does, but also non-party state employees. The full impact of this leviathan, called the National Supervision Commission (国家监察委员会) (NSC), remains to be seen.

As in past campaigns, inspections have been a key enforcement mechanism. The CCDI dispatches inspection teams to investigate party members in provinces, state organs, ministries, and SOEs all over the country. “Since Xi Jinping took over as Party chief, the role of the [CCDI] ad hoc inspection teams has been strengthened and enhanced in terms of their scope, intensity, and frequency of their inspections.” More than half of the “leading cadres” brought down in the campaign, the CCDI reported in 2016, were initially discovered by inspection teams. The Xi administration also “introduced new institutions, called…central inspection groups to complement the existing inspection system.” Because they report to the Leading Small Group on Central Inspection Work (中央巡视工作领导小组), which was headed by Wang Qishan during Xi’s first term, these groups (teams) provide the most “direct channel for central supervision of leaders in both local government and key SOEs” [emphasis in the original]. The CCDI also installs disciplinary inspection teams in central state and party institutions on a more permanent


338 Yeo Yukyung, “Complementing the local discipline inspection commissions of the CCP: empowerment of the central inspection groups,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 25, No. 97, p. 60.
basis; it reported in January 2016 that it had successfully installed 47 such teams in all 139 central party and state institutions.\textsuperscript{339}

Beyond just investigating wrongdoing, inspection teams can also supervise a wide range of reforms. Inspection teams assess the state of reforms in local governments, ministries, or SOEs that are their hosts and write reports to those institutions pointing out weaknesses and urging improvements. For example, inspection teams may advise that SOEs address issues like efficiency, solvency, nepotism, salaries and bonuses, the relationship among companies under the same corporate umbrella, or party representation in SOE leadership.\textsuperscript{340}

Though Xi’s campaign remains unfinished as of this writing, it has developed far enough for us to conclude that it is a Limited Victory against corruption. To start with, discipline enforcement, though uneven, has been undeniably far-reaching both horizontally and vertically within the party-state. Top officials from every province have been disciplined, along with more than 70 SOE executives and 63 generals between 2012 and 2017.\textsuperscript{341} In the first six years after the Eight-point Code was announced, the party has dealt with some 250,000 suspected violations of the anti-austerity and anti-extravagance rules, disciplining nearly 350,000 people.\textsuperscript{342}

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\item[\textsuperscript{339}] “Stationed supervision, while exploring innovation, achieves full coverage,” 2016/1/7, Central Discipline Inspection Commission Supervision Department.
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\item[\textsuperscript{342}] Xinhua [新华], 2018/12/4, \url{http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2018-12/04/c_1123802424.htm}
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to official statistics, “disciplinary action [has] been taken against 25 officials at the ministerial or provincial level, and 28,532 county or divisional level officials [have] been punished.” The CCDI confiscated 20.1 billion yuan in allegedly corrupt funds between the start of the campaign in late 2012 and June 2015—a total not including significant confiscations by other bodies. Unlike in some previous campaigns, discipline enforcement has not suffered any significant backtracking; the unprecedented length of the campaign reflects strong political will at the top and makes it increasingly unlikely that its verdicts will be overturned.

Anti-corruption bodies, procedures, and organizational arrangements that were established or enhanced under the campaign have supposedly become permanent. The introduction of the NSC in 2018 is the latest and greatest institution-building in corruption control, and follows numerous enhancements to the CCDI’s capabilities and reach. “The retention of temporarily mobilized anticorruption resources,” the “simplification of evidence production procedure,” and other reforms from the campaign have resulted in “a considerable expansion of the CCDI’s anticorruption investigative capacities and a significant increase in Xi Jinping’s leverage to impose political loyalty and compliance upon Party officials in the future.” Unlike “the many others over the past thirty years,” Xi’s anti-corruption campaign has

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345 I say supposedly because while the campaign has been unprecedentedly long and the party is treating these changes as permanent, we cannot be sure what retreats the end of the campaign might bring.

been combined with substantial “administrative reform” and “disciplinary regulation.” Even analyses critical of the campaign accept that it has strengthened party discipline and capacity.

The campaign’s myriad rules have deeply affected the behavior of bureaucrats and officials. As Elizabeth Economy writes, “Xi has sought to eliminate through regulation even the smallest opportunities for officials to abuse their position. Regulations now govern how many cars officials may own, the size of their homes, and whether they are permitted secretaries.”

The Bertelsmann Transformation Index assesses that “petty corruption” in the form of demanding bribes for services has become more difficult. Service providers are monitored with computer programs and even video cameras, and the electronization of financial transactions has imposed additional barriers to corrupt behavior.

Economic studies analyzing land transactions, luxury imports, car sales, and new business registration conclude that there has indeed been success in curbing corruption in those areas. Market research shows that party regulations against extravagant spending by officials in restaurants—“corruption on the tongue tips”—sharply affected the high-end dining industry starting in 2013, as well as the hotel industry.

Government statistics show that the number of cases of misuse of public funds on

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dining, presents, and travel was initially large in 2013 but has been declining sharply year-on-year through 2017. If this trend is accurate, it suggests that strong enforcement of these rules has succeeded in deterring these behaviors. However, one troubling outcome of the campaign for the CCP is the widely-reported trend of “doing nothing” (不作为), in which cadres slow down their ordinary work to avoid making decisions that could get them in trouble with graft-busters. It remains unclear how much of a problem this is, given that some bureaucratic paralysis has been reported as a result of every PRC anti-corruption campaign from the 1930s campaign in the Jiangxi Soviet onward. Furthermore, with worries that the economy was overheating early in the Xi administration, curbing corruption-fueled and likely wasteful economic activity may in fact be beneficial.

Several reforms that could constrain high-level corruption have not been systematically enforced. The party’s “Rules for Disciplinary Action” (中国共产党纪律处分条例) put restrictions on the business activities of officials’ family members, which is seen as a crucial reform because so much high-level corruption is hidden in this manner. But, as Pei explains, the party’s rules on this and many other proscribed activities remain so “vaguely defined” that they can be easily skirted, even after revisions to the “Rules for Disciplinary Action” in 2015.

It could be argued that enforcement is simply slacking off, but overall anti-corruption investigations have been increasing year-on-year.

Regulations have been similarly weak with regard to the country’s stock market, where corruption is common and China’s rich are getting richer. The CCDI signaled in November 2018 that it was working on new measures to address the problem. Although the campaign proposes to prevent capital flight, tax evasion, and international money laundering, international document leaks like the Panama Papers have revealed how troubled and contradictory these tasks are for China’s leaders. In groundbreaking analysis of leaked documents, the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists found “nearly 22,000 offshore clients with addresses in mainland China and Hong Kong…Among them are some of China’s most powerful men and women — including at least 15 of China’s richest, members of the National People’s Congress and executives from state-owned companies.” Many records pointed to family members of current and past leaders, including Xi’s brother-in-law Deng Jiagui and former premier Wen Jiabao’s son Wen Yunsong. The extent of Xi’s personal corruption is unknown. A leaked U.S. intelligence portrait of Xi from 2009 based on conversations with an informant who knew Xi personally argued that the future leader was “not corrupt and does not care about money,” but has always been power-hungry: “exceptionally ambitious,” “driven,” and “calculating.”

Though the campaign continues to inspire debate in academic and policy circles, most analysts conclude that it has had a real if limited effect on corruption. Manion argues that “the campaign has significantly changed the structure of Party and government incentives so as to


reduce bureaucratic opportunities for corruption and structural obstacles to anticorruption enforcement.”

Economy, while noting problems and contradictions, writes that “by several measures, the anticorruption campaign has been very effective.”

Fang Qiang concludes that Xi in his campaign has “made more significant inroads against corruption than [his] immediate predecessors”—but that a full cleaning would be “an impossible mission.”

Sun Yan and Yuan Baishun see “mixed effects,” with the national-level campaign being more successful than cleanups at local levels.

Wedeman hedges, arguing that Xi has “at best…perhaps brought the problem [of corruption] closer to some sort of ‘controlled’ level.”

The World Bank’s control of corruption indicator shows modest improvement from “-0.51” in 2011 to “-0.27” in 2017 on a scale of -2.5 to 2.5 (the cleanest).

Xi Jinping himself, for what it is worth, has announced that “the struggle against corruption has won an overwhelming victory.”

A minority of appraisals are decidedly more negative. Pei argues that while “corruption is temporarily suppressed” during the campaign, it will bounce back afterwards.

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360 Economy, *The Third Revolution*, p. 32.


363 Andrew Hall Wedeman, “Four Years On: Where is Xi Jinping’s Anti-corruption Drive Headed?” *Asia Dialogue*, 2016/9/19.


inconceivable that the CCP can reform the political and economic institutions of crony capitalism because these are the very foundations of the regime’s monopoly of power.”

Analyzing Chinese firms, John Griffin, Clark Liu, and Tao Shu find that the campaign has failed to change the country’s corporate culture of self-dealing. And Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index records only a miniscule improvement: an increase of only 3 points on a 100-point scale between 2011 and 2018.

In sum, Xi’s anti-corruption campaign has been a Limited Victory but not a Breakthrough success. It earns points in this study’s scoring system for substantial disciplinary action (3 points), enforcement of all three kinds of institutional reforms (3 points), and an overall somewhat positive perception of its achievements among experts (1.5 points). It falls short of a Breakthrough because of its failures in systematic enforcement of reforms that could constrain high-level corruption, despite the numerous arrests of elites. This issue of high-level corruption is a key reason why expert assessments of the campaign were not more positive, which also lost it points. The campaign being a Limited Victory accords with the expectation

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369 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, https://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview

I exclude indices that use measures of democracy as measures of clean government, as they do not account for the possibility of an authoritarian anti-corruption reform that does not make the country more democratic. For example, the Index of Public Integrity measures corruption through indicators like judicial independence and freedom of the press. See: https://integrity-index.org/about/


discussed in the first chapter that full Breakthroughs are unlikely after a regime’s formative early years.

*Explaining Xi’s Limited Victory*

The effectiveness of the current anti-corruption campaign owes a great deal to Xi’s unconstrained leadership—the consolidation of which was made easier by weak oversight from party elders—and his deployment of the authoritarian playbook.

Xi has been instrumental in enforcing, expanding, and sustaining the campaign. Official media highlights Xi’s leadership, Xi’s reforms, and Xi’s instructions for combating corruption. As a professor at a prominent Party School explained in a frank interview: “Naturally, the center has to be powerful for our political system to work.”372 Other experts in China who are supportive of Xi’s anti-corruption efforts deny that they constitute a political campaign comparable to those of the Mao era, but they note that Xi’s leadership of the campaign is a return to CCP “tradition.”373 Outside analysts often refer to “Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign,” which was not common usage for the anti-corruption campaigns under Jiang or Hu. Xi led the norm-breaking prosecution of several “big tigers” since 2013, though he reportedly consulted party elders before starting the first investigation against Zhou.

Taking a more positive view of Mao-era politics than his immediate predecessors, Xi has also been responsible for the campaign’s use of harsh Maoist tactics.374 “Complete with

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372 Author’s interview with a professor at a Party School, February 2019.

373 Author’s interviews with two Chinese corruption control experts, February 2019.

374 For example, his statement that the party’s pre-Reform and Opening experiences should not be negated: [http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2013/1108/c1001-23471419.html](http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2013/1108/c1001-23471419.html); There is some debate to as to how his experiences in the Cultural Revolution shaped Xi’s views on Mao and the Mao era. Andrew J. Nathan, “Who is Xi?” *The New York Review of Books*, 2016/5/12.
discipline inspection teams, self-criticisms, and public denunciations,” Xi’s campaign “displays the unmistakable imprint of earlier Maoist anticorruption campaigns,” Prasenjit Duara and Elizabeth Perry argue.\textsuperscript{375} Though this trend has alarmed many Chinese, including some party members, it is part of Xi’s return to “seemingly anachronistic tools” of governance.\textsuperscript{376} While few believe that Xi can become a second Mao, his power consolidation, party-first agenda, ideological and anti-Western rhetoric, and wide-ranging crackdown on dissent are all reminiscent of Mao.\textsuperscript{377} One interviewee old enough to remember the Cultural Revolution told me that “older Chinese are more scared of Xi” than younger Chinese who do not remember.\textsuperscript{378}

Backed by a powerful state apparatus, Xi has used an authoritarian playbook reliant on power centralization, disruption of existing institutions, tightened top-down control, and regime propaganda.\textsuperscript{379} Fu Hualing explains that Xi and Wang Qishan “significantly reinforce[d] central control over regions within the Party structure…by transferring corruption investigation powers from provinces, ministries and SOEs to the Party’s Central Committee for Disciplinary Inspection (CCDI).”\textsuperscript{380} Xi’s campaign bypasses governmental and legal organs that theoretically

\textsuperscript{375} Prasenjit Duara and Elizabeth J. Perry, Eds., Beyond Regimes: China and India Compared (Harvard University Asia Center, 2018), p. 24.


\textsuperscript{378} Author’s interview, February 2019.

\textsuperscript{379} The authoritarian playbook is a broad term intended to have cross-national applicability, meaning that it covers variation in policy styles. For example, the authoritarian playbook may or may not involve mass mobilization. The CCP’s anti-corruption efforts are shaped by its own “guerrilla policy style,” which is not shared by most other authoritarian regimes. See: Sebastian Heilmann and Elizabeth J. Perry, Eds., Mao’s Invisible Hand: The Political Foundations of Adaptive Governance in China (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Asia Center, 2011).

\textsuperscript{380} Fu, “Wielding the Sword: President Xi’s New Anti-Corruption Campaign,” p. 142.
should be central to anti-corruption work, like the judiciary, by working primarily through party disciplinary authorities. The new NSC has absorbed the anti-corruption functions of two governmental (meaning non-party) agencies: the State Council Ministry of Supervision and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate. Discipline inspection committees under the NSC can “annex 1/5 of the agents and staff of the procuratorates nationwide,” Li Ling writes. “An inter-institutional personnel transfer of this scale is unprecedented in the recent history of the People’s Republic of China.” The law governing the NSC, the Supervision Law, does not put the NSC within China's legal system, but rather makes it “ultimately accountable only to the CCP.”

As part of the authoritarian playbook, top-down enforcement has been strengthened to allow the campaign to pierce local protectionism. The party has taken several measures to enhance the CCDI’s control over provincial and lower level discipline inspection committees, such as advancing the “dual leadership system.” Ad hoc inspections are also a way to get around obstructionist bureaucracies and local governments. The obstruction-evading power of anti-corruption investigators is reflected in the use of the term “paratroopers,” meaning investigators who are “dropped” from the central government into lower-level party or government units to fight corruption. Local governments have been shaken by the campaign’s

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intrusiveness, with “paralysis” and “fear” being common symptoms.\textsuperscript{387} At the individual level, while enforcement has been far less violent than in some previous campaigns and torture is theoretically banned, reports have come out detailing coerced confessions, torture, and suicides by officials suspected of corruption.\textsuperscript{388} The campaign has taught the world the Chinese abbreviation \textit{shuanggui}, which is a disciplinary procedure in which suspects are held indefinitely, incommunicado, and without the presumption of innocence. As one former CCDI member explained in an interview: “Sometimes there’s no other way. I used [\textit{shuanggui}] sparingly because it was extralegal…history may judge us for it.”\textsuperscript{389} While the recently passed National Supervision Law appears to do away with the practice, it in effect means that \textit{shuanggui} has been normalized and even strengthened.\textsuperscript{390}

Regime propaganda has played an important role in building the party’s narrative about the campaign and drumming up support for it. A flood of official media coverage of the campaign has sought to instill several messages: that anti-corruption efforts must be led by the party, that corruption is a personal moral failing rather than a result of perverse structural incentives, and that resisting the party’s campaign is futile. The propaganda department helped create a television miniseries called \textit{Always On The Road} (永远在路上) (2016) that trumpeted the party’s anti-corruption successes and aired emotional confessions by officials under arrest.\textsuperscript{391}

\textsuperscript{387} Ahlers and Stepan, “Top-level design and local-level paralysis: Local politics in times of political centralization.”

\textsuperscript{388} “China: Secretive Detention System Mars Anti-Corruption Campaign,” Human Rights Watch, 2016/12/6, \url{https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/12/06/china-secretive-detention-system-mars-anti-corruption-campaign}

\textsuperscript{389} Author’s interview with a former CCDI member, February 2019.

\textsuperscript{390} Author’s interviews with several scholars in Beijing, February 2019.

To drive home the idea that corruption is wrong and corrupt officials are bad people, sentencing documents often include “lurid details” about mistresses and extravagant spending.\textsuperscript{392} In addition, Xi has revived the party tradition of “democratic life meetings,” which are criticism and self-criticism sessions used to create psychological pressure to confess crimes and report others.

