Als wär’ es ein Stuck von uns . . .

German Politics and Society Traverses Twenty Years of United Germany

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Twenty years is not an insignificant time in remembered history. Much can change in two decades. Twenty years after the revolution of 1918 came Kristallnacht and twenty years after the signature of the Versailles Treaty the preparations for the German attack on Poland that launched World War II in Europe. Twenty years ago at the end of 1989, my editor at Princeton University Press asked me if I might write a quick book on what was happening in East and West Germany, and that book (hardly quick) is already a dozen years old. For those of us who spent last fall at one commemorative event or another we have been compelled to think about that passage of time. The question I found pressing was not Was bleibt? but Was bleibt zu sagen? What is left to say? After all the discussions of Germany and its unification, its continuities and its transformations, it seemed worthwhile to ask how “we”—observers of contemporary Germany represented through our journal—had dealt with these two decades. What preoccupations did we have; how have they changed?

This is a story about Germany-watching, not Germany. Some of us were already academically in mid-career when the GDR collapsed; others would begin their professional observation only during this interval. At the age of 80, Fritz Stern could write a memoir based on five Germanies he had known; most of us have been a younger crew and have had one—the Berlin Republic—or three—including the GDR and the ‘two’ FRGs. What Germany represents has changed—and our scholarly and perhaps personal lives along with it. I have chosen as my title a paraphrase of the pun which playwright Carl Zuckmayer used for his memoir—Als wär’es ein Stück von mir—lifted in turn from the last line of Franz Uhland’s military lament, “Ich hatte einen Kamerad.” It is appropriate on two counts. The comrades no longer run East Germany; and German Politics and Society was a piece of our intellectual life, certainly for “Andy” Markovits, and owing much to Guido Goldman and Abby Collins in its early years at Harvard, then, following Markovits, at Santa Cruz. It should be noted that the Harvard’s CES (along with Georgetown and Berkeley) was benefiting from Chancellor Kohl’s initiative of the late 1980s to establish “Centers of Excellence” for German and European studies. Had this major commitment not been resolved on before unification dominated the German government’s agenda, it might well have never been funded. Most of the ongoing grant went to train graduate students, but the journal, too, was a beneficiary; and helped, I believe on reviewing its record, to repay the expectations of that grant.
What follows is hardly scientific. It is not scholarship, but not just memory either. I’ve surveyed most of the almost 80 issues of GP&S since 1989, or least their contents, extracted some essays that seemed symptomatic and have used them as the occasion for a highly subjective reflection. The underlying sensation relates not to the object of study but the observer -- the confrontation with vanished time, expressed as the perhaps universally: posed autobiographical question: Where have the years gone? The elision of time is an unremarkable experience, and yet it can take one’s breath away. Has our journal conspired in that elision, that blurring? Or does it let us resist the smooth passage of time and mark every turn of event or cultural transition, such that we might feel we’d experienced the years as if in a harshly fought retreat (or advance), contesting every interval like some trench to be defended?

As a group we have to face the fact that we nurture ambivalent interests for Germany. As commentators and teachers who often have to represent the German scene to a wider public, we are grateful for a country that is civic minded, has a generous welfare state, seems to be a model democracy and (at least when the United States is itself acting rationally) a good ally. Nonetheless, most of us, certainly the historians, literary and cultural critics, also have a stake in its being slightly off center – heir to a problematic politics, a picturesque cultural scene, a lingeringly imperfect unification, a sense of historical memory that is either too contrite or, conversely, too self-pitying. In short where would be without some sort of Sonderweg? And, of course, exposing whatever uniqueness or whiff of deviance might exist was in the corporate interest of GP&S. Certainly no country is quite like any other, but our journal has been implicitly predicated, perhaps, on the expectation that Germany was to be a little more not like the others than the others from each other. Our job was to explain why that was so, or why it really was no longer so.

