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Citation	Inglehart, Ronald, and Pippa Norris. 2009. Muslim Integration into Western Cultures: Between Origins and Destinations. HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Series RWP09-007, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.
Published Version	http://web.hks.harvard.edu/publications/workingpapers/citation.aspx?PubId=6478
Citable link	http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4481625
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HARVARD Kennedy School
JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT

Faculty Research Working Papers Series

Muslim Integration into Western Cultures: Between Origins and Destinations

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March 2009

RWP09-007

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Draft 2: 2/28/2009 2:13 PM

[Total word count: 11,331]

Muslim integration into Western cultures: Between origins and destinations

Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris

Abstract

To what extent do migrants carry their culture with them, and to what extent do they acquire the culture of their new home? The answer not only has important political implications; it also helps us understand the extent to which basic cultural values are enduring or malleable; and whether cultural values are traits of individuals or are attributes of a given society. Part I considers theories about the impact of growing social diversity in Western nations. We classify two categories of society: ORIGINS (defined as *Islamic Countries of Origin* for Muslim migrants, including twenty nations with plurality Muslim populations) and DESTINATIONS (defined as *Western Countries of Destination* for Muslim migrants, including twenty-two OECD member states with Protestant or Roman Catholic majority populations).¹ Using this framework, we demonstrate that on average, the basic social values of Muslim migrants fall roughly mid-way between those prevailing in their country of origin and their country of destination. We conclude that Muslim migrants do not move to Western countries with rigidly fixed attitudes; instead, they gradually absorb much of the host culture, as assimilation theories suggest.

One of the most striking developments in the modern era of globalization is the rapid flow of people across national borders. The United Nations estimates that, in 2005, 191 million migrants lived outside their country of birth (roughly 3% of the global population).² This figure has doubled since 1960 and continues to rise; today the estimate is close to 200 million.³ Most move to Western societies; just over two dozen countries of destination, mainly in Europe, North America and Asia, absorb almost three-quarters of all migrants around the world.⁴ In 2005, among all world regions, Europe hosted the largest number of international migrants, who represented almost one tenth of Europe's total population.⁵

The rapid settlement of Muslim migrants into European societies, in particular, has raised important challenges for how European policymakers manage cultural diversity, maintain social cohesion, and accommodate minorities.⁶ Recent events have intensified concerns about the integration of Muslim populations: (1) sharp ethnic tensions arose in The Netherlands after the murder of filmmaker Theo van Gogh by Islamic extremists in November 2004; (2) heated protests broke out in many countries, following the September 2005 publication of the 'Muhammad' cartoons in Denmark: the cartoons were seen as blasphemous in Islamic countries, while demands for their suppression raised concerns about freedom of expression in Western countries; and (3) violent riots occurred a few months later in suburban Paris housing projects involving disaffected Franco-Maghrebi communities. These concerns were heightened by a series of extreme terrorist events, particularly by 9/11 in the United States, the bombings directed against civilian targets in Madrid (2004), London (2005), and, most recently, Mumbai (2008).⁷ The UK was particularly shocked that British-born second-generation Muslim youths of Pakistani and Jamaican descent, with good education and job prospects, were the perpetrators. These events raise fears that second-generation Muslims living in isolated urban communities are becoming alienated from democratic societies and may be developing closer sympathies with extremist Islamic movements. For some observers, disaffected Muslims in France, the UK or the Netherlands are seeking to create a society entirely separate from the mainstream.⁸

This backdrop highlights the importance of the broader research question that this study addresses: to what extent do migrants carry their culture with them, and to what extent do they acquire the culture of their new setting? The answer not only has important political implications; it also helps us understand the extent to which basic cultural values are enduring or malleable; and whether cultural values are traits of individuals or attributes of a given society.

To explore these issues, Part I considers alternative arguments about the potential consequences of the experience of migration for cultural change. Theories of cultural integration suggest that immigrants gradually absorb the values and norms which predominate in their host society, especially on an inter-generational basis. By contrast, theories of divergence suggest that distinctive social values and norms are enduring and deep-rooted within each nation, shaped by collective histories, common languages, and religious traditions, so that migrant populations are unlikely to abandon their cultural roots when they settle in another country. We propose to test these claims by examining whether the basic values of Muslim migrants are closer to those prevailing in their societies of origin or destination. Part II describes the research design and the empirical evidence used in this study, drawing upon the World Values Survey/European Values Study (WVS/EVS) dataset, pooled across five-waves from 1981-2007. The study compares two types of societies: ORIGINS (*Islamic Countries of Origin* for Muslim migrants, comprising twenty nations with plurality Muslim populations) and DESTINATIONS (*Western Countries of Destination* for Muslim migrants, comparing twenty-two OECD member states with Protestant or Roman Catholic majority populations).

Cultures have multiple dimensions and this study focuses on four important indicators. We analyze attitudes towards gender equality and sexual liberalization, areas where previous research has demonstrated that a cultural cleavage divides Islamic and Western societies.⁹ Muslim practices of forced marriages, polygamy, domestic violence, and honor killings, as well as patriarchal beliefs about the traditional roles of women in the family, and the symbolic wearing of the hijab, niqab and burqa, have proved controversial by conflicting with the more egalitarian gender roles, the liberal social values, and the secular legal frameworks prevailing in Western countries.¹⁰ We also compare religious values, where we expect to find strong contrasts between Muslim migrants and the increasingly secular Western publics.¹¹ Lastly, the study compares democratic attitudes, representing important components of civic integration for new citizens in Western countries. Multicultural theories argue that migrants should be engaged in the rights and responsibilities of democratic citizenship in their host societies, even though they should be free to maintain distinct cultural identities, practices and beliefs.¹²

To analyze the underlying drivers of cultural integration, we examine whether the values under comparison can be explained by: (1) *individual-level Muslim religious identities*, controlling for many factors which may shape both social values and transnational mobility, including levels of education and socio-economic status, marital status, labor force participation, religiosity, age, and gender; or (2) *living within Islamic or Western societies*, at macro-level, controlling for world region. Hierarchical linear

models (HLM) are employed, specifically multilevel regression analysis, as the most appropriate technique for examining the strength of both macro-level and individual-level data simultaneously.¹³ Updating and extending previous research, the results presented in Part III highlight two major findings.