Xi’s administration has moved away from any possibility of a more democratic approach to corruption control. Citizen activists with the New Citizens Movement, which has campaigned for governmental transparency on officials’ assets, have been detained and harassed.\textsuperscript{393} Chinese journalists report a closing space to cover corruption, saying that the government is reporting less information on cases, defense lawyers are more wary of talking to independent journalists, and independent journalists are more careful about what they write.\textsuperscript{394} One independent journalist I interviewed said that they had solid leads on corruption by more than one Central Committee member, but were not allowed by their superiors to investigate further.\textsuperscript{395} One corruption control expert argued that the regime has “made anti-corruption more convenient” for itself by undermining its own legal procedures with suspects. In the Hu era, high-profile defendants would appeal their cases—now they tearfully confess their crimes for documentaries used in party propaganda.\textsuperscript{396}

8. Conclusions

\textsuperscript{392} “Visualizing China’s Anti-Corruption Campaign.”


\textsuperscript{394} Author’s interview with three Chinese journalists, February 2019.

\textsuperscript{395} Author’s interview with an independent (private media) Chinese journalist, February 2019.

\textsuperscript{396} Author’s interview with a Chinese anti-corruption expert in Beijing, February 2019.
Having applied this study’s theoretical framework to the Chinese Communist Party’s major anti-corruption efforts, I submit two takeaways about Chinese corruption control.

While many argue that China needs to take a more democratic approach to corruption control and/or that political liberalization in the 1990s and 2000s was promising in this regard, I find that it actually took greater authoritarianism to curb corruption under Xi. 397 Nor was this a fluke—Xi’s campaign is effective for some of the same reasons and with some of the same tools as the Three Antis–Five Antis. Even the CCP’s many Failed Reforms between these two successes made some contributions, punishing wrongdoing and perhaps keeping corruption lower than it otherwise might have been. This is not to say that a democratic approach taken by some future democratic China would not be more consistently successful. Modern democracies with high state capacity and high wealth per capita virtually all have low levels of corruption. Exceptions, like Japan under the 1955 system, seem to be democracies with prolonged dominance by one political party. As Christian Göbel argues and I discuss further in Chapter Six, the alternation of power between political parties is often the trigger for anti-corruption reforms after democratization. Speculatively, then, we can say that if a democratic China continued to get richer, retained high state capacity, and managed at least one handover of political power, it would be in a strong position to reduce corruption.

In addition, this chapter’s analysis complicates the commonly proposed dichotomy between a relatively clean Mao era and a rampantly corrupt post-Mao era. 398 This dichotomy can


lead to the misimpression that ideological zeal or perhaps poverty will keep corruption low. But when corruption rose in rural areas in the early 1960s, Mao’s ideological zeal actually hindered implementation of the Four Cleans. Ideological zeal was at its height in the Cultural Revolution, but failed to prevent the embezzlement and looting that took place during its turbulent early years. While a country’s poverty assures that corruption will be small in objective terms, the illicit sums involved may not be so small as a percentage of state expenditures or as a percentage of officials involved. Moreover, Xi’s effective anti-corruption campaign links back to early PRC successes, bridging the divide.
Chapter Five

Around the Authoritarian World

1. Introduction

This chapter examines authoritarian anti-corruption efforts and rhetoric in 14 regimes not discussed in Chapters Two, Three, and Four, with a focus on Cuba, Singapore, Vietnam, Malaysia, and North Korea. It shows that neither anti-corruption efforts nor successes in nondemocracies are limited to East Asia. I find that these cases provide preliminary evidence for the global applicability of the theoretical framework laid out in previous chapters, including the importance of unconstrained leadership, state capacity, and revolutionary or developmental goals. Additionally, my argument that quasi-democratic institutions will not help authoritarian regimes curb corruption is bolstered by the scarcity of positive examples around the world. The analysis in this wide-ranging chapter is primarily based on secondary sources and interviews with scholars who have expertise in specific countries, though primary-source research was necessary to elucidate little-known North Korean anti-corruption efforts.

I focus on corruption control in these five regimes because each sheds light on a different aspect of the relationship between authoritarianism and corruption, sometimes confirming and sometimes complicating the proposed theoretical framework. In revolutionary Cuba, Fidel Castro’s early successes align with the theory’s expectations, but the failure of reforms in the Rectification Process in the late 1980s does not. Singapore’s much-cited success story under the People’s Action Party (PAP) conforms to theoretical expectations in some ways, but also raises a challenge to the proposed dichotomy of democratic and authoritarian approaches to corruption control. The Vietnamese Communist Party leadership’s reform efforts in recent decades have
often been blocked by conservative elites, suggesting that consensus-based collective leadership can hold back much-needed anti-corruption reform. In Malaysia, corruption grew unchecked and eventually contributed to the fall of the long-ruling United Malays National Organisation, despite the regime being seen as a model of authoritarian durability with quasi-democratic institutions. North Korea today seems to be the stereotypical authoritarian regime that does not care about corruption control, but this has not always been the case. Anti-corruption campaigns in the 1950s under revolutionary leader Kim Il-sung have largely been overlooked.

**Table 5.1:**

**Authoritarian Anti-Corruption Efforts Beyond East Asia**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regime and Dates</th>
<th>Strong Motivation?</th>
<th>Unconstrained Leadership?</th>
<th>High State Capacity?</th>
<th>Anti-Corruption Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Philippines 1975</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Failed Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico 1976–77</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓ ²</td>
<td>Failed Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran (Pahlavi) 1977–79</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Failed Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico 1982–83</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Failed Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR 1982–84</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Failed Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba 1986–89</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Failed Reform³</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

³ Red indicates that the case’s outcome does not conform to my basic theoretical expectations.

¹ North Korean anti-corruption efforts, which were not discussed in previous chapters, are included here as well.

Table 5.1 Continued: Authoritarian Anti-Corruption Efforts Beyond East Asia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Status 1</th>
<th>Status 2</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>1986–89</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Failed Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>1997–2004</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Failed Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>1998–2001</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Failed Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>2004–?</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Failed Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>2005–2009</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Failed Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Failed Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>1955–58</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Unclear, limited information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>1959–66</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Breakthrough</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>1960–66?</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Breakthrough</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>1999–?</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Breakthrough</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This chapter is divided into six substantive sections: five sections which each cover one of the five main regimes and one section that surveys anti-corruption activity—both efforts and Empty Gestures—in other countries.

2. Revolutionary Cuba

Table 5.2:

<p>| Major Anti-Corruption Efforts in Cuba |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name and Dates</th>
<th>Strong Motivation?</th>
<th>Unconstrained Leadership?</th>
<th>High State Capacity?</th>
<th>Anti-Corruption Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Purification” 1959–66</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Breakthrough</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rectification Process 1986–89</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Failed Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Campaign Against Privilege” 2004–?</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Failed Reform</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One of the early achievements of Fidel Castro’s revolutionary regime in Cuba was curbing the country’s infamous corruption. Scholars consistently describe former president Fulgencio Batista’s regime and other preceding governments as deeply corrupt, and say that this was a key reason for Batista’s delegitimization and eventual fall.\(^4\) Castro promised to “purify” the country—a goal many Cubans supported him in hopes of achieving.\(^5\) The revolution had “a strong puritanical streak,” with action “against gambling, immorality, corruption.”\(^6\) Law 732, passed in February 1960, imposed harsh penalties for public graft, and, by categorizing graft as


counterrevolutionary crime, put offenders at the mercy of revolutionary courts. On the issue of corruption, at least for a time, Castro delivered. As Hugh Thomas wrote in 1971:

“The majority, too, believed that for the first time the government, if intolerant, was at least not corrupt...the break from corrupt officials, corrupt judiciary, corrupt politicians, corrupt unionists and corrupt men of business was, in the minds of the majority, a stark, extraordinary, maybe baffling but wonderful contrast. The sleazy world of prostitution, police protection rackets and clip joints had also almost vanished.”

Jorge Domínguez similarly concludes that the revolutionary regime “has already punished miscreants even in high positions. The evidence of outright corruption is fairly rare, certainly rarer than in prerevolutionary Cuba.” Conduct by public officials was much improved, and “corruption is not a serious problem.” The revolutionary government “can claim to have eradicated that [high-level corruption] which it found, not fallen into the patterns of corruption found in Eastern Europe’s socialist states, and vitally, not allow any hint of impunity on the issue.” “Even its bitterest critics have not accused it of the most glaring defect of previous regimes: a scandalously pervasive dishonesty in all branches of government.”

This achievement did not land all at once. Governance was evolving in the early 1960s as revolutionary organizations merged in 1962 and formed the Communist Party of Cuba only in 1965. Then, in 1966, the firing and imprisonment on corruption charges of Efígenio Ameijeiras,

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8 Author’s interview with several scholars of Cuba, fall 2018.
11 Domínguez, Cuba: Order and Revolution, p. 233.
a hero of the revolution and member of the party’s central committee, led to dozens of other
arrests and a “far-reaching ‘cleansing’ of the revolutionary government and party.” Armando
Acosta, long-time “Communist boss of Oriente [Province],” was among those purged.

Castro’s willingness to follow through on his promises to curb corruption followed from
his radical state-building goals. “Fidel Castro has also long believed that he has a historic
mission.” His commitments to anti-colonialism and communism demanded a remaking of
Cuban politics, economics, and society—goals which made anti-corruption reforms a necessity.
The new regime needed to curb the debilitating corruption of the Batista regime to break with the
pattern of pre-revolutionary Cuba and to build a new Cuba. Ideology aside, the economic and
military challenges posed by the United States in the early 1960s, including a trade embargo, the
Bay of Pigs invasion, and several assassination attempts, were reason enough to pursue defensive
state-building.

Fidel Castro had unconstrained leadership in pushing for reforms and a disciplined state
apparatus. His personal power derived from his tremendous authority in the regime and within
society. The revolution, Domínguez argues, “has rested much of its legitimacy on the
routinization of Fidel Castro’s charisma.” As one early supporter put it: “Fidel’s popularity

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p. 227.
17 There is some debate, however, as to when exactly Castro became a communist. NYT, 1986/10/19,
Especially in the early years of the regime, Castro intervened personally in numerous matters of governance and enforced ideological homogeneity in the country. Revolutionary struggle and post-revolutionary consolidation produced a “powerful and cohesive” ruling party, though more slowly than in other cases judging by scholarly assessments of the Communist Party of Cuba’s consolidation process. Unfortunately, much remains unknown in the literature about how specific reforms took place in the early revolutionary period.

As in almost all other authoritarian cases, anti-corruption success in Cuba eroded over time. “Post-1975 changes,” including a new acceptance of “limited consumerism,” “partial decentralization,” and the opening of the party, “had all fused to create unprecedented opportunities for patronage, privilege, and small-scale corruption.” Antoni Kapcia argues that “while this was hardly corruption on, say, the Mexican scale under the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional Revolutionary Party) after 1976, it nonetheless had clear implications.” The old, pre-revolutionary corruption was mostly gone, but new forms of corruption emerged. “Corruption in revolutionary Cuba primarily, but not exclusively, takes the form of using power to obtain access to other things; it does not often involve money…power itself became the currency of corruption.”

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23 Kapcia, Leadership in the Cuban Revolution, pp. 144, 145.

moral rectitude, the revolutionary government “could not afford to allow” a return to the bad old
days, meaning that “corruption once again became an emblematic issue, as powerful as the
related ‘bureaucratism’ had been in the 1960s.”

The related trends of liberalization and rising corruption eventually provoked a backlash
in the form of the Rectification Process: a conservative reform spearheaded by Castro starting in
1986 to bring illicit economic activity, including corruption, back under control. The
Rectification, with echoes of “radicalism of the late 1960s,” was against bureaucratism,
profiteering, inefficiency, market incentives, the Soviet Union’s economic model, and other
“errors and negative tendencies.” Castro “railed against mid-level corruption, misuse of
government property, and [the] inefficiency of government officials in preventing illicit
enrichment.” A new emphasis on “socialist legality…suggests the regime is still trying to
recover from…recent instances of corruption.” The Rectification is reminiscent of Mao
Zedong’s counter-reforms in China against the grassroots growth of markets and low-level cadre
corruption in the early 1960s. Like Mao, Castro sought to recover the revolution’s original spirit
and shore up his own personal authority in the process. 

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25 Kapcia, Leadership in the Cuban Revolution, p. 145.
26 Eckstein, Back from the Future, pp. 60–70.
government re-monopolization of the economy were other major hallmarks of rectification.”\(^{31}\) At the same time, to avoid bureaucracy, the Cuban regime re-introduced “micro-brigades:” “workers temporarily released from their work centers and people who were not otherwise employed.”\(^{32}\) These brigades “had fallen out of use…[but] by the end of 1987, Havana was expected to have about 30,000 micro-brigade members, who would address, among other things, the deteriorating housing situation in that city.”\(^{33}\)

The Rectification Process was unsuccessful in both corruption control and economic retrenchment, despite Castro’s unconstrained leadership and strong state capacity. The Rectification seemingly failed because of the drop-off in Soviet aid, which triggered an economic crisis. Early Rectification measures did rein in the “market opening” of past years by curbing private enterprise and closing farmers’ markets, and “notoriously corrupt” private housing construction.\(^{34}\) The summer of 1989 saw “widespread dismissals” for corruption in “agencies dealing with tourism and foreign trade,” the arrest of “several senior military and security officials for drug smuggling, and the execution of four officers, including Cuba’s legendary Division General Arnaldo Ochoa.”\(^{35}\) Cuban leaders “envisioned that rectification would go on for many years. In 1989, however…Cuba’s effort was dramatically intruded upon

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by the beginning of the collapse of Soviet-bloc Communism.”36 The decline in the Soviet Union’s critical economic support, which accelerated as the regime weakened, began “in the first nine months of 1987.”37 Without plentiful Soviet assistance, the Cuban government did not have the luxury of a Rectification, and so it loosened economic controls to survive.38 Both the economic crisis and the state’s “timid” and “piecemeal” responses in the early 1990s “produced new opportunities for corruption.”39 “Such was the depth and breadth of the crisis termed the Special Period” that widespread low-level corruption came “back to Cuba as a generalized phenomenon.”40 Ultimately, the blow that was communism’s collapse in Europe pushed corruption control off the agenda until the economy began growing again.

Fidel Castro passed leadership of the regime to his younger brother Raúl Castro in the early 2000s, but the latter did not inherit Fidel Castro’s tremendous authority and unconstrained leadership. “Fidel Castro's charismatic authority was replaced by a collegial arrangement.”41 The transition from Fidel to Raúl Castro was one of “depersonalization,” with party and government organizations becoming more important in decision-making.42 Raúl Castro “trusts and relies on established institutions in a way Fidel never did.”43 Additionally, Raúl Castro’s leadership was

38 Diaz-Briquets and Pérez-López, Corruption in Cuba, p. 93.
40 Klepak, Raúl Castro and Cuba, p. 69.
43 Brenner et al., A Contemporary Cuba Reader, p. 35.

The next period of major anti-corruption efforts began in 2004 under Raúl Castro, then Vice President and Defense Minister. The younger Castro created the National Commission to Fight Corruption and Illegalities and attacked “socialist entrepreneurs,” meaning officials who abuse socialism for personal gain.\footnote{45 Diaz-Briquets and Pérez-López, Corruption in Cuba, pp. 169, 241.} He “organized literally thousands of courses on corruption, how to fight it, how to search it out and report it, and the like.”\footnote{46 Klepak, Raúl Castro and Cuba, p. 71.} And he attacked the “corruption-laden tourism industry” in particular, saying it was like “a tree born twisted that must be uprooted and planted anew.” Harsh new rules banned industry workers from receiving gifts and tips, and generally the party moved to reduce businesses’ organizational autonomy and “scrap executive perks such as expense accounts.”\footnote{47 Diaz-Briquets and Pérez-López, Corruption in Cuba, p. 18.; Frank, “Anti-corruption drive signals change in Cuba.”} In 2005, “several leaders of the Union of Communist Youth were dismissed” for corruption.\footnote{48 Diaz-Briquets and Pérez-López, Corruption in Cuba, p. 143.} More measures were put in place after Raúl Castro became president in 2008 (he had been acting president since 2006). In 2008, civil servant salaries were raised in an effort to reduce incentives for bribe-taking. In 2009, the government established the Office of the Comptroller, again with corruption control in mind.\footnote{49 William M. LeoGrande, “After Fidel: The Communist Party of Cuba on the Brink of Generational Change” in Brenner et al., A Contemporary Cuba Reader, p. 67.} “Dozens of arrests and ministerial dismissals followed (the latter usually for a failure to act against
corruption, such as the formerly high-flying minister of basic industry, Yádira García, dismissed in 2010."