That’s been a hard stance to maintain, however. Even before the events of 1989, we were faced with a country long since wealthy and equipped with a forty-year old political system that managed to filter out the impulses toward prejudice or parochialism we spent so much time in dissecting. Occasionally we could take alarm at an ugly rightist resurgence, usually confined though to one regional setting or another. Analysis of street demonstrations and police crack-downs generally represented the liberal academic call to ameliorate underlying grievances: “violence on a large scale will continue as long as an unresponsive, overly statist government does not deal with root causes – widespread unemployment among youth, poor housing, callousness of the prosperous two-thirds of the population toward the one-third less well off, ecological disasters, and the arms race.” And we could become moved by the memory wars, or perhaps better said, the amnesia struggle. We explored that moral and sometimes moralistic earnestness that could inform foreign policy or environmental concerns.
The end of the GDR and German unification brought the issues of historical responsibility that the Communist dictatorship raised to new salience. No longer did we as intellectuals just have to focus on the issues raised by the Nazi past, although that set of questions was never to disappear for long. What responsibilities must be assigned with respect to the SED state that disappeared before our surprised eyes? Before 1989 the occasional presence of the other Germany in our pages had not forced a fundamental moral scrutiny of the role of elites East and West, since the existence of two German states seemed so inscribed for the ages in the postwar European order. To put it differently, we were hypnotized by Helsinki’s “basket one” (stabilizing borders) that we (along with virtually all other observers in the West) underestimated the subversive impact of basket three” (human rights). GP&S was not home to those who harped on the repressiveness of the East German regime; rather we explored all the signs of evolution and dissent. There was certainly no Charter 77 or Solidarnosc in the GDR, but Christa Wolf could publish *A Model Childhood*. I cite her because, her changing reputation, signaled in our pages, became symptomatic of the cultural climate of newly united Germany.

At the time of the 1989-90 *Wende* -- when in fact the term *Wende* still referred to the CDU-FDP 1982 replacement of the Social-Liberal coalition -- our journal was six years old, published three times yearly out of the Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies. The Center in the months after November 1989 fizzed with the effervescence from the changes underway in Central Europe, as participants from the GDR or Czechoslovakia (still a country) arrived every few weeks to report on this most fantastic of transformations. John Connelly, now professor at Berkeley, then a Harvard graduate student, reported on the demonstrations and confrontations he had observed in early October in Plauen, where the trains filled with GDR citizens who had fled to the West German embassy in Prague passed through on their way to the West. By the time his article appeared as reunification loomed, Connelly could already note the changed mood in Plauen as massive unemployment threatened and nostalgia, not for the old regime, but for the exhilaration of the autumn moment, was already encroaching.3

The same issue featured a long essay by Peter Schneider, based on a piece in *Die Zeit*, which chastised the Writers Union of the expiring GDR for their unwillingness to undergo a needed self-criticism. Could Schneider have anticipated that within a couple of years Christa Wolf, whom he mentioned with admiration as an exception, would come under harsh attack by a newly fashionable FAZ cohort around Frank Schirmacher, and such writers as Ulrich Greiner and the playwright Botho Strauss -- similar in their zeal to instrumentalize the critique of a now defunct GDR for a neo-con-like discrediting of the social democratic left. GP&S 27 reported on a 1991 Harvard conference covering politics and intellectuals in a special issue in the fall of 1992, “Getting over the Wall: Recent Reflections on German Art and Politics since the Third Reich.” Did Judith Ryan fully perceive the elitist political implications of Strauss’s aesthetic stance she refereed as postmodernism? Did our editors understand the implications and political valence of
Greiner’s supposedly neutral reporting on the Literaturstreit of 1990? Or was it just too difficult to disentangle a social democratic variant of cultural politics in the old FRG of the 1980s and the new FRG after 1990 from the political liability of having tolerated and perhaps reinforced the GDR for perhaps a decade too long? As Greiner said, West Germany, at least the West Germany that had accepted Ostpolitik, had also ended (an observation this author made at a conference on the fortieth anniversary of the Basic Law in October 1989 – but without the sharpening of knives that Greiner’s essay portended). Nonetheless, the implications were becoming clear to the American Germanisten more sympathetic to GDR authors.

Just two issues after the issue in which Ryan and Greiner appeared, Marc Silberman of Wisconsin-Madison published his critique of the triumphalism of the West German intelligentsia. Suitably hedged with claims of impartiality and the invocation of a post-modern sensibility, the piece nonetheless implied that there had been a viable tradition of subtle resistance among the GDR literary establishment who had been coerced into silence by the triumphalism of unification. Looking back on the debate, the present historian recalls a certain distaste for the mauvaise foi on both sides: whether the politically correct apologetics on the part of the American academic left; or the total lack of charity for the difficulties East German writers had faced on the part of a fashionable “smart set” in the West.

