A Linguistic Frame of Mind: ar-Rāġib al-I#fahānī and What It Meant to be Ambiguous

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<tr>
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<tbody>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A Linguistic Frame of Mind:

ar-Rāġib al-Īṣfahānī and what it meant to be ambiguous

Abstract

The mediaeval Islamicate world was dominated by a language-obsessed culture that placed great value on words and their meanings. These words and meanings could, for those who used them, make the difference between both earthly success or failure, and salvation or damnation in the hereafter. Scholars were also conscious of the contingency of the links between words and their meanings, and the potential this created for ambiguity. This dissertation is about the mechanisms, models, and assumptions those scholars used to manage linguistic ambiguity. My investigation focuses on ar-Rāġib al-Īṣfahānī (fl. ≤ 409/1018), one such language-obsessed scholar. I provide a comprehensive review of his life, works, and times. He put together a portfolio of intellectual positions in exegesis, theology, ethics, and poetics that was guided by a philosophy of language which accepted and negotiated linguistic ambiguity.

Underpinning that philosophy was a theory of meaning that used the pairing of expression and idea (lafẓ and maʿnā) to deal with polysemy, the intent of the speaker, and the function of the lexicon. Ar-Rāġib’s philosophy was emblematic of what I call the Arabic Language Tradition, the shared assumptions of which constituted an indigenous philosophy of language that was able to supply its own answers to the central questions of linguistics and then use those answers across all of the genres encompassed by its scholarship, from grammar to poetics, law, and theology. It was an Arabic Language Tradition that is best understood through comparison to an alternative Classical Language Tradition that had its roots in the Organon and a theory of meaning with little space for ambiguity. Re-telling Islamic intellectual history through the lens of language in this way shows us that in addition to the well-known and oft-studied Islamic engagement with Hellenistic philosophy there was another, indigenous, tradition with its own answers to the problems of mediaeval scholarship. This Arabic Language Tradition saw in language a solution to these problems, rather than seeing language as just another hurdle to be overcome.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>On Human Virtue Arising from the Disciplines of Knowledge (Risālah anna Faḍīlat al-Insān bi-l-ʿUlūm)</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On the Ordering of Intellectual Disciplines and of Worldly Actions (Risālah fi Marātib al-ʿUlūm wa-l-Aʿmāl ad-Dunyawīyah)</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Correct Way in Chess (Adab aš-Šatranţ)</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On Knowledge of the Soul and On Invocation of God’s Name (Risālah fi-Maʿrifat an-Nafs, Risālah fi-d-Dīkr)</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Key to Success: Commentary on the Morning Personal Prayer (Ṣaḥr li-Duʿāʾ as-Ṣabāh al-mawsūm bi-Miftāh an-Naḥāţ)</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lost and Spurious Titles</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anecdotes from Historical Reports (Nukat al-ʿAţfār)</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choice Poetry (ʿUyūn al-ʿAţ)</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On Calling Attention to the Lessons of the Quran (ar-Risālah al-Munabbihah ʿalā Fawāʿid id-Qurʿān)</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On the Nobility of Sufism (Kitāb Šaraf at-Taṣawwuf)</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On the Relationships between Expressions (Risālah Munāsabāt al-Alfāţ)</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On Synonyms (Taḥqīq al-Alfāţ al-Mutarādīfah ʿalā al-Maʿnā al-Wāhid)</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Principles of Derivation (Uṣūl al-Istiqlāq)</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durrat at-Taʿwil wa Ǧurrat at-Tanzil fi-l-ʿAṭāʾ al-Muṭaṣabbihah wa-l-Muṭaʿalḥihāh (The Pearl of Interpretation and the Finest of Revelation in Unclear and Delayed Verses)</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitāb al-Maʿnī al-Akbar (The Larger Book of Literary Ideas)</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iḥtiqāq al-Qirāʿ āṭ al-Muḥtaṣṣah (Vindication of Specified Readings of the Quran)</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Šarḥ Kalām Rasūl Allāh fi Haqq ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib (Commentary on the Prophet’s Words Concerning the Right of Ali)</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Times</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isfahan</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabic and Persian Isfahan</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collegial Relationships</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fitting into the Institutional Landscape</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Court</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hadith</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sectarian Affiliations</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunnis</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shia</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditionists, Senior Sufis, and Wise Philosophers</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ragib’s Beliefs</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. RAGIB’S PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE ................................................................. 102
   Synopsis ........................................................................................................... 102
   Analysis ........................................................................................................... 109
      Expression and Idea (lafz and ma’nā) .......................................................... 109
      Intent (murād, qaṣd) .................................................................................... 119
   The Lexicon ...................................................................................................... 121
   The Referents of “Idea” .................................................................................. 136
   Truth and Quranic Ambiguity ....................................................................... 141
   The Value of Complexity and Analogy ......................................................... 146

4. RAGIB’S PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE IN PRACTICE ..................................... 152
   Compulsion and Free Will ............................................................................. 153
   Attributes ....................................................................................................... 159
   Poetics ............................................................................................................ 172
   Figurative Readings ...................................................................................... 191
   Concluding Remarks on Ragib’s Philosophy of Language .......................... 196

5. THE HISTORY OF THE ARABIC LANGUAGE TRADITION .................................. 199
   Universal Concepts ....................................................................................... 199
   Early Analyses of Linguistic Ambiguity ....................................................... 201
   The Great Men of the Arabic Tradition ....................................................... 210
   The Theorists .................................................................................................. 219
   Concluding Remarks on the Arabic Language Tradition ........................... 234

6. A CONCLUDING COMPARISON TO A CLASSICAL LANGUAGE TRADITION ...... 237
   Expressions, Ideas, Logic, and Homonymy in the Classical Language Tradition .... 241
   Epilogue ......................................................................................................... 254

APPENDIX ONE: MANUSCRIPTS ......................................................................... 257
   Description of the London Quranic Glossary .............................................. 257
   Description of Ragib on Innovative Figures of Speech (Kitāb min Kalām ar-Rāġib fī-l-Baḍī’ / Afānīn al-Balāḡah) ........................................................ 259
   Description of Chester Beatty AR 5277 (On Creeds) .................................. 260
   Annotated list of Ragib’s Work in Manuscript Catalogues around the World (a work in progress) ................................................................. 262
      Notes and Observations ............................................................................. 262
      Exegesis of the Quran (Tafsīr) .................................................................. 263
      Quranic Glossary (Mufradāt Ǧarīb al-Qurʾān al-Karīm) ......................... 266
      On Creeds (al-�示dāt) ................................................................................. 271
The Path to the Nobilities of the Revelation (Kitāb aḏ-Ḍarīʾah ilā Makārim aš-Ṣarīʾah) 274

Analysis of the Two Creations and Attainment of the Two Happinesses (Tafsīl an-Naṣʿatayn wa Tahṣīl as-Saʿādatayn) ................................................................. 276

Littérature’s Ripostes and Poets’ and Eloquent Men’s Rejoinders (Muḥāḍarāt al-Undābāʾ wa-Muhāwarāt aš-Šuʿarāʾ wa-l-Bulaḡāʾ) ................................................... 278

The Confluence of Eloquence (Maḏmaʿ al-Balāḡah) ........................................................................ 284

Ragib on Innovative Figures of Speech (Kitāb min Kalām ar-Rāġib fī-l-Badīʾ) .......... 285

Abridgement of ’The Reform of Speech’ by Ibn as-Sikkīt (Muṣṭaṣar Iṣlāḥ al-Manṭiq li-Ibn as-Sikkīt) .................................................................................. 285

On the Difference Between the Words ’One’ and ’Absolute One’ (Risālah fī Ḏikr al-Wāḥid wa-l-Aḥad) .......................................................................................... 285

On the Correct Ways to Mix with People (Risālah fī Ādāb al-Iḥtilāṭ bi-n-Nās) .......... 286

On Human Virtue Arising from the Disciplines of Knowledge (Risālah anna Faḍīlat al-Insān bi-l-ʿUlūm) ............................................................................. 286

On the Ordering of Intellectual Disciplines and of Worldly Actions (Risālah fi Marāṭib al-ʿUlūm wa-l-Aʾmāl ad-Dunyawīyah) ................................................................. 286

The Correct Way in Chess (Adab aš-Ṣaṭranḏ) ................................................................................. 287

On Knowledge of the Soul and On Invocation of God’s Name (Risālah fī-Maʿ rifat an-Nafs, Risālah fī-ḏ-Ḏikr) ................................................................................. 287

Ṣarḥ li-Duʿ āʾ aṣ-Ṣabāḥ al-mawsūm bi-Miftāḥ an-Naḡāḥ (The Key to Success: Commentary on the Morning Personal Prayer) ............................................................... 287

Ṣarḥ Kalām Rasūl Allāh fī Haqq ’Alī b. Abī Ṭālib (Commentary on the Prophet’s Words Concerning the Right of Ali) ........................................................................ 288

False Attributions (in addition to those detailed above) ................................................................. 288

Aḥlāq ar-Rāġib (Ragib’s Ethics) ........................................................................................................ 288

Aṭbāq aḏ-Ḍahab (Trays of Gold) ...................................................................................................... 289

Al-Qalāʾ id wa-l-Fawāʾid (Poems and Homilies) ........................................................................... 289

Ṣaqīl al-Fahm (Burnished Understanding) ...................................................................................... 289

APPENDIX TWO: SELECTIONS FROM UNPUBLISHED MANUSCRIPTS ........................................... 290
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in memoriam Elizabeth Key
1. INTRODUCTION

Ambiguity

Linguistic ambiguities, and the obsession with language from which they spring, have long been recognised as a prominent characteristic of mediaeval Islamicate intellectual culture.

Richard M. Frank wrote that in “no culture, perhaps, has speech and the eloquent use of language been so praised and admired or the language itself more cherished and studied”.¹ This observation was updated by James Montgomery with a list of eighteen intellectual disciplines ranging from law to poetry that show a “fascination (or: fixation) with speech”.²

The obsession with language³ was accompanied by an awareness that language was inescapably imprecise. European scholars were aware of this back in 1954, when in the first


² The full list:
At the very heart of the manifold, complex and shifting responses to the Qurʾān which we identify (and frequently distort) as characteristic of the Islam of the first two ʿAbbāsid centuries, beats a fascination (or: fixation) with speech: speech as divine (the Qurʾān); speech as revealed law (the Shariʿa); speech as prophetic exemplar (the Ḥadīth); speech as God’s special gift to the Arabs and their Prophet (ʿarabiyya); speech as creedal declaration (shahāda); speech as deontology (al-amr bi-l-maʿruf); speech as grammar (nabw); and lexicography (lugha); speech as reasoned (nūq); and logical (manṭiq); speech as dialectic, eristics and speculative science (kalām); speech as doctrine (maqāla); and oration (khutba); speech as utterances threaded together as a poem (gawl manẓūm); or scattered untrammelled by rhyme or rhythm as prose (gawl manṭūr); speech as the cooing of doves [rhymed] (saj); speech as translation (naqal, occasionally tafsīr); speech as rhetoric (khafāba).

James E. Montgomery, "Speech and Nature: al-Jāḥiz, Kitāb al-Bayān wa-l-Tabyīn, 2.175-207, Part 1," Middle Eastern Literatures 11, no. 2 (2008): 170. It is a moot point whether the intellectual culture cared so much about language as a result of the Quran, or whether the Quran became intellectually central because the culture cared so much about language.

³ It was a culture obsessed with language, but perhaps not quite “logocentric” (pace Montgomery, ibid.). The intellectual culture was obsessed with all words from a plurality of speakers more than it was obsessed with a single logos, even if that single logos were to be the Quran. Islamic scripture is also not quite what Jacques Derrida had in mind when he coined the word logocentrisme for the single shared logos, inevitably and naturally expressed in sounds, that he accused everyone “from the pre-Socratics to Heidegger” of being fixated with: “ce logocentrisme qui est aussi un phonocentrisme” (that logocentrism that is also a phonocentrism). NB: the link between Derrida’s logocentrisme and Islamicate intellectual culture was perhaps first made by Mohammed Arkoun. Jacques Derrida,
edition of the journal *Arabica* Louis Massignon observed that Arabic was more the “*langue des Ḍādād*” than it was the “*langue du Ḍād*”, a pithy remark that played on the indigenous tradition that the phoneme ḍād was unique to the Arabic language, and on the apparent prevalence in Arabic of words with two opposite meanings (*addād*).⁴ The article on linguistic structures in which he made this observation about ambiguity was a catalyst for a 1967 collection edited by Jean-Paul Charnay entitled *L’Ambivalence dans la culture arabe*. In its introduction Charnay wrote that it appeared paradoxical to base one of the great cultures of humanity on a notion that appeared to negate the great Hellenic principles of identity and causality, which had enabled modern civilisation to reason on the basis of evidence from reality.⁵ Although the contributions to Charnay’s collection demonstrated that words with two opposite meanings are no more common in Arabic than in French,⁶ and broadened the analysis of ambiguity to include the genres of legal disputes (*iḥtiilāf*), dialectics, and mysticism, Charnay had nevertheless highlighted

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⁵ Charnay’s argument reads:


a key aspect of the foreignness of mediaeval Islamicate intellectual culture from a European perspective: it appears to be particularly tolerant of ambiguity.

In *Die Kultur der Ambiguität: Eine andere Geschichte des Islams*, Thomas Bauer notes that mediaeval Islamicate scholarship often still offers the best theoretical presentation of verbal ambiguity available, before going on to address language as just one of a number of types of cultural agency that can be evaluated against an ideal of *Ambiguitätstoleranz* that he hopes can be useful for Europeans, Muslims, and European Muslims today.\(^7\) It is likely that the difference between Charnay’s discomfort with ambiguity and Bauer’s celebration of it reflects philosophical developments in European scholarship in the later decades of the twentieth century. We have, thanks to Michel Foucault, Richard Rorty, and many others, as well as substantial recourse to the ironies laid out by Friedrich Nietzsche, become more comfortable with ambiguity and commensurately less comfortable with certainty. Revealingly, Bauer bookends *Die Kultur der Ambiguität* with a quotation from the Nobel Prize winning physicist Max Born (1882-1970) that says absolute certainty and the belief in a single attainable reality are at the root of the world’s evils.\(^8\) In this dissertation, however, I am dealing with a different time and a different place. There was no mediaeval Islamicate discussion of whether absolute certainty existed, comparable to the debates that informed Born, Charnay, and Bauer. Instead, there were a series of methodological disagreements about how best to attain certainty. This dissertation focuses on disagreements about the role language played in that process.

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\(^7\) Thomas Bauer, *Die Kultur der Ambiguität: Eine andere Geschichte des Islams* (Berlin: Verlag der Weltreligion, 2011), 13, 16-17, 405. (*The Culture of Ambiguity: an alternative history of Islam*). *Ambiguitätstoleranz* (tolerance of ambiguity) is a concept from psychology that Bauer says has not yet found its place in the social sciences. Ibid., 13.

I argue that the various instances of linguistic ambiguity, such as the *aḍḍād*, are all products of the relationship between expression (*lafẓ*) and idea (*maʿnā*), and that it is only by starting one’s investigation with this basic pairing that one can come to understand the different ways in which mediaeval Arabic-language scholars engaged with and negotiated ambiguity. I also argue that just as Charnay and Bauer differentiated between the European and Islamicate traditions’ attitudes to ambiguity, there are two separate traditions within mediaeval Islamicate scholarship that accepted the framework of expression and idea while disagreeing on its relevance to their goals. The Arabic Language Tradition exemplified by ar-Rāġib al-Īṣfahānī (henceforth anglicized as “Ragib”) chose to focus on language and manipulate the relationships between expressions and ideas in order to solve many of the problems of divine revelation, human speech, and reality. The Classical Language Tradition rejected such obsession with language in favour of the pursuit of a reality made up of supra-linguistic ideas. These contrasting philosophical approaches to language resulted in two very different attitudes to its potential for ambiguity; the Arabic Language Tradition was comfortable with the prospect, and the Classical Language Tradition was not.

The Arabic and Classical Language Traditions may have disagreed about ambiguity but they tended to share the assumption that expression and idea constituted the primary conceptual vocabulary for the interaction of language, mind, and reality. The pairing of expression and idea (*lafẓ* and *maʿnā*) therefore stands at the very center of this dissertation, which in fact began life as an enquiry into the functions performed by these two terms in the work of Ragib, his contemporaries, and the preceding generations. Now if we step away from the Arabic-speaking world for a moment to ask what “expression” and “idea” mean, the answer is that they are simply
two levels of linguistic structure. Expression (lafẓ) and idea (maʿnā) are the names used in Arabic for the two core elements of linguistics:

linguists over the years have made a strong case for distinguishing at least two levels of structure: one that will interface with the morphology and the phonology of the language to yield the surface form of sentences [i.e. lafẓ], and another that will interface with other conceptual components of the mind to yield the meaning of sentences [i.e. maʿnā].

The pairing of expression and idea was ubiquitous in Arabic-language mediaeval scholarship. All the authors I am dealing with simply assumed that these two concepts were part of the fabric of language and reality. Terminological alternatives were very rarely countenanced.

The ubiquity of the pairing of expression and idea means that it has attracted substantial attention from scholars of mediaeval Arabic, and their works have given us a clear and informative picture of the range of ways in which these two words were used. Frank’s article investigating the concept of maʿnā, which he usually translates as “meaning”, reflects a paradigmatic philological approach. It is a detailed enquiry into the word’s meaning in the specific genre and context of pre-eleventh-century Arabic grammar.

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10 That this was not an inevitable assumption can be seen by turning back to twenty-first century linguistics, where Noam Chomsky and others have to argue for their “big facts” about language, the “essential, unavoidable features of human language” that exist by “conceptual necessity”. One such fact is that “sentences are pairings of sound and meanings”, and Chomsky would argue that this binary was all that mattered against a proliferation of earlier theories, some of which were his own. In Chomsky’s words: “(a.) A linguistic expression (SD) [structural description] is a pair (π, λ) [phonetic form, logical form] generated by an optimal derivation satisfying interface conditions. (b.) The interface levels are the only levels of linguistic representation”. Boeckx’s analysis of Chomsky’s 1993 article adds that Chomsky would add the word “virtual” in brackets to “conceptual necessity” to show that “in science we must always be ready to be proven wrong”. Such quibbles could only have been alien and irrelevant to Ragib. Ibid., 73. (Norbert Hornstein, Jairo Nunes, and Kleanthes K. Grohmann, *Understanding Minimalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 7f.) Noam Chomsky, “A Minimalist Program for Linguistic Theory,” in *The View from Building 20: essays in linguistics in honor of Sylvain Bromberger*, ed. K. Hale and S. J. Keyser (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993), 1, 2, 3, 5, 43.

observation Frank makes is that the “grammarians of the period … elaborated no formal theory of meaning”. This is true of Ragib, who never laid out all the components of his language model in one place, nor labelled them as his methodology or theory. However, I will show that across his portfolio of works Ragib provided a number of compatible presentations of “what speech is” or “what language is”.

Frank’s conclusion is that maʿnā means enough different things for it to be almost impossible to translate with a single English word, and he groups these alternatives under four main headings: maʿnā as intent; maʿnā as referent; maʿnā as “semiotic equivalent” or paraphrase; and maʿnā as “conceptual signicate” and “an ideal or abstract entity”.

However, had Frank broadened the scope of his enquiry beyond the grammarians he would have confronted the fact that although manageable limits on the number of English words needed to translate maʿnā are elusive, there is no evidence that mediaeval Islamicate scholars had an equivalent problem. Polyvalency and homonymy were familiar issues for them but while many words and concepts were known for being multivalent, maʿnā was not one of them. It appears to have been a fixed part of the architecture that enabled them to deal with the polyvalency of other words. Frank writes:

The problem [of different uses of maʿnā] seems not to have posed itself and it is hardly required for us to attempt to formulate a theory for them, forcing the texts to answer a question they do not raise and, more pertinently, the answer to which is not needed for our understanding of their responses to the questions they do raise.


12 Ibid., 260.

13 Ibid., 314-315.

14 Ibid., 314.
The question did not pose itself because it was irrelevant but rather because it was commonplace, widely shared, and generally assumed. I consequently understand the concept of ma‘nā as an “assumption” and translate it with the single word “idea”. It is true that mediaeval scholars did not need to interrogate their own assumptions in order to use them, but if we wish to understand their methodologies then we must. Methodologies have the inevitable character of affecting the subject matter of the genres in which they are used.

Whereas Frank was unsure “whether all … or which, if specifically one or some and not another, of the several meanings [of ma‘nā] we have found and distinguished in the texts should be understood when” the word ma‘nā is used, I would argue that there is in fact a single meaning. I disagree with Djamel Eddine Kouloughli that this breadth of signification is one of the factors that “proved harmful to a meticulous and methodical study of the relationship between” lafẓ and ma‘nā. On the contrary, I believe that the absence of such a study by a mediaeval scholar can be evidence of the widely shared nature of the assumptions about language, mind and reality that I am investigating. When assumptions are so obvious and well-known, and at the same time so fundamental to the way one thinks, they tend not to be addressed specifically or explained explicitly. Equally, it is because ma‘nā is such a broad concept that it proved to be so useful, and together with lafẓ remains such an aesthetically pleasing theory.

15 Cf. my brief discussion of the problem of translation on page 30.

16 Frank, "Meanings " 315.


The aesthetic impact of using the single pairing of expression and idea to deal with all problems of meaning and signification, singularly defines Ragib’s work and is found throughout the analyses of scholars writing in Arabic throughout the mediaeval period. This should not be taken to mean that it dominates everywhere to an equal extent, an observation particularly true after Ragib’s death, when spectacularly successful programmes such as that of Abū Ya’qūb Yūsuf as-Sakkākī (555/1160-626/1229)\(^1\) had found favour in the madrasa. As-Sakkākī used the terms expression and idea, but their pairing did not structure his thought about language in the way it did Ragib’s.\(^2\) His commentator al-Ḥaṭīb al-Qazwīnī (Ḡalāl ad-Dīn Abū ʿAbdallāh Muḥammad, 666-739/1268-1338) on the other hand, did use the pairing: “in the Qazwīnian tradition the [poetics] figures are divided into two kinds, as they are anchored either in the meaning [the idea] (maʿnawī) or in the wording [the expression] (lafẓī)”.\(^3\)

Both as-Sakkākī and al-Qazwīnī fall outside the chronological scope of this dissertation, but when their work is reflected in secondary studies such as that of Ahmed Moutaouakil it can provide useful further information about the meaning of these two terms. In his Réflexions sur la théorie de la signification dans la pensée linguistique arabe, Moutaouakil is sensitive to the

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\(^1\) Dates will be given in this format, A.H./A.D., and the A.D. date should be regarded as approximate ± one year, although I have calculated it correctly when the requisite information was available. The Ḥiǧrī calendar (A.H.) is lunar, the Gregorian calendar (A.D.) solar, and the extra notation required to represent the ambiguity in every instance would be cumbersome to little effect. Centuries (for example “the eleventh century”) will be given in A.D. only.

\(^2\) As-Sakkākī brought the linguistic disciplines in Arabic (excluding lexicography) together under a single umbrella, a programme and achievement that falls outside the chronological scope of this dissertation. He called this new discipline ʿilm al-adab and wrote that it contained all those aspects of adab, apart from lexicography, that were indispensable. Abū Ya’qūb Yūsuf as-Sakkākī, Miftāḥ al-ʿUlūm, ed. ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd Hindāwī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīyah, 2000). 37. Cf. Kees Versteegh, “The Arabic Tradition,” in The Emergence of Semantics in Four Linguistic Traditions: Hebrew, Sanskrit, Greek, Arabic, ed. Wout Jac van Bekkum (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1997), 262.

breadth of signification of key Arabic terms, writing that *maًnā* can signify lexical meaning [from a dictionary], semantic meaning [from a sign], pragmatic meaning [from an intent], a representation of a principle (*ašl*) [derived meaning], syntactic meanings [from relationships to other words], and propositional content as a speech act.\(^{22}\) However, he only deals with the combination of *maًnā* and *lafż* when he ascribes these two levels of analysis to the grammarians, for whom *lafż* is something analogous to the modern concept of surface form while *maًnā* is more profound and a representation of both syntactic sense and pragmatic signification.\(^{23}\)

Kees Versteegh writes that from “the point of view of the historiographer the most fascinating aspect of the development of the science of language in the Arabic world is the perseverance of the dichotomy of *lafż*/*maًnā*.\(^{24}\) I agree. However, Versteegh continues this sentence:

…in spite of a constantly changing perspective in the use of *maًnā*. … Apparently, they were not bothered by the variety of meanings in which the term *maًnā* was used and made no effort to clarify and demarcate these various usages…\(^{25}\)

He provides a list of sixteen meanings of *maًnā* in five groups: aspects of *maًnā* “linked with the speaker” (intent); “linked with the message” (intent, paraphrase, communicative purpose…); “linked with the extra-linguistic world” (referent…); “linked with thought” (“the conceptual


\(^{23}\) Ibid., 108-110. Moutaouakil’s study reinterprets mediaeval ideas about language in order to make them contribute to modern linguistics and semiotics. He synthesises Arabic ideas into a “théorie du discours” that he says, with some justification, is pragmatics-based (i.e. centred upon language in use, deixis, and context). Moutaouakil’s work is effective in demonstrating the scope, scale, and variety of mediaeval Arabic work on language, and of the relevance of these ideas to twentieth-century Western linguistics and semiotics.


\(^{25}\) Ibid.
correlate of a word”, Aristotelian form, Platonic idea’); and “linked with the linguistic sign” (lexical meaning, underlying grammatical structure or function…).\(^{26}\)

Versteegh is consciously broadening his field of enquiry beyond grammar, hence the inclusion of results of the translation process from Greek and Syriac such as the Platonic ideas.\(^{27}\) Nevertheless, what we have here is a list of the ways mediaeval scholars used a single concept, rather than evidence of the internal subdivision of that concept. If there was, as I argue, a broad ontological assumption that the interface between language and reality was made up of just the two spaces of idea and expression, then it is hardly surprising that a mediaeval scholar would translate Aristotle’s “form” with the same word that he would use for “thought” or “intent”. This is, of course, not to say that mediaeval scholars did not have the tools to distinguish between alternatives when required. The translators and Hellenistic philosophers were comfortable with creating neologisms, and everyone else had plenty of resources in the lexicon to establish the difference between a contemplative idea (fikrah…) and a specific conversational intention (qaṣd…).\(^{28}\)

\(^{26}\) Ibid., 230-231.

\(^{27}\) Kouloughli agrees with Versteegh about the limitations of the grammarians’ horizons. In his article “A propos de lafż et maʿnā”, which starts with the statement that “[t]he pairing of lafż and maʿnā occupies a central position in all disciplines that are particularly concerned with language and texts…” (le couple lafż/maʿnā a occupé une position centrale dans toutes les disciplines qui sont intéressées de près à la langue et aux texts…), he writes that the grammarians had little interest in the semantic aspects of the language, by which he means those aspects connected to the meaning of words, and consequently to the mind. He suggests that this lack of interest contributed to the poverty of their contributions to the semantic dimensions of grammatical problems. Djamel Eddine Kouloughli, “A propos de lafż et maʿnā,” Bulletin d’Etudes Orientales 35(1983): 43.

\(^{28}\) It is only when Versteegh addresses a further subdivision of maʿnā into divergent grammatical meanings, by Georges Bohas working on Muwaffaq ad-Dīn Abū al-Baqāʾ Ibn Yaʿīś (553/1158-643/1245), that he is prepared to admit that subdivisions can be a problem:

the distinction of two different maʿnās by Bohas is a distinction set up by a modern historiographer. Within the Arabic tradition the two senses of the term maʿnā are used indiscriminately, and maʿnā denotes at the same time the lexical and the morphological/syntactic meaning.

Versteegh, "The Arabic Tradition," 248-249. As part of a close reading of Ibn Yaʿīś’ commentary on Abū al-Qāsim
Twentieth-century Arabic-language scholarship has also paid attention to expression and idea (lafẓ and maʾnā). Iḥsān ʿAbbās wrote that the binary (ṭanāʾīyah) of lafẓ and maʾnā was set up by the earliest scholars, crystallised with Ibn Qutaybah al-Dīnawārī’s (213/828 - 276/889) division of poetry according to the quality of its lafẓ, maʾnā, or both, and was then felt to be restrictive by the great literary theorist from the generation after Ragib, ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Ḡurğānī (d. 471/1078). Sulaymān Ḥasīkī’s article on the relationship between lafẓ and maʾnā gives a well-chosen review of mediaeval and modern works that deal with this binary, showing that scholars such as Ibrāhīm ʿAbd al-Māzinī (d. 1949) were still able to make profitable use of the pairing to talk about language and mind in the twentieth century.

Al-Ḡurğānī had been perhaps the first mediaeval scholar to develop a meta-discourse about expressions and ideas in Arabic. Unlike Ragib, he not only used these two terms, but was also interested in the way that other scholars had used them. He was aware that the genre of poetic criticism (naqd aš-šiʿr) had enabled opposing schools of thought to see themselves as partisans of either one or the other, and he felt that such focus on the poetic quality of either specific expressions or specific ideas obscured the importance of combinations of expressions (naẓm) and

az-Zamaḥšarī’s (467/1075-538/1144) compendium of Arabic grammar Kitāb al-Mufassal fi an-Nahw, Bohas had distinguished between the maʾnā that connects “hitting” and “hitter” to “hit” (the root d-r-b), and the maʾnā that connects “hitter” to “eater” and “drinker” (the pattern fāʾ il). Georges Bohas, "Contribution à l'étude de la méthode des grammairiens arabes en morphologie et en phonologie d'après des grammairiens arabes 'tardifs',' in Etude des théories des grammairiens arabes I: morphologie et phonologie, ed. George Bohas and Jean-Patrick Guillaume (Damascus: Institut Français de Damas, 1984), 27.


Kouloughli wrote that it was only with la révolution Ǧurğānienne (“The al-Ḡurğānian revolution”) that lafẓ and maʾnā became the part of a semantic theory. Kouloughli, "A propos de lafẓ et maʾnā," 55-56. The problem with this chronology from my point of view is that Ragib is “pré-Ǧurğānienne” and yet is using what appears to be an established methodology that addresses language, mind and reality with the binary of expression and idea.
their consequent combinations of ideas (maʿnā al-maʿnā). This was the first time that there had been a critical assessment of the role the pairing of expression and idea had been playing in poetics, and al-Ğurğānī’s work has unsurprisingly been the focus of sustained attention.32

Margaret Larkin’s monograph on al-Ğurğānī refers to the pairing as “the overused terms, lafẓ and maʿnā”,33 which reflects her recognition of the tremendous range of conceptual functions performed by these two terms. She is explaining how the Muʿtazilī theologian al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Ğabbār (d. 415/1024) simply defined eloquence with parallel adjectives for each term: eloquence is elegance of expression and superiority of idea.34 The two words in question were indeed often used in such an indeterminate manner, but contrary to Larkin, my feeling is that they are used so often and in so many ways not because they are vague or ill-defined, but because they represent core assumptions with a clear semantic range.35 Kamal Abu Deeb is more sympathetic to the breadth of signification behind the word “expression” than Larkin; writing that before al-Ğurğānī the word lafẓ had indicated “the sound-aspect of poetry, with no reference


34 Larkin translates ǧazāl al-lafẓ wa-ḥusn al-maʿnā as “elegance of diction and superiority of content”. Ibid.

35 In her discussion of the debate in poetic criticism between partisans of expression and partisans of idea, Larkin writes that “there exists a considerable amount of confusion in the sources regarding this issue due to the varying uses of the terms of the debate”. Ibid., 10.
to its meaning”, as well as the “form or construction, as opposed to the content or raw material”, and finally “the single word as an independent unit”.

The basic constituent parts of the mechanisms that I am investigating in this dissertation, expression and idea, have therefore not gone unnoticed by scholarship. In fact, modern Arabic scholarship continues to use them confidently and productively, which may well reflect the fact that ‘Abbās, Ḥāṣīkī, and al-Māzinī did not have to translate these two words in order to use them. Abu Deeb, Frank, Kouloughli, Larkin, Moutaouakil, and Versteegh provide compelling evidence of the semantic breadth of the concepts involved, their commonplace nature, and their importance to mediaeval scholarship.

Secondary scholarship has shown how the word ma‘nā can mean everything from grammatical paraphrase (the ma‘nā of the conjunction “and” (wa) is connectivity) to poetic motif (the ma‘nā of this line of poetry is that the cheeks of the beloved are like a rose). The argument that I want to make, and that Ragib’s works will allow me to make, is that the conceptual relationship between wa and the idea of connectivity behind it is analoguous to the conceptual relationship between a line of poetry and the motif behind it. One is a physical representation whether written or spoken, and the other is that which the physical representation conveys. The expression, and the idea behind it.

36 Abu Deeb is criticised by Larkin for integrating al-Ġurğānī into Western literary criticism rather than into his own context, but nevertheless remains well aware throughout his Al-Jurjānī’s Theory of Poetic Imagery that the mediaeval scholar was trying very hard to repudiate the idea that poetic quality, or its absence, was always to be evaluated in terms of expressions rather than ideas. Abu Deeb, Al-Jurjānī’s Theory, 48, 50.

37 Ragib was happy to use ma‘nā for poetic motif. In his discussion of literary plagiarism (as-sariqāt) he talks of “the ma‘ānī that have become controversial among poets…” due to accusations of uncritical copying. Abū al-Qāsim al-Ḥusayn b. Muhammad al-Īṣfahānī Ragib. [Ragib on Innovative Figures of Speech] Ms. of Kitāb min Kalām ar-Rāġib fi-t-Bādi’ (Ajānin al-Balāğah). MSS 165 (dated estimate ca. 14th C.), in Landberg Collection, Yale University Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, New Haven. ff.38b-39b. See also Wolfhart Heinrichs, "An Evaluation of Sariqa," Quaderni di Studi Arabi 5-6(1987-1988).
Or as Ludwig Wittgenstein would have it: “Hier das Wort, hier die Bedeutung”. Expression and idea are, as I noted above, simply two levels of linguistic structure when one is outside the Arabic-speaking world. Sadly, rather than providing us with an appropriate German translation of the pairing of expression and idea, Wittgenstein was satirising the pairing for its failure to take into account how language was used. In the next sentence he substitutes Wort and Bedeutung for two physical things: “Das Geld und die Kuh, die man dafür kaufen kann”. His point is that a philosophy of language should be looking for something other than two simple entities; it should be looking for what people do with them: “Anderseits aber: das Geld, und sein Nutzen”. This is where the mediaeval Arabic Language Tradition as exemplified by Ragib stands out from treatments of the same subject in pre-Wittgenstein European-language intellectual history. Ragib’s philosophy of language used the pairing of expression and idea to deal with the dynamics of language use, intent, truth, and ambiguity. The pairing was more than a sterile analytical division, it was a creative hermeneutic.

Finally, I must note one usage of maʿnā in the mediaeval Arabic sources that is not part of the pairing of expression and idea. It is an extra-linguistic meaning: maʿnā as the attribute, quality, accident, or form of a substance. Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ašʿarī (d. 324/935-6) wrote that: “people disagree about whether the maʿānī (plural of maʿnā) that subsist in bodies, such as movement, stillness, etc., are accidents or attributes”. Al-Ašʿarī is using maʿnā to describe a non-physical, non-sensible entity that is connected to a substance, and it is clear from the

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subsequent discussion about the nature of these things and what they should be called that he was not the first to do so. The word maʾnā is, in effect, acting as a placeholder to show that we are dealing with an idea and not a thing, and maʾnā is sufficiently broad and vague a term to allow it to function throughout the debate on what these maʿānī really are, and what they should be called. The term maʾnā in this usage is, however, still to an extent analogous to the linguistic maʾnā discussed above. Al-Ašʿarīʾs maʾnā is the intangible idea of movement or knowledge inside or behind an actual sensible substance, just as a linguistic maʾnā is the idea behind or within the substance of a written or spoken expression.

**Language and Logic**

The mediaeval Islamicate intellectual world was well aware that it had access to a rich heritage of Mediterranean thought, which had already confronted many of the problems with which it was dealing. The vast land mass east of Baghdad, which had transformed Islamicate intellectual culture through the transfer of paper-making technology from China in the eighth century, was also a source of knowledge but scholars such as Ragib tended to look to, for example, ancient Persia as a source of ideas about politics rather than about knowledge. The major source for epistemology was ancient Greece, whose traditions were transmitted and commented upon by scholars throughout late antiquity right up to the eleventh century. By


Ragib’s time, scholars had been writing in Arabic for centuries about Aristotle, Plato, and the Neoplatonic corpus of late antiquity.

The challenge these Arabic-speaking scholars encountered was the same problem of cross-cultural (and cross-historical) epistemology that Frank faced when trying to translate *maʿnā* into English: the assumptions about the interface between language and reality are different even while many of the same concepts are being discussed. If the translation of the Arabic word *maʿnā* into European languages is an example of how this problem plays out in the modern Western academy, then an example of the same problem in the mediaeval Islamicate world is the struggle to understand how Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* and *Poetics* might be dealing with the same concepts as the indigenous Arabic disciplines of literary analysis and criticism (*naqd aš-šiʿr, badīʿ, balāḡah, faṣāḥah*, et al.).

This struggle has been extremely well documented in a number of key works, notably those of Fritz Zimmermann and Shukri Abed on Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī’s (d. 339/950) efforts to integrate the Hellenistic philosophical traditions into Arabic, and the work of Deborah L. Black on both al-Fārābī and Avicenna (Abū ʿAlī al-Ḥusayn Ibn Sinā, 370/980-428/1037). Al-Fārābī was one of the great polymaths in the Greek-derived tradition, concerned with everything from music theory to politics and prophecy. After his death, three centuries elapse before we know of another Arabic language literary theorist making a concerted attempt to use Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*


and Poetics, Ḥāzim b. Muḥammad al-Qaṭaḡannī (608/1211-684/1285).\textsuperscript{43} That three hundred year gap, and the fact that in the middle of it al-Ḡurğānī did not feel a need to use the Rhetoric or Poetics, points to the existence of sufficient conceptual resources within the indigenous Arabic tradition. These resources are the subject matter of this dissertation. They are also the unheard weight of cultural assumption that sits in the background when one reads, for example, Black on Avicennna.\textsuperscript{44} Avicenna was living in an intellectual context dominated by the assumptions about Arabic, language, and literature that dominate Ragib’s work, and that of a vast swathe of his contemporaries and predecessors.

While the mediaeval scholars themselves, in the disciplines I have addressed up to this point, do not appear to have made as much use of Hellenistic ideas about language and literature as might have been expected, a piece of recent modern European-language scholarship has intriguingly used Hellenistic logic to assess mediaeval Arabic scholarship. Cornelia Schöck’s Koranexegese, Grammatik und Logik uses the lens of Organon logic to assess the theology and exegesis of figures in the Arabic tradition who have not usually been connected with Greek thought.\textsuperscript{45}

\textsuperscript{43} Whose synthesis has been studied by Wolfhart Heinrichs, Arabische Dichtung und griechische Poetik. Ḥāzim al-Qaṭaḡannīs Grundlegung d. Poetik mit Hilfe aristotel. Begriffe (Beirut / Wiesbaden: Deutsche Morgenländische Gesellschaft / F. Steiner in Komm., 1969). Scholars writing in Arabic in the philhellenic Organon tradition (most notably Avicenna) had also of course contended with Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Poetics on their own terms. See: Black, Logic and Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Poetics. And for al-Fārābī’s attitude to non-Aristotelian rhetoric, see: Maroun Aouad, "Al-Fārābī critique des traditions non aristotéliciennes de la rhétorique," in Literary and Philosophical Rhetoric in the Greek, Roman, Syriac and Arabic Worlds, ed. Frédérique Woerther (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 2009).

\textsuperscript{44} Black argues in her excellent article that Arabic scholars working on Aristotle’s Organon did not equate logic and grammar in the way that the Latin European tradition did. Rather than seeing grammar as a tool for language in the same way as logic was a tool for thought, al-Fārābī and Avicenna relegated grammar to the study of idiom, and accepted Aristotle’s inclusion of some linguistic questions at the start of On Interpretation. Black, "Aristotle’s ‘Peri hermeneias’," 77 (and passim).

\textsuperscript{45} Cornelia Schöck, Koranexegese, Grammatik und Logik (Leiden: Brill, 2006). ———, "Discussions on Conditional Sentences from the Year AH17/AD 638 to Avicenna (d. AH 428/AD 1037)," in Classical Arabic
Schock’s central insight is that the discussions in early Arabic logical works are dealing with the same subject as discussions in early legal and theological works. In both Ibn al-Muqaffa’s (Abū Muḥammad ʿAbdullāh, d. ca. 137/755) analysis in al-Manṭiq (Logic) of how a syllogism is affected by its terms’ potential to mean more than one thing at once, and Abū Ḥanīfah’s (Nuʿmān b. Ṭābit, d. 80/699-150/767) analysis of whether the “pig” prohibited in the Quran is a specific pig, or all pigs, the argument is about the relationship between language, mind and reality and in particular whether an expression always stands for a specific indivisible idea, or can refer to multiple ideas.

Schock leads her readers through the centuries of these debates, focusing on, for example, whether the definite article means that an expression signifies all members of its class, or whether it requires the addition of a quantifier to clarify the instances when it only refers to some of them. She reads all these debates through the prism of Aristotle’s logical works, an exercise that is productive because Aristotle does indeed, in Prior Analytics, warn of the logical problems caused by confusing expressions that signify the whole of things with identical expressions that signify parts of things. Schock shows that these discussions led to recognition of the problem that logical and grammatical subjects and predicates are not the same. From the perspective of


48 For example ———, Koranexegese, 430-434.


50 Schock, Koranexegese, 436.
the logician, logical predication claims to determine things in reality whereas grammatical
predications tell us nothing other than that words have been used.

Schöck contrasts Avicenna’s consequent position that logical and grammatical predication
are different with Sībawayh’s (Abū Bišr ʿAmr b. ʿUṯmān d. ca. 796) identification of “expression
with thing, and grammatical structure with logical relation, and therefore grammatical necessity
with logical necessity”.51 The problem with this comparison is that it assumes that Sībawayh was
taking part in the same conversation as Avicenna. If he was not, then reading grammar as logic
results in a fallacy; grammar is not logic so grammar is bad logic. Even when conversations can
be objectively recognised as having the same subject matter, such as a specific Quranic verse,
and even though the broad issue of language’s relationship to reality is the same, Abū Ḥanīfah
and Ibn al-Muqaffa‘ are still not a fortiori taking part in the same conversation. The problem
with Schöck’s methodology is that while she is sensitive to the dynamics of the logical Organon
tradition, by applying its concepts to the works of scholars outside that tradition she risks doing
violence to their ideas.52 My aim in this dissertation is to complement the work of scholars such

51 ———, “Discussions on Conditional Sentences,” 70, 72.

52 Schöck’s analysis of Abū Ḥanīfah’s position on the value of the singular noun is based on two passages. In one,
Abū al-Ḥasan al-Aṣ’arī (d. 324/935-6) is enumerating those historical figures with Murǧī ī tendencies (a movement
holding that judgements on the status of believers in the hereafter should be postponed (murğa‘), recounting an
anecdote in which Abū Ḥanīfah is happy to call someone a “believer” when that person is saying that he is not sure
whether the word “Muḥammad” means the Prophet or just a particular black man. Abū Ḥanīfah and his interlocutor
are certainly playing with word meanings, but the thrust of the argument is that even people who play with words to
the extent of heresy remain believers. Schöck’s observation is that this is an understanding of synonymy in the sense
of Aristotle’s Categories I: “both a man and an ox are animals”, ———, Koranexegete, 114-115. al-Aṣ’arī,
1a.6. In the second passage, Abū Ḥanīfah is responding by letter to the Basran jurist ʿUṯmān al-Battī (d. 143/760)
who had accused him of being a Murǧī ī and treating grave sinners as just deviant believers. Abū Ḥanīfah starts by
using Quranic verses containing both words to show that God considered belief separate from acts. Furthermore,
acts can be done to a greater or lesser extent whereas belief, or assent (taṣdīq), can only be given or not given. He
engages with al-Battī’s historical arguments about whether the community were believers before the Quran revealed
all the prescribed acts, and goes on to say that “belief” has to be a broad category or the participants in the civil war
would cease to be believers because of their acts of killing each other. He notes that ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭalib, the fourth
caliph, called both parties to the civil war “believers”. Wordplay is less prominent than in the passage above, and it
as Schöck by providing an analysis of ideas that do not originate in the Classical Language Tradition with which she is familiar. My analytical toolbox therefore has to be autochthonous in the Arabic Language Tradition, and its two heaviest tools are not major and minor premise, but expression and idea.

Language and Law

The opening line of Aron Zysow’s oft-cited Harvard Ph.D. dissertation reads: “[t]he great dividing line in Islamic legal tradition is between those legal systems that require certainty in

is again clear that Abū Ḥanīfah was not in any way taking part in a conversation about the logical force of nouns. Schöck, Koranexegese, 104-106. Nu’mān b. Ṭābit Abū Ḥanīfah, "Risālat Abī Ḥanīfah îlah Uṭmān al-Battī," in al-‘Alamat wa-l-Muta’allim Riwāyat Abī Muqātil ... wa-yalīhi Risālat Abī Ḥanīfah îlah Uṭmān al-Battī ṭumna al-Fiqh al-Absat, ed. M. Zāhid al-Kawjārī (Kairo: al-Ḥāngī, 1949), 34-38. These concerns are shared by David Vishanoff, who writes that Schöck projects “onto the earliest theologians a greater concern with formal logic than is warranted by the [ ] sources”. Vishanoff, Islamic Hermeneutics, 30.

A final example is her use of a passage in the Amālī of aš-Šarīf al-Murtaḍā (355/967-436/1044) to address the role of the definite object. In this passage the early Mu’tazilī theologian Wāṣil b. ‘Āṭī (d. 131/748-9) self-consciously uses the syllogistic form in an argument with ‘Amr b. Ubayd (d. ca. 699-761) about what to call those who pray yet commit grave sins (ahl al-kabā’ir min ahl aṣ-ṣalāh). ‘Amr maintains that they are hypocrites (munāfīqūn) because the presence of the definite article makes the combination of Quran 9:67 (at-Tawbah) and Quran 24:4 (an-Nūr) makes a syllogism: the hypocrites are the transgressors (al-fāsiqūn); the false accusers of virtuous women (i.e. the grave sinners) are the transgressors; therefore the grave sinners are the hypocrites (AaB, CaB, therefore, AaC). (This deviates from Aristotle’s third figure in Prior Analytics where the conclusion is AaC (Darapti)). Wāṣil’s response is to substitute different Quranic verses into the same form: those who do not use the revelation in their decisions (i.e. the grave sinners) are the unjust (az-zālimūn) (Quran 5:45 (al-Mā’ idah); the unbelievers (al-kāfirūn) are the unjust (Quran 9:67 (at-Tawbah); therefore the grave sinners are the unbelievers. Having shown that that ‘Amr’s argument from the force of the definite article proves that grave sinners are unbelievers just as much as it shows they are hypocrites, Wāṣil then goes on to get ‘Amr to agree on the principle that one should use the terminology on which the minority of Muslim sectarian groups agree, rather than using terminology on which they disagree. When ‘Amr accepts this principle, Wāṣil concludes that grave sinners should be called transgressors because that is the minimum upon which all the sects agree, and ‘Amr concurs. Aš-Šarīf al-Murtaḍā, who is reporting this debate, then gives his own response: the fact of sectarian disagreement is never by itself sufficient proof that a doctrine is incorrect (wa-baṭala ‘alā kulli ḥālin an yakūna –l-ḥīṭalāfū fi-l-qawli dalīlān ‘alā wuğābi –l-imtīnā’ i minhu).

Schöck is correct that the question of the definite article is part of the discussion. However, it is clear from the text that the interlocutors were in no way engaging with the syllogism as anything other than a dialectic tool. The winner of the argument uses the force of the definite article in the syllogism merely as a reductio ad absurdum. Josef van Ess, whose translation of and commentary on this passage Schöck cites, agrees: “Seine reductio ad absurdum hat rein dialektische Funktion” (His reductio ad absurdum has a purely dialectic function). The core issue, and the question with which aš-Šarīf engages, is what role sectarian consensus or the lack of it can play in the politics and theology of naming. Schöck, Koranexegese, 43f. ‘Ali b. aṭ-Ṭāhir aš-Šarīf al-Murtaḍā, Amālī as-Sayyid al-Murtaḍā, ed. Muḥammad Badr ad-Dīn an-Na’āṣīf al-Ḥalabi, 4 vols. (Kairo: Aḥmad Nāḡī al-Ǧamālī & Muḥammad Amīn al-Ḥāngī, 1907). 115-116. Josef van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert Hidschra, 6 vols. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1991-1995). 5:143.
every detail of the law and those that will admit probability”. He then goes on to engage with a tradition of legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh) that is replete with discussions of language, theories of meaning, and the problem of linguistic ambiguity. In twentieth-century Baghdad the Shia scholar Muḥammad Bāqir aṣ-Ṣadr, working in that very same tradition, gave the following summary of how the law understood language in a manual for eighteen-year old students:

There exist in every language connections between a group of expressions and a group of ideas. Each expression is associated with a particular idea in a way that causes us, whenever we form a mental image of the expression, to transfer our minds immediately to a mental image of the idea. This conjunction between conceptualizing the expression and conceptualizing the idea and transfer of the mind from the one to the other is what we name signification.54

In 2000 Mohamed M. Yunis Ali wrote a comprehensive study of Sunni legal theory from the ninth to the nineteenth century using pragmatics, H. P. Grice’s twentieth-century theory of communication that centers on language in use, deixis, and context.55 Among his insights is the recognition that Taqī ad-Dīn Ibn Taymīyah (661/1269-728/1328) had a theory of meaning


54 In this quotations I have replaced Roy Mottahedeh’s “utterance” with my “expression” and his “meaning” with my “idea”. Muḥammad Bāqir aṣ-Ṣadr, Lessons in Islamic Jurisprudence, trans. Roy Mottahedeh (Oxford: Oneworld, 2003; repr., 2005). 65.

55 Mohamed M. Yunis Ali, Medieval Islamic Pragmatics. Sunni Legal Theorists' Models of Textual Communication (London: Routledge, 2000). See also the references in the encyclopaedic article by Gregor Schwarb, "Capturing the Meanings of God's Speech: the relevance of uṣūl al-fiqh to an understanding of uṣūl al-tafsīr in Jewish and Muslim kalām," in Davar davur ‘al ofanay: meḥķarim be-farshanut ha-Mikra yeha-Êor an bi-yeme ha-benayim mugashim le-Ḥagai Ben Shamai / A word fitly spoken: studies in mediavel exegesis of the Hebrew Bible and the Quran presented to Haggai Ben-Shammai, ed. Me’ir Mikha’el Bar-Asher, Simon Hopkins, Sarah Stroumsa, and Bruno Chiesa (Jerusalem: Mekhon Ben-Tsevi, 2007), 136 n.100. Despite this, specialists still feel that not enough attention has yet been paid to language: “modern scholarship … has thus far largely ignored theories of language embodied in Islamic law”. Ahmed El Shamsy, "From Tradition to Law: the Origins and Early Development of the Shāfiʿī School of Law in Ninth-Century Egypt" (Ph.D. Thesis, Harvard University, 2009), 71 n.57.
closely analogous to “the Gricean programme for reducing meaning to the contents of intentions of speakers”.56

Legal theory therefore contains a discourse about certainty and ambiguity, has a well-developed and self-conscious theory of meaning, and clear and instructive parallels with modern Western linguistic thought can be made. Ragib, however, was not writing legal theory, just as he was not writing grammatical theory. He was perfectly aware of both traditions, and equally certain that he was not a direct part of either. Ragib was also writing before the madrasa transformed intellectual culture and placed the law at its centre.57 A few madrasas did exist in Iran and Iraq during Ragib’s lifetime but he had passed away when the great Saljuk vizier Niẓām al-Mulk founded the famous Niẓāmīyah madrasa in Baghdad, consecrated on 10 Dū al-Qa’dah 459 / 22 September 1067.58 Ragib therefore represents a chance to study a set of ideas that must have been influential in the madrasa (his Quranic Glossary would after all become hugely popular) and that must at the same time represent the culmination of centuries of thought and speculation in Arabic about the interface between language, mind and reality. If one considers the madrasa age with its great synthesising figures as a new consensus, then Ragib is one of the last language-obsessed scholars of an Arabic Language Tradition that would disappear when the madrasa started to produce new syntheses. The third point of separation between Ragib’s work


57 Vishanoff, Islamic Hermeneutics, 252, 271.

and legal theory is that legal theory is a hermeneutic that analyses language in order to explain and interpret it, whether the object of study be a person’s contractual utterance or God’s divine word. Ragib, on the other hand, had a understanding of how language worked that applied equally well to both language production and language interpretation. He did both poetics and exegesis.

Ragib was not writing legal theory, but he was aware of it as a discipline well-established in his pre-madrasa age. There has been substantial recent scholarship on early legal theory, and David Vishanoff’s important study has addressed the core issues of ambiguity and language therein.59 Vishanoff tells how legal theory, inspired in large part by the work of Muḥammad b. Idrīs aš-Šāfīʿī (d. 204/820) chose to both exploit the ambiguity it claimed was inherent in the Arabic language, and react against that ambiguity. Vishanoff’s focus on the law makes him ask whether the hermeneutical theories he is analysing actually changed rulings by judges in court, leading him to ask “[w]hy … did legal theory come to be dominated by such a powerful and flexible hermeneutic, if most of the interpretative possibilities it offered were never to be pursued?”60 The answer can be found in the assumptions and debates about language, mind, and reality that, rather than being created by legal theory, were merely reflected in it. Vishanoff is of course aware of the array of non-legal disciplines and usefully reviews exegesis, theology and grammar in his introduction, but approaching ambiguity solely through hermeneutics is inherently limiting.61 As I have noted above, Ragib and many like him were concerned with the ontology of language, mind, and reality; truth and cosmology were at stake rather than just rules

59 Vishanoff, Islamic Hermeneutics.
60 Ibid., 8, 7-9.
61 Ibid., 15-34.
for syntax and morphology (grammar) or rules for human behaviour (law). These broader concerns of his can easily be called “philosophy”.

An indication of this difference of scope and scale can be found in a comparison of the language mechanisms that Vishanoff and I are investigating. One major focus of Vishanoff’s linguistic analysis is the general or specific force of an expression (ʿāmm versus ḥāṣṣ). This binary is inevitably about the relationship between a spoken or written text and reality; how many of the pigs existing in real life are indicated by the word “pig”? However, if one focuses on the binary of expression and idea (lafẓ and maʿnā), the issue comes to be about the relationship between words and mind. General and specific are then just two ways that expression and idea can interact. For example, Ragib describes the signification of “those who were brought” in Quran 3:23 as follows: “even though the expression is general, the idea behind it is specific”.63

Language and Ragib

Ragib is at the centre of this dissertation about language, and yet he is part of neither of the disciplinary traditions discussed above: grammar and the law. In the following chapter I will discuss the difficulties of situating him in any particular discipline. It will suffice to say here that despite his protestations, he was at times engaged in theology (kalām).64 He made use of the

62 For a comprehensive review of the different ways that the ʿāmm – ḥāṣṣ binary was used by the first major legal theorist see: Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 72-87. In what follows, I will also argue that another well-known pairing, haqiqa and mağż, is equally dependent on the core linguistic structure of expression and idea. See note 415f below.


64 The translation of kalām as “theology” is an oversimplification, but the alternative is prolixity. “Speculative theology?” “Scriptual philosophy?” “Dialectic, eristics and speculative science?” One’s choice of translation often depends on whether one wishes to preserve a distinction made in the educational institutions of thirteenth and fourteenth-century Europe between a “theology” that made use of scripture and a “philosophy” or “science” that did
resources of the Arabic Language Tradition to analyse and propose solutions for problems that scholars had been debating for centuries: is the Quran eternal? Does God really have the “hands” that he is described as having in the Quran? Versteegh remarked that the Greek and Arabic grammatical traditions shared a concern with interpreting a text (the Homeric poems and the Quran) that led them to restrict their focus to linguistic matters, faced as they both were with vigorous philosophical traditions that were making claims about language and its relationship to mind and reality. This may well be true, but Ragib’s career is a reminder that it cannot be the whole truth. Ragib was a scholar who cared about ontology and was comfortable with philosophical ideas. By putting the focus in this investigation of linguistic methodologies onto Ragib we will inevitably engage with ideas about language, mind and reality, as opposed to just language on its own.

When we move outside law and logic, there is much less recent scholarship on language and ambiguity. Gregor Scharb concluded that a “comprehensive monography on kalāmic


theories of meaning and signification remains a desideratum”, and the references he subsequently provided were to the works of Schöck, Frank, Versteegh and Vishanoff discussed above. This may well reflect the dynamics of Western scholarship. Rorty observed that it tends to focus on, for example, mediaeval logic and language rather than mediaeval theology. This is because it is easier to connect mediaeval logic and language to modern scholarship and modern debates. The same is self-evidently true of law. Theology is no longer of any use to us; few careers or livelihoods are bound up with the ontological status of God’s attributes.

Ragib was more than just a theologian (mutakallim). He was an exegete and, importantly, a littérateur and theorist of poetics. Such combinations of language-centred disciplines have been identified and studied by Wolfhart Heinrichs, who started with the dichotomy between literal and non-literal language (ḥaqīqah and maḡāz) and traced it through mediaeval discussions about poetry, exegesis, and legal hermeneutics. The literal/non-literal binary is an important one, but it is not the mechanism that drives Ragib’s methodology. Instead, it is the binary of expression and idea that is most important. Literal language and non-literal language are, like general and specific, just two more ways that expression and idea interact.

Scholars writing in Arabic, Persian, and Turkish are well-aware of the importance of language in Ragib’s work. Ömer Kara writes in the second edition of the İslâm Ansiklopedisi that Ragib moves forward from the simple idea that lafḍ is limited and ma’na is unlimited to dwell on

66 Schwarb, "Capturing the Meanings," 131 n.86.
69 See note 415 below.
homonymy and semantic extension. The leading writers on Ragib in their respective languages, ‘Umar ‘Abd ar-Raḥmān as-Sārīsī and Sayyed ‘Alī Mīr Lawḥī, both credit Ragib with a particular skill in and attention to language. However, no-one has tried to work out the mechanisms that underpin his thinking, nor has anyone given the most important binary, expression and idea, its methodological due.

**Methodological Issues**

**Ragib never elaborated a theory of meaning**

“Real historians wait for the evidence to suggest questions by itself” is a principle that I have tried hard to adhere to, but risks remain as I attempt to describe a methodology that Ragib never explicitly elaborated or claimed to follow. There is a “constant temptation to find a ‘message’ which can be abstracted and more readily communicated”. The exegetical process of finding ideas that are “rarely worked out systematically” and then trying to “present these ideas in some coherent form ... gives the thoughts of the major philosophers a coherence, and an air generally of a closed system, which they may never have attained or even aspired to attain”. I am hopeful that if Ragib were to be presented with my account of his methodology in some hypothetical time-travel situation he would recognise it and approve, thereby confirming my

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70 Ömer Kara and Anar Gafarov, "Râgib el-İsfahâni," in Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi, ed. Kemal Güran (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2007), 398. I am grateful to Dimitris Kastritis for his assistance with the translation of this entry.


73 Ibid., 67.

adherence to Quentin Skinner’s principle that: “no agent can be said to have meant or achieved something which they could never be brought to accept as a correct description of what they had meant or achieved”.  

Nevertheless, my exegesis is creating something new. Heinrichs has usefully described such a process as the creation of “a finely tuned tool which is not exactly theirs and not exactly ours”. The value of Skinner’s principle is that it reminds us of the risk of slipping from “not exactly theirs” to “not theirs at all”. Although Schöck was aware that she was analysing an implicit logic rather than explicit textual evidence, she can hardly have imagined that her mediaeval interlocutors among theologians and lawyers would recognise her portrayal of their ideas.

Perhaps one reason that I am forced to attribute to Ragib a theory of meaning that he never explicitly described is that it is in the very nature of language to both govern our minds’ interactions with reality and yet at the same time always remain in the background as an unquestioned assumption. This is the problem that Wittgenstein was talking about when he wrote:

Wir wollen in unserm Wissen vom Gebrauch der Sprache eine Ordnung herstellen: eine Ordnung zu einem bestimmten Zweck … Wir werden zu diesem Zweck immer wieder Unterscheidungen hervorheben, die unsre gewöhnlichen Sprachformen leicht übersehen

75 Ibid., 77.

76 Heinrichs was discussing his own reconstruction of a theory of Arabic literary plagiarism from mediaeval scholars’ works. Heinrichs, “Evaluation of Sariqa,” 358.

77 Schöck wrote that while “there is no indication of a logical reflection on the opposing doctrinal standpoints” she would “rather label the early discussions about the understanding of sentences as implicit logic.” My emphasis. Schöck, "Discussions on Conditional Sentences," 63. See also note 52.
lassen … Die Verwirrungen, die uns beschäftigen, entstehen gleichsam, wenn die Sprache leerläft, nicht wenn sie arbeitet.\textsuperscript{78}

Ragib never had to explain his assumptions about language to his readers because in their mediaeval Arabic-language scholarly context these assumptions were the “ordinary forms of language” that Wittgenstein mentions. As well as watching them run, we have to put Ragib’s language mechanisms into neutral so that their engine idles and we can look at them. After all, Ragib was prepared to take this same step himself. He would stop at a problem, pause, and then deconstruct its language. This happens much more often in his works, and indeed in the works of other mediaeval Arabic scholars, than we find in the works of European-language scholars, whether mediaeval or modern. The difference reflects the extent to which Ragib and others like him were obsessed with language.

Another of Wittgenstein’s metaphors is equally useful for examining mediaeval Islamicate intellectual culture. He described how children interact with language and reality through language games based around naming. Adults play language games too and can deviate from existing rules of the game to make up new rules.\textsuperscript{79} Scholars such as Ragib had complicated language games based around mechanisms like metaphor and the manipulation of polysemy. Some of these language-games, such as homonymy, were well known and did not need to have their rules explained, whereas others such as Ragib’s ideas about metaphor and metonymy needed to be laid out in the hope that others would start playing them.

\textsuperscript{78} Emphasis in original. (“We want to establish an order in our knowledge of the use of language: an order with a particular end in view … To this end we shall be constantly giving prominence to distinctions which our ordinary forms of language easily make us overlook … The confusions which occupy us arise when language is like an engine idling, not when it is doing work.”) Wittgenstein, \textit{Philosophical Investigations}, #132.

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid., #7, #83.
Translation

This dissertation is an attempt to follow Rorty’s exhortation to “get into the swing of whatever exotic language-games are being played by the people whose beliefs we are trying to describe and explain”. The problem is that once in the swing of the game one has to describe it to people who are not playing. Wittgenstein again: *Wenn ich über Sprache ... rede, muss ich die Sprache des Alltags reden.* The most faithful rendering of a term in an academic work will always be transliteration, which would mean that this dissertation would be written in a language, perfectly intelligible to specialists, of English and Arabic *alfāẓ* combined!

The problem is that an alien term, once translated, ceases to be alien. Once it becomes familiar it is coloured by the associations of the familiar term in the target language. This is the process of cross-cultural epistemology. As Skinner says, the idea that we have to “pair the terms used by alien peoples with counterparts in our own languages” in order to understand them is too optimistic. “Often there will be no prospect of translating terms in an alien language by means of anything approaching counterparts in our own”. I believe that this does not hold for the rendering of *lafẓ* and *maʾnā* with “expression” and “idea”, but I accept that it is the case with many other Arabic words, particularly those that denote a discipline or type of knowledge unlike anything that exists in our own context. Examples of this latter category that will be encountered below are *adab*, *istiʿārah*, and *badīʿ*.

80 Skinner, *Visions of Politics*, 43. Skinner is paraphrasing and criticising Rorty for not providing enough detail of the intended interpretative strategy.

81 My emphasis. (“When I talk *about* language … I must speak the language of every day”). Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, #120.

Cross-cultural epistemology extends into the names and boundaries of disciplines. Ragib did not see himself as a philosopher of language like Wittgenstein, and would not have understood modern philosophy departments that focus on language, mind, and epistemology. He saw himself as, among other things, a lexicographer and an exegete. He also kept his exegesis and his poetics largely separate. If I were to do the same thing, and stay within his terminological and disciplinary boundaries, then I would struggle to deal with the very underlying methodological structure that I am trying to explain.
2. RAGIB

The Arabic, Persian, and European-language biographical traditions have not done justice to Ragib. Confusions and contradictions abound in their archives about the most basic facts of his life and even the century in which he lived. In this chapter I review his life, his works, and his times.83

Life

Dates

We now know for certain that Ragib was alive in or before the year 409/1018. The manuscript of his *Quranic Glossary* that proves this was brought to light by Muḥammad ʿAdnān al-Ḡawharḡī in a 1986 article, and I have been able to consult it at the home of its owner, Muḥammad Luṭfī al-Ḥaṭīb, in London.84 Its colophon is dated Muḥarram 409 (May-June 1018) and it has a titlepiece in New Abbasid Style script beneath which is a purchase note from 7 Ṣawwāl 420 (18 October 1029). The purchase note is significant because it contains names and handwriting that I have been able to verify:

ʿAlī b. ʿUbaydallāh aš-Ṣīrāzī bought this book from the city of Isfahan on the seventh of the month of Šawwāl in the year 420 for the library of al-Ustāḏ al-Ḡalīl Abū al-Muẓaffar 83


Ibrāhīm b. Ahmad b. al-Layṯ, may God prolong his life in nobility and wealth and preserve his high rank.\textsuperscript{85}

Abū al-Muẓaffar Ibrāhīm b. Aḥmad b. al-Layṯ al-Azdī (fl. 432/1041) was a littérateur (\textit{adīb}) and the scribe (\textit{kātib}) of the Kurdish prince Wahṣūdān b. Mamlān ar-Rawwādī (Abū Manṣūr, reg. 416/1025-451/1059).\textsuperscript{86}

From an Istanbul manuscript we learn that Abū al-Muẓaffar Ibrāhīm’s employee ʿAlī b. ʿUbaydallāh aš-Šīrāzī was in Tabriz four years after he was in Isfahan.\textsuperscript{87} In Ramaḍān 424 / July-August 1033 he copied out the \textit{Diwān} of Abū ʿUbādah al-Walīd al-Buḥturī (206/821-284/897) and wrote on the title page:

Copied by ʿAlī b. ʿUbaydallāh aš-Šīrāzī in the city of Tabriz in the year 424 in the month of Ramaḍān, in the service of the library of al-Ustāḏ al-Ǧalīl Abū al-Muẓaffar Ibrāhīm b. Ahmād b. al-Layṯ, may God prolong his life in nobility and wealth and preserve his high rank.\textsuperscript{88}

ʿAlī b. ʿUbaydallāh aš-Šīrāzī’s handwriting is identical in the London and Istanbul manuscripts.

\textsuperscript{85}———. \textit{Mufradāt al-Ḫaṭīb Collection}. I.1a.


\textsuperscript{87} It appears that aš-Šīrāzī was accompanying Abū al-Muẓaffar on his travels. See note 86.

Beneath aš-Širāzī’s purchase note on the *Quranic Glossary* there is also a reading note and again it can be verified:

Aš-Šayḥ al-Fāḍil al-Adīb Abū Ğa’far Muḥammad b. Abū Bakr b. aḥ-Naṣīb aš-Šahrastānī, may God embellish his success, read this book to me from beginning to end. This was in the year 510. [This note was] written by Mawhūb b. Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-Ḥaḍir al-Ḡawālīqi in praise of God for his blessings, and in prayer and salutation to his messenger Muḥammad and his family.\(^89\)

Mawhūb b. Aḥmad al-Ḡawālīqi (466/1073-539/1144) is the famous author of *al-Mu’arrab min al-Kalām al-Aḡami ’alā Hurūf al-Mu’ḡam*, an explanatory lexicon of foreign words in Arabic.\(^90\)

Abū Ğa’far aš-Šahrastānī is known to have studied lexicography with him in Baghdad.\(^91\) These two men appear in an almost identical reading note dated 514/1120, again written by al-Ḡawālīqi, on the cover of a copy of Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. ‘Umar al-‘Uzayrī as-Siḡistānī’s (d. 300/941) dictionary of rare Quranic words in Dublin.\(^92\) Al-Ḡawālīqi’s handwriting is identical in the London and Dublin manuscripts.\(^93\)

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\(^93\) It should be noted that while al-Ḡawālīqi’s handwriting in the two reading notes is identical, the Dublin manuscript (of which he is the copyist) provides evidence that he could also write in a more careful script when required. That more formal script is the one reproduced by: Ḥayr ad-Dīn az-Ziriklī, *al-A lām*, 8 vols. (Beirut: Dār al-‘Ilm li-l-Malāyīn, 2002). 7:335.
There is a further note on the title page of the London *Quranic Glossary* manuscript but it is anonymous and cannot be corroborated in the way that we could corroborate the notes by aš-Šīrāzī and al-Ḡawālīqī. It comes in between the aš-Šīrāzī and al-Ḡawālīqī notes, and reads:

The author of this book was born at the beginning of the month of Raḡab in the year 343 in the citadel of Isfahan (*qaṣbat Isfahān*), and died on the ninth of Rabīʿ al-Āḫar in the year 422, may God exalted have mercy on him, Amen. 94

The London *Quranic Glossary* manuscript is the only physical evidence that exists from Ragib’s lifetime, if indeed he was still alive when it was written. It proves that he was alive in or before 409/1018. The combination of the manuscript’s colophon dated 409/1018 and its verifiable purchase note dated 420/1029 is enough to establish this beyond reasonable doubt. To fix Ragib in a still more defined time and place requires us to look at the references he makes to other people.