Now that Raúl Castro has retired, however, a look back at his anti-corruption efforts reveals little success. "Although sentences for yielding to this temptation are severe indeed, the leadership has not been able to stamp out the phenomenon by any means;” effects subsided “as soon as the pressure and the campaigning subsided.” Official Cuban media continues to openly discuss the troubling extent of corruption and how the problem potentially threatens national security and the legitimacy of the state. The new president, Miguel Diaz-Canel, frequently discusses the need for new measures to address it.

3. The Curious Case of Singapore

Table 5.3:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name and Dates</th>
<th>Strong Motivation?</th>
<th>Unconstrained Leadership?</th>
<th>High State Capacity?</th>
<th>Anti-Corruption Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Preventing Corrupt Practices” 1960–66?</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Breakthrough</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


52 Brenner et al., A Contemporary Cuba Reader, pp. 81, 210.

Singapore is a rare case of widely-acknowledged, long-term anti-corruption success under authoritarianism. The People’s Action Party, led by Lee Kuan Yew (LKY), came to power on an anti-corruption platform in 1959. Many forms of government corruption were rife in Singapore in the 1950s, with profiteering and bribery being particularly common.\(^{54}\) Since corruption was “one of the biggest issues” at the time, the public was pleased that “incorruptibility was the pivotal value which the PAP brought to governance.”\(^{55}\) Once in power, it launched numerous reforms that effectively curbed corruption throughout the government.\(^{56}\) Not only that, but the government actually continued enforcement in later decades. By the mid-1970s, Singapore had established the “enviable” reputation for cleanliness it still enjoys today, with “instances of corruption involving a large number of officers…nearly eliminated.”\(^{57}\) It has “an honest and efficient government with officials who rank high by world standards in terms of quality, efficiency, and effectiveness.”\(^{58}\)

In the case of Lee Kuan Yew, unlike for most autocrats, scholars and commentators have little difficulty believing that his anti-corruption efforts were sincere and motivated by an ambitious vision of what kind of future Singapore should have. LKY is often cited as an example

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of the rare “enlightened” autocrat, and his smarts and incorruptibility in particular have been the subject of praise from many diplomats and politicians who knew him.\(^{59}\) LKY opposed both communism and Western liberal democracy, advocating instead authoritarian developmentalism and a “well-ordered” society with a foundation of Confucianism or “Asian values.”\(^{60}\) These commitments explain why curbing corruption was so important. LKY wrote in his memoirs that in 1959: “We were sickened by the greed, corruption, and decadence of many Asian leaders… We were swept up by the wave of revolution in Asia… We had a deep sense of mission to establish a clean and effective government.”\(^{61}\) Another perspective would be that any Singaporean leader would have had good reason to curb corruption because of how heavily the city-state’s economy relies on being an international entrepôt; corruption would be very damaging if it drove foreign businesses away from the port.

The 1960 Prevention of Corruption Act (PCA) provided the framework for anti-corruption efforts. Replacing weak laws from the colonial period, the PCA was more comprehensive in defining and listing corrupt acts, imposed harsher penalties for those convicted, and, crucially, strengthened the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB).\(^{62}\) The CPIB had been set up in 1952 but was understaffed and only focused on certain kinds of corruption cases.\(^{63}\) The PCA built up the CPIB and granted it wide latitude to conduct


\(^{60}\) This term is widely associated with LKY. Fareed Zakaria, “A Culture is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew,” *Foreign Affairs* 109 (1994).


\(^{63}\) Oral History Interview with Richard Middleton-Smith (the first chief of the CPIB), National Archives of Singapore, 1999/9/27, Reel 4 of 5.
investigations, arrest suspects, and conduct searches. The CPIB’s director and “senior officers” have the authority to investigate any bank account and look at any government records on a suspect. The PCA and the CPIB only grew stronger in later years as they were reformed to stay current, and impressed observers with their strict and impartial enforcement.

The PAP was aided in reforms by the highly capable Singaporean state. State capacity was partly a legacy of British rule and partly a result of the PAP’s own organizational strength and unity, which in turn grew out of a period of complex revolutionary struggle. Also, Singapore’s small size as a country made it easier to achieve a comparable level of state capacity. Britain established a well-organized, capable bureaucracy and meritocratic institutions that are often cited as factors in Singapore’s later successes, including against corruption. The PAP was formed in late 1954 as a “radical and anti-colonial coalition of democratic socialists and left-wing communist forces,” with the moderate faction being represented by LKY and his associates. But through years of infighting and a dramatic 1961 party split, LKY and the moderate faction came to dominate, suppressing the Communists and

64 Quah, *Curbing Corruption in Asia*, p. 116.
70 Chan, “The PAP and the Structuring of the Political System,” p. 71.
socialists. Relatedly, the PAP dealt with race riots between Chinese and Malays and oversaw Singapore’s secession from Malaysia in 1965. These early years “already reflected tendencies towards centralization of power and bureaucratization. Draconian measures developed initially to deal with the communists were institutionalized as features of the new political structure.”  

In this tumultuous period, the PAP began “to exhibit the politically stabilizing effects of elite collective action that we associate with durable party dominance.”  

Lee Kuan Yew had unconstrained leadership through at least the mid-1980s. LKY was “virtually synonymous with the city-state he has largely created.” He won great legitimacy as the leader who defeated the Communists, guided the nation through fraught negotiations with Malaysia, and delivered true Singaporean independence in 1965. As a result, he “so dominates Singapore politics that his personal style sets the tone for the government.” His personal example of incorruptibility, for instance, reportedly had an impact on those working under him. Robert Rotberg includes LKY in the list of those leaders who with “unquestioned power…can change prevailing political cultures by fiat.”  

This claim that LKY had unconstrained leadership may seem to be at odds with Singapore having quasi-democratic institutions, but through the 1980s the regime was not nearly  

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71 Chan, “The PAP and the Structuring of the Political System,” p. 78.  
74 Vogel, “A Little Dragon Tamed,” p. 1051.  
75 Vogel, “A Little Dragon Tamed,” p. 1053.  
76 Quah, Curbing Corruption in Asian Countries, p. 216.  
as democratic as it is sometimes portrayed. Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way score it as “fully authoritarian because restrictions on speech and association made it nearly impossible for opposition groups to operate publicly and because legal controls and other institutional obstacles prevented opposition parties from contesting most seats in parliament.” Larry Diamond likewise writes that it does not qualify as a competitive authoritarian regime because “elections are largely an authoritarian façade, the ruling or dominant party wins almost all the seats…repeatedly over 95 percent.”

The regime became more authoritarian with Operation Coldstone, a security crackdown in February 1963 that saw the arrest of more than 100 opposition figures and leftists. The party and LKY in particular became so dominant that elections did not threaten his hold on power at all, and checks and balances existed but were among political bodies under him. Though Singapore was not a one-party state, the PAP monopolized power; from 1968 to 1984, it held every seat in the national parliament. “Lee was so disturbed by the decline [in the 1984 elections] that after the election he even suggested that the one-man-one-vote system may not be appropriate for Singapore.”

Is Singapore a case of an authoritarian regime that succeeded in curbing corruption by mimicking the democratic approach with its quasi-democratic institutions? Scholars have argued

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that Singapore’s success in reducing corruption is due to various factors: the country’s small size, an unusually dedicated autocratic leadership with strong political will, particularly draconian anti-corruption enforcement, and British colonial legacies such as a separation of powers and a well-trained bureaucracy.83 There are many factors here, but the key question is how much weight to give the regime’s formally democratic institutions: its relatively strong judicial independence, rule of law, separation of power, etc.

Judged against the four indicators of the democratic approach and the authoritarian playbook discussed in Chapter One (see Table 1.1), the Singaporean case does not fit clearly into either camp. On the question of power centralization versus decentralization, Singapore should be seen as the former, suggesting an authoritarian playbook. Singapore’s anti-corruption agency was often hailed as “independent,” but it was only so from outside influence; as prime minister, LKY had direct control over it.84 The CPIB “owes it success to being at the heart of political power, not to distancing itself from it.”85 The “separation of power,” Ezra Vogel writes, was not “the pillar of good government” in Singapore.86 On the second indicator, the question of strengthening laws and norms versus disrupting them, Singapore is more in line with the democratic approach. LKY did not use his discretionary authority to aggressively disrupt and remake major party and state organizations. Mostly, corruption control proceeded through normal, often pre-existing institutional channels, like those in the judicial system. The third indicator, about public engagement versus top-down control, points to the PAP using an

85 Painter, “Myths of Political Independence,” p. 278.
86 Vogel, “A Little Dragon Tamed,” p. 1053.
authoritarian playbook. Corruption was curbed through persistent and draconian enforcement of discipline by an integrity system accountable only to the top leadership.\textsuperscript{87} To defeat corruption, the Lee administration borrowed “campaign-style mobilization” tactics from Malaysian Communists, bullied and tailed officials without warrants, limited the legal rights of defendants, punished civil servants more severely than private citizens, and often acted with the presumption of guilt rather than innocence.\textsuperscript{88} “Corrupt officials, particularly high-ranking ones, are dealt with in Singapore with a severity rarely seen elsewhere.”\textsuperscript{89} Besides sticks, there were also carrots—like pay raises for bureaucrats—but these were top-down initiatives as well.\textsuperscript{90} The fourth indicator asks whether the regime allows transparency and governmental openness to outside investigations or promotes its anti-corruption efforts through a controlled propaganda narrative. Here, Singapore is closer to the democratic approach, although it somewhat paradoxically combines high governmental transparency with low press freedom. In sum, though quasi-democratic institutions were not responsible for curbing corruption in Singapore, neither did LKY rely fully on an authoritarian playbook.

I submit that perhaps LKY did not need to go so far as a fully authoritarian playbook to reduce corruption. While corruption was rampant when the PAP came into power in 1959, this was overwhelmingly at lower levels, whereas the upper ranks of the bureaucracy were already


\textsuperscript{89} Quoted in Quah, “Learning from Singapore’s Effective Anti-Corruption Strategy,” p. 21.

\textsuperscript{90} Quah, \textit{Curbing Corruption in Asia},” p. 110.
“almost totally free of corruption” and high quality.\textsuperscript{91} So despite the scale of corruption, the necessary changes to the already strong British institutions inherited by the PAP were relatively small, requiring mostly political will from the top to be carried out. This may help explain why simple fixes like raising bureaucrats’ salaries worked in Singapore but have been ineffective in other countries.\textsuperscript{92} Many autocrats abolish or undermine inherited institutions that could give the opposition channels to challenge them, but LKY and the PAP were so politically dominant in the early decades of their rule that these British holdovers did not pose a serious threat.

4. Blocked Reform in Vietnam

Table 5.4:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Anti-Corruption Activity Under the VCP</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Name and Dates</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign to Purify Party Organization and State Bureaucracies 1986–89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regeneration Drive 1998–2001</td>
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<tr>
<td>“Trong’s Cleanup” 2017–</td>
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Government corruption has been a thorny problem for the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) at least since national reunification in 1975, especially after the pro-market reforms

\textsuperscript{91} Mauzy and Milne, *Singapore Politics under the People’s Action Party*, p. 27.

known as Doi Moi (Renovation) began in 1986. As a consensus gradually emerged among party leaders that bureaucratic profiteering was detrimental to economic reforms and challenged party legitimacy. As the CIA assessed in 1986, Vietnam suffered from a “bloated and inefficient government bureaucracy. Widespread corruption and criminal behavior.” Anti-corruption efforts launched by General Secretary Nguyen Van Linh in the late 1980s and General Secretary Le Kha Phieu in the late 1990s both sought to restore discipline and effectiveness in the party and state—party/state-building—but faltered in the face of resistance from regime elites, resulting in Failed Reforms. This was despite the revolutionary legitimacy and proven state capacity that the regime had at its disposal, the damage caused by corruption notwithstanding.

As the new VCP general secretary in 1986, Linh launched efforts to rectify a regime that was increasingly “ossified, unyielding, corrupt, and uncompromising.” Widespread criticism of the party and its policies emerged in the local congresses of the party organization in 1986. In 1987, Linh launched the “Campaign to Purify Party Organization and State Bureaucracies.”

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98 Thayer, Political Developments in Vietnam, p. 6.
He carried out a membership review of the party and purged corrupt and ineffective cadres; the results were soon portrayed in the state-run media as “surgical success of the campaign to eliminate…members who had cluttered the party’s membership rolls.”99 The party rectification disciplined 127,800 members and expelled 78,200 from the ranks, though corruption was just one of several reasons for expulsion.100

Unable to rely on the party to cleanse itself, Linh sought outside help. He took steps in 1987 to “liberalize the press and empower intellectuals” so that they would expose corruption and rally the public to his cause of governmental rejuvenation.101 He hoped public pressure would help him “pressure and cajole the bureaucracy” and “party and state officials who were blocking his reforms.”102 Some scholars have characterized this opening as part of a Vietnamese glasnost Linh led after 1986.103 “His own version of glasnost has featured a vigorous attack on inefficient and corrupt party and government cadres.”104 In 1987, in a major newspaper editorial entitled “Things Which Must Be Done Immediately,” Linh “railed against corruption” and other ills.105 Another way in which Linh tried to rally support was by allowing the newly-organized Club of Former Resistance Fighters (CFRF)—a kind of “loyal opposition within the party”—to push for anti-corruption measures and other major governance reforms. Though it never

99 Stern, Renovating the Vietnamese Communist Party, pp. 19, 29.
100 Thayer, Political Developments in Vietnam, p. 7.
102 Abuza, Renovating Politics in Contemporary Vietnam, p. 77.
advocated multiparty democracy, the CFRF was a uniquely well-organized interest group in the VCP that “launched virulent attacks” on the party’s policy failures.\textsuperscript{106} As a former Vietcong guerrilla who “directed the 1968 Tet offensive,” Linh naturally claimed to be trying to loyally improve the party and therefore governance of the country.\textsuperscript{107}

Linh’s personal power was constrained by the VCP’s tradition of collective leadership, which is unusual in communist regimes.\textsuperscript{108} “Because of pressure from conservatives and the bureaucracy, Linh [had] trouble implementing the reform program.”\textsuperscript{109} He “could not push beyond the conservative majority and his own faith and political beliefs.”\textsuperscript{110} Linh lacked the authority of his predecessor Le Duan, who had been the top decision-maker in the party since the 1960s, when revolutionary leader Ho Chi Minh had suffered from health problems. Additionally, the entrenched “bureaucracy, which gained its power and privileged position in society by controlling the distribution of money and resources” was not eager to implement Linh’s liberalizing anti-corruption reforms.\textsuperscript{111} Party elites “re-imposed party controls” on the press that had been allowed to criticize corruption relatively freely in 1989, sapping the campaign of its


\textsuperscript{108} The general secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party is commonly regarded as holding the most powerful position in the regime, followed by the prime minister and then the president. However, the general secretary is at most the primus inter pares within the Politburo, which is the organ of collective rule.


\textsuperscript{110} Stern, \textit{Renovating the Vietnamese Communist Party}, p. 179.

\textsuperscript{111} Abuza, \textit{Renovating Politics in Contemporary Vietnam}, p. 17.
momentum.\textsuperscript{112} Sporadic attempts to fight corruption continued in the early 1990s, but without leadership.\textsuperscript{113}

A decade later, General Secretary Le Kha Phieu led a new round of efforts aimed at party rejuvenation, including corruption control. The public was demanding action, with corruption being the most common cause of protest in the late 1990s.\textsuperscript{114} Phieu “seem[ed] genuinely concerned” about the problem, argues Zachary Abuza.\textsuperscript{115} Phieu personally had “a very clean image. He was never publicly identified with graft and by all accounts he lived a modest lifestyle. Unlike most leaders, there were also no corruption scandals or nepotism allegations involving his family.”\textsuperscript{116} “Phieu launched a two-year ‘regeneration drive’ of criticism and self-criticism in May 1999 to restore the party’s soiled image,” expelling hundreds of party members and disciplining thousands more for graft and other economic crimes.\textsuperscript{117} A deputy prime minister and two provincial party chiefs were fired, but most high-level officials were safe.\textsuperscript{118} In February 1999, the VCP Central Committee “voted to enhance the authority of internal inspection and discipline committees, as well as the authority of law enforcement agencies, elected bodies, and the media over party members.”\textsuperscript{119}

\textsuperscript{112} Thayer, \textit{Political Developments in Vietnam}, p. 7.

\textsuperscript{113} Lee, “Corruption & Anti-corruption in Doi-moi Era Vietnam,” p. 130.


\textsuperscript{115} Abuza, \textit{Renovating Politics in Contemporary Vietnam}, p. 32.


\textsuperscript{117} Abuza, \textit{Renovating Politics in Contemporary Vietnam}, p. 222.