The editors’ preface – and I was an editor – recognized that the euphoria of unification and Maastricht was giving way to “gloom and doom.” But perhaps we were not initially prepared to recognize the powerful culture of reproach that was coming to prevail both east and west, although the themes emerged in the following issue of autumn 1993 edited by John Torpey and A. James McAdams. And for better or worse, we were not prepared to act as critics of the debate, which as Americans we might, in fact, have been well positioned to do. Instead – let’s face it – it was all too tempting to cast it into older categories of German politics that we often were tempted to conclude still lurked in the German psyche. Thus John Ely in the summer of 1995 denounced a resurgent “intellectual spectrum of rightist thinking – the renaissance, one might say, of a ‘conservative revolution’ at precisely the time when the boundaries between conservative views clearly within a liberal-democratic consensus and those outside are tendentially dissolving…One aspect of the new Right is the increasing dissolution of this dualistic distinction between liberal-democratic and antidemocratic conservatism, between ‘black’ and ‘brown’ politics.”

Of course, this seems alarmist, but looking back at the essays of the 1990s, we can discern in the pages of German Politics and Society, a trend that may have characterized political culture more broadly. The Wall had fallen, the twin towers still stood; political violence in the West was a bad memory from the 1970s or confined to the intractable peripheries of Europe. After so much hard work in winning the Cold War and concluding the Maastricht treaty and re-energizing capitalism; faced, too, with the troubling
massacres in the Balkans and the unspeakable violence of Rwanda that neither Europeans nor Americans really wanted to deal with, wouldn’t it be better if intellectuals took a brief vacation from historical responsibility, a happy holiday at the end of the century? Couldn’t they (hypocrites lecteurs, nos semblables, nos frères) use the hiatus to revisit ideas that once seemed venomous, try them on like old clothes from the back of the closet? Alternatively, if Carl Schmitt was too much to swallow, mightn’t we happily anticipate the advent of international civil society, doctors without frontiers, international criminal jurisdiction and transitional justice? Germany had become a nation: the FAZ wanted it to become a state. Most Germans in fact weren’t ready, and neither was GP&S.

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In the succeeding years some of these themes have continued, others have subsided, new ones have emerged. The reader who dips into the journal throughout the period encounters a number of recurrent preoccupations: first, that of cultural politics, including coverage of cinema and literature – a concern shared by our journal with the New German Critique, although GP&S brought a less cohesive post-Frankfurt-school stance. Second, Vergangenheitsbewältigung and memory wars; third, the transformation of German ideas of citizenship under the impact of immigration; fourth, politics, foreign and domestic (these last themes also marking the British journal, German Politics). Finally political economy – the future of Germany’s industrial vocation and the role of labor and entrepreneurs. Each of these topical areas had probably its own constituency of readers and contributors although they all ran into each other. In what follows however, I want to focus on the continuing reassessments that seem to have followed from the legacy of 1989.

It did not take unification to signal concerns about Federal Republic power (or the reluctance to wield power. Still, unification raised the stakes. Was united Germany likely to become a new European hegemon, or alternatively was it continually going to punch below its economic weight and large population? “Should Europe fear the Germans?” asked Andrei Markovits and Simon Reich in 1991 in a question that was more ominous than the answer, which argued that the united country had the responsibility to exercise more leadership. Rather, argued a friendly critic, Germany was “not yet capable of formulating a European policy that matches ends and means,” charged another contributor with respect to the Yugoslav crisis two years later. Another two years on, Beverly Crawford’s analysis of the disputed German decision to recognize the secession of Slovenia and Croatia from the Yugoslav federation came to a similar conclusion. Unilateral though it was, the policy reflected the upshot of German domestic political pressures on Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Genscher, and not a reversion to a nationalist agenda. Indeed the issue was debated among American observers of Germany; I recall that my own misgivings of German recognition were sharply contested by Stanley Hoffmann, who, along with many others, felt that the federation was
no more than a cover for Serbian ambitions. The paradoxical upshot of the protracted Yugoslav conflict (which became Bosnia’s anguish, not Croatia’s) was that in order to reintegrate its policy in a western framework, Germany was compelled to accept an initially unwelcome armed intervention outside its borders. Three articles in the summer of 1996 caught this transformation, so to speak, on the wing and endeavored to account for its halting evolution. Mary M. McKenzie appealed to the concept of of “normality” in taking on an international military role (even while Kohl tried to make sure that the East European countries would remain welcomed in the projects of alliance and union). Jeffrey Lantis traced the acceptance of military deployments to shifts in domestic politics that pushed the CDU-FDP government toward greater activity (sanctioned also by the Constitutional Court decision of 1994 that found no legal impediment to intervention abroad and prodded, too, by Joschka Fischer’s public rebalancing of German national obligations). And Thomas Banchoff emphasized the continuing role of historical memory as a constraint, although one that demanded careful public rationalizing and did not impose paralysis. The upshot, as noted six months later, was that for all the hesitation, by the end of 1996 Germany had decided to contribute to the Eurocorps and was prepared for intervention abroad, without, though, being tempted by any hegemonic vocation: “reflexive multilateralism, not hegemonic unilateralism will still be the rule for the foreseeable future” -- and “only haphazardly and inefficiently, by frustrating fits and starts.”