In a persuasive confirmation of the evidence that as-Sārīsī had already been putting together on Ragib’s dates and lifetime,95 Iḥsān ʿAbbās picked up references to two figures of the late tenth and early eleventh centuries.96 The first is Abū al-Qāsim Ġānim b. Abī al-ʿAlāʾ, a member of the retinue of that famous patron and politician the vizier aš-Šāḥīb Ibn ʿAbbād (938-

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94 Ragib. *Mufradāt al-Ḫaṭīb Collection*. f.1a. The note appears to be in the same hand as an ownership note on the title page: “from the books of Muhammad b. Ahmad al-Anṣārī, may God benefit him with knowledge”. I have not been able to trace Al-Anṣārī. The dates would mean that Ragib died age 78, a number that does not tally with another anonymous note on an Istanbul manuscript. ———. *Ms. of Kitāb al-Ḏarīʿ ah ilā Makārim aš-Šarīʿ ah*. Damad Ibrahim 768 (dated ?), Süleymaniye, Istanbul. title page. Cf. as-Sārīsī, *ar-Rāġib*, 32. See also Appendix.


In his literary anthology *Littérateurs’ Ripostes and Poets’ and Eloquent Men’s Rejoinders*, Ragib writes: “Abū al-Qāsim b. Abī al-‘Alā’ wrote to me with some lines of poetry…” ⁹⁸ and elsewhere:

Abū al-Qāsim b. Abī al-‘Alā’ recited poetry one day that he had addressed to a leader, but we had already heard it from him before. When he was criticised for this he replied ‘I composed it and I can repeat it to whomever I want’. ⁹⁹

The second connection Ragib makes is to ’Abd as-Samad b. Bābak (d. 1019): ¹⁰⁰ “Abū Saʿīd b. Mirdās told me that he sat drinking beneath a trellis of grapes with a group of people among whom was Ibn Bābak…” ¹⁰¹

It seems clear that Ragib was a contemporary of known literary figures at the end of the tenth and beginning of the eleventh centuries. He talks of having spent time with a member of aṣ-Ṣāḥib’s court, and this chronological connection to aṣ-Ṣāḥib is confirmed by a third reference: “some of the people of our age who are with aṣ-Ṣāḥib talk about…” ¹⁰² These three references to contemporary figures in Ragib’s literary anthology, together with the manuscript evidence from London, are the sum total of proofs that originate in Ragib’s lifetime. They are enough to establish that he was alive at the end of the tenth and beginning of the eleventh centuries, and the

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⁹⁹ My emphasis. Ibid., 1:179.


¹⁰² My emphasis. Ibid., 1:141.
anonymous birth and death dates on the front of the London Quranic Glossary are as good an unproven estimate as any. It is tempting to speculate as to the reasons for this lack of evidence from a time and place when biographical dictionaries, court records, and writings by scholars about scholars abound. However, in the absence of textual or other evidence the temptation to speculate must be resisted.

It is in this light that further tentative connections to Ragib must be viewed. As-Sārīsī argues that the patron to whom Ragib addresses a number of his books was Abū al-ʿAbbās aḍ-Ḍabbī (Kāfī al-Awḥad, d. 399/1008),104 the successor to as-Ṣāhib b. ʿAbbād in the vizierate of Faḫr ad-Dawlah (Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. Rukn ad-Dawlah b. Būyah, reg. 366/977-387/997, d. 387/997).105 As-Sārīsī’s argument rests on the fact that aḍ-Ḍabbī has been referred to with the honorific al-ustāḏ ar-raʿīs (“the scholar and leader”) while Ragib says he wrote his Analysis of the Two Creations and Attainment of the Two Happineses for al-ustāḏ al-karīm (“the noble scholar”),106 his On Human Virtue Arising from the Disciplines of Knowledge for al-ustāḏ (“the

103 This dilemma is eloquently addressed by Kurd ʿAlī, who suggests that Ragib may not have been close enough to powerful people to have been remembered by their chroniclers. Kūrdu ʿAlī, Kunūz, 34.


105 Bosworth, Islamic Dynasties, 154, #75.

106 Abū al-Qāsim al-Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad al-Iṣfahānī Ragib, [Analysis of the Two Creations and Attainment of the Two Happineses] Tafsīl an-Naṣʿ atayn wa Tafsīl as-Saʿ ādatayn, ed. Asʿ ad as-Saḥmarānī (Beirut: Dār an-Nafāʾ is, 1988). 26. Mīr Lawḥī highlights a marginal correction to this phrase in a British Museum manuscript (dated 776/1374) of Analysis of the Two Creations that responds to the omission of al-karīm with an insertion that Mīr Lawḥī reads as ar-raʿ īs. Mīr Lawḥī, Rāḡeb, 34, 100-103. However, the reading an-nafs is also possible from the plate provided by Mīr Lawḥī and this is confirmed by the older manuscript at Princeton, which reads al-ustāḏ an-nafs. Abū al-Qāsim al-Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad al-Iṣfahānī Ragib. Ms. of Kitāb aḍ-Ḍarīʿ ah ilā Makārim as-Sarīʿ ah and Tafsīl an-Naṣʿ atayn wa Tafsīl as-Saʿ ādatayn. Yahuda 3555 (dated 584/1188), in Garrett Collection (Yahuda Section), Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, Princeton. f.142b.
and in his *On the Ordering of Intellectual Disciplines and of Worldly Actions* he refers to his love for *al-ustāḏ* at the beginning of the epistle and ends it with a prayer for the same. Ragib also uses the title *al-ustāḏ ar-raʾīs* when quoting aḍ-Ḍabbī’s poetry in *Littérateurs’ Ripostes* and *The Confluence of Eloquence*. Nevertheless, all we have here is a title (*ustāḏ*) that Ragib used anonymously, a historical figure quoted by Ragib who was referred to by the same title, and no proof.

The same must be said for claims about where Ragib lived, in light of his absence from the extant histories. ‘Abbās suggests that the frequency and nature of Ragib’s references to Isfahan in *Littérateurs’ Ripostes* means that he probably lived there. As-Sārīsī’s report of an anonymous note on the cover of an Istanbul manuscript stating Ragib was from Isfahan and travelled to Baghdad is incorrect. The manuscript in question has instead only two notes about Abū Bakr Muḥammad Ibn Fūrak al-Iṣfahānī (d. 406/1015) on its title page, notes which include some of the text thought by as-Sārīsī to describe Ragib, including a trip to India and a death in

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107 ———, *Letters*, 159.
108 Ibid., 213, 236.
Nishapur in 406/1015. There is no mention of Baghdad, reference to which is made by both as-Sārīsī and Mīr Lawḥī, the latter on the authority of Ismāʿīl Pāša (d. 1920).  

Finally, mention must be made of the mass of bibliographic material that erroneously places Ragib’s death a century or more too late. It includes Šams ad-Dīn Abū ʿAbdallāh ad-Ḍahābī (673/1274-748/1348) who said Ragib was alive in 450/1058, Ismāʿīl Pāša, who gave Ragib’s death date as 500/1107, Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ḥwānsārī (d. 1313/1895) who gave it as 565/1170, and then Carl Brockelmann (d. 1956) and Wilhelm Ahlwardt (d. 1909), both following Gustav Flügel (d. 1870), who provided 502/1108-1109. These materials have been reviewed in both Arabic and English and it appears to me that there has been a clear connection over the centuries between the vacuum of information about Ragib during or near his lifetime, and the need of the biographical tradition to fill that vacuum with numbers. The biographical


117 For reviews of the material see aš-Ṣidī: Ragib, Exegesis ed. aš-Ṣidī, 52-62. Also Dagmar Reidel, who identifies Ḡalāl ad-Dīn as-Suyūṭī’s (d. 911/1505) biography as the key driver for the subsequent attributions of late death dates, and gives details of Flügel’s influential choice of 502/1108-1109. Reidel should however be read in the light of the corrective information on Ragib’s works and references to them that I provide in the rest of this chapter. Riedel, "Searching for the Islamic episteme," 106-128.
tradition did not have access to or knowledge of the London manuscript of the *Quranic Glossary* that proves Ragib was alive in or before 409/1018.

**Early Biographies**

The first mention of Ragib by a third party is in Mufaḍḍal b. Sa‘d b. al-Ḥusayn al-Māfarrūḥi’s book *Kitāb Maḥāsin Isfahān (The Good Qualities of Isfahan)*, written between 465/1072 and 485/1092.¹¹⁸ Ragib appears only as a name (“Abū al-Qāsim ar-Rāġib”) in a list of those Isfahanis who excelled in language-based disciplines.¹¹⁹

The second mention of Ragib comes in a compendium of “philosophers” biographies by Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. Zayd (Ibn Funduq) al-Bayhaqī (ca. 490/1097-565/1169).¹²⁰ This work was intended as a continuation and completion of an earlier compendium of philosophers, the *Šīwān al-Ḥikmah (The Wardrobe of Wisdom)*, intended to preserve and share the sage aphorisms of Greek and Islamic philosophers working in a single tradition, from Anaxagoras and Pythagoras to contemporaries of Ragib in Baghdad and elsewhere.¹²¹

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¹¹⁹ Al-Māfarrūḥi’s description of this category of people reads:


Al-Bayhaqī brings the list up to date with biographies of poets, physicians and other scholars from “all the different races and religions of the Near East”, many of whom were known to him or to his father. They include al-Fārābī and Abū Bišr Mattā (see above), the Iḥwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ (see below), and al-Bayhaqī’s contemporaries. There are relatively few scholars working in the traditional Islamic disciplines of lexicography and Quranic exegesis other than Ragib, whose entry makes the claim that he combined religious law (aṣ-ṣarīʿah) and philosophical wisdom (al-ḥikmah) and that he was particularly proficient in the rational disciplines (kāna ḥaẓuzūhū min –l-маʿqūlāti ak ṣaṣr). Al-Bayhaqī then quotes at length from Ragib’s Analysis of the Two Creations and Attainment of the Two Happinessest.

Works

Observations

Ragib’s best known and most easily accessible works, the Quranic Glossary, Path to Nobility, and Littérature’s Ripostes, provide a valid but incomplete representation of his ideas. The lacunae are felt most strongly with regard to his sectarian positions, which have attracted a


123 al-Bayhaqī, Tārīḥ Ḫukmāʾ al-Islām, 112.

124 Ragib, Analysis of the Two Creations. Al-Bayhaqī quotes from pages 27-28 (authorial introduction), 63 (chapter eight), 117 (chapter eighteen), 126 (chapter twenty), 143 (chapter twenty-four), 147 (chapter twenty-five), 153 (twenty-seven), and 178-180 (chapter thirty-two).

125 This list supersedes my entry for Ragib in Essays in Arabic Literary Biography entry, although Essays does provide succinct epitomes of the content of his works. Alexander Key, "al-Rāghib al-Īṣfahānī," in Essays in Arabic Literary Biography I, ed. Mary StGermain and Terri de Young (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2011).
great deal of speculation over the centuries despite being clearly laid out in On Creeds. The problem is that manuscripts of On Creeds were not widespread, and printed copies of the work are so rare today as to almost require their cataloguing. A similar problem exists with regard to his Exegesis, and his work on poetics remains unpublished and only exists in a single manuscript. The details below will establish Ragib’s authorship of On Creeds and the Exegesis, but the fact remains that his reception and reputation continue to be dominated by the vagaries of print runs and manuscript transmissions.  

Exegesis of the Quran (Tafsīr)

Ragib’s Exegesis includes a methodological introduction and is extant up to the end of Quran 5:120 (al-Mā’idah). Editors have used the titles Tafsīr ar-Rāġib al-Isfahānī (Ragib al-Isfahānī’s Exegesis) and Ğāmi‘ at-Tafsīr (Collection of Exegeses). In the introduction to The Path to the Nobilities of the Revelation (Kitāb ʿd-Ḍarī‘ah ilā Makārim aš-Šarī‘ah) Ragib mentions having written a work called Tahqīq al-Bayān fī Taʾwīl al-Qurʾān (An Investigation of Clarity in Quranic Interpretation) in which he had discussed the difference between the Quran’s ethical qualities and legal judgements, but I have been unable to locate any such discussion in the extant parts of his Exegesis.

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126 It is impossible to purchase a copy of On Creeds or the Exegesis in the Arabic-speaking world, and they are held in only a very limited number of libraries in Europe and America. The problems this causes are demonstrated in as-Sārīsī’s ignorance of al-ʿAǧalī’s edition of On Creeds, Mīr Lawḥī’s apparent lack of access to as-Sārīsī’s scholarship, and the fact that aš-Ṣidī’s edition of the Exegesis published in Riyadh in 2003 appears to have fallen into a black hole.


The methodological introduction has been published three times: as an appendix to al-Qādī ʿAbd al-Ḡabbār’s *Tanzīḥ al-Qurʿān ‘an al-Maṭā‘īn* (Freeing the Quran from its Calumnies) edited by Muḥammad Saʿīd ar-Rāfīʿī (Cairo: al-Maṭba‘ah al-Ḡamāliyyah, 1911); as an appendix to Ṣalāh ad-Dīn ʿAbd al-Laṭif an-Nāḥī’s *al-Ḥawālid min Ārā’ ar-Rāġib al-İṣfahānī fī Falsafat al-Aḥlāq wa-t-Taṣrīf wa-t-Tašawwuf* (Selections of Ragib’s Opinions on the Philosophies of Ethics, Legislation, and Sufism); and by Aḥmad Ḥasan Farḥāt as *Muqaddimat Ġāmi‘ at-Taḥqīq  wa-t-Taṣawwuf* (The Introduction to the Collection of Exegeses) with the addition of the exegesis of Quran 1:1 (al-Fātiḥah) to Quran 2:5 (al-Baqarah). The section Quran 2:5 to Quran 3:1 (Āl ʿImrān) has been imperfectly published online, and the remainder is the subject of two diligent theses at Umm al-Qurā University in Mecca by ‘Ādil b. ʿAlī aš-Šidī (Ph.D., published) and Hind Bint Muḥammad b. Zāhid Sardār (M.A., unpublished).

The primary manuscript for the bulk of the *Exegesis* is Carullah 84 in the Süleymaniye Library in Istanbul. It is undated, acephalous, and stops suddenly at Quran 5:120 without a colophon. Corroboration is found primarily in other Istanbul manuscripts: Ayasofya 212, Atīf Efendi 362-002, and Laleli 171 in the Süleymaniye, and Emanet Hazine 1616 in the Topkapı.
Palace. Ayasofya 212 starts at the beginning of the methodological introduction and finishes with no colophon at Quran 2:223. It appears to have been collated against Carullah 84. Atıf Efendi 362-002 contains the full methodological introduction and finishes with no colophon at Quran 2:216. It varies from both Ayasofya 212 and Carullah 84 and appears to have been collated against neither. Laleli 171 and Emanet Hazine 1616 both contain the methodological introduction and end at Quran 2:6. The latter was used by Farḥāt, while aš-Šidī and Sardār both use Carullah 84, Ayasofya 212, and Atıf Efendi 362-002. Carullah 84 appears to be the oldest of the manuscripts (angular nashr scholar’s bookhand, Quranic verses in larger tawqīʿ script, dark brown paper, approximately eleventh to fifteenth centuries?). Ayasofya 212 could be placed somewhat later (rounded nashr scholar’s bookhand, Quranic verses overlined in red, white paper), and the remainder of the manuscripts mentioned above appear to be from the Ottoman period (scholars’ nastaʿlīq bookhands, illuminated headpieces, rule-borders and frames).

Internal references show that the Exegesis was once a coherent whole. In exegesis of Quran 2:106 Ragib writes that “the essence of abrogation and the difference between it and specification has been discussed above at the outset of this book” and that this is an accurate reflection of the chapter in the methodological introduction on “requisite knowledge of the difference between abrogation and specification”. In exegesis of Quran 4:127 (an-Nisāʾ) Ragib writes that “the fact that a single action can correctly be attributed, with different expressions, to

132 See the Appendix for an annotated listing of all Tafsīr manuscripts.


two different agents has been established at the outset of this book”. This is an accurate reflection of his discussion in the methodological introduction. Internal references also confirm that Ragib is the author of the Exegesis. He refers to his The Path to the Nobilities at one point, and the discussions and definitions of key terms are almost identical to those in his Quranic Glossary, and The Path to the Nobilities.

Aš-Šidī has demonstrated that Ragib’s Exegesis was used as a source by Šaraf ad-Dīn al-Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad at-Ṭībī (d. 743/1324), Abū Ḥayyān Aṭīr ad-Dīn al-Ǧarnāṭī al-Andalusī (Granada to Cairo, 654/1256-745/1344), Abū ʿAbdallāh Badr ad-Dīn Muḥammad az-Zarkašī (Cairo, 745/1344-794/1392), and Ġalāl ad-Dīn ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān as-Suyūṭī (Cairo, 849/1445-911/1505). Each of these authors quotes Ragib by name, and their quotes can be traced back to the Exegesis manuscripts. As-Suyūṭī quotes, at length, only the methodological introduction. He quotes sections that are not quoted by az-Zarkašī, showing that he engaged independently with Ragib’s work. At-Ṭībī was known for his strong rejection of Hellenistic philosophy.


137———, Exegesis ed. aš-Šidī, 131-134. See also the definitions of al-kufr and al-qawl. ———. Carullah 84. ff.14b-15a, ff.17b-18a. ———, Quranic Glossary, 688, 714.


139———, Exegesis ed. aš-Šidī, 121-134.


and we therefore already have indications that in the centuries after his death Ragib’s varied portfolio of works would appeal both to those who collected philosophers such as al-Bayhaqī, and those like al-Ṭibī who rejected them.

Finally, Ragib’s *Exegesis* is mentioned in two bibliographical works. Abū al-Ṭahir Muḥammad b. Yaʿqūb al-Fīrūzābādī (729/1329-817/1415) described it as “large, in ten bound volumes, extremely detailed”.

Kâtip Çelebi (1017/1609-1067/1657) wrote that it was one of the sources of Nāṣir ad-Dīn Ṭabarānī b. ‘Umar al-Baydāwī’s (d. ca. 710/1310-11) famous Quranic exegesis, *Anwār at-Tanzīl wa-Aṣrār at-Ta’wil* (The Lights of Revelation and the Secrets of Interpretation).
Quranic Glossary (*Mufradāt Ġarīb al-Qurʾān al-Karīm*)

There is virtually no difference between the texts of London *Quranic Glossary* and the current preferred critical edition by Ṣafwān ʿAdnān Dāwūdī despite the intervening 974 years, and despite the fact that Dāwūdī did not use the London manuscript itself.145 This is testament to the numerous and accurate transmissions of this work of Ragib’s, which themselves reflect the work’s popularity across the centuries. As can be seen from the list in the appendix, there are catalogued witnesses to this text in manuscript libraries from Patna to Michigan, and from Sana’a to Berlin. In a testament to the efforts of the Ottoman Empire, the majority are in Istanbul. Like Ragib’s *Exegesis*, the *Quranic Glossary* is replete with lexicographical data, often with a great deal of overlap between the two, for when Ragib starts to discuss a verse in the *Exegesis*, he usually glosses the key terms first.146 Again like the *Exegesis*, the *Quranic Glossary* was praised and used by, inter alia, az-Zarkašī and as-Suyūtī.147 The latter quotes the *Quranic Glossary* throughout his manual for exegetes as well as in his *al-Muzhir fī ʿUlūm al-Luḵah* (*The Illumination of the Linguistic Sciences*).148

Ragib makes numerous references to his major ethical work, *The Path to the Nobilities*, in the *Quranic Glossary*.149

145 The only aspect of the work that tends to differ is the title: *Mufradāt Al-fāz al-Qurʾān, Muğam Mufradāt Al-fāz al-Qurʾān, Mufradāt Ġarīb al-Qurʾān*. See Key, “al-Rāghib.”

146 See note 137.


149 For example: “I have indicated in *The Path to the Nobilities*...”, “I have mentioned in *The Path to the Nobilities*...” Ragib, *Quranic Glossary*, 54, 226, 714, 1186 (index). ———. *Mufradāt al-Ḥaṭib Collection*. f.1b, f.37b, ff.161a-161b. One might be tempted to guess that the *Quranic Glossary* was written after *The Path to the Nobilities* and before the *Exegesis*. 
**On Creeds (al-Iʿtiqādāt)**

In *On Creeds* Ragib reviews the standard topics of theological disagreement and presents his own beliefs. He lays out “the Sunni consensus”, and argues that Sunni beliefs are supported by proofs reasoned from the Quran and Sunna. At times, this project leads him to engage in heresiography, wherein he criticises excessive anthropomorphism, excessive partisanship in favour of Ali, and the Muʿtazilah. He distinguishes himself from the Ašāʿirah, and situates himself in a “traditionist” camp called *ahl al-ātahr*, that is itself distinguished from the partisans of Hadith (*ahl al-ḥadīth*).150

Unlike the majority of Ragib’s works, *On Creeds* has been published only once, in 1988 by Šamrān al-ʿAǧalī working in Tlemcen, Algeria.151 Al-ʿAǧalī took the title *al-Iʿtiqādāt* (*The Creeds*) from the incipit, while the two manuscripts with titles have *Risālah fi-l-Iʿtiqād* (*Epistle on Creeds*) and *Kitāb fi-l-ʿAqāʾid* (*Book on Creeds*).152 He produced a critical edition from three of the four known manuscripts (detailed in the Appendix) but the resultant codex printed in Beirut by Muʿ assuresat al-Aṣraff is marred by numerous and substantive errors and confusions. Al-ʿAǧalī struggled to integrate the differing structures of the manuscripts; a task which the Appendix shows was indeed a difficult one. Over half of what may be the oldest witness (Āstān-e Quds-e Raʿāvī 56) is missing and there appears to be substantial confusion in chapter two of what might otherwise be the best witness (Chester Beatty AR 5277), which is itself undated. Al-

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150 These affiliations will be addressed below.


152 raġabtu rağaḥbatan šādiqatan an aʿmala risālātan ubayyīnū fīḥā anwāʿa –l-iʿtiqādāt... ("I had a true desire to write an epistle in which I would explain the different creeds..."). ———, *On Creeds*, 10, 14. See Appendix for manuscript details.
ʿAǧalī is nevertheless the only person to reproduce the lines of the manuscripts’ texts in a printed form and thereby make them accessible to a wider audience. A new critical edition remains a desideratum.

In a section of the book that is extant in the Mashhad and Dublin manuscripts, Ragib refers to his Path to Nobility and thereby establishes that On Creeds is indeed his: “…for I have explained this in the book The Path to the Nobilities…”\(^\text{153}\) In The Path to the Nobilities, when discussing the number of sects into which the Muslim community has split, he may refer to On Creeds as “a separate composition” of his in which this subject is explained.\(^\text{154}\)

**The Path to the Nobilities of the Revelation (Kitāb āq-Ḍarīʾ ah ilā Makārim aš-Ṣarīʾ ah)**

This is Ragib's major ethical treatise, it demonstrates his catholic synthesis of Islamic, Aristotelian and pre-conquest Iranian ideas, and it has at its heart an ambitious goal for humanity. The Path to the Nobilities is an account of the ways in which human beings can fulfil their divine potential and deserve to be described as God’s vicegerents (ḥalifah, pl. ḥulafāʾ) on the earth. It has been published numerous times since the late nineteenth century and translated into Persian and English.\(^\text{155}\) Of all Ragib’s works it has attracted the most attention in European-

\(^\text{153}\) \text{fa-qad bayyantuhā fī kitābi –ḍ-Ḍarī ʾati ilā Makārimi –ṣ-Ṣarīʾ ah... ibid., 62. ———. Ms. of al-I tiqādāt [On Creeds]. Āstān-e Quds Rezāvī 56 (dated 1280), Āstān-e Quds-e Ražāvī, Mashhad. f.75a. ———. Ms. of al-I tiqādāt [On Creeds]. AR 5277 (dated ?), Chester Beatty, Dublin. f.96b.}

\(^\text{154}\) \text{wa-qad ḏukira dālika wa-buuyīna fī risālatin mufradah. ———, The Path to the Nobilities, 191. Cf. ———, On Creeds, 23-24. On Creeds may also be the Kitāb al-Īmān wa-l-Kufr (Book of Belief and Unbelief) that appears in the bibliographic tradition. For example: Muḥsin al-Amīn al-Husaynī al-ʿĀmilī, A yān aš-Ṣīʾ ah (Damascus: Maṭḥāʾ at Ibn Zaydūn, 1948). 27:220.}

Wilferd Madelung was the first to demonstrate that over half of Abū Ḥamīd Muḥammad al-Ḡāzālī’s (450/1058-505/1111) Mīzān al-ʿAmal (The Scale of Action) is taken unattributed from Ragib’s *The Path to the Nobilities*.

Al-Ḡāzālī’s working method, in which he reworked his ideas from book to book, means that his magnum opus Iḥyāʾ ʿUlūm ad-Din (Revival of the Religious Sciences) also incorporates a great deal, equally unattributed, of Ragib’s ethical thought.

As noted above, Ragib refers to *The Path to the Nobilities* in his *Exegesis, Quranic Glossary*, and *On Creeds*.

**Analysis of the Two Creations and Attainment of the Two Happinesses (Taṣṣīl an-Našʿatayn wa Taḥṣīl as-Saʿādatayn)**

Ragib’s shorter ethical treatise has much more Quranic quotation than *The Path to the Nobilities*, and is shorn of many of its complex epistemologies of reason and knowledge in favour of rhetorical phrases and repetition. It may have been intended for use in teaching, or indeed as a text from which to preach. Its most important slogan is that human reason (ʿaql) and divine revelation (šarʿ) are mutually dependent and jointly productive (chapter 18). Despite its

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popular tone, the *Analysis* is also heavier on Hellenistic philosophical terminology than any of Ragib’s other works. For example, he describes God as “necessary of existence” (*wāqīb al-wuqūd*), a phrase that would come to be associated with his more famous contemporary Avicenna. 158 In its earliest extant manuscript (Yahuda 3555), the *Analysis* is copied together with *The Path to the Nobilities*, and it is the work from which al-Bayhaqī quotes at length in his entry on Ragib.159

Littérature’s Ripostes and Poets’ and Eloquent Men’s Rejoinders (*Muḥādarāt al-Udabā* wa-Muḥāwarāt aš-Šu’arā’ wa-l-Bulağā*)

*Littérature’s Ripostes* is perhaps Ragib’s best known work after the *Quranic Glossary*. It is a literary anthology, a work of *adab*, a tightly structured, comprehensive and quality-controlled selection of the most apt quotations and the best poetry for any one of the hundreds of situations and subjects that make up its chapters, sub-chapters, and sub-sub-chapters. Although existing in a number of manuscripts and printed a number of times, it has only recently been produced in a critical edition with indexes. As-Sārīṣī has a number of complaints about this edition by ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd Murād, but its indexes nevertheless provide a great service.160 Even before being indexed, *Littérature’s Ripostes* had been the subject of two Ph.D. dissertations in the United States, and its


160 Ragib, *Littérature’s Ripostes*. as-Sārīṣī, ”Ḥawla Taḥqīq.” Murād used three of the manuscripts detailed in the Appendix.
accessibility (both in terms of print runs and internal organisation) means that it has been used by many more scholars.¹⁶¹

There are no references in *Littérateurs’ Ripostes* to any of Ragib’s other works, nor do any of his other work in exegesis or creed refer to his *adab* compilations. We have to assume that the author of *Littérateur’s Replies*, who lived around the end of the tenth century and was familiar with Isfahan, is the author of the *Quranic Glossary*, *On Creeds*, *The Path to the Nobilities*, and the *Exegesis*, who was alive at or before the start of the eleventh century, whose *Quranic Glossary* was purchased from Isfahan in 420/1029, and who had the same name. We are in good company making this assumption; as-Suyûtî read both Ragib’s *adab* (*Littérateurs’ Ripostes*) and his exegesis (*Quranic Glossary*) and considered them to have one and the same author: “he has the *Quranic Glossary*, and *The Branches of Eloquence* [see below], and *Littérateurs’ Ripostes*, and I have seen all three”.¹⁶²

The Confluence of Eloquence (*Maḡmaʿ al-Balāḡah*)

*The Confluence* is a shorter, more technical and linguistic, *adab* compendium. It provides its reader with strings of related words, short phrases and linguistically significant snippets of poetry, rather than the somewhat longer stories and quotations of *Littérateurs’ Ripostes*, which themselves still rarely run beyond a short paragraph. The editor of the only published edition, as-Sârîsî notes substantial overlap between the two works.¹⁶³


Ragib on Innovative Figures of Speech *(Kitāb min Kalām ar-Rāġib fī-l-Bāḍī’)*

Existing in only a single manuscript in The Landberg Collection at Yale University’s Beinecke Library, the manual of poetics *Ragib on Innovative Figures of Speech* has usually been referred to, on the rare occasions when it has been mentioned in European or Arabic-language scholarship, as *The Branches of Eloquence (Afānīn al-Balāġah)*. This is because Count Carlo Landberg (1848-1924), the eminent Swedish arabist who donated the manuscript to Yale, connected its subject matter of poetics to the title *The Branches of Eloquence (Afānīn al-Balāġah)* attributed to Ragib by Kâtip Çelebi, of which no other manuscripts are known. However, the title *Kitāb min Kalām ar-Rāġib fī-l-Bāḍī’* is found on the title page of the manuscript in the same hand as the textblock. It is perhaps more likely, though equally unproven, that *The Branches of Eloquence* was an alternative title for *The Confluence of Eloquence*. The attribution of this work to Ragib rests only on its content, style, and his name being on the title page.

*Abridgement of 'The Reform of Speech’ by Ibn as-Sikkīt (Muḥṭasār Iṣlāḥ al-Manṭiq li-Ibn as-Sikkīt)*

Like *Ragib on Innovative Figures of Speech*, this work remains unedited. Abū Yūsuf Ya’qūb b. Ishāq Ibn as-Sikkīt (d. ca. 244/858) had a particular concern for lexicography and semantic nuances, and Ragib epitomised his *Reform of Speech*, which is in large part a review and analysis of morphological patterns. Ragib wrote in the introduction:

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My approach [to The Reform of Speech] has been to extract the essence and remove the lines of poetry adduced as evidence. For each long chapter containing repetitions, I have provided a revision in alphabetical order, starting with the letter hamzah and then the letter bāʾ. The repeated material has consequently been erased. For those expressions, in a single chapter, that conveyed the same idea, I have organised them so that you no longer need repeated explanations. For the different morphological structures such as faʿala and fuʿila, I have reduced their categories so that each occurs just once, and their explanations are dealt with together. This process has resulted in acquired memorization and a proximity to comprehension. Success lies with God.

The attribution of this epitome to Ragib rests on the single manuscript in Cairo (see Appendix).

On the Difference between the Words 'One' and 'Absolute One' (Risālah fī Ḏikr al-Wāḥid wa-l-Aḥad)

This short lexicographical and theological epistle has been edited by as-Sārīsī from a single Istanbul manuscript, the title page of which is the only proof available for its attribution to Ragib, other than similarities in style and content with his other works (see, for example, the discussion in the Appendix of a passage on the word ‘one’ in the Āstān-e Quds-e Ražāvī 56 copy of On Creeds).

166Ragib’s text as reproduced by Ibrāhīm reads:


On the Correct Ways to Mix with People (Risālah fī Ādāb al-Ḥītlāt bi-n-Nās)

This epistle (with an internal contents section) of ethical adab has been edited by as-Sārīsī as above,\textsuperscript{168} and by Mīr Lawḥī under the title The Circumstances of Friendships and the Observances of Loves (Aḥwāl al-Mawaddāt wa-Murā‘āt al-Maḥabbāt).\textsuperscript{169} The title page and similarities in style and content are the only proof available for its attribution to Ragib.

On Human Virtue Arising from the Disciplines of Knowledge (Risālah anna Faḍīlat al-Insān bi-l- Ḫūm)

This ethical and epistemological epistle (with an internal contents section) has been edited by as-Sārīsī as above.\textsuperscript{170} The title page and similarities in style and content are the only proof available for its attribution to Ragib.

On the Ordering of Intellectual Disciplines and of Worldly Actions (Risālah fī Marātib al-ʿUlūm wa-l- Aʾmāl ad-Dunyawīyah)

This shorter epistemological and theological epistle has been edited by as-Sārīsī as above.\textsuperscript{171} The title page and similarities in style and content are the only proof available for its attribution to Ragib.

\textsuperscript{168}———, "On the Correct Ways to Mix With People." As-Sārīsī notes that he had published this epistle previously in Amman with Dār al-Bašīr in 1998. ———, Letters, 3.


The Correct Way in Chess (Adab aš-Šaṭranḵ)

Recorded by Theodor Menzel as the title of a manuscript in Kazan, Russia. It may be related to the eight sub-sub-sections on chess (šaṭranḵ) in chapter eleven of Littérature’s Ripostes.

On Knowledge of the Soul and On Invocation of God’s Name (Risālah fī-Maʿrifat an-Nafs, Risālah fī-ḏ-Ḍikr)

These two titles are attributed to Ragib in the catalogue entry for a single manuscript containing 145 works in Istanbul. During my visit to the Süleymaniye the manuscript was being repaired and I was only able to consult a scanned image, the quality of which was insufficient to determine the text of these works, which appear to be found copied in the margins. See Appendix for details.

The Key to Success: Commentary on the Morning Personal Prayer (Šarḥ li-Duʿāʾ āṣ-Ṣabāḥ al-mawsūm bi-Miftāḥ an-Naḡāḥ)

The attribution of this commentary on a prayer attributed to ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib (fourth caliph, reg. 35/656-40/661) is uncertain. See Appendix.

Lost and Spurious Titles

Anecdotes from Historical Reports (Nukat al-Aḥbār)

Mentioned by Ragib in introduction to Littérature’s Ripostes.

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173 Ragib, Littérature’s Ripostes, 2:726-733.
Choice Poetry (ʿUyūn al-ʿAṣʿār)

Mentioned by Ragib in introduction to Littérature’s Ripostes.\textsuperscript{175}

On Calling Attention to the Lessons of the Quran (ar-Risālah al-Munabbihah ʿalā Fawāʾid al-Qurʾān)

Mentioned twice by Ragib in the Quranic Glossary.\textsuperscript{176}

On the Nobility of Sufism (Kitāb Šaraf at-Taṣawwuf)

Mentioned by Ragib in Exegesis of Quran 2:37 and 2:49.\textsuperscript{177}

On the Relationships between Expressions (Risālat Munāsabāt al-Alfāẓ)

Mentioned by Ragib in introduction to the Quranic Glossary.\textsuperscript{178}

On Synonyms (Taḥqīq al-Alfāẓ al-Mutarādifah ʿalā al-Maʿnā al-Wāḥid)

Mentioned by Ragib as a book that he plans to write after the Quranic Glossary.\textsuperscript{179}

The Principles of Derivation (Uṣūl al-Iṣtiqāq)

Mentioned twice by Ragib in the Quranic Glossary.\textsuperscript{180}

\textsuperscript{174} Ibid., 1:3.

\textsuperscript{175} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{176} ———, Quranic Glossary, 53, 229.

\textsuperscript{177} ———. Carullah 84. f.42a line 15, f.51a line 14. Cf. Ibid., f.44b line 7. ———, "On the Ordering of Intellectual Disciplines and of Worldly Actions," 222.

\textsuperscript{178} ———, Quranic Glossary, 55.

\textsuperscript{179} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{180} Ibid., 118, 189.
This work has usually been listed among Ragib’s but the recent study of Muḥammad Muṣṭafā Āydīn is persuasive in attributing it to Abū ‘Abdallāh Muḥammad al-Ḥaṭīb al-Iskāfī (d. 420/1029). Āydīn has done a substantial amount of manuscript, bibliographical and content-based research. The most important witness that he draws on is Ahmed III 85 (Topkapı Palace, Istanbul, Turkey), which was copied by the famous Yāqūt al-Ḥamawī (574 or 575/1179-626/1229). Yāqūt records a previous scribal note on the witness he was working from that described using an autograph copy by al-Iskāfī. The incipit of this manuscript, as well as the incipit of Fazıl Ahmed Paşa 154 (Süleymaniye, Turkey, Istanbul), record dictation of the text by al-Iskāfī to Abū al-Farağ Ibrāhīm b. ‘Alī b. Muḥammad al-Ardastānī.

The attribution to Ragib rests largely on the title on what appears to be a relatively early manuscript at Esad Efendi 176 (Süleymaniye, Turkey, Istanbul), al-Bayhaqī’s inclusion of the title in his biographical entry, and Muḥammad Ḥālid Ṣiddīqī’s incorrect claim that the incipit of British Museum OR 5784 (British Library, London, United Kingdom) contains Ragib’s name.


183 Ibid., 1:199-200.

184 The incipit of British Museum OR 5784 does not contain Ragib’s name, pace Ṣiddīqī, "Durrat at-Ta’wil," 16-18. NB. Al-Bayhaqī also gives another unsupported title: Kitāb Kalimāt as-Sahābah (Words of the Prophet’s Companions), and appears only to have been personally familiar with Analysis of the Two Creations as discussed above. al-Bayhaqī, Tārīḥ Ḥukamā’ al-Islām, 112.
Kitāb al-Maʿānī al-Akbar (The Larger Book of Literary Ideas)

Mentioned in the introduction to Durrat at-Tawīl, and therefore likely to have been written by al-Ḥaṭīb al-Iskāfī.

Iḥtiğāq al-Qirāʿat al-Muḥtaṣah (Vindication of Specified Readings of the Quran)

Mentioned in the introduction to Durrat at-Tawīl, and therefore likely to have been written by al-Ḥaṭīb al-Iskāfī.

Šarḥ Kalām Rasūl Allāh fī Ḥaqq Ἄlī b. ʿAlī Ṭālib (Commentary on the Prophet’s Words Concerning the Right of Ali)

No evidence for attribution to Ragib. See Appendix.

Times

We know almost nothing about Ragib’s life, for there is no information to be found in the Arabic and Persian biographical and bibliographical traditions. This makes it more urgent that we fit him into his intellectual context, which means evaluating the ideas and beliefs expressed frankly in his works against the ideas and beliefs of others. Yet at the same time, while we can revisit the mosques and courts of Isfahan we have no way of knowing whether or when Ragib “the Isfahanian” was actually there, or exactly why he might not have been.

Isfahan

Isfahan sits in a valley in the great mountain range (then known as the Ǧibāl) that separates Iraq from Iran. Baghdad and Basra lie to the west, Shiraz to the south, Ray (now Tehran) to the north, Kerman to the south east at the end of the mountains, and to the east the great high plains of the Iranian desert (al-mafāzah) beyond which lie Nishapur, Herat, and Marv. Trade and
scholarship arrived in and left Isfahan from all points of the compass, although the main routes ran mostly north, south, and west, avoiding the desert. Isfahan was at the heart of what was known as “Persian Iraq”, the twin of “Arab Iraq” over the mountains to the west.

In Ragib’s time Isfahan was a large, relatively prosperous, and relatively chaotic city. The dynasty founded in the mid-tenth-century by the sons of Būyah b. Fannāḥ, a fisherman from the south shores of the Caspian Sea, was just starting to lose control. Būyah’s grandson Faḫr ad-Dawlah died in 387/997, two years after his vizier aṣ-Ṣāḥib. Būyah’s great-grandsons would not be so successful. Maĝd ad-Dawlah (Rustam b. Faḫr ad-Dawlah, reg. 387/997-4201029), who succeeded his father aged four and scarcely ever ruled independently of his mother (Sayyidah, d. 405/1014), lost control of Isfahan around 398/1008 to the founder of a new, smaller, dynasty originating from the same southern Caspian area, Ibn Kākūyah (ʿAlā’ ad-Dawlah Abū ʿ āfr Muḥammad b. Dušmanziyār, cousin of Sayyidah, reg. ca. 398/1008-433/1041).


186 The two Iraqs (al-ʿirāqayn) made up of ʿirāq ʿaǧamī and ʿirāq ʿarabī.

187 Durand-Guédy estimates 100,000-130,000 inhabitants around this time. (This would make it approximately the size (101,355 inhabitants) of the city of Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States in the 2000 census). Durand-Guédy, Iranian Elites, 25-26.


In 409/1018, the same year that the London manuscript of Ragib’s *Quranic Glossary* was written, Ibn Kākūyah’s dynasty, with Isfahan as its capital, was recognised by the caliph in Baghdad and “was undeniably the major power of Western Iran”.\(^{190}\) Al-Māfarrūḥī describes how Ibn Kākūyah ruled Isfahan for forty and a half years in a state of constant watchfulness with spies in the camps of all his surrounding enemies. It is reported that upon learning that an enemy intended to attack Isfahan he would judge whether the enemy could be resisted, and then either fight back or retreat swiftly and tactically “to preserve the city”.\(^{191}\)

However, during one of these tactical absences in 420/1029, the year in which ʿAlī aš-Šīrāzī was in the city buying the London *Quranic Glossary* manuscript, Masʿūd of Ġaznah (Abū Saʿīd Šihāb ad-Dawlah b. Maḥmūd b. Sebüktigin, reg. 421/1031-432/1040) entered Isfahan and ordered a large-scale massacre to punish a local population that had been resisting in their ruler’s absence.\(^{192}\) Ibn al-Ḡawzī tells of an “uncountable number of scholars being killed”, even in the city’s mosques. Ibn al-Aṯīr puts the number of dead at around five thousand.\(^{193}\) Could Ragib have been among them? In any case these were hard decades. According to Durand-Guédy, “the

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\(^{192}\) ———, *Iranian Elites*, 64, 62-65.

city’s life was punctured by violent occupations, assaults, sieges, pillages, massacres, epidemics and want”.

Ibn Kākūyah would later recover his position, and in 429/1038 he built walls of mud brick covered in plaster around the city, with crenellations and platforms, and protected by moats. However, the next threat was already on the horizon and Ibn Kākūyah’s son Farāmūz (Abū Manṣūr Žāhir ad-Dīn Šams al-Mulk b. Muḥammad, reg.433/1041-443/1051, d. after 455/1063) joined the forces of the incoming Salḡūk Ṭoḡrīl Beg (Muḥammad b. Mīkā‘īl b. Salḡūk, d.455/1063), whose siege of Isfahan would be delayed by the walls Farāmūz’s father had built for an entire year before the city fell in 443/1051. Another massacre and a sea change in intellectual life followed: “the creation of the Saljuqid state … in Isfahan … had a huge impact on the local urban society … the old local elites were marginalized and deprived of the networks that enabled them to play a role…”.

We may never know to what extent Ragib was caught up in these events, if indeed he was still alive at this time. He may only have known Isfahan under the relative calm of Faḫr ad-Dawlah and aṣ-Ṣāḥib, if indeed he was there. Nevertheless, it does seem likely that the preservation of his biography and his scholarly networks were affected by the turmoil. Scholars that he taught, who would otherwise have passed on details of his life, may not have survived the chaos that enveloped Isfahan in the early eleventh century. The same could be true of his works. It does not seem too much of a stretch to imagine that the library founded by aṣ-Ṣāḥib’s successor as vizier Abū al-ʿAbbās aḍ-Ḍabbī next to the great mosque, full of books on

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194 ———, Iranian Elites, 53.
195 Ibid., 57.
everything from lexicography to logic, might have held copies of Ragib’s works.\textsuperscript{197}

Archaeologists have uncovered small fragments of this baked brick addition, but the library itself is unlikely to have survived Masʿūd’s attack and Ṭoğrıl’s conquest intact.\textsuperscript{198} Perhaps the wide distribution of manuscripts of Ragib’s \textit{Quranic Glossary} owes something to the fact that ʿAlī aš-Šīrāzī bought a copy and took it out of Isfahan to the library of his employer in Damascus.

\textbf{Arabic and Persian Isfahan}

Durand-Guédy describes a diglossic situation in which the Isfahan vernacular was Persian while the intellectual elite, the scholars, spoke and worked in Arabic. During this period Persian was experiencing a literary and scholarly revival on the other side of the desert, but Isfahan turned more towards Arabic-speaking Baghdad.\textsuperscript{199} Ragib fits this context perfectly; we have already seen that al-Māfarrūḥī lists him among scholars who were proficient in both languages, and there is evidence in his works, all of which are in Arabic, that he knew Persian as well. Mīr Lawḥī has produced extensive lists of Ragib’s use of Persian sources,\textsuperscript{200} Ragib notes Persian

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\textsuperscript{197} The library catalogue took up three volumes and comprised works in exegesis, Hadith, grammar, lexicography, morphology (\textit{at-taṣrīf wa-l-abniyah}), poetry, narrative history (\textit{al-ḥbār}), lives of the prophets, caliphs, kings and princes, as well as collections of Hellenistic disciplines (\textit{min ʿulūm al-awāʾil}) such as logic, mathematics, physics, metaphysics (\textit{ilāhīyāt}) and more. al-Māfarrūḥī, \textit{Maḥāsin Iṣfahān}, 85.

\textsuperscript{198} Grabar, \textit{The Great Mosque}, 47. Durand-Guédy lists a number of lost histories of Isfahan, most pertinently for Ragib those by Muḥammad b. Isḥāq Ibn Mandah (d. 395/1005) and his son ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān (d. 470/1078). Durand-Guédy, \textit{Iranian Elites}, 317-318.


etymologies and quotes Persian phrases at several points, and in *Littérateurs’ Ripostes* he has a section on “poetry taken from Persian”.

**Collegial Relationships**

There is some oblique evidence in Ragib’s *Letters* that at times he suffered from the vicissitudes of an intellectual culture that thrived on controversy, dispute, and factional disagreement. If anything, this shows that he was integrated into the rough and tumble scholarly culture that existed even when the broader political climate was relatively stable.

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fāḍil, the same one?) has slandered him to a figure in authority (al-ustāḏ, the same one?).  

Ragib had also said that were it not for the encouragement of the senior scholar (aš-šayḥ al-fāḍil) he would not have written On the Difference between the Words 'One' and 'Absolute One', fearing that it could fall into the hands of those who would not understand and cause controversy (fitnah).  

Integrated as Ragib may have been into the turmoil of scholarly life in Isfahan, he consistently expressed distaste for it. In The Path to the Nobilities he discusses how common it is to see scholars who have attained a certain position in a field criticising those above them and shunning those below. Competition between scholars, and the resultant mutual hatred and conflict, is an evil that it is incumbent upon the secular authorities (as-sulṭān) to control. Furthermore, debate and dialectic itself is a bad thing. It is a reprehensible thing for intelligent scholars, and even more so for the ill-informed masses. Although debate may spur participants on to search for knowledge, the fact that they are driven by a desire to vanquish their opponent makes them unable to agree to anything, however true it may turn out to be. The right thing to do if one is faced with opponents girded for such argumentation is flee, and one should not be tempted to enlighten them with wisdom, for as the Prophet says “angels don’t enter a house with a dog in it”. The problem with debate is that it is much easier to break down an argument than

205 ———, "One and Absolute One," 44.  
206 ———, The Path to the Nobilities, 173.  
207 Ibid., 182.  
provide a new one, just as humans are able to slaughter animals, but not create them.\textsuperscript{209} Again, these criticisms were popular tropes in the literature of the time; rarely, if ever, did a scholar praise the factional process of disagreements and sectarian quarrel.

\textbf{Fitting into the Institutional Landscape}

\textbf{The Court}

In Ragib’s time it was very important to fit in. Careers could be made or broken based on a scholars’ ability to integrate themselves into circles of power and patronage. Erez Naaman, in a recent Harvard Ph.D. dissertation, writes persuasively about the challenges and rewards of fitting into what he calls “the courtly habitus”.\textsuperscript{210} He is mostly dealing with literary taste rather than theological or sectarian positions but his analysis of the hegemonic, but not simplistic or monolithic, tastes at the heart of each circle of power is pertinent.

Naaman studied the court of aṣ-Ṣāḥib b. ʿAbbād, an arena with which we know Ragib was in contact. The member of that court with whom Ragib corresponded, Abū al-Qāsim b. Abī al-ʿAlā’, was described as a distinguished and leading member of the elite of Isfahan (\textit{min wuḡūhi ahli Isfahān wa-a’yānihim wa-ru’asāʾihiim}).\textsuperscript{211} Despite his correspondence with a member of the elite, Ragib does not appear in any of the many records of the scholars at aṣ-Ṣāḥib’s court.\textsuperscript{212}


\textsuperscript{211} For example: at-Ṭaʾālibī, \textit{Yaḡmat ad-Dahr} 1956 ed. Yāqūt, \textit{Muʿam al-Udabāʾ}. at-Tawḥīdī, \textit{Aḥlāq al-Wazīrayn}. 
It seems possible that Ragib’s absence from the records of his time could be the result of his failure to fit into a habitus in Isfahan, whether by choice or not. It is possible to read in some of his ideas a certain coolness towards secular authority, along with an ethically founded refusal to countenance that authority behaving badly. He wrote that God censures those who seek to govern others before they have first governed and improved their souls and bodies.\textsuperscript{213} God’s is the only real command, and when one human commands another it is just figurative language.\textsuperscript{214} Kings do not deserve to rule because of their wealth or their inheritance, they deserve to rule if they are righteous, effective, and of sound body.\textsuperscript{215} Finally, anyone with a wife, a servant, and a house is a king! Or alternatively, anyone who does not have to work is a king!\textsuperscript{216} These do not sound like the words of a good client.

**Hadith**

The collection and study of Hadith presented an alternative source of cultural capital to that provided by the court. In Isfahan, its sectarian affiliations were directly opposed to the Shia and


\textsuperscript{214} wa-dālika anna šay’an min –l-ašyā’ i lā yakūnu illā bi-amrihī subḥānahā wa-amru –s-sultaṇi iḏā uḍīfa ilā hāḏā wa-qūbila bihi ṭuğida mağāzan… (“…and that [Quran 36:82 where God commands things to “be!”] is because things only exist with God’s command, and if the command of a sultan is placed next to and compared to that it is found to be figurative”). ———, On Creeds, 165.

\textsuperscript{215} For example, the first four (”rightly guided”) caliphs of Islam were rich in humility, not in material wealth. The subsequent text reads: *inna –l-mulka yustaḥqqu fī an yakūna –l-insānu min ‘unsūrin ṣālihin sawā’un kāna min bayti –l-maliki gaylyn aw lam yakun wa-an yakūna dā ‛ilmi sīyāsati nafsihī wa-ahluhī min ra‘yatihi wa-an yakūna fī ḡismihī kāmilah –l-ḫilqati šaḍida –l-quwwati… (The human who deserves to be king must be of good stock, whether or not he is a princeling from the king’s family, he must know how to govern his own soul, his family must be among his flock, he must be, and appear to be, of sound body, and he must be strong…)

———. Carullah 84. f.165a-b. Cf. ———, The Path to the Nobilities, 129.

\textsuperscript{216} ———, Exegesis ed. Sardār, 310-311.
Muʿtazilī sympathies of aṣ-Ṣāḥib.²¹⁷ Hadith partisans were either Ḥanbalī or Šāfiʿī, and there are reports of a lack of tolerance for anything close to Shiism. They vehemently defended the fifth caliph Muʿāwiyah b. Abī Sufyān (reg. 41/661-60/680), who took the caliphate from ʿAlī, to the extent that they considered a Hadith that classed him as a “king” rather than a “caliph” tantamount to a profession of Shiism.²¹⁸ Aṣ-Ṣāḥib can only have been motivated by a desire to combat anti-Muʿtazilī sentiment in Isfahan when he built an entire new mosque to promote Muʿtazilī theology.²¹⁹

On the other side of the theological and sectarian fence from aṣ-Ṣāḥib’s Muʿtazilī Shiism, Hadith had its own institutions and its own habitus. Isfahan had a specialised institution for Hadith (bayt alʿilm wa-r-riwāyah / bayt al-ḥadīth wa-r-riwāyah) that produced the city’s chief judges and was attended by its prominent families.²²⁰ The men who dominated the Hadith scene in Isfahan during Ragib’s lifetime were engaged in bitter doctrinal quarrels, and in the process of...

²¹⁷ This should not be taken to mean that the boundaries between the two groups were necessarily fixed or rigid. Naaman discusses aṣ-Ṣāḥib’s inclusion of scholars with sectarian affiliations that clashed with his own. Aṣ-Ṣāḥib’s librarian, Abū Baqr Muḥammad b. al-Muẓri’ (d. 381/991) was, after all, a Ḥanbalī. Naaman, "Literature and Literary People," 74-75. On the library, see: Pomerantz, "Licit Magic and Divine Grace," 111-114. Nevertheless, Faḥr ad-Dawlah chose two Shia viziers to succeed aṣ-Ṣāḥib: Abū al-ʿAbbās ad-Ḍabbī and Abū ʿAlī b. Ḥamūlah al-Isfahānī. Durand-Guédy, Iranian Elites, 40. Naaman confirms that aṣ-Ṣāḥib was a Zaydī Shia, pace Madelung: Naaman, "Literature and Literary People," 7 note 8.


documenting both those quarrels and their own prestige. Ibn Mandah (Muḥammad b. Ishāq, 310/922-395/1005) was a leading Ḥanbalī and a descendant of the pre-Islamic Sasanian elite. He went on long, expensive journeys to receive transmission of Hadith and returned laden with it, followed by forty camels carrying records of the cultural capital he had amassed.\footnote{Šams ad-Dīn Muḥammad b. Aḥmad ad-Ḍahabī, \textit{Kitāb Taḏkirat al-Huffāz}, 5 vols. (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyah, 1990). 3:1031f.} 

Abū Nuʿaym al-Iṣfahānī (Aḥmad b. Ṭabdallāh, 336/948-430/1038) was an adherent of the legal school of aš-Šāfiʿī, and was such a controversial figure that someone who suggested going to hear Hadith from him was almost killed by Ḥanbalī partisans (referred to as \textit{ahl al-ḥadīṯ}) with their pen-sharpening knives.\footnote{Ibid., 3:1095.} From an old Persian family himself (his great-great-grandfather was called Mihrān), he engaged in and recorded his quarrel with Ibn Mandah.\footnote{Ibid., 2:278, 3:1097.} Just as with the records of events at court, Ragib is nowhere to be found in the histories of these achievements and controversies. 

Ragib was conversant with Hadith terminology and committed to the theory that Hadith, the iteratively verified reports of the sayings and actions of the Prophet, were a valid and valuable source of knowledge. He was not, however, engaged in the same sort of activity as Abū Nuʿaym or Ibn Mandah who were part of the system of transmission and verification that produced works such as Abū Nuʿaym’s \textit{Ḍikr Aḥbār Isfahān} (\textit{The Enumeration of Reports from Isfahan}), a long and critical “literary inventory of the transmitters of traditions”.\footnote{Chabbi, \textit{Abū Nuʿaym}.} Instead we

\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{Ibid., 3:1095.}
\item \footnote{Chabbi, \textit{Abū Nuʿaym}.}
find in Ragib’s works scattered references to the Hadith specialists (ahl al-hadīṯ), a group with whom Ragib does not identify himself and with whom he does not always agree.

For Ragib, Hadith was a staging post on the scholar’s progression through the different intellectual disciplines and not the ultimate destination. It was a source of revealed truth to be used alongside the Quran, but unlike the Quran it must of course be carefully checked for authenticity. Those Hadith that have been related by enough parallel transmitters to remove any possibility of forgery and error (al-mutawātirah) have the status of necessary knowledge. Less reliable Hadith with only a single chain of transmitters (a bār al-āḥād) can be rejected by reason.

It is only the partisans of Hadith (ahl al-hadīṯ) who maintain that religion is known only through transmission to the complete exclusion of reason, a position with which Ragib disagreed. Religion, as he consistently maintained in his ethics, exegesis, and creed, is known

225 The different stages are listed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>fa-min manāzilihī [al-ʿilm]</td>
<td>lexicography, upon which revelation is founded; then memorization of the Quran; then listening to Hadith; then law; then ethics and piety; and then the knowledge of correct actions together with the intermediaries that enable the correct actions to be known, intermediaries consisting of the principles of proofs and indications.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ragib, *The Path to the Nobilities*, 172.


229 maḏhabu ahli –l-hadīṭi anna lā wāqībā illā min ǧihati –n-nūbuwwah (the doctrine of Hadith partisans is that no religious prescription is incumbent upon believers unless it comes from a prophet). ———, *On Creeds*, 115.
and followed through a combination of reason and revelation.\(^{230}\) Ragib was happy to cite the controversial Hadith about Muʿāwiyah in *On Creeds*.\(^{231}\) This is not a set of convictions that would have allowed him to fit into Isfahan’s Hadith culture.

### Sectarian Affiliations

**Sunnis**

There is no doubt that Ragib saw himself as Sunni and would have been recognised as such by his contemporaries. In *On Creeds* he writes that “the Sunnis, those who follow the example of the Prophet’s Companions, are the sect in which salvation is found”.\(^{232}\)

The next chapter is titled “that which is incumbent upon Sunnis” and ends with the following list of “the authorities of Islam” (*aʿimmat al-islām*): Mālik b. Anas (Abū ʿAbdallāh, d. 179/796), al-Layṭ b. Saʿd (ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān, 94/713-175/791), al-Awzāʾī (Abū ʿAmr Abd ar-Raḥmān, 88/707–157/774), Sufyān at-Ṭawrī (Abū ʿAbdallāh b. Saʿīd, 97/716-161/778), Ibn ʿUyaynah (Sufyān al-Hilālī, 107/725-196/811), aš-Šāfiʿī (d. 204/820), and Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal.

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\(^{230}\) *maḏhabu akṭari ahli –l-atari anna ḏālika [dīn allāh] ba ḏuhū ʿaqīli wa-ba ḏuhū šarʿī*. The doctrine of the ahl al-atār (see below) is that some of God’s religion is known by reason and some by revelation. Ibid. See also ———, *Analysis of the Two Creations*, 117-121 (chapter 18).

\(^{231}\) “The caliphate will continue after me for thirty years and then it will become a kingdom” (*al-ḥilāfatu ba ḏī jālātūna sanatan ʿumma taṣīru mulkan*) was cited by Ragib to argue that all Muslim rulers after 40/661 should be subject to evaluation and correction by their subjects. ———, *On Creeds*, 30. For all the protestations of the Isfahani Hadith partisans, this Hadith also appears in Ahmad b. Ḥanbal’s collection. Ahmad Ibn Ḥanbal, *Musnad*, 6 vols. (Cairo: al-Māṭbaʿah al-Maymanīyah, 1895). 5:221.

All these men had been dead for over a century when Ragib was writing, and all were famous jurists and transmitters of Hadith. The men who would give their names to three of the four major legal schools are present (Mālik, aš-Šāfiʿī, and Aḥmad) and the only notable absentee is the fourth: Abū Ḥanīfah (an-Nuʿmān b. Ṭābit, d.150/767). The list confirms that Ragib was Sunni, and while it suggests a certain degree of coolness towards the Ḥanafī school of jurisprudence, a minority affiliation in Isfahan at the time, Ragib is happy to cite Ḥanafī positions without criticism in his Exegesis.

Shia

Although we have established that Ragib was Sunni and not Shia, his works still contain a tremendous amount of quotations from, and venerations of, ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib. That he could do this while confidently identifying himself as a Sunni tells us that the boundaries between these two major confessional groups were not in exactly the same places as in later centuries. Ragib


234 Cf. al-Bayhaqī’s (Abū Bakr Aḥmad b. al-Ḥusayn, d. 458/1066) list of the Sunni imams, which is exactly the same as Ragib’s with the addition of Abū Ḥanīfah, and of two scholars who are later than anyone in Ragib’s list, the authors of of the two canonical Hadith collections al-Buḫārī (Abū Abdallāh Muḥammad b. Ismāʿīl, 194/810-256/870) and Muslim (Abū al-Ḥaǧǧāǧ b. al-Ḥaǧǧāǧ, d. 261/875). Abū al-Qāsim ʿAlī Ibn ʿAsākir, "The Exposure of the Calumniator's Lying Concerning what has been Imputed to the Imam Abu ʾl-Ḥasan al-Asḥar," in The theology of al-Asḥar: the Arabic texts of al-Asḥar’s Kitaḥ al-lumaʿ and Risālat istiḥsān al-ḥawd fī ilm al-kalām: with briefly annotated translations, and appendices containing material pertinent to the study of al-Asḥar, ed. Richard Joseph McCarthy (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1953), 160.

235 …from the middle of the third/ninth century Hanafism steadily lost ground to Shafiʿism, which became the majority madhhāb in Ḥisbān in the fourth/tenth century". Durand-Guédry, Iranian Elites, 36.

236 Ragib appears to approve of a Ḥanafī rejection of the Šāfiʿī principle of negative implication. The Ḥanafī position is that negative implication is incorrect because it would mean that Quran 3:130’s prohibition of "doubled and re-doubled" interest would produce an allowance of interest so long as it was not “doubled and re-doubled”. Ragib, Exegesis ed. aš-Šida, 852. That this is an accurate reflection of the Ḥanafī position is confirmed by: al-Ǧaṣṣaṣ, Uṣūl al-Fiqh, 1:291, 1:296, 1:301. For confirmation of this being a Šāfiʿī position: Vishanoff, Islamic Hermeneutics, 60. For another example of Ragib citing a Ḥanafī position see: Ragib, Exegesis ed. Sardār, 205.

237 These have been enumerated by Mīr Lawḥī, together with Ragib’s references to other Shia imams. Mīr Lawḥī, Rāġeb, 39, 115, Appendix One.
was pro-ʿAlī, as reflected by his relating an anecdote in which ʿAlī’s failure to persuade the masses of his legitimacy is the result of their being blinded by his light.\(^{238}\) He was also against the love of ʿAlī when it reached the stage of attacking the Prophet’s other companions and wives.\(^{239}\) He stated that the Shia were wrong about the imamate.\(^{240}\)

**Traditionists, Senior Sufis, and Wise Philosophers**

Ragib was unquestionably Sunni, but the biographical tradition in subsequent centuries would not be satisfied with simply placing him in such a broad church and neither should we. The majority of *On Creeds*, and much of the work of other heresiographers, focussed on the differences of opinion, controversies, and sectarian battles within Sunni Islam. The problem is that it is by no means clear into which existing category Ragib should be placed, and it appears problematic to assert that someone whose work was so popular could be *sui generis* and in his own category. Nevertheless, that appears to be the case. Ragib affiliates himself with ahl *al-ṭaḥar wa-muḥassili aṣ-ṣūfiyah wa-l-hukamāʾ* (“traditionists, senior Sufis, and wise philosophers”); a

\(^{238}\) The anecdote in *The Path to the Nobilities*, in a section addressing the problems faced by the wise when preaching to the masses, reads: Salmah b. Kuhayl was asked what it was about Ali that led the masses to reject him while he was clearly sharper than them? Salmah replied that the masses’ eyes were too dim to see Ali’s light, and people always lean towards those similar to themselves. (*wa-qad qīla li-Salmah b. Kuhayl mā li-ʿAlī (r) rafaḍath –l-ʿāmmatu wa-lahū fī kulli ʿāmmtu wa allū fī kulli ayrin qāṭiʿun fa qāla li anna ḍaʾwaʿaʿuyūnihim qaṣura ʿan nūrihī wa-nūsu ilā aškālihim amyāl*).

Ragib, *The Path to the Nobilities*, 183.


grouping that I have not found attested anywhere else. The remainder of this chapter is an attempt to understand what it meant to him and what it would have meant to his contemporaries.

**Traditionists (ahl al-ätar)**

The Ašʿarī theologian, and contemporary of Ragib, Ibn Fūrak used the name ahl al-ätar for a group of scholars that al-Ašʿarī himself debated with in Baghdad in the tenth century. Al-Ašʿarī disagreed with them, but was prepared to defend them against those who would belittle their knowledge, saying that their cautiousness about legitimate word usage was not necessarily incorrect, but due to an excess rather than a lack of knowledge. Al-Ašʿarī was an ex-Muʿtazī arguing for theological solutions that were more consistent with revelation and required less hermeneutical recourse to figurative interpretations of Quran and Sunna than those of the Muʿtazī.

The ahl al-ätar in al-Ašʿarī as reported by Ibn Fūrak appear to represent the Ḥanābilah, theologians who were engaged in a political, cultural, and theological struggle with the Muʿtazī that often rested on Ḥanbalī commitments to literal interpretation of revelation, and consequent Muʿtazī claims that the Ḥanābilah were simplistic and stupid. Ragib himself was

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241 In this passage the traditionsists (called both ahl al-ätar and asḥāb an-naql wa-l-ätar) maintain that one should refuse to describe any expression of the words of the Quran as either created or uncreated in order to avoid giving the impression that the Quran itself could be described as created. Al-Ašʿarī himself was more confident and held that one could make a distinction between the sounds created by the movement of the tongue and lips during recitation of the Quran, and the thing that was being recited, the Quran itself. Abū Bakr Muḥammad Ibn Fūrak, *Maqālāt aš-Sayḥ Abī al-Ḥasan al-Ašʿarī*, ed. Ahmad Ἄbd ar-Raḥmān as-Sāyiḥ (Cairo: Maktabat aṯ-Taqāfāh ad-Dīniyah, 2005). 61-62. Al-Ašʿarī also mentions the ahl al-ätar as a group who believed that Quranic phrases that name or praise God may be abrogated by other Quranic verses that were revealed later. This is a minority position: “most people” do not allow abrogation of historical information (aḥbār), praise, or the names of God. al-Ašʿarī, *Maqālāt*, 610-611.
familiar with Muʿtazilī thought and whenever he identified a concept as Muʿtazilī, he disagreed with it.  

Ragib confirms the identification of ahl al-aṭār with literal interpretations in his Exegesis, where the ahl al-aṭār are the group that take literally God’s “we will write down what they say” in Quran 3:181 rather than seeing it as an analogy for his memory. The ahl al-aṭār also follow what Ragib calls the literal (aẓ-ẓāhir) meaning of Quran 3:195: when God forgives the sins of the early believers who fought for the cause it refers to forgiveness on the day of judgement, rather than the oblique meaning that Ragib ascribes to “some of the Sufis” that God will purify them in this world.

An aṭār is an impression, a trace, a vestige, a remnant, and it is consequently used for the traces of God’s words and the traditions and contexts that preserved the revelation. The theological group most committed to the literal interpretation of revelation would therefore be keen to describe themselves as the partisans of the tradition (ahl al-aṭār), and it is indeed the term that the Ḥanbalī ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Ǧīlānī (470/1078–561/1166) used to describe his own

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243 ———, Exegesis ed. aš-Šīdī, 1014-1017.

244 Ibid., 1056.

245 “To transmit (knowledge), to relate it. Imperfect vowel u. Verbal nouns aṭran, aṭāratan, uṭratan. Origin: to follow something’s trace.” (wa-aṭār tu ʾilm al-rāwaytuḥu ʾaṭrūḥu aṭran wa-aṭāratan wa-uṭratan wa-aṣlūḥu ṭatabbā tu aṭrāḥū). ———, Quranic Glossary, 62. The knowledge of revelation’s context is called ilm al-aṭār wa-laḥbār and comprises the study of the occasions of revelation (asbāb an-nuẓūl) together with explanations of the prophetic and historical narratives (al-aqāṣīs) in the Quran. ———, Methodological Introduction and Exegesis ed. Farḥāt, 95. ———, "Methodological Introduction ed. Nāhī," 121. Ragib distinguishes ahl al-aṭār from jurists and students of eloquence as a group that studies the narratives (qīṣāṣ) in the Quran: fa-l-balīğu yaḥṭāṣṣu bi-ma ʾrīfātī balāğāthī [al-qurʾān] wa-faṣāḥāthī wa-l-faṣīḥu yaḥṭāṣṣu bi-ma ʾrīfātī aḥkāmīḥī wa-aḥlu-l-aṭārī yaḥṭāṣṣu bi-ma ʾrīfātī qīṣāṣīḥ. (“Scholars of eloquence specialise in knowledge of the Quran’s expressiveness and eloquence, jurists specialise in knowledge of its legal judgements, and traditionists specialise in knowledge of its narratives”). ———, On Creeds, 177.
group a little more than a century after Ragib. Al-Ḡilānī was also connected to Sufism, of which see more below.