\textsuperscript{119} Abuza, \textit{Renovating Politics in Contemporary Vietnam}, p. 223.
Despite these measures and the concerns of many in the party that corruption was damaging, Phieu lacked the authority to enforce or follow through on reforms that went against the private interests of party elites. Phieu had been selected as leader as a “compromise candidate;” he was “constrained” from bold actions and needed to seek balance among elite interests.\footnote{David W. P. Elliott, Changing Worlds: Vietnam’s Transition from Cold War to Globalization (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 180.} It is unsurprising therefore that “senior officials originally indicted…disappeared from lists of defendants with no explanation” and fraud investigations simply lost momentum.\footnote{Andrew Solomon, “Vietnam Talks Tough but Corruption Seems Ingrained,” 
Reuters, 1998/3/29.} Prime Minister Phan Van Khai, for example, was able to weather accusations of corruption from other senior officials, claiming publicly that corruption in Vietnam, unlike in other countries, did not reach the regime’s upper levels.\footnote{Justin J. Corfield, The History of Vietnam (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2008), p. 121.; Solomon, “Vietnam Talks Tough but Corruption Seems Ingrained.”} Similarly, Politburo member Pham The Duyet was exonerated from “a high-level investigation into allegations surrounding graft and nepotism” despite his own calls for stronger anti-corruption efforts.\footnote{Abuza, Renovating Politics in Contemporary Vietnam, p. 223.}

The trend of inaction against corruption continued into the new century, though malfeasance at the highest levels of the party is widely suspected. “At the 4th Plenum of the Central Committee in October 2012, General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong and the majority of the Politburo tried but failed to discipline Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung for policy mistakes and corruption.”\footnote{Jonathan D. London, Politics in Contemporary Vietnam: Party, State and Authority Relations (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), p. 41.} Sporadic arrests did little to change officials’ incentives.\footnote{“Vietnam: Corruption abounding,” The Economist, 2002/9/14.; “Vietnam: Corruption probes uncover 49 cases,” Asia News Monitor, 2012/7/3.} “For many
dissidents, the extent and scale of corruption in Vietnam is what ignited their disgust with the political system.”

Since 2017, however, a major new anti-corruption campaign has been under way. The main aim appears to be to reverse the delegitimizing effects corruption is having on the VCP. The most high-level casualty of the campaign has been former Politburo member and CEO of PetroVietnam Dinh La Thang. His trial in early 2018 also included twenty-one of his subordinates from PetroVietnam. The campaign involves legal measures that could improve monitoring of corruption, broaden the public’s access to information, and change bureaucratic incentives.

There is some disagreement as to the political background of this campaign. Some scholars argue that it coincides with a strengthening of collective leadership after an attempt to personalize power by former prime minister Nguyen Tan Dung, who stepped down in 2016. Others see Trong consolidating personal power, especially after he became the President in addition to being the VCP General Secretary. From that perspective, the campaign is reminiscent of Xi Jinping’s moves since 2012. The VCP certainly watches and learns from developments in the Chinese Communist Party. So far there is “little documented reduction in

129 Malesky and Phan, “Rust Removal,” p. 27.
132 Author’s interview with John Gillespie, 2018/10/4.
the corruption experienced by citizens or businesses in Vietnam,” but anti-corruption enforcement is more systematic than before and the campaign is ongoing.133

5. Malaysia: A Test of Quasi-Democratic Institutions

Table 5.5:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name and Dates</th>
<th>Strong Motivation?</th>
<th>Unconstrained Leadership?</th>
<th>High State Capacity?</th>
<th>Anti-Corruption Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mahathir calls for “clean and efficient government” 1982</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Empty Gestures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Reforms for National Integrity” 1997–2004</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Failed Reform</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The ruling Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition began in a conservative mobilization against the threat of communist revolution in pre-independence Malaysia. This threat helped the BN’s leading party, the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), to win remarkably broad support. It crossed communal divisions, attracted ethnic Chinese and other minorities as well as ethnic Malays, and drew leaders from among both traditional and new elites.134 This political strength carried UMNO and its allies to smashing electoral victories in the early 1950s and

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through Malaysia’s independence in 1957. Though the threat of revolution receded, the coalition held together to the mutual advantage of the various groups. A combination of successful economic policies and manipulation of the electoral system secured UMNO and its allies continued victories. As Dan Slater and Nicholas Rush Smith argue, counterrevolutionary consolidation produced an “exceedingly durable” political order. But the BN did not use its dominance to quash all opposition; Malaysia had semi-competitive elections and relative political openness compared to fully authoritarian regimes. Malaysia was a competitive authoritarian regime with a multiparty legislature from 1959 onward, and one that was “much more competitive than Singapore has ever been.”

Under BN, corruption increased from one decade to the next. In “the late 1950s, the growing concern of the United Malays’ National Organization over its heavy financial dependence on the Malaysian Chinese Association led party leaders to establish covert ‘special funds’ to which firms could make regular contributions.” Further enhancements to party financing became necessary when the coalition almost lost in the 1969 general election. UMNO increasingly supported itself by engaging in illegal business ventures and through patronage networks among politicians and the wealthy, especially after the launch of the New Economic Policy in 1971. Corruption then “spread exponentially” in the 1980s under Prime

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136 Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism*, pp. 21, 22. The quote is from the author’s interview with Dr. William Case, 2018/8/10. Dan Slater has said he disagrees that Malaysia and Singapore were of different levels of political competitiveness, but that was before the surprising ouster of UMNO through elections in May 2018.

137 Author’s interview with several scholars specializing in Malaysian politics and economy.


Minister Mahathir Mohamad, including the “rampant use of cold hard cash” to buy elections.\(^\text{140}\) Personal and factional rivalries within the BN were a major cause of the campaign finance arms race.\(^\text{141}\) Another factor was that over time Mahathir lost the ability to discipline party members who maintained personal patronage networks beyond his reach, leading to a diffusion of corrupt campaign activities.\(^\text{142}\)

Despite overseeing an increase in corruption, Mahathir was committed to a modernizing, developmental mission. “From the very day that he began his tenure of office it was made clear that one of his primary tasks would be...the nation-building process.”\(^\text{143}\) He wanted to build a modern, industrialized, high-growth Malaysia, and “much of what he did, or did not do, could be explained by devotion to this cause.”\(^\text{144}\) Believing traditional Malay culture to be causing laziness and poverty, Mahathir “sought to promote values such as hard work, discipline, and efficiency, and...holds up Japan and South Korea as models for Malaysian development.”\(^\text{145}\) His “general program for ‘modernization’,” spurred him to raise standards for the civil service to bureaucratic excellence, for example.\(^\text{146}\) In the 1990s, Mahathir promoted his modernizing ideas

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under the slogan “Vision 2020,” which was about the impressive development Malaysia could theoretically achieve by 2020.\textsuperscript{147} Despite pushing privatization in some areas, Mahathir embraced building up the power of the state to guide development. Scholars debate how similar Malaysia in this period was to the paradigmatic developmental states in East Asia.\textsuperscript{148}

Mahathir repeatedly promised to combat corruption during the 1982 general election campaign. “Money politics” was becoming “institutionalized in UMNO” and top leaders were criticizing its evils in speeches, so Mahathir pushed for a “‘clean and efficient government’ movement”.\textsuperscript{149} Mahathir put forward ideas with the potential to address corruption, such as that there should be “leadership by example” among civil servants, but it is unclear what if any follow-through there was on these words.\textsuperscript{150} The mid-1980s instead saw the emergence of corruption scandals that embarrassed the ruling party.\textsuperscript{151} Overall, Mahathir’s movement was little more than Empty Gestures.

Mahathir personalized power in the 1990s, but did not end the regime’s quasi-democratic institutions, leaving a major constraint on the full exercise of autocratic leadership. Slater argues convincingly that Mahathir had “transformed” the Malaysian system by the late 1990s by

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{147} Mauzy and Milne, \textit{Malaysian Politics Under Mahathir}, pp. 165–66.
\item \textsuperscript{149} Wain, \textit{Malaysian Maverick}, pp. 61, 142.
\item \textsuperscript{150} Shafiqa and Mohamed, “Insight of Anti-Corruption Initiatives in Malaysia,” p. 527.
\item \textsuperscript{151} NYT, 1985/1/8, \url{https://www.nytimes.com/1985/01/08/business/malaysia-discloses-details-of-bank-scandal.html};
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
“packing, rigging, and circumventing” regime institutions to expand his personal power.\textsuperscript{152} Mahathir purged Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim in 1998 and had him jailed in 1999; Mahathir had the “absolute loyalty of the police.” This was personalization, however, within a “‘pseudo-democracy or ‘competitive authoritarianism’.”\textsuperscript{153} Mahathir continued to face semi-competitive elections, which meant the need to build broad coalitions of supporters to win—which in turn required fundraising, deal-making, policy concessions, patronage, and other forms of compromise.\textsuperscript{154}

Vineeta Yadav and Bumba Mukherjee argue that the Malaysian government successfully curbed corruption with a series of reforms between 1997 and the mid-2000s.\textsuperscript{155} Mahathir certainly made a show of reform, saying: “I have tried asking nicely, begged and even cried...money politics is the worst kind of disease which can cause UMNO to rot from within.”\textsuperscript{156} Accordingly, he oversaw the passage of the path-breaking Anti-Corruption Act of 1997. This was followed by the National Integrity Plan, the Integrity Institute of Malaysia, the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission, and other laws, plans, and organizations.\textsuperscript{157} The motivation for these anti-corruption measures, Yadav and Mukherjee contend, came from organized pressure in the legislature from opposition parties and business interests.


\textsuperscript{153} Slater, “Iron Cage in an Iron Fist,” p. 83.

\textsuperscript{154} Quoted in Case, “New Uncertainties for an Old Pseudo-Democracy,” p. 92.

\textsuperscript{155} Vineeta Yadav and Bumba Mukherjee, \textit{The Politics of Corruption in Dictatorships} (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2016), Chapter Seven.

\textsuperscript{156} Quoted in Case, “New Uncertainties for an Old Pseudo-Democracy,” p. 92.

\textsuperscript{157} Yadav and Mukherjee, \textit{The Politics of Corruption in Dictatorships}, Chapter Seven.
This anti-corruption success, however, is highly questionable. Transparency International’s CPI, which Yadav and Mukherjee use in their statistical analysis, does not show any clear trend for Malaysia in the period that they examine.\textsuperscript{158} Many scholars, including some cited by Yadav and Mukherjee, do not describe the regime as having cleaned house at all. Several call corruption rampant and cite failures on this front by Prime Ministers Mahathir Mohamad and Abdullah Badawi.\textsuperscript{159} Nor did foreign media coverage in this period look positively on the regime’s handling of the issue.\textsuperscript{160}

The political consequences of widespread corruption rose precipitously after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. “In the 1999 elections, waged in the aftermath of economic crisis, social grievances over the UMNO’s corruption helped weaken its electoral appeal.”\textsuperscript{161} Rising support for opposition parties had “to do with wanting a moral compass in a widespread perception of the travails of modernity and the corruption, cronyism, and nepotism that many Malaysians…rage[d] about since at least the election campaign of 1999.”\textsuperscript{162} We can speculate that government corruption was easier for Malaysians to accept when the economy was doing well, though numerous factors affect how public anger at corruption translates into political change.

\textsuperscript{158} Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, https://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview


My interviews with three specialists in Malaysian politics confirmed this generally negative impression.

\textsuperscript{160} “Asia: Cleaning up?; Malaysia,” \textit{The Economist}, 2007/3/24.

\textsuperscript{161} Case, “New Uncertainties for an Old Pseudo-Democracy,” p. 92.

Corruption played an important role, though it was far from the only factor, in UMNO’s eventual ouster in May 2018. Prime Minister Najib Razak’s reputation was fatally weakened by revelations of large-scale corruption. Najib is accused of having syphoned hundreds of millions of dollars from the state investment fund 1Malaysia Development Berhad into his personal account. Around 7.5 billion dollars went missing from the fund in total. The public was incensed by the lurid details: “a 22-carat pink diamond necklace…for his wife,” “paintings by Monet, Van Gogh and Warhol,” a “megayacht for a family friend,” etc.\(^{163}\) The fractured opposition unified around the theme of corruption and the goal of throwing Najib out. The BN still went into the 2018 elections with confidence and its time-tested strategy of handing out money (hundreds of millions of dollars) to secure the necessary political support.\(^{164}\) But this time, the political minuses of corruption outweighed the pluses for the incumbent regime.

The failure to control corruption in Malaysia came despite quasi-democratic institutions, strong state capacity, and Mahathir’s commitment to modernization and development. The first of these may even have had negative effects if BN or opposition party politicians were motivated to engage in corruption to finance legal and illegal campaign activity for semi-competitive legislative elections. While the counterfactual of how corruption control would have turned out in a fully authoritarian Malaysia is hard to know, without quasi-democratic institutions Mahathir would certainly have had unconstrained leadership, which I argue was a key missing factor.

6. North Korea

Table 5.6:


Anti-Corruption Activity in the 1950s and Today

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name and Dates</th>
<th>Strong Motivation?</th>
<th>Unconstrained Leadership?</th>
<th>High State Capacity?</th>
<th>Anti-Corruption Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Corruption and Anti-Waste Campaign 1955–58</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Unclear, limited information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kim Jong-un calls for a “war” on corruption 2012–</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Empty Gestures</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This section discusses North Korea’s anti-corruption campaigns in the 1950s under Kim Il-sung (KIS) and reform rhetoric in recent years under Kim Jong-un (KJU). These early anti-corruption efforts are worth analyzing if only because there has been virtually nothing written about them in English. Informational constraints unfortunately make it difficult to judge whether anti-corruption efforts in the 1950s were successful or not, though the theory put forward in this study suggests that they should have been. Jumping to the present, KJU’s anti-corruption rhetoric has done little to suggest that North Korea will change its current image as one of the most corrupt countries in the world.

In 1952, in the midst of the Korean War, KIS launched an “anti-corruption and anti-waste” campaign. The effort was explicitly modeled on the Chinese Communist Party’s Three Antis Campaign from the previous year. As in that campaign, there was also an attack on

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165 Hwanghae Ilbo [황해일보] (hereafter HHIB), 1952/4/5, Box 1214, Record Group 242: National Archives Collection of Foreign Records Seized, 1675 – 1958. Note: The records cited from Group 242 in this chapter are from among those captured by United Nations forces during the Korean War.


bureaucratism, which KIS was concerned had made the leadership in party and state organs ineffective.\textsuperscript{167} Often, the same Three Antis slogan from China was used: “a struggle against corruption, bureaucratism, and waste.”\textsuperscript{168}

KIS announced that this campaign would raise the quality of party members, support the war economy, and ultimately help ensure military victory.\textsuperscript{169} A political knowledge handbook from 1952 captured by United Nations forces reveals what KIS wanted to tell his party members and soldiers about the issue. In it, he is quoted as criticizing the growing trend of corruption, misuse of resources, and collusion with “dishonest merchants” both in government and society. KIS cited the case of a rubber plant in Pyongyang where there had been “manipulation of production statistics and then selling based on those false numbers, stealing from the national finance.” “Many party members in the factory failed to report and criticize this action at the appropriate time,” he lamented. Therefore, KIS claimed, there was a need for “strict statistics and control…systematic inspection of expenditures…and sharp criticism and self-criticism.”\textsuperscript{170}

Despite continued references to corruption cases in official media in the following years, it is not clear what became of this campaign, or even whether it amounted to enough to be considered an anti-corruption effort by the standards of this study.\textsuperscript{171} It is unknown, for example,


\textsuperscript{168} Democratic Youth [민주청년], 1952/7/9, Box 1224, Record Group 242: National Archives Collection of Foreign Records Seized, 1675 – 1958.


\textsuperscript{170} “Political Knowledge No. 3, 1952.5,” pp. 2–8.

how many people were punished for bribery and embezzlement. Article 192 of the North Korean penal code, which was promulgated in 1950, states that bribery can be punished with “up to three years of forced labor.” A report from the Polish Embassy in North Korea from 1952 relates that “two groups of 5 people each, including the deputy to the general prosecutor of the Republic, have been executed by firing squad for theft and squandering of state property, while the general prosecutor was also dismissed and imprisoned. The total amount of losses incurred by the state through the criminal activity of only one of these groups reached 130 million wons [sic].” The report concluded that “there is no question that the current action of purging the state and economic apparatuses is strengthening them.”