The upshot was that by the issues of 1996-1997, united Germany – as reflected in the pages of the journal – was emerging as a nation less constrained by old hesitations and doubts. Although foreign policy responsibilities, as GP&S suggested, would remain conditioned by history and debated in its light, they no longer had to be constrained by formulaic lessons. So too the debates over the historical relationship with the former GDR could move beyond pinning responsibilities on those who collaborated and those who fled; that is, it could leave behind the culture of reproach from the early 1990s. In the same issue of summer 1996 that featured, McKenzie, Lantis, and Banchoff, Caroline Molina skillfully analyzed Wolf Biermann’s career between East and West, by focusing on his poem, “Prussian Icarus,” and could present him as neither martyr nor hero, while Renate Holub explained how Jürgen Habermas was updating his insistence on normative politics to argue for public intellectuals’ engagement in the life of the Berlin Republic.

The stimulating issue of summer 1997, “One Nation – Which Past? Historiography and German Identities in the 1990s,” took up for intellectuals and political culture the themes that had been pointed out in the debates on foreign policy. How did a country willing finally to say “Nie wieder Auschwitz” rather than “Nie wieder Krieg” (and commit forces to peacekeeping, or peace-imposing missions), manage to steer by the Habermasian course of post-nationality and Verfassungspatriotismus?: In effect, this was a re-run of the Historikerstreit but growing out of more subtle issue. No one in that controversy a decade earlier had really wanted to rehabilitate the Third Reich into a constitutive part of the Bonn Republic. But was the East German legacy to be
similarly excised. “The East German past,” Konrad Jarausch pointed out, “has become such a hotly contested terrain because of its implications for the identity of a united Germany.” If it was simply totalitarian, “its legacy had best be obliterated and the FRG does not need to change.” If it had a mix of bad and good elements, what was its contribution to be in reconstituting the FRG.12, but now with a positive slant – not fear of reversion to bad old Germany, but confusion about what sort of national structure in which to integrate the GDR.

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One might be forgiven for thinking that with respect to issues of German identity and intellectuals Heraclitus had it wrong: one plunged into the same river over and over again. But in fact the identity issue was changing – certainly for the public and for intellectuals as well. Most notably it was being inflected less as a debate over history than one over culture. As a participant-anthropologist who appreciated the Kreuzberg “Szene,” John Bornemann wrote a provocative and humorous essay for the new millennium: “Multikulti or Schweinerei in the Year 2000.” He included gender as well as ethnic issues, and concluded that “the national debate about German Kultur is now always a debate about Multikulti, since German monoculture occupies a shrinking part of the experiential landscape of Germany. German Kultur’s major historical force is as utopia of dystopia….Self-deception with respect to this empirical reality is perhaps the real joke, a self-inflicted Schweinerei.”13 Further shifting sites for investigating the new Germany’s culture was Patricia Anne Simpson’s 2005 report on music groups that expressed wildly opposed views on inclusivity in the years after unification. Was German HipHop assisting “self-empowerment for people of color,” or would rap, as promoted by major labels “effectively open the musical culture to recoding from the Right”? Simpson found that at least the German coding of masculinity was less misogynistic and homophobic than the American models. “Much German popular music questions the hegemony of military masculinity in the political sphere, but also the violent, aggressive practices of men in the street, on the dance floor, and in bed.” As of 2005, however, one needed to ask whether Simpson’s female singers were targeting the macho males looking for hook-ups in Berlin or those patrolling Baghdad.14

Culture is obviously a capacious, probably too capacious a category. Perhaps it should be divided into Simpson and Borneman’s Saturday night culture and Sunday civic culture. Sunday’s was certainly less fun. In the same issue as Bornemann, David P. Conradt offered social-survey take on the political culture that had crystallized in united Germany since 1990. In his major report, the alternative culture to be evaluated arose not in the gay scene or among Turks but in the persistence or non-persistence of former GDR values. In specific, were citizens in the New Länder as committed to democracy as those in the West? Not surprisingly, living in a region that seemed to lag persistently economically tempered a commitment to abstract democracy, although the younger age cohorts were closer to West German levels of acceptance. Convergence into a single
James McAdams came to a similarly pessimistic conclusion from the viewpoint of the controversy over Stasi files. The East German past had been thoroughly scrutinized, whereas the West Germany’s democratic leadership, as evidenced by the campaign financing scandals, had behaved evasively but with little sanction. Since this disillusioned observation was not a function of economic disparity, McAdams speculated, it was likely to persist, perhaps even across the generations.