First, as expected, compared with Western nations, Islamic societies prove highly conservative on issues of sexuality and gender equality, including support for egalitarian roles for women in the home, workforce, and public sphere. Islamic societies are also far less tolerant towards issues of sexual liberalization, as manifested in their attitudes towards abortion, divorce and homosexuality. Not surprisingly, Islamic societies are also strongly religious in their values, while in comparison most Western countries are almost always more secular. Based on comparing a broader range of Islamic countries, these results update and support findings reported in the previous literature.¹⁴

But this phenomenon does not mean that Muslim immigrants living within Western societies share identical traditional values to their counterparts living in Islamic societies; instead, the analysis demonstrates that the basic values of Muslims living in Western societies fall roughly half-way between the dominant values prevailing within their countries of destination and origin. This suggests that migrant populations living in Rotterdam, Bradford and Berlin are in the process of adapting to Western cultures, while at the same time continuing to reflect the values learnt through primary socialization in their original countries of origin. The multi-level models used for analysis in this study, controlling for many other social characteristics, show that living within an Islamic or Western society has a far stronger imprint on values than individual-level religious identities, or indeed the effects of an individual's education, age, gender, and income. Some previous studies argue that Muslim migrants encounter particular difficulties with cultural integration into European societies.¹⁵ By contrast, the results of the analysis is largely consistent with previous studies based on other populations, such as the integration of Mexican migrants into the U.S., suggesting common underlying processes are at work.¹⁶

In interpreting these results, we suspect that in the short-term, one reason why Muslim migrants express values located between their countries of origin and destination may be self-selection: people already sympathetic towards Western cultures, as well as those with the higher skills and status which facilitate mobility, are more likely to relocate to live in affluent post-industrial societies. Nevertheless in the long-term, there is probably a reciprocal process at work, especially for the second and third generations of migrant families. Our overall view of these findings is that Muslim migrants do not come to Western countries with rigidly fixed attitudes; instead, they gradually absorb the values

prevalent in their host society, as assimilation theories suggest. Part IV summarizes the key conclusions and reflects upon their broader implications.

I: Context, theoretical framework, and literature review

The rate of population migration has accelerated sharply worldwide as part of the phenomenon of globalization-- the process expanding networks of interdependence spanning national boundaries that follows the increasingly swift movement of ideas, money, goods, services, ecology, and people across territorial borders.¹⁷ Globalization is understood here as multidimensional, encompassing *economic* aspects, such as the flow of trade, labor and capital; *social* aspects, such as inter-personal contacts and mediated information flows; and *political* dimensions, including the integration of countries into international and regional organizations. In particular, the flow of peoples across national borders has risen due to trade liberalization, economic integration, and more open labor markets, as well as international travel and communications, while inter-state wars and internal conflicts have expanded the number of displaced populations and refugees. Western societies are becoming increasingly socially diverse, yet paradoxically the expansion of cosmopolitan communications flowing across the state borders has simultaneously weakened the hegemonic control once enjoyed by the major national agencies of cultural transmission, notably domestic television broadcasting channels, within each country. Cosmopolitan communications facilitates multiple information networks linking together the lives of strangers from distant lands, a process which has changed the way we learn about, and interact with, people and places beyond the borders of our country.¹⁸

These developments have touched all parts of the globe but Western democracies, with high demand for labor and liberal human rights policies, remain the most attractive destination for migrants and refugees. In 2005, the International Organization for Migration estimates that among all world regions, Europe hosted the highest number of international migrants (70.5 million), followed by North America (45.1 million) and Asia (25.3 million). At the dawn of the twenty-first century, about one in four or five residents in countries such as Australia (24%), Switzerland (24%), New Zealand (19%), and Canada (18%) were foreign-born, as were one in eight in Germany (13%), the United States (13%), and Sweden (12%).¹⁹ In 2005, just 28 host countries absorbed three-quarters of all migrants worldwide. Social diversity is further reinforced by demographic trends; immigrants from developing societies often have younger age profiles and higher fertility rates than is common in Western countries. Since 2008, the global economic downturn and rising job losses has slowed the demand for low skilled service labor and

migration flows into Western countries, but it is not yet apparent whether this has substantially reversed earlier trends.²⁰

Due to these developments, European countries which used to be relatively homogeneous in their cultural heritage, historical traditions, ethnic composition, language, lifestyles, and religious faith -- such as Denmark, France, and Sweden -- have become far more socially diverse today.²¹ Eurostat reports that in 2007, foreign nationals represent one in four (41%) people living in Luxembourg and one in five living in Switzerland (21%) and Latvia (19%).²² Part of this is due to interregional mobility within the internal European market, as EU nationals choose to live or work in other member states; the French financial community in Kensington, the British expatriate community in Tuscany, or Polish laborers in Spain and Ireland. Most concern about social diversity arises from the challenges of integrating non-EU nationals within member states. Standardized estimates about the exact size of this population derived from official national statistics are not available, but it is commonly suggested that Muslims constitute the largest minority religion within the European Union.²³ Europe has a long history of engagement with Islam and modern developments are rooted in the era of colonial rule; Britain, France, and the Netherlands, in particular, experienced large Muslim immigrations after the collapse of their empires. Others came to Europe in the 1950s and 1960s to fill labor shortages. The overall size of the population has also risen because of high birth rates among immigrant families, and refugee flight from impoverished and unstable home countries, such as in the Balkans and Afghanistan. Migration has brought a particularly rapid and profound transformation of many EU societies; nowhere exemplified more dramatically than in poorer city outskirts where Muslim communities have concentrated, such as the population of Turkish guest workers in Berlin, Bremen and Frankfurt; the Moroccan, Turk and Sudanese communities in Rotterdam; Franco-Maghrebis in Marseilles; and Bangladeshis and Pakistanis in the East End of London, Bradford, or Leicester.²⁴ In response to these developments, Western governments have sought to implement effective policies for managing diversity, while preserving social cohesion, minimizing discrimination, and promoting inter-faith tolerance.²⁵

What has been the impact of these trends on cultural integration? The theoretical and empirical literature is divided between theories of cultural integration, suggesting that migrants gradually absorb the values and lifestyles of their countries of destination, and theories of multiculturalism, which suggest that enduring traditions, shared identities, and deep-rooted values persist for many minority groups for many decades, or even for centuries.²⁶

Do migrants gradually absorb the culture of their new destination?