The campaign recurred, or perhaps continued, soon after the ceasefire in 1953. At the Tenth Korean Workers’ Party’s (KWP) Central Committee plenum in April 1955, KIS launched an “anti-corruption and anti-waste” campaign and an accompanying “self-confession” campaign, which aimed to elicit voluntary confessions of wrongdoing. In launching the anti-corruption and anti-waste campaign, KIS sought to strengthen party and state institutions to lead the post-war recovery and implement a socialist rapid-growth agenda. It would be “a mass movement to improve cadre management of businesses and remold thought in the whole nation”—the first


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such movement after the end of the Korean War. The self-confession campaign, similarly, was meant to contribute to the economic recovery and improve bureaucratic discipline, as well as to increase coercive social control. In his closing speech at the plenum, KIS reportedly called for “the establishment of daily monitoring and strict discipline in the expenditure of financial resources and materials, and a national struggle against theft and embezzlement.” He continued by claiming that “approximately 1/3 of all resources and materials is being wrongly spent and partially looted in all sectors of the state and cooperative economy.” The campaigns continued for three years, ending in August 1958.

KIS consolidated personal power in the mid-1950s, meaning during the anti-corruption campaign. KIS purged hundreds of high-ranking officials between 1955 and 1958, quashing the KWP’s Soviet faction, the domestic faction, and the Yan’an (Chinese) faction in favor of his guerrilla faction. Charles K. Armstrong notes that after the utter failure of KIS’s critics to unseat him in the August 1956 Incident, it was only foreign intervention by the Soviet Union and China that “temporarily forced Kim and his allies to relent and reinstate the critics.”

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Zhihua and Xia Yafeng conclude that Kim “was successful in establishing his personal authority over all the factions in the KWP” even before the August 1956 Incident, but that “dissenting voices within the KWP were not completely eliminated.”\(^\text{182}\) At the absolute latest, it is clear that from March 1958 onward “Kim ruled without any public challenge.”\(^\text{183}\)

Despite the devastation of the Korean War, North Korea had high state capacity in the mid-1950s. The Korean War crippled North Korean infrastructure, to say nothing of the human toll. The U.S. bombing of North Korea was so intense, with no target thought to be too small, that it ultimately left “hardly a modern building standing.”\(^\text{184}\) But the country recovered with amazing speed; rebuilding was largely finished by 1956.\(^\text{185}\) This achievement can be attributed to the revolutionary KWP’s strong organization and centralized control over a supportive population. North Korea also benefitted from Chinese and Soviet aid. Furthermore, the KWP was able to build on its prior industrial base and successful land reform in the late 1940s to prepare the country for socialism. The 1960s and 1970s would be the golden age of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, relatively speaking. The regime oversaw rapid economic modernization and realized social stability through effective repression.

We know enough about the anti-corruption measures taken between 1955 and 1958 to conclude that they were more than Empty Gestures and qualify at least as a reform effort. More than 2000 people were reportedly disciplined for corruption and waste by the Anti-Corruption and Anti-Waste Committees that had been established at various levels of government to monitor


them. In Pyongyang alone, more than 400 officials lost their jobs or party status, and some were executed.\textsuperscript{186} “In 1955 more than 70\% of all court cases were connected with the theft, misappropriation, and waste of state and cooperative property, and bribery and squandering of state and cooperative money.”\textsuperscript{187} The self-confession movement focused on theft of national assets and other “impure activities” during and after the war, especially in the “commercial distribution department and economic institutions.”\textsuperscript{188} Much of what was confessed in the self-confession movement was small; “for example, 12\% of all the members in a producer's cooperative of the province of North Hwanghae confessed to theft and squandering.”\textsuperscript{189} The campaigns were accompanied by mass propaganda and lengthy educational meetings of the kind that would have been familiar to people living in Maoist China.\textsuperscript{190} Finally, at least a few high-ranking officials were arrested for corruption. Kim Yeol, who had earned the nickname “king of swindlers” during his tenure as Chairman of the Party Committee of South Hamgyeong Province, was brought down by criticism from party members shortly after the launch of the anti-corruption campaign.\textsuperscript{191}


\textsuperscript{188} \textit{North Korea Overview, 1945–’68}, p. 183.

\textsuperscript{189} “Report from the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs to A. A. Okhotin.”

\textsuperscript{190} \textit{NK Chosun} [NK 조선], 2013/10/30, http://nk.chosun.com/bbs/list.html?table=bbs_23&idxno=3749&page=9&total=247&sc_area=&sc_word

The prospect of enlightening comparative studies of the CCP and the KWP is just one reason scholars should hope that it will one day be possible to do more in-depth work on North Korea’s formative 1950s.

Whatever the outcome of the post-war campaigns, we know that corruption in North Korea grew substantially in the 1980s and 1990s. An influx of foreign capital and the growth of black market activity in the late 1980s led to a rise in “bureaucratic deviance,” which “typically appeared as corruption, such as bribes and embezzlement.”

The loss of critical Soviet aid and the North Korean Famine (1994–98) greatly exacerbated embezzlement by officials and petty corruption across society, whether these actions were motivated by greed or—in many cases—desperation.

Since coming to power in December 2011, KJU, KIS’s grandson, has repeatedly called for tougher measures against corruption. Under slogans like “war with corruption,” his administration has ordered several rounds of inspections and investigations in party and state organs. In November 2012, KJU instructed prosecutors to “strengthen the legal struggle against the phenomenon of corruption and waste of national assets.” KJU consistently raises

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194 Interestingly, Kim Jong-un has started using the word for corruption that is most commonly used in South Korea, *bupae* 업재, which was not previously how most North Korean authorities had referred to the problem. This linguistic change reflects recent foreign influence on the regime and the public affecting how they understand political and economic issues. Source: Author’s interviews with South Korean experts on North Korea, January 2019.


196 “Dear Leader Kim Jong-un sent a letter to the participants of the National Judicial Prosecution First Team Enthusiast Assembly,” *Democratic Korea*, 2012/11/27.

corruption, bureaucratism, and related problems in his important New Year’s addresses. In late 2018, the issue of corruption reportedly prompted the party leadership to order “all cadres” to write “self evaluations.” These measures are partly in response to public complaints about cadre corruption, which are now common. Bronwen Dalton notes that having to bribe officials is the single most common complaint North Korean women make about the government, which is highly relevant because women are more likely than men to engage in market activity.

Accusations of corruption also featured in the dramatic elite politics of KJU’s early years in power, during which he purged some 140 high-ranking officials, executing many of them. KJU’s purge of his uncle-in-law Jang Song-taek was justified in part by accusations of corruption. Jang allegedly spent 4.6 million Euros in a “foreign casino” in 2009. More importantly, Jang’s extensive corruption allowed him to create within the regime a “small kingdom that no one could touch.” KJU has reportedly complained of corrupt “small

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“kingdoms” beyond his control at other times as well.204 This is similar to the recurring issue of “independent kingdoms” under the CCP leadership in China.205

But despite heightened rhetoric regarding corruption control and accusations of corruption against purged elites, there is little evidence that KJU’s regime has gone beyond Empty Gestures on reform. If investigations have actually been carried out widely in the bureaucracy, punishments applied, and new monitoring rules put into place, this has not been reported outside the country. As for the elite purge, corruption was among the accusations leveled against some of the offenders, but was not a defining theme; most elites were at least nominally brought down for various different offenses. Jang’s long list of supposed crimes ran from counterrevolutionary acts to factionalism to improper relations with women. And generally speaking, KJU’s purges were not broad or systematic enough to suggest a motive beyond the obvious: weakening potential rivals for power consolidation in a hasty leadership transition after his father Kim Jong-il’s death.

KJU has the unconstrained leadership and state capacity to carry out a major anti-corruption campaign, but lacks a strong motive. Despite early predictions to the contrary, the “Supreme Leader” is firmly in charge of North Korea. KJU has made some stylistic changes in how the country is led, but he continues his grandfather’s and father’s tradition of one-man rule.206 State capacity suffered during the famine, even resulting in the breakdown of the public

204 RFA [Korean language version], 2016/12/14, https://www.rfa.org/korean/in_focus/ne-ms-12142016083706.html

205 Chapter Four discusses how the Three Antis–Five Antis Campaign targeted independent kingdoms in the 1950s. More recently, the term has been used to describe Bo Xilai’s rule in Chongqing and raised by the CCDI as an issue in the current anti-corruption campaign.

distribution system, but has greatly recovered. Unlike KIS in the 1950s, KJU is not faced with the urgent task of post-war reconstruction. Nor is he, despite the endless speculation by foreign observers, leading North Korea in a Chinese-style Reform and Opening or any other kind of state-led developmentalism. His anti-corruption rhetoric and the small steps taken so far appear to be motivated by several goals: to placate public opinion; to prevent private wealth accumulation from evolving into a challenge to his rule, as in the case of Jang Song-taek; and to make sure money earned in foreign trade is passed to the central government rather than ending up in the pockets of officials working as intermediaries or private entrepreneurs. While these motives are unlikely to take corruption control far, North Korea’s strong leader–strong state combination suggests that KJU would be able to significantly curb corruption if he believed it necessary.

7. Anti-Corruption Activity Elsewhere: A Spectrum of Outcomes

This section briefly covers authoritarian anti-corruption efforts and rhetoric in other countries and gives preliminary assessments of their accomplishments, if any. I discuss Empty

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207 Park, “The Real Situation of Corruption in and Anti-Corruption Strategies for North Korea,” p. 171. Though state capacity has recovered, the public distribution system has never returned to full strength.

208 Some scholars, like Paik Nak-chung, believe that North Korea’s leadership has now dedicated itself to economic reform and will advance as soon as the United States guarantees the country’s security. Source: Author’s interview with Paik Nak-chung, January 2019. This argument, however, understates the tremendous domestic political risks that economic reform would entail and skates over the strong possibility that these risks are the reason why North Korea’s leaders have not embraced Chinese-style economic reform. This view is explained persuasively by Andrei Lankov in Chapter Three of his book The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia (2014).

Gestures in Indonesia and Russia; Failed Reforms in Mexico, the Philippines, the Soviet Union, and Saudi Arabia; a Limited Victory in Ethiopia; and a Breakthrough in Rwanda.\textsuperscript{210}

**In Indonesia,** President Suharto came to power in 1967 “promising to end corruption.” He had the slogan “not only good government, but also clean government.” But Suharto’s follow-through on that promise was almost entirely limited to using investigations to smear former president Sukarno’s administration.\textsuperscript{211} The legislature passed a law in 1971 that at least clarified that corruption was criminal activity, but it could not be used to prosecute the military or any high-level Suharto allies.\textsuperscript{212} Transparency International’s Global Corruption Report in 2004 listed Suharto as the single most corrupt leader in the world, with an alleged haul of $15–35 billion.\textsuperscript{213} By around the time of Suharto’s resignation in 1998, despite economic growth during

\textsuperscript{210}This leaves a few cases listed in Table 5.1 undiscussed. On the three Iran cases, see:


\textsuperscript{212}Juwono, *Berantas Korupsi*, p. 142.

his long rule, corruption was “probably the major political issue” in the country, with a major reform movement calling for an end to “KKN” (corruption, collusion, and nepotism).  

**In Russia,** in a more recent example, President Dmitry Medvedev (2008–12) repeatedly vowed to address the country’s well-known corruption problems. His administration wrote clean government plans and established an Anti-Corruption Council, but anti-corruption prosecutions actually declined during his presidency. Medvedev himself admitted in 2011 that there were “very few successes in this direction.” After Vladimir Putin became president (again) in 2012, the campaign could only advance with “full support and free rein [given] by the president.” But Putin relies too heavily on support from powerful business tycoons and high-level officials who “believe that they are entitled to rob the country blind. Indeed, it is an essential part of their informal contract with Putin.” The real pressure for clean government reforms in Russia has come from activism; opposition leader Alexei Navalny has led nationwide protests against high-level corruption.


219 Krastev and Inozemtsev, “Putin’s Self-Destruction.”

As U.S. Ambassador Henry Byroade explained to President Richard Nixon:

“As I see it, Marcos is a product of the political system here, and not the cause of that system. His training in that system here has been in fact nearly all of his adult life—through the Congress, the Senate and now the Presidency. The whole atmosphere has been one of public expectancy that anyone able to move through these ranks would capitalize financially on their positions—and anyone who did not would be considered naive indeed—if not down-right incapable.”\footnote{Document 219, FRUS, 1969–76, Volume XX, 1970/5/13. See also on corruption: Document 362, FRUS, 1964–1868, Volume XXVI, 1967/12/7.}

Marcos justified his imposition of martial law in 1972 on governance grounds, writing: “…it was recognized on all sides that the nation was in the throes of a political paralysis and on the verge of a complete collapse. The economy was at a standstill. Crime and corruption were rampant. The country was fragmented into a number of private armed encampments.”\footnote{Document 321, FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume XXII, 1978/5/3.} What Marcos did not say was that he was at the very same time consolidating his position as the country’s “supreme godfather.”\footnote{Wurfel, Filipino Politics, pp. 148, 152.}

Marcos took one shaky step toward corruption control in September 1975 when he dismissed around 2,000 officials, including prominent judges, prosecutors, bureau chiefs, and others. He announced the purge in a dramatic speech with some of the dismissed sitting on the podium with him or in the audience. It was his “harshest statement on corruption and privilege thus far.”\footnote{“Martial Law Day: A Rededication?” U.S. State Department cable, 1975/9/19.} This shift in policy created “pandemonium” in the government, however, so Marcos
backtracked.\footnote{David Wurfel, \textit{Filipino Politics: Development and Decay} (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), pp. 136–37.} He “promised to purge the military of corrupt elements. The military viewed the promise as a threat, however, and several top officers authorized Secretary [Juan Ponce] Enrile to submit their resignations to the President; so the plan was dropped.”\footnote{Wurfel, \textit{Filipino Politics}, p. 148.}

\textbf{In Mexico}, presidents Jose López Portillo and Miguel de la Madrid cracked down on corruption at the start of their terms in 1976 and 1982 respectively, but lacked the commitment and the unconstrained leadership to follow through. Anti-corruption campaigns under the PRI, which involved arrests, purges, and new laws, “tend[ed] to come in the first year of each new administration.”\footnote{Dan A. Cothran, \textit{Political Stability and Democracy in Mexico: The “Perfect Dictatorship”?} (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994), p. 144.} In both of these cases, measures “clearly failed to curb the incidence of corruption” and were allowed to fizzle out later in the presidential term.\footnote{Stephen Morris, “Corruption and the Mexican Political System: Continuity and Change,” \textit{Third World Quarterly} 20, No. 3 (1999), p. 628.} De la Madrid glorified his efforts as a “Moral Renovation,” but his administration was consumed by other issues.\footnote{Stephen Morris, \textit{The Causes, Consequences and Dynamics of Political Corruption in Mexico} (ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 1988), p. 5.; NYT, 1982/05/28, \url{https://www.nytimes.com/1982/05/28/world/once-again-a-mexican-leader-tilts-at-corruption.html}} After inheriting an economy on the brink of collapse, De la Madrid implemented sweeping neoliberal reforms, including major privatizations and an unpopular austerity program. While the resulting changes in the economy affected patterns of corruption, for example by changing the balance of power between state and society, De la Madrid’s reforms should not be thought of as effective corruption control.\footnote{Nubia Nieto, “Political Corruption and Narcotrafficking in Mexico,” \textit{Transcience} (2012) Vol. 3, Iss. 2, p. 27.}
In the Soviet Union, General Secretary of the Communist Party Yuri Andropov’s (1982–84) anti-corruption campaign was promising, and might have even succeeded had Andropov not died of natural causes in February 1984. Breaking from his predecessor Leonid Brezhnev’s “cosmetic” anti-corruption measures, Andropov “identified corruption as the country’s number one problem” and launched what Luc Duhamel calls the USSR’s “last campaign against corruption.” After leading anti-corruption work in the late 1970s as head of the KGB, Andropov impressed the country with the speed and force of his campaigns as soon as he came to power. “It was very important for Andropov to prove that he could successfully handle this issue, which had become a serious threat to the Soviet political system.” Anti-corruption investigations had several purposes: to alleviate economic problems, to rejuvenate government by replacing ineffective officials, and to consolidate Andropov’s own power.

Expert assessments suggest that the campaign initially reduced corruption and improved discipline, especially among lower-level officials, but lacked institutional follow-through. The CIA assessed that “the party itself has been rejuvenated to a degree.” Years later, a sizable group of Russians, perhaps even a majority, continued to look back at Andropov with respect


and nostalgia.” President Mikhail Gorbachev, who succeeded Andropov, “believed that, since the anticorruption campaign had carried out much of its mandate under Andropov, it should now be reined in and its pace slowed.” Government corruption remained widespread throughout the 1980s and, at the risk of understatement, was not curbed in the 1990s under the new Russian government.