But if such attitudes persisted, that did not mean the party alignments would remain static. The election of 1998, might be interpreted as one of democratic confirmation, but it could also be seen as a rejection of a Chancellor who had stayed too long. In any case, the Schroeder government ended in a disillusion that threatened to erode the traditional pattern of party change based on a bellweather center. Thus David Conradt labeled his report on the 2005 national elections, “The Tipping Point,” and suggested it might usher in a “deconsolidation” of the German party system. The report was prescient and valuably linked evolving electoral preferences to changing bases in society, including the decline of the SPD’s working-class. Still, the answer to his question – “Can the current [black-red] coalition save the old party system, or will it spark further de-consolidation and give the Federal Republic a multi-party system based on four or five parties of roughly equal strength? Is this the end of reform gridlock (Reformstau), or the continuation of the ‘catastrophic equilibrium’…?” Catastrophic equilibrium,” was not Conradt’s own term, and indeed there were strong indications, through the economic shocks after 2008, that Germany had moved beyond gridlock: indeed the Schroeder governments along with the successive Merkel administration had compelled significant “reform.” Reform might be reduced to the almost universal neo-liberal sense of the capacity to reduce work forces and cap spending on welfare, an effort symbolized by the passage of Hartz IV. This was the initiative that could be counted on to arouse rallies for “die Linke.” But there were other dimensions, as well. Angelika von Wahl claimed that the Merkel government was making significant improvements to childcare policies that would allow women greater opportunity to combine work and family roles. Reform, too, was coming to the educational system, as Helga Welsh documented in her report of 2009. Of course, even after the election of 2009 we don’t know the answer to Conradt’s question although the party system inched closer to the 1871-1930 pattern of multiple parties. As of this writing we have yet to see GP&S’s analysis of this last result, although the summer 2009 issue previewing the election anticipated the Misere of the SPD. My own sense is two implicit camps of voters confronted each other in German politics after a decade of political frustrations. There was a large group – a coalition for continuity -- largely composed of older voters, seeking to vote for reliability, whether expressed by the diminishing SPD or by the CDU/CSU. In opposition was another group, a latent coalition for change, perhaps younger (although in East Germany sometimes elderly PDS voters) willing to wager on instability by voting for one of the three smaller parties. – the coalition for change -- of which the FDP profited most. The problem for the SPD was that there was “space” for only one of the Volksparteien to represent the coalition for continuity.
What conclusions can one draw from 20 years of reading our journal? What conclusions about Germany, what conclusions about the German watchers who filled its pages? It was natural enough that the writers had sought out and presented the most jagged and edgy aspects of culture and politics. How else justify their vocation? We were invested in following an interesting country. Certainly there was a great deal that promised interest: The momentous events of unification, the contradictory efforts at seeking to integrate and to master the former GDR, the claims of historical memory – which never were allowed to disappear. Erich Langenbacher and Frederke Eigler, insisted that they were still vital in the special issue on memory issues of autumn 2005. They denied memory fatigue and cited the continuing controversies over German interpretations of their past as evidence of “a sustained and unabated memory boom.” “Indeed 2005, like 1995, was a ‘super’ memory year.” Langenbacher’s own essay argued for the legitimacy of the then proposed center to remember the Germans expelled from Central Europe in 1945 and for a broad memory regime. Here perhaps was a sign of the evolution that the events of 1989 had helped to open up, because it is doubtful that the journal could have accepted such a plea so easily in the 1980s.