During the early twentieth century, the Chicago school of sociology sought to understand how successive waves of European immigrants became assimilated or integrated into American society.²⁷ The American historical experience from the colonial era until World War I suggested that migrant populations gradually came to share mainstream values, ways of life, and beliefs prevailing in their host society, usually through an intergenerational process.²⁸ The mainstream agencies of cultural transmission, including schools, the mass media, participation in the labor-force, and bridging social networks in the local community, facilitate the socialization of second and third generation minority groups. During the early twentieth century, assimilation theory was the dominant sociological paradigm for understanding historic waves of immigration by Italian-Americans, Irish-Americans, Polish-Americans and other European émigrés.

As a normative ideal, the concept fell out of favor in America during the 1960s, driven in large part by the civil rights and black power movement, and by the growing diversity of new waves of migrants from around the world, as well as by a reaction discrediting ethnocentric assumptions about the superiority of Anglo-American culture in the United States.²⁹ In recent years, however, several social scientists have produced revised and updated versions of the assimilation thesis, stripped of its normative connotations. The most comprehensive and analytically-rigorous theory, developed by Alba and Lee, identifies a variety of mechanisms that facilitate the integration of minorities into American society, emphasizing the role of human capital, social networks, and the institutional arrangements of the state and labor market.³⁰ Portes and Zhou suggest that segmented assimilation typically occurs for second generation immigrants in the United States, emphasizing that integration into the workforce or community is far from automatic, and it occurs at varying rates for different types of ethnic groups.³¹ European scholars have been drawing upon these ideas to understand integration occurring among second generation groups in the EU.³² Compared with Europe, however, the United States may prove to be distinctive in its more tolerant cultural attitudes towards migrants, as a society founded historically on the principle of open borders to diverse flows of immigrants.

Most empirical research testing evidence for patterns of cultural integration has compared populations within specific countries but several studies have used cross-national surveys to examine these issues. Support for the thesis is provided by Inglehart and Welzel who analyze plural societies containing large numbers of two *long-standing* religious communities, comparing Catholics and

Protestants, Hindus and Muslims, and Christians and Muslims.³³ Evidence from the WVS/EVS (1999-2001) indicates that religious traditions have historically shaped national cultures-- but today their impact is transmitted mainly through nation-wide institutions, to the population as a whole. Historically Catholic or Protestant or Islamic societies show very distinctive values, but the differences between Catholics and Protestants and Muslims *within* given societies proved relatively small. For example, the basic values of German Catholics were closer to those of German Protestants than they were to those of Catholics in other countries: the German Catholics were much more German than Catholic. The same is true in the U.S., Switzerland, The Netherlands and other religiously mixed societies: Catholics tend to be slightly more traditional than their Protestant compatriots in these countries, but they do not fall into the historically Catholic cultural zone or anywhere near it. Rather surprisingly, this also holds true of the differences between Hindus and Muslims in India; and Christians and Muslims in Nigeria: the basic values of Nigerian Muslims are closer to those of their Christian compatriots than they are to those of Indian Muslims. Similar patterns exist for other variables as well: educational, generational, occupational and ethnic differences on the two value dimensions of traditional versus secular-rational authority and survival versus self-expression values are much smaller *within* than *between* societies. Living in a given country has a stronger impact on people's belief systems than their specific type of faith, lending support to the integration theory.

Moreno obtained related findings when he compared Mexicans living in Mexico, Mexicans living in the U.S., and non-Hispanic U.S. citizens.³⁴ Mexicans in the U.S. were divided into two subgroups, those who have lived in the U.S. for more than 20 years, and those who lived there for less than 20 years. He finds that Mexicans living in the U.S. have values that are slightly closer to those of Anglo-Americans than to those of Mexicans living in Mexico; and that Mexicans who have lived in the U.S. for more than twenty years, have values that are slightly closer to those of the Americans, than are those of Mexicans who have lived there for less than twenty years. Juan Diez-Nicolas made similar comparisons between the social and political values of the Spanish public; the values of immigrants to Spain from Latin America, North Africa, Eastern Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia; and the values of the public in the immigrants' countries of origin.³⁵ He obtains similar findings: the values of the immigrants generally fall about halfway between those of the Spanish public and those of their country of origin, but often tend to be somewhat closer to those of their current host country.

These findings lend support to the integration thesis nevertheless further analysis is required to see whether patterns found for these groups also apply to short-term change among *recent* Muslim

migrant populations. The idea of 'segmented assimilation' developed by Portes and Zhou holds that minority groups integrate at different rates; in particular, professional and entrepreneurial immigrants usually assimilate their host society's values much faster than those at the bottom of the occupational hierarchy or jobless.³⁶ It is therefore unclear whether patterns of successful integration, for example observed for professional and middle class Jewish, Hispanic or Asian communities in America, also hold for Muslim minorities in Europe, who often come from far poorer developing societies characterized by lower levels of education and literacy. As Alba and Lee argue, groups rates of assimilation typically differ due to factors such as reservoirs of human capital (educational, vocational, and linguistic skills), economic capital (socioeconomic status, economic resources), and social capital (social and organizational networks). National groups also differ in how far the values of their countries of origin are congruent with those that predominate in their host society; for example, Polish workers living in Dublin share a common Catholic faith, and standards of education, literacy and income that could facilitate integration far more than would be the case with Bangladeshis moving to London. The integration thesis predicts severable propositions open to testing with further empirical evidence in this study. In particular, where substantial inter-societal gaps exist between Western and Islamic cultures, such as in attitudes towards the family, marriage, and the roles of women, assimilation theory predicts that migrants will gradually come to share the predominant values in their country of destination.

Or to what extent do migrants carry their original culture with them?