The clearest indication that Ragib considers “traditionists, senior Sufis, and wise philosophers” to be his preferred affiliation comes in his list of the different schools of thought about the existence of evils in the world. This category is the seventh and final school of thought listed, and they believe that there is wisdom in God’s actions although humans are not always able to perceive it, and that the question of evil in the world is part of the issue of predestination, which is God’s secret and not to be investigated. The sixth school was the Aṣāʾirah, who believed that God does what he wills with his servants and that while there is no wisdom requiring him to do so, everything he does is good. Ragib says that there is “no objection” to the Aṣʾarī position, which is clearly compatible with that of the traditionists, senior Sufis, and wise philosophers, indicating that Ragib wished to make the point that while he did not necessarily disagree with the Aṣāʾirah, he did not consider himself one of them.

The same dynamic is at play in Ragib’s position on the attribution of human actions to God. Ragib supports the ahl al-aṣār, who hold, against the Muʿtazilah, that human actions are created by God and that the ink made with gallnuts and vitriol is in fact created by God, who put


247 The first five schools are: al-Bakrīyah who maintain that pain is falsely imagined due to a lack of faith (but cf. al-Aṣʾarī, Maqālāt, 287-288. van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft, 2:108-118.); the dualist Magians (al-Māḡūs) who source evil in Satan and good in God; the dualists (at-tanāsuḥīyah, Zoroastrians) who believe in an eternal light of good struggling with an eternal darkness of evil; the transmigrationists (at-tanāsuḥīyah) who believe in eternal souls doomed by an initial act of disobedience to God to inhabit multiple bodies until they gradually reform themselves (see ibid., 3:428f.); and the Muʿtazilah who believe that God created humans for paradise, but will prevent them from entering paradise unless they are Muʿtazilī and have not committed grave sins, actions that are rationally incumbent upon God, who would otherwise be in the reprehensible position of rewarding people who do not deserve the reward. Ragib, On Creeds, 250-253. See also notes 481f below.
the specific potentiality to make ink into those two substances. Iron-gall ink (for writing) was made from gallnuts (or oak apples, ʿafṣ), which “are formed from swellings produced by insects laying their eggs under oak leaves”, together with vitriol (a sulphate, zāḡ) obtained from alum (a mineral salt), and gum arabic from the acacia tree. Gacek, Vademecum, 132-135.

249 Ragib, On Creeds, 28-29, 277-279. See also notes 481f below.

250 Ibid., 284. In the Quranic Glossary, Ragib expresses the same point as follows: God acts in one of two ways. He either actually does the whole action in one go (an abda' ahū kāmilan duf'atan), or he creates both the principles for the act and the potentiality for their implementation in a certain fixed way (mā ʿala uṣūlahū maw ūdatan bi-l-fī'ī wa-aḡzā' ahū bi-l-quwwaita wa-qaddarahū 'alā waḡḥin lā yataʾattā minhu ġayru mā qaddarahū fīhi). Quranic Glossary, 658. He repeats this point at: ———, On Creeds, 265-266.


“eternal” but not “eternity” (qidam). This second position may be equivalent to one taken by a group of the followers of Ibn Kullāb (Abdallāh b. Saʿīd al-Qaṭṭān, d. ca. 241/855), an early opponent of the Muʿtazilah with argumentation along broadly Ašʿarī lines, although we do not know the reasoning behind his follower’s position in this case.

As for the Ašʿarī irah in Ragib’s time, al-Bāqillānī (Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. at-Ṭāyyib, d. 403/1013) is comfortable using the word “eternal” to describe God while maintaining the same principle as Ragib, that descriptions of God must have divine precedent. He does not mention the question of precedent for “eternal”. Ibn Fūrak both uses “eternal” and rejects the principle.

253 We have no way of knowing whether Ragib wrote the Quranic Glossary before or after On Creeds (both mention The Path to the Nobilities). In the Quranic Glossary he says while the devotional phrase yā qadīmu –l-ḥisān (“o eternally beneficient”) is a precedent, it is not “in the Quran or in correct Hadith” (min –l-qurʾān wa-l-ẓāhirī –s-shāḥīh). ———, Quranic Glossary, 661. In On Creeds, he writes that “some of the ahl al-ajār” are incorrect to describe God’s capability (qudrāh) and knowledge as eternal (bi-l-qidām) because “we” hold the principle that any description of God must have a precedent in revelation, and yā qadīmu –l-ḥisān is such a precedent. ———, On Creeds, 89. The phrase yā qadīmu –l-ḥisān appears in a prayer that was learnt from the Prophet Muḥammad in a dream. Muḥibb ad-Dīn at-Ṭabarī (Aḥmad b. ʿAlī al-Makkī, 615/1218-694/1294) states that Abū ʿUṯmān Ismāʿīl aṣ-Sāḥibīn (a widely travelled transmitter of Hadith, 373/983-449/1057) related that Muḥammad b. Wazīr (al-Wāṣiṭī, d. 257/871) had seen the Prophet in a dream, asked him for beneficial prayers, and been provided with a prayer that included the phrase yā qadīmu –l-ḥisān. Muḥibb ad-Dīn at-Ṭabarī, ar-Riyāḍ an-Naṣirah fī Maḥāqīb al-ʿAṣarah, ed. Muhammad Badr ad-Dīn an-Nāṣiri al-Ḥalabī, 2 vols. (Cairo: al-Maṣṣār al-Dūr al-Maʿārif, 1958). 1:30. For al-Wāṣiṭī: Šams ad-Dīn Muhammad b. Ahmad ad-Dahābī, Kītāb Taḏkirat al-Ḥuffāẓ, 5 vols. (Hyderabad: Odisha Oriental Publications Bureau, 1958). 2:502. ———, Siyār, 12:185. For as-Sāḥibīn: Kaḥḥālah, Muʿjam al-Muʿāllīfīn, 1:368.

254 “Some of them claim that God is eternal without ‘an eternity’, and others claim that God is eternal with ‘an eternity’” (fa-minhum man zaʿam anna –l-lāḥa qadīnum lā bi-qidām wa minhum man zaʿam annaḥ qadīnum bi-qidāmīn). al-Ašʿarī, Maqālāt, 170, 547. Cf. note 428.

255 Al-Bāqillānī is discussing whether God can be described as “desiring” (bi-š-ṣahwah): That is correct as an idea, but he has made a mistake and gone against the community by describing the eternal as desiring for there is no precedent for that in the Quran or Sunna, and because God’s names are not fixed by analogy. (qalāka šahīhum min ṭarīqi –l-maʾnā ġayra annahū aḥtaʿa wa-ḥašāfa –l-ummata fī ṣawṣ ṭl-ṣadīmī bi-š-ṣawītāq iṯ lam yarid bi-š-dīlika kītābun wa-lā summātun li-anna aṣmāʾ uḥū tiʿālā lā ṭabātu qīyāsān).


256 Calling God “eternal” is the consensus of the imams (iǧmāʿ al-aʿimmah) “even though the expression is found in neither the Quran nor the Sunna” (wa-in lam yarid bi-lafṣīhī nāṣṣū kītābīn wa-lā sunnah). Abū Bakr Muḥammad Ibn Fūrak, Muṣarrād Maqālāt al-ʿAṣʾarī, ed. Daniel Gimaret (Beirut: Dār al-Maṣṣīḥ, 1987). 42.
The Muʿtazilah’s overriding principle was to rely on reason and analogy to decide questions such as how to describe God, so it is hardly a surprise to find that they are comfortable describing God as “eternal”, and the same holds true for those working in the Hellenistic philosophical tradition (the falāsifah).^{257}

If not the Ašāʿirah or the Muʿtazilah, who is it that agrees with Ragib’s principle, and who might therefore be connected to the ahl al-āṭār? A prominent member of the Shia of Baghdad, aš-Šayḥ al-Mufīd (Abū ‘Abdallāh Muḥammad, d. 413/1022) took the same position as al-Bāqillānī, assuming that God could be called “eternal” but stating the position that he could only be described following divine precedent. Like the Ašāʿirah and the Ḥanābilah, aš-Šayḥ al-Mufīd was developing a theology opposed to the Muʿtazilī over-reliance on reason, but it is hard to imagine Ragib’s ahl al-āṭār being Shia.^{258} A slightly more likely group are the Māturīdīyah, followers of Abū Manṣūr Muḥammad al-Māturīdī (d. 383/993) in Samarkand and Transoxania. They too maintained the principle that God could only be described in his own words, but they were Ḥanafi and I have already noted Ragib’s pointed exclusion of Abū Ḥanīfah from his list of

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^{258} As a Shia, aš-Šayḥ al-Mufīd of course considered divine precedent to include the sources of proof that came after Muḥammad, i.e. the imams:
The creator can only be named with that which he named himself in the Quran, or that which his Prophet called him, or that with which he is named by one of the imams. (lā yaḡāzu tasmiyyatu –l-bārī tuʿālā illā bi-mā sammā bihi ʿalā lisāni nabīyihī (ṣ) aw sammā bihi huǧǧātun min ʿulafāʾi nabīyihī). Aš-Šayḥ al-Mufīd then goes on to say that if one removes the imams from this list, and replaces them with consensus (iǧmāʿ), then the position becomes acceptable to all Imāmī Shia, all the Muʿtazilah in Baghdad, all the Murǧī ah, and the partisans of Hadith (aṣḥāb al-ḥadīṯ, for whom read the Ḥanābilah). Reliance on consensus is also an Aš’ arī position (see note 256). aš-Šayḥ al-Mufīd, Awāʾil al-Maqālāt, ed. Mehdi Mohaghegh and M. J. McDermott (Tehran: Institute of Islamic Studies: University of Tehran / McGill University, 2004). 4, 13.
the imams of Islam. Furthermore, Madelung remarks that before the Salğûk period they were “virtually unknown” west of the Iranian desert.

The group most likely to have influenced Ragib were the Ḥanābilah. As we have discussed above, they were a dominant force in pre-Salğûk Isfahan and they were also a loud voice in Baghdad, which was much closer to Isfahan than Samarkand and Transoxania. Al-Barbahârî (Abū Muḥammad al-Ḥasan b. ‘Alî, d. 329/941), whose defence of Ḥanbalî positions had been so strident as to spark rioting on a number of occasions in Baghdad, put forth the principle that God could only be described in his own words in his creedal statement.

The Ḥanābilah were also the group that tended to share Ragib’s professed distaste for theological niceties. When Ragib addresses the question of whether God should be described as

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259 Although Abū Ḥanīfah does imply in his discussion of God’s will (mašîʾah) that God should only be described in the way that he has already described himself, i.e. according to precedent:

If someone says no [to the question of whether God could have chosen to make his entire creation as obedient as his angels] then they have described God with something other than that with which he described himself (fa-in gâla lâ fa-qad wasafa –llâha taʿâlå bi-ğayri mâ waṣafa bihî naṣfurû).

Abū Ḥanīfah, "al-Fiqh al-Abṣât," 55. For a discussion, with references, of the probability that this work is an accurate transmission of Abū Ḥanīfah’s teaching, see: Hiroyuki Yanagihashi, "Abū Ḥanīfa," in Encyclopaedia of Islam, THREE, ed. Gudrun Krämer, Denis Matringe, John Nawas, and Everett Rowson (Brill Online: Brill, 2011).


261 His creed read:

Only talk about God with what he described himself with in the Quran, and what the messenger of God explained to his companions. (wa-lâ yatakallam fi-r-rabbi šubḥanâhû wa-taʾâlâ ʿllâ bi-mâ waṣafa bihî nafsuhû ʿazza wa-ğalla fi-l-qurʾâni wa-mâ bayyana rasûlu –l-lâhi (s) li-aṣḥâbîh).

“willing” (murīd) he accepts that it is a legitimate description because of the Quranic precedent, but then expresses frustration with subsequent theological parsing:

And the discussions about whether God wills for himself, or whether he wills with an eternal will, or with a created will, and if with a created will is the will in a specific place or not in a specific place – God has protected us from needing to deal with these matters. These are exactly the questions debated by the Ašāʿirah and Muʿtazilah, and avoided by the Ḥanābilah. As discussed above, Ragib had distaste for the dialectic processes of theological debate, a distaste shared by Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal who said that following the Sunna meant abandoning debates, dispute, and quarrels about religion. Theologians (al-mutakallimūn) often appear in On Creeds as a group that is in error. In an important passage that I will return to below, Ragib writes that it is because the Muʿtazilah fail to either submit to revelation (istislām li-l-āṯār) or be sufficiently inspired to understand it that they misunderstand the status of the Quran.

The problem with identifying Ragib’s ahl al-āṯār with the Ḥanābilah is that Ragib himself makes a clear distinction between ahl al-āṯār and Hadith partisans (ahl al-ḥadīṯ) in which Hadith

262 Ragib, Quranic Glossary, 371.

263 wa-l-kalāmu fī anna –lāha taʿālā huwa murīdun li-nafsīhī aw bi-irādatin qaḍāmatīn aw muḥḍatātin wa-annahū wa-in kāna murīdan bi-irādatin muḥḍatātin fa-hal hiya fī maḥallin aw lā fī maḥallin mimmā [al- Ağalī has fa-mā after Sehid Ali 382 ≠ the other three mss.] kafānā allāhu annahā. ———, On Creeds, 270.


267 Ibid., 167-168.
(partisans rely solely on prophecy to determine religion, whereas “most of the ahl al-atar” rely on both reason and revelation. Ibn Fūrak made a comparable distinction between two types of Hadith partisans (aṣḥāb al-ḥadīt): those who focussed on the simple transmission of tradition and its correctness, and those who were more concerned with the principles, analogies, structures (tartīb al-furūʿ ʿalā –l-uṣūl), and proofs in the traditions themselves. Both Ibn Fūrak and Ragib seem to identify a grouping that shares the beliefs of the Hadith partisans while also delving into more complex theories than were required by the simple process of collection, verification, and transmission of Hadith. These classifications are not just a problem for us; they must also have been a problem for Ragib in Isfahan in the tenth/eleventh centuries. His opposition to, and criticism of, the Muʿtazilah prevented him from joining their circles and his commitment to reason at the expense of sole reliance on prophecy would have been a problem for the Ḥanābilah. His distaste for the use of theological neologisms to describe God may have prevented him from entering their circles.

268 Ragib also identifies a non-Muslim group as relying solely on reason to the exclusion of prophecy. Patricia Crone has discussed how this group (al-Barāḥimah) were often used in kalām as placeholders for such an idea. Patricia Crone, "Barāhima," in Encyclopaedia of Islam, THREE, ed. Gudrun Krämer, Denis Matringe, John Nawas, and Everett Rowson (Brill Online: Brill, 2011).

269 Ibn Fūrak likened the first group to the treasury of a king, and the second group to the patricians who defend that treasury against its opponents. Abū Bakr Muhammad Ibn Fūrak, Kitāb Muškil al-Ḥadīt aw Ta`wil al-Aḥbār al-Mutašābihah, ed. Daniel Gimaret (Damascus: Institut Francais de Damas, 2003). 2. This passage is commented upon by Frank, who translates tartīb al-furūʿ ʿalā –l-uṣūl as “how the secondary dogmas … are derived from those that are primary”. Frank, "Elements", 148-149, cf. 180-181.)
been the reason for his decision not to identify himself with the usual Ašʿarī middle position between the Ḥanābilah and Muʿtazilah.

This absolute commitment to the combination of reason with revelation, expressed by Ragib in his ethics as well as his theology,\(^{270}\) is what would lead him to agree with the Muʿtazilah on several key issues, although he would never name them or admit that their position was valid, as he was prepared to do with the Ašāʿirah. These positions of Ragib’s were then most probably the cause of the reputation for Muʿtazilī beliefs that would follow him after his death. At the end of the fifteenth century as-Suyūṭī would write that “lots of people think that he is Muʿtazilī”.\(^{271}\) Even as-Suyūṭī himself had thought this until he came across a note that alerted him to Faḥr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī’s (543/1149-606/1209) statement that Ragib was “a Sunni imam”.\(^{272}\)

The “lots of people” that as-Suyūṭī refers to would indeed have had cause to think Ragib was a Muʿtazilī if, like as-Suyūṭī himself, they did not have access to Ragib’s *On Creeds* or his complete *Exegesis*. In the methodological introduction to the *Exegesis*, Ragib states that the Quran is inimitable in part because God actively prevented the Arabs at the time, who were highly skilled users of language, from even trying to imitate it.\(^{273}\) This is the doctrine of ṣarfah

\(^{270}\) Ragib, *Analysis of the Two Creations*, 117-121 (chapter 18).


\(^{272}\) Ibid. As-Suyūṭī says that the note was in the handwriting of az-Zarkašī, and that it cited this judgement as being in Faḥr ad-Dīn’s *Tuʿṣīs at-Taqwīs*. The extant statement in Faḥr ad-Dīn’s *Asās at-Taqwīs* is not quite the same: Ragib is mentioned along with al-Gazālī as believing in immaterial souls and substances, and as belonging to the same group as the Sunni Faḥr ad-Dīn (wa-miḥla Abī – l-Qāsim ar-Rāġib wa Abī Ḥamīd al-Gazālī min aṣḥābinā). Faḥr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī, *Asās at-Taqwīs*, ed. Ḩaḍīṯī Ḥiǧāzī as-Saqā (Cairo: Maktabat al-Kulīyāt al-Azharīyah, 1986). 16-17. Cf. Riedel, "Searching for the Islamic episteme,” 112,122-123.

(the turning aside), and it is widely recognised as a Muʿtazilī doctrine, first heard of from an-Nazzām (Abū Ishāq Ibrāhīm, d. ca. 840), maintained by Ragib’s Muʿtazilī contemporaries in Baghdad such as aš-Šarīf al-Murtaḍā (Abū al-Qāsim ‘Alī, 355/967-436/1044), and rejected by the Ašʿā’īrah. Ragib must have been well aware of aš-Šarīf al-Murtaḍā, a powerful Baghdadi Shia, and did indeed quote his brother aš-Šarīf ar-Raḍī (Abū al-Ḥasan Muḥammad, 359/970-406/1016) on numerous occasions in his adab compendia

Ragib was also prepared, at times, to interpret the Quran figuratively. He writes in the methodological introduction to the Exegesis that the words “God’s hands are outspread” in Quran 5:64 mean that his blessing is continuous, and not that God actually has hands. He repeats this reading in the Quranic Glossary and the Exegesis itself. It was a central tenet of Ašʿarī, and of course Ḥanbalī, creed to reject this figurative reading, and a well-known Muʿtazilī


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position to accept it. Al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Ḡabbār described it as a choice of reason (ʿaql) above literal meaning (ẓāhir).

We do not know whether Ragib’s incompatibility with the major theological and socio-political groups of his time was the result of his own choices, perhaps his refusal to make the intellectual compromises needed to fit into a particular school, or whether it is the result of our own incomplete knowledge of his context, and he in fact fitted perfectly into a habitus of which we are now ignorant. In any case, it appears that the ahl al-atar as he understood them are, as far as we know, close to the Ḥanābilah but also distinct from them on crucial points. Perhaps this is why Ragib chose to put the ahl al-atar together with two better-known and potentially more easily definable groups: senior Sufis and wise philosophers (muḥassilī as-ṣūfiyyah wa-l-ḥukamā).

**Senior Sufis (muḥassilī as-ṣūfiyyah)**

Ragib’s combination of Sufism and traditionism was a common one in the Isfahan of his day. There were long-established Sufi institutions in the city, and an acceptance of Sufism on both sides of the juristic-political conflict between the Ḥanābilah and Śāfiʿīyah. A contemporary of Ragib’s, and close associate of the powerful Isfahani Ḥanbalî Ibn Mandah, made an explicit attempt to argue that Ḥanbalî ideas were the only natural partner for Sufi ethics and lifestyle. Abū Maṣūr al-Iṣfahānī (Maʿmar b. Aḥmad, d. 418/1027) wrote that his adherence

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278 al-ʿAṣ’īrī, The Theology, 237. ———, Maqālāt, 218. Al-Bāqillānī adjusts al-ʿAṣ’īrī’s position to include the statement that while God does have hands, they are not limbs (gāriḥatayn) and do not have form (ṣūrah) or structure (hayʾah). Al-Bāqillānī, al-Inṣāf, 23. Cf. Frank, “Elements,” 163f, 175, note 87. Ibn Fūrak, however, admits that at least one instance of God’s “hands” (aydin) in the Quran (51:47, aḏ-Ḍāḥrīyāt) means both “ability” and “potentiality” (al-qudrah wa-l-quwwah), and later Aṣ’īrī scholars such as Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Ǧuwaynī (Abū al-ʿAlīʿ Abū al-Malik b. Abdallāh, 1028-1085) would agree. Ibn Fūrak, Maqālāt ed. as-Sāyiḥ, 45; W. Montgomery Watt, Islamic Philosophy and Theology: an extended survey (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1985). 83.


280 On the Śāfiʿī side Abū Nu`aym (see above) combined Hadith and Sufism. Isfahan also had long-standing Sufi institutions (ḥāṅqāḥ). Durand-Guédy, Iranian Elites, 37.
was to the Sunna and to Sufism, and that he belonged to *ahl as-sunnah wa-l-atar*. The *atar* here can only be a reference to Abū Manṣūr’s Ḥanbalī creed. The only explicit profession of Sufism that Ragib made was his reference to a work called *On the Nobility of Sufism* in which he said he had discussed the different stages (*maqāmāt*) attained by scholars, the wise, and senior figures.

Abū Manṣūr wrote that there are two ways for humans to approach God: through worship, and through mysticism. This is perhaps the central claim of Sufism, that there is a mystic and inspired route to the truth that has the potential to bypass the normal human approaches to knowing and learning. Abū Manṣūr did not believe that any of his contemporaries were good enough to travel on the second mystic path. Ragib seems to have been more optimistic. There is a repeated conviction throughout Ragib’s ethical works that human beings have the potential to become as good as the angels, and indeed that this is their purpose. The attainment of such status, or of something close to it, puts humans in a position where they can receive divinely

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284 A Hadīth used by Ragib in this context, “my community are almost prophets themselves”, is found in Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal’s collection. Ibn Ḥanbal, *Musnad* 1895, 1:296. The Path to the Nobilities is an account of the ways in which a human being can fulfill his divine potential and come to deserve to be described as God’s vicegerent (*ḥālīfah*) on the earth. The *Analysis* is an exhortation that we become as good as, or even better than, the angels. Ragib, *The Path to the Nobilities*, 59f. ———, *Analysis of the Two Creations*, 185-186 (chapter 33).
provided knowledge (al-‘ulūm al-mawhabīyah) directly. Abū Manṣūr, who shared Ragib’s profession of distaste for theology, would no doubt also have agreed with this theory. In On the Ordering of Intellectual Disciplines Ragib called those who had attained the top level of divinely provided knowledge “the senior figures” (al-kubarāʾ), and distinguished them from the scholars (al-‘ulamāʾ) and the wise (al-ḥukamāʾ). His “senior figures” are the same group that he mentioned in his Exegesis as being dealt with in more detail in his lost work On the Nobility of Sufism.

Where Ragib perhaps strays from mainstream Sufism is in his confidence that those who attain the highest levels of knowledge and access divine inspiration are scholars schooled in reasoning rather than mystic hair-shirt-clad itinerants. In a section of The Path to the Nobilities on the necessity of earning a living, Ragib attacks those who refuse to work while claiming to be Sufi for their clogging up the streets and pushing up prices. Elsewhere in The Path he makes a threefold split between angelic humans, demonic humans, and merely human humans in which


287 The ‘ulamāʾ have acquired knowledge of theology, law, and similar subjects. The ḥukamāʾ have acquired knowledge of ethics and act according to them. The kubarāʾ have acquired the divinely-provided knowledge. Ragib, "On the Ordering of Intellectual Disciplines and of Worldly Actions," 222. ———. Carullah 84, f.42a. The Hadith that Ragib quotes in both these places: “ask the scholars, mix with the wise, and sit with the senior figures” is found in the collection of the Sufi Hadith specialist al-Ḥakīm at-Tirmīḏī (Abū ‘Abdullāh Muḥammad, d. ca. 320/938) and is also used by Ragib in The Path to the Nobilities. Abū ‘Abdallāh al-Ḥakīm at-Tirmīḏī, Nawādir al-Uṣūl fī Maʿrifat Ahāḏīf ar-Rasūl, ed. Ismāʿīl Ibrāhīm Mutawallī ‘Awad, 2 vols. (Cairo: Maktabat al-Imām al-Buḫārī, 2008). 1:434. Ragib, The Path to the Nobilities, 123 (and note 2).

the angelic, the “real believers”, are those who “use their reason as much as possible”. Ragib’s angelic humans are thinkers.

The divinely provided knowledge that some humans are able to access provides them with certainty (yaqīn). It is the sort of certainty that humans require when faced with problems such as unclear verses in the Quran (al-mutašābih), and Ragib’s solution to that problem is to posit the existence of scholars who are firmly-rooted in knowledge (ar-rāsiḥūna fi-l-ʿilm) and are able to deal with the lack of clarity in some verses because they are always able to determine which interpretative option is correct. The status of these people, which Ragib describes as almost approaching the level of prophecy, relies upon God having endowed humans with the ability to think and through their thinking (al-fikr wa-t-tamyīz) to become his vicegerents on the earth, a rank which is of course the ethical goal for humanity that Ragib laid out in The Path to the Nobilities.

On the one hand, just as Abū Manṣūr thought no-one at the time he was writing could attain such a rank, the only examples Ragib gives of humans who attained it are perhaps self-

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289 fa-l-malākiyyu ʿillaḏī yastaʿmalu l-quwwata l-ʿāgilata bi-qadri ḡahdihī wa-hum l-miṇīna haqqān. Ragib, The Path to the Nobilities, 128.

290 On Creeds, 92.

291 Doubt (šubhah) is the failure to distinguish between two things that are similar to each other (tašābuh), and Ragib defines the rāsiḥūna fi-l-ʿilm as those unaffected by it. Quranic Glossary, 352. Ragib understands unclear verses in the Quran as falling into three main categories: the wholly unknowable (the day of judgement etc.); the knowable through study (rare Quranic words); and an intermediate category that can only be understood by ar-rāsiḥūna fi-l-ʿilm. This means that Quran 4:126 can be read both ways depending on which category of al-mutašābih is being dealt with. Either “no-one can interpret unclear verses in the Quran apart from God, and those firmly-rooted in knowledge say “we believe in it” or “no-one can interpret unclear verses in the Quran apart from God and the firmly-rooted in knowledge, who [also] say “we believe in it”. Exegesis ed. aš-Šidī, 412-430. Exegesis ed. Sardār, 226-230. Methodological Introduction and Exegesis ed. Farḥāt, 74, 89. —, "Methodological Introduction ed. Nāḥī," 108-109, 117-118. Quranic Glossary, 352, 443-445. See also discussion below at note 442.

consciously uncontroversial and from the earliest years of Islam: “Ibn `Abbās, `Alī, and others” were firmly-rooted in knowledge. Divinely-provided knowledge is restricted to “prophets and some saints (awliyā’).” Ragib describes `Alī as having certainty through divinely-provided knowledge, and as having reached the stage at which the veil was withdrawn. “Other wise men” who had attained this stage described it as seeing God in everything they saw. On the other hand, Ragib devoted his pedagogical and ethical works to explicitly encouraging his readers to strive to attain this rank, to become as good as or better than the angels, and to deserve to be described as human beings and God’s vicegerents on earth. Scholars should try to be saints. However,

Ragib believed that the only way that humans had been able, and were now able, to achieve this top level of divine certainty was through external acts of piety coupled with internal thought and reflection. Scholars must purify their souls in order for their minds to be clear, and to purify their souls they must act righteously. The broad claim that knowledge and action (al-ʿilm wa-l-ʿamal) should be combined was not a new one, nor was it particularly controversial.

Abū al-ʿAbbās ʿAbdallāh b. al-ʿAbbās (d. 68/688), such an omnipresent figure in exegesis, including Ragib’s Exegesis, that he was known as the “father of exegesis”.

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294 ———, On Creeds, 94-95.

295 ———, Analysis of the Two Creations, 186 (chapter 33). ———, The Path to the Nobilities, 59. For a comparative use of the verb istahqaqa see Peters’ discussion of how al-Qādī ʿAbd al-Ḡabbār analysed the relationship between a known reality and its description as “entitlement”. Peters, God’s created speech, 152-153.

296 Ragib writes that Quran 3:79’s “be divine” (kūnū rabbānīyīna) means “be wise saints for God” (ḥukamāʾ awliyāʾ li-llāh) and continues: “it is said that if the scholars are not saints then God will have no saint on earth” (fa-qad qīla in lam yakun -l-ʿulamāʾ u awliyāʾ a li-llāhi fa-l-ardī walīy). Ragib, Exegesis ed. aš-Šidī, 672.


Ragib knew that the specific mystic conviction that knowledge could be accessed through pious acts rather than books or lessons was not shared by all his contemporaries. He wrote in On Creeds that theologians (al-mutakallimūn) thought it unlikely, and in On the Ordering of Intellectual Disciplines that it was rejected by some dialecticians (baʿḍ al-ḡadalīyīn). He gave the idea its clearest expression in his Exegesis of Quran 3:103 where he wrote that a level could be reached in which the Quran and Sunna were no longer necessary. The only circles in which such an idea would have been acceptable were Sufi.

Wise Philosophers (al-hukamāʾ)

It is a little bit of a stretch to translate ḥukamāʾ as “wise philosophers”. Ragib’s idea of “wisdom” (al-hikmah) was broader than what we mean by philosophy today in the English language. As we have seen above, “the wise” (al-ḥukamāʾ) included mystics who had attained a level of spiritual and intellectual achievement that brought them close to God, rather than those schooled in the works of Plato and Aristotle. Nevertheless, Ragib was familiar with the ideas of Hellenistic philosophy and we can see evidence of this throughout his works. Hellenistic philosophy was something that he was prepared to use and admire, but just as with the partisans of Hadith, the Sufis, and the theologians it was not an intellectual habitus with which he directly identified himself.

Online: Brill, 2011).


300 The verse talks of the rope of God (ḥabl allāh), which Ragib says is the Quran and the Sunna. The three stages are reliance on God (al-ʾiʿtiṣām), faith in God (at-tawakkul), and then submission to God (al-islām) at which point the rope is no longer needed and the believer becomes as if God was a part of him (istaʿgāna ḥiyya ʿidan an ʿl-wasāʾ ʾiti ʿl-ḥiṣna hum ḥablū ʿl-lāhī ʿaṣ ʿl-mīmmān qāla ʿl-ḥikāyatān ʿan allāhī fa-ʿl-ḥaṣī aḥbabtuhū kuntu samʾ ʿalāhu). Aš-Šidī describes this position disapprovingly as “extreme Sufism”. ———, Exegesis ed. aš-Šidī, 766-767. For the Hadith (Qudsī) see: Ibn Ḥaḡar, Fath al-Bārī, 14:414f (#6502).
Ragib’s definition of wisdom in *The Path to the Nobilities* shows that he felt Hellenistic philosophy was just one of the sources of knowledge available to him: “wisdom is a name for any good knowledge and any good action”, and it “has been defined with different expressions according to different perspectives”. The first perspective he reports defines wisdom as: “knowledge of the things that exist as they really are, which must mean universal categories of things because human knowledge is incapable of encompassing every specific thing”. These are common phrases with which Ragib’s contemporaries would define the purpose of Hellenistic philosophy (al-falsafah).

We have already seen that Ragib was included by al-Bayhaqī in a compilation of those working in the Hellenistic philosophical tradition, and this is confirmed by the contexts in which Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī mentioned Ragib. In *Asās at-Taqḍīs (The Foundations of Sanctification)* Faḫr ad-Dīn was justifying his principle, with specific reference to God, that things could exist...
and yet be imperceptible and outside of space and time. He wrote that Hellenistic philosophers agreed on the existence of substance, souls, and intellects that were imperceptible and immaterial in this way and he gave four examples of scholars who held this position: a Muʿtazilī, a Shia, and from his own Sunni community, Ragib and al-Ġazālī.  

In his *Exegesis*, Faḥr ad-Dīn describes the idea that humans are immaterial and immortal souls and says that it is held by the majority of metaphysical Hellenistic philosophers (*al-ilāhīyīn min al-falāsifah*) and “a large number of Muslim scholars”, which includes the same Muʿtazilī and Shia names together with al-Ġazālī and Ragib.  

Ragib had indeed held the position that things could exist immaterially, writing in *On Creeds* that “most reasonable scholars” believed that, for example, angels and jinn consisted of pure imperceivable soul. However, it appears that Faḥr ad-Dīn went too far in associating Ragib with Hellenistic philosophers, attributing to him the position that human existence is in the immaterial soul and not the body (*al-insānu mawḡūdun laysa bi-ḡismin wa-lā ḡismānīyah*). In fact Ragib, who was well aware that others believed only the soul was resurrected, maintained that humans were made up of the combination of body and soul and that their bodies would be resurrected on the day of judgement.  

Ragib identified these others with whom he disagreed as Hellenistic philosophers and the Ismāʿīliyah (*al-falāsifah wa-l-bāṭinīyah*).  

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306 Ragib writes that the soul leaves the body at death and returns to it on the final day in order for the body to be resurrected. Ibid., 203, 224-225. ———, *The Path to the Nobilities*, 72-73. ———, *Analysis of the Two Creations*, 60-62 (chapter 7).  
307 ———, *On Creeds*, 224. The term *al-bāṭinīyah* (“internalists”) was usually a pejorative term for the Ismāʿīliyah,
Ragib was by no means the only scholar at the end of the tenth and beginning of the eleventh century to make use of Hellenistic philosophy while at the same time maintaining a commitment to Sunni Islam. Many of his ideas are shared with Miskawayh (Abū ʿAlī Āḥmad, d. 421/1030),308 al-ʿĀmirī (Abū al-Ḥasan Muḥammad, d. 381/992), and the Iḥwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ (ca. 949-983). However, he stands out among this group as the only scholar to have also written popular and influential exegesis.

Ideas from Hellenistic philosophy are found throughout Ragib’s work, although they are most concentrated in the Analysis of the Two Creations. They range from God as a being necessary of existence,309 to the creation of the reason before anything else followed by the four elements,310 the first intellect and the active intellect,311 the human being as a microcosm,312 and the...
injunction to “know thyself.”  

Ragib is most attracted to those elements of the philosophical tradition, like the human as microcosm (found in the Quranic Glossary as well as the Analysis), that enable him to argue for the human duty to emulate and approach the divine. Where the philosophical tradition restricts his ability to lay out his ambitious ethical goal for humanity, he rejects it. Ragib reads Quran 2:31, in which God instructs Adam to demonstrate his superior knowledge to the angels, as being in part a reminder that while previous traditions have regarded the human concupiscent and irascible faculties as weaknesses, the God of the Quran regards them as a constitution that uniquely qualifies humans to become God’s vicegerents.

The ethical ideal of vicegerency to God (ḥilāfah) is central to Ragib’s ethics, and is itself found in both al-ʿĀmirī and the Iḥwān aṣ-Ṣafāʿ.  

Ragib never mentions the persistently mysterious and anonymous group of tenth-century authors known as the Iḥwān aṣ-Ṣafāʿ, but he does share a number of their positions on key

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313Ragib, Analysis of the Two Creations, 29, 33 (intro., chapter 1).


…[as for that] human composition of different faculties, two of which are those that have been considered corrupting (by which I mean the concupiscent and irascible), God cautions them that even though there are some corrupting elements therein there are also numerous benefits, and the vicegerency for which humans are nominated can only be achieved with this composition. (…tarkība –l-insānī mīn –l-quwā –l-mutafāwitati – lātī minhā l-quwwatānī –l-latīnī kānū yarawnahumā mufṣidatayani a nī aš-ṣahwiyyata wa-l-ghadābiyyata wa-nabbahahun [allāh] anna ḡālika wa-in kānā fī fī huwa wa-annā fī-annā fī maṣāliḥun kaṣfātuqwa wa-annā –l-ḥilāfata –l-latī rašīha la-hā –l-insānī fī-l-arḍī fī yuslaḥu la-hā illā llā hāja –l-tarkīb)

Ragib. Carullah 84. f.27a.

315 For al-ʿĀmirī the most specific purpose of the human rational soul is to be God’s ḥilāfah on earth. al-ʿĀmirī and Rowson, A Muslim philosopher, 97, 118-119, 138-139, 268. Iḥwān aṣ-Ṣafāʿ, Rasāʾ il Iḥwān aṣ-Ṣafāʿ wa Ḥullān al-Waṭāʿ, 4 vols. (Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1957; repr., 2008). 4:125. Daiber writes that the Quranic idea (Quran 2:30, 6:165 (al-Anʿām), 7:129 (al-Aʿrāf) etc.) of ḥilāfah is what connects Ragib’s Neoplatonic ethics with the šarīʿah. Daiber, "Griechische Ethik," 185.
issues. Their combination of a rigorous and rational Neoplatonism with a commitment to Islamic ethics and revelation is a likely source for some of his ideas. The Iḫwān share Ragib’s belief that humanity must try to emulate the divine, his stress on the importance of pious self-purification alongside intellectual endeavour, his equation of reason and revelation, his sympathy for ʿAlī, and his position on the physical resurrection of bodies when their souls are returned to them. The most salient difference between them is one of audience, and of emphasis. While Ragib wrote reference works and pedagogical ethics in public, the anonymous Iḫwān produced an intellectual manifesto for a restricted elite.

Ragib was also attracted to those elements of the Hellenistic tradition that helped him explain definitions and word meanings. In his exegesis and ethics he uses the vocabulary of genus and species, necessary accidents and differentia, apodictic proof, and conception and

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317 Passages such as the following, from the Iḫwān’s fourteenth letter, could have provided much of the material for Ragib’s central ethical claims.

Know that the philosophical disciplines and the prophetic religious law (al-ulūm al-ḥikmīyah wa-š-ṣarīʿah an-nubūwīyah) are two divine entities that agree with regard to their aim, which is a principle, and they differ in the applications of that principle. The ultimate goal of philosophy is that which can be described as emulation of the divine according to human ability, as we have explained in all of our letters. Philosophy is based on four characteristics: knowledge of existents as they really are (maʿrifat ḥaqāʾiq al-mawūdāt), correct beliefs, good morals and praiseworthy disposition, and pure actions and good deeds. The aim of these characteristics is the correction of the soul … so that it can ascend to be with the angels, who are of the same species. The aim of prophecy (an-nubūwah wa-n-nāmūs) is also the correction and reform of the human soul in order to deliver it from the hell of a world of generation and corruption and bring it to paradise … For this is the aim of both the disciplines of philosophy and of the prophetic religious law.


318 Netton, *Muslim Neoplatonists*, 100. De Callataÿ goes further and argues for their Shia affiliation and their millenarianism, neither of which would have been shared by Ragib. Callataÿ, *Ikhwan al-Safa*, 54, 57, 96, 99-100.

319 Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ, Rasāʾil, Beirut, 3:301.

320 Ragib writes that a single idea can be indicated by a number of things: a name such as “human”; one of its necessary accidents (ḥusāʾ is lāzim) such as “upright”, “walking on legs”, or “broad of fingernail” [the fourth
assent (tašawwur wa-tašdiq). He also ascribes such terminology to “logic” and “logicians” (al-manṭiq, al-manṭiqiyūn), a discipline with which he seems familiar and that, unlike theology, nowhere attracted his opprobrium. Not everyone that Ragib encountered was as comfortable with the use of such terminology across political and cultural divides. In On the Ordering of Intellectual Disciplines Ragib tells us how a senior scholar refused to even say the word “potentiality” (quwwah) and exclaimed: “this expression is used by philosophers so instead I say ‘ability’ (qudrah!” Ragib was dismissive of this stance: “it was as if he didn’t know the difference between the two words in common usage, never mind among specialists!”

In the final analysis Ragib is always defined by the combinations that he made, whether of logic and exegesis, Neoplatonic ethics and Ḥanbalī mysticism, or reason and revelation. The group that he said he approved of, traditionists, senior Sufis, and wise philosophers, is itself a

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universal]; or one of its specific differentiae (faṣl lāzīm) such as “speaking” or “dying” [the third universal]. Ragib, Methodological Introduction and Exegesis ed. Ṣafī al-Dīn Farḥāt, 52. ———, "Methodological Introduction ed. Nāhī," 95. He defines burḥān as apodeictic proof (allaḏī yaqtaḍī ʿš-ṣidqa abadan lā maḥālah). ———, Quranic Glossary, 121.

321 “Intellectual disciplines are achieved through two channels: conception and assent” (al-ʿulūmu min ḥaytu ʿl-kayfiyyati darbāni tašawwurun wa-tašdiq). He goes on to give examples of both and explain that conception is an idea, whereas assent is conception with the addition of proof (wa-t-tašdiq huwa an yutašawwara ʿš-sayʿu wa-yataḥbutuʿindāhū bi-ḍalālatin taqtaḍī ṣiḥḥatahū). ———, Analysis of the Two Creations, 139-140 (chapter 23). This understanding of conception and assent is shared by Avicenna. Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā), "al-Madḫal," 17 (line 7f). See also: A. I. Sabra, "Avicenna on the Subject Matter of Logic," The Journal of Philosophy 77, no. 11 (1980): 757-762.

322 In his Quraanic Glossary discussion of al-qawl Ragib writes that:


323 ka-ḥadāmāhū lam yaʿlamūn min ʿl-farqī fī taʿārufi ʿawāmī –n-nāsi faḍlan ʿan ʿawāmmi. Ragib, "On the Ordering of Intellectual Disciplines and of Worldly Actions," 214. Elsewhere Ragib explains that quwwah is an inevitable force in something (such as burning in fire) whereas qudrah is a force that the agent may choose whether or not to use. ———, On Creeds, 280. NB: on line 3 of p.280 al-ʿAǧaf has the erroneous qāla fa-l-quwwah while all four mss. have qāla fa-l-qudrah.———, Ṣṭān-e Quds-e Ražāvī 56. f.52b; ibid., f.84b; ———. Sehid Ali 382. f.51a; ———. Feyzullah Efendi 2141. f.78b.
combination in which we can trace the traditionists to the Ḥanābilah, the wise philosophers to scholars such as the Iḥwān as-Ṣafā’, and the senior Sufis to the Sufis of Isfahan. Few of these parties would have been at all happy to have been combined with each other, and yet Ragib would not be last to attempt such a synthesis.

Ragib’s Beliefs

The exercise of trying to understand Ragib through his real or potential affiliations has proved to be useful up to a point. I will now translate a brief example of his exegesis to complete the picture.

‘Whenever we abrogate a verse or cause it to be forgotten, we bring another verse better than it or of a similar status; do you not know that God can do anything?’ (Quran 2:106).

I have discussed the essence (mā ṭīyah) of abrogation and the difference between it and specification at the start of this book.324 The lexicographical understanding of abrogation is that it is when an image moves from one thing onto another, like the shadow moving over the sun.325 … Exegetes have interpreted abrogation and causing to be forgotten in two ways. The first way is that abrogation is the removal of the verse’s authority while its expressions remain and the removal of the verse’s judgement along with its expressions. Causing to forget is equivalent and means that the verse is not abrogated but is recited.326 The second way is that abrogation is the removal of just the judgement, whether or not the expression remains, and that causing to forget is the removal of the expression, whether or not the judgement remains … Therefore we say, and success lies with God, that he created


us on the earth as his vicegerents in it and inhabitants of it in order to become close to him and to approach him in a life after which there will be no death and in which there will be no want, and we will have ability unaffected by any disability. The only way to attain this is with a healthy soul, and its health has two components: knowledge and action … likewise the only way to attain a healthy soul is through two good things: one is internal and is reason, and one is external and is the Prophet … Aš-Šāfiʿī and his followers have used this verse to argue for their position that the Quran can only be abrogated by the Quran 327 … and the Sunna is indeed not better than any verse of the Quran, nor is it of similar status … but although God said ‘a verse’ he meant ‘a judgement’ because abrogation only occurs with regard to judgements. 328 Therefore his words ‘better than it or of a similar status’ only refer to the verse’s judgements and it is as if the verse read “whenever we abrogate a judgement, we bring another judgement better than it or of a similar status”. That is the central point of God’s speech here (fa-ʿalā hādā madāru –l-kalām). Those committed to literal interpretation (ahl aẓ-ẓāhir) use this verse when they maintain that the abrogating verse has to be lighter than the abrogated, and they took lightness to mean that which the soul naturally finds more pleasant (mā yasta iffu –n-nafsu bi-ṭṭabʿ). 329 This is unlikely, for the revealed law (aš-ṣarīʿah) is built upon the principle of contradicting the soul and rejecting that which nature [seems to] require … for those divine matters that are pleasant and easy in this world and the next are exactly those which the soul finds burdensome… 330


328 Ragīb argues in the omitted portion that the Šāfiʿī position rests on the Quran’s superior status as opposed to the Sunna. It is, after all inimitable while the Sunna is not. The claim that abrogation only occurs with regard to judgements then makes the Šāfiʿī distinction between Quran and Sunna irrelevant because they only represent different forms of divine judgement. I have not found this argument anywhere else. When the statement “abrogation only occurs with regard to judgements” was made by later authors (ʿAlāʾ ad-Dīn al-Buḫārī dies in 730/1330) it referred to abrogation being permissible in judgements but not in historical narratives (aḥbār). ʿAlāʾ ad-Dīn al-Buḫārī, Kašf al-Asrār ʿalā Uṣūl al-Imām Fāhr al-Islām ʿAlī b. Muḥammad al-Bazdawī, 4 vols. (Cairo: Dār al-Kitāb al-Islāmī, 1917). 3:198.

329 Al-Ǧaṣṣāṣ relates this position (qāla āḥarīna lā yunsahu ḥukmun illā bi-mā āḥaffū minhu) and disagrees with it, allowing abrogation by both what is lighter and what is more burdensome for the person concerned. al-Ǧaṣṣāṣ, Uṣūl al-Fiqh, 2:223. Aḥl aẓ-ẓāhir may be a reference to the Zāhirī school of theology and legal interpretation, for whom see: Vishanoff, Islamic Hermeneutics, 78-88.

330 Ragīb. Carullah 84. f.84 (lines 12f, 21f), f.85a (lines 1f, 12f, 18f) f. 86a (lines 14f, 20f), f.86b (lines 1f, 12f).
All the salient aspects of Ragib’s belief system are here, from the initial reliance on lexicography, to the technical discussions of exegetical theory, the knowledge of the legal implications of exegesis, and then the ethical and religious goal of becoming God’s vicegerent on earth, a goal which can only be attained by a mystic, and perhaps even Neoplatonist, insistence on suppressing one’s soul’s base natural desires.

This is what Ragib believed. It is a combination of monotheism, Hellenistic ethics, and mysticism that he thought was reasonable and rational. When he encountered opposition to his beliefs, that opposition consisted of rival exegetical options ranging from a rejection of anything mystic in favour of reasoned theologies, to a complete rejection of any reasoning, to even a rival cosmology in which the heavenly spheres were eternal and Islamic revelation was almost irrelevant. It is possible that he encountered some form of scientifically based unbelief; the adherents of which he referred to as “naturalists” (at-ṭabīʿīyūn), but their numbers scarcely represented a threat.331

Nevertheless, Ragib did discuss the problem that some people with reputations for abundant rationality denied the existence of the afterlife. Their denial in turn led ignorant people to say “if they don’t believe in it, and they are so rational, it must not be true”. Ragib explained that the error lay in a failure to understand that reason can only master either the question of the afterlife or the matters of this world. If, as is the case with those who have reputations for deep

331 These naturalists denied the existence of anything purely spiritual because it lacked a sensible origin, and they denied that an afterlife exists ———, On Creeds, 145. Patricia Crone, to whom I am grateful for the following references, writes that the ṭabīʿīyūn, or aṣhāb at-ṭabāʿiʿi, “were empiricists in the sense of that they held all genuine knowledge to be based on sense impressions in conjunction with reasoning”, and were so called because of their belief that the world is composed of four natures (hot, cold, wet and dry). Crone, Patricia “The Dahrīs According to al-Jāḥiẓ” Mélanges de l’Université Saint-Joseph, forthcoming. See also: al-Aš’arī, Maqālāt, 348. Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, Tasaffuh al-Adillah: the extant parts introduced and edited, ed. Wilferd Madelung and Sabine Schmitkke (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2006). 82. Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Karīm aš-Ṣahrastānī, Kitāb al-Mīlāl wa-n-Nīhal, ed. Muḥammad b. Fathallāh Badrān (Cairo: Maṭbāʿat al-Azhar, 1947-1955). 661. For some mediaeval authors the aṣhāb at-ṭabāʿiʿi are coterminous with the dahrīyūn (deniers of the afterlife / eternalists), for whom see Martin J. McDermott, “Abū ʿĪsā al-Warrāq on the Dahrīyya,” Mélanges de l’Université Saint-Joseph 50(1984).
rational investigation of this world (whom I assume to be the naturalists mentioned above), their reason is addicted to the profane sphere, and is inevitably unable to cope with the question of the afterlife.\textsuperscript{332}

In our terms, Ragib’s conclusion is that too much effort spent on natural science renders a rational person unable to comprehend what they could otherwise understand, for example, that an eternal afterlife exists. His beliefs rest on very different assumptions about human reason and its limitations from those we are used to today. However, in Ragib’s context these were assumptions that were rational for him to hold.\textsuperscript{333} Ragib also claimed that his beliefs were rational and that they were the product of the mutual dependency of divine revelation and human reason. For example, he maintained that it is in accordance with reason to say that the fate of the world and its inhabitants is God’s secret and should not be investigated.\textsuperscript{334} As historians, it is because this belief was “widely accepted as rational and indeed indubitable” in his context that we can think it was rational for him to have held it.\textsuperscript{335}

Although Ragib shared the same basic assumptions about a monotheistic creator as the majority of his contemporaries, we have seen in the discussion above that mediaeval intellectual culture in late tenth and early eleventh-century Isfahan was not homogeneous on almost any other theological question. Faced with this plurality of opinion and controversy, Ragib seems to have chosen not to affiliate himself with a powerful group but rather to develop his own

\textsuperscript{332} Ragib, \textit{Analysis of the Two Creations}, 180.

\textsuperscript{333} See Skinner, who defines rationality as follows: “When I speak of agents as having rational beliefs, I mean only that their beliefs (what they hold to be true) should be suitable beliefs for them to hold true in the circumstances in which they find themselves”. Skinner, \textit{Visions of Politics}, 31, 35.


\textsuperscript{335} Skinner, \textit{Visions of Politics}, 36. Skinner is talking about the beliefs of sixteenth-century European peasants in the Bible being the inspired word of God.
idiosyncratic combination of creeds and philosophies. He appears to have been part traditionist, part Sufi, and part philosopher without being fully integrated into any one known group. That said, the contingent nature of the single manuscript discovery that has alone enabled us to be sure that he was alive at that time is a valuable reminder that Ragib himself might not recognise this sketch of himself as an outsider, and would consequently be saddened to learn that the records of his successful professional life and his many scholarly companions had been lost to the vicissitudes of time.
3. RAGIB’S PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE

This chapter starts with an abstraction. I have taken the analyses and comments on language that are scattered across Ragib’s works in all genres and assessed his hermeneutical approaches to both divine texts and literature, all in order to produce a six-page synopsis of what I believe to be his philosophy of language. I will provide the textual evidence for the claims in this synopsis in the remainder of this chapter, but for the time being Ragib’s philosophy of language and theory of meaning, if they are indeed worthy of the attention I am giving them, must be able to stand on their own as concepts that make sense.

Synopsis

The constellation of assumptions and claims laid out by Ragib at various points across his portfolio of works constitutes a philosophy of language that contains claims, preferences, and attitudes in fields that range from ontology to semantics. It is important to remember that we are not dealing with a field of enquiry that can be easily mapped onto any of our own. As Tony Street observed,

[w]hereas there is an Arabic term (manṭiq) that equates to ‘logic’, there is no such term or phrase for ‘philosophy of language’. As it happens, philosophers tried to solve problems which are now taken to be the concern of a philosophy of language, but this they generally did in the midst of either a logic treatise or a treatise on grammar.\(^\text{336}\)

\(^{336}\)Street also remarked that “[i]t is a sad fact of modern scholarship that those who study the Greek-derived traditions of philosophy of logic in Arabic are unlikely to have the competence to deal with parallel traditions within the Islamic sciences, and vice versa”, a criticism I hope to answer in what follows. Tony Street, "Arabic and Islamic Philosophy of Language and Logic," in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/arabic-islamic-language/Fall 2008 Edition).
Ragib, of course, worked in genres (exegesis, ethics, creed, and literary theory) beyond the logic and grammar mentioned by Street.337

Ragib’s theory is based around the ontological assumption that the pairing of expression and idea is all that there is, and all that we need, to understand and manipulate the interaction between language, mind, and reality. Expressions are the physical product of the vocal chords, while ideas are an entity that can subsist in our minds, our books, or our speech. The division is between the action by which an idea is vocalized, and the places in which that idea can subsist before, during, and after its vocalization. There is no doubt that Ragib saw the physical act of speech as the primary locus for the insubstantiation of ideas, and therefore also assumed speech to be the primary means of linguistic communication.338

Unlike many of the other important binaries of mediaeval hermeneutics and epistemology, expression and idea have an existence outside analytical processes in addition to their uses

337 “Philosophy of Language” is a name often given, in the European and American academy today, to theories about language. An instructive example of how it functions in this academy as a disciplinary name, and some of the topics it is taken to include, can be taken from the “Philosophy of Language” section of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry for the German philosopher Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher (1768-1834). Many of the issues on which Schleiermacher is presented as theorizing can be found in this dissertation:

Schleiermacher nowhere presents his philosophy of language separately; instead, it is found scattered through such works as his lectures on psychology, dialectics, and hermeneutics. The following positions … are especially worth noting: (1) … on the question of the origin of language … (2) Language (and hence thought) are fundamentally social in nature … (3) Language and thought … lend a distinctive character to, all human mental processes. (4) Schleiermacher in his early work postulates an identity of thought with linguistic expression … (5) Schleiermacher adopts a view of meaning which equates it -- not with such items, in principle independent of language, as the referents involved, Platonic forms, or the mentalistic “ideas” favored by the British empiricists and others -- but with word usages, or rules for the use of words. (6) … Schleiermacher argues that thought and conceptualization are not reducible to the occurrence of sensuous images … (7) Human beings exhibit, not only significant linguistic and conceptual-intellectual similarities, but also striking linguistic and conceptual-intellectual diversities, especially between different historical periods and cultures, but even to some extent between individuals within a single period and culture … (8) Schleiermacher, importantly, develops a much more holistic conception of meaning than was yet found in his predecessors … (c) He holds that the distinctive nature of a language's grammatical system (e.g. its system of declensions) is also partly constitutive of the character of the concepts expressed within it …


338 Cf. the quotation beginning “[i]n a discussion of the nature of writing…” at page 137.
therein. For example, the theory that expressions can have either general (ʿāmm) or specific (ḥāṣṣ) application (whether “pig” means all pigs or just this pig) is a hermeneutical theory constructed by scholars to assist with deciding whether or not to eat pigs in light of the Quranic text. Just as the conceptual distinction between a root principle (aṣl) and its practical application (farʿ) was made by scholars in order to help them understand and describe the difference between, for example, the principle that Muslims should follow the Quran and the subsequent applications of its rules to their lives. None of these conceptual distinctions (ʿāmm, ḥāṣṣ, aṣl, farʿ) is part of an objective or external reality that applies to both the divine and humanity.

The pairing of expression and idea is part of such a reality. Ragib’s assumption is that ideas are objective rather than subjective, accessible to all and amenable to being referred to by expressions. Both expressions and ideas are created by God, for Ragib’s monotheistic cosmology has no place for anything else that could be ultimately responsible for them, but as it stands God has ideas just as humans have ideas. The Quran is an example of how he encapsulates his ideas in expressions.

Expression and idea are not just exegetical or hermeneutical tools. For Ragib they are the model by which human communication functions. This is a familiar type of claim: “[m]ost philosophers of language today think that the meaning of an expression is a certain sort of entity, and that the job of semantics is to pair expressions with the entities which are their meanings”. 339

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339 This quotation, and much of my understanding of what a theory of meaning is, comes from: Speaks, *Theories of Meaning*. When Speaks says “meaning” he is referring to the same “sort of entity” as Ragib when Ragib says maʿnā, and his use of “meaning” is therefore analogous to Frank’s translation of maʿnā as “meaning” (see note 11). In this dissertation I translate maʿnā as “idea” because I believe the English word is more flexible, and more appropriate. While, in English, “words” do have “meanings”, people are better thought of as sharing “ideas” through language rather than sharing “meanings”, and one may be more easily able to think of, for example, the “idea” of God’s mercy rather than the “meaning” of his mercy, or of poetic motifs as “ideas” rather than “meanings”. The word “meaning” in English is inextricably connected to insubstantiation in language acts, whereas the existence of Ragib’s ideas does not depend on their being spoken, written, or heard. Most importantly, however, the word “meaning” in English
To sum up, Ragib’s model conceives of language as a series of connections that people make between the ideas in their minds and the sounds on their lips. Now, these connections are either direct references to objects, in which case they substitute for the physical gesture of indication or pointing, or they are polysemic references to ideas. The most common type of polysemy is homonymy, which is caused by the fact that ideas are infinite while expressions are finite. Homonymy is when multiple ideas share a single expression. It is the inevitable consequence of our need to make a finite vocabulary refer to an infinite number of ideas: “the finite cannot encompass the infinite”.  

In this situation, where language is polysemic whenever it cannot be replaced by a physical act of pointing, people either follow the existing precedents or make new connections between ideas and expressions. Poetry is written through these new connections, and Ragib worked in a society where the linguistic innovation constituted by these unprecedented linkages had great cultural value. Perhaps the primary site of innovation was metaphor, where poets made complex sets of connections between big deep ideas and concise expressions that, thanks to the context provided by the surrounding words and the audience’s familiarity with the genre, conveyed those ideas in their totality.

The ideas in question were not just numerically infinite, but they were also each semantically broad. Ideas could have a semantic range that covered a number of subsidiary ideas, so that depending on the identities of speaker and audience the single idea of “mercy” in the adjective “merciful” could apply to a number of very different types of mercy.

usually refers to the intent behind a speech act and as will be made clear below (page 119f), Ragib deals with intent as a separate category that links expressions to ideas.

This combination of infinity and semantic breadth on the level of the ideas with a finite corpus of expressions contained the potential for substantial linguistic ambiguity. Ragib managed that potential ambiguity by a process of circumscription. He assumed that two factors governed, and limited, the interactions between ideas and expressions: the intent of the speaker and the lexicon. By limiting ambiguity these two factors enabled language to function.

People (and God) intend certain ideas when they use certain expressions. They choose the expressions that they use and they know what they mean when they use them. It is the task of the listener to recognize and understand the ideas being referenced. To limit the infinite potential of intent to generate meaning, listeners or readers have recourse to the lexicon, an iteratively produced record of the permissible connections that have been made between ideas and expressions. God made the first connections and taught them to Adam along with the principles for their use and development to which humans continue to adhere.

Listeners also have recourse to the context of the speech act, but Ragib saw context as just one of a number of ways to comprehend intent (a speaker’s intent could alternatively be apprehended through the use of the listener’s reason). Finally, the listener had recourse to the

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341 However, it should be remembered that Ragib does not assume that meaning is only generated in conversations. Language happens whenever expressions are combined with ideas, not necessarily just when people are combined with other people. That said, the assumption that language was best analysed in terms of conversations between people, rather than, for example, writing, was very widespread. See: Carter, "Pragmatics and Contractual Language," 36.

342 These ideas about language are not unfamiliar to twentieth-century philosophy. Saul Kripke has developed a theory in which words have an initial baptism followed by histories of usage for certain purposes. Saul A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980; repr., Wiley-Blackwell, 1981), 96, 106f. See also: Speaks, Theories of Meaning. Speaks also notes that Kripke’s theory would be compatible with mentalist (and mostly Gricean) theories of meaning that rely on intent because “introducing a term involves intending that it stand for some object or property” and transmitting a term involves people “intending to use it in the same way” (emphasis in original). Such a combination is achieved by Ragib’s theory of meaning, which combines an account of names with a reliance on intent.

343 Ibn Taymīyah’s fourteenth-century theory of meaning would, in contrast, put much more stress than Ragib on the context in which a speech act took place. This is what led Ali to make his persuasive comparison of Ibn Taymīyah’s
work of scholars such as Ragib, who were engaged in the vast project of explaining how language had been used, how well it had been used, and how it could be used. This project was lexicographical in nature, but it swelled and spread out across the genres of theology and poetics. Ragib was confident that his ethics, piety, and scholarship would ensure that his prescriptions for language, just like his interpretations of sacred prose and profane verse, were correct.

This account of the interaction of expressions and ideas interact is the theory of meaning that lies at the heart of Ragib’s philosophy of language.\(^\text{344}\) It explains how language is produced as well as how words can be interpreted, and it provides Ragib with the tools to manage ambiguity. The extent of his comfort with linguistic ambiguity, and with the process of negotiating and managing it, is where we can read him as having a philosophy of language built upon that theory of meaning. The theory is a structure that explains and enables polysemy, and the philosophy is the attitude of its author to the linguistic ambiguity it produces.

In a very brief gesture towards the question of whether this conceptual package makes sense, I note two of its qualities that are, to my mind, advantages. They are the autonomy that it grants to language users and its terminological parsimony. The autonomy that the theory of intent gives to language users is substantial. Its impact can be felt both in Ragib’s appreciation of

\[\text{344}\] Ragib engaged with the subject matter of both what are now called semantic theories of meaning, which “assign [ ] semantic contents to expressions of a language” and foundational theories of meaning, which look for the reasons behind those assignments. See: ———, *Theories of Meaning*. In Ragib’s work these two genres of enquiry correspond to the relationship between expression and idea, which is a semantic theory of meaning, and to the issues of communicative intent (*marād, qaṣd*), the lexicon (*al-luġah*), and God’s coinage of languages (*al-wad’a: tawqīf; iṣṭilāḥ*), which are all components of a foundational theory of meaning.
how poetry freely creates new metaphors, and in the fact that he felt free to develop his own exegetical positions when it came to matters of religion.

The aesthetic and practical impact of having just two terms to cover every hermeneutical and communicative situation is also substantial.\(^{345}\) We have a complete, self-sufficient, and terminologically indigenous account of language and its use without recourse to the neologisms and proliferation of levels that would characterize twentieth-century linguistics (there are no Carnapian intensions, Russellian propositions, or Fregean senses).\(^{346}\) This degree of economy makes Ragib’s theory intriguingly attractive from the perspective of the program of linguistic minimalism.\(^{347}\)

Finally, the question of how conscious Ragib was of the theory I have laid out here should be addressed before we move onto the textual details of his thinking. Ragib self-consciously put

\(^{345}\) In Boeckx, the value of the minimalist program is to a substantial extent bound up in its aesthetic impact (“beautiful theories”). Boeckx, *Linguistic Minimalism*, 116-123.


\(^{347}\) Linguistic minimalism was a response to the proliferation of concepts, such as the intensions, propositions and senses referenced above, that had accrued in late twentieth-century linguistics. It claimed to follow Ockham’s razor and it rested on three pillars: economy (i.e. as few components and levels as possible); virtual conceptual necessity (big inevitable facts); and symmetry (of syntactic operations and representations). The program was launched in 1993 in: Chomsky, ”A Minimalist Program.” The presentation here is from: Boeckx, *Linguistic Minimalism*, 83. And see notes 9f. Ockham’s razor (attributed to William of Ockham (d. 1349) but of earlier origin) is the principle that *entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem* (in explaining anything no more assumptions should be made than are necessary). It is analogous to the law of parsimony. “Ockham's razor, n.” in *OED Online* (Oxford University Press, September 2011). One of the “big facts” of linguistic minimalism matches the pairing of expression and idea in Ragib’s theory of meaning: “[s]entences are pairings of form (sound/signs) and meaning”. Ragib might have recognised some other big facts as assumptions that were the concern of the mediaeval Arabic grammatical tradition: “sentences are basic linguistic units”; “sentences are composed of smaller expressions (words and morphemes)”; “[t]hese smaller units are composed into units with hierarchial structure i.e. phrases, larger than words and smaller than sentences”; “expressions that appear in one position can be interpreted in another”; “there’s no upper bound on the length of sentences”. Hornstein, Nunes, and Grohmann, *Understanding Minimalism*, 7. Ragib certainly assumed that there was no conceptual alternative to the pairing of expression and idea (i.e. it was inevitable), and Ragib’s theory of meaning was furthermore symmetrical (homonymy is multiple ideas for one expression and synonymy is multiple expressions for one idea. We will see, in the next chapter, the same basic symmetry in his theory of poetics: brevity is more idea than expression, prolixity is more expression than idea, and equality is equal idea and expression). It is perhaps no more than an irony of history that linguistics in twenty-first century Europe and America has had to work so hard to achieve a level of simplicity that was assumed by Ragib and his contemporaries to be inevitable.
forward a number of epistemological, ethical, political, and hermeneutical theories throughout his work but he never explicitly addressed the linguistic methodological assumption that lies at the centre of many of his theories. It seems that he regarded the pairing of expression and idea as a simple part of the epistemological and linguistic furniture, to be used rather than deconstructed. He was not alone in this. He was more explicit about the philosophy that stemmed from his theory of meaning, and he talked about truth, ambiguity, and hermeneutical complexity. His responses to the questions posed there mark him, and those like him in the Arabic Language Tradition, out from scholars in the Classical Language Tradition for whom language was a mere obstacle to logic. The elegant binary of expression and idea may have been a simple accident of Arabic vocabulary, or an assumption so basic that it was shared by everyone, but the subsequent choice to become obsessed with language and the negotiation of ambiguity was by no means as inevitable.

Analysis

Expression and Idea (lafẓ and maʿnā)

In his Quranic Glossary, Ragib wrote that "'language' applies to both the syntactically structured expressions and to the ideas that lie beneath them". This quotation comes from a

work that was more than just an exegetical reference. Ragib had taken the opportunity presented by the writing of a book about the meanings of words to define concepts that he considered important, irrespective of whether they actually appeared in the Quran. He included terms such as “accident” (al-ʿarad), as used by theologians and philosophers, and terms that were used in both literature and exegesis, such as “the non-literal” (al-maḡāz). The quotation at the head of this paragraph is therefore an account of what language is and not simply an account of what “language” means when it occurs in the Quran. Language is all expressions so long as they are placed in linguistic structures, and all the ideas that lie behind them. The only limit on the plane of expressions is that they be syntactically structured.

There is no limit on the plane of ideas, other than the fact that in order to be shared with people they must be put into expressions. Ragib reports a popular etymology of nūṭq (speech) that relates it to niṭāq (belt, girdle) because “an expression is like a belt that surrounds and encompasses the idea”. The same concept of tying up, or tying down, an idea into an expression is behind Ragib’s hermeneutic definition of the idea as “divulging that which the expression had encompassed”.

The pairing of expression and idea works in two directions. It is both a hermeneutic that explains the ideas behind words and a theory of meaning that shows how language is created by speakers. In this case, and unsurprisingly so in a glossary of the Quran, Ragib is thinking hermeneutically. He equates the idea behind a Quranic verse with the exegesis of that verse: “the

2009). As for “expression”, Ragib himself defined a linguistic “expression” as figuratively derived from the root’s lexical meaning “to eject from the mouth” (al-lafẓ bi-l-kalāmi mustaʿārun min lafẓī ʿ-š-ṣayʿi min ʿ-š-fam). Ragib, Quranic Glossary, 743.