**In Saudi Arabia,** Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman (MBS) surprised the world in November 2017 by suddenly detaining hundreds of elites, including eleven princes, other members of the royal family, dozens of high-ranking current and former officials, and scores of prominent businesspeople. Many were charged with corruption or other abuses of power by the government’s newly formed anti-corruption committee, which MBS headed. More than 2,000 bank accounts were frozen and the government later claimed to have recovered $100 billion in illicit funds from these targets. Competing narratives quickly emerged over whether this mass detention was the beginning of MBS’s modernizing reforms for the Kingdom or a cynical power grab and disciplining of potential challengers. Despite the drama of these arrests, specific new

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238 Duhamel, *The KGB Campaign against Corruption in Moscow*, p. 91.


anti-corruption rules and institutional constraints on future wrongdoing have not emerged. So far, the purge cannot be considered an anti-corruption success.

**In Ethiopia,** more lasting corruption control—likely a Limited Victory—was achieved under the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). Unlike many other authoritarian regimes in the region, the EPRDF’s “aspirations go beyond a short-term resource grab, as they use the state to centralise resources and create and/or strengthen a robust edifice of control.”

Prime Minister Meles Zenawi (1995–2012) was an “illiberal state-builder”—an autocrat who led a transformation of the state and economy after a deadly civil war. Zenawi was an earnest student of former Korean president Park Chung-hee’s; he traveled numerous times to South Korea to learn about the country’s developmental model. Like Park, Zenawi grew increasingly powerful within his regime over his long tenure.

In May 2001, Zenawi established the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission, which aggressively pursued more than 1,000 cases in the first two years, especially in state agencies crucial for development, such as the Ethiopian Privatization Agency and the Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation. This was part of broader reforms by the EPRDF in the early 2000s aimed at building the public sector and improving public confidence in government. There was “a highly publicized campaign of party ‘renewal’ (tehadso),” and the “phase from 2001 to 2005 saw

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243 Author’s interview with Dr. Harry Verhoeven, 2018/9/12.

244 Author’s interview with Dr. Harry Verhoeven, 2018/9/12. Moses Khisa calls it a personalist regime in *The Institutional Transformation of Africa’s Personalist Regimes* (2016).

new emphasis on the developmental state as party structures were…brought more clearly beneath a single apex of control.”

The EPRDF’s reforms curbed corruption in the bureaucracy and state-controlled enterprises. The Bertelsmann Transformation Index’s country report for 2006 argued that “some progress has been achieved in combating corruption and improving the capacity of the administration.” An extensive World Bank report on the country’s state sector in 2012 concluded that “corruption does not appear to be as pervasive in Ethiopia as in other [African] countries…Many private stakeholders argue that corruption in Ethiopia is comparatively controlled; first-hand experience is that it is much lower than elsewhere.” Tilman Altenburg concludes that the regime has been “focused on creating an efficient civil service” and “corruption does not seem to be as pervasive as it is in many other poor countries.” He notes that Transparency International’s view of corruption in Ethiopia is more negative, but finds that “most other sources paint a more favourable picture.”

Finally, in Rwanda, there has been a Breakthrough success in reducing corruption. After leading the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) to victory in 1994 and ending the Rwandan genocide, Paul Kagame became the de facto leader of the country. “On and off the battlefield, the Rwandan Patriotic Front had gained a reputation for discipline, tight organization, superior strategy and strong ideology.” Much of this has to do with “the vision, leadership and training…particularly


by Paul Kagame from 1990 onwards. Kagame took over formally as president in 2000, but by then his developmental agenda was already underway. He announced that Rwanda could follow Singapore’s lead in terms of economic growth, political order and stability, and clean government. The RPF’s developmental mission has its roots in the “waves of political violence following independence,” which “led to widespread instability in the early 1990s” and “eventually culminated in genocide.” The RPF “came to see itself as the only actor capable of preventing further bloodshed,” which it did by exerting “a strong grip over the country,” making “mass social payments to reduce potential unrest,” and prioritizing growth. The political leadership is motivated to avoid “corruption that might divert resources away from developmental needs.”

Kagame led post-war political and economic reforms as a relatively unconstrained autocrat with a capable state apparatus at his disposal. Despite having built up a strong legal order beneath him, Kagame brooks no opposition and is given deference as a revolutionary hero. Rwanda’s government restricts civil liberties and emphasizes “order” above political openness. Unlike for the majority of African states, “the scholarship on Rwanda reflects the

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253 Mann and Berry, “Understanding the Political Motivations that Shape Rwanda’s Emergent Developmental State,” p. 124.

254 Khisa, *The Institutional Transformation of Africa’s Personalist Regimes*.

idea that the country’s state is powerful, hierarchical, and quite effective at controlling the population.” In addition, the RPF contributed some of its own advanced organizational capacity when it took over the state. Phil Clark writes that “internal party cohesion and low levels of corruption (factors lacking in most other African rebel movements) meant the RPF could focus on rebuilding national infrastructure, political and judicial institutions.”

In October 1999, Kagame began high-level anti-corruption purges, including of cabinet members. “Even cabinet ministers and longtime friends of the president have fallen into disgrace and worse for failing to meet the regime’s rigid ethical standards.” Kagame’s consistent willingness to fire high-level members of his own ruling party has “surprised many observers.” Institutional achievements include establishing the “Office of the Ombudsman, the Anti-Corruption Unit in the Rwanda Revenue Authority, the Auditor General, and the National Tender Board.” There are incentives for local officials as well—for example, “an annual competition and awards have been instituted for the districts at which, based on the marks they

258 Waugh, Paul Kagame and Rwanda, p. 153.
attain for their work on anti-corruption and good governance, they are given national recognition by way of trophies and certificates.”

Assessments by international analysts and scholars have been very positive. Aid and development organizations, including the World Bank, Transparency International, and the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, have lauded Kagame’s leadership and judged his anti-corruption efforts to be successful. “Rwanda is fast gaining [a] reputation as a country under a corporate-like political system run by a CEO-like president who oversees a ‘tightly marked ship’ in which minor infractions by public officials are heavily punished and excellence in service takes precedent over short-term political calculations.” Rwanda is seen as unique in Africa for having “zero tolerance for corruption.” Typical of mainstream Western media’s coverage, The Economist raves that “no African country has done more to curb corruption.” That said, Rwanda clearly still has a long way to go to rival Singapore’s reputation.

7. Conclusions

In this chapter, I demonstrated the extent of authoritarian anti-corruption reform as a global phenomenon and argued for the applicability of this study’s theoretical framework to diverse cases. This is not to say that all cases conformed to theoretical expectations. Cuba’s Rectification Process in the mid-1980s should have been an anti-corruption success, but failed. I


263 “Overview of Corruption in Rwanda 2009.”


posited that the drop-off in Soviet aid was a shock that fatally undermined the RP, though of course the existence of such a factor does not prove that the RP would otherwise have succeeded. Also, the case of Singapore is a major exception to my theory. This is not because the regime succeeded in curbing corruption, but because it did so through a hybrid method between the democratic approach and the authoritarian playbook.

Despite its usefulness, this chapter’s survey of authoritarian corruption control has methodological limitations. Case studies this brief and based largely on secondary scholarship can only yield preliminary conclusions about any specific case. Also, I do not claim to have presented an exhaustive list of authoritarian anti-corruption efforts. In particular, there are many Failed Reforms that have gone unexamined.
Chapter Six

Democratic Taiwan and South Korea

1. Introduction

This chapter explains how democratization affected corruption control in Taiwan and South Korea. In it, I advance three arguments: 1) Taiwan’s relative political openness and competition during democratization in the late 1980s and 1990s led to a temporary but substantial rise in corruption, 2) in both countries, full democratization brought a reversal in how corruption control was carried out, and 3) democratic anti-corruption efforts were successful, despite persistent trouble areas in both systems. The first argument provides additional evidence for my finding that quasi-democratic institutions generally do not reduce corruption. Fully democratic from 2000 onward, Taiwan undertook useful reforms after the Democratic Progressive Party came into power at the national level. The new government launched the “Program for Sweeping Away Organized Crime and Corruption” under the Ministry of Justice, severed many of the inappropriate KMT-state financial ties, passed laws to clean up elections, and strengthened laws against conflicts of interest. In South Korea in the 1990s, opposition leaders-turned-presidents Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung attacked the corrupt practices of the authoritarian past and launched legal reforms that became foundational for clean government.

This chapter is divided into three sections, which analyze corruption and anti-corruption reforms in transitional Taiwan, democratic Taiwan, and democratic South Korea.

2. Transitional Taiwan

In the late 1980s, Taiwan’s gradual liberalization became a more thorough opening with the acceptance of organized political opposition and the lifting of martial law in 1987.
Democratization continued as Lee Teng-hui, Chiang Ching-kuo’s vice president, smoothly succeeded CCK as president after the latter’s death in 1988. The DPP emerged as a real opposition party that could contest KMT power across the island, though one heavily disadvantaged by the KMT’s disproportionate control over state resources, the media, and social organizations.  

Another rival was the New Party, which formed by splitting off from the KMT in 1993 after some party members grew disgusted with President Lee’s autocratic tendencies and with the party’s increasing reliance on corruption. Overall, while some scholars see Taiwan as being democratic from the late 1980s, others are more accurate in saying that it was still competitive authoritarian until the 1996 elections or possibly until the transfer of power to the DPP in 2000.

In many countries, democratization does not immediately make democratic institutions effective at curbing corruption. If the state is weak, the country is poor, or both, then a high level of corruption is likely to persist even after democratization is complete. Scholars have noted that many new democracies experience first rising and only later falling corruption.

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uses cross-national statistics to estimate that the turning point from rising corruption to falling corruption is at around 10–12 years after the onset of political liberalization.\(^6\) Christian Göbel argues that democratization alone was not enough to reduce corruption in Taiwan and South Korea; the critical juncture in both countries, he notes, was the first alternation of power between parties.\(^7\) Samuel Huntington also believed that the opening of new political opportunities breeds corruption, though his main thesis on the topic was that modernization breeds corruption.\(^8\) The reason for this increase in corruption, scholars note, is that new political competition and openness invites a flood of money to compete over power. The autocrat’s harsh regime of control is failing or gone, and with it go any constraints the autocrat might have imposed on corruption. Meanwhile, democratic institutions are not yet strong enough to replace them. Hsueh Chao-Yung argues that “countries in a situation of political and economic transition are the most corrupt. When authoritarian control is challenged and destroyed through economic liberalization and political democratization, but has not yet been replaced by democratic checks and balances or by legitimate and accountable institutions, the level of corruption will increase.”\(^9\) This is not true in every case of democratization, but Hsueh describes a common phenomenon.

Taiwan’s transition period saw precisely these problems; to keep winning against now serious electoral challengers, the KMT began to engage in corruption in ways it had not for

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\(^6\) Rock, “Corruption and Democracy.”

\(^7\) Göbel, “Warriors Unchained.”


decades. The KMT regime had managed to keep corruption relatively low for a long period of time following the successful KMT Reconstruction, but there is “a widespread perception that corruption…actually worsened during the transition to democracy.”

As elections broadened after 1990, the scale of vote buying increased, as did the price for bribing voters. Democratization “unfortunately unleashed burgeoning corruption as both business and gangsters were able to gain access to the increasingly expensive political process.” This favored the KMT because it had superior access to illicit funding through its incumbency advantage and control over the state.

To defeat opposition parties and rival factions in the 1990s, the KMT “relied on its links to corrupt local factions and big business.” The regime “distributed state credit, licenses, and concessions to friendly businesses, which contributed ‘huge sums’ to the party in return, and tax audits were used to punish businesses that backed the opposition DPP.” Local factions of the KMT “were granted contracts or oligopolistic concessions in sectors such as transportation, construction, utilities, and banking; in exchange, they channeled a portion of their profits back into party coffers.” The growing power of the legislature, rather than checking this corruption, facilitated the strategic contract granting.

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11 Bruce J. Dickson and Chao Chien-min, Eds., Assessing the Lee Teng-hui Legacy in Taiwan’s Politics: Democratic Consolidation and External Relations (M.E. Sharpe, 2002), p. 81.


14 Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, p. 315.

“Public Functionary Assets Disclosure Law” and the crackdown on vote-buying in 1994, which were aimed mostly at KMT legislators, could not reverse the boom in election-related corruption.  

Besides misusing state resources, the KMT also engaged in corruption by colluding with criminal elements. In the early 1990s, the KMT nominated numerous “black gold” candidates for parliament. These were candidates linked to local criminal gangs but who brought in enough money to win seats. While the term initially meant political funds tainted by crime, black gold later came to refer generally to political corruption.  

“Bid-rigging, along with vote-buying, election violence, mafia politicians, and official corruption are the five major areas of ‘black gold’ politics.”  

Academia Sinica President Lee Yuan-tseh estimated in 1999 that a stunning half of all elected representatives in the country had criminal backgrounds. Other scholarly estimates were less extreme, but still very troubling. In 1984, the government had carried out a cleanup (一清專案) of gangster activity using harsh tactics to arrest and prosecute thousands. But many of those arrested were later released and successfully went into politics, such as legislators Zheng Taiji and Luo Fuzhu. Similarly, Milan Vaishnav explains that parties in India and some other democracies may nominate known criminals for public office because these shady characters can bring in much-needed funding.

17 Fell, Party Politics in Taiwan, p. 69.
20 See chart in Chin, Heijin, p. 15.
21 Vaishnav, When Crime Pays. See also Chin, Heijin, p. 18.
All this corruption helped keep the KMT in power throughout the 1990s, but simultaneously damaged the party’s brand. In the 1980s, corruption was a minor political issue, and not one the nascent opposition emphasized. But at the same time as Taiwan was strengthening its democratic institutions, corruption became “arguably the most salient political issue.” The KMT was torn—it felt it had to rely on collusion with businesses and exploitation of state resources to win elections, but also understood that “such corrupt links were unpopular with voters.” The DPP began to talk about political corruption “far more than any other issue.”

This is not to say that the DPP was not engaging in corruption. The DPP needed to compete with the KMT, which incentivized some similar behaviors, much to the dismay of longtime supporters. Over time, however, the DPP’s attacks succeeded in tarring the KMT and “the opposition’s anti-corruption campaigns were a critical factor in the KMT’s fall from office after ruling Taiwan for over fifty years.” The KMT did stay in power through the end of the 1990s, but You Jong-sung is not far off in saying “the KMT’s reliance on clientelistic strategies backfired.” The DPP’s Chen Shui-bian (CSB) won the presidency in 2000 in large part on his promises to “root out corruption,” though it also helped that the right split their votes between two candidates.

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3. Democratic Taiwan

The DPP’s anti-corruption reforms combined new legal measures, investigations and arrests, and governmental reorganization. Three key legal measures were: the “Public Functionaries Election and Recall Law…to bar organized criminals from running for political office in the future, the Civil Servant Services Act was…amended to forbid civil servants from accepting gifts or donations, and the Criminal Law was [passed] to punish repeated offenses more severely than before.” Over the objections of the KMT, the DPP also managed to pass three “Sunshine Laws,” which aimed to prevent conflicts of interest, restricted political donations, and regulated lobbying.\(^{28}\) “In 2002, when Chen had consolidated his position, he set up a Special Investigation Unit…to target high-ranking politicians suspected of corruption.”\(^{29}\) The Ministry of Justice carried out most of the anti-corruption work through several bureaus, including the Investigation Bureau and the Government Employee Ethics Department.\(^{30}\) Between July 2000 and March 2008, the administration prosecuted 4,269 corruption-related cases, with 11,513 people involved in those cases. Among those, 672 were described as “high-level” officials. In all, 30.7 billion yuan, (around $990 million USD) was seized. The statistics also show that the indicted include officials at various levels, different departments, and in different geographical areas, as well as private citizens.\(^{31}\) As for governmental reorganization, “the allocation of public


finance was centralized.” “Legislators had been able during the KMT era to ‘recommend’ the financing of small-scale construction projects…which in fact amounted to a sizeable pork barrel.”

CSB pushed for these reforms as president, but he did not have unconstrained power; the driving force of reforms was public pressure on the whole political system. Reforms were demanded by voters and maintained in part through public engagement. “Under the DPP government, a plethora of participatory channels were opened up for movement activists. Unlike the KMT, which was used to a top-down style of governance and inclined to view citizen groups as troublemakers, the DPP was much more prepared for broadly based participation.” DPP members had individual electoral incentives to support anti-corruption rules, even if these rules would constrain them and not just the KMT. So the DPP, not just its leadership, had broad interest in reform. Another departure from the authoritarian playbook was that the DPP worked within the existing legal framework in its relationship with the state—it did not “declare war” on corrupt state organs and replace them. While many in the KMT were resistant to the DPP’s anti-corruption efforts, they were only able to stop some of the proposed reforms. Soon, KMT “leaders began shifting their efforts from blocking anticorruption moves to projecting a ‘clean’ image of their own.”