Yet alternative theories of multiculturalism suggest that Muslim migrants, who have acquired deep-rooted and enduring social norms and cultural values through processes of childhood socialization within the family, local community, and country, will carry their culture with them when they travel. In this view, persisting ethnic sub-cultures in multicultural societies, or even deepening divergence between minority and majority communities, seems the most likely scenario. Benedict Anderson argues that national cultures and collective identities are shaped by common histories, shared languages, and deep-rooted religious traditions that persist for centuries.³⁷ Supporting this claim, empirical analyses by Acemoglu et al. trace contemporary cross-national differences in economic development and levels of democracy to cultural and institutional differences (or "nation-specific factors") established as much as five hundred years ago.³⁸ The experience of migration to another country may strengthen the awareness and importance of regional, national, or religious identities, rather than weakening them.³⁹ Historically, traditional ideas of assimilation within American society came under challenge during the

1960s, and the core idea was politically discredited, not least by the persistent structural inequalities that continued to be experienced by African-Americans.⁴⁰

Some empirical evidence also supports observations about enduring cultural differences; Rice and Feldman analyzing cumulated data from the General Social Survey, find strong correlations between the values of various ethnic groups in the U.S., and the values prevailing in their countries of origin—two or three generations after their families migrated to the U.S.⁴¹. Ethnographic studies of disaffected Muslim youth, such as Bangladeshis in the UK, report that these groups are turning to revivalist Islam in reaction to political and cultural alienation from the West.⁴² Analysis of the UK Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities found that Muslims integrate less fully, and more slowly, than other non-Muslim migrants (Asians, Hindu and Caribbean).⁴³ In Spring 2006, Pew surveys compared public opinion in four European countries (Britain, France, Germany and Spain) alongside Muslim minorities in these countries, reporting that both groups perceived a sense of growing Islamic identity and concern about Islamic extremists.⁴⁴ The majority of Europeans expressed doubts that Muslims coming into their countries wanted to adopt their national customs and way of life. A subsequent Pew survey in Fall 2008 reported that many Europeans also viewed Muslims in an increasingly negative light, especially in France, Germany and Spain.⁴⁵ As mentioned earlier, the incidence of radical protest involving inter-communal violence, and cases of outright terrorist incidents involving small groups of militant Muslims, lends further plausibility to the divergence argument.⁴⁶

There is also systematic evidence that basic cultural values can be remarkably enduring – especially where colonial settlements form the *majority* population in new settings. Support for this claim is demonstrated by the way that colonization from the British Isles or from the Iberian Peninsula seems to have left an impact on the prevailing contemporary values of English-speaking and Latin American societies, an impact that remains clear and distinctive centuries after colonies achieved independence. Thus, analyzing data from the 1990 Values surveys, Inglehart found evidence that colonial immigrants from given countries tend to bring the values of their society of origin to the new setting, and that these values seem to persist over long periods of time: in global perspective, the basic values of the peoples of Latin American countries were relatively similar to each other, and to the values of the publics of Spain and Portugal.⁴⁷ A similar pattern emerged in the existence of an English-speaking cultural zone, where the publics of Great Britain and Ireland, the U.S., Canada, Australia and New Zealand showed relatively similar religious, political, economic, social and sexual norms. Analysis of data from subsequent waves of the Values Surveys confirms that these findings are robust over time.⁴⁸

If the multiculturalism thesis is correct, then where substantial cultural differences exist between countries of origin and countries of destination, migrants will express values that are closer to those predominating in their country of origin, rather than to those of their destination. Moreover any significant cultural differences among majority and minority populations are not be expected to diminish among second and third generation migrants; indeed if alienation from the West has occurred, as some observations suggest, then this could even potentially strengthen Muslim identities among younger populations.

II: Comparative framework, evidence and research design

What research design is best suited to analyze the empirical evidence? Much previous survey research seeking to understand these issues has focused on public opinion towards immigration within each host society, for example Strabac and Listhaug used the European Social Survey to examine prejudicial attitudes towards ethnic minority populations, while Panagopoulos examined American attitudes towards Muslims and Arab-Americans in the aftermath of 9/11.⁴⁹ Studies have also analyzed public attitudes in Western countries towards the related topics of labor mobility, trade liberalization, and economic protectionism.⁵⁰ Lahav examines European preferences for particular types of immigration policy, at mass and elite levels, showing that many Europeans find immigrants to be threatening.⁵¹ It is important to understand public opinion in Western societies, as perceptions of immigration is one of the factors facilitating or restricting processes of integration. But this only reflects one side of the relationship, rather than directly comparing the cultural values of minority and majority populations.

Within-societal comparisons of majority and minority publics have also often been employed. Given the limited sample size of most standard nation-wide social surveys, analysis is usually based on specially-designed matching surveys that over-sample specific types of minority populations. These are exemplified by studies of ethnic minorities, such as Latinos or Muslim American voters, compared with the Anglo-American electorate within the United States.⁵² Cross-national studies have also analyzed societal cultures, including a growing body of surveys of public opinion in diverse Muslim-majority countries, facilitating comparison with cultures in Western countries.⁵³ Our earlier analysis based on the 1999-2001 WVS/EVS documented almost universal support for democratic values in 13 Islamic societies, with attitudes towards gender equality and sexual liberalization forming the sharpest cleavage dividing Islamic and Western societies.⁵⁴ Subsequent studies have further confirmed these patterns in Muslim-majority countries.⁵⁵ Nevertheless these conclusions need to be revisited, since others have argued that

the comparison of Muslim majority societies disguises important sub-cultures, as attitudes towards democracy and gender equality in the Arab region differ from those of Muslim societies in Asia and elsewhere.⁵⁶ Muslim opinion may also vary by the type of state; including among theocracies where Islam is the official religion, such as Iran, absolute autocracies such as Saudi Arabia, and electoral democracies such as Turkey with secular constitutions and a division of mosque and state.⁵⁷ Just as Evangelicals, Lutherans, and Roman Catholics hold distinct theological beliefs and social values, so too predominately Shi'a and Sunni Muslim societies may prove far from homogenous in their cultures.