349 ———, Quranic Glossary, 211-212, 560.
350 wa-qīla ḥaqīqatu n-nuṭqī ʿa-rūn min lafẓī ʿ-š-ṣayʿî min ʿ-š-fam. Ibid., 812.
351 wa-l-maʿ nā iḍhārū mā tadammanahū ʿ-š-lafẓū. Ibid., 591.
idea [behind an expression] is comparable to the exegesis [of that expression] even though there is a difference between the two”. He expands on this comparison in On Creeds:

The ‘idea’ is that which language intends to communicate and that which inheres in language. Its name is derived from the verb ‘to mean’ (‘anā). It can also be defined as the intent contained beneath the expression. In this latter case it is derived from an equally likely source: ‘the captive’ (al-‘ānī), which means ‘the prisoner’ (al-asīr).

‘Exegesis’ is the revelation of that which was intended by language. It has been said to be derived from ‘to unveil’ (as-safr) with the first two letters swopped around, but exegesis (al-fasr) specifically refers to revelation of ideas, which is why the vial of fluid is called al-fasr because it informs the doctor [i.e. gives the doctor ideas] about the temperament of the patient who produced it. ‘Unveiling’ on the other hand specifically refers to the revelation of substances, such as unveiling a mask from the face and a turban from the head.

To paraphrase: ideas are an inevitable and inseparable part of language and one way to conceive of them is as the intent behind a speech act. Exegesis is the process of revealing exactly which...

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352 wa-l-ma’īnī yuqārinu –t-tafsīra wa-in kāna baynahumā farq. Ibid.
353 Cf. as-safra kašfu –l-ğīṭa’ (‘unveiling is the removal of the cover”). Ibid., 412.
355 Cf. wa-minhu qīla li-mā yunbi’u ‘anhu –l-bawlu tafsiratun wa-summiya bi-hā qārūratu –l-mā’ (“that which is communicated by urine (tafsirah) is derived from al-fasr and for this reason the water vessel is called al-fasr”). ———, Quranic Glossary, 636.
ideas were intended by the expressions in question. Ragib’s argument in this quotation relies heavily on etymologies, and this is symptomatic of his tendency to rely on the lexicon, which is of course where the etymologies are recorded and stored. Furthermore, in this passage and throughout his works Ragib is not only using the lexicon, he is creating and refining it. In the centuries after his death, he would become a lexical authority himself.

This quotation from On Creeds also reinforces the image of ideas being restricted by expressions. The infinite potential scope of ideas and intentions is held captive by a finite number of expressions, and language consequently has no option but to allow both homonymy and the potential for ambiguity that accompanies it:

With regard to expressions, our principle is that they vary according to variations in the ideas. However, this is impossible, for the ideas are infinite while the expressions, despite the variations in their combinations, are finite. The infinite cannot be encompassed by the finite. Homonymy is therefore inevitable.

In this quotation Ragib raises the possibility of a theory of meaning that would be essentialist, in which each expression would refer to a single idea. He describes this possibility as a principle (aṣl), but a principle which must perforce be abandoned in the face of complex reality. There are

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just too many ideas out there for such a simple model of language to work, and expressions have
to do the work of conveying multiple ideas.

Not only are there an infinite number of ideas accessible to those who use language, but
these ideas themselves are also far from simple. Many of them have a broad semantic range. For
example, Ragib’s exegesis of the word “merciful” in the basmalah 359 explains that “mercy” has
a range of meaning, from the human feeling of delicacy (ar-riqqah) to the divine actions of
favour and grace (al-’atf wa-t-tafaddul). The same principle applies to “compassionate” (ar-
ra’il) and “generosity” (al-ğûd). Ragib explains:

This exegesis, I mean that of ‘generosity’, is according to the precedent set by the
generation that came after the Prophet Muḥammad when they said ‘God’s generosity is
blessing and favour while human generosity is delicacy and sympathy’. 360 It is more
obvious, a clearer methodology, and closer to the view of our forefathers than that of those
who blindly grope around in their exegesis of this subject, claiming that the ideas behind a
description do not change when the thing described changes. Those who make this claim
fail to conceive that it is possible for there to be a substantial gap between the beginning
and the end of an idea. 361

This is an unambiguous argument against an essentialist theory of descriptions; the claim that a
descriptive expression refers to an unchanging essence is a fumble of the exegetical process.

359 The Quranic invocation that introduces all (except the ninth) of its suras: bi-smi –llâhi –r-raḥmânî –r-raḥîm (“in
the name of God, the merciful the beneficient”).

360 I have not yet found this exegetical statement quoted by Ragib anywhere outside his own works.

361 wa-hâdâ –t-tafsîru a’ni fi-r-raḥmati huwa ’alâ mā ruwîya ’an –t-tâbi’îna ḥaytu qâlā –r-raḥmatu min –llâhi
in ‘âmân wa-îfâlun wa-min –l-âdamiyîna riqqatun wa-ta’âṣfu kính wa-hâdâ –t-târîqatu azharu wa-abyamu wa-âsba hu
bi-nazâri –s-salafl min nazâri man tahâbbîta fi tafsîri ǧalika zâ ‘iman anna –l-wasîfā lâ taḥtalîfu ma’ ânîhi bi-ḥtiîfi
–l-mawsûfîna wa-âlîka anna qâ’ ila ǧalika lam yatasaâwvar annahî qad yakûmu bayna mabda’ i –l-ma’ nâ wa-
Creeds, 270; ———, Quranic Glossary, 347.
Ideas are so semantically broad that expressions can refer to different parts of them, depending on what the expression in question is describing.\textsuperscript{362}

Why is this so important? The answer is that greater issues are at stake than mere linguistic structure. Ragib’s analysis is designed to combat the potential that language has to imply that divine and human qualities are the same. From the perspective of his beliefs it simply cannot be that the expression “generous” refers to exactly the same idea of generosity no matter whether it is used to describe God or to describe a shopkeeper. There has to be a hierarchy of meanings for descriptive words such as generosity, mercy, and compassion in order to differentiate between divine and human qualities.

If Ragib’s theological convictions can guide him towards rejecting an essentialist theory of descriptions in the above exegetical situation, what happens to this position when questions of theological importance are not at stake? This is where Ragib’s manual of poetics becomes an important part of the process of understanding his assumptions about language. He writes in the section titled “the structure of language”:

There are two types of language, that which is used and that which is not used.\textsuperscript{363} There is no need to discuss the latter. Language that is used can also be sub-divided into two types. There is language that enables us to make a distinction between two specific things and by doing so replace a physical gesture. This is the proper name. There is also language that exists in order to communicate through polysemy. This second type is then sub-divided again into two parts. One part applies to different things and opposites, such as the nouns

\textsuperscript{362} In the Quranic Glossary Ragib explains it thus: \textit{fa-ma nāhu –l-mawḡudu fi-n-nāsi min –l-ma’nā –l-mawḡudu lī-llāhī tu’ālā (“the idea of mercy that is present in humans is part of the idea of mercy that is applied to God”).} ——, Quranic Glossary, 347.

\textsuperscript{363} Alternatively “operative” and “inoperative”, see: Sophia Vasalou, “Subject and Body in Başran Mu’tazilism, or: Mu’tazilite Kafām and the Fear of Triviality ” Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 17(2007): 205 note 9. As-Suyūṭī uses Ibn Fāris (Abū al-Ḥusayn Ahmad, d. 395/1004) to define inoperative language: it is either impermissable combinations of letters in a root, for example putting \textit{‘ayn} next to \textit{gayn}, or it is a permissable combination of letters that is not found in the lexicon (or is not used by the Bedouin) such as \textit{‘-d-ḥ}. as-Suyūṭī, \textit{al-Muzhir}, 1:240.
‘colour’ and ‘substance’ and the verbs ‘to do’ and ‘to make’. The second part pertains to specifics, such as the nouns ‘horse’ and ‘donkey’ and the verbs ‘to go out’ and ‘to hit’.

There are different types of communicative expressions. There are those that are used for one specific idea, those that are used for two different ideas, and those that are used for two opposite ideas. There is no disagreement about the first type. With regard to the second and third types, there is no disagreement that this can happen in two different dialects, but there is disagreement about whether it can happen within a single dialect. Those who deny that it can happen in a single dialect require that every such expression has two aspects.

Furthermore, people disagree about whether a single expression can refer to two different ideas. Many of the litterateurs and jurists deny that it can, some of them allow it, and the latter group are correct. An example of this is the line:

Water, its supply tainted, deserted. The wild beasts dig at its edges.

‘Water’ can be applied to the place in which water is, and in this line both the water itself, and the place in which it is, can be what is intended by ‘water’. This is because ‘tainted’ is an attribute of water, ‘deserted’ is an attribute of place, and both can be attributed to ‘water’.

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364 Colour, for example, can refer to the opposites of black and white. “To hit” is a potential homonym because it can apply to both “I hit Zayd” (darabtu zaydan) and “I coined an analogy” (darabtu maṭālan). In each case it is used to convey a specific idea (yatānāwalu maḥṣūsan). These examples come from a lost work by al-Mubarrad (Abū al-ʿAbbās Muhammad, d. 900), Kitāb Mā Ittafaqa Lajzuhū wa-Ḫtalafa Ma’nāhu (The Book of Homonyms). ———, al-Muzhir, 1:388.

365 As in, for example, the anecdote that tells how a man mistook a Yemeni king’s command to sit (ṭib in Ḫimyaritic according to Ibn Fāris and as-Suyūṭī) for a command to jump (ṭib) and subsequently leapt obediently to his death from the hill they were standing atop. For Ragib, Ibn Fāris, and as-Suyūṭī, Ḫimyaritic was a luḡah just like other dialects, although we might call it a language. Abū al-Ḥusayn Ahmad al-Qazwīnī Ibn Fāris, as-Ṣāḥibī fi Fiqh al-Luḡah wa-Sunan al-ʿArab fi-Kalāmihā (Cairo: al-Maktabah as-Salafīyah, 1910). 22; as-Suyūṭī, al-Muzhir, 1:256-257, 1:381, 1:396.

366 -wāfir. Rabīʿah b. Makrūm (d. ca. 672). A marginal annotation is recorded in the ms. at f.4a: “Marginal note. Digging (al-iqtām) means excavating (al-iḥtiqār) at the side of a well. It is also said to mean hesitation, and this is more correct”. Ragib. Innovative Figures of Speech. ff.3b-4a. A more literal translation would follow Edward Lane: “Many a water, or and a water, of which the supplies are altered for the worse, and which is deserted, by the sides of which the beasts of prey dig hollows in the ground, app. to obtain water that has become purified by filtration … or, as some say, the meaning is … taraddadu i.e. go to and fro”. Edward William Lane, Arabic-English Lexicon, 8 vols. (London: Williams & Norgate, 1863-1893). ṣ-q-m.

367 The Arabic text is provided in Appendix Two. Ragib. Innovative Figures of Speech. ff.3b-4a. Ragib makes
Ragib divides language into two. The first type of language replaces a physical gesture of indication, and an essentialist theory of descriptions applies. The second type of language “exists in order to communicate through polysemy” (darwinu wa’di’ a li-yufida ’alā ʾtarīqi –l-ištirāk).

Therefore, every expression for which a physical gesture cannot be substituted refers to ideas through polysemy.\footnote{exact expenditure of the methodological introduction to his Exegesis:} 

Ragib’s claim that language is either an act of naming or a negotiation of polysemy can be brought into focus by a comparison with the discussion between Wittgenstein, whose work on language I have found useful for thinking about Ragib’s, and St Augustine of Hippo (d. 430).

Augustine wrote that language is acquired by gradual memorisation of the names of things:

> When they (my elders) named some object, and accordingly moved towards something, I saw this and I grasped that the thing was called by the sound they uttered when they meant to point it out … as I heard words repeatedly used in their proper places in various sentences, I gradually learnt to understand what objects they signified; and after I had trained my mouth to form these signs, I used them to express my own desires. \footnote{Augustine Confessions I.8 quoted and translated in Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, #1. It should be noted that Wittgenstein is making polemical use of Augustine’s work here, and is consequently unconcerned with the question of whether his quotations are an accurate presentation of Augustine’s positions.} 

\addtocounter{footnote}{-1} 

\footnotetext[368]{\textit{al-ištirāk} is homonymy whereas \textit{ištirāk al-lafz} (for example note 358) is homonymy. Ragib understands polysemy as being broader (inclusive of names of genera) than homonymy (not inclusive of names of genera). His list of expressions that appear to be homonymous but can actually be explained as, for example, names of species, is at: ———, "Methodological Introduction ed. Nāhī," 82; ———, Methodological Introduction and Exegesis ed. Farḥāt, 31-32.} 

\addtocounter{footnote}{1}
This is very similar to the first type of language described by Ragib: “a distinction between two specific things … [that] replace[s] a physical gesture”. Wittgenstein wanted to break down Augustine’s assumption that language is acts of naming and replace it with a focus on how people use language: “Die Bedeutung eines Wortes ist sein Gebrauch in der Sprache”. The European tradition recognises this as an important step forward, one that would influence the development of theories of speech-acts and pragmatics by, among others, John L. Austin (1911–1960) and John R. Searle (1932–). Like Wittgenstein, Ragib assumed that words were inherently ambiguous and that the way to identify their meaning was through knowledge of the speaker’s intent. The difference between them is that, as noted above, Wittgenstein rejected theories of meaning like Ragib’s, which were built around the two-part linguistic structure of expression and idea. This means that while the two men share the assumption of linguistic ambiguity, only Ragib held that this ambiguity operates through polysemy.

In the quotation on “the structure of language” above, Ragib explains what he means by polysemy. The first sort of polysemy is the ambiguity that results from the names of qualities and generic verbs. On this reading, “I do” is a homonym because the “doing” can refer to any number of actions, and “colour” can refer to opposites such as black and white. The second sort of polysemy is the ambiguity that results from the names of species and more specific verbs, and

370 “[T]he meaning of a word is its use in the language”. Ibid., #43.
371 See note 38.
372 My alibi for this flight of comparative fancy is Rorty, who writes: “[w]e need to imagine Aristotle studying Galileo or Quine and changing his mind, Aquinas reading Newton or Hume and changing his…” “[R]econstructions are necessary to help us present-day philosophers think through our problems”. Rorty, “The Historiography of Philosophy,” 51, 54, 68.
373 Page 114.
it is what Ragib elsewhere calls “expressions in concert” (al-lafz al-mutawāṭi’) with the example of the expression “human being” referring to two different people (Zayd and 'Amr, of course).³⁷⁴

In all of these cases, when expressions are used they are either intended to refer to a single idea, in which case they are uncontroversial, or they are intended to refer to two different things, or even two opposites. Ragib sides with what he implies is a minority position (“many deny … some allow”) that permits a single expression to mean two different things at the same time. In the methodological introduction to his Exegesis he sharpens this to mean that a single expression in the Quran can only refer to different ideas when those ideas can be read as different aspects of a single general idea.³⁷⁵ Indeed, in the quotation on “the structure of language” above the example given is one where the different ideas behind “water” are closely related.³⁷⁶


³⁷⁶ In a further example, Ragib writes in his Exegesis that “that which has been recited to you” (mā yutlā ʿalaykum) in Quran 4:127 can be understood by a process of suppletive insertion (taqdīr), both “that which has been recited to you will be made clear to you” (mā yutlā ʿalaykum bayyana la-kum) and “God states to you that which has been recited to you” (yuṭqīkum allāhu mā yutlā ʿalaykum). Ragib explains that this expression can mean two things at the same time according to the exegetical principle he laid out in his methodological introduction to the Exegesis: that a verb can have two different agents when it is considered in two different ways (wa-qad taqaddama fī ᵉ-d린 –l-kitābi anna fī laq waḥdān yuṣṣuffsu an yunsabā išā fī ilayhī bi-‘ibāratēn muḥṭafīfah). ———, Exegesis ed. Sardār, 178; ———, "Methodological Introduction ed. Nāhī," 101-104; ———, Methodological Introduction and Exegesis ed. Farḥāt, 63-67.
Intent (murād, qaṣḍ)\textsuperscript{377}

The tension at the heart of the relationship between expression and idea is that Ragib believes that language is ambiguous, but he also believes that it is comprehensible. His theory of meaning necessitates the assumption that polysemy is everywhere, and the consequent uncertainty about which expression refers to what idea can only lead to ambiguity. But Ragib does not appear to be overly concerned about whether this ambiguity can be managed. He assumes that intent links expression and idea,\textsuperscript{378} and that this intent can be known. If the speaker has sufficient ability, then the intent will be known: the audience fails to understand only when speakers either can’t properly conceive what they want to say, or can’t express their conception. It scarcely needs adding that this failure to talk properly never happens with God.\textsuperscript{379}

When God says something, he means something by it. His intent can be misconstrued by his audience, in which case he can clarify what he meant. For this principle Ragib gives an example from the early days of Islam, when God was in conversation with the detractors of the new religion through his prophet and Quran. God asked the rhetorical question “who will make a

\textsuperscript{377} And occasionally (and potentially confusingly), the verb yaʾnī and the noun maʿnā. See, for example: wa-qīla maʾnā qawlıhī yaʾnī bi-l-gaybi yaʾnī bi-l-qalbi wa-n-nūrī –llaḏī āḏāhum allāhu –l-ʿaql. (“It is said that the idea behind [or “the meaning of’] ‘they believe in that which is hidden’ [Quran 2:3] means ‘they believe in the heart and the light that God gave them’, and this is the reason”). [My emphasis].

\textsuperscript{378} This is what Speaks would call a “mentalist” theory of meaning, one that “aim[s] to explain the nature of meaning in terms of the mental states of language users”. Speaks, \textit{Theories of Meaning}. See Ragib as quoted above (note 356): al-maʾnā huwa al-maqṣūdu min –l-kalām. Ragib, \textit{On Creeds}, 178. The fact that Ragib continues “it can also be defined as the intent contained beneath the expression” disproves Kouloughli’s assertion (repeated by Versteegh) that when maʾnā is intent it is not a correlate of lafẓ. Kouloughli, "A propos de lafẓ et maʾnā,” 44. Versteegh, "The Arabic Tradition," 229-230.

good loan to God that God may return it to him doubled?’  

This was gleefully misunderstood by Muhammad’s opponents to mean that his God was in need of their money. God subsequently said “we have heard those who say that ‘God is poor and we are rich’, and we will record what they say together with their unlawful killing of previous prophets, and we will say ‘taste the painful torment!’”

Ragib explains that they had not really thought that God was poor, and God was therefore not correcting a miscomprehension, but rather they had construed God’s speech “against its intended force” and God was correcting their insincere failure to understand what he meant.

Ragib appears to be sensitive to the implication that God’s speech could be unclear, and he is keen to shift the blame to the wilful audience.

In the methodological introduction to his Exegesis it again appears that Ragib does not think misapprehensions of intent are a major problem for communication. While he states that communication functions when the audience comprehends the speaker’s intent, in his lengthy enumeration of ways in which language can get in the way of understanding he only obliquely refers to intent as a potential problem. He writes that the difference in illocutionary force between “do!” being a demand, plea, or command is a supplementary factor to the expression and it can be solved with reference to the context in which the words were spoken.

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380 Quran 2:245 and Quran 57:11 (al-Ḥadīd).

381 Quran 3:181.


383 ———, “Methodological Introduction ed. Nāhī,” 86; ———, Methodological Introduction and Exegesis ed. Farḥāt, 39. See note 379. There can of course be confusion, and exegetical discussion, about the intended audience for a particular Quranic address, for example whether the “you” in Quran 4:79 “that which affects you” (wa-mā aṣābaka) refers to all humans or just to the Prophet. ———, Exegesis ed. aš-Šidī, 1340f.

Ragib also deals with deliberate misinterpretation of God’s speech in his discussion of Quran 4:46 in the *Quranic Glossary*. He explains that the phrase “they twist the words out of their place” (*yuḥarrifūna –l-kalima ‘an mawdū‘īhi*) can be read as referring to the expressions or to the ideas. If it refers to the expressions, then it means that the Prophet’s Jewish opponents were swopping and changing the words of the Quran. If it refers to the ideas, then they were “interpreting God’s speech in a way that was contradictory to what God intended and required”.\(^{385}\) Ragib prefers the second reading because “if expressions circulate in common currency it is hard to swop them”,\(^{386}\) although it is possible for divine intent to be deliberately misinterpreted, the the lexicon provides checks and balance.

**The Lexicon**

The lexicon is a store of semantic connections that guides how words can be used. Ragib used the pairing of expression and idea to create a theory of meaning that guaranteed some words would have multiple meanings, but he did not solve all of the resultant ambiguity with pragmatics. Although he assumes that speakers’ intentions determine the ideas to which their expressions refer, unlike Ibn Taymīyah in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and Grice in the twentieth, Ragib does not always explain ambiguous language by working out what the speaker meant. Perhaps Ragib felt that it would be too rootless an exegetical strategy, or perhaps he simply assumed that the tradition in which he worked was the right one. There was certainly a tremendous amount of cultural weight behind the lexicographical project of the Arabic Language Tradition, which had for several centuries by Ragib’s time been producing a record of the

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*Methodological Introduction and Exegesis ed. Farḥāt, 38.*

\(^{385}\) *innahā kāna min ġihatī –l-ma‘nā wa-huwa ḥamluhī ʿalā ġayri mā qaṣada biḥī wa-qtaḍāḥu.* ———, *Quranic Glossary*, 725.

\(^{386}\) *wa-hāḏā amṭalu –l-qawlayni fa-inna –l-lafẓa ʿidā tadāwalathu –l-alsinatu wa-ṣṭahara yaʿṣubu tabdīluhī.* Ibid.
legitimate connections that had been made, and therefore could be made, between expressions and ideas.\textsuperscript{387}

Ragib solves the problem of polysemy with precedent rather than pragmatics. For any homonymous expression, the lexicon will contain a list of potential ideas to which it may refer. An ambiguous phrase can usually be split into its constituent expressions, or it can be related to a phrase someone else has used previously. The lexicon in the form of dictionaries is a source of both these precedents and their legitimacy; if a usage is in the lexicon then it has been approved. The lexicon is also more than just dictionaries and it can in some cases encompass whole genres of literature or the entire opera of famous authors. When Ragib comes to explain a complex image in a recent line of poetry, he can look back across centuries of poems that everyone knows for precedents that could explain the new image’s constituent parts. The lexicon is therefore in everyone’s heads as well as in the dictionaries on their shelves. Finally, the lexicon is a work in progress. Ragib did not only refer to it, he created it.\textsuperscript{388} Subsequent generations of scholars would refer to his \textit{Quranic Glossary} as a reliable indication of what someone could be said to have said.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{388} For example, in his \textit{Exegesis} Ragib engages with and corrects his lexicographical predecessors: kāfir, which in the lexicon (\textit{fi-l-luğah}) means the act of covering is not enshrined in the lexicon as a name for the night (because it covers people in darkness) or the sower (because he covers the ground with seeds) “as some lexicographers have thought” but rather “it is a description taking the syntactic role of the thing described” (\textit{fa-‘inna ḍālīka ‘alā iqāmati al-waṣfi maqāma –l-mawṣūf}). Little is at stake here except the lexicographical nicety that the relationship of kāfir to layl is mağāz (deviation from the lexicon’s fiat coinage) rather than haqīqah (adherence to the lexicon’s fiat coinage). See below for the discussion of these two terms. Ragib. \textit{Carullah 84}. ff.14b-15a.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Where did the lexicon come from? This was a well-established point of theological discussion to which Ragib gives his answer in exegesis of the verse that says “God taught Adam all the names”. The quotation below runs to several pages, but it deserves to be reproduced in full (and edited in Arabic in the Appendices) because Ragib clearly felt he was discussing the essence of language rather than, as elsewhere, giving hermeneutical or poetic strategies for working with language. He also makes a number of interesting epistemological claims along the way:

One can scarcely explain Quran 2:31 without dealing with the question of how God taught the names to Adam, and whether there is an indication therein that languages were created by fiat, or that the first languages were created by convention. Furthermore, did God teach Adam the names without the ideas behind them, or did he teach the names and their ideas together? … We say (although the final arbitration is God’s) that people disagree about languages. Some theologians think that the first languages were created by convention and the remainder of languages were then created by fiat. They deduce this from the fact that God’s intent can only be known through his speech and it cannot just be necessarily evident because knowledge of God’s intent is subsidiary to knowledge of God’s essence, and knowledge of God’s essence is not necessarily evident, it is acquired. It is not possible for God’s intent to be necessarily evident while knowledge of his essence has to be acquired.

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389 Quran 2:31. Adam’s role in the origin of language is not unique to the Islamic tradition. While the God of the Quran is explicitly a teacher, in the Bible (Genesis 2:19-20) God creates and then it is Adam that does the naming. Just as scholars like Ragib in the eleventh century and earlier had engaged with the origin of language as reported in the Quran, so philosophers like Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) and John Locke (1632-1704) worked on explanations of the Biblical account. Both men took the position that Adam worked out the names on the basis of onomatopoeia. Both chose, like Ragib, to use Adam to talk about the origin of language. The account in Plato’s Cratylus, where Socrates posits a “namegiver” in order to discuss the origin of names (and ultimately knowledge), appears to have been a less satisfying starting point (it was certainly available to Leibniz and Locke, whereas it might not have been to Ragib). For Leibniz and Locke see: Roy Harris and Talbot J. Taylor, Landmarks in Linguistic Thought I: the Western tradition from Socrates to Saussure (London: Routledge, 1997). 36-38. For a discussion of Adam’s role see: Michael Carter, "Adam and the Technical Terms of Islam," in Words, texts, and concepts cruising the Mediterranean Sea: studies on the sources, contents and influences of Islamic civilization and Arabic philosophy and science: dedicated to Gerhard Endress on his sixty-fifth birthday, ed. Gerhard Endress, Rüdiger Arzzen, and Jörn Thielmann, Orientalia Lovaniensia analecta (Peeters, 2004). For a review of Arabic positions, see: Henri Loucel, "L'origine du langage d'après les grammariens arabes: I-IV," Arabica 10-11, no. 2-3, 1-2 (1963-1964).
because this would mean that hidden knowledge was necessarily evident while clear knowledge had to be acquired. Their argument is unsound, but it is what they said.\textsuperscript{390}

The correct position, God willing, is that to which the great mass of people adhere: that language was created by fiat. Before we provide the evidence for this we will clarify that, however God may have taught his servants, discussion and resolution of this question is facilitated by the fact that God referred to the matter when he said: ‘God only speaks to humans through revelation, or from behind a veil, or he sends a messenger to whose ear he reveals what he will’.\textsuperscript{391}

The Quran therefore says that God speaks to humans in one of these three ways. The most noble is the dispatch of a messenger who both sees God and hears his speech as the Prophet did when he was with Gabriel (ṣ). The second way is when God casts speech into hearing without sight as happened to Moses (ṣ) at the beginning of his mission. The third is when God reveals, and ‘revelation’ here specifically refers to God’s casting into the soul, and his acts of inspiration, command, and dream. God must have taught Adam the names in one of these three ways (dispatch of messenger, hearing without sight, revelation).

To return to the evidence for creation by fiat, it is impossible for expressions to have developed through convention before God taught Adam because convention requires the existence of speech that people are already using together. Such a position would lead to there being neither convention nor any language!

\textsuperscript{390} This is the Muʿtazilī position espoused by al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Ḡabbār: God is someone whose intent cannot be known as a matter of necessity because his intent is a subsidiary of his essence, which would itself then have to be known as a matter of necessity. God’s essence cannot be known as a matter of necessity because that would negate the need to acquire and believe in his essence, which is one of the tasks that humans have been given in order to earn their reward. (\textit{wa-qad ʿulima anna –l-qadima taʿālā mimman lā yusahhu an yuḍṭarra ilā murādihi maʿa –t-taklīfi li-anna –l-ʿilm bi-dātihi idā wuğiba kawnuhū makhtasaban fa-l-ʿilm bi-irādatihī bi-an yağiba dāliika fihi maʿa a annahū farʿun ʿalā –l-ʿilm bi-dātihi ālā). Ibn Aḥmad al-Asadābādī al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Ḡabbār, \textit{al-Muğni fī Abwāb at-Tawḥīd wa-l-ʿAdl}, ed. Ṭāhā Ḥusayn, 14 vols. (Cairo: ad-Dār al-Miṣrīyah li-Taʿlīf wa-Našr, 1965-74), 7:182. Ragib does not spell out all the steps in this Muʿtazilī argument about the origin of language, which are that since we must know God’s intent by acquired knowledge, we have to have some prior knowledge of language before we can do the necessary acquiring. Were we to know God’s intent by necessarily evident knowledge then language could be bypassed, but this is not the case. Our prior knowledge of the language in which God subsequently speaks must have come about by convention. Ibid., 7:182-184. See also: Peters, \textit{God’s created speech}, 386.

\textsuperscript{391} Quran 42:51 (aš-Šūrā)
One may be confronted by someone saying ‘seeing as you do not deny that physical signs and noises can be used for communication between people, well then people who are mute can do that for they have a mouth with which to form sounds and we know that people who do not talk can understand and be understood despite having no language’. The answer to this objection (which implies that signage could have been used as a convention before language was created by fiat) is that one understands physical signs through a process of deduction, similar to other processes of deduction, that would function even if we were to imagine that speech did not exist. People who are mute can only deduce and they have no capacity to form and compose expressions. Their sounds are like the sounds of a child that has not yet grasped those expressions. However, language is only language when it includes compositions of the three types of individual words.

Were there any way to achieve language without education then that which passes between people who are deaf and dumb would necessarily become formed as language, because the defect of combined deafness and dumbness is in the hearing, and deaf and dumb people are unable to speak because of their inability to comprehend through hearing. This proves that the start of the process of language acquisition requires a teacher, and that is what happened when God taught Adam in the ways described above.

One may also be confronted by someone saying ‘how did God teach Adam all the names when we know that in every age the people of that time ascribe names to ideas and physical things by either inventing them or by transferring them from other ideas?’ The answer to this question is that while some people say that God taught Adam all such names in their individual specifics even though they then appeared at certain times and among certain of his peoples, the correct position is that real knowledge depends on knowledge of principles that can be implemented. These universal ideas, which encompass individual specifics are for example, the substance ‘human’ or ‘horse’. They are also the rules by which the

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392 Interestingly, this is different from Ibn Fāris’ division of the study of language into principles and their applications. For Ibn Fāris, the application (farʿ) of the knowledge of Arabic is knowledge of names and attributes such as “horse” and “long” (these are principles for Ragib), while Ibn Fāris’ principle (aṣl) is discussion of the origin of language and subsequently of the exemplary customs of Bedouin speech. (inna li- ʿilmī –l- ʿarabi aṣlan wa-farʿ an ammā –l-farʿu fa-ma ʿrifātī –l-asmāʾ i wa-š-ṣifātī ka-qawlinā rāqulun wa-farasun ... wa-ammā –l-ашlu fa-qawlu ʿalā mawḍūʿi i –l-lugāti .. ʿumma ʿalā rusūmi –l-ʿarabi fī muḥāfabāthā). Ibn Fāris, aṣ-Ṣāḥibī, 2. as-Suyūṭī, al-Muḥir, 1:4.
realities of things are known such as the multiplication principle in mathematics, the properties of dimension and quantity in geometry, and the principles upon which many a subject is built in the law, theology, and grammar. Knowledge of individual specifics without the principles is not knowledge, and a person who only knows the individual specifics is no scholar but rather a parrot who imitates expressions. Therefore, God taught Adam all the names by teaching him the rules and principles to cover individual specifics and implementations. It is after all known that teaching the universals is a greater wonder and something closer to the divine than simply teaching a boy one letter after another.

When God said ‘all the names’ he intended ‘the expressions and the ideas in single words and combinations, their realities, and the essences of the things in themselves’. The evidence for this is that names are used in two ways, one of which is the first position: the three types that are subject, predicate, and connector (these are expressed by ‘noun’, ‘verb’ and ‘particle’). This way of using names is what is intended in this verse, for God did not teach Adam ‘man’ and ‘horse’ to the exclusion of ‘to go’, ‘to leave’, ‘from’, and ‘about’. A human must know what something is in order to be able to name it when presented with it. Don’t you see that were we to know words in an Indian or other unknown language without knowing the images that the words represented we would not know these things when we saw them? We would only know mere noises.

We have therefore established that one only knows a word when one knows what it represents, and when this knowledge of the named thing itself is in one’s heart. The things that one knows in this way could be substances, accidents of quantity or quality, additional aspects, or any of the other sorts of accidents. Words are made for each single thing according to these considerations and there is no doubt that humans have to comprehend these ideas together and separately in order to know the words produced from amongst them. For example, a single person is called ‘so-and-so’ when considering his given name, ‘man’ when considering his genitalia, ‘son’ when considering his parents, ‘father’ when considering his children, ‘brother’ when considering those who surround him and to whom

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393 Ragib repeats this and a number of the subsequent points at: Ragib, *Quranic Glossary*, 428.

394 From this point on, following Ragib’s explanation that the *asmāʾ* are not just names or nouns, I am free to translate *asmāʾ* as ‘words’.
he is related, Qurayshite or Isfahanian when considering his tribe and country, and so on with regard to a countless number of words…395

In this passage, Ragib reiterates his position that language is the communication of ideas through a corpus of expressions. If the expressions do not communicate any ideas, or if the expressions themselves are not structured according to the right principles, it is not language. He also makes two claims that apply to both language and other types of knowledge: the first is that all knowledge is structured, and learnt, according to principles, and the second is that in order to know a thing one must know both its name and its essence. I will return to that second epistemological claim in the section below.

The claim that all knowledge runs according to principles, and that species names are an example of those principles in the field of language, is couched here in a way that is typical of Ragib’s work. He borrows from the mereological vocabulary of the Classical Language Tradition with the assumption that concepts such as “universals”, “species” and “accident” are familiar,396 but without any sort of comprehensive attempt to use the universals of the Organon tradition to describe the principles by which he claims language functions.397 Ragib then gives the principles a quasi-divine status: it is more noble and more godly to think and learn through a

395 Ragib. Carullah 84. ff.26a-27a. See Appendix for Arabic text. My translation here follows Carullah 84 with some variations after Ayasofya 212 that can be checked in the notes on the Arabic text.


397 By way of contrast, Ragib’s younger Andalusian contemporary Ibn Ḥazm (Abū Muḥammad ‘Alī b. Ahmad, d. 456/1064, of whom see more below) would make the explicit argument that Aristotelian logic provided the methodological tools needed to understand exactly how God taught Adam the names. Ibn Ḥazm, at-Taqrīb li-Hadd al-Manṭiq, 9-10.
structure of principles and their applications than to simply deal in particulars. This is reminiscent of his mystic approaches to knowledge as discussed in chapter two.  

Ragib makes his claim about the principles of language in order to answer a common-sense objection to his doctrine that language was created by fiat. How can the fiat model answer the documented human tendency to constantly expand and manipulate the lexicon? The answer is that God taught Adam, in addition to all the words and their meanings, principles that humans could use to produce new words for new contexts.  

The record of all these words, old and new, is the source of the data that Ragib produces during his explanation of what homonymy is, what homonymy isn’t, and where homonymy comes from. Where else but in the lexicon can one find the information that the expression *fulk* ("small ship") can mean both the plural and the singular without any morphological or phonetic...
change, or that ṣaqr means “very bitter milk” in most Bedouin dialects but “date paste” in the dialect of most people in Medina. The dialectical variation within Arabic that allows one expression to mean either sour milk or date paste is the first source that Ragib enumerates when he lists the places that homonymy comes from in the methodological introduction to his Exegesis. The other sources of homonymy are lexical as well, and they are also diachronic: the creation of new meanings for existing words. Specialists in a certain discipline can take an existing connection between an expression and an idea and change the idea to another one that fits their specific purpose. The expression therefore becomes homonymous. The most common example of this is the new, specifically Islamic, meaning that words like prayer and charity came to have for Muslim jurists, theologians, and grammarians.

In other cases, Ragib explains that an expression already connected to an idea by fiat is borrowed from that idea and given to a different idea, which already had an expression of its own in the lexicon. This is the mechanism that he, and others, call istiʿārah (borrowing), and the

consequence is that the expression in question becomes a homonym. For example, the expression “lion”, which is already connected to the idea of a large carnivorous quadruped of yellowish brown colour, is borrowed from the quadruped and given to a brave person despite the fact that this person already has their own lexical expression (“human”). According to Ragib, the difference between the way these two types of language change function is that in the first case the usage must follow a precedent set by specialists in the discipline concerned, whereas in the second case:

anyone can borrow an expression and use it so long as they intend an idea that is correct, and as long as the idea is true to the comparison. For example, you could say ‘I rode a lightening bolt’ and intend with that expression that you rode a horse that was fast like lightening.\textsuperscript{404}

Anyone can reorder the lexicon, so long as they make sense.

Scholars like Ragib were preserving both linguistic precedent and language development. In the *Quranic Glossary*, the entry for the root gīm-wāw-zay includes the following statement: “you can say ‘I asked so-and-so to pass me and he did pass me’ if you asked someone for water and he gave you water. This is *istiʿārah*”.\textsuperscript{405} Lexicographers like Ragib have allowed a new connection to be made between the expression “to pass” and the idea of giving water despite the fact that there was already a word for giving water.

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\textsuperscript{405} qišla –stağaztu fulānan fa-ağāzanī ʾiḍā –stasqaytahū fa-saġāka wa-γālika –sti ʾāratūn. ———, *Quranic Glossary*, 211.
Ragib understood this iterative process by which lexical precedent was created as something ongoing, potentially even into his own lifetime. Again in the Quranic Glossary, his proof for reading God’s resurrection (našr) of the dead as an istiʿārah, in which the source domain is the spreading out (našr) of cloth, is a line of poetry from around a century before his own birth. Elsewhere in the same work he uses the poetry of al-Mutanabbī (Abū at-Ṭayyib Aḥmad, 303/915-354/955), a man with whose lifetime his own may well have overlapped, as evidence for the relative pronoun man (“who”) referring to humans to the exclusion of animals.

It is because Ragib works in both exegetical hermeneutics and poetics that he has such an open view of language and its potential to do new things in the hands of its users. Metaphor in general, and istiʿārah in particular, are the mechanisms that break open the lexicon and poetics is the discipline in which language changes and develops. Without them, the lexicon risked


407 The full line, which Ragib quotes in The Path to the Nobilities while attributing it to al-Mutanabbī, is: “Around me, everywhere, physiognomies / that you would be wrong to enquire about with the pronoun ‘who’” (ḥawlī bi-kulli makānin minhum ilaqun / tu ṭī iḍā ʾīta bi-stifhāmihā bi-man). Ragib, The Path to the Nobilities, 80. In the Quranic Glossary he only cites the first hemistich and attributes it to “some modern poets” (baʿda ʾl-mubdiʿīna). ———, Quranic Glossary, 778. Abū at-Ṭayyib al-Mutanabbī and ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān al-Barqūqī, Sarḥ Diwān al-Mutanabbī, 2 vols. (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 2002). 2:1212.

408 However, Ragib would never have gone so far as to take the step taken by al-Ḡūrānī later in the eleventh century, most probably several decades after Ragib’s death. Al-Ḡūrānī rejected the lexicon as a theoretical component of language and argued that language is not the intrinsic connection of expressions to ideas fixed by fiat, but rather their contextual combination and the listener’s interpretation of this combination. While Ragib, engaged
becoming a set of restrictive precedents and protocols, that which Frank identified as the grammarians’ view of language as “a closed system: a self-contained realm of linguistic reality, of semiotic entities variously related to one another by consistent, intrinsic relationships of equivalence and non-equivalence, morphological patterns, rules of syntactic combination, etc.”.

It was not just grammarians who believed in a closed system. For those working in strictly hermeneutical disciplines, such as the legal theorist al-Ǧaṣṣāṣ (Aḥmad b. ʿAlī, 305/917-370/981), deviations from coinage by fiat are “lexicalized and cannot freely be formed by analogy”. God used such deviations in the Quran because they were part of the Arabic of the time, but as for scholars in the tenth century: “the principle with regard to expressions that deviate from coinage by fiat is they are governed by precedent and found in the lexicon. We may not go beyond those recorded uses”.

Metaphor, metonymy, and indeed all figurative language are the process of exchanging one word for another related word. Ragib, and others, explained these mechanisms as deviations from the lexicon, and consequently dependent on the lexicon as a reference point from which changes are made. The relationship between expressions and ideas therefore lies at the root of

as he was in the lexical practice through his Qur’anic Glossary, was never prepared to abandon the lexicon to this extent, he did share al-Ǧurğānī’s belief in the importance of syntactic structure (naẓm), a theoretical concept that had been around since the ninth century and that was part of Ragib’s theory of Quranic inimitability (for which see the subsequent chapter). ‘Ābd al-Qāhir b. ‘Ābd ar-Raḥmān al-Ǧurğānī, Dalā’il al-l’ ǧāz, ed. Muḥḥammad Maḥmūd aš-Šinqīṭī (Beirut: Dār al-Ma’rifah, 1978; repr., 1987). 206, 415. Sophia Vasalou, "I’jāz," in Encyclopedia of Arabic Language and Linguistics Online Edition, ed. Kees Versteegh, Lutz Edzard, and Rudolf de Jong (Brill Online: Brill, 2010). ———, "The miraculous eloquence of the Qur’an: general trajectories and individual approaches," Journal of Qur’anic Studies 4, no. 2 (2002): 32.

409 Frank, "Meanings " 277.

410 Heinrichs, "Contacts," 269.

411 al-Bāqillānī, at-Taqrīb, 1:354; Vishanoff, Islamic Hermeneutics, 166.

412 al-ašlū fi-l-alfāzī –l-māḏāzi anna ṣaṭīqaḥā –s-sam ’u wa-mā wurida fi-l-lu’qatī wa-laysa yaḡūzu la-nā an nata’ addā bī-hā māwda’ aḥā –fitāt takallamat –l-’arabu bi-hā. al-Ǧaṣṣāṣ, Uṣūl al-Fiqh, 1:367. Al-Ǧaṣṣāṣ, like Ragib, explains maḏāz as deviation from coinage by fiat: “maḏāz is that which goes beyond the
them all. Expressions and ideas form the binary linguistic structure that enables one to both conceive and explain how figurative language works. *Istiʿārah*, for example, is a mechanism by which an expression is borrowed from one idea and given to another, while *mağāz*, the larger category of which *istiʿārah* is a part, is the name for any deviation whatsoever from the connection, enshrined in coinage by fiat, between an expression and an idea.

The relationship between expressions and ideas is therefore the best way to understand the binary of literal and non-literal language (*ḥaqīqah* and *mağāz*): either the expression-idea connection remains fixed according to its fiat coinage (literal), or the expression-idea connection is reworked and remade into something new (non-literal). This new something does not have to be as grand as a poetic metaphor. While literal language is the stable system fixed in place by the lexicon, when “an expression is used according to its original fiat coinage”, non-literal language is absolutely everything else, be it a metaphor, an ellipsis, or a pleonasm (however minor).

The pithy definition that Ragib settled on in his *Quranic Glossary* is that non-literal language goes walkabout but literal language stays in its place.

413 “*Istiʿārah* is a category of *mağāz*” (wa-l-stiʿāratu min bābi –l-mağāz). Ragib. *Innovative Figures of Speech*. f.11a.


416 The deviation from the original fiat coinage can be very minor indeed. For example, the lengthening of a vowel from anẓuru to anẓūru (from “I look” to “I loook”) is *mağāz*. ———, "Methodological Introduction ed. Nāhī," 97-99; ———, Methodological Introduction and Exegesis ed. Farḥāt, 55-60.

417 al-maḡāzun min –l-kalāmi mā taḡāwaza mawda ahā –lлаlī fī wuḍiʿa la-hū wa-l-ḥaqīqatū mā lam yataḡawaz ḏālik. ———, *Quranic Glossary*, 211-212. Ragib’s understanding of ḥaqīqah as original fiat coinage and mağāz as
Non-literal language is such a broad category that it must apply to almost all of poetics, and indeed Ragib only addresses the literal/non-literal binary at the very beginning of his poetics manual before moving onto istiʿārah and other rhetorical figures in more detail. However, as the references above to al-Ǧaṣṣāṣ indicate, the question of literal and non-literal language is much more important in hermeneutical disciplines such as legal theory, and the Quranic exegesis on which legal theory in part depends. It is in this context that Ella Almagor raised the question of whether “the medieval Arab speaker …[felt] the need for a clear distinction between the lexical meaning of a word, the abstract idea which it comes to convey, and the mode of conveying this idea”. Ragib used the linguistic structure of expression and idea to answer this challenge as follows.

Absolutely everything else follows that of al-Ǧaṣṣāṣ, who wrote that the Arabic language was one or the other, and that ḥaqīqah is when a thing is named according to coinage by fiat while mağāz is that with which this coinage by fiat is bypassed, and the thing is then named with a non-literal name (fa-l-ḥaqīqatu mā summiya biḥī—š-sayʿu fiʾ asli—l-ṣāli wa-mawḍī′ iḥā′ wa-l-mağāzu mā yağūṣu biḥī—l-mawḍī′ a—l-laaḍī huwa haṣṣā tấn la-hī fiʾ l-ṣāli wa-summiya biḥī mā layṣa—l-ismu la-hī haṣṣā tấn). al-Ǧaṣṣāṣ, Uṣūl al-Fiqh, 1:359-361. It is also close to the less-explicitly expressed understanding of Ibn Qutaybah. Heinrichs, “Contacts,” 259f; Abū Muḥammad ʿAbdallāh Ibn Qutaybah, Taʾwīl Muṣkil al-Qurʾān, ed. Ahmad Ṣaqr (Cairo: Dār at-Turāṯ, 1973). 102f. It is impossible to know whether Ragib and al-Ǧaṣṣāṣ’ understanding of mağāz might have been shared by Abū ʿUbādah (d. ca. 209/824) some two centuries previously, but were it to have been, it would solve the interpretative difficulties experienced by both Wansborough and Almagor in their respective articles. Following Ragib’s model, the mağāz of a Quranic verse could be its paraphrase, its figurative expressions, and indeed pretty much everything else. Cf. Almagor, "The Early Meaning of Majāz.”; Wansborough, "Majāz al-qur’ān." Ragib’s definition of mağāz would in fact solve Wansborough and Almagor’s problem along exactly the lines proposed by Heinrichs, whose “etymological translation cum interpretation” defines mağāz as “that place in a discourse where the explicit meaning goes beyond … the actual wording of a phrase and leaves it behind”. Heinrichs, “The Ḥaṣṣa-Majāz Dichotomy,” 127.

Ragib also makes use of the literal/non-literal binary in his ethics, where unbelievers are only called “human” (mağāzan) because they lack the reason that defines real humans, and those with lots of money are only figuratively rich because the true riches are those of the soul. Ragib, Analysis of the Two Creations, 129 (Chapter 20).

As, indeed, Heinrichs had hoped: “[a]pproaching the mağāz problem from the angle of the lafẓ-maʾnā confusion seems to be very appropriate”. Heinrichs, “The Ḥaṣṣa-Majāz Dichotomy,” 126.


419 As, indeed, Heinrichs had hoped: “[a]pproaching the mağāz problem from the angle of the lafẓ-maʾnā confusion seems to be very appropriate”. Heinrichs, “The Ḥaṣṣa-Majāz Dichotomy,” 126.
A homonymous expression can refer to two different ideas in two different ways at the same time. It can refer to one idea via a mode of literal correspondence between expression and idea as laid down in the lexicon according to coinage by fiat. This mode is called ‘literal’. At the same time, it can refer to a different idea via a mode in which there is a deviation from that lexical coinage. This alternative mode is called ‘non-literal’. It can be achieved by the simplest of grammatical applications such as the imperative ‘do’ applying to both men and women, a more complex dual reference such as ‘whale’ referring to both Pisces in the sky and the mammal in the sea, or by istiʿārah. Speakers need not be explicitly conscious of which mode they are using. Nevertheless, in all these cases there must a general overarching idea that connects the two different ideas to which the expression in question refers. This connecting idea must also be discernible to those scholars who are concerned with language. For example, if one were to say ‘fear the lion and the donkey’ and mean both the beasts in question (literally) and the humans who share their characteristics of bravery and stupidity (non-literally), then the connecting idea which would work in both the literal and non-literal modes would be ‘fear the brave animal and the stupid animal’.

Ragib uses the pairing of literal and non-literal, the latter inclusive of istiʿārah, to explain how apparently ambiguous language works, and to answer Almagor’s query about the modes by which ideas are conveyed. The linguistic structure for his explanation is the pairing of expression and idea, and the literal and the non-literal are two of the modes by which they interact with each other and with the lexicon. Ragib also provides an explicit insubstantiation of the “abstract idea”

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that Almagor was looking for when Ragib explains how “brave animal” is the “general idea” that connects “brave lion” and “brave human”.

**The Referents of “Idea”**

What are the limits of “the idea” in Ragib’s structure of linguistic assumptions? Is the maʿnā an idea in the mind, or can it also refer to external physical reality? On the one hand, this is where the aesthetic impact of a theory with only two parts breaks down. However, Ragib is indeed aware of the three-way conceptual difference between ideas, words, and things; between mind, language, and reality.

Ragib knew that one must comprehend the essence of the thing being named (the musammā) if one is to understand the name. Otherwise, we would be able to learn foreign languages just by parroting their sounds.⁴²³ He also knew that the things being named could be physical things (aʿyān) or they could be ideas (maʿānī).⁴²⁴ Indeed, the ideas might not even be connected to any physical reality at all: “imagination is when you conceive a form in your soul, whether or not it has any existence outside, for example the form of a person who does not exist such as the phoenix or hircocervus”.

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⁴²³———, Quranic Glossary, 428. And towards the end of the long quotation above from the Exegesis, see note 395.

⁴²⁴“ascribe names to ideas and physical things”, see quotation from the Exegesis at page 125.

⁴²⁵wa-l-wahu sūratun tāṣāwwrathū fī nafsīka sawā ʿun kāna la-hā wuğūdun min hāriğin ka-ṣūratu ʾinsānīn mā lam yakhun la-hā [Ayasofya 212 has la-hā] wuğūdun ka-ʿanqā a muğribin wa-ʿazāyila [sic.] wa-l-ḥayālu tāṣāwwrū mā ad rakāhū –l-ḥāssatu fi-n-nafs. Ragib. Carullah 84. f.27a. The word ʿazāyila should be read ʿan-z-ayyil. It is the hircocervus, or “goat-stag”, from the Arabic translation of Aristotle’s On Interpretation. Al-Fārābī had paired it with “phoenix” to the same effect as Ragib does here (Zimmermann notes that al-Fārābī was following the translation of Aristotle’s Physics, which mentions both non-existent animals). Aristotle, “On Interpretation,” 16a.15f;———, Organon Aristotelis, 60; Abū Naṣr Muḥammad al-Fārābī, Šarḥ al-Fārābī li-Kitāb Arisṭūṭālīs fi-l-ʿĪbārah, ed. Wilhelm Kutsch and Stanley Marrow (Beirut: Dār al-Mašriq, 1986). 28 (lines 14-15 and 21-22); Zimmermann, Commentary and Short Treatise, 15 (note 4).
In a discussion of the nature of writing with respect to the Quran, Ragib makes the following ontological statement:

There are four ways that a thing can exist: (1) existence in essence, which refers to the physical things; (2) existence in human thought, which refers to the ideas; (3) existence in the expression; and (4) existence in writing, the final existence that is only ever subsequent to existence in memory or in expression.\footnote{Paraphrase of: \textit{al-ašyāʾ u la-hā arbaʿ u wuğūdātin wuğūdun fī ḏātihī wa-huwa –l-aʿyānu wa-wuğūdun fī fikri –l-insāni wa-huwa –l-maʿani wa-wuğūdun fī lafẓihī wa-huwa –l-ibāratu wa-wuğūdun fī-l-kitābati wa-huwa wuğūdun kitābiyun wa-l-wuğūdu –l-kitābiyu āḥaru –l-wuğūdāti id fī ḥifẓan ilā la yūgaddu –s-sayʿu kitābatan illā baʿda an yūgada hifzan aw lafzan. Ragib, \textit{On Creeds}, 274. This same four-part division is found in Ibn Wahb al-Kātib: Ibn Wahb al-Kātib, \textit{al-Burhān [an-Naqd]}, 10.}

The simple pairing of expression and idea has perforce been expanded to take into account the real world outside language. Ragib includes the fourth category of existence in writing because he is at this point concerned about the status of God’s written word in the Quran, but for our purposes here the interesting ontological categories are (1), (2), and (3): the expression, the idea, and the physical thing; language, mind, and reality. The problem is whether the expression relates to the idea, to the physical thing, or to both.

Ragib was aware of this problem too, and he used it as a stick with which to beat the Muʿtazilah. In his discussion in \textit{On Creeds} of the controversy over the Quran being an attribute of God or a recited and copied thing among humanity, Ragib describes a golden age in which there were but two valid approaches to the problem: a conservative one that chose not to investigate further, and the divinely inspired approach of those who had attained the highest ranks of certainty. This happy situation persisted until a group of dialecticians (ǧadalīyīn) neglected God’s guidance and went beyond revelation into error:

They failed to advance beyond the stage of things that can be sensed and described into the stage where things that are reasoned are investigated. They took speech to be just
something sensed, and thought that it was impossible for a body that could be sensed, which was in a place, to then be in another place. They did not know that pure reasoned forms are different from shapes that can be sensed. They also disagreed amongst themselves.

The bulk of the Muʿtazilah said that God’s speech never reaches the point of existence. This is because speech is a series of composed letters, and each letter cannot exist until the previous letter has ceased to exist. Things that exist cannot be combined with things that do not exist, and therefore the existence of God’s speech cannot be conceived of in any way, neither in the souls of those who memorize it, nor in the recitation of those who recite it, nor in the writing of its scribes. That which exists in all these cases is a human act and a creation attributable to humans from every aspect. No part of God’s speech has ever existed, neither now nor in the time of the Prophet.427

The Kullābīyah claimed that God’s speech subsisted in the essence of the creator, and that it was neither a sound, nor a letter, nor a command, nor a prohibition, nor indeed was it any part of speech. The Quran does not exist among humans at all, and indeed with investigation it is not God’s speech, for the Quran is the sounds and the letters that are an expression of God’s speech.428

Perhaps the mistake that they made was with regard to the fact that ‘Quran’ is a homonym. It applies to the speech that subsists in the essence of the creator, and to that which is in the

427 This is an accurate, albeit unsympathetic, representation of the Muʿtazilī position as laid out by al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār. Al-Qāḍī wrote that God’s speech was “an accident that can never exist in a place” (ʿaraḍun yastabīlū kawnuhū maḥallan). The composition of God’s speech is an aspect of mind (maʿqūl), not of external reality. Whether divine or human, speech cannot be composed outside the mind because composition in external reality requires the combination of two things that exist, while in speech each letter replaces the previous one “and if we allowed them both to remain then something that existed would be composed with something nonexistent, and that is impossible” (fa-law aḥbatā −l-baqa’ a fiḥimā la-adā ilā kawnī −l-mawğūdī mu ʿallafan bi-l-ma’ dūmī wa-hāḍā muḥāl). Al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār, al-Muğnī, 16:227.

428 This is an accurate representation of the position of Ibn Kullāb (Abū Muḥammad ʿAbdallāh b. Saʿīd, d. ca. 241/855) as reported by al-ʿAṣʿari: the Quran among humans is an expression (ʿibārah) of God’s speech. Human speech is made up of commands and prohibitions, whereas God’s speech has no sound or any other divisions. al-ʿAṣʿari, Maqālāt, 584-585.
hearts of the believers, and to the written copies. This means that the Quran is three things each of which is different from the other, and indeed many different things.\footnote{This is indeed the mistake that they made, or rather, in the case of al-\textit{Qāḍī} ʿAbd al-\textit{Qādī} ʿAbd al-\textit{Qādī} ʿAbd al-\textit{Gādār}, the conviction to which they held. See the subsequent chapters below and: al-\textit{Qāḍī} ʿAbd al-\textit{Gādār}, \textit{al-Muğnī}, 7:14.}

Were the Muʿtazilah and the Kullābīyah to have taken into consideration that most simple of considerations, that reasoned forms are different from things that can be sensed, then they would not have been so foolish. After all, we know that pieces of knowledge can travel from the soul of the teacher to the soul of the pupil without leaving the soul of the teacher. The piece of knowledge can then exist in the two souls at the same time. The form of a piece of handiwork is reasoned in the soul of its creator and then exists as a thing that can be sensed when it has been made, in the same way as an engraving exists on the ring and in the wax imprint without leaving the ring, and a single form can be reflected in many mirrors without it leaving its formed substance. If this principle is established for the Quran, which is God’s speech (albeit that it cannot be compared to human speech with regard to nobility), then it can scarcely be surprising that God’s speech exists at one and the same time with God on the preserved tablet, and with humans in their souls, their recitations, in the hearing of those who listen to it being read, and in the written copies.\footnote{Ragib, \textit{On Creeds}, 168-169.}

Ragib’s point is straightforward: the Muʿtazilah fail to understand that the homonymous expression “Quran” refers to both ideas and to physical things.\footnote{Ragib’s position on how God’s speech reaches humans is discussed just before this quoted passage, in terms similar to his \textit{Exegesis} (see note 395). Ragib writes that there are two kinds of speech: that which is sensed (\textit{mahsūs}) and that which is in the mind (\textit{maʿqūl}). The \textit{mahsūs} speech is that which relies on the physical abilities to speak and hear, and on the transmission of the sound through the air. The \textit{maʿqūl} speech is the ideas behind the expressions. God is capable of making his ideas reach humans in a number of different ways: direct \textit{mahsūs} speech, inspiration, divine command without sound, etc. Ibid., 163-164. Mīr Lawḥī is mistaken in his identification of this passage with the Ašʿarī distinction between \textit{kalām nafsī} and \textit{kalām lafżī}. Mīr Lawḥī, \textit{Rāġeb}, 36-39, 109-115. The Ašʿarī binary was designed to solve the problem of the status of the Quran in the world by positing two separate ontological categories of Quran: a \textit{nafsī} one with God and a \textit{lafżī} one among humans. Ragib, on the other hand, uses a single linguistic structure (homonymy) to show how the Quran can be both divine and human at the same time. Cf. Key, "Language and Literature," 35.} Rather than being part of the problem of language versus mind versus reality, homonymy is the solution. Expressions can refer to both ideas and to things.
The relation of words to things comes up in another related theological talking point, the meaning of the word “name” (ism) in the invocation “in the name of God” (the basmalah) with which the Quran and many of its suras begin. Once again, Ragib turns to homonymy and remarks: “the disagreement about whether the name is the thing named or something else is really two opinions coming from two different perspectives, each correct on its own terms”.432 Ragib’s explanation is that “name” is a homonym, the expression of which can either refer to the thing named (as in “I saw Zayd”, the musammā) or the naming of the thing (as in “I called my son ‘Zayd’”, the tasmīyah). In the absence of an assumption of homonymy, the explanations of this issue look very different. Al-Bāqillānī maintains that the name and the thing named are identical in essence, because he is determined to ensure that God’s attributes cannot be seen as separate from God.433 This forces him to maintain elsewhere that the word “fire” cannot be the name of the conflagration, because if it was, then it would be identical to the conflagration, and the letters f-i-r would burn the speaker’s mouth. Instead, he says that the act of naming that involves the letters f-i-r is ontologically separate from the name. 434 Homonymy enables Ragib to avoid such tortuous reasoning, and he can simply say that “no reasoning person” would maintain that the letters Z-a-y-d are the same as the person Zayd.


433 anna –l-isma huwa –l-musammā bi-ʾaynihi wa-qātihi. Al-Bāqillānī then goes on to imply that a name is literally an actual thing: “the act of naming that indicates the thing named is only a name in the non-literal sense” (wa-t-tasmīyatu –d-dāllatu ālayhi –smi ’alā sabili –l-maḡāz). al-Bāqillānī, al-Insāf, 57-58. Al-Bāqillānī is concerned to combat the Muʿtazilī position that God’s names are just human speech acts that describe him, for which see: Naṣr Ḥāmid Abū Zayd, al-Ittiḥād al-ʿArqī fi-t-Tafṣīr: dirāsah fi qadīyayn al-maḡāz fi-l-qurʾān fi dhikr al-maḏābir (Beirut: Dār at-Tanwīr, 1982). 83-84; al-Aʿfī arī, Maqālāt, 172. See also my discussion of the divine attributes starting at page 159 below.

Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913) thought that surrogationalism, the mistaken belief that language is a nomenclature in which words just stand for things, was at the heart of the problem of language, mind, and reality.\textsuperscript{435} Saussure’s answer was that \textit{[l]e signe linguistique unit non une chose et un nom, mais un concept et une image acoustique.}\textsuperscript{436} Ragib, on the other hand, who organised his linguistic structures differently, believed that a sound pattern can refer to both a concept and a thing. The difference between these two theories lies in the fact that Ragib did not share Saussure’s assumption that concept and sound pattern (signifié and signifiant) were part of a third entity called a sign (signe). For Saussure, it was the sign that provided order and structure to the \textit{plan indéfini des idées confuses} and \textit{[plan] non moins indéterminé des sons},\textsuperscript{437} but for Ragib, as we have seen, polysemy provided enough structures to link the two planes together without confusion or indeterminacy.

**Truth and Quranic Ambiguity**

Just as Ragib assumes that expressions can refer to both ideas and to things, he understands truth as the accurate correspondence between that which is in a person’s heart and something external to that person. The something external can be a thing, an idea, or an action. He does not understand truth, or truthfulness, in terms of the relationship between a speech act and external physical reality. Instead, “the truth” (\textit{al-ḥaqq}) is either the correspondence between a fact of life and our knowledge that it is real (for example \textit{death is real}) or it is the correspondence between

\textsuperscript{435} Harris and Taylor, \textit{The Western tradition}, 221.


\textsuperscript{437} “[P]lane of vague, amorphous thought” and “equally featureless plane of sound”. \textit{———}, \textit{Cours}, 156; \textit{———}, \textit{Course}, 110-111.
the belief that an idea or thing exists and its actual existence (for example he believes that resurrection is real). Truthfulness (aṣ-ṣidq) is primarily a correct predication in a speech act as a result of correspondence between the predication in a person’s heart and the external idea or thing concerned.

Truth is therefore both a quality of language and a quality of external physical reality. It is not something that enables us to differentiate between language and reality in the way that Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) intended when he said:

it is only when we are concerned with whether what is said is true or false that we are not satisfied with merely grasping the thought … it is the striving for truth that drives us always to advance from the sense to the reference.

Frege thought that expressions referred to ideas and that we only cared about external physical reality when we needed to evaluate the truth of the expressions. For Ragib, on the other hand, truth is the realm of ontological fact in which nothing is disputed. This includes things that today one might call a belief rather than a fact, such as divine reward and punishment. Ragib’s concept

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Ragib writes that al-haqq is used in two ways: (1) with regard to an existing thing the necessary existence of which is required by wisdom (wugūdūhā bi-hasabi muqtaḏī –l-hikmah), or (2) with regard to a belief that corresponds to the existence of a thing in itself (li-l-i tiqāḏi –l-muṭabaqī li-wugūḏī –ṣ-ṣay’i fi nafṣīhī) or a statement of belief that corresponds to the idea of the thing that the idea relates to (fi-l-qawli –l-muṭabaqī li-ma’nā –ṣ-ṣay’i –llaḏī huwa alayhi). Ragib, "Methodological Introduction ed. Nāhī," 97; ———, Methodological Introduction and Exegesis ed. Fārḥāt, 55.

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Ragib writes that:

The core of truth and falsity is the speech act, whether past or future, a promise or otherwise. Truth and falsity are only the primary matter in speech acts, and in speech acts they are only ever predicates … truth and falsity may be accidents in parts of speech other than the predicate, such as requests for information [that truthfully reveal the questioner’s ignorance]. (aṣ-ṣidqu wa-l-kīḏbu aṣḥahumā fi-l-qawli māḏīyān kāna aw mustaqbalan wa’dan kāna aw ġayrahū wa-lā yakānā bi-l-qawla –l-awwalī illā fi-l-qawli wa-lā yakānā bi-l-qawli illā fi-l-ḥabarī dūna ġayrihī min aṣnāfī –l-kalāmi … wa-qad yakānā bi-l-’arāḍī fi ġayrihī min anwā’i –l-kalāmi ka-l-stifhām……)

———, Quranic Glossary, 478. In his ethical work he defines truthfullness as the correspondence between internal speech and the thing being thought about (ḥaddu –ṣ-ṣidqi –t-tammi huwa muṭābaqatu –l-qawli –d-’damiri wa-l-muḥbari ’anhu). ———, The Path to the Nobilities, 193.

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of right and wrong was inextricably caught up with his beliefs, and in his major ethical work he writes that “there is no worthier pillar on which rests the survival of the world than truth, for were a world without truth to be imagined, it would be a world without order that would not survive”.

What happens when these lofty principles come into contact with the practice of Quranic exegesis? The answer is that the linguistic structures and assumptions that we have been discussing provide Ragib with sufficient conceptual resources to deal with most of the problems he encounters. What is particularly interesting is that he in no way seeks to downplay the difficulties of exegesis and the ambiguities of language. In fact, he expresses a preference for complexity and a degree of comfort with confusion. Behind this comfort, as we now might have come to expect, lies a confidence that scholars have the potential to reach the highest levels of divine knowledge and certainty.

For Ragib, the Quran contained linguistic ambiguity. The name that the Quran itself gave to this ambiguity was *mutašābih* or “mutual similarity”, which meant that there were Quranic expressions that resembled other expressions, and Quranic ideas that resembled other ideas. The ambiguity came from the fact that the human reader did not always know which idea God intended when he used which expression. While the Quran contained ambiguity it did not contain contradictions, the difference between the two being that ambiguity is linguistic.

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441 *wa-š-ṣidqu aḡdaru arkāni baqāʾi –l-ʿālami hattā law tūhamu murtafaʾ an la-mā ṣahha niẓāmuhū wa-baqāʾ uh. Ragib, The Path to the Nobilities, 193. I have discussed Ragib’s attitude to linguistic, Quranic, and poetic truth in: Key, "Language and Literature." See also: Ragib, *Exegesis ed. aš-Šidī*, 124, 1297.


443 Examples include ambiguity resulting from rare words, homonyms, brevity, prolixity, and syntactic composition.
whereas contradictions are irreconcilable references to external physical reality (for example “Zayd is going” and “Zayd is not going” referring to the same Zayd, the same place, and the same time). There are aspects of the Quran that are wholly unknowable for humans, but these are divine mysteries such as the last day, and they are not the result of language. Ragib calls these unknowables “ambiguous solely with regard to the idea”, as opposed to ambiguity that involves expressions.

Two problems, and two consequent tasks remain: solving the linguistic ambiguity, and determining which Quranic verses fall in which category and therefore whether they can indeed be solved. Both these tasks fall to the scholars. Ragib identifies the highest ranks of scholars, whose understanding and piety is such that their understanding of the Quran can be relied upon, with those firmly rooted in knowledge (ar-rāsiḥūna fī-l-ʿilm) who can be read as the only group other than God to understand the whole Quran.

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444 Exegesis ed. aš-Šidī, 416-417; ___ , Quranic Glossary, 444.