Reforms in the early 2000s went some way to decoupling the state and the political party in power, meaning that corruption control was not just anti-KMT but could be enforced against

33 Author’s interview with former Ministry of Justice anti-corruption investigator.
the DPP as well. Accusations of corruption against CSB led to a mass protest movement in 2006 with the self-explanatory name “A Million Voices Against Corruption – President Chen Must Go.” He managed to complete his term, leaving office in 2008, but then was charged with “graft, forgery and money laundering” and was sentenced to “20 years in prison and fined NT$250 million.” “Prosecutors also charged Chen’s wife, son, daughter in-law and 11 other family members or former aides in connection with the web of suspected financial crimes, which have been investigated for more than two years.” High-profile cases like these may make it seem as if the DPP’s anti-corruption measures were disingenuous, and therefore little progress against corruption had been achieved, but this is not the case. Presidents may be symbols of the government or even the country, but their personal performance in office does not necessarily reflect or correlate with the performance of the average bureaucrat, the strength of a state’s institutions, or a country’s level of democratization. CSB’s fall did not stop the Ministry of Justice from continuing to enforce anti-corruption laws and prosecuting violators.

The fight against corruption has continued to see gains in the last two administrations, as power has alternated between the KMT and the DPP. Ma Ying-jeou (MYJ), former Justice Minister under Lee Teng-hui and mayor of Taipei, ran on an anti-corruption platform in 2008 and was elected president in part due to his image as “Mr. Clean.” In 2011, his administration established the “Ministry of Justice’s Agency Against Corruption, the first organization [exclusively] responsible for preventing and eradicating civil service corruption in Taiwan.”


After the end of his term, MYJ was indicted on charges of illegal wiretapping and several cases related to the mismanagement of state and party assets, but was not convicted. After regaining control of the Legislative Yuan in the 2016 elections, the DPP seized the opportunity to pass the “Act Governing the Handling of Ill-gotten Properties by Political Parties and Their Affiliate Organizations,” which aims to investigate historic and continuing corruption in the KMT. “In August, the [Executive Yuan] established the Ill-gotten Party Assets Settlement Committee, which moved swiftly to freeze KMT assets and launch a far-reaching investigation of KMT-related organizations. These measures led the KMT, once one of the richest political parties in the world, to claim that it was “struggling to pay the bills” and to request emergency aid from donors. Meanwhile, high-profile individual criminal cases continue to emerge. In 2017, for example, former head of the Legislative Yuan Lin Hsi-shan was slapped with a 16-year sentence for “corruption, receiving kickbacks, being in possession of assets of unknown origin and other offenses.” In December 2016, the legislature passed the Money Laundering Control Act, part of Taiwan’s plan to bring its anti-corruption framework up to global standards in all areas.
The success of Taiwan’s clean government reforms since 2000 can be seen in the scope of prosecutions, institutional advances, and improving perceptions. Both KMT and DPP administrations have allowed high-level prosecutions to move forward, including against suspected wrongdoing in their own ranks. When a major corruption scandal involving three High Court judges and a prosecutor broke in 2010, it “prompted President Ma Ying-jeou to set up a new anti-corruption watchdog,” which he did in 2011, as mentioned.\(^{46}\) In 2015, New Taipei City deputy mayor Hsu Chih-chien (KMT) was indicted for bribe-taking.\(^{47}\) Overall, “fierce competition between the political camps, aggressive reporting and an educated and highly sensitive population ensure that high-profile corruption charges receive much publicity.”\(^{48}\)

From an institutional perspective, there have been noticeable advances: new anti-corruption legislation is being enforced and organizations for monitoring government officials have been strengthened. “In Taiwan, engaging in acts of corruption is far riskier now than it was twenty years ago…Investigators, prosecutors, and judges have become far more professional and independent, and less likely to be swayed by influence or money.”\(^{49}\) The corruption-linked organized crime that entered and flourished in mainstream politics especially in the 1990s has receded.\(^{50}\) “Black gold…was seen as a major stain on Taiwan’s early efforts at democratization,” but today “police officials and criminology experts say that these gangs, after being targeted for


\(^{49}\) Göbel, “Taiwan’s Fight Against Corruption,” p. 136.

decades, no longer have the resources to run sophisticated criminal operations.”

“Since 2000, all major parties have tried to keep their distance from local politicians with corrupt reputations.” Increasingly, legislators take notice of how NGOs like Citizen Congress Watch rate their job performance on a variety of indicators. And anti-corruption regulations continue to be used to prosecute corrupt officials.

Taiwan’s reform achievements are confirmed by positive outside perceptions. International experts and businesspeople have been convinced by reforms. The Office of the United States Trade Representatives’ annual National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers stopped listing corruption in Taiwan as a barrier to trade as early as 2004. According to surveys, however, Taiwanese people see less positive change. Public perception may be


52 You, Democracy, Inequality and Corruption, p. 120.

53 Author’s interview with Taiwanese political scientist, August 2018.


more negative because the public’s standards have risen, because citizens’ experiences differ from those of foreign businesses, or because the media has increased reporting on corruption. However, the fact that the issue of government corruption has “faded in importance” in Taiwanese elections suggests that the public implicitly acknowledges improvement from 15 or 20 years ago. Some remaining, widely-acknowledged trouble areas are judicial corruption, commercial corruption, and corruption related to the after-effects of the KMT’s historic control over state assets during the authoritarian period. President Tsai Ing-wen’s administration is trying to take up all of these issues.

4. Democratic South Korea

South Korea held its first democratic election in 1987 following massive protests against Chun Doo-hwan’s military regime. Because the opposition vote was split, CDH’s chosen successor, Roh Tae-woo (RTW), was able to narrowly win the presidency. RTW distanced himself from his predecessor, in whose regime he had served, by promising various democratic reforms. Despite public anger over corruption, it was not until Kim Young-sam (KYS) became president in 1993 that the democratic period’s first major anti-corruption reforms were undertaken. As in Taiwan, therefore, it was the alternation of power to the opposition that spurred anti-corruption efforts. But unlike in Taiwan, the transition period between the

58 Dafydd Fell made this last point in an email exchange with the author.

59 Rubinstein, Taiwan: A New History, p. 504. Rubinstein’s comment here was perhaps too early to apply to presidential elections considering Ma’s anti-corruption platform in 2008, but since then is increasingly accurate.


61 This point is made in Göbel, “Warriors Unchained.” KYS did not become president with his own opposition party in 1993, however, but instead merged with the authoritarian successor party.
beginning of democratization and the first alternation of power did not see a spike in corruption. One reason for this is perhaps that CDH’s regime was already corrupt in the extreme. It is also possible that there was no clear rise in election-related corruption because legislative elections were already semi-competitive and awash with money.

**Anti-Corruption Reforms**

The Kim Young-sam administration took dramatic steps against corruption almost at once. Former presidents CDH and RTW were arrested and convicted of various crimes relating to the coup in 1979, the brutal crackdown on the Kwangju Uprising, and corruption.\(^{62}\) The new administration passed the Public Officials Ethics Law, which required 7,000 top politicians and civil servants to disclose their assets and make annual follow-up reports.\(^{63}\) KYS set the tone by disclosing his own and his family’s assets and pledging to take no political donations, which was possible because the presidency is limited to one five-year term.\(^{64}\) Besides arresting the two former presidents, the administration discharged 13 generals and jailed three sitting members of the National Assembly.\(^{65}\) Kim Jae-soon, former speaker of the parliament, retired.\(^{66}\) His successor, Park Jyun-kyu, was “forced out of the ruling party.”\(^{67}\)

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\(^{62}\) Corruption charges came first and then the others were added. See: Young W. Kihl, *Transforming Korean Politics: Democracy, Reform, and Culture* (Armonk, NY, MESharpe, 2005), p. 130.

\(^{63}\) Hoon Shim Jae, “South Korea: Whirlwind honeymoon,” *Far Eastern Economic Review*, (Jun 24, 1993). Other sources say the law only applied to around 1000 officials.


\(^{67}\) Hoon, “South Korea: Whirlwind honeymoon.”
of “arrests of retired generals, politicians, bankers, policemen and underworld figures on corruption-related charges.”

68 For KYS, as one journalist noted, “high-profile arrests are the easy bit.”

69 Many were caught by the rule that unexplained wealth would be treated as evidence of corruption; the chief justice of the Supreme Court, the prosecutor-general, the head of the National Police, some high-ranking bureaucrats, and “more than 100 tax officials…could not explain the sources of their wealth.”

70 In total, “over 1,000 senior officials were officially reprimanded, sacked or jailed.”

71 To aid enforcement, KYS set up an Anti-Corruption Measures Committee within the pre-existing Board of Audit and Inspection.

72 While charges of corruption were no doubt often accurate, many accusations were against leading politicians close to RTW or critical of KYS, sparking accusations of political bias.

73 The public was very supportive, however, with approval for the president at “90% in April…and 79.2% in August.”

Besides the new ethics law, corruption control was advanced through a real-name banking system and two new election campaign laws. In the 1980s, CDH had failed repeatedly to enforce the use of real names for bank accounts and other financial dealings. So in 1993, when according to the Ministry of Finance some 10 percent of the country’s financial assets were “under fictitious or borrowed names,” KYS set a deadline in October for full implementation of a


70 Lee and Sohn, “South Korea in 1993,” p. 2.


72 Kihl, Transforming Korean Politics, p. 111.


74 Lee and Sohn, “South Korea in 1993,” p. 4.
real-name system. With the passage of the “Election Malpractice Prevention Act,” which had “277 articles and 12 addenda” South Korean “election laws [became] very strict and state a clear limit on both the sources of funding and campaign expenses.” “It was forbidden to reward campaign workers in cash, and vote mobilization by government officials was made illegal.” Violators of the law could be banned from public service or running for office for ten years. The “Political Fund Law raised the ceiling for political contributions by individual persons…and made the reporting of such contributions to the Central Election Management Commission compulsory.”

Finally, KYS tried to control corruption through his Administrative Reorganization Plan (1994), which has been praised as the “largest reduction of the administrative apparatus” in the nation’s history.

KYS’s crusade lost some momentum—and his presidency a great deal of public support—when the Hanbo Scandal broke in early 1997. KYS was revealed to have accepted campaign donations for his 1992 run from the Hanbo Group, a large chaebol, in exchange for

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76 Oh, Korean Politics, p. 142.
81 Kim “Regulation and Corruption,” p. 89.
government approval and loans of “about $6 billion [US] for the construction of a steel mill.” It also came to light that “his youngest son, Kim Hyung-Chul, was involved in the Hanbo Scandal and also in other cases of influence-peddling, such as the acceptance of bribes in return for support in getting licenses to set up TV stations.”  

KYS’s successor, rival authoritarian-era opposition leader Kim Dae-jung (KDJ), vowed to push anti-corruption reforms forward. “In 1998, he declared the ‘War on Corruption’, and one year later established the Presidential Commission on Anti-Corruption (PCAC), an advisory body to the president.” “In February 2000, revisions of the National Assembly Law, the Political Fund Law and the Political Party Law obliged, among else, candidates for public office to lay open their military service and tax [records].” Then came the Anti-Corruption Act, the two-part Money Laundering Prevention Act, Code of Conduct for Maintaining the Integrity of Public Officials, and the Korea Independent Commission Against Corruption, which replaced the PCAC and “in 2008 was replaced by the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission [ACRC].” Like KYS before him, KDJ also tried to reduce governmental malfeasance through the administrative reorganization of corruption-prone sectors, this time under a newly formed Regulatory Reform Committee (RRC). “Excessive regulations encourage corruption as businessmen are prepared to bribe the relevant officials to bypass the cumbersome and tedious


87 Kim, “Building National Integrity through Corruption Eradication in South Korea,” p. 140.
procedures for obtaining a factory permit…After its first year of operations, the RRC abolished
5,226 or 48% of 11,125 administrative regulations.”  

In sum, the KDJ administration built on the KYS administration’s successes and set up the “major basic pillars of [South Korea’s] anti-
corruption infrastructure.”

The following three administrations, of Roh Moo-hyun (RMH), Lee Myung-bak (LMB),
and Park Geun-hye (PGH), were less focused on corruption control and all had their own
scandals.  

Still, there have been some recent advances. In the mid-2000s, the RMH
administration enacted several anti-corruption measures that incorporated citizen participation,
including strengthening the ability of citizens to sue, to recall officials, and to hold referendums,
improving e-government, and “expanding the disclosure of administrative information.”

LMB’s government “created [the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission] in 2008 by
integrating the Ombudsman of Korea, the Korea Independent Commission against Corruption,
and the Administrative Appeals Commission.” The ACRC has since been the “control tower”
and “primary institution in charge of fighting corruption.”  

A former head of the ACRC, Kim

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88 Jon S. T. Quah, *Curbing Corruption in Asian Countries: An Impossible Dream?* (Singapore: ISEAS Pub, 2013),
p. 81.

89 Kim Suk Pan, “Building National Integrity through Corruption Eradication in South Korea” in Clay Wescott and
Bidhya Bowornwathana, Eds., *Comparative Governance Reform in Asia: Democracy, Corruption, and Government


91 Sam Youl Lee and Jung Kwangho, “Public Ethics and Anticorruption Efforts in South Korea” in Evan M.
Berman, M. Jae Moon, and Choi Heungsuk, Eds., *Public Administration in East Asia: Mainland China, Japan,
South Korea, and Taiwan* (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2010), p. 414.


93 Anti-Corruption & Civil Rights Commission (ACRC),
Young-ran, proposed a bill that was passed by the legislature in 2015 as the Improper Solicitation and Graft Act. The act aims at “widespread practices of solicitations and entertainment” and imposes strict price limits “on food, gifts and congratulatory or consolatory payments.” Because of its broad scope and high penalties, the Improper Solicitation and Graft Act has been described as “the strictest anti-corruption law in Korea’s history.” Finally, NGOs have become powerful political actors, often in alliance with political parties. There are several major NGOs in South Korea working to address government corruption, including the People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy, the Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice, the Korean YMCA, and the Young Korean Academy.

Corruption Control Outcomes

Despite negative public perceptions of the South Korean government’s anti-corruption efforts and recurring presidential scandals, corruption has been significantly reduced since democratization.

South Koreans generally have negative perceptions of their government’s anti-corruption efforts. Among citizens of 16 Asian countries surveyed between 2015 and 2017, “people in South Korea were most likely to rate their government as doing badly at stopping graft. Over three quarters rated their government badly (76 per cent).” However, public perceptions may be based on higher standards than in the past or than in other countries. South Korea’s “vibrant civil

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society organizations and…watchful public are very sensitive to signs of corruption.” The public’s self-reported use of corruption to obtain public services is low both objectively and relative to the rate in many other Asian countries.

Figure 6.1:

![Chart showing the percentage of survey respondents who paid a bribe to a public service in the last 12 months for various Asian countries.](Data Source: Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer 2015/16/17)

One reason for South Koreans’ negative perceptions must be the seemingly unbreakable pattern of corruption in the Blue House. The record of the last seven presidents on corruption is remarkably poor: Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo were convicted and later pardoned, Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung were embarrassed by their sons going to jail, RMH committed suicide while under investigation, LMB saw his brother convicted in 2013 and was sentenced to

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97 “BTI 2018, South Korea,” Bertelsmann Transformation Index, [https://www.bti-project.org/en/reports/country-reports/detail/itc/kor/](https://www.bti-project.org/en/reports/country-reports/detail/itc/kor/)

98 Kalinowski, “Trends and mechanisms of corruption in South Korea,” p. 627.

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15 years in jail himself, and PGH is currently in jail serving a long sentence. This record is bad enough that for many it could dash any thought that South Korea has improved.

However, presidential scandals actually tell us something positive about anti-corruption enforcement in South Korea. It is significant that presidential corruption is uncovered and legal action is pursued. Unlike in many countries, high-level South Korean officials do not in the main enjoy political protection from investigations, regardless of party affiliation. Political partisanship is strong, and can influence anti-corruption investigations, but has not been so strong that corruption on one’s own side is excused. Anti-corruption activists see the 2017–18 candlelight protests that led to PGH’s ouster as an impressive mass movement against governmental wrongdoing in the tradition of the April 19 Movement in 1960 and the June Struggle for democracy in 1987. Göbel argues that South Korea is in the “paradoxical situation of anti-corruption efforts that are improving the quality of the bureaucracy, enhancing public accountability and powerful enough to take even presidents before court, but…insufficient in deterring political leaders from engaging in bribery in the first place.”

Moreover, as noted earlier, presidents are not representative of the whole of government.