Any satisfactory test of these theories, however, needs to examine cultural values at the societal level, as well as among majority and minority populations within countries. This article tests alternative propositions by examining evidence from all five pooled waves of the World Values Survey and European Values Study, a global investigation of socio-cultural and political change carried out from 1981 to 2007. This project has conducted representative national surveys of the basic values and beliefs of the publics in more than 90 independent countries, containing over 88 of the world's population and covering all six inhabited continents. The project builds on the European Values Survey, first carried out in 22 countries in 1981. A second wave of surveys was completed in 43 countries 1990-1991. A third wave was carried out in 55 nations in 1995-1996, and a fourth wave, in 59 countries, took place in 1999-2001. The fifth wave covering 55 countries was conducted in 2005-2007.⁵⁸

[Table 1 about here]

Most importantly for our purposes, the survey includes systematic data on public opinion in many diverse Islamic states containing Muslim-plurality populations, providing the broadest comparison available from any existing social survey. Societies in the World Values Survey are classified by their predominant religion, as listed in Table 1. Based on estimates of the religious population contained in the CIA World Factbook, the survey covers 20 *Islamic* nations, defined as those where the Muslim population is the largest plurality (which may also contain substantial minorities of other faiths). It is important to compare a wide variety of societies to examine the variety of attitudes and values found among Muslim nations around the globe.⁵⁹ The World Values Survey includes Arab states, both majority Sunni (such as Jordan, Algeria, Morocco, and Egypt) and majority Shi'a (such as Iran and Iraq), as well as countries in Asia (Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia), Central Europe (Bosnia Herzegovina, Albania) and in Sub-Saharan Africa (Mali, Nigeria, Burkina Faso). The survey also covered states that have adopted Islam as the foundation of political institutions (such as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan), societies where Islam is the official or established state religion (including Egypt, Bangladesh,

and Malaysia), and secular states where the constitution is neutral towards religion (such as Turkey, Azerbaijan, Indonesia). The World Values Survey contains eight of the ten most populous Muslim nations around the globe, including the top three, Indonesia, Pakistan and Bangladesh. This variation is important as others have noted that the comparison of *all* Islamic societies may overlook important distinctions, since attitudes towards gender equality and sexuality in Arab cultures are expected to be substantially more traditional than those of Asian Islamic cultures.⁶⁰

The WVS/EVS survey covers societies with all levels of economic and human development, including many affluent Western countries, such as the U.S., Japan and Switzerland, with per capita annual incomes over \$40,000; together with middle-level Muslim countries including Malaysia, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, as well as poorer Muslim societies, such as Bangladesh, Mali and Burkina Faso, with per capita annual incomes of \$500 or less. In terms of regimes, Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy, which Freedom House classifies as one of the world's most restrictive states in respect for civil liberties and political rights, but the World Values survey also monitored public opinion in the democratic states of Mali and Indonesia, as well as the secular state of Turkey.⁶¹

What types of cultural values are selected for comparison? The choice is important, because some types seem to be more deeply embedded in peoples' personality structure than others, making them relatively resistant to change when an individual moves into a new situation. Following Berger and Luckman, and Pettersson, we hypothesize that orientations that are established in one's primary socialization, relatively early in life, such as gender roles, ethnic identities, and religious values, are likely to become part of one's core identity, which is relatively resistant to change.⁶² Conversely, the formative period for political and economic values seems to occur later in life; such orientations, instilled in one's secondary socialization, are more open to change.⁶³ Consequently, we expect that migrants would be more likely to change their values concerning politics, than those concerning religion and gender roles. Previous research seems to support this expectation.⁶⁴ Though Muslim publics clearly support the goal of democracy, a substantial cultural gap exists between Islamic and Western societies concerning gender equality and sexual liberalization. Moreover, this gap seems to have widened in recent years because, while advanced industrial societies in North America, Western Europe, Japan and Australia have experienced rapid cultural change on issues such as tolerance of homosexuality, divorce and gender equality, the values of preindustrial societies have been changing relatively slowly.

A series of 13 items were selected to monitor cultural values towards gender and sexuality, religiosity, and democracy, and their dimensions were examined using factor analysis. The results

presented in Table 2 show that the items monitoring tolerance of homosexuality, abortion and divorce formed one consistent dimension, representing positive orientations towards issues of sexual liberalization and choice. The items concerning gender equality tapped into approval of traditional or egalitarian roles for men and women in the workforce, elected office and university education, forming a consistent scale that we have used in an earlier detailed study.⁶⁵ Support for democratic values and principles was monitored using four items: approval of having a democratic political system, and agreement or disagreement with questions about having a strong leader who does not have to bother with elections, having experts take decisions instead of government, and having military rule. The separate dimensions were summed and standardized into 100-point scales, for ease of comparison, with the full items listed in the Technical Appendix.

[Table 2 about here]

III: Results and findings

The descriptive mean position of the groups on the four 100-point value scales is shown in Table 3 and Figure 2, without applying any controls. The strength and significance of the association was measured by ANOVA. The results of the societal-level comparison demonstrates the existence of a sizeable (25 percentage point) culture gap between Islamic countries of origin and Western countries of destination on issues of religiosity, sexual liberalization and gender equality values. On questions such as tolerance of homosexuality, divorce and abortion, for example, Western Christians proved twice as liberal as the more traditional Muslims living in Islamic societies. A far smaller (10-percentage point) gap exists between Islamic and Western countries in support for democratic values, where there was widespread approval. This pattern confirms previous comparisons based on the 1999-2001 WVS/EVS, where the largest gap between Islamic societies and the West was over 'eros not demos'.⁶⁶ The marked societal contrasts in levels of religiosity have also been documented earlier in detail, with most Western nations proving increasingly secular in religious values and practices, exemplified by the steady erosion of regular attendance at church services in European societies.⁶⁷

[Table 3 and Figure 2 about here]

More importantly for the purposes of this study, the position of Muslim migrants proved to be *located approximately half-way between the dominant values prevailing within their Destination and their Origins*. This suggests that Muslims are not exceptionally resistant in levels of integration, as some studies suggest⁶⁸; instead, the centrist position documented⁶⁸ in other studies for Mexican and for Latin American migrants also applies to this population.⁶⁹ Migrants do not wholly reject their cultural roots, it

seems, but neither do they fully adopt the values of their host societies. This pattern was clear and consistent across all the indicators, although the exact location of migrants varied slightly across different cultural scales. It is also striking that although much of the European debate has focused on the attitudes and practices towards the roles of men and women, it appears that on the gender equality scale, Muslim minorities are in fact far closer to Western than to Islamic publics.