445 Exegesis ed. aš-Šidī, 1348.

446 Those firmly rooted in knowledge (ar-rāsiḥūna fī-l-ʿilm) know what humans are able and unable to know (ma ʿrifata mā li-l-insāni sabīlun ilā ma ʿrifatihī mimmā lā sabīla la-hū), because it is the wise (al-ḥukamāʾ) who know what may and may not be known, and by doing so occupy the noblest rank (hāḏā ašrafu man ilatin li-l-ḥukamāʾ). Exegesis ed. aš-Šidī, 426-427. Ragib allows that both readings of Quran 4:126 are possible. See note 291.
How are scholars able to conquer the problem of linguistically ambiguous Quran? Ragib believes that one factor in their favour is that while there may be ambiguity about exactly what God intends, his general or overall meaning is always apparent. It is not as if the Quran were in a foreign language. This is a substantial limit on ambiguity, and it rests on a belief in a God who makes sense. Ragib goes further: if speech is from God, then it is in accordance with reason and if it is not in accordance with reason then it is not from God. This fits with his ethical slogan that reason and revelation are mutually dependent, and the way that he describes the scholars who use their reason to interpret the Quran also matches the high aspiration for humanity that he lays out in his ethics: that people follow the prophets. Indeed, the reasons that a reasonable God would make some of the Quran linguistically ambiguous were to train the scholars’ minds,

447 Ragib explains this point as follows. He makes a distinction between knowing God’s overall intent (muğmalan) and knowing it in detail (mufaṣṣalan). Ambiguity resides in the detailed knowledge, but detailed knowledge is less important. The examples of unknowable intent that Ragib gives are the mysterious letters that appear at the beginning of a number of Quranic verses, and those religious ordinances we are unaware of the reason behind:

That which some people say, that if God can address us without making us know his intent then he might as well address us in an African or Byzantine language, can be answered as follows: the intent of Byzantine and African speech is unknown whether it is taken together as a whole or broken down into its separate parts. However, the intent of the ambiguous parts of the Quran is known when it is taken together as a whole but unknown when broken down into its separate parts, because each verse has been explained by exegetes in a number of different ways. We know that God’s intent must be adhered to, but we do not know which of these different ways God intended. This is clear, and it follows the principle that it is not inconceivable for God to charge us to recite letters the ideas behind which we do not know and then reward us for our recitation of them. In the same way, he charges us with actions that we we do not know the wisdom behind in order to reward us for performing them. (wa-mā qāla ba’duhum innahā law ḏāsa an yuḥjahbanā ʿummā lā yuʿārinā muğdahā la-ḏāsa an yuḥjahbanā bi-kalāmi –z-zangī wa-r-rāmī fa-l-ʿawābu ‘anhu anna kalāma –r-rāmī wa-z-zangī lā yu’ lamu minhu –l-murādū muğmalan wa-lā mufaṣṣalan wa-l-mutaṣābihu yu’ lamu minhu muğdahū muğmalan wa-in lam na’ lamu mufaṣṣalan li-anna kullā āyatin qad fassarahā –l-mufassirūna ʿalā avḡuḥin fa-na’ lumn anna –l-murāda la yuḥraṣu minhu ʿummā ta’ yīnu murādī –l-lāhi ta’ ālā minhā ʿgayru ma’ limin wa-hāda zāhirūn ʿalā annahā lam yakūn yunita‘u an yuкалilfi fa-ta’ ālā tilāwata aḥrifin lā na’ rifu ma’ anāhā fa-yuğbanā ʿalā tilāwathā kāmā yuкалilfi fa-āf ālā lam na’ rifu wa-qhā –l-ḥikmati fīhā li-yuğbanā ʿalayhā).

448 Ibid., 424-426.

449 Ibid., 1349.

450 an yaṣīra –n-nāsu tab’an li-l-anbiyā’. Ragib, Exegesis ed. aš-Šidī, 428. See also note 284.
to enable them to earn the rewards they deserve for their efforts, to demonstrate their nobility, and “to demonstrate the nobility of thought”. 451

**The Value of Complexity and Analogy**

It would appear that linguistic ambiguity was a problem, albeit a good sort of problem that could be solved by an analytical process that brought divine rewards to scholars. However, Ragib’s philosophy of language, as has already been noted, was more than just a hermeneutic. He had ideas about how language should be produced as well as how it should be interpreted. These ideas applied to everybody who used language: both God and humanity. 452

In *The Path to the Nobilities*, Ragib says while discussing the role of the teacher that it is the right and the duty of scholars to guide those who wish to be taught on the right path with kind words “and oblique speech, for communication is more effective when it is oblique than when it is straightforward”. 453 He then gives five examples of how this can be the case:

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453 *wa-ta rīdīn fī-l-ḥīṭābi fa-ta rīdu ablağu min –t-tasrīhi*. Other translations for *ta rīd* could be “circumlocutionary”, “periphrastic”, or “equivocal”. It is not one of the terms in Ragib’s manual of poetics, but in the *Quranic Glossary* he defines it as:

language that has two aspects, one true and one false, or one explicit and one implicit. For example Quran 2:235 ‘your *ta rīd* to women is not a sin’. It is said that such *ta rīd* is saying ‘you are beautiful’ while doubting that fact. (*wa-ta rīdu kalāmun la-hū wa ghānī min šīdīn wa-kīgūn wa-zāhirīn wa-baṭīnīn gāla wa-lā ḡunāha ‘alaykum fī-mā ‘arrādūm bihi min ḥuṭbatī –n-nisā’i qīla huwa an yaqūlu la-hā anti ǧāmīfatiun wa-margūbun fī-ka wa-nāḥwū dālika*).

Ragib, *Quranic Glossary*, 560. For some justification of my translation of *balāğah* as effective communication see: Key, "Language and Literature," 37-40.
Virtuous souls, because they have a natural inclination towards the discovery of ideas, tend to communicate obliquely because they love to think through the ideas behind language.\textsuperscript{454}

Oblique communication preserves our awe and covers up our shame.\textsuperscript{455}

Straightforward communication has but a single aspect whereas oblique communication has a number of aspects, which in itself makes oblique communication more effective.\textsuperscript{456}

Oblique communication can be expressed in multiple different ways, and can therefore be adduced for multiple different reasons. Straightforward communication, however, can only be used for a single purpose according to its single expressive option.\textsuperscript{457}

A straightforward prohibition can be enticing.\textsuperscript{458}

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\textsuperscript{455}anna –t-ta’ rīda lā tuntahaku bihī suqūfu –l-haybatī wa-l-lā yurtafa’u bihī satru –l-hīsmah. Ibid., 179.

\textsuperscript{456}Ragib goes on to give Quran 39:73 (az-Zumar) as an example of communication that has multiple aspects. The text with which he introduces the Quranic quote is not entirely clear. Al-ʿAǧamī has:

Straightforward communication has but a single aspect whereas oblique communication has a number of aspects, which in itself makes oblique communication more eloquent, and from this aspect [also] a great number of answers have been elided with regard to the necessary conditions for reward and punishment. For example, Quran 39:73… (annāhū laysa li-t-taṣrīḥi illā wağhun wāhidun wa-li-t-ta’ rīdi wugūhun fa-min hādā –l-waģhi yakūnu ablağun wa-min hādā –l-waģhi ḥudja aqığwibatun [/-tan?] kağrān [sic.] min aṣ-ṣurūṭi –l-muqaṭṭaṭiyat li-t-tawābī wa-l- uqābi nāhwi qawli –llāhi ta ṣalā…)

Ibid.

———. Ms. of aḏ-Ḍarīʿah ilā Makārim aṣ-Ṣarīʿah [The Path to the Nobilities]. Gedik 17308/1 (dated 1605), Aфyon Gedik Ahmet Paşa İl Halk Kütüphanesi, Milli Kütüphane-Ankara, Istanbul. f.48b.

\textsuperscript{457}anna li-t-ta’ rīdi ‘ibāratun muṭtalifatun fa-yumkīnu īrādūhā ūlā wağhīn maḥīlīfatun wa-lā yumkīnu īrādū –t-taṣrīhi illā ‘alā wağhīn wāhīdīn id laysa la-hū illā ‘ibāratun wāhīdah. ———, The Path to the Nobilities, 179.

\textsuperscript{458}anna šāriḥa –n-nahī dāʾīn ilā –l-iğrāq. Ragib then cites a popular saying, a line of poetry, and a prophetic Hadith that make the same point. Ibid.
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We have met the idea behind Ragib’s [1] already: scholars love thinking, and thinking is in and of itself a good thing. The extra thought that is required by language that is not straightforward is therefore also a good thing. In [3], complexity in the sense of multiple interpretative options is given a poetic stamp of approval: it is more effective as communication, or more eloquent. Ragib’s [4] is interesting because it appears to speak to *adab*, the process by which one learns the right things to say and the right times at which to say them. The multiple interpretations available in an oblique expression are particularly valuable because one can have a single quotation in one’s head with the potential to make it fit any number of situations. Straightforward language is less malleable to context and therefore less useful.

How can we tally these principles with Ragib’s oft-stated division of language into that which is clear and that which is unclear? As we have seen above, Ragib distinguished between clear and unclear language by defining polysemic language as unclear while clear language was made up of simple statements such as “thanks be to God” or “praise God”.<sup>459</sup> Now it seems that language that can be interpreted in more than one way is in fact more effective communication than simple straightforward language.

Ragib squares this circle with the analogy. The analogy (*al-maṭal*) is not simple language and it is not straightforward. In analogy, the basic correspondence between expression and idea that is enshrined in coinage by fiat is broken down and the expressions consequently become polysemic; they come to refer to a different set of ideas:

Should someone ask you ‘what is the use of switching to an analogy?’ You should reply: the analogy is the most noble form of expression because of the quality of the comparison,

syntactic composition, and brevity therein. With regard to ideas, it is the most noble because it denotes both that which is intended and that with which the intended meaning combines. Its reference is universal rather than partial, and it refers obliquely rather than straightforwardly. There is a subtlety in oblique communication, and it is the most noble level that speakers can attain.

The most important point here is that the analogy is powerful because it does two things at once. The expression refers to two ideas at the same time, and these two ideas are connected to each other. This is one example of what Ragib meant when he wrote in his ethics that the best communication has multiple aspects (in the quotation above this was [4]).

Ragib goes on to say that the analogy is the language used by the wise (al-ḥukamāʾ), that Arabic as a language is particularly replete with analogy, that only the elite are qualified to deconstruct and identify all the analogies, and that God honoured the community by revealing the Quran in language equally replete. Later on he gives the example of Quranic descriptions of paradise:

Generally, most of the circumstances of the day of resurrection are described in the Quran by way of analogy, for example Quran 47:15 (Muḥammad): ‘the maṭal of the paradise that

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460 In his poetics, which will be discussed in more detail in the subsequent chapter, Ragib deals with maṭal only briefly under the heading tamgil (making a maṭal), which is one of the types of brevity. Brevity occurs when there is more idea than expression, i.e. when an expression communicates a disproportionate amount of idea. ———. Innovative Figures of Speech. ff.16a-b. This was a standard understanding of tamgil in the ninth and tenth centuries, see: Wolfhart Heinrichs, "Early Ornate Prose and the Rhetorization of Poetry in Arabic Literature," in Literary and Philosophical Rhetoric in the Greek, Roman, Syriac and Arabic Worlds, ed. Frédérique Woerther (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 2009), 227-228; Qudāmah b. กา far, Naqd, 90. Wansbrough describes “the Quranic mathal [as] … primarily an extended simile” in his perceptive synchronic analysis of rhetoric and allegory in exegesis. John Wansbrough, Quranic Studies: sources and methods of scriptural interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977). 227-246, 239.

the pious are promised is that it has in it rivers of pure water’. This means that the analogy for paradise is a garden in which are rivers.\textsuperscript{462} 

Ragib uses analogy to deal with those verses in the Quran that describe God in anthropomorphic terminology and mention the things he does with his hands, or the throne on which he sits. Ragib takes what we might call a figurative approach to such verses. This is what we mean when we say that a piece of language is figurative, or that it should be taken figuratively rather than literally. Ragib writes that the words “God’s hands are outspread” in Quran 5:64 mean that God’s blessing is continuous, and not that God actually has hands.\textsuperscript{463} This is God “using comparison and \textit{isti’ārah} in the same way as the Bedouin Arabs did”.\textsuperscript{464}

The difference between the way we use the phrase “figurative” today and the way that Ragib understood the analogy is that today we might tend to assume that if something is figurative it is not real. For Ragib this was not the case: an analogy may involve manipulations of the relationship between expression and idea that was enshrined in coinage by fiat and recorded in the lexicon, and this manipulation may be described as a deviation from that literal meaning, but he is not making an ontological claim that everything God communicates through the analogy is unreal.

Instead, the reason that God used analogy is that the lexicon cannot cope with his divinity. Human beings use the expressions in circulation that have been fixed by coinage to a limited


number of ideas. At the time of the Quran’s revelation, these ideas had tended to be based on sensory experience, and it was therefore impossible for them to deal with the inconceivable divinity of, for example, paradise. This is why God turned to analogy. Descriptions of heaven and hell in the Quran are analogies and allusions that could be misconstrued if taken literally. Those who have been trained in rhetorical figures such as istiʿārah will not make this mistake.

There is a clear parallel between the way that Ragib explains the analogy and the way that he explains homonymy. Homonymy exists because there is an infinite amount of ideas and only a finite amount of expressions with which to describe them. Both God and humans deal with this mismatch by using expressions that communicate a disproportionate amount of ideas. These expressions are figurative, analogical, metaphorical, metonymic, and homonymous, and they refer to ranges of meaning. The analogy exists because sometimes God has no option but to use it to convey ideas the divine infinity of which is inaccessible to humanity. His language is therefore made up of expressions that speak to multiple and multifarious ideas.


466 wa-hāḏīhi kulluhā išārātun wa-tamṭilātun fa-lā tunāfī ... wa-hāḏā ẓāhirun li-man tadarraba minhu fi bābi –l-balāgāti wa-l-istiʿārāt. Ibid., 241-242.
4. Ragib’s Philosophy of Language in Practice

Ragib once wrote that there were three types of knowledge. Knowledge was connected to either expressions, or to expressions and ideas, or just to ideas. The knowledge that was connected to expressions dealt either with the the essences of expressions, in which case it was lexicography, or it dealt with their attributes (lawāḥiq), in which case it comprised etymology, syntax, morphology, prosody, and rhyme. Ideas remained necessary intermediaries (wasāʾīt) in all these cases. The type of knowledge that was connected to both expressions and ideas was knowledge of certain proofs, dialectics and debate, oratory, effective communication, and poetry. The knowledge that had to do with ideas alone was either theoretical, “in which the only aim is knowledge”, or practical, “in which it is necessary to know and then act”. Theoretical knowledge ranged from theology to physics and medicine via “knowledge of the reason and of the soul”, and practical knowledge ranged across ethics and religious ordinances.467

All but one of the four shibboleths of mediaeval Islamic intellectual culture that I will examine in this chapter (God’s attributes, compulsion and free will, poetics, and figurative

467 Paraphrase of:


———, The Path to the Nobilities, 169-170.
readings of the Quran) are, in this epistemology, connected to ideas alone. Only poetics is explicitly understood as knowledge of the interaction of expressions with ideas. However, it will become apparent in the sections that follow that even when Ragib is dealing with an “ideas only” topic, he uses linguistic analyses to explain it, in just the same way as he recognises that knowledge connected to expressions cannot be stripped of all connection to ideas. What is more, it will also become apparent that, just as in the epistemology paraphrased above, Ragib loves to return to the pairing of expression and idea in order to explain almost anything. Language, the force that connects expressions and ideas, is at the heart of everything.

**Compulsion and Free Will**

Compulsion and free will were already an established source of theological debate in the ninth century when Ibn Qutaybah discussed the questions of whether the adherents of these two doctrines were indeed referred to in Prophetic Hadith, and what they should be called. As tended to be the case, adherents were named by their opponents; those who believed in free will were called *al-qadarīyah*, while those who believed that God compelled all outcomes were called *al-ġabrīyah*. This despite the fact that both these words in Arabic mean almost the same thing: God’s predestination (*qadar*) or compulsion (*ġabr*). Ibn Qutaybah reported that it had consequently been suggested that “the *ġabrīyah* are the *qadarīyah*” but he then acerbically noted that were this to be the case then there would be no need for the name *ġabrīyah*, and furthermore

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468 I have addressed Ragib’s discussions of another shibboleth of mediaeval Islamic intellectual culture, Quranic inimitability (*iʿāẓ*), elsewhere: Key, "Language and Literature."

469 He concluded that while the Prophet did say “the *qadarīyah* are the Magians of this community…”, references to the *ġabrīyah*, *rāfidah*, *murgīʿah*, or *ḥawāriġ* came from early sources other than the Prophet. Abū Muḥammad ʿAbdallāh Ibn Qutaybah, *Ta wil Muḥtalīf al-Ḥadīt*, ed. Muḥammad Muḥyī ad-Dīn al-Āṣfar (Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islāmī, 1999). 136.
“names just fall into place and [the names of sects] only adhere to their adherents”\(^\text{470}\). By the time al-Ašʿārī was enumerating the various schools of thought in the mid-tenth century, the names had stuck.\(^\text{471}\)

The importance of the act of naming should come as no surprise, but there is a substantial theological and ethical issue at stake here. If God is all-powerful and aware of everything that has happened and will happen, then he must know what people are going to do. If this is the case, then how can humans have any free will to choose to obey or disobey him? If humans lack free will, then what are their motivations for following God’s instructions?

Ragib’s answer is that God compels humans to act as they do, but gives them the impression that they are acting of their own free will.\(^\text{472}\) He explains that the ǧabrīyah believe that humans are wholly incapable of those acts that they are preordained not to carry out, while the qadarīyah believe both that humans are capable of acts they are preordained not to carry out, and that those things could in fact happen despite God knowing they will not. Another group, known as the mufawwidah (having full power), believe that humans do what they want and obey orders, or not, as they choose. For Ragib, the correct position is to avoid both these extremes and say that “there is neither compulsion nor free will”.\(^\text{473}\)

\(^{470}\) _wa-qad yaḥmilu baʿdum –l-himyata ṣalā an yaqūla –l-ǧabrīyatu hum –l-qadarīyah ... wa-l-asmāʾu lā taqaʿu ǧayra mawāqiʿiʾihā wa-l-lā ṭalzamu illā ahlahā_. Ibid., 137.

\(^{471}\) al-Ašʿārī, _Maqālāt_, 430. Although the discussion about the counter-intuitive nature of the names was still going on: ———, _The Theology_, 74-75.

\(^{472}\) “God created man as compelled to act, [but] in the form of being free to choose” (_wa-ğaʾalāḥū muḫbaran fī ṣūʿaratin muḫayyar_). Ragib, _Quranic Glossary_, 184-185. Cf. ———, _On Creeds_, 28-29.

\(^{473}\) lā ǧabra wa-lā tafwīḍ. ———, _On Creeds_, 282.
In al-Ašʿārī’s heresiography, this phrase was understood as a Shia formulation, and Ragib’s contemporary al-Ābī (Abū Saʿd Maṇṣūr, d. 421/1030) attributes it to the Shia Imam Ǧaʿfar aṣ-Ṣādiq (Abū ʿAbdallāh b. Muḥammad Bāqir, sixth Imam of the Twelver Shia, d. 148/765). Nevertheless, Ragib justifies this formulation at length. There cannot be any compulsion because that would render irrelevant the reason, thought, and contemplation with which God endowed humans so that they could distinguish between real and false beliefs, true and untrue speech, and good and bad actions, and choose the real, the true, and the good in order to become his vicegerents on earth. “For God to create human reason, the most noble thing that exists, and then render it irrelevant would be repugnant”. Furthermore, if humans did not act then it would make no sense for their reason to query, as it does, the motivations for their actions.

Human reason therefore stands at the heart of Ragib’s beliefs about free will and predestination. Alongside it stand his belief in God’s wisdom, which can be trusted and is the guiding principle behind all preordained acts and events, and his belief that human passivity is

474 “A second group of the Shia (ar-rāfidah) claim that there is no compulsion, as al-Ǧahmī said (according to al-Ašʿārī: Ǧahm b. Ṣafwān, d. 128/745, see: al-Ašʿārī, Maqālāt, 279-280.), and no free will, as the Muʿtazilah said…” ibid., 41.

475 Al-Ābī reports that ʿAlī b. Mūsā ar-Riḍā (Abū al-Ḥasan, eighth Imam of the Twelver Shia, d. 203/818) was asked about the meaning of the statement of aʿfar aṣ-Ṣādiq that “there is no compulsion nor free will; [it should be] a matter between two matters” (lā ʿabra wa-lā tafwīḍa amrun bayna amrayn). ʿAlī ar-Riḍā replied: whoever claims that it is God who does our actions (anna ʿlā yaḥaṣa ala qaṭā’iʿa) and then punishes us for them has spoken according to the doctrine of compulsion. Whoever claims that God delegated the affair[s] of creation and blessing to his creation (anna ʿlā ṣafwāda amra-l-ḥalqi wa-r-riqi ilā ḥalqihi) has spoken according to the doctrine of free will (bi-t-tafwīḍ). The adherent of the doctrine of compulsion is an unbeliever (kāfir), and the adherent of the doctrine of free will is a polytheist (mušrik).

Upon being subsequently asked the nature of the correct middle position, ʿAlī ar-Riḍā said: “it is finding the path to doing what one is ordered and not doing what one is forbidden” (waqṣādu-s-salbī ilā ityāni mā umirū biḥi wa-turki mā nuḥuʿ ʿanhu). Abū Saʿd Maṇṣūr b. al-Ḥusayn al-Ābī, Naṭr ad-Durr, ed. Muḥammad ʿAlī Qurnah, ʿAlī Muḥammad al-Baḡawī, Ḥusayn Naṣṣār, Muḥammad Ibrāhīm ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān, and Sayyidah Ḥāmid ʿAbd al-ʿĀl, 8 vols. (Cairo: al-Ḥayʾah al-ʿĀmmah li-I-Kitāb, 1981-1991), 1:363-364. This formulation is also attributed to Ǧaʿfar aṣ-Ṣādiq in: aš-Sahrastānī, al-Milal wa-n-Nihal, 1:195.

476 …wa-qabīḥun an yū ida-l-lāhu taʿālā-l-ʿaqla-llaḏī huwa ašrafu mawḏūdīn ʿumma yabṭulu fāʾidatahū… Ragib, On Creeds, 282.
not an option. Ragib’s ethical principles do not allow him to countenance a human refusal to use reason to try and do the right thing, and he quotes the Quran: “humans will have nothing but that for which they strive”.

In the methodological introduction to his Exegesis, Ragib explains his beliefs about free will and predestination by deconstructing the language in which they are couched. In doing so, he addresses another critical dimension of the theological debate around compulsion and free will: the question of whether human actions are attributable to God, or to the human actors themselves. Ragib makes the argument that an expression denoting an action (fiʿl) can refer to two different actors (fāʿilān) according to different perspectives (naẓarān).

As is so often the case, the evidence is a line of poetry, which in this case most likely comes from the pre-Islamic period:

[Camels] given to us by our ancestor, by the god, and by the harsh chopping blow.

Ragib explains that the verb “given to us” has three agents: the first cause (God), the immediate cause (the blow), and the intermediary (the ancestor). All actions can be looked at in two ways. On the one hand the human being is the immediate actor (mubāšir), while on the other hand God is the first cause. Ragib argues that this duality is reflected in the Quran, which states in different

\[\text{Quran 53:39 (an-Naظلم): } wa-an laysa li-l-insāni illā mā saʿā. ]\]

477

Ibid., 282-283.

478


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The poet is Ḥazāz b. ʿAmr from the tribe of ʿAbd Manāf. According to the editors of both the Mubḥī and the Ḥamāsah, he is pre-Islamic and to be identified with Ḥarrān b. ʿAmr b. ʿAbd Manāh, who appears elsewhere in the Ḥamāsah. Abū Fath ʿUṭmān Ibn Ğinni, al-Mubḥī fī Tafsīr Asmāʾ ʿarāʾ al-Ḥamāsah, ed. Marwān al- Aṭīyah and ʿAbd as-Salām Muḥammad Hārūn, 4 vols. (Beirut: Dār al-Ǧil, 1991). 1017, 1671.
verses that on the one hand God, and on the other hand the angel of death, take souls when they die. Ragib also reads the Quranic reference to God’s assistance to the Muslims in their first major military victory in 2/624 as referring to a general truth about all human action: “you did not kill them, it was God that killed them, and when you threw [stones at them (according to the exegetical tradition)], you did not throw, but rather it was God that threw”. 480

Ragib’s conclusion is that God is the only real actor and everyone else is only an actor “by semantic extension”. 481 In other words, the fiat coinage connection between the expression “actor” and the idea of acting only remains fixed when it is God that is being described, and in all other cases the relationship between the expression and the idea behind is manipulated and extended. This can lead to ambiguity, for example when the ġabrīyah say “actor” and intend “immediate actor” (humans) while the qadarīyah say “actor” and mean “first cause” (God). 482

Having established the principle of semantic extension with regard to actions, Ragib goes on to claim that it had been an operative assumption throughout both the revelation itself and the work of the early generations of Muslim scholars. 483 Ragib’s claim is that everyone always shared the assumption that an expression denoting an action could refer to two different actors according to different perspectives, and that human actions could therefore remain human and be


attributable to God at the same time. This is why “there is neither compulsion nor free will”.

Compulsion requires that human actions are attributable to God alone, and free will requires that they are attributable only to humans. Ragib’s linguistic principle is a polysemic mean: the expression “act” refers to multiple agents, neither of which can be the sole agent. The connection by fiat coinage may be between the expression “agent” and the idea of God’s agency, but the subsequent connections by semantic extension between the expression “agent” and ideas of human agency are also fully linguistically operational.

Ragib ends the chapter with the observation that this principle applies whenever language confronts divinity. He writes that the early generations of Muslim scholars used the expression “thing” to describe both God and his creation, again “according to two different perspectives” (bi-nazarayni muhtalifayn). Furthermore, he remarks that this polysemic principle, in which one expression can refer to two different ideas according to perspective, is a fact of the language itself. This is because the Arabic verbal noun (al-maṣdar) can be used to refer to both an active

484 Ragib does not take us through this line of reasoning with the level of detail I have provided in these two sentences. Instead, he states the relevance of this chapter (titled “explanation of the aspects that determine a noun’s expression as an agent”, see note 478) to the question of free will and predestination in its first sentence (wa-huwa faṣlu takṭuru –š–subahu li-aqūlī wa-yata’allaqu bihī –l-farīqānī –l-mansūbān ilā –l-ṣabīlī wa-l-qadar), and explains later that the chapter erases the doubt that comes from thinking that actions are only attributable to either God or to humans, and not to both at the same time (wa-bi-tasawwuri ḥāḏā –l-ṣubahu finā yurā min –l-afʿali mansūbān ilā –l-lāhi taʿālā manfīyan ’an –l-ʿabdī wa-mansūbān ilā –l-lāhi tāratan manfīyan ’an –l-lāhi taʿālā). ———, "Methodological Introduction ed. Nāhī," 101, 103; ———, Methodological Introduction and Exegesis ed. Farḥāt, 63, 65.

485 The question of whether the word šayʾ could be used to describe God was indeed a subject of theological discussion, but I have been unable to find anyone making Ragib’s point about the maṣdar or polysemy (for which see page 159). See: al-Aṣ’arī, Maqālāt, 181; Faḥr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī, Maṣāḥīḥ, 1:123-125, 12:186-188; Ibn Fūrak, Maqālāt ed. as-Sayḥ, 43; Abū Manṣūr Muḥammad al-Māturīdī, Kitāb at-Tawḥīd, ed. Bekir Topaloğlu and Muhammed Aruçi (Istanbul / Beirut: İrşad Kitap Dağitim / Dār Sādir, 2001). 104-107. Al-Māturīdī, Ibn Fūrak, and Faḥr ad-Dīn agree with Ragib that šayʾ is a legitimate expression to use for God, and Faḥr ad-Dīn ascribes opposition to this position to Ghām b. Ṣafwān (d. 128/745), a historical figure who nevertheless often occupies an almost apocryphal role in theological discussions. Faḥr ad-Dīn also makes the pertinent observation that this is a theological debate on the level of expressions, not ideas: God is definitely a thing, the question is just whether or not to call him one (fa-haḏā nīzā ’uf miṣgarradi –l-lafzī lā fi-l-ma’nā). Faḥr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī, Maṣāḥīḥ, 1:125.
agent (al-fāʿīl) and a passive recipient (al-mafʿūl), and “conceiving of this actuality behind the expression ‘thing’ is something that reminds us that this language is from God”. Polysemy is not just an explanatory tool, or a linguistic assumption. It is a linguistic structure so productive and effective that it constitutes evidence of intelligent design.

Attributes

God’s attributes may well be the most important subject in Islamic theology. From at least the eighth century onwards, scholars had engaged in a prolonged dialectical attempt to understand what God was. Uniquely among the religions of the mediaeval Middle East, these Muslim scholars had a scripture that they believed was God’s actual word, right down to the vowels and the grammar, scarcely corrupted by its passage through mortal hands. Less uniquely, many of them developed a commitment to the interpretative and analytical power of their own reason, and thus one could easily read the history of Islamic theology as a long, multifarious interaction between reason and revelation. This is certainly true in the case of Ragib, as we will see below.

The fixed corpus of Islamic scripture was unable to answer all the questions about God that were posed over the centuries across a febrile theological landscape in which many of the key questions about the nature of God had already been asked, and answered, in other religious traditions (most notably Christianity, Neoplatonism, and combinations thereof). The Quran, and to a much lesser extent the Hadith, told believers that God knew, was powerful, sat on a

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487 See, for example, note 253.
throne, and had hands. The fact they these were God’s own words and not the words of humans describing him meant that Muslim scholars had to give the words substantial epistemological weight, regardless of where those scholars stood on the primacy of revelation or reason.

Harry Austryn Wolfson made the critically important point that the problem of the attributes is both ontological and semantic.\(^{488}\) It is ontological in the sense that scholars sought to understand the actual nature of God (physical or not) and whether the existence of, for example, God’s knowledge alongside him implied that he was made up of more than one thing. It is semantic in the sense that scholars sought to understand on the one hand how God could be both wholly unlike his creation and at the same time describe himself with words that he also used to describe them, and on the other hand how they themselves could then go on to describe God using the language they shared with him.\(^{489}\)

For Ragib, unsurprisingly, the problem was largely semantic. In his *Quranic Glossary*, he reads God’s Quranic phrase: “the lord of glory, above that which they describe” as being: “a warning that most of his attributes are not as they are believed to be by most people, and cannot be conceived of by way of analogy or comparison”.\(^{490}\) This admission of the limits of language, however polysemic, to deal with the ontological reality of God is reflected at the start of *On Creeds*, where the first two of the seven beliefs that define Sunni faith address the attributes. Ragib’s first principle of Sunni belief is that God is one, unlike anything else that exists, and all

\(^{488}\) Wolfson, *Philosophy*, 205.

\(^{489}\) Ibid., 207. My assertion that God and humanity shared the language does not come from Wolfson. See references at note 452.

\(^{490}\) *qawluḥu ʿazza wa-ḡalla rabbi –l-ʿizzati ʿammā yaṣifūn* [Quran 37:180 (aṣ-Ṣaffāt)] *tanbīhun ʿalā anna akṭara ṣifātihī laysa ʿalā ḥasabi mā ya taqiduhū katīrūn min -n-nāsi lam yutaṣawwar ʿanhu tamīlūn wa-tašbīhun wa-annaḥā yata ṣīlā mmā yaqaļū –l-kuffār*. Ragib, *Quranic Glossary*, 873. Only the final phrase (“and that God is above that which the unbelievers say” is the standard interpretation of the verse in the exegetical tradition. See, for example: aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Tafsīr*, 19:661.
that he shares with others are “some of his names, such as ‘knowing’ and ‘powerful’, with regard to the expression, not the idea’.\(^{491}\) Language is therefore the only thing that connects humanity to the divine and it does so only on the level of expressions. Second, Sunnis must:

believe that God is alive, knowing, powerful, hearing, seeing, and the other attributes for which there is precedent in the revelation and upon which the community agrees. Furthermore, that he has knowledge, power, and sight that cannot be apprehended by the senses. Sunnis must also abandon investigation into the idea behind his attributes unless that investigation was already carried out by our forefathers. They must not engage in theological discussions about whether descriptions of God are themselves eternal or temporal, whether they are God or something other than God, or not God and not something other than God, for that is all heresy and engagement with that which the Prophet’s Companions and the generation after them left aside; it is the blasphemy with regard to God’s names that God mentioned in the Quran: ‘throw off those who blaspheme with regard to his names’.\(^{492}\)

This position is consistent with Ragib’s tendency to disparage and caricature theological argumentation. However, later in the same work he will engage in a prolonged theological discussion of the problem of the attributes. How can we explain this apparent contradiction?

Perhaps the answer lies in Wolfson’s distinction between the ontological and semantic aspects of the problem, and Ragib’s intellectual distaste is in fact for ontological speculation about God’s

\(^{491}\) awwalan anna –illāha ʿazza wa-ğalla wāhidun lā yuṣbihuhū šayʿ’un min –l-mawgūdāti wa-lā yuṣārikuhū bi-wağhin illā fi baʿdi asmāʾihi lafaqan lā ma naḥwul ʿālimin wa-qādir. 491. \(^{492}\) The text reads:


———, On Creeds, 28. Cf. Ibid., 270.
attributes: the question of whether the attributes actually constitute part of God or are separate from him is heretical.

493 On the contrary, the semantic question about what God said and what humans can and should say about him is a valid one. Ragib engages with it in depth, and I will record his discussion of the attributes in detail because it shows how language lay at the centre of his understanding of perhaps the most important problem in Islamic theology. What follows is an explanatory and greatly abbreviated paraphrase of the discussion, including a number of direct quotations that are represented as such:

Ragib starts with an explanation of the concept of similarity (mumāgalah) in order to establish that there is no similarity between God and humanity. Bearing in mind that God shares nothing with any part of his creation, it is better for us not to refer to him with our ‘tongues of flesh’, in order to avoid describing him as having human characteristics.

494 The only reason we do so is because God, through the Prophet, mercifully permitted us to do so. There are two types of attributes: those that hold God aloof (munazzihah) and those that praise him (mumağgidah).

495 The attributes that hold God aloof can then be subdivided into those that do so through both expression and idea, and those that do so only through the idea. For example, while the Quranic verses ‘neither begetting nor begotten’ and ‘taken neither by light nor heavy sleep’ are made up of expressions that communicate ideas that describe God negatively, the idea of oneness (ahad) on its own denies any duality to God ‘even if the expression establishes it’. 496

493 Wolfson, although he had not read Ragib, agreed: “[n]o basis for this problem is to be found in the Koran. It originated under the influence of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity…”. Wolfson, Philosophy, 206.


495 Ibid., 75-76. I have not found this division of the attributes outside Ragib’s work. The more usual division at his time was between attributes of God’s essence (dāt) and attributes of his actions (afāl). See: al-Bāqillānī, al-Insāf, 25; Ibn Fūrak, Maqālāt ed. as-Sāyi, 48.

What Ragib is saying here is that there are cases in which the idea overrides the expression.

Some of the ideas behind the language of revelation are so central to the conception of God that they must be adhered to even if the revelation also contains expressions that contradict them. The Quran makes the ontological claim that God is one, and this overrides any semantic questions about how this claim is expressed.\(^{497}\)

Ragib continues with the argument that the attributes that hold God aloof are superior to those that praise him, in large part because human knowledge of God is necessarily so limited and imperfect that we can more accurately say what God is not than what he is. While attributes that praise God, on the other hand, inevitably associate him with descriptions that also apply to humans, and are consequently problematic. It is for this reason that the 112th Sura of the Quran, al-Îḥlāṣ, despite being only seventeen words long, is held to be equivalent to a third of the Quran. Its second two verses state negative attributes (‘neither begetting nor begotten, with none comparable to him’), and its first two verses (‘say: he is God the one, God the eternal source’), ‘while their form is positive, are in reality negative because oneness negates duality and multiplicity, and being an eternal source is a negation of any need for food, drink, limbs, and tools…’\(^{498}\) Precedent is the only reason that we use positive attributes that praise God. It is precedent that leads us to reject the position of some philosophers (ṣinfun min –l-falāsifah) that God should only be described negatively in order to avoid implying that God is composite or shares human characteristics. In fact, the philosophers themselves also use positive terminology to describe God, such as ‘the pure that-ness’ (an-annīyah al-maḥd) or ‘the true he-ness’ (al-huwīyah bi-l-ḥaqq),\(^{499}\) but in doing so fall into the trap of positive description, and then by adding qualifiers to those descriptions they fall into the trap of polytheism.

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\(^{497}\) Cf. the discussion of figurative readings below (from lafẓ to ma’nā versus from ma’nā to lafẓ) at page 191.


\(^{499}\) For a discussion of these terms, see: Toby Mayer, "Anniyya," in Encyclopaedia of Islam, THREE, ed. Gudrun
The Mu'tazilah claimed that God could be described with any word that made sense according to human understanding, whereas the traditionists (ahl al-atār) maintained that precedent was the only source that could legitimate a description, and that the precedent had to be either certain [with regard to its historical accuracy], or agreed upon by the community. These traditionists were aware that the names enumerated in divine precedent were accidents of quantity, quality, time, and place that if they had been arrived at independently by human reason would have led to false equations between God and humanity. Human reasoning was problematic, because even in the case of specialists (ahl al-ḥaqā'iq) it could lead to well-motivated false attribution of good human qualities to God (tašbīh), or conversely false denial of qualities that are enshrined in revelation (taʿṭīl).

Attributes that praise God can be divided into those that come in pairs, such as ‘the first and the last’, and those that come singly and often at the end of Quranic verses, such as ‘the wise’, or ‘the knowing’. They can also be divided into names (ism) and descriptions (waṣf), although all agree that ‘God’ is the only name, while the rest are descriptions. Attributes can be restricted, such as ‘God is the light of the heavens and earth’, which does not mean that God is just ‘the light’, or they can be reliant on accompanying expressions for context, such as ‘they plotted, and we plotted’, which does not mean that

Krämer, Denis Matringe, John Nawas, and Everett Rowson (Brill Online: Brill, 2011).

500 This is an accurate epitome of the Mu'tazīlī position. See, for example, al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Ḡabbār, who maintains that God can be described with those descriptions to which he is indeed entitled. Peters, God's created speech, 152-153, 250f; al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Ḡabbār, al-Muğní, 7:53, 7:117.

501 Ragib, On Creeds, 80. These specialists (ahl al-ḥaqā'iq) are ill-defined. It often appears that Ragib understands the ḥaqā'iq to be the accurate connections drawn between expressions and ideas, but in the absence of textual evidence this can only remain an inference. Ragib does, however, place the ḥaqā'iq alongside the disciplines of divinely-provided knowledge (ʿulūm al-mawhabah) that the highest levels of humanity can access. ——, "On the Ordering of Intellectual Disciplines and of Worldly Actions," 220, 222. Cf. page 87.

502 Quran 57:3: huwa –l-awwalu wa-l-āḥīru wa-z-zāhīru wa-l-bāṭinu wa-huwa bi-kulli šay’in ʿalīm. Ragib returns to this point in more detail in what follows. He notes that theologians analyse God as being the first and last in terms of him existing before anything else, and after everything has gone (this is an accurate representation of the position of, for example: Ibn Fūrak, Maqālāt ed. as-Sāyiḥ, 44.) Ragib raises the question of whether this reading implies that at the current time (i.e. neither before nor after) the verse is false, because creation is here and so is God. Ragib then answers this potential objection by clarifying that God simply intended (qaṣada) to highlight the amazing nature of his attributes and the fact that he is the source of all creation. Ragib, On Creeds, 90.

503 This topic was in fact the subject of more debate than Ragib implies. See, for example: Peters, God's created speech, 251.

God is an inveterate plotter. Attributes can also be divided into those specific to God, such as ‘the merciful’, and homonymous attributes that God shares with others, which refer to quantity, quality, adjunction, time, ownership, emotion, and place.

Next, Ragib expands on the difference between names and descriptions, and this leads him into discussion of the nature of name (ism), attribute (ṣifah), and description (waṣf):

‘The name is an expression (lafẓah) that acts as a sign for an essence in order that listeners understand what they have heard. The attribute expresses (ʿibārah ‘an) a state that the essence is in. The description is what the describer says when he says something is such-and-such. Furthermore, the expression (lafẓ) ‘attribute’ can be used in the place of ‘description’ and vice versa, as happens with measure, weight, number, and time. The fiat coiange of ‘name’ is more general than that of ‘attribute’ because every attribute can be called a name, whereas not every name can be called an attribute.’

Names are either proper names, or not. The proper name (al-ʿalam) is that which is not considered to have an idea behind it, but rather it is just a sign. For example, one does not

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505 Quran 27:50 (an-Naml): wa-makarū makran wa-makarnā makran. This verse is part of the narrative in which God sends the prophet Ṣāliḥ to the people of āmūd.

506 mā yaddillu ʿalā iḍāfatin naḥwu –l-mawğūd. The implication here appears to be that some attributes, such as existence, can be added or adjoined to God without the result being polytheism. Ragib, On Creeds, 82.

507 This is a critical departure from the Ašʿarī position of al-Bāqillānī, who makes a distinction between the ontological ṣifah, which is a “real existent residing in God”, and the semantic waṣf, which is a speech act. For Ragib, ṣifah is not an ontological fact but an expression of one, that itself is made up of an expression (lafz) and an idea (ma’nā). This is made clear by Ragib’s reference in the next sentence to lafẓatu-ṣ-ṣifati (see note 509 below). Abū Bakr Muhammad b. ʿat-Tayyib al-Bāqillānī, Tamhīd al-Awāʾil fī Taliṣad-Dalāʾ il, ed. Imād ad-Dīn Ahmad Haydar (Beirut: Muʿassasat al-Kutub aṯ-Ṭaqāfiyah, 1987). 247, 250; Claude Gilliot, "Attributes of God," in Encyclopaedia of Islam THREE, ed. Gudrun Krämer, Denis Matringe, John Nawas, and Everett Rowson (Brill Online: Brill, 2011).

508 Another Ašʿarī, Ibn Fūrak, contradicts al-Bāqillānī (see note 507) and makes the same point as Ragib, writing that al-Ašʿarī had said that there was no difference between the words ṣifah and waṣf. Ibn Fūrak also uses some of the same examples as Ragib (measure, weight, number, time). Ibn Fūrak, Maqālāt ed. as-Sāyiḥ, 38.

think of an idea of ‘increase’ (az-ziyādah) when one hears the name ‘Zayd’, rather one thinks of the person Zayd.\footnote{alamun wa-huwa –llaḏī lā ṭabaru fihi ma’nan wa-innamā yaqrī maqrā –l-išārati ilayhi ka-Zaydin –llaḏī lā yurā ḍī fihi ma’nā –z-ziyādah. Ibid.}

Names other than proper names are either derived (muštaqq) from other words that share a connecting idea, or not. Non-derived names are all those which are coined by fiat for a specific idea.\footnote{wa-gayru muštaqqin kullu –smin wuḍiʿa fī aṣli –luġati li-nawʿin mā min ġayri –ʿtibāri maʿnan fihi huwa maw ūdun fī ġayrihī. Ibid., 84.}

There are two sorts of attributes. Firstly, those that ‘express an idea that subsists in the essence of the thing described, such as black and moving’.\footnote{mā huwa ʿibāratun ʿan ma’nan yaqūmu bi-ḏāti –l-mawsūfi ka-l-aswadi wa-l-mutaḥarrik. ———. On Creeds, 84.} When this type of attribute is used to describe two things it requires that they actually do share something. This first type can be either essential, such as heat in fire, or it can be accidental, such as heat in water. The second type of attribute “expresses an idea that does not subsist in the essence of the thing described, but is rather applied to it because of a relationship between it and something else’.\footnote{mā huwa ʿibāratun ʿan ma’nan lā yaqūmu bi-ḏātiḥī bal yuṭlaqu ṭalayhi li- ʿalāqatin baynihī wa-bayna ḍālika. Ibid.}

For example ‘king of the house’ is a phrase in which the relationship

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between an actual king and the king of a house is not one where something is actually shared between their two separate essences.

When Ragib argues for a distinction between attributes that do not imply real ontological connections and those that do, he is clearly thinking about God. He wants to imply that the relationship between God and knowing in “God is knowing” is not the same as the relationship between “the stone” and “black” in “the stone is black”. Instead God is knowing in the same way as the castle in ‘an Englishman’s home is his castle’ is a real castle with crenellations and a drawbridge.

In the immediately preceding discussion about the nature of names and attributes, Ragib makes some interesting points about linguistic structure and the way in which it relates to the external physical world. Proper names are expressions that directly indicate external physical referents, not ideas. This is a reiteration, using different terminology, of his argument in his manual of poetics, where he says that language is either a proper name or it is polysemous. We can now refine this as follows: language is either a connection between an expression and the ideas shared between people’s minds, in which case it is inevitably polysemous, or it is a proper name that connects an expression directly to an external physical referent.

Next, Ragib undertakes a brief heresiographical review of those attributes that are said to be connected to God’s essence, without mentioning names of schools or scholars.

The first school of thought holds that ‘God is alive, powerful, and knowing, with a knowledge, power, and eternal life, and that these ideas subsist and exist for him in his

\[514\] See page 115.
essence, thereby making him alive, powerful, and knowing.\footnote{\text{515}} This is an Ašʿarī position,\footnote{\text{516}} and Ragib’s objection to it is that it implies God is a composite.

The second position is also Muʿtazilī,\footnote{\text{517}} and holds that God does not have these attributes but that they are rather states (\textit{aḥwāl}) to which he is entitled, which should not be described as eternal, or as things. Ragib’s objection here is that although the first school of thought was incorrect and implied polytheism, it did at least make sense whereas this second school of thought is incomprehensible.\footnote{\text{518}}

The third position maintains that God is, for example, knowing with a knowledge in his essence, and that his essence is able to be the two things at the same time. Ragib allows that this might be the case, but notes that it does open the door for a perception of God as composite.

The fourth position is that God is, for example, knowing, but does not have knowledge,\footnote{\text{519}} and that the idea behind the name ‘knowing’ is the same whether it is used for God or humans. Ragib objects both to the sharing of an idea between God and humans, and to ‘the invention of names, the referents of which it is impossible to know through the lexicon’.\footnote{\text{520}}

The fifth position is that of the traditionists (\textit{ahl al-ṣaḥṣar}), who maintain that God has these attributes, can be described with them, but there is no connection between the idea behind

\begin{itemize}
\item\footnote{\text{515}} \textit{anna līlāha taʿəlā ḥayyun qādirun ʿālimun bi-ʿilmin wa-qudratīn wa-ḥayātīn qadīmatīn wa-anna hādīhī l-maʾānī qāʿimatūn bi-ḏātihī mawḡūdatūn laḥū wa-bi-hā ẓāra ḥayyan ʿāliman wa-qādiran}. Ragib, \textit{On Creeds}, 86.
\item\footnote{\text{516}} Ibn Fūrak, \textit{Maqālāt ed. as-Sāyiḥ}, 39. However, al-Ašʿarī also attributes an anaologous position to the Muʿtazilī Abū Huḍayl (Muḥammad b. al-Huḍayl al-ʿAbdī, d. ca. 227/842). al-Ašʿarī, \textit{Maqālāt}, 165, 188; Peters, \textit{God's created speech}, 251.
\item\footnote{\text{517}} It is attributed to Abū Hāsim al-Ṣubbāṭ. See: \textit{———}, \textit{God's created speech}, 252-253.
\item\footnote{\text{518}} Ragib’s objection is to the doctrine that God does not have these attributes (\textit{maḏhabu man lā yaḥbutu lahū ʿilman wa-qudratīn wa-ḥayātīn}) rather than the doctrine of states (\textit{aḥwāl}), Ragib having previously stated that the attributes do express God’s states (\textit{wa-ṣṣifatū ʿibāratū ḥālin min aḥwālī qādirūn}). Ragib, \textit{On Creeds}, 83, 86.
\item\footnote{\text{519}} Up to this point, this is the position that al-Ašʿarī attributes to “most of the Muʿtazilah” and a number of other sects. al-Ašʿarī, \textit{Maqālāt}, 164.
\item\footnote{\text{520}} \textit{maʿa ʿḥtirāʾi asəmin lā sabīla ilā l-wwqūfī ʿalā madīlūlāthīhā min ḥayyī ʿl-ṣūbah}. The implication here is that the idea of a “knowledge” that humans and God share is not in the lexicon. All that the lexicon can provide is explanations of the “knowledge” that humans have, in addition to negative explanations of how God’s knowledge is, for example, \textit{not} limited. Ragib, \textit{On Creeds}, 87.
\end{itemize}
them when applied to him, and the idea behind them when applied to humans. If these names are applied to humans, then they communicate a specific form (hay’ah) that involves (in the case of ‘knowing’) something being known, or (in the case of ‘doing’) some action being taken. On the contrary, when these names are applied to God they communicate absolute negatives: there is nothing that he does not know, and there is nothing that he cannot do. The expression ‘knowing’ is therefore effectively two expressions, one for humans and one for God. The expression for humans admits negatives and context, such as ‘he does not know that’, or ‘he can do that in such a place’. The expression for God admits neither negatives nor any limitation.

Expressions of praise and blame have levels, and God is of course at the very highest level of the expressions of praise. This is why people have said that these expressions are literal when applied to God and nonliteral when applied to humans. God is the one who is most entitled to be described with these words. The is the same dynamic as applies when humans are described as truly human only when they fulfill their ethical promise, otherwise they are described as donkeys or cows.521

It is interesting that none of the five positions that Ragib lays out match the famous doctrine maintained by al-Ašʿarī: that God is knowing with a knowledge, but that knowledge cannot be God.522 The closest Ragib’s brief heresiography comes to this is the third position, which shares al-Ašʿarī’s formulation that God is knowing with a knowledge in his essence, but lacks his consequent statement that it is impossible for this knowledge to be God. Instead, we get Ragib’s phrase “and that his essence is able to be the two things at the same time”, which can be read as a positive rendering of al-Ašʿarī’s (and Ibn Kullāb’s)523 negative statements. Ragib is, in effect,

521 Ibid., 88-89. Ragib makes this same point in his ethical works, see: ———, Analysis of the Two Creations, 26-28 (introduction).

522 ṣaḥḥa annahū ‘ālimun bi-‘ilmīn yastaḥīlu an yakūna huwa nafsuhū. al-Ašʿarī, The Theology, 14.

523 Ragib’s third position also lacked the related statement of Ibn Kullāb, who also said that God is knowing with a knowledge in his essence, but went on to say that “God’s attributes belong to his essence and subsist in him, but are not him, nor anything other than him, and they do not have attributes of their own”. ———, Maqālāt, 169.
arguing that if theologians want to say that God’s attributes are in God’s essence but are not God, then they must mean that his essence can be two things at once.

It is therefore clear that Ragib is conscious of the ontological aspect of the problem of the attributes, and indeed his criticism of the first three positions is that they imply God is ontologically composite. However, both his argumentation throughout the long passage on the attributes, and the fifth position to which he adheres, have a semantic aspect. He writes that both of the two main concepts in question (name and attribute) are aspects of the relationship between language and essence: expressions that act as signs for essences, and expressions of the states of essences. This assumption that language is inextricably part of the problem was not shared by the Ašā‘irah and Muʿtazilah, who argued about the ontological relationship between God’s essence and his attributes, not about the relationship between language and essences.

For Ragib, God’s attributes are linguistic structures that God used to describe himself in his revelation, and that humans can consequently use to describe him. These linguistic structures are made up of expressions that refer to ideas. The ideas are then ideas of ontological entities, such as God himself, or a human being. Ragib’s answer to the problem of the attributes uses this model to describe a situation in which each expression can refer to two different ideas. One idea is made up of negative associations and is of God, while the other idea is made up of positive associations and is of humans. Therefore the expression “knowing” can either refer to the idea of God not being ignorant of anything, or it can refer to the idea of Zayd knowing ʿAmr is at home (but possibly not knowing in which room).

This model enables us to contribute to an interpretative problem highlighted by Heinrichs. An-Nāšiʿ al-Akbar (Abū al-ʿAbbās, d. 293/906) was reported to have written that the attributes
apply to God literally (fī-l-ḥaqīqah) and to anyone else non-literally (fī-l-maḡāz).\footnote{524} Ragib proposed the same distinction, albeit with different reasoning. For an-Nāṣī’, the literal or non-literal binary was the only way in which the difference between attributes applied to God and attributes applied to humans could be described. He is reported to have written that names can apply to two different external physical referents (al-musammā) for four different reasons: either there is a similarity (ištibāh) in their essences; or a similarity in some quality of their essences (li-ṣṭibāḥi mā -ḥtamalathu –d-ḏātayn) such as “colour” or “movement”; or they share a necessary quality, the absence of which means they cease to be what they are, such as “sensible” or “created” (li-mudāfīn udīfa ilayhi wa-muyyīzā minhu lawlāhu mā kānā ka-ḏālika); or they apply to one literally and to the other non-literally. When it comes to the attributes, God, and humanity, there can be no sharing or similarity of essences or qualities, and the literal/non-literal binary is therefore the only option. Ragib, on the other hand, explained the applicability of the literal/non-literal binary to the problem of the attributes in terms of the breadth of semantic field available in any idea: there are always degrees of a quality, God is always at the highest degree, and God is therefore more entitled to be connected to the name by fiat coinage (i.e. literally) than anyone else.\footnote{525}

Heinrichs raises the question of whether an-Nāṣī’’s use of “literally” (fī-l-ḥaqīqah) is a claim about the real nature of an external physical reality, or a claim about the nature of the

\footnote{524} Or bi-l-ḥaqīqah and bi-l-maḡāz. ibid., 184-185, 500-501; Heinrichs, “The Ḥaqīqa-Majāz Dichotomy,” 136-137; Vishanoff, Islamic Hermeneutics, 22.

\footnote{525} al-Aš’arī, Maqālāt, 184-185, 500-501; Ragib, On Creeds, 88-90. There is, of course, a degree of circularity in Ragib’s argument: the determining factor in what is coined by fiat is of course the fiat coiner himself – God. See also notes 214 and 521 for Ragib’s other uses of the literal/non-literal binary.
linguistic description of that reality. Looked at in light of the greater detail about linguistic structures available in Ragib’s work it would appear to be both. An-Nāši’’s basic linguistic structure is one in which words (names, al-ism) refer to external physical reality (al-musammā) and the ways in which they do so are determined by the identity of that external physical reality. In Ragib’s more nuanced model, expressions refer to ideas in the mind, and the mind is sensitive to ontological problems. The language user therefore decides to which ideas the expressions refer based on ontological considerations. In the work of both scholars, separated by approximately 100 years, the dynamic is neither purely semantic nor purely ontological. It is rather a dynamic in which semantic decisions are made on the basis of ontological considerations.

Poetics

Poetry was central to mediaeval Islamicate intellectual culture. It was both a source of linguistic precedent and an arena for innovation. By the eleventh century, for a scholar such as Ragib who may have lived his whole life in Iranian towns and villages where Persian was the most common spoken language, and for whom the Prophet and his companions were as chronologically distant as the Spanish Armada and the founding of New York and Boston are to us today, poetry was a living link to pre-Islamic Arabia. Ragib was familiar with the same poetic culture that Muḥammad grew up with in the seventh century, and he was also an active part of a development of poetic criticism that had been gathering momentum and complexity ever since the, possibly apocryphal, poetic competitions in the pre-Islamic Ḥiḡāz.

One thread of the discussions about poetics is particularly relevant to this dissertation. It is the distinction often made between analysis of poetry in terms of its expressions, and analysis of

526 Heinrichs, "The Haqīqa-Majāz Dichotomy," 137.
poetry in terms of its ideas. As with many other of the apparently clear-cut distinctions that were popular with mediaeval scholars engaged in the process of writing, and indeed imagining, the history of poetic criticism, this binary is somewhat less of a chasm than it seems. Apart from a few oft-quoted claims that poetic expressions were the site of genius while poetic ideas were simply repetitions of what the man in the market was thinking, the majority of scholars


528 Abū ʿUṯmān Ḍāḥaṣ (d. 255/868) is most often quoted. He cited the opinion that ideas were merely strewn in the street and accessible to the masses and foreigners whereas expressions were the true site of eloquence and linguistic skill. al-Ǧāḥiẓ, al-Hayawān, 3:131-132. ʿIḥsān ʿAbbās argued that when al-Ǧāḥiẓ talked about ideas being strewn in the street he was only referring to simple ideas. ʿAbbās was using al-Ǧurgānī’s division of ideas into simple ones like those behind “Zayd left” and the more complex ideas created by metaphor and metonymy such as “the reins of the northwind”. ‘Abbās, Tārīḥ an-Naqḍ, 423-424. Elsewhere, al-Ǧāḥiẓ made the authorial statement that Abū Ḍāḥaṣ al-ʿAttābī (d. ca. 835) was mistaken to say that command of language was simply making one’s interlocuter understand one’s need, because flawed grammar and pronunciation (failures of expression) that nevertheless successfully communicates an idea could not be good language. al-Ǧāḥiẓ, al-Bayān wa-t-Tabyīn, 1:161. The ʿIḥwān as-Ṣafā’, elitists to a man, agreed that the common man’s mind could scarcely be a repository of language excellence, and therefore good language must be a matter of good expression. They did, however, have a somewhat more elevated concept of what the ideas could be, hinting that sometimes great and true ideas (such as their own) could fall on stony ground. Their definition of effective communication was “the clearest and most concise communication of an idea” (wa-lnnāmā –l-balāğatu hiya –t-tawaṣṣulu ilā ʿifhāmi –l-maʾnā bi-awḡāzi maqālin wa-ablaġi kalām). ʿIḥwān as-Ṣafā’, Rasāʾil il, Beirut, 3:121-122.
believed that poetry involved both expressions and ideas, although they differed on which were most important.

Ragib’s theory of meaning, as described in the previous chapter, favours neither side. Language, and therefore poetry, is a matter of the connections that people make between expressions and ideas. Poetics, as we shall see below, is the study of how these connections are made, and how they differ according to the different rhetorical figures employed. Ragib also makes this position clear at two points in his adab compendium. In one anecdote a Bedouin praises a man by saying that it was “as if his expressions were the moulds of his ideas”, and in another, a poet says “his ideas adorn his expressions, and his expressions are the adornments of

529 Abū al-Fāth ʿUṭmān Ibn Ǧīnī (d. 392/1002) wrote, in a rejection of the apparently still prevalent argument that the early masters of poetry were only concerned with expressions, that the only reason one focuses on expressions is in order to make sure that one’s ideas are getting across (fā-ḥlā ṭarayānna anna –l-ʾināyata ʿid dāka innamā ḥiyya bi-l-alfāżī bal ḥiyya ḥidmatun minhum li-l-maʾāni). Ibn Ǧīnī, al-Ḥaṣaʾiṣ, 215-217, 217. Cf. A. Elamrani-Jamal, Logique Aristotélicienne et grammaire arabe. Étude et documents (Paris: J. Vrin, 1983). 102. Unsurprisingly, given the nature of adab, al-ʿGāḥīz provides an anecdote that points in this direction as well. He records that Biṣr b. al-Mu tamir (Abū Sahl al-Ḥilālī, d. ca. 210/825) defined effective communication (al-balāḡah) as that in which the expressions are refined and sweet but the idea is commonly known and appropriate to one’s audience, whether that audience is the elite or the masses. An idea is not necessarily more noble because it is an elite idea, nor baser because it circulates among the masses, but rather the value of an idea lies in its linguistic correctness, its usefulness, and its appropriateness to the situation in which it is used. al-Ǧāḥīz, al-Bayān wa-t-Tabyīn, 1:135-136. Cf. Thomas, "Concept of Muhādara," 112-115.

530 Ibn Raʾšiq (Abū ʿAlī Ḥasan al-Qayrawānī, d. ca. 456/1063) describes the different schools of thought on the matter in terms of the choice that poets themselves made, when composing, to either privilege the eloquence of their expressions or the quality of their ideas and motifs (presumably when faced with the need to make a choice to fit the metre). Ibn Raʾšiq al-Qayrawānī, al-ʿUmdah fī Mahāsīn aš-Šīʿr wa-ʿĀdāhiḥī, ed. Muhammad Muḥyī ad-Dīn ʿAbd al-Ḥamād, 2 in 1 vols. (Cairo: Matbaʿ āṭ Hīḡāzī, 1934). 1:103f (chapter 19). At the end of the eleventh century al-Ǧūrgānī expressed his impatience with over-emphasis on expressions, writing that “the expressions are the servants of the ideas; the ideas decide how the expressions can circulate” (al-alfāẓu ḥidamū –l-māʿūnī wa-l-muṣarrafātu fī ʿuḥmāniḥā). ʿAbd al-Qāhir b. ʿAbd ar-Rahmān al-Ǧūrgānī, Asrār al-Balāḡah: the mysteries of eloquence, ed. Helmut Ritter (İstanbul: Government Press, 1954). 8. This exact point would be repeated by Ǧīyāḍ ad-Dīn Ibn al-Aḍīr (Abū al-Fāth Naṣrallāḥ, 558/1163-637/1239), who wrote that “expressions are the servants of the ideas, and there is no doubt that the one served is more noble than the servant”. Ǧāṣīṭī, "Al-ʿAlaqaḥ Bayn al-Lafẓ wa-l-Maʾnā," 190. Quoting Ibn al-Aḍīr’s al-Maṭal as-Sāʿir fī Adab al-Kāṭib wa-s-Sāʿir. Edited by ʿAbd al-Ḥawfī and Badawī Ṭabānah. Cairo: Maktabat Naḥḍat Misr, 1960. 1:240, 249.
his ideas”. The two central components of linguistic structure appear to interact on an equal basis.

Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, the controversy about the primacy of expressions versus ideas helps us understand what ideas were thought to be. The criticism of ideas strewn in the street for the masses that we find reported in al-Ǧāḥīẓ (Abū ʿUṯmān ʿAmr b. Bahr, d. 255/868) and believed in by the Iḫwān reinforces the notion that ideas were an entity that could be shared between language users. Ideas had an ontological status, albeit a non-physical one. They were part of an objective shared reality. Ideas could also therefore be anything from the idea behind the simplest of nouns, shared by all, to the complex motif behind a line of poetry, equally accessible to poets and their audiences.

The title on our only manuscript of Ragib’s manual of poetics is Ragib on Innovative Figures of Speech (Kitāb min Kalām ar-Rāġib fī-l-Badīʾ). While it may not be the author’s own title, it is appropriate for a work in the introduction to which Ragib says: “this book contains the methodologies of the arts of innovation in prose and poetry” (wa qad intahaytu fī-mā amlaytu ṭuruqa funūni –l-badīʾ i min an-naẓmi wa-n-naṭrī). The manual contains a taxonomy of rhetorical figures, the “methodologies and arts” to which Ragib refers. He wrote that he

531 madaḥa a rāḥīyun raǧūlun fa-qāla ka-anna alfūzahū qawālību li-ma ’nūhi. qāla –š–šā’ iru [min al-mutaqārib] tazīnu ma ’ānihi alfūzahū / wa-alfūzuhū zā ’inātu –l-maʾānī. Ragib, Littérates’ Ripostes, 1:125. (See also note 558). Ragib’s adab compendium tends to organise anecdotes on the mahāsin/masāwī (good things/bad things) model, in which praise of something is always juxtaposed with its blame and vice versa. The section titled “an expression helping an idea to be good” (lafẓun sā’ ada –l-ma’ nā fi-l-ğūd) consists in its entirety of just the two items quoted above, and is not complemented by a contradictory neighbouring section. This makes it likely that it reflects Ragib’s own opinion, though he makes no reference to the scholarly controversy itself.

532 NB: at the end of the eleventh century, Ibn Rašīq would draw a distinction between “the crafted poetic idea” (ma’ nā as-ṣan’ ah) achieved by rhetorical figures, and the normal “idea of speech”, which is the “spirit” (rūḥ) behind every expression. Ragib never makes such a distinction. Ibn Rašīq al-Quyrawānī, al-ʿUmdah, 1:111 (chapter 20). Cf. Heinrichs, lafẓ and ma’ nā, 462.

533 See details at pages 53 and 259.

534 Ragib. Innovative Figures of Speech. f.2b.
enumerated these techniques in order to enable the reader to engage in criticism, distinguish between good and bad poetry, and compose good poetry. Where does innovation come in? I have argued in the previous chapter that Ragib’s understanding of the relationship of language to the lexicon was such that poetry would inevitably involve the creation of new connections between expressions and ideas. His manual of poetics is an explanation of how this happens. Good poetry, and indeed good prose, is characterised by successful manipulation of the relationships between expressions and ideas. Ragib’s manual records, classifies, and analyses these manipulations, and in the last (incomplete) chapter on literary plagiarism (as-sariqāt) he seeks to determine their originality and the dynamics of their transmission.

The nature of poetry is that someone always uses connects an an idea to an expression for the first time, and then others either copy, or respond with variations that are subsequently assessed as good or bad. The term for innovation was badīʿ. I prefer this translation to reading badīʿ as a specific reference to the new style of the muḥda ūn (poets from the eighth-century onwards), or to a specific craft or collection of rhetorical artifices. Ragib wrote in The Path to

535 After the ḥamdallah, Ragib starts:
You asked me, may God continue to bless you, to dictate something that could act as a signpost in the field of poetic criticism, and that would distinguish between the worthless and the choice. Whoever comes to recite and criticise poetry, even if he already knows most of its lexicographical, Arabic, historical, and analogical apparatus etc., and even if he has a natural inclination towards the best poetry, nevertheless he must have the tools of criticism to the extent that he guide and help him with that which he composes and criticises.

536 It is true that the most prominent early work that deals explicitly with bāḍīʿ, the Kitāb al-Bāḍīʿ of Ibn al-Muʿtazz, gives the impression that it is a defined craft rather than a description. The caliph and critic writes that “we present in the chapters of this our book the part of what the muḥda ūn call al-bāḍīʿ … Baššār, Muslim, Abū Nuwās and those who followed them were not the first to achieve this craft… (lam yusbiqū ilā hāḏā –l-fanni). ‘Abdallāh Ibn al-Muʿtazz, ed. Ignatius Kratchkovsky (London: E. J. W. Gibb Memorial, 1935). 1. It is also true
the Nobilities that *ibdā‘* meant ex nihilo creation, and that while it was strictly only something that God could do, the Bedouin Arabs had used it to describe someone who dug a fresh well in a previously untapped area, and someone “who composed poetry or produced speech that had never been composed in that way before”. I think that for Ragib and many of his contemporaries the term *badī‘* primarily served to isolate and recognise innovation. It may in fact be unproductive to draw a distinction between a “specific collection of rhetorical artifices” and “innovation” because the poets were innovative *with* rhetorical figures, which were then enumerated and collectively called “innovative”. For Ibn Rašīq (Abū ’Alī Ḥasan al-Qayrawānī, d. ca. 456/1063), “producing something *badī‘* means that the poet comes forth with an idea which is considered a novelty the like of which has never been habitual”.


537 al-*ibdā‘* u wa-huwa ḏu‘dū wa-s-say‘i du‘’atan lā ’an mawghūdīn wa-lā tartībūn wa-lā ’an naqsīn ilā kamālīn wala‘ysa ḏālika illā li-l-bārī ta’ ilā wa-in kānāt –l-‘arabu qad tasta’milū –l-ibdā‘ a fīman yahfiru bī ‘rān fī màkānīn lam yahfir fiḥi min qablu wa-fīman nasa‘a ši’ ran aw awrādā kālāmān lam yansīg ‘alā minwālihī min qabl. Ragib, *The Path to the Nobilities*, 293.

538 Cf. “[T]he second prerequisite for the rise of *muhdat* poetry is a craving for innovation on the part of the poet as well as his audience” Heinrichs, "Paired Metaphors," 2.

539 See Heinrichs on “the rhetorization of poetry”. ———, "Early Ornate Prose," 229.

In *The Confluence of Eloquence* Ragib has a subsection on *kalām bādīʾ* in which he gives a series of apposite descriptions for people who invent original speech. One such description is “virgin speech”. Further descriptions are themselves in verse:

if he speaks, his speech is ungirdled by offspring.

And:

too pure for the secret plagiarism, too honourable for the repeated idea.

In his *Littérature’s Ripostes* section on the description of clouds tinged with colour that create good pasturage Ragib quotes a line of Imruʾ al-Qays:

continuously raining in large drops and heavy, the cover of the earth chooses the best parts, and pours down.

Ragib then quotes the judgement of one of the al-Ḥālidī brothers: “‘the cover of the earth’ [for ‘rain’] is *bādīʾ* untouched by anyone before or after the poet, and whoever [subsequently] engages in its [the motif’s] use is defiled by his own soul”. Elsewhere, Ragib describes the following line by al-Farazdaq (Ḥammām b. Ġālib, d. 110/728) as innovative:

I am the immoderate flare of the hearth when someone wants a meal, and the dog’s mild restraint when the guest knocks at night.

541 Ragib, Confluence of Eloquence, 95.
542 *wa-iḏā takallama lam yakun / fī –l-qawli minṭaqatan ‘iyālā. Anonymous?*
546 *wa-īnī ṣafīhu –n-nārī lī-l-mubtaḡī –l-qirā / wa-īnī ḥafīmu –l-kalbi lī-d-dīyāfī yāṭruqu. Ibid., 2:594 (line missing*
He judged the line to be innovative because “the poet combines the immoderacy of the campfire, which means the extravagance of its flames, with the forbearance of the dog.”

There is no imaginary dimension in al-Farazdaq’s line; a host may indeed immoderately leap up like a fire to serve a guest, and may indeed be calm and hospitable rather than angry when a guest arrives suddenly at night. This would make the line characteristic of the ancient, pre-muḥdat, poets (al-qudamā’) whose metaphors Heinrichs has described as tending towards analogies in which the source is projected onto the target to create an image that seems natural, rather than the new muḥdat style in which the poet would take the image created in the target and progress further with it to a new imaginary image that has no natural link back to the source.