This has been a subjective journey. Other readers would emphasize different themes and essays. But I am struck by what I read, by several aspects. First by the vibrancy and size of the German watching community in the United States. Some remained attracted by the laboratory of social challenges, represented above all perhaps by the issues of cultural identity and assimilation or non-assimilation of immigrants. Perhaps one could compare Germany and the United States. A faithful group sustained an interest in government and party politics. Whether the memory boom was flagging in Germany – or perhaps more accurately increasingly a function of interest-group contestation – could be debated. In any case some of the most profound commentators, for instance Andreas Huyssen or Ansony Rabinbach, wrote in other forums. For all the interest that our community had in exposing what was unique, problematic, or conversely highly successful in Germany, the contributions to *German Politics and Society*, I believe, revealed a society that had mellowed over two decades. The euphoria of 1989 had in some areas, such as economic integration, changed into disappointments. Germany had gone through a phase of deep recrimination; it had also experienced a period of real skinhead violence. It had pleaded its own brutal past to avoid the harsher international commitments of the early 1990s. But that had changed. The country seemed more at ease with its own divisions. There was institutional stickiness – *eppure si muove!* In the fall of 20009, the United States gave signs of being a country far more bitterly divided than Germany, far more vulnerable to extreme political rhetoric and factional hostility, and perhaps more deeply caught in its own gridlock. And this despite the fact that a charismatic presidential candidate had captured the White House and generated tremendous enthusiasm – ironically, not least in Germany!
For all the essays, moreover, the German subject had become less unique. It had been a divided country – and the world spirit had seemed to descend on Germany on November 9, 1989. But since then the issues, for instance, surrounding Islamic societies or the rise of China as an economic giant had reproportioned Europe. *German Politics and Society* produced a valuable series of reports in a special issue (vol. 24,4) at the end of 2006: “Social Integration in the New Berlin,” edited by Hilary Silver. But the problems exposed, the communities observed, were not particularly German – they were those of disadvantaged diasporas throughout the West, and exploded far more violently in the Paris banlieu two years later. On the other side of the social spectrum, more educated Germans spoke English easily – perhaps a class of American cultural mediators who were at home in its complex language appeared less necessary. Shortly after unification in Berlin, spooky large steel gray posters appeared throughout the city, each etched with a shadowy knife and the inscription “Deutschland wird deutscher.” But in fact Germany had become less German.

If we ask the question, “Was bleibt?” we really need to ask it about united Germany not the former GDR. All of Germany has changed under our gaze, though not because of it. Of course much remains – foods, and art, evocative landscapes, soccer teams, great music and opera, the funky S-Bahn, countless places of personal memory. Much has changed. The purpose of our journal was not to capture a grand historical perspective but to track change underway. Such a task has to be undertaken in fragments, attaining fragmentary perspectives, applying fragments of expertise. In general I think the fragmentary reports we produced were discerning. Some were exaggerated, some over-emotional, some alarmist, but they provided orientation. When French statesmen or writers used to discuss their relationship with France they often personified her as a lover. I don’t think our community would ever find that metaphor apt. When Heine wrote about revisiting his home in Hamburg, he reckoned with his ageing Jewish mother. I think if we wanted a metaphorical personification, we might think of long-term, but contingent railroad companions. We shared a train compartment, some of us a first-class compartment, others a second-class. The train line, we knew had had a catastrophic accident long before we boarded, when drivers and passengers together had decided to drive really recklessly. But our trip was far calmer although we enjoyed at least one exhilarating passage in 1989. Different travelers got on, and indeed a whole family who hadn’t been allowed to travel joined us warily at that time twenty years ago. We were curious about where we were going, but just as intrigued by the scenery along the way. It’s gotten more familiar; we know what the passengers will talk about and the papers they’ll read, and the sandwiches they’ll open, but it’s been an interesting ride and happily enough a surprisingly unpredictable one.
NOTES


4 Judith Ryan, “Postmodernism as Vergangenheitsbewältigung,” and Ulrich Reiner, “Die Mauer im Kopf: toward an Understanding of the 1990 German Literary Dispute,” both in GP&S 27 (Fall 1992): 12-24, and 61-68. In the spring of 1993 GP&S would move to the University of California at Santa Cruz with Andrei Markovits as its primary and long-serving editor, and begin identifying issues by annual volume and issue numbers.


6 John Ely, “The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and Contemporary National-Conservatism,” GP&S 13, 2 (Summer 1995), 81-121, citation p. 82. Although Ely was alarmist about encroaching fascist tendencies, he valuable documented the new-old national arguments that was tempting the intellectuals. Ely connected it to the debates on immigration at a time of rising alarm over asylum seekers. Just as important, though, was a willingness on the part of the FAZ editorial leadership to push the envelope, so to speak, ever since Joachim Fest's opening the paper’s pages to Ernst Nolte's argumentation at the time of the Historikerstreit. Having discussed this policy with Fest, a courteous and historically engaged commentator, my sense was he believed he was allowing a genuine debate. It says something about the Berlin Republic that Germany’s two essential daily papers remain based in Frankfurt and Munich, and the assorted print runners-up in Hamburg.