[Figures 3 and 4 about here]

To examine more closely the national variations, we constructed scatter-plots to compare the mean positions of countries on the gender equality and sexual liberalization scales (Figure 3) and on the democracy and religiosity value scales (Figure 4). In both cases, we find a clear clustering of societies by the predominant type of religion; thus while the Scandinavian countries of Sweden and Norway prove exceptionally egalitarian in their attitudes towards sexuality and gender, the other affluent Western nations such as France, the Netherlands and Switzerland follow close behind. By contrast the Muslim countries, in the bottom left quadrant of Figure 3, prove far more traditional on these issues, notably Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt. Asian and African Islamic societies are slightly more liberal, but they still all remain below the Western societies in this regard. Figure 4 comparing democratic values and religiosity shows a slightly looser scatter of societies, for example, among the Islamic societies, Tanzania, Azerbaijan and Pakistan show exceptionally high approval of democratic values. Nevertheless, while a less clear-cut division, there is also a pattern apparent with most Muslim societies clustered in the bottom right quadrant, showing less support for democratic ideals and greater religiosity.

So far we have examined the descriptive means at societal levels but of course before we can attribute these to the type of predominant religion in each society, or to individual Muslim religious identities, we need to control for a number of important variables. After all, Muslim migrants may well prove distinctive from their compatriots for many reasons; for example, younger groups, and those with greater educational qualifications or higher socioeconomic resources, may well find it easier to relocate. The use of Hierarchical Linear Models, in particular multilevel regression analysis, is an appropriate technique for comparing the impact of societal-level and individual-level factors simultaneously. We theorize that Muslim religious identities will have a *direct* effect on individual values. We also predict that living in Islamic societies will be important for the diffusion of cultural values.

To operationalize these factors, the key models involve measurement at two distinct levels. A representative sample of individual respondents (level 1) is nested within national-level contexts (level

2). The WVS/EVS was conducted among a representative random sample of the adult population within each country. Given the use of multilevel data, hierarchical linear models (HLM) are most appropriate for analysis, including multilevel regression analysis. The models in this study use restricted maximum likelihood techniques (REML) to estimate direct and cross-level effects for hierarchical data. Individual respondents are thus grouped into countries. Each country has a different set of parameters for the random factors, allowing intercepts and slopes to vary by nation.⁷⁰ In hierarchical linear models, as is customary, all independent variables were centered, by subtracting the grand mean (which becomes zero). The standardized independent variables all have a standard deviation of 1.0. This process also helps to guard against problems of collinearity in the independent variables in the OLS models. The independent variables were treated as fixed components, reflecting the weighted average for the slope across all groups, while nation was treated as a random component, capturing the country variability in the slope. The strength of the beta coefficients (slopes) can be interpreted intuitively as how much change in the dependent variable is generated by a one-percent change in each independent variable. The multilevel regression models used in this study usually generate small differences in the size of the slope coefficient (b) compared with the results of OLS models, but the average standard errors for level 2 variables tend to be slightly larger. The process is thus more rigorous and conservative, avoiding Type I errors (false positives, concluding that a statistically-significant difference exists when, in truth, there is no statistical difference). In the REML model, by contrast, Schwarz's Bayesian Criterion (BIC) is used, where the model with the lower value is the best fitting.

Level 1 in our core models includes the following *individual-level* Muslim religious identities, along with several other standard controls, described in the Technical Appendix, including male gender (0/1), household income using a 10-point scale, age (in years), the education scale, marital status, labor force participation, and religiosity (the Importance of God 10-point scale). Level 2 includes *national-level* variables, including the classification of societies into Islamic or Western Christian (see Table 1), based on the religious proportion of each country's population. In addition, we also control for the location of Islamic countries (classified as in the Middle East or elsewhere in the world), to test whether these societies differ.

[Table 4 about here]

Table 4 presents the models predicting cultural values in the Islamic and Western societies under comparison. The models show that both individual religious identities, and the type of society, influence social values. The type of society, however, consistently provides by far the stronger effect

across all value scales; thus, all other things being equal, living in an Islamic society makes a person roughly 10 percentage points more conservative towards sexual morality, about 10 points more religious, roughly 8 percentage points less supportive of gender equality and 3 points less positive towards democratic values. Being a self-identified individual Muslim, by contrast, has a significant but far weaker effect, although in the same direction. These effects remain significant controlling for many other factors that could plausibly influence social attitudes. The other controls in the models behave mostly as expected; hence education has a liberal effect across all value, while religiosity is associated with more traditional values. Support for tolerance of sexual liberalization values was strengthened by education, household income and labor force participation, while support was weaker among the older generation, those who were married, men, and the most devout. Other exploratory models, not reproduced here, found that similar results were generated controlling for other factors, such as use of the mass media and familiarity with a European language, which could facilitate processes of cultural assimilation. A comparison of the standardized coefficients shows that the experience of living in either an Islamic or Western society had a far stronger effect than any other characteristic under comparison.

[Figure 5 about here]

To see whether generational processes are gradually closing any remaining value gaps, Figure 5 illustrates the attitudes by age category and by type of social group. The graphs show that across each of the value scales, the societal-level gaps largely persist (concerning democracy), or even widen (for sexual liberalization and religiosity), by age group. On religiosity, for example, the younger population in Western societies is increasingly secular compared with older generations. By contrast, Islamic Muslims, and Western Muslims, show a far slower process of age-related change towards religious values. Similar observations can be made concerning attitudes towards sexual liberalization; here younger Western Muslims are indeed becoming more tolerant than middle-aged and older generations, but the change among Western publics is far greater. As a result, although Western Muslims are consistently located between Islamic and Western societies, there is no evidence that generational change, by itself, will transform the situation so that the cultural differences between Muslim migrants and Western publics will disappear: younger Westerners are adopting modern values even more swiftly than their Muslim peers.

IV: Conclusions and Implications

There has been widespread public debate about how far Western societies can manage the growing social diversity produced by the rising influx of migrants flowing across national borders, and, in

particular, the rapidly expanding Muslim population living within Europe. During earlier historical eras, the United States assimilated successive waves of people, whether Irish, Italian, or Polish Catholics, Central European Jews, or Scandinavian Lutherans, as well as later populations drawn from around the globe, whether Vietnamese refugees, Korean shopkeepers and Indian software engineers, or Liberian, Colombian, Mexican laborers and service workers. Can historically more homogenous European cultures, such as Sweden, France and Germany, also manage to accommodate greater social diversity successfully? Or will immigration deepen cultural tensions, social instability, and intra-communal conflict in Europe, especially when tested under conditions of deep-rooted economic recession and joblessness?