This means that Ragib is comfortable applying the term bādī’ to the pre-muḥdat style of pre-muḥdat poets such as al-Farazdaq. If, as a critic, Ragib does not necessarily connect bādī’ to the new style of the muḥdatūn then I feel comfortable taking it to mean simply innovation.

Ragib structures his manual on poetic innovation according to a tripartite typology of interactions between expressions and ideas. The manual therefore represents further evidence of his theory of meaning in action. The structure is as follows:

from index). In Ragib’s poetics manual this this would be an example of muṭābaqah (antithesis) in which the ideas behind two nouns are contrasted while their scansion matches. ———. Innovative Figures of Speech. ff.26b-27a. In our modern English terminology, the line juxtaposes a pair of identifying genitive metaphors.

547 safīḥ –n-nārī is opposed to ḥalīmu –l-kalbi but they have the same morphological pattern and metre. In Ragib’s terms: muṭābaqatu –l-lafẓi ma‘ nan wa-waznan. ———. Innovative Figures of Speech. f26b. Cf. Heinrichs, Rhetorical Figures, 659.

548 ———, “Paired Metaphors,” 5.

549 Although Avigail Noy has pointed out in personal correspondence that this line is an example of muṭabaqah (antithetical parallelism), which is itself a rhetorical figure, and therefore Ragib may still be using bādī’ to mean “rhetorical figures”. On innovation and creativity in mediaeval Arabic poetics more generally see: Kemal, Poetics, 23f.

550 It also takes Ragib into the realm of theory, rather than just taxonomy. Heinrichs noted the dominance of taxonomy (of rhetorical figures) in the history of Arabic poetics, and the paradigmatic example of this tendency is usually taken to be Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī (al-Ḥasan b. ʿAbdallāh, d. ca. 1010). B. Gruendler, "al-ʿAskarī, Abū Hilāl,”
i. Introduction.

ii. tarĝamat al-abwāb wa-l-fuṣūl. List of contents.

1. taqāsīm al-kalām. The structure of language.

2. al-ḥaqiqah wa-l-maḡāz. Literal and non-literal expression.


3.1. al- iqāz. Concision. Of either expression or of idea. fa-l-iqāzu ʿalā ḏarbayni ṭeqāz u lafzin wa-iqāzu maʾnan.

3.1.1. at-talwīḥ Indicating multiple maʾānī with a few alfāẓ. al-išāratu ilā –l maʾnā –l-kaṭīrī bi-lafzin qaṭālīn.

3.1.2. at-tašbīh. Comparison. Divided by number and type (ʿayn (thing) or ḥadat (event)) of target/source.

3.1.3. al-istiʿārah. By type (ʿayn, ḥadat, ism, fiʿl, ḥarf) of target/source. Also includes istiʿārat al-kināyah (metonymy) in which the poet makes a description (waṣf), an action (fiʿl), or a state (ḥāl) that belongs to the source (al-mustaʿār minhu) apply to the target (al-mustaʿār lahū).551

3.1.3.1. al-irdāf. To indicate one idea, the poet uses an expression for another idea that follows from the first one.

3.1.3.2. at-taqdīm. Delaying the intended meaning.

3.1.3.3. iṭlāq al-lafẓ ʿalā mā yuṣiruhū. Naming something by that which is adjacent, or near to it.

3.1.3.4. al-kināyāt. Allusion and euphemism.

3.1.3.5. al-muṣāwaqāh. Borrowing the final clause of a conditional sentence for its initial clause, and vice versa.

3.1.3.6. istīʾmāl al-lafẓ ʿalā at-tahakkum. Sarcasm, for example in reply to an image of praise.

551 The examples include the first hemistitch of the famous line by Abū Ḫṣayb:
when Death sinks its claws in, you find all amulets of no avail wa-ṭādā manīyatu anṣabat aẓfāahā / alfayta kullā tamīmatin lā tanfaʿu.

Ragib wrote: “the poet intends to compare Death [target] to a ravaging wild beast [source] and therefore borrowed the wild beast’s action [contiguous effect of source] and weapon [attribute contiguous to source].” Ragib. Innovative Figures of Speech. f.12b. The translation is from: Heinrichs, The Hand of the Northwind, 4 (note 8), 14. This tallies with the usual understanding of metonymy as the substitution of a cause, effect, or attribute of something for the thing itself. But in the later tradition cf. ———, Rhetorical Figures, 661.
3.1.3.7. *al-fahwā*. Use of a single *lafẓ* to indicate other things above or below it (such as ‘he wouldn’t cheat you out of a penny’ to mean he wouldn’t cheat you out of a pound either)

3.1.3.8. *at-tamṭīl*. analogy.

3.1.3.9. *at-taḍmin*. Using a *lafẓ* with unrestricted application while intending it to have limited application.

3.1.3.10. *al-musāwāh*. When the *lafẓ* is exactly equal to the *ma’nā*.

3.2. *al-baṣṭ*. Used to ensure that everyone (whether astute or obtuse) understands, or to clarify ambiguous language.

3.2.1. *at-takmīl*. Continuing with a *ma’nā* until there is no obstacle to understanding.

3.2.2. *at-tablīgh*. Use of *takmīl* at the end of the line.

3.2.3. *at-tadyīl*. Repetition of part of the first hemistich in the second.

3.2.4. *al-isti‘ānah*. Bad poetry that results from *irdāf*, *taqdīm*, and *fahwā al-hiṭāb* that is unclear.

3.2.5. *a-ta’kid*. That which removes doubt and vagueness.

3.2.6. *at-takrīr*. Repetition, which may be both superfluous and not.

- *fasl*. Extra section not listed in contents: many grammarians rightly allow superfluous words and particles.

4. *al-haḍīf*. Elision of part or all of a word, or of the second half of a conditional.


6. *at-taṣḥīf*. A type of *taḍṇīs* where the words differ only in their pointing.


8. *al-muqābalah*. Correspondence/opposition. More than one term on each side of the antithesis.

9. *at-tadāruk*. Asserting that which has been negated and vice versa.


- *at-taṣḍīr*: *raḍḍ a‘gāz al-kalām ilā ṣadriḥī*. Extra chapter not listed in contents. Putting the second hemistich in the place of the first (epanadiplosis).

11. *at-tabyīn*. Separating out and explaining expressions that refer to more than one thing.

12. *at-taqṣīm*. Division. Enumeration of cases followed by an explicit mutual characterization of each.

13. *al-īġāl*. A description that crosses the line and results in an impossibility.

14. *al-iltīfāt*. Switches of address from the third person to the second person and vice versa.


16. *at-taṣrī‘*. Making the last foot of the first hemistich rhyme.
17. **al-istiṣṭārād.** An idea that leads to another idea, such as moving from old age into praise. *al-aḥḍū fi maʾan yutawaṣṣalu bi-hī ilā maʾan āḥirah muttaṣilin bi-hī min ḍālika –l-mulaḥḫīṣu min aš-šaybi ilā –l-maḏḥī.

- **faṣl:** Extra section not listed in contents: the craft of poetry requires criticism of things unconnected to *balāḡah*, such as the quality of the cola (*fuṣūl*).

18. **an-naẓm.** Syntactic structure.

19. **al-wazn.** Balancing the number of letters and short vowels (*ḥarakāt*).

20. **naqd aš-šiʿr.** Poetic criticism. “Some prefer complicated ideas, other complicated wordplay.” Some say that one is never able to explain why one likes a particular piece of poetry.

21. **anwāʿ as-sariqāt.** *Types of literary borrowing.* This final (according to the contents list) chapter is partially cut off by the end of the manuscript. The colophon is therefore missing.

The manual is divided into three parts. The first four and a half folios (#s i-ii and 1-2) are introductory and consist of a discursive introduction with aposite quotations, a contents list, and analysis of the structure of language and the literal and non-literal. The next seventeen folios (#3) are a tripartite typology of effective communication (*al-balāḡah*): “there are three types of effective communication: concision, equality and prolixity”.  

The first way that effective communication can be achieved is through concision. Concision of expression is achieved through the use of morphological and grammatical structures that abbreviate, such as the diminutive (which stands for the combination of a noun and the adjective “small”) and the plural (which removes the need to repeat the noun).  

Concision of idea is achieved when a single idea communicates a plurality of ideas, such as “that which is in the skies and that which is on the land” communicating the plurality of everything both in and between them.  

Ragib consistently understands concision as a limited amount of

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553 Ibid., ff.5b-6a.

554 Quran 2:255 (al-Baqarah) &c..
expression communicating an excess of idea, whether through a word that stands for the ideas of multiple words, or through an idea that stands for multiple ideas. His three sub-divisions of concision (#s 3.1.1, 3.1.2, and 3.1.3) offer different ways in which this can be achieved. He makes a distinction between ordinary concision, which is part of the lexicon coined by fiat and includes abstract numbers (al-mubhamāt) and names of genuses, and the concision that constitutes the eloquent inventions of the poetic craft, and includes metaphor and metonymy.\(^{555}\)

The opposite of concision is prolixity (#3.2). In this case the idea is given and fixed, but for reasons specific to either the context or content of the speech act the speaker adds extra expressions in order to ensure clarity.\(^{556}\)

In between concision and prolixity lies equality, wherein expressions and ideas are perfectly aligned and balanced, with an excess of neither.\(^{557}\) Ragib explained equality with the

\(^{555}\) Ragib writes:

> There are two types of concise expressions. The first was coined by fiat in order that one could dispense with proliferations of expressions, for example those nouns which abbreviate and by which one understands [more], and many abstract numbers and genus names. The second type is that the form of which is invented by the eloquent after their investigations of the lexicon, and it is this type that is part of the craft of poetry.

\(^{556}\) (Arabic text in Appendix).

Prolixity is required in a number of situations specific to it. Its context may be such as to require that the masses are made to understand somebody [more] discerning [than them]; the masses include those near at hand and far away, the quick-witted, and the slow. Alternatively, the expression may be homonymous, conveying two literal ideas, or a literal and a non-literal one, or a general and a specific idea [and therefore requiring explanation]. The prolixity may also be required for true meticulousness about the source of the information in question, which is one that requires thoroughness”.

\(^{557}\) al-musāwāhu wa-huwa an yakāna –l-lafzu musāwīyan li-l-ma’nā lā zāyida [sic.] ’alayhi wa-lā nāqiṣa ’anhu.

Ibid., f.16b. See Appendix for the Arabic text.
same piece of adab he used in Littératoires’ Ripostes: “it was as if his expressions were the moulds of their ideas”. He then provided the following four lines of poetry as examples.

There will be days that will show you that of which you were ignorant. He whom you had not furnished with provisions will bring you news.

And:

… the one most content with his path is he who treads it.

And:

I am bored of the burdens of life. Bastard! He who lives for eighty years becomes nauseated.

And:

I have become bored of life, its length, and these people asking me how I am.

NB. in the Murād edition of Littératoires’ Ripostes the expressions are the moulds of the speaker’s ideas (li-ma’ānīhi) whereas in this ms. they are the moulds of their own ideas (li-ma’ānīhā). The latter is, I think, preferable.

———, Littératoires’ Ripostes, 1:125.

———. Innovative Figures of Speech. ff.16b-17a.


(Arabic text in Appendix) Ragib remarks that: “the ulamāʾ approved of Zuhayr’s line and judged it to be good because the poet said that he was bored of the burdens of life rather than of life itself, for life is not boring. They preferred it to this line of Labīd’s”. Ragib makes the same remark about the same two lines in Littératoires’ Ripostes. Ragib, Littératoires’ Ripostes, 4:315.

184
These are four famous and well-regarded lines of poetry, but none of them contain any imagery. Their expressions convey ideas effectively in metre, but neither duplicate each other by repeating an idea nor serve on their own to communicate a plurality of ideas. In each case, every single expression has its own single idea. This one-to-one correspondence might be expected to be the pattern of language from which one can deviate, but in Ragib’s manual it is relegated to one and a half folios at the end of the istiʿārah section, and just four lines of poetry. It is clear Ragib thinks that most good poetry and prose does not work like this. Eloquence is the act of manipulating the relationships that idea and expression have with each other so that individual ideas and expressions no longer correspond directly to each other.

The concept of poetic equality has been little studied, to the best of my knowledge, and because it speaks so directly to the relationship in poetics between expression and idea it is worthy of a brief investigation here, alongside investigation of the tripartite typology and the structure in which it sits. Ragib used established typological components. Qudāmah b. Ğaʿfar (Abū al-Faraḡ, d. ca. 337/948), whom Ragib quoted both with and without attribution at numerous points in his manual, presented four ways in which the expression is connected to the idea: equality, concision, īrdāf, and analogy. Qudāmah’s explanations of equality, concision, īrdāf (3.1.3.1 above), and analogy (3.1.3.8 above) are almost identical to Ragib’s, although Qudāmah uses ʾiṣārah (literally “indication”) for concision instead of Ragib’s īḡāz. Qudāmah’s work is structured in two parts: examples of good poetry, followed by examples of bad poetry.

564 The expression “as if his expressions were the moulds of their ideas” also appears in Qudāmah’s discussion of equality. Qudāmah b. Gaʿfar, Naqīd, 84. Qudāmah’s analogy (tamfīl) is when: “one intends to point out an idea and puts down words that point to another idea, and that idea and those words are an analogue (miǧāl) for the idea no one wants to express. Thus ‘analogy’”. Heinrichs, “Early Ornate Prose,” 227-228. For a review of theories of concision see Geert Jan van Gelder, “Brevity: the long and the short of it in Classical Arabic literary theory,” in Proceedings of the Ninth Congress of the Union européenne des arabisants et islamisants: Amsterdam, 1st to 7th September 1978, ed. Rudolph Peters (Leiden: Brill, 1981).
Each of these sections is divided into aspects of poetry related to the expressions (metre and rhyme) and aspects related to the ideas (everything from the genres of praise, satire and eulogy to the techniques of comparison and analogy, and the themes of love (naṣīb) and description (waṣf)). Ragib splits his manual in two as well: seventeen folios (#3) on effective communication structured according to the three ways expression and idea interact, followed by seventeen folios (#4-21) on aspects of poetry that do not involve manipulation of that interaction.

The only author that I am aware of who used Ragib’s tripartite division of concision, equality, and prolixity wrote in Persian some two hundred years after Ragib’s death. Šams ad-Dīn Muḥammad b. Qays ar-Rāzī (usually Šams-e Qays in Persian) wrote al-Muʿgam fī-Maʿāyir Aṣʿār al-Āḡām (The Clarification of the Measures of Persian Poetry) in around 630/1233. Šams-e Qays was fully conversant with Arabic poetics; he tells us that because Persian works quote Arabic poetry and vice versa he worked in both languages so that both peoples might benefit from his explanations.

In the Muʿgam, Šams-e Qays deals with metre, then rhyme, and ends with a chapter on the techniques used in good poetry and prose in which the trio appear. Concision is “when the expression is small and its idea is bigger”, equality (musāwat) “is when the expression and the idea are equal (barābār bāsad)”, and prolixity is when “the idea is explained with many

565 It has been hailed as “the most distinguished work in the history of Persian literary theory” for “from the Arab Conquest until the present day, a period of more than 1260 years, no such accurate, complete and comprehensive treatise on this subject has been composed in Persian”. Respectively: J. T. P. de Bruijn, "Badīʾ," in Encyclopaedia Iranica, ed. Ehsan Yarshater (New York: Iranicaonline Website, 1988); (Šams ad-Dīn Muḥammad b. Qays ar-Rāzī) Šamš-e Qays, al-Muʿgam fī-Maʿāyir Aṣʿār al-Āḡām ed. Mīrzā Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Qazwīnī and E. G. Browne (Leiden: Brill, 1909). 187.

expressions, for example when a homonym is clarified’. He then classifies rhetorical figures under these three headings just as Ragib did. The category of concision contains rhetorical figures based on metaphor and comparison, while the category of prolixity contains rhetorical figures that provide additional information or clarify ambiguities. Neither Ragib nor Šams-e Qays provides any sub-categories of equality, and Šams-e Qays in fact only produces a single line as an example:

Now you always ask for more favour, and it is with your repeated asking, that your favours are accepted.

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568 I have interposed the numbers of the sections in Ragib’s manual into Šams-e Qays’ text:


Šams-e Qays, al-Mu’gam 1909 ed., 349. ———, al-Mu’gam 2008 ed., 378. Šams-e Qays’ definition of īgāl is equivalent to ar-Rāġib’s taʃīg [3.2.2] and therefore should indeed come under bast. The same is true for Šams-e Qays’ tabyīn and taqṣīm, which are not the same as ar-Rāġib’s chapters 11 and 12. ———, al-Mu’gam 1909 ed., 327, 341, 343. ———, al-Mu’gam 2008 ed., 357, 371, 372. However, other key terms in Šams-e Qays such as maqāz, istī ‘ārāh and taʃīf are in accordance with the Arabic tradition in which ar-Rāġib worked. For example, the beginning of the definition of istī ‘ārāh reads:

a type of maqāz (non-literal language), and maqāz is that which is the opposite of haqīqat (literal language).

Haqīqat is when they use an expression for an idea in the way that the originator of the language first coined that expression for that idea in the lexicon (haqīqat ān ast ke lafż-rā bar ma nī-i ʃī laq konand ke wādī ’-e luȝat dar ʃīl-e ṣad-e wa’d-e ān lafż be-izā ’-e ān ma ‘nī nehāde bāṣed).


The most notable variation is the disagreement on where istīt̲rād̲ should be placed. On the one hand, istīt̲rād̲ is the continuation of an idea and can be read as proximity, but on the other, in both Šams-e Qays and ar-Rāģib’s analyses it is an idea (maqād in Šams-e Qays and mā ‘nā in ar-Rāģib) that is connected to another idea. It may therefore fit best in the second section of ar-Rāģib’s manual (17), where word units are moved around, rather than the expression-idea relationship itself being manipulated.

Just as in Ragib’s definition, equality is the absence of any imagery that would break the one-to-one correspondence between expression and idea.

Finally, Abū ʿAbdallāh Muḥammad b. Sinān al-Ḥaḍāḥī (422/1031-466/1074), who was born around the time of Ragib’s death, reports the same tripartite structure in his *Sirr al-Faṣāḥah* (The Secret of Eloquence) but with different names for the three categories.\(^{570}\) All the lines of poetry adduced by these three critics share the lack of imagery that defines poetic equality.\(^{571}\)

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\(^{570}\) In al-Ḥaḍāḥī, concision is *išārah* (as in Qudāmah), proximity is *taqīl*, and equality remains *musāwāh*. The definitions in terms of *laqf* and *ma‘nā* are identical to ar-Rāgib’s. The expression “as if his expressions were the moulds of their ideas” is repeated. Where Ragib wrote that proximity is for situations when the speaker wants to ensure that listeners of all abilities understand (…*tuḥtāšu fiḥi ilā taqfīmī – l-‘āmmatī* [ṣ: wa-fīhum] – *l-qarību wa-l-ba‘īdu wa-d-dakīku wa-l batī‘u – l-fahima…), al-Ḥaḍāḥī agrees and extends this to mean that concision should only be used when dealing with the elite, and equality is for those situations that fall between the two (*inna – t-taqīlu yuṣlaḥu … bi-ḥaytu yakūnu – l-kalāmu muḥājīban bi-hī ‘āmmata – n-nāsī … wa-l-išāratu tustlaḥu li-muḥājībatī – l-ḥulāfī ‘i wa-l-mulūkī … wa-l-musāwātī – ilātī hiya – l-wasatū bayna hāḍayini – i-tarafayn*). Abū Muḥammad ʿAbdallāh b. Muhammad al-Ḥaḍāḥī, *Sirr al-Faṣāḥah*, ed. ʿAbd al-Mutaʿalī as-Ṣādiqī (Cairo: Maktabat wa-Maṭba‘at Muḥammad ʿAllī Ṣabīḥ wa-Awādī, 1969). 199, 209. Ragib, *Innovative Figures of Speech*. f.17a.

\(^{571}\) Qudāmah cited two of the lines that Ragib used: “there will be days that will show you…” (note 560) and “for the one most content with his path…” (note 561, Qudāmah citing the full line). Al-Ḥaḍāḥī also cited “there will be days that will show you…” The lines not cited by Ragib are as follows:

**Qudāmah**:

If you hide the malady we will not fear it, and if you declare war we will not remain seated. If you fight us we will fight you, and if you intend to spill blood we will do the same. I am prepared to leap into war on a steed, whether spurred on or allowed to walk.


**Qudāmah and al-Ḥaḍāḥī**: And whenever a man has a characteristic it is known, even if he thinks it is hidden from people.


**Qudāmah and al-Ḥaḍāḥī**: If you fail to refrain from ignorance or obscenity then you wound those of mild temperament, or [your fellow] ignoramuses wound you.

[*ar-tawīl*] *igīt ḥaṭibī lām taqṣīr ‘an – l-ğahī wa-l-ḥanā / aṣabta ḥalīman aw asābaka ḡāhilā. In Zuhayr’s *Dīwān* this poem is attributed to his son Ka‘b. Ibid., 71. In the *Ṣarḥ* by Ṭa‘lab it is attributed to Zuhayr. Zuhayr b. Abī Sulmā and Ṭa‘lab, *Ṣarḥ Dīwān Zuhayr*, 300. Ṭarāfah as above.

**Qudāmah**: A band tried to ambush some of them, yet they neither ambushed, nor were they reproached, nor did they fall short.

[*ar-tawīl*] *sa‘ā ba’ dāhum qawmīn likay yudrikūhumū / fa-lam yudrikū wa-lam yulūmī wa-lam ya’lī. Zuhayr*
I will end this section on poetics with an example of how Ragib used the pairing of expression and idea in his *Exegesis*, and the rhetorical figures developed in his poetics manual, to deal with the Quran. It must also be remembered that Ragib assumed throughout his manual that the techniques for poetic innovation that he is analysing occur in both the Quran and profane poetry. Examples from the Quran abound throughout the manual. There appears to be no doubt

b. Abī Sulmā, *Dīwān*, 63. With *yaf alā* for *yudrikā* and *yulīmū* for *yulāmū*. Cf. Zuhayr b. Abī Sulmā and Ṭa’ lab, *Sharḥ Dīwān Zuhayr*, 114. With *yaf alā* for *yudrikā*. Ṭa’ lab (815/6-904) explains the line as referring to a group of young men whose failed ambush was an attempt to emulate their fathers, whom they would go on to equal.

Qudāmah:
I swear by your life! It is death that, as it fails to catch the youth, is like the loose rope whose ends are held in the hand.


This is the line immediately preceding “there will be days that will show you...”, Qudāmah quotes them both. This line does contain the image of death being like a loose rope, but most likely Qudāmah felt that the lines needed to be quoted as a pair for them to be understood, despite equality only occurring in the second. al-Ḥafāǧī, *Sīr*, 209-210; Qudāmah b. ʿAlīfar, *Naqḍ*, 84-85.

Qudāmah:
May God not take you away o Tawbah, for the encounter with fate is the same whether one is in armour or undressed.


Al-Ḥafāǧī:
Perhaps perfuming the breeze in welcome will restore her, take our breaths away, and augment her.


Al-Ḥafāǧī:
If the youth has a flaw in his perfection, then every sound member of mankind is defective.

*[at-tawīl]* idā kāna muqṣāmū –l-fatā fi tamāmīhī / fa-kullu šaḥīḥīn fi-l-anāmīʾ alūlu. Abū Naṣr Ibn Nubātah. To the best of my knowledge, these two lines by Ibn Nubātah are only extant in *Sīr al-Faṣāḥah*.

Al-Ḥafāǧī:
Fate’s children [i.e. previous generations] visited him in his youth and he cheered them up. We come to him when he is old


Al-Ḥafāǧī:
He continued to outstrip [them] until a jealous person said ‘he has a shortcut to the heights’.

in Ragib’s mind that God could use the same rhetorical figures to communicate as effectively as poets had before and after the coming of Islam:

If someone were to ask how the two comparisons in Quran 2:17 (‘they are like one who lights a fire…[but God leaves them in darkness]’) and Quran 2:19 (‘or like the rainstorm…[that they fear]’) are adjoined to each other (kayfa wağhu -l-’att) when the second is not an appropriate way to follow the first, then one could answer in one of two ways. First, that “or like the people of the rain” was intended [making the comparison between a person who lights a fire and a person who is rained upon, rather than between a person and a rainstorm]. Alternatively one could say that the coordination is on the level of the idea, because comparison (tašbīh) sometimes occurs on the basis of a correspondence on the level of expressions, and sometimes on the basis of a correspondence of ideas not reflected in the expressions [i.e. the comparisons are really between the fear of being in darkness and the fear of the rainstorm, rather than between lighting a fire and being rained upon]. Another example of this is Quran 3:117: ‘that which they spend in this worldly life is like a cold wind that strikes a harvest of a people who have wronged themselves’. The idea of this verse is ‘like the harvest of a people who have wronged themselves, which was struck by a wind’ [i.e. the comparison is really between wasteful spending and a ruined harvest, rather than between spending and wind]. This reading is derived on the basis of ideas, not on the basis of expressions. Another example is the poet’s:

The daughter of Ḥiṭṭān b. ʿAwf left many campsites / like a scribe adorns a parchment with the title. ⁵⁷²

The grammatical reconstruction (taqdir) of this verse is ‘like the title that the scribe has written’ [i.e. the comparison is really between the campsites and the titles, rather than

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between the campsites and the scribal act of writing]. This type of comparison is called ‘enfolded comparison’ (at-tašbih al-mulaffaf).\textsuperscript{573}

Ragib deals with enfolded comparison, a relatively rare rhetorical figure,\textsuperscript{574} in his poetics manual. He explains that it is a matter of two targets (mušabbahayn) being together compared to a single source (mušabba bihi), and then each source being comparable to one of the targets. In the line quoted above, the multiple campsites are the target, and they are compared to the single source of the book title. The book title is then effectively multiplied, and the image becomes one of multiple book titles compared to multiple campsites. The campsites are, in effect, folded into the book title. In one of the lines of poetry Ragib uses as examples of enfolded comparison in his manual of poetics, the fore and hind-legs of a horse are folded into a single pair of legs that moves as one:

As if the two forelegs and the two hind legs were fleeing and trying to move as one.\textsuperscript{575}

Poetics is a matter of exegesis as well as poetry, and the tools of literary criticism can be used on both the words of divine revelation and the words with which pre-Islamic poets lusted after their beloveds.

**Figurative Readings**


\textsuperscript{574} Al-Marzūqī (Abū `Alī Aḥmad b. Muḥammad, d. 421/1030) was a contemporary of Ragib’s, and also from Isfahan. In his commentary on the Ḥamāsah, he writes that comparing campsite remains to the act of writing is “enfolded, according to their methodologies” (malfūfun fī ūtarā iqīhim). The “they” could well be a reference to poetics circles in Isfahan of which Ragib knew, or with which he was connected. al-Marzūqī and Abū Tammām, *Ṣarḥ al-Ḥamāsah*, 1:721.

\textsuperscript{575} ka-annamū–r-rīglānī wā-l-yadānī / ṭālibatā wātrīn wā-hāribānī. Ragib also quotes this line in his *Quranic Glossary* and *Littérateurs’ Ripostes*, in the latter giving the name of the poet as Bakr b. al-Naṭṭāḥ (fl. ca. 174/790). ibid., 2:1285; Ragib, *Littérateurs’ Ripostes*, 4:642; \textemdash, *Quranic Glossary*, 163; \textemdash. *Innovative Figures of Speech*. f.8a.
In the example of poetics in exegesis quoted above, Ragib makes a hermeneutical distinction between reading on the level of expressions and reading on the level of ideas. He was quite happy to think about what God meant, and by extension what Ragib believed through the exercise of his reason God to have meant, and then to allow his conclusions to override the divine text. We already know that this was a substantial area of debate across mediaeval Islamicate intellectual culture, and one that was usually couched in terms of human reason versus divine revelation. Schools of thought such as the Muʿtazilah believed that the divine word could be evaluated, and if necessary overridden or explained away by human reason whereas everyone else, from the Ašāʾirah to the Ḥanābilah and beyond, believed that such a Muʿtazilī position was dangerous and heretical overreach. How could humans, created and controlled by God, be able to decide for themselves what God should or should not have meant? Ragib was taking a Muʿtazilī position here, despite as we have seen regarding himself as an opponent of theirs, and holding fast to the text of divine revelation and its precedent in all doctrinal matters.

It was Ragib’s focus on language that enabled him to square this circle. I would argue that it was because he saw language as composed of both expressions and ideas that he could choose to either follow God’s ideas or God’s expressions while remaining faithful at all times to God’s language. His theory of meaning therefore enabled him to make the bold claim that God’s literal word should be understood as analogy rather than fact. Taking it as analogy did not make it less divine, and reading it as a figure of speech did not privilege human reason above God’s wisdom. Unsurprisingly, Ragib explained this position of his in terms of the pairing of expression and idea.
At the very end of *The Path to the Nobilities*, Ragib concluded a discussion about the different ways in which an action can be read (God as the first cause, humans as the immediate cause, etc.\(^{576}\)) with the following remark:

This is a subject in which one cannot establish ideas according to their equivalent expressions. One cannot, therefore, look at the idea through the expression. One must rather look at the expression through the idea.\(^{577}\)

Ragib made exactly the same epistemological claim in the methodological introduction to his *Exegesis*:

The third area of disagreement and doubt is a difference of perspective.\(^{578}\) Should one look at the idea through the expression, or at the expression through the idea? Al-Ḥaṭṭābī [Ḥamd b. Muḥammad, d. ca. 386/996], for example, looked through the expression when he established the essences of things.\(^{579}\) The wise (al-ḥukamā’), on the other hand, looked through the essences of things and then to the expressions. This difference is exemplified by the debate about the divine attributes. Those who look through the expression are confronted with a grave doubt by, for example, Quran 5:64 ‘rather his two hands are outstretched’, Quran 54:14 (al-Qamar) “proceeding under our eye”, and other verses like them.

\(^{576}\) See note 478.


\(^{578}\) The first two areas are: homonymous expressions, and differing intents behind expressions (for the latter, see note 482).

\(^{579}\) Aḥmad Ḥasan Farḥāt, the editor, persuasively interprets this as a reference to al-Ḥaṭṭābī’s position on the attributes in his *al-Gunyah ’an al-Kalām wa-Aḥlihi* (Dispensing with Theology and Theologians), as quoted by Ibn Taymīyah. There, al-Ḥaṭṭābī maintains that the attributes describe God’s essence (ḏāt) rather than his abilities or actions, and therefore that the Quranic expression “hand” means that God’s essence has a hand, albeit not a hand like other hands, and that “we cannot say [as Ragib does] that the idea behind ‘hand’ is strength and blessing” (*wa-lisnā an nāqūla inna ma’nā –l-yadi –l-quwwatu wa-n-nī’mah*). Abū al-ʿAbbās Aḥmad Ibn Taymīyah, *al-Fatwā l-Ḥamwiyyah al-Kubrā*, ed. Ḥamad b. ʿAbd al-Muḥsin at-Tawaygīrī (Riyad: Dār aṣ-Ṣamīʿī, 2004). 361-365, 364; Ragib, *Methodological Introduction and Exegesis ed. Farḥāt*, 40 (note 5). Cf. Frank, "Elements," 165-166.
[However,] when specialists in the realities of things (ahl al-haqāʾiq) demonstrate with proofs that God is one and unblemished by multiplicity (and consequently cannot have limbs or organs), they establish the expressions based on that [principle]. They therefore understand these expressions as non-literal language and idiom, and by doing so are protected from the doubt that confronted the group discussed above.  

Verses that describe God were a source of doubt for non-specialists, and in On Creeds Ragib told his readers to “beware of thinking that there is a physical reality behind these expressions!” in the context of his discussion of God’s throne. Taking these verses to be analogy or figures of speech was not a rejection of God’s language, it was an accurate reading of that divine text. This position of Ragib’s was not a rejection of language in favour of ontology. He was not saying that we should bypass words and instead focus on concepts, but rather that when faced with the combination of expression and idea that constitutes language we should be prepared to work on the level of the ideas rather than the expressions, if the hermeneutical situation requires. Nevertheless, the conclusions that this strategy led him to make, such as the claim that the Quranic expressions “God’s hands” meant “God’s blessing” put him directly at odds with the Sunni majority. He was conscious of this, as we saw from his citation of al-Ḥaṭṭābī in the quotation above, and as we can see from the following discussion in the Quranic Glossary.


582 See notes 276f.
Ragib writes that some say God is called *al-ḡabbār* in the Quran because he is powerful and makes people do things and that lexicographers agree, deriving *al-ḡabbār* from the factitive verb *aḡbara*. An alternative position denied that derivation and suggested an etymology from *ḡabr* in the phrase “neither compulsion (ḡabr) nor free will”. The Muʿtazilah disagreed with this alternative position on the basis that it implied God needs to compel people, an implication that denigrates God. Ragib then described this Muʿtazilī position as “not objectionable”, characterizing them as thinking “with regard to the idea” (*min ḥay ʿal-maʿnā*) while the lexicographers thought “with regard to the expression” (*min ḥay ʿal-lafẓ*).

However, when it came to proposing a solution to the problems caused by Quranic expressions, Ragib was ultimately more comfortable borrowing phraseology from Sufism than from the Muʿtazilah. In his discussion in the *Exegesis* of the Quranic description of God raising Jesus “to him”, Ragib wrote that “to him” was a reflection of elevated noble status, and in no way an indication of a physical upwards movement: “the real nature of this cannot be attained through the expression. Humans can only come to know it through God’s light”.

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583 And it does after all fit with the first part of Ragib’s own belief that there is “neither compulsion nor free will”. See notes 473 and 484.

584 God is described as *ḡabbār* in Quran 59:23 (al-Ḥašar). Ragib writes:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{fa-qad ṣila summiya bi-dālika ... liannahā yuğbiru –n-nāsa ay yaqharuhum 'alā mā yurīduhū wa-dafa'a bā'du ahli –l-ḥugāti dālika min ḥayyū –l-lafza ... fa-uğība 'ānhu bi-anna dālika min lafzi –l-ğabri –l-marwwīfi fi qawlihī lā ǧabrā wa-lā tafwīda lā min lafzi –l-iğbāri wa-ankara ġamā atun min –l-mu 'azalati dālika min ḥayyu –l-ma nā fa-qālū yata 'alā –llāhu 'an dālika wa-layṣa dālika bi-munkar.}
\end{align*}
\]


585 Ragib’s commentary on Quran 4:158 (“Rather God raised him [Jesus] to him” (*bal rafa’ahū –llāhu ilayhī*)):  

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{wa-dakara qawlahū ilayhi tanbihan 'alā ta'āzīmi –l-marfrī lā 'ilā isāratin ilā ḥaddin mahdūdīn tanbihan ilā annahā ḥasala lahā bihi 'a'īā aš-šaraṣaf ... wa-lā yumkinu –l-kasfu 'an ḥaqā iqīhā bi-l-lafzi wa-innāmah yudrikūhū –l-ḥasabin ga' alahū lahū min nūrīhī.}
\end{align*}
\]

———, *Exegesis* ed. Sardār, 222.
certainly saw God’s light as itself a metaphor for the reason with which he had endowed humanity, but he would not describe that human reason as trumping revelation.\textsuperscript{586}

What he was prepared to say is that when one considers the expressions and ideas that make up the language of revelation, one should ensure that the ideas stack up together, rather than focussing on the expressions alone. In effect, this position was an inevitable consequence of his assumptions about linguistic structure. If the majority of language is potentially ambiguous, made up of polysemous connections between finite expressions and infinite ideas, then it would be impossible to follow the expressions without first considering the ideas. One would have no way of knowing to which ideas, among the options provided by the lexicon, the expressions referred. Looking through the expressions at the ideas would only be possible with the proper name that is a sign for a single external physical referent. For everything else, and we have seen that everything else is the vast majority of language, an expression has the potential to mean more than one thing. There is nowhere to look for the solution other than among the ideas themselves.

\textbf{Concluding Remarks on Ragib’s Philosophy of Language}

Having completed a review of Ragib’s philosophy in language both as a theory and in practice, I will now attempt to sum up some of the most important points of the previous two chapters.

Ragib’s philosophy of language is one in which linguistic ambiguity is accepted, even welcomed, and then negotiated and managed with a combination of assumptions, models of linguistic structure, and religious faith.

\textsuperscript{586} Indeed, in his \textit{Analysis of the Two Creations}, Ragib compares both human reason and divine revelation to God’s light. \textit{———}, \textit{Analysis of the Two Creations}, 119 (chapter 18).
The model that underpins this philosophy of language is a theory of meaning in which expressions (\(\text{\textit{alfāz}}\)) express (\(\text{\textit{\textit{`ibārah `an}}\)) ideas (\(\text{\textit{ma`ānī}}\)) according to the intent (\(\text{\textit{qasd, murād}}\)) of the speaker. The ideas are ontologically real and shared between language users, but they are not external physical things. Expressions express either through a one-to-one correspondence; a proper noun (\(\text{\textit{`alam}}\)) that is simply a sign for an external physical thing, or they express ideas, in which case they do so through polysemy (\(\text{\textit{ištirāk}}\)). Polysemy is a situation in which the finite corpus of expressions interacts with the infinity of potential ideas. This infinity is proscribed in the lexicon (\(\text{\textit{al-luğah}}\)), which was coined by God’s fiat (\(\text{\textit{waḍ’}}\)) and then expanded upon by generations of humanity.

Literary innovation (\(\text{\textit{badī'}}\)), be it in poetry or in prose, is the result of new connections being made between expressions and ideas. This creative process was undertaken by pre-Islamic poets, poets and literary figures throughout the Islamic period up to Ragib’s time, and had been practiced by God in the Quran. The process is recorded in the archive of literary transmission and criticism, and when new connections become sufficiently widespread, humans choose to include them in the lexicon.

Ragib is able to exploit his theory of meaning and his assumptions about the ambiguity of language in order to solve theological problems such as that of God’s compulsion versus human free will, and of God’s attributes. In both these cases, he uses his theory of meaning to explain that although they use the same language, there is a massive ontological difference between God and his human creation. When faced with evidence in the form of language, a scholar must decide, with reference to the lexicon, on the intent that determines to which ideas the expressions refer. The nature of linguistic ambiguity is such that these expressions have the potential to refer to ideas as different as “God” and “human”.
The nature of linguistic ambiguity is also such that expressions can refer to multiple ontologically distinct ideas at the same time. For this to happen, the ideas must be connected to each other, but if they are, however loose the connection, a single expression can mean two things at once. This is how we can be both responsible for our own actions and believe that God is acting through us.
5. THE HISTORY OF THE ARABIC LANGUAGE TRADITION

Universal Concepts

When Ragib’s work, written in the late tenth/early eleventh-century Islamicate world, is read alongside the work of other scholars from different centuries and cultures it becomes clear that he was not the first to think as he did about language, and would not be the last. Many of the concepts discussed in the preceding chapters speak to fundamental human assumptions about language, mind, and reality that reoccur at all times and in all contexts.

Historical accounts of the philosophy of language usually begin with the Stoic logic of ancient Greece, where a theory of meaning developed that distinguished between expression, idea, and external physical referent, and viewed language and its ambiguities as an integral part of philosophy.587 Some Stoic concepts are enticingly close to those found in the Arabic Language Tradition, just as they are close to concepts developed in twentieth-century Europe. However, the temptation to suggest that each civilization’s scholars directly influenced the next should be resisted. The Stoic λεκτόν may perform an analogous function to the Arabic maʾnā,588 and indeed an analogous function to Frege’s Sinn and Carnap’s Intension,589 but in the absence of

587 The major Stoic figure is Zeno (born in Rhodes, fl. ca. 35—260 BC). It should be noted that our knowledge of Stoic logic is dependent on scattered and fragmentary data found in sources that are usually hostile to the Stoic ideals. Benson Mates, Stoic Logic, vol. 26, University of California Publications in Philosophy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953). 1, 6, 8, 11; Versteegh, Greek Elements, 178f. For a discussion of how Stoic logic included syntax, poetics, verbal ambiguities, and parts of speech under its purview, see: Kwame Gyekye, Arabic Logic: Ibn al-Tayyib's Commentary on Porphyry's Eisagoge (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1979). 7.

588 Mates translates λεκτόν as “the signifyate”. Both Schöck and Versteegh address attempts to draw connection between Stoic logic and Arabic theories of meaning. Mates, Stoic Logic, 16; Schöck, Koranexegese, 386, 432; Versteegh, Greek Elements, 184.

589 Mates makes a tabular comparison between the terminology of the Stoics, Frege, and Carnap that equates λεκτόν, Sinn, and Intension. Mates, Stoic Logic, 20.
intertextual proof it is safer to assume that these concepts represent fundamental human assumptions that any scholar could have developed from first principles.

The value of considering the Arabic Language Tradition alongside the variety of other linguistic models proposed throughout the ages is that doing so highlights the resilience and the civilization-wide breadth of penetration that the pairing of expression and idea achieved in Arabic. Neither the Stoic σημαίνων and σημαινόμενον, Frege’s Sinn, Carnap’s intension, nor even Saussure’s significant and signifié achieved the degree of acceptance within their cultural contexts that the pairing of lafẓ and maʿnā did across Arabic scholarship from the eighth-century onwards. The struggle, already documented in this dissertation, to find an appropriate English translation for lafẓ and maʿnā further confirms that English lacks equally omnipresent terminology for the two basic building blocks of so many theories of meaning.

I will demonstrate in what follows that the pairing of expression and idea was an assumption about linguistic structure that everybody working in Arabic shared and used without quibble or question. In this chapter, I will focus on those scholars who used the pairing of expression and idea to manage polysemy, and whose philosophy of language accepted and managed linguistic ambiguity. These scholars constitute what I am calling the Arabic Language Tradition. Ragib was a part of this tradition, and an exemplar of it. In the conclusion that follows this chapter I will show how scholars working in the Classical Language Tradition also used the pairing of expression and idea as the foundation for a theory of meaning, but then chose, influenced by an established Aristotelian philosophy of language, not to embrace the role that

590 Respectively: sign/indicator and significate/indicated, sense, intension, signifier and signified. All of these terms do, of course, have their own defined roles in the theories of meaning in which they were situated. This is not the appropriate place for a detailed analysis of those theories. Schöck, Koranexegese, 386; Versteegh, Greek Elements, 179. See also note 346 and page 199 in addition to Speaks, Theories of Meaning.
polysemy and ambiguity could play. The Arabic Language Tradition and the Classical Language Tradition therefore shared an assumption about linguistic structure but disagreed on the nature of the relationship between language, mind, and reality. Expression and idea were omnipresent in Arabic-language scholarship, but only the Arabic Language Tradition exploited their potential to manage ambiguity.

**Early Analyses of Linguistic Ambiguity**

Our story begins in the two great garrison towns of southern Iraq, Basra and Kufa. Together, they were the dual hub of intellectual production for the nascent Islamic civilization that had founded them as army camps around the year 17/638. The first scholars whose work is available to us were born some sixty years later, and by the time Abū Ḥanīfah and Abū al-Ḥasan Muqāṭil b. Sulaymān died in 150/767 the Abbasid dynasty had not only brought the caliphate back to Iraq from Syria in 132/749, but also founded a third city in 146/763. That city, Baghdad, would overshadow everything else for the next few centuries.

We cannot know, in the absence of manuscript evidence, what scholars were saying and writing in the century before Abū Ḥanīfah became head of his Kufan study circle in 120/737, but it must have been an incredible period in which to work. We know from reports in later sources that the Quranic text was being discussed and fixed, and that arguments were starting

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591 Yanagihashi, *Abū Ḥanīfa*. When it comes to our knowledge of the region’s already-developed intellectual traditions, it should be noted that we:

[H]ave no evidence of handbooks or technical treatises of rhetoric in Syriac from the pre-Islamic period … [t]he fifth and sixth centuries marked the beginning of the intensive Syriac work of translation and commentary on the *Organon* … for evidence of a technical treatise in Syriac … we have to wait until the Islamic period.

Furthermore, “the bulk of the technical theory of late antiquity is devoted to judicial and deliberative rhetoric”. John W. Watt, “Literary and Philosophical Rhetoric in Syriac,” in *Literary and Philosophical Rhetoric in the Greek, Roman, Syriac and Arabic Worlds*, ed. Frédérique Woerther (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 2009), 144, 149.
about the central issues of theology. Arguments about politics had of course already been the cause of two civil wars.

Abū Ḥanīfah and Muqātil are the very first Arabic-language scholars whose work is extant. This is particularly important in the context of this dissertation because the nature of an investigation into linguistic structures is such that the words and phrases that scholars used are of primary importance. If the scholars in question are reporting the scholarship of their predecessors, then regardless of their doctrinal or conceptual accuracy, it would be negligent to place weight on the linguistic terminology reported to have been used by the earlier generation. The assumptions about language that I am attempting to draw out are exactly the sort of methodological and conceptual tools that would slip unnoticed into a scholar’s transmission of earlier work. With at least one of Abū Ḥanīfah’s theological treatises we are on relatively certain ground when it comes to its authenticity, although in the absence of a codex dating from his lifetime nothing can be certain. With Muqātil we are on firmer ground, for a papyrus fragment dating from around the time of its author’s life has been studied by Nabia Abbott and established as his study of Quranic polysemy.

We can tell from Abū Ḥanīfah’s works that theological arguments were already raging during his lifetime, and that language itself was under consideration. In a letter written to the

592 Hiroyuki Yanagihashi writes that the Risālah ilā ʿUmar al-Battī (discussed in note 52) is regarded as the only authentic text from Abū Ḥanīfah’s pen, and that the other text that I make use of (al-ʿʿīlim wa-l-Mutaʿallim), is a valid record of discussions between Abū Ḥanīfah and Abū Muqātil b. Sulaymān (Hafs b. Salm, d. 208/823), recorded by the latter. U. F. ʿAbd-Allāh, "Abū Ḥanīfa," in Encyclopaedia Iranica, ed. Ehsan Yarshater (New York: Iranicaonline Website, 2011); Nuʿmān b. ʿAbī Abū Ḥanīfah, al-ʿʿīlim wa-l-Mutaʿallim Riwāyat Abī Muqātil ... wa-yalihi Risālat Abī Ḥanīfah ilā ʿUmar al-Battī tamma al-Fiqh al-Absaṭ, ed. M. Zāhid al-Kawṭārī (Cairo: al-Ḥānǧī, 1949). 3; Yanagihashi, Abū Ḥanīfa.

Basran jurist ʿUṯmān al-Battī (d. 143/760), Abū Ḥanīfah defends himself against accusations of Murĝīʾi tendencies as follows:594

As for your use of the name Murĝiʾah, what would be the sin of a group of people who spoke about justice and were then called ‘the people of justice’ by heretics,595 when they were in fact the people of justice, and Sunni? It is just a name that odious people applied to them. By my life, that which is disparaged as justice, were you to encourage people to call it odious, and were people to follow you and indeed call it odious, then the name ‘justice’ would become heresy. How, as long as you had adopted it from the just, could it be so disparaged?596

In a culture of oral argument what people said mattered, and the fact of their saying it raised the question of language. Quarrels about naming and what people were called by other people lay at the heart of early Muslim theology. Elsewhere, Abū Ḥanīfah makes the same distinction between a person being something and being called something,597 and asks “how many a word is first

594 The Murĝīʾah were a movement that believed judgements on the status of believers in the hereafter should be postponed (murgaʾ). See note 52.

595 It would appear that Abū Ḥanīfah is referring to the still nascent Muʿtazilah (who called themselves the adherents of God’s justice and unity, ahl al-ʿadl wa-t-tawḥīd), and that the justice he refers to is God’s divine justice.

596 The syntax here is not entirely clear:


597 As part of his argument that belief is not the same as good works Abū Ḥanīfah writes:
How many people do good works for another, but do not have a place among God’s servants as a result, nor does the name ‘placed among God’s servants’ apply to them. Others may have a place among God’s servants and not do good works, and the name ‘placed among God’s servants’ will nevertheless not leave them (wa-gāka annahū kam min insānin ya-malū bi-l-iḥirin wa-lā yakūnī bi-gālika muqarran laḥī bi-l-ʿubūdiyati wa-lā yaqṣuʿa ʿalayhi –smu l-iqrāri bi-l-ʿubūdiyati wa-ʾaḥṣirin gād yakūnī muqarran bi-l-ʿubūdiyati wa-lā ya-malū fa-lā yafḍhabu ʾanhu –smu iqrārihi bi-l-ʿubūdiyih).

heard and despised, and then accepted when it is explained?" He also describes both homonymy (ism ǧāmiʿ) and synonymy, without using the pairing of expression and idea.

Questions about linguistic ambiguity were being asked, but the terminology had not been firmly established. This conclusion is reinforced by the work of Muqātil on the Quran. In some of the very earliest extant exegetical passages to which we have access, Muqātil uses idea (maʾnā) on one occasion in his Exegesis and writes an entire book on Quranic polysemy. He uses maʾnā to mean the idea behind a Quranic verse: with regard to the movement of the angels as they take souls up to heaven, “this is the idea of [the Quranic verse] ‘by the angels hastening’”.

Muqātil starts his al-Wuğūh wa-n-Naẓāʾ ir fi-l-Qurʾān al-Karīm (Aspects and Equivalences in the Noble Quran) with a Hadith that he ascribes to the Prophet: “a man is not completely...

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598 fa-rubba kalimatīn yasmaʾ ūhā –l-ınsānu fa-yakrahahū fa-iğā uḥbīra bi-taqsīrīḥā radiya bihi. Ibid.

599 Homonymy:

Homonymy: worship is a name that gathers within it obedience, desire, and fixedness in the divine (ismu –l-ʿibādati –smun ġāmiʿ un yağtamiʾu fīhi –t-tāʾ atu wa-r-rağbatu wa-l-iqrāru bi-r-rubūbīyah). Ibid., 28.

Synonymy:

These are different words [assent, knowledge, placed, Islam, certainty] that have the same single idea, which is ‘belief’ (ḥāḍihī asmāʾu muḥtalifatu [at-taṣḍīq, al-maʿrifah, al-iqrār, al-islām, al-yaqīn] wa-maʾnāhā wāḥidun huwa –l-īmān. Ibid., 14.

knowledgable until he realises that the Quran has many aspects”.  

He then provides analysis of 176 Quranic words that each have between two and seventeen different aspects, which he enumerates and explains with examples from Quranic verses. For example, the word *al-ğabbār* has four different aspects (‘*alā arba’ati awğuhin*): God overpowering his creation or telling the Prophet that only God can overpower his creation; unjust oppression by humans in the sense of unlawful killing; arrogant neglect of the worship of God; and the great extent of power. There is no evidence of the sort of detailed theological engagement with the justification of God’s oppression versus his justice that we saw in Ragib’s analysis of the same word nearly 300 years later, but Muqātil is clearly aware of, and intent on communicating, the fact that God used a single word to mean four different things in four different contexts.

Kufa and Basra were cities with tens of thousands of inhabitants at the time of Muqātil and Abū Ḥanīfah, yet we only have three or four of those inhabitants’ books. On the one hand, this vacuum may lead us to assume incorrectly that our next scholar, Sībawayh, changed the face of Arabic intellectual history with a series of grammatical theories that made systematic and heavy use of the pairing of expression and idea. On the other, he may well have done so. He was

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603 Quran 26:130 (aš-Šu’arā’), in which the prophet Hūd asks his people whether they fight as oppressors, Quran 28:19 (al-Qaṣaṣ), in which Moses is asked whether he plans to become an oppressor, and Quran 40:35 (Ḡāfir), in which God promises to seal the hearts of oppressors.

604 Quran 19:14 (Maryam), in which John is not arrogant towards his parents, and Quran 19:32, in which Jesus says that he is not arrogant.

605 Quran 5:22, in which Moses’ people say that there is already a people of great strength in the Holy Land that he wants them to enter.

606 See note 584.
certainly cited, commented upon, and exploited by the generations who followed him. The opening lines of his *al-Kitāb (The Book)* lay out the grammatical structure of the Arabic language:

words are either a noun, a verb, or a particle that conveys an *idea* while being neither noun nor verb. Examples of the noun are ‘man’ and ‘horse’. Instances of the verb are taken from the *expression* of the events [that happen to] nouns…

Sībawayh assumes that his readers are familiar with two levels of language: the level of ideas, in which a particle such as ‘and’ (*wa*) can convey the idea of connection; and the level of expressions, upon which events that happen to nouns such as ‘went’ are expressed. Shortly after, he describes how homonymy and synonymy are structured according to these two levels in a

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607 If one is writing a history of Arabic grammar, then the problem is that:

…we really only have the *Kitāb* to go on: evidence of previous scientific interest in Arabic is scanty, and in the end the most detailed information we have about grammar before Sībawayhi comes from his own book.

Michael Carter, *Sibawayhi* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2004). 2-3. Cf. Rafael Talmon, "Naḥwiyyūn in Sībawayhi’s *Kitāb*," *Zeitschrift für arabische Linguistik* 8(1982). However, if one’s concern is the history of the Arabic language itself, then Sībawayh’s status is clearer. He was building on the pre-existing traditions of poetic transmission and the variant readings of the Quran:

Sībawayh inherited a linguistic tradition from a group of scholars already interested in the analysis of a pre-defined kind of Arabic. This nascent tradition obviously lacked the sophistication and robustness that would characterize it following Sībawayh; however, one cannot emphasize the matter strongly enough: Sībawayh did not begin from scratch. What he and the other early grammarians did was build around an already-established register of Arabic a sophisticated theoretical model of analysis.


609 Such an ‘idea’ of connection has often been explained in the secondary literature as *maʿnā* referring to grammatical function, rather than to lexical meaning, or underlying sense or purpose. For example: Carter, *Sibawayhi*, 69-72; Versteegh, "The Arabic Tradition," 241-244. My position, as laid out in the Introduction (especially at note 13), is that the different aspects of *maʿnā* in Sībawayh’s work represent different functions performed by the same concept (that of “idea” understood in opposition to “expression”), rather than different/separate concepts.
section titled “The Relationship of the Expression to the Idea” (Bāb al-Lafz li-l-Maʾnā), which is translated here in its entirety:

Know that their speech contains the variation of two expressions according to the variation of two ideas, the variation of two expressions while there is a single idea, and the agreement of two expressions while the two ideas differ. You will see this in what follows, God willing. Examples of the variation of two expressions according to the variation of two ideas are ‘he sat’ and ‘he went’. Examples of the variation of two expressions while there is a single idea are ‘he went’ and ‘he left’. Examples of the agreement of two expressions while the ideas differ are waġadta ʿalayhi (‘you were angry with him’) with regard to anger and waġadta (‘you found’) if you intended the finding of a lost sheep. There are many examples of this.610

“They” in the phrase “their speech” are Bedouin Arabs, whose use of Arabic Sībawayh, a native speaker of Persian, was engaged in recording and analysing. At the beginning of his comprehensive work on their language he addressed the existence of homonymy and synonymy in their vocabulary, and did so by using the pairing of expression and idea.611 It was an analytical division of language into two spheres that would continue to function throughout the next millenium of Arabic-language scholarship, just as we have seen it at work in the opening lines of al-Kitāb quoted above.

610 Sībawayh, Kitāb, 1:24 (1:7-8).
611 It should be noted that this passage (chapter four) is part of the seven-chapter introductory Risālah that comes at the start of al-Kitāb. The connection of this section to the rest of the Kitāb has been the subject of discussion. In a recent article, Noy has shown that at least one part of the Risālah (the sixth chapter on muḥāl) is inconsistent with the rest of the Kitāb, lending weight to the argument that the Risālah may represent the ideas that were established before Sībawayh, rather than his own analyses. In either case, for my purposes here the important thing is that lafz and maʾnā were used to analyse polysemy at a very early stage. Carter, Sibawayhi, 65-69; M. G. Carter, “The Origins of Arabic Grammar,” in The Early Islamic Grammatical Tradition, ed. Ramzi Baalbaki (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006), 7-9. 26; Avigail S. Noy, “Don’t be absurd: the term muḥāl in Sībawayhi’s Kitāb,” in Sībawayhi and Early Arabic Grammatical Theory, ed. Amal Elesha Marog (Leiden: Brill, forthcoming); Gregor Schoeler, The Oral and the Written in Early Islam, ed. James Montgomery (New York: Routledge, 2006). 20, 49; Talmon, "Naḥwiyyūn," 18 (note 20); Versteegh, Greek Elements, 17 (note 78).
Sībawayh also deals with semantic extension and brevity in terms of expression and idea. He devotes a section to Bedouin Arab use of verbal expressions that were out of kilter with their usual ideas, usually for the sake of concision. He gives examples from Bedouin speech, the Quran, and poetry. In all these cases, expressions that are intended to be understood are omitted, leaving a set of expressions that on its own does not convey the intent of the speaker. In order for the intent to be clear, and for the complete idea to be conveyed, the audience needs to know what is going on. The audience would know what was going on either because they were used to this Bedouin Arab speech practice and understood the full idea behind the limited expressions, or because they had read Sībawayh’s book in order to familiarise themselves with such idioms. As Sībawayh puts it, the idea can “come according to semantic extension and brevity because of the audience’s knowledge of the idea”.

Semantic extension is a situation in which the one-to-one correspondence between ideas and expression breaks down, and there is more going on at the level of the ideas than is directly represented on the level of the expressions. According to Quṭrub (Abū ‘Alī Muḥammad b. al-

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613 For example, for the phrase “two days were hunted on his account” (ṣīda ʿalayhi yawmānī) “the idea is in fact ‘the wild beast was hunted on his account for two days’ but the speaker has used semantic extension and abbreviated” (wa-innamā –l-ma’ nā šīda ʿalayhi –l-wahšu fī yawmaynī). Sībawayh, Kitāb, 1:211 (1:109).


615 For example, a line by Sāʿidah b. Ğu’ayyah al-Huḍālī (seventh century) includes the phrase “the fox kept close the path” by which “he intends ‘to the path’” (’asala –l-tarīqa aṭ-ṭa’ labu yurīdu fī-l-tarīq). Ibid., 1:214 (1:109).


617 Versteegh is right to point out that it is comparable to the distinction between literal and non-literal language that we have discussed above, in which non-literal language (maḡāz) represents all and any deviations from strict one-to-
Mustanīr, eighth century and likely a contemporary of Sībawayh in Basra), it was the motivation for Bedouin Arabs’ use of synonymy. Qutrūb gives the same three-part presentation of separate words, synonyms, and homonyms as Sībawayh, with additional examples in each category. He says that Bedouin Arabs used synonyms “to expand their speech and their expressions, just as they would alter the metre of their poetry in order to expand its structure without having to adhere to a single scheme”⁶¹⁸ Qutrūb evaluates semantic extension alongside the manipulation of metre as ways in which Bedouin Arabs would exploit the flexibility inherent in synonymy and metrics in order to make their language more eloquent. This is an early recognition that eloquence and creativity could be the result when the one-to-one correspondence between expression and idea broke down.

Creativity apart, this was an intellectual culture still in its infancy, and a great deal of taxonomical work still needed to be done only two hundred years or so after the birth of the Islamic community. This taxonomical work is reflected in the composition of Qutrūb’s from which I have just quoted. It is a collection of 207 Arabic words in which the expression can refer to two opposite meanings (addād, enantiosemic), a subsection of homonymy. They vary from commonplace dialectical variations such as ṭib meaning “sit” in Ḥimyaritic and “jump” in

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Arabic,\(^{619}\) to discussions of meaning that have explicit theological implications. For example, Quṭrub writes that the verb ẓanna (“to think”) can refer to either certainty or doubt. When God uses the verb ẓanna in the Quran for the words of those who enter heaven on the day of judgement: “I thought that I would indeed meet my reckoning”, then “this is certainty, and were it to be doubt, then the idea would be impermissible and would constitute unbelief. But it is certainty”.\(^{620}\)

Therefore, in the very first book on words with two or more opposite meanings the pattern is established. The polysemy inherent in language offers a hermeneutical opportunity that enables scholars to deal with theological difficulties. There would be many more works of this nature written in the decades to come.

**The Great Men of the Arabic Tradition\(^{621}\)**

With the major figures of aš-Šāfīʿī and al-Ǧāḥiẓ our story emerges into a world of more established texts, better-understood contexts, and more secondary literature. The recent work of Joseph Lowry, James Montgomery, David Vishanoff, Ahmed El-Shamsy,\(^{622}\) and others gives us

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\(^{619}\) Kofler, "Das Kitāb al-Addād," 264; Quṭrub, *Kitāb al-Addād*, 118. See note 365 for Ibn Fāris and as-Suyūṭī’s repetition of this report.


a relatively clear picture of the intellectual culture at the turn of the eighth and ninth centuries, whereas the intellectual context from which Sībawayh had produced *al-Kitāb* remains shrouded in relative mystery.

Aš-Šāfiʿī is a foundational figure of Islamic law, standing close to the very beginning of legal history in Arabic. He wrote that:

God addressed the Arabs with his book in their language. He did so because the Arabs knew the ideas behind their language. They knew that the language had semantic breadth (*ittisāʿ*), and that it was in God’s nature to address them in the Quran with explicit language of general application (*āmman zāhiran*) while intending that language to be indeed explicit, unrestricted, and independent of the words around it, or alternatively intending the explicit and unrestricted language to contain specificity (*al-ḥāṣṣ*) that rested on the surrounding words, or intending the explicit and unrestricted language to be in fact specific, or intending explicit language to be non-explicit, this being known from its context.

The Arabs begin their speech with expressions that clarify what follows, and they begin speech with expressions that need to be clarified by what follows.

The Arabs say something and they make the idea behind it understood without this being manifest in the expression. This is comparable to the way that they indicate something with a physical gesture. They consider this way of speaking to be the most elevated, because only those who know it can do it and those who are ignorant of it cannot.

The Arabs call a single thing many names, and they call many ideas with a single name.

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624 *innamā ḥāṭaba –llāhu bi-kitābihī –l- ’araba bi-lisānihā ’alā mā ta’rifu min maʾānīhā.*

625 *wa-takallamu bi-š-šayʾi tu’arīfuhū bi-l-maʾnā dāna –l-ʾidāḥi bi-l-lafz.*

A civilizationally-specific programme is in operation. Aš-Šāfiʿī describes how God spoke ambiguously to his chosen people the Arabs in his revelation, confident in the knowledge that they would be able to understand the Quran because they were already talking to each other in allusions and ellipses. Polysemy was a fact of Arabic, and aš-Šāfiʿī, as a member of the Arabic-language community, was confident in his ability to negotiate the apparent ambiguity that it caused. Arabic language “carries multiple potential ideas” (muḥtamilan li-l-maʿānī), and key terms can be homonymous: the word bayān (clear, clarity) is a “noun comprising several convergent basic ideas which are, however, divergent in their details”. This description of homonymy as a noun that comprises (ismun ġāmiʿ un) ideas had already appeared in the work of Abū Ḥanīfah.

Montgomery and Lowry agree that al-Ḡāḥiẓ, whose discussions of expression and idea we have already encountered, was aware of and engaged with aš-Šāfiʿī’s ar-Risālah. Al-Ḡāḥiẓ repeats aš-Šāfiʿī’s definition of bayān, albeit in somewhat more evocative language: “bayān is a noun that comprises everything that throws open to you the veil of the idea”. This comes in a section that started with the statement that ideas “subsist in the hearts of people, conceived in

627 Vishanoff argues productively that ambiguity is “the central theme” of aš-Šāfiʿī’s Risālah. ———, Islamic Hermeneutics, 15-65, 51, 238.


630 See note 599. Another term of aš-Šāfiʿī’s, ġumlah, is more central to the Risālah’s discussion of ambiguity. It is opposed to naṣṣ (unambiguous and self-sufficient) and means language that in itself gathers together (ġamala) multiple interpretative options. It has been analysed by Vishanoff as an aspect of polysemy, but Lowry’s suggestion that it refers to the need to gather the text together with the other texts required to understand it is persuasive. Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 104f (note 80); Vishanoff, Islamic Hermeneutics, 55f.

631 See note 528. Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 51f; Montgomery, "al-Bayān wa al-Tabyīn," 102f.

632 wa-l-bayānu –ismun ġāmiʿ un li-kulli šayʾ in kašafa laka qināʾ a –l-maʿānā. al-Ḡāḥiẓ, al-Bayān wa-t-Tabyīn, 1:76; Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 52.
their minds”, 633 and he then says that there are five ways in which these ideas are indicated, of which the expression (al-lafz) is only one. The other four are the physical gesture (al-išārah), counting with numbers (al-’aqd), writing (al-ḥaṭṭ), and context (al-ḥālu –llatī tusammā niṣbatan). 634 Elsewhere, in the context of God teaching language to Adam, al-Ǧāḥiẓ writes that a name (ism) must consist of the combination of an expression and an idea for it to be meaningful. 635 The implication is exactly that laid out by Ragib centuries later: language is the combination of expressions and ideas. 636

The difference between aš-Šāfiʿī and al-Ǧāḥiẓ, as Montgomery and Lowry are aware, 637 is that the former is working on a hermeneutic for the interpretation of divine revelation while the latter is putting forward a theory of communication that applies to both humans and God. Montgomery attributes this difference to al-Ǧāḥiẓ’s greater regard for the role of human reason, but I would rather place weight on their respective genres. Adab works inevitably pull in quotations and ideas from a broad range of disciplines, but more importantly it is the very ideal

634 Ibid., 1:76.
635 wa-l-smu bi-lā maʾnan laqwun ... wa-lā yakānu –l-lafzu -sman illā wa-huwa muḍammanun bi-maʾnan wa-qad yakānu –l-maʾnā wa-lā –sma lahū wa-yakānu –sman illā wa-lahū maʾnan. ———, "Risālah fi-l-Gidd wa-l-Hazl," in Rasāʿ il al-Ǧāḥiẓ, ed. 'Abd as-Salām Muḥammad Hārūn (Cairo: Maktabat al-Ḥānūf, 1965). Cf. Behzadi, Sprache und Verstehen, 110-111. I believe that Naṣr Ḥāmid Abū Zayd misreads al-Ǧāḥiẓ here, writing that if the ism must contain a maʾnā then “we can infer that al-Ǧāḥiẓ uses maʾnā to refer to the relationship between the ism and the musammā” (my emphasis). However, as al-Ǧāḥiẓ has already said (see note 633), ideas are in people’s minds. It is intent that makes the connections between ideas and external physical reality. Abū Zayd, al-ITTIGâH AL- ‘AQlÎ FÎ T-Tafsîr, 84-85; Larkin, The Theology of Meaning, 33.
636 My discussion of Ragib’s position on the composition of language started at page 109, and my translation of his discussion of God teaching language to Adam at page 123.
637 Lowry writes that “[t]he relationship between Jâḥiẓ’s discussion of the bayān and that of Shāfiʿī remains puzzling, however, since Shāfiʿī focuses on revealed texts, and Jâḥiẓ on … a general theory of communication”. Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 54. Montgomery describes the difference as being between aš-Šāfiʿī’s “salvationist deontology” (thereby focusing on the purpose of his hermeneutic) and al-Ǧāḥiẓ’s “axiology – a theory of ultimate values – in which man’s reasoning intellect dominates: man has to decide how he should live”. Montgomery, ’al-Bayān wa al-Tabyīn," 103.
of language excellence and language performance that lies at the heart of adab itself: to be an adīb is to not just know things, but to say them and say them well. This concern forces al-Ḡāḥīz, and Ragīb over a century later, to deal with language as something that is produced as well as something that is interpreted. Aš-Šāfī’ī had no such motivation, but hermeneutics was difficult enough on its own.

Whatever the divisions of genre and scope, everyone agreed that language could be ambiguous and that polysemy was an inevitable part of that ambiguity. A consensus was also starting to develop that the primary epistemological tool for dealing with the resultant problems was the pairing of expression and idea. Sībawayh used lafẓ and maʿnā to explain homonymy and synonymy, but as we can see from Abū Ḥanīfah, Muqātīl, aš-Šāfī’ī, and others, this terminology was not uniform. Abū Ḥanīfah and aš-Šāfī’ī discussed homonymy by pairing “idea” (maʿnā) with “word” (ism). Aš-Šāfī’ī used the pairing of expression (lafẓ) and idea when he was dealing with Hadith: the transmission of reports of what the Prophet said can be accurate right down to the expressions themselves (lafẓ), or just accurate with regard to the ideas behind the expressions (maʿnā).638

The pairing of expression and idea that Sībawayh used to describe single words and their polysemy therefore works for Hadith just as well as it works for poetry. And aš-Šāfī’ī used expression and idea to deal with both.639 This means that by the first few decades of the ninth century, the core of the Arabic Language Tradition had been established and was in wide


639 For example, when explaining that šatr (direction) in Quran 2:150 means giḥah (the same) he cites four lines of poetry containing the word šatr from early and pre-Islamic poets and notes that šatr, giḥah, and tilqā “are all a single idea albeit expressed by different expressions” (wa-inna kullahā maʿnā wāḥidan wa-in kānat bi-alfāzīn muhtalifah). ———, *ar-Risālah*, 34f (#105f). Cf. Montgomery’s argument that this constituted a challenge to the “antiquarian study by philologists and grammarians of the poetry of the desert Arabs”. Montgomery, ”*al-Bayān wa al-Tabyīn,“* 104.
circulation. Language was assumed to be ambiguous, and its ambiguity was conceived of through the duality of expressions and ideas. This was true whether one was writing literature or law. Our next two figures, Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal and Ibn Qutaybah, show what scholars started to do with these concepts.