Expert assessments agree that corruption has been significantly reduced, if incompletely. “In particular, the first civilian President Kim Young-sam…successfully

99 The United States under President Donald Trump would be a current example of a society with polarization intense enough to outweigh credible corruption charges. During the Cold War, ideological polarization made corruption a lower political priority in many countries. Laurence Cockcroft writes that “the international policies of Western governments during the Cold War tolerated corruption on a huge scale, on the grounds that an anti-Communist position trumped all others.” Laurence Cockcroft, Global Corruption: Money, Power and Ethics in the Modern World (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), p. 8.

100 Author’s interview with former anti-corruption activist in South Korea, Summer 2018.


implemented important reforms.”¹⁰³ The ACRC’s Integrity Assessments, based on reviews of government projects and laws and in-depth surveys of policy experts, bureaucrats, and the public, show strong and continuous improvement overall. The 2017 report shows that useful anti-corruption laws have not only been passed, but also continue to be enforced and updated in later administrations.¹⁰⁴ The bureaucracy, already less corrupt than the government, remains merit-based and high-quality in the democratic era; You cites the decreasing percentage of disciplinary cases that have to do with corruption as evidence that “bureaucratic corruption has been substantially decreasing” into the late 2000s.¹⁰⁵

That said, reforms in the 1990s did not sever “the corrupt links between politicians and big business.”¹⁰⁶ Current president Moon Jae-in’s (MJI) anti-corruption plan promises the same, but chaebol impunity is still common.¹⁰⁷ Even when heads of chaebol are tried and convicted of corruption, they often receive only a slap on the wrist and return to lead their companies. For example, despite being convicted of bribing PGH, Samsung Vice Chair Lee Jae-yong, “the de facto head of South Korea’s largest conglomerate,” has already been released and may be returning to lead the company soon.¹⁰⁸ As in the authoritarian period, the importance of the

¹⁰³ Kalinowski, “Trends and mechanisms of corruption in South Korea,” p. 628.

¹⁰⁴ “Integrity Assessment 2017,” ACRC, http://www.acrc.go.kr/en/board.do?command=searchDetail&method=searchDetailViewInc&menuId=020504&confId=64&conConfId=64&conTabId=0&currPageNo=1&boardNum=50201

¹⁰⁵ You, Democracy, Inequality and Corruption, p. 171.


chaebol to the national economy makes them hard targets for any administration’s anti-corruption efforts.

After PGH’s particularly shocking corruption scandals and removal from office in March 2017, MJI pledged to “eliminate accumulated ills” and make corruption a “top priority.” His administration launched a new round of anti-corruption activity, beginning with regular crackdowns by investigation squads under the Prosecutors’ Office and the announcement of a 50-point strategic plan against corruption over his five-year term. MJI is aiming at private sector corruption, which has been a weak point of previous anti-corruption efforts, as well as well-known trouble areas like the National Intelligence Service, defense industry contracting, and the military in general. The campaign has already opened investigations into many dealings of the PGH administration; top officials like former finance minister Choi Kyung-hwan and former spy agency chiefs Nam Jae-joon and Lee Byung-kee have been arrested or are being investigated.

5. Conclusions

The dramatic changes in corruption in these two countries during and after democratization show the importance of political factors in determining corruption control outcomes, but not in a simple “democracy reduces corruption” narrative.

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111 Financial Times, 2017/11/20, https://www.ft.com/content/ec3a6810-eda9-11e7-b781-794ce08b24dc
The rise and fall of corruption in Taiwan during democratization, as well as the fact that South Korea launched substantial reforms only in 1993, suggests that within democratization the alternation of power in particular matters for reform. Quasi-democratic institutions created strong incentives for the ruling party in Taiwan to engage in corruption in the late 1980s and 1990s, which the KMT did. Taiwan’s increasingly open and competitive political institutions allowed the opposition to credibly challenge the government at the ballot-box, which pushed the KMT to shore up support. This is true regardless of whether we view this period in Taiwan’s political development as competitive authoritarianism distinct from the KMT’s previous rule or simply as part of the transition to democracy. The DPP victory in 2000 was no panacea, but it brought major reforms.

Anti-corruption efforts in democratic Taiwan and South Korea departed significantly from the previous authoritarian playbook. Strengthening the rule of law and the separation of powers allowed governmental bodies to investigate corruption horizontally or even upwards, for example against the president. In both countries, presidents under investigation for corruption were not able to stop the investigation, even if it came from “their” judiciary or Ministry of Justice. Even as scandals weakened or ousted presidents in both countries, corruption-related prosecutions and enforcement of new laws continued.\(^{112}\) In fact, inter-party competition for power has led to inter-party cooperation on anti-corruption legislation; parties with less political power seek to hold those with more power accountable and those in power seek to prove they are committed to corruption control.\(^{113}\)

\(^{112}\) Blechinger, “Report on Recent Bribery Scandals,” p. 4.

\(^{113}\) Author’s interview with an investigative reporter covering the Blue House, January 2019.
While democratization led to lower corruption in Taiwan and South Korea, many other countries that democratized in the late 20th century did not see such clear improvement. Brazil, Mexico, and the Philippines, for example, all remain high-corruption democracies.\textsuperscript{114} It is beyond the scope of this study to build an argument as to why some democratic transitions lead to a reduction in corruption and others do not. That said, high state capacity and high wealth per capita appear to be important variables.\textsuperscript{115} This is an area for further research.


\textsuperscript{115} Yan and Johnston, “Does Democracy Check Corruption?”
Chapter Seven

Conclusion

This study has analyzed how and why some nondemocracies, playing against type, succeed in curbing government corruption. I have demonstrated that authoritarian anti-corruption efforts are most likely to succeed when unconstrained political leaders can command a capable state apparatus and are motivated by broad revolutionary or developmental state-building agendas. Authoritarian reform efforts succeed not by mimicking the democratic approach to corruption control but through an alternative approach that relies on the particular strengths of authoritarian government; centralized discretionary power challenges entrenched corrupt interests, disrupts and remakes corrupt institutions, and enforces top-down discipline in the state. Through this authoritarian playbook, autocrats can curb corruption without ceding power to democratic or quasi-democratic institutions.

These findings are based on my analysis of 30 anti-corruption efforts, nine of which I assessed to be somewhat or very successful. These numbers show that globally authoritarian anti-corruption efforts are common and even success cases are not rare. In order to establish this, I developed an empirical standard for anti-corruption efforts and a scoring system for anti-corruption outcomes based on several dimensions of discipline enforcement, rulemaking, and expert perceptions. A limitation of these empirical tests is that they only apply to national-level reform efforts, missing smaller but potentially consequential subnational efforts. While practical constraints prevented me from creating a definitive list of all anti-corruption efforts after 1945, the standard for inclusion and scoring system are meant to be applied broadly.
Beyond general findings, this study also makes specific contributions to our understanding of East Asian politics. Firstly, there is variation over time in the corruption control outcomes of every East Asian country from 1945 to the present, and often variation even under the same leader. This suggests that structural explanations focused on East Asian cultural traditions, regime type or origins, economic systems, or other relatively fixed factors cannot fully explain their corruption trajectories. Secondly, some anti-corruption efforts have been given short shrift in the literature despite their importance in autocrats’ policy agendas: in South Korea, the General Administrative Reform; in North Korea, the Anti-Corruption and Anti-Waste Campaign; and in Taiwan, the Governmental Rejuvenation. And thirdly, this study has country-specific conclusions that result from applying the theory to the cases, such as that greater authoritarianism has helped Xi Jinping to curb corruption in China.

Despite not taking a cultural approach, my study does find that regional history has shaped corruption control outcomes in East Asian countries. Many of the region’s autocrats since 1945 have been revolutionary and developmental state-builders, and state capacity has generally been strong. This concentration of factors conducive to authoritarian reform is unusual in the developing world and is not a coincidence. I have argued that Japan’s imperial aggression sparked defensive but also emulatory responses in neighboring countries and contributed to the development of all of these factors. The Empire of Japan directly contributed to state capacity in Korea and Taiwan through its settler colonialism, triggered and facilitated the rise of three revolutionary parties that would later take power in the region, and inspired Chinese and Korean elites with its developmental model, among others. These colonial mechanisms are not dissimilar from those generally thought to lead to state capacity, revolutions, and developmentalism in
other regions, but I have argued that they were heightened in East Asia by the fact of Japan being the world’s first non-Western great power and therefore a local force with deep ties in the region.

Even after the Empire of Japan’s defeat and collapse, East Asian authoritarian regimes continued to learn from each other, whether as allies or enemies. Chiang Kai-shek studied the Chinese Communist Party as an organization to better reform the Nationalist Party, and Kim Il-sung modeled his anti-corruption efforts during the Korean War on China’s Three Antis Campaign. While some of this cross-national learning was specifically about how to address corruption, more often it was about emulating a general political-economic model. The Japan model, the Singapore model, the South Korea model, and most recently the China model, though vaguely defined, have all been influential in the region and around the world.

This study suggests four main theoretical contributions. First, successful anti-corruption reforms help autocrats achieve state-building goals and can provide authoritarian regimes with a host of other political and economic benefits that contribute to regime durability. This is a counterpoint to the conventional wisdom that autocrats benefit from corruption and would have to cede power to curb it. While corruption certainly helps keep some autocrats in power, reducing it can also be a path to regime durability. Curbing corruption through the authoritarian playbook provides for more effective government, stronger economic growth, and less public anger over corruption. In fact, I suggest that anti-corruption reform itself can be seen as a demonstration of authoritarian durability; regimes show their ability to course correct and head off internal threats to their rule by combating “the enemy within.” As several cases analyzed in this study show, widespread corruption can destabilize or even topple authoritarian regimes.

Second, unconstrained leadership is critical to authoritarian reform, and therefore is in many cases an asset for authoritarian regimes. Personalism in authoritarian regimes is
commonly—and correctly—associated with chaotic governance, economic mismanagement, and rampant corruption, among other negatives. This leads to the view that personalism is necessarily inferior to collective leadership. However, the issue of corruption control reveals that there is a distinct subset of regimes in which personal power is an effective tool of governance and a boon to the regime. Personalists in this subset are committed to revolutionary or developmental agendas and can implement them with the aid of a capable state. I am not attempting to reprise a hoary argument for the “enlightened autocrat”—many of these leaders are ruthless toward their citizens and quash grassroots attempts to improve society—but rather noting that centralized discretionary power can be an authoritarian asset. By contrast, collective leadership can block much-needed reforms, as cases in Vietnam and elsewhere demonstrate.

Third, this study cuts against the view that quasi-democratic institutions strengthen authoritarian regimes and improve their durability. There is little evidence that quasi-democratic institutions help authoritarian regimes curb corruption, except partially in the case of Singapore. They therefore do not serve as a replacement for the democratic approach to curbing corruption in authoritarian regimes. Like collective leadership, quasi-democratic institutions often hinder top-down authoritarian reforms. In several cases examined in this study, their presence even incentivized greater corruption. In other work, I develop these points further to show that authoritarian regimes with quasi-democratic institutions are generally not stable, and that their corruption is often to blame.  

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Lastly, this investigation of authoritarian corruption control suggests a larger point about regime durability—even more than regime origins, the continuing ability of a regime to reform and strengthen itself is crucial. Many cases in this study show how corruption arises repeatedly as a challenge for authoritarian regimes. The ability to meet this challenge depends on whether the regime can overcome inertia or the status quo and reform from within. This ability to auto-reform is not the product of any one type of regime and even varies within regimes over time.

When curbing corruption, democracies reform themselves by strengthening democratic institutions, whereas authoritarian regimes reform themselves through an authoritarian playbook. This is not to say that democratic and authoritarian regimes are equally good at curbing corruption—which in general is far from the case—but rather that what matters is each regime’s ability at that moment to draw on its own particular institutional strengths.

Despite these contributions, this study has methodological problems and limitations. Endogeneity is a concern in the causal argument. In some cases, unconstrained leadership is consolidated through anti-corruption efforts. In other cases, unconstrained leadership may exist before an anti-corruption effort but be difficult to observe until the anti-corruption effort begins. Both unconstrained leadership and state capacity, I have argued, aid anti-corruption efforts and can be further bolstered by them.

This study’s breadth brings potential analytical problems. One issue is that case-based research may not properly account for supranational changes that affect the domestic politics of corruption control. The most obvious example would be the end of the Cold War. While ideological polarization made corruption a second-tier political issue in many countries during

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3 See the discussion of the problems with “methodological nationalism” in Prasenjit Duara and Elizabeth J. Perry, Eds., *Beyond Regimes: China and India compared* (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2018).
the Cold War, concerns over good governance became more prominent after its conclusion.\(^4\) Corruption scandals rarely brought down national leaders during the Cold War, but they are now among the most likely causes of exit from office before the end of a leader’s term. Between 2013 and 2018, more than 10 percent of countries (21) have had a president or prime minister brought down by corruption—meaning resignation in the face of scandal, ouster through a vote of no confidence, or impeachment and removal from office.\(^5\) In short, while the political costs of corruption have changed over time for international reasons, this fact is not reflected in this study’s case-based analysis.

Furthermore, this study makes several framing choices and assumptions that could be questioned. Anti-corruption efforts are treated in this analysis as nearly independent events, which is a simplification. For example, after the KMT Reconstruction successfully constrained high-level corruption in Taiwan, it seems that the later Governmental Rejuvenation only needed to address low-level corruption, limiting it by definition to a Limited Victory. Corruption is taken to be a unified phenomenon, when in fact differences among types of corruption may matter. Anti-corruption efforts are defined narrowly, not taking into account the possibility of corruption control as a downstream result of politically engineered economic or societal change. While I stand by my argument for the separateness of unconstrained leadership, state capacity, and state-building motivations, there may be interactivity among these variables that complicates the causal story. The democratic approach and authoritarian playbook for corruption control are ideal types; democratic regimes sometimes combat corruption through executive power and with


temporary organizations outside the normal bureaucracy that intrusively inspect lower levels of government. And perhaps most importantly, this study examines autocratic motives only in terms of whether they help an anti-corruption effort succeed, not to produce a theory of why authoritarian regimes launch anti-corruption efforts in the first place.

Finally, its limitations notwithstanding, this study raises promising paths for future research. Scholars of authoritarianism might further examine the relationship between corruption and regime durability, about which there are many open questions. Are authoritarian regimes that manage to keep corruption in check more durable than those that engage in it as a strategy of rule? Does promising and then failing to curb corruption weaken a regime’s legitimacy? Does it weaken a leader’s legitimacy? This study also raises questions about the effects of democratization on corruption control. Why does democratization lead to clean government in some countries but not in others? How, if at all, are anti-corruption efforts in a new democracy shaped by the country’s authoritarian past? Another path for future research would be to study the role of the strong leader–strong state combination and the authoritarian playbook for corruption control in other areas of governance. To what extent is this also a formula for authoritarian regimes to carry out successful public goods provision or effectively manage social unrest? Under what conditions is collective leadership more effective than personalized leadership, or vice versa? Through these questions, and many others, scholarship can and should continue to enlighten us about the causes of stability and change in authoritarian regimes.
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Appendix A

Abbreviations for Sources

ACRC – Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission (South Korea)
CCDI – Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (China)
CSIB – 조선일보 [The Chosun Ilbo]
DAIB – 동아일보 [The Dong-A Ilbo / East Asia Daily]
FEER – Far Eastern Economic Review
FRUS – Foreign Relations of the United States (Department of State)
HHIB – 황해일보 [The Hwanghae Ilbo]
KHSM – 경향신문 [Kyunghyang News]
LHB – 聯合報 [United Daily News]
NSC – National Supervisory Commission (China)
NYT – The New York Times
RFA – Radio Free Asia
RMRB –人民日報 [People’s Daily]
SCMP – South China Morning Post
WCDA – The Wilson Center Digital Archive
WP – The Washington Post
YHN – 연합뉴스 [Yonhap News]
ZDZYSS – 中国当代政治运动史数据库
[Database for the History of Contemporary Chinese Political Movements, 1949–]
ZGSB – 中國時報 [China Times]

ZLWB – 自立晚報 [The Independent Evening Post]

ZLWZH - 中共重要历史文献资料汇编
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ZYRB – 中央日報 [Central Daily News]
Appendix B

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The Department of Defense
The Department of Justice
The Department of State
The Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library
The Harry S. Truman Presidential Library
The John F. Kennedy Presidential Library
The Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
The Office of the United States Trade Representative
The Wilson Center Digital Archive
Tiananmen Square Incident Materials Collection, Harvard University (天安门资料集)
U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, especially the National Archives Collection of Foreign Records Seized, 1675 – 1958
South Korea:
Central Officials Training Institute
Office for Government Policy Coordination
Ministry of Government Administration
Ministry of the Interior
Ministry of Unification
National Library of Korea
National Archives of Korea (Daejeon, Sejong, Seongnam, and Seoul branches)
Seoul Metropolitan Library
The Korea Institute for National Unification

Other:
National Archives of Singapore
WikiLeaks