As we demonstrate, cultural cleavages do exist. They are not monolithic. The largest differences between Muslim and Western societies are found in religiosity, gender roles and sexual norms. This does not mean that migrants are constructing a sub-culture that is entirely separate from the mainstream national cultures of Western societies; instead, Muslim migrants living in Western societies are located roughly in the center of the cultural spectrum, located between the publics living in Islamic and Western societies. It is entirely possible—indeed, we think it rather likely—that some degree of self-selection may be involved: those who choose to immigrate to the U.S. or to Spain may already have values that are relatively compatible with those of their future host country. But even if this is true, these findings contradict the idea that immigrants simply import an unmodified version of the values of their own country into their new host country. In the long-term, the basic cultural values of migrants appear to change in conformity with the predominant culture of each society.

Nevertheless, substantial national differences are apparent, and the gap between Muslim and Western societies is particularly large. They do not concern fundamental disagreement about whether democracy is a desirable form of government. But they do involve tolerance of sexual liberalization and women's equality—and tolerance is a particularly crucial aspect of a democratic political culture. Do such cultural differences necessarily lead to tensions or even clashes? No. Under high levels of existential insecurity, xenophobia and intolerance are particularly intense and likely to lead to violence. Conversely, conditions of security are conducive to relative tolerance of diversity; indeed, at high levels of existential security, cultural pluralism is regarded as enriching the diversity of lifestyles, the range of choices that are open to people. Cultural differences are a potential fault line that demagogues can exploit to inflame hatred between groups. But there is nothing inevitable about cultural conflict. Depending on conditions, diversity can be seen either as threatening or as a positive contribution

towards the innovation and creativity that makes society and economies adapt successfully to new challenges in a globalized world.

Table 1: Classification of countries under comparison

Countries of origin			Countries of destination				
Country	% Muslims	Global region	Country	% Muslims	Global region		
1	Iraq	98.9	Middle East	1	France	1.4	Western Europe
2	Algeria	98.0	North Africa	2	Finland	1.4	Scandinavia
3	Iran	97.7	Middle East	3	Belgium	1.2	Western Europe
4	Saudi Arabia	97.0	Middle East	4	Britain	1.0	Western Europe
5	Jordan	96.9	Middle East	5	Australia	0.9	Asia-Pacific
6	Egypt	94.3	North Africa	6	Netherlands	0.7	Western Europe
7	Mali	93.0	West Africa	7	W. Germany	0.7	Western Europe
8	Indonesia	92.2	South East Asia	8	Canada	0.7	North America
9	Azerbaijan	91.0	Central Europe	9	Switzerland	0.6	Western Europe
10	Bangladesh	88.7	South Asia	10	Luxemburg	0.6	Western Europe
11	Turkey	81.7	Central Europe	11	N. Zealand	0.3	Asia-Pacific
12	Kyrgyzstan	74.3	Central Asia	12	Denmark	0.3	Scandinavia
13	Pakistan	69.6	South Asia	13	Norway	0.3	Scandinavia
14	Albania	64.3	Central Europe	14	Sweden	0.2	Scandinavia
15	Morocco	63.6	North Africa	15	U.S.A.	0.2	North America
16	Malaysia	57.4	South East Asia	16	Austria	0.1	Western Europe
17	Burkina Faso	53.3	Sub-Saharan Africa	17	Spain	0.1	Mediterranean Europe
18	Bosnia	48.9	Central Europe	18	Ireland	0.0	Western Europe
19	Tanzania	40.1	East Africa	19	Greece	0.0	Mediterranean Europe
20	Nigeria	28.1	West Africa	20	Iceland	0.0	Scandinavia
				21	Italy	0.0	Mediterranean Europe
				22	Portugal	0.0	Mediterranean Europe

Table 2: Dimensions of cultural value scales

	Religiosity	Sexual liberalization	Gender equality	Democratic values
Importance of God scale	.719	-.434		
Religious identity	.705			
Importance of religion	.677	-.452		
Frequency of attending religious services	.586			
Take moments of prayer or meditation?	.582			
How often think about meaning of life	.491			
Justifiability abortion		.753		
Justifiability divorce		.745		
Justifiability homosexuality		.702		
Men make better political leaders than women			.742	
University education more important for a boy			.719	
Men should have more right to a job than women			.669	
Having a strong leader rule without elections				.772
Having experts, not government, take decisions				.686
Having the army rule				.611
Approve of having a democratic system		.439		.419
% of variance	16.7	16.5	13.4	10.9

Notes: Individual-level Principal Component Factor Analysis was used to develop the scales with varimax rotation and Kaiser Normalization, excluding coefficients below 0.40. See the technical appendix for the detailed survey items.

Source: Pooled World Values Survey, 1981-2007

Table 3: Mean position of groups on the value scales

Type of society	Respondent's religious identity	Religious values	Gender equality	Democratic values	Sexual liberalization
Islamic	Muslim	82.5	57.0	70.8	23.6
Islamic	Non-Muslim	80.8	61.7	76.9	26.4
Western	Muslims	75.5	75.3	75.4	37.1
Western	Christian	60.4	82.2	81.3	50.4
	All	69.4	67.3	74.2	42.9
	Muslim identity	.385***	.464***	.300***	.370***
	Islamic society	.460***	.551***	.328***	.444***
	N.	110,990	80,573	84,114	133,170
	Period	1981-2007	1994-2007	1994-2007	1981-2007

Note: Each value scale is standardized to 100-points for ease of comparison. See the technical appendix and Table 2 for the detailed survey items. ANOVA tests for differences in means across groups were performed. The strength of association coefficient was measured by Eta coefficients. The asterisks (***) denote differences in these coefficients that are significant at the 1 percent level.