Ibn Ḥanbal, like aš-Ṣāfiʿī, used the pairing of expression and idea for the wording of a Hadith and the idea behind it: “this is the exact wording of Ḥabīb b. Ṣandal’s Hadith, and the idea behind both these expressions and his is the same”. When it came to theology, and his famous interrogation by the political authorities about the created or uncreated status of the Quran:

Ibn Ḥanbal’s polemic strategy was to demonstrate that his opponents quoted problematic verses which had multiple meanings and therefore could not be used as proof… Thus, he sought to expose the multiple meanings or lack of clarity of these verses.641

Nimrod Hurvitz put this well. Ibn Ḥanbal assumed, and exploited, linguistic ambiguity. As we have seen, by the mid-ninth century the intellectual culture in which he was working was used to doing the same. The Muʿtazilī interrogators of Ibn Ḥanbal assumed that words were not ambiguous: they cited Quran 43:3 (az-Zuḥruf) “we made it a Quran” and asked “isn’t everything


641 Hurvitz, The Formation of Hanbalism, 141. The work in question (Ibn Hanbal, "ar-Radd," 69-72.) was written by Ibn Ḥanbal’s son, Ḥabīb b. Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Ḥanbal (Abū ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān, d. 290/903). Livnat Holtzmann’s citation of both ad-Dāhābī’s statement that it was incorrectly attributed (mawdūʿ) to Ibn Ḥanbal and ad-Dāhābī’s editor Ṣuʿayb al-Arnaʾū’s agreement with that judgement implies a greater risk of unreliability than is in fact the case. Ad-Dāhābī himself does not equivocate in the slightest in his attribution of it to Ḥabīb b. Ḥanbal, who like his father was an eighth-century scholar. ad-Dāhābī, Siyar, 11:287, 13:523; Livnat Holtzman, “Aḥmad b. Hanbal,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, THREE, ed. Gudrun Krämer, Denis Matringe, John Nawas, and Everett Rowson (Brill Online: Brill, 2011); Hurvitz, The Formation of Hanbalism, 4. For an example of what may be switches in voice between father and son (qāla –l-imāmu Aḥmad ... fa-kāna mimmā balağa hā di ...), see: Ibn Ḥanbal, "ar-Radd," 64-65.
that is made created?” Ibn Ḥanbal cited Quran 21:58 “we made them into fragments” and Quran 105:5 (al-Fīl) “he made them into dry eaten leaves of corn” and asked “did he create them? Is every made thing a created thing? How can the Quran be created when [we know from ‘we made it a Quran’ that] it was made beforehand?” The interrogator, a judge who believed the Quran to be created, was silent in the face of this exploitation of polysemy.642

Ibn Qutaybah is a tremendously important figure.643 His is the first ouevre we have seen in this chapter that combines grammar, lexicography, theology, exegesis, law, adab, Hadith, and poetics. It is a range of intellectual interests that (with the exception of Hadith) mirrors Ragib’s, and the two scholars, separated by over a century, share a certain orientation within the disciplines in which they worked. Ibn Qutaybah, like Ragib, saw himself as subscribing to a traditional way of thinking that had started with Ibn Ḥanbal, rejected theology as both needlessly innovative and incoherent, nevertheless was prepared to engage in theological reasoning, and maintained a belief in the need for unquestioning acceptance of certain unknowable aspects of the divine.644


644 In his al-Iḥtilāf fī-l-Lafẓ wa-r-Radd ʿalā al-Gahmīyah wa-l-Muṣabbihah (The Disagreement about the Expression [of the Quran] and the Rebuttal of the Followers of Ǧahm and the Anthropomorphists) Ibn Qutaybah praises the ahl al-hadīṯ, notes that despite their good qualities they remain divided over the status of human expressions of the Quran, both apologises for and stresses the need for the subsequent theological discussion, states that predestination is God’s secret, and stresses that justice that applies between humans cannot be applied to God. Abū Muḥammad ʿAbdallāh Ibn Qutaybah, "al-Iḥtilāf fī-l-Lafẓ wa-r-Radd ʿalā al-Gahmīyah wa-l-Muṣabbihah," in ʿAqāʾ id as-Salaf, ed. ʿAlī Sāmī an-Naṣšār and ʿAmmār aṭ-Ṭālibī (Alexandria: al-Maʿārif, 1971), 224-226. As we have seen above,
Ibn Qutaybah uses polysemy, and an assumed theory of meaning in which intent links expression and idea, to solve certain hermeneutical problems. The question of whether or not human expressions (i.e. vocalizations, *alfāẓ*) of the words of the Quran are created is solved as follows:

The mean position with regard to the disagreement about the recitation and the expression of the Quran is that ‘recitation’ is a single expression comprising two ideas. One idea is the action of reciting, and the other idea is ‘Quran’… the Quran subsists in the action of recitation and that action is the movement of the tongue and the mouth with the Quran, an action that is created. The thing that is being recited is the Quran, and it is uncreated. 645

Ibn Qutaybah continues with an analogy in which two men take their quarrel over whether a hot coal is a “fire” or “a substance” to a jurist who says to each one of them in turn: “you are correct, but the thing that you mention has two ideas and you have only used one of them”. Ibn Qutaybah concludes that “the ‘hot coal’ is like the ‘recitation’ because it is a name that gathers together two meanings”. 646 The argument is therefore a lexicographical one: there are words that mean more than one thing, and we have identified them. Sure enough, in his manual on language usage for the scribal class, *Adab al-Kātib*, Ibn Qutaybah has a section on the *addād* (“calling two

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645 My emphasis.

646 Ragib makes many of the same points. For example, that predestination is God’s secret: note 334.

Ibid., 248. The arguments over *lafẓ al-qur‘ān* were indeed an internal Hanbali dispute, evocatively described by Hurvitz as an internal purge following their victory over the Muʿtazilah. Hurvitz, *The Formation of Hanbalism*, 152-157.

oppose things with a single name”) that enumerates them in order to enable proper usage and avoid confusion.\footnote{———, \textit{Adab al-Kātib}, ed. Max Grünert (Leiden: Brill, 1900; repr., Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1967). 230-233.}

However, Ibn Qutaybah does not use the pairing of expression and idea to describe the aḍdād, and the theory of meaning constituted by that pairing does not dominate his hermeneutical work. This is despite the fact that his two books \textit{Taʾwīl Muḥtalif al-Ḥadīṯ} and \textit{Taʾwīl Muškil al-Qurʾān}, on the interpretation of controversial Hadith and difficult Quran respectively, explicitly aim to manage and negotiate linguistic ambiguity. Although in the work on Hadith he uses \textit{maʾnā} for the idea behind a Quranic verse or Hadith, and explains the intensity of friendship referred to in a phrase as: “he did not intend, with this speech act [x] … but rather he intended [y] …”,\footnote{…lā yurīdu bi-hādā –l-qawli maʾnā ṣuḥbati aṣḥābihī … wa-innamā yurīdu annahū… ———, \textit{Taʾwīl Muḥtalif al-Ḥadīṯ}, 92. Cf. Ibid., 116, 168.} the theory of meaning therein is by no means central to his hermeneutic and the terms \textit{lafẓ} and \textit{maʾnā} never appear together.\footnote{This observation is borne out by Lowry, "Legal Hermeneutics."} The same is true of his work on the Quran, where \textit{maʾnā} is the idea behind a speech act, a Quranic verse, or the grammatical function of a word and the term \textit{lafẓ} appears sporadically in the same contexts.\footnote{For example: “people would err with regard to both the expression[s] of that line of poetry, and the idea behind it” (\textit{an-nāṣu yaḡlaṭūna fi-lafẓi hāḏā –l-baytī wa-maʾnāhu}). Ibn Qutaybah, \textit{Taʾwīl Muškil al-Qurʾān}, 96. Cf. Ibid., 280f.}

The potential of the pairing of expression and idea is only realised in Ibn Qutaybah’s \textit{adab} and his poetics. Specifically, it is realised in contexts where Ibn Qutaybah lays out the structure of a field of enquiry. In the section of his \textit{adab} manual devoted to correcting linguistic error he explains near-synonymy, near-homonymy, and the relationships of grammatical functions to
morphology by tracking variations on the level of expressions, and then on the level of ideas. \footnote{Near synonymy is when both the expressions and their ideas are similar and there is potential for confusion, and near-homonymy is when the expressions are similar but the ideas are different. ——, Adab al-Kāthib, 333f.}

In the critical introduction to his poetic anthology he divides poetry into four, according to the quality of the expressions and the quality of the ideas. Poets achieve success in both expression and idea, or they fail because either their expressions are beautiful while the ideas behind them are vapid, or their ideas are powerful but the expressions fail to do them justice, or finally both their expressions and ideas are defective. \footnote{“darbun minhu ḥasuna lafzuhū wa-ḡāda maʾnāhu ... wa-darbun minhu ḥasuna lafzuhū wa-ḥalā fa-iḏā anta fattaṣṭahū lam taḡid hunāka fāʿidatan fi-l-māʾ nā ... wa-darbun minhu ḡāda maʾnāhu wa-qassarat alfāẓuhū ṣanhu ... wa-darbun minhu taʾāḥāra maʾnāhu wa-taʾāḥāra lafzuhū. ———, aš-Šiʾr wa-š-Suʾarāʾ, 12 in 1 vols. (Beirut: Dār at-Ṭaqaʿfah, 1964). 12-15.}

This use of the pairing of expression and idea is significant. It is the first time in this narrative that we have seen the binary used as a way to structure one’s thoughts and to explain the way that mind and language interact. The pairing is moving from being a terminological assumption used in thinking about grammar, or a conceptual assumption about polysemy that assists with hermeneutics, to being a theory of meaning in the full sense of the word “theory”: “[a] conception or mental scheme of something to be done”. \footnote{“Theory, n.1,” in OED Online (Oxford University Press, June 2011).}

My reading here is confirmed by the way that Ibn Qutaybah introduced his division of poetry: “I have contemplated poetry and subsequently found it to be of four types”. \footnote{My emphasis. tadabbartu –š-ṣiʾ ra fa-waḡadṭuhū arbaʾ ata aḍrub. ———, aš-Šiʾr wa-š-Suʾarāʾ, 12.}

**The Theorists**

Ṣībawayh’s fully-formed theory of syntax and morphology simply assumed that the pairing of expression and idea was the appropriate way to understand the difference between the word on
page or lips, and the grammatical function it performed. His contemporaries working on theology and scripture assumed that the exploitation of linguistic ambiguity was a legitimate hermeneutic. Poetry was ever-present in grammar, theology, and exegesis throughout the first centuries of Islamicate intellectual endeavour, both as a source of linguistic precedent, and as a catalyst for thinking about language and imagery. For example, Abū al-ʿAmayṭal (ʿAbdallāh b. Ḥulayd, d. 240/854) was both a successful poet and, at the same time, the author of a work on homonymy that enumerated the different meanings of over three hundred words with poetic examples. It is not hard to imagine that this work of lexicography was designed to facilitate the imagination and wordplay of poets, including himself.655

Sībawayh’s fully-formed theory of grammar, containing a theory of meaning based on expression and idea, appears to have come out of a vacuum. In the absence of further manuscript discoveries, or sources that will allow us to identify the shadowy “grammarians” he mentioned in al-Kitāb, all we know with relative certainty is that the culture the Islamic conquests brought out of the Arabian desert and into the new garrison towns of Kufa and Basra was a literary one, with a well-developed tradition of poetry at its political and artistic core. Little more than a century after those two towns were founded, that literary culture was engaged in the production of theory.

In subsequent centuries, when theories began to be constructed outside the discipline of grammar, they were naturally influenced by the language-obsessed culture in which they grew. For example, aš-Šāfīʿī took the oratory and poetry of the Bedouin Arabs as proof of a linguistic

ambiguity that he made into the central claim, and the primary recourse, of his legal hermeneutic. In Ibn Qutaybah’s theory of poetic quality we have one of the first attempts to bring taxonomical and methodological coherence to poetry in the same way that aš-Šāfīʿī had brought it to the derivation of the law. A new stage of intellectual production was beginning, and theories were becoming more popular. Instead of the reactive hermeneutics of early theologians such as Abū Ḥanīfah and the exegetical and Hadith work of even Ibn Qutaybah, and in place of the free-wheeling associative adab with its hidden and subtle structures of al-Ǧāḥiẓ, we have organised conscious reflection on disciplines, their contents, and the theories necessary to make sense of them.656

In the works of the scholars of the tenth century there are arguments about which theories of language are best. Take, for example, Ibn Durustawayh (Abū Muḥammad ‘Abdallāh, 258/871-346/957):

In his Commentary on ‘The Eloquent Man’, in which the different ideas behind the expression ‘he found’ are discussed, Ibn Durustawayh said:

‘This expression (‘he found’) is one of the strongest proofs adduced by those who claim that the Bedouin Arab language contains homonyms. Sībawayh discussed homonymy at the start of his al-Kitāb and made it one of his initial principles.

Those who fail to contemplate the level of ideas, and fail to investigate the actual connections between expressions and ideas, suppose that it is a single expression that has come to have multiple different ideas behind it. However, the ideas behind this expression are in fact all the same: the idea of attaining something whether for good or bad’. 657

656 This dynamic has been noted and analysed by more than one scholar. See, for example: Wolfhart Heinrichs, "The Classification of the Sciences and the Consolidation of Philology in Classical Islam," in Centres of Learning: Learning and Location in Pre-Modern Europe and the Near East, ed. Jan Willem Drijvers and A A MacDonald (Leiden / New York: Brill, 1995).

657 Ibn Durustawayh’s commentary (Šarḥ al-Faṣīḥ) on The Eloquent Man (al-Faṣīḥ) by Ṭa’lab is lost, and this
Ibn Durustawayh is engaged in a polemical modification of the concept of homonymy. He chooses the same example (the word wağada, “he found”) that Sībawayh used to explain homonymy at the start of al-Kitāb, and uses it to argue that this is not a matter of a single expression denoting multiple ideas but rather of an expression denoting a single idea that can itself be used in different ways. This contradicts the more usual understanding of the polysemous lexicon as being one in which the multiple and independent ideas behind expressions are enumerated. Enantiosemy (aḍdād), in which these multiple ideas actually contradict each other, is therefore the most extreme type of homonymy. If Ibn Durustawayh denied homonymy he must have also denied enantiosemy, and we know from his reference to a work of his (now lost) titled On the Invalidity of Enantiosemy that this was indeed the case.

The question of whether aḍdād did indeed exist in Arabic was a live issue among the tenth-century theorists. Ibn al-Anbārī (Muḥammad b. al-Qāsim, d. 328/940) wrote in the introduction to his Kitāb al-Aḍdād that expressions with two opposite meanings were a characteristic of quotation is preserved in as-Suyūṭī, al-Muzhir, 1:384. Cf. Kanazi, Studies, 204-205 (note 5); as-Suyūṭī, Buɣyat al-Wū ‘āh, 2:36. We learn from as-Suyūṭī’s Bugyah that Ibn Durustawayh was thought to have been a companion of al-Mubarrad (for whom see note 364) and to have met ibn Qutaybah. The text translated above reads:

Ibn Durustawayh goes on to explain that lexicographers have been confused by the variant verbal nouns (maṣādir) that exist for a particular root (w-ğ-d has at least seven: wağd, ǧidah, wuğd, wuğād, wiğdān, ǧiḏān, and mawğidah), have incorrectly associated them with different objects of the verb in reality, and have failed to comprehend the complex subtleties of their morphological derivations. Sure enough, this is exactly what Sībawayh’s teacher and the first extant lexicographer, al-Ḥaḍib b. Aḥmad al-Farāḥīdī (d. 175/791), did in his Kitāb al-ʿAyn: wağd is connected to sorrow, mawğidah is connected to anger, and wiğdān and ǧiḏān are connected to attaining something. Ibn Aḥmad al-Farāḥīdī al-Ḥaḍib, Kitāb al-ʿAyn, ed. Mahdi Maḥžūmi and İbrahim Sāmarrā’ī, 8 in 4 vols. (Baghdad: Wizārat aṯ-ʾaqāfah wa-l-Iʿlām, 1980). 6:169; as-Suyūṭī, al-Muzhir, 1:384. Cf. Ragib, for whom w-ğ-d is an opportunity to draw another dividing line between a word’s application to God and its application to humans: Ragib, Quranic Glossary, 854.

658 See page 207.
Arabic as spoken by the Bedouin Arabs, that they were a subset of homonymy, and that their linguistic context (the other words surrounding them) would always enable the correct meaning to be understood. He also refers to unnamed “others” who maintained, as did Ibn Durustawayh, that words referring to two contradictory ideas should in fact be understood as referring to a single principle idea within the semantic breadth of which the two different variants could then interact with each other.

The best known exponent of this theory, that the multifarious meanings of almost every root in Arabic can be traced back to a single principle, is Ibn Fāris (Abū al-Ḥusayn Ahmad, d. 395/1004). His dictionary, *Muʿam Maqāyīs al-Luğah* (Dictionary of the Gauges of the Lexicon), states these principles for every single root it includes. Ibn Fāris is clearly motivated by the desire to minimize the number of principles per root, and in the great majority of cases does indeed confine each root’s range of meanings to a single principle. In the case of the root *w-*ğ-*d* dealt with by Sībawayh and Ibn Durustawayh, he writes that these three letters in this order “indicate a single principle – finding something”.

Ibn al-Anbārī also commented on the controversy over whether synonyms really existed in Arabic, or whether in fact each apparent synonym actually had a subtly different meaning. He quotes Quṭrub as saying that the Bedouin Arabs’ use of synonyms was a rhetorical flourish designed to show the semantic breadth of their language. Some fifty years later, Ragib’s

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661 Ibid., 1-4.


contemporary Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī (al-Ḥasan b. ʿAbdallāh, d. ca. 1010) would write a book explicitly designed to show the subtle inflections in meaning that enabled him to deny the existence of any synonyms.\footnote{al-Ḥasan b. ʿAbdallāh Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī, \textit{al-Furūq al-Luḡawīyah} (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīyah, 2006).}

In all these lexical discussions, there was also often a latent political angle: what was the status of the intellectual inheritance from the desert Bedouin Arabs? Were they to be praised for their poetry and facility with language, or condescended to for a damaging inexactness in expression? Ibn al-Anbārī is clear: the Bedouin Arabs manipulated context so skillfully that the multi-faceted words they used never in fact resulted in ambiguity.\footnote{Ibn al-Anbārī, \textit{Kitāb al-Aḍḍād}, 1-2. This cultural and political argument over the status of the new civilization’s Bedouin Arab heritage vis-à-vis its contacts with more established Persianate cultures was widespread in the eighth and ninth centuries. It is usually referred to as the Šuʿūbīyah controversy. See: C. E. Bosworth, "Shuʿūbiyya," in \textit{Encyclopedia of Arabic literature}, ed. Julie Scott Meisami and Paul Starkey (London / New York: Routledge, 1998).}

In the quotation above, Ibn Durustawayh complained about the failure of scholars to “contemplate the level of ideas”.\footnote{\textit{man lam yataʾmmal l-maʿānī}. See page 221.} This concept, in which the pairing of expression and idea is used to make a distinction between two different strategies for thinking, is something that we have already seen in Ragib.\footnote{See the section “Metaphorical Readings” on page 191.} For Ragib, thinking of language as composed of both expressions and ideas was useful in exegesis and theology because one can then choose to either follow God’s ideas or God’s expressions while remaining faithful at all times to God’s language. For Ibn Durustawayh it was useful in lexicography. For the major theorist Ibn Ġinnī (Abū al-Faṭḥ ʿUṯmān, d. 392/1002) it enabled him to distinguish the different ways in which Sībawayh had constructed his grammatical theory. The pairing of expression and idea performs the same
function in lexicography, theology, exegesis, and grammar; it facilitates the distinction between form and content.

Language, for Ibn Ğinnī, was “every expression that is self-sufficient in its communication of the idea behind it”. He explained that the chapter on homonyms in his al-Ḥaṣāʾiṣ (The Properties [of Arabic]) does not deal with divergent ideas behind single expressions in the way that discussions about, for example, the different ways that wağada can be used “appear a great deal in the books of the lexicographers”. Instead, he was dealing with “the level behind that .. [which is] formulated in the souls of the words”. This referred to the grammatical idea or function behind each morphological component (the vowels and letters) of a word.

Ibn Ğinnī made the following statement about the way Sibawayh thought in a particular case: “explanation according to the idea, not according to the expression”. According to Ibn Ğinnī, Sibawayh was not looking at morphological rules and patterns when he put forward the proposal in question but rather at the mental associations made by language users. Sibawayh had explained that the kasrah (“i”) vowel at the end of the word fağāri (a proper name: “Vice”) was

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668 ammā –l-kalāmū fa-kullū lafżin mustaqillin bi-nafṣihī muḍīdin li-ma’nāhu. Ibn Ğinnī, al-Ḥaṣāʾiṣ, 1:17. He was talking about language, or more exactly about meaningful speech: that which made sense on its own; a sentence or clause.


670 wa-innamā ġaraḍunā hunā mā warā ʿuhū ... al-maṣūḡatu fi anfusi –l-kalim. Ibid.

671 taḥsīrun ʿalā ʿaṭīqi –l-maʾ nā laʾ alā ʿaṭīqi –l-lafẓ. Ibid., 2:198-199. Ibn Ğinnī was not the first to make this sort of judgement in the field of grammar. Ibn as-Sarrāḡ (Muḥammad b. Sahl, d. 316/928) made the same statement about Quran 7:59 and 11:50 (Hūd): mā lakum min ilāhin ġayruhū (or ġayrīhī in the variant readings of Abū Jaʿfar Yazīd b. al-Qa qā (d. 130/747) and Alī b. Ḥanẓa al-Kisāʾī (d. 189/804)). Ibn as-Sarrāḡ wrote that the reading ġayruhū was according to the ma nā and the reading ġayrīhī was according to the lafẓ. Versteegh notes that “ma nā is identical with the underlying level” and that this usage may well follow the use of ma nā to paraphrase or reconstruct the intention of a Quranic verse. This example was also used by Frank. Frank, "Meanings ", 312; Muḥammad b. Sahl Ibn as-Sarrāḡ, al-Uṣūl fi-n-Nahw, ed. ‘Abd al-Ḥusayn al-Fatlı, 4 vols. (Beirut: Muʿassasat ar-Risālah, 1996). 1:94; Royal Aal al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought, "Altafsir.com," http://www.altafsir.com/Recitations.asp; Versteegh, "The Arabic Tradition," 245.
the result of the Bedouin Arabs’ association of what is actually a noun with the ending of a hypothetical verb in the feminine.672

Ibn Ğinnī also engaged in a more exact description of the level of ideas. He made a distinction between two types of functions that occur behind expressions, one of which was strictly grammatical, and the other of which he identified as idea (maʿnā). He distinguished between the level of grammatical reconstruction and supplementation needed to explain the declension of an expression (taqdir al-iʿrāb) and the level of reconstruction that explains the idea, context, and intent behind an expression (tafsīr al-maʿnā). In the former, the elided word that is re-supplied fits into the case structure of the sentence, whereas in the latter, the reconstruction does not reproduce the case structure that motivated it in the first place. The exegesis of the idea behind an expression is a mental reconstruction, whereas simple grammatical reconstruction reconfigures the text (and its expressions).673

672 In the chapter in question (bāb mā āʾa maʿdūlūn ʿan ḥaddīhī min –l-muʾanna) Sībawayh is describing how masculine proper names (diptotes that do not fully decline) can be derived, against their own grammatical principles (maʿdūlūn ʿan waḥkīhi wa-aṣlihī), as feminine on the pattern faʿāli. In some cases, the final kasrah comes from the yāʾ found on the feminine singular imperative (ifʿalī) and in other cases Sībawayh argues that it should be traced back to the feminine gender of the verbal noun. The example that Ibn Ğinnī picks up on, faʿāri, is according to Sībawayh derived from the feminine verbal noun al-faṭrah. The proof texts are, of course, poetry. Sībawayh, Kitāb, 3:270-274, 274 (2:36-38, 38).

673 An example of taqdir al-iʿrāb is the phrase ahlaka wa-layla (*“your people and the night!”*), the grammatical reconstruction of which is ilḥak ahlaka wa-sābiq –l-layla (*“find your people and outstrip the night!” i.e. get to them before nightfall*). The addition of the two transitive verbs both explains and fits the accusative case in which the two objects in the original sentence were placed. Ibn Ğinnī, al-Ḥasāʾ is, 1:279. An example of tafsīr al-maʿnā is the phrase darabtu zaydan sawṭan (*“I struck Zayd a stick!”*) the idea behind which is darabtuhū darbatan bi-sawṭin (*“I struck him a blow with a stick”*). This idea makes sense, but according to Ibn Ğinnī it does not represent an accurate taqdir al-iʿrāb, which would be darabtuhū darbata sawṭin (*“I struck him a blow of stick”*) because the taqdir al-iʿrāb reconstruction strategy requires in this case that the word which governs the case in sawṭin must be the word that had been elided and is to be supplied (ḥaḍf al-harf as opposed to ḥaḍf harf al-gharr (*“elision of the preposition governing the genitive”* which is less favoured)). Therefore, the taqdir al-iʿrāb of darabtu zaydan sawṭan is darabtuhū darbata sawṭin but the more meaningful tafsīr al-maʿnā of the same phrase is darabtuhū darbatan bi-sawṭin. Ibid., 1:284. Cf. al-ʿUrǧānī’s maʿānī an-naḥw: Larkin, The Theology of Meaning, 54. Al-ʿUrǧānī also discusses this exact example in his Aṣrāʾ, concluding that the grammarians’ reconstruction is “the original [level of] language that may be forgotten and copied over (…mā kānaʿ alayhi –l-kalāmī fi aṣlihi wa-anna qad nusiya wa-nusiḥa)”. al-ʿUrǧānī, Aṣrāʾ al-Balāghah, 330.
This is important evidence of critical thinking about the pairing of expression and idea, and about the different functions that the idea had come to discharge both in grammar, and in broader accounts of language. It is a distinction that also appears in the work of Ibn Ğinnī’s predecessor az-Zağgāğı (Abū al-Qāsim ‘Abd ar-Raḥmān, d. ca. 337/948), albeit with less terminological precision. Az-Zağgāğı wrote that Sībawayh’s use of expressions and ideas to analyse polysemy at the start of al-Kitāb should be read as a referring to both the ideas behind expressions of case inflection and the ideas behind expressions of whole words. Ibn Ğinnī would then say that the first type of ideas were accessed by taqḍīr al-iʿrāb, and the second type by tafsīr al-maʿnā.

Finally, in a division that parallels the one Ragib would later make between language that indicates things with proper nouns and language that indicates ideas through polysemy, Ibn Ğinnī writes:

If you were to ask why proper names seldom refer to ideas and more often refer to external physical things such as Zayd, Ğaʿfar, and all individuals that have a name, then the answer would be that external physical things are more easily sensed and more clearly witnessed. They are more amenable to naming than that which can neither be seen nor sensed, but rather must be contemplated and deduced without the knowledge that inevitably comes from direct witness.

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674 Therefore, just as “he went” and “he sat” are two different expressions with two different ideas behind them, the visible difference in the case of “your brother” in akramānī aḥāka (“your brother honoured me”) and akramtu aḥāka (“I honoured your brother”) constitutes two different expressions with two different ideas behind them. Abū al-Qāsim az-Zağgāğı, al-Īḍāḥ fī ʿIlal an-Naḥw, ed. Māzin al-Mubārak (Cairo: Dār al-ʿArūbah, 1959). 137-138.

675 See page 166.

676 The text reads:


Ibn Ğinnī, al-Ḥaṣāʾīṣ, 2:200.
Ibn Ğinnī now appears to us both as a member of the generation of theorists that took a basic theory of meaning, and assumptions about the management of linguistic ambiguity, to a whole new level of sophistication, and as someone whose ideas about language may have been influential on Ragib. As we have seen in the preceding chapters, Ragib translated the grammatical theory of scholars like Ibn Ğinnī into a philosophy of language and a theory of meaning that could work across the genres of exegesis, theology, and poetics.

There is neither time nor space here for us to review the vast swathe of theories and disputes about language that took place among Ragib’s predecessors and contemporaries in the tenth and eleventh centuries. The major figures dealt with above provide sufficient evidence that the turn towards theory had taken place, and that the pairing of expression and idea was at the centre of all the discussions of language in the Arabic Language Tradition. It was accompanied by the iterative process of negotiating linguistic ambiguity. To conclude this section I will now refer in brief to three scholars who had particularly notable theories in poetics and legal theory, and one man who came after Ragib but cast such a great shadow that he cannot be omitted from any historical review of the philosophy of language in Arabic.

In the tenth and eleventh-centuries legal theory was developing into an independent discipline, one that would achieve its full potential in the madrasa from the twelfth century onwards. In the two hundred years after aš-Šāfī’i’s death, however, legal theory had both a distinct identity and a particular approach to language. Ragib’s slightly younger contemporary, the Mu’tazī Abū al-Ḥusayn al- Başrī (Muḥammad b. ʿAlī, d. 436/1044), clarified this self-conscious identity. He argued that legal theory needed to be separated from extraneous detailed
discourses about the nature and classification of knowledge, and stated that the subject matter of legal theory was divinely revealed judgements (aḥkām šarʿīyah).

Legal theory was therefore the process of establishing the hermeneutical principles that would enable jurists to read divine revelation and determine its judgements. The theories of language that it contained did not speak to any concerns broader than the extraction of actionable legal information from text and speech. However, even that limited goal did catalyse sustained theorizing on language, and we can see this in the work of the tenth-century legal theorist al-Ğaşšāṣ. Every hermeneutical device and division is described in terms of the relationship between expression and idea, from general versus specific reference (ʿāmm and ḥāṣṣ), to the literal and non-literal (ḥaqīqah and mağāz), and of course polysemy. An expression can encompass two ideas, one of which is literal and the other non-literal, or one of which is unequivocal (ṣarīḥ) and the other allusive (kināyah).

Intent was critical in determining what the speaker meant. Al-Ğaşšāṣ reports his teacher, Abū al-Ḥasan al-Karḫī (ʿUbaydallāh b. al-Ḥusayn, d. 340/952), as proving a point by saying: “when he intended one of the two meanings of a homonym then it was as if he had spoken


678 Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, for whom ḥaqīqah and mağāz were necessary and inevitable aspects of language, saw homonymy as primarily a matter of an expression being connected to one idea literally, and to another idea non-literally. Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, al-Muʿtamad, 1:22-23. For a review of al-Ğaşšāṣ’ understanding of mağāz, see: Heinrichs, "Contacts," 258ff. And on al-Ğaşšāṣ’ legal scholarship more broadly: Vishanoff, Islamic Hermeneutics, 219-220 (and index).

unequivocally and named it exactly, and therefore not included the other meaning [in his speech].  

Al-Karḫī needed to give a linguistically ambiguous speech act the status of an unambiguous one, and so he used the speaker’s posited intent to read ambiguity as clarity.

In all these cases what matters is the judgement, the legal value (al-ḥukm). It dominates al-Ğaṣṣāṣ’ thinking to the extent that his eighty-ninth chapter reproduces the traditional explanation of the structure of homonymy and synonymy, but the expressions in this new structure are replaced by the judgements (ahkām). This tells us both that the judgement is what is primarily at stake, and that al-Ğaṣṣāṣ has internalised the use of the pairing of expression and idea to conceive of polysemy to such an extent that he reproduces it for a different purpose. This kind of taxonomical theorizing is typical of the work produced after the twelfth century in the madrasa, and the fact that it can be found in tenth-century legal theory shows how much influence the discipline of legal theory had on the later development of intellectual endeavour.

Linguistic ambiguity is therefore a fact of Arabic, but one that has to be conquered in order to derive the law, whether from a divine revelation in Arabic, or for a community that speaks in Arabic. These hermeneutical principles, which in the work of al-Ğaṣṣāṣ go hand in hand with confidence in the scholar’s ability to determine the intent behind linguistic ambiguity, are the


681 The chapter title is: “on the judgements being different while the idea is the same, and the judgements being the same while the ideas are different” (fī –ḥtilāfi –l-ahkāmi ma’a –tīfāqi –l-ma’ nā wa-tīfāqiḥā ma’a –ḥtilāfi –l-ma’ ānī). The actual argument that al-Ğaṣṣāṣ made in this chapter was relatively simple. A single idea can produce rulings on a number of different subject. For example, the idea or hermeneutical concept of sexual intercourse produces a ruling requiring expiatory extra fasting if sex occurs during the Ramadan fast, as well as a ruling requiring sacrifice of an animal as atonement if sex occurs while the person is in a state of ritual purity for pilgrimage (yağzu an yata alluqa bi-l-ma’ nā –l-wāḥidī ahkāmun muhtalifatun ka-ta alluqa īgābī kaffārati ramadāna wa-dammī –l-ihrāmī bi-l-γīnā‘). Al-Ğaṣṣāṣ then says that this ma’ nā-ahkām dynamic is the same as the dynamic when a single name (ism) is a sign (‘alam) for different rulings. Conversely, a single ruling can be derived from different ideas, or on the basis of different rationales (wa-ğā’ izun aydan –tīfāqu –l-ahkāmī li-‘ilalin muhtalifah). Ibid., 4:175-176.
same in legal theory and in exegesis.\textsuperscript{682} It is only when literature is involved that theories of meaning come to address the creation of language as well as its interpretation.

That was the case with Ragib, and it was also the case with Qudāmah, with whose work Ragib was, as we have already seen, familiar. Qudāmah, like Ragib, structured his poetics according to the dynamics of the connections made between expressions and ideas.\textsuperscript{683} Poetics was the genre in which fully fledged theories of meaning that were more than just hermeneutics could emerge. After Qudāmah, and Ragib, it is therefore unsurprising that the scholar who would come to dominate the analysis of language from the eleventh century onwards worked in both the hermeneutical discipline of Quranic exegesis, and in poetics. Al-Ǧurğānī, dying as he did in 471/1078, falls outside the chronological scope of this dissertation, which does not consider those who could not have been Ragib’s predecessors or contemporaries.

Nevertheless, al-Ǧurğānī’s impact was so substantial that it behoves us to use him, and Ragib, to conclude this historical review of the Arabic Language Tradition. We should also note the form in which he wrote: his two books on language, \textit{Asrār al-Balāğah} and \textit{Dalāʾil al-Iʿā}, are substantial monographs on literary eloquence and Quranic inimitability respectively. This self-conscious foregrounding of language results in clear statements about his intellectual endeavour that tally with what we have already seen in more scattered remarks across a variety of genres in this and the preceding chapters. Al-Ǧurğānī writes in the introduction to his \textit{Dalāʾ il} that the best discipline of knowledge in any language is the study of clear communication ('ilm

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{682} Schworb discusses the relationship between exegesis, legal theory, and poetics with similar conclusions at: Schworb, "Capturing the Meanings," 133f.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{683} See page 185. Ragib may also have been aware of another notable work of tenth-century language theory that showed some Aristotelian influence, that of Ibn Wahb, for which see notes 285 and 426, and Geert Jan Van Gelder, "Ibn Wahb," in \textit{Encyclopedia of Arabic literature}, ed. Julie Scott Meisami and Paul Starkey (London / New York: Routledge, 1998).}
al-bayān), that knowledge of language is a subtle and reasoned process at the summit of which is Quranic inimitability, and that poetry is the source and the essence of that profound and elusive process.684

The theoretical advance of al-Ǧurğānī’s that is most important for the discussions in this dissertation is his decision to subdivide the level of ideas. Ragib’s analysis of how complex metaphors functioned had gone some way in this direction, but al-Ǧurğānī made the theoretical distinction between an initial idea (ma’nā) and a subsequent idea about that idea (ma’nā al-ma’nā). Ragib understood complex metaphors with two models that went beyond the simple concept of an attribute borrowed from a source and given to a target. In the rhetorical figure of allusive borrowing (istiʿārat al-kināyah) he broadened the understanding of the source to include ongoing actions and states as well as attributes. When “the reins of the morning were in the hand of the northwind”, the northwind (target) is compared to a leader engaged in the act of leading (source), with the clouds as the sheep that he is leading.685

Ragib’s other theory of complex metaphor includes the combined comparison (tašbih muğmal), in which “the target and the source are mentioned, but the aspect that they share is not clarified, in which case the compared idea is reasoned either intuitively or deductively [by the


685 iḏ aṣbaḥat bi-yadi –šamāli zimānmā ḍasaḍa ilā tašbihā –š-šamāli bi-qā yidin [sic.] wa-s-saḥāba bi-baʾ īrin maqūd. Ragib therefore does “justice to the underlying tamhīl [analogy]”, answering Heinrich’s complaint that the notion of istiʿārah in other theorists’ work usually fails to do so (they read this line as the borrowing of the hand for the northwind, and the borrowing of the rein for the morning). The poet is Labīd (Abū ʿAqīl b. Rabīʿah, d. ca. 40/660). Heinrichs, The Hand of the Northwind, 9; al-Ḥuḍayliyīn and Ḥuwayyīd b. Ḥalid Abū Ḍū’ayb, Diwān al-Ḥuḍayliyīn, ed. Ǧaḥmād az-Zayn and Maḥmūd Abū al-Wafā, 3 in 1 vols. (Cairo: Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣrīyah, 1945-1950). 1:3; Key, "Language and Literature," 58; Ragib. Innovative Figures of Speech. f.12b.
The dynamic in this single rhetorical figure heralds one of al-Ǧurğānī’s theoretical statements about language as a whole:

Language is divided into two types. In one, you grasp the intended aim with the indication of the expression alone (bi-dalālati –l-lafẓ waḥdahū), for example if you intended to inform [someone] about Zayd’s literal departure, you would say ‘Zayd left’. In the other type of language you do not grasp the intended aim with the indication of the expression alone, but rather the expression indicates its idea, the lexical context of which it necessitates, to you, and then you find that this idea contains a second indication that leads you to the intended aim. This type of language relies on allusion, istiʿārah, and analogy. 687

As in Ragib, the theory of meaning is twofold. Language is either simple indication, or complex reference. For al-Ǧurğānī, complex reference is defined not by the polysemic situation in which it occurs, but by the second level of mental effort on the part of the audience that goes into deciphering it. He is aware that this is an explicit theoretical claim, and he creates a new terminology for it:

If you have understood all of the above, then here is an abbreviated way to express it. You can just say ‘the idea’ and ‘the idea of the idea’. By ‘the idea’ you will mean the idea directly understood from the expression itself (ẓāhir al-lafẓ) without an intermediary. By ‘the idea of the idea’ you will mean that you reason an idea from the expression and then that idea leads you to another idea… 688

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they rose early and set out at dawn, for they and the valley of ar-Rass were like the hand to the mouth (bakarna buƙaɾaŋ wa-staƙaɾna bi-suhraɾin / fa-hunna wa-waɗi –r-rassī ka-l-yadi li-l-fami)

Ahlwardt, Divans, 94; Ragib. Innovative Figures of Speech. f.8a.


Like Ragib, al-Ḡūrānī was concerned with the theological status of words as well as their poetic value. He could therefore put his theory to use in the sort of exegetical problems with which Ragib had dealt. ⁶⁸⁹

**Concluding Remarks on the Arabic Language Tradition**

The notion that the interaction between language and mind could be divided into two core concepts that referred to the form of words and their content was by no means unique to Arabic. Scholars writing and talking in Arabic settled on the pairing of expression and idea very early on, as those of other times and places had and would settle on their own names for this binary. However, the theory of meaning that developed in the Arabic-speaking intellectual world of the seventh to eleventh centuries was remarkable in its resilience, widespread usage, and not coincidently, its interpretative power and the autonomy it gave to scholars to make their own decisions about what language had meant and should mean. In the Arabic Language Tradition, as we have been reading in this chapter, the theory of meaning based on expressions and ideas was paired with an assumption that linguistic ambiguity was ubiquitous, surmountable, and could be emancipatory.

⁶⁸⁹ Al-Ḡūrānī denied that the word “hand” can simply be conceived of as lexically equivalent to the word “blessing”, and attempted to demonstrate that the two words are not interchangeable. For example, they are not interchangeable in translation into other languages (al-Ḡūrānī, Aṣrār al-Balāḡah, 327; Larkin, The Theology of Meaning, 89f.). Ragib had espoused just that equivalence in his Exegesis, and qualified the relationship between the two words as one of istiʿārah in his Quranic Glossary (“Hand” was borrowed [and given to] ‘blessing’”. Ragib, Quranic Glossary. See discussions and translations above at notes 276, 463, 579, and 580). Al-Ḡūrānī’s solution was more complex. The semantic connection between “hand” and “blessing” is weaker, when reasoned with examples, than the semantic connection between “hand” and “ability (qudrah)”. “Ability” is therefore a more acceptable exegetical response to the word “hand” in the Quran. The relationship between “hand” and “ability” is an “allusion by way of analogy” (talwil bi-l-maṭal), and this is appropriate for an attribute of God. In fact, al-Ḡūrānī concludes, the hermeneutical equivalence between “hand” and “blessing” or “power” was originally motivated by a laudable theological belief in the impossibility of anthropomorphism combined with an insufficient theory of meaning (al-Ḡūrānī, Aṣrār al-Balāḡah, 332; Larkin, The Theology of Meaning, 90-91. Al-Ḡūrānī references al-Mubarrad as an early adopter of such exegetical equivalences. Al-Mubarrad had equated God’s right hand (yamūn) in Quran 39:67 (az-Zumar) with “power”. Ragib had agreed that the relationship between “right hand” should be read according to the hermeneutic for “hand”. al-Mubarrad, al-Kāmil, 1:75; Ragib, Quranic Glossary, 893.).
The story began in the first cultural capitals of Islamic intellectual society, Kufa and Basra. There, scholars started to standardize terminology that would enable them both to argue about what to call each other, and to negotiate the revelation that Islam had brought from the other side of the Arabian desert. Two key principles were established: language was potentially ambiguous, and a popular solution was homonymy. The most systematic theory was done in grammar, which is also where we find the first presentation of polysemy explained with the pairing of expression and idea.

The work of the next generations of scholars laid down theories that could stand alongside Sībawayh's magnum opus in grammar. By now, the pairing of expression and idea was terminologically established, and another key assumption had started to become apparent and self-conscious. In the Arabic language that had always been understood as linguistically ambiguous, the main site of that ambiguity, and the source that scholars could always refer back to for precedents, was poetry. The Bedouin Arabs had been poets, and the intellectual culture that was now over two centuries old was becoming a culture of literary critics.

Later, as we get closer to Ragib's contemporaries, the central issues of linguistic ambiguity and polysemy had begun to be debated, and deconstructed. Scholars were arguing, and writing, about the way that polysemy occured in Arabic, and the best way to describe it. They were also engaged in criticism of the theories of their predecessors. The level of sophistication and abstraction in the work of intellectuals such as Ibn Ğinnī matches anything that theorists of language are producing in the twenty-first century in European languages. As theorists became more numerous, the particular strand of thought that was legal theory came to develop its own account of language, which lay at the heart of the jurisprudential hermeneutic being developing. The analysis of polysemy was a central concern of a genre that sought to extract firm rules from
the linguistically ambiguous corpus of revelation, and to impose these rules on the equally ambiguous world of human speech.

The legal theorists tended to neglect poetry and poetics, or at least to relegate them to the role of a stale resource of linguistic precedent, a treasure trove of past usage that could be mined but not expanded. However, other scholars were working in that very discipline, and were taking insights about language developed in exegesis, grammar, and indeed legal theory itself and developing them into new theories about eloquence and rhetorical innovation. It is therefore not surprising that the most complete accounts of language, where the theory of meaning based on expression and idea, and the negotiations of linguistic ambiguity, are most fully developed, are those that come from scholars who worked in both hermeneutical and poetic disciplines. Ragib, whose theory has in previous chapters been extracted from across the range of genres in which he worked, was one such scholar.
6. A CONCLUDING COMPARISON TO A CLASSICAL LANGUAGE TRADITION

In order to bring the Arabic Language Tradition discussed in the preceding chapters into focus, we need to examine it alongside the Classical Language Tradition. The difference between the two philosophical approaches to language that these two traditions embodied has not gone unnoticed in the European-language academy. In his article on metaphor, Jacques Derrida wrote that “the genius of oriental languages” is to be "lively and figurative", and that metaphor has been understood by philosophy as being defined by “a provisional loss of meaning”, which destroys the connections necessary for conceptual thought. According to Derrida, this destruction is what Aristotle recognised and decried as sophistry.

Both Derrida and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, whom he was quoting, used this comparison to dramatize the contrast between an Orient suffused in metaphor, and the cold rational North that was Europe. It is my argument, however, that this opposition between two rival philosophical approaches to language can be profitably used to describe the situation in the Arabic-speaking mediaeval world. The Arabic Language Tradition embodied a philosophy of language in which the language itself, with its potential for ambiguity, stood front and centre. The Classical Language Tradition embodied an entirely different philosophical approach, one that believed language was a distraction, and that assumed language needed to be sidelined in order for philosophy to deal directly with both thoughts and things.


The idea that language could ever be separated from mind and reality never occurred to scholars working in the Arabic Language Tradition. Could this have been the consequence of genre and discipline? Scholars like Ragib worked in poetics, literary criticism, exegesis, and literary compilation, all of which required a focus on language. The work of scholars in the Classical Language Tradition, on the other hand, often centered on the *Organon*, a collection of works with logic at its core. Perhaps only the question of the divine brought the two traditions together: the beliefs about the nature of the one and the spheres laid out in *Book Lambada* of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* and Ragib’s discussions of God’s unity and attributes are both conversations about the divine. However, Aristotle and the generations of Greek, Syriac, and Arabic commentators on him, did not talk about divinity in terms of language. Ragib, and the thousands of Arabic-language scholars whose assumptions he shared, could scarcely mention God without confronting the issue of the language used to describe him.

This opposition mirrors a culture clash. Mediaeval Islamicate scholars argued about whether their intellectual culture should turn to the inheritance passed down to them from the Greeks through late antiquity, or whether that heritage in fact represented an undesirable foreign influence inseparable from metaphysical claims incompatible with Islam. There was a persistent division, before the twelfth century, between Arabist scholars working in exegetical and poetic disciplines, and philhellenic scholars working on the Greek inheritance from late antiquity, and in particular, on the transmission and reception of Aristotle’s *Organon*. The paradigmatic text that highlights this divide is Abū Ḥayyān at-Tawḥīdī’s (d. 414/1023) report of a debate between the grammarian Abū Saʿīd as-Sīrāfī (d. 368/979) and the logician Abū Bišr Mattā (d. 328/
This was a debate, albeit set in a court that expected Arabic to win, and reported by a follower of the victorious participant, in which Arabic culture chose Arabic grammar as its weapon in the defeat of a foreign Hellenistic logic that made false claims of universality. This summary reflects Abū Ḥayyān’s partisan reportage, but the text tells us how conscious tenth-century scholars were of the culture clash.

Nevertheless, scholars such as Ragib remind us that the intellectual borders of philhellenism and anti-hellenism were porous. It was not simply the case that scholars who


693 Fritz Zimmermann wrote:

The clash between Hellenists and anti-Hellenists in the controversy over logic and grammar, by bringing pride and prejudice to the fore, further inhibited dispassionate discussion. At the same time, however, this clash is evidence of intense contact between the two subjects … pointed silences may have played an important part in the debate and … each side may have paid far more attention to the other than it cared to acknowledge.

In this context, Zimmermann discusses “significant agreements” between al-Ḥarīrī and his grammarian contemporary Ibn as-Sarrāq (Abū Bakr Muḥammad, d. 316/929). Zimmermann, Commentary and Short Treatise, cxxix-cxxi, cxxviii. Further evidence of al-Ḥarīrī’s sensitivity to these dynamics can be extracted from his apparent avoidance of Arabic grammar as a source for the consideration of indefinite nouns in Aristotle’s logical works. For details of the avoidance, see: Black, "Aristotle's 'Peri hermeneias'," 64-65, 68.
preferred Arabic grammar to Greek philosophy, and who subscribed to the Arabic rather than the
Classical Language Tradition, were anti-hellenic. Ragib, whose approach to language as
polysemic and ambiguous puts him squarely in the Arabic Language Tradition, chose the
Neoplatonic inheritance of late antiquity as the source for the vast majority of his ethical work.
Ragib was culturally prepared to quote Aristotle in his ethics, and equally certain that Aristotle
should not be part of his Quranic exegesis. Ragib was able to compartmentalize based on genre
or discipline.

The boundaries between genres and disciplines, and their interactions with the culture clash
described above, also explain the failure of Aristotle’s works on language and poetry to influence
scholars like Ragib. As Black and others have shown, Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* and *Poetics* came
into the Arabic-speaking world as an integral part of an *Organon* centered on logic. They were
therefore studied by those Arabic scholars who were working in the *Organon* tradition, and
ignored by those working outside it. This was in contrast to Aristotelian and Neoplatonic
ethics, the transmission of which was much less tightly attached to the *Organon* and its logic.
Furthermore, one can imagine that had a scholar like Ragib come into contact with the approach
to language and its use embodied in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* in particular, he would have thought it
more applicable to his ethics and *adab* than his hermeneutic, theological, and poetic

694 For example, a note on the manuscript of the *Rhetoric* edited by M. C. Lyons reads: “not many of those who read
in the craft of logic (*qurrāʾ ṣināʿati l-mantiq*) have come to study this book”. The thrust of this note is that students
of logic are the book’s natural readership, but because the book is little known and poorly transmitted, they have
(Cambridge: Pembroke Arabic Texts, 1982). I:ii, xxvi. The author of the note appears to have been Ibn as-Samḥ
(ʾAbū ʿAlī, Christian and pupil of Yahyā b. ʾAdī, d. 418/1027), but for uncertainty on this attribution, see: ibid., iv-vi.
Heinrichs, albeit addressing a later period than that of Ragib, remarks that “[l]ogical poetics (and rhetoric) and
indigenous poetics and literary theory did not often rub shoulders. Most practitioners of the latter ignored what the
logicians had to say…”. Wolfhart Heinrichs, “Takhyīl: Make-Believe and Image Creation in Arabic Literary

240
considerations of language, mind, and reality. The questions that Aristotle asks in his *Rhetoric* about how language persuades, and about the tropes of pleasure, youth, and old age, are the same questions that are addressed in Ragib’s literary compendia and ethics.\(^{696}\)

Making the distinction between the Arabic and the Classical Languages Traditions therefore has a number of advantages. It highlights a persistent philosophical difference between conceiving of language as a solution and conceiving of language as a problem. It reminds us that mediaeval Islamicate intellectual culture was engaged in an argument about which intellectual heritage was best. Finally, it helps explain the otherwise puzzling fact that a scholar like Ragib could have been ethnically philhellenic but linguistically Arabic.

**Expressions, Ideas, Logic, and Homonymy in the Classical Language Tradition**

Al-Kindi (Abū Yusuf Ya’qūb b. Ishāq, d. ca. 252/866) was perhaps the most substantial early Arabic philosopher to work on the *Organon* tradition,\(^{697}\) and the trope of Arabic as a language notable for its polysemy can be found in his works just as it can in the theory of his contemporary aš-Šāfīʿī. He wrote that while the mutual resemblance of words and their derivations was a feature of all languages, this was particularly frequent in Arabic to the extent


\(^{697}\) Although it should be noted that Ibn al-Muqaffa’ had already produced an analytical synopsis of the *Organon* (or more exactly: Porphyry’s *Eisagoge* and Aristotle’s *Categories, On Interpretation, and Analytics*) in the mid-eighth century. He began with the observation that Porphyry had been concerned with the status of logical terminology (*al-asma*’ in *al-mantiq*) and the need for both the words (*al-asmā*’) and the process by which they were named (*attasmīyah*) to be explained. Ibn al-Muqaffa’, “al-Mantiq.” 1.
that a single name could be used for two opposites. Elsewhere, as part of his explanation that Hellenistic philosophy (al-falsafah) is the study of universals rather than particulars, he uses the pairing of expression and idea: “we say that every expression must either have an idea behind it, or not” and only those expressions that have ideas matter in philosophy. The vocabulary that constituted Ragib’s theory of meaning, and Sibawayh’s account of polysemy, was therefore equally familiar to a scholar working on the Organon like al-Kindī.

The pairing of expression and idea was just as present in the work of Ragib’s contemporary Avicenna, nearly two centuries later. Avicenna explains Aristotle’s inclusion of composite negative nouns such as “not human” or “not seeing” alongside simple nouns like “human” in the same way that Ragib might explain a polysemic problem of interpretation: “the expression ‘not’ and the expression ‘seeing’ both indicate an idea, and the combination of their two ideas is the idea of the ‘not human’ whole”. Avicenna’s explanation also relies on the concept of composite ideas. The multiple ideas of animal, living, speaking, and dying can be substituted for with a single expression “human”.  

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701 Avicenna writes:  

The composition may be … composed of two ideas … for which a single expression can be substituted. For example ‘Zayd is a speaking, dying, animal’. The part of this phrase ‘speaking, dying, animal’ is a
The motivation behind Avicenna’s explanation is Aristotle’s text, and therefore by extension, the need to establish the types of words that can be used to construct syllogisms and the relationship between their single or composite natures. The model was constructed for a very different purpose than that of Ragib’s, where the motivation was the need to give both a hermeneutical account of linguistic ambiguity and a poetic account of metaphor and imagery. Nevertheless, the result of the two processes is analogous. Both models use the pairing of expression and idea to represent the interaction of language and mind, and both models describe a situation in which a single expression denotes multiple ideas. Ragib would have included this phenomenon under the category of prolixity (bast), and Avicenna called it a composition of ideas (tarkīb bayna ma’niyayn) being exchanged for a single expression (badlahū lafẓun mufrad), but the concepts are closely related. This raises the intriguing possibility that Avicenna did not influence subsequent work in poetics of scholars such as al-Ḡurğānī so much through his work on Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Poetics as through his work on logic and Aristotle’s On Interpretation.

Avicenna, of course, wrote more than just extended Organon commentary. He made more use of the indigenous Arabic pairing of expression and idea in his Išārāt wa-Tanbīhāt (Pointers and Reminders), where he wrote that “there is a certain relationship between the expression and the idea”, the nature of the ideas can be affected by the nature of the expression, and the logician must therefore take heed of actual expressions in the languages in which they are couched.\(^\text{702}\)

\(^{702}\) bayna –l-lafzi wa-l-ma’ nā’ alaqatan mā wa-rubbamā agārat aḥwālun fī-l-lafzi fī aḥwālī –l-ma’ nā fa-li-dālika...
The requirements of the logician reappear shortly afterwards, when Avicenna lays out a theory of meaning designed to meet syllogistic, rather than poetic, requirements. Therein, expressions can indicate ideas through congruence (*muṭābaqah*), in which each expression stands opposite its idea (the relationship between the idea of a three sided shape to the expression “triangle”), or through implication (*taḍammun*; the relationship between the expression “shape” and the idea of a triangle), or concomitance (*al-istibtā’ wa-l-iltizām*) in which one idea requires that another follow it (the relationship between the expression “ceiling” and the idea of a wall supporting it). Congruence is analogous to Ragib’s understanding of a literal relationship between expression and idea according to fiat coinage. Avicenna’s implication is necessary for the logical accommodation of the relationships between universals, such as that between a species and the genus in which it is included. There is no foregrounding of mechanisms that accommodate linguistic ambiguity therein, but the third category of concomitance is potentially analogous to Ragib’s analysis of how one idea can lead to another in poetic metaphor, and indeed to al-Ḡurğānī’s ideas that are subsequent to other ideas (*ma’nā al-ma’nā*).

In between al-Kindī and Avicenna, and equally firmly in the Classical Language Tradition, al-Fārābī eschewed the indigenous vocabulary of expression and idea in favour of expressions and intelligibles (*maʿqūlāt*) at several points in his works. It is in al-Fārābī that we get the statement that logic is the grammar of the mind and that the grammatical rules of syntax are analogous to the logical rules of thought. Al-Fārābī also argued that expressions reliably...
imitate intelligibles, and that Aristotle (on whose *On Interpretation* al-Fārābī was commenting) was able to explain the composition of intelligibles by substituting expressions for them exactly because the two sides corresponded with each other.\(^{705}\)

Language, in fact, could be used in two different ways. Al-Fārābī distinguished between the investigation of expressions in linguistic contexts, which had the potential to cause confusion and error, and the investigation of expressions in so far as they were simply a convenient substitute for intelligibles. The first type of investigation was that found in Aristotle’s *Sophistical Refutations* (in which he combated language manipulated in order to deceive), *Rhetoric*, and *Poetics* (in which language was manipulated for literary effect).\(^{706}\) The second type of investigation was that found in logic, and these two ways of approaching language are themselves the two separate philosophical approaches that I have sought to capture with the labels of the Arabic and the Classical Language Traditions. When laid out by a logician, however, they make a very clear argument, which is that logic is concerned with linguistic expressions for only two reasons. Expressions either matter because their ambiguity needs to be

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\(^{705}\) In the background of al-Fārābī’s discussion of whether Aristotle, in *On Interpretation*, was talking about expressions as used in language or about intelligibles in people’s minds was the long-established debate about the subject matter of both *On Interpretation* and *Categories*. Throughout late antiquity, the commentary tradition has struggled with the question of whether the discussions of names that appear in these two parts of the *Organon* should be understood as discussions of words, or as discussions of things and ideas. The underlying concern was whether or not language was part of logic. Perhaps the most influential compromise position (and certainly one influential on al-Fārābī) was that of Porphyry (d. ca. 305), who wrote that Aristotle’s *Categories* was about “words in so far as they signify things”. Later, Simplicius (fl. 529) would put more stress on the signification than the things, arguing that *Categories* was concerned with “the words … that signify … [beings] qua significant”. Centuries later, Avicenna would quote and reject Porphyry, arguing that the *Categories* were things that just happened (and indeed needed) to have fixed names (wa- alayhā taqa‘a wa-l-alfāz –l-mufradatu –l-tigādan mawdū‘ an musallaman). The consensus among modern commentators is with Avicenna, that Aristotle was discussing things: “Aristotle relies greatly on linguistic facts and tests, but his aim is to discover truths about non-linguistic things” (J. L. Ackrill). Aristotle and Ackrill, *Categories*, 71; Avicenna (Ibn Sinā), “al-Maqūlat,” 6-7; Black, “Aristotle’s *Peri hermeneias,*” 59; Sabra, “Avicenna,” 762; Richard Sorabji, *The Philosophy of the Commentators, 200 - 600 AD: a Sourcebook. Vol. 3: Logic and Metaphysics.* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005). 61f, 69.

erased, or (and indeed subsequently) expressions matter as inevitable yet substantively unimportant substitutes for concepts and things.

By pairing expressions with intelligibles (maʿqūlāt) and not with ideas (maʿānī), al-Fārābī makes it clear that he is not working with the theory of meaning that dominated the Arabic Language Tradition. But al-Fārābī did use the term maʿnā to talk about language. He wrote that Aristotle’s discussion at the end of the first chapter of *On Interpretation* is a statement that expressions and intelligibles resemble each other with regard to truth and falsity. Combinations (i.e. predications) of expressions can be true or false, and commensurately combinations of intelligibles can be true or false. A single expression or a single intelligible, however, cannot be true or false. “Man” or “whiteness” on its own cannot be true or false, “except that every single expression indicates the idea that it was intended to explicate”. The idea that is indicated by an expression can then either be an imaginary conception in the soul (ḥayāl fī-n-nafs), or an intellectible in the mind (maʿqūl) that itself relies on something in external physical reality (tastanidu ilā mawḡūdīn min ḥārīq). If we were to say “goat-stag”, then our speech would “indicate an idea conceived in our heart, of an animal half of which is the body of a goat and half of which is the body of a stag”. This idea could then not be true or false.

707 The “linguistic Hellenism” that Zimmermann identified as an aspect of al-Fārābī’s thought is relevant here: “[al-Fārābī’s] show of deference to Greek grammar makes sense only as a gesture designed to hurt the pride of Muslim Arab scholarship”. Cf. note 693, ——, *Commentary and Short Treatise*, cxxxiv, cxxxvii.

708 This is an accurate paraphrase. Aristotle, "On Interpretation," 16a.9; al-Fārābī, Šarḥ al-ʿIbārah, 26; Zimmermann, *Commentary and Short Treatise*, 14. It should be noted here that Zimmermann corrects Kutsch and Marrow’s ordering of the folios. Ibid., cxliii-cxliv, 12 (note 1).

709 illā anna kullā wāḥidin min || –l-alfāẓi –l-mufradati dāllun ‘alā –l-maʿnā –l-ilaḏi gūṣīda –l-ibānatu ‘anhu bihī. al-Fārābī, Šarḥ al-ʿIbārah, 27, 28; Zimmermann, *Commentary and Short Treatise*, 14-15. The notation || represents the point where the folios are incorrectly ordered in Kutsch and Marrow.

I would like to read al-Fārābī’s switch between intelligible and idea in this passage as follows. Ideas are linguistic; they are that to which the expressions refer, and they cannot be conceived of apart from the expressions. Intelligibles, on the other hand, are a subdivision of ideas and they are concepts in the mind that can exist devoid of linguistic expression. Scholars in the Arabic Language Tradition such as Ragib dealt only in ideas because they assumed no potential for a sphere of conception or understanding that was unconnected to language. A scholar in the Classical Language Tradition such as al-Fārābī wanted both to distinguish himself from the Arabic Language Tradition, and to focus on a logical mentality wholly separated from, and indeed superior to, language. He associated intelligibles with logic and ideas with language, associations that would also be reflected in the work of Ragib’s contemporary Miskawayh. Al-Fārābī was committed to the paradigmatic attitude of the Classical Language Tradition: we do not need linguistic expression in order to think, just to express our thoughts. A century later,

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16a.15f. See also note 425.


72 In a review of Aristotle’s Organon, Miskawayh wrote that: “syllogisms are composed of expressions and ideas” (al-qiyyāsu fa-īdā huwa murakkabun min alfāzin wa-maʿānin), and that while a minimum of two expressions are required for a premise, “the smallest number of syllogistic ideas that are required is two intelligibles [in one premise] and two intelligibles [in the other]” (My emphasis) (wa-aqallu –l-maʿānin –l-qiyyāṣiyyatī mā kāna min maʿqūlayni maʿqūlayn). Ahmad b. Muḥammad Miskawayh, Kitāb as-Saʿādah li-Ibn Miskawayh fī Falsafat al-Aḥlāq, ed. ʿAlī aṭ-Ṭūbḡī as-Suyūṭī (Cairo: al-Madrasah aḍ-Ḍāʿīyah al-Ilāhīyah, 1917). 66. On this work of Miskawayh’s see: Dimitri Gutas, "Paul the Persian on the classification of the parts of Aristotle's philosophy: a milestone between Alexandria and Bagdad," Der Islam 60(1983): 231, 234.

Avicenna agreed: “speaking about the expressions that correspond to their ideas is equivalent to speaking about the ideas, although the use of expressions is more practical”.\textsuperscript{714}

For al-Fārābī, “goat-stag” is both an expression and an idea, but not an intelligible. It is not founded on any external physical reality, but instead represents a person’s internal subjective imagination. As such, it has little value in logic. Intelligibles, on the other hand, can be predicated with other intelligibles to form the premises of a syllogism or other logical construction. For scholars in the Arabic Language Tradition like Ragib, in the absence of a need to construct statements in correct logical form there is no such firm distinction between predicable objective ideas and imaginary subjective ideas. Ideas are just ideas, and expressions refer to them. Ideas in the Arabic Language Tradition are also not understood as subjective. For ideas to work in poetry, for example, they must be accessible to all language users and therefore part of an objective reality, albeit neither external nor physical. The “goat-stag” in poetics is therefore an objective entity in the mind, just like “the hand of the northwind”.

That the attitude to homonymy constitutes a major difference between the Arabic and the Classical Language Traditions is clear. For scholars like Ragib it is a hermeneutical and poetic opportunity while for Aristotle and his followers in the logical tradition it is a difficulty to overcome before logic can start to work. However, the Classical Language Tradition is broader than just philhellenic scholars working on the Organon. It included scholars working in theology, and scholars whose cited lists of authorities did not include Aristotle. One such scholar, the Muʿtazīlī al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Ḡabbār, thought that homonymy was a problem, and a threat.

\textsuperscript{714} fa-inna -l-kalāma ʿalā –l-alfāzi –l-muṭābaqati li-maʿānīhā ka-l-kalāmi ʿalā maʿānīhā illā anna waḍʿa –l-alfāzi aḥsanu ʿamalan. For Avicenna, the subject matter of logic is single ideas (maʿānīhā wāḥid mufrad) and combined ideas (maʿānīhā muʿallafah), and only the latter can create decisive logical assent to a proposition (taṣāliq) while the former creates only the initial conception of an idea (taṣawwur). Expressions are not necessary for logic qua logic, but they are necessary for its communication. Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā), "al-Madḥal," 21, 22 (lines 13f), 23 (lines 3-4); Black, "Aristotle's 'Peri hermeneias'" 54-55; Sabra, "Avicenna," 752.
ʿAbd al-Ḡabbār was a contemporary of Ragib’s, a representative of the Muʿtazilī school of theology with which we have seen Ragib engage so closely, and he shared Ragib’s acceptance of the potential language had for ambiguity. Thereafter, however, the two scholar’s attitudes, approaches, and models diverged completely. Ragib exemplified the Arabic Language Tradition while ʿAbd al-Ḡabbār shared the Classical Language Tradition’s prejudice against language as a means of conveying the truth. And while for those working on the Organon that truth could be derived from the predicated logical statements of humanity, for ʿAbd al-Ḡabbār the truth in play was the divine monotheistic justice of God. We have moved from a difference in philosophy of language between logicians on the one hand and littérateurs, theologians and grammarians on the other, to differences in philosophy of language between theologians themselves.

ʿAbd al-Ḡabbār’s theory of meaning was one in which intent was everything. Language was therefore understood when the context in which it was uttered was known and analysed. He used a concept that originated in legal theory, and maybe even in logic, to describe the...


716 Intent was a reflection of human will (irādah), a central concept in ʿAbd al-Ḡabbār’s theology. It is the will (not the ability, qudrah) that specifies whether an expression (lafẓ) is a predicate (jabar) or imperative (amr). Without intent (qaṣd) language has no meaning. With intent, we can make “Zayd” mean any number of Zayds we want. al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Ḡabbār, al-Muḡnī, 6.2:8-12, 17-19. My thanks to Philip Pilkington for this reference. Cf. Larkin, The Theology of Meaning, 32-38; Vishanoff, Islamic Hermeneutics, 116f, 134-135.

717 “Context” (ḥāl al-mutakallim) was one of two things required for speech to have meaning. The other was muwādaʿah, the lexicon in communicative human usage. al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Ḡabbār, al-Muḡnī, 16:347. Muwādaʿah was translated by Schöck as Festsetzung (“fixing”), by Vasalou as “convention”, and described by Peters as “man comes to a convention and in this way makes a language”. Larkin, The Theology of Meaning, 37-38; Peters, God’s created speech, 387; Schöck, Koranexegese, 382; Sophia Vasalou, “Their Intention Was Shown By Their Bodily Movements": The Basran Muʿtazilīs on the Institution of Language " Journal of the History of Philosophy 47, no. 2 (2009): 212.
additional evidence (qarīnah) that had to be brought to bear on each speech act.\textsuperscript{718} The door would seem to be open for a consideration of linguistic ambiguity, but in fact ʿAbd al-Ḡabbār slammed it shut with an explicit commitment to resist and refute polysemy. The concept of enantiosemy (addād) that we have seen so lovingly enumerated in the Arabic Language Tradition, was for ʿAbd al-Ḡabbār an epistemological threat to hermeneutics, and consequently a threat to religion. Polysemy leads us to “lose faith in the true meanings of words”.\textsuperscript{719}

My reading of ʿAbd al-Ḡabbār’s position is that it was in all likelihood influenced by the discipline of logic, and the study of the \textit{Organon}, that was so well-developed by his time. He described the possibility that a word could mean two things at once as anathema to reason, and

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\textsuperscript{718} The idea that the status of some linguistic acts was ambiguous until a piece of supplementary evidence (qarīnah) had been provided, often from context, was developed in legal theory. Wael B. Hallaq, "Notes on the Term qarīna in Islamic Legal Discourse," \textit{Journal of the American Oriental Society} 108, no. 3 (1988); Schwarb, "Capturing the Meanings," 130 (note 82). Schöck draws a persuasive conceptual parallel between qarīnah and the term sūr in the logical tradition. Schöck, \textit{Koranexegese}, 383. The Iḥwān as-Ṣafā for example, use sūr to describe the extra things that people need to say in order to ensure that their speech is accurately understood. Speech without such a quantifier is indeterminate (muḥmal). Iḥwān as-Ṣafā, \textit{Rasā il}, Beirut, 1:416. Their analysis in turn can be traced by to al-Ṭārābī’s use of the term sūr, which Zimmermann then connects to what may have been early Syriac logic influencing Ibn al-Muqaffa’. Zimmermann, "Some Observations," 517, 529-531.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{719} ʿAbd al-Ḡabbār wrote that ideas (maʿāni) need to be estabolishable by human reason, whether that reason is intuitive/necessary (idīrār) or learnt/acquired (iktīsāb). Then:

it is not possible for us to believe that the rationale (ʿilah) that we cite as productive of a judgement is accompanied by another different idea that produces a different judgement, and that with that idea is a third idea, and so on for infinity or until the [erroneous] idea is found to be present. This also applies to the discussion of enantiosemy, that which is both praiseworthy and blameworthy at the same time, and those ideas that connect to contrary ideas. Such discourses [about language] invalidate the proofs, and should such doubt be accepted with regard to proofs then it would be even more acceptable with regard to matters of religion. Such discourses also lead us to lose faith in the true meanings of words, and to make claims about words without any indicators. Such practices lead to mutual ignorance about both words and ideas, and anything with that result must be condemned as corrupt.


250
destructive of our ability to draw conclusions from evidence. This position is analogous to Aristotle’s desire to address polysemy at the start of On Interpretation in order to prevent it from undermining his teaching on logic, and to expose sophistical manipulations of polysemy in Sophistical Refutations. ‘Abd al-Ġabbār agreed: homonymy was intended to cause deception.720

A word therefore cannot be, or mean, two things at once. This is the ontological and epistemological assumption behind ‘Abd al-Ġabbār’s argument that language (al-kalām) is only physical sound.721 Language cannot be, as it was for Ragib, both the expressions and the ideas behind them. ‘Abd al-Ġabbār believed that the ideas (maʿānī) in people’s minds were only subjective, and that there was no connection between them and expressions that could be analysed.722 Larkin persuasively attributes his motivation for this separation of expressions and ideas to his theological commitments, which include a refusal to contemplate the prospect of

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722. ‘Abd al-Ġabbār’s hypothetical interlocutor in this passage challenges him: “I know for sure that there is an idea in my heart that corresponds to these letters” (innī aʿlamu bi-ḍtirārin fī qalbī maʿnan yuṭābiqu hāḏihī l-ḥurūf). ‘Abd al-Ġabbār responds that his interlocutor does not know this, but only wishes it. Rather, this hidden speech (kalām ḥaḍī) is unknowable. “This hidden speech may then be mixed up with thought made up of the letters of [real] speech as a result of the soul’s conversations [with itself]” (wa-rubbamā yaltabisu ʿalayhi l-fikru fī ḥurūfī l-kalāmi bi-ḥadītī n-naṣ). ‘Abd al-Ġabbār is, on the one hand, clearly struggling to disentangle himself from linguistic metaphors, but more importantly he is also clearly trying to establish that the ideas in people’s minds, which they think are connected to their expressions, are not actually connected to the expressions. Rather than the ideas (maʿānī) being objective and shared, as they are for Ragib, the ideas in people’s minds are for ‘Abd al-Ġabbār wholly subjective. ———, al-Muğnī, 7:15-16. It must however be remembered that ‘Abd al-Ġabbār did not deny any connection between expressions and ideas, he just denied that “language” was composed of both. Elsewhere, he wrote that meaningful speech, including of course the Quran, was made up of expressions used to refer to ideas (alfāẓ wuḍiʿat li-maʿānī). Speech was meaningful when it indicated an idea, and indication (dalālah) occurred in three ways: by the expression, by a qaʿrīnah (see note 718), or by reason (ʿaql). ibid., 16:349; Schöck, Koranexegese, 382-383.
God having ideas that might co-exist with him or need to be known by humans.  

I would like to suggest an additional dimension for ‘Abd al-Ḡabbār’s rejection of the notion that language could be both ideas and expressions: he tended to assume that a single word or thing could only mean one thing. In the case of language (al-kalām), that thing could only be the physical expressions of words by humans. Language could never have both a physical level and a mental level. It could never be both divine and profane. Ragib, of course, had expressed impatience with this refusal to contemplate polysemy.

Larkin, Vishanoff, and I do all agree, however, on the importance of theological conviction in shaping ‘Abd al-Ḡabbār’s positions. He is at all times committed to separating God from humanity, and in the face of the Quranic revelation and the obsession with language that characterised the intellectual culture in which he lived, this led him to downplay and de-stress language in a way that is very reminiscent of the attitude of those working in the Organon tradition. Just as Avicenna was prepared to examine linguistic concerns only because they were an unavoidable necessity for the communication of ideas that the mind composed and connected, so ‘Abd al-Ḡabbār wrote that the Quran was in effect an irrelevant linguistic byproduct of a divine message. God’s justice and unity made sense on their own in human

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723 Larkin, *The Theology of Meaning*, 38. In the preceding pages, Larkin explains how it is intent behind speech (qaṣd) that is knowable, rather than the ideas behind it (maʿānī). The theological implication is clear: it is permissable for us to know what God intended, but not what he was actually thinking.

724 Ragib implied in his discussion of the word “Quran” that the Muʿtazilah were naïve and essentialist in their refusal to conceive of the Quran as being in multiple places at once, both divine and human. See note 429.

725 Vishanoff, *Islamic Hermeneutics*, 133.

726 See note 714.

727 He wrote that while humans can compel their audience to understand their intent through either speech or physical gesture, God’s speech is different. Human speech (al-hijāb) is knowable (mudrak) whereas divine speech is unknowable (lā yudrak) because God is unknowable. For example (the example is mine), while one can know Zayd (ʿalimtu Zaydan) one cannot know God (ʿalimtu ʿllāha), a point with which Ragib agreed. Furthermore, ‘Abd al-
reasoning, and language, with its reliance on knowledge of context, could support that message but also corrupt it. Reason was paramount for both the philhellenic philosophers and Muʿtazilī theologians like ῬʿAbd al-Ḡabbār.

῾Abd al-Ḡabbār’s theological argumentation was also, of course, directed at the Ašāʿirah. It was their doctrine of speech on the lips versus speech in the soul (kalām lafẓī / nafsī) to which he was responding. That doctrine, which posited a nafsī Quran with God and a lafẓī Quran among humans, was designed with the same primary motivation as ῬʿAbd al-Ḡabbār’s theology: to maintain the distance between the divine and humanity.728 The Ašāʿirah set up two separate ontological categories of Quran (and by extension of “language”), but they often shared the Muʿtazilī prejudice in favour of words meaning just one thing that could then be argued about.729 It was only scholars like Ragib, obsessed with language and more often than not directly engaged with literature as authors or critics, who went in a different direction. For while Ragib struggled throughout his theological writings to maintain and explain a complete separation between God and humanity, often doing so through the creative use of polysemic hermeneutics, he was completely comfortable with the equation of God’s language with that of poets. In Ragib’s intellectual worldview the divine and the human shared the same language with all its potential for ambiguity and eloquence. This is in direct contrast to the logicians of the Organon tradition.

Čabbār wrote that with regard to the core theological principles of God’s unity and justice: “it is the reason that indicates this matter, and we know that God sent down that speech (i.e. the Quran) because it was in some way beneficial” (inna –l-ʾaqla huwa –llaḏī yadillu Ῥʿalā Ῥālika –l-amri wa-na’lamu annahū taʾālā an Ῥalā Ῥaḥīma –l-kalāma li-ḍarbin min –l-maṣlaḥah). al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Ḡabbār, al-Muḡnī, 16:354, 17:12; Ragib, Quranic Glossary, 560; Schöck, Koranexegese, 383-387.

728 Al-Bāqillānī wrote that humans cannot say they “speak God’s language” (lā yaqūla an yaqūlu aḥadun innī atakallamu bi-kalāmi –l-lāh) when, for example, they recite the Quran. This was because God’s speech needed to be entirely separate from that of humans, a point also made by Vasalou. Al-Bāqillānī also wrote that “the real language is the idea that exists in the soul” (al-kalāma –l-haqqīqī huwa –l-ma’ nā –l-mawgūdū fi-n-nafs). See also note 431. al-Bāqillānī, al-Insāf, 101; Vasalou, "Institution of Language," 221.

729 See, for example, the Aṣ’arī analysis of the divine attributes, which is addressed above in chapter four (page 159f).
for whom language was an inconvenient obstacle, and to the Muʿtazilī theology of ʿAbd al-Ğabbār, for whom language was mired in the human because it could not be two things at once. For the Classical Language Tradition therefore, human reason was the source of the human connection to the divine and the truth, whereas for the Arabic Language Tradition that connection lay in language itself.

Epilogue

The story about language told in this dissertation has ended in the eleventh century. Ragib dies around the year 1020, ʿAbd al-Ğabbār in 1024, Avicenna in 1037, and al-Ǧurǧānī in 1078. The madrasa in its classical institutional form was born in 1067. It is tempting to make that latter date into a defining turning point for Islamicate intellectual culture, and while the reality is hardly likely to be as simple or convenient, it is true that the nature of the scholarship that was produced in the late eleventh and twelfth centuries was very different from what had gone before. In the works of Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī and al-Ǧazālī in particular, the relationship between language, mind, and reality is sliced up in a very different way to that found in Ragib or his predecessors in the Arabic Language Tradition.

The new consensus that would come to dominate madrasa scholarship in the subsequent centuries can perhaps best be described as a synthesis of the Arabic and Classical Language Traditions. This synthesis relied on the achievement of Avicenna, whose thoroughgoing analysis of the Organon tradition was written in an Arabic that was accessible, and that minimalized the self-conscious neologisms that had characterised al-Fārābī’s previous bold attempt at synthesis. The new synthesis also relied on the achievement of al-Ǧurǧānī, whose analysis of exegetical and profane poetics built on a tradition of Arabic literary criticism that was approximately half a millennium old by the eleventh century.
Was Ragib as significant for the centuries to come as these great names? It seems unlikely. His role in this dissertation has been as a perfect example of a tradition that would never be the same again after the eleventh century. In Ragib’s works we can see an eclecticism and pluralism that allowed him to maintain Ibn Ḥanbal as an influence and authority while writing ethical guidance for the Muslim community that was based on the Neoplatonic ethics attributed to Aristotle and Plato. This synthesis would be the same as that attempted by al-Ḡazālī, whom we of course know was an avid consumer of Ragib’s ethical works. Ragib’s poetics also made some strides in the typology and analysis of complex metaphor that may have contributed to al-Ġurğānī’s theory. However, it is just as likely that al-Ġurğānī was building on the work of other literary scholars, or indeed on ideas contained in the logical works of Avicenna.

The Arabic Language Tradition as understood in this dissertation therefore died in the eleventh century, to be replaced by a new synthesis with the Classical Language Tradition that had been its rival. However, the obsessions with language that it embodied would continue to play a substantial role in defining the intellectual culture of the subsequent centuries, in which the consumption and creation of literature in the forms of both poetry and adab would become no less important. The obsession with language would also find a home in the taxonomies of coinage developed in the discipline of ‘ilm al-wad’ studied by Bernard Weiss.

The Arabic Language Tradition, with its focus on linguistic ambiguity and its obsessive engagement with the pairings of expressions and ideas, has not been fully appreciated in scholarship before this dissertation. More work remains to be done on its central early figures, although the success of that work may depend on the potential for further manuscript discoveries from those first centuries of intellectual endeavour. More work also remains to be done outside
the discipline of legal theory, a sub-field in which Vishanoff has recently made persuasive arguments about rival approaches to language and the law.

Perhaps the most important lacuna is the need to address the great figures of the eleventh century in terms of their attitudes to language, with sensitivity to the linguistically obsessed culture in which even philhellenic philosophers like Avicenna were working. Frank Griffel’s recent work on al-Ğazālī has taken steps in this direction, but all too often scholars like Avicenna and even al-Fārābī are considered solely in the context of their dominant influence (the Organon tradition) and without sufficient reference to the rigorous and complex attitudes to language that can be found in Arabic, and that are unconnected to the Organon. Those rigorous and complex attitudes have been the subject of this dissertation.

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APPENDIX ONE: MANUSCRIPTS

Description of the London Qur'anic Glossary

Library of Muhammad Luṭfī al-Ḥāṭib, Private Collection, London. Title piece on f.1a in Abbasid Bookhand script:731 Mufradāt Ġarīb al-Qurʿān al-Karīm | li-Abī l-Qāsim al-Ḥusayn b. Muhammad b. al-Mufaḍḍal al-maʿrūf bi-r-Rāġib al-Isfānī [sic.] | adāma -llāh 'ulāhu wa-aṭāla -llāh fi-l-ʾizz wa-n-niʾam baqāhu [sic.]. Author’s name in incipit: fa-yaqūl al-faqīr Ḥusayn b. Muhammad b. al-Mufaḍḍal al-Maʿrūf bi-r-Rāġib al-Isfahānī ballaḡahū allāh al-amānī. Thick white Arabic paper, low pulp quality with high interference and visible fibres, little to no burnishing, faint and irregular chain lines approx. 50mm apart, thick laid lines with irregularities between 27 and 34mm apart (vertical to spine in f.1 and f.2, horizontal to spine in remainder of text block), reed or grass laid mould. Page 200x170mm, written area 160x110mm, 21 lines per page, no rulings. No foliation. 40 II/III (222). The quire at ff.192-195 is upside down. Textblock in angular scholar’s nashīh bookhand fully pointed and unvocalised. No catchwords. Chapter headings (the letters of the alphabet) shaded in red, rubricated entry titles. Type III pasteboard binding, leather covering, central lozenge almond shape floral stamp (mandorla) cf. Déroche Type Osh8732 on upper and lower covers together with embossed chain frame. Chevron endbands in blue and yellow appear relatively new, textblock is bound too tightly resulting in loss of some marginalia close to spine. Frequent marginal commentary in several hands in some cases marked with rubricated “ḥāšiyah”, frequent collation marks (usually minor textual variations or scribal

731 See Gacek, Vademecum, 1-2.
omissions, errors, and illegibilities) with ĥ [nusḥah uḥrā] and ẓ [ṣahha]. Anonymous marginal note with bibliographical assertions on f.51a in recent hand. Purchase and reading notes on f.1a as discussed in chapter two above. Colophon dated Muḥarram 409 / May-June 1018. Multiple impressions of seal dated 976/1568 with which Esmehan Sultan, daughter of the Ottoman Sultan Selim II (reg. 974/1566-982/1574), endows the manuscript to her madrasa in the Eyüp quarter of Istanbul (waqf ʾismīhān sulṭān bint salīm ḥān madrasatahā fī abī ayūb al-anṣārī 976). After the colophon (ff.206b-218a) Ragib’s methodological introduction to the Exegesis has been copied out in full in a different hand (rounded scholar’s ʾnasḥ bookhand), starting just after the introduction with: bi-ḥaqqin ẓāra –l-kalāmu ʾtalāṭata aqsām… Three folios of this text have become detached from the codex at f.207a. The detached folios start with: wa-dālika bi-ḥasabi –ʿṭibāri –l-muḥāṭib… and end with: …fa-qṭaʿ lubānata man taʿarraḍa waṣluhū. This witness to the methodological introduction is undated, and has an anonymous quotation after it on f.218a. The last two folios of the detached section also contain undated Hadith (scholar’s taʿlīq bookhand) and invocations.

The change in orientation of the laid lines in the first two folios as opposed to the rest of the text block and an apparent slight change in hand between f.2b and f.3a (from more rounded to more angular hand, and from thicker to thinner calamus) both point to the replacement of the

733 al-Ǧawharī, "Raʾy fī Taḥdīd," 199-200.
734 I am grateful to Betsy Omidvaran for her help with this seal.
first two folios at an early stage, certainly before 420/1029 when the first note on f.1a was written. The overtight binding and apparently recent chevron endbands point to later repairs, which may have taken place in the Al-Assad National Library in Damascus. The manuscript’s owner, Muḥammad Luṭfī al-Ḥaṭīb, tells of taking it to this library for scanning and then removing it when the library staff began to cut the binding to facilitate the scanning and he suspected theft. The resulting confusion may have been what led al-Ḡawharḡī, who saw the manuscript when it was in the National Library, to confuse the plates in his article. He provides accurate images of f.51a and f.206a (the colophon) but inaccurate images of the title page and a folio with Hadith notes.\(^{738}\) The anonymous note on f.51a discussed by al-Ḡawharḡī may also date from this period of confusion, and could have been written by a Damascus library staff member attempting to remove and substitute the title page.

**Description of Ragib on Innovative Figures of Speech (Kitāb min Kalām ar-Rāġib fī-l-Badī‘ / Afānīn al-Balāḡah)**

Title on f.1a in textblock hand: *Kitāb min Kalām ar-Rāġib fī-l-Badī‘*. Title on upper doublure with question mark: *Afānīn al-Balāḡah (The Diversity of Eloquence)*. Title in catalogue: [Afānīn al-Balāḡah], “title supplied by Dr. Landberg”.\(^{739}\) Incipit f.1b: al-ḥamdu li-llāhi muʿṭī –l-insāna faḍīlata –l-lisānī taqwiyatan li-iʾūr’ānī ¶ | wa-ṣallā –llāhu ʿalā nabīyihī –l-muḥtāri muḥammadin wa-ālihī –l-āhyārī ¶ | saʾaltum adāma –llāhu –l-imtāʾa bi-kum

\(^{738}\) al-Ḡawharḡī, "Ra’y fī Taḥdīd," 197-200. Al-Ḡawharḡī’s article is reproduced with the incorrect plates in as-Sārīṣī, *Fī-d-Dījā*, 49-56.

an umliya mā yuģʻalu amāratan fī naqdi | -l-ašʾ āri... Explicit f.39b: wa-n-naqli | wa-l-qalbi wa-
t-tabdīli wa-huwa ahrū -t-tarīqati wa-tanāwulu –l-laφzi. The text breaks off in the chapter on
types of literary plagiarism (Fī Anwāʻ as-Sariqā), which is the last chapter according to the table
of contents on f.3a-b. Good quality thick Arabic paper, brown biscuit colour, slight burnishing,
clumping in pulp, fine fleck intrusions, opaque. Hard to discern laid lines vertical to spine with
occasional irregularities (slants eg. f.17a) at approx. 7 per 10mm. Thick (1.5mm) and vague
chain lines 26-30mm apart very rarely discernable (eg. f.16a) with horizontal slant from left to
right. Grass (?) laid mould. Page 165x130mm, written area 135x95mm, 13-15 lines per page, no
rulings, English foliation every five folios at top left in pencil. V-½(39), 3V(30). Quire
signatures at f.10a, f.20a, f.30a. No catchwords. Clear bold scholar’s nash bookhand fully
pointed and partially vocalised in places. Chapter titles in larger (double/triple size) nash with
consistent head serifs to right on alif. Type III thin pasteboard binding covered in patterned red
and green leaf design. Closed volume 10mm thick with dark red paper spine. Good preservation
with occasional worm holes. Repaired and trimmed probably at time of binding with loss of
some marginalia. Some smudges and repairs cover text. Collation marks throughout, both ṣh
[ṣahha] (eg. f.17b) and ʃ [maḥṭūṭah uhrā]. Some marginalia marked as “ḥāšiyah” eg. f.2a, f.8b.

Title page has calculations and prices for foodstuffs. Lower cover doublure has unvowelled note
in different hand partially obscured by doublure hinges: [---] ḥayṭu qāla –l-muṣannifu raḥimahū

Description of Chester Beatty AR 5277 (On Creeds)
Title on f.1a (scholars nash bookhand ≠ textblock): Kitāb aš-Šayṭān Abū al-Qāsim al-Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad b. al-Mufaḍdal ar-Rāḡib fī-l-ʿĀqāyid [sic]. Author’s name in incipit: aš-Šayḥ Abū al-Qāsim al-Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad b. al-Mufaḍdal ar-Rāḡib. Medium-good quality Arabic paper, light brown, light burnishing, rare and slight interference, regular (?) but hard to discern straight chain lines horizontal to spine 20-30mm apart, regular and distinct laid lines with some variations vertical to spine at 7 per 10mm and 0.5mm (?) wide, reed or grass laid mould. Page 165x125mm, written area 130x90mm (+/-0.5mm), 18 (occ. 17) lines per page, no visible rulings. Irregular Latin foliation in pencil top left, Arabic pagination up to f.57. 12 IV (96), V-2 (104). Textblock in rounded scholar’s nash bookhand fully pointed and unvocalised, catchwords ≠ textblock hand, red overlines for qāla etc, some red shading in early pages, all rubrication decreases towards end, black triangular shading between šād and lām of faṣl in chapter headings throughout. Type III pasteboard binding (appears to be original), leather covering, central lozenge almond shape floral stamp (mandorla) on upper and lower covers (Ottoman?) cf. Déroche type OAi. Sparse collations marks, both š [ṣaḥḥa] (eg. f17b) and ṭ [maḥṣūṭah uḥrā] (eg. f.28a), editing marks and suggestions in Western (?) hand in first 57 folios. Prayers and poetry on upper cover doublure and title page, one couplet on lower cover doublure, aphorisms (ḥikam) and poetry, prayers, Hadith on ff.103b-104a. Poem of 96 lines in nastaʿlīq hand ff.102b-103b as noted on title page titled: Nafahāt Manāzīl as-Sāʾirīn wa-Rašāhāt Mutaʾahhīl al-ʿArijīn. Purchase note dated 1109/1697 on f.103b.741

740 Déroche, Berthier, Waley, and Foundation, Islamic Codicology, 306.

741 Cf. al-ʿAḡalī, who appears to take the phrase “…into the ownership of its [i.e. this note’s] scribe…” to mean “…into the ownership of its [i.e. this work’s] scribe…” (…ilā mulki kātibih...). The purchase note is in a thick Mamluk nash scholar’s bookhand ≠ the textblock. Ragib, On Creeds, 11.
Annotated list of Ragib’s Work in Manuscript Catalogues around the World (a work in progress)

Notes and Observations

The manuscripts that I have been able to consult in Istanbul and elsewhere have their references in bold type. Those listings not in bold are taken from the sources referenced. I have also included (in italics), in those cases where I have been able to verify them, the false attributions and cataloguing errors that inevitably abound.

The Quranic Glossary has the largest number of recorded copies at over eighty worldwide, Littérateurs Replies comes in at around two thirds of that number, The Path to the Nobilities and Analysis of the Two Creations at less than half, and then the ten or so copies of the Exegesis. The documentation of dating is patchy, but these approximate numbers appear to be evidence that Ragib’s exegetical, ethical and adab works were all popular across the centuries, albeit with nothing approaching the popularity of the Quranic Glossary. In light of the number of false attributions identified in copies of the Exegesis, the caveat remains that many of the witnesses in the subsequent lists are probably false. For example, al-Iskāfī’s Durrat at-Ta`wil wa Ġurrat at-Tanzīl (see above) has often been catalogued as the Exegesis.

The oldest manuscript is the London Quranic Glossary, dated in or around Ragib’s lifetime. We then have The Confluence of Eloquence (Ahmed III 2390 dated 521/1127),

Littératures’ Ripostes (British Museum ADD 18529 dated 523/1129), The Path to the Nobilities (Laleli 1744 dated 545/1150), Abridgement of ‘The Reform of Speech’ (at-Taymūrīyah 137 Luğah reported as dated 552/1157), and Analysis of the Two Creations (Yahuda 3555 dated 584/1188) all from around a century or more after his death. The oldest manuscript of On Creeds comes a good century later (Āstān-e Quds-e Rażāvī 56 dated 679/1280), and everything else is even later still, or undated. This reaffirms the importance of the London Quranic Glossary, and throws into sharp contrast our dependence on the indigenous manuscript tradition.

The dominance of Istanbul, and indeed the libraries of Turkey in general, is, as noted above, testament to the power of the Ottoman empire and the efforts it made to collect cultural capital in manuscript form. The worldwide spread of the remainder of the witnesses is testament to the difficulties faced by both their cataloguers and those who want to read them. It is also a reaffirmation of the fact that a bad printed edition is better for scholarship than no edition at all.

Exegesis of the Quran (Tafsīr)⁷⁴³


Attributed to Ragib in incipit.


Carullah 84 (Quran 1:1-5:120). Süleymaniye. Istanbul. (Carullah is usually Walī ad-Dīn Ġār Allāh in Arabic-language catalogues). Section from Quran 3:89 (f.228b) to Quran 4:63


Fazıl Ahmed Paşa 100 ≠ Ragib. Anonymous and dated 734/1334. The text on Quranic inimitability at the start of this manuscript is close, but not identical, to that of the ninth-century Zaydī exegeses collected by ‘Abdallāh aš-Šarafī (d. 1652).

Feyzullah Efendi 2141-001 ≠ Ragib (Quran 1:1). Anonymous and dated 1091/1690.

Feyzullah Efendi 62, 63 ≠ Ragib. Millet Kütüphanesi.

744 Although Šams ad-Dīn al-İsfahānī wrote his own name as reproduced here (see his autograph on Carullah 86 and Laleli 138), it tends to be given in the biographical tradition as Šams ad-Dīn sAbū at-Ṭanā’ Maḥmūd b. ‘Abd ar-Raḥmān b. Aḥmad al-İsfahānī. Kahhālah, Muʿjam al-Muʿallifīn, 3:814.

745 Ragib, Exegesis ed. aš-Šīdī, 393.


748 Ragib, Exegesis ed. aš-Šīdī, 395.

**Feyzullah Efendi 2141.** Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. Title page (f.1a) attributes Tafsīr al-Fāṭihah to Ragib, but the text (ff.1b-16b) is not Ragib’s Exegesis. Dated 1091/1680.

Raza Library II 47/97. Rampur, India. GALS.

*Sana‘a al-Ǧāmi‘ al-Kabīr ≠ Ragib? (Muḥtaşar at-Tafsīr).* Sana‘a, Yemen. The text provided by the cataloguer does not tally with any of Ragib’s works and Dāwūdī was unsure of the attribution on consultation of the manuscript.750

**03 Gedik 17308/1 ≠ Exegesis.** Afyon Gedik Ahmet Paşa İl Halk Kütüphanesi. Milli Kütüphane-Ankara (Qarah Ḥiṣār in Arabic-language catalogues). Incorrectly titled Taḥqīq al-Bayān, this is a copy of Ragib’s The Path to the Nobilities dated 1015/1605.751


*Maktabat al-Qādirīyah 60 ≠ Ragib (Ǧāmi‘ at-Tafsīr) (Quran 23f).* Baghdad. Aš-Šīdī reports on the basis of an undated Ph.D. thesis by Muḥammad Iqbāl Farḥāt (az-Zaytūnah University, Tunis) that the Ragib manuscripts catalogued as being in Baghdad are either not by Ragib or are no longer there.752

749 Ibid., 390-391.


751 Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism, “Turkey Manuscripts Online Database,” http://www.yazmalar.gov.tr/.

At-Taymūrīyah 361 (methodological introduction). Cairo, Egypt. Farḥāt. 753

32 Yalvaç 178 (Tafsīr). Bölge Yazma Eserler Kütüphanesi. Konya, Turkey. 754


Quranic Glossary (Mufradāt Ġarīb al-Qurʿān al-Karīm)


Adab 27. Alexandria, Egypt. “Fragment”. GAL.

Amasya Beyazıt İl Halk Kütüphanesi 05 Ba 1433. Istanbul, Turkey. Yazmalar. 756

ʿĀrif Ḥikmet 68. Medina, Saudi Arabia. FS. K. Dāwūdī. 757

ʿĀrif Ḥikmet 69. Medina, Saudi Arabia. FS. Dāwūdī. 758

Asir Efendi 1120. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. 759

Āstān-e Quds-e Rażāvī 3/219. Mashhad, Iran. FS. Handlist. Mīr Lawḥī. GALS. 760

753 ———, Methodological Introduction and Exegesis ed. Farḥāt, 22. I have been unable to find reference to this manuscript in the published catalogues of the Taymūrīyah.

754 Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism, "http://www.yazmalar.gov.tr/".

755 Manuscripts with “FS” are from Royal Academy for Islamic Civilization Research, al-Fihris aṣ-Šāmil, 1:125-126. Volume II contains a key to the manuscript libraries and catalogues cited. Mīr Lawḥī, Rāgef, 229.

756 Catalogued at: Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism, "http://www.yazmalar.gov.tr/".


758 ———, Quranic Glossary, 39.


760 Cf. Sayyed ʿAlī Ardalān-e Ğavān, Fehrest-e Kutub-e Ḥaṭṭī-ye Ketābḫānah-ye Markazī-ye Āstān-e Quds-e Rażāvī,
Aṣtān-e Quds-e Rażāvī 1554. Mashhad, Iran. FS. Handlist. Mīr Lawḥī.761

Atıf Efendi 278. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. K.

Atıf Efendi 362. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. FS. Cf. GALS.

Atıf Efendi 378. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. FS.

Al-Awqāf 1076. Baghdad, Iraq. FS.

Ayasofya 432. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. FS, K, GALS.

Berlin Staatsbibliothek 675/966. Germany. Dated 1265/1849. FS. Ahlwardt. GAL.762

Beşir Aga 77. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. FS, K, GALS.

Carullah 445. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. K.

Carullah 446. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. K.

Carullah 2048. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. FS.

Damad Ibrahim 312. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. K.

Damad Ibrahim 313. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. K.

Esad Efendi 3279. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. K, GALS.

Fatih 5272. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. K.

Feyzullah Efendi 365. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. K.

Feyzullah Efendi 2107. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. FS, K, cf. GALS.

Feyzullah Efendi 2108. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. FS. K.763


762 Cf. Ahlwardt, Verzeichnis, 1:268.

763 Karabulut, Muʿgam al-Maḥfūẓat, 1:471.
Feyzullah Efendi 2141. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. ff.81a-252b. Dated 1092/1681. FS.


Hādā‘ī 114. Selim Ağa Kütüphanesi, Üsküdar, Istanbul, Turkey. K.


Hamidiye 190. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. FS. K.

Hamidiye 191. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. FS. K.

Al-Ḥaram 137. Mecca, Saudi Arabia. FS.


Kiliç Ali 177. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. FS, GALS, K.

Khuda Bakhsh Oriental Library 1484. Patna, Bihar, India. Dated 1088/1677. FS. GALS. Cf. GAL


Laleli 3632. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. FS, K, GALS.


Al-Maḥmūdiyah 138/218/228. Mecca, Saudi Arabia. Dated 1054/1644. FS, Kaḥhālah,

Dāwūdī.766


Maktabat al-Qādirīyah 99. Baghdad, Iraq. Acephalous. Note at end:


765 Şeşen, Fihris Kūprūlū, 2:98.


767 ———, Quranic Glossary, 39.
this book has been rescued from the River Tigris after it was thrown there by the Tatars, may God curse them, in the year 656 of the Prophet’s hiǧrah, and I am al-faqīr ilā-llāh ‘Abdallāh b. Muḥammad b.‘Abd al-Qādir al-Makkī.

FS. Mīr Lawḥī. Raʿūf.\textsuperscript{768} 

**Manisa Akhisar Zeynelzade Koleksiyon 45 Ak Ze 476.** Manisa İl Halk Kütüphanesi. Manisa, Turkey. Yazmalar.\textsuperscript{769}

**Manisa İl Halk Kütüphanesi 45 Hk 2080.** Manisa, Turkey. Dated 714/1314. Yazmalar.\textsuperscript{770}

**Manisa İl Halk Kütüphanesi 45 Hk 4383.** Manisa, Turkey. Dated 1168/1753. Yazmalar.\textsuperscript{771}

**Michigan University Library Sulaiman Purchase Collection.** [al-Mufradāt fī gharīb al-Qur’ān, 19th century?] Former shelfmark: Mich. Isl. Ms. temp. no. 179. United States.\textsuperscript{772}

Mingana 44/1248. Selly Oak Colleges Library, Birmingham, United Kingdom. Dated 1190/1776. FS.

Muhammad Yakun [?] Paşa. Milli Kütüphane. Ankara, Turkey. FS.

Murad Molla 313. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. FS, K.

**New Series 114.** Princeton University Library, United States. Dated 1269/1853. Mach and Ormsby.\textsuperscript{773}

Nuruosmaniye 599. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. FS, K.

Nuruosmaniye 600. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. FS, K.

\textsuperscript{768}Raʿūf, al-Ąğār al-Ḥaṭṭiyah, 125. Mīr Lawḥī, Rāġeb, 229.

\textsuperscript{769}Scanned images viewed at: Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism, "http://www.yazmalar.gov.tr/".

\textsuperscript{770}Scanned images viewed at: ibid.

\textsuperscript{771}Catalogued at: ibid.

\textsuperscript{772}Available online at: http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015079132174.

Nuruosmaniye 601. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. FS. K.

Ragib Paşa 1448. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. K.

Rashed Efendi 1424. Istanbul, Turkey. Dated 998/1590. FS. Cf. K.

Reşit Efendi 1424. Istanbul, Turkey. Dated 1167/1754. FS.

Reşit Efendi 117. Istanbul, Turkey. FS.

Raza Library 620. Rampur, India. FS. GALS.

Raza Library 621. Rampur, India. FS.

Şan’a’ al-Ǧāmi‘ah al-Kabīr 203. Sana’a, Yemen. Dated 819/1306. FS. Ruqayḥī.774


Selim Ağa 146. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. Dated 1172/1759. FS, K, GALS.

Tehran University 553. Tehran, Iran. Mīr Lawḥī.776

Tokat İl Halk Kütüphanesi 60 Hk 181. Ankara, Turkey. Yazmalar.777

Topkapı Palace 1747. Istanbul, Turkey. 1167/1754. FS.


\[^{774}\text{Ruqayḥī, Hibšī, and Ānisī,} \\text{Fihrīst,} \\text{1:219-220.}\]

\[^{775}\text{Ibid.}\]

\[^{776}\text{Mīr Lawḥī,} \\text{Rāḡeb,} \\text{228.}\]

\[^{777}\text{Scanned images viewed at: Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism,} \\text{"http://www.yazmalar.gov.tr".}\]

\[^{778}\text{Maḥmūd Mar’aṣī and Ahmad Ḥusaynī,} \\text{Fehrest-e Nūṣḥehā-yı Ḥaṭṭī Kitābḫāne-yı ʿUmūmī Ḥaẓrat-e Ayāt Allāh al-ʿUzmā Naḡafī Mar’aṣī,} \\text{40 vols.} \\text{(Qum: Ṣadrā, 1975).} \\text{12:291.}\]

\[^{779}\text{Mīr Lawḥī,} \\text{Rāḡeb,} \\text{224-227.}\]
Umumiya 278/558. Bayezid. Istanbul, Turkey. FS. K.

Veliyuddin 445. Süleymanıye. Istanbul, Turkey. FS. GALS.

Veliyuddin 446. Süleymanıye. Istanbul, Turkey. FS. GALS.

Veliyuddin 447. Süleymanıye. Istanbul, Turkey. FS. GALS.

Veliyuddin 448. Süleymanıye. Istanbul, Turkey. FS. GALS.

Vehid Paşa 394. Suleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. K.

Ya’qub Sarkis 104. Baghdad University, Iraq. FS.

Yehuda 4784. Princeton University Library, United States. Dated 1166/1753. FS. Mach. 781

Yeki Cami 58. Suleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. K.

Yeni Cami 58. Suleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. FS. GAL.

Yeni Cami 58. Suleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. FS. GAL.


On Creeds (al-I’tiqādāt)

Āstān-e Quds-e Ražāvi 56. Mashhad, Iran. Catalogued as Taḥqīq al-Bayān. Dated 679/1280.

Acephalous, starting towards end of chapter four (fī ṣuwarin muḥtalifah... p.151 in al-

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780 Ibid., 228.


ʿAġalī’ s edition). The section on the knowledge of God (maʿrifat allāh) that al-ʿAġalī places at the end of chapter two (pp.39-63) comes at the end of the manuscript, after chapter eight. This fact is alluded to in an internal colophon f.75a, following which is an text on the investigation of the word “one” (taḥqīq al-wāḥid, ff.75b-76b), at the end of which comes the dated colophon. This text is introduced with the scribal phrase: “this was at the end of the book” (kāna fi āḥirī –l-kitābī hāḏā) and its content is very close to, and in some places repeats, Ragib’s discussions of “one” elsewhere.784 GAL, GALS, Library Catalogue, Ṭalas, Al-Aġālī, Mīr Lawḥī.785

Şehid Ali 382. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. Titled Risālah fī-l-Iʿtiqād (Epistle on Creed)

Dated 15 Rabīʿ al-Awwal 961 / 18 February 1554. The third in a collection of works copied in the same hand, the first of which is Analysis of Forty Hadith (Taḥrīq al-Aḥādī  al-Arbaʿīn) by Ṣadr ad-Dīn Abū ʿAbdallāh Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm as-Sulamī (742/1342-803/1401),786 and the second of which is Risālah fī-l-Iʿtiqād by ‘Ālāʾ ad-Dīn al-Buḫārī (completed on 14 ʿṢafar 961 / 18 January 1554).787 Both of these works appear to be unpublished. On Creeds starts on f. 17b and ends on f.52b. The section on the knowledge of God (maʿrifat allāh) that Āstān-e Quds-e Raʿ āvī 56 places after chapter eight is omitted, as is a small section on God’s attributes (pp.74-79 missing at f.22b), and the manuscript

784 Ragib, On Creeds, 68-71. ———, “One and Absolute One.”


786 Kaḥḥālah, Muʿam al-Muʿallīfīn, 3:25.

finishes early at the end of chapter seven (…fa-mā qāla lī fī šay`īn ḥālafatā murādahū lima fa`’alta. p.290). 788

**Chester Beatty AR 5277.** The Chester Beatty Library. Dublin, Ireland. See description above. Undated. The section on the knowledge of God (ma`rifat allāh) that Āstān-e Quds-e Ražāvī 56 places after chapter eight comes instead after chapter seven (ff.88b-97a). The small section on God’s attributes omitted in Şehid Ali 382 (al-`Aḡalī pp.74-79) is present (ff.14a-15b). A subsequent section on the attributes also appears in a different place (Şehid Ali 382’s f.23a (pp.79-82 al-`Aḡalī) is swopped with Şehid Ali 382’s ff.25b-26a (pp.98-101 al-`Aḡalī) at AR 5277’s f.16a and f.23a). Arberry, Kahle, Al-Aḡalī. 789

**Feyzullah Efendi 2141.** Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. Untitled. Dated 1091/1680. Third text (ff.26b-80b.) in a collection (mu`allad) of four works: an anonymous exegesis of Quran 1 (see above); Ragib’s *Analysis of the Two Creations* (see below); and Ragib’s *Quranic Glossary* (see above). The text of *On Creeds* is not mentioned on the title page whereas the the other three works are. The text agrees with Şehid Ali 382 in the omission of the large section on the knowledge of God, the ordering of the section on the attributes (Şehid Ali 382’s f.23a), and the early conclusion, but the small section on the attributes omitted by Şehid Ali 382 is present in accordance with Chester Beatty AR 5277 (ff.43a-43b).

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The Path to the Nobilities of the Revelation (Kitāb aḍ-Ḍarīʿah ilā Makārim aš-Ṣarīʿah)

Afyon Gedik 17308/1. Afyon Gedik Ahmet Paşa İl Halk Kütüphanesi. Milli Kütüphane-Ankara
(Qurah Ḥiṣār in Arabic-language catalogues). Incorrectly titled Taḥqīq al-Bayān. ⁷⁹⁰

Āstān-e Quds-e Raʿāvī 6/21. Mashhad, Iran. Handlist, GALS. ⁷⁹¹

Atif Efendi 2118. Süleymaniyê. Istanbul, Turkey. K, GALS.

Ayasofya 2896. Süleymaniyê. Istanbul, Turkey. K, GALS.

Ayasofya 2897. Süleymaniyê. Istanbul, Turkey. K, GALS.

Ayasofya 2898. Süleymaniyê. Istanbul, Turkey. K, GALS.

Ayasofya 1844. Süleymaniyê. Istanbul, Turkey. K, GALS.

Ayasofya 4027. Süleymaniyê. Istanbul, Turkey. K, GALS.

Ayasofya 4818. Süleymaniyê. Istanbul, Turkey. K, GALS.


British Museum 7016. London, United Kingdom. Stocks and Baker, GAL, GALS. ⁷⁹³

British Museum 146 (Persian Translation). London, United Kingdom. GAL, GALS.

Carullah 2166. Süleymaniyê. Istanbul, Turkey. K.


Damad Ibrahim 768. Süleymaniyê. Istanbul, Turkey. Undated. Anonymous notes on cover with biographical information about Ragib. As-Sārīsī, K. ⁷⁹⁵

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⁷⁹⁰ Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism, "http://www.yazmalar.gov.tr/".

⁷⁹¹ Fekrat and Murādi, Fehrest, 272.

⁷⁹² Ragib, The Path to the Nobilities, 45-46.


⁷⁹⁴ Arberry and Lyons, Chester Beatty, 5:128.


Fatih 3890. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. K, GALS.  

Feyzullah Efendi 1239. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. K.  

Feyzullah Efendi 1240. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. K.  

Köprülü 1299. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. GAL.  

Köprülü 1324. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. GAL.  

Köprülü 1371. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. Sesen, GAL.  

**Laleli 1744.** Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. Dated 545/1150. Collated. GALS.  

**Manisa İl Halk Kütüphanesi 45 Hk 6214.** Manisa, Turkey. Undated. Yazmalar.  

Nuruosmaniye 2383. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. K.  


**Ragib Paşa 1179.** Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. ff.1b-91a. GAL.  

Selimiye 630. Edirne, Turkey. K.  


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795 See note 94. as-Sārīsī, *ar-Rāğib*, 32.  

796 Ragib, *The Path to the Nobilities*, 45-46.  


799 Scanned images viewed at: Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism, "http://www.yazmalar.gov.tr/".  

ʿUmūmī 12052. Kitābḵāne-ye ʿUmūmī Ḫaẓrat-e Naḡafī Marʿašī. Qum, Iran. Marʿašī, Mūsavī and Muttaqī. 802

Vienna 1839. GAL.

**Yahuda 2741.** Princeton University Library, United States. Undated. Mach. 803

**Yahuda 3555.** Princeton University Library, United States. Dated 584/1188 in Isfahan. Mach. 804

Yeni Cami 937. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. K.

**Analysis of the Two Creations and Attainment of the Two Happinesses (Tafṣīl an-Našʿatayn wa Taḥṣīl as-Saʿādatayn)**

Āṣafīyah 2/712. State Central Library, Hyderabad, India. GALS.

Āstān-e Quds-e Raẓāvī. Mashhad, Iran. Fihrist. 805

Āstān-e Quds-e Raẓāvī. Dated 661/1263. Mashhad, Iran. Fihrist. 806


Ayasofya 1862. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. K.

Ayasofya 4027. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. K, GAL.


804 Ibid.


806 Ibid., 7:121.

807 Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism, "http://www.yazmalar.gov.tr/".
Ayasofya 4818. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. K.

British Museum. London, United Kingdom. Stocks and Baker. 808

Carullah 3189. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. K.

Çorum Hasan Paşa Îl Halk Kütüphanesi 19 Hk 767. Çorum, Turkey. Dated 27 Šawwāl 735 / 19 June 1335. Yzmalar. 809

Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣrīyah 280. Cairo, Egypt. GALS.

Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣrīyah 555. Cairo, Egypt. GAL.

Esad Efendi 3640. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. K.

Feyzullah Efendi 1235. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. K.


Nuruosmaniye 2394. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. K.

Ragib Paşa 1067. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. K.

Ragib Paşa 1179. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. ff.91b-119b. K.


808 Stocks and Baker, Subject-guide, 216.

809 Scanned images viewed at: Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism, "http://www.yazmalar.gov.tr/".


811 Şeşen, Fihris Kûprîlû, 2:98.

812 Mach and Ormsby, New Series, 318.
Selimiye 630. Edirne, Turkey. K.

Şehid Ali 2394. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. GALS.


Yahuda 3555. Princeton University Library, United States. Dated 584/1188 in Isfahan. Copied together with The Path to the Nobilities (see above). Mach.814

Littératores’ Ripostes and Poets’ and Eloquent Men’s Rejoinders (Muḥḍarāt al-Udabā’ wa-Muḥāwarāt aṣ-Ṣuʿarāʾ wa-l-Bulaḡā’)


Āstān-e Quds-e Ražāvī 38. Mashhad, Iran. Dated 1250/1834. Cf. Fihrist, Handlist, GALS.816


Āstān-e Quds-e Ražāvī 4306. Mashhad, Iran. Undated, Persian abridged translation. Riedel.818

Āstān-e Quds-e Ražāvī 4990. Mashhad, Iran. Dated 1250/1834, abridgement. Riedel.819

Al-Awqāf. Baghdad, Iraq. Ṭalas.820

813 Marʿaṣī and Ḥusaynī, Fehrest, 8:275.
814 Mach, Yahuda, 169.
815 Mīr Lawḥī, Rāḡeb, 189.
817 Afšār, Dānišpāžūh, Ḥuḡḡatī, and Munzavī, Fehrest, 5:402. Fekrat and Murāḏī, Fehrest, 499. Riedel, 2004 #123@32} Mīr Lawḥī, Rāḡeb, 186-188.
819 ———, "Searching for the Islamic episteme," 32.
Atif Efendi 2258. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. K.
Ayasofya 4252. Süleymaniye, Istanbul, Turkey. GAL.
Ayasofya 4254. Süleymaniye, Istanbul, Turkey. K, Riedel, GAL. 821
Ayasofya 4255. Süleymaniye, Istanbul, Turkey. K, Riedel, GAL. 822
Ayasofya 4256. Süleymaniye, Istanbul, Turkey. K, Riedel, GAL. 823
Ayasofya 4257. Süleymaniye, Istanbul, Turkey. K, Riedel, GAL. 824
Ayasofya 4258. Süleymaniye, Istanbul, Turkey. K, Riedel, GAL. 825
Bayezid 5433. Istanbul, Turkey. K.
Berlin Petermann 105. Staatsbibliothek, Berlin, Germany. Undated, fragment. Ahlwardt, Riedel, GAL. 826
Berlin Sprenger 1218. Staatsbibliothek, Berlin, Germany. Undated, fragment. Ahlwardt, Riedel, GAL. 827
Berlin Wetzstein II 423. Staatsbibliothek, Berlin, Germany. Undated, fragment. Ahlwardt, Riedel, GAL. 828

820 Ṭalas, "Nafī‘is al-Maḥṭūtāt “ 167.
821 Riedel, "Searching for the Islamic episteme," 32.
822 Ibid.
823 Ibid.
824 Ibid.
825 Ibid.
Ahlwardt, Riedel, GAL.  

Berlin Wetzstein II 1175. Staatsbibliothek, Berlin, Germany. Dated 596/1200, fragment.
Ahlwardt, Riedel, GAL.  

Biblioteca Ambrosiana 51. First half of work. Löfgren and Traini.  


British Museum ADD 7305. London, United Kingdom. Dated 1169/1755. Colophon details copying from manuscript dated 591/1195. Stocks and Baker, Murād, Riedel, GAL.  

British Museum ADD 18529. London, United Kingdom. Dated 14 Ṣafar 523 / 5 February 1129.

“Volume Four” (chapters 20-25 inclusive). Variant title f.3b: Muḥādarāt al-Bulağāʾ wa-Muḥāwarāt al-Udabāʾ wa-Šurʿarāʾ (Eloquent Men’s Replies and Littérateurs’ and Poets’ Ripostes). Variant author’s name f.3b: aš-Šayḥ Abū –l-Qāsim al-Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad b. Abī al-Faḍl ar-Rāġib. Deletions of sensitive material at f.29a (anecdote about the caliph Muʿāwiyah’s (reg. 41/661-60/680) death being caused by a crucifix hung on him as a talisman by a Christian doctor) and f.77b (“Shia” anecdote about the caliph ʿAlī (reg 35/656-40/661) having sex with the mother of the caliph ʿUmar b. al-Ḥaṭṭāb (reg. 13/634-23/664)). This sub-sub-chapter on Criticism of Extreme Shiʾism and Infatuation with the  

Companions of the Prophet (Ḏamm al-Ġulāw wa-t-Tahāfut fī as-Šahābah) has extra text not found in Murād’s edition, with further deletions. Stocks and Baker, GAL, Mīr Lawḥī has detailed review based on Tehran photocopy.


Esad Efendi 2897. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. K.

Fatih 4064. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. K.


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834 Deleted text is at: Ragib, Littérateurs’ Ripostes, 4:279 lines 2-6, 4:283 line 9.
840 ———, "Searching for the Islamic episteme," 32.
841 Ibid.
842 Ibid.


Feyzullah Efendi 1752-1754. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. K.


Halle 116. Halle, Germany. Tuʿmah. 850

Hamidiye 1188. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. K.

Hamidiye 1189. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. K.

Kastamonu 2022. İl Halk Kütüphanesi, Kastamonu, Turkey. K.

Laleli 1920. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. K.


843 Ibid.
844 Ibid.
845 Ibid.
847 ———, "Searching for the Islamic episteme," 32.
848 Ibid.
849 Ğu’bah, Ḥālidī, and Salāmah, Fihris.

United States. 852


Selim Ağa 981. Süleymaniye, Istanbul, Turkey. K.


Tabriz National Library. Tabriz, Iran. Dated 1276/1860. Riedel, Mīr Lawḥī. 855

Tehran ʿAlī Muṭahharī 3265. Tehran, Iran. Dated 1070/1660. Riedel. 856

Tehran Mağlis 308. Tehran, Iran. Undated, Persian abridged translation. Riedel. 857

Tehran ʿUmūmī 144. Tehran, Iran. Dated 1285/1868. Riedel. 858


Tehran University 2492. Tehran, Iran. Fragment. Riedel. 860

Tehran University 4503. Tehran, Iran. Undated, Persian abridged translation. Riedel. 861

Kitābḫāne-ye ʿUmūmī Ḥaẓrat-e Naḡafī Marʿaṣī. Qum, Iran. Dated 1285/1868. Mīr Lawḥī. 862

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852 Available online at: http://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/006834155.
853 Nuruosmaniyede Kütüphanesi, Defteri, 243.
855 Ibid. Mīr Lawḥī, Rāğeb, 188-189.
860 ———, "Searching for the Islamic episteme," 32.
Vazīrī Library, Yazd, Iran.  


Yeni Cami 1004. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. Riedel, K.  


Aẓ-Ẓāhirīyah 86, 5. Damascus, Syria. Riedel, GALS.  

The Confluence of Eloquence (Mağma'al-Balāğah)


862 Mīr Lawḥī, Rāḡeb, 189.  
863 Ibid.  
865 Ibid.  
866 Ibid.  
867 Ibid., 32.  
868 Ibid.  
869 Ragib, Littératores’ Ripostes, 1:23.  
871 Ragib, Confluence of Eloquence, 1:10-16.  
872 Ibid., 1:6-10.
Ragib on Innovative Figures of Speech (Kitāb min Kalām ar-Rāġib fī-l-Badī’)

Landberg 165. The Landberg Collection, Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale University, New Haven, United States. Nemoy.873

Abridgement of 'The Reform of Speech’ by Ibn as-Sikkīt (Muḥṭaṣar ʾIṣlāḥ al-Manṭiq li-Ibn as-Sikkīt)

At-Taymūrīyah 137 Luğah. Dated 552/1157. Cairo, Egypt. Photocopy in Umm al-Qurā University, Mecca, Saudi Arabia at #316. Fihris, Dāwūdī, Ibrāhīm.874

On the Difference Between the Words ‘One’ and ‘Absolute One’ (Risālah fī Ḏikr al-Wāḥid wa-l-Aḥad)


873 Nemoy, Arabic manuscripts, 41.
876 Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism, "http://www.yazmalar.gov.tr/".
On the Correct Ways to Mix with People (*Riṣālah fī ʿĀdāb al-ḥilāt bi-n-Nās*)


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On Human Virtue Arising from the Disciplines of Knowledge (*Riṣālah anna Faṣīlāt al-Insān bi-l-ʿUlūm*)


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On the Ordering of Intellectual Disciplines and of Worldly Actions (*Riṣālah fī Marāṭib al-ʿUlūm wa-l-Aʿmāl ʿad-Dunyāwīyah*)


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878 Mīr Lawḥī, *Rāḡeb*, 241-248 (with 5 plates).  
879 Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism, "http://www.yazmalar.gov.tr/".  
880 Ragib, "On Human Virtue Arising from the Disciplines of Knowledge," 151-152.  
881 Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism, "http://www.yazmalar.gov.tr/".  

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286

**The Correct Way in Chess (Adab aš-Šaṭranĝ)**

Kazan, Russia. Menzel, Brockelmann, GALS. 884

**On Knowledge of the Soul and On Invocation of God’s Name (Risālah fī-Ma ‘rifat an-Nafs, Risālah fī-ḍ-Ḍikr)**

Hamidiye 1447. Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. The works attributed to Ragib are numbered 052 and 053 in this collection of 145 works on a wide variety of philosophical and historical subjects. 052 and 053 appear to be in the margin between f.93 (#050) and f.106a (#057).

**Šarḥ li-Du‘ ā’ aš-Šabāḥ al-mawsūm bi-Miftāḥ an-Nağāḥ (The Key to Success: Commentary on the Morning Personal Prayer)**


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883 Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism, "http://www.yazmalar.gov.tr/".
to Muḥyī ad-Dīn Ibn ‘Arabī (560/1165-638/1240) at ff.31b-42b. The attribution of the The Key to Success comes on text on f.11a that ends in a ruled upturned triangle:

aš-Šayḫ al-Imām Abū al-Qāsim al-Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad al-Muḥafḍal, known as ar-Rāḡib al-Iṣfahānī, commented on this noble section [of the morning prayer] attributed to ‘Alī, may God exalt him and be pleased with him…[followed by a brief review of some of Ragib’s works].

The manuscript as a whole appears to be quite late Ottoman (red rule-borders, scholar’s nāṣīḥ bookhand), and while the text of the prayer itself corresponds to recent editions,885 the text of the commentary titled The Key to Success is not reminiscent of Ragib’s other work. As-Sārīsī.886

Šarḥ Kalām Rasūl Allāh fī Ḥaqq ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib (Commentary on the Prophet’s Words Concerning the Right of Ali)

Ragib Paşa 1179 ≠ Ragib (?). Süleymaniye. Istanbul, Turkey. ff.119b-124a. There is no evidence that this text at the end of a copy of The Path to the Nobilities and Analysis of the Two Creations (see above) is Ragib’s. It begins with the phrase: “this is a section (faṣl) containing the words of the Prophet...”. K.

False Attributions (in addition to those detailed above)

Aḥlāq ar-Rāḡib (Ragib’s Ethics)

Ahlwardt suggested that the unknown author (fl. 460/1068) of this work may have been Ragib. The chapter headings he records do not tally with any of Ragib’s known works.887


Aṭbāq aḏ-Ḏahab (Trays of Gold)

Kaḥḥālah lists this manuscript in ‘Arif Ḥikmet, Mecca, Saudi Arabia, but Dānišpažūh lists it as a commentary on az-Zamaḥšarī’s (467/1075-538/1144) Aṭbāq aḏ-Ḏahab.888

Al-Qalāʾid wa-l-Fawāʾid (Poems and Homilies).

Listed by Kaḥḥālah in ‘Arif Ḥikmet, Mecca, Saudi Arabia, this is in fact by Abū al-Ḥusayn Muḥammad b. al-Ḥusayn al-Ahwāzī (d. 330/941) with a false additional attribution to Ragib on its front endpaper. The work has been published by Dār Ibn Ḥazm under al-Ahwāzī’s name, edited by Iḥsān Ḏunān  at-Ṭāmirī, in Beirut in 2006. The Mecca manuscript is dated 907/1501.889

Ṣaqīl al-Fahm (Burnished Understanding)

Kātib Čelebi notes that this may be Ragib’s Littérateurs’ Ripostes and this is supported by Ragib’s use of the phrase ṣaqīl al-fahm in the introduction to Littérateurs’ Ripostes.890

887 Ahlwardt, Verzeichnis, 5:5.


889 Kaḥḫālah, al-Muntaḥab, 42. I am grateful to Shoaib Ahmed for helping me obtain a copy of this manuscript.

APPENDIX TWO: SELECTIONS FROM UNPUBLISHED MANUSCRIPTS

كِتابٌ مِنْ كَلامِ الرَّاغِبِ في البَديع

تَقاسِيمُ الكَلام

الأَعْلامُ وضَاْبٌ وُضِعا لِيُفِيدا على طارِيقِ الاِشْتِِاكِ واذٰلِِا قِسْماينِ قِسْمٌ ياقاعُ على الُ

أتالافُوا فيِ الأَشَاءْ وَالثَّانيُّ واَخْتالافُوا فيِ الأَشَاءْ وَالثَّانيُّ وَالثَّانيُّ واَخْتالافُوا فيِ

Appendix One

للمزيد من المعلومات Appendix One

891

892
جوازه [ص: إذا كان] في لغة واحدة ومن أبي جواز ذلك تطلب لكل الوس ين من ذلك وجمان [4a]

ثم اختلفوا هل يصح أن يراد باللفظ الواحد معنيان مختلفان فأتي ذلك كثير من الأدباء والفقهاء

وجوزه بعضهم وهو الصحيح

وعلى ذلك قول الشاعر

وماء آجن الأجنات قطر تعتم في جوانبه السباغ

والماء قد يطلق على مكانه وقد أريد هو مكانه في البيت لأن الآجنب من صفة الماء وقنطر من صفة المكان وقد وصف بالوضعين ولئن هذا موضوع الاستيعاب فيه [بجاشية: الأغنيام الاختصار في جوانبه البني [كذا] ويقال هو الردُّ وهو الأصحّ]

المُسَأْوَة

ومن هذا الباب [باب الاستعارة] المُسَأْوَة وهو أن يكون اللفظ مساوياً للمعنى لا زايد [كذا] عليه

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893 في الهاش مع رمز "ص"
ولا ناقص عنه كَا قال بعضهم في وصف تليف كَانَت أَلفاظهُ قَوالبُ لمعنيها ونحوه

وَنَبَدِي لِاكَالأيام ما كُنْتُ جاهِلاً

وَأَوَّل راَضٍ سِّنَةً مِن يِبيِّرها

وَقَدْ زَهْير

سُمِّيتُ [أَكُدا] ٨٩٤ تَكَالِيفِ الحياة وَمِن يِعْش

فَإِلَّا الْعَالَمَاء ارْتَضُوه وَاشْتَخَصُوه إِذْ قَدْ ذِكَرْ أَنَّهُ سُمِّي تَكَالِيفِ الحياة لا الحياة إذ كَانَتُ الحياة لا تمل

وَفَضَّلَ عَلَى نَبَيِّ لَه يِبَّد خطَب يَقول

وَلَقَد سُمِّيتُ مِن الحياة وطُولُها

وَسُؤَلَ هذا الناس كَيفِ لَه

٨٩٤ والضُّوَاب سُمِّيتُ
في الكلام لَه مَواضِع يَختصُ بها وَهُوَ أَن يَكُون في مَوقف يُحتاج فيه إلى تَفَهيمِ العامة [س: وَفِيهِ]

القريب والبعيد والذكي والطبي الفهم أو كان اللَّفظ مَشترِكا بين مَعنىَين حقَّين أو حقَّيقتين أو مجاز أو عام وخاص أو لِصدِق العناية بمورد الحَب فَيُحتاج إلى الإِشباع

[Carullah 84: f.24a]

فَإِنْ قَبَلَ كَيْف وَجْه العطَّاط في ذَلِك وَقَد قَالَ في الأَوْلِ مُتَلَكَّم كَمْلَرَّ الَّذِي استَتوَقَّد نَاءا وَلا يُليِق أَن يَقال بعدَه كَصِيب قِبل قَد أَجيب عن ذَلِك بَلْ أَريد أَو كَأَهْل صَيب من الشَّيء وَقَبل إن ذَلِك عَطَف

\[\text{Appendix One}\]

في الهاش مع رمز"ح"
على المعنى وذلك لأن التشبية تارة يوقٍ ۝ يه مطابقة للنصبه في اللفظ و타رة يوقٍ ۝ يه على ما يقتضيه المعنى دون اللفظ على ذلك قوله تعالى ۝ مثل ما ينفكون في هذه الحيوة ككل ريح فيها صر أصابت حزن قوم ظلهم أفسسهم ۝ ومعناه كحسر قوم ظلهم أفسسهم أصابته ريح فزعي في المعنى دون اللفظ وعلي ذلك قول الشاعر

فلايلة حطان بن عوف منازل كما رقص النخل في النهي كتاب

وتشير كان قرنان رقصته الكاتب وهذا النوع من التشبية يقال له التشبية الملفقة

[Carullah 84: f.26a]

وشرح هذه الآية لا بد أن نبين فيه كيف كان تعليم الله تعالى آدم الأسماء وهل في ذلك دلالة على

Carullah 84: ۸97

Carullah 84: ۸98

۸99 يكبه أراد أن يبتديء ب"فإع"
أنّ اللُغات تؤيّن أو اصطلاح وَانَّهُ حُلّ عَلَمَة الأّشخاص دُونْ المعاني أو عَلَمَة إِيّاهَا جمِيعًا ... فَيَقُولُ 

وِبِاللهِ التَّوْفِيق إِنَّ النَّاس اخْتالفوا في اللُغات فَذَهَبَ بِغَفِّ للمتَكْلِمِينّ إِلَى أنَّ أَوَّلِها [كَذَا] اصطلاحٌ 

وَالباقِي يُصِّح أنّ يكون تأويفاً وَاستدل على ذلك بيّنّه لا سِبب إِلَى مَعْرِفة مـَرَادِ الله إِلَّا بالحَطابِ وَلا 

يُصِّح أن تَعْلَمَة ضرورة لأنَّ العلم بِمَرَاد فَزَعَ على العلم بِذنَابه فلا يُصِّح أنَّ يكون العلم بِمَرَاد ضرورِة 

وَالعلم بِذنَابه مَكْتَسَبًا لأنَّ ذَلِك يؤيّن إِلَى أنَّ يكون العلم الحقيقي ضروريًا والجَانِي مَكْتَسِبًا وَذَلِك فَائِسَ 

هَذَا ما قاله والصَّحيح إن شاء الله ما ذَهَب إِلَى الهِجْمُهُ أنَّهُ تأويفٌ وَقَبَل الدَّلالة عَلَى المَشْتَلَة بَنيّنَ 

أنّ تَعْلَمَي الله تعالى عباده عَلَى أيّ وجه يكون ذَلِك يُسِهِل الكلام في المَشْتَلَة والقول في ذلِك أنَّ الله 

تَعَلَّمَ قد أَشَارَ إِلَى ذِلَك بِقوله وما كان لِبَشَر أن يَعْلم أنَّ يَكْلِمَهُ الله إِلَّا وَجَيّا أو مُؤَرِّف بِرَسُولَةَ كِبْرِيَّةً إِلَّا يُشاَء 902 فَذَكَر أنَّ مَكَالَمَةَ تَعَلَّمَى البَشَر عَلَى أَحَد هَذِه الأَواْجِه الثَّلَاثة أَشْرَفَهَا 

ما كان يَأْسِرَ بِرَسُولَ يَبُري ذاَهِة وَتَبْشِّر كِلَامُه كِحالَة يَتْبَيّن مِعْ جَيْلَ عَلَيّهِ السَّلَامُ وَالثَّانِي ما كان إِلَّا 

كِلَامُ في الشَّعْب مِنْ عَالِي رَؤْيَة كِحال مُؤَسِّي عَلَيّهِ السَّلَامُ في اِبْتدَاء الرِسَالَة وَالثَّالث ما كان يُؤَيّن 

900 فَيَقُولُ: آيّة 51

901 فَيَقُولُ: آيّة 51

902 سورة الشورى
والوحي هاهنا مخصص بالإنفاذ في النبوء والإلهام والتشخيص والمفاهيم فتعلّم الله تعالى آدم الآشبة
على أخذ هذه الوجهة ومحال أن يكون الاضطلاع على الألفاظ متقنًا على التعلم فإن الاضطلاع
لا بد له من كلام يتواطأون [كذا] عليه وذلك يؤدي إلى أن لا يكون اضطلاع ولا لغة فإن قيل فيما
تنكر أن تواضعوا إشارات وتضويف فإن الأخرس [f.26b] يشير على ذلك وله مخارج الحروف
لذا فأعد الله لا يتكلمون تفهمون وفهمون ولا لغة لهم فإن الإشارات يفهم عنها بالاستدلال كسائر
[كذا] الاستدلالات التي لا توحينا الكلام مرتّقًا أصح خصوصه وليس بالأخرس إلا الاستدلال فقط
ولا فذره له على ألفاظ تأملها وإي ضؤيت كصوت الطفل الذي لم يتفق الألفاظ واللغة إلا يكون لغة
بخصوص تركيب المفردات الثلاث وله كان إلى ذلك سبيل من غير تغليم كان من شرط التعلم أن
يتواعظوا فيها نبتهم كلاماً لأن أفة البتكم من السّم يعجز عن الكلام لعجزه عن التلبين بالشعل فثبت
أن ابتداء تعلم الكلام لا يكون إلا من معلم وذلك قد كان من الله تعالى آدم ياخد الوجه المتقدمة وإن
قبل كيف علمه الأساسي كله وقد علمنا أنه ما من زمن إلا ونوه بها أصحابهم لمعنى وأبعان إنما
مختصرة وإنما متقلة إليها عن غيرها قيل قد قال بعض الناس إن كان ذلك يجري بها [كذا] علمها الله آدم
وإن أظهر في بعض الأزمنة من بعض أهلها والصحيح أن العلم في الحقيقة يتعلق بالمعرفة الأصول
المستقبلة على الفروع والمعاني الكلامية المتقطعة على الأجزاء كفرقة جوهر الإنسان والقرن والقوائين
التي تعرف بها حقيقة الشيء كفصل الضرب في الحساب وأحوال الأبعد والتقدير والهندسة
والأصول المباني [كذا] عليها المسائل [كذا] الكبيرة في الفن والكلام والتحق فنما معرفة الجريات [كذا]
متعزية عن الأصول قليلاً بل إن بقال العارف بها عالم على الإطلاق وإنما هو في معرفتها محاكاة
محاكاة البيناء بالأنفاس وإذا كان كذلك فتفهم الله آدم الأشياء كلهما إعلامه القوايين والأصول المستقلة
على الجريات [كذا] والفرع وقد علم أن تعلم الكلمات أعظم في الأجمعية وأشبى بالأمور الإليément من
تعلمه الضماي الحرف بعد الحرف وقوله الأشياء كلهما آراد به الألفاظ والمعاني مفرداتها ومركبتها وحقايها
[كذا] وذوات الأشياء في أنفسها ويثني ذاك أن الاسم يستعمل على ضربين أحدهما يحسب الوضع
الأول وذلك يقال للأنواع الثلاثة التي هي المخبر عنه والخبر والرابط بينهما وهي المعتبر عنها بالاسم
والفغال والحرف وهذا هو المرد هاهنا فإنه تعالى لم يرد بقوله وعلم آدم الأشياء كلهما تعلية رجلًا وفسأ
دون ذهب وخرج [ف.27a] ومن وعنه ولا يعرف الإنسان الاسم فيكون عارية مسما إذا عرّض عليه

Ayasofya 212: 903

Ayasofya 212: 904
لا يمكنني قراءة النص العربي. للمساعدة بجميع الطرق الممكنة، يُرجى تقديم النص باللغة الإنجليزية أو أي لغة أخرى يمكنني قراءتها بشكل طبيعي.
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