Source: Pooled World Values Survey, 1981-2007


Table 4: Full model predicting cultural values

	Gender equality	Liberal sexual morality	Democratic values	Religious values
PREDICTOR VARIABLES				
Muslim religious identity	-0.55*** (.099)	-0.59*** (.123)	-0.62*** (.086)	2.43*** (.105)
Islamic society	-8.22*** (.070)	-10.24* (1.06)	-3.23*** (.940)	10.67*** (1.67)
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL CONTROLS				
Age (years)	-0.96*** (.070)	-2.01*** (.078)	0.97*** (.054)	3.31*** (.068)
Gender (male=1)	-3.83*** (.060)	-2.08*** (.069)	0.52*** (.047)	-1.72*** (.060)
Household income 10-pt scale	1.06*** (.066)	1.05*** (.074)	0.76*** (.051)	-0.777*** (.065)
Education 9-pt scale	3.06*** (.066)	2.98*** (.078)	2.63*** (.050)	0.31*** (.067)
Labor force participation	0.72*** (.063)	1.42*** (.073)	0.11* (.050)	-0.43*** (.064)
Marital status	-0.52** (.062)	-1.07*** (.071)	0.15*** (.049)	0.49*** (.062)
2 nd generation immigrant	0.17** (.043)	0.45*** (.053)	0.03 (.037)	.093* (.045)
Religiosity	-1.95*** (.083)	-7.67*** (.087)	-0.48*** (.061)	
NATIONAL-LEVEL CONTROLS				
Middle East	-2.58** (1.26)	-.090 (1.28)	-1.26 (1.07)	-.128 (1.73)
Constant (intercept)	73.1	44.3	75.55	65.4
Schwartz BIC	654,224	771,651	761,323	729,290
N. respondents	78,037	87,694	94,018	85,781
N. nations	31	38	38	34

Note: All independent variables were standardized using mean centering (z-scores). Models present the results of the REML multilevel regression models including the beta coefficient, (the standard error below in parenthesis), and the significance. The 100 point scales are constructed from the items listed in Table 2. P.*>.05


Source: Pooled World Values Survey 1981-2007.

Figure 1: The typological classification



Note: *'Islamic countries of origin'* were classified as those with a plurality Muslim population. *'Western countries of destination'* were defined as OECD member states with a plurality Protestant or Roman Catholic population. Within each category, individual Muslims, non-Muslims, and Christians were defined by individual religious identities, as monitored in the pooled World Values Survey 1981-2007.


Figure 2: Cultural values by type of society and religious identity



Note: For the classification, see Figure 1. For the value scales, see the Technical Appendix.


Source: pooled World Values Survey 1981-2007.

Figure 3: Sexual liberalization and gender equality values by type of society




Source: pooled World Values Survey 1981-2007.

Figure 4: Democratic and religious values by type of society



Source: pooled World Values Survey 1981-2007.

Figure 5: Values by age group and type of societal-religious identity



Source: pooled World Values Survey 1981-2007.

Technical Appendix A: Concepts and Measures

Variable	Definitions, coding and sources
Per Capita GDP	Measured in constant international \$ in Purchasing Power Parity. Various years. Source: The World Bank. World Development Indicators.
Type of religion	V184: "Do you belong to a religious denomination? [IF YES] Which one?" Coded: No, not a member; Roman Catholic; Protestant; Orthodox (Russian/Greek/etc.); Jewish; Muslim; Hindu; Buddhist; Other. Source: World Values Surveys.
Type of predominant religion worldwide	The classification of the major religion (adhered to by the plurality groups in the population) in all 193 states around the world is based on the CIA. <i>The World Factbook</i> , 2009. (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency). Source: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook
Gender equality scale	The combined 100-pt gender equality scale is based on the following 3 items: MENPOL Q118: "On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do." (Agree coded low); MENJOBS Q78: "When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women." (Agree coded low); BOYEDUC Q.119: "A university education is more important for a boy than a girl." (Agree coded low). Source: World Values Surveys.
Sexual liberalization value scale	"Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified (10), never justified (1), or somewhere in-between, using this card...Abortion, Homosexuality, Divorce". Source: World Values Surveys
Democratic values scale	V148-151. "I'm going to describe various types of political system and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections/ Having experts, not government, make decisions../Having the army rule/ Having a democratic political system?" Source: World Values Surveys.
Religious values scale	This is a composite 100-point scale constructed by summing the following items: Importance of God, Religious identity, Importance of religion, Frequency of attending religious services, Take moments of prayer or meditation, How often think about meaning of life?
Occupational Class	Coded for the respondent's occupation. "In which profession/occupation do you, or did you, work?" The scale is coded into 4 categories: Professional/manager (1); Other non-manual (2); Skilled non-manual (3); Unskilled Manual Worker (4). Source: World Values Surveys
Paid work status	V220. "Are you employed now or not?" Coded fulltime, part-time or self-employed (1), other (0). Source: World Values Surveys
Education	V217. "What is the highest educational level that you have ever attained?" Coded on a 9-point scale from no formal education (1) to university level with degree (9). Source: World Values Surveys
Age	Age coded in continuous years derived from date of birth. Source: World Values Surveys. Age groups: Younger (18-29), middle (30-49), and older (50+).
Language	V222. "What language do you normally speak at home?" Code English=1, else=0. Source: World Values Surveys
Religiosity	V192 'How important is God in your life' 10-point scale

Household Income V253 *“On this card is a scale of incomes on which 1 indicates the “lowest income decile” and 10 the “highest income decile” in your country. We would like to know in what group your household is. Please, specify the appropriate number, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in.” (Code one number).* Source: World Values Surveys

Education scale V238. *“What is the highest educational level that you have attained?” [NOTE: if respondent indicates to be a student, code highest level s/he expects to complete]: (1) No formal education; (2) Incomplete primary school; (3) Complete primary school; (4) Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type; (5) Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type; (6) Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type; (7) Complete secondary: university-preparatory type; (8) Some university-level education, without degree; (9) University-level education, with degree.* Source: World Values Surveys

Note: Full details of the World Values Survey codebooks and questionnaires can be found at www.worldvaluessurvey.com.

¹ It should be noted that throughout the paper the term 'Islamic' is used to refer to Muslim majority societies, and it is not used to describe the official religion or policies of the state, or the relation between religious and political authorities. 'Muslim' is used throughout to refer to individuals who identify with the Muslim faith.